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Revisiting Rustow: An Empirical Assessment of the Relationship Between National Identity and Attitudes Towards Democracy in post-Soviet Russia

John P. Schultz
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**REVISITING RUSTOW: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA**

by


John P. Schultz

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy



Department of Political Science

West Lafayette, Indiana

May 2018

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ABSTRACT

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Title: Revisiting Rustow: An Empirical Assessment of the Relationship between National Identity and Attitudes towards Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia

Major Professor: Dr. James McCann

Does national identity influence a country's prospects for democratization? Brudny and Finkel (2011) contend that national identity explains variation in the political developments among former Soviet states. In considering this argument, this effort examines the empirical evidence to determine 1) whether a measurable model of national identity has developed within Russia, 2) how this national identity has developed over time, and 3) whether a relationship exists between this intersubjectively held conception of national identity and attitudes towards democracy. Findings suggest the development and ongoing contestation of two competing conceptions of national identity that covary with changing attitudes towards democracy over time. This supports prior research suggesting a purposively distinctive conceptualization of democracy that prioritizes stability over liberty at a foundational level (Hale 2011). Consistent with social identity theory and Eckstein's (1966) congruency theory, this research adds to the knowledge derived from the intersection of political psychology, political culture, and democratization, while providing evidence to support the theoretical linkage between psychological mass tendencies and systemic institutional properties.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Rustow's Hypothesis and the context of Russia

Does national identity influence democratization? In 1970, Dankwart Rustow posited an explicit relationship between national identity and democratization. His articulation held that a coherent sense of national unity was the only necessary precondition to successful democratization. This congruence between a sense of belonging amongst the national polity, and their attitudes towards the state was required to facilitate both the formal and informal practices that reflect the workings of a democracy, i.e. democratic consolidation. Stated simply, this national identity-based explanation posits that before a society at large can institutionalize and routinize democratic customs and practices for its people, knowing who 'the people' that are to be governed is paramount (Jennings 1956; Rustow 1970).

How did I arrive at this question? The first piece of the puzzle appeared just over 20 years ago when- as a student in Alaska- I became intrigued by the pronouncements of Vladimir Zhirinovsky who campaigned for President of Russia on the platform of reconstituting the Russian Empire (including the reclamation of Alaska) with nuclear force if needed! My initial reaction was to dismiss such proclamations as the typical ravings of a fringe candidate. But then I discovered that the Zhirinovsky-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)- generally characterized as a hyper-nationalist political party- held a plurality of seats in the Russian Duma. Recognizing that such statements, fringe though they may seem- actually had the potential to translate into some semblance of potential viability, I then became intrigued by the broader question: what could help to explain why acceptance of such a fundamentally extreme and seemingly anti-democratic posture held by political elites could ever be accepted as a possibility by the citizens of Russia?

This time period surrounding the 1996 Presidential elections was less than five years from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia had liberalized quickly, and the country was still experiencing the growing pains associated with its adoption of democratic electoral procedures as well as the ‘shock therapy’ privatization of its economy. It seemed easy to excuse minor mis-steps- after all, the trappings of American democracy had been in place for over 200 years and it seemed that at times it was still working out the kinks. That the Russian people were still drawn to politicians who promised strength and stability at the expense of democratic ideals was understandable. Ultimately the people selected Boris Yeltsin in the runoff for the 1996 presidential election, Zhirinovsky’s LDP party lost power and prominence, and the question seemed to be how long it would take Russia’s democracy to consolidate. The 1990’s was a great decade indeed.

At the end of 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned suddenly and appointed Vladimir Putin as Acting President of the Russian Federation. Putin won election outright the following year with 53% of the popular vote. He won re-election in 2004 with 72% of the popular vote. It seemed that perhaps Russia was ready to consolidate its democracy. Elections were seemingly free and fair, confirming an exceedingly competent President presiding over a resurgent export-based economy buoyed by high oil and commodity prices, which served to reverse a good deal of the economic misfortune that had plagued the country throughout the 1990’s.

Yet there was a serious lingering question of ‘who are the Russian people?’ and ‘what it means to be Russian?’ thanks in large part to the legacy of Soviet-era ‘nationalities policies’ which served to directly foster nationalist sentiments among non-Russian minority groups within the Soviet Union while indirectly conflating Russian-ness with Soviet-ness. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, non-Russians generally recognized- and worked to foster- their non-Russian, (and now non-Soviet) sense of titular national identification (e.g. Ukrainians wrestling with what it means to be distinctly Ukrainian once free from the top-down imposition of what it meant to be a

‘good’ Soviet citizen). However, the question of Russian national identity was much trickier to resolve.

One thing that was not in question was the incredible popular support maintained by Vladimir Putin. The Russian people have seemingly thrown their lot in with Putin, and what has occurred is the consolidation of Putin’s vision for Russia’s future, as well as the political power (deriving from popular sovereignty) necessary to strive towards that vision. Perhaps no better example exists to illustrate this point than the people’s acceptance of- if not outright support for- Putin’s transference of presidential powers to the position of prime minister and back to the presidency, effectively circumventing the statutory obstacle of presidential term limits. And over time, this continuing popular support increasingly corresponds with explicit appeals to the fundamental nature of who the Russian people are, via oppositionally divisive identifications of who the Russian people are not. It is possible that Putin effectively elicited an answer to the general question of Russian-ness which not only prevented the consolidation of democratic norms, but also served to consolidate unchecked political power. If evidence is found to support the existence of a coherent sense of national identity, future research efforts could assess to what extent this sense was influenced by intentional elite-driven efforts to successfully exploit the institutional weakness of Russia’s fledgling democracy. But that is research for a different day.

Returning to the primary question of whether national identity influences democratization, some scholars have explicitly argued that such a relationship between national identity and democratization exists. Brudny and Finkel (2011) contend that national identity explains the difference in post-communist political development within Ukraine and Russia. However as persuasive as their argument is made, the empirical evidentiary support for said argument is suspect. This is where this research project comes in. This effort seeks to answer the following: is there empirical evidence to suggest a relationship between Russian national identity and

democratization (Chapter 5)? In order to test this, one must first address what national identity ‘is’ within the particular country context of Russia, and how to appropriately assess and model Russian national identity. And assuming national identity does exist within a particular country context, is this conception of identity static or is it possible for national identity conceptions to change over time (Chapter 4)? This in turn requires distinguishing national identity from other politically relevant bases of group identification (Chapter 3), following a consultation of the extant literature (Chapter 2).

1.2 Democratization, Political Culture, and Trust

Democratization refers to the process by which a country transitions from a non-democracy to a democracy. While traditional democratization scholarship was often pre-occupied with the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions, most contemporary scholars now eschew such characterizations in favor of facilitating and/or obstructing factors (Shin 1994). Within contemporary literature, most approaches to democratization are now framed in terms of *transition* and subsequent *consolidation*. An alternative way of understanding these approaches derive from the question being asked. If you don’t have democracy and want to know what’s missing or preventing a democratic transition from taking place (i.e. how do you get there?), the research is focusing on transition. If you have ‘democracy’ and are questioning what makes it stick (i.e. how do you stay there?), the research is dealing with consolidation.

There are a number of explanatory camps that address how countries are able to transition from a nondemocratic to a democratic regime type, and what conditions are necessary for maintaining/consolidating a democratic regime type once achieved. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified as agency-based and structural-based explanations. More specifically,

such explanations often center around three major camps: socio-economic, historical institutional and political culture.

Within this latter camp political culture research addresses its role in “the emergence, survival, and development of democracy”. Prominent democratization scholars such as Larry Diamond and Robert Putnam have argued that “the evolution of democratic political culture is a key factor in the consolidation of democracy, and [this is] why the consolidation phase usually takes decades or even generations to run its course” (Shin 1994, 145-146). Within these discussions lies the notion of civil society. Harkening back to Enlightenment-era thinkers in the 18th century, theorists sought the foundations of *societatis civilis*- better conceived of as the “well-governed society” or the “civil state.” (Foley and Hodgkinson 2003) With the emergence of the modern civil society tradition, civil society came to signify society apart from the state, rather than the whole of the ordered *polis*. Alexis de Tocqueville expanded upon this notion by focusing on the diversity of social associations which may produce the civic skills necessary for political life within a democratic republic, but that occur apart from the state. This Tocquevillian tradition was contemporaneously revived by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s, *The Civic Culture*. Advanced during the behavioralism era of the 1960’s, Almond and Verba presented empirical evidence correlating public support for democracy, with trust (in others and in government), and a general willingness to participate in civic life. It was found that seemingly non-political attitudes and affiliations underlie distinctly political behavior.

The concept of trust as a variable has been considered within the broader general context of political culture, and within the more specific literature pertaining to civil society. The willingness to trust others- particularly strangers- fosters civic mindedness/facilitates the building of a civic community (Putnam 1993). Harkening back to de Tocqueville’s theory of democratic governance, Gianfranco Poggi (1972, 59) contends that “Interpersonal trust is probably the moral

orientation that most needs to be diffused among the people if republican society is to be maintained.” Even actions that may be purely self-interested are affected within the context of trust-reinforced social networks. Rather than fostering individuals acting in isolation from one another, trust-reinforced civic communities increase the social interconnectedness of individuals, in turn decreasing the opportunities- and inclination- to free-ride and defect from calls for collective action (Granovetter 1985).

When it comes to fostering civic-mindedness, not all trust is the same. People’s feelings of trust vary based upon their perception of ingroup/outgroup dynamics. Particularized trust fosters deeper ties to a smaller social circle, i.e. the recognized ingroup to which an individual belongs. This type of trust is what Putnam (2000) refers to as “bonding” social capital. Generalized trust reflects an individual’s belief that most others- including those who belong to recognized outgroups- share the same fundamental values (Fukuyama 1995). When generalized trust extends between groups (i.e. “bridging” social capital), norms of reciprocity and cooperation are furthered.

Linking this notion of trust to ethnicity, scholars have posited that greater degrees of ethnic heterogeneity may produce less generalized trust, and impede cooperation between members of differing social groups (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Collier 2001), while ethnocentrism generally predicts more particularized trust and promotes cooperation among in-group members (Hammond and Axelrod 2006). Expounding upon these relationships, Bahry et al. (2005) articulate a four-fold typology that accounts for variation in an individual’s degree of trust vis a vis their recognized ingroup, and known outgroups:

- “inclusionary” trust (reflects bridging social capital)- people who trust both their in-group, and out-groups.
- “exclusionary trust (reflects bonding social capital)- people who trust their own in-group, but distrust out-groups.
- “alienated” trust- people who distrust their own in-group, but trust out-groups.
- “atomized” trust- individuals who trust neither their in-group, nor out-groups.

What all of these views have in common, is a tacit assumption that the ingroup/outgroup is clearly defined in the minds of individuals, i.e. there exists a clearly defined sense of who “we” are, and who “they” are. This in turn facilitates uncertainty reduction which social psychologists have increasingly confirmed serves as a fundamental human motivation driving the near universal tendency for humans to conceptually categorize themselves into groups (Hale 2004).

But what if this is not the case? Before one can speak of an individual’s trust ‘within’ or ‘between’ groups, there must exist a coherent sense of the “us” and “them”. In other words, “Identity of territory and citizenry must be clearly enough defined to allow behavior to be predictable, interests to be complementary, and mutual trust to grow...” (Rustow 1967, 36) Without a coherent *a priori* sense of national identity, it may be difficult- if not outright impossible- to create and foster the spirit of “social connectedness” that facilitates cooperation and coordination for the common good.

1.3 National Identity and Democratization

What is national identity in its basic form? Smith (1991, 75) characterizes national identity as a “sameness” in “national character” and identifies it as a goal arising out of the process of nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” highlights the socially constructed nature of such character. Thus, national identity can be briefly summarized as a socially constructed sameness resulting from the process of nationalism (Kunovich 2009).

Returning to the broader theoretical question of what influences democratization, if national identity matters for democratization, then why (and how) does it matter? Assuming for a moment that national identity does foster democracy, (albeit in an indirect fashion as opposed to a direct transformation of institutions), how does it do so? The crucial component linking identity and democratization is trust. When a greater cohesive sense of identity exists within a nation, bonds

of loyalty and trust are strengthened, and the impetus for greater cooperation exists. As John Stuart Mill noted,

“A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others-- which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.” (1861 in Rustow 1967, 20; underlining added)

Rustow’s (1967, 24) concurrent definition holds that “... a nation is conceived of a group of people bound together by a common loyalty...” Thus as instruments of social communication foster greater education, communicative understanding, and awareness amongst the population, suspicions subside and common daily interactions occur with less suspicion and greater frequency. In this fashion, “A modernizing society attains its growing understanding and control over the forces of nature through the cooperation of ever wider groups and at length the entire population... Loyalty *presupposes trust*; and in the modern world only a modernizing nation is likely to retain the loyalties of its people over the long run (Rustow 1967, 30-31, emphasis added).” In turn, I contend that trust presupposes a coherent sense of politically relevant national identification.

Any relationship between national identity and democratization must account for a linkage between two distinct types of societal-level phenomena: institutional system properties characterizing a nation’s political system, and the psychological mass tendencies of its population (Welzel and Inglehart 2007, Coppedge 2012). Such an assumption has historical antecedents as far back as Aristotle’s *Politics* and de Toqueville’s *Democracy in America*. Contemporary scholarship- beginning with Eckstein (1966) and continuing with Welzel and Inglehart (2007)- has framed this linkage in terms of congruence theory, arguing that a country’s patterns of political authority must be congruent with the authority orientations of the public. This supports the belief that “democracy...can survive and advance only when the mass public is committed to it” (Shin 1994 137).

Previous scholarship efforts have considered the character of varying systems of mass belief. Beginning with Adorno et al. (1950) identification of an “authoritarian personality”, and Lasswell’s (1951) converse recognition of “democratic character”, Rokeach (1960) considers “open” and “closed” belief systems that differ on the primary basis of belief in existential security or existential threat. Open belief systems are more compatible with democratic alignments, while closed belief systems are consistent with authoritarian rule (Rokeach 1973). When processes bring about more favorable existential conditions (e.g. economic modernization), belief systems may shift from a more closed to a more open outlook (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997).

This scholarship seeks to follow in the efforts of Welzel and Inglehart (2007) and Brudny and Finkel (2011) in the consideration of national identity as a mass belief that influences democratization, likely as a bridge or an intervening variable between exogenous socioeconomic conditions and institutional democratization. A coherent, widely held sense of national identity can relieve existential pressures and foster an open-belief system. Conversely, when the question of identity is unresolved, such pressures may be exacerbated, trust diminished, and the resulting belief system remains “closed”. Democratization cannot be achieved by the mere existence of socioeconomic conditions- collective actions are required and such efforts require motivational forces propelling them towards democracy. Mass beliefs provide such motivational forces, thus beliefs such as national identity translate socioeconomic conditions into the collective efforts that achieve, consolidate, and sustain democracy (Welzel and Inglehart 2007). Alternatively, in contexts where democratic institutions are nascent, weak, or underdeveloped, the presence of strongly-held, stable sense of national identity may mitigate or prevent democratic backsliding, whereas weakly-held or unstable conceptions might create more permissive conditions for democratic erosion. Even with the contemporary conceptual/terminological framing of transition and consolidation, national identity has a place within the story of democratization. While Rustow

has been mostly forgotten, I believe that his original identification of a potential relationship between national identity and democracy is deserving of further exploration within this context.

1.4 What Comes Next

Is there evidence to support the existence of the theoretical relationship between an intersubjectively-held conception of national identity and attitudes regarding democratic consolidation? This first chapter identified Dwankart Rustow's original hypothesis- as well as a sampling of subsequent scholarly efforts- relating national identity to democratization, and broadly relates the consideration of the question to other approaches that seek to explain the emergence and survival of democracy. The second chapter presents the literature review, delving deeper into- and situating this question within- the broader literature pertaining to both national identity and democratization, with an eye towards reconciling this research effort with existing scholarship specifically pertaining to post-Soviet Russia within each of these two broad realms.

The three chapters that follow reflect the operationalization, research, and analysis of the central question. These analytical chapters will be organized around the progression of the identified research objectives. Chapter 3 explores trends in public attitudes regarding various forms of group identity over time. Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the measurement component for national identity. Chapter 5 then tests the central research hypotheses under examination. These analytical chapters are then followed by a concluding chapter which summarizes the findings and outlines considerations for future research.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Before delving into the treatment of whether an empirically verifiable relationship exists between respondents' attitudes towards national identity and attitudes towards democracy, it is important to first understand the foundational underpinnings of what national identity *is* as well as its political significance. The philosophical origins of national identity can be traced back to the political philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau. In contrast to John Locke's emphasis on the state-protected rights and freedoms of the individual, Rousseau stressed the importance of the collective rights and freedoms of the community representing the general will of "the people" as a collective entity (Sodaro 2004). In the 19th century, John Stuart Mill continued in this vein when considering the importance of collective national affiliation for the development of democratic governance. Contemporary scholars of liberal nationalism have not only emphasized the continuing reality of national identity, but also have sought to permanently integrate its role within discussions of philosophical liberalism (Dzur 2002).

2.1 Understanding 'National Identity'

What 'is' national identity? At its most fundamental level national identity reflects a nation's relationship to "the other" resulting from the contact and inter-relationship between (at least) two groups (Prizel 1998). The foundations of a nation arise when people believe that they can communicate more easily with some than with others. They then begin to define who is within the group and who the "others" are (Suny 1993). This formative distinction reflects a shared consciousness that serves as a basis for collective interests, and subsequent collective action.

Of central importance to this shared sense of consciousness is a similarly shared basis of communication. Karl Deutsch (1953) conceptualizes the making of a nation as a process of

increasing communication among the members of a collective group or 'people'. Corresponding processes such as modernization and urbanization increase the degree of social interaction within a group, resulting in enhanced political awareness and a subsequent progression from 'a people' to a 'nationality' and in some cases a 'nation-state.' In a distinct yet somewhat related vein Benedict Anderson (1991) points to the advent of print-capitalism as the causal force behind the rise of national consciousness. The rise of print publishing and its subsequent uses in state administration required the standardization of a shared vernacular for people within a state. Print-capitalism required a reduction in the number of spoken dialects and a resulting abbreviation of print languages that were fewer in number and capable of being understood by a wider audience.

At the heart of nationality discussions lies a disputation regarding the origins of the collective community (i.e. nation) in question. Is there some objective pre-existing basis linking a grouping of people together, or is any basis of shared identification largely subjective and socially constructed? Anthony Smith (1991) identifies a pre-existing cultural basis that distinguishes between human societies (i.e. 'ethnies') along ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious lines. These communities share such fundamental features as common myths of descent, a sense of history, language and/or religion, and often a historic association with a territory or homeland. Others have disagreed with this assessment. The disagreement lies not with the substantive basis of such associations, but rather that the processual component of arriving at such associations is socially constructed rather than objectively inherent or pre-existing. In addition to the aforementioned social and economic forces, individuals are widely seen to be the active agents in the construction of nations and national identity (Fearon and Laitin 2000). The shared traditions and history of origin for a people were invented at some point in time, by someone, and for some purpose. This parallels the process by which nations themselves are actively constructed. Such processes typically involve academic scholars and/or political elites who actively diffuse national ideas based

upon a hyper-accentuated linkage to cultural, historical, and linguistic markers (Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985). This process results in Anderson's oft-cited definition of a nation as an "imagined political community," subjective in its basis yet quite real in its inter-subjectively shared sense of belief in- and belonging to- a unique community (1991, 6).

Having briefly explained both the concepts of nation and national identity, it is important to distinguish them from the related yet distinct ideas of nationalism and the state. This also provides insight into the issue of 'how' national identity is brought about. According to Anthony Smith (1983, 21), nationalism is a doctrine that holds that 1) humanity is divided into nations, 2) the sources of political power lies within the collectivity of the nation, 3) loyalty to one's nation overrides all other loyalties, and 4) that nations are only fully realized once they assume control of (and become synonymous with) the apparatus of sovereign states. Thus nationalism is "primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Hobsbawm 1990, 9). This understanding of nationalism highlights the centrality of political interests, and the oft-stated goal of achieving statehood within nationalist discourses (Suny 1993). To these stated political ends, national identity can be thought of as the more passive basis of commonality which provides "the cornerstone of nationalism" as an active political force and/or ideology.

Another articulation of this idea is the notion of "stateness"- the relationship between feelings of national unity among groups of people within (and to) an existing state, and the subsequent relationship between social membership and democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996). National identity- insofar as its political relevance is concerned- reflects the tensions arising from these related, yet often conflicting ideas. It is important to remember that nations may nationalize, but it is states that democratize. Thus nationalizing discourses are not always congruous with democratization discourses. This reflects the tension identified by Linz and Stepan between building nations and crafting democracy (1996). Their efforts sought to answer under what

empirical conditions is the logic of building nation-states complementary to- versus in conflict with- the logic of democratization. They note that, “conflicts between these different policies are reduced when almost all residents of state identify with one subjective idea of the nation, and that nation is virtually contiguous with the state” (1996, 25). Logically agreements addressing (and hopefully resolving) such ‘stateness’ conflicts are in place prior to the creation of democratic institutions. Failure to do so reflects “problems of the proper scope and domain of democratic units from within democratic theory. Like the majority principle, the democratic process presupposes a unit. The criteria of the democratic process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not [considered] proper or rightful – if its scope or domain is not justifiable- then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures” (Dahl 1989, 207).

Not only does the state serves as a goal for most nationalist discourses, but once achieved, becomes the mechanism by which the continuing formation of national identity is most actively fostered (Gellner 1983, Weber 1976). Perhaps the most widely understood means is the transmission of national values from high-culture groups to low-culture groups within a state (Gellner 1983). This process of cultural homogenization and standardized education (brought about by the historical necessities of industrialization and urbanization, notably the increasing need for shared communication among incoming factory workers) reflects a top-down approach to nation building by political elites who are in control of state resources and institutions.

2.1.1 *Theoretical and Practical Significance*

Why are questions of national identity important? In theoretical terms, it has been noted that national identity lies at the heart of the most fundamental level of decision-making within any political system. Before the fundamental political questions of ‘who gets what, when, and how’

can be answered, there must already be a sense of the 'who we are' in question, that is a decision on the identity and territorial boundaries of the political system (Offe 1997).

As a practical extension of this idea, the scope and strength of collective identity has been associated with the onset of conflictual behavior between competing groups. Social identity theory argues that strong feelings of collective social identity result in individuals enhancing the perceptions of the ingroup while concurrently devaluing the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The stronger the identification with the ingroup, the greater the potential for a more negative devaluation of the target outgroup, and thus a greater potential for conflict (Schafer 1999, Hammond and Axelrod 2006). At the national level, this enhanced ingroup identification is best understood when associated with ideas of patriotism, while the outward devaluation of an outgroup is linked to the more negative derivations of nationalism (Druckman 1994).

Of course, the more relevant significance of national identity- at least for purposes of this project- relates to its supposed relationship with democracy, specifically a country's prospects for democratic consolidation. This project seeks to test whether the importance of national identity extends beyond these micro-level manifestations (e.g. inter-personal and/or small-group conflict) in an effort to determine whether an inter-subjectively held mass belief among the population of a country has any bearing upon that country's prospects for achieving or sustaining democratization (Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 2003, Qi and Shin 2011). As noted in the preceding chapter, some scholars have argued that a coherent sense of national identity is a (and perhaps the only) necessary precondition to democratization (Rustow 1970; Linz and Stepan 1996). Whether evidence exists to support this relationship is the fundamental question underlying this research effort.

2.2 Qualifying Rustow's Theory

It is important to recognize the limitations to- and the intended scope of- Rustow's ideas. Dankwart Rustow's original stated hypothesis accounts for a scenario of regime transformation within a state from non-democracy to democracy (i.e. the transitional process of democratization). Although not explicitly mentioned, this could be reasonably extended to a scenario whereby a democratic regime emerges within a new state, post-independence from another state. Rustow's original conceptualization never argues or implies that national identity is a sufficient condition for democratization. Also, while original conceived and presented as one component within a theory to explain democratic transition, I'm positing that it may be more appropriate to conceive of the workings of national identity as having its greatest impact during the consolidation phase, rather than during the transitional phase (depending on how/where one draws the line between the two). Finally, given that national identity is conceived as being dynamic rather than static, it does allow for the later development of national identity-based issues even after democracy has been consolidated (e.g. contemporary identity-issues arising in democratically mature Belgium).

These caveats are important for a couple of reasons. That the theory does not propose that the presence of national identity unto itself is a sufficient condition for democratization, addresses whether answering the question of "Does one find examples of states NOT becoming democratic WITH a strong, well-defined sense of national identity?" constitutes an acceptable challenge to the theory. With the impact of national identity articulated as a necessary condition, this implies that other circumstances are allowable or perhaps even necessary to produce a transitional event such as internal regime transformation. Otherwise the case of China might be used as a counter example whereby a strong sense of national identity is present, yet the country is not democratic. Such cases reflect how the permissiveness of existing institutional arrangements must also be

considered-particularly in relation to the transition phase- as has been noted by Samuel Huntington (1968).

When transformative events occur (which may themselves be facilitated by strong national identity), a strong national identity may be better conceived as a concurrent necessary condition for democratic consolidation. This adaptation of Rustow's ideas within the more contemporary framework of transition and consolidation reframes the theory, casting national identity as a facilitating condition still in need of an exogenous transformational event. This in turn addresses the distinction of creating a democracy versus sustaining/consolidating a democracy already created (i.e. preventing backsliding from occurring).

Besides the possibility of countries having a strong sense of national identity without democracy, it is also important to consider countries that achieved democracy, and then later experienced some sort of identity crisis that threatened the stability or cohesiveness of the whole. Are there examples of currently "mature" democratic states with unresolved national identity issues? Certainly. Examples such as The Netherlands¹, Belgium², and Canada³, readily come to

¹ Netherlands basis = 1579 Treaty of Utrecht (i.e. Protestant provinces joining together against Catholic Spain). Religious identity reflecting pre-national consciousness, which didn't develop until late 1700's.

² Belgium- feelings of underrepresentation/subsequent Independence from Netherlands analogous to the U.S. 1830 Revolution predicated primarily upon religious (and also linguistic) differences (cleavages) was relatively homogenous; Catholic unity/mostly French-speaking. Unlike Netherlands, reflects fusion of primarily religious identification with national consciousness/considerations. More provinces (i.e. more representatives) + ruling elite all from Northern (present-day) Netherlands. Majority of population (with fewer representatives) in the 'South' (i.e. Belgium). Within this southern region, relatively homogenous; Catholic unity/mostly French-speaking. Flemish (i.e. Dutch speaking) region of northern Belgium included by force, mainly due to economic reasons Flemish/ Dutch). Upon independence from Protestant Netherlands, the official language of newly independent Belgium was French, and Dutch speaking majority in the Flanders region was marginalized. A Flemish movement began and steadily grew in importance, and the Dutch language was given official state recognition in 1898. Later, the regional-based Walloon (with accompanying French dialect) sub-cleavage also gained prominence over time.] Initial independence predicated upon primarily religious (secondarily linguistic) sense of national unity. Democratic institutions were developed. Saliency of religious cleavage diminished over time (supplanted in importance by linguistic/regional cleavages).

³ Canada- 1763 France ceded Canada to British; Quebec Act of 1774 was passed to quell discontent among French settlers who remained (it also ceded territory from the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley region, fueling American independence; 1783 Treaty of Paris recognized independence and returned said land back to U.S.) 1867 Constitution Act = Canada designation as a unique, confederal administrative territory; 1931 independence of a democratically ruled territory from an equally democratic Great Britain.

mind. But such cases do not necessarily disprove the role that national identity may have served during the consolidation process. Arguably there was either a pre-existing, coherent basis of national identity upon initially gaining independence, or one that developed during an identifiable consolidation phase. National unity issues may certainly arise- or the saliency of long-existing issues may increase- post consolidation, at which point already established democratic practices can ameliorate the potential negative consequences of these divisions.

A more significant *prima facie* test of the theory is whether one finds examples of states achieving democratic consolidation WITHOUT a strong, well-defined sense of national identity. Baogong He (2001) offers such a test citing the examples of South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia. If true, He's argument regarding these cases would be problematic for Rustow's theory, and thus need to be addressed. However, He's analysis seemingly conflates issues of territorial unification (involving North and South Korea, and China and Taiwan) with national identity, asserting that such issues are reflective of a lack of national identity in both South Korea and Taiwan respectively. However, I would contend that each of these cases does possess its own unique and coherent sense of identity, and that the development of such distinct identities may be a significant factor preventing unification.

In examining the historical development of both Taiwan and South Korea, there is a marked difference in the degree of acceptance and the attitudes towards the effects and legacy of Japanese imperialism. Korea (pre-split) already had a well-developed sense of identity, resulting a greater rejection and hostility towards the legacy of Japanese imperialism. Conversely, pre-WWII Taiwan did not, and even today aspects of Taiwanese society and culture reflect a positive acceptance of Imperial Japanese influence.

These pre-War imperial remnants were the existing cultural/societal base encountered by the Nationalists that fled from mainland China in 1949. Modern Taiwanese national identity

reflects a fusion of this ‘Nationalist-meets-Japanese-imperial-legacy’, which is a stark contrast with the national identity of mainland communist China. In fact, the issue of unification (vs. formal independence, or the uneasy in-between nature of the status quo) reflects the existence- not the absence- of a unique and coherent sense of national identity. Granted, part of China’s national identity may include the incorporation of Taiwan, but that is not the same as Taiwan’s identity (and related desire of independence, formal or otherwise).

The case for South Korean identity is bit different. In 1945, Japan surrendered to U.S. and Russian forces. Ensuing Cold- War antagonism resulted in the 1948 division of North and South Korea, analogous to the division of East and West Germany. However, the key distinction between divided Germany and divided Korea was North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, and an eventual stalemate (but no formal cessation of hostilities) by 1953. South Korea made some strides towards democracy in the 1960’s, but autocratic rule ensued until 1987. I would argue that the post-WWII fracturing of the country initially stunted the development of a contemporary unified Korean national identity, while a South Korean national identity was kick-started after the 1950 invasion. To this day, mandatory military service exists for all South Korean men in response to the potential threat from North Korea. While Koreans from both North and South Korea may hold hopes of a politically unified Korea- and the return to a potentially unified Korean national identity- this does not undercut the current reality of distinctive national identification within each country.

In the case of Russia, I would accept the possibility of He’s latter premise (i.e. Russia might be lacking in a stable, generally understood and agreed upon sense of national identity) while the fundamental basis of this research reflects the belief that Russia is not currently a consolidated democracy. He’s assertion to the contrary is based upon a cursory glance at developments in the early-to-mid 1990’s- it only reflects the identification of Russia’s preliminary transition- but does

not address whether consolidation of Russia's democracy ever occurred nor accounts for developments of the past fifteen years.

Having addressed some of the cursory challenges to Rustow's theory, it is important to consider the limitations that exist regarding its applicable scope. With Rustow's original articulation applicable to scenarios of transition, in general there are two circumstances in which one would expect Rustow's theory to manifest itself: 1) a country whose borders remain (relatively) fixed which transitions from non-democracy towards democracy, and 2) a newly independent country that arises out of a post-colonial context, or that emerges from the dissolution of a previous state entity.

In this latter circumstance there exists a choice between democracy and non-democracy, albeit one influenced by the legacy of the previous regime type. When the previous system is democratic, and strong national identity exists along with the conditions for independence, one would expect the new system to become democratic. Confirmation of such cases result in a weak test of the theory, i.e. one would expect to find democracy emerge given the cited conditions. When the previous system is democratic, and national identity is weak or non-existent exists (along with the transformative conditions for a new regime type), this provides a stronger test. If democracy is absent in the newly emerging political system than one finds stronger support for the theory (i.e. that national identity is necessary). If one finds the consolidation of democracy in spite of the lack of coherent national identity, one has evidence effectively challenging, and potentially disproving the theory. When the previous system is non-democratic, and a transformative event occurs resulting in a newly emerging democracy, the eventual consolidation of democracy along with the presence of a strong national identity would buttress Rustow's theory, while its absence would cast significant doubt. A hypothetical situation where the previous system is non-democratic, a strong national identity exists, a transformative event occurs, but democracy does not take hold

would suggest the need for greater evaluation and/or the absence of (an)other necessary condition(s).

2.3 The Case of Russia

The role of elite efforts to foster a sense of shared national unity *vis a vis* the state is clearly reflected in the recent history of Russia and the former Soviet Union. In reviewing these efforts, it is worthwhile to first consider the unique character of the former Soviet Empire. Indeed, the very use of the term ‘empire’ is subject to debate (Duncan 2005). Some have proposed that an empire is defined by its multi-national character, where typically one dominant group enjoys a position of privilege over other minority groups. Yet the Soviet Union presents a unique case in that the majority of “Russians lived worse than other minorities” within its boundaries (Duncan 2005, 285).

The reason for this is the legacy of top-down Soviet-era policies that actively promoted the national consciousness of ethnic minority groups, in a pre-emptive effort to combat the potentially destabilizing effects of nationalism. Beginning in the 1920’s, these policies were Lenin’s answer to the “nationality question (Slezkine 1994; Suny 1993). In the minds of the Soviet leadership there was a conflict between “Great Russians” and “non-Great Russians”- the latter being the victims of the former’s ethnic arrogance and “great power chauvinism” (Slezkine 1994, 209). Allowing such conflict to persist would make it difficult to reap the fruits of the Soviet revolution, and tempt minority groups to engage in reactionary nationalism.

The response was policies designed to simultaneously eliminate the possibility of unique political sovereignty for minority groups within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, while guaranteeing and promoting territorial, educational, and cultural autonomy within certain political units, formally institutionalizing ethnicity within the state apparatus, and actively promoting native cadres into positions of regional power within the Soviet party-state (Suny 1993). This seemingly

contradictory policy provided concrete privileges for non-Russians and resulted in what one scholar describes as the world's only "Affirmative Action" Empire (Martin 2001).

But after minority nationalities were defined, recognized, and formally supported, the question remained- what about the Russians? "Russian" was initially a politically empty category- a "non nation" within the early Soviet Union (Slezkine 1994, 218). Russians did not have their own party, national academies, or a clearly defined territory that was truly their own. They could be recognized as minorities in territories assigned to others, but in the Russian Soviet Republic, they had no additional rights or opportunities of a national character (Slezkine 1994). Yet beginning with the recognition of Russian as an ethnic group (which did not occur until the 1930's) 'Russian' was perceived as increasingly synonymous with 'Soviet' in the eyes of non-Russians and thus inherently privileged. One reflection of this was that linguistically, Russian effectively became the Soviet *lingua franca*. To further illustrate the relationship between Russians and non-Russians, Yuri Slezkine (1994) employs an analogy of a communal apartment. Every recognized non-Russian minority nationality had its own room. Russians on the other hand did not, but rather occupied the central hallway and kitchen space where all major decisions affecting the apartment as a whole were made. As time went by, the minority tenants became unequal and felt increasingly excluded until finally closing themselves off from the central hallway for good.

It is easy to envision how such policies planted the seeds of formative nationalist movements that were eventually sown with the onset of political liberalization in the 1980's. Although the history of such policies is useful for explaining the formation of national identity in non-Russian Soviet Republics and addressing the question of "Why the USSR broke up?" it does not provide any analytical traction for addressing what the state of Russian national identity is at present. Indeed, much of recent post-Soviet identity scholarship has focused on the development

of non-Russian national identity (e.g. Agadjanian 2001), leaving the particular issue of Russian national identity in need of further exploration.

Some scholars have made some preliminary inroads addressing the effects of elite efforts on the broader public (Tolz 2001). Based on survey data collected in the mid-1990's, Tolz concludes that the general sentiment of most Russians reflects support for nation-building along voluntaristic, civically-oriented lines. Is this still the case? Has this sentiment become effectively consolidated? Or have these observations from the mid-1990's become outdated, and not reflective of recent elite efforts at nation-building? This reflects the general sense that a vagueness persists in the notion of 'Rusianness' (Prizel 1998) and the question still remains, who should be members of the national community? By what definition or criterion should members be defined?

2.3.1 *The post-Soviet Context as a Unique Opportunity to Evaluate Rustow's Theory.*

While much has been written about Russia and its supposed 'identity crisis' following the collapse of the former Soviet Union (e.g. Chaffetz 1996), there have been few empirical efforts to link this phenomenon with Russia's struggles to democratize. While Russia is nominally a democracy⁴ insofar as it meets the minimalist standard of maintaining free and relatively fair elections, most scholars would never confuse Russia with cases reflecting more maximalist conceptions of democracy. Conversely there has been a relative degree of certainty regarding who 'we the people' are in some of these former-soviet republics that are now independent countries. These countries broke away precisely because they felt a sense of identity among themselves that

⁴ According to excerpts taken from the 2010 Polity IV Country report, "While far from consolidated, nevertheless, democratic norms and institutions in Russia have been bolstered by the electoral contests of the past decade. In contrast to the political climate of the early 1990s, all major political players now openly voice their belief that elections are the only legitimate means for assuming power. However, Russia's effort to consolidate democracy continues to face serious challenges. While the most recent elections were not marred by significant political violence or voter fraud, the Kremlin continued to use its institutional powers to interfere with the electoral process. Most significantly, the government effectively restricted media freedom."

was incongruent with the larger Soviet Union. In some cases, the transition away from Soviet-era political and economic practices occurred with relative ease and little hardship. Bridging these two bodies of scholarship, this effort considers whether the lack of democratic consolidation reflects the lack of a coherent- or at least stable- sense of national identity. While other scholars have advanced similar arguments much of the evidentiary support for the argument has been theoretical rather than empirical. For example, one of the most forceful articulations of this argument to date (Brudny and Finkel 2011, 825), provides four paragraphs- two each for Russian and Ukraine- comparing descriptive statistics derived from public opinion polls from each country in support of their central argument. While I find the central argument itself to be persuasive, the evidentiary support is admittedly lacking, thus the efforts that follow.

Within the general context of the former Soviet Union, the previous system was non-democratic, and multiple political systems emerged with some becoming more democratic and others becoming less democratic. In this situation, the previous regime type is effectively held constant, and its impact as a variable is controlled. This post-Soviet context is also roughly the equivalent of post-colonial independence, i.e. in both situations there is a fresh start for the newly independent countries. Within this context there exists a great deal of observable variation. Many countries emerged with new freedoms and institutional arrangements. Some countries have since experienced backsliding, while others seem to be moving slowly towards democratic consolidation. Given both the relative variation in the strength and coherence of national identification as well as the variation in regime-type outcomes, this post-Soviet context provides the ideal circumstances to robustly test Rustow's theory. Thus the break-up of the former Soviet Union provides a unique opportunity to compare and contrast how variation in national identity (as a cause) may have affected the process of democratization, resulting in variation within public attitudes towards democracy (as a consequence). While this project is limited to an initial empirical analysis of

Russia, if the findings do not result in an outright rejection of Rustow's theory, then there will be a ready supply of logically subsequent cases to continue testing which in turn should aid in developing, deepening, or disproving said theory.

2.4 Methodology

Ultimately the following efforts to measure and assess the development of this potential relationship between national identity and democratization will treat national identity as an ordinal variable that changes over time rather than as a static nominal variable. Such an effort is analogous to the debate within democratization literature arguing whether consideration of democracy as a dependent variable ought to be treated in a nominal vs. ordinal fashion (e.g. Sartori 1987, Bollen 1990, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Such efforts will be predicated upon survey data reflective of public national consciousness within the selected countries. In analyzing this data, I will look to construct a big-picture image of what (if any) consensus exists as to what national identity 'is' within the context of Russia, whether this construct has changed over time, and how this variation relates to indicators of measures of public attitudes regarding democracy. This analysis evaluates the evolution of Russia's national identity- and its subsequent attitudes towards democracy- as a country 'left behind' amidst the historical, cultural, and institutional remnants of the past. Assuming evidence of such a relationship is discovered the completion of such an analysis serves as a foundation for future comparative efforts, providing a basis by which to contrast the development of national identity in these 'break-away' countries.

2.4.1 Use of Identity as a Variable

To better study the effects of social identity, it is useful to consider the literature that seeks to clarify and guide operationalization efforts of the term identity for use as a variable. Identity refers to a social category, or a set of people that have been ascribed a particular label- for example,

'Russian' in the examination to follow (Fearon and Laitin 2000). According to Fearon and Laitin (2000), these categories are distinguished by two main features: rules of membership that determine who is (and who is not) a member of the categorical group; and content, that reflects the characteristics thought to be representative of members within the categorical boundary.

The elaboration and development of a somewhat similar analytical framework was the recent subject of focus for Abdelal et al. (2006). For them, identity as a social category is recognized as varying along two key dimensions; content and contestation. The basic understanding of content as describing the meaning and collective identity is similar to that of Fearon and Laitin (2000). However, Abdelal et al. (2006) further break down and specify the composition of content as reflecting any potential combination of four elements: constitutive norms (including the rules that define membership), relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models. Contestation refers simply to the degree of agreement within in a group over said content.

Similarly, Schafer (1999) identifies three dimensions of group-based identity. Again, the first is content, or the belief in the shared basis of similarity. Second is the instrumental dimension, or the extent of an individual's motivation to support one's country (i.e. patriotism). Third concerns the nature of the outgroup as indicated by perceptual comparisons of the group member to the identified 'other.' This corresponds with Abdelal et al. (2006) 'relational comparisons' content sub-type but is articulated as a necessarily unique dimension of group-based identity.

The variation that exists along the content dimension shared by all three perspectives has been the primary focus of scholarly efforts to define and explain the substance of identity. In the general scholarship on national identity, the two primary content dimensions that have been most often identified are an ethnic-orientation and a civic-orientation (Chafetz 1996). These dimensions are generally applicable to the case of Russia, although some authors have identified and expanded this range to as many as five differing conceptions of potentially valid content orientations. In

addition to the two primary orientations, Tolz (2000) considers a linguistic orientation (often collapsed into other ethnic orientations, but purposefully separated by Tolz), a racial orientation (easily the least resonant of the five), and a union identity. This last one is perhaps the most intriguing supplement to the standard dichotomous ethnic/civic pairing, emphasizing the multi-ethnic character and common history of the former Soviet Union. Related to this conception is Hopf's identification of five specific sources of pride in the Soviet experience- its status as a global power, the emergence of democracy under Soviet rule, the quality of Soviet mass culture, the conditions for young people, and Soviet economic performance (2002, 160). Considering these competing content dimensions, the primary focus of chapter four will be attempting to cast light on which dimensional basis is supported by the available data.


2.4.2 *Inventory of Available Data*

A number of potentially fruitful survey data sources exist and are available at Gesis.org. These include a variety of collections within various International Survey Programs (e.g. ISSP, and European Values Survey). Within the ISSP series, modules from 1995, 2003, and 2013 focus on the topic of national identity and provide a good amount of material allowing for the development of potential identity constructs. The drawback of the ISSP datasets is that they only include one question measuring the degree of pride in the way democracy works. The European Values Survey- a longitudinal study completed in four waves between 1981 and 2008- captured similar attitudes within the pool of potential county cases in the 1990, 1999, and 2008 panels. Measures included the degree of satisfaction with democracy, the extent of a feeling of belonging with different geographical groups, pride in citizenship, trust towards in-group members, and attitudes towards immigrants. Ideally, similar findings across multiple datasets will help to

overcome the limitations of any one dataset and enhance the robustness of the findings pertaining to the identified research question.

2.4.3 *Central Research Question and Hypotheses*

Setting aside the overly deterministic language of Rustow’s original articulation, this effort seeks to test a modified version of Rustow’s theory regarding the relationship between national identity and democracy in the context of post-Soviet states. Such an effort is inspired by Coppedge’s useful reminder that given the complexity of the social world which we inhabit, “any student of comparative politics must learn to be comfortable with theories that are probabilistic, partial, conditional, and provisional”, or in other words, measured uncertainty (2012, 5). To this end, this effort seeks to contribute to the broad consideration of ‘why’ - and ‘why not’ - democracy by addressing the following **research question: Is there an identifiable relationship between intersubjectively held conceptions of national identity and democratization?**



Recalling the major camps that explain ‘why democracy?’ identified in chapter 1, within the political cultural tradition is the idea that a strong civil-society- one that develops apart from the state- will be reflective of/foster trust among individuals/groups and result in an increased willingness to participate in civic life. However subsequent research has suggested that not all trust is the same. Given the presence of differing subgroups within a society, an individual may recognize an ‘ingroup’ as distinct from ‘outgroups’. Such recognition may result in variations in the fostering of trust among these subgroups. When such distinctions are made, ‘trust’ that bridges individuals identified ‘ingroup’ and its ‘outgroup’ counterpart, is essential to democratic

consolidation. This scenario reflects that distinctive ‘ingroups/outgroups’ are present, and that an individual possesses reasonable certainty as to the membership within these subgroups. However, if membership boundaries are uncertain, and there is not a widely agreed upon sense as to who the ingroup ‘is’ and who the contrasting outgroup may be, then an individual may not be able to develop the trust necessary to foster bridging social capital.

This brings us back to the idea of national identity. If significant variation exists as to the very nature of the national character, then trust is unable to develop resulting in the diminished potential for democratic consolidation. Thus, it becomes essential to identify the basis by which ingroups and outgroups are constructed, and what the relationship between such constructions may have with a constituent’s conception of democracy. I contend that it is appropriate to ground the consideration of national identity’s potential relationship to democratization within the subset of research that broadly considers the relationship between “mass beliefs” as a way of understanding a society’s potential for democratic consolidation. Granted, such an approach does not serve as a direct explanatory basis for explaining democratic or non-democratic regime-type outcomes at the state level. Rather findings derived from this research suggest indirect influences (e.g. permissive socio-cultural conditions) on a country’s prospects for democratization via Congruence Theory.

While it’s worth acknowledging at the outset that many factors induce both direct and indirect effects that influence democratization (i.e. modernization, economic development, institutional development, civil society, etc.), and that many of these factors likely act as exogenous variables that also influence such ‘mass beliefs’ as national identity and trust, this complex reality suggests that alternative approaches to explaining democratization should be viewed as complementary rather than competitive, which in turn can facilitate a more holistic approach to explaining democratization.

This research will proceed with testing whether an empirically verifiable relationship exists between respondents' attitudes towards national identity and attitudes towards democracy. This effort will employ multiple large-N datasets capturing the attitudes of individual respondents within Russia over multiple points (or snapshots) in time. While employing confirmatory factor analysis and multi-level modeling techniques to capture the relationship of aggregated societal attitudes within countries follows those made previously by Jones and Smith (2001) and Kunovich (2009), this effort considers multiple datasets from two different survey programs (i.e. ISSP and EVS) better allowing for an analysis of the variation in both the development of national identity and attitudes towards democracy across time. Such an effort joins a recent surge in quantitatively oriented scholarship that strives to improve techniques for- while advancing our understanding of- intersubjectively held schemas (such as national identity) and their potential for political consequences (Bonikowski 2016, Aleman and Woods 2016).

There will be three major components of the 'within case' analyses of Russia that follows. Chapter 3 will consider a series of summary statistics from multiple primary and secondary sources exploring the features of relative saliency of membership within- and attitudes towards- subgroups within Russia. This chapter will strive to distinguish national identity from other salient forms of group identification. Utilizing survey data and employing factor analytic techniques, Chapter 4 will strive to answer whether a widely agreed upon sense of a distinctly Russian 'ingroup' exists and to what extent that sense of identity has changed over time. Following this treatment of national identity as the dependent variable, the third part of this analysis presented in Chapter 5 will deploy the developed construct as the primary independent variable, testing whether there is evidence to suggest the existence of a potential relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democratization via structural equation modeling (SEM). Specifically, the hypotheses to be tested include-

Chapter 3

H₀: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are not identifiable.

H₁: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are identifiable.

Chapter 4

H₀: A shared sense of collective national identity is not present.

H₁: A shared sense of collective national identity is present.

H₀: Any shared sense of collective national identity does not change over time.

H₁: Any shared sense of collective national identity does change over time.

Chapter 5

H₀: There is no relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.

H₁: There is a relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.

H₀: A relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy does not change over time.

H₁: A relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy does change over time.

CHAPTER 3. THE SALIENCE OF GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS

Does a coherent, identifiable, inter-subjectively held sense of national identification exist within the minds of Russians? Answering this question is a necessary precursor to considering whether- and/or to what extent- national identity may influence a country's prospects for democratic consolidation. To answer this question, it is useful to first identify the general contours of the identifiable group associations which are of the greatest importance to an average Russian. While Brudny and Finkel (2011) contend that a distinctive sense of national identity exists in both Russia and Ukraine, their argument tacitly assumes the existence of such group identity while then presenting limited evidence that supports this claim. This chapter treats the existence of national identity as an empirical question rather than an assumed theoretical construct. Paralleling the methodological approach of analyzing descriptive summary statistics employed by Brudny and Finkel (2011), this chapter attempts a more robust analysis of this precursor question: is it possible to empirically identify distinctive trends in collective national consciousness that in turn suggest a shared sense of collective national identity?

In addressing this research question, this chapter tests the following hypothesis:

H₀: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are not identifiable.


H₁: Distinctive trends in collective national consciousness are identifiable.

To address this question, this initial exploration into the attitudes of Russian respondents relating to the perceived contours of salient group identification will proceed in four parts. The first part explores the different types of groups that Russians self-identify as belonging to, with comparisons between findings reported via secondary data sources and preliminary statistics generated from the datasets used throughout this research effort. The second part considers the relative strength of pride deriving from said associations. Part three examines descriptive statistics

relating to more explicit measures of what respondents believe is important for membership within the Russian ‘ingroup’, followed by similar considerations as to the salient features and relevant perceptions of various ‘outgroups’ within Russia in part four.

3.1 Identification of Salient Group Memberships

In 2013, a poll commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club in preparation for a forum on national identity revealed that the most significant associations felt by Russians were with fellow citizens of the Russian Federation (57%) and with residents of the same city/town (35%, Figure 1). These poll results suggest that the relative prevalence of associations with these two groups were more than twice that of the next most significant group (i.e. generation and ethnicity, both at 16% respectively). This statistic is somewhat surprising given the aforementioned scholarly




Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013.

Figure 1: Prompted Self Identification

contributions suggesting the absence of any cohesive sense of identification widely shared among Russian citizens. Yet further evidence provides additional support for this arguable trend.

In 2004, a poll conducted by the Russian Institute of Sociology found that 78% of all poll respondents claimed to identify themselves with citizens of Russia (Figure 2). By comparison people felt a greater sense of identification with people of their same town or village (82%), people of the same nationality (89%), people with the same life views (92%), and people of the same profession (99%) suggested by the poll to be the most relevant basis of identification. However, a follow-up poll conducted in 2011 reveals identification with citizens of Russia had increased to 95%, going from the least relevant to the most relevant form of self-identification.




Source: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, IS RAS)

Figure 2: Change in the relative importance of national group identities, 2004-2011, %

This basis of identification had the most significant increase over this period of time. The only other basis of self-identification that increased was locality (i.e. identification with people of

the same town/village) from 82% in 2004 to 89% in 2011. Other forms of identification either decreased (e.g. identification with people of the same life views; people of the same profession) or stayed the same (i.e. people of the same nationality). It is interesting to note the earlier differentiation made by respondents between their perceived sense of citizenship and nationality (78% vs. 89% respectively in 2004) which seems to have dissipated over time (95% vs. 90% in 2011).

These findings were compared to those captured by polling data from 1992 (Figure 3). Whereas identifying with people of the same profession was the greatest relative form of self-identification in 2004 (99%) it was the least relevant form of self-identification in 1992 (40%). Conversely, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union respondents initially felt the greatest relative connection to fellow citizens (72%), at a rate seemingly constant for the first 10+ years through 2004 (78%), before this sense of identification blossomed over the next decade (95% in 2011). One interesting distinction worth noting with the Institute of Sociology poll is the



Source: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, IS RAS)


Figure 3: 1992- Who do you feel a connection to a large extent, %

response option of 'fellow countryman' distinct from both citizens of Russian and people of the same nationality- a feature that (thankfully) was not present in subsequent polls (likely) due to the difficulty to effectively distinguish the meaning of different responses.

Lest one conclude that the strong sense of identification with profession was some sort of outlier, other evidence supports this sense of connection to one's profession during this time period. The 2003 ISSP survey provided a list and asked respondent's which groups in said list were the most important (and second/third most) in describing who they were. While family was the group overwhelming chosen by most people as either the most or second most important group to describe who they were (a feature similarly noted by the Institute of Sociology poll), occupation was easily the second most selected of the options (Figure 4).

While this sense of identification with one's profession was consistent across multiple polls, there was an interesting discrepancy between one's reported sense of identification with nationality. In the 2004 and 2011 Institute of Sociology polls, people's self-reported identification with nationality was both fairly high and fairly stable over time. However, the 2003 ISSP data suggests that- as compared to other identification options- a respondent's connection to nationality was relatively less important. It is worth noting that the ISSP survey featured a corresponding 'ethnicity' option not featured in the Institute of Sociology polls, and that the combined ISSP results for ethnicity and nationality would correspond roughly with those reporting a connection to people of the same nationality revealed by the Institute of Sociology data. Conversely, the Institute of Sociology polls featured options for both nationality and citizenship, whereas the ISSP survey did not offer a separate, explicit option for identifying with fellow citizens. Given the relative strength of ethnic identification within the ISSP results (behind only profession and family) its categorical omission from the Institute of Sociology polls is somewhat surprising, while the ISSP survey's

omission of citizens as a potential group one identifies with suggests a similar comparable shortcoming with the survey instrument.




Source: ISSP 2003, responses to Q1) We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?

Figure 4: Prompted self-identification

Having acknowledged the potential shortcomings of the ISSP survey, the results were aggregated in a fashion similar to those of the Valdai Club polls to better facilitate a comparison of the results (Figure 5). The revealed differences were stark. While the 2013 Valdai Club survey suggests that the greatest sense of self-identification is with fellow citizens (57%), the 2003 ISSP results suggest that family (57.6%) and occupation (54.1%) were the strongest bases of association. While the identification with family is not surprising and can seemingly be explained by the

difference in question wording (i.e. relating to your role within a family more generally, e.g. being a grandparent in a more abstract sense vs. the more general feeling of belonging to your family), the difference in the importance of one's profession is less easily explained. The ISSP results suggest 54.1% of respondent's identifying with one's profession from a list of available presented choices- one of the strongest relative associations, vs. only 8% (and one of the weakest relative associations) suggested by the Valdai results. The contrast is even starker given the approximate similarity in findings relating to associations with ethnicity, part of country, and generation/age group, which similarly appear as the number 3-5 options across both surveys.



Source: ISSP 2003, responses to Q1) We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?

Figure 5: Prompted self-identification, aggregate % (ordered)

Table 1: Relative importance of prompted self-identification, comparing aggregated responses from different sources over time.


Item	Inst. Soc 1992	ISSP 2003	Inst. Soc 2004	Inst. Soc. 2011	Valdai 2013
Citizenship	72%	N/A	78%	95%	57%
	1st		4th	1st	1st
Locality	N/A	30.5%	82%	89%	35%
		3rd	3rd	3rd	2nd
Profession	40%	54.1%	99%	81%	8%
	4th	1st	1st	4th	4th
Nationality	51%	14.7%	89%	90%	N/A
	3rd	4th	2nd	2nd	
Ethnicity	N/A	31.5%	N/A	N/A	16%
		2nd			3rd
(‘countrymen’)	60%				
	2nd				

Table 1 features a comparison of the results for five selected group types, from four different points in time. Given the omission of at least one of each of these groups from each survey (only profession was included in all five) it was useful to evaluate the relative strength of these group associations across the range of compiled data. Citizenship ranks high initially, declines in relative importance, before rebounding and again registering as the group eliciting the greatest degree of shared identification. This trend was precisely the opposite for profession which was initially one of the weakest forms of group identification, before registering as the strongest relative basis by two different surveys in the mid-2000’s, before again declining in relative importance. Values representing the strength of identification on the basis of nationality were all over the place depending on the survey instrument making even these highly generalized comparisons difficult. However the glass-half-full perspective on this non-finding is that this lack of a clear take-away on the basis of nationality justifies further exploration and is precisely what

this project is all about. Interestingly ethnicity was only included in two of the data sets also preventing meaningful comparison.


One additional feature worth noting is the slight difference in question wording between the ISSP and Valdai Club surveys. The Valdai Club survey phrased the question as “which groups do you feel like you belong to” while the ISSP survey asked respondents “which groups are important to you in describing who you are”. While the distinction is subtle and perhaps only obvious when directly comparing the survey questionnaires, it is not difficult to imagine respondents feeling like they are part of many groups, while not necessarily feeling that all groups they are a part of are important for describing who they are.

The multitude of available data sources also provides an interesting basis of comparison along the lines of geography as a specific subset of belonging. Similar questions were asked in both the 1999 and 2008 versions of the European Values Surveys (Figure 6), as well as the 1995, 2003, and 2013 ISSP surveys. Both sets of surveys suggest that the greatest relative geographic associations are with one’s city/town and with one’s country as compared to intermediate regions such as counties and their equivalent, or macro-aggregate considerations such as the continent writ large. The ISSP data (Figure 7) seems to suggest that there was an initial surge in feelings of belonging (41.7%) to one’s country shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which then steadily declined in later years. While the ISSP results suggest that this sense of connection was short-lived (declining in each of the subsequent surveys), the European Values Survey results suggest the opposite trend, with only 25.2% of respondent’s initially identifying with their country in 1999 (vs. 50.6% identifying with their town/locality), before growing to 41.6% in 2008 (while identification with town/locality shrinks to 38.4%).



Source: EVS data, responses to question: Which of the following geographic groups do you belong to first of all?

Figure 6: Prompted self-identification, geographic groups.



Source: ISSP data, responses of “Very close” to question: How close do you feel to [town/city; county; country; continent]?

Figure 7: Strength of identification with geographic groups.

A comparison across datasets on this basis of geography (Table 2) reveals two interesting features. While the absolute values of the numbers for locality differ significantly between the two datasets, both sets of surveys suggest that the relative importance of locality is slowly declining over time. In contrast, though similar values for association with country were found in both the EVS and ISSP data, there does not seem to be a consistent pattern over time. In fact, if one were to examine only the ISSP data, one would reasonably conclude that the association with country is declining over time. If one were to examine only the EVS data, the opposite conclusion would likely be reached.


Table 2: Relative importance of geography, comparing aggregated responses from different sources over time.

Item	ISSP 1995	EVS 1999	ISSP 2003	EVS 2008	ISSP 2013
Locality	31.8%	50.6%	29.2%	38.4%	26.1%
	2nd	1st	1st	2nd	1st
County	24.6	7.9	16.5	13.4	21
	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd	3rd
Country	41.7%	25.2%	26.4%	41.6%	24.3%
	1st	2nd	2nd	1st	2nd
Continent	7.8	0.4	3.3	1.3	2
	4th	4th	4th	4th	4th

3.2 Pride Associated with Ingroup Membership

Shifting attention slightly from general feelings of belonging to the relative strength of pride deriving from said feelings, we turn again to the reported results of the Valdai Club's commissioned poll (Figure 8). Again citizenship- and the pride associated with it- tops the list with 63% of respondent's not only taking pride in the sense of membership with the group, but also feeling like fellow members of this group are better than others. Two different geographic

associations also place within the top-5 as respondents closely identify as belonging – and taking pride in- the sense of connection with fellow residents of their city/town as well as the larger territorial region within the country (at 58% and 53% respectively). While this strong sense of connection with one’s local community (i.e. city/town) is consistent with the EVS and ISSP data, this regional sense of pride and belonging being on par with one’s sense of belonging with their more localized community is unique to the Valdai survey results.




Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013. Responses to: Are you proud to belong to the following groups?

Figure 8: Identification with- and relative degree of pride in- various ingroups


This data also suggests ethnicity as a salient basis of membership, second only to citizenship with 59% of respondents indicating not only a sense of pride and group belonging, but also feeling that fellow members are better than members of other ethnic groups. This finding is consistent with the ethnic/civic dichotomy featured in much of the scholarship of the 1990's, but seemingly at odds with more recent scholarship which has suggested it to be a less-than-accurate framing of contemporary Russian identity. Whereas this statistic suggests a relatively strong sense of belonging to one's ethnicity, different questions from the same poll produced dissimilar results. When provided options from a list and prompted to answer 'which group or groups do you feel like you belong to?' (Figure 1) only 16% of respondents selected ethnic group as one of their (up to) three choices (versus 35% selecting residents of their city/town and 57% identifying with citizens of the Russian Federation). And while the sense of pride and belonging to one's city/town is consistent with the findings described above, the relative strength of association with residents of one's broader region within the country is surprising given the EVS results (Figure 6) though this latter difference may be explained in part by the slightly different emphasis on the people within a region versus the feeling of connection to the region itself.

The strength/feeling of pride with fellow citizens (as of 2013) seems to be additionally supported by the EVS query of 'how proud are you to be a Russian citizen' (Figure 9). The percentage of respondent's identifying themselves as very proud grew from 31.6% in 1999 to 48.5% in 2008. Those expressing that they were somewhat proud also grew modestly (38.6% to 43%) during this time. Conversely those expressing that they were not very proud or not proud at all declined from a combined 29.5% in 1999 to a comparatively meager 8.5% in 2008.



Source: EVS data, responses to question: How proud are you to be a Russian citizen?


Figure 9: Extent of pride in citizenship.



Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country.

Figure 10: Relative strength of pride in Russian citizenship vs other citizenship.

Those agreeing with the more pointedly phrased ISSP question ‘I would rather be a citizen of Russia than of any other country’ (Figure 10) held constant from 1995 until 2013, with the combined percentage of those agreeing strongly or simply agreeing fluctuating slightly from 75.2% (1995), to 77.9% (2003), to 75.1% (2013). More similarly phrased ISSP questions suggest that this increased sense of pride not present in 1999 was manifesting itself by 2003- and holding relatively strong/constant as of 2013- with the combined percentage of respondents identifying as very proud or somewhat proud at 85.4% and 81.2% in 2003 and 2013 respectively (Figure 11).




Source: ISSP data, responses to question: How proud are of being Russian?

Figure 11: Extent of pride in nationality.

Perhaps the starkest reflection/indication of this shift was captured by the responses to the statement ‘I am often less proud of Russia than I would like to be’ (Figure 12). In 2003, the combined percentage of respondents who agreed/agreed strongly was 80.5%, with 12.2% neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Only 7.4% disagreed with this sentiment. By 2013 only 65.3% of

respondent's agreed with this statement, with the percentage of respondent's disagreeing rising to 13.5% and the percentage of those expressing indifference growing to 21.3%. These gains were fueled mostly by the significant drop-off in respondents agreeing strongly with the statement- 41.8% in 2003 dropping more than twenty percentage points to 20.7% in 2013.




Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: I am often less proud of Russia than I would like to be.

Figure 12: Changes in relative pride in Russian nationality vs unspecified alternative over time.

3.3 Impressions of Russianness

Having considered some indicators reflecting the relative strength/saliency of pride in citizenship over time as one aspect of national identity, let's now consider more explicit measures of respondent's perceptions of what's important for national identity. Returning to the Valdai Club data, the question was asked 'who would you describe as Russian?' (Figure 13). 35% of respondents indicated that growing up in Russia and being raised in Russia's cultural traditions

best captures what it means to be Russian. This was easily the most provided answer- greater than the next two choices combined (i.e. being ethnic Russian and being a native Russian speaker at 16% and 14% respectively). Only 10% felt that self-identification alone (i.e. someone believing themselves to be Russian) was a sufficient criterion for describing someone as Russian.




Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013. Response to: Who would you describe as Russian?

Figure 13: Basis for determining Russian nationality.

The inversely related question of whether ‘it is possible for people who do not share Russia’s customs/traditions to become fully Russian’ was asked across all three of the ISSP Surveys (Figure 14). While the combined percentage of those disagreeing was 29.4% in 1995, this fell to 5.7% in 2003, (and held nearly constant at 5.8% in 2013). These losses fueled the gains of those agreeing strongly, which rose from 33% in 1995 to 53.3% in 2003, while the combined


percentage of those agreeing (i.e. agree + agree strongly) went from 59.2% in 1995 to 86.8% and 81.4% in 2003 and 2013 respectively. The responses to this question in a vacuum support the relative assessment captured by the Valdai Club's efforts.



Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: It is impossible for ppl who do not share Russia's customs and traditions to become fully Russian.

Figure 14: Relative importance of embracing culture as basis for nationality.

The most interesting source of data indicating what is important for Russian national identity drives from the questions asked across multiple ISP surveys. In 1995, 2003, and 2013, respondents were asked the relative importance of seven different attributes (and an eighth which was included in 2003 and 2013). While the data reflects the dynamic nature of the ever-changing contours of national identity- and certainly does not suggest that any identity-related questions have been settled- a number of interesting trends are suggested (Figure 15).




Source: ISSP data, responses to prompt: How important are each of the following to be considered 'Russian'?

Figure 15: Change in relative importance of national identity attributes over time.

For example, the relative importance of having been born in Russia and possessing Russian citizenship seems to have experienced modest growth over the past 20 years. In 1995 a shade under 40% of respondents felt that having been born in Russia was very important. The combined percentage of those believing it to be either very or fairly important was 72.3%. By 2003 both of these statistics increased significantly to 55.6% and 84.9% respectively. While the percentage of those believing it be very important tapered off a bit to 51.5% in 2013, the combined percentage increased slightly to 87.3%. The importance of citizenship similarly grew from 80% in 1995 to 88% and 90% in 2003 and 2013 respectively. Similar views about the ability to speak the Russian language also grew modestly from 81.8% in 1995 to 84.3% in 2003 and 88.3% in 2013.

In addition to the ISSP survey data, the 2008 EVS featured a similar query, with five of the same eight attributes as the ISSP surveys (Figure 16). The consistency of the findings across data sets is somewhat remarkable as the EVS results for three of the five attributes (i.e. ability to speak Russian, respect for the institutions/laws, and having Russian ancestry) were within four percentage points of the 2013 ISSP results. The importance of living in Russia for a long time was within 5.9% (ISSP = 87.1% vs. EVS = 81.2%), and the slight difference may be accounted for with the slight variation in question wording (i.e. most time of life in Russia v. lived in Russia for a long time). The only attribute whose results differed significantly between the different surveys was the perceived importance of having been born in Russia. The EVS results (78.4%) seem to split the difference between the 1995 ISSP results (72.3%) and the 2003 results (84.9%), while being furthest from the 2013 results (87.3%) to which all of the other attributes otherwise compared favorably.



Source: EVS 2008 data, responses to question: How important are each of the following to be considered 'Russian'?

Figure 16: Relative importance of various indicators of nationality.

Other attributes experiences only slight growth in perceived importance and in some cases held virtually steady over this period of time. The importance of having spent most of one's life in Russia rose slightly from 80% in 1995 to 85% in 2003 and 2013. Having respect for Russia's laws and political institutions experienced a slight dip (85.4% to 82.5%) between 1995 and 2003, before settling again at 85.7% in 2013. Feeling Russian has seemingly always been important- perhaps even a necessary pre-requisite- with agreement with this attribute holding at over 90% across all three surveys.

Perhaps the most intriguing development across these three surveys is the change in attitudes regarding the perceived importance of religion over the first 20 years of the Russian Federation. In 1995 only 17.4% felt that being Russian Orthodox was very important, with a slight majority believing it to be not very important or not important at all (60.3%). From 1995 to 2003


the response rate for very important doubled from 17.4% to 34.1% while the combined percentage of very important and fairly important grew from 39.7% to 58.3%. According to the 2013 survey this grew yet again from 58.3% to 73.6%. Whereas the percentage of those believing religion to be not important at all was 32.1% in 1995, this shrunk to 8.8% by 2013. While the total percentage of those feeling this attribute is at least fairly important is still lower than any other listed attribute, in just under 20 years religion went from practically being a non-factor to being a potentially important factor when considering the development (and status) of Russian national identity.

3.4 Attitudes Towards Outgroups

Having explored some of the data that speaks to what's important for the substance/boundaries of Russian national identity (i.e. ingroup), the final portion of this chapter will consider some of the perceptions regarding 'others' or members of the various out-groups' within Russia (i.e. immigrants, ethnic minorities). Granted some of these preliminary measures are indirect at best, asking respondents to consider who they would want as neighbors or who they would hypothetically 'allow' to move to their city, while others try to gauge general levels of trust or prompt respondents to consider differences between groups in very general terms. However other measures directly capture the perceptions held by Russians of immigrants as a distinctive outgroup.

Figure 17 reflects a general recognition of the types of the differences between groups that may be considered important. However, the question was posed quite generally, and the results should be interpreted as such. The most significant finding was the identification of cultural difference as being important, more so than ethnicity and geography. Interestingly, the attributes identified in the earlier parts of this chapter were all perceived to be relatively less important than not. 52% of respondents believed ethnicity to be relatively unimportant compared to 44% believing


this attribute to be a relatively important difference among groups. Religious differences were relatively unimportant by a 3:2 margin while geographic differences were closer to 2:1.



Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013. Response to question: Which kind of differences between various groups do you see as important or unimportant?

Figure 17: Relative importance of various national ingroups.

When considering the question of whether the government should allow people from less developed countries entry in to Russia (for purposes of obtaining work, Figure 18), roughly 15% believed that the government should outright prohibit such entry. Roughly twice that (29.7%) believed that there should be strict limits on the number of foreigners allowed in to Russia. The combined percentage of these perspectives matched that of the slightly more receptive belief that foreigners should be allowed in but with the conditionality of there being a sufficient number of jobs available.




Source: EVS 1999 data, responses to question: How about people from less developed countries coming here to work. Which of the following do you think the government should do?

Figure 18: Attitudes towards others- immigrants seeking employment.

A question within the 2013 Valdai Club survey shifted this hypothetical consideration from the macro-perspective (i.e. work-related immigration in to the country) to a more personalized scale, asking respondents to consider who they would allow to move to their city (Figure 19, it is worth noting that the question text emphasized the hypothetical nature of this question and included a brief statement that there are no such restrictions on movements within Russia). While slightly more than a third (36%) indicated no need for restrictions, slightly less than one third (29%) indicated that such movement should be restricted to citizens only- implying that non-citizens/immigrants should be prohibited from doing so- while further supporting the growing importance of citizenship as a basis to distinguish ingroup/outgroup membership boundaries.


The most personalized queries asked respondents to consider the types of people they would dislike as neighbors- a question featured in both the European Values Survey as well as the commissioned Valdai Club poll. Again focusing attention on previously identified attributes, religion once again makes somewhat surprising appearance. 41% of respondents identified that



Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013. Response to question: Who would you let move to your city?

Figure 19: Attitudes towards others- restrictions on outsiders moving to city


members of unconventional religions or sects were among the least desirable neighbors, placing within the top-3 of the Valdai Club polling results (Figure 20). Muslims were identified separately by 14%. Some interesting perceptions of regionality were also revealed via respondents indicated preference for not living near/regularly interacting with persons from various regions within Russia and former Soviet republics. Between 20-30% of all respondents identified people from Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and trans-Caucasus regions as unacceptable neighbors. These results reveal some fairly specific bases of dislike and distrust; when these specific characteristics as options to select within the question, only 9% of respondents subsequently identified differences in ethnicity more generally as a basis for not undesirability.



Source: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) poll, “Modern Russian Identity: Dimensions, Challenges, Responses,” commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, August 2013. Response to question: What kind of person would be most unacceptable as a next-door neighbor or co-worker, someone you see every day?

Figure 20: Attitudes towards others- unacceptable neighbors (Valdai)


While the question asked within the EVS surveys was similar, the presented attributes were quite different (Figure 21). More interesting than the particulars of any one outgroup are the across-the-board increases in the types of people disliked as neighbors from 1998 to 2008, suggesting an increasing trend of dislike- and possibly distrust- of those perceived generally as ‘others’. One specific group that stands out is the nearly three-fold increase in the dislike of immigrants and foreign workers between 1999 and 2008 (from 11.2% to 32.4%).



Source: EVS data, responses to question: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?


Figure 21: Attitudes towards others- unacceptable neighbors- (EVS)

The 2008 EVS also featured a battery of eight questions pertaining specifically to the attitudes held by Russian citizens towards immigrants (Figures 22 and 23). The results reflect the overwhelming distrust of immigrants held by most Russians. When asked whether they agreed with the statement ‘Today in Russia, there are too many immigrants’, 74.4% agreed or agreed strongly. When asked about the specific effects of immigrants (i.e. immigrants take away jobs; immigrants increase crime, etc.) an overwhelming majority of respondents placed themselves on the negative end of the spectrum. In fact, for the five questions featuring a ten-point scale - with 1 being the most negative view of immigrants and 10 being the least negative - the modal response was 1. Not only was the most negative response the most often provided response, but in some instances it was provided twice (e.g. immigrants increase crime) and three times (e.g. immigrants



Source: EVS 2008 data, responses to prompts: “Today in Russia there are too many immigrants” and “Because of the number of immigrants in Russia, I sometimes feel like a stranger.”

Figure 22: Attitudes towards others- immigrants



Source: EVS 2008 data, responses to prompt: Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale (e.g. 1- take away jobs vs 10- do not take away jobs).

Figure 23: Attitudes towards others- effects of immigrants

will become a threat to society) as often as the next most provided response. The only effect that immigrants did not have on most citizens is making them feel like a stranger within their own country, with a majority of respondents disagreeing with that statement.

3.5 Analysis

Most individuals belong to- and identify with- a variety of group identities. The primary goal of this chapter was to identify the components that help to answer the question: what is national identity? These preliminary exploratory efforts began by considering the general types of groups with which respondents most closely identify. Starting with data sources relating to group identity (including nationality) more generally, I attempted to work up to data sources that were increasingly focused on national identity, while refining the distinction between nationality (as a more general concept) and national identity (as a more specific, underlying belief). Identifying the particular components of one's belief in national identity in turn contrasts with the secondary, outward attitudinal manifestations of these concepts (i.e. affirming expressions of pride in country; relational expressions of country being better than others, etc.)

The data suggests that a sense of belonging with fellow citizens, members of the same profession, ethnicity, and locality have all played significant roles as the groups which are of the greatest relative importance to most respondents. Of these identified groups, association with fellow citizens and with members of the same profession have seemingly alternated as the group association of greatest relative importance over time. This has similarly occurred on a geographic basis as Russians have seemingly alternated between stronger feelings of association with locality and with their country as a whole. While some general trends could be identified across various datasets, inconsistencies in the findings were also present which dampened the potential for greater generalization.

When considering the extent of pride deriving from such associations, the relative significance of one's profession dissipates quickly relative to the more pride-inducing associations of citizenship, ethnicity, and locality. While the pride associated with ethnic identification is not surprising, the prevalence of such ethnic association remains unclear. Nearly all of the available data suggests a noticeable increase in the relative feelings of pride associated with Russian citizenship occurring sometime between 1999 and 2013.

Similarly, there was remarkable consistency in the preliminary findings across both the EVS and ISSP data as to which features were of the greatest importance to being considered Russian. Findings suggest that Russians were more prone to tolerating individuals being able to 'opt in' to a sense of 'Russianness' early on, but gradually shifted to favoring more ascriptive characteristics (e.g. having been born in Russia; having Russian citizenship) over time. These findings coincide with the general disdain towards immigrants and foreign workers held by most Russians, as well as the across the board increase of disliking nearly all 'others' over roughly the same time period.

These findings suggest an image of collective consciousness increasingly cohering around the basis of citizenship. At the same time, the relative importance of one's workplace identity seems to be diminishing. Coinciding with this increased pride in citizenship is the growing belief in the significance of cultural differences. This is most evident when considering the growing disdain of immigrants as a distinctive outgroup. This growing perception of cleavages, coupled with the exogenous economic circumstances (highlighted by the global drop in oil prices on which the Russian economy depends), increasingly suggests that the collective national consciousness within Russia reflects that of a closed belief system (Rokeach 1960, Welzel and Inglehart 2007).

Though the data primarily considered within this chapter is unable to definitively assess whether a distinctive national identity exists, it provides utility in the identification and

clarification of the general boundaries that loosely exist between the varieties of groups with which an individual feels a sense of belonging. The preceding analysis attempted to identify the instances of convergence (and divergence) between data sources, with the belief that greater consistency in responses to similar questions across different surveys suggests greater reliability in the inferences derived from the findings. (It was also intended to be a clever way to build up to/introduce/present the initial summary statistics for the ISSP and EVS data that is featured in subsequent chapters.)

While this chapter was unable to identify the precise boundaries of ‘nationality’, it was useful to first distinguish this general sense of group identity from what it is not. This end-of-chapter uncertainty as to the significance and scope of nationality as a basis of relevant group identification mirrors the uncertainty that seemingly exists within the Russian population. Given both the abstractness and complexity of knowing what nationality ‘is’ this is not unsurprising. The next chapter seeks to alleviate this uncertainty by using factor analysis to identify the relevant components of national identification, and develop a model of Russian national identity. If successful, this constructed model would then be employed to formally test the potential relationship between one’s sense of national identity and one’s attitudes towards democracy.

CHAPTER 4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter's exploration of the development of national identity begins by first examining respondent's attitudes towards the perceived importance of various characteristics relating to one's membership within an identifiable Russian 'ingroup'. Within the (previously described) 2003 ISSP module, one cluster of eight questions asked respondents how important it is to: have been born in Russia, have Russian citizenship, have lived in Russia for most of one's life, speak Russian, be Russian Orthodox, respect Russia's political institutions and laws, feel Russian, and have Russian ancestry. Each of these questions is (potentially) a manifest indicator of a latent general construct of national identity, that is, that the aggregation of individual opinions regarding such potential aspects of national identity will suggest which of the identified components contributes to underlying sense of national identity reflected in the minds of surveyed Russians. Please note that all statistical procedures described in this chapter were performed using SPSS.

4.1 Does a shared sense of national identity exist within Russia?

This initial cluster of questions was factor analyzed using principal axis factoring (PAF). A survey of the literature guided the decision to employ PAF over principal components analysis (PCA), as the latter is only a data reduction technique computed without regard to any underlying structure, while the former aims to reveal whether latent variables- in this case national identity- cause the manifest indicators to covary (Costello and Osborne 1995). As multivariate normality in the indicators could not be assumed, PAF was chosen over maximum likelihood as the most appropriate factor extraction method (Fabrigar et al. 1999). The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy suggests that the sample is suitable for factoring (KMO = 0.841).

Employing the principal axis factoring extraction method with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation initially revealed one underlying factor of significance accounting for 35.5% of the combined variance among the eight indicators (Table 3). Given the indicators suggested as salient, this factor seems to reflect the ‘ascriptive’ components of national identity. The resulting factor matrix provides factor loadings reflecting standardized estimates of the regression slopes predicting the indicators from the latent factor (Brown 2006). The five salient indicators all had factor loading values of .61 or greater, meaning that a one standardized unit score increase in the underlying construct would result in a .61 (or greater) standardized score increase in the given indicator.

Table 3: Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results-Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item			
Important to have been born in Russia	.63		.40
Important to have Russian citizenship	.63		.40
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one’s life	.70		.49
Important to be able to speak Russian	.68		.46
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.50		.25
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions	.44		.19
Important to feel Russian	.54		.29
Important to have Russian ancestry	.61		.37
Eigenvalues		2.84	
Percentage of Total Variance		35.5	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Squaring these factor loadings produces the communality scores, reflecting the proportion of an indicator’s shared variance explained by the underlying factor. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) have suggested communality values of 0.32 (or greater) as the threshold for determining whether such values are significant. A significant proportion of each of these five indicators variance can be explained by the underlying factor. Of the eight included indicators five produced significant

values of common variance- greater than 0.32- suggesting saliency in relation to the underlying construct. This is substantively interpreted to mean that 32% (or more) of the variance for each indicator can be explained by the underlying factor. This indicator variance is reflected in the extracted communality values, which suggests that the underlying factor of national identity accounts for between 37% (e.g. ancestry) and 49% (e.g. lived in Russia) of the variation among the salient indicators. Three of the indicators possessed low communality values (<30%), suggesting that these indicators were not (as) meaningfully related to the primary factor identified. In the initially run model, the three indicators of questionable saliency loaded at .54, .50, and .44 respectively, resulting in communality values of 0.25, 0.19, and 0.29.

While this preliminary analysis yielded only one factor according to the traditional Kaiser criterion (eigenvalue > 1.0), the possibility of a second factor was suggested as the next highest eigenvalue (0.972) just missed this threshold value. It has been noted that this traditional metric is among the least accurate methods for selecting the number of factors to retain (Velicer and Jackson 1990). Rather researchers should be flexible in their interpretive approach, with Thompson and Daniel (1996) contending that the consideration of multiple decision rules is not only appropriate but often desirable. Furthermore, the initial suggestion of one factor is likely a function of the available data. It has been suggested that EFA will typically reveal the number of factors with eigenvalues greater than one as being somewhere within a range of values between the number of variables divided by 3 and the number of variables divided by 5 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). This relates to the corresponding generalization that between 3 and 5 indicators are typically needed to accurately identify an underlying factor. In this instance, the number of included indicators was 8; given this provided generalization, the number of factors would be approximated between 1.6 and 2.7. Given how close the second-highest eigenvalue was to 1.0 (i.e. 0.972), two efforts to re-run the model were executed: one in which the model was re-run following the

removal of the three indicators that loaded poorly on the initially identified factor (Table 4) and another with the imposed constraint of a two-factor solution (Table 5).

Table 4: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation – Non-Salient Indicators removed

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item			
Important to have been born in Russia	.68		.46
Important to have Russian citizenship	.65		.42
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one's life	.71		.50
Important to be able to speak Russian	.63		.40
Important to have Russian ancestry	.57		.32
Eigenvalues		2.10	
Percentage of Total Variance		42.0	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Both revised models better reflected the underlying construct as the amount of the shared variation explained increased from 35.2% to 42% and 41.1% respectively, suggesting a better factor grouping of the remaining indicators, as well as supporting the appropriateness of characterizing the identified factor as ascriptive in nature. Table 4 reflects the model with the indicators removed, while Table 5 retains the indicators but imposes a two-factor solution. Both of these models lend support to the idea that this ascriptively oriented conception of national identity explains a significant proportion of the shared variance in the indicators: having been born in Russia, whether one has lived most of their life in Russia, has Russian citizenship, Russian ancestry, and the ability to speak Russian. Each of the five remaining indicators have correlation values between 0.57 and 0.71, resulting in communality values ranging from 0.32 to 0.50.

The data reported in Table 4 provides additional support for the initial indicator groupings however its utility (derived from removing available data) should not be overstated. Rather Table

5 reflects a model better fitting the available data. Imposing a two-factor solution with all 8 indicators resulted in factor loadings not only supporting the preliminary indicator grouping, but also suggesting a clustering of two of the other three indicators: importance of feeling Russian and the importance of respecting Russia's laws and political institutions. This suggests the existence of a 'subjective' national identity component apart from the ascriptive construct. The communality values for the five originally retained indicators increased slightly or remained the same.

Table 5: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia Item	Factor Loadings		Communalities
	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.75	.10	.57
Important to have Russian citizenship	.58	.27	.41
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one's life	.60	.35	.48
Important to be able to speak Russian	.53	.41	.45
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.40	.28	.24
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.17	.54	.32
Important to feel Russian	.24	.64	.47
Important to have Russian ancestry	.51	.32	.36
Eigenvalues	2.04	1.25	
Percentage of Total Variance	25.5	15.7	
Cumulative Variance Explained			41.2

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Interestingly, the indicator capturing the importance of being Russian Orthodox generated a factor loading of 0.40 on the ascriptive construct. While this is above the minimum 0.32 threshold for significance, suggesting that it might be a minor component of this ascriptive construct, it also loaded at close to a significant level (0.28) on the secondary construct. Given the weak, yet barely significant loading on one, the weak and not quite significant loading on the other, that the difference between the two loadings were quite close, and that the communality score for the

indicator was 0.24, my initial interpretation is that this indicator is overall not significant but one to keep an eye on in future iterations of this data set.

While this indicator may not be cleanly loading on only one of the underlying constructs, it has some company. Three of the indicators cross-loaded- i.e. had factor loadings 0.32 or greater on both of the identified underlying factors- suggesting that the factors themselves may be correlated. This makes sense as both of the underlying factors are two different yet inter-related conceptions of the broader idea of Russian national identity. These factor loadings provide empirical support for the correlation of these underlying factors, which is consistent with theory, i.e. that such conceptions of group identities are fluid constructions that individuals may accept simultaneously. In turn, this suggests that one additional modeling effort is necessary- one in which an oblique rotation method is applied allowing this correlation among factors to be accounted for statistically.

One last EFA model was run employing the same principal axis factoring extraction but varying the rotation method from orthogonal (varimax) to oblique (promax). Oblique methods statistically allow for underlying factors to correlate, when theoretical justifications exist (Costello and Osborne 2005). The results of the model are reported in Table 6. The cumulative variance explained by this two-factor model is 41.2%. The same indicators again cluster together suggesting ascriptive and subjective orientations towards national identity. Allowing the factors to correlate resulted in an increase in most of the factor loadings. For example, the indicator reflecting the importance of having been born in Russia increased from 0.75 to 0.89. Substantively, this would indicate that a one standardized unit increase in the underlying ascriptive identity construct would result in a 0.89 standardized score increase in the 'born in Russia' indicator. More than half (0.57) of this indicator's shared variance is explained by this factor.

Table 6: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia Item	Factor Loadings		Correlations		Commun.
	One	Two	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.89	-.23	.74	.35	.57
Important to have Russian citizenship	.59		.64	.45	.41
Important- lived in Russia for most of one's life	.58	.15	.68	.54	.48
Important to be able to speak Russian	.47	.26	.64	.57	.45
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.37	.16	.47	.40	.24
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions		.59	.35	.56	.32
Important to feel Russian		.68	.45	.68	.47
Important to have Russian ancestry	.49	.16	.59	.48	.36
Eigenvalues	2.89	.40			
Percentage of Total Variance	36.1	5.1			
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)			2.72	2.11	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

In turn, allowing the factors to correlate produced slightly stronger factor loadings for the two indicators suggesting a subjective identity orientation. The importance of 'respecting laws/political institutions' and 'feeling Russian' loaded at 0.59 and 0.68 respectively. Perhaps more importantly, allowing the factors to correlate 'cleaned up' the model by eliminating the previously identified cross-loadings. Finally, the significance of the previously noted religiosity indicator declined slightly, supporting the initial conclusion that it is likely not substantively significant in the context of the current model.

Collectively, these preliminary results suggest that there exists a nascent underlying conception of what is important in terms of belonging to a broader Russian 'ingroup'. The results suggest that two underlying factors of interest manifest themselves- an ascriptive conceptualization of national identity and a subjective conceptualization. The subjective conceptualization accounts for a significant proportion of the variance in the indicators measuring one's respect towards the laws and political institutions of Russia, feeling Russian, and the importance of speaking Russian

(although the initial cross-loading of the latter disappeared once the oblique rotational method was used).

Intuitively this makes sense- where one may cognitively opt-in to feeling positively towards institutions and laws, and/or feeling Russian, one does not exercise the same psychological choice in terms of deciding where one is born, who their parents are, or their initial citizenship status. It also makes sense that the indicator reflecting the importance of speaking Russian is partially captured by both underlying constructs. While one's primary language is significantly determined by the familial and societal context that one is born in to, it is also possible to choose additional languages later in life. Indeed, the theory-driven acknowledgment of this possibility guided the decision to iteratively work towards an oblique extraction method, in order to account for this potential correlation among the underlying factors.

4.2 How stable is this sense of identity over time?

Following this preliminary exploration of the 2003 ISSP national identity module, the same EFA techniques were applied to the preceding 1995 ISSP module as well as the recently released 2013 module. Except for the question relating to the importance of Russian ancestry (which was absent from the 1995 survey), the same indicators were present across all three surveys. Although the precise values differed slightly, the same indicators generally loaded in similar ways, suggesting a similar significance of influence upon common variance.

Employing the same principal axis factoring method with orthogonal rotation on the 1995 module resulted in a preliminary two-factor solution accounting for 37.3% of the combined variance among the seven indicators (Table 7). The same four indicators- birthplace, citizenship,

Table 7: 1995- Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia Item	Factor Loadings		Communalities
	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.70		.50
Important to have Russian citizenship	.63	.22	.44
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one's life	.70	.22	.53
Important to be able to speak Russian	.50	.34	.37
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.29	.18	.12
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.18	.58	.37
Important to feel Russian	.14	.52	.29
Eigenvalues	1.75	.86	
Percentage of Total Variance	25	12.3	
Cumulative Variance Explained			37.3

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

longevity, language- generated standardized factor loadings on the underlying construct ranging between 0.50 and 0.70, and achieved communality values greater than 0.32. This suggests that the underlying factor of national identity accounts for between 37% (e.g. language) and 53% (e.g. lived in Russia) of the variation among the salient indicators, while a one-unit increase in the underlying ascriptive national identity factor results in a standardized score increase between 0.50 and 0.70 in each of the indicators.

Varying the rotation method from orthogonal to oblique again resulted in slight increases across most of the factor loadings (Table 8). The same indicators again clustered around two underlying factors suggesting ascriptive and subjective orientations towards national identity, while also minimizing the prevalence of cross-loadings. For example, within the suggested ascriptive factor the indicator reflecting the importance of having been born in Russia increased from 0.70 to 0.77, while half of this indicator's shared variance is explained by the underlying

Table 8: 1995- Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation

Russia Item	Factor Loadings		Correlations		Commun.
	One	Two	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.77		.70	.28	.50
Important to have Russian citizenship	.64		.66	.39	.44
Important- lived in Russia for most of one's life	.72		.73	.40	.53
Important to be able to speak Russian	.46	.21	.58	.46	.37
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.27	.11	.33	.25	.12
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions		.60	.34	.61	.37
Important to feel Russian		.54	.28	.54	.29
Eigenvalues	2.18	.43			
Percentage of Total Variance	31.1	6.2			
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)			2.09	1.33	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

ascriptive factor. Within the suggested 'subjective' factor, the importance of 'respecting laws/political institutions' and 'feeling Russian' loaded at 0.60 and 0.54 respectively. In contrast with the 2003 data, the communality value for the 'feeling Russian' indicator registered just under the 0.32 threshold for significance, while the religiosity indicator barely registered.

The final EFA efforts were applied to the recently available 2013 ISSP national identity data module. Similar to the 2003 module, preliminary efforts initially suggested only one underlying factor reflecting 43.7% of the total variance (Table 9). In contrast with the 2003 data, 7 of the 8 indicators achieved initial communality values greater than 0.32, with factor loadings similar to- or greater than- the 2003 module. The "feeling Russian" indicator experienced the largest gains with its factor loading increasing from 0.54 in 2003 to 0.69 in 2013.

Given the lessons learned from the 2003 module efforts, the orthogonal EFA was re-run following the imposition of a two-factor solution (Table 10). The percentage of total variance

Table 9: 2013- Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item			
Important to have been born in Russia	.65		.42
Important to have Russian citizenship	.67		.45
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one's life	.71		.51
Important to be able to speak Russian	.68		.47
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.60		.28
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.53		.36
Important to feel Russian	.69		.48
Important to have Russian ancestry	.73		.53
Eigenvalues		3.49	
Percentage of Total Variance		43.7	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Table 10: 2013- Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation- Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.64	.28	.48
Important to have Russian citizenship	.67	.27	.52
Important to have lived in Russia for most of one's life	.61	.38	.52
Important to be able to speak Russian	.51	.44	.46
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.41	.33	.28
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.39	.48	.36
Important to feel Russian	.27	.79	.69
Important to have Russian ancestry	.43	.60	.55
Eigenvalues	2.08	1.79	
Percentage of Total Variance	26	22.3	
Cumulative Variance Explained			48.3

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

explained again increased (from 43.7% to 48.3%), with the same relative clustering of indicators around the two underlying factors. The one exception was the indicator for Russian ancestry. In 2003 this indicator loaded primarily on the first factor while loading more prominently on the second factor in 2013.

Cross-loadings were prominent once more, suggesting a correlation among the underlying factors and prompting the final EFA with oblique rotation (Table 11). Once again, allowing the factors to correlate resulted in stronger primary factor loadings and reduced the prevalence of cross-loadings across factors. The primary loadings for ‘born in Russia’ and ‘having Russian citizenship’ increased on the ascriptive factor (from 0.64 and 0.67 to 0.70 and 0.76 respectively), while the secondary factor loadings all but disappeared. Similarly, the primary loading for ‘feeling Russian’ increased (from 0.79 to 0.91) on the subjective factor.

Table 11: 2013- Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia	Factor Loadings		Correlations		Commun.
Item	One	Two	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	.70		.69	.51	.48
Important to have Russian citizenship	.76		.72	.52	.52
Important- lived in Russia for most of one’s life	.60	.15	.72	.60	.52
Important to be able to speak Russian	.43	.29	.65	.61	.46
Important to be Russian Orthodox	.37	.19	.51	.46	.28
Important to respect Russia’s laws/pol institutions	.26	.39	.54	.58	.36
Important to feel Russian	-.10	.91	.57	.83	.69
Important to have Russian ancestry	.23	.56	.64	.73	.55
Eigenvalues	3.54	.32			
Percentage of Total Variance	44.3	4.0			
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)			3.26	3.02	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Finally, allowing the factors to correlate shifted the percentage of total variance among the indicators explained by each of the underlying factors. With the orthogonal rotation, results suggested that the ascriptive factor accounted for 26% of the variation among the indicators. While the subjective factor accounted for 22.3%. Once the correlation among factors was accounted for, results suggested that the ascriptive factor accounted for a much greater amount of variation (44.3%) as compared to the subjective factor (4.0%).

The existence of three datasets covering a period of 18 years provides the opportunity to evaluate changes in attitudes relating to national identity over time. Within the 1995 data exploratory factor analysis suggested two distinct yet inter-related factors pertaining to national identity. The initial clustering of indicators suggests one conception of national identity that is ascriptive in basis, and another that may be subjectively achieved. The ascriptive basis of national identity is reflected in the indicators reflecting the importance of: having been born in Russia, having lived in Russia for most of one's life, having Russian citizenship, and the ability to speak Russian. Unsurprisingly, this latter linguistic indicator cross-loaded and was associated with both of the underlying factors across all three data sets. The indicators measuring the importance of one's respect for Russian political institutions and laws, and the importance of feeling Russian loaded on the second underlying factor, suggesting a subjective dimension to national identity. Qualifying this observation somewhat is the recognition that the 'feeling Russian' indicator fell just short (0.29) of the communality threshold for significance in 1995 (0.32), while 'respect for political institutions/laws' was only slightly greater (0.37).

Table 12: Orthogonal Factor Loadings over Time (Tables 5, 7, and 10 combined)

Russia	1995			2003			2013		
Item	One	Two	Comm.	One	Two	Comm.	One	Two	Comm.
Important...born in R	.70		.50	.75	.10	.57	.64	.28	.48
Important...R citizenship	.63	.22	.44	.58	.27	.41	.67	.27	.52
Important...lived in R most life	.70	.22	.53	.60	.35	.48	.61	.38	.52
Important...speak R	.50	.34	.37	.53	.41	.45	.51	.44	.46
Important... R Orthodox	.29	.18	.12	.40	.28	.24	.41	.33	.28
Important... respect R laws/inst	.18	.58	.37	.17	.54	.32	.39	.48	.36
Important...feel R	.14	.52	.29	.24	.64	.47	.27	.79	.69
Important...R ancestry				.51	.32	.36	.43	.60	.55
Eigenvalues	1.75	.86		2.04	1.25		2.08	1.79	
Percentage of Total Variance	25	12.3		25.5	15.7		26	22.3	
Cumulative Variance Explained			37.3			41.2			48.3

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

While the EFA efforts involving the 2003 data initially suggested only one underlying factor, the aforementioned theoretical justifications resulted in the imposition of the two-factor solution which ultimately resulted in a better fit with the data (41.2% of total variance explained versus 35.5%). The same indicators again loaded on the same underlying factors. An indicator measuring the importance of having Russian ancestry was added to the 2003 module, loading primarily on the suggested ascriptive factor. The indicator relating to feeling Russian- whose proportion of shared variance previously clocked in at a less-than-significant 0.29 in 1995- experienced the largest increase of any of the indicators. In 2003 the communality score grew to 0.47- with a factor loading of 0.64- seemingly anchoring the second underlying factor.

Table 13: Oblique Factor Loadings over Time (Tables 6, 8, and 11 combined)

Russia	1995				2003				2013					
	Loadings		Corr.		Loadings		Corr.		Loadings		Corr.		Comm.	
	One	Two	One	Two	One	Two	One	Two	One	Two	One	Two	One	Two
Item														
Important...born in R	.77		.70	.28	.89	-.23	.74	.35	.57	.70		.69	.51	.48
Important...R citizenship	.64		.66	.39	.59		.64	.45	.41	.76		.72	.52	.52
Important...lived in R most life	.72		.73	.40	.58	.15	.68	.54	.48	.60	.15	.72	.60	.52
Important...speak R	.46		.58	.46	.47	.26	.64	.57	.45	.43	.29	.65	.61	.46
Important... Orthodox	.27	.11	.33	.25	.37	.16	.47	.40	.24	.37	.19	.51	.46	.28
Important... respect laws/inst		.60	.34	.61		.59	.35	.56	.32	.26		.54	.58	.36
Important...feel R		.54	.28	.54		.68	.45	.68	.47	-.10		.57	.83	.69
Important...R ancestry					.49	.16	.59	.48	.36	.23		.64	.73	.55
Eigenvalues	2.18	.43			2.89	.40				3.54	.32			
Percentage of Total Variance	31.1	6.2			36.1	5.1				44.3	4.0			
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)			2.09	1.33			2.72	2.11				3.26	3.02	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Interestingly, the preliminary EFA efforts involving the 2013 data initially suggested only one underlying factor. Had the 2013 data been run in a vacuum, independent from any experience with prior data or theoretical consideration one might have concluded that there was no real contestation among competing conceptions of national identity. However, when the two-factor solution was imposed the same indicator clusters emerged, suggesting that a two-factor solution better served to explain the variance among the indicators. When examining the final results for each of the three datasets, the percentage of total variance explained by the underlying factors increased across each subsequent dataset (37.3% in 1995, 41.2% in 2003, and 48.3% in 2013).

Two of the indicators within the suggested ascriptive factor experienced the largest changes overall. The communality score for the importance of feeling Russian indicator increased from 0.47 in 2003 to 0.69 in 2013, while ‘importance of Russian ancestry’ increased from 0.36 to 0.55, for increases of 0.22 and 0.19 respectively. The indicators within the suggested ascriptive factor experiencing the biggest changes were importance of having been born in Russia (communality scores: 0.57 in 2003, 0.48 in 2013; change of -0.09) and importance of having Russian citizenship (0.41 to 0.52; change of 0.11). One possible explanation for these changes may be the passage of the 2003 Citizenship Laws which revised the laws previously in effect from 1993. These changes solidified the *jus sanguinis* basis of citizenship, diminishing the de jure importance of having been born on Russian soil. This in turn may help to explain the relative increase in both the importance of feeling Russian (communality scores: 0.29 in 1995, 0.47 in 2003, and 0.69 in 2013) and the importance of having Russian ancestry (communality scores: 0.36 in 2003, and 0.55 in 2013). The 0.69 communality value associated with the ‘feeling Russian’ indicator was the highest of all indicators in the 2013 dataset, perhaps suggesting a simultaneous increase in the relative strength

of national pride and identity, along with the increase in uncertainty as to where the precise boundaries of membership lie.

Some interesting results emerge when examining some of the individual indicators over time. For example, the indicator relating to 'feeling Russian' was not significant in 1995 (communality value of 0.29) but was in 2003 and 2013. While just missing the threshold for significance in 1995 nearly 70% of the indicator's shared variance was explained by the underlying factor in 2013- the highest percentage relative to the other measured indicators. Similarly, there has been an interesting uptick in the perceived importance of being Russian Orthodox. While the indicator was nowhere close to salient in 1995 (communality = 0.12), it experienced a significant increase in 2003 (0.24) and seemingly continued to grow in importance over time (communality = 0.28 in 2013). It will be interesting to see in future ISSP national identity modules whether the importance of this indicator will continue to grow slowly over time.

4.3 Analysis

When considering the question of whether a cohesive sense of national identity exists, the answer would be a qualified yes. Preliminary EFA on all three datasets suggest at least one underlying factor accounting for a significant amount of variation among the selected indicators. Further exploration suggests that there is a likely two correlated dimensions within the broader underlying factor. Given the pattern of indicator clustering- and the remarkable consistency across time- it is believed that these dimensions reflect both an ascriptive and subjective aspect to national identity. The ascriptive dimension is reflected by the indicators measuring the perceived importance of: having been born in Russia, having Russian citizenship, and having lived in Russia for most of one's life. Setting aside the perceived importance associated with these attributes, the ability to affirm whether any of these attributes apply to a given individual is fairly objective, and

ultimately comes from outside the control of the individual. By contrast, the subjective dimension reflects the value associated with the attributes that are felt by any individual, including the extent to which importance is assigned to: feeling Russian, and respecting Russian laws and political institutions. One indicator-the importance of being able to speak Russian- loaded on both dimensions, while the indicator measuring the importance of being Russian Orthodox failed to load on either.

Given these dual conceptions of national identity, the question of whether there has been a stable conception of identity over time becomes more a question of which conception of identity is prevalent at any particular time. For example, in 1995 the indicators of having been born in Russia and having lived in Russia for most of one's life were the indicators with the strongest factor loadings (followed closely by possessing Russian citizenship). While these markers of national identity were discrete in their indication of membership (i.e. one was or was not born in Russia, does or does not have Russian citizenship) and thus were easily recognizable, they were agnostic as to the substantive contours of membership and belonging.

Over time, this more inclusive perspective started to shift as the perceived importance of de jure citizenship started to wane while the de facto importance of feeling Russian grew steadily (Table 12: 0.52 -> 0.64 -> 0.79). Perhaps the most interesting indicator reflecting this shift was the one added to the 2003 dataset measuring the perceived importance associated with having Russian ancestry. While just significant in 2003 with a communality score of 0.36, the indicator initially loaded on the ascriptive dimension of identity. By 2013 the communality score was 0.55 (the second highest of all measured indicators) and the indicator loaded on the subjective dimension of identity, helping to solidify this feeling-based sense of Russianness as the most important component of one's sense of Russianness.

This shift in public attitudes followed a significant policy change which formally re-defined the basis of Russian citizenship, shifting from a *jus soli* basis- affirmed shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union- to a *jus sanguinis* basis. Subsequent reaction to- or at least knowledge of- this policy shift is believed to drive the significant increase in attitudes pertaining to the importance of having Russian ancestry (Table 12: 0.32 -> 0.60) while a bit of corresponding uncertainty likely explains the surge in support for the more subjectively-oriented basis of ‘feeling Russian’.

For a democratic political system to have value, the people have to possess a generally agreed upon sense of who ‘We the People’ are. This chapter has explored how a series of indicators measuring the perceived importance of national identity tend to cluster around two present yet distinct dimensions of national identity. The relative strength of the factor loadings suggests the relative importance for each of the two broader dimensions- ascriptive and subjective- as well as the relative strength of association between the indicators and these dimensions. Looking at these measures of strength over time suggests that while Russians maintain a strongly held belief in the relative importance of indicators (associated with) measuring national identity, there is a near ever-present ongoing contestation as to which indicators reflect the metrics of greatest importance. Given these trends it is anticipated that the next chapter’s efforts to explore the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy will initially show a positive relationship within the earlier dataset, followed by a corresponding weakening of said relationship as reflected in the datasets over time.

CHAPTER 5. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

The first steps in chapter 5 involved data screening procedures and its preparation for use in the later measurement and structural models. One of the standard assumptions is that all relevant endogenous variables are normally distributed. As is indicated in Table 1, this assumption was not violated by any of the variables used in this study as the values for skewness and kurtosis were all below the generally accepted threshold levels of 3 and 10 respectively.

Table 14: Univariate Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality- Preliminary Data

	N= 2383 (valid/missing)	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness < 3		Kurtosis <10	
Indicator	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
V11- Imp born in..	2331/52	1.63	.84	1.26	.05	.85	.11
V12- Imp citizenship	2323/60	1.56	.78	1.36	.05	1.32	.11
V13- Imp most life	2332/51	1.62	.81	1.18	.05	.62	.11
V14- Imp- speak Rus	2345/38	1.58	.85	1.36	.05	.94	.11
V15- Imp Rus Orth	2246/137	2.25	1.13	.31	.05	-1.30	.11
V16- Imp pol inst/law	2271/112	1.73	.87	1.04	.05	.28	.11
V17- Imp feel R	2315/68	1.42	.69	1.74	.05	2.92	.11
V18- Imp- Rus ances	2318/65	1.85	.94	.84	.05	1.31	.11
V26 – Proud D works	1939/444	3.81	.80	-.68	.06	-.18	.11

The second consideration was the handling of missing data. Given the relatively large sample size, the effect of missing data is not thought to be of much concern. A quick examination of the variables reveals a relatively small percentage of missing values for all of the indicators with

the notable exception of the indicator measuring perceived pride in Russia's democracy. With more than 18% of respondents not providing an answer to the question of how much pride they feel for the way democracy works in Russia, it was believed that missing values for this indicator likely violated the missing completely at random (MCAR) distribution assumption, thus disqualifying a strategy of mean imputation for all variables. To avoid the potential for magnifying the effects of systematic bias arising from the unknown nature of the missing responses, casewise deletion of those 444 respondents was employed, lowering the N to 1939. Following this deletion, mean imputation was used for all remaining cases of missing values. Significant consideration of outliers was not needed given the nature of the data (Likert scale responses with constrained ranges of either 4 or 5 scale points). The univariate summary statistics for this trended data are reported in Table 15.

Table 15: Univariate Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality-Data with Trend Replacement

Indicator	N= 1939 (valid/missing)	Mean Statistic	Std. Deviation Statistic	Skewness < 3		Kurtosis <10	
				Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
V11- Imp born in..	1906/33	1.67	.86	1.17	.06	.57	.11
V12- Imp citizenship	1901/38	1.61	.80	1.24	.06	.91	.11
V13- Imp most life	1910/29	1.64	.83	1.13	.06	.45	.11
V14- Imp- speak Rus	1921/18	1.62	.87	1.27	.06	.66	.11
V15- Imp Rus Orth	1845/94	2.31	1.15	.23	.06	-1.38	.11
V16- Imp pol inst/law	1876/63	1.76	.88	1.0	.06	.19	.11
V17- Imp feel R	1895/44	1.46	.72	1.68	.06	2.56	.11
V18- Imp- Rus ances	1900/39	1.89	.95	.79	.06	-.40	.11
V26 – Proud D works	1939	3.18	.80	-.68	.06	-.18	.11

Furthermore, multi-collinearity was considered by examining the Pearson correlations among the observed variables (presented in Table 16 below). None of the observed variables had correlations of significant magnitude, and the absence of significant multi-collinearity was assumed.

Table 16: Pearson Correlation Coefficients among the Observed Variables

	v11	v12	v13	v14	V15	V16	V17	V18	V26
V11- Imp born in.R.	1								
V12- Imp citizenship	.47	1							
V13- Imp most life	.43	.38	1						
V14- Imp- Rus lang	.35	.39	.50	1					
V15- Imp- Rus Orth	.26	.20	.27	.37	1				
V16- Imp resp pol inst/law	.18	.26	.26	.26	.22	1			
V17- Imp feel R	.24	.28	.36	.39	.20	.39	1		
V18- Imp- Rus ancestry	.42	.33	.37	.32	.38	.21	.36	1	
V26- Proud D works	.17	.14	.14	.13	.09	.16	.20	.14	1

5.1 Analysis of Measurement Models

A preliminary structural model (Figure 24) was the first formal effort testing the central hypothesis concerning the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy. This preliminary model achieved a poor fit to the data, resulting in a chi-square value of 422.72 (d.f.= 25) and fit indices of AGFI = .918, CFI = .889, and RMSEA = .091. Both the AGFI and CFI failed to surpass the generally accepted threshold of .95. While RMSEA values at or below .05 are generally preferred, values between .05 and .08 are often considered acceptable. The RMSEA for this preliminary model is thus considered too great to be satisfactory. Improvements were thus sought in order to better fit the model to the data.

The next step was ensuring that the measurement model was satisfactory before proceeding to any further testing of structural model relationships. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to verify the factor structures suggested in the preceding chapter's analysis and to assess the overall fit of the model to the data. Paralleling the sequence of data considerations from the preceding chapter, the first efforts involved the 2003 ISSP data. Recalling the earlier decision to impose a two factor solution though only one factor was suggested by the preliminary results, the first CFA model run as a baseline tested the model fit of a one factor model to the data (Figure 25). This initial CFA model fit the data rather poorly⁵, producing a chi-square value of 438.29 (d.f.= 20) and fit indices of AGFI = .909, CFI = .883, and RMSEA = .104 (for a comparison of measurement model fit indices see Table 17 below). The preliminary two factor model fit the data slightly better, but fit indices suggest that improvements were still necessary (Figure 26).

An examination of the modification indices resulting from the preliminary two factor model suggested that co-varying the disturbance terms (e1 and e2, e6 and e7, and e1 and e8 respectively) would substantially improve the fit of the model. The model was revised (as indicated in Figure 26) and re-run with the indicated co-variances and a significant improvement in model fit was achieved. Chi-square was reduced from 377.26 to 178.32, the values for GFI, AGFI, and CFI rose to .980, .954, and .954 respectively, while the RMSEA dropped below the .08 threshold. This iterative process was repeated for the 2013 and 1995 datasets with the results reported in Table 17. While the model fit indices suggest that the specified model is a relatively good fit to the data, the resulting estimates measuring the effects of each latent on the dependent variable were (0.86) that exists between the two latent factors.

⁵ Rule of Thumb: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Adjusted GFI (AGFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) values greater than 0.95 are desirable, Similarly Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) values less than 0.04 and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) values less than 0.08 are preferred.

Table 17: Comparison of Measurement Model Fit Indices

CFA Measurement Model	Chi-sq.	DF	p	Chi-sq./d.f.	RMR	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
<i>2003</i>									
One Factor	438.29	20	<.001	21.91	.040	.949	.909	.883	.104
Preliminary	377.26	19	<.001	19.86	.037	.954	.913	.900	.099
Revised	178.32	16	<.001	11.14	.026	.980	.954	.954	.072
<i>2013</i>									
Preliminary	224.06	19	<.001	11.79	.023	.967	.937	.949	.084
Revised	157.52	18	<.001	8.75	.018	.974	.948	.965	.072
<i>1995</i>									
Preliminary	209.46	13	<.001	16.11	.037	.964	.923	.902	.098
Revised	93.03	11	<.001	8.46	.033	.983	.957	.959	.069

While it was possible to achieve a relatively good model fit to the ISSP data, said data is limited insofar as it only contains one indicator for the dependent variable of interest: attitudes regarding democracy. This limitation (combined with the high correlation between the competing latent constructs and the inflated standard errors) led to applying the same modeling procedures to one additional dataset. The 2008 European Values Survey (EVS) contains most (but not all) of the same independent variable indicators as well as more indicators capturing respondents' attitudes towards democracy. The first step involving the European Values Survey data was repeating the factor analysis procedures featured in the previous analytical chapter to ensure that the underlying independent variable factor constructs were suitably comparable. Nothing in these results suggested anything to the contrary, which are reported in Tables 18-20 below.




Figure 24: Preliminary Test of Structural Model (2003)




Figure 25: Preliminary CFA Measurement Model- One Factor (2003)




Figure 26: Preliminary CFA Measurement Model- Two Factor (2003)





Figure 27: Revised CFA Measurement Model (2003)



V26- pride in democracy
How important is it to-
V11- have been born in Russia
V12- have Russian citizenship
V13- have lived in R for most of one's life
V14- speak Russian
V15- be Russian Orthodox
V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
V17- feel Russian
V18- have Russian ancestry

Figure 28: Revised Test of Initial Structural Model (2003)

Table 18: Summary of Initial Exploratory Factor Analysis Results-Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item			
Important to have been born in Russia	.53		.28
Important to have lived in Russia for <i>a long time</i>	.66		.44
Important to be able to speak Russian	.67		.46
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.52		.27
Important to have Russian ancestry	.54		.29
Eigenvalues		1.73	
Percentage of Total Variance		34.6	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Table 19: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Varimax (orthogonal) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia	Factor Loadings		Communalities
Item			
Important to have been born in Russia	.60	.51	.62
Important to have lived in Russia for <i>a long time</i>	.62	.07	.38
Important to be able to speak Russian	.80	-.45	.85
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.50	.02	.25
Important to have Russian ancestry	.51	.11	.26
Eigenvalues	1.89	.47	
Percentage of Total Variance	37.7	9.3	47.0

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Table 20: Summary of Secondary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results- Principal Axis Factoring and Promax (oblique) Rotation - Imposed Two-Factor solution

Russia	Factor Loadings		Correlations		Commun.
Item	One	Two	One	Two	
Important to have been born in Russia	-.04	.80	.34	.78	.62
Important to have lived in Russia for <i>a long time</i>	.37	.36	.54	.53	.38
Important to be able to speak Russian	.96	-.10	.92	.36	.85
Important to respect Russia's laws/pol institutions	.33	.25	.45	.41	.25
Important to have Russian ancestry	.35	.25	.46	.41	.26
Eigenvalues	2.37	.79			
Percentage of Total Variance	47.4	15.8			
Eigenvalues (post-rotation)			1.89	.47	

>= 0.10 retained; >= 0.32 bolded.

Once the similarity between the constructs underlying the independent variable indicators across datasets was confirmed, attention was turned to analyzing the factor structure(s) underlying the indicators reflecting respondent's attitudes regarding democracy. Again following the same data-screening procedures undertaken with the independent variable, treatment of the dependent variable indicators began with some preliminary univariate summary statistics.

When asked the question, "On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?" a majority of respondents expressed a lack of satisfaction with the development of democracy within Russia. Of the 1500+ respondents queried, only 51 (4%) answered that they were 'very satisfied' while more than 60% expressed that they were not very satisfied or not satisfied at all. The summary of respondents' attitudes regarding their satisfaction with their perceptions of the actual development of democracy within Russia is contrasted with responses to roughly analogous comparative abstractions (e.g. rule by a strong leader, experts, the army, and a hypothetical consideration of having a democratic political system as understood by individual respondents) in Table 21 below. These findings suggest that respondents' valuation of having a democracy is positive in the abstract, but the commensurate perceptions of the actual development of democracy within Russia leaves much to be desired.

Another cluster of indicators delves further into the possible bases of criticism by asking the respondents their perspective of what makes democracy suboptimal. While squabbling and indecision were easily the most widely agreed upon basis of criticism (with 58% of respondents agreeing) even this criticism was outweighed by respondents' support of the Churchillian notion that democracy may have its problems but is still better than the alternatives.

Table 21: Attitudes towards Democracy in Russia- Satisfaction with Current System and Comparisons to Specific Alternatives

Russia (N = 1504)	Satisfied/ Good			Unsatisfied/ Bad			% Missing
Item	Very	Fairly	(valid)	Fairly	Very	(valid)	
Satisfaction- Dem development in R?	4.0	34.4	38.4	47.9	13.7	61.6	14.6
Strong leader unbothered elec/parliam	21.6	36.9	58.5	29.3	12.2	41.5	13.6
Experts- not govt- decide for country	8.4	40.6	49.0	38.1	12.9	51.0	21.9
Having army rule country	3.1	13.9	17.0	40.3	42.7	83.0	13.8
Having democratic pol system	16.3	61.2	77.5	16.7	5.8	22.5	19.7

Table 22: General Criticisms of Democracy and Comparison to non-Specific Alternative

Russia (N = 1504)	Agree			Disagree			% Missing
Item	Strongly		(valid)		Strongly	(valid)	
D: Problems but > than alt's	20.7	60.2	80.9	16.3	2.8	19.1	21.0
In D, econ system runs badly	6.1	29.1	35.2	58.4	6.4	64.8	22.1
D = indecisive/too much squabbling	16.5	41.3	57.9	38.1	4.0	42.1	18.4
D not good maintain order	9.9	43.0	52.9	42.6	4.5	47.1	22.5

Following this cursory examination of the dependent variable indicators, a preliminary structural model was attempted involving latent constructs for 'national identity', and 'democratic attitudes' (Figure 29). The preliminary modeling efforts with the EVS data fared better than the initial efforts involving the ISSP data. While the number of indicators (5) for national identity disallowed the testing of differing conceptions of national identity, it did effectively allow for testing the relationship between national identity (in the aggregate) and a better latent construct for attitudes towards democracy. The model fit estimates suggest a good fit between the model and the data, and the indicator estimates are statistically significant.

Additionally, the presence of an explicit measure of generally trust in fellow citizens allowed for a limited form of subgroup analysis. The survey included the question “Generally speaking would you say that you that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”, with responses recorded in a dichotomous fashion (most can be trusted/can’t be too careful). The final modeling results that follow (Figures 29-31) reflect the full sample after handling missing data (N = 923), one subgroup of respondents indicating that they generally trust people (N = 235) and another subgroup indicating that you can’t be too careful (N = 635). The coefficients presented reflect standardized factor loadings.

Table 23: General Degree of Trust in Others

Russia (N = 1504)	
Item	
Most ppl can be trusted	29.9%
Cannot be too careful	70.1%

The modeling results suggest a positive relationship between national identity and democratic attitudes. As a one standardized unit increase of national identity occurs, there is a 0.19 unit decrease in the democratic attitudes construct. Given the coding nature of individual indicators, substantively this means that as the perceived importance of national identity measures increase, having a democratic system is seen as better, democracy is viewed more favorably, and respondents disagree with negative characterizations of democracy. The strength of the individual indicator loadings suggests that speaking Russian and living most of one’s life in Russia are perceived as more important across each of the models relative to having Russian ancestry or respect for political institutions.




Figure 29: Preliminary Test of Structural Model with EVS data (full)




Figure 30: Test of Structural Model with EVS data- ‘Trust’ subgroup (N = 265)




Figure 31: Test of Structural Model with EVS data- ‘No Trust’ subgroup (N = 635)

Table 24: Comparison of Model Fit Indices- EVS 2008

Structural Model	Chi-sq.	DF	p	Chi-sq./d.f.	RMR	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
Full	93.5	33	<.001	2.83	.016	.981	.968	.967	.045
Generally trusting	91.1	33	<.001	2.76	.032	.938	.896	.901	.082
Generally cautious	76.1	33	<.001	2.31	.18	.976	.960	.965	.045

This general relationship also holds true in each of the subgroup analyses, with only minor, predictable variation in the indicator estimates. For example, the strength of the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy for those within the more trusting subgroup was 0.22 versus 0.18 for those in the generally more cautious subgroup (as compared to the 0.19 value for the full sample). As the more cautious subgroup was roughly twice the size of the more trusting subgroup, it was not surprising to find most of the indicator values for the full sample aligned more closely with the more cautious subgroup.

While it was not possible to test differing compositions of national identity, examining the communality scores within the subgroup analysis suggests variation in the relative importance of the indicators supporting each of the latent constructs. For example, within the trust subgroup the latent construct for national identity accounts for 42% of the variation in the ‘importance of being born in Russia’ indicator. For those in the generally cautious subgroup, this value is only 20%. Similar variation was also detected among the dependent variable indicators across the two subgroups. 62% of the variation in the measure of democracy being indecisive and prone to

squabbling was accounted for by the democratic attitudes construct within the generally cautious subgroup; this value was 48% within the generally trusting subgroup. Conversely, the variation accounted for in the indicator measuring the belief that democracies are not good at maintaining order was 0.46 and 0.64 for the generally cautious and generally trusting subgroups respectively.

An interpretation of these results suggest the perceived importance of having been born in Russia is more than twice as significant a component of the conception of national identity for those already possessing generally greater trust in their fellow countrywomen and men (i.e. the importance of having been born in Russia is a more significant driver of what national identity 'is' for those possessing greater trust in other Russians). When considering what it means to be Russian, for those respondents who are generally more cautious having been born in Russia is a comparatively less important component of national identity. Conceptually this makes sense- a greater value is placed on having been born in Russia by those who generally self-identify as more trusting of their fellow Russians, reflecting a tacit belief/assumption that it is easier to relate to and work with those you presume to be more similar to yourself. For generally more cautious types, simply having been born in Russia may be perceived as too low a bar or simply too arbitrary a standard before tacitly presuming a greater degree of connection and trust in one's countrymen. After all, being born in Russia may make you a citizen, but it wouldn't necessarily make you truly Russian.

Notable differences between the two subgroups also exist in the dependent variable indicators. More variation in the belief that democracies are not good at maintaining order is explained by the aggregate democratic attitudes construct within the greater trust subgroup, while the same group's view of democracy accounts for comparatively less variation in the indicator measuring the belief that democracies are indecisive and prone to squabbling. More generally cautious respondents seem relatively less concerned with the general maintenance of order within

society, but are more prone to being critical of democracy's tendency towards squabbling and indecisiveness.

Having found evidence suggesting a possible relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy in the EVS data, one last effort was made with the ISSP data to see if the issue of collinearity between the national identity constructs could be adequately modeled. After all, though significant overlap between the subjective and ascriptive identity constructs exists (0.86), a relationship between the IV and DV was also suggested. More interesting was the suggested differences between the IV latents: as the importance of an ascriptive conception increases, pride in democracy increases, whereas an increase in the subjective conception resulted in pride in democracy decreasing (in turn suggesting that less trust is present).


To address the issue of collinearity (high correlation) between the differing conceptions of national identity, the previous factor analyses were re-examined to identify potential issues with model specification. Ultimately, a different approach was taken with the identified cross-loadings which resulted in a significant improvement in model fit. Whereas a unique one-to-one relationship between indicators and latents was imposed in the preliminary ISSP modeling efforts (i.e. an indicator could only be associated with one latent or the other), the revised modeling efforts incorporated this cross-loading into the revised structural model. Specifically the model was adjusted so that the indicators measuring the importance of speaking Russian (v14) and the importance of possessing Russian ancestry (v18) were influenced by each of the latent identity constructs with 2-3 unique indicators remaining for each construct (Figure 32). Additionally, the indicator measuring the importance of religiosity (i.e. Russian Orthodox) was removed.

The results suggest that the revised modeling efforts were warranted. The correlation between the two national identity constructs was reduced (0.86 to 0.60), measures of model fit improved slightly, and- more importantly- all indicator estimates achieved statistical significance.

Substantively speaking a one standard deviation unit increase in ascriptive identity provides a 0.18 standardized increase in one's pride in Russian democracy. This contrasts with the findings suggesting that a one standardized unit increase in the subjective identity construct decreases one's pride in democracy by 0.11 standardized units.

The final steps of this research effort than repeated these re-modeling efforts for the 1995 and 2013 ISSP datasets with the model fit results reported in table 12 below. Joining the EVS results, models associated with each of the three ISSP datasets achieved good fit with estimates providing evidence that suggests a statistically significant relationship between one's sense of national identity and one's attitudes towards democracy. The ISSP results distinguished themselves from the EVS data by further suggesting that national identity is not a static or monolithic concept, but rather an ever-evolving idea divisible into two differing- and sometimes competing- conceptions of national identity that exists in the minds of Russian citizens.

Perhaps the most interesting product of these final efforts is the changing nature of which identity conception influences pride in democracy over time. Whereas the 2003 data suggests that both conceptions of national identity each have a statistically significant- yet distinctive- relationship with one's attitude towards democracy, both the 1995 and 2013 data each suggest that only one conception relates to democratic attitudes and that which conception relates to the dependent variable has shifted over time.



V26- pride in democracy
 How important is it to-
 V11- have been born in Russia
 V12- have Russian citizenship
 V13- have lived in R for most of one's life
 V14- speak Russian
 V16- respect R pol institutions/laws
 V17- feel Russian
 V18- have Russian ancestry


Figure 32: Re-revised ISSP 2003 SEM model (indicators removed; cross-loadings allowed)

Table 25: Comparison of Model Fit Indices- revised models over time


Structural Model	Chi-sq.	DF	p	Chi-sq./d.f.	RMR	GFI	AGFI	CFI	RMSEA
1995	118.1	16	<.001	7.38	.034	.979	.953	.939	.069
2003	120.8	15	<.001	8.05	.020	.985	.964	.966	.060
2013	84.5	15	<.001	5.63	.017	.985	.963	.978	.058

The 1995 data reveals a statistically significant relationship between the subjective identity construct which the ascriptive construct fails to match. A one standardized unit increase in the perceived importance of subjectively oriented national identity (i.e. one's perceptions of how important it is to feel like a member of Russia and one's respect for Russia's laws and political institutions) produces a 0.11 standardized unit increase in one's pride towards how democracy functions within Russia. Eight years later this statistically significant relationship was still present but the directionality had been *reversed*. The same one unit change now produced a commensurate 0.11 unit decrease in one's pride towards democracy, while increasing pride in democracy was now reflected in increases of the ascriptive construct of identity (e.g. having been born, possessing citizenship, and living most of one's life in Russia), producing a 0.12 standardized unit increase in in one's democratic pride. By 2013 this subjective construct no longer held a statistically significant relationship while the strength of the relationship between ascriptive identity and pride in democracy had grown to 0.16.

1995



2003



2013




Figure 33: Summary of Structural Model Results Over Time.

Do these results make sense? They do seem to pass the *prima facie* sniff test. The 1995 data was collected only a few short years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is easy to imagine one's sense of pride in newfound political institutions tinged by the idealistic belief in its benefit for all fellow Russians and driven by a respect for said institutions. By 2003 the effects of shock therapy likely soured many on the purported egalitarian ideals of democracy (i.e. belief in the benefits of a set of routinized practices among those within society who share similar fundamental values). Idealism likely turned to cynicism as extraordinary hardships had been conferred upon many while extraordinary wealth had been consolidated among few, in turn leading to increasing mistrust of the governing political institutions and the democratic system they represented. However conflict with- and victory over- Chechen separatists allowed for some sustained pride in a still ill-defined in-group relative to the more clearly defined outgroup. By 2013 the economy had stabilized due to high oil prices and Russia had formally changed the legal basis for Russian citizenship. The former significantly improved the socio-economic circumstances of many Russians (potentially helping to restore some sense of pride in the workings of the country's political institutions) while the latter influenced the evolving understanding of in-group membership boundaries.

Speculative causal interpretation aside, models employing similar indicators used by two different social survey groups, generated similar factor loadings (both in terms of association and magnitude), while also suggesting which indicators contribute the greatest relative influence to each of the constructed latent variables, solidify the belief in a relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

6.1 The Puzzle

Does the development of mass beliefs- such as a widely agreed upon sense of national identity- influence a country's prospects for democratization? Arguably yes. This research project set out to empirically test the theoretical relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy, as a way of furthering an understanding of Russia's political developments following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such efforts are theoretically significant as they contribute to both the conversations regarding the causal explanations of democracy and democratization, as well as our discipline's understanding of how amorphous concepts such as national identity can be operationalized and utilized within social science research programs. In considering the former, this scholarship effort was situated within political culture-oriented explanations of democratic consolidation. While the boundary markers for national identity scholarship are less readily identifiable, this effort contributed to the development of this subfield with its modeling efforts involving existing large-N social survey data. While such dimensions reflect a constructed inter-subjective basis of generalization, the fundamental units of analysis ultimately reflect the psychology of individuals. Assuming that the masses matter in stories involving democratic (or non-democratic) outcomes, then the evidence helps to support Congruence Theory as the theoretical bridge between individual-level data and state-level outcomes (i.e. democratic consolidation; Eckstein 1966, Welzel and Inglehart 1997).

Beyond its theoretical significance, increasingly questions addressing who 'we' are as a politically relevant grouping of people are dominating societal discourses which seek to explain the current state of increasingly turbulent political affairs. Increasing our understanding of what national identity 'is' and how it (and its effects) manifests outwardly in terms of political behavior

and attitudes is more important than ever. In practical terms, the more efforts are made to understand the causes and consequences of national identity development, the better one is able to understand the methods, motivations, and effects of elite efforts aimed at promulgating nationalizing discourses.

6.2 The Findings

When the notion of a linkage between national identity and democratization was initially expressed by Dankwart Rustow (1970), it was presented in the deterministic logic of necessary and sufficient conditions which was methodologically fashionable in the 1960's and 1970's. This effort approached its consideration of the question in a probabilistic fashion (Coppedge 2012, 5), employing quantitative statistical techniques to assess whether evidence of a potential relationship between two admittedly abstract concepts exists. In some ways this statistical approach itself was a novel contribution as the majority of scholarship efforts dealing with the subject of national identity are often case studies employing qualitative methodologies.

This statistical exploration of national identity began with chapter 3 which considered a variety of descriptive statistics relating to the salient bases of group identification. The rationale of this chapter was to provide a contextual understanding of relative in-group identifications within Russia via a comparison of both primary and secondary data sources while also assessing the extent to which trends in collective national consciousness could be readily identified. Such comparisons were intended to allow for the primary data sources to serve as a preliminary 'test' of the results reported in secondary sources. Results from this chapter were decidedly mixed. An evaluation of the relative strength of association with one's profession and citizenship suggests a pair of inverted quadratic functions. Whereas profession starts low, gains in relative strength, then decreases in relative importance, citizenship starts high, decreases for a period of time, before regaining the

status as the most salient group identification. Compared to the clear juxtaposition of the relative importance of citizenship and profession, results conveying the relative importance of ethnicity and nationality were all over the place- likely due to differences in the category options provided across different data sets- and suggested a greater degree of relative uncertainty as to the perceived importance of these social categories.

When compared to these other bases of group membership, geography (specifically the locality in which a respondent lives) was a relatively less important basis of collective identity. However, when isolating and comparing different geographic groupings, there is an interesting alternation between identification with locality and identification with the country as a whole. Evidence from two different data sources suggest that while still important relative to other geographic divisions, the overall strength of identification on the basis of locality seems to be declining over time. By comparison, identification with the country as a whole was found to decline within one source of data (ISSP) while increasing in another (EVS). While similar values were found across both data sets, a consistent pattern over time was not. Ultimately it was possible to identify some trends in the development of collective Russian national consciousness. Ingroup identification on the basis of citizenship (and the degree of pride associated with said identification) has consistently strengthened over time. So too has the outward devaluation of non-national outgroups, namely immigrants, increasingly suggesting the emergence of a 'closed' belief system. This evidence lends support to rejecting the null hypothesis that a shared sense of national consciousness is neither identifiable nor present.

The difficulty in identifying trends in nationality (and ethnicity) simply on the basis of the summary statistics presented in chapter 3, led to the more in-depth considerations of how to measure and construct a testable model of national identity in chapter 4. This second analytical chapter featured the use of factor analytic techniques to consider potential dimensions of national

identity. Before assessing whether a relationship between national identity and democratization exists, one must first have a operationalized construct with which to test. Thus the primary objective of this chapter was to develop a construct of national identity for use in the subsequent analytical chapter. Within the context of the three ISSP datasets, exploratory factor analysis identified two distinctive yet correlated dimensions of national identity: ascriptive and subjective. This evidence lends support to rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no discernable basis to an agreed upon sense of collective national identity within Russia. Rather it seems that there is active contestation occurring over time between two correlated- yet distinct- bases of Russian national identity.

Whereas ascriptive components of collective national identity (e.g. having been born in Russia, citizenship, having lived in Russia for most of one's life) were initially more important immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these arguably more inclusive components gave way to a more subjective basis of shared identity over time. By 2013, 'feeling Russian' had become the most significant individual indicator of national identity. Joined by 'having Russian ancestry' these two indicators helped shift the relative strength of identification away from the ascriptive dimension to the subjective dimension. These preliminary trends in the shifting nature of national identity over time led to the prediction that any relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy would also shift over time.

The constructs developed in chapter 4 were then used to formally test this relationship in chapter 5. Following confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling efforts involving two different sources of data across four points in time, findings suggested the existence of a statistically significant relationship between one's sense of national identity and one's attitudes towards democracy. While the ISSP data produced more robust findings with respect to the independent variable indicators, a more robust relationship with the dependent variable indicators

was identified in the EVS data. Ultimately considerations of both series of data helped to avoid a type 2 error (i.e. incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis). Furthermore the modeling efforts were able to capture the distinctive effects of each of the national identity dimensions on democratic attitudes. While both dimensions had a significant effect of comparable magnitude on the dependent variable in 2003 (0.12 and -0.11 for ascriptive and subjective respectively), the directionality of these impacts were at odds with each other. As the importance of the ascriptive dimension increases, positive attitudes towards democracy also increased. However when the subjective dimension grew in relative importance, favorable attitudes towards democracy would decrease.

When evaluating the effects of these national identity dimensions over time, two interesting results revealed themselves. First was the shift in which identity construct was found to associate with the dependent variable/the democratic attitudes construct. In 1995, the subjective dimension held a statistically significant relationship with democratic attitudes while the ascriptive dimension did not. In 2003, both dimensions produced a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards democracy though in opposite directions. By 2013, the dimensions (relative to 1995) were reversed with the ascriptive dimension producing a significant effect on attitudes towards democracy. The second interesting finding was the increasing strength of association between each of the factors with one another over time. Beginning with the 1995 data and progressing through the 2013 data, the correlation values between the two dimensions grew from 0.54 to 0.60 to 0.72. This suggests that not only is there active contestation as to which of these identity dimensions truly captures the essence of Russianness, but that the distinctiveness of these dimensions is becoming increasingly murkier in the minds of Russian respondents.

6.3 Limitations

While the findings of this research effort are interesting and potentially significant, said effort is not lacking in some important qualifying limitations. First- and perhaps the most obvious- is the standard critique of whether quantitative methodologies are even appropriate for considering such subjective and abstract questions of national identity. Acknowledging that such modeling efforts will never reflect a truly perfect ‘fit’ to an abstraction such as national identity, there is still value to be gained from engaging in the efforts to model and formally operationalize existing national identity data if for no other reason than to formally assess the arguable shortcomings in said data and to avoid a tautological self-fulfilling prophecy, i.e. statistical modeling isn’t legitimate because the data can never truly capture the essence of national identity; the data is never good enough because no one employs it in statistical models to uncover the precise nature of its shortcomings and recommendations for improving what information is collected. Furthermore, the significance of the critique is lessened when research takes great pains to acknowledge the valid *prima facie* concerns regarding concept validity in its methodological approaches to the research. For example, the use of factor analytic techniques to bundle together ‘thin’ quantitative indicators in order to better identify the ‘thick’ underlying dimension of national identity reflects a sensitivity to such concerns, as well as an adherence to the sort of prescriptions set forth to address such concerns (Coppedge 2012). If efforts such as this still face a reflexive ‘it might not be effectively capturing the underlying concept’, then at a certain point, the basis of critique reflects a ‘no true scots-person’-style fallacy that no amount of research effort can overcome.

More specific concerns include the consideration of missing data and the always present specter of omitted variable bias. Responses to the key dependent variable indicators were missing at a rate close to 20% leading this author to believe that MCAR (missing completely at random)

could not be assumed. Additionally, the correlational strength between the identity dimensions was not insignificant and at times problematic. While modeling efforts were able to generate findings that have some generalizable value, future efforts will need to pay particular attention to the identification and development of discrete identity constructs. Furthermore, given that structural equation models are “models of causality that may or may not correspond to causal sequences in the real world”, it is important to remember that causality is treated as an assumption of SEM rather than a consequence (Kline 2005, 324). Therefore, using SEM allows one to assess whether a hypothesized causal structure is- or is not- consistent with the data (McCoach, Black, and O’Connell 2007). While there is value in assessing whether correlational structures match the data as a prelude to more rigorous analysis of causation, the susceptibility of SEM to the problem of omitted variable bias must be acknowledged (Tomarken and Waller 2005). Because the disturbance terms effectively account for any omitted variables, they can “mask the limitations of a rather incomplete model” (Tomarken and Waller 2005, 49). The potential effects of this include the misrepresentation of the relationship among the variables, and biased parameter estimates.

6.4 Discussion

The evidence from this research suggests three important findings, specifically 1) the existence of multiple, competing, inter-subjectively held conceptions of national identity existing within Russia, which 2) vary over time, and 3) covary with inter-subjectively held beliefs towards democracy across time. How do these findings contribute to our general understanding of mass beliefs, and the particulars of national identity within Russia? What do these findings contribute to our understanding of mass beliefs and democratic consolidation within Russia? And how do these findings impact the way one thinks about democracy *writ large*?

Broadly speaking these findings are generally consistent with the expectations that derive from understandings of social identity theory (Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Hale 2004, Clunan 2014). These findings are also consistent with those uncovered by Gibson and Duch (1993) who similarly employed survey data and found evidence suggesting general attitudinal support for democratic institutions but an absence of tolerance for political ‘others’. The gradual strengthening of ingroup identification further suggests the growth of bonding social capital as well as a general increase in exclusionary trust (Putnam 2000, Bahry et al 2005, Hammond and Axelrod 2006). In this fashion, understandings of national identity reflect a kind of “social radar” which helps individuals see where they stand in relation to their socially constructed human environment (Hale 2004, 463).

When considering the question of how these findings impact our understanding of national identity as a general held mass-belief within Russia, while a measurable conception of national identity is seemingly present within Russia, its nature is dynamic and changing over time. These findings suggest additional support for Tolz (2001) that the dominant identity orientation in Russia during the 1990’s reflected a more civic/voluntaristic (i.e. subjective) understanding of national identity. However the evidence also suggests that this collective understanding has since shifted in favor of a more ascriptive basis of understanding. This development is unlikely to change so long as the Russian people continue to be broadly supportive of status quo ‘nationalizing state policies’ (Brubaker 1996).

This also serves as evidence to support (in-part) the argument advanced by Brudny and Finkel (2011). In their comparison of Russia and Ukraine, they argue explicitly that national identity is the variable that best explains the differences in democratization between the two countries. While their overarching causal argument is persuasive, their empirical evidentiary support for said argument was noticeably lacking. The empirical support provided for their

operationalization of national identity consisted of three sentences of opinion poll summation across two paragraphs, involving analysis of arbitrarily selected indicators, and no explicit empirical test of the broader relationship between national identity and democratization (2011, 285). In general terms this research project provides a more robust empirical basis of evidentiary support for the relationship between national identity and democratization. The analytical efforts of Chapter 3 can be viewed as picking up where Brudny and Finkel (2011) leave off, thoroughly extending on their initial empirical efforts to explore the constitutive basis of Russian national identity. In doing so, this project strove to provide some of the evidentiary support for the idea initially advanced by Rustow (1970), developed further by Linz and Stepan (1996), and formally argued by Brudny and Finkel (2011).

While Russia is nominally a democracy, it is not a consolidated democracy⁶. Given the preceding consideration of national identity, it is worth considering- what is required for consolidation? And what would it look like if it were? In general terms, a democracy is consolidated when “a society frees itself from the spells cast by authoritarian demagogues and rejects all alternatives to such democracy so as to no longer imagine any other possible regime” (Hermet 1991, 257). More specifically, a consolidated democracy is “one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers” (Linz 1990, 158). There must be an authentic belief in democracy among both masses and elites, as opposed to merely ‘superfluous’ or ‘expedient’ participation (Mainwaring 1992).

⁶ See fn 4 in Chapter 2 on page 25.

Russia currently finds itself in a phase where democratic mechanisms and procedures exist, but neither a majority of the mass public nor the political elites seem principally committed to Russia being more than a democracy in name only as evidenced by Putin's ability to effectively veto legitimate opposition with seemingly little impact upon his high public approval ratings and periodic electoral validation. Indeed, one might contend that the problem is not an absence of national identity, but rather the presence of two dueling conceptions of national identity. This in turn suggests that it the mere presence of a cohesive sense of national identity is not enough to sustain the possibility of democratic consolidation insofar as the mass attitudes of the people are concerned. A more charitable- and potentially more accurate- characterization of the findings would be that they lend support to alternative conceptions of what democracy "is" and how it is fundamentally understood by the people of Russia. These findings reflect potential support for the prominence of a statist conception of state-civil society relations within Russia, reflecting the tacit support of the Russian people to see the primary purpose of democracy as reducing the risk of anarchy at the expense of checks against tyranny (Hale 2002). These findings are consistent with research supporting the notion that rather than interpreting Russian public opinion as being generally supportive of autocracy, Russians differ from their western counterparts in their purposive conceptualization of democracy as promoting stability- rather than individual liberty- at a foundational level (Hale 2011).

What is required for mass attitudes to orient themselves towards democracy? Building upon Rokeach's typology of "open" and "closed" belief systems, Welzel and Inglehart (2007) contend that what's necessary is an open belief system reflecting social configurations that alleviate (rather than exacerbate) existential pressures. If the prevailing psychological outlook of a population is subject to significant existential pressures (e.g. precarious economic conditions, conflated social cleavages, social polarization, etc.), people feel increased vulnerability and an

increased desire for security and “protection under the shield of group cohesion” (2007, 300). However if existential pressures are alleviated via social configurations that promote unity over divisiveness, and a ‘we’re all in this together’ mentality, the perceived need for group-based protection from the ‘others’ within one’s country is diminished and bridging social trust can flourish. Whereas trust is something you have in others, national identity reflects the others you have trust in.

Speaking of trust, what do these findings suggest in terms of our understanding of political culture and democratic consolidation? One of the enduring questions within the subfield of comparative politics is ‘what determines the emergence, survival, and development of democracy?’ (Welzel and Inglehart 2007, 297). Efforts contributing to answering this question broadly comprise the study of democratization. Within this realm of study, causal explanations of democratization have long been dominated by institutional/structural approaches (i.e. those considering the effect of existing institutions and/or emphasizing socioeconomic requirements) and rational actor approaches (i.e. those focusing on actions spurred by political elites). While both approaches have their advantages, neither of them place significant (if any) emphasis on the role of mass attitudes. Rather such emphasis is found within political culture approaches which serve as an important compliment to the aforementioned approaches.

Political culture research is premised on the belief that answering ‘why democracy?’ requires some understanding of the mass beliefs held by the polity. This premise in turn depends upon the assumption that mass beliefs are relevant in shaping the emergence, development, and survival of democratic political structures- unless mass beliefs had some effect upon political systems there would be no real point in analyzing them. While some scholars argue that the very fate of democracy depends upon the people’ internalized commitment to democratic principles

(Welzel and Inglehart 2007), others have disputed the extent to which such mass belief systems actually impact political regimes.

In one well-regarded article broadly reviewing democratization literature (Shin 1994), the role of mass beliefs is limited only to considerations of democratic consolidation. Characterizing democratization as primarily elite-driven Shin (1994, 153) notes that “the literature does not consider the commitment of the mass public to democracy an absolute requirement for democratic transition. Indeed, it suggests that democracy can be created even when a majority of the citizenry does not demand it.” Interestingly, the footnote and annotation accompanying that last sentence includes the sole reference to Rustow (1970) which seems like a less-than-accurate characterization of Rustow’s contribution to the history of democratization scholarship. Shin (1994, 154) thusly summarizes the role of the masses, “It is only in the consolidation of new democracies that the mass public plays a key role.”

This general critique is supported and elaborated on by Coppedge (2012, 248-255). While explicitly agreeing with the sentiment that elite involvement is necessary to facilitate democratic transition and that the mass public plays only an indirect role in influencing or constraining the actions of elites, Coppedge attempts to extend the potential implications of this critique even further by calling in to question whether there is *any* relationship between political culture and the survival of a democratic regime. Five enumerated claims are provided: that democratic institutions can survive when opinion polls suggest low confidence in such institutions, it’s unclear whether Robert Putnam’s proxy use of ‘participation in voluntary associations’ clearly promotes cooperation and trust, that such participation does not directly impact regime change, that the opinions of elites matter more, and that elites shape culture rather than the other way around. And for good measure, Coppedge even also calls into question the potential relevance of trust relative to other mass level attitudes.

In first responding to the claims regarding political elites, yes, elites likely influence political culture. That the causal influence works moreso in one direction does not singularly invalidate the possibility that it can also work in the other direction. It also suggests the possibility of a resolve via research design and/or methodological considerations to better distinguish between the directionality of such effects. And yes, elites matter more when it comes to effectuating regime change- no dispute here. Again, that observation does not invalidate the possibility of some influence from the mass political culture; it merely suggests a greater influence from political elites. While this (again) suggests a comparative lack of relative influence, it does not effectively indict such a relationship nor suggest a lack of influence in an absolute sense. In regards to Putnam, such observations at best invalidate the work of Putnam, rather than the entire subfield of political culture. There is (again) the conflation with direct regime change vis a vis democratic transition as opposed to the consideration of regimes that already possess some existing elements of democracy while lacking others. Additionally, while I don't doubt that criticisms of Putnam's use of 'participation in voluntary associations' exist, neither the basis of such criticisms, nor the source citations associated with such arguments were presented. And given the repeated argument that the opinions of the masses likely bear no significant, direct influence on existing regime-level institutions, it seems somewhat perplexing that the continuing existence of such institutions (not surprising given research suggesting their ability to endure, e.g. Thelen 1999) would uniquely serve to disprove any potential effects deriving from mass culture. Perhaps this observation lends itself to the argument that institutions (like elites) matter *more than* political culture. But that is not the same as proving the point that political culture is without relevance. Finally, when considering the influence of trust as a specific attribute in relation to (or deriving from) these mass beliefs, Coppedge is most persuasive when questioning the generalizability of how trust functions across all cross-national contexts. However, Coppedge again seemingly conflates 'not being the

most important variable' with being 'a variable lacking in any importance' while also not accounting for research that contextualizes its relative importance at a micro-foundational level (Carlin and Love 2013).

Welzel and Inglehart (2007) in turn offer a critique of the critique. Noting the "lingering tendency to consider mass orientations as democracy consolidating, but not democracy inducing has inhibited the political culture school", they adopt a more expansive view and contend that political culture studies can engage with the aspects of emergence and survival, not simply development and consolidation (2007, 303). From this perspective, I tend to agree with their conclusion that "a population's prevailing psychological outlook is a selective force in the emergence and survival of political regimes, helping to delegitimize incompatible regimes and legitimize compatible ones." (Welzel and Inglehart 2007, 299). Other scholars have argued that the only effective way to understand the interplay between masses and political elites within the context of democratization research is by way of an analysis of public attitudes and beliefs (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1993). Even if such limiting parameters (e.g. mass political culture only matters when considering democratic consolidation) were true, there is still validity in deepening our understanding of how permissive and/or exacerbating conditions, circumstances, and/or variables are influenced and/or operate within the process of democratic consolidation. Even Coppedge concedes the potential relevance for mass attitudes- especially within the context of newer democracies- when citing agreement with Norris (1999, 268) that "it is hard to discount the possibility that distrust in institutions could eventually metastasize to a rejection of democracy in principle. Thus when regimes are not widely believed to be legitimate, then public opinion will not act as an effective deterrent against anti-democratic forces."

While this research admittedly does not offer a definitive resolve to these general tensions within the discipline, its findings (and the author) lend support to the sentiment that mass beliefs

matter and that political culture research can be analytically significant in ways beyond its current general scope of application. While reasonable disagreement exists as to the exact extent of mass beliefs' impact upon democracy, circumstances such as those in Russia should leave no doubt that mass attitudes are certainly a permissive circumstance that allows for backsliding, and is also consistent with the general consensus within the discipline that the necessary evolution of political culture required to support consolidation may take decades if not generations (Diamond 1992, Putnam 1992). If true, this understanding could it turn provide an easy basis by which present and future leaders may successfully exploit institutional weaknesses of existing democracies while avoiding a forceful rebuke by the ultimate stakeholders within said democracy.

6.5 Implications

It has been noted that there exists a general need to overcome the perceived divisions between- and research approaches associated with- thick and thin concepts that exist within comparative politics generally, and approaches to democratization research more specifically (Coppedge 2012). Following the prescriptive advice of Coppedge that such divisions can be overcome “by developing quantitative indicators of thick concepts” (2012, 45), these findings reflect the successful creation of an empirical model of something approximating ‘thick’ conceptions of national identity within Russia. Such a model was achieved by an aggregation of ‘thin’ quantitative indicators. Individually, each of these indicators would serve as a poor approximation of the underlying concept of national identity. Bundled together via factor analytic techniques, they more robustly suggest the presence of underlying dimensions reflective of changing conceptions of national identity over time.

These findings also suggest the existence of empirical support for the hypothesized relationship between national identity and democratization. Broadly speaking, these findings

suggest that Rustow was right...sort of. While not as deterministic of a relationship as Rustow originally articulated, evidence supports the existence of a quantifiable relationship between a generally agreed upon basis of national identity and how people view the relative benefits of democracy. While these findings do not provide evidence of a direct causal relationship between mass-level and institutional level phenomenon, they arguably serves as an indirect basis of support for Eckstein's Congruency Theory (1966) as a theoretical linkage or bridge between the aforementioned 'selective force' of psychological mass tendencies and systemic institutional properties. Specifically, this suggests a relationship between how people understand the contours of their national basis of group membership and their thoughts regarding the overall effectiveness and desirability of a democratic system. Moreover, the findings also suggest variation in this relationship, i.e. how national identity is understood affects how democracy is perceived.

This makes sense as the notion of democracy as a political system 'by the people, for the people' requires knowing who 'the people' are. Thus national identity is inextricably linked to considerations of democracy as questions of national identity seek to answer 'who are we'? (Huntington 2004). While it might be possible to achieve a preliminary transition to democracy – as Russia did- without first resolving this question, both the extant literature and these findings suggest that subsequent consolidation of democracy is difficult if not outright impossible.

When coupled with the prevailing sentiments regarding the important role that political elites serve in influencing mass attitudes towards both national identity and democracy, then these findings illustrate the potential for political elites to actively appeal to a people's sense of national identity, given the understanding that such politically relevant group identity can serve as a cornerstone of commonality on which to base one's appeals in active pursuit of one's political goals. Leaders principally committed to democracy could influence mass attitudes to facilitate a greater sense of openness within the belief system of a population, thus increasing the likelihood

for consolidation. However this requires a principled commitment to democracy- or at least a commitment greater than one's self-interest in preserving political power. Unfortunately, this also highlights the potential for exploitation by illiberal leaders appealing to- and thus effectively reinforcing- divisions within society. If democratic institutions are weak, or if democratic norms have not been internalized within a country's political culture, then calling in to question who should appropriately be considered members of 'the people' is an excellent means of reducing cooperation and trust within society. Indeed it has been noted that the more vocal or explicit the appeal to country's sense of identity, the more wary one should be- historically it has been nationalists least secure in their sense of national identity which have exhibited the greatest potential for engagement in outward conflict with others (Rustow 1970, Schafer 1999). This can be particularly problematic when exogenous economic circumstances worsen, increasing the susceptibility of majority groups to scapegoat minority groups within society.

Such real-world implications not only provide additional avenues for further testing within comparative politics, but also extend beyond the discipline's subfield boundaries. While this effort was dedicated to the consideration of national identity's effect on a country's prospects for democratization, IR scholars have similarly considered how political elites use identity management techniques to help shape foreign policy efforts (Hopf 1998, Clunan 2014).

6.6 Suggestions for Future Research

While this effort served an important role in formally modeling national identity and testing the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards democracy, it is an admittedly small step towards addressing the larger puzzle of national identity's relationship with democratic consolidation *writ* large. When considering likely primary causal influences, the role of political elites- specifically their ability to influence not only mass-level conceptions of national identity,

but also as the actors with the greatest ability to directly initiate changes to the institutional workings of democracy at the institutional regime level- was assumed for the purposes of this project. Rather than assuming the influence of political elites, future research efforts should more robustly examine the role/ability/effect of political elites on such mass-level attitudes as national identity.

Subsequent research efforts should also assess the generalizability of these preliminary findings by applying these modeling techniques to other country cases. The logical next step would be an examination of other former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Belarus, which would hopefully continue to uncover empirical support for highly persuasive, well-developed arguments otherwise lacking in robust evidentiary support (Brudny and Finkel 2011). Once attention shifts towards cross-national comparability close attention would be paid to reconciling recent discussions and developments regarding the appropriate methodological basis of comparability across said contexts (Aleman and Woods 2016, Welzel and Inglehart 2016).

Additionally, this effort revealed some shortcomings with existing survey collections as it relates to this particular research question. Future surveys would ideally include a multitude of indicators for both national identity and democratic attitudes. Long term, it will be worthwhile to figure out the boundaries of acceptable generalization for these findings a la Bunce (2000), by operationalizing and testing this relationship in different regional contexts beyond the post-Soviet context.

Finally it is worth repeating that while this author sees unique value in the political cultural tradition of exploring and explaining democratization, this in no way implies that efforts grounded within this approach are superior to those deriving from other research traditions. In essence, these findings effectively provide the evidentiary support for ideas developed from within the aforementioned traditions. This reflects the belief that no one camp can explain the totality of

democratization. Rather these findings should be seen as complementary to the excellent theoretical contributions driving from these alternate traditions. Indeed future research should consider the interplay of these distinctive explanations. For example, how might institutions serve as an important check against political elites making anti-democratic appeals on the basis of national identity? Analogous to the way that national identity approximates a daily plebiscite (Renan 1882), democratic institutions similarly require periodic affirmation by the people. When ‘the people’ can affirm who they are (and are not) while also valuing the workings of democracy as an intrinsic good, then the types of democracy we know and love can continue to emerge, survive, and thrive.

APPENDIX A. ISSP SURVEY INFORMATION

ISSP Series Description

Series name

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

Series information

The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration programme, which has been continuously conducting annual surveys on diverse social science topics since 1985. The topics for each ISSP survey are proposed by delegates from ISSP member countries. Then, a Basic Questionnaire is composed and improved over several years by a committee, elected by the General Assembly before it is pretested in various countries. Starting in 1984 with four founding nations - Australia, Germany, Great Britain and the United States, the ISSP meanwhile has grown up to almost 50 member countries covering various cultures around the globe.

ISSP Modules 1985 – 2015:

- Citizenship: 2004/ 2014
- Environment: 1993/ 2000/ 2010
- Family and Changing Gender Roles: 1988/ 1994/ 2002/ 2012
- Health and Health Care: 2011
- Leisure Time and Sports: 2007
- National Identity: 1995/ 2003/ 2013
- Religion: 1991/ 1998/ 2008
- Role of Government: 1985/ 1990/ 1996/ 2006
- Social Inequality: 1987/ 1992/ 1999/ 2009
- Social Networks: 1986/ 2001 (Social Relations and Support Systems)
- Work Orientations: 1989/ 1997/ 2005/ 2015

Study Description – National Identity II - ISSP 2003

Authoring Entity/ Principal Investigators

<large table removed>

Bibliographic citation

Publications based on ISSP data, which are made available through GESIS, should acknowledge those sources by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such source attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations should appear in footnotes or in the reference section of publications.

How to cite the data: ISSP Research Group (2012): International Social Survey Programme: National Identity II - ISSP 2003. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3910 Data file Version 2.1.0, doi: 10.4232/1.11449

Abstract

Questions on national consciousness and national identity.

Topic classification

Topics: Identification with the town, the city, the region, the nation and with the respective continent; most important characteristics for national identity; identification with one's own nation and national pride (scale); perceived pride in the democracy of the country, the political influence of the country in the world, the economic achievement, the social security system, the scientific achievements, the achievements in sports, the achievements in arts or literature, the armed forces, the history and equal rights of all social groups in society; preference for protective duty to support the national economy; attitude to the right of international institutions to enforce solutions to be accepted nationally; attitude to enforcing national interests regardless of evoking conflicts with other countries; rejection of acquisition of land by foreigners in one's country; reference for national films in national television stations; damage done by large international companies to the local business; attitude to free trade; attitude to follow the decisions of international organisations even if the local government does not agree with them; international organisations take away too much power from the country; availability of worldwide information as a benefit of the internet; importance of sharing national customs and traditions to achieve full nationality; attitude to government support of national minorities to preserve their customs and habits; preference for assimilation of minorities or retention of their identity; hostility to foreigners and prejudices against immigrants (scale); attitude to a reduction of immigration of foreigners; respondents citizenship; citizenship of parents at birth of respondent; birthplace or citizenship of parents should allow naturalization of children; same rights for citizens and legal immigrants; attitude towards stronger measures regarding illegal immigrants; languages spoken at home; perceived ethnic affiliation and strength of this feeling.

Universe

18 years old (exclusions: Finland: 15; Japan, Netherlands, Russia and South Africa: 16; Sweden: 17) and older

Selection method

Sampling procedures differ for the individual countries: Partly simple, partly multi-stage stratified random sample

Fieldwork and sample sizes

Table: Countries (regions) and fieldwork information for ISSP 2003

Russia	RU	Jul 03	Levada-Center, Russia	RU03	2383
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Mode of data collection

Oral, paper and pencil respectively postal interview with standardised questionnaire

Corresponding survey material

When dealing with international comparative data, data sets and documentation must be seen as two sides of the same coin. Even though ISSP members make huge efforts to

produce comparable data in each country, there still remains a remarkable amount of country specific peculiarities in the contributions to the final, international data set. These country specific peculiarities either have to be harmonised or to be documented, as they provide vital information for secondary analysts.

National Study Description

For each country, the original National Study Description is available in the appendix of this Variable Report. The National Study Descriptions are provided by the countries and include information on sample sizes, field dates, modes of data collection, sampling procedures, response rates and weighting processes.

Characteristics of National Population

The appendix of this Variable Report also includes Characteristics of National Populations for all participating countries from 1989 on. These documents provide statistical data on the composition of national populations in terms of gender, age, education and employment rates and, therefore, allow assessing how representative national samples are.

Where to find the survey materials and the data set of the ISSP Module of 2003 – National Identity II

In the GESIS Data Catalogue on the GESIS web you find

the **Basic Questionnaire** of this module together with all **country questionnaires** in the respective local languages, the **Codebook** (Variable Report) with the **National Study Descriptions and the Characteristics of National Populations** in its appendix the **Study Monitoring Report** and the **integrated data file ZA3910_v2.1.0**

for download under the tab “Data and Documents” of:
<http://info1.gesis.org/dbksearch19/SDesc2.asp?no=3910>

The GESIS online data portal ZACAT also provides the integrated data file and further ISSP documentation materials for download:

<http://zocat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zocat.gesis.org/obj/fStudy/ZA3910>

Study Description: Russia

Study title: ‘ISSP-2003 Module “National Identity II”
Fieldwork dates: July,01.-15,2003
Principal investigators: L. Khakhulina, Levada-Center
Sample type: Description of the sampling procedure

Stratification procedure. Nationwide sample (N=2100) was divided among:

10 large economic-geographical macro regions proportionate to the size of the local population aged 16+ of each macro region

5 strata of rural districts and urban settlements* in each of 10 macro regions proportionate to the size of the local population aged 16+ of each stratum.

*1) less than 10,000; (rural districts & small urban settlements)

2) from 10,000 – to 100,000;

3) from 100,000 – to 500,000;

4) from 500,000 – to 750,000;

5) over 750,000 inhabitants

Selection primary sampling units (PSUs). All cities over 500,000 inhabitants were included in the sample as self-representative units. Urban and rural settlements were considered as primary sample units (PSUs). In each stratum (except strata of cities over 500,000 and 2 capital cities) the number of PSUs was calculated on the limitation of 15 interviews per PSU and the PSUs as well were selected with the probability to its sizes (the number of its inhabitants). The total numbers of interviews accounted for a stratum was distributed approximately equally among selected PSUs. **Totally 101 PSUs were selected.**

Selection of secondary sampling points (SSUs). Electoral districts were used as secondary sampling points. In the cities over 500,000 inhabitants the number of surveyed SSUs was defined by condition of 7 interviews per SSU. In the rest of selected PSU two sampling points were randomly selected from the list of all electoral districts of this PSU.

Totally 240 sample points were selected.

Selection of households. The households were selected by a random route method. If a household or a respondent refused to participate in the survey or not been achieved for 4 visits an interviewer should visit the next address from the route in the selected districts.

Selection of respondents. Within a household a member with the nearest birthday was selected for interviewing. In order to reach a selected respondent an interviewer visited each address up to 3 times in different days of a week and at different time of a day.

The following categories were excluded from the gross sample:

- a) persons doing their military service by draft (about 1%)
- b) persons under imprisonment (about 0,8%)
- c) population of the areas under the war conflict in North Caucasus (1,9%)
- d) population of remote or difficult to access regions of Far North (0,9)
- e) rural localities with less than 50 inhabitants (0,8%)

Fieldwork institute: Levada-Center

Fieldwork methods: Self-completion

Sample size: N=2400 (2100 + 300 extra sample in Moscow)

Response rates:

5902	A - Total issued (total sample)
182	B - Ineligible (address vacant, wrong ages,...)
5720	C - (= A - B) Total eligible (in scope sample)
2408	D - Total ISSP questionnaires received
3367	E - (= C - D; = F + G + H) Total non-response
1653	F - Refusals (refusing to take part)
1328	G - Non-contact (never contacted)
331	H - Other non-response

Language: Russian
 Weighted: yes, a weighting factor exists in the data set
 Weighting procedure: exact description of the weighting procedure / algorithm

Main principles of weighting procedure

The total expected number N of respondents for a certain region being treated equal

$$N = N_0 * P,$$

where N_0 denotes the size of total sample, P - the share of the region population in the entire population.

As a result of correction, every respondent $X[k]$ has the definite weight $W[k]$, within the limits $0 < W[k] < \sim 10$, so that the following conditions were valid:

- 1) the value of $\sum(W[k])$ for the region concerned was equal to N
- 2) for every controlled group $G[i]$ the value $Q[i]$ being equal to $Q[i] = \sum(W[k] | X[k].\text{belong to } G[i]) / N$, was closed to a proportion $P[i]$ of group $G[i]$ in the region population

i.e. $Q[i] \sim P[i], i=1,2,\dots,16$.

The value of J being equal to $J = \sum((Q[i]-P[i])**2) + (\sum(W[k])/N - 1)**2$, was used as the criterion for minimization on the weights' sets variety.

Quality of corrections

male	fem	<25	<40	<55	>54	H	S	P
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Survey:

3785 6214 1590 2490 2549 3370 2553 5371 2075

Weighted:

4578 5421 1719 2709 2761 2810 1541 5444 3014

State

4579 5420 1718 2710 2762 2809 1542 5444 3013

Statistics:

*1-2 -sex

3-6 -age

7-9 - education (higher, secondary, primary)

Weights coefficients sum is equal 2107.

Mean values:	ZERO	0	-1	.1-	.2	.2 - .5	.5- 1	1-2	2- 5	5-10	>10
Number:	0	0	291	1021	489	330	266	12	0		

ISSP Characteristics of National Population (Russia)

Source: the data of the State Statistics Committee of Russia, 2000

Source no. 1

SEX

Male	45,57
Female	54,43

AGE (groups)

18-24	13,53
25-39	28,12
49-54	28,90
55+	29,45

YEARS OF SCHOOLING (groups)*

Higher	16,28
Secondary	55,80
Incomplete secondary	27,92

EMPLOYMENT STATUS (1.02.04)**

Employed	58.6
Unemployed	9.5
Not in labor force	31.9

Source – Census, 2002 , Russian State Statistical Committee (Rosstat).

*) Data of years of education are not available.

***) Social and economic situation in Russia. Rosstat. 2004.

APPENDIX B. ISSP QUESTIONNAIRE- 2003 MODULE

Q. 1. We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?^{1, 2}

Please tick one box in each column

	Most Important	Second Most Important	Third Most Important
Your current or previous occupation (or being a homemaker).	D	D	D
Your race/ethnic background.	D	D	D
Your gender (that is, being a man/woman).	D	D	D
Your age group (that is, Young, Middle Age, Old).	D	D	D
Your religion (or being agnostic or atheist).	D	D	D
Your preferred political party, group, or movement.	D	D	D
Your nationality.	D	D	D
Your family or marital status (that is, son/daughter, mother/father, grandfather/grandmother, husband/wife, widower/widow, not married, or other similar)	D	D	D
Your social class (that is upper, middle, lower, working, or similar categories)	D	D	D
The part of [COUNTRY] that you live in	D	D	D

Q. 2. How close do you feel to... (Please, tick one box on each line)

	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all	Can't choose
a) Your town or city	D	D	D	D	D
b) Your [county]	D	D	D	D	D
c) [COUNTRY]	D	D	D	D	D
d) [Continent; e.g. Europe]	D	D	D	D	D

[2. Precode: "Feel close to" is to be understood as "emotionally attached to" or "identifying with".

2b) [county] (or province, state, etc.): to be understood as the most relevant administrative unit smaller than the entire country/nation.

2d) [Europe]: give relevant continent or subcontinent: Europe, North America, East Asia/Southeast Asia]

¹ In oral interviews, use card with choices

² This question was not asked in the 1995 or 2013 modules.

Q. 3. Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]³. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is... (Please, tick one box on each line)

	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Can't choose
a. to have been born in [COUNTRY]	D	D	D	D	D
b. to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizenship	D	D	D	D	D
c. to have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life	D	D	D	D	D
d. to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]	D	D	D	D	D
e. to be a [religion]	D	D	D	D	D
f. to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws	D	D	D	D	D
g. to feel [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	D	D	D	D	D
h. to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry ⁴	D	D	D	D	D

[3. Precode "truly [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]" E.g. "truly British", American "a true American".

3d) [dominant language(s)] If two or more languages are recognized nationwide both are included in the question. However, if there is one national lingua franca (Spanish, Russian) just give this language.

3e) The dominant religion or denomination in your country should be given (eg. Christian in the US and Canada, Catholic in Ireland and Italy, Russian Orthodox in Russia)].

³ Insert nationality corresponding to COUNTRY.

⁴ This question was not asked in the 1995 module.

Q. 4. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please, tick one box on each line)

	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
a. I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world	D	D	D	D	D	D
b. There are some things about [COUNTRY] today that make me feel ashamed of [COUNTRY]	D	D	D	D	D	D
c. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	D	D	D	D	D	D
d. Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries	D	D	D	D	D	D
e. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.	D	D	D	D	D	D
f. When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	D	D	D	D	D	D
g. I am often less proud of [COUNTRY] than I would like to be.	D	D	D	D	D	D

Q. 5. How proud are you of [COUNTRY] in each of the following? (Please, tick one box on each line)

	Very proud	Somewhat proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all	Can't choose
a. the way democracy works	D	D	D	D	D
b. its political influence in the world	D	D	D	D	D
c. [COUNTRY's] economic achievements	D	D	D	D	D
d. its social security system	D	D	D	D	D
e. its scientific and technological achievements	D	D	D	D	D
f. its achievements in sports	D	D	D	D	D
g. its achievements in the arts and literature	D	D	D	D	D
h. [COUNTRY'S] armed forces	D	D	D	D	D
i. its history	D	D	D	D	D
j. its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	D	D	D	D	D

Q. 16. How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]? (Please, tick one box on each line)

Very proud	D
Somewhat proud	D
Not very proud	D
Not proud at all	D
I am not [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]	D
Can't choose	D

APPENDIX C. EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEY INFORMATION

1 European Values Study 1981-2008

The European Values Study is the most comprehensive research project on human values in Europe. It is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics and society. Repeated every nine years in an increasing number of countries, the survey provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens all over Europe.

The research program was initiated by the European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) in the late 1970s and has emerged as a well-established network of social and political scientists aiming at high standards in data creation and processing. From 1981 to 2008 four waves of survey were conducted in European and other countries. These surveys explore value differences, similarities, and value changes among citizens of the EVS member countries.

Survey 2008

The fourth wave has a persistent focus on a broad range of values. Questions with respect to family, work, religious, political and societal values are highly comparable with those in earlier waves (1981, 1990 and 1999). This longitudinal scope of the study makes it possible to study trends in time. The EVS has an increasing international and regional coverage. In 2008 it covers 47 countries/regions of Europe. Table 1 gives an overview of countries participating in EVS waves and year of fieldwork.

2 Access to data and documentation

General study information

The EVS website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) covers comprehensive information on the origin of the project and provides access to all data and documentation available for EVS surveys.

Data and documentation download

Data and documentation can be obtained at the GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne through their online download facilities GESIS Data Catalogue (<http://gesis.org/data-catalogue/>) and ZACAT-Online Study Catalogue (<http://zcat.gesis.org/>).

GESIS Data Catalogue: <https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/GDESC2.asp?no=0009&DB=E>

ZACAT: <http://zcat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zcat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5>

Study Description

Study description included in the GESIS Data Catalogue gives information about the origin of the data, as well as data releases, errors detected between data releases, and error corrections.

2.1 Bibliographic citation

Publications based on EVS data should acknowledge this by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such source attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations must appear in the footnotes or in the reference section of publications.

How to cite the data

EVS (2010): European Values Study 2008 - Russian Federation. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4777 Data File Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.10170.

How to cite this publication

EVS, GESIS (2013): European Values Study 2008 - Variable Report Russian Federation. GESIS- Variable Report 2013/70.

Principal investigators

- Bashkirova, Hena, Bashkirova & Partners, Russian Federation

Data collector

- Bashkirova and partners, Moscow

2.2 Study scope

Abstract

Moral, religious, societal, political, work, and family values of Europeans

Topics

1. Perceptions of life: ...

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.

5. Politics and society: political interest; political participation; preference for individual freedom or social equality; self-assessment on a left-right continuum (10-point-scale); self-responsibility or governmental provision; free decision of job-taking of the unemployed or no permission to refuse a job; advantage or harmfulness of competition; liberty of firms or governmental control; equal incomes or incentives for individual efforts; attitude concerning capitalism versus government ownership; post-materialism (scale); expectation of future development (less emphasis on money and material possessions, greater respect for authority); trust in institutions; satisfaction with democracy; assessment of the political system of the country as good or bad (10-point-scale); preferred type of political system (strong leader, expert decisions, army should rule the country, or democracy); attitude towards democracy (scale).

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7. National identity: geographical group the respondent feels belonging to (town, region of country, country, Europe, the world); citizenship; national pride; fears associated with the European Union (the loss of social security and national identity, growing expenditure of the own country, the loss of power in the world for one's own country and the loss of jobs); attitude towards the enlargement of the European Union (10-point-scale); voting intentions in the next election and party preference; party that appeals most; preferred immigrant policy; opinion on terrorism; attitude towards immigrants and their customs and

traditions (take jobs away, undermine a country's cultural life, make crime problems worse, strain on country's welfare system, threat to society, maintain distinct customs and traditions); feeling like a stranger in one's own country; too many immigrants; important aspects of national identity (being born in the country, to respect country's political institutions and laws, to have country's ancestry, to speak the national language, to have lived for a long time in the country); interest in politics in the media; give authorities information to help justice versus stick to own affairs; closeness to family, neighbourhood, the people in the region, countrymen, Europeans and mankind; concerned about the living conditions of elderly people, unemployed, immigrants and sick or disabled people.

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Interviewer rating: respondent's interest in the interview.

Additionally encoded: interviewer number; date of the interview; total length of the interview; time of the interview (start hour and start minute, end hour and end minute); language in which the interview was conducted.

Additional country specific variables are included in this national dataset.

Universe

Persons 18 years or older who are resident within private households, regardless of nationality and citizenship or language.

2.3 Methodology and processing

Selection method

A representative multi-stage or stratified random sample was used in EVS member countries.

For more country-specific information about the sampling procedure, please go to the EVS website <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/surveys/survey-2008/participatingcountries/> and see the method reports provided for all participating countries.

Mode of data collection

Face-to-face interviews with standardized questionnaire PAPI (Paper)

Fieldwork was conducted on the basis of detailed and uniform instructions prepared by the EVS advisory groups. The English basic questionnaire was translated into other languages by means of the questionnaire translation system WebTrans, a web-based translation platform designed by Gallup Europe. The whole translation process was closely monitored and quasi-automated documented.

Number of units: 1504

Number of variables: 441

APPENDIX D. EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Hello. I am from the [NAME OF ORGANIZATION]. We are carrying out the [NATION] part of a European-wide study on what people value in life. This study will interview samples representing the European people. Your name has been selected at random as part of a representative sample of the [NATION] public. I'd like to ask your views on a number of different subjects. Your help will contribute to a better understanding of what people all over Europe believe and want out of life.

SHOW CARD 6 – CODE AN ANSWER FOR EACH

Q6 On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

			mentioned	not mentioned	DK	NA
v46	A	People with a criminal record	1	2	8	9
v47	B	People of a different race	1	2	8	9
v48	C	Left wing extremists	1	2	8	9
v49	D	Heavy drinkers	1	2	8	9
v50	E	Right wing extremists	1	2	8	9
v51	F	People with large families	1	2	8	9
v52	G	Emotionally unstable people	1	2	8	9
v53	H	Muslims	1	2	8	9
v54	I	Immigrants/foreign workers	1	2	8	9
v55	J	People who have AIDS	1	2	8	9
v56	K	Drug addicts	1	2	8	9
v57	L	Homosexuals	1	2	8	9
v58	M	Jews	1	2	8	9
v59	N	Gypsies	1	2	8	9
v60	O	Christians	1	2	8	9

Q7 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1 – most people can be trusted (v62)

2 – can't be too careful

8 – don't know
(spontaneous)

9 – no answer
(spontaneous)

SHOW CARD 64

Q64 On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

1 – very satisfied (v223)

2 – rather satisfied

3 – not very satisfied

4 – not at all satisfied

8 – don't know (spontaneous)

9 – no answer (spontaneous)

Q66 I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

		very	fairly	fairly	very	DK	NA
v225	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1	2	3	4	8	9
v226	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country	1	2	3	4	8	9
v227	Having the army rule the country	1	2	3	4	8	9
v228	Having a democratic political system	1	2	3	4	8	9

SHOW CARD 67 – READ OUT AND CODE ONE ANSWER PER

Q67 I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them?

		agree strongly	agree	disagree	disagree strongly	DK	NA
v229	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of	1	2	3	4	8	9
v230	In democracy, the economic system	1	2	3	4	8	9
v231	Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling	1	2	3	4	8	9
v232	Democracies aren't good at	1	2	3	4	8	9

SHOW CARD 69 – CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR Q69

Q69 Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?

STILL USE CARD 69 – CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR Q70

Q70 And secondly?

		Q69 (v253)			Q70 (v254)		
		First	DK	NA	Second	DK	NA
A	locality or town where you live	1	8	9	1	8	9
B	region of country where you live	2	8	9	2	8	9
C	[COUNTRY]	3	8	9	3	8	9
D	Europe	4	8	9	4	8	9
E	the world as a whole	5	8	9	5	8	9

Q71 Are you a citizen of [COUNTRY]?

1 – yes (v255)

2 – no ----- > GO TO Q73

8 – don't know (spontaneous) ----- > GO TO Q73

9 – no answer (spontaneous) ----- > GO TO Q73

Q72 How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?

1 – very proud (v256)

2 – quite proud

3 – not very proud

4 – not at all proud

7 – not applicable (spontaneous)

8 – don't know

(spontaneous)

9 – no answer

(spontaneous)

APPENDIX E. SECONDARY RUSSIAN DATA SOURCES

Contemporary Russian Identity: Measurements, Challenges, Answers.

The Russian Public Opinion Research Center conducted a poll commissioned by the Valdai Discussion Club, “Contemporary Russian Identity: Measurements, Challenges, Answers,” ahead of its tenth anniversary meeting “Russia’s Diversity for the Modern World” to feed the discussion at the conference.

This research poll analyses five basic valuable aspects of contemporary Russian identity. In particular, the respondents were proposed to reflect over following principal aspects: culture, religion, ethnicity, self-identification, patriotism etc.

The survey integrated the respondents presented by men and women between the ages of 28 and 42, at least 50% of them active internet users, politically active (willing to attend rallies for their rights, protests against declining living standards, etc.). The poll took place in Moscow, Kaliningrad, Yekaterinburg and Makhachkala. Nationwide representative quantitative poll was presented by 1,600 Russian respondents over 18 years old in 45 regions, 137 cities and towns.

The results (both in English and Russian) are accessible at-

http://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/contemporary_russian_identity_measurements_challenges_answers/

Twenty Years of Reforms through the Eyes of Russians

The original file (in Russian) is accessible at-

http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Doklad/20_years_reform.pdf

Translated excerpts from the Foreword (reflecting methodological considerations) and chapter 12 are included below. Translation achieved via Google Translate.

In order to identify Russians' perception of the experience of reforming the economic, social and political life of society over the past twenty years, the changes that took place in the society over these years, in April 2011, the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences conducted an all-Russian sociological study: "Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians ". A representative sample in all the territorial and economic regions of the country, as well as in Moscow and St. Petersburg, polled 1,750 respondents aged 18 and over, representing 11 social groups: workers, mines and construction sites; engineering and technical intelligentsia; humanitarian intelligentsia (scientists, university professors, teachers of schools, colleges); employees of trade, consumer services, transport and communications; employees; entrepreneurs of small and medium business; servicemen and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; inhabitants of villages and villages; city pensioners; university students; unemployed. The study was conducted in 58 settlements, in proportion to the population of megacities, regional centers, district cities and villages.

At the same time, the empirical basis of this study was the results of a study carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2001. "New Russia: Ten Years of Reforms." Since the studies were carried out on the same sample model using a number of similar issues (indicators), this report was able to carry out a comparative analysis that reveals not only the current state of mass consciousness but also its development trends, the features of manifestation at various stages of reform. We are talking about two periods in the life of the country: the 90's, and 2000's.

12. Russian identity and interethnic relations

Russian citizens live in a state whose image was completely different for most of them 20 years ago. Not only its spatial outlines "from the southern mountains to the northern seas" have changed, but also the system of relations, the ethnic composition of the population, the state structure. And since these changes coincided with economic difficulties, loss of confidence in life, adversity, even in one area, united in the representation of people with others and caused in many an inescapable longing for the past: "how well we lived badly."

In the early years of the new Russia, many people still felt "Citizens of the USSR." In 1992, 71% of respondents identified themselves as a citizen of Russia⁵³. Now, twenty years later, when determining their identity, 95% of respondents in the country to some extent perceive themselves as "citizens of Russia", of which 72% feel their community with Russian citizens "to a large extent." Judging by the survey results, this is the strongest, most confident identity among the other most significant identities (Figure 12.1).

Figure 12.1. With whom people feel a connection to a large extent, %

With Russian citizens 72
 With fellow countrymen 60
 With people of the same views on life 52
 With people of the same nationality 51
 With people of the same faith 42
 With people of the same profession 40

The Russian identity is historically rapidly emerging. In 2004, according to the polls, in terms of intensity, it was obviously inferior to both ethnic identity and community of people in terms of views on life, both professional and local identity. Then Russians called themselves 78% of respondents, and a strong connection (often felt Russians) - 31% (Figure 12.2).

Figure 12.2. The change in the significance of the Russian identity against the background of other identities, 2004 and 2011, %

<Fig. 12.2>

⁵³ Studies under the guidance of V.A. Yadova, used for comparison in the book: Russian identity under transformation conditions / Ed. M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova. M., 2005. S. 82.

By 2011, Russian identity has become not only the most widespread among the most significant identities, but the feeling of connection with it has become the highest⁵⁴. If in 2004 the identification with the country, though not so much, but still was clearly inferior to identifying people by profession, a commonality in views on life and nationality, in 2011, based on the results of the study, Russian identity prevailed. And this is not only recorded by the proportion of respondents who confirmed their identification with the country, but also because the feeling of a "strong connection" with it has doubled. The connection of times has been restored. In Soviet times, few people could say that they associate themselves with the RSFSR, and this, by the way, distinguished them from the inhabitants of other union republics. In the new Russian identity there is also a pre-Soviet layer of ideas.

If we compare with the states of Western Europe, then the strength of communication with the country, Russians are now close to the inhabitants of Great Britain, Germany.⁵⁵

Naturally, the greatest interest is the comparison of Russian identity with ethnic, regional, local, because it reflects the processes of integration in the country. Identification by nationality until very recently was not just competing, but prevailing among people in comparison with the state.

And by the end of the twentieth century, Russian identity as a whole across the country (at least in regions with a dominant Russian population) began to dominate a little, with 90% of the population still retaining identity by nationality and by place of residence. However, a strong connection, as can be seen from Fig. 12.2, on the national and local grounds 50-60% feel, and with Russian citizens - 72%.

The respondents were asked the clarifying question "Who do you feel more to?". 25% feel equally in both of them, but the majority of the respondents (47%) considered themselves "more likely Russians". At the same time, Russians called themselves "Russians" more often than people of other nationalities (48% vs. 39%).

Thus, the answers to this clarifying question confirmed the established trend.

⁵⁴ The comparisons do not include family ties, which in all studies are the strongest.

⁵⁵ For comparison, ISSP 2003 data is taken, where the link is fixed through the answer to the question whether the respondent feels a connection with his country "very much", "pretty much", "not very much", "I do not feel any connection" at all. We have combined the first two answers. Our comparisons are not correct to within a percentage, but reflect a trend.

There are no significant age differences in identifying themselves as Russians and ethnicity. A little more identifying with the people of their nationality among the older generation - 93% versus 87% among the youth of 18-25 years, which is most likely due to the national movements they have experienced in the republics of the USSR, the split of the Union and, possibly, a reaction to the influx of foreign migrants. This is confirmed by the fact that with an alternative choosing among them the proportion of people who "feel more like Russians" also turned out to be slightly more (53% versus 44% among 18-25-year-olds).

With such high rates of prevalence of both Russian and ethnic identity, the issue of their competitiveness is losing its urgency and their compatibility is confirmed. It should be noted that half of the respondents feel a strong connection with their people (in ethnocultural meaning), and with the Russian community. By the way the same applies to the local identity, which, judging by the polls, was almost as widespread and strong.

It would seem that these data testify to the high degree of integration of society and the far-fetched nature of the topic of separatism and disunity of the country's population. And in something it is really so. However, the bases of integration are important. After all, we know about high social differentiation and political disunity. But it's obvious that there are values and needs of people who become cementers in society. The very country where you were born and lived, the Motherland is a value for most people. The idea of it is usually emotionally colored and constitutes that component of identity, which is called patriotism. "What does it mean for you to be a patriot of Russia?" - asked during interviews with respondents. In all generations, agreed answers were received: "Love your country" - 95-99%, strive to improve life in the country 92-97%, "to be proud of your country 91-97%. This patriotism, of course, is not always critical. With the fact that the patriot must "Talking about the country the truth, whatever it was", a fifth of the respondents did not agree; and a third agreed that you should not say that your country has shortcomings.

There is another, unfavorable symptom confirmed by the poll - solidarity is largely based on grievances. 62% of respondents joined the opinion: "people of my nationality have lost much in the last 15-20 years". Among Russians this point of view is more common, than among other nationalities - 64% against 44% respectively. He pays grudges for secession from the Union of Peoples of the former Union Republics; for national movements, during which Russians were accused of imperial policy; finally, resentment for the criticism of the past, which only recently seemed to be a bright future.

Hence the sensitivity to the place that the majority in the polyethnic space of the country should occupy. On the one hand, the older generation still has previous ideas about the norms in the country, where each person is a "reliable friend and friend", in the part of the middle and the youngest about the humane values of tolerance, which democracy declares, and on the other hand, insults for losing status the elder brother, the son of a great nation.

For twenty years, these grievances have not left the consciousness of people. They received additional fuel at the expense of those feelings that are experienced by other peoples in Europe, in those countries in which there was a significant and rapid influx of foreigners. Russia in these years became the third country in the world after the US and Germany on the influx of immigrants. And this happened against the background of a significantly changed ethnic composition. In the USSR, Russians accounted for 51%, now in Russia - 80%. In addition, we are experiencing the consequences of the Chechen crisis (billions of rubles are spent for rebuilding the republic, and in the end there are rallies "Enough to feed the Caucasus").

In conditions when the politicization of the ethnic factor was added to the objectively available position in the country by populist politicians, the representation of people about multinationality as a historical reality of our country was changing. "The fact that people of different nationalities live in Russia, is it rather an advantage for the development of the country or is it more a problem?", The respondents were asked. Definitely considered an advantage - 16%. The position "both" was the most common and scored 41%, while 28% believe that "it is more a problem". Both Russians and some less often representatives of other nationalities hold such an opinion (29% and 21% respectively).

Hence, over the past twenty years, the debate on the question of how much Russia is a common home for the nationalities living in it has not lost its morbidity. From Table. 12.1 shows how opinions were distributed on this issue since 1995.

Table 12.1 The respondents' opinions how much is Russia a common home for the Russian people, 1995-2011,% ⁵⁶

Judgments	1995	1998	2001	2004	2006	2007	2011
Russia must be a state of Russian people	11	11	12	17	19	16	14
Russia is a multinational country, but the Russians, when making up the majority, should have more rights, for they have the primary responsibility for the destiny of the people as a whole.	14	20	20	24	31	31	31
Russia is a common home for many peoples, exerting influence on each other. All the peoples of Russia must have equal rights, and no one should have any advantages.	65	64	61	54	50	48	47
Difficult to answer	10	5	8	6	0	6	8

56 The shares of those who agreed with each of the judgments are indicated.

The fact that the state is a common home for the Russian people, and all of them should have equal rights, no one should have any advantages, remains the most widespread opinion, but it receives less and less support every year. In the 90-ies. this was the view of the obvious majority (64-65%), and in the 2000s. the proportion of its supporters declined: from 61% in 2001 to 47% in 2011

But the proportion of people who believed that "Russia is a multinational country, but Russians, making up the majority, should have more rights," has doubled (from 14% to 31%), and along with those who believe that "Russia should be the state of Russian people "they accounted for 45% (25% in 1995).

The study showed that open support for the idea of Russian exclusivity is most often expressed by young people, little educated Russians. In capitals, however, the percentage of "soft nationalists" (40% versus 30-32% in other types of settlements) is fairly high, convinced that Russians should be given greater rights than other peoples (Figure 12.3).

All this suggests that the Russians' self-awareness is actualized. 79% share the view that "in our time a person needs to feel part of his nationality," and 82% attributed themselves to those who "never forgets about their nationality."

Previous studies of the 90's. even in the republics where Russians are more in contact with people of other nationalities, they did not record such high indices of the need for affiliation. True,

the opinion is rather solidarizing, than reflecting real practice, because at the same time 47% respond that they rarely think about who they are by nationality.

Solidarity is associated with the politicization of ethnicity, including the discussion in the country of questions about how our state should be built.

We, too, were interested in the opinion of our citizens about the state structure and policies related to the country's multinationality.

As for the state structure, most of our citizens do not have a firm opinion on this matter. 42% of respondents believe that "it is necessary to abolish the division of Russia into republics". This opinion is mainly Russian (among which 43% "for", 56% "against"), since among the representatives of other peoples it is shared by 27% and among them there are few nationalities living in the republics according to the sampling conditions. But more importantly, 73% of Russians share an alternative opinion: "It would be better if the peoples of the republics retained their independence within the country, autonomy ", and fully confident in the second opinion more than in the first: 24% against 13%. And among the non-Russians, 79% are of opinion about the preservation of autonomy.

Figure 12.3. Opinions of respondents of different socio-demographic groups on what should be the national structure of the Russian state,%

<Fig 12.3>

Thus, it is obvious that the Russians are hesitating about preserving the type of state structure that we have historically, and representatives of other nationalities, the more living in the republics, in the majority - against.

In the mood of those who are for the abolition of the republics, most likely more resentment and fatigue from the need to do something in connection with the multinational nature of the country. This is evidenced by the agreement of the majority (64%) with the opinion "... it is better if the peoples who do not want to live peacefully together would have the right to withdraw from Russia." Support for such an opinion is not just a manifestation of liberalism. Judging by the data, hardly anyone wants to disintegrate the country, but the terrorist acts in the North Caucasus and in the Center of the country not only frighten, but also cause resentment, readiness for radical decisions.

The Russian identity that has become massive, confident and strong enough, cementing the Russian political nation, is certainly an important result of the twentieth anniversary, but this identity is stored in itself by the painful experience of change and the negativism of phobias and experiences.

After the December events (2010), the public and the authorities expressed concern about the preservation of interethnic harmony. At the meeting of the State Council, the President of the Russian Federation stated that without civil peace, interethnic, inter-confessional consent in our country "The development of the state itself is impossible", "there can be no future for us or for our children." ⁵⁷

The data of the conducted research also draw an alarming picture. Half of the respondents recorded that there were clashes in their locality on the basis of national hostility, and 68% frankly admitted that they "are irritated or dislike towards representatives of some nationalities." It is known that we "in the image of the enemy" most often were "Caucasians" the last time, however, it was proved in studies that if a person has prejudices towards persons of one nationality, in another situation they will be manifest themselves to others. Most strongly this hostility on ethnic grounds is due to the fact that people of a different culture behave "as owners on this earth" - 63%. Another argument of dislike is the difference in "people's behavior, their way of life" - 39%, and only 1/5 of respondents have a sense of competition in their quest for prestigious jobs. This is quite understandable, since most of the non-cultural migrants take up work that the local population does not claim. For twenty years, the readiness to communicate with people of a different nationality has not changed (Table 12.2).

Table 12.2. Influence of a nationality of the person on the relation to it, 1994-2011,% ⁵⁸

The influence of nationality in different situations	1994	2001	2011
Affects when choosing a circle of friends	22	24	29
Affects the choice of residence	43	36	40
Affects marriage	39	35	47

⁵⁸ Shares of those who agreed with each judgment are indicated.

As we see from the data, there is no need to dramatize interethnic relations (and in this Dmitry Medvedev was right in assessing the Presidium of the State Council). This seems to be confirmed by other research centers - the share of bias prejudiced against mass-scale types of interethnic communication as a whole has been fluctuating for some years in the region of 30% (data from the Levada Center). Completely agreed answers were received during this study. 89% of Russians and the same percentage among other nationalities believe that "violence in interethnic and interreligious disputes is unacceptable," but 44% simultaneously believe that "Violence is permissible if justice against my people is violated," and 41% agreed that "all means are good to protect the interests of my people." And among Russians such sentiments are more common than among other nationalities (43% and 34% respectively).

This is a new situation in the 2000s. In the 1990s, such sentiments were much more frequent among non-Russians. These answers of the Russians are fully consistent with the actualization of their ethno-national self-awareness, as discussed above.

Such sentiments of Russians are largely related to the rapid influx of foreign migrants. In this, Russians do not differ from citizens of other European countries caught up in a similar situation. Knowing the actions of the Sarkozy government towards the Roma, we asked our citizens about their attitude towards the forced eviction of people of some nationalities (Figure 12.4).

Figure 12.4. Approval / non-approval of forced eviction of representatives of some nationalities from the city (village) of residence, %

<Fig. 12.4>

Those who would not approve forced evictions are more than those who approve - 46% against 39%. But as we see supporters of power actions are quite a lot and, which is especially alarming, their share is greater among young people. Among those who are 18-25 years old, 46%; among respondents aged 50-60 years and older - 36-37%. A lot of them among the socially disadvantaged groups of the population.

But, most often in support of a radical solution of national problems residents of capitals express themselves - 63% of them support (including 22% unconditionally), the idea of deporting some nationalities (Figure 12.5).

Figure 12.5. Approval / No Approval by respondents of different socio-demographic groups of forced eviction of representatives of some nationalities from the city (village) of residence, %

<Fig. 12.5>

What is the reason for such moods? To say that this is a fairly large group of young people or residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg – convinced xenophobia, it is impossible. After all, 85% of young people at this age consider violence in interethnic disputes unacceptable. Combined negative interethnic installations have about 15%. But the sense of loss in the last 15-20 years, that is, practically for their still short conscious life, is even more than among people of middle age. Rather, of course, behind the sense of loss lies their discontent with the practice of the present life they face, reacting more sharply to both corruptness and social injustice. The complex of social grievances and dissatisfactions takes the form of ethnonational grievances, infringement of ethnic feelings. And the events on On December 11, 2010, this was clearly shown in the Manege Square.⁶⁰

The growing Russian identity, combined with ethnic identity, integrates people, but also makes us think about the fairness of the existing system of resource allocation, and solidifies against injustices.

⁶⁰ A special study, initiated by the Public Chamber, among young people aged 15-30 years, confirmed: 78% consider performances at the Manezh Square not as nationalistic, but as a protest against corruption. This is the opinion of both Russians and representatives of other nationalities, and "Caucasians are better suited to corrupt authorities (66%)."

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