

Borders and Identity

Ágnes Tóth

Director
HAS – Research Institute of
Ethnic and National Minorities
E-mail: toth@mtaki.hu

János Vékás

Researcher
HAS – Research Institute of
Ethnic and National Minorities
E-mail: vekas@mtaki.hu

As a direct result of political, economic and social transformation experienced in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, over the past decade and a half the phenomenon of international migration – which in the decades of the dictatorial state regimes was either strictly regulated or banned – has once again become commonplace. After the political system change, the opening of Hungary's borders completely transformed the processes of migration. From being a source country for migration Hungary has become partially a transit country and to a certain extent a host country too, mainly for the ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries. In line with this process another situation has been developed: an increasing number of people settling and living in Hungary consider that their national identity is not tied, or not only tied to a Hungarian identity. Non-Hungarian, or not exclusively Hungarian-identity individuals settling in Hungary are not only increasing the thirteen officially acknowledged minority communities numerically, but they also display far greater minority solidarity than their fellow minorities who have been long established in the country. The vast majority maintain their minority tongue as their native language, unlike the minorities born and brought up in Hungary who, on the whole, only describe themselves as belonging to a particular minority on a subjective basis (nationality or cultural ties). The former groups bring with them cultural and behavioural models which may even differentiate them from their fellow minorities. Based on the results of the 2001 Census, our case study aims to analyse the characteristics of those minority people who were born abroad.

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As a direct result of political, economic and social transformation experienced in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, over the past decade and a half several phenomena have once again become commonplace, which were either strictly regulated or banned altogether in the decades of the totalitarian state regimes. Migration is such a phenomenon. The communist regimes, in a bid to monitor every area of life (including national consciousness and social mobilization) and to guarantee the impermeability of borders to all, tightly controlled movement, restricted international migration and politicised patterns of behaviour linked to foreigners. The borders within Central and Eastern Europe became the primary means of limiting regional movement, of shutting the door on the free entry and exit of people.

Up until 1990, Hungarian society only glimpsed the phenomenon of international migration through reports of those (for example illegal migrants) who had quit the country without official authorization. The state's refusal to countenance (and its ideological approach to) migration restricted its acceptance as a natural concomitant of social, economic and political transformation (Tóth–Turai [2004]).¹

During these decades, as so often in history, the partitioning and restrictive function of borders was defended not only in regional, geographical terms but also culturally and intellectually. Once again the principle of “*quius regio, eius religio*” was asserted, that is to say, the state exercising authority over a specific geographical area, endeavoured to impose its exclusive legitimacy in the political and economic sphere and also spiritually.

After the change of the political system, the opening of Hungary's borders transformed completely the processes of migration. From being a source country for migration, Hungary has become, in part, a transit country and to a certain extent a receiver country too. At the same time, although a considerable proportion of settlers in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from beyond the border, they are by no means the only ones seeking a new life in Hungary. This makes an examination of the regional aspect of the “border concept” and national identity highly topical.

Citizenship is an expressly legal category: it regulates the legal relationship between the individual and the given state, that is, it brings the individual into the circle of those who – through birth or later manifestation of their own will – fall directly

¹ TÓTH, P. P. – TURAI, T. [2004]: A magyar lakosság külföldiekhez való viszonyáról szóló szakirodalom összefoglalása. (Summary of Literature on the Relation of the Hungarian Population to Foreigners.) In: Tóth, P. P. (ed.): *Külföldiekkel vagy idegenekkel*. A KSH Népeségtudományi Kutatóintézetének Kutatási jelentései 76. (With Foreigners or Strangers. Research Reports No. 76. of the HCSO Demographic Research Institute.) Budapest.

under the state's legal authority. Persons holding citizenship bear certain responsibilities towards the state, and, at the same time are entitled to its protection.

However, ever fewer individuals are subject to the sole legal jurisdiction of a single state, while every state finds it has legal relationships with an increasing number of people holding different citizenships. If an individual travels to a country of which he/she is not a citizen, his/her responsibilities towards his/her "own" country remain, while, however, he/she is bound by numerous provisions of the country of residence, even when he/she does not hold citizenship of that country. Thus, citizenship is not the only form of legal relationship between the state and the individual, and at the same time, the individual may be a citizen of more than one state. Even so, it is imperative to examine the question of national-ethnic identity differentiated from that of the system of citizenship. Here we do not mean independent of the system of citizenship, but naturally we are not talking of a causal relationship either. Every national culture can be viewed as the unique grouping of historically-shaped identity patterns in which elements and models of "high culture" and everyday, traditional culture are apparent at one and the same time. In this respect too, modern societies are pluralistic, in that they offer the individual several different (albeit equally valid and legitimate) patterns for the manifestation of identity.²

One of the fundamental conditions for the preservation of any community is a sense of solidarity. If an individual joins a community, then this only has any sense if the individual participates in creating the community's values, contributes to its advancement and, on this basis, earns the natural right to share in the created values and to enjoy the cooperation of the community (thereby providing the individual with an element of security). Furthermore, in the name of social solidarity, it is only natural for the majority nationality of a given state to lend its backing to the minorities in preserving their spiritual and cultural values and in their efforts to advance.

Any intelligently managed state will conduct a thorough investigation to discover those areas in which it has a legal right to intervene in the private life of its citizens. It is not wise for the state to attempt to exploit national-ethnic characteristics for the homogenisation of its subjects, interpreting these characteristics as declarations of loyalty.

Mobility is a precondition of dynamic development, bringing in turn multiculturalism and diversity. It is thus necessary to establish specific systems of institutions to regulate the internal relations of both the state and the national-ethnic collectivity, and it is primarily the state's duty to ensure that these institutional systems are able to operate smoothly together.

An increasing number of people living in Hungary consider that their national identity is not tied, or not exclusively tied to a Hungarian identity. Non-Hungarian,

² PATAKI, F. [2001]: *Élettörténet és identitás. (Life History and Identity.)* Osiris Kiadó. Budapest.

or not exclusively Hungarian-identity individuals settling in Hungary are not only increasing minority communities in Hungary numerically, but they also display far greater minority solidarity than their fellow minorities who have been long established in Hungary. The vast majority maintain their minority tongue as their native language, unlike the minorities born and brought up in Hungary who, on the whole, only describe themselves as belonging to a particular minority on a subjective basis (nationality or cultural ties). The former groups bring with them cultural and behavioural models which may even differentiate them from their fellow minority nationalities established in Hungary.

This situation developed in just a single decade after the change of the political system; in other words, measured in historical terms within a remarkably short period. Due to the impermeability of the borders, the restrictive migratory policy imposed throughout the bloc, as well as the smothering of the nationality question in earlier years, statistically speaking Hungary had a negligible number of non-Hungarian citizens living within its borders, while the number of those settling in Hungary was similarly insignificant. At the time of the 1960 Population Census, the number of individuals with non-Hungarian citizenship was so small that census publications did not present data related to citizenship, and the following three censuses did not even include questions on this subject. However, the 2001 Population Census indicated that at the time there were more than 110 000 people living in Hungary who, as concerns their citizenship, did not consider themselves affiliated to Hungary or exclusively to Hungary. The census also recorded 35 000 individuals belonging to national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary who were not born in Hungary.

So where is this change leading Hungary? Is the rapid growth of migration good or useful for the country? At the same time, what changes have to be made to meet the challenges?

1. Population census methodology

The population census conducted in Hungary in 2001 represents a highly valuable source of information for an investigation into the character of national identity.³ We coupled the long list of objective characteristics concerned with the living conditions of those questioned to the subjective and non-obligatory responses to questions on

³ The source of data used in our analysis concerning the 2001 Census, unless otherwise specified, is the electronic database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. For the sources of the previous censuses see *KSH* [2003]: *2001. évi népszámlálás. 6. Területi adatok. (2001 Population Census. Regional Data. No. 6.)* Budapest. CD Annex.

national and ethnic affiliation in this “public opinion survey” conducted on sample of unprecedented proportions (10 million individuals, the entire population of Hungary).

In earlier population censuses the response to national affiliation was on an either-or basis: one could give only a single response to each question. In the framework of the state political instrumentalization of the concept of nation this, as it happens, was most expedient. The insistence on belonging to the nation state as a gesture of patriotism tended rather to complicate than to ease the formation of social-political behaviour recognizing the multicultural national and ethnic identity.

The revised methodology employed in the 2001 Census opened the door to an exploration of all dimensions of national and ethnic identity.

In addition to the two usual questions (nationality and native language) directly related to national and ethnic identity, further two questions – inquiring about cultural affiliation and the language spoken with family and friends – were built into the questionnaire in order to refine the approach. The picture was enhanced by questions on command of languages and (to differing degrees depending on nationality) religious denomination.

What’s more, three responses could be given to each of the questions on national identity. Thus, in theory, it was possible for someone to record affiliation to a possible twelve nationality-linguistic communities.

It is important to note that there was no obligation to reply to the four questions mentioned formerly and the question on religious affiliation, while the reply for the question of language skills was obligatory. (See Table 1.)

In the end, there were 18 potential response combinations for the nature of the given national attachment (leaving implicitly out the 00 and 05 combinations), and 208 combinations for any two given affiliations, right up to several thousand potential variations for various minority affiliations.

In fact, the results revealed the realistic boundaries: national identity is a multi-layered, fluid category but despite the wealth of its elements, it can basically be clearly delineated up until the point that it is not confused with state political means – and here we are talking about genocide, resettlement, restrictions on use of language and those procedures which are not malicious (and frequently not even conscious) deriving from a monolingual state administrative procedure.

Of the 10 198 315 individuals registered in the census 9 627 778 gave a valid response to the question on national affiliation while the total number of replies was 9 746 186. Every hundredth person making an answer gave a multiple response, a significant majority of which referred to the Hungarian affiliation of national minorities. Of those who gave more than one answer to the question on national affiliation, a total of 463 did not include Hungarian in their responses (441 gave two responses, 22 three responses).

Table 1

The potential response combinations

Code	Nationality	Cultural affiliation	Native language	Language spoken in family	Spoken language	Description
00	–	–	–	–	–	No affiliation
01	X	–	–	–	–	Only nationality
02	–	X	–	–	–	Only cultural affiliation
03	–	–	X	–	–	Only native language
04	–	–	–	X	–	Only language spoken in family
05	–	–	–	–	X	Only spoken language
06	X	X	–	–	–	Nationality and cultural affiliation
07	X	–	X	–	–	Nationality and native language
08	X	–	–	X	–	Nationality and language spoken in family
09	X	–	–	–	X	Nationality and spoken language
10	X	–	X	X	–	Nationality, native language and language spoken in family
11	X	X	X	–	–	Nationality, cultural affiliation and native language
12	X	X	–	X	–	Nationality, cultural affiliation and language spoken in family
13	X	X	–	–	X	Nationality, cultural affiliation and spoken language
14	X	X	X	X	–	Nationality, cultural affiliation, native language and language spoken in family
15	–	X	X	–	–	Cultural affiliation and native language
16	–	X	–	X	–	Cultural affiliation and language spoken in family
17	–	X	–	–	X	Cultural affiliation and spoken language
18	–	X	X	X	–	Cultural affiliation, native language and language spoken in family
19	–	–	X	X	–	Native language and language spoken in family

So in practice multiple affiliation is dual, one element of which is Hungarian. The 95 individuals describing Serbian and Croatian dual national affiliation are rare exceptions, interpretable for historical reasons. The proportions were similar in the three other questions. At the same time, by its very nature, when we speak about dual identity we are not being particularly precise: a person has one identity which is varied, complex and sustained from as yet not fully defined sources.

In the 2001 Population Census around 442 000 respondents declared an affiliation to one of the 13 minorities specified in the Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (Minorities Act) in at least one of the four questions regarding identity. Around a half of those declaring a minority affiliation were Roma, one quarter German, and the remaining quarter one of the other 11 specified minorities.

Some of these individuals with minority affiliation are exclusively Hungarian citizens, others do not have Hungarian citizenship, but quite a considerable number hold dual citizenship. One common characteristic is that they have an established abode in Hungary.

Our examination focused on people coming to Hungary from abroad with the intention of establishing themselves here but who at the same time considered it important to indicate their minority affiliation in the census. We compared their characteristics with, on the one hand, national data and, on the other hand, the averages of the total number of the given minority.

2. Individuals with minority affiliation born abroad

Hungary's population has been in continual decline since the early 1980s. Earlier censuses (with the exception of the 1949 Census) showed continuous growth in the population, although the rate of growth began to taper off in the 1970s. The country registered its peak population in 1981.

There are two reasons for the fact that Hungary's population has fallen by more than 500 000 since 1980. One is the (negative) level of natural reproduction. While the number of live births in Hungary between 1980 and 2001 was around 2.5 million, the number of deaths was more than 3 million. The annual average number of births between 1990 and 1992 was 125 000 and between 1993 and 1995 115 000, yet this figure did not even reach 100 000 in the second half of the decade. Due to the low level of reproduction and high mortality rate, Hungary now ranks among the countries with the least favourable demographic outlooks in Europe.

The other factor is the migration difference. Between 1980 and 1989 around 200 000 more individuals left the country than were registered as settling here. After the change of the political system, this proportion swung the other way: nearly 200 000 more people arrived in Hungary than left to start a new life abroad. If over the past decade the migration differential had continued the trend established between 1980 and 1989, today the population of the country would not be half a million fewer but close on a million fewer than in 1980. 18 percent of the positive migration balance of nearly 200 000 is made up of the 35 104 individuals with minority affiliation not born in Hungary.

The proportion of this group within the individual minority communities living in Hungary is extremely variable. In this respect Ruthenians born abroad are already in a majority: of the over 2 000 Ruthenians registered in the census 55 percent were not born within the borders of Hungary. Furthermore, the relevant proportion of Ukrainians and Romanians is just a fraction under 50 percent, while the 932 Roma registered in the census as being of foreign birth represent less than half of one percent of those declaring Roma affiliation.

Fewer than 10 percent of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians were born outside Hungary, and the proportion is similar for Germans (although we need to be cautious about the latter). It is true that the 9 756 Germans born abroad represent just 8.11 percent of the German minority living in Hungary, but in proportional terms they constitute more than one quarter of all persons with minority affiliation born in a foreign country, and in straight numerical terms there are 2 500 more Germans born abroad than the next most populous group, Romanians. (See Table 2.)

Table 2

The number and proportion of minority persons born abroad, 2001

Minority	Total	Minority person born abroad	Proportion of minority persons born abroad to the total number of the minority	Proportion of certain minority persons born abroad to the total number of minority persons born abroad
			Percent	
Bulgarian	2 316	977	42.18	2.78
Roma	205 720	932	0.45	2.65
Greek	6 619	1 290	19.49	3.67
Croatian	25 730	2 050	7.97	5.84
Polish	5 144	2 162	42.03	6.16
German	120 344	9 756	8.11	27.79
Armenian	1 165	366	31.42	1.04
Romanian	14 781	7 286	49.29	20.76
Ruthenian	2 079	1 142	54.93	3.25
Serbian	7 350	2 808	38.20	8.00
Slovak	39 266	2 360	6.01	6.72
Slovene	4 832	307	6.35	0.87
Ukrainian	7 393	3 668	49.61	10.45
<i>Total</i>	<i>442 739</i>	<i>35 104</i>	<i>7.93</i>	<i>100.00</i>

Individuals declaring German (9 756 persons: 28 percent) and Romanian (7 286 persons: 21 percent) affiliation represent more than 48 percent of the national-ethnic groups and born abroad.

Individuals born outside Hungary originate from a total of 99 countries. More than 100 persons of foreign birth with minority affiliation arrived from 16 countries, respectively. They represent 97 percent of those born abroad. Most came from Romania (9 675) followed by those born in Germany (5 520). (See Table 3.)

Table 3

The minority persons born abroad by the country of origin, 2001

Country	Minority													Total
	Bulgarian	Roma	Greek	Croatian	Polish	German	Armenian	Romanian	Ruthenian	Serbian	Slovak	Slovene	Ukrainian	
Romania	11	552	62	54	22	1 274	109	7 134	69	51	214	31	92	9 675
Germany	3	25	13	24	33	5 342	6	6	8	18	16	12	14	5 520
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	10	105	18	894	9	780	2	21	20	2 492	57	37	21	4 466
Ukraine	7	48	13	11	41	130	10	33	412	9	93	8	3 131	3 946
Slovakia	6	103	19	21	20	417	4	18	19	5	1 801	60	35	2 528
Poland	4	3	8	7	1 973	83	1	2		2	9	12	6	2 110
Croatia	2	10	2	847	3	164		2	2	122	8	10	3	1 175
Greece	4	3	985	2	1	6	4	1		5	1	2		1 014
Russia	8	6	10	4	23	76	31	17	517	7	11	11	276	997
Bulgaria	897	3	9	3	1	13	2	1	3	3	3	1	2	941
Austria		8	5	37		3	838	1	9		12	3	4	926
Switzerland	1					222		1		1				225
Czech Republic	1	8	4	1	5	68	2	1	3	2	100	8	4	207
Bosnia Herzegovina		2	1	104		13				46	2	3		171
Armenia						1	141	2	1				1	146
Slovenia	1	3		9	1	12			1	8	2	89		126
US		9	7	13	2	34	3	4	1	5	7	7	4	96
Cyprus			86				1							87
France		4	2	1	3	38		1	1		12	1	1	64
Kazakhstan			2		1	2	1		28			1	22	57
Belorussia	1				3	5	1		23	1			8	42
Turkey	9	1	7			12	7	1			1		1	39
Great Britain		6			2	20	1	1		1	5	1	1	38
Italy	2	2	3	4		18	1		1		2	1		34
Netherland		3		3		25								31
Belgium		2		1	1	19							3	26
Moldova							1	14	3				8	26
Sweden		5		1		11				2	1			20
Georgia			1				7		6				5	19
Australia		6				9	1							16
Canada		3	3	1		7		1				1		16
Macedonia	1		4	1		2		1		6			1	16
Uzbekistan			1			1			5	2			7	16
Albania	2		9			1				2				14
Syria					1	4	4	1			1		2	13
Azerbaijan							9		2		1			12
Egypt			3		1	5		2					1	12
Denmark					2	7					2			11
India				3		6		1					1	11
Kirgizstan						2			8				1	11
Israel			2		2		3	1		1		1		10
Other 58 countries	7	12	11	4	9	89	13	10	9	5	8	6	11	194
Total	977	932	1 290	2 050	2 162	9 756	366	7 286	1 142	2 808	2 360	307	3 668	35 104

Close on three-quarters of individuals declaring a minority affiliation and born abroad arrived from countries in which the language of their nationality is in official use, and where the entire spiritual and cultural system of institutions was at their disposal in their own tongue. 98 percent of persons with Romanian affiliation, born abroad came from Romania, 91 and 92 percent of Bulgarians and Poles came from Bulgaria and Poland, respectively. 89 percent of Serbs and 85 percent of Ukrainians came from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Ukraine, in the order given. However, just 29 percent of Slovenes born abroad actually left Slovenia to start a new life in Hungary.

Nearly two-thirds of individuals with German affiliation, born abroad were born in Germany, Austria or Switzerland. In their case, two other countries also had a significant proportion: Romania (1 274) and Yugoslavia (780). (See Table 3.)

The 2001 Population Census shows that over 2 000 persons with minority affiliation born abroad came to Hungary from Romania, Germany, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, Slovakia and Poland, respectively. We shall now examine these characteristics in more detail.

27 percent of persons with minority affiliation born abroad (9 675) came from Romania. The census indicates that nearly three-quarters describe themselves as having Romanian affiliation, and 13 percent German affiliation. The 552 individuals with Roma affiliation born in Romania represent 60 percent of Roma who live in Hungary but were born abroad.

Among those with minority affiliation, born in Germany are just a few who – in the population census – did not declare German affiliation. The 5 520 individuals born in Germany constitute 15.72 percent of minorities born abroad. Among them 5 342 (97%) declared German affiliation in all the census questions. These individuals represent 4.44 percent of the German minority living in Hungary.

2.1. Gender segmentation

At no time in the past century has there been such an imbalance in the proportion of men and women in Hungary as was revealed in the 2001 Census. For every 100 men there were more than 110 women.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the ratio of men to women was roughly in balance. From then on the proportion of women in the population has gradually climbed. In the 1949 Population Census taken after the Second World War this ratio stood at 100:108 (naturally as a consequence of the fighting). The imbalance gradually smoothed out in the 1960s and 1970s before deteriorating once again from the 1980s.

The greater ratio of women to men in the population is fundamentally related to an increase in life expectancy: the average for women in Hungary has risen to a greater extent than that of men.

Looking at individuals with minority affiliation, born abroad, it is evident that this disproportion is even greater: of the 35 000 individuals polled 20 000 were women, that is to say, to every 100 men there were 133 women. At the same time there were significant differences within the minorities themselves. While the proportion of women in the Ruthenian and Polish minorities is well over double that of men, among the Serbian community there are not even 80 women to every 100 men. In the latter case, it is clear that the war has played a part in this development since many men left Serbia in order to avoid military service. However, men are also in the majority among Armenians, Croatians, Greeks and Bulgarians born abroad, and the proportion among Romanians is more favourable than the national average too. (See Table 4.)

Table 4

The minority persons born abroad by gender, 2001

Minority	Man	Woman	Total	Number of women to 100 men
Bulgarian	491	486	977	98.98
Roma	430	502	932	116.74
Greek	651	639	1 290	98.16
Croatian	1 039	1 011	2 050	97.31
Polish	662	1 500	2 162	226.59
German	4 056	5 700	9 756	140.53
Armenian	189	177	366	93.65
Romanian	3 554	3 732	7 286	105.01
Ruthenian	339	803	1 142	236.87
Serbian	1 562	1 246	2 808	79.77
Slovak	778	1 582	2 360	203.34
Slovene	117	190	307	162.39
Ukrainian	1 217	2 451	3 668	201.40
<i>Total</i>	<i>15 085</i>	<i>20 019</i>	<i>35 104</i>	<i>132.71</i>

2.2. Age structure

Over the past century, the average age of the population in Hungary has increased by 12 years. In 1900 the average age was not quite 27 years, and the 2001 Census indicated it had increased to over 39. The average lifespan of both women and men has risen, although the rate of increase is somewhat faster for women. In 1870 men en-

joyed longer lifespan, by the turn of the century there was a balance between men and women, and today women live on average four years longer than men.

This positive trend is, however, offset by the population's unfavourable age composition: due to a continual decline in the number of births, every age group under 39 years shows a continuing downward tendency.

The age composition of Hungary's minorities is even worse than the national average. The proportion of children among every minority group (with the exception of Roma) is lower than that of the total population: barely half the national average.

At the same time the proportion of the elderly among the largest minorities – again excluding the Roma – is higher. One-fifth of the population of Hungary is aged 60 or over, while more than one-third of the Slovak minority falls into this category.

It is apparent that age compositions are more favourable among those minorities with higher proportions of individuals born outside the country. This is natural because generally speaking only the most physically active individuals of working age are prepared to take on the challenges that come with a move to a new country and a new life. The age composition of groups by citizenship status of the census population living in Hungary shows it very clearly.

As already mentioned, more than 110 000 individuals whose citizenship is not Hungarian, or not solely Hungarian, have an established abode in Hungary.

Among individuals with Hungarian and another citizenship (persons with dual or multiple citizenship), there are considerably more children and somewhat fewer elderly than the national average. In the group of individuals with foreign citizenship, the proportion of children is fewer than and that of the elderly is just half the national average. In their instance the percentage of those aged between 15–39 years, that is the most productive age group, exceeds 55 percent.

So, the age composition of immigrants tends to rejuvenate the average age of the total population of Hungary, although this does not solely concern individuals with minority affiliation. Their characteristics are better than the averages of certain minorities living in Hungary, but minority averages are considerably worse than the average Hungarian value.

On the one hand, looking at the average for all individuals with minority affiliation born abroad, the proportion of children is only one-third of the very poor national average. On the other hand, the proportion of the elderly is one percent higher than the national average. The real bonus can be seen in the relatively high proportion of young adults, over 50 percent in the case of Romanians, Serbians and Ukrainians. Furthermore, it is apparent that the proportion of the 15–59-year-olds, that is, individuals of working age, is only considerably lower than the national average among the Greeks, and 18–21 percent higher among Romanians, Poles and Ukrainians. (See Table 5.)

Table 5

The number of minority persons born abroad by age group, 2001

Minority	Age group (years)				Total
	0-14	15-39	40-59	60-X	
Bulgarian	31	270	366	310	977
Roma	117	454	237	124	932
Greek	24	345	272	649	1 290
Croatian	131	781	548	590	2 050
Polish	60	599	1 214	289	2 162
German	609	2 808	3 578	2 761	9 756
Armenian	31	147	100	88	366
Romanian	364	4 380	1 764	778	7 286
Ruthenian	58	448	386	250	1 142
Serbian	211	1 466	677	454	2 808
Slovak	72	801	762	725	2 360
Slovene	9	106	85	107	307
Ukrainian	223	1 862	1 125	458	3 668
<i>Total</i>	<i>1 940</i>	<i>14 467</i>	<i>11 114</i>	<i>7 583</i>	<i>35 104</i>

If we compare the age compositions of individuals declaring minority affiliation born abroad with the proportion of all minorities, then we can state that the age characteristics of the minorities are most likely to be improved by immigrant minorities in that they represent a higher proportion of individuals of working age. (See Table 6.)

Table 6

The proportion of the age groups of all minority persons and minority persons born abroad, 2001 (percent)

Denomination		Age group (years)				
		0-14	15-39	40-59	60-X	15-59
Averages	National	16.62	35.05	27.92	20.41	62.97
	Minority total	20.70	36.86	25.42	17.02	62.28
	Born abroad	5.53	41.21	31.66	21.60	72.87
Bulgarian	Born abroad	3.17	27.64	37.46	31.73	65.10
	Total	9.33	34.07	34.93	21.68	69.00
Roma	Born abroad	12.55	48.71	25.43	13.30	74.14
	Total	34.52	43.43	17.35	4.70	60.78

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Continuation.

Denomination		Age group (years)				
		0–14	15–39	40–59	60–X	15–59
Greek	Born abroad	1.86	26.74	21.09	50.31	47.83
	Total	7.55	46.03	30.02	16.39	76.05
Croatian	Born abroad	6.39	38.10	26.73	28.78	64.83
	Total	9.16	29.18	33.30	28.36	62.48
Polish	Born abroad	2.78	27.71	56.15	13.37	83.86
	Total	9.49	32.81	43.45	14.25	76.26
German	Born abroad	6.24	28.78	36.67	28.30	65.46
	Total	8.54	29.95	32.85	28.66	62.80
Armenian	Born abroad	8.47	40.16	27.32	24.04	67.49
	Total	8.33	39.06	32.70	19.91	71.76
Romanian	Born abroad	5.00	60.12	24.21	10.68	84.33
	Total	8.03	43.54	27.85	20.57	71.40
Ruthenian	Born abroad	5.08	39.23	33.80	21.89	73.03
	Total	8.32	37.71	34.44	19.53	72.15
Serbian	Born abroad	7.51	52.21	24.11	16.17	76.32
	Total	8.65	39.86	29.37	22.11	69.24
Slovak	Born abroad	3.05	33.94	32.29	30.72	66.23
	Total	9.13	24.49	31.68	34.70	56.17
Slovene	Born abroad	2.93	34.53	27.69	34.85	62.21
	Total	8.07	28.48	34.11	29.35	62.58
Ukrainian	Born abroad	6.08	50.76	30.67	12.49	81.43
	Total	10.13	42.80	30.70	16.37	73.50

2.3. Fertility

Fertility is constantly declining in Hungary. In 1970 there were 178 live births to every 100 women aged 15 or over, while this figure was only 153 in the 2001 Census. Since 1970 the number and proportion of women aged 15 or over bearing four or more children have been in continual decline, and the proportion of those bearing two children is ever greater.

Women with minority affiliation aged 15 or over have on average 1.93 live births, considerably above the average for the entire country (1.53). However, the fertility of the majority of minority communities is lower than the national average. Women with Roma affiliation (constituting around a half of all minorities in Hungary) are an exception: 262 live births to every 100 Roma women aged 15 or over; moreover,

only in their case does this proportion exceed the level necessary to guarantee the simple reproduction of the population of Hungary. Fertility indicators for the Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians are also above the national average. There are 187 live births to every 100 Slovene women aged 15 or over, 170 to every 100 Slovak women and 163 for Croatian women.

The ratio of Slovene women bearing three children (15.28) as well as four or more children (9.43) far exceeds the national average. In the case of Slovaks, a fertility indicator higher than the national average is largely due to the higher ratio of women bearing three children (13.21). Croatian fertility indicators show slight above-average ratios for women bearing two (40.73) and three children (11.78).

The fertility of women with minority affiliation born abroad – as opposed to the average of all women with minority affiliation – lags behind that of the national average. The primary explanation for this is the extremely low proportion of immigrants with Roma affiliation: in the 2001 Population Census, of those born abroad a total of 932 individuals declared Roma affiliation (see Table 5), and among them the number of women aged 15 or over was 443. At the time the census was held nearly a quarter of these women were childless.

However, the fertility of women with Roma affiliation who had given birth was significantly above the national average even for those women born abroad (see Table 7), although it should be noted that it was somewhat lower than the fertility rate for Roma women born in Hungary.

Table 7

*The number of live births to hundred minority women
and to hundred minority women born abroad and aged 15 and over, 2001*

Minority	Number of live births to 100 women	Number of live births to 100 minority women born abroad	Difference
Bulgarian	131.34	139.66	8.31
Roma	262.39	230.47	-31.92
Greek	107.79	148.89	41.10
Croatian	163.79	149.89	-13.89
Polish	137.28	158.25	20.97
German	149.85	155.95	6.10
Armenian	125.81	137.20	11.38
Romanian	151.56	127.45	-24.12
Ruthenian	151.37	146.04	-5.32
Serbian	124.98	114.52	-10.45
Slovak	170.55	161.71	-8.83
Slovene	187.89	148.65	-39.24
Ukrainian	135.52	126.77	-8.75

To sum up, Greek and Polish female immigrants increase their respective minority fertility rates to the greatest extent, but Armenian, Bulgarian and German women also positively influence fertility amongst their respective minority communities. At the same time, the fertility of other minorities – Ruthenians, Romanians, Serbians, Armenians and Ukrainians – with a high proportion of individuals born abroad, and the age composition of which lowers the average age of the minority, is, as we have seen, not only below the national average but in fact below the fertility indicator for the given minority itself.

2.4. Marital status

Over virtually the entire century there has been a continual increase in the proportion of widows and divorcées among women aged 15 or over living in Hungary. From the 1980s the number of unmarried women has also grown year on year, and the rate of decline in the proportion of marriages has gradually increased.

This adverse trend is even more conspicuous among men: nearly a third of men aged 15 or over is single, and the proportion of marriages has been plummeting ever since the 1980s.

The proportion of married women in most minority communities is – by given age group – greater than that of the average of the entire population. The instances where it is lower are among the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Roma, Serb and Slovak minorities where the differences are offset by the higher-than-average proportion of unmarried women and divorcées.

This trend is all the more conspicuous among individuals born abroad. Taken against a national average of 49.38 percent, almost 70 percent of women with Polish affiliation born abroad and aged 15 or over are married, and the figure is over 60 percent for Ruthenian women. (See Table 8.)

Thus, it is possible to conclude that a far greater proportion of women aged 15 or over born abroad are married than is found in both the population as a whole and the totality of individuals with minority affiliation living in Hungary. Their proportion of spinsters is 3.5 percent lower than that of the population as a whole and nearly 8 percent lower than the totality of individuals with minority affiliation.

The far higher proportion of marriages is not reflected in the fertility indicators of women born abroad, and indeed in some minority communities these indicators fall below the national average. We should not forget, however, that the vast majority of individuals with minority affiliation born abroad had only settled in Hungary in the months/years prior to the census, and as such they were still adjusting to their new life. For instance, more than 20 percent of Romanian affiliated individuals born abroad had no registered abode in Hungary one year prior to the 2001 Census Day.

Table 8

The number of minority women born abroad and aged 15 or over by marital status, 2001

Minority	Marital status				Total
	Spinster	Married woman	Widow	Divorcee	
Bulgarian	61	246	99	63	469
Roma	124	216	65	38	443
Greek	127	286	153	64	630
Croatian	192	461	244	47	944
Polish	147	1 013	128	185	1 473
German	809	3 058	977	541	5 385
Armenian	34	82	31	17	164
Romanian	828	2 044	312	361	3 545
Ruthenian	93	466	104	108	771
Serbian	366	547	145	85	1 143
Slovak	239	817	347	138	1 541
Slovene	32	92	49	12	185
Ukrainian	465	1 362	236	279	2 342
<i>Total</i>	<i>3 517</i>	<i>10 690</i>	<i>2 890</i>	<i>1 938</i>	<i>19 035</i>

2.5. Social and economic situation

When examining the living conditions of individuals with minority affiliation, only in the case of the Roma minority we can speak of a disadvantaged state, although here we are speaking of a multiple disadvantaged position. However, the proportion of the Roma born abroad is minimal, amounting to less than half of one percent.

In this section of our analysis we also included minorities not specified in the Minorities Act, thus Chinese, Africans, Arabs, Jews and those speaking Hebrew as their native language, in order to illustrate their remarkable performance from the point of view of social-economic situation and productivity.

With regard to economic activity, the highest rates of employment were recorded among native speakers of Chinese, Arabic and Polish, while the proportion of unemployment – excluding the Roma community – was not far off the approximately four-percent national average. However, among Germans the rate of unemployment was just 1.77 percent, and a mere 8 of the 2 414 Chinese registered in the 2001 Census were jobless (0.33%).

Africans, Arabs and Hebrew-speakers had the highest proportions of groups with a tertiary education qualification, while with regard to holding a minimum secondary

school certificate, those speaking Hebrew and Polish as their native languages came out top. Among minorities with a generally older age composition, the proportion of those having completed secondary school was somewhat under the 50-percent average, but – again not taking into account the Roma minority – the lowest proportion was 41 percent (Slovenes).

Turning to work activity, the highest proportion of managers was found among those with Hebrew or an African or Arabic language as their native tongue, although the Armenians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians and Serbians were not far behind in this respect. Greeks and Poles were over-represented in other intellectual activities, while the Chinese were unrivalled in the service sector. In this respect too the proportions of the Roma are truly problematic, and the characteristics of Slovenes and Romanians also give cause for concern.

2.6. Regional distribution

Minorities settled in Hungary live in a relatively scattered pattern right across the country. Their combined total exceeds 10 percent of the total population in only one county, Baranya. At the same time, there are individuals with minority affiliation living in every county in the country, but in not one county does the distribution of the total number of minorities concentrated into one area exceed 10 percent, with the exception of the capital where they make up 12 percent of the population. However, as we shall see, this is mainly the result of those born abroad.

Turning to minorities born in Hungary, in totality their proportion only exceeds 10 percent in two counties and Budapest: 12 percent of all minorities live in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, 10 percent in Budapest, and 10 percent in Pest County.

41 percent of individuals with minority affiliation born abroad live in Central Hungary (Budapest and Pest County). The others are spread thinly across the country, barely attaining 4–6 percent in the other counties.

At the same time, there are counties in which minorities born abroad represent a significant proportion of the given minority. As we have already seen, on a national level Ruthenians born abroad represent a majority of their community, and the Romanians are not far behind this. Moreover, there are only two counties in which the number of Ruthenians born in Hungary outweighs those born abroad.

The situation is similar with the Romanians. Only in two counties on the border with Romania, Békés and Hajdú-Bihar, do the Romanians born in Hungary exceed the number of Romanians born abroad. There are other regions and counties in Hungary where the minorities born abroad form a majority among the given minority. This is the case with those with Bulgarian affiliation in Csongrád and Heves counties, and Armenians in Békés and Szabolcs-Szatmár counties. Croatians and Serbians

born abroad are also not averse to settling elsewhere in the country other than in the counties of the southern border. The relatively large number of Serbians settled in Győr-Moson-Sopron, Somogy, Hajdú-Bihar, Vas and Szabolcs-Szatmár counties were probably drawn there by the promise of new jobs, and the same is true of Croatians born abroad who form a majority within the Croatian affiliated communities in Békés and Hajdú-Bihar counties. Ukrainians born abroad are also willing to settle in counties other than in the east of the country: they form the majority in communities with Ukrainian affiliation in Budapest, Fejér, Heves and Veszprém counties. Besides Nógrád, Poles born abroad represent majorities in their communities in counties representing the two “ends” of the country, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Vas.

2.7. Characteristics of identity

As the poet *Dezső Kosztolányi* once wrote, the secret chambers which were once to be found in medieval fortresses no longer exist, but secret places still lie buried in our souls. In fact, a significant proportion of elements related to an individual’s self-identity lie hidden in these “secret chambers” of the soul. Personality development may be fundamentally shaped by a childhood memory, something one has read, or indeed by tragedy experienced within the family or in the fate of one’s nation. And while national-ethnic consciousness in all its shades and variations is just one of countless personality traits which, given the appropriate social and historical environment, can be adapted more or less successfully to the other personality traits, in crisis situations this identity may actually act as a springboard for collective action.

Four hundred in-depth interviews, let alone four questions in the population census, would still not be sufficient to provide accurate orientation in the complexity that is personality. Of course, this is not the role of the census.

Data gathered by the census does not provide us with answers to what an individual is like but rather how they describe themselves, what they consider important and what they are prepared to reveal to public scrutiny about their identity. However, if we are to interpret national-ethnic affiliation as a constitutional category (and this is the only possible route towards reconciliation of national-ethnic questions) then it is essential to know an individual’s standpoint and manifestation of will. No one is able, and in the final analysis no one has the right, to categorize others according to national affiliation, native language or religion.

In this respect the 2001 Population Census provides a far more detailed picture of the national-ethnic identity of the population.

Of course, such data should be interpreted bearing in mind the conditions under which they were collected: it is obvious that results will differ if the legal consequences of declaration are different.

Over and above this, one can assume that a sizeable proportion of those questioned, and in all likelihood a good number of those asking the questions, did not interpret certain categories uniformly. For instance, we cannot know precisely what any one individual understands by the term “nation”, nor can we know where he/she draws the line between national belonging and cultural affiliation. We will come back to these questions later.

However, of one thing we can be certain: those who registered minority affiliation in the census make up the core group of individuals for whom national-ethnic identity is an important category, which they consider worth recording and are willing to declare.

The census questionnaire allowed 15 possible answers to the four questions on identity. Questions could be supplemented with other components such as command of languages or religion, a factor of critical importance among certain minorities. Responses to these questions provide us with a more detailed picture of the methods and levels of expression of the identity of the individual.

However, within the bounds of the four census questions related to identity we are able to differentiate the following elements of the identity of the given national-ethnic community:

1. *Compactness of identity declaration* – the proportion of those declaring themselves as belonging to a given minority in all questions related to national-ethnic identity varied enormously from minority to minority. These individuals represent the core of the given identity community, and around them are others who describe themselves as belonging to the given minority from selective aspects.

2. *The dominant identity category* – two of the four questions on identity allowed some level of objective valorisation. The language a person first learnt, namely his/her native language, is a matter of fact. It is also possible to be objective about which language is spoken in the family. The other two questions, however, demand completely subjective responses: the individual has to decide which nationality he/she “feels himself/herself” belonging to, and which nationality cultural values and traditions he/she “feels an affiliation for”.

In every one of the minority groups in Hungary there were more who fell into the range of individuals with minority affiliation based on a subjective response (namely on the strength of their nationality or cultural affiliation) than those who were included in this category from an aspect classifiable as objective, such as native language or the language spoken within the family and with friends. Broadly speaking, one can interpret this situation as coming about because the minorities were subject to intense assimilation in the past decades or centuries, while a declaration of their current minority affiliation is a sign of a reawakening awareness of national-ethnic identity.

However, the dominance of individual identity categories signalling the “affiliation compass” differs according to minorities. This allows us to draw conclusions about individual minority groups and their possible future.

3. *Affiliation compass* – as already mentioned, even three responses could be given to each question concerning identity. However, the number of persons giving three responses was statistically insignificant, while among those giving two responses, the overwhelming majority gave Hungarian as one of their responses. The proportion of these individuals within the minority differed considerably depending on the minority in question.

4. *No response* – more than 628 000 refused to give a response to the census question on cultural affiliation. 541 000 did not wish to respond to the question on native language. The insecurity surrounding minority identity is evident in the proportion of those who declared certain of the minority languages as their native language and refused to answer the other three questions on identity.

Our particular interest in this study was to examine how the formerly mentioned identity characteristics of individuals with minority affiliation born in Hungary and those born abroad differ.

As has already been mentioned, using data collected during the population census, we selected the identity-related responses of those who described having affiliation to one of the specified minorities in at least one of their responses to the four identity-related questions. It should be noted, however, that this affiliation differed both in intensity and character from minority to minority.

The most characteristic indicator was the proportion of those declaring an attachment to a given minority in responses to all four identity-related questions. In completing all four questions, these individuals most deliberately declared their linkage to a given minority. Their proportion was highest amongst Ukrainians (42%), Slovenes (40%) and Croatians (over one-third).

At the other end of the scale, the proportion of Slovaks and Armenians giving this response combination did not even top 15 percent. In both cases this was due to the low ratio of those declaring the respective language as their native language. While around 25 percent of Armenians declared Armenian as their native language, about the same as those using Armenian when with family and friends, far more individuals with Slovak minority affiliation (nearly 16 percent more) said they used the Slovak language among family and friends than declared it as their native language.

The proportion of Germans giving four responses to identity-related questions was similarly low: barely more than 15 percent. Here, too, native language (28%) was to “blame” for the low proportion.

The situation of Roma is very specific also in this respect: although only 18 percent completed all four identity categories, more than 92 percent of individuals with Roma affiliation declared their Roma nationality in the census, the highest proportion of all the specified minorities.

Let us now look at the “compactness” by identity characteristics of individuals born abroad. It was immediately apparent that in the case of most specified minori-

ties, the proportion of individuals born abroad who described themselves as having affiliation to their minority in all four identity categories was far higher. The highest proportion was seen among Greeks (over 61 percent), while amongst Poles it exceeded 50 percent and for Bulgarians the figure was close on 50 percent.

Comparison of the two data shows that the difference is most conspicuous for Greeks: 39 percent. The Germans came next, with a difference of over 26 percent. These two minorities are finding that their fellows arriving from abroad to settle in Hungary represent considerable “identity reinforcement” potential. It is interesting to observe that in the case of the so-called “compact”, more reclusive ethnic communities such as the Croatians and primarily Slovenes, a smaller proportion of those born abroad declared an attachment to the given minority in all categories, their native language proportion was lower, and they were primarily analysed through their use of language when with family and friends.

One can quickly establish that the proportion of response combinations was higher among those with minority affiliation born abroad who signalled one clear, unequivocal identity. For instance, the proportion declaring a native language was higher than among individuals born in Hungary (with the exception of Romanians and Slovenes). The preservation and use of the native language is one of the firmest foundations for national-ethnic identification of the individual.

For a more detailed examination of the question of multiple affiliation, we took the example of those with Romanian affiliation.

If we compare the number of response combinations regarding Romanian and Hungarian affiliation, only 26 percent of those questioned and born abroad declared Romanian affiliation in all four questions on national-ethnic identity, while 46.6 percent declared they belonged to the Hungarian people on the basis of nationality and cultural affiliation, native language and the language spoken within the family.

How can we rank these 7 286 individuals for Romanian and Hungarian affiliation according to level of affiliation given in census responses? On what basis would it be possible to determine that one is “more Romanian”, the other is “more Hungarian”?

A comparison of amalgamated response combinations by identity category shows that overall the group with Romanian affiliation born abroad is more strongly affiliated to the Hungarian people than to the Romanians: just 29.15 percent of individuals with Romanian as their native language gave Hungarian as their native language too, while over a half of those describing themselves as having Romanian nationality signalled their Hungarian nationality at the same time.

Using a similar method to compare the data of Ukrainians, we see that the picture here is unambiguous: almost 90 percent gave only one native language, Ukrainian, and nearly three-quarters declared themselves to be of Ukrainian nationality only. Two-thirds of their number designated Ukrainian as the only language spoken within the family.

In contrast, not quite 10 percent of Slovaks said that they only speak Slovakian with friends and in the family; fewer than 32 percent were not prepared to state that they felt themselves to be exclusively Slovak nationality. (See Table 9.)

Table 9

The proportion of persons giving only one response to each identity category within the minority communities, 2001 (percent)

Minority	Identity category			
	Nationality	Cultural affiliation	Native language	Language spoken in family
Bulgarian	56.63	39.87	82.53	24.06
Roma	70.21	66.18	62.51	43.51
Greek	54.60	40.41	72.72	29.58
Croatian	61.85	50.82	85.65	24.54
Polish	53.71	35.65	79.69	16.85
German	52.73	42.23	73.82	14.21
Armenian	52.58	40.07	80.61	48.67
Romanian	60.09	45.97	83.11	19.98
Ruthenian	60.56	46.67	81.58	29.96
Serbian	69.10	48.59	82.08	27.83
Slovak	31.78	27.70	52.70	9.76
Slovene	57.92	53.11	84.65	41.15
Ukrainian	74.14	70.47	89.25	65.63

One of the most exciting questions concerning national-ethnic identity is the way in which (and to what level) it would be expressed if behind it there were no blatant/subtle national-state or state-national homogenisation pressure.

So when we see that a relatively high proportion of minorities living in Hungary also indicated an affiliation to the Hungarian people, inevitably we must ask ourselves to what level they would consider it important to signal their Hungarian associations if, for instance, they lived in their mother country and were asked to make a declaration about their national-ethnic affiliation there.

We have no way of even conditionally answering this question. However, we can examine what sort (and level) of minority affiliation individuals with an established abode in Hungary but originating from abroad brought with themselves.

Of the four census questions on identity, the one on national affiliation is the “most ideological”. When answering this, most will have had some thoughts of pa-

triotism and loyalty in the back of the mind. By examining how individuals with minority affiliation born abroad answered the question on nationality, we see that the Poles, Greeks and Bulgarians were most inclined to answer the national affiliation question with a single response, that is, they only registered their own minority. (See Table 10.)

Table 10

The distribution of responses of minority persons born abroad to the question of nationality, 2001
(percent)

Minority	Response to the question of nationality			
	Only minority	Hungarian and minority	Only Hungarian	No response
Bulgarian	55.07	24.36	14.94	1.84
Roma	40.99	12.02	30.69	2.68
Greek	55.50	23.10	13.26	0.85
Croatian	33.67	12.52	39.33	1.66
Polish	57.83	25.02	11.52	1.52
German	41.84	16.00	30.60	3.16
Armenian	53.28	15.30	20.49	3.28
Romanian	29.67	19.01	45.96	2.32
Ruthenian	42.56	12.61	28.55	3.15
Serbian	32.00	9.11	44.39	3.49
Slovak	25.13	17.46	50.30	1.65
Slovene	24.68	11.36	32.79	2.27
Ukrainian	46.42	15.68	29.57	2.31

By contrast, over 50 percent of individuals with Slovak affiliation gave only Hungarian as their response to the question on nationality. This proportion was 44–46 percent for the Serbs and Romanians.

So who are these people? Is there any legal title under which we can call them “Hungarians living beyond the border”? Unquestionably, a considerable proportion are of Hungarian origin, have moved to Hungary and live in mixed marriages, and have been ranked in the census statistics as minority affiliated on the basis of the language spoken within the family, or have felt it necessary to signal as cultural affiliation the relationship to the majority nation of the former homeland. The lesson from this is that when moving from one country to another the individual brings his/her identity across the border too; we will only be able to get some true bearing on the intricacies of questions surrounding identity if we make it understood that this is a highly complex process.

Finally, let us mention a few words on the issue of response refusals. We have seen that 5–6 percent of the population did not give any response to questions concerning identity.

In Hungary there are 828 020 persons living in households in which at least one member has minority affiliation. Roughly speaking, around a half of these individuals are – based on census responses – “pure Hungarian”, namely, they described themselves as solely Hungarian in every question related to minority affiliation. In this group the proportion of those refusing to respond in the case of all four questions was far lower than the national average. Among individuals with minority affiliation born abroad, the proportion of those refusing to respond to the question on nationality was even lower: with no minority it even reached 3.5 percent. Personal contacts and the everyday experience of living in a mixed nationality community mean that people learn how to handle questions arising from diversity of national-ethnic identity in a natural way so that they do not become taboos and that their significance is neither greater nor lesser than it is required to guarantee social harmony.

3. Conclusions

When examining migratory processes, and particularly when speaking of the migration of Hungarians living beyond the border to Hungary, the point is often raised that increasing numbers of these people are “quitting their land of birth” – thereby “threatening the viability of the remaining Hungarian communities” – because of the unfavourable living conditions they experience there. An investigation of their existential situation and living conditions undoubtedly requires a far more thorough, methodological analysis; however, this was not a focal element of our paper. We concentrated instead on the effect of migration on ethno-demographic processes, taking into consideration the evidence that Hungary will only be able to support Hungarians living beyond the border and encourage common intellectual and cultural progress if the country steps on to a path of long-term, dynamic development. From this point of view, the country itself is dependent on immigrants, whether Hungarian or non-Hungarian.

Rapid economic growth is a fundamental condition of social-economic structural transformation (and development that attends it) in the coming decades because this is the only way to broaden the room for manoeuvre essential for structural change. Some of the key resources for economic growth include “human capital”, labour force and human creativity.

It is worth highlighting three factors that have a bearing on this (from the aspect of our research): population decline, disparities in regional development, and potential ethnic conflict.

The following means may be employed in order to counterbalance or minimize the long-term processes of depopulation:

1. Policies aimed at boosting the birth rate may prove an incentive to have children. This requires change in our economic, social and cultural models plus a sensitive approach at several different levels; however, there will be no spectacular results in the short-term.

2. Optimal utilization of domestic resources requires specific regional planning, competing labour and capital and greater internal mobility; support for training and retraining programmes.

3. The influx of external resources (encouraging both foreign investments and immigration) requires a whole series of complex social measures.

In the course of our research we only dealt with those listed factors and aspects that have demographic and primarily ethno-demographic relations.

Demographic processes have a fundamental impact on the structure of society, the system of social institutions, cultural mentality and a society's level of civilization. The interrelation has a reactive effect, but this is far slower in asserting itself and is at a much lower intensity.

Ethno-demographic processes may, at the same time, represent an additional source of conflict. It is common knowledge that the social dynamic increases when – with a rising birth rate – the proportional share of young jobseekers grows in society. However, if this “critical mass” is made up of a national-ethnic group which can be clearly differentiated from the majority, this may be the source of tension. And vice versa: ageing can at the same time represent a root cause of social inertia.

The relationship between demographic trends and economic growth, although somewhat indirect, is still apparent: population decline is just as much a restraining factor on the economy as lack of capital. In this instance, as elsewhere, ethno-demographic interrelations reveal themselves in a far more complex and subtle form: the increasing pace of growth provides greater room for manoeuvre for social and economic structural transformation and paves the way towards the levelling of social disparities. However, the individual's ability to occupy a new position in the vertical social hierarchy is in large part determined by the professional (and the corresponding regional, horizontal) mobility of the different national and ethnic groups. The source of conflict here is when an individual has to sacrifice his identity for the sake of mobility, or when group characteristics per se restrict an individual's mobility.

The goal, therefore, is the establishment of a social system of institutions and relations in which integration does not equate to assimilation. In other words, in a system in which members of different national and ethnic groups can integrate them-

selves in the processes of social and economic development, in which they can represent the resources of modernization and in the interests of which they can change jobs or move home, and yet in which they are free to express their own and unique national-ethnic identities.

A more in-depth study of the relationship between identity and migration would be useful.

As a consequence of Hungary's EU accession negotiations, the country's peripheral location has also given it a mediatory role. On the one hand Hungary will continue to be a transit stop for migrants set on reaching the more developed countries of Western Europe, and on the other hand, it will be increasingly viewed as a target country. In the meantime, we have to take into account the fact that as the country gradually develops, multilingualism and multiculturalism will become ever more apparent in society. Whereas today the country is searching for the most appropriate social-economic-legal solutions for inter-ethnic relations (bearing in mind its relatively limited number of national minorities), this can be seen as a sort of "experimental model" in preparing for future challenges. However, in the case of the Roma ethnic minority, this challenge is already upon us.

Therefore, it is important to investigate which legal and institutional solutions best meet the endeavours of the minorities for self-realization and self governance when an ever smaller proportion of their number live in traditional, "closed" settlements scattered over a wide area.

Looking at minority rights and taking basic human rights as our starting point, it is also questionable how long the distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" minorities can be sustained given the considerable levels of immigration into the country.

Finally, it is important to resolve how we can maintain a balance between rights and responsibilities in the case of (state-endorsed, constitutional) entitlements derived from declarations made by avowal (by subjective declaration).

To sum up: of individuals with minority affiliation coming to Hungary from abroad with the aim of settling permanently in the country and tying their fate to that of the nation, one might say, with heavy irony, that "we have more to gain than lose". Given the majority of them, their demographic characteristics are positive, they are economically active, they are appropriately qualified, they speak foreign languages and they can more easily adjust to the demands of modernization.

At the same time, they have stronger national-ethnic identity than individuals with minority affiliation born in Hungary, and they have every intention of preserving it. Thus, if it is agreed that one of the prerequisites of development in Hungary is immigration, the constitutional conditions have to be created permitting assertion of immigrants' national-ethnic identity and their realization has to be constantly monitored. This represents a new challenge for Hungarian society, but coming up with the right answers to challenges forms the basis of advancement at any stage in history.

As *Arnold J. Toynbee* writes in respect of the development of civilizations, a historical challenge is akin to striking sparks out of a stone. One has to judge exactly the right force to obtain the spark, but not so much that it smashes the stone.

It is to be hoped that an ever smaller fraction of Hungarian society views Hungarians coming from Transylvania, Hungarian and non-Hungarian nationalities arriving from Slovakia (now Slovak EU citizens), and indeed Germans returning to the land of their ancestors from Germany, as threats.