

# Plurality and Solidarity: Multicultural Minority Groups and Multicultural Coexistence in Korean Society

In-Jin Yoon (Korea University)

## I. Introduction

Over the past twenty years, South Korea has faced dramatic demographic changes. The demographic changes often involve three key elements—birth, death, and the movement of people—but what is unique about the demographic trends of Korea is its exceptionally rapid pace of change. For example, the total fertility rate decreased from 4.5 in 1970 to 1.15 in 2004 and the Korea's current level of fertility is the lowest among OECD countries (Shin, 2009: 1). As a result, Korea's population size is shrinking and in 2050 its population size is predicted at 42.3 million as compared to 48.8 million in 2010. While the number of young people decreased as a result of low birth rate, the number and proportion of old people over 65 years old increased as a result of low death rate: the proportion of old people jumped from 3.1% in 1970 to 11% in 2010 and is forecasted at 38.2% in 2050 (Korea National Statistical Service, 2009: 12). The combined effect of low birth and death rates was the reduction of the economically active population between the ages of 15 and 64. Furthermore, the improved standard of living of Koreans discouraged Koreans from engaging in physically demanding and low-paid jobs in manufacturing and personal service industries, creating labor shortage in so-called 3-D jobs. This prompted the admission of labor migrants from Asia's developing countries in the late 1980s. Female marriage migrants joined labor migrants in increasing numbers in the early 1990s as Korean males in rural areas married foreign brides and when international marriage brokers began international matchmaking service in the early 2000s, the number of female marriage migrants grew rapidly from 9,684 in 2000 to 30,719 in 2005 and since then declined gradually to 25,142 in 2009 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2010). Thus, within a span of three decades, Korea has transformed from an immigrant-sending country to an immigrant-receiving one. In 2010, the number of foreigners in Korea reached 1.2 million, accounting for 2.4% of the national population, and the proportion of foreigners is expected to rise up to 5% in 2020, and 9.2% in 2050 (Park et al., 2009: 1). This means South Korea is now entering a multicultural society.

Korean society has responded to this unprecedented phenomenon in many fields. Korean scholars introduced theories and discourses of multiculturalism developed in Western societies to Korea and examined current situations and problems of various types of migrants. Civic organizations advocated rights of migrant workers and marriage migrants and supported their adjustment in Korea. Mass media transformed migrants' problems into a social issue and raised public awareness of difficulties faced by migrants. The Korean government took proactive measures to accommodate needs of foreigners and migrants. Although acted rather too quickly and hastily, the central government and its affiliated organizations have made some remarkable accomplishments in immigration and multicultural policies. They include 1) establishment of the Employment Permit System and Healthy Family Support Centers, 2) legislation of the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Multicultural Family Support Act, and 3) establishment of legal and institutional infrastructures like the Korea Immigration Service. Also, according to many surveys on Koreans' perceptions of migrant workers and multicultural society, Koreans have rather much more open-minded and positive viewpoints toward migrant workers, marriage migrants, and a multicultural society than ever before, and their perspectives are slowly but gradually changing more positively (Yoon and Song, 2010; Yoon et al., 2010). These changes were able to happen mainly because of many progressive civic organizations and media, which actively challenged infringement of human rights, social prejudices and discriminations faced by migrant workers, marriage migrants, and their children. They also have spotlighted the urgency of granting support and attention toward the groups above. Also, when Hines Ward, an African-American Korean who plays American football, visited South Korea, his "mother's country," in 2006 after he received the Super Bowl MVP award, discrimination problems among children of international marriages began to get more attention from society (Lee and Ahn, 2007: 65-66). Moreover, as a tool for overcoming exclusive nationalism, the idea of multiculturalism has further accepted, and is regarded as synonym for liberalization or a step toward joining the ranks of advanced nations (Seol, 2009).

Despite such efforts and opportunities, the level of social discrimination and exclusion that foreigners and migrants perceive turned out to be very high. The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism carried out a survey in April-May 2008 among 825 migrants and marriage migrants, and 102 North Korean migrants over 20 years old. The results showed that their perceived level of discrimination toward migrants and/or their families was 'rather high' (53.3%), followed by 'moderate

high' (19.2%), 'significantly high' (6.9%), 'low' (20.1%), and 'none' (0.5%), and that the level of discrimination toward North Korea migrants was 'rather high' (53.9%), followed by 'moderate high' (29.4%), 'significantly high' (2.9%), 'low' (11.8%), and 'none' (2%). Furthermore, 55.8% of the migrants and marriage migrants felt the need of education on multiculturalism for the general public while 8.4% did not, and 66.7% of North Korean migrants also felt the need of educating the public about North migrants' culture and while 7.5% did not (Cho, Park, and Hong, 2008). The outsiders' evaluation of Koreans' acceptance of multiculturalism is far worse and negative than Koreans believe in; according to the International Institute for Management Development's (IMD) World Competitiveness Index, Korea was at the bottom (out of 55 nations) in 2008, and second from the bottom (out of 57 nations) in 2009 (Jung, 2009).

The negative evaluations of outsiders about Koreans' acceptance of multiculturalism suggest that the transition from a hitherto mono-ethnic and mono-cultural society to a multiethnic and multicultural one would be a difficult and rocky journey. As Korean society has entered the first phase of multicultural society, Koreans need to find a new principle of social solidarity and integration in order to incorporate new members of Korean society who have acquired citizenship by naturalization. Ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism based on blood ties and common culture are no longer appropriate to mobilize a sense of belonging and solidarity among people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Also, citizenship is an outdated and rigid form of social membership and entitlement in a multicultural society, and does not accommodate the problem of permanent residents and undocumented foreigners effectively. There are a significant number of foreigners who are actual members of local communities but denied of basic human rights because of their non-citizenship or undocumented statuses.

A multicultural society is not just a place where people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds live together but also a place where people of different statuses and relationships cohabit. Here, discordance between official membership and actual membership occurs. In order for the majority and minority groups to coexist, it is necessary to develop a new principle of social solidarity and integration, and to endow socially marginalized groups with legitimate social membership and rights. As Kymlica (2001) defined multiculturalism as a form of politics of recognition, emphasizing equal rights to racial, cultural, and sexual minorities, we need to develop a more expanded social membership that enables peaceful coexistence between the majority and minority groups.

In this article, I wish to examine the overall circumstances and problems of multicultural minority groups in Korean society, and to analyze Koreans' perceptions of and relations with these groups. Also, I wish to propose an alternative principle of social solidarity and integration that can facilitate coexistence of majority and minority groups.

## II. Definition of a Multicultural Minority Group

A minority group refers to any group that is distinguished from a dominant group in terms of social status, race and ethnicity, education, age, sexual orientation, religion, ideology, region, wealth, etc. Moreover, the minority status is conditioned not only by numerical inferiority but also by political, social, and economical powers. Dworkin and Dworkin (1999) offer a definition of a minority group as a group characterized by these four qualities: 1) Identifiability—the group can be distinguished from dominant societal members by any number of factors, including physical traits or cultural practices, 2) Differential Power—on average the minority group members (in comparison with members of the majority group) have less power, fewer resources, and are less able to mobilize the resources to get their way in the presence of opposition, 3) Differential and Pejorative Treatment—these are the behaviors of the dominant group in their dealing with the minority, and specifically refer to discriminations toward a specific person due to his or her membership of certain minority group, and 4) Group Awareness—minorities are often reminded of their low status and have developed an identity. This often has led to a sense of greater solidarity in the struggles engaged in by members of their group as they have combated long periods of discriminatory treatment.


Though the term 'minority' is more suitable for multiracial or multinational societies like the United States, as there are increasing number of socially marginalized groups in Korea, minorities in Korean society can be also defined as above. North Korean migrants, the disabled, marriage migrants, homosexuals, and more, represent quickly evolving aspects of Korea. They all are generally recognizable as distinct from the majority group, and at the same time they are given less or no political, economic, and social powers, which often become targets for persisting discrimination. Since the 1990s there has been a great increase in numbers of minority-focused social organizations, and their growth has been deeply related to strengthening their group solidarity. In May 2001, for example, the National Human Rights Commission Act was passed and it applies to all citizens of Korea and all

foreigners residing therein. Also, this act prohibits any discriminatory actions that violate equality based on one's social status, race, sexual orientation, disability, etc. This again provides evidences of regarding North Korean migrants, the disabled, migrant workers, and homosexuals as minorities in Korea.

In a multicultural society one's race, ethnicity, nationality, or culture are more salient markers than sex, age, sexual orientation, disability, or region when defining him or her as a minority. I refer groups of people with such characteristics as multicultural minority groups. At the present time in Korean society, migrant workers, marriage migrants, children of international marriages, Korean Chinese or ethnic Koreans of Chinese nationality, overseas Chinese, and North Korean migrants are the most representative multicultural minority groups. Yet, whether to or not to view North Korean migrants as a multicultural minority group still remains an open question. Most North Korean migrants and civic activists who work for them oppose the idea of multiculturalism because North Korean migrants are Koreans from birth and deserve special treatment. Scholars and civic activists who work for immigrants and their children, on the other hand, think that it is no wrong to view North Korean migrants as a multicultural minority group because they are migrants who came from different backgrounds from South Korea and have to adapt to new environments like other foreign migrants. I agree with the latter viewpoint and will examine their living conditions and relations with South Koreans in comparison with other multicultural minority groups.

The multicultural minority groups listed above are differentiated from each other according to their nationality, compatriot status, and legal status. Picture 1 shows the position of multicultural minority groups arranged among the dimensions of nationality, compatriot status, and legal status. North Korean migrants belong to the right upper part, where Korean nationality and compatriot status fit in together, and therefore they get special treatments for they are innate Koreans and expected to play important roles in the process of unification. In the right lower part, where non-Korean nationality and compatriot status fit in together, ethnic Koreans in China, Russia, and other overseas Koreans are located. Here, though they are not Korean nationals, they are given extra care and attention often based on brotherly or fraternal love. The left upper part, where Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlaps, belongs to the naturalized-marriage migrants. They have acquired Korean nationality through marriage and are expected to continue family lineage by giving birth to the next generation. These marriage migrants and Korean husbands form multicultural families, and their children—who are full

citizens—also receive special attention and support, especially in education. Last but not least, the left lower part, where non-Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, belongs to ethnic Chinese in Korea and migrant workers. Although ethnic Chinese have been long-time permanent residents living in Korea for several generations, they are treated as ‘half-citizens’ (H. Kim, 2006). Migrant workers are non-citizens, non-overseas Koreans, and remain temporal residents in Korea. Thus, they receive much less attention and this small attention gets further divided based upon their legal status. Legal migrant workers are somewhat protected through Foreign Workers Employment Law and Foreigners Treatment Act, while illegal (or undocumented) migrant workers are excluded from any forms of legal protections, and therefore, are put in a very difficult situation.



<Figure 1> Koreans’ cognitive schema of immigrants

### III. Current Situations of Multicultural Minority Groups

#### 1. Foreign Migrant Worker

##### 1) Background

The influx of foreign migrant workers<sup>1</sup> has started after facing a significant labor shortage in the domestic labor market in 1987. Since 1987, large-scale massive labor movements occurred, and therefore, quickly increased laborers' wages. Moreover, as the overall living standards of Koreans improved, Korean laborers gradually began to avoid difficult, dangerous, and dirty occupations. As a result, the labor shortage of manufacturing and construction industries has got dramatically serious. From late-1992, as the use of migrant workers was legalized, many overseas investment enterprises that have overseas branches started to admit migrant workers. Furthermore, starting from November 1993, migrant workers entered Korea more easily through the introduction of the Foreign Industrial Trainee that various industrial organizations, such as Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and Construction Association of Korea, have implemented. Also, the number of migrant workers gaining illegal access to jobs in Korea by entering with tourist visas increased. The number of migrant workers in 1991 was 45,449 and it quickly increased to 140,000 by 1995. Though the number slightly decreased in the 1997 financial crisis, as the economy quickly recovered, the number bounced to 258,866 by July 2000. This number represented about 1.2% of Korea's employees, 1.9% of wage earners, and has continuously increased up to 551,858 by December 2009.

## 2) Demography and Characteristics

As the number of migrant workers increased, nationalities of migrant workers also got diverse. Prior to 2003, migrant workers came from 90 different nations but the number of nations constantly increased to 120 by 2007. In early 1990s, major migrant worker sending nations were China, the Philippines, and Bangladesh, but further expanded to Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, etc. However, Korean Chinese still make up 55.5% of the migrant worker population, followed by Southeast Asians 25%, Han Chinese 3.4%, Central Asian 2.4%, and Mongolian 2.3% (Korean Immigration Service, 2009b). From 1997 to 2008, the number of female migrant workers has been remained low, around 31%, when compared to other labor importing countries. However, since 2002, Korean Chinese were allowed to work in the service industry and this preferential arrangement

---

<sup>1</sup> Foreign migrant workers will be further referred as migrant workers

increased the percentage of female migrant workers in the total migrant worker population because females are as highly represented as 44.6% in the Korean Chinese population.

The migrant workers' occupational ranges expanded further as well. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice, the number of migrant workers working in the professional fields, such as teaching and research, English lessons, skill training, and entertainment, etc, were 15,900 in 1997; this number has further increased to 40,698 in 2009 (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). Also, migrant workers from Nigeria, Ghana and other African countries have altered their careers to international trades especially between Korea and their countries, or have established themselves as entrepreneurs. However, their population is significantly low; 6.6% as professionals and 0.8% as artists and sportsmen, and the majority of migrant workers remain as low-skilled laborers. Also, out of the total migrant worker population, 8.7% (48,029) are undocumented immigrants and, again they mostly work for low-skilled jobs (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). In short, the migrant workers can be largely divided into four main categories: 1) professional workers, 2) non-professional workers who come under the Employment Permit System and work in manufacturing industries, 3) overseas Koreans with Working Visit Visa, and 4) undocumented migrant workers. Except the professional workers, the rest types of migrant workers, largely low-skilled working in manufacturing, construction, and personal service industries, constitute multicultural minority groups in Korean society (Seol, 2009b: 64).

Furthermore, as the number of migrant workers who are staying longer periods in Korea increased, they have created themselves group residences or ethnic communities. Wongok-dong in Ansan and Garibong-dong in Seoul are the popular examples of local communities where Koreans and migrant workers reside together. According to the 2009 survey of foreign residents administered by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 35.7% of migrant workers reside in Gyeonggi Province, 29.6% in Seoul, 6.6% in Gyeongnam Province, and 5.7% in Incheon. When compared to the 2008 survey, the migrant worker population in Seoul and Chungnam Province increased dramatically by 57.8% and 93%, respectively. Seventy percent of the migrant workers are residing in the capital areas because most businesses and companies are located there (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2009).

### 3) Current Situations and Problems



In January 2007, the Industrial Training System was abolished and the Employment Permit System was implemented instead. The new system of foreign labor management was revised in April 2010 and the revision offers: 1) long-term labor contracts, 2) extension of length of employment from three to five years, 3) increased flexibility in the change of workplace, 4) longer period allowed for searching for a new employer after the change of workplace, and 5) overall better working conditions. However, this revision is being criticized by civic activists for being advantageous to employers and for not considering migrant workers' basic human rights. In other words, with migrant workers not given full details and information on their occupation and workplace environment and by just extending terms of contract can restrict workers' autonomous decision making process. Furthermore, the right to rehire migrant workers solely resides within the employers, and therefore, when workers' three years of employment contract expires, the employers are most likely to take control over the migrant workers and even their amount of wages. Also, even if more legitimate reasons for changing workplaces were added, the system is criticized for severely restricting the workers' rights to change workplaces and thereby keeping them under the condition of low wage and subordinate employment (H. Kim, 2008: 290-294; Y. Kim, 2009: 128-129).

Further related problems with migration workers are: 1) exceedingly expensive referral fees, 2) differences of terms in contract and reality, 3) long working hours and low wages, 4) overdue wages, 5) industrial accidents and lack of safety education, 6) verbal abuse and discriminative treatments, 7) vulnerability to diseases, injuries, and mental stresses, 8) exclusion from public social welfare and medical check-ups, and 9) violation of human rights of detained migrant workers at the Foreigners Detention Center (Han and Seol, 2007: 57-58; J. Song, 2006: 41-45; Lee and Jang, 2008: 247-248; Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea, 2009: 3-5). For legal migrant workers, their priority predicaments are focused on mental issues, while personal liberty and human rights, overdue wage, and other financial issues remain as key problems for the documented migrant workers. They are also faced with fear of regulation and exportation.

According to statistics on medical care for industrial accidents released in 2009 by the Korea Occupational Safety & Health Agency, migrant workers are facing greater difficulties related to industrial accidents as years go by. The numbers increased gradually—3,406 (3,312 injured and 94 dead) in 2006, 3,967 (3,880 injured and 87 dead) in 2007, and 5,221 (5,114 injured and 117 dead) in

2008 (Seol, 2009a: 170-175). In daily lives, they also face great amount of difficulties; they have troubles with the Korean language and culture and face discrimination because of their backgrounds (especially when they come from developing countries) and colored race. They also have difficulties with food and lack of spaces to carry out religious practices. Furthermore, exclusion from medical and social benefits, poor residential and education environment for themselves and their children, and lack of legal protections are also their key problems while living in Korea. Last but not least, being unable to communicate well in Korean, they are vulnerable to accidents and minor disputes can lead up to racial conflicts (Seol, Choi, and Han, 2002: 93-103; Yoon, Park, and Kwon, 2005: 240-246; Gyeonggi Resesarch Institute, 2006: 208-210).

## 2. Female Marriage Migrants

### 1) Background

The history of international marriages in Korea goes back up to the Korean War. In order to block the expansion of communism in the Northeast Asia after the war, 40,000 American soldiers were stationed each year. From 1950 to 1964, about 6,000 Korean women were married to American soldiers and moved to the United States. But, gradually, the number of Korean women who emigrated overseas for the purpose of marriage decreased; the number dropped to 6,187 in 1981 and further to 1,113 in 2003. However, the turning point of international marriages occurred in the early 1992. As the diplomatic relations between Korea and China were established, Korean bachelors in rural areas married female Korean Chinese, and from then, the number of Korean Chinese increased. Furthermore, Japanese and Filipino women entered Korea to get married as well, with religious purposes emphasized under the Unification Church. In 2000, the international marriage occurred more frequently after the introduction of marriage broker systems and businesses. The foreign brides started to come from the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia, Russia, Uzbekistan, etc., and especially the number of Vietnamese brides increased significantly after the year 2003. It is reported that in the year 1990, 1.2% of all marriages in Korea were international marriages, which later has increased to 13.6% by 2005 and slightly decreased to 11% by 2008.

## 2) Demography and Characteristics

According to statistics released in February 2010 by Korea Immigration Service, the total number of marriage migrants in Korea was 134,426, with 117,148 being females (87.2%) and 17,278 males (12.8%). Out of the total number of foreign brides in Korea, the majority are from East Asia and Southeast Asia, with 30,756 Chinese (26.3%), 30,773 Vietnamese (26.3%), 25,783 Korean Chinese (22%), 9,210 Japanese (7.9%), 6,406 Filipinas (5.5%), 3,395 Cambodians (2.9%), 2,381 Thais (2%), 2,373 Mongolians (2%), and 6,071 from other nations (5.2%).

A recent survey of marriage immigrants and their families conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare from July 20 to October 31 in 2009 that interviewed 131,000 marriage migrants and 73,000 families provides concrete information about this group. Main results are: 1) 54% of all marriage migrants entered Korea after 2005, confirming the recency of their arrival, 2) the average period of residence was 5.3 years (5.1 years for women and 7.1 years for men), and 3) 51.9% of marriage migrants resided in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province, which constitutes capital area, and other metropolitan areas, and women had higher ratio of residing in rural areas than men (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2009).

Most female migrants were in her twenties (average age was 23.3 years old) while male migrants were in his late-thirties or forties (average age was 41.6 years old). The age gap between female marriage migrants and Korean husbands was ten years while the gap between male marriage migrants and Korean wives was 1.3 years. The age gap was the widest among Cambodians and Vietnamese—17.5 years between Cambodian-Korean couples and 17 years between Vietnamese-Korean couples.

The education level of female marriage migrants were generally low—36.1% less than high school education, 42.3% high-school education, 20.6% college education. On the other hand, the education level of male marriage migrants was higher; 24.3% received less than high school education, 34.5% were high school graduates and 40.1% were college graduates. The education level also varied among different nationalities; 93.9% of marriage migrants from North America, Western Europe and Australia, 61.3% of Mongolians, 60.5% of Japanese, and 57.5% of Filipinas received college degrees while the majority of Cambodian (66.4%), Vietnamese (61.8%), and Chinese, including the Han-raced Chinese (36.8%), marriage migrants received less than high school education. Furthermore, 51% of

female marriage migrants with less than elementary education got married to husbands with less or higher high school education, which presents another huge educational level gap.

### 3) Current Situations and Problems

Most female marriage migrants face serious economic difficulties in Korea. According to the 2009 survey of multicultural families, 38.4% of the interviewed families earned less than 1~2 million won (approximately \$862~\$1,724) per month, and 21.3% earned even smaller income of less than 1 million. Only 2% earned more than 5 million won (\$4,310) of monthly family income. Because of financial difficulties, the families that failed to pay medical insurance bills or utilities bills, borrowed loans for living expenses, or suspended or gave up medical treatment accounted for 30% of all interviewed families (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2009).

The most frequently reported difficulties include 1) language barriers, 2) financial insecurity and limited access to social services, and 3) difficulties with educating and raising children. Especially, those with children at the ages of elementary school have extra difficulties of paying tuition fees for private educational institutes and helping school homework. They also report high levels of perceived discrimination—34.8% of female marriage migrants and 52.8% of male marriage migrants replied that they have experienced social marginalization and discrimination because of their foreign statuses and physical appearances. This result confirms that social prejudice and discrimination still exist toward marriage migrants despite the apparently growing public acceptance of multiculturalism.

However, the marriage migrants' overall life satisfaction turned out to be high—57% of female marriage migrants and 53.8% of male marriage migrants replied satisfactory to their current lives. Only 6.7% of female marriage migrants and 8.3% of male marriage migrants replied negatively toward their living conditions in Korea. There was also a noticeable variation among people of different nationalities. North American, Australian, Western European and Cambodian, Thai, and Vietnamese marriage migrants expressed high levels of life satisfaction while Japanese marriage migrants reported the lowest level of satisfaction. Satisfaction with family relations was also reported to be high—74.8% of the marriage migrants replied they were satisfied with their spouses, 88.1% with their children, 64.8% with their parents-in-law, and 60.1% with siblings of their spouses.

Although the survey results showed high levels of satisfaction with overall life conditions and family relations, the stability of international marriage is known to be weak and fragile. The husbands' economic incompetence, domestic violence, and language and cultural barriers are hard to overcome

and many international marriages have come to an end. According to divorce statistics released in April, 2010 by Statistics Korea (2010: 2-3), the number of divorces filed for international marriages increased rapidly from 1,744 in 2002 to 4,171 in 2005 and to 11,692 in 2009. By contrast, divorce cases of ordinary Korean couples decreased from 144,900 in 2002 to 124,000 in 2009.

### 3. Children of Multicultural Family

#### 1) Background

In recent years, the number of international marriages has increased dramatically and with it, the number of children of immigrant families has also escalated. They used to be called ‘the racially-mixed’ or ‘children of mixed-blood’ but those terms were replaced by ‘children of multicultural family’ that are thought to give a more positive meaning and connotation. The boundary of children of multicultural family has been open to debate among researchers, government officials, civic activists, and immigrants themselves. The experts on multicultural education generally include children of migrant workers, marriage migrants, and North Korean migrants in the broad category of multicultural family, but as mentioned earlier North Korean migrants do not want to be categorized together along with other migrants.

Migrant worker families are mostly comprised of non-citizen parents while marriage migrant families are often comprised of one parent with foreign citizenship and the other with Korean citizenship. Children of migrant workers were either born in Korea or moved to Korea at an early age. Among these children, they can be further differentiated through their parents’ legal statuses. Therefore, children of legal migrant families are legally protected whereas children of undocumented migrant families are left vulnerable, with little legal protection of basic human rights and educational support.

#### 2) Demography and Characteristics

As reported by the annual surveys of foreign residents conducted by Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the number of children of multicultural family has been gradually increasing—25,000 in 2006, 44,000 in 2007, 58,000 in 2008, and 107,689 in 2009. Ethnic backgrounds

of the parents are diverse but the largest ethnic group is non-Korean Chinese (50.7%) followed by Southeast Asians (34.9%), Korean Chinese (17.3%), Japanese (6.3%), Mongolians (1.6%), and Central Asians (1.5%).

In terms of age distribution, these children are concentrated in the pre-school ages and elementary school ages—64,040 under the age of six and 28,922 in the 7-12 age bracket as compared to 8,082 in the middle school ages and 6,645 in the high school ages. As a result, the current issues are more focused toward family and schools, within ten years, however, issues of labor, poverty, discrimination and other socioeconomic problems will begin to surface and become important sources of social conflicts and divisions.

### 3) Current Situations and Problems

The children of multicultural family have different appearances, ways of speaking, and poor language proficiency when compared to native Korean children, and are often alienated from the mainstream South Korean culture and their peers at school. This, therefore, intimates them mentally and creates difficulties for them in establishing self-identity as Koreans (J. Kim et al., 2005; Bae, 2006). These problems get further serious and affect children more critically once they are proceeding to secondary level of education; the number of students who dropout or discontinue the pursuit of education gets higher— 14% of multicultural family children do not attend elementary school, 40% do not attend middle school, and 70% do not complete high school.

According to Cho (2006), who investigated the situations of the children of multicultural family, children of marriage migrants are referred as ‘falling-behind children,’ children of migrant workers as ‘neglected children,’ and children of North Korean migrants as ‘drop-out children’ when evaluating each groups’ educational problems. About 8,000 children of migrant workers are not receiving any types of education, and moreover, undocumented migrant parents hesitate sending their children to public or accredited schools because of unstable residence and financial insecurities, and fear of disclosing their identities. On the other hand, the children of marriage migrants and North Korean migrants are Korean citizens and are regarded disadvantaged minorities, and therefore, receive further attention and double support from the government and civil organizations. Although these children suffer from difficulties in following Korean curriculum at school, but it is true that they are

offered better support, such as guaranteed educational opportunities and access to other programs carried out by the government and civic organizations to improve educational performance. Children of migrant workers, especially undocumented ones, however, are neglected and abandoned from basic public education because they are not Korean citizens and compatriots.

#### 4. Korean Chinese

##### 1) Background

Korean Chinese share the same race or bloodline as Koreans but hold China citizenship. Korean Chinese were not allowed visiting Korea during the Cold War era, and therefore, maintained close relationship with North Korea instead. However, the presence of Korean Chinese was intermittently introduced in Korea since 1970. From 1973, letters from Korean Chinese were delivered through other nations, and from 1974, their presence has got more popular after the letter exchanges between Korea and other communist nations were allowed. Moreover, after Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) radio launched a campaign for reunion of dispersed family members of ethnic Koreans in China, they started to visit Korea through layovers at Hong Kong. Their visits and entries got further increased after the establishment of diplomatic relations, which legalized their entrance to Korea in 1992 (Han and Kwon, 1993: 4; Noh, 2001: 16; Lee and Park, 2009: 104).

The waves of Korean Chinese to Korea can be largely differentiated into two types by their purpose of visit. During the first wave, from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, mostly the first and second generation Korean Chinese came to visit their family or relatives in Korea. Their visits were coordinated very well both internally and externally where the family or relatives in Korea were financially well supported and the Korean government's international policies supported and encouraged Korean Chinese's visits (Yeo, 2005: 252-253).

During the second wave, from mid-1990s until now, most of Korean Chinese coming to Korea have had, and still have, the purpose of finding employment and permanent residence. This phenomenon is the product of both a pull factor in Korea, which attracted migrant workers to fill in labor shortage, and a push factor in China that drove out Korean Chinese overseas, who were alienated from China's Reform and Open-Door Policy (Noh, 2001: 16-18; Im, 2004: 19-22; Yeo, 2005: 253-254).

Korean Chinese have utilized such various routes and mechanisms to enter Korea for employment purposes as industrial technical training, visit to family members, invitation of parents, and marriage to Koreans. Furthermore, the government offered various support and special treatments, and the implementation of the Working Visit Visa System in 2007 has further attracted Korean Chinese, even the ones who were not interested in coming to Korea (H. Kim, 2009: 38). Also, the number of Korean Chinese students has gradually increased since 2000 as Korean colleges and universities opened their doors more widely than before to foreign students. Similarly, Korean Chinese women started entering Korea in increasing numbers as provincial governments that experienced depopulation in their areas sponsored marriage between Korean men and Korean Chinese women (H. Kim, 2008: 45).

## 2) Demography and Characteristics

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992, Korean Chinese are the largest foreigner group who entered Korea in search of 'Korean Dream.' They are hired in such various industries and occupations as manufacturing, construction, restaurants, nannies, housekeepers, and more. According to the 2009 survey of foreign residents, Korean Chinese accounted for 40.1% (443,836) of all foreign residents (including undocumented ones). Furthermore, their size is growing as the annual number of entrants keeps increasing—65,000 in 2006, 182,000 in 2007, 256,000 in 2008, and 270,000 in 2009 (Korea Immigration Service, 2010). As explained earlier, the Working Visit Visa System that has got implemented in March 2007 has greatly increased the number of Korean Chinese entering Korea. By February 2010, Korean Chinese currently registered under the Working Visit Visa System was 300,000, which was 82.4% of all Korean Chinese in Korea. There are also more than 3,000 Korean Chinese international students and more than 33,000 marriage migrants who increase the complexity of the Korean Chinese population in Korea (Korea Immigration Service, 2010).

Like other migrant workers, Korean Chinese are heavily concentrated in Seoul and adjacent metropolitan areas where industrial complexes, firms, and schools are located. Especially, Kuro-gu Garibong-dong (32,000) and Yongdongpo Daerim-dong (41,000) are well-known inner-city ethnic places of Korean Chinese where they established numerous stores, associations, and close social networks that stretch to China and Japan (Piao, 2008).



### 3) Current Situations and Problems

Korean Chinese are a minority group that has multiple identities such as Korean compatriots, Chinese citizens, foreign migrant workers, and marriage migrants. They share the same language, lifestyle and cultures with native Koreans, and their identities are closely knit with Korean history. These close connections as 'compatriots' often bring Korean Chinese and Koreans closer. However, though Korean Chinese seem to occupy privileged positions in Korea compared to other migrant worker groups, they are equally low-skilled workers and clustered at the lower classes. They are like 'marginal men' who frequently cross the border of compatriots and foreigners (M. Kim, 2003: 184; Yeo, 2005: 245-246).

Not only Korean Chinese believe that their adjustment to Korea will be rather easy for they share similar appearances, language, and cultures with Koreans, but they also seek for vague compensation or support from Korea for having their ancestors who fought for independence from Japanese colonial rule (Noh, 2001: 29; Moon, 2008: 138). However, in reality, they face many differences in language, food and life styles, social norms, and political views from Koreans that often hinder their adaptation to Korean society. Furthermore, as they realize their current statuses as undocumented foreigners and lower classes in Korea, their initial expectations of being treated equally as compatriots shattered. Their sense of mistrust and dissatisfaction increased further as they experienced mistreatment and discrimination in the labor market and interpersonal relations with Koreans (Noh, 2001: 32-42).

As Korean Chinese's negative views toward Korea and Koreans get worse, the views of Koreans toward Korean Chinese are getting also worsened. Especially, crimes committed by undocumented ones turned previously sympathetic views of Koreans into negative and suspicious ones. In some industries like construction, competition between Korean Chinese and Korean workers

reached a serious level so that some dissatisfied Korean organized anti-Korean Chinese rallies and pressured the government to restrict the entry of Korean Chinese into the construction industry.

## 5. Overseas Chinese

### 1) Background

The history of overseas Chinese in Korea dates back to 1882, when the Imo Incident occurred and a commercial treaty between Chosun Dynasty and Qing Dynasty was signed. This treaty was signed in order to strengthen Qing's economic power over Chosun dynasty, which eventually facilitated commercial trades between the two. For an example, an overseas Chinese businessman named Dong-Soon Tae was successful in running a trading company in Chosun (Chung, 2007: 19). However, after the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, which both Japan won, Japan took exclusive domination over Chosun, and therefore, took over overseas Chinese businessmen's privileges and implemented policies unfavorable toward them. Many powerful overseas Chinese businessmen moved back to China, yet a small number of overseas Chinese businessmen gradually came to Korea avoiding civil wars and economic crises in China (Jeon, 2003: 384). Aside to the influx of businessmen, a lot of workers and laborers also came from China in this period; in 1922, 50% (15,833) of all overseas Chinese in Korea were laborers (Park, 1981: 112).

The overseas Chinese's history of ordeals started from the Japanese colonial era. The 'Manbo Mountain Incident,' which happened at the Manbo mountain region of Changchun, Jilin Province in 1931, refers to Japan's forced relocation of Chosun people in northeastern districts of China for the development of farmland and irrigation canal construction, and conflicts occurred between Chosun farmers and Chinese farmers. Although there were no casualties, in order to drive a wedge between the two groups, Japan spread false reports or rumors that numerous Chosun farmers were killed. The upset Chosun farmers started to rebel against the overseas Chinese merchants in Chosun, by setting fires to many Chinese stores and houses, beating and slaughtering. After this incident, the impact has also affected overseas Chinese in Korea; a lot of overseas Chinese lost their grounds in Korea (Han, 2010).

After the liberation from Japan's colonialism, the overseas Chinese businessmen re-grasped power in trading and commercial industries, but they were once again limited by strong restrictions and

policies on foreigners' rights implemented by President Lee and President Park administrations (Jang, 2004). During President Lee's administration, the immigration of Chinese was almost stopped in 1948, and caused more economic damage toward overseas Chinese's businesses by severed diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1949. President Park's administration took a much tighter rein on them; the government prohibited overseas Chinese from owning lands, and limited their amount of available wealth<sup>2</sup> (Park, 2004). Due to too strict restrictions, many overseas Chinese migrated to other nations, such as the United States and Taiwan, and starting from 1972, their numbers started to decrease gradually.

Yet, through the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Korea and increased effort and attention toward overseas Chinese and their capital in 1990s and 2000s<sup>3</sup>, Korea is expected to present a positive and opportunistic turning point for overseas Chinese societies in Korea. It can be said that the future of overseas Chinese are in the hands of an active intermediary that connects rising China and Korea together.

## 2) Demography and Characteristics

As the additional immigration from China has been hindered after the liberation from Japan's colonization, the population increase of overseas Chinese fully depended on biological reproduction. The population of overseas Chinese in 1945 was 12,648, and has increased up to 33,000 in 1972. However, this number gradually decreased back to 21,782 by 2002. By 2009, permanently residing overseas Chinese were about 19,539 (permanent residency and F-2 resident visa holders included), and were mostly from Shandong Province and their descendants, commonly carrying Taiwan citizenship. The gender distribution of overseas Chinese is 55% of males and 45% of females. Geographically, 40% of them are residing in Seoul, followed by 13% in Incheon, 11% in Gyeonggi-do, and 9% in Busan. Moreover, about 40% of the population are under age of 30, and 13% are over age of 61, which shows serious aging of the population.

Due to long period of experiencing social discrimination, the economic activities of overseas Chinese are limited, and are often focused on self-employed businesses that are medium or small-sized.

---

<sup>2</sup> The overseas Chinese were only allowed to have one house that is smaller than 661 m<sup>2</sup>, one store or shop that is smaller than 165 m<sup>2</sup>, and could not rent their properties to others.

<sup>3</sup> There has been increased interest in creating Chinatowns in Incheon and other many metropolitan areas, and permanent residency system and Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea have been implemented in the 2000s.

Measured in 1994, the detailed numbers of overseas Chinese owned businesses were: 1,378 restaurants, 317 oriental medical clinics, 165 western medical clinics, 165 Chinese grocery businesses, 103 pharmacies, 98 tailor shops, 84 silk shops, 76 trading companies, 38 food processing businesses, and 209 miscellaneous jobs (such as photo studios, billiard saloon, etc.) (J. Lee, 2008: 258).

### 3) Current Situations and Problems

Most of overseas Chinese carry Taiwan citizenships, and therefore, have to register themselves as foreigners while in Korea. Before until the permanent residency system did not get implemented, overseas Chinese were given the Residential Qualification (F-2 visa). Although the visa recognizes his or her long-term stay, the overseas Chinese had to renew the visa regularly, and if they violate the regulations, they could be deported. However, the inconvenience of renewing visas and the risk of deportation were minimized by granting permanent residency to overseas Chinese with F-2 visas and their children with F-5 visas, who legally reside in Korea more than 5 years. Furthermore, they were given rights, same as Korean citizens, to property transact, financial activities, and education for their children (Jang, 2004: 266).

Yet, the overseas Chinese still suffer from discrimination and many other disadvantages. Instead of social security numbers, they were given foreign registration numbers, which often cannot prove their identification on online services and other financial activities, such as opening a credit card. Furthermore, the Special Admission System for Foreigners is applied to the students, who graduated from overseas Chinese school, when applying to colleges; however, it does not apply to the students with Korean mother for his or her parents are not both foreigners. In order to send their children to colleges, there are many instances of Korean mothers renouncing Korean citizenship or forging divorce agreements (Park, 2006: 128). Moreover, the overseas Chinese pay their taxes but yet still excluded from receiving welfare benefits. The disabled, low-SES families, and elders are also excluded from receiving the government's Livelihood Subsidy because of their foreign statuses.

The overseas Chinese are focused on certain types of business; more than 50% of overseas Chinese are engaged in restaurant businesses, and other businesses such as grocery stores, furniture, Chinese medicine, and self-employed businesses. When compared to the past, their choice of occupations got more diverse nowadays, but yet still remains limited and face significant level of

discrimination at workplace (Park and Jang, 2003: 47-50). According to the Immigration Control Law, there are no restrictions on becoming government officials or professionals, but it is almost practically impossible for them to become one of them. Even if they get hired, the jobs are mostly related to Chinese and are less likely to get promoted.

In social and cultural perspectives, there has been great decline in overseas Chinese schools and overseas Chinese association, which resulted in hardship of maintaining ethnic identity and overseas Chinese communities together. The schools are experiencing significant drop in number of students and deficits, which results poor quality of education and education environments. In 1974, there were 50 overseas Chinese elementary schools and 5 middle/high schools nation-wide, but now the total number of schools have dropped to 18 (Park, 2008: 175). This goes same with the situation of overseas Chinese association; there is little remaining more than a name, producing no valuable supports or carrying out proper functions.

## 6. North Korean Migrants

### 1) Background

Until the end of Cold War era, North Korean migrants were regarded as ‘defected soldier,’ and as political logic out-ruled economic logic, they received special treatments in Korea. They were great examples of showing the superiority of the South Korean government and its systems, and therefore, experienced no hard-times, socially and financially, in adapting into Korean societies (Yoon, 2009: 19).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, many North Korean students, diplomats, trade-workers, and prominent figures who were mostly out of North Korea, sought asylum in Korea instead of returning to North Korea. About ten of them exiled to Korea each year until 1993, and they were able to adjust fast into Korean societies through generous re-settlement funds, and their high educational level and socio-economic statuses (Yoon, 2009: 20).

After the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994 and disastrous flood that occurred in 1995, significant number of North Koreans migrated with economic (survival) motives rather than political motives.

This number increased after the worsening food crisis in mid-1990s, which caused North Koreans to go to China or other third countries first and finally migrate to Korea. In 1995, there were only 41 North Korean migrants, which later rapidly increased to 312 in 1999. The North Korean migrants who migrated during this period were mostly lower class industrial workers, farmers, low-level military officers, students, housewives, and the unemployed. In order to prepare for the mass defection from North Korea, the Protection and Resettlement Aid Act for Defecting North Korean Residents was passed and encouraged systematic support policies in 1997. Along with the passage of this law, the North Koreans who sought refugees in Korea were officially titled as 'North Korean Defecting Residents'. However, the media and Koreans commonly refer North Korean migrants as 'defectors.'

After the year 2000, the number of North Korean migrants rapidly grew through the appearance of brokerage system, family invitation, and increased chain migration pattern. In 2000, there were 312 North Korean migrants, followed by 583 in 2001, 1,141 in 2002. This number gradually increased, although it faced a slight decrease in the year 2005, to 2,109 in 2006. The evident characteristics of these migrants are that there are higher percentage of women and family, and that their motives are more (and getting more) focused on pursuit of better life rather than survival (Lee et al., 2003: 56). Furthermore, more North Koreans migrated to China for employment and seeking fortunes, and many of them were upper middle class North Koreans. Also, there is steady increase in family reunifying type of migration, where the already settled North Koreans in Korea brings their rest of family members in either North Korea or China through the brokerage systems (Kwak, 2005: 48). These changes allowed Koreans and academia to further recognize and refer North Korean defecting residents as 'North Korean migrants.'

## 2) Demography and Characteristics

The demographic and social-background characteristics of North Korean migrants are becoming more diverse, and there has been steady increase in female and family-grouped North Korean migrants. Furthermore, there are about 30,000~50,000 overseas North Korean migrants, who are staying (or have stayed) in other countries for a longer period, and some of them are moving to Korea (Lee et al., 2003: 55). Among the few of overseas North Korean migrants migrating to Korea have married foreigners, and therefore, have brought characteristics of international/multicultural

family with them. Also, the number of family invitation of North Korean migrants increased as well; the brokerage system that connects Korea, China and North Korea offers services of bringing the migrants' family members with the cost of about 5,000,000~10,000,000 won (approximately \$4,166~\$8,333). This clearly shows the institutionalization of migration patterns.

Compared to past North Korean migrants, current ones are mostly falling behind in socioeconomic statuses. According to a survey of North Korean migrants by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (hereafter NKDB Center) in 2005, 29.0% of North Korean migrants had non-professional occupations, such as 18% students, 6% housewives, and 4.7% unemployed, while residing at North Korea. Among the migrants with professional occupations, 34.6% were laborers, followed by 7.3% farmers, 8.0% office workers, 2.4% managers, 2.4% artists or athletes, and 3.8% teachers or doctors (Y. Yoon et al., 2005). The proportion of residing in professional occupations was only 16.6%. Because they were mostly unemployed or simple-laborers while residing in North Korea, it is highly unlikely for them to find professional jobs in Korea.

From examining North Korean migrants' lifestyle and standard of living, only 11.1% were upper middle class, followed by 52.5% lower middle class, 26% lower class, and 7.8% the submerged tenth, which clearly shows the inadequate standard of living in North Korea and how it worked as a significant motive for migration. When viewed their educational levels, only 26.7% graduated from college or higher, while 62.1% received middle/high education. Furthermore, after they migrated to Korea, 73.6% never attended schools, and among the migrants, who have attended schools, 30.4% are currently enrolled in colleges and 19.3% are enrolled in middle schools.

The real problem with the North Korea migrants' education is not the level of education received but the level of quality, contents, and compatibility with Korean education. North Korea migrants, who are used to North Korea's central idea (Juche Idea), face difficulties in adapting the idea of capitalism and its competitiveness. Also, 90% of the teenagers of North Korea migrants have missed out schoolings, which often later results in poor academic achievements, in North Korea and third countries during the process of migration and only 38% are enrolled in regular Korean schools. However, even the enrolled students are falling behind in Korean curriculum or are having difficulties in getting along with fellow students or teachers. The drop-out rate of North Korean migrant students is about 13.7%, which is 10 times higher than the Korean students' drop-out rate (Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development, 2004). By reviewing North Korea migrants' backgrounds of

educational level, occupation, and statuses, it can be concluded that their quality of human capital is quite low, and therefore, they are most likely to be marginalized and disadvantaged in Korea's labor markets.

### 3) Current Situations and Problems

According to several surveys and literature reviews dealing with North Korea migrants' social adaptation to Korean societies, most of them face difficulties in economic adaptation, which is the most basic phase of social adaptation. Out of the currently economic active population, 30~40% are unemployed, and most of the employed population reside upon temporary positions or part-time jobs in manual labor or personal service industries. More than 60% of North Korean migrants are reported to depend on government aid of living expenses, and they face difficulties in human relations mainly due to language barriers and differences in values and beliefs (Yoon, 2009). They heavily depend on mass media, such as TV, radios and videos, for leisure activities, and have limited access to productive activities, hobbies, or learning/self-development activities (Cho, Park, and Hong, 2008: 14). The defectors with no friends or family in South Korea also lack social network, which ultimately leaves them out from access to opportunities and information. Except through churches and related activities, North Korea migrants do not have other major social gatherings or organizations. They are thus unavailable to have primary relationships with Koreans, and ends up befriendng their fellow migrants. North Korea migrants also face difficulties in psychological adaptation; negative bias and stereotypes, and discriminations toward North Korea migrants are the key factors of making them difficult in adapting and socializing in a career and social life. Their health is generally in poor condition, and the rate of chronic illness and disease is much higher than that of South Korean residents. Their poor health makes it difficult for them to seek employment and other normal socioeconomic activities (I. Yoon, 2007: 80).

## IV. Searching for Coexistence

Foreign residents in Korea comprise of only 2.4% of the Korean population and the percentage of long-term foreign residents is even lower. Therefore, one can say it is premature to call



Korean society a multicultural society. Yet, the number of foreigners and the level of racial and ethnical diversity keep growing, and therefore, it is undeniable that Korean society is slowly transforming into a multicultural society. Low fertility and aging will reduce the total population, especially the economically active population and it would be inevitable Korea to admit more foreign labor force in order to keep up with the current level of economic growth and living standards. Furthermore, in addition to migrant workers, marriage migrants and foreign students enter Korea in increasing numbers and many of them manage to settle permanently. As a result, Korean society will become more diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and culture, and achieving social integration out of diversity has become the major task for Korean society. In a situation like this, multiculturalism is thought to be an unavoidable choice as an ideology and policy of multicultural coexistence among various multicultural groups. In other words, it is not about whether to accept immigrants or not, but is about to allow which immigrants and how to facilitate their incorporation into society. Also, it is not about whether to accept multiculturalism or not, but is about to what kind/form of multiculturalism will be implemented. Therefore, our next discussion of multiculturalism should go beyond theoretical discourses and step toward seeking solutions to concrete and actual problems of a multicultural society.

One concrete action plan is to discard compassionate and naïve thinking and viewpoints of multiculturalism that seem prevalent among ordinary Koreans at this point and to pay attention to and prepare potential risks and conflicts that a multicultural society can bring in. We need to learn a lesson from Western countries that used to admit large numbers of immigrants and now suffer from racial and religious conflicts when the second generation of immigrants rebel against the majority group's prejudice and discrimination against them. Koreans seem to be tolerant and sympathetic toward immigrants because they are not numerous and threatening yet. When their number gets bigger and they compete with natives and resist assimilation to mainstream culture, it is likely that Koreans' attitudes toward immigrants become sour and negative so rapidly. In order to prepare for these phenomena, Korean society needs to improve its acceptability of multiculturalism and create environments where multicultural minorities can feel they are equal and productive members of a society. It also needs to develop consistent principles to respond to such concrete and realistic problems as whether to allow Muslim immigrants, because of their religious devotion, to wear Hijabs in the public arena.

Multicultural coexistence between the majority and minority groups requires both attitudinal changes of people and systematic changes of laws and institutions. I will first propose recommendations for systematic changes and second an alternative principle of social solidarity and integration for a multicultural society.

First, the minimum and the most basic condition of multiculturalism is to abolish all kinds of discrimination and social exclusion and provide all people with equal opportunities for self-development. Thus, we need to expand and strengthen the existing the Prohibition Act on Discrimination to prohibit any mistreatment and discrimination against multicultural minority groups.

Second, we need to go beyond the passive protection of basic human rights that prohibits discrimination against minorities and step toward the active protection of human rights that guarantees both social and cultural rights of cultural minority groups. From this standpoint, when children of multicultural family face learning difficulties at school, we need to acknowledge their right to receive special education tailored to meet their needs and characteristics and to require the government to provide funding and manpower for these children.

Third, we need to find realistic solutions to the problems of undocumented foreign residents who are actual members of Korean society and living residents of local communities. They are stuck in a blind spot of human rights protection with little basic human rights like education and medical care because they are not Korean citizens, compatriots and of legal status. We need to develop plans of legalization by which we set qualifications and conditions of legalization, select qualified ones, give them conditionally legal status for a certain period of time (e.g., 5 years), and then change their status to permanently legal status after they prove their ability of self-sufficiency and contribution to society. We can benchmark the precedents in the United States to develop the Korean model of legalization of undocumented migrants.

Attitudinal changes of people are more difficult to occur and require long-term investment in education and training. Thus, we need to expand and strengthen multicultural education not only for migrants but also ordinary Koreans so that they learn multicultural values, lifestyles, and modes of behavior and practice them in their everyday lives.

Finally, we need to develop a new principle of social solidarity and integration suitable for a multicultural society. As explained earlier, relationships between Koreans and multicultural minority groups are determined largely by whether they are Korean nationals or not, compatriots or not, and

legal foreigners or not. South Koreans apply the principle of national to naturalized marriage migrants and their children, the principle of compatriot to overseas Koreans, and the principle of legality to foreigners. Naturalized marriage migrants and their children become the target of inclusion and assimilation. Overseas Koreans receive preferential treatment over non-Korean foreigners. Legal foreigners are protected from discrimination and receive support for social adjustment and economic activities while illegal or undocumented ones are excluded from social support and protection. These group-specific principles are inconsistent and discriminatory and thus not appropriate to become the principle of coexistence among peoples of different cultural backgrounds in a multicultural society. Thus, there is a need for a more universal and inclusive principle of social integration that can be applied to all actual members of a multicultural society.

Ethnicity and ethnic nationalism used to be the principle of social solidarity and the driving force that united South Koreans in times of national crises. It is no longer valid in recent times, however, when the territory, ethnicity, culture, and nationality do not coincide (Befu, 2001). Nationality (or citizenship) and civic nationalism are more effective than ethnicity and ethnic nationalism to incorporate such naturalized foreigners as marriage migrants and their children into South Korean society. They are not, however, applicable to overseas Chinese who are permanent members of Korean society and other sojourning foreigners. Moreover, undocumented foreigners who constitute a sizable portion of foreigners do not receive the basic protection of human rights because Korean laws like the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Ordinance to Support Resident Aliens protect only legal foreigners.

In order to acknowledge all actual members of a multicultural society and provide them with minimum protection of human rights, I propose that we need to adopt the principle of residence and cohabitation as the principle of multicultural coexistence. By the principle of residence and cohabitation, foreigners and migrants are acknowledged as residents and living people of local communities and are entitled to basic human rights regardless of legal status. All multicultural minority groups are cohabitants of South Koreans who share the residence and have interdependent relationships. The concept of cohabitation is similar to the concept of denizenship proposed by Soysal (1994). Soysal argues that the restructure of citizenship from particularistic national to universalistic postnational citizenship has its roots in the post-WWII period when a new legal arrangement, also called as denizenship, came into being for labor migrants and guestworkers. The guestworkers in Germany and

France, who have resided in countries for years, have obtained civil and social rights, regardless of their nationality. It is true that denizenship does not allow political participation, and therefore represents a legal status to be located between being alien and being a citizen (Joppke, 2010: 33). However, it can still provide long-term aliens with social rights and opportunities to participate as productive members of host society and work as a rational transitional procedure of normalizing the status of long-term aliens by naturalization. In that sense, cohabitation and denizenship can work as middle-range principles of multicultural coexistence before South Koreans still imbued with strong nationalism adopt universalistic postnational citizenship.

### References

- Bae, Eun-joo, "Hanguk nae Ijunodongja Janyeodeul ui Hakkyo Saehwaleseo ui Galdeung Haegyeol Bangan: Chodeung Hakkyorol Chungsumeuro" [A Study on the Ways to Solve the Problems in Elementary School of Foreign Workers: Children in South Korea], *Kyoyuk Illyuhak Yeongu* [Anthropology of Education], Vol. 9, No. 2 (2006).
- Befu, Harumi, *Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001).
- Cho, Hyun-Sung, Young-Jung Park, and Ki-Won Hong, *2008 Ijumin Munhwa Hyangsu Siltaejosa* [2008 Survey of Cultural Consumption of Migrants] (Seoul: Munhwacheyukgwangwangbu [Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism], 2008).
- Cho, Youngdal, *Damunhwagajeong ui Janyeogyoyuk Siltaejosa* [A Survey of Educational Conditions of Children of Multicultural Family] (Seoul: Kyoyukinjeokjawonbu [Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development], 2006).
- Chung, Hyejung, "Gaehanggi Incheon Hwasang Netwok wa Hwagyo Jeongchak ui Teukjing" [Characteristics of Chinese Merchants' Network and Settlement in Incheon at the Time of Opening of the Port], *Jungguk Keunhyeondaisa Yongu* [Korean Studies of Modern Chinese History], Vol. 36 (2007).
- Dworkin, A. G. and Dworkin, R. J., *The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations* (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999).
- Gyeonggi Kaebalwon [Gyeonggi Research Institute], *Oegukingeulloja Jeongjusiltae mit Jeongchaeksuyojosa* [Housing and Living Condition of Foreign Migrant Workers] (Gyeonggi Kaebalwon, 2006).
- Han, Geon Soo and Dong-Hoon Seol, *Ijujaga Bon Hanguk ui Jeongchaek kwa Jedo* [Korean Policy and System from Immigrants' Perspective] (Seoul: Hanguk Yeoseong Jeongchaek Yeonguwon [Korean Women's Development Institute], 2007).
- Han, Hongkoo, "Hotteokjip e Buljireun Suchi ui Yoksa" [Shameful History of Setting Fire to Chinese Pancake House], *Hangyore* 21, Vol. 350 (2010).
- Han, Sang-Bok and Tae-Hwan Kwon, *Jungguk Yeonbyeon ui Joseonjok: Sahoe ui Gujo wa Byeonhwa* [Ethnic Koreans in Yanbian of China: Social Structure and Change] (Seoul: Seooul Daehakkyo Chulpanbu [Seoul National University Press], 1993).
- Jang, Soo Hyun, "Hanguk Hwagyo ui Hyeonsil kwa Dojeon" [Reality and Challenge of Ethnic Chinese in Korea] *Hanguk ui Sosuja, Siltae wa Jeonmang* [Minorities in Korea: Reality and Prospects] (Seoul: Hanul, 2004).
- Jeon, U Yong, "Hanguksa ui Teuksusinbun: Hanguk Geundai ui Hwagyomunje" [Special Status in Korean History: Ethnic Chinese Problem in Modern Korea], *Hanguksahakbo* [Journal for the Studies of Korean History], Vol. 15 (2003).
- Joppke, Christian, *Citizenship and Immigration* (UK: Polity Press, 2010).
- Oegukiniju·nodongundonghyeopuihoi [Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea], *Goyongheogaje Sihaeng 5junyeon Ijunodongja Nodonggweon Siltaejosa* [A Survey of Labor Rights of Migrant

- Workers after Five Years of Implementation of the Employment Permit System*] (Seoul: Oegukiniju·nodongundonghyeopuihoi, 2009).
- Jung, You-Hun, “Guknae Damunhwa Hyeonsang ui Teukjing kwa Sisajeom” [Characteristics and Implications of Multicultural Phenomena of Korea], *Gyeongjeopyeong* [Economic Weekly Review], Vol. 9, No.44 (November 2009).
- Kim, Hee Sung, “Ijugeulloja ui Goyong e Gwanhan Bopjeok Munjejeom kwa Gaeseonbangan” [Legal Problems and Proposal on Employment of Migrant Workers], *Gyeongyeongbeopryul* [Journal of Business Administration & Law], Vol. 13, No. 3 (2008).
- Kim, Hye-Soon, “Gyeolhonijuyeoseong kwa Hanguk ui Damunhwasahe Silheom” [Migrant Brides and Making of a Multicultural Society: Sociological Approach to Recent Discourse on “Multicultural Korea”], *Hanguksahehak* [Korean Journal of Sociology], Vol. 42, No. 2 (2008).
- Kim, Hyeon-seon, “Gukmin, Bangukmin, Bigukmin – Hanguk Gukminhyeongseong ui Wolli wa Gwajeong” [The Principles and Process of Nation Formation in Contemporary Korean Society], *Saheoyeongu* [Korean Journal of Social Issues], Vol. 7, No. 2(October 2006).
- Kim, Hyun Mee, “Bangmunchuieop Jaejung Dongpo ui Il Kyeongheom kwa Saenghwalseggye” [The Impact of the Working Visit System on the Korean-Chinese Migrants in South Korea], *Hanguk Munhwa Ilhuhak* [Korean Cultural Anthropology], Vol. 42, No. 2 (2009).
- Kim, Myong-Hee, “Hanguk nae Joseonjok Jeongcheseong kwa Hangukkwan” [Identity and View on Korea among Chosunjok in Korea], *Gyegansasang* [Ideas], Vol. 58 (September 2003).
- Kim, Young Jong, “Goyong Jeongchaek Hyeongseong Gwajeong ui Dongtaesung Bunseok: Oegukin Goyong Heogajae ui Jeongchaek Neteuwokeu wa Jeongchaek Ongho Yeonhap Mohyeong eul Jungsimeuro” [An Analysis on the Dynamics of Policy Making Process for Employment Policy], *Hangukjeongchaekgwahakhakhoebob* [Korean Policy Sciences Review], Vol. 13 (June 2009).
- Chulipguk Oegukin Jeongchaek Bonbu [Korea Immigration Service], “Jagyeokbyeol Oegukin Geulloja Hyeonhwang” [Status of Foreign Workers], 2009nyeon 4bungi [Fourth Quarter of 2009], December 31, 2009. ([http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/TIMM/imm\\_06/imm\\_2010\\_03.jsp](http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/TIMM/imm_06/imm_2010_03.jsp))
- \_\_\_\_\_, “2010nyeon 2wol Tonggyewolbo” [Monthly Statistics, February 2010] ([http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs\\_003/ListShowData.do?strNbodCd=noti0097&strWrtNo=53&strAnsNo=A&strOrgGbnCd=104000&strRtnURL=IMM\\_6070&strAllOrgYn=N&strThisPage=1&strFilePath=](http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_003/ListShowData.do?strNbodCd=noti0097&strWrtNo=53&strAnsNo=A&strOrgGbnCd=104000&strRtnURL=IMM_6070&strAllOrgYn=N&strThisPage=1&strFilePath=))
- Kwak, Hae-Ryong, “Bukhan Italjumin Hyeonhwang kwa Munje: Sarye wa Jiwon Bangan” [Current Conditions and Problems of Defecting North Korean Residents] (Paju: Hangukhaksuljeongbo [Korean Studies Information Co.], 2005).
- Kymlicka, Will, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) (Oxford University Press, 2001).
- Lee, Jean Young and Woo Park, “Jaehan Jungguk Joseonjok Nodongjajipdan ui Hyeongseong Gwajeong e Gwanhan Yeongu” [A Study on the Formation of Korean-Chinese Worker in Korea], *Hangukdongbukanonchong* [Review of North East Asia], Vol. 51 (2009).
- Lee, Jung Nam, “Dongbuka ui Chainiseu Diaseupora wa Gukga Jeongchaek: Hanguk gwa Ilbon ui Saryereul Jungsimeuro” [Chinese Diaspora in Northeast Asia and the Policy of the New Country of Residence: A Case Study of Korea and Japan], *Gukjaejiyeokyeongu* [Journal of International Area Studies], Vol. 12, No. 3 (2008).
- Lee, Kum Soon et al., *Bukhanitaljumin Jeongeung Siltaejosa* [Survey on the Adaptation of North Korean Migrants] (Seoul: Tongil Yeonguwon [Korea Institute for National Unification], 2003).
- Lee, Sang-Gil and Jee-Hyun An, “Damunhwajuui wa Midieo/munwhayeongu: Guknae Yeongudonghyang ui Geomto wa Saeroun Jeonmang ui Mosaek” [Multiculturalism and Media/Cultural Studies], *Hangukeonronhakbo* [Korean Journal of Journalism & Communication Studies], Vol. 51, No. 5 (2007).
- Lee, Soo-Sang and Im-Sook Jang, “Ijunodongja ui Sahoejeokseobiseu e Daehan Jeopgeunseong gwa Sahoejeokyeongyeolmang” [Social Network and Social Services Accessibility of Migrant Workers], *Hangukmunheonjeongbohakhoeji* [Journal of the Korean Library and Information Science Society], Vol. 42, No. 4 (2008).
- Lim, Sungsook, “Hanguk nae Joseonjoknodongja ui Minjokjeongchaeseong Jaehyeongseong Gwajeong” [Living as Undocumented Workers in their ‘Homeland’: How Korean Chinese Workers in South Korea Rethink Their Ethnic Identities], Hanyangdaehakgyo Daehakwon Munwhainryuhakgwa Seoksahakwinonmun [MA thesis at the Department of Cultural Anthropology, The Graduate School of Hanyang University] (2004).
- Moon, Hyoung Jin, “Hanguk nae Joseonjok Nodongjadeul ui Galdeungsarye e Gwanhan Yeongu” [A Study of Trouble Cases of Korean-Chinese Labors in Korea], *Gukjejiyeokyeongu* [Journal of International Area Studies], Vol. 12, No. 1 (2008).

- Gyobukinjeokjawonbu [Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development], *Gyoyuk ui Tongiljunbi* [Preparation of Unification in Education: Situations of Adaptation of Adolescent North Korean Migrants and Plans for Establishing Special Schools], Gyoyukinjeokjawonbu Jeongchaekkwajeyeongu Simpojum [Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development Policy Research Symposium] (2004).
- Bogeonbokjibu [Ministry of Health and Welfare], *Gukjegyeolhon Ijuyeoseong Siltaejosa* [National Survey of Multicultural Families] (Seoul: Bogeonbokjibu [Ministry of Health and Welfare], 2009).
- Haengjeonganjeonbu [Ministry of Public Administration and Security], *2009nyeon Oegukinjumin Hyeonhwangjosa Gyeolgwa* [Report of the 2009 Survey of Foreign Residents] (Seoul: Haengjeonganjeonbu [Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2009].
- Noh, Gwoon, "Gidae wa Hyeonsil Saeseo: Hanguk nae Joseonjok Nodongja ui Sam gwa Jeokeungjeonryak" [Between Expectation and Reality: The Life and Adaptative Strategy of the Korean Chinese Workers in South Korea], Seouldaehakgyo Daehakwon Inryuhakgwa Seoksahakwinonmun [MA thesis at the Department of Anthropology, Graduate School of Seoul National University], 2001.
- Park, EunKyung, "Hanguk Hwagyo Sahoe ui Yeoksa" [The History of Chinese Society in Korea], *Jindanhakbo* [Jin-dan Society], Vol. 52 (1981).
- Park, Kyung-Tae and Soo Hyun Jang, *Guknaegeoju Hwagyo Ingwonsiltaejosa* [A Survey of Human Rights of Ethnic Chinese in Korea] (Seoul: Gukgaingwonwiwonhoe [National Human Rights Commission of Korea], 2003).
- Park, Se Hoon, Young A Lee, Eun Ran Kim, and So Yang Jung, *Damunhwasahoe e Daejeunghaneun Dosjeongchaek Yeongu – Oegukin Miljipjiyeok ui Hyeonhwang gwa Jeongchaekgwaje* [Reinventing Urban Policy in response to Ethnic Diversity: A Report on Emerging Ethnic Places in South Korea] (Anyang: Guktoyeonguwon [KRIHS], 2009).
- Piao, Gang Xing [Park Kwang Seong], *Segyehwa Sidae Junggukjoseongjok ui Chogukjeok Idong kwa Sahoebyeonhwa* [Transnational Migration and Social Change of Ethnic Koreans in China in the Era of Globalization] (Paju: Hangukhaksuljeongbo [Korean Studies Information Co.], 2008).
- Seol, Dong-Hoon, "Hanguksahoe ui Damunhwa Damron e Daehan Seongchaljeok Jeopgeun" [A Reflective Approach to the Multicultural Discourse in Korean Society], *Yeoksa ui Sikakeseo Bon Tongasiasegye ui Aidentiti wa Dayangseong* ( I ), Paper presented at the International Conference on Identity and Diversity of the 'East Asian World' from a Historical Perspective, Hotel Grand Hilton Seoul, November 6-7, 2009a.
- \_\_\_\_\_, "Yeoksa Sok ui Sosujadeul: Hanguksahoe ui Oegukin Ijunodongja – Saeroun 'Sosuja Jipdan' e Daehan Sahoehakjeok Seolmyeong" [Foreign Migrant Workers in Korea: A Sociological Explanation of a New Minority Group], *Sarim* [Historical Journal], Vol. 34 (2009b).
- Seol, Dong-Hoon, Hong-Yop Choi, and Geon Soo Han, *Guknae Geoju Oegukin Nodongja Ingwon Siltae Josa* [Survey of Human Rights of Foreign Migrant Workers in Korea] (Seoul: Gukgaingwonwiwonhoe [National Human Rights Commission of Korea], 2002).
- Shin, Yoon-Jung, "OECD Gukka ui Jeochulsan Hyeonhwang mit Cheongchaek Tonghyang" [Current Conditions of Low Fertility and Policy Trends among OECD Countries], *Bogeon Bokji Issue & Focus* [Issue and Focus in Health and Welfare], Hanguk Bogeonsahoe Yeonguwon [Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs], Vol. 9 (November 2009).
- Song, Jong Ho, "Hanguk ui Oegukinnodongja: Oegukin Jiwondanchae ui Hyeonhwang gwa Hwaldong" [Foreign Worker Supporting NGO's Present Circumstances and Activities], *Minjok Yongu*, Vol. 28 (2006).
- Soysal, Yasemin, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
- Statistics Korea, "2009 Ihon Tonggye" [Divorce Statistics of 2009], April, 2010.
- Yeo, Su Kyeung, "Hangukcheryu Joseonjok ui Galdeung gwa Jeokeung" [A Conflict and Adaptation of Chosunjok in South Korea], *Inmunyeongu* [Studies of Humanities], Vol. 48 (2005).
- Yoon, In-Jin, "Bukhanijumin ui Geongang gwa Gyeongjejeokeung ui Gwangye" [Relationships between Health and Economic Adaptation of North Korean Migrants], *Bogeon gwa Sahoegwahak* [Health and Social Science], Vol. 21 (2007).
- \_\_\_\_\_, *Bukhanijumin: Saenghwal gwa Usik geurigo Jeongchakjiwonjeongchaek* [North Korean Migrants: Lives, Consciousness, and Support Policy for Resettlement] (Seoul: Jipmundang, 2009).
- Yoon, In-Jin and Young-Ho Song, "Hangukin ui Gukminjeongchaeseong gwa Damunhwasuyongseong" [National Identity and Acceptance of Multiculturalism of South Koreans], Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, GA, August 14~17, 2010.
- Yoon, In-Jin, Young-Ho Song, Sang-Don Kim, and Joo-Young Song, *Ijunodongja ui Hangukgyeongje mit Sahoe e Michin Yeonghyang gwa Hangukin ui Ijunodongja e Daehan Insik* [South Koreans'

- Perceptions of Migrant Workers and Multicultural Society* ] (Paju: Korean Studies Information Co., 2010).
- Yoon, Yeo Sang et al., *Saeteomin Jeongchaksanghwang Jonghapsiltaejosa* [*Comprehensive Survey on the Settlement of North Korean Migrants*] (Seoul: NKDB, 2005).
- Yoon, Sun-O, Myeong-Ho Park, and Jang-Soo Kwon, “Ijunodongja Hyunhwang mit Gaesunbangan” [Migrant Worker Present Condition and Improvement Program], *Bokjihaengjungnonchong* [*Journal of Welfare Administration*], Vol. 15, No.2 (2005).