

“National Responses to American Military Withdrawal from Korea: North Korea, South Korea”

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I. Introduction

During the previous two decades, the United States policy in Asia has been based on an extension of the containment strategy originally designed for Europe. It started with the assumption that Chinese Communism constituted the same kind of expansionist threat to the security of the noncommunist world, and ultimately to the United States, as did communism in its Russian variant.

In July 1969, Mr. Nixon made the “Guam Declaration” stating in effect that, although U.S. treaty commitments remained in force and the U.S. nuclear umbrella would continue to be extended to protect allies, the “Nixon Doctrine” called for gradual American retrench-

ment and greater “burden sharing” on the part of allies throughout the world.

In 1971, the first withdrawal of U.S. military troops from the Korean peninsula was made. The collapse of the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia in 1975 and the announcement by the Carter Administration early in 1977 that U.S. ground combat forces would be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula over the course of the next several years further reduced confidence in American power and in America's reliability as an ally of Japan on the part of certain members of Japan's governing elite.⁽¹⁾

The Korean peninsula has long been recognized as the focal point for conflicting interests among the great powers in Northeast Asia. It was the American response to Kim Il-sung's invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 which

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(1) Susumu Awanohara, “Will Harsher Criticism Mean Knee-Jerk?”, *Far Eastern Review*, June 24 1977, p. 38.

brought the United States into direct confrontation with communist ambitions in the region; ever since, it has been the presence of the American troops on the peninsula which has, in the minds of almost all observers both American and Asian, constituted the key stabilizing force in the complex politics of the region. The early 1977 announcement by the Carter Administration that the U.S. intended to withdraw most of its ground forces from Korea over the next four to five years stirred anxiety throughout Northeast Asia.

II. The North Korean Reaction

According to a Pyongyang broadcast, on January 3, 1978, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean peninsula is a precondition for achieving the reunification of the country.⁽²⁾ This suggests that a main principle of North Korea's foreign policy is to emphasize the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean peninsula.

The Rodong Shinmun (North Korean Worker's Party newspaper) of January 15, 1978, said that the U.S. had brought in new types of air force equipment to South Korea and that the establishment of the Korea-U.S. Joint Command served to increase tension in the area. It further said the withdrawal of American forces was a

disguise or smokescreen tactic in the strengthening of their position on the Korean peninsula.⁽³⁾

The news from Washington of the possibility of an amendment of the troop withdrawal plan spurred further claims of trickery and obfuscation on the part of the Carter Administration from North Korea.⁽⁴⁾

A Pyongyang Broadcast reported on Feb. 1, 1978 that the Department of Foreign Affairs of North Korea had suddenly announced a memorandum deploring that the ROK, the U.S. and Japan, were making joint attempts to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula, and also declaring that North Korea would never tolerate such attempts. The memorandum further stated that American troops, bases and nuclear weapons in South Korea should be withdrawn completely,⁽⁵⁾ and stressed that the U.S. must phase out all its troops and military weapons of "slaughter", especially nuclear weapons, from South Korea completely and without delay,⁽⁶⁾ and that it at the same time stop intervention in Korean affairs.⁽⁸⁾

The Pyongyang authorities also held that their demands corresponded with the interests of the Korean and world peoples. Moreover, they alleged that debate in South Korea regarding the withdrawal of American troops had the intended result of firming their exist-

(2) *The Naewoe Press* (News article series), No. 731, January 3, 1978, p. 5

(3) Kang Chul Soo's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 3, 1978, p. 5.

Kang Chul Soo's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 3, 1978, p. 6.

Shin Tong Bum's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 9, 1978, p. 6.

The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 740, January 16, 1978.

The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 768, February 17, 1980.

The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 773, February 28, 1978.

The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 780, March 4, 1978.

The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 781, March 6, 1978.

(4) *The Naewoe Press* (News article series), No. 825, April 27, 1980.

(5) Pyongyang Broadcasting, February 1, in *The Naewoe Press* (Naewoe article series), No. 755, February 2, 1978.

(6) *The Naewoe Press* (Supplement VII), 1979, p. 78.

North Korea Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1, 1978, p. 43.

(7) *The Naewoe Press* (News article series), No. 760, February 8, 1978, p. 78.

tence there.

North Korea continued to carry statements published by various civilian organizations in the *Rodong Shinmun* which were basically favorable to its official position, and this effort was aimed at affirming to the Korean people that their position was quite righteous.⁽⁸⁾

North Korea showed a very sensitive reaction to the military exercise called "Team Spirit '78," and denounced the fact that "such an exercise had the purpose of heightening tension in the Korean peninsula and was a part of America's double-faced tactic to perpetuate the division of Korea by force."⁽⁹⁾

Concerning the testimony of U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown to the House of Representatives, the Pyongyang authorities denounced it as "a reckless act" and as "having the purpose of making the Japanese territory available for new military bases to invade North Korea."⁽¹¹⁾ It alleged that "Team Spirit '78 was a mere reckless act which increased the danger of war, and asserted that all means of war in South

Korea, including American troops and nuclear weapons, must be removed completely."⁽¹²⁾ On March 6, North Korea's Department of Foreign Affairs made a statement through Pyongyang Central Broadcasting in which it seriously attacked the joint ROK-American military exercise Team Spirit '78,⁽¹³⁾ and this denunciation was also publicized through a statement made by a spokesman of the Revolutionary Party of Unification.⁽¹⁴⁾ In addition, North Korea heightened its attacks on such military exercises by carrying many statements made by various oversea organizations in its official organ, the *Rodong Shinmun*.⁽¹⁵⁾

This organ also carried statements seriously attacking such military exercises in the name of social organizations in North Korea. North Korea showed a sensitive reaction to the visit of Rogers, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to South Korea, and reiterated its previous claim by stating that his visit was aimed at reinforcing the preparedness for another war on the Korean peninsula according to a "plan of

(8) The Soviet newspapers and news agencies review the plan for U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea, *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 13, 1978, p. 6; The Revolutionary Party of Unification's spokesman makes a statement. *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 26, 1979, p. 5; *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 27, 1978, p. 6. says the statement about U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea was a deceptive claim aimed to justify South Korea's armament; All military provocations in South Korea should be ceased according to Bulgarian newspapers and Albanian correspondences, *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 31, p. 6; *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 1, 1978 reports the argument in the International Democratic Lawyers Association Conference that U.S. should withdraw from South Korea promptly and cease its support for the South Korean regime.

(9) Kang Chul Soo's commentary entitled "A Trial to Keep two Koreas by Force", *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 6, 1978, p. 6.

(10) *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 22, 1978, *The Naewoe Press* (Supplement VIII), *op. cit.*, p. 16; *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 26, 1978, p. 6.

(11) Song Moo Kyong's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 1, 1978, p. 3, p. 6.

Song Moo Kyong's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 2, 1978, p. 6.

The Rodong Shinmun, March 3, 1978, p. 4, p. 3; *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 4, 1978, p. 5, p. 6.

(12) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 5, 1978, p. 5.

(13) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 6, 1978, p. 5.

(14) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 6, 1978, p. 4.

(15) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 7, 1978, p. 4, p. 5.

invasion into North Korea.”⁽¹⁶⁾ According to North Korea’s arguments, the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and the U.S. president’s policy of phasing out American ground forces from South Korea have actually resulted in the reinforcement of South Korea’s military power, and the precipitation of America’s preparation for an invasion into North Korea.⁽¹⁷⁾ The North Korean authorities denounced the “occupation” of South Korea by the American imperialists and their policy of invasion as major elements causing the nation’s misery, and of increasing the possibility of war at all times. They claimed the U.S. presence and influence made the Korean peninsula a powder keg situation.⁽¹⁸⁾ They went on that “the pullout of military forces from South Korea which was announced by the American imperialists meant only a change in U.S. policy based on a power status quo and at the same time was merely a way to cover up its new scheme to bring about war in Korea.”⁽¹⁹⁾

After a silence on U.S. policy toward South Korea had hung for several weeks, North Korea, on April 23, 1978, again started directing severe attacks on the Carter Administration for its neglect in carrying out the initial plan of withdrawing its ground forces from South Korea.

The Rodong Shinmun claimed on April 23 that the Carter administration’s plan to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea was only a deceptive tactic, that despite its asserted plan of phasing out its ground

forces, the U.S. continued to reinforce strength in South Korea, and the ROK military was also making every effort to strengthen itself.⁽²⁰⁾

With regard to the communique issued by President Carter on April 21, in which he revealed a partial revision of the plan to withdraw American military forces in South Korea, North Korea claimed on April 26 that such a revision made it clear that Carter’s pledge had originally been made as only a clever tactic to influence world opinion to perceive a renewed North Korean threat.⁽²¹⁾

It is noteworthy that North Korea concentrated on severe attacks on Team Spirit ’78 and on the Carter Administration, and that it proclaimed that it would again strengthen its anti-American position.

Pyongyang Broadcasting reported that Kim Il-sung, the North Korean leader, had reiterated that he himself was resolutely opposed to the two-Koreas idea, and that the complete withdrawal of the American military force stationed in South Korea was the only righteous way to solve the Korean problem.⁽²²⁾

Hua Kuo-fung, Chinese Premier and Party Chairman made a state visit to North Korea on May 5, 1978, on Kim Il-sung’s invitation. The Chinese leader had summit meetings with Kim Il-sung three times, and participated in a series of mass welcome rallies held in the cities of Pyongyang and Hamheung. He returned to Peking after a 6-day visit.

Through policy announcements made during his visit to North Korea, Hua emphasized that

(16) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 8, 1978, p. 5.

(17) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 9, 1978, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 10, 1978, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 11, p. 4; *ibid.*, March 12, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 13, p. 5; *ibid.*, March 14, p. 5; *ibid.*, March 15, *ibid.*, March 16 p. 5, p. 6.

(18) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 28, 1978, p. 1, p. 3.

(19) *The Naewoe Press* (Material series), No. 66, April 5, 1978.

(20) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 23, 1978, p. 6.

(21) Kang Chul Soo’s commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 26, 1978, p. 6.

(22) *The Naewoe Press* (Material series), No. 70, May 3, 1978.

the U.S. supported the "two Koreas" policy and perpetuated their division, and that it did not give up its ambitions of invading the socialist nations by using Korea as a military base. He went on that the Korean peninsula was artificially split into two parts, and that the major cause was found in compulsory American imperialistic occupation of South Korea and their policy toward the division of Korea.⁽²³⁾

In particular, Hua said as follows: "the American government must withdraw its invading army from South Korea, and then Korea must be reunited. The two peoples of North Korea and China will fight the enemy to the last and will have the final victory."⁽²⁴⁾ Most noteworthy here was that China generally recognized North Korea as the only legal and sovereign state in the Korean Peninsula and did not extend her recognizance to South Korea. In this respect, China reaffirmed her strong diplomatic support for North Korea, strengthening the latter's status in the international community.

Kim Il-sung, in an address welcoming Hua at a mass rally held in Pyongyang, said that "the U.S. had broken its pledge to phase out American troops, and that it had further strengthened preparations for war on an unprecedentedly large scale. He went on in the address that the U.S. must stop its imprudent military build-up and withdraw its troops from South Korea as pledged as soon as possible, and that the U.S. together with North Korea should seek a peaceful solution to the Korean problem."⁽²⁵⁾

North Korea, at the 386th truce talks, claimed that "the American imperialists must stop all provocative actions leading to war and immediately leave Korea, withdrawing its invading armed forces from South Korea."⁽²⁶⁾

The Rodong Shinmun carried an editorial on May 14 written by Hang Jin-suk, denouncing the U.S. plan to withdraw its armed force as "a mere maneuver to build up its military power,"⁽²⁷⁾ and also quoted a report by the *North Korean Central News Agency* entitled "the disclosure and censure of a new provocative scheme of war by American imperialism and South Korea," in which it was said that various overseas social organizations and newspapers had asked America to leave South Korea.⁽²⁸⁾ A delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, headed by Itzio Askada, visited Pyongyang at the invitation of North Korea from May 11 to 16. During its stay in North Korea, the delegation had a series of meetings with the North Korean authorities.

Park Sung-chul, in his address welcoming the delegation, argued that the American imperialists and the South Korean authorities were making every effort to prepare for war by extensively reinforcing their invading military force and by frequently conducting military exercises, while reserving the deceptive plan of the withdrawal of military ground forces.⁽²⁹⁾ Responding to this statement, Itzio Askada stressed that the U.S. should withdraw all deadly weapons, including nuclear weapons, from South Korea, unconditionally and completely.⁽³⁰⁾

(23) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 8, 1978, p. 2.

(24) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 7, 1978, p. 3.

(25) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 8, 1978, p. 2.

(26) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 12, 1978, p. 6.

(27) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 14, 1978, p. 6.

(28) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 14, 1978, p. 14.

(29) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 16, 1978, p. 3.

(30) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 14, 1978; *ibid.*, May 16, 1978, p. 3.

Askada visited Panmunjom, and asserted that it was natural that American troops be withdrawn since the Armistice Agreement stipulates that all foreign troops must do so, and held that there was no reason for them to be stationed in South Korea. He went on that "a peace treaty must be concluded between North Korea and the U.S. since only those two countries had signed the Armistice Agreement."⁽³¹⁾

On May 23, 1978, Nicolae Ceauseascu, the Rumanian President, left North Korea for Hanoi after finishing a 4-day visit to Pyongyang. A joint communique between Kim Il-sung and Ceauseascu was announced, in which the two leaders insisted on the complete withdrawal of American troops in South Korea and also denounced the South Korean government's attempt to perpetuate the division of Korea by adhering to a two Koreas policy.⁽³²⁾

On May 29, 1978, President J. Opango of Congo left Pyongyang after ending a 5-day visit. A joint communique was announced during his stay in Pyongyang, asserting that "all foreign troops stationed in South Korea and all the means of war, including nuclear weapons, must be completely withdrawn."⁽³³⁾ On June 24, 1978, *the Rodong Shinmun* released a statement entitled "we appeal for a massive international campaign as a means to force all foreign troops to be withdrawn." In this statement, the official organ of North Korea emphasized that "American imperialism should stop its reckless maneuvers to provoke war and leave South

Korea without delay."⁽³⁴⁾

On the same day, a mass rally held in Pyongyang declared that the American imperialists must give up their ambition of invading North Korea, throw away their scheme for a new war, and leave South Korea without delay."⁽³⁵⁾ Also, *the Rodong Shinmun* editorial of the same day carried such catchphrases as "American imperialists--immediately leave South Korea,"⁽³⁶⁾ and "American imperialists--wash your hands of Korea."⁽³⁷⁾

North Korea, through *the Rodong Shinmun*, insisted that the U.S. stop its reckless playing with fire and immediately evacuate its all troops and deadly weapons from South Korea according to the U.N. Resolution and as pledged previously. On the same day, it also loudly claimed that the American imperialistic aggressors should leave South Korea.

North Korea set a thirty day period, fifteen days before June 25 and fifteen days afterward, as the period for a joint anti-American struggle, emphasizing that "American troops must leave South Korea immediately."⁽⁴⁰⁾ In an editorial on June 29, *the Rodong Shinmun* stated that the U.S. should withdraw its troops and all deadly weapons immediately and completely."⁽⁴¹⁾

On the day commemorating the announcement of the July 4th Joint South-North Communique, the North Korean authorities publicized a statement entitled "The Three Major Principles Essential for National Unification." In this

(31) *The Naewoe Press* (Material series), No. 73, May 24, 1978.

(32) *The Rodong Shinmun*, May 22, 1978, p.2, p.3, p.4, p.6.

(33) *The Naewoe Press* (Material series), No. 75, June 7, 1978.

(34) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 24, 1978, p.2.

(35) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 26, 1978, p.1.

(36) *Ibid.*, p.4.

(37) *Ibid.*, p.6.

(38) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 27, 1978, p.3.

(39) *Ibid.*, p.5.

(40) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 28, 1978, p.6.

(41) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 29, 1978, p.4.

statement they stressed that "the American imperialists are backing up the Park military clique and perpetuating the division of Korea by reinforcing their naval and air forces behind the plan of the withdrawal of troops and also by stockpiling ammunition and other military manpower and facilities from South Korea."⁽⁴²⁾

North Korea also announced on July 8 a communique in the name of what is called the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Party of Unification, in which it asserted that "the American imperialistic aggressors, who attempt to reinforce military power and to project provocative actions behind the plan of the withdrawal of military ground forces, must be removed."⁽⁴³⁾

Also, *the Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial on July 1, entitled "the commitment to the withdrawal of military forces and the perpetual compulsor occupation of South Korea," in which it was reiterated that "the U.S. should leave South Korea as soon as possible."⁽⁴⁴⁾

On July 12 *the Rodong Shinmun* carried a comment stating that "it is a strong tide of the times to demand that the U.S. stop its plot to reinforce military might behind the withdrawal plan and that it pull out its troops from South Korea, and support our people's great work to achieve national unification."⁽⁴⁵⁾

The Rodong Shinmun also declared that the

U.S. was preparing a "fanatic tactic for a new war behind the plan of the troops' withdrawal", on July 13,⁽⁴⁶⁾

The Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful National Unification also announced on July 13 that "the American imperialists must stop their reckless plot for a new war, which is being prepared behind the plan of the withdrawal of ground forces, and they must also sincerely remove their invading troops and all military facilities from South Korea."⁽⁴⁷⁾ Every day for a week, *the Rodong Shinmun* featured overseas comments made on the withdrawal of American troops.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Subsequently, *the Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial on July 24 entitled "the American imperialists' plot to bring the puppet armed forces of South Korea into an adventure of war," stating that "the U.S. should remove all its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea without delay."⁽⁴⁹⁾

In an editorial four days later on the theme "our people are resolutely determined to hamper and ruin the American imperialists' plot to divide Korea and provoke war, and then to achieve national unification," *the Rodong Shinmun* said that "there is no reason why U.S. military forces should stay in South Korea,"⁽⁵⁰⁾ while asserting that the U.S. was "forced to publicize its plan of the withdrawal of military

(42) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 4, 1978, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6.

(43) The Revolutionary Party of Unification Central Committee announcement, *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 9, 1978, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6.

(44) Song Moo Kyong's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 11, 1978, p. 5.

(45) Cho Nam Soo's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 12, 1978, p. 5.

(46) *Ibid.*; Kim Chong Kyu's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 13, 1978, p. 6.

(47) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 14, 1978, p. 5.

Pyeongyang authorities announced it on July 13, 1978.

(48) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 15, 1978; *ibid.*, July 16, 1978; *ibid.*, July 17, 1978; *ibid.*, July 18, 1978; *ibid.*, July 20, 1978; *ibid.*, July 21, 1978; *ibid.*, July 22, 1978; *ibid.*, July 25, 1978; *ibid.*, July 26, 1978; *ibid.*, July 27, 1978.

(49) Wang Chin Sik's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 24, 1978, p. 5.

(50) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 27, 1978, p. 1.

(51) Song Moo Kyong's commentary, *ibid.*, p. 5.

forces from South Korea with invading military facilities and new style weapons, and by conducting military exercises frequently.”⁽⁵¹⁾ Furthermore, the organ mentioned specially a catchphrase which translates: “American aggressors: leave South Korea immediately.”⁽⁵²⁾

Ho Tam, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of North Korea, delivered an address at the meeting in July of the non-aligned nation, in which he said “In order to find a peaceful solution to the Korean problem all American troops and nuclear weapons must be withdrawn, foreign intervention into Korean affairs should be stopped, and the Armistice Agreement should be transformed into a peace treaty.”⁽⁵³⁾

Social organizations and political parties in North Korea made an appeal on July 30 declaring that “the American imperialists must withdraw their invading military troops and weapons and leave South Korea without delay in accordance with the Resolution of the 30th U.N. General Assembly.”⁽⁵⁴⁾

According to a report in *the Rodong Shinmun*, the participants in the non-aligned foreign minister's conference rendered their support to North Korea's position that all foreign troops stationed in South Korea should be withdrawn and the Armistice Agreement should be made into a peace agreement.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Moreover, in its editorial entitled “a historic conference on the preservation of autonomy and unity,” *the Rodong Shinmun* stated that all foreign troops and military bases in foreign

territories must be completely removed, the headquarters of the U.N. military force be dismantled, all foreign military bases and facilities in South Korea be abolished, and the Armistice Agreement be transformed into a peace agreement.” It went on that “the American imperialists must withdraw all their deadly weapons, including their troops and nuclear weapons, without delay and completely.”⁽⁵⁶⁾

The Rodong Shinmun also stated in an editorial on August 5 that “in order to remove the cause of tension in Asia and to eliminate the danger of war American military forces must be withdrawn from South Korea.”⁽⁵⁷⁾

The Central Committee of the Revolutionary Party of Unification in North Korea announced a declaration in August, in which it stressed that “we have to fight for the withdrawal of the American troops in South Korea,” and that “the U.S. must pull out all its invading forces including its troops and nuclear weapons, immediately and completely.”⁽⁵⁸⁾

The Rodong Shinmun made a comment on August 17 on the theme of “reckless tactics of a fanatic of war,” stating that “the U.S. should immediately leave South Korea and remove all American troops and nuclear weapons.”⁽⁵⁹⁾

Kim Il-sung gave an address in which he emphasized that “the U.S. must abandon its ambition to maintain colonial rule over South Korea, and to finally take all Korea under its rule, and that it should withdraw its troops from South Korea as soon as possible and completely in accordance with the U.N. Resolution

(52) *Ibid.*

(53) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 28, 1978, p. 4; *North Korea Quarterly*, Vol. V, No. 3&4, 1978, pp. 44-50.

(54) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 30, 1978, p. 6.

(55) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 1, 1978, p. 1.

(56) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 3, 1978, p. 5.

(57) Editorial, *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 5, 1978, p. 1.

(58) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 7, 1978, p. 6; Editorial, *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 12, 1978, p. 1; *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 16, 1978, p. 3.

(59) Song Moo Kyong's commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 17, 1978, p. 6.

and its previous pledge.”⁽⁶⁰⁾

Teng Shao-ping, the Chinese Vice Premier, who visited North Korea to attend ceremonies commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of North Korea (DPRK), participated in a mass rally held in the city of Hamheung on September 11, 1978. In the address he delivered at that rally, Teng declared that “I heartily supported the North Korean people’s righteous demands for the dismantling of the U.N. military command and the complete withdrawal of invading American military troops and facilities from South Korea.”⁽⁶¹⁾

North Korea reiterated as follows: “the U.S. has no reason nor any pretence as to why it should station invading forces in South Korea, and American troops must leave South Korea without delay with the complete removal of their deadly weapons.”⁽⁶²⁾

The Rodong Shinmun also mentioned in particular communiques supporting North Korea’s demand for the withdrawal of American troops, issued by social organizations abroad during the period from September to October.

The spokesman of the Revolutionary Party of Unification issued a communique on November 13, in which he stressed that “the U.S. should withdraw all its killing weapons and munitions from South Korea without delay and completely.”⁽⁶³⁾

Through its editorial, *the Rodong Shinmun* on December 2 stated that “despite its pledge to withdraw military forces, the U.S. has

strengthened its military power and hastened its preparations for war.”⁽⁶⁴⁾ Thereafter, the organ continued to mention specially reports calling for the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea by various overseas leftist organizations which had appeared in foreign newspapers.

The Rodong Shinmun also reported on December 6 the Resolution adopted by a world conference for Korea’s unification on its front page, in which it was stressed that “North Korea called for the removal of all military weapons in South Korea, including American troops and nuclear weapons, the dismantling of the U.N. military command, the conclusion of a peace agreement between North Korea and the U.S., and the suspension of South Korea’s military buildup.”⁽⁶⁵⁾

For the first time, 219 American ground troops stationed in the South were sent home on December 13, 1978.⁽⁶⁶⁾ On January 23, 1978, the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the National Unification in North Korea issued a communique, in which it stressed that “all military actions which are hostile and threatening should be stopped unconditionally and immediately, and that the introduction of military weapons into Korea be suspended and all possibility of military clashes be eliminated.”⁽⁶⁷⁾

The Rodong Shinmun restated through its editorial that “these calls were a new realistic solution, reflecting the whole nation’s aspirations and will.”⁽⁶⁸⁾

(60) Kim Il Sung’s report celebrating the 30th year anniversary of Liberation from Japanese rule, *The Rodong Shinmun*, September 10, 1978, p. 4.

North Korea Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3&4, 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

(61) *The Rodong Shinmun*, September 12, 1978, p. 5.

(62) Kim Chang Woon’s commentary, *The Rodong Shinmun*, September 17, 1978, p. 5.

(63) *The Rodong Shinmun*, November 13, 1978, p. 5.

(64) *The Rodong Shinmun*, December 2, 1978, p. 1, p. 2, p. 3, p. 4, p. 6.

(65) *The Rodong Shinmun*, December 6, 1978, P. 1.

(66) *The Rodong Shinmun*, December 13, 1978.

(67) *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 24, 1979, p. 1.

(68) Editorial, *ibid.*

In a New Year's meeting with reporters, President Park Chung-hee of South Korea made an appeal to North Korea that "a South-North dialogue unconditionally be reopened."⁽⁶⁹⁾ In response to this proposal, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front of National Unification issued a communique on February 5,⁽⁷⁰⁾ and an editorial in *the Rodong Shinmun* described the proposal as "a new forward-looking proposal for dialogue and unification."⁽⁷¹⁾ These words were carried in *the Rodong Shinmun* every day.

On February 23, 1979, *the Rodong Shinmun* carried a comment speaking ill of a joint ROK-U.S. military exercise.⁽⁷²⁾ The spokesman of the Department of the People's Army of North Korea issued a communique in which he argued that "the South Korean authorities, together with the U.S., should be responsible for consequences that might result from their reckless and hostile military actions threatening us."⁽⁷³⁾

North Korea heightened its propaganda drive against the joint ROK-U.S. military exercise. In a comment on March 16, 1979, "*the Rodong Shinmun* reported as follows: "the voice of the people of the world calling for the withdrawal of American military forces becomes louder day by day. If the U.S. listens to this voice and withdraws its military forces from South Korea without delay, it can detach itself from Korean

affairs without losing face."⁽⁷⁵⁾

North Korea argued that "the stationing of American troops in South Korea was an infringement on human rights and a persistent threat to world peace."⁽⁷⁶⁾

In honor of the 29th anniversary of the 1950 *the Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial in which it reiterated that "the American imperialists must withdraw their invading military force from South Korea"⁽⁷⁷⁾ and that "it was necessary to wage a joint anti-American struggle as a means of hastening an effort to see the U.S. evacuate its troops from South Korea."⁽⁷⁸⁾

North Korean Vice Premier Ho Tam made an address on June 27 stating that "for the purpose of national unification, the Armistice Agreement must be transformed into a peace agreement on the condition that foreign troops in South Korea would be withdrawn."⁽⁷⁹⁾ Moreover, North Korea announced a statement, in which it reiterated its previous position that "the American imperialists must withdraw their military means, including nuclear weapons, and immediately leave South Korea."⁽⁸⁰⁾

Concerning President Carter's June visit to South Korea, the North Korean authorities made a comment calling his trip "a tricky covered with a signboard for peace,"⁽⁸¹⁾ in *the Rodong Shinmun*, in which they stated as follows: "It is not essentially different from the continuous

(69) *The Hankook Ilbo*, January 20, 1979; *The Dong-A Ilbo*, January 19, 1979.

(70) *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 6, 1979, p. 1.

(71) Editorial, *ibid.*, the articles expressing their support appear daily from February 7 to February 13.

(72) *The Rodong Shinmun*, February 23, 1979, p. 5.

(73) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 1, 1979, p. 1.

(74) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 15, 1979, p. 3, (with the name of Ronpyongwon).

(75) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 16, 1979, p. 3, *ibid.*, March 17; *ibid.*, March 18; *ibid.*, March 19; *ibid.*, March 21; *ibid.*, March 22; and *ibid.*, March 25, p. 4.

(76) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 1, 1979, p. 6.

(77) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 25, 1979, p. 1.

(78) *Ibid.*, p. 2, p. 3, p. 6; *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 26, 1979, p. 3, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6.

(79) *The Rodong Shinmun*, June 28, 1979, p. 4.

(80) *Ibid.*, p. 6.

(81) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 1, 1979, p. 5.

The Rodong Shinmun, July 3, 1979, p. 2.

compulsory occupation of South Korea by American troops under the pretence of the so-called military balance of power. This is a breach of faith to American voters and a mockery to the peace-loving people of the world. It becomes apparent that from the beginning Carter has had no intention of pulling out American troops from South Korea."

On the occasion of the month of joint anti-American struggle, North Korea stressed that American troops must immediately be withdrawn under the slogan "We call for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea."⁽⁸²⁾

The Rodong Shinmun carried overseas reports critical of Carter's visit to South Korea.⁽⁸³⁾ On July 10, 1979, the spokesman of North Korea's Department of Foreign Affairs issued a communique, in which he stated as follows: "Concerning the switching of the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement, South Korea should not participate in the negotiations which might take place between North Korea and the U.S.. The reason is that South Korea is not qualified to take part in the negotiations because it was not originally a signatory of the Armistice Agreement. If the U.S. really desires it, South Korea may be admitted only as an observer into the process of the negotiations between North Korea and the U.S., the major subjects of which would include the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the transformation of the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement."⁽⁸⁴⁾ In a comment entitled "Stripping off the Mask of Peace,"⁽⁸⁵⁾ the North

Korean authorities denounced the Carter Administration for continuing to strengthen military facilities and bases in South Korea under the pretense of so-called complementary steps necessary following the withdrawal of American troops, and for making every effort to prepare for another war, having totally given up its plan of the troops' withdrawal.

In an interview with the press in Peking on July 12, the North Korean Ambassador to China pointed out that U.S. President Carter's visit to South Korea and his proposal of a three-party conference was a reflection of the American ruling circles' ambition to perpetuate the division of Korea and to make South Korea their permanent colony and military base.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Five days later North Korea also described the Japanese Self-Defense Minister's visit to South Korea as "a dangerous conspiracy for invasion and selling his country."⁽⁸⁷⁾

At a joint meeting between the members of the Central Committee and the Political Committee of the Workers' Party, and those of the Central People's Committee on July 18, North Korea adopted a Resolution declaring that "all foreign military bases and troops must be withdrawn. The target of this resolution was the would-be confluence of the non-aligned countries."⁽⁸⁸⁾

In an editorial, *the Rodong Shinmun* asserted as follows: "The American imperialists must remove themselves from South Korea without delay."⁽⁸⁹⁾ The proposal of a three-party conference was a mere tactic to hide their

(82) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 5, 1979, p. 6.

(83) *Id.*, p. 5; *Asian Security 1979*, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan, 1979, p. 139.

(84) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 11, 1979, p. 1.

(85) *Id.*, p. 4.

(86) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 13, 1979, p. 5.

(87) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 17, 1979, p. 6.

(88) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 19, 1979, p. 1.

(89) *The Rodong Shinmun*, July 27, 1979, p. 1, p. 5, p. 6.

actions to divide Korea and to provoke war, and to deceive the public." At the 394th truce talks, the North Korean side claimed that "the U.S. must suspend immediately its criminal acts of the illegal introduction of new style military weapons and facilities for operations into South Korea, the conduct of war exercises, and the using of South Korea as military base."⁽⁹⁰⁾ It went on that "the U.S. must withdraw all its new style weapons, facilities for operations, and its invading troops from South Korea without delay and unconditionally, and should fulfill its duties as stipulated in Clause 60 of the Armistice Agreement and be devoted to the Resolution of the 30th U.N. General Assembly."⁽⁹¹⁾

A North Korean press comment pointed out that "the campaign against the U.S. tactic to perpetuate the division of Korea must be further strengthened", and added that "the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea is an urgent requirement of the times."⁽⁹²⁾

In an editorial, *the Rodong Shinmun* emphasized on Aug. 15 as follows; "The American imperialists have cancelled their false plan of troop withdrawal, and provided South Korea with a nuclear umbrella. They have also made a proposal for a three-party conference, but the problem of Korea's national unification must be solved by Koreans themselves."⁽⁹³⁾

In a comment five days later entitled "A Dangerous Military Conspiracy". North Korea stated that "the U.S. suspended its plan of troop withdrawal, further strengthened its military power in South Korea, provided South Korea with a large amount of military assis-

tance, instigated Japan to build up military links with Korea, and planned to form a triangular military alliance with Japan and South Korea."⁽⁹⁴⁾

At a commemorative meeting Aug. 21 of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the so-called Revolutionary Party of Unification held in Pyongyang, Kim Won, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, spoke as follows: "American imperialism, with Carter's visit to South Korea, suspended its plan of the invading troops' withdrawal, attempted to use the port of Jinhae as a naval base for their 7th Fleet, established a task force on the mainland of America under the pretence of coping with a state of emergency, and even made a plan to set up the Third Aircraft Carrier Group which is expected to operate around South Korea and Japan. Thus, we turn down the proposal of a three-party conference as a segregator's idea."⁽⁹⁵⁾ North Korea displayed a slogan on August 26 stating: "We energetically fight for the strengthening and development of the non-aligned movement under the flag of autonomy, unification and unity." Under this slogan, the North Korean authorities warned: "What the Carter Administration has done under the pretense of the troops' withdrawal is only to build up its military strength and prepare military operations in South Korea. The U.S. established the joint ROK-U.S. military command and a task force which prepared to move South Korea, and already has a short-term plan to attack the northern part of Korea and to wage a nuclear war."⁽⁹⁶⁾

At the 396th session of the truce talks, the

(90) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 1, 1979, p. 5.

(91) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 10, 1979, p. 5.

(92) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 11, 1979, p. 1, Announces the period from June 27 to July 27 'the Month of Common Struggle Against America'.

(93) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 15, 1979, p. 1.

(94) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 20, 1979, p. 5, p. 6.

(95) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 21, 1979, p. 5, p. 6.

(96) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 26, 1979, p. 2.

The Rodong Shinmun, August 27, 1979, p. 6.

North Korean side again strongly criticized the U.S. for its dangerous military provocation.⁽⁹⁷⁾

The Rodong Shinmun carried a lengthy commentary on January 8, 1980, entitled "The triangular military alliance between the U.S., Japan and South Korea is very dangerous to peace in Korea and Asia."⁽⁹⁸⁾ The spokesman of the Revolutionary Party of Unification issued a statement on March 15 in which he strongly denounced "the American imperialists and their hunting dogs" for "making a reckless plot to bring about war."⁽⁹⁹⁾

The Rodong Shinmun carried a Resolution April 19 regarding Korea's unification and human rights in South Korea, adopted at an international conference, stating that "the American government must withdraw all its troops, nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons from South Korea."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The Rodong Shinmun soon thereafter carried an editorial with the theme "Nobody can obstruct the aspirations of peaceful unification," in which the Pyongyang authorities pointed out that "a large-scale joint ROK-U.S. military exercise called Magex 80 was a mere means through which the U.S. tried to maintain its colonial role over South Korea, and that the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea would be a firm step for peace and also be good for U.S. interests."⁽¹⁰¹⁾

It is noteworthy that starting with 1980's *The Rodong Shinmun* carried reports calling for the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea from various social organizations abroad almost every day.⁽¹⁰²⁾

On the occasion of the March 1st Independence Movement Day of 1980, *The Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial on the subject of "Let us open the door for national unification through collaboration and unity between North and South Korea." In this editorial, the Pyongyang authorities argued that the U.S. should stop its intervention in Korea's internal affairs and leave South Korea without delay, and that it must do nothing harmful to the great work for national unification.⁽¹⁰³⁾

At a civilian declaration rally on the 60th anniversary of the March 1st Independence Movement Day held in Pyongyang, the North Korean authorities stressed that "all military facilities, including American troops and nuclear weapons, be withdrawn from South Korea without delay."⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

The Rodong Shinmun also mentioned specially various communiques issued by many social organizations abroad opposing the joint ROK-U.S. military exercise called Team Spirit '80, and severely criticized it.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Moreover, through *The Rodong Shinmun*, the spokesman of Revolutionary Party of Unification on March 15

(97) *The Rodong Shinmun*, August 27, 1979, p. 6.

(97) *The Rodong Shinmun*, October 3, 1979, p. 6.

(98) *The Rodong Shinmun*, January 8, 1980, p. 2.

(99) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 15, 1980, p. 5.

(100) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 19, 1980, p. 4; *ibid.*, April 20, 1980, p. 4, p. 6.

(101) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 25, 1980, p. 4.

(102) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 30, 1980, p. 4.

The Rodong Shinmun, May 3, 1980, p. 16.

(103) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 1, 1980, p. 1.

(104) *Ibid.*, p. 3.

(105) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 2, 1980, p. 5; *ibid.*, March 7, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 9 p. 6; March 15 p. 5, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 16, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 21, p. 5; *ibid.*, March 23, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 27, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 28, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 30, p. 6; *ibid.*, March 31, p. 6; Kang Kyong Soo's commentary, *ibid.*, April 4, p. 8; *ibid.*, April 5, p. 5, p. 6; *ibid.*, April 12, p. 6; *ibid.*, April 18, p. 6; *ibid.*, April 25, p. 4; and *ibid.*, May 11, p. 6.

issued a communique declaring that "American imperialism must withdraw its invading weapons, and leave South Korea."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

After censuring American imperialism through various commentaries made by overseas social organizations and newspaper, *The Rodong Shinmun* carried a comment on April 4 written by Kang Yung-su, a commentator for the organ, on the subject of "an indiscreet tumult peace and unification." In this piece, he asserted that "the Team Spirit '80 exercise was a reckless action to prepare for war, and that U.S. continues to increase its military power, including a 20% increase in its air force."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

It was reported that at the 400th session of the truce talks, the North Korean side revealed and denounced this "enemy's criminal act", which was aimed at "making a new plot to bring about war and to intensify the state of tension."⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

On the memorial day-anniversary of the April 19, 1960 Students' Revolution, North Korea emphasized that "the U.S. must stop its reckless military actions threatening our people, and immediately leave South Korea with the removal of all invading weapons, and that it at the same time must suspend its intervention in Korea's internal affairs."⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Moreover, on the same day, *The Rodong Shinmun* carried the resolution adopted by an international conference of peace and security held in New Delhi, India, demanding strongly that "the U.S. must pull out its deadly weapons, troops and nuclear weapons without delay, and that it must comply unconditionally to negotiations through which the

Armistice Agreement could be transformed into a peace agreement."⁽¹¹⁰⁾

At a Central Reporting Meeting on April 24 on the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the founding of North Korea's people's Army, the Chief of Staff of the People's Army stressed in his report that "the Team Spirit '80 operation had the purpose of strengthening preparations for war: the U.S. must leave South Korea with the removal of its all deadly weapons, including nuclear weapons, without delay from South Korea."⁽¹¹¹⁾

At a joint meeting of government and party on June 25, North Korea set forth a plan to play a leading role in the forthcoming non-aligned conference, and decided to continue its energetic fight for the abolition of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign military troops."⁽¹¹²⁾ In addition, it requested that the members of the non-aligned conference should make every effort so that foreign troops obstructing national unification could be removed from South Korea. On the occasion of a month of anti-American struggle called for June-July, the Supreme People's Assembly throughout the world, in which it was written: "Korea's unification cannot be achieved, and national autonomy cannot be preserved, as long as there are foreign military bases and foreign troops in South Korea.

American troops must remove all their military facilities, including nuclear weapons, and the U.S. must leave the Korean question alone so that it can be solved by Koreans themselves."⁽¹¹³⁾

(106) *The Rodong Shinmun*, March 15, 1980, p. 5.

(107) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 4, 1980, p. 8.

(108) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

(109) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 19, 1980, p. 4.

(110) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 20, 1980, p. 4 (March 23-25 at New Delhi).

(111) *The Rodong Shinmun*, April 25, 1980, p. 4.

(112) *The Jjaewoe Press* (Material series), No. 181, June 25, 1980.

(113) *The Jjaewoe Press* (Material series), No. 182, July 2, 1980 (Pyongyang Broadcasting dated June 4).

The Supreme People's Assembly further insisted that "the Armistice Agreement be switched into a peace agreement, and special attention paid to the relations between North Korea and the U.S. as follows: One does not encroach upon the other; both sides make efforts to eliminate the danger of armed clash; the U.S. does not interfere into Korea's internal politics; both sides give up their military buildup and arms race; all foreign military troops stationed in South Korea under the name of U.N. military force be removed, and Korea be no longer allowed to become a military base of any foreign state. If such a peace treaty can be substituted for the present Armistice Agreement, the cause of war will be eliminated, and the state of tension will be alleviated. We desire that you put pressure on the U.S. through various channels so that it will withdraw its military force from South Korea."⁽¹¹⁴⁾

North Korea's diplomatic and consular offices in foreign countries set the period from June

25 through July 27, 1980 as "a month for supporting North Korea," and intensively conducted campaigns promoting pro-North Korean activities and the anti-South Korean struggle. Through these campaigns, North Korea claimed that the heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula was due to the U.S. policy of stationing troops in South Korea. On the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the announcement of the July 4th Joint South-North Communique, *the Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial on the subject "Let us press forward the great work of national unification under the slogan of autonomy, peaceful unification and national unity" in which it repeated its previous position that "the U.S. must immediately comply with the proposal of a Joint North Korea-U.S. conference, which will deal with such problems as the withdrawal of American troops and the changing of the Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty."⁽¹¹⁵⁾ This was consistent with North Korea's previous position.

**Listing of Instances of Comment on American Ground Force
Withdrawal from Korean Peninsula in the Rodong Shinmun**

Source	Year			Total
	1978	1979	June, 1980	
Foreign Press Reports Analysis, Opinions of Foreign Countries Organizations	134	329	84	547
Revolutionary Unification Party Statements	10	12	1	19
Commentary	38	5	7	50
Secretariat for Peaceful Unification	6	6		12
Central Committee for Peaceful Unification		9		9
Editorial	7	9	2	18
A report to a gathering reprinted	5			5
Welcoming party for foreign dignitaries	3			3
Memorial Day Report	1	2		3
Central Committee of Korea Federation in Japan	2			2
Military Armistice Committee	1	3	1	5
Statement of North Korea's Social Organizations	8		1	9
Miscellaneous News Articles	46	88	13	147

(114) *Ibid.*

(115) *The Naewoe Press* (Material series), No. 183, July 9, 1980.
The Rodong Shinmun, Editorial (July 4, 1980)

Source	Year			
	1978	1979	June, 1980	Total
Statement of Ministry of Defense		1		1
Statement of <i>the Central News Agency</i>			1	1
Total	261	464	110	835

Instances of Comment by content in *the Rodong Shinmun*

Content	Year			
	78	79	June, 1980	Total
U.S. forces should be immediately withdrawn	33	24	1	58
Nuclear weapon and all other deadly weapons should be immediately be removed	33	26	7	66
ROK-U.S. joint military exercises should not be allowed, should not occur	24	19	36	79
ROK-U.S. joint military exercises increase tension and are a rash provocation	15	4	1	20
Advocate an immediate withdrawal of American forces from South Korea	13	8	8	29
The forced occupation of South Korea by American forces is a major hindrance to the Unification of Korea, and American forces should be withdrawn from Korea	11	3	1	15
According to a resolution and commitment of the U.N., American forces and deadly weapons should be removed from South Korea	8	5	7	20
Carter should stand by his commitment to the withdrawal of American forces from Korea	8	11	1	20
American imperialists should not interfere in Korea and their war policy and their forces and weapons should immediately be removed	5	5	2	12
The reinforcement of armed forces is justified	4	3	1	8
All foreign troops should be withdrawn	10	14	2	26
All U.S. forces and their deadly weapons should be withdrawn immediately and completely as this is demanded by the people of the world	2	3	7	12
American ground forces withdrawal from South Korea only hides a redistribution of American military power	4	5	1	10
Immediate removal of aggressive forces from South Korea	4	5	1	10
A peace agreement should be sought as the main goal	5		2	7
American forces should be withdrawn from South Korea and peaceful unification should be achieved independently	4	3	8	15
Total eradication of the two Korea's plot should be pursued	3	17	3	23
The U.S. must remove their American forces and military equipment from South Korea	4	6	1	11
Reject all plots for the permanent division of Korea	1	9	1	11
The removal of ground troops is a plan in name but not in reality for the withdrawal of U.S. military power in Korea	3	4	2	9

Content	Year			Total
	78	79	June, 1980	
Oppose the permanency of forced occupation of South Korea	4	7		11
Oppose the intervention of foreign powers	3		2	5
Dissolve the U.N. Command	4			4
Stand by commitment to withdrawal of forces and end permanent forced occupation of South Korea	2	2		4
Behind the scene of a withdrawal of forces is the reinforcement of military might and a plot of war	4	1	1	6
American forces should be withdrawn from south Korea and the threat of aggressive Japanese reaction eliminated	2	8		10
American forces being stationed in South Korea is an agony for the South Korean people	1			1
American imperialism is the real war criminal in Korean aggression	1			1
Movement to request complete withdrawal of American forces should be spread	1	2	1	4
There is no excuse to prolong American Imperialism in South Korea	1			1
Federation system for North-South Korea is most reasonable method of unification	1			1
To decrease tension, the unconditional withdrawal of American forces is necessary	1	7	1	9
American Imperialism should keep its hands off Korea	4	3	1	8
Foreign military bases should be abolished	1	3	3	7
Foreign forces of aggression should be removed	1		2	3
A halt should be put to the preparation of nuclear war by American forces in Korea	1	4	11	16
There is a new plan for preparation of war on the peninsula	7	1		8
Hands of Korea totally	1	5	3	9
American aggressor should be driven from Korea	1	2	1	4
U.S. should have contacts with North Korea for peaceful resolution	1	1	1	3
U.S. should retract its two Koreas policy and American forces and aggressive weapons must be driven out completely from South Korea	3	6	1	10
American Imperialism should keep its hands off the provocation of war	1	6	1	8
Aggressive forces in South Korea should be withdrawn	1	3	1	5
Aggressive ambitions of American imperialism should be immediately discontinued	1	7	1	9
South Korean people are fighting against American imperialism and its puppets' suppression	1	1	1	3
American forces should be driven out from South Korea and a halt put to its support for South Korea's regime	1	6	1	8
American imperialism is a threat to peace in Korea and provocative military action should be halted	1	4	1	6

Content	Year			Total
	78	79	June, 1980	
All military disturbances should be halted	1	4	1	6
Korean people do not condone American imperialism and South Korea's threat of power	1	4	1	6
The withdrawal of U.S. ground forces is an excuse for increased suppression by South Korea's puppet regime	1	1	2	4

III. Response of South Korea

1. Government

U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced on April 21, 1978 that two combat battalions scheduled to be withdrawn from South Korea in 1978 would remain in that country. Carter issued a statement saying just one battalion would be withdrawn in 1978 instead of the three originally planned.⁽¹⁾

Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin said that "Carter's rethinking of the pullout is a realistic judgment but future withdrawals of U.S. troops must be accompanied by compensation measures."⁽²⁾ Park Tong-jin emphasized that "the American forces stationed in Korea are a deterrent power on the Korean peninsula, therefore, the withdrawal of American forces should be approached more cautiously and with flexibility, giving compensation higher priority."⁽³⁾

Kim Kyun-gwon, special assistant for international affairs to Korea's late President Park Chung-hee, told *Newsweek* magazine that some Koreans are beginning to question U.S. strength. He said in the interview that in the past "there was the assumption the U.S. had both the physical strength and political will to be an

active participant in the regional equilibrium in Northeast Asia. Some people are beginning to question this. The Korean public reacted to the decision to withdraw troops from South Korea with a great deal of puzzlement."⁽⁴⁾

Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Kim Yong-shik said that "the North Koreans have been taking a negative attitude toward our three-stage program for unification and furthermore, they have simply repeated their demands for the unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula along with a green light for communist political activity in the South." Kim said that "militarily, North Korea is far superior to the South, in naval and airpower as well as fire power of ground troops, but the presence of American troops over the past 25 years has deterred aggression from the North. Economically, South Korea is far superior to North Korea. However, that the present U.S. administration plans to withdraw American troops may encourage the North Koreans to believe that the international situation is turning in their favor."

Minister of Defense Ro Jae-hyun discussed with his U.S. counterpart, Harold Brown, matters regarding the security of Korea. They discussed the Korean armed forces improvement program and American support of Korea's

(1) *The Korea Herald*, April 23, 1978 (Washington-AP) Each battalion has about 800 persons.

(2) *The Dong-A Ilbo*, April 25, 1978.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) *The Korea Times*, August 5, 1978. (New York-UPI)

(5) *The Korea Herald*, October 7, 1978. (Washington-Hapdong) In his speech to the Rotary Club in Cleveland Ohio. *The Korea Times*, October 7, 1978. (Cleveland-UPI)

defense industry.⁽⁶⁾ The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command was established on November 7, 1978.⁽⁷⁾

A group of 219 soldiers of the Second Battalion, Ninth Company of the Second Infantry Division, left for the United States aboard a chartered airplane on December 13, 1978, to become the first U.S. ground combat troops to be withdrawn from Korea.⁽⁸⁾

The Ministry of Defense of Korea had a special meeting of the commanders of the Korean Army to discuss the American ground troops withdrawal plan and general situation of Northeast Asia.⁽⁹⁾

A new United States Army intelligence report has concluded that the strength of the North Korean Army is far greater than previously estimated. The finding has aroused controversy over both the adequacy of existing intelligence estimates and President Carter's decision to withdraw American ground combat troops from South Korea. It indicated the communist nation had the equivalent of 41 divisions rather than the 28 previously estimated by the Carter Administration, and a force of some 2,000 tanks, at least 300 more than had been listed previously by American intelligence.⁽¹⁰⁾

Korean authorities said on January 8, 1979 that "there is reason to review the ground troop pullout in light of a report that North Korean military power is greater than had been estimated previously."⁽¹¹⁾

President Park Chung-hee said that "we desire to keep American ground forces in Korea, but given the decision of the American administration and the fact that we need to avoid any military conflict on the Korean peninsula and keep the military balance, we request the strengthening of other military sectors in compensation."⁽¹²⁾ President Park Chung-hee emphasized that the American troop pullout from the Korean peninsula was a problem, and stressed more cooperation between the two countries.⁽¹³⁾

It became clear that Korea and the United States should start negotiations on the revision of the U.S. troop withdrawal plan if that was necessary for the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, and that is precisely what Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Yong-shik said on January 17, 1979, after returning to Washington after winding up home consultations.⁽¹⁴⁾

President Park Chung-hee proposed to North Korea on January 19, 1979 to resume unconditionally the South-North dialogue at any level, at any time and in any place to discuss directly and frankly all unification-related problems.⁽¹⁵⁾ Alluding to a self-reliant defense posture following possible U.S. ground troops withdrawal, President Park disclosed that "the nation was fully prepared to meet any challenges, pursuing steadily programs to develop guided missiles, manufacture highly sophisticated electronic armaments and airplanes as well in

(6) *The Korea Herald*, November 7, 1978.

(7) *The Dong-A Ilbo*, November 7, 1978.

(8) *The Korea Herald*, December 14, 1978. *The Hankook Ilbo*, December 14, 1978.

(9) *The Choong Ang Ilbo*, December 15, 1978.

(10) *The New York Times*, January 4, 1979.

(11) *The Dong-A Ilbo*, January 8, 1979.

(12) *The Choong Ang Ilbo*, November 21, 1978. *The Dong-A Ilbo*, November 21, 1978. President Park Chung-hee had a discussion with a group of American congressmen at Chong Wa Dae on December 20, 1978.

(13) *The Dong-A Ilbo*, January 13, 1979. President Park spoke with Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee of the U.S. Senate.

(14) *The Korea Herald*, January 18, 1979.

(15) *The Korea Times*, January 20, 1979. New Year press meeting.

the middle part of the 1980's."⁽¹⁶⁾

South Korea accepted a North Korean proposal to hold preliminary discussions on unifying the divided country, creating the framework for the first talks between the divided halves in seven years on January 26, 1979.⁽¹⁷⁾

South Korean officials appeared somewhat disappointed that the visit to Washington and Tokyo by Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsia-ping of China did not have the side effect of generating momentum to restart political talks on the Korean peninsula. Because North Korea under Kim Il-sung had maneuvered successfully in the Soviet-Chinese rivalry, China found it too risky at the time to press North Korea into accepting an accommodation with the Seoul regime.

"It will take time before China could expect to influence north Korea in any significant degree," said Representative Park Jun-kyu, a senior policy maker for President Park.⁽¹⁸⁾

President Park Chung-hee on March 1, 1979 once again called for the unconditional and immediate reopening of dialogue between pertinent authorities of South Korea and North Korea as the best way to realize the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.⁽¹⁹⁾

South Korea demanded that North Korea promptly respond to its call for the resumption of South-North dialogue by sending a competent delegation to the conference table on April 7,

1979, in a statement by Rhee Kyung-sik, spokesman of Seoul's working-level delegation for the South-North dialogue.⁽²¹⁾

South Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin said "there is no need for a three-party meeting on Korean problems. Direct talks between the South and North should solve the Korean issues."⁽²²⁾

President Park Chung-hee expressed the view that "the revising of the American ground troops withdrawal plan by the U.S. administration is very welcome. The Korean question should be discussed by South and North Korea themselves."⁽²³⁾

Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin noted that the U.S. administration would find it inevitable to rewrite its plan for troop withdrawal from Korea.⁽²⁴⁾ Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah said on June 21, 1979 the U.S. decision to freeze its ground troop withdrawals from South Korea until 1981 was "a firm manifestation of its commitment to the Republic of Korea."⁽²⁵⁾

U.S. President Jimmy Carter's announcement on July 21, 1979 of the suspension of the U.S. ground troops withdrawal from Korea should be interpreted as an "indefinite" freeze or a "virtual nullification" of the original plan, a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on July 21, 1979.⁽²⁶⁾

Both political parties of South Korea wel-

(16) *Ibid.* *The Korea Herald*, January 21, 1980.

(17) *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1979, p.A 1.

(18) *The Korea Times*, January 27, 1979.

(19) *The New York Times*, February 11, 1979, p. 20.

(20) *The Korea Herald*, March 1, 1979.

(21) *The Korea Herald*, April 8, 1979.

(22) *The Hankook Ilbo*, May 12, 1979. *The Chosun Ilbo*, May 12, 1979.

(23) *The Kyung Hyang Shinmun*, May 12, 1979. President Park discussed the American ground troops withdrawal with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at Chong Wa Dae on May 2, 1979.

(24) *The Korea Herald*, June 28, 1979.

(25) *The Korea Herald*, June 22, 1979.

(26) *The Korea Herald*, July 22, 1979.

comed U.S. President Carter's decision to freeze the withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea. Rep. Oh You-bang, spokesman of the Democratic Republican Party(DRP), commented that Carter's decision was an ideal one based on the reassessment of the latest power balance on the Korean peninsula. Similar comments came from Rep. Jung Je-ho, spokesman of the Yujong-ho. He said the freezing of the withdrawal of American forces from Korea was quite an appropriate decision for the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia overall. Meanwhile, Rep. Park Kwon-heon, spokesman of New Democratic Party, welcomed the decision, saying that it would contribute to promoting peace and security in Korea and Asia.⁽²⁷⁾

North Korea formally rejected, on July 10, 1979, a three-party talks proposal by South Korea. According to *Naewoe News Agency* North Korea reiterated its previous demand for direct talks with the United States, alleging that South Korea was not qualified to participate in any discussions of U.S. troops withdrawal or conclusion of a peace treaty but only in discussions of Korean unification, as it is not a signatory of the armistice agreement.⁽²⁸⁾

Such a reaction by North Korea reflects no change in its previous stand and makes it clear once again that it has no intention to respond to the call for constructive dialogue between the divided halves.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea expressed regret over Pyongyang's negative reaction to the ROK-U.S. joint proposal for the convening of a meeting of official

representatives of South and North Korea and the United States and urged Pyongyang to respond positively to the peace initiative.⁽²⁹⁾

The South Korean government has decided to raise annual military spending in 1980 by about \$500 million, equivalent to 1 percent of the nation's gross national product, from currently budgeted levels, *the New York Times* reported on July 10, 1979.⁽³⁰⁾ According to *the New York Times*, Carter, it appears, used the reversal of his position on withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Korea to put pressure on the Korean government to increase military spending.

South Korean President Park Chung-hee on August 15, 1979 renewed a call for three-way talks on the Korean question among the two Koreas and the United States, but accused North Korea of continuing "a reckless military buildup" to take the South by force.⁽³¹⁾

Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin has denounced, as a tactic to propagandize itself abroad as the sole government on the Korea peninsula and to degrade the status of Seoul in international society, that Pyongyang tries to have bilateral talks and conclude a peace agreement with the United States.⁽³²⁾

U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units joined with their Korean counterparts for joint combined maneuvers in Exercise Team Spirit '80 beginning on March 1, 1980.⁽³³⁾

Kim Young-sam, President of the New Democratic Party, said on February 27, 1980 that the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea had greatly contributed not only to easing tension on the Korean peninsula, but also to maintaining

(27) *Ibid.*

(28) *The Korea Herald*, July 11, 1979. *The Korea Times*, July 18, 1979.

(29) *The Korea Herald*, July 11, 1979.

(30) *The Korea Times*, August 11, 1979. *The New York Times*, August 10, 1979.

(31) *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1979, p. A. 24.

(32) *The Korea Times*, September 9, 1979.

(33) *The Korea Times*, March 2, 1980.

peace in East Asia.⁽³⁴⁾

South Korean Defense Minister Choo Young-bock urged North Korea on March 2, 1980 to stop immediately any provocations if it truly wanted to maintain security and peace on the Korean peninsula. He pointed out that North Korea launched an all-out surprise attack on the South in 1950 after it suggested talks for peace negotiations between the South and the North. The minister warned any further savage actions committed by the North would be chastised in a very determined way.⁽³⁵⁾

2. Non Government

The recent action of the U.S. House Subcommittee caused one voice after another to be raised by an increasing number of political analysts and military strategists on the new direction toward which American foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia should be reoriented. "At this juncture, it is significant that the U.S. government is known to have taken up the troop withdrawal issue for review and possible revision. It is reassuring that our long-standing and well verified contention that the U.S. military presence on a sizeable level is essential to the peace and security of Korea has found a louder echo in Washington. A serious reconsideration of this point is definitely in order now."⁽³⁶⁾

The New Democratic Party issued a statement on May 1, 1978 that "maintaining American ground troops in Korea is essential as a deterrent to war in Korea" and "consultations with the Korean government on Korean security problems should precede any actual American policy changes."⁽³⁷⁾

"The U.S. would like to think that if the

U.S. ground forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, then the U.S. could avoid direct intervention in a conflict on the Korean peninsula and still deter an invasion by the supporting presence of air force and naval power. The U.S. global strategy which thus chooses to resolve its part in the Korean question may have too much of the confident arrogance of the great power—the U.S. may suddenly find itself under a dangerous illusion.⁽³⁸⁾ A leading Korean scholar in international relations observed that U.S. President Jimmy Carter's policy on the withdrawal of the American ground troops from Korea "itself" would not be changed, but there might be some changes in the course of its implementation. Dr. Han Sung-joo of Korea University, at a seminar on the "The Carter Troop Withdrawal Decision, Policy Formation and Implementation", recalled that "President Carter's troop withdrawal decision was not made under normal circumstances in the United States in view of domestic and international situations it then faced, including the American debacle in Vietnam in 1975.

However, those who oppose the troop pullout policy have reasonable logic, Han said. Their logic is that "there is a gap in military power between South and North Korea. If the American troops are withdrawn from the peninsula, North Korea would be tempted to make a southward invasion. South and North Korea would be involved in heated competition in building up military power. South Korea might develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the projected troop pullout will have an adverse effect on the economic development of the Republic of Korea. The troops withdrawal result in the

(34) *The Korea Times*, February 23, 1980.

(35) *The Korea Times*, March 3, 1980.

(36) *The Korea Herald*, editorial: "Pullout Review in Order," April 11, 1978.

(37) *The Dong-A Ilbo*, May 1, 1978.

(38) Ree Sang-woo, "Will the U.S. withdraw from Asia?", *The Hankook Ilbo*, May 10, 1978.

decrease of foreign capital investments in South Korea. The troops withdrawal might lessen the U.S. influence in Korea.”⁽³⁹⁾

The Korea-Japan Parliamentary Security Consultative Council was formally inaugurated in Seoul on April 30, 1978 with the opening of its first general conference at the Plaza Hotel in Seoul attended by legislators of the two countries. Rep. Lee Chong-chan, former Korean defense minister who heads the Korean team, said in a keynote address that tension on the Korean peninsula was increasingly sharpened, taking a new tone amid growing Soviet military pressure in the Far East and continuing conflicts in Indochina. In another keynote speech, Japanese chief delegate Michita Sakata said “it is desirable that America suspend the military pullout for time being to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula.”⁽⁴⁰⁾

The military leaders and other political leaders familiar with the Northeast Asian situation strongly opposed any such move as withdrawing American ground forces from Korea. What they favored in Korea was a stronger and firmer U.S. commitment, and modernization of the U.S. and Korean ground forces—not to attack but to maintain peace in the region.”⁽⁴¹⁾

Both ruling and opposition parties welcomed on July 22, 1979, in respective statements, the U.S. decision to freeze its troop withdrawals from Korea until 1981. Rep. Oh You-bang, spokesman for the ruling Democratic Republican Party, hailed it as “realistic and reasonable.” He added that the pullout freeze would greatly contribute to promoting security and peace in Northeast Asia and the Pacific region.

Yujong-hoe spokesman Rep. Jung Je-ho said that the decision stood for binational cooperation based on “mature relations between the two countries.” Rep. Park Kwon-hum, spokesman of the opposition New Democratic Party, said the party reaffirmed the necessity of U.S. military presence in South Korea for national security and prevention of war on the peninsula.⁽⁴²⁾

The Republic of Korea and the United States have renewed their common pledge to defend the Korean peninsula from aggressive force on the occasion of the renaming of the existing Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. According to a *Korea Times* editorial on the Combined Field Army, “we attach particular significance to this impressive occasion, timely with the ongoing Team Spirit '80 war games, which is considered an unprecedented combat exercise undertaken by South Korean and U.S. military strategists. The redesignation of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Setup should mean much in this context, showing U.S. determination to continue its military presence on the Korean peninsula until such a time as it confirms a drastic change in the North Korea policy toward the South discarding its revolutionary plot against the Republic. We make a due estimate of the positive U.S. military presence here, particularly in transition stage directed toward social and political reforms in South Korea these days. It is also our firm conviction that the latest U.S. military decision in Korea will undoubtedly encourage our sustained efforts for attaining a self-supporting defense in the foreseeable future.”⁽⁴³⁾

(39) *The Korea Herald*, November 8, 1978.

(40) *The Korea Herald*, May 1, 1980.

(41) Lee Chong-ik, “Carter’s visit to Korea”, *The Korea Times*, July 1, 1979.

(42) *The Korea Times*, July 22, 1979.

(43) *The Korea Times*, March 13, 1980.

Response of South Korea: Government

content	year	Frequency of Remarks			
		78	79	80	Total
President Park Chung-hee on the problems of the plan of troops withdrawal from South Korea and emphasis on a close cooperation system between ROK-U.S.		1	17	—	18
Park Chung-hee on unconditional reopening of North-South talks		2	—	—	2
President Choi Kyu-ha on above.		—	2	5	7
Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwak on above.		—	—	14	14
Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin on the amendment of the plan to American troops as realistic and requiring a recompensation plan		4	14	6	24
Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Yong-sik on concern about the American forces withdrawal from South Korea		2	4	—	6
Minister of Defense Rho Jae-hyun on recompensation upon withdrawal of forces and efforts for improvement of defense industry		1	2	—	3
Special Assistant to the President Kim Kyong-won on the Korean people's anxiety on American forces withdrawal from South Korea		2	2	—	4
Ministry of Defense special meeting of military leaders: concern over withdrawal plan		2	1	—	3
Minister of Unification: concern over withdrawal plan		—	1	1	2
Representative of Seoul side for North-South working-level talks Tong Hoon on concern over the withdrawal plan		—	2	—	2
Increase of tension over venue of North-South talks		—	—	2	2
Disagreement on important issues at North-South Korea talks		—	—	5	5
Reopen hot-line between Pyongyang and Seoul		—	—	3	3
Possibility of readjustment of withdrawal of American forces plan		—	4	—	4
Team Spirit '80' ROK-U.S. military maneuvers		—	—	5	5
Acting chairman North-South coordinating committee Seoul representative Min Kwan Shik		—	1	—	—

Non-Government Organization

content	year	Frequency of Remarks			
		78	79	80	Total
American forces stationed in Korea are an essential element for stability and peace		4	—	—	4
Carter's American force's withdrawal plan should be reconsidered:		—	—	—	—
Article by Professor		2	—	—	2
New Democratic Party		1	—	—	1
There is no progress in the North-South talks at Panmunjom		—	2	—	2
Meeting between President Park Chung-hee and Carter to discuss freezing of American force withdrawal plan		—	1	—	1

content	year	78	79	80	Total
New Democratic Party and Republican Democratic Party welcome the postponement of the American troops withdrawal plan		—	1	—	1
Editorial		—	1	1	2
Team Spirit '80'		—	—	1	1
Increase in U.S., Japan and Chinese military cooperation		—	—	1	1
Concern for a possible North Korean "misjudgment" because of the troop withdrawal plan		—	—	1	1

IV. Conclusion

By May of 1975 candidate Carter had pledged to withdraw all U.S. ground combat troops from Korea within five years if he became President. The option in Policy Review Memorandum on Korea (PRM 13) were designed primarily to implement a decision already announced by the President on March 9, 1977. The estimate in PRM 13 indicating that North Korea has an important firepower advantage over South Korea alone was discounted because of the continuing U.S. air, naval and ground support role after 1981. ⁽¹⁾

South Korean officials believe that they were not consulted but were only "informed." Between March and July 1977 they knew only that U.S. troops would be leaving, but they were uncertain about timing and compensation. As a result, great anxiety existed in South Korea. The July 1977 Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul provided the first consultations and firm U.S. promises regarding compensation, and as a result reduced the concerns of South Korean officials. ⁽²⁾

President Park Chung-hee pointed out that the plan for withdrawal of troops was proble-

matic and emphasized a system of closer cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. for Korean security. He emphasized these points 18 times from 1978 to 1980. Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwak also pointed them out 14 times in 1980. Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin emphasized that amendment of the plan to withdraw of American troops was realistic and be followed by a compensation plan more than 24 times from 1978 to June 1980. Special assistant to President Pak Chung-hee, Kim Kyong-won pointed out 4 times from 1978-1979 that the American troops withdrawal issue had caused the Korean people great anxiety. This will give some idea of the South Korean government's position on the troop withdrawal issue. The American troop withdrawal policy was firm. Therefore, South Korean officials were in favor of military compensation in other respect and modernization of the Korean army.

The response of non-government organizations in Korea indicated that they thought American forces stationed in Korea were an essential element for stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. Most Korean people remember that American troops were withdrawn in 1949 and there followed the North Korean aggression

(1) *U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea: A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, January 9, 1978. (95th Congress 2nd Session), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1978, pp 1-2.*

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 2.

which started the Korean war in June 1950.

Therefore, the Korean people are anxious to see an amendment of the troop withdrawal plan by the American government. After President Carter visited Korea in July 1979, a U.S. government statement on the postponement of the American troop withdrawal plan was welcomed by government officials and citizens. The joint military exercise of ROK-U.S. combined forces encouraged the Korean people with regard to the security and stability of their fatherland.

A U.S. military presence has also been necessary because of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Since the United States signed the armistice rather than South Korea, the United States is responsible under the agreement for truce keeping. Technically, a state of war continues interrupted by an armistice now in its 27th year. Both the United States and the Republic of Korea have repeatedly called for a more permanent arrangement, but all such attempts have been rejected by the North.⁽³⁾ When President Carter visited South Korea in July 1979 and proposed three-way talks to the North, this proposal was also rejected by the North.⁽⁴⁾

However, Pyongyang's statement that time rejected a meeting among Seoul, Pyongyang and Washington. In the statement, North Korea called for two-way talks between the United States and North Korea, aimed at discussing matters related to the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and the conclusion of a peace agreement, totally separate from North-South Korean talks aimed at discussing the Korean unification problem.

Pyongyang alleged that the holding of a Washington-Pyongyang meeting is quite natural in view of the fact that the two are the direct

parties concerned with the signing of the Korea Armistice Agreement.

It further alleged that "there are no legal and logical grounds for South Korea to intervene in" the U.S.-North Korea meeting.⁽⁵⁾

North Korea has never wavered in its stance that the U.S. military presence in South Korea should be totally and unconditionally removed. Its denunciation of the oppressive imperialist occupiers in the South does not seem to have changed at all from that which was heard prior to the U.S. withdrawal in 1949.

Because of the importance of stability in Korea, the United States shares with China, Japan and the Soviet Union an interest in easing tension on the peninsula. President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground troops from Korea has naturally caused other Asian states to reconsider the role of the United States in East Asia. Korean developments thus are a key to stability in the region.⁽⁶⁾

V. Summary

1. The North Korean Reaction

One of North Korea's main foreign policy contentions is that all U.S. troops must be withdrawn from the peninsula. However they were very much skeptical from the beginning of Carter's plan to pull the U.S. troops out of South Korea. North Korean intelligence monitored what was claimed to be an increase in air power by the U.S. on the peninsula in January, 1978 and reacted critically to the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Joint Command the same year. North Korea concluded that U.S. claims of a troop reduction and eventual withdrawal amounted to a smokescreen tactic behind

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 3.

(4) *The Korea Times*, July 4, 1979.

(5) *The Korea Herald*, July 11, 1979.

(6) *U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea, op. cit.*, p. 9

which would occur a massive buildup in military sector other than ground troops, for the purposes of perpetuating the division of the peninsula and preparing an aggressive war effort.

A relentless drive calling for the total removal of "U.S. imperialist aggressors and their weapons of destruction" coincided with the period of controversy in South Korea and the U.S. over the projected troop withdrawal plan. Statements from nations sympathetic to North Korea were carried in *the Rodong Shinmun*.

Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng, Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, Japanese Socialist Party member Itzio Askada and Congo President Opango al made state visits in May 1978 to deplore the U.S. perpetuation of the division of the peninsula and to support the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.

According to statements in the Party organ *the Rodong Shinmun* the decision to freeze the troop withdrawal was seen by the North Korean authorities as a continuation of U.S. intervention in South Korean affairs, from military support to support of a suppressive puppet regime.

Upon U.S. President Carter's 1979 visit to South Korea, Pyongyang said through *the Rodong Shinmun* that they believed Carter never had any intention to withdraw troops.

A comment in *the Rodong Shinmun* in August, 1979, said the U.S. withdrawal plan reversal had resulted in strengthening South Korea, instigated Japan to build military links with South Korea and had been aimed at a triangular military alliance between the U.S., Japan and South Korea.

North Korea has maintained vehemently into 1980 that the U.S. presence should be removed altogether from the peninsula following the transformation of the Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty, and that North and South Korea alone should pursue unification.

2. The South Korean Reaction

The initial South Korean reaction to President Carter's proposed troop withdrawal plan was an objection to the fact that it had been a unilateral decision. Officials felt they should have been consulted. Cooperation on the matter has been stressed.

There is the desire for military self-sufficiency in South Korea, so compensation in other military sectors for the projected reduced ground forces was a major concern. Yet, as evidenced by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on July 21, 1979, to the effect that the suspension of the withdrawal plan could be regarded as a virtual nullification of it, the South Korean government felt the realistic approach would be to keep things as they were for the time being.

That the presence of the troops themselves was repeatedly cited as the single major deterrent to war on the peninsula shows concern that the balance of power was such that it could not be easily tampered with.

U.S. intelligence reassessed the balance of power on the peninsula in July, 1979, and determined President Carter's plan to be untimely. As Dr. Han Sung-joo has observed, the decision to withdraw troops had been taken by Carter under the influence of public sentiment after the Vietnam debacle, during an election campaign.

The projected troop withdrawal had caused great anxiety in South Korea. The process of revising and eventually freezing the removal of ground forces was very much favorable to south Korea.

The South Korean government raised annual military spending in 1980 by \$500 million, according to *the New York Times*. This and efforts, notably by President Park Chung-hee, in 1979 to have constructive, tension-relieving talks with North Korea followed the U.S. admi-

nistration's reversal on the troop withdrawal issue. Ruling and opposition party alike welcomed on July 22, 1979, the U.S. decision to freeze the withdrawal until 1981.

The U.S. gesture of concern and attention in redesignating the ROK-U.S. combined forces command as the Combined Field Army in 1980 was met with wide approval. The massive Team Spirit '80 combined maneuvers further elicited responses that the U.S. was showing an ever-stronger commitment to security on the peninsula.

Indications were that elements not only in South Korea but in Japan and other Asian countries began to question U.S. military strength and political will when the troop withdrawal plan was in effect from 1977 to 1979. The view from South Korea is that the communists in the North remain the unrepentant aggressors they were in 1950, when they invaded the South after the withdrawal of American troops in 1949. An active U.S. role in maintaining the equilibrium in the Northeast Asian region is still very much necessary.