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
ASIA'S SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR
TENSIONS, IDENTITY GAPS,
CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD
NORTH KOREA

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NEW THINKING ON DIPLOMACY
TOWARD NORTH KOREA

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental question about the purpose of diplomacy regarding North Korea has come into stark focus. For a time Park Geun-hye seemed to be redoubling her efforts to find a diplomatic path forward to the “*taebuk*,” which some translate as “jackpot” of reunification. These were accompanied by her “peace and security initiative,” proposed to diplomatic partners as a blueprint. However much it needed to be jointly clarified, for diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. position toward North Korea and, notably China, hardened. Its diplomacy over two decades toward North Korea was, arguably, directed mostly at China, but now doubts had increased that the limited cooperation realized in managing North Korea warranted efforts to find common ground with China on maritime disputes and on other tense questions, where U.S. allies and partners pressed for a more vigorous response. Meanwhile, attention continued to center on how Chinese thinking about diplomacy toward the North Korean challenge is evolving. While in the midst of the Ukraine crisis Russia is less willing to cooperate with the United States on North Korea and Japan has again put a spotlight on the abductions issue by resuming talks with North Korea after it allowed a meeting of Yokota Megumi’s parents with a granddaughter, whom they had never seen, the center of interest in diplomacy remains fixed on the Sino-Seoul-Washington triangle. Any genuine new diplomacy would require joint agreement among two or more of these countries that the time was ripe to proceed.

The three chapters of Section IV successively evaluate debates about how to deal with North Korea in Seoul, Washington, and Beijing. Shin-wha Lee explains that Park was faced with stark realities when she began her presidency at a low point in relations with Pyongyang, but at the beginning of 2014 when Kim Jong-un was appealing for creating an “atmosphere of reconciliation and unity” she had sought to reinvigorate her *trustpolitik* as a diplomatic strategy, aiming to promote a culture of regional cooperation. Mark Fitzpatrick emphatically acknowledges the growing danger from North Korea, but he concludes that diplomacy is not meaningless. It can limit the dangers, he says, in combination with other policy tools—deterrence, interdictions, and also sanctions. Zhu Feng also makes the case for diplomacy under troubled conditions. He sees a more proactive Chinese approach: irritated, quiet, and more interested in cooperation with South Korea and the United States; yet, hesitant to apply the pressure that would make a major difference. Zhu Feng makes it clear that China is in the driver’s seat as far as diplomacy is concerned: it has a strategy that prioritized North Korea as a buffer state and counted on economic transformation through integration with China’s economy, giving China the leverage to press for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After Jang Song-taek’s purge amid signs that the North is walking away from economic cooperation with China, it is not only worried that the economic strategy is failing, but that the denuclearization one is also failing.

These three chapters taken together allow us to consider the overlap and disconnect among the strategies of the three main actors in diplomacy with North Korea. Until the purge and execution of Jang, the impression in the U.S. is that Beijing was pursuing its own strategy with limited coordination with Seoul and Washington, although that had increased after the February 2013 third nuclear test by North Korea. There was enough encouragement and coordination for Barack Obama to agree to sustain his “strategic patience” and for Park Geun-hye to detect an opening to pursue her new *trustpolitik*. Yet, Beijing was disinclined

to apply the pressure that many observers deem essential for those strategies to work. For a time the situation in North Korea discouraged Beijing, giving it new incentive to expand diplomatic cooperation with the other two countries. For a time, Pyongyang had decided to be more forthcoming to Seoul, leading it to accelerate its diplomatic activities. There was willingness in Washington to continue a wait-and-see outlook with more active diplomacy likely as long as Seoul and, especially, Beijing saw hope ahead. Yet, by the spring of 2014, the atmosphere had changed. Pyongyang was more defiant. Beijing seemed to be less inclined to cooperate with Washington, as bilateral relations deteriorated. Seoul was under more pressure to tighten its alliance. Prospects for diplomacy had worsened.

The purpose of today's diplomacy, as has been the case for many years, is largely to find common ground with Beijing to achieve meaningful denuclearization, marked by a reduction of tensions with long-lasting promise. Seoul keeps adjusting its mix of carrots and sticks to encourage Pyongyang to turn in this direction, but, more likely, to assure Beijing that a new combination of pressure and incentives would not lead to regime collapse and a setback to China's geopolitical objectives. Washington has more skepticism, even if it sees little alternative to giving Beijing more time amidst the discomfort Beijing is showing over recent trends in North Korea. A glimmer of hope is seen in Beijing's attitude that it will not host Kim Jong-un or reward him without a commitment to denuclearization. Thus, closest attention centers on how Beijing will respond to the critical juncture before it. Zhu Feng describes its policy at present as giving North Korea the "cold shoulder." He suggests that Beijing will walk a fine line, not thoroughly changing its policy by cutting off supplies of oil or food, but distancing itself from Kim Jong-un, increasing diplomatic coordination with the other two states, and keeping some pressure on Pyongyang while awaiting its next steps. This is a formula for continued diplomacy, preparing for future provocative moves, but not for optimism that Seoul or Washington's diplomatic hopes should be raised very high. Beijing may lean toward closer coordination, but it will insist on setting the terms for diplomacy with the goal of restarting the Six-Party Talks on terms that will bring denuclearization back into the picture without allowing room for various other aspirations favored in Seoul and Washington to be easily realized.

Zhu Feng's relative optimism about Beijing's interest in new and coordinated policy toward North Korea appeared harder to sustain in the spring of 2014, as the Obama-Park summit intensified warnings to Pyongyang and was met with a vitriolic response. Sino-U.S. relations, and Obama, were putting increased pressure on Park to do things that were not welcome in Beijing. Prospects for new diplomacy were on hold, as observers anticipated a fourth nuclear test by North Korea. Even so, there have been so many ups and downs in diplomacy toward North Korea that reviewing the search for new diplomacy from 2013 under Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping, newly in power, as well as Barack Obama, deserves our attention.



South Korea's Search for a New Diplomatic Strategy Toward North Korea: Trustpolitik as a Goldilocks Approach?

Shin-wha Lee

With the North Korean nuclear threat still lingering, the international community's decades-long effort to bring about peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was in vain. Although there were only a few optimistic moments for establishing a peace regime on the peninsula, no such mechanism has been created thus far. The Six-Party Talks' last push for a permanent peace regime in late 2007, which was facilitated by the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Agreement, was as close as we could come. Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun's unreserved outreach to North Korea, and Lee Myung-bak's stern response to the North's nuclear program and provocations all proved to be fruitless to induce changes in North Korea. There seems to be no escape from the treacherous repetitive patterns in dealing with Pyongyang. This is the sobering legacy that Park Geun-hye inherited from her predecessors.

Park had to begin her presidency facing harsh realities. Even before she took office in late February 2013, North Korea launched a series of provocative actions: its third nuclear test, another missile test, withdrawal from the 1953 armistice and the non-aggression pact with the South, severance of the North-South military hotline, closure of the Kaeseong industrial complex, massive cyber-attacks, and numerous rhetorical threats. In September, the factories at Kaeseong restarted operations, and Pyongyang made several conciliatory gestures, including resumption of the reunion program for families separated by the Korean War amid talk of re-opening tours at Mt. Kumgang for South Koreans that stopped in 2008 when a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean soldier. However, the North abruptly canceled plans for the reunions, blaming the conservatives in the South for "throwing obstacles" in the inter-Korean reconciliatory process.¹ A more surprising development unfolded in early December 2013, when Jang Sung-taek, uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who was second-in-command, was suddenly arrested and later reportedly executed. The year ended with the lowest expectations for inter-Korean relations.

Beginning the year 2014, Kim Jong-un called for creating "an atmosphere of reconciliation and unity" on the peninsula. Seoul replied that it wanted to see action not rhetoric and stated that family reunions would be a first step for forging inter-Korean reconciliation.² On February 12, the first high-level talks in seven years were held at the truce village of Panmunjom, with family reunions, South Korea-U.S. military exercises, and tours of Mt. Kumgang on the agenda; however, Pyongyang demanded that Seoul postpone joint military drills with the United States as a precondition for the reunions. Seoul refused, claiming that the humanitarian agenda should not be linked to military issues. Later, both sides agreed that they would suspend hostile rhetoric toward each other and resume the reunions despite the upcoming joint exercise. Yet, on March 25, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles. It also harshly criticized Park's "Dresden Declaration" of March 28 on taking Germany's unity as an example and model for a peaceful reunification of the peninsula and laying the groundwork for reunification through economic and cultural exchanges and humanitarian aid as the "psychopath's daydream" and "bits of useless junk."³ Indeed, inter-Korean relations have long been a seesaw, with North Korea's repetitive cycle of provocations followed by weak international sanctions and its conciliatory initiatives that often ended abruptly with little progress.⁴

Despite the strained relationship with North Korea during the first months after her inauguration in 2013, Park pursued "Hanbando shinroe" (Korea Peninsula trust-building process), putting

emphasis on the importance of maintaining dialogue, honoring every promise that has already been made, and abiding by international norms. “Trustpolitik” is known to be an expression of Park’s philosophy based on historical experience that sustainable cooperation among states requires both trust and awareness of the realities of the peninsula and Northeast Asia. In addition, the “*Dongbuka pyonghwa gusang*” (Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: NAPCI) was proposed as a roadmap to carry out trustpolitik at the regional level and shift from current mistrust and rivalry driven by “Asia’s Paradox” (strengthening regional economic interdependence, which is offset by an escalation in territorial and historical disputes) into a new structure of trust-based cooperation and sustainable peace in the region.⁵ The Park administration has emphasized the difference between NAPCI and previous Northeast Asia initiatives that were proposed since President Roh Tae-woo in the late 1980s, stating that NAPCI intends to promote a culture of regional cooperation through building trust and aims to accumulate habits and practices of dialogue and cooperation starting with soft security issues.⁶

Park’s approach has induced no real change in de facto nuclear North Korea. In fact, the North’s pacifying gestures in 2014 (although it still fired missiles and slammed Park’s reunification speech in March) compared to 2013 seem not to be drawn from Park’s “resolute and principled” management, but are more closely related to the North Korean domestic situation. In 2013, the second year of his reign, Kim Jong-un seemed to be desperate to achieve real discernible results so as to legitimize the third generation of the Kim family’s dynastic rule. Because of this internal situation, Park had difficulties in pursuing her North Korean policy. As quoted in a *Daily NK* interview with a North Korean expert, “North Korea may respond better to South Korean policy changes in 2014 as it aims to improve relations with the U.S. and China.”⁷ Recently, Pyongyang has pursued the strategy of “*Tongnam Tongmi*” (setting up a relationship with the United States through enhancing its relationship with South Korea) instead of the long-held strategy of “*Tongmi Bongnam*” (trying to set up a relationship with the United States while insulting and refusing a relationship with South Korea).⁸

Against this backdrop, this chapter evaluates Park’s North Korean policy through the lens of both checkered inter-Korean relations and complex regional settings. She advocated trustpolitik as an approach to assume “a tough line against North Korea sometimes, and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.” It has the appearance of a “Goldilocks approach,” a middle-of-the-road policy, taking no aggressive actions and not being too passive or too generous, which is similar to what many say about Obama’s foreign policy.⁹ Park’s administration appears to have taken lessons from ineffective policies of her predecessors, whether a progressive Sunshine Policy or Lee Myong-bak’s frosty responses to North Korea’s “bad behavior” which did not lead to peace and security on the peninsula.

After more than one year of promotional efforts, however, Park’s catchphrases of trustpolitik and NAPCI still suffer conceptual vagueness and lack tangible policy guidelines. The essence of trustpolitik is subject to some interpretation and criticism for not yet having much perceptible content. Also, Park’s Goldilocks approach is subject to criticism, as is Obama’s, as unable to take any decisive move in either direction. The challenging regional security situation limits Seoul’s strategic freedom of action, making its North Korean policy reactive, rather than proactive, and heavily affected by the great powers and Pyongyang’s precarious actions, which, as earlier in the nuclear crisis, often proved to be beyond a South Korean president’s grasp.¹⁰

TRUSTPOLITIK AS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND A POLICY TOOL

Since Park Geun-hye first introduced the basics of trustpolitik in her article in *Foreign Affairs*, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” in the fall of 2011, it has been perceived by many as a rather ambiguous policy concept.¹¹ With the launch of her regime, the South Korean foreign policy elite, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has been diligently explaining the meaning and significance of this concept and converting it into a workable policy platform, making ever more detailed policy explanations. According to Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, trustpolitik is a vision, philosophy, and policy by which South Korea, as a responsible middle power, can pursue the Korean Peninsula trust-building process and NAPCI.¹² This catchword appears to presuppose a philosophically driven policy initiative that is to encompass inter-Korean and regional affairs all together.

As the name itself suggests, “trust” is the core concept of trustpolitik. Nations, as individuals, need to trust each other in order to cooperate together. Though it may sound simple and almost self-evident, this is exactly where contending theoretical paradigms of international politics differ in their perspectives and prescriptions. Realists are inclined to see the notion of building trust among nations as either impossible or implausible, whereas liberals tend to embrace it as both feasible and desirable. Minister Yun argues that trustpolitik is “neither a utopian idealism that shies away from realpolitik nor a naïve political romanticism.”¹³

To those who advocate trustpolitik, Park’s North Korean policy is a reasonable combination of carrots and sticks. They evaluate the normalization of the Kaeseong industrial complex after a five-month shutdown by the North as a tangible outcome of Park’s new policy that sticks to a consistent stance, urging Pyongyang to respect international standards and norms and abide by its promises, or otherwise pay a penalty for broken promises, which is the key element of trustpolitik. It also demonstrates the possibility of a paradigm shift in inter-Korean relations because it marks the first time that Seoul has departed from its past practice of either easily accepting or helplessly enduring North Korea’s self-indulgent behavior. Meanwhile, Seoul’s decision to allow humanitarian assistance to North Korea via international organizations such as UNICEF is also in line with one of the central tenets of trustpolitik. The policy supports the provision of assistance to the most vulnerable North Koreans, such as infants and pregnant women, regardless of the political situation between the two Koreas.¹⁴

As far as the policy nametag is concerned, trustpolitik seems to echo Roh Tae-woo’s opportune and fairly effective stratagem of nordpolitik; however, the two initiatives are readily distinguishable. While nordpolitik mainly focused on geopolitically and diplomatically encircling North Korea by taking advantage of the dissolution of the communist bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, trustpolitik aims at laying a solid foundation for meaningful inter-Korean rapprochement as well as regional cooperation. Also, interestingly, there appears to be no geopolitical notion or regional focus in trustpolitik. Instead, it is to emphasize strong philosophical principles that demonstrate South Korea’s superior moral ground. This is quite a departure from her predecessors’ rather grandiose diplomatic slogans.

Table 1. Comparison of South Korea’s Successive Governments’ Regional Initiatives		
Presidents	Initiatives	Major Characteristics
Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)	Nordpolitik	Opening to the former communist countries and initiatives for inter-Korean reconciliation
Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)	Globalization	Advancing outreach to East Asia and the rest of the world, with aims to have a positive spillover effect on North Korea
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	East Asia Initiative	Taking initiative in the East Asian community building process (e.g. East Asia Vision Group, East Asia Study Group), seeking cooperation on traditional security issues, and employing a top-down approach based on political agreements between heads of states
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-008)	Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative	Establishing Northeast Asia security and economic communities that include regional cooperation on non-traditional security agendas, and seeking a “balancing” role in international relations in Northeast Asia.
Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012)	Creative, Pragmatic Diplomacy	Strengthening relations with key regional powers, promoting conditional engagement with North Korea, and enhancing Korea's role in the international community
Park Geun-hye (2013-present)	Trustpolitik; Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative	Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. Building trust between the two Koreas by striking a balance between sternness and flexibility, focusing on consistent international alliances against North Korea (especially for the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program), promoting a culture of regional cooperation grounded in trust, accumulating practices and habits of dialogue and cooperation starting with softer issues, and building trust through concrete cooperation projects

In retrospect, during the Cold War period, Korea tried to develop its strategic thought toward regionalism, although it was somewhat restrained and distorted. Based on the firm bilateral alliance structure with the United States, Korean diplomatic leverage and choices were limited in the region’s multilateral process. Its regional strategy was distorted to some extent because the primary objective of its foreign policy was to gain relative predominance over North Korea in ideological, political, diplomatic, and economic terms. Post-Cold War efforts of regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries have produced mixed outcomes, or what Park called “Asia’s paradox,” with growing economic interdependence but little political and security cooperation. This reflects the fact that the functionalist approach does

not work well in advancing the regional integration process in this region. Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun advocated “open regionalism,” assuring that Northeast Asian regional cooperation will not be exclusive and discriminatory against countries outside the region, but rather play a catalytic role for broader regional cooperation, which embraces the rest of the region.¹⁵ Yet, their respective regional strategies were considered to be an inward-looking protectionist approach in economic terms, as well as heavily associated with their North Korean policies.¹⁶

During Lee Myung-bak’s administration, dealing with U.S. attitudes toward multilateral initiatives such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which did not include the United States, was an arduous concern in strategic planning to develop regional cooperation. As Washington expressed its continued reservations about evolving East Asia regionalism, it was difficult for Seoul to disregard its views because of the geopolitical reality in and around the peninsula. Lee was eager to promote “greater Asian diplomacy,” through the expansion of an Asian cooperative network based on open regionalism. His pledge for reconciliation with Japan on the basis of trilateral cooperation involving the United States was an important step toward regional cooperation, although his proposal did not come to fruition. Lee’s so-called creative, pragmatic diplomacy gave priority to strengthening the U.S. strategic alliance, emphasizing its usefulness for Korea’s national interest, and his strategic thinking on regionalism could not be developed at the cost of Seoul’s relationship with Washington.¹⁷


In comparison, Park has sought a “G-2” strategy of balanced and harmonious relations with both the United States and China. While retaining South Korea’s traditional alliance, Park is attempting to develop a strategic partnership with China in dealing with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and trade. Her administration claims that successful summits with both countries were possible due to a mutual sense of trust between the leaders.¹⁸ How South Korea, a middle power, can position itself well to secure its national interests in the face of the rivalry between giant powers is a thorny task. As U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden in his visit to Korea in December 2013 stated, “Betting on the opposite side of the United States would not be a great bet.” Noticing Seoul’s growing ties with Beijing, he may be reminding the Park administration that it wants Korea’s support in Washington’s rebalancing foreign policy.¹⁹ Given this reality, Park’s NAPCI attempts to reflect on the lessons learned from the previous administrations’ struggles for regional initiatives by emphasizing the importance of making cooperation projects and dialogues executable and achievable.²⁰

As for the perception of Pyongyang toward South Korean presidents, it seems to have been less critical of Park than Lee. According to a preliminary study on North Korea’s media content by Martin Weiser,²¹ peaks in references to Lee in March and July/August 2012 coincided with military exercises that began in March and August and the celebration of the end of the Korean War. Despite the fierce rhetoric in the spring of 2013 and the numerous references to the Korean War in August, references to Park remained less frequent. This trend in the coverage of South Korean presidents started in mid-2012, before Park took office, and might point at North Korea’s willingness to engage the South after only a few months of vitriol following the death of Kim Jong-il. This shows that the third nuclear crisis was linked by North Korea more to the United States while paying less attention to Seoul for a stern response by the UN. Still, North Korea closed the Kaeseong complex at the beginning of April, not long after the war rhetoric rose sharply in March (See Figure 1).

North Korean media paid virtually no attention to Park after her inauguration in February 2013 and started to mention her more frequently only in the cabinet's newspaper *Minju Choson* in June and July, dropping again in August. *Rodong Sinmun*, which has a broader domestic audience as the party's newspaper, included surprisingly few references to her. Having criticized Lee immediately after his election, it took a "wait and see" attitude in the case of Park. As South Korean-U.S.-Japanese joint naval drills involving a U.S. aircraft carrier in South Korean waters heightened tensions with North Korea in October, references to Park increased; however, Pyongyang clearly was less critical of her (See Figure 1).

This lesser attention given to Park in North Korean media may not be a surprise, given the fact that Lee clearly took a harder line with the North, a policy the United States supported at that time, and given Park's "middle of the road policy." Yet, Pyongyang's response has been less unforgiving even when Park clearly rejected the North's requests, such as holding the family reunions only after cancelling the Foal Eagle exercises. Arguably, Pyongyang's reaction to Park is somewhat related to North Korea's memory of her father Park Chung-hee's statement of July 4, 1970 that led to an agreement with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, grandfather of Kim Jong-un, as well as to her 2002 visit to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-il, father of Kim Jong-un. In addition, after a series of violent provocations and threats until the first half of 2013, Pyongyang seemed to employ conciliatory gestures and policies in order to go forward with diplomatic engagement with Seoul, and ultimately with Washington, which is known as the policy of "Tongnam Tongmi." In February 2014, the two Koreas held reunions of families separated by the Korean War, despite the Korea-U.S. joint military exercise. Initially, the North demanded a delay in joint military drills until after the reunion finished, but the South refused and, in a very rare concession, the North agreed to hold the family reunions as scheduled. This raised hopes for improved inter-Korean relations, but Pyongyang has increased tensions again by testing short-range ballistic missiles and rockets and rejected Seoul's proposal to hold Red Cross talks to discuss arranging more

Figure 1. North Korean Media Analysis: References to South Korean Presidents (Jan 2012 to Nov 2013)



family reunions in March. Recently, the North Korean media have also noticeably raised its criticism against Park, particularly in the wake of the Foal Eagle exercise, a two-month long Korea-U.S. joint military drill aimed at improving combat readiness against North Korea, and Parks' Dresden Proposal.

In brief, trustpolitik, whether as Park's overarching political philosophy or as a policy tool that is applicable both to inter-Korean relations and international diplomacy, is based on the hope of establishing a community in which members feel a sense of trustworthiness with each other. In implementing trustpolitik since she came to office, Park has diligently explained her political viewpoint related to NAPCI to other countries. She claimed that the trust-building process on the peninsula and NAPCI are mutually reinforcing since the regional objectives of peaceful cooperation are to increase common interest and trust between the states involved, to offer opportunities for sustained dialogue and shared norms to facilitate one country's understanding of and predictability about another state's actions, and ultimately to foster a favorable environment for peaceful unification of the two Koreas. NAPCI is also considered a useful means to indirectly send a strong message to North Korea that the international community will respond to any military provocation.²²

Still, the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia remains. As the existing bilateral security system is pivotal to regional peace and stability, the multilateral regional security system should serve as a complement to the current bilateral structure. Given a clear lack of inter-state trust due to historical animosity, geopolitical complexity, and competitive military build-ups, Park's emphasis on trust among nations is not only pertinent but also imperative to regional peace and security. However, given the realist assumption that nations have no eternal friends or enemies but only have permanent national interests in international relations, promoting a regional sense of sustainable trust among states, as well as managing inter-Korean relations based on trust, sounds both naïve and unfeasible. In an opinion poll in February 2014, 71.3 percent of 150 experts on diplomacy and security who responded to the survey said the Korean Peninsula trust-building process has no practical effect.²³

Park in her NAPCI called for the promotion of multilateral cooperation that begins with less controversial regional common interests such as environmental problems, cross-border crimes, and anti-terrorism. The main objective of NAPCI is to increase the habit of dialogue and cooperation in these soft security sectors, which, in turn, would generate a spillover effect to more sensitive issues such as arms control, alliances, and historical and territorial disputes. Yet, critics argue that it is just an ambiguous goal that lacks concrete and practical ways of implementation.²⁴ Furthermore, a functionalist approach envisioned in NAPCI appears to not be effective in the case of Northeast Asia, where geopolitical complications and urgency prevail, as shown in ongoing Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese bilateral tensions that have frustrated trilateral meetings. Strengthening cooperation on softer issues has not effectively generated necessary conditions for regional peace and security. Rather, tensions over "harder" political and military issues have disturbed inter-state functional cooperation already under way. Therefore, confidence-building measures on hard issues through a political breakthrough at the highest level are urgently required to regain a sense of momentum in support of bilateral and multilateral dialogue in the region.

CHALLENGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The world has witnessed a power shift in a changing world order, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis. Northeast Asia seems to be at the forefront of the transition. China's rising economic power is being rapidly converted to formidable military capabilities and diplomatic influence. Japan's push for achieving a normal state is already causing increased friction among the countries in the region. U.S. supremacy in the region is increasingly questionable despite the American diplomatic and military rebalancing to Asia.²⁵ The economic worries may, to some degree, be fading away, but the geopolitical challenges are intensifying.²⁶ In South Korea's North Korean policy and regional diplomacy, the complex and uncertain regional background needs to be carefully considered.

North Korea: Oscillating Behavior Increases Uncertainty

Since the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there has been an apparent lack of consistency in North Korea's behavior, recently even less predictable and more puzzling than usual. Last year it took a series of provocative actions and then suddenly went on a "peace offensive." The periodic ups and downs in its rhetoric are now too frequent to discern what it wants, let alone what it truly intends to do. Back in February 2012, there was cautious expectation that the long overdue promises at the Six-Party Talks might be fulfilled step-by-step if the process resumed, as the "Leap Day" deal was reached between the United States and North Korea. North Korea had pledged to allow the IAEA inspectors to assess and monitor the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and suspend nuclear tests as well as long-range missile launches in return for significant U.S. "nutritional assistance."²⁷ However, the deal was soon nullified by the North's declaration that it would test a "satellite launch vehicle," (SLV), then the actual, if failed, launch, and later a more successful December launch. In February 2013, just a week before Park's inauguration, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. Perhaps emboldened, Pyongyang threatened nuclear war with not only South Korea but also Japan and the United States. Pyongyang appears not to have the capability to actually carry out an attack on the United States, although it threatened to conduct a preemptive attack against it and South Korea in response to the two allies' agreement of October 2013 on a new strategy for deterring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strikes by North Korea.²⁸ Taking a more positive approach, from July 2013, North Korea appeared conciliatory for a time before turning more belligerent again.

What caused North Korea to zigzag? 1) China's persuasion and pressure? 2) North Korea's own economic necessity? or 3) Kim Jong-un regime's internal power struggle? All three causes are intertwined to make coherent policy implementation more difficult. As evidence of the third argument, one need only cite the shocking news of Jang Sung-taek's purge, in the aftermath of which, the domestic political situation appears even more complex and uncertain. Now North Korea is tightening control over the deeply troubled population because it senses that sympathy for Jang would endanger the regime. Mobilization to denounce Jang's crimes reportedly took place nationwide. On the one hand, Kim Jong-un has frequently visited military installations to show off his strong grip on the military. On the other, Jang's personal network—including his relatives and subordinates in the

party, the cabinet, and affiliated agencies—was arrested. Those in overseas missions were summoned back—all subject to varying severity of punishment from execution to imprisonment, depending on their degree of intimacy with Jang. These developments are indicative of North Korea’s political instability.

In the midst of this purge, Pyongyang relaunched its “peace offensive.” Starting from the New Year’s message, it removed harsh elements from its rhetoric and called for improving inter-Korean relations and reciprocally stopping slander and mudslinging. Since Pyongyang’s “soft” gestures have often been followed by major provocations, discussion about how Seoul should respond was cautious. The North’s tactics appeared to be an attempt to soften its negative image in the United States and elsewhere.²⁹ Seen in the context of its prior zigzag behavior, the pattern of provocation followed by conciliation is nothing new.

Recent Trends among the Surrounding Great Powers

There is widespread skepticism among U.S. policy elites about North Korea’s credibility after its abrogation of the “Leap Day” deal and the execution of Jang Sung-taek. Few think that conditions are ripe for the resumption of denuclearization talks with North Korea, let alone for its strategic turnabout. The United States will likely continue to put pressure on the North over the nuclear issue while trying to induce China to play a constructive role.³⁰ Though it is difficult to determine whether Kim Jong-un’s power basis has solidified, the United States continues to keep its eye on the possibility of new North Korean provocations, even as there is mounting impatience for action both in the United States and from its partners in the region.

There is little chance for any U.S. reengagement in bilateral direct negotiations with the North to succeed. After past failed bilateral attempts, it prefers multilateral negotiations. Therefore, it is crucial for Park to strengthen policy coordination with Washington and seek together to develop principles for a multilateral approach. She can be confident now that Washington will not give Pyongyang the impression that it can take advantage of occasional bilateral contacts with the United States to try to drive a wedge between Seoul and it, as was the case at the time of the South Korea-U.S. perception gap (and thus policy gap) over North Korea under South Korea’s progressive governments.³¹

As for China, Beijing is inclined to see the purge of Jang Sung-taek as an internal problem and take a “business as usual” position. Yet, Sino-North Korean economic cooperation is troubled because many Chinese investors reportedly feel uneasy about their prospects since many of their North Korean counterparts—mostly Jang’s surrogates—were either purged or replaced.³² Also, Beijing seems noticeably irritated with recent developments, wary of losing its leverage over the Pyongyang regime. Over the past few years, China’s awareness of North Korean affairs, especially internal political dynamics, has been found to be deficient, lacking high-level channels with the leadership in Pyongyang.³³ While it is clear that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang wants to damage their traditional relations, the former considers it essential for the latter not to engage in belligerent behavior and worries about the immature nature and unpredictability of Kim Jong-un. Though China expects Kim to stay in power for the foreseeable future, it also predicts a certain degree of political and socio-economic instability to ensue over the course of his power consolidation. Mending relations depends not only on whether Pyongyang exercises self-restraint, but also on how quickly and smoothly Kim finishes the “house-cleaning” within his leadership.

Outside observers are closely observing the following issues in North Korea-China relations: a Kim Jong-un visit to China, North Korean nuclear and missile tests, North Korea's border control with China, the PLA's movements in the vicinity of the border area, Sino-North Korean economic cooperation activities, and Beijing's strategic calculations about Pyongyang. Kim will eventually visit China in restoring the traditional comradeship with his country's only ally in the region, but North Korea is not expected to abandon its tandem strategy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear armaments and economic revitalization under his monolithic leadership.³⁴ It is, thus, important for Park to continue to keep warm ties with Xi Jinping, coordinating her North Korean policy with him, as well as to urge China, as North Korea's major sponsor, to play a greater role in solving the nuclear issue and involving the international community.

From Japan's perspective, North Korea will experience political instability for some time due to Kim Jong-un's unfinished power consolidation, his arbitrary decision-making style, and the apathetic attitude of his senior subordinates, who are now instinctively preoccupied with self-preservation. At present, there is no reason to believe that Japan has changed its policy, which basically aims to comprehensively resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile problems, as well as the abduction issue by maintaining sanctions and allowing for dialogue. Nevertheless, politicians in Tokyo, especially Abe and those around him, may hope to quickly settle the abduction issue rather than merely participating in the painstakingly slow multilateral process to produce a comprehensive resolution since he pledged to solve it during his term in office. It cannot be ruled out that Japan could try to strike a deal if it were to directly reengage with the Kim Jong-un regime. Abe sent Iijima Isao, a special advisor to the Cabinet Secretary, to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue with Kim Yong Nam without careful prior policy consultations with the other Six-Party Talks partners. This visit concerned both Seoul and Washington since any sudden progress in a Pyongyang-Tokyo dialogue would be at odds with the close trilateral coordination on the North Korean issue they have sought. Tokyo's uncoordinated, unilateral approach undercuts hope of making a breakthrough in the dormant Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North Korea. The Korean Foreign Ministry openly stated that Iijima's visit was "unhelpful."³⁵

Japan's bilateral ties with South Korea and China, respectively, have been strained by the Abe administration's increasingly aggressive and nationalistic posture on historical and territorial issues. Abe's comments about Japan becoming a "normal state," changing its peace Constitution, and revising two standing apologies to its neighbors (the Kono and Murayama statements) undermine Japan's standing in the region.³⁶ The United States is concerned about the escalating tension between its major allies. North Korea is predictably tempted to take advantage of Japan's unilateral approach in order to drive a wedge between it and its allies. Close consultations with the United States are necessary to urge Japan not to act unilaterally.

As for Russia, Putin's absolute power and keen interest in the development of the Russian Far East have not only put a spotlight on a strategic approach to Pyongyang, but also have led to the pursuit of joint business opportunities in North Korea. Even after Jang's purge, there is no significant sign of a setback to bilateral economic cooperation with North Korea, and Pyongyang reportedly reaffirmed that Russian partners' investments, including those in the Rajin-Khasan joint logistics venture, will not be affected. Although Russian observers say that Kim Jong-un needs more time to complete large-scale follow-up purges and generational

changes in the party, government, and the military, they are positive about the survival of his regime and the health of the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Russia.³⁷ Since North Korea is likely to increase contacts with the Russian side in order to reconfigure the old northern triangle of North Korea, China, and Russia, there is a possibility of a Kim visit to Russia for a summit with Putin, should he find it difficult to visit Beijing first. Therefore, it is essential for Park to include Russia in her Northeast Asian regional strategy to address North Korean questions, whether nuclear threats, humanitarian issues, or economic reforms.

TRUSTPOLITIK AS A WORKABLE GOLDILOCKS STRATEGY: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Through the catchword *trustpolitik*, Park has repeatedly expressed her desire to engage in the “peace process” for improving inter-Korean affairs, an operable manifestation of *trustpolitik*, which underscores South Korea’s proactive diplomatic initiatives to create favorable external conditions as a crucial prerequisite. *Trustpolitik* can be both a means to achieve peace and security on the peninsula and an end goal to be fulfilled by the peace process. The Park administration also claims that whereas the policies of past governments have gone from one extreme to another, her strategy is a policy of alignment, i.e., neither a coercive policy nor an appeasement policy, but rather an effective and balanced combination of contending or competing policy options, such as inter-Korean and foreign relations, pressure and dialogue, and deterrence and cooperation, while separating humanitarian issues from those related to politics and security.

With the possibility of increasing uncertainty and unrest in North Korea in recent months, questions have been raised about South Korea’s preparedness for contingency scenarios that could include regime change. There have been lots of predictions about political instability and regime collapse over the last 20 years, generating plans like CONPLAN 5029, a military contingency plan drafted by South Korea and the United States in 1999 for responding to sudden change, which was finally developed into an operational plan in 2009.³⁸

Given geostrategic circumstances surrounding the peninsula and the unique resilience of the North Korean leadership,³⁹ sudden collapse is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but there has been much speculation about how the Kim Jung-un regime would collapse.⁴⁰ In this regards, there has been more discussion about how to prepare for it instead of mere predictions about the collapse itself.⁴¹ During her New Year press conference on January 6, 2014, Park mentioned “*tongil daebak*” (unification being the jackpot), which generated a hot debate over whether it would be a jackpot or crackpot. Due to the enormous economic burden (“*tongil biyong*” unification costs), a growing number of South Koreans have begun to consider this long-desired prospect as not only improbable, but also undesirable. Others claim that “*bundan biyong*” (division costs) are equally exorbitant, if not greater, because North Korea’s perilous and unpredictable actions have often generated a “Korea discount” in the global market and hurt South Korea’s overall image in the international community. Ordinary South Korean citizens also do not wish to tolerate any longer the uncertain environment arising from the North’s provocations. Meanwhile, Pyongyang charged that Park’s comment was “fueled by delusions about unification by absorption.”⁴²

Considering that the ultimate objective of Park's peace process and trustpolitik is peaceful unification that would be "*daebak*" not only for the Koreans but for all of Northeast Asia, as she said in Davos in late January, there is reason to pursue new approaches to North Korea. First, the South's strategic communications and policy coordination with the United States and China are important to prepare for possible scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. For this, information sharing with these states and international consensus on handling unstable situations are desirable, deepening the '2+2' information-sharing formula between South Korean and U.S. diplomatic and military authorities and more actively consulting with the epistemic community at the regional level in analyzing North Korea's power restructuring trends and developing indicators for measuring its instability would be instrumental.

Second, independent of North Korea's nuclear crisis, its human rights problems and humanitarian crisis such as food shortages, political prisoners' camps, and refugee issues should be continually addressed on the international stage. The Park administration needs to develop strategies for how to take full advantage of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, which released its report about "unspeakable atrocities" committed in the country and called for the international community's responsibility to protect the North Korean people from crimes against humanity,⁴³ the United Nation's Human Rights resolution targeting the North Korean regime, and other international human rights NGO activities. Third, the administration should seek ways to effectively build an international consensus for the eventual unification of the two Koreas. Employing various Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 approaches is necessary, although, using direct government channels with China requires caution. During 2013, Park had a total of 27 summit meetings, including the ones with four great powers, and foreign ministers' meetings were more frequent. It is important to develop follow-up measures based on Park's linkage of trustpolitik and the peace process to NAPCI.

What I call Park's "middle of the road policy" needs to be reconsidered for its effectiveness. If her North Korean policy takes the safe road of not rocking the boat, she needs to face criticism, as Obama has, of being too wary and ineffectual in forging a breakthrough for rocky inter-Korean relations. A step-by-step approach towards developing the Goldilocks diplomatic strategy in the short and long-term should be clearly presented. The short-term should be a stepping-stone approach. In retrospect, there has been a plethora of ambitious and grandiose rhetoric in dealing with North Korean problems. To be fair, previous administrations in South Korea and the United States alike made considerable efforts to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea. However, with a lack of clear understanding about the desirable end state on the Korean Peninsula and the methodology to arrive there, they hastily attempted a variety of "comprehensive solutions." For instance, the George W. Bush administration proclaimed it was ready to take a "bold approach" to meet what it considered to be Pyongyang's needs, including negative security assurance and economic incentives in exchange for North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons programs in a comprehensive fashion. Policy makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington each had their own initiatives, which were varied in name but not-so-different in essence—a "package deal."

Roh Moo-hyun's "peace regime" and Bush's "complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization" (CVID) are well-known examples. Although the merits of such deals should not be ignored, North Korea's notorious "salami tactics" proved to be particularly tricky to overcome. The Lee government's "Vision 3000" was not so different in this regard.

When the decades-long effort turned out to be a series of failures, it was clear to everyone that a major paradigm shift or a “game changer” in dealing with the North was absolutely necessary. Park’s trustpolitik strives to avoid this past pattern.

Longer term planning should be related to preparation for unification, building an international consensus for this. North Korean refugees and humanitarian issues should not be put aside. South Korean decision makers may have to reconsider their previous “low profile” approach to these issues. South Korea can take valuable lessons from German unification, where the East German government did not merely change, it collapsed completely from within. Purely in order to ease the suffering of partition, the two sides negotiated with one another. They did not cooperate with one another, though the West was a dialogue partner for the East. Similarly, as reconciliation with the North Korean dictatorship proceeds, a regime that gravely represses its people must not be a collaborative partner. A national coalition cannot be formed between a free market system and a dictatorship that, at least on the outside, calls itself socialist. A unification strategy must be formed from this perspective. In educating young South Koreans about unification, the Park administration must acknowledge that the regime of Kim Jong-un does not represent the will of the North Korean people. They are taking the people hostage, and are not to be viewed as a party for cooperation. In this way, the next generation will take an interest in North Korean human rights and democratization.

CONCLUSION

When new South Korean presidents are elected, it has been common for North Korea to make threats and provocations as it tests the new administration, but eventually the North takes conciliatory measures that can easily turn into another round of hostile acts. The Park administration has been prepared with a sustainable and resilient policy, both in its direct dealings with the North and in its close consultations with the international community. Nearly all previous efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea have failed to achieve meaningful accomplishments because Seoul had adhered to a negotiating principle of reaching a collective, comprehensive, and grand bargain, that was countered by North Korea’s salami tactics and other strategies to stall progress. Learning from these experiences, Park has been trying to build trust between the two Koreas, but with Pyongyang’s continuous provocations, her approach has not been successful in achieving its objectives.⁴⁴

It is therefore better to strive for small but meaningful results in the short term, while also building on these achievements to move forward towards the ultimate goal in the mid to long term. In order to cultivate an environment for unification, Seoul needs to concentrate on cooperating with the international community and building global consensus and support for unification, while simultaneously dealing with issues in North Korea, not only traditional military issues, but also human rights and humanitarian assistance.

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What to Do about North Korea

Mark Fitzpatrick

North Korea is the world's most troublesome country, brutal at home and a bully abroad. In 2013 it became even more dangerous, both to its neighbors and to its own people. Most worrisome are the nuclear weapons that Pyongyang sees as vital for the preservation of the regime. Although North Korea seems intent on never trading them away for economic or political benefits, this does not mean that diplomacy is meaningless. In combination with deterrence, interdictions, sanctions, and other policy tools, engagement can seek to limit the dangers. The policy options for the United States are not new; nearly every policy choice short of military preemption has already been tried. What is changed is the set of unfavorable circumstances faced by Pyongyang: a pervasive market economy, an increasing flow of outside information, widespread corruption, and the exposure of internal divisions that reached to the leader's own relatives. Pressure on Pyongyang that sharpens its policy choices also serves a longer-term goal of hastening internal change that can lead to unification.

A DANGEROUS REGIME

The external threats posed by North Korea include progress in both the plutonium and uranium paths to a nuclear weapon. Whether the DPRK has "smaller, diversified and precision nuclear weapons," as claimed,¹ cannot be confirmed. Nor is it known whether the February 12, 2013 test, North Korea's third since 2006, was based on plutonium, as were the other two, or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The radioactive isotopes collected in Japan two months later had decayed too much to allow a determination. But each test brings Pyongyang closer to having a deliverable nuclear weapon.

The North's current plutonium holdings are sufficient for no more than about ten weapons. The 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon which produced that plutonium before it was partially disabled in 2007 appears to have been restarted in the autumn of 2013, although North Korea has not yet announced this. Resumption of reactor operations will enable it to annually add one to two weapons' worth of plutonium to that stockpile, beginning in two to three years when the fuel load is discharged, cooled, and then reprocessed. The facility for producing enriched uranium appears to have doubled in size, based on overhead imagery of the roof, and new activity is underway on other probable nuclear-related facilities at the sprawling Yongbyon complex.² Construction of an experimental light-water reactor may be completed by the end of 2014 or early 2015, giving North Korea another means of producing plutonium for two or three weapons a year, although the main purpose is probably electricity generation since the plutonium from such reactors is not ideal for weapons use. In the summer and autumn, excavation work and two new tunnel entrances were observed at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.³ In late March 2014, North Korea threatened to carry out a "new form" of nuclear test.⁴

Giving legal and political weight to the nuclear weapons program, meetings of the Workers' Party and Supreme People's Assembly in March and April 2013 decided that nuclear weapons possession should be a matter of law and never traded away, and that the nuclear and missile programs should be pursued simultaneously with economic development, a policy known as the "byungjin (progress in tandem) line." During the spring 2013 escalation of tension following the UN Security Council's response to the third nuclear test, North Korea threatened a "pre-emptive nuclear strike" on the United States and released YouTube

clips depicting attacks on the White House and New York City, the latter copied from a video game. To drive home the point, North Korea released a staged photograph of leader Kim Jong-un in a command center-like setting with a map supposedly showing target sites for a missile strike on various cities in the continental United States.

North Korea has no missiles capable of hitting the American homeland, though it is working toward this goal. The longest-range missile of known reliability, the Nodong; can reach about 900 km with a 1,000 kg warhead. A Nodong variant that was displayed in a 2010 parade and has striking similarities to the Iranian Ghadr-1 might extend that reach to 1,600 km, but the operational status of this system is unclear. North Korea has also displayed apparent mock-ups of two longer-range missiles that it has never tested. In April 2013, it deployed two road-mobile Musudan missiles to the East Coast, but whether it ever intended to test them or only to use them for political signaling is unclear. The United States estimates that the Musudan has a potential range of 4,000 km, which would put Guam in reach. The maximum range, however, may be closer to the 2,400 km of the Soviet R-27 system on which it was apparently based.⁵

Prototypes of another road-mobile system, designated Hwasong-13 by North Korea and KN-08 by the U.S. military, were paraded in April 2012 and July 2013. The U.S. Department of Defense assesses that they have a range of more than 5,500 km and would be capable of hitting much of the continental United States “if successfully designed and developed” but notes that, like the Musudan, their current reliability is low because they have not been flight-tested.⁶ Non-governmental Western experts are divided as to whether the mock-ups represent real systems. Germans Marcus Schiller and Robert Schmucker believe the systems displayed are technically infeasible.⁷ Americans Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling contend that the mock-ups are consistent with a development program for an intercontinental ballistic missile and argue that the space launch that North Korea successfully carried out in December 2012 was almost as technically challenging as an ICBM launch.⁸ The 100-kg satellite put into (dysfunctional) orbit by the three-stage Unha-3 is ten times lighter than a nuclear warhead, and the space launch did not test atmospheric re-entry. Until North Korea successfully tests re-entry of a dummy nuclear warhead, it can be argued that it does not have a reliable nuclear strike capability. Lewis cautions analysts not to be too sanguine on this point, noting that China tested a missile-delivered warhead in 1966 with its fourth test and ultimately solved engineering challenges related to re-entry vehicles for intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1980.⁹ Further missile developments can be expected in 2014, drawing on the successful Unha-3 launch and the reports of five static engine tests in 2013, which might have been for the Hwasong-13, although this is unknowable.¹⁰ The main launch site at Sohae has been expanded to allow for launches of rockets almost 70 percent longer than the Unha-3.¹¹

North Korea’s missile systems can also be used to deliver chemical weapons far afield, although artillery is a more effective means of chemical warfare. With Syria’s decision in 2013 to give up its chemical weapons, North Korea became the only country presumed to have an active chemical weapons program. Testimony from defectors and other evidence give South Korea reason to estimate that the North has 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical agents,¹² which would be two to four times the size of Syria’s former stockpile. North Korea’s chemical weapons are thought to include sulfur mustard, chlorine, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents.¹³ Over the past

decade there have been several unconfirmed reports of North Korean assistance to Syria's chemical weapons program,¹⁴ which came close to being corroborated in April 2013 when Turkey detained a Liberian vessel en route to Syria from North Korea that was found to be carrying a number of gas masks in addition to small arms and ammunition.¹⁵

North Korea had also assisted Syria's misbegotten pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, an effort that was abruptly halted in September 2007 by Israel's bombing of the plutonium-production reactor at Al Kibar. North Korea may also have cooperated with Iran's illicit nuclear program, although the evidence remains too sketchy to allow conclusions to be drawn.¹⁶ Similarly, there was reason to believe that North Korea may have been engaged in nuclear cooperation with Burma; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said as much in an interview in 2009.¹⁷ Whatever assistance North Korea was providing to it in the nuclear and missile field has apparently ceased as a result of Burma's move away from authoritarianism and toward engagement with the United States and other Western countries. The drying up of North Korea's markets for unconventional weapons sales is one of the bright spots in an assessment of the troubles the North poses.

North Korea does continue, however, to sell conventional weapons in contravention of Security Council resolutions. Panama's seizure of the Chong Chon Gang in July 2013 provided graphic proof of North Korea's determination to continue such sales. This is no wonder. Military goods are among the few areas in which North Korea has a competitive advantage; it is thought to have netted \$100 million or more a year from such sales.¹⁸

Cyber warfare is another area in which North Korea poses security threats. It is strongly suspected of launching cyber attacks against South Korean television stations and banks in March 2013, similar to earlier massive denial-of-service attacks in 2011 and 2009. North Korea is reported to have a 3,000-person cyber army. The hermit nation has an asymmetric advantage in the cyber realm because its governmental and military infrastructure relies on computer systems to only a limited degree.

North Korea's troublesome behavior toward the South in 2013 included diatribes against President Park Geun-hye and threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. In April that year, North Korea abruptly withdrew workers from the Kaesong Joint Industrial Zone, halting for five months the most promising form of inter-Korea interaction. Just as Kaesong was coming back on line on a reduced scale, the North abruptly refused to permit North-South divided family reunions at the height of the Chuseok harvest festival holiday. A reunion event was allowed in February 2014, but North Korea refused to regularize such meetings.

North Korea found still other ways to pose problems internationally. In April 2013, it sentenced naturalized U.S. citizen and Christian missionary Kenneth Bae to 15 years of hard labor for unspecified "hostile acts" while he was visiting as a tourist the previous year. U.S. efforts to win Bae's release were rebuffed in August when a State Department official was disinclined at the last minute, while Kim Jong-un instead entertained the flamboyant former U.S. professional basketball player Dennis Rodman.¹⁹ In October, Merrill Newman, an 85-year old U.S. Korean War veteran, was pulled off an airplane as he was about to depart Pyongyang after a ten-day tourist visit. He was held for a month until he confessed to killing North Korean soldiers and civilians 60 years earlier. In January 2014, Bae was put before

a ‘press conference’ in Pyongyang at which he confessed to unspecified “anti-government” acts and asked for U.S. government help to win his release. The staged event appeared to be North Korea’s way of seeking U.S. engagement.²⁰

Even worse than the dangers that North Korea presents externally are the crimes the regime commits against its own people. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay last year noted that North Korea’s deplorable human rights situation “has no parallel anywhere in the world.”²¹ In view of this deplorable picture, last March the UN Human Rights Council established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations. After a year-long investigation, including interviewing over 320 victims and witnesses, the Commission on February 17, 2014, released a report which concluded that the systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations constituted crimes against humanity. Documenting in great detail the “unspeakable atrocities” committed in the DPRK, the report said these crimes “entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.” Implying that Kim Jong-un and others should be held accountable, the Commission noted that the main perpetrators are officials “who are acting under the effective control of the central organs of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the National Defence Commission and the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The headline recommendation was that these issues should be referred to the International Criminal Court for action.²²

Hopes that the Swiss-educated young leader would bring North Korea closer to international norms were dashed when the world saw how he dealt with his uncle and former regent, Jang Song-taek, who apparently got caught on the wrong side of a struggle over control of resources. Jang’s summary execution showed the young leader to lead in the style not of Gorbachev but of Stalin. “Kim Jong-Un has picked up where his father and grandfather left off, by overseeing a system of public executions, extensive political prison camps, and brutal forced labor,” commented Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.²³

POLICY CONUNDRUM

In the quarter century since North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons became apparent, the United States has tried every possible policy response, save one. There has been engagement bilaterally and multilaterally, with talks variously involving three parties, four parties, six parties, and eight parties. Sanctions of all forms have been applied. Policies of inducement, concessions, disengagement, and threats have all had their day. Lack of consistency can be faulted, but not lack of imagination. Nothing has persuaded North Korea to desist from its nuclear pursuit. Temporary diplomatic successes, the best of them being the 1994 Agreed Framework, have all been reversed through North Korean reneging.²⁴

The one option that has not been applied, military intervention, has been kept on the shelf for fear of sparking a repeat of the devastation of the 1950-1953 Korean War. Despite atrocious provocations over the years, North Korea has remained immune from U.S. military reprisal because its artillery held Seoul hostage. The nuclear weapons that may now accompany the conventional artillery reinforce the case for caution but do not account

for the reason Pyongyang is not attacked. The reason, rather, is geography. Although a U.S. military strike against North Korea remains an ever-present deterrent, the United States has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with either nuclear or conventional weapons, as it put in writing in September 2005.²⁵

In December 2009, after visiting Pyongyang in the Obama administration's first high-level contact with the nation, Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Steven Bosworth told reporters "this may be the time to exercise strategic patience."²⁶ Bosworth's catchphrase has characterized U.S. policy ever since, though U.S. officials say it is not strictly accurate. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel explained in answer to a question about strategic patience posed at an event at Chatham House in January:

...our strategy is not to succumb to impatience. Our strategy is to maintain a very solid grasp on the things that we do control and where we do have an ability both to shape North Korea's choices but also to avoid repeating chronic mistakes that we have, frankly, made in the past. The essence of those mistakes was to put hope over evidence – the hope that this time maybe North Korea would mean it...²⁷

To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Obama administration is determined not to return to any negotiating table with North Korea until it takes actions to demonstrate a commitment to denuclearization. Pyongyang's statements instead signal the opposite intention: to talk to the United States as an equal nuclear-armed state and not to give up its nuclear weapons until the United States does likewise.²⁸ Angered by the speed with which Pyongyang violated the February 29, 2012 "Leap Day deal," the Obama team has little interest in trying again. Under that deal, in implicit exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid, North Korea agreed to suspend nuclear tests, enrichment activity, and long-range missile launches. Although the U.S. negotiators made clear that a space launch would be a deal breaker, the definition of "long-range missile launches" was not agreed in writing. Sixteen days later Pyongyang announced its intention to put a satellite into space on the centennial of founding father Kim Il-sung's birthday. The rocket—and hopes for U.S.-DPRK rapprochement—blew up shortly after the launch. Although the next launch succeeded, relations with the United States and the rest of the world have gone from bad to worse.

The policy conundrum is that as Washington remains patient, Pyongyang is pushing its nuclear and missile program ahead on all fronts. Before long, it will undoubtedly demonstrate a capability to reliably mount and deliver nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea and possibly further. As former Deputy Assistant of State Evans Revere put it, "When that occurs, it will dramatically mark the failure of years of efforts to end the North Korean WMD program."²⁹ Arguing that the United States and its allies cannot afford to just sit back and wait for that day, several private-sector experts advocate renewed engagement without preconditions. Frank Jannuzi, Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, for example, says: "The smart choice is to be bold. Engage Pyongyang without delay—not as a reward for bad behavior, but because it offers the best chance to gradually influence North Korea's conduct, encouraging it to respect international norms, protect the human rights of its people, and abandon its nuclear weapons."³⁰ After meeting with North Koreans in Europe, Bosworth and former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci argued that:

“Whatever risks might be associated with new talks, they are less than those that come with doing nothing.”³¹

“Doing nothing” is not how the Obama administration would characterize its North Korea policy, of course. Although it is not talking to Pyongyang, it is sending signals. One signal is a strengthened posture of deterrence, which serves at the same time as a means of reassurance to America’s allies in the region. In October 2013, the United States and South Korea announced a “tailored deterrence” strategy to deter North Korean use of nuclear and chemical weapons and other forms of aggression.³² In line with this strategy, U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials took part in the two-day Extended Deterrence Policy Committee Tabletop Exercise in Hawaii in January 2014 to explore a range of possible alliance responses to a nuclear crisis.³³ In February 2014, the Pentagon temporarily added an 800-person army regiment to the 28,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Korea. The annual large-scale Foal Eagle joint military exercise was again held in South Korea in March–April 2014. Last year, in light of North Korea’s nuclear threats, the Pentagon enhanced the exercise by sending nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers to fly near the border and simulate bombing runs as much to reassure the South as to deter the North. The United States also bolstered missile defenses in the region. UN sanctions against North Korea were strengthened and China was persuaded to more strictly implement existing international sanctions.

In return, China has encouraged the United States to return to the Six-Party Talks that began in Beijing in 2003. Those talks broke down in 2008 over verification requirements for the partial dismantling of its nuclear program that North Korea had agreed to undertake. In September 2013, Pyongyang sought to reconvene the talks “without preconditions,”³⁴ meaning without meeting U.S. demands to recommit to the original denuclearization purpose of the talks and to verifiably halt the enrichment and plutonium-related activity. A DPRK diplomat told this author bluntly in January that under these conditions, the Six-Party Talks are dead.

This does not mean that engagement with North Korea itself is dead. At least it should not be. Washington should find other ways to talk to North Korea. The Obama administration’s mantra of “not talking for the sake of talks” has a nice ring to it, but the argument is not compelling. Talking is useful for sounding out the other side’s intentions and exploring potential shifts. Keeping channels open will stand the United States in good stead in the event of a crisis that requires immediate communication. Moreover, talking is cost-free, and not a benefit bestowed on the other party. It is the essence of diplomacy. U.S. engagement should be aimed at reaching the ear of the leader.³⁵ Although Dennis Rodman is nobody’s idea of the ideal envoy, the fact that he is the only American to have engaged personally with Kim Jong-un is telling. Engagement should be coordinated with Seoul; the most important dialogue channel is North-South. For Pyongyang, the road to Washington runs through Seoul. The United States will not abandon its ROK ally or relegate it to a second-tier status in negotiations, as North Korea repeatedly suggests.

Last year North Korea sought several times to arrange for informal discussions in the guise of Track 1.5 talks in Beijing, Berlin, and London. Some of the American academics who joined those talks reported afterwards that there was room to find common ground. The idea that Pyongyang wants to be recognized as a nuclear power in diplomatic talks was

a “misunderstanding,” the North Korean participants reportedly said.³⁶ They could not accept conditions in advance, but their nuclear weapons program would be on the table,³⁷ including a freeze of the nuclear program, postponement of missile tests, and re-entry of IAEA inspectors: in short, a return to the Leap Day deal minus any moratorium on satellite launches.³⁸ North Korea, of course, would want food aid on the order of the 2012 deal and some political concessions.³⁹

The Obama administration is highly unlikely to pursue a comprehensive deal that does not include space launches. To allow space launches after they have been denounced by successive U.S. presidents and prohibited by two UN Security Council resolutions would be politically infeasible, widely condemned across the political spectrum as rewarding bad behavior. There is too much overlap between North Korea’s military-use missiles and its supposed space exploration. After successfully recovering the front section of the Unha-3 rocket, South Korea concluded that it was designed to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

So, what is there to talk about? Jannuzi’s suggestion for a Helsinki-like initiative to build multiple bridges of discussion on a broad number of topics including energy security, health policy, the rights of women and the disabled, etc.⁴⁰ is breathtakingly ambitious. He is under no illusions about North Korean sincerity with regard to denuclearization. In Jannuzi’s view, a multilateral process of engagement is first needed to bring about fundamental changes in thinking. The idea is akin to the “Sunshine Policy” that won President Kim Dae-jung the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 and was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun. The no-strings attached assistance provided to North Korea under the Sunshine Policy contributed to a conservative political backlash in South Korea because it failed to elicit any reciprocity from Pyongyang regarding reducing the nuclear program or improving human rights. Little appetite is likely to be found in either Seoul or Washington for another turn down this road.

There may be scope for discussion of discrete aspects of North Korea’s strategic weapons programs. Siegfried Hecker has suggested focusing on “three no’s: no more bombs (meaning no more plutonium and no HEU); no better bombs (no nuclear testing and no missile tests); and no nuclear exports, though he recognizes that each advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program pushes up against his first red line.⁴¹ North Korea should also be encouraged to end its chemical weapons program and to adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is one of only six states that prevents this treaty from becoming universal. The United States would find it hard, however, to give up much in return for incomplete measures that North Korea, if true to past form, is unlikely to honor for very long, especially with regard to the verification measures that would be needed. Any pursuit of discrete measures must also be done in a way that does not signal acceptance of the nuclear weapons program. What it can offer is an improved relationship and integration into the international community on condition that Pyongyang denuclearize. Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is prepared to sign a non-aggression pact.⁴² In 2005 it put into writing a promise of no intention to attack or invade into an agreement, and could do so again. North Korea could also be offered a process leading to a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War once denuclearization is complete.

Above all, the United States can offer to help North Korea escape the contradictions that will otherwise spell its demise. If North Korea continues its nuclear weapons development, the United States will instead seek to make those contradictions more apparent. Over the

past year, policy makers have emphasized that Washington is seeking to sharpen the choices confronting the DPRK between isolation or integration.⁴³ Contrary to the byungjin policy line of procuring both guns and butter, “there is no scenario in which North Korea can create a viable economic future for itself or its people and retain a nuclear weapons program,” Russel said in January 2014.⁴⁴ Sharpening the choices is ROK policy as well. President Park said in Switzerland in January, “unless North Korea changes voluntarily, we have to create an environment where it cannot help but change.”⁴⁵ When both governments agreed in January to set up a consultative body to assess developments in North Korea, an unnamed senior ROK official suggested that the purpose was not just to watch but also to induce faster change in the regime.⁴⁶

A NATION BESET BY CONTRADICTIONS

As a nation, North Korea is beset by contradictions. For a nation that is chronically unable to feed itself and is heavily reliant on China for oil, trade, and investment, the self-reliance national ideology of *juche* is a meaningless slogan. Even in several areas away from the border, the Chinese yuan is replacing the national currency. The communist system is crumbling as market forces take over the economy. The public food distribution system never fully recovered after its collapse in the famine years of the mid-1990s. A study of defectors found that most of them had derived the bulk of their income in North Korea from unofficial economic activity.⁴⁷ Despite the state’s efforts to regain control of the economy, the private markets are there to stay.⁴⁸ Because the markets are not fully authorized, bribery is pervasive. In a ranking by Transparency International, North Korea is tied for the title of most corrupt nation on earth.⁴⁹

Corruption and emphasis on wealth accumulation have strained the ideological underpinnings of the state. Rampant smuggling of Chinese radios and South Korean-origin DVDs and CDs has undermined the state’s control over information. Cognizant North Koreans know their nation is far behind South Korea and a far cry from the socialist paradise portrayed in government propaganda. Arch North Korea critic Josh Stanton is not far from the mark when he suggests that: “poverty doesn’t cause revolutions; jealousy does. Class envy is far more dangerous to Kim Jong-un than famine was to Kim Jong Il.”⁵⁰ The economic reforms that the state does attempt to implement quickly fall victim to the contradictions. The directive of June 28, 2012 sought to incentivize agriculture by allowing family units to keep 30 percent of their production and to stimulate industry by giving factory managers more freedom. Among other reforms, factories were required to make their own production plans and procure their own inputs. The resultant inflationary wage increases, supply constraints, and resistance from entrenched forces within the state and military created insurmountable problems.⁵¹ In another heralded economic reform, North Korea in November established 13 new special economic zones. Yet the abrupt closing of the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the increased sanctions on North Korea will have scared off all but the most risk-seeking of foreign investors. Apart from these new political risk factors, conditions such as restrictions on the use of the Internet and inattention to the rule of law make North Korea inhospitable to foreign investment. Foreign firms that have made an impact, such as the Egyptian Orascom Telecom Holding, which now has two million cell phone subscriptions, have had trouble repatriating profits.⁵² Meanwhile the government

allocates scarce resources to non-productive vanity projects such as equestrian parks, a dolphinarium, skating rinks, and a ski resort, plus more monuments to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Yet under Kim Jong-un, less than ten km of new roads have been built.⁵³

North Korea is often called a failing state. Collapse may, indeed, come in the foreseeable future, as predicted by Bruce Bennett at RAND,⁵⁴ or the present progressive form of the verb “failing” could stretch out for many more years. It is incorrect, however, to call North Korea an economic basket case. Visitors to Pyongyang report an uptick in consumerism: more restaurants, cars, kiosks, and cell phones. Women wear more fashionable clothes, and a housing boom is visible in the capital. Many analysts wonder where the money is coming from. Rüdiger Frank, one of the most astute foreign observers of North Korea, recalls a similar pattern of consumer spending in his native East Germany that was untethered to changes in economic policy and surmises that the DPRK may be living off its reserves. “Once they are depleted, trouble is inevitable,” he notes, adding: “We may be witnessing the beginning of the long-predicted endgame for North Korea.”⁵⁵

Fissures among the ruling elite became glaringly apparent over Jang’s purge and kangaroo trial. Foremost among his many alleged crimes was the claim of disloyalty to the state and forming a faction to threaten Kim Jong-un’s power. For a state that has unflinchingly proclaimed absolute unity, this was an extraordinary admission of internal divisions.⁵⁶ The byungjin line is the most obvious contradiction. For countries in dire straits, the policy choice should be guns OR butter, not more of both. As long as North Korea maintains its nuclear weapons, it will remain cut off from most sources of foreign trade and investment. China continues to offer a lifeline, but at reduced levels after the February 2013 nuclear test and subsequent provocations. According to some reports, China stopped state investment in free-trade zones and froze high-level visits.⁵⁷ China also began implementing UN sanctions more rigorously, releasing a 236-page list of goods denied to North Korea and stepping up inspections of North Korea-bound cargo.⁵⁸ It even went beyond the requirements of the UN sanctions by cutting ties with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank and other bank outlets.

The rationale behind byungjin is that nuclear weapons save money by allowing deterrence to be sustained with smaller conventional forces. The most militarized country on earth, North Korea maintains the world’s fourth-largest army with the world’s 49th-biggest population. Defense spending accounts for 22 percent of GDP, a huge drain on resources. The state apparently wants to redeploy some of its forces to economically productive activities. Indeed, this is already underway as soldiers are put to work in agriculture,⁵⁹ but whether military spending is being cut cannot be confirmed.

CONCLUSION

The argument is made that if only the United States would stop its hostile policy and halt large-scale military exercises, the DPRK would be able to relax its guard and lower its military spending. These exercises are necessary, however, precisely because of North Korea’s provocations and threatening posture toward its neighbors with nuclear and other unconventional forces. Regular exercises are an important means of maintaining deterrence and the capability to properly respond to provocations and to quickly defeat aggression should deterrence fail. It is all the better if such defensive exercises put pressure on the North

Korean regime in ways that intensify its contradictions. It is no wonder that the January 16 proposal that North Korea made to the South, in the name of the National Defense Commission headed by Kim Jong-un, sought a halt to those exercises.⁶⁰

One should not be sanguine about the turmoil that would be unleashed by implosion of the North Korean state. Bennett's 2013 study amply lays out the tremendous human, political, and security problems that would ensue. There is every reason to hope that the collapse will come about with a soft, rather than hard, landing. Peter Hayes, among others, makes a reasonable argument for seeking to transform the DPRK "inside-out" via engagement aimed at non-collapse.⁶¹ This, in effect, is the consistent policy of China, which is wary of turmoil on its northeast border and fears that U.S. policy aims at regime change. But those who prop up the North Korean state prolong the suffering of its population, and the longer unification is forestalled, the harder it will be to knit together the divergent Koreans.

The United States is genuinely in favor of Korean unification that would remove the greatest and most longstanding threat to regional security. Unification as a democratic, free-enterprise-based republic free of nuclear weapons would be a happy ending indeed to the long-running North Korean tragedy.⁶² Washington does not seek to overthrow the Kim regime, nor should it. Yet the United States can help to foster the internal conditions that can lead to a regime change, including by promoting a greater flow of information to the people about the regime's human rights record and other failings. Washington is already doing this through Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in South Korea.

Sanctions will be further strengthened if North Korea conducts another nuclear test or long-range missile launch. In particular, Washington should consider the kind of secondary sanctions that have been effectively employed against Iran. It is absurd that far tougher sanctions have been imposed on Iran even though North Korea's record of nuclear non-proliferation treaty and human rights violations is far worse. Third parties that do business with North Korean entities involved in illicit nuclear or missile programs should themselves face penalties. Any foreign banks that provide financial services for blacklisted North Korean entities should face the threat of being declared an institute of "primary money laundering concern" as was applied against Banco Delta Asia in Macao in 2005.

U.S. officials insist that the policy of sharpening North Korea's choices is intended to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons. Privately, most of them would agree with the dominant mood in the analytical community that North Korea will not willfully make that decision. Officials can never say so, but putting pressure on Pyongyang also serves a longer-term goal of hastening an internal change that can lead to unification. The "new" U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea is looking to the end game. The goal is not regime change per se, but creating the foundation for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

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Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on China's Policy Toward North Korea

Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

On December 12 Jang Song-taek, largely considered the second most powerful man in North Korea and a well-known “China hand,” was executed for treason and corruption, leaving the Chinese government without its most trusted interlocutor and Chinese companies without their most important business contact. Jang, who was referred to by the KCNA as the “despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog,” was publicly purged, arrested, and executed in just four days for “[perpetrating] thrice-cursed acts of treachery in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the leader for him.”¹ These salacious, headline-making accusations were likely less shocking to Jang’s Chinese counterparts than the fact that he was purged and executed so suddenly, threatening their economic plans for North Korea and eliminating their bridge into their reclusive neighbor. Jang’s brutal purge presented Beijing with pressing questions and no real answers—does China understand Kim Jong-un; can China trust him; and do China’s interests still dictate support for Pyongyang?

JANG’S EXECUTION IRRITATES CHINESE LEADERS AND DISGUSTS THE CHINESE PEOPLE

Jang Song-taek’s execution surprised the world and China as well, but how this affects China-DPRK ties has been persistently mysterious since then. Even months later the implications remain truly hard to estimate, given Beijing’s unchangeable twin concerns about North Korea: denuclearization and instability. It is becoming clearer that Beijing might be more concerned with the reality that the young leader Kim Jong-un has proven to be more inexperienced and less trustworthy than his father. This reality is driving the policy balancing in China’s DPRK policy more than its previous sputtering thinking about a strategic buffer.

Jang’s brutal purge is a loss for China. As broadly believed, he is a well-known “China hand,” dominating most of the trading and economic transactions between Pyongyang and Beijing when he was powerful. His execution left China without its most trusted interlocutor for its economic counterparts and, perhaps, the trading partner with whom it was arguably best acquainted. Beijing’s surprise at Kim Jong-un’s relentlessness was quickly overshadowed by the huge disappointment at its inability to know what had previously gone on between Kim and Jang. Otherwise, Beijing would have perhaps sorted out some way to mitigate the predicament. A few question marks arose shortly after Jang’s execution, and there was no way to gloss over them—what is the real nature of the Kim Jong-un regime? Is it possible for the regime to take China’s interests seriously? And furthermore, should China’s genuine calculus be to continuously support Pyongyang as it is? Obviously, exploring such questions has fueled Chinese ire.

Beijing’s official response can be characterized as the “desperation of quietness.” China’s foreign ministry spokesman even emphasized that the execution is North Korea’s internal affair, and there is no appetite in China to intervene. But China’s real response was a mixture of growing irritation and mounting anxiety—irritation at the young Kim for his indifference to Jang’s China association, and anxiety over China’s lack of leverage to foresee North Korea’s domestic dynamics and, in a timely manner, to react.

The Xi Jinping administration quickly decided to let the young Kim know of China's irritation. Previously every time there was something big happening, Beijing would choose to send a high-ranking official—a special envoy from China's top leader—to visit Pyongyang to inquire in person. Or, an important figure from the North would quickly make his way to Beijing, asking about China's response. Jang's execution did not elicit any official communication between the two sides. The CCP International Department, a long-time messenger between the two countries, seems quite idle these days. The irony usually is this: there is no possible flow of assistance without the dispatching of a high-level official to Pyongyang. Since Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao visited Pyongyang to attend the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War military parade in July 2013, the China-DPRK official connection has been frozen.²

Jang's execution immediately attenuated Beijing's diplomatic passion to pursue its "persuasion campaign" to achieve the restoration of the Six-Party Talks. China's chief representative to the multinational talks, Ambassador Wu Dawei, engaged in shuttle diplomacy among Washington, Seoul, and Moscow between September and November 2013 purporting to persuade the parties to return to Beijing for talks with the DPRK on the denuclearization process. So far in 2014, there seems to be little sign that Beijing will work on that "pull-and-push" policy any longer unless Pyongyang sincerely shows the world community that it will use nuclear abandonment to break its self-imposed isolation.

Without Beijing's bundle of promised assistance, North Korea's economic situation will quickly become desperate. The adverse consequences of Jang's execution have surfaced recently. Because Jang's followers have been similarly purged, Jang's business "empire," tangible and intangible, has broken into pieces. Even with the authorization to Prime Minister Park Bung-chul to fill the gap, it is most improbable that he could reestablish a massive network quickly to replace Jang's. Therefore, most Chinese business people are not able to contact their business partners in the North, and there is no way that they can maintain their activities both in the border areas and within North Korea. There is no exact number for the moment showing how hard the blow has been for China-North Korea underground trade and business, but it is virtually certain that the trading volume in 2014 will register a sharp drop.

Jang's execution has suddenly resulted in a huge loss of Kim Jong-un's financial income. Jang usually amassed money from his "empire," and provided funding for the operation of a goodly number of political activities and events to show people the benevolence of their leader. But with Jang's execution, the money provided through his network is gone. Kim Jong-un must know how it hurts. Whether this adversity will eventually be overcome might depend on China's decision to sustain the survival of the North or just to leave it alone.

Five months after the initial media hype over the motivations and implications of Jang's purge, the full fallout for China-North Korea relations remains a mystery, even to those in Beijing and Pyongyang. Exasperated as the Chinese leadership may be, its top priorities remain stability and denuclearization, and it is unlikely that Beijing will see this event as the tipping point for a new strategic calculus in China-North Korea relations. However, Jang's purge crystallizes Beijing's belief that Kim Jong-un is more inexperienced, more reckless, and less reliable than his father, Kim Jong-il. This lack of faith in the younger Kim is now driving Chinese policy more than the previous core belief of North Korea as a strategic

buffer. Under this new outlook, China may increasingly rely on threats and pressure rather than incentives and reassurances to alter North Korea's behavior. Furthermore, Beijing may be more interested in closer cooperation with the United States and South Korea now that Kim has started to directly impact Chinese economic interests and appears willing to gamble North Korea's political stability in his quest for greater personal power.

The Chinese government's official response has been one of studied calm, but other signs point to a surprised and worried benefactor. After the KCNA's official statement on the purge, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Hong Lei said the purge was North Korea's "internal affair" and defended the economic relationship by saying it "serves the interests of both sides."³ Anxiety about China's lack of intelligence on North Korea's domestic dynamics, reinforced by Beijing's surprise at Jang's purge, continues a disturbing trend, both for Beijing's own peace of mind and for the rest of the world—Pyongyang does not communicate crucial events to its only ally.⁴ The surprise at Kim's brutality was quickly followed by Beijing's disappointment at not being able to foresee and mitigate the impending purge of its most reliable advocate within the Kim regime.

FEARING A DOMINO EFFECT ON TRADE RELATIONS

Beijing fears Jang's purge will damage the economic ties it has been steadily building with North Korea, jeopardizing its economic interests and possibly Beijing's behind-the-scenes efforts for denuclearization. In contrast to the official line, Chinese commentary in the mainland media reveals that Beijing is remarkably concerned for the future of China-North Korea economic relations, especially the Rajin port after it was singled out by North Korea as one of Jang's crimes.⁵ This accusation is obviously targeted at China and suggests that North Korea also knew that Jang was China's man in Pyongyang, and no longer approved. While Jang's China ties may be a cover-up for the real domestic power struggle, the accusations could also signal Pyongyang's intention to reduce its economic reliance on Beijing or create negotiating leverage for a more equitable trade relationship going forward. In response to this perceived threat to Chinese economic interests in North Korea, one prominent Chinese scholar, Central Party School professor Zhang Liangui, even suggested that China should rethink its policy on non-intervention.⁶

Jang's purge has already affected Chinese traders and investors in North Korea, although the true impact may never be known since so much trade goes unrecorded. Since the purge extended to Jang's followers, his business "empire," largely funded by trade with China, has collapsed and Chinese businesses are having difficulty contacting their North Korean business partners to maintain normal trade relations. This, in turn, means that the Kim regime will be looking for new revenue streams, since Jang's network funded many of its activities.

Moreover, SIPRI's latest report on China-North Korea relations asserts that China's economic push into North Korea is part of the Chinese government's strategy for denuclearization.⁷ If this is true, then Jang's purge not only cost Beijing its most trusted interlocutor and its biggest supporter of Chinese trade and investment, but also threatens its plan for denuclearization. Thus, Jang's purge may force China to change its denuclearization strategy if North Korea

walks away from economic cooperation with China. This suggests that despite the Chinese government's nonchalance, Beijing is very worried about the message Jang's criminal accusations were intended to send to China and the potential impact not only on Chinese trade and investment with the North but also on denuclearization efforts.

BEIJING'S NEW APPROACH TO THE YOUNG LEADER: A COLD SHOULDER

In response to Kim killing China's inside man, Beijing has adopted a new approach to North Korean misbehavior—silence. When North Korea has made pivotal decisions in the past, China would either dispatch or receive a senior official—a special envoy from the top leaders—to communicate China's response in person. Yet since Jang's execution, there has been no such official communication between the two sides. Indeed, the CCP International Liaison Department has remained idle since political ties were frozen following Vice President Li Yuanchao's visit to Pyongyang. China's vital assistance will likely not resume until a high-level official visits either Beijing or Pyongyang; so the onus is on Kim to revive the relationship.

Beijing's silence has only been broken by a fleeting call for Kim to make his first visit to Beijing, likely for what would best be described by American diplomats as a “frank” discussion to explain his actions. Following the KCNA's official announcement of Jang's crimes on December 9, the Chinese state-run media made an immediate overture to Kim for a visit to China. On December 10, *People's Daily* ran a *Global Times* editorial stating that “China should help bring about Kim Jong-un's visit to China as soon as possible.”⁸ The resumption of talk about a Kim visit reveals that the Chinese government is concerned enough to want a face-to-face meeting with Kim, possibly after concluding that no one can challenge Kim for power now that Jang is gone. However, it is unlikely he will be extended such an honor unless Kim is prepared to come with a necessary concession—a readiness to give up North Korea's nuclear weapons.⁹

Chinese leaders are quickly growing tired of Kim's antics and politics. Kim Jong-un's third nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March and April outraged Chinese leaders. Jang's execution undoubtedly only increased President Xi Jinping's abhorrence for the young leader, as Xi's strong advocacy for cleaning up Chinese domestic politics stands in stark contrast to the Kim dynasty's lavishness and malicious personal cult. Xi's signature theme, the “China Dream,” focuses on enhancing the lives of the people, relegating the political darkness of North Korea to a bygone era. North Korea appears to increasingly realize that its behavior has pushed China farther away, but instead of mending relations with Beijing, Pyongyang has turned to other suitors. North Korea's recent overtures to South Korea suggest China's tougher policy is already having an effect.

OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS?

Beijing may be nearing a critical juncture for its North Korea policy. Although China has, in the past, resisted altering its long-term strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula in response to short-term problems, the current recklessness exhibited by Kim over his first two years in power may begin to loom as a long-term problem for Chinese leaders as they judge

he is not following the acceptable learning curve. Without China's continued assistance, North Korea will likely perish sooner or later, but unconstrained support will enable the long-stalled nuclear standoff to persist, and there will be no resolution to the growing uncertainty inside North Korea. Jang's execution will not be the straw that breaks the camel's back, but it does serve as a clear signal that continued non-action in support of the North Korean regime raises the stakes for the Chinese leadership.

Continuously resuscitating the North notably puts at risk for China not only the effects of the long-stalled nuclear standoff, but also the consequences from growing uncertainty inside that country. Kim Jong-un's third nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March and April outraged Chinese leaders. Jang's execution forces Chinese leaders to be conscious of the higher stakes at risk. Kim Jong-un's capricious nature compels Beijing to think about alternatives that would be instinctively different from previous ones. For example, China's three military exercises along the border with the DPRK in North Korea in less than two months, culminating with 100,000 troops from the unit stationed closest to the border, are presumably less focused on a scenario of an American military incursion, and more on that of the DPRK's domestic implosion as a result of Kim Jong-un's mismanagement. Immediately after news of Jang's purge, 3,000 troops from the 39th Group Army under the Shenyang Military Region, the region responsible for North Korean contingencies and the Group Army stationed closest to the border, exercised near Changbai Mountain. Then in late December, the Chinese Navy drilled in Bohai Bay, the waters between China and North Korea. Finally, in early January 2014, the PLA conducted a massive military drill, again near Changbai Mountain, with 100,000 troops from the same 39th Group Army, among others.¹⁰

For his personal popularity Xi Jinping chose to keep the DPRK far away. As long as Beijing holds the line on giving North Korea the cold shoulder, the Kim Jong-un regime will inevitably have to struggle to change its posture in order to secure its survival. Its recent grappling to court the ROK is evidence that China's policy turn of being tough will, as expected, have some bearing. Kim Jong-un might eventually want to visit Beijing to seek some lenience; however, it is out of the question that he would be welcome if he only comes with empty hands and no readiness to give up his nuclear weapons.

As Kim continues to ignore China's signs of increased frustration, Beijing is growing increasingly comfortable favoring "sticks" above "carrots" to remind North Korea who is the patron and who is the client. While Beijing is not considering a change in policy by Western standards, namely abandoning North Korea, it is looking to use new tools to better manage the relationship more in line with China's own interests. China's reaction to North Korea's third nuclear test may have provided the first glimpse of this tactical preference. The Chinese government agreed to an unprecedented level of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea and even unveiled unilateral measures, including the Bank of China's decision to end banking ties with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's September 2013 announcement of an export ban on certain dual-use items.¹¹ One notable change is that Beijing is more responsive to Pyongyang's bad behavior and less trapped in the view of North Korea as a buffer, i.e., China's North Korea policy is becoming more proactive. As long as North Korea continues to be provocative, Beijing will find no other option than to bring its policy more in line with the international community.

IS IT LIKELY THAT CHINA WILL TAKE A HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA?

Dramatically, Pyongyang seems to have turned to flattering the Chinese people rather than Chinese leaders. A North Korean diplomat published a rare article in *Global Times*, a notorious nationalist medium, to defend its policy of maintaining cemeteries of Chinese war dead from the Korean War of 1950-53. DPRK Ambassador Cho openly called at a press conference in Beijing for rebuking the United States and the ROK for their upcoming joint military drill. What we can imagine is motivating this is Pyongyang's worry about the drift of China away from it, and in trying to pull China back, it is resorting to traditional appeals to the "lips-and-teeth" friendship and to the American conspiracy theory. I am deeply skeptical how effective such tactics will be given China's increasing pluralism domestically.

It is quite likely that Beijing will continue to walk a fine line, and it is quite less likely that Beijing will thoroughly change its policy course toward the DPRK, i.e., abandoning Pyongyang by cutting off oil and food supplies. Actually, it is not realistic to expect China's policy toward the DPRK to embrace such a completely dramatic change given the intensified geopolitical complexity in East Asia. Yet, a remarkable change in China's policy is that it is more sensitive to Pyongyang's bad behavior and less entangled in its previous thinking. China's posture toward the DPRK shows signs of recognizing the need to be forward leaning. As long as the DPRK continues to be provocative, there is no way but to insist on a policy adjustment more in line with the international community.

For the time being, the challenge is for the United States and South Korea to respond to Beijing's cold-shoulder towards DPRK with a greater effort to find a shared vision. It could take the form of three-way consideration of how to deal with the endgame of the Kim Jong-un regime. The DPRK has never been weaker due to Chinese abhorrence of it.

Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Beijing in February 2014 presented an opportunity for increased cooperation on North Korea policy as Beijing was giving a cold shoulder to Pyongyang. One tangible sign of increased Chinese willingness to move forward on policy would be its insistence on persuading Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks without increasing the assistance level to its troubled ally. To what extent Beijing would use its leverage—cutting off oil provisions and even reducing food assistance—to force the North to recede seems uncertain for the time being. One of the obvious misgivings on China's side is that it has no willingness to carry on prominent discussions planning for a North Korea collapse scenario with the United States. Diplomatically, Beijing's current stance is to distance itself from the Kim Jong-un regime, and there is no doubt that it would not welcome the young leader's visit until he could show real sincerity for abandoning nuclear weapons. Instead, China will lean towards greater unity with Washington and Seoul on denuclearization. How to force North Korea to return to the talks remains a big struggle for Beijing, unless it is really ready to brandish its "stick." At least this much is true: Beijing has implemented trade sanctions against Pyongyang seriously and firmly since the third nuclear test in February 2013.

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
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Valery Denisov is a leading Russian expert on Korea. He graduated from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1970 where he specialized in international relations and Korean studies, and in 1983, from the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. After earning his Candidate of Science degree in law and a doctorate in history, Denisov worked as a Soviet and then Russian diplomat for more than 30 years. From 1996 to 2001, he was the Russian Ambassador to North Korea. In 2001, he was appointed Ambassador at Large and Russia's Foreign Ministry representative to the Eurasian Economic Community. After retiring from the diplomatic service, Ambassador Denisov taught Korean history and politics at MGIMO University. He currently works as a senior research fellow at the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at MGIMO University.

He has authored and coauthored more than a hundred publications, including *The Korean Problem: Ways of Resolution, 1970-80s* (1988), *The Korean Problem: a New Perspective* (1995); *Russia and Korea* (2004), and numerous articles on the Korean Peninsula and the situation in Northeast Asia.

Mark Fitzpatrick

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Mark Fitzpatrick is director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. His IISS program focuses on proliferation challenges posed by Iran, North Korea, Syria and other outlier states, and on nuclear security and nuclear disarmament issues. He is the author of *Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers* (2014) and *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding worst-case outcomes* (2008). He is also the editor of six IISS Strategic Dossiers on countries and regions of proliferation concern, most recently on North Korea (July 2011) and Iran (February 2011). He has lectured throughout the world and is a frequent media commentator on proliferation topics. He is a founding member of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. He is also a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Policy Advisory Group of the United Nations Association of the UK.

Mr. Fitzpatrick joined IISS in October 2005 after a 26-year career in the U.S. Department of State, including as deputy assistant secretary for Non-Proliferation (acting). His diplomatic postings also included Vienna, in charge of liaison with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as postings in Seoul, Tokyo (twice) and Wellington. He earned a Master's degree in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and he attended a one-year post-graduate study program (1990-1991) at the Japanese National Institute of Defence, where his dissertation on Korean unification was published in journals in Japan and South Korea.

Matthew P. Goodman

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Matthew P. Goodman holds the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, Goodman was White House coordinator for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). He also served as director for international economics on the National Security Council staff and was responsible for the G-20, G-8, and other international forums. Prior to joining the White House, Goodman was senior adviser to the under secretary for economic, energy, and agricultural affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He also worked with the deputy secretary of state on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

Before joining the Obama administration in August 2009, he worked for five years at Albright Stonebridge Group, where he was managing director in charge of the firm's Asia practice. From 2002 to 2004, he served at the White House as director for Asian economic affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. From 1988 to 1997, he worked as an international economist at the U.S. Treasury Department, including five years at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, where he served as financial attaché. His private-sector experience includes five years at Goldman, Sachs & Co., where he headed the investment bank's government affairs operations in Tokyo and London. Goodman holds an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a BSc in economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Jiyeon Kim

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Jiyeon Kim is a research fellow and the director of the Public Opinion and Quantitative Research Center at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Dr. Kim received her B.A. in Political Science and Diplomacy from Yonsei University, M.P.P. in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, she was a lecturer at Concordia University and Yonsei University. She was also a postdoctoral research fellow at Université de Montréal. Her research interests include elections and voting behavior, distributive politics in multiethnic societies, American political development, political methodology, and Korean politics. Recent publications include “Political judgment, perceptions of facts, and partisan effects” (*Electoral Studies*, 2010), and “Public spending, public deficits, and government coalition” (*Political Studies*, 2010). She also co-edited the volume of *The Choice of Korean Electorates: National Assembly Election 2012* and *The Choice of Korean Electorates II: Presidential Election 2012*. Her chapter on “Party System in Korea and Identity Politics” appeared in the book *New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan* (Stanford University Press, 2014) edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Larry Diamond.

Shin-wha Lee

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Shin-wha Lee is a professor of political science and international relations at Korea University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Maryland at College Park and held a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Harvard University. She was a research associate at the World Bank; a visiting scholar at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); a special advisor to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Rwandan Independent Inquiry at the United Nations; chair’s advisor of East Asian Vision Group (EAVG); a Korean delegate of the 2004 Korea-China-Japan Future Leaders’ Forum; a visiting scholar at Princeton University; a full-time visiting professor at Columbia University; executive committee member of Academic Council on the UN Studies (ACUNS); and vice president for international affairs, Korea University. She received the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award of Excellence in 2008 and is an international advisory member of Asia-Pacific Center for Responsibility to Protect (Australia) and GR:EEN (Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks). She is a consultant to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reunification, and Defense, as well as the National Assembly and Navy. Her numerous published articles and books include *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in East Asia* (2004), *South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia* (eds.)(2008), “Northeast Asian Security Community: From Concepts to Practices” (2008), “A New Paradigm and Tasks for Korean Foreign Policy” (in Korean)(2010), “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) after Libya: Practical Implication for North Korea” (2013), “International Legal Perspectives on North Korean Refugee Issues” (2013), and “Providing for Peacekeeping Country Profile: South Korea” (2014).

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Sung-Yoon Lee is the Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and assistant professor at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is an associate in research at the Korea Institute, Harvard University, and a former research fellow of the inaugural National Asia Research Program, a joint initiative by the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Lee's essays on the international politics of the Korean Peninsula have been published in *The LA Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*, CNN.com, *Asia Times*, *The Weekly Standard*, *Foreign Policy*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and *Imprimus*. Recent publications include "North Korean Exceptionalism and South Korean Conventionalism: Prospects for a Reverse Formulation?" *Asia Policy* 15 (January 2013), "Don't Engage Kim Jong Un—Bankrupt Him," *Foreign Policy* (January 2013), "The Pyongyang Playbook," *Foreign Affairs* (August 2010), "Engaging North Korea: The Clouded Legacy of South Korea's Sunshine Policy," *Asian Outlook* (AEI Press, April 2010), and "Life After Kim: Planning for a Post-Kim Jong Il Korea," in *Foreign Policy* (February 2010).

Lee has taught Korean history and politics at Bowdoin College, Sogang University, and Seoul National University. He has testified as an expert witness before a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing on North Korea policy and has advised senior officials in the U.S. government.

Lee is a frequent commentator on major international media organizations, including BBC, PBS, NPR, PRI, CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, and CBC.Syaru Shirley Lin [Lin](#) *Chinese University of Hong Kong*

Shirley Lin is a member of the founding faculty of the professional master's program in global political economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and also teaches at the University of Virginia. Her main research interests include theories of global political economy, national identity and Asian regionalism and she is completing a book on the consolidation of Taiwan's national identity and its impact on Taiwan's cross-Strait economic policy. She was previously a partner at Goldman Sachs, where she was responsible for private equity and venture capital investments in Asia, as well as the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Greater China and Singapore. She graduated cum laude from Harvard College and earned her Ph.D. in politics and public administration from the University of Hong Kong.

She has served on the boards of numerous private and public companies including Alibaba, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Hung Hing Printing (Hong Kong) and Impress (Japan). Her present board service includes Key Safety Systems (US), Mercuries Life Insurance (Taiwan) and Langham Hospitality Investments (Hong Kong). Shirley's philanthropic interests are in education for children throughout Asia and she serves on the board of Excelsior Bi-Lingual Experimental School in Hunan, China.

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He co-authored *Three Journeys through China* with Andrei Dikarev (Moscow, 1989), wrote *The Political Culture of the Russian Democrats* (Oxford University Press, 2000), *The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century* (M.E. Sharpe, 2003) as well as numerous articles and policy papers on Russian and Chinese politics. He has also written on the international situation in East Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russian-Chinese relations. He is a member of the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the Russian National Committee for BRICS Studies.

Deepa M. Ollapally

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Deepa M. Ollapally is research professor of international affairs and associate director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Her areas of research and teaching are: Asian regional security; Indo-US relations; politics of South Asia; and identity politics in the international system. She was a South Asia specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace from 1998-2003, and taught at Swarthmore College from 1990-1997. She was head and fellow of the Strategic Studies Unit at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bangalore, India during 1996-1998. She is author and co-editor of the book *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia* (Oxford University Press, 2012). She also published *The Politics of Extremism in South Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) and *Confronting Conflict: Domestic Factors and U.S. Policymaking in the Third World* (Greenwood Press, 1993). She has published extensively in journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Asian Survey*, *The National Interest* and *Political Science Quarterly*. Dr. Ollapally has received major grants from the MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and Asia Foundation for projects related to India and Asia. She served on the board of directors of Women in International Security, Washington D.C., and is an advisory council member for Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace, Delhi. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

Gilbert Rozman

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Having recently retired from teaching, Gilbert Rozman is the Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he spent more than forty years on the faculty. Since 2013 he also serves as the editor of *The Asan Forum*, a bi-monthly, on-line journal on international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. His academic interests have been concentrated on four countries—China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia—, examining issues such as regionalism, national identities, and mutual perceptions, while drawing linkages to bilateral security issues. Recent publications include a five-volume series on strategic thinking in the countries of Northeast Asia and a three-volume series comparing national identities and examining their impact on bilateral relations, the most recent of which are *The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations*, and *East vs. West in the 2010s*. Rozman moved to Washington as a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and continues to immerse himself in the policy-oriented environment of think tank and university seminars, contributing regularly to a column in *The Asan Forum* called “Washington Insights.” He also keeps abreast of foreign language sources through the cycle of Country Reports in the journal, which rotate from Japan to China to Korea to Russia over each two-month period.

Jin Kyo Suh

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Dr. Suh is a senior research fellow of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a leading institute in Korea that advises the government on all major international economic policy issues. He is a policy advisor of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy and also a news commentator of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Korea’s leading public service broadcaster and the most influential media organization in the country.

Dr. Suh has published a wide range of books, reports, and opinion pieces in Korean on trade policies, including agricultural market liberalization policies, and has deeply engaged in forming national strategies on multilateral and regional trade negotiations since 1990. He has continuously attended the WTO Ministerial Conference as an advisor of the Korean delegation since 2001.

He has both a Ph.D. and a M.S. in agricultural and resource economics from the University of Maryland, College Park and an M.A and a B.S. in agricultural economics from Korea University in Seoul.

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Sue Mi Terry is a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. From 2001-2008, Dr. Terry worked as senior analyst for the Directorate of Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In that role, she regularly monitored and assessed political and economic developments in North Korea and East Asia. In 2008, she was Director of Korea, Japan, and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the NSC, she played an integral role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy towards Northeast Asia, while bridging the gap between two U.S. Presidents during the critical transition period of 2008-2009. Dr. Terry served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the Office of Director of National Intelligence during 2009-2010. In September 2010, Dr. Terry joined the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as the National Intelligence Fellow. Dr. Terry switched careers into the private sector in late 2011 and currently works as Managing Director at Gerson Global Advisors, a strategic investment and advisory firm based in New York. In this role, she co-heads the Sovereign Advisory business and is primarily responsible for developing and managing the firm's strategy, activities, and client relations in Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. Dr. Terry holds a M.A. degree and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

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Zhu Feng

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Dr. Zhu Feng is executive director of the China Center for Collaborative Innovation of the South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University, and will be Dean of Institute of International Studies, Nanjing University in August 2014. He is also a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University. Dr. Zhu is also senior research fellow of the Center for Peace and Development of China, a senior research fellow of the Center for Contemporary World Affairs, and sits on editorial boards of several scholarly journals.

Previously, Dr. Zhu served as vice president of the Institute of International & Strategic Studies (IISS) of Peking University. He has also been a research fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and Harvard University, a visiting scholar at Durham University (UK), and a visiting professor at the University of Wellington. He began his college studies at the Department of International Politics of Peking University and received his Ph.D. from Peking University.

His recent books are *International Relations Theory and East Asian Security* (Beijing: People's University Press, 2007), *China's Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics* (co-edited with Robert S. Ross, Cornell University Press, 2008), *China's Rise: Theoretical and Practical Examination* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2009), *China-Japan Defense Exchange and Security Cooperation: the Past, Present and Future* (co-edited with Akiyama Masahiro, Tokyo Aiji Press, 2011). His upcoming book is *US-China and the World Order* (co-edited with John Ikenberry and Wang Jisi, Palgrave, 2014).



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