



# South Korean Stock Exchange and Currency

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*I pledge my honor that I have neither received nor provided any unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.*

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## **Executive Summary**

After being left impoverished by the 1948 Korean War, South Korea restructured its political atmosphere and experienced rapid economic expansion in the decades that followed by becoming an export driven economy. This has led South Korea to become the fourth largest Asian economy by GDP, which means today more than ever it is influenced by and exposed to international economies. We wanted to see the extent to which the Korean stock market and its currency, the Won, is affected by some of its neighboring East Asian countries, namely China, Japan, Hong Kong and Indonesia. We also wanted to find out if the relationship was stronger during times of growth or during periods of crisis. Thus, our paper examines the interdependency of the Korean Stock Exchange and the Won with the economies and currencies of the above mentioned countries during a growth period, 2002-07, and 2 crisis periods, the 1997-98 East Asian Crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis.

In terms of the stock markets, the results were that the Korean stock market is strongly correlated with Hong Kong and Indonesia, and only with China and Japan during a crisis. We also found that these economies more correlated during a period of crisis than a period of economic growth.

In terms of currencies, the data we analyzed showed that the Korean Won is not linked to any of the currencies of some of its East Asian neighbors, regardless of the economic environment.

The purpose of this paper is to find some trends of the South Korean market and currency with some of its neighbors in order to forecast how the Korean economy would behave, depending on the performance of our chosen countries and the economic environment.

## Korea Exchange overview

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The Korea Exchange (KRX) was created in 2005 through the integration of the Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Futures Exchange, and the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ).<sup>1</sup> However, prior to that the three components of the KRX have been around for much longer. “The Stock Market division has been operating since 1956 and operated as the sole stock exchange in Korea until 1996 when the Stock Index Futures Market was launched. Prior to this development, electronic trading was introduced in 1988. The Stock Index Options Market kicked off operations in 1997 and subsequently, the portfolio of trading instruments was increased at the turn of the century to include warrant trading, equity options and exchange traded funds (ETFs).”<sup>2</sup> “As of October 2012, Korea Exchange had 1,796 listed companies with a combined market capitalization of \$1.1 trillion.”<sup>3</sup>

The three main divisions of the KRX are the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) division, the KOSDAQ division, as well as the derivatives market division. The Korea Exchange provides an electronic platform for the trading, clearing and settlement of cash equities, bonds and derivatives.<sup>4</sup> The Korea Exchange's main stock index is the KRX KOSPI which will also be the main focus of this paper. “The KOSPI Index is a capitalization-weighted index of all common shares on the Korean Stock Exchanges. The Index was developed with a base value of 100 as of January 4th, 1980.”<sup>5</sup>

## Going Global

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Through the Korea Exchanges recently acquired partnerships with Eurex and the CME Group, they have expanded their position into the international derivative markets. This allows for distribution and trading in options and futures on its benchmark KRX KOSPI 200 stock index.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Korea Exchange. [http://www.marketswiki.com/mwiki/Korea\\_Exchange](http://www.marketswiki.com/mwiki/Korea_Exchange)

<sup>2</sup> All About the Korea Exchange. <http://www.etoro.com/education/all-about-korea-exchange.aspx>

<sup>3</sup> Korea Exchange. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea\\_Exchange](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea_Exchange)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 1

<sup>5</sup> Bloomberg. Korea Stock Exchange KOSPI Index. <http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/KOSPI:IND>

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 1

“In November 2009 KRX launched a joint agreement with Chicago-based CME Group to provide after-hours electronic trading access to KOSPI 200 Futures contracts via the CME Globex platform. KRX and the CME also agreed on a bi-directional order-routing system similar to that successfully implemented between the CME and BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil's largest securities-trading exchange.”<sup>7</sup>

“In August 2010, KRX began listing its KOSPI 200 options contract, also during non-Korean market hours, on Eurex. The partnership allows Eurex members to trade and clear Kospi 200 options during European and North American trading hours. The Eurex KOSPI product is a daily futures contract based on the KOSPI 200 options. These futures contracts expire at the end of each trading day and open positions are transferred to KRX in the form of a KOSPI option.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Largest constituents of the KRX**

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The largest firms listed on the KRX in terms of market capitalization include Hyundai Motor, POSCO, as well as Samsung Electronics. Founded in 1968, POSCO is the third largest company on the KRX and the world's fourth largest multinational steel making company. Today POSCO has become USS-POSCO forming some partnerships with some US companies and has a cap of \$32.6 billion.<sup>9</sup>

Subsequently, Hyundai Motor is the largest automaker in Korea and the second largest firm on the KRX. Established in 1967, it is now the fifth largest car manufacturer in the world by expanding its presence into many overseas economies such as China, the USA, and India etc. It has a market cap of \$49.8 billion.<sup>10</sup>

Lastly, more than three times bigger than the second largest firm listed on the KRX in terms of market cap, Samsung Electronics has a market cap of \$165.2 billion. Founded in 1969, the conglomerate

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 1

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 1

<sup>9</sup> South Korea's 10 biggest companies. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48237596/page/9>

<sup>10</sup> South Korea's 10 biggest companies. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48237596/page/10>

is now the world's largest producer of smartphones, memory chips, and televisions. Accounting for one-fifth of the Korean GDP, the Samsung group has a significant impact on Korea's economy.<sup>11</sup>

### **Gaining Competitive Advantage**

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Korea Exchange is responding to global changes in the stock exchange industry and securing market competitiveness by implementing the Vertical Silo model in order to run the stocks and derivatives market.<sup>12</sup> "This means that KRX is equipped with stable and efficient stock trading infrastructure that provides one-stop services for core capital markets functions, such as trading, order execution, clearing, and settlement."<sup>13</sup> In order to build a Vertical Silo model, many exchanges worldwide such as the NYSE Euronext, Nasdaq OMX, and LSE etc. are taking over clearing houses such as LCH.Clearnet. The KRX has a much better advantage as its derivatives market has abundant liquidity. Along with that, due to Korea's remarkable information technologies, KRX has pushed forward into overseas markets, in particular South Asian markets, as there is a tremendous prospective for growth.<sup>14</sup> For example: "In Laos, KRX took over the Lao Securities Exchange's stakes and jointly opened a stock exchange; it exported Korea's IT trading infrastructure for bond trading, supervision, and market making monitoring to Bursa Malaysia. Furthermore, KRX has plans to export its stock trading system, market monitoring system, and expertise to Cambodia, Vietnam, and Philippines."<sup>15</sup> Along with that, the KRX plans to move into central Asia, where the infrastructure for stock trading is not as developed, starting with Uzbekistan.

In addition, the KRX has been developing a new generation IT system called the New Exture which will increase stock trading stability, allow for progressive transaction services such as high frequency trading, and allow for KRX to secure a strong position in the global markets for stock trading

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<sup>11</sup> South Korea's 10 biggest companies. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48237596/page/11>

<sup>12</sup> Competition in the Global Capital Markets and Challenges Ahead for the KRX

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. at Page 3

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. at Page 3

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. at Page 4

IT systems.<sup>16</sup> “KRX rivals include NYSE Euronext, which exported its stock trading system to Malaysia and Philippines, and Nasdaq OMX, which exported its stock trading system to Singapore and Indonesia and sold its derivatives system to Thailand.”<sup>17</sup> However, the New Exture system will allow the KRX to provide more advantages than other competitors. Pushing KRX’s stocking trading model overseas will help increase awareness as well as competitiveness, permitting for an increase in revenue.

## Regulation

The Korean stock market is regulated by the Korea Exchange. The Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) has given the KRX the self-regulatory authority. The main roles of the KRX involve “maintaining a fair and orderly organized market, regulating and supervising the member firms, setting listing requirements, surveillance of securities transactions and regulating corporate disclosure”<sup>18</sup>. In order for companies to receive acceptance on listing they must submit the listing application to KRX, which must then be approved by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).<sup>19</sup> The KRX is primarily responsible for settling all transaction on the stock exchange and is liable for all the damages. The secondary bond market has been divided into three segments, namely the KRX, an organized exchange and the OTC market<sup>20</sup>. The KRX market for bonds is a competitive trading of listed bonds, whereas the OTC market is the most dominant form of bond trading in South Korea<sup>21</sup>. With the introduction of several derivatives products, there were increased supervision and compliance procedures for financial institutions under the amended Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act<sup>22</sup>. The KRX introduced a system of “Circuit Breaker” for the KOSPI 200 Futures financial product when the derivative hits  $\pm 5\%$  of previous

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. at Page 4

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. at Page 4

<sup>18</sup> Financial Supervisory System in Korea. Page 24. Retrieved from <http://www.fsc.go.kr/downManager?bbsid=BBS0049&no=61122>

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. at Page 109

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. at Page 111

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. at Page 111

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. at Page 111

closing.<sup>23</sup> The use of circuit breakers would allow market participants to accumulate more information so as to make informed choices during the period when trading is halted on a particular derivatives product.

### **Comparison between Futures Trading Act and Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act**

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The Futures Trading Act was enacted in 1995 in South Korea in order to make sure that the Futures derivatives were traded in a safe manner for the protection of investors.<sup>24</sup> The Act talks about the manner in which a futures product can only be traded on the futures exchange and only a corporation with certain equity capital be allowed to trade in futures.<sup>25</sup> The Act mentions the fines and punishment that will be imposed for indulging in unfair practices on the futures trading market.<sup>26</sup> But the Act fails to talk about the manner in which futures trading corporations can eliminate futures trading manipulation.

The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act passed in 2009 talks about the manner in which financial investment firms would require to have a full time auditor as well as an audit committee that would look into the financial statements of the firm.<sup>27</sup> The Act also mentions that financial firms require to appoint a “Compliance Officer”, who would look into the internal controls and procedures followed by the firm and report his or her findings to the audit committee.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid. at Page 112

<sup>24</sup> Financial Supervisory System in Korea. Page 113. Retrieved from <http://www.fsc.go.kr/downManager?bbsid=BBS0049&no=61122>

<sup>25</sup> Futures Trading Act. Page 1 Retrieved from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011495.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA). Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act. Retrieved from <http://www.kofiabond.or.kr/ENG/DATA/Financial%20Investment%20Services%20and%20Capital%20Markets%20Act.pdf>

## New Amendments in the Korean Stock Exchanges

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There have been a few amendments in the past year that have brought about a change in the way trading is executed on the Korean Stock Exchanges. The first area in which there is a new rule is the area of short selling. The FSS, FSC and the KRX have come to a conclusion that all individual investors who have a position on short selling in the market have to report their positions to the regulator at the end of each trading day.<sup>29</sup> The threshold set by the regulators of the short selling position on investors is set at “0.01% of the issued share capital of a listed company”.<sup>30</sup> This move is particularly helpful during uncertain domestic as well international economics conditions and keeps a check on fair trading during these volatile economic times.

## Statistical Analysis of KOSPI vs. East Asian Neighbors

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As we wanted to see how correlated the Korean markets are to China, Japan, Hong Kong and Indonesia, we ran regressions of the Korean KOSPI against the major benchmark indexes of the other countries. Due to the fact that we also wanted to see if the East Asian markets are more correlated during growth periods or crisis periods, we used data from the East Asian Crisis during 1997-98, the global financial crisis during 2008-12, and the growth period that occurs in-between, from 2002-07.

In terms of the crisis periods, we chose the two most recent crises that have affected Asian markets. The first was the East Asian Crisis that began due to the outflow of money from East Asia to other parts of the world with higher interest rates.<sup>31</sup> “Thailand was the first to have to float the Thai Bhat, this caused a rapid devaluation, which triggered a loss of confidence throughout the Asian economies.”<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> FSC, FSS, and KRX plan introduction of short position reporting rules. Retrieved from <http://www.theasianbanker.com/updates/?&docid=0008109725031185%20312081208>

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> The 1997-1997 Asian Financial Crisis <http://www.economicshelp.org/dictionary/f/financial-crisis-asia-1997.html>

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.



This began a ripple effect, where economies of other Asian countries also began decreasing. The South Korean economy in particular dropped 30 percent at the peak of the crisis, and was eventually given \$57 billion USD by the IMF in order to stabilize its currency and economy.<sup>33</sup> The second was the 2008 global financial crisis that began in the United States. The depression had worldwide repercussions, affecting most of the world's economies and had aftereffects until the present day as many economies are still struggling to recover.

The reason we chose the five year time period from 2002-2007 was because the economies of the world collectively saw positive GDP growth.<sup>34</sup> World output grew 3.22% per year, and in particular, East Asian economies during the time period averaged 7.48% GDP growth per year.<sup>35</sup>

Our data is based on monthly data. Regressions with a p-value of less than 0.05 are considered significant.

Growth; 2002-2007

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Comparing the KOSPI with the SHCOMP (Shanghai Composite Index), we got an  $R^2$  value of 0.0%, which indicates there is absolutely no correlation of the Korean markets with the Chinese markets during this growth period. This is mitigated by the fact that the p value is 0.913, which indicates the regression is not statistically significant. Thus, it cannot be said that the SCHOMP is completely uncorrelated with the KOSPI during this period.

Comparing the KOSPI with the NIKKEI, we got an  $R^2$  value of 13.0%, with a p value of 0.033 indicating the test is statistically significant. This data shows that the Korean markets and the Japanese markets are not very correlated.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007  
[http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp\\_archive/2007wespupdate.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_archive/2007wespupdate.pdf); source;  
<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/index.html>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

Unlike the other two markets, the regressions we ran with the KOSPI against the Hang Seng Composite Index and the JCI (Jakarta Composite Index) showed that the Hong Kong market and the Indonesian markets were quite strongly correlated with the Korean market. Against the Hang Seng, we got an  $R^2$  value of 57%, and against the JCI, an  $R^2$  value of 83.3%. Both the p values were under 0.05, showing the regression was statistically significant.

Thus, during the growth period of 2002-2007, the regressions we ran showed us that the Korean stock exchange was quite strongly correlated with the Hong Kong exchange and the Jakarta exchange, and not so much with the Chinese and the Japanese stock markets.

#### Crisis 1; 1997-1998

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Comparing the KOSPI with the SHCOMP we got an  $R^2$  value of 9.2%. The p value we got was 0.013, indicating the regression was statistically significant. This low  $R^2$  value suggests almost no correlation between the two markets, and goes against our hypothesis that the Korean and Chinese stock markets would be linked.

This was an exception though, as the KOSPI was extremely correlated to the other stock exchanges; there was a 83.3% correlation with the NIKKEI, 80.5% with the Hang Seng, and 76.5% with the JCI. All of the p values were below 0.05, which indicates all of these regressions were statistically significant. This data shows that during the East Asian Crisis, the Korean markets are linked with most of the countries we chose.

#### Crisis 2; 2008-2012

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Comparing the KOSPI with the SHCOMP, we got an  $R^2$  value of 31.4%, with a p value of 0.001 showing statistical significance. Against the NIKKEI, we got an  $R^2$  value of 5.5%, showing that during this crisis period, the Japanese markets were not correlated with the Korean markets. Although this goes against our hypothesis, the p value for this test was 0.196, which means it was not statistically significant.

The Hang Seng and the JCI were strongly correlated during the global financial crisis. This is shown with the  $R^2$  values we got regressing against the KOSPI, which were 65.6% and 84.3% respectively. The p values under 0.05 show the regression was statistically significant.

Thus, during the global financial crisis period of 2008-2012, the regression data shows the Korean stock exchange was strongly correlated with Hong Kong and Jakarta, and fairly correlated with Shanghai. We had to dismiss the regression against Japan because it was not statistically significant.

### **Statistical Analysis of Korean Won Vs. East Asian Neighbors**

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The data that we compiled for each time period was monthly. Regressions with a p-value of less than 0.05 are considered significant. The x-values in our regression represent the Korean Won and the y-values include the currencies of China, Japan, Hong Kong and Jakarta.

Growth; 2002-2007

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First, we ran a regression between the Korean Won and the Chinese Yuan during the growth period. The linear regression equation is  $y = -235 + 3.24x$  and its p-value is 0.000, thereby indicating that the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq of the above equation is 61.2%, which shows that a 61% of the variation in the Yuan can be explained by the variation in the Korean Won. This is particularly a high number looking at the number of data points that we had while running the regression. Thus the Chinese Yuan shows a strong correlation with the Korean Won during this time period.

Then we ran a regression between the Korean Won and the Japanese Yen and the equation that we get is  $y = 35.0 + 0.553x$  and the p-value is 0.007, which shows that the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq of the equation is 10.9%, which indicates that the currencies are not strongly correlated during the growth period. Next, we ran a regression between the Won and the Hong Kong dollar. The equation of the regression is  $y = -1033 + 11.2x$  and the p-value was 0.015, which shows that the regression was statistically significant. The positive x-variable shows a positive relation between the

currencies but the R-sq of the regression is 9%, which shows that the currencies do not have strong correlation during the time period.

The last regression we ran during the growth period was between the Won and the Indonesian Rupiah. The linear regression we get is  $y = 116 - 0.369x$  and a p-value of 0.117, which shows that the regression was not statistically significant. The R-sq we get is 3.8%, which is extremely low and shows that the currencies are not strongly correlated. Thus by running all the regressions during the period of growth, we see a general trend that the currencies are not strongly correlated with the exception of the Chinese Yuan.

Crisis 1; 1997-1998

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During the Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998, we ran a simple regression between the Korean Won and the above mentioned currencies. The regression equation for the relation with the Yuan is  $y = 33972 - 339x$  with a p-value of 0.00, which shows that regression is statistically significant. The R-sq is 72.9%, which is very high, shows a strong correlation between the currencies. The regression equation with the Japanese Yen is  $y = -114 + 2.32x$ , with a p-value of 0.004, which shows the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq is 31.9%, which is low and confirms our hypothesis of a weak correlation between the currencies.

The regression equation with the Hong Kong dollar is regression equation is  $y = -4547 + 46.8x$  with a p-value of 0.599, which shows that the regression is not statistically significant. The R-sq is 1.3%, which confirms our hypothesis of a low correlation between the currencies. The regression equation with the Indonesian Rupiah is  $y = 99.9 + 0.140x$  with a p-value of 0.00 that shows that the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq is 61.7%, which is particularly high, which shows a strong correlation between the currencies during that time period.

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Crisis 2; 2008-2012

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During the global financial crisis, the regression equation that we get for the Chinese Yuan is  $y = 116 - 0.369x$  and a p-value of 0.013, which shows the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq of 9.3% and the negative x-variable coefficient shows a weak correlation between the currencies. When we compared the Korean Won to the Japanese Yen, the regression equation we get is  $y = 155 - 0.417x$ , with a p-value of 0.012, which indicates statistical significance. The R-sq of 9.6% suggests not a very strong correlation between the two currencies during the crisis.

The Hong Kong dollar's regression equation is  $y = 3423 - 33.2x$  and a p-value of 0.000 shows that the regression is statistically significant. The R-sq is 34.4%, which is relatively low, showing little correlation in the two country's currencies. When we compared the Indonesian Rupiah to the Won, the regression equation we get is  $y = 7.7 + 1.12x$  with a p-value of 0.00 indicating statistical significance. The R-sq of 53% shows that there was a relatively strong correlation between the two currencies in comparison to the others. Thus, during the second crisis period, the general trend again shows the currencies are not strongly correlated, with the exception of the Rupiah.

### **Reasons for Correlation**

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From the time period of 2002 till 2007, we see a high correlation between the Chinese Yuan and the Korean Won. A possible explanation for that could be the fact that the Chinese Yuan had stabilized at the 8.28 RMB/USD rate for about 10 years till 2005.<sup>36</sup> After that though, the Chinese Yuan started depreciating rapidly till the end of our model at, the end of 2006. The Korean Won's depreciation had since the beginning of the model (1<sup>st</sup> Jan 2002) combined with the Yuan's rapid depreciation from 2005-2007 explains the correlation between the currencies.

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<sup>36</sup> The Case for Stabilizing China's Exchange Rate: Setting the Stage for Fiscal Expansion. Retrieved from [http://www.stanford.edu/~mckinnon/papers/fulltext\\_McKinnon%20and%20Schnabl.pdf](http://www.stanford.edu/~mckinnon/papers/fulltext_McKinnon%20and%20Schnabl.pdf) Page 5

The Japanese central bank intervened between 2003 and 2004 on several occasions in order to weaken the Yen.<sup>37</sup> Thus the Yen depreciated and appreciated at several occasions between the time periods of our model, whereas the Korean Won consistently depreciated during the time period. This explains the weak correlation in the Japanese and Korean currencies as Japan intervened several times bringing down the value of its currency and appreciating briefly again.

The Hong Kong dollar has been firmly pegged to the US dollar since 1983, thus the Hong Kong dollar was trading in a very narrow trading range due to its hard peg to the US dollar.<sup>38</sup> The Korean Won's constant depreciation during the regression model's time period and the wide range that the currency was trading combined by the narrow range the Hong Kong dollar was trading was the reason for the low correlation of their currencies.

During the financial crisis of 2008, the South Korean central bank and the Indonesian central bank intervened in the foreign exchange markets in order to buy dollars to keep a check on their country's currency appreciation.<sup>39</sup> This was particularly done by the country's central banks in order to keep their competitive advantage in the international exports markets. The similar proportions of USD buying during the central bank interventions may be the reason for the relatively strong correlations in comparison to other currencies.

Japan also intervened during the financial crisis at multiple occasions but the proportions in comparison to the rest of the countries were much higher. Between September 2010 and October 2011, the Japanese central bank intervened by buying as much as \$100 billion USD.<sup>40</sup> The Japanese central bank did this in order to weaken the value of the Yen in order to remain competitive in the international

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<sup>37</sup> An Assessment of the Impact of Japanese Foreign Exchange Intervention: 1991-2004 . Retrieved from <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2005/824/ifdp824.pdf> . Page 11

<sup>38</sup> Hong Kong faces heat on dollar peg. Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a6988b6-e774-11df-b5b4-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Dq9YuxCB>

<sup>39</sup> Asian Central Banks Intervene as Currencies Rise. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704503104576250402542030250.html>

<sup>40</sup> Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Volume Matter?. Retrieved from <http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0115.pdf> Page 2

exports market, being an export driven nation themselves. This number is extraordinary high in comparison to the interventions of Korea, Indonesia and Hong Kong. Thus we can conclude that during the financial crisis, the Yen appreciated at multiple occasions and the central bank intervened in the FX market buying USD's in a much higher proportion as opposed to the Korean central bank. This could be a cause for the weak correlation between their currencies.

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## Conclusion

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Our data showed us that during a period of growth, the markets of only Hong Kong and Jakarta moved with Korea, but during a period of crisis, Japan and China also joined that list. This shows that during a crisis period, the East Asian economies are more linked with one another. We speculate that a reason for this is market sentiment is stronger during a crisis period; the fear of losing money is a stronger driver of decision making than the speculation of making money.

While the stock markets show some signs of interdependency, this is not the case with currencies. We say this because we did not find a general trend when analyzing the data. For example, one country's currency correlation might have happened during one crisis, but the same correlation did not occur during the other crisis. We found reasons that shed light to why this was happening, which ultimately led us to the conclusion that there is no definitive correlation between the currencies of the East Asian countries we chose, regardless of economic environment.

The reason we performed these regressions was in order to find some trends with some of South Korea's East Asian neighbors in order to make a forecast how the Korean stock market would behave. Through our analysis, we can say that the Korean market is strongly correlated with the markets of Hong Kong and Indonesia, regardless of economic environment. Thus, our recommendation to foreign investors looking to add South Korea to their investment portfolio would be to look at how the stock markets of Hong Kong and Indonesia are performing and invest accordingly.



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**Exhibits****Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus SHCOMP Index****Asian crisis of 1997-1998 Minitab Output**

The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = 157 - 0.796 SHCOMP Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	157.11	31.27	5.02	0.000
SHCOMP Index	-0.7964	0.3132	-2.54	0.013

S = 17.4332    R-Sq = 9.2%    R-Sq(adj) = 7.8%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	1964.5	1964.5	6.46	0.013
Residual Error	64	19450.7	303.9		
Total	65	21415.3			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	SHCOMP Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
59	117	87.41	63.65	5.97	23.76	1.45 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus NKY Index**

The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = - 82.7 + 1.89 NKY Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-82.698	9.022	-9.17	0.000
NKY Index	1.8864	0.1055	17.88	0.000

S = 7.46961    R-Sq = 83.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 83.1%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	17844	17844	319.82	0.000
Residual Error	64	3571	56		
Total	65	21415			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	NKY Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
-----	-----------	--------------	-----	--------	----------	----------

1      80   47.220   67.696   1.079   -20.476   -2.77R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus HSI Index

The regression equation is  
KOSPI2 Index = - 5.04 + 1.04 HSI Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-5.043	5.194	-0.97	0.335
HSI Index	1.03702	0.06381	16.25	0.000

S = 8.07910    R-Sq = 80.5%    R-Sq(adj) = 80.2%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	17238	17238	264.09	0.000
Residual Error	64	4177	65		
Total	65	21415			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	HSI Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
22	59	75.416	55.828	1.679	19.588	2.48R
23	59	72.436	55.690	1.685	16.746	2.12R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus JCI Index

The regression equation is  
KOSPI2 Index = 2.70 + 1.00 JCI Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	2.704	5.314	0.51	0.613
JCI Index	1.00036	0.06927	14.44	0.000

S = 8.86415    R-Sq = 76.5%    R-Sq(adj) = 76.2%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	16387	16387	208.55	0.000
Residual Error	64	5029	79		
Total	65	21415			

#### Unusual Observations

JCI	KOSPI2
-----	--------

Obs	Index	Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	64	47.22	66.42	1.35	-19.20	-2.19R
2	60	44.96	62.83	1.51	-17.87	-2.05R
43	69	93.91	71.64	1.17	22.27	2.54R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

## Period of growth 2002-07 Minitab Output

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus SHCOMP Index

The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = 115 + 0.041 SHCOMP Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	115.39	36.25	3.18	0.003
SHCOMP Index	0.0410	0.3715	0.11	0.913

S = 46.5429    R-Sq = 0.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 0.0%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	26	26	0.01	0.913
Residual Error	33	71486	2166		
Total	34	71512			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	SHCOMP Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	163	213.16	122.05	26.20	91.11	2.37RX

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
 X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus NKY Index

The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = 50.8 + 0.539 NKY Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	50.76	31.67	1.60	0.118
NKY Index	0.5394	0.2424	2.22	0.033

S = 43.4097    R-Sq = 13.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 10.4%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	9327	9327	4.95	0.033
Residual Error	33	62185	1884		
Total	34	71512			

## Unusual Observations

	NKY	KOSPI2				
Obs	Index	Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
35	150	39.52	131.75	9.23	-92.23	-2.17R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

**Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus HSI Index**

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KOSPI2 Index} = -31.5 + 1.33 \text{ HSI Index}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-31.53	23.40	-1.35	0.187
HSI Index	1.3251	0.2005	6.61	0.000

S = 30.5386    R-Sq = 57.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 55.7%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	40737	40737	43.68	0.000
Residual Error	33	30776	933		
Total	34	71512			

## Unusual Observations

	HSI	KOSPI2				
Obs	Index	Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	175	213.16	200.58	13.34	12.58	0.46 X
5	131	204.01	141.42	6.15	62.59	2.09R
25	132	72.84	143.97	6.37	-71.13	-2.38R
26	137	87.81	150.40	6.99	-62.59	-2.11R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
 X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus JCI Index**

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KOSPI2 Index} = 41.3 + 0.434 \text{ JCI Index}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	41.291	6.869	6.01	0.000
JCI Index	0.43386	0.03377	12.85	0.000

S = 19.0024    R-Sq = 83.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 82.8%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	59596	59596	165.05	0.000
Residual Error	33	11916	361		
Total	34	71512			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	JCI Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	461	213.16	241.10	10.01	-27.94	-1.73 X
35	114	39.52	90.64	3.91	-51.12	-2.75R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**2008-2012 crisis data****Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus SHANGHAI**

The regression equation is  
KOSPI = 67.9 + 0.312 SHANGHAI

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	67.929	8.378	8.11	0.000
SHANGHAI	0.31211	0.08421	3.71	0.001

S = 18.0290    R-Sq = 31.4%    R-Sq(adj) = 29.1%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	4465.7	4465.7	13.74	0.001
Residual Error	30	9751.3	325.0		
Total	31	14217.0			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	SHANGHAI	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
20	192	113.00	127.95	9.03	-14.95	-0.96 X
21	203	115.77	131.27	9.87	-15.49	-1.03 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Scatterplot of KOSPI vs SHANGHAI****Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus NIKKEI**

The regression equation is  
KOSPI = 116 - 0.213 NIKKEI



Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	115.82	14.97	7.74	0.000
NIKKEI	-0.2134	0.1614	-1.32	0.196

S = 21.1612    R-Sq = 5.5%    R-Sq(adj) = 2.4%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	783.2	783.2	1.75	0.196
Residual Error	30	13433.8	447.8		
Total	31	14217.0			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	NIKKEI	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
32	85	53.98	97.63	3.81	-43.66	-2.10R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus HANG SENG

The regression equation is  
 $KOSPI = 7.1 + 1.02 \text{ HANG SENG}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	7.09	12.04	0.59	0.561
HANG SENG	1.0216	0.1349	7.57	0.000

S = 12.7592    R-Sq = 65.6%    R-Sq(adj) = 64.5%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	9333.1	9333.1	57.33	0.000
Residual Error	30	4883.9	162.8		
Total	31	14217.0			

#### Unusual Observations

HANG						
Obs	SENG	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
20	126	113.00	135.64	5.62	-22.65	-1.98 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus JAKARTA

The regression equation is  
 $KOSPI = 51.7 + 0.438 \text{ JAKARTA}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
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Constant	51.705	3.858	13.40	0.000
JAKARTA	0.43813	0.03455	12.68	0.000

S = 8.63124    R-Sq = 84.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 83.8%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	11982	11982	160.84	0.000
Residual Error	30	2235	74		
Total	31	14217			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	JAKARTA	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
21	100	115.77	95.71	1.53	20.07	2.36R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

## Period of growth 2002-07 Minitab Output

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus SHCOMP Index

The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = 115 + 0.041 SHCOMP Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	115.39	36.25	3.18	0.003
SHCOMP Index	0.0410	0.3715	0.11	0.913

S = 46.5429    R-Sq = 0.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 0.0%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	26	26	0.01	0.913
Residual Error	33	71486	2166		
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#### Unusual Observations

Obs	SHCOMP Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	163	213.16	122.05	26.20	91.11	2.37RX

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Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	50.76	31.67	1.60	0.118
NKY Index	0.5394	0.2424	2.22	0.033

S = 43.4097    R-Sq = 13.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 10.4%

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Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
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The regression equation is  
 KOSPI2 Index = - 31.5 + 1.33 HSI Index

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-31.53	23.40	-1.35	0.187
HSI Index	1.3251	0.2005	6.61	0.000

S = 30.5386    R-Sq = 57.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 55.7%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	40737	40737	43.68	0.000
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Total	34	71512			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	HSI Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	175	213.16	200.58	13.34	12.58	0.46 X
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25	132	72.84	143.97	6.37	-71.13	-2.38R
26	137	87.81	150.40	6.99	-62.59	-2.11R

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## Regression Analysis: KOSPI2 Index versus JCI Index

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KOSPI2 Index} = 41.3 + 0.434 \text{ JCI Index}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	41.291	6.869	6.01	0.000
JCI Index	0.43386	0.03377	12.85	0.000

S = 19.0024    R-Sq = 83.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 82.8%

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Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	59596	59596	165.05	0.000
Residual Error	33	11916	361		
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### Unusual Observations

Obs	JCI Index	KOSPI2 Index	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	461	213.16	241.10	10.01	-27.94	-1.73 X
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R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
 X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

## 2008-2012 crisis data Minitab Output

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus SHANGHAI

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KOSPI} = 67.9 + 0.312 \text{ SHANGHAI}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	67.929	8.378	8.11	0.000
SHANGHAI	0.31211	0.08421	3.71	0.001

S = 18.0290    R-Sq = 31.4%    R-Sq(adj) = 29.1%

### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	4465.7	4465.7	13.74	0.001
Residual Error	30	9751.3	325.0		
Total	31	14217.0			

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Obs	SHANGHAI	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
20	192	113.00	127.95	9.03	-14.95	-0.96 X
21	203	115.77	131.27	9.87	-15.49	-1.03 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

## Scatterplot of KOSPI vs SHANGHAI

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus NIKKEI

The regression equation is  
 $KOSPI = 116 - 0.213 NIKKEI$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	115.82	14.97	7.74	0.000
NIKKEI	-0.2134	0.1614	-1.32	0.196

S = 21.1612    R-Sq = 5.5%    R-Sq(adj) = 2.4%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	783.2	783.2	1.75	0.196
Residual Error	30	13433.8	447.8		
Total	31	14217.0			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	NIKKEI	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
32	85	53.98	97.63	3.81	-43.66	-2.10R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

### Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus HANG SENG

The regression equation is  
 $KOSPI = 7.1 + 1.02 HANG SENG$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	7.09	12.04	0.59	0.561
HANG SENG	1.0216	0.1349	7.57	0.000

S = 12.7592    R-Sq = 65.6%    R-Sq(adj) = 64.5%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	9333.1	9333.1	57.33	0.000
Residual Error	30	4883.9	162.8		
Total	31	14217.0			

## Unusual Observations

HANG							
Obs	SENG	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid	
20	126	113.00	135.64	5.62	-22.65	-1.98	X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Regression Analysis: KOSPI versus JAKARTA**

The regression equation is  
 $KOSPI = 51.7 + 0.438 \text{ JAKARTA}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	51.705	3.858	13.40	0.000
JAKARTA	0.43813	0.03455	12.68	0.000

S = 8.63124    R-Sq = 84.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 83.8%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	11982	11982	160.84	0.000
Residual Error	30	2235	74		
Total	31	14217			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	JAKARTA	KOSPI	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid	
21	100	115.77	95.71	1.53	20.07	2.36	R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

**Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus CNY Curncy**

The regression equation is  
 $KRW \text{ Curncy} = 33972 - 339 \text{ CNY Curncy}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	33972	4396	7.73	0.000
CNY Curncy	-338.92	44.04	-7.70	0.000

S = 16.5734    R-Sq = 72.9%    R-Sq(adj) = 71.7%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	16269	16269	59.23	0.000
Residual Error	22	6043	275		
Total	23	22312			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	CNY Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
11	100	194.20	159.63	4.30	34.57	2.16R
13	100	190.27	157.19	4.12	33.08	2.06R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

**CURRENCY ANALYSIS MINITAB OUTPUTS****Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus JPY Curncy  
1997-1998 Currency crisis data**

The regression equation is

$$\text{KRW Curncy} = -114 + 2.32 \text{ JPY Curncy}$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-114.34	79.06	-1.45	0.162
JPY Curncy	2.3215	0.7224	3.21	0.004

S = 26.2710    R-Sq = 31.9%    R-Sq(adj) = 28.9%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	7128.2	7128.2	10.33	0.004
Residual Error	22	15183.7	690.2		
Total	23	22311.9			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	JPY Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
11	109	194.20	138.68	5.36	55.52	2.16R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

**Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus HKD Curncy**

The regression equation is

$$\text{KRW Curncy} = -4547 + 46.8 \text{ HKD Curncy}$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-4547	8774	-0.52	0.609
HKD Curncy	46.80	87.62	0.53	0.599

S = 31.6417    R-Sq = 1.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 0.0%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	286	286	0.29	0.599
Residual Error	22	22026	1001		
Total	23	22312			

Unusual Observations

Obs	HKD Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
14	100	137.35	130.20	17.96	7.15	0.27 X
15	100	114.32	130.63	17.22	-16.31	-0.61 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

### Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus IDR Curncy

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KRW Curncy} = 99.9 + 0.140 \text{ IDR Curncy}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	99.942	7.712	12.96	0.000
IDR Curncy	0.13993	0.02349	5.96	0.000

S = 19.6991    R-Sq = 61.7%    R-Sq(adj) = 60.0%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	13775	13775	35.50	0.000
Residual Error	22	8537	388		
Total	23	22312			

Unusual Observations

Obs	IDR Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
11	379	194.20	152.94	4.64	41.26	2.15R
13	229	190.27	131.94	4.20	58.34	3.03R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.

### Exchange rates 2002-07 Period of Growth Minitab Output

#### Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus CNY Curncy

The regression equation is  
 $\text{KRW Curncy} = -235 + 3.24 \text{ CNY Curncy}$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-235.49	32.02	-7.35	0.000
CNY Curncy	3.2356	0.3248	9.96	0.000



S = 5.68310    R-Sq = 61.2%    R-Sq(adj) = 60.6%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	3205.5	3205.5	99.25	0.000
Residual Error	63	2034.7	32.3		
Total	64	5240.2			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	CNY		Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
	Currency	KRW				
1	93	70.868	65.786	1.909	5.082	0.95 X
2	93	70.868	65.661	1.920	5.206	0.97 X
3	93	71.625	66.764	1.818	4.862	0.90 X
4	94	71.694	67.163	1.781	4.531	0.84 X
25	100	76.742	88.078	0.844	-11.336	-2.02R
26	100	75.912	88.066	0.843	-12.155	-2.16R
28	100	76.439	88.070	0.843	-11.631	-2.07R
63	100	101.028	88.105	0.845	12.922	2.30R
64	100	100.343	88.070	0.843	12.272	2.18R
65	100	99.848	88.074	0.844	11.774	2.09R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

### Regression Analysis: KRW Currency versus JPY Currency

The regression equation is  
KRW Currency = 35.0 + 0.553 JPY Currency

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	35.03	17.47	2.00	0.049
JPY Currency	0.5528	0.1990	2.78	0.007

S = 8.60838    R-Sq = 10.9%    R-Sq(adj) = 9.5%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	571.66	571.66	7.71	0.007
Residual Error	63	4668.57	74.10		
Total	64	5240.23			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	JPY		Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
	Currency	KRW				
63	101	101.03	90.76	2.84	10.27	1.26 X
64	101	100.34	91.02	2.93	9.32	1.15 X
65	102	99.85	91.58	3.11	8.27	1.03 X

X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

## Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus HKD Curncy

The regression equation is  
 KRW Curncy = - 1033 + 11.2 HKD Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-1032.5	445.8	-2.32	0.024
HKD Curncy	11.177	4.464	2.50	0.015

S = 8.69781    R-Sq = 9.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 7.6%

### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	474.16	474.16	6.27	0.015
Residual Error	63	4766.06	75.65		
Total	64	5240.23			

### Unusual Observations

Obs	HKD Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
1	100	70.87	88.59	2.32	-17.72	-2.11R
2	100	70.87	88.67	2.35	-17.81	-2.13R
45	99	87.56	77.08	2.77	10.48	1.27 X

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
 X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

## Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus IDR Curncy

The regression equation is  
 KRW Curncy = 116 - 0.369 IDR Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	115.88	20.46	5.66	0.000
IDR Curncy	-0.3689	0.2324	-1.59	0.117

S = 8.94317    R-Sq = 3.8%    R-Sq(adj) = 2.3%

### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	201.47	201.47	2.52	0.117
Residual Error	63	5038.75	79.98		
Total	64	5240.23			

### Unusual Observations

Obs	IDR Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
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21	99.0	79.36	79.34	2.82	0.02	0.00 X
22	99.0	78.76	79.34	2.82	-0.58	-0.07 X
63	94.5	101.03	81.03	1.89	20.00	2.29R
64	97.6	100.34	79.87	2.52	20.47	2.39R
65	99.2	99.85	79.30	2.85	20.55	2.42RX

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage

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### Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus CNY Curncy

The regression equation is  
KRW Curncy = 207 - 0.939 CNY Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	206.75	32.85	6.29	0.000
CNY Curncy	-0.9389	0.3689	-2.55	0.013

S = 13.0488    R-Sq = 9.3%    R-Sq(adj) = 7.9%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	1102.9	1102.9	6.48	0.013
Residual Error	63	10727.2	170.3		
Total	64	11830.0			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	CNY Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
45	90	150.45	122.02	1.69	28.43	2.20R
46	90	166.90	121.95	1.70	44.96	3.47R
47	90	150.07	121.80	1.72	28.27	2.19R
49	90	159.77	122.01	1.69	37.75	2.92R
63	99	99.56	113.64	4.11	-14.07	-1.14 X
64	100	102.07	113.21	4.27	-11.14	-0.90 X
65	100	100.00	112.86	4.39	-12.86	-1.05 X

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

### Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus HKD Curncy

The regression equation is  
KRW Curncy = 3423 - 33.2 HKD Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	3423.3	574.1	5.96	0.000
HKD Curncy	-33.240	5.782	-5.75	0.000

S = 11.0982    R-Sq = 34.4%    R-Sq(adj) = 33.4%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	4070.4	4070.4	33.05	0.000
Residual Error	63	7759.6	123.2		
Total	64	11830.0			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	HKD Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
46	99	166.90	129.40	1.74	37.50	3.42R
49	99	159.77	131.53	1.99	28.24	2.59R
62	99	97.98	131.53	1.99	-33.54	-3.07R
65	100	100.00	99.25	4.40	0.75	0.07 X

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus JPY Curncy**

The regression equation is  
KRW Curncy = 155 - 0.417 JPY Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	155.27	12.47	12.45	0.000
JPY Curncy	-0.4170	0.1611	-2.59	0.012

S = 13.0276    R-Sq = 9.6%    R-Sq(adj) = 8.2%

## Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	1137.7	1137.7	6.70	0.012
Residual Error	63	10692.3	169.7		
Total	64	11830.0			

## Unusual Observations

Obs	JPY Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
45	83	150.45	120.48	1.94	29.98	2.33R
46	82	166.90	120.96	1.84	45.94	3.56R
47	76	150.07	123.65	1.62	26.42	2.04R
49	81	159.77	121.68	1.73	38.09	2.95R
65	100	100.00	113.56	4.08	-13.56	-1.10 X

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.

**Regression Analysis: KRW Curncy versus IDR Curncy**

The regression equation is

KRW Curncy = 7.7 + 1.12 IDR Curncy

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	7.69	13.75	0.56	0.578
IDR Curncy	1.1226	0.1331	8.43	0.000

S = 9.39175    R-Sq = 53.0%    R-Sq(adj) = 52.3%

#### Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	1	6273.1	6273.1	71.12	0.000
Residual Error	63	5556.9	88.2		
Total	64	11830.0			

#### Unusual Observations

Obs	IDR Curncy	KRW Curncy	Fit	SE Fit	Residual	St Resid
45	127	150.45	150.63	3.45	-0.18	-0.02 X
46	131	166.90	154.29	3.86	12.61	1.47 X
47	124	150.07	146.66	3.01	3.41	0.38 X
49	135	159.77	158.69	4.36	1.08	0.13 X
60	102	101.75	122.44	1.17	-20.70	-2.22R
61	102	100.20	122.19	1.17	-21.98	-2.36R
62	99	97.98	118.85	1.28	-20.87	-2.24R
63	100	99.56	119.48	1.25	-19.91	-2.14R
64	102	102.07	122.47	1.17	-20.40	-2.19R
65	100	100.00	119.95	1.23	-19.95	-2.14R

R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.  
 X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage.