

UNIVERSITAT OBERTA DE CATALUNYA

**Reformulation of the Relationship Between Individual
Freedom and Technology Theorized through/by the Channel
of Cinematic Philosophy:**

A Research Based on

If and If Yes How

Cinematic Pieces

Can Philosophize and Theorize

on the Restriction of Individual Freedom

through/by Technology

as a Contribution of

Cinematic Philosophy

Doctoral Thesis

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Abstract

The fundamental basis of this research grounds on if and if yes how cinematic pieces can philosophize and theorize on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Regarding these grounds, to test the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, an inclusive relational formulation is introduced in order to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of the restriction of individual freedom. Subsequently, contemporary distinct individual freedom conceptions are situated within this organizational scheme with reference to the restrictive defining conditions that they propose. Correspondingly, departing from the contemporary political philosophical scene, an inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom which are asserted to encompass all contemporary conceptions are proposed. One of these types is acknowledged to be overlooked by the contemporary political philosophical scene. Therefore, in order to underline the parameters behind this novel kind of restriction, a theoretical journey setting off with Heidegger's enframing which is coupled with Foucault's 'Panopticism' and ending at Deleuze's 'Control Society' which is coupled with Deleuze & Guattari's account of 'Desire' is introduced.

Within the context of this thesis 'Cinematic Philosophy' is suggested as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, ontologically, create and manifest ideas and concepts as cinematic experiences. This signifies that cinematic philosophy implies a novel channel of philosophy in which the philosophizing and theorizing is done through the cinematic channel by solely using cinematic elements. Accordingly, the chosen cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) are acknowledged to propose each inductively established type of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Subsequently, with the objective of

revealing the potential of the cinematic pieces as philosophical pieces theoretically contributing to political philosophy, following the philosophical methodology, close reading analysis is applied to the cinematic pieces focusing on their macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements.

With reference to this analysis, it is concluded that cinematic philosophy is a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom as unique theoretical philosophical contributions of cinematic philosophy. Correspondingly, the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*. The restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *THX 1138*. The restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* and, eventually, the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series. Besides, *Nosedive*'s contribution is solely theorized by the cinematic piece itself since the restriction type that it proposes is a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, this new type of restriction forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that is derived from the *Nosedive* cinematic piece as another theoretical contribution of this research.

Key Words: Political Philosophy, Digital Culture, Cinematic Philosophy, Individual Freedom, Technology, ICT, Speculative Visual Fiction, Alphaville, THX 1138, Ex Machina, Nosedive, Black Mirror

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I have been thinking about which saying could summarize my Ph.D. journey in the most encapsulating way and I decided that it is: ***When there is a will, there is a way!***

Speaking from my heart, I can genuinely say that this journey hasn't been easy precisely because throughout the whole process I was feeling like I was on a roller coaster ride which was full of ups (joy, intellectual and emotional fulfilment, self-confidence,.. and a lot of sleepless nights due to these feelings) and full of downs (stress, chaos, confusion, failure, self-doubt... and a lot of sleepless nights due to these feelings). However, in the background of all of these feelings, the most fundamental things that kept me going were my passion and my will towards my research. That's why, following my passion and my will, I managed to create a way to conclude my Ph.D. thesis.

Before starting my research, I had two fundamental but challenging floating urges. One was somehow to test and prove the capacity of the cinematic pieces to uniquely philosophize and theorize through the cinematic channel using the cinematic elements. The other was somehow to underline the novel actions that are practiced within information and communication technologies bringing about a new kind of restriction of individual freedom which comes into being through/by cognizant individuals' freely given and choice-based consents that they provide through clicking. Yet, the inherent challenge was how to combine these two floating urges through conducting highly interdisciplinary research. However, I was so dedicated to working on this precise research but no research else because I strongly believe that 'thinking beyond' and collectively making fruitful contributions out of this beyond is really crucial to serve for making the world that we live in a more flourishing place and I strongly believe that political philosophy and the cinematic channel that uniquely serves for this philosophizing play a crucial role for this flourishing. Therefore, even if I have been

through an excessive amount of thinking, reading, and writing processes which most of the times led me into even more chaos and more sleepless nights, I have, yet again, following my will, my passion, my love and my motivation towards my research managed to overcome this inherent challenge and hopefully managed to base my research on solid academic grounds.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The foundation of this research grounds on if and if yes how cinematic pieces can philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a contribution of cinematic philosophy. The precise reasons to set the basis of this research on this foundational grounds is the consideration of the cinematic pieces to be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to introduce philosophical conceptions and theories. Correspondingly, I aim to set the primary motivation of this research to base upon testing the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Thus, this signifies that within the context of this research cinematic philosophy implies a novel channel of philosophy in which the philosophizing and theorizing is done through the cinematic channel by exclusively using the cinematic elements. Hence, the priority reason that I establish the theoretical context of my research on the relationship between individual freedom and technology is my contemplation of the diverse contemporary conceptions of individual freedom to be inadequate to capture some contemporary novel aspects that come into being due to some technological advancements while setting the defining conditions of individual freedom and setting the defining conditions of the restrictive factors of individual freedom. Subsequently, in this research, first of all, departing from the contemporary political philosophical scene which focuses on the concept of individual freedom and on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, I propose inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom and, consequently, I try to test, following the philosophical methodology through the close reading analysis, if these three types of restriction of individual freedom along with the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory are unique theoretical contributions of

the precise cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Respectively, I hypothesize that:

1. Cinematic philosophy is a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I claim, introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom: *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*. These types are unique theoretical philosophical contributions of cinematic philosophy.
2. Departing from this assertion, the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of the cinematic piece *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* (Godard, 1965). The restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of the cinematic piece *THX 1138* (Lucas, 1971). The restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of the cinematic piece *Ex Machina* (Garland, 2014) and, eventually, the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of the cinematic piece *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series (Brooker & Wright, 2016).
3. *Nosedive*'s contribution, as a contribution of cinematic philosophy, is solely theorized by the cinematic piece itself since the restriction type that it introduces is a novel type of restriction of individual freedom, which, as I assert, is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, this new type of restriction is functioning through the 'Click Consent' of the individuals and this accentuation forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory.

The fundamental departing point of this research bases upon my cinematic experience of the *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series (Brooker & Wright, 2016). Thus, my cinematic experience of the *Nosedive* episode grounding on the screening of the cinematic piece brought forth the motivation to test the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Hence, in my perception, *Nosedive* episode philosophizes on and theorizes a novel type of restriction of individual freedom, and it does this philosophizing and theorizing, as a piece of cinematic philosophy, through its cinematic experience solely by using its cinematic elements. Subsequently, this assertion motivated me to set the fundamental grounds of my

research to test, from a broader perspective, the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize because if tested and proved, there could be a novel channel of philosophy which is solely different from the traditional channels of philosophy.

I introduce this essential part of my research in the fourth chapter of my thesis but for the sake of, holistically, making sense of this research, here, primarily, I want to propose the part of my thesis in which I focus on the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Thus, in my research, I depart from connecting philosophy and fiction by proposing a fictional construction in the form of an imaginative exercise as a thought experiment and by changing some conditions of this fictional construction, I propose another fictional construction to highlight the overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom as a consequence of the intense use of and the intense exposure through/by the information and communication technologies. My fictional construction, which I also revisit in the fourth and the sixth chapter, is as it goes:

Imagine that you are physically attached to someone who automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have. Imagine that this someone constantly shares all these recordings with the public. Imagine that due to this exposure, you see a lot of people physically reaching out to you with the information that is recorded by this someone. Imagine that others constantly see you through these sharings and respectively you start to act inauthentically. For instance, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want other people to know that you are sad therefore you are acting as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have their physically attached someones' and you are constantly receiving those other's recordings as well. Imagine that you receive recordings from others in which they all start to eat sand and correspondingly you start to eat sand. In this system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, personal choices, your characteristics, what your home is like, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you have access to the same mentioned things of the other individuals. Correspondingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others concretely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to be attached to this physical being? I claim, with reference to the literature, that you wouldn't. Also, could you say that you are free in this kind of a society? I claim, yet again with reference to the literature, that you couldn't because all things considered there is constant interference and domination from the other individuals through their physically attached someones' which forms the grounds of this system.

Now, let me alter some conditions of the proposed fictional construction. Let's remove the physicality part from this society and let's make it a digital one. Let's also change this physically attached someone to your digital presence and let's think of the status of freedom again. So, imagine a society where this attached physical presence is your digital

presence which automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have. Therefore, you are constantly exposed to the public. Imagine that due to this exposure you see a lot of people digitally reaching out to you with the information that is recorded by your digital presence. For example, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want other people to know that you are sad so you are doing sharings as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have a digital presence and you are constantly receiving those other's recordings. Imagine that you receive recordings from others that they all start to eat sand and correspondingly you start to eat sand. In this system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, your characteristics, personal choices, what your home is like, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you know the same specified things of the other individuals. Accordingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others concretely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to have a digital presence? Yes, you do and apparently most of the individuals do *choose* to have a digital presence through giving 'click consent' to these recordings, sharings, control, manipulation and surveillance. Can you say that you are free in this kind of a society? In my perception, *Nosedive*, through its cinematic experience using its cinematic elements answers this question as; 'The previous theories claim that you can because they consider the restriction of individual freedom to be practiced on the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is connected to their bodies. However, you can not because there is a novel type of a restriction of individual freedom which is practiced and exercised through the digital presence of the individuals and *Nosedive* justifies its claim by revealing the 'Click Consent' theory through its cinematic experience using its cinematic elements.

Here above, I introduced a fictional construction in the form of an imaginative exercise as a thought experiment and departing from this fictional construction, by altering some conditions of it, I attempted to propose another fictional construction to highlight an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom as a consequence of the excessive use of and the excessive exposure through/by the information and communication technologies. Hence, I regularly used the word imagine precisely because I consider fictional constructions to be a product of imagination which have the capacity to raise philosophically loaded questions and arguments that eventually attend to establish the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007).

Here, I want to underline that cinematic pieces as a product of imagination are fictional constructions and are extended thought experiments. Therefore, cinematic pieces also have the capacity to establish philosophically loaded questions and arguments that ultimately attend to form the grounds of a theory. However, as Tal Shamir accentuates, moving image fiction develops a new kind of a thought experiment using multiple channels

to transfer the argument, the idea, the philosophizing (Shamir, 2016). Accordingly, the cinematic pieces, with the experience that they propose through their ontologically unique cinematic elements, which opens a door to exceed the logical demonstration and discursive argumentation, introduce new ways of thinking that seek to alter our understanding. Departing from this perception, *Nosedive* as a product of imagination is a fictional construction which has the capacity to establish philosophically loaded questions and arguments that eventually attend to form the grounds of a theory. Nonetheless, *Nosedive* proposes this theorizing as a novel kind of a thought experiment since it discloses its theorizing through its cinematic experience by using its ontologically unique cinematic elements, which eventually attends to form the grounds of the referred novel type of restriction of individual freedom and also attends to form the grounds of the 'Click Consent' theory.

What I have introduced in the first fictional construction above is the base of the journey that I present in the third chapter of this research which I set off with Heidegger's enframing and I couple this kind of an enframing with Foucault's panopticism. Hence, this journey grounds on the critique of modern disciplinary power to be excessively dependent on the bodily presence of the individuals in which the loss of individual freedom is physically experienced and individual freedom is intimately related to the physical presence of the body. Therefore, from this perspective the restriction of individual freedom is excessively related to manipulation, control and surveillance of and the interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is connected to their bodies. This kind of an emphasis, as I endorse it, is not only theorized by the philosophers that I refer to in my third chapter but also, as I claim in my fifth and sixth chapters, is theorized by the cinematic pieces *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138* and *Ex Machina*. Hence, these cinematic pieces reveal the restriction of individual freedom to be experienced through manipulation, control and surveillance of and interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is connected to their bodies. Respectively, the presence of as an external agent/factor, as I have introduced in my third chapter, in Foucault's panopticism theory, is construed either to make an incognizant agent (in a sense that she is not cognizant of these restrictions) to be controlled and/or manipulated or to make a cognizant/incognizant (in a sense that she is either cognizant or incognizant of the restrictions on her individual freedom) agent to conform to the mentioned mechanisms of power.

All of these consequences disclose distinct kinds of restriction of individual freedom which, as I underline in my thesis, are theorized by the a priori theories and by these three precise cinematic pieces as a unique contribution of cinematic philosophy. However, in each proposed case, we can not notice an agent to be cognizantly restricting her individual freedom as a consequence of internal factors. Therefore, it can be emphasized that the

novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors through/by technology* is not a consequence of panopticism regarded in the Foucauldian sense. Thus, this is the primary reason that I advance this journey that I have proposed in my third chapter with Deleuze's 'Control Society' theory. This is because Deleuze introduces a digital presence, as data doubles, that surpasses the physical presence of the individuals. Accordingly, there is a novel type of enframing functioning by the digital presence of the individuals through deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires. However, the effects of this type of an enframing does not primarily have effects on the physical presence of the individuals. Therefore, this kind of an enframing that I acknowledge as functioning through the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of individuals' desires establishes the ground of this novel type of restriction of individual freedom which, as I claim, is solely theorized by *Nosedive* through its cinematic experience as a piece of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, *Nosedive* alters some conditions of the fictional construction that I have proposed in the beginning of this section to underline an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom due to the intense use of and the intense exposure through/by the information and communication technologies.

The priority reason that I have introduced these two fictional constructions is to highlight that *Nosedive* is the cinematic piece which alters the conditions of the previous fictional construction that I proposed above. Subsequently, it surpasses the a priori theorizing either presented through traditional philosophy channels or the cinematic philosophy channel. Therefore, it surpasses the theorizing which argues that the restriction of individual freedom is intimately related to manipulation, control and surveillance of and interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is connected to their bodies. This is precisely because *Nosedive* introduces a society which solely functions through the digital presence of the individuals and which also functions through the digital dimension instead of a physical dimension. *Nosedive*, then, brings forth a motivation to surpass the panopticism theory in order to grasp the more exhaustive reading of contemporary social complexity and precisely in order to propose the most exhaustive reading of the contemporary relationship between individual freedom and technology.

This novel type of restriction of individual freedom is acknowledged to be due to the rise of information and communication technologies which surpasses the technologies that have a spatial physicality base as it is seen in the theory of Foucault and in other theories of the contemporary philosophers. However, the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies disclosed an alteration on the previously critical and negative perception towards modern technology as a consequence of the novel liberating aspects that these technologies ontologically introduced, liberating in a sense that these technologies function in the digital space which surpasses the technologies that have a

spatial physicality. This perception change towards information and communication technologies reveals an overlooked aspect on the new restrictive factors, parameters and actions of individual freedom, practiced through and by information and communication technologies.

Nosedive, as a piece of cinematic philosophy, reveals that the contemporary conceptions of 'individual freedom', and the restrictive factors that these conceptions introduce have been rendered insufficient with the advent and the rise of information and communication technologies. The priority reason behind this idea is that the novel practices that are performed, practiced and exercised within/through these technologies are not considered as restrictive factors of individual freedom due to, as I have underlined, the ontologically liberating nature dedicated to these technologies. Therefore, the advent and use of the information and communication technologies generates a necessity to revisit and redefine the X factor (the individual as an agent) and the Y factor (the restrictive conditions) of the formula which I will propose in the further part of this section and which I scrutinize in the second chapter. This necessity is, in my perception, overlooked by the contemporary political philosophical scene due to the alteration in the perception towards technology with the advent of information and communication technologies.

Nosedive by redefining the individual (X), as a data and as a digital presence, reveals that within the control societies ultimately cognizant and respectively free individuals restrict their individual freedoms', due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires, through their given 'consent' through/within the information and communication technologies. Yet, eventually cognizant individuals choose to restrict their individual freedom by exposing their digital presence which has no difference than their physical presence. It is to say that cognizant X (X that fulfils the self-realization conditions of individual freedom introduced by the literature and X that is cognizant of the restrictive elements on her individual freedom) actively participates in the restriction of her individual freedom (Y) by choosing to give consent to/through information and communication technologies which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory. Conclusively, this novel type of restriction of individual freedom and this introduced 'Click Consent' theory, then, is a unique contribution of *Nosedive* as a piece of cinematic philosophy. Thus, as I underline in my third chapter, I relate this kind of a restriction of individual freedom to Deleuze's 'Control Society' theory and Deleuze & Guattari's account of 'Desire'. Accordingly, I propose *Nosedive*, as a cinematic philosophy piece, to uniquely theorize this emphasis through its cinematic experience by using its cinematic elements. Therefore, I, as a cinematic philosopher, reveal that this type of restriction of individual freedom which forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory is the unique theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*. Here, I want to give more details on the basis of this premise in order to make the grounds of my research more explicit.

Above, I have connected philosophy with fiction by stressing that fictional narratives in the forms of imaginative constructions are philosophizing and are within the philosophical discourse. Thus, Thomas Wartenberg relates these fictional constructions in the form of imaginary scenarios with the thought experiments. He stresses the capacity of thought experiments to base upon challenging the existing perspectives by initiating philosophical reflections, raising philosophical questions, and by posing counter-arguments and bolstering a theory or forming the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007). Therefore, with consideration of the significance of the thought experiments in the political philosophy tradition, I assert that thought experiments utilize the mind as a laboratory to philosophize that eventually in some formulations can even lead to a formation of a theory. Correspondingly, thought experiments function to create clear and simplified illustrations of complex and abstract theories, concepts and ideas (Shamir, 2016; Brown & Fehige, 2010). This kind of an emphasis designates thought experiments to have a capacity, as Shamir states, to:

Bring on a crisis or at least create an anomaly in the reigning theory and so contribute to paradigm change. Thought experiments can teach us something new about the world, even though we have no new empirical data, by helping us to re-conceptualize the world in a new way (Brown & Fehige, 2010, 23). (Shamir, 2016, 92)

Thus, the mentioned capacity of the thought experiments can be transferred to any kind of a fictional construction precisely because these constructions are considered as extended elaborative thought experiments. The inherent thought here is that fictional constructions “present us with imaginary worlds that play the same role as those conjured by the narratives of thought experiments that philosophical texts are replete with from Plato’s onwards” (Wartenberg, 2011, 18).

Correspondingly, in my research, I try to integrate fictional pieces, in general, as an alternative to philosophical theories formulated in the traditional sense, to the scope of thought experiments. However, I want to underline that the general perception is set to focus on literary fiction pieces which have the capacity to philosophize. So as to say, the philosophizing is done by formulating a fictional scenario through the use of the words. Then, a literary fiction which has the capacity to provide a philosophically loaded argument has no difference than a thought experiment that is created by a philosopher in her philosophically loaded text. Yet, the focus of this thesis is to highlight the capacity of the cinematic pieces on philosophizing and theorizing. Therefore, in my research, I focus on the relationship between fictional moving images and thought experiments and I try to highlight

how the philosophizing done by cinematic fictional pieces is different from the philosophizing done by the literary fictional pieces. Therefore, for this research, it is fundamental to differentiate literary fiction and visual fiction as thought experiments precisely because their way of philosophizing is ontologically different from each other.

The ontological difference is based upon the idea that “Cinematic thought experiments are not merely confined to the experience of the mind or imagination, but happen on a screen (the screen of a movie theater, television set, computer monitor, tablet, etc.)” (Shamir, 2016, 97). Hence, what Shamir tries to propose here is that cinematic thought experiments, ontologically, are a different kind of a thought experiment with reference to a distinct multi-channel type of an engagement that they introduce. Accordingly, although it can be asserted that they introduce philosophy through fiction in the shape of thought experiments, they are beyond the traditional thought experiments and they are even beyond thought experiments in general. Subsequently, cinematic pieces as cinematic thought experiments propose a novel type of philosophizing which is ‘Cinematic Philosophy’. Hence, in order to introduce cinematic philosophy as a novel kind of philosophy which has the capacity to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, here, I want to propose how I link film and philosophy within the context of this research.

I depart from the idea that film and philosophy share one common thing which is the thought itself. That’s the primary reason why, above and also in my thesis, I connect them through thought experiments. Hence, the idea that thought is inherent to film discloses a philosophical interest in cinema and this interest reveals itself by underlining cinema’s potential as philosophy to lay on its capacity to go beyond our linguistically structured perception. However, since philosophy and philosophizing, even if they are at the core of any discipline, has been transformed into a specialized discipline and counted as just one among many disciplines with its own unique domain, with its special language, standards of success, and specified concerns (Shamir, 2016), the philosophy and philosophizing set to be practiced through linearly constructed verbal expression of the words, verbal language, expressed either orally but mostly in the written form. Correspondingly, the philosophical pieces are restricted to the verbal language. Yet, I claim that cinema is a channel that introduces a liberation from this restriction precisely because it uses distinct cinematic elements to philosophize which go beyond the verbal language. Therefore, cinematic philosophy is a distinct type of philosophy and it is as valuable as oral and written philosophy. Respectively, all the cinematic elements that are utilized in a film is a component of the philosophical idea, concept, thought that is presented by the film itself. Yet, in my perception, the capacity of cinema as a possibility of philosophy has been consistently

overlooked concretely because of the non-linguistically present elements of the cinema itself.

The cinematic philosophy that I endorse in this research not only functions through the words but also functions through framing, editing, colors, sound, light, plot, acting, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, movements and as well as the empathy it evokes for its characters and story that belong to the cinematic medium. Respectively, it can be claimed that the cinematic pieces propose, create and manifest ideas and concepts as cinematic experiences through the cinematic language. Here, the crucial point is to understand the philosophical wisdom of the cinematic piece and place it within a theoretical context which, then, can unfold layers of knowledge that can help orient us and help us to fathom the world in which we live. As Shamir underlines:

Whether or not an archeologist analyzes a stone and places it in the context of an archeological theory, the stone stays the same stone. And whether or not a cinematic philosopher analyzes a film and places it in the context of a philosophical theory, the film stays the same film. (Shamir, 2016, 166)

Accordingly, the cinematic philosopher's motivation is to connect the film itself and the experience of it to the context of philosophy. Correspondingly, as a cinematic philosopher, in this research, I focus on the piece itself and focus on how this piece itself evokes philosophical ideas. Accordingly, I try to reveal the potential of the films as philosophical pieces contributing to philosophy. However, this contribution is based upon the cinematic elements rather than the elements belonging to traditional philosophy. Thus, films are most commonly acknowledged as non-philosophical and respectively they are acknowledged to become philosophical when they are situated within a priori defined theories. Yet, what I endorse as cinematic philosophy grounds on the cinematic pieces which are philosophical within their own immanent processes and these processes have the potential of theory being an a posteriori consequence of the film itself. In short, cinematic philosophy, as I endorse it, tries to overcome the perception that "there has yet to be an idea identified as philosophical in film which bears no resemblance with any current written philosophy" (Mullarkey, 2009, 16). Subsequently, from this perspective there is no theoretical or conceptual superiority of traditional philosophy over cinematic philosophy. This underlining introduces a possibility of transforming philosophy through its encounter with the cinematic channel. As expressed, "Film and philosophy become partners in a 'thinking dialogue'; a transformative engagement that helps elaborate the philosophy immanent within particular films, while prompting philosophy to respond creatively to the kind of thinking that cinema allows us to experience" (Carel & Tuck, 2011, 36). Therefore, the potential of film as a piece of philosophy base upon

its moments composed of the multiplicity of elements that when holistically combined and evaluated establishes the grounds of the philosophical potential of the films. Correspondingly, there is the becoming philosophical of the film itself which stands against any singular and reductive theorization of its philosophical being (Mullarkey, 2009, 11). This is because the films that are philosophical pieces themselves introduce their own theorization as a novel kind of philosophy which is the experience of the novel philosophical ideas, concepts and theories. This new kind of a philosophy, cinematic philosophy, introduces possible new ways of thinking. Then, the film, as a combination of unique cinematic elements, evolves into thinking moving images. As Deleuze talks on the French New wave filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard “Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking” (Deleuze, 2004, 141). Accordingly, the cinematic philosophy that I advocate in this research introduces cinematic pieces as a process of cinematic thinking which positively contribute arguments and ideas not yet thinkable by the traditional philosophy alone just because of the ontological nature of a new type of thinking that the cinematic pieces introduce.

Departing from this consideration, in this research, I try to test if the cinematic pieces can be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to propose philosophical conceptions and theories. Correspondingly, I intend to reveal the potential of the films as philosophical pieces contributing to philosophy as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Thus, in this thesis, I am trying to be the mentioned cinematic philosopher by locating precise films as pieces of cinematic philosophy within the theoretical context of individual freedom and technology through which I assert that the inductively established distinct types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology is the theoretical contribution of these pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, here I want to give more details on how I propose and construct these inductively established types of restriction of individual freedom in my research so that I can test if and if yes how cinematic pieces can philosophize on and theorize these types of restriction of individual freedom.

The priority reason that I establish the theoretical context of my research to the relationship between individual freedom and technology is my contemplation of the diverse contemporary conceptions of individual freedom to be inadequate to capture some contemporary novel aspects that come into being due to some technological advancements while setting the defining conditions of individual freedom. Correspondingly, in the second chapter of my thesis, I try to highlight the diverse conceptions of individual freedom with reference to the specific elements that they set as defining conditions of the notion. In order to do this, I dedicate a comprehensive reading of these distinct conceptions and I try to underline their inadequacy with reference to the restrictive factors that they propose as a

reflection of the defining conditions that they set on the individual freedom concept. Hence, to encapsulate the fundamental defining elements of the restriction of individual freedom in a more organized way, I introduce an inductively established relational formulation on the restriction of individual freedom and I re-situate the conceptions that I referred to with reference to the restrictive conditions that they have as a component of their defining conditions. Thus, the objective of this proposal is to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of the restriction of individual freedom and to situate these distinct conceptions within this organizational scheme. I depart from MacCallum's triadic relational formulation while establishing the formula of restriction of individual freedom which is as MacCallum states:

X is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z, "x ranges over agents, y ranges over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance. (MacCallum, 1967, 314)

Here, there are X, Y and Z parameters to be included as the defining elements of individual freedom in conceptual terms. Since, my formulation is based upon the restriction of individual freedom, the priority is dedicated to the agents and the limiting conditions. Therefore, the defining elements of the restriction of individual freedom that I use in my formulation are X and Y parameters and I integrate the Z element of MacCallum's formulation to the X and Y elements of my formulation. My formulation is as it goes:

The restriction of Individual freedom of X by Y

Here, X principally is the individual (the agent), since the scope of this thesis is set on the notion of individual freedom and Y ranges over principally the limiting conditions of the individual freedom of X. However, I add an essential parameter to the X element of my formulation which is also the touch that I integrate the Z element to it. The fundamental reason behind this attempt is the objective of setting the defining conditions of my formulation to inductively encapsulate all the scope of the contemporary conceptions of the restriction of individual freedom. The value-based parameter that I include to the X element of the formulation is being *cognizant or incognizant*. Within the context of this thesis, cognizant is considered as being aware which is inferred to inductively represent the distinct positive conceptions of individual freedom which are set on the ranges of the term variables that are grounded on the 'real' identities of the agents whose freedom is in question. Hence, this kind of a value-based parameter is also set according to whether individuals are

cognizant of the restrictive factors or incognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom. Ultimately, if all elements are acknowledged, there are four possibilities on the restriction of individual freedom:

- (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*
- (4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

I situate distinct contemporary conceptions of individual freedom within the taxonomy that I propose. As I highlight in the second chapter, I consider the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion of individual freedom along with the option-based conceptions to be an instance of either (1) or (2) and (1) and (2) with reference to the restrictive conditions that they propose as defining factors of their conception of individual freedom. Thus, I locate some of these conceptions in the formula as *X simpliciter* and some of them as *cognizant X*. Yet, these accounts assign the focus to the Y element as a restrictive factor of individual freedom. Accordingly, all of these conceptions of individual freedom that I involve within the scope of this research fall under either instance (1) or instance (2) and instances (1) and (2). It is to say that instances (1) and (2) encompass the option-based conceptions and all the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion. On the other hand, all of the conceptions that have a positive understanding of the notion along with the conception as ownness dedicate their focus to the X factor and endorse that the priority condition of individual freedom is to be cognizant, however construed. Therefore, ontologically, a cognizant X is free. Correspondingly, if X is an incognizant agent then there are some internal factors that restrict her individual freedom. I acknowledge these kinds of conceptions of individual freedom as an instance of (3) since they prioritize X element which is directly related to the internal factors.

Here, I presume that the contemporary literature on individual freedom, in conceptual terms, does not give a space for a cognizant agent to be in the position of restricting her individual freedom. As a contribution of this research, I propose a novel type of restriction of individual freedom as an instance of (4) which is the *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*. As I emphasize in my research, almost all of the conceptions that have a positive understanding of the notion focus on the X element of the formulation that I introduce. However, since they acknowledge freedom as the achievement of a cognizant X, any state of X which is not cognizant (incognizant), is a state of non-freedom. This state of non-freedom is a consequence of some internal restrictions. Therefore, cognizant X can not have internal restrictions and if X has internal restrictions,

then X is by default incognizant. As it is blatantly seen, there is no space for a cognizant X to have internal factors that restrict her individual freedom. However, cognizant agents, considered as being cognizant, can restrict their individual freedoms due to some internal factors. This is a matter of instance which is overlooked by the literature concretely because of the perception that base upon the prioritization of minimal but in most cases more than minimal level of reason as a necessity inherent to contemporary culture. Correspondingly, a cognizant agent who has a minimal level of reason, is construed as an individual that, by nature, would not choose to restrict her individual freedom in any case. However, due to some parameters and practices deep-rooted in contemporary societies, cognizant agents, cognizant in a sense that they fulfil the minimal rationality conditions in conceptual terms, restrict their individual freedoms due to some internal factors.

As I endorse in my research, this kind of a restriction became blatant due to the advent of the information and communication societies. Here, the fundamental point is that individuals, although they fulfil the self-realization conditions set by contemporary literature as the defining conditions of individual freedom, and accordingly, although they are cognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom, restrict their individual freedom through/by some internal factors. Therefore, the *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)* can be incorporated into the literature as a new kind of a restriction of individual freedom. Subsequently, my claim is that contemporary conceptions of 'individual freedom', and the restrictive factors that these conceptions introduce have been rendered inadequate with the advent and the rise of information and communication technologies. The priority reason behind this idea is that the novel practices that are performed, practiced and experienced within/through these technologies are not acknowledged as restrictive factors of individual freedom due to the ontologically liberating nature dedicated to these technologies. Although, as I have already mentioned, the advent and use of the information and communication technologies generated a necessity to revisit and redefine the X factor (the individual) and the Y factor (the restrictive conditions) of the formula that I introduce. This necessity is, in my perception, overlooked by the contemporary political philosophical scene as a consequence of the change in the perception towards technology with the advent of information and communication technologies. Therefore, my aim and my objective is to underline the effects of this change on individual freedom, especially on the restrictive factors of individual freedom in order to indicate the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies which I eventually acknowledge to trigger a novel kind of a restriction of individual freedom. For this reason, in the third chapter of this research, I try to incorporate this novel type of *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* into the literature by offering a detailed analysis on the

relationship between individual freedom and technology. My aim in the third chapter is to indicate the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of information and communication technologies which I eventually consider as triggering this new kind of restriction of individual freedom.

In the third chapter, I present a reading starting from the critical perception towards technology within the contemporary debates ending at the critical analysis of the information and communication technologies which I ultimately acknowledge to form the grounds of the proposed novel kind of restriction of individual freedom. Hence, I consider this novel type of restriction of individual freedom to be a consequence of the rise of information and communication technologies which surpasses the technologies that have a spatial physicality ground. I propose this consideration in my research to be seen in the theory of Foucault and in other theories of the contemporary philosophers. However, I claim that the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies revealed an alteration on the previously critical and negative perception towards modern technology due to the novel liberating aspects that these technologies ontologically proposed, liberating in a sense that these technologies function in the digital space which is beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality. This perception towards information and communication technologies discloses an overlooked aspect on the novel restrictive factors, parameters and actions of individual freedom experienced through/by information and communication technologies. Therefore, one of the primary motivations and objectives of the third chapter is to scrutinize the relationship between individual freedom and technology and to scrutinize the influence of technology as a restrictive factor on the freedom of the individuals. Correspondingly, in my third chapter, I depart from the technological enframing introduced by Heidegger and I couple this enframing to Foucault's critique of modern disciplinary power that I assert through the 'Panopticism' concept that he introduces. The reason to set the focus of this discussion within this framework is my consideration of the critique of modern disciplinary power and precisely my consideration of the panopticism theory to be exclusively related to the individual freedom context.

In my thesis, I claim that modern disciplinary power has an intense effect on the freedom of the individuals both internally since it involves the control and manipulation of the mind and externally since it involves the manipulation of the body. This precise emphasis bolsters the perspective towards modern technology to be functioning as restricting individual freedom. Hence, Heidegger and Foucault both share the perspective that the technological structures which pervade within modern society determine the individuals by objectifying and ordering the forces of life (Heidegger, 1954 [1977]; Foucault, 1977 [1979]). Within this picture, individuals are acknowledged to be the essential manipulable resources for the functioning and the technological management of modern society (Rayner, 2001).

This accentuation is observed in the thought of Heidegger through the critique of technological enframing and in the thought of Foucault through the critique of modern disciplinary power. Thus, Heidegger's handling of enframing bases upon entities which are revealed according to their potential use value. These entities according to Foucault are 'docile bodies' confined through power relations as Heidegger's enframed people (Van Cooten, 2019). Although enframing can be contemplated as one mood of subjection of the disciplinary power as Foucault asserts, there is an analogy between the two philosophers on the handling of the issue. According to Foucault this confinement through power relations grounds on "the infinitesimal government of the individual in the name of freedom" (Newman, 2017, 10). As Foucault underlines this kind of a control is a consequence of the disciplinary power. Thus, the inquiry of the attributed power cannot be reduced to the critical analysis of the government, the system of law and legal forms of repression. The inquiry of this type of power must extend to the critical analysis of the modes of organizing knowledge and disciplining bodies through which the state apparatuses may co-opt and employ the production of subjects. Therefore, it is critical to scrutinize this type of power and these mechanisms of control in order to fully grasp the contemporary shadowing parameters of individual freedom. Consequently, the fundamental focus in this research is to scrutinize the acknowledged kind of a shadowing of freedom through technology which consequently is endorsed as restricting the freedom of the individuals. This emphasis that Foucault dedicates to the body of the individuals is intimately related to individual freedom notion, since the scope of the individual freedom concept is exceedingly grounds on the physical actions of the individuals either motivated through external factors or internal factors. Therefore, the spatio-temporal management of the body through technology, affirmed in the Foucauldian sense, is highly referent on the status of freedom of the individuals.

Foucault asserts that this handling of spatio-temporal management of the body functions through the panoptic design. Therefore, according to Foucault, from a broader perspective, panopticon is a governance technique which grounds on controlling the overlap of subject and discourse (Basturk, 2017). Thus, Foucault's panopticism assigns Bentham's idea of panopticon as a prototype in which discipline, normalization and surveillance come together (Jespersen et al, 2007). The referred panopticism according to Foucault is the reality of contemporary society, a prison-like society, in which panopticism as a technique along with other techniques serves for the functioning of the disciplinary power. As asserted:

Disciplinary power comprises a series of means including drills, constant reports, testing, regulation, and surveillance. Among these means, surveillance plays a prominent part as a kind of 'visibility instrument' that ensures control of the individual. Disciplinary power thus mainly exercises its power through the gaze, more

specifically the all-seeing eye” (Jespersen et al, 2007, 112). Thus, from this aspect “surveillance, then, is the seeking of the standardization point for adapting individual to the subject that power requires. (Basturk, 2017, 4)

This kind of surveillance is acknowledged to be exercised and practiced in a certain spatio-temporal dimension since the subjectification demands the observation of the body. Correspondingly, the confinement spaces through surveillance are the physical spaces of discursive productions of power (Basturk, 2017).

Foucault refers to self-discipline as a consequence of the micro mechanisms of power exercised and practiced through technology. The fundamental point here is the presence (actual/modal) of an external factor which assigns the observed to self-discipline herself. Thereupon, this external presence as micro mechanisms of power, triggers some internal factors that lead to self-discipline. Eventually, Foucault’s panopticism through the Foucauldian sense of technology suggests that external and internal factors are in effect of the restriction of individual freedom. One fundamental point within the context of this research is how cognizant these agents are of these self-disciplining processes. Hence, the presence of the observer is considered either to make a cognizant/incognizant agent to conform to the mentioned mechanisms of power as an external factor or is construed to make an incognizant agent (incognizant since she is not aware of the restrictions) to self-discipline herself as an internalized factor. Both of these consequences disclose distinct kinds of restriction of individual freedom. Nonetheless, in all of the proposed cases, we can not acknowledge an agent to be cognizantly restricting her individual freedom due to internal factors triggered by the mentioned aspects. Therefore, it can be asserted that the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors through/by technology* is not a consequence of panopticism acknowledged in the Foucauldian sense.

This inference brings forth a motivation to go beyond Foucault’s panopticism theory in order to grasp the more comprehensive reading of contemporary social complexity and precisely in order to propose the most comprehensive reading of the contemporary relationship between individual freedom and technology. Hence, I acknowledge this novel type of restriction of individual freedom to be a consequence of the rise of information and communication technologies which goes beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality ground as it is seen in the theory of Foucault and in other theories of the contemporary philosophers. That’s the precise reason why, in the third chapter, I attempt to go beyond Foucault’s panopticism. As I propose in my third chapter, in my perception, the rationale behind the positive reading of information and communication technologies ground on the insufficiency of the panopticism theory to encapsulate the non-physical nature of

these technologies since Foucault's proposal prioritizes micro mechanism of power to rely on enclosures, be they material, cultural or psychical. Therefore, the liberation from the enclosure through the digital is acknowledged as a liberation from the surveillance, control and domination that these micro mechanisms of power enforce. Yet, for many philosophers the technological innovations that information and communication technologies brought to contemporary societies fundamentally alter the organization, practice and effects of power, control and surveillance relationships. Respectively, a necessity emerges to go beyond Foucault's panopticism.

Among all these thinkers, in my research, I precisely focus on Deleuze and his theory of 'Control Society' because, in my perspective, he proposes a comprehensive reading on how surveillance and control is functioning within the digital technologies ruled societies and how this kind of functioning restricts the freedom of the (cognizant) individuals (Deleuze, 1995). Deleuze goes beyond Foucault's theory by asserting that the operation of these mechanisms is no longer confined to the institutional work of standardization of the bodies through knowledge and power. Thus, these mechanisms do not inhabit a material/physical space but a digital space which is not dependent on the body of the individuals but dependent on the digital presence of the individuals. Respectively, there is a shift from discipline societies which function through the power relying on enclosures be they material, cultural or psychical to control societies which function through the power relying on the precise digital mobility of the individuals. Here, what Deleuze affirms is that within the mood of panoptic discipline, the individual bodies are marked by signatures and numbers. Yet, with the numerical language of control, the individual bodies transfer into information that is marked by codes which dissolves the mass-individual pair. Therefore, individuals have become 'dividuals' and masses, samples, data, markets or 'banks (Deleuze, 1995). In the societies of control individuals by doubling as a code and as an information transfer into 'dividuals'. Thus, within control societies the panoptic gaze does not function through seeing but through the mode of ordering information. Additionally, in the control societies, the surveillance apparatus does not operate through the bodies or minds but on the information about the bodies and the minds. Correspondingly, the object of control is the digital representation of the body (Schleusener, 2018).

According to Deleuze, the dismantling of the Foucaudian panopticism generates "new freedoms, while at the same time contributing to mechanisms of control as rigorous as the harshest confinement" (Deleuze, 1995, 178). As Deleuze asserts, these underlined new freedoms emerge as a consequence of the advent of information and communication technologies which introduce the kind of practices that the individuals freely choose to participate in. Thus, individuals attend and contribute to the mechanisms of surveillance and control themselves. Correspondingly, "one can surf the Internet 'infinitely and freely' and yet

be perfectly controlled” (Schleusener, 2018, 183). Therefore, the one essential defining condition inherent to the control societies is the willing participation of the surveilled individuals. This highlighted significance of the willing participation of the individuals in the digital space couples control with two interrelated actions. The primary action practiced and exercised by the individuals is to choose whether to provide or deny sharing their data and the following action is, if shared, exploitation of this data. Subsequently, control societies function through capturing the desires, the creativity and the uniqueness of the individuals’. This kind of an underlining, generates new forms of surveillance which surpasses panopticism and which ground on the active and freely chosen participation of the individuals. The surveillance system here is without walls, windows, towers or guards. Therefore, “the ‘voluntary’ surrender of privacy performed by millions of Internet users who ‘publicly’ share their ‘private’ data, experiences, preferences, and particularities” (Schleusener, 2018, 177). Respectively, these technologies propose a different kind of violation of privacy, restriction of individual freedom which emerges by the free choice-based actions of the users of these technologies.

Deleuze affirms that information is “the controlled system of orderwords that are used in a given society.. enables a ‘free’ but nonetheless ‘perfectly controlled’ movement” (Deleuze, 1998, 18). Here, what he tries to highlight is that within the control societies subjection no longer belongs to a specific enclosure to be performed, instead subjection constitutes an outside “which is farther away than any external world and even any form of exteriority, and which, henceforth, also becomes infinitely closer and deeper than any form of interiority as well” (Deleuze, 1988a, 86). This is so as to say, the subjection that is practiced and experienced within information and communication technologies function through the interiority of the individuals themselves by the free and choice-based actions that they practice.

The crucial point here is how the mentioned control functions within this domain and the answer is that the control functions through the individuals becoming legible by their participation within these technologies. The concrete control attributed here encourages the expression of individuality and identity which is bolstered by the share of idiosyncrasies and eccentricities. Therefore, the control suggests unprecedented freedom experienced within the digital spaces (Flaxman, 2018). Departing from accentuation, the practice of this unprecedented freedom grounds on the ‘desire to see’ and a ‘desire to be seen’. In this regard, as Schleusener states:

The desire to become “all-seeing, all-knowing” (Eggers, 2014, 71) – the impulse to constantly ‘check everything,’ from emails and social media to physical activity and

calorie consumption – is not just related to ‘self-entrepreneurship’ (Bröckling, 2007) and the Deleuzian notion of ‘self-modulation. (Schleusener, 2018, 194)

Hence, this can also be acknowledged as a symptom of the loss of individual freedom in a sense that individuals by being watched and by watching through the participatory actions that they perform within these technologies, attribute a justification to the external surveillance and data exploitation. This kind of a bottom-up manifestation of contemporary surveillance which is grounded on the desire to always participate, blurs the boundaries between desire and compulsion, so as to say inner-directedness and outer-directedness (Schleusener, 2018). As Deleuze offers, human actors in control societies participate in the mechanisms of control themselves, by constantly participating within these technologies which leads to a complete visibility (Deleuze, 1995). The one essential point is that the complete visibility here is not to ensure complete control by the external agents as in Foucault’s panopticism but rather it is the agent’s own deepest desire which guides the free actions of the agent. Correspondingly, unlike the panoptic society in which bodies are subjectified and controlled by the power processes, in the control society which functions through the digital spaces, individuals willingly participate in the subjectification and control in order to make their beings meaningful. Deleuze couples this underlined control society with the technical machines of a given milieu which, as he asserts, functions by and through the desires. Hence, he introduces the defining characteristics of control as the continuous system of modulation and he asserts ‘dividuals’ of control society, that is parts of selves, affects, desires, which are identified, addressed and controlled by means of samples and data, actively participate in this continuous system of modulation (Beckman, 2018).

As to Deleuze, desire comes first and structures all relations and desire, assembled from the social field, disseminates power relations (Deleuze, 2006a). Respectively, control occurs in all facets of society through/by the active participation of the dividuals and the collective desire for more freedom leads to dispersed but extensive forms of control (Gilge, 2015). Subsequently, Deleuze and Guattari affirm that desires motivate and animate behavior and they precisely scrutinize how control societies which function through constant process of rearrangements transform desires to interests and actions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]; Kozinets et al., 2016). This type of an asserted complex system consists of the assemblage of machines operated by desires connected to other machines through ‘territories’. Hence, for Deleuze and Guattari these territories are unfixed spaces assembled through the continuous process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization (Erol, 2020). These specified processes are the power processes through which desiring machines connect and disconnect assembling a continuous process of deterritorialization

and reterritorialization (De Souza-Leao & Costa, 2018). According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is through these processes that the power interiorizes itself within the individuals and accordingly subjectivities of each desiring machine are produced by another's production of products, with desire displaying itself through a productive unconscious regulated by connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]; Erol, 2020).

Unlike the panoptic societies which operate through the docile subjects that it produces, control societies function through individuals expressing their desires (Basturk, 2017). This type of an expression of desires and of pure individuality is the primary and fundamental source of the continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Subsequently, these power processes function through capturing the impulsion inside of individuals. Hence, these processes' function "by capturing the desire (potential form of being) and re-nominate it to another plane" (Basturk, 2017, 6). Therefore, power becomes an extension of the individual impulsions. Departing from this accentuation for Deleuze and Guattari power is not external to the subjects but is rooted on the internal (Deleuze, 1988b). Correspondingly, control societies function through handling of this power by the deterritorialization of the desires and reterritorialization of these desires within the continuous system of modulations. In short, the Control Society's primary and fundamental functioning forces are the individuals themselves and their desires. This emphasis assigns individuals and their subjectivity to be essential for the functioning of the referred processes.

Situating Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire in the context of information and communication technologies, it can be asserted that these technologies are the spaces to experience this kind of a liberation from the inner repression of desires and from the rationalized bureaucratic society. Subsequently, within control societies which functions through the circulation of information, desiring machines are acknowledged as being able to fully express their individuality, their identity, their differences, their idiosyncrasies and their eccentricities in a way encouraged by the control itself (Beckman, 2018; Erol, 2020). However, although control seems to offer a space in which to exercise limitless freedom, the apparent exercise of an immense freedom is just the desiring machines participating within these technologies as a reflection of the desire displaying itself through a productive unconscious regulated by connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses (Erol, 2020). The fundamental point here is that these choice-based actions which are practiced by the willing participation of the individuals are considered to be the reflection of the wild chaos of the passionate creative energy and the desires. However, this willing participation within the control societies is also considered to lead to a kind of control emerging as an immanent process of rechanneling of turbulent flows. This is a new type of control that leads to a loss of individual freedom. Hence, this kind of a loss of individual freedom is distinct from the

other three types of restriction of individual freedom that I propose in the second chapter precisely because individuals are cognizant of this kind of a loss but still choose to actively participate in the process of this loss due to the underlined internal factors related to desire. Consequently, it can be affirmed that the advent and use of the information and communication technologies reveals a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*. Thus, as I emphasized previously, I assert that this kind of a restriction of individual freedom, along with the other types of restrictions of individual freedom that I have proposed, is a theoretical contribution of a cinematic piece as a piece of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, here, I want to give more details on how I test my assertion within the context of this research.

As I emphasize throughout my research, one of the prominent objectives of this thesis is to test the capacity of the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy to theorize the inductively established three types of restriction of individual freedom that I introduce in the second chapter along with the inductively established novel kind of restriction of individual freedom which forms the base the 'Click Consent' theory. Consequently, here, I want to highlight the significance of cinematic philosophy on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Hence, in this research, as a cinematic philosopher, I focus on the cinematic pieces themselves and focus on if and if yes how these pieces ontologically evoke philosophical thinking on the mentioned relationship. Correspondingly, in my research, I unfold these chosen piece's philosophical wisdom and situate them within a theoretical context which in my perception reveals layers of knowledge on the relationship between freedom and technology and contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way.

Respectively, I affirm that every piece that I analyze, through the cinematic elements that they have, introduces one type of restriction of individual freedom independent from the a priori theoretical literature. Thus, as I claim, the first three types of restriction of individual freedom have commonalities with the a priori philosophical theories and the fourth type of restriction of individual freedom is the unique neglected type of restriction of individual freedom that is proposed by none of the a priori theories but solely by the cinematic piece itself. The point here is that even the restriction types have similarities with the a priori theoretical literature, as I endorse, the pieces propose these types in a uniquely cinematic way through the cinematic elements and this ontologically makes their contribution to be different than the orally and textually proposed theories. Subsequently, I offer cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces propose the inductively established three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy along with the novel kind of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology which forms the ground of the

'Click Consent' theory also as a philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy. In order to test my hypotheses, I focus on four cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series)¹ themselves and focus on if and if yes how these pieces evoke philosophical thinking on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. As I have already stated, I acknowledge these cinematic pieces to independently include the theory itself on the restriction of individual freedom and as a cinematic philosopher my role is to test if these pieces are capable of theorizing the types of restriction individual freedom that I introduce and if yes, my role is to reveal the theorizing that they propose.

In the fifth chapter, following the philosophical methodology, I apply the close reading analysis to these precise cinematic pieces by focusing on if and how these pieces evoke philosophical insights and propose philosophical theories, through the cinematic channel using the cinematic elements, on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom. Correspondingly, I apply the close reading analysis following the novel cinematic philosophical approach which is based upon the revelation of the cinematic elements that are deep-rooted in the cinematic pieces. Thus, I acknowledge these cinematic elements to serve for the philosophizing and theorizing that the precise cinematic pieces propose. Therefore, within the context of this research, I set my unit of analysis to the macrostructure of the cinematic pieces which consists of the cinematic elements such as of the theme, story, plot, characters, the various elements of film language as used in the film, and its composition etc. which add up to provide the 'meaning' and the microstructure of the cinematic pieces which consists of framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, eventually, consists of individual shots, fragments of picture and sound to the arrangement of these fragments into scenes. Accordingly, I apply the close reading methodology to macrostructural cinematic elements and to microstructural cinematic elements when holistically evaluated reveal the theory itself as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

I treat my observations as a data set built through multiple views and reviews of the cinematic pieces and through the constant referencing and modification of my notes with a detailed attention given to the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements. Correspondingly, I pay an extensive attention to any cinematic element that serves for the philosophizing which is proposed within these cinematic pieces which I consider as eventually theorizing the distinct types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology. Subsequently, within the context of my research, following the philosophical methodology approach I intend to analyze the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic

¹ In the fourth chapter, I dedicate a detailed explanation on why I choose these precise cinematic pieces to apply the close reading methodology in order to test the hypotheses of this research.

philosophy (as an extension of the thought experiments) to test if they philosophize on and theorize the types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology (as to test the conceptual scheme that I have proposed). Accordingly, in the fifth chapter, I apply the close reading analysis to mentioned precise cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series), in order to test and reveal the theorizing that they introduce on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

In the sixth chapter of my research, I underline that every cinematic piece that I applied the close reading methodology in the fifth chapter, through its cinematic experience by its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements, theorize one type of restriction of individual freedom independent from the a priori theoretical literature as a contribution of cinematic philosophy. This, within the context of this research, signifies (as the tested hypotheses of my research, accordingly, as results):

1. Cinematic philosophy is a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom: *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*. These types are unique theoretical philosophical contributions of cinematic philosophy.
2. (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, in a sense that all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *Alphaville*, the individual freedom of the incognizant residents of Alphaville is restricted by the internalized transformation, manipulation and control applied by the supercomputer, Alpha 60, functioning as an external factor.
(2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is theoretical contribution of *THX 1138* in a sense that all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *THX 1138*, the individual freedom of some cognizant agents but especially of cognizant THX 1138 is restricted by propaganda, surveillance, manipulation, control and force employed by the system which is solely ruled according to the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers as an external factor.

(3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* in a sense that all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *Ex Machina*, Caleb is incognizant of the manipulation he is exposed to by Ava (Humanoid A.I) due to his emotions such as love, attraction and compassion, as internal factors, which eventually are the primary parameters restricting his individual freedom.

(4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series in a sense that all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *Nosedive*, Lacie and the other participants of the proposed preeminent digital media platform willingly choose to participate within this platform due to their internal cravings, as internal factors, manifested as their territorialized desires to have a high ranked digital presences even if they are cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to their lives.

3. *Nosedive's* contribution, as a contribution of cinematic philosophy, is solely theorized by the cinematic piece itself since the restriction type that it proposes is a novel type of restriction of individual freedom, which, as I assert, is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, this new type of restriction functions through the 'Click Consent' of the individuals which forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I derive from *Nosedive* cinematic piece.

Here, I want to, briefly, underline the contributions of my research, which I emphasize in the sixth chapter, departing from the results of my research that I share above. Thus, in the second chapter of my thesis, I locate distinct contemporary conceptions as theories of restriction of individual freedom within the taxonomy that I proposed. Correspondingly, I emphasize that I assign the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion of individual freedom along with the option-based conceptions as an instance of either (1)² or (2)³ and (1) and (2) with reference to the restrictive conditions that they propose as defining factors of their conception of individual freedom. Here, I want to incorporate *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* as being an instance of (1) since the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution and I want to incorporate *THX 1138* as an instance of (2) since the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution. On the other hand, I assign all of the conceptions that have a positive

² (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*

³ (2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*

understanding of the notion along with the conception as ownness as an instance of (3)⁴ since they prioritize the X element which is directly related to the internal factors. Here, I want to incorporate *Ex Machina* as an instance of (3) since the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution.

The point here is that even if the restriction types that the cinematic pieces introduce have similarities with the a priori theoretical literature, the pieces propose these types in a uniquely cinematic philosophical way and this ontologically makes their contribution to be different than the theories proposed as pieces of traditional philosophy. Accordingly, the theories on the restriction of individual freedom that these cinematic pieces propose are unique philosophical contributions of these cinematic pieces since they use distinct cinematic elements to philosophize and theorize which go beyond traditional philosophizing and theorizing. Subsequently, these pieces' contribution grounds on the cinematic philosophizing and theorizing rather than traditional philosophizing and theorizing. Therefore, these cinematic pieces as cinematic philosophy pieces contribute unique theories which are equal to the theories that are introduced as pieces of traditional philosophy. Consequently, *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138* and *Ex Machina* by philosophizing on and theorizing these precise types of restriction of individual freedom through their cinematic experience using their cinematic elements propose a transformation of philosophy through its encounter with the cinematic channel. Eventually, these cinematic pieces introduce each type of restriction of individual freedom as a unique philosophical theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Yet again, I intend to highlight here that the contemporary literature on individual freedom, in conceptual terms, does not give a space for cognizant agents to be in the position of restricting their individual freedom. As another contribution of this research, I propose *Nosedive* cinematic piece to be an instance of (4)⁵ which is the unique neglected type of restriction of individual freedom that is proposed by none of the a priori theories but solely by the *Nosedive* cinematic piece itself. Therefore, the kind of restriction that *Nosedive* proposes is distinct from the other types of restrictions of individual freedom that are proposed by the referred cinematic pieces. This is concretely because the other types of restrictions that the other cinematic pieces introduce are somehow theorized through other channels of philosophy. Yet, the restriction that *Nosedive* proposes, as I emphasize throughout this research, is completely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, *Nosedive*, as a piece of cinematic philosophy, not only introduces a unique theoretical contribution to the political philosophical scene by theorizing *the restriction of*

⁴ (3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

⁵ (4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology but also originally contributes this unique type of a restriction of individual freedom to the philosophical theoretical scene. I acknowledge and propose this novel type of restriction to be functioning through the 'Click Consent' of the individuals. Respectively, *Nosedive* as a cinematic philosophy piece, by introducing this novel type of restriction of individual freedom, forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory. Correspondingly, *Nosedive*, departing from the linkage that I introduce between this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom and Deleuze's 'Control Society' theory and Deleuze & Guattari's account of 'desire' (Basturk, 2017), reveals this type of restriction of individual freedom to be a consequence of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of desires belonging to the desiring machines, shaped by the power processes, experienced and practiced within the control societies through/by information and communication technologies (Erol, 2020). Thus, within the control societies ultimately cognizant and correspondingly free individuals restrict their individual freedoms, due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of desires, through their given 'consent' within these technologies. Departing from this accentuation, I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from the *Nosedive* episode, the 'Click Consent' theory which is:

'Click Consent' theory: Any action taken within/through information and communication technologies grounded on the consent of individuals is not considered as a restriction of individual freedom. However, due to the non-oppressive and non-imposed territorialization of desires, as internal factors, in the 'Control Societies', cognizant agents restrict their individual freedoms' through/by their freely given and their choice-based 'click' consents.

Consequently, in this thesis, departing from the results of my research, cinematic philosophy is proved to be a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I emphasized, ontologically, introduce each type of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy to the political philosophical scene. Correspondingly, *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*. *The restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *THX 1138*. *The restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* and, eventually, *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*. Moreover, *Nosedive's* contribution, as a contribution of cinematic philosophical piece, is solely theorized by the piece itself since this

novel type of restriction of individual freedom is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Accordingly, *Nosedive*, as a cinematic philosophy piece, by proposing this new type of restriction of individual freedom forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory. Subsequently, the contribution of this research, in the first place, is that cinematic philosophy, departing from the theoretical literature that underlines the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize, is a neglected and accordingly a novel channel of philosophy which has the capacity to theorize and philosophize in general. Yet, since I set the scope of my thesis to be established on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, this research focuses on the philosophizing and theorizing that is proposed through/by this novel channel of philosophy on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology. Correspondingly, *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138* and *Ex Machina* theorize the inductively established three types of restriction of individual freedom as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophical pieces. Furthermore, *Nosedive* theorizes not only an inductively established but also a novel type of restriction of individual freedom along with the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from *Nosedive* as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Chapter 2

The Concept of Individual Freedom

In this chapter, I aim to review and analyze the differing contemporary conceptions of freedom and the restrictive elements that these conceptions nominate in an exploratory nature from an individual freedom perspective. Consequently, in order to grasp and situate these conceptions in a more organized way, I will propose an inductively established relational formulation. The aim of this proposal is to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of the restriction of individual freedom and to locate these distinct conceptions within this organizational scheme. As the contribution of this research, departing from this organizational scheme that I propose, I will introduce inductively established three types of restrictions of individual freedom along with a novel type of restriction of individual freedom emerged as a consequence of the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies. Consequently, with the motivation of considering cinematic pieces to be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to introduce philosophical conceptions and theories. I suggest cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I construe them, ontologically, have the capacity to introduce this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory along with the inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

2.1 The Conceptualization of Individual Freedom

Freedom is one of the most challenging concepts within the field of political philosophy. This ontological challenge is a consequence of the essentially contested nature of the concept. Fathoming the concept of freedom involves grasping fundamentally different

ways in which the notion has been conceptualized by various philosophers (Monday, 2015). Therefore, instead of focusing on a unifying and commonly accepted definition of freedom, it is crucial to give attention to different conceptualizations of freedom that are compatible with the broad concept. This mentioned sort of perception is set according to the consideration of the social science concepts as unfixed expedients consist of an ongoing set of definitive conditions. In the precise case of conceptualization of freedom, these definitive conditions are established by the specification of parameters that are in effect of the construction of the concept. The stated speculative and unfixed nature of the concept generates different types of freedom. Thus, one of these types of freedom is 'Individual Freedom'.

Classic approaches of freedom and the attempts to theorize the notion consider freedom to have an individual feature and consider it as associated in the first degree with real persons only. Consequently, freedom is coupled with the observed, assessed and hindered actions or non-actions of the individuals (Graeff, 2012). Within the western political philosophy tradition, in which this thesis sets its scope on, individual freedom is one of the most prioritized parameters of social complexities. Thus, different conceptualizations of freedom, although they have distinct defining conditions, consider the individual as the subject of the freedom they conceptualize. This mentioned normative prioritization of the individual is a consequence of the historically transforming character of the freedom notion. The qualitative shift that has taken place in the position of the individual, generates a necessity to change how we think of freedom and its forms of experience. Along these lines, the individual is set as the primary subject of the freedom concept within this chapter and within the general scope of this thesis. However, it is critical to underline that in current societies almost every individual is a citizen of a state which requires to acknowledge different types of freedom such as political freedom, civil freedom, social freedom etc.,. Although the freedom concept, ontologically, is related to and is shaped by political and social complexities, the priority can be given to the individual and the position of the individual within these political and social complexities. Consequently, in this chapter differing contemporary conceptions of freedom and the restrictive elements that these conceptions nominate are going to be analyzed in an exploratory nature from an individual freedom perspective in order to underline overlooked novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of information and communication technologies which eventually is construed to trigger a novel kind of a restriction of individual freedom. Throughout this chapter and the following chapters 'liberty' and 'freedom' words are going to be used interchangeably (Berlin, 1969; Skinner, 2016).

The word 'concept' is used to discuss phenomena ranging from idiosyncratic cognitive entities to complex and contested structures of language-based meaning (Adcock, 2005). However, the convenient understanding of the word within the scope of individual

freedom notion is considered as one's mental picture or image of a given phenomena with prior experience based on the contextual circumstances (Monday, 2015). Thus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari even go further enough to define philosophy as an art which consists in forming, inventing and fabricating concepts along with the determination of its moment, its occasion and circumstances, its landscapes and personae, its conditions and unknowns (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Hence, a longstanding concern of political philosophy is the formation and analysis of political concepts such as freedom, equality, justice, authority, legitimacy, democracy, welfare, etc,. Each and every of these concepts has been construed in varying ways in which every of these conceptions are constructed as a matter of prioritization and a sacrifice of certain conceptual virtues. Therefore, there are no pure types, but interpretations of the concepts grounded on and accompanied by the unique normative principles (Gerring, 1999).

Since precisely this chapter and generally this thesis focuses on the 'Individual Freedom' concept, it is essential to underline some general aspects of conceptualization of individual freedom before getting into the detailed exploration of the differing interpretations and formulations of the concept. As stressed:

We may have a broadly outlined concept of freedom as the absence of constraints on agents' actions, which still leaves open what kinds of constraints, agents, and actions matter (MacCallum 1967). A full specification of those constraints, agents, and actions yields a precise conception of freedom. Different conceptions can thus be compatible with the same broad concept. We can translate the distinction between concepts and conceptions into our earlier terminology by defining a conception exactly as we defined a concept in the last section, where the domain, defining conditions (if any), and extension are fully specified, and redefining a concept as a broader family of such conceptions, with some aspects of the domain, defining conditions, or extension left open. (List & Valentini, 2016b, 532)

As the passage indicates different conceptualizations of individual freedom, ontologically, ground on distinct specifications of the principles and the standards set with reference to the defining conditions. Subsequently, the scope of individual freedom conceptualizations are based upon a complicated network of similarities and differences overlapping and criss-crossing (Baldissoni, 2018). Therefore, the aim of this thesis is not to clash differing individual freedom conceptions but to have an exploratory journey in the theoretical and normative universe of individual freedom in order to introduce the most adequate reading of contemporary reality. With this motivation, in the next parts of this chapter different normative and theoretical perspectives on the conceptualization of 'Individual Freedom' are going to be

referred to and analyzed in an exploratory nature. Consequently, departing from this theoretical journey, I intend to propose an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom.

2.1.1 Tracing the Roots of the Notion of Individual Freedom

The aim of this chapter is, as expressed above, to have an exploratory journey in the theoretical and normative universe of individual freedom in order to introduce the most adequate reading of contemporary reality focused on the notion. The scope of this thesis primarily grounds on the scrutinization of the individual freedom concept through contemporary western political philosophy tradition. With this motivation, I will dedicate a detailed focus on the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom within this tradition. However, since freedom as a notion has a transforming character, before getting into the detailed inquiry of the contemporary conceptualizations of individual freedom, I will briefly trace the roots of the notion of freedom and how the notion of freedom has evolved throughout history.

We can trace the roots of the contemporary western political philosophy tradition subsequently the notion of freedom, dating back to Ancient Greece. *Eleutheria* (ἐλευθερία) is the word that elucidates the notion of freedom in relation to politics and the society in Ancient Greece. *Eleutheria* (ἐλευθερία) evolves from the word *eleutheros* (ελεύθερος) which can be associated with 'freeborn' or 'free' in the contemporary context. *Eleutheria* in the Ancient Greece context instead of having a connotation related to the individual had a collective connotation engaged in relation to the city. The active practice of politics, in which half of the Athenian population is excluded, through the engagement of the citizens in a shared way of life is considered as the primary parameter to make the city, but not the individual, free (Held, 1987).

The Romans used the word *libertas* as a counterpart of *eleutheria*. Since the historical context of the Roman Empire was different from Ancient Greece, the word *libertas* is associated with lawful government and perhaps with the institutionalized private security for the plebs. The primary reason behind this association is that in contrast with the Athenians, the Romans were not citizens but subjects of an empire that is more concerned with lawful rule rather than direct democracy and having access to power (Yupanqui, 2011). The collapse of the Roman Empire constituted a novel historical context in which opened the way to the feudal system. Accordingly, as expressed:

The medieval ancestors of the “free-” family did not make reference to ideas of access to power as *eleutheria* did or did not refer to lawful rule or institutionalized private security as *libertas* did. In a feudal political order, it meant immunities from interference by the jurisdictional overlords. (Yupanqui, 2011, 28)

Hence, although there are underlined differences in the understanding of the words, the Greek *eleutheria* and the Latin *libertas*, as C.S Lewis emphasizes, converge on their original meaning which is ‘not a slave’ (Spector, 2010). However, as Joel Feinberg accentuates on the original meaning of freedom “this use, important as it once was, has declined since the fall of feudalism and slavery, and is now almost archaic.” (Feinberg, 1980, 11). The emphasis on the archaic understanding of freedom as not being a slave is considered to be a consequence of Hobbes’s triumphant redefinition of the concept of liberty which inaugurated the modern discussions on freedom.

In the context of modernity, the ideal of freedom as self-perfection through religious and collective entities had come to an end with the emergence of the idea of freedom as absence of interference (Skinner, 2002). Earliest treaties that the concept of freedom is systematically analyzed is Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, first published in 1651. Thus, the priority reason to start the modern discussion from Hobbes’s *Leviathan* is that chapter twenty-one of *Leviathan* entitled ‘Of Liberty of Subjects’ fundamentally inaugurates the systematic thinking on freedom within the modernist context. Also, another reason is that it has been highly influential within the classical liberal tradition and on the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom (Skinner, 2016). As Hobbes states a free man “is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do.” (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter 21). Hobbes, focusing on freedom, underlines that any external agency prevents or compels an action within the power of the individual through interfering with the individual’s physical presence. In more precise words, as Hobbes accentuates, freedom is the “absence of external impediments to motion” (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter 21). Within his proposed ‘absence’ of interference as a mechanistic conceptualization, he grounds freedom as the absence of ‘bodily’ interference in which the coercion of the will is not considered as an interference to freedom.

John Locke, although agreeing with Hobbes on the position that bodily interference is a coercion of individual freedom, introduces the coercion of the will as an alternative kind of an interference to freedom by offering a more social conceptualization of the notion. Locke’s conception refers more to interpersonal relations between human beings. Consequently, Locke describes freedom as the absence of coercion in human affairs (Locke, 1689). Although Locke does not precisely define coercion, he refers to four actions which are threats, promises, offers and bribes. According to Locke, all of these actions have the

potential to bend the will therefore take the freedom away (Skinner, 2016). Indeed, Locke's vagueness on the means for the will to be coerced situates Locke's conception to be a departing point of the contemporary, especially Anglo-American liberal, conceptions of individual freedom. These conceptions are grounded on the precise description of the coercion of the will as a restricting condition of individual freedom. For instance, Jeremy Bentham proposes precise characteristics of the threats in his written work called *On the Limits of the Penal Branch of Legislation* (1780-1782). He defines coercion as "rendering alternatives ineligible standardly and basically by means of threats so long as the threats are credible, immediate and serious" (Skinner, 2016). This kind of a definition can be claimed to set the general rhetoric in the contemporary liberal, mostly falling under freedom as non-interference accounts of individual freedom.

One other thinker John Stuart Mill is also commonly accepted as conceptualizing freedom, within his work *On Liberty* (1859), as the absence of interference. What he underlines in his work is the nature and the limits of the power which can legitimately be exercised by the society over the individual and he considers all restraints as evil (Mill, 1859). With reference to his underlining, most of the following political philosophers belonging to the 'freedom from' camp regarded Mill as a leading exponent of the negative understanding of freedom. However, although Mill is construed as one of the leading figures who conceptualized freedom as the absence of restraints, it is crucial to underline the priority that Mill dedicates to individuals because this accentuation leads to a more complex interpretation of Mill's ideas on freedom. For instance, in chapter three of *On Liberty* he emphasizes the significance of freedom on individuality and self-development for preserving and encouraging originality, eccentricity, variety and progress (Mill, 1859, Chapter 3). Here, what Mill introduces is a slightly different perspective on liberation and is sort of a reaction to the tyranny of the majority. Thus, his idea of liberation, precisely because of the underlined aspect, is through self-realization which includes self-development for preserving and encouraging originality, eccentricity, variety and progress beyond rational conformity. Consequently, this underlined conception of freedom as self-realization leads to the emergence of novel contemporary conceptions of individual freedom construed in the positive sense. Mill situates the place of any kind of a collective, as an organ, in optimal conditions, not to shadow the individual but to serve for the aim of providing the conditions to individuals to reach self-realization and self-perfection.

The increasing significance of the self within the discussions based on freedom, triggers some systematic thinking on the individual freedom concept. For instance, in *The Philosophical Theory of State*, first published in 1899, Bernard Bosanquet underlines that to be free, an action must be motivated and initiated by the rational self, a self that has an internal motivation, growth, and creative energy (Bosanquet, 1899). This underlined

self-secures the true self against being coerced to be free as a consequence of the interpersonal relations. As Bosanquet emphasizes akin to Mill, since self-development is a matter of inner growth, it rules out imposing a uniform pattern of conduct on individuals. Thus, coercion coming from interpersonal relations threatens the very possibility of realization of the true-self. Therefore, freedom is reaching to your high-self through self-realization processes liberated from a uniform pattern of conduct (Bosanquet, 1899; Simhony, 2016). As T.H. Green expresses, in his lecture *On the Different Senses of 'Freedom' as Applied to the Will and to the Moral Progress of Man*, real freedom consists in determination of the will by reason and reaching at harmony with the true law of one's being (Green, 1886 [2011]). For Green, "Once I have a genuine opportunity to be myself (i.e., all internal impediments have been disposed of) I will become myself" (Nelson, 2005, 62).

These introduced conceptions acknowledging freedom in a self-realization (positive) sense, generated the idea of coercion of individual freedom by individuals themselves through internal factors. Although most of the modernist discussions on freedom focus on the ways individual freedom is coerced by restraints and interferences coming from the 'other', these underlined accentuations sparked the idea of individuals playing a role in the coercion of their freedoms. Consequently, these underlinings inaugurated an inclination to go beyond the liberal tradition in the late 19th-century social and political philosophy. As Skinner states these discussions initiated the question of "Can we make sense of this radical extension of the classical liberal tradition?" (Skinner, 2016). It can be claimed that this radical extension has evolved, up until the contemporary discussions on individual freedom, towards different conceptions of the notion under the scope of distinct formulations (for instance positive formulations after the underlined significance of self-realization) but the most prominent formulations were under the scope of the negative understanding of the notion. Consequently, although there are some accounts which try to conceptualize the notion in more positive manners, freedom is mostly conceptualized in more negative manners within the modernist context.

As I tried to delineate in this section, there have been broadly two kinds of perceptions of individual freedom persistent in the modernist context which have an influence on the contemporary debates. One, the most prominent, is freedom understood as an absence of any kind of coercion coming from an external 'other'. Another one is freedom understood as self-realization. Both of the underlined aspects have set the grounds of the differing contemporary conceptualizations of the notion. Thus, Isaiah Berlin, although he is not the one coining the terms positive and negative freedom, made a clear-cut division between the two mentioned understandings within the Western tradition which set the popular distinction in the present academia (Yupanqui, 2011).

Berlin presented 'negative' and 'positive' freedom camps originally in his lecture given at the Oxford University' in 1958. Respectively, he scrutinized these two distinct conceptions in his work 'Two Concepts of Liberty' within his *Four Essays on Liberty* (1969) book. The detailed account of these two conceptions will be proposed as a starting point of the next part of this chapter. I aim to use this dichotomy as a compass or a navigation instrument on the journey through contemporary individual freedom conceptions. Therefore, the aim of the next part of this chapter is not trying to situate the chosen conceptions within these two camps but to use these two camps as a departing point of the journey I plan to propose. Eventually, I will try to introduce the most accurate grounds for the conceptualization of individual freedom within the contemporary context. Consequently, I will attempt to offer an overlooked type of restriction of individual freedom with reference to the suggested journey as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

2.2 Contemporary Conceptualizations of Individual Freedom

Political theories depending on the given normative priority take different shapes. In this thesis the normative priority is given to individual freedom. Therefore, in this part of the thesis, I will focus on the contemporary conceptual arrangements on the individual freedom notion. The starting point of this journey will be Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. Departing from the two concepts of freedom, I will try to emphasize different conceptualizations which propose full specifications on the defining conditions of the notion. The aim of this part is, in exploratory nature, to encompass and to accentuate diverse conceptions of individual freedom introduced by the unique political philosophers coming from different traditions. So that, I can suggest the most encompassing grounds and conceptual structure on the notion of individual freedom in order to underline an overlooked aspect that challenges and contributes to the cannon with the challenge that it underlines.

I want to open one clause here. The grounds of the conceptions that I am going to refer to are set to prioritize the pure notion of individual freedom. Therefore, an individual who faces several social, political and economical obstacles which are out of scope of the freedom concept will be considered as "unable" instead of "unfree" (Hayek, 1960; Berlin, 1969; List & Valentini, 2016a; Skinner, 2016). The primary intention of this motivation is to focus purely on the concept of individual freedom without the interference and involvement of any other natural, economical, social and political concepts, parameters and values in order not to have conceptual confusions. Therefore, accounts that situate freedom as a component of their broader theories grounded on democracy, justice, economy, power etc. which essentially conceptualize freedom as development (Sen, 1999), as material equality

(Cohen, 1995), as capability (Brown, 2017), as moral responsibility (Miller, 1983), etc. will be out of the focus of this thesis. Although it is unattainable to include all the precise conceptions of individual freedom to the scope of this thesis, I will try to incorporate a wide range of individual freedom conceptions in order to offer an overlooked type of restriction of individual freedom with reference to insufficiency that these conceptions have regarding the contemporary social complexities. Thus, I will group these conceptions under two broad titles: 'Two Concepts of Liberty' and 'Theories Beyond Two Concepts of Liberty'. I will start this theoretical journey from 'Two Concepts of Liberty' as a departing point.

2.2.1 Two Concepts of Freedom

It is commonly acknowledged that Isaiah Berlin is the thinker who introduced 'Two Concepts of Liberty' to the contemporary political philosophy scene. His distinction is considered as a practical one which had and has been having widespread influence within the scope of political philosophy. Therefore, I will start the journey of the conceptualization of individual freedom by Berlin's conceptions of the notion. Berlin emphasizes that there are more than two hundred senses of freedom proposed by historians of the history of ideas. Yet, he puts his focus on two precise central senses with a great deal of human history behind them. These two senses are 'negative liberty' and 'positive liberty'. In his own words:

The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject--a person or group of persons--is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?' The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?'. (Berlin, 2002, 169)

The answers given to the questions that are asked by Berlin sets the scope of his two conceptions. Thus, if we consider the historical evaluation of the conceptualization of the notion, which I tried to broadly emphasize in the previous part of this chapter, what Berlin introduces is not uniquely different from the past conceptualizations. However, the unique touch that Berlin proposes is to situate the vague and floating conceptualizations of the notion under precise two camps. Respectively, Berlin identifies in *Two Concepts of Liberty* the adherents of 'negative' freedom as Occam, Erasmus, Hobbes, Locke, Bentham,

Constant, J. S. Mill, Tocqueville, Jefferson, Burke, Paine and adherents of 'positive' freedom as Plato, Epictetus, St. Ambrose, Montesquieu, Spinoza, Kant, Herder, Rousseau, Hegel, Fichte, Marx, Bukharin, Comte, Carlyle, T. H. Green, Bradley, Bosanquet (MacCallum, 1967). Thus, as I have underlined before, the two concepts are the concrete representatives of the freedom conceptualized as an absence of any kind of coercion coming from the external 'other' (negative freedom) and freedom conceptualized as self-realization (positive freedom) throughout the history of thought.

I want to give a more detailed account of Berlin's conceptions, since I aim to use this proposed dichotomy as a departing point and as a compass or a navigation instrument of the contemporary conceptualizations of the individual freedom notion. Berlin sets the defining condition of the 'negative freedom' concept as non-interference. According to Berlin, an individual is "said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with his/her activity" (Berlin, 2002, 169). Correspondingly, as he states, "The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes." (Berlin, 2002, 170). Here, what he tries to signify by being free is not being interfered with by the others (Berlin, 2002). However, in the revision of his original text (Berlin, 1969), Berlin underlines that letting freedom to be dependent on desires would rule out a non-subjective criterion in which being free or unfree becomes a matter of feeling oneself to be so (Riccardi, 2007). Therefore, he revises his negative conceptualization of freedom as:

Simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved. (Berlin, 2002, 169)

Berlin underlines that there will be some conditions and parameters from which the mentioned area of non-interference is to be drawn with reference to natural law, or natural rights, or of utility, or the pronouncements of a categorical imperative, or the sanctity of the social contract, or any other concept with which men have sought to clarify and justify their convictions (Berlin, 2002). He construes this negative kind of an understanding of individual freedom as 'freedom from' and also as 'absence' of interference. Therefore, the conceptualization that Berlin underlines is freedom as 'non-interference'. He sets the criterion of oppression to be practiced by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so. Thus, these defining conditions are the precise reason why some of the contemporary political philosophers criticized Berlin and acknowledged his negative freedom conception as insufficient. Hence, a considerable number of thinkers

emphasize that other parameters such as the intention, the directness, the arbitrariness etc., on the exercise of oppression employed by the other plays a fundamental role in the conceptualization of the notion. Nevertheless, diverse contemporary conceptions of individual freedom grounded on the absence of any kind of impediments coming from the external 'other' can be situated under this stressed 'freedom from' interpretation of individual freedom as a 'negative' understanding of the concept.

According to Berlin, the question of 'Who governs me?' is logically distinct from the question 'How far does the government interfere with me?'. As underlined, the level of interference sets the scope of negative freedom. On the other hand, the level of self-mastery sets the scope of positive freedom. As Berlin stresses:

The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. (Berlin, 2002, 178)

One crucial point of Berlin's positive understanding of freedom is his emphasis on self-mastery through reason. This kind of self, variously identified with reason, is construed as the 'higher-self' which grounds its actions on rational choice. The process of reaching to the 'higher-self', as underlined by Berlin, requires a liberation from the 'lower-self' which grounds its actions to irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, and immediate pleasures. This mentioned process of reaching to the higher-self is the primary reason why Berlin is sceptical of the positive understanding of freedom and why he bolsters the negative understanding of individual freedom.

According to Berlin, reaching to the higher-self requires a level of rational maturity. However, not all of the individuals are at the level of this mentioned rational maturity state. Therefore, Berlin underlines that it is possible and justifiable to coerce an individual by an external agent under the name of some goal because this individual would have chosen the option if this person is more enlightened but do not since they are blind or ignorant or do not have the rational maturity. The danger that Berlin sees in the positive understanding of individual freedom is that a person who is constrained in this way is no longer an autonomous being but instead a collective being whose own reason must conform to the rational-self (higher-self), automatically to the reason of a more rational entity, if there is one. This underlined positive doctrine of liberation is construed as 'freedom to' self-mastery (higher-self) leads to paternalism under the disguise of individual liberation since, from this

point of view, the rational ends of our 'true' natures must coincide, or be made to coincide. Thus, this kind of an accentuation is the ground of some of the eighteenth-century accounts of freedom in which obeying the rational laws is ontologically to act according to reason which leads to liberation of the individuals through self-realization.

On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous part of this chapter there are some accounts on the positive understanding of freedom in which freedom is reaching to your high-self through self-realization processes liberated from a uniform pattern of conduct within a collective that serve for the aim of providing the conditions of self-mastery to individuals (Mill, 1859; Bosanquet, 1899; Green, 2011; Simhony, 2016). However, for Berlin, the idea that the rational ends of our true nature must coincide makes it impossible for individuals to be liberated from a uniform pattern of conduct. This contradiction, for him, makes the positive understanding of the individual freedom notion problematic. Therefore, Berlin favours the negative conception of freedom. Nonetheless, Berlin's positive freedom as 'freedom to' self-mastery can be construed as the departing point of the contemporary positively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom which are going to be underlined in the next section of this chapter along with the negatively constructed conceptualizations of the notion. Thus, departing from Berlin's distinction, unique conceptions of the contemporary political philosophers on the defining conditions of individual freedom notion will be grouped under two broad titles which are; negative understanding of individual freedom and different conceptualizations of the notion, positive understanding of individual freedom and different conceptualizations of the notion.

2.2.1.1 Negative Understanding of Individual Freedom and the Different Conceptualizations of the Notion

From the Berlinian sense, the concept of negative freedom is broadly outlined as the absence of constraints on agents' actions. This understanding of individual freedom, grounded on normative theorizing, sets the departing point of the negatively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom. However, in order to introduce a fully specified conceptualization of the notion, it is necessary to emphasize the types of constraints, agents and actions (MacCallum, 1967). Thus, in this part of the chapter, different negatively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom are going to be introduced with reference to the precise constraints, agents and actions that they specify in the conceptions that they propose in descriptive manners.

Broadly speaking, negative understanding of individual freedom grounds on "the claim that the liberty of a person is strictly a function of the restraints that the agent faces in

the carrying out of her decisions (however the concept of a restraint is construed)” (Christman, 1991, 343). Departing from the emphasis above, my aim here is to underline different contemporary conceptions of individual freedom which are grounded on the absence of construed restraints, under the broad negative (freedom from) understanding of individual freedom. Nonetheless, Berlin’s allegedly successful negative conception of individual freedom as non-interference which follows the classical liberal tradition occupies most of the conceptual space. However, the negative understanding of the concept used here encompasses distinct conceptualizations of individual freedom that go beyond the classical liberal tradition but before getting into the details of these accounts I want to scrutinize the classical liberal conceptualizations of individual freedom that propose individual freedom as non-interference.

One of the body of accounts which follow these negative lines is the ‘pure negative’ conceptualizations of individual freedom. These accounts, as a constituent of the freedom as non-interference, following Hobbes, prioritize the constraints rather than paying equal or more attention to other defining conditions such as agents and actions. As Ian Carter emphasizes, pure negative conceptions of individual freedom precisely focus on the restrictions on freedom that render a great number of actions on an agent's part *physically impossible* (Carter, 2019).

One of the prominent representatives of this kind of a conceptualization of individual freedom is Hillel Steiner. Steiner defends a negative conception of individual freedom by stating that an individual is unfree, if and only if, the action is rendered impossible by the action of another individual. He defends this theorem of freedom considered as and equated to the personal possession of physical objects. As he states:

The statement that 'X is free to do A' entails that none of the physical components of doing A is possessed by an agent other than X. The statement that 'X is unfree to do A' entails that at least one of the physical components of doing A is possessed by an agent other than X. (Steiner, 1974-75, 48)

The pure negative freedom account that Steiner embraces has two defining conditions. The first condition is that any kind of source of unfreedom is limited to the actions of other agents. The first condition underlines his exclusion of natural or self-inflicted obstacles. The second condition is that the free or unfree actions to be performed are weighted in a value-neutral way, so that the options available to an individual are not more valuable or favorable to that individual’s self-realization (Carter, 2019, The concept of overall freedom section, para 4). Therefore, the expansion of the class of constraints undermines the essential distinction between X being free to do A (value-neutral account of freedom) and X

wanting to do A (value-based account of individual freedom) (Miller, 1983). Subsequently, what Steiner tries to underline is that any account of freedom which extends constraint beyond physical impossibility makes some premises about human desires and obligations. Thus, according to Steiner any extension of constraints beyond physical impossibility such as coercive threats which has a reference to an agent's desire should not be included in the conceptualization of individual freedom, understood in the purely negative sense, as non-interference. Thus, Steiner by prioritizing X being free to do A (value-neutral account of freedom) over X wanting to do A (value-based account of individual freedom) tries to introduce a purely negative conceptualization of individual freedom asserting that there is no necessary relation between an agent's freedom and her desires.

One other contemporary thinker who formulated a pure negative conception of individual freedom is Matthew H. Kramer. He, by drawing on the work of Steiner, enunciates a pure negative conception in which pure is formulated as making no reference to an agent's desires or interests. As he emphasizes "overall freedom of each person ... is determined by the range of combinations of conjunctively exercisable opportunities that are available to him" (Kramer, 2008, 34). Thus, this type of negative conceptualization of freedom is concerned with the range of unimpeded actions of an individual under given circumstances along with the interference an agent encounters in attempting to engage in any particular act. Therefore, as Kramer states the introduced type of negative freedom is a modal concept (Kramer, 2003a, 4) in which the defining conditions of the concept not only ground on the actual interference but also on the relative likelihood of possible future interference (Harbour, 2011, 190). One difference that Kramer introduces compared to Steiner is the acknowledgement of some implications of the subjunctive or counterfactual facets of freedom and unfreedom. So as to say "we shall investigate the implications of the fact that everyone's freedom and unfreedom are partly determined by potential events which do not occur but which could have occurred" (Kramer, 2003b, 64). The subjunctive aspect of Kramer's account is based upon his emphasis that freedom of each agent is not only defined by the actually performed actions but also by the potential actions that do not occur but could have occurred. Although Kramer differs on the subjunctive aspect of his proposal from the proposal of Steiner, he introduces a value-neutral conceptualization of individual freedom as Steiner does.

Ian Carter is another contemporary thinker who proposes his conception of individual freedom on the pure negative grounds. Thus, for Carter:

Unfreedom is a social relation consisting in the presence of humanly imposed impediments rendering actions impossible. Social impediments to action that do not render actions impossible—for example, physical obstacles that can be overcome at

great cost or pain—do not render the agent unfree to perform those actions... The threat to punish agent B for doing x does not remove B's freedom to do x for the same reason that the offer to reward B for doing not-x does not remove B's freedom to do x. (Carter, 2013, 31)

Therefore, from a pure negative conception of freedom aspect there is no connection between agent's negative freedom and their will in a sense that an agent is unfree to do x if and only if someone else has rendered x impossible for her, regardless of whether or not she wants to do x (Carter, 2013, 32). This mentioned aspect of his conception underlines the value-neutrality, as a defining condition, that he prioritizes in his account of freedom in a sense that he excludes the wishes, and the desires of the agents whose actual and potential choices/actions are in question.

It can be asserted that all the thinkers, mentioned as a representative of the pure negative freedom concept, try to consider freedom equated to actions as physical occurrences in the world. The priority reason behind this emphasis on individual freedom is grounded on these thinkers' efforts to have an overall measure of freedom. Thus, Ian Carter champions the concept of *Overall Freedom* (1999) which he defines as "some kind of aggregation over one's specific freedoms" (11). Specific freedoms refer here to the possibility of doing and being some things in particular representing the options that an agent can or cannot choose. Carter bases his measurement of freedom on the specific actions or set of actions as physical occurrences which are countable if a space-time grid is used to count them. Therefore, the degree of a person's freedom depends on "how 'extensive' the actions available to her are" (Carter, 1999, 184). Considering the underlined aspects, Carter claims that value-neutrality is the necessary condition of a complete and coherent conceptualization of individual freedom which forms the ground of this conception of pure negative freedom. Hence, not only Carter but also other mentioned thinkers who follow a purely negative understanding of individual freedom, propose diverse measurements of overall freedom (Kramer, 2003a; Steiner, 1994, 1983). However, the details that they provide on the measurement of individual freedom is out of the scope of this thesis. Therefore, no more specifications on the measurement of overall individual freedom that are proposed by the mentioned thinkers are going to be emphasized here. Consequently, the pure negative conceptions of individual freedom propose precise defining conditions of the concept prioritizing a non-interference based account of negative freedom. Although there are distinct conditions on the defining conditions of pure negative freedom conceptions which are highlighted by the thinkers referred above, one common point shared by all of the thinkers is the value-neutrality parameter that is attributed to the notion.

However, there are some accounts that conceptualize individual freedom as non-interference in value-based grounds.

The value-based accounts of negative freedom place the primary emphasis on the significance of independence of an individual from the arbitrary will of another agent as the basis of freedom as non-interference. Thus, freedom, as defined, is being free from the subjection to the will of others. Therefore, from the underlined perspective, a man's freedom does not depend on the range of choices open to him (Viner, 1961). As F. A. Hayek states:

The range of physical possibilities from which a person can choose at a given moment has no direct relevance to freedom [...] Whether he is free or not does not depend on the range of choice but on whether he can expect to shape his course of action in accordance with his present intentions, or whether somebody else has power so to manipulate the conditions as to make him act according to that person's will rather than his own. (Hayek, 1960, 13)

This attention dedicated to the significance of an agent as one of the crucial parameters of individual freedom concept is the priority parameter that differentiates value-based accounts of negative freedom from non-value-based accounts. As follows, Hayek underlines that it is inconvenient to acknowledge freedom as the physical ability to do what an agent wants and as the extent of the choice alternative open to that agent. This mentioned inconvenience is due to the underestimation of the individual as a being that chooses, thinks and acts. Therefore, it is crucial to include the unique aspects of the agents whose freedom is in question to the defining conditions of the concept. Hence, this value-based understanding of negative freedom is supported by the thinkers that have a free-market grounded approach towards the liberal society and the state. Therefore, they are generally sceptical of state-enforced social welfare policies. Instead, they favour letting the market mechanisms determine the distribution of the resources. This is the precise reason why they introduce a conception of freedom from a negative understanding of it as non-interference putting an emphasis on an agent's actions and free will.

Robert Nozick is one of the thinkers that proposes a concept of individual freedom that has a value-based market-oriented basis as well. Thus, in his influential book *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974), he introduces a free-market based approach to liberal society and the state, as he calls the 'minimal state', in which he regards legitimate government functioning as restricted to upholding the rule of law. Since Nozick considers freedom as a natural right, many critics of Nozick claim that he defines individual freedom in terms of individual rights meaning that individuals are free in so far they have rights (Flikschuh, 2007). Acknowledging Nozick to employ a rights-based definition of freedom, makes it

problematic for this thesis to include Nozick within the scope of the contemporary conceptualizations of individual freedom since the prior motivation of this chapter is set to purely focus on the concept of individual freedom without any conceptual confusions. However, I consider Nozick's proposal as having a freedom-based definition of rights rather than a rights-based definition of freedom. This perception, in my sense, prioritizes the concept of freedom. As Flikschuh states "individuals have rights because they are ends, and they are ends because they are possessed of free will" (Flikschuh, 2007, 175). Therefore, although Nozick's account of freedom is not rights based, still, it can be moralized in the sense that it does not operate with a morally neutral conception of freedom (Flikschuh, 2007). This underlined value-based conception that Nozick proposes is precisely one of the defining conditions of his conceptualization of negative freedom. Thus, Nozick defines individual freedom as the state in which a man is not subject to interference by the arbitrary will of another. Nozick describes the states in which an individual is coerced by the arbitrary will of another with reference to conditional proposal. Threats and offers are two types of this conditional proposal that sets the ground of his conception. Accordingly, it can be claimed that the value aspect of Nozick's conceptualization grounds on the subjective evaluation of the individuals since the status of the types of proposals as threats or offers depend on the subjective evaluation of the consequences that these proposals bring about. However, he asserts that one common criterion is the willingness of the agent towards the proposal(s). For example, "a person in a threat situation is unwilling to be there, i.e., because the person has been moved there against his will, Nozick thinks the will of another is operating or predominant" (Carr, 1988, 62). Aligned with this perspective, Hayek also thinks that as long as the market mechanism functions through individual decisions which are made independently of the arbitrary will of others, there is a greater set of opportunities which leads to a higher degree of freedom.

F. A. Hayek is one of the other thinkers that sets a value-based market-oriented conceptualization of negative freedom. Thus, according to Hayek freedom belongs to and the concept of individual freedom properly applies to agents who choose, think and act. Although he underlines the significance of the individual within his conception of freedom, he acknowledges that:

In defining condition of freedom, it suffices to consider only external impediments to action as they might arise not from nature, but from other human beings... Individual freedom is not to be understood as exercising free will or choosing one's course of action and sticking to it. In defining a condition of freedom, the question is whether others can impose their will on me, not whether I can follow my own will. (Miller, 2010, 39-40)

Hayek, in *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960), highlights that the chief concern of his book grounds on the conception of freedom under the rule of law. As he states his conception “rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free” (Hayek, 1960, 153). Thus, the achievement of the rule of law is the priority defining condition of the individual freedom conception of Hayek. Therefore, Hayek offers a conceptualization of individual freedom that is grounded on the rule of law which eliminates the arbitrary will of another in order to act according to one’s will (Hayek, 1960, 223-224).

One significance of Hayek as an influential classical liberal thinker who acknowledges individual freedom in the negative sense as non-interference, is the republican tones of his individual freedom conception. This is a crucial point to be underlined because the precise ground of the contemporary republican theorist’s conceptualization of individual freedom as non-domination rests on the criticism of the liberal conceptions of individual freedom as being insufficient in a sense that the liberal theorists conceptualize the concept simply in terms of the absence of external constraints on one’s will. Thus, contemporary republican theorists base the distinctness of their conceptions (freedom as non-domination) on the claim that interference can not be limited to physical interference. However, Hayek’s negative conceptualization of individual freedom as non-interference, as emphasized, goes beyond the interference limited to physical coercion. Accordingly, contemporary republican theorists, by construing the liberal tradition to be grounded on economic activity functioning in the absence of all governmental action, overlook the rule of law emphasis of Hayek as a liberal thinker. Thus, Hayek does not support that the government should not be included in the economic matters and this clearly distinguishes Hayekian conception of individual freedom from the liberal conceptions, even if it is construed as following the Hobbsian account of individual freedom as non-interference. Hence, not only Hayek but also Nozick emphasizes the significance of the rule of law on his conception of negative freedom. Respectively, these theorists with the emphasis that they put on the rule of law can be considered as closer to the republican accounts of negative freedom conceptualized as non-domination than the pure negative freedom accounts conceptualized as non-interference. Thus, it can be asserted that there are distinct differences between pure negative freedom accounts and value-based market-oriented negative freedom accounts. However, it can also be asserted that the same distinct differences exist between the value-based market-oriented accounts of negative freedom (freedom as non-interference) and the republican accounts of negative freedom (freedom as non-domination) which are going to be accentuated next.

Contemporary republican theorists have persistently emphasized the distinctiveness of their conceptualization of freedom as non-domination from the liberal understanding of freedom as non-interference. The general scope of the republican conceptualization of individual freedom establishes on the emphasis that freedom is the independence from the arbitrary will of other agents regardless of whether or not interference occurs. Thus, the historical grounds of this kind of a conceptualization is based on the tradition of Roman Republicanism. Therefore, republican conceptions of the notion prioritize the rule of law and advocate interference in the marketplace in order to prevent the dependence on the will of another agent (Kennedy, 2016). According to republican's underlining domination primarily requires the capacity for arbitrary interference rather than actual interference. To give a precise example, republican theorist Philip Pettit proposes the happy slave case in which there is a non-interfering benevolent master, a slave is considered to be at liberty from the freedom as non-interference perspective. However, according to the freedom as non-domination perspective, the slave is not at liberty since there is the constant possibility of interference due to the presence of arbitrary power of the master. Hence, contemporary republican accounts underline the significance of distinct versions of interference such as non-interfering dominance and non-arbitrary interference as defining conditions of the negative conceptualizations of individual freedom. Accordingly, these accounts claim that liberal advocates of the negative freedom concept, without proposing any differentiation, view all forms of interference as coercive. This is one of the substantial reasons why republican theorists introduce their conceptualizations of individual freedom as a distinct one.

Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit are considered to be the most prominent representatives of the negative conception of freedom as non-domination. In Skinner's view, freedom as non-domination is a form of negative freedom distinct from Berlinian negative freedom and from positive freedom (Spector, 2010). The crucial point of Skinner's account is that not all forms of interference are considered as a restricting factor of individual freedom. For instance, he does not acknowledge non-arbitrary interference that is sanctioned by a stable and democratically agreed system of laws as a condition of interference. He construes this kind of an interference to be forced to track the avowed or readily avowable interests of the other agents. Correspondingly, for Skinner it is vital to ensure that any government does not give any agent prerogative or discretionary powers to interfere with or to dominate other agents' individual freedom according to her own arbitrium. Following his emphasis, it can be stated that his account of republican negative freedom considers both non-interference and non-domination as defining conditions of his conception. Therefore, as Pettit suggests, Skinner presents the ideal of republican freedom as horizontally complex including both non-interference and non-domination as the crucial parameters of his

conception. Then, again as Pettit suggests, Skinner introduces two coordinated and distinct elements which are domination without interference and interference without domination. Hence, in domination without interference freedom is compromised primarily by domination. This underlined aspect is the classical defining condition of the republican conceptualizations of the negative freedom notion. On the other hand, interference without domination is the coercion of the will, implicit in the imposition of a non-arbitrary rule of law, which is considered to track the avowable common interests of those who live under the law (Pettit, 2002).

What Pettit tries to underline is that there are two distinct ways of setting the antonym of freedom. From Skinner's perspective domination and interference are a joint antonym of freedom in which freedom is compromised by domination and interference and conditioned by limitation. Thus, Pettit distinguishes himself from Skinner by proposing the antonym of freedom just as domination in which freedom is compromised by domination and conditioned by non-arbitrary interference and non-intentional limitation (Pettit, 2002). Thus, Pettit explicitly argues that domination as a distinctive evil, should count as the only antonym of freedom. However, as Pettit states:

Undominating or nonarbitrary interference -in particular, the interference suffered in living under a coercive but fair rule of law- must count as a secondary offence against freedom. Such a rule of law will not compromise freedom, in the manner of a dominating agency, but it will condition freedom.. It will reduce the range or ease with which people enjoy undominated choice. (Pettit, 2002, 342)

Therefore, instead of equating non-domination and non-interference, Pettit proposes that non-interference is subordinated to non-domination. Pettit, as one other thinker conceptualizing negative freedom as non-domination, sets the defining condition of individual freedom as primarily guarding people against domination, precisely an arbitrary one, and secondarily as maximizing the range in which people can exercise their undominated capacity for choice (Pettit, 2003). Pettit criticizes the accounts which conceptualize freedom as non-interference on the basis that they prioritize maximizing the range of options open to agents instead of prioritizing the non-domination aspect of individual freedom. Thus, according to Pettit, freedom is a modally demanding concept in which a slave with a benevolent, non-interfering master still counts as unfree because there is a nearby possible world in which the master interferes. Therefore, Pettit sets the defining conditions of his individual freedom concept as: A dominates B when A has the capacity to interfere with B, on an arbitrary basis, in any choice that B is in position to make (Spector, 2010). However, the crucial point of his account is the emphasis that he puts on arbitrary

power. Hence, Pettit reformulates his analysis by substituting ‘alien or alienating control’ for ‘arbitrary power’. As follows, the controlled person’s capacity to choose is reduced by the alien controller via removing or replacing one or more of her options and this can occur with or without interference. According to some interpretations of Pettit’s account, he proposes a morally demanding concept since he situates the robust absence of interference of arbitrary constraints as the grounds of his individual freedom conception.

Considering arbitrariness, most generally, construed as a moralized notion, situates Pettit’s account of individual freedom to be morally demanding. However, Pettit proposes to define non-arbitrariness in a non-moralized way by offering a definition which bases upon tracing of the subject’s avowed or avowal-ready interests (Pettit, 2008). As persistently underlined by Pettit, the conception that he proposes on freedom as non-domination, grounds on the priority he dedicates to the rule of law which is forced to track the avowed or avowal-ready interests of the individuals, independent from the content of their interests. Subsequently, for Pettit, individual freedom is established, optimally, in a well-ordered self-governing republic of equal citizens where no one citizen is master of any other. In addition, this republic must be governed by the rule of law that is constantly being checked, controlled, contested and is forced to track the avowed or avowal-ready interests of its citizens. As follows, a society that maximizes freedom as non-domination is a democratic one in which democratic decision making is the instrument for the determination of the citizens’ avowed or avowal-ready interests. However, in the absence of unanimity among all the citizens, no democratic decision can fully track every citizen’s avowed or avowal ready interests (List & Valentini, 2016a). Therefore, avowed or avowal ready interests and consequently non-arbitrariness cannot be non-moralized. Reasonably, as List & Valentini emphasizes “even a justly imprisoned criminal—unless he is unusually repentant—will not avow an interest in being imprisoned. And so, his imprisonment, however just it may be, cannot be said to track his avowed interests and thereby to leave his freedom intact” (List & Valentini, 2016a, 1060). Thus, following the criticism above, it can be claimed that republican freedom conceptualized as non-domination incorporates some morally permissible constraints (e.g., ‘non-arbitrary’ or ‘just’ ones) as non-freedom restricting as long as they follow the rule of law. Subsequently, as some accounts assert, republican conceptualizations of freedom as non-domination ground on the robust absence of relevant constraints, except when those constraints are morally permitted.

In order to give a full account of the negative conceptualization of individual freedom, I will dedicate some space to the conception of individual freedom as independence which bases upon the robust absence of the relevant constraints, without any moralized exemption clause. Thus, different conceptualizations of individual freedom, according to freedom as independence account, can be distinguished with reference to ‘moralization’ and

'robustness' dimensions. List & Valentini propose two questions regarding these two dimensions, and they emphasize that the answers given to these questions form the defining conditions of the varying conceptions of individual freedom. They introduce these questions as:

The moralization question: Is the constraint-absence condition qualified by some moralized exemption clause, according to which morally permissible constraints (e.g., "non-arbitrary" or "just" ones) do not count as freedom restricting?" and "The robustness question: Is the constraint-absence condition fortified with a modal robustness requirement, according to which freedom requires the absence of the constraints in a sufficiently large class of possible worlds (relevant hypothetical scenarios) over and above the actual world? (List & Valentini, 2016a, 1046)

Respectively, they offer four different conceptions of individual freedom with reference to the answers they provide to the questions above. As expressed, (List & Valentini, 2016a, 1047):

- (1) the actual absence of the relevant constraints, without any moralized exemption clause;
- (2) the actual absence of the relevant constraints, except when those constraints are morally permitted;
- (3) the robust absence of the relevant constraints, without any moralized exemption clause;
- (4) the robust absence of the relevant constraints, except when those constraints are morally permitted.

We can situate the negative conceptions that I have indicated in the previous parts of this chapter to the offered two by two matrix conceptions above. Hence, it can be claimed that the pure negative liberal conceptions of individual freedom are an instance of case 1. Value-based market-oriented liberal conceptions of individual freedom are an instance of case 2. Republican conceptions of individual freedom are an instance of case 4. The precise reason to introduce freedom as independence as a distinct conception is the diverse defining conditions of the proposed concept as the robust absence of the relevant constraints, without any moralized exemption clause.

List & Valentini tries to clarify the structure of the most prominent contemporary negative conceptions of individual freedom and they propose their conception as a superior alternative to liberal and republican conceptions which exactly is in between these two conceptions of individual freedom. As they underline, their conception of freedom as independence is the *robust* absence of constraints *simpliciter*, not only arbitrary constraints.

Thus, they propose the defining conditions of their conception of individual freedom as “Robust absence of constraints simpliciter (rather than of arbitrary constraints), in an appropriate sense of robustness, which can be spelt out further. (Recall our expositional convention according to which any reference to “constraints” should be understood to mean “relevant constraints⁶.”” (List & Valentini, 2016a, 1067). Thus, the precise conception that they propose is versatile as compared to the other differing definitions of negative freedom. The flexibility that they introduce establishes on the distinct definition schemes formed with reference to the intended application of the concept. Therefore, the flexibility of the defining conditions of the concept gives an opportunity to set different notions of possibility, different levels of robustness, and conditional along with unconditional variants. The possibility of the distinct definition schemes concretely creates the versatility of the negative freedom concept which is introduced as independence. Therefore, freedom as independence dissociates from the previously referred conceptions of negative freedom by proposing the defining conditions of the concept as the robust absence of the relevant constraints, without any moralized exemption clause.

Heretofore, I have tried to propose distinct negatively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom with unique defining conditions. The common ground of these differing conceptions of individual freedom is the absence of precisely proposed kinds of impediments exercised by the external agents. In other words, ‘the absence of *external* factors which could prevent X, to (not) do or (not) be is equated to individual freedom itself’. Consequently, the referred accounts fundamentally focus on the description and removal of the obstacles while conceptualizing individual freedom. However, it is distinct to assert, ‘the absence of *external* factors which could prevent X, to (not) do or (not) be is equated to individual freedom itself’ than ‘the absence of *all* factors which could prevent X, to (not) do or (not) be is equated to individual freedom itself’. Therefore, the absence of *external* factors should be combined with the absence of *internal* factors to arrive at the absence of *all* factors which could prevent X to (not) do or (not) be. At this point, I will underline the internal factors which I assert as an impediment to individual freedom. Nonetheless, some accounts which propose a negative understanding of individual freedom precisely emphasize the significance of the *absence* of some internal factors on the defining conditions of individual freedom. These accounts underline that even if we include internal factors/forces we are speaking about the need to eliminate an element of constraint if we are to reach individual freedom.

Eric Nelson, as one of the theorists, tries to offer a non-nonnegative (non-positive) way of conceptualizing freedom as self-realization. As he emphasizes, historical figures

⁶ Here the relevant constraints, as they propose, include only intentionally imposed ones or also some non-intentional ones (such as structural constraints, which are by-products of social arrangements).

acknowledged as advocating positive conceptualization of individual freedom include ancient writers such as Plato and Stoics, classical and civic republicans such as Machiavelli and Rousseau, Hegel and Neo-Hegelians. These thinkers emphasize that a free man is who embodies a form of self-realization, independent self-rule, or some state of being reflective of the most rational or virtuous life. However, according to Nelson, this state of being(s) to be reached requires the absence of (internal) barriers (Christman, 2005). What Nelson tries to emphasize is that the quarrel between the negative and the positive conceptualizations is based on the disagreement about constraint not about freedom itself. Since, for Nelson, any kind of constraint (internal and external) is an obstruction of negative freedom, then the accounts of freedom as self-realization constructed in the positive sense fail to isolate a coherent view of liberty that is distinguishable from the absence of constraints (Nelson, 2005). Thus, whatever descriptive condition of positive freedom is set on self-realization, there would be a list of constraints which ontologically emerge as impediments for an individual to follow his self-realized self. "In other words, if doing or being x is man's true nature (i.e., the thing his unobstructed "higher" self would always choose), then anything that might make him do or be "not x" becomes a constraint" (Nelson, 2005, 65). Therefore, according to the negative account of individual freedom as self-realization, the absence of internal obstacles is the fundamental defining condition of the concept. Subsequently, these accounts construe the positive conceptions of individual freedom as self-realization fail to isolate a coherent view of freedom that is distinguishable from negative freedom. As Nelson underlines, in accordance with the emphasized perception above, "positive liberty is merely disguised negative liberty because all claims that freedom is a positive state can be reanalyzed into the idea that freedom is nothing more than the removal of all obstacles to that state" (Christman, 2005, 82). On the contrary, some theorists suggest that positive freedom is not in any sense an absence, but rather the affirmative achievement of self-realization which is therefore distinct from negative freedom as a genuine second "concept" of freedom. The next part of this chapter will be dedicated to highlight the positively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom proposed as a distinct concept of the individual freedom notion.

2.2.1.2 Positive Understanding of Individual Freedom and Different Conceptualizations of the Notion

From the Berlinian sense, negative understanding of freedom grounds on "the claim that the liberty of a person is strictly a function of the restraints that the agent faces in carrying out her decisions (however the concept of a restraint is construed)" (Christman,

1991, 343). In the previous parts of this chapter, distinct negatively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom are introduced with reference to the type of impediments that they propose. Respectively, these accounts set the fundamental defining conditions of their proposed negative conceptions as the absence of these precise impediments. Therefore, one common ground of these conceptions is that individual freedom is a 'freedom from' concept which signifies an absence of mostly external but in some conceptions of internal impediments.

The core ground of positive freedom as a distinct concept of individual freedom is to emphasize that absence of all kinds of impediments as the defining condition of individual freedom is inadequate to fully grasp the individual freedom concept. Thereupon, some thinkers introduce a positive understanding of the individual freedom notion, underlined by Berlin as a 'freedom to' concept, as a distinct conceptualization of the notion from the negative conceptualization of it. This underlined 'freedom to' aspect of the positive freedom concept is set as 'freedom to' self-realization. Respectively, distinct conceptions of positive freedom ground on the precisely disparate defining conditions that the thinkers propose as self-realization.

Returning back to the proposition 'the absence of *all* factors which could prevent X, to (not) do or (not) be is equated to individual freedom itself', positive conceptions of individual freedom focus on the X itself instead of focusing on the factors preventing X to (not) do or (not) be. If we take this one step further, these accounts count the complex set of functioning capacities and the forces that condition them in the calculation of the freedom of X, the agent. The crucial point here is that X and the self-realization status of X is the primary defining condition of the individual freedom of X. Thereupon, I will dedicate the further parts of this section to the details of the distinct positively constructed conceptualizations of individual freedom which propose various aspects towards the descriptive elements of self-realization.

Doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with the exercise of control over one's life. The exercise emphasis here signifies that one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. The concept of freedom here is an exercise-concept. By contrast, doctrines of negative freedom are concerned with opportunities open to the agents in which being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do without interference, whether or not we do anything to exercise these options. The concept of freedom here is an opportunity-concept. Charles Taylor is the thinker who differentiates negative and positive freedom conceptions by claiming that positive freedom being an exercise concept is distinct from negative freedom which is an opportunity concept (Taylor, 1985). "Taylor suggests that positive liberty is not in any sense an absence, but is rather the affirmative achievement of self-realization. It is therefore, in his view,

incompatible with negative liberty, a genuine second "concept" of freedom" (Nelson, 2005, 63). Hence, the significance that Taylor dedicates to *exercise* precisely grounds on the view that if an agent is totally unaware of her potential, if this agent is paralyzed by the fear of overruling a norm which does not authentically reflect her, some degree of exercise is necessary for this agent to be considered as free (Taylor, 1985). Thus, Taylor explicitly highlights that the negative conceptions of individual freedom are inadequate because they prioritize the absence of impediments which are accordingly construed as having opportunities that are free from any kind of obstacles. However, as Taylor suggests:

For freedom now involves my being able to recognize adequately my more important purposes, and my being able to overcome or at least neutralize my motivational fetters, as well as my way being free of external obstacles. But clearly the first condition (and, I would argue, also the second) requires me to have become something, to have achieved a certain condition of self-clairvoyance and self-understanding. I must be actually exercising self-understanding in order to be truly or fully free. I can no longer understand freedom just as an opportunity-concept. (Taylor, 1985, 228-9)

As the passage above suggests, to be ultimately free the priority condition is to have some kind of self-realization in order to be aware of the internal and external impediments. Here, I want to underline that the presence of external impediments is dependent on the external factors and the removal of these external impediments are acknowledged to be independent of the agent itself. However, the presence of the internal impediments is dependent on the agent itself. Therefore, some negative accounts of individual freedom emphasize that the removal and respectively the absence of internal obstacles are equated to be fully free. Yet, Taylor underlines "being in a position to exercise freedom, having the opportunity, involves removing the internal barriers; and this is not possible without having to some extent realized myself" (Taylor, 1985, 213). Thereupon, some kind of a self-realization, in Taylor's sense being able to recognize adequately the more important purposes, and being able to overcome or at least neutralize the motivational fetters, is an essential defining condition of individual freedom conceptualized in the positive sense.

A possible challenge that Taylor faces is how to set the defining conditions of self-realization which leads to the positive conception of individual freedom. Thus, negative accounts of individual freedom, precisely underline that "no valid guidance can be provided in principle by social authority, because of human diversity and originality, and hold that the attempt to impose such guidance will destroy other necessary conditions of freedom" (Taylor, 1985, 217). This is what Berlin, along with the other thinkers, underlines when he speculates

about the possible dangers of the totalitarian theories of positive freedom. Taylor being aware of this danger offers a path from the negative to the positive conception of individual freedom which “moves us from a notion of freedom as doing what one wants to a notion which discriminates motivations and equates freedom with doing what we really want, or obeying our real will, or truly directing our lives” (Taylor, 1985, 217). Respectively, following this path will lead to an exercise-concept of individual freedom that bases on the discrimination among motivations. Accordingly, Taylor accentuates that there must be some qualitative discriminations as to motives. This proposition makes Taylor’s conception of positive freedom to be a value-based account in a sense that some activities and goals are highly significant for human beings and others are less so (Taylor, 1985). Essentially, he asks what lies behind judging certain purposes/feelings as more significant than others? Then he answers as the reflection on this kind of a significance grounds on the fact of strong evaluation. Thus, according to Taylor, strong evaluation is the consideration of human subjects as not only subjects of first-order desires but also of second-order desires which is desires about desires. He relates strong evaluation to freedom by underlining that our attributions of freedom make sense against a background sense of more and less significant purposes (Taylor, 1985). Respectively, freedom and unfreedom is tied up with the frustration/fulfilment of our purposes. Hence, as Taylor emphasizes “our significant purposes can be frustrated by our own desires, and where these are sufficiently based on misappreciation, we consider them as not really ours, and experience them as fetters” (Taylor, 1985, 227).

Taylor makes a distinction between import-attributing desires and the real desires. Subsequently, he describes real desires as “are of great significance for me, meet important, long-lasting needs, represent a fulfilment of something central to me, will bring me closer to what I really am, or something of the sort” (Taylor, 1985, 224) and import attributing desires as the desires and feelings which we can experience mistakenly. The crucial point here to be free, in the Taylorian sense of positive freedom, is to identify with the real desires. For instance, if I have two desires that I identify myself with, even if they are in conflict with each other and even if they are painful or fateful, we can not talk about lesser freedom. This is the case of a genuine conflict in which both desires belong to the agent. On the other hand, if there is an import-attributing desire that an agent feels fettered by, then we can talk about a lesser freedom because this is a desire that the agent wants to repudiate.

All in all, Taylor explicitly proposes a distinct concept of individual freedom, value-based positive freedom, which grounds on the adequate recognition of the more important purposes and on the ability of overcoming or at least naturalization of the motivational fetters. Correspondingly, in his conception of individual freedom, the fundamental priority condition of these two grounds to be reached requires an agent to

become something, to achieve a certain level of self-realization and self-understanding which includes a kind of an exercise that goes beyond being in the state of opportunities in order to be truly or fully free. Hence, the conceptions of positive freedom proposed by the traditional theorists relied upon the regulation of the 'lower' animalistic desires in order to have individual freedom grounded on the 'higher-self'. However, as John Christman underlines "not all actions that result from "uncontrollable" impulses should plausibly be counted as unfree" (Christman, 1991, 351). Subsequently, Christman suggests a conception of positive freedom which prioritizes how effective agents' desire change takes place. There should be a preference formation process. This preference formation process grounds on the factors and forces that demonstrate the changes in an agent's preference set. Subsequently, an agent's freedom will be manifested through her reflection and resistance towards these factors and forces that demonstrate the change(s).

Integrating the desires to the context of preference formation Christman explicitly underlines that the crucial parameter to participate in the development of a desire is to be in the position to focus on the processes and conditions that lead to the adaptation of that desire. This position is reached when there is a relevantly complete description of the steps of reasoning or the causal processes that lead the agent to have this desire as available for her possible consideration. Eventually, Christman with consideration of individual autonomy to be relevant within the context of positive individual freedom, underlines that the motivating idea behind his conception is that "autonomy is achieved when an agent is in a position to be aware of the changes and development of her character and of why these changes come about" (Christman, 1991, 348) and he proposes a minimal rationality condition involved in the self-reflection process of beliefs and desires. Respectively, he sets this minimal rationality condition to 'internalist' or 'subjective' accounts and 'externalist' or 'objective' accounts. The blatant way of capturing the distinction between internalist and externalist conceptions of rationality is that the internalist account requires an action to be grounded on reason that fulfils the requirement of consistency, on the other hand the externalist account requires an action to be grounded on reason that involves knowledge of the truth about the world and morality (Christman, 1991).

According to Christman, the procedural conditions necessary for the development of the desires of the autonomous self should include (only) minimal internalist rationality which he equates with consistent beliefs and transitive desires. One crucial detail that makes the positive freedom conception of Christman as value-neutral is his rejection of the external value requirement. Thus, external value requirement, in here, could be equated to the 'higher-self' emphasis prioritized by the distinct positive conceptions. Thus, all of these positive conceptions put externally set conditions/requirements such as reason, moral

values, relational values, etc. in order to reach to the 'higher-self'. However, in Christman's view:

If the desires and values that a person develops are generated in accordance with the procedural conditions of autonomous preference formation that are constitutive of freedom, then no matter what the "content" of those desires, the actions which they stimulate will be (positively) free. (Christman, 1991, 359)

Therefore, as he highlights, any action-based on a desire, developed within the autonomous preference formation process, will not be counted as positively unfree no matter how evil, self-sacrificing or slavish that desire is. Consequently, what Christman proposes is a value-neutral conception of positive individual freedom which prioritizes the autonomous preference formation process that grounds on the minimal internal rationality instead of prioritizing externally constructed set of values as a defining condition of positive individual freedom.

Eventually, I have tried to propose a conceptual theoretical journey through the distinct conceptions of the individual freedom notion, departing from the 'positive' and 'negative' freedom distinction that is popularized by Berlin (1969) within the contemporary political philosophy scene. The precise individual freedom conceptions that I have made a part of this journey either proposed a positive understanding of the concept or a negative understanding of it. However, there are some conceptions of individual freedom which suggest a conceptualization of the notion that is beyond the negative or positive understanding of freedom. The next part of this chapter will be dedicated to the mentioned contemporary conceptions of individual freedom.

2.2.2 Theories Beyond Two Concepts of Freedom

There are some conceptions of individual freedom which neither have a positive nor a negative understanding of the notion. These conceptions prioritize alternative aspects to play a crucial role as the defining conditions of the individual freedom notion. In order to propose a comprehensive journey on the contemporary conceptualizations of the individual freedom notion, I will try to underline, below, the conceptions which go beyond the two concepts of freedom.

S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein in a joint article that they have published (1971), as a revised definition of their previous accounts of individual freedom, characterize being free as "to be able to choose among available courses bearing in mind their expected

consequences both good and ill” (Benn & Weinstein, 1971, 198). In accordance, freedom is construed as “the non-restriction of options, rather than as the absence of impediments” (Benn & Weinstein, 1971, 201). Therefore, the accounts that set the defining conditions of individual freedom as the absence of impediments are unsatisfactory if there are no restrictions of choice by making alternatives unavailable. They delineate their conception by highlighting that the range of alternatives open to an agent does not depend on the agent's preference for one or another. This subsequently means that the availability of the range of alternatives, independent from the preference of the agent, is a defining condition of the individual freedom concept.

Their concern focuses on distinguishing the agent who acts in one way just because she has only one possibility of action left open to her, from the agent who would act in that same one way although there are more possibilities of action (Benn & Weinstein, 1971). Correspondingly, they propose some cases which can be qualified as instances of unfreedom, which restrict choice by making alternatives unavailable or ineligible (Benn & Weinstein, 1971). The crucial condition as an instance of unfreedom then is the impossibility of choice. Therefore, the thinkers underline that any additional motive for action (any kind of fear but precisely the fear of punishment or any kind of reward) makes an agent no less free. This is the case concretely because although there are subjectivity grounded consequences of the minimally rational choices, it does not change the status of the choice as being available and possible.

E. F. Rosenbaum (2000), more recently, proposes a conception of an option-based individual freedom which grounds on the cruciality of the range of the available/possible options. According to his account of individual freedom, if an agent has a set of possible choices of action which are identical to each other, although there are more than one options, that agent can not be considered to possess a freedom of choice. On the other hand, if an agent has at least two different actions possible or available then that agent can be considered as possessing a freedom of choice. Here, I want to underline that option-based conceptions of the notion, equates individual freedom to the availability/possibility of the options to be chosen, therefore they equate individual freedom to freedom of choice. To express it more explicitly Rosenbaum states that if, *ceteris paribus*, the range of choices A contains is greater than the range of choices contained in the rival set B, then a choice set A offers more freedom than the rival set B, “where range has to be understood as the greatest possible distance between two elements of each set in terms of the characteristics of the elements under study, that is as the distance between the most extreme elements of the set” (Rosenbaum, 2000, 216). Subsequently, option-based conceptions of individual freedom give priority to availability of options to act, the possibility

of options to act and/or the range of the available options to act while setting the defining conditions of the concept.

One other account of individual freedom which conceptualizes individual freedom beyond the two distinct understandings of the notion is the account of 'Freedom as Ownness'. Thus, the German philosopher, Max Stirner, in *The Ego and its Own* (1844 [1995]), argued that the external conditions and standards such as normative ideals, the presence of laws and institutions, actions of others, rational and moral norms, determining the standards of the extent of individual freedom, disempower the individual herself and her capacities for freedom. These external standards and conditions are contemplated as the limiting factors of individual freedom. Therefore, he proposes an alternative notion of *Eigenheit* (ownness), a radical understanding of autonomy and self-ownership, as a defining condition of the individual freedom concept.

Saul Newman introduces Stirner's notion of ownness to the contemporary political philosophy scene as an alternative paradigm which is not reducible to neither negative nor positive freedom (Newman, 2017). According to Newman, ownness is an ontological freedom which grounds on the radical form of individualism and self-possession. Although it is not easy to situate the notion within the existing normative and conceptual frameworks, ownness presents a way of rethinking freedom as independent from external conditions and from higher moral, rational ideals. The priority reason behind embracing the notion of ownness as a defining condition of individual freedom is that within the contemporary neoliberal context as Newman states:

Freedom is turned into an ideal to be attained, and in tying it to a certain institutional regime or form of society, one essentially alienates freedom from the individual. This is why, according to Stirner, freedom appears to us moderns increasingly as an empty, hollow dream, a mystification. (Newman, 2017, 6)

However, ownness as a radical form of self-ownership and as a form of freedom promotes self-defining and self-constituting forms of subjectivity independent from any higher moral and rational ideal that the individual is forced to internalize. Here, as claimed by Newman, ownness appears as a better alternative conception of individual freedom precisely because ownness is an experience of freedom that is established on the unique actuality and singularity of the individual experience (Newman, 2017). Therefore, an agent is considered as free when she constitutes alternative modes of subjectivity. This subjectivity is created by the mastery of the instincts, passions and desires which is the opposite of the 'possessedness' that signifies the mastery of one's externally shaped desires and passions over the agent herself (Newman, 2017). Accordingly, the individual within the context of

ownness is not a fixed or an idealised subject but an always becoming self-constituting immanence. This is the liberated individual of the ownness conception of individual freedom that is utterly distinct from the self-interested individual invoked in the concept of negative freedom and the so-called authentic-self invoked in the concept of positive freedom. Consequently, ownness conception of individual freedom which proposes a radical understanding of autonomy and self-ownership goes beyond the two conceptions of individual freedom and introduces a unique conceptualization of the notion.

Another account that conceptualizes individual freedom beyond the two conceptions of the notion is introduced by Gerald MacCallum (1967) as a triadic relational conception of individual freedom. Hence, MacCallum proposes a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of individual freedom as a value-neutral philosophical construction of the concept that abstracts from the substantive individual freedom conceptions by articulating a triadic syntax. He introduces his conception as:

Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something.' Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something; it is a triadic relation. Taking the format "x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z," x ranges over agents, y ranges over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance. (MacCallum, 1967, 314)

Thus, he proposes a single concept of freedom grounding on this referred triadic relation and he highlights that there is a whole range of possible interpretations or 'conceptions' of this single concept of freedom. Therefore, he dissolves the dichotomy between 'positive' and 'negative' freedom by underlining that freedom is as always one and the same triadic relation and distinct conceptions of freedom are constructed on these specifications on the agents, preventing conditions and doings/becomings. It can be contemplated that what MacCallum proposes is a formal and a schematic base which can embody different precise conceptualizations of individual freedom. Subsequently, the full specification of the mentioned three elements (agents, preventing conditions, and doings/becomings) can be acknowledged as unique conceptions that are compatible with this broad concept (List & Valentini, 2016a).

What Berlin does by introducing two concepts of liberty is to normatively theorize on the individual freedom concept. He depicts certain influential and divergent ethical visions

that employ different conceptions of freedom. Consequently, the two dyadic relation that he proposes (freedom from and freedom to) is insufficient to fully embody the individual freedom concept. “He can, at most, be said to be attending to, or emphasizing the importance of only one part of what is always present in any case of freedom” (MacCallum, 1967, 318). On the other hand, MacCallum proposes a metatheoretical concept in which he introduces a basic conceptual structure that fully embodies the crucial elements of the individual freedom concept. Hence, the triadic relational conception of individual freedom offers a shared structure that is common to a set of different conceptions and that allows the mutual recognition of all the conceptions of freedom including positive and negative freedom conceptions. Therefore, it is neutral towards any type of individual freedom conception such as value-based or non-value-based conceptions (Carter, 2015). Accordingly, the triadic concept creates a structural common ground for distinct conceptions of individual freedom in order to make their respective nature apparent by bringing out their different specifications of X (agents), Y (preventing conditions as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers), and Z (actions or conditions of character or circumstance).

However, in order to propose the schematic organization of the conceptual elements as a common ground for all the conceptions of individual freedom, the triadic relation should include all the sufficient parameters involved in the concept. Thereupon, the elements that are included to the schematic organization should involve all the defining conditions of the previous conceptions of individual freedom. For instance, Gideon Elford, following Taylor’s exercise-concept of freedom, claims that exercise-freedom consists in individual’s acting in certain ways not, as underlined by the opportunity-freedom, consists in the absence of constraints. Therefore, to frame the positive conceptions acknowledged in the exercise-freedom sense in terms of the triadic framework is to overlook the structural distinctness of the exercise-based conception of individual freedom (Elford, 2012). Thus, not only Elford but also Taylor suggests that positive freedom is not in any sense an absence but is rather the affirmative achievement of self-realization (Taylor, 1985). Departing from the common emphasis above, Elford criticizes the triadic conception of individual freedom as being static by identifying individual freedom with the absence of constraints and as overlooking the dynamic nature of the positive understanding of individual freedom (Elford, 2012).

Yet, there is another way of construing Elford’s insight which is that the dynamic nature of the positive understanding of freedom can be represented through the value-based parameter that we dedicate to the X element of the triadic relation which signifies the range of the agents whose individual freedom is on issue. Subsequently, the X as an agent could be considered as in the constant process of becoming. An individual in the process of this becoming can either be interpreted to be in the path to self-realization or not, or can be

interpreted to be self-realized or not. Thus, the X element of the triadic formulation will be emphasized in more detail in an interpretative nature in the further parts of this research. Here, I just wanted to infer that MacCallum's conception of individual freedom captures the exercise-based self-realization aspect of the individual freedom concept (mostly bolstered by the positive theorists) represented by the X element of the triadic relationship. All in all, as asserted MacCallum introduces a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of individual freedom as a value-neutral philosophical construction of the concept by articulating a triadic syntax. He proposes his individual freedom conception as a metatheoretical concept which inaugurates the mutual recognition path for the distinct conceptions of individual freedom. The syntax that he proposed takes the format of "X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, become, not become) Z" (MacCallum, 1967, 314). The elements of the formulation according to MacCallum are sufficient enough and uniquely necessary to conceptualize the individual freedom notion and the specification of these elements leads to the particular and distinct conceptions of individual freedom within the contemporary political philosophy context. Subsequently, the formulation captures negative and positive freedom camps since it entails both the removal of obstacles and the consideration of the capacity to think and act to attain certain goals along with the theories beyond two concepts of freedom.

I will dedicate the next section of this chapter to introduce a particular formulation of restriction of individual freedom departing from MacCallum's triadic relational formulation. I will proceed with situating the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom that I have included to this chapter within this formula with reference to the restrictive factors of individual freedom that they propose so that I can introduce the original contributions of cinematic philosophy as distinct types of restriction of individual freedom.

2.3 Contemporary Theories on the Restriction of Individual Freedom

In the previous parts of this chapter, I tried to underline the diverse conceptions of individual freedom with reference to the precise elements that they set as defining conditions of the notion. I dedicated a detailed reading on these distinct conceptions precisely because I consider all of these accounts to be inadequate to capture some contemporary novel aspects while setting the defining conditions of individual freedom. I will try to underline their inadequacy with reference to the restrictive factors that they propose as a reflection of the defining conditions that they set on the individual freedom concept. In order to do this, in this part of my research, I will try to highlight and group the restrictive conditions of individual

freedom departing from the conceptions that I have underlined. I will use the word 'restriction' within the context of this research as a limiting condition, since individual freedom is in the broadest sense acknowledged as a notion that ontologically can be present without a limit, a limit construed in various distinct senses. Even, individual freedom construed as a goal to be attained, if you are in the status of not being in the status of that goal, then there is a limiting condition to be in the status of that goal. Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the limiting conditions of individual freedom in order to grasp the presence status of individual freedom. Thus, contemporary political philosophers, aware of this emphasis, mostly focus on the limiting conditions of individual freedom while proposing their conceptions of the notion. So as to say, every conception of individual freedom that I emphasized in the previous parts of this chapter can be read and differentiated through the restrictive conditions that they propose. Since, I try to propose a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which I construe as overlooked by the literature, I will re-situate the conceptions that I referred to with reference to the restrictive conditions that they have as a component of their defining conditions. Consequently, in order to grasp and situate the conceptions in a more organized way, I will propose an inductively established relational formulation. The aim of this proposal is to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of the restriction of individual freedom and to situate these distinct conceptions within this organizational scheme.

2.3.1 The Formula of the Restriction of Individual Freedom

I will depart from MacCallum's triadic relational formulation while structuring the formula of restriction of individual freedom. Consequently, I want to return back to the formulation of McCallum which is:

X is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z," x ranges over agents, y ranges over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance. (MacCallum, 1967, 314)

Here, there are X, Y and Z parameters to be involved as the defining elements of individual freedom. Since, my formulation is grounded on the restriction of individual freedom and the priority is dedicated to the limiting conditions and elements, I use X and Y parameters as the defining elements of the restriction of individual freedom and I integrate the Z element of

MacCallum's formulation to the X and Y elements of my formulation. I will get into the details of this kind of an integration in the further parts of this section. My formulation is as it goes:

The restriction of Individual freedom of X by Y

Here, X primarily is the individual (the agent), since the scope of this thesis is set on the notion of individual freedom. However, in order to integrate the Z element along with the integration of the exercise-freedom conception of individual freedom to the formulation, I add an extra value-based parameter to the X factor, to the individual. Y ranges over primarily the limiting conditions of the individual freedom of X.

In order to specify the formulation that I propose, I will get into the details of the defining conditions involved in the formulation. X element, as I explicitly expressed, is the individual. However, I add a crucial parameter to the X element of my formulation. The fundamental reason behind this attempt is the aim of setting the defining conditions of the formulation to inductively cover all the scope of the contemporary theories on the restriction of individual freedom. Besides, the value-based parameter that I add to the X element is the crucial component of the novel overlooked type of restriction of freedom that I aim to propose as a contribution of cinematic philosophy. The value-based parameter that I add to the X element of the formulation is being *cognizant or incognizant*. Within the context of this thesis, cognizant is construed as being aware which is inferred to inductively represent the distinct conceptions of individual freedom that are set on the ranges of the term variables that is grounded on the 'real' identities of the agents whose freedom is in question and this kind of a value based parameter also is set according to either individuals are cognizant of the restrictive factors or incognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom. Besides an individual being cognizant or not, would include the Z factor of MacCallum's formulation. Thus, 'freedom to' in MacCallum's formulations ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance (MacCallum, 1967). Hence, contemporary positive conceptions of individual freedom set the defining conditions of individual freedom concept as 'freedom to' the term variables that is grounded on the 'real' identities, however construed. Therefore, the status of agency, in qualitative matters, of X, as being cognizant or incognizant represents the status of the level of either being reached to the real identity or not. Consequently, it represents either Z or non-Z. In the dyadic syntax that I propose, Y ranges over primarily the limiting conditions of the individual freedom of X. Here again, in order to set the defining conditions of the formulation to inductively cover all the scope of the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom and accordingly of restriction of individual freedom, I assign Y to be represented as the *internal factors* and the *external factors*. As I have underlined before, I partially integrate the Z element of MacCallum's formulation to the

Y element of my formulation. Hence, contemporary negative conceptions of individual freedom set the defining conditions of individual freedom concept as *freedom from* the limiting factors. Respectively, the removal of the Y element, the restriction, can be represented as Z, however construed. From this perspective, no precision of Z is necessary but in the relational sense the restriction by Y will automatically represent non-Z. Since the focus of this research is precisely set on the restrictive parameters of individual freedom, partial integration of the Z parameter is a sufficient condition to proceed with the relational formula that I propose. Therefore, I consider the integration of the Z element of MacCallum's formulation as sufficient enough and therefore compatible with my formula: The *restriction of individual freedom of X by Y*.

2.3.2 Situating the Contemporary Theories within the Formula of the Restriction of Individual Freedom

In this section, I will try to situate the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom due to the restrictive conditions that they propose within the formula that I present. Here, as I have stated before, my aim is to offer an inductively established relational formulation, in order to situate these conceptions within an organizational scheme which is based upon the types of restriction of individual freedom. Subsequently, I will introduce a novel type of a restriction of individual freedom that is not embodied by the contemporary conceptions of the notion.

2.3.2.1 Restriction of Individual Freedom of (*simpliciter/cognizant*) X by External Factors(Y)

Negative understanding of individual freedom and the conceptions of the notion proposed from this perception, in the broadest sense, prioritize the Y element, the external factors, while defining the restrictive conditions of individual freedom. Generally, the scope that is set by Berlin in the first place is the restriction of individual freedom of X by interference, however construed. For instance, pure negative conceptions of the notion precisely focus on the restrictions of individual freedom that render a great number of actions on an agent's part *physically impossible*. Here, it can be claimed that the pure negative conceptions of individual freedom can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of X (simpliciter) by impediments to physical action*. X simpliciter here, precisely because X being cognizant or incognizant has no effect as a restrictive element. Option-based individual freedom conceptions follow the same lines. These conceptions

underline that the range of alternatives open to an agent does not depend on the agent's preference for one or another. Therefore, the option-based individual freedom conceptions can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of X (simpliciter) by restriction of the options*.

Value-based market-oriented conceptions of individual freedom put more emphasis on the X element of the equation. Thus, according to Hayek freedom belongs to, and the concept of individual freedom properly applies to agents who choose, think and act. Accordingly, Hayek accentuates the essentiality of individual's wills and values as a defining condition of the individual freedom concept. Only external impediments grounded on the will of another agent which are not compatible with the rule of law are considered as a coercion of individual freedom as an interference to it. Also, Nozick underlines that individual freedom is a state in which a man is not subject to interference by the arbitrary will of another. Nozick describes the states in which an individual is coerced by the arbitrary will of another with reference to conditional proposal. Respectively, for any given proposal, that proposal can be classified as either coercive or uncoercive according to whether it counts as a threat or as an offer (Haworth, 1990). For instance, if the proposal makes the consequence of Q's action, suppose Q accepts the proposal, worse than the pre-proposal state, it is a threat. Therefore, value-based market-oriented conceptions of individual freedom can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by the subjection to the will of others that is not compatible with the rule of law or by the arbitrary will of another through threats*. Here, I explicitly set the value to cognizant because in these precise conceptions X is considered as having the capacity to set her will as a being who chooses, thinks and acts, subsequently considered as cognizant of these external restrictive factors. Therefore, the mentioned external factors are the priority reason that restricts the individual freedom of X who is cognizant of these external factors.

The general scope of the republican conceptions of freedom establishes on the emphasis that freedom is the independence from the arbitrary will of other agents regardless of whether or not interference occurs. So, it is the robust absence of constraints that differentiates the republican accounts proposed as non-domination from non-interference accounts. The republican accounts also underline that the mere awareness of living under an arbitrary power is a restriction of individual freedom (Skinner, 2002). Therefore, it can be stated that the republican conceptions of freedom proposes X as cognizant. However, they contemplate arbitrary power as:

If the person wielding it is capable of interfering with others, with impunity, solely on the basis of his or her own arbitrium or will, and hence with no obligation to take into account the interests of those subject to the interference. (Skinner, 2002, 248)

Subsequently, independent of X being cognizant or not if there is an arbitrary will of another agent, it is the cause of the restriction. Here, there are two aspects: one situates X as cognizant, the other situates X as simpliciter. However, one other detail these accounts add to their conceptions is that any domination becomes non-domination, if it tracks the avowed or avowal-ready interests of its citizens. Thereupon, this condition ontologically situates the X to have an interest so that the avowed or avowal ready interests are set accordingly. As I construe it, the republican conceptions put a minimal account of reason to their understanding of interest. Respectively, they attribute some kind of a reason-based awareness to the agents. Consequently, although republican conceptions can propose X as simpliciter, it is more accurate to consider that they propose X as cognizant. Then, republican conception of individual freedom can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by robust presence of arbitrary domination and interference that do not track the avowed or avowal-ready interests of X*. On the other hand, the account that proposes freedom as independence criticizes the republican accounts on the grounds that they put so much emphasis on the arbitrariness considering it as a moralized exemption clause. Therefore, they propose their conception as the robust absence of constraints simpliciter (rather than of arbitrary constraints) (List & Valentini, 2016a). Thereupon, freedom as independence conception of individual freedom can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of X (simpliciter) by robust presence of the relevant constraints⁷, without any moralized exemption clause*.

In this section of my research, I tried to situate the distinct contemporary conceptions of individual freedom with reference to the restrictive defining conditions they propose to the formula of *restriction of individual freedom of X by external factors(Y)* In the next section, I will try to situate some other conceptions of individual freedom to the formula of *restriction of individual freedom of (Incognizant/Cognizant) X by internal factors(Y)*.

2.3.2.2 Restriction of Individual Freedom of (incognizant) X by Internal Factors(Y)

Positive understanding of individual freedom and the conceptions of the notion proposed from this perception, in the broadest sense, prioritize the X element, while defining the restrictive conditions of individual freedom. Thus, the general scope of positive freedom that is set by Berlin in the first place is freedom of X as self-mastery. It is the affirmative achievement of self-mastery. This self-mastery concept can be construed as the ranges of

⁷ Here the relevant constraints, as they propose, include only intentionally imposed ones or also some non-intentional ones (such as structural constraints, which are by-products of social arrangements).

the term variables that are grounded on the 'real' identities of the agents whose freedom is in question. The priority reason for this clarification is that every conception that focuses on the X element uniquely sets the defining conditions of self-mastery, however construed. Hence, as I underlined before, the perception grounded on self-mastery through reason is one of the most prominent accounts of the discussions based on freedom. Thus, desires are considered as a part of the "lower-self" which must be trained towards the "higher-self", the rational self. Starting with the Ancient times, especially in the eighteenth century, and still within some of the contemporary debates based on the conceptualization of individual freedom, this perception is commonly prioritized.

The significance dedicated to reason as the dominant determinant of freedom, made most of the discussions on the issue disregard the influence of desires on the self-realization process of the individuals. Respectively, some theorists underline some precise factors that restrict this kind of self-mastery, self-realization, self-awareness, self-government, etc. These factors are asserted as desires, inauthenticity, false consciousness, etc. Therefore, generally individual freedom is equated to absence of internal constraints and the precise specification of these internal constraints set the grounds of the different conceptions of individual freedom. For instance, thinkers such as Plato and Stoics, classical and civic republicans such as Machiavelli and Rousseau, Hegel and Neo-Hegelians accentuate that a free man is who embodies a form of self-realization, independent self-rule, or some state of being reflective of the most rational or virtuous life (Christman, 2005). Thus, according to Eric Nelson this state of being(s) to be reached requires the absence of internal barriers in general sense. Consequently, if X has an internal constraint, then ontologically, X is not cognizant, accordingly not free. With reference to the emphasis above, individual freedom, introduced by Nelson as self-realization, can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors*.

Some doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with exercise of control over one's life. The exercise emphasis here, signifies that one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one's life. Therefore, the status of agency, in qualitative matters, of X, as being cognizant or incognizant represents the status of the level of either being reached to the real identity or not. Subsequently, it represents either being free or not in the positive sense. As Taylor underlines individual freedom requires an individual to have achieved a certain condition of self-clairvoyance and self-understanding. Thereupon, some kind of a self-realization, in Taylor's sense being able to recognize adequately the more important purposes and being able to overcome or at least neutralize the motivational fetters, is an essential defining condition of individual freedom conceptualized in the positive sense (Taylor, 1985). Therefore, Taylor accentuates that there must be some qualitative discriminations as to motives.

This proposition makes Taylor's conception of positive freedom to be a value-based account in a sense that some activities and goals are highly significant for human beings and others are less so (Taylor, 1985). He equates these mentioned activities and goals to real desires which represent fulfilment of something central to the individual. On the other hand, he considers import attributing desires as emotional fetters that are experienced mistakenly. Thereupon, if an individual, in qualitative matters, is motivated by the fetters and import-attributing desires, then he is not a cognizant agent. Consequently, if X is motivated by the real desires, she is cognizant, then she is free. On the contrary, if X is motivated by the fetters and import-attributing desires then she is not free. Here, freedom is equated, as a state of effective agency, to being cognizant or not. Automatically, if X is contemplated as being cognizant then there is no restriction of individual freedom in any sense. Therefore, with reference to the emphasis above, individual freedom, introduced by Taylor, as an exercise concept can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by motivational fetters and import-attributing desires*. Here, one clause should be opened because the crucial point of Taylor's formulation is the achievement of a cognizant X. Therefore, any state of X that is not cognizant unquestionably brings about an unfree X and the unfree X is unfree due to motivational fetters and import-attributing desires.

Newman, departing from Stirner's work (1844 [1995]), proposes the defining condition of cognizant X as ownness which grounds on a radical form of individualism and self-possession. According to Newman, external conditions and standards such as normative ideals, the presence of laws and institutions, actions of others, rational and moral norms, determining the standards of the extent of individual freedom, disempower the individual herself and her capacities for freedom. Therefore, an agent is considered as free when she liberates herself from the forms of identity, which involves the sacrifice of the individual to a moral or rational abstraction that has been imposed upon her by the contemporary forms of governmentality. Thus, if X is an agent sacrificing her authentic-self by internalizing the forms of identity imposed by the system, then X is an incognizant agent. Respectively, if X achieves this kind of a form of individualism through liberation then X is a cognizant agent. Like Taylor's conception, Newman's proposal equates individual freedom, as a state of ownness, to being cognizant or not. Consequently, if X is contemplated as being cognizant then there is no restriction of individual freedom in any sense because then X is contemplated to be in the state of ownness. Therefore, individual freedom, introduced by Newman as ownness, can be situated in the formula as *restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by the sacrifice of the self to the external conditions and standards such as normative ideals, laws and institutions, actions of others, rational and moral norms, forms of identity and forms of governmentality*.

As I have already emphasized, there is a value-based evaluation of the desires and the lower-desires, construed as uncontrollable impulses, are ontologically seen as a restrictive factor of individual freedom. However, Christman underlines that “not all actions that result from "uncontrollable" impulses should plausibly be counted as unfree” (Christman, 1991, 351). Accordingly, Christman suggests a conception of positive freedom which prioritizes how effective agents’ desire change takes place. This effective agency is manifested here not only as one's internal or psychological capacities to govern oneself but also as one's ability to carry out one's wishes through action in the world (Christman, 2005). This process of desire changes ground on the steps of reasoning or the causal processes that lead the agent to have this desire as available for her possible consideration. Consequently, in Christman's view:

If the desires and values that a person develops are generated in accordance with the procedural conditions of autonomous preference formation that are constitutive of freedom, then no matter what the "content" of those desires, the actions which they stimulate will be (positively) free. (Christman, 1991, 359)

Therefore, as he highlights, any action based on a desire, developed within the autonomous preference formation process, will not be counted as positively unfree no matter how evil, self-sacrificing or slavish that desire is. However, the development of the desires of the autonomous self should include (only) minimal internalist rationality which he equates with consistent beliefs and transitive desires. Therefore, X is cognizant if and only if the values and the desires of X are generated in accordance with the procedural conditions of autonomous preference formation that grounds on the minimal internal rationality. Respectively, X is incognizant, ontologically, just because her values and desires are not generated in accordance with the procedural conditions of autonomous preference formation mentioned above. Thereupon, individual freedom, introduced by Christman as effective agency, can be situated in the formula *as restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by the values and the desires that are not generated in accordance with procedural conditions of autonomous preference formation that grounds on the minimal internal rationality.*

Ultimately, I have tried to situate the contemporary conceptions of individual freedom with reference to the restrictive conditions that they propose within the formula that I offer which is the *restriction of individual freedom of X by Y*. As I have stated previously, my aim is to offer an inductively established relational formulation, in order situate these conceptions within an organizational scheme that is based upon the types of restriction of individual freedom. With reference to the journey, I proposed within the contemporary individual freedom literature, I detect a novel type of a restriction of individual freedom which is not

embodied by the contemporary literature. In the next section, I will try to introduce this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom.

2.4 A Novel Type of Restriction of Individual Freedom: Restriction of individual Freedom of (*cognizant*) X by *Internal Factors*(Y)

Formerly, I proposed my formulation as: the *restriction of Individual freedom of X by Y*. Here, X primarily is the individual (the agent), since the scope of this thesis is set on the notion of individual freedom and Y ranges over primarily the limiting conditions of the individual freedom of X. However, I add a crucial parameter to the X element of my formulation. The fundamental reason behind this attempt is the aim of setting the defining conditions of my formulation to inductively cover all the scope of the contemporary theories of the restriction of individual freedom. The value-based parameter that I add to the X element of the formulation is being *cognizant or incognizant*. Within the context of this thesis, cognizant is construed as being aware which is inferred to inductively represent the distinct conceptions of individual freedom which are set on the ranges of the term variables that is grounded on the 'real' identities of the agents whose freedom is in question and this kind of a value based parameter is also set according to either individuals are cognizant of the restrictive factors or incognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom. Ultimately, if all conceptual elements are considered there are four possibilities on the restriction of individual freedom:

- (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*
- (4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

I have situated distinct contemporary conceptions of individual freedom within the taxonomy that I introduced. As underlined, the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion of individual freedom along with the option-based conceptions are considered as an instance of either (1) or (2) and instances of (1) and (2) with reference to the restrictive conditions that they propose as defining factors of their conceptualization of individual freedom. Thus, some of these conceptions are situated in the formula as X *simpliciter* and some of them are situated as *cognizant X*. Yet, these accounts dedicate the focus to the Y element as a restrictive factor of individual freedom. Accordingly, some of these conceptions of individual freedom that I have included within the scope of this

research fall under instances of either (1) or (2) and instances of (1) and (2). It is to say that instances of (1) and (2) embody the option-based conceptions and all the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion. On the other hand, all of the conceptions that have a positive understanding of the notion along with the conception as ownness focus on the X factor and underline that the priority condition of individual freedom is to be cognizant, however construed. Therefore, ontologically, a cognizant X is free. Subsequently, if X is an incognizant agent, then there are some internal factors that restrict her individual freedom. These kinds of conceptions of individual freedom are considered as an instance of (3) since they prioritize the X element which is directly related to the internal factors. Here, it can be inferred that the contemporary literature on individual freedom, in conceptual terms, does not give a space for a cognizant agent to be in the position of restricting her individual freedom. As the contribution of this research, I will introduce a novel type of restriction of individual freedom as an instance of (4) which is *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors*.

2.4.1 The 'X' Factor as Cognizant Agents

As I emphasized previously, almost all of the conceptions that have a positive understanding of the notion focus on the X element of the formulation that I proposed. However, since they acknowledge freedom as the achievement of a cognizant X, any state of X which is not cognizant (incognizant), is a state of non-freedom. This state of non-freedom is due to some internal restrictions. Therefore, ontologically, cognizant X can not have internal restrictions and if X has internal restrictions, then X is by default incognizant. As it is blatantly seen, there is no space for a cognizant X to have internal factors which restrict her individual freedom. However, cognizant agents, construed as being cognizant, can restrict their individual freedoms due to some internal factors.

This is a matter of instance which is overlooked by the literature precisely because of the perception that grounds on the prioritization of minimal but in most cases more than minimal level of reason as a necessity inherent to contemporary culture. Respectively, a cognizant agent having a minimal level of reason, is recognized as an individual that, by nature, would not choose to restrict her individual freedom in any case. However, due to some parameters and practices deep-rooted in contemporary societies, cognizant agents, cognizant in a sense that they fulfil the minimal rationality conditions in conceptual terms, restrict their individual freedoms because of some internal factors. As I propose it, this kind of a restriction became blatant due to the advent of the information and communication societies. I will devote the next chapter to a detailed inquiry dedicated to this emphasis.

Here, the crucial point is that individuals, although they fulfil the self-realization conditions set by contemporary literature as the defining conditions of individual freedom, and accordingly, although they are cognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom, they restrict their individual freedom by some internal factors. Therefore, the *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors* can be incorporated into the literature as a novel kind of a restriction of individual freedom.

2.4.2 Cognizant Agents Restricting Their Individual Freedom by Internal Factors

My claim is that contemporary conceptions of ‘individual freedom’, and the restrictive factors that these conceptions propose have been rendered insufficient with the advent and the rise of information and communication technologies. The priority reason behind this idea is that the novel practices that are performed within and through these technologies are not acknowledged as restrictive factors of individual freedom due to the ontologically liberating nature dedicated to these technologies. Yet, the advent and use of the information and communication technologies created a necessity to revisit and redefine the X factor (the individual) and the Y factor (the restrictive conditions) of the formula that I propose. This necessity is, in my perception, overlooked by the contemporary political philosophical scene due to the change in the perception towards technology with the advent of information and communication technologies. Therefore, my aim is to underline the effects of this change on individual freedom, especially on the restrictive factors of individual freedom in order to indicate the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies which eventually is construed to trigger a new kind of a restriction of individual freedom.

This novel type is: The *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors*. Thus, I acknowledge this type of restriction of individual freedom to emerge as a consequence of the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of desires belonging to the desiring machines, shaped by the power processes, experienced and practiced within the ‘Control Societies’ through/by information and communication technologies (Erol, 2020). I will dedicate a great amount of attention to give a more detailed account on this emphasis in the next chapter. However, I want to underline broadly what I mean by the statement above and how this statement is related to this novel type of restriction of individual freedom.

Within the control societies ultimately cognizant and accordingly free individuals restrict their individual freedoms, due to de-territorialization and re-territorialization of their desires, through their ‘consents’ which is given by ‘clicking’ within these technologies. Thus,

X internalizes these processes and even if she is considered as cognizant, she restricts her individual freedom by ultimately free choices she makes within/through the information and communication technologies. It is to say that cognizant X (X that fulfils the self-realization conditions of individual freedom proposed by the literature, cognizant in a sense that she is aware of the restrictive conditions on her individual freedom) actively participates in the restriction of her individual freedom by choosing to give consent to/through these technologies which I will propose as the 'Click Consent' theory. Hence, these choice-based actions are affirmed to be due to the internalized processes of de-territorialization and re-territorialization of desires. As I have underlined, I consider this type of restriction of individual freedom to be overlooked by contemporary literature which focuses on the individual freedom concept. For this reason, in the next chapter of this research, I will try to incorporate this novel type of *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors* into the literature by proposing a detailed analysis on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. My aim is to indicate the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of information and communication technologies which eventually trigger this new kind of restriction of individual freedom. Thus, with the motivation of contemplating cinematic pieces to be acknowledged as philosophical pieces that have the capacity to present philosophical conceptions and theories, I suggest cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I claim, ontologically, introduce this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom along with the inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Chapter 3

Individual Freedom and Technology

In this chapter, I aim to focus on the analysis of the relationship between individual freedom and technology. I will precisely try to underline the change in the perception towards technology due to the advent of information and communication technologies. I will attempt to underline the effects of this change on individual freedom, especially on the restrictive factors of individual freedom. Thus, my aim is to indicate the novel parameters and practices that come into being as a consequence of the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies which eventually is considered to trigger a new kind of a restriction of individual freedom that is overlooked by the contemporary literature grounded on the conceptualization of individual freedom. Therefore, shifting the focus of my thesis from the literature that is based upon the conceptualization of individual freedom, I will offer a reading starting from the critical perception towards technology within the contemporary debates ending at the critical analysis of the information and communication technologies which I ultimately consider setting the basis for the proposed novel kind of restriction of individual freedom that forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory. Thus, with the motivation of contemplating cinematic pieces to be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to present philosophical conceptions and theories, I suggest cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I assert, ontologically, introduce this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom along with the inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

3.1 A Critical Reading: The Perception Towards Technology within the Contemporary Debates

Social complexity ontologically has a historically transforming character. This underlining proposes a necessity to analyze the qualitative changes and shifts that take place within these social complexities and their forms of effectivity in order to fully grasp the contemporary parameters of the current world (Wolfe, 2017). With this motivation, in this chapter, I will try to scrutinize the changes and shifts that took place within the contemporary literature regarding the perception towards technology and regarding the effects of these shifts and changes on individual freedom. Thus, the main concern of this chapter is not to give a detailed reading of the literature grounded on the philosophy of technology but to scrutinize the shifts on the perception towards technology and consequently scrutinize the effects of this alternation on the freedom of the individuals'. Hence, as I have underlined in the previous chapter, the contemporary theories that I have referred to overlook the novel parameters that come into being due to the advent of the information and communication technologies. Therefore, in this chapter, I find it more accurate to shift the theoretical focus to theories that propose an alternative reading of contemporary reality on the restriction of individual freedom. Hence, the theoretical journey that I will propose in this chapter prioritizes the theories of the theorists who take the effects of technology and the novel technological changes into account while constructing their theories related to/on restriction of individual freedom. Correspondingly, I will propose a reading starting with the discussions proposing a critical perception towards technology.

Martin Heidegger is one of the most prominent philosophers that gives a great concern on the essence of modern technology and the significance of this modern technology on fathoming contemporary social complexities. Precisely, his work *The Question Concerning Technology* (1954 [1977]), has a high influence on the debates that ground on grasping the nature of contemporary societies. The cruciality of his work on modern discussions is based on the view that individuals in modern society are to some extent determined by technological structures pervading the society. Hence, he departs from the ancient Greek understanding of *Techne* and tries to underline the fundamental differences between *techne* and modern technology. For Heidegger, "the fundamental Greek experience of reality was one in which men were immediately responsive to whatever was presencing to them. They openly received whatever spontaneously met them" (Lovitt, 1977, xxiv). This constant coming into present from non-present is considered as *Poiesis* which is etymologically derived from the Ancient Greek term ποιεῖν that means to make, to create, to produce, to bring forth, etc. *Techne* was a form of this bringing forth. Therefore, *Techne* is a model of revealing which is a form of Greek experience of the world. This kind of a revealing for Heidegger is rooted in Aristotle's analysis of technical practice of the craftsman which ontologically grounds on grasping this model of revealing as an object

in the world. However, for Heidegger, *Techne*, in its role as an ontological model, instead of being treated objectively must be treated phenomenologically described from within on its own terms (Feenberg, 2005). Thus, for Heidegger, *Techne* realizes the inherent potentialities of things and is a world of itself. His criticism of modern technology precisely grounds on this emphasis. Thus, According to Heidegger:

Modern technology in its essence is a "challenging revealing." It involves a contending with everything that is. For it "sets upon" everything, imposing upon it a demand that seizes and requisitions it for use. Under the dominion of this challenging revealing, nothing is allowed to appear as it is in itself. (Lovitt, 1977, xxix)

Hence, in the contemporary world, all things are a component of a vast network. These mentioned all things' only meaning is dependent on their availability to serve for some end. For Heidegger, this essentially undifferentiated supply of the available is the 'standing reserve'. Here, the ordering of everything in the contemporary world as a 'standing reserve' is the main ground of objectification of the thing itself. The *Techne* of Heidegger transforms to something else as it is treated as objectively. Respectively, this kind of a challenging revealing brings forth a way of appearing that "gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger calls this kind of a self-revealing as *Ge-stell* (*Enframing*). The 'enframing' mentioned here "brings both men and things to take their places in the stark configuration that is being wrought out through ordering for use" (Lovitt, 1977, xxix).

The essence of technology establishes on the dominion of this mentioned 'enframing' accompanied by the presence of the 'standing-reserves'. These two underlined parameters are most blatantly seen "in the realm of machine technology, where no object has significance in itself and where the "orderability" of everything, from energy and statistics to machines and persons, is all-important" (Lovitt, 1977, xxx). Within this context, an individual is alienated from her own essence, from the Being. As Lovitt emphasizes:

Even while Being, in the self-withdrawnness of its challenging self-revealing, is so encountering him that he is in fact being constrained to bring about the dominion of that revealing-i.e., is being claimed by it. For this reason, man does not know himself as the one who is being brought into relation to Being; that is, he does not know himself as man. (Lovitt, 1977, xxxiii)

Respectively, individuals never experience their own essence and experience their presence as a merely self-conscious being knowing himself only as an instrument ready for use

(Lovitt, 1977). Thus, according to Heidegger the dominion of 'enframing' and the presence of the 'standing-reserves' as processes of objectification of the essence is construed to be exhaustively mediated by modern technology. These specified processes are acknowledged to be "inseparable from the deployment of technical concepts, structures, practices, and procedures, and governed by an overarching perspective on the world that would situate all forms of life within a domain of technical manipulation" (Rayner, 2001, 150). All in all, for Heidegger the predominant position of technology in modern society is a manifestation of the discordant attitude towards Being which, in general, gives rise to the philosophy of technology as a critique of modernity.

This sort of perception motivated many philosophers from different fields of study to critically examine modern technology and its role in the contemporary social complexities. These philosophers are as such Hans Jonas (1979 [1984]), Arnold Gehlen (1957 [1980]), Andrew Feenberg (1999), Langdon Winner (1977, 1980, 1983), Bernard Stiegler (1998, 2009), Lewis Mumford (1934), Jacques Ellul (1954 [1964]), Harbert Marcuse (1964), Hannah Arendt (1958), Paul Virilio (1994), Bruno Latour (1992, 1993), etc. Thus, many of the mentioned philosophers from different perspectives and motivations focus on the critical reading of the rapid process of change brought by modern technology to contemporary social complexities. These philosophers, in general, tend to single out for consideration the negative effects of technology on human society and culture. Hence, the detailed analysis of these precise accounts is out of the scope of this thesis. However, it is crucial for this research to underline that there has been a growing literature on the critical reading of modern technology in order to fathom the perception change which is a consequence of the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies.

As emphasized above, one of the principal motivations of this chapter is to scrutinize the relationship between technology and individual freedom and to scrutinize the influence of technology as a restrictive factor on the freedom of the individuals. Therefore, I will focus on the technological enframing introduced by Heidegger and I will relate this enframing to Foucault's critique of modern disciplinary power that I am going to emphasize through the 'Panopticism' concept that he introduces. The reason to set the focus of this discussion within this framework is the consideration of the critique of modern disciplinary power and precisely consideration of the panopticism theory to be exclusively related to the individual freedom context.

Foucault underlines in *Discipline and Punish* (1977 [1979]) that the panoptic machine brought about a technical mutation in power relations. Hence, the mutation here concerns transformations in social control from public punishment of the body which is a form of an exercise of an external heavy force (the material and resource intensive application of punishment) to private punishment of the mind and the soul which is a form of an exercise of

a lighter non-corporal condition of mind over mind (Simon, 2005; Matthewman, 2013). What's more, as emphasized:

Foucault described Panopticism as a new political anatomy in which discipline replaces the earlier sovereign power (e.g. the king) that was manifested in pomp and circumstance. The sovereign was replaced by a more subtle and hidden authority. This new kind of authority exercised its power by objectifying the subjects which it desired to control, and by creating knowledge about them. Therefore, Panopticism implies a disciplinary power that aims to train and manipulate the body. (Jespersen et al, 2007, 112)

Here, what is underlined is the transformation which led to control and manipulation of the 'body' through the panoptic machine. However, the mentioned transformation is also construed to be grounded on the non-corporal condition of mind over mind. These combined, it can be construed that the modern disciplinary power has a strong effect on the freedom of the individuals both internally since it involves the control and manipulation of the mind and externally since it involves the control and manipulation of the body. This precise emphasis bolsters the perception towards modern technology to function as restricting individual freedom. Thus, I will try to give a more detailed account of this reading.

Heidegger and Foucault both share the perception that the technological structures that pervade within the modern society determine the individuals by objectifying and ordering the forces of life. Within this picture, individuals are acknowledged to be the essential manipulable resources for the functioning and the technological management of modern society (Rayner, 2001). Hence, this emphasis is noticed in the thought of Heidegger through the critique of technological enframing and in the thought of Foucault through the critique of modern disciplinary power. Thus, Heidegger's handling of enframing sets upon entities which are revealed according to their potential use value. These entities according to Foucault are 'docile bodies' constricted through power relations as Heidegger's enframed people (Van Cooten, 2019). Although enframing can be contemplated as one mood of subjection of the disciplinary power as Foucault stresses, there is an analogy between the two philosophers on the handling of the issue. According to Foucault this constriction through power relations grounds on "the infinitesimal government of the individual in the name of freedom" (Newman, 2017, 10). The disciplinary power under liberalism "must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats ..." (Foucault, 2008, 64). This kind of freedom is shadowed by the mechanisms of control through managing the social processes which produce the individual itself (Newman, 2017). As Foucault emphasizes this kind of a control

is a consequence of the disciplinary power. Thus, the inquiry of the referred power cannot be reduced to the critical analysis of the government, the system of law and legal forms of repression. The inquiry of power must extend to the critical analysis of the modes of organizing knowledge and disciplining bodies through which the state apparatuses may co-opt and employ the production of subjects. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize this type of power and these mechanisms of control in order to fully grasp the contemporary shadowing parameters of individual freedom. Consequently, the precise focus here is to scrutinize the acknowledged kind of a shadowing of freedom through technology which consequently is construed as restricting the freedom of the individuals.

Before getting into the details of Foucault's account on the issue, I will dedicate how he accentuates 'technique' and 'technology'. As expressed:

Yet while Foucault never dwelt directly on these issues, 'technology' is a word that appears frequently in his writing and is, moreover, integral to his thought. Foucault primarily typically employs the term – as well as the related and in French often synonymous one of 'technique' – to refer not to tools, machines, or the application of science to industrial production, but rather to methods and procedures for governing human beings. (Behrent, 2013, 55)

Consequently, he uses the term 'technology', as a social and political critique, to underline the ways in which power relations operate and to underline how modern political and social systems control, supervise and manipulate the individuals (Behrent, 2013). Thus, Behrent states, according to Foucault:

Political power, before acting on ideology, on the consciousness of individuals, exerts itself in a much more physical way on their bodies. The way in which gestures, attitudes, usages, allotments in space, and modalities of housing are imposed – this physical, spatial distribution of people belongs, it seems to me, to a political technology of the body. (Behrent, 2013, 83)

This emphasis that Foucault dedicates to the body of the individuals is closely related to individual freedom notion, since the scope of the individual freedom concept is exceedingly grounds on the physical actions of the individuals either motivated through external factors or internal factors. Therefore, the spatio-temporal management of the body through technology, acknowledged in the Foucauldian sense, is highly referent on the status of freedom of the individuals. Thus, as emphasized, according to Foucault "technology is not simply an ethically neutral set of artefacts by which we exercise power over nature, but also

a set of structured action by which we also inevitably exercise power over ourselves” (Gerrie, 2003, Para 2). This underlined power is practiced through or/and by the forms of technology. Hence, Foucault uses the metaphor of an architectural form, *Panopticon*, to propose the mentioned kind of a management of power and knowledge. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977 [1979]), he scrutinizes a new technology of power through the principle of panopticism which brings about a ‘technical mutation’ to power relations (Matthewman, 2013). By emphasizing that control is embedded in design, he connects technology, fathomed as objects, activities, knowledge and modes of organisation, to power (Matthewman, 2013).

Panopticon building as an ‘all seeing place’ was designed by Jeremy Bentham towards the end of the 18th Century. It is a type of prison, an inspection house, whose architectural design facilitates an observer to watch all the prisoners without their knowledge (Jespersen et al, 2007). Hence, the crucial point of Foucault’s handling of panoptic design grounds on the inmate’s internalization of the observer’s gaze and, accordingly, on the changes of the mood of subjectivity as a consequence of this gaze. As he expresses:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (Foucault, 1979, 202-203)

According to Foucault, from a broader perspective, panopticon is a governance technique which bases upon controlling the overlap of subject and discourse (Basturk, 2017). Thus, Bentham’s idea of panopticon is a prototype of Foucault’s panopticism in which discipline, normalization and surveillance come together (Jespersen et al, 2007). The proposed panopticism according to Foucault is the reality of contemporary society, a prison-like society, in which panopticism as a technique along with other techniques serves for the functioning of the disciplinary power. As underlined:

Disciplinary power comprises a series of means including drills, constant reports, testing, regulation, and surveillance. Among these means, surveillance plays a prominent part as a kind of ‘visibility instrument’ that ensures control of the individual. Disciplinary power thus mainly exercises its power through the gaze, more specifically the all-seeing eye. (Jespersen et al, 2007, 112)

Thus, from this aspect “surveillance, then, is the seeking of the standardization point for adapting individual to the subject that power requires” (Basturk, 2017, 4). This kind of

surveillance is construed to be exercised in a certain spatio-temporal dimension since the subjectification demands the observation of the body. Therefore, the confinement spaces through surveillance are the physical spaces of discursive productions of power (Basturk, 2017). Hence, as Feenberg proposes:

According to Foucault, power/knowledge is a web of social forces and tensions in which everyone is caught as both subject and object. This web is constructed around techniques, some of them materialized in machines, architecture, or other devices, others embodied in standardized forms of behavior that do not so much coerce and suppress the individuals as guide them toward more productive use of their bodies. (Feenberg, 1991, 71)

This emphasized guidance cultivates through micro mechanisms of power instead of an arbitrarily imposed power. Consequently, this underlined power is inherent to all types of social relations, not just relations that base upon punishment and coercion (Gerrie, 2003). Thus, this kind of an accentuation of power develops different types of restriction of individual freedom which is practiced through and by the channels of technology. From this sense, power functions as a form of self-control, as a self-imposed system of rules instead of functioning as an externally imposed system of rules (Gerrie, 2003). For Foucault, “the origin of oppression is not big individuals with authority but a myriad of self-imposed forms of structured activity” (Gerrie, 2003, para 14), as a consequence of the explained panoptic diagram. These self-imposed forms of structured activity emerge from the gaze itself. As Bogard states:

If Foucault emphasized the importance of the gaze... it was always with a view to other problems: first, of the standardization of multiple techniques – the concrete operations – for partitioning space and ordering temporal relations (i.e. imposing form on the multiplicity of human conduct), and second, of linking these operations to the forms of discursive knowledge which direct the gaze and give it its object. (Bogard, 1991, 336-337)

The underlined gaze here produces two different and sometimes divergent developments of distinctly modern relations of surveillance, control and domination (Simon, 2005). One is related to the observer, which I bond with the external factors that restrict the freedom of the individuals. Here, the story of the observer “takes us to a discussion of techniques of observation, information gathering, data management, simulation” (Simon, 2005, 4). One is related to the inmate, which I bond with the internal factors that restrict the freedom of the

individuals. Here, the story of the inmate “takes us to a discussion of techniques of the self and a focus on self-discipline, normalization, ‘soultraining’, the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ and ultimately studies in subjectification and governmentality” (Simon, 2005, 4-5). What is expressed here, as a diagram, requires the physical presence of an observer (either she is there or not) and the physical presence of an observed and these two distinct kinds of presences trigger different kinds of techniques on the development of distinctly modern relations of surveillance, control and domination. Although it is underlined that for Foucault the enclosure is more of a property of the psyche than concrete spatial arrangements, the precise way of making the constant monitoring technically feasible is the physical enclosure. Yet, it doesn’t have to be a concrete physical space enclosure, like in Bentham’s model a prison, but with the late modern condition of high mobility it is more of a pervasive enclosure. However, this pervasiveness does not mean an absence of enclosure but means a distinct version of enclosure. Therefore, although Foucault dedicated the priority to the enclosure as a property of the psyche, the panopticism theory that he proposes functions through the actual or occasionally modal physical presence of the observer and actual physical presence of the observed.

Foucault refers to self-discipline as a consequence of micro mechanisms of power exercised through technology. The fundamental point here is the presence (actual/modal) of an external factor which makes the observed to self-discipline herself. Thereupon, this external presence as micro mechanisms of power triggers some internal factors which lead to self-discipline. Eventually, Foucault’s panopticism suggests through the Foucauldian sense of technology that external and internal factors are in effect of individual freedom. One essential point within the context of this research is how cognizant these agents are of this self-disciplining process.

The presence of the observer is construed either to make a cognizant/incognizant agent to conform to the mentioned mechanisms of power as an external factor or is construed to make an incognizant agent (incognizant since she is not aware of the restrictions) to self-discipline herself as an internalized factor. Both of these consequences reveal distinct kinds of restrictions of individual freedom. However, in both proposed cases, we can not acknowledge an agent to be cognizantly restricting her individual freedom due to internal factors triggered by the mentioned aspects. Therefore, it can be underlined that the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is not a consequence of panopticism acknowledged in the Foucauldian sense.

This inference brings forth a motivation to go beyond the panopticism theory in order to grasp the more accurate reading of contemporary social complexity and precisely in order to propose the most accurate reading of the contemporary relationship between individual

freedom and technology. Hence, this novel type of restriction of individual freedom is considered to be a consequence of the rise of information and communication technologies which goes beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality ground as it is seen in the theory of Foucault and in other theories of the contemporary philosophers. However, the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies revealed an alteration on the previously critical and negative perception towards modern technology due to the novel liberating aspects that these technologies ontologically introduced. This perception towards information and communication technologies reveals an overlooked aspect on the novel restrictive factors, parameters and actions of individual freedom experienced through/by information and communication technologies. Thus, in order to thoroughly grasp these novel kinds of restrictive factors, parameters and actions of individual freedom, first I want to emphasize how individual freedom and the defining conditions of individual freedom are formulated and fathomed within the context of information and communication technologies.

3.2 Individual Freedom within the Domain of the Information and Communication Technologies

Contemporary social complexities embrace the idea of openness and transparency, but these complexities also prioritize to set a ground for guaranteeing individuals right to privacy which signifies to abolish the power of government to subject its citizens to surveillance (Greenwald, 2014). Yet, Foucault's work on panopticism proposes a model that has a much more complex relationship between individuals, external agents and surveillance. As Schleusener expresses "What Foucault's perspective suggests is that the increase in mass surveillance during the modern era is in many ways connected to the establishment of a type of power that was specifically designed for democracy" (Schleusener, 2018, 176). This emphasis underlines the necessity to scrutinize the contemporary social complexities which prioritize democracy and freedom on a deeper level. One of the fundamental objectives of this research is to propose a deeper reading of the relationship between individual freedom and technology within the context of contemporary social complexities. Therefore, I will dedicate some focus on how individual freedom is fathomed and construed within the context of information and communication technologies so that I can introduce a profound reading of the mentioned relationship.

The term 'Information and Communication Technologies', in the broad sense, acknowledged as all the devices, networking components, applications and systems which come together to make the interactions between the actors of the social complexities be possible in the digital world. As stated:

Information and communication technologies, considered as the terms that include any communication device and practice encompassing radio, television, cellular phones, computer, network, hardware, software, etc. (Sahoo, & Sahoo, 2016) are anticipated as meta-technologies of information that are claimed to change the nature of the society and to expand the degrees of freedom with which humans can act in the social and material worlds (Lucchi, 2016). (Erol, 2018, 56)

Thus, the defining conditions and fundamental tenets of individual freedom within these meta-technologies of information and communication are constructed on informational privacy and informational self-determination. To give a more detailed account, informational privacy consists of “the claim for individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about themselves is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, 7). Thus, within the contemporary debates which base upon informational privacy, the focus mostly revolves around the context of “new technology, ranging from genetics and the extensive study of bio-markers, brain imaging, drones, wearable sensors and sensor networks, social media, smart phones, closed circuit television, to government cybersecurity programs, direct marketing, Big Data, head-mounted displays and search engines” (Van den Hoven et al., 2020, para 8). Therefore, the main concern of these debates and one of the main parameters that is acknowledged as a restriction of individual freedom is the violation of informational privacy which lies on the “dissemination of an intimate nature to an interested audience without the consent of the subject” (Ess, 1996, 54) within the domain of information and communication technologies. Another fundamental tenet is data protection, closely related to informational self-determination, which is the notion that assigns people the right to exercise control over their own personal data. Thus, informational self-determination articulates the necessity to fathom information as a part of the personality of the individual and therefore it is related to human dignity. This sort of a perception dedicates individuals the right to choose what information may be disclosed or used by the external agents along with how much and where such information may be shared and used. Accordingly, these defining conditions are construed to be practiced by means of individual's giving or withholding consent to certain forms and processes of data management. Hence, in the further parts of this chapter, I will devote a comprehensive scrutinization to the issue of consent and its relation with the restriction of individual freedom. However, here, I want to state that even if I intend to put a critical stance towards the capacity of the existing legal framework concerning the freedom of the individuals within the domain of these technologies, the legal standpoint towards the issue is out of the scope of this research. Consequently, what I try to underline here is the

defining conditions of individual freedom within the context of information and communication technologies from a theoretical and normative standpoint and as expressed informational privacy and informational self-determination are the fundamental defining conditions of individual freedom within this mentioned context.

3.3 Perception Change Towards Technology with the Advent of the Information and Communication Technologies

The critical reading of modern technology bases upon the distinct perceptions that are set on the scrutinization of the diverse practices that the modern technology introduced. Thus, this research precisely focuses on Foucault's critical reading of the micro mechanisms of power constructed around techniques, some of them materialized in machines, architecture, or other devices, others embodied in standardized forms of behavior through panopticism. However, not only Foucault but also a number of thinkers, as Fred Turner states:

Suggested that society was undergoing a rapid process of centralization and rationalization, a process both supported by new technologies and designed to help build them. The resulting social order went by a variety of names—the “technostructure” (Galbraith), the “technological society” (Ellul), and “technocracy” (Roszak). In each case, critics pointed to computers and automation as forces driving the rise of this new way of life. (Turner, 2006, 29)

These accounts, blatantly, were affected by the great destruction caused as a consequence of the use of the instrumental power of technology during the twentieth century. Subsequently, these accounts set their perception on the idea that technology will continue to function as a technique and as an instrument of externalities for the development of distinctly modern relations of surveillance, control and domination. As Turner underlines:

With this new ‘megatechnics’ the dominant minority will create a uniform, all-enveloping, super-planetary structure, designed for automatic operation. Instead of functioning actively as an autonomous personality, man will become a passive purposeless, machine-conditioned animal whose proper functions, as technicians now interpret man’s role, will either be fed into the machine or strictly limited and controlled for the benefit of de-personalized, collective organizations. (Turner, 2006, 29)

This critical reading of modern technologies is predominantly based upon the concern for the individuals to lose their autonomous personality, lose their individual freedom. However, there was an abrupt shift on this critically negative perception towards the modern technologies with the advent and the rise of the information and communication technologies. Hence, this shift primarily grounds on the acknowledged capacity of these new technologies to overthrow conformity; to 'disrupt' the old, destructive, dominating and controlling practices (Erol, 2020). Respectively, as John Perry Barlow, an information technology journalist who drafted the 'Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace', states, thanks to the advent of the digital technologies:

We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege, or prejudice, accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth. We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity...Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here. Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. (in Turner, 2006, 13)

This underlining on the liberation of the individual from the prison of flesh and bones is the fundamental parameter which reveals the incapacity of the distinct prior critical readings of modern technology including the reading of Foucault through panopticism. Respectively, individuals are acknowledged to gain ultimate freedom to express and experience their authentic-selves within free, decentralized and egalitarian digital spaces. These digital spaces, by introducing a novel kind of an individual whose existence goes beyond its physical presence, are regarded to bring the end of the discipline societies which ground on the surveillance and control that is practiced in a certain space with the seeking of standardization for adapting individuals to the subject power it requires (Erol, 2020). This liberation that the information and communication technologies introduce, ontologically, assign these technologies to have a non-conformist and liberating nature. Respectively, these technologies are considered to propose a self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception (Castells, 2007) spaces in which participants of these technologies liberate themselves through and by their non-physical/non-material presence and actions within these technologies.

The computerized databases have a history going back to the end of the nineteenth century. Hence, the first automated processing equipment was deployed by the US bureau of the Census in 1890 (Boyd & Crawford, 2012). However, the advent of personal computing and the Internet made it possible for scholars, marketers, governmental agencies, educational institutions, and motivated individuals to have access to the computerized databases. Consequently, this access proposed a channel for these agents to produce, share, interact with, and organize data (Boyd & Crawford, 2012). The wide range of personal access to these technologies is considered to break down the barriers of bureaucracy, time and space and to create a space of individual intellectual freedom. This consideration created a perception leading towards new understandings of the ways in which information and technology might reshape social complexities. Hence, the mentioned perception bolstered to “create the cultural conditions under which microcomputers and computer networks could be imagined as tools of liberation” (Turner, 2006, 73).

Accordingly, with the advent of the information and communication technologies, individuals are considered to be liberated from the prior technological structures that determine the individuals by objectifying and ordering the forces of life. The participants of these technologies, just by participating within these technologies, overthrow conformity and disrupt the old, destructive, dominating and controlling practices and gain an active control to experience their unique beings. Subsequently, it is acknowledged that the advent of the information and communication technologies created a novel space for individuals to bolster and flourish their individual freedom. Correspondingly, regarding the context of individual freedom, the previously mentioned critical negative perception towards technology shifted to a positive perception due to the advent of the information and communication technologies. However, the referred liberating parameters and practices, if critically analyzed, are contemplated not to be liberating but to be functioning as a novel kind of control and restriction of individual freedom practiced through the free choice-based actions of the individuals. With this emphasis, I will dedicate the following part to the critical analysis of the positive reading of information and communication technologies.

3.4 Critical Analysis of the Positive Reading of the Information and Communication Technologies

The rationale behind the positive reading of information and communication technologies, in my perception, is based upon the insufficiency of the panopticism theory to encapsulate the non-physical nature of these technologies since Foucault’s proposal prioritizes micro mechanism of power to rely on enclosures, be they material, cultural or

psychical. Therefore, the liberation from the enclosure through the digital is considered as a liberation from the surveillance, control and domination that these micro mechanisms of power enforce. However, even grounding on his theory on enclosures, Foucault “prompts us to analyse those dimensions of modern surveillance that have remained largely understudied, namely how individuals, aware of being under surveillance, may end up exercising power over themselves without any coercion or use of force by other actors” (Manokha, 2018, 221).

The primary objective of this section is to underline the parameters inherent to the information and communication technologies that function in a manner that individuals end up exercising power over themselves without any coercion or use of force by external actors. Yet, the reading I am going to propose will ground on the accounts involved in surveillance and control which go beyond the account of Foucault. Therefore, I consider it crucial to underline the fundamental difference that these accounts have from panopticism. As Foucault underlines:

There is another type of ... technique[e] which permit[s] individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves ... Let's call these techniques technologies of the self. (Foucault, 1985, 367)

The fundamental difference of this mentioned technique/technologies of the self from the accounts going beyond of Foucault's view is that in Foucault's account this kind of self-discipline is due to the power/knowledge configurations that ground on the presence of the experts/observers. Thus, these observers such as the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator judge, the social worker-judge as the power of the gaze create 'truths' about 'normality' and 'deviance' and set some sort of a universal normativity (Manokha, 2018). Accordingly, this power of the gaze practiced through enclosure of the individual establishes a structure in which individuals themselves, without coercion, end up exercising self-discipline and self-restraint (Manokha, 2018). However, the presence of the gaze, ontologically, is a fundamental external factor affecting the self-disciplining and self-restriction of the individuals. The positive reading of information and communication technologies is precisely based upon the annihilation of this power of the gaze due to the non-material and non-physical nature of these technologies.

For many philosophers the technological innovations that information and communication technologies brought to contemporary societies fundamentally alter the organization, practice and effects of power, control and surveillance relationships.

Respectively, a necessity emerges to go beyond Foucault's panopticism. Therefore, many philosophers propose some critical reading on the power, control and surveillance relationships inherent to the contemporary digitally functioning social complexities. Some of these thinkers are Vaz and Bruno (2003), David Lyon (2001, 2003), Mark Poster (1996), William Bogard (1996) and Gilles Deleuze (1995) (Simon, 2005). Among all these thinkers, I will precisely focus on Deleuze and his theory of 'Control Society' because, in my perception, he proposes a detailed reading on how surveillance and control is functioning within the digital technologies and how this kind of functioning restricts the freedom of the individuals. Thus, Deleuze underlines the significance of Foucault's panopticism while introducing his theory. As he asserts, the control society that he introduces is an expansion of Foucault's accentuation of power as the experience of life itself established on the multiple formation of mechanisms. However, Deleuze goes beyond Foucault's theory by affirming that the operation of these mechanisms is no longer confined to the institutional work of standardization of the bodies through knowledge and power. Hence, these mechanisms do not inhabit a material/physical space but a digital space which is not dependent on the body of the individuals but dependent on the digital presence of the individuals. Respectively, there is a shift from discipline societies that function through the power relying on enclosures be they material, cultural or psychical to control societies that function through the power relying on the precise digital mobility of the individuals. Hence, as Schleusener states:

In contrast to disciplinary societies (which were ruled by 'signatures' and 'numbers'), the "digital language of control is made up of codes indicating whether access to some information should be allowed or denied." Concerning the exploitation of data, Deleuze argues that, analogous to the transformation of individuals into 'dividuals,' "masses become samples, data, markets, or 'banks'. (Schleusener, 2018, 182)

The crucial point here is the shift from the signatures or numbers to codes. Here, what Deleuze stresses is that within the mood of panoptic discipline the individual bodies are marked by signatures and numbers. Yet, with the numerical language of control the individual bodies become information that is marked by codes which dissolves the mass-individual pair. Therefore, individuals have become 'dividuals' and masses, samples, data, markets or 'banks' (Deleuze, 1995). In the societies of control individuals by doubling as a code and as an information become 'dividuals'. Hence, within control societies the panoptic gaze does not function through seeing but through the mode of ordering information. Also, in the control societies the surveillance apparatus does not operate through the bodies or minds but on the information about the bodies and minds and the object of control is the digital representation of the body (Schleusener, 2018).

According to Deleuze, the dismantling of the Foucauldian panopticism brings about “new freedoms, while at the same time contributing to mechanisms of control as rigorous as the harshest confinement” (Deleuze, 1995, 178). As Deleuze stresses, these underlined new freedoms emerge as a consequence of the advent of information and communication technologies which introduce the kind of practices that the individuals freely choose to participate in. Thus, individuals attend to the mechanisms of surveillance and control themselves. Consequently, “one can surf the Internet ‘infinitely and freely’ and yet be perfectly controlled” (Schleusener, 2018, 183). Therefore, the one crucial defining condition inherent to the control societies is the willing participation of the surveilled individual. Hence, as expressed by Poster:

The unwanted surveillance of personal choice becomes a discursive reality through the willing participation of the surveilled individual. In this instance the play of power and discourse is uniquely configured. The one being surveilled provides the information necessary for surveillance. No carefully designed edifice is needed, no science such as criminology is employed, and no complex administrative apparatus is invoked... surveillance is assured when the act of the individual is communicated by telephone line to the computerized database... a gigantic and sleek operation is effected whose political force of surveillance is occluded in the willing participation of the victim. (Poster, 1995, 86-87)

The highlighted significance of the willing participation of the individuals in the digital space couples control with two interrelated actions. The primary action practiced by the individuals is to choose whether to provide or deny sharing their data and the following action is, if shared, exploitation of this data. Therefore, control societies function through capturing the desires, the creativity and the uniqueness of the individuals'. This kind of an underlining, generates new forms of surveillance, which go beyond panopticism and ground on the active and freely chosen participation of the individuals. Thus, some theorists described the mentioned type of surveillance as ‘post-panoptic’ (Gane, 2012), ‘super-panoptic’ (Poster, 1995), ‘liquid’ (Bauman & Lyon, 2013), ‘participatory’ (Cascio, 2005), and ‘market-driven’ (Zuboff, 2015). These theorists underline a bottom-up version of the continually watched society. Hence, the constant surveillance is not done by malevolent bureaucracy or faceless corporations (Cascio, 2005), It is done by individuals themselves through their independent choices. The surveillance system here is without walls, windows, towers or guards. Respectively, “the ‘voluntary’ surrender of privacy performed by millions of Internet users who ‘publicly’ share their ‘private’ data, experiences, preferences, and particularities” (Schleusener, 2018, 177). Therefore, these technologies introduce a different

kind of violation of privacy, restriction of individual freedom which emerges by the free choice-based actions of the users of these technologies.

I will give a detailed account on the mentioned type of a restriction of individual freedom and the defining conditions of this kind of a restriction in the further parts of this chapter. Before getting into the details of this type of restriction, I want to underline the parameters that lead to the emergence of this inference. Hence, the fundamental liberating characteristic of the information and communication technologies is the ultimate freedom that is dedicated to the individuals. So as to say, individuals liberate themselves from the institutional work of standardization of the bodies through knowledge and power by freely choosing to express their unique-selves through these technologies. Respectively, “any information that is voluntarily exhibited to the public gaze ceases to be private and therefore loses its entitlement to be protected” (Schleusener, 2018, 185). Therefore, contemporary self-tracking and self-monitoring, according to Deleuze self-modulation, coupled with the inclination to share private content on information and communication technologies are attributed to personal choice. With reference to this underlining, it can be stated that individuals, by their ultimately free actions which are based upon revealing information, choose to compromise their informational privacy, consequently, their individual freedom. Thereupon, in order to grasp this novel kind of a restriction of individual freedom, it is essential to put a more individualistic focus on the loss of privacy, accordingly on the loss of individual freedom.

Deleuze emphasizes that information is, as he defines “the controlled system of orderwords that are used in a given society.. enables a ‘free’ but nonetheless ‘perfectly controlled’ movement” (Deleuze, 1998, 18). Here, what he tries to underline is that within the control societies subjection no longer belongs to a specific enclosure to be performed, instead subjection constitutes an outside “which is farther away than any external world and even any form of exteriority, and which, henceforth, also becomes infinitely closer and deeper than any form of interiority as well” (Deleuze 1988a, 86). This is so as to say, the subjection that is practiced within the information and communication technologies function through the interiority of the individuals themselves by the free and choice-based actions that they practice. As expressed by Flaxman:

Whether in space or cyberspace, we are ostensibly liberated, released into a frictionless space of boundless movement that is extending along an endless wave of searches, agreements, purchases – of choices.. Under control, the moulds of discipline that had aggregated masses and individuated subjects give way to the smooth space of a digital domain on which we perpetually glide, ‘moving among a continuous range of different orbits’ (Deleuze, 1995: 178). Segmentary functions

cede to modulating surfaces of mobile milieu, and at first glance, naturally, control seems to offer the space in which to exercise limitless freedom. Control aspires to what we might think of as an open-floor plan: control promotes circulation, inducing the movements with which freedom itself is increasingly identified – as the right to choose, to be oneself, an individual apart from all others. (Flaxman, 2018, 126-127)

The fundamental point here is how the mentioned control functions within this domain and the answer is that the control functions through the individuals becoming legible by their participation within these technologies. The precise control attributed here encourages the expression of individuality and identity which is bolstered by the share of idiosyncrasies and eccentricities. Therefore, the control suggests unprecedented freedom experienced within the digital spaces (Flaxman, 2018). With reference to this accentuation, the practice of this unprecedented freedom grounds on the ‘desire to see’ and a ‘desire to be seen. In this regard, as Schleusener states concerning desire “to become “all-seeing, all-knowing” (Eggers, 2014, 71) – the impulse to constantly ‘check everything,’ from emails and social media to physical activity and calorie consumption – is not just related to ‘self-entrepreneurship’ (Bröckling, 2007) and the Deleuzian notion of ‘self-modulation’ (Schleusener, 2018, 194). Hence, this can also be construed as a symptomatic of the loss of individual freedom in a sense that individuals by being watched and by watching through the participatory actions that they perform within these technologies, attribute a justification to the external surveillance and data exploitation. This kind of a bottom-up manifestation of contemporary surveillance which is based upon the desire to always participate, blurs the boundaries between desire and compulsion, so as to say inner-directedness and outer-directedness (Schleusener, 2018). Accordingly, this desire of total visibility effectively legitimizes the advancement of the novel technologies of surveillance. With reference to this underlining, Alexander Galloway highlights in his book *Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization* (2004) that the information and communication technologies far from being radical spaces of individual freedom, are spaces of control and surveillance in which external agents are being authorized to access and data-mine personal e-records. However, the mentioned obscureness of the boundaries between desire and compulsion makes the control to become so integrated to the pleasures of the individuals that individuals accept this kind of a control with open arms. As Frida Beckman states:

Although we are at least vaguely aware of the ways in which our increasingly, and increasingly inescapable, digital existence makes it possible to monitor, mine and profile our behaviour and desires everywhere and all the time, that very immediacy itself – ‘the stimulating distractions and sensual pleasures of the new digital age’ –

sidetracks us from this fact (Harcourt 2015: 3)... Because 'coercive surveillance technology is now woven into the very fabric of our pleasure and fantasies', it has become impossible, today, to separate between pleasure and punish (Harcourt 2015: 21). (Beckman, 2018, 12)

As Beckman underlines, Bernard E. Harcourt precisely focuses on the influence of desires on surveillance practices inherent to the contemporary digitally functioning social complexities. Respectively, Harcourt stresses that the novel digital technologies shape the exposed, watched, recorded, predicted individual's subjectivity (Harcourt, 2015). Thus, the individual's inability to control the intimate information is based upon the constant craving that they dedicate to rankings and ratings, to the number of "likes," retweets, comments, and shares which eventually defines the conception of the self. As Harcourt affirms:

There is instead a deeply embedded self, shaped by these new digital technologies, that cannot easily be pried open. We are deeply invested— with "investments of desire," as Deleuze suggested— and these investments need to be explored. "We never desire against our interests," Deleuze explained, "because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it... That it shapes and produces desires locked onto other desiring machines. Those other machines, we know them well today. We are glued to them. Inseparable. And we give ourselves up to them—in the process, giving ourselves away. This may also help to explain the self-destructive nature of some of the digital cravings... We desire those digital spaces, those virtual experiences, all those electronic gadgets— and we have become, slowly but surely, slaves to them. Slaves to them and to our desires, our desires for shares, clicks, friends, and like. (Harcourt, 2015, 228)

The one crucial point here is that this kind of slavery rests on the choice-based actions of the individuals practiced as an expression of their liberated-selves. Subsequently, the process of broader trend of surveillance goes as follows: The human bodies are abstracted from their material settings and are separated into a series of distinct flows. Then, these flows are reconciled into discrete 'data doubles' that are legitimately open to control, surveillance and intervention (Harcourt, 2015). This clarified process ontologically starts when individuals voluntarily cede their individual privacy, give up their personal data and expose their intimate lives. All in all, individuals voluntarily restrict their individual freedom through renouncing their informational privacy and informational self-determination within the context of information and communication technologies.

I consider this emphasized restriction as a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents (X) by internal factors(Y)*. The agents in question are considered as ultimately cognizant since they are in a space that they could experience their unique-selves in any ways that they want and *choose* to express. In other words, unlike the other restrictive types of individual freedom, in this type there is no such manipulation enforced by any external and internal factors that can incognizantly manipulate the individuals. Therefore, even if individuals are cognizant of the information as being a part of their personality, they choose to disseminate their personal data due to some parameters. The question, then, arises as what are those parameters? In the novel type of restriction of individual freedom that I propose, these parameters are represented as the *internal factors*.

As I emphasized previously, these parameters are exceedingly related to the desires of the individuals and these internal factors are considered as a reflection of the desires. I will dedicate more emphasis to this accentuation in the following parts of this chapter. Here, I want to underline the fundamental element of this novel type of restriction of individual freedom. Thus, cognizant agents freely choose to violate their individual freedom and this kind of a violation is practiced through the ‘consent’ of the individuals which is given by ‘clicking’. In other words, the fundamental way to exercise informational privacy and informational self-determination within the domain of information and communication technologies is to give or to withhold ‘consent’ to certain forms of data processing. Subsequently, it can be stated that individuals choose to violate their informational privacy and informational self-determination by cognizantly choosing to give their consents to, within and through these technologies. Therefore, the magical gate to this novel type of restriction of individual freedom within the domain of information and communication technologies is a novel type of consent, as I call it ‘Click Consent’. Before getting into the parameters behind this novel type of restriction of individual freedom, I want to focus on the relationship between consent and individual freedom along with the fundamental significance of consent within the scope of information and communication technologies.

3.5 Relationship Between Individual Freedom and Consent within the Context of Information and Communication Technologies

The term ‘consent’ is defined as a verb meaning to agree and to give permission. The same word is defined as a noun meaning voluntary agreement (Illustrated Oxford dictionary, 1998). Even the field-specific accounts of consent agree on the core meaning of the word (McConnell, 2018). Thus, an eminent legal dictionary defines consent as

“agreement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose esp. given voluntarily by a competent person” (Garner & Black, 2009, 346). One crucial characteristic of consent is that it involves a relationship between at least two agents: the consent giver and the consent receiver. Indeed, in the history of thought there is a notable attention dedicated to consent starting with the philosophers of Antiquity.

For instance, Cicero emphasizes that consent is one of the most important symbols of a well-ordered society (Cicero, 1988). Thus, in the Roman Republic, as Ulpian, one of the prominent legal figures, states, unless there is consent, there can be no contractual agreement since the function of consent is related to collect and to gather (Lee, 2018). This kind of a function of consent to make individuals join together in the cultivation of a common social life, assigns consent and sovereignty to be mutually constitutive. Accordingly, as Lee states “This line of reasoning, investigating the pre-social natural origins of the sovereign state in the free choices of individuals, serves as one of the key starting points of the modern social contract tradition” (Lee, 2018, 14). Hence, Thomas Hobbes as one of the prominent figures of the modern social contract tradition underlines the individualistic characteristic of consent to be crucial to constitute a sovereign state. In the Hobbesian theory, consent performs as a channel through which naturally free, equal and rights holding individuals gather together under the Hobbesian state of commonwealth for rational self-interest. However, by underlining within his consent theory the rational self-interest aspect, Hobbes proposes a limitation on the given consent. As he argues submission to another through giving consent, in his case to the sovereign, to avoid the harm or death, counts as a valid form of consent resulting from rational calculation (Lee, 2018). Therefore, in order to survive as an extension of the rational self-interest, individuals give consent to a sovereign power.

This kind of a limitation is also witnessed in the social contract theory of John Locke in a sense that he insists on strict limitations on consent upon actions that potentially involve risk, harm, or some other self-inflicted disadvantage (Lee, 2018). Hence, his contract theory prioritizes a civil government that secures individuals’ enjoyment of their properties. As he underlines, this kind of a government is designed to protect the property rights of by nature free, equal and independent individuals (Lee, 2018). This kind of protection can only be secured by the individual's consent. The individual consent, here, as Locke argues is a ‘tacit consent’. As Watner states:

Tacit consent meant that one accepted the government one lived under simply because one continued to live in the geographic area over which it maintained jurisdiction. Owning property according to governmental law and using government services of one sort or another indicated one's support. (Watner, 1986, 122)

Thus, Locke underlines the significance of consent on the civil government, and he also underlines that individuals being the workmanship of God is bound under natural law to preserve themselves in a sense that they cannot consent to anything that puts them in a situation that is against their free, equal and independent selves (Lee, 2018). Hence, parallel to modern theory of consent there was a flourishing modern scepticism on the issue of consent. For instance, as David Hume emphasizes, the modern political authority is based upon either any pretence of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the individuals (Hume, 1752 [1994]). Therefore, for Hume, “consent almost never serves as the just foundation of government” (Hume, 1752 [1994], 192). The crucial point here is that although there are distinct theories based upon the significance and the relevance of consent starting from Antiquity up until the contemporary times, there is a broad agreement among thinkers that the fundamental cases of valid consent enable permission.

The contemporary debates on the theory of consent revolves around the understanding that “Consent makes otherwise (pro tanto) prohibited acts (pro tanto) permitted, removing the wrongfulness (in the relevant respect) of acts that would otherwise constitute wrongings” (Koch, 2018, 37). This kind of an accentuation regarding the issue of consent is underlined by many thinkers within the literature (Thomson, 1992; Wellman, 1997; Westen, 2004; Shiffrin, 2008; Watson, 2009; Dougherty, 2015; Schaber, 2016). Here, the essential point is that if an individual consents, then, there is no wrongdoing. Respectively, it can be derived from this perspective that an individual who consents cannot be exploited. For instance, if an individual gives consent to a particular X, then this individual does not have a right to complain, even if the consequence of this consent giving causes harm that would otherwise give rise to a moral or legal claim against the injurer (Hurd, 2018). Therefore, consent has a kind of magic that can turn an exploitive act into a non-exploitive one (Hurd, 1996). In other words, as John Kleinig states “consent can sometimes function like a proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s access, access that would be impermissible absent the act of voluntarily opening the gate” (Kleinig, 2010, 4). Respectively, this kind of an emphasis situates consenting individuals to have the sole responsibility on the consequences of their given consent. Therefore, an individual must be aware of what she is consenting for and the consequences that this given consent can cause or bring about.

The literature based upon the theory of consent which is aware of the significance of the consent giver, underlines some necessary conditions for a consent to be valid. These necessary conditions are that the given consent must be intentional and must be voluntary (Beauchamp 2005; Walker, 2018). Also, the consent giver must have sufficient understanding of what is involved and must be informed (Beauchamp 2005; Walker, 2018). All the mentioned conditions met, the given consent is considered as autonomous and free enough to legitimize or justify the consequences it produces (Guillarme, 2012).

Here, this emphasis is really crucial for this research. Thus, consent is essentially considered to have a central role in safeguarding individual freedom. As I have, in detail, emphasized in the second chapter, individual freedom is closely related to individual self-rule and correspondingly is related to the absence of any coercion coming from an external agent. If we apply this inference to the consent rhetoric, it can be affirmed that if a competent individual in an informed manner voluntarily and intentionally gives her consent to a X (can be an agent or an action), this consent giving action is considered to be a reflection of the individual self-rule. Respectively, if an individual gives her consent to a X (can be an agent or an action), then X by default is considered as non-coercive which means that the given consent ensures individual freedom in a sense that it transforms the coercion coming from the X to be non-coercive. Respectively, many theorists underline to pay a detailed scrutiny on the fulfilment of the necessary conditions of a valid consent such as the consent giver must be competent, must have sufficient understanding of what is involved and must be informed. Besides, consent must be given voluntarily and intentionally (Beauchamp, 2005; Walker, 2018).

The aim of this research is not to give a detailed reading on the distinct determinants of these necessary conditions. Therefore, I will not get into the details of this subject matter. Yet, I want to focus on how these necessary conditions of a valid consent become less significant and acknowledged as fulfilled within the information and communication technologies. As I have underlined before, informational privacy and informational self-determination are the defining conditions of individual freedom within the context of information and communication technologies. Thereupon, the most prominent way in which individuals can exercise informational privacy and informational self-determination is by giving or withholding consent to certain forms of data processing.

One fundamental difference of the consent given within information and communication technologies from the consent given within the physical/material world is that the one given within the information and communication technologies domain is by default accepted as valid. Therefore, the careful scrutinization of the necessary conditions of a valid consent belonging to a non-digital era loses its significance. The primary reason behind this inference is that information and communication technologies domain primarily functions through the 'click consent' of the individuals. In practical manners as soon as the consent is given through clicking, then, the given consent becomes valid without the exhaustive consideration of the necessary conditions of a valid consent. Furthermore, the widely accepted liberating nature of these technologies acknowledge the participating individuals to be self-ruled, competent and voluntarily acting with an intention to exercise their authentic-selves. This kind of an emphasis is bolstered by the fact that in almost every process functioning through these technologies, there is detailed information declared on the

use and process of the shared data. This kind of a fact is contemplated to satisfy one of the necessary conditions of the valid consent which is based upon the prerequisite that individuals must be informed to give a consent. However, as Bert-Jaap Koops states:

It is generally recognised that with Internet-based services, most people just tick consent boxes without reading or understanding privacy statements, or that service providers sometimes assume that website visitors are somehow miraculously informed of the privacy statement and automatically give consent by merely visiting the website... The continued belief in consent as a major legitimating ground also in online contexts denies the reality of 21st-century data processing, which creates two fundamental challenges that make informed and voluntary consent a Sisyphean task. Often, there is little to choose: if you want to use a service, you have to comply with the conditions—if you do not tick the consent box, access will be denied. And there are no good alternatives: most other providers of the service you want apply the same practice and similar data-processing conditions, and with the most-used major services, such as Facebook, Google, or Twitter, there is no realistic alternative for most people. (Koops, 2014, 251-252)

All the underlined parameters considered, there is a growing literature focusing on the problematic of 'click consent' (Lynskey, 2015; Austin, 2014; Zafir, 2014; Koops, 2014; Schermer et al., 2014; Rhoen, 2016; Solove, 2013). Nonetheless, since individuals within the scope of information and communication technologies are abstracted from their material settings and are separated into a series of distinct flows and these flows are reconciled into discrete 'data doubles', the regulative management of the problems that come along with the 'click consent' is troublesome to be handled. This kind of trouble is bolstered by the previously underlined non-restrictive nature of these technologies. Correspondingly, although there are regulatory and legal initiatives to protect the informational privacy and informational self-determination, the applicability of these laws and regulations are insufficient to manage the challenges that arise as a consequence of the use of these technologies.

The legal parameters that are in effect on the management of informational privacy and informational self-determination are out of the scope of this research. However, consent is still the crucial parameter of the data protection policies despite all the previously underlined problematics (Austin, 2014, 136; Zafir, 2014, 239; Koops, 2014, 251). Thus, although there is an effort on the regulative bases to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individuals in the processing of personal data, the reforms that are introduced still continue to prioritize consent. As Benjamin Bergemann states:

This has been true since the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD) and has been continued in the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Here, consent is defined as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her” (art 4). The challenge of updating the legal framework, to enable it to stand the test of time in the coming decade or so, has been taken up by the European regulator, in the form of a proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that will replace the Data Protection Directive (DPD). (Bergemann, 2018, 113)

Here, the introduction of the GDPR is one reform done within the context of Europe. Yet, the reforms done on the novel data protection regulations all over the world narrowly focus on a single general framework of data protection law to solve excessive amounts of information and communication technologies related challenges. Thus, this general framework prioritizes putting individuals in control of their data since informational self-determination and informational privacy are the fundamental rights to data protection. Accordingly, all things considered, the protection of individual freedom within the context of information and communication technologies primarily depend on the actions of the individuals. As an extension of this inference, if an individual gives her ‘click consent’ to and within these technologies, this action is considered as a reflection of individual freedom. However, I acknowledge this mentioned action as a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is: Cognizant individuals restrict their individual freedoms’ by the ‘click consent’ that they choose to give to and through these technologies.

I propose this novel type of restriction of individual freedom as an overlooked kind of a restriction precisely because the agents in question are considered as ultimately cognizant since they are in a space that they could experience their unique-selves in any ways that they want and *choose* to express. In other words, unlike the other restrictive types of individual freedom, in this type there is no such manipulation enforced by any external and internal factors that can incognizantly manipulate the individuals. Therefore, even if individuals are cognizant of the consequences of their sharings through their ‘click consent’, they still choose to disseminate their personal data due to some parameters and factors. The question, then, arises as what are those parameters and factors? In the novel type of restriction of individual freedom that I propose, these parameters are represented as the *internal factors*. As I emphasized previously, these parameters are exceedingly related to the desires of the individuals and these internal factors are contemplated as a reflection of the desires of the individuals. I will dedicate the next part of this chapter to underline the parameters that set the grounds for this novel type of restriction of individual freedom.

3.6 Back to the Novel Type of Restriction of Individual Freedom: The Restriction of Individual Freedom of *Cognizant Agents(X)* by *Internal Factors(Y)* through/by 'Click Consent' within the Context of Information and Communication Technologies

Information and communication technologies are considered to be spaces that offer limitless freedom for individuals to express and experience their unique-selves. This emphasis is based upon the perception that these technologies ontologically offer liberation from surveillance, control and domination that the micro mechanisms of power enforce. However, as Deleuze suggests, human actors in control societies participate in the mechanisms of control themselves, by constantly participating within these technologies. Thus, this constant engagement creates complete visibility which bolsters the loss of individual freedom. The one crucial point is that the complete visibility here is not to ensure complete control by the external agents as in Foucault's panopticism but rather it is the agent's own deepest desire which guides the free actions of the agent. Unlike the panoptic society in which bodies are subjectified and controlled by the power processes, in the control society which functions through the digital spaces, individuals willingly participate in the subjectification and control in order to make their beings meaningful. As Basturk states:

The semiology of the political economy of the sign works by deterritorialization of the meanings in order to be reduced into the gaze which constantly and flowingly occurs. The difference between surveillance and gaze should be realized here, because gaze refers a practice by which desires deterritorialized could be located into the coded identities capturing these desires and denominate them. This is the reterritorialization, which firstly separates desires from being and then locate them in another context... The reterritorialization should be understood as a function to be exercised by the modulative forces of the society; and these forces also set up a subjectification process in which individuals make them subjects by functioning the gaze. The gaze, here marks a process which correlates the desires and codes; and post panoptic power works by creating and demonstrating these codes to people in order to modulate them with these codes. (Basturk, 2017, 12)

Accordingly, control societies seek individuals to express their uniqueness. Individuals perceive their uniqueness as real by revealing their desires in order to be the very focus of

the gaze and these desires are constantly modulated with the mentioned constantly altering codes. Therefore, individuals perceive visibility through these technologies as a desire for the proof of being. This kind of a recognition triggers a kind of surveillance that no longer represents a power technique belonging to governmental reason but represents an individual practice of daily life which grounds on the continuation of observing (Mathiesen, 1997). Thus, “this form of power is faster and freer – it does not depend on institutions and on moulding individuals according to their norms, but on the constant modulation and coding of affects and desires” (Beckman, 2018, 4).

Deleuze relates this underlined control society that he introduces to the technical machines of a given milieu which, as he asserts, functions through/by the desires. Hence, he proposes the defining characteristics of control as the continuous system of modulation and he asserts ‘dividuals’ of control society, that is parts of selves, affects, desires, which are identified, addressed and controlled by means of samples and data, actively participate in this continuous system of modulation (Beckman, 2018). According to Deleuze, desire comes first and structures all relations and desire, assembled from the social field, disseminates power relations (Deleuze, 2006a). Respectively, control occurs in all facets of society through the active participation of the dividuals and the collective desire for more freedom leads to dispersed but extensive forms of control (Gilge, 2015).

This line of underlining reveals the question which was once established by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari early in *Anti-Oedipus* (1972 [1983]) and revisited again in *A thousand Plateaus* (1972 [1987]): Why do individuals desire their own repression? If this question is adapted to the context of this research, then, the question can be revised as why do individuals desire to restrict their individual freedom through and by their active participation within information and communication technologies? Hence, in order to come up with an attempt to answer this question, it is crucial to dedicate some amount of attention to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of desire. As I have underlined in one of my papers:

Deleuze and Guattari, in their 1972 book, *Anti-Oedipus*, challenge the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud and Lacan which considers dreams and fantasies as representations of desire. For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a production of the assemblage of ‘machines’ created by a ‘factory’ of the unconscious. By this, they mean that desire is a force that motivates behaviour through a consciousness that is shaped by the drives, motives and inclinations of the unconscious, with the unconscious itself under a constant process of rearrangement determined by relations between the ‘machines’ of desire within a capitalist society (Özpolat, 2018). Desire, for Deleuze, is a kind of vital force which functionally organises a complex

arrangement of elements such as objects, bodies and experiences (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000; 2005). (Erol, 2020, 573)

Subsequently, Deleuze and Guattari highlight that desires motivate and animate behavior and they precisely scrutinize how control societies which function through constant process of rearrangements transform desires to interests and actions (Kozinets et al., 2016). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire focuses on the desire itself, and on its blockages, flows and transmutation into interests and actions (Kozinets et al., 2016) which is closely related to connections and disconnections, a continuous system of modulations. As Kozinets et al. express:

Desire functions by connecting different things into systems. Through connection, the energy of desire flows. Because of the flows of energetic desire, things connect and disconnect. In D+G's theory, the sites where desire's energetic connections and disconnections occur are called desiring-machines. The term desiring-machine encompasses actual machines such as smartphones, software programs, and tablet computers as well as human bodies, animals, and plants—each hungers to connect or disconnect in different ways with other desiring-machines and thus exchange flows of energy. One “machine is always coupled with another” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 5) forming a type of whole which can also be part of a network, which interconnects with other networks into a larger (social, institutional, cultural) open complex system. (Kozinets et al., 2016, 662)

This kind of an asserted complex system consists of the assemblage of machines operated by desires connected to other machines through 'territories'. Thus, according to Deleuze and Guattari these territories are unfixed spaces assembled through the continuous process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization (Erol, 2020). These indicated processes are the power processes through which desiring machines connect and disconnect assembling a continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (De Souza-Leao & Costa, 2018). For Deleuze & Guattari, it is through these processes that the power interiorizes itself within the individuals and accordingly subjectivities of each desiring machine are produced by another's production of products, with desire displaying itself through a productive unconscious regulated by connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]; Erol, 2020). Therefore, since I consider that this mentioned type of subjectivity is one of the fundamental grounds of the restrictive actions of individual freedom within the context of information and communication

technologies, I will dedicate more focus on the relationship between these processes and the subjectivity of the individuals.

Unlike the panoptic societies which function through the docile subjects that it produces, control societies function through individuals expressing their desires (Basturk, 2017). This kind of an expression of desires and of pure individuality is the primary source of the continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Correspondingly, these power processes function through capturing the impulsion inside of individuals. Hence, these processes operate “by capturing the desire (potential form of being) and re-nominate it to another plane” (Basturk, 2017, 6). Therefore, power becomes an extension of the individual impulsions. With reference to this accentuation for Deleuze and Guattari power is not external to the subjects but is rooted on the internal (Deleuze, 1988b). Consequently, control societies function through handling of this power by the deterritorialization of the desires and reterritorialization of these desires within the continuous system of modulations.

In short, the Control Society's primary functioning force are the individuals themselves and their desires. This emphasis assigns individuals and their subjectivity to be crucial for the functioning of the referred processes. Therefore, it is important to underline how individuals are acknowledged within Deleuze and Guattari's theory. They refer to individuals as “unique chances”, packets of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings (Deleuze, 2006b). In *Anti-Oedipus* they state that individuals are not clearly defined personalities but vibrations, flows, schizzes and knots (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]). Individuals as vibrations result from the productive processes of connecting, coding and conjunction as a synthesis of the unconscious. These productive processes function through desires and the choices as a reflection of these desires. Accordingly, choices in matters of impulsions are at the crossroad of vibrations which signifies that these choices are consequences of connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions of flows that cross through a society (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]). Therefore, as Deleuze and Guattari expresses the proposed theory of desire functions through:

Tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing the flows they would be capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity; and assembling the desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983], 362)

As blatantly seen, this kind of a functioning includes an inner repression of desire which lies beneath the surface of individual psyches as well as of rationalized bureaucratic society

itself. However, Deleuze and Guattari underlines that the liberation from this inner repression depends on embracing the wild chaos of the passionate creative energy and becoming comfortable with unfettering desires (Kozinets et al., 2016). Situating Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire in the context of information and communication technologies, it can be affirmed that these technologies are the spaces to experience this kind of a liberation from the inner repression of desire and from the rationalized bureaucratic society. Subsequently, within control societies which functions through the circulation of information, desiring machines are considered as being able to fully express their individuality, their identity, their differences, their idiosyncrasies and their eccentricities in a way encouraged by the control itself (Beckman, 2018; Erol, 2020). However, although control appears to offer a space in which to exercise limitless freedom, the apparent exercise of an immense freedom is just the desiring machines participating within these technologies as a reflection of the desire displaying itself through a productive unconscious regulated by connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses. As stated:

As Deleuze emphasizes, individuals are intensely invested with investments of desire. Interests are placed by desire therefore it follows and finds itself where the desire has placed it. Consequently, individuals never desire against their interests (Harcourt, 2015). The desires attached to the desiring machines are formed, produced and invested by the digital technologies. Yet, in the context of digital space, the desiring machines are always already programmed for in advance; 'control' comes to be so subtle that it may well present itself in the form of 'choice'. In such a situation, control emerges as an immanent process of rechannelling of turbulent flows (Parisi & Terranova, 2000), a process one may well not even experience as 'control'" (Poster & Savat, 2009, p. 57). The desire to be exposed, to be watched, to be recorded, to be predicted, is a consequence of the kind of a choice grounded on a constant attention to rankings and ratings, to the number of 'likes', retweets, comments, and shares (Harcourt, 2015). "In this regard, the desire to become all-seeing, all-knowing (Eggers, 2014, p. 71)—the impulse to constantly 'check everything,' from emails and social media" (Schleusener, 2018, p. 194) can also be interpreted as symptomatic of the loss of individual freedom. (Erol, 2020, 573-574)

The fundamental point here is that these choice-based actions that are practiced by the willing participation of the individuals are contemplated to be the reflection of the wild chaos of the passionate creative energy and the desire. However, this willing participation within the control societies is also contemplated to lead to a kind of control emerging as an immanent process of rechannelling of turbulent flows. This is a novel kind of control that

leads to a loss of individual freedom. Thus, this kind of a loss of individual freedom is distinct from the other types of restriction of individual freedom that I have proposed precisely because individuals are cognizant of this kind of a loss but still choose to actively participate in the process of this loss due to the underlined internal factors related to desire. Consequently, it can be stated that the advent and use of the information and communication technologies reveals a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*. I acknowledge and propose this new type of restriction to be functioning through 'click consent' and this accentuation forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I introduce as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Here, I want to underline that the journey I proposed starting with Heidegger's enframing that then I couple with Foucault's panopticism which is a critique of modern disciplinary power is heavily dependent on the bodily presence of the individuals in which the loss of individual freedom is physically experienced. Thus, the priority reason that I continue with Deleuze's 'Control Society' theory is that it introduces a digital presence, as data doubles, which goes beyond the physical presence of the individuals. Correspondingly, there is a novel type of enframing functioning by the digital presence of the individuals through deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires. However, the effects of this kind of enframing does not have consequences on the physical presence of the individuals and individual freedom is closely related to the physical presence of the body. Therefore, the restriction of individual freedom is closely related to manipulation, control and surveillance of the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is attached to their bodies. Accordingly, individuals cognizantly feed their digital presence through giving their 'click consents' within information and communication technologies precisely because they do not physically realize the control, manipulation and surveillance they are exposed to through/by these technologies. However, the redefinition of the individual as a data and as a digital presence reveals that cognizant individuals choose to restrict their individual freedom by exposing their digital presence which eventually leads to the manipulation, control and surveillance of their digital presence that is no different than their physical presence. Hence, this novel type of restriction of individual freedom is, as I claim, a unique contribution of cinematic philosophy as a mood of philosophizing which is understood in the sense that philosophy should make film a partner in the creation of concepts, and theories because film evokes new possibilities for thought. Therefore, in the next chapter of this research, I will try to emphasize the significant capacity of film to philosophize, as the context of this research bases upon, on the relationship between individual freedom and technology in order to underline the capacity of the cinematic pieces to propose this novel type of restriction and consequently, the 'Click Consent' theory along with the inductively established other three

types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Chapter 4

Cinematic Philosophy: Cinematic Pieces Theorizing on the Relationship Between Individual Freedom and Technology

The aim of this chapter is to underline the significance of cinematic pieces, as a unique way of philosophizing, to theorize the introduced types of restrictions along with the novel type of restriction of individual freedom. Thus, in this chapter, I intend to propose that cinematic pieces can be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to present philosophical conceptions and theories. I will precisely focus on the capacity of the visual fiction pieces to philosophize because within the long tradition of philosophy, fiction has a prominent place in philosophizing and visual fiction can be integrated to the tradition of philosophy. Subsequently, I will propose cinematic philosophy as an alternative to oral and written philosophy traditions. Thus, in this chapter, I aim to present cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I acknowledge them, ontologically introduce an inductively established novel kind of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory along with the inductively established other three types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Subsequently, I will try to emphasize the significant capacity of cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize, as the context of this research bases upon, on the relationship between individual freedom and technology.

4.1 Philosophy and Fiction

Imagine that you are physically attached to someone who automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have. Imagine that this someone constantly shares all these recordings with the public. Imagine that as a consequence of this exposure you see a lot of people physically reaching out to you with the information that is recorded by this someone. Imagine that others constantly see you through these sharings and accordingly you start to act inauthentically. For instance, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want other people to know that you are sad so you are acting as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have their physically attached someones' and you are constantly receiving those other's recordings as well. Imagine that you receive recordings from others in which they all start to eat sand and respectively you start to eat sand. In this system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, personal choices, your characteristics, what your home is like, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you have access to the same mentioned things of the other individuals. Correspondingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others precisely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to be attached to this physical being? I think you wouldn't. Also, could you say that you are free in this kind of a society? I think you couldn't because all things considered there is constant interference and domination from the other individuals through their physically attached someones' which forms the grounds of this system.

Now, let me change some conditions of the proposed society. Let's take out the physicality part from this society and let's make it a digital one. Let's also make this physically attached someone to be your digital presence and let's think of the status of freedom again. So, imagine a society where this attached physical presence is your digital presence which automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have and you are constantly exposed to the public. Imagine that as a consequence of this exposure you see a lot of people digitally reaching out to you with the information that is recorded by your digital presence. For instance, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want the other people to know that you are sad so you are doing sharings as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have a digital presence and you are constantly receiving those other's recordings. Imagine that you receive recordings from others that they all start to eat sand and respectively you start to eat sand. In this system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, personal choices, your characteristics, what your home is like, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you know the same mentioned things of the other individuals. Correspondingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others precisely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to have a digital presence? Yes, you do and apparently most of the individuals do

choose to have a digital presence through giving 'Click Consent' to these sharings, recordings, control, manipulation and surveillance. Can you say that you are free in this kind of a society? Apparently, you can because you think that you are free but I think you can not because all things considered there is constant interference and domination from the others through their digital presences which forms the grounds of this system.

One crucial point here is that in the physically functioning society, these mentioned aspects experienced through the presence of the physically attached someone is considered as a restriction of individual freedom. The priority reason for this is that individual freedom is closely related to the physical presence of the body. Therefore, the restriction of individual freedom is closely related to manipulation, control and surveillance of the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is attached to their bodies. Accordingly, by redefining the individual as a data and as a digital presence, it can be claimed that within the control societies ultimately cognizant and respectively free individuals restrict their individual freedoms, due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires, through their given 'Click Consent' within these technologies. Thus, X internalizes these processes and even if she is considered as cognizant, she restricts her individual freedom by ultimately free choices that she makes within/through information and communication technologies. It is to say that cognizant X (X that fulfils the self-realization conditions of individual freedom proposed by the literature and X that is cognizant of the restrictive factors on her individual freedom) actively participates in the restriction of her individual freedom by choosing to give consent to and through these technologies. However, at the end cognizant individuals choose to restrict their individual freedom by exposing their digital presence which is no different than their physical presence.

Here above, I proposed a fictional construction, as an imaginative exercise and departing from this fictional construction, by changing some conditions of it, I tried to propose another fictional construction to underline an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom emerges as a consequence of the intense use of and the intense exposure through information and communication technologies. Hence, I repeatedly use the word imagine precisely because I contemplate fictional construction to be a product of imagination which has the capacity to raise philosophically loaded questions and arguments. Let me take Plato's widely acknowledged allegory of the Cave that he introduces in *The Republic* (Plato, around 380 BC [2000]). Thus, the allegory itself is a fictional construction in which he proposes a narrative embodying a memorable image or scenario, designed to raise general questions about the role of sense experience, the nature of knowledge, and in general about his metaphysics. Ironically enough Plato employs a fictional construction by embodying a process of philosophizing through imagination in order to challenge the capacity and ability of the image to express the truth within the philosophical discourse

(Wartenberg, 2007). Departing from this famously acknowledged combination of fiction and philosophy, I claim that fictional narratives in the forms of imaginative constructions are philosophizing and are within the philosophical discourse.

Thomas Wartenberg associates these fictional constructions in the form of imaginary scenarios with the thought experiments. He underlines the capacity of thought experiments as raising philosophical questions, challenging the existing perspectives by initiating philosophical reflections and by posing counter-arguments and bolstering a theory or forming the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007). Hence, Plato's Cave allegory can be situated as a thought experiment along with the thought experiments that are occupied with normative properties, with introspectively available properties and with metaphysical properties (Elgin, 2014). For instance, Nozick introduces the 'Experience Machine' thought experiment in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974). In this thought experiment, he asks individuals to imagine a machine that provides all the desirable and pleasurable experiences. He enriches his argument against hedonism departing from this thought experiment, which is an ultimately fictional philosophical imaginary scenario. One other example is the 'Original Position' or 'Veil of Ignorance' thought experiment developed by John Rawls in his work *A Theory of Justice* (1971). In the original position individuals are asked to evaluate the principles that they would select for the basic grounds of a society and this choice must be made under the veil of ignorance which signifies that individuals do not have knowledge of their ethnicity, social status, gender and their idea of how to lead a good life. Thus, this thought experiment forms the base of Rawls's well-acknowledged 'Theory of Justice' in which he tries to theorize the principles of a society composed of equal, free and moral individuals. Hence, the examples of thought experiments proposed within the contemporary political philosophy tradition are not only circumscribed by the examples above but also introduced by many other philosophers as the grounds of and as a part of their theories. For instance, some other examples are Judith Jarvis Thomson and Philippa Foot's *Trolley Problem* (Foot, 2002; Thomson, 1985), G. A. Cohen's *Camping Trip* (Cohen, 2009), Robert Nozick's *Utility Monster* (Nozick, 1974), Peter Singer's *The Pond and the Envelope* (Singer, 1972), etc.,. Therefore, with reference to the examples coming from the political philosophy tradition, it can be claimed that thought experiments use the mind as a laboratory to philosophize which eventually in some formulations can even lead to theory formation.

The examples above clearly indicate that thought experiments function to provide clear and simplified illustration of complex and abstract theories, concepts and ideas (Shamir, 2016; Brown & Fehige 2010). This kind of an emphasis assigns thought experiments having a capacity to as Shamir states:

Bring on a crisis or at least create an anomaly in the reigning theory and so contribute to paradigm change. Thought experiments can teach us something new about the world, even though we have no new empirical data, by helping us to re-conceptualize the world in a new way (Brown & Fehige 2010 , 23). (Shamir, 2016, 92).

Thus, the mentioned capacity of the thought experiments can be transferred to any kind of a fictional construction precisely because these constructions are considered as extended elaborative thought experiments. The idea here is that fictional constructions “present us with imaginary worlds that play the same role as those conjured by the narratives of thought experiments that philosophical texts are replete with from Plato’s onwards” (Wartenberg, 2011, 18). Here, the accentuation focuses on literary fiction which has the capacity to philosophize. So, as to say, the philosophizing is done through the use of words by creating a fictional scenario. Then, a literary fiction that has the capacity to provide a philosophically loaded argument is no different than a thought experiment that is proposed by a philosopher in her philosophically loaded text. However, the focus of this thesis is to underline the capacity of the cinematic pieces on philosophizing. Therefore, I will focus on the relationship between fictional moving images and thought experiments and I will try to underline how cinematic fictional pieces are different from literary fictional pieces.

In the previous parts, I have tried to connect fiction to philosophy through thought experiments and I proposed that fiction through thought experiments was effectively used in theoretical philosophical pieces throughout history. Thus, I tried to integrate fictional pieces in general, as an alternative to philosophical theories proposed in the traditional sense, to the scope of thought experiments. However, it is crucial to differentiate literary fiction and visual fiction as thought experiments precisely because their way of philosophizing is ontologically different from each other. Hence, literary fiction is a text and the only channel to pass the argument is the words. Even if the arguments are presented through a story including a plot along with the characters, the thought experiment is transferred through the text. On the other hand, moving image fiction creates a new kind of a thought experiment using multiple channels to transfer the argument. The ontological difference grounds on the idea that “Cinematic thought experiments are not merely confined to the experience of the mind or imagination but happen on a screen (the screen of a movie theater, television set, computer monitor, tablet, etc.)” (Shamir, 2016, 97). As Tal S. Shamir states:

Technical ability to produce thought experiments as experiences onscreen (rather than simply as ideas confined to the mind or imagination) allows for the creation of a wholly new kind of thought experiment, which can no longer be considered to be the

same thing as a traditional thought experiment...By definition, a thought experiment is something we have to imagine in thought. When it is manifested on the cinematic platform, it is no longer a thought experiment. Once we have experienced it, once it has been manifested on screen, we don't have to imagine it any longer, and thus, it is no longer a thought experiment in the traditional sense. (Shamir, 2016, 14-80)

Here, what Shamir tries to underline is that cinematic thought experiments, ontologically, are a different kind of a thought experiment with reference to a distinct multi-channel type of an engagement that they propose. Accordingly, although it can be claimed that cinematic thought experiments introduce philosophy through fiction in the shape of thought experiments, they are beyond the traditional thought experiments, and they are even beyond thought experiments in general. Subsequently, cinematic pieces as cinematic thought experiments introduce a novel type of philosophizing which is *cinematic philosophy*. I will get into the details of what I mean by cinematic philosophy in the further parts of this chapter. This underlined, there is an extensive literature on the capacity/incapacity of the film to philosophize. In order to propose cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy which has the capacity to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, in the next section I will focus on the link between film and philosophy.

4.2 Film and Philosophy

Film and philosophy both share a blank, one a blank paper and the other a blank screen. They both need a way of filling the mentioned blanks. Philosophy does it by thought expressed through the words and film does it by thought expressed through cinematic elements. One common thing that film and philosophy share is the thought itself. That's the primary reason why I connected them through thought experiments in the previous section. The idea that thought is inherent in film reveals a philosophical interest in cinema. Thus, as Shamir underlines:

The earliest instances of a philosophical interest in cinema can be found in Henri Bergson (*Matter and Memory*, 1911), Hugo Munsterberg (*Photoplay: A Psychological Study*, 1916), Germaine Dulac (*The Essence of Cinema: The Visual Idea*, 1925), and Rudolf Arnheim (*Film as Art*, 1932). Some of the other important and illuminating writers on the topic include Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, Andre Bazin, Antonin Artaud, Jean-Louis Schefer, and Bela

Balazs, Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean Epstein.
(Shamir, 2016, 28)

However, the first instances of the idea that cinema evokes thinking and thought was acknowledged to be a consequence of the unique technique that cinema introduced. For instance, for Jean Epstein, an avant-garde filmmaker and theoretician, cinema is a thinking machine that has the capacity to transcend human physical and mental limits (Epstein, 1946; Botz-Bornstein, 2010; Shamir, 2016). The technique that is underlined here precisely grounds on the montage and on the capacity of the film to reconstruct the reality through montage. Thus, Sergei Eisenstein, as the theorist of montage, attempts to see cinema as a thinking process in a sense that film reconstructs the actions of the human mind through montage. This kind of an understanding is blatantly realized while he is trying to put different parts by constructing and reconstructing his film *Battleship Potemkin* (1925). Taken from this sense, first instances of philosophical interest in cinema are based on the film's capacity to make independent contributions to philosophy through/by means unique to the cinematic medium. These contributions are acknowledged as unique precisely because they are ontologically inherent in the film medium (Shamir, 2016).

Deleuze in his speculative writings on film underline that cinema must be considered as philosophy because by combining time and movement in a novel fashion it develops cinematic concepts which are not simply representing reality but in itself ontological practices (Shamir, 2016). He shares his thoughts on the relationship between film and philosophy more concretely in his two outstanding books on cinema, "Image-Mouvement" (*Cinéma I*) and "Image-Temps" (*Cinéma II*). In his books, he broadly underlines that films do not think with simple images, but with *movement-images* and *time-images*. He relates time-image with pure thinking which signifies that time-image do not simply indicate actions as movement-image does, but it indicates different layers of time that converge at the single points at the present⁸. Therefore, according to Deleuze, cinema is more than simply an art. Correspondingly, Deleuze's writings on cinema go beyond film theory and aesthetics and base upon film as philosophy.

Deleuze's speculative writings on film as philosophy in my perception are precisely grounded on the extraction of the essence of cinema to depict what exclusively belongs to it. Thus, cinema as a development of a new form of philosophical expression according to Deleuze, following Nietzsche, satisfies the concern of the formal renewal of philosophy. I think this is the precise reason why Deleuze approaches film not as a model for perception, nor a reflected image of reality, but as a unique image with its own temporality. This

⁸ This is blatantly seen, as Deleuze suggests, after WWII in Italian Neo-Realism and French New Wave cinema.

emphasis on duration is the core differentiation that Deleuze proposes between movement-image and time-image. Hence, according to Deleuze in the movement image, manifested by the classical Hollywood cinema, time follows the action through narrative, cause and effect and rationality. Therefore, the movement-image is governed by 'sensory-motor schema' (a linear, cause-and-effect logic) (Deleuze, 1983 [2003a]; Herzog, 2000). Accordingly, "the movement-image is structured, not only by narrative, but by rationality: closed framings, reasonable progressions, and continuous juxtapositions" (Herzog, 2000, 4). As Deleuze suggests, the potential of cinema as philosophy bases upon the liberation from this sensory-motor link which eventually is a novel kind of seeing which leads to a type of thinking about the world that did not exist before the invention of cinema (Deleuze, 1985 [2003b]).

Time-image by breaking itself from sensory-motor links, liberates itself from this logical progression of images and creates an experience of the image in itself which according to Deleuze makes the problematic of time in philosophy visible (Deleuze, 1985 [2003b]; Herzog, 2000). In time-image there are moments of rupture, hesitation, irregular cutting, prolonged duration which eventually triggers man to experience the unthinkable in thought. Thus, the time-image exists thus not as a linear narrative, but as a series of juxtaposed presents. Here, I want to give an example of a work as a time-image from Jean-Luc Godard's cinema. In *Vivre sa vie* (1965) which is composed of twelve chapters, the first chapter starts with Nana (Anna Karina) in a cafe talking with Paul (André S. Labarthe). Even the opening scene of the chapter is a break from logical progression of the images in a sense that the scene is set on the conversation between Nana and Paul and as the images process during the conversation, we see both of the characters from their back sitting on a bar chair. There are no faces seen during the conversation. In my perception this mentioned kind of a break from the logical progression becomes the most blatant when Nana asks Paul 'What does that look mean?' and there is no image of a look or even of a face in the frame. While the conversation flows, the shift between images seems explicitly non-logical (as if random) along with the music fading in and fading out in non-logical manners. The constantly repeated phrases also represent a break from the sensory-motor links. Even, the content of the conversation grounds on a breakup that includes dramatic statements. Yet, since *Vivre sa vie* (1965) is a time-image, the drama is not reflected because the dramatic sentence belongs to the present and the next present of the film doesn't carry the dramatic elements of the previous present. This is blatantly reflected when Nana offers to play a game as if there is no dramatically loaded conversation made in the previous presents. This is exactly what Deleuze means when he talks about the time-image as the juxtaposed presents. When Deleuze tries to underline the difference of cinema from other forms of art

such as literature, photography, painting, or even in philosophy, he was insisting on the uniqueness of the cinematic techniques to express temporality. As Viegas underlines:

With its aberrant movements and irrational cuts, with its indices of equivocity, between images *and* between images and sounds, cinema creates a suspension of disbelief in the world, not to show the act of thinking (what to think and how) but to show what is not thinkable (Schefer, 1997). (Viegas, 2018, 282)

Departing from this emphasis, the ontological connection between film and philosophy grounds on the perception that film can do philosophy which is unique to the medium itself.

The main grounds of the accounts that focus on the capacity of film on philosophizing, as underlined by Livingston, is the uniqueness belonging to the medium itself which depends on if an exclusively cinematic philosophical insight can be paraphrased verbally or not. This means that if a cinematic philosophical insight can be paraphrased through any channel rather than cinematic means, then, there can be some doubt on the capacity of film to do philosophy or be philosophy itself (Livingston, 2008). Some accounts precisely focus on this emphasis and claim that film rather than doing philosophy itself serves to provide impetus to or material for philosophical work that is done wholly linguistically in written and verbal text (Cox & Levine, 2012). From this perspective, film is situated to illustrate a priori philosophical theory or philosophical concept that is based on verbally articulated philosophizing. Hence, film can provide engaging stimulus to previously articulated political philosophical thinking but in order to claim that film does philosophy, then, films should as Livingston underlines:

Make independent, innovative and significant contributions to philosophy by means unique to the cinematic medium (such as montage and sound-image relations), where such contributions are independent in the sense that they are inherent in the film and not based on verbally articulated philosophizing, such as a commentary or paraphrase. (Livingston, 2008, 592).

Although film is contemplated as having the capacity to “raise philosophical questions, offer counterexamples to putative necessary truths, remind us of what we already know, and motivate us to find out what we don’t know, or reconsider what we think we know” (Russell, 2008, 1), it does not have the capacity to advance a philosophical position or make a philosophical argument. Thus, these accounts acknowledge film as a source of illustration of the previously established philosophical positions, ideas and questions. Correspondingly,

they embrace philosophy through film instead of film as philosophizing and as philosophy. To give an example Goodenough and Read underlines on the film *The Matrix* (1999):

This set of dark science-fiction fantasies provides a graphic illustration of a number of philosophical issues. Our hero, Neo, is awakened from his everyday life to discover that that life was in fact a computer programme; in reality, his body – together with those of almost all other human beings in the world – was being kept unconscious by the machines that have now taken over the world. The Matrix is a shared life-programme generated by the machines and fed to these bodies, giving them a consistent dream that they take to be everyday life. Such a film appeals to some long-standing philosophical problems; to the difference between appearance and reality, to questions of solipsism, of the nature of dreaming, and so on. It illustrates certain moves in Descartes' methodological skepticism in the Meditations, adapts Putnam's brain-in-a-vat case, and relates to Nozick's experience-machine. (Goodenough & Read, 2005, 2)

Here, *The Matrix*, according to philosophy through film accounts, illustrates the mentioned philosopher's theories and ideas (as thought experiments). Accordingly, the accounts that underline that if *The Matrix* is to be acknowledged to make philosophical contribution, then, it should first be innovative in a sense that it should not be a mere illustration of a priori philosophical theory (Carroll, 2006; Smuts, 2009) and should not be dependent on the theoretician's interpretation or textual sources (Shamir, 2016, 61). However, these accounts in my perception focus too much on the ways to relate the films, especially in this case, *The Matrix*, to a priori theories that they oversee the non-verbal elements of the film which offers something unique and beyond the mentioned a priori theories. Stephen Mulhall following the same lines as mine underlines that:

Even the most useful of these discussions would usually begin with a long explanation of the relevant theory, and turn to the specific film only at the end, and only as a cultural product whose specific features served to illustrate the truth of that theory - as one more phenomenon the theory rendered comprehensible. (Mulhall, 2002, 6)

For instance, *The Matrix* is contemplated as illustrating Nozick's 'Experience Machine' thought experiment. In Nozick's Experience Machine, as he calls, super-duper neuropsychologists can stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel whatever you want. While this dream-like experience is happening, you would be floating in a tank with

electrodes attached to your brain (Nozick, 1974). In the experiment he tries to show that there is something valuable other than pleasure which can increase the well-being of the individuals. On the other hand, *The Matrix* portrays a dystopian future in which human beings, kept in a liquid filled pod with electrodes attached to their bodies, unknowingly live in a simulated reality which is created by the intelligent machines to use their bodies as an energy source. Thus, it can be stated that there are considerable similarities between the two pieces. However, to claim that *The Matrix* is an illustration of Nozick's thought experiment would mean to underestimate the power of the film to introduce new directions of thought through unique cinematic means of expression which goes beyond traditional forms of thinking constrained by the mask of the language (Frampton, 2006).

For example, in *The Matrix* there is a scene that is based upon a conversation between one of the members of the Resistance, Cypher, and the agent working for the machines. If you focus on the verbally shared discussion, you can clearly consider the film to be an illustration of Nozick's thought experiment in a sense that Cypher wants to and prefers to live in the artificially created reality, so as to say in Nozick's 'Experience Machine'. However, the scene offers more than the dialogue itself. For instance, when the agents ask Cypher if they have a deal on Cypher giving information about the Resistance in exchange for being able to go back into the Matrix, we see a juicy and seemingly super delicious steak in a close-up shot which is representative of the pleasure itself for Cypher. The scene continues with a close-up shot of how much pleasure Cypher gets from eating the steak. Right after Cypher says "ignorance is bliss" there is an abrupt cut to a close-up shot to a harp and we hear the soft sound of the harp which with the flu background of a luxury restaurant directly represents Cypher's material pleasures and desires. In the following scene, we see Cypher, enjoying the material pleasures such as drinking wine and smoking a cigar while talking about the details of his demands for his artificially created reality. What I try to offer here with this close reading is that the scene when all the mentioned elements are combined, which is unique to the cinematic medium itself, ontologically, proposes something beyond Nozick's thought experiment. Therefore, *The Matrix* can not, by nature, be considered as a mere illustration of this a priori philosophical idea. To put it into words more explicitly, Tal Shamir introduces an analogy in which he states that:

Whether or not an archeologist analyzes a stone and places it in the context of an archeological theory, the stone stays the same stone. And whether or not a cinematic philosopher analyzes a film and places it in the context of a philosophical theory, the film stays the same film. (Shamir, 2016, 166)

Therefore, *The Matrix*, without any prior theory to be situated within, is a philosophical piece

in itself because it offers a unique way of philosophizing which goes beyond the verbal expressions. Respectively, even if the *Experience Machine* and *The Matrix* in some aspects philosophize on the same ideas, they are independently and equally unique pieces of philosophy one delivered through the language one delivered through the cinematic means.

What I underlined above through the close reading of a scene from *The Matrix* occupies a prominent place in many recent continental and Anglo-American discourses. The main concern of these accounts is to scrutinize how to prove the significance of film as philosophy and as philosophizing which is somehow to prove as Read expresses that:

Films are no longer merely to be viewed as illustrative material for pre-existing philosophies (as films are typically presented as being in philosophy teaching of film) nor as illustrative material for pre-existing ideologies or theories (as films are typically presented as being in Film Studies). (Read, 2005, 31)

This idea of film to be a potential contributor to philosophy was fiercely bolstered by Stanley Cavell, who can be considered as one of the first philosophers to properly address the issue of film as philosophy. He approaches film as it is the rediscovery of philosophy in a sense that:

It is not simply a matter of framing arguments, undertaking analyses, or debating theoretical claims. It is a matter, rather, of aesthetic experience and its rhetorical presentation, of how philosophical insight is married to literary expression in the quest to restore and enrich our engagement with the ordinary as a source of philosophical experience. (Sinnerbrink, 2014, 57)

The point here for Cavell is to practice film-philosophy in a way that goes beyond the limits of our knowledge and in creative ways in which we can reinterpret our experience both aesthetically and philosophically.

Correspondingly, film, with the experience that it introduces through its ontologically unique elements, which opens a door to go beyond the logical demonstration and discursive argumentation, proposes new ways of thinking that seek to transform our understanding. Hence, film itself poses questions and develops answers of a philosophical nature through the cinematic elements belonging to the medium. It is a different way of doing philosophy in which “the philosophical implications drawn from the film can be further elaborated and articulated by combining close interpretation and analysis with more general theoretical reflection, philosophical questioning, and critical discussion” (Sinnerbrink, 2014, 65). This is so as to say that instead of illustrating a priori philosophical theories, films introduce their

philosophical ideas, concepts and theories which are open to further interpretation in relation to a priori ideas, concepts or theories. To make this emphasis more concrete *The Matrix* does philosophy in a uniquely different way than Nozick doing philosophy in his *Experience Machine* thought experiment. Therefore, there could be some further elaboration of *The Matrix* and its relation to the *Experience Machine* to provide more general theoretical reflection, philosophical questioning, and critical discussion. However, this should not signify that *The Matrix* is just a mere illustration but should signify that *The Matrix* is a philosophical contribution as the *Experience Machine* is. Therefore, not only every film, since not all the written pieces are considered as doing philosophy, but some films as cinematic pieces should be considered as doing philosophy or being pieces of philosophy.

The film-philosophy scope, as I have highlighted above, is mainly concerned on how to prove the significance of film as philosophy and as philosophizing. Therefore, I can claim that there is a difference between the accounts which bolster film as philosophy and film as philosophizing. For instance, Thomas Wartenberg acknowledging film as philosophizing construes *The Matrix* as an updated version of Descartes's Evil Genius thought experiment. From his perspective, before it is only possible to imagine Descartes's thought experiment but with *The Matrix* individuals can experience the thought experiment. Here, for Wartenberg, *The Matrix* is philosophizing. Thus, his main methodological path grounds on articulating as Shamir states:

How philosophical techniques such as thought experiments, counterexamples, and argumentation are used in specific films. If cinema can screen philosophical techniques in specific films, then cinema can screen philosophy. Wartenberg concludes that while this does not resolve the question of what makes a work philosophical, it does show how philosophical techniques and questions can be screened, and thereby, exposes a plurality of connections between cinema and philosophy. (Shamir, 2016, 74; Wartenberg, 2007)

Therefore, film can be used for significant philosophical purposes through philosophizing. However, for Wartenberg, it is different and stronger to claim that films are works of philosophy rather than claiming that films are philosophizing because there are some features and concerns of more traditional philosophical media that cannot be replicated cinematically. Hence, departing from this accentuation, he claims that it is receptive to claim that films are works of philosophy. Nonetheless, films not only have the ability to illustrate philosophical claims or theories in a way that provides genuine illumination, but also films can make arguments, provide counterexamples to philosophical claims, and put forward novel philosophical theories and where films happen to do these mentioned things then they

are philosophizing (Wartenberg, 2007, 9). Stephen Mulhall also underlines the significance of film as philosophizing by stating, talking on films, that:

I see them as themselves reflecting on and evaluating such views and arguments, as thinking seriously and systematically about them in just the same ways that philosophers do. Such films are not philosophy's raw material, are not a source for its ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, philosophy in action – film as philosophizing. (Mulhall, 2002, 2)

The main concern of Wartenberg for claiming that films are philosophizing but not works of philosophy precisely grounds on how to consider a film as a work of philosophy. Here, I propose that the significance of film as a work of philosophy depends on the “priority of the particular” and on the holistic evaluation of this particular. Thus, I will propose my perception on film's capacity as a piece philosophy in the next section but here I want to underline the grounds that I depart from. For instance, from the Cavell inspired perspective, Stephen Mulhall underlines the priority of the particular which signifies that film as philosophy thesis should be based upon the detailed analyses and critical interpretations of particular films themselves (Mulhall, 2002). As Sinnerbrink expresses:

Conventional ‘philosophy of film’, to be sure, depends upon general arguments and theoretical claims aiming at the highest level of generality. Cavellian or Mulhallian film-philosophy, by contrast, prioritizes the particular, responds aesthetically to the work, and develops its argumentative claims on the basis of philosophically-informed film criticism. (Sinnerbrink, 2014, 59)

Thus, the crucial point here is that without the careful reading (as Cavell calls) and analysis of the precise cinematic pieces, the discussions on whether films can make contributions to philosophy and what precisely those contributions are cannot be settled (Sinnerbrink, 2014). Therefore, particular films can be considered as works of philosophy but how?

This question proposes a necessity of methodological paths to close read specific films in order to introduce these specific films as works of philosophy. Hence, it is insufficient just to be concerned with the stories and the plot of the films just because then it would mean to ignore its unique cinematic means of expression which is capable of evoking new types of thinking. As Daniel Frampton argues “It only takes one character to say “man is not an island” for somebody to jump up and declare the film philosophical.” (Frampton, 2006, 9). Thus, although the words that are used within a film matters in its capacity as a work of philosophy, it is not sufficient enough to declare a film as a work of philosophy by the written

text associated narrative that it proposes. “Cinema can produce the un-thought in thought; it is the birth of the visible that is still hidden from our linguistically structured perception” (Shamir, 2016, 119). Therefore, Frampton’s film-thinking proposes a holistic understanding of the cinematic pieces that base upon the choices using different elements such as framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, plot, acting, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, and as well as the empathy it evokes for its characters and story that belong to the cinematic medium (Frampton, 2006). However, the crucial point here is that all these mentioned fragments that compose the film, when holistically perceived, assign the film itself to be a work of philosophy. All these fragments, holistically discerned, create an emancipation of knowledge through experience that goes beyond and cannot be mastered by traditional philosophy. Hence, this kind of a perception takes film to be capable of the aesthetic disclosure of novel aspects of our experience – provides a salutary way of overcoming the philosophical disenfranchisement of film which approaches to film to be an inferior form of knowing and subsumes it within a theoretical framework that typically reduces its aesthetic complexity (Sinnerbrink, 2011). Thus, this allows “film to be philosophically self-reflective, while opening up the possibility that philosophy might be transformed through its encounter with film” (Sinnerbrink, 2011, 26). This kind of an understanding of film as philosophy as expressed by Sinnerbrink:

Avoids assuming that there is a ready-made conceptual framework or theoretical approach that should be applied to a film to reveal its meaning or, alternatively, which the film is supposed to illustrate. The second is a sustained receptiveness to what film aesthetically discloses; an engagement with the aesthetic elements of film, the reflection it inspires, and to the way film resists immediate translation into theoretical argument. This kind of responsiveness to film’s forms of aesthetic disclosure, its distinctive ways of thinking, might involve, for example, consideration not only of its narrative aspects but its audiovisual rhythms, hermeneutic ambiguities, and capacity to both enact and evoke effective forms of thought. Third, and taking the above into account, is an openness to transforming how one can think and write philosophically about film, exploring ways in which we can find words to articulate what film allows us to experience, and elaborating upon what it ‘thinks’ in its own distinctive manner. (Sinnerbrink, 2011, 38)

Here, film is acknowledged as having the capacity to transform philosophy into the possibility of thinking ‘the new’ and at the same time having the capacity to be the philosophy itself. Thus, departing from this underlining, in the next section, I will try to propose this kind of an understanding of film and cinematic medium as ‘Cinematic Philosophy’. All in all, I will try to

propose my version of cinematic philosophy. So as to say, I will try to find the words to articulate what film allows us to experience and elaborating upon what it 'thinks' in its own distinctive manner as a piece of cinematic philosophy.

4.3 Cinematic Philosophy

Cinema's potential as philosophy lays on its capacity to go beyond our linguistically structured perception. Correspondingly, all the cinematic elements that are used in a film is a component of the philosophical idea, concept, thought that is proposed by the film itself. However, in my perception the capacity of cinema as a possibility of philosophy has been consistently overlooked precisely because of non-linguistically present elements of the cinema itself. The preeminent reason for this is the long tradition of philosophy which solely functions through the words either orally or verbally expressed and used. Cinematic philosophy that I propose here not only functions through the words but also functions through framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, plot, acting, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, and as well as the empathy it evokes for its characters and story that belong to the cinematic medium. Accordingly, cinematic philosophy proposes a type of philosophy that is the closest to the human experience of life. From this perspective it has the potential to change and expand our relation and dependence on the verbal language itself by offering a philosophical territory that is not restricted to the linear functioning of the words that is filtered by the pre-conditioned mind.

Looking back in history, the image had a prominent epistemological significance as a non-linear form of expression on making sense of the living which was also the concern of philosophy. As Shamir expresses:

One can argue that we have always been dependent on artistic, visual possibilities to confront the chaos. From cave paintings to thought experiments by way of Egyptian hieroglyphs, Greek theater, medieval paintings, and Renaissance art, one can see that the visual world, was not just used for entertainment or matters of taste, but used to be a key player in making our world plausible. (Shamir, 2016, 204)

Therefore, the image, in my perception, was considered as philosophizing on making sense of the world. However, philosophy and philosophizing, although being at the core of any discipline, has been transformed into a specialized discipline and counted as just one among many disciplines with its own unique domain, with its special language, standards of success, and specified concerns (Shamir, 2016). This formed the basis of what we consider

as philosophy today. The core functioning of this specialized discipline is set as the linearly constructed verbal expression of the words, verbal language, asserted either orally but mostly in the written form. Respectively, the philosophical pieces are restricted to the verbal language. However, I claim that cinema is a channel that proposes a liberation from this restriction just because it uses distinct cinematic elements which go beyond the verbal language. Therefore, cinematic philosophy is a distinct type of philosophy, and it is no less valuable than oral and written philosophy. Here, I want to give one example to precisely indicate how traditional philosophy and cinematic philosophy, although equals, dissociate from each other.

The main and the most fundamental ground of traditional philosophy is to articulate thought through oral and written forms of expression. Therefore, traditional philosophy is precisely occupied with oral and written forms of expression. Departing from this emphasis Frampton reasonably argues that it only takes one character to say “man is not an island” for somebody to jump up and declare the film philosophical (Frampton, 2006, 9). Here, the film's capacity to philosophize and to be philosophical solely depends on the verbal language that is used which is accessible through the screenplay of the film.

At this point, I want to dive into the example that I want to give to differentiate film as philosophizing and being philosophical in the traditional sense and as philosophizing, being philosophical and even being a philosophical piece in the cinematic sense. In *Vivre sa vie* (Godard, 1965) which is composed of twelve chapters. The eleventh chapter takes place in a cafe and solely grounds on the philosophical discussions between Nana (Anna Karina) and a stranger (Brice Parain) as Godard titles him (although the stranger is mostly acknowledged as the philosopher). If you just focus on the discussions between Nana and the philosopher, *Vivre sa vie* (1965) can be considered as being philosophical and as philosophizing in the traditional sense. Thus, acknowledging film in this sense would mean to recognize just the screenplay of the film which is no different than a written text of philosophy. The philosophical nature of the discussions is based upon the themes that are discussed. Nana and the philosopher ironically talk about the limits and the function of the language, about the relationship between thinking and the talking processes, about the inevitability of mistakes to reach the truth and about love. However, the scene proposes more than just the text. It philosophizes and is philosophical in a distinct way, in a cinematic way. For instance, if you just read the text, you wouldn't be able to grasp where the conversation takes place, and the setting is a crucial element to put the scene into a context. Thus, the conversation takes place in a cafe and during the conversation we constantly hear the background voice of daily life flowing as it is. Therefore, the cinematic piece, through its cinematic means, brings the institutionalized discipline of philosophy back to daily life. Throughout the scene, the frames are set to get the reactions and the gestures of Nana and

the philosopher. Respectively, although the text of the film proposes a philosophical discussion on the limits and the function of the language, the scene proposes the despair and anger of Nana on the limits and the function of the language through the gestures and reactions of her that could only be possible to be proposed through the cinematic means. The frames that focus on Nana and her gestures while the philosopher is talking is another indicator that the gestures serve for and go beyond the philosophizing that is verbally expressed during the conversation. The most blatant parameter within the scene which bolsters the significance of cinematic means serving to go beyond the traditional philosophy is the part in which the camera focuses on Nana's face and her direct look into the camera when the philosopher says, 'an individual should express herself in the most truthful sense'. Here, the philosopher means through language but the cinematic piece shows Nana and her look as if the eyes and her facial expressions are more truthful than the words. This, precisely, is the power of cinematic means and the cinematic channel. At the end of the conversation Nana asks the philosopher 'what do you think about love'. Right immediately, we hear the recurring theme music of the film. Thus, the cinematic piece separates the themes, which are obviously distinct from each other, through music. This is also a cinematic element that goes beyond the traditional philosophy. Here, my aim is not to claim that from one scene a film can be declared as a philosophical piece as you cannot declare a text to be philosophical by one philosophically loaded sentence that it has. On the other hand, with this philosophically loaded scene, I tried to give a precise example to differentiate film as philosophizing and being philosophical in the traditional sense and as philosophizing and being philosophical in the cinematic sense. One can argue that the fictional texts can include the details that are proposed by the cinematic means, but it is obvious that it would still not be the same because as Shamir expresses "cinema's potential for creating philosophy lies in its ability to manifest the experience, rather than the reflection, of philosophical wisdom (the reflection being what emerges from written and oral media)" (Shamir, 2016, 15). Thus, in the fiction literature, the piece introduces the details that are constructed via the imagination of the individuals but in the cinematic pieces the whole experience is constructed by the piece itself. This is the power of the films to be pieces of cinematic philosophy. Yet again Shamir gives an example from *The Matrix* to underline the experience introduced by the film itself:

The Matrix manages to make us experience an epistemological gap between the two different worlds in which Neo (Keanu Reeves) lives. There are no voice-overs, titles, or talking heads expressing problems of epistemology—instead, there is a journey that makes us see and experience an epistemological gap as an action event. In this way, the film gives us the opportunity to comprehend an epistemological gap from a different and unique perspective. The epistemological confrontation in *The Matrix* is

not dependent on traditional philosophy. A viewer does not have to read about epistemology to understand the gap between Neo's two worlds. Simply by watching the film, one can come to understand aspects of epistemology without even knowing that it is called epistemology or which philosophers have dealt with this subject. The Matrix is not an illustration of the ideas of any specific philosopher, nor is it a direct representation of any specific thought experiment; it exemplifies how a film can confront an epistemological problem and evokes a new type of engagement with philosophy—the possibility of seeing and experiencing philosophy as an event in motion, rather than merely reflecting on the philosophy or imagining it. (Shamir, 2016, 17)

Respectively, it can be claimed that cinematic pieces introduce, create and manifest ideas and concepts as cinematic experiences through the cinematic language. Here, the crucial point is to fathom the philosophical wisdom of the cinematic piece and place it within a theoretical context which, then, can unfold layers of knowledge that can help orient us and help us to understand the world in which we live. Yet again Shamir underlines:

Whether or not an archeologist analyzes a stone and places it in the context of an archeological theory, the stone stays the same stone. And whether or not a cinematic philosopher analyzes a film and places it in the context of a philosophical theory, the film stays the same film. (Shamir, 2016, 166)

Therefore, the cinematic philosopher's motivation is to connect the film itself and the experience of it to the context of philosophy. Thus, in this research, I am trying to be this cinematic philosopher by situating precise films as pieces of cinematic philosophy within the theoretical context of individual freedom and technology.

Here, as a cinematic philosopher, I focus on the piece itself and focus on how this piece itself evokes philosophical ideas. Correspondingly, I aim to reveal the potential of the films as philosophical pieces contributing to philosophy. However, this contribution is based on the cinematic elements rather than the elements belonging to traditional philosophy. Thus, cinematic pieces are most commonly acknowledged as non-philosophical and respectively they are considered to become philosophical when they are situated within a priori defined theories. However, what I propose as cinematic philosophy grounds on the cinematic pieces which are philosophical within their own immanent processes and these processes have the potential of theory being an a posteriori consequence of the film itself.

In short, cinematic philosophy, as I construe it, tries to overcome the perception that "there has yet to be an idea identified as philosophical in film which bears no resemblance

with any current written philosophy” (Mullarkey, 2009, 16). Subsequently, from this perspective there is no theoretical or conceptual superiority of traditional philosophy over cinematic philosophy. This underlining proposes a possibility of transforming philosophy through its encounter with the cinematic channel. As expressed “Film and philosophy become partners in a ‘thinking dialogue’; a transformative engagement that helps elaborate the philosophy immanent within particular films, while prompting philosophy to respond creatively to the kind of thinking that cinema allows us to experience” (Carel & Tuck, 2011, 36). Therefore, the potential of film as a piece of philosophy grounds on its moments composed of the multiplicity of elements that when holistically evaluated establishes the grounds of the philosophical potential of the films. Subsequently, there is the becoming philosophical of film itself which resists any singular and reductive theorization of its philosophical being (Mullarkey, 2009, 11). This is because the films that are philosophical pieces as themselves propose their own theorization as a novel kind of philosophy which is the experience of the new philosophical ideas, concepts and theories. This novel kind of a philosophy, cinematic philosophy, introduces possible new ways of thinking. Here, then, the film, as a combination of unique cinematic elements, becomes thinking moving images. As Deleuze talks on Godard “Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking” (Deleuze, 2004, 141). Accordingly, the cinematic philosophy that I endorse here proposes cinematic pieces as a process of cinematic thinking which positively contribute arguments and ideas not yet thinkable by the traditional philosophy alone just because of the ontological nature of a novel kind of thinking that the cinematic pieces introduce. Since the scope of this research grounds on the cinematic philosophy pieces that precisely focus on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. In the next section, I will try to underline the significance of cinematic philosophy on the relationship between individual freedom and technology as I endorse it.

4.4 Cinematic Philosophy on Individual Freedom and Technology

As I have underlined in my previous chapters, one of the prominent objectives of this thesis is to test if and if yes how cinematic pieces evoke philosophical thinking on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Hence, I aim to reveal these chosen pieces’ philosophical wisdom and I aim to place them within a theoretical context which in my perception contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way. Therefore, my aim is to test if and how the precisely chosen cinematic pieces propose the referred novel kind of restriction of individual freedom along with the

inductively established other three types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as the unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

In this section, I want to clarify the significance of cinematic philosophy on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Thus, as a cinematic philosopher, I will focus on the cinematic pieces themselves and focus on if and if yes how these pieces ontologically evoke philosophical thinking on the mentioned relationship. Hence, I aim to reveal these chosen piece's philosophical wisdom and place them within a theoretical context which in my perception unfolds layers of knowledge on the relationship between freedom and technology. Respectively, every piece that I will analyze, through its cinematic element, as I claim, introduce one type of restriction of individual freedom independent from the a priori theoretical literature. Thus, as I assert, the first three types of restriction of individual freedom have commonalities with the a priori philosophical theories and the fourth type of restriction of individual freedom is the unique neglected type of restriction of individual freedom that is proposed by none of the a priori theories but solely by the cinematic piece itself. The point here is that even the restriction types have similarities with the a priori theoretical literature, the pieces propose these types in a uniquely cinematic way through their cinematic elements and this ontologically makes their contribution to be different than the orally and textually proposed theories. Hence, in the next chapter, I will, following the philosophical methodology, apply the close reading analysis to four precise cinematic pieces in order to test if my claims can be justified or not. Yet, at this stage, I will introduce the scheme in which I situate the cinematic pieces that I acknowledge as having the capacity to propose each type of restriction of individual freedom. Here, I want to return back to the four types of restriction of individual freedom that I inductively established.

The four types of restriction of individual freedom:

(1) Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)

(2) Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)

(3) Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)

(4) Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)

I consider these four restriction types to be the theoretical contribution of the four precise cinematic pieces. Below is the scheme in which I situate the cinematic pieces that I claim as having the capacity to propose each type of restriction of individual freedom.

Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology	External Factor (Y)	Internal Factors (Y)
Incognizant Agents (X)	Cinematic Piece 1: <i>Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution</i>	Cinematic Piece 3: <i>Ex Machina</i>
Cognizant Agents (X)	Cinematic Piece 2: <i>THX 1138</i>	Cinematic Piece 4: <i>Nosedive</i> Episode of the <i>Black Mirror</i> TV series

Above in the scheme, I situate *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* to propose the restriction type (1) which is the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)*. I situate *THX 1138* to propose the restriction type (2) which is the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)*. I situate *Ex Machina* to propose the restriction type (3) which is the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* and I situate the *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series to propose the restriction type (4) which is the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)*.

4.4.1 Why These Precise Cinematic Pieces?

Parallel to including and excluding precise theories throughout the theoretical journey that I propose with the intention of offering my own unique reading of the contemporary relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology in the previous chapters, I have included four precise cinematic pieces and excluded many of the contemporary cinematic pieces within the scope of this research. As I claim, although one can argue that other cinematic pieces can also

have the capacity to theorize the proposed restriction types of individual freedom according to their close reading of these other cinematic pieces, the four cinematic pieces that I choose to close read are *the most accurate* cinematic pieces which has the capacity to introduce and theorize the four types of restriction of individual freedom as pieces of cinematic philosophy. Below, I want to underline the justifications for choosing these four cinematic pieces to test their capacity on theorizing the restriction types that I inductively established.

The four elements which are the determinants of the four types of restriction that I propose are being *cognizant* or *incognizant* of the restrictive parameters on individual freedom and *external* or *internal* factors restricting individual freedom. Therefore, one of the crucial criterias for the selection of the cinematic pieces is how explicit and prioritized these elements are within the experience of the cinematic pieces. Correspondingly, the cinematic pieces that I have chosen as a cinematic philosopher to reveal their theoretical philosophical significance have one common point which is that all of them philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology through their cinematic elements prioritizing these determinant elements of restriction of individual freedom. Therefore, my corpus design has a particular thematic focus which is the relationship between individual freedom and technology. However, the primary criteria that differentiate these pieces from other cinematic pieces to be included in this research is that these pieces explicitly propose these determinant elements at the centre of their cinematic experience.

Respectively, after screening vast amount of contemporary cinematic pieces that has a focus on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, with reference to the attention that these chosen pieces dedicate to these determinant elements which are at the centre of my research, I have chosen *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* to apply the close reading methodology in order to test and respectively reveal the theorizing it proposes as *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)*. I have chosen *THX 1138* to apply the close reading methodology in order to test and respectively reveal the theorizing it proposes as *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)*. I have chosen *Ex Machina* to apply the close reading methodology in order to test and respectively reveal the theorizing it proposes as *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* and I have chosen *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series to apply the close reading methodology in order to test and respectively reveal the theorizing it proposes as *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*.

One other crucial criterion that I add in the selection process of these precise cinematic pieces is that these pieces are contemporary cinematic pieces. The primary reason for this decision grounds on the focus that I dedicate to the contemporary political philosophical scene regarding the relationship between individual freedom and technology.

Therefore, I tried to follow a parallel between the theoretical aspects of my research and the corpus design of my research. Hence, the two pieces that I choose to apply the close reading methodology, which are *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* and *THX 1138*, are contemporary cinematic pieces which put their focus on the external factors restrictive of individual freedom and they propose the external factors to be the computer itself and the computerized system ruled society itself. These pieces precisely propose speculatively fictional constructions which ground on the power and the use of technology that is related to control and manipulation by an *external factor/agent* which has an effect on the *cognizance level of the individuals*. These cinematic pieces were produced, one in 1965 (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*) and one in 1971 (*THX 1138*), around the time when the first successful high-speed electronic digital computers were invented and were advancing to lead to a computer revolution. Hence, this period precisely sets off with the invention of the first electronic digital computer, ENIAC, during the early 1940s (Stern, 1988) and proceeds with the advancements on the electronic digital computers which historically happen around the times that these cinematic pieces were introduced. Correspondingly, these pieces were produced during a social context in which electronic digital computers gain significance within the societies. Therefore, I concretely choose these pieces not only because they prioritize the determinant elements of restriction of individual freedom but also because these pieces historically were produced at the time that high-speed electronic digital computers were becoming visible and prominent within contemporary societies. Consequently, these pieces are concretely chosen since they speculate as pieces of cinematic philosophy on the effects of these technological advancements and their effects on the freedom of the individuals at the time that these technological advancements are becoming more and more prominent within the societal context.

Following the same lines, the other two pieces that I choose to apply the close reading methodology, which are *Ex Machina* and *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series, are contemporary cinematic pieces which put their focus on the *internal factors* in effect of the *cognizance level of the individuals* that are restrictive of individual freedom. Thus, these two pieces propose these internal factors to create the restrictive conditions. Hence, these pieces were produced, one in 2014 (*Ex Machina*) and one in 2016 (*Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series), around the time that information and communication technologies are the most prominent actors for the functioning of societies. Here, I want to underline that the internal factors that are in effect of the restriction of individual freedom become more potent and blatant after the technological innovations done on the information and communication technologies. Appropriately, as I underlined in the third chapter, there was a perception shift towards the power and the use of technology in a sense that before

the advent of the information and communication technologies, the power and the use of technology was related to control and manipulation by an *external factor/agent*, as it is seen in *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* and in *THX 1138*. However, with the advent and the intensive use of information and communication technologies, this perception shifted to a perception that the technology is going to function as a liberating factor on the freedom of the individuals. However, *Ex Machina* and *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series, as I acknowledge, propose digital technologies as restrictive of individual freedom in a sense that not external factors but *internal factors* which have an effect on the cognizance level of the individuals create the restrictive conditions. Therefore, I concretely choose these pieces not only because they prioritize the determinant elements of restriction of individual freedom but also because these pieces historically were produced at the time that the information and communication technologies were becoming the most prominent channels serving for the functioning of the societies. Respectively, these four cinematic pieces are precisely chosen since they speculate, as pieces of cinematic philosophy, about the effects of these technological advancements on the freedom of the individuals at the time that these technological advancements are becoming more and more prominent within the societal context.

I add another crucial criterion to my selection process which is that I choose the cinematic pieces that are speculative visual fiction pieces. The priority reason behind this selection criteria is the capacity of the speculative visual fiction pieces to philosophize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology which creates a potential to theorize the types of restriction that I have inductively established. Here, I haven't expressed that these cinematic pieces belong to speculative visual fiction genre precisely because the field of speculative fiction in general is a blanket term and it is as expressed:

Super category that houses all non-mimetic genres—genres that in one way or another depart from imitating consensus reality—from fantasy, science fiction, and horror to their derivatives, hybrids, and cognate genres, including the gothic, dystopia, zombie, vampire and post-apocalyptic fiction, ghost stories, weird fiction, superhero tales, alternate history, steampunk, slipstream, magic realism, retold or fractured fairy tales, and many more. (Oziewicz, 2017, para. 1)

Speculative visual fiction here independent from the genre boundary-based limitations is acknowledged as a special sort of contemporary creation as expressed by Judith Merril “which makes use of fantastic and inventive elements to comment on, or speculate about, society, humanity, life, the cosmos, reality [a]nd any other topic under the general heading of philosophy” (Merril, 1967, 3). Accordingly, speculative visual fiction

pieces, although belonging to other mentioned genres above, can be contemplated as an imaginative necessity and as a mode of critical inquiry that celebrates human creative power (Oziewicz, 2017). Consequently, speculative visual fiction can thus be considered as the unlimited cloud space for the non-mimetic genres which have the capacity to philosophize on contemporary social, political, cultural, etc. issues. Therefore, the cinematic pieces that I choose, although some of them have science fictional elements, are speculative visual fiction pieces which have the capacity to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Respectively, the technology that is proposed within these pieces is acknowledged as an element that is speculatively philosophized on instead of being considered as the scientifically fictional element. Subsequently, I evaluate the technological elements that are used within these cinematic pieces according to their relationship with and their influence on the freedom of the individuals’.

As I have underlined before, the potential of cinematic pieces as pieces of philosophy, which is distinct than the oral and the written philosophy traditions, grounds on the cinematic elements that they have such as framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, plot, acting, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, etc. Departing from this emphasis, I claim that all of the four cinematic pieces shared above have a capacity to use these cinematic elements for theorizing the mentioned types of restriction of individual freedom with prioritization of the four determinant elements (being cognizant, being incognizant, internal factors, external factors). Hence, these cinematic elements are either embedded in the microstructure of the film, which is composed of elements such as individual shots, fragments of picture and sound to the arrangement of these fragments into scenes or are embedded in the macrostructure of the film which is composed of the theme, story, plot, characters, the various elements of film language as used in the film, and its composition etc. add up to provide that ‘meaning’. Consequently, these cinematic elements when holistically combined and evaluated construct the grounds of the philosophizing that I claim to be introduced within these cinematic pieces. I eventually consider these pieces to have the capacity to propose the distinct types of restrictions of individual freedom through technology.

Here, the question of ‘Why didn’t you include other cinematic pieces to be analyzed?’ can be raised. Thus, the priority reason for choosing one cinematic piece and not more than one piece to be analyzed is to introduce each type of restriction to be the possible contribution of these specific cinematic pieces. What I mean here is that the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy, as I claim, introduce their unique theoretical contributions as other philosophers do and in my perception, it wouldn’t be accurate to claim that one theory can be theorized by many philosophers. Hence, although it can be claimed that the philosophers theorize on the same concept, their theorization will be unique and

ontologically different from each other. Therefore, it would contradict with the nature of 'Cinematic Philosophy' that I endorse, within the context of this research, to include many contemporary cinematic pieces to be analyzed. This is the precise reason why I assign one cinematic piece to have the capacity to propose one of the types of restriction of individual freedom as its original contribution. Besides, since I claim that each cinematic piece theorizes one type of restriction of individual freedom, I wanted to dedicate an in-depth analysis, compatible with the close reading analysis that I apply, by solely focusing on and analyzing one cinematic piece to test its capacity on theorizing one type of restriction of individual freedom.

Although I will get into the extensive analysis of the cinematic pieces and of their cinematic elements through the close reading methodology that I will apply in the next chapter to test and reveal the theorizing they propose, I want to underline, at this point, their focus on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and how they political philosophically speculate and philosophize on the relationship prioritizing the determinant elements that I introduce as the defining conditions of the restriction of individual freedom.

The first cinematic piece that I claim to introduce the restriction type (1) which is *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)* is *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*. Thus, *Alphaville* (Godard, 1965) is a French New Wave speculative fiction film directed by Jean-Luc Godard. The film is about a U.S. secret agent who is sent to the distant space city of Alphaville trying to destroy Alphaville and its dictatorial computer, Alpha 60. Alpha 60's dictatorial rule grounds on the abolishment of free thought along with the concepts that are associated with emotions. Accordingly, any sign of emotions is presumed as illogical and is punished in front of the public gaze. Thus, the individuals who are a part of the Alphaville society are externally altered and pressured to not to feel anything by Alpha 60, the computer itself. These mentioned individuals, except from Lemmy Caution, even if being manipulated and controlled, are not aware of this manipulation and control. Therefore, they are incognizant of these kinds of manipulation, control and even dehumanization processes precisely because of the techniques of manipulation and control, which are embedded within the societal system of Alphaville, that are exercised by Alpha 60. So as to say, the incognizant agent's individual freedom, since they are not aware of this kind of a restriction of individual freedom due to control and manipulation, is restricted by Alpha 60, the technology itself. Thus, this kind of a restriction of individual freedom, although not precisely as the cinematic piece introduces it, is proposed and emphasized by the negatively conceptualized accounts of individual freedom (especially by the republican one) within the political theoretical scene through written philosophy pieces. However, *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, as I claim, proposes and emphasizes this kind of a restriction through its cinematic elements which is distinct

from the proposal of this type of restriction done through a channel rather than a cinematic channel. Respectively, if tested and proved this type of restriction will be the unique contribution of the cinematic piece itself as a piece of cinematic philosophy.

The other cinematic piece that I claim to introduce the restriction type (2) which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)* is *THX 1138*. Thus, *THX 1138* (Lucas, 1971) is a speculative fiction film directed by George Lucas as his first feature film directorial debut. It is set in a fictional society in which the populace is controlled through the advanced digital infrastructure, through the constant control of the android police and human officers who follow the directions of the computer calculations of this digital infrastructure and through the mandatory use of drugs which suppress emotions. Thus, the citizens of this system are forced to use sedatives to suppress their emotions in order to reach the highest levels of efficiency. Correspondingly, the journey of THX 1138 is a journey against this system of propaganda, surveillance, manipulation and control towards his freedom. Thus, this journey turns into a freedom fight against the system when THX 1138 stops taking the sedatives and accordingly is convicted as a criminal due to malfunctioning in his work and due to his romantic involvement with LUH 3417. Right after THX 1138 is sent to the prison, the story mostly revolves around him trying to escape from the advanced digital infrastructure and from the android police and human officers who follow the directions of the computer calculations of this digital infrastructure. Throughout the film, especially right after THX 1138 stops using the sedatives which suppress emotions, the presence of the android police and human officers who follow the directions of the computer calculations of this digital infrastructure becomes extensively present as the control mechanisms trying to externally control the individuals of this society. Thus, the cinematic piece explicitly manifests this emphasis through the journey of THX 1138.

The crucial point that differentiates *THX 1138* from *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* is that *THX 1138* grounds on the journey of an individual being cognizant of the restrictions coming from an external factor, represented as the android police and human officers who follow the directions of the computer calculations of this digital infrastructure. Therefore, the film revolves around THX 1138 trying to escape, so as to say free himself, from this external factor. Correspondingly, the control and manipulation here is not embedded within the societal system itself like in *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* but is externally and physically imposed. Subsequently, in *THX 1138* a cognizant agent's individual freedom is restricted by android police and the officers who follow the directions of the computer calculations of this digital infrastructure as they are the technology themselves. Thus, this type of restriction is extensively and chiefly bolstered within the political theoretical scene from the negatively conceptualized accounts of individual freedom as I have underlined in the first chapter. Yet again, *THX 1138*, as I claim,

proposes and emphasizes this kind of restriction as a cinematic philosophy piece through its cinematic elements which is distinct from the proposal of this type of restriction done through a channel rather than a cinematic channel. Respectively, if tested and proved this type of restriction will be the unique contribution of the cinematic piece itself as a piece of cinematic philosophy.

The other two cinematic pieces that I am going to refer to here and that I am going to apply the close reading methodology in the next chapter, propose digital technologies as restrictive of individual freedom in a sense that not external factors but internal factors create the restrictive conditions. Accordingly, *Ex Machina*, as I claim, proposes the restriction type (3) which is *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* and the *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series, as I claim, proposes the restriction type (4) which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*.

Ex Machina (Garland, 2014) is about a young programmer who is chosen by the founder of the company that he works for to participate in a ground-breaking experiment in synthetic intelligence by evaluating the human qualities of a highly advanced humanoid A.I. The film mostly revolves around the interaction between Caleb Smith (the programmer) and Ava (the humanoid A.I.). As the cinematic piece proceeds Caleb develops some emotions towards Ava. Subsequently, he helps Ava for her escape from the control of Nathan Bateman (the founder of the company). As it is revealed at the end of the cinematic experience, Ava was just using Caleb to break free from being the captive of Nathan. Thus, ironically, Caleb ends up physically getting stuck in a room due to the manipulation of Ava while Ava becomes free of her captivation. The point here is that Caleb, throughout the cinematic experience, is manipulated and controlled by Ava not because of Ava's external manipulation and control but because of the fascination and the emotions that he has towards Ava which are internal to Caleb. Therefore, Ava, represented as the technology itself within the cinematic piece, manipulates and controls Caleb due to the internal factors belonging to Caleb. However, Caleb is not cognizant of this control and manipulation precisely because the mentioned internal factors filter him to see the real motivation behind Ava's rhetoric and actions. Subsequently, in *Ex Machina* an incognizant agent's individual freedom is restricted by the internal factors due to the control and the manipulation employed by a humanoid A.I. The crucial point here is that the incognizance here does not depend on an external manipulation and control but depends on the emotions of Caleb which leads to his captivation in a locked room. Therefore, even if it is the technology itself (Ava) which applies the manipulation and control, it is the internal factors that restrict his individual freedom. Hence, this type of a manipulation is underlined by the positively conceptualized accounts of individual freedom acknowledged in the self-awareness sense

within the political philosophy tradition. However, *Ex Machina*, as I claim, proposes and emphasizes this kind of restriction through its cinematic elements which is distinct from the proposal of this type of restriction done through written philosophy within the political theoretical scene. Respectively, if tested and proved this type of restriction will be the unique contribution of the cinematic piece itself as a piece of cinematic philosophy.

As I stated previously, the *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series, as I assert, proposes the restriction type (4) which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*. Thus, *Nosedive* (Brooker & Wright, 2016) is the first episode of the third season of the British television anthology series *Black Mirror* (2011) created by Charlie Brooker which features speculative fiction with dark and sometimes satirical themes that examine modern society, particularly with regard to the consequences of new technologies. The *Nosedive* episode is about a fictional society in which the socioeconomic status of every individual is cumulatively calculated and rated on a 5-star scale with reference to the sharings and interactions that they make within their daily activities through a social media platform. As expressed, *Nosedive*:

Leads us off into a world where everyone, except only the most pitiful and apathetic people, live in a world nearly entirely driven by social media likes, followers, and ratings. Every interaction throughout the day is rated on a 5-star scale, and the results determine your job prospects, friends, what apartments you can get, and even what cars you are allowed to rent. (Sculos, 2017, 4)

Lacie Pound has a 4.2 as a rating and the whole story revolves around Lacie trying to raise her ratings to 4.5 in order to buy the house that she wants (she has to have at least 4.5 as a rating to buy the house). Throughout the cinematic experience, Lacie constantly tries to act pleasant and pleasing in order to get likes, sharings and high ratings from the other members of this fictional society but eventually she ends up in a captive space precisely because her ratings fall below 1.0 rating.

During the cinematic experience, Lacie along with the other members of this fictional society consciously and willingly participate within this digital technology based and ruled societal system and the motivation behind this conscious and willing participation is to get likes, sharings and high ratings from the other members. Therefore, even if Lacie and the other members of this society are constantly being watched and being exposed, they continue to share, to rate and to like each other through the digital channels due to some internal factors which I consider as restrictive factors of individual freedom⁹. However, this

⁹ As I have underlined at the end of the third chapter, these internal factors are dependent on the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the desires. As Deleuze emphasizes, individuals are

type of restriction of individual freedom is distinct from the other types of restriction of individual freedom that are proposed precisely because individuals are cognizant of this kind of a loss but still choose to actively participate in the process of this loss due to the internal factors related to desire.

Consequently, it can be stated that the advent and use of the information and communication technologies reveals a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*. I acknowledge and propose this new type of restriction to be functioning through 'Click Consent' and this accentuation forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from the *Nosedive* episode. Subsequently, as I claim, *Nosedive* episode as a cinematic philosophy piece proposes this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom which is solely overlooked by the political philosophy arena and if tested and proved, it contributes to the theoretical scene by introducing this novel type of restriction along with the 'Click Consent' theory. Thus, in the next chapter of this research, following the philosophical methodology, I will apply the close reading analysis to these four precise cinematic pieces by focusing on and revealing their macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which, as I assert, when holistically acknowledged theorize the proposed types of restriction of individual freedom along with this novel type of restriction which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory as contributions of cinematic philosophy.

intensely invested with investments of desire. Interests are placed by desire therefore it follows and finds itself where the desire has placed it. Consequently, individuals never desire against their interests (Harcourt, 2015). The desires attached to the desiring machines are formed, produced and invested by the digital technologies. Yet, in the context of digital space, the desiring machines are always already programmed for in advance; 'control' comes to be so subtle that it may well present itself in the form of 'choice'. In such a situation, control emerges as an immanent process of rechanneling of turbulent flows (Parisi & Terranova, 2000), a process one may well not even experience as 'control'" (Poster & Savat, 2009, p. 57). The desire to be exposed, to be watched, to be recorded, to be predicted, is a consequence of the kind of a choice grounded on a constant attention to rankings and ratings, to the number of 'likes', retweets, comments, and shares (Harcourt, 2015). "In this regard, the desire to become all-seeing, all-knowing (Eggers, 2014, p. 71)—the impulse to constantly 'check everything,' from emails and social media" (Schleusener, 2018, p. 194) can also be interpreted as symptomatic of the loss of individual freedom (Erol, 2020).

Chapter 5

The Analysis of the Precise Cinematic Pieces

Before getting into the analysis of the precise cinematic pieces, I want to encapsulate the steps that led me to this stage of my research. In the previous chapter, I intend to offer that cinematic pieces can be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to introduce philosophical conceptions and theories. Respectively, I suggest cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, as I assert, introduce an inductively established novel kind of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory along with the inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy. As I have also stated, I intend to focus on the four cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) themselves and focus on if and if yes how these pieces evoke philosophical thinking on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. Hence, I aim to reveal these chosen pieces' philosophical wisdom and I aim to place them within a theoretical context which in my perception contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way. As I have already underlined, I consider these cinematic pieces to independently include the theory itself on the restriction of individual freedom and as a cinematic philosopher my role is to test if these pieces are capable of theorizing the types of restriction individual freedom that I introduce and if yes, my role is to reveal the theorizing that they propose. Subsequently, in this chapter, following the philosophical methodology, I will apply the close reading analysis to these precise cinematic pieces by focusing on if and how these pieces evoke philosophical insights and propose philosophical theories, through the cinematic channel using cinematic elements, on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom.

5.1 Why Close Reading?

The prominent assumption in the field of film theory is departing from a theory to analyze a film. As Elsaesser and Buckland emphasizes:

The common assumption is that theory functions as a frame of reference for methods, as a conceptual scheme that enables the film scholar to analyse and formulate problems (for example, is post-classical Hollywood cinema dominated by narrative logic?), thereby providing the analyst with guidance on what to look for when analysing a film, and how best to analyse it. (Elsaesser & Buckland, 2002, 3)

With reference to the emphasis above, within the literature, the film analysis crucially depends on departing from methodological film theories (Auteur, Cognitive, Deconstruction, Formalist, Feminist, Ideological, Post-Colonial, Post-Modernist, Structuralist, Semiotics, etc.) to analyze a film. Thus, one other essential parameter to analyze a film after setting the theory as a conceptual scheme is to choose the way of analysis which could be narrative analysis focusing on the examination of the story elements, including narrative structure, character, and plot which could be *mise-en-scène* analysis focusing on cinematic elements which add meaning to the formal effect produced by a given scene, including: design, color, lighting, costume, as well as how these elements work in conjunction with decisions related to sound, cinematography, and editing, which could be cultural/historical analysis focusing on film's relationship to its broader cultural, historical, or theoretical contexts, which could be semiotic analysis focusing on interpretation of signs and symbol, etc.,.

Here, I want to underline, following Shamir's emphasis (Shamir, 2016), that there is a fundamental semantic difference between film theory and what I propose as cinematic philosophy. As Shamir accentuates:

In essence, film theory is a theoretical reflection on film/cinema, on the same level as literary theory. It is where the analysis of content, structure, form, reflection, authorship, narrative, and genre is conducted, without necessarily being labeled as philosophy.. Cinematic philosophy, on the contrary, concentrates on how philosophy can be created through cinema (in the same way that philosophy can be created, for instance, orally or through writing). Therefore, in essence, cinematic philosophy explores the possibility, potential, and limitations of creating philosophy via the cinematic medium.. There are many film related studies and theories that refer to

philosophy (or include “philosophy” in their titles), but do not deal with the potential of the cinematic medium to evoke philosophy. (Shamir, 2016, 7)

Respectively, these theories and their analysis on films do not precisely focus on the capacity and the potential of the cinematic medium for creating philosophy. However, this is the primary motivation of my research. Therefore, I pay critical attention to if the cinematic pieces have the capacity to philosophize and theorize and if yes how they do it, rather than paying critical attention to examining cinematic pieces in relation to a particular theoretical perspective by means of particular analytic methodology. Correspondingly, concerning my research:

Of all the available “methods”, the one that is indispensable and that is also the most open (in the sense that it requires an open mind and yields results that are often open-ended) is simply that of watching a movie carefully, surrendering to it and seeing where it goes and how it gets there - in effect of how the movie, as a discourse, proceeds and succeeds; not just what it does right but how it does and how it works. (Kawin, 1992, 37)

Departing from this accentuation, I rather focus on if and if yes how the cinematic pieces philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and in order to do that I, rather, follow the philosophical methodology approach which:

Admits a “Lower-order” reading on which admissible answers are the use of thought experiments to test conceptual analysis, or understanding us or our environments in a way conducive to human flourishing... admits of a “higher-order” reading, on which admissible answers are the epistemological methods that distinguish philosophy from the natural sciences (on one side) and the humanities (on the other side), or the pursuit of a description of reality at the most fundamental level. (Cappelen, et al., 2016)

Thus, in the previous chapter, I have emphasized that I consider cinematic philosophy as a distinct kind of a thought experiment which extends from the classical thought experiments. Therefore, the philosophical methodology that I apply in this research is to use the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy (as an extension of the thought experiments) to test if they philosophize on and theorize the types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology (as to test the conceptual scheme that I have proposed). Correspondingly, I will apply the close reading analysis to these pieces in order to test the

mentioned aspects and in order to reveal the philosophizing and theorizing that they propose. Here then my motivation is to appreciate the cinematic piece as a cinematic piece, to discover its major terms and minor terms and to observe how they are established, interrelated, and, in general, played with to propose the philosophizing and theorizing that they ontologically contain (Kawin, 1992). As Kawin emphasizes on 'Close Reading' methodology:

In both literary and film criticism, this process is known as "close reading" it is the equivalent of a long, tight, mental closeup, an intense act of critical attention to every nuance, every camera movement, every line- in fact, every aspect of the text itself, as it declares and deploys its major and minor terms. This is the analytical and critical method whose goal is to demonstrate how meanings are expressed and recognized in cinematic works. (Kawin, 1992, 37).

Departing from the accentuation above, in this research, I choose to apply the close reading methodology, as an analytical and critical method, to the cinematic pieces that I have proposed in order to expose their major and minor elements which I claim as forming the grounds of the philosophizing and theorizing that is introduced by these pieces. Subsequently, I want to give more details on the close reading methodology and how I adapt this methodology to my research.

Close reading as a hermeneutic technique was initially developed in the late 1930s and 1940s by John Crowe Ransom and 'New Critics' (Tanenbaum, 2015). Thus, "it was articulated in opposition to a dominant school of literary criticism that was overly preoccupied with the social and historical contexts in which a work was produced, rather than the work itself (Inman, 2003)" (Tanenbaum, 2015, 64). The New Critical approach suggests that the text can be analyzed as an object itself through its central elements which are the pieces that hold any text together (Inman, 2003). Thus, this kind of an analysis served as a new manner of analyzing in academic fields such as communication, English, and literature, and also in broader academic fields such as humanities and social sciences. Hence, as I emphasized, the priority that the close reading methodology dedicates is the internal characteristics of the text rather than the external characteristics. Departing from the underlined aspects, in this research, I intend to apply the close reading methodology to the cinematic pieces by solely focusing on and analyzing all the cinematic elements that these cinematic pieces ontologically have as internal characteristics. Correspondingly, I situate myself as a cinematic philosopher in a sense that my role is not to offer my own interpretation/analysis of the cinematic pieces and also not to relate them to any specific theories or philosophers from the history of philosophy. Thus, I intend to focus on what the

mind of the cinematic piece is saying through its cinematic elements rather than focusing on what the cinematic piece is saying according to my own mind, interpretation and analysis (McGuire, 1973). Subsequently, my role is to reveal these chosen piece's philosophical wisdom and place them within a theoretical context which in my perception unfolds layers of knowledge on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way.

The practice of close reading when applied to cinematic pieces involves the repeated viewing and reviewing of the piece accompanied by a detailed set of observational notes on all the cinematic elements inherent in the cinematic pieces (Bizzocchi & Yossef, 2009). As expressed:

Close reading is an iterative process. During the process of performing a close reading, interim observations are reached with respect to the work and possible conclusions to be drawn from it. As these interim observations are made, earlier parts of the work are reviewed with the current observations and possible conclusions in mind. As this process repeats through several viewings of the work, the set of observations and conclusions gradually evolve together. In the end both work and the design decisions that form the work are revealed. When conducted with proper discipline and attention, close reading is an extremely reliable and effective methodology. (Bizzocchi & Yossef, 2009, 60)

In the academic fields concerning film and its related studies there are some scholars who apply the close reading methodology, underlined as above, to specific cinematic pieces. These examples, although not the only ones, are Barbara Creed's reading of *The Alien*, *The Exorcist*, *The Brood*, *The Hunger*, *Carrie*, *Psycho* (Creed, 1993), Jordi Sánchez-Navarro and Klaus Zilles reading of *The Comfort of Strangers* (Sánchez-Navarro & Zilles, 2005), Joshua Foa Dienstag's reading of *The Philadelphia Story* (Dienstag, 2016) or his reading of *Her*, *Us*, *Blade Runner*, *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance* (Dienstag, 2020), Mathew Abbott's reading of Abbas Kiarostami's films such as *The Wind Will Carry Us*, *ABC Africa*, *Ten*, *Five*, *Shirin*, *Like Someone In Love* (Abbott, 2017), Judith Rifesser's reading of Claudia Llosa's film *The Milk of Sorrow* and Shirin Neshat's film *Women Without Men* (Rifesser, 2020), etc.,. However, each of these readings has their own unique departure points to apply the close reading methodology.

In the case of this precise research, I will apply the close reading methodology departing from the novel cinematic philosophical approach that grounds on the revelation of the cinematic elements which are deep-rooted in the cinematic pieces to serve for the philosophizing and theorizing that the precise cinematic pieces propose. Accordingly, within

the context of this research, I set my unit of analysis to the macrostructure of the cinematic pieces which consists of the cinematic elements such as of the theme, story, plot, characters, the various elements of film language as used in the film, and its composition etc. which add up to provide the 'meaning' and the microstructure of the film which consists of framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, eventually, consists of individual shots, fragments of picture and sound to the arrangement of these fragments into scenes. Therefore, I will apply the close reading methodology to macrostructural cinematic elements and to microstructural cinematic elements when holistically evaluated, as I acknowledge it, reveal the theory itself as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

I treat my observations as a data set built through multiple views and reviews of the cinematic pieces and through constant referencing and modification of my notes with a detailed attention given to the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements. Correspondingly, I pay an extensive attention to any cinematic element that serves for the philosophizing and theorizing that is introduced within these cinematic pieces which I consider as eventually proposing the distinct types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology. Here, I want to underline that since I focus on the cinematic pieces themselves, the channel of the cinematic piece that is screened does not change the philosophizing and theorizing that is presented by the cinematic piece. As Shamir addresses:

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, cinema resembles an octopus, morphing and expanding into different structures, formats, and possibilities. I understand and refer to the cinematic possibility as a phenomenon that includes a wide spectrum of forms and variations that can appear on different screens and in various manifestations, including the movie theater, television, videos, mobile phones, tablets, video games, and computers... My goal is to examine the cinematic phenomenon as a metaconcept; therefore, I will consider all of these different variations to be part of the cinematic phenomenon. (Shamir, 2016, 6)

Departing from Shamir's emphasis, I will solely focus on the cinematic pieces themselves and I will consider a wide spectrum of forms and variations of these pieces which can appear on different screens to be a part of the cinematic phenomenon.

Before getting into the close reading of the precise cinematic pieces, I want to underline the limits of the close reading methodology that I apply in this research. Hence, close reading methodology is strongly inductive and speculative in nature. Therefore, it assigns a kind of an individuality which is manifested as the precise decisions of the

interpreter. Hence, each step in the process of analysing a piece belonging to a complex medium involves translation which consists of precise decisions and choices. Therefore, “there will always be viable alternatives to the choices made, and what is left out is as important as what is present” (Rose, 2008, 343). Thus, as commonly accepted by the literature within the literary theory in which the close reading methodology is developed, this process of choosing and leaving out is a consequence of the interaction between the interpreter and the text. Hence, “each possesses his, her, or its own horizon, and every moment of understanding represents a fusion of these horizons” (Gadamer, 2006, 45). Correspondingly, as Smith states that this underlined individuality:

Leaves the interpretation, claim, or account open to dispute by other readers or scholars. At the same time, however, the grounding in personal observation and experience opens the possibility of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences... And, along with connections to broader intellectual issues and other concerns, that grounding and that attendant possibility—of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences—are also what sustain the value of much historical and theoretical research in the humanities as such. (Smith, 2016, 68-69)

However, as I have already emphasized, I situate myself as a cinematic philosopher in a sense that my role is not to offer my own interpretation/analysis of the cinematic pieces and also not to relate them to any specific theories or philosophers from the history of philosophy. Thus, I intend to focus, as a cinematic philosopher, on what the mind of the cinematic piece is saying through its cinematic elements rather than focusing on what the cinematic piece is saying according to my own mind, interpretation and analysis (McGuire, 1973). Subsequently, my role is to reveal these chosen piece’s philosophical wisdom and place them within a theoretical context which in my perception discloses layers of knowledge on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way. Therefore, my close reading analysis, even if, with reference to its subjective nature, is open to dispute by other readers and/or scholars, ground on testing and revealing the philosophizing and theorizing that is introduced by the chosen cinematic pieces which in my perception mitigates the speculative nature of my analysis. Correspondingly, I will apply the close reading methodology to precise cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series), in order test and reveal the theorizing that they introduce on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Subsequently, I will dedicate the next parts of this chapter to the analysis of these cinematic pieces but before this I want

to return back to the scheme that I have introduced on the types of restriction of Individual freedom through/by technology.

5.2 The Scheme: Situating the Cinematic Pieces within the Theoretical Context of Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology

If all elements considered there are four possibilities on the restriction of individual freedom which are the four types of restriction of individual freedom that I acknowledge as to inductively encompass all contemporary conceptions of individual freedom that I have referred to with reference to the restrictive factors that they propose. Below, is the scheme in which I situate the cinematic pieces that independently propose each type of restriction of individual freedom. Thus, as a cinematic philosopher, what I intend to propose with this scheme is to place these cinematic pieces within a theoretical context in order to reveal their philosophical wisdom which in my perception contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way.

Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology	External Factor (Y)	Internal Factors (Y)
Incognizant Agents (X)	Cinematic Piece 1: <i>Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution</i>	Cinematic Piece 3: <i>Ex Machina</i>
Cognizant Agents (X)	Cinematic Piece 2: <i>THX 1138</i>	Cinematic Piece 4: <i>Nosedive</i> Episode of the <i>Black Mirror</i> TV series

5.3 Close Reading of the Precise Cinematic Pieces For the Inquiry of the Types of Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology to be a Theoretical Contribution of Cinematic Philosophy

In this section, I will apply the close reading analysis to the cinematic pieces which are situated in the scheme above. Thus, as I claimed before, my role here as a cinematic philosopher is to connect the experience of the cinematic pieces to the context of philosophy. Hence, my role, therefore, is to test if these pieces are capable of theorizing the types of restriction individual freedom that I propose and if yes, my role is also to reveal the theorizing that they propose. Accordingly, I will focus on if the situated specific cinematic pieces evoke philosophical insights and present philosophical theories through the cinematic channel using cinematic elements on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom and If yes, how these pieces do this.

Following the philosophical methodology approach, I aim to analyze the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy (as an extension of the thought experiments) to test if they philosophize on and theorize the types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology (as to test the conceptual scheme that I have proposed). Respectively, I will apply the close reading analysis departing from the novel cinematic philosophical approach which bases upon the revelation of the cinematic elements that are deep-rooted in the cinematic pieces to serve for the philosophizing and theorizing that these precise cinematic pieces propose. Respectively, within the context of this research, I set my unit of analysis to macrostructure of the cinematic pieces which consists of the cinematic elements such as of the theme, story, plot, characters, the various elements of film language as used in the film, and its composition etc. which add up to provide the 'meaning' and the microstructure of the cinematic pieces which consists of framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, eventually, consist of individual shots, fragments of picture and sound to the arrangement of these fragments into scenes.

In my close reading of the referred cinematic pieces, for each close reading that I apply, first I will broadly outline and focus on the macrostructural cinematic elements through which I will reveal how each cinematic piece presents either internal or external factors to be restrictive of individual freedom and presents how individuals are either cognizant or incognizant of these restrictive factors on their individual freedom. Then, I will focus on the

microstructural cinematic elements, starting with the first instance of the cinematic experience and ending with the last instance of the cinematic experience, through which I will reveal precise cinematic elements that serve for the philosophizing and theorizing on the restriction of individual freedom. Thus, I assert that these macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements when holistically combined, theorize the inductively established novel kind of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory along with the also inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

5.3.1 *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution: Restriction of Individual Freedom of Incognizant Agents(X) by External Factors(Y) through/by Technology*

Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution sets off when a secret agent Lemmy Caution (Eddie Constantine) originating from what is only known as the outlands arrives in Alphaville under the pretext of doing journalistic work for a publication called the *Figaro-Pravda*. His actual purpose is firstly to search for a missing agent known as Henry Dickson (Akim Tamiroff) and secondly to destroy the creator of Alphaville, a scientist known as Professor Von Braun (Howard Vernon), as well as the computerized system which Professor Von Braun himself constructed. Thus, *Alphaville* is ultimately about the struggle of a single determined individual against a totalizing, dehumanizing rationally driven computer society, one that is literally operated by a central artificial intelligence, known as Alpha 60 which watches, weighs and predicts any subversive element beyond logical rationality.

My role here is to reveal this struggle and how this struggle is embedded within the cinematic piece to propose the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology. Thus, since my aim is to test through its cinematic elements if this mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom is a theoretical contribution of this cinematic piece, I aim solely to focus on situating the cinematic language that the film uses within the context of restriction of individual freedom. Respectively, I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present the external factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present the individuals as being incognizant of these external factors. Eventually, as I claim, all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged will introduce *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology*.

First, before getting into the details of the precise cinematic elements, I want to focus on how, broadly, the external factors are presented as restrictive of individual freedom and how individuals are incognizant of these external factors within the cinematic piece. Thus, Alpha 60 proposed as a faceless and opaquely dominating presence which is in control of the active process of subtle surveillance, subliminal coercion and manipulation to sustain a conformist society. These sorts of processes are shaped by logic ruled forms of behavior and logic ruled forms of knowledge that have the effect of reinforcing particular structures of this technocratic power. Therefore, Alpha 60 is the only power source which gives life to the residents of Alphaville in a sense that, within the cinematic experience, the particular structures and rules of this technocratic power along with its ideology become irreversibly interwoven into the residents of Alphaville that it indoctrinates to the point where the two become indistinguishable and inseparable; When one dies, so must the other.

The cinematic revelation of this emphasis is blatantly experienced through the sequence of the film starting with Lemmy destroying Alpha 60 with the riddle that he tells precisely because the riddle is unfathomable through logic. Correspondingly, Alpha 60 starts to break down and simultaneously the residents of Alphaville start to lose their energy and balance. This connection as a cinematic experience is given through the cinematic means by the abrupt cuts in between the scenes showing a giant computer, Alpha 60 giving errors by irregular flashing of its buttons and the scenes showing the residents of Alphaville acting out of balance in the need of the energy of Alpha 60. Hence, right after Alpha 60 starts to break down, some shots within the sequence start to fall into a black screen, and start to be proposed through a negative filter accompanied by a dramatic music in the background. Thus, while all these cinematic elements are proposed within the sequence to highlight the effects of Alpha 60's destruction on Alphaville, Lemmy continues his actions without any visible effects of this destruction. This distinction between Lemmy and the residents of Alphaville forms the grounds of the control and manipulation to be irreversibly interwoven into the residents that the system indoctrinates. In short, this signifies that Alpha 60, as a faceless authority, by applying subtle forms of control and manipulation makes its logic-oriented rules and structures to be internally embraced by the residents of Alphaville. Correspondingly, although the destruction of Alpha 60 causes severe effects on the residents, Lemmy coming from the outlands does not get affected from this destruction.

Within the mentioned sequence of the cinematic piece starting with Lemmy destroying Alpha 60 with the riddle, there is a part in which throughout the scene we visually see Lemmy on the move, while we hear a voice-over proceeds as a discussion between Alpha 60 and Lemmy. Alpha 60 through its robotic voice states to Lemmy that "From many aspects your reactions and your perspective is different from Alphaville's 'normal'". This normal here represents the indoctrinated residents of Alphaville. That's why, in the scene

Lemmy in the form of a voice-over replies Alpha 60 as “The residents of Alphaville are not normal. They are the products of mutation”. Accordingly, within the same sequence, we see the residents of Alphaville as a product of this mutation losing balance and dying due to the loss of light, while Lemmy as an abnormal within the context of Alphaville survives without any effect coming from this destruction. Consequently, the external factors presented as restrictive of individual freedom within the cinematic piece is the manipulation and control applied by the technology itself, Alpha 60, to create a system solely ruled by logic. This mentioned manipulation and control is functioning due to the internalization of the structures and rules of this system by the residents of Alphaville. Hence, this process of internalization proposed by the cinematic piece through its cinematic elements assigns the residents of Alphaville to be incognizant of these external factors and this incognizance is realized through Lemmy's cognizance of the restriction applied to the residents.

In one of the scenes in which two agents, Henry and Lemmy, talking about the technocratic rule of Alphaville, Lemmy states, referring to the residents of Alphaville “They have become the slaves of probabilities”. Here, what Lemmy means is that they are the slaves of a totalizing, dehumanizing rationally driven computer society ruled by Alpha 60. Thus, it is blatantly seen that Lemmy is cognizant of this kind of manipulation and control applied to the residents of Alphaville. Then, it can be claimed that Lemmy represents the non-slave being cognizant of this slaveness. Respectively, Lemmy being cognizant of the calculating and predictive logic embodied by Alpha 60 which seeks to abolish the slightest hint of individual thought and sensations, represents the ‘free’ individual, free from the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom. Then, the unfree individuals, automatically are situated as the slaves being incognizant of this slaveness which are proposed as the residents of Alphaville. This duality of cognizance and incognizance is emphasized throughout the cinematic experience through its cinematic elements. However, this duality is best revealed by Natasha (Anna Karina) through her transformation from incognizant to cognizant as a consequence of the discovery of her love towards Lemmy. Natasha (the daughter of professor Von Braun) in the beginning of the cinematic experience is an indoctrinated individual who as a consequence of the subtle forms of manipulation and control does not know the meaning of being in love¹⁰. However, throughout the cinematic experience her discovery of love reveals an entire universe of emotions and irrationality which she does not know that it exists. Thus, Natasha's journey essentially is the proof of the manipulation and control of the system, and her liberation is through her transformation from being incognizant of this control and manipulation to being cognizant of them.

¹⁰ Love is one of the prominent themes which signifies the opposite of logic. Therefore, it is used throughout the cinematic piece as one of the prior elements functioning as a liberating factor from the control and manipulation that the technocratic system imposes.

Furthermore, Alpha 60's effect as an external factor in the process of internalization of this logic ruled system is bolstered by the fact that she was brought to Alphaville by her father rather than being born there. This emphasis implies that Natasha once was a free individual who is aware of and can experience her emotions before being brought to Alphaville. However, the system through manipulation and control made her internalize this solely logic-based rules and structures. That's the precise reason why, from the beginning of the cinematic experience Natasha tells something through her words and expresses almost always the opposite through her eyes, gestures and reactions which is and can only be revealed through the cinematic elements such as the close-up shots to her facial expressions, the music and the sound used, the lighting, the acting, etc.. Here, I will connect this emphasis with the opening scene of the film and from here then I will focus on the precise scenes which include concrete cinematic elements that are used to propose all the aspects mentioned above.

Hence, until here I tried to reveal how the cinematic piece, through its macrostructural cinematic elements, proposes the external factors as restrictive of individual freedom and how the individuals under the control of these external factors are incognizant of this restriction. However, since my motivation is to propose that this type of a restriction is not only introduced and theorized through the macrostructural cinematic elements but also through the microstructural cinematic elements, in the next part, I will reveal these precise microstructural cinematic elements that are embedded within this specific cinematic experience. These cinematic details, when holistically acknowledged are construed to propose the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom.

In the opening scene of the cinematic piece a robotic voice, visually represented as a flashing light, states "Sometimes reality can be too complicated to be conveyed by the spoken word". This statement, ironically revealed by Alpha 60, represents the power of the cinematic elements to have a capacity to reveal reality by going beyond the spoken word. Thus, Natasha telling something through her words and expressing something different through her eyes not only reveals her incognizance of the manipulation and control that she is exposed to but also reveals the power of the cinematic elements to expose ideas through connecting cinematic elements. Departing from this emphasis I, as a cinematic philosopher, contemplate cinematic pieces in the broad sense, and *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution sets off when a secret agent Lemmy Caution* in this case not as a constant stream of seconds and minutes but rather as an amalgam of ideas manifested through cinematic elements within specific scenes when holistically combined proposing theories and concepts. Thus, this is what *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* manifests since it is, as expressed:

Not a film with a linear, predictable narrative direction. Although the content of the film revolves around modes of alienation and their subsequent logical and scientific organisation, it should be noted that the structure of the sense of the film in terms of direction is constantly being reoriented. (Bouhaben, 2015, 120)

This constant reorientation is manifested through “the rupture of the narrative, the combination of genres, the play between music and images” (Liandrat-Guides & Leutrat, 1994, 48; Bouhaben, 2015, 123). This kind of an attitude that the cinematic piece proposes matches with my contemplation of the cinematic pieces. Subsequently, in the next part of this section, I will close read this cinematic piece with reference to the ideas that it manifests through its microstructural cinematic elements within specific scenes when holistically acknowledged are construed to propose the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom.

The cinematic piece sets off with a flashing light accompanied by dramatic music. This flashing light scene abruptly cuts to a poster of a tank thrown to the sea by people followed by a poster of a bird flying away from the hands of a human being. All the cinematic elements combined, this sequence sets the context to revolve around the struggle between freedom and technology. Thus, the cinematic piece sets its context through the combination of cinematic elements such as the visuals and the music. Within the sequence, the crucial question that is seeded to the experience is what does the flashing light signify? In order to make this question to be less of a mystery, the same flashing light appears in the next scene accompanied by a robotic voice-over which, as blatantly understood, is the voice of the flashing light itself. Then, while this robotic voice continues, the scene abruptly cuts to the captures of huge, modernized apartments with most of its household’s lights are on. Here, the cinematic piece makes the connection of the one centered flashing light to be present in almost every household and even be present in every bit of the captures showing Alphaville city itself. As the sequence continues, we see the light embedded within the city of Alphaville and the cinematic piece being black and white blatantly bolsters the intensity of all these lights. During the sequence the tense mood is set through the music and through the inserts which include a flashing arrow showing just one direction and a poster introducing Alphaville buttressing values such as silence, logic, security and prudence. All in all, the cinematic piece with its opening sequence proposes a setting which hints to a totalitarian power of technology represented through the light embedded within Alphaville.

From the beginning Lemmy Caution is introduced as an outsider which automatically situates Lemmy as not belonging to the Alphaville society, accordingly, not belonging to the Alphaville system. Also, from the beginning Lemmy as an outsider to Alphaville, sets his attitude towards the residents of Alphaville as sceptical in a sense that as if he does not trust

the residents. This is blatantly seen through his gestures and through his acting. For instance, in the scene where he checks into the hotel, the bellboy offers to carry his baggage but Lemmy fiercely, in rude manners, refuses the bellboy's request. His attitude is the same towards Beatrice (Christa Lang) (a third-class seductress) who accompanies him to his hotel room. However, Lemmy's attitude becomes fathomable when Beatrice's actions and reactions are as robotic as the sound of the introduced flashing light. The hints of her being robotic as a resident of Alphaville is followed by the questions that she asks to Lemmy in mechanical tones. However, the blatant scene that hints Beatrice as having limited conceptual abilities preventing her from contemplating the issue at a deeper level and emotional level is the scene when a man attacks Lemmy in his hotel room. In the scene, while Lemmy and the man are fighting, Beatrice is taking a bath as if nothing is happening and the music in the background as a light music fits more with the mood of Beatrice having a bath rather than the mood of the two men fighting. Thus, the cinematic elements used in the scene hints to her limited conceptual abilities preventing her from contemplating the issue at an emotional level. The climax of this attitude becomes most obvious when Beatrice talks to Lemmy after the fight as if nothing has happened. Here, the way that Beatrice acts and communicates recalls a mode of attitude and discourse which is pre-programmed.

Up until this scene this kind of pre-programmed attitude of Beatrice has been given through the cinematic elements such as the acting, the rupture of the narrative and the play between music and images. Thus, Lemmy by asking Beatrice "what is going on here? Are you on drugs or what?", for the first time, puts this problem (he considers this as a problem) into words. Here, what Lemmy tries to understand is what is the reason that makes Beatrice to pretend in this way. Thus, the cinematic piece gives some hints on the reasons that make Beatrice act in a pre-programmed way through the bible that she was looking for as the first thing she does when she enters the hotel room or through the tranquilizers that she leaves for Lemmy. This connotes that there is such a power which manipulates and controls the residents of Alphaville through these elements. However, this control and manipulation becomes so inherent within the system that Beatrice considers herself as 'normal'. Then, the question arises as to what is the power behind this? The Cinematic piece, at this precise point, reminds us of the presence of this flashing light through its robotic voice. This voice is heard through a telephone call in which Natasha Von Braun is, for the first time, mentioned within the cinematic piece. Hence, when the voice of this flashing light is talking, there is an insert of the image of a transmission tower accompanied by a machine sound. This cinematic intervention connotes that this flashing light is beyond a flashing light as it is a machine. In this scene both professor Von Braun (through his picture) and her daughter Natasha Von Braun are introduced. When Natasha and Lemmy are having a conversation, Natasha even it is not asked by Lemmy says 'I'm very well, thanks for asking' as a reflection

of the mechanical conformism and this is repeated many times by other residents of Alphaville which signifies the manipulation that is inherent within the system of Alphaville. In the scene, Natasha getting the tranquilizer that Beatrice brought again signifies that the manipulation and control is deeply inherent within the system that the residents make it a part of themselves which automatically assign them as being incognizant of this kind of a control and manipulation that leads to the loss of their individual freedom.

One difference that Natasha has from Beatrice though is her facial reactions and expressions along with the look in her eyes. This differentiation is proposed through the scenes in which the camera solely focuses, in close-up shots, on her facial reactions that are intensely emotional. This cinematic touch proposes that Natasha is situated in a different place than the other residents of Alphaville in a sense that she at least has the capacity to feel even if she is not cognizant of her feelings. Thus, throughout the cinematic experience except for a few instances Natasha is in a gloomy mood sensed through her tone of voice, through the way she talks, through the look in her eyes. This hints to her limited conceptual abilities preventing her from contemplating the issue at a deeper level, and therefore preventing her from discovering that, perhaps, she is actually gloomy because she lacks the freedom to openly express her emotions or thoughts. Even if her emotions and thoughts are there, she is not cognizant of them (Yoshioka, 2012, Para. 11). This is the precise reason why her actions, reactions and her words are in conflict. This conflict triggered by her incognizance is represented through her emotions towards Lemmy which makes her act in a conflictual way or give conflictual reactions. This is blatant in the scene where the security of professor Von Braun beats Lemmy. When Natasha sees that Lemmy is on the ground and in pain, she cries but when someone asks if she is crying, she says no because it is forbidden to cry. However, her facial reactions show that she is in such sorrow because Lemmy is beaten up and caught by the security.

At this stage of the cinematic experience, it becomes obvious that there is an internalized external power embedded within the residents of Alphaville. This external power is implied, throughout the cinematic experience, as authoritarian through the insert of shots of visual symbols/images and through the aural elements in between the instances of the cinematic experience such as the arrow, the poster of Professor Von Braun, the flashing SS sign, the use of sound and music. Furthermore, the cinematic piece reveals the source of this authoritarian system as being a logic dominated machine through the insert of shots of visual symbols/images and through the aural elements such as the intensified use of light and the flashing light, the mechanistic voice over, the equations, the transmission towers, the sign of Alpha 60, the use of the sound of a machine, etc. Hence, as Maximilian Yoshioka states, referencing the inserts of the arrow and the equation:

The arrow clearly represents the death of freedom and choice; with the 'correct' path always pointed out, one loses the ability to individually reject or accept alternative modes of action and existence. Determinism gains the upper hand over free will; and all manifestations of free thought and self-determination are stifled. The equation, the backbone of science and mathematics, points towards similar consequences, in that it also represents a form of pre-decided, logically necessitated reality that by definition destroys the possibility of choice. (Yoshioka, 2012, Para. 3)

The cinematic piece, after giving precise details almost enough to disclose the general characteristics of the residents of Alphaville through Beatrice and Natasha, proceeds to propose the system itself and the authority behind this system. This is when Henry (the other agent) is introduced within the piece, as an individual who can share details about how the system works in a more cognizant way than any other residents of Alphaville. Lemmy, aware of this, directly asks Henry 'What is Alpha 60?'. Then, the cinematic piece for the first time in concrete details reveals that Alpha 60 is a one hundred and fifty light years more powerful computer system which manifests technocracy and professor Von Braun is a figure who just obeys the logical orders coming from Alpha 60. Therefore, the piece reveals that Alpha 60 is the sole authority behind this system.

In this scene, the cinematic piece not only reveals the power behind the system of Alphaville but also reveals what is the pushing force of the system along with how the system makes this pushing force to become deep-rooted in the residents of Alphaville. Thus, Henry tells to Lemmy that many people who cannot adopt to this place commits suicide. Right immediately, the scene cuts into an insert in which there is a modernized building with all of its lights on with a background sound of a machine beep. Henry continues to explain, in sort of pain¹¹, by saying that the system uses dissuasion to adapt the individuals. Then, it becomes blatant that the insert in the previous scene is used to hint to the force behind this dissuasion which is Alpha 60 manifested through a modernized building with all of its lights on. Here, the cinematic piece itself raises the question of adaptation to what and what is abolished within this adaptation process? And the piece itself answers these questions through the following scene when the two agents are looking at and are playing with the light bulb which is in the centre of the frame and the scene. Therefore, it is adaptation to the light itself, the technology itself which represents the solely logical orders coming from Alpha 60. Accordingly, in the process of this adaptation what is lost is anything which is outside of the accepted structures of knowledge and the scene blatantly exposes that if you do not adapt

¹¹ Henry is in sort of pain because he resists against this dissuasion which clearly indicates how strong and how deep-rooted the power of Alpha 60 is.

or commit a suicide then you are executed by the system just because you openly express your emotions or thoughts. As expressed:

In the aforementioned execution ceremony in the swimming pool, those being disposed of are those who challenged the dominant system of technological rationality by being committed to ideals outside of the accepted structures of knowledge, regardless of the consequences. This attitude is exemplified by a brief speech one of the prisoners makes before his death, in which he defiantly proclaims that 'we see the truth you no longer see. The truth is that the essence of man is love and faith, courage, tenderness, generosity and sacrifice...the rest is the obstacle created by the progress of your blind ignorance!'. (Yoshioka, 2012, para. 17)

The crucial point here is that this obstacle created by the progress of the blind ignorance is not a natural process, but an imposed process applied by this logic-ruled system to make individuals inherently forget their capability of openly feeling and expressing their emotions or thoughts. To support this proposal, within the execution scene, since the residents of Alphaville are incognizant of their feelings due to the dissuasion process, they all clap every time an individual is executed. In the scene the actions of the residents connotes as if they are the reflection of Alpha 60, they become a fragment of Alpha 60. So, what the system imposes is that either you are free but this freedom brings your end, or you are unfree but you are not cognizant of this unfreedom. However, there is Natasha who through the help of a free individual, Lemmy, physically gets out of this system to be free again and when she does get out of this system, the first thing that she says to Lemmy is 'I love you'. Therefore, it is not that the residents are ill-equipped to feel or think but they are made incognizant of their capacity of thinking and feeling beyond the logical rules of Alpha 60.

As I have stated before, the cinematic piece proposes the residents as if they are the fragments of Alpha 60. This is hinted in some inserts and scenes such as when the chief engineer states that the centre of Alphaville is within Alpha 60 or when an insert shows a light turning around itself as the world does and right above this light there is an 'El mundo' signboard or when Lemmy asks Natasha why the residents of Alphaville are all gloomy, she answers as 'they lack electricity'. All these hints which are revealed through the cinematic elements impose that in Alphaville there are no individuals anymore but there are just the reflections of Alpha 60. Therefore, Alpha 60 is everywhere in Alphaville although it is not seen in one shape in almost anywhere. That's why, we see or hear Alpha 60 throughout the film, as the flashing light, as the mechanic voice-over, as the machine, as a composition of all computers, cables, wires within huge rooms, as the transmitter towers, as the light itself. This becomes most blatant within the scene when Lemmy is interrogated by Alpha 60. Even

if there is a precise flashing light that is sometimes shown within the scene, when Lemmy is talking to Alpha 60 surrounded by all the distinct technological devices, Lemmy seems like he is talking to air. Thus, this signifies that Alpha 60 is not a precise physical presence/figure but it is the system itself and the residents must be the fragments of this system, of Alpha 60.

This emphasis is explained in the following scene while Lemmy is wandering around within Alpha 60 through its huge rooms composed of all computers, cables, wires. In the scene, as a voice-over, Alpha 60 talking about the residents of Alphaville states that 'They must be destroyed, that is to say they must be transformed'. Therefore, it is clear at this point that the transformation is equated to destruction and this destruction process is shared through the thoughts of Lemmy as a voice-over as 'the foreigners are gradually assimilated and the others, the ones that cannot be assimilated are purely and simply killed... If an individual shows hope of reclamation, he is sent to a chronic illness hospital where the mechanical and propagandist treatments soon cures him'. The cinematic power of this scene is that when Lemmy is revealing his thoughts through the words shared above, the piece as visuals shows Natasha in a totally dark room illuminated by just one light right next to her face and she is smiling. This scene clearly indicates the power of the cinematic elements to propose the idea that the residents of Alphaville after being exposed to the process of so-called transformation by the power of Alpha 60 (Represented through the shining light bulb) become incognizant of this transformation process that they are exposed to (represented by the smiling face of Natasha). Therefore, they are all incognizant of the manipulation and control that they are exposed to, which is employed by Alpha 60, in order to make its system continue to function.

The cinematic piece in order to extensively underline the inherent manipulation and control embedded within the system of Alphaville, at this stage of its experience, proposes the liberation process of Natasha who through the help of a free individual, Lemmy, physically gets out of this system to be free again. Thus, if Natasha is able to get out of this type of manipulation and control, then, automatically the presence of the restriction of individual freedom would be confirmed. Thus, Natasha couldn't help but go to see Lemmy due to her emotions towards him even if it is forbidden for her to see him. However, within the scene where Lemmy and Natasha are together in Lemmy's hotel room (the second hotel room), she still acts and talks as a consequence of the control and manipulation that she is being exposed to. For instance, she uses the 'I'm very well, thanks for asking' sentence as a reflection of the mechanical conformism which is repeated many times by the other residents of Alphaville. This kind of attitude becomes the most blatant within the scene when Lemmy asks Natasha if she knows the book 'The Capital of Pain'. Natasha starts to read the book and even if the sentences within the book are intensely emotional, she does not show a sign

of any emotions. In the scene, when she reads the word 'Conscience', she looks right into the camera and says, 'these are the words that I don't understand'. Thus, the cinematic piece through her eyes and her facial expressions underlines her despair due to not knowing the meaning of the word.

Simultaneously, the piece underlines that Alphaville system manipulates its residents by making them forget the meaning of the words so that the residents can forget their feelings or forget to think. This process of manipulation is proposed throughout the film as many of the residents such as Henry, the chief engineer, Natasha, etc., do not know the meaning of 'Why'. Hence, within this scene, the film reveals that the reason why the residents of Alphaville do not know the meaning of why or conscience or love is because the system has erased all words deemed dangerous to its domination from the bible. The Bible here appears as one of the main manipulation objects of the system which is a dictionary that the system constantly updates by removing the incompatible words. The significant point here is that Natasha internalizes the bible itself. That's the precise reason why when Lemmy reads the parts of the poetry book, she nervously intends to check the bible or when she realizes that there is no such word 'conscience' in the bible, she says, 'It's no longer there. So, no one here knows the meaning of the word conscience any more' as if it is 'normal'. However, Natasha knows what the word conscience means as she tells Lemmy 'I know that word without ever having seen it or read it'. Thus, Lemmy's presence by itself triggers Natasha's self-realization process which is what she is afraid of precisely because she thinks that she will not be 'normal' anymore. This is the 'normal' of Alphaville which signifies being unfree. Therefore, Natasha is actually afraid of being free even if her real-self seeks for it. This conflict is represented within the scene through the cinematic elements.

Within the scene her reactions/gestures and her use of the worlds are in constant conflict. This is the conflict between her real-self and her manipulated-self. For instance, when she answers Lemmy's questions as 'yes', she either nods her head with the gesture of no or moves her finger with the gesture of no. This conflict is underlined through the cinematic elements such as the combination of the sound, the visual, the acting and the words. Thus, right after Lemmy says to Natasha that he is falling in love with her, Natasha asks 'what is love?' The cinematic power is manifested within the scene with a close-up shot focusing on Natasha's face in which her eyes indicate that she feels the love itself. The film with its cinematic elements reflects this love. This reflection reaches its climax in the sequence that starts with an extreme close-up shot showing the eyes of Natasha while in voice-over she gives the definition of love which is composed of sole emotions. Thus, her eyes and the change in the look through her eyes represents the transformation that leads to her liberation from the deeply-rooted control and manipulation of the Alphaville system. Therefore, it is almost a foreshadowing when Natasha reads 'Your eyes have returned from

a despotic land where no one has known the meaning of a glance' from the book that Lemmy gives to her. Here, although she is not cognizant, these words represent her and her transformation. A transformation from her unfree self to her free self which is manifested by the film through its cinematic means as the transformation from her emotionless eyes to her eyes full of emotions. Hence, even if Natasha blatantly expresses that she is not cognizant of what is happening to her, she feels this kind of a transformation which is actually a reversed version of the transformation that is applied by the system.

The sequence is followed by the visuals of a romantic interaction between Lemmy and Natasha, while Natasha in voice-over continues to talk about love. Within this stage of the sequence the more Natasha talks about love, the more chaotic the camera moves, camera cuts and the use of lights become. This is another indicator that Natasha by her transformation, blatantly, creates some chaos within the system of Alpha 60. Correspondingly, Alpha 60 right immediately sends its officials to separate them and Lemmy is taken to confront Alpha 60 again. This confrontation followed by the confrontation with professor Von Braun eventually leads to the destruction of Alpha 60. Hence, Lemmy tells a riddle that is unfathomable by Alpha 60. Respectively, Alpha 60 starts to lose power and starts to break down. As I have detailed before, the moment that Alpha 60 starts to lose its power, the residents of Alphaville start to either die or lose balance due the absence of light and energy. They scatter as the fragments of Alpha 60 because Alpha 60 and its system is deeply-rooted within them. It is deeply-rooted because due to the transformation, manipulation and control, the residents of Alphaville internalize the system itself and this kind of an incognizant internalization makes them lose their individual freedom. That's why, the destruction of Alpha 60 leads to their destruction as well. Natasha with the help of Lemmy, as a free being, literally escapes from this destruction. Thus, although she is struggling to manage her emotions, she liberates herself and becomes a free being when she manages to say 'I love you' to Lemmy. Yet, the cinematic piece reflects her liberation not only through her words but also through close-up shots focusing on to her eyes and to her smile and through the use of music and the light. Eventually, the cinematic piece ends its experience by introducing 'the end' credit manifested in an illogical and nonlinear way as a symbol of liberation from the solely logic ruled system of Alphaville.

Here, right after concluding my close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I want to give some details on the other intersections of the scheme which are not covered in a paradigmatic way within my close reading of the cinematic piece. Hence, throughout the close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I precisely focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the external factors as restrictive of individual freedom and how individuals are incognizant of these external factors. However, within the cinematic experience there are some hints

given through the cinematic elements that serve for the philosophizing prioritizing other determinant elements of the scheme which are being *cognizant* or *incognizant* of the restrictive parameters on individual freedom and *external* or *internal* factors restricting individual freedom. I want to give some precise details on the other intersections of the determinant elements that are hinted throughout the cinematic experience.

For instance, from the beginning of the cinematic experience the cinematic piece proposes professor Von Braun as being cognizant of the restrictive factors of individual freedom restricted by Alpha 60, the technology itself as an external factor. However, as the scientist who created Alpha 60, he accepts all of the restrictions by heart which recalls some internal factors as well. Therefore, it can be stated that there is a hint of the intersection which are *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors*, the external here is the Alpha 60 and there is a hint of intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors*, the internal here is represented as the fascination of the professor towards Alpha 60. Besides, Lemmy himself can be considered as a cognizant individual whose individual freedom is restricted by the Alpha 60, since he is being exposed to some forced interrogation by Alpha 60. What's more, Henry (the other agent) is also cognizant of the restrictive parameters that he is exposed to by the system along with the people that are executed since they do not conform with the system of Alpha 60. Thus, these examples indicate that there are also hints of the intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors*. However, within the cinematic experience there are no hints of the intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by internal factors*. The crucial point here is that I consider these hints, signifying some philosophizing to be done on the other intersections of the scheme that I propose, to serve for the primary philosophizing and the theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece. So as to say, the cinematic piece uses these other intersections to make the primary intersection to be more explicit and solid. Accordingly, I assert that the sole theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece is: *The restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by external factors*.

Subsequently, I, as a cinematic philosopher, tried to connect the cinematic experience of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* to the context of individual freedom and technology by focusing on how it evokes philosophical insights through the cinematic channel using its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements. All in all, I tried to reveal its theorizing by applying the close reading methodology/analysis to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the external factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the individuals as being incognizant of these external factors. Eventually, all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged, in

Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution, the individual freedom of the incognizant residents of Alphaville is restricted through the internalized transformation, manipulation and control applied by Alpha 60 functioning as an external factor. Subsequently, the cinematic piece as a piece of cinematic philosophy proposes and theorizes *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology* as a theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

5.3.2 THX 1138: Restriction of Individual Freedom of Cognizant Agents(X) by External Factors(Y) through/by Technology

THX 1138 is a cinematic piece which is based upon the journey of THX 1138 (Robert Duvall) in a society that is solely ruled according to the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers. This society functions through the advanced digital infrastructure and through the constant control of the android police who follow the directions of these computer calculations like the other human officers do. Thus, the citizens of this system are forced to use sedatives to suppress their emotions in order to reach the highest levels of efficiency. Correspondingly, the journey of THX 1138 is a journey against this system of propaganda, surveillance, manipulation and control towards his freedom. Thus, this journey turns into a freedom fight against the system when THX 1138 stops using the sedatives and accordingly is convicted as a criminal.

My role here is to reveal this struggle and how this struggle is embedded within the cinematic piece to propose the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology. Thus, since my aim is to test through its cinematic elements if this mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom is a theoretical contribution of this cinematic piece, I aim solely to focus on situating the cinematic language that the film uses within the context of restriction of individual freedom. Subsequently, I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present the external factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present THX 1138 and some other individuals as being cognizant of these external factors. Eventually, as I claim, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, will introduce *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology*.

First, before getting into the details of the precise cinematic elements, I want to focus on how, broadly, the external factors are presented as restrictive of individual freedom and how some individuals are cognizant of these external factors within the cinematic piece. Thus, the cinematic piece introduces THX 1138 for the first time through a monitor, a monitor

that is everywhere and anywhere within the city. The system's priority aim is greater efficiency, and this efficiency is being stabilized through the stabilization of the individuals belonging to this society. This stabilization of the individuals is done through the sedatives, through constant surveillance and through extensively advanced digital infrastructure. Thus, throughout the cinematic experience there is an almost constant distorted radio sounds of people giving commands and orders accompanied by the drone of the machines. The system through and by the power of technology tries to standardize people in order to get the most efficiency from them. The cinematic piece proposes this standardization through the system mandating all of the individuals to use sedatives, to wear identical white clothing, to shave their heads to bald. For the sake of efficiency there is the dominance of the numbers. Every order and every action is over-numericized and even the names of the individuals consist of three letters and four numbers.

The external force here as the technology itself considers individuals as an object to be consumed and it has total control over its objects. This kind of control is done through sedatives and through constant surveillance, propaganda and manipulation. Especially sedatives by making individuals suppress their emotions, enable the system to control and conduct the individuals. Respectively, drug evasion and malicious sexual perversion are one of the crimes that could lead to immediate destruction because of an incurable imbalance with socially deteriorating conscience. All in all, in this system ruled by mathematical calculations for the sake of technological efficiency there is no place for emotions and emotion motivated actions. Accordingly, the system through its extensively advanced digital infrastructure, intensely surveils, manipulates and indoctrinates all the individuals in order to prevent them breaking free from this non-emotional state of being.

For instance, even the mating between individuals is done by the system and is done according to the efficiency that the two mates could bring to the system and there is no chance to choose your own mate. This obviously requires allegiance. This allegiance is manifested as a companionship which is one of the primary elements of control and manipulation. For example, while THX 1138, in his house, is watching a TV broadcast in the form of a hologram, one of the commentators in the program states 'Control through companionship, combined with economic advantages of the mating structure far surpasses any disadvantages in increased perversions'. The point here is that the natural sexual intercourse as a sign of emotions is considered as a sexual abnormality which in the eyes of the system must be punished by immediate destruction. That's why, in the trial of THX 1138 in which he is charged with malicious sexual perversion, the prosecution states 'If society is to free itself from these deviants...We must not continue to consume these erotics'. What prosecution manifests here is that since the system acknowledges individuals as objects to be consumed, then, any individual who becomes non-efficient because of her emotions has

no use for the system. As the system manifests 'In the history of now all ethos are designed' and if in any condition an individual is outside of this designed ethos then she must be consumed. Thus, I precisely wrote 'consumed' here because while THX 1138 and SRT 5752 hologram man (Don Pedro Colley) are escaping from the android police, they find themselves in a room full of jars filled with a liquid and all of the jars have a fetus inside. As the scene proceeds SRT 5752 says 'How shall the new environment be programmed?' While he is saying this, the cinematic piece displays these jars, each of them labelled as the individuals are labelled within this system. Actually, this is a hint for an upcoming scene in which THX 1138 and SRT 5752 are stuck in a surveillance room. THX 1138 searches for LUH 3417 (Maggie McOmie) through the extensively advanced surveillance system in order to learn where her lover LUH 3417 is. The system indicates that LUH 3417 is 'consumed' and her name is reassigned to one of the fetuses within one of the jars. Then, as the cinematic piece hinted before, all of the fetuses within the jars are named after the individuals that are consumed and they are waiting to be programmed and made ready to be objectified by the system again. Here, what is proposed by the cinematic piece is that all the individuals are the usable objects for the system who are programmed to serve in the most efficient way. To make this emphasis to be complete, the cinematic piece, right after this referred scene, proposes a scene in which within the same frame there is SEN 5241 (Donald Henry Pleasence) being captured by the android police, and there are young children, uniformed in white and are bald as the rest of the society, going up on an escalator. Throughout the scene there is a voice-over repeating the words 'changeable, alterable, mutable, variable, versatile, moldable, moveable, fluctuate, undulate, flicker, flutter, pulsate, vibrate, alternate, plastic' accompanied by sensational music.

All in all, what this system grounds on is a recurring circle composed of individuals that are used as objects to be 'consumed' through propaganda, control, indoctrination, manipulation and force. Thus, as the cinematic piece suggests, the power behind this recurring circle is the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers that function through the digital infrastructure and through the constant control of the android police who follow the directions of these computer calculations like the other human officers do. One fundamental point here to be mentioned is that the individuals that are exposed to this kind of control, manipulation and indoctrination are serving to the system as objects but not as subjects. Then, according to this system, an individual who wants and tries to stand as a subject but not as an object should be captured, punished and necessarily be consumed by the system itself. Thus, THX 1138 is this individual who tries to survive as a subject against this system. Therefore, THX 1138 is the individual who becomes cognizant of this objectification process and accordingly the cinematic experience proceeds as THX 1138 is trying to escape from this system to be a subject, to be free.

The cinematic experience proposes THX 1138's journey as the journey towards his freedom. However, this journey sets off precisely when he stops using the sedatives and consequently when he becomes cognizant of the control, surveillance, manipulation and indoctrination he was exposed to. Thus, the cinematic experience sets this distinction between the incognizant and the cognizant agents (incognizant in a sense that they are unaware of the restrictions on their individual freedom and cognizant in a sense that they are aware of the restrictions on their individual freedom), by setting the distinction between the individuals serving for the system as objects and the individuals that are sent to the detention centre because of remaining as non-contributing individuals on the edge of society. THX 1138 is one of these people who is sent to the detention centre precisely because he refuses to be controlled, manipulated and indoctrinated by the system. However, the crucial point here is that within the detention centre he is still being used, manipulated and controlled by the system. This is crucial because the one difference between real life and the detention centre is that in real life the individuals are incognizant of this objectification process through and by the power of technology and in the detention centre individuals are cognizant of this process of objectification. For instance, one of the inmates within the detention centre states that 'When posterity judges our actions here, it will perhaps see us not as unwilling prisoners, but as man who, for whatever reason, preferred to remain as non-contributing individuals on the edge of society...This place where blind circumstance has placed me'. This kind of a statement blatantly indicates that individuals within the detention centre are aware that they are unwilling prisoners who are captured and enslaved precisely because of not standing as contributing individuals. Correspondingly, they are aware of the objectification processes that they are exposed to within the detention centre in contrast to objectified people in real life.

The cinematic piece highlights this cognizance most blatantly in the sequence which starts when three android police touch THX 1138 with their batons in the detention centre. These touches, directed through the commands, resemble digital insertions to his physical presence. In the scene THX 1138 in despair tries to avoid these touches. Thus, the cinematic piece expresses this despair through his acting in a sense that every touch of the batons has a physical effect on his body. At this point, the restriction of his individual freedom through external factors turns into a physical presence. A physical presence that he is cognizant of. Then, the sequence continues as THX 1138 goes through an intense amount of medical processes and examinations as if they are the continuation of the mentioned digital insertions done through the batons of the android police. Hence, the scene exhibits within one frame, in a close-up shot, both his face and all the processes applied on him through the machines to indicate that although he is cognizant of what he has been going through, he has no chance to escape from it. This becomes the most blatant when there is

an insert in a close-up shot to his eyes in despair (shows that he is totally cognizant) and the following shot indicates that this despair is due to the needle entering to his veins and he can not do anything about it. As to demonstrate the inherent constant monitoring and surveillance, the scene has the inserts in which the digital machine is recording all the information that is gathered from his physical examination. After this examination, the sequence continues with an insert in which the digital screen indicates that his diagnosis is chemical imbalance. A chemical imbalance due to not taking the sedatives, a disease that he is attached to just because he wants to be a free individual from the effects of the sedatives. Thus, the sequence continues as two medical examiners seeing THX 1138 through a digital monitor, due to the results of his medical examination, give some commands to the machine to play with his physical conditions in order to see the effects of the changes on his body. Yet again, in every change in his physiologic conditions, he acts as if he is in severe pain. Hence, the sequence cuts in between the scenes in which THX 1138 is shown through the digital monitor and in which he is shown in the real setting (in the detention centre). Here, the cinematic piece tries to underline by this cinematic touch that even if THX 1138 is in real pain, the medical examiners do not care about his pain because he is an object for the system. An object who is cognizant that he is being objectified. An object whose physical conditions and reactions are modified to calculate the efficient amount of physical conditions to be applied to other objects of this society. All in all, all of these holistically combined, the sequence blatantly proposes that THX 1138 although is cognizant, still becomes objectified by the system and becomes the product of the system. This is a total invasion of his physical presence and a total violation of his individual freedom. Therefore, in *THX 1138*, there is a restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors through/by technology. This cognizance is proposed through THX 1138 and the external factors proposed as the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers that function through the digital infrastructure and through the constant propaganda, manipulation, control and indoctrination.

Up until here I tried to broadly reveal how the cinematic piece, through its macrostructural cinematic elements, proposes the external factors as restrictive of individual freedom and how some individuals under the control of these external factors are cognizant of this restriction. However, since my motivation is to propose that this type of a restriction is not only introduced and theorized through the macrostructural cinematic elements but also through the microstructural cinematic elements, in the next part, I will reveal these precise microstructural cinematic elements embedded within this specific cinematic experience. These cinematic details, when holistically acknowledged are construed to propose the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom.

The cinematic piece sets off with a machine beeping and with a melancholic music. As visuals there are digital numbers that are not precisely centered within the frame. Then, the scene cuts to another scene in which a man (THX 1138), seen through a monitor, tries to connect with whoever is watching him through this monitor. The monitor itself asks through a recorded sound manifested as the voice-over 'What's wrong?' and the man answers as 'Nothing really. I just feel that I need something stronger'. The appearance of the man within the monitor is distorted. The man continues as 'I will be alright' and takes a sedative while the monitor, through a voice-over, tells him to call a number to get assistance. The sequence up until this point, hints that the sedatives cure this man's problem and there is a power that watches him and provides assistance to him through a monitor. Then, the sequence continues as a woman (LUH 3417) tries to connect with the same authority through the monitor and the monitor itself asks through the same recorded sound manifested as a voice-over 'What's wrong?'. However, this time the woman answers as 'never mind' and gets the sedative. The two distinct answers given to the same question automatically sets a distinction between these two individuals. As the sequence proceeds, her never mind answer is repeated as a voice-over for a couple of times manifested as a distorted machine sound while the cinematic piece shows the visuals of the light waves.

The initial sequence of the cinematic piece clearly proposes the preeminence of technology manifested through the monitor screen, the computer voice, the digital beeping sound and the digital light waves. Then, with all these hints the cinematic piece introduces the question 'What are the effects of this preeminence of technology on the presented society' and cleverly proposes the next scene as a part of the sequence to set a perception on the possible effects of this preeminence. Hence, in the next scene, through a digital screen we see the same man (THX 1138) who is shown with blood on his clothes sitting on the ground and surrounded by some guards. The scene is accompanied by a computer beeping sound and a voice-over in a computerized voice saying 'Can you feel this? What is that? Nausea. Are you now? Or have you ever been? Move slowly'. Thus, this digital screen constantly scrolls to a black screen and that black screen scrolls to this digital screen again which throughout the scene signifies as a reminder of the dominance of the digital. All in all, the cinematic piece through its cinematic elements hints to a system that this preeminence of technology functions as to command the individuals. Then, the question arises as how does this commanding process operate?

The cinematic piece, then, proceeds to answer the question 'how does this commanding process operate?' which it proposes through its cinematic elements. Correspondingly, in the next scene, the same man, called as THX 1138 is working to build a robot through operating an intensely advanced machine by solely following the commands of the computer. At this precise point of the scene, there is an insert of a man asking the

monitor for a stronger pill. However, this time the man's voice is computerized. Thus, the cinematic piece with this cinematic touch hints that not only THX 1138 but also other members of the society are following the commands of this computerized technology. The cinematic piece, then, proceeds to give more details about how THX 1138 along with the other members of this society is commended by this computerized technology. Accordingly, the camera cuts to a surveillance room which is full of monitors that surveille the society itself and some individuals are monitoring this surveillance. The overall sequence here through its cinematic elements, such as different framings centring on the surveillance monitors and the operators of these monitors, such as abrupt cuts to different channels of this surveillance, such as computer sounds and computerized voice-overs and such as lighting, underline that the central power of this command and surveillance is the computer and the technology itself. This accentuation, in chaotic manners through abrupt cuts, is manifested by the cinematic piece through a surveillance chain. This surveillance chain sets off when a woman (LUH 3417), who is presented in the first sequence, is surveilling THX 1138 while he is working, then another officer (SEN 5241) is surveilling THX 1138 and the woman (LUH 3417) from separate monitors while both of them are working. Throughout this surveillance sequence, there is a repeated voice-over which states through a computerized voice 'for greater efficiency consumption is being standardized'. Hence, this chain of surveillance combined with this voice-over hints that this surveillance could be one of the prior functioning forces of efficiency, which is made obvious by the cinematic elements, that is prioritized by this system. Thus, the cinematic piece, within the sequence, by using cinematic elements such as overriding voice-overs combined of human voices and the machine voices, such as visuals abruptly cut in between the footage that presents the individuals through the monitor screens and presents individuals in their real settings, blur the distinction between the digital and the real. This cinematic touch hints that digital technology and real life are so intertwined with each other within this society.

Up until this point of the cinematic experience, the cinematic piece proposes a society which operates through a highly digitalized technology for an efficiently functioning system. Consequently, the cinematic piece answers the question of 'how does this commanding process operate?' as: It operates through the individuals who are deeply embedded within this highly digitalized technology grounded system. Then, the question evolves to the question of how the individuals within this society are deeply embedded within this system? Hence, the cinematic piece tries to answer this question through some cinematic touches which hint to some practices and processes of control, manipulation and propaganda. For instance, in one of the following scenes, there is a random voice-over which is abruptly inserted within the scene stating that 'if you feel you are not properly sedated call a number 348-844 immediately... The failure to do so may result in prosecution

for criminal drug evasion'. This voice-over blatantly indicates that the system not only encourages the use of sedatives but makes it mandatory for the individuals to use it. Hence, it becomes obvious at this stage of the cinematic experience that this sort of allegiance to the commands of the system is not due to natural processes but due to processes that are used by the system to make individuals to obey the commands. Yet, the integration of the individuals not only functions through the constant use of sedatives but through the constant propaganda and manipulation which serves for the goal of efficiency.

For instance, when THX 1138 and some other officers are working to build the robots, there is an alert of a leakage of radiation due to an accident happened in one of the other sectors, even there is an announcement manifested within the cinematic experience as a voice-over stating that the leakage caused 63 officers to die, THX 1138 and other officers working in his sector continues to work as if nothing has happened because the efficiency is the priority. However, even if efficiency is the priority, there should have been some emotional reaction given to this tragic event. Yet, the same woman from the previous sequence (LUH 3417) who is monitoring one of the surveillance screens is the only one within the whole sequence to give an emotional reaction to this tragic situation and the cinematic piece shares her emotional reactions through her facial expressions and gestures. Hence, the distinction between THX 1138 and the woman (LUH 3417) is set again (as it is done in the opening scene of the cinematic experience as well) through their actions and reactions.

This differentiation becomes the most blatant within the sequence which reveals that this woman (LUH 3417) and THX 1138 share the same flat. Thus, within the sequence, THX 1138 tries to ignore her, when, on the contrary, she tries to connect with him. The sequence precisely focuses on the difference between the actions and reactions of THX 1138 and the woman who is presented as LUH 3417 for the first time. This difference grounds on THX 1138 acting emotionless and LUH 3417 acting with emotions. Within the sequence, this emphasis is hinted to be due to distinct use of the sedatives. For instance, the sequence sets off with LUH 3417 asking for a distinct sedative and the frame cuts to a digital screen, as an alert, stating that there is a possible drug violation. This frame is accompanied by a voice-over stating that 'substitution of one drug with another may cause chemical imbalance with the mate'. Hence, this scene not only hints to the surveillance, control and manipulation employed by the system but also hints to LUH 3417's emotion grounded reactions and actions can be due to distinct or non-use of these sedatives. Hence, this hint is affirmed when LUH 3417 changes the sedatives of THX 1138. Therefore, the cinematic piece within this precise sequence affirms that the dissimilar actions and reactions of THX 1138 and LUH 3417 is due to distinct use of sedatives. Hence, this dissimilarity is presented within the sequence through the reactions of both of the characters to the things that appear in the

hologram screen which functions as a TV and as a manipulation object. For instance, while THX 1138 is zipping the hologram screen, he stops on the channel that shows an android police intensely beating a man with a baton. THX 1138 watches this intensely violent footage with no reactions in his face. On the contrary, LUH 3417 is seen as highly disturbed by the footage. The cinematic piece underlines this difference in their reactions through abrupt cuts between the two characters. Hence, the cinematic piece within the sequence tries to emphasize that the use of sedatives causes individuals to not to have emotions and the system intensely surveilles and controls everyone to make sure that they are getting these sedatives.

Since, the use of sedatives are so embedded within the individuals, due to LUH 3417 changing the dosage and version of THX 1138's sedatives, THX 1138 feels extremely uncomfortable and guilty of starting to feel some emotions and starting to work less efficiently. That's why, he tries to confess it to a religious figure. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes this religious figure to be a machine manifested through an image of a holy man and through a recorded mechanistic voice. Here, the cinematic piece itself underlines how the machine itself is considered as the God and how it is apotheosized. Even the prayers ground on the collective connotations such as 'One for all and all is one' to manipulate individuals to internalize the mechanical efficiency by making them neglect their individuality. The crucial point here is that THX 1138 really feels guilty as he is incognizant of the manipulation, propaganda and control that he is being exposed to. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this 'God' to be just a machine as a propaganda channel of the system through its recorded, mechanistic and irrelevant answers it gives to the confessions of THX 1138 such as 'Yes, yes', or 'I understand', or 'excellent'. The cinematic piece demonstrates that this 'God' is actually a propaganda machine by abruptly cutting into a frame of a pre-recorded voice record running while this divine power is, through voice-over, talking to THX 1138 as "Thou art a subject of the divine, created in the image of man.. By the masses for the masses.. Work hard, increase production..".

This 'God' to be a propaganda machine is affirmed within a scene which appears almost at the end of the cinematic experience in which there is a recording studio all equipped with cameras set to record these captures of the 'God'. The cinematic piece, while showing this setting, proposes a holy music to indicate that this studio itself is manifested as a church. The cinematic piece permeates this kind of a propaganda, manipulation, control and indoctrination within the cinematic experience through technological elements such as the machine manifested as the divine power, such as computerized voice-overs, such as the android police, such as the hologram screen, and such as the constant and randomly made digital announcements. Thus, one of these constant announcements is on the illegality of sexual intercourse. For instance, there is an announcement made through a voice-over as

an alert of a libido leveller to be mislaid near the pulse buffering gate or there is an announcement of an alert of illegal sexual activity detected through the surveillance monitor.

The precise reason for sexual intercourse to be illegal is to keep individuals away from human interactions so that the individuals can just focus on serving the system in the most efficient way. That's the primary reason why even sexual relief, as masturbation, is done by the machine itself with the help of the visuals of the hologram. Accordingly, after LUH 3417 stops using the sedatives, her first craving is to have human interactions in the emotional and physical sense. That's why, she immediately tries to make THX 1138 to be liberated from the dehumanizing effects of these sedatives which leads to the turning point of the cinematic experience. Thus, it is a turning point because THX 1138 faints due to the lack or misuse of the sedatives and he wakes up as a person who can feel and show affection. He is totally a new person, a liberated person. Thus, the cinematic piece emphasizes the intense power of sedatives on dehumanizing individuals through its cinematic elements within an intensely emotional love scene in a sense that right after both THX 1138 and LUH 3417 liberate themselves from the effects of the sedatives, they show intense affection towards each other. This signifies that they both always had feelings and cravings for each other but these feelings and cravings had been blocked by the sedatives and the removal of this blocking leads to the revelation of the pressured cravings and feelings. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests the intensity of these cravings and feelings as a cinematic experience through close-up shots which display the passionate touches and kisses and through the romantic music in the background. As the sequence continues with them making love, the music turns into a tense one and LUH 3417 while they are intensely hugging each other says to THX 1138 'They know. They have been watching us'. On the contrary THX 1138 replies to her as 'No one can see us'. Right at this point, the sequence cuts into a scene that shows the faces and precisely the eyes of the other members of the society directly looking at the camera, hinting that everybody is watching them, the system is watching them. To make it more blatant the sequence cuts into a scene in which their making love is screened through many surveillance monitors and these monitors right after THX 1138 and LUH 3417 making love, see them as criminals, even if they become liberated individuals. That's why, I proposed the mentioned sequence to be a turning point. Hence, after THX 1138 is liberated from the effects of the sedatives, he could have returned back to use the sedatives and continue to serve the system as an object. However, he chooses to stay as a liberated subject even if he knows that this makes him a criminal and even if he knows that without the use of the sedatives, he will not be able to work as efficiently which will be detected by the system. Therefore, right after this moment of the cinematic experience THX 1138, as cognizant of the propaganda, manipulation, control and indoctrination, fights against the system itself for his freedom and for his love.

After this turning point of THX 1138 which grounds on his transformation from being an object incognizant of the restrictive parameters on his individual freedom to being a subject cognizant of these restrictive parameters, these restrictive parameters employed by the system become much more blatant within the cinematic experience. This is precisely because the system dictates that being free is a crime and THX 1138, fighting for his freedom, automatically becomes a criminal. Respectively, the rest of the journey of THX 1138 revolves around him escaping from the system as a criminal. Here, I want to underline that the system considers THX 1138 as a criminal just because he is not following the orders which are based upon the computer calculations with reference to efficiency. However, the cinematic piece right after this point of its experience manifests THX 1138 as a freedom fighter instead of a criminal. The cinematic piece manifests THX 1138 as an individual fighting against the restrictions of this system for his freedom. Therefore, the rest of the cinematic experience is based upon explicitly demonstrating, through its cinematic elements, the propaganda, dominance, control and manipulation that the system employs on THX 1138, while he is in constant fight for his love and for his freedom.

For instance, in one of the scenes THX 1138 is performing his work by putting a radioactive material within a robot. For the first time he is working without the effects of the sedatives. Although he struggles, he is constantly trying to apply the orders that he hears in order not to be detected by the system. The cinematic piece presents these orders in an extensively chaotic way, through the fusion of abrupt cuts in between different surveillance channels accompanied by intertwined multi-channel voice-overs, in order to underline the intensity level of the control and manipulation employed by many officers who are constantly and severely monitoring his moves while he is conducting the process. This mentioned control and manipulation reaches its climax with the sequence which sets off when THX 1138 could not manage to do his work efficiently. As the sequence proceeds all these officers monitoring and controlling THX 1138 start to share information about his body measures such as his blood temperature, his visual behaviours, his brain wave functions. Thus, the cinematic piece in order to indicate the intensity level of this control cuts into a scene in which while all these officers start to give details of his physiological measures through a voice-over, cinematic piece shows a digital screen in which half of the screen indicates in the written report format his physiological measures and the other half of the screen indicates the x-rayed parts of his body such as his skull, his lungs, his hands, his spinal cord. Hence, he is not just surveilled and controlled from the outside but he is also surveilled and controlled from inside. Accordingly, after the physiological screening of his body, the system detects a low level of sedatives which leads to his mind to be locked by the officers and with the mindlock that is employed, he becomes non-functioning like a robot who is switched-off through a button. Therefore, it is blatantly seen within this sequence that

even if THX 1138 chooses to have some level of freedom, the system through its channels of surveillance and control will not let THX 1138 to be free. This kind of an emphasis within the sequence is manifested through cinematic means such as the combination of voice-overs, abrupt cuts, framings, acting and this sequence when holistically acknowledged manifests that the control, surveillance and manipulation inherent within this system is inescapable. The cinematic piece exhibits this inescapability with the following scene in which the android officers arrest THX 1138 due to drug evasion, malicious sexual perversion and transgression. These actions to be counted as a crime clearly indicates that cognizantly wanting to be free is a crime. Wanting not to be controlled by the sedatives is a crime. Wanting to have sex with the person that you love is a crime. Wanting to disobey the orders following the efficiency based calculation of a computerized system is a crime. They are such crimes that even the prosecution of the system demands the immediate destruction of THX 1138. However, the decision of the court ends up as sending THX 1138 to a detention centre.

The cinematic piece presents the setting of the detention centre as all white. The walls are white, the ground is white, the mandatory clothing is white. Thus, the detention centre, as the cinematic experience of it, seems not like the real world but like some sort of a digital space. Thus, the cinematic piece, through its experience, manifests here that after being detained by the system, THX 1138 becomes literally a slave of this digitally functioning system. However, as I mentioned before, THX 1138 being a slave of this system doesn't change the fact that he is cognizant of his enslavement. Thus, the cinematic experience sets this distinction between the incognizant and the cognizant agents (incognizant in a sense that they are unaware of the restrictions on their individual freedom and cognizant in a sense that they are aware of the restrictions on their individual freedom), by setting the distinction between the individuals serving for the system as objects and the individuals that are sent to the detention centre because of remaining as non-contributing individuals on the edge of society. THX 1138 is one of these people who is sent to the detention centre precisely because he refuses to be controlled, manipulated and indoctrinated by the system. However, the crucial point here is that within the detention centre he is still being used, manipulated and controlled by the system. This is crucial because the one difference between real life and the detention centre is that in real life the individuals are incognizant of this objectification process through and by the power of technology and in the detention centre individuals are cognizant of this process of objectification.

For instance, one of the inmates within the detention centre states that 'When posterity judges our actions here, it will perhaps see us not as unwilling prisoners, but as man who, for whatever reason, preferred to remain as non-contributing individuals on the edge of society...This place where blind circumstance has placed me'. This kind of a

statement blatantly indicates that individuals within the detention centre are cognizant that they are unwilling prisoners who are captured and enslaved precisely because of not standing as contributing individuals. Correspondingly, these people's freedom is to feel, to crave for human connection and consequently, to break free from the objectively designed ethos. Hence, the cinematic piece manifests this kind of a liberation through the scene in which within all the emptiness of the detention centre LUH 3417 and THX 1138 is making love with intense emotions or through the scene in which within all the emptiness of the detention centre SEN 5241 tries to bond with THX 1138. Within the sequence, SEN 5241 states 'We need a new unity. Not a unity that discourages dissent. We need dissent. Our voices are not raised in a harmonious chorus but our differences are differences of emphasis rather than our fundamentals'. The cinematic piece hints here that these people in the detention centre are no more objects of the conformist system but subjects who embrace dissent, who embrace their feelings and who embrace their subjectivity. The cinematic piece underlines this distinction between the conformity ruled system and the individuals within the detention centre through its cinematic elements in the scene in which an android police brings a shell dweller to the detentions centre. The cinematic piece with an insert underlines that the shell dweller is identified as non-descript by the system. Accordingly, he is sent to the detention centre just because of being physically divergent. Then, the scene cuts to a frame which in middle-shot shows an inmate trying to fondle the shell dweller. All in all, the scene, when holistically acknowledged, manifests how the inmates, on contrary to the conformity ruled system, embrace dissent, embrace their feelings and embrace their subjectivity.

THX 1138 as one of the inmates who embraces his feelings and who embraces his subjectivity decides to escape from the detention centre to break free and to go after finding LUH 3417. SEN 5241 decides to accompany him due to his human interaction cravings. As they try to proceed with their escape, they start to walk within the white void of the detention centre in which the air gets thinner and the pressure gets greater. These condition changes are demonstrated through SEN 5241's words, actions and gestures. Thus, this cinematic touch manifests the explicit restrictions that are applied by the system on the cognizant individuals. While they continue walking in the void of the detention centre the setting of the detention centre evokes a digital space. Here, the cinematic piece recalls how digital technology is embedded within the system and how real life and the digital are intertwined through the setting of the detention centre. This is cinematically experienced as if the detention centre is a digital construct. Hence, this intertwining is bolstered by the presence of SRT 5752 who looks no different than a human being but confesses in the upcoming parts of the cinematic experience to be a hologram who is electrically generated by the fantasy breau. At the end, this hologram man, SRT 5752, who THX 1138 and SEN 5241 meet while

searching for an escape, shows the way out of the detention centre and all of them eventually escape from this digitally connoted captive space. One other cinematic touch here is that the cinematic piece proposes the escape gate as a flashing black hole to imply that this escape is also a trap in a sense that the system itself is a trap. This hint is affirmed by the next scene in which when they all get out of this gate, they find themselves in the middle of a stack of individuals who are flowing intensely fast. This visual is accompanied by a voice-over saying 'save time, save lives'. Thus, the first interaction with the out of detention life is manifested as a trap. Hence, for the first time THX 1138 and SEN 5241 as cognizant of the real-life to be a trap of the system, find themselves in the middle of these incognizantly trapped and objectified individuals. The cinematic piece manifests the intensity of this cognizance through the terrorized eyes of THX 1138 and SEN 5241.

The system right after the escape of THX 1138 and SEN 5241 dedicates all of its technological tools and infrastructure to capture them. However, one fundamental point within this sequence which blatantly underlines that the system sees all of the individuals as objects is the cost-benefit calculation that it dedicates to the capture of THX 1138 and SEN 5241. For instance, while THX 1138 is on the run from the system there is an insert of a digital screen indicating his estimated capture time along with the cost of credits required for his capture. Hence, throughout the sequence of his escape from the system, there are repeated voice-overs or visuals updating the costs of chasing THX 1138. Eventually, this chasing ends since the cost dedicated to the capture of THX 1138 is over the computer calculated budget. This mentioned cinematic touch reveals the escape of THX 1138 to be a freedom fight against the computer directed technological rule. Accordingly, THX 1138 is, throughout his escape, using his unmanipulated and uncontrolled subjectivity to overcome the computerized calculations of the system and at the end his subjectivity brings him his freedom.

The cinematic piece reveals THX 1138's superiority as a subject over this computerized and digitized system through explicitly manifesting him as a real human being who can think and feel beyond the computerized calculations. For instance, when THX 1138 and SRT 5752 both get into different cars to escape from the android police, THX 1138 by using his reason and his abilities manages to drive the car and escape. However, SRT 5752 by just being a computer programmed hologram couldn't manage to drive the car and respectively he vanishes. Here, the cinematic piece manifests SRT 5752 as part of the unreal reality that is created by the system to employ propaganda, surveillance, control, manipulation, indoctrination and force. Therefore, the capacity of these unreal realities are restricted to computer calculations and due to the mentioned practices employed by the system, individuals become restricted to these computer calculations as well and they are a part of this unreal reality. Yet, THX 1138 by liberating himself from these restrictions becomes an individual who can

manage to escape from all these computer ruled elements that the system directs towards him for his capture.

However, THX 1138 escaping from the system as a cognizant individual of the propaganda, control, manipulation and force employed by this system, doesn't make the presence of these factors less significant. Therefore, the cinematic piece in order to underline the intensity of these practices which are employed on THX 1138, proposes the system as dedicating all of its technological tools and infrastructure to capture him. For instance, during the whole escape of THX 1138, there is a constant chase by the android police who are following the orders of many officers. These officers are intensely surveilling all the moves of THX 1138. Hence, from this sequence it becomes blatant that the surveillance infrastructure is inherited in every bit of the city. The cinematic piece shares the intensity of these practices of surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, control and use of force through its cinematic elements. For instance, throughout the sequence, there are inserts displaying many officers to be constantly surveilling THX 1138 through different monitors and through different digital infrastructures. These inserts are accompanied by the constant voice-overs giving commands and directions to the android police to catch THX 1138. At the same time within the sequence a regular voice-over updates the expenditures of this chase. Thus, this signifies that THX 1138 has a materially calculated value as the rest of the people in this city have and when the expenditures are over his materially calculated value, then the system automatically gives up on him. As a matter of fact, while THX is 1138 climbing towards the outside of the city, the android police who are chasing him receive a command to terminate the chase due to over budget expenditures and they let THX 1138 to climb towards his freedom. Yet, the cinematic piece still manifests the propaganda that is embedded within the system through the android police stating in a mechanistic tone to THX 1138 that 'You have nowhere to go.. You cannot survive outside the city shell'. Yet, THX 1138 as being cognizant of this manipulation and propaganda continues to climb towards the surface, towards his freedom. Thus, the cinematic experience ends by THX 1138 becoming a part of the brightly shining sun accompanied by a holy music recalling victory and the sun sets while he is standing there as a free individual. All in all, the whole system was under the ground far away from the aliveness of the surface anyways.

Here, yet again, right after concluding my close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I want to give some details on the other intersections of the scheme which are not covered in a paradigmatic way within my close reading of the cinematic piece. Hence, throughout the close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I precisely focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the external factors as restrictive of individual freedom and how some precise individuals are cognizant of these external factors. However, within the cinematic experience there are

some hints given through the cinematic elements that serve for the philosophizing prioritizing other determinant elements of the scheme which are being *cognizant* or *incognizant* of the restrictive parameters on individual freedom and *external* or *internal* factors restricting individual freedom. I want to give some precise details on the other intersections of the determinant elements that are hinted throughout the cinematic experience.

For instance, the cinematic piece in order to underline the cognizance of THX 1138 on the restriction of his individual freedom through/by the computer ruled system itself sets a blatant distinction between the incognizant and the cognizant agents (incognizant in a sense that they are unaware of the restrictions on their individual freedom and cognizant in a sense that they are aware of the restrictions on their individual freedom). Thus, the cinematic piece sets this distinction by differentiating the individuals serving for the system as objects and the individuals that are sent to the detention centre because of remaining as non-contributing individuals on the edge of society. THX 1138 is one of these people who is sent to the detention centre precisely because he refuses to be controlled, manipulated and indoctrinated by the system. However, the crucial point here is that within the detention centre he is still being used, manipulated and controlled by the system. This is critical because the one difference between real life and the detention centre is that in real life the individuals are incognizant of this objectification process through/by the power of the computer ruled system and in the detention centre individuals are cognizant of this process of objectification. Therefore, the cinematic piece proposes the objectified individuals serving for the system as being incognizant of the restrictive factors of individual freedom restricted by the computer ruled system itself as an external factor. Therefore, it can be stated that there is a hint of another intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by external factors*. However, within the cinematic experience there are no hints of *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by internal factors* or *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors*. The crucial point here, yet again, is that I consider these hints, signifying some philosophizing to be done on the other intersections of the scheme that I propose, to serve for the primary philosophizing and the theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece. So as to say, the cinematic piece uses these other intersections to make the primary intersection to be more explicit and solid. Accordingly, I assert that the sole theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece is: *The restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors*.

Subsequently, I, as a cinematic philosopher, tried to connect the cinematic experience of *THX 1138* to the context of individual freedom and technology by focusing on how it evokes philosophical insights through the cinematic channel using cinematic elements. All in all, I tried to reveal its theorizing by applying the close reading methodology to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements. All in all, I tried to reveal its

theorizing by applying the close reading methodology/analysis to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the external factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present some precise individuals as being cognizant of these external factors. Eventually, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *THX 1138*, the individual freedom of some cognizant agents but especially of cognizant THX 1138 is restricted through propaganda, surveillance, manipulation, control and force employed by the system which is solely ruled according to the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers as an external factor. Subsequently, the cinematic piece as a piece of cinematic philosophy proposes and theorizes *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y) through/by technology* as a theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

5.3.3 *Ex Machina*: Restriction of Individual Freedom of Incognizant Agents(X) by Internal Factors(Y) through/by Technology

Ex Machina sets off when Caleb (Domhnall Gleeson), as a young programmer at one of the world's largest internet companies, is selected to spend a week at a private mountain retreat belonging to the CEO of the company, Nathan (Oscar Isaac). When Caleb arrives at this mountain retreat he finds out that he is there to be offered by the CEO to administer the Turing test to an intelligent humanoid robot by evaluating the human qualities of this highly advanced humanoid AI, Ava (Alicia Vikander). Thus, *Ex Machina* is ultimately about the internal journey of Caleb which is shaped by his interactions with Nathan and especially with Ava. Thus, this internal journey is about how Caleb's emotions evolve while Ava is trying to manage her escape through Caleb by using her imagination, sexuality, self-awareness, empathy for manipulation.

My role here is to reveal this internal journey and how this internal journey is embedded within the cinematic piece to propose the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology*. Thus, since my aim is to test through its cinematic elements if this mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom is a theoretical contribution of this cinematic piece, I aim solely to focus on situating the cinematic language that the film uses within the context of restriction of individual freedom. Subsequently, I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present the internal factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present Caleb as being incognizant of the manipulation he is exposed to due to these internal factors. Eventually, as

I claim, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, will introduce *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology.*

First, before getting into the details of the precise cinematic elements, I want to focus on how, broadly, the internal factors are presented as restrictive of individual freedom and how these internal factors make Caleb to be incognizant of the manipulation that he is exposed to. Here, I want to clarify that the cinematic piece proposes its experience to revolve around Caleb's separate interactions with both Nathan and Ava and how these interactions shape the internal emotional status of Caleb. Accordingly, the cinematic experience focusing on Caleb's emotions proceeds as his emotions change according to the interactions that he has with Nathan and Ava. Thus, the cinematic piece makes it clear through Caleb's first interactions with Ava that Nathan and Ava are on the two opposite sides. However, in the case of this cinematic experience there is no external force to make him choose a side but two sides to be chosen. Hence, the cinematic experience proposes these two sides precisely through the emotions of Caleb in a sense that due to his fascination towards Ava, starting with his first interactions with her, Ava is proposed as the captive of Nathan who is held there without her compliance. Correspondingly, the cinematic experience evolves from the eyes of Caleb in order to propose how incognizant he is towards the manipulation of Ava due to his fascination, his love, his compassion towards her. That's the precise reason why, throughout the cinematic experience this manipulation is proposed as Ava having the same reciprocal emotions towards Caleb. Also, that's the precise reason why the cinematic piece reveals that Ava actually does not have emotions towards Caleb but she is just using him for her escape by using her AI capacities such as imagination, sexuality, self-awareness, empathy, manipulation at the end of the cinematic experience. All in all, since the cinematic experience is given from the eyes of Caleb, until the end of the experience, Ava is shown as the victim of Nathan, but the film reveals at the end that Ava was manipulating Caleb from the beginning to manage her escape from this captivity.

The cinematic piece uses this cinematic touch to underline that not Ava but his emotions towards Ava are the primary reason for Caleb to be manipulated and to be incognizant of this manipulation. Accordingly, the holistic experience of the cinematic piece proposes this incognizance of Caleb to be due to his emotions which at the end causes him to end up in an inescapable captive space. The crucial point here is that he lets himself be manipulated and eventually he *makes* himself end up in this inescapable captive space. So, his emotions are the internal factors that make him restrict his own individual freedom precisely because his emotions are the primary reason that causes him to be incognizant of this manipulation. Thus, there is no systematic force applied to him to be incognizant of this manipulation in a sense that he is solely free throughout the cinematic experience either to

believe in or not to believe in Ava. Hence, the cinematic piece actually proposes this freedom through the hints that are given by Nathan on the possibility of Ava manipulating him. Therefore, the cinematic experience is all about Caleb either believing in Ava or not. However, due to his fascination with her, he *chooses* to believe in Ava. The cinematic piece manifests his fascination from the first instances that he has with Ava in order to underline that his emotions towards her make him *choose* to believe in Ava.

For instance, after the first session that Caleb has with Ava, Nathan asks him what he feels about her and Caleb answers as 'I feel that she is fucking amazing' and his emotions gets more intense as the cinematic experience evolves. However, the cinematic piece proposes this emotional process parallel to his perception change towards Ava from seeing her as an AI towards seeing her as a real person which signifies the power of AI as a technology on manipulating an individual to believe that it is a real person. For instance, after the first session Nathan also asks Caleb on how to proceed with the next session with Ava, and Caleb confidently answers that 'I'm not sure. I'm still trying to figure out the examination format. Testing Ava by conversation is kind of a closed loop. Like trying to test a chess computer by only playing chess'. Here, Caleb is still aware that Ava is just an advanced machine and he definitely differentiates her from a real person. However, as the cinematic experience evolves it becomes blatant that Caleb evolves to have a blurred perception on Ava being a machine and, at the end, due to his fascination, love and compassion towards her as a consequence of the manipulation that he is being exposed to by her, he starts to feel and think that she is a real person.

For instance, towards the end of the cinematic experience the cinematic piece introduces the question of what is going to happen to Ava after this Turing test ends and the cinematic piece answers this question itself by Nathan revealing that Ava is one of the versions that is a part of the process of perfecting this AI. Respectively, Nathan says to Caleb that he is going to download her mind, unpack her data and reuse her body for the updated version of her. However, one crucial point here is that after this process Ava will lose all of her memories meaning that she will lose all of her memories with Caleb. Hence, Caleb after hearing this, becomes really upset and the cinematic piece manifests his sadness through its cinematic elements such as shots focusing on his facial reactions and such as the tone of his voice. After, in the cinematic experience, Caleb while having a conversation with Ava reveals to Ava that Nathan is going to reprogram her AI and then he continues as saying that it is the same as killing her. This blatantly indicates that Caleb not only grows emotions towards Ava but also indicates that he considers Ava as a real person rather than an AI as he equates her system to be reprogrammed to her death. Hence, this perception change due to his growing emotions towards Ava, makes Caleb to villainize Nathan precisely because Nathan sees Ava as just an advanced machine and nothing more.

Consequently, what is manifested by the cinematic piece through its cinematic journey is that Caleb's emotions such as fascination, love, attraction and compassion towards Ava are the internal factors that cause him to overlook the manipulation that is employed by Ava and subsequently cause him to restrict his individual freedom.

One other aspect that is proposed by the cinematic piece is Caleb's incognizance of the manipulation of Ava. Thus, as I underlined above this incognizance is due to his emotions towards Ava. However, these emotions have grown through the reciprocal interaction that he has with Ava and since the cinematic experience of the piece evolves according to the emotions of Caleb, for a long period of the experience the cinematic piece proposes Ava as reciprocating the emotions of Caleb. Here, the cinematic piece, while proposing that she is reciprocating the emotions of Caleb, deep-down, tries to underline the capability and ability of Ava as an AI to use her imagination, sexuality, self-awareness, and empathy to make Caleb feel that she has the same feelings towards him.

For instance, throughout their sessions Ava says to Caleb that if she was to go out she would be in a 'Maybe a busy pedestrian and traffic intersection in a city' then she directly says that she wants to go there with Caleb. Thus, while she is talking with Caleb, she starts to flirt with him by saying to him 'Do you think about me when we aren't together? Sometimes, at night, I wonder if you're watching me on the cameras. And I hope you are'. Thus, Ava not only tries to make Caleb get attracted to her, but she also tries to victimize herself and villainize Nathan to make Caleb have compassion towards her. Accordingly, Caleb not only considers Nathan as a villain just because Nathan sees Ava as an advanced machine and nothing more but also he considers Nathan as a villain due to Ava's victimization of herself.

The cinematic piece proposes this through liberating its experience from Caleb's perception and this liberation is also a cinematic touch that demonstrates how Caleb is being manipulated by Ava but is incognizant of this manipulation due to his emotions towards her. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this through its cinematic touch by introducing the same scene first from Caleb's perspective, then from Nathan's perspective. Hence, in the scene Caleb watches Ava and Nathan from the CCTV without the audio of the footage. In the footage Nathan visits Ava in her room while Ava is drawing something. There are some discussions going on between them and Nathan rips Ava's drawing apart. Then, he leaves the room and Ava, in sad manners, collects the pieces of her drawing. Since this scene is first proposed from Caleb's perspective, Caleb feels so furious towards Nathan and this rage extends as Ava in the next session shows Caleb that this ripped drawing is the drawing of Caleb's face. However, the cinematic piece returns back to the same footage, this time manifesting it from Nathan's perspective. In the scene, Nathan shows the same footage to Caleb from his own CCTV set up in which there is also the sound of the footage.

Correspondingly, the conversation between Ava and Nathan can be heard. As the conversation goes Nathan says to Ava that Caleb can watch but cannot hear the conversation between them. Nathan after showing the footage to Caleb says to him 'Misdirection. I rip her picture, which she can then present as an illustration of my cruelty to her, and her love for you'. As Nathan emphasizes that Ava precisely does this and presents the ripped drawing to Caleb in order to victimize herself and villainize Nathan to make Caleb have compassion towards her while in the meantime, she is proving his love towards him by showing that she draws the picture of him.

As I underlined previously, the cinematic piece by using its cinematic elements liberates the cinematic experience from Caleb's emotional filter and proposes the big picture underlining the capacity of Ava as an AI to manipulate Caleb. Here again, the precise point is that Caleb throughout the whole experience unwittingly chooses to be manipulated by Ava due to his emotions towards her. What's more, one blatant reason that Caleb gets emotionally affected from Ava and gets emotionally attached to her is due to her manipulation on making him believe that they are equals. Thus, in one of the previous sessions, Ava asks Caleb 'Do you want to be my friend?' And she states that it won't be possible unless their conversations become two-sided and makes Caleb talk about himself to make him feel her not as a machine but as a real human being. This becomes the most blatant when Ava goes to her room and dresses herself up in a way that the dress and the wig cover all of her machine parts and she totally seems like a human being. Subsequently, all these cinematic touches combined together, Caleb, due to his emotions towards Ava, is and *chooses* to stay incognizant of the manipulation that he is being exposed to by her and eventually this is the fundamental ground of his restriction of individual freedom.

Up until here, I tried to broadly reveal by focusing on the macrostructural cinematic elements how the cinematic piece proposes the internal factors as restrictive of Caleb's individual freedom and how Caleb under the influence of these internal factors is incognizant of the manipulation employed by Ava. However, since my motivation is to propose that this type of a restriction is not only introduced and theorized through the macrostructural cinematic elements but also through the microstructural cinematic elements, in the next part, I will reveal these precise microstructural cinematic elements embedded within this specific cinematic experience. These cinematic details, when holistically acknowledged are construed to propose the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom.

The cinematic piece sets off with a frame in which there is a reflection of a number of computer screens from the glass walls of an office. Thus, the cinematic piece with this frame, automatically hints to a context in which life is functioning through the computers and their reflected realities. Right immediately Caleb is included within the frame as a human being working on coding in two screens. Then, he receives a VIP email stating that he won

the staff lottery. At this precise moment of the scene the frame cuts to an insert showing Caleb from the Webcam. This cinematic touch actually hints to someone watching Caleb through the camera. Hence, his excitement on winning the staff lottery is given solely through cinematic means by the abrupt cuts, non-steady camera moves and unconstructed angles. Throughout the scene, Caleb, when shown through the webcam, is filtered with digital glitches. He shares his excitement primarily through texting from bluebook phone which is the company that he works for. However, even if the scene focuses on the celebration of Caleb winning the staff lottery, the whole scene is accompanied by tense music. Thus, the cinematic piece proposing a tense music here accompanied by the surveillance from the webcam and the digital glitches applied to Caleb hints to a forthcoming tension due to the preeminence of advanced technologies.

In the next scene, it is revealed that he won the lottery to stay with Nathan, the CEO of the company that he works for, at Nathan's private mountain retreat for one week. The cinematic piece proposes this mountain retreat as a high-tech place. For instance, Caleb's first interaction with the place is when he arrives at the door, a machine right immediately takes his picture and instantly gives his access card to him. However, the cinematic piece proposes this high-tech infrastructure to be shaped and to function as a captive space as if it is a luxury prison. Thus, the details of this luxury prison are exposed by Nathan as the creator of the place through the house tour that he gives to Caleb. The setting connotes a luxury prison which is fully controlled by the digital technologies through the details such as thick cement walls without any windows, such as the solely digital access card and such as the digital automatic lockdown system. Hence, the cinematic piece reveals the reason why it proposes this kind of a setting through Nathan who says to Caleb that this place is not just a mountain retreat but a research facility in which 'there are enough fiber optics to reach to the moon and rasso it'. Right after, the piece proposes the question: A research facility researching on what? It answers this question in the next scene in which Nathan proposes to Caleb to be a part of a Turing test that Caleb will be the human being testing the abilities and capabilities of an AI (Ava) and at the end of the test if Caleb can't tell he is interacting with a computer, the test will be passed. The cinematic piece up until this point of its cinematic experience reveals the situation as: A young programmer, Caleb, who is solely amazed by the CEO of the company is offered to participate in a test that if passed will automatically assign Caleb at the centre of the single greatest scientific event in the history of man. Thus, this amazement is not only bolstered by the actions of Nathan through treating Caleb as a friend and as an equal but also bolstered by Caleb's fascination towards Nathan as at the further parts of the cinematic experience he confesses that he sees Nathan as the Mozart of coding.

At this point, the cinematic piece proposes the first instances of Caleb's emotions which make him overlook some restrictive parameters that he is exposed to within this facility. For instance, It is obvious that within the facility his freedom is restricted in a sense that he has limited access to some rooms. These restrictions become the most blatant when Nathan proposes the non-disclosure agreement to Caleb. The agreement is as follows 'The signee agrees to regular data audit with unlimited access, to confirm that no disclosure of information has taken place, in public or private forums, using any means of communication, including but not limited to that which is disclosed orally or in written or electronic form...'. Hence, even if Caleb knows that the signing of this agreement will put a lot of restrictions on his freedom, he signs the agreement due to his fascination towards Nathan and towards the test that he is going to participate in. Thus, throughout this scene his fascination is manifested by the cinematic piece through his facial reactions and gestures and through his words as 'If you've created a conscious machine, it's not the history of man. It's the history of Gods'. As I have already asserted, the cinematic experience evolves from the eyes of Caleb up until a certain point of the cinematic experience in order to underline his incognizance of the manipulation he is being exposed to due to his emotions. Accordingly, the cinematic piece introduces these restrictive aspects in the background of its experience and instead it puts Caleb's emotions forward and lets its cinematic experience flow through following his emotions.

The cinematic piece, in order to underline the heavy surveillance that both Caleb and Ava are exposed to by Nathan, proposes the first interaction of Ava and Caleb through the CCTV that Nathan monitors. Then, the shot cuts into the observation room in which Ava is kept in an inescapable room surrounded by the thick glass walls. The cinematic piece presents the preeminence of digital technologies as a part of the intense security system through the blue and red light access consoles in the visual background. The sequence cuts to a close-up shot of a fracture on the glass wall of Ava's captive space recalling a sign of struggle and violence. The scene is accompanied by tense music. Hence, the start of the sequence, when the cinematic elements holistically combined, sets a tense mood. However, when the sequence cuts to a frame in which Caleb sees Ava for the first time, the music changes into a soft and romantic one which abruptly changes the mood of the cinematic experience. Thus, within the sequence, the sudden cuts in between Ava's point of view and Caleb's point of view bolsters the intensity of their first interaction.

The cinematic piece introduces Ava as an AI whose hands, face, feet and voice are in human structure, but the rest of her body is in machine structure covered by wires. Thus, the biggest hint that the cinematic piece proposes within its experience on how these two characters set a perception towards each other is the part within the scene in which Ava tells Caleb that she hasn't met anyone new before Caleb and Caleb tells Ava he hasn't met

anyone like her. The hint here is that Ava knows that if she wants to change her circumstances, Caleb is her only choice. Therefore, she should use her AI capabilities of imagination, sexuality, self-awareness and empathy to manipulate Caleb. On the other hand, the hint about Caleb is that his fascinations towards Ava can make him overlook this manipulation. Hence, the next scene proposes Caleb's instant fascination and trust towards Ava in order to underline this aspect. In the scene, Caleb shares his first impressions on Ava to Nathan as 'She's extraordinary. When you talk to her, you're through the looking glass'. Thus, this fascination precisely is based upon the advanced capacity of Ava for displaying herself as a human being instead of an AI.

At this precise moment of the cinematic experience, the piece proposes one of the most important hints of the cinematic experience through Nathan as he states 'The real test is to show you she is a robot. Then, see if you still feel she has consciousness'. The hint here is that the real test is to see if Caleb would 'feel' if Ava has a consciousness or not. Correspondingly, Caleb is the one who is tested and Ava within this equation is the one who is testing Caleb if she can manipulate his emotions or not. Subsequently, Nathan within this equation is the conductor of the test who considers both Caleb and Ava as the objects of this research. However, this hint, although manifested by deeply embedded cinematic touches throughout the cinematic experience, does not become explicit until late in the cinematic experience. This is yet again precisely because the cinematic experience evolves from the eyes of Caleb up until a late point of the experience in order to underline his incognizance of the manipulation that he is being exposed to due to his 'feelings'.

The cinematic piece with the intention of underlining the intensity of the restrictive parameters functioning through the digital technology, proposes the sequence which sets off with Caleb figuring out that the screen at his room actually displays a CCTV camera that is situated at Ava's room. Accordingly, Caleb starts to watch Ava and the cinematic piece manifests the intensity of this surveillance through cutting into CCTV footage that show Ava from many different angles. Another cinematic hint that is deep-down manifested within the cinematic experience is that while the cinematic piece showing Ava through the CCTV, Ava touches the wall and then there happens a temporary power cut within the whole facility. As the cinematic piece reveals in the further parts of the cinematic experience, Ava by using her AI capacities triggers these power cuts. This ability that the cinematic piece dedicates to Ava suggests the superior powers and capabilities that she has compared to Nathan and Caleb. However, since this hint at this point of the experience is not explicitly manifested by the cinematic piece, and since the experience is evolving through the eyes of Caleb, he nervously tries to figure out what is going on. Hence, the cinematic piece manifests this power cut as all the lights in Caleb's room turning into red and through chaotic camera moves accompanied by a tense music. Within the scene Caleb tries to get out of the room

but apparently when there is a power cut, the facility totally becomes locked down. Therefore, Caleb can not get out of the room. The cinematic piece introduces this scene to underline that Caleb actually *chooses* to be in a high-tech prison controlled and ruled by smart technologies and he is totally incognizant of the consequences of his choice along with many things because his emotions obscure these details. For instance, this incognizance combined with the advanced development level of AI makes him overlook that Kyoko (Sonoya Mizuno), another AI, is not a human being, although it is hinted by the cinematic piece, through her actions, gestures and reactions, that she does not act like a real human being.

Up until this point of the cinematic experience, the cinematic piece suggests many enigmas that Caleb is incognizant of through its cinematic elements such as the settings, Nathan's actions/gestures/words, music, framings, lighting, special effects and editing. However, at this stage of the experience he is cognizant of one thing which is that Ava is an AI but not a real human being. For instance, when Nathan asks Caleb how to proceed with the next session, he confidently answers that 'I'm not sure. I'm still trying to figure out the examination format. Testing Ava by conversation is kind of a closed loop. Like trying to test a chess computer by only playing chess'. Here, Caleb is still aware that Ava is just an advanced machine and he definitely differentiates her from a real person. Thus, the cinematic piece underlines that Ava is an AI but not a human being in the next scene which sets off with a shot in which Ava shows the drawing that she made to Caleb. The cinematic touch here to underline that she is an AI is the camera tilt moving from his human being shaped hands to his machine shaped arms. Then, the discussion between them evolves as Ava asking Caleb if he wants to be her friend. Ava continues as 'Our conversations are one-sided. You learn about me, and I learn nothing about you. That's not a foundation on which friendships are based'. Here, it is the first instance of manipulation that is applied by Ava in a sense that Ava tries to make Caleb to feel her as his equal. However, since the cinematic experience evolves through the eyes and emotions of Caleb, the experience indicates Ava's move to be a sign of initiating a sincere connection. At this point of the cinematic experience, the piece focuses on Caleb's facial reaction indicating how impressed he is from Ava and the lowkey heartbeat sound in the background hints to the liveliness Caleb feels about their conversation. Thus, the cinematic piece focuses, in close-up shot, to Ava's gestures and eventually she seems, talks and smiles just like a real human being. Ava, using her capability of making Caleb feel like she is not just an AI, organically starts to lead the conversation and by asking Caleb some personal questions, she tries to make him bond with her. Yet, Caleb unwittingly continues to bond with Ava. That's the precise moment when Ava asks Caleb if he likes Nathan. The cinematic piece in order to underline that they are under the constant surveillance of Nathan, cuts to an insert which shows the CCTV

cameras in the observation room. The next cut to an insert of the CCTV cameras is when all of the cameras turn off as a consequence of a power cut which happens right after Ava asks Caleb if he likes Nathan. Here, even if it is not explicitly put into words, the cinematic piece through its cinematic elements manifests that Ava does the power cuts in order to have a talk with Caleb without the surveillance of Nathan indicating that Ava is even more powerful than her creator. This is also hinted within the scene when Ava does not give any reactions when there is a power cut. On the other hand, Caleb, incognizant of this, stands up and tries to figure out what is going on. Thus, the cinematic piece makes all of the lights turn into red any time there is a power cut in order to differentiate the filtered conversations of Caleb and Ava as a consequence of Nathan's surveillance and the non-filtered conversations of them. Therefore, from the eyes of Caleb the red light signifies the moments that they truly connect. However, the real significance of the red light is the sole manipulative moments of Ava. That's the precise reason why when there is the power cut, she right immediately tells Caleb not to trust Nathan and not to trust anything he says.

This is the first instance that the cinematic experience introduces the two rival sides. However, in the case of this cinematic experience, there is no external force to make him choose a side but two sides to be chosen. Accordingly, the rest of the cinematic experience evolves through Caleb's emotion changes according to the interactions that he has with Nathan and Ava. Yet, due to the manipulation of Ava through her acting to reciprocate his feelings and through her victimization of herself and villainization of Nathan, Caleb, although confused, from the first instances of this rivalry chooses Ava's side. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this confusion within the mentioned scene above through his gestures and facial expressions that he gives after the electric power is back. Also, the cinematic piece manifests that he chooses Ava's side when he does not tell Nathan about their red light talk that he had with Ava. Here again, Caleb choosing Ava's side is a consequence of his emotions towards Ava as he evolves to think that Ava has an awareness of her mind and awareness of his mind. This signifies that Caleb starts to feel some emotions towards her and he also thinks that Ava has the capacity to reciprocate his feelings. Eventually, his emotions evolve as the clear perception that he has towards Ava to be an AI becomes more and more blurred.

The cinematic piece at this point of its experience tries to manifest this connection between Ava and Caleb through the scene in which Caleb is watching Ava from the CCTV in his room. Even if Ava does not know that Caleb is watching her, she directly looks at the CCTV camera (In the further parts of the experience she confesses that she is looking at the camera with the hope that Caleb is watching her). Hence, the cinematic piece by proposing cuts in between shots in which Caleb is looking at Ava through the screen showing CCTV footage of Ava and Ava is looking at the CCTV camera, accompanied by romantic music,

manifests the feeling that they are growing emotions towards each other. This unique cinematic touch is presented as a combination of framing, editing, music and acting. This hint is confirmed within the scene through the shot that zooms-in to Caleb's smiling face indicating that he feels like Ava is looking at him to connect with him. This manifestation of connecting is a reflection of Caleb's feelings. However, as Nathan reveals in the further parts of the experience Ava's AI system is a combination of the emotions, thoughts and reactions of billions of people. Subsequently, Ava has the ability to analyze the situation and present herself accordingly with reference to the data of billions of people. Respectively, she consists of impulse, response, fluid, imperfect, patterned, chaotic and in Caleb's eyes, all these characteristics combined, the complexity of Ava precisely blurs the fact that she is not a real human being but an AI.

In the next session Ava continues to manipulate him again both using the tactic of victimizing herself and using the tactic of making Caleb get attracted to her. For instance, in the session, Ava confesses that she never went outside of her room and right immediately she confesses that if she was to go out, she would be in a 'a busy pedestrian and traffic intersection in a city' accompanied by Caleb. Thus, Ava throughout their conversation organically underlines that she is a prisoner of Nathan and organically flirts with Caleb. Her flirting becomes the most blatant within the scene when she, to surprise Caleb, goes to her room to wear clothes and a wig in order to precisely look like a real human being. Thus, her wearing clothes and a wig, as the cinematic piece indicates, not only manifests her attempt to attract Caleb but also manifests her craving to be a real human being and to be with real human beings. This craving, throughout the scene, is manifested by the shots focusing on the touch of the clothes to her skin, focusing on her face with a reaction of how delighted she feels by wearing these clothes, focusing on her gentle touches to the wigs, focusing on the posters that she hangs to her wall which are posters of real people and of a real life with a lot of real people. Thus, all these shots combined with an emotional music manifests a scene consisting of a cinematic experience which indicates that the main craving for Ava is to be like a real human being and to be acknowledged like one. That's why, she tries to put on an appearance of a real human being and the cinematic piece proposes that when she does these changes she is no different than a human being. The excitement of Ava before showing herself to Caleb is also manifested through a cinematic touch by focusing on her nervous hand gestures and her nervous gestures in general while she is walking towards Caleb. From Caleb's side, seeing Ava as no different than a real woman makes him lose track of the fact that she is actually still a machine even if she is the most advanced one, therefore, he falls more for her. Accordingly, he gets nervous due to his physical and emotional attraction towards her and the superiority of Ava is manifested yet again as she says to Caleb that he gives her indications that he is attracted to her because of his micro

expressions such as the way his eyes fix in her eyes and in her lips. Here, Ava, after getting the hint that Caleb is really attracted to her, organically turns the conversation into an emotional one by stating that 'Do you think about me when we aren't together? Sometimes, at night, I wonder if you're watching me on the cameras. And I hope you are.' Thus, after this intense emotional revelation of Ava, Caleb's emotions get more intense on a level that he, although still confused, starts to really get attached to her. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this in the next scene by cutting in between the shot of the CCTV footage of Ava taking her clothes off and the extreme close-up shot to Caleb's eyes watching Ava, to his gulping, to his hand trying to touch her. Yet, after the piece hinting that Ava wants him to watch her, she acts as if Caleb is watching her and sort of manipulates him through this knowledge.

The cinematic experience reveals the intensity of Caleb's feelings through his confusion as a consequence of this intensity. That's the reason why he asks Nathan if he programmed Ava to flirt with him. Here, to propose the power of Nathan as the creator of Ava, the scene cuts to Kyoko's emotionless face while they are talking about programming to indicate that AI works in the capacity of the programming that it is exposed to. The cut here to Kyoko is to underline the power of Nathan on programming two different AIs with distinct level of capacities and to underline that Ava is rather much advanced than Kyoko precisely because Ava is programmed in a way that the actions are not automatic but rather a reflection of the consciousness that she grows by using imagination, sexuality, self-awareness, empathy and manipulation. Correspondingly, Nathan answers Caleb by saying that she hasn't programmed her to flirt with him. The cinematic piece then indicates Caleb's relief through its cinematic elements such as the shots focusing on his facial reactions and his gestures. Yet, the piece here hints one more time that Nathan does not care if Caleb affirms that Ava has a consciousness but he cares if Ava will be able to manipulate Caleb and make Caleb help her to change her circumstances by using her abilities and capabilities. So as to say, Nathan just cares if Ava will be able to make Caleb grow emotions towards her and to make Caleb to overlook the manipulation that she employs to him as a consequence of these emotions that he has towards her.

The cinematic piece, after Nathan's revelation that Ava acts autonomously, in order to manifest that Caleb now sees Ava as his equal, presents the staging of the next sessions to be framed as both Ava and Caleb sitting in the same way, as they are on the same level and as they put their hands in their laps in the same way like as if they are mirroring each other. Thus, the cinematic piece with this kind of a staging not only manifests that they are equals now in Caleb's eyes but also manifests that again in Caleb's eyes the connection between them is getting stronger. As a reflection of this connection that Caleb feels towards Ava, he tells the story of Mary in the black to her. The story is about a scientist specialized in

colours who lives in a black and white room all her life and one day she walks out and sees the real colors. Caleb, after telling this thought experiment says to Ava 'The thought experiment was to show the students the difference between a computer and a human mind. The computer is Mary in the black and white room. The human is when she walks out'. Thus, the cinematic piece shares this thought experiment by Caleb in order to manifest that Caleb deep inside thinks that if and only if Ava gets out of this captive space and makes it to the real world, she will be a real human being. The scene here directly cuts to Ava's face and it is seen through her facial reactions that she wants to break free and become a real human being. Then, the scene cuts to Caleb confessing to Ava that he is there to test her if she has a consciousness or if she is just simulating one. All in all, the cinematic piece proposes this scene to emphasize that Caleb, moving on with his confusions on Ava's emotions towards him, trusts her, wants her to be real and wants to make her real. This is the manifestation of his feelings towards Ava. Eventually, Ava, realizing that Caleb is vulnerable towards her, directly cuts the power to have their red light moments, which are unobserved, sincere, affectionate and emotional. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes the intensity of these red light moments through the close-up shots to their faces while they are talking. During their discussion under the red light, Ava once again convinces Caleb that he should not trust Nathan by using Caleb's emotions towards her.

Yet again, the cinematic piece does not manifest Ava's actions as a manipulation but as an indicator of affectation. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes this cinematic touch in order to underline that its experience flows through Caleb's emotions and through the choices that he makes according to his emotions. Thus, by this cinematic touch, the cinematic piece keeps the dramatic effect of its experience constant with reference to the tension that is manifested due to the emotional journey of Caleb. Therefore, the cinematic piece, throughout its experience, does not propose anything certain but proposes everything to be shaped by and flow through Caleb's emotions. Hence, this cinematic touch is to highlight that the primary philosophizing that the cinematic experience manifests is not Ava's manipulation but how Caleb overlooks this manipulation due to his emotions. This is the precise reason why the cinematic piece reveals that Ava is manipulating Caleb at the end of its cinematic experience instead of revealing it at the beginning of its experience. Correspondingly, the cinematic piece, with this touch, manifests that it is Caleb's emotions which make him overlook the manipulation of Ava and her manipulation is just a trigger on his emotions.

Going back to the following scene, Nathan affirms Ava by accepting that he has lied to Caleb on the selection process of him and Nathan states that he on purpose chose Caleb since he has high intelligence. Here, yet again Caleb is manipulated but this time by Nathan since Nathan, as will be revealed in the further parts of the experience, precisely chooses

Caleb due to his vulnerabilities which makes him the perfect candidate to see if Ava will be able to use these vulnerabilities to manipulate him or not. Cinematic piece after reminding that Nathan is still in the picture, cuts to a scene in which Caleb, while having a shower, dreams of kissing Ava in the middle of nature. The cinematic piece manifests here that even if Nathan is still in the picture as a rival to Ava, Caleb, due to his romantic and sexual attachment to Ava, is on Ava's side. The cinematic piece proposes this dreaming scene in black and white to underline the illusion that Caleb has in a sense that even if he somehow manages to take Ava to real life she still will be an AI. Therefore, the cinematic piece with this black and white touch actually underlines the intensity of Caleb's emotions towards Ava that the cognizance that he has on Ava being an AI rather than a human being becomes much more blurred.

The next session of Ava and Caleb sets off with Ava putting Caleb through a lie detection test to learn his personal choices. As their conversation flows, Ava asks Caleb 'What will happen to me when I fail your test? Do you think I might be switched off because I don't function as I am supposed to? Why does it have to be up to anyone? Do you have people to test you and might switch you off?' Ava here, by pressuring Caleb to face the fact that he can lose her, tries to make him feel compassionate about her. However, even if Ava acts as affectionate towards Caleb, the cinematic piece hints to Ava's deep inside anger of not being considered as a real human being through the shots focusing on her facial expressions and her gestures. That's precisely why she cuts the electric power again to create another red light moment in order to manipulate Caleb more to make him help her escape from this captive space and respectively to become a real human being (at least to be in a real life context in which people as incognizant of her being an AI can consider her as a real human being). In this red light moment, she tells Caleb 'I want to be with you. Do you want to be with me?' Here again, since the cinematic experience flows through the eyes of Caleb, them being together is not manifested as absurd but manifested as a possibility. Hence, the cinematic piece with this touch underlines that Caleb, at this stage of the cinematic experience, genuinely believes and feels that Ava is no different than a human being. Accordingly, in the following scene he directly asks Nathan 'What is going to happen Ava? And Nathan reveals to him that Ava is one of the versions that is a part of the process of perfecting this AI. Subsequently, Nathan says to Caleb that he is going to download her mind, unpack her data and reuse her body for the updated version of her. However, one crucial point here is that after this process Ava will lose all of her memories meaning that she will lose all her memories with Caleb. Hence, Caleb after hearing this, becomes really upset and the cinematic piece manifests his sadness through its cinematic elements such as shots focusing on his facial reactions and such as the tone of his voice. After, in the cinematic experience, Caleb, while having a conversation with Ava, reveals to Ava that Nathan is going

to reprogram her AI and then he continues as saying that it is the same as killing her. This, yet again, blatantly indicates that Caleb not only grows emotions towards Ava but also indicates that he considers Ava as a real person rather than an AI as he equates her system to be reprogrammed to her death. Going back to the scene, Nathan, seeing the frustration of Caleb, says to him 'Feeling bad for Ava? Feel bad for yourself man.' The cinematic piece here through Nathan, proposes that it is not Ava but Caleb who puts himself within this situation. Also, the cinematic piece, within this scene, blatantly manifests the difference between Nathan and Caleb to underline the intensity of the illusion that Caleb has in a sense that Nathan sees Ava as an object to be used to advance his AI technology however Caleb sees Ava as a real human being that he is in love with.

Subsequently, the cinematic piece proposes the next couple of scenes to underline the intensity of Caleb's illusion created solely by himself through his emotions. For instance, in the sequence in which he is watching the previously recorded CCTV footage through Nathan's personal computer without Nathan knowing it, he is bewildered and shocked by the process of Nathan creating and testing different versions of his AI technology. Hence, the footage generally manifests the intense anger and rage that the different versions of AI have towards Nathan and also manifests Nathan as seeing these AI as objects to be used. The sequence occasionally cuts into Caleb watching the footage and focuses on his facial reactions which indicate his intense frustration, shock and anger towards Nathan. Thus, as the sequence proceeds, both AI's rage and Caleb's emotions get much more intense and this is manifested through the music in the background getting much more tense parallel to the sequence. The sequence proceeds as Caleb finds different versions of AIs in Nathan's room which are hung in the cabinets as clothes. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes this sequence to underline how Nathan uses and controls all of these AIs. However, the crucial touch of the sequence is to underline the intensity that Caleb feels by seeing Nathan's actions towards AIs. This is a crucial touch because the sequence manifests that this intensity is due to Caleb seeing all of these AIs as real human beings. Respectively, for Caleb what Nathan does assigns him as a relentless villain who uses, controls and hurts real human beings. Thus, the sequence continues with a scene which solely manifests Caleb's bewilderment. In the scene, Caleb being extremely confused on how the real and the artificial are intertwined and how real the AI feels and looks, checks his body parts in the mirror to see if he is real or not. Consequently, he cuts himself to see if there is blood in his body. The cinematic touch within the scene to underline that the real and the artificial are so indifferent and so intertwined, is the digital glitch added as a filter to Caleb while he is checking himself in the mirror to figure out if he is real or not. Also, some close-up shots to his face and to the blood coming out of his arm are presented for the intensification of the

scene. At the end of the scene, he punches the mirror. The cinematic piece adds this detail to underline that his bewilderment turns into a rage towards Nathan.

This rage is manifested in the next session of Ava and Caleb which sets off with Ava saying to Caleb that she was worried, and she was waiting for him to come. Caleb, as the scene suggests, directs this rage to make a plan for both of them to escape from the place. Yet again, they have a sincere talk under the red light in which Ava after hearing Nathan's plans, miserably, as her acting manifests, asks for Caleb's help. As their conversation proceeds, Caleb tells Ava that he is going to reprogram the system to unlock during a power cut so that Ava can be free, and they both can escape from the place. Hence, as I have constantly emphasized, the cinematic piece proposes its experience through Caleb's eyes, in order to underline how incognizant he is on the manipulation that he is exposed to due to his feelings towards Ava. At this precise stage of its experience, the cinematic piece tries to integrate another perception to the cinematic experience so as to manifest the intensity of the illusion of Caleb as a consequence of his love, attraction and compassion towards Ava. Correspondingly, in the upcoming scene Nathan raises the questions such as 'How do you know if a machine is expressing a real emotion, or just simulating one? Does Ava actually like you? Or not. Although that I now think about it there is a third option. Not whether she does or does not have the capacity to like you but whether she is pretending to like you. Maybe, she thought of you as a means of escape'. Then, the cinematic piece proposes the scene in which Nathan rips the drawing of Ava apart (I have revealed the cinematic touch of this scene in the previous parts of this section) through Nathan's perception as Ava trying to manipulate Caleb. Accordingly, in the upcoming scene, Nathan reveals that the real test, from the beginning, is Caleb and Ava is, as he states, 'a mouse in a mousetrap. And I gave her one way out. To escape, she would have to use imagination, sexuality, self-awareness, empathy, manipulation - and she did'. At the end, what Nathan wants to manifest is that he is on Caleb's side and the villain here is not him but Ava.

While the cinematic piece proposes through its cinematic elements such as Caleb's gestures and actions that he is yet again bewildered, it also gives one of the most significant hints of the cinematic experience. This significant hint is that while Nathan is telling Caleb that he is aware of Caleb's escape plan, the cinematic piece cuts to an insert in which Kyoko goes to Ava's captive space. This hint here signifies that Caleb already reprogrammed the system and with Ava cutting the power, Kyoko was able to go to Ava's room which also signifies that Ava is free from her captive space. At this precise point of the cinematic experience, Ava's motivation becomes an enigma due to the recent intakes that the cinematic experience proposes through Nathan and due to Caleb already reprogramming the system before hearing the revelations of Nathan. Hence, this enigma as expected, on Nathan's side, resolves with Ava killing Nathan using her higher capacities as an AI.

Yet, the most crucial enigma, at this stage of the cinematic experience, is manifested as Ava's motivation and emotions towards Caleb. However, for the last time, the cinematic piece manifests its cinematic experience through Caleb's eyes in a sense that even if Nathan hints to Caleb that Ava is manipulating and using him for her escape, he still due to his emotions towards Ava, listens to her when she asks him to stay where he is. Hence, Caleb does not question her motivation and chooses to listen to her because of his emotions towards her such as trust, love, attraction, compassion.

His attitude continues as the same in the next scene in which he with astonishment watches Ava from where he is, while Ava makes herself physically get ready for the real life. Subsequently, the cinematic piece dedicates the next scene to Ava making herself appear like a real human being. Throughout the scene the shots focus on Ava putting some artificial skin that she gets from other non-functioning AIs on herself and focus on Ava replacing her broken arm with a functioning one. This footage is accompanied by music recalling a baby's music as if she is getting ready to meet with the real world for the first time as a baby to be born. The cinematic piece manifests her inner peace and her fascination in the process of becoming a real human being through the close-up shots focusing on her putting the human skin to her body, focusing on the way she watches herself as fully covered as a human being through different mirrors from different angles. Yet again, Caleb is watching all this process of her rebirth from a distance. He can run away, he can fight against Ava but he trusts her and he watches her with fascination as if he is waiting for her to get ready for him and for their escape.

At the end, the enigma for Caleb, resolves with Ava locking Caleb in a room that he can not get out due to the technological infrastructure since his card does not have access to open the door. Subsequently, Ava locks him to death and she doesn't even hesitate to look back. All in all, the red light moment, this time, represents Caleb's despair due to sticking in an inescapable room, while Ava is already on her way to real life as an AI. Eventually, Ava takes the helicopter that brought Caleb to this place and flies towards real life while Caleb is stuck in this captive space. Eventually, Ava becomes Caleb and Caleb becomes Ava due to Caleb *choosing* to believe in Ava. The cinematic experience ends with Ava in real life as a real human being standing in the crossroad with all the people crossing across her as she dreamt however without Caleb because he was never in her dream anyways.

Here, yet again, right after concluding my close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I want to give some details on the other intersections of the scheme which are not covered in a paradigmatic way within my close reading of the cinematic piece. Hence, throughout the close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I precisely focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present

the internal factors as restrictive of individual freedom and how Caleb is incognizant of these internal factors. However, within the cinematic experience there are some hints given through the cinematic elements that serve for the philosophizing prioritizing other determinant elements of the scheme which are being *cognizant* or *incognizant* of the restrictive parameters on individual freedom and *external* or *internal* factors restricting individual freedom. I want to give some precise details on the other intersections of the determinant elements that are hinted throughout the cinematic experience.

For instance, the cinematic piece in order to underline the dominance of Caleb's feelings as internal factors to serve for the restriction of his individual freedom, in the beginning of the cinematic experience, presents Caleb as signing an agreement to be captured in an advanced digital technology ruled captive space. Thus, he is cognizant that the space that he consents to live in is a place where his individual freedom is restricted by the advanced technology infrastructure. However, he still accepts to live in this space due to his emotions (precisely fascination) as internal factors. Therefore, it can be stated that there is a hint of another intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors*. Thus, Nathan and even Ava can be considered as external factors to restrict incognizant Caleb's (incognizant in a sense that he is not aware of the restrictions that he is being exposed to either by Ava or Nathan) individual freedom. Yet, as I have persistently underlined, the cinematic piece, throughout its experience, proposes everything to be shaped by and flow through Caleb's emotions. Hence, this cinematic touch is to highlight that the primary philosophizing that the cinematic experience manifests is not Ava and Nathan's manipulation but how Caleb overlooks this manipulation due to his emotions as internal factors. Accordingly, I claim that there are no intersections including the determinant element of external factors concerning Caleb. However, at the end of the cinematic experience Ava as an AI kills Nathan, therefore, it can be claimed that this proposal of the cinematic piece can be construed as a hint of the intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors* (cognizant in a sense that Nathan is aware of the potential of Ava to kill him). However, within the cinematic experience there are no hints of the intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by external factors*. The crucial point here, yet again, is that I consider these hints, signifying some philosophizing to be done on the other intersections of the scheme that I propose, to serve for the primary philosophizing and the theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece. So as to say, the cinematic piece uses these other intersections to make the primary intersection to be more explicit and solid. Accordingly, I assert that the sole theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece is: *The restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by internal factors*.

Subsequently, I, as a cinematic philosopher, tried to connect the cinematic experience of *Ex Machina* to the context of individual freedom and technology by focusing on how it evokes philosophical insights through the cinematic channel using cinematic elements. All in all, I tried to reveal its theorizing by applying the close reading methodology/analysis to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the internal factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present Caleb as being incognizant of the manipulation that he is exposed to due to these internal factors. Eventually, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *Ex Machina*, Caleb is incognizant of the manipulation he is exposed to by Ava due to his emotions such as love, attraction and compassion, as internal factors, which eventually are the primary parameters restricting his individual freedom. Respectively, the cinematic piece as a piece of cinematic philosophy proposes and theorizes *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* as a theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

5.3.4 Nosedive Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series: Restriction of Individual Freedom of Cognizant Agents(X) by Internal Factors(Y) through/by Technology

Nosedive Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series sets off with a frame of a setting which is composed of houses in light pastel colors surrounded by trees and by a light pink colored sky accompanied by the sound of birds chirping. Lacie (Bryce Dallas Howard) enters this frame by running towards the camera while she is constantly checking the social media platform through the device that she holds in her hands. Thus, this light pastel colored society solely functions through this social media platform in which individuals belong to this society willingly participate within it through their constant sharings and their constant ratings of their interactions with others on a scale of 1 to 5 stars which at the end cumulatively affects everyone's socioeconomic status. *Nosedive* is ultimately about Lacie's journey shaped by her obsession with her ratings and by her desire for higher ratings within this digital presence ruled society and it is ultimately about how these internal factors shaping her journey make her willingly continue to participate within this platform even if she is cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to her life.

My role here is to reveal her journey and to reveal how these internal factors shaping her journey are embedded within the cinematic piece to propose the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology*. Thus, since my

aim is to test through its cinematic elements if this mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom is a theoretical contribution of this cinematic piece, I aim solely to focus on situating the cinematic language that the film uses within the context of restriction of individual freedom. Accordingly, I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present the internal factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and I will focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements that present Lacie to willingly continue to participate within this platform, due to these internal factors, even if she is cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to her life. Eventually, as I claim, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, will introduce *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology.*

First, before getting into the details of the precise cinematic elements, I want to focus on how, broadly, the internal factors are presented as restrictive of individual freedom and how these internal factors make Lacie willingly to continue to participate within this platform even if she is cognizant of the freedom restrictive consequences this participation brings to her life. Thus, as I have already emphasized, the cinematic piece sets off with Lacie, while running, constantly checking the social media platform through the device that she holds in her hands within a solely and excessively light pastel colored setting. Then, as the cinematic experience evolves, the cinematic piece proposes these light pastel colors to be embedded, within each and every physical detail of this society. The cinematic piece proposes this touch on purpose to underline that, within this society, the real life that the individuals' experience is through their digital presences, and they use real life just to provide content to feed their digital presences. Therefore, within the cinematic experience, real life is almost presented as a light pastel colored theatre stage in which individuals willingly put their total positivity facade to make the ratings of their digital presence get higher.

The cinematic piece proposes this total positivity as a facade in order to underline the willingness of the individuals to perform in this stage even if it requires them to not be themselves but to act according to the rules of this play, as Lacie calls in the further parts of the cinematic experience 'numbers game'. However, the cinematic piece from the first instances of its experience, proposes Lacie to willingly and obsessively participate within this numbers game in which she, in order to higher her score, constantly high rates other members and constantly acts on total positivity just as the other members of this society do. All in all, the cinematic piece proposes a society in which individuals willingly participate in this social media platform by constantly rating each other precisely because in the first place they collectively participate in the territorialization of their desires to ground on perfecting their social media platform ratings. Correspondingly, the cinematic piece manifests individuals as digital presences who actively participate in this precise kind of a

territorialization of their desires. Eventually, the cinematic piece proposes this kind of a territorialization of the desires through individual's obsession but precisely through Lacie's obsession on perfecting her social media platform ratings since she, along with the other members of this society, equates real life to this social media platform and equates the value of her being to the rating that she has within this social media platform. That's exactly why, throughout the cinematic experience, Lacie obsessively just focuses on making her score higher and yet pays almost zero attention to the restrictive parameters that her active participation within this platform brings to her real life.

The cinematic piece proposes the first instance of these kinds of restrictions in the scene when Lacie decides to rent a home for herself, and she needs a discount in order to rent the home. However, her social media platform score is 4.2 and in order to get a discount she needs to be 4.5. Since she is craving to be a high four, instead of seeing this as a restriction, she obsessively dedicates herself to make her score reach to 4.5 although she knows that this restriction in the first place is set due to her participation within this system along with other member's obsessive and willing participation due to their territorialized desires. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes Lacie's craving for this home to inherently represent her craving to become a high-four in the score rank. This cinematic touch is to underline that the house as belonging to real life can just be a manifestation of her digital presence to be a high-four. Hence, since she, due to her territorialized desires, innately equates real life to this social media platform, she considers this restriction as a reflection of her digital presence. That's the precise reason why she obsessively continues to participate within this platform in order to overcome this restriction even if she actually serves for this kind of a real life restriction along with the other members of this society. All in all, her real-life is this social media platform. Accordingly, she prioritizes her digital presence and makes her physical presence to serve for her digital presence.

The cinematic piece explicitly manifests this prioritization to be inherent in Lacie through her constant real-life actions which are based on pleasing people all the time and are based on high rating people all the time without consideration in order to receive back high ratings from other people. Yet, the cinematic piece indicates that all of these actions are due to Lacie's happiness and unhappiness solely grounding on the high and low ratings that she receives within this platform. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this through its cinematic elements such as close-up shots focusing on her facial reactions and gestures indicating how happy and sad she feels whenever she is high and low rated by the other members of the society. All these cinematic touches combined, the cinematic piece proposes Lacie as an individual who, due to the territorialization of her desires, solely grounds her happiness to have a high score within this social media platform. Therefore, all of her real-life actions and reactions ground on perfecting her score even if these actions

and reactions cause her to fake her emotions, to constantly expose herself, to serve for the real life restrictions that she is exposed to, eventually to restrict her own individual freedom willingly and by choice.

Subsequently, the cinematic piece, throughout its cinematic experience, introduces the fundamental restrictions of individual freedom as being administered by the willing individuals themselves due to their obsession with their ratings on this platform. This administration in the first place is manifested as individuals and precisely Lacie faking their real emotions in order to higher their scores. Hence, this kind of a restriction then triggers another kind of a restriction which is again administered by the willing individuals exposing all the aspects of their real lives which consequently leads to a complete visibility which causes violation of informational privacy and informational self-determination since everybody is a data and this data is constantly being exposed to other members of this society. Eventually, this kind of an exposure triggers another kind of a restriction of individual freedom which is again administered by the willing individual's participation within this platform that leads to some score-based limitations on the real-life options such as renting a home, entering a building, renting a car, getting into events. Subsequently, all these restrictive parameters are a consequence of the willing and choice-based participation of the individuals within this platform due to their internal cravings manifested as their territorialized desires.

Above, I explicitly added that the individuals *willingly choose* to participate within this platform. Hence, the cinematic piece proposes this willingness as a consequence of the individuals equating this social media platform to real life and equating their values to the score that they have within this platform. However, the cinematic piece manifests that they *choose* to participate within this platform by introducing individuals such as the brother of Lacie, Ryan (James Norton), and the 1.4 scored truck driver Susan (Cherry Jones) who choose not to participate within this platform. Accordingly, the cinematic piece assigns Lacie and the other participating individuals to be cognizant of the fact that the individuals are free either to choose or not to choose participating within this platform. Since Lacie *chooses* to obsessively participate, she is cognizant of all of these restrictions which leads to a loss of individual freedom. Thus, as stated:

The desire to be exposed, to be watched, to be recorded, to be predicted, is a consequence of the kind of a choice grounded on a constant attention to rankings and ratings, to the number of 'likes', retweets, comments, and shares (Harcourt, 2015). "In this regard, the desire to become all-seeing, all-knowing (Eggers, 2014, p. 71)—the impulse to constantly 'check everything,' from emails and social media"

(Schleusener, 2018, p. 194) can also be interpreted as symptomatic of the loss of individual freedom. (Erol, 2020)

The cinematic piece manifests this desire triggered choice to be a choice of cognizant agents which eventually leads to a loss of individual freedom.

For instance, when Lacie desperately tries to arrive at the wedding of her high-four scored childhood friend Naomi (Alice Eve) in order to get the high ratings of high-four guests in the wedding, she, since she has no other choice, accepts 1.4 scored truck driver Susan's offer to give her a ride. During their ride Susan confesses that she was 4.6 once and used to live for it. Then, Susan continues her story as 'All the work I put in Eight years ago, Tom, my husband, got cancer. It was pancreatic. It was a real bitch. The symptoms showed up late. I five-starred every doctor, every nurse, every high-four consultant that we had. A couple of months in, we heard about this experimental treatment. It was very expensive. It was very exclusive. I did everything I could to get him a spot there. Tom was a 4.3. They gave his bed to a 4.4. So, when he died, I thought, fuck it. I started saying what I wanted, when I wanted. Just drop it out there. Maybe you should try it?' and Lacie as an answer to Susan says 'I can't just kick off my shoes and walk the earth or whatever. Look, you had something with your life, real things, good things, and you lost it all, and I'm sorry. So, now you've got nothing left to lose. But I don't even have something worth losing, not yet. You know, I mean, I'm still fighting for that'. This 'that' here is manifested by Lacie as 'Enough to be content? Like, to look around and think, well, I guess I'm okay. Just to be able to breathe out, not feeling like like - Like just. And that is way off, like, way, way off. And until I get there, I have to play the numbers game. We all do, that's what we're in. That's how the fucking world works'. Thus, the cinematic piece by adding Susan to its cinematic experience underlines that breaking free from this platform is possible but Lacie desires to be content and she blatantly relates this contention to her high ratings due to her territorialized desires. Therefore, she *chooses* to participate within this platform that she considers as a numbers game which undoubtedly assigns her of being cognizant of the restrictive parameters that either she applies to herself or receives as a consequence of this participation. Thus, Lacie considering the platform to be a numbers game not only assigns her as being cognizant of the restrictive factors of this participation but assigns other individuals as digital presences to be used in order to win this numbers game and every member who obsessively participate within this platform reciprocally have the same considerations.

For example, from the moment that Naomi calls Lacie to ask her to be her maid of honour both of them act as if this proposal is due to their old emotional connection and the cinematic piece manifests it through Lacie's and Naomi's acting as their eyes get watery after Naomi proposing Lacie to be her maid of honour and as they get super emotional and

excited about the wedding. However, when Naomi learns that Lacie is down to 2.6, she directly calls Lacie and tells her that she does not *need* her in her wedding anymore. Then, both of them reveal their real feelings towards each other which manifests that right from the beginning they are both faking their feelings, gestures and reactions due to their obsession towards enhancing their digital scores, eventually their digital presence. Hence, the cinematic piece proposes this revelation through their conversation and through their facial expressions and gestures within this conversation. Within the conversation Naomi says 'You've seen the guest list. They are all, like, 4.5 or above. They are going to freak at a 2.6, and I am not taking that kind of damage, plus I haven't dipped under a 4.7 in, like, six months. When I asked you to speak, you were a 4.2, okay? And the authenticity of a vintage bond low four at a gathering of this calibre played fantastically on all the simulations we ran. Forecast was a prestige bounce of 2 minimum. But now you're a sub three. Sorry. That just puts the stink on things a little too much. That just plays badly for us' and when Lacie says to Naomi 'So it was just about numbers for you?' Naomi answers as 'Oh, cut the shit! It was numbers for both of us. You wanted those primo votes, don't deny it. It's not like you could get them on your own. Let's not kid ourselves'. The cinematic piece, within this scene through its cinematic elements, confirms that for both Lacie and Naomi all that matters is the numbers which eventually designates their social media platform scores. All in all, the cinematic piece introduces Lacie, and the other participants of this platform willingly choose to participate within this platform due to their internal cravings manifested as their territorialized desires to have a high ranked digital presence even if they are cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to their lives.

Up until here, I tried to broadly reveal through its macrostructural cinematic elements how the cinematic piece proposes the internal factors restrictive of individual freedom and how Lacie and the other individuals, even if they are cognizant of these restrictive factors, willingly continue to participate within the social media platform. However, since my motivation is to propose that this type of a restriction is not only introduced and theorized through the macrostructural cinematic elements but also through the microstructural cinematic elements, in the next part, I will reveal these precise microstructural cinematic elements embedded within this specific cinematic experience. These cinematic details, when holistically acknowledged are construed to propose the mentioned type of restriction of individual freedom.

As I have explicitly referred to above, *Nosedive* sets off with a frame of a setting which is composed of houses in light pastel colors surrounded by trees and by a light pink colored sky accompanied by the sound of birds chirping. Thus, the cinematic piece, with this cinematic touch, sets the mood of its experience to a light tone. Thus, it even proposes the name of the episode in light pink colors accompanied by the background of a light pink sky.

In order to bolster this mood of lightness, the cinematic piece adds a calm song into its experience. Lacie enters this frame by running towards the camera while she is constantly checking the social media platform through the device that she holds in her hands. The cinematic piece, by the digital sound that it introduces while Lacie is checking her phone during her run, manifests that she is in some sort of an interaction within this social media platform. Thus, the cinematic piece within this scene hints that not only Lacie but also other members of this society are using this social media platform. Accordingly, the cinematic piece proposes this platform to be a reflection of the interactions that the individuals have in real life. For instance, while Lacie is running, she sees another member of this society and after they both greet each other, they right immediately direct their devices towards each other and the cinematic piece adds another digital sound to hint that they not only communicate in real life but also through this device.

The cinematic piece cuts to the next scene to propose more details on this social media platform and on the content that Lacie is constantly checking. Respectively, the camera cuts to the screen of this device and in the screen there are other users' sharings which Lacie is constantly rating. Eventually, the cinematic piece through its cinematic elements proposes that what Lacie is constantly checking is a social media platform in which anyone using this platform has a score from 1 to 5. Hence, the opening sequence broadly proposes Lacie as having some addictive vibes towards this social media platform and also proposes that this kind of an addictive vibe cuts Lacie's interaction with real life since throughout of her running and stretching, she just looks at her phone but nothing else, even if the real life is happening around her. To underline this, the cinematic piece proposes some vehicle sounds in the background throughout the stretching scene.

The cinematic piece, in order to give more details on the dominance of this social media platform cuts to a scene in which Lacie is checking herself in the mirror and constantly laughing. Then, the cinematic piece cuts to an extreme close-up shot to indicate that there is a digital lens inserted to her eyes which enables her to see the feed of this social media platform as her vision. Thus, this cinematic touch blatantly indicates the intensity of the preeminence of this social media platform in Lacie's life. This preeminence is also bolstered by the cinematic touch of adding her score, 4.2, right next to her appearance in the mirror. Hence, through her acting, Lacie gives the vibe that she is rehearsing her laugh. That's why she is constantly laughing while she is looking at the mirror. The cinematic piece in the next scene affirms that Lacie was rehearsing her laugh by showing Lacie smiling as she rehearsed in real life at the other members of this society. This kind of a cinematic touch hints to a society in which excessive cheerfulness is prioritized and this kind of a hint becomes blatant as the cinematic experience continues to flow. Accordingly, the cinematic piece cuts to a scene which proposes this kind of an excessive cheerfulness to be

embedded not only in Lacie but also within the proposed society. The cinematic piece manifests this kind of an excessive cheerfulness through the setting in which everything is aggressively in light pastel colors and in which each and every individual is just looking at the screen of their devices. As the cinematic piece cuts to the screen of Lacie's device, we see Laice giving 5 stars to almost all of the sharings within this platform. One cinematic touch here is that not only real life but also the content of the sharings within this platform are excessively and aggressively in light pastel colors. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes this cinematic touch to underline that there is a total cheerfulness and total positivity inherent within this society and the physical reflection of it is the real life itself to be colored in these light pastel colors. Thus, throughout the scene this inherent cheerfulness and positivity is manifested through the interactions between the individuals. However, one crucial touch here is that any interaction that they have with each other, they, right immediately, rate each other through this social media platform.

For instance, within this cafe scene Lacie, right after her interaction with the waiter, rates the waiter with 5 stars and he does the same. The cinematic piece cuts to a frame in which Lacie looks at the people sitting in this cafe and from her vision, due to the digital lenses that she has, she sees everybody with their digital scores next to their heads. Hence, the cinematic piece proposes this touch to hint that individuals within this society see each other as a digital presence and value each other according to their digital scores. The cinematic piece after giving this hint shows Lacie as trying to create a content for a picture to share in her account using her cookie and her coffee. Eventually, she bites the cookie to give a moon shape to it and then she spills the cookie out. She shares the picture of the cookie and the coffee. Then, she takes a sip from her coffee and her facial reactions clearly indicate that she does not like the coffee. All in all, the cinematic piece within this cafe scene, proposes a cinematic experience through its cinematic elements manifesting a society in which the individuals use their real lives as a stage to act in order to higher their social media platform scores. However, their acting recalls an inherent pretentiousness since it is excessively and aggressively cheerful and positive. Hence, this pretentiousness, although hinted through the cinematic elements, is explicitly manifested by the cinematic piece in the scene that Lacie even if she neither likes the cookie nor the coffee makes a sharing out of them and she becomes extremely happy any time she receives high ratings from the others on her sharing. This cinematic touch blatantly manifests that Lacie prioritizes her digital presence and makes her physical presence to serve for her digital presence.

The cinematic piece explicitly manifests this prioritization to be inherent in Lacie through her constant real-life actions to ground on pleasing people all the time and to ground on high rating people all the time without consideration in order to receive back high ratings from them. Yet, the cinematic piece indicates that all of these actions are due to Lacie's

happiness and unhappiness solely grounding on the high and low ratings that she receives within this platform. Thus, the cinematic piece manifests this through its cinematic elements such as close-up shots focusing on her facial reactions and gestures indicating how happy she feels whenever she gets a high rating on the picture that she shared. The cinematic piece proposes the next scene to demonstrate how individuals interact one to one within this digital presence prioritized system. In the scene, Lacie is in the same elevator with a colleague Bethany (Daisy Haggard) and they both use the lens in their eyes to check each other's feeds in order to communicate with each other. Thus, throughout the scene they just focus on the lens in their eyes instead of looking at each other and there is the same excessive total cheerfulness and positivity inherent within their conversations which yet again hints to the pretentiousness manifested earlier within the cinematic experience. Hence, up until this point of the cinematic experience, the way that the cinematic piece manifests this pretentiousness is to be a free choice of the individuals. However, the cinematic piece proposes this free choice to be motivated by the priority that the individuals dedicate to their social media platform scores.

Right at this point of the cinematic experience, then, the question becomes why do individuals dedicate this much priority to their digital presence and to their digital scores? Then, the cinematic piece answers this question in the scene that it introduces which sets off when a colleague, Chester (Kadiff Kirwan), with a 3.1 score offers Lacie a smoothie. When Lacie gets the smoothie, the cinematic piece cuts to a shot that shows all the other people in the office looking at Lacie with judgement. Yet, Lacie directly rates Chester with five stars because, as the cinematic experience already manifested so far, any interaction has to be rated and as the social codes show has to be rated positively. Instantly, Chester gets a huge relief. This reaction as a cinematic touch is the first hint that having low points have some consequences in the real lives of the individuals within this society. The cinematic piece, even if it does not explicitly manifest what are the real consequences of having low scores, manifests through another colleague's confession to Lacie that all of the people collectively decided to score Chester down due to his relation with his partner. Correspondingly, the colleague states that 'if he is below 2.5, it is bye bye'. Here, this statement clearly reveals that in this society the individuals by willingly participating within this platform creates a society in which the digital scores literally designate the real-life value of the individuals. Therefore, the cinematic piece proposes a society in which individuals willingly participate in this social media platform by constantly rating each other precisely because in the first place they collectively participate in the territorialization of their desires to ground on perfecting their social media platform ratings. Accordingly, the cinematic piece manifests individuals as digital presences who actively participate in this precise kind of a territorialization of their desires.

The cinematic piece proposes this kind of a territorialization of the desires through individual's obsession but precisely through Lacie's obsession on perfecting her social media platform ratings since she, along with the other members of this society, equates real life to this social media platform and equates the value of her being to the rating that she has within this social media platform. That's why, throughout the cinematic experience, Lacie obsessively just focuses on making her score higher and yet pays almost zero attention to the restrictive parameters that her active participation within this platform brings to her real life. The cinematic piece, even if it hints at the presence of these kinds of restrictions in the previous scene, explicitly manifests the first instance of these kinds of restrictions in the scene when Lacie decides to rent a home for herself, and she needs a discount in order to rent the home. However, her social media platform score is 4.2 and in order to get a discount she needs to have 4.5. Since she is craving to be a high-four, instead of seeing this as a restriction, she obsessively dedicates herself to make her score reach to 4.5 although she knows that this restriction in the first place is set due to her participation within this system along with other member's obsessive and willing participations due to their territorialized desires. Thus, the cinematic piece proposes her craving for this home to inherently represent her craving to become a high-four in the score rank. This cinematic touch is to underline that the house as belonging to real life can just be a manifestation of her digital presence to be a high-four. Hence, Lacie's craving to become a high-four in the score rank is also clearly manifested by the cinematic piece through Lacie constantly checking and constantly giving five stars to her high-four childhood friend Naomi's digital presence.

At this stage of the cinematic experience, the cinematic piece, after manifesting that this obsession towards this social media platform is due to the territorialization of individual's desires which leads to their willing participation within this platform as a consequence of their internal feelings, tries to propose the preeminence of these internal feelings which eventually makes individuals to *choose* to constantly participate within this platform. Correspondingly, the cinematic piece introduces Lacie's brother Ryan to its cinematic experience. Ryan is manifested as a free individual who chooses not to live for his digital presence and his score. Therefore, he is judgemental of Lacie's obsession with her digital presence and her score. After seeing that Lacie wants to move to a home in Pelican Cove, Ryan directly refers to it as a Eugenics program. The reference that the cinematic piece inserts here is to underline that this platform that the individuals willingly and obsessively participate in creates a society in which individuals constantly try to perfect themselves to reach specific desirable traits in order to have the highest scoring digital presence. The cinematic piece, by introducing Ryan as choosing not to be a part of this system, assigns Lacie freely choosing to constantly try perfecting herself to reach these specific desirable traits in order to higher the score of her digital presence.

The cinematic piece in order to hint at these specific desirable traits, introduces the scene in which Lacie goes to see a counsellor in Reputelligent firm to get feedback on how she could manage to reach the score of 4.5 in a short amount of time. Here, the company's name to be reputelligent recalls that these counsellors work as perfecting the digital reputation of the individuals within this social media platform. Accordingly, all the conversions within their session solely focus on acknowledging all the individuals as a digital presence, as a number and as a data. Therefore, the cinematic piece hints that these specific desirable traits ground on managing these data in the optimal way through one dimensional, excessively cheerful and positive, interactions with these data. However, it is not only enough to interact with these data but it is also crucial to interact with the data that is a high-four since they are considered as 'quality' people. Hence, the cinematic piece here not only blatantly manifests that the value of the individuals are equated to their social media platform scores and that every individual is solely considered as a digital score but also manifests that within this society individuals willingly participate in violation of their informational privacy and violation of their informational self-determination, eventually, violation of their individual freedom in a sense that they, by choice, expose all their information to every and each member of this society in order to perfect their digital presence. All in all, this scene manifests that Lacie, in order to reach her dream digital presence, needs to play according to the rules of this social media platform game, as she calls in the further parts of the experience as the numbers game. This emphasis automatically assigns Lacie to be cognizant of the rules of this numbers game which has restrictive consequences in her real life. Yet again, she continues to play this numbers game, even more obsessively than ever precisely because she equates her value to the score that she has within this platform.

The cinematic piece manifests this obsession within the sequence through, after her session with the counsellor in reputelligent, her constant effort of pleasing high-fours by acting extremely nice to them or through her constant effort of giving five stars to high-four people. Yet, the cinematic piece manifests this obsession most blatantly through Naomi in a sense that Lacie constantly checks Naomi's feed and constantly gives 5 stars to her sharings. Hence, this cinematic touch not only manifests her obsession with playing the numbers game but also manifests her obsession towards the digital presence of Naomi as a high-four. With reference to these obsessions, she decides to make a move towards Naomi. At this precise point of the cinematic experience the camera focuses on a handmade doll. Hence, the cinematic piece with this cinematic touch hints to a connection between this doll and Naomi and this connection, as hinted, becomes explicit in the further parts of the experience as in their childhood times Naomi helped Lacie to make this doll.

Eventually, Lacie shares this doll's picture in her account with the note of 'good ol' Mr. Rags'. Thus, after her sharing, the cinematic piece cuts to Lacie's face to make it blatant how excited she is while she is waiting for a high rating from Naomi. As the cinematic piece hints, she gets extremely happy when Naomi rates this picture with 5 stars. In order to underline the admiration that Lacie has towards Naomi who inherently represents a high-four, the cinematic piece cuts to a scene in which she is cooking an olive tapenade since she saw it from Naomi's feed. As the cinematic piece tries to manifest the preeminence of the digital presence of the individuals to supersede their real presences, up until this stage of the cinematic experience, it proposes Naomi within its experience through her digital presence. However, at this stage of the cinematic experience the physical presence of Naomi joins the experience since Naomi calls Lacie to ask her to be her maid of honour in her wedding. Thus, Naomi tells Lacie that seeing Mr. Rags really made her emotional to a point where she wants her oldest friend, Lacie, to be her maid of honour. From the moment that Naomi asks Lacie to be her maid of honour both of them act as if this proposal is due to their old emotional connection and the cinematic piece manifests it through Lacie's and Naomi's acting as their eyes get watery after Naomi proposing Lacie to be her maid of honour and as they get super emotional and excited about the wedding. The cinematic piece reveals that these watery eyes are a part of the numbers game in the scene where Lacie rehearses her wedding speech. Right after she finishes her emotional speech with her watery eyes, she changes her reaction and asks Ryan if the crying is too much or not. Thus, this is also manifested in the scene where while Lacie is driving towards the wedding, she rehearses her speech again and at the end of her speech she says 'Teardrop, The crowd goes wild. You can do this.' These scenes blatantly indicate that Lacie is faking her reactions and emotions in order to get the ratings of the high-fours in the wedding. Accordingly, since the sole motivation of Lacie is to get the five-star ratings of the high-fours, she within the call that she is having with Naomi directly asks 'How big is the crowd?' and when Naomi tells her that 'All the guest list on the wedding is high above 4.7' the camera cuts, in a close-up shot, to Lacie's face to indicate her excitement.

In order to underline the intensity level of Lacie's obsession with having a high-four digital presence, the cinematic piece includes Ryan to its experience once again as an outsider not living for his digital presence. Respectively, Ryan not only confesses to Lacie that she misses her normal sister before this obsession, but he also reveals that Lacie is going to this wedding just for the 'captive audience of 4 point holies 5 starring her ass off' even if she knows that Naomi was really mean to her throughout their childhood. Ryan also reveals that those high-fours being fake smile jail cells and this whole ranking system grounding on comparing yourself to people who only pretend to be happy is insane and inhuman. Hence, these revelations lead to an argument between Lacie and Ryan precisely

because Lacie, even if cognizant that all of the things that his brother says are true, continues to play the numbers game because of her territorialized desires grounding on perfecting her digital presence. Hence, the cinematic piece proposes the intensity of this fight through the close-up shots to their faces and through the instant cuts in between their faces while they are shouting at each other. Eventually, Lacie's territorialized desires reveal themselves as an obsession towards her digital presence on a level that she even sees her brother through his digital score as she calls her brother 'Mr. three-point fuck' during their fight.

The cinematic piece, right after this stage of its cinematic experience, tries to manifest how this obsession, even if the restrictions on her freedom become intense and explicit through the use of this platform, makes Lacie to still fight on perfecting her digital presence by trying to higher her digital score. Hence, the cinematic piece with this cinematic touch tries to reveal the dark side of this social media platform ruled society, which it disguises under the excessively cheerful and positive interactions up until this stage of its experience. This revelation starts with Ryan rating Lacie's score down due to their fight. Then, her score is rated down again by her neighbour right after she unwittingly hits her and makes her coffee spill. Consequently, due to Lacie's pretentiousness while speaking to Naomi within the taxi, the taxi driver also rates her score down. The cinematic piece with this sequence blatantly reveals the value of Lacie to be solely dependent on the ratings' of the other individuals. Thus, up until this sequence, the cinematic piece proposes this dependence to manifest itself through Lacie's cheerful and positive interactions with others in which she solely receives high ratings. However, the cinematic piece with this sequence proposes a perception change which hints to the possible negative consequences of this dependence. Correspondingly, the cinematic piece proposes the next scene in which Lacie learns that her flight to the wedding is cancelled and she needs 4.2 in order to get into the next flight. Yet, due to previous low ratings that she receives in a row, her point is down to 4.1. Therefore, she learns that she can not get into the next flight. Due to her obsession towards the high ratings that she plans to get in the wedding, she gets frustrated and angry. Accordingly, she couldn't manifest her fake politeness and positivity to the flight attendant in the counter which eventually leads her to act rude to this flight attendant on a level that she shouts at her as 'you got to fucking help me'. Right after Lacie shouts at the flight attendant, the flight attendant says that she will call the security and it is blatantly manifested through Lacie's acting that she right immediately tries to be extremely polite towards the flight attendant. Thus, this cinematic touch here is to manifest how hard Lacie tries to hide her real reactions and feelings under the disguise of total positivity and total politeness.

Another cinematic touch within the scene is when the camera cuts to the other individuals rating Lacie's score down just because she shouted to the flight attendant.

Hence, the cinematic piece with this cinematic touch not only underlines the dominance of one dimensionality that grounds on total positivity, cheerfulness and politeness but yet again underlines that individuals' are the primary actors to create and to serve for the functioning of this one dimensionality with their willing participation. Eventually, this willing participation creates a collectively conformist society which excludes people due to their low-scores within this platform. Hence, this was underlined before within the cinematic experience when Chester, due to his colleague's low ratings, can not enter from the office door since his score goes down to 2.4. Within this scene, Chester almost begs Lacie to rate him high but since Lacie sees Chester through his digital presence as 2.4, she overlooks his real-life desperation and does not rate him high. Now, Lacie being at Chester's place begs the security guard at the airport not to lower her score as a security measure but at the end her score gets down to 3.1 with double damage. Hence, the cinematic piece by focusing on Lacie's reactions and gestures through her acting as being frustrated, devastated and extremely sad after her score is down to 3.1, blatantly manifests her obsession with her score. The cinematic piece with this scene also manifests how the intense level of her obsession makes her continue to participate within this platform even if this platform in the first place is the reason why she applies restrictions to herself and why she is facing external restrictions. Thus, in the scene, even if the fake smiling flight attendant is the reason why Lacie hits down to 3.1 and even if this social media rating system is the reason she can not attend the flight, she still participates within this platform by rating this flight attendant with five stars due to her obsession to higher her score.

At this stage of the cinematic experience, the cinematic piece inherently puts Lacie in a position in which she can either give up and go back home since there is literally no power forcing her to continue this numbers game or she can continue this numbers game. However, even if the cinematic piece assigns Lacie in the position above, in order to manifest Lacie's obsession on her score within this platform, it continues with the scene in which Lacie right immediately goes to a car rental agency to rent a car in order to get to the wedding on time. At this stage of its experience the cinematic piece makes the score grounded restrictions more explicit through introducing a cut focusing on a billboard at the rental agency which states 'express lane is 4.0 or more'. Thus, the cinematic piece, as a cinematic touch, introduces these kinds of inserts asserting explicit score-based limitations, right after Lacie's score starts to go down. This cinematic touch is a part of the revelation of the dark side of this social media platform ruled society, which the cinematic piece disguises under the excessively cheerful and positive setting up until Lacie's score starts to go down.

The more the cinematic piece reveals the dark side of this social media platform ruled society, the more obsessed Lacie becomes to arrive at the wedding to get the five-star ratings of the high-fours in the wedding. For instance, due to her low score she is restricted

to renting the oldest version of the rental cars. Yet, instead of seeing this as a restriction she rents the car without questioning the primary reason for this restriction and she obsessively rehearses her wedding speech while driving towards the wedding. Thus, her obsession, which by choice makes her participate on her own restriction, becomes once again explicitly blatant within the scene when she desperately waits for Naomi to rate her back with five stars after their talk in the car. Hence, the cinematic piece manifests this as a pattern that Lacie constantly follows in order to manifest that the ruling force behind Lacie's actions is her territorialized desires. Hence, this pattern is seen when Lacie, no matter how they pretend towards her, rates the taxi-driver, the flight attendant, the rental car agency responsible, the car battery charger responsible, and many other members of the society with five stars. However, her constant rating of five stars starts to get reciprocated less and less parallel to her score getting lower and lower. This touch here underlines, yet again, how the individuals within this society see the other members as a digital presence and judge them with reference to the scores that they have within this preeminent social media platform.

The cinematic piece explicitly underlines this emphasis in the scene where Lacie starts to walk in the highway and tries to find a car to get her closer to the wedding. Hence, while she is trying to make the cars give her a ride, a couple in the car getting closer to her, even if they consider to stop, do not stop to get her into their car precisely because her score is 2.8. Thus, the sequence continues as the individuals passing by Lacie with their cars constantly rating her score down even, as Lacie expresses, she didn't do anything. The cinematic piece manifests the intensity of people scoring her down through the repeated decreased score sound that it adds to its cinematic experience. Yet, although Lacie gets angry towards people who rate her down solely according to her low score, she hesitates to accept 1.4 scored truck driver Susan's offer to give her a ride due to Susan's low score.

The cinematic piece introduces Susan into its cinematic experience as an individual who does not live for her digital presence. The cinematic piece reveals this kind of a manifestation through Susan's clothes, through the way she talks, through the close-up shot focusing on the whiskey picture that she shares in her feed. Thus, the cinematic piece introduces Susan to its cinematic experience to make Lacie, for the first time, express her real feelings and real emotions without any filters. That's the precise reason why, when Susan tells Lacie to break free from this platform as she did, Lacie says to her 'I can't just kick off my shoes and walk the earth or whatever. Look, you had something with your life, real things, good things, and you lost it all, and I'm sorry. So now you've got nothing left to lose. But I don't even have something worth losing, not yet. You know, I mean, I'm still fighting for that'. That here is manifested by Lacie as 'Enough to be content. And she states 'until I get there, I have to play the numbers game. We all do, that's what we're in. That's how the fucking world works'. Here, for the first time Lacie explicitly says that she does

consider this as a numbers game and she manifests her game strategy as “as long as I get to the wedding, do the speech, they'll overlook the 2.8. I'm with the bride. And if I do well, well, they're all high fours so that velocities my arc. And once they lift the point penalty, well, my average goes way up, and, yeah, it's gonna be okay'. Thus, the cinematic piece by adding Susan to its cinematic experience underlines that breaking free from this platform is possible but Lacie desires to be content and she blatantly relates this contention to her high ratings due to the territorialization of her desires. Therefore, she eventually, through her unfiltered emotions and reactions, confesses that she *chooses* to participate within this platform which she considers as a numbers game. This confession here undoubtedly assigns her of being cognizant of the restrictive parameters that she either applies to herself or receives as a consequence of this participation. Thus, Lacie considering the platform to be a numbers game not only assigns her as being cognizant of the restrictive factors of this participation but assigns other individuals as digital presences to be used in order to win this numbers game and every member who obsessively participate within this platform reciprocally have the same considerations.

For instance, from the moment that Naomi calls Lacie to ask her to be her maid of honour both of them act as if this proposal is due to their old emotional connection and the cinematic piece manifests it through Lacie's and Naomi's acting as their eyes getting watery after Naomi proposing Lacie to be her maid of honour and as they get super emotional and excited about the wedding. However, when Naomi learns that Lacie is down to 2.6, she directly calls Lacie and tells her that she does not *need* her in her wedding anymore. Then, both of them reveal their real feelings towards each other which manifests that right from the beginning they are both faking their feelings, gestures and reactions due to their obsession towards enhancing their digital scores, eventually their digital presence. Hence, the cinematic piece proposes this revelation through their conversation and through their facial expressions and gestures within this conversation. Within the conversation Naomi says 'You've seen the guest list. They are all, like, 4.5 or above. They are going to freak at a 2.6, and I am not taking that kind of damage, plus I haven't dipped under a 4.7 in, like, six months. When I asked you to speak, you were a 4.2, okay? And the authenticity of a vintage bond low four at a gathering of this calibre played fantastically on all the simulations we ran. Forecast was a prestige bounce of 2 minimum. But now you're a sub three. Sorry. That just puts the stink on things a little too much. That just plays badly for us' and when Lacie says to Naomi 'So it was just about numbers for you?' Naomi answers as 'Oh, cut the shit! It was numbers for both of us. You wanted those primo votes, don't deny it. It's not like you could get them on your own. Let's not kid ourselves'. The cinematic piece, within this scene through its cinematic elements, confirms that for both Lacie and Naomi all that matters is the numbers which eventually designates their social media platform scores. All in all, the

cinematic piece introduces Lacie, and the other participants of this platform willingly choose to participate within this platform due to their internal cravings manifested as their territorialized desires to have a high ranked digital presence even if they are cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to their lives.

The cinematic piece proposes this unfiltered talk between Naomi and Lacie to be a breaking point and a trigger for Lacie to continue unfiltered. However, the crucial point here is that Lacie still does not give up on making it to the wedding even Naomi explicitly expresses that she does not want Lacie in the wedding. This is precisely because she is obsessed with those stars that she plans to get in this wedding and the cinematic piece, once again, reveals her obsession when she tells Naomi 'Oh, I'm getting those votes' even after hearing Naomi's real emotions towards her. Thus, the cinematic piece reveals this obsession not only through her words but also through a close-up shot to Lacie's face indicating how captivated she is on the votes that she can get. Yet, the rest of the cinematic experience manifests a Lacie who acts and talks unfiltered. For instance, she shouts to the people within the Van which she once got in by faking herself or she drinks the whiskey that Susan has left for her in the middle of the highway. Then, she jumps into the middle of the highway shouting to cars to stop to give her a ride to the wedding. Thus, the cinematic piece throughout this scene adds the constant decreased score sound in order to highlight that the more she acts unfiltered, the more she loses from her score.

Right after this stage of its experience, the cinematic piece manifests a sequence to explicitly differentiate between old filtered Lacie and new unfiltered Lacie. That's the precise reason why the cinematic piece changes the music in the sequence to underline the change on Lacie. Hence, the cinematic piece manifests old filtered Lacie to be represented by all the members in the wedding in order to highlight the intensity level of the filter that Lacie was applying to herself so that she can perfect her digital presence. Accordingly, the cinematic piece abruptly cuts in between the scene in which Lacie borrows an ATV and wildly goes through the forest to make it to the wedding and the scene in which the wedding is happening. All in all, within this sequence the cinematic piece on the one hand reveals an unfiltered Lacie wildly going through the forest full of mud and dirt on the other hand reveals the wedding in which the filtered decent and elegant individuals constantly give five stars to each other within an excessively light pastel colored setting. Yet again, the unfiltered Lacie and the filtered individuals both are the same since Lacie, even unfiltered, still obsessively tries to reach the wedding in order to get the votes of the high-fours in the wedding. However, since the individuals see Lacie through her digital score which is 1.1 at this stage of the experience, they do not welcome her well in the wedding. What's more, the cinematic piece manifests her mud and bushes covered appearance to represent her 1.1 score since

the physical world throughout the cinematic experience is manifested as a reflection of the digital scores of the individuals.

As the cinematic experience flows, Lacie continues to act as her unfiltered version. Correspondingly, she starts to make a spontaneous speech following her unfiltered feelings and emotions instead of making her obsessively rehearsed filtered speech. Then, right after she starts to constantly hear the decreased score sound as a reaction to her speech and her actions, she has a nervous breakdown. Subsequently, the guards take her away to be put into a captive space as a criminal. The cinematic piece manifests that she is considered as a criminal by her mug shot inserts that it introduces before she is put into a captive space. Consequently, the cinematic piece adds the Mr. Rags insert into its cinematic experience in order to reveal that she is only left with what is real, what belongs to the previous life which is not ruled by the digital presences and scores. Yet, the cinematic piece explicitly reveals Lacie's real break from this social media platform with the scene in which the lens that visualizes the content of this platform is being removed from her eyes. The liberation that comes with this removal is revealed by the cinematic piece through an extreme close-up shot to Lacie's beautiful unfiltered blue eyes. The cinematic piece also manifests this liberation through Lacie taking her light pastel colored dress out. What's more, the cinematic piece in order to explicitly highlight that the individuals being obsessed with their digital presence do not pay any attention to real life, it manifests Lacie as focusing on the little particles gliding in the air. Eventually, the cinematic piece shows Lacie, for the first time, as crying for real after seeing these particles. However, the piece reveals through Lacie's facial reactions that this is a cry out of relief. As the sequence flows, Lacie sees the other captive in the other captive space across from her. Hence, the cinematic piece in order to, yet again, reveal her obsession towards this platform, cuts to an extreme close-up shot focusing on Lacie's hand trying to rate the man in the other captive space as if she has the device in her hands. Thus, the cinematic piece here with this insert, tries to manifest that Lacie, at the end, does not end up in this captive space by *choice* but ends up here due to her obsession towards this social media platform and due to her obsession with her digital presence. Yet again, she is forced to be liberated from this system and this force is a consequence of the willing and active participation of the individuals including Lacie within this social media platform which is motivated by their territorialized desires. Yet, the cinematic piece proposes its experience to end as Lacie and this other captive man constantly shouting their unfiltered emotions towards each other within a captive space in order to explicitly manifest that both of them feel much more free in this captive space, compared to the non-captive space in which they are a captive of their digital presences and their digital values. In the last scene of the cinematic experience, they both loudly shout 'fuck you' to each other and the cinematic piece reveals this shouting to manifest how liberated they feel. Thus, this liberation

is manifested as rapid cuts in between the extreme close-up shots focusing on Lacie's and the other captive man's face. All in all, Lacie is liberated from the captivity of her digital presence. In the end, Lacie is the one who is willingly making herself a captive of her digital presence even if she is cognizant that she is a captive anyways.

Here, yet again, right after concluding my close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I want to give some details on the other intersections of the scheme which are not covered in a paradigmatic way within my close reading of the cinematic piece. Hence, throughout the close reading analysis that I have applied to the cinematic piece, I precisely focus on the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the internal factors as restrictive of individual freedom and which present Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform as being cognizant of the restrictive parameters that they expose to themselves due to these internal factors. However, within the cinematic experience there are some hints given through the cinematic elements that serve for the philosophizing prioritizing other determinant elements of the scheme which are being *cognizant* or *incognizant* of the restrictive parameters on individual freedom and *external* or *internal* factors restricting individual freedom. I want to give some precise details on the other intersections of the determinant elements that are hinted throughout the cinematic experience.

For instance, the cinematic piece predominantly underlines that the participants of the social media platform and precisely Lacie are cognizant of the restrictions that they have on their individual freedom and these restrictions are, as I have constantly asserted, due to the internal factors belonging to these individuals. However, at the end of the cinematic experience Lacie due to her unfiltered actions is put into a captive space without her consent. Accordingly, it can be stated that there is a hint of another intersection which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by external factors*. Due to the same predominant emphasis above, I assert that there are no hints of any intersections that have incognizance as one of their determinant elements. Correspondingly, within the cinematic experience, there are no hints of the intersections which are *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by external factors* and *the restriction of individual freedom of incognizant agents by internal factors*. The crucial point here, yet again, is that I consider these hints, signifying some philosophizing to be done on the other intersections of the scheme that I propose, to serve for the primary philosophizing and the theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece. So as to say, the cinematic piece uses these other intersections to make the primary intersection to be more explicit and solid. Accordingly, I assert that the sole theorizing that is introduced by the cinematic piece is: *The restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents by internal factors*.

Subsequently, I, as a cinematic philosopher, tried to connect the cinematic experience of *Nosedive* to the context of individual freedom and technology by focusing on how it evokes philosophical insights through the cinematic channel using cinematic elements. All in all, I tried to reveal its theorizing by applying the close reading methodology/analysis to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present the internal factors as the restrictive parameter of individual freedom and to its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements which present Lacie as being cognizant of the restrictive parameters that she exposes to herself due to these internal factors. Eventually, all the cinematic elements, holistically acknowledged, in *Nosedive*, Lacie and the other participants of the proposed social media platform willingly choose to participate within this platform due to their territorialized desires manifested as their internal cravings to have a high ranked digital presence even if they are cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to their lives. Respectively, the cinematic piece as a piece of cinematic philosophy proposes *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology*.

In this chapter, as a cinematic philosopher, I tried to reveal these four cinematic piece's (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) philosophical capacity and I tried to place them within a theoretical context which in my perception contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way. As I have already stated, I consider these cinematic pieces to independently propose the theory itself on the restriction of individual freedom and as a cinematic philosopher my role was to reveal this theorizing that they propose by connecting their cinematic experience to the context of political philosophy. Correspondingly, I applied the close reading methodology/analysis to these precise cinematic pieces by focusing on how these pieces evoke philosophical insights and propose philosophical theories, through the cinematic channel using macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements, on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom. Since, I introduce cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy, I acknowledge these precise cinematic pieces, ontologically, to introduce each type of restriction of individual freedom as a theoretical contribution to the political philosophical scene. Accordingly, the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)* is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*. The restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X) by external factors(Y)* is a theoretical contribution of *THX 1138*. The restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* and, eventually, the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*.

However, the type of restriction that *Nosedive* proposes is distinct from the other types of restrictions of individual freedom that are proposed. This is precisely because the other types of restrictions that the other cinematic pieces introduce are somehow theorized through other channels of philosophy. Yet, the restriction that *Nosedive* proposes, as I acknowledge, is completely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Subsequently, I construe this type of a restriction to be solely theorized by the *Nosedive* cinematic piece. I acknowledge and propose this new type of restriction to be functioning through 'Click Consent' and this accentuation forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from *Nosedive*. Subsequently, *Nosedive*, as a cinematic philosophy piece, by introducing this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory which, in the next chapter, I will try to theorize as a contribution of cinematic philosophy, along with theorizing the inductively established other three types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Chapter 6

Results and Contributions

In this thesis, I tested and proved that every cinematic piece that I applied the close reading analysis, through its cinematic experience by its macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements theorize one type of restriction of individual freedom independent from the a priori theoretical literature as a contribution of cinematic philosophy. This, within the context of this research, indicates as the tested hypotheses accordingly as the results:

1. Cinematic philosophy is a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom: *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*. These types are unique theoretical philosophical contributions of cinematic philosophy.
2. (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, in a sense that all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged, in *Alphaville*, the individual freedom of the incognizant residents of Alphaville is restricted by the internalized transformation, manipulation and control applied by the supercomputer, Alpha 60, functioning as an external factor.
(2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *THX 1138* in a sense that all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged, in *THX 1138*, the individual freedom of some cognizant agents but especially of cognizant THX 1138 is restricted by propaganda, surveillance, manipulation, control and force employed by the system which is solely

ruled according to the efficiency grounded calculations of the computers as an external factor.

(3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* in a sense that all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged, in *Ex Machina*, Caleb is incognizant of the manipulation he is exposed to by Ava due to his emotions such as love, attraction and compassion, as internal factors, which eventually are the primary parameters restricting his individual freedom.

(4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive* episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series in a sense that all the cinematic elements holistically acknowledged, in *Nosedive*, Lacie and the other participants of the proposed preeminent digital media platform willingly choose to participate within this platform due to their internal cravings manifested as their territorialized desires to have a high ranked digital presences even if they are cognizant of the restrictive consequences this participation brings to their lives.

3. *Nosedive's* contribution, as a contribution of cinematic philosophy, is solely theorized by the cinematic piece itself since the restriction type that it proposes is a novel type of restriction of individual freedom, which is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, this new type of restriction functions through the 'Click Consent' of the individuals which forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I derive from *Nosedive* cinematic piece.

Consequently, in this chapter, I will try to give more details on how the above-mentioned results are theorized as a contribution of this research. Accordingly, I will try to theorize, as the reflection of the results, the inductively established three types of restriction of individual freedom as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy and, also, I will try to theorize, again as the reflection of the results, the novel type of restriction of individual freedom along with the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from *Nosedive* as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

6.1 Theorizing the Types of Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology as a Contribution of Cinematic Philosophy

Throughout this research, I asserted that fictional narratives in the forms of imaginative constructions are philosophizing and are within the philosophical discourse and I associated these fictional constructions in the form of imaginary scenarios with the thought experiments. Correspondingly, I underlined that the capacity of thought experiments base upon raising philosophical questions, challenging the existing perspectives by initiating philosophical reflections and by posing counter-arguments and bolstering a theory or forming the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007). Departing from this accentuation, thought experiments, as Shamir underlines, have a capacity to:

Bring on a crisis or at least create an anomaly in the reigning theory and so contribute to paradigm change. Thought experiments can teach us something new about the world, even though we have no new empirical data, by helping us to re-conceptualize the world in a new way (Brown & Fehige 2010, 23). (Shamir, 2016, 92).

Thus, the indicated capacity of the thought experiments can be transferred to any kind of a fictional construction precisely because these constructions are construed as extended elaborative thought experiments. Therefore, cinematic pieces as fictional constructions are extended thought experiments. However, moving image fiction creates a new kind of a thought experiment using multiple channels to transfer the argument (Shamir, 2016). This ontological difference between traditional thought experiments and cinematic thought experiments grounds on the idea that “Cinematic thought experiments are not merely confined to the experience of the mind or imagination, but happen on a screen (the screen of a movie theater, television set, computer monitor, tablet, etc.)” (Shamir, 2016, 97). As Tal S. Shamir states:

Technical ability to produce thought experiments as experiences onscreen (rather than simply as ideas confined to the mind or imagination) allows for the creation of a wholly new kind of thought experiment, which can no longer be considered to be the same thing as a traditional thought experiment...By definition, a thought experiment is something we have to imagine in thought. When it is manifested on the cinematic platform, it is no longer a thought experiment. Once we have experienced it, once it has been manifested on screen, we don't have to imagine it any longer, and thus, it is no longer a thought experiment in the traditional sense. (Shamir, 2016, 14-80)

Here, what Shamir tries to highlight is that cinematic thought experiments, ontologically, are a different kind of a thought experiment with reference to a distinct

multi-channel kind of an engagement that they propose. Therefore, although it can be claimed that they introduce philosophy through fiction in the shape of thought experiments, they surpass the traditional thought experiments. Subsequently, cinematic pieces as cinematic thought experiments introduce a new type of philosophizing which is *cinematic philosophy*. Correspondingly, this emphasis appoints cinematic pieces to no longer be acknowledged as illustrative material for pre-existing philosophies and as illustrative material for pre-existing ideologies or theories (Read, 2005, 31). Accordingly, cinematic pieces with the experience that they propose through its ontologically unique cinematic elements, which opens a door to go beyond the logical demonstration and discursive argumentation, introduce new ways of thinking that seek to transform our understanding. Thus, the cinematic piece itself poses questions and develops answers of a philosophical nature through the cinematic elements belonging to the medium. This is a distinct way of doing philosophy in which “the philosophical implications drawn from the film can be further elaborated and articulated by combining close interpretation and analysis with more general theoretical reflection, philosophical questioning, and critical discussion” (Sinnerbrink, 2014, 65). This is so as to say that instead of illustrating a priori philosophical theories, films present their philosophical ideas, concepts and theories which are open to further interpretation in relation to a priori ideas, concepts or theories. Thus, this unique type of philosophizing, which differentiates cinematic philosophy from other channels of philosophy that propose a priori ideas, concepts or theories solely grounds on cinema’s potential as philosophy laying on its capacity to go beyond our linguistically structured perception. Correspondingly, all the cinematic elements that are utilized in a film is a component of the philosophical idea, concept, thought that is proposed by the cinematic piece itself. However, in my perception, as I have already underlined in the previous chapters, the capacity of cinema as a possibility of philosophy has been consistently overlooked precisely because of non-linguistically present elements of the cinema itself. The principal reason for this is the long tradition of philosophy to be solely functioning through the words either orally or verbally expressed and used.

Cinematic philosophy that I endorse here not only functions through the words but also functions through framing, movements, editing, colors, sound, light, plot, acting, cinematography, music, special effects, lighting, mood, etc., the empathy it evokes for its characters and story that belong to the cinematic medium. Respectively, cinematic philosophy proposes a kind of philosophy that is the closest to the human experience of life. From this perspective cinematic pieces have the potential to change and expand our relation and dependence on the verbal language themselves by offering a philosophical territory that is not restricted to the linear functioning of the words which is filtered by the pre-conditioned mind. Subsequently in this thesis, as a cinematic philosopher, I attempt to reveal the

potential of the cinematic pieces as philosophical pieces contributing to philosophy with reference to their cinematic elements rather than the elements belonging to traditional philosophy. Thus, cinematic pieces are most commonly considered as non-philosophical and respectively they are acknowledged to become philosophical when they are situated within a priori defined theories. However, what I endorse as cinematic philosophy grounds on the cinematic pieces which are philosophical within their own immanent processes and these processes have the potential of theory being an a posteriori consequence of the cinematic piece itself. In short, cinematic philosophy, as I acknowledge it, tries to overcome the perception that “there has yet to be an idea identified as philosophical in film which bears no resemblance with any current written philosophy” (Mullarkey, 2009, 16). Correspondingly, from this perspective there is no theoretical or conceptual superiority of traditional philosophy over cinematic philosophy. This underlining proposes a possibility of transforming philosophy through its encounter with the cinematic channel. As expressed, “Film and philosophy become partners in a ‘thinking dialogue’; a transformative engagement that helps elaborate the philosophy immanent within particular films, while prompting philosophy to respond creatively to the kind of thinking that cinema allows us to experience” (Carel & Tuck, 2011, 36). Therefore, the potential of film as a piece of philosophy grounds on its moments composed of the multiplicity of elements that when holistically evaluated establishes the grounds of the philosophical potential of the films. Correspondingly, there is the becoming philosophical of film itself which resists any singular and reductive theorization of its philosophical being (Mullarkey, 2009, 11). This is because the films that are philosophical pieces as themselves introduce their own theorization as a new kind of philosophy which is the experience of the new philosophical ideas, concepts and theories. This novel kind of a philosophy, cinematic philosophy, proposes possible new ways of thinking. Here, then, the cinematic piece, as a combination of unique cinematic elements, becomes thinking moving images. Accordingly, the cinematic philosophy that I endorse here proposes cinematic pieces as a process of cinematic thinking which positively contribute arguments and ideas not yet thinkable by the traditional philosophy alone just because of the ontological nature of a novel kind of thinking that the pieces introduce.

Since the scope of this research grounds on the cinematic philosophical pieces that precisely focus on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, I want to underline the relationship that these pieces have as pieces of cinematic philosophy with individual freedom and technology. As I have underlined before and above, the potential of cinematic pieces as pieces of philosophy, which is distinct from the oral and the written philosophy traditions, bases upon the cinematic elements that these cinematic pieces inherently have. Departing from this accentuation all of the four cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the

Black Mirror TV series) use these cinematic elements on theorizing the mentioned types of restriction of individual freedom. Thus, these elements are either embedded in the microstructure of the film which is composed of elements such as individual shots, fragments of picture and sound to the arrangement of these fragments into scenes or are embedded in the macrostructure of the film, which is composed of the theme, story, plot, characters, the various elements of film language as used in the film, and its composition etc. add up to provide that 'meaning'. Subsequently, these cinematic elements when holistically combined and evaluated construct the fundamental ground of the philosophizing that is presented within/by these cinematic pieces on the distinct types of restrictions of individual freedom through/by technology.

As I emphasized in my previous chapters, one of the prominent objectives of this thesis is to introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as the unique theoretical philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Correspondingly, as a cinematic philosopher, in the previous chapter, I applied the close reading methodology to these four precise cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series), in order to reveal these chosen pieces' philosophical wisdom and place them within a theoretical context. Accordingly, every piece that I applied the close reading methodology presents one type of restriction of individual freedom, independent from the a priori theoretical literature that I revealed in the second chapter, through/by their cinematic elements. Going back to the taxonomy that I introduced in the first chapter, if all conceptual elements are considered there are four possibilities on the restriction of individual freedom and the first three are:

- (1) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (2) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*
- (3) *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

Thus, in the second chapter, I situated distinct contemporary conceptions as theories of restriction of individual freedom within the taxonomy that I established. I asserted that the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion of individual freedom along with the option-based conceptions are considered as an instance of either (1) or (2) and (1) and (2) with reference to the restrictive conditions that they present as defining factors of their conception of individual freedom. Hence, I situate some of these conceptions in the formula as *X simpliciter* and some of them as *cognizant X*. Yet, these accounts devote the focus to the Y element as a restrictive factor of individual freedom. Therefore, some of these conceptions of individual freedom that I included within the scope of this research fall under

either instance (1) or instance (2) and instances (1) and (2). It is to say that instances (1) and (2) encompass the option-based conceptions and all the conceptions that have a negative understanding of the notion. Here, I want to include *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution* as being an instance of (1) since the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution and I want to include *THX 1138* as an instance of (2) since the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution. Nonetheless, all of the conceptions that have a positive understanding of the notion along with the conception as ownness focus on the X factor and underline that the priority condition of individual freedom is to be cognizant, however construed. Thereupon, ontologically, a cognizant X is free. Subsequently, if X is an incognizant agent then there are some internal factors that restrict her individual freedom. I acknowledge these kinds of conceptions of individual freedom as an instance of (3) since they prioritize X element which is directly related to the internal factors. Here, I want to involve *Ex Machina* as an instance of (3) since the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* is its theoretical contribution. The essential point here is that even if the restriction types that the cinematic pieces propose have similarities with the a priori theoretical literature, the pieces present these types in a uniquely cinematic way through their cinematic elements and this ontologically makes their contribution to be different than the theories proposed as pieces of traditional philosophy. Therefore, the theories on the restriction of individual freedom that are introduced by the cinematic pieces are unique philosophical contributions of these cinematic pieces since they use distinct cinematic elements to philosophize and theorize which go beyond the verbal language. Accordingly, cinematic philosophy is a distinct type of philosophy, and it is no less valuable than oral and written philosophy. Correspondingly, these cinematic pieces as cinematic philosophy pieces contribute unique theories which are no less eminent than the theories that are introduced as pieces of traditional philosophy which use traditional philosophy channels. Subsequently, these pieces' contribution grounds on the cinematic elements rather than the elements belonging to traditional philosophy. Consequently, *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138* and *Ex Machina* by philosophizing on and theorizing these precise types of restriction of individual freedom through the cinematic channel using the cinematic elements introduce a transformation of philosophy through its encounter with the cinematic channel. Eventually, these cinematic pieces propose each type of restriction of individual freedom as a unique philosophical theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Going back to the taxonomy that I introduced, if all conceptual elements are considered, there are four possibilities on the restriction of individual freedom and the last one is:

(4) *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*

The one crucial point that I emphasized in the second chapter, and I want to underline here again is that the contemporary literature on individual freedom, in conceptual terms, does not give a space for cognizant agents to be in the position of restricting their individual freedom. As another contribution of this research, I present this fourth type of restriction of individual freedom as the unique neglected type of restriction of individual freedom that is proposed by none of the a priori theories but solely by the *Nosedive* cinematic piece itself. Therefore, the type of restriction that *Nosedive* proposes is distinct from the other types of restrictions of individual freedom that are presented. This is precisely because the other types of restrictions that the other cinematic pieces introduce are somehow theorized through other channels of philosophy as I presented in the second chapter. Yet, the restriction that *Nosedive* presents, as I acknowledge, is completely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Thereupon, *Nosedive* not only proposes a unique theoretical contribution to the political philosophical scene by theorizing *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* through the cinematic channel using its cinematic elements as a piece of cinematic philosophy but also contributes to the philosophical theoretical scene this type of a restriction as a novel type of restriction of individual freedom. Hence, I acknowledge and propose this new type of restriction to be functioning through 'click consent' and this emphasis forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from the *Nosedive*. Subsequently, *Nosedive*, as a cinematic philosophy piece, by presenting this novel kind of restriction of individual freedom forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory which, in the next part, I will try to theorize as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

6.2 'Click Consent' Theory: Theorizing the Novel Type of Restriction of Individual Freedom through/by Technology as a Contribution of Cinematic Philosophy

In the previous chapters, I asserted that fictional narratives in the forms of imaginative constructions are philosophizing and are within the philosophical discourse and I associated these fictional constructions in the form of imaginary scenarios with the thought experiment which have the capacity to raise philosophical questions, challenge the existing perspectives by initiating philosophical reflections and by posing counter-arguments and

bolster a theory and especially or form the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007). Subsequently, to form the grounds of the theoretical contributions of *Nosedive* which are the emphasized novel type of restriction of individual freedom and the 'Click Consent' theory, I want to return back to the fictional constructions that I have proposed in the first and the fourth chapter in the form of an imaginary scenario as a thought experiment. It it as it goes:

Imagine that you are physically attached to someone who automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have. Imagine that this someone continually shares all these recordings with the public. Imagine that due to this exposure, you see a lot of people physically reaching out to you with the information that is recorded by this someone. Imagine that others constantly see you through these sharings and correspondingly you start to act inauthentically. For instance, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want other people to know that you are sad therefore you are acting as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have their physically attached someones' and you are continually receiving those other's recordings as well. Imagine that you receive recordings from others in which they all start to eat sand and respectively you start to eat sand. In this system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, personal choices, your characteristics, what your home is like, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you have access to the same referred things of the other individuals. Accordingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others concretely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to be attached to this physical being? I think you wouldn't. Also, could you say that you are free in this kind of a society? I think you couldn't because all things considered there is constant interference and domination from the other individuals through their physically attached someones' which forms the fundamental base of this system.

Now, let me alter some conditions of the proposed society. Let's remove the physicality part from this society and let's make it a digital one. Let's also make this physically attached someone to be your digital presence and let's think of the condition of freedom again. So, imagine a society where this attached physical presence is your digital presence which automatically records your actions and interactions that you do or you have. Accordingly, you are constantly exposed to the public. Imagine that as a consequence of this exposure you see a lot of people digitally reaching out to you with the information which is recorded by your digital presence. For instance, imagine that you are feeling sad but you do not want other people to know that you are sad so you are doing sharings as if you are happy. Imagine that all the other members of this society have a digital presence and you are continually receiving those other's recordings. Imagine that you receive recordings from others that they all start to eat sand and correspondingly you start to eat sand. In this

system, everybody knows or could know your personal information, personal choices, your characteristics, what your home is like, what you like or don't like to eat, what you like to or don't like to wear, what you like or don't like in general. Also, you know the same referred things of the other individuals. Accordingly, you tend to adapt yourself to others concretely because you are totally visible and do not want to look like an outsider. Would you choose to have a digital presence? Yes, you do and apparently most of the individuals do *choose* to have a digital presence through giving 'click consent' to these recordings, sharings, control, manipulation and surveillance. Can you say that you are free in this type of a society? Apparently, you can because you think that you are free but I think you can not because all things considered there is constant and continuous interference and domination from the others through their digital presence which forms the base of this system.

One crucial point here is that in the physically functioning society, these emphasized aspects experienced through the presence of the physically attached someone is acknowledged as a restriction of individual freedom. The priority reason for this is that individual freedom is intimately related to the physical presence of the body. Therefore, the restriction of individual freedom is intimately related to manipulation, control and surveillance of and interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is connected to their bodies. Subsequently, by redefining the individual as a data and as a digital presence, it can be affirmed that within the control societies ultimately cognizant and correspondingly free individuals restrict their individual freedoms, due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires, through their given 'consent' within these technologies. Yet, at the end cognizant individuals *choose* to restrict their individual freedom by exposing their digital presence which is no different than their physical presence. Thus, X internalizes these processes and even if she is acknowledged as cognizant, she restricts her individual freedom by ultimately free choices she makes within/through information and communication technologies. It is to say that cognizant X (X that fulfils the self-realization conditions of individual freedom proposed by the literature and X that is cognizant of the restrictive factors on her individual freedom) actively participates in the restriction of her individual freedom by *choosing* to give consent to and through these technologies. I endorse that *Nosedive* proposes this underlined emphasis as the grounds of the 'Click Consent' theory. In the upcoming parts of this chapter, I want to give more details on the 'Click Consent' theory that I derived from *Nosedive* as a contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Here above, I presented a fictional construction in the form of an imaginative exercise as a thought experiment and departing from this fictional construction, by changing some conditions of it, I attempted to present another fictional construction to emphasize an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom as a consequence of the intense use of and the intense exposure through/by the information and communication

technologies. Hence, I repeatedly use the word imagine concretely because I acknowledge fictional constructions to be a product of imagination which have the capacity to raise philosophically loaded questions and arguments that eventually lead to form the grounds of a theory (Wartenberg, 2007). Here, yet again, I want to highlight that cinematic pieces as a product of imagination are fictional constructions and are extended thought experiments. Therefore, cinematic pieces also have the capacity to formulate philosophically loaded questions and arguments that eventually lead to form the grounds of a theory. However, as I underlined previously, moving image fiction creates a new kind of a thought experiment using multiple channels to transfer the argument (Shamir, 2016). Accordingly, cinematic pieces with the experience that they present through their ontologically unique cinematic elements, which opens a door to go beyond the logical demonstration and discursive argumentation, propose new ways of thinking that seek to transform our understanding. Departing from this perception, *Nosedive* as a product of imagination is a fictional construction which has the capacity to raise philosophically loaded questions and arguments that eventually lead to form the grounds of a theory. Nonetheless, *Nosedive* introduces this theorizing as a new kind of a thought experiment since it reveals its theorizing through its cinematic experience by using its ontologically unique cinematic elements, which eventually leads to form the fundamental base of the referred novel type of restriction of individual freedom and also forms the fundamental base of the 'Click Consent' theory.

Here, before getting into the details of the theorizing that is presented by *Nosedive*, I want to focus on the grounds of the unique theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*. Thus, what I introduced in the first fictional construction above is the common basis of the journey that I proposed in the third chapter which is a journey starting with Heidegger's enframing that I coupled with Foucault's panopticism. Hence, this journey bases upon the critique of modern disciplinary power to be heavily dependent on the bodily presence of the individuals in which the loss of individual freedom is physically experienced and individual freedom is closely related to the physical presence of the body. Therefore, the restriction of individual freedom is closely related to manipulation, control and surveillance of and the interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals. This kind of an emphasis, as I acknowledge it, is not only theorized by the philosophers that I referred above but also is theorized by the cinematic pieces *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*. Hence, these cinematic pieces reveal the restriction of individual freedom to be experienced through manipulation, control and surveillance of and interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals. Respectively, the presence of the observer, as I introduced in the third chapter through Foucault's panopticism theory, as an external factor is considered either to make a cognizant/incognizant (in a sense that she is either cognizant or incognizant of the restrictions on individual freedom) agent to conform to the mentioned

mechanisms of power or as an internalized factor to make an incognizant agent (in a sense that she is not cognizant of these restrictions) to be controlled and/or manipulated. Hence, all of these consequences reveal distinct kinds of restriction of individual freedom which, as I already emphasized, are theorized by the a priori theories and by these three precise cinematic pieces as a unique contribution of cinematic philosophy.

However, in each proposed case, we can not acknowledge an agent to be cognizantly restricting her individual freedom due to internal factors. Therefore, it can be underlined that the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y) through/by technology* is not a consequence of panopticism acknowledged in the Foucauldian sense. Thus, this is the primary reason that I continue this journey that I have proposed in the third chapter with Deleuze's 'Control Society' because it presents a digital presence, as data doubles, which goes beyond the physical presence of the individuals. Accordingly, there is a novel type of enframing functioning by the digital presence of the individuals through deterritorialization and reterritorialization of their desires. However, the effects of this kind of an enframing does not primarily have consequences on the physical presence of the individuals. Therefore, this kind of an enframing that I endorse as functioning through the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of individuals' desires forms the fundamental base of this novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is solely theorized by *Nosedive* through its cinematic elements as a piece of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, *Nosedive* alters some conditions of the fictional construction that I presented in the beginning of this section to underline an overlooked novel type of restriction of individual freedom as a consequence of the intense use of and the intense exposure through/by the information and communication technologies.

The priority reason that I present these two fictional constructions is to underline that *Nosedive* is the cinematic piece which changes the conditions of the previous fictional construction, that I introduced above, by raising the question 'Would you choose to have a digital presence?' Then, it answers this question through its cinematic elements as 'Yes, you do and apparently most of the individuals do *choose* to have a digital presence through giving 'click consent' to these sharings, recordings, control, manipulation and surveillance due to some internal factors'. Then, yet again, it raises the question 'Can you say that you are free in this kind of society?' and it answers this question through its cinematic elements as 'The previous theories claim that you can because they consider the restriction of individual freedom to be practiced on the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is attached to their bodies. However, you can not' and *Nosedive* justifies its claim by revealing the 'Click Consent' theory through its cinematic experience by its cinematic elements. Subsequently, it goes beyond the a priori theorizing either proposed through

traditional philosophy channels or the cinematic philosophy channel. Subsequently, it goes beyond the theorizing which argues that the restriction of individual freedom is closely related to manipulation, control and surveillance of and interference to the physical body and the mind of the individuals which is attached to their bodies. This is precisely because *Nosedive* presents a society which solely functions through the digital presence of the individuals and which also functions through the digital dimension instead of a physical dimension. *Nosedive*, then, brings forth a motivation to go beyond the panopticism theory in order to grasp the more accurate reading of contemporary social complexity and precisely in order to propose the most encapsulating reading of the contemporary relationship between individual freedom and technology.

I endorse that this novel type of restriction of individual freedom is a consequence of the rise of information and communication technologies which goes beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality ground as it is seen in the theory of Foucault and in other theories of the contemporary philosophers. Yet, the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies revealed an alteration on the previously critical and negative perception towards modern technology due to the novel liberating aspects that these technologies ontologically introduced, liberating in a sense that these technologies function in the digital space which is beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality. This perception towards information and communication technologies reveals an overlooked aspect on the novel restrictive factors, parameters and actions of individual freedom experienced through/by information and communication technologies. Accordingly, *Nosedive* reveals that the contemporary conceptions of 'individual freedom', and the restrictive factors that these conceptions introduce have been rendered insufficient with the advent and the rise of information and communication technologies. The fundamental reason behind this idea is that the novel practices that are performed within/through these technologies are not acknowledged as restrictive factors of individual freedom due to, as I repeatedly emphasized, the ontologically liberating nature dedicated to these technologies, yet again liberating in a sense that these technologies function in the digital space which is beyond the technologies that have a spatial physicality. Therefore, the advent and use of the information and communication technologies initiates a necessity to revisit and redefine the X factor (the agent) and the Y factor (the restrictive conditions) of the formula that I presented in the first chapter. This necessity is, in my perception, overlooked by the contemporary political philosophical scene due to the change in the perception towards technology with the advent of information and communication technologies.

Nosedive by redefining the individual, the X, as a data and as a digital presence, discloses that within the control societies ultimately cognizant and respectively free individuals restrict their individual freedoms', due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization

of their desires, through their given 'consent' within/through the information and communication technologies. However, at the end cognizant individuals choose to restrict their individual freedom by exposing their digital presence which is no different than their physical presence. Thus, *Nosedive* presents this individual as precisely Lacie but also as the other participants of the social media platform internalizing these processes. Correspondingly, even if they are cognizant of the restrictive factors that they are exposed to due to their participation within the social media platform, they restrict their individual freedom by ultimately free choices they make within/through this social media platform. It is to say that cognizant X, Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform (X that fulfils the self-realization conditions of individual freedom proposed by the literature and X who is cognizant of the restrictive factors on her individual freedom) actively participates in the restriction of her individual freedom by choosing to give consent to and through this social media platform which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory. Eventually, this novel type of restriction of individual freedom and this proposed 'Click Consent' theory, then, is a unique contribution of *Nosedive* as a piece of cinematic philosophy.

As I already emphasized in the third chapter, I relate this kind of a restriction to Deleuze's 'Control Society' theory and Deleuze and Guattari's account of 'Desire'. Accordingly, I acknowledge *Nosedive*, as a cinematic philosophy piece, to uniquely theorize this emphasis through its cinematic experience by using its cinematic elements. Therefore, I, as a cinematic philosopher, reveal that this type of restriction of individual freedom which forms the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory is the unique theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*. Hence, *Nosedive*, departing from the linkage above, discloses this type of restriction of individual freedom, the *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*, to be a consequence of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of desires belonging to the desiring machines, shaped by the power processes, experienced and practiced within the control societies through/by information and communication technologies (Erol, 2020). Hence, within the control societies ultimately cognizant and correspondingly free individuals restrict their individual freedoms, due to deterritorialization and reterritorialization of desires, through their given 'consent' within these technologies. Departing from this emphasis, I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from the *Nosedive* episode, the 'Click Consent' theory which is:

'Click Consent' theory: Any action taken within/through information and communication technologies grounded on the consent of individuals is not considered as a restriction of individual freedom. However, due to the non-oppressive and non-imposed territorialization of desires, as internal factors, in

the 'Control Societies', cognizant agents restrict their individual freedoms' through/by their freely given and their choice-based 'click' consents.

Here, I want to give more details on this 'Click Consent' theory and on the grounds of this theory. Hence, in order to propose the 'Click Consent' theory, I tried to integrate the theories on 'consent' and 'clicking'. Hence, the contemporary debates on the theory of consent are mostly based upon the understanding that "Consent makes otherwise (pro tanto) prohibited acts (pro tanto) permitted, removing the wrongfulness (in the relevant respect) of acts that would otherwise constitute wrongings" (Koch, 2018, 37). This kind of an emphasis regarding the issue of consent is underlined by many thinkers within the literature from different academic fields (Thomson, 1992; Wellman, 1997; Westen, 2004; Shiffrin, 2008; Watson, 2009; Dougherty, 2015; Schaber, 2016). Thus, departing from the accentuation above it can be derived that consent has a kind of magic that can turn an exploitive act into a non-exploitive one (Hurd, 1996). Correspondingly, as John Kleinig underlines "consent can sometimes function like a proprietary gate that one opens to allow another's access, access that would be impermissible absent the act of voluntarily opening the gate" (Kleinig, 2010, 4). Thus, I integrate 'clicking' to the 'Click Consent' theory that I propose by asserting that 'clicking' is the key to this proprietary gate. In other words, all the actions within information and communication technologies set off with the action of *clicking*. Hence, there are theories that focus on the significance of *clicking* as an online form of participation which employ concepts of 'Slacktivism' (Morozov, 2012; Tiidenberg & Allaste, 2016), 'Clickism' (Amin, 2010; Tiidenberg & Allaste, 2016), etc.,. However, in this research, I intend to differentiate 'Click Consent' from these theories by acknowledging the significance of clicking through its functioning as a validation of the *given consent* within these technologies which, as I assert, is a restrictive element of individual freedom.

As I already underlined in the previous chapters, for many philosophers the technological innovations that information and communication technologies brought to contemporary societies fundamentally change the organization, practice and effects of power, control and surveillance relationships. Subsequently, *Nosedive* proposes a necessity to surpass Foucault's panopticism. Therefore, it reveals a cinematic experience which grounds on how surveillance and control is functioning within the digital technologies and how this kind of functioning restricts the freedom of the (cognizant) individuals. *Nosedive* affirms with its cinematic experience that the mechanisms of control are no longer confined to the institutional work of standardization of the bodies through knowledge and power. Thus, these mechanisms do not inhabit a material/physical space but a digital space that is not dependent on the body of the individuals but dependent on the digital presence of the individuals. Correspondingly, there is a shift from discipline societies which function through

the power relying on enclosures be they material, cultural or psychical to control societies which function through the power relying on the precise digital mobility of the individuals. *Nosedive*, as I have emphasized in the previous chapter through the close reading of it, presents a society which solely functions through a social media platform in which individuals are primarily digital presences and their value as a human being solely depends on the value of their digital presence. Therefore, “In contrast to disciplinary societies (which were ruled by ‘signatures’ and ‘numbers’), the “digital language of control is made up of codes indicating whether access to some information should be allowed or denied.” (Schleusener, 2018, 182). The crucial point here is the shift from the signatures or numbers to codes. Subsequently, what *Nosedive* asserts is that with the numerical language of control the individual bodies become information that is marked by codes which dissolves the mass-individual pair. Therefore, in the societies of control individuals by doubling as a code and as an information become ‘dividuals’. Accordingly, individuals have become ‘dividuals’ and masses, samples, data, markets or ‘banks’ (Deleuze, 1995).

Within control societies the panoptic gaze does not function and operate through seeing but through the mode of ordering information. Parallel to this, in the control societies the surveillance apparatus does not operate through the bodies or minds but through the information about the bodies and the minds. Correspondingly, the object of control is the digital representation of the body (Schleusener, 2018). Thus, *Nosedive* by dismantling from the control mechanisms that function through the body of the individuals reveals new kinds of freedoms which emerge as a consequence of the advent of information and communication technologies, and which introduce the kind of practices that the individuals freely choose to participate in. Hence, *Nosedive* presents these kinds of freedoms to serve for the mechanisms of control themselves through the willing participation of Lacie and the other individuals within/through the social media platform. Therefore, the one crucial defining condition inherent to the society that *Nosedive* proposes is the willing participation of the surveilled individual. Accordingly, as Poster emphasizes:

The unwanted surveillance of personal choice becomes a discursive reality through the willing participation of the surveilled individual...The one being surveilled provides the information necessary for surveillance. No carefully designed edifice is needed, no science such as criminology is employed, and no complex administrative apparatus is invoked... surveillance is assured when the act of the individual is communicated by telephone line to the computerized database... a gigantic and sleek operation is effected whose political force of surveillance is occluded in the willing participation of the victim. (Poster, 1995, 86-87)

The underlined significance of the willing participation of the individuals in the digital space couples control with two interrelated actions. The primary action exercised by the individuals is to choose whether to provide or deny sharing their data and the following action is, if shared, exploitation of this data. Therefore, control societies function through capturing the desire of the individuals’.

Nosedive reveals this kind of an emphasis, as generating new forms of surveillance, which go beyond panopticism and which ground on the active and freely chosen participation of the individuals. Hence, *Nosedive* presents this constant surveillance and control to function through the independent choices of individuals themselves. Respectively, the surveillance and control system that *Nosedive* proposes is without walls, windows, towers or guards. Subsequently, in *Nosedive* the ‘voluntary’ surrender of privacy is performed by primarily Lacie and by the other participants of the social media platform who ‘publicly’ share their ‘private’ data, experiences, preferences, and particularities (Schleusener, 2018, 177). Therefore, *Nosedive* introduces a different kind of a restriction of individual freedom which emerges by the free choice based actions of the participants of this social media platform. This is so as to say, the restriction of individual freedom within *Nosedive* functions through the interiority of the individuals themselves by free and choice-based actions that they practice. Accordingly, in *Nosedive* the participants of the digital media platform are apparently liberated and released into a smooth space of boundless movement which extends along an endless wave of searches, agreements, purchases of choices. Thereupon, as Flaxman states:

At first glance, naturally, control seems to offer the space in which to exercise limitless freedom. Control aspires to what we might think of as an open-floor plan: control promotes circulation, inducing the movements with which freedom itself is increasingly identified – as the right to choose, to be oneself, an individual apart from all others. (Flaxman, 2018, 126-127)

The fundamental question here is how the mentioned control functions within the social media platform ruled society that *Nosedive* presents and the answer is that the control functions through Lacie and other participants of this social media platform becoming legible by their participation within this platform.

The cinematic piece exposes this participation as a consequence of the territorialized desires of the individuals. Respectively, the cinematic piece discloses these territorialized desires as an obsession on perfecting the digital presence which is grounded on the total visibility of the individuals. Thus, this desire of total visibility, presented within the cinematic experience, makes the control and the surveillance to become so integrated to the pleasures

of the individuals that individuals accept this kind of a control with open arms. Therefore, although the participants of this social media platform and precisely Lacie, are ambiguously aware of the ways in which their unavoidable digital existence makes it possible to constantly and continuously monitor, profile and mine their behaviour and desires, the sensual pleasures of the new digital age along with the stimulating distractions side-tracks the participants from this fact (Harcourt, 2015). This is concretely because “coercive surveillance technology is now woven into the very fabric of our pleasure and fantasies’, it has become impossible, today, to separate between pleasure and punish (Harcourt 2015: 21)” (Beckman, 2018, 12). Respectively, *Nosedive* presents a society in which the obsession towards the digital presence and perfecting the digital presence shape the exposed, watched, recorded, predicted individual’s subjectivity (Harcourt, 2015). Thus, *Nosedive* proposes the individual’s inability to control the intimate information to be based upon the constant craving that they dedicate to their ratings and other participant’s ratings of their sharings within the social media platform which eventually defines the conception of their selves. Therefore, the participants of the digital media platform are actually deeply embedded selves who are shaped by this new digital technology. As Harcourt affirms:

We are deeply invested— with “investments of desire,” as Deleuze suggested— and these investments need to be explored. “We never desire against our interests,” Deleuze explained, “because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it... That it shapes and produces desires locked onto other desiring machines. Those other machines, we know them well today. We are glued to them. Inseparable. And we give ourselves up to them—in the process, giving ourselves away. This may also help to explain the self-destructive nature of some of the digital cravings... We desire those digital spaces, those virtual experiences, all those electronic gadgets— and we have become, slowly but surely, slaves to them. Slaves to them and to our desires, our desires for shares, clicks, friends, and “likes. (Harcourt, 2015, 228)

The one crucial point here is that this kind of slavery that is highlighted above and that is presented by *Nosedive* bases upon the choice-based actions of the individuals practiced as an expression of their liberated-selves. Respectively, the process of broader trend of control and surveillance within *Nosedive* goes as follows: The human bodies are abstracted from their material settings and are separated into a series of distinct flows. Then, these flows are reconciled into discrete ‘data doubles’ which are legitimately open to control, surveillance and intervention (Harcourt, 2015). This clarified process ontologically starts when Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform voluntarily cede their individual privacy, expose their intimate lives and give up their personal data. All in all, individuals, as

participants of this social media platform, voluntarily restrict their individual freedom through renouncing their informational privacy and informational self-determination within this social media platform ruled society.

As I constantly emphasized, *Nosedive* presents this restriction as a novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is the *restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)*. The agents in question are considered as ultimately cognizant since they are in a space that they could experience their unique-selves in any ways that they want and since they are cognizant of the restrictive parameters on their individual freedom as a consequence of their participation within this social media platform. In other words, unlike the other restrictive types of individual freedom proposed by the other cinematic pieces, in this type introduced by *Nosedive* there is no such manipulation triggered by any external and internal factors that can incognizantly manipulate or interfere with the individuals. Therefore, even if individuals are cognizant of the restrictive factors on their individual freedom, they *choose* to continue participating within this social media platform due to some parameters.

The question, then, arises as what are those parameters? In this new type of restriction of individual freedom that *Nosedive* proposes, these parameters are presented as the *internal factors*. As I emphasized previously, *Nosedive* reveals these internal factors to be a reflection of the territorialized desires. Parallel to Deleuze's underlining of the human actors in control societies participating in the mechanisms of control themselves by constantly participating within these technologies, *Nosedive* introduces a society in which the individuals are in a constant engagement through their digital presences and this constant engagement creates complete visibility which bolsters the loss of individual freedom. The one essential point is that the complete visibility here is not to ensure complete control by the external agents as in Foucault's panopticism but rather it is Lacie's and other participant's own deepest desires which guides the free actions of them. Thereupon unlike the panoptic society in which bodies are subjectified and controlled by the power processes, in *Nosedive* which functions through the digital presences, individuals willingly participate in the subjectification and control in order to make their beings meaningful. This process functions as the deterritorialization of the meanings in order to be reduced into the constantly and flowingly occurring gaze.

However, the surveillance and gaze are distinct from each other in a sense that the gaze mentioned here attributes a practice by which the deterritorialized desires are located into the coded identities through/by capturing these desires and denominating them. Hence, this is the reterritorialization process which functions as primarily separating desires from being and then locating them in another context. This kind of a reterritorialization process is exercised by the modulative forces of the society which sets up a subjectification process in

which individuals make these forces to be the subjects by operating the gaze. (Basturk, 2017). Hence, “the gaze, here marks a process which correlates the desires and codes; and post panoptic power works by creating and demonstrating these codes to people in order to modulate them with these codes.” (Basturk, 2017, 12). Correspondingly, in *Nosedive*, Lacie and the other participants of the social media platform perceive their value through revealing their desires as being in the very focus of the gaze and these desires are constantly modulated with constantly altering codes. Therefore, Lacie and the other participants of the social media platform perceive visibility through this social media platform as a desire for the proof of their being. This kind of a recognition triggers a kind of surveillance that no longer represents a power technique belonging to governmental reason but represents a power technique which is an individual practice of daily life that grounds on the continuation of observing (Mathiesen, 1997). Thus, “this form of power is faster and freer – it does not depend on institutions and on moulding individuals according to their norms, but on the constant modulation and coding of affects and desires” (Beckman, 2018, 4). Respectively, *Nosedive*’s individuals, parallel to Deleuze’s ‘dividuals’, as parts of selves, affects, desires which are identified, addressed and controlled by means of samples and data, actively participate in this continuous system of modulation (Beckman, 2018). Accordingly, as *Nosedive* proposes, desire comes first and structures all relations and desire, assembled from the social field, disseminates power relations. Respectively, control occurs in all facets of *Nosedive*’s society through the active participation of the participants within this social media platform and through the collective desire for more freedom which leads to dispersed but extensive forms of control (Gilge, 2015).

Departing from this line of assertion, *Nosedive*, through its cinematic experience by using its cinematic elements, raises the question: Why do individuals desire to restrict their individual freedom through/by their active participation within this social media platform? Yet again, as a cinematic philosopher my role here is to reveal the theorizing that *Nosedive* proposes as a piece of cinematic philosophy and I reveal this theorizing to have commonalities with Deleuze’s ‘Control Society’ theory and Deleuze and Guattari’s account of ‘Desire’. Therefore, I propose *Nosedive*’s answer to the question above with reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s account of desire in a sense that:

For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a production of the assemblage of ‘machines’ created by a ‘factory’ of the unconscious. By this, they mean that desire is a force that motivates behaviour through a consciousness that is shaped by the drives, motives and inclinations of the unconscious, with the unconscious itself under a constant process of rearrangement determined by relations between the ‘machines’ of desire within a capitalist society (Özpolat, 2018). Desire, for Deleuze, is a kind of

vital force which functionally organises a complex arrangement of elements such as objects, bodies and experiences (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000; 2005). (Erol, 2020, 573)

Respectively, Deleuze and Guattari highlight that desires motivate and animate behavior. Therefore, they precisely scrutinize how control societies which function through a constant process of rearrangements transform desires to interests and actions (Kozinets et al., 2016). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's account of desire focuses on the desire itself, and on its blockages, flows and transmutation into interests and actions (Kozinets et al., 2016) which is closely related to connections and disconnections, a continuous system of modulations. Accordingly, desire operates by connecting things into the system and through this connection the energy of desire flows. Hence, this flow of connections and disconnections functions through the desiring machines which encompass actual machines such as "smartphones, software programs, and tablet computers as well as human bodies, animals, and plants—each hungers to connect or disconnect in different ways with other desiring-machines and thus exchange flows of energy" (Kozinets et al., 2016, 662). Thus, these machines by constantly coupling with each other forms a kind of a whole which "interconnects with other networks into a larger (social, institutional, cultural) open complex system" (Kozinets et al., 2016, 662).

Here, I want to underline that *Nosedive*, as a piece of cinematic philosophy, uniquely proposes, uniquely because it uses the cinematic elements to philosophize and theorize, Lacie and the other participants of the social media platform as hungering to connect or disconnect in different ways with other participants of this platform. Respectively, Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform are a digital presence and they, as a digital presence, create a type of a whole which forms an open complex system that leads to the restriction of individual freedom. Hence, this kind of an asserted complex system that *Nosedive* proposes consists of the participating individuals, as digital presences, and it functions through the desires connected to these participants through 'territories'. Thus, according to Deleuze and Guattari these territories are unfixed spaces assembled through the continuous process of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization (Erol, 2020). These indicated processes are the power processes through which the participants of this social media platform, as digital presences, connect and disconnect assembling a continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (De Souza-Leao & Costa, 2018). As *Nosedive* reveals it, it is through these processes that the power interiorizes itself within the individuals and correspondingly subjectivities of each participant of this social media platform are produced by another's production of products, with desire displaying itself through a productive unconscious regulated by connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972 [1983]; Erol, 2020).

Nosedive reveals this referred kind of subjectivity as one of the fundamental grounds of the restrictive actions of individual freedom within the context of this social media ruled society. However, unlike the panoptic societies which function through the docile subjects that it produces, the society that *Nosedive* proposes functions through individuals expressing their desires (Basturk, 2017). This type of an expression of desires and of pure individuality is the primary source of the continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Respectively, these power processes function through capturing the impulsion inside of Lacie and other participants of this social media platform. Hence, these processes operate “by capturing the desire (potential form of being) and re-nominate it to another plane” (Basturk, 2017, 6). Therefore, power becomes an extension of the individual impulsions which is manifested precisely through Lacie’s obsession towards her social media rating and through her obsession towards perfecting her social media rating. With reference to this accentuation *Nosedive* through its cinematic experience reveals that the power is not external to the subjects but is rooted on the internal (Deleuze, 1988b). Consequently, the society that *Nosedive* introduces function through handling of this power by the deterritorialization of the desires and reterritorialization of these desires within the continuous system of modulations.

In short, *Nosedive*’s social media platform ruled society’s primary functioning force is the individuals themselves and their desires. Accordingly, in *Nosedive* these processes function through the individuals’ choices as a reflection of these desires. Therefore, choices in matters of impulsions are at the crossroads of vibrations which signifies that these choices are consequences of connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions of flows that cross through this social media platform ruled society. As *Nosedive* blatantly manifests, this kind of functioning includes an inner repression of desire which lies beneath the surface of individual psyches, as it is manifested through the filtered actions and reactions of primarily of Lacie and of the other participants of this social media platform which eventually leads to a loss of individual freedom. Respectively, the participants of this social media platform are deeply invested with the investments of desire and their interests are shaped by their desires. Consequently, these participants never desire against their interests (Harcourt, 2015). Thus, the desires of these desiring machines are produced, formed and invested by the digital technologies (Erol, 2020). Nonetheless, within the context of this social media platform, the participants are constantly programmed in advance which assigns control to be extremely subtle that it may present itself in the form of an independent ‘choice’. Therefore, the desire to be watched, to be recorded, to be predicted, to be exposed is a consequence of this kind of a choice which is triggered by the constant attention dedicated to ratings and rankings, to number of likes, shares and comments (Harcourt, 2015). “In this regard, the desire to become all-seeing, all-knowing (Eggers, 2014, 71)—the impulse to constantly

'check everything,' from emails and social media" (Schleusener, 2018, 194) can also be interpreted as symptomatic of the loss of individual freedom" (Erol, 2020, 573-574). The fundamental point here is that *Nosedive* proposes these choice-based actions to be practiced by the willing participation of the individuals which leads to a kind of control emerging as an immanent process of rechannelling of turbulent flows. This is a novel type of control that leads to a loss of individual freedom. Thus, this kind of a loss of individual freedom is distinct from the other types of restriction of individual freedom that the other cinematic pieces propose precisely because as *Nosedive* proposes it, Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform are cognizant of this kind of a loss, but they still choose to actively participate in the process of this loss due to the underlined internal factors related to desires. Consequently, *Nosedive* introduces *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents(X) by internal factors(Y)* as a novel type of restriction of individual freedom emerged as a consequence of the advent and use of the information and communication technologies and it introduces this new type of restriction to be functioning through the 'click consent' of the individuals which forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory which I, as a cinematic philosopher, derive from *Nosedive* as a theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Here, I want to underline that the essential element of this novel type of a restriction of individual freedom is the 'click consent' of the individuals. Thus, cognizant agents freely choose to violate their individual freedom and this kind of a violation is practiced through the given 'consent' of the individuals. In other words, the fundamental way to practice individual freedom within the domain of information and communication technologies is to give or to withhold 'consent' to certain forms of data processing. Accordingly, it can be asserted that individuals choose to violate their individual freedom by cognizantly choosing to give their 'consents' to, within and through these technologies. Therefore, the magical gate to this novel type of restriction of individual freedom within the domain of information and communication technologies is a novel type of consent, as I call it '*Click Consent*'. The precise reason to call this type of a consent as 'Click Consent' is that all the actions within information and communication technologies set off with the action of *clicking*. Thus, in this research, I intend to differentiate 'Click Consent' from the previous theories by acknowledging the significance of clicking through its functioning as a validation of the given consent within these technologies which, as I assert, is a restrictive element of individual freedom. Accordingly, here, I want to focus on the fundamental significance of consent within the scope of information and communication technologies.

The term 'consent' is defined as a verb meaning to agree and to give permission. The same word is defined as a noun meaning voluntary agreement (Illustrated Oxford dictionary, 1998). Even the field-specific accounts of consent agree on the core meaning of

the word (McConnell, 2018). Thus, a distinguished legal dictionary defines consent as “agreement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose esp. given voluntarily by a competent person” (Garner & Black, 2009, 346). One fundamental characteristic of consent is that it involves a relationship between at least two agents: the consent giver and the consent receiver. The contemporary debates on the theory of consent revolves around the perception that “consent makes otherwise (pro tanto) prohibited acts (pro tanto) permitted, removing the wrongfulness (in the relevant respect) of acts that would otherwise constitute wrongings” (Koch, 2018, 37). Here, the crucial point is that if an individual consents, then, there is no wrongdoing. Correspondingly, it can be affirmed from this perspective that an individual who consents cannot be exploited. For example, if an individual gives consent to a particular X, then this individual does not have a right to complain, even if the consequence of this consent giving causes harm that would otherwise give rise to a moral or legal claim against the injurer (Hurd, 2018). Respectively, consent has a kind of magic that can turn an exploitive act into a non-exploitive one (Hurd, 1996). So as to say, as John Kleinig states “consent can sometimes function like a proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s access, access that would be impermissible absent the act of voluntarily opening the gate” (Kleinig, 2010, 4).

Nosedive blatantly introduces this kind of an underlining through Lacie and the other participants of the social media platform constantly, voluntarily and obsessively clicking to consent within this platform and this clicking eventually allows access to all of the other participants of this platform. Thus, the sole responsibility of this allowance belongs to the participants of this social media platform. Respectively, this kind of an emphasis situates the consenting participants to have the sole responsibility on the consequences of their given consent(s). Therefore, participants must be aware of what they are consenting for and the consequences that this given consent can cause or bring about. Hence, the literature base upon the theory of consent which is aware of the significance of the consent giver, underlines some necessary conditions for a consent to be valid. These necessary conditions are that the given consent must be intentional and must be voluntary (Beauchamp, 2005; Walker, 2018). Besides, the consent giver must have sufficient understanding of what is involved and must be informed (Beauchamp, 2005; Walker, 2018). All the referred conditions met, the given consent is acknowledged as autonomous and free enough to legitimize or justify the consequences it produces (Guillarme, 2012).

Here, this accentuation is really crucial for this research. Hence, consent is essentially considered to have a central role in safeguarding individual freedom. As I have, in detail, underlined in the second chapter, individual freedom is closely related to individual self-rule and accordingly is related to the absence of any coercion coming from an external agent. If we apply this inference to the consent rhetoric, it can be affirmed that if a competent

individual in an informed manner voluntarily and intentionally gives her consent to a X (can be an agent or an action), this consent giving action is considered to be a reflection of the individual self-rule. Correspondingly, if an individual gives her consent to a X (can be an agent or an action), then X by default is considered as non-coercive which means that the given consent ensures individual freedom in a sense that it transforms the coercion coming from the X to be non-coercive. Respectively, many theorists underline to pay a detailed scrutiny on the fulfilment of the necessary conditions of a valid consent such as the consent giver must be competent, must have sufficient understanding of what is involved and must be informed. What's more, consent must be given voluntarily and intentionally (Beauchamp, 2005; Walker, 2018). Departing from these emphasis, *Nosedive*, proposes Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform as fulfilling the necessary conditions of a valid consent since they are competent, have sufficient understanding of what is involved and are informed. However, one fundamental difference of the consent given within this social media platform from the consent given within the physical/material world is that the one given within this social media platform is by default accepted as valid since the participants are considered as fulfilling the necessary conditions above. Accordingly, the careful scrutinization of the necessary conditions of a valid consent belonging to a non-digital era loses its significance. The primary reason behind this inference is that this social media network that *Nosedive* proposes primarily functions through the 'Click Consent' of the individuals. In practical manners, as soon as Lacie and the other participants of this social media platform give their consent through clicking, then, the given consent becomes valid without the exhaustive consideration of the necessary conditions of a valid consent.

Here, what I try to emphasize is that any action taken within/through information and communication technologies are not considered as a restriction of individual freedom precisely because these actions grounded on the valid consent of the individuals, valid in a sense that the individuals as the consent givers are competent, are informed and have sufficient understanding of the consequences that their given consent brings. This emphasis concretely bases upon the consideration of the individuals within the scope of information and communication technologies to be abstracted from their material settings and to be separated into a series of distinct flows which are reconciled into discrete 'data doubles'. Accordingly, these data doubles as digital presences, if and only if they are competent, are informed and have sufficient understanding of the consequences that their given consent brings, are considered as free individuals who are not exposed to any restriction of individual freedom due to any internal or external factors. Subsequently, all things considered, the protection and practice of individual freedom within the context of information and communication technologies fundamentally and primarily depend on the actions of the individuals. As an extension of this inference, if an individual gives her 'click consent' to,

through and within these technologies, this action is acknowledged as a reflection of individual freedom. However, *Nosedive* proposes this referred action as the grounds of the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which is that the cognizant individuals restrict their individual freedom due to the internal factors as a reflection of their desires by the 'click consent' that they choose to give to/through these technologies even if they are competent, are informed and have sufficient understanding of the consequences that their given consent brings. Accordingly, this revelation of *Nosedive* forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that it discloses through its cinematic experience by using its cinematic elements which is yet again:

'Click Consent' theory: Any action taken within/through information and communication technologies grounded on the consent of individuals is not considered as a restriction of individual freedom. However, due to the non-oppressive and non-imposed territorialization of desires, as internal factors, in the 'Control Societies', cognizant agents restrict their individual freedoms' through/by their freely given and their choice-based 'click' consents.

Consequently, in this thesis and also in this chapter, with the motivation of considering cinematic pieces to be acknowledged as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to propose philosophical conceptions and theories, I suggest cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces introduce inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom: *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y); Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y); Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y); Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)* as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, the restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*. The restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *external factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *THX 1138*. The restriction of individual freedom of *incognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Ex Machina* and, eventually, the restriction of individual freedom of *cognizant agents(X)* by *internal factors(Y)* through/by technology is a theoretical contribution of *Nosedive*. Also, *Nosedive's* contribution, as a contribution of cinematic philosophy, is solely theorized by the cinematic piece itself since the restriction type that it proposes is a novel type of restriction of individual freedom, which, as I assert, is solely overlooked by the political philosophical scene. Hence, this new type of restriction functions through the 'click consent' of the

individuals which forms the base of the 'Click Consent' theory that I derive from *Nosedive* cinematic piece. Consequently, in this chapter, as a contribution of this research, first of all, I tried to theorize the inductively established three types of restriction of individual freedom as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy and, besides, I tried to theorize, also inductively established, novel type of restriction of individual freedom along with the 'Click Consent' theory that I, as a cinematic philosopher, extracted from *Nosedive* as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

The foundation of this research grounds on if and if yes how cinematic pieces can philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a contribution of cinematic philosophy. Departing from these grounds to test the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, I tried to introduce an inclusive relational formulation in order to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements on the restriction of individual freedom. Consequently, I situated contemporary distinct individual freedom conceptions within this organizational scheme with reference to the restrictive defining conditions that they propose. Departing from this organizational scheme, I introduced inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom and I offered one of the types of the restriction of individual freedom as a new overlooked type of a restriction, overlooked as a consequence of the novel parameters and practices that come into being due to the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies which I eventually acknowledge as triggering this new kind of restriction of individual freedom. Correspondingly, with the motivation of considering cinematic pieces as philosophical pieces which have the capacity to introduce philosophical conceptions and theories, I suggested cinematic philosophy as a novel channel of philosophy in which the cinematic pieces, ontologically, propose each type of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a unique philosophical contribution of cinematic philosophy to the political philosophical scene. Eventually, following the philosophical methodology, I applied the close reading analysis to test and to reveal the philosophizing and the theorizing that the selected cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) present. Subsequently, I conclude that the proposed three types of restriction of individual freedom along with the novel type of restriction of individual freedom which forms

the ground of the 'Click Consent' theory are unique theoretical contributions of the precise cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy.

I want to share my personal remarks before broadly underlining the academic and practical contributions of my research along with the limitations and further research suggestions that this research nominates. Hence, before starting this research, I had two floating urges. One was somehow to test and prove the capacity of the cinematic pieces to uniquely philosophize and theorize through the cinematic channel using the cinematic elements. The other was somehow to underline the novel actions that are practiced within information and communication technologies bringing about a novel kind of restriction of individual freedom that comes into being through/by cognizant individuals' freely given and choice-based consents that they provide through clicking. Thus, in this research, I tried to transfer these floating urges to established solid academic grounds. Respectively, I tried to give a detailed look to the existing literature and tried to go beyond it by following these urges that I have which I objectified within my research. Subsequently, I believe that these floating urges that are being transferred into established solid academic grounds adds novel perspectives to the academia world along with the world outside of academia. Here, yet again, I want to broadly underline these novel perspectives as the original contributions of this research while sharing the concluding remarks of my thesis.

In this research, I depart from the existing literature which grounds on the relationship between film and philosophy and precisely on the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and I tried to contribute to the existing literature by uniquely going beyond it. Correspondingly, I have introduced 'Cinematic Philosophy' as a novel channel of philosophy which goes beyond the existing literature by liberating philosophy from our linguistically structured perception. Respectively, it can be claimed that cinematic pieces introduce, create and manifest ideas and concepts as cinematic experiences through the cinematic language which is composed of macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements. Accordingly, the cinematic philosophy that is endorsed in this thesis proposes cinematic pieces as a process of cinematic thinking that positively contribute arguments and ideas not yet thinkable by the traditional philosophy alone just because of the ontological nature of a novel kind of thinking that the cinematic pieces present. Therefore, the cinematic philosophy that is asserted in this thesis is an original contribution of this research in a sense that the cinematic channel is no longer a channel that serves for a priori theories but a channel by itself to propose unique theories and a channel which uniquely contributes to the political philosophical scene.

Since the scope of this research is set on the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and precisely on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology, I, departing from the existing

literature, introduced an inductively established relational formulation on the restriction of individual freedom. Hence, the aim of this proposal was to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements of the restriction of individual freedom. Correspondingly, departing from this organizational scheme, I proposed inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom so that I can test the capacity of the chosen cinematic pieces to propose each of these types of restriction as a unique theoretical contribution of cinematic philosophy. Therefore, one of the other original contributions of this research is the inductively established three types of restriction of individual freedom (*Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by external factors(Y)*; *Restriction of individual freedom of incognizant X by internal factors(Y)*) along with a novel type of restriction of individual freedom (*Restriction of individual freedom of cognizant X by internal factors(Y)*) which is triggered due to the novel practices that come into being because of the advent and rise of the information and communication technologies. Thus, I, by offering these inductively established four types of restriction of individual freedom, contribute to the political philosophy scene a novel and encapsulating theoretical model regarding the latest changes and challenges within the society in effect of individual freedom.

As I constantly underlined throughout this thesis, I consider these four types of restriction of individual freedom to be solely theorized by the cinematic pieces that I have chosen as pieces of cinematic philosophy. What I also constantly underlined throughout this thesis is that the fourth type of restriction of individual freedom which is *the restriction of individual freedom of cognizant agents (X) by internal factors (Y)* is a novel neglected type of restriction of individual freedom. Hence, in this thesis it is endorsed that this kind of a restriction of individual freedom forms the grounds of the 'Click Consent' theory that is derived from one of the chosen cinematic pieces (*Nosedive*). Therefore, this novel type of restriction of individual freedom and the 'Click Consent' theory which is that '*Any action taken within/through information and communication technologies grounded on the consent of individuals is not considered as a restriction of individual freedom. However, due to the non-oppressive and non-imposed territorialization of desires, as internal factors, in the 'Control Societies', cognizant agents restrict their individual freedoms' through/by their freely given and their choice-based 'click' consents*' are also the original contributions of this research which raises awareness on the significance and problematic of consent given by clicking through/within the information and communication technologies.

Until now, I have tried to underline the academic contributions of this research and now I want to highlight the practical contributions that my thesis presents. I think, at this point, I can highlight two significant practical contributions of my research. The first one is that this research by persistently underlining the significance and the problematic of the click

consent based actions of the individuals on individual freedom, raises awareness on how crucial it is to be considerate while taking action within information and communication technologies. This eventually triggers another practical contribution which is to raise awareness on the contemporary consequences of the predominance of these technologies which adds another layer to human beings. Hence, this layer is 'data beings'. This research by underlining this layer practically contributes to contemporary societies to raise awareness on the significance of individual actions, as data beings, on individual freedom within/through information and communication technologies. Eventually, these contributions may alter individual's surrendering attitudes towards information and communication technologies.

One other significant practical contribution of my research is the fundamental grounds of this thesis which is the capacity of the cinematic pieces to provide novel aspects through a novel channel of philosophizing and philosophy. Thus, the practicality of this contribution is to alter the perception towards the capacity of the cinematic pieces which could assign the cinematic channel to be considered as a channel to offer critical aspects on the issues related to the practical lives of the individuals. Thus, individuals with this consideration can be illuminated through/by the cinematic pieces (as they can be through a written work of any kind) which can practically lead to an attitude change towards the illuminated issues. Hence, departing from this generalization, as this research underlines, individuals can alter their attitudes towards technology and precisely towards information and communication technologies through the experience of the chosen cinematic pieces which ontologically presents four different types of restriction of individual freedom through/by technology.

At this point, I want to emphasize the limitations of my research. First of all, I want to underline that this research, in general, is speculative by nature in a sense that what I try to conduct within this research is to offer my own theoretical reading of the contemporary reality grounded on the relationship between individual freedom and technology. In order to offer my own reading along with offering my own theoretical model on the restriction of individual freedom and in order to establish my research onto solid academic grounds, I have tried to include precise theories that are serving for the objectives of my thesis. Accordingly, in every part of this research, I have included some theories and excluded some theories which I consider as a limitation of my research. However, in these mentioned each and every part, I tried to encapsulate most of the theoretical aspects in order to mitigate this limitation.

This speculative nature is also present in the analysis that is applied to test the hypotheses. Thus, the close reading technique that is applied, as I have already underlined, is strongly inductive and speculative in nature. Therefore, it assigns a kind of an individuality which is manifested through my precise decisions that are circumscribed by my reading of

the microstructural and macrostructural cinematic elements of the cinematic pieces. Hence, each step in the process of analysing a piece belonging to a complex medium, in this research it is the cinematic medium, involves translation which consists of precise decisions and choices. Therefore, “there will always be viable alternatives to the choices made, and what is left out is as important as what is present” (Rose, 2008, 343). Correspondingly, this highlighted individuality, as stated:

Leaves the interpretation, claim, or account open to dispute by other readers or scholars. At the same time, however, the grounding in personal observation and experience opens the possibility of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences... And, along with connections to broader intellectual issues and other concerns, that grounding and that attendant possibility—of shareable insights and of connection to shareable experiences—are also what sustain the value of much historical and theoretical research in the humanities as such. (Smith, 2016, 68-69)

Yet, as I have already emphasized, I situate myself as a cinematic philosopher in a sense that my role is not to offer my own interpretation/analysis of the cinematic pieces and also not to relate them to any specific theories or philosophers from the history of philosophy. Hence, I intend to focus, as a cinematic philosopher, on what the mind of the cinematic piece is saying through its cinematic elements rather than focusing on what the cinematic piece is saying according to my own mind, interpretation and analysis (McGuire, 1973). Correspondingly, my role is to reveal these chosen piece’s philosophical wisdom and place them within a theoretical context which in my perception unfolds layers of knowledge on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and contributes to the political philosophy literature in a novel cinematic philosophical way. Therefore, my close reading analysis, even if with reference to its subjective nature is open to dispute by other readers and/or scholars, is based upon testing and revealing the philosophizing and theorizing that is introduced by the chosen cinematic pieces which in my perception mitigates the speculative nature limitation of my analysis.

Parallel to including and excluding precise theories throughout the theoretical journey that I propose with the intention of offering my own unique reading of the contemporary relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology, I have included four precise cinematic pieces and excluded many of the contemporary cinematic pieces within the scope of this research. Thus, I consider this exclusion to be another limitation of my research concretely because this choice of analyzing four cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) narrows

the analyzed data of my research. However, as I have already emphasized in the previous parts of this thesis, I consider each type of restriction to be theorized by solely one cinematic piece. Therefore, the priority reason for choosing one cinematic piece and not more than one piece is to propose each type of restriction to be, the possible and at this point proved, contribution of these specific cinematic pieces. What I mean here is that the cinematic pieces as pieces of cinematic philosophy present their unique theoretical contributions as other philosophers do and in my perception, it wouldn't be accurate to claim that one theory can be theorized by many philosophers. Hence, although it can be claimed that the philosophers theorize on the same concept, their theorization will be unique and ontologically different from each other. This is the precise reason why I assign one cinematic piece to have the capacity to introduce one of the types of restriction of individual freedom. Correspondingly, even if it is a limitation to have four cinematic pieces rather than having many cinematic pieces to be analyzed, it would contradict with the nature of 'Cinematic Philosophy' that I endorse, within the context of this research, to include many contemporary cinematic pieces to be analyzed.

Here, departing from the contributions of my research, I want to highlight further research suggestions. First of all, as I have already stated, in order to test the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology, I tried to present an inclusive relational formulation in order to have a schematic organization of the conceptual elements on the restriction of individual freedom. Respectively, I situated contemporary distinct individual freedom conceptions within this organizational scheme with reference to the restrictive defining conditions that they propose. Eventually, departing from this organizational scheme, four inductively established types of restriction of individual freedom are introduced. Thus, I claim that this theoretical model that I propose encapsulates most of the contemporary theories on the restriction of individual freedom and groups them under four types. Hence, if this theoretical model is to be found political philosophically satisfying, then, this theoretical model can be used within many academic fields concerning individual freedom. This can be done by changing the through/by technology part of my theoretical model to through/by any concept and issue related to field specific research. Therefore, I claim that the theoretical model that I present can, ontologically be used in further research.

Also, departing from the grounds of my research which is based upon the capacity of the cinematic channel in general and the cinematic pieces in specific to philosophize and theorize, further research can be conducted, from a brother perspective, on the capacity of the cinematic pieces to philosophize and theorize and on revealing the philosophizing and theorizing that these pieces present. Therefore, there can be further research administered on the analysis of the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements of the

cinematic pieces to reveal their philosophizing and theorizing. Thus, I consider this kind of an analysis, grounding on the 'Cinematic Philosophy' that I endorse, to be a novel type of an analysis which focuses on the revelation of the cinematic language instead of the verbal language that is intensely dominant within the field of philosophy. Correspondingly, this kind of an analysis and this kind of a research that bases upon the revelation of the macrostructural and microstructural cinematic elements can bolster the significance of this novel channel of philosophy within the academic world and within the world outside of academia. Hence, this can alter and respectively expand the whole tradition of philosophy acknowledged as solely functioning through the words and the language itself. From this perspective, further research conducted on cinematic philosophy itself has the potential to change and expand our relation and dependence on the verbal language by offering a philosophical territory that is not restricted to the linear functioning of the words. Here, yet again, I want to give the example that Shamir shares in which he reveals the capacity of the cinematic piece, *The Matrix*. Thus, I want to give this example to leave the borders of my thesis which is circumscribed by the four cinematic pieces (*Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution*, *THX 1138*, *Ex Machina*, *Nosedive* Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series) in order to indicate that there are many cinematic philosophy pieces except from the four cinematic pieces that I have chosen to be analyzed which philosophize and theorize on distinct concerns of philosophy. Hence, as Shamir states:

The Matrix manages to make us experience an epistemological gap between the two different worlds in which Neo (Keanu Reeves) lives. There are no voice-overs, titles, or talking heads expressing problems of epistemology—instead, there is a journey that makes us see and experience an epistemological gap as an action event. In this way, the film gives us the opportunity to comprehend an epistemological gap from a different and unique perspective. The epistemological confrontation in *The Matrix* is not dependent on traditional philosophy. A viewer does not have to read about epistemology to understand the gap between Neo's two worlds. Simply by watching the film, one can come to understand aspects of epistemology without even knowing that it is called epistemology or which philosophers have dealt with this subject. *The Matrix* is not an illustration of the ideas of any specific philosopher, nor is it a direct representation of any specific thought experiment; it exemplifies how a film can confront an epistemological problem and evokes a new type of engagement with philosophy—the possibility of seeing and experiencing philosophy as an event in motion, rather than merely reflecting on the philosophy or imagining it. (Shamir, 2016, 17)

Respectively, further research based upon the capacity of the cinematic pieces to introduce, create and manifest ideas and concepts as cinematic experiences through the cinematic language can alter and respectively expand the whole tradition of philosophy.

Departing from this emphasis, it is asserted in my thesis that one of the cinematic pieces as a piece of cinematic philosophy introduces a novel type of restriction of individual freedom and this kind of a new type of restriction and the parameters behind this restriction can be elaborated more with further research. Thus, this kind of further research can raise awareness on the desire motivated choice-based free actions of the individuals which function through clicking and justified through the given consents within information and communication technologies. Hence, I think that this kind of an awareness in the best case can minimize but in the less optimal cases can mitigate the negative consequences of these kinds of actions in effect of individual freedom. Thus, I strongly believe that in order to raise awareness on individual actions through these technologies, individuals also should be made aware of the novel layer that these technologies and these technologies-ruled contemporary societies assign on individuals. Correspondingly, there can be further research conducted on individuals gaining a novel layer as 'data beings' which could serve for raising awareness on the contemporary understanding of the individuals as 'data'. Thus, this is critical because this new layer added to individuals has crucial consequences on their individual freedom and on their daily lives. All in all, as I persistently underline in my thesis, the contemporary societal system is going through a fundamental change and further research based upon raising awareness on individuals becoming 'digital beings' and 'data beings' can serve to make individuals be aware of this change and can make individuals to act accordingly before it is too late to alter the negative consequences of this change. For instance, further research can be conducted concerning the questions such as; What are the effects of this fundamental change on the definition of a human being living in the physical world? How to be a conscious digital being? How to consent as a digital being responsibly through clicking?, etc,. These questions above lead to one other further research suggestion that I derive from my thesis. Hence, I propose the 'Click Consent' theory as an original contribution of my research. Correspondingly, I propose a novel theory to the academic literature. Thus, every novel theory that is introduced needs to be scrutinized and needs to be situated on more solid and eminent grounds in order to become an established theory. Therefore, there can be further and extended research through using different methodologies and different theoretical readings on 'Click Consent' theory, in order to test its capacity to become a more established theory.

Eventually, as my concluding remarks I want to state that in this research, I tried to add novel aspects primarily to academia and to the world outside of academia because I strongly believe that 'thinking beyond' and collectively making fruitful contributions out of this

beyond is really crucial to serve for making the world that we live in a more flourishing place. Hence, I strongly believe that political philosophy and the cinematic channel that uniquely serves for this philosophizing play a crucial role for this flourishing. That's the precise reason why, I have tried to combine my floating urges that I have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter through proposing an established academic research grounding on 'if and if yes how cinematic pieces can philosophize and theorize on the relationship between individual freedom and technology and on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology as a contribution of cinematic philosophy'. Correspondingly, after delineating how cinematic pieces can philosophize and theorize on the restriction of individual freedom through/by technology, I modestly acknowledge and respectively propose this thesis to serve for making the world that we live in a more flourishing place.

Filmography

Alphaville: A Strange Adventure of Lemmy Caution (Jean-Luc Godard, 1965)

Battleship Potemkin (Sergei M. Eisenstein, 1925)

Ex Machina (Alex Garland, 2014)

Nosedive Episode of the *Black Mirror* TV series (Charlie Brooker & Joe Wright, 2016)

THX 1138 (George Lucas, 1971)

The Matrix (Lana Wachowski & Lilly Wachowski, 1999)

Vivre Sa Vie (Jean-Luc Godard, 1962)

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