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


REPRESENTATION AND LEGISLATIVE
CULTURE IN CONSTITUENCIES:
A STUDY OF LINKAGE FORMS IN KOREA

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Occasional Paper Series



**The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa**

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December, 1979

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The subject of our inquiry is the forms of representative linkage that evolve in a country with a relatively short but turbulent parliamentary experience. More specifically, our purpose is twofold: (1) to identify various forms of representative linkage that each legislator forges with his/her district constituency, and (2) to explore the factors that account for the variance in representative linkages. The linkage, as defined in this study, refers to the complex nexus of behaviors and attitudes connecting a representative and his district constituency. It consists of, among other things, mutual expectations of roles, interactive behaviors in conformity to such roles, and the exchanges of goods and services and electoral support.

One important aspect of a legislator's job is to serve his district constituency. The quantity and quality of services and the ways in which he provides them determine the particular form of his representative linkage. The linkages are formed largely as the result of an interplay of two different sets of forces. At the one end of the linkage is the representative himself with his particular ambition, his unique conception of his role, his peculiar ties to the district formed over a period of time, and all of his idiosyncrasies. At the other end is a complex bundle of interests, sentiments and traditions, i.e., district constituency. Not only do different configurations of interests prevail in different districts, but the same interests are often articulated by different groups in different constituencies. Moreover, different constituency groups have varying amounts of resources and political skills, requiring a representative to pay closer attention to some but not to others. With but a few exceptions, most previous studies have analyzed the representative linkages from a limited vantage point, either from the viewpoint of the representatives or from the perspective of district constituents.¹ Obviously, a more complete understanding of the linkage phenomenon can be achieved if we take into account all

relevant actors, namely the representative and his constituents simultaneously.

The Concept of Legislative Culture

In an effort to account for variations in representative linkages we have formulated a concept of legislative culture. It refers to a part of the district political subculture, that is, the pattern of beliefs and attitudes shared widely among district constituents about the legislative institution and its members.² To what extent do the constituents of a district regard the legislature and its members as salient political objects? To what extent do they value the legislature as a key institution? What function and how much of it do they expect this institution to perform? And, how effectively do they feel the legislature and its members are performing their tasks?

For the purpose of analysis we have constructed a typology of district legislative cultures. As shown in Figure 1, the typology is based on two variables, cognition and evaluation, which are derived from the Almond-Verba formulation of the political culture.³ Each of the four types of legislative culture requires a further explication.

The Responsive Culture

This type of legislative culture manifests a high level of public's cognition of and a positive support for the legislature and its activities.⁴ A majority of the constituents in such a district exhibit a keen interest in all aspects of legislative affairs, are generally well informed of what the legislature and its members do, and regard the legislature as a highly valued institution.

The responsive culture requires a certain socioeconomic level for its development. Education, urban residence, media exposure, and personal income all contribute to a heightened political consciousness among constituents. And the politically-conscious constituents are likely to pay close attention to what the legislature does and also evaluate their legislators' performance critically. This kind of district subculture impels a representative to be responsive to constituents' demands, for his reelection depends in a large measure on how well he satisfied their expectations. Thus, the responsive culture is likely to evolve in districts that are socioeconomically developed.

FIGURE 1. A TYPOLOGY OF LEGISLATIVE CULTURES

		<u>Public Cognition of Legislative Affairs</u>	
		High	Low
<u>Public Evaluation of the Legislative Institution</u>	High	The Responsive Culture	The Deferential Culture
	Low	The Disenchanted Culture	The Apathetic Culture

In districts where the responsive culture predominates, legislators are subject to a number of specific constraints. In contrast to some of their colleagues representing less developed constituencies, they have to deal with highly articulate and well informed voters. Their daily behaviors, within and outside the legislature, are closely scrutinized by their constituents and they are held accountable for their actions when the next election comes around. There are strong pressures on him to act in close conformity to what his constituents believe to be his proper role. Furthermore, he is expected to maintain a close and at the same time a broad contact with the district. All of these constraints lead him to form a distinctive representative linkage.

The representative linkages that operate in the responsive cultures should exhibit, for the reasons discussed above, the following features. First, there is a strong consensus on what a representative should be doing between a legislative member and his constituents. Second, there is an extensive interaction and communication between the representative and his constituency. Third, the representative engages in active constituency service works. Fourth, the rate of electoral participation is high in such districts with a majority of voters deciding their votes on the basis of a candidate's performance records. Fifth, the role of intermediaries such as local notables is insignificant because the activist constituents seek a direct access to their representatives. The responsive culture, with its coterminous representative linkages discussed above, is clearly the type of a legislative culture required for the development of a strong representative government. It would not only provide a political environment where the

legislature would enjoy a broad base of mass support, but also the conditions conducive to a strong legislative body.

The Deferential Culture

There are districts where a majority of constituents know very little about the legislature and its activities and yet continue to give strong support to it. At first glance, it may appear implausible: why would anybody show a positive affect for an institution about which he or she knows so little? There are, however, a large group of people in Korea who manifest such orientations. Often these people are concentrated in the most traditional sectors of society and are characterized by their deeply ingrained attitudes of deference toward status and power. They are habitually deferential and submissive to governmental institutions including the legislature and its individual members. Consequently, their support for the legislature grows out of their deference, not their conscious assessment of legislative performance based on some detailed knowledge of what the institution and its members actually do.

The deferential culture is likely to be found in remote and culturally isolated districts where traditional patterns of authority still prevail. These districts are often socioeconomically most backward and least affected by modernization. The kind of representative linkages most likely to evolve in such districts are of an elitist character. The representatives, relatively free from close scrutiny of informed and self-assertive constituents, enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in their actions. Similarly, they can expect little constituency opposition no matter what they do as legislators because a large majority of their constituents are basically deferential in attitudes. For this reason their posture toward the rank-and-file district voters tends to be elitist in character. However, this does not mean that they are totally free from all constituency constraints. In the deferential cultures local notables play an important social and political role in the community, often as the spokesmen and guardians of local interests. The local notables such as village heads, leaders of kinship organizations and wealthy farmers build their ties with the members of a rural community on the basis of communal norms of reciprocity and personal loyalty. At the minimum, the representative needs the endorsement

and support of the notables for his success in an election. Without their cooperation he cannot even reach the voters with any degree of effectiveness. Given the pivotal role of local notables it is only natural for the legislator to cultivate a close relationship with the notables.

The main features of representative linkage in the deferential culture include: a close agreement on legislative roles between the representative and the local notables in his district but not between the representative and his general constituents, an extensive network of interaction and communications channels between the representative and his local notables but not between the representative and his general constituents, an active service role of the representative almost exclusively for his notables but not for the broad public in the district. Another feature is that such a district shows a higher than average voting rate because the deferential voter is easily mobilized in support of a candidate favored by local notables.⁵ The local notables are in effect the gatekeepers of local communities and serve as the intermediaries on their behalf. Thus, the representative linkage of the deferential culture has a two-step flow of communication and interaction: one between a legislator and his local notables and another between the notables and their respective local followers. A direct link between a representative and the general constituents is seldom operative, and any such attempt by a legislator would antagonize his local notables.

The Disenchanted Culture

The defining characteristics of this culture are a high level of public cognition of the legislature and a negative evaluation of its performance. While the constituents are well informed about what the legislature and its individual members do, they nevertheless accord them a low support because they are deeply disappointed by the institution's performance or by the incompetence of their representatives. When such disappointment runs deep they become totally cynical about the very worth as well as the existence of the legislature itself. Their disenchantment becomes acute because they know a great deal about the legislature and possess high expectations. Such cynicism and disenchantment

may eventually diminish their support for the institution. Such a culture is most likely to evolve in highly modernized urban districts. This is because well informed citizens tend to have a higher expectation of legislative performance and become easily disappointed if the legislature delivers a poor performance.

There are several distinctive features of representative linkage that evolve in the disenchanting culture. The degree of agreement on the legislative role between a representative and his constituents would be relatively low. There would be only a minimal amount of interaction and communication between the representative and his constituency. While his contact with the district is sparse, his level of activity within the legislature or in his party, in contrast, would be markedly high. In a similar vein, he would provide relatively little service for his constituency, in part because his action is more oriented toward the matters internal to the legislature, and in part because his constituents, disdaining his effectiveness, do not actively seek his assistance. In the disenchanting culture we expect to see a low rate of electoral participation simply because the electorate holds a negative view of the legislature as well as of the electoral process associated with it. Also, local notables would play a limited intermediary role because neither the representatives see any need in seeking their support nor do the constituents depend on them for influence mediation.

The Apathetic Culture

Characteristics of this legislative culture are: an extremely low level of public cognition of the legislative institution and a low support for or an indifferent attitude toward, the legislature. The constituents of the apathetic culture are poorly informed on governmental affairs and the activities of the legislature in particular. They are little interested in what transpires in the Assembly Hall and in what their representative does. These matters are usually beyond their comprehension, and even when they can comprehend they often regard them as irrelevant to their central concerns. Typically, members of the apathetic culture hold a parochial worldview and do not see themselves as an integral part of the national political life.

On the periphery of a political system we encounter such electoral districts. They are usually located in the most backward areas of a nation or in the regions occupied by minority racial and cultural groups. Needless to say, the apathetic culture indicates the extent of malintegration of the political system and is widespread in newly emerging nations with the deep cleavages running along tribal, religious, ethnic, and cultural lines.

The distinctive aspects of the representative linkage in the apathetic cultures include: a role ambiguity caused by the constituents' indifference or lack of role expectations, a marked absence of interactions and communications, and a limited amount of service performed by the representative almost exclusively on behalf of a few select local notables. Overall, the linkages are the weakest in this type of district.

In Figure 2 we summarize the kinds of linkages that we expect to find in different legislative cultures. Before we proceed to present the data on linkage types, a brief discussion of our research setting and the data is in order.

Setting and Data

The Korean National Assembly or the Kukhoe was created in 1948. Since then it has functioned continuously with the exception of two occasions when it was interrupted by the 1960 Student Uprising and the 1961 military coup. Over the years, its constitutional status has changed several times as the nation's Constitution was frequently amended. Under the Yushin (Revitalizing Reforms) constitution the powers of the legislature were drastically reduced, permitting the Executive to exercise an almost total power. There were 219 seats in the National Assembly, two-thirds of which were filled by members popularly elected in geographical constituencies. The remaining one-third were filled by the members appointed by the President with the concurrence of a larger representative body called "the National Conference for Unification." The NCU, allegedly created to promote and secure the national consensus on the issue of unification, was a rubber stamp organization and remained completely loyal to the President. Its membership, some 2500 delegates, was popularly elected. Not only did it convene infrequently but also, its meetings were very brief. It routinely endorsed the list of nominees

Figure 2. Characteristic Features of Representative Linkages
in Different Legislative Cultures

Types of culture	Level of socioeconomic development	Role perception & agreement	Interaction & communication	Level of constituency service	Local notables as intermediaries
Responsive culture	Highly developed	Clear perception & high agreement	Extensive interaction & communication	Active services by MP	No significant role
Deferential culture	Relatively low development	No clear perception & a high agreement between MP and local notables	High between MP and notables and between notables and constituents, but low between MP and constituents	Active services by MP, mostly for local notables	Very significant role
Disenchanted culture	Highly developed	Clear perception but low agreement	Little interaction or communication	Minimal	No significant role
Apathetic culture	Least developed & most backward	Low awareness of legislature and thus, low agreement	Moderate amount between MP and notables, but none between MP and constituents	Moderate amount to notables, but none to constituents	Moderately significant role

proposed by the President, elected the incumbent President by a unanimous vote, and occasionally adopted resolutions that had been prepared in advance in the President's office. The appointed members of the Assembly were, for all practical purposes, accountable only to the President and thereby, gave him an almost total control over the legislative branch.

There were 73 election districts, each electing two members by the combined use of single-vote and plurality principles. The adoption of the medium size electoral districts signified an important departure from the past: a single member district had been used prior to the Yushin reforms. Despite frequent changes in the constitutional status of the legislature, the expectation that the representative should serve his district well has become firmly established among both the public and the legislators themselves. Studies have shown that Korean legislators, particularly those who are popularly elected, regarded very seriously their representational activities on behalf of their district constituents, and also that a majority of citizens considered such activities as the single most important aspect of their representatives' duty.⁶

This study draws upon the interview data collected in Korea. A total of 2,274 constituents in 12 electoral districts were interviewed. The twelve districts were selected according to five criteria: the level of economic development, urbanization, location, party competition, and proximity to the main arteries of transportation. In each district we conducted the survey with a random sample of approximately 200 constituents. In addition, we had interviewed some 468 local notables, roughly 40 of them in each district. Also, we tried to interview the legislators representing these districts, succeeding in 20 cases out of the total of 24.

Classifying Legislative Cultures

Both cognition and evaluation have served as the basis of our typology of legislative cultures. Drawing upon the constituency data, we can determine the relative levels of citizens' cognition and evaluation of the legislature in each district. An index of salience of the legislature was constructed to indicate the degree to which the constituents are aware of what the legislature and its members do. It is derived from seven survey questions, each tapping the level of their knowledge of and their familiarity with, various facets of legislative affairs.⁷

The index scores range between a low of 0 and a high of 7. The constituent evaluation of the legislature is measured by a Guttman-type scale of support based on five survey questions. This six-point scale indicates the level of support accorded the legislature by the constituents.⁸ The first step of our classificatory effort involves aggregating the individual level data to that of constituency groups. The mean scores are displayed for each district constituency in Table 1.

Of the twelve districts six could be classified into the responsive cultures, three into the deferential cultures, two into the disenchanting cultures, and one into the apathetic culture. The districts with mean scores below the total means were taken as the low groups on cognition and evaluation, while others with the scores above the total means, the high groups.⁹ The results of classification are reported in Table 2.

Table 1. Saliency and Support in Each District
(mean scores)

Election District	Saliency Index	Support Scale
Pyŏngt'aek	3.15	2.15
Sŏngbuk (Seoul)	3.74	1.82
Kangnŭng	2.44	1.86
Andong	2.63	2.23
Dalsŏng	3.51	2.45
Mokpo	3.06	1.88
Imsil	3.26	2.09
Ch'ungju	2.87	2.35
K'ongju	2.85	2.19
Pusanjin	3.57	2.49
Kwangju	4.03	2.51
Chinju	3.93	2.45

Table 2. Districts Classified

	High Salience	Low Salience
High Support	<p>The Responsive Culture:</p> <p>Pyongtaek, Dalsong, Imsil, Pusanjin, Kwangju, Ch'inju</p> <p>(n=1125)</p>	<p>The Deferential Culture:</p> <p>Andong, Ch'ungju, Kongju</p> <p>(n=586)</p>
Low Support	<p>The Disenchanted Culture:</p> <p>Songbuk, Mokpo</p> <p>(n=385)</p>	<p>The Apathetic Culture:</p> <p>Kangnung</p> <p>(n=178)</p>

Note: The division points for high and low support and for high and low salience are based on the total mean scores (see footnote 9).

A preliminary inspection of the data does make intuitive sense on the basis of what we know about each of these electoral districts. The six districts classified as having the responsive cultures, are all highly advanced areas by any measure of socioeconomic development. Their residents are most modern in their attitudes and beliefs as indicated by the Inkeles individual modernity scores.¹⁰ Moreover, they are all competitive districts, dominated neither by the government party nor by the opposition parties. Given these characteristics one would expect to find a responsive legislative culture in these districts. The three districts, Andong, Ch'ungju, and Kongju, where we identified the deferential cultures, are all well-known strongholds of traditionalism. In these areas the traditional patterns of authority still remain, based on the Confucian precepts of proper social relations, including the traditional attitude of deference to power.

The disenchanted cultures were identified in two districts: Seoul, the nation's capital and the Mokpo constituency located at the southwestern tip of the peninsula. The capital city with its population approaching 8 million is the largest metropolis in the nation. Its residents are the

best educated in the country and are politically most aware, being so close to the center of political life. One marked aspect of electoral behavior among the Seoul residents is their cynicism manifest in their usually low turnout rates and in their tendency to support opposition candidates. The low voting turnout is a result of the sense of futility felt by a large number of well educated and intellectual middle class voters. The tendency to support members of opposition parties can be interpreted as an electoral expression of protest against what the regime stands for. Protest voting of urban residents has been a persistent phenomenon since the times of Syngman Rhee's autocratic rule, a pattern so frequently observed that it is taken as a unique aspect of Korean electoral behavior and well-summarized in the popular parlance of "yŏchon yado" or "the countryside for the government and the cities for the opposition."⁸ The Mokpo constituency is not quite as urban and its citizens not as sophisticated in their political orientations as those in Seoul. However, one important political characteristic is shared. Opposition sentiments run high in this Mokpo district. It is the district once represented by Kim Dae-jung, a presidential challenger who almost succeeded in unseating the incumbent Park Chung-hi and his Democratic Republican government in the 1971 election. Kim is the only opposition leader in the postwar period who has given the incumbent president such a close fight. He received 55 percent of the urban votes while President Park garnered only 44 percent. The events that followed have intensified the feelings of disaffection among the voters of that district. The infamous abduction affair of Kim from a Tokyo hotel masterminded by a group of Korean CIA agents and his subsequent imprisonment were the factors contributing to the anti-government feelings in Mokpo.

The apathetic culture was identified in only one district. The constituents of this district knew very little about the legislature and the activities of their representative. Neither did they regard the legislature as a key institution worthy of their support. The district lies in the most rugged and mountainous part of Kangwŏn province including the three counties of Kangnŭng, Samchŏk, and Myŏngju. Until recently, the area was difficult to reach because it was removed from the main trunk

lines of rail and paved roads. Also, it is one of the most backward and poorest regions.

The Linkages in Different Cultures

The representative linkage is defined as the totality of interconnections between a legislator and his district constituents. The nature of such interconnections may be best characterized in terms of mutual role perceptions and agreement, the amount of interaction and communications flow, the amount of service activities provided by a legislator, the rate of electoral participation and support and the activity level of local notables as intermediaries. What follows is a characterization of the patterns of representative linkages in different legislative cultures.

Role Perceptions and Agreements

The constituents' capacity to clearly articulate what they feel a legislator should do varies significantly from one district to another. Included in the survey were six role questions, each asking the respondent to rate the importance of a specific activity in which a legislator is presumed to engage. The six role activities were: explaining government policies to constituents, making laws, telling the government what people in the district want, inducing public projects and other "pork barrels" to the district, intervening with government agencies on behalf of the constituents, and solving conflicts in the community.¹¹ Some constituents could not indicate the importance of these activities because they did not have any clear conception of what a legislator is supposed to do. Also, the proportion of those who fail to exhibit an understanding of legislative role varied markedly from district to district.

The relevant data are displayed in Table 3.¹² As expected, the constituents of the responsive and disenchanting cultures exhibited a clear notion of what their representatives should do. They held definite views on what role activities of a legislator are most important. The proportions of the constituents incapable of forming such views in the responsive and disenchanting cultures were only 8.1 percent and 8.9 percent, respectively. By contrast, nearly one-third (33.2 percent) of the constituents in the apathetic culture and one-quarter (25.5 percent)

Table 3. Percentages of Constituents and Local Notables Incapable of Articulating Clear Role Expectations

Legislative Culture	Constituents (n=2274)	Local Notables (n=468)
Responsive Culture	8.1%	2.1%
Deferential Culture	25.5%	1.8%
Disenchanted Culture	8.9%	1.7%
Apathetic Culture	33.2%	0.0%

of the constituents in the deferential cultures were totally incapable of forming a conception of what constitutes the important aspects of legislative role. The lack of role perceptions among constituents thus varied markedly in different legislative cultures.

Among the local notables virtually everyone exhibited some sort of clear conception of the legislative roles, which is not surprising at all given their community status and leadership stature. Regardless of the cultural type of their districts, all indicated an explicit view on what a legislator's role should be. In this respect, there were no significant district-by-district variations among the local notables while the same was not true among the ordinary constituents.

Role agreement is not easy to measure, for it requires a careful matching of role data collected from the role incumbent and other significant actors. We asked the same role questions discussed above in all of our interviews, i.e., with legislators, their local notables, and their district constituents. The first step was to determine a legislator's own perception of his role. Then, we proceeded to count the number of times his constituents disagreed with him over six different aspects of the legislative role. The greater the number of disagreements, the smaller the degree of role agreement. A similar procedure was applied to the role agreement between the representative and his local notables.

We had two expectations in respect to the the results of data analysis. First, we expected to see significant variations in the degree

Table 4. Percent of the Time the Constituents and Local Notables Disagree With Their Own Legislators on Six Role Items

Legislative Culture	Constituents (n=2274)	Local Notables (n=468)
Responsive Culture	16.3%	15.8%
Deferential Culture	20.5%	26.7%
Disenchanted Culture	35.0%	22.5%
Apathetic Culture	39.8%	35.3%

of role agreement by district. In the responsive cultures would occur the highest role agreement because the constituents have assertive role expectations that must be fulfilled if a legislator wishes to remain in office. The next highest agreement should occur in the deferential cultures, followed by the disenchanted and the apathetic cultures in that order. Indeed, the data in Table 4 bear out our expectation. The greatest role agreement occurred in the responsive cultures, with their constituents disagreeing with their legislators only 16.3 percent of the time. The smallest agreement was observed in the apathetic culture: the constituents disagreed nearly 40 percent of the time. The data for the deferential and disenchanted cultures fit the expected pattern.

The second expectation pertains to the local notables. Given their role as important intermediaries and their frequent contact with the representative, it was expected that they would agree more often with the latter than would the constituents on various aspects of the legislative role. With one exception, the data generally confirm it. In the deferential cultures the notables agreed less frequently than did the constituents with their legislators (20.5 percent versus 26.7 percent). In the other cultures, however, they agreed more frequently. Although the evidence is not overwhelmingly clear, our tentative conclusion remains that the local notables agree with the representatives more frequently.

Interaction and Communication

Not all legislators maintain an equally extensive contact with their constituencies. We expect systematic variations in it by the types of legislative culture. The interaction data are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. Viewing the interaction from the vantage point of legislators, we were struck by the extensiveness and intimacy of contact in the responsive cultures. They visited their districts at least once each month, spending an average of 4.5 days touring through their constituencies. Eighty percent of these legislators made a special effort to see as many individual constituents as possible while back in home district. They sponsored not only the largest number of petitions on behalf of their constituent groups but also distributed pamphlets most frequently, explaining various policies and their positions on the issues of the day. A similar pattern obtains when we look at the data from the side of the constituents (Table 6). They reported having seen their legislators more often than their counterparts in other districts. The proportion of the constituents who were aware of the things that their legislators had done for the district was the highest in the responsive culture. Thus, the interaction data suggest the strongest and the broadest contact between the representative and his constituents in this type of legislative culture.

The contacts were also strong in the deferential cultures. The legislator representing such a district spent, on the average, 5 days each month in his constituency, received some 47.5 communications from his district each week, and met 50 visitors in a typical week. The interactive mode in the deferential cultures is, however, different from that of the responsive cultures in one important respect. While the interaction between a legislator and his local notables is quite extensive in the deferential cultures, it is not so in the responsive cultures. The data in Table 6 show that the local notables of the deferential cultures maintain a close contact with their representatives, more than do their counterparts of the responsive or disenchanting cultures, and to a similar extent as the apathetic culture.

In both the responsive and deferential cultures the interaction and communication are very extensive but organized in quite different ways. In the responsive cultures the representative and his constituents

Table 5. Legislator's Interactive and Communicative Behaviors
With Their Constituents: Legislator's Report

Behaviors	Responsive Culture	Deferential Culture	Disenchanted Culture	Apathetic Culture
Number of times MP visits his district per month	1.0	2.3	0.5 ^a	1.0
Number of days MP spends in district per month	4.5	5.0	4.5 ^a	4.0
% of MPs who sought to meet constituents individually rather than in groups while back in home district	80%	75%	100%	50%
Number of letters received per week	25.3	47.5	25.8	55.0
Number of petitions sponsored per session	26.3	7.5	8.3	3.5
Number of constituents visiting MP per week	36.5	50.0	47.5	60.0
Number of times MP publishes leaflets per year	3.4	1.0	0.5	2.0

Note: ^a Two legislators representing the Songbuk district were not included in computation because it is in Seoul where the National Assembly is physically located.

interact directly without going through the intermediaries such as local notables. In contrast, the interaction in the deferential cultures is indirect, comprised of a two-step flow of communications, from a legislator to his notables and from the notables to constituents or vice versa.

The interaction was most tenuous in the disenchanted cultures. No significant contacts existed here, neither between a legislator and his rank-and-file constituents, nor between him and his local notables. Our data substantiate this point beyond doubt. The legislators representing

Table 6. Interactions and Communications
As Reported by Constituents and Local Notables

Behaviors	Responsive Culture C/LN*	Deferential Culture C/LN	Disenchanted Culture C/LN	Apathetic Culture C/LN
How many times have you seen your MP in last 6 months in the district?	0.4/1.0	0.2/1.2	0.1/0.6	0.1/1.8
% who talked to MPs personally	2.6/31.5	6.5/47.6	4.7/32.4	4.5/52.9
% who reported that MP had done something personally for him	0.6/3.5	1.2/7.8	0/1.4	1.1/5.9
% who were aware that MP had done something for the district	18/30	13/32	8/15	7/20
	(N)=(1125/260)	(586/103)	(385/71)	(178/34)

*Note: C stands for Constituents and LN for Local Notables.

such districts were the least active in terms of their effort to keep in touch with their constituencies. Measured by seven indicators of contact they showed the lowest overall activities. This observation receives a corroboration from the constituency data, also. The constituents of this type of district seldom initiated a contact with their representative.

Nor did they seek his assistance to solve their personal or community problems. Consequently, they saw their legislators the least frequently, did not care or recall what their legislators had done for the district, and seldom reported that they had received personal attention from the legislators. The interaction is both sparse and sporadic in the disenchanted cultures.

The apathetic culture was identified in a single district. The district is located on the periphery of the nation's political and cultural life, in the most backward and sparsely populated mountain region, often neglected by the government in its development programs.

As expected, there was very limited personal contact between the representative and his constituents in this district. The constituents seldom saw their legislators; and few were aware of what their legislators had done for the district. The contact between the legislator and his local notables was of a quite different sort, however. It was both intimate and extensive. The local notables met their representatives frequently, far more than did their counterparts elsewhere. They most frequently talked to their legislators personally. Also, they reported with the greatest frequency personal favors received from their legislators. In such a district the contacts appear largely confined to the local notables. The representative linkage extends down to the level of community notables, but below this level there is very little penetration. The constituents of the apathetic culture are little aware of the legislature and the activities of their representatives. Their attitudes toward the institution are ones of indifference. Thus, they seek no direct contact with their representative nor do they expect their local notables to act as their intermediaries. They are not yet fully integrated into the political life of the nation. In this respect, the constituents of the apathetic cultures are different from those of the deferential cultures.

Constituency Service

Varying amounts of constituency service are rendered by individual legislators in response to the personal requests originating in the district. Such service activities take many different forms, ranging from a legislator's effort to intercede with government agencies on behalf of his constituents, securing a job or promotion, arranging marriages, to a variety of ceremonial functions such as attending weddings, funerals, and making commencement speeches.

The data permit us to examine two aspects of the constituency service. First, we can determine the importance that each legislator attaches to his service role in relation to his other duties. Second, we have information regarding whether he feels he should spend more time on service activities. Taken together, they indicate how much time each legislator invests in his service role and how much more of his time he would like to spend on it (Table 7).

Table 7. Time Allocated to Service Role By Legislators
(percentages)

Items	Responsive Culture	Deferential Culture	Disenchanted Culture	Apathetic Culture
(1) Which activities occupy most of your time?				
Explaining government policies to voters	0	50	25	0
Proposing, debating bills	50	0	25	0
Representing the views of voters in legislation	10	0	50	0
Interceding with government on behalf of district voters	30	50	0	100
Others	10	0	0	0
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
(2) Do you think you should spend more time on your interceding role?				
Yes, more time	40%	50%	25%	50%

The legislators in Korea devoted varying amounts of time to constituency services. Most active services were provided by those from the apathetic and deferential cultures (Table 7). Without exception, the legislators of the apathetic culture reported that they had spent most of their time interceding with government on behalf of their constituency, more accurately, on behalf of the few select local notables. In the deferential cultures, half of their representatives acted similarly. Among those representing the disenchanted cultures none mentioned this activity as occupying most of his time. It is also interesting to observe that the legislators of the responsive cultures divided their time more or less equally between lawmaking activities (50 percent) and the service

role (30 percent). Moreover, those who provided active services went directly to their rank-and-file constituents rather than utilizing local notables as the intermediaries.

We asked the legislators whether they felt they should spend more time on their interceding role. Those representing the deferential and apathetic cultures replied affirmatively more often than did others. Fifty percent of these two groups said they should spend more time on it. Among others representing the responsive cultures and the disenchanting cultures, fewer persons replied affirmatively: 40 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The level of service activities thus appears to vary systematically with the type of legislative culture prevailing in each district.

Electoral Participation

The highest electoral participation is likely to occur in the responsive cultures. The constituents of these districts are not only well informed of politics and of the legislature in particular, but also perceive a high stake in the election outcomes. They decide their votes on the basis of a candidate's personal merits or his performance records. These orientations produce a high voting participation. The lowest rate of voting would occur in the disenchanting cultures where the constituents have a profound sense of futility. Why would anyone waste their time and energy in voting when they perceive it as completely ineffectual? Their knowledge of politics would intensify such feelings, leading to even further withdrawal from electoral involvement.

The constituents of the deferential cultures are expected to exhibit a fairly high voting rate, not because they are politically conscious but because they are easy targets for mobilization. While the voters in the responsive cultures are active because of their political awareness, the voters in the deferential cultures become active because they are mobilized by local notables. Huntington and Nelson distinguish two kinds of participation: autonomous and mobilized participation.¹³ Much of voting in the responsive cultures is of the autonomous and self-assertive sort, whereas it is largely an act of compliance in the deferential cultures. Similar pressures for compliance and mobilization operate in the apathetic cultures, contributing to their high overall voting rates.

In the 1973 National Assembly election the constituents of the responsive cultures reported a strikingly high voting rate of 92 percent. The lowest rate of 69 percent was registered in the disenchanting cultures. The intermediate rate of 80 percent was reported by the constituents of the deferential and apathetic cultures. Thus, electoral participation varied markedly by district, and it closely followed the pattern expected of each culture.

Local Notables As Intermediaries

Local notables exercise a substantial influence and leadership role in their communities.¹⁴ In tightly-knit rural communities where the patron-client mode of social exchanges predominates, they exercise even greater influence as the gatekeepers of local communities and the ultimate arbitrators of conflict arising among community members. In more urban and advanced districts the local notables are no longer as prominent as in the past and perform only a limited role due to the diversification in the channels of authority and the erosion of traditional interpersonal relationships.

Because of their stature and influence, local notables often intervene between a legislator and constituents and act as the intermediaries. However, their role as the intermediaries is likely to vary depending upon the type of legislative cultures prevailing in their areas. We expect that the local notables of the deferential cultures and the apathetic cultures would occupy a dominant role, exercising almost a total control of both upward and downward flow of influence. By comparison, the notables of the responsive cultures are less frequently sought after by the constituents as the intermediaries and thus perform a limited role. The constituents of such a district, equipped with their political awareness and a strong sense of efficacy, make demands directly on their representatives. The influence of the notables in the disenchanting cultures should be minimal, because there is little interaction between a representative and his constituency.

We can approach the subject of local notables from several vantage points. First, we look at the role of the notables from the vantage point of a legislator. How often does he seek out his district notables for consultation and discussion? Of the people who come to talk to him, what proportion are local notables? How often are the most pressing

district problems brought to his attention by the notables? The data reported in Table 8 show that the legislators from the deferential and the apathetic cultures maintained most active channels of communication with the notables. They made special effort to seek out and talk to the notables in their home districts; they learned mostly from the notables about the pressing matters of their district; and they devoted most of their time talking to the notables while back in their districts. As expected, the legislators of the disenchanting cultures showed the least intimate relationship with the district notables, while those of the responsive cultures maintained a modest amount of contact.

The second vantage point is to view the role of the local notables from the constituents' perspective. Where local notables play an insignificant role, and thus have low standing and visibility in the community, it will be difficult for an average constituent to identify the names of their notables. By contrast, the constituents can easily identify the notables in districts where the latter are actively involved as the intermediaries. In the survey we asked the constituents to name those notables whom they consider to have influence. The data proved to be completely consistent with our expectations (Table 9). A clear majority (79 percent) of the constituents in the apathetic cultures had no difficulty whatsoever in naming one or more of their community notables. It is astonishing in view of the fact that they are the least well-educated, the least well-informed, and the least involved in politics. Even among the most aware and sophisticated constituencies of the responsive cultures only 47 percent could name their local notables. The reason for this is not hard to find. In the apathetic cultures, and also to a certain degree in the deferential cultures, the local notables monopolize the community leadership role and act as almost the only link to the political world beyond the village communities. Only few constituents of the disenchanting cultures (13 percent) could identify their local notables, and indeed we expected them to play a minimal role.

The third vantage point is to examine what the local notables themselves claim they do in relation to the legislator. How many of them have ever rendered personal assistance to their representative? How many of them visit with him regularly when they are in the capital city?

Table 8. The Role of Local Notables as Intermediaries:
From the Perspective of Legislators

Questions	Responsive Culture	Deferential Culture	Disenchanted Culture	Apathetic Culture
(1) When you are back in your home district who are the people you most particularly try to see or who most often try to see you?				
% who mentioned local notables as <u>first choice</u>	10%	100%	0%	100%
% who mentioned local notables as <u>second choice</u>	20%	50%	50%	100%
% who mentioned local notables as <u>third choice</u>	50%	50%	0%	0%
(2) What group or individual brought this problem (district problem) to your attention?				
% who mentioned local notables	30%	50%	0%	100%

Table 9. Saliency of Local Notables in District
As Perceived by Constituents

Items	Responsive Culture (n=1125)	Deferential Culture (n=586)	Disenchanted Culture (n=385)	Apathetic Culture (n=178)
% of constituents capable of identifying their local leaders (as indicator of visibility)	47%	55%	13%	79%

Table 10. Self-Report of Their Own Roles by Local Notables

Items	Responsive Culture (n=260)	Deferential Culture (n=103)	Disenchanted Culture (n=71)	Apathetic Culture (n =34)
% of local notables who talked to their own legislators while visiting in the capital city	12%	22%	12%	26%
% of local notables claiming that they have done something personally for their legislators	5%	10%	4%	12%

The data show that the notables of the apathetic cultures maintained the closest contact with the representative, followed closely by those of the deferential cultures (Table 10). The notables of the responsive and the disenchantèd cultures had infrequent contacts.

What emerges consistently in the analysis is the unmistakably strategic role that the local notables in the apathetic and the deferential cultures play. In the responsive cultures their role as the intermediaries is much less important. The influence of the notables in the disenchantèd cultures is almost negligible. Systematic variations therefore exist in the linkage role of the local notables.

Conclusions

Several theoretical concerns have guided the present study. First, we were interested in the proper conceptualization of the phenomenon of representative linkages. This concern led us to focus upon the actual interactive process between the representative and his constituents. Drawing upon three separate sets of survey data collected in 12 election districts, we tried to characterize the nature of the linkage functioning in each district. The characterization was based on the degree of clarity in role definitions held by constituents and of role agreement between the representative and his constituents, the amount of direct

interaction and communication between the two groups, the level of constituency service provided by the representative, the level of electoral participation, and the role of local notables as the intermediaries. We found that these five descriptive variables performed well beyond our expectation in discriminating the basic forms of representative linkages.

Second, we were interested in one aspect of the district political culture most relevant to a legislator's representative behaviors. We call it "the legislative culture" of district. The concept is grounded in the structure of constituents' cognitive and evaluative orientations toward the legislature and its members. We have identified four different types of the legislative culture: the responsive, the differential, the disenchanting, and the apathetic cultures.

Third, our interest in the legislative cultures derived from our attempt to explore the sources of representative linkages. What factors might account for the different forms of the linkages? The analysis has disclosed that the representative linkages varied systematically with the type of legislative culture that prevails in an election district. This evidence suggests that the representative linkages are shaped in an important way by the type of district legislative culture.

Going beyond the simple recapitulation of our conceptualization efforts and findings, we might note a few theoretical and methodological implications. The representative government requires a certain form of relationship between a representative and his constituency. This relationship should be based on a fairly close contact, mutual responsiveness, accountability, a common understanding of the legislative duties, and active exchanges of service and electoral support. This kind of relationship is most likely to occur in the districts where the constituents are well informed and are also supportive of the legislative institution, i.e., the responsive cultures. Thus, the responsive district culture is one prerequisite of representative government, and the larger the number of election districts with this type of culture, the greater the potential of that society for establishing such form of government. There appears to be in Korea still too many electoral districts with the patterns of legislative culture that are not conducive to a genuine form of representative government. The transformation of the disenchanting, the apathetic

and the deferential cultures that predominate in some districts is an obvious first step.

Previous studies of representative linkages have, for the most part, focused upon the question of convergence (or divergence) in policy preferences between legislators and their constituents.¹⁵ They have ignored, with a few exceptions, the crucial question of how and in what ways a legislator actually interacts with members of his constituency. Even in one recent and most insightful study of the U.S. Congressman's home style the linkage was analyzed from a single vantage point, i.e., that of the legislator.¹⁶ The representative linkages involve, by their very nature, various groups of actors such as the representative himself, his local notables, and his constituents. The linkages are formed as the result of a complex interplay among these actors and therefore it is not possible to gain a full understanding of the linkage phenomena without reference to all major groups of actors. Our approach is distinctive in that we tried to encompass all relevant groups of actors in the analysis.

Finally, the concept of legislative culture proved to be useful in our study. Defined as the patterns of cognitive and evaluative orientations toward the legislature, it captures essential aspects of the district political milieu that matter in the shaping of linkages, that is, constituency representation. The utility of the concept may be even greater in cross-national comparative studies. Korea is a compact nation territorially, with a highly homogeneous culture. There is little regional or social diversity in terms of cultural habits, mores, and belief systems. Despite the homogeneity of Korean society, the concept of legislative culture could sharply discriminate election districts. In societies where there exists a large gap between the center and the peripheries and where sociocultural cleavages run deeper, as in many Third World countries, it promises to have an even greater analytic and discriminatory power.

Footnotes

The research project on which this publication is based is a collaborative enterprise among a number of scholars in Kenya, Korea, Turkey, and the United States. The study was jointly designed by Professors Joel D. Barkan, G.R. Boynton, Chong Lim Kim, Gerhard Loewenberg, and John C. Wahlke, all of the University of Iowa; and by Professors John Okumu (University of Khartoum); Seong-Tong Pai (Seoul National University); and Ahmet Yucekok (University of Ankara). Field work in Korea was directed by Professors Kim and Pai, and by Young W. Kihl (Iowa State University); in Kenya by Professors Barkan and Okumu; in Turkey by Professor Turan and by Professors Nur Vergin (University of Istanbul) and Metin Heper (Bagazici University). Professor Malcolm E. Jewell (University of Kentucky) served as a Research Associate during the analysis phase of the project. Financial support was obtained from an institutional development grant made to the University of Iowa by the Agency for International Development, and from the Rockefeller Foundation for aspects of field research in Kenya.

1. Some important exceptions are: Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu, "Political Linkage in Kenya: Citizens, Local Elites, and Legislators," Comparative Legislative Research Center Occasional Paper No. 1 (1975); Michael L. Mezey, "Constituency Demands and Legislative Support: An Experiment," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1-1 (February 1976), 101-128; Samuel C. Patterson and G.R. Boynton, Citizens, Leaders, and Legislators: Perspectives on Support for the American Legislature. Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences, Comparative Legislative Studies Series, No. 90-014, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1974.

2. The term "legislative culture" was used before in a different context to refer to a specific pattern of constituents' cognition and evaluation in a nation. It was used previously in a manner analogous to our "responsive legislative culture" in the present study. However, it should be emphasized here that we employ it as a more general concept to refer to several different patterns of cognition and evaluation at the constituency level. See: Chong Lim Kim and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Cultural Roots of a New Legislature: Public Perceptions of the Korean National Assembly," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1-3 (August 1976), 371-387, and Gerhard Loewenberg and Chong Lim Kim, "Comparing the Representativeness of Parliaments," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 3-1 (February 1978), p. 44.

3. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 11-26.

4. We gratefully acknowledge our debt to Professor Samuel C. Patterson for his suggestion regarding the label of each legislative culture that we employ here.

5. The notion of mobilized voting and sociocultural characteristics associated with it are discussed at length in Chong Lim Kim, ed., Political

Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio Press, 1979), esp. chapters
1 and 6.

6. For the data on legislators, see Chong Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16 (November 1972), pp. 626-651, and the data on public perceptions of the legislative roles are reported in Chong Lim Kim and Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Culture Roots of a New Legislature," op. cit., pp. 375-384.

7. The method of the index construction and the specific survey items employed are explained in Malcolm E. Jewell and Chong Lim Kim, "Sources of Support for the Legislature in a Developing Nation," Comparative Political Studies, 8 (January 1976), pp. 461-489.

8. The support scale is derived from five survey items. The results of Guttman scale analysis produced a Coefficient of Reproducibility of .90 and a Coefficient of Scalability of .64.

9. The total mean score for the salience index is: 3.23. The total mean for the support scale is: 2.21.

10. D.H. Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, 29 (December 1966), pp. 353-377. An application of this scale to a sample of national population in Korea is found in Chong Lim Kim and Seong-Tong Pai, "Urban Migration, Acquisition of Modernity, and Political Change," in Yunshik Chang, ed., Korea: Two Decades of Development (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, forthcoming).

11. The six role items included in our survey were:
(a) How important do you think it is that a legislator should explain government politics to the district voters?
(b) How important do you think it is that a legislator should take an active part in the debates of the National Assembly and pass bills?
(c) How important do you think it is that a legislator should tell the government what people in the district want?
(d) How important do you think it is that a legislator should try to get more projects and benefits for district?
(e) How important do you think it is that a legislator should help people in the district who have problems with government?
(f) How important do you think it is that a legislator should help solve conflicts in community?

12. The following formula was used to calculate the percentage:

$$\frac{\text{Total number of don't knows in district}}{\text{Total number of respondents} \times 6} = \% \text{ incapable of articulating role expectations}$$

13. Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 7-10.

14. On political roles of yujil or local notables in Korea, see Young Whan Kihl, "Political Roles and Participation of Community Notables," in Kim, ed., Political Participation in Korea, op. cit.

15. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57 (March 1963), pp. 45-56, and Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review 60 (March 1966), pp. 66-72.

16. Richard F. Fenno, "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration," American Political Science Review 71 (September 1977), pp. 884-890.

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