

# GreeSE Papers

## Hellenic Observatory Discussion Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe



**Paper No. 170**

### **On divisionism and cyriotism: The civic languages of the Cyprus Problem**

**Theodoros Rakopoulos**

# **On divisionism and cypriotism: The civic languages of the Cyprus Problem**

**Theodoros Rakopoulos**

GreeSE Paper No. 170

Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe

## Contents

1. Introduction.....	4
2. The Republic’s vernacular: Divisionism and Cypriotism .....	5
3. A long dash [-].....	12
4. Clinging to the civic: The “Others” of the Republic .....	19
5. Concluding thoughts: Understanding the local language[s] of “nationalism[s]” ..	24
Bibliography .....	28

# On divisionism and cypriotism: The civic languages of the Cyprus Problem

Theodoros Rakopoulos<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

---

This article analyses the two main vernacular poles through which the Greek-Cypriot population engages with statehood, and thus the Cyprus Problem. Using ethnography, I dissect two versions of “nationalist” cultural ethos, which, while pertinent to the post-colonial condition generally, are largely unknown outside Cyprus. These concern on the one hand the idea of divisionism and on the other that of cypriotism. I specifically show how the bicomunal nature of the state in Cyprus finds emic continuity among certain Greek-Cypriots that adhere to a non-nation-bound loyalty glossed as cypriotism, while I illustrate how dividing techniques of conventional nationalist rhetoric operate among other Greek-Cypriots. I also briefly discuss how such vernacular experiences of nationhood and statehood reverberate among Turkish-Cypriots and Turks (the state’s “Others”) and consider the ways this affects the Republic. The article therefore contributes to understanding the political vernacular in the post-colonial and post-conflict context of Cyprus, and highlights from below the local “languages” pertaining to the Cyprus Problem.

---

<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo.  
Email: theodoros.rakopoulos@sai.uio.no

## 1. Introduction

This paper proposes a historical ethnographic way to rethink 'nationalism' in postcolonial, post-conflict settings. Focusing on the emic ways people claim and articulate state symbols, it moves beyond 'nationalism' to critically analyse statehood in the everyday. I specifically pay attention to the two main vernacular ways through which Greek-Cypriots conceptually engage with the "Cyprus Problem" (the island's division for more than 47, or in other readings 58, years). I firstly show how the bicomunal nature of the state in Cyprus finds emic loyalty among certain people politically inclined towards "cypriotism", an idea premised on a nationhood-defying constitutional bicomunalism. I also show how dividing techniques of rhetoric and everyday practice among some Greek-Cypriots posit Turkish-Cypriots (and Turks) as culprits for the Republic of Cyprus, and consequently I discuss the conceptual and political underpinnings of "divisionism", the tacit recognition of the UN Buffer Zone as a state border. The paper aims to contribute to understandings of the political vernacular in post-colonial contexts and is in discussion with scholarship focusing on statehood in the Greek historical experience, as well as in post-colonial settings elsewhere. Paying attention to the dividing and converging ways of thinking about the state(s) can possibly help to move beyond analyses relying on 'nationalism' as an overarching concept in understanding the local languages of states in conflict.

There is one question that could encapsulate much of the above: Can you have two states in one country? The modernist egalitarian premise and promise for polities has been clear: democratic representation and stability is better guaranteed when country and state coincide. The historical compromise between the romantic Heimat and the civic state has yielded different forms of modern countries all operating on an agenda of the nation-state as the main unit. The Hellenic Republic is a typical example. The Republic of Cyprus is not.

Understanding and hopefully solving the Cyprus Problem might lie in precisely acknowledging and accepting that not all countries in the world are supposed to follow the typical nation-state solution, a stale blueprint that the Cypriot post-colonial condition and its post-conflict Problem has long overcome. Listening to the grassroots

voices that speak a civic language profoundly different from that of Greece (or Turkey, for that matter), and thus comprehending the vernacular “nationalisms” of the island might help in this task, and this is what I intend to do in this essay.

## 2. The Republic’s vernacular: Divisionism and Cypriotism

In April 2019, in the course of a few days, I participated in two events of political dissent in Nicosia. The first one was unique to the tragic specifics of a horrid set of events (or rather, the public revelation and discussion thereof) that took place in April 2019. In what is by far the bloodiest case of serial killing in the island’s peacetime history, in March of the same year, it was revealed that a 35-year-old man had assassinated seven immigrant domestic labourers, in a spray of racist and misogynist violence. The killed women included many Filipinas as well as a Romanian, while among the victims were the two infant daughters of two women. The bodies were found after the killer was captured.

On Great Friday, according to Greek Orthodox customs, the year’s most solemn day, an event was spontaneously orchestrated in front of the Presidential Palace at Nicosia. I attended the demonstration with friends; we drove from Limassol to join about 1500 people, gathered outside the gates of the Palace. Many Filipinas were present, holding candles; many Cypriots, angered and ashamed, were calling for the resignation of the Minister for Justice. *Απ’ ον αντρέπεται, ο κόσμος έν’ δικός του* [He who feels shame, can go far in life], a popular Greek-Cypriot saying, was written on a banner, held by an aged demonstrator. The deep sense of indignation for state and social secrets was now in the open (cf Bryant 2010b).

President Nicos Anastasiades was abroad, ironically meeting the Presidents of Russia and China in Beijing to talk, among other things, about the development of the citizenship by investment programme of the Republic – “the President is in China to

sell passports”, as a friend present in the demonstration shouted out<sup>2</sup>. Meanwhile, as demonstrators pointed out to me, domestic workers who lived in the island for years were not only not naturalized but massively oppressed; and now, it was revealed, were being killed or were going missing.

Nikos Metaxas, the serial killer, was a professional lieutenant with the National Guard, the Republic of Cyprus’ (henceforth RoC) army, instituted in 1964 after the inter-communal violent clashes. He thus held a respected position at the service of the Republic. His case revealed a larger rift in the heart of Greek-Cypriot society: police investigation on the case unearthed that between 2000 and 2019 there had been 35 disappearances of young women in the Southern part of the island.

At the time of the event, 27 women were reported missing, and their names were glumly read in public during the demonstration, for a moment of silence, among sobbing immigrants and citizens alike. There was a sense in the crowd that a servant of the state was a killer, and a few young anarchists associated with Nicosia’s old town told me “this is a killer state”. There were many scales of concern here, not least because the violence opened some self-criticism for the treatment of foreign domestic workers and the “image of the country internationally”, in a country where memories of violence and of bodies found or investigated have left scars on the body politic (Sant-Cassia 2005, but also 1993). In fact, this anxiety was shared across political confines, as many people raised it with me<sup>3</sup>.

Many in the demonstration felt that the President and the elite political class formed around the Greek-Cypriot political establishment were responsible for both institutional racism and associated “divisionist” policies. In fact, demonstrators felt that the racism of the “Greek-Cypriot state”, traced in a number of factors (the absentee President, the killer sergeant, the indifferent police) was in a conceptual and political continuum with “divisionism” – the institutional racism towards Turkish Cypriots and the tacit promotion of a Greek-only Cyprus. Divisionism, in that context,

---

<sup>2</sup> The Citizenship by Investment Programme (CIP), or the golden passport programme of Cyprus lasted 13 years until it was cancelled in late 2020 due to scandals (see Rakopoulos 2021 and forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> The New York Post and the BBC reported on the mass murdering.

was the lack of tolerance for diversity and co-existence, and the promotion of a one-nation-only vision for Cyprus. A point to which I shall return below.

The second event where potential internationalism and domestic politics converged with each other was well-instituted and routine, in some sense, while at the same time unique to the inherent internationalism of Cypriot left-wing politics: the 1st of May demonstration in the (double) capital's centre. The 1st of May is the one annual event that the parties of the Left on both sides of the Green Line celebrate and utilize to display the potential for bicomunal political cooperation and common class interests across the border. The gathering of the two different marches was on the neutral ground of the Dead Zone, i.e. the UN Buffer Zone between the two communities and their respective 'states' – a state proper in southern Nicosia, an illicit statal form in the north part of the city (Papadakis 2005, Demetriou 2007). Just past the Paphos gate of the Walled City, the so-called Green Line, coincides with the Old City's medieval walls. This way, the boundary looks and feels like an ancient border, literally sealing out each of the two sides, the bastion being one major point of reference of that division. I followed the banners of AKEL, clearly the main political party promoting bicomunalism across the Green Line (see Charalambous and Ioannou 2018; cf Bryant 2010a: 164-165), and mingled with friends as we marched from central Nicosia's Eleftherias square towards the Line.

As the two marches were merging into one colourful demonstration in bilingual solidarity, we realised that we were being watched from the Venetian walls, and specifically from the bastion, where many residents of Northern Nicosia (Lefkoşa) had gathered. Two of them had brought and were waving large red flags of Turkey, expressing their disapproval and suggesting active resistance to the bicomunalist rhetoric from a classic, staunch nationalist take. One yelled at some point "faşizm". The flags waving underneath the Venetian bastion, carried by the T/C, G/C and other demonstrators, were depicting "one Cyprus", a unified item, geographical entity and object of unitary political desire. The flags waved by the Turkish (or T/C) nationalists on the bastion were re-ethnicising the debate, rejecting the Cypriotism of the Leftists for a divisionist nationalism.



Divisionism (*dihotomismos*) is a notion with quite some history in Cyprus, although it has been solidified with an –ism suffixed word only of recent (see Ioannou 2020 for arguably the most eloquent analysis of the term to date.) Since the late 1950s’ idea of *taksim* (division), popular with the nationalist component in the Turkish-Cypriot community, visions of a permanently divided Cyprus have been part of the main political lexicon. In fact, divisionism is the official state ideology for the Northern regime: both the state’s official rhetoric and the current (2021) right-wing ruling party’s motto, promote an island where two permanent states exist, recognised *erga omnes*. Among Greek Cypriots, outright divisionism is avoided and divisionary visions are more tacit, given that the Republic’s official line is that of a “united Cyprus”. I would thus define G/C divisionism as the political culture, that permits the conceptual and affective breakup of island as a bicomunal entity, and the solidification of division between its two main communities. In divisionism, what Cypriots characteristically call the surrounding atmosphere (*i perirreousa atmosfaira*), a certain ambience and flair in the political climate and public sphere is key. Divisionism, in that respect, is an affective state (Navaro-Yashin 2012). Divisionism and its predecessor and prerequisite, rejectionism (*aporriptismos*) are conservative ideas. Rejectionism stems from a nationalist ethos that requires maximalist ethnic-based “solutions” for the Cyprus Problem.

Cypriotism, instead, evokes a progressive lexicon and cultural reference, although it is not necessarily left-wing: many among the richest and most privileged citizens of the island have been Cyriocentrics very early on – at the conception of the Republic in 1960. Those early independentists, in fact, outraged the Helleno-centric George Seferis, whose eye was on the island. The idea to distance the island conceptually and culturally, as well as politically, from the ‘motherlands’ in Greece and Turkey has been at the centre of this conceptual struggle. In many ways, for Greek-Cypriots the idea of Cypriotism was to simply align with the geographic distance from Greece already in place; as one interlocutor told me, “to see Cyprus on the map” – and thus, as Panayiotou argues, as a border island society (Panayiotou 2005, 2012).

Cypriotism has a radical version, mostly expressed through AKEL and some organic intellectuals sympathetic to the party (Trimikliniotis 2019, as well as Panayiotou 2007),

but also covering the social area to the left of AKEL. The most succinct and possibly creative phrase of a radical cyriotist lexicon is one that the late Kostis Achniotis, life-long activist for the reunification cause wrote: “Cyriotism is the arrogance of those at the margins”. The phrase, written on the man’s grave, emanates the idea of being on the right side of history, but also being branched in a permanent, if proud minority, a position many left-leaning cyriotists claim for themselves. The post-1974 reverberations of cyriothood are the underlying cultural politics of cyriotism as a political expression for self-government and civic statehood.

Cyriothood, of course, has many lives and aspects, many faces and meanings. These can vary and contradict one another. They can be associated with self-government from a radical left perspective (the ideas, for instance, of AKEL’s leading member Adam Adamantos in the early 1950s) or linked to international business ties raised by the Limassolian entrepreneur Lanitis in the early 1960s. They can even include contemporary formations of G/C nationalism (one bereft of and beyond Enosis) in terms of Tassos Papadopoulos’ 2004 referendum state of the union in front of the Cypriot flag and a photo of a bombed Presidential Palace, as well as, anarchist groups in Faneromeni square, and their bicomunal anti-state consensus.

Take the example of 50-year old Limassol resident Nicolas, an accountant. He would define himself as a centre-right, pro-market neoliberal; at the same time, he would be a pro-solution, bicomunalist, Cyprocentric person. In fact, Nicolas voted for AKEL due to the party’s stance on the Cyprus Problem. Because of his commitment to ‘the solution’, Nicolas would prioritise the left’s promotion of bicomunalism and was disappointed with DHSY, the party he had been a member of for 25 years, due to their lapse from a pro-solution to a tacit divisionist stance, according to him.

Nicolas was for years a central figure in promoting “golden passports”, in the citizenship by investment business environment of the city of Limassol (Rakopoulos 2021, 2022). Namely, he would facilitate the purchase of ‘golden’ passports by wealthy foreign investors (“I have sold the most passports in Cyprus” as he told me once), as he is an employee of a major auditing company. While professionally sound in what he did, he resented that policy in private, as he found that the Citizenship by Investment business in Cyprus reinforced and was inspired by an implicit policy of

divisionism (Rakopoulos 2023). Indeed, his insider version of the golden passport history offers insights to the political underpinning of the divisionist underbelly of centrist/conservative Greek-Cypriot politics:

This is the deep G/C state. The Church made the state, out of a bunch of loan-sharks... This is also a history that has to do with the history of important Cypriot families. Including masons. Limassol has 4 freemason lodges. The central is on Jerusalem road. The history of the [golden] passports is a history of mobilization of those forces that do not desire a solution to the Cyprus problem. It goes back to Spyros Kyprianou<sup>4</sup>.

Nicolas is a mason himself, so his references to Freemasonry articulate with how the phenomenon hides in plain sight and interlocks with other institutions (Mahmood 2012).

The commitment of politically progressive, if economically neoliberal Nicolas to solving the Cyprus Problem clashes with his engagement as a Citizenship by Investment maker, to some extent. He and my friend Nicos, also a pro-solution person, report that during 2017 there was discussion in the cafes in Limassol as to whether “if we allow the T/C in they are going to compete with us in the passport business?”

Dionysis Dionysiou, a major newspaper’s director, another Limassolian, is clear: “the invention of this new Limassol is an expression of divisionism; an anti-paradigm to the solution. The only prospect is solution” [emphasis mine]. He leads the major pro-solution newspaper in the island, of a liberal, centrist, Europeanist persuasion. His idea of the “new Limassol” includes the golden passport (citizenship by investment) as an expression of this divisionism.

Giorgos Nikolaou, a Nicosian who comes from the far Left, an experienced civil engineer, has similar ideas about the future – how the CIP is projected into the developments in the Cyprus problem that will take place in the coming years:

The fact that the Russians speak with Anastasiades directly might have a side effect in the kypriako... In a possible solution it would be more complicated for

---

<sup>4</sup> A major, if disputed, statesman in G/C history, the second RoC President after Makarios for 10 years.

them to be accountable to the Turkish Cypriots too. ...The program will unsettle the new facts (dedomena). It is a new fact that is facing the new facts that are coming our way.

The above observations reflect the ideas shared with me by a major Cypriot sociologist, Andreas Panayiotou: “The geographical and historical division of Cyprus in Limassolians and refugees and its political expression in Kyprianou and Anastasiades.” Both these Presidents, who essentially delayed the solution to the Cyprus Problem and the peace process, came from high browed lawyer backgrounds in the deep South, both being Limassolians, invested personally in the development of their city. While Famagustian developers have an equal share in Limassol’s development, the fact remains that what a lawyer told me is “the Limassol complex”, is a historical force to reckon with.

While the demonstration outside the President’s Palace was at play, however, and while the President was away for business, there was a widespread sense that the commodification of Cypriot citizenship in the form of golden passports are “the business of the President” [“oi doyleies tou Proedrou”] (see Rakopoulos 2021, 2022). The concept oi douyeies (in Cypriot) means both “the tasks” and “the works” and indeed “the jobs” of a person; it can best be translated in the Cypriot context as business<sup>5</sup>. In that respect, there is a common recognition among people of different backgrounds that “Cyprus” [as in, the Cypriot state] “is a wreck” [Η Κύπρος εν χάρβαλλον]. “Politicians’ work” translates literally in the idea that this is their work as well as their oeuvre, their main means of income<sup>6</sup>.

These issues are not unique to Cyprus or to the Eastern Mediterranean in any way; the corrupt higher echelons of the Tory Party in Britain, outcomes of a system of elite cronyism, or the ways in which both major parties in the US are in cahoots with major funders in the military-industrial complex can put to shame the Cypriot particulars.

---

<sup>5</sup> Although the vernacularized Anglo formation μιτζίνες (pronounced byziness) is also used.

<sup>6</sup> This is the case with many politicians at the higher echelons, but not necessarily – see the example of DHSY leader Averof Neofytou, professional politician, mayor of the small town Polis Chrysochous for a number of years.

My approach here is, in line with earlier work, decidedly comparative and anti-exoticising, as I am trying to place the crucial component of the merger between market and state, in the form of the golden passport, in its comparative context.

### 3. A long dash [-]

This conceptual status concerns the relations between nationhood and statehood, which as mentioned in the introduction, are different in Cyprus than they are in typical nation-states like Greece. In Cyprus, there is a marked, historical and ideological distance between nation and state in the state formation of the RoC as a polity that is not a nation-state but a bicomunal entity. Put it that way: the dash, the [-] symbol between “nation” and “state”, indicates a connection between the two notions, as well as a certain distance. The merging of the two in an ethnostate, in an organic expression of a nation in a statal entity has –potentially- totalitarian connotations (Arendt 1958) and so the idea gathering consensus among political scientists is that of a link between two similar, yet distinct, concepts, expressed linguistically in that nation-state dash.

Begoña Aretxaga talks of the “untenable hyphen” that permeates much thinking about the state and notes how it is difficult to think of the state outside the hyphenated nation-state dyad (2003: 396). This is not least due to the excessive supply of statehood actors in many parts of the world, be them companies, paramilitaries, organised crime and indeed the gender factor that destabilizes the assuredness of the nation-state. However, it seems to me that Aretxaga and theorists following her, have not developed the hyphen part of the nation-state dyad. By that I mean that, whilst we know much about how nation and state do not ever coincide and at best only ever overlap somewhat within the same state form (to use Aretxaga’s term), what happens when we think of statehood devoid of a grasp on nationhood? It is well known that fragmenting forms of Greek and Turkish nationalism dominate the politics on both

sides of the Green Line. But what does this do to the nation-state form in the war-torn post-colony?

I argue that that dash, the linking, if distancing, conceptual tool, is slightly longer in Cyprus than elsewhere. The dash in the phrase “nation=state” is not a concept per se. Rather, it is the conceptual expression of an act that links and at once distances two concepts – the state and the nation. This bridging conceptual work that the dash operates in this staple double concept in political science (the nation-state) takes a particularly interesting path in the post-colonial Republic.

Indeed, this explains both why the Right in Cyprus has a history of parasitic Hellenic nationalism (Worsley 1979) that invests and is inspired by the “root” of Hellenism, which lies outside the island, in Greece (Sant-Cassia 1995). As a Greek author who wrote the authoritative text on the EOKA struggle of young Greek-Cypriots notes, reporting from the island, what he encounters is:

“...pure, unamalgamated nationalism like in the 19th century was their mobilizing force. This only liquidates the deleterious effects and the facile temptations of colonial life: the lack of responsibility, the rajiadismos, the love of money and the cunning of the shameless, the unrooted Levantine” (Roufos 2011 [1960])

This heated, emotive discourse still animates much of the Hellenic nationalism in the island (for an acute analysis, see Papadakis 1998). This type of ideologised nationalism makes Hellenism a sublime object of ideology (Žižek 1989). As an opposing narrative that cools down this pompous verve, the Left performs a discourse of Cypriot patriotism in the island that is efficient among quite a few of its inhabitants across the Green Line (Panayiotou 2012). This is the reason why the island experiences the odd political situation in which it might be one of the very few places on earth where patriotism can actually be seen as internationalism. In an AKEL rally, say of the 1st of May mentioned earlier, speeches ahead of the march are ceremoniously ending with what would be seen as an odd exclamation among leftists elsewhere in Europe: Long live our Cyprus [Zito i Kipros mas]. This localist discourse that reclaims a country and a state as an outpost against imperialism is common among post-colonial progressive

claims around statehood in places like Latin America –civic nationalism is, after all, a historical modality through which Marxism has most often, however controversially, been historically expressed (see Nimni 1991). This expression of anti-imperialist, bicomunal patriotism, anti-nationhood rhetoric, is a salient achievement of left-wing analysis (see also Anthias 1998). In the case of the island under scrutiny it calls for a ‘One Cyprus’, and is a formidable expression of cypriotism.

Cypriotism has been historically unopposed to civic nationalism; indeed, in some ways it has been its historical sociocultural expression (Peristiany 1994: 126). The dialectical relation of the two pushes for a unified patriotism in Cypriotist civic loyalty to actually transcend the two antithetic and oppositional nationalisms of the motherlands, Turkey and Greece. Cyprus has historically, at least since the 1930s, been the stamping ground of these revanchist nationalisms, whose historical memory goes back to the Ottoman Empire and its collapse (Katsiaounis 1996). In fact, it can be argued with some conviction that Cyprus is one of the last places on earth, where the Ottoman Empire’s statehood legacy has real, current statehood effects on the lives of ordinary citizens today (cf Hadjikyriakou 2016).

From a right-wing perspective, or rather, from a right-wing Greek-Cypriot culture, seen in the Weberian sense (Mavratsas 1994), nationhood is only achieved in the form of greater Hellenism and in some modalities (for example through what has been called “the parallel programme” in education), in the idealistic, utopian horizon of Enosis. While an outrageous statement that is seen as even ridiculous by many moderates in DHSY in recent years, and indeed with the divisionist tendencies in line with the party’s mainstream voices, such Enosis-philia is resurfacing.

This is particularly interesting in the case of Limassol which, as we have seen above, can be claimed the divisionist capital par excellence<sup>7</sup>. Eleni Stavrou-Syrou, the daughter of EOKA-B’s vice-leader, was a candidate for the European Parliament elections during my sojourn in the island. I attended a rally to honour the EOKA fallen on the 1st of April, standing by the Grivas monument in Limassol, where the

---

<sup>7</sup> I am aware this is an ambiguous statement. As this research was being prepared, there was at least one major Cypriot politician coming from Limassol who was fighting for a Cypriotist agenda and a unified state: Turkish Cypriot leader, or President of the TRNC (depending on one’s convictions) Mustafa Akinci.

ambiguous leader died. After a fiery speech, and among flags of Greece, she proclaimed that “Enosis is still the goal”. She was elected MEP, ending first among all DHSY and all Cyprus candidates by way of votes.

From a conventional nationalist culture perspective, we could be referring to the RoC as a nation-state, with the national in italics, as if implicitly suggested but not fully achieved. In fact, as the Hellenic grasp still dictates the hegemonic specifics of G/C nationalism (Thrasyvoulou 2018), it would pay to critically think of that long dash in the nation-state, that distance between the romantic ethnos and the pragmatic civic polity.

An excellent example, in my opinion, of that conceptual distance between nation and state as well as the cypriotist ideology especially among left-wingers is the prologue to the last, among many, book by –one-time General Secretary of AKEL and mayor of Limassol- Ploutis Servas. The prologue is written by Eurocommunist established leader of the reformist Left, Leonidas Kyrkos, a major figure of the Left in Greece. Kyrkos, considered a figure of high intellectual calibre, notes that when he read the Servas manuscript’s title (“Common Homeland” [koini patrida]) he immediately thought of Greece and Cyprus being one piece. He then describes his astonishment that the Cypriot communist meant that the “Common” in the “Homeland” was common between the inhabitants of the island: T/C and G/C.

The (attempt for a) formation of an altogether different sort of bicomunal common civic state in Cyprus as in Ploutis Servas’ book is one expression of this historical force, aplenty with contradictions and conceptual struggles of its own. For instance, there is the established idea that the “Mother”-land is for the G/C Greece and the T/C Turkey. This is expressed in those countries with phrases like “Greece is the mother land of Cyprus” (i mitera patrida), the language being heavily gendered here, and in less gendered ways in Turkey (where the widely used Yavruvatan literally means ‘babyland’, with the sex unspecified). What is common in both Greece and Turkey is a patronising (or matronising) lexicon to describe the dependent island – a baby needs its mother, after all. At the same time, there is a sense, among bicomunalists, that the G/C and the T/C are “siblings” (aderfia/kardeşler). The kinship political lexicon then is complicated: if they are siblings from different parents, they must be half, or



adopted siblings. Their siblinghood is not “biological” or socially organic in the sense that, importantly, they do not share the same native language (or: “mother” tongue, see Yashin 2000). This siblinghood is socially constructed and historically referred, through common struggles for a civic statehood, that have not been bearing tangible fruits for almost half a century.

Importantly for the purpose of this study, the above notional problematic and material realities have serious ramifications for the formation of an environment in which the CIP idea and practice can thrive. The conceptual distance between nation and state is a possible reason for the unproblematic selling of civic status in Cyprus. The sense of attachment to the *politiotita*, as the self-projects to the national centre (Greece) is less pronounced than it would have been in Greece itself.

The modernization process in Cyprus’ statehood has a particular axis, that diasporic UK sociologist Floya Anthias, the daughter of a communist internationalist major poet from the island, has called “the ethnos axis” (see for instance Anthias and Ayres 1983; Anthias 1992). The sociological imagination of the nation-state and its tensions with civil society often encounters the national in the civil; this is not a Cypriot particularity at all. The specificity regarding Cyprus lies in the fact that here we witness a civil society that, for the most part, refuses to see a nation-state in the state, or even encapsulate the nation of its belonging within the state. In fact, a large part of the historical civil society, in the greater movement the island has seen in its post-colonial period claimed that the state leaves its own nature to identify with an exo-geographical, exo-historical even, nation, that lied elsewhere, in another nation state.

Glafkos Clerides<sup>8</sup> famously said that the flag of Cyprus is the best flag in the world, as no one ever will die for it (Clerides 1993: 8). The low-level identification with the

---

<sup>8</sup> Clerides was the Speaker of the Parliament and for a few days the transition President in the terrible days of 1974. His legacy includes at least one divisionist error: “sending” the Turkish-Cypriots to the North, and thus solidifying *taksim*. He founded DHSY, as a centre-right party and inspired terror to the whole political spectrum, who conspired on excluding a party that scored 26% in the elections from the Assembly of Representatives in 1976. Clerides, ever the fighter, became President twice, in 1992 and 1997, serving 10 years in which he promoted what he always believed in: an odd mixture of right-wing conservatism and a moderate, sober, bicomunal rapprochement with the T/C leadership, in a pro-resolution prospect (Rauf Denktaş was his colleague as a QC in London, and a personal confidante). His multi-volume memoir *My Deposition* is a classic read for conservative Greek Cypriots. His contribution

symbols of the RoC therefore would permit the coming and going of that flag and of the national herald (again, a peace symbol – a dove with two olive branches) in international exhibitions of competing citizenship by investment schemes (Rakopoulos and Fischer 2020).

This problematic between the sacrality of the nation and the distance of nationhood from Cypriot statehood may suggest a certain backdrop to the political culture that allows the CIPs to thrive in the Republic of Cyprus. A lawyer in Limassol and another in Nicosia, both of conservative backgrounds, told me explicitly that they found accusations against the CIP to be “nonsense” as they were “not selling out the identity of Cyprus” which was supposed to be Greek. In terms of “selling the state”, or even the country, actually, there is an ample cultural production with references to that. In fact, most of the Greek songs referring to Cyprus, suggest an antithesis between the place and ‘international trade’ of some sort, in that the island is seen to be part and parcel of imperialist trade-offs in the Eastern Mediterranean and a stake (and eventually, a state) of exchange itself.

The famed Greek singer-songwriter Dionysis Savvopoulos, who began from the radical left to eventually embrace a communalist Orthodox and arguably nationalist cosmology already since the 1980s, mentions in the song “Cyprus”: “It is Cyprus, that the merchants hate”. Fontas Ladis, a far-left popular verse writer in the 1970s, notes in the 1975 eponymous song by composer Thanos Mikroutsikos: “curse to the strong, for the small they manipulate”. Finally, the patriotic left-wing poet Theodosios Pieridis, already in the 1930s, wrote a poem that has been turned into a song by many a composer, noting the following:

you have it all wrong  
in your minds, oh merchants,  
homeland and freedom are not  
for sale on the cubit.

---

to the Republic is posthumously considered so great that the Larnaca international airport was named after his unpronounceable name – despite Larnaca being the birthplace to arguably the most well-known Cypriot thinker of all time, philosopher Zeno of Kition.

The song is remarkably popular, to the extent that two verses from the poem of AKEL member Pieridis are inscribed as the motto of Haravgi, the party's newspaper. They read:

Τούτη η δίψα δε σβήνει τούτη η μάχη δε παύειχίλια χρόνια αν περάσουν δεν  
πεθαίνουμε σκλάβοι

[This thirst cannot be quenched, this battle goes on  
we won't die slaves, even if a thousand years roll on]

Despite efforts on reconciliation and a unified state, the fact remains that, on the basis of the state of exception, itself a problem for Turkish-Cypriots (Constantinou 2008, Özersay 2008<sup>9</sup>), the Greek Cypriots are monopolizing the civic state since 1963, and with a greater force since 1974. Working on the basis of international legitimation and having diplomacy on their side (at least until 2004 and their rejection of the Annan Plan), the G/C operationalise the RoC, to large extent a de facto national state, in terms of a civic state, while in fact ethnicising it.

Of course, there are constitutional and even grassroots impediments in this process, despite Cyprus being one of the most multicultural countries in Europe (although the state of exception impedes workers' mobility within the EU – see Trimikliniotis 2018). Nevertheless, the G/C hegemony and monopolist grasp over the RoC is beyond doubt. Indeed, since 1964 they have debated moral legitimacy towards the civic nature of the state, which is now civic mainly nominally. Nonetheless, for the sake of the Cyprus Problem remaining open to a solution, the Republic of Cyprus remains a civic state and shall not morph into an ethnic expression, at least de jure. In order for the G/C upper hand to continue lead negotiations on the Cyprus Problem, this is very likely to continue being the situation in the island. In what follows, I shall try to further unpack this important aspect of the double nationhood and “twofold” statehood of Cyprus. I pay attention to the Turkish people of Cyprus, the main reason the Republic remains (and should remain) a civic state. They constitute the Republic's “Others”, and their

---

<sup>9</sup> The author of this important study was, at the time of research and writing, the Foreign Minister of the Northern Cyprus state. His father was assassinated by G/C paramilitaries; he is considered the major “person of Ankara” in the TRNC, the most formidable voice of divisionism in the North, and possibly a future President of North Cyprus.

own languages of statehood and nationalism also influences the future of the Cyprus Problem.

#### 4. Clinging to the civic: The “Others” of the Republic

A simple issue lies at the heart of the Cyprus Problem currently: if we are faced with two nations, and hegemonic nationalisms push to solidify the dash in the nation-state bridge, the outcome would be to accept that there is not one but two Republics operating in the island<sup>10</sup>? Accounting for this problem as well as accounting for the – nominal- civic underpinning of the RoC and the ethnic underpinning of the “TRNC” rise as major questions of our time when the federal solution to the Problem seems distant, post-the failed inter-communal negotiations in Crans-Montana (2017) and the current Cyprus stalemate.

With parallel entities operating on different moral grounds while splitting the same geographical ground, Cyprus is no doubt a puzzle that inspires IR theorists and political geographers alike. The suspended step of civic statehood for the Republic of Cyprus is one of the major aspects of the many complexities that this political maze inspires. As it has not received proper attention, it is important to unpack it further. In the conundrum of how citizenship has been historically forged, the existence of the T/C community impedes the nationification of the Republic’s civic nature.

Apart from being owners of a statal entity in the occupied North, most T/C are holders of a “Republican passport” (Navaro-Yashin 2012: 108). We have just discussed the refugee G/C views on statehood and property above. The idea of T/C property in the RoC-controlled areas being a major pillar of debates on democracy in the island and

---

<sup>10</sup> In many ways, the T/C proto-state, simulating sovereignty (see Bryant and Hatay 2011, as well as 2020) was established about 10 years earlier, due to G/C oppression. Then, rather than the acceptance of division, the event established the internationalization of the Cyprus Problem, with the 1964 UNFICYP’s establishment on the island, and the multiple claims of the Republic to the UN, most of them successful, as well as the mapping of the various projects for the/a future of the island in the world map as a NATO, an EU and a non-Aligned domain.

indeed an expression of their democratic rights is central to the understanding of the RoC and possibly war-torn polities in general.

“The Turkish Cypriots” are, for the RoC, a legal and indeed a constitutional category in a twofold sense. The T/C category is constitutional in both the positivist way (mentioned in the Constitution’s text as one of two foundational communities of the state) and in the deeply political sense of one of two separate but complimentary historical subjects of state formation: “the people” of the civic state. They are thus both constitutive and constituted, in Carl Schmitt’s analysis of any Constitutional state and thus any state (2008). In the case of the Republic under scrutiny, the T/C’s “withdrawal” (according to most G/C) or “expelling” from (constitutional) power in 1963 was excused, in terms of an “exception” to the law.

Conceiving the Republic as a state of emergency, in other words of exception (see Agamben 2000) is oddly unceremonious and even routine for Greek Cypriots – indeed, most would not know that this is the ideological – cum – practical premise of their Republican status and state. That smooth passage from Schmitt to Agamben is bestowed upon the social scientist interested in law in few places in the world in such palpable way as it does in the Republic of Cyprus. The fact that there is a practical side for “a practical people” as Cypriots like to see themselves to what is essentially an ideology, does not empty the state’s premise from its actual ideological content. As Žižek argues, the order of ideology does not operate outside the realm of praxis; even if we know we are doing something and we still do it, that thing still belongs to the core of ideological domain (Žižek 1989).

The Turkish Cypriots, however, most often remain loyal to their own state and version of history. There is ample evidence of the resentment that spoils of war and a shamed melancholia bring about in their lives (Navaro-Yashin 2009), as well as the various degrees in which they identify with their phantasmatic state (Navaro-Yashin 2012). However, there is also a historical anthropology claiming the seriousness with which they projected claims to statehood and practices of sovereignty (Bryant and Hatay 2011, Constantinou 2010), and an acceptance of the de facto divisionism of New Cyprus (Bryant 2010a – although the author does not use the term). The young population of the country is more likely to accept some premises of its state, as well

as more likely to be open to the RoC (Hatay and Charalambous 2015). The T/C for the RoC are an established but possibly slippery category, but are much better accommodated into the civic imaginary of even conservative people in the RoC than are settlers, or even new immigrants (Demetriou 2018).

Importantly, the ways of property are paths through which the T/C participate in the Republic, unlike their G/C counterparts. While G/C property in the North is internationally recognized as a democratic right and indeed is emically seen as a “human” right for Greek Cypriots, the G/C are excluded from the ethnically defined “Turkish” unrecognized Republic of/in Northern Cyprus. This means, as a matter of the utmost priority for them, that they are excluded from their properties there. However, the same is only partially true for the T/C, whose claims to property are partially respected by the civic RoC. The Republic, in need of continuity, need respect T/C rights as a practice against division. Interestingly, divisionists would often undermine T/C rights in order to undermine the Republic’s civic nature – a situation that has not prevented a small number of T/C to live in the southern part.

Take the example of a neighbour of mine during fieldwork, in Limassol’s Polemithkia district. “Christos”, a Hellenic name with which he is known in the neighbourhood, is a 53-year-old Turkish Cypriot, originating from Limassol (his father from Paphos). Born in Polemithkia, he claimed his property back from the state in 2012, which is where he now lives. Coming back to Cyprus was an existential drive; after working in Toronto and then Seven Sisters, London, he found those places to be “cold” – not as much in terms of the ambience, as in terms of people’s thinking and behaving. He voted Anastasiades “for the solution”, and now vows that he would rather “have had his hand cut”. He voted “for Niyazi” in the last elections. He “believes in one Cyprus”.

Recently, one further step has been taken towards including the T/C (as in any civic state) in the institutions of the Republic. The first T/C person (he prefers the term “Cypriot” in that context) to actually represent the RoC in political institutions since 1963, is a man in his mid-50s, Niyazi Kizilyürek. “Niyazi”, as commonly known among the G/C, a Professor of Political Science in the University of Cyprus (where he teaches in Greek), currently represents, alongside 5 others, the Republic of Cyprus in the European Parliament, after a successful campaign under the red colours of AKEL.

His opinions on T/C property are firm and he campaigns for its protection; but linking property to buy the Cypriot citizenship finds him opposed. An evening in June, exploring the potential bicomunal future of Cypriot statehood, I went to the presentation of Niyazi alongside Marina Nikolaou, also a candidate for MEP with AKEL. The conference centre was packed with around 250 people. I raised the question about golden passports and the tensions they bring to Cyprus-EU relations to the two MEP candidates. Marina offered a very AKEL perspective, mentioning how the President was tense in the EU Parliament when asked about it and how the program is not providing growth as it should have. Later in the evening she confessed to me as to how EU officiaires were stunned at Anastasiades' behaviour and were wondering why the fuss. Niyazi offered a very clear, personal perspective: "I don't like it. I don't want to sell passports and ID cards to anyone; I don't think it's right".

Very different from the T/C vis-à-vis the RoC, although sharing the "TRNC" with them, are "the settlers", or "Turks". "The settlers" are an ambivalent non-community in the G/C imagination (see Hatay 2005). The first and –according to many T/Cs- the only settler colonialists proper were invitees in North Cyprus, of the "TRNC"-Turkey joint political venture, not least on the idea of nationalist T/C leader Rauf Denktaş of "one Turk going another one coming" as "there is no such thing as a Turkish-Cypriot" (quoted in Navaro-Yashin 2012: 52). Indeed, many people came from Anatolia to settle in North Cyprus and "settled" a war with its spoils and shame, and indeed "settled" a historical situation.

The T/C is still a community to a good extent distinct from the "settlers". Both in the Annan plan 2004 referendum and in countless examples since they have shown support for civic cypriotism. At the same time, while many among the settlers seem to be by and large clinging to divisionist policies of nationalist taksim (the community's current support to Tatar's administration partly suggesting this), their political subjectivity is more complex than we might think. In the Annan referendum, however, settlers (who were able to vote if they were also TRNC citizens) voted around 50% in favour of the plan—a much higher number than 'yes'-voting Greek Cypriots. The main reason for this was that the Annan Plan would have given them RoC citizenship, although it also would have taken away the G/C houses in which they were living.

We should note, therefore, that the term “settlers” is difficult to define and is applied by G/C and Greeks to an often indiscriminate ensemble of a very variegated population (see Ioannou 2020). Indeed, it is often used for people from mainland Turkey that came through regular migration paths to places where more employment opportunities are offered, like Kyrenia (Girne) and its coast. Within Cyprus at large, they are seen with suspicion across the Green Line.

In the North, they are often seen as abject status denizens, called by many othering terms, like fellah (Navarro-Yashin 2012: 56, 150) and T/C see many among them as second-class citizens, while they see of their own status of indigeneity as under threat by this repopulating policy (ibid: 60). The mainland Turkish immigrants seem to lack “local knowledge”, and their hygiene tactics, as many among my own informants told me, put them in the abject status of matter out of place – as well as matter out of the political community, as many T/C complain about their “counterfeit citizenship” when they are granted “TRNC” passports (ibid: 122). The talk, among Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (henceforth: G/C and T/C) of the eating or hygiene habits of “the settlers” shows us how, in Cyprus –like elsewhere- emic understandings of pollution and otherness go together (Argyrou 1997)

In the South, they are nobodies: as abject denizens of the North, they are not granted citizenship rights within the RoC and cannot even cross the Green Line (see Demetriou 2018). In fact, not only can they not cross to the South, but they are excluded, in various degrees and in varied percentage politics, from future solutions of the Cyprus Problem. In the eyes of the G/C, they are part of the Problem and cannot be part of any of its possible solutions. While a civic, federal Cyprus should include the T/C de jure, it now needs to consider inclusion of the offspring of “settlers” de facto. Among many supporting rapprochement, cypriotism is recognised as a language of inclusion, and a daring and pragmatic inclusion might need to settle the historical fact of long-term settlement.



## 5. Concluding thoughts: Understanding the local language[s] of “nationalism[s]”

In the absence of bloodshed, the Cyprus Problem being a “non-violent conflict”, the Problem is mostly expressed in the discursive domain. Linguistic semantics and semiotics have become a battlefield. With the RoC (and the world) not recognizing the “TRNC” (although many of its citizens live in the North and refer to it as home), and with North Cyprus not recognizing the Republic of Cyprus (although the citizens of the former are overwhelmingly also citizens of the latter), the complexities of non-recognition are expressed in the linguistics of political and journalistic reporting. Another level of complexity is added to this situation, when we consider the G/C refugees who still call North Cyprus their home.

Take the scare quotes that I used in the sentence above -and throughout this essay- for “TRNC”, for instance. The “”, as Yael Navaro-Yashin notes (2012), could be seen as the abject content, the area where discourse circumscribes a taboo meaning, in an anthropological lexicon of absent content. The settlers are the mirror image of the illustrious invitee new citizens of the CIP, who, in their part, could be desired subjects in North Cyprus.

I agree with Yael Navaro-Yashin that much of the making and unmaking of statehood is discursive and is effected on an open, if framed, domain like language that is constantly manipulated (2003, 2012). This includes symbols, not least the national herald. As discussed above, a dove holding olive branches sits as the guardian of the RoC and is replicated in the “TRNC” (with, tellingly, a “1983” underneath it, instead of a “1960<sup>11</sup>”). The statehood dialogue, i.e. what is conventionally called negotiations over the Cyprus Problem in both the language of IR and in the emic lexicon, is taking place between two non-equals – two entities that, while they do not enjoy equal international status, reserve for themselves the linguistic right of denial.

---

<sup>11</sup> On deconstructing the dove of the national emblem of both sides of the island, based on the satirical grassroots maxim «the bird has flown» (to poullin epetassen), see Karathanasis 2018.

Thinking back with cypriotism calls to review the institutional title “The Republic of Cyprus”. The RoC is the official translation of the country’s name in English; the same linguistic formation appears in the other EU languages as well. It is a simple phrase, syntactically, and a routine in international relations: noun denoting politics, conjunction, noun denoting geography. The official languages of the country differ in their rendering here: in Turkish Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti is a literal translation of RoC while Greek has it differently: Kypriaki Dimokratia - that is, Cypriot Republic-. The semantic lapse between a noun and an adjective is substantial. To have a place in the world, a geographical location pure and simple, Cyprus in this case, is not the same as to have that location produce something of its own: something Cypriot – like a Republic, no less<sup>12</sup>. This Cypriotist language is intrinsic in the solidification of civic nationhood for the island.

In this essay, I have precisely traced the civic languages of understanding the Cyprus Problem in the everyday life of Greek-Cypriots. I develop ideas suggesting a post-colonial Cypriot vernacular (Panayiotou 2007, Philippou 2010) to approach the main issue Cyprus has been associated with in post-colonial studies: its “Problem” of division and partition (Calotycho 1995, Papadakis et al 2005, Ioannou 2020). I find that the emic vernacular of Cypriotism has pursued ethnic and social egalitarianism, contradistinguished to the two main historical nationalisms of Cyprus (Sant-Cassia 1999). I argue that this local politics presents us with the need to account for not only vernacular nationalisms (a la Anderson 1986) that have detrimental effects on sharing a country equally, but also vernacular civic egalitarianisms.

While we should be careful not to over-romanticise Cypriotism (as many descendants of settlers feel uncomfortable around the notion, and indeed civic nationalism can and

---

<sup>12</sup> Some of the semantic distance between the two statal entities operating in Cyprus was meant to be alleviated through the OECD’s suggestion to introduce a Dictionary of Terms to rephrase and reopen the public sphere across the Green Line. This is the semiotic war story of the Glossari – a set of words and phrases circulated among T/C and G/C journalists on a volunteer basis. Philologists and journalists from both sides, in a bicomunal service, wrote down some 56 key words and phrases that would operate as suggestions on how to report on a more mutually agreeable (and inclusive, that is, cypriotist) language composed the Glossari. Examples include substituting phrases like katehomena (occupied territories) and eleftheres periohes (free territories). The havoc caused in the RoC’s public sphere by the Glossari is telling (Ioannou 2019: 193-196).

has been used as a non-tolerant rhetoric vis-à-vis immigrants), the emic language of loyalty-to-the-island is definitely more amenable to a solution than ethnic patriotism.

What is more, divisionism and new rising versions of Cypriotisms can nowadays be messier and more difficult to distinguish between them than a two-pole categorisation accounts for. As already noted in the Annan years, the passage of decades since 1974 has given people a loyalty to their own states (or “states”) that produced the separation of nation and state that we have discussed above. This was quite noticeable in the Annan Plan period, when many people clung to their unrecognised or rump statelets, having adopted them over time. Such clinging to the state (or hope in the “state”) remains relatively strong, and creates new potentially divisionist rhetorics – in Greek Cypriot identified in the idea of “*emeis poda, tzeinoi potzei*” (us on this side, them on that side). This new loyalty is an impediment to solving the Cyprus Problem and a historical outcome of separation and separate welfare policies of the RoC and the “TRNC”.

Turkish Cypriots strive for “political equality” since independence (1960). Since 1974 and the Turkish invasion of the country, they live apart from their civic counterparts in the Republic of Cyprus (the larger community of the Greek-Cypriots) in their own statal entity that no country in the world other than Turkey recognizes, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (Bryant and Hatay 2020). In the South, Greek-Cypriots factually control the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), whose de jure territorial sovereignty however extends to the entire island (Bryant 2010). The T/C are citizens of both the RoC (which they do not recognize) and the “TRNC”, towards which some feel uncomfortable. The G/C call the “TRNC” an illegal regime or “occupied territories” (Ioannou 2019), but some feel the T/C are their compatriots in the current and future RoC. A small, if at times critical mass of people across the Green Line (drawn in 1964, solidified in 1974, and still in effect) strive for the island’s Reunification – an egalitarian term itself that offers a solution to the Cyprus Problem by reestablishing a Republic co-controlled by the two main communities. In the above pages, I offered ethnographic and micro-historical examples to decipher this overtly perplexed situation, that has been befuddling analysts for half a century now (and which has rendered the Cyprus Problem “unsolvable”).

As an anthropologist, I have traced the Republic's vernacular through paying attention to the movements of people, news and politics that lay old and new claims to the state. These can be associated to bi-communal or inter-national political mobilization. Through ethnographic vignettes, I have stressed how the inter-communal cooperation or political indignation within one community can potentially undermine the solidity of the one-community state current dogma. This is timely to see in a context where the Cyprus Problem is unfortunately moving towards a tacit two-state solution, with both sides looking more stubborn in rejecting a federal prospective than ever before.

## Bibliography

Anthias, Floya. and Ayres, R. 1983. Ethnicity and Class in Cyprus, *Race and Class*, XXV, I.

----- . 1992. "Connecting 'Race' and Ethnic Phenomena", *Sociology*, 26(3).

Aretxaga, Begoña. 2003. Maddening states. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 32: 393-410.

Argyrou, Vassos. 1996 *Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean: The Wedding as Symbolic Struggle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (paperback edition 2005)

Bryant, Rebecca. 2010a. *The Past in Pieces - Belonging in the New Cyprus*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

----- . 2010b. The State of Cypriot Silences. *Cyprus Review*, 22 (2): 113-122.

Bryant, Rebecca & Mete Hatay. 2011. Guns and guitars: Simulating sovereignty in a state of siege. *American Ethnologist*, 38 (4), (pp. 631-649).

Charalambous, Giorgos and Gregoris Ioannou. 2017. Party systems, party-society linkages, and contentious acts: Cyprus in a comparative, Southern European perspective. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 22(1): 97-119.

Constantinou, Costas. 2008. On the Cypriot states of exception. *International Political Sociology*, 2: 145-164.

----- . 2010. Cyprus In-dependence and the problem of sovereignty. *The Cyprus Review* 22(2): 17-31.

Constantinou, Costas and Yannis Papadakis. 2011. The Cypriot State(s) in situ: Cross-ethnic contact and the discourse of recognition, *Global Society*, 15(2):125-14.

Demetriou, Olga. 2018. *Refugeehood and the post-conflict subject: Reconsidering minor losses*. New York: CUNY Press.

Hadjikyriakou, Antonis. 2016. The Ottomanization of Cyprus: towards a spatial imagination beyond the centre-province binary. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 25(2): 81-96.

Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2003. "‘Life is Dead Here’: Sensing the Political in ‘No Man’s Land’." *Anthropological Theory*, 3(1): 107-125.

----- . 2005. "Confinement and the Imagination: Sovereignty and Subjectivity in a Quasi-State", in Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds.), *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 103-119.

----- . *The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Post-War Polity*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Ioannou, Gregoris. 2019. Ο Ντενκτάς στο Νότο: Η κανονικοποίηση της διχοτόμησης στην ελληνοκυπριακή πλευρά. *Denktas in the South: The normalization of the division on the Southern side (O Denktash sto Noto: H kanonikopoiisi tis dihotomisis stin Ellinoypriaki plevra)*. Thessaloniki: Psifides.

Panayiotou, Andreas. 2005. «Συνοριακές εμπειρίες: Ερμηνεύοντας τον πατριωτισμό της Κυπριακής Αριστεράς» [Border Experiences: Interpreting the Patriotism of the Cypriot Left] in Trimikliniotis, N. (ed.), *Το Πορτοκαλί της Κύπρου [The Orange colour of Cyprus]*. Athens: Nisos, pp. 43-74.

----- . 2006. Models of Compromise and 'Power Sharing' in the Experience of Cypriot Modernity. *The Cyprus Review* 18 (2), 75-103

----- . 2007. Lenin in the coffee shop: The communist alternative and forms of non-western modernity. *Postcolonial Studies* 9 (3), 267-280.

----- . 2012. 'Border Dialectics: Cypriot Social and Historical Movements in a World Systemic Context', in Trimikliniotis, Nicos and Umut Bozkurt (eds.), *Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation*. New York: MacMillan Palgrave, pp.67–82.

Peristiany, Nico. 1995. Right-left, greek-centrism-cypriot-centrism: The pendulum of collective identifications after 1974. Δεξιά-αριστερά, ελληνοκεντρισμός-

κυπριοκεντρισμός: Το εκκρεμές των συλλογικών ταυτίσεων μετά το 1974. In: Peristiany, Nico and Tsaggaras, Giorgos, pp. 123-157.

Peristiany, Nico and Tsaggaras, Giorgos (editors). 1995. Ανατομία μίας μεταμόρφωσης: Η Κύπρος μετά το 1974. Anatomy of a metamorphosis: Cyprus after 1974. Nicosia: Intercollege press.

Philippou, Nicos, 2007. Coffee house embellishments. Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press.

----- . 2010. The legibility of vernacular aesthetics. Photographies 3(1): 89-98.

Rakopoulos, Theodoros 2018. The global life of austerity (ed.).. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.

----- . 2021. The Republic of property (Or, when citizenship is for sale): Golden passports and political community in Cyprus. Η Δημοκρατία της ιδιοκτησίας (Η', όταν η ιθαγένεια πωλείται): Χρυσά διαβατήρια και πολιτική κοινότητα στην Κύπρο. Synchrona Themata, 150: 103-115.

----- . 2022 (forthcoming). The golden passport EUtopia: Offshore citizens in a global Republic. Social Anthropology.

----- . 2023 (forthcoming). Citizenship for sale: The global market for passports in Cyprus. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Rakopoulos, Theodoros and Leandros Fischer. 2020. In Cyprus, the golden passports scheme shows us how capitalism and corruption go hand in hand. Jacobin

Roufos, Rodis. 2011 (1960). Η χάλκινη εποχή: Το μυθιστόρημα του κυπριακού αγώνα. (The copper age: The Cypriot struggle's novel). Athens: Estia.Sant-Cassia, Paul. 1993. Banditry, Myth and Terror in Cyprus and other Mediterranean Societies. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 773-795

----- . 1995. "Divided past and united present: Perceptions of the Greek extremist nationalism in Cyprus". In: Peristiany, Nico and Tsaggaras, Giorgos, pp. 157-188.

----- . 1999. Martyrdom and Witnessing (Martyria). Narratives of Violence and Memory in Cyprus. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11(1): 22-54.

----- . 2005. Bodies of Evidence. Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus. Oxford: Berghahn.

Thrasylvoulou, Marios. 2018. Ο εθνικισμός των Ελληνοκυπρίων: Από την αποικιοκρατία στην ανεξαρτησία (όψεις, τάσεις, και ο ρόλος της Αριστεράς). Thessaloniki: Epikentro.

Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2018. The Proliferation of Cypriot states of exception: The erosion of fundamental rights as collateral damage of the Cyprus Problem, *The Cyprus Review*, 30:2, 43-84.

Worsley, Peter. 1979. Introduction. In: "Small States in the Modern World: Conditions for their Survival", edited by Worsley, Peter and Paschalis Kitromilides. Nicosia: New Cyprus Association and Cyprus Geographical Association.

Žižek, Slavoy. 1989. The sublime object of ideology. London: Verso.