

RELATIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR GLOBAL EGALITARIANISM AND COSMOPOLITAN INCLUSION¹

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“In a world where we all have a joint interest in survival, the real absurdity is the absence of any system where that joint interest is effectively represented.”

(Dahl, 1970: 67)

Introductory Remarks: Global Affectedness, the Route Towards Cosmopolitanism

We may very well live in a globalized world, dominated by international trade and communications, where even those very few with little or no direct exposure to the modern technological world are now nonetheless affected by it, notably through diffuse phenomena such as environmental pollution and climate change. (Heilinger, 2020: 5)

But our world is not truly global, for even ignoring existing chauvinistic sentiments, the fact of the matter is that our movement and political rights are by and large legally restricted by borders beyond which there is little to no recognition of our interests in policy-making processes. Despite this, there is general agreement that globalization is responsible for our interests being affected beyond the jurisdictions of the states that recognize us as their citizens. This, we surmise, raises a moral problem, for justifying whose and which affected interests should be recognized and how depends first and foremost on moral considerations.

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Cosmopolitans have long sought to make sense of a global world, for they have traditionally tried to make sense of a “world/cosmic citizenship”, as against a citizenship restricted to the arbitrary borders of the state, which they long questioned as to its justification. As a doctrine or philosophical stance, cosmopolitanism has been around for over two millennia, and it has many roots in different schools of thought, but its general idea is captured by whichever may follow from our understanding of world citizenship. What this means for the particular framing of what we could call *moral cosmopolitanism* has changed throughout the years. From the works of the Stoics, passing through Kant, and reaching today, it is difficult to pinpoint an exact thesis that will fit all the moral understandings of self-proclaimed cosmopolitans. However, nowadays the literature on cosmopolitanism has narrowed down on Pogge’s tripartite conjunctive definition as the go-to textbook definition of moral cosmopolitanism: it comprises (1) ethical individualism, the thesis that human beings or persons are ultimate units of moral concern; (2) universality, the thesis that individualism concerns all persons equally; and (3) generality, that universality applies for everyone (Pogge, 1992a: 48-9). Conjoined, these theses mean that, irrespectively of their group of belonging (as defined by whatever social identity marker such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, what have you at any given time), all individuals should be the target for equal moral concern in the minds of others. A more synoptic definition can read:

Moral cosmopolitanism: “Every human has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern.” (Pogge, 2002: 169)

Somewhat surprisingly, however, it has turned out that even liberal *nationalists* – which one would expect to oppose cosmopolitanism –, have thought moral cosmopolitanism to be trivial. David Miller, for instance, has told us that it is a “platitudinous element” of morality that “every human being has equal moral worth, or in a different formulation that each person is equally an object of moral concern” (Miller, 2002: 81).

The nationalists’ rejection that moral cosmopolitanism should lead us towards the changes that would make our world truly global is reasonable. Simply put, a principle of *equal concern or respect* applying to all (Dworkin, 1977: 370) does not entail “surface level equality” or *treating equally*.

Indeed, equal concern might at times result in demands for unequal treatment, they think. On this basis, many authors have argued for the compatibility of moral cosmopolitanism with liberal nationalism, with domestic egalitarianism, and with other parochial moralities which are less than global in the scope of their egalitarian demands of justice (e.g.: Scheffler, 1999; Santos, 2003; Appiah, 2005; Sassen, 2006; and Harvey, 2009).

In this essay, we will follow a common line of argument according to which it is possible to impartially justify partial treatment, such that restricting the scope of egalitarian demands of distributive justice to the state is compatible with moral cosmopolitanism. This common line of argument, however, depends on the application of Rawls's relational *principle of fairness* to the provision of basic goods, which some critics have argued can be similarly used to justify extending the scope of egalitarian demands of justice beyond the state. This is because there are institutions that constitute a basic structure for the provision of basic goods and whose jurisdiction goes well-beyond state borders.

As we will see, however, these institutionalist approaches have been rightfully accused of not justifying a putative global egalitarianism either. But there is, we argue, a general problem with this family of relational approaches to the scope of egalitarianism: they are unyieldingly founded upon institutionalism and the principle of fairness. This is a problem because we will show that there are at least some goods (namely, climate goods) whose provision is truly global and is (at least currently) beyond genuinely global institutional provision, such that we can find a relational foundation for global egalitarianism. The cost of such a move, however, depends on making do without the institutionally-grounded principle of fairness and embracing a novel principle of cosmopolitan inclusion which we introduce for the first time in the literature and begin to explore in this essay.

The Relational Foundations of Egalitarian Justice

As Win-Chiat Lee (2012: 282) made clear, the argument for restricting the scope of egalitarian justice to the state depends on the consistency between taking all humans to be of equal moral worth and simultaneously

allowing for special treatment or privileging some over others owed, perhaps, to some special relations. After all, it seems to be another platitude that parents should privilege their children over others, and this would be owed to their special relationship of parenthood, which justifies their special obligations and duties.

Liberal nationalists and domestic egalitarians must as such think it is possible to impartially justify the partial treatment they think is owed to co-nationals or co-citizens of a state owed to there being a special relationship holding among them which is lacking between individuals of different nationalities or statehood, respectively. Such a level of co-nationality or co-membership in a state should make them equal to the rule of law. Domestic egalitarians can as such hold there to be two different sources of moral reasons. Following Jeff McMahan (1997: 110), the first would impose on us duties which are blind to whichever relations may hold between us (perhaps owed to our shared humanity), and the second would be those which arise from whichever special relations we might entertain with one another.

However, we believe it is at the very least inaccurate to ascribe the title of cosmopolitan (of “world citizen”) to those who believe egalitarian justice is to be restricted to the limits of state borders (see McMahan, 1997: 117 and Brock, 2010: 11-5 for similar concerns). Mathias Risse was surely right when he said that “the term cosmopolitan has become the victim of its own success” (2012). Understandably, more substantive cosmopolitans have thought it wise to make sure that even in the absence of such special relations we should still treat humans equally to some extent, and irrespectively of their group of belonging. The most common reason provided for doing so is rooted in many cosmopolitan’s traditional humanist stance. This allows us to formulate a more specific substantive moral cosmopolitanism:

Humanist cosmopolitanism: all humans should be treated equally in virtue of their shared humanity. (e.g.: Buchanan, 1990; Nussbaum, 1996 & 1997; and Caney, 2011)

However, some more substantive moral cosmopolitans believe that shared humanity only really does warrant equal concern or

respect, and that it might at best warrant equal treatment of the kind presupposed by such international law charters as the UDHR, that is, a minimal sense of global justice, entailing, for instance, a humanitarian duty of assistance, which domestic egalitarians can easily agree to. Despite this, they might still believe that the scope of egalitarian justice is truly global, and one way to argue so is by entertaining a relational foundation for egalitarianism, but then go on to argue that the morally meaningful relations that determine the scope of egalitarian justice do nevertheless obtain, against the liberal nationalist/domestic egalitarian intent, across the borders of current states (Lovett, 2016: 33). We can thus aptly call this form of substantive moral cosmopolitanism:

Relational cosmopolitanism: all humans should be treated equally because certain relations obtain between all of them. (e.g. the Rawlsian institutionalism of Beitz, 1979 and Pogge, 2002 & 2005, but also Barry & Valentini, 2009, and the civic republican cosmopolitanism of Lovett, 2016)

There are different reasons why we believe relational cosmopolitanism to be the most promising way to argue, but we shall concern us here with this variety of cosmopolitanism in particular because we believe it to be most interesting to defeat the liberal nationalists and the domestic egalitarians at their own game, by turning their own arguments against their favoured conclusions. In adopting this strategy, we can build up the positive argument for cosmopolitanism while simultaneously disabling the main argument for domestic egalitarianism.

We begin by making sense of what relations are there available to us that could ground the scope of a relational principle of egalitarian justice, where *relationalism about scope* is the thesis according to which the scope of principles of distributive justice are determined by whichever relations hold between individuals.

Such a version of relationalism may in principle include (e.g.) sporadic cooperative relations between unbeknownst persons, but also parenthood, and, lastly, co-nationality. But a sub-set of this thesis will consider only those relations between individuals which have to do with their particular associative relationships (thereby excluding

random interactions between non-associated persons). Thus, we would have *associationalism*, according to which the scope of principles of distributive justice are determined by the extent of individuals' voluntary associations.

But more often what we find is an even more restrictive form of relationalism, concerned only with associations characterized by economic, social, cultural, legal, and political institutions. According to *institutionalism*, the scope of principles of distributive justice are determined by individuals' institutional arrangements.

Notice that adoption of a relationalism like associationalism or institutionalism does not require one to embrace communitarian metaphysics (and thus denying the ethical individualism that characterises liberalism and moral cosmopolitanism alike), for we can understand institutional relations along *reductionist* lines, that is, according to the thesis that there are fundamental moral facts underlying each discrete relation "such as promises, intimacy, or mutual interdependence between us" (Wellman, 2000: 539; Scheffler, 1997: 190) for which we value them. So, we do not need to attribute moral concern directly to any associations or institutions. Groups are relevant, yes, but only insofar as they are of relevance for individuals. Our moral concern with groups is of second order.

Further notice that there need not be one and only one principle of justice. We could argue that an institutional principle holds true, and that would by itself tell us nothing about the existence of non-relational principles according to which duties of justice exist simply in virtue of shared humanity, or whether less exclusive relational principles, such as associative ones, would also hold true simultaneously.

The Institutional Argument for Domestic Egalitarianism

The most traditional defence of domestic egalitarianism is founded on Rawls's relational

Principle of Fairness: (W)hen a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict

their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. (Rawls, 1971: 112; after Hart's 1955: 185 version of the principle formulated in terms of "mutuality of restrictions" on liberty.)

Consequently, under such a scheme of things, duties and obligations arise that demand of one not to be a free-rider (Arneson, 2016: 568). But what social relations qualify to be the ground for the determination of the scope of egalitarian justice according to this principle? Rawls thought that such a principle would apply to those *basic structures* that provide *basic goods* and distribute legal rights and obligations (Rawls, 1971: 6). But a more comprehensive understanding reveals different empirical qualities of basic structures that allow to distinguish them normatively from other institutions: (1) they "determine and regulate the fundamental terms of social cooperation; (2) (...) have profound and pervasive impact upon persons' life chance; or (3) (...) subject persons to coercion" (Abizadesh, 2007: 319).

Many, like Rawls, thought nations and states "involve a kind of institutionalised reciprocity" (Miller, 2002: 82) that would qualify them as basic structures (e.g.: Miller, 1998; Blake, 2001; Nagel, 2005 and Sangiovanni, 2007), but they differ as to why this is so. Blake (2001) and Nagel (2005), for instance, believe coercion is the difference-making quality. Sangiovanni (2007), in turn, argues that we can think of more fundamental relations than coercion, which is not at all necessary, for we can imagine a coercion-free state that nonetheless maintains a legal-political system on which individuals depend to live prosperous lives. From this thought experiment he concludes that "it is the nonvoluntary, de facto authority of a legal system that requires a special justification in terms of a conception of socioeconomic equality" (Sangiovanni, 2007: 13). This state enjoys *de facto* authority "to impose duties, confer rights, issue directives, and demand compliance with them, and most of those subject to it comply for reasons other than a fear of legally authorized sanctions" (*idem*), but because it restricts our lives while bringing mutual advantages, the arrangement requires special justification. What is more, "the mere exercise of political authority does not necessarily

violate our autonomy in the way coercion does; in fact, in many cases, it is necessary to preserve it” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 14). Indeed, it is precisely because it tends to *preserve autonomy* that individuals would tend to continue to abide by it even in the absence of coercion (an aspect that Nagel’s theory implicitly assumes (2005: 128-9)).

In anticipation of a critique to his argument, Sangiovanni recognizes that “noncompliance or exit from most major international organizations, let alone the global institutional order as a whole, carries significant costs for states subject to them, especially smaller and less powerful ones” (2007: 18), and goes on to argue that “the voluntary/nonvoluntary distinction establishes a *continuum* positively related to the stringency of the norms which apply to it” (Sangiovanni: 18-9). Consequently, Sangiovanni’s conclusion is not that there are no duties towards non-fellow citizens, nor that all forms of inequality are permissive between states, but, rather, the more modest conclusion that the domestic demands of equality are much more stringent than the ones holding abroad. *Why?* – you may ask –, because – he trusts –, although abandoning international organizations comes at a big cost – indeed, the cost may be so high enough to be considered coercive (Blake & Smith, 2013: §3.2), such that ““(l)ove it or leave it””(Sangiovanni, 2007: 17) is not even an option, contra Sangiovanni’s suggestion –, the state remains the only institution that provides basic goods, such that “there is also no basis for redistribution” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 27) abroad.

On the application of the principle of fairness to the distribution of basic goods by basic structures, he concludes the state to be the only truly necessary institution for the safeguard of our autonomy, that is, to develop and act on a plan of life we choose to ourselves, and therefore the one determining the scope of our duties and obligations of egalitarian justice, which do not extend to non-citizens, who do not partake in the provision of such basic goods necessary to protect our autonomy (Sangiovanni, 2007:19-20).

Summarising this institutionalist argument for domestic egalitarianism, it turns out that the kind of relations that matter for egalitarian justice are those *relations of reciprocity necessary for the provision of basic goods*, where equality has to do with the *distribution* of, and access to,

resources, welfare, opportunities, and other entities typically including “objects, qualities, positions within a system, or even human beings” (Galston, 1980: 112). More importantly, however, Sangiovanni’s thought experiment reveals that they are not just economic goods and services but are more generally understood as political and legal rights, such as those protecting private property, whose provision is *not* guaranteed by non-citizens, and consequently our egalitarian duties and obligations do not extend towards them as they do towards co-citizens.

Extending the Institutional Argument Beyond Domestic Egalitarianism

We will now proceed to argue with many other authors that the relations that are of moral relevance to the institutional argument do obtain beyond the borders of states, such that there is no way to uphold the domestic egalitarian conclusion. That is, applying the principle of fairness to the provision of basic goods does actually extend the egalitarian demands of justice beyond state borders. One way of doing so retains the institutionalist approach and argues that there is a developing system of organizations that constitute a Rawlsian “global basic structure”, that is, an institutionalized network of social cooperation with worldwide reach providing the basic goods. As the author who pioneered this approach put it, “the world is not made up of self-sufficient states. States participate in complex international economic, political, and cultural relationships that suggest the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation” (Beitz, 1979: 143-4; Pogge, 2002 advances a similar proposal).

Domestic egalitarians like Sangiovanni (2007: 20) have retorted that such international institutions in fact have barely anything to do with the provision of basic goods, for although there are global institutions safeguarding the legal figure of the state as sovereign, and others, still, that are involved in international trade, such as the IMF, it is nevertheless states that remain the providers of basic goods, with the small and infrequent exception of failed and occupied states (which by definition cannot themselves assure such a provision).

Remember, Sangiovanni does not say no duties whatsoever ever arise between countries. As he sees it, these purported counter examples are all illustrative of there being a duty of assistance, however simple and minor, which he believes follows from moral cosmopolitanism and is compatible with domestic egalitarianism.

But we find this answer very unsatisfying. One could easily reply by pointing out many non-extreme cases of inter-state provision of basic goods. There are everlasting tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, owed to the great dependence of the former on the latter for the provision of water that flows through the river Nile. Some countries in Europe depend up to 100% from Russia for their provision of natural gas, and this has been a central theme under the negotiations that lead to the annexation of Crimea by Russia without EU interference. Another great example that raises suspicion over the states' capacity to protect property would be the territorial loss of island nation states in the Pacific due to rising sea levels, which is itself a consequence of anthropogenic global warming caused by other states' policies. Countering like-minded examples, Sangiovanni may claim that such provision is nonetheless "regulated by domestic law" (2007: 15); nevertheless, that would be a poor reply, as states' decisions on trade agreements are the fruit of *multi-lateral negotiations*, rather than unilateral decisions (see Barry & Valentini, 2009: 493, and especially Maffettone, 2014, for more detailed analysis of this line of argument). What is worse, as the island-nation states example shows, some states really are powerless in negotiations that could assure the protection of their territory, and with it any future value that private property could have within their borders.

Thus, institutionalists have concluded that on adopting a principle of fairness in the provision of basic goods we do end up with a global, rather than a domestic egalitarianism, and relational cosmopolitanism, that is, a moral cosmopolitanism of a more substantive kind is vindicated.

However, there is a major issue with the institutionalist approach. Despite crossing state-borders, the many networks of cooperation providing basic goods that are institutionally mediated are not truly global either. Indeed, there is no institution in the world that covers the entire

globe. Even the most comprehensive international institutions, namely the UN, the IMF, and the WTO, fail to encompass all countries in the world, or have limited recognition of some members (e.g. the Vatican City/Holy See and the State of Palestine are non-members but permanent observers in the UN, the most comprehensive global governance institution). Thus, the patchwork of institutional relations can at best justify heterogeneous duties of reciprocity, a “patchwork of obligations” (Miller, 2002: 83-4), or, as another critic said, of “nested and overlapping sets of obligations with varying geographical scope” (Arneson, 2016: 570), such that the ensuing egalitarianism would be, at best, international, but not truly global.

Towards Relational Global Egalitarianism Beyond Institutionalism

Absent institutions, one may think focusing on the provision of basic goods is not a viable path towards global egalitarianism. However, we intend to challenge this premise. We believe that the provision of basic goods does in fact depend to an important extent on non-institutional relations. Certainly, Sangiovanni would disagree with us (2007: 21), but the fact is that we do not need institutions or even explicit norms dictating the provision of basic goods for it to be justifiable that we should bring all humans under egalitarian justice.

Perhaps it is even better that we abandon the institutionalist approach, as it seems to be unavoidably pro-status quo. This is because, on focusing on the scope of existing institutions, although not prohibiting it, it can hardly justify forming institutions where they do not already exist, but where their existence might be necessary, and where that existence should be egalitarian. But if you find that what is made legally binding should accord to moral reasons, like we do, then there might be non-legally recognized morally relevant relations of affectedness which should warrant inclusion under egalitarian justice. But taking on such an approach seemingly requires dropping out the principle of fairness as our guiding liberal principle for determining the scope of egalitarian justice.

There may be other independent reasons to drop the principle of fairness altogether. For notice that Rawls (1971: 343-4) thought that the

principle of fairness ascribes obligations only insofar as they arise from *voluntary* relations (as does Scheffler, 1994: 7). To us, however, it is not at all clear that membership in states or nations is voluntary. Rawls could say that permission to leave is by and large dictated by how *just* the group is. But therein lies a problem, for what is just according to the principle of fairness need not be all that is just. And in practice it does not seem to be the case that one can freely decide to abandon and effectively abdicate from membership in a state. (Certainly not by just leaving its borders, as states retain *personal* jurisdiction over citizens even if they are abroad – that is what extradition is all about, after all.) Some authors are less restrictive and argue that all persons should have a right to freely leave the state (e.g.: Benhabib, 2002: 21), independently of whether the state is just or not. But, as Sangiovanni's (2007) argument goes, it is not clear whether there is a viable alternative to living in a state at all. That is the premise on which his thought-experiment weighs. Yet other reasons have been advanced for why national membership is also not voluntary (see Anderson 1983 and Margalit & Raz, 1990).

Surely, we cannot have duties to states just owed to the accident of having been born into them either. Furthermore, whilst there may be a duty to reciprocate (insofar as you still owe for the benefits you have received), there is no duty to continue on benefitting from any specific state, and so it should be possible to reject new beneficent acts coming in from the state, thereby cutting subsequent obligations that would ensue. But perhaps we do not even have such a duty to reciprocate to begin with, for new-borns are neither in a position to accept nor refuse benefits (they arguably do not even have a will on this)². Indeed, what is worse for the viability of the principle is that it seems to entail that one can indebt others in duties or obligations by simply benefiting them against their will. As Nozick put it, "(o)ne cannot, whatever one's purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment" (1974: 95; see also: 90-1; there are similar criticisms in Simmons, 1979: 128-9 and Arneson, 1982 & 2016). Moreover, as Arneson (2016: 570) claims, the duties the principle would establish would not

²I owe Martin Sticker for calling my attention to this.

necessarily be duties towards fellow citizens as a whole, but possibly duties originating from specific debts, and even if we were to latch on to a general cooperative scheme such as those resulting from taxation and public expenditure in welfare states, it is not obvious how this could give support to restricting egalitarianism to members of our own *nation*.

At any rate, we do not intend to solve these problems here³. Instead, we wish to make do without this principle. We need a principle that should make sense of the fact that there are mutual advantages in getting together in the provision of basic goods where that provision is, independently of institutions, dependent of all of us, and where we also depend on that provision in order to establish “conditions required for a flourishing life” (Sangiovanni, 2007: 28) or, indeed, even to survive.

In particular, there seems to be a class of basic goods whose provision is truly global, and that may as such, with the application of an appropriate principle, render global egalitarian justice forceful. We believe the best example of such goods are environmental and climate goods, which are almost always *commons*, *i.e.* *non-excludable* and *rivalrous* (that is, individuals cannot be excluded from using them, but their use is not without a cost, as providing them to an individual means reducing availability to others). Typical examples of commons would be shared grazing pastures for the herds of a village and fisheries. While these examples have obvious boundaries (the size of the grazing pastures only goes so far and fisheries, if they are located in oceans, can potentially spread throughout the entirety of the oceans, but are so bounded nonetheless), it is consequent that they are not global. But with climate examples the situation is different, as it can be shown by our non-voluntary vulnerability to the practices of long distant others. Consider, for instance, that the provision of the air we breathe and, more importantly for our lives, its quality, is not so bounded. Climate change impacts are to be felt to some extent by all that live on Earth. So, the scope of these commons is global, and so is, quite inadvertently, their provision.

³See Klosko (2005: 6-9) for an alternative theory of how fairness may produce political obligations in the absence of voluntariness, and see Dagger & Lefkowitz (2014) for how duties need not be voluntary.

Informal agreements and implicit rules are not uncommon in the management of the commons. Ostrom's (1990) seminal contribution to Economics demonstrated plenty of instances in which the provision of such basic goods is not guaranteed by states, not made private, and which are nevertheless quite successful. Such agreements are necessary, for when agents act on their unbridled self-interest in exploiting common pool resources, they risk what the literature has called a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968), where these resources may reach depletion, or otherwise simply become unviable due to overexploitation. The overgrazed pastures are likely to overcome their carrying capacity, potentially leading to an ecological cascade effect. Schools of fish may altogether disappear from the oceans (especially if fertile adults are captured before giving birth to offspring). But in the case of climate commons we might witness a planetary-scale tragedy which might ultimately put our very lives at stake.

What these and other similar examples (e.g. Barrett, 2007 and Arneson, 2016: 568) achieve for us is that they strip Sangiovanni's aforementioned thought experiment against coercion-based relational arguments of its institutional-basis while keeping it working in the sense that the remaining relations may be judged according to a principle that need not be so different from the principle of fairness, in that it is founded on reciprocity and autonomy. In any case, insofar as many commons constitute basic goods under worldwide interdependency, it is hard to see how a relational principle of justice could stick to state borders. Quite intuitively, at least, in such cases egalitarian justice should not conform to the shape of the state. Indeed, if we are right that the provision of such basic goods as climate commons is truly global, then we have established relational foundations for a genuinely global egalitarianism.

The Principle of Cosmopolitan Inclusion

In order to overcome the limitations of the principle of fairness, we should adopt an alternative principle that does not depend on pre-existing institutions. In effect, the problem with the principle of

fairness is that it takes for granted the moral justification of the limits of existing political communities, and therefore the legitimacy of the scope of their territorial and personal jurisdictions. Alas, it is possible to question these assumptions, which are at the heart of the literature on the *democratic-boundary problem*.

To theoreticians of democracy, most notoriously Dahl (1970), it became clear that political power, either held by the people or by some subset of it, does not always solely affect those inhabitants of states in which policies are meant to apply. Not only have powers emerged which affect our lives but are largely operating outside the taming hand of states' jurisdictions (such as multinational corporations), but also existing states' inequalities of power express themselves quite *arbitrarily* in the way they determine the conditions of foreigners' lives, way beyond the scope of their internationally recognized sovereignty over territorial jurisdiction (Bernstein & Coleman, 2009: 9). This is especially clear when global collective action problems, such as the governance of common goods, is at stake. As we saw, the stakeholders for climate change policy are not only those inhabitants of the state where the policies are made and targeted to apply. Nevertheless, because states invoke international law's consecrated right to sovereign rule (UN Charter, Art.2.1.), they are permitted to deny foreigners from *interfering* with their environmental policy-making procedures, while legally interfering with the provision of basic goods of others, and thus tampering with their autonomy. That is, they abuse their right to autonomy when violating others' means to remain autonomous. The first *all-affected interests principle* was motivated by these realizations:

Dahl's All-Affected Interests Principle: "Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government" (1970: 64).

Dahl's principle addresses the question of how we should establish the extension of political powers; it suggests that certain kinds of interactions are the causally relevant phenomena from which we are to track the scope of institutional justice; but it also tells us what ought to happen so that the affectedness be morally justified (in particular, the

principle suggests that those whose interests are affected should be enfranchised).

More generally, all-affected interests principles' claim there is a demand of justice to include others in our polity if our polity affects specific morally relevant interests of these others. Here we would like to argue that in doing so, they presuppose a principle that establishes the limits of political jurisdiction, or, in other words, a policy-making principle that we hereby call, in its most generic form, the

Principle of Institutionalization: inclusion under a political institution should correspond to the scope of duties and obligations of justice.

Dahl's all-affected interests principle, for instance, seems to presuppose a version of this principle which we may call:

Principle of Democratic Inclusion: "the scope of democratic political institutions should correspond to the scope of obligations of justice" (Young, 2000: 236).

Now, in line with what we have previously said about relationalism about justice, it is possible to discern between *institutional* theories of justice, according to which individuals' rights, duties, and obligations exist only under a mediating institutional framework, and *interactional* theories of justice, for which individuals have rights and duties independently of institutions, and simply on account of agents' interactions to each other (Pogge, 1992b: 90-101 and Caney, 2005: 108). According to this rationale, and as our principle of institutionalization makes apparent, all-affected interests principles are characteristic of interactional theories of justice, for they presuppose the prior existence of duties of justice which apply to individuals and to which political inclusion should correspond.

This is, as we say, one way in which we differentiate our approach from that of the Rawlsians according to which justice is to be adjudicated among somewhat self-enclosed relations of cooperation under which rights and duties are distributed by an overarching legal frame. The Rawlsian understanding of (distributive) justice, as such, is

institutional (Rawls, 1971: 6), and not obviously compatible with the interactional understanding of justice presupposed by all-affected interests principles. We have seen, however, that there are good reasons not to restrict our approach to the institutional provision of basic goods.

It is on these bases that we therefore suggest the following version of an all-affected interests principle:

Principle of Cosmopolitan Inclusion: persons should engage in a polity if the provision of a basic good on which they depend in order to live autonomous lives requires that they restrict their liberty according to cooperative rules that yield advantages for all, and, reflecting the nature of their affect- edness, they should on such circumstances enjoy equal rights, duties, and obligations as participants in the framework that would generate those rules, and should not use this polity to negate the rights of others not included in the polity.⁴

There is a lot we could write about this principle in its relation to issues of justice, governance, legitimacy, and overall prospects of application. In this essay, however, we have and will continue to restrict ourselves to solidifying our introduction of this principle, so that we may use future essays to focus on its development. Naturally, on adopting such a principle it is advisable that we should argue for its value. One such value has to do with the easiness by which it can help adjudicating matters of justice, as it formally binds interactants together, distributing their rights and duties. In the absence of such an “institutional vehicle” (Young, 2000: 249), individuals’ lives and needs would tend to remain invisible to others’ considerations. The principle of cosmopolitan inclusion’s claim to institutionalization therefore establishes an individual civic duty according to which affected individuals should get together to form, at the very minimum, a well-ordered system instrumentally valuable for all concerned.

It is interesting to observe that both proponents of all-affected interests principles and Rawlsian institutionalists will agree that there *should* be a coupling between basic institutions and demands of justice. What the

⁴In order to build this principle, we took inspiration from Held’s (2004:147) principle of autonomy.

institutionalists need in order to block the principle of institutionalization from inflating existing institutions is an argument to the point that there are no (strong) demands of justice that are independent of institutions (which includes (strong) duties between individuals of different states sharing no overarching institution), or no duty to form new institutions or extend the scope of nowadays institutions' jurisdictional limits.

The existence of such an argument against inflating existing institutions will in turn depend on the relationship between the scope of affectedness and of demands of justice. But because existing principles deployed to conclude in favour of egalitarian justice latch on to autonomy, survival, and the provision of basic goods, as ours does, it seems to be difficult to avoid the conclusion that follows from its application.

The principle of cosmopolitan inclusion is, naturally, inherently cosmopolitan. This is due to recommending inclusion irrespectively of the group of belonging of all those affected. If anything, one could at best argue that affectedness is determinant of the group of belonging. However, this would not be a correct appreciation of the sense of "group", as those affected may not be recognized as affected or as members of one's own group, nor might they want to be identified as belonging to the same group as those that affect them. The principle, however, claims that irrespectively of their social group identity, individuals share rights, duties, and obligations in virtue of their shared fate, as shown by their vulnerability and mutual affectedness.

To our modest understanding, political inclusion can be restricted to the scope of some relation and remain cosmopolitan "if we adopt an idea of association from which all the contingency of proximity and acquaintance is removed" (Vernon, 2010: 3). As it stands, the principle of cosmopolitan inclusion is independent of both acquaintance between the individuals concerned and designed to work under those very conditions in which proximity is overcome by such things as communications and other long-distance interdependencies in trade, environment, etc., as they have been brought about by globalization. Furthermore, for the application of the principle it does not matter whether there is "common reciprocal interest in one another's actions and choices" (Goodin, 2007: 48), for it is "interlinked interests" (Goodin, 2007: 49) not "interest in another's interests", which forms the basis of the principle's imperative to include.

Concluding Remarks

We can thus conclude that there are grounds for a global egalitarianism. And cosmopolitans can be thankful to globalization (and, in particular, to industrialization as it was driven by the engine of capitalism) for revealing the relational foundations for global egalitarianism, being, as they are, some of the most notorious drivers of anthropogenic climate change, on which we focused as our prime example.

But what is more important, insofar as it is true that institutionalization should track the scope of global egalitarian demands of justice, then persons should really be brought together under the inclusion of a global governance institution. Crucially, however, this global governance institution is *not* a global state (meaning, not an all-pervasive form of global governance with coercive powers). It is, rather, an egalitarian institution for governing the domain of climate commons in particular. Perhaps the coronavirus pandemic could be used to show that other global governance institutions, with other subjects for their policies, could similarly be justified. These questions, and the question of how such institutions would relate to one another, we leave open.

We are also leaving open the question of what form of governance should be institutionalized. According to Dahl, to Young, and to the domestic egalitarians and liberal nationalists we confronted, like Sangiovanni, the right way of adjudicating egalitarian justice is democratic. So, keeping up to their spirit, perhaps we should build a global democratic climate governance institution. Perhaps democracy would be ideal, too, in dealing with elements of justice which are not distributive, but have to do, for instance, with the disproportion of power, which is reflected in the way, say, the island-states in the Pacific can bargain in policy-making to prevent their own drowning (to which they have themselves barely contributed). Indeed, we focused on the relational foundations of distributive justice, but we did not address whether egalitarian justice is just distributive, or may also be itself relational⁵, counter-domination, among other options (see, e.g.: Tan, 2004: 118;

⁵We should not confuse relational foundations for determining the scope of egalitarianism with the possible relational nature of egalitarianism itself.

Maffettone, 2014: 189; and Lovett, 2016). Such questions, as well as whether there could be other legitimate and more viable ways of constituting such cosmopolitan polities as that which we claim ought to govern the climate commons, we leave for future developments.

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