

PN-AAH-664

Comparative Legislative Research Center



LEGISLATURES AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY
OF KENYA, KOREA, AND TURKEY


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Occasional Paper Series



**The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa**

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Occasional Paper No. 14

December, 1979

A paper delivered at the XIth World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Moscow, USSR, August 12-18, 1979.

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the developmental role of legislatures in developing societies. In the last two decades a massive corpus of literature has been produced on the subject of developing polities. However, much of it has concentrated on such key institutions as the military, charismatic leadership, political parties, and public bureaucracy, often neglecting the representative bodies.¹ The reason for this neglect is the implicit assumption that legislatures of developing societies do not play a significant role. In a limited sense it is true that legislatures tend to exercise little power over lawmaking. But it is equally true that they perform functions well beyond lawmaking alone. The political significance of these legislatures is likely to be embedded in these non-lawmaking functions.

Recently, Almond and Powell have urged us to examine the legislatures more closely, which they argued were "usually neglected in 'Third World' literature" but "deserve some description and analysis."² Aware that the legislatures do not play a major role in lawmaking, a function which is often preempted by the executive branches, one should fruitfully look elsewhere to identify significant contributions that a legislature can make for social change. In two most recent efforts to synthesize research findings emerging from comparative legislative behaviors several key functional aspects have been identified.³ These functions were empirically derived after a careful scrutiny of diverse activities in which these legislatures and their individual members engage and thus, have cross-national applicability. Loewenberg and Patterson have identified three such functions: linkage (or representation), conflict management, and leadership recruitment.⁴ In addition, even though they did not include it on their formal list of functions, they gave an extensive treatment of the system maintenance functions with a special reference to citizens' support for the legislature.⁵ In a much similar way Mezey's recent work, which focuses upon developing legislatures more extensively, lists the functions of policy making, representation, and system maintenance.⁶ Furthermore, Mezey subsumes under the system maintenance the sub-functions of political recruitment and public support.⁷ Taken together, these recent works suggest that the legislatures perform certain common functions, and it is through the analysis of these functions that we can assess the developmental role of legislatures.

With regard to the specific role of legislatures as change agents, some scholars have expressed doubts about their potential contributions. Huntington and Nelson have summarily dismissed the legislatures as a progressive political force, especially in the context of achieving

socioeconomic equity through land reform measures. They have asserted: "Parliaments are the enemy of land reform, and a modest body of political participants is likely to have the interest and the means to obstruct the approval and implementation of such reforms."⁸ Pakenham concurs with this view and even extends it to other general roles of legislatures for modernization and development.⁹ These arguments are premised on two key assumptions: one is that the majority of legislative members are recruited from privileged social groups with vested interest in status quo including land tenure system, and another, because of their social origins the legislative elites tend to embrace essentially conservative ideology, often "more inclined to resist modernization than popularly elected executives and even nonelective authoritarian elites."¹⁰

Whether legislatures contribute to the process of developmental changes or impede it is in the final analysis a matter of empirical investigation. We will explore this question in the context of three countries: Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. The data for analysis were obtained by means of direct interviews with three population groups involved in the legislative process: members of parliament, local leaders, and adult citizens.¹¹ Altogether we completed interviews with 252 MPs, 1203 local leaders, and 8411 adult citizens in the three countries.


I. Legislatures and Development

At the outset it is necessary to state explicitly the connections between the functions that legislatures perform and development. Without this consideration our subsequent discussion of legislative functions cannot shed much light on the developmental role of representative bodies. Social development is a multifaceted phenomenon and its contents may vary from society to society depending upon their specific social conditions and their developmental goals. However, there appears to be certain common core values that all developing societies seek to realize. These include: political integration, mass political participation and involvement, equity in distribution of wealth, and legitimation.¹² Legislatures are surely not the only institutions that may promote these development values. There are other institutions such as the executive, political party, interest group and military, all of which may contribute in their own ways to development. The question that concerns us is: whether the legislature does anything in the way of promoting these values. If the legislature engages in any kind of activities that affect these developmental values, one may take these activities as defining its developmental role.

Recent literature suggests a list of functions common to all developing legislatures: representation, political participation, resource allocation, and legitimation.¹³ The extent to which a legislature performs these functions indicates its contribution to development. Representation

fosters not only a sense of involvement among citizens at the periphery but also, provides a direct channel of communication and contact with the government at the center. The relationship between representation and political integration is clear enough, requiring little elaboration here.

Figure 1: Legislative Functions and Development



The legislature offers an institutional framework in which citizen participation can expand. In most countries members of the legislature are popularly elected in a periodic election, which provides regular opportunities for the people to exercise their voting rights. Such electoral participation may not however represent a strong form of citizen involvement in some developing societies. Voting is one of the easiest forms of participation requiring relatively little political knowledge and commitment. Consequently, many of those who exercise their voting rights often do so in deference to government authorities and official ideology or because of community pressure. In this instance, it seems difficult to regard such activity as an autonomous participation.¹⁴ Rather, it is a participation of a mobilized variety. An increase in mobilized participation should not be regarded as development because it is not an act of self-conscious and self-assertive choice. In a more important way, the legislature fosters citizen involvement by creating non-electoral opportunities for participation. These non-electoral opportunities tend to stimulate participation of more autonomous sorts, such as attending meetings organized by an MP, talking to him about personal or community problems, seeking an MP's assistance for lobbying government agencies. Because of their electoral ties to specific geographic constituencies, MPs are likely to be most visible and accessible public figures from the point of view of ordinary citizens. By virtue of this fact,

individual MPs can promote active citizen participation.

All legislators provide a measure of constituency service. Part of it may involve an effort to bring government resources to the district in the form of public work projects. They may exert pressure on government agencies to make special allocation of funds for a school building, road construction, reclamation project, housing, and industrial project, all of which can benefit the people of a district. Competition for these "pork barrels" among individual MPs, especially when they perceive a direct link between their success of obtaining "pork barrel" projects and their chance for reelection, may result in a more equitable regional distribution of resources than otherwise possible. Bureaucrats in the central government in charge of economic growth planning are more likely to be preoccupied with the growth strategy of national economy, often ignoring the variable needs of each district. In contrast, legislators elected from these districts cannot disregard the development requirements of their districts. This special tie to a geographic constituency makes MPs orient their activities toward redistributing the fruits of economic development. Collectively, members of parliament may act as a countervailing force to the growth centered strategy of the executive branch. Thus, one important contribution that a legislature can make toward development is through its role in resource allocation with its propensity towards redistributive policies.

Legislatures can enhance the legitimacy of the regime through its activities. Packenham suggests three main ways by which a legislature can help legitimate the regime.¹⁵ First, it contributes to legitimacy by simply "meeting regularly and uninterruptedly" in accordance with the constitution. He calls it a latent legitimation because it produces, by just being there, an aura of legitimacy for the regime of which the legislature is a part. Second, it can actively legitimate the policy actions of the government by attaching its seals of approval. He calls it a manifest legitimation. Third, the legislature may serve as a "safety valve" for political tension. Tensions accumulated in the society can be openly aired and their pressures released through parliamentary debates. There is yet another way in which the legislature contributes to legitimation, which may be called a "spill-over" effect. Where a legislature performs its constitutionally charged functions well enough, it will enlist a broad base of popular support and respect. The reservoir of support and respect accrued to the legislative institution may affect the citizens' basic attitudes toward other parts of government. Of course, this is true only when the citizens regard the legislature as an integral part of the regime or when a large majority of the population are incapable of clearly distinguishing the two branches of government. In many developing societies citizens tend to regard various branches of government as an indistinguishable whole, partly due to their relatively short histories of political independence or because of their low levels of education.

II. Representation

The term 'representation' defies an easy definition.¹⁶ It has been used and abused in many different contexts. Because it is not our intention to engage in a detailed conceptual analysis, we simply stipulate a working definition for the purpose of this study. By representation we refer to the relationship that a legislator forges with his constituents in the pursuit of his duties. This relationship is embedded in the mutual expectations of role and in the interactive patterns between an MP and constituents. Thus, representation can be described and analyzed in terms of role conception and the ways in which the two groups actually interact.

We distinguish two aspects of role conceptions held by both MPs themselves and their constituents.¹⁷ The first aspect has to do with the kind of activities that MPs and constituents regard as most appropriate to the legislative role. The second aspect relates to the question of representational focus, i.e., the target group or groups for representation. In our three country survey we asked the respondents to indicate the activities that they consider most important to an MP. The data are presented by country and by population groups in Table 1.

The activities considered most important by the constituents include, not surprisingly, the matters that directly affect them. Without exception in all three countries, the MPs' duty to express the views of people in the district on policies was singled out as the most important job. Similarly, they also stressed the role of the MPs in the areas of inducing government projects to the district and helping the constituents who have problems with the government agencies. These are all the kind of activities we usually associate with MPs' constituency service role. On the other hand, a majority of the constituents did not attribute much importance to the MPs' role in law-making or explaining government policies. In all three countries the public attributed the greatest importance to the constituency service aspect of the MP's role. This finding is in complete accord with some recent studies of the legislature in developing societies.¹⁸ The local notables with more sophisticated conceptions of the legislative role, regarded the MPs' role in the areas of law-making and explaining government policies as important, markedly more than did the constituents. However, it is still the service oriented roles of the MPs that the notables considered most important.

In contrast to the constituents and to the local notables to a lesser degree, the MPs defined their own roles differently. With the exception of the Kenyan legislators, most of them emphasized their own roles of law-making and explaining the policies of government more than or at least equal to, their district service roles. For instance, nearly 70 percent of the Turkish legislators regarded their role of explaining policy as

TABLE I

Role Expectations: Aspects of Legislative Activities Regarded
As Important by MPs, Local Notables, and Constituents
(percentages)

Activities	KENYA			KOREA			TURKEY		
	Local MPs	Local notables	Consti- tuents	Local MPs	Local notables	Consti- tuents	Local MPs	Local notables	Consti- tuents
Explaining Policies to Voters	10.7	74.8	68.3	30.0	47.0	34.9	69.4	39.4	18.2
Proposing, debating and amending bills	32.1	79.5	65.6	75.0	67.1	44.2	41.7	33.4	18.6
Expressing the views of the people in district	28.6	88.7	84.1	55.0	63.0	52.1	51.4	66.9	45.7
Obtaining government projects to district	71.4	88.5	79.0	40.0	32.5	41.2	59.7	62.7	46.1
Interceding with civil servants for district voters	28.6	67.8	67.6	35.0	44.9	40.1	30.6	21.3	20.6
Resolving local conflict	7.1	56.7	54.6	0.0	37.8	25.4	16.7	25.1	21.2
Visiting district	Not asked	77.9	68.8	Not asked	30.6	35.8	Not asked	46.0	28.1
(N) =	(28)	(453)	(4128)	(20)	(468)	(2274)	(72)	(287)	(2007)

- Note: 1 The MPs were asked if they felt they should spend more time, about the same time, or less time on each activity listed. The percentages include those who said they should spend more time on these activities.
- 2 Both the local notables and the constituents were asked to rate the importance of each activity. The percentages include those indicating each activity as "very important".
- 3 We have examined only those MPs in whose districts we conducted the mass survey. Consequently, the size of Ns for the MPs are smaller than the totals whom we interviewed in each legislature.

very important, a striking contrast with 39.4 percent of the notables and 18 percent of the constituents who regarded this particular role as important. In regard to the law-making role, the same is true: while 42 percent of the MPs stressed this role, the comparable figures for the notables and the constituents were 33.4 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively. In Korea, the law-making role was rated very highly in importance by all three groups. Among the MPs three-fourth stressed it, making it by far the most important role for the legislators. Both the notables and the constituents concurred with it (67% and 44%, respectively).

The importance attributed to the MPs' role of law making in Korea should not, however, be construed to mean that the legislature is an effective law-making body. On the contrary, its effectiveness in legislation is in fact minimal due to the executive dominance. One reason why the Koreans had rated the law-making so important may be related to their disillusionment with the impotence of the legislature. They knew that a strong and active legislature is a prerequisite of a liberal democracy, a form of government that the school textbooks taught them to aspire to in the last three decades. But they knew that the legislature has been reduced to a rubber-stamp organization, quite contrary to what it should properly be doing. Their aspiration for a strong representative body led them to express their feelings that it ought to be more active in law-making than it presently is.

The Kenyan MPs provide a unique case. More than two-third of them (71.4%) stressed their constituency service role, especially their activities aimed at obtaining government resources and delivering such material benefits to their districts. This role received the highest ratings among both the Kenyan notables and the constituents, also. The Kenyan MPs regarded other activities as less important, and in comparison to their counterparts elsewhere, their role perception stands in a marked contrast. Evidently, the MP's role in resource allocation is the most important aspect of their job in Kenya. There appears to be a consensus on this role among the general population as well as among the legislators themselves. This aspect of representation clearly distinguishes Kenya from other countries that we have studied.

In order to explore the second aspect of the role we asked our respondents which group's interests an MP should seek to represent most actively. We provided a list of relevant groups such as the interests of district, political party, the executive, interest group, personal advisors, and personal beliefs and conviction, out of which they were instructed to choose one. The data are summarized in Table 2. Somewhat different patterns emerge in the three countries. In Kenya the district served as the single most important representational focus. Almost 86 percent of the notables and 78 percent of the constituents mentioned it. The notables regarded the political party, the KANU in this case, almost as much important as the district (73.3%). For the constituents, however, the party was not as much important. In Korea too, a similar pattern obtained: the greatest importance was attributed

TABLE 2

Role Expectations: Representational Focus
 Considered Most Important by Local Notables
 and Constituents
 (percentages)

Representational foci	KENYA		KOREA		TURKEY	
	Local notables	Constituents	Local notables	Constituents	Local notables	Constituents
Electoral district	85.4	77.7	62.4	59.1	18.5	15.3
Political party	73.3	48.0	41.2	23.4	39.0	16.2
Executive branch of government	43.0	38.7	25.6	22.6	14.6	12.2
Interest group	41.7	41.2	15.2	12.1	18.8	9.3
MP's personal advisers	25.6	26.3	7.5	8.5	10.1	8.1
MP's own convictions	32.2	27.8	56.2	42.8	29.6	17.8
(N) =	(453)	(4128)	(468)	(2278)	(287)	(2007)

Note: 1 The respondents were asked to rate the importance of each representational focus listed above. The percentages are based on those who rated any focus as "very important".

to the district focus, followed next by political parties. The Turkish pattern is considerably different. Political parties were considered more important foci than were the electoral districts, the reverse of the patterns observed in other two countries. This may be due to the central role that the Turkish parties play in politics and in part to a multi-member system being used there.

Of special interest is a strong emphasis placed on the personal convictions in Korea. More than half of the Korean notables (56.2%) felt that the MPs should act according to their personal convictions rather than anything else. Among the constituents almost as many (43%) held the similar views. In comparison to other countries these figures represent substantially higher proportions, suggesting that many Koreans think it appropriate for

their MPs to act according to their personal beliefs, i.e., trustee orientations. It has been suggested that the trustee orientations are particularly compatible with the prevailing norms and expectations of leadership role in Korea.¹⁹ The Confucian ethics which are still dominant in the Korean culture, extol the virtue of chijo, that is, being a man of principle. The leaders with chijo have supposedly a set of clear-cut personal political philosophy, and are expected to stand unflinchingly by these principles. Actions leading to a compromise or conciliation are regarded as egregious violations of this cardinal virtue. The prevalence of such cultural norms renders a trustee orientation both appropriate and desirable.

The nature of representation is also revealed in the interactive process between MPs and their constituents. In order to remain in touch with their districts most MPs engage in a wide range of activities. These activities may include their frequent visits to home districts, mailing pamphlets or other printed matters to voters to explain their stands on policy issues, attending to the case mail, touring their districts on speaking engagements, spending the time in their district offices to see ordinary constituents, and attending ceremonial functions such as a wedding or funeral. Whether an MP does this because of his reelection strategy or merely out of a sense of his duty, the fact remains that he cannot escape from the necessity of contact with his constituency.

However, an MP does not perceive, as Richard Fenno has recently shown his constituency as an indistinguishable whole.²⁰ Fenno has argued that an MP tends to perceive his district as "a nest of concentric circles" of different constituencies: the geographical, the reelection, the primary, and the personal constituencies. Each carries a different weight in importance for an MP, with the personal constituency at the head of his list followed by the primary, the reelection, and the geographic constituencies. He will try most hard to remain in good relations with the members of his personal and primary constituencies, by listening carefully to their opinions and by giving a priority to any request coming from them. In a country like the United States, which was the context in which Fenno has conducted his study, the district political system has usually a highly differentiated structure. There are a multiplicity of active and well organized groups, each based on common economic interests, political convictions, social and cultural concerns, a specific issue, or an ethnic identity. These groups act as the intermediate structure of politics.

The situations in many developing societies are vastly different. At the district level the political structure remains largely undifferentiated. Nor has the intermediate structure of organized groups attained a level of full maturation. In the absence of well organized and effective groups, local notables take on the functions of the intermediate structure in these societies. Consequently, local notables residing in a community perform a critical role of intermediaries between the government at the center and the grassroots people at the periphery. They are respected in the community for their knowledge, status and wealth. Their views and

guidances are eagerly sought and are deferred to by individual members of the community. Because of these reasons the notables provide a vital link in both upward and downward flow of political communication.

In an electoral district local notables are, in some sense, rough equivalent to what Fenno would call the members of an MP's personal or primary constituencies. Without their support he has little chance to win in election. Without their cooperations he cannot penetrate effectively into his constituency, nor can he learn major concerns of his voters. In fact, a preponderant majority of the MPs interviewed mentioned the names of local notables when we asked them whom they particularly try to see back in their home districts. The proportions of MPs who sought most to see their local notables were: 85.7% in Kenya, 69.7% in Korea, and 91.3% in Turkey. This evidence attests to the important role of local leadership in developing societies.

Because any form of interaction involves at a minimum two parties, we examine the subject from two sides: MPs on the one hand and the represented on the other. Turning to MPs and the ways in which they try to keep in touch with their constituencies, we see significant variations by country (see Table 3). Almost on all the constituency activities examined, the Kenyan MPs showed the highest level of activism. They reported that they had returned to their home districts an average of 4.5 times each month. In comparison, the Korean and Turkish legislators visited their districts 1.5 and 2.6 times, respectively. Looking at the average number of days each legislator spends in his constituency per month, the Kenyan MPs showed an impressive record. They spent 14.8 days in district, dividing their time equally between their sojourns in Nairobi and in their constituencies. The MPs of other countries spent much shorter time in their districts: 5.9 days in Korea and 9.1 days in Turkey. These findings are not surprising, because we have already seen the highest priority that the Kenyans attached to the service aspect of the legislative role.

Other variations exist, also. The volume of mails coming to an MP, the number of district voters he sees, the number of petitions he sponsors for his voters, and the number of times he publishes leaflets and distributes them in the district, all vary from country to country. Of particular interest is the number of voters the MPs entertained. In all three countries the MPs met with a number of their voters every day. In Kenya, the MPs reported that they had received 37.4 voters per week. In Korea and Turkey, the legislators met with even a greater number: 44.5 persons and 38.2 persons, respectively. It is interesting to note that the Kenyans published leaflets far more frequently than did their colleagues in other countries. Many factors undoubtedly affect the level of an MP's activities in his district, including among others the size of his district, its proximity to the nation's capital, the accepted means of social communication, his self-role perceptions and his political ambition.

The interaction pattern could be analyzed from the standpoint of constituents, too. How extensive contacts do constituents maintain with

TABLE 3

MP's Constituency Activities in Three Countries

Activities	Kenyan MPs	Korean MPs	Turkish MPs
How often do you visit your district each month?	4.5 times	1.5 times	2.6 times
How many days do you spend in district each month?	14.8 days	5.9 days	9.1 days
How many letters do you get from your constituency a week?	18.6 letters	34.1 letters	27.7 letters
How many petitions do you receive from your constituency each session?	13.2 petitions	21.6 petitions	N.A.
How many of your voters come to see you each week?	37.4 voters	44.5 voters	38.2 voters
How many times a year do you publish leaflets explaining policies and your positions on them?	11.8 times	2.6 times	2.5 times
Who are the people you most often try to see in district (% of MPs who tried to see local notables)	85.7%	69.7%	91.3%
	(N) = (28)	(83)	(104)

Note: 1 The responses to this open ended question were first coded in terms of specific types of people an MP sought to see. For the purpose of data presentation we have collapsed our detailed categories into two groups: local notables and ordinary voters.

2 The appointed members were not included.

their MPs, and how? The contact data from the three countries are summarized in Table 4. Two general aspects of the data deserve some comments. The first point relates to the consistent tendency among the Kenyan citizens, more than among anyone else, to maintain a close contact with their MPs, which is something one can easily expect knowing their inclination to stress the service aspect of the legislative role. They indicated that they had seen their MPs an average of 1.3 times in the recent six month period, in contrast to a minimal 0.3 times reported in both Korea and Turkey. The constituents in Kenya saw the MPs as much as four times more frequently than did the constituents in other countries. Their contacts were also markedly more extensive in other respects: 12 percent reported that they had talked personally to the MPs in Nairobi (only 1% in Korea and 3% in Turkey); 49 percent could tell us some specific things that their MPs had done in the district; and 4 percent claimed that the MPs had helped them with personal problems. Compared to the constituents in Korea and Turkey, the Kenyans enjoyed the most active contact with their representatives.

The second point had to do with the local notables' contacts with MPs. Without any exception they maintained greatly more extensive contact than did the ordinary constituents in all areas that we examined. They saw the MPs more frequently both in the capital and in the district, visited with the MPs more frequently, and received more personal favors. The differences between the two groups were consistent across nations and impressively large in magnitude. We are, therefore, convinced that the local notables constituted the most activist elements in their respective communities, providing a vital link between the center and peripheries. Moreover, we can now say with some confidence that among the three countries Kenya had the most extensive and intimate representative linkages, frequently forged on the basis of service activities and close contacts.

III. Citizen Participation

Elections of the members to representative bodies provide opportunities for citizens to participate. Beyond the relatively simple and formal act of voting, MPs create significant participatory opportunities in many other ways. Election campaigns draw activist elements as campaign workers and involve a large portion of citizens in election rallies through which the citizens are exposed to direct political stimuli. Moreover, the MPs as the intermediaries between the government and their districts can educate citizens in the arts of lobbying. If there were no legislature, the citizen participation of this kind would probably not exist. The developmental role of the legislature must be seen in this context.

TABLE 4

Constituents' Contact with MPs

Types of Contact	KENYA		KOREA		TURKEY	
	Constituents	Local Notables	Constituents	Local Notables	Constituents	Local Notables
How many times have you seen your MP(s) in the last 6 months?	1.3	2.9	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.8
How many times have you seen your MP(s) in the district in the last 6 months?	1.2	2.8	0.2	1.0	n.a.	n.a.
% of people who have ever talked to the MP in the capital city	12%	28%	1%	10%	3%	37%
% of people who have talked personally to their MPs about some problems	4%	10%	0.7%	4%	2.9%	3.5%
% of people who have mentioned specific things the MP did for the district	49%	73%	14%	27%	26%	48%
% of people who mentioned that the MP did something personally for them	2.6%	5.1%	0.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.4%
(N) =	(4128)	(453)	(2274)	(468)	(2007)	(287)

A significant part of citizen participation revolves around the legislature and its members. To cite a few examples, we note the acts of voting, attending election rallies, discussing relative merits of candidates in order to persuade others, working as campaign staff, lobbying an MP for community or private interests. Given the formal nature of voting and its susceptibility to mobilization, we regard other modes of participation fostered by MPs as far more important. This is because the acts of campaign assistance and lobbying require a greater political sophistication and therefore, represent a more genuine self-assertive behavior.

In Table 5 we report the participatory data from the three countries. Voting participation is uniformly high. Eighty-four percent voted in the National Assembly Election in Korea. In Turkey and Kenya their respective voting rates were 80 percent and 67 percent. Election rallies also drew an impressive rate of participation: 53% in Korea, 34% in Turkey, and 51% in Kenya. Looking at more time consuming political activities such as campaign work and direct lobbying with MPs, it comes as no surprise that only a minority of activists were involved. However, we were impressed with the rates of such activities in the three countries, especially in comparison with the similar figures collected in other advanced western countries.

TABLE 5
Levels of Political Participation
(percentages)

Activities	Korea	Turkey	Kenya
<u>Voting</u>			
Voted in the last election	84	80	67
Voted in the election before the last one	88	71	51
<u>Campaign activity</u>			
Attended campaign rallies	53	34	51
Persuaded others how to vote	35	24	20
Ever worked for a candidate	11	16	20
<u>Contacting officials</u>			
Contacted officials regarding local problems	12	23	15
Contacted officials regarding national problems	5	13	17
Contacted legislators	4	10	6

There are of course other channels of participation. But the main point that we wish to stress is that political activities engendered by the legislative process account for a large share of citizens' total political involvement. Had there been no functioning legislatures in these countries, their citizens would have been deprived of these participatory opportunities that they now enjoy.

IV. Resource Allocation

There are two principal ways in which a legislature can affect the resource allocation. One is through its lawmaking capacity, especially through the exercise of its power over budgetary matters. The other is through an individual member's effort to induce the government funds to his district. Although the legislature has a formal power of appropriations it exercises in fact little control over such matters in many developing countries. Economic planning and spending policies are largely determined by the executive, while the legislature tends to approve these government actions as a matter of course without amending or modifying their contents in any significant way. Although legislatures can in theory affect the allocative process, they appear in practice to exercise little influence in this way.

The allocative role of the legislature, if any, is likely to be seen in its individual members' constituency activities. MPs are everywhere expected to perform a certain degree of constituency service. In fact, for a majority of constituents this aspect of an MP's job is what is usually meant to be representation. Recent studies of developing legislatures all point out the constituency service as a single most important function of legislators. Part of this constituency activity involves a competition among MPs for government resources. They try to attract more public funds to their districts such as construction projects, rural development schemes, industries, educational and health care facilities. Because they are in a unique position that obligates them to be responsive to the variable needs of their districts, unlike those planners and bureaucrats in the central government who are preoccupied with the growth aspects of national economy, MPs' effort to obtain government resources for their districts may result in a more equitable regional distribution of wealth.

A clear majority of MPs in all three countries considered their allocative role as extremely important. For example, 71.4 percent of our Kenyan MPs ranked their job of getting government projects at the top of their important duties (see Table 1). In Turkey and Korea 59.7 percent and 40 percent of their MPs rated this particular job as most important. On the other hand, their constituents also stressed the MPs' allocative role. The constituents in the three countries expected their MPs to be active in their allocative role and their MPs responded by taking this role seriously.

In an effort to determine the amount of time each MP actually spends to provide goods and services for his district, we asked him: "What types of problems occupy most of your time?" The responses to the question are summarized in Table 6. In all three countries a majority mentioned the problems of their districts. In Kenya a preponderant majority of 82 percent indicated such problems, suggesting a greater salience of constituency service work among the Kenyan MPs than it is elsewhere. It is not too difficult to imagine that part of the district problems that MPs spoke of involve their efforts to bring both material and other tangible benefits to their districts.

TABLE 6
Problems Occupying Legislator's Time
(in percentages)

Types of Problems	Kenya	Korea	Turkey
Problems in district	82.1	57.3	51.0
National problems	7.1	40.2	34.6
Both equally	7.1	2.4	13.5
Evades questions, NA,DK	3.6	0.0	1.0
	(N) = (28)	(82)	(104)

The allocative role of MPs could be analyzed from the view point of their constituents, too. To begin with, much of an MP's constituency service is the result of requests originating among district voters. They may express their concerns for the inadequate facilities of public education, the lack of health care centers, the retarded economic development in the area, or the need for paved roads. Before an MP can act in response to these needs, constituency requests must be communicated to him. In the survey we asked both local notables and constituents whether they had ever talked to their MPs personally in the recent 6 months. We did not expect to find many constituents having such an experience, because if they had indeed any such request they were more likely to channel it through their community leaders such as village heads or other notables who were in close touch with politicians. As shown in Table 7 relatively few constituents had direct contacts with their MPs (roughly between 5-11%) but among the local notables nearly half had experiences of talking to their MPs personally. It seems quite clear that the bulk of problems that people bring to their MPs' attention were normally mediated by

their prominent local leaders.

What kind of problems do people take to their MPs? The data in Table 8 show that a sizable proportion of these problems were of the public nature involving the interests of a whole village or a larger district community. In Turkey such problems accounted for two-thirds of all the problems. In Kenya and Korea they accounted for more than one-third. There is no doubt that much of the problems classified as of the public nature has something to do with the "pork barrel" projects.

TABLE 7

Have You Ever Talked to An M.P.
About Any Problem
(Percentages)

	<u>KENYA</u>		<u>KOREA</u>		<u>TURKEY</u>	
	Const.	Notables	Const.	Notables	Const.	Notables
Yes	7.2	47.4	5.4	45.6	10.7	64.8
No	92.8	52.6	94.6	54.4	89.3	35.2
	(N=3381)	(N=342)	(N=1724)	(N=377)	(N=1950)	(N=287)

TABLE 8

What Problem Have You Talked About
With Legislator
(Percentages)

	<u>KENYA</u>		<u>KOREA</u>		<u>TURKEY</u>	
	Const.	Notables	Const.	Notables	Const.	Notables
Personal Problems	59.1	37.7	54.2	58.8	13.2	3.5
Public Problems	39.7	61.1	32.5	39.9	66.5	67.8
Both	0.0	0.0	13.3	1.3	20.3	28.7

An impressive number of the constituents were aware of material and other tangible benefits that their MPs have brought to their districts (see Table 9). With the exception of Korea, nearly one-half of the Kenyans and well over two-thirds of the Turkish constituents could mention at least one or more things that their MPs had done for the districts. In contrast, barely fourteen percent of the Korean constituents could name such activities of their MPs. It is also interesting to note that the local notables of all three countries saw greater achievements in their MPs' activities than did the rank-and-file constituents. This may in part reflect their greater familiarity with what their MPs actually do. At any rate, it is evident that the MPs spend a good deal of their time attending to their allocative role. Also, their constituents were acutely cognizant of their allocative role.

Despite some significant variations between countries and between individual MPs of the same country, their allocative activities nevertheless comprise a main part of their duties. If it were not for their allocative role, the distribution of government resources would have taken a different shape in these countries probably less in the direction of regional equity.

TABLE 9

What Has Your Legislator Done
For Your Community
(Percentages)

	KENYA		KOREA		TURKEY	
	Consti- tuents	Notables	Consti- tuents	Notables	Consti- tuents	Notables
Mentioned 3 to 5 things	11.0	15.4	1.1	3.8	5.0	10.8
Mentioned 2 things	15.6	24.9	3.4	7.3	8.0	14.6
Mentioned 1 thing	22.1	32.9	9.5	16.5	13.0	22.6
Mentioned nothing or N.A.	51.4	26.7	85.9	72.4	74.0	51.9
N =	(4128)	(453)	(2274)	(468)	(2007)	(287)

V. Legitimation

The legislature can play a critical role in legitimating the regime. Even in countries where the powers of legislature is reduced to its bare minimum, seldom do the leaders of these regimes do away with it entirely. Occasionally, legislatures have been abolished following military coups or revolutions. But in most cases they were restored after a relatively brief interruption. All of this suggest that various regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, see some advantages in having a representative body. One advantage that they may see is its legitimating function. Otherwise, it would not have been retained in many authoritarian political systems.

The legitimating function can be described in several ways as discussed earlier: latent, manifest, the safety valve, and the spill-over effect. However, we will concentrate on the two aspects of legitimation, namely the manifest and spill-over functions because the relevant data are available. The manifest function refers to the legislative activities that directly legitimate the policies and actions of government. These activities may include the legislative approvals of government proposed legislation, the endorsements of government policies, and individual members' effort to explain to their constituents why these policies are appropriate. The spill-over effect refers to the link between citizens' support for the legislature and their basic attitudes toward other parts of the government.

In most countries the executives tend to set the legislative agenda: they formulate most of the bills considered by the legislature and the rates of government bills enacted in the legislature tend to be substantially higher than private members' bills. In the Kenyan National Assembly only a single bill was introduced by a private member during the 1963-69 period, with the remainder originating in the executive branch.²¹ In the Korean case, not only do the government bills outnumber private members' bills but also, show a greater rate of success in their enactment.²² The chief activity of the legislature in these two countries almost seems to be one of legitimating policies for the executive.

Moreover, many MPs regarded the job of explaining government policies to their constituents as an important part of their duties. In Turkey nearly 70 percent of the MPs considered it as their foremost duty (see Table 1). In other two countries it is regarded as less important: 30 percent in Korea and 11 percent in Kenya, respectively. Although there are marked variations between country, it is nevertheless important to note that some MPs spend a good deal of their time and energy to justify the actions of government.

Constituents' support for the legislature can affect their attitudes toward other parts of government, ultimately contributing to the regime stability. A variety of factors can determine a citizen's support for the representative body, including his demographic characteristics, the degree of his contact with the MP, his knowledge and expectation of the

legislative institution, his satisfaction with legislative performance. Of all these variables two were of particular importance: the degree of satisfaction with legislative performance and the level of one's knowledge about the legislature.²³

To test the spill-over effect it is necessary to measure the amount of support that citizens accord the legislature. Our operational measure of the support is based on a battery of questions included in the survey. Each of these questions was designed to determine whether the constituents consider it both necessary and desirable to maintain a legislative body, whether they regard the legislature as one of the best things ever established since independence, whether they believe their country would be worse off if it were abolished or reduced in size, or whether they believe it has played an important and useful role. In Table 10 we display these questions and the constituents' responses from the three countries.

TABLE 10
Responses to Support Questions in Kenya,
Korea and Turkey
(percentages)

Support Items	KOREA (N=2274)			TURKEY (N=2007)			KENYA (N=4128)		
	Supportive	Negative	N.A. or D.K.	Supportive	Negative	N.A. or D.K.	Supportive	Negative	N.A. or D.K.
Do we really need a legislature?	81	3	16	93	2	5	not asked		
What difference has it made to this country?	67	8	25	83	3	14	61	13	26
Are we better off because we have a legislature?	63	9	28	80	8	12	64	8	28
Is it one of the best things established since independence?	42	13	45	90	2	8	71	8	21
Could we do just as well with half as many MPs? (No scored as support.)	20	30	50	51	34	15	not asked		

The data suggest several conclusions. First, the level of legislative support is generally high in all countries, perhaps surprisingly high for an institution that is neither highly institutionalized nor very powerful. In Korea and Turkey over four-fifths of those interviewed indicated that the legislature is a necessary institution. Similarly, at least three-fifths of all constituents believed that they are better off because they have a legislature and that it has played a significant and useful role. Secondly, a small percentage of the constituents gave negative answers, suggesting that the legislature is not a target for widespread public hostility. The main line of division lies between those who gave positive answers and those who did not know or did not have any opinions. Therefore, a majority of the population were either supportive of the legislature or indifferent to it and only relatively few people regarded it with hostility. Thirdly, of the three countries the Turkish people gave the strongest support, a finding that might have been anticipated given the long history of her legislature and the influence that body wields in the Turkish political system.

We now know that a majority of the constituents in the three countries are basically supportive of their legislatures. How much of this support spills over into their attitudes toward other parts of government? We do not have adequate data to determine its causal links directly. However, we can establish a correlation between the level of legislative support and the support for other parts of government by showing that a majority of citizens see various branches of government as an indistinguishable whole. If a citizen supports the legislature, he is very likely to support other branches of government just as much because he does not see them as separate entities. We asked the constituents: "Do you think the National Assembly does something very different from other parts of the government, and if so, what?" A sizable percentage of the adult population in each country replied that there are no differences (see Table 11). Roughly three-fourths of both Kenyans and Koreans saw their legislature as an indistinguishable part of the government. In Turkey the proportion is smaller and yet, nearly 44 percent did not distinguish the legislature from other parts of the government. To the extent that a legislature is capable of enlisting popular support it can contribute to the legitimacy of the regime, especially among the segment of the population who do not distinguish the legislative branch from other parts of the government.

TABLE 11

Percentages of Citizens Who Did Not Distinguish
Legislature From Other Parts of Government

	KENYA	KOREA	TURKEY
	78.5%	74.4%	43.8%
Total (N)	(4128)	(2274)	(2007)

VI. Conclusions

We have seen that legislatures could contribute to development through a variety of functions that they perform. Drawing upon the survey data collected in three countries we have analyzed four key legislative functions. Representation as a mechanism linking the politicians at the center and the ordinary people at peripheries promotes the integrative process. Both legislators and their constituents in the three countries regarded representation chiefly as a relationship through which support and services are exchanged. MPs tried to develop a close tie with their constituencies and broaden their support bases by involving more of their voters. As a result those elements of the population who would otherwise be left out of politics were brought into the representative linkages.

Accessibility and responsiveness of MPs foster citizen participation. Citizens look upon their MPs as their tribunes and seek MPs' help for their grievances or problems. They try to influence the government actions through the mediation of their representatives. Legislatures expand participation because they create opportunities for periodic elections and demand-making behaviors that are channeled through MPs. The formal electoral opportunities created by the legislature may be of the secondary importance, for much of the voting participation could be the results of mobilization. The more genuine participation of the self-conscious and self-assertive sort derives from non-electoral participation. Legislators provide opportunities for such citizen participation by offering themselves as an easily accessible and responsive target for demand-making actions.

Two aspects of MPs' allocative role were considered. They could influence the resource allocation by their collective actions such as lawmaking. In most countries however the initiatives for legislation and spending policies originate for the most part with the executive. The allocative role of individual MPs appears to be far more important. They compete with each other to induce more public funds and projects to their districts. Often, because their success in bringing both material and tangible benefits to their constituents is directly linked to their reelection, they try to do their best to satisfy the economic needs of their districts. In all three countries the allocative role was regarded as the single most important aspect of the legislative role by both MPs themselves and the constituents. Because MPs are more sensitive to the variable needs of their geographic constituencies than are the bureaucrats in the central government, their allocative behaviors may lead to a more equitable regional distribution of resources. In this sense, MPs constitute a countervailing force against the growth strategy often adopted by the planners and officials in the central government.

Legislatures can legitimate the actions of the government. A government policy, formally approved in the form of a law by an elected body, will be

regarded by citizens as more legitimate than otherwise. This is probably one of the reasons why legislatures are maintained even in most autocratic regimes. A well functioning legislature can also enhance the legitimacy of the regime through what we have called its "spill-over" effect. Citizens may develop a positive attitude toward the legislature, regarding it as a valuable and useful political institution. The reservoir of good will and support that the population builds up could be extended to other parts of the government. A legislature which meets the needs and expectations of a majority of citizens helps legitimate the regime itself. We have seen that a majority of the constituents in the three countries were basically supportive of their legislatures and that they saw the legislature and other parts of the government as an indistinguishable whole. Therefore, their support for the legislature, we argued, would be spilled over, so to speak, to the regime as a whole.

The potential contributions of a legislature to development and modernization depend upon what key functions and how much of them it performs. In the three countries where we conducted our study, we found that the legislatures were actively involved in creating the representative linkages, the opportunities for more autonomous and self-assertive citizen participation, the channels which promote a more equitable regional distribution of resources, and the political atmosphere which enhances citizens' support for the regime. Although the legislature in each country performed all of these functions in somewhat variable manners, they nevertheless were all engaged significantly in representation, resource allocation, legitimation, and participation. The legislatures contribute to development to the extent that they perform these functions.

Footnotes

The research project on which this publication is based is a collaborative enterprise among a number of scholars in Kenya, Korea, Turkey, and the United States. The study was jointly designed by Professors Joel D. Barkan, G.R. Boynton, Chong Lim Kim, Gerhard Loewenberg, and John C. Wahlke, all of the University of Iowa; and by Professors John Okumu (University of Khartoum); Seong-Tong Pai (Seoul National University); and Ahmet Yücekök (University of Ankara). Field work in Korea was directed by Professors Kim and Pai, and by Young C. Kihl (Iowa State University); in Kenya by Professors Barkan and Okumu; in Turkey by Professor Turan and by Professors Nur Vergin (University of Istanbul) and Metin Heper (Bogazici University). Professor Malcolm E. Jewell (University of Kentucky) served as a Research Associate during the analysis phase of the project. Financial support was obtained from an institutional development grant made to the University of Iowa by the Agency for International Development, and from the Rockefeller Foundation for aspects of field research in Kenya.

1. The well-known Princeton University series (7 volumes) on political development has almost totally ignored the significance of legislatures in political change. Primary attention was given to such topics as political communications, bureaucracy, modernization in Turkey and Japan, education, political culture, political parties, and crises in development.
2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), p. 269.
3. See Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel C. Patterson, Comparing Legislatures (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979) and Michael L. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979).
4. Loewenberg and Patterson, op. cit., pp. 43-67.
5. Ibid., pp. 283-292.
6. Mezey, op. cit., pp. 6-11.
7. Ibid., pp. 223-224 and 266-274.
8. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 76.
9. Cited by Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
10. Ibid., p. 269.
11. The data were collected as part of the comparative legislative research project by the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa, with support from the Agency for International Development. The field survey in the three countries was conducted during the period of 1973-74.

12. For a good summary of legislative functions, see, in addition to recent works by Loewenberg and Patterson and Mezey already cited, Robert A. Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development," in Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 521-582.

13. See C.L. Kim, Joel D. Barkan, Iltter Turan, and Malcolm E. Jewell, The Legislative Connection: The Representative and the Represented in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey (forthcoming).

14. For the concept of autonomous participation, see Huntington and Nelson, op. cit., pp. 7-10, and C.L. Kim, ed., Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-Clio Press, forthcoming), esp. chapter 1.

15. Packenham, op. cit., pp. 527-530.

16. For recent formulations of the concept 'representation' see Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karps, "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (August, 1977), pp. 233-254, and Gerhard Loewenberg and Chong Lim Kim, "Comparing the Representativeness of Parliaments," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 3 (February, 1978), pp. 27-49.

17. We have followed the distinction between representational style and focus, first suggested by Wahlke and his associates. See John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, W. Buchanan, and L.C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 269-272.

18. See the special issue on the parliamentary politician in Asia of the Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (August, 1976), which includes the analyses of legislators' behavior in India, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, and Korea.

19. C.L. Kim and B.K. Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (November, 1972), pp. 626-651.

20. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration," American Political Science Review, 71 (September, 1977), pp. 883-917.

21. J.E. Hakes, The Parliamentary Party of the Kenyan African National Union: Cleavages and Cohesion in the Ruling Party of a New Nation. Ph.D. Dissertation (Duke University, 1979), p. 215.

22. C.L. Kim and B.K. Woo, "Legislative Leadership and Democratic Development," in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (eds.), Political Leadership in Korea (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1976), pp. 47-52.

23. See The Legislative Connection, op. cit., esp. chapter 12.

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The Center is a research unit in the Department of Political Science of the University of Iowa. Under its auspices, research is conducted on the role of legislative and non-legislative political elites in both industrialized and less-developed countries. This research is comparative and collaborative, involving scholars at the University of Iowa, at other U.S. universities, as well as at universities in Belgium, Italy, Kenya, Korea, Switzerland and Turkey. The Center has been supported by grants from the Agency for International Development, the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Fonds National Suisse.

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