

***The Conservative Party Representatives Study 2002:  
A Multi-Focus, Quantitative Analysis of the  
Beliefs, Behaviour and Background of  
Conservative Party Politicians in 2002***

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**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of  
London Metropolitan University  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

**2010**

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PERSONAL COMMENTS</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<i>Background</i> .....	<b>7</b>
<i>How This Relates to the Approach to the CPRS 2002</i> .....	<b>8</b>
<i>The Role of Eric Forth</i> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>COINING A TERM: RHETOMETRICS</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE CPRS 2002</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>WHAT IS CONSERVATISM?</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<i>The Purpose of the CPRS 2002</i> .....	<b>11</b>
<i>From the Literature</i> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>FROM THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTION</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<i>From Individual Conservatives</i> .....	<b>13</b>
<i>Attenuating the Noise</i> .....	<b>14</b>
<i>A Note of Caution</i> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>A QUALIFICATION ABOUT THE WIDER CONTEXT</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>EXISTING WORK ABOUT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 2002</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<i>A Nadir in the Party's Fortunes</i> .....	<b>15</b>
<i>The "Nasty Party"?</i> .....	<b>16</b>
<i>But Was It So Bad?</i> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>BRITAIN AND THE WORLD IN 2002</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<i>Britain</i> .....	<b>18</b>
<i>The World</i> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>TYPES OF STUDY AND THE CPRS 2002</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>A SMALL-SCALE PILOT STUDY</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>AN ISSUE WITH DEVELOPING THE QUESTIONNAIRE</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>TOPICS COVERED</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<i>Aims of the Research</i> .....	<b>25</b>
<i>Topic Ordering</i> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>THE RESPONDENTS</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<i>The Intended Targets</i> .....	<b>26</b>
<i>Identifying the Targets and Sampling</i> .....	<b>27</b>
<i>Who and Where Were Excluded</i> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>ETHICAL ISSUES</b> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>THE MULTI-ITEM SCALES</b> .....	<b>29</b>
<i>Types of Scales</i> .....	<b>29</b>
<i>Purpose and Derivation of the Scales</i> .....	<b>29</b>
<i>Subject Ordering</i> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>PRESENTATION OF ITEMS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE</b> .....	<b>33</b>
<i>Types of Item</i> .....	<b>33</b>
<i>Response Options</i> .....	<b>33</b>
<b>PHYSICAL DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE</b> .....	<b>34</b>
<i>Design Overview</i> .....	<b>34</b>
<i>Creating the Questionnaire</i> .....	<b>35</b>
<i>The Introductory Letter from Eric Forth</i> .....	<b>35</b>
<i>A Note about Questionnaire Length</i> .....	<b>36</b>
<b>DEPLOYING THE QUESTIONNAIRE</b> .....	<b>36</b>
<i>Possible Methods</i> .....	<b>36</b>
<i>Despatch</i> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>DATA CAPTURE</b> .....	<b>37</b>

RESPONSES .....	37
<i>Response Rates</i> .....	37
<i>Responses and the Multi-Item Scales</i> .....	39
<i>Statistical Robustness of the Multi-Item Scales</i> .....	40
WERE ANY SCALES FROM WITHIN THE DATA MISSED?.....	40
CHOICE OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS.....	41
THE PRESENTATION OF DATA IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS.....	41
<i>Level of Data</i> .....	41
<i>Base Size and Reported Analysis</i> .....	42
<i>Unexplained Variance</i> .....	42
<b>CHAPTER 3: BEYOND “LEFT AND RIGHT”: THE POLITICAL MAP.....</b>	<b>43</b>
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM .....	43
<i>“And”, not “but”</i> .....	43
<i>Same Words, Different Meanings</i> .....	44
WHY IS IT STILL USED? .....	45
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS.....	46
ANOTHER SOLUTION: THE POLITICAL MAP.....	47
THE POLITICAL MAP USED IN THIS ANALYSIS .....	49
<i>The Design, Layout and Naming of the PoliMap</i> .....	49
<i>A Finite World</i> .....	52
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MODEL AND SOME RESPONSES .....	53
<i>Objections Raised</i> .....	53
<i>There is Only One Dimension</i> .....	53
<i>An Insufficiency of Dimensions</i> .....	53
<i>Poor Questionnaire Sets and Evidence for Multi-Dimensionality</i> .....	55
<i>Unacceptable Creation of Internal Sectors</i> .....	57
THE POLIMAP AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY .....	58
THE DIMENSIONS CONSIDERED SEPARATELY.....	58
CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS MAPPED ONTO THE POLIMAP .....	59
<i>All Respondents on the PoliMap</i> .....	59
<i>The PoliMap and Socio-Demographics</i> .....	62
THE POLIMAP AND THE “ACTUALLY EXISTING CONSERVATIVE PARTY” .....	62
NOT PERFECT, BUT BETTER.....	63
<b>CHAPTER 4: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATIVE LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN ENGLAND.....</b>	<b>64</b>
BACKGROUND AND THE USE OF SECONDARY DATA.....	64
WHAT WAS OMITTED AND WHY .....	65
<i>Basic Issues</i> .....	65
<i>Representativeness</i> .....	65
<i>Researcher Choice and Sensitivity</i> .....	66
AN INITIAL SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS .....	67
<i>Gender, Age and Ethnicity</i> .....	67
<i>Education</i> .....	69
<i>Marital Status</i> .....	72
<i>Residence and Type of Accommodation</i> .....	72
<i>Area of Representation</i> .....	74
<i>Employment</i> .....	75
<i>Parental Background in the Conservative Party</i> .....	77
<i>Service in the Conservative Party</i> .....	79
<i>Social Class</i> .....	81
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES.....	84
<i>Rationale and Methodology</i> .....	84
<i>Analysis and Results</i> .....	86
THE INTERNET .....	87
<i>Use of Email and the Internet</i> .....	87
<i>Ideology and the Internet?</i> .....	89

<i>Other CPRS 2002 Respondents</i> .....	89
IDEALISM, PRAGMATISM AND TIME.....	90
CONCLUSION.....	91
<b>CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY .....</b>	<b>93</b>
ITEMS ABOUT THE PARTY IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE.....	93
INTRA-PARTY ELITISM, INTRA-PARTY INCLUSIVITY AND OPTIMISM.....	93
<i>Unwarranted Optimism</i> .....	93
<i>Running and Changing the Party</i> .....	94
A DESIRE FOR CHANGE?.....	94
<i>Was Change Needed?</i> .....	94
<i>Why Was Change Needed?</i> .....	95
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?.....	98
<i>A Perceived Lack of Clarity</i> .....	98
<i>Inconsistent Attitudes?</i> .....	99
PARTY LEADERS .....	100
<i>A First Look</i> .....	100
<i>Multivariate Analysis</i> .....	102
CONSERVATIVE PARTY YOUTH ORGANISATIONS.....	105
<i>Membership</i> .....	105
<i>Whatever Happened to the "Conservative Radicals"?</i> .....	106
CONCLUSION.....	106
<b>CHAPTER 6: ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER UK POLITICAL PARTIES .....</b>	<b>109</b>
ONE AMONGST A NUMBER.....	109
AN OVERVIEW OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE OTHER PARTIES .....	109
<i>The Questionnaire Items and the Parties</i> .....	109
<i>Self-Reported Insufficient Knowledge</i> .....	110
<i>For Respondents Who Reported Sufficient Knowledge</i> .....	111
<i>Differences Between the Groups of Respondents</i> .....	115
PARTY-POLITICS AND ATTITUDES .....	115
<i>Analysis</i> .....	115
<i>The Major UK-Wide Parties</i> .....	116
<i>The Minor UK-Wide Parties: Splittists or Ginger Group?</i> .....	117
<i>The Scottish and Welsh and Parties</i> .....	119
<i>The Northern Irish Parties</i> .....	119
CONCLUSION.....	120
<b>CHAPTER 7: THE WIDER WORLD .....</b>	<b>122</b>
A RESEARCH QUESTION AND BEYOND .....	122
‘EURO-SCEPTIC, ATLANTICIST, ZIONIST ECONOMIC LIBERALS’ VERSUS ‘EURO-ENTHUSIAST, CONTINENTALIST, ARABIST ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTIONISTS’? .....	122
<i>The Research Question</i> .....	122
<i>Analysing the Observation with the CPRS 2002 Data</i> .....	123
<i>Analysing the Foreign Affairs Items</i> .....	124
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ISSUES: CORRELATING OR CUTTING ACROSS? .....	126
THE COMMONWEALTH .....	128
THE WESTERN AND ISLAMIC WORLDS .....	130
CONCLUSION.....	131
<b>CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL IDENTITY .....</b>	<b>133</b>
ASPECTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY .....	133
SELF-IDENTIFICATION.....	133
<i>How Respondents Thought of Themselves</i> .....	133
OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING THE UNITED KINGDOM .....	136
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.....	138
A REVISED TYPOLOGY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY.....	138
CONCLUSION.....	139

<b>CHAPTER 9: THE FREE-MARKET AS “A NECESSARY EVIL” OR “A GOOD THING”?.....</b>	<b>141</b>
PRO-FREE-MARKET, BUT WHY? .....	141
THE EFFICIENCY AND WORTHINESS OF THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS.....	141
ASSOCIATIONS WITH EMPLOYMENT.....	143
CONCLUSION.....	143
<b>CHAPTER 10: RELIGION.....</b>	<b>145</b>
MEANINGS OF RELIGION IN THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> .....	145
RELIGION AND THE UK AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY .....	146
<i>Politico-Religious Cleavages in the UK</i> .....	146
<i>Christianity and the UK</i> .....	146
<i>Christianity and the Conservative Party</i> .....	147
RELIGIOSITY AND THEOCRATISM.....	148
<i>Considered Separately</i> .....	148
<i>Considered Together</i> .....	149
CONFESSONAL AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND.....	150
THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH .....	152
RELIGIOSITY, THEOCRATISM AND ENGLISH LOCAL COUNCILLOR SOCIO- DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES.....	153
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS PREDICTORS OF OTHER ATTITUDES AMONGST <i>CPRS 2002</i> RESPONDENTS .....	153
<i>A Note about Causality</i> .....	153
<i>Multivariate Analysis</i> .....	154
<i>Religiosity and Environmentalism</i> .....	156
CONCLUSION.....	157
<b>CHAPTER 11: THE PARTY-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.....</b>	<b>158</b>
THE “WHERE” OF POLITICS.....	158
THE LOCUS OF POWER BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.....	158
<i>Power and Responsibilities</i> .....	158
<i>The Institutions Compared</i> .....	159
<i>Whatever happened to “Rolling back the frontiers of the state”?</i> .....	160
REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER .....	160
WHY BECOME A POLITICIAN?.....	161
<i>Types of Reason</i> .....	161
<i>Why?</i> .....	163
<i>The Socio-Demographics of Local Councillors in England and “Idealism”</i> .....	163
ELECTIONS, PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER.....	164
TRUST IN PUBLIC LIFE .....	168
A FORAY INTO SCALE BUILDING .....	169
CONCLUSION.....	170
<b>CHAPTER 12: THE 2001 CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP CONTEST.....</b>	<b>171</b>
A SHORT-LIVED VICTORY.....	171
THE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 2001 .....	171
ISSUES DURING THE CONTEST .....	173
CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS AND THE 2001 LEADERSHIP CONTEST .....	175
NEW CHOICES OF SUPPORTERS OF EXCLUDED CANDIDATES .....	177
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE LAST THREE CANDIDATES.....	178
<i>All Three Candidates</i> .....	178
<i>Michael Portillo’s Exceptionalism</i> .....	180
THE FINAL BALLOT .....	181
<i>All Respondents</i> .....	181
<i>Local Councillors in England</i> .....	184
COMMENTARY .....	184
“A WORD IN YOUR EAR...” .....	185
CONCLUSION: EUROPE BUT NOT ONLY EUROPE.....	187

AFTERWARD: CHANGING SALIENCY .....	188
<b>CHAPTER 13: THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND ELECTORAL POLITICS .....</b>	<b>190</b>
LETTING IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD .....	190
MAIN CONCERNS FACING BRITAIN .....	190
<i>Concerns Across a Range of Issues</i> .....	190
<i>Saliency and the Multi-Item Scales</i> .....	191
BELIEFS ABOUT THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE PUBLIC'S STATED VIEWS .....	193
<i>Main Comparisons</i> .....	193
<i>The General Public's Own Views</i> .....	194
THE EXPERIENCE OF ELECTORAL POLITICS .....	195
<i>Fighting for their Seat</i> .....	195
<i>Further Analysis of Attitudes Towards Labour and the Liberal Democrats</i> .....	199
<i>Attitudinal Predictors and Electoral Experience Together</i> .....	200
THE ENGLISH GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE POLIMAP .....	202
<i>Using the PoliMap</i> .....	202
<i>Identifying Comparators Amongst the Public</i> .....	202
<i>Mapping the Public</i> .....	202
<i>Tribalism and Party Realignment</i> .....	205
CONCLUSION .....	205
<b>CHAPTER 14: A PROFILE OF POSSIBLE FUTURE HIGHER-LEVEL CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS .....</b>	<b>209</b>
CHANGES IN THE TYPE AND ATTITUDES OF FUTURE PARLIAMENTARIANS .....	209
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL REPLACEMENTS .....	209
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF REPLACEMENTS .....	211
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPLACEMENTS AND SITTING MPs .....	213
ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES .....	214
CONCLUSION .....	216
<b>CHAPTER 15: BRINGING THE FINDINGS TOGETHER .....</b>	<b>218</b>
THE PURPOSE OF THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> RESTATED .....	218
THE "TYPICAL" CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN IN 2002 .....	218
<i>Drawing a Picture</i> .....	218
<i>The Conservative Politician in 2002</i> .....	219
THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTION .....	221
THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> AS A PICTURE AT A PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME .....	221
<b>CHAPTER 16: BEYOND THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> .....</b>	<b>224</b>
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> DATA .....	224
RE-RUNNING THE STUDY .....	224
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>APPENDIX 1: THE SEPTEMBER 2000 PILOT STUDY .....</b>	<b>290</b>
<b>APPENDIX 2: TEXT OF ACCOMPANYING LETTER FROM THE RT. HON. ERIC FORTH MP .....</b>	<b>293</b>
<b>APPENDIX 3: DETAILS OF THE MULTI-ITEM SCALES USED IN THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> .....</b>	<b>294</b>
<b>APPENDIX 4: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MULTI-ITEM SCALES BY TYPE OF RESPONDENT .....</b>	<b>299</b>
<b>APPENDIX 5: THE <i>CPRS 2002</i> QUESTIONNAIRE .....</b>	<b>305</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

The *Conservative Party Representatives Study 2002* is a multi-focus analysis using quantitative methods of the institutional and political culture of Conservative politicians in 2002.

A 20-page questionnaire was sent in April 2002 to all Conservative MPs, Peers, MEPs, Scottish MPs, Welsh and Greater London Assembly members, local councillors in Scotland and Wales and a 10% random sample of local councillors in England.

The closed format items cover a range of topics under the headings: the United Kingdom; the environment; business, labour relations, welfare and the economy; Britain, Europe and the wider world; ethnicity, citizenship and national image; society and culture; the conduct of politics; the political parties; religion; and the 2001 Conservative Party leadership contest. There are a small number of experiential items for all respondents and a larger battery of socio-demographic items for local councillors in England. A large proportion of attitudinal items are not intended as stand-alone items but as part of statistically robust multi-item scales.

Also used in the report is a range of secondary data allowing relevant comparisons between *CPRS 2002* respondents and politicians from other parties and/or the general public.

Statistical analysis using a range of methods was conducted using *SPSS*. These techniques are used to determine differences, associations and/or predictors of attitudes, behaviour and socio-demographic background in a range of subject areas covered by a series of thematic chapters. This affords four outcomes. First, a systematic portrayal of the attitudes, background and to some extent behaviour of Conservative politicians in 2002. Second, predictions about the impact of generational replacement as lower-level politicians progress to higher positions. Third, the investigation of a number of specific research questions. Fourth, the creation and lodging of a dataset with the relevant academic authorities both to allow for further analysis of the captured data and to serve as the potential basis of a time series dataset.

# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PERSONAL COMMENTS**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Thanks are particularly owed to my mother Erna Meek, my father William Meek (1925-1993) and my brother Howard Edgar. Also to my PhD supervisor Professor Richard Topf of London Metropolitan University (formerly London Guildhall University), my external viva examiner Professor Paul Whiteley of the University of Essex and the internal examiner Professor Sam Whimster. Also to the Right Honourable Eric Forth MP (1944-2006) and, of course, to those Conservative politicians who took the time to complete such a lengthy questionnaire.

Thanks are also due to Denise Panattoni, Peter Naylor, Lorna Williams, Dr Julie Withey, Professor Shah Hashemi and all the other staff at LMU who helped with logistical or academic aspects of this research. Also to Peter and Catherine Ennor of Keystroke Knowledge in Northumberland, members of staff at local authorities and other organisations who responded to enquiries, Deirdre Hinwood of Orpington College of Further Education, Alison and Martin Bowman, Professor Antony Flew (1923-2010), the Civic and Education Research Trust and the Society for Individual Freedom. Also to the members of Bromley and Chislehurst Conservative Association's Plaistow branch and members of the London Borough of Bromley's Conservative group who responded to a pilot study and to those individuals who commented on early drafts of the questionnaire.

## **PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY**

### **Background**

I started as a volunteer activist for the Conservative Party in the mid-1980s, formally joining what would become Bromley and Chislehurst Conservative Association in 1987 just before the general election held that year.

Throughout the course of my two-decade membership I sat on the committee of my ward branch and was for much of the time an elected member of the Association's executive and political committees. I was also a member of the London South-East European constituency committee.

I sat on the candidate selection boards for local council elections that took place in 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. Following the retirement of Sir John Hunt MP and Sir Roger Sims MP and the creation of a merged constituency I was a member of the candidate selection board for the 1997 general election which saw the selection and then election of Eric Forth MP. Following Mr Forth's sudden death in 2006 I sat on the candidate selection board that selected Bob Neill who narrowly won the subsequent by-election.



It is fair to say that I was always a “dissident” member of the Party,<sup>1</sup> being more of a classical liberal or libertarian. For this and other reasons, not least the death of Eric Forth and subsequent events, I let my membership lapse in 2007.

It is to be hoped that any of this does not show in the following *analyses*, although it is true that on a number of occasions it and other personally held views influenced the *topics* chosen.

### **How This Relates to the Approach to the *CPRS 2002***

This association with the Conservative Party was an important factor in determining the focus of the research. This is why a glance at the references used throughout this report will note that whilst many come from traditional academic sources there are also a large number of reports from both the mainstream and Internet media.

During my time as a Party activist it became apparent to me that, other than opposition to the Soviet Union and radical examples of domestic socialism, the attitudes of those that I associated with on a weekly basis such as other senior activists and local councillors appeared “all over the place” when examined on an individual level. This became more evident after, in the space of not many years, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of New Labour. For me, as a trained social researcher, this came to a head after the Labour landslide victory in 1997. Most of my fellows seemed obsessed with New Labour, Tony Blair, Peter Mandelson and “spin”. The discussion was frequently some variant of how best to emulate Labour’s success and so to win the next election, i.e. the “how” of politics. It seemed that only a few of us were asking what we wanted to do with this power should we acquire it, i.e. the “why” of politics.

To look at things from the other direction as an example of what this research was *not* about, a copy of the Political Studies Association’s journal *Political Studies* came into my possession just as a draft of this section was being written. In it there is an article by Efraim Podoksik<sup>2</sup> titled ‘Overcoming the Conservative Disposition: Oakeshott vs. Tönnies’. Ferdinand Tönnies is most famous for his distinction between two types of social groups: *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Michael Oakeshott is often spoken of as one of the most significant British conservative intellectuals of the previous century. It is a fascinating article. However, when one reads such passages as Podoksik (p. 875) quoting Oakeshott as arguing that...

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<sup>1</sup> Meek, July 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Podoksik, December 2008.

*“Rules, duties, and their like ... are to be recognised as densities obtruded by the tensions of a spoken language of moral intercourse, nodal points at which a practice turns upon itself in a vertiginous movement and becomes steadier in ceasing to be adventurous”*

... then I am *very* sure that is not the form of “discourse” of any local councillors of my acquaintance.

This is a far from trivial point. I spent two decades associating with such people as a colleague within the Party and at the time of writing still do so on an informal basis. The aim of the *CPRS 2002* was to gain an objective and quantitative measure of their views as they might be discussed between themselves and at least senior Party activists such as I had been, but always through using appropriate academic methods of data collection and analysis.

In this respect the current report is much like the *True Blues* study in that it is “written with a diverse audience in mind”<sup>3</sup> of Conservative Party politicians and members, journalists, pollsters and academic social scientists. A local councillor might not have knowledge of some of the *methods* used but he or she should be able to perceive the *results* so acquired as being meaningful.

In short, this study is not about conservatism *qua* philosophy—although brief mention will be made below—but rather it is about the beliefs of Conservative Party politicians.<sup>4</sup>

## **The Role of Eric Forth**

Eric Forth had been my MP since 1997. However, he was more than that. As a somewhat libertarian-inclined Conservative<sup>5</sup> he was of help in some of my own political activities outside of the Conservative Party. For example, on a number of occasions he hosted luncheons at the House of Commons for the Society for Individual Freedom, a classical liberal organisation<sup>6</sup> partly run by me. He went so far as to formally join the SIF shortly before his death.

Mr Forth was more than willing to help me by signing an introductory letter—the original of which was produced on his personal House of Commons notepaper—drafted by me but approved by him. The text of this letter can be found in Appendix 2. He was also provided with a copy of the draft questionnaire prior to signing this letter. He in no way contributed to the content of the questionnaire. His sole comment concerned how long the questionnaire was.

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<sup>3</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson: 1994: 8.

<sup>4</sup> Norton, July-September 2008: 324.

<sup>5</sup> Roth & White, 19<sup>th</sup> May 2006; *The Times*; 19<sup>th</sup> May 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Society for Individual Freedom, 27<sup>th</sup> October 2004.

At the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork Eric Forth was not merely a sitting Conservative MP but was the Shadow Leader of the House of Commons under Iain Duncan Smith and a frequent guest on radio and television. He was also well-known as previously having been, and latterly would become again,<sup>7</sup> a leading member of the “awkward squad”. It has been argued that some of Iain Duncan Smith’s initial success in curbing overt Conservative backbench dissent was due in part to co-opting Eric Forth and his like-minded colleague David Maclean into the Shadow Cabinet.<sup>8</sup>

I have no objective proof that his introductory letter boosted response rate. However, compared to the alternative of *only* having the letter from me on the front page of the questionnaire it seems incredible to suggest that it did *not*.

## COINING A TERM: RHETOMETRICS

Many will recognise terms such as “psychographics”<sup>9</sup> in marketing and “psychometrics”<sup>10</sup> in personality testing. Both deal within their disciplines with objective measurement. There does not seem to be a similar term within political science for the sort of attitude measurement featured in the *CPRS 2002*.

Possessing long-forgotten schoolboy Latin and no Greek at all, I asked a friend and associate, the now-departed philosopher Antony Flew,<sup>11</sup> if he had any ideas. In brief, his response<sup>12</sup> was that, given that the classical Greeks did not have organised political parties with beliefs and policies about everything, the term “rhetoricmetrics” as a measurement of what public speakers say might suffice. However, this is unappealing as a word in English. Instead, he suggested the shorter “rhetormetrics”. Strictly speaking, this is a measurement of the public speakers themselves, but it’s easier on the eye and tongue. I offer it to the reader.

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<sup>7</sup> Brown, 20<sup>th</sup> May 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Cowley & Stuart, October 2004: 356.

<sup>9</sup> Gunter & Furnham, 1992.

<sup>10</sup> Rust & Golombok, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> *The Telegraph*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2010. It is much to be regretted that at the time of Antony’s death in April 2010 the media seemed almost exclusively concerned with the more sensationalist aspects of his thoughts about religion that he acquired in his, to be frank, declining final years.

<sup>12</sup> Personal correspondence, 7<sup>th</sup> August 1999.

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE *CPRS 2002*

## WHAT IS CONSERVATISM?

### The Purpose of the *CPRS 2002*

The *CPRS 2002* is an empirical analysis of the attitudes, background and to some extent behaviour of individual Conservative politicians in 2002. In turn, the findings from individual respondents are aggregated to provide a picture of the Conservative elected political class as a whole. In other words, to provide an overall picture of the Conservative Party.

But before getting to the heart of the survey, a very brief and far from exhaustive mention should be made of some other approaches that can be and have been utilised when addressing this question.

### From the Literature

When looking at the literature an array of sources can be consulted in an attempt to answer this question. They can be academic or popular. They can be historical or contemporary. They can be specific with the subject matter being primarily conservatism and/or the Conservative Party—and the distinction is discussed below—or they can be general in scope. They can be works listed under many disciplines including politics, philosophy, history, sociology, economics and even humour. Throughout this, whilst it would not be true to say that all sources agree on all things, and some studies that might be considered outliers<sup>13</sup> notwithstanding, certain reoccurring themes can be discerned.

Little detail will be gone into here since it is the purpose of the *CPRS 2002* to an answer to this question in its own way. However, by way of example, just three classic texts can be consulted, two decidedly historical and one a history but of more contemporary authorship. Individually, these works are held to examine the nature of Conservatism as a doctrine: Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*;<sup>14</sup> as an ideology: Marquand's *Britain Since 1918*;<sup>15</sup> and as a class related practice: McKenzie and Silver's *Angels in Marble*.<sup>16</sup> The following is a brief synthesis of relevant and compatible elements from these three texts.

For these authorities, conservatism is as much a state of mind or temperament as ideology. It accepts the existence of the irrational in the social world and denies the perfectibility of man with his limited stock of reason. It seeks a knowledge of practical control of the here and now—and so often attracts supporters of

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<sup>13</sup> Evans, 1996.

<sup>14</sup> Mannheim, 1936: 120, 229-238.

<sup>15</sup> Marquand, 2009: 57-58, 137-138, 324.

<sup>16</sup> McKenzie & Silver, 1968: 18-59.

classless managerialism—and concerns itself with the “is” rather than the normative “should” that inspires liberals and socialists. It emphasizes a known past and rejects utopian dreams of the future.

Conservatism holds that men are inherently unequal and that where there is variety of quality and ability there will be differentiation into classes. But this does not mean that there should be no fluidity of movement in both directions. Conservatives liken society to a tree, accepting growth and change and, to some extent, necessary pruning.

It discovers itself after the event and is defined as much by what it opposes. In the British context this was first the 19<sup>th</sup> century laissez-faire individualism of the Liberals and so Conservatives did not hesitate to use the power of state and society to redress perceived wrongs. Then it was the 20<sup>th</sup> century socialist exultation of the collective by Labour and so Conservatives emphasised the importance of the individual. (For those raised in the last few decades and knowing only of the latter tendency, the former can come as a surprise. This applies to many Conservatives as well as to the political laity...)

Conservatives believe that security of property—initially of land ownership but eventually of property as such—is perhaps the main purpose of government and that without property civilisation cannot endure. However, conservative principles are entirely compatible with the idea of state responsibility for such matters as social welfare and other forms of interventionism.

Conservatism makes appeals to a sense of community—including the minimisation of both individual desires and group demands wherever they threaten the stability of society—and nationalism and this sometimes veers into outright xenophobia. Part of this belief in the British context can be seen in the historical support for an established church as a national act of religious devotion although such religiosity is not taken to theological extremes and ultimately each man must hold himself responsible only to God

Conservatives tend to look back to an idealised pre-industrial society where social order was guaranteed and legitimised by a system of norms and values which were to be swept away by industrialization. Ironically—and here the problem becomes apparent when consulting such undoubtedly interesting and useful sources and trying to extrapolate them to an analysis of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century Conservative Party—the Conservatives in the period before the *CPRS 2002* had themselves stimulated populist rage against the very institutions that it had once defended: the older universities, the liberal professions, the senior civil service and the Church of England.

## From the Party as an Institution

Much of this above is interesting and useful and indeed seems right in terms of their analysis. But in truth it is somewhat woolly when considering real-world politics. So, coming at matters from the other direction, one might consult formal documents and statements such as election manifestos.<sup>17</sup>

But the problem is that—even assuming that they are written in good faith at the time—while there are certainly reoccurring themes of interest—often not dissenting from the ideas rehearsed in the previous sub-section—much of the content is context-specific and ephemeral. No doubt it is a cherry-picked example, but how many Britons these days have even heard of the Colombo Plan<sup>18</sup> for economic and social development in the Asia-Pacific region which was apparently important enough to feature in the Conservative Party's 1959 general election manifesto?<sup>19</sup>

## From Individual Conservatives

Moreover, as suggested in the personal comments above, confusion reigns once individual Conservatives are consulted on a person-by-person basis. Looking ahead to Chapter 12 on the Party's 2001 leadership contest, the noise and confusion generated by internal debate within the Party was encapsulated in just two days when the *Daily Telegraph* invited and received comments from ordinary Conservative members and senior Party figures alike.<sup>20</sup>

Almost every conceivable view—if not the relative prevalence of such views within the Party—was mooted. Examples include pro-EU and anti-EU; for and against social liberalism; for and against increased spending on the State sector; some for more and others for less taxation; the need to replace William Hague with a more charismatic leader against having someone who appeared quiet and decent; those who thought that the party had lost due to being seen as too extreme and right-wing against those who thought that it had failed to defend traditional Conservative values; whether Hague and the Conservatives had lost the 2001 general election or Tony Blair and New Labour had won it; those who thought that the Conservatives needed to embrace inclusivity and multiculturalism against those who thought that this was a gimmick; policy failures against strategy failures; the implications of successes at a local level against failure at the national level.

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<sup>17</sup> Kimber, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2010; Pogorelis *et al*, November 2005; Topf, 1994.

<sup>18</sup> Colombo Plan, 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Conservative Party, 1959.

<sup>20</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

## **Attenuating the Noise**

A study such as this cannot hope to achieve a definitive answer to the question posed at the start of this chapter when considered from all possible approaches. In Chapter 2 there is more detail on the purposes of the *CPRS 2002*, why its target was the publically elected (or appointed or inherited in the case of Peers) politicians of the Conservative Party rather than ordinary members and how the research was conducted. The main purpose of the *CPRS 2002*—along with some specific research questions of a more general nature—is to determine the nature of British Conservatism at least as it can be determined by an analysis of what Conservative politicians thought and believed at the time.

## **A Note of Caution**

Before proceeding it should be noted that is easy to allow some confusion and perhaps even arrogance to creep into such a study. It assumes, at least within the British context, that the Conservative Party has a near-monopoly on any discussions about the similarly-named “ism”. Some have gone so far as to argue that for many years the Conservative Party as an institution has been positively damaging to conservatism as an ideology in the UK.<sup>21</sup> Perhaps, perhaps not. But the milder point is well made and should always be kept in mind.

But the *CPRS 2002* is indeed a study of the Conservative Party and the beliefs and background of its representatives or politicians.

## **A QUALIFICATION ABOUT THE WIDER CONTEXT**

On a number of occasions in the thematic chapters below comparisons are made between the data captured by the *CPRS 2002* and that captured by other studies. As will be noted where appropriate this was done for a variety of reasons. Sometimes this might be done to explore a specific research theme of the *CPRS 2002*. At other times it might be done to provide additional validation of the robustness of the *CPRS 2002*'s data. At other times it might be done simply to highlight the obvious point that in a multi-party democracy the Conservative Party does not operate in a vacuum. Nevertheless, the focus of the study is the Conservative Party and not the wider British political culture.

## **EXISTING WORK ABOUT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY**

As indicated above, as one of the major political institutions of Britain the “centre-right” Conservative Party has been an enduring subject of scrutiny of every sort. Some of this has been journalistic: every day the Conservative Party features in national, local and international newspapers, radio, television and

latterly on the internet, and many instances are referenced in this report. Some of this has been academic: peer-reviewed politics and history journals regularly feature articles on the Party and there are many books written by acknowledged scholars, and numerous instances are referenced in this report. Market research companies also study the Party and attitudes towards it from the most basic items about voting intention to attitudes about leaders and policy as well as the general social and political environment, and again such work is referred to in this report. There is also ongoing research on the Party at various universities at various levels<sup>22</sup>.

However, studies that are both thematically wide-ranging and quantitative are much rarer. No more will be said here since this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

A traditional, all-embracing literature review is also not found in this chapter. Because of the thematic nature of the report it makes for better comprehension to deal with the literature in appropriate depth in each chapter. However, whilst many of the thematic chapters can be read on their own it is only in combination that they fulfil the main purpose of the *CPRS 2002* which is to provide an objective measure of the attitudes, behaviour and background of Conservative politicians.

It is this mixture of the thematic breadth of the study, the nature of the targets of the study, the quantitative and replicable nature of the study, and the methodologically rigorous way in that this was done that assures the *CPRS 2002*'s contribution to knowledge within political science.

The rest of this chapter will be taken with a number of matters. First, there is some general scene-setting about the Conservative Party in 2002 and which reiterates a key element of the motivation behind this study. Following this, there are a few words of more general scene-setting about Britain and the world in 2002, particularly as it was most relevant to the thematic chapters. This chapter ends with an overview of each of the thematic chapters including, by way of a taster, some of the main findings in each.

## **THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 2002**

### **A Nadir in the Party's Fortunes**

Having been in power since 1979 under first Margaret Thatcher and then John Major, for various reasons the Party's national support collapsed from 1992 and it was finally crushed under the Tony Blair-led New Labour landslide of 1997. The Conservative Party was reduced to just 165 seats at Westminster including none outside of England. The 2001 general election produced an almost identical result. It was not until years after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork that the Conservative Party began to recapture lost national support

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<sup>21</sup> Gabb, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Such as Heppell, 2009.



and it took until after another narrower general election loss in 2005 for the Party to consistently lead Labour in the polls. In the meantime the Conservatives failed to win a single Parliamentary by-election between 1997 and 2005.

Mention should also be made of the relative success of the Liberal Democrats which during this period returned its largest number of MPs since the 1920s. During the period around the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork any occasional apparent increase in support for the Conservatives was often due to a decline in support for Labour which moved instead to the Liberal Democrats. Support for the Conservatives remained static and often unable to break out of a 30%-35% voting intention “ghetto”.

Turning briefly to the then newer Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, in 1999 the Conservatives came a distant third behind Labour (in both cases) and the SNP and Plaid Cymru respectively. That said, on both occasions they edged out the Liberal Democrats for third place, largely thanks to the use of proportional representation. Brief mention will also be made of the Greater London Assembly elsewhere in this study.

On an institutional level the Conservative Party was suffering a long-term decline in membership. However, it was not alone in this with at least the larger political parties and also some major pressure groups suffering a similar decline.

Talk of Conservative members leads to mention of another event directly affecting the Party and which forms an important part of the *CPRS 2002*. The *CPRS 2002* came at an historic time for the Party in that only the year before it had conducted its first all-members leadership contest where, at least in the final ballot, all members and hence all respondents to this study had an equal vote.<sup>23</sup>

### **The “Nasty Party”?**

It was common currency amongst many both inside and outside of the Party to claim that it had become and continued to be unelectable on a national level after 1992 largely because of its attitudes and policy prescriptions.<sup>24</sup> The description of the Conservatives as “the nasty party” was (in)famously made by the Conservative MP and then Party chairman Theresa May at the 2002 Conservative Party Conference. The “nasty party” thesis was that the Party was overtly sexist, racist and homophobic and generally “bigoted”, as well as being mean-spirited and uncaring about the poor witnessed by a perceived opposition to state

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<sup>23</sup> See, for example, the following for much more detail on the facts and figures of the preceding: *BBC News*, May 1999; Broughton, October 2004: 350-351; Croucher, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2002; Davies, 6<sup>th</sup> January 2006; Dorey, 2003: 131; Landale, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2001; Leake, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2000; Leeke, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2003: 9; Mellows-Facer, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2005: 14; Morgan, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2001: 5; MORI, March 2009; Norton, 1997: 80; Norton, 2002: 68; Osborne, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2000; Rallings & Thrasher, April 2003: 271; Riddell, 1997: 19; Sanders & Brynin, 1999: 219; Travis, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2002; UK Polling Report, March 2009, May 2009; Young, 11<sup>th</sup> May 2005: 7.

welfare and the NHS. Not only were these were bad own their own, the thesis continued, but they were also electorally damaging.<sup>25</sup>

Whether or not the Conservative Party and its politicians were “nasty” or “nice” depends in part on a normative—ought/ought not—and subjective assessment. It is not the purpose of this study to prove or refute such views. That is a matter of one’s own political beliefs. But before that, if the task is to be undertaken with any seriousness, it requires more positive—is/is not—and objective evidence of what was actually being thought and said. This is the main task of the *CPRS 2002*.

## But Was It So Bad?

All of that said, there have been “revisionist” analyses of the period around 2002.<sup>26</sup> These have argued, for example, that opinion polls under-reported the level of support for the Conservatives. Also that by some measures, particularly in local elections in England,<sup>27</sup> the electoral performance of the Party was not wholly disastrous which suggests that the “feel on the doorstep” might be different for some *CPRS 2002* respondents than it was for others. Also that the first-past-the-post voting system, tactical voting, the distribution of the population with constituency boundaries and other aspects of the UK’s electoral system were particularly damaging to the Conservatives when compared to the other main parties.

Others argued that the Party’s long-term electoral problems were not so much because of being perceived to be unpleasant towards homosexuals, women and racial minorities but due to a failure to engage in issues such as education and crime. Conversely, others argued that the Conservative Party’s adherence to supposedly unpopular “traditional” policies was often illusory. Instead, it has been claimed, the Party leadership adopted a “progressive” agenda after each general election defeat only to switch to more traditional policies when this tactic failed to gain support. In turn, this was too late to win elections but just in time to save the modernizers from blame for the defeat.

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<sup>24</sup> Kent, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2001.

<sup>25</sup> See for example: Carr, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2002; O’Sullivan, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2009; Wegg-Prosser, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2001; Williams, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>26</sup> Found in whole or part in, for example: Berrington, October 2001: 213-214; Broughton, 2003: 204 and 211; Broughton, October 2004: 352; Burns & Cowell, 7<sup>th</sup> May 2010; Evans, Curtice & Norris, 1998: 76-77; Glover, 9<sup>th</sup> February 2002; Heffer 6<sup>th</sup> July 2002 and 12<sup>th</sup> October 2002; Hetherington, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2001; Kimber, 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2008; McAllister & Studlar, 2000: 368; MORI, March 2009; O’Sullivan, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2009; Rallings & Thrasher, April 2004: 394; UK Polling Report, March 2009.

<sup>27</sup> In May 2010 exactly the opposite phenomenon occurred. On the same day that the Conservatives made net gains and Labour made net losses at the general election, in local elections held in much of England the Conservatives made net losses of both seats and councils—as did the Liberal Democrats—whilst Labour made net gains. See *BBC News*, 8<sup>th</sup> May 2010. This might merely be a “one of those things” coincidence or a phenomenon due to differential turnout even down to a ward level. Or it might be due to conscious and quite sophisticated behaviour such as compensatory split-ticket voting.

Commentators have also argued that between 1997 and 2001 the Conservatives became more professional in their presentational approach, utilising modern marketing concepts and techniques.<sup>28</sup> These met with little electoral success in 2001, the results confirming political marketing analysis that the Conservatives did not offer a viable product voters wanted to buy. However, it has been argued that there were long-term benefits. William Hague's marketing background and skills had attracted more young people and (ironically, by some lights) women and ethnic minorities to the Party as well as winning more local council seats and bequeathed to Iain Duncan Smith and in turn his successors a more professional organisation, if one that was still imperfectly so.<sup>29</sup>

## BRITAIN AND THE WORLD IN 2002

### Britain

It is worth a few words placing the *CPRS 2002* within a period in time. On a national level there were a number of issues affecting the UK such as the Good Friday Agreement as part of the Northern Ireland peace process which was signed in April 1998<sup>30</sup> and the devolution of powers in Scotland, Wales and—albeit of a different nature—London. These are matters that are explored one way or another in the following thematic chapters.

One or two of the headline economic and social conditions of 2002 should also be mentioned, not least because such issues feature prominently in the thematic chapters. By some measures the UK remained the world's fourth largest economy in terms of GDP<sup>31</sup> although economic growth in the UK had fallen in the preceding two years<sup>32</sup> but would rise again until the economic problems that came to the fore in 2008. Unemployment appeared to be at a low level.<sup>33</sup> In other words, the general perception was probably that things were “ticking along” reasonably well.

It is not the place here to go into the vexed question of the accuracy of crime statistics.<sup>34</sup> However, according to the *British Crime Survey* actual as opposed to reported crime had been falling since 1995.<sup>35</sup> This must be set against a huge rise in, for example, violent crime in absolute terms since the 1940s and 1950s, something that occurred within the lifetimes of many *CPRS 2002* respondents and which by 2002 made the UK one of the most crime-ridden countries within the developed world.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Lees-Marshment, November 2001: 929, 938-939.

<sup>29</sup> Ashcroft, 2005.

<sup>30</sup> Northern Ireland Office, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Nation Master, 2009.

<sup>32</sup> Trading Economics, 2009.

<sup>33</sup> National Statistics, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2008.

<sup>34</sup> Ford, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2010.

<sup>35</sup> Jansson, 2007: 8.

## The World

Internationally, this was now a “post-9/11” world and the “War on Terror” was underway. US-led military forces including those of the UK had invaded Afghanistan. However, the fieldwork for the study was taken a year before the invasion of Iraq in which British forces would also participate and three years before the 7/7 attacks in London. This was, perhaps, early days in a process<sup>37</sup> the final outcome of which—if there can be such a thing—is still uncertain. Again, some of these are matters that feature below.

The *Maastricht Treaty*, which had been particularly painful for the Conservatives,<sup>38</sup> was history. However, one of the first acts of the incoming Labour government was to sign the *Amsterdam Treaty* in 1997, something which for good or ill furthered the process of European integration. No comprehensive study of the Conservative Party conducted in the last few decades can possibly avoid this topic. Indeed, some might take issue with this paragraph being in a sub-section titled “The World” rather than the preceding one titled “Britain”.<sup>39</sup>

## AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

Chapter 2 (p. 23) describes the methodology of the *CPRS 2002*. Following this there are a number of thematic chapters.

Chapter 3 (p. 43): ‘*Beyond “Left and Right”: The Political Map*’: This chapter explores the failings of the traditional one-dimensional “left and right” model of ideology, looking instead at a two-dimensional model combining socio-economic relationships on the one hand and civil liberties and morality on the other. This model is refined and operationalised using statistically robust values dimensions into a device termed the Political Map (PoliMap). This is used to measure and plot *CPRS 2002* respondents and when used in this manner they are seen to inhabit a constrained area of the PoliMap.

Chapter 4 (p. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 64): ‘*Socio-Demographic Analysis of Conservative Local Councillors In England*’: Using an additional battery of items—asked only of this largest group of respondents due to the potentially identifying nature of the items—concerning matters such as age, sex, race, education, political experience and employment, a picture is drawn of Conservative Party local councillors in England at the time. They are compared in a number of ways to councillors from the other major parties and also the general public. The “typical” Conservative local councillor was a middle-class, middle-aged, white male; but so too were those from the other main parties. The association between

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<sup>36</sup> Bartholomew, 2004: 15-16.

<sup>37</sup> Meek, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Baker, Gamble & Ludlum, 1994; Ludlum, 1996.

<sup>39</sup> North, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2009; 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2010; Szamuely, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2010.

socio-demographic differences and attitudinal differences is also studied, with the perhaps surprising finding that there was very little.

Chapter 5 (p. 93): *'Attitudes towards the Conservative Party'*: Issues such as the Party's beliefs, prospects, public image and leadership are studied here. The evidence suggests that many respondents were out-of-touch and overly optimistic about the state of the Party in 2002. However, there was a perceived need to change the Party's public image if not actual beliefs inasmuch as respondents believed that they knew what these were. Regarding attitudes towards present and past leaders of the Party, there were striking results for Edward Heath, who was somewhat disliked, and Margaret Thatcher, who was the object of something approaching worship.

Chapter 6 (p. 109): *'Attitudes towards Other UK Parties'*: To those versed in Conservative local politics in particular there was the unsurprising finding that the Liberal Democrats were more disliked than Labour although it was not *objectively* clear why from the data. When looking at attitudes towards some of those that were generally perceived to be smaller, single-issue parties, attitudes towards them were significantly associated with their signature issue and in the direction of these parties' perceived inclinations.

Chapter 7 (p. 122): *'The Wider World'*: Of particular interest was to see if a general observation that attitudes towards the EU, the USA and Israel were associated was also true amongst Conservative politicians. They were. Euro-sceptic, pro-USA and pro-Israeli views tended to be associated with each other and some explanations are tentatively offered. Other issues explored include the Commonwealth, where there was support for stronger ties to both the Old and (albeit less so) New Commonwealths, and the Islamic world where there mixed views about the prospects for long-term peace between the Western and Islamic worlds.

Chapter 8 (p. 133): *'National Identity'*: This chapter looks at attitudes about England, Scotland and Wales vis-à-vis the UK and also the EU and how respondents perceived themselves. Whilst there was evidence for a mixed British and English/Scottish/Welsh identity there was much less support for European as a component of self-identity. Also studied were issues such as devolution and an English parliament. Whilst there was little appetite for Scottish or Welsh independence or an English parliament let alone English regional assemblies, there was acceptance from respondents from what was the most anti-devolution of the major political parties of the constitutional changes that had actually happened by 2002. There was also an attempt to develop and deploy a typology of national identity in a more general sense. However, this suffered due the extreme directional loading of responses although there were some interesting results when this same typology was used to analyse the general public by way of comparison.

Chapter 9 (p. 141): *'The Free-Market as "A Necessary Evil" or "A Good Thing"?'*: This short chapter examines whether a demonstrable tendency amongst respondents to support free-market economics and

the private sector was likely based upon utilitarian or ideological grounds. It was clear that whilst respondents believed that the private sector was more efficient than the public sector this tendency was less evident when considering its worthiness. Drawing upon data from local councillors in England, there was some evidence that experience of employment was associated with differing attitudes towards the private and public sectors with those employed in the latter less likely to believe in the superior worthiness of the former.

Chapter 10 (p. 145): *'Religion'*: Looking briefly at confessional background, more space is given to looking at both private religious views and attitudes towards the role of religion in society and what impact religious views might have on more secular attitudes. Whilst respondents tended to be personally somewhat religious they could hardly be described as zealots when it came to the role of religion in public life. "Religion" in either sense seemed to have little impact on more earthly values. The possible real exception was attitudes towards the environment, where stronger personal religious beliefs were positively correlated with holding "green" views and the "stewardship versus dominion" argument about religion and the environment is noted.

Chapter 11 (p. 158): *'The Party-Political Institutions'*: Issues such as where respondents believe political power should lie at an institutional level are analysed, as is why people become politicians. There was a perhaps conservative and/or nationalist attitude towards the various legislative bodies, with noticeably more hostility to the newer bodies such as those in Scotland, Wales, London and Europe compared to Westminster or elected local authorities. This was mediated by an unsurprising tendency of respondents to be more favourable to the body on which they sat than were others although this was irrespective of whether they were in power in those bodies. With the exception of Peers there was a noticeable divide between parliamentarians of all sorts who tended to cite ideological reasons for going into politics and local councillors who were more likely to regard themselves as representatives of the electorate.

Chapter 12 (p. 171): *'The Conservative Party Leadership Contest of 2001'*: All stages are analysed, from the MPs-only initial contest with five candidates through to the final contest between Ken Clarke and Iain Duncan Smith where all members had a vote. Along the way matters such as informal input into the contest by non-MPs at the early stages are also studied. Attitudes associated with support for the various candidates are identified. It is clear that, based upon the response from politicians, the final choice between Clarke and Duncan Smith was in notable part an internal Party referendum on the UK's relationship with the EU, with a secondary issue being perceptions of the condition and general popularity of the Party. The more Euro-sceptic and the more optimistic respondents were then the more likely they were to have backed Duncan Smith.

Chapter 13 (p. 190): *'The General Public and Electoral Politics'*: Drawing in part on material from some of the preceding chapters and making considerable use of secondary data, this chapter opens up the *CPRS 2002* to the beliefs and voting behaviour of the general public. First, the views of respondents and the

public about the main concerns facing Britain are compared and whilst in ordinal terms these were similar there were clear differences in that the public was more concerned about bread and butter issues than *CPRS 2002* respondents. The next section looks at the experiences of respondents in fighting elections, particularly against Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The antipathy towards the latter is again noted. However, it is also clear that electoral considerations were not as important as ideological ones when looking at attitudes towards the Party's two main rivals. Finally, the chapter returns to the PoliMap and is used to plot and compare both *CPRS 2002* respondents and the public. It is shown that both inhabit constrained areas of the PoliMap and that whilst these overlap there are considerable differences. The implications of this on gathering electoral support are discussed.

Chapter 14 (p. 209): *'The Socio-Demographic and Attitudinal Profile of Future Higher-Level Conservative Party Politicians'*: By identifying a subset of local councillors most likely to become MPs or MEPs at subsequent elections and comparing these to sitting MPs, an impression is formed of whether the ideological and socio-demographic profile of senior Conservative politicians might shift in some manner. In fact, absent of socio-demographic positive discrimination and/or attitudinal litmus testing, based solely on generational replacement it seemed unlikely that there would be many dramatic changes in the intakes of the two or three general elections after 2002.

Chapter 15 (p. 218): *'Bringing the Findings Together'*: This chapter offers some concluding remarks including the drawing of a word picture of the "average" Conservative politician of the time but also discussing differences between the average views expressed in the *CPRS 2002* and the views of the Party as an entity as expressed, for example, in manifestos. The chapter concludes by arguing that the *CPRS 2002* studies a time that was a notable juncture in the history of the Party.

Chapter 16 (p. 224): *'Beyond the CPRS 2002'*: This final, brief chapter notes the possibilities of further research, both additional analysis of the data captured by the *CPRS 2002* and as using this data as the starting point for a time-series dataset. In doing so, and by treating the *CPRS 2002* as a pilot study and candidly acknowledging some of its weaknesses, some advice is offered about how subsequent studies might be improved.

## CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

### TYPES OF STUDY AND THE *CPRS 2002*

In deciding how to conduct the *CPRS 2002* issues of practicality were of great importance in deciding the nature of the study. What might have been possible for a large and well-funded team was not for a lone researcher. Although qualitative research might be able to produce richer data, the nature of the main study with aims including providing a wide-ranging thematic picture of the attitudes, behaviour and background of Conservative Party politicians made quantitative research a more appropriate tool for a number of reasons. At the simplest, it is more straightforward to analyse.<sup>40</sup> The use of statistically validated, multi-item scales in the study—the chosen method to obtain a wide-ranging but objective picture—directed the use of quantitative techniques. Flavour could have been added with the use of *some* open questions,<sup>41</sup> but given how time-consuming coding even these can be<sup>42</sup> it was decided against it mindful of both how lengthy even the purely closed questionnaire was and the impact on the length of the subsequent report.

A review of studies of the Conservative Party indicates a variety of aims and methodologies, for example quantitative or qualitative, general histories or analysing specific themes. Of course, a work that broadly falls into one type will often contain elements of another and the borders can be fuzzy. To reiterate, there is nothing wrong with qualitative research and in-depth interviews. However, such things would not be the right tools commensurate with the aims and resources of the *CPRS 2002* however desirable it might have been to be able to capture the “essence and ambience” of an issue via qualitative as opposed to quantitative research which deals in “counts and measures”.<sup>43</sup>

In short, the *CPRS 2002* is quantitative and general. The only comparable study to the *CPRS 2002* is that by Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd and Jeremy Richardson published in 1994 as *True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership*.<sup>44</sup> However, there are important differences between it and the *CPRS 2002*. The main difference is the respondents within the Party. *True Blues* was a study of Conservative Party *members*, whereas the *CPRS 2002* focuses on Conservative Party *politicians*. In addition, although not a difference in kind, there is the passage of time. The fieldwork for the *True Blues* study was conducted in January to April 1992<sup>45</sup> when the Conservative Party formed the government whereas that for the *CPRS 2002* was conducted a decade later in April 2002 when it assuredly did not.

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<sup>40</sup> Bryman, 2008: 238.

<sup>41</sup> Moser & Kalton, 1971: 341-342.

<sup>42</sup> Bryman, 2008: 232.

<sup>43</sup> Berg, 1995: 3.

<sup>44</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson: 1994.

<sup>45</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson: 1994: 240.



## **A SMALL-SCALE PILOT STUDY**

Before proceeding, brief mention should be made that nearly two years before the fieldwork for the *CPRS 2002* proper a small-scale pilot study looking at just two issues was conducted. One was an attempt to create an alternative operationalisation of the PoliMap that will be discussed in Chapter 3. This used a question set along the lines of a semantic differential format.<sup>46</sup>

The other was an attempt to create a new multi-item scale, provisionally called the “Judeo-Christian Concerns” scale, based upon a speech given by the then leader of the Conservative Party, William Hague, to the Black Majority Churches’ joint millennium “Faith in the Future” celebration in July 2000.<sup>47</sup> In his speech Hague focused on a number of alleged threats to society such as Third-world debt, drug use, family breakdown, crime, the easy availability of violent and sexually explicit material, and the promotion in schools of homosexuality.

The two-page questionnaire, covering letter and pre-paid reply envelope were despatched in September 2000. Further details can be found in Appendix 1. The recipients of the questionnaire were elected members of the Conservative group on the council of the London Borough of Bromley and also all members of the committee and all ordinary members of Plaistow Branch, Bromley & Chislehurst Conservative Association. From the 70 questionnaires despatched the response rate was 69%.

Neither of these devices were included in the final questionnaire. In the case of the PoliMap, however innovative the operationalisation used in the pilot study might have been with further development it was superseded by the more conventional and tried-and-tested Left-Right and Authoritarianism scales.

That said, according to the measures used in the pilot study respondents—including local councillors—tended to have mildly free-market economic views coupled with mildly socially authoritarian views. These findings do not go against what is described throughout this report.

The Judeo-Christian Concerns scale looked more promising. However, it too was superseded by existing scales that dealt with similar issues. In what was an increasingly lengthy questionnaire, it was decided to omit this potential new scale.

## **AN ISSUE WITH DEVELOPING THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Unfortunately it was not possible to pilot the main questionnaire, responses to which form the basis of the following thematic chapters. This was for two reasons, both time-related. First, the mailing lists for most

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<sup>46</sup> De Vaus, 1996: 88.

<sup>47</sup> Hague, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2000; Buchanan, 6<sup>th</sup> July 2000.

groups of potential respondents were easy to compile. Even local councillors in Scotland and Wales were not too difficult given how few of them there were. However, local councillors in England, who numbered in their thousands, were another matter. A database of local councillors in England was purchased from a commercial supplier and then kept up-to-date each week by following local by-elections on both specialist politics and local authority websites—which at the time were often slow and hard to navigate—and where necessary email and hardcopy enquiries to local councils. However, in May 2002 local elections were scheduled throughout England and this would have undone a great deal of work.

Second, the Party's leadership contest of 2001 was a major component of the *CPRS 2002* and time was slipping away when it came to accurate recall of the events and participation in them.

## **TOPICS COVERED**

### **Aims of the Research**

The *CPRS 2002* is an analysis of attitudes and beliefs along with a smaller number of behavioural and socio-demographic items. It is a multi-focus study centred on an analysis of the attitudinal culture of Conservative politicians in 2002. Within this there are a number of main objectives. First, to provide a wide-ranging snapshot of the values, attitudes, beliefs,<sup>48</sup> socio-demographic background and to a lesser extent behaviour of Conservative Party politicians. In other words, what has been referred to as “value and ideological orientations”, “cultural/national orientations” and “underlying social structure”.<sup>49</sup>

Second—although the analysis is shown towards the end of the study—to identify the sort of existing lower-level Conservative politicians most likely to “move up the ladder” and then to examine their attitudinal and socio-demographic profile both by themselves and against those they are most likely to replace in the years after the fieldwork.

Third, to analyse a number of more specific issues such as work on a two-dimensional mapping of ideology, predictors of support during the Party's 2001 leadership contest and other topics that are covered in the thematic chapters below.

Finally, and looking beyond the survey itself, to construct and lodge a dataset with the UK Data Archive based at the University of Essex to allow analysis and comparison by other researchers of the data itself and also the possibility of using it to form the start of a time-series dataset.

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<sup>48</sup> Schwartz, 2007: 169-170.

<sup>49</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[a]: 4.

To allow all of this, the questionnaire covered a variety of topics ranging from questions about abstract political, economic, social, religious and moral beliefs to more concrete issues of the day.

## **Topic Ordering**

The questions or items were grouped in subject blocks under distinct headings.<sup>50</sup> Some of these contained only one battery of items, others rather more. In order, these headings were (with page numbering referring to the original questionnaire):

- The United Kingdom (page 3)
- The Environment (page 4)
- Business, Labour Relations, Welfare and the Economy (pages 4 to 5)
- Britain, Europe and the Wider World (pages 5 to 7)
- Ethnicity, Citizenship and National Image (pages 7 to 8)
- Society and Culture (pages 8 to 9)
- The Conduct of Politics (pages 9 to 11)
- The Political Parties (pages 11 to 14)
- The 2001 Conservative Party Leadership Contest (page 15)
- Religion (page 16)
- A Few Questions About Yourself (pages 17 to 18)
- Additional Questions for Local Councillors in England (pages 19 to 20)

Although is it impossible to cover everything, it can be seen from the preceding list that a wide range of topics was covered in the *CPRS 2002*.

## **THE RESPONDENTS**

### **The Intended Targets**

With a view towards obtaining as wide-ranging as possible picture of Conservative politicians the *CPRS 2002* targeted all main groups of the Party's publically elected—or appointed or inherited in the case of Peers—politicians. These groups were the Party's members of the House of Commons (MPs), members of the House of Lords (Peers), members of the European Parliament (MEPs), members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), members of the Welsh Assembly (AMs), members of the Greater London Assembly (GLAs), and local councillors in England (ELCs), Scotland (SLCs) and Wales (WLCs).

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<sup>50</sup> Bryman, 2008: 204.

## Identifying the Targets and Sampling

Questionnaires were sent out to all members of all groups with the exception of ELCs where, because of the numbers involved, a 10% random sample was used. Except again for ELCs, mailing lists for all of the groups of respondents, whose names and some form of contact address were a matter of public record, were constructed from various online or hardcopy sources and any changes such as those due to by-elections were also easily dealt with in the same manner.<sup>51</sup>

There were two duplicates between the groups. One member of the House of Lords was also an MEP, and one local councillor in Scotland was also a member of the Scottish parliament. These individuals were assigned solely to the MEP and MSP groups respectively because these two groups were better served by the boost in increased size than the alternatives.

In short, for these groups the *CPRS 2002* was an attempted census.<sup>52</sup>

For Conservative local councillors in England a census was impractical. With approximately 6550 Conservative local councillors in England at the time of the fieldwork a comprehensive database would have been difficult to construct from scratch. Moreover, it would have been prohibitively expensive to print and despatch this number of questionnaires. Instead, a ready-made mailing list of all Conservative local councillors in England was purchased at a reduced cost from Keystroke Knowledge<sup>53</sup> in Northumbria, England, and then kept up-to-date until just before despatch using online and hardcopy sources and where necessary direct enquiries to the local councils involved.

When it was time to despatch the questionnaires a number of operations were involved in obtaining the 10% random sample of ELCs. First, there were rather more Conservative local council positions (6818) than there were individual councillors (6549). This was because a number of ELCs were members of both district and county councils. These duplicates were identified and removed using various permutations of Microsoft *Access*'s "find duplicates" query function and/or by eye. This two-tier system of local government was only found in the English shire regions, with most urban local authorities in England and all local authorities in Scotland and Wales being unitary in nature.<sup>54</sup> No distinction was made between these two tiers since in combination they were, in effect, what unitary local authorities were elsewhere.

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<sup>51</sup> Edkins, 2005

<sup>52</sup> De Vaus, 1996: 60.

<sup>53</sup> Keystroke Knowledge, c. 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Fenney, 2000: 15-16, 231.

The 6549 local councillors were each then assigned a unique number from 1 to 6549. An online random number generator<sup>55</sup> was then used to generate the required 10% sample, i.e. 655 numbers ranging from 1 to 6549. Where necessary, duplicate random numbers were identified and removed and more random numbers generated until 655 unique numbers had been generated. These were then matched against the full list of 6549 local councillors and the final 10% sample identified.

The numbers despatched of each type and in total can be found in Table 2.3 below.

## **Who and Where Were Excluded**

All the respondents represented wards, regions or constituencies in mainland Britain (although one could argue that Peers represented the whole of the UK). Around the time of the fieldwork there were some local councillors sitting in Northern Ireland who had been elected as Conservatives,<sup>56</sup> but too few to study.

Members of parish or town councils<sup>57</sup> were also excluded for a number of reasons. At the time of the study members of such bodies were often difficult to locate, and there was also still a strong ethos of ostensibly non-partisan representation with candidates standing as “Ratepayers” or similar.

As for the other British Isles—the Isle of Man, the Isles of Scilly and the Channel Islands—at the time of the study none of the mainland political parties were represented on locally elected governing bodies<sup>58</sup> and/or these places were not constitutionally part of the UK.

## **ETHICAL ISSUES**

There are a number of main ethical issues of which researchers need to be aware. These include “lack of informed consent”, “deception”, “invasion of privacy” and “harm to participants”.<sup>59</sup> Given the use of a voluntary, self-completion questionnaire, the first of these surely falls.

There was no deception involved. The items in the questionnaire were just that, no more and no less. Given the use of a postal questionnaire, there was no meaningful invasion of privacy as there might have been with real-time techniques such as telephone interviewing or face-to-face interviewing.

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<sup>55</sup> Haahr, 1999.

<sup>56</sup> Taylor, 2000: 1418.

<sup>57</sup> Fenney, 2000: 14-16.

<sup>58</sup> Taylor, 2000: 1437-1446.

<sup>59</sup> Bryman, 2008: 118.

This leaves harm to participants. It is possible that some respondents might have feared for their standing with the Party, press and electorate if they said “the wrong thing”. This is why the survey was conducted under the cloak of anonymity and not just assurances of confidentiality. It was also why few potentially identifying questions were asked about sex, age and so except in the case of local councillors in England where the sheer number made identification of individual respondents unlikely.

## **THE MULTI-ITEM SCALES**

### **Types of Scales**

With a view to obtaining a wide-ranging and systematic picture of attitudes many of the individual items in the questionnaire were always intended to serve as components of multi-item scales designed to provide “a useable measure of a theoretical construct”.<sup>60</sup>

In many cases these were values-dimensions used with a view to identifying “underlying ‘deep-rooted’ value orientations”<sup>61</sup> and as such they transcended specific actions and situations.<sup>62</sup> Examples include Authoritarianism and Left-Right. It has been argued that there are ten basic types of values, identifiable in terms of their goals.<sup>63</sup> If this is the case, then it is clear that the dimensions featured in the *CPRS 2002* represented some of these more than others. The most prominent were those identifying attitudes towards “power” (“social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources”), “conformity” (“restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms”), “tradition” (“respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self”), “universalism” (“understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature”) and “security” (“safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships, and of self”). Less present were the more personal ones found under the concepts of “achievement”, “hedonism”, “stimulation” “self-direction” and “benevolence”.

Other scales were more concerned with the here and now of politics as it was relevant to *CPRS 2002* respondents. Examples include the Optimism and Intra-Party Elitism scales.

### **Purpose and Derivation of the Scales**

The full wording of the items that make up each scale can be found in Appendix 3 and their purpose can be discerned from this. However, since they play such an important role in the analyses in the following

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<sup>60</sup> Judd, Smith & Kidder, 1991: 147

<sup>61</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[e]: 235.

<sup>62</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[f]: 262.

<sup>63</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[f]: 267-268, 294-296.

thematic chapters the name of each and if not absolutely self-evident a brief word about their purpose—what construct or issue they seek to illustrate—is set out in alphabetical order:

- *Authoritarianism*: Law and order; morality.
- *Environmentalism*: State of the Earth; individual/government responsibilities.
- *Europeanism*: UK's relationship with the European Union
- *Feminism*: Role of women in society at large.
- *Intra-Party Elitism*: Control or running of the Conservative Party
- *Intra-Party Inclusivity*: Promoting women and minorities with the Conservative Party.
- *Left-Right*: Economic relations; egalitarianism versus inegalitarianism
- *Optimism*: Present state and future fortunes of the Conservative Party
- *Political Elitism*: Control or running of the government and country
- *Postmaterialism*: Physical security versus self expression.
- *Pride in Heritage and Culture*: Of the UK
- *Pride in the Way the Nation Functions*: Of the UK
- *Protectionism*: Foreign people and goods/services.
- *Religiosity*: Personal religious beliefs.
- *Theocratism*: Role of religion in public life.

Table 2.1 provides more information about these scales, specifically the number of individual items within each and its derivation. The derivation refers to any direct connection between other studies and the *CPRS 2002*. However, many of the non-original scales are frequently encountered elsewhere in at least somewhat similar forms.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> *European Social Survey, 2007[e]*: 236.

TABLE 2.1: MULTI-ITEM SCALES: NUMBER OF ITEMS AND DERIVATION		
Scale	Items	Derivation
Authoritarianism	7	Items used in the <i>British Social Attitudes</i> series. <sup>65</sup>
Environmentalism	5	Items used in the <i>British Social Attitudes</i> series. <sup>66</sup>
Europeanism	7	Items used in Baker <i>et al.</i> <sup>67</sup>
Feminism	5	Items used in the <i>British Representation Study 1997</i> . <sup>68</sup>
Intra-Party Elitism	3	Items used in Lees-Marshment & Quayle. <sup>69</sup>
Intra-Party Inclusivity	3	Items used in the <i>British Election Panel Study 1997-1998</i> . <sup>70</sup>
Left-Right	5	Items used in the <i>British Social Attitudes</i> series. <sup>71</sup>
Optimism	10	Original to the <i>CPRS 2002</i>
Political Elitism	4	Items used in Copus. <sup>72</sup>
Postmaterialism	4	Developed by Ronald Inglehart. <sup>73</sup>
Pride in Heritage and Culture	5	Items in <i>British Social Attitudes Survey 1995</i> . <sup>74</sup>
Pride in the Way the Nation Functions	4	Items in <i>British Social Attitudes Survey 1995</i> . <sup>75</sup>
Protectionism	5	Items in <i>British Social Attitudes Survey 1995</i> . <sup>76</sup>
Religiosity	3	Items used in the <i>International Social Survey Programme's survey Religion I</i> . <sup>77</sup>
Theocratism	3	Items used in the <i>International Social Survey Programme's survey Religion I</i> . <sup>78</sup>
Traditional British Liberties	4	Original to the <i>CPRS 2002</i>
Welfarism	8	Items used in the <i>British Social Attitudes</i> series. <sup>79</sup>
Xenophobia	8	Items in <i>British Social Attitudes Survey 1995</i> . <sup>80</sup>

<sup>65</sup> e.g. NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

<sup>66</sup> e.g. NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[a].

<sup>67</sup> Baker *et al*, 1998.

<sup>68</sup> Norris, 1997.

<sup>69</sup> Lees-Marshment & Quayle, April 2000.

<sup>70</sup> Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 1999.

<sup>71</sup> e.g. NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

<sup>72</sup> Copus, April 2000.

<sup>73</sup> e.g Inglehart, 1990: 74-75.

<sup>74</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

<sup>75</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

<sup>76</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

<sup>77</sup> *ISSP*, 1991.

<sup>78</sup> *ISSP*, 1991.

<sup>79</sup> e.g. NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[c].

<sup>80</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.



The two scales noted as being original to the *CPRS 2002*, Optimism and Traditional British Liberties, were not piloted as they were relatively late inclusions. Whilst statistically robust, the latter made little impact on the analyses. However, as will be seen in particular from Chapter 12 on the Party's 2001 leadership contest, Optimism, which looked at attitudes towards the present state and likely fortunes of the Party, was a more successful development. It was largely a product of what were originally intended to be a range of stand-alone items about the Party but which provably amounted to something more.

## Subject Ordering

The ordering of blocks of topics, and hence multi-item scales, was not haphazard. In particular, relatively personal questions were deliberately left to the end for fear of putting off some respondents.<sup>81</sup> Other than that, there was no need to order the blocks in the sense that there was a logical requirement either to have answered one before another or not to have done so.<sup>82</sup>

There is evidence that there can be a fall-off of response rate for batteries placed near the end of a lengthy questionnaire.<sup>83</sup> However, it is hard to calculate whether this was the case with the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire since, looking at the multi-item scales, it is difficult to untangle presentation order, the number of component items, the position of items on the page and the nature of the subject of the items. However, an informed opinion can be arrived at. Response rates were analysed for the first *item* at the top of each page where these all used the same five-level Likert-type response sets. Little detail is required. Based upon the whole dataset of 505 respondents, response rates for these items were remarkably consistent at between 97% and 100%. In other words, there is little evidence of any fall-off in response rate based upon how far along the questionnaire was the item.

The influence of the ordering of individual items within subject blocks is equivocal.<sup>84</sup> It was accepted as something about which little could be done within the constraints of the *CPRS 2002*. For example, it was impractical to create and despatch multiple versions of the questionnaire even if this was methodologically acceptable.<sup>85</sup>

The direction of the wording of individual items is another matter. The potential problems of a response set and "the tendency to answer all questions in a specific direction regardless of their content"<sup>86</sup> caused by wording all questions in the same direction—such as all "agree" responses indicating Euro-sceptic views—are well known. Wherever possible the use of such unbalanced sets<sup>87</sup> was avoided. However,

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<sup>81</sup> Bryman, 2008: 204.

<sup>82</sup> Bryman, 2008: 202-203; Moser & Kalton, 1971: 346.

<sup>83</sup> Moser & Kalton, 1971: 347.

<sup>84</sup> Duffy, 2004; Siminski, 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Bryman, 2008: 204.

<sup>86</sup> Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 263.

<sup>87</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 192.

often it could not be. In particular, some of the more important multi-item dimensions such as the Authoritarianism scale are often encountered in an unbalanced format despite there being evidence for some effects on responses because of this.<sup>88</sup> However, in practice the effects may often be small<sup>89</sup> particularly amongst the better-educated<sup>90</sup> which, certainly relative to the general public, includes the majority of *CPRS 2002* respondents as examined in Chapter 4.

Whatever the effects of unbalanced sets of items, since a direct comparison between *CPRS 2002* respondents and the British general public of approximately the same period formed a part of some of the analyses this problem had to be accepted. Again, this meant that solutions often used such as multiple versions of a questionnaire with different item ordering could not be used.

## PRESENTATION OF ITEMS IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE

### Types of Item

Most of the items were about attitudes, beliefs or normative standards and values.<sup>91</sup> There was a much smaller range of behavioural and experiential items. These included respondents' experiences of fighting elections, behaviour and attitudes during the Party's 2001 leadership contest, background in the Party and use of the Internet.

Local councillors in England were also presented with a range of socio-demographic items such as sex, age, occupation and duration of Party membership. These were deliberately not asked of the other respondents. Many of the other groups consisted of small numbers of individuals and it was believed that asking such people these types of questions would lead to identifying individual respondents, thus going against the promise of anonymity and not just confidentially made in the introductory letter printed on page 1 of the questionnaire which is reproduced in Appendix 5. In turn, it was feared that this would lower the response rate. Of course, anonymity meant that sending out reminders and in particular duplicate questionnaires—even if practical, which it was not—was impossible.<sup>92</sup>

### Response Options

The majority of attitudinal items within the questionnaire used a Likert-type response set.<sup>93</sup> The majority of *these* used a five-point, “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set including a “neither/nor mid-point option. Where this was not the case this was often because the items concerned factual issues

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<sup>88</sup> Heath *et al*, 1991: 9-17.

<sup>89</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 191.

<sup>90</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 192 & 202; Heath *et al*, 1991: 22.

<sup>91</sup> Bryman, 2008: 239.

<sup>92</sup> Oppenheim, 1992: 105.

such as socio-demographic indicators or else the source of the items and scales used a different set of response options. Where appropriate this will be made clear in the thematic chapters.

In almost all cases respondents were not offered a “Don’t know” option.

The use or not of mid-points and/or “Don’t know” options continues to divide opinion concerning issues such as forcing responses, obtaining a stronger sense of the intensity of feeling or mitigating social desirability bias.<sup>94</sup>

The choices offered within the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire were for two reasons. First was the desire to maximise response rates from an often small number of potential respondents. It is likely that any forced responses would even out over the course of the whole dataset. Second, it was anticipated that some comparisons were to be made between data from the *CPRS 2002* and that other from other studies. In those specific instances most of these both *did* provide mid-point item and did *not* provide a “Don’t know” option

## PHYSICAL DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

### Design Overview

The questionnaire consisted of 20 pages or sides. There were two different versions of the questionnaire: one for local councillors in England and one for all others. In every case the front cover of page 1 carried an introductory letter along with a set of instructions for respondents. In every case page 2 was left deliberately blank. In every case pages 3 to 18 consisted of a number of items dealing with the topics discussed above.

Most items were universal but there were a small number that only applied to some of the groups of respondents. For example, the unelected Peers were not asked about the nature of their constituency or ward. Where this was the case, there were clear instructions such as “For all except Peers” although any invalid responses would have been weeded out either at the data input or analysis stages.

Allowing for this and the very small number of questions that had a filter, there were approximately 215 questions in total on pages 3 to 18. For all respondents except ELCs, pages 19 and 20 were left deliberately blank. The version of the questionnaire for ELCs had two further pages, totalling 18 questions, on page 19 and the back cover, page 20. These pages contained the socio-demographic items noted above.

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<sup>93</sup> Bryman, 2008: 146-147.

<sup>94</sup> Bryman, 2008: 244; Converse & Presser, 1986: 35-37; Garland, 1991: 70.

Since the questionnaire was to be sent to potential respondents and in turn sent back by them, it was of a paper type. Since all groups except local councillors in England shared exactly the same questionnaire in terms of its content the various groups were distinguished by a combination of having different coloured covers (i.e. pages 1, 2, 19, and 20) or using different sized paper as described in Table 2.2.

Group	Type	Paper Size	Cover Colour
Local councillors in England (ELCs)	Full	A3 folded	White
House of Lords (Peers)	Partial	A3 folded	Blue
House of Commons (MPs)	Partial	A3 folded	White
Local councillors in Scotland (SLCs)	Partial	A3 folded	Orange
Local councillors in Wales (WLCs)	Partial	A3 folded	Gold
European Parliament (MEPs)	Partial	A3 folded	Pink
Scottish Parliament (MSPs)	Partial	A3 folded	Green
Greater London Assembly (GLAs)	Partial	A4	Cream
Welsh Assembly (AMs)	Partial	A4	Red

A blank specimen of the questionnaire sent to ELCs can be found in Appendix 5. The other questionnaire has not been included since it was the same as the one for ELCs but with pages 19 and 20 left blank.

## **Creating the Questionnaire**

The questionnaire was created using *Data Entry Builder*<sup>95</sup> which had advantages over using a straightforward DTP package in that it automatically created both the data input mask and the *SPSS* file needed for subsequent analysis.

## **The Introductory Letter from Eric Forth**

A separate introductory letter from Eric Forth, my own Conservative MP and then Shadow Leader of the House of Commons, accompanied each questionnaire. These were photocopies of an original written and signed on Mr Forth's House of Commons notepaper. The text of this can be found in Appendix 2.

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<sup>95</sup> SPSS, 2006.

## A Note about Questionnaire Length

The length of a questionnaire is likely to have some effect on response rate. Longer questionnaires will tend to have lower response rates than shorter ones because of the sheer length and/or because of the nature of any additional items not found in a hypothetical shorter version.<sup>96</sup> According to some authorities, questionnaires of the length of the ones used in the *CPRS 2002* in terms of both the number of pages and items<sup>97</sup> might be expected to experience a drop-off in response rate. However, there is no objective evidence that this was the case here and it was not possible to contact non-responders to ascertain the reasons for their non-response.

## DEPLOYING THE QUESTIONNAIRE

### Possible Methods

From the start, a self-completion postal survey was the only method of deploying the questionnaire that was seriously considered. It is true that face-to-face or telephone interviews can increase response rate by a substantial margin.<sup>98</sup> However, the hundreds of geographically widely distributed potential respondents made face-to-face interviewing by a sole researcher wholly impractical. Telephone interviewing was just as impractical given the same problem plus the length of the questionnaire and, more importantly, the unlikelihood of being able to reach many of the respondents even with a notional contact number. Computer assisted personal (CAPI) or telephone (CATI) interviewing<sup>99</sup> were also not practical given the nature of the respondents and the resources and contact details available.

It was not plausible to use the Internet whatever the advantages are such as lower cost.<sup>100</sup> Email addresses were not available for many on the list of potential respondents (and general Internet access or lack thereof is discussed in Chapter 4 on the socio-demographics of ELCs). Even if they had been, it could not be guaranteed that such a large document would get through any firewall or anti-virus software even assuming that it could be accepted in the days before the widespread use of broadband.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, as was anticipated, when asked about their use of email and the Internet in the actual questionnaire large minorities of some groups of respondents made little or no use of what was then relatively novel technology. The least “switched on”, reporting use of email less often than once a week or never, were ELCs (23%), Peers (42%) and MPs (20%).

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<sup>96</sup> Bryman, 2008: 221; Moser & Kalton, 1971: 263-264.

<sup>97</sup> Dillman, 1978: 55.

<sup>98</sup> Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 226.

<sup>99</sup> Bryman, 2008: 199.

<sup>100</sup> Bryman, 2008: 653.

<sup>101</sup> *BBC News*, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2003.

## Despatch

All questionnaires were despatched from the University by normal second class post—or the appropriate EU postal rate to MEPs in the European Parliament in Brussels—in the first two weeks of April 2002. Along with the separate letter from Eric Forth all questionnaires were accompanied by a pre-paid, printed reply envelope addressed to me at the University. The reply envelopes for the use of MEPs had the appropriate Belgian postage affixed.

## DATA CAPTURE

It had been intended to electronically scan in the responses. However, because of the physical design of the questionnaire, the physical nature of responses and the technology available it proved impractical to do this. Instead, the data was manually entered over a deliberately prolonged six-month period to lessen the chances of error from fatigue.

As noted above, the use of *Data Entry Builder* to create the questionnaire also created a data input mask. This lessened the chances of error in manually entering the data since it prevented implausible responses being entered. For example, the number “6” cannot be entered for an item that only had five possible responses such as found in a standard “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set. Instead, a button was marked corresponding to the respondent’s answer.

## RESPONSES

### Response Rates

Overall, the literature is equivocal about how good response rates have to be for a survey to be considered acceptable.<sup>102</sup> The actual response rates per group can be found in Table 2.3. Regarding the larger groups, the response rates varied by audience with that for Peers being rather low and that for MSPs very high. In general, the rates were between 35% and 45%. This was at the higher end for a mail survey without a follow-up<sup>103</sup> although somewhat lower than some comparable studies<sup>104</sup> although these often had the advantage of more resources such as seen in the use of reminders and duplicate questionnaires. In this respect the work of single researcher could not be expected to be comparable to the 70% or more that some high-end surveys obtain.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Bryman, 2008: 219-220.

<sup>103</sup> Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 226.

<sup>104</sup> e.g. Denver *et al*, 1999[a]; 1999[b]; IaDA, 2001: 1; Baker *et al*, 2002)

<sup>105</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[j]; 2007[k].

Logistic constraints coupled with the promise of anonymity as well as what might be considered moral considerations meant that devices such as advance letters, reminders, duplicate questionnaires (which anyway have the problem of inviting more than one response) let alone such devices as monetary incentives were not used even though these might have an impact on response rates above that of a simple, single-shot mailing.<sup>106</sup>

The true response rate is not merely the proportion of questionnaires returned but the proportion returned that are both fully completed and indicate that the respondent understood what they were doing and took the task seriously.<sup>107</sup> The returned *CPRS 2002* questionnaires indicated little problem with the latter and, whilst not every item was completed by every respondent, most were fully and appropriately completed (the slight problem with the Postmaterialism scale is noted below). It cannot be stated objectively that respondents were taking the survey seriously. However, it is surely very unlikely that someone would bother to go through so many items “just for a laugh”.

Group	Number Sent	Number Returned	Response Rate
Local councillors in England (ELCs)	655	283	43%
House of Lords (Peers)	221	60	27%
Westminster MPs (MPs)	166	52	31%
Local councillors in Scotland (SLCs)	112	48	43%
Local councillors in Wales (WLCs)	70	28	40%
European Parliament (MEPs)	36	14	39%
Scottish Parliament (SMPs)	19	14	74%
Greater London Assembly (GLAs)	9	4	44%
Welsh Assembly (AMs)	8	2	25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1296</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>39%</b>

Non-response is not a problem providing that “the people lost... were themselves a random subset of the sample, but this is very unlikely to be the case”.<sup>108</sup> However, because of both the anonymity involved in the *CPRS 2002* and also the deliberate omission of potentially identifying items of a socio-demographic nature it is difficult to explore non-response bias in most of the groups beyond the data presented in Table 2.3. For example, the response rate amongst all three groups of local councillors was remarkably consistent. More will be said about this in Chapter 4 about ELCs and how well the socio-demographic profile of *CPRS 2002* respondents matched that of the statistical population.

<sup>106</sup> e.g. Boser, April 1990: 6; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 230; Madhok *et al*, 1990; Nakash *et al*, 2006; Paul, Walsh & Tzelepis, 2005.

<sup>107</sup> Bryman, 2001.

## Responses and the Multi-Item Scales

As was noted above, the scales were not all of the same length in terms of the number of individual items of which they were comprised. Nor were the response rates for the scales: in other words the total number of respondents who validly answered *all* items—no form of substitution was employed such as using a mean figure for missing data although this would have increased the valid response rates a little—for each scales. Table 2.4 provides details about the response rates for the scales used.

Scale	Responses	Response rate <sup>1</sup>	Cronbach's alpha
Authoritarianism	492	97%	0.71
Environmentalism	484	96%	0.71
Europeanism	459	91%	0.73
Feminism	489	97%	0.62
Intra-Party Elitism	501	99%	0.69
Intra-Party Inclusivity	495	98%	0.80
Left-Right	488	97%	0.72
Optimism	484	96%	0.74
Political Elitism	493	98%	0.69
Postmaterialism	436	86%	n.a.
Pride in Heritage and Culture	489	97%	0.57
Pride in the Way the Nation Functions	489	97%	0.64
Protectionism	495	98%	0.61
Religiosity	482	95%	0.84
Theocratism	495	98%	0.74
Traditional British Liberties	477	94%	0.60
Welfarism	493	98%	0.72
Xenophobia	483	96%	0.84

Note: (1) Rounded figures based on 505 entered questionnaires

The relatively poor response rate for Postmaterialism will be noted. A study of the returned questionnaires indicates that this was a presentational matter rather than anything to with the concept of Postmaterialism. Postmaterialism was different from the other scales in the way that the individual items were presented. Here, respondents had to make mutually exclusive first and second choices out of four options and this confused some respondents who provided invalid responses.

<sup>108</sup> Sapsford, 1999: 95.



Excepting Postmaterialism for the reason just indicated, bivariate analysis was conducted to see if there was a significant correlation between the number of items in a scale and the response rate for that scale. Although there was a negative correlation in that longer scales tended to have lower response rates it was not statistically significant: one-tailed  $p = 0.13$  using the Pearson statistic.

### **Statistical Robustness of the Multi-Item Scales**

Before any of the multi-item scales could be used for analysis, it first had to be confirmed that they were statistically robust. This was done by using *SPSS* to calculate the Cronbach's alpha value using the entire *CPRS 2002* dataset. The alpha value is a measure of how well a set of variables measures a single construct, with the nearer to 1.0 the better. There is no firm agreement as to how near to 1.0 the Cronbach's alpha value should be before a scales is considered acceptably robust.<sup>109</sup> However, a "liberal" level of 0.5 was treated as the minimum throughout the *CPRS 2002*. As can also be seen from Table 2.4 all of the scales displayed a value greater than this and usually much greater.

Most of the scales used in the various analyses below were constructed as intended. However, calculating the alpha value meant that in a small number of cases individual items that degraded the overall alpha value could be discarded prior to any further analysis. For example, the original version of the Intra-Party Elitism scale had five component items, but these were reduced to three items leading to a more robust scale. Similarly, testing the alpha value followed by factor analysis indicated that the initial version of the Theocratism dimension overlapped with Religiosity to a noticeable degree. Removal of two items remedied this overlap and also boosted the alpha value from 0.69 to 0.74.

### **WERE ANY SCALES FROM WITHIN THE DATA MISSED?**

Even such a wide range of scales—even without taking into account stand-alone items which will be referred to in the following thematic chapters—cannot hope to capture everything. What is not there, just is not there. However, it is possible to explore if anything was missed from *within* the data captured by the *CPRS 2002*. Specifically, whether the data suggested the presence of "underlying 'deep-rooted' value orientations"<sup>110</sup> not clearly covered by the range of named multi-item scales such as Left-Right and Authoritarianism.

This was done by taking together all of the items making up the named scales—except for Postmaterialism because of its unusual nature—plus almost all other stand-alone items presented with a comparable response set. In total, this amounted to 148 items. All of these items were loaded into a confirmatory factor analysis in *SPSS* with varimax rotation, with principal components extraction, with

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<sup>109</sup> Bryman, 2008: 151; Bryman & Cramer, 1999: Campbell, 2004: 34; 65; Scarbrough, 2000: 410.

<sup>110</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[e]: 235.

the maximum iterations eventually raised to 55, rotated factor solution, with only Eigenvalues over 1 extracted and with absolute values less than 0.3 suppressed. The entire dataset was used without distinction between the groups of respondents.

The analysis produced 45 factors and all that needs to be said is that “there were no surprises”. No hitherto undetected factors emerged that could not be explained by reference to either the named scales or clearly related items that might result in factors in a statistical such as items concerned with views on proportional representation at different levels of electoral representation.

From within the data there was little that suggested that anything major had been missed in the way of undiscovered and unused attitudinal scales that might have had substantial additional explanatory power in the various multivariate analyses described in the thematic chapters.

## **CHOICE OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS**

Brief mention must be made about why certain methods of inferential statistical analysis were used rather than others. In particular, why to a greater or lesser extent these were limited to analysis of variance (ANOVA), partial correlation coefficients (where a causal relationship was ambiguous), regression analysis (where a causal relationship could be justified) and factor analysis. The major reason refers back to the personal comments at the start of this report. It was always intended that the results of this study as presented should be comprehensible to those who formed the basis of the study. Without suggesting a series of objective trials, nevertheless personal experience in conversation with politicians and activists indicates that the “in words” methods and results of (say) regression analysis were acceptable in this regard.

As noted in Chapter 16, the data captured by the *CPRS 2002* will be made available for further analysis by other researchers using different techniques.

## **THE PRESENTATION OF DATA IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS**

### **Level of Data**

As is often the convention within the social sciences, data produced by Likert scales was treated as interval or ratio level data rather than the ordinal level data that, strictly speaking, it is.<sup>111</sup> Particularly at the level of multivariate analysis, statistical analysis with such data “raw” is often the most appropriate method. Reporting it on the page, particularly with univariate or bivariate analysis, can be a different matter. In most cases in the following chapters for ease of reporting the data was collapsed into three-

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<sup>111</sup> Bryman, 2008: 322.

level categorical-level data. As such, except on occasions where responses were heavily loaded towards one pole, the “in between” are clearly identified.<sup>112</sup>

## **Base Size and Reported Analysis**

The sizes in absolute terms of some of the groups of respondents were very small and would have been even with a 100% response rate. This can cause problems. For example, some statistical tests have assumptions such as the minimum number of expected frequencies in any cell in Chi<sup>2</sup>.<sup>113</sup> Even at a basic descriptive level caution is urged when reporting in percentage terms where the base number is below 50 and it is possibly an exercise in spurious accuracy when the base number is below 20.<sup>114</sup> From this perspective, reporting in percentage terms responses from ELCs (283 total respondents) is certainly acceptable and from Peers (60), MPs (52) and SLCs (48) probably so. A decision was made early on in the analysis that WLCs (28) and even MEPs and MSPs (14 each) would be reported, but where necessary the small numbers in absolute terms would be highlighted. However, GLAs (4) and AMs (2) were too small to report. To save repetition, this explains the absence of these two groups in many of the tables in the following chapters where the results are analysed by group.

## **Unexplained Variance**

What is not usually actively discussed in the following thematic chapters is unexplained variance.<sup>115</sup> This can arise both through normal differences amongst respondents—the fact that humans emit noisy data—and/or that there has been a systematic but unidentified omission in the independent variables used.

This is a routine problem within the social sciences. However, beyond the procedure described above that analysed whether any multi-item scales had gone undetected and unexamined nothing more can be made of this other than to note it as the standard caution against scientism and “the belief that the methods and vocabulary of science can eventually account for the whole of reality”.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Blastland, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2008.

<sup>113</sup> Clegg, 1982: 93.

<sup>114</sup> Marsh, 1988: 126.

<sup>115</sup> Klassen, 12<sup>th</sup> September 2008.

<sup>116</sup> Lachman, 2003/2005: 58.

# CHAPTER 3: BEYOND “LEFT AND RIGHT”: THE POLITICAL MAP

## THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

### “And”, not “but”

“Left” and “right” are amongst the most common shorthand terms used to describe the ideology—the “fundamental and enduring attitudes towards general moral and political principles”<sup>117</sup>—professed by an individual or group. This terminology, rooted in the French parliament of 1789-91,<sup>118</sup> has an underlying assumption that the ideology of any individual or group can be found somewhere along a bi-polar scale. So powerful is its hold that most people try to locate themselves or others within the confines of the model.<sup>119</sup> As one writer put it, “From Left to Right, most people would accept the following spectrum: communism → socialism → liberalism → conservatism → fascism”.<sup>120</sup> Others have stated it straightforwardly in that the terms left and right are “fundamental to ideological debate”.<sup>121</sup>

However, that something is in common usage does not mean that it is correct. An individual can believe in comprehensive tax-funded welfare and state intervention in the economy, generally seen as a “left” position, *and* also believe in the repatriation of certain immigrant groups and “traditional” gender roles, generally seen as a “right” position. The views of such a person, combining economic and personal collectivism or traditionalism, are held by many that are sometimes described as “fascist”. It is unfortunate the terms such as “fascist” have become mere terms of abuse<sup>122</sup> whereas they describe potentially coherent sets of views.<sup>123</sup>

On the other hand, an individual can believe in the wholesale denationalisation of the NHS and the education system, generally seen as a “right” position, *and* believe in the legalisation of narcotics and the right to engage in sado-masochism,<sup>124</sup> generally seen as a “left” position. The views of such a person, combining economic and personal individualism are held by many are sometimes described as “libertarians”.

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<sup>117</sup> Heath *et al*, 1991: 2.

<sup>118</sup> Brittan, 1968: 32-33; Arthur, 2004: 10.

<sup>119</sup> Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996: 94; Harris, 1996.

<sup>120</sup> Heywood, 1992: 19.

<sup>121</sup> Rose & McAllister, 1990: 91.

<sup>122</sup> Levitt, 2003; Wharton, 1999: 36.

<sup>123</sup> Paxton, 2004.

<sup>124</sup> Meek, 2006.

Examples of pairs of individuals or regimes normally regarded as exemplars of left and right yet who or which share important features can be found in a number of places.<sup>125</sup> However, these often have another feature found in mass-media articles on the subject<sup>126</sup> which is that there is a sense that the problem has not been noticed before.

In short, whilst the one-dimensional left-right model may well be parsimonious it is demonstrably true that its use leads to a confusion of important political distinctions.<sup>127</sup>

## Same Words, Different Meanings

To describe the problem on another level, beyond just “brand name confusion”,<sup>128</sup> it is that given words are but symbols lacking intrinsic meanings then their meanings must be agreed by mutual consent. If people mean different things when using the same words then rational debate is impossible.<sup>129</sup> This is compounded when it is noted how certain words have changed their meanings over time, a frequently cited example being the word “liberal” which has not only undergone a semantic change since the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>130</sup> but which is internationally inconsistent as well.<sup>131</sup> Of course, this is equally true of the subject matter of *CPRS 2002*. The problem of the upper case and lower case use of “conservative” in the UK to denote variously a party, an ideology and a temperament is well known.<sup>132</sup>

Moreover, even when labels such as “libertarian” or “fascist” or “conservative” are understood and used—and often they are not<sup>133</sup>—they are in practice often only categorical-level or nominal-level data. They do not convey some sense of relationship towards other views that for all its faults the left-right model does. Similarly, various terms are often used for single-issue labelling with little or no attempt at coherence between issues.

Matters possibly become even worse when, for example, commentators attempt to describe foreign politics using the traditional terminology. As one writer complained when noting the BBC’s description of Iran’s theocratic Guardian Council as being “dominated by right-wingers”, did that mean that the Council believed in “free markets, and a smaller state?”<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> e.g. Kenny, 5<sup>th</sup> February 2005.

<sup>126</sup> e.g. Delingpole, 28<sup>th</sup> February 2009; Riddell, 9<sup>th</sup> December 1997.

<sup>127</sup> Grendstad, 2003: 1.

<sup>128</sup> Finemann, in Fritz, 1988.

<sup>129</sup> Nolan, 1971: 3.

<sup>130</sup> Lillie & Maddox, 1981: 63.

<sup>131</sup> Danziger, 1998: 42.

<sup>132</sup> Garnett, 2003[b]: 109; Norton, July-September 2008: 324.

<sup>133</sup> Friedman, 1999.

<sup>134</sup> Whittles, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2003.

To give an academic example of this confusion, two articles in the October 2008 issue of the *European Journal of Political Research* can be cited. The first by Timothy Hellwig, 'Explaining the salience of left-right ideology in post-industrial democracies: The role of structural economic change', cites a number of studies which generally locate "left and right" as terms denoting "positions on state involvement in the economy".<sup>135</sup> The topic of the second, by Jens Rydgren, 'Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries',<sup>136</sup> is self-explanatory and, in the same issue of the same journal, clearly takes "right-wing" to mean something rather different.

In short, there is a profound "conceptual failure common in most forms of modern political debate".<sup>137</sup>

## WHY IS IT STILL USED?

Yet the obviously flawed left-right model continues to be used, even by commentators who have previously acknowledged its failings.<sup>138</sup> A number of reasons have been suggested for this.<sup>139</sup> For example: its very familiarity and simplicity such as the way that it can be depicted on a piece of paper<sup>140</sup> ensures its continuing use by "custom and practice"; that those who cannot be readily situated along the dimension can be dismissed as "inconsistent"; and because the traditional model is indeed sometimes "accidentally correct", lending validity to it.<sup>141</sup>

It has also been argued<sup>142</sup> that it can be used to "smear" individuals or groups with labels that possess at the time objectionable connotations. This was seen very clearly in the treatment accorded to the eventually assassinated Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn. He was routinely associated with "fascist" or "right-wing" politics because of his views on Islam and immigration despite professing and living a life of considerable social and economic "liberalism".<sup>143</sup>

At a psychological level, it may also be a manifestation of a seemingly hard-wired tendency that humans have to analyse the social world in a bipolar "us or them" manner.<sup>144</sup> This may be an evolutionary device to limit the amount of cognitive processing required in stressful situations.

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<sup>135</sup> Hellwig, October 2008: 689

<sup>136</sup> Rydgren, October 2008.

<sup>137</sup> Evans, 1996: xiii.

<sup>138</sup> Riddell, 9<sup>th</sup> December 1997; 20<sup>th</sup> September 2004.

<sup>139</sup> Lillie & Maddox, 1981: 61 & 64.

<sup>140</sup> 'JK', 11<sup>th</sup> January 2000.

<sup>141</sup> Herrera, 1993, in Herbst, 1998: 128-129.

<sup>142</sup> Halcombe, 1996.

<sup>143</sup> Boyes, 7<sup>th</sup> May 2002; Riddell, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2002; Browne, 1<sup>st</sup> January 2003; Meek, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2002; *The Spectator*, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2004.

<sup>144</sup> Baron & Byrne, 1994: 228-229; Crisp, 2002.

## PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

What is to be done? Or rather, *what else can be devised and used to describe the political views of an individual or group in a manner that is both more meaningful than the left-right model and which is still reasonably comprehensible to “the intelligent layperson”?* If a measure of success in these two tasks can be achieved, then *CPRS 2002* respondents can be analysed and then compared to the general public of the time.

To tackle this long-acknowledged problem a number of solutions have been proposed.<sup>145</sup> From afar afield as the worlds of political science, sociology, opinion polling, political philosophy and psychology they have included:

- To describe a near-circular or horseshoe scale whereby “extreme Left” and “extreme Right” almost meet up.<sup>146</sup> As has been acidly noted, this concept, much loved by serious writers<sup>147</sup> and bar-room philosopher alike, means that Western liberal democracy is thus defined as being halfway between Stalin and Hitler.<sup>148</sup> Or, as Ludwig von Mises asked,<sup>149</sup> “What is ‘left’ and what is ‘right’? Why should Hitler be ‘right’ and Stalin, his temporary friend, be ‘left’?”
- A single scale that more specifically defines its end-points as representing complete collectivism and complete anarchism.<sup>150</sup>
- The sometimes *ad hoc* models of political polling organisations.<sup>151</sup>
- A triangular model with the major historical strands of British politics of socialism, liberalism and conservatism all pulling against each other.<sup>152</sup>
- Various personality scales such as “Conservatism-Radicalism”, “Egalitarianism-Elitism”, “Radicalism-Orthodoxy” and “Liberalism-Authoritarianism”.<sup>153</sup>
- More sophisticated variants of the standard two-dimensional model whereby, for example, attitudes towards socio-economic egalitarianism are mediated via means to various ends<sup>154</sup> or by intensity of feeling towards the various possible positions on the scale<sup>155</sup> or the degree of “reason” in any given ideological system.<sup>156</sup>
- A series of one-dimensional scales which are relative to the ideological standpoint of the analyst.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Bergland, 1993: 30.

<sup>146</sup> Lester, 1995: 1.

<sup>147</sup> Thompson, 2000: 103.

<sup>148</sup> Aaronovitch, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2005; Nolan, 1971: 4.

<sup>149</sup> von Mises, 1940.

<sup>150</sup> Burns, 1989, in Evans, 1996: 81-82.

<sup>151</sup> Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996: 93.

<sup>152</sup> Hayek, 1960: 398; Greenleaf, 1983.

<sup>153</sup> Brittan, 1968: 87-99; 1976: 354-373; Eysenck, 1954; Wilson, 1973: 184.

<sup>154</sup> Bobbio, 1996.

<sup>155</sup> Caplan, 1997.

<sup>156</sup> Pournelle, 1986.

<sup>157</sup> Tansey, 1995: 104.

- The use of statistical techniques such as multidimensional scaling “to detect meaningful underlying dimensions”.<sup>158</sup>
- The taxonomies and models developed or used by academic researchers.<sup>159</sup>

Others have taken a different approach. They argue that the “old” ideological cleavages and political alliances have weakened.<sup>160</sup> Instead, they have been superseded by or at least must now include “new” or alternative politics<sup>161</sup> such as environmentalism,<sup>162</sup> feminism<sup>163</sup> and Postmaterialism.<sup>164</sup> In short, a shift away from values concerned with “consumption and material progress” towards values centred on “personal autonomy and identity”.<sup>165</sup> Alternatively, others have stressed the importance of cultural, ethnic, and/or national identity.<sup>166</sup> On the other hand, others have suggested taking a more pragmatic or case-by-case approach.<sup>167</sup>

However, whilst some of these provide interesting and important analyses, none are wholly acceptable. Their problems may include: being conceptually unclear; being largely descriptive or qualitative rather than quantitative; being of little use in describing ideology in a manner that is both reasonably comprehensive *and* comprehensible to the non-specialist; being overly dependant on time and/or place; or simply failing to conform to the conventions of methodological good practice in political science.<sup>168</sup>

## ANOTHER SOLUTION: THE POLITICAL MAP

However, it is not the intention of the *CPRS 2002* to start from scratch and to investigate all possible alternatives to the standard left-right model. Instead, an alternative is noted and refined which in some form can already be found in academic literature and which in a populist and often unsatisfactory form already exists as a tool for describing political beliefs.

The literature indicates that many researchers wishing to go beyond left and right have come to the same conclusion and therefore have used much the same solution.<sup>169</sup> This solution has two components. First,

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<sup>158</sup> StatSoft, 2003.

<sup>159</sup> e.g. 6, 1998: 26-27 & 80-82; Baker, Gamble & Ludlum, 1994[b]; Cowley & Stuart, 2004; Gamble, 1974: 213-214; Grenstad, 2003; Heppell 2002 & 2005; Heppell & Hill, September 2005; Norton, 1990 & 2002; Peele, 1997: 102-107; Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994.

<sup>160</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[d]: 191; Gibbins, 1989: 23.

<sup>161</sup> Inglehart, 1989: 250-251.

<sup>162</sup> Nas, 1995.

<sup>163</sup> Lundmark, 1995.

<sup>164</sup> Inglehart, 1990.

<sup>165</sup> Gundelach, 1995: 412.

<sup>166</sup> Cable, 1994.

<sup>167</sup> Brittan, 27<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>168</sup> Bryman, 2008; Gunter & Furnham, 1992: 99; Meek, 1999: 3-4.

<sup>169</sup> e.g. Campbell, 2004; Schofield, Miller & Martin, 2003; Topf, 1989: 69.



that two dimensions or axes are used to describe “core political beliefs and values”<sup>170</sup> rather than the single dimension of the left-right model. Whether this is for theoretical or practical reasons can only be judged on a case-by-case basis. However, a two dimensional model has the advantage that whilst it has the potential to be far more informative than a one-dimensional model it can still be depicted on the page. Three dimensions can still be presented physically, but more than three becomes a mathematical abstract.

Second, that these two dimensions measure matters connected with economics or socio-economic relationships on the one hand and civil liberties, morality or law and order on the other. Some authorities have argued for the paramount importance of these two dimensions.<sup>171</sup> Heath & Topf<sup>172</sup> argued that,

*“... we need to consider two contrasting sets of values and perceptions. The first set relates to the economic order of society, in particular economic equality and perceived conflicts... The second set of values relates to social order and covers such matters as civil liberty and respect for the law. These two sets of variables might be said to represent the two most fundamental ideological principles in contemporary society.”*

Fleishman<sup>173</sup> argued that a,

*“... two-dimensional model adequately describes the structure of social attitudes. General orientations to economic welfare, on the one hand, and individual liberties on the other, organize attitudes toward more narrowly focused issues and objects... implying a dualistic model”.*

Aspects of economics or socio-economic relationships, are generally regarded by political scientists as one of the most important dimensions along which political parties compete.<sup>174</sup> Furthermore, it “has also been widely argued that the most important value orientation to cut across the left-right dimension is a libertarian-authoritarian one”.<sup>175</sup>

For the purposes of this chapter this particular two-component solution is accepted and from now on it shall be referred to by the name “Political Map” or “PoliMap” for short. Problematic versions of it, often using the name “Political Compass”, are available on the Internet and elsewhere as self-administered tests

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<sup>170</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 191.

<sup>171</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 191; Sanders, July 2006: 179.

<sup>172</sup> Heath & Topf, 1987: 59.

<sup>173</sup> Fleishman, 1988, in Heath *et al*, 1991: 3.

<sup>174</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[d]: 191.

<sup>175</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[e]: 241.

such as the one provided by the politically committed Advocates for Self-Government<sup>176</sup> and the one provided by the ostensibly politically neutral PoliticalCompass.org.<sup>177</sup>

It should be noted that the PoliMap developed in this chapter does not derive from any of the other alternatives to the standard left-right model described above. Instead, it is a synthesis of two multi-item scales used in the *CPRS 2002*. It is a means of combining attitudes towards two areas of great social and economic importance to produce a more meaningful yet still comprehensible picture of an individual's or organisation's *Weltanschauung*.<sup>178</sup>

## THE POLITICAL MAP USED IN THIS ANALYSIS

### The Design, Layout and Naming of the PoliMap

So far this alternative method has been described only in outline. The creation of the model used in this chapter has now to be described. However, to avoid repetition the method by which the PoliMap was created—such as statistical considerations—is described in greater detail in the section following this one. This section is primarily concerned with its physical design.

The PoliMap is formed by separately measuring attitudes along two orthogonal scales—from now on termed “Economic” and “Personal”—useable as measures of the sorts of economic and personal beliefs noted above. Then these measures, using a standardised scale so that a like measure on one equals a like measure on the other, are joined at a right-angle at one end: the lowest possible score for both in this case. The scores along both scales are traced perpendicular to the axes and where the scores meet this is the respondent's position within the PoliMap.

The basic model is shown in Diagram 3.1a. “0” represents the lowest possible score along either axis and “1” represents the highest possible score. It also displays the position of a hypothetical respondent who has views that are individualist or laissez-faire or a similar description along the Economic scale and who also has views that are collectivist or traditionalist or a similar description along the Personal scale. The “X” is the meeting point for the separate scores from the two scales used as measures for the PoliMap.


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<sup>176</sup> Advocates for Self-Government, c. 2003

<sup>177</sup> PoliticalCompass.org, 2004[a].

<sup>178</sup> Jary & Jary, 1991: 708.


DIAGRAM 3.1A: THE BASIC POLIMAP



As it is this provides a scatter-plot with a wide range of possible positions within the PoliMap. Although this can elicit useful information this is hard to use as an everyday description of political attitudes. Therefore, three-level ordinal categories of the sort used throughout the *CPRS 2002* are used by recoding each scale into three levels measured in absolute terms, i.e. the lowest, middle and highest thirds of possible scores on each scale.

Using these measures produces a PoliMap containing nine internal sectors as shown in Diagram 3.1b. Again, "X" marks the position of a hypothetical respondent who has views that are individualist or laissez-faire or a similar description along the Economic scale and who also has views that are collectivist or traditionalist or a similar description along the Personal scale.


DIAGRAM 3.1B: THE BASIC POLIMAP WITH INTERNAL SECTORS



Certain presentational issues need to be dealt with here. It has become the convention in some of the existing (if flawed) versions of what is here called the PoliMap to rotate the model so that the sector combining individualist positions along both scales forms the top of the PoliMap and the sector combining collectivist positions along both scales forms the bottom. There is no right or wrong to this presentation. If it is thought that such a layout of the diagram implies a more positive view of the top-most sector then the model can be flipped if so desired.

The other orientation has a certain commonsense justification. The PoliMap sector that combines an individualist position on the Economic scale and a collectivist position on the Personal scale is placed on the right and the sector that combines a collectivist position on the Economic scale and an individualist position on the Personal scale is placed on the left. This is because these sectors somewhat conform to current, stereotypical notions of left and right. It surely makes sense to retain this degree of familiarity.

There is also the matter of the nomenclature of the sectors. As far as possible the names used must make sense in describing what one is physically seeing and also they should strive to be affectively neutral. A number of methods have been used<sup>179</sup> including somewhat messy terminological hybrids. Instead, the version used in the *CPRS 2002* makes use of the conventional points of the compass. The final PoliMap can now be displayed in Diagram 3.2.



<sup>179</sup> Lester, 1995; Lopez, 2002; PoliticalCompass.org, 2004[b].

Those falling into each of the nine sectors of the PoliMap can be described as follows in terms of their political beliefs. Starting at the top-most sector and moving clockwise:

- Northern (N): an individualist position on both axes.
- North-Eastern (N-E): Economic individualism combined with a centrist position on the Personal axis.
- Eastern (E): Economic individualism combined with Personal collectivism.
- South-Eastern (S-E): a centrist position on the Economic axis combined with Personal collectivism.
- Southern (S): a collectivist position on both axes.
- South-Western (S-W): Economic collectivism combined with a centrist position on the Personal axis.
- Western (W): Economic collectivism combined with Personal individualism.
- North-Western (N-W): a centrist position on the Economic axis combined with Personal individualism.
- Central (C): a centrist position on both axes.

The hypothetical respondent located in the previous diagrams would be located in the Eastern sector: Economic individualism combined with Personal collectivism.

Something like the PoliMap used in this chapter appears to have been in existence since the late 1960s or early 1970s although the original authorship is disputed.<sup>180</sup>

## **A Finite World**

There is a conceptual issue that needs to be acknowledged. The PoliMap is of a form that one encounters in ancient maps of the earth in that it describes a world that is flat and, above all, finite. As for the first of these, the possibilities and problems of additional dimensions are also discussed in this chapter.

As for the second, it is certainly possible to find (say) individuals who are more extreme than would be suggested even by someone who responded in the most extreme manner to all the questions put to them to determine their score on the Personal and Economic scales and hence their position on the PoliMap. However, whilst in theory there may be no edge of the ideological world for such individuals to sail off, in practice they represent vanishingly small tails of the distribution and they do not delegitimize the PoliMap within the context of providing a device of service to everyday debate.

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<sup>180</sup> Nolan, 1971.

## ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MODEL AND SOME RESPONSES

### Objections Raised

A number of objections have been raised against the PoliMap, all of which have at least some validity and which must be addressed. Moreover, in doing so the creation of the PoliMap used in this chapter can be described in greater detail.

### There is Only One Dimension

Some commentators have argued from certain philosophical positions that there *is* only one, indivisible dimension<sup>181</sup> such as from freedom to unfreedom or anarchy to omnarchy and that all aspects of political debate revolve around this single issue. Perhaps this is true according to some political philosophies. It certainly makes more sense than the Stalin-to-Hitler, left-right one-dimensional model.<sup>182</sup> However, if the aim of this chapter is to describe the political views of an individual or group in a manner that is more meaningful than the left-right model but which is still reasonably comprehensible to the layperson, then the PoliMap does a better job. Indeed, even some of those who argue for the principle of a single dimension accept the socio-political reality of the two-dimensional model used by the PoliMap.<sup>183</sup> There is also a real-world and statistically demonstrated rebuttal of this objection that is examined in greater detail below.

It must be stressed again that the PoliMap is not an exercise in esoteric political philosophy. It is a device to shed light on everyday political debate that amongst other things will enable at least the more interested of the general public to visualise the political positions of individuals and parties both alone and relative to each other.<sup>184</sup>

### An Insufficiency of Dimensions

The next objection is the mirror image of the first. Even amongst some who accept that the PoliMap is better than the standard left-right model it is argued that it is limited in its scope and in particular that it omits issues to do with foreign and military affairs.<sup>185</sup> This is of particular salience when one considers the less-than-uniform Conservative response to world events since the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001,<sup>186</sup> the

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<sup>181</sup> Skousen, 2000; Roberts, 14<sup>th</sup> February 2004.

<sup>182</sup> Arthur, 2004: 11.

<sup>183</sup> Tame, 1998, in Meek, 1999: 5.

<sup>184</sup> Lent & Sowemimo, 1996: 137.

<sup>185</sup> Blundell & Gosschalk, 1997: 9-10.

<sup>186</sup> Duncan Smith, 1<sup>st</sup> September 2002; Nixon, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2003.

continuing importance of the EU to internal Conservative Party debate,<sup>187</sup> and the debate over protectionism.<sup>188</sup> Others have also noted the continuing importance of religion,<sup>189</sup> something not directly covered by the PoliMap.

Accordingly, some have used an axis concerned with such issues as an *alternative* to one of those used in the “standard” PoliMap.<sup>190</sup>

Others have kept variants of the PoliMap’s two dimensions but have added a third. For example, Ross<sup>191</sup> added one concerning the nature of political participation so that—to mix it in with the terminology of this present chapter—it is possible for an individual to be a “Anarchist-Northerner” or a “Monarchist-Northerner” depending upon how one believes one’s particular choices are best defended. This has echoes of a unipolar model sometimes encountered that talks of an “autocracy-democracy” continuum.<sup>192</sup> It is explicitly about how—if at all—power is transferred and only implicitly about what policies are followed by whomever wields political power at time. Alternatively, the Vosem Chart retains the PoliMap’s Personal and Economic axes but adds a third axis concerning “corporate issues” and whether businesses can be considered as private individuals with all their rights.<sup>193</sup> With specific reference to the lack of mention of military and foreign policy issues in the standard PoliMap, Quintiliani<sup>194</sup> takes the two existing dimensions and adds a third concerned with these matters.

A variant of this objection is that it does not distinguish between different individuals or groups that end up in the same sector of the PoliMap but who profess *philosophically* distinct ideologies<sup>195</sup> and this is responded to below.

A similar objection is that there is no attempt to identify any differences in the saliency for respondents of the dimensions used in the model. This has an importance when one considers the clear evidence that the issues that were most important for the public around the time of the *CPRS 2002* were not necessarily the ones on which the Conservative Party focussed.<sup>196</sup>

All of these objections make fair points. However, firstly, it has already been noted above that this chapter accepts the opinions of acknowledged authorities concerning the particular salience of the two dimensions used in the PoliMap. Secondly, the response is the same as in the previous sub-section: that

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<sup>187</sup> Burdett-Conway & Tether, 1997: 89-90; Cowley & Norton, 1999: 90; Heppell, 2002; 2005.

<sup>188</sup> Congdon, 9<sup>th</sup> September 2000.

<sup>189</sup> Nelson, Guth & Fraser, 2001; Van Deth, 1995: 1.

<sup>190</sup> Baker, Gamble & Ludlum, 1993 & 1994[b]; Dunleavy, 1993; Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 1985: 116-121.

<sup>191</sup> Ross, 2004.

<sup>192</sup> Fox & Sandler, 2003: 469.

<sup>193</sup> 3ebnut, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2003.

<sup>194</sup> Quintiliani, 2004.

<sup>195</sup> de Havilland, 21<sup>st</sup> May 2003.

<sup>196</sup> Broughton, 2003: 208-209.

the two-dimensional PoliMap does a better job of describing political debate in a comprehensible manner: and certainly in the simplified “desert island” or “Robinson Crusoe” form sometimes used by economists.<sup>197</sup> A third dimension can always be added and the results can still be presented physically, albeit with difficulty. For example, both the Vosem Chart and Ross’s model may be conceptually useful but are extremely hard to read. More than three dimensions and it becomes a formula of little use to anyone except the mathematician.

It should be emphasised that this model is primarily a measure of “how one should go about things in the real world”. It does not distinguish between different philosophically-derived ends or justifications.<sup>198</sup> Equally, it does not inherently distinguish between normative and positive reasons for advocating this or that political direction. Indeed, politicians have been known to argue for normatively “awkward” policies on utilitarian grounds.<sup>199</sup> Hitler and Stalin may well have adhered to different philosophies and purposes but their means had more than a passing resemblance to each other.<sup>200</sup> Looking at the mainstream of UK politics, previous work indicated that despite their ostensible differences *all* of the mainland UK political parties that won seats at the 1997 general election mapped into the same Centre sector of a somewhat differently configured PoliMap.<sup>201</sup> In short, it measures the “where” of the distribution of political beliefs rather than the “why”.<sup>202</sup>

A study of the two dimensions actually used for the *CPRS 2002*’s PoliMap noted in the next subsection suggests a good deal of trans-national applicability. Certainly this is true in the Anglophone world but also in much of the rest of the world following suitable translation. However, the more dimensions that are used then the greater the possibility that this trans-national applicability is lost. For example, a PoliMap analysis that added a third axis about attitudes towards the EU—and it appears that at least in a British context this is an issue that cuts across others similar to those measured by the Authoritarianism and/or Left-Right dimensions<sup>203</sup>—would have less relevance to a New Zealander or Ghanaian than it does to a Briton.

## Poor Questionnaire Sets and Evidence for Multi-Dimensionality

The next objection is methodologically the most important. It has been rightly claimed that the various questionnaire sets used in different versions of the PoliMap have often been unsound. In some manner or other they do not satisfy the conventions for the creation of acceptable multi-item dimensions.<sup>204</sup> For example, the World’s Smallest Political Quiz (WSPQ), probably the most commonly encountered variant

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<sup>197</sup> Mankiw, 2001: 533-534.

<sup>198</sup> Gove, 1<sup>st</sup> January 2000.

<sup>199</sup> Conservative Party, 25<sup>th</sup> January 2002.

<sup>200</sup> Goldberg, 2009; Paxton, 2004: 212.

<sup>201</sup> Meek, 1999: 14.

<sup>202</sup> Ball, 1988: 227.

<sup>203</sup> Heath, Jowell, Taylor & Thomson, 1998: 100-101.



and the one used by many US libertarians,<sup>205</sup> clearly leads people into giving answers in a certain direction.<sup>206</sup> The version used by PoliticalCompass.org<sup>207</sup> is also somewhat biased, albeit in a different manner to that of the WSPQ,<sup>208</sup> and is also rather long. Others take a decidedly odd view of what one or both of the dimensions actually mean in practice.<sup>209</sup>

Besides being a reminder not to confuse a model in theory with its deployment in practice, there are ways around this problem. One solution is to make use of existing and proven dimensions that can be regarded as meaningfully representing the Economic and Personal dimensions.

For the *CPRS 2002* it was decided to use two dimensions with a long history<sup>210</sup> of use in social research. The Left-Right (*sic*) scale was used as the Economic dimension. It looks at attitudes towards issues such as business, the unions and wealth. The Authoritarianism scale was used as the Personal dimension. It looks at attitudes towards issues such as conformism, censorship, homosexuality and the death penalty. Both of these have been used in the well-known annual *British Social Attitudes (BSA)* series<sup>211</sup> and were included in the *CPRS 2002*. The wording of the items making up these two dimensions can be found in Appendix 3.

The first objection noted above can now be returned to: the claim that there is only one dimension. Indeed, analysing responses using the entire *CPRS 2002* dataset to all 12 individual items from the Left-Right and Authoritarianism scales using the Cronbach's alpha test—a measure of how well a set of variables measures a single construct—provides a value of 0.69, suggesting a valid single dimension. However, in this instance it would be a mistake to take this result at face value. It is not the purpose here to argue for or against any *philosophical* argument that holds to the view that there is only one dimension. Instead, it can be demonstrated that *in practice* in the way that respondents think about these matters, if not necessarily consciously, there *is* more than one dimension.

By using factor analysis it could be determined whether the commonalties of individual items for the two scales were those of the multi-item scales used to describe the PoliMap. Again using the entire dataset, confirmatory factor analysis—using varimax rotation, with principal components extraction, with a maximum of 25 iterations, rotated factor solution, with only Eigenvalues over 1 extracted and with absolute values less than 0.3 suppressed—was carried out using the 12 individual items from the Left-Right and Authoritarianism scales. The result is not shown in any detail here because the finding was so clear. Factor 1 was simply Left-Right, containing all five items and none other, and Factor 2 was clearly

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<sup>204</sup> Rupright, 1997.

<sup>205</sup> Advocates for Self Government, c. 2003; Taher, 24<sup>th</sup> October 2004.

<sup>206</sup> Huben, in Raphael, 1996.

<sup>207</sup> PoliticalCompass.org, 2004[a].

<sup>208</sup> de Havilland, 21<sup>st</sup> May 2003.

<sup>209</sup> Rozenburg, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2005.

<sup>210</sup> Heath *et al*, 1991.

Authoritarianism containing six of the seven items. As if sometimes the case with factor analysis there was also a weaker Factor 3 that contained some items from each. Little can be made of this and it may be no more than an artefact of the nature of the respondents.

The alpha value of 0.69 for the combined items from the Left-Right and Authoritarianism scales demonstrated that to some degree the separate items from the two dimensions are correlated with each other. At first sight this accords with those who suggest that something very like these two dimensions are not truly unrelated to each other.<sup>212</sup> Within the context of discussions about the Conservative Party this can also be seen in assertions that “Thatcherism” was “incoherent” since “while it preached economic freedom, it often practised social authoritarianism and the politics of intolerance”.<sup>213</sup> However, the more detailed factor analysis clearly indicates that the actual rather than theoretical commonalities of responses to the individual items robustly fall along the two dimensions that were used for this version of the PoliMap. Attitudes towards economic and moral issues *are* correlated to each other.<sup>214</sup> However, for *CPRS 2002* respondents the components of objective measures of these issues are more strongly correlated within than between the two issues.

## Unacceptable Creation of Internal Sectors

As noted above, in any variant of the model that wishes to do more than display the results as a two-dimensional scatter-plot internal sectors need to be constructed. Exactly where respondents end up depends upon the geometry of the sectors.<sup>215</sup> However, other versions of the PoliMap have used methods of categorisation that, whilst not necessarily “wrong”, can seem strange or cumbersome. For example, the five-sector WSPQ has a Centrist sector that is a different shape to the others<sup>216</sup> and there is in existence a nine-sector variant that uses three different sector sizes.<sup>217</sup>

Instead, as described above, a “pure” method of creating discrete categories or levels was used by recoding each of the dimensions into three levels measured in absolute terms—labelled “collectivist”, “centrist” and “individualist”—thus providing a diagram of nine equal-sized and equal-shaped sectors.

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<sup>211</sup> e.g. NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

<sup>212</sup> Janiskee, 15<sup>th</sup> October 2003; Nolan, 1971: 6-7.

<sup>213</sup> Evans, October 2004: 383; Redwood, 2005: 202.

<sup>214</sup> Heath *et al*, 1991: 1

<sup>215</sup> Lester, 1995: 3.

<sup>216</sup> Advocates for Self-Government, 1995.

<sup>217</sup> Thies, 2000.

## THE POLIMAP AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

One issue that the media highlighted around the time of the *CPRS 2002*—for example in *The Times*, although that newspaper may have had its own agenda<sup>218</sup>—was the split in the Conservative Party between the “authoritarian Right” and the “libertarian Right”<sup>219</sup> that had once been the alliance at core of “Thatcherism” towards instead a new coalition of the Conservative “Left”<sup>220</sup> united more on social issues than economic ones. This was sometimes picturesquely depicted as a struggle between “mods” professing social liberalism, “rockers” professing a more traditionalist view of things and “muddled in the middle” self-evidently between the two.<sup>221</sup>

Taking a longer-term view, both academics and the mass media have argued for the presence of long-standing and often antagonistic factions within the Party: in particular the Left, the authoritarian Right and the libertarian Right or some variations upon the theme.<sup>222</sup> Within the context of the Conservative Party as mapped onto the PoliMap, these three groups just mentioned could be interpreted as Centrist, Eastern/South-Eastern and Eastern/North-Eastern respectively.

The point of this for the purposes of the present chapter is that, explicitly or implicitly, it has been noted by others that matters that are plausibly to do with the Personal scale are different from issues connected with the Economic scale let alone traditional notions of “left and right”.

## THE DIMENSIONS CONSIDERED SEPARATELY

The responses to the Authoritarianism and Left-Right dimensions broken down into three categories and also by group of respondent can be found in Appendix 4 and little needs to be restated here. Regarding Authoritarianism, all groups of respondents split between the “authoritarian” and “in between” categories with almost no “libertarians”. Regarding Left-Right, all groups split between the “right” (*sic*) and “in between” categories with almost none on the economic “left”. Greenleaf<sup>223</sup> was therefore largely correct to say that Conservatism has a “twin inheritance” of individualism and collectivism. Overall, Conservative representatives were inclined towards individualist views on the economy or at least not inclined towards economic collectivism, and inclined towards social and personal collectivism or at least not inclined towards social individualism.

Whilst from these findings it cannot be predicted how the Personal and Economic axes will interact, some predictions of a negative nature can be made. In particular, it can be predicted that Conservative

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<sup>218</sup> Glover, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2002.

<sup>219</sup> Baldwin, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2000.

<sup>220</sup> Charter, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

<sup>221</sup> Baldwin, Webster & Watson, 5<sup>th</sup> October 2000.

<sup>222</sup> Seyd, 1980; Pilbeam, 1998: 280-281; *The Times*, 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2000.

representatives will map onto only a limited area of the PoliMap since it can be known that there will be very few or no respondents in those sectors dependent upon respondents falling into certain sectors along the Authoritarianism and Left-Right dimensions. These are the Northern, Southern and all those with the West suffix.

## CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS MAPPED ONTO THE POLIMAP


### All Respondents on the PoliMap

At this stage the positions of the *CPRS 2002* respondents can be mapped. Table 3.1 shows the positions of the respondents within the nine sectors of the PoliMap broken down by respondent group. Diagram 3.3 shows the same analysis for ELCs transposed onto an actual PoliMap by way of (literal) illustration.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Northern	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
North-Eastern	19%	36%	43%	25%	23%	43%	39%
Eastern	22%	22%	18%	25%	12%	21%	15%
South-Eastern	31%	13%	12%	25%	50%	7%	23%
Southern	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
South-Western	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Western	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
North-Western	1%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Central	18%	27%	25%	25%	15%	29%	23%
Base	266	55	51	44	26	14	13

<sup>223</sup> Greenleaf, 1983: 189.

DIAGRAM 3.3: POLIMAP DISTRIBUTION OF ELCs



Certain findings stand out. Looking at all of the groups together, in line with the predictions made above there were no respondents located in the Western sector, and virtually none in the Northern, North-Western, South-Western and Southern sectors. Out of the nine sectors in the PoliMap only four contain substantial numbers of respondents: Central, Eastern, North-Eastern and South-Eastern.

These four sectors are contiguous. Within the PoliMap they form a mini-PoliMap of their own. Interestingly, when the diagram is examined, within the context of the two-dimensional PoliMap it is quite legitimate to describe the Conservative Party as “centre-right”. However, this statement has a degree of meaning wholly absent when that term is used in the conventional sense. Here it describes a political party whose public representatives could be described as adhering to a set of beliefs that are generally economically individualist and personally collectivist but with a strong “moderating” influence.

Whether it was ever true that “the Conservative party acts or thinks as unrelated, *ad hoc* groups of members, groups whose members join together to contend for one specific objective, and then fall apart once the goal has been attained or has been by-passed by events”,<sup>224</sup> it is clear that the *CPRS 2002* respondents inhabited a constrained part of this ideological map. Overall, in terms of its politicians at least, the Conservative Party was not a catchall, open-forum debating society.

<sup>224</sup> *Finer, Berrington & Bartholomew, 1961: 110.*

This has a further implication that whilst new leaders of the Party *qua* artificial entity may change the Party's policies and/or image in search of votes they cannot so easily change the Party *qua* aggregate of attitudes.<sup>225</sup>

There were some differences between the groups of representatives. Looking at the four sectors containing substantial numbers of respondents, SLCs were evenly divided between them. There was a noticeable difference between the “senior” representatives of MEPs, MPs, MSPs, and Peers on the one hand and WLCs on the other. In the case of the former groups, a plurality fell into the North-Eastern sector, a fair number fell into the Central and Eastern sectors and relatively few—except in the case of MSPs—fell into the South-Eastern sector. It might be argued that overall this indicates a tendency towards that brand of conservatism noted above as “liberal conservatism”, either of a more recent kind<sup>226</sup> or elements of an older “New Right” that questioned whether such things as sexual morality were a wholly legitimate pursuit for a cause that in general promised to “set the individual free”.<sup>227</sup> On the other hand, WLCs, although almost a quarter (23%) fell into the North-Eastern sector, also displayed the largest proportion that fell into the South-Eastern sector (50%), and indeed no other group displayed such a large proportion in a single sector. It might be argued that overall this indicates a tendency towards “conservative conservatism”, albeit one tempered with a sizeable minority of “liberal conservatives”.

Turning to ELCs, somewhat like their Welsh colleagues, albeit not to the same degree, South-Eastern was the most populated sector with a plurality (31%) mapping into it. The remainder mapped relatively evenly into the other three sectors of the mini-PoliMap. However, in one sense ELCs were unique in that a small number of respondents mapped into the diametrically opposed PoliMap sectors of Northern and Southern. One group adhered to robust economic and personal individualism—the Northerners—and the other to robust economic and personal collectivism—the Southerners. In both cases it was possible that such respondents self-consciously acknowledged themselves to be on the fringes of the Conservative Party. However, perhaps meeting on occasion their mirror image in the other group, it is to be wondered if they ever asked themselves what either they, the other or both of them were doing there or hoped to achieve. In any event, there must have been *something* to unite them—whether “for” or “against” something—as members of the Conservative Party and it was not ideology as measured by the PoliMap. Unfortunately, the numbers were too small to allow meaningful further investigation.

The mini-PoliMap identified by the mapping of *CPRS 2002* respondents might suggest that only part of the PoliMap is valid. However, the result of mapping members of the English public discussed in Chapter @ below indicates otherwise. The mini-PoliMap results from the particular nature of the *CPRS 2002* respondents.

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<sup>225</sup> Goldberg, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2004.

<sup>226</sup> Dorrell, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2002.

<sup>227</sup> Durham, 1989: 70.

## The PoliMap and Socio-Demographics

Further analysis was conducted using the range of socio-demographic data collected from ELCs and which is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4. However, there were almost no statistically significant associations between such variables and position on the PoliMap. Only two analyses just satisfied the two-tailed 5% significance level: subjective view of the rural or urban nature of their ward (two-tailed  $p = 0.05$ ), and highest level of education (two-tailed  $p = 0.05$ ). Little can be made of this. There is always the danger when running a lengthy sequence of bivariate analyses of a Type 1 error of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis.<sup>228</sup> It is safest to say that location within the PoliMap had little association with the socio-demographic characteristics of ELCs.

## THE POLIMAP AND THE “ACTUALLY EXISTING CONSERVATIVE PARTY”

To summarise the mapping for the *CPRS 2002* groups—and keeping in mind the probably minor biases introduced by the use of unbalanced Authoritarianism and Left-Right scales<sup>229</sup> discussed above in Chapter 2—within the context of PoliMap it is legitimate to describe the Conservative Party’s politicians in 2002 as “centre-right”. The Conservative MP John Hayes,<sup>230</sup> one of the sitting Westminster MPs targeted by the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork, argued that,

*“Conservatives are the party of freedom. We believe in giving people more control over their lives, by cutting taxes and reforming public services. But there is more to Conservatism than freedom. In recent times the dangerous myth has developed that the economic liberalism championed by Margaret Thatcher must now be matched by social liberalism. The myth has grown to the point where it is now widely believed that to be truly compassionate, Conservatives must be liberal. In fact, the opposite is the case. Britain today is marked not by an absence but by an excess of social licence. We must match economic liberalism not with social liberalism but with social conservatism.”*

Analysed through the PoliMap, Hayes was describing a position that could be described as Eastern or Centre-Eastern and as such was describing a Conservative Party that, at least according to the views of its politicians, actually existed.

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<sup>228</sup> Clegg, 1982: 66.

<sup>229</sup> Evans & Heath, 1995: 203.

<sup>230</sup> Hayes, 2004.

## **NOT PERFECT, BUT BETTER**

Modest claims have been made in this chapter for the PoliMap and its operationalisation. For example, using the PoliMap with two different dimensions for the Economic and Personal axes—assuming that they were both clearly to do with economic and personal issues and were statistically reliable scales—may lead to a different distribution within the PoliMap for respondents so analysed.

Nevertheless, the PoliMap as a theoretical model along with the operationalisation used in this chapter has allowed the construction of a typology of ideology that is more meaningful than the traditional left-right model whilst still being comprehensible to the intelligent layperson.

If political scientists, media commentators and politicians alike started “pushing” the PoliMap, then whatever risks there might be of initial confusion amongst the public would soon be outweighed by the benefits of much greater “exactness of expression”.<sup>231</sup>

To sum up the PoliMap: Not perfect, but better.

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<sup>231</sup> Tucker, 1897: 21.



## CHAPTER 4: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATIVE LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN ENGLAND

### BACKGROUND AND THE USE OF SECONDARY DATA

In this chapter the additional battery of socio-demographic questions presented to ELCs is studied in more detail. The first aim of this chapter is to provide a descriptive analysis of ELCs at the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork—and where appropriate make comparisons with local councillors from other political parties or the general public—accompanied by a commentary on the more noteworthy findings.

Following this, there is multivariate analysis using these socio-demographic variables as predictors of attitudes as measured by the multi-item scales described in Appendix 3.

Other organisations conducted socio-demographic research on local councillors in England and Wales at about the same time as the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork. In particular, reference is made in this chapter to work carried out by the Employers' Organisation for Local Government<sup>232</sup>.

Regarding these other studies, there are three matters to note. First, the response rates to these other studies where they can be identified were not dramatically higher than that for the *CPRS 2002*. For example, the response rate for the IaDA study of local councillors in England and Wales was a combined 57%.<sup>233</sup> This compares to the *CPRS 2002* response rates for local councillors in England and Wales of 43% and 40% respectively. When it is considered both that the IaDA study had greater resources and also that it was little more than the equivalent of a few pages of the much longer *CPRS 2002* then the response rates for the *CPRS 2002* compare well.

Second, where they can be compared, the results provided by the EOFLG<sup>234</sup> study are remarkably similar to those from the *CPRS 2002*. This must be counted in favour of the robustness of the *CPRS 2002* in terms of obtaining a representative sample of local councillors in England (unless both studies are similarly inaccurate). It shows that it is possible for a relatively small-scale survey—in terms of the resources available—to get as robust results as a much larger one.

Third, it will however be noted that these other studies refer to councillors in “England and Wales” combined whereas the *CPRS 2002* separated them and this present chapter is only about those in England. Whilst unfortunate, in practice this is a relatively minor issue. Around the time of the *CPRS 2002* there

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<sup>232</sup> EOFLG 2001; 2003; and see also that of the Improvement and Development Agency (IaDA), 2001, conducted in association with the EOFLG.

<sup>233</sup> IaDA, 2001: 1.

<sup>234</sup> EOFLG, 2001.

were under 1000 local councillors sitting in Wales<sup>235</sup> whereas there were over 21,000 councillors sitting in England and Wales.<sup>236</sup> The difference in numbers means that data from local councillors in Wales was swamped by their colleagues in England. Nevertheless, where they could be identified from the EofLG data councillors representing Plaid Cymru were removed from the analysis. In other words, in any of the tables below where a column is headed 'Other local councillors in England & Wales', this should be taken to indicate those from the Labour Party (37% of the total and 55% of non-Conservatives), the Liberal Democrat Party (21% of the total and 31% of non-Conservatives), the Green Party (0.4% of the total and 1% of non-Conservatives), independents (8% of the total and 12% of non-Conservatives) and others (1% of the total and 2% of the non-Conservatives) with councillors from Plaid Cymru omitted. The EofLG data suggests that at the time councillors from Plaid Cymru made up approximately one fifth of local councillors in Wales, so any impact of Welsh councillors is attenuated still further.

## WHAT WAS OMITTED AND WHY

### Basic Issues

Before proceeding, there needs to be a few words about why certain socio-demographic variables were used whilst others were not. For example, the questionnaire contained items about age and sex but not about weight. There are a number of reasons why this is the case. The most obvious is a matter of practicality. There is simply a limit to the number of questions that respondents can be expected to answer. This could be due to fatigue on the part of respondents or because individual items require too much work on the part of respondents or because the questions become increasingly intrusive and personal. This does not answer why this or that indicator was or was not studied, but simply states the obvious that not everything can be asked.

Another reason is one of replicability, or custom and practice. Generally, in political science age and sex might be studied whereas weight is usually not. Citing "because it's what everyone else does" may seem unconvincing, but given the limits of practicality just noted there have to be very good reasons for introducing novel measures beyond an exercise in data trawling. To some extent, it might be argued that this is also a reflection of what is "fashionable" in social research.

### Representativeness

There were other reasons of greater substance. Beyond a sociological analysis of "what sort of people were Conservative local councillors in 2002" there was also the more political matter of "representativeness". In other words, given that *CPRS 2002* respondents exercised power over citizens of

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<sup>235</sup> *BBC News*, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>236</sup> EofLG, 2001: 1.

the United Kingdom to what extent were they *like* the citizens of the United Kingdom? That said, it would be an error to claim that if it is found that in some respect deemed important they were not like them then this is in itself evidence that something is amiss.)

By itself this might not be important and it is inevitable the members of *any* “profession” including that of politician will never be a mirror image of the country as a whole. They will always diverge, particularly along measures such as age. However, it does assume an importance to a more limited but consequential degree when aspects of Conservative Party doctrine and general political debate at the time *specifically addressed* representativeness.

This can be summed up by quoting then Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and former Party Chairman Michael Ancram<sup>237</sup> in a speech that he gave to the Conservative Women’s Conference a matter of months before the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork. Said Ancram,

*“One of my greatest disappointments as Chairman was my failure to see more conservative women elected to Parliament. I know that if we are to present an acceptable face to the electorate it must be a representative face, representative of the world we live in where women outnumber men... I believe that this is one of the most important challenges facing us in the next year.”*

In turn, this relates to the then controversial issue of the local versus central and even non-Party selection of, in particular, parliamentary candidates.<sup>238</sup> In short, matters such as the sex and perhaps to a lesser extent age and ethnicity of politicians were a headline issue around the time of the *CPRS 2002* and it would have been strange not to look at them.

## **Researcher Choice and Sensitivity**

In any study making claims to some originality there is the matter of the personal choice of the researcher, in particular concerning specific hypotheses and research questions. In the case of the *CPRS 2002* it is not obvious what information about weight or shoe size would contribute.

The battery of socio-demographic items included ones about sex and marital status. What it did not include were items concerned with sexuality. Although by 2009 at the latest this issue amongst Conservative politicians and candidates was being analysed more openly,<sup>239</sup> it must be recalled that it was not until a few months *after* the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork that Alan Duncan became the first openly

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<sup>237</sup> Ancram, 29<sup>th</sup> November 2001.

<sup>238</sup> Catling, 8<sup>th</sup> March 2002; Baldwin, 21<sup>st</sup> October 2002; Bennett, 26<sup>th</sup> June 2003.

<sup>239</sup> Isaby, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2009.

homosexual Conservative MP.<sup>240</sup> It was felt that it was too sensitive an issue to include in the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire even allowing for assurances of anonymity. Future research might not need to be so nervous about this topic.<sup>241</sup>

## AN INITIAL SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

Note that in these and subsequent tables in this chapter the data for ELCs—which includes any data not stated to be otherwise—are from the *CPRS 2002*. All other data sources are as cited.

### Gender, Age and Ethnicity

	ELCs	Conservative councillors in England & Wales <sup>242</sup>	Other councillors in England & Wales <sup>243</sup>
Male	75%	73%	70%
Female	25%	27%	30%
Base	281	6,872	13,957

	ELCs	Conservative councillors in England & Wales <sup>244</sup>	Other councillors in England & Wales <sup>245</sup>	General population in England and Wales <sup>246</sup>
Up to 44	15%	13%	15%	60%
45-54	17%	20%	26%	13%
55-59	17%	16%	18%	6%
60-64	20%	19%	17%	5%
65-69	17%	15%	13%	4%
70-74	9%	12%	8%	4%
75+	4%	5%	3%	8%
Mean <sup>247</sup>	58	59	57	39
Base	276	6,632	13,445	52,041,916

<sup>240</sup> Waugh, 29<sup>th</sup> July 2002.

<sup>241</sup> Whitworth & Baldwin, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010.

<sup>242</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 1.

<sup>243</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 1.

<sup>244</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 1.

<sup>245</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 1.

<sup>246</sup> National Statistics, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2005: Table S001; National Statistics, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2007.

<sup>247</sup> The mean ages calculated from the EOFLG data are approximates.

TABLE 4.3: ETHNICITY				
	ELCs	Conservative councillors in England & Wales <sup>248</sup>	Other councillors in England & Wales <sup>249</sup>	General population in England <sup>250</sup>
White	100%	99%	96%	91%
Other	0%	1%	4%	9%
Base	279	6,870	13,913	52,041,916

The IaDA report<sup>251</sup> notes that local councillors in office at start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century were generally white, middle-aged males. As the EOFLG report<sup>252</sup> indicates, this applied to councillors irrespective of which political party they represented. Regarding age, it is inherently implausible that members of *any* occupation could mirror the population at large. (Although there is evidence that the proportion of young Conservative local councillors—i.e. under 35—was much the same as the proportion of non-councillors of the same age range *in the Party* around the time of the *CPRS 2002*.)<sup>253</sup> “White, middle-aged males” also described Parliamentary candidates and actual MPs for *all* major political parties and had done so for a long time.<sup>254</sup>

Regarding the “100% white” finding, as is reported in Chapter 10 on religion there were a number of Jewish respondents. All that can be said is that 99% of Jewish respondents to the 2001 Home Office Citizenship Survey considered themselves to be white.<sup>255</sup>

The view that seems to have taken hold around this time that the Conservative Party was *especially* at fault on such matters as the gender and ethnic composition of its sitting politicians and candidates<sup>256</sup> seems puzzling. Tables 4.1 and 4.3 suggest that, at least in its selection for winnable seats of local council candidates, the Conservative Party at the time was neither better nor worse than the other main parties. And it must also be noted that on occasion the other major political parties were criticised on this issue.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>248</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 2.

<sup>249</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 2.

<sup>250</sup> National Statistics, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2005: Table S101.

<sup>251</sup> IaDA, 2001: 2

<sup>252</sup> EOFLG, 2001.

<sup>253</sup> Travis, 18<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>254</sup> Watt, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2000; Brivati & Baston, 2002: 8.

<sup>255</sup> O’Beirne, March 2004: 9.

<sup>256</sup> Phillips, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2001; Kite, Baldwin & Miles, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2002; Simple, 1<sup>st</sup> February 2002; but see also Yule, 2000.

<sup>257</sup> Black, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2002; Hurst, 28<sup>th</sup> December 2002; Sieghart, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2000.

Nevertheless, this period saw increasing demands for the Conservative Party to reform its candidate selection process at all levels. In other words that the process should be more appealing for, and less hostile towards, potential female, non-white and homosexual candidates.<sup>258</sup>

However, some within the Conservative Party strongly resisted moves to “force the pace” of increasing representation of such groups.<sup>259</sup> Others argued that it was not actually that important as far as voters were concerned<sup>260</sup> or simply that, regarding ethnicity at least, it was an empirically dubious aim.<sup>261</sup>

In any event, such attempts that were made met with both (claimed) success<sup>262</sup>—although some claimed that the Conservative Party was going out its way to “show off” such candidates<sup>263</sup>—and (alleged) failure.<sup>264</sup>

(At the level of crude head-counting, the proportion of elected female politicians in the UK at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was similar-going-on-a-bit-worse when compared to many other major Western nations.<sup>265</sup> In absolute terms women rarely made up more than a third of the main national legislative body with the Scandinavian parliaments tending to have the largest proportion of female members.)

## Education

To simplify matter for respondents, they were only asked about their highest level of education achieved, not their educational careers.<sup>266</sup> For these purposes, someone who took a conventional O-level then A-level then university progression was taken to be educated to the same level as someone who had (say) left school with no qualifications but who had much later acquired an Open University degree.

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<sup>258</sup> e.g. Baldwin, 1<sup>st</sup> October 2002; Catling, 8<sup>th</sup> March 2002; Glover 9<sup>th</sup> April; Keswick, Pockley & Guillaume, 1999; Maude, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2002; Pierce, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2000; Watt, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2002.

<sup>259</sup> Kite, 25<sup>th</sup> October 2002; Odone, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2003.

<sup>260</sup> Steven, 28<sup>th</sup> July 2002.

<sup>261</sup> Meek, 2003.

<sup>262</sup> Adams, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2002; Thomson, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2003; Villiers 20<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

<sup>263</sup> Hames, 7<sup>th</sup> October 2000.

<sup>264</sup> Kite, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2002; Vaizey, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2002; Sieghart, 20<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

<sup>265</sup> International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006.

<sup>266</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[b]: 28.

	ELCs	Conservative councillors in England & Wales <sup>267</sup>	Other local councillors in England & Wales <sup>268</sup>
University or professional equivalent or higher	60%	58%	57%
Lower	40%	42%	43%
Base	277	6,829	13,829

Fee-paying secondary school	35%
Non-fee-paying secondary school	65%
Base	279

Regarding formal education, it is unsurprising that local councillors from all parties tended to have achieved a higher level than the general public given that in 2001 only 37% of the UK population possessed a first degree.<sup>269</sup> However, this latter figure does not take into account university-level professional qualifications. That said, this should be offset against the fact that, given the much older age profile of local councillors compared to the general public, many of the former will have gone through the usual school and university age period before the more recent substantial expansion of the Higher Education sector in the UK<sup>270</sup> or even that of the earlier expansion in the 1960s around the time of the *Robbins Report*.

To add to the confusion a little, the 2001 *British Social Attitudes* survey<sup>271</sup> suggests that 28% of the general population had at least some Higher education. However, only 15% of the total had at least a full first degree. In any event, Conservative local councillors—and probably all local councillors—tended to have attained higher levels of education than those they represented.

Table 4.5 perhaps confirms the stereotype of “public school” Conservative politicians,<sup>272</sup> something particularly true at the most senior ranks.<sup>273</sup> (Although the Party has historically been electorally popular amongst the working class and certainly in previous times enacted legislation to ameliorate the lot of the working class, that same class has been historically under-represented amongst both Conservative MPs and senior members of the voluntary side.<sup>274</sup>) They confirm it inasmuch as only 7% of the general

<sup>267</sup> EOF LG, 2001: 5.

<sup>268</sup> EOF LG, 2001: 5.

<sup>269</sup> National Statistics, 4<sup>th</sup> February 2004.

<sup>270</sup> Clarke, 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2003.

<sup>271</sup> NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

<sup>272</sup> Baker & Fountain, 1996: 96.

<sup>273</sup> Cowley & Melhuish, March 1997: 27.

<sup>274</sup> McKenzie & Silver, 1968: 38-39, 45-47.

population in the United Kingdom—probably a little more in England alone—attended an independent school at around the time of the *CPRS 2002*<sup>275</sup> whereas 35% of Conservative local councillors in England did (assuming that “independent school” and “fee-paying secondary school” are different labels for the same thing). That said, almost two-thirds of Conservative local councillors in England had *not* attended a fee-paying school. A substantial majority of them had attended state schools “just like everybody else”.

(The proportion of ELCs attending a fee-paying school was less than Conservative MPs where nearly two-thirds (64%) had attended such schools although this had been on a generally declining trend since at least the 1970s.<sup>276</sup>)

The two items about the type of school that respondents attended and whether or not they subsequently acquired a university or equivalent level education allows a few words about educational progression.

		Type of school	
		Free-paying	State
Highest level of education	Secondary or equivalent	25%	49%
	University or equivalent	75%	51%
Base		97	179

Using the  $\chi^2$  statistic, it can be seen in Table 4.6 that there is a significant association (two-tailed  $p = <0.001$ ) between the two variables in the expected direction. Those who attended a fee-paying school were more likely to have later acquired a university or equivalent level education than those who had not, a finding similar to that found in the general population.<sup>277</sup> Nevertheless, half of those who had attended a state school later received a university level education. The proportion of ELCs educated at state schools who acquired university or equivalent qualifications was broadly in line with that of the general population (42%) around the time of the survey.<sup>278</sup> However, given that many of them would have achieved this before the expansion in the Higher Education sector then in practice State-educated ELCs tended to end up better qualified than most state-educated members of the public.

<sup>275</sup> Independent Schools Council, 2006.

<sup>276</sup> Marquand, 2009: 324; Sutton Trust, 2005: 8; 2010: 7.

<sup>277</sup> *BBC News*, 27<sup>th</sup> November 2007.

<sup>278</sup> Lightfoot, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2006.



## Marital Status

Support for “the family” and “marriage” remained strong in William Hague’s Conservative Party.<sup>279</sup> However, by then many were noting that those two terms were not always synonymous.<sup>280</sup> Some inside the Party were arguing that the Party’s continuing stress on “traditional marriage” was “politically unwise”<sup>281</sup> and that it had to accept the new realities of, for example, increasing co-habitation.<sup>282</sup>

Married	78%
Living with a partner	4%
Widowed/divorced/separated	11%
Single	7%
Base	279

How did ELCs live up to the Party’s then ideal in these matters? At first glance, rather well. The non-married cohabitation rate of 4% amongst this group of *CPRS 2002* respondents shown in Table 4.7 was much lower than that of the general population of England around the same time which was approximately 25%.<sup>283</sup> However, it has already been noted that the age distribution of local councillors in England was not like that of the general population, with most councillors being in their 40s to 60s. Non-married cohabitation rates for the general public in this age range in 2001 ran from approximately 10% at age 40 to approximately 2% at age 70.<sup>284</sup> As such, these *CPRS 2002* respondents were little different to the same age range within the general population.

## Residence and Type of Accommodation

Rural villages or farms	38%
Town	39%
Suburb or outskirts of a major city	17%
City or metropolitan	6%
Base	280

<sup>279</sup> Gledhill, 25<sup>th</sup> September 2000.

<sup>280</sup> Cooper, 2001: 15.

<sup>281</sup> *BBC News*, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2000.

<sup>282</sup> Kite, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>283</sup> National Statistics, 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2005.

<sup>284</sup> National Statistics, 7<sup>th</sup> July 2005.

Hamlet, isolated dwelling or village	10%
All others	90%
Base	49,138,831

Tables 4.8a and 4.8b do not allow an exact like-for-like comparison. The items in the *CPRS 2002* and the 2001 *Census* were different: the former analysed the nature of the local authority ward represented whereas the latter analysed the population's main accommodation. Nevertheless, the finding that over a third (38%) of these *CPRS 2002* respondents considered that they *represented* a mainly rural ward whereas only 10% of the population as a whole *lived* in such areas highlights the disproportionately rural or non-metropolitan nature of the Conservative Party by then.

This rural background was seen as both strength and a weakness of the Conservative Party at the time. It was seen as a strength or at least a crumb of comfort in that the more rural areas was where the Conservative vote held up relatively well preventing a complete electoral collapse.<sup>286</sup> The Party sometimes deliberately highlighted its championing of rural areas and issues.<sup>287</sup> This was particularly true for local elections, although Labour made gains in rural areas at the 1997 and 2001 general elections.<sup>288</sup>

It was seen as a weakness because, along with other demographic issues such as the age of Conservative supporters<sup>289</sup> it meant that the Party's support was drawn disproportionately from those most resistant to "change" whereas it was argued that in previous times the Party had embraced it and this was a necessary and good thing to do.<sup>290</sup> It anyway was argued that there was little future for a party of "rural geriatrics".<sup>291</sup> Moreover, by 2001 there were few areas in England in particular that were truly rural—perhaps only 10% or so of all constituencies by some measures—and so the overall impact of such rural strongholds was small.<sup>292</sup>

Of course, the main problem was that it meant that the Party was simply not winning enough votes and seats to gain power. It needs to be remembered what a change the by then "parlous" condition<sup>293</sup> of the Conservatives in urban areas represented. For example, the Conservatives controlled Liverpool in the 1950s, and into the 1960s returned a majority of MPs representing the city. By the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork the Party had long had no MPs representing the city and the Party's percentage of the

<sup>285</sup> National Statistics, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2005.

<sup>286</sup> Berrington, 2001: 212-213; Riddell, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2001; Hetherington, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2001; Tyrie, 2001: 11.

<sup>287</sup> Brown, 11<sup>th</sup> September 2000; Dorey, 2003.

<sup>288</sup> Woods, 2002.

<sup>289</sup> Parris, 10<sup>th</sup> July 2001.

<sup>290</sup> Gove, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

<sup>291</sup> Rees-Mogg, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>292</sup> Berrington, 2001: 212-213.

popular vote at the 2002 local elections was down to single figures.<sup>294</sup> By the opening years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in urban local elections in England—although it would take matters too far to extrapolate this to a national level—the Conservatives were sometimes pushed into fourth or even fifth place behind not only Labour and the Liberal Democrats but sometimes even the Green Party or the British National Party.<sup>295</sup>

	ELCs	General population in Great Britain <sup>296</sup>
Own the property outright	61%	29%
Own the property with a mortgage	37%	40%
Rent the property	2%	31%
Base	278	24,418

Differences in age, social class, geographical location and so on make a direct comparison between Conservative local councillors in England and the general population shown in Table 4.9 difficult. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the former were much more likely to own their home, either outright or with a mortgage, rather than rent it than was true of the general population. Indeed, renting was virtually unknown amongst this group of *CPRS 2002* respondents.

### Area of Representation

	ELCs	General population in England <sup>297</sup>
South East (except London)	35%	16%
Midlands	19%	19%
North	14%	29%
East	13%	11%
South West	13%	10%
London	6%	15%
Base	283	49,138,831

The item about where in England was the ward that they represented was from the main body of the questionnaire. Table 4.10 reinforces the fact that around the time of the *CPRS 2002* at all levels of

<sup>293</sup> *The Spectator*, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2001.

<sup>294</sup> Jenkins, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2002.

<sup>295</sup> Sherman, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2003.

<sup>296</sup> National Statistics, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2005, weighted base.

<sup>297</sup> National Statistics, 2005.

representation south-east England *excluding London* was the Conservative Party's regional stronghold.<sup>298</sup> Their numbers there as a proportion of all ELCs was over double that of the general population as a proportion of the whole population. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was also the UK's richest area and disproportionately the biggest contributor of taxation.<sup>299</sup>) Conservative local councillors were disproportionately under-represented in northern England, having half the representation that they would have had if their distribution matched the general population.

In short, allowing for slightly different boundaries and also remembering the small number of local councillors from Scotland and Wales also featured in the *CPRS 2002*, the vast majority of Conservative local councillors came from areas defined by some<sup>300</sup> as being part of the UK's "inner core" or "outer core" of London, south-east England, the Midlands, East Anglia and Wessex rather than the "inner periphery" or "outer periphery" of north England, Wales, south-west England and Scotland.

## Employment

In the questionnaire there was no further split in what was termed "public" into nationalised industries and the like and the NHS, state education and so on.<sup>301</sup>

	ELCs	Conservative councillors in England & Wales <sup>302</sup>	All councillors in England & Wales <sup>303</sup>
Private	71%	81%	41%
Public	20%	16%	51%
Voluntary	9%	3%	8%
Base	277	3434	7073

	ELCs
Employed	62%
Self-employed	38%
Base	274

<sup>298</sup> Rallings, Thrasher & Johnston, 2002: 281.

<sup>299</sup> Denham, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2002.

<sup>300</sup> Steed, in Heath, Rother & Jarvis, 2002: 169.

<sup>301</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[b]: 48.

<sup>302</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 4. This indicates current employment only unlike the data for ELCs which indicates current or most recent employment if no longer working.

<sup>303</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 4. See the preceding footnote.

In 2001 and 2002 the proportion of the mainland UK general public employed in the public sector was between 20% and 30% depending upon the region of the country.<sup>304</sup> Table 4.11 suggests that Conservative local councillors more nearly matched the employment profile of the public compared to other councillors who were far more likely to work in the public sector.

Self-employment rates of *CPRS 2002* respondents are not directly comparable with the data from other sources since the former took together present or most recent past employment if the respondent was unemployed or otherwise economically inactive. However, calculations based upon secondary analysis of official figures<sup>305</sup> suggest that the 2002 self-employment rate amongst economically active members of the general public was approximately 13%. Table 4.12 therefore suggests a much higher rate of self-employment amongst Conservative local councillors in England than amongst the general public. Moreover, further data<sup>306</sup> suggests that, however measured, the rate of self-employment amongst Conservative local councillors in England at the time was nearly one-and-half times greater than amongst Liberal Democrat councillors and over three times higher than amongst Labour local councillors. Coupled with the lower rate of public sector employment amongst Conservative local councillors in England compared to their Labour and Liberal Democrat colleagues it might be argued that this suggests a degree of “sturdy independence” amongst elected Conservatives at a local level.

The questionnaire went into a little more detail by asking respondents to fit their occupation into one of a number of broad categories. As a result, exactly half (50%) could be placed in a collapsed category of “service sector management or the professions” with nearly a fifth (18%) in that of “manufacturing or agriculture” and 9% in “retail”. Although it is not a like-for-like comparison, what was noticeable if expected was the relative absence of those describing themselves as either “skilled artisan” or “other manual” (5% in total) when compared to the English public of the time (*British Social Attitudes Survey 2001*) where a third, 32% in total, described themselves as either “skilled manual” or “semi-skilled or unskilled manual”.

There was no attempt to go into detailed sociological analysis of this area,<sup>307</sup> but the broadly middle-class and white-collar nature of the respondents can be seen.

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<sup>304</sup> *British Social Attitudes Survey 2001*; National Statistics, 28<sup>th</sup> October 2005.

<sup>305</sup> Weir, 2003: 442.

<sup>306</sup> EOFLG, 2001: 3.

<sup>307</sup> *European Social Survey, 2007[b]*.

## Parental Background in the Conservative Party

	ELCs	Conservative ordinary members <sup>308</sup>
Both parents a member	16%	32%
Mother only a member	3%	6%
Father only a member	3%	6%
Neither parent a member	66%	44%
Not available <sup>309</sup>	12%	13%
Base	259	c. 2446

Table 4.13 suggests that family involvement was not an overwhelmingly important pathway into the Conservative Party for ELCs. Only a fifth (22%) of respondents were certain that at least one parent had been a member of the Party and two-thirds (66%) were sure that neither had been. That said, there is some evidence that those who *did* come from a Conservative family background came from quite a strongly Conservative background. Only 6% said that only one parent had been a member whereas 16% said that both had been.

The comparison with the results from the earlier *True Blues* study is here to flesh things out. It would appear that by 2002 local councillors were less likely to have had a parental background in the Conservative Party than ordinary members had been some years previously.

It cannot be directly claimed whether the differences in parental background observed in these two studies were due to the different types of respondents being studied or the passage of time. However, looking just at *CPRS 2002* respondents it can be seen whether there might have been a pattern of increasing or decreasing parental socialisation into the Party. It cannot be said whether there *was* parental socialisation only that that the figures suggest that there could have been.

First, the responses to the items about parental membership of the Party were recoded into a new variable with two categories: those who *knew* that *at least one parent* had been a member in the Party (28% out of a base of 252) and those who *knew* that *neither* had been (72%). Independent samples t-tests for age (two-tailed  $p = 0.471$ ) and length of service as a local councillor (two-tailed  $p = 0.697$ ) suggested no significant connection between respondents' service in the Party and that of their parents (and it is hard to see what we would make of the latter anyway as indicated below).

<sup>308</sup> Whitely, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 250.

<sup>309</sup> Includes all who did not respond either "Yes" or "No" for both parents.

However, there was a significant difference (two-tailed  $p = <0.001$ ) between “family” and “non-family” respondents and how long they had been members of the Party. Further analysis using cross-tabs analysis—and the  $\chi^2$  statistic indicated a significant association, two-tailed  $p = <0.001$ —is shown in Table 4.14.

		Parental background in the Conservative Party		
		At least one parent a member	Neither parent a member	Base
Number of years as a member of the Conservative Party	0 to 9	11%	89%	53
	11 to 19	22%	78%	46
	20 to 29	25%	75%	53
	30 to 39	49%	51%	37
	40 or more	38%	62%	39
	Base	62	166	228

It can be seen is that there was a decline in the proportion of those with a parental background in the Party amongst who joined in the last 30 years or less compared to those who had been members for 30 or 40 years or more. Furthermore, this trend accelerated in the decade before the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork. There are at least two plausible reasons for this. First, that because there had been<sup>310</sup> a marked decline in membership of the Party in the years before 2002<sup>311</sup> and so there were simply less people in the Party to be the mothers and fathers of newer members. (In the years immediately before 2002 the Labour Party had suffered a proportionally even greater loss of membership so that by 2002 the Conservative Party again had more members. However, this was on the back of a surge in recruitment in the years leading up to Labour’s landslide victory at the 1997 general election.<sup>312</sup>)

The other is that declining parental membership might suggest the decline in the importance of the “social” aspects of Party membership and in particular youth membership.<sup>313</sup> This can be tentatively examined by correlating parental membership with an item from the main body of the questionnaire that invited responses to the item “The Conservative Party is not an ideological party”. It is not implausible to hypothesise that those without a parental background in the Party would be more likely to disagree with this item—because their motives for joining were more political than social—than those with a parental

<sup>310</sup> but see Landale & Baldwin, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2001.

<sup>311</sup> Landale, 21<sup>st</sup> April 2000; 13<sup>th</sup> March 2001.

<sup>312</sup> Baldwin, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2002[a]; *The Guardian*, January 2002.

<sup>313</sup> Evans, 1996: 17; Holroyd-Doveton, 1996: 156-157; Billen, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2000; but see for example Cramb, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2000 for a more modern understanding of what “social” might mean.

background in the Party. However, cross-tabs analysis using the chi<sup>2</sup> statistic found no significant association (one-tailed p = 0.374) between the two variables.

### Service in the Conservative Party

1945 to 1949	4%
1950 to 1959	9%
1960 to 1969	12%
1970 to 1979	25%
1980 to 1989	18%
1990 to 1999	29%
2000 to 2002	3%
Base	269
Mean	1978
Median	1979
Mode	1970

1950 to 1959	1%
1960 to 1969	3%
1970 to 1979	10%
1980 to 1989	19%
1990 to 1999	52%
2000 to 2002	15%
Base	278
Mean	1992
Median	1996
Mode	1999

<sup>314</sup> It is possible that a small number of respondents had been elected as non-Conservative councillors beforehand.



<b>TABLE 4.17: NUMBER OF YEARS BETWEEN JOINING THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND FIRST BEING ELECTED AS A LOCAL COUNCILLOR</b>	
0	12%
1 to 4	23%
5 to 9	16%
10 to 19	20%
20 to 29	16%
30 to 39	8%
40 and more	5%
Base	269
Mean	13
Median	9
Mode	0

Regarding Tables 4.15 and 4.16, it ought to be remembered of the inherent arbitrariness of collapsing what is near enough the scale data of individual years into the ordinal data found in the tables. If, for example, instead of using a “traditional” or “easy on the eye” calendar decade as the main span of each category some other span had been used then the tables might look different and “reveal” something else.

That proviso aside, in the case of Tables 4.15 and 4.16 it is hard to relate contemporary political events with either recruitment into the Conservative Party or election as a local councillor. For example, the effects of any political events that might be expected to have had an impact on recruitment—such as “Black Wednesday” in 1992 and the Party’s subsequent loss of public support<sup>315</sup>—are confused by the almost never-ending cycle of general, multi-level local, European and Greater London Assembly elections and by-elections. There is also the uncertain and in practice unknowable influence of particularly vigorous or slack local campaigning.<sup>316</sup>

Nevertheless, it would seem too much of a coincidence not to note that the most common year for joining the Party, 1970 with 8% of the total, was also a general election year. A year-by-year analysis indicates that the only other years to account for 5%—there were none greater—of all ELC respondents’ initial entry into the Party were 1980 (the first full year of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership), 1990 (the year of her ejection from office by the Party) and 1998 (the year after the Party’s devastating general election

<sup>315</sup> Pattie & Johnston, 1996; Norton, 2002: 68; Travis, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2002; but see Sanders & Brynin, 1999: 223; Anderson, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2000.

<sup>316</sup> Denver, Hands & McAlester, 2004.

defeat). It might be speculated that dramatic events in the Party's history, whether for good or bad, were a boost to recruitment.

The so-called flatline years of relatively low and static levels of support for the Party after 1992<sup>317</sup> did not seem to have had too negative an impact on recruitment into the Party regarding future ELCs. More detailed analysis indicates that nearly a quarter (23%) of ELC respondents joined the Party between 1993 and 2002 (inclusive).

With the proviso at the start of this section again in mind, what is also interesting is the finding in Table 4.15 that the most successful decades in terms of recruitment into the Party—at least as far as the respondents under analysis in this chapter are concerned—were the 1970s (25%) and particularly the 1990s (29%), not the main era of “actually existing Thatcherism”, the 1980s (18%).

Despite the small number of respondents who had been local councillors for two or even three decades, there is evidence of quite a high replacement rate. Detailed analysis indicates that over half (56%) of ELCs had first become councillors seven years or less before the *CPRS 2002*.

The finding in Table 4.17 that over a third (35%) of ELCs in England had been members of the Conservative Party for just four years or less before becoming a local councillor is worth noting. Over one in ten (12%) ELC respondents had joined the Party and been elected as local councillors within a year *and this was the most common gap between the two events*. These respondents had, in effect, “walked in off the streets” and almost immediately become local councillors. Such people must have had little formal track record within the Conservative Party and yet almost immediately become amongst its most prominent local spokespersons.

On the other hand, well over a quarter (29%) of ELCs had been members of the Party for two decades or more before being elected and had grown grey in the service of the Party on the voluntary side before being elected as local councillors.

## **Social Class**

Respondents were asked to rate their social class both at the time of the survey and of their family when young. This item was not calculated using indicators such as income or educational level but instead was the subjective rating of *CPRS 2002* respondents.

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<sup>317</sup> Tory Reform Group, 11<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

	Of family when young	Of respondent now
Upper class	3%	2%
Middle class	49%	68%
Working class	40%	10%
No social class	8%	20%
Base	279	276

Certain features stand out from Table 4.18. First and perhaps most trivially, very few respondents regarded themselves as upper class at either point in their lives. However, there was a marked sense of upward social movement amongst respondents through their lives. Half (49%) said that they came from a middle class family background and a large minority (40%) said that they had come from a working class one. However, by 2002 two-thirds (68%) regarded their status as middle class whereas only a fifth (20%) regarded it as working class. This progression has been noted in previous studies.<sup>318</sup>

Only 8% felt that their families had no class background, but by 2002 a fifth (20%) did not regard themselves as members of a particular social class.

		Of family when young		
		Middle class	Working class	None
Of respondent now	Middle class	91%	54%	10%
	Working class	2%	24%	0%
	None	7%	22%	90%
	Total	135	110	21

Omitting the small number of those who regarded themselves as upper class at either point in their lives, Table 4.19 displays the nature of the class progression. The pattern is very clear. Those who regarded themselves in childhood as either middle class or not belonging to any particular social class tended to say the same about their current social class: 90% or more in both cases. However, over half (54%) of those who felt that they had come from a working class background thought that by the time of the *CPRS 2002* they were now middle class and more than a fifth (22%) now regarded themselves as belonging to no social class. Only a quarter (24%) retained their working class self-image.

It comes as no surprise that when subjective social class is correlated with the more objective measures found in the questionnaire about level of education and whether respondents attended a fee-paying school

<sup>318</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 47.

then the results are in the expected direction. (In the following analyses, the tiny number of those who responded “upper class” to the subjective social class item were again omitted.)

<b>TABLE 4.20A: CHILDHOOD SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS AGAINST HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION</b>			
		Highest level of education	
		Secondary school	University
Current subjective social class	Middle class	58%	77%
	Working class	21%	4%
	No social class	21%	19%
	Base	110	157

<b>TABLE 4.20B: CURRENT SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS AGAINST HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION</b>			
		Highest level of education	
		Secondary school	University
Childhood subjective social class	Middle class	39%	59%
	Working class	51%	34%
	No social class	10%	7%
	Base	110	157

At either time, there was little correlation between level of education and the self-identification of not belonging to any social class.

Using the  $\chi^2$  statistic, there was, however, a significant association overall between the variables in both Table 4.20a (two-tailed  $p = 0.007$ ) and Table 4.20b (two-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ). In both cases those who had a university or equivalent level of education were more likely to rate themselves as middle class than those who did not.

Rather more who had a university education described themselves as middle class at the later period of their life than the earlier (77% against 59%). This is likely a result of the real or perceived upwards social mobility noted above. That those who went to university were more likely to say that they came from a middle class family background is probably a reflection of the reality that historically university was “for” the middle class.<sup>319</sup> It would be surprising, however, if in at least a small number of cases this was not due to a degree of retrospective analysis on the part of respondents. In other words, “I went to university, therefore I must have come from a middle class background.”

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<sup>319</sup> Babb, 2005: 9.

Turning to whether or not respondents attended a fee-paying school, Tables 4.21a and 4.21b tell a somewhat similar story.

<b>TABLE 4.21A: CURRENT SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS AGAINST ATTENDANCE AT A FREE-PAYING SCHOOL</b>			
		Type of school	
		Fee-paying	State
Current subjective social class	Middle class	83%	63%
	Working class	2%	15%
	None	15%	22%
	Base	92	176

<b>TABLE 4.21B: CHILDHOOD SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS AGAINST ATTENDANCE AT A FREE-PAYING SCHOOL</b>			
		Type of school	
		Fee-paying	State
Childhood subjective social class	Middle class	81%	35%
	Working class	12%	56%
	None	7%	9%
	Base	90	178

Using the Chi<sup>2</sup> statistic, in both cases there was a significant association overall between the variables (two-tailed  $p = 0.001$  in both cases), clearly as a result of the larger proportion of those who attended a fee-paying school describing themselves as middle class at either stage of their lives. The proportion of those who had attended a public school and describing themselves as middle class was nearly the same at both stages of their lives. In what was again probably the impact of perceived social mobility, a much higher proportion of those who had not attended a fee-paying school described themselves as middle class at the time of the *CPRS 2001* (63%) compared to when they were children (35%).

## **SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES**

### **Rationale and Methodology**

Numerous works have indicated that differences in various socio-demographic variables are associated with differences in attitudinal variables. (Although, perhaps unsurprisingly, in certain circumstances it has been demonstrated that, against expectations, some such variables are *not* associated with attitudinal

differences, e.g. social class and the views of so-called “Essex man” Conservatives.<sup>320</sup>) For example, age has been implicated in a range of generational or cohort (where older people are simply replaced by younger people), life-cycle (for a range of possible physiological, psychological or social reasons) and period (where something effects everyone in society) effects on various social and political attitudes and behaviour,<sup>321</sup> often involving complex interactions.<sup>322</sup> So, too, has education<sup>323</sup> and sex.<sup>324</sup> The list is almost endless.

To take just two examples. Looking specifically at Conservative Party politicians, it has been noted that there have been observable differences between different cohorts. It has been argued that those entering Parliament as the “class of 1959” had a special role in the rise of Thatcherism in that they were not haunted by the “hungry thirties” or the election defeat of 1945. As such, they were more prepared to question the post-War consensus.<sup>325</sup> Similarly, in research into Conservative candidates for parliament seats in the run-up to a presumed 2010 general election it was noted that many were a product of the 1980s “Thatcher revolution” and not always in favour of some of the policies espoused by David Cameron and the leadership of the Party.<sup>326</sup>

Looking at it from a different direction and more generally, there is a wealth of evidence<sup>327</sup> from research amongst the general public that those who are better-educated and/or younger tend to be more socially tolerant, for example of homosexual relationships.

Because the *CPRS 2002* only has one point in time available, the analysis cannot be as ambitious as some other studies. However, a range of socio-demographic variables collected from the responses of ELCs can be analysed in terms of whether they have any predictive power on attitudes described by the multi-item scales set out in Appendix 3. This was done by running a series of regression analyses in *SPSS* using the multi-item scales as the dependant variable on each occasion. The putative predictive variables were of two sorts:

- Sex, marital status, current subjective social class, childhood subjective social class, highest academic qualification, type of school attended (i.e. private versus state), location of ward (e.g. rural or city), tenure of property (e.g. owned with a mortgage or rented), employment sector (e.g. private or state) and employment status (i.e. self-employed versus employed). Because of the nature of the data and the demands of regression analysis, in most cases dummy variables were created.
- Age, number of years a member of the Conservative Party and number of years a local councillor. These variables could be entered raw as scale variables.

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<sup>320</sup> Baker & Fountain, 1996: 97.

<sup>321</sup> Hames, 12<sup>th</sup> January 2004; Rotton & Heath, 2003.

<sup>322</sup> Tilley, 2002.

<sup>323</sup> Heath & Topf, 1986.

<sup>324</sup> Campbell, 2004; Childs & Withey, 2004.

<sup>325</sup> Green, 2002: 237.

<sup>326</sup> Montgomerie, 30<sup>th</sup> April 2009.

It is reasonable in the instances of many of the socio-demographic variables to make assumptions about their potential causal relationships with the multi-item scales. Clearly, such variables as age and sex precede placement on any of the scales. This is not always the case: placement on certain scales might be argued to determine (say) choices in career. But it is sufficiently so to allow for the use of regression analysis.

## Analysis and Results

First, there were a small number of socio-demographic variables that *never* appeared as significant predictors, even at a trivial level. These were type of school attended, location of ward and employment status.

Second, there were seven multi-item scales for which socio-demographic variables were not significant predictors of variability. These were Environmentalism, Political Elitism, Intra-Party Elitism, Political Elitism, Theocratism, Pride in the Way Nation Functions and Left-Right.

Third, there was a large group of scales which did have statistically significant regression models associated with them but of a marginal sort where the final model explained less than 10 % of variability and/or no single variable accounted for more 5% by itself. These were Authoritarianism, Europeanism, Intra-Party Inclusivity, Optimism, Postmaterialism, Pride in National Heritage and Culture, Protectionism, Religiosity, Traditional British Liberties, Welfarism and Xenophobia.

This left only *one* multi-item scale where socio-demographic variables accounted for a significant and substantial amount of that scale's variability. This was Feminism—which looked at attitudes towards the role of women in politics and so on—where the variables in the final model accounted for 13% of its variability. All that needs to be said is that of this 13% two socio-demographic variables accounted for 5% of the total each. One was age where younger respondents were more likely to display feminist attitudes and the other was sex where female respondents were more likely to display feminist attitudes. Both of these findings were to be expected.

In the case of sex, the finding tallies with the actual voting behaviour of near-contemporaneous female *Labour* MPs.<sup>328</sup> There are indeed “women's issues” which are disproportionately supported by mainstream female politicians irrespective of their party allegiance.

It is also worth noting the frequent claims around the time of the *CPRS 2002* that it was the “blue rinse brigade” of older, female Conservative activists who were most opposed to female candidates for elected,

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<sup>327</sup> Evans, 2002: 218-219.

particularly Westminster, office.<sup>329</sup> This might have been true for *members*, but if so it is a phenomenon much attenuated (to say the least) amongst female Conservative local *politicians*.

## THE INTERNET

### Use of Email and the Internet

The only item in the *CPRS 2002* directly looking at media consumption concerned the “new media” of email and the Internet as opposed to the “old media” of newspapers, magazines, radio and TV.<sup>330</sup>

It can be hard to remember the growth of the Internet since the 1990s. Just between 2002 and 2008 the proportion of households in the UK that had Internet access increased from less than a half to two-thirds.<sup>331</sup>

Respondents were presented with two items, one concerning how often they used email and the other concerning how often they used the “Internet for news and information”. (Eric Forth famously disliked such things and said so to me on a number of occasions when I tried to persuade him of the opportunities presented by blogging.<sup>332</sup>)

	Email	Internet
At least once a day	64%	29%
At least once a week	13%	29%
Less often than once a week or never	23%	42%
Base	274	275

It is clear from a comparison of the data columns in Table 4.22 that rates of email usage were apparently much higher than Internet usage. This could have been because some respondents understood “email” to refer to internal electronic mail systems provided by the councils of which they were members or by their other places of work.

Returning to the main theme of this chapter, the relationship between a number of core socio-demographic indicators and email and Internet usage was analysed. One-tailed hypotheses were used

<sup>328</sup> Childs & Withey, 2004.

<sup>329</sup> Watt, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2000.

<sup>330</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[c]: 124.

<sup>331</sup> National Statistics, c. 2003; 15<sup>th</sup> March 2007; 26<sup>th</sup> August 2008.

<sup>332</sup> Meek, September 2003.



since the literature was clear that higher rates of usage were to be expected amongst younger, male and/or better educated respondents.<sup>333</sup>

	Up to 39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
At least once a day	96%	89%	64%	59%	35%
At least once a week	4%	3%	17%	16%	14%
Less often than once a week or never	0%	8%	19%	25%	51%
Base	24	36	72	100	37

	Up to 39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
At least once a day	72%	47%	28%	18%	19%
At least once a week	24%	33%	36%	31%	13%
Less often than once a week or never	4%	20%	36%	51%	68%
Base	25	36	72	100	37

Tables 4.23a and 4.23b could hardly be clearer. Higher rates of email and Internet usage were associated with relative youth. This, of course, was similar to the pattern amongst the general public.<sup>334</sup>

The results for sex were interesting. There was no significant association (one-tailed  $p = 0.25$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic) amongst ELCs between sex and email usage. There was, however, between sex and using the Internet for news and information (one-tailed  $p < 0.001$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic), with male respondents much more likely to have done this. This discrepancy might indeed indicate that by “email” respondents were referring to internal mail systems provided by their local councils or other places of employment and which might have been used more commonly. This becomes more plausible when one considers that 60% of female and 65% of male respondents said that they used email at least once a day against only 9% and 36% respectively who said that they used the Internet at least once a day. Nevertheless, the higher rates of Internet usage amongst men is again consistent with many years of data collected from the British general public.<sup>335</sup>

An analysis of email or Internet usage based on level of education also found results in the expected direction. At a simple binary level of university or equivalent against less than that, there was a significant association with both email (one-tailed  $p = 0.046$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic) and Internet (one-

<sup>333</sup> Gardner & Oswald, 2001: 162-163.

<sup>334</sup> National Statistics, c. 2003; 15<sup>th</sup> March 2007; 28<sup>th</sup> August 2007: 6.

<sup>335</sup> National Statistics, c. 2003; 28<sup>th</sup> August 2007: 6.

tailed  $p = 0.032$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic) usage with those educated to degree level more likely to have used both.

## **Ideology and the Internet?**

Given that *CPRS 2002* respondents were relatively homogenous when compared to UK society as a whole, this chapter need not concern itself with the so-called “digital divide” that has been discussed in terms of “social exclusion” and so on.<sup>336</sup> However, around the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork it was claimed by a number of writers and activists that the Internet would be of particular help to those with ideological views perceived by them to be under-represented and/or misrepresented by the mainstream media. This, it was claimed, was particularly true of conservatives, libertarians and Euro-sceptics.<sup>337</sup>

This possibility was analysed way of regression analyses with email and Internet usage as the dependant variables and the range of multi-item scales as the putative predictive variables along with age (given what was described above). Without detailing the results, the problem is that age drowned out virtually all other variables and in practice was the only meaningful significant predictive variable for both email and Internet usage.

Remove age from the analyses and almost none of the multi-item scales were significant predictors of the two dependant variables. The marginal exception was Protectionism which was the most important—relatively speaking—predictive variable in both cases. It explained 5% (out of a mere 7% total based upon the adjusted  $R^2$  figure) of the variability in email usage and 4% (again out of 7%) of the variability in Internet usage. Bivariate analysis indicates that in both cases those who were less protectionist tended to be heavier users of both email and the Internet. When the items making up the Protectionism scale are studied then these results make an intuitive sense. Such respondents tended to be less afraid of new things. However, without taking age into consideration as well nothing more can be made of this.

## **Other *CPRS 2002* Respondents**

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that all respondents were presented with these items about email and Internet usage. The most “switched on” were MEPs and the least were Peers. Little needs to be said about the average age of the latter group. In the *CPRS 2002*, 68% of MPs said that they used email at least once a day with a further 12% saying that they used it at least once a week.

Although it had been dubbed the first Internet election, analysis after the 2001 general election suggested that Internet use by both local and national parties as well as individual candidates was patchy, generated

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<sup>336</sup> Citizens Online, 26<sup>th</sup> July 2007.

<sup>337</sup> Crozier, 2000; Meek, September 2003; Micklethwait, 2002; but see also North, 12<sup>th</sup> April 2009.

little additional interest amongst the electorate and above all had a negligible impact on election outcomes.<sup>338</sup> However—and the circumstances in which they used it were not identified in the *CPRS 2002*—by May 2008<sup>339</sup> the vast majority of MPs stated that they used email (92%) to communicate with their constituents. Most (83%) had a personal website. Matters had changed in a short space of time.

## IDEALISM, PRAGMATISM AND TIME

Measures of attitudes such as the ones used above may suggest what people think but not how important these issues—or just “ideals” at all—are to the respondent nor how this might change with the passage of time. Within the context of the Conservative Party it has been claimed that there were two mutually reinforcing factors at work: “The leaching out of idealism and the ageing of the party membership”.<sup>340</sup>

Here a tentative analysis can be conducted using the “The Conservative Party is not an ideological party” item from the questionnaire. If this view was correct then, given the direction of the wording of the item, there ought to be a significant correlation between it and the time-related variables. In other words, older respondents should be more likely to downplay the importance of ideology within the Conservative Party than younger ones. The item can also be run against the number of years respondents had been members of the Party and the number of years that they had been local councillors. Altogether, this might offer a guide regarding maturational processes (age) as against experiential processes (length of membership in the Party and time served as a local councillor).

Looking first at the variable alone, out of the 278 valid responses 40% agreed that the Conservative Party was *not* an ideological party against 31% who disagreed (that is, they thought that the Conservative Party *was* an ideological party) and 29% who took the “Neither/nor” option. In short—and their own motivations cannot be disentangled from their views of the Party in whose name they had been elected nor whether they thought their view was “good” or “bad”—only a minority viewed the Conservative Party as substantially “ideological”. Instead, a plurality seemed to have regarded the Party as being substantially pragmatic.

In fact, bivariate analysis using the Pearson statistic indicated no significant correlation between the “not an ideological party” item and either simple age or how long respondents had been local councillors. There was, however, a significant correlation (Pearson correlation  $-0.127$ , one-tailed  $p = 0.02$ ) in the expected direction between the “not an ideological party” item and length of membership of the Party. For example, only a third (31%) who had been members for five years or less agreed with the item whereas a half (49%) of those who had been members for 30 years or more did so.

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<sup>338</sup> Ward & Gibson, May 2003: 189.

<sup>339</sup> Williamson, 2009: 8.

<sup>340</sup> Darwall, 2002: 35.

Given that length of membership of the Party was significantly correlated with age—indeed, all three of the time-related variables were significantly correlated with each other ( $p = <0.001$  in all cases) in the expected direction—but that age itself was not significantly correlated with the “not an ideological party” item, this seems evidence that there was an experiential processes at work.

It might be that there was a tendency that as time went by the initial ideological enthusiasms that prompted someone to join the Party—and at some point perhaps to become a local councillor—made way for an increasing focus on “procedure”. This could either be the internal processes of the Party, usually at a local level, or on “getting the vote out” at election time as a political but often non-ideological process. In short, a focus on the “how” rather than the “why”. All of this is particularly true in the context of local politics where for many years local government had a decreasing independence vis-à-vis central government and there was correspondingly relatively little room for ideologically motivated activity.<sup>341</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Looking first at the descriptive analyses in the first part of this chapter, as might have been expected the large majority of Conservative local councillors in England were—objectively or subjectively—white, middle-aged, middle class and non-metropolitan and a majority were also male. (Much of this was not confined to *Conservative* local councillors.) This was contrasted with the general population in England which was less so in each aspect although in some areas this disparity, particularly in the case of ethnicity, was attenuated given the geographical areas that most of the respondents represented, i.e. non-metropolitan. They tended to work in the private sector—much more so than non-Conservative councillors—and although tended to be employed rather than self-employed their rates of self-employment were higher than amongst the general public.

As for their service as a member of the Party and as a local councillor, there was a considerable range. On the one hand a small but noticeable proportion could trace their membership back to the 1950s or earlier and their political office back to the 1970s or earlier. However, many were newer entrants with over a third having been members of the Party for very few years before being first elected as a councillor.

Turning to more complex analysis, there was little less to report in the “rejecting the null hypothesis” sense about socio-demographic variables and attitudes. With relatively few exceptions—perhaps most noticeably regarding sex and age and views towards women in public life as measured by the Feminism dimension—who a respondent was socio-demographically made little difference in reported attitudes.

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<sup>341</sup> *The Telegraph*, 4<sup>th</sup> September 2006.

The section on the Internet found little remarkable. Younger, male and/or better-educated respondents tended to have higher rates of usage and in this respondents were the same as the contemporary British public.

The final part suggests that whilst neither age nor length of time as a local councillor were correlated with any difference in “ideological fervour”, length of membership of the Party did seem correlated with a leeching away of idealism. Depending upon one’s view about the “goodness” of a degree of ideological drive in British party politics, this may or may not be a depressing finding.

## **CHAPTER 5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY**

### **ITEMS ABOUT THE PARTY IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Other than the Party's 2001 leadership contest which is analysed separately in Chapter 13, there were three batteries of questions specifically looking at attitudes towards the Conservative Party: Intra-Party Elitism (which analysed the role of grass-roots members in running the Party), Intra-Party Inclusivity (which analysed attitudes towards promoting certain groups within the Party) and Optimism (which looked at how optimistic or pessimistic respondents were about the then current state and likely future fortunes of the Party). There were also a small number of stand-alone items of relevance to this chapter.

In addition, respondents were asked to rate on a five-point scale their attitudes towards the then most recent leaders of the Conservative Party: Edward Heath, Margaret Thatcher, John Major, William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith. The first three had all been both leaders of the Party and Prime Ministers, Hague had been leader of the Party only and Duncan Smith was at the time leader of the Party although would be forced out of this position.

Respondents were also asked about their membership of the Conservative Party's youth organisations.

### **INTRA-PARTY ELITISM, INTRA-PARTY INCLUSIVITY AND OPTIMISM**

#### **Unwarranted Optimism**

As in most of this study, it is not the intention to look at the multi-item scales in any great detail by themselves. They can be found elsewhere as components in multivariate analysis. The results, split by type of respondent, for the Intra-Party Elitism, Intra-Party Inclusivity and Optimism scales can be found in Appendix 4. However, there were a few findings that might be noted here.

Regarding Optimism, most respondents were indeed optimistic about the then current state and likely future fortunes of the Conservative Party and ANOVA found no significant differences between the groups of respondents.

Looking at just a single item from the Optimism scale, given what happened at the 2005 general election where Labour was "merely" reduced to an overall majority of 66, it speaks of a lack of realism amongst respondents<sup>342</sup> that in 2002 very few thought that the Conservatives could *not* "win the next general

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<sup>342</sup> Gill, Atkinson & Davidson, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2002.

election". For Peers the proportion was 10%, for MPs 8%, for WLCs 7%, for MEPs 14% and for MSPs 7%. ELCs were a little more cautious with the proportion at 18% and SLCs easily the most cautious of all at 29%. That said—and to turn the question around—the only ones amongst whom there was *not* a majority who thought that the Conservatives *could* win the next general election were MEPs. Only 43% thought that they could and exactly the same proportion affirmed the middle Nether/nor response on the questionnaire.

In contrast, it should be noted that a year before the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork a YouGov poll of Conservative activists found that no less than two-thirds (77%) of activists believed that Labour would win the general election.<sup>343</sup> In other words, ordinary Conservative *activists* seem to have been more realistic than Conservative *politicians*. However, it cannot be said whether this divergence was because of the respondents being different, the short passage of time or an artefact of the nature of the research. Perhaps, also, Conservative politicians were particularly sensitive to the perceived failings of the main pollsters during previous elections campaigns such as in 1992 and 2001 where the polls were seen by many to have been unduly “pro-Labour”.<sup>344</sup>

## Running and Changing the Party

Regarding Intra-Party Elitism, Appendix 4 displays the rather predictable finding that local councillors tended to be more in favour of grass-roots control of the Party than parliamentarians in Westminster.<sup>345</sup>

Looking at just the “Women” item from the Intra-Party Inclusivity scale and taking ELCs alone for the sake of convenience, it might come as surprise to note that there was *not* a significant difference (using the  $\chi^2$  test, two-tailed  $p = 0.24$ ) between male and female local councillors. Only 16% and 12% respectively disagreed with the notion advancing women within the Party, a finding at variance with the perceived “traditionalist” views of grass-roots *activists* around that time.<sup>346</sup>

## A DESIRE FOR CHANGE?

### Was Change Needed?

Some have argued that after the 1997 and 2001 elections the Party became more proficient at the use of professional marketing, but that there had been too little analysis of the product itself, in other words

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<sup>343</sup> Ahmed, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2001.

<sup>344</sup> Glover, 9<sup>th</sup> February 2002; Wyn Jones in Shipton, 16<sup>th</sup> October 2008; but see Association of Professional Opinion Polling Organisations, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>345</sup> Lees-Marshment & Quayle, April 2000.

<sup>346</sup> Watt, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2000.

policy.<sup>347</sup> Two items looked at this area. Using a standard five-point response set, the items were each prefaced with the statement that, “The defeats at the 1997 and 2001 general elections show that the Conservative Party...” followed by “Needs to change its principles and beliefs” and “Needs to change its style and presentation”.

ANOVA detected a single significant between-groups difference ( $p = 0.005$ ) between ELCs and MPs (Bonferroni post-hoc test,  $p = 0.003$ ) on the question of whether respondents thought that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs. Irrespective of this, amongst all groups of respondents only a minority believed that this was the case. However, as Table 5.1 indicates, this was sometimes a sizable minority with a smaller proportion unsure. In other words, some respondents “had doubts”.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Agree	28%	22%	16%	21%	28%	21%	21%
Neither/nor	14%	9%	12%	12%	11%	7%	14%
Disagree	58%	69%	72%	67%	61%	71%	64%
Base	277	58	51	48	28	14	14

When it came to style and presentation, the picture was much more clear-cut. Irrespective of which group of respondents they came from—and ANOVA detected no significant between-groups differences ( $p = 0.141$ )—the overwhelming majority (88% or more) of respondents agreed that the Party needed to change. The proportion of those who positively disagreed with the idea that the Party needed to change its style and presentation never exceeded 4% irrespective of which group of respondents they belonged to.

In short, respondents tended not to be unhappy with the Party’s “ideology” but they were very unhappy about the Party’s “public relations”.

### **Why Was Change Needed?**

Having established that at least a substantial minority of respondents felt that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs and others were uncertain about this, and also that the overwhelming majority felt that the Party needed to change its style and presentation, the next question is “why?” In other words, what was associated with a desire for change?

Unfortunately, however this question is approached—using regression analysis or partial correlation analysis, for example—no more can be made of the “style and presentation” item given the very one-sided loading of responses.

<sup>347</sup> Lees-Marshment, November 2001: 929 & 938; October 2004: 396.



However, the “principles and beliefs” item allows a more thorough exploration of the perceived need for change. Because of its specific nature, a regression analysis was run with “Needs to change its principles and beliefs” as the dependant variable and the usual range of multi-item scales and dummy variables for the types of respondent as the putative significant predictors.

The result, whilst perhaps predictable, was nevertheless still revealing. Even when specifically asked about the need to change the Party’s then principles and beliefs, by far the strongest independent variable in the final model (not shown in full here) as to why this might be so was the Optimism scale which alone accounted for 14% out of the total predictive power of the model of 27% (based upon the  $R^2$  figure). Bivariate analysis was equally predictable. The less optimistic respondents were about the Party’s present state and likely future fortunes then the keener they were on change. In short, the main determinant of a need for change amongst representatives of a party no longer in control at Westminster was a desire to regain power. Ideological considerations were decidedly secondary.

There were such secondary reasons, but they were something of a jumble. Excluding the minor if still statistically significant presence of a single dummy variable for type of respondent, there were five other attitudinal predictors of the perception of a need for change to the Party’s principles and beliefs. The strongest of these was Europeanism with a predictive power of 4% of the total predictive power of the model of 27%. Bivariate analysis (not shown here) is clear. The *less* Euro-sceptic respondents were then the *more* they were inclined towards wanting change. This was true for all groups of respondents if not always significantly so because of the small sizes of some of the groups. This suggests that less Euro-sceptic respondents both viewed the Conservative Party as being strongly—even excessively so in their view—Euro-sceptic and that change to a less Euro-sceptic position was desirable to bolster the Party’s fortunes.

Although minor in absolute terms, other information from the questionnaire allows a detailed examination of this finding. There was another item in the questionnaire that asked respondents to rate themselves and various political parties subjectively on a 10-point, “Euro-enthusiast” to “Euro-sceptic” scale. By subtracting the item for themselves from the item for the Conservative Party a new variable was calculated identifying those who viewed themselves as more Euro-sceptic than the Party, those who viewed themselves as less Euro-sceptic than the Party and those who held that their views matched.

(This variable is interesting in its own right. There was considerable variation between the groups of respondents and, perhaps surprisingly, it was MSPs and not MEPs who were most likely to have viewed themselves as less Euro-sceptic than the Party. However, more detailed will not be gone into here)

It might be hypothesised that those who viewed themselves as being less Euro-sceptic than the Party tended to be the ones wanting change in the Party’s principles and beliefs. This can be analysed in a

number of ways. One was a series of bivariate correlations, split by type of respondent, between the two, uncondensed items—perceived need for changing the Party’s principles and beliefs and the difference in subjective Europeanism of respondents and the Conservative Party—along with the one-tailed hypothesis that those who viewed themselves as less Euro-sceptic than the Party were more inclined to want change.

Given the Pearson signs and the directions of the items, the results lend support to the one-tailed hypothesis. None of the bivariate correlations went against it and in two cases, ELCs (correlation = 0.212,  $p = <0.001$ ) and MPs (correlation 0.535,  $p = <0.001$ ), the combination of correlation strength and sample size was sufficient to raise the correlation to a statistically significant one. As was predicted, those who viewed themselves as being less Euro-sceptic than the Party tended to have been the ones wanting change in the Party’s principles and beliefs *generally* although attitudes towards the EU was itself the prime visible factor in this.

All of this is historically interesting. Detailed analysis following the 1997 election indicated that overall Labour and the Liberal Democrats more nearly represented the preferences of voters than did the Conservatives. The notable exception was on the issue of the EU where the Conservative’s perceived Euro-scepticism chimed with the views of voters.<sup>348</sup> However, there was disagreement amongst Conservatives about what they should take from this. Some argued for a move to the “centre”. Others suggested targeting the one million anti-EU voters who had voted for the Referendum Party or UKIP along with waiting for disillusion with Labour to set in.<sup>349</sup> Paradoxically, it was those who were relatively less Euro-sceptic amongst *CPRS 2002* respondents who seemed most in favour of the Party needing to change in principles and beliefs were. It can be speculated that so dominant had the theme of “Europe” become, that reigning-in Euro-scepticism was seen as a move to the “centre”.

The next strongest (3% of the total of 27%) was, rather unpredictably, Theocratism. The more theocratic respondents were then the less they were inclined towards wanting change. This might suggest that there was a belief on the part of those enthused by the idea of a strong role for religion in public life both that the Conservative Party was itself generally theocratic as measured by the scale and also that this was fine within the context of the Conservative Party’s future electoral fortunes. Intra-Party Inclusivity, Authoritarianism and Postmaterialism all had a marginal significant input into the model of 1% or 2% each, but they will not be considered further here.

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<sup>348</sup> McAllister & Studlar, 2000: 368.

<sup>349</sup> Butler & Kavanagh, 2002[a]: 39-40.

## THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?

### A Perceived Lack of Clarity

Two items in the questionnaire looked at views on the overall purpose of the Conservative Party, or at least whether it was thought that there *was* any. These were, “In recent years, it has not always been clear what the Conservative Party stands *for*” and its mirror image, “In recent years, it has not always been clear what the Conservative Party stands *against*”. Both were presented with a standard five-point response set.

ANOVA with the micro-groups of AMs and GLAs omitted detected no significant between-groups differences ( $p = 0.536$ ) in the case of “stands for” item. Using the entire dataset, almost exactly three-quarters (74%) of respondents agreed with this item against 20% who disagreed.

However, as Table 5.2, there were more appreciable differences ( $p = 0.001$ ) in the case of the “stands against” item.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Agree	60%	57%	36%	71%	64%	64%	43%
Neither/nor	10%	7%	2%	4%	11%	0%	0%
Disagree	30%	37%	62%	25%	25%	36%	57%
Base	280	60	52	48	28	14	14

In short, the belief that the Party had become “woolly” in its ideological prescriptions was strongly and widely held. This was generally if more weakly the same view when considering the Party’s ideological proscriptions, although MPs and MSPs seemed to have a stronger sense of who or what was “the enemy”.

Assuming some degree of objective reality to these opinions, in the years leading up to the *CPRS 2002* a number of reasons can be suggested for this. In the aftermath of the crushing defeat at the 1997 general election the Party was shell-shocked and “was slow to set up the necessary machinery to conduct long-term policy development”, something that did not meaningfully get underway until after another defeat at the 2001 election.<sup>350</sup> Put crudely, in terms of policy, it was argued that the Party had been flapping around for years.

<sup>350</sup> Clark & Kelly, October 2004: 379.

The longer-term problem was the disappearance of major confrontational “others” against which the Conservative Party and some form of alternative grand vision could be contrasted,<sup>351</sup> whether domestically such as trades union militancy or abroad with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the latter and the rise of New Labour rather put paid to that contrast.

Specifically within the context of discussing the Conservative Party, it was argued<sup>352</sup> that one could not give a short answer to the question “what do the Conservatives stand for?” This was at least in part because one could not give a short answer to the question “what is it that they stand against?” In other words, because they were two sides of the same coin. This was often the case with respondents. Bivariate analysis (not shown here) indicated a positive correlation between responses to the two items amongst almost all groups of respondents large enough to measure. The sole exception were MSPs who were noted above as being one of the two groups of respondents more sure of the enemy. The SNP, perhaps?

However, when looking in more detail, regression analysis (not shown here) using the usual range of multi-item scales and dummy variables for the groups of respondents was unable to detect any substantial predictors to the responses to the two items. Once significant dummy variables for the groups of respondents were taken into consideration (particularly for the “against” item as might have been anticipated), neither model was particularly informative. The sense of “drift” was a diffuse one.

### **Inconsistent Attitudes?**

Considering all of this but thinking also about the earlier part of this chapter, there is something of a puzzle. It was noted above that a clear majority of respondents *disagreed* with the proposition that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs. Yet it has just been seen that, generally speaking, a majority of respondents *agreed* with the propositions that it was not clear what the Party stood for or against. To simplify matters for the sake of illustration, on the face of it the findings described a group of people who were generally happy with the Party’s ideology but who had little idea what it was!

This description is a little unfair, and further analysis attenuated the apparent inconsistency. Bivariate analysis using the whole dataset indicated a significant association in the predictable direction between the “change its principles and beliefs” item and “not clear what Conservative Party stands for” (one-tailed  $p = 0.02$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic) and “not clear what Conservative Party stands against” (one-tailed  $p = 0.025$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic) items. Those less inclined to think that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs were also less inclined to think that it was unclear what the Party stood for or against.

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<sup>351</sup> Gamble, 1996: 35; Gray, 2001; McAnulla, 1997: 316-322; Pilbeam, 1998: 280-282.

The inconsistency might also be an example of what happens when one approaches a problem from different directions. It might also be possible that whilst some respondents thought that *they* knew what the Party stood for or against they felt that the Party had not communicated this to the electorate.

Nevertheless, this only goes so far in attenuating the inconsistency. Using the entire dataset and looking just at the “extremes” of this inconsistency, 43% (out of 493 respondents) *disagreed* that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs but also *agreed* that it was not clear what the Party stood for. Similarly, exactly a third (33% of 487 respondents) *disagreed* that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs but also *agreed* that it was not clear what the Party stood against.

One further piece of information can be taken from these cross-tabulations. Since one of the variables was held the same, by using the Cramer’s V measure of the strength of association it can be determined whether a desire for change of the sort discussed earlier in this chapter was more strongly held with perceived weaknesses in what the Party stood for or against. In fact, with a finding of 0.103 for “for” and 0.102 for “against”, they were virtually identical. Again, this suggests that these are probably two sides of the same coin.

## PARTY LEADERS

### A First Look

Respondents were asked to rate the most recent leaders of the Conservative Party on a five-point, “Very positively” to “Very negatively” scale. ANOVA with the two micro-groups omitted detected no between-groups differences in attitudes towards Edward Heath ( $p = 0.196$ ), John Major ( $p = 0.90$ ) or William Hague ( $p = 0.509$ ). Using the entire dataset for these three individuals provides the results set out in Table 5.3a.

	Edward Heath	John Major	William Hague
Positive	24%	58%	55%
Neutral	20%	23%	24%
Negative	56%	19%	21%
Base	501	503	504

There were, however, significant between-groups differences in the cases of Margaret Thatcher ( $p = 0.008$ ) and Iain Duncan Smith ( $p = 0.006$ ). The results for these two individuals are set out in more detail in Tables 5.3b & 5.3c.

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<sup>352</sup> O’Sullivan, 1999: 9.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Positive	96%	98%	96%	96%	100%	93%	71%
Neutral	3%	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	7%
Negative	1%	0%	0%	4%	0%	7%	22%
Base	283	60	51	48	28	14	14

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Positive	58%	60%	78%	73%	79%	72%	93%
Neutral	32%	32%	20%	25%	18%	7%	7%
Negative	10%	8%	2%	2%	3%	21%	0%
Base	282	60	51	48	28	14	14

Before moving on to multivariate analysis a few items stand out from these tables. Edward Heath was rather disliked with just over half of all respondents rating him negatively. This echoes earlier findings amongst Conservative Party members.<sup>353</sup>

Margaret Thatcher, on the other hand, was positively worshipped (with the exception of MSPs amongst whom there was some coolness). At the risk of flippancy, her ratings were those probably more associated with the sort of “polls” held by—to name just two leaders in 2002—Kim Jong-il of North Korea and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The attitudes towards the three post-Thatcher leaders were broadly similar. They were generally positive<sup>354</sup> but with a leavening of neutrality and sometimes outright hostility. The somewhat inconsistent attitudes towards Iain Duncan Smith may, in part, stem from a mixture of such things as loyalty (or not) towards the leader of the Party at the time of the *CPRS 2002* and/or from considerations of his shaky hold on that very leadership.

In different ways, then, when analysed on this level and when compared to each other, it was Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher who stood out. It was perhaps a surprising finding given the rivalry between them and their supporters<sup>355</sup> that when analysed on a between-groups basis there was no significant correlation at the conventional two-tailed 5% level in attitudes towards them.

<sup>353</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 61.

<sup>354</sup> Anderson, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2000.

<sup>355</sup> Monteith, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2005.

Regarding attitudes towards the three who had actually been prime ministers, other polls of the public and academics alike of 20<sup>th</sup> century British prime ministers tended to rate Thatcher near the top with both Heath and Major in the bottom half.<sup>356</sup>

## Multivariate Analysis

Were there any predictors of attitudes towards party leaders? To go some way to answering this, a series of regression analyses was run with the dependant variable being attitude towards each leader turn and the putative independent variables being the standard range of multi-item scales along with dummy variables for the various groups of respondents. Regression was used in this instance because, at least on balance, it seems plausible to suggest a causal relationship between scales measuring attitudes, values or beliefs on the one hand and individuals on the other hand who might be regarded as champions (or not) of those values.

The much simplified Tables 5.4a to 5.4e display the leaders and the predictors of variability in attitude towards each leader left in the final, significant regression model. The percentage figures are based on the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> figure.

TABLE 5.4A: PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS EDWARD HEATH	
Variable	Variability explained
Europeanism	29%
Audience dummy	2%
Pride in National Heritage and Culture	2%
Optimism	1%
Total	34%
Base	321

<sup>356</sup> Theakston & Gill, May 2006.

<b>TABLE 5.4B: PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARGARET THATCHER</b>	
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variability explained</b>
Optimism	9%
Europeanism	4%
Religiosity	3%
Welfarism	2%
Political Elitism	1%
Audience dummy	1%
Total	20%
Base	321

<b>TABLE 5.4C: PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS JOHN MAJOR</b>	
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variability explained</b>
Europeanism	11%
Pride in the Way Nation Functions	4%
Audience dummy	2%
Intra-Party Inclusivity	2%
Postmaterialism	2%
Total	19%
Base	321

<b>TABLE 5.4D: PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS WILLIAM HAGUE</b>	
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variability explained</b>
Europeanism	9%
Optimism	3%
Authoritarianism	2%
Feminism	1%
Total	15%
Base	321



TABLE 5.4E: PREDICTORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IAIN DUNCAN SMITH	
Variable	Variability explained
Optimism	18%
Left-Right	3%
Audience dummy	1%
Total	22%
Base	321

The most notable finding must surely be that for Edward Heath. The final model explained 34% of the total variability. Of this, no less than 29% of the total was explained by just one variable, Europeanism,<sup>357</sup> with the remainder contributing no more than 1% or 2% each. It surely comes as no surprise that bivariate analysis confirms that the more Euro-sceptic respondents were then the less favourable they tended to be towards Heath.<sup>358</sup>

The other striking finding was at the other end of the *CPRS 2002*'s time scale: the finding for Iain Duncan Smith and the predictive power of 18% for the Optimism variable. The more optimistic respondents were about the then state and likely future fortunes of the Conservative Party the more favourable they were towards Duncan Smith. However, referring the Chapter @ on the Party's leadership contest, what is perhaps surprising is the absence of the Europeanism scale in predicting attitudes towards Duncan Smith.

Looking at the three leaders in between Heath and Duncan Smith, in each case there was one variable that explained about 10% of the total variability in attitude. In the case of Thatcher, just like Duncan Smith, the more optimistic respondents were about the then present state and likely future fortunes of the Conservative Party (9% out of a total predictive model of 20%) then the more favourable they were towards her. It is hard not too see this as a belief that there needed to be "no turning back" from Thatcherism. Euro-sceptic respondents were also more favourable towards her. Other than that, however, nothing stands out. It may seem odd to have little more to say here about Margaret Thatcher but the extreme loading of attitudes towards her makes further analysis difficult. As adored as she generally may have been, it is a struggle to find obviously "ideological" reasons for this beyond the predictable Europeanism scale. As such, it is probably not far off the mark to think instead about such concepts as "charisma".<sup>359</sup> (It was his perceived lack of charisma which was viewed by many as a reason for Iain Duncan Smith's later difficulties.<sup>360</sup>)

<sup>357</sup> Griffiths, 1996: 69.

<sup>358</sup> Letwin, 1996: 175-176.

<sup>359</sup> Jary & Jary, 1991: 64-65; Kempley, 2009/2010: 38; Scarbrough, 1984: 47.

<sup>360</sup> Jenkins, 9<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

In the case of John Major, Europeanism was again the main predictor of attitudes at 11% out of a total of 19%. In his case the less Euro-sceptic respondents were then the more favourable they tended to be. Given the history of John Major and the *Maastricht Treaty* then this is perhaps not too surprising.<sup>361</sup>

For William Hague, Europeanism was also the main predictor of attitudes explaining 9% out of a total variability of 15%. However, in his case it was the opposite of Major: the more Euro-sceptic respondents were then the more favourable they tended to be.

Of note was that “economics”, particularly as measured by the Left-Right dimension, had almost no predictive power, only appearing as a minor indicator in the case of Iain Duncan Smith. It might be noted historically that early opposition to Heath within the Party was substantially on economic issues<sup>362</sup> rather than that of “Europe”.

That said, this surely is the main finding from these analyses. One way or the other, attitudes towards the EU measured by the Europeanism scale was the strongest predictor of attitudes towards Edward Heath, John Major and William Hague and was the second strongest predictor for Margaret Thatcher and Iain Duncan Smith. In turn, attitudes towards the present state and likely fortunes of the Party measured by the Optimism scale was the strongest predictor of attitudes towards Margaret Thatcher and Iain Duncan Smith. It seems that what mattered to respondents was “Europe” and “power”.

## CONSERVATIVE PARTY YOUTH ORGANISATIONS

### Membership

Regarding the Party’s youth organisations<sup>363</sup> the first was the Young Imperial League created in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Federation of University Conservative and Unionist Associations (FUCUA) was founded in 1931 and was aimed at undergraduates. This was followed in 1967 by the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS) which in turn this was followed in 1987 by the Conservative Collegiate Forum (CCF) following the closing down of the FCS in 1986. The most famous youth organisation, the Young Conservatives (YCs), was formed after the Second World War. However, there was a consolidation in 1998 of all youth organisations for those under the age of 30 resulting in Conservative Future.

All respondents were asked whether they had been members of these organisations. Few respondents said that they had been members of the Federation of University Conservative and Unionist Associations (4%), the Conservative Collegiate Forum (2%), the National Association of Conservative Graduates (2%)

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<sup>361</sup> Gorman, 1993; Spicer, 1992.

<sup>362</sup> Green, 2002: 234.

or Conservative Future (2%) and the Federation of Conservative Students (7%). However, rather more said that they had been members of the Young Conservatives (33%).

Of the groups of respondents large enough to analyse, MPs were by some way the most likely to have been members of the YCs, with 52% reporting that they had against approximately a quarter to a third of all the others. MEPs were the least likely with only 21% (i.e. 3 respondents) saying that they had been members of the YCs. MPs were also easily the most likely to have been members of the FCS, with 29% saying that they had been members against very small numbers of the other groups.

### **Whatever Happened to the “Conservative Radicals”?**

Evans’s study<sup>364</sup> of Conservative youth structures gives rise to the plausible hypothesis of a degree of radicalisation amongst Conservatives who had been members of the FCS. The problem is that there were such small numbers involved with only 35 individuals spread across a number of groups of respondent. On top of this there were possibly confounding factors such as age and sex, information not held for most groups of respondents. This makes meaningful analysis very difficult. Only in the case of MPs was there a sufficiently homogenous group with large enough numbers even to attempt such an analysis. However, analysis using t-tests on the various multi-item scales with whether or not respondents had been members of the FCS as the grouping variable found only a solitary significant difference: Pride in the Way Nation Functions.

It should be acknowledged that this is not a fair analysis. It would require much more data and/or a radically different methodology to research the impact of socialisation and possible radicalisation within the FCS, particularly in the 1980s before the Party closed it down perceiving it to be excessively “radical”.<sup>365</sup> This brief sub-section is here to note the possibility of such research.

### **CONCLUSION**

Perhaps the most striking finding comes from the single item within the Optimism scale, “The Conservative Party can win the next general election”, the results of which suggests just how out of touch with public opinion Conservative politicians seemed to have been in 2002. This was made more stark given that polling in very early 2003, only a few months after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork, indicated that Conservative politicians were less trusted than those from either the Labour or Liberal Democrat parties.<sup>366</sup> It is a tedious convention that when being interviewed politicians are obliged to sound upbeat about their electoral prospects even in the teeth of all the evidence. However, even within the confines of

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<sup>363</sup> Epping Forest Conservatives, 7<sup>th</sup> March 2006; Evans, 1996: 2-3, 12 & 44 & 79.

<sup>364</sup> Evans, 1996; and compare the very different Holroyd-Doveton, 1996.

<sup>365</sup> Libertarian Alliance, 2009.

<sup>366</sup> Barnett, July-September 2008: 322.

an anonymous questionnaire this was still the “form”. Perhaps, despite everything, they really believed it?

Inasmuch as there was perceived to be a need for change, this was much more strongly in the area of “style and presentation” rather than “principles and beliefs”. In other words, to borrow from the standard “four Ps” of the marketing mix, it was not so much the “product” as the “promotion” that was perceived to have been at fault for the disastrous general election results in 1997 and 2001. Where the product was seen as in need of an ideological overhaul much of this desire seems to have come from the Party’s less Euro-sceptic politicians. As will be discussed in Chapter 13 on the 2001 leadership contest, even under Iain Duncan Smith the Party’s leadership sought to “neutralise” this strongly felt issue, at least as far as the public’s perception of it was concerned.

It was also clear that by 2002 many respondents were unsure what the Conservative Party either stood for or, albeit less strongly, against. Attitudes towards these two were closely linked. However, there was little explicit reasoning behind this. Instead, it seemed to speak of a wide, strong but diffuse sense of wooliness and drift. This sense of drift was shared by the electorate. In the previous year’s general election, only 9% of voters thought that that Conservatives were the most clear and united about what their policies should be.<sup>367</sup>

It was seen that there was an apparent inconsistency in that whilst a majority of respondents did not think that the Party needed to change its principles and beliefs they *also* tended to believe that it was not clear what the Party stood for or against. Whilst attenuating and explaining some of this, nevertheless the inconsistency stood.

There is also a paradox here concerned with changing the Party’s policies and/or image. Research after 2002 indicated that when a policy with strong support amongst the general population such as controls on immigration was revealed to be a Conservative policy, it immediately lost that support.<sup>368</sup> As such, it could be argued that this is support for the “policy good, image bad” views noted above. Paradoxically, it was many of these more popular policies that “modernisers” within the Party aspired to change in order to appease “liberal” critics of the Party.

Attitudes towards the Party’s leaders in the years leading up to the survey indicated generally positive view of John Major, William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, but considerable coolness towards Edward Heath and something approaching worship of Margaret Thatcher. The main significant predictors of these attitudes often accorded with reasonable expectations. This was particularly true in the case of Heath (Europeanism) and to a lesser degree in the cases of Thatcher and Duncan Smith (Optimism in both cases).

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<sup>367</sup> Lees-Marshment, November 2001: 939.

A key finding of this section on the Party's leaders was the salience of just two issues measured by two of the *CPRS 2002*'s multi-item scales: attitudes towards the EU measured by Europeanism and to the present state and likely future fortunes of the Party measured by Optimism. All other issues were decidedly secondary.

It is fitting to conclude this chapter with attitudes towards Margaret Thatcher. Amongst almost all groups—not just the Party's middle and lower ranks<sup>369</sup>—attitudes towards her were both overwhelmingly positive and yet quite hard to explain objectively by way of attitudinal variables. It was suggested that it was perhaps more to do with “charisma” and hence that attitudes towards her were visceral than intellectual. Given the reverence in which she was still held—in sharp contrast to Heath<sup>370</sup>—some dozen years after her (as some believed) betrayal by others<sup>371</sup> then the long “shadow” which she cast—and at the time of writing continues to cast—for so long over the Party and perhaps the country as a whole is hardly surprising.<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> O'Sullivan, 2009.

<sup>369</sup> Green, 2002: 235.

<sup>370</sup> Norton, 1992: 57.

<sup>371</sup> Marquand, 2009: 327.

<sup>372</sup> Anderson, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2000; Garnett, October 2004: 367; Green, 2002: 235; Groves, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010; Hall, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2010; Lister *et al*, 2002; Robertson, 7<sup>th</sup> April 2008; Whitworth & Baldwin, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010: 26.

## **CHAPTER 6: ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER UK POLITICAL PARTIES**

### **ONE AMONGST A NUMBER**

The Conservative Party does not operate in a political vacuum. It is but one of a number of competing political parties, albeit historically one of the most important. In this chapter, attitudes of *CPRS 2002* respondents towards their party-political competitors are examined.

This is done by a series of analyses. First, by obtaining a general impression of how well-disposed or ill-disposed respondents were towards the other parties. Second, by analysing if there were any significant differences between the various groups of respondents and how they viewed the other parties. Third, by analysing if there were any variables associated with attitudes towards the other parties and in particular whether there were any universal predictors (which might say more about the respondents themselves) and/or any party-specific predictive variables (which might say more about attitudes towards individual parties).

A later chapter in part returns to this theme, but with a view to looking at the impact of electoral politics and the experience “on the ground” of competing against Labour and the Liberal Democrats.

### **AN OVERVIEW OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE OTHER PARTIES**

#### **The Questionnaire Items and the Parties**

The questionnaire contained two batteries of questions looking at the other political parties of note in 2002. One was prefaced by “How do you feel towards the following mainland British political parties” and the other by “How do you feel towards the following Northern Ireland political parties”. There were 13 parties included—by no means *every* political party then operating somewhere in the United Kingdom—and aside from any constitutional and historical reasons the divide between mainland and Northern Ireland parties was largely a device to split this large number into more manageable groups.

The mainland British parties were: Labour Party, Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems), Plaid Cymru (PC), Scottish National Party (SNP), UK Independence Party (UKIP), British National Party (BNP), Green Party and the Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party (SA/SSP).

The Northern Ireland parties were: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Fein, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Alliance Party (APNI). Leading up to 2002,

the Conservatives were the only major mainland party that campaigned under its own name in Northern Ireland,<sup>373</sup> the others having relationships such as that between the Labour Party and the SDLP.<sup>374</sup> After an initially bright start at a local level the Party's results in Northern Ireland were very poor. It was claimed that it was one of the conditions of John Major securing the support of nine UUP MPs during the passage of the *Maastricht Treaty* that the Conservative Party would allow the Northern Irish Conservatives "to wither on the vine".<sup>375</sup> By the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork this seems to have been achieved.<sup>376</sup>

## Self-Reported Insufficient Knowledge

Both batteries offered a five-level response set of "Strongly sympathetic to "Strongly antipathetic". In addition they were offered a sixth option of "Don't know enough to say" and these responses are detailed in Table 6.1.

	ELC	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Labour	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	<1%
Lib Dems	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
PC	31%	24%	4%	39%	0%	18%	18%
SNP	26%	13%	2%	0%	12%	9%	0%
UKIP	9%	5%	0%	7%	4%	0%	0%
BNP	7%	2%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%
Greens	9%	2%	2%	9%	0%	0%	8%
SA/SSP	23%	15%	8%	2%	16%	9%	0%
UUP	13%	2%	0%	9%	8%	0%	0%
DUP	15%	2%	0%	9%	8%	0%	0%
SF	13%	0%	0%	7%	4%	0%	0%
SDLP	23%	8%	0%	16%	20%	0%	8%
APNI	44%	31%	6%	36%	36%	18%	8%

Note: Since these represent 91 separate calculations no bases are presented

A cynic might define a politician as someone with the ability to talk with great confidence for long periods of time on subjects about which they know very little. However, it is clear that amongst some *CPRS 2002* respondents there was an honest admission of ignorance about some of the other parties, in

<sup>373</sup> Conservative Party, 1998: 8.

<sup>374</sup> Conservatives in Northern Ireland, c. 2000.

<sup>375</sup> Coulter, 2001: 29-41.

<sup>376</sup> Watt, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2001.

particular those from Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The APNI seemed to be the most mysterious for respondents. That it was *not* the SA/SSP is interesting because in objective terms it probably *was* the most obscure at the time although less so in Scotland under the SSP banner.<sup>377</sup>

The differing responses of ELCs, SLCs and WLCs towards the SNP and PC is also of note if only to be expected. All SLCs and WLCs felt comfortable giving an opinion about the SNP and PC respectively whereas notable minorities of SLCs—and WLCs professed ignorance about PC and the SNP respectively. A substantial minority of ELCs professed ignorance about both.

At the other end of the scale, almost all respondents felt that they were sufficiently knowledgeable to offer a view about Labour and the Liberal Democrats.

### For Respondents Who Reported Sufficient Knowledge

In Tables 6.2a, 6.2b and 6.2c the figures represent the mean attitudes rounded to the nearest integer. The responses were scored 1 for “Strongly sympathetic”—although there were no such instances—to 5 for “Strongly antipathetic” with 3 representing a neutral view.

	Labour		Lib Dems		UKIP		BNP		Greens	
	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base
ELCs	4	275	5	276	4	248	5	256	4	249
Peers	4	59	5	59	4	55	5	58	4	58
MPs	4	49	5	49	4	49	5	48	4	48
SLCs	4	46	5	45	4	42	5	43	4	42
WLCs	4	25	5	25	5	24	5	25	4	25
MEPs	4	11	5	11	5	11	5	11	4	11
MSPs	4	12	5	12	5	12	5	12	4	11

<sup>377</sup> Baldwin, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2000; Gove, 15<sup>th</sup> January 2002; Kerevan, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2003 & 18<sup>th</sup> November 2004; Linklater, 25<sup>th</sup> April 2002.



	PC		SNP		SA/SSP <sup>378</sup>	
	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base
ELCs	4	190	4	202	5	212
Peers	4	44	4	49	5	50
MPs	4	47	4	48	5	45
SLCs	4	28	5	46	5	45
WLCs	4	25	5	22	5	21
MEPs	4	9	4	10	5	10
MSPs	4	9	5	12	5	12

	UUP		DUP		SF		SDLP		APNI	
	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base	Mean	Base
ELCs	2	239	4	233	5	241	4	211	3	152
Peers	2	59	4	58	5	60	4	54	3	41
MPs	2	48	3	48	5	48	4	49	3	46
SLCs	2	41	4	41	5	42	4	38	3	29
WLCs	2	23	4	23	5	24	4	20	4	16
MEPs	2	11	3	11	5	11	4	11	3	9
MSPs	2	12	3	12	5	12	4	11	3	11

Tables 6.2a and 6.2b indicate not a single instance of anything other than antipathy towards the other mainland British parties. Table 6.2c on the other hand indicates that there was considerable warmth towards the UUP and at least some degree of neutrality towards the DUP and the APNI. However, there was no such warmth towards the two historically Irish nationalist or Republican parties listed, the SDLP and Sinn Fein.

Looking in more detail at the mainland parties, the universal antipathy shown by respondents is roughly split into loathing verses mere dislike. The contrast in attitudes towards Labour and Liberal Democrats is striking. Respondents may have disliked Labour but they loathed the Liberal Democrats. Only the British National Party—which did *not* appear to be “attractive” to respondents<sup>379</sup>—and the Socialist Alliance—perhaps just because of its name—evoked such feeling. To look at it from the other direction,

<sup>378</sup> The SA/SSP is included here because of its mainly Scottish presence as the SSP.

<sup>379</sup> Garnett & Lynch, January 2002: 37.

along with the Green Party the Labour Party was the *least* actively disliked example of any other party campaigning in England and which was asked about in the *CPRS 2002*.

The Greens and Plaid Cymru seem to have been disliked but with no particular fervour. There were mixed views about UKIP and the SNP. Ignoring for the moment the cases of WLCs and MSPs, it is probably no surprise that MEPs particularly disliked UKIP.<sup>380</sup> It is also probably no coincidence that both of the specifically Scottish groups—SLCs and MSPs—were particularly hostile towards the SNP although this phenomenon was not replicated concerning WLCs and Plaid Cymru despite some claims that the opposite has been true historically.<sup>381</sup>

These results contradict the findings of the *True Blues* study<sup>382</sup> of Conservative Party *members* conducted a decade earlier in early 1992. Most notably, this earlier study found that the Liberal Democrats were by some way the *least* disliked out of Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Greens, not the *most* disliked as the *CPRS 2002* data suggest.

By looking at another dataset, this time for the *British Election Panel Study 2001*,<sup>383</sup> it can be seen that these findings suggest an enduring difference between Conservative Party politicians on the one hand and Conservative members and supporters on the other. The *BEPS* data used here was the person-to-person survey conducted by NOP after the 2001 general election. Attitudes towards Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the SNP and Plaid Cymru—and the Conservatives—were measured on an 11-point “Dislike” to “Like” scale. In the cases of both “Very strong” and “Fairly strong” Conservative identifiers the Liberal Democrats were *less* disliked than Labour, the SNP or Plaid Cymru.

Turning to Northern Ireland, and perhaps rather predictably, Sinn Fein was one of the most disliked of all other parties, vying with the BNP for the label of “most loathed”. This might have been the finding at any time, but near the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork there was controversy over the government’s alleged plans to grant an amnesty to dozens of IRA terrorists who were on the run in exchange for any soldiers implicated in the Bloody Sunday killings not being prosecuted.<sup>384</sup> As an example of “today’s news is tomorrow’s fish and chip paper”, only months before the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork there was a political row when the Labour government allowed Sinn Fein to use House of Commons facilities, a move opposed by the then Conservative opposition.<sup>385</sup> There was even an item devoted to this in the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire (with a standard five-point Agree strongly to Disagree strongly response set): “The government was right to allow Sinn Fein MPs to make use of Commons facilities”. It will come as little surprise to learn that 87% (out of the 499 who responded to this item) of respondents disagreed with

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<sup>380</sup> Batten, January/February 2005.

<sup>381</sup> Evans, 2002: 5.

<sup>382</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 178.

<sup>383</sup> *BEPS*, 4<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

<sup>384</sup> Reville, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2002.

<sup>385</sup> Glover, 18<sup>th</sup> December 2001.

the government's action. Furthermore, when split by group of respondents, there was a significant correlation (using the Pearson test in *SPSS*, two-tailed  $p = <0.05$  in all relevant cases) between this item and attitudes towards Sinn Fein in that the more respondents disagreed with the item the more antipathetic towards Sinn Fein they tended to be.

The largely Catholic and Irish nationalist SDLP was also disliked, but not with the same intensity. The absolute number of Catholic respondents to the *CPRS 2002* was too small to allow objective analysis although a brief examination of the data suggests that Catholic respondents were less antipathetic towards both Sinn Fein and the SDLP than their Anglican colleagues.

After that, the picture changes. The DUP evoked some negative feelings, but tended to be viewed with some equanimity by members of other groups, not least by MPs who would have had some contact with them in the House of Commons. The cross-party Alliance Party generally evoked neutral views.

The exception was the UUP. It alone evoked sympathetic responses and this was true for all groups of respondents. This is unsurprising given the historical relationship—at the time at the EU level as well as at Westminster<sup>386</sup>—and openly expressed continuing closeness at the most senior level between it and the Conservatives.<sup>387</sup> In 2009 a joint committee of the Conservative Party and the UUP approved the formation of “a new force in Northern Ireland politics”, the Conservatives and Unionists.<sup>388</sup>

That said, less than two years before the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork it was noted that two Conservative MPs were campaigning for a DUP candidate—who was eventually victorious<sup>389</sup>—against a UUP candidate at a by-election and were opposed by the Conservative leadership for doing so.<sup>390</sup> Shortly after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork a Conservative MP quit the party to stand for the Northern Ireland assembly as a DUP candidate.<sup>391</sup> This might be an expression of the neutral—as opposed to antipathetic—attitudes towards the DUP shown by at least MPs amongst respondents.

Certain items in the questionnaire were particularly sensitive to the historical period in which they were asked. This is perhaps generally true about attitudes towards “things Irish”.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>386</sup> European Democrats, 2007; Towler, Bordes & Rotherham, 2001: 3.

<sup>387</sup> Duncan Smith, 19<sup>th</sup> October 2002; Kite, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2001; Monteith, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2003; Trimble, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2001.

<sup>388</sup> Conservatives in Northern Ireland, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2009.

<sup>389</sup> Deans, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2000.

<sup>390</sup> Walker, 20<sup>th</sup> September 2000.

<sup>391</sup> *The Guardian*, 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2002.

<sup>392</sup> Howard, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2004.

## Differences Between the Groups of Respondents

The various tables above indicated that there were differences in how some of the groups tended to view some of the other parties.

However, ANOVA with the entire dataset excluding the micro-groups or AMs and GLAs found that this was often not to a statistically significant level. There were no significant between-groups differences at the conventional 5% level in attitudes towards Labour ( $p = 0.968$ ), the Liberal Democrats ( $p = 0.828$ ), UKIP ( $p = 0.081$ ), the Greens ( $p = 0.254$ ), the BNP ( $p = 0.4$ ), the SNP ( $p = 0.373$ ), Sinn Fein ( $p = 0.747$ ) and the SA/SSP ( $p = 0.252$ ).

To turn it around, the only parties where there were significant between-groups differences were Plaid Cymru ( $p = 0.014$ ) and the four remaining Northern Ireland parties the SDLP ( $p = 0.001$ ), the UUP, the DUP and the Alliance Party ( $p = <0.001$  in all cases). Even here, the post-hoc Bonferroni test suggests that these differences were rarely significant at the 5% level when analysed at a group-to-group level (albeit that the small sizes of some of the groups lessened the chance of significant findings even with the omission of AMs and GLAs). The only parties about which there were at least some significant differences identifiable by pairs of groups were the DUP and the Alliance Party. Looking at the DUP, MPs were significantly more sympathetic towards it than ELCs and Peers (but none of the other groups). Looking at the Alliance Party, WLCs were significantly more antipathetic than Peers and MPs. It is not clear why this might have been the case and having run so many analyses this might be an example of a Type I error of a false positive.

## PARTY-POLITICS AND ATTITUDES

### Analysis

Within the context of general antipathy towards almost all other parties, were there any significant associates of such attitudes? Since it cannot be said with certainty if there is a causal relationship between attitudes towards the other political parties and the sorts of attitudes measured by the *CPRS 2002*'s range of multi-item scales, partial correlation analysis was used rather than regression analysis.

Additionally, only the UK-wide parties—Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, the BNP and the Greens—are studied in any detail. This is for a variety of reasons such as self-reported insufficient knowledge for some of the smaller and specifically Celtic parties, the ANOVA results noted above which detected certain between-groups differences in attitudes, the anomalous position of Northern Ireland in terms of party representation and the small size of some the *CPRS 2002*'s Scottish and in particular Welsh groups of respondents.

## The Major UK-Wide Parties

Starting first with the major UK-wide parties—Labour and the Liberal Democrats—and using the entire dataset, Table 6.3 displays the significant attitudinal correlations once all other multi-item scales have been accounted for.

Party	Scale	Correlation	2-tailed sig.	Base	Comments
Labour	Europeanism	0.157	0.007	295	More Euro-sceptic, more antipathetic
	Left-Right	0.138	0.017	295	More pro-free-market, more antipathetic
	Pride in Way Nation Functions	-0.136	0.019	295	More proud, less antipathetic
Lib Dems	Europeanism	0.202	<0.001	296	More Euro-sceptic, more antipathetic
	Left-Right	0.126	0.029	296	More pro-free-market, more antipathetic

It can be seen that the Pride in the Way the Nation Functions scale was significantly associated with attitudes towards the Labour Party. It is hard to analyse this finding at a simple bivariate descriptive level because of the one-sided loading for both variables. However, it would seem that greater pride in Britain in this respect was associated with somewhat less antipathy towards Labour. It might be suggested that this could be due to a view of the Labour Party as a longstanding element of the fabric of British culture and democracy despite any ideological differences that respondents might have. But this is very speculative.

Much less speculative was the main finding that in both cases the only other significantly associated attitudinal variables were the two important scales of Europeanism and the Left-Right economics scale. Moreover, in both cases the findings were in the same, and surely expected, direction. The more Euro-sceptic and/or supportive of free-market economics respondents were then the more antipathetic they tended to be towards either party. This suggests, at least in part, a strongly ideological assessment of the Conservative Party's two main UK-wide opponents. Both of them were perceived as not merely competitors but "the enemy" in a more profound sense.

In a finer detail, it is of interest that in both cases there was a stronger correlation between attitudes towards the parties and placement on the Europeanism scale. As is mentioned throughout the study this highlights the salience that “Europe” had for Conservatives at the time of the *CPRS 2002*.

### The Minor UK-Wide Parties: Splittists or Ginger Group?

Turning to the minor UK-wide parties—UKIP, the BNP and the Greens—it can be seen from Table 6.4 that a very different picture emerges.

Party	Scale	Correlation	2-tailed sig.	Base	Comments
UKIP	Europeanism	-0.292	<0.001	294	More Euro-sceptic, less antipathetic
	Intra-Party Elitism	0.14	0.016	294	Greater grass-roots control of Conservative Party, less antipathetic
	Traditional British Liberties	-0.151	0.01	294	More authoritarian, more antipathetic
BNP	Theocratism	0.172	0.003	296	More theocratic, more antipathetic
	Welfarism	0.16	0.006	296	Self-help views, less antipathetic
	Xenophobia	-0.146	0.012	296	Xenophobic, less antipathetic
Greens	Europeanism	-0.161	0.006	296	More Euro-sceptic, more antipathetic
	Environmentalism	0.275	<0.001	296	More green, less antipathetic

Before moving on to the major finding, it is not hard to see the connection between less antipathy for UKIP and more support for grass-roots control of the Conservative Party as measured by the Intra-Party Elitism scale as a cry of frustration from those sympathising with the Conservative Party’s often Euro-sceptic membership.

The finding that in some sense the more religious respondents were then the more antipathetic they tended to be towards the BNP may come as more of a surprise. In fact this chimes with findings on religion and social attitudes from the USA. Whilst strong religious beliefs can indeed be associated with negative views about (say) sexuality, they can also act as a “brotherhood of man” inoculation against

negative views on (say) race.<sup>393</sup> It is perhaps going too far to speculate whether the additional finding of the Welfarism scale and attitudes towards the BNP suggests a “macho” or “survival of the fittest” attitude on the part of a minority of respondents.

However, the main finding was one that involved all three of these parties. It surely cannot have been a coincidence that in all three cases there was a significant association—if not necessarily the strongest one—between attitudes towards each party and the scale used in the *CPRS 2002* that can surely be accepted as the one most closely associated with that party at the time: Europeanism and Xenophobia and Environmentalism.

But when examined in detail the finding was even more powerful. Such analysis makes it clear that in every case respondents supportive of the views on the relevant scale most associated with the party concerned tended to be relatively less antipathetic towards the party. 25% of those respondents categorised as xenophobic were not antipathetic towards the BNP (a phenomenon suggested at the time of the 2001 leadership contest within the context of an attack on Iain Duncan Smith).<sup>394</sup> 39% of those categorised as Euro-sceptic were not antipathetic towards UKIP. No less than 51% of those categorised as having green or environmentalist views were not antipathetic towards the Green Party (and that there has been a strand of Conservative thinking sympathetic to green values generally is beyond doubt).<sup>395</sup>

Why? There are certainly two and by no means mutually exclusive possibilities. The first is straightforward: a simple match between views on an issue and the perception of a party’s views on that issue. For example, that Euro-sceptics tended to be less hostile towards other Euro-sceptics. The results do not go against this.

However, the other possibility is more “political” and provides the slightly tongue-in-cheek title to this sub-section. For example, it is perfectly reasonable to hypothesise that—particularly on apparently clear-cut issues represented by parties closely associated with those issues—a relatively Euro-sceptic Conservative politician would be even more hostile towards UKIP because they were “splittists” robbing the Conservatives of public support and votes.<sup>396</sup> (Something for which there was some evidence,<sup>397</sup> let alone that at around the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork some of the minor parties such as the Greens and UKIP were experiencing a growth in membership just as the major ones including the Conservatives were experiencing a long-term decline.)<sup>398</sup> There were certainly some who thought that this was true the

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<sup>393</sup> Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, March 2001.

<sup>394</sup> Kent, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2001; Osborne, 1<sup>st</sup> February 2003.

<sup>395</sup> Lovibond, summer 2006; Pilbeam, October 2003.

<sup>396</sup> Cash, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2005; Gabb, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2004.

<sup>397</sup> Travis & White, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2004.

<sup>398</sup> Croucher, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2002; Marquand, 2009: 154; *The Guardian*, January 2002.

other way around. It was suggested by one observer that many UKIP activists hated the Conservative Party, regarding them as “the class enemy”.<sup>399</sup>

But it is equally reasonable to hypothesise that the opposite was true. For example, that a relatively pro-green Conservative politician would have been less hostile towards the Green Party because they were a courageous if usually electorally impractical “ginger group” within British party politics. (It is also possible that, regarding the Green Party, relative lack of antipathy was somehow evidence of support for “new” politics.<sup>400</sup> However, this hypothesis takes us beyond the capabilities of the data.)

## **The Scottish and Welsh and Parties**

For the reasons cited above, only a brief mention can be made of the correlates of attitudes of *CPRS 2002* respondents towards the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish parties. In the case of the Scottish and Welsh parties—the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the SA/SSP—when all of the other multi-item scales were taken into consideration there were very few significant associations. There were none at all with attitudes towards the SA/SSP and only one each for Plaid Cymru and the SNP as might occur when running such a lengthy series of analyses. It is safe to say that there were few ideological correlates with attitudes towards the Scottish and Welsh parties.

## **The Northern Irish Parties**

The series of analyses for the parties in Northern Ireland—the UUP, DUP, SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Alliance Party—was a little different to that of the mainland parties in that an additional item from the questionnaire was included. This was, “Who do you think has benefited most from the recent Northern Ireland peace process?” The response options were “The Unionist or Loyalist community”, “Both equally” and “The Nationalist or Republican community”. It is worth reporting in its own right that almost no respondents, irrespective of which group of politicians they belonged to, thought that the peace process had benefited the Unionist community. Only 5% of SLCs and 2% of ELCs thought that this had been the case, and nobody else. Whilst there were substantial minorities who thought that both communities had benefited—between a fifth and a third amongst all groups—in every case a clear majority thought that the peace process had been a victory for the Republican community.

That said, it must be noted that when the analysis was run for the Northern Irish parties this item was never significantly associated with attitudes towards any of them when all of the multi-item scales were taken into consideration.

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<sup>399</sup> North, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2004; UK Independence Party, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2002.

<sup>400</sup> Cable, 1994: 32-33; Nas, 1995.



In the case of the two mainly Protestant and Unionist parties, the UUP and the DUP, but also the cross-community Alliance, the results were similar to those of Scotland and Wales. With no or only one significant attitudinal correlate it is safe to say that there were few ideological correlates with attitudes towards them.

The findings were different for the two mainly Catholic and Nationalist parties. For both Sinn Fein (correlation 0.126,  $p = 0.032$ ) and the SDLP (correlation 0.118,  $p = 0.045$ ) there was only one significant correlate of attitudes towards them and this was the Xenophobia scale. In both instances there was the predictable finding that more xenophobic views were associated with more antipathetic attitudes towards these parties.

At the risk of forcing matters somewhat, a series of exploratory regression analyses (not shown here) were run with attitude towards each Northern Irish party as the dependant variable and the range of multi-scales along with dummy variables for the various groups of respondents as the putative explanatory variables. When analysed in this manner there was a perhaps rather predictable finding but one which took things a little further than the findings of the partial correlation analyses above. For the Northern Irish parties the Xenophobia scale was a reoccurring predictor of some importance. In the cases of the mainly Protestant and Unionist parties, the DUP and the UUP, more xenophobic views were associated with less antipathetic attitudes towards the parties. In the cases of the mainly Catholic and Nationalist parties, Sinn Fein and the SDLP, but also the cross-community Alliance Party, more xenophobic views were associated with more antipathetic attitudes.

These findings robustly highlight the Unionist sympathies of *CPRS 2002* respondents. It might even speak of a degree of anti-Catholicism amongst some. However, although confessional background was one of the additional questions asked of ELCs the numbers of Catholic respondents makes further analysis impractical in this case.

## CONCLUSION

Looking at respondents' attitudes towards the other parties, the pattern seems clear. All of the mainland parties were disliked, but it was noticeable that the Liberal Democrats were more disliked than Labour across all groups of respondents. There was a more mixed view of the Northern Ireland parties, with those associated with Unionism viewed more favourably or at least less unfavourably.

Attitudinal associates of attitudes towards the Conservative Party's two main rivals, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, suggest a degree of universality in that attitudes towards the EU and economics were both significant. In both cases, attitudes on these scales were *negatively* associated with the other parties' generally perceived position. For example, respondents favouring free-market economics tended to be more antipathetic towards the Labour Party.

It should be noted what cannot be said. The results of the analyses in this chapter do not say much about why the Liberal Democrats were more disliked than Labour.

However, it was clear that when it came to parties rightly or wrongly identified as single-issue ones, the Green Party, the BNP and UKIP, then a key associate was that scale most closely associated with the party concerned and that this association was *positively* correlated with the other parties' generally perceived position. For example, respondents favouring Euro-sceptic policies tended to be less antipathetic towards UKIP. In short, there was a qualitative difference between respondents' attitudes—or, rather, possible reasons for them—towards the two parties which were generally their main rivals on the one hand and the relatively minor parties on the other.

The only summary comment that can be made about attitudes towards the Celtic parties, or at least the Northern Irish ones, is that they strongly reflect the Unionism of *CPRS 2002* respondents.

## **CHAPTER 7: THE WIDER WORLD**

### **A RESEARCH QUESTION AND BEYOND**

Whilst covering a range of headline issues concerned with the world outside of the UK, the main purpose of this chapter is to examine a particular research question concerning the association between attitudes towards different aspects of the wider world. Specifically the EU, the USA and what is generally termed the Middle East. This is dealt with in the first section below.

After that, and using the same items from the questionnaire, the chapter tentatively investigates whether attitudes towards foreign affairs are associated with or cut across attitudes towards domestic ones.

Finally, to provide a more rounded sense of the views of respondents, additional data is analysed concerning attitudes towards the Commonwealth and the Islamic world.

### **‘EURO-SCEPTIC, ATLANTICIST, ZIONIST ECONOMIC LIBERALS’ VERSUS ‘EURO-ENTHUSIAST, CONTINENTALIST, ARABIST ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTIONISTS’?**

#### **The Research Question**

This chapter does not intend to add to the many libraries’ worth of material, academic or otherwise, concerning “the Conservative Party and Europe”. Instead, it will look at a particular observation made by others around the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork and see, within the context of the *CPRS 2002* data, whether there is any validity to the view expressed. No claim is made that these findings were particular to Conservative Party politicians in 2002. The aim here is to see whether, with the data to hand, any support can be given to the general observation.

The observation, in whole or part, could be found in a variety of sources.<sup>401</sup> Closer inspection will reveal that most if not all of these sources are Euro-sceptic and/or pro-US and/or pro-Israeli and/or written from a libertarian or conservative perspective. However, whilst this may well bias the authors’ perceptions it does not bias objective analysis.

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<sup>401</sup> e.g. Applebaum, 12<sup>th</sup> September 2006; Craven, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2005; Davis, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2002; Duncan Smith, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2004; Hughes, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2005; Griffith, 12<sup>th</sup> February 2003; Hannan, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2006 & 12<sup>th</sup> August 2006; Joffe, 2002; Lowry, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2002; Pipes, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2005; Schroeder, February 2004; Steyn, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2001; Sullivan, 17<sup>th</sup> November 2002, *The Times*, 19<sup>th</sup> September 2002; Wooldridge, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2004; Yeor, 9<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

The observation was that attitudes towards the EU, the USA and Israel were correlated with each other. More specifically, that negative attitudes towards the first of these and positive attitudes towards the other two were associated with each other and vice-versa. (It is not the place here to discuss the view that a “pro-USA/anti-EU” stance is historically contradictory given the desire by successive US administrations for a “single phone number” when dealing with “Europe” and the alleged actions that have been taken by US agencies to further this cause.<sup>402</sup>)

There was also sometimes an additional observation that Euro-sceptic, pro-USA and pro-Israeli views tended to be correlated with support for free-market economics. In addition, it was claimed that younger people, particularly younger Conservatives, were more likely to be Euro-sceptic, pro-USA and pro-Israeli.

A variety of reasons have been put forward. Teasing out those most connected with *CPRS 2002* respondents, suggestions have included an “Arabist” romantic view of the Middle East and a degree of anti-Semitism; support for multiculturalism and/or an opposition to such things as a strong national and ethnic self-identity; regret at the displacement of a traditional and hierarchical society by a consumerist one; and anti-US or anti-Israeli views alongside an “enemy of my enemy” attitude towards the other.

Whatever the validity of the explanations put forward, was there any evidence for the observation in amongst correspondents?

### **Analysing the Observation with the *CPRS 2002* Data**

A number of scales and single items in the questionnaire can be used to look at this observation. The Europeanism and Left-Right scales are encountered throughout this report, and ELCs were asked their age in the additional battery of items presented to them.

Respondents were also presented with two items dealing with the USA and also Israel and Arabia/Palestine. Regarding the former, respondents were presented with, “Britain should be more cautious in supporting the USA’s foreign and military policies” along with a five-point Likert-type Agree strongly to Disagree strongly response set. (It will be remembered that the fieldwork took place after the terrorist attacks in the USA on the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 and the initial overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan but before the invasion of Iraq.) Regarding the latter, Respondents were presented with, “Thinking about the Middle East, how best would you describe yourself?” along with a five-point Likert-type “Very pro-Arab/Palestinian” to “Very pro-Israeli” response set.

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<sup>402</sup> Hitchens, 10<sup>th</sup> February 2009.

Because of the speculative or exploratory nature of this chapter, and the fact that it is as much to do with attitudes amongst the public, only the responses from local councillors in England, Scotland and Wales were analysed. ANOVA was first conducted and there were no significant between-groups differences on the three foreign affairs items concerning the EU as seen by the Europeanism scale ( $p = 0.207$ ), the USA ( $p = 0.095$ ) and the Middle East ( $p = 0.967$ ), and nor the Left-Right scale ( $p = 0.402$ ).

### Analysing the Foreign Affairs Items

Univariate analysis of the combined responses from ELCs, SLCs and WLCs to the four main items or scales discussed above provides the figures set out in Tables 7.1a to 7.1d.

TABLE 7.1A: LEFT-RIGHT				
	Left	Centre	Right	
	5%	51%	44%	
Base				346

TABLE 7.1B: EUROPEANISM				
	Euro-enthusiast	Euro-neutral	Euro-sceptic	
	2%	46%	52%	
Base				324

TABLE 7.1C: THE MIDDLE EAST				
	Pro-Arab/Palestinian	View both equally	Pro-Israeli	
	17%	52%	31%	
Base				348

TABLE 7.1D: MORE CAUTIOUS IN SUPPORTING USA				
	Agree	In between	Disagree	
	60%	19%	21%	
Base				354

Local councillors—like other Conservative politicians at the time—were middling-to-free-marketeers regarding economics with very few displaying “leftist” views and were middling-to-sceptical towards the EU with very few enthusiasts.

Regarding the Middle East, respondents were more split with half (52%) viewing both sides equally but after that rather more favouring Israel. That said, within living memory there was an attitude amongst

some Conservative politicians towards Israel that tended to be more anti-Zionist and arguably anti-Semitic than the other way around.<sup>403</sup> Near-contemporaneous opinion polling amongst the general public<sup>404</sup> indicated that Conservative supporters were less pro-Palestinian (23%) than either Labour (32%) or Liberal Democrat supporters (40%). Nevertheless, all were noticeably more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli, with the pro-Israeli figures for all three groups being between 11% and 14%. In other words, Conservative politicians of all sorts tended to be notably more pro-Israeli and somewhat less pro-Palestinian than even Conservative supporters.

Looking at attitudes towards the USA, ELCs, SLCs and WLCs were strongly inclined to Britain being more cautious in supporting the USA's foreign and military policies with well over a half—indeed, nearer two-thirds at 60%—reporting this against just a fifth (21%) who presumably wanted Britain to be at least as and perhaps more enthusiastic. This might seem surprising since the Conservative Party is generally seen as pro-US. However, there was a long-standing element of anti-US sentiment in the 20<sup>th</sup> century Conservative Party.<sup>405</sup>

Moving on, a series of bivariate analysis was conducted with the one-tailed hypothesis noted above.

TABLE 7.2: CORRELATION MATRIX OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VARIABLES				
		Europeanism	Middle East	USA
Europeanism	Pearson correlation			
	One-tailed significance			
	Base			
The Middle East	Pearson correlation	0.13		
	One-tailed significance	0.011		
	Base	318		
The USA	Pearson correlation	0.179	0.288	
	One-tailed significance	<0.001	<0.001	
	Base	322	344	
Left-Right	Pearson correlation	0.124	0.087	0.171
	One-tailed significance	0.014	0.054	0.001
	Base	315	337	342

<sup>403</sup> Defries, 2001: 193-197.

<sup>404</sup> Travis, 24<sup>th</sup> April 2002.

<sup>405</sup> Finer, Berrington and Bartholomew, 1961: 8; Gamble, 1974: 162; Global Intelligence Company, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2002; Wooldridge, 31<sup>st</sup> May 2004.

The results in the correlation matrix set out in Table 7.2 could hardly be more supportive of the overall hypothesis. All of the foreign affairs items were significantly correlated with each other in, as further analysis indicated, the predicted direction. The supplementary economics variable—here using the Left-Right scale—was significantly correlated with both Europeanism and the USA item and only just fell short of being significantly correlated with the Middle East item.

What about the age of respondents? For this only local councillors in England (ELCs) can be studied since this was the only group who were asked for this information. The results do not support this element of the observation. Even using a one-tailed hypothesis there was no significant correlation between age and Left-Right ( $p = 0.11$ ), Europeanism ( $p = 0.12$ ) or the Middle East item ( $p = 0.42$ ). There was a significant correlation (one-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ) between age and the USA item in the predicted direction. Younger ELCs wanted Britain to be at least as, and perhaps more even more supportive of the USA's foreign and military policies. Looking at the different results of the USA and Middle East items, bearing mind that ELC respondents ranged in age from 24 to 81 it might be tempting to suggest that if by 2002 the shadow of the anti-US feeling demonstrated by a number of Conservatives at the time of the Suez crisis<sup>406</sup> had lifted from ELCs vis-à-vis the USA, then that of the King David Hotel<sup>407</sup> vis-à-vis Israel had not.

As an aside, the finding just noted of there being no significant correlation between attitudes towards the EU and age suggests a secular change in the attitudes of Conservative Party politicians. Given that the Conservative Party became more Euro-sceptic over some years through fears of the state being re-imposed on an EU-level and the perceived threat to national sovereignty<sup>408</sup> then a plausible hypothesis might have suggested that older respondents were significantly less Euro-sceptic than younger ones.

## **FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ISSUES: CORRELATING OR CUTTING ACROSS?**

Moving on from this specific research question, to what extent did attitudes towards foreign affairs correlate with or cut across attitudes towards domestic issues? To look at this, the same three foreign affairs variables were used which looked at in some fashion attitudes towards the EU, the USA and the Middle East. A series of partial correlation analyses was run, again using all but only local councillors in England, Scotland and Wales to keep a like-for-like comparison with the previous section. In the cases of the USA and the Middle East items each was tested one at a time alongside one of the multi-item scales whilst controlling for all the other multi-item scales. The procedure for the EU item was the same except, of course, that the Europeanism scale was removed from the set of control variables.

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<sup>406</sup> *The Times*, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2009.

<sup>407</sup> Defries, 2001: 194-197.

In all three cases there were a number of correlations that were significant at the two-tailed 5% level having controlled for responses to the other multi-item scales. In the case of the EU—tested here by using the Europeanism scale—these were (in descending order of strength of correlation): Traditional British Liberties (correlation = 0.232,  $p = 0.001$ ), Optimism (correlation = -0.203,  $p = 0.003$ ), Welfarism (correlation = -0.185,  $p = 0.008$ ), Feminism (correlation = -0.166,  $p = 0.017$ ) and Religiosity (correlation = -0.149,  $p = 0.032$ ).

In the case of the USA these were: Environmentalism (correlation = -0.183,  $p = 0.009$ ), Europeanism (correlation = 0.150,  $p = 0.0032$ ), Postmaterialism (correlation = -0.147,  $p = 0.036$ ) and Feminism (correlation = 0.141,  $p = 0.044$ ).

In the case of the Middle East these were: Authoritarianism (correlation = -0.153,  $p = 0.029$ ) and Traditional British Liberties (correlation 0.142,  $p = 0.043$ ).

From this evidence, the answer to the question posed at the start of this section is, on balance, that attitudes to foreign affairs cut across attitudes towards domestic issues for this sub-set of *CPRS 2002* respondents. No single multi-item scale was a reoccurring feature in all three sets of correlation analyses. Indeed, only Traditional British Liberties and Feminism appeared more than once. This suggests that any correlations between domestic and foreign attitudes are on a case-by-case basis and not an indication of a secular association of attitudes.

In the case of attitudes towards the EU as measured by the Europeanism scale, whilst a number of other scales were correlated with it having controlled for responses to the other scales it is also surely fair to note the reality of politics in Britain in the 2002, particularly regarding the Conservative Party. As is discussed elsewhere in this study, “Europe” was such a salient issue<sup>409</sup> that it can with justice be described as at least in part a domestic issue.

That said, the findings for the other two foreign affairs items can be fleshed out a little. The only issue significantly associated with the Middle East item were the two overlapping and themselves robustly correlated (one-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ) scales of Authoritarianism and Traditional British Liberties. Further analysis indicates a correlation between “authoritarian” and pro-Israeli views. This perhaps goes against what was suggested above of pro-Arab views being associated with support for a more traditional view of society but it is difficult to make much of this.

Of more interest was the analysis of the USA item. In the case of Europeanism it is predictable finding that bivariate analysis indicates that Euro-sceptic respondents were more inclined to support the USA

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<sup>408</sup> Webb, December 2008: 440.

<sup>409</sup> Burdett-Conway & Tether, 1997: 89-90; Cowley & Norton, 1999: 90.



than less Euro-sceptic respondents. For many—rightly or wrongly—the USA and the EU were something of an either/or choice.<sup>410</sup>

Leaving that aside, it surely cannot be a coincidence that the other three significant correlations were with examples or tests of “new” values: Postmaterialism, Environmentalism and Feminism.<sup>411</sup> Bivariate analysis indicates that those tending to support such new values, particularly in the cases of Environmentalism and Postmaterialism, were more opposed to the USA or more specifically thought that Britain should be more cautious in supporting the USA’s foreign and military policies. It can be suggested in general terms that supporters of “new” values viewed the USA as particularly at fault in its attitude towards (say) environmentalism. In more specific terms, it can be suggested that supporters of “new” values were inherently more suspicious of military and similar matters and that—although this is speculation since it is difficult from within the *CPRS 2002* data to make any comparisons—the USA was particularly associated with such things.

## THE COMMONWEALTH

A small number of other items in the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire also belong in this chapter. Two dealt with attitudes towards the UK’s relationship with the Commonwealth. Accompanied by a five-level “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set, each question was prefaced with, “Britain should re-establish closer ties with...” with one continuing, “the former colonies in areas such as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada” and the other continuing, “the former colonies and existing dependencies in areas such as the Caribbean, Africa and Asia”. In other words, those former parts of the British Empire often known as the “Old”—or less politically correctly, “White”—Commonwealth and the “New” Commonwealth respectively.

	Old Commonwealth	New Commonwealth
Agree	75%	50%
Neither/nor	16%	27%
Disagree	9%	23%
Base	499	497

Using the undifferentiated dataset—since ANOVA and the Bonferroni post-hoc test with the two micro-groups omitted detected no significant between-groups—Table 7.3 shows that there was strong support for Britain forging closer ties with the Old Commonwealth with exactly three-quarters (75%) of all respondents agreeing with the item and only 9% disagreeing. There was less active enthusiasm for

<sup>410</sup> Laughland, 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2010.

<sup>411</sup> Inglehart, 1990; Nas, 1995; Lundmark, 1995.

forging closer ties with the New Commonwealth, although even here just over twice as many wanted to (50%) than did not want to (23%).

Overall, and as might be predicted by the Conservative Party's post-War policy of maintaining Britain's position influence in the Commonwealth,<sup>412</sup> there was considerable support for maintaining and strengthening ties with the former Empire. Whether the Commonwealth was consciously or unconsciously seen as some kind of substitute for the Empire cannot be ascertained from the data.<sup>413</sup>

Were attitudes towards the Commonwealth associated with other attitudinal measures? In some cases a causal relationship between the Commonwealth items and the multi-item scales might reasonably be hypothesised. This is perhaps particularly true of those scales which clearly have a "foreign" component to them such as Xenophobia and Europeanism. But in other cases such a relationship is not at all obvious. Therefore this question was analysed by running a series of partial correlation analyses using these two Commonwealth items and the usual range of multi-item scales.

In both cases there were a number of significant bivariate associations between the two Commonwealth items and the scales having allowed for responses to all of the other scales. Perhaps the most predictable one was between the New Commonwealth item and the Xenophobia scale (correlation = 0.173,  $p = 0.002$ ) where respondents with less xenophobic attitudes were more positive about forging closer ties.

There were only three scales which were significantly associated with both Commonwealth items: Europeanism (correlation = -0.224,  $p = <0.001$  for the Old item and correlation = -0.167,  $p = 0.004$  for the New item), Authoritarianism (correlation = 0.169,  $p = 0.003$  for both items) and Pride in the Way the Nation Functions (correlation = -0.116,  $p = 0.043$  for the Old item and correlation = -0.115,  $p = 0.056$  for the New item).

More Euro-sceptic, more authoritarian and more nationally proud views were associated with wanting closer ties to both the Old and New Commonwealth.

In the case of Europeanism and Authoritarianism, respondents were similar to the general public at the same time. Analysis of relevant items from the *British Social Attitudes 2001* survey<sup>414</sup> (not shown here) indicates a similar attitude.

Overall, the findings concerning the Europeanism dimension make sense inasmuch as they might imply—as Euro-enthusiasts might be the first to argue—a sense of connection to, or even a nostalgia for, Britain's past global achievements and connections in a time before "Europe" came to dominant debate.

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<sup>412</sup> Buller, 1996: 222.

<sup>413</sup> Baker, Gamble & Seawright, 2002: 404.

<sup>414</sup> NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

The case of Authoritarianism is more difficult to explain. If it had just been significantly associated with the Old Commonwealth and had been in the other direction then it might be explained in terms of Authoritarianism's overlap with the Xenophobia scale as this related to some historical Conservative Party attitudes towards immigrants.<sup>415</sup> However, it was in an "authoritarian = closer ties" direction. It must be admitted that it is hard to discern why those who tended to hold "authoritarian" or "traditionalist" views on matters such as the death penalty, censorship, homosexuality and the teaching to children of deference also tended to favour closer ties with both the Old and New Commonwealths, unless it was from some sense of nostalgia. It could simply have been "one of those things" thrown out by the wide array of analyses used in this study.

The case of the Pride in the Way the Nation Functions scale might also be an indication of pride not just in Britain at the time of the survey but again a nostalgic admiration for its past imperial history.

## THE WESTERN AND ISLAMIC WORLDS

One final item in the questionnaire, again accompanied by a five-level "Agree strongly" to "Disagree strongly" response set, was "The Western and Islamic worlds can never truly be at peace with one another".

Of course, particularly in the years since the attacks in the USA on the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the bombings in London in July 2005, it would take a book-length work merely to act as an introductory bibliography to this subject. Here the aims are much more modest.

It should be acknowledged that this single item could as well have been included in Chapter 10 dedicated to religion. It depends upon one's view as to what, for example, "Islamic world" means. Implicit in the item is the notion—which may or may not be correct—that "the Western world" and "the Islamic world" offered different and competing world views.<sup>416</sup> However, it must be admitted that it is not clear what respondents understood by "The Western and Islamic worlds", especially the latter. Did it mean the geographical region of the world generally thought of as the Middle East and so on and "where the oil comes from"? Or perhaps it suggested an ideological/theological bloc, such as Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution? Closer to home, was it by then associated with terrorism? Or just "those people that I saw when I was walking down the Edgware Road<sup>417</sup> the other day"? It was the "ideological/theological bloc" meaning that was intended but, upon reflection, this should have been made clearer in the questionnaire.

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<sup>415</sup> Gamble, 1974:181.

<sup>416</sup> Adams, 1993: 352; *BBC News*, 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001; Dougherty, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2002; Hague, 6<sup>th</sup> November 2000; Heywood, 1992: 5; Thatcher, 12<sup>th</sup> February 2002.

<sup>417</sup> A centre of Arab life in London; see for example Maysaloon, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2007.

ANOVA with the post-hoc Bonferroni test indicated that ELCs were significantly more pessimistic ( $p = <0.001$ ) about relations between the two worlds than some of the other groups. Over half (55%) of ELCs were pessimistic about relations between the two worlds and exactly a quarter (25%) who were optimistic. In the case of the other groups of respondents, the responses were more balanced—indeed, this was an item where there was little agreement amongst respondents—with 35% being pessimistic and 43% optimistic.

When run once for ELCs only and then for all other respondents, partial correlation analysis indicated that was only one multi-item scale that was significantly and indeed robustly associated with attitudes in both cases. It will perhaps come as little surprise that this was the Xenophobia scale (correlation  $-0.256$ ,  $p = 0.001$  for ELCs and correlation  $-0.387$ ,  $p = <0.001$  for all others). In both cases more xenophobic attitudes were associated with a more pessimistic view of relations between the Western and Islamic worlds. What this suggests is that those who viewed immigrants as tending to have a harmful impact on Britain in areas such as crime and the economy also tended to have a pessimistic view about the relationship between the two worlds. In other words, the findings perhaps indicated a view that “aliens” were bad for Britain and that furthermore Islam was notably alien.

There was a minor but still interesting finding concerning the analysis for all non-ELC respondents. Other than Xenophobia, the only other scale that was significantly associated with responses to this item was the Theocratism scale (correlation =  $0.195$ ,  $p = 0.028$ ). Bivariate analysis indicated that those with more secularist attitudes—those who wanted to see little or no role for religion in public life—tended to be more pessimistic about relations between the Western and Islamic worlds.

Taking these findings together, it seems that for those agreeing with the item the main factor was the perceived harmful and alien nature of Islam along with—amongst most groups of respondents—a lesser but still significant belief that Islam was particularly and unacceptably insistent in its demands for a religious input into public life and governance. To turn it around, those who disagreed with the item tended not to have a problem with things and people who might be viewed as alien—and it will be remembered that the Xenophobia scale does not specifically mention Islam—and/or they were more relaxed about an enhanced role for religion in public life even if this was not necessarily Christianity.

## CONCLUSION

Turning first to attitudes towards the Commonwealth it was seen that respondents tended to support Britain establishing closer relations with both the Old and, albeit less so, New Commonwealths. If nothing else, this can perhaps be taken as evidence against the more extreme charges of xenophobia—although the presence and direction of the Xenophobia scale in one of the analyses was revealing—that were sometimes labelled against the Conservative Party at the time. Provided that, the cynic might suggest, the “others” stayed where they were.

Looking in more detail at statistically associated multi-item scales, the underlying theme that suggested itself was perhaps one of nostalgia for Britain's imperial past.

Turning to relations between the Western and Islamic worlds, attitudes were mixed. Local councillors in England were noticeably pessimistic about the prospects for peaceful relations between the two cultures whereas all other tended, although not strongly, to be more optimistic.

Looking at associated attitudes, by far the most powerful one was the Xenophobia scale. For those taking a pessimistic view about relations between the two worlds there was the strong implication that Islam was viewed as both alien and malign. In addition, amongst some respondents there was a small but statistically significant indication of what may have been quite a complex view regarding Islam and secularism.<sup>418</sup> It would seem that those who tended to take a pessimistic view about the relationship between the two worlds also tended to believe that the influence of religion in the world—beyond a purely personal one—should stop at the doors of the church or mosque.

A large part of this chapter was taken up with testing the validity within the context of Conservative Party politicians in 2002 of an observation made by many others. The core of it was that attitudes towards the EU, the USA and Israel were correlated with each other in a “negative, positive and positive” direction. The results robustly supported this observation at the level of bivariate analyses.

Following on from this, an admittedly tentative analysis using the same variables suggests that attitudes towards foreign affairs tended to cut across rather than be associated with attitudes towards domestic issues. A supplementary finding of note was that attitudes about Britain's relationship with the USA were most strongly associated with attitudes towards “new” values such as Environmentalism, Feminism and Postmaterialism rather than “old” values such as those measured by the economic Left-Right scale.

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<sup>418</sup> Meek, May 2004.

## **CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL IDENTITY**

### **ASPECTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Throughout this study reference has been made to local councillors in England, Scotland and Wales. All of these respondents were the same type of politician distinguished by the fact that they had been elected in three of the four countries making up the United Kingdom. It is attitudes towards various aspects of this Union that are analysed in this chapter before moving on to other aspects of national identity.

Respondents were presented with a number of items concerning attitudes about England, Scotland, Wales, the United Kingdom, the EU, devolution and so on and how these relate to each other.

Also briefly explored is a typology of national identity in a more general sense, and it is possible to compare these findings with those of the near-contemporaneous general public with reference to data from the *British Social Attitudes* series from which this particular typology was derived.

The electoral background to the *CPRS 2002* is a reminder of the irony that a party which had inserted “and Unionist” into its formal title to show its support for the Union had ended up after the May 1997 general election with not a single MP elected outside of England<sup>419</sup> and only one from Scotland after 2001.<sup>420</sup>

### **SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

#### **How Respondents Thought of Themselves**

Respondents were presented with two items based upon the Moreno national identity scale<sup>421</sup> analysing identification as British as opposed to English, Scottish or Welsh and then European as opposed to British, English, Scottish or Welsh.

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<sup>419</sup> Dyer, 2001; McLean, 1997: 145.

<sup>420</sup> Austin & Hames, 2001: 296.

<sup>421</sup> Curtice & Heath, 2000: 157.

TABLE 8.1: SELF-IDENTIFICATION: BRITISH VERSUS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
More English/Scottish/Welsh than British	32%	17%	28%	20%	15%	29%	21%
Equally English/Scottish/Welsh and British	33%	21%	31%	33%	33%	43%	57%
More British than English/Scottish/Welsh	35%	62%	41%	48%	52%	29%	21%
Base	274	58	51	46	27	14	14

Table 8.1 presents a mixed picture, with opinions spread across the presented options. In all cases, at least a fifth and usually a third or more of respondents regarded themselves as equally British on the one hand and English, Scottish or Welsh as the case may have been on the other. Overall, there was evidence for a dual British and English/Scottish/Welsh identity. Looking at secondary data, *CPRS 2002* respondents from Scotland and Wales were conspicuously more likely to identify as equally or even more British than their compatriots amongst the Scottish and Welsh general public whereas ELCs and MPs much more closely matched the attitudes of the English general public.<sup>422</sup>

No table is provided for the other analysis which told a very different story. In practice there was a complete rejection of any sense of being European at the expense of being British. Only 1% of ELCs regarded themselves as more European than British, English, Scottish and/or Welsh and no respondents from any of the other groups did, not even MEPs. With the exception of MEPs (43%), there was generally a rejection of even a shared or equal identity with never more than 25% of any group citing this. There was little evidence of respondents from Scotland or Wales looking for an “umbrella” in the EU previously provided by Britain,<sup>423</sup> although given the specific nature of the respondents there should be little surprise at this.

The findings from the respondents can be compared to those of the public at the time<sup>424</sup> set out in Table 8.2.

<sup>422</sup> Curtice & Syed, 2001: 236.

<sup>423</sup> Clark, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2000.

<sup>424</sup> *British Social Attitudes Survey*, 2001.

	England	Scotland	Wales
More English/Scottish/Welsh than British	30%	74%	40%
Equally English/Scottish/Welsh and British	45%	14%	32%
More British than English/Scottish/Welsh	25%	12%	28%
Base	1683	593	469
Source: <i>BSA 2001</i>			

Compared to the public at the time, it was noticeable that explicitly Unionist *CPRS 2002* respondents from above all Scotland and—albeit to a lesser extent even allowing for less Welsh self-identity in the first place—Wales were less inclined to regard themselves as more Scottish or Welsh than British. The responses from the *CPRS 2002*'s English groups of ELCs and MPs were broadly in line with those of the public.

Within the context of being peripheral representatives of the Conservative and *Unionist* Party, that Scottish and Welsh local councillors were relatively more likely to emphasise their Britishness than their counterparts in England might be seen as indicating their status as beleaguered unionists.

The exercise is not repeated for the European aspect since the item was presented differently but also, like *CPRS 2002* respondents, there was little in the way of European self-identification amongst the British general public of the time.

There was another finding that indicated that in this respect respondents were similar to the general public. Amongst ELCs, stronger English as opposed to British identification was associated with *more* Euro-sceptic attitudes as measured by the Europeanism scale (one-tailed  $p = 0.044$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic). On the other hand, amongst SLCs stronger Scottish as opposed to British identification was associated with *less* Euro-sceptic attitudes as measured by the Europeanism scale (one-tailed  $p = 0.023$  using the  $\chi^2$  statistic). This is the same pattern that was detected amongst the near-contemporary general public<sup>425</sup> and supports claims that Euro-scepticism, despite much talk of “Britain”, was in reality more about a perceived threat to English identity, a view that had less resonance in Scotland or Wales or indeed in the rest of the EU.<sup>426</sup>

<sup>425</sup> Curtice & Heath, 2000: 167; Curtice & Syed, 2001: 240.

<sup>426</sup> Marquand, 2009: 326.



## OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the following, all items were coupled with a five-point “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set.

*“The cause of the centre-Right in Scotland and Wales has been damaged by its association with a Conservative Party that is often regarded as ‘the English Party’”* (as one Conservative MSP and other Conservatives would later publically state,<sup>427</sup> a view shared by some academics<sup>428</sup>). Responses to this item generally indicated uncertainty tending towards agreement and in no case did even a plurality disagree. Those most strongly agreeing were respondents from Scotland where 67% of SLCs and 86% of MSPs agreed. WLCs were less sure, although a plurality (38%) agreed with the statement. ELCs were the least convinced, but even here more agreed (31%) than disagreed (24%).

A belief amongst some Conservatives that this *had* been the case was one of the motivating factors behind the ongoing calls for a “CSU” option, named after the *Christlich-Soziale Union* which only operates in more identity-conscious Bavaria, leaving the rest of Germany to its sister party, the *Christlich Demokratische Union*. The idea was that a linked but clearly separate “centre-right” party—not one merely renamed<sup>429</sup>—might do better.<sup>430</sup> However, many on the “right” of the Party rejected such an idea because it might lead to a shift toward the “centre” and become rather like the old Scottish Unionist Party.<sup>431</sup>

That this view from Scotland was not so robustly shared by councillors in Wales is perhaps surprising given claims that by the early 21<sup>st</sup> century anti-Conservatism was part of the Welsh national identity.<sup>432</sup> Nevertheless, on balance the view was clear, and some senior Welsh Conservatives noted the vicious circle that with so few Welsh and to some extent Scottish Conservative representatives it was often English Conservatives to be seen in the media talking about Welsh and Scottish affairs. This served to reinforce the image of the Conservatives as an “English party”,<sup>433</sup> something perhaps anyway apparent during the lengthy Thatcher and Major period when the Conservatives adopted a hard-line Unionism, moving away from an older belief that different policies in different places might be required.<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>427</sup> *BBC News*, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2005; Leslie, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2003.

<sup>428</sup> Mitchell, 1995: 1382.

<sup>429</sup> Linklater, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

<sup>430</sup> Browne, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2007; Hamilton, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2005; Nelson, 7<sup>th</sup> April 2007; Robertson & Black, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2001.

<sup>431</sup> Lynch, 2003: 168-169.

<sup>432</sup> Charmley, 2009/2010; Wyn Jones, Scully & Trystan, 2002: 243.

<sup>433</sup> Evans, 2002: 18.

<sup>434</sup> Cooper, 1995: 1385; Hector, 2009/2010: 19; Peter Lynch, 1997: 564; Philip Lynch, 2000: 66; October 2004: 386; Mitchell, 1995: 1382.

*“England should have its own parliament.”* Amongst all groups a majority disagreed with this item. ELCs were relatively the most in favour, with 42% agreeing against 51% actively disagreeing. On the other hand, their colleagues in Scotland and Wales were the most vehemently opposed, with 71% of SLCs and almost all (96%) WLCs disagreeing with this item. 59% of MPs, 70% of Peers and 57% of MEPs also disagreed. Particularly with these latter groups, one must wonder how much this had anything to do with national identity as such against how much it spoke of a more mundane fear of competition.

*“The regions of England should have their own assemblies.”* Following on from the previous item, opposition to such a development was even more marked, with in most cases 80% or more of respondents from the different groups opposed to some degree. The two relative exceptions were respondents from Scotland where only 58% of SLCs and 50% of MSPs actively disagreed with this item. It is not clear why this should have been, unless it was a (relative) manifestation of a desire to “cut England down to size”. Taking these last two items together there was generally clear opposition to moves that might be seen as further splitting or federalising the UK.<sup>435</sup>

*“The Scots and the Welsh have a more developed sense of national identity than the English.”* In every case a majority agreed with this item. Give or take two or three percentage points, two-thirds of Peers and MPs and three-quarters of ELCs, WLCs, MSPs and MEPs agreed as did exactly half of SLCs. Given the general direction of responses to this item and also the data in Tables 8.1a and 8.2, this again suggests a difference in the way that Celtic Conservatives perceived themselves when compared to the Scots and Welsh public.

*“The extra public spending received by Scotland and Wales relative to England is often justified.”* The responses to this item were delightfully predictable. There had long been complaints from English Conservatives—particularly from the North of England—about the amount of public money that Scotland (via the Barnett Formula<sup>436</sup>), Wales and Northern Ireland received.<sup>437</sup> This feeling appeared to increase following the creation of the devolved institutions in Wales and Scotland and their alleged “generosity” towards their own electorate at the expense of English taxpayers.<sup>438</sup> Robust majorities of ELCs (76%), MPs (75%) and Peers (65%) disagreed against equally robust majorities of SLCs (74%), WLCs (68%) and MSPs (71%) who agreed. MEPs fell between these two groups, although a majority (57%) disagreed. (Further reading suggests that the assumptions behind this last item *may* have been incorrect or at least slightly misleading<sup>439</sup> and that it could be argued that that it was not so much a case of England “propping up” Scotland and Wales but London, south-eastern and eastern England “propping up” the rest of the UK including the rest of England.)

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<sup>435</sup> Barnes, 1998.

<sup>436</sup> Kallenbach, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2001.

<sup>437</sup> Cooper, 1995: 1385-1390.

<sup>438</sup> Williams, 17<sup>th</sup> August 2002.

<sup>439</sup> See for example Allardyce, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2009; Farrer, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2007; Leask, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2007; Orr, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2002.

## THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Whereas there were no items in the survey looking explicitly at attitudes towards the overall “legitimacy”<sup>440</sup> of the political system as it pertained to the UK in 2002, there was one item in the Europeanism scale that is worth noting on its own in this context. It was one of the shortest items in the entire questionnaire: “Britain should withdraw from the EU”. Within the context of a tendency towards Euro-scepticism, substantial minorities of some groups of respondents went so far as to agree with this “nuclear option”. This included 29% of ELCs, 26% of WLCs, 20% of SLCs and 22% of MPs and even three MEPs.

It is surely reasonable to argue that many respondents were not merely “unfriendly” towards the EU but did not accept its legitimacy at all. Given both that around this time the Conservative Party’s perceived Euro-scepticism was one of the few areas where they more nearly represented the preferences of voters than did the other parties<sup>441</sup> and also what British opponents of the EU have argued is the ever-increasing powers of the EU over its members states,<sup>442</sup> then perhaps this might be the source of some future “legitimation crisis” albeit on more straightforward nationalist grounds than sometimes suggested.<sup>443</sup>

On the other hand, it may be that the EU’s “complicated, abstruse and intransparent multi-level network structures”<sup>444</sup> serve to diffuse any hostility.

## A REVISED TYPOLOGY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

During research for the *CPRS 2002*, further work was conducted on a study published in a *British Social Attitudes* report by Lizanne Dowds and Ken Young on the subject of ‘national identity’.<sup>445</sup> In turn, they had based their work on items used in the 1995 *BSA* survey. Elements of their work were used in the *CPRS 2002*.

The original authors’ aim was twofold. Firstly, to identify “dimensions of identity”. They posited the existence of two different forms of nationalism: inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive nationalism (“national sentiment”) they took to mean (i) pride in the nation’s heritage and/or (ii) its functioning and place in the world. Exclusive nationalism (“exclusiveness”) they took to mean protectionist or xenophobic tendencies towards (iii) foreign products and capital and/or (iv) foreigners themselves. These four elements were measured—and it is not the place here to look at how they developed these scales—by the Pride in

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<sup>440</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[g]: 327.

<sup>441</sup> Butler & Kavanagh, 2002[a]: 39.

<sup>442</sup> Campaign for an Independent Britain, 13<sup>th</sup> June 2008.

<sup>443</sup> Jary & Jary, 1991: 351-352.

<sup>444</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[g]: 329.

Heritage & Culture, Pride in the Way the Nation Functions, Protectionism and Xenophobia dimensions respectively used throughout the *CPRS 2002*. The first and second and then the third and fourth of these dimensions were further combined into new dimensions: National Sentiment and Exclusiveness respectively although these combined dimensions were not used in the *CPRS 2002*.

Second, they identified and operationalised distinct attitudinal typologies regarding national identity by combining these two new dimensions of identity into a fourfold typology. In principle, these four groups they described and labelled as follows:

- **Supra-Nationalists:** Low in exclusiveness and low in national sentiment.
- **Patriots:** Low in exclusiveness and high in national sentiment.
- **Belligerents:** High in exclusiveness and low in national sentiment.
- **John Bulls:** High in exclusiveness and high in national sentiment.

For the *CPRS 2002*, a simpler method of dividing National Sentiment and Exclusiveness into absolute halves was used.

The “problem” was that because of the extreme loading on the two “Pride” scales—respondents tended to be very proud of Britain—there were effectively no Supra-Nationalists or Belligerents. Respondents were divided between the other two types depending upon their view of foreign people and things. The tendency was for “higher” representatives such as Peers, MPs, MSPs and MEPs but also SLCs to fall into the Patriot category whereas ELCs and WLCs were more inclined to fall into the John Bull category.

This typology was also used to analyse members of the British public using data from the 2003 *British Social Attitudes* survey.<sup>446</sup> The only finding of note was that approximately 10% of respondents could be described as Belligerents, liking neither their own country nor foreign people and things.

## CONCLUSION

Looking first to how *CPRS 2002* respondents regarded themselves as being British or Scottish or European and so on, it was a tale of two parts. There was evidence for a dual and a mixed British and English/Scottish/Welsh identity. Respondents were notably more inclined to think of themselves as British to some degree than their compatriots amongst the public. That they were representatives of the Conservative and *Unionist* Party with its historical and explicit support for a *British* identity<sup>447</sup> means that this should come as no surprise.

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<sup>445</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

<sup>446</sup> *British Social Attitudes*, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2008.

<sup>447</sup> Seldon & Snowdon, 2001: 24-25.

That said, the findings confirm that Britain is one of those “countries [where] citizens do not have a single and evident national identity, but can choose between different more or less competing national identities”.<sup>448</sup>

On the other hand, respondents were strongly inclined towards British/English/Scottish/Welsh rather than European identity, at least if the latter was at the expense of the former. Given the strongly Euro-sceptic attitudes reported throughout this study, this comes as no surprise.

It also needs to be noted that no attempt was made to differentiate between notions of “citizenship” and “nationality” let alone “race”. When a few years after 2002 the German-born Labour MP Gisela Stuart stated that the rise of Englishness was a threat to democracy,<sup>449</sup> John Alden, a local Conservative councillor, responded by saying, “I know people who are Scottish, Irish and Welsh and we are all proud British citizens, but if I was asked what nationality I was I would say English.”

The array of stand-alone items cannot so easily be summarised. However, the main view seemed to be a continuing support for the Union much as it was by the time of the survey. In particular, whilst there was almost no support for outright Scottish or Welsh independence, there was support for some form of devolution. Even if they had been reluctant converts to devolution,<sup>450</sup> by 2002 few Conservative politicians advocated outright opposition to devolution anymore.<sup>451</sup> On the other hand, a bare majority opposed the creation of an English parliament which would arguably make the UK parliament redundant for all but policy areas such as foreign and military affairs and UK-level macroeconomics. There was also strong opposition to English regional assemblies. Overall, this might indicate opposition to what some would perceive as the further Balkanisation of the UK.

The typology of national identity was not a success in this case because of the particular nature of *CPRS 2002* respondents and their strong pride in Britain.

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<sup>448</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[i]: 400.

<sup>449</sup> Walker, 18<sup>th</sup> November 2005.

<sup>450</sup> Lynch, 2003: 164-165.

<sup>451</sup> Lynch, October 2004: 389.

## **CHAPTER 9: THE FREE-MARKET AS “A NECESSARY EVIL” OR “A GOOD THING”?**

### **PRO-FREE-MARKET, BUT WHY?**

As detailed in Appendix 4, respondents were very strongly disinclined towards “leftist” economic views as measured by the Left-Right dimension. Depending upon which group of respondents were examined, between a third to two-thirds fell into either the “in between” or “right” categories with almost all of the remainder falling into the other one.

However, caution needs to be exercised since this should be seen as evidence of a fair degree of support for a “mixed economy”. Whereas the Labour Party has clearly been associated with socialist ideas, historically it had been the Liberals at least as much the Conservatives who supported, in this sense, “liberalism”.<sup>452</sup> There has always been a strand of thinking within the Conservative Party that has been suspicious and sometimes critical of free-market liberalism,<sup>453</sup> arguing instead for “economic policies that stressed community and social cohesion rather than markets and individuals”<sup>454</sup> or were designed to create a triangular economic system of government, organised labour and capital.<sup>455</sup>

That noted, economic liberalism was in the ascendancy within the Conservative Party by the 1980s<sup>456</sup> and respondents were at least inclined towards free-market economics.

In this brief chapter this was examined a little further. To repeat the title of this section, did respondents regard the market as “a necessary evil” that was just better than socialism at literally “delivering the goods”, or as “a good thing” in itself?<sup>457</sup>

### **THE EFFICIENCY AND WORTHINESS OF THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS**

This was examined in an indirect but defensible manner. Respondents were presented with two items each with three response options. The first was a choice between, “The public sector is more efficient than the private sector”, “The public and private sectors are equally efficient” and “The private sector is more efficient than the public sector”. The other was a choice between, “The public sector is more worthy than the private sector”, “The public and private sectors are equally worthy” and “The private

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<sup>452</sup> Heath *et al*, 1991: 5.

<sup>453</sup> Green, 2002.

<sup>454</sup> Evans, October 2004: 383.

<sup>455</sup> Marquand, 2009: 181.

<sup>456</sup> Bale, July 2006: 385.

sector is more worthy than the public sector”. Between them, these two items analysed attitudes towards both the utilitarian and moral aspects of the free-market. As such, “private sector” was intended as a symbol for “market economics” and “public sector” as a symbol for “statist economics”. Or to use the terminology of the associated dimension, “right” and “left”.

Before proceeding, it was checked that both of these items were significantly correlated with the Left-Right dimension. They were. Using the whole dataset and the Pearson statistic, two-tailed  $p = 0.008$  and  $p = 0.001$  for the “efficient” and “worthy” items respectively. Similarly there was a significant correlation of two-tailed  $p = 0.009$  between the two items themselves in the predictable direction.

ANOVA detected no significant between-groups differences ( $p = 0.7$ ) on the “worthiness” item. There were significant between-groups differences on the “efficiency” item but the finding was marginal ( $p = 0.03$ ) and the post-hoc Bonferroni test failed to detect any significantly different pairs. It is therefore reasonably safe to say that responses to these items were similar across all groups of respondents. Table 9.1 displays the results.

The public sector is more efficient than the private sector	2%	The public sector is more worthy than the private sector	3%
The public and private sectors are equally efficient	11%	The public and private sectors are equally worthy	75%
The private sector is more efficient than the public sector	87%	The private sector is more worthy than the public sector	22%
Base	492	Base	484

Using the entire dataset, Table 9.1 indicates a strong belief that the private sector was more efficient than the public sector with over four-fifths responding with this option. However, whilst almost no respondents believed that the public sector was more worthy than the private sector three-quarters of respondents believed them to be equally so with the remainder opting for the private sector.

In short, there was some tentative evidenced for at least a mild version of the “necessary evil” attitude. This is because the results suggest that whilst the private sector was strongly seen as being more efficient than the public it was generally not seen as more worthy even if the bias was towards thinking that it was.

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<sup>457</sup> O’Keeffe 2004; Rey, 1994.

## ASSOCIATIONS WITH EMPLOYMENT

One of the socio-demographic items asked of ELCs—see Chapter 4—concerned which employment sector they worked in or had most recently worked in. The majority (71%) said that it was the private, a minority (20%) said that it was the public with the remainder saying that it was the voluntary or other sectors. Taking those from the private and public sectors only it is a reasonable hypothesis that this will correlate with attitudes towards the two sectors as seen in responses to the two items above.

In fact, in the case of the “efficiency” item there was little to choose between the two. Mostly this was because of the strongly one-sided loading of the responses. 88% of those who worked in the private sector believed that the private sector was more efficient than the public sector against “only” 82% of those who worked in the public sector.

The differences were more marked in the case of the “moral” item, as can be seen in Table 9.2.

	Private sector employment	Public sector employment
The public sector is more worthy than the private sector	3%	9%
The public and private sectors are equally worthy	73%	83%
The private sector is more worthy than the public sector	24%	8%
Base	192	53

Those who worked in the public sector were significantly less likely—crosstabs and the  $\chi^2$  statistic, two-tailed  $p = 0.009$ —to believe in the superior worthiness of the private sector than their private sector colleagues. Whether this indicates an enduring belief that prompted such respondents to enter the public sector or a consequence of working within it and over time becoming more likely to believe in its worth—cause or effect—cannot be determined from the data.

## CONCLUSION

In looking at attitudes towards the public and private sectors, the bias in favour of the latter was confirmed. This must surely have been anticipated from responses to the Left-Right dimension. However, it also suggested that this tended to be on utilitarian rather than moral grounds. Or, if one prefers, pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Respondents did *not* typically regard the public sector as “unworthy” and this was particularly true amongst those who had recent experience of working in the public sector.



This combination of experience and attitude of some Conservative politicians might be of note if in the future the Party's leadership comes to believe that there really is a "tremendous political opportunity" in more actively canvassing for support amongst public sector workers.<sup>458</sup>

This focus on the utilitarian as opposed to moral claims of the free-market and the private sector reflected the debates on the subject both inside and outside of the Conservative Party. For example, looking at the national background, it has been argued that Conservative government's privatisations of the 1980s were not "ideological" so much as an economic necessity brought about the UK government's revenue as a proportion of GDP passing the apex of the Laffer Curve<sup>459</sup> resulting in collecting less tax against a background of rising demand for public services.<sup>460</sup> Also, the speeches and writings of senior Conservative politicians around the time of the study—particularly in the area of healthcare provision—often emphasised the alleged utilitarian benefits of the free-markets and the private sector.<sup>461</sup>

Nevertheless, others such as the Party leader at the time of the *CPRS 2002*, Iain Duncan Smith,<sup>462</sup> continued to make a moral claim. Others, such as senior Conservative MP Dr Liam Fox,<sup>463</sup> argued that strong emotional—arguably "moral"—attachment to the NHS had hampered rational debate about its efficiency at delivering healthcare provision.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>458</sup> Sanders, July 2006: 193.

<sup>459</sup> Sloman, 1991: 351.

<sup>460</sup> Whitehouse, 2002.

<sup>461</sup> Riddell, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2001.

<sup>462</sup> Kite, 6<sup>th</sup> February 2002.

<sup>463</sup> Fox, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2002.

<sup>464</sup> Anderson, 18<sup>th</sup> May 2002: 26.

## CHAPTER 10: RELIGION

### MEANINGS OF RELIGION IN THE *CPRS 2002*

It is beyond the scope of a single chapter in a wide-ranging survey to engage in a full sociological and attitudinal analysis of religious beliefs and practises.<sup>465</sup> Nevertheless, the *CPRS 2002* asked a number of questions on these matters. Batteries of questions were asked that formed two, multi-item scales: Religiosity that measured belief in God and religious observances and Theocratism that measured attitudes towards the role of religion and religious institutions in public life. Additionally, respondents were asked whether or not there should be an Established Church in any part of Britain and ELCs were asked their confessional background even if they did not consider themselves personally religious.

After some scene setting, the initial part of this chapter provides an analysis of Religiosity and Theocratism on their own split by groups of respondents and then a two-way typology that uses both Religiosity and Theocratism. Next, confessional background is discussed and then the position of the Established Church. Then the two scales are analysed against socio-demographic data held for ELCs. Turning to further analysis, the predictive power of the two multi-item scales towards other attitudes is analysed, both by themselves using a series of bivariate correlation analyses and as but two of many variables using regression analysis.

Before moving on it should be noted that “religion” can mean many things, sometimes simultaneously. It can be “institutional” in terms of (possibly notional) membership of a particular religious organisation or denomination. It can be “ideological” in the sense of describing beliefs about this world and the next. It can also be a symbol for ethnic identity. The core of this chapter is taken up with the second—ideological—of these meanings. However, the others are touched on as well. For example, there are brief analyses concerning membership of the Roman Catholic Church and the position of Jews within the Conservative Party.

What is not covered by the two scales primarily analysed in this chapter are such things as the content of any religious doctrine adhered to by respondents.<sup>466</sup> Partly this was because this would involve too much detail in a study such as this. However, it was also because it was permissible to make some assumptions about the respondents, e.g. that most of them would come from Christian and indeed usually Anglican backgrounds and within this context detailed theological speculation did not seem relevant. For the same reason the questionnaire did not provide an exhaustive list of all possible religious and denominational backgrounds from which respondents could choose. Instead, as far as the Religiosity scale was concerned

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<sup>465</sup> Arts & Halman, 2004: 283-386; *European Social Survey*, 2007[h].

<sup>466</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[h]: 350.

the focus was on non-denominational “personal devotion and experience”<sup>467</sup> and basic ritualistic elements concerning church attendance.

## RELIGION AND THE UK AND THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

### Politico-Religious Cleavages in the UK

Unlike in much of continental Europe, religious cleavages have been a relatively small factor in mainland British and certainly English party politics.<sup>468</sup> Similarly, there has never been the same anti-clerical tradition in British politics of the sort that continues to inform political debate in other members of the EU.<sup>469</sup>

Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the Conservatives were once able to win considerable support in parts of Scotland, Wales and in English cities such as Liverpool by appeals to Protestant “Orange” sensibilities, Anglicanism and an associated Unionism. However, these appeals had largely vanished by 2002.<sup>470</sup>

### Christianity and the UK

Next, any discussion of religion and politics must be set against a decline in traditional Christian religious beliefs in much of Britain since the 1940s, alongside a static but minority adherence to non-traditional beliefs such as horoscopes, reincarnation and ghosts.<sup>471</sup> This was to such an extent that according to some measures and studies around the time of the *CPRS 2002* Britain was one of the world’s least religious countries.<sup>472</sup>

Some argued that by the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there was a noticeable reluctance on the part of mainstream British politicians and commentators to directly connect religion—or at least mainstream Christianity—and politics,<sup>473</sup> often treating it with embarrassment.<sup>474</sup> Indeed, it was argued by one British conservative commentator that by the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the highly secular nature of much of

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<sup>467</sup> *European Social Survey*, 2007[h]: 350 & 351.

<sup>468</sup> Gabriel, 1995: 379.

<sup>469</sup> *Sunday Telegraph*, 11<sup>th</sup> April 2009.

<sup>470</sup> Bradley, 1996: 1751-1752; Catterall, 1994: 656; Cochrane, 29<sup>th</sup> August 2006; Wyn Jones, Scully & Trystan, 2002: 233.

<sup>471</sup> Gill, Hadaway & Marler, 1998: 509 & 513.

<sup>472</sup> Gledhill, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2004; King, 27<sup>th</sup> December 2004; but see for example Graaf & Need, 2000: 129; Reid, 13<sup>th</sup> September 2006.

<sup>473</sup> Assinder, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2006.

<sup>474</sup> Hobson, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2002.

British society, and certainly of “opinion formers”, led to a view of the rest of the being world distorted by being looked at through “a secularised prism, underplaying and denigrating the role of religion”.<sup>475</sup>

This view was not confined to Conservatives. Tony Blair, who had been Prime Minister at the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork, would later note that during his term in office he refrained from talking about his religious views for fear of being labelled “a nutter” whereas it was commonplace in the USA and elsewhere for politicians to talk about their religious convictions.<sup>476</sup>

Historically the Conservative Party had a religious background in that it was part of the “old nation” of the Anglican Church and the nobility.<sup>477</sup> However, the generally positive relationship between the Conservative Party and the Anglican Church as an institution was severely strained by the 1980s. The Church opposed many of the Thatcher government’s economic policies<sup>478</sup> and was often seen as giving encouragement to more “socialistic” ideas<sup>479</sup> and as being actively hostile to the Conservative Party.<sup>480</sup> However, even if true then this was not a completely new phenomenon. When the then-famous preacher, suffragette, sometime pacifist and socialist Maude Royden made her famous call in 1917 that, “The Church should go forward along the path of progress and be no longer satisfied only to represent the Conservative Party at prayer”<sup>481</sup> it was with a view to moving the Church towards Royden’s own socialist views.<sup>482</sup>

On social issues, a jaundiced view of what the Anglican Church had become was voiced by Norman Tebbit<sup>483</sup> when he said that that the modern Church has lost faith in its own Judeo-Christian ethics and “scarcely recognises any sins but racism, sexism, and homophobia.”

## **Christianity and the Conservative Party**

It was clear that for many Conservatives religion in some sense still mattered. It cannot be a coincidence that Margaret Thatcher’s only House of Commons defeat was in April 1986 when she suffered a Conservative back-bench rebellion on the *Shops Bill* which was attempting to liberalise Sunday trading.<sup>484</sup> Relating religion to the Party’s 2001 leadership contest, Iain Duncan Smith’s victory was

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<sup>475</sup> Sherman, 2004: 13; and see also Browsers, February 2005, for a worldwide perspective; but see Sarler, 13<sup>th</sup> September 2007, for an alternative view, at least in terms of the more “illiberal” forms of religion.

<sup>476</sup> *BBC News*, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2007.

<sup>477</sup> Blake, 1985: 93.

<sup>478</sup> Catterall, 1994: 638-641.

<sup>479</sup> Forrester, 1988: 44; Crouch, 2000: 101; Walters, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2002.

<sup>480</sup> Willetts, 1996: 81.

<sup>481</sup> Partington, 1996: 549; but see Hilton, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2010, for an earlier provenance of the idea.

<sup>482</sup> Fletcher, 1989. By a coincidence, Agnes Maude Royden’s personal papers are held at the Women’s Library at London Metropolitan University, reference 7AMR.

<sup>483</sup> Tebbit, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2000.

<sup>484</sup> Johnston, 10<sup>th</sup> April 2006.

welcomed by the Conservative Christian Fellowship,<sup>485</sup> a group promoted in official Party literature at the time.<sup>486</sup>

On the other hand, some commentators, often with a Conservative background, rejected the Party's involvement with religion, often because of views on issues such as homosexuality and marital status.<sup>487</sup>

In the end, all that can be said is that around the time of the *CPRS 2002* at least some Conservative and conservative politicians and commentators were still making the case that there was an active role for religion and religious institutions in British public life<sup>488</sup> and/or that political parties should not be shy in canvassing for support in specifically religious settings.<sup>489</sup>

## RELIGIOSITY AND THEOCRATISM

### Considered Separately

Before proceeding, it should be noted that an analysis of the data that formed the core of Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson's work on Conservative Party members, *True Blues*,<sup>490</sup> suggests that religion was an area where the attitudes of local councillors were similar to that of ordinary Party activists. Whether this was still true a decade later cannot be answered directly by the *CPRS 2002*.

There is no need to rehearse in any detail the findings for Religiosity and Theocratism found in Appendix 4. Whilst it is the case that ANOVA detected significant between-groups differences ( $p = 0.002$  for Religiosity and  $p = <0.001$  for Theocratism), the patterns of distribution were the same. Regarding Religiosity, across all groups respondents tended to fall into either the "in between" or "devout" sectors. Conservative politicians in 2002 tended to be somewhat if not always fervently religious.

Regarding Theocratism, in every group a majority of respondents fell into the "in between" sector. However, there were differences either side with, in particular, Peers and MPs notably more inclined towards the "theocrat" category than the others. In other words, there was a tendency for members of all of groups of politicians to believe that there was at least *some* role for religion in public life.

It might be argued somewhat cynically that the finding that more respondents tended to fall into the "secularist" category of the Theocratism scale than the "sceptic" category of the Religiosity scale should

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<sup>485</sup> Conservative Christian Fellowship, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2001.

<sup>486</sup> Conservative Party, 2001[a]: 18-19.

<sup>487</sup> e.g. Gledhill, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2000; Parris, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2000; Webster, 1<sup>st</sup> November 2000; and see for example Wilson, 25<sup>th</sup> January 2001.

<sup>488</sup> Gledhill, 25<sup>th</sup> September 2000; Bates, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2000.

<sup>489</sup> Gledhill & Webster, 16<sup>th</sup> January 2001; Montgomerie, 24<sup>th</sup> January 2001.

<sup>490</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1992; 1994.

come as no surprise. The latter is “merely” about personal religious beliefs and practices. The former says something about political power, and implicitly the sharing of political power with others.

Comparison can be made of levels of religious belief between the near-contemporaneous English general public and their closest matches amongst *CPRS 2002* respondents, ELCs. The self-completion part of the 1998 *British Social Attitudes* survey<sup>491</sup> included identical items from the Theocratism scale and two of the three items from the Religiosity scale. To make the comparison as close as possible, as well as only using *BSA* respondents who lived in England only those respondents aged between 24 and 81 inclusive—the same age range as ELC respondents—were included.

Regarding Theocratism, the proportion of those members of the general public falling into the “theocrat” category was little different from ELCs: 6% (out of 491 valid cases) against 8% of ELCs. The difference was that an appreciably larger proportion of the English general public fell into the “secularist” category: 46% against only 30% of ELCs. The comparison for Religiosity is more difficult because there was a “missing” item from the *BSA* survey. However, a tentative analysis suggests that members of the general public were less devout than ELCs. In short, the English general public at the time tended to be less religious in both senses of the term used in this chapter compared to ELCs.

(As an aside, see Spencer<sup>492</sup> for arguments in a UK-specific if not Conservative-specific context for the active engagement of religion in public life. The publishers of this report, Theos, also commissioned research by Communicate Research<sup>493</sup> some years after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork which suggested that public opinion in the UK was on balance favourable to religion having a say in public life in the UK with a majority (58% against 37%) agreeing that “On balance, religion is a force for good in society”.)

## Considered Together

Having looked at Religiosity and Theocratism individually, to what extent were they correlated? Was it usually the case that strong personal religious views carried over into a desire to see religion and religious institutions play a role in public life or can we see evidence for some belief in a “separation of church and state” even amongst the personally devout?

A series of bivariate analyses was run between the two scales, broken down by group of respondent. As might be expected, the small numbers in some of the groups lessened the chances of obtaining statistically significant results (assuming a correlation in the first place). Nevertheless, using the Pearson statistic there was a one-tailed significant correlation at the 5% level or better in the anticipated “more Religious = more Theocratic” direction in the case of the four largest groups of ELCs, Peers, MPs and SLCs.

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<sup>491</sup> NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[b].

<sup>492</sup> Spencer, 2006,

<sup>493</sup> Communicate Research, 2006.

Table 10.1 displays a cross-tabulation of the two variables for ELCs only since this was only group large enough not to violate the assumptions of the chi<sup>2</sup> test.

		Religiosity				
		Sceptic	In between	Devout	Base	Total
Theocratism	Secularist	51%	33%	18%	81	31%
	In between	45%	63%	69%	164	62%
	Theocrat	4%	4%	13%	20	7%
Base		49	116	100	265	100%
Total		100%	100%	100%		

The results are in the direction that would be expected with “sceptic” views tending to be associated with “secularist” ones and the association is statistically significant: one-tailed  $p = 0.001$ .

However, there are two points of interest that might be seen as the mirror image of each other. The first is that by falling into the Theocratism’s “in between” category, nearly half (45%) of all those identified as religious “sceptics” nevertheless believed that religion should have at least some role in public life. On the other hand, relatively few (13%) identified as “devout” held that religion should have a prominent role in public life. Indeed, slightly more (18%) religiously “devout” fell into the “secularist” category.

At the “extremes”, out of the 265 valid cases 25 (9% of the total) fell into the “sceptic/secularist” cell indicating little or no personal religious beliefs and an opposition to religion having a say in public life. Only 13 (5% of the total) fell into the “devout/theocrat” cell indicating strong personal religious beliefs and support for religion having a say in public life. Rather endearingly, the most populated cell was the one in the middle, “in between” along both dimensions, which held 73 (28% of the total) respondents.

## **CONFESSONAL AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND**

Almost all (82%) of ELCs came from an Anglican or Episcopal background, with a minority coming from non-Anglican Protestant (8%) or Roman Catholic (5%) backgrounds. (It is not the place here to engage in any discussion about whether the Anglican Church is “Protestant” or “Catholic” or something between or even unique.<sup>494</sup>) Only 4%—a small number of Jews and those who said that they had no religious or confessional background—stated that they came from an explicitly non-Christian

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<sup>494</sup> Graaf & Need, 2000: 121.

background. (The predominance of Anglicans was also a feature of MPs at the time, particularly amongst Conservative MPs.<sup>495</sup>)

To put this into context, the 2001 National Census<sup>496</sup> indicated that “only” about 72% of the population in England regarded themselves as Christians of any sort against no less than 96% of *CPRS 2002* respondents. Given that most non-Christians tended to live in urban areas at the time<sup>497</sup> and that this was where the Conservative Party was weakest, there are simple geographic reasons for this difference without having to suggest anti-minority prejudice on the part of candidate selection panels.

The Census figures suggest that the 1% of ELCs who came from a Jewish background accurately reflected the position of Jews in England at the time in terms of both their numbers in the population<sup>498</sup> and their increasing post-Second World War support for the Conservative Party. (It also goes beyond the scope of this work to discuss any distinction between “Jew” *qua* religion and *qua* race.) This was something that had not happened amongst other, more recent racial minority groups which tended very strongly to back the Labour Party.<sup>499</sup> Given the geographical distribution of non-Anglo-Saxon Christians vis-à-vis electoral support for the Conservatives, this in fact suggests—tentatively, since the numbers in absolute terms are so small—an “over-representation” of Jews amongst ELCs. Perhaps this should not be a surprise. Looking back a few years, Margaret Thatcher’s preference for Jews, including some of her closest advisors, has been commented upon.<sup>500</sup> Although he tended to play down his background,<sup>501</sup> Michael Howard, who would take over the Party leadership from Iain Duncan Smith, was born to a father named Bernat Hecht.

The absolute numbers were very small, but it would seem that Roman Catholics amongst ELC respondents were markedly more religious in both senses used here. 60% of them fell into Religiosity’s “devout” category against 40% of their Anglican colleagues. 27% of them fell into Theocracy’s “theocrat” category against only 5% of their Anglican colleagues. T-tests indicated that these were statistically significant findings, with two-tailed  $p = 0.026$  and  $p = 0.002$  for Religiosity and Theocracy respectively. However, despite good reason to think that there might be similar significant differences along what might be regarded as some of the *CPRS 2002*’s “core” dimensions such as Europeanism,<sup>502</sup> Left-Right<sup>503</sup> and Authoritarianism,<sup>504</sup> this was not found to be the case. In other words, Catholics were

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<sup>495</sup> Brivati & Baston, 2002: 8.

<sup>496</sup> National Statistics, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2004; O’Beirne, March 2004: 6.

<sup>497</sup> Meek, May 2003: 8.

<sup>498</sup> National Statistics, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2004.

<sup>499</sup> Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001: 651 & 660.

<sup>500</sup> King, 2002: 446; Riddell, 27<sup>th</sup> February 2009.

<sup>501</sup> Roth, October 2004: 364.

<sup>502</sup> Boyes, 6<sup>th</sup> June 2003; Allen, 1<sup>st</sup> April 2005; Grennan, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2001; Nelson, Guth & Fraser, 2001; North, 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2009; Deloy, 21<sup>st</sup> September 2003.

<sup>503</sup> Glasman, 1996; Malcolm, 1996: 56; Meek, 2003.

<sup>504</sup> Browne, 28<sup>th</sup> October 2004.



more religious but based on a handful of specimen variables this did not follow through into differences in other attitudes.

## THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH

Although it is often referred to as such, the Church of England has never been officially ‘established’ since its creation in 1534. It is simply part of the same organisation as the Crown. A brief history of the Church of England can be found on its website.<sup>505</sup> For various reasons, the Church was disestablished in Ireland in 1871, in Wales in 1920 and was never established in Scotland.<sup>506</sup> The Church of Scotland is the national church of Scotland as guaranteed in the *Act of Union* of Scotland and England of 1707, but is not established like the Church of England and is “free... from civil interference in spiritual matters” unlike the Church of England.<sup>507</sup> Both the Church of Ireland and the Church in (*sic*) Wales have been independent members of the Anglican Communion since Disestablishment.<sup>508</sup>

Table 10.2 displays the responses to a single item in the questionnaire, originally using a five-point Likert-type response set, “There should no longer be an Established Church in any part of Britain”.

	ELCs	SLCs	WLCs	Peers	MPs	MEPs	MSPs
Agree	17%	36%	32%	30%	19%	54%	36%
Neither/nor	14%	9%	7%	15%	15%	0%	21%
Disagree	69%	55%	61%	55%	66%	46%	43%
Base	280	47	28	60	52	13	14

It can be seen that generally there was opposition to Disestablishment. Amongst all groups of local councillors, Peers and MPs a majority were opposed and amongst MSPs a plurality were. Only MEPs were marginally in favour. Given the Conservative Party’s *historic* connection to the Established Church these results should come as no surprise.

The number of Roman Catholics amongst ELC respondents was too small to allow for detailed analysis. Nevertheless, of the 15 who responded to this item in the questionnaire 40% agreed to some degree against only 14% of those who identified their confessional background as Anglican. 33% Catholics disagreed with the item against 75% Anglicans. Again, there might be little surprise at the relatively high proportion of Catholics who disagreed with their constitutional situation. On the other hand, a third of the admittedly small group of Catholic respondents were not unhappy with the situation.

<sup>505</sup> Church of England, 2004.

<sup>506</sup> Baldwin, 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2002.

<sup>507</sup> Church of Scotland, c. 2006a & 2006b.

## **RELIGIOSITY, THEOCRATISM AND ENGLISH LOCAL COUNCILLOR SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES**

In Chapter 4 looking at ELC socio-demographics it was found that there was no significant correlation between age and either Religiosity or Theocracy. What about the other major measures used in the *CPRS 2002*: sex, marital status, level of formal education, type of school attended and the nature of the area that they represented?

Analysis indicated not a single statistically significant association between any of these measures and either Religiosity or Theocracy. This goes against some literature dealing with the British general public in the past,<sup>509</sup> but the findings stand. In short, the “type” of person that a respondent was, at least amongst ELCs, predicted no meaningful difference in religious attitudes and beliefs.

## **RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS PREDICTORS OF OTHER ATTITUDES AMONGST *CPRS 2002* RESPONDENTS**

### **A Note about Causality**

Before proceeding, a few words need to be said about temporal causality<sup>510</sup> and these religion-based variables. First, of course, must be repeated the usual mantra that “correlation doesn’t mean causation”.

However, if there are causal relationships, it is intuitively probable that in any significant correlation between Theocracy and/or Religiosity and another attitudinal scale it is the religion-based variable that precedes the other in time. It seems unlikely that views about (say) economics, taxation and welfare lead one to believe (or not) in God. It is, however, much more plausible that considerations of God and accompanying religious teachings might well lead someone to views about what makes up a “just” society regarding (say) economics, taxation and welfare. In other words, that there is clear direction to any causal relationship. This is one of the reasons that Religiosity and Theocracy are singled out for special treatment compared to most of the other multi-item scale.

As always, there may be exceptions to this temporal causality and, indeed, one might have been found in the following analysis.

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<sup>508</sup> Anglican Communion, 2004.

<sup>509</sup> e.g. Schweisguth, 1995: 339.

<sup>510</sup> Jary & Jary, 1991: 62-63.

## Multivariate Analysis

Rather than take up a great deal of space with exploratory bivariate analysis broken down by group of respondent, multivariate analysis was proceeded with directly by using regression analysis. One at a time each of the usual range of scales was treated as the dependent variable with all the other scales and dummy variables for the groups of respondents treated as putative explanatory variables.

Returning to the question of whether religious beliefs as measured by the two dimensions had any predictive power regarding other attitudes measured by the *CPRS 2002*'s range of then looking at the results the answer must be "not really." In the cases of Europeanism, Intra-Party Elitism, Intra-Party Inclusivity, Optimism, Political Elitism, Postmaterialism, Pride in the Way Nation Functions, Protectionism, Traditional British Liberties and Xenophobia neither Religiosity nor Theocracy remained in the final, significant model.

Table 10.3 displays the results for those scales where either—but in fact never both—Religiosity or Theocracy remained in the final model. All of the figures are based upon the adjusted  $R^2$  figure from the regression analysis.

Scale	Religiosity	Theocracy	Total of all variables	Base
Authoritarianism	2%	0%	47%	321
Environmentalism	5%	0%	17%	321
Feminism	0%	1%	21%	321
Left-Right	1%	0%	17%	321
Pride in Heritage & Culture	1%	0%	15%	321
Religiosity	n/a	12%	25%	321
Theocracy	12%	n/a	25%	321
Welfarism	2%	0%	32%	321

Excluding each other as might have been expected, in no case did either Religiosity or Theocracy appear as significant predictors accounting for even 10% of the variation in the dependent variable being tested.

In only one other case was Theocracy present at all as a significant predictor in a regression model. This was in the case of Feminism where it was the fifth (out of sixth) strongest predictive variable accounting for just 1% (out of a total power of the model of 21%) of the variation in Feminism. Detailed analysis indicated that Theocracy was positively associated with patriarchal attitudes. That those who wished to see religion play a strong role in public life had traditionalist views about the place of women in

society probably comes as no surprise.<sup>511</sup> In short, beliefs about the influence that religion should have on public life had little impact on what that “public life” should be doing or not doing when other attitudes were taken into account.

Religiosity appeared more frequently as an element of other predictive models. However, with one exception this was also at a trivial, if significant level.<sup>512</sup> It contributed 1% (out of 17%) towards predicting the Left-Right dimension, with Religiosity positively associated with economic right-wing attitudes. It also contributed 2% (out of a substantial 47%) towards predicting Authoritarianism and Religiosity was positively associated with authoritarian attitudes.

Although marginal, these results make sense and can be plausibly explained. The connections between strong religious views and support for free-market economics (the Left-Right dimension) and/or socially conservative or traditionalist views (the Authoritarianism dimension) have certainly been demonstrated in the USA.<sup>513</sup> In the UK, regarding the former of these issues, senior Christian Conservatives have argued that there is no incompatibility between Christianity and support for a free-market economic system.<sup>514</sup> Regarding the latter of these issues, critics of the Conservative Party have certainly claimed a connection between strong religious views and traditionalist views on issues such as homosexuality.<sup>515</sup>

In the light of some of the preceding, that Religiosity was a significant predictive variable for Welfarism, contributing 2% (out of 32%) to the model may come as a surprise. This is because Religiosity, perhaps surprisingly if one believes the “nasty party” hypothesis noted near the start of this study, was positively associated with welfarist attitudes. However, within the context of the British Conservative Party and British Christianity there has been a counter-argument that “a permissive, consumerist, competitive, market-orientated liberalism seems to undermine central Christian ideas of solidarity and community”.<sup>516</sup> As such, there has existed within British conservatism a religiously-derived ethic that individuals should be protected to some degree against possible negative outcomes of free-market economics.<sup>517</sup> Indeed, it has been stated the Christian Conservative Fellowship was in part formed in 1990 to “reignite the party’s compassion.”<sup>518</sup>

Therefore it is not too surprising that those with stronger religious belief were more inclined to support state provision of welfare. In short, it could be argued that, at least amongst *CPRS 2002* respondents, holding stronger religious beliefs was associated with support for free-market economics but also the view that those who “fell through the cracks” should be supported by the taxpayer via the state.

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<sup>511</sup> e.g. Clarkson, 1994; Gledhill, 19<sup>th</sup> April 2000.

<sup>512</sup> Gibbins & Reimer, 1995: 320.

<sup>513</sup> e.g. Laythe, Finkel & Kirkpatrick, March 2001; Brittan, 27<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>514</sup> Mawhinney, 1999: 288-229.

<sup>515</sup> Williams, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>516</sup> McLellan, 1997: 172.

<sup>517</sup> Greenleaf, 1983: 196-262.

Religiosity also contributed 1% (out of 15%) towards the predictive model for Pride in National Heritage and Culture, with Religiosity positively associated with higher levels of national pride. It might be conjectured that here can be seen evidence of an inner conflict within the Conservative Party between what one conservative writer termed “brutalist counting-house Toryism”<sup>519</sup> on the one hand and on the other a belief in “The conservation of what remains of rural England is the assertion of cultural references and national definition. What more important task can there be for a Conservative Party?” It is with this in mind, along with the “faith and flag” tradition within the Party<sup>520</sup> recently represented by the Cornerstone Group<sup>521</sup> of socially conservative or traditionalist Conservative MPs formed a while after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork, that the finding regarding Pride in National Heritage and Culture can be plausibly explained.

## Religiosity and Environmentalism

There was one dimension where the role of religious belief was less trivial. Religiosity accounted for 5% (out of 17%) of the predictive power of the model and was the second most powerful (out of four) predictive variable of variation in Environmentalism. Bivariate analysis indicated that stronger religious beliefs were positively correlated with holding pro-green beliefs. Again, this can be plausibly explained.

Using the terms of the ongoing debate, a plausible argument can be made that the more religious respondents came down on the “stewardship” view of modern Christian thinking vis-à-vis the environment rather than the “dominion” view.<sup>522</sup> It should be noted that there is no reason to think that this explanation might not apply to others. For example, it might be offered it as an explanation if a similar survey of Labour politicians also found a link between stronger religious beliefs and having more green attitudes.

It was noted above of the likelihood of the religion-derived variables—inasmuch as there was any significant correlation let alone claimed causation—temporally preceding the more mundane ones. It might be argued that of all the other variables analysed Environmentalism was one where “earthly” values—literally in this case—could attain a transcendent quality. It is not the place here to discuss whether or not the modern environmentalist movement is some kind of ersatz religion.<sup>523</sup> However, there is a respectable body of literature on, for example, pantheism that holds that “the Universe as a whole is worthy of the deepest reverence, and that only the Universe and Nature are worthy of that degree of

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<sup>518</sup> Cook, 12<sup>th</sup> February 2010.

<sup>519</sup> Lovibond, 2006: 24-25.

<sup>520</sup> Tempest, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2005.

<sup>521</sup> Cornerstone Group, 2009.

<sup>522</sup> Santmire, 1985: 1-9; Gore, 1992: 243-244.

<sup>523</sup> A formal ruling by a UK Employment Appeals Tribunal in November 2009 seemed to suggest that it was exactly that. See for example Adams & Gray, 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2009.

reverence".<sup>524</sup> But given the nature of *CPRS 2002* respondents in terms of confessional background and so on this is probably unlikely to be the case here.

## CONCLUSION

The findings in this chapter generally bear out what has been argued for some time.<sup>525</sup> That whilst many thinkers have argued for some essential connection between conservatism and religion, and that there is indeed a tradition of British conservative thought on religion that emphasises in particular original sin and the moral imperfection of human nature, there is also a tradition much more latitudinarian, Deist or simply secular and humanist.

As such, it is not surprising that the most comprehensive near-contemporaneous document of the Conservative Party's beliefs, its 2001 General Election manifesto<sup>526</sup>, contains virtually no mention of religious matters. All that it does contain are a few comments about religious freedom and tolerance<sup>527</sup> and, perhaps more significantly given the association between Religiosity and Welfarism noted above, the pledge that "churches and other faith communities"<sup>528</sup> would be allowed to set up schools. There was not a single mention of Christianity as such.

That said, nor was there in either the Labour (2001) or Liberal Democrat (2001) manifestos.<sup>529</sup> The same word of caution applies to much of this chapter. For example, it has been seen that there was some admittedly generally weak evidence for the continuing impact of religious beliefs on more secular issues. Another survey done at the same time might have been able to examine, for example, whether or not it was reasonable to talk of the continuing influence of "Christian socialism" amongst Labour Party politicians.<sup>530</sup>

Conservative politicians in 2002 were quite personally religious as measured by the Religiosity dimension. However, as measured by the Theocratism dimension this did not *strongly* translate into a desire to see a role for religious institutions in public life and even less so as measured by the other dimensions into much of the way of religion-informed beliefs. Respondents were some way from being "American style" Christian Reconstructionists.<sup>531</sup> Taken as a group, these Conservative politicians could not be described as "fundamentalist".<sup>532</sup> Where, however, religious views were significantly associated with attitudes towards other issues, they were in a predictable or plausibly explained direction.

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<sup>524</sup> Harrison, 2004: 1.

<sup>525</sup> Quinton, 1978: 9-11.

<sup>526</sup> Conservative Party, 2001[b].

<sup>527</sup> Conservative Party, 2001[b]: 31-33.

<sup>528</sup> Conservative Party, 2001[b]: 9.

<sup>529</sup> Labour Party, 2001; Liberal Democrats, 2001.

<sup>530</sup> e.g. Amber & Haslam, 1980; Thomas, 2005.

<sup>531</sup> Brinkley, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2006.

<sup>532</sup> Bealey, 1999: 140.

# CHAPTER 11: THE PARTY-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

## THE “WHERE” OF POLITICS

The *CPRS 2002* questionnaire contained a number of items concerned with the conduct and purpose of politics rather than attitudes towards issues and themes. Most of these were stand-alone items not specifically intended to form parts of multi-item scales.

That said, some of the scales set out in Appendix 3 were be of a similar nature, most notably Political Elitism which says nothing about what “power” does but where respondents believe that it ought to reside. However, this is not covered again here.

There were also items concerning attitudes towards the powers of the various institutions overtly legislating in 2002 and it is with these that this chapters starts.

## THE LOCUS OF POWER BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

### Power and Responsibilities

Respondents were asked, “Relative to the present situation, what should be done about the powers of the following institutions?” followed by a list of institutions and a five-point “Increased a lot” to “Decreased a lot” Likert-type response set. The institutions were the Westminster Parliament, European Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly, Greater London Assembly, principal local authorities and parish/town councils.

“Power” was meant in the everyday sense of the legislative powers of the various institutions rather than in any more philosophic sense.<sup>533</sup> This battery of items relied on a subjective “feel” for the institutions and their powers rather than relying on the expectation of a possibly unreasonable level of detailed, objective knowledge. Also implicit was the understanding that any desired change must be at least partly relative to the other institutions except in those cases where an increase or decrease was desired amongst all the institutions.

It is not clear that contemporary politicians of any of the major parties grasped these issues. For example, commentators in Scotland noted that the major parties were still campaigning at the 2001 general election

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<sup>533</sup> Jary & Jary, 1991: 490-492.

as if devolution had not happened. They often argued about issues such as education, crime and healthcare that would have to wait until the 2003 Scottish parliamentary elections.<sup>534</sup>

The least surprising finding was that in every case where there was a direct comparison members of an institution were the most inclined to want increased powers for that institution rather than leaving things as they were or decreasing them. Peers (53%) and particularly MPs (88%) most favoured increased power for the Westminster Parliament, MEPs (64%) for the European Parliament, MSPs (36%) for the Scottish Parliament and ELCs (71%) for principal local authorities. This was also true for the tiny number of respondents sitting in the Welsh and Greater London Assemblies, where both AMs and all four GLAs wanted to see their institutions possess increased powers.

Being in power in the institution was not the issue. For example, ELCs, many of whom would have sat as members of the ruling party in their local authorities, wanted increased powers for local authorities but so did Conservative MPs at Westminster who were in opposition at the time.

### The Institutions Compared

By looking across the results it can also be seen which institutions were generally held in esteem by respondents and which were not. This was done by subtracting the proportion of those who wanted to see a decrease in the powers of an institution from the number who wanted to see an increase. A positive figure indicates an overall desire to see powers increased and a negative figure an overall desire to see powers decreased. The middle “Stay the same” option was retained in this calculation since omitting it exaggerates reported opinion.

TABLE 11.1: NET DESIRE TO SEE INCREASE OR DECREASE IN POWERS OF INSTITUTIONS							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Westminster Parliament	25	48	87	17	8	43	0
European Parliament	-75	-41	-58	-79	-64	50	-43
Scottish Parliament	-45	-59	-34	-21	-46	-14	29
Welsh Assembly	-41	-38	-29	-23	-29	-21	25
Northern Ireland Assembly	-27	-28	-16	-5	-39	-7	25
Greater London Assembly	-48	-53	-52	-20	-59	-14	-8
Principal local authorities	66	26	63	40	52	64	-8
Parish/town councils	47	35	58	48	37	36	8

Note: Since these represent 56 separate calculations no bases are presented

<sup>534</sup> Butler & Kavanagh, 2002[b]: 114.



It can be seen from Table 11.1 that the institutions tended to break down into those where there was general support for increased powers—the Westminster Parliament and both principal and parish/town councils—and those where there was general support for decreased powers—all of the others except in the expected like-for-like instances noted above. MSPs stand out as being somewhat unusual in their coolness towards Westminster and their warmth towards the other Celtic devolved institutions in Wales and Northern Ireland but not of the “English” devolved body of the Greater London Assembly.

In short, there was support for what might be thought of as the traditional institutions at Westminster and also at a local level, but a general if not universal antipathy towards what were at the time the newer institutions in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London. This theme is also discussed in Chapter 8 that looks at aspects of national identity.

The Conservatives were opposed to the creation of the Scottish and the Welsh bodies, generally campaigning for a “No” result in the referenda in 1997.<sup>535</sup> This stance changed by the time of the Greater London Authority referendum in 1998<sup>536</sup> although this seems to have had little impact on the reported attitudes of respondents.

### **Whatever happened to “Rolling back the frontiers of the state”?**

... as a young William Hague (amongst others) once said.<sup>537</sup> A notable finding from this battery of items was that so many respondents were happy to see the powers of at least some of these institutions remaining the same or even increased. Amongst these, however, were there any respondents who wanted to see a *total* reduction of “state power” as demonstrated by a desire to see the powers and presumably responsibilities of *every* level of government reduced, from the might of the “EU Directive” to the maintenance of the village clock?<sup>538</sup>

Indeed there were. *Three* out of 505 valid respondents. One Peer and two WLCs.

## **REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER**

Using data<sup>539</sup> to calculate the electorate-to-MP ratio at the 2001 general election it can be demonstrated that Scotland and Wales were noticeably over-represented in the UK parliament compared to England. Each MP from Scotland and Wales represented between 55,000 and 56,000 electors whereas each MP from England represented almost 70,000 electors. This had been a reoccurring issue in British politics for

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<sup>535</sup> Brown, 11<sup>th</sup> September 1997; Donegan, 19<sup>th</sup> June 1997; MacAskill, White & Donegan, 12<sup>th</sup> September 1997; Travis, 10<sup>th</sup> October 1997.

<sup>536</sup> *BBC News*, 9<sup>th</sup> April 1998.

<sup>537</sup> Utley, 20<sup>th</sup> June 1997.

<sup>538</sup> Cheshire County Council, 1999; National Association of Local Councils, 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008.

some time, particularly since the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly with their differing powers (itself a subject of debate <sup>540</sup>). It was noted that this over-representation of Scots and Welsh MPs at Westminster was arguably compounded by the fact that England continued to be ruled—excepting, of course, those increasing areas covered by membership of the EU<sup>541</sup>—by a UK-wide parliament unlike Scotland, Wales and, in an erratic fashion, Northern Ireland.<sup>542</sup>

This is also connected with the “West Lothian question”, and was troubling to many in England who felt aggrieved at the situation where Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster could vote on matters that did not affect their own constituents.<sup>543</sup>

With a view to looking at these issues there was a stand-alone item that asked respondents to choose from four options concerning the level of Scottish and Welsh representation in the House of Commons at Westminster. The two “extreme” options of “Scotland and Wales should continue to return a relatively larger number of MPs to Westminster than England” and “Scotland and/or Wales should become independent countries” were chosen by almost no respondents.

Instead, respondents were split between the two “middle” options of “The number of Westminster MPs returned by Scotland and Wales relative to England should be brought in line with their population” and “Scotland and Wales should return a proportionately smaller number of MPs to Westminster than England, commensurate with the autonomy of their devolved institutions”. Furthermore, and just “in words”, the mainly English respondents of ELCs and MPs were relatively if not absolutely more inclined to want to see taken into account the reality of the powers of the devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales. This was an area that would take on a concrete form shortly after the *CPRS 2002* where Scottish MPs allowed the Labour government to win a number of Commons votes that did not affect Scotland.<sup>544</sup> On the other hand, respondents from in particular Scotland wanted to see a less sophisticated arithmetical calculation and one might argue that this was a case of wanting to have their cake and eating it too.

## **WHY BECOME A POLITICIAN?**

### **Types of Reason**

In this battery of ranked items respondents were prompted with “The following are some of the reasons why people decide to become politicians. Which for you is the MOST important? And the NEXT MOST

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<sup>539</sup> Austin & Hames, 2001: 296.

<sup>540</sup> Melding, 14<sup>th</sup> August 2000.

<sup>541</sup> Kamall, November 2008.

<sup>542</sup> Curtice & Heath, 2000: 155-156.

<sup>543</sup> Hughes, 13<sup>th</sup> November 2000; Hurst, 8<sup>th</sup> March 20002.

<sup>544</sup> Lynch, October 2004: 387.

important? And the LEAST important?" There was the assumption that this would elicit an autobiographical response rather than a more general one.

The wording of the three options was, "As someone concerned with social change or the promotion of certain beliefs", "As a representative of the electorate or public" and "As a necessary element within the machinery of stable, democratic government". These might be thought of as "ideological", "representational" and "constitutional" reasons respectively.

These three items were informed by Fenney.<sup>545</sup> However, it is not an exhaustive list. Crude self-interest might also be one reason.<sup>546</sup> Another might be a desire to seek out like-minded company.<sup>547</sup>

Only those who responded validly to all three parts of the item were counted. Looking at just the "Most important" reason, as can be seen in Table 11.2 there were differences between the types of respondent.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
As someone concerned with social change or the promotion of certain beliefs	27%	41%	64%	28%	26%	79%	62%
As a representative of the electorate or public	57%	19%	28%	65%	63%	21%	38%
As a necessary element within the machinery of stable, democratic government	16%	40%	8%	7%	11%	0%	0%
Base	272	53	50	46	27	14	13

Peers were different to MPs, MEPs and MSPs who in turn were different to local councillors. Peers were evenly split between the ideological and constitutional reasons—and were the only group who cited the latter reason in large numbers—with neither having a majority. MPs, MEPs and MSPs regarded the ideological reason as the most important, with a clear majority in each case opting for this. Local councillors primarily saw a career in politics as a representational calling.

Turning in words to the least important reason, either a plurality (ELCs and WLCs) or even an outright majority (MPs, SLCs, MEPs and MSPs) cited the constitutional reason as the least important. At least two reasons can be imagined. It might be because the concept of being "a necessary element within the machinery of stable, democratic government" was somewhat vague or high-flown compared to the other

<sup>545</sup> Fenney, 2000: 21.

<sup>546</sup> *The Telegraph*, 2009.

two. More optimistically, it could have been that respondents agreed with earlier writers such as Almond and Verba and believed that British democracy was anyway sufficiently secure.<sup>548</sup> As was noted, Peers were the exception. For them it was the representational reason that was the least important. Irrespective of their route into the House of Lords such as hereditary, appointee or former MP, given the unelected (by the general public) nature of the Lords this finding is not too surprising.

## Why?

Were there any attitudinal indicators about why someone cited either of the two most popular reasons for becoming a politician? In principle this can be analysed by creating two new binary variables indicating ideological/not ideological (the latter indicating those who cited either the representational or constitutional reasons) and representational/not representational (the latter indicating those who cited either the ideological or constitutional reasons).

There is, however, a problem because of what was detected in the preceding analysis: the strong influence of what group of politician respondents belonged to. Exploratory regression analysis (not shown here) with the entire dataset was conducted using these new binary variables and as the putative predictive variables the usual range of multi-item scales plus dummy variables for the type of respondent. In both cases these dummy variables featured heavily in the final model, particularly in the case of the ideological/not ideological item where they made up almost the entire model.

It is true that when a series of partial correlation analyses was conducted for these two binary items alongside the usual range of multi-item scales there were indeed significant associations at the two-tailed 5% level. However, it is clear that in this case what was of main importance about why respondents thought that people—whether or not themselves—became politicians was their representational level at the time of the survey.

## The Socio-Demographics of Local Councillors in England and “Idealism”

In Chapter 4 on ELC socio-demographics it was noted that most socio-demographic variables appeared to have little predictive power concerning attitudes. However, might they have had some association with “idealism” more generally, in this case as indicated by those who cited the ideological reason as being the most important? This particular regression analysis was re-run, but this time also using the range of socio-demographic items found in Chapter 4. The answer was “no” in any meaningful sense. Only one variable produced a significant (*sic*) model explaining 1% of the variability in this binary item.

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<sup>547</sup> Mulé, 1995: 291.

<sup>548</sup> Marquand, 2009: 155-156.

## ELECTIONS, PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

Within the context of a major aim of the *CPRS 2002* being a wide-ranging snapshot of attitudes of Conservative Party politicians, a number of stand-alone if sometimes related items relevant to this chapter were presented in the questionnaire. Because of the number of them they are reported in words with only the headline results for each item, only going into more detail where, for example, there was a substantial difference between some of the groups of respondents or an item seemed polarising. All items were presented alongside a five-point “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set.

*“There should be at least an element of proportional representation for general elections.”* There was a robust rejection of this idea, with only SLCs (55% disagreeing) and MEPs (64% disagreeing) displaying less than two-thirds disagreement to some degree. *“There should be at least an element of proportional representation for local authority elections.”* Here there was also robust disagreement with the item, with again only SLCs (49% disagreeing) and MEPs (54% disagreeing) displaying less than two-thirds disagreement to some degree.

Taking these two items together, there was strong support for the first-past-the-post system with even those involved in a proportional representational system offering support. With some notable exceptions<sup>549</sup> there was a long tradition of Conservatives arguing against proportional representation on principle even when it had benefited them electorally.<sup>550</sup> Nevertheless, historically and based upon other research of Conservative *supporters*,<sup>551</sup> it is perhaps surprising that respondents from Scotland and Wales in particular were not more favourably inclined towards proportional representation.<sup>552</sup> In the 2001 general election<sup>553</sup> the Conservatives gained 21% of the popular vote in Wales—putting them in second place behind Labour—but did not win a single Westminster seat. Similarly, they captured 16% of the popular vote in Scotland which was equal to the Liberal Democrats, but whereas the latter won 10 seats the Conservatives won only one.

On the other hand, aside from any principled objection to proportional representation there may have been reasons of overall self-interest. The first-past-the-post system had for years acted as a prop to the two main parties at the expense of the Liberal Democrats or other parties such as UKIP, the BNP and the Greens. In 1955 Labour and the Conservatives polled between them 91% of votes cast and in 1970 this was still 88%. But this fell progressively throughout the 1980s and 1990s reaching 68% by 2005.<sup>554</sup> And yet Labour or the Conservatives continued to secure often substantial overall majorities.

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<sup>549</sup> Holroyd-Doveton, 1996: 77.

<sup>550</sup> Fraser, August/September 2002.

<sup>551</sup> Curtice, Seyd, Park & Thomson, 2000.

<sup>552</sup> Broughton, 2003: 204.

<sup>553</sup> Austin & Hames, 2001: 296.

<sup>554</sup> Aaronovitch, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2010; Marquand, 2009: 154.

More dramatically, some commentators argued that any move towards proportional representation for Westminster elections represented a real threat to the existence of the Conservative Party.<sup>555</sup> This was particularly the case over the issue of “Europe” if both “pro” and “anti” wings thought that they could gather sufficient votes by themselves to satisfy any minimum threshold needed to win seats.

*“Local government is just as an appropriate arena for party politics as national government.”* This was a somewhat polarising item. A majority of all members of all groups agreed to some extent but often between a quarter and a third disagreed. Respondents from Scotland (SLCs 68% and MSPs 71% agreeing) and Wales (WLCs 71% agreeing) were the most “party political”. In 2002 they were also the most electorally beleaguered. It is possible that being in such a position fostered a “No compromise with the electorate”<sup>556</sup> attitude.

This might seem like a rather naive item considering recent political history and local government in the UK in the years leading up to 2002. Consider, for example, the so-called “loony left” phenomenon and local government in London and Liverpool in the 1980s.<sup>557</sup> Yet within living memory there was a tradition within the Conservative Party whereby candidates would often stand at local elections as, for example, Ratepayers, “to imply that, unlike the Labour Party, they were non-political”.<sup>558</sup> It also needs to be kept in mind that in 1979 two-party and three-party contests featured in only 41% and 17% respectively of wards although by 2002 local elections had become more competitive.<sup>559</sup> Many more experienced respondents, particularly ELCs, might have regarded “party politics” as just being opposed at all. It has also been argued that there was a major change after local government reorganisation in 1973 when much of “local government shifted from political control to managerial governance”.<sup>560</sup> This left local councillors with less of the “deadly dull but vitally important issues of council management” so that “they devoted more and more time to party political bickering”.

*“Local campaigning makes little difference these days compared to the overall impression of the national party.”* This was a polarising item, with groups often noticeably split with at least a third on the less populated pole and with few in between. Only WLCs (64% disagreeing) strongly looked towards local campaigning. Conservative local councillors in Wales were in an unusual position in 2002 and indeed historically. The objective truth of this item is not an issue here. However, a number of authorities, making use of data from general elections either side of the CPRS 2002 fieldwork have argued that local campaigning was certainly important to the overall performance of political parties.<sup>561</sup> For example, because successful local parties are more likely to have campaigning activists and parties in power locally

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<sup>555</sup> 6, 1998: 15.

<sup>556</sup> Stone-Lee, 1<sup>st</sup> October 2002.

<sup>557</sup> Tyler, 16<sup>th</sup> May 2006.

<sup>558</sup> Hutchings, 1999: 81.

<sup>559</sup> Rallings, Thrasher & Johnston, 2002: 284-285.

<sup>560</sup> North, 27<sup>th</sup> September 2008.

<sup>561</sup> Fisher & Denver, October 2008; Rallings, Thrasher & Johnston, 2002: 272.

are more likely to be visible to the local electorate and media and to be able to demonstrate their ability govern (or not).

*“Single-issue groups are now a better way than political parties of advancing causes.”* There was general disagreement with this notion, with half to two thirds of each group of respondents disagreeing. MEPs were less certain, with opinion evenly divided with about a third agreeing or disagreeing. To turn the findings around, however, a fair number of respondents were at least sceptical about whether conventional political parties were still the best way of advancing causes. The phenomenon of the reported rise of the influence of pressure groups as part of a general rise in participation in what was once labelled unconventional activity<sup>562</sup> was most frequently cited in the context of environmentalism and the impact of organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth whose influence was generally held to have been greater than the more conventional Green Party.<sup>563</sup> Accordingly, responses to this item alongside the Environmentalism scale were analysed. However, there was no significant correlation. Nor was there any correlation between this item and whether or not respondents cited “As someone concerned with social change or the promotion of certain beliefs” as being the most important reason for becoming a politician.

*“Political parties should be funded by the State and taxpayer rather than by individual donors, businesses, or unions.”* In every case at least a plurality disagreed with this idea. However, sizable minorities—often a quarter to a third—agreed with the proposition with all three groups of local councillors being the most receptive to the idea of state funding of political parties. This is an issue that never goes away. It was raised again around the time of the *CPRS 2002*<sup>564</sup> at least in part because of a decline in the subs-paying membership of the major parties—which is why some of the smaller parties such as UKIP were particularly opposed to the idea<sup>565</sup>—and as had certainly been the case with the Conservatives for some years.<sup>566</sup> At the time it was the position of the Conservatives to oppose any moves towards state funding of political parties<sup>567</sup> and this was explicitly stated by the then Chair of the Party, Theresa May<sup>568</sup> even though in the run-up to the 2001 general election the Conservatives were the poorer of the two main parties.<sup>569</sup>

*“The House of Lords should be replaced by a wholly or mainly elected second chamber.”* This item indicated considerable disagreement both within and between groups. Never less than a quarter identified with one or either of the poles. MEPs, MPs and MSPs (69%, 69% and 64% respectively agreeing to some degree) were the most supportive of such constitutional change with, predictably, Peers (72%

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<sup>562</sup> Topf, 1995[b]: 78.

<sup>563</sup> Matthews, 2008: 35; Sanders, 1997: 218.

<sup>564</sup> Hinsliff, 18<sup>th</sup> August 2002.

<sup>565</sup> Croucher, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2002.

<sup>566</sup> Conservative Party, 1998: 3; Watt, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2001.

<sup>567</sup> Fisher, October 2004: 409.

<sup>568</sup> Kite, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2002.

disagreeing) and, less predictably, WLCs (71% disagreeing) the least supportive. When House of Lords of reform was debated in the House of Commons in February 2003 it is a matter of record that Conservative MPs were split over the five options where the House divided.<sup>570</sup> 43% supported a fully elected second chamber. 49% supported one that was 80% elected. 34% supported one that was 60% elected. 40% supported one that was fully appointed. Only two Conservative MPs (1%) supported outright abolition. Amongst MP respondents to the *CPRS 2002* reported support for a wholly or mainly elected second chamber apparently diminished somewhat in the intervening year.

*“However a second chamber is elected or selected, it should always be subordinate to the House of Commons.”* In every case a plurality, and usually a majority, agreed with this idea. The responses from Peers were not markedly different from those of other groups. Taking this and the previous item together, amongst conservative commentators—amongst many others—there had long been debate about the relationship between the Commons and a second chamber, the position of hereditary peers and so on.<sup>571</sup> Although the question was put in a different way—and the respondents self-selecting—a consultation process initiated by the Lord Chancellor’s Department<sup>572</sup> also in 2002 suggested strong support for a second chamber that was wholly or mainly elected. This was also the position of Iain Duncan Smith after being elected as leader<sup>573</sup> and indeed MPs of all parties.<sup>574</sup> The consultation also indicated support for an increase in the powers of a second chamber however constituted.<sup>575</sup> In other words, Peers excepted, the opinions of Conservative politicians seemed to chime with those of the public in a desire for a substantially elected—as opposed to inherited or appointed—second chamber.

*“Britain should become a republic.”* The negative responses to this item suggested very strong support for the monarchy—in almost every group those not actively disagreeing were limited to one or two individuals—and historically this had long been the case within the Conservative Party.<sup>576</sup> Opinion polls around the same time found that this was also the case amongst the general public.<sup>577</sup>

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<sup>569</sup> Fisher, October 2004: 409.

<sup>570</sup> Cowley & Stuart, October 2004: 357-359.

<sup>571</sup> Heathcoat-Amory, 1998.

<sup>572</sup> Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2002: 16.

<sup>573</sup> Alderman & Carter, July 2002: 585; Duncan Smith, 13<sup>th</sup> January 2002.

<sup>574</sup> Perkins, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2002.

<sup>575</sup> Lord Chancellor’s Department, 2002: 37.

<sup>576</sup> Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994: 180.

<sup>577</sup> Doughty, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2001; Harris & Millar, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2002.



## TRUST IN PUBLIC LIFE

There was a further item looking at “trust”, a common theme in social research. This was “*Public life in this country is generally honest.*”

There was strong support for this belief with at least 70% agreeing to some degree. Although the results were marginal, local councillors (ELCs 80%, SLCs 70% and WLCs 71% agreeing) were relatively less sure than parliamentarians at a Westminster or European level (Peers 85%, MPs 92% and MEPs 85% agreeing). It cannot be said with certainty whether this item was measuring perceptions of their own and/or their immediate colleagues’ standards, those of the political level at which they operated or of the UK when compared to abroad.<sup>578</sup> That SLCs had the most jaundiced view of the probity of public life might have been anticipated given allegations of corruption in a number of areas in Scotland.<sup>579</sup>

Elections in Britain and the rest of the Western world were and are clearly qualitatively more honest than in many other parts of the world.<sup>580</sup> However, there has never been a time when the British public has fully trusted politicians, even at the height of the Second World War as indicated by a poll by Gallup in 1944. However, this tendency rose “inexorably” from the early 1990s and beyond under both Conservative and Labour governments.<sup>581</sup> Conservative politicians of the *CPRS 2002* generation must have had the often-alleged<sup>582</sup> impact of accusations of “Tory sleaze” engraved on their hearts;<sup>583</sup> the list of allegations against the Labour government even in the short time between 1997 and 2002 was already lengthening;<sup>584</sup> and there were concerns about the greater ease of postal voting introduced in 2000 and associated fraud, concerns which would multiply as the years went by.<sup>585</sup> Given this, that so many continued to believe in the probity of the conduct of public life was perhaps a little surprising. It is possible that they thought that many of these accusations were untrue or at least exaggerated by the media<sup>586</sup> or just “didn’t apply to them”.

The *British Social Attitudes* surveys provides a comparison with the public. In the 2004 survey<sup>587</sup> there was an item “Thinking of the last national election in Britain, how honest was it regarding the counting and reporting of the votes?” Of the 833 respondents to this item, only 7% thought that it was actively dishonest. In this respect, the public agreed with *CPRS 2002* respondents.

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<sup>578</sup> Rawnsley, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2002.

<sup>579</sup> Linklater, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2002.

<sup>580</sup> Topf, 1995[a]: 28.

<sup>581</sup> Thompson, 2008: 305.

<sup>582</sup> Sanders & Brynin, 1999: 223.

<sup>583</sup> Farrell, McAllister & Studlar, 1998: 92; Norton, 2002: 68.

<sup>584</sup> Dale & Fawkes, 2006.

<sup>585</sup> *BBC News*, 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2005; Electoral Reform Society, August 2007; Greenhill & Shipman, 4<sup>th</sup> May 2010.

<sup>586</sup> Marr & Major, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2006.

Of course, any study even faintly touching upon “trust in public life” that has been produced after the revelations about MPs’ expenses published by the *Daily Telegraph*<sup>588</sup> from May 2009 onwards must concede that responses to such items might latterly be very different. Unless, that it is, politicians of all sorts—and not just Westminster MPs—“just don’t get it”.

## A FORAY INTO SCALE BUILDING

The analyses within this report generally rely upon multi-item scales that either already existed or were created for the study. However, the items discussed in the previous sections of this present chapter were not designed to form part of any such scale. But did they nevertheless?

This was analysed by taking these items and running a confirmatory factor analysis using varimax rotation, with principal components extraction, with a maximum of 25 iterations, rotated factor solution, with only Eigenvalues over 1 extracted, and with absolute values less than 0.3 suppressed. All respondents, undifferentiated by group, were used.

There is little need to go into great statistical detail when reporting this necessarily speculative and possibly highly context-dependant analysis so it shall just be done “in words”. Most of the findings were to be expected. For example, the strongest factor (accounting for 21% of the variance between all variables) consisted mainly of the two obviously related ones about attitudes towards proportional representation at general and local elections. Similarly, the third strongest factor (accounting for 12% of the variance between all variables) mainly consisted of items concerned with attitudes towards the House of Lords and a second chamber.

However, there was also a less expected result that was of interest. This was the second factor (accounting for 13% of the variance between all variables) consisting entirely of the items concerning the effectiveness of single-issue groups and local campaigning. Bivariate analysis indicated a robust association between these two variables (using the whole dataset and the Pearson statistic, two-tailed  $p = <0.001$ ). Those who agreed that “Local campaigning makes little difference these days compared to the overall impression of the national party” also tended to agree that “Single-issue groups are now a better way than political parties of advancing causes”. It suggests the beginnings of a scale tapping into a view of the efficacy of local and/or participatory politics. In other words, some idea of agreeing or disagreeing with the view that politics in terms of influence and power was increasingly in the hands of people and organisations at some remove from ordinary citizens and even grass-roots activists of traditional mass-membership parties.

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<sup>587</sup> *British Social Attitudes Information System, 2009.*

<sup>588</sup> *The Telegraph, 2009.*

## CONCLUSION

Looking first at the powers of the various legislative bodies under study, there were three findings of note. First, and not too surprisingly, respondents tended to want a boost in the powers of the bodies in which they sat.

Next, with some unremarkable exceptions, the general trend was for respondents to have relatively little antipathy—as measured by a desire to reduce their powers—towards the more “traditional” bodies such as those at Westminster or local government level. It was the newer or less traditional bodies—the European Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly and Greater London Assembly—that they tended to want to “cut down to size”. This might speak of nationalism, particularly British nationalism vis-à-vis the European Parliament, but might also speak of just “conservatism” and a resistance to change.

The third major finding was that, on the face of it, there was little desire to reduce the power of such institutions *overall*.

Regarding the level of representation of Scots and Welsh at Westminster it is clear that respondents felt that something had to change in order to address the realities of the new institutions in Scotland and Wales and the numerical over-representation of Scots and Welsh at Westminster.

As to why people become politicians, there was a marked divide between parliamentarians of all sorts who tended to cite “ideological” reasons and local councillors who tended to cite “representational” reasons. It could be argued that parliamentarians viewed politics as acquiring power to implement ideological beliefs whereas local councillors viewed the profession of politics as representing the people *to* power. It was speculated that one of the reasons why the final proffered choice, the “constitutional” reason, was relatively infrequently cited was a belief in the enduring stability of British democracy.

The paragraphs looking at the array of stand-alone items will not be further discussed. However, of interest was the foray into scale building where it was speculated that there was some evidence for the beginnings of a scale tapping into a view of the efficacy of local and/or participatory politics.

## CHAPTER 12: THE 2001 CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP CONTEST

### A SHORT-LIVED VICTORY

In November 2003, after only 777 days as leader of the Conservative Party, Iain Duncan Smith was ejected from his position by a slim majority of MPs at Westminster.<sup>589</sup> The only candidate for the now-vacant post was Michael Howard who had come last in the MPs-only leadership ballot that followed John Major's resignation in 1997.<sup>590</sup> All those who had contested the 2001 leadership contest declined to stand again<sup>591</sup> and Michael Portillo took the opportunity to announce that he was standing down as an MP.<sup>592</sup> No other challenger came forward.<sup>593</sup> There was no confirmatory ballot of members which there had been in October 1997 when William Hague's election as leader by the Party's MPs had been confirmed 81% to 19% by the Party's general membership.<sup>594</sup> This time a ballot was not required under the Party's then rules since there was only one candidate.<sup>595</sup> Michael Howard became the Conservative Party's third leader in as many years. By then, the Conservative Party's first experiment in choosing a new leader via a direct and competitive democratic consultation of the ordinary membership seemed a long time ago.

### THE PARTY LEADERSHIP ELECTION OF 2001

Following the Conservative Party's defeat at the general election in June 2001 William Hague resigned as leader. This initiated a leadership contest, the first held under the new rules introduced by Hague in 1998 via the *Fresh Future* document. This allowed Party members other than Westminster MPs a formal say on the new leader through casting a deciding vote between two candidates who had survived what was in effect an MPs-only "primary".<sup>596</sup>

It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine in detail the background to the rules changes made during Hague's time as leader. However, it has been claimed that the "sexy" possibility of having a final vote between two candidates when choosing a future leader hid a marked centralisation in power within the Conservative Party. It has been argued that this lure was successfully used as an inducement in getting the Party's members to approve Hague's internal reforms by an overwhelming (96%) majority in a ballot

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<sup>589</sup> Hughes, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2003.

<sup>590</sup> Cowley & Stuart, 2003: 68.

<sup>591</sup> Brogan, 1<sup>st</sup> November 2003.

<sup>592</sup> Tempest, 7<sup>th</sup> November 2003.

<sup>593</sup> Gilmour, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2003.

<sup>594</sup> Kelly, 2003: 88.

<sup>595</sup> Cowley & Stuart, October 2004: 360.

<sup>596</sup> Conservative Party, 1998: 21; Alderman, 1999; Lees-Marshment & Quayle, April 2000; Quinn, 2005: 804.

in February 1998.<sup>597</sup> Nevertheless, this was some sort of move towards more direct membership participation in the running of the Party,<sup>598</sup> and one which, by the time of the later 2005 leadership contest Hague was publicly regretting.<sup>599</sup>

Five Conservative MPs entered the 2001 contest: Michael Ancram, Kenneth Clarke, David Davis, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Portillo. Kenneth Clarke was the only one of the five who had also stood during the leadership contest in 1997 when he had lost to William Hague. In that earlier contest he had led the first two stages but lost in the final round when virtually all of John Redwood's erstwhile support went to William Hague.<sup>600</sup>

Regarding the 2001 contest, precise details about who declared when and how they did it can be found elsewhere.<sup>601</sup> In brief, the first MPs-only round on the 10<sup>th</sup> July 2001 saw Portillo come out on top with 49 votes (30%), followed by Duncan Smith with 39 votes (23%), Clarke with 36 votes (22%) and finally Ancram and Davis with 21 votes (13%) each.

Since there was a tie for last position, all five candidates went through to the next round held on the 12<sup>th</sup> July 2001. The results were similar to those of the first round. Portillo again come out on top with 50 votes (30%), followed by Duncan Smith with 42 votes (25%), Clarke with 39 votes (23%), Davis with 18 (11%) and finally Ancram with 17 votes (10%). This resulted in the exclusion of Ancram with Davis voluntarily withdrawing soon after. Both then pledged their support to Duncan Smith.<sup>602</sup>

A third ballot took place on the 17<sup>th</sup> July 2001 between the remaining candidates. This produced a very close result with Clarke receiving 59 votes (36%), followed by Duncan Smith with 54 votes (33%) and lastly Portillo with 53 votes (32%).

This resulted in the exclusion of Portillo to the surprise of many commentators who had predicted a Portillo victory amongst MPs.<sup>603</sup> Accordingly, Duncan Smith and Clarke went forward to a final postal ballot of all Party members.<sup>604</sup>

This result was much less close. Duncan Smith received 155,933 votes (61%) against the 100,864 votes (39%) received by Clarke. Approximately 79% of eligible members voted. This was or would be more

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<sup>597</sup> Lees-Marshment & Quayle, April 2000; Kelly, 2003: 86-89 & 98; *The Telegraph*, 15<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>598</sup> Kelly, October 2004: 398-399.

<sup>599</sup> Bennett, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2005.

<sup>600</sup> Cowley & Stuart, 2003: 68.

<sup>601</sup> Conservative Party, September 2001; Alderman & Carter, 2002; Heppell & Hill, February 2010: 36-37.

<sup>602</sup> Alderman & Carter, 2002.

<sup>603</sup> Riddell, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>604</sup> Alderman & Carter, 2002.

than in the leadership elections of Tony Blair (Labour Party in 1994), Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrats in 1999) or Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats in 2006) and surpassed all previous party postal ballots. In winning by the margin that he did Duncan Smith secured a larger personal mandate from party members than Blair, Kennedy or Campbell in their respective parties' leadership elections<sup>605</sup> although not as large as David Cameron's 68% to 32% victory over David Davis in the Conservative Party's next *contested* leadership race in 2005.<sup>606</sup>

For the second time—first to Hague in 1997 and then to Duncan Smith in 2001—the allegedly more electorally appealing and certainly more politically experienced Clarke had lost to a less experienced candidate who was nevertheless more ideologically appealing to the Party if not necessarily to the wider electorate.<sup>607</sup>

## ISSUES DURING THE CONTEST

Throughout the leadership contest there was no shortage of opinion expressed, whether by the mass media via formal editorials, newspaper and other columnists, or the candidates themselves and their supporters and detractors. During the contest even the mass media had to concede that the old “labels” did not fit. Portillo was cited as an economic “Thatcherite” and yet was also now championing socially liberal policies. On the other hand, Clarke was seen as being on the Left because of his pro-EU views but had a track record in government of anti-trades unionism.<sup>608</sup>

Much commented upon was how the electorate perceived the Party. By the time of the contest, more “conservative” columnists were complaining that some senior Conservatives seemed to believe that the only reason that they had lost the 2001 general election was that they “didn't propose equal rights for serial cohabitant bisexual cocaine snorters”.<sup>609</sup> On the other hand, some of those who defended the Conservatives against charges of *actual* extremism argued that it often *sounded* abrasive and extreme.<sup>610</sup>

This led on to considerations that it was not just *what* one said that mattered but the *way* one said it and *who* said it. For example, at an early stage one commentator backed Clarke over Portillo on the grounds that the public was not that interested in Portillo's new-found social liberalism but in everyday matters such as healthcare, education and law and order. Clarke, it was argued, was able to deploy a form of language that the public understood.<sup>611</sup> Certainly, opinion polls at the time seemed to indicate that members of the public thought that out of the five candidates Clarke would do the best job of leading the

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<sup>605</sup> Conservative Party, September 2001; Hurst, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2006.

<sup>606</sup> *BBC News*, 6<sup>th</sup> December 2005.

<sup>607</sup> Heppell & Hill, April 2008: 89.

<sup>608</sup> Gove & Baldwin, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2001.

<sup>609</sup> Phillips, 1<sup>st</sup> July 2001.

<sup>610</sup> Glover, 11<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>611</sup> Osborne, 16<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

Party.<sup>612</sup> On the other hand, some supporters of Portillo argued that he should be backed because he was a man in the mould of Disraeli or Thatcher. He was someone “interesting”, unlike the previous leader William Hague or then rival Duncan Smith.<sup>613</sup> Clarke and his supporters argued that it was a contest between ideological dogma, i.e. that of his opponents and in particular Duncan Smith, or electoral pragmatism, i.e. that of himself.<sup>614</sup> Mixing the personal and political, some commentators, mistakenly assuming a final contest between Clarke and Portillo, argued that it would come down to whether some Conservatives were more “Europhobic” or “homophobic”.<sup>615</sup> As noted below, Clarke continued to believe this after the election. During the contest Portillo was certainly subjected to attack by sexual innuendo.<sup>616</sup> Portillo had gone public about his “homosexual experiences as a young person”<sup>617</sup> following his decision to stand for adoption as the Conservative candidate for the Kensington & Chelsea by-election that would see his return to Westminster.

Of course, the matter of the UK’s relationship with the EU could hardly be ignored. It had been an issue of remarkable saliency for Conservative Party internal debate for a great many years<sup>618</sup> if not always for the general public.<sup>619</sup> This was emphasised by the nature of some of the candidates, not least the “anti-Maastricht rebel” Iain Duncan Smith<sup>620</sup> as opposed to Kenneth Clarke, a supporter of the cross-party, pro-EU European Movement.<sup>621</sup>

It was also the case that the candidates measured up very differently in terms of their previous experience of political office,<sup>622</sup> a factor regarded by many as important.<sup>623</sup> Looking at the final two candidates, Clarke had been an MP since 1970 and had been Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1993 and 1997. On the other hand, Duncan Smith had first been elected an MP only in 1992 and was perhaps best known as a backbench “irritant” during John Major’s time as Prime Minister. Indeed, before becoming leader of the Party, Duncan Smith “had voted against his party’s whip five times more than his four predecessors [as leader] put together”.<sup>624</sup>

In amongst this were complex electoral issues that centred on the question of just how popular or unpopular the Party *really* was and hence its likely fortunes in the near future.<sup>625</sup> This in turn partly

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<sup>612</sup> Mortimore, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2001.

<sup>613</sup> Rees-Mogg, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>614</sup> *The Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>615</sup> Hames, 6<sup>th</sup> July 2001.

<sup>616</sup> Alderman & Carter, 2002: 579.

<sup>617</sup> *BBC News*, 9<sup>th</sup> September 1999.

<sup>618</sup> Burdett-Conway & Tether, 1997: 89-90; Cowley & Norton, 1999: 90.

<sup>619</sup> Baker, 2002: 321; Broughton, 2003: 208.

<sup>620</sup> Baker, 2002: 324-325.

<sup>621</sup> Baldwin, 15<sup>th</sup> May 2002; Tory Europe Network, c. 2002.

<sup>622</sup> Heppell & Hill, February 2010: 37.

<sup>623</sup> Garnett, 2003[a]: 49.

<sup>624</sup> Cowley & Stuart, 2004/2005: 25.

<sup>625</sup> Norris & Lovenduski, 2004: 86.

hinged on the answer to the long-running question of how accurately opinion polls were depicting levels of support for the various parties, and in particular whether the Conservatives were being sold short.<sup>626</sup> For example, on the same day in 2001 that the Party went down to a crushing general election defeat it made gains in English county council elections at the expense of both Labour and the Liberal Democrats and became the biggest party in English local government.<sup>627</sup> There was also the issue of the use of anti-Conservative tactical voting. This meant that given between them Labour and the Liberal Democrats received support from approximately 35% of the electorate against the Conservative's 19% the Conservatives had to "run to stand still" regarding the relationship between the proportion of the popular vote received and Westminster MPs returned.<sup>628</sup>

This chapter seeks to attenuate this "noise". In the end, what did members of the Conservative Party, or at least the *CPRS 2002*'s particular subset of it, have in mind when casting their vote?

## CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS AND THE 2001 LEADERSHIP CONTEST

A section of the *CPRS 2002* focused on the 2001 leadership contest. All respondents were asked who they did support (if they were MPs) or who they would have supported (for the other groups of respondents) at all three major stages of the leadership contest.

Most respondents reported that they voted at the final stage with only 5% to 10% in some groups saying that they did not although this rose to over a fifth (22%) in the case of Peers. In most cases (75%) non-voting was due to "technical" reasons such as not receiving a ballot paper or being out of the country rather than a "none of the above" abstention.

Tables 12.1a to 12.1c detail respondents' support—actual or would-be—at the major stages of the contest. No distinction was made between the first and second ballots that featured all five candidates. The figures for MPs can be compared to the actual voting behaviour of Westminster MPs noted above. It would appear that there was a modest under-representation of Clarke and Portillo supporters and possibly an over-representation of Duncan Smith supporters amongst *CPRS 2002* respondents. This may be real or as a result of the well-known tendency for the proportion of those claiming to have voted for the winner in a past election to be somewhat higher than the proportion who actually did.<sup>629</sup>

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<sup>626</sup> Glover, 9<sup>th</sup> February 2002; Worcester, 11<sup>th</sup> April 2010.

<sup>627</sup> Hetherington, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2001.

<sup>628</sup> Heathcoat Amory, 9<sup>th</sup> June 2001; Seldon & Snowden, 2001: 3; Tyrie, 2001: 4 & 29-30.

<sup>629</sup> Mortimore, 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2001.



	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Michael Ancram	9%	9%	17%	13%	15%	7%	14%
Kenneth Clarke	30%	37%	19%	36%	26%	29%	29%
David Davis	12%	7%	15%	15%	7%	14%	14%
Iain Duncan Smith	23%	19%	25%	23%	44%	21%	21%
Michael Portillo	18%	25%	25%	13%	7%	29%	21%
None of the above	8%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	275	59	48	47	27	14	14

Note: Only MPs had an actual vote at this stage

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Kenneth Clarke	34%	42%	33%	47%	35%	29%	50%
Iain Duncan Smith	43%	31%	43%	43%	61%	43%	29%
Michael Portillo	19%	24%	24%	8%	4%	29%	21%
None of the above	4%	3%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Base	278	59	49	47	26	14	14

Note: Only MPs had an actual vote at this stage

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Kenneth Clarke	44%	55%	41%	51%	30%	50%	67%
Iain Duncan Smith	54%	43%	59%	49%	70%	50%	33%
Deliberately spoiled the ballot paper	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	258	55	46	47	27	14	12

Note: This excludes those who were unable to vote for some reason

From these tables it can be seen that:

- In some cases there were considerable between-groups differences in expressed support.
- Kenneth Clarke's would-be support was relatively strong amongst MSPs, SLCs and Peers. At least initially, Clarke also had more support "out in the country" amongst local councillors than amongst his colleagues at Westminster who actually had a vote in the earlier stages.
- Iain Duncan Smith's support was remarkably strong amongst WLCs and—perhaps importantly as a possible indicator of grass-roots support in the Conservative Party's English heartland—to a lesser

degree amongst the two “English” groups of ELCs and MPs. (There was only one Westminster MP representing a non-English constituency).

- Michael Portillo’s support flat-lined from the beginning, not least amongst MPs, which meant that he was unable to progress to the final ballot of all members. Whilst attracting considerable initial support he was the second choice of very few. Why this was is open to speculation. Some have argued that many MPs were angered by his apparent disloyalty to William Hague. Others claimed that he had “re-engineered”<sup>630</sup> his beliefs rather dramatically between losing his seat in 1997 and re-entering parliament in 1999 and moreover it was not too clear what his new beliefs actually were.<sup>631</sup> In any case, he was notably unpopular amongst Scottish and above all Welsh local councillors.

## NEW CHOICES OF SUPPORTERS OF EXCLUDED CANDIDATES

The destination of support for excluded candidates can also be analysed. Table 12.2 describes the destination of the small number of former Ancram and Davis supporters.

	Ex-Michael Ancram supporters	Ex-David Davis supporters
Kenneth Clarke	50%	29%
Iain Duncan Smith	50%	57%
Michael Portillo	0%	14%
Base	8	7

From this table it can be seen that:

- Iain Duncan Smith was the gainer, receiving at least half of each excluded candidate’s former support amongst MPs.
- Kenneth Clarke was already loosing ground to Iain Duncan Smith inasmuch as the latter gained more support from former David Davis supporters.
- Michael Portillo was the clear loser, unable to gather much new support amongst MPs: little from former supporters of David Davis and none at all from former supporters of Michael Ancram.
- Former supporters of either of the two excluded candidates did not necessarily follow in lock step with those candidates’ declared support for Duncan Smith.

<sup>630</sup> Denham & O’Hara, July 2007: 180.

<sup>631</sup> Cowley & Stuart, 2003: 78; Walters, 2001.

The destination of former Michael Portillo supporters is shown in Table 12.3.

Kenneth Clarke	45%
Iain Duncan Smith	55%
Base	11

It can be seen that destination of former Portillo supporters was quite even.

## **DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE LAST THREE CANDIDATES**

### **All Three Candidates**

Returning to the penultimate stage, were there any differences between those who supported Kenneth Clarke, Iain Duncan Smith or Michael Portillo? This can be analysed following some of the methods of Cowley and Garry<sup>632</sup> in their analysis of the 1990 Conservative Party leadership contest eventually won by John Major.

A series of bivariate analyses were conducted identifying any significant differences or associations between those who supported a candidate and those who did not—i.e. who supported either of the other two candidates—and what those differences were.

Other techniques could have been used but the maximum base size of 52 made these impractical. Instead, the analyses were conducted using t-tests or the chi<sup>2</sup> statistic as appropriate using the full range of the *CPRS 2002's* multi-item scales and also items concerning the main challenger to their seat and the seat's perceived safeness (looking only at those who stated that it was either Labour or the Liberal Democrats). Only those variables where there was a significant difference or association at a two-tailed 5% level between supporters and non-supporters are reported in Tables 12.4a to 12.4c. In each case a line of explanation is provided.

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<sup>632</sup> Cowley & Garry, 1998.

Scale	Base	t	Two-tailed sig.	Greater support from those...
Feminism	49	-2.725	0.009	More in favour of female equality in society
Intra-Party Inclusivity	49	2.414	0.02	More in favour of advancing women etc. in the Conservative Party
Authoritarianism	49	-2.607	0.012	Less authoritarian
Theocratism	49	-2.249	0.029	More theocratic
Protectionism	47	2.828	0.007	Less protectionist
Pride in National Heritage & Culture	48	2.844	0.007	Less proud
Pride in the Way Nation Functions	49	3.169	0.003	Less proud
Safeness of seat	48	-3.416	0.002	With a safer seat

Scale	Base	t	Two-tailed sig.	Greater support from those...
Environmentalism	48	3.936	0.001	More environmentalist
Europeanism	45	4.311	0.001	Less Euro-sceptic
Intra-Party Inclusivity	49	2.698	0.01	More in favour of advancing women etc. in the Conservative Party
Left-Right	49	2.083	0.043	Less economically right-wing (sic)
Optimism	47	-3.389	0.001	Less optimistic about the state of the Conservative Party
Pride in National Heritage & Culture	48	-2.361	0.023	Less proud
Pride in the Way Nation Functions	49	-2.595	0.013	Taking a more middle position

Scale	Base	t	Two-tailed sig.	Greater support from those...
Environmentalism	48	-3.347	0.002	Less environmentalist
Europeanism	45	-4.92	0.001	More Euro-sceptic
Intra-Party Inclusivity	49	-4.187	0.001	Less in favour of advancing women etc. in the Conservative Party
Left-Right	49	-2.381	0.021	More economically right-wing (sic)
Authoritarianism	49	3.619	0.001	More authoritarian
Optimism	47	3.081	0.004	More optimistic about the state of the Conservative Party
Xenophobia	47	-2.358	0.023	More protectionist
Protectionism	47	-2.737	0.009	More xenophobic

Further discussion can be found below concerning the meaning of the ultimate significant predictors of support for Clarke or Duncan Smith in the final, all-members ballot. However, with perhaps one exception noted in the next section, it would generally be agreed that the results shown in these tables tend to accord with the common perception at the time of the three candidates and their supporters as well as those of subsequent academic studies.<sup>633</sup>

### **Michael Portillo's Exceptionalism**

There is one finding in Table 12.4a that stands out as surprising. It will be noted that placement on the Theocratism scale was a significant distinguishing feature between those MPs who supported Michael Portillo and those who supported either of the other two candidates. Closer examination reveals that Portillo supporters were more "theocratic" and they were more supportive of the intervention of religious leaders and institutions in public and political life. There might be something to this or it might just be an example of a Type 1 error of a false positive always possible when running such a large number of bivariate analyses.

That aside, a study of the tables leads to a subtler finding that ought to be highlighted and which separates Michael Portillo from both Kenneth Clarke and Iain Duncan Smith. Although many of the variables appear as significant findings in all three tables, what are conspicuously missing from the table analysing support for Michael Portillo are the economic issues tapped into by the Left-Right dimension and also the Europeanism dimension. (Whilst stating that he was personally opposed to the UK joining the single European currency Portillo generally downplayed issues concerned with the EU.<sup>634</sup>) When compared to

<sup>633</sup> Heppell & Hill, February 2010: 37, 46.

<sup>634</sup> Baker, 2002: 324.

the other two candidates, Portillo's support was largely associated with attitudes towards cultural and social issues measured by scales such as Feminism, Intra-Party Inclusivity and Authoritarianism.

Additionally, and although referring to "would-be" rather than actual support, the findings from another item within the *CPRS 2002* revealed that Portillo was relatively popular amongst ELCs from London and south-east England. Overall, 42% of ELC *CPRS 2002* respondents represented wards in London and south-east England. However, whereas 34% and 41% respectively of Kenneth Clarke's and Iain Duncan Smith's would-be ELC supporters came from this area, no less than 60% of Michael Portillo's would-be support came from ELCs representing wards in this area.

With this final piece of information in mind it is plausible to combine:

- that those issues that separated Portillo from the other two were neither "hard" economic issues nor the European issue;
- that Portillo supporters backed their man "from the off" but that he was unable to gather little actual or theoretical support during the leadership contest;
- that his would-be support "out in the country" was disproportionately to be found in London and the surrounding areas;

into the view that there was evidence for the then existence of a group of often metropolitan-based "Portillistas": a substantial minority of Party members who were somewhat different from others and who supported Michael Portillo as much as a "personality" as for what he was perceived to believe or wished to do.<sup>635</sup>

## **THE FINAL BALLOT**

### **All Respondents**

Using regression analysis, the significant predictive variables of support in the final ballot could be determined. Regression analysis was used because, even allowing for some "affective" reaction to the two candidates, it is surely more likely that considerations of issues tapped into by the multi-item scales were more likely to impact on the decision who to vote for than the other way around. Also, in this case, with such a binary either/or dependant variable—the choice between the two men—regression provides a clear-cut result.

The analysis was run with all respondents who said that they had voted for either Clarke or Duncan Smith (or would have voted if some purely technical reason such as not receiving a ballot paper had not prevented them) and then with ELCs only as detailed below. The analysis used the usual range of multi-item scales along with a binary item from the questionnaire asking whether respondents thought that the

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<sup>635</sup> Baldwin, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2001; Rogers, 14<sup>th</sup> August 2002.

most important task of the party was to “unite internally” or “reach out externally”. Dummy variables for the groups of respondents were not included since ANOVA indicated no significant between-groups (omitting the two micro-groups) difference ( $p = 0.226$ ) in who respondents actually voted for in the final ballot.

The simplified Table 12.5 shows the predictors of variability left in the final, significant regression model. The percentage figures are based on the adjusted  $R^2$  figure.

Variable	Variability explained
Europeanism	19%
Optimism	5%
Intra-Party Inclusivity	3%
Pride in the Way Nation Functions	1%
Total	28%
Base	284

The final model predicted a substantial 28% of the variation in the choice between Iain Duncan Smith and Kenneth Clarke. One variable stood out in importance. Europeanism, looking attitudes towards the UK’s relationship with the EU, predicted 19% of the total variation on its own. Some way behind this Optimism, looking attitudes about the state and likely fortunes of the Conservative Party, additionally provided 5% of the total. It is probably no coincidence that Intra-Party Inclusivity, looking at attitudes towards the promotion of female, non-White and homosexual candidates within the Conservative Party should also appear providing 3% of the total predictive power of the model. Pride in the Way Nation Functions provided a minor if statistically significant 1% of the total.

Irrespective of their direction, the salience of the Europeanism and Optimism scales confirms, for example, elements of an ICM poll of ordinary Conservative Party *members* conducted during the run-up to the final all-members ballots.<sup>636</sup> This indicated that, from a list of options, “Europe and the single currency” was the most important policy issue in deciding which candidate to support. 37% said that it was the most important issue against 28% who said that it was “Health” and 21% who said that it was “Law and order”. No less than 86% of respondents said that the issue of Europe was “Very important” or “Quite important” in deciding which candidate to support. On the other hand, in a choice between whether liking a candidate the most or believing that he was more likely to win the next general election would help to decide their vote, the latter beat the former option by 66% to 25%.

<sup>636</sup> Cracknell, 26<sup>th</sup> August 2001.

Bivariate analysis for each of the significant predictors, although omitting the trivial Pride in the Way Nation Functions, indicated the meaning of the results. Looking first at the dominant Europeanism dimension, outright Euro-sceptics were much more likely to have supported Duncan Smith, with Euro-centrists and almost all (88%) of the “stricken minority”<sup>637</sup> of outright Euro-enthusiasts much more likely to have supported Clarke.

Looking at the Optimism scale, those optimistic about the (then) present state and likely future fortunes of the Party were much more likely to have supported Duncan Smith, with those taking a more cautious or even pessimistic view were much more likely to have supported Clarke.<sup>638</sup> It will be recalled that in Chapter 5 Optimism was found to be a significant predictor of attitudes towards Iain Duncan Smith and this was in the same direction as found in this present analysis.

Finally, looking at Intra-Party Inclusivity it was found that outright “traditionalists” were much more likely to have supported Duncan Smith and outright “modernisers” were somewhat more likely to have supported Clarke.

In short, an “average” Iain Duncan Smith supporter was a socially conservative Euro-sceptic who was quite optimistic about how things stood for the Conservative Party or who simply denied that there were any serious problems.<sup>639</sup> An “average” Kenneth Clarke had fewer distinguishing features, generally taking a more “middling” position on these issues.

These results regarding the salience of those issues measured by the Europeanism and Optimism scales, although not necessarily their salience relative to each other, corresponds to the findings of polls carried out during the contest on members of local Conservative Party associations on the key determinants of support.<sup>640</sup>

What was also revealing about the findings of the regression analysis is what was missing. Variables concerning important issues such as the economy and welfare were absent as significant predictors of support. (Some have anyway argued that the Conservative’s focus on economics during the last two or three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was something of an aberration.<sup>641</sup>) So too was anything to do with moral or social or religious issues except in the case of how this applied to the Party internally.

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<sup>637</sup> *The Guardian*, 14<sup>th</sup> September 2000.

<sup>638</sup> and see Peek, Henery, McDonald, Rozenburg & Baldwin, 8<sup>th</sup> November 2002.

<sup>639</sup> Cooper, 2001: 23.

<sup>640</sup> Lynch, 2003: 161.

<sup>641</sup> Scruton, 2001: viii.



## Local Councillors in England

The regression analysis was re-run just looking at ELCs. The same variables were included but so too were the range of socio-demographic data discussed throughout Chapter 4. The results are not further discussed here because they were almost identical to those found when analysing all respondents. There were three significant variables left in the model predicting a total of 22%. These were Europeanism (15% of the total), Optimism (4%) and Intra-Party Inclusivity (3%).

The only significant finding was the negative one that *when taken together*<sup>642</sup> with the *CPRS 2002's* range of attitudinal variables who respondents were socio-demographically made no difference to voting behaviour in this instance.

## COMMENTARY

If nothing else, the closeness of the actual vote amongst MPs between Clarke, Duncan Smith and Portillo suggested something close to a three-way tie with MPs “as a group” having little idea who they wanted to succeed William Hague.<sup>643</sup> However, looking at the final choice between Clarke and Duncan Smith, a straightforward question can be asked but only to receive a slightly less straightforward response. Was the 2001 Conservative Party leadership contest an internal referendum on Europe? At least as far as Conservative politicians were concerned, the answer must be, “Yes, *and...*”

Firstly, it has to be noted that the “and” must include the majority of the variation between a vote for Kenneth Clarke or Iain Duncan Smith not explained by the regression analysis noted above. One would not expect to explain 100% of human behaviour by such methods.<sup>644</sup>

Nevertheless, within the limits of the variables analysed the analysis indicates that the EU was clearly the dominant issue. This is hardly surprising. Everyday observation and academic studies have indicated that “Europe” has been the most divisive issue amongst Conservatives since at least the 1970s but perhaps particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s “Bruges speech” in 1988.<sup>645</sup>

However, a small number of other issues mattered as well. In particular, two other factors were significant predictors of the final choice between Clarke and Duncan Smith irrespective of what representational group respondents belonged to and, as far as it can be ascertained from local councillors in England, their socio-demographic status: Optimism and Intra-Party Inclusivity.

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<sup>642</sup> Heppell & Hill, February 2010: 47.

<sup>643</sup> D’Ancona, 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2002.

<sup>644</sup> Sheehan, 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2006.

<sup>645</sup> Marquand, 2009: 311.

Regarding the latter, this accords with evidence that local associations had long resisted attempts by the Party to force them by some means to adopt a greater number of female and racial minority candidates in winnable seats.<sup>646</sup> Given this, the finding that those who took a “traditionalist” view on the promotion of women, racial minorities and homosexuals in the Party tended to back Duncan Smith makes sense. In Duncan Smith they saw themselves:<sup>647</sup> he was a “representative leader”.<sup>648</sup>

It seems reasonable to argue that the meaning of the finding regarding the Optimism scale is that those who had a relatively less optimistic view of the Party’s situation and prospects were more inclined to support the candidate generally perceived as being able to “reach out” to the electorate—Kenneth Clarke. Conversely, those who believed that Party was in good shape, held in reasonable esteem by the public and likely to do quite well in future elections were less concerned about this and more likely to support a candidate for more “ideological” reasons—Iain Duncan Smith.

The directions of the findings on the Europeanism and Optimism scales were reflected in the mass-media coverage and opinion at the time. In an editorial *The Times* came out in favour of Duncan Smith for a number of ideological reasons but specifically because it could not accept Clarke’s pro-EU and in particular pro-single-currency stance, views which sharply contrasted with that of the former leading “Maastricht rebel” Duncan Smith.<sup>649</sup> However, on the same day, the *Daily Mail* came out in favour of Clarke.<sup>650</sup> This was despite that newspaper’s opposition to his pro-EU views, but instead because it believed that Duncan Smith’s lack of charisma made him no match for Tony Blair and because Clarke was more capable of connecting with ordinary voters. Clarke was perceived by many as the man more likely to appeal to the general electorate. This was borne out by analysis conducted after the contest where Duncan Smith did better than Clarke amongst ordinary members in the remaining Conservative Party strongholds.<sup>651</sup>

### “A WORD IN YOUR EAR...”

Kenneth Clarke, echoed by others,<sup>652</sup> later claimed that MPs had been influenced in their choice between himself and Portillo by the relative strength in attitudes of some of their local activists about the EU and homosexuality.<sup>653</sup>

All *CPRS 2002* respondents except MPs were asked whether during the MPs-only stages of the contest their opinion had been offered to or sought by a Westminster MP. It can be seen from Table 12.6 that this

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<sup>646</sup> Cracknell, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2002; Baldwin, 9<sup>th</sup> April 2002; *The Guardian*, 7<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

<sup>647</sup> Parris, 25<sup>th</sup> August 2001.

<sup>648</sup> van Vugt, 2004: 276.

<sup>649</sup> *The Times*, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2001; Baker, Gamble, Randall & Seawright, 2002: 1.

<sup>650</sup> *Daily Mail*, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2001.

<sup>651</sup> Howard, 18<sup>th</sup> September 2001.

<sup>652</sup> Kelly, January 2002: 43.

was often the case, with the likelihood seeming to be primarily influenced by how “high up” respondents were on the political “ladder”: MEPs were the most likely followed by MSPs and Peers. WLCs and SLCs were the least likely, unsurprisingly given that the 2001 general election had seen the Party returning to Westminster only one MP from a Scottish constituency and none at all from Wales. Of course, the majority of English Conservative associations also did not have a sitting Conservative MP,<sup>654</sup> although it seems likely to suppose that the ones that *did* tended to have larger and hence potentially more influential memberships. In any case, it can be reasonably inferred that non-MPs—including other *CPRS* 2002 respondents—had at least *some* informal input into the MPs-only stages of the contest.

**TABLE 12.6: OPINION SOUGHT BY OR OFFERED TO AN MP BEFORE THE FINAL ALL-MEMBER BALLOT**

	Peers	MEPs	MSPs	ELCs	SLCs	WLCs
Yes	45%	38%	46%	39%	27%	15%
No	55%	62%	54%	61%	73%	85%
Base	56	13	13	279	45	26

Keeping in mind that there is no information about when in the process respondents had their informal input or how hard and how often they pressed their case, nevertheless what did they advise and could this have mattered? In other words, did those who caught the ear of MPs differ from those who did not about either which candidate—between Clarke and Portillo—they supported and/or their views on the two issues that Clarke mentioned, the EU and homosexuality?

Looking at the contest between Clarke, Duncan Smith and Portillo, the first of these questions can be analysed by testing for any significant association between which candidate respondents “would-be supported” and whether or not they consulted or were consulted by an MP. Looking only at those groups where there were sufficient numbers not to violate the assumptions of the  $\chi^2$  test—ELCs and Peers—the answer is a resounding “no”. With two-tailed significance values of  $p = 0.89$  and  $p = 0.77$  respectively, there was no association between whether or not respondents supported Kenneth Clarke or Michael Portillo and whether or not they had had some contact with an MP on the matter.

Nevertheless, looking only at those who *did* communicate with their MP during the MPs-only stages, did they differ in their attitudes towards the EU and/or homosexuality? Just looking at ELCs because of the small numbers involved, this can be tested by using an independent samples t-test with the multi-item Europeanism scale and the “Homosexual relationships are always wrong” item from the Authoritarianism scale as the test variables and which of these two candidates ELCs “would-be supported” as the grouping variable. Looking first at the issue of homosexuality, there was no significant difference (two-tailed  $p =$

<sup>653</sup> Eastham, 7<sup>th</sup> January 2002.

<sup>654</sup> Kelly, 2003: 99.

0.16) between would-be Clarke and Portillo supporters. Looking at the issue of the EU, there *was* a significant difference (two-tailed  $p = 0.01$ ) between would-be supporters of these two candidates.

On balance, it has to be concluded that Clarke was wrong. What these results again demonstrate was the extraordinary importance of attitudes towards the EU during the contest. It is very hard to argue from these results for any evidence that “homophobia” amongst a particularly energetic group of activists—at least as far as it can be judged from the responses of ELCs—had any real impact.

## CONCLUSION: EUROPE BUT NOT ONLY EUROPE

Without agreeing with one commentator who argued that the result of the contest had demonstrated that the Party was no longer a political party at all but merely a single-issue, anti-EU pressure group,<sup>655</sup> by the 1990s the Conservative Party was “Euro-sceptic—and proud of it”<sup>656</sup> and the EU was by far the most significant ideological issue detected by this analysis when taking all of the others into account. The others were matters of electoral support or related to the running of the Party. Andrew Gamble—writing just before Margaret Thatcher’s resignation as Prime Minister in 1990 but already looking beyond her leadership—was possibly correct when he argued that within the Conservative Party “Attitudes towards Europe are rapidly becoming that litmus test, superseding old wet/dry divisions over economic management”.<sup>657</sup> Subsequently, other commentators agreed,<sup>658</sup> and writing after the 2001 general election and Party leadership contest one was even more forthright in declaring that “For many Conservative MPs and party members, Euro-scepticism has become the defining feature of their political identity and the defence of British sovereignty the over-riding mission of their party”.<sup>659</sup>

The findings from the *CPRS 2002* suggest that, as far as it can be judged from the attitudes of Conservative representatives based upon their behaviour in the final leadership ballot in 2001, mass-media obsession at the time with “modernisers versus traditionalists” or “mods versus rockers”<sup>660</sup> was not an accurate description of what was uppermost in respondents’ minds.

Nevertheless, during the leadership campaign the mass media often got it right when it came down to those issues that really mattered. (As therefore did Duncan Smith when he stated that Clarke’s views on the EU were a minority within the Party.<sup>661</sup>) By some way, the most important issue was the debate about Britain’s relationship with and perhaps even continuing membership of—given that 29% of local councillors in England *and even 23% of MEPs* agreed with the item in the *CPRS 2002* that Britain should

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<sup>655</sup> O’Farrell, 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2001.

<sup>656</sup> Bale, July 2006: 385-386.

<sup>657</sup> Gamble, 1990: 34.

<sup>658</sup> Heppell, 2002: 300.

<sup>659</sup> Lynch, 2003: 154.

<sup>660</sup> Baldwin, Webster & Watson, 5<sup>th</sup> October 2000.

<sup>661</sup> Alderman & Carter, 2002: 583; see also Gilby, Skinner & Atkinson, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2001.

withdraw from it—the EU. This was backed up to a lesser but still important degree with considerations of the state of the Party, both as an institution and in terms of the electorate’s attitude towards it.

All about Europe? “Yes, *and...*”

## AFTERWARD: CHANGING SALIENCY

Conservative MPs are not stupid. Just as with the “surprise” election as leader of Margaret Thatcher in 1975<sup>662</sup> it is likely that more than anyone MPs knew what they were getting in Iain Duncan Smith as leader.<sup>663</sup> Initially, Duncan Smith’s leadership may well have rested on a Europe-shaped prop, but the significance of the “*and*” was not lost on MPs.

By the middle of 2003 the Party was still behind Labour in the opinion polls and, indeed, any disillusion with Labour often tended to benefit the Liberal Democrats rather than the Conservatives.<sup>664</sup> There was little indication that a more positive view of the Party in the minds of the electorate had been created.<sup>665</sup> For all of these Duncan Smith’s poor communication skills were widely blamed<sup>666</sup> and the matter assumed a new urgency as thoughts turned to the next general election.

It has been argued that “one of Iain Duncan Smith’s few successes as leader had been to quarantine Europe from the main party agenda”.<sup>667</sup> Certainly, compared to previous years there was relatively little in the way of dissent amongst Conservative MPs as measured by votes cast against the Party whip.<sup>668</sup> There was thus the irony that by damping down the Party’s internal debate on the EU<sup>669</sup> Iain Duncan Smith had dug his own political grave by negating *the* issue that had helped him to be elected in the first place.

At a fringe meeting during the Conservative Party’s 2006 annual conference, commentator Christopher Booker noted that, “The bizarre thing with IDS was that, although the main reason why he won such overwhelming support from the Tory grass roots in the leadership election was that he had a reputation for being a keen Eurosceptic, no sooner did he get into office than we heard almost nothing from him about it ever again. Although it was the very reason why he had been elected, it just seemed to vanish from his agenda—just as he was soon to vanish himself.”<sup>670</sup>

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<sup>662</sup> Marquand, 2009: 260; Wickham-Jones, 1997.

<sup>663</sup> *The Telegraph*, 15<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>664</sup> Rallings & Thrasher, April 2004: 380.

<sup>665</sup> Broughton, October 2004: 352.

<sup>666</sup> Gove, 18<sup>th</sup> October 2003; King, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2003; but see also Pierce, 6<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

<sup>667</sup> Baker & Sherrington, 2004: 360.

<sup>668</sup> Cowley & Stuart, 2004/2005: 25-28.

<sup>669</sup> Hitchens, 4<sup>th</sup> October 2003; Jones, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2003; Portillo, 6<sup>th</sup> June 2004; Thomson, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2003.

<sup>670</sup> Booker, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2006.

*CPRS 2002* respondents were asked whether any future leadership contest should return to being formally decided by Westminster MPs alone. As Table 12.7 demonstrates, amongst all groups of representatives—even Westminster MPs—the answer was “no”.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Yes	16%	32%	30%	20%	11%	14%	38%
No	84%	68%	70%	80%	89%	86%	62%
Base	279	60	50	46	27	14	13

But by November 2003, little more than a year after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork, MPs and the Party generally appeared to have changed their minds. It was as if *Fresh Future* had never been published and that the campaign during the summer of 2001 had never taken place. It is true that some members—including some local councillors—complained to the press that MPs had betrayed the Party’s internal electorate.<sup>671</sup> However, others responded by saying that in 2001 MPs had presented members with a poor choice between Kenneth Clarke, regarded by many as far too “Europhile”, and the largely unknown Iain Duncan Smith.<sup>672</sup>

After initially accepting ejection with good grace, Duncan Smith argued that it was ludicrous that a leader chosen by a majority of a 300,000-strong electorate could be deposed by a handful of MPs. He also said that he was unhappy with certain individuals with whom the new leader Michael Howard was associating.<sup>673</sup> He also later argued that, with almost no MPs from large swathes of the UK, Conservative members were more representative than MPs.<sup>674</sup>

But by then nobody was listening and it was not until Howard’s own resignation as leader in 2005 that the ordinary membership again had a formal say in the election of a new leader, this despite the best attempts of the Party’s senior leadership to strip them of this power.<sup>675</sup>

<sup>671</sup> Forrest, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2003.

<sup>672</sup> Le Page, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2003; Scott, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2003.

<sup>673</sup> Kite, 4<sup>th</sup> December 2003; *The Telegraph*, 15<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>674</sup> Duncan Smith, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2005.

<sup>675</sup> *BBC News*, 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2005; *BBC News*, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2005; *BBC News*, 28<sup>th</sup> September 2005.

# **CHAPTER 13: THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND ELECTORAL POLITICS**

## **LETTING IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD**

Most of the *CPRS 2002* concerns itself with the attitudes of politicians, but from time to time there is mention in some context of the general public. However, rather than deal with these issues in detail within the thematic chapters such considerations are brought together in one place.

First, some space is devoted to what *CPRS 2002* respondents thought were the main concerns facing Britain, what they thought the main concerns of the public were, and what those concerns actually were as far as can be known by use of secondary data.

Next, the analysis returns to attitudes towards the other parties, already discussed in some detail in Chapter 6. In this present chapter the focus is on the Conservative's two main national challengers, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, but with the addition of data looking at the impact of electoral competition on attitudes about these parties.

Then the study returns to the PoliMap described in Chapter 3. In the present chapter the focus is on how the general public of the time were distributed on the PoliMap, how this compares with Conservative politicians, and what this might say about the space for viable electoral competition and the constraints on political parties seeking popular support.

## **MAIN CONCERNS FACING BRITAIN**

### **Concerns Across a Range of Issues**

Respondents were asked to choose from a list of seven options what they considered to be the most pressing concern facing Britain and then asked to repeat the exercise by indicating what they thought were the public's main concern.

TABLE 14.1: MAIN CONCERN FACING BRITAIN: RESPONDENTS' OWN VIEW							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Economy and taxation	20%	25%	10%	28%	16%	43%	14%
Welfare, NHS, education and other public services	43%	31%	52%	46%	60%	29%	64%
Environment	1%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%	0%
Europe	8%	12%	13%	17%	4%	14%	0%
Law and order	25%	19%	12%	7%	16%	7%	21%
International relations, defence and terrorism	3%	8%	13%	2%	0%	7%	0%
Civil liberties	1%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	269	59	52	46	25	14	14

Table 14.1 provides the responses for respondents' own views. It is clear that respondents strongly tended to view "Welfare, NHS, education and other public services" as the most important issues with, except in one case, a plurality and sometimes a majority citing this. "Economy and taxation"—which MEPs cited as the most important—"Europe"—where the responses from MEPs were not noticeably different from most of the other groups—and "law and order" were also cited quite often. "Environment" and "civil liberties" hardly rate a mention although a number of MPs cited "international relations, defence and terrorism" as the most important issue facing Britain.

Throughout this study use has been made of Ronald Inglehart's Postmaterialism dimension.<sup>676</sup> Appendix 4 indicates that respondents tended towards a "mixed" position on the dimension. When asked about their main concerns in the manner presented in this chapter it would appear that respondents adhered to a distinctly "materialist" position. Certainly it can be argued that "Economy and taxation" and "Law and order" are materialist concerns, but so too is much of "Welfare, NHS, education and other public services". To turn it around, the two clearly postmaterialist concerns of "Environment" and "Civil liberties" were the main concerns of very few respondents.

### Saliency and the Multi-Item Scales

Asking respondents about their main concerns taps into the saliency of issues for them. That said, it might be reasonable to expect that saliency of issues as asked in the questionnaire was associated with those sets of attitudes most nearly associated with them.

To test this, a series of partial correlation analyses was run to see if there was an association between the multi-item scales and saliency. The test variables were created by recoding the responses to the original



main concerns item into a series of new, binary items. For example, the first one differentiated between those who did and those who did not list “Economy and taxation” as their main concern. Because of the small numbers of positive responses in some cases this was run for only the latter main concern and also for “Welfare, NHS, education and other public services”, “Europe” and “Law and order”.

The entire, undifferentiated dataset was used since ANOVA detected no significant between-groups differences at the conventional 5% confidence level in the cases of “Economy and taxation” ( $p = 0.076$ ), “Welfare, NHS, education and other public services” ( $p = 0.057$ ) or “Europe” ( $p = 0.225$ ). There was a significant difference in the case of “Law and order” ( $p = 0.036$ ) but the post-hoc Bonferroni test did not identify any pairs of significant differences.

Controlling for the other scales, in the case of “Economy and taxation” there were significant two-tailed associations between it and Europeanism ( $p = 0.003$ ), Environmentalism ( $p = 0.045$ ), Optimism ( $p = 0.042$ ), Protectionism ( $p = 0.04$ ) and Traditional British Liberties ( $p = 0.04$ ). In the case of “Europe” there were only significant two-tailed associations between it and Europeanism ( $p = 0.001$ ) and Religiosity ( $p = 0.038$ ).

In the case of those who cited either “Welfare, NHS, education and other public services” or “Law and order” as their main concern there were no significant associations between them and the multi-item scales controlling for attitudes towards the other scales.

Only in the case of “Europe” and the strong association with the Europeanism scale was there an obvious like-for-like saliency and attitude association. Detailed analysis indicates that those with more Euro-sceptic views were more likely to cite this as their main concern. It should be noted that the direction of this finding was not a foregone conclusion. For example, analysis in Chapter 5 indicated that it was the less Euro-sceptic respondents who were more inclined to want to see change in the Party’s principles and beliefs.

On balance, what these results suggest is that knowing a respondent thought that such-and-such an issue was particularly important says little about what they thought about that issue. Broadly speaking, the “hypothesis” of this section was wrong.

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<sup>676</sup> Inglehart, 1990; 1997.

## BELIEFS ABOUT THE PUBLIC AGAINST THE PUBLIC'S STATED VIEWS

### Main Comparisons

From the same list, respondents were also asked what they believed to be the public's view of the main concerns facing Britain. Table 14.2a provides these latter responses and Table 14.2b provides the difference between Table 14.1 and Table 14.2a. Positive numbers in Table 14.2b indicate issues where respondents thought that they attached greater importance to them than did the public and negative numbers the opposite.

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Economy and taxation	9%	5%	4%	11%	12%	21%	7%
Welfare, NHS, education and other public services	70%	78%	79%	76%	71%	71%	86%
Environment	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Europe	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Law and order	20%	15%	15%	11%	17%	7%	7%
International relations, defence and terrorism	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Civil liberties	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	269	59	52	46	24	14	14

	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Economy and taxation	11	20	6	17	4	22	7
Welfare, NHS, education and other public services	-27	-47	-27	-30	-11	-42	-22
Environment	1	0	0	0	4	0	0
Europe	7	12	13	15	4	14	0
Law and order	5	4	-3	-4	-1	0	14
International relations, defence and terrorism	3	6	11	2	0	7	0
Civil liberties	1	5	0	0	0	0	0
Base	269	59	52	46	24	14	14

It is clear that respondents believed that the public was much more concerned about “welfare, NHS, education and other public services” than they were. (Relatively so, since this was the issue that they most frequently cited themselves.) On the other hand, they believed that they were somewhat more concerned about the “economy and taxation” and “Europe” (something suggested by relative Euro-enthusiasts and others<sup>677</sup>).

The findings in Table 14.2b make sense. Respondents—all of whom were at least semi-professional politicians—believed that more abstract or seemingly distant issues such as the economy and Europe were in fact more important than the public realised. On the other hand, they probably felt that the public were more concerned than they were about here-and-now issues such as finding a place for their children at a decent school or a relative needing a hip replacement operation.

### The General Public’s Own Views

The beliefs of respondents about the main concerns of the general public can be compared with near-contemporary data from a range of other sources, and here data is used from the post-election part of the *British Election Panel Study 2001*.<sup>678</sup> The *CPRS 2002* and the *BEPS 2001* data have been recoded into a small number of as near-similar categories as possible. Because of the small numbers involved the only comparisons are between ELCs and the English general public as set out in Table 14.3.

	ELCs’ own view	ELCs’ belief about public’s view	English public (all) <sup>679</sup>	English public (Strong Conservative identifiers) <sup>680</sup>
Economy, taxation, inflation, etc.	20%	9%	12%	13%
Welfare, NHS, education, pensions etc.	43%	70%	57%	39%
Europe, EU, Euro	8%	1%	17%	34%
Crime, law & order, dishonesty	25%	20%	8%	10%
Other	4%	0%	6%	5%
Base	269	269	1475	226

<sup>677</sup> Baker, 2002: 321; Broughton, 2003: 208.

<sup>678</sup> *BEPS*, 4<sup>th</sup> December 2006.

<sup>679</sup> *BEPS*, 2001.

On an ordinal level the findings match. This was most obvious is that a plurality stated that “Welfare, NHS, education, pensions” was the main concern facing the country. However, *CPRS 2002* respondents somewhat overestimated the salience of this range of issues for the public: 70% compared with an actual reported proportion of 57% of the public citing this as their main concern.

Conversely—it might be said *perverse*ly—it would appear that respondents rather underestimated the salience of “Europe” for the public. This was particularly true when looking at their keenest supporters amongst strong Conservative identifiers. Some argued that during the 1990s and early 2000s the Conservatives undersold one of the few areas where their own views chimed with those of the electorate.<sup>681</sup> This was also true of “law and order”.<sup>682</sup> However, caution is needed since, as suggested above, knowing that someone feels strongly about something is not necessarily a guide to what they think should be done.

## THE EXPERIENCE OF ELECTORAL POLITICS

### Fighting for their Seat

This section starts where Chapter 6 on attitudes towards the other parties left off. Respondents—except for Peers in the case of the first battery of questions below—were asked a number of questions concerning their recent experience of electoral politics.

Specifically, they were asked to rate subjectively the following: who their main challenger was, how safe they felt that their seat was and whether they had experienced any anti-Conservative tactical voting. Also included were two variables from the questionnaire specifically concerning the Labour and/or Liberal Democrat parties: “The Labour Party has genuinely shed its socialistic instincts” and “The Conservatives should be focusing their national campaigning efforts against the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour”. (The emphasis was on “national” given both the impact of energetic or slack local campaigning<sup>683</sup> and that at a local level Conservative respondents might face different political situations.) Both were accompanied by a standard five-point “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set.

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<sup>680</sup> *BEPS*, 2001.

<sup>681</sup> Evans, 1998, 2001: 249; McAllister & Studlar, 2000: 368; but see Baker, Gamble & Seawright, 2002: 405 for a view that the Party had used these areas to at least some benefit.

<sup>682</sup> Osborne, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2003.

<sup>683</sup> Denver, Hands & MacAllister, June 2004: 303-304.

	ELCs	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Labour	40%	58%	48%	76%	73%	54%
Lib Dem	53%	40%	15%	16%	18%	23%
Other	7%	2%	37%	8%	9%	23%
Base	273	48	46	25	11	13

Table 14.4 indicates a distinction between the “English” groups of ELCs and MPs (there was only one MP elected from a non-English constituency at the 2001 general election) and the exclusively or partially “Celtic” groups—including MEPs—regarding the perceived main challenger. In the case of ELCs and MPs, Labour and the Liberal Democrats accounted for 40% to 60 % each, and between them accounted for the vast majority of respondents’ perceived main challengers. (Where there was occasional competition from other parties around this time such as from the BNP or the Green Party<sup>684</sup> it tended to be in a very geographically limited area and/or a “flash in the pan” phenomenon. It can rarely have been considered to have been a challenge to the Conservatives nationally however embarrassing it might have been at the time.)

In the case of the other groups of respondents, perceived competition from the Liberal Democrats was much less evident, hardly surprising given Labour’s historic strength in Scotland and Wales. The only two groups where “Others” were a significant competitor were the exclusively Scottish groups of SLCs and MSPs and it will come as no surprise to note that this was the SNP.

The same phenomenon was *not* found amongst WLCs vis-à-vis Plaid Cymru, but this says much about the geography of Welsh politics and the relative rarity of electorally meaningful first-past-the-post competition between the two parties.<sup>685</sup> (Although, as Conservative Party leader Iain Duncan Smith noted,<sup>686</sup> the Conservatives, despite not winning any seats, attained a greater share of the popular vote at the 2001 general election—but not at the 1999 Welsh Assembly election<sup>687</sup>—than either the Liberal Democrats or Plaid Cymru. Wales was certainly an area where the Conservatives suffered under the first-past-the-post electoral system.<sup>688</sup>)

<sup>684</sup> Baldwin, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2000; Carr, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2002; Jenkins, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2002; Riddell, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2002; Sherman, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2003).

<sup>685</sup> Evans, 2002: i.

<sup>686</sup> Duncan Smith, winter 2001: 1.

<sup>687</sup> Wyn Jones & Trystan, 2001: 712.

<sup>688</sup> Evans, 2002: 17-18.

Next, respondents were asked how “safe” they felt was their seat as detailed in Table 14.5.

	ELCs	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Very marginal	13%	10%	20%	32%	36%	21%
Somewhat marginal	21%	12%	43%	20%	27%	50%
Safe or fairly safe	66%	78%	37%	48%	36%	29%
Base	277	51	46	25	11	14

Again, the main difference was between the England-only groups of ELCs and MPs on the one hand and then the others, with the former tending to feel considerably more secure. Two-thirds (66%) and over three-quarters (78%) of ELCs and MPs respectively felt that their seat was at least fairly safe. This compared with at most just under a half in the other cases. The relaxed attitude found amongst the two England-only groups is perhaps unsurprising. In the case of MPs it is probably true to say that any Conservative MP elected at the landslide Labour general election victories of 1997 or 2001 had been fortunate enough to be selected to contest a “true blue” constituency. In Westminster terms—and excepting a profound alteration in England’s political and/or ideological landscape probably last witnessed with the decline of the old Liberal Party in the 1920s—the Conservatives were down to their bedrock.

It might also say something about what some see as a fundamentally different political culture in England compared to Wales and Scotland. As one commentator put it, unlike in England, where historically the Conservative party has been at least nominally in favour of less interventionist government than Labour, “Scotland and Wales have openly statist governments working for ever more government spending and regulations—and openly statist oppositions, working for ever more government spending and regulations”.<sup>689</sup>

Matters were a little different with ELCs. There was probably a degree of the same “true blue” effect, albeit at a ward level. But the Conservative Party’s disastrous showing at the 1997 and 2001 general elections was not always reflected at local elections, even when these had been held on the same day. (This was sometimes true even in Scotland.<sup>690</sup>)

The next question in this series asked whether respondents believed that they had experienced any anti-Conservative tactical voting by electors who might otherwise have supported other parties. This was a major political issue during the 1997 and 2001 general elections.

<sup>689</sup> Marks, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2002; and see McLean, 1997: 152 for a more objective but similar view.

<sup>690</sup> Fraser, 29<sup>th</sup> December 2002.

	ELCs	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
A great deal	13%	10%	17%	19%	25%	50%
Some	45%	43%	44%	50%	67%	43%
Very little or none	42%	47%	39%	31%	8%	7%
Base	276	51	46	26	12	14

In every case a majority believed that they had experienced at least some anti-Conservative tactical voting in recent years, a phenomenon at all levels of political contest—parliamentary, local and so on—generally acknowledged in the literature.<sup>691</sup> Here, the most noticeable distinction was between those groups elected by a first-past-the-post system and those elected via some type of proportional representation system, i.e. MEPs and MSPs. (The data does not allow a distinction to be made between those directly elected as constituency representatives and those elected via the party list.) The latter were very much more likely to believe that they had been hit by anti-Conservative tactical voting. Unfortunately, it is hard to take this observation much further given the different systems used to elect MEPs and MSPs.

(There was a final question in this series. This was the mirror to the previous item and asked if respondents believed that they had experienced any *pro*-Conservative tactical voting. Since often 90% and more within in each group of respondents said that they had not, no more is made of this item.)

Then there were the two other items from the questionnaire. The responses from Peers are included in Tables 14.7 and 14.8 out of a sense of completeness although, of course, they did not take part in public elections. In the case of “The Labour Party has genuinely shed its socialistic instincts” ANOVA detected a significant between-groups difference ( $p = 0.035$ ) although the Bonferroni post-hoc test did not. That noted, in every case a clear majority of respondents from all groups disagreed with this item and this was particularly true in case of both types of both Peers (80%) and MPs (86%) at Westminster. In other words, respondents rejected the view that Labour had abandoned socialism although whether they thought that Labour had *ever* abandoned it and if so how consistently is another matter.<sup>692</sup>

ANOVA detected no between-groups differences ( $p = 0.909$ ) in responses to “The Conservatives should be focusing their national campaigning efforts against the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour”. However, responses to this second item were less clear-cut. In most cases around a half or a little more of respondents disagreed with the item as posed and instead thought that the Conservatives should indeed be focussing on Labour rather than the Liberal Democrats. MEPs were unique in that they tended to lean towards the Conservatives focussing on the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour.

<sup>691</sup> Broughton, 2003: 211; Butler, 6<sup>th</sup> May 2000; Evans, Curtice & Norris, 1998: 77; Seldon & Snowdon, 2001: 3.

<sup>692</sup> Baldwin, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2002[a]; Darwall, 2002: 1; *Evening Standard*, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2002; White, 20<sup>th</sup> July 2002.

## Further Analysis of Attitudes Towards Labour and the Liberal Democrats

First, what relationship, if any, was there between attitudes towards the two main parties and the degree of electoral challenge that respondents thought that they presented? Because of the small numbers in many of the groups this analysis could only be carried out on ELCs.

Where the Labour Party was perceived to be the main challenger there was no significant difference (two-tailed  $p = 0.580$  using the Pearson statistic) in attitudes towards either party. However, where the Liberal Democrats were perceived as the main challenger then there was a significant difference (two-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ) in attitudes towards the two parties and the Liberal Democrats tended to be more disliked.

It will be remembered that all respondents under analysis in this sub-section were sitting local councillors. What these results suggest is that a Labour challenge was regarded with relative equanimity compared to a Liberal Democrat challenge which tended to be associated with a greater degree of dislike. Whether this was due to attitudes towards the Liberal Democrats *qua* institution, their perceived beliefs<sup>693</sup> or their campaigning practices<sup>694</sup> cannot be answered here.

Main challenger	Labour	Lib Dems
Very marginal	21%	8%
Somewhat marginal	22%	18%
Safe or fairly safe	57%	74%
Base	109	144

Moreover, as Table 14.8 indicates, it does not seem to have been due to the Liberal Democrats being seen as the more pressing challenger. Respondents associated (two-tailed  $p = 0.005$ ) a more serious challenge from Labour with holding a *less* safe seat. In other words, the particularly negative attitude displayed towards the Liberal Democrats did not seem to be simply a result of them being seen as more of a threat to their seat.

Table 14.9 looks at who ELCs regarded as the main challenger and their perception of anti-Conservative tactical voting. It can be seen that there was a significant perception (two-tailed  $p = <0.001$  using the Pearson statistic) that where the Liberal Democrats were the main challenger the greater was the degree of anti-Conservative tactical voting. Less than half (45%) of those most pressed by the Labour party said

<sup>693</sup> *Conservative Home*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2006.

<sup>694</sup> Anderson, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2010; Methven, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2002.



that they had experienced any meaningful anti-Conservative tactical voting against well over two-thirds (71%) of those of those facing the Liberal Democrats. It cannot be stated whether this indicated that the Liberal Democrats were better at marshalling the potential anti-Conservative vote, or whether notional Labour supporters were more willing to switch to aid the anti-Conservative cause, or whether it was a feature of the type of geographical area under analysis.

Main challenger	Labour	Lib Dems
A great deal	9%	16%
Some	36%	55%
Very little or none at all	55%	29%
Base	107	145

All of these analyses tend to reinforce the impression of the particular dislike respondents felt towards the Liberal Democrats.

It can also be seen whether attitudes about who the Conservatives should be directing their energies against were associated with who their main challenger actually was.

Main challenger	Labour	Lib Dems
Agree	17%	41%
Neither/nor	18%	19%
Disagree	65%	40%
Base	108	145

The results set out in Table 14.10 come as no surprise. There was a significant association (two-tailed  $p = <0.001$  using the Pearson statistic), with those respondents regarding the Liberal Democrats as their main challenger very much more likely to agree with the questionnaire item.

### **Attitudinal Predictors and Electoral Experience Together**

It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that the only major attitudinal correlates with attitudes towards the Conservative Party's two main rivals, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, were the Europeanism and Left-Right scales. In both cases the findings were in the same direction, with the more Euro-sceptic and/or supportive of free-market economics respondents were then the more antipathetic they tended to be

towards the two other parties. This was taken to indicate a relatively narrow, ideological assessment of the Party's two main UK-wide opponents.

Looking again at these two parties, what can be said of the impact of electoral competition when taken alongside these more ideological considerations? To assess this, the partial correlation analyses were re-run for attitudes towards Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The undifferentiated dataset was used but only those respondents, irrespective of which group of politician they belonged to, who said that either Labour or the Liberal Democrats were their closest challenger were analysed.

In addition to the usual range of attitudinal scales, the electoral items already discussed in this present chapter were also included. The item for whether Labour or the Liberal Democrats were the main challenger was included as were the items for the perceived safeness of their seat and experience of tactical voting. Also included were the two variables specifically concerning the Labour and/or Liberal Democrat parties: "The Labour Party has genuinely shed its socialistic instincts" and "The Conservatives should be focusing their national campaigning efforts against the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour".

The purpose of the analyses was to see if such electoral considerations—the struggle for political power—trumped more ideological considerations.

The answer, reasonably strongly, is "no". In the case of Labour, not a single one of these electoral items was significantly associated at the conventional 5% level with attitudes towards the party when attitudinal variables were controlled for. In the case of the Liberal Democrats there was a single instance. This was the "The Labour Party has genuinely shed its socialistic instincts" item (correlation 0.164, two-tailed significance 0.015) which might suggest that attitudes towards the rival parties somewhat informed one another, but no more can be made of this here.

Looking solely at the Conservative Party's two main challengers, it seems clear that electoral politics had very little to do with attitudes towards them once more ideological measures were taken into account.

# THE ENGLISH GENERAL PUBLIC AND THE POLIMAP

## Using the PoliMap

In Chapter 3 the development of the PoliMap was discussed and then used to develop a picture of the ideological positions of Conservative Party politicians. Given that much was made of its aim being to help shed light on everyday political debate in way that was more meaningful than the flawed traditional left-right model, it can now be used to do just that. In this section the PoliMap is used to portray the general public and then to compare them with Conservative Party politicians.

## Identifying Comparators Amongst the Public

How did *CPRS 2002* respondents compare with their contemporaries amongst the general public? For reasons of sample size only ELCs were first compared with the English general public as a whole and then against those amongst those who were recorded as identifying with the Conservative Party, the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrat Party. To do this, data from the *British Social Attitudes 2001* survey<sup>695</sup> that also used the Left-Right and Authoritarianism dimensions was used. The Cronbach's alpha values found from the responses of the *BSA* respondents used in this present analysis were a robust 0.87 for the Left-Right dimension and 0.74 for Authoritarianism.

Identifying the subsets of the *BSA* dataset is a simple matter. Only those listed as residing in one of the *BSA*'s regions in England were included. Similarly, the three types of party identifiers were noted as such in the relevant derived variable. Of those *BSA* respondents in England recorded as identifying with one of the three parties 30% were Conservative identifiers, 54% were Labour identifiers, and 16% were Liberal Democrat identifiers. As a matter of historical record at the June 2001 general election the Conservative Party received 37% of the votes cast in England for one of the three main parties, Labour 43%, and the Liberal Democrats 20%.<sup>696</sup>

## Mapping the Public

Table 14.11 displays the PoliMap distribution for ELCs and the English general public both undivided and split by party identification. Diagram 14.1 shows the PoliMap diagram for the undivided English general public by way of illustration and comparison with Diagram 3.3 in Chapter 3.


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<sup>695</sup> NCSR, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2008[d].

<sup>696</sup> Austin & Hames, 2001: 296.

TABLE 14.11: POLIMAP DISTRIBUTIONS OF ELCs AND THE ENGLISH PUBLIC					
	ELCs	General public in England <sup>697</sup>	Conservative Identifiers <sup>698</sup>	Labour Identifiers <sup>699</sup>	Lib Dem Identifiers <sup>700</sup>
Northern	2%	<1%	0%	<1%	0%
North-Eastern	19%	5%	9%	2%	6%
Eastern	22%	2%	6%	1%	1%
South-Eastern	31%	17%	26%	13%	10%
Southern	5%	19%	13%	22%	16%
South-Western	2%	16%	8%	19%	17%
Western	0%	3%	0%	5%	5%
North-Western	1%	3%	<1%	3%	4%
Central	18%	35%	38%	35%	41%
Base	266	1498	373	683	203

DIAGRAM 14.1: POLIMAP DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENGLISH GENERAL PUBLIC



Looking first at the figures for the general public overall, it can be seen that they displayed a different distribution within the PoliMap than did ELCs. A plurality of them (35%) were located in the Centre sector, and most of the remainder (52% of the total) were distributed in the three Southern-most sectors. Amongst the general public in England there was very little support for either economic or personal

<sup>697</sup> BSA, 2001.

<sup>698</sup> BSA, 2001.

<sup>699</sup> BSA, 2001.

individualism and instead considerable support for economic and personal collectivism. This can be seen from the small proportion (14% of the total) that mapped onto the Western, Eastern or any of the three Northern-most sectors.

This might suggest that those Conservative or ex-Conservative activists and commentators at the time who felt aggrieved at the Party's new-found interest in "social liberalism" and/or longer-standing attachment to "market forces"<sup>701</sup> may have had popular or electoral grounds to support their view. It also literally illustrates the difference between the relatively unchangeable political "middle ground" which is the theoretical middle position between ideological "extremes" and the more changeable political "common ground" which is the point around which the largest number of individuals under analysis are located.<sup>702</sup> Whilst both the general public and the Conservative Party had a strong centrist element the "gravitational influences" or the common ground for each group were somewhat different if nevertheless overlapping.

Looking at the three types of party identifier, it can be seen that, whilst there were differences between them, they were more similar to each other than were Conservative identifiers with ELCs. The most noticeable feature of all three groups is that, unlike ELCs, in each case a plurality of respondents mapped into the Centre sector.

Nevertheless, there was a difference between Conservative identifiers on the one hand and Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers on the other. For example, whilst a mere 15% of Conservative identifiers mapped into the "capitalistic" sectors of Eastern, North-Eastern and Northern, even fewer Liberal Democrat (7%) and Labour (4%) identifiers did so. Conversely, whereas a substantial 22% of Conservative identifiers mapped into the "socialistic" sectors of Western, South-Western, and Southern—albeit mostly in the last of these—some 38% of Liberal Democrat and no less than 46% of Labour identifiers did so. At least to a relative degree these findings accord with perceptions of what the Conservative and Labour and possibly the Liberal Democrat<sup>703</sup> parties stood for at the time and why people tended to support one rather than the other.

(Surprisingly if some media reports at the time were to be believed,<sup>704</sup> Conservative Party identifiers were the least wholly "authoritarian"—Southern, in the PoliMap's terms—of the three groups of identifiers.)

In other words, whereas the distribution of Conservative identifiers was more similar to that of Labour and Liberal Democrat identifiers than ELCs, it was less dissimilar.

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<sup>700</sup> *BSA*, 2001.

<sup>701</sup> Rankin, 2001: 145-147; Scruton, 21<sup>st</sup> September 2002.

<sup>702</sup> Crewe & Särilvik, 1980: 247-248.

<sup>703</sup> Parris, 19<sup>th</sup> May 2001; Riddle, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2001.

## Tribalism and Party Realignment

And it must again be noted that numbers of people with widely differing political views supported—albeit in this case identifying with if not actually joining let alone representing—the same political party. Indeed, this was perhaps especially true of Conservative identifiers where almost identical proportions of respondents mapped into the South-Western (8%) and North-Eastern (9%) sectors.

The reverse was even truer. To know that someone was a Centrist according to the PoliMap was little guide to which party they supported.

It goes beyond the remit of the *CPRS 2002* to delve into this phenomenon in any detail, but it seems likely that party identification is often “tribal”<sup>705</sup> rather than ideological. If for some reason those tribal bonds weakened but there was no major ideological shift amongst the public, then the PoliMap indicates the viable space for identification with other, perhaps existing parties. To take a provocative example—and as others have noted before<sup>706</sup>—an examination of the similarity of many of their respective social and particularly economic policies makes a large-scale desertion of electoral support from Labour to the BNP not at all implausible. Of more direct relevance to the *CPRS 2002*, the association between elements of Conservative Party and UKIP policies—or at least elements wished for by many of their supporters—has been remarked upon.<sup>707</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Regarding what respondents believed to be the most pressing concerns facing Britain today, it is perhaps admirable that they *thought* that they had at least somewhat different priorities to those of the public. They neither were arrogant enough to believe that “That they think like I do” nor supine enough merely to parrot the worries of the electorate.

As one conservative-inclined commentator argued,<sup>708</sup> “If a multiparty democracy is to work properly, parties must march to the beats of drums that stand somewhat apart from the rhythm of the whole nation, agglomerated. It is not wrong for them to resonate to particular interests, instincts or opinions.” In other words, there is at least something to be said for political parties *not* to operate along simple Downsian lines of party competition—which is that parties must converge on the median positions of aggregate voter distribution—since parties can shift voters’ positions.<sup>709</sup>

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<sup>704</sup> Kent, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2001.

<sup>705</sup> Lucas, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2010.

<sup>706</sup> Hannan, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2009.

<sup>707</sup> BBC News, 6<sup>th</sup> September 2009.

<sup>708</sup> Parris, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2008.

That said, the apparent rejection by the Conservatives of such a Downsian approach was held by many to have been one of the many reasons for their lack of electoral success, most notably in 1997 and 2001.<sup>710</sup> How much this was a principled rejection of such an approach or simply a failure of senior Conservatives to understand what the public thought is unclear. Research by others using the *British Representation Survey* of 2001, the *British Social Attitudes* surveys of 1997 and 2001 and other sources has indicated that Conservative politicians were much less accurate than Labour and Liberal Democrat politicians when asked about their perceptions of voters' views on subjects such as tax cuts and European integration compared to voter's actual views.<sup>711</sup>

Polling data from the 2001 general election indicated that voters were most interested in areas such as the NHS and education but that the Conservative Party, if by no means ignoring these issues, did not appear to focus on them.<sup>712</sup> The data from this chapter indicates that Conservative politicians were well aware of their importance, if nevertheless sincerely believing that some of these issues were not as important as the public thought.

The middle part of this chapter focused mainly on the experience of respondents in fighting for their seats, particularly against the Conservative Party's two main opponents, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. What was striking was the behaviour of voters: the majority of respondents from all groups had experienced at least some anti-Conservative tactical voting. The implications of the cessation of this—or, indeed, of another party being the victim of such behaviour<sup>713</sup>—are clear even without any increase in active support for the Conservatives.

Despite the parlous state of the Party and considerations of phenomena such as anti-Conservative tactical voting, the political situation in 2002 as far as *CPRS 2002* respondents were concerned needs to be reiterated. Anyone elected whilst wearing a blue rosette at this time would have been fortunate to have been selected in the first instance for what was probably a “true blue” constituency or ward. Indeed, only a minority of respondents said their seat could be described as very marginal. Such a place would in all likelihood contain a socio-demographic voter profile rather different from the country as a whole or even, for example, the swing seats lost in 1997 and which the Party needed to win back if it was ever to form a government.

Returning to the two main challengers, amongst ELCs at least the phenomenon noted in an earlier chapter of a particular and in part visceral or perhaps tribal dislike of the Liberal Democrats was reinforced. Nevertheless, further analysis indicated that, when taken alongside attitudinal measures, the experience of fighting elections had little impact on attitudes towards either of the two main challengers.

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<sup>709</sup> Ward, April 2000.

<sup>710</sup> Norris & Lovenduski, 2004: 97.

<sup>711</sup> Norris & Lovenduski, 2004: 98-99.

<sup>712</sup> Lees-Marshment, November 2001: 938.

Turning to the PoliMap, it might be possible that the electorate becomes so profoundly disillusioned with *all the major parties* that they accede to the attractions of one or more anti-political establishment (APE) parties<sup>714</sup> almost irrespective of what such parties stand for beyond that. This is not the same as a “throw the rascals out” disenchantment with *a party in office* where support will turn instead towards one or more of the existing major parties, as the Conservatives experienced only too well in 1997.

It is also possible that, for some reason, an issue outside of the PoliMap such as attitudes towards the EU becomes of overriding if perhaps temporary importance<sup>715</sup> or perhaps that one of the parties manages to buck the conventional Downsian model of positioning themselves to attract the median voter by inserting a different dominant issue into an election campaign.<sup>716</sup>

But absent of a major sea-change in political attitudes—and also accepting the salience of what are termed here the “Personal” and Economic” dimensions—then it is likely that for the foreseeable future any British political party that wishes to receive considerable electoral support has to be perceived as having its heart in a common ground which is the centre-to-collectivist area of politics measured in absolute terms.

Any desire to move away from this Centre-South common ground, whether this is the Conservative Party<sup>717</sup> or one of the other major parties,<sup>718</sup> whilst ideologically desirable from certain perspectives,<sup>719</sup> runs the risk of distancing that party from the electorate.<sup>720</sup> And, of course, this necessarily presents difficulties when, as has been seen, the ideological common ground of the Conservative Party at the time was at least somewhat different from that of the general public.

However, if the leaders of the major parties become ever-more concerned about the opinions of the public rather than those of their own members—particularly with increasing focus on daily opinion polling and a system of continuous campaigning—it calls into question the viability of ideologically distinct, mass-membership parties.<sup>721</sup> In this instance a more explicit move is possible towards the type of catch-all parties described by Kirchheimer in the 1960s which feature a strong leadership but a downgraded membership.<sup>722</sup>

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<sup>713</sup> McFarlane, 9<sup>th</sup> April 2010.

<sup>714</sup> Hayton, February 2010: 26.

<sup>715</sup> Micklethwait, 27<sup>th</sup> February 2003; Aaronovitch, 10<sup>th</sup> May 2005.

<sup>716</sup> Ward, April 2000.

<sup>717</sup> Ahmed, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2001.

<sup>718</sup> Baldwin, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2002[b],

<sup>719</sup> Parris, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2001.

<sup>720</sup> Norris & Lovenduski, 2004; but see also Crewe & Searing, 1988.

<sup>721</sup> Micklethwait, 24<sup>th</sup> April 2010.

<sup>722</sup> Pettitt, April 2007: 4.



Finally, it has been argued that it is a mistake to assume that there must be one major party on the “left” and another on the “right” by the reckoning of the conventional model.<sup>723</sup> If so, then the analysis presented here suggests that there is also no reason to think that at any particular moment all the sectors of the PoliMap must have or even can have their own electorally viable party<sup>724</sup> outside of a proportional representation system with a very low threshold for winning seats.<sup>725</sup>

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<sup>723</sup> Hames, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2002.

<sup>724</sup> Clarke, 1999; Meek, 1998; 1999: 14.

<sup>725</sup> Daems, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2010: para 44.

# CHAPTER 14: A PROFILE OF POSSIBLE FUTURE HIGHER-LEVEL CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS

## CHANGES IN THE TYPE AND ATTITUDES OF FUTURE PARLIAMENTARIANS

Eventually, sitting politicians must be replaced by new ones. After the 2001 general election new MPs comprised 20% of the strength of the parliamentary Conservative party<sup>726</sup> although a concatenation of events at other times might alter this proportion considerably.<sup>727</sup> What predictions can be made about the socio-demographic composition and attitudes of such replacements in the years following 2002? In this chapter a method of identifying one group of possible replacements is first described before looking at the type of person who might replace existing parliamentarians and then analysis of possible attitudinal changes.

### IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL REPLACEMENTS

Around the time of the *CPRS 2002* many higher-level Conservative politicians had served as local councillors before being elected to Parliament.<sup>728</sup> As shown in Table 14.1, responses to an item in the *CPRS 2002* indicated that a majority of Westminster MPs and other higher-level representatives had either been local councillors or had at least stood as local council candidates before attaining their present position. This was particularly true of MEPs who appear to have had more direct experience in “local” electoral politics experience than their all-UK or Scottish counterparts.

	MPs	MEPs	MSPs
Had been a local councillor	35%	64%	38%
Had stood unsuccessfully at a local election	26%	7%	31%
Neither of the above	39%	29%	31%
Base	49	14	13

In addition, as shown in Table 14.2, a quarter (24%) of ELCs indicated that they would “definitely” consider a career “further up the political ladder” as an MP, MEP or member of the newer Scottish, Welsh or London institutions. Another fifth (19%) indicated that they “possibly” would.

<sup>726</sup> Criddle, 2002: 182.

<sup>727</sup> Riddell, 15<sup>th</sup> May 2009.

<sup>728</sup> Cowley & Melhuish, March 1997: 27; Landale & Peek, 15<sup>th</sup> March 2000.

<b>TABLE 14.2: LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN ENGLAND CONSIDERING A CAREER “FURTHER UP THE POLITICAL LADDER”</b>	
Yes, definitely	24%
Yes, possibly	19%
Unlikely or not at all	57%
Base	278

Based upon these findings, an attempt can be made to describe the possible socio-demographic and attitudinal changes of incoming higher-level Conservative politicians in the years following the *CPRS 2002*. This can be done by comparing those current ELCs most likely to become higher-level politicians with such politicians at the time of the *CPRS 2002*. Because of the numbers involved, when looking at “higher-level politicians” only consider Westminster MPs will be considered.

Furthermore, “those sorts of current ELCs most likely to become higher-level politicians” needs to be defined more objectively. First, by looking at those who were already MPs around the time of the *CPRS 2002* a defensible age-related cut-off point can be calculated beyond which someone is unlikely to be elected as an MP for the first time. Table 14.3 presents data collated from a convenient source<sup>729</sup> concerning age-related details of when individuals were first elected as a Conservative MP.

Analysis including a boxplot analysis in *SPSS* confirmed the presence of a solitary outlier at the upper end of the range of maximum age first elected as an MP. This individual was first elected as an MP at the age of 60 compared to the next oldest at 49. Accordingly, this individual was removed from the analysis although in practice it made little difference.

<b>TABLE 14.3: AGE-RELATED DETAILS OF CONSERVATIVE MPs RETURNED AT THE 2001 GENERAL ELECTION</b>	
Minimum age first elected as an MP	27
Maximum age first elected as an MP	49
Mean age first elected as an MP (rounded)	38
Standard deviation (rounded)	5
Base	165
Note: The outlier discussed in the main text has been excluded from the figures in this table	

It is known that two standard deviations from the mean encompass over 95% of a normally distributed population. In practice, looking both at this and the simple maximum age of first being elected of those

<sup>729</sup> Austin & Hames, 2001.

Conservative MPs returned at the 2001 general election it means that the age of 49 can be accepted as the cut-off point for ELCs who harboured ambitions to climb the political ladder. Given that the fieldwork for this study was done in 2002 and there was in fact a general election three years later in 2005, this can be qualified by excluding from further analysis any “ambitious” ELCs who were 47 or older at the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork.

When combining this calculation with the responses to the item about whether respondents would consider a career further up the political ladder, 30 ELCs are left who were “definitely” politically ambitious and were sufficiently young to entertain realistic hopes of advancement, at least for a few years.

The following analysis only included those who said that they were “definitely” ambitious rather than also including those who were “possibly” ambitious, even though the smaller base would make statistically significant findings less likely. This was because it was and is difficult just to be selected to contest a seat, let alone a winnable seat. Even allowing for a degree of diffidence on the part of *CPRS 2002* respondents—if such a quality may be allowed for politicians—it was felt that only those prepared to say “definitely” were sufficiently keen.

In passing, it should be noted that ELCs were often politically ambitious. Of the 51 ELCs who could be identified as being younger than 47 a mere seven indicated that they were unlikely or not at all likely to consider a career further up the ladder.

Of course, there are other and/or additional routes to becoming an MP. However, an analysis of the 51 people who entered the House of Commons as Conservative MPs for the first time after the 2005 general election indicates that the “former local councillor route” remained an important one.<sup>730</sup> Of those 51 individuals, 40% could definitely be identified as having been local councillors. The analysis was done by reading the very brief biographies on the Conservative Party’s website, so the number must be regarded as an approximation. Still, it suggests no great change either way in importance of the former-local-councillor route.

## **SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF REPLACEMENTS**

Before looking at what differences there might be between potential replacements drawn from ELCs and sitting MPs, a few things can be said about what these replacements “look like”. The following is an outline of the 30 ELCs identified above.

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<sup>730</sup> House of Commons Information Office, personal communication, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2007; Conservative Party, 2007.

In much of the following the small number of respondents in absolute terms should be noted. The problem of reporting that 11% of potential replacements were cohabiting when this actually represents only three individuals is acknowledged.

Possible replacements were all white with not a single respondent checking the non-white option. They were also overwhelmingly male (87%).

By way of a check, those who were actually new entrants at the 2005 general election can be analysed. There were 51 new Conservative MPs. Of these 12% were women, matching the proportion of potential replacements (13%) from the *CPRS 2002* almost exactly. More crudely, just by way of looking at names and photographs, only two could definitely be considered to be non-white.

Carrying on with the relevant *CPRS 2002* respondents, they were generally married (68%) with few cohabiting with a partner (11%) with the rest noting that they were single. Most had attended a state secondary school (83%) and irrespective of this many had gone on to university or had attained equivalent professional qualifications (69%).

Three quarters (76%) were employed as opposed to self-employed, primarily working in the private sector (77%) and mainly in jobs that fell into the questionnaire's "service sector management or professions" category (70%) with "manufacturing or agriculture" accounting for much of the rest (13%). This accords with a crude analysis of the 51 individuals who were actually elected as MPs for the first time in 2005. Without creating a formal schema to quantify it, it was clear that the majority—at least two-thirds—had some significant occupational background in either the professions or the service sector, particularly law and finance.

Over two-thirds (69%) of the potential replacements viewed themselves as being "middle class" with most of the rest (21%) regarding themselves as belonging to no particular social class (as opposed to stating that they considered themselves to be "working class").

Nearly half (47%) had been in the Young Conservatives but very few (10%) said that they had been in the Federation of Conservative Students.

In short, and perhaps to no great astonishment, this is a picture of a fairly homogeneous group of white, middle-class, white collar, youngish-middle-aged males.

It says much about these respondents' dedication to the Conservative Party and/or public office and/or personal ambition that nearly half (45%) said that they had joined the Party before the age of 20 and exactly the same proportion (45%) said that they had become a local councillor before the age of 30.

## SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPLACEMENTS AND SITTING MPs

It was noted in Chapter 4 that analysed the socio-demographics of ELCs that there was much talk at the time of making the Conservative Party's MPs (and so on) more representative of the general public. Particular attention was paid to sex and race.

For the reasons noted in Chapter 2 concerning the methodology of this study, such items were not asked of any of *CPRS 2002* respondents *except* ELCs. However, some of this information about MPs of the time can be found in secondary sources. In 2002, 14 Conservative MPs were women, comprising 8% of the Party's total, and there were no non-white Conservative MPs.<sup>731</sup>

As already noted, of the possible replacements ELCs identified above, only 13% were female. This was hardly a dramatic increase in absolute terms. However, it would be a greater increase if female ELC respondents had been as likely to want to become MPs (and so on) as their male colleagues. But they were not. To turn the figures around, only 6% of *all* female ELC respondents fell into the group of possible future MPs compared to 12% of *all* male ELCs. Female ELCs were proportionately less likely than their male counterparts to fall into the group of potential replacements. Whether this was because of age, lack of political ambition or a belief that the selection system was biased against them—in short, the debate<sup>732</sup> about whether and to what extent it is “demand” or “supply” of female candidates that tends to be low—goes beyond this study.

As for race, it has already been seen that *every* ELC respondent ticked the box marked “White”.

It is of course true that elected local politicians are far from representing the whole pool of potential parliamentarians. That said, there was little evidence that replacement in terms of career advancement—as opposed to a more dramatic change in career—would have the (rightly or wrongly) apparently desired effect of markedly increasing the number of female and non-white candidates standing in general elections after the one in 2001. It seems likely that some form of positive discrimination would be needed.<sup>733</sup> That 92% of ELCs, 92% of SLCs and 89% of WLCs agreed with the statement “Local Conservative associations should retain control over parliamentary candidate selection” suggests that it would be in the teeth of local resistance.<sup>734</sup> Of course, some more senior female Conservative politicians around the time of the *CPRS 2002* also opposed positive discrimination.<sup>735</sup>

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<sup>731</sup> Brivati & Baston, 2002: 8.

<sup>732</sup> Krook, May 2010.

<sup>733</sup> Sieghart, 20<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

<sup>734</sup> Walker, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2009.

<sup>735</sup> Villiers, 20<sup>th</sup> December 2004.

## ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES

Looking at the range of multi-item scales used throughout this study and detailed in Appendix 3, the attitudes of potential ELC replacements were compared with those of existing MPs from the *CPRS 2002* using the t-test procedure in *SPSS*. Of course, there can be little certainty about what attitudinal types of MP might *leave* the House of Commons thus creating a vacancy. In part, it depends upon matters such as the fortunes of the Conservative Party at elections and the size of majorities handed over to new parliamentary candidates. This analysis is meant only as a tentative guide.

The first result is that there was no significant difference at the conventional two-tailed 5% level between the two groups along most scales: Authoritarianism, Left-Right, Europeanism, Environmentalism, Welfarism, Feminism, Postmaterialism, Pride in the Way Nation Functions, Intra-Party Inclusivity, Political Elitism and Optimism. That there was no significant differences in attitudes between possible replacement ELCs and sitting MPs on some of the most important attitudinal scales—both politically and in terms of analyses within this report—is surely of note.

Based upon other research undertaken some years after the *CPRS 2002* commentators noted that, “For all his attempts to make the Conservative Party look to the future, a giant from the past looms over David Cameron. The next generation of Tory MPs are Thatcher’s Children.”<sup>736</sup>

However, there were seven scales where there were significant differences: Traditional British Liberties, Theocratism, Religiosity, Xenophobia, Protectionism, Pride in National Heritage & Culture and Intra-Party Elitism. These are set out in Table 14.4.

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<sup>736</sup> Groves, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010; Hall, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2010; Whitworth & Baldwin, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2010: 26.

TABLE 14.4: SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SITTING MPS AND POSSIBLE ELC REPLACEMENTS				
Scale	Base (MPs/ELCs)	t	Two-tailed sig.	Comments
Theocratism	52/28	3.882	<0.001	ELCs more inclined towards secularist attitudes
Religiosity	48/29	4.497	<0.001	ELCs more inclined towards non-religious attitudes
Traditional British Liberties	49/30	2.236	0.028	ELCs more inclined towards authoritarian attitudes
Xenophobia	49/29	-2.976	0.004	ELCs more inclined towards xenophobic views
Protectionism	50/29	-2.507	0.014	ELCs more inclined towards protectionist views
Pride in National Heritage & Culture	51/29	2.181	0.032	ELCs less proud
Intra-Party Elitism	51/30	4.614	<0.001	ELCs more inclined towards grass-roots control of Party

That members of the subset of ELCs tended to be more in favour of grassroots control of the Party than MPs hardly needs further comment. Whether they would have continued to do so after a few years at Westminster or Brussels is another matter.

That there were significant differences in the same direction in attitudes measured by both of the religion-based variables suggests a potential development of some substance. Religion was analysed more fully in Chapter 10, but this finding highlights the general secularisation of British—or at least English in this instance—public life.

The finding that the possible replacements were *less* proud of their country's heritage and culture than sitting MPs is interesting and at first sight puzzling. It might indicate a straightforward if unexpected finding about these relatively younger politicians' views about Britain's achievements and attributes. However, it might indicate a "going to hell in a handcart" view of how Britain was moving at the time after years of rule under a (to respondents) disliked Labour government and/of from an equally disliked "Brussels".

A study of the individual items detailed in Appendix 3 making up the Traditional British Liberties, Xenophobia and Protectionism suggests a degree of overlap. Correlation analysis (not shown here) using the Pearson statistic indicated significant bivariate, two-tailed correlations well below the conventional



5% level between all three scales. Given this, then the fact that the significant differences were all in the same direction—more “authoritarian” in some manner—again suggests a possible development of note. It can also be seen from Appendix 3 that the Xenophobia and Protectionism scales also dealt in some manner with economic issues. Overall, it may be defensible to argue that these findings suggest a shift towards economic and social/moral “populism”, a reoccurring and *sometimes* electorally successful strand within Conservative thinking around the time of the *CPRS 2002*.<sup>737</sup>

That said, there were no significant difference between (then) current MPs and some of their most likely replacements along a whole range of important variables concerned with, for example, the EU and the environment. This is despite reputable claims to the contrary that there has indeed been a continuing process amongst Conservative politicians of attitudinal change in some of these areas for many years.<sup>738</sup> In short, much like the findings for possible demographic changes, in some attitudinal areas of significance new Conservative MPs are likely to be much like the ones around the time of the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork. For good or ill, matters are unlikely to change unless the Party leadership actively promotes candidates to winnable seats at least in part on the basis of political views different to those held by the sitting MPs they hope to replace.

The other qualification, already noted in the case of control of the Party, is that becoming an MP or MEP and so on might “refocus” points of view.

## CONCLUSION

Regarding socio-demographic changes amongst future higher-level politicians, what can be said is that the proportion of non-whites is unlikely to increase by a great deal although the proportion of women might increase somewhat. This is backed up by an analysis of those who actually did enter the Commons in 2005. Similarly, they are likely to possess a university (or equivalent) education and have a background in the service sector or the professions, particularly finance and law. In short, if the analysis holds any significant truth then for the next two or three general elections after 2005 then the “typical” new Conservative MP likely is likely to a middle-class—although by no means “posh” when it is recalled that the majority of them did *not* attend a fee-paying school—white male with a background in law or finance. It is to be suspected that this appears very much like the picture that many would hold about Conservative politicians “as a group”.

Regarding attitudinal changes, it has already been noted that if translated into reality—and “naively” assuming that the mere fact of becoming an MP did not result in real or professed attitudinal changes—a move towards more “authoritarian” or “populist” attitudes can be expected amongst Conservative

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<sup>737</sup> Baker, Gamble & Seawright, 2002: 405; Cowley & Norton, 1999: 95-96; Norton, 2002: 86; Tyrie, 2001: 17.

<sup>738</sup> Webb, 2003; Heppell, 2005.

parliamentarians.<sup>739</sup> However, it is also true that in many important areas likely replacements share the views of many of those that they will replace.

To reiterate, for good or ill it seemed unlikely that either the socio-demographic or attitudinal profile of higher-level Conservative politicians would greatly change in the two or three general elections after 2002 absent of an active and centralising<sup>740</sup> policy by the Party leadership to force such a change.<sup>741</sup> This might include taking advantage of unforeseen circumstances to remove less desirable sitting MPs<sup>742</sup> and/or, apparently paradoxically, giving members of the electorate from outside of the Party more say in the selection of candidates.<sup>743</sup>

Of course, assuming that any such changes were made at least partly in order to boost electoral popularity then there is still no guarantee that such changes would have the desired, causal result.<sup>744</sup>

Time and further research will tell.

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<sup>739</sup> Elliott, 30<sup>th</sup> April 2009; Montgomerie, 30<sup>th</sup> April 2009.

<sup>740</sup> Isaby, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2009.

<sup>741</sup> Montgomerie, 11<sup>th</sup> May 2006; but see Elliott & Coates, 28<sup>th</sup> April 2009; Isaby, 29<sup>th</sup> April 2009.

<sup>742</sup> Montgomerie, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2009.

<sup>743</sup> Conservative Party, 10<sup>th</sup> July 2009; Hitchens, 9<sup>th</sup> August 2009.

<sup>744</sup> Bale, September 2008: 295.

## CHAPTER 15: BRINGING THE FINDINGS TOGETHER

### THE PURPOSE OF THE *CPRS 2002* RESTATED

To reiterate, the *CPRS 2002* is a multi-focus study with its primary aim being an analysis of the attitudinal culture of Conservative politicians in 2002. It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to bring together the results so far presented but in a manner other than just rehearsing the concluding sections of the preceding thematic chapters.

Brief mention must also be made of the relationship between the Conservative Party as an institution on the one hand and the aggregate views, behaviour and background of its constituent parts on the other.

Finally, returning to a theme from Chapter 1, some further thoughts are presented as to why the *CPRS 2002* can plausibly be taken as an examination of Conservative Party politicians at or around a particular juncture in the history of the Party and of British politics.

### THE “TYPICAL” CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN IN 2002

#### Drawing a Picture

Rather than rehearsing the summations and conclusions found at the end of the preceding thematic chapters it is possible to (almost) end with a flourish and draw together the findings from the *CPRS 2002* into a readily comprehensible and succinct if “average” form.

Much of the work in the thematic chapters involved multivariate analysis and attempting to see what is associated with or predicts what. But if this is stripped away, and at the risk of providing an example of the ecological fallacy of making inferences about individuals from aggregate data<sup>745</sup> and also being somewhat “generous” about combining results, a picture can be drawn of a typical Conservative politician in 2002. Needless to say, many of the actual respondents deviate a good deal from this exemplar.

In Chapter 1 a rough outline using a variety of approaches and sources was provided of “conservatism”. However, it was also noted that “conservatism” and the “Conservative Party” are not necessarily the same. This applies just as much to the distinction between the “Conservative Party” and individual “Conservative Party politicians”. That said, there is clearly a link between all three. It would be foolish to claim that the following “Conservative Party politician” represents a definitive picture of

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<sup>745</sup> Bryman, 2008: 307.

“conservatism” in the UK at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> or start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But he (*sic*) is not too far away.

## **The Conservative Politician in 2002**

He—for he was likely to be a he rather than a she—was white, middle-aged and at the time of the survey if not from birth middle-class if not necessarily “posh”. In most of this he differed little from his counterparts in Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Where he did differ from them was that his occupational background was more likely to have been in the private sector and also that he was more likely to represent a rural or suburban rather than urban area.

He was likely from an Anglican background. Although in his personal beliefs he was quite religious, these views were generally isolated from his secular attitudes and he was not convinced that religion should play a strong role in public life.

He was a democrat in that he believed that ordinary people should have a strong say in how the country was run. Nevertheless he accepted the desirability of a degree of elite control. Similarly, he was quietly confident about the strength of British democracy, but when it came to what the purpose of that democracy was he was sometimes in two minds about whether the job of a politician was to be a representative of the people or to seek power to implement certain beliefs.

Looking at more specific ideological attitudes, he held mixed-economy to free-market economic views although he did not necessarily have a principled objection to the public sector. Similarly, he believed in some state provision of welfare to the needy but he was no believer in an all-embracing, cradle-to-grave Welfare State.

He held rather traditionalist or authoritarian views on morals and law and order.

However, turning to “new” values he had some sympathy for environmentalist or green views and was certainly no dyed-in-the-wool adherent of “traditional” views about “a woman’s place”.

He was a patriot. He was generally proud of the way that Britain functioned although this was not without reservations. However, he showed almost unalloyed pride in Britain’s heritage and culture. His attitude towards foreigners and foreign influences was middle-of-the-road, being neither notably welcoming nor antagonistic.

He was easy with thinking himself both British and English—since he was probably English—but was much less happy about seeing himself as both British and European. It therefore comes as no surprise that he had at most “in Europe, not run by Europe” views tending towards outright hostility regarding the

EU. If for the sake of party unity and discipline he was quiet on the subject of “Europe”, this might not always be the case...<sup>746</sup>

He took a “thus far and no further” attitude towards devolution, accepting the new institutions in Wales and Scotland but rejecting Celtic independence and possible developments such as an English parliament and particularly English regional assemblies. He held robustly Unionist sympathies as far as Northern Ireland was concerned and thought that the “peace process”—for he probably thought of it in inverted commas—had largely been a victory for the Republican side of the conflict.

Looking further afield, he was a little pessimistic about the prospect for peaceful relations between the West and the Islamic worlds. He was generally neutral between the Israelis on the one hand and the Palestinians and the Arab world in general on the other, although he inclined somewhat towards the Israelis. He was not inclined towards an enthusiastic Atlanticism inasmuch as this suggested subordination to the USA and he tended to believe that Britain should be more cautious in its support for the USA. He was generally keen to see Britain re-establish closer ties with the Commonwealth and this was even more so in the case of the “Old” Commonwealth.

When it comes to the Conservative Party, he believed in a mixture of Central Office and grass roots control of the Party. However, he felt that the Party’s leadership sometimes went too far in watering down some principles and beliefs for fear that they would be unacceptable to the floating voter or sections of the mass media. He was in two minds about attempts to “modernise” the Party vis-à-vis advancing women, racial minorities and homosexuals. As far as the other major political parties were concerned, whilst he liked neither he had a particularly strong dislike of the Liberal Democrats when compared to Labour although these attitudes seemed as much visceral as ideological. The only party in the UK that he had active sympathy for was the historically closely associated Ulster Unionist Party. His views about those perceived to be single-issue parties such as the Greens, UKIP and the BNP was shaped by his own attitudes towards those same single issues.

He was, to be blunt, unduly optimistic about the Party’s condition and short to medium-term prospects. This attitude, along with his Euro-scepticism, was why he probably voted for Iain Duncan Smith in the 2001 leadership contest.

And as of 2002, his attitude towards Margaret Thatcher still approached fervent worship.

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<sup>746</sup> Webb, December 2008: 441.

## THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTY AS AN INSTITUTION

That said, and turning matters completely around, the briefest acknowledgment must be made that there are reasons to predict that there would be differences between the aggregated and averaged views of Conservative politicians as recorded by the *CPRS 2002* on the one hand and the Party as an institution on the other.

(It is beyond the scope of this final chapter to engage in an in-depth study of Conservative Party documents such as general election manifestos<sup>747</sup> to ascertain the values of the Party as an institution. This would be a different study altogether.)

In the 1960s Robert McKenzie<sup>748</sup> argued that the main parties were oligarchical in nature and that this was a positive quality in that ordinary party members—as opposed to the leadership—were more “extreme” than ordinary voters. (Revisiting McKenzie, it was argued that between 1997 and 2001 the Conservative Party moved somewhat away from such an oligarchical structure towards more direct membership participation. This was particularly seen in the election as leader by the mass membership of Iain Duncan Smith, a man who was never overwhelmingly popular amongst MPs.<sup>749</sup>)

The concept of “Downsianism”<sup>750</sup> must again be mentioned: the tendency of political parties to move towards the political “centre” in an attempt to attract votes. (Of course, in reality this would often apply to the public utterances of politicians who were toeing the party line irrespective of what they personally believed.)

In short, it is likely that if such a like-for-like comparison could be done—if the Conservative Party itself was a *CPRS 2002* respondent, so to speak—then it would tend to fall at least relatively nearer the middle of the range of multi-item scales used in this study than the average actual respondent.

## THE *CPRS 2002* AS A PICTURE AT A PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME

A case can be made that the fieldwork for the study took place during a period with a claim to be distinctive. This period represented a nadir in the Party’s fortunes.

An extended account of this period can be considered as starting in September 1992 following the events of Black Wednesday when the Conservative government was forced to withdraw the pound from the

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<sup>747</sup> Conservative Party 2001[b]; Conservative Party, 2005; Klingemann *et al*, 2006.

<sup>748</sup> McKenzie, 1964; Kelly, 2004: 398.

<sup>749</sup> Kelly, 2004: 398-399.

<sup>750</sup> Lees-Marshment & Quayle, 2000; Ward, 2000.

European Exchange Rate Mechanism and after which popular support for them collapsed.<sup>751</sup> This period also witnessed the rise of New Labour.<sup>752</sup> The end date was May 2010 when the Conservatives under David Cameron formed a new government albeit in coalition with the Liberal Democrats under Nick Clegg.<sup>753</sup>

A shorter account of this period can be considered as starting in May 1997 when the Conservatives succumbed to the Labour landslide at the general election.<sup>754</sup> The slightly less distinct end date for this period is around December 2007 or January 2008 when the Conservatives under David Cameron were at last routinely ahead of Labour in the polls<sup>755</sup> even if this was substantially based on hostility to Labour rather than a positive endorsement of the Conservatives.<sup>756</sup>

However, an even narrower period can be defined. The start date for this is still May 1997 when the Conservative Party lost office. The end date is November 2003—a year and a half after the *CPRS 2002* fieldwork—when Michael Howard replaced Iain Duncan Smith as leader of the Conservatives and was seen by many as steadying the ship before leading the Party to a still losing but more respectable performance at the 2005 general election.<sup>757</sup> The latter events seemed to draw a line—albeit a somewhat indistinct one—under a long period of national electoral and institutional misery and decline for the Party.

It is this period of five or six years, May 1997 to November 2003, into which the *CPRS 2002* falls. Revisionist analyses of the sort noted in Chapter 1 notwithstanding, by most common metrics of British politics, and above all from the results of general elections, this was a period of unique gloom in the history of the modern Conservative Party. It was out of office and with no immediate prospect of return. It was going through a parade of unsuccessful leaders. Furthermore, and perhaps as strikingly indicated by the attitudes of *CPRS 2002* respondents towards the Iron Lady in Chapter 5, for good or ill its politicians—and its lay members, it is to be expected—were still looking backwards to the perceived golden age of Margaret Thatcher's period in office.

The main purposes of the *CPRS 2002* include providing a wide-ranging picture of the attitudes, behaviour and socio-demographic background and culture of Conservative Party politicians with—as is discussed in the following chapter—the additional purpose of the creation of a dataset that would allow analysis and comparison by future researchers.

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<sup>751</sup> Pattie & Johnston, 1996; Norton, 2002: 68; Travis, 27<sup>th</sup> April 2002.

<sup>752</sup> Worcester & Mortimer, 1999.

<sup>753</sup> *BBC News*, 12<sup>th</sup> May 2010.

<sup>754</sup> Worcester & Mortimore, 1999.

<sup>755</sup> *BBC News*, 6<sup>th</sup> December 2005; Marquand, 2009: 398-399.

<sup>756</sup> *Political Studies Association News*, March 2009: 30.

<sup>757</sup> Dyke & Bale, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2010; King, 30<sup>th</sup> July 2004.

It is true that some of the younger *CPRS 2002* respondents and their colleagues elsewhere in the country—particularly those that are local councillors—are likely to continue to have an overt role in the Party for many years after the fieldwork. In short, some of the younger *CPRS 2002* respondents or those like them might be targets for a *CPRS 2032*. Furthermore, if one tries hard enough almost any point in time can be described as “pivotal” in some manner or other.

Nevertheless, for the reasons just rehearsed, the period around 2002 seems a defensible time to call *finis* on the late 20<sup>th</sup> century Conservative Party.



## **CHAPTER 16: BEYOND THE *CPRS 2002***

### **FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE *CPRS 2002* DATA**

However, it is not necessary to call *finis* on the *CPRS 2002*. The study captured in excess of 100,000 items of data—over 500 individuals responding to over 200 questionnaire items—even before considering the calculation of derived variables such as the multi-item scales or the PoliMap. The preceding thematic chapters can only describe so much and there was insufficient space and/or justification within the remit of the study to analyse every single variable alone or in combination. For example, there are a small number of items—such as about the running of the Party, about religion and about general attitudes towards the state—the data for which is not analysed at all.

In addition to this, for the reasons explained at the start of this study the range of statistical techniques used to analyse the data was limited and there are others that might be used with profit. Similarly, others might wish to examine different theoretical questions and hypotheses such as an empirical analysis of elements of the synthesised description of conservatism found at the start of Chapter 1.

In short, other researchers might seek to interrogate the data in ways besides those described in the preceding thematic chapters.

### **RE-RUNNING THE STUDY**

The *CPRS 2002* captured data at a point in time. For a number of reasons such as a desire to answer specific questions or as a necessary step towards constructing a time-series dataset some or all of the items in the questionnaire might be used again with future Conservative politicians. Or others, of course, since many of the items are universal in nature.

For the reasons noted in Chapter 2 it was not possible to pilot the main questionnaire. If one could treat the *CPRS 2002* itself as a pilot study then it is possible to suggest certain amendments, omissions and additions.

Trivially, other than out of a sense of completeness one wonders whether there is any point in sending questionnaires—assuming for the sake of argument a similar form of deployment—to members of the Greater London Assembly or Welsh Assembly. The number of potential respondents is so small. (The counter argument might be, “In which case, why not?”)

Looking at the items in the questionnaire, the most obvious candidates for removal would be the scales Pride in Heritage and Culture, Pride in the Way the Nation Functions, Protectionism and Xenophobia

used to create a typology of national identity. In terms of analysis of the Conservative Party the typology, and indeed the individual scales, added very little. Similarly, the Postmaterialism scale was rarely of great importance and, because of its manner of presentation, caused some confusion amongst a minority of respondents leading to a noticeably lower response rate. Between them, these five scales consisted of 24 items the removal of which would lead to a considerable saving of space within the questionnaire.

There are certainly some topics and items that could be cleaned up or added, even though this would delay the start of a time-series dataset. As just suggested, the areas of the *CPRS 2002* dealing with national identity and foreign affairs were not as strong as they could have been and/or were used to answer what some might see as idiosyncratic questions such as the relationships between attitudes towards the EU, the USA and Israel. Other researchers will surely have different interests. The Religiosity scale, although valid and reliable, was accompanied by an unusual response set which meant that statistical standardisation had to be used. It is surely possible for otherwise similar items using a more typical five-point range to be devised.

In the *CPRS 2002* questionnaire there should have been more on media consumption such as standard items about newspaper readership. A future survey would likely go into more detail about use of the Internet and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) generally.

Over time the salience of various topics will likely change. For example, May 2010 witnessed the formation of a Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government along with a commitment by David Cameron to offer a referendum on some form of change to the voting system as a price for Liberal Democrat support.<sup>758</sup> It might be of interest to revisit but in more detail the robust aversion expressed in 2002 by Conservative politicians to both the Liberal Democrats and proportional representation.

Some issues were not dealt with, in part because the answers were assumed. For example, the Conservative Party's long-standing support for an independent British nuclear deterrent was taken for granted.<sup>759</sup> This particular assumption was almost certainly correct, but it is well to examine one's assumptions.

When looking at socio-demographic issues it would be advisable to employ more orthodox and hence comparable measures such as the Goldthorpe Class Schema<sup>760</sup> or NRS social grades<sup>761</sup> (the famous "C1s" and "C2s").

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<sup>758</sup> *The Telegraph*, 12<sup>th</sup> May 2010.

<sup>759</sup> Marquand, 2009: 184.

<sup>760</sup> Goldthorpe & Heath, 1992.

<sup>761</sup> National Readership Survey, 2008.

One can also think of other techniques that would capture not just more but perhaps different information. With much greater resources—particularly in terms of a team of trained researchers rather than a lone individual—the use of at least some face-to-face interviews would be of profit.

All of that said, the *CPRS 2002* captured a wide array of reliable and valid quantitative data about the attitudes and socio-demographic background of Conservative politicians. It seems likely that any future researchers would be obliged to use at least the bulk of the items already used.

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## APPENDIX 1: THE SEPTEMBER 2000 PILOT STUDY

As described in Chapter 2, a small-scale pilot study was conducted in September 2000. The questionnaire contained a number of items that were intended to assess two multi-item scales: the new “Judeo-Christian Concerns” dimension and a new way of operationalising the PoliMap, a concept described in greater detail in Chapter 3.

The following sets out the preface for each set of items and the wording for each item. It also describes the response option sets used for the two scales. All original text is in italics.

### Question 1

*“Below are five issues that often appear as matters of public and political discussion. Some people think that, whilst accepting that any or all of them may not always cause problems for every single individual, in general they represent serious and immediate moral and physical dangers to civilised society as a whole. Other people think that, whilst accepting that any or all of them may well cause problems for some individuals, in general their importance and impact for civilised society as a whole has been subject to exaggeration and scaremongering. In each case, where would you put your own view? Please place only one tick per row.”*

Each of the five items below was presented along with the following five-point Likert-style response set: “Very serious danger to society”, “Fairly serious danger to society”, “Somewhere in between”, “Somewhat exaggerated danger to society” and “Very much exaggerated danger to society”.

- *“Drug use, especially amongst young people”.*
- *“The weakening of the traditional family, particularly seen in increased divorce and single-parenthood”.*
- *“The availability of violent and pornographic material through videos and the internet”.*
- *“Crime and the fear of crime”.*
- *“Removing barriers to the promotion in schools of homosexuality and other non-conventional relationships”.*

### Question 2

*“Below you will find ten pairs of opposing statements concerning ten separate issues. Some people will fully agree with one of the pair, some the other, and others will have a view somewhere in between. Between each pair of statements you will also find a row of five boxes. People who fully agree with either one of the pair of statements would place a tick in the box at the end of the row closest to that statement.*

*People who tend to agree with one of the statements but with reservations would place a tick in one of the boxes second in from the end of the row closest to that statement. People who take a neutral position between the two statements would use the middle or third box. In each case, please place a tick in the box that most nearly reflects your own opinion. Please place only one tick per row."*

In the original questionnaire, between each opposing statement there were five boxes into which respondents would place their mark depending upon how close (or equidistant) to either was their own view. Here are only presented the opposing pairs.

*"It is the duty of the state to provide through taxation for all the educational, health, and welfare needs of its citizens" and "It is up to individuals themselves, their families, or charitable organisations to provide for all of a person's educational, health, and welfare needs".*

*"The success or failure of businesses and the fate of their employees should be left entirely to the workings of the free market" and "The government should not hesitate to regulate, subsidise, or take into public ownership businesses if this is necessary to ensure their survival or to safeguard jobs".*

*"Adults should be allowed to engage in any form of private, consensual sexual activity they wish" and "The only form of sexual activity that is acceptable is between a man and woman who are married to each other".*

*"Within the criminal justice system the emphasis should always be on the rights of the victim" and "Within the criminal justice system the emphasis should always be on the rights of the accused".*

*"The level and standards of wages and working conditions should be solely a matter of negotiation between employers, employees, or their respective representatives" and "The government should set legally enforceable levels and standards for wages and working conditions".*

*"The government should take whatever measures are necessary to protect domestic industry and jobs from foreign competition even if this means limiting consumer choice" and "The freedom of consumers to purchase goods and services from anywhere they wish, including from abroad, overrides any considerations of protecting domestic industry and jobs".*

*"Adults are responsible for their own bodies and should be able to consume whatever drugs they wish" and "For their own good, the government should use all its powers to stop people taking drugs".*

*"Key industries and utilities such as public transport and power generation and supply need to be in public ownership to ensure their use for the good of the nation as a whole" and "Industries and utilities*

*such as public transport and power generation and supply are no different from any other businesses and should be in private hands competing in the free market”.*

*“If adults wish to read or watch material of a pornographic or extremely violent nature that is entirely up to them” and “To protect decent society and vulnerable individuals, the government needs to stop the distribution of material of a pornographic or extremely violent nature”.*

*“The young people of this country, and the country itself, would benefit from the reintroduction of some form of compulsory national service, whether of a military or civilian form” and “Any form or compulsory national service, whether of a military or civilian form, is simply enforced servitude of a sort unacceptable in a civilised, peacetime society”.*

## APPENDIX 2: TEXT OF ACCOMPANYING LETTER FROM THE RT. HON. ERIC FORTH MP

*14<sup>th</sup> March 2002*

*Dear Colleague,*

*I have pleasure in introducing the enclosed survey from Nigel Meek, a researcher at London Guildhall University.*

*As well as his work at London Guildhall, Nigel has been an activist in what is now the Bromley & Chislehurst Conservative Association since the mid-1980s. He has served on its Executive Committee and various candidate selection panels, and was a member of the former London South-East European Constituency Council.*

*I think that one of the striking aspects of contemporary political reporting is the often poor coverage given to the Conservative Party itself. At times, this may be due to the political inclinations of many in the media. However, even when well-intentioned, reports often derive from anecdote and gossip on the one hand, or serious study which is nevertheless partial or out of date on the other.*

*Nigel's work is important for two reasons. First, being both an academic and a member of the Party, he is able to bring to bear objective analysis on an institution that he is part of and understands. Second, the outcome will enable serious commentators to draw upon reliable, up-to-date, and wide-ranging data about the Conservative Party's "front-line" representatives.*

*These days, some politicians are deluged with surveys of one sort or another. Others seem comparatively ignored. In either case, please see if you can spare the time to complete and return the enclosed questionnaire.*

*Yours faithfully,*

*Eric*

## **APPENDIX 3: DETAILS OF THE MULTI-ITEM SCALES USED IN THE *CPRS 2002***

The following are the multi-item scales used throughout the study and discussed in Chapter 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all items were introduced with “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?” Unless otherwise indicated, respondents were presented with a five-point, Likert-type “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly” response set. The direction of the wording of the individual items is as found in the original *CPRS 2002* questionnaire set out in Appendix 5 below. Where necessary the order of individual items was reversed to compute the final multi-item scale.

### **Authoritarianism**

- Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values
- People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences
- For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence
- Schools should teach children to obey authority
- The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong
- Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards

In the *CPRS 2002* the following item was used to identify attitudes towards gays and lesbians:

- Homosexual relationships are always wrong

In the *BSA 2001* survey a different item was used to identify attitudes towards gays and lesbians:

- Do you think they would be right or wrong to refuse a job to an applicant only because he or she is gay or lesbian?

### **Environmentalism**

- The government should do more to protect the environment, even if it leads to higher taxes
- Industry should do more to protect the environment, even if it leads to lower profits and fewer jobs
- Ordinary people should do more to protect the environment, even if it means paying higher prices
- People should be allowed to use their cars as much as they like, even if it causes damage to the environment
- Many of the claims about mankind’s damage to the environment are exaggerated

## **Europeanism**

- The UK should embrace the concept of a federal Europe
- Membership of the Euro is crucial for Britain's future prosperity
- The EU's budget should be enlarged
- A single European Army would undermine rather than underpin the security of the UK
- Britain should withdraw from the EU
- The strength of national identities rules out parliamentary democracy on a European scale for the foreseeable future
- Conservative MEPs should remain committed members of the EPP/ED group

## **Feminism**

- Government should make sure that women have an equal chance to succeed
- Men and women are equally suited emotionally for politics
- All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job
- Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay
- A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family

## **Intra-Party Elitism**

*(Members of the Conservative Party should have more influence in...)*

- Basic principles and beliefs of the Party
- Formulation of Party policy and writing of manifestos
- Running and administering the Party and its finances

## **Intra-Party Inclusivity**

*(More should be done to advance members of the following groups within the Conservative Party...)*

- Women
- Racial minorities
- Homosexuals and lesbians

## **Left-Right**

- Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off
- Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers
- Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth
- There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
- Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance



## **Optimism**

- People do not trust Conservative politicians at a national level
- People do not trust Conservative politicians at a local level
- The Conservative Party can win the next general election
- The Conservative Party can win the next-but-one general election
- The Conservative Party as an institution is in better shape than many seem to think
- Opinion polls underestimate the level of support for the Conservatives amongst ordinary people
- The Conservative Party should change its name
- The view that the Conservative Party is culturally and socially “out of touch” is exaggerated
- The Conservative period in office between 1979 and 1997 brought about a major change in public attitudes
- Depictions in recent years of the Conservative Party as being “extreme” have some validity

## **Political Elitism**

- Ordinary citizens should have more say in the decisions made by government
- More should be done to interest people in government
- More should be done to involve ordinary people in decision making
- It is for politicians rather than the public to make decisions on issues and priorities

## **Postmaterialism**

(First and second most important aims of the country in the coming years)

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

## **Pride in Heritage and Culture**

*(How proud or not are you of Britain in each of the following? “Very proud”, “Somewhat proud”, “Not very proud” or “Not proud at all”)*

- Its armed forces
- Its history
- Its achievements in sports
- Its achievements in arts and literature
- Its scientific and technological achievements

### **Pride in the Way the Nation Functions**

*(How proud or not are you of Britain in each of the following? “Very proud”, “Somewhat proud”, “Not very proud” or “Not proud at all”)*

- Its political influence in the world
- Its social security system
- The way its democracy works
- Its economic achievements

The individual items making up this scale and Pride in Heritage & Culture were furthermore designed by the original researchers<sup>762</sup> to be combined into a single multi-item scale, National Sentiment (alpha = 0.69,  $n = 484$ ).

### **Protectionism**

- Britain should limit the import of foreign products to protect its national economy
- British television should give preference to British films and programmes
- Foreigners should be allowed to buy land in Britain as easily as British people
- Britain should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations
- People do not have to share British customs and traditions to become fully British

### **Religiosity**

- How close do you feel to God most of the time? [5-point scale.]
- How often do you attend a religious service? (Excluding weddings & funerals etc.) [4-point scale.]
- Which of the following comes closest to your own view? [6-point scale.]

Because each individual item possessed a different response option set, the Religiosity scale was computed from the three items after they had been standardised using *SPSS*.

### **Theocratism**

- Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections
- Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions
- Churches and religious organisations in this country have too much power

### **Traditional British Liberties**

- Britain should introduce compulsory identity cards
- Jury trials should be reserved only for the most serious of criminal charges
- The “double jeopardy” principle should be abolished for the most serious crimes
- Successive governments have been right to place stricter controls on the ownership of firearms

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<sup>762</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

### **Welfarism**

- The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves
- People receiving social security are made to feel like second class citizens
- The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other
- The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes
- Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one
- Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help
- Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another
- If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet

### **Xenophobia**

- Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain
- Immigrants increase crime rates
- Immigrants are generally good for Britain's economy
- Refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in Britain
- Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and culture
- British schools should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly
- The number of immigrants allowed into Britain nowadays should be increased
- Race relations will improve over the next few years [added for the *CPRS 2002*]

The individual items making up this scale and Protectionism were furthermore designed by the original researchers<sup>763</sup> to be combined into a single multi-item scale, Exclusiveness (alpha = 0.85, n = 478).

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<sup>763</sup> Dowds & Young, 1996.

## APPENDIX 4: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MULTI-ITEM SCALES BY TYPE OF RESPONDENT

The following tables display the observed distribution of responses to the multi-item scales detailed in Appendix 3. The responses are split by group of respondent: MPs, Peers and so on but omitting the two micro-groups of AMs and GLAs. The responses from the raw scales—i.e. the re-ordered where necessary sum of all responses to each scale's constituent items—are categorised into three-levels measured in absolute terms, i.e. the lowest, middle and highest thirds of the aggregate scores along each multi-item scales. Where it was not mathematically possible to exactly divide the scale data into three equal categories the middle category alone was altered to accommodate this calculation. This also applies to the use of such categories in the chapters above.

Little detail is gone into here since these scales are discussed in the text. However, since they are all in one place, sometimes one or two additional pieces of information are included. One-way ANOVA tests were run in *SPSS* for each uncategorised scale, with the factor being the type of respondent, again excluding AMs and GLAs. In formal terms, the null hypothesis was tested that there were no significant differences in attitudes between the groups of respondents. In those cases where the null hypotheses could be rejected—where two-tailed  $p = <0.05$ —this is stated below the table along with the significance figure. At the same time, the Bonferroni post-hoc multiple comparison procedure was run to determine if any significant between-groups differences between pairs of types of respondent could be identified. Where such differences are present, these are highlighted along with the significance figure.

Both the ANOVA and Bonferroni tests are sensitive to the sizes of the groups being compared. However, this also means that significant differences between smaller groups such as, for example, MEPs and WLCs in the case of Authoritarianism, must be considered robust.

As suggested, these inferential statistical analyses are here to add flavour to the descriptive data provided by the tables themselves. As such, the assumptions of ANOVA and/or non-parametric alternatives such as the Kruskal-Wallis test are not considered<sup>764</sup> nor are the full workings for the ANOVA and Bonferroni tests shown.

There is also the matter of nomenclature of the categories within each scale. To take one example, at the time of the survey to be seen as “Green” was “a good thing” whereas to be regarded as “Not Green” was generally regarded as “a bad thing”. However, it forms no part of the *CPRS 2002* to argue for or against the “goodness” of any beliefs and as such neutrality in terminology has been strived for.

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<sup>764</sup> Norušis, 2000: 263 & 334.

AUTHORITARIANISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Authoritarian	58%	35%	31%	47%	59%	29%	36%
In between	40%	63%	67%	53%	41%	71%	64%
Libertarian	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	275	57	52	47	27	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p = 0.023$ ; ELCs & MPs,  $p = 0.011$ ; ELCs & MEPs,  $p = 0.02$ ; MPs & WLCs,  $p = 0.044$ ; WLCs & MEPs,  $p = 0.016$ .

ENVIRONMENTALISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Green	26%	21%	23%	24%	26%	21%	8%
In between	65%	65%	67%	71%	67%	71%	92%
Not green	9%	14%	10%	4%	7%	7%	0%
Base	270	58	51	45	27	14	13

EUROPEANISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Euro-enthusiast	2%	4%	4%	2%	9%	33%	0%
In between	44%	54%	26%	54%	50%	25%	71%
Euro-sceptic	54%	43%	70%	44%	41%	42%	28%
Base	259	56	47	43	22	12	14

ANOVA:  $p = 0.007$ .

FEMINISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Patriarchist	5%	2%	6%	8%	0%	14%	0%
In between	72%	76%	72%	69%	63%	71%	67%
Feminist	23%	22%	22%	23%	37%	14%	33%
Base	276	55	51	48	27	14	12

INTRA-PARTY ELITISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Grass-roots control	57%	36%	22%	42%	61%	57%	21%
In between	41%	59%	53%	50%	39%	36%	57%
Central control	3%	5%	25%	8%	0%	7%	21%
Base	281	59	51	48	28	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p = 0.001$ ; ELCs & MSPs,  $p = 0.001$ ; Peers & MPs,  $p = 0.012$ ; MPs & SLCs,  $p < 0.001$ ; MPs & WLCs,  $p < 0.001$ ; MPs & MEPs,  $p = 0.04$ ; WLCs & MSPs,  $p = 0.034$ .

INTRA-PARTY INCLUSIVITY							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Moderniser	18%	25%	38%	26%	7%	29%	29%
In between	57%	60%	48%	52%	68%	57%	64%
Traditionalist	25%	15%	14%	22%	25%	14%	7%
Base	275	60	52	46	28	14	14

ANOVA:  $p = 0.008$ .

LEFT-RIGHT							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Left	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
In between	49%	43%	39%	51%	67%	36%	46%
Right	44%	57%	61%	49%	33%	64%	54%
Base	274	58	51	45	27	14	13

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p = 0.004$ .

OPTIMISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Optimistic	53%	58%	67%	53%	64%	43%	50%
In between	46%	42%	33%	47%	36%	57%	50%
Pessimistic	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Base	271	55	49	47	28	14	14

<b>POLITICAL ELITISM</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Democrat	38%	34%	25%	27%	50%	21%	15%
In between	55%	64%	65%	64%	50%	79%	77%
Elite	7%	2%	10%	9%	0%	0%	8%
Base	277	58	52	45	28	14	13

Bonferroni: MPs & WLCs,  $p = 0.044$ . There was no significant difference result on the initial ANOVA procedure. However, like the Bonferroni result, this was marginal but the other side of the standard significance level:  $p = 0.055$ .

<b>POSTMATERIALISM</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Materialist	17%	19%	12%	17%	5%	17%	20%
Mixed	77%	77%	88%	71%	90%	58%	70%
Postmaterialist	6%	4%	0%	12%	5%	25%	10%
Base	248	48	49	42	21	12	10

<b>PRIDE IN HERITAGE AND CULTURE</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Not proud	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
In between	8%	11%	8%	17%	0%	14%	8%
Proud	92%	89%	92%	83%	100%	86%	92%
Base	274	57	51	47	27	14	13

<b>PRIDE IN THE WAY THE NATION FUNCTIONS</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Not proud	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
In between	61%	65%	65%	64%	68%	86%	69%
Proud	36%	35%	35%	36%	32%	14%	31%
Base	275	57	52	47	25	14	13

<b>PROTECTIONISM</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Not protectionist	9%	21%	28%	9%	7%	29%	21%
In between	66%	78%	68%	74%	64%	71%	71%
Protectionist	25%	2%	4%	17%	29%	0%	7%
Base	278	58	50	47	28	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p < 0.001$ ; ELCs & MPs,  $p < 0.001$ ; ELCs & MEPs,  $p < 0.001$ ; Peers & WLCs,  $p = 0.036$ ; MPs & SLCs,  $p = 0.043$ ; MPs & WLCs,  $p = 0.005$ ; WLCs & MEPs,  $p = 0.014$ .

<b>RELIGIOSITY</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Sceptic	19%	7%	4%	17%	12%	15%	21%
In between	43%	37%	29%	30%	46%	31%	21%
Devout	38%	56%	67%	52%	42%	54%	57%
Base	267	57	48	46	26	13	14

ANOVA:  $p = 0.002$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & MPs,  $p = 0.002$ .

<b>THEOCRATISM</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Secularist	30%	12%	8%	38%	29%	29%	14%
In between	62%	64%	69%	50%	64%	57%	71%
Theocrat	8%	24%	23%	12%	7%	14%	14%
Base	275	58	52	48	28	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p < 0.001$ ; ELCs & MPs,  $p < 0.001$ ; Peers & SLCs,  $p < 0.001$ ; MPs & SLCs,  $p < 0.001$ ; MPs & WLCs,  $p = 0.013$ .

<b>TRADITIONAL BRITISH LIBERTIES</b>							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Authoritarian	48%	29%	4%	48%	42%	36%	36%
In between	44%	55%	63%	40%	58%	50%	50%
Libertarian	8%	16%	33%	12%	0%	14%	14%
Base	271	55	49	42	26	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & MPs,  $p < 0.001$ ; Peers & MPs,  $p = 0.006$ ; MPs & SLCs,  $p < 0.001$ ; MPs & WLCs,  $p < 0.001$ .



WELFARISM							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Self-help	36%	32%	27%	28%	36%	43%	15%
In between	62%	66%	73%	70%	64%	57%	85%
Welfarist	2%	2%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Base	275	59	52	46	28	14	13

XENOPHOBIA							
	ELCs	Peers	MPs	SLCs	WLCs	MEPs	MSPs
Not xenophobic	12%	26%		17%	4%	29%	29%
In between	66%	65%	71%	72%	85%	57%	71%
Xenophobic	22%	9%	4%	11%	11%	14%	0%
Base	272	54	49	47	27	14	14

ANOVA:  $p < 0.001$ . Bonferroni: ELCs & Peers,  $p = 0.001$ ; ELCs & MPs,  $p = 0.002$ ; ELCs & MSPs,  $p = 0.034$ .

## APPENDIX 5: THE *CPRS 2002* QUESTIONNAIRE

The following is an appropriately resized<sup>765</sup> facsimile of the questionnaire sent to local councillors in England (ELCs) in April 2002. To save space, the questionnaire sent to all others has not been reproduced. This was the same as the one presented here except that the final two pages of socio-demographic items were omitted and left blank except for a “This page deliberately blank” notice.

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<sup>765</sup> London Metropolitan University, September 2003/June 2008: 84

**CONSERVATIVE PARTY  
REPRESENTATIVES STUDY 2002**



**LONDON GUILDHALL  
UNIVERSITY**

**Introduction**

Dear Sir/Madam,

It would be kind of you if you could spare the time to complete the enclosed questionnaire and to return it in the SAE supplied.

The purpose of this study, part of a PhD thesis, is to obtain an objective measure of the views of the Conservative Party's 'public' or 'statutory' representatives. The responses will then be used to answer questions concerning a wide range of abstract political, economic, social, and religious beliefs on the one hand, and more concrete matters on the other. Some of the issues and questions are 'tried and tested' and you may have encountered them before. Others have been developed for this study.

Aside from the scope of the questions, another feature is the range of individuals being surveyed. Versions of this questionnaire are being sent to all Conservative Westminster MPs, Peers, MEPs, Scottish MPs, Welsh AMs, members of the GLA, local councillors in Scotland and Wales, and a 10% sample of local councillors in England. Altogether, this is one of the most comprehensive academic studies of the Conservative Party for a decade.

Please note that this survey is anonymous. Nowhere are you asked to give your name, address, or the exact area that you represent.

I am grateful to my own member of parliament, the Rt. Hon. Eric Forth MP, for introducing this survey. However, this work has no formal connection with the Conservative Party, but instead is part of an academic project being undertaken at London Guildhall University.

With thanks for your help,

Nigel Meek  
(Department of Politics & Modern History)

**Instructions**

This questionnaire should only be answered by the person to whom it has been sent.

The following questions take a number of forms, but you should find them reasonably easy to answer. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. All you need to do is put a tick in the box that you select. Please use either a black or a blue pen. If at times you find that none of the provided answers exactly fits what you think, please choose the one that comes closest to your views.

Except where instructions in block capitals indicate otherwise, all questions are for everyone. For example, there are a number of questions concerning Scotland and Wales on the one hand, or England on the other. The views of everyone are important.

Please go to the first question on page 3

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## The United Kingdom

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

1	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A The cause of the centre-Right in Scotland and Wales has been damaged by its association with a Conservative Party that is often regarded as 'the English Party'	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B England should have its own parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C The regions of England should have their own assemblies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D All three major mainland UK political parties should organise and campaign in their own right in Northern Ireland	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E The Scots and the Welsh have a more developed sense of national identity than the English	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F The extra public spending received by Scotland and Wales relative to England is often justified	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G The government was right to allow Sinn Féin MPs to make use of Commons facilities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2 Who do you think has benefited most from the recent Northern Ireland peace process?

- The Unionist or Loyalist community
- Both equally
- The Nationalist or Republican community

3 Which one of the following comes closest to your own view?

- Scotland and Wales should continue to return a relatively larger number of MPs to Westminster than England
- The number of Westminster MPs returned by Scotland and Wales relative to England should be brought in line with their population
- Scotland and Wales should return a proportionately smaller number of MPs to Westminster than England, commensurate with the autonomy of their devolved institutions
- Scotland and/or Wales should become independent countries

## The Environment

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

4	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A The government should do more to protect the environment, even if it leads to higher taxes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Industry should do more to protect the environment, even if it leads to lower profits and fewer jobs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C Ordinary people should do more to protect the environment, even if it means paying higher prices	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D People should be allowed to use their cars as much as they like, even if it causes damage to the environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E Many of the claims about mankind's damage to the environment are exaggerated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

## Business, Labour Relations, Welfare, and the Economy

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

5	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D There is one law for the rich and one for the poor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F In general, the trades unions have been tamed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6 Which of the following comes closest to your own view?

- The public sector is more efficient than the private sector
- The public and private sectors are equally efficient
- The private sector is more efficient than the public sector

7 Which of the following comes closest to your own view?

- The public sector is more worthy than the private sector
- The public and private sectors are equally worthy
- The private sector is more worthy than the public sector

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

8		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	The welfare state makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	People receiving social security are made to feel like second class citizens	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### Britain, Europe, and the Wider World

If all were equally possible, which of the following would you MOST prefer Britain to seek? And the NEXT MOST preferred? And the LEAST preferred?

9		Greater British independence at the expense of ties with both the EU and the USA	Closer ties to the USA at the expense of British independence and ties with the EU	Closer ties to the EU at the expense of British independence and ties with the USA
A	Most preferred	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Next most preferred	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Least preferred	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10 Thinking about the Middle East, how best would you describe yourself?

- Very pro-Arab/Palestinian
- Somewhat pro-Arab/Palestinian
- View both sides equally
- Somewhat pro-Israeli
- Very pro-Israeli

Commentators sometimes talk about 'Euro-enthusiasts' and 'Euro-sceptics'. Using the following scale, where 1 means Euro-enthusiast and 10 means Euro-sceptic, where would you place:

11		1 - Enthusiast	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 - Sceptic
A	Yourself	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Labour Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Liberal Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Scottish National Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Plaid Cymru	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12 Which of the following statements best describes how you see yourself?

- English/Scottish/Welsh not British
- More English/Scottish/Welsh than British
- Equally English/Scottish/Welsh and British
- More British than English/Scottish/Welsh
- British not English/Scottish/Welsh
- None of these

13 Which of the following statements best describes how you see yourself?

- British/English/Scottish/Welsh not European
- More British/English/Scottish/Welsh than European
- Equally British/English/Scottish/Welsh and European
- More European than British/English/Scottish/Welsh
- European not British/English/Scottish/Welsh
- None of these

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

14		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	Britain should re-establish closer ties with the former colonies and existing dependencies in areas such as the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Britain should re-establish closer ties with the former colonies in areas such as Australia and New Zealand, Southern Africa, and Canada	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Britain should be more cautious in supporting the USA's foreign and military policies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	The Western and Islamic worlds can never truly be at peace with one another	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

15	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A The UK should embrace the concept of a federal Europe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Membership of the Euro is crucial for Britain's future prosperity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C The EU's budget should be enlarged	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D A single European Army would undermine rather than underpin the security of the UK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E Britain should withdraw from the EU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F The strength of national identities rules out parliamentary democracy on a European scale for the foreseeable future	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G Conservative MEPs should remain committed members of the European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) group in the European Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### Ethnicity, Citizenship, and National Image

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

16	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Britain should limit the import of foreign products to protect its national economy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B British television should give preference to British films and programmes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C Foreigners should be allowed to buy land in Britain as easily as British people	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Britain should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E People do not have to share British customs and traditions to become fully British	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F Immigrants are generally good for Britain's economy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G Immigrants increase crime rates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How proud or not are you of Britain in each of the following?

17		Very proud	Somewhat proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all
A	its armed forces	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	its history	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	its achievements in sports	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	its achievements in arts and literature	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	its scientific and technological achievements	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	its political influence in the world	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	its social security system	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	The way its democracy works	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I	its economic achievements	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

18		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	Refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in Britain	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and culture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	British schools should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Britain	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	The number of immigrants allowed into Britain nowadays should be increased	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Race relations in Britain will improve over the next few years	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Society and Culture

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

19		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	Men and women are equally suited emotionally for politics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Government should make sure that women have an equal chance to succeed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

20	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Schools should teach children to obey authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G Homosexual relationships are always wrong	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

21	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Britain should introduce compulsory identity cards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Jury trials should be reserved only for the most serious of criminal charges	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C The 'double jeopardy' principle should be abolished for the most serious crimes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Successive governments have been right to place stricter controls on the ownership of firearms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E The idea that social and cultural matters in Britain are dominated by a 'Left-liberal, London-based metropolitan elite' is much exaggerated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F Detention without trial is not justified in peacetime	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### The Conduct of Politics

We often talk about what the main aims of the country should be in the coming years. If you had to choose between the following items, which one seems the MOST important and which one the NEXT most important to you?

22	Most Important	Next most important
A Maintaining order in the nation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Giving people more say in important government decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C Fighting rising prices	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Protecting freedom of speech	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Relative to the present situation, what should be done about the powers of the following institutions?

23		Increased a lot	Increased somewhat	Stay the same	Decreased somewhat	Decreased a lot
A	Westminster Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	European Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Scottish Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Welsh Assembly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Northern Ireland Assembly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Greater London Assembly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	Principal local authorities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	Parish/Town councils	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

24		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	There should be at least an element of proportional representation for general elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	There should be at least an element of proportional representation for local authority elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Local government is just as an appropriate arena for party politics as national government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Local campaigning makes little difference these days compared to the overall impression of the national party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Single-issue groups are now a better way than political parties of advancing causes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Public life in this country is generally honest	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

25		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
A	Political parties should be funded by the State and taxpayer rather than by individual donors, businesses, or unions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	The House of Lords should be replaced by a wholly or mainly elected second chamber	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	However a second chamber is elected or selected, it should always be subordinate to the House of Commons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	There should no longer be an Established Church in any part of Britain	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Britain should become a republic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

26	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A The scope and power of the State over the individual should be much reduced	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B A strong State is necessary for the preservation of a peaceful social order	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C The State should be an active agency for social change and development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Ordinary citizens should have more say in the decisions made by government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E More should be done to interest people in government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F More should be done to involve ordinary people in political decision making	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G It is for politicians rather than the public to make decisions on issues and priorities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

### The Political Parties

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

27	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A In recent years, it has not always been clear what the Conservative Party stands FOR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B In recent years, it has not always been clear what the Conservative Party stands AGAINST	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C The Conservative Party is not an ideological party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D The Conservative period in office between 1979 and 1992 brought about a major change in public attitudes about issues such as the economy, taxation, public services, and welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E Depictions in recent years of the Conservative Party as being 'extreme' have some validity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

28	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Conservative constituency agents should be employed and deployed by the Party centrally	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Local Conservative associations should retain control over parliamentary candidate selection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

29		<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A	People do not trust Conservative politicians at a national level	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	People do not trust Conservative politicians at a local level	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	The Conservative Party can win the next general election	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	The Conservative Party can win the next-but-one general election	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	The Conservative Party as an institution is in better shape than many seem to think	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Opinion polls underestimate the level of support for the Conservatives amongst ordinary people	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	The Conservative Party should change its name	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	The media is generally hostile towards the Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I	The view that the Conservative Party is culturally and socially 'out of touch' is exaggerated	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree that more should be done to advance members of the following groups within the Conservative Party?

30		<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A	Women	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Racial minorities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Homosexuals and lesbians	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How would you rate the following leaders of the Conservative Party?

31		<i>Very positively</i>	<i>Positively</i>	<i>Neither positively nor negatively</i>	<i>Negatively</i>	<i>Very Negatively</i>
A	Edward Heath	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Margaret Thatcher	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	John Major	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	William Hague	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Iain Duncan Smith	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

32 All mass political parties that seek to be both honest and electorally successful need to reconcile two tasks: INTERNALLY to unite the party, and EXTERNALLY to reach out to the electorate. Of the two, which do you think is the most urgent task for the Conservative Party at the moment?

- To unite internally       To reach out externally

Do you agree or disagree with the idea that the members of the Conservative Party should have more influence in...

33	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Basic principles and beliefs of the Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Formulation of Party policy and writing of manifestos	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C Running and administering the Party and its finances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The defeats at the 1997 and 2001 general elections show that the Conservative Party...

34	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Needs to change its principles and beliefs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Needs to change its style and presentation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?

35	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A The Labour Party has genuinely shed its socialistic instincts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B The Conservatives should be focusing their national campaigning efforts against the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

36 FOR LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN ENGLAND AND WESTMINSTER MPs IN ENGLAND ONLY. In which part of England is the constituency, ward, or region that you represent located?

- North       Midlands       East       South-West
- South-East (excluding Greater London)       Greater London

How do you feel towards the following mainland British political parties?

37		Strongly sympathetic	Sympathetic	In between	Antipathetic	Strongly antipathetic	Don't know enough to say
A	Labour Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Liberal Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Plaid Cymru	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Scottish National Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	British National Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	Green Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	Socialist Alliance/Scottish Socialist Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How do you feel towards the following Northern Ireland political parties?

38		Strongly sympathetic	Sympathetic	In between	Antipathetic	Strongly antipathetic	Don't know enough to say
A	Ulster Unionist Party (led by David Trimble)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Democratic Unionist Party (led by Ian Paisley)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Sinn Fein	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Social Democratic & Labour Party (SDLP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

39 FOR ALL EXCEPT PEERS. How marginal or safe is the constituency, ward, or region that you represent?

- Very marginal       Somewhat marginal       Safe or fairly safe

40 FOR ALL EXCEPT PEERS. Who is the MAIN challenger in the constituency, ward, or region that you represent?

- Labour       Liberal Democrat       Ratepayer/Residents/Regionalist/Independent  
 SNP       Plaid Cymru       Other

41 FOR ALL EXCEPT PEERS. In recent years, have you experienced ANTI-Conservative tactical voting by supporters of other parties in the constituency, ward, or region that you represent?

- Yes, a great deal       Yes, some       Very little or none at all

42 FOR ALL EXCEPT PEERS. In recent years, have you experienced PRO-Conservative tactical voting by supporters of other parties in the constituency, ward, or region that you represent?

- Yes, a great deal       Yes, some       Very little or none at all



### The 2001 Conservative Party Leadership Election

43 If you had been able to vote and had been presented with all five original candidates, who would you have voted for (or did vote for if you are a Westminster MP)?

- Michael Ancram       Kenneth Clarke       David Davis  
 Iain Duncan Smith       Michael Portillo       None of the candidates

44 And from the 'almost final' three, who would you have voted for (or did vote for if you are a Westminster MP)?

- Kenneth Clarke       Iain Duncan Smith       Michael Portillo       None of the candidates

45 FOR ALL EXCEPT WESTMINSTER MPs. At any time during the MPs-only stages of the contest, was your opinion offered to, or sought by, a Westminster MP?

- Yes       No

46 Did you cast your vote in the final ballot of all members?

- Yes [Please go to Q48]       No [Please go to Q47]

47 If no, was this because...

- I could not support either of the two candidates  
 Some other practical reason such as not receiving a ballot paper, being ill or out of the country, etc.

48 Who did you vote for (or would have voted for had some practical reason not prevented you)?

- Kenneth Clarke       Iain Duncan Smith  
 Deliberately spoiled the ballot paper or wrote in another's name

49 In any future leadership contest, should the final decision return to being one for Westminster MPs alone?

- Yes [Please go to Q52]       No [Please go to Q50]

50 Do you nevertheless think that Westminster MPs should retain the task of narrowing down the final candidates to two or three?

- Yes       Don't know       No

51 Do you think that all paid-up Party members should have the final say or just the demonstrably activist membership?

- All members       Activists only

52 Irrespective of who you think ought to make the final choice, do you think that it would be a good idea to introduce a method whereby votes for a second-choice candidate might count in some way?

- Yes       Don't know       No

**Religion**

**53 Which one of the following comes closest to your own view?**

- I don't believe in God
- I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out
- I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind
- I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others
- While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God
- I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it

**54 How close do you feel to God most of the time?**

- Don't believe in God
- Not close at all
- Not very close
- Somewhat close
- Extremely close

**55 How often do you attend a religious service? (Excluding weddings and funerals etc.)**

- At least once a week
- At least once a month
- At least once a year
- Never

**How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

56	<i>Agree strongly</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree strongly</i>
A Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C It would be better for Britain if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E Churches and religious organisations in this country have too much power and influence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**A Few Questions About Yourself**

57 Were you ever a member of one or more of the following Conservative Party youth or younger persons' organisations? Please tick any that apply:

- A  Young Conservatives (YCs)
- B  Federation of Conservative Students (FCS)
- C  Conservative Collegiate Forum (CCF)
- D  Federation of University Conservative and Unionist Associations (FUCUA)
- E  National Association of Conservative Graduates (NACG)
- F  Conservative Future (CF)

The following are some of the reasons why people decide to become politicians. Which for you is the MOST important? And the NEXT MOST important? And the LEAST important?

58		<i>As someone concerned with social change or the promotion of certain beliefs</i>	<i>As a representative of the electorate or public</i>	<i>As a necessary element within the machinery of stable, democratic government</i>
A	Most important	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Next most important	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Least important	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

59 FOR ALL LOCAL COUNCILLORS ONLY. Would you consider a career 'further up' the political ladder, i.e. as an MP, MEP, or member of the Scottish, Welsh, and London institutions?

- Yes, definitely       Yes, possibly       Unlikely or not at all

60 FOR ALL EXCEPT LOCAL COUNCILLORS. Before attaining your present position, did you have any experience as a local councillor?

- I was a local councillor       I stood unsuccessfully as a local council candidate       Neither of these

61 How often do you use email?

- At least once a day       At least once a week       Less often than once a week       Never

62 How often do you go online to the Internet for news and information?

- At least once a day       At least once a week       Less often than once a week       Never

In politics people sometimes talk of 'Left' and 'Right'. Using the following scale, where 1 means Left and 10 means Right, where would you place:

63		1 - Left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 - Right
A	Yourself	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	Labour Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	Liberal Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
E	Scottish National Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
F	Plaid Cymru	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
G	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
H	Green Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I	British National Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

From the following list, what for YOU are the TWO most pressing concerns facing Britain today? And what do you think the GENERAL PUBLIC considers being the TWO most pressing concerns?

64		Economy & taxation	Welfare, NHS, education, & other public services	Environment	Europe	Law & order	International relations, defence, & terrorism	Civil liberties
A	YOU - choice 1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
B	YOU - choice 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C	PUBLIC - choice 1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
D	PUBLIC - choice 2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**Additional Questions for Local Councillors in England**

- 65 Your age in whole years is...
- 66 Your sex is...  
 Female  Male
- 67 Your ethnic group is...  
 White  Non-White
- 68 Your marital status is...  
 Married  Living with partner  Widowed/divorced/separated  Single
- 69 Do you think of yourself as belonging to any particular social class?  
 Upper class  Middle class  Working class  No
- 70 When you were young, would you say that your family belonged to any particular social class?  
 Upper class  Middle class  Working class  No
- 71 What is your highest educational qualification?  
 Primary school  Secondary school or equivalent  University/polytechnic or professional equivalent
- 72 Did you attend a fee-paying secondary school?  
 Yes  No
- 73 Even if you do not consider yourself personally religious, what is your religious/confessional background?  
 Church of England/Anglican/Episcopal  Other Protestant/Non-conformist  
 Roman Catholic  Other Christian  
 Jewish  Other non-Christian  None at all
- 74 In what year did you first join the Conservative Party?
- 75 In what year were you first elected as a Conservative local councillor?

Please go to the final page of questions on the back cover

**Before you joined the Conservative Party, had either your mother or father been a member?**

76                      Yes                      No                      Don't know                      Not applicable

A Mother                                                                                       

B Father                                                                                       

77 Which one of the following best describes the residential make-up of the majority of your ward?

Rural villages or farms                       Town                       Suburb or outskirts of a major city                       City or metropolitan

78 In your main accommodation, do you or your household...

Own the property outright                       Own the property with a mortgage  
 Rent from a private landlord                       Rent from your local authority or housing association

79 Excluding your work as a councillor, what sector of the economy do you work in? If you no longer work, which best describes your most recent occupation?

Private                       Public                       Voluntary                       Other

80 Excluding your work as a councillor, are you employed or self-employed? If you no longer work, which best describes your most recent occupation?

Employed                       Self-employed

81 Excluding your work as a councillor, please indicate your main area of occupation from the following list of broad categories. If you no longer work, which best describes your most recent occupation? Please tick one box only.

- Manufacturing or agriculture
- Service sector management or professions
- Armed services
- Retail
- Skilled artisan
- Other manual
- Other non-manual
- Other

**This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for taking the time and trouble to complete it. Your contribution is greatly appreciated. Please return it in the SAE supplied.**