



*Citation for published version:*

Ferns, G, Lambert, A & Günther, M 2021, 'The Analogical Construction of Stigma as a Moral Dualism: the Case of the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement', *Academy of Management Journal*.  
<https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0615>

*DOI:*

[10.5465/amj.2018.0615](https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0615)

*Publication date:*

2021

*Document Version*

Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication](#)

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## The Analogical Construction of Stigma as a Moral Dualism: The Case of the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement

Journal:	<i>Academy of Management Journal</i>
Manuscript ID	AMJ-2018-0615.R5
Manuscript Type:	Revision
Keywords:	Qualitative orientation (General) < Qualitative Orientation < Research Methods, Organization and management theory (General) < Organization and Management Theory < Topic Areas, Social issues in management (General) < Social Issues in Management < Topic Areas, Discourse/Narrative analysis < Qualitative Orientation < Research Methods
Abstract:	<p>We explore the global fossil fuel divestment movement to show how climate activists worked to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry using analogy. In doing so, we develop a model that illustrates how constructing a "moral dualism" is central to stigmatizing an organizational category. This involves concurrently establishing "stigmatizers" (ingroup) as morally superior and amplifying the deviancy of the fossil fuel industry (outgroup), both in relation to analogical contexts. Stigmatizers strategically employed two types of analogy: "deep" and "surface." Deep analogies produce emotive power, facilitating the moralization of the ingroup through the transfer of affective meanings from a source context to a target domain. Surface analogies generate causal power to inform wider audiences of the target's deviance through association with already-stigmatized organizational categories. Analogical power underpinning the morally dualistic nature of stigmatization can therefore empower fringe actors to stigmatize an incumbent as they appropriate meanings from analogical source domains.</p>

# The Analogical Construction of Stigma as a Moral Dualism: The Case of the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement

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## **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Emilio Marti, David Courpasson, Mike Reed, Nora Lohmeyer, Emmanuel Raufflet, and the many others who guided and supported the development of the paper and our ideas. This paper developed from the first and third author's doctoral dissertations at University of Edinburgh and Freie Universität Berlin and we give special thanks to the respective supervisory teams, Kenneth Amaeshi and John Amis, and Michaela Haase and Elke Schüßler. We also greatly appreciate the constructive and formative discussions with colleagues at the following conferences and symposia: University of Edinburgh Business School Writing Workshop on 'Organisational and Institutional Change'; the 2017 EGOS Sub-theme 48: 'Social-Symbolic Work: Aspirations, Efforts and Struggles'; 2019 EGOS Sub-theme 16: 'Discursive and Material Struggles over the Natural Environment'; CORGies Sessions, Cardiff Business School, 2019; GRONEN Reading Group, 2020; and the 2017 WK-ORG workshop in Hamburg, Germany (zfo-Award for best young scholar conference paper). We are very grateful for the support and guidance of Editor Eero Vaara and the three anonymous referees whose insightful comments and constructive guidance helped us to realize the paper's full potential.

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3 **THE ANALOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF STIGMA AS A MORAL DUALISM:**  
4 **THE CASE OF THE FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT**  
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7 **ABSTRACT**

8 We explore the global fossil fuel divestment movement to show how climate activists worked to  
9 stigmatize the fossil fuel industry using analogy. In doing so, we develop a model that illustrates  
10 how constructing a “moral dualism” is central to stigmatizing an organizational category. This  
11 involves concurrently establishing “stigmatizers” (ingroup) as morally superior and amplifying the  
12 deviancy of the fossil fuel industry (outgroup), both in relation to analogical contexts. Stigmatizers  
13 strategically employed two types of analogy: “deep” and “surface.” Deep analogies produce  
14 emotive power, facilitating the moralization of the ingroup through the transfer of affective  
15 meanings from a source context to a target domain. Surface analogies generate causal power to  
16 inform wider audiences of the target’s deviance through association with already-stigmatized  
17 organizational categories. Analogical power underpinning the morally dualistic nature of  
18 stigmatization can therefore empower fringe actors to stigmatize an incumbent as they appropriate  
19 meanings from analogical source domains.  
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23 **Keywords:** stigma; organizational category; language; analogy; moral dualism; divestment; fossil  
24 fuel industry; climate change  
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27 A central theme in organization and management theory is that favorable social evaluations  
28 are important for organizational survival (Elsbach, 1994; Pollock, Lashley, Rindova, & Han, 2019;  
29 Sutton & Callahan, 1987). It follows that organizations actively seek to avoid unfavorable  
30 evaluations (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). The most extreme negative social evaluation that can  
31 affect organizations – or categories of organizations such as an industry (Lashley & Pollock, 2020;  
32 Vergne, 2012) – is stigma, a form of social disapproval evoking a “perception that an organization  
33 possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization [...]”  
34 (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009: 157).  
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45 An important area of study concerns the social processes that drive organizational stigma  
46 (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Roulet, 2015). Extant work suggests that stigma emerges when an  
47 organizational target is linked to discredited others such as organizational categories (Devers et  
48 al., 2009; Sutton & Callahan, 1987), or discrediting attributes such as negative labels or stereotypes  
49 (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Helms, Patterson, & Hudson, 2018).  
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3 However, this body of literature lacks “cogent theoretical understanding of the processes that drive  
4 the formation of an organizational stigma” (Devers et al., 2009: 155). Therefore, questions of *how*  
5 these links are formed, for instance how meanings transform from “normal” to “stigmatized” given  
6 the strategic work of actors, are not well understood.  
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12 Addressing this oversight, in this study we follow a discourse analytical approach (Maguire  
13 & Hardy, 2013; Phillips & Oswick, 2012), focusing on how actors attempting to stigmatize an  
14 organizational category strategically harness the power of analogy (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010;  
15 Cornelissen, Holt, & Zundel, 2011; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Oswick, Keenoy, & Grant,  
16 2002). Analogical reasoning functions by making the unfamiliar familiar, creating “ways of seeing  
17 things as if they were something else” (Manning, 1979: 661) by comparing source (familiar) and  
18 target (unfamiliar) domains (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff, & Boronat, 2001;  
19 Glaser, Fiss, & Kennedy, 2016).  
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31 Our empirical case elucidates the role of analogy in stigma construction by exploring how a  
32 specific type of actor – climate activists – used meanings generated by analogies, predominantly  
33 South African apartheid and tobacco divestment, to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry. These  
34 activists form part of the global fossil fuel divestment movement, a collection of grassroots groups  
35 operating under the umbrella organization 350.org that encourages stakeholders to rid their  
36 financial portfolios of assets related to the fossil fuel industry (McKibben, 2012). Divestment was  
37 promoted not necessarily to financially bankrupt the industry, but as a symbolic tool of  
38 stigmatization for profiting from products that cause dangerous climate change (SSEE, 2013).  
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49 From our analysis, we develop a model illustrating how organizational stigmatization emerges  
50 through purposive analogical work. This contributes to literature on organizational stigma by  
51 demonstrating the importance of examining the “stigmatizers’ perspective,” and the fundamental  
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3 role of analogy in stigmatization, proposing three key points. First, stigmatization is contingent on  
4 constructing a *moral dualism* in which two opposing “sides” are distinguished concurrently  
5 through analogical work: a moral ingroup (stigmatizer) versus an immoral outgroup (stigmatized).  
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8 Second, the interplay between “deep” and “surface” analogies is central to constructing this moral  
9 dualism as actors harness moral/stigmatized meanings from different types of source domains.  
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12 Thirdly, stigma can be an empowering resource for “radical” or “fringe” actors (den Hond & de  
13 Bakker, 2007; Schifeling & Hoffman, 2017) – such as climate activists – contesting a powerful,  
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16 incumbent actor, particularly in the context of providing “solutions” to grand challenges like  
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19 climate change (Wright & Nyberg, 2017).  
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## 23 THEORETICAL CONTEXT

### 24 Organizational Stigma and its Emergence

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26 The concept of stigma is attributed to Erving Goffman who defined stigmatization as reducing  
27 an individual “in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (1963: 3).  
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30 Organization scholars draw upon this understanding to explore how organizational contexts can  
31 also be stigmatized (Devers et al., 2009). Organizations, or in the case of our study organizational  
32 categories, are stigmatized not necessarily due to certain intrinsic pejorative traits or attributes  
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35 (Helms et al., 2018) but given their relationship with socially constructed meanings of deviance or  
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38 abnormality (Helms & Patterson, 2014; Tracey & Phillips, 2016). A key theoretical perspective  
39 explaining stigmatization as such is labeling theory (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). This  
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42 perspective demonstrates how organizational categories are stigmatized given associations with  
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45 certain pejorative labels and stereotypes (Durand & Vergne, 2015), describing, for instance, the  
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48 vilification of “sin industries” (Grougiou, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2016) such as arms manufacturing  
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51 (Vergne, 2012), tobacco (Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 2004), or medical cannabis (Lashley &  
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54 Pollock, 2020). Belonging to stigmatized categories results in stakeholders stereotyping an  
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3 organization “such that it is defined in terms of the attributes of this category, rather than as a  
4 unique entity” (Devers et al., 2009: 157). Moreover, a stigmatized organization’s stakeholders,  
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6 e.g., suppliers and customers, may also be vilified given their relationship with the stigmatized  
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8 entity (Ashforth, Kreiner, Clark, & Fugate, 2007; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Pozner, 2008).  
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12 Despite this wealth of knowledge, questions of *how* organizations become stigmatized remain.  
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14 Addressing these questions often involves examining how stigma becomes affixed to  
15  
16 organizational contexts (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997: 48). This assumes a rather passive audience  
17  
18 and therefore does not explain how stigmatizing meanings are actively generated, or “by whom”  
19  
20 (Hudson, 2008: 262). As Devers et al. (2009: 157; emphasis added) suggest: “a stigmatized  
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22 organization *is viewed* as fundamentally flawed in the sense that it *is perceived* as emblematic of  
23  
24 the negatively evaluated category to which it is linked [...]” Organizational studies thus examine  
25  
26 how categorical stigma emerges and is dealt with (Piazza & Perretti, 2015) before understanding  
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28 how it “comes into being as individuals take action” (Scott, 1987: 495).  
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34 There have been several calls in the literature to advance “agentic lenses” (Helms & Patterson,  
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36 2014: 1418) that explore “types of actions [...] that cause or prevent organizational stigmatization”  
37  
38 (Devers et al., 2009: 155). Nascent scholarship examining actors’ agency in the stigmatization  
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40 process indicates how an organizational category can move from being demonized—even  
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42 criminalized—to its stigma being eradicated or minimized (Adams, 2012; Lashley & Pollock,  
43  
44 2020). However, how stigmatizing actors strategically achieve the reverse – purposive  
45  
46 stigmatization of an organizational context – lacks detailed empirical analysis. Without exploring  
47  
48 the perspective of stigmatizers, little is known about how their work and strategies shift meanings  
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50 around organizational categories from “normal” to “fundamentally flawed” (Devers et al., 2009:  
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52 157).  
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3 Given a need to focus on the strategic shifting of *meanings*—understood here as symbols,  
4 associations, discourses, among other terms (Dandridge, Mitroff, & Joyce, 1980) — we draw on  
5 the “discursive turn” in organizational studies to inform our analysis (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000;  
6 Boje, Oswick, & Ford, 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). This literature explores how meanings  
7 related to organizational contexts can be changed by actors (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Several  
8 studies explicate the role of language and strategic use of analogies (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010;  
9 Etzion & Ferraro, 2010), though they do not focus on processes of stigmatization. These studies  
10 demonstrate how associations from one organizational context can be strategically transmitted to  
11 another, which is particularly relevant to stigma construction given its relational emergence.  
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### 23 **Language and the Strategic Use of Analogies**

24 Language is central to the construction of meaning (Cornelissen, Durand, Fiss, Lammers, &  
25 Vaara, 2015; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Language can also be  
26 strategically deployed to change meanings in relation to a particular context (Lawrence, Phillips,  
27 & Hardy, 1999), and plays an important role in theorizing how actors engage in meaning work  
28 related to stigma (Link & Phelan, 2001; Smith, 2007). Goffman’s (1963: 13) work on stigma  
29 explicitly notes the role of language, highlighted in his initial explanation: “the term stigma, then,  
30 will be used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, but it should be seen that a language  
31 of relationships, not attributes, is really needed.” A linguistic device that addresses this “language  
32 of relationships” is analogy.  
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46 Analogy is a process of abstraction “ubiquitous in human cognition” (Gentner, 2005: 106) that  
47 can explain how novel (stigmatizing) meanings arise and change through relationality, elucidating  
48 an unfamiliar domain by relating it to a familiar one (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Cornelissen et  
49 al., 2011; Gavetti et al., 2005; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Ketokivi, Mantere, & Cornelissen,  
50 2017; Logue, Clegg, & Gray, 2016; Oswick et al., 2002). What is familiar is the “source” and what  
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3 is unfamiliar is the “target.” Analogical reasoning, which encompasses a variety of linguistic tropes  
4 (e.g., metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, parable, etc.), forms new and sometimes intricate  
5 understandings around the “relational similarity” of source and target domains. For example, the  
6 analogy “her eyes are as blue as the sea” compares two distinctive domains (human organs, a body  
7 of water) to generate inferences beyond color, alluding to the beauty and depth of the former by  
8 comparison to the latter. Analogy, by creating new insight and changing meanings of existing  
9 contexts, is thereby “often the most effective way for people to learn a new relational abstraction”  
10 (Gentner & Smith, 2012: 131).

11  
12 Analogies can have literal similarity (direct one-to-one correspondence – e.g., the cat is as  
13 black as my cat), surface similarity (similarity based on alike but structurally different objects,  
14 e.g., the cat is as black as a panther) or structural similarity (similarity between domains based on  
15 systemic relations shared by both, e.g., the toddler is as curious as a cat). The most effective  
16 analogies adhere to the systematicity principle (Gentner & Toupin, 1986) whereby two domains  
17 share a deep structural connection, rather than a simple literal connection. Such structural analogies  
18 have greater “inferential power.” That is, actors can make “highly informational” inferences from  
19 the source to understand the target (Gentner & Smith, 2012: 132). Indeed, analogies “based on an  
20 extended web of counterparts will be more easily understood and are also more likely to be granted  
21 with legitimacy” (Cornelissen et al., 2011: 1708). An analogy’s effectiveness also depends on a  
22 person’s (or organization’s) orientation toward the analogy (Glaser et al., 2016; Holyoak &  
23 Thagard, 1997): a reasoner having some connection to or sympathy with the source domain makes  
24 it more effective (Ketokivi et al., 2017). Analogies are particularly effective when transferring  
25 complex affective meanings such as those related to stigma (Ashforth, 2018) given the difficulty  
26 of conveying emotions literally (Gentner et al., 2001: 5).

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3 Organizational scholars often focus on how analogical reasoning can elucidate complex  
4 phenomena, notably “the organization” (e.g., Morgan, 1997) and processes of organizing  
5 (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Logue et al., 2016; Oswick et al., 2002). Indeed, Ketokivi et al. (2017:  
6 637) observe that they “are hard pressed to name a prominent organization theory not based on the  
7 idea that a complex organization is being thought of as analogous to something comparatively  
8 simpler.” The strategic use of analogy (Gavetti et al., 2005; Glaser et al., 2016) is evidenced by  
9 studies exploring organizational change, demonstrating how certain analogies are more effective  
10 than others (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Lovallo, Clarke, & Camerer, 2012). Studies also indicate  
11 how analogical reasoning is strategically used to create novel categories, schemas, and ideas in the  
12 context of: institutionalizing reporting practices (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010); legitimating strategic  
13 change endeavors (Gavetti et al., 2005); managing the emergence of new technologies  
14 (Burgelman, 2002); and coping with establishing controversial business concepts (Glaser et al.,  
15 2016). The role of analogy in the process of stigmatization has yet to be explored, though it may  
16 explain how actors use stigma to change meanings of an organizational context from “normal” to  
17 “deviant.” As such, we ask: how do actors strategically use analogy to stigmatize an organizational  
18 category?  
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## 39 40 **METHODS**

### 41 **Research context**

42 To address our research question, we focus on specific group of stigmatizers: climate  
43 activists. These actors form part of the global fossil fuel divestment movement that emerged in  
44 2011, becoming a global phenomenon by 2012 (Go Fossil Free, 2017). Climate activists urge  
45 institutions to halt new investment in the fossil fuel industry and rid financial portfolios of fossil  
46 fuel assets (McKibben, 2013). Their key message, as stated by their main organization *350.org*, is:  
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55 “If it is wrong to wreck the climate, then it is wrong to profit from that wreckage. We believe that  
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3 educational and religious institutions, governments, and other organizations that serve the public  
4 good should cut their ties to the fossil fuel industry” (350.org, 2014a). The fossil fuel divestment  
5 movement has become the fastest growing divestment campaign in history (SSEE, 2013), with  
6 over 1000 institutions representing in excess of \$14 trillion in assets committed to divest (Go Fossil  
7 Free, 2020).

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15 Examining how climate activists worked to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry is an ideal  
16 context for examining both the “stigmatizers’ perspective” and the role of analogy in the  
17 stigmatization process. Despite selling a product that causes dangerous climate change (Crutzen,  
18 2002), the fossil fuel industry’s products are likewise responsible for widespread economic  
19 development, used on a daily basis in modern societies (IEA, 2016). As such, activists needed to  
20 make a conscious effort to stigmatize an industry that could likewise be celebrated. This was  
21 primarily done by communicating the need for divestment through various written and spoken  
22 media—specifically using analogical reasoning—which we examined using discourse analysis,  
23 described next.

### 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 **Research approach: discourse analysis**

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37 Our analytical approach is based on a discourse tradition, concerned with language and the  
38 construction of meaning (Boje et al., 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Phillips & Oswick, 2012).  
39 Discourses shape social reality, defining “who and what is ‘normal,’ standard and acceptable”  
40 (Meriläinen, Tienari, Thomas, & Davies, 2004: 544), or in our case, which organizational  
41 categories are considered “good” and which are stigmatized. Discourse analysis often involves  
42 exploring the constitutive effects of certain discursive devices or structures (e.g., Cornelissen,  
43 2005). This was useful for the purpose of our study given our aim to understand how actors use  
44 analogical reasoning to shift meanings associated with an organizational category from “normal”  
45 to stigmatized. Our approach to discourse analysis therefore focused on analogy and analogical  
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3 reasoning, concepts based in cognitive linguistics as discussed in the theoretical framework. This  
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5 emphasis emerged inductively, described in our analytical strategy, whereby a coding process  
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7 indicated activists' purposive use of analogy to shape stigmatizing discourses associated with the  
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9 fossil fuel industry.

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12 Our discourse analysis approach itself was tailored to our emergent research question,  
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14 involving both a more classical method of homing in on specific texts (Fairclough, 1995), along  
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16 with considering how analogy was used over time. This longitudinal dimension facilitated  
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18 exploration of how activists, through the production, dissemination, and mobilization of certain  
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20 discourses, shaped (stigmatizing) meanings related to the fossil fuel industry's role in advancing  
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22 climate change. We detail our process of discourse analysis in the analytical strategy after  
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24 describing our data corpus.

### 25 26 27 28 **Data Corpus**

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30 We relied on several discourse-related data sources (see Table 1) with interviews conducted  
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32 as necessary with activists and key actors.

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35 --- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---

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37 ***Internal and external documents.*** We analyzed a total of 342 texts produced and distributed  
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39 by climate activists specifically. Climate activists' texts were either intended for external  
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41 publication (e.g., press releases, public speeches, news media contributions, etc.) or internal  
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43 distribution ("how to" guides and communication toolkits; etc.). Most were produced and  
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45 distributed by 350.org, its founder Bill McKibben, or their flagship project "Go Fossil Free." We  
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47 also collected texts from student-based initiatives, typically societies or clubs such as People &  
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49 Planet in the UK. These texts consisted of letters to university boards asking to divest the schools'  
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51 endowments, open letters from pro-divestment faculty supporting the cause, and online messages  
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3 via activists' social media accounts; we considered these texts "strategic resources" (Hardy,  
4 Palmer, & Phillips, 2000) used by activists to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry.  
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8 To examine how stakeholders responded to climate activists' analogical work, we analyzed  
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10 texts of five key actors: news media (see next section for more detail), policy actors, investors and  
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12 financial institutions, celebrities/opinion leaders, and "divestors," or those actors who chose to  
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14 divest their financial portfolios from fossil fuel assets. We collected a total of 47 texts from policy  
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16 actors, including press releases, speeches, and news media contributions from national  
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18 governments (Osborne, 2017), supranational bodies such as the United Nations (UNFCCC, 2014),  
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20 and international development organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the World  
21  
22 Bank (2014). These all explicitly addressed fossil fuel divestment, or more generally the  
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24 relationship between climate change and the fossil fuel industry. We collected a total of 38 texts  
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26 from the financial industry, mostly investor reports (e.g., HSBC, 2015) and news media  
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28 contributions. Here, we paid particular attention to prominent financial institutions publicly  
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30 addressing fossil fuel divestment related to climate change (e.g., Bank of England, 2015). As  
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32 opinion leaders and celebrities became particularly important for the global fossil fuel divestment  
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34 movement, we captured their voices primarily through their public endorsement statements and  
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36 speeches (e.g., DiCaprio, 2016), which totaled 39 texts. We collected 107 texts from divesting  
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38 organizations, which were produced and disseminated by healthcare institutions, local  
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40 governments, faith-based organizations, philanthropic organizations, and universities (e.g., BMA,  
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42 2014).  
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49 **News media.** The news media was an important actor given its well-established role in shaping  
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51 public debate (Carragee, 1993). Using the online Factiva database, we collected articles directly  
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53 addressing fossil fuel divestment, or the fossil fuel industry in relation to climate change. Covering  
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3 a timespan from June 2012 to December 2017, we gathered 648 media articles. This also allowed  
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5 us to “trace” how stigma emerged, tracking how stigma labels and associations gained popularity  
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7 in the press over time (Roulet, 2015).  
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10 **Interviews.** Thirteen interviews were conducted in order to gain insight into the movement’s  
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12 main arguments and activists’ motivations for partaking in the divestment movement. This  
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14 consisted of eight interviews with climate activists directly involved with the movement as  
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16 grassroots activists (four in the UK, three in the US, and one in Germany); three interviews with  
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18 researchers with expertise in energy, climate change, and sustainability at an international think-  
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20 tank; and two interviews with individuals working in financial services, one the head of a major  
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22 Scottish investment firm, and the second a London-based senior executive specializing in  
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24 environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) issues. These interviews guided our  
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26 research design and validated emerging conclusions from data analysis. Interview data indicated  
27  
28 the importance of analyzing internal and external documents and media articles to ascertain the  
29  
30 role of analogy in the construction of stigma, as well as further contextualizing and elucidating the  
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32 divestment movement as a project of stigmatization.  
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### 38 **Analytical strategy**

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40 Our analytical strategy was largely inductive and consisted of four stages. Curious to explore  
41  
42 the divestment movement and activists’ motivations for stigmatizing the fossil fuel industry, in the  
43  
44 first stage we familiarized ourselves with the various data accounts and plotted a detailed event  
45  
46 timeline as illustrated in Table 2 (van de Ven & Poole, 1995). We identified McKibben’s Rolling  
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48 Stone article, published in June 2012, as the point at which climate activists began what we  
49  
50 discovered was a stigmatization effort based on both texts and interviews describing it as such. We  
51  
52 also identified a tipping point at the end of 2016 and early 2017 when the fossil fuel industry’s  
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54 stigma arguably became increasingly institutionalized. Governments began proposing laws  
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3 banning the use of public funds for new investments into fossil fuels (e.g., Darby, 2017), and fossil  
4 fuel companies such as Peabody Energy (Wilson & Crooks, 2016) filed for bankruptcy, both citing  
5 the fossil fuel divestment movement as an impetus.  
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10 --- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---  
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12 In the second stage of analysis, we examined documents produced and distributed by climate  
13 activists, including interview transcripts, to understand how stigmatization was enacted. We used  
14 qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) to independently engage in open coding and inductively  
15 identify initial descriptive codes. We aimed to understand climate activists' main arguments,  
16 focusing on their descriptions of the relationship between the fossil fuel industry and climate  
17 change. This process resulted in approximately 90 codes; we stopped upon reaching theory  
18 saturation – i.e., when no new codes were emerging (Goulding, 2002). At this point, all three  
19 authors compared results and began rearranging these codes based on overlaps, producing several  
20 first-order categories – e.g., “death;” “disease;” and “deception.” Concurrently, other seemingly  
21 conflicting first-order categories were apparent – e.g., “morality;” “political struggle;” and  
22 “justice” – which were directed not toward the fossil fuel industry, but the activists themselves. To  
23 make sense of these categories we turned to seminal works on stigma and deviance (e.g., Becker,  
24 1963; Erikson, 1962; Goffman, 1963), working iteratively between theory and data (Glaser &  
25 Strauss, 1967). Here we realized the importance of considering the perspective of stigmatizers,  
26 which, from our reading of the organizational stigma literature, was not explicitly considered. This  
27 led us to “climb the ladder of abstraction” (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van De Ven, 2013:  
28 8) to see whether we could draw any further connections between the first-order categories  
29 described above, and other codes.  
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3 At this point, it became strikingly apparent that activists were drawing from several historical  
4 contexts to justify divestment, mostly related to past instances where organizations or countries  
5 were penalized—through divestment or boycotts—for morally inappropriate behavior. These  
6 included most notably: tobacco, weapons and arms, South African apartheid, US slavery and Civil  
7 Rights, and boycotts of Israel, Darfur, and Sudan. Given familiarity with discourse and language  
8 studies, two of the authors noted how these contexts were being used analogically. We therefore  
9 refocused our coding strategy on a discourse analysis approach, described above, and  
10 concentrating on the strategic use of analogy.  
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22 This third stage of analysis entailed identifying instances where analogies were mentioned,  
23 including relevant analogical figures of speech (e.g., metaphors, metonymy, etc.). We quickly  
24 realized that activists overwhelmingly drew from two analogical contexts in particular—apartheid  
25 and tobacco—and that each was used almost exclusively either in relation to the activists  
26 (apartheid), or the fossil fuel industry (tobacco). Returning to literature on analogy in both  
27 management studies and cognitive linguistics (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Gentner et al., 2001), we  
28 identified that these analogies took different forms for different purposes: deep (e.g., South African  
29 apartheid to generate emotive power related to morality of activists) and surface (e.g., tobacco to  
30 generate causal power related to the deviance of the industry).  
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42 The fourth stage of analysis involved temporally tracing the two analogical forms to identify  
43 their manifestation and strategic use within the context of activists' stigmatizing analogical work  
44 (see Table 3 for overview and quotation examples). Further abstracting from our data, we noticed  
45 that climate activists' analogical work formed a *moral dualism* between activists (moral) and the  
46 target of stigmatization (immoral); an "either, or," "us or them" division between stigmatizers and  
47 stigmatized. To make theoretical sense of this dynamic we turned to organization and management  
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3 studies literature, which has extensively explored the notion of dualism (Barley & Tolbert, 1997;  
4 Orlikowski & Yates, 2002; Poole & van de Ven, 1989). This literature defines dualism as a “clear-  
5 cut and decisive contrast” between opposing groups or dynamics with “no middle [...] ground”  
6 (Farjoun, 2010: 203). It is often studied in relation to organizational conflict, examining for  
7 instance how managers handle seemingly opposing organizational dynamics (van de Ven & Poole,  
8 1995). Extending this theorization, our data indicated that stigmatization’s dualistic nature is  
9 informed by *moralizing* processes (Ashforth, 2018). This final stage of analysis therefore involved  
10 identifying dynamics associated with moral dualism, such as activists overlooking or  
11 underrepresenting nuance – e.g., the fossil fuel industry’s potential to reduce the emissions of their  
12 products and services; or cultivating an “antagonistic relationship” (Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, &  
13 Hambrick, 2008: 239), whereby the target was constructed as an antithetical counterpart or  
14 “enemy” in relation to the moral superiority of stigmatizers.  
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31 --- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ---  
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### 33 **FINDINGS**

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35 The findings of our study are depicted by Figure 1, a model that illustrates the analogical  
36 construction of stigma as a dualistic process. “Initial framing” encompasses two preliminary  
37 discursive practices enacted by stigmatizers: (1) “problem articulation,” demonstrating how the  
38 status quo is problematic and assigning blame to specific actors; and (2) “solution proposal,”  
39 highlighting stigmatization as the solution.  
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46 The bulk of stigmatizers’ analogical work involves the next two co-constitutive strategies.  
47 The first substantive strategy, “establishing ingroup morality,” denotes how stigmatizers (the  
48 ingroup) emphasize their moral position using the analogical practices of “virtue transfer”  
49 (accentuating ingroup morality) and “affective association” (generating emotions to motivate  
50 stigmatization). The second substantive strategy, “amplifying outgroup deviance,” demonstrates  
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3 how stigmatizers transfer meanings from already-stigmatized source domains to the target (the  
4 outgroup), involving two analogical practices. “Instituting commonalities” forms a target category  
5 of organizations and accentuates the category’s commonalities with source domains. Stigmatizers  
6 then “reinforce negative traits” shared by the sources and target to both encourage the target’s  
7 ostracization and highlight its fundamental flaws.  
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12 Finally, “uptake and dispersion” demonstrates how stigmatizers’ analogical work  
13 disseminates through two practices. “Proximal adoption” illustrates how stakeholders empathic  
14 toward either the ingroup or an analogical source domain adopt stigmatizing analogies, while  
15 “distanced enactment” shows how “distant” stakeholders harness and contextualize meanings  
16 emerging from analogical work to stigmatize the target.  
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26 --- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---  
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### 28 **Initial framing**

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30 The “initial framing” process captures the germination of the stigmatization process. Though  
31 two practices, “problem articulation” and “solution proposal,” stigmatizers cultivate reasons for  
32 stigmatization and establish corresponding analogical contexts.  
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37 ***Problem articulation.*** The stigmatization process begins with stigmatizers’ constructing a  
38 compelling narrative to justify the radical shift in meanings of an organizational category from  
39 “normal” to “stigmatized.” This involves highlighting a specific problem with the status quo and  
40 assigning blame to a set of actors deemed responsible.  
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46 Climate activists were frustrated by the lack of action on climate change, as a University of  
47 Glasgow activist (2013) explained an interview:  
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51 We’ve tried traditional means of creating change. Through democratic means, through our  
52 votes and so on but this has not worked [...]. Since climate change first became a political  
53 issue at the Rio conference in 1992, emissions have gone up and continue to rise each day.  
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3 A lack of progress in the face of a climate emergency prompted activists to search for an alternative  
4 means of creating change. In doing so, activists aimed to “take the fight right to the source of the  
5 problem,” identifying the fossil fuel industry as *the* primary culprit for climate change and central  
6 to political inaction (350.org, 2014b). The industry was often accused of hijacking the  
7 policymaking process, particularly in the US where it had “just had too much control over  
8 Congress” (Welton, 2012). Activists constructed the fossil fuel industry as the “enemy,”  
9 exemplified by head of the movement Bill McKibben (2012) who asserted in the most cited text  
10 produced by activists:

21 [...] the planet does indeed have an enemy – one far more committed to action than  
22 governments or individuals. Given this hard math, we need to view the fossil-fuel industry  
23 in a new light. It has become a rogue industry, reckless like no other force on Earth. It is  
24 Public Enemy Number One to the survival of our planetary civilization.  
25

27 A clearly defined target, or “enemy,” toward which “moral outrage” could be directed was  
28 vital to diverting attention from other potential causes of the constructed problem. An Edinburgh  
29 University student activist (2013) further explained the necessity of assigning blame to the target  
30 of stigmatization in an interview:  
31

36 Nothing is working, and no one is taking the blame. But I’m telling you people need  
37 someone to blame, like an enemy. It’s the fossil fuel industry. [...] It’s so important that  
38 people don’t think it’s their fault, if they do, they won’t want to put up a fight. They will  
39 look at themselves and think they should stop driving, and maybe recycle more. This is  
40 [...] total nonsense. The blame lies squarely at the feet, or drilling site should I say, of the  
41 fossil fuel industry.  
42

44 To reinforce the blameworthiness of the fossil fuel industry and justify its stigmatization, activists  
45 heavily relied on arguments related to (im)morality. A “deeply flawed [political] system”  
46 benefitting a “morally bankrupt” fossil fuel industry was argued to propagate climate change, as  
47 student activist Talia Rothstein (2014) described. This discursive construction of moral bankruptcy  
48 disseminated widely and was often cited by news media (e.g., Carrington, 2015a; Ormerod, 2014;  
49 Oroschakoff, 2016).  
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3        ***Solution proposal.*** Once an intractable problem and its culprit (an organization or  
4 organizational category) have been identified and constructed, stigmatization can be proposed as  
5 a solution. As a Swarthmore College activist explained in the *New York Times* (in Gillis, 2012a):  
6  
7 “We need to by-pass the traditional political process and go directly to fossil fuel industry. That’s  
8 the goal, to stigmatize them directly.” In this process, stigmatizers also clarify *how* to achieve  
9 stigmatization. Climate activists, for instance, described how they mobilized discourses related to  
10 past, successful divestment movements and their associated contexts to achieve their goal of  
11 stigmatizing the fossil fuel industry. Importantly, divestment had established moral connotations  
12 that could be analogically linked to the fossil fuel industry and its role in advancing climate change,  
13 provoking an extreme either/or (moral) dilemma that forced stakeholders to “choose a side.” The  
14 UK’s leading divestment advocacy organization, Go Fossil Free (2013), explained:  
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16

17        Divestment isn’t primarily an economic strategy, but a moral and political one. Morally,  
18 it sends a clear message that if it’s wrong to wreck the planet, it’s also wrong to profit  
19 from that wreckage. Politically, divestment builds political power by forcing our nation’s  
20 most prominent institutions and individuals [...] to choose which side of the issue they are  
21 on.  
22  
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24        The most prominently utilized past divestment movements related to South African apartheid  
25 and tobacco. Early in the movement, the seminal US-based student group “Swarthmore Mountain  
26 Justice” (SMJ) noticed a relational pattern between seeking climate justice and the struggle against  
27 the apartheid regime and began to harness associated stigmatizing meanings. An SMJ document  
28 suggested (2012; emphasis added):  
29  
30

31        Swarthmore College ended its complicity in an unjust system by divesting from companies  
32 supporting South African apartheid. This nationwide campaign was hugely successful in  
33 working toward the end of the South African apartheid. We believe that it is now time for  
34 the College to respond to an *analogous* system of injustice.  
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37        SMJ’s cause became an international phenomenon when McKibben linked his environmental  
38 NGO, 350.org, to their movement. Like SMJ, McKibben explicitly used the analogy of apartheid,  
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3 exemplified throughout his popular *Rolling Stone* article “The Case for Fossil-Fuel Divestment”  
4  
5 (2013). News media similarly began referencing apartheid, for instance *The New York Times*  
6  
7 (Gillis, 2012b; emphasis added) describing the fossil fuel divestment movement as a “conscious  
8  
9 imitation of the successful effort in the 1980s to pressure colleges and other institutions to divest  
10  
11 themselves of the stocks of companies doing business in South Africa under apartheid.”  
12  
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14 Other divestment contexts, tobacco in particular but also arms manufacturing and the  
15  
16 boycotting of Israel, for instance, were similarly employed by both activists and the media (e.g.,  
17  
18 Urist, 2015). The mobilization of these contexts provided an effective and readily applicable  
19  
20 solution to tackling the “problem” described above. Indeed, as a Warwick University activist  
21  
22 expressed in an interview:  
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25  
26 ...Even if you were not born then [during apartheid], you know racism is immoral. You  
27  
28 also don’t need a PhD to know smoking causes cancer. It should therefore not be difficult  
29  
30 to make people believe that we should cut our ties with the fossil fuel industry, just as we  
31  
32 did with South African government, or tobacco, or Israel [...].

33 We next discuss the role of analogy, demonstrating how activists enacted two mutually reinforcing  
34  
35 strategies of “establishing ingroup morality” and “amplifying outgroup deviance” that were  
36  
37 fundamental to the stigmatization process.

### 38 **Strategy 1: Establishing ingroup morality**

39 The strategy “establishing ingroup morality” concerns the construction and mobilization of  
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41 discourses related to the moral superiority of an ingroup of stigmatizers. These discourses are  
42  
43 formed using *deep* analogies that generate emotive power to transfer both emotions and complex,  
44  
45 abstracted meanings from sources (analogical contexts) to target (ingroup) domains. Two  
46  
47 predominant analogical practices are used in this strategy: *virtue transfer* and *affective association*.  
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52 ***Virtue transfer.*** The analogical practice of “virtue transfer” positions the ingroup as morally  
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54 superior by transferring certain “virtue concepts”—abstracted meanings recognized by a wide  
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3 audience as righteous, honorable and good—from the source domain to the ingroup target. Climate  
4  
5 activists used three primary virtue concepts (“political struggle,” “justice” and “morality”) related  
6  
7 to analogical contexts concerning freedom from oppression, notably apartheid, to “connect the  
8  
9 historical dots” (Welton, 2012). This constructed what a Divest Harvard activist called “our  
10  
11 collective outcry” (Rothstein, 2014).  
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14 The virtue concept “political struggle” likened activists’ campaign against the fossil fuel  
15  
16 industry to political struggles of past divestment movements, particularly apartheid. A Divest  
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18 Harvard campaigner described during an interview: “the goal is that the *fight* against the fossil fuel  
19  
20 industry becomes the new apartheid *struggle* of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.” Mimicking the apartheid  
21  
22 campaign analogically enabled activists to adopt language used by apartheid campaigners in order  
23  
24 to produce a discourse framing the fossil fuel industry as their “opponent” in a “fight,” “battle,” or  
25  
26 even “war” (350.org, 2014a). This further created an amorphous, inclusive “we” of individuals,  
27  
28 groups, and organizations working together in the “battle,” described on 350.org’s website  
29  
30 (350.org, 2015a; emphasis added) as “an international movement of *ordinary people* working to  
31  
32 end the age of fossil fuels.” The construction of an all-encompassing and ordinary “we” was also  
33  
34 reproduced in the media, exemplified by activist and Harvard professor James Engell’s *Huffington*  
35  
36 *Post* article that repeatedly referenced Abraham Lincoln’s call for a collective struggle against  
37  
38 slavery, amongst other contexts related to historical struggles against oppression including  
39  
40 apartheid. Commencing his article with a quote from Lincoln highlighting “we,” Engell (2013)  
41  
42 also concluded by invoking Lincoln’s words related to the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation: “We  
43  
44 — even *we here* — hold the power, and bear the responsibility” (2013 emphasis original).  
45  
46 Correspondingly, McKibben encouraged attendees of his 2012 *Do the Math* tour to sign a banner  
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48 stating: “We > fossil fuels” (Appendix 1), “the people” scrawled under “We” as an homage to the  
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3 US constitution. This political phrase signifying a righteous struggle against an oppressor was also  
4 depicted on another oft-used banner with “Fossil Fuel CEOs” struck through and “We the People”  
5 scribbled prominently beneath (Appendix 2).  
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10 The virtue concept “justice” similarly united diverse audiences on the basis of morality. A  
11 Yale student activist explained during an interview: “Some of us would never call ourselves  
12 environmentalists. We are just people who do this because of moral reasons. Divestment is the  
13 right thing to do” (2015). Movement co-founder Naomi Klein explicated further during a 350.org  
14 (2015b) online workshop:  
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22 We’re fighting for the principle that polluters should pay, that how we pay for the  
23 transition has to be justice-based. We can bring our movements together and have one  
24 conversation instead of these separate conversations. [...] My hope is that the labor  
25 movement, the anti-cuts movement, the climate movement will really come together in a  
26 coherent demand for a just transition away from fossil fuels.  
27

28 Klein expanded the ingroup beyond environmentalists to encompass a wide variety of movements  
29 linked by the “justice” virtue concept, similar to the apartheid protesters who “provoked the  
30 consciences of the nation” (Strauss, 2013a). Discourses related to a (moral) quest for justice were  
31 as such evoked to encourage participation. For instance, Tufts Professor Julian Agyeman (in  
32 Associated Press, 2014) described faculty members supporting fossil fuel divestment as “veterans”  
33 of apartheid divestment campaigns. They used the virtue concept justice to encourage students to  
34 join the fossil fuel divestment campaign: “What we’ve tried to do with our students is say ‘this is  
35 your anti-apartheid movement, this is your social justice divestment campaign.’” Under a section  
36 entitled “We are stronger when we collaborate,” 350.org formally instituted the goal of unification  
37 of diverse audiences based on seeking justice (350.org, 2015a; emphasis added):  
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51 The climate crisis is not just an environmental issue, or a social justice issue, or an  
52 economic issue—it’s all of those things at once. The only way *we* will be strong enough  
53 to put pressure on governments and stand up to the fossil fuel industry is if *we* all work  
54 together. That means *bringing people together and building diverse coalitions*.  
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3 The third virtue concept, “morality,” captures the ingroup’s *esprit de corps*, forming a  
4 foundation for the movement and this strategy. As Go Fossil Free (2014a) recognized: “Just like  
5 in the struggle for civil rights in America or the fight to end apartheid in South Africa, the more  
6 we can make climate change a deeply moral issue, the more we will push society toward action.”  
7  
8 To reinforce the moral link between source and target domains, activists aligned themselves with  
9 (moral) actors associated with source domains, most notably Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a key  
10 figure in the fight against South African apartheid. Early in the campaign McKibben (2012)  
11 associated student activists with Tutu:  
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22 [...] these are no longer normal companies. They are rogues, breaking not the laws of the  
23 nation, but the laws of physics. And there is no gentle way to rein in rogues. [...] students  
24 know all this—they understand the grave importance of this battle. They know that heroes  
25 of the past, like Desmond Tutu, have joined their voices to the call.  
26

27 McKibben’s discursive work cultivated a sense that the fossil fuel divestment campaign was part  
28 of an historically grounded and universal moral struggle with activists likened to virtuous “heroes”  
29 such as Tutu. Tutu officially signaled his endorsement of the campaign in a Guardian opinion piece  
30 entitled, “We need an apartheid-style boycott to save the planet” (2014a). He explained: “Who can  
31 stop it? Well, we can, you and I. And it is not just that we can stop it, we have a moral responsibility  
32 to do so. [...] People of conscience need to break their ties with corporations financing the injustice  
33 of climate change.” Tutu’s moral call to arms invokes the “we” discourse to include those  
34 considering themselves to have a conscience, or anyone feeling a moral responsibility to fight “the  
35 injustice of climate change.”  
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48 ***Affective association.*** The second analogical practice, “affective association,” transfers  
49 emotions linked to source domains to the ingroup target to motivate stigmatizing action. An  
50 Edinburgh University divestment activist described: “[...] these past events we all know well, and  
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3 they stir emotion in all of us.” Three prevailing affective states loosely aligned with the above  
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5 virtue concepts: anger (“political struggle”), suffering/empathy (“justice”), and pride (“morality”).  
6

7  
8 Activists constructed discourses to provoke anger drawing on the virtue concept of “political  
9  
10 struggle.” Analogical source domains central to this virtue concept concern historical political  
11  
12 movements fraught with intense emotions of anger and indignation, such as US slavery and South  
13  
14 African apartheid. Climate activists posited that climate change inaction likewise engendered such  
15  
16 emotions. As the activist quoted above remarked of the need to target the fossil fuel industry for  
17  
18 stigmatization: “Many of us are pissed off [...]. If you’re looking for the cause, if you want to vent  
19  
20 your frustration [about climate change] at something, there it is, right in front of you.” Analogical  
21  
22 contexts related to political struggles were thus harnessed to rouse and accentuate such affective  
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24 states. McKibben (2012) explained that these feelings were critical to motivating action that could  
25  
26 generate “a real movement” as they had, for instance, in the analogous context of apartheid:  
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31 [...] pure self-interest probably won’t spark a transformative challenge to fossil fuel. But  
32  
33 moral outrage just might – and that’s the real meaning of this new math. It could, plausibly,  
34  
35 give rise to a real movement. Once, in recent corporate history, anger forced an industry  
36  
37 to make basic changes. That was the campaign in the 1980s demanding divestment from  
38  
39 companies doing business in South Africa.

40  
41 Feelings of anger and *moral* outrage, McKibben argued, triggered historical political struggles and  
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43 could likewise propel fossil fuel divestment.

44  
45 Emotions concomitant with suffering and empathy, intrinsic to the virtue concept “justice,”  
46  
47 were likewise incited to motivate stigmatization on the basis that the vulnerable would (again)  
48  
49 suffer most. As Tutu (2014b) explained:

50  
51 The most devastating effects are visited on the poor, those with no involvement in creating  
52  
53 the problem. A deep injustice. Just as we argued in the 1980s that those who conducted  
54  
55 business with apartheid South Africa were aiding and abetting an immoral system, today  
56  
57 we say nobody should profit from the rising temperatures, seas and human suffering  
58  
59 caused by the burning of fossil fuels.  
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3 Activists' analogical construction implicates the virtue concept of justice and its associated  
4 affective states of suffering and empathy to unite fossil fuel divestment with past struggles for  
5 justice. This discourse justified and propelled stigmatizing action, clarified by Cornell student  
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10 activist Jacob Glick (2015) in a newspaper opinion piece:

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12       Few, if any, of the students protesting apartheid had suffered under a racist regime; few,  
13       if any, of the students urging the University to divest from fossil fuels have had their  
14       homes destroyed by climate change. But they continue to march because of a noble  
15       concern for less fortunate others whom they may never meet.  
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18 Glick underscores how suffering itself does not necessitate action; rather empathic concern for  
19  
20 justice for vulnerable people is needed to drive stigmatization efforts.  
21

22       Activists elicited the virtue concept "morality" to generate feelings of nostalgia and related  
23  
24 pride. These affective associations were exemplified by Vice President of the UK's National  
25  
26 Students Union Piers Telemacque's *Guardian* opinion article entitled, "Whether it's apartheid or  
27  
28 fossil fuels, divestment is on the right side of history." In the article, Telemacque elides any  
29  
30 differences between the source and target domains to accentuate their union and righteousness on  
31  
32 a historical plane, employing emotional language to evoke feelings of nostalgia and pride.  
33  
34 Recalling past successes (nostalgia) in what he frames as an *ongoing* moral fight for justice  
35  
36 stimulates pride of having acted and continuing to act with moral integrity. In his conclusion he  
37  
38 asserts (2015):  
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43       I'm proud to be part of a movement that is still on the right side of history in our most  
44       crucial fights for global justice, just as we were in the 1970s and 80s. Sometimes you act  
45       on principle simply because it's the right thing to do. Sometimes, you act pragmatically to  
46       make a real impact. Divestment does both these things at the same time, and it's as  
47       effective now as it was during apartheid.  
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49

50 Qualified by the engendered sense of pride, Telemacque utilizes morality, "the right thing to do,"  
51  
52 to unify a collective "we" (ingroup), encouraging (divestment) action, "act pragmatically." This  
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3 affect therefore underscores necessary and principled action that unites analogous contexts as part  
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5 of a grander moral cause.  
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## 7 8 **Strategy 2: Amplifying outgroup deviance**

9 While the strategy of establishing ingroup morality constructs a morally superior and  
10 emotionally charged ingroup using deep analogies, amplifying outgroup deviance focuses on the  
11 outgroup, or target of stigmatization. This strategy harnesses “surface” analogies to generate direct  
12 comparisons between ostensibly similar sources and targets, therefore digestible by a wide  
13 audience. Surface analogical work produces *causal power* to explain cause-and-effect dynamics,  
14 such as how the fossil fuel industry’s business activity (cause) advances dangerous climate change  
15 (effect). This involves two analogical practices: “instituting commonalities” and “reinforcing  
16 negative traits.”  
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28 ***Instituting commonalities.*** In this practice, surface similarities common to both source and  
29 target domains are established and accentuated to intuitively transfer stigmatized meanings from  
30 an already stigmatized source to the target. An activist from Warwick University (2014) described  
31 the relative ease of engaging in surface analogical work that typically involved source domains of  
32 the tobacco and arms industries during an interview:  
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39 It’s easier in many ways [compared to apartheid]. Tobacco companies and fossil fuel  
40 companies are both companies, and they both sell highly dangerous products. In a way,  
41 the campaigns that stigmatized smoking, especially in the US and increasing in Europe,  
42 have done the work for us. We all know smoking is a disgusting habit, so why not burning  
43 fossil fuels. It’s a no-brainer.  
44  
45

46 Although emphasizing that tobacco divestment campaigners had “done the work for us,” activists  
47 engaged the practice of instituting commonalities to ensure analogical comparison was effortless,  
48 a “no brainer.” They did so by both grouping fossil fuel companies into the organizational category  
49 and elucidating important commonalities between source and target domains that were not  
50 immediately apparent or historically instituted.  
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3           Grouping fossil fuel companies into an identifiable organizational category of “the fossil  
4 fuel industry” facilitated comparisons with stigmatized organizational categories such as the  
5 “tobacco industry” or “arms industry.” This encouraged deindividuation that obscured the  
6  
7 idiosyncrasies of a single organization to transfer stigma across a category of organizations. A  
8 student activist from the University of Edinburgh (2013) described in an interview:  
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13           We don’t want to give the message that particular companies such as BP or Exxon need  
14 to be targeted, or specific industries such as only oil. Always keeping them together and  
15 referring to them as the fossil fuel industry works better and is more focused. It [...] isolates  
16 them as a separate group, sort of the bad boys in the school yard.  
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20 To demarcate organizations belonging to this outgroup, activists utilized material artifacts such as  
21 The Carbon Underground 200 Index, created by a former Standard & Poor’s managing director  
22 after attending a speech by McKibben on his “Do the Math” tour. According to 350.org’s Blair  
23 Palese (350.org, 2014c) this index acted as a “hit list” for stigmatization: “the companies at the top  
24 of the list have been warned – we’re coming after you [...].”  
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31           Further to deindividuation, activists accentuated surface links between sources and target that  
32 were less obvious. Karthik Ganapathy, 350.org spokesperson, explicated in the *Huffington Post*  
33 (O’Connor, 2015):  
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38           The idea was basically to shift cultural attitude [...]. Americans see cigarette companies in  
39 this certain way that’s really negative. If you ask an average American for their opinion  
40 of Philip Morris, it’s that they’re sort of merchants of death [...]. We want folks to see  
41 fossil fuels the same way, because the business model isn’t fundamentally all that  
42 different.  
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45 Activists sought to elucidate this fundamental similarity between source domains and the target to  
46 facilitate surface analogical work. By referencing the epithet “merchants of death” that relates to  
47 the arms industry profiting from human casualty during war, Ganapathy situates the fossil fuel  
48 industry amongst already stigmatized organizational categories on the basis of causing disease and  
49 death. To establish the fossil fuel industry as another “merchant of death,” activists emphasized  
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3 the deleterious effects of climate change, frequently citing the World Health Organization's  
4 research finding that "climate change caused some 150,000 deaths worldwide each year" (Divest  
5 Harvard, 2014). They in turn generated cause-and-effect links between the fossil fuel industry's  
6 business model and climate-related disease/death. For example, Naomi Klein's (2013) *Guardian*  
7 article critiquing the contradiction between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's fossil fuel  
8 investments and their action against malaria emphasized the industry's propagation of the disease:  
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17 [...] a top priority of the Gates Foundation has been malaria research, a disease intimately  
18 linked to climate. Mosquitoes and malaria parasites both thrive in warmer weather. Does  
19 it really make sense to fight malaria while fuelling one of the reasons it may be spreading  
20 more ferociously in some areas?  
21

22  
23 These types of arguments buttressed commonalities, or surface links, between the  
24 tobacco/arms and fossil fuel industries on the basis that all of their products contribute to disease  
25 and death. To further institute commonalities and thereby strengthen surface analogical work, any  
26 differences between sources and target – e.g., anti-divestment proponents' assertions that fossil  
27 fuels are considered necessary for powering economic activity whereas smoking may be regarded  
28 as needless indulgence (e.g., Bryce, 2012) – were also elided. Imagery replacing representations  
29 of smoking with the use of fossil fuels vividly illustrated this elision, e.g., substituting a factory  
30 smokestack which represents the burning of fossil fuels with a cigarette (see Appendix 3), or using  
31 the iconic image of Joe Camel from the Camel cigarette brand advertisements to represent a fossil  
32 fuel company CEO (see Appendix 4).  
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46 ***Reinforcing negative traits.*** In the practice "reinforcing negative traits," stigmatizers work to  
47 analogically establish the outgroup's deviance. For climate activists, this involved ostracizing the  
48 fossil fuel industry and exposing its business model as existentially flawed, emphasizing two key  
49 common negative traits between sources and target: disease/death (a trait instituted by activists'  
50 discursive work) and deception (a trait historically established). This practice generates *causal*  
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3 *power* to propel stigmatization by analogically establishing the cause of the problem and showing  
4  
5 the harmful effects engendered.  
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8 By reinforcing negative cause-and-effect traits related to both “disease” and “death,” activists  
9  
10 encouraged the ostracization of the fossil fuel industry. A Divest Harvard activist explained: “[we]  
11  
12 want to treat fossil-fuel companies like tobacco companies, ostracizing them because they  
13  
14 capitalize on businesses that have bad health effects” (Mufson, 2013). To emphasize this strategic  
15  
16 outcome, activists frequently referenced diseases common to products sold by the tobacco and  
17  
18 fossil fuel industries. A letter by Fossil Free Warwick University suggested (Fossil Free Warwick  
19  
20 University, 2013):  
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24 No UK university in their right mind would accept funding from or invest their funds in  
25  
26 tobacco companies these days - it’s inconsistent with their research on cancer. The same  
27  
28 holds true for fossil fuel companies causing climate change and yet most universities still  
29  
30 do not recognise this. That’s about to change!

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32 This analogical work established causal power by suggesting the fossil fuel industry’s business  
33  
34 model is as deathly as that of the tobacco industry, necessitating similar stigmatization.

35  
36 Several media outlets also associated fossil fuels with diseases linked to smoking, such as  
37  
38 addiction. A *Guardian* article (Corner, 2013) entitled “Coming off fossil fuels is akin to quitting  
39  
40 smoking – only harder” suggested: “Our reliance on fossil fuels is like an addiction, and to confront  
41  
42 it we can learn from how other addictive behaviours are tackled [...]. Although the analogy is not  
43  
44 complete, the parallels are clear enough.” Interestingly, while acknowledging analogical  
45  
46 incompleteness given obvious differences between the analogical contexts, as we described,  
47  
48 instituting commonalities ensured that “the parallels are clear enough.” On the basis of its role in  
49  
50 contributing to death and disease, amputation metaphors were elicited to explain that the fossil fuel  
51  
52 industry must be “cast out” of society in order for it to remain “healthy”: “They [the fossil fuel  
53  
54 industry] are the rotting part of our system. Actually, they are the ones causing the rot! We need  
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3 to get rid of them quickly before the infection becomes irreversible” (Edinburgh University climate  
4  
5 activist, interview, 2013).  
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8 A second reoccurring negative trait was “deception.” Activists analogically explained that the  
9  
10 fossil fuel industry, like the tobacco industry, knew about the dangerous nature of their product  
11  
12 and misled the public in order to maintain profits. As McKibben (in SMJ, 2015) suggested: “[this]  
13  
14 is no different than the tobacco industry—for years, they lied about the dangers of their industry.”  
15  
16 The surface similarity of the deceitful behavior of both industries had a historical precedence.  
17  
18 Activists based analogical comparisons on a campaign by the Union of Concerns Scientists (2007)  
19  
20 that implicated US oil giant Exxon Mobil in funding climate denialism. The UCS’ report, resulting  
21  
22 in a legal dispute, was fittingly entitled, “Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big  
23  
24 Tobacco’s Tactics to ‘Manufacture Uncertainty’ on Climate Change.” A similar comparison was  
25  
26 later made by Harvard historians Oreskes and Conway (2011) in a popular book entitled *Merchants*  
27  
28 *of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to*  
29  
30 *Global Warming*, which elicited analogical links to “merchants of death,” as previously mentioned.  
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36 This historical connection was harnessed by activists to reinforce the common negative trait  
37  
38 of deception. As an MIT activist asserted in a *Guardian* opinion piece: “Climate science denial is  
39  
40 as clear as the science itself. *The Merchants of Doubt* [...] exposes the fossil fuel lobby’s self-  
41  
42 described ‘win ugly or lose pretty’ tactics, drawn straight from Big Tobacco’s playbook” (Supran,  
43  
44 2012). Reinforcing the negative trait of deception, as suggested above, also discredited the fossil  
45  
46 fuel industry’s influence over climate change policy. Activists focused on the industry’s ability to  
47  
48 use its financial power to lobby and manipulate politicians, as the tobacco industry had in the past.  
49  
50 One activist described this dynamic analogically in a newspaper opinion piece entitled: “Big Oil,  
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52 Big Tobacco, Big Lies: Why the fossil-fuel industry has no place in climate policymaking”  
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3 (Louaillier & McKibben, 2015). Situating the fossil fuel industry as a “political player” was also  
4  
5 central to framing the need for its stigmatization in the first place, discussed in the initial framing  
6  
7 section. As one activist explained: “We think that will have a powerful effect on their ability to  
8  
9 manipulate our political system. Stigmatization is key. This is the tobacco industry of our day”  
10  
11 (Butterfield, 2013).  
12  
13

14 Both negative traits (death/disease and deception) were used analogically to reinforce the  
15  
16 project of stigmatization; namely, emphasizing the fossil fuel industry as fundamentally flawed.  
17  
18 Rather than focusing on its operations such as extracting and selling fossil fuels, activists  
19  
20 highlighted its core being as beyond repair, emphasizing the industry’s “destructive business  
21  
22 model” (Mulkey in 350.org, 2013a) posing a “fundamental” (Lappen & Jiang, 2014) or “existential  
23  
24 threat” (Seiger, 2014). A Warwick University student activist (2014) emphasized the impossibility  
25  
26 of industry change or improvement:  
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31 This is not about technical fixes, or making the fossil fuel industry more efficient [...].  
32 These are red herrings, smoke screens, distracting from the issue. You can’t make a  
33 weapons company a little more moral, [or] you can’t make tobacco a little more healthy!  
34 So do you think a fossil fuel company can be a bit cleaner? That’s just plain stupid.  
35

36 Situating the fossil fuel industry alongside arms and tobacco suggested that all three are inherently  
37  
38 flawed, accentuated by dismissing any prospect of the fossil fuel industry transitioning to a more  
39  
40 sustainable, or “cleaner,” path. That a person must be “plain stupid” not to understand this logic  
41  
42 emphasized the intuitiveness of the surface analogical work, therefore generating causal power to  
43  
44 encourage stigmatization.  
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### 47 **Stigma uptake and dispersion**

48 The effects of the above strategies, establishing ingroup morality and amplifying outgroup  
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50 deviance, were evidenced by the uptake of the activists’ analogical stigmatization work,  
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52 comprising two stakeholder practices: *proximal adoption* and *distant enactment*. Proximal  
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3 adoption involves empathic stakeholders harnessing analogical inferential power cultivated by  
4 activists to support and propagate stigmatization. In contrast, distant enactment demonstrates how  
5 stakeholders without overt empathic ties contextualized certain aspects of activists' analogical  
6 work (e.g., morality) to fit their own reasons for stigmatizing the target.  
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12 ***Proximal adoption.*** Stakeholders with either empathic ties to the ingroup and motivations  
13 driving stigmatization or with particular source domains mobilized by stigmatizers proximally  
14 adopt stigmatizers' analogical work without substantively changing the analogies. Proximal  
15 adoption was initially evidenced in relation to stakeholders that climate activists referred to as  
16 "allies" (350.org, 2014d). Often, activists intentionally worked to involve allies such as opinion  
17 leaders, celebrities, and media outlets, among others. A senior member of Edinburgh University's  
18 divestment campaign explained: "We [...] tap into our own network to target specific individuals  
19 [...]. Nine times out of ten they are very receptive even though the whole idea of stigmatizing the  
20 [fossil fuel] industry thing can seem extreme." Allies' receptiveness often stemmed from their  
21 existing identification with climate activism. The activist continued: "Many of these people know  
22 about our struggle before the divestment campaign started, so it's easy to get them aboard. They  
23 are vital for our case because everyone listens when they talk." A key example of an ally opinion  
24 leader is academic Noam Chomsky. Chomsky (in SMJ, 2016) proximally adopted activists' line  
25 of analogical reasoning by amplifying the fossil fuel industry's deviance related to the tobacco  
26 source domain (referencing "addiction") before implementing the apartheid source domain in  
27 explaining his support for the movement:  
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49 None of us can wait for someone else to end the addiction to fossil fuels that is causing  
50 the climate chaos that is just beginning. Ending apartheid required the force of many  
51 different streams in the movement. But Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu have  
52 stated that one key stream was the delegitimizing of apartheid that resulted from the  
53 divestment campaign.  
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3 Several allies more directly adopted activists' analogical work in lending their support to the  
4 campaign. For instance, in 2015 *The Guardian* newspaper launched its own divestment campaign  
5 called "Keep it in the Ground" (Guardian, 2015) and used proximal adoption extensively. After  
6 divesting its fossil fuel holdings, then editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger justified the move in an  
7 editorial piece outlining the moral imperatives for divestment. He recited activists' analogical  
8 arguments with a hyperlink to Tutu's seminal article on divestment (Tutu, 2014a). In a short video  
9 accompanying the piece, Rusbridger employed the apartheid analogy to cite the moral impetus  
10 behind his editorial decision to support divestment, explaining:  
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21 A generation ago when the biggest moral issue in the world was apartheid in South Africa,  
22 Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu suggested this tactic, that it was time for the great  
23 institutions of the West to cut their ties with companies that propped up the apartheid  
24 regime. [...] Divestment is very useful for shaming companies, for bringing the issue out  
25 into the open more.  
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28 Stakeholders not necessarily considered "allies" or associated with grassroots climate activism  
29 often engaged with proximal adoption given an identification with the analogical source domains.  
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31 For example, Irish ex-president Mary Robinson (2014) reminisced about her involvement with the  
32 anti-apartheid campaign in justifying her support:  
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37 It's, to me, a little bit like the energy that was behind the anti-apartheid movement when I  
38 was a student. We were all involved because we saw the injustice of it. There's an injustice  
39 in continuing to invest in fossil fuel companies that are part of the problem.  
40  
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42 Given her personal history, Robinson interpreted the divestment movement with a similar moral  
43 imperative through the virtue concept of justice. In other instances, stakeholders resonated with  
44 activists' amplification of the fossil fuel industry's deviance. For example, healthcare institutions  
45 strongly identified with activists' analogical work around the source domain of tobacco. Notable  
46 examples of healthcare institutions who proximately adopted activists' analogical reasoning in  
47 supporting divestment include the British Medical Association (BMA), World Medical  
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3 Association, the Royal College of Physicians, and American Public Health Association. A BMA  
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5 spokesperson (BMA, 2014) explained:

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8 Doctors have long recognised that it is wrong to treat smoking-related diseases whilst  
9 investing in the tobacco industry. This vote makes a similar statement in relation to fossil  
10 fuel investments and the immediate and grave threats to human health posed by climate  
11 change. It is to be hoped that all organisations and individuals will follow their lead, and  
12 will similarly act with principle.  
13

14 Exemplified by this quote, healthcare institutions often echoed activists' analogical work by  
15 emphasizing negative health effects propagated by climate change that are caused by the fossil  
16 fuel industry's business model, while also citing a moral ("act with principle") imperative for  
17 action.  
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23 Faith-based organizations' (FBOs) history with divestment on ethical grounds often  
24 engaged in proximal adoption, and comprise the most significant proportion of total assets divested  
25 (Go Fossil Free, 2020). FBOs have a strict asset-screening process to avoid "sin stocks" related to  
26 gambling, arms, tobacco, and pornography, among others. Activists' analogical work prompted  
27 fossil fuel stocks' inclusion on this list. The United Methodist Church, for instance, revised its  
28 investment guidelines based on the virtue concept of "justice:" "[We have] a history of divestment  
29 to enforce its social justice agenda. The church divested \$77 million from companies doing  
30 business with apartheid South Africa in the 1980s" (Audi, 2015). This move was arguably  
31 furthered by religious figures such as Pope Francis, a Guardian headline reading : "Catholic orders  
32 take their lead from the pope and divest from fossil fuels" (Slezak, 2016). As Reverend Margaret  
33 Bullitt-Jonas (in Wangsness, 2013) of Grace Episcopal Church explained:  
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49 Just as I wouldn't want to be making money off tobacco or military operations, I don't  
50 want to be making money off fossil fuel. [...] It is one of the only businesses I can think  
51 of that, if successful in carrying out their business plan, they are going to essentially be  
52 killing life as it has evolved on this planet.  
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3 Bullitt-Jonas situates the fossil fuel industry among both the tobacco and arms, proximally  
4 adopting and accentuating the deviant trait of “death.” As such, activists’ analogical work raised  
5 awareness of the fossil fuel industry’s deathly, destructive actions that are contrary to FBOs’  
6 religious values.  
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12 Interestingly, some stakeholders proximally adopted activists’ analogical work after initial  
13 hesitation. For instance, although firstly avoiding engagement with stigmatization efforts despite  
14 mounting pressure (350.org, 2014e), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate  
15 Change (UNFCCC) became increasingly radical in its tone regarding the fossil fuel industry’s role  
16 in advancing climate change. By March 2015, the UNFCCC chose to support divestment,  
17 proximally adopting activists’ analogical work by tweeting: “#Divestment worked to free SA of  
18 #apartheid. Now it can help free us of #fossilfuels.” This tweet was linked to 350.org’s Twitter  
19 account and contained a picture of Tutu with an accompanying quote that stated: “We can no  
20 longer continue feeding our addiction to fossil fuels as if there is no tomorrow. For there will be  
21 no tomorrow” (Carrington, 2015b).  
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35 ***Distanced enactment.*** By engaging in distanced enactment, stakeholders not associated with  
36 the ingroup or analogical source domains employed and contextualized activists’ analogically  
37 generated meanings without directly referencing the analogies themselves. For instance, The  
38 Rockefeller Family Foundation (in Rupert, 2016) drew on moral arguments emerging from the  
39 deceptiveness of the fossil fuel industry and specifically ExxonMobil to justify their decision to  
40 divest in March 2016, explaining:  
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49 We would be remiss if we failed to focus on what we believe to be the morally  
50 reprehensible conduct on the part of ExxonMobil. Evidence appears to suggest that the  
51 company worked since the 1980s to confuse the public about climate change’s march,  
52 while simultaneously spending millions to fortify its own infrastructure against climate  
53 change’s destructive consequences and track new exploration opportunities as the Arctic’s  
54 ice receded.  
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3 Morality was central to its decision to divest, significant given the family's notorious history with  
4 the oil industry. This significance was not lost on activists, a DC Divest member observing (in  
5  
6 Kurzius, 2016): "We've gone from being a fringe thing to seeing the Rockefellers divest."  
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10 Cities choosing to divest similarly harnessed analogically created meanings around  
11  
12 "morality." For instance, Washington D.C. Council Member Charles Allen (in Hirji, 2016)  
13  
14 declared of the city's decision to divest: "This is a decision that is morally and ethically the right  
15  
16 thing." Distanced enactment was also evidenced by his allusion to the success of past divestment  
17  
18 movements without mentioning analogical contexts: "I applaud the D.C. Retirement Board for  
19  
20 doing right by all Washingtonians. In the past, divestment has proven to be an incredibly powerful  
21  
22 tool for effecting positive change" (Richardson, 2016).  
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26 Other stakeholders drew on meanings generated by activists' analogical work around  
27  
28 death/disease. For instance, in 2018 Georgetown University (Cassou, 2018) described its decision  
29  
30 to divest from tar sands as well as coal by alluding to death and disease:  
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33 Tar sands extraction, like coal mining, is an activity that has an extremely deleterious  
34  
35 effect on the environment [...] Tar sands extraction is also inconsistent with the  
36  
37 University's principle of 'protection of human life and dignity'. It negatively affects public  
38  
39 health in communities living near extraction sites, disproportionately harming indigenous  
40  
41 people from First Nations communities.

42 Contextualized in relation to the university's principle to protect life, the university cited not only  
43  
44 environmental harm, but also public health effects in neighboring communities. Activists  
45  
46 accentuated links to their analogical work in reaction to the news, one stating (Cassou, 2018;  
47  
48 emphasis added): "Eliminating tar sands, a particularly dirty fossil fuel with *disastrous health*  
49  
50 *effects*, from our university's financial underpinnings is a huge step in the *right* direction."  
51

52 Analogical outcomes related to fossil fuels' "devastating impact" were often incited through  
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54 distanced enactment by stakeholders using this reasoning to substantiate a transition to "cleaner"  
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56 energy sources. For instance, Jim Yong Kim (World Bank, 2014), president of the World Bank,  
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3 noted at the World Economic Forum: “We called for a phase-out of harmful fossil fuel subsidies.  
4 Act now. [So that these] can be redirected to support investment in clean growth.” This draws on  
5  
6 analogical meanings of the harm (disease/death) engendered by the fossil fuel industry as an  
7  
8 opportunity to develop new forms of investment. This line of reasoning was exemplified by Oslo  
9  
10 finance commissioner Eirik Lae Solberg who explained of the city’s 2015 divestment: “We are  
11  
12 pulling ourselves out of coal companies, because power generation based on coal is one of the  
13  
14 most environmentally harmful in the energy sector. We want to use our investments to promote  
15  
16 more environmentally-friendly energy and a more environmentally-friendly society” (Carrington,  
17  
18 2015c). Distanced enactment therefore facilitated stakeholders not traditionally associated with  
19  
20 climate activism or the analogical contexts to employ meanings generated by analogical reasoning  
21  
22 in divesting or transitioning from fossil fuels.  
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## 28 **DISCUSSION**

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30 This paper began by asking how actors strategically use a specific discursive device – *analogy*  
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32 – to stigmatize a category of organizations. We answer this question by reflecting on our key  
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34 contribution, that the process of stigmatization is contingent on constructing a *moral dualism* in  
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36 which two opposing sides are emphasized: good, moral stigmatizers and an evil target.  
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38 Constructing this moral dualism is based on analogical work cultivating emotive and causal  
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40 inferential power to create and disperse stigmatizing associations to a variety of stakeholder  
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42 audiences. We discuss how analogical stigmatization work can therefore empower radical fringe  
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44 actors, such as climate activists, enabling them to change meanings associated with an incumbent  
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46 actor. We conclude by outlining the transferability of these findings, along with limitations and  
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48 opportunities for future research.  
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### Stigmatization as a moral dualism

The key contribution of our study is to demonstrate how the construction of a moral dualism between stigmatizers (moral) and stigmatized (immoral) is intrinsic to the process of stigmatization. Because organizational research on stigma typically focuses on those entities *being* stigmatized rather than those *doing* the stigmatizing (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Tracey & Phillips, 2016), the dualistic nature of stigmatizers' work has largely been overlooked.

As evidenced by our study, stigmatization is cultivated by establishing a stark dualistic moral contrast. The target of stigmatization is painted as completely evil, while those doing the stigmatizing as entirely moral in their quest for justice, both in relation to morally dualistic analogical contexts. Somewhat counterintuitive to extant literature, stigmatizers' analogical work was to a great degree focused on constructing their own moral superiority, seeking to be perceived as the ordinary, just, and good "normals" in relation to a deviant, immoral target of stigmatization (Goffman 1963). This amplifies Ashforth's (2018: 23) observation of the "contagious" nature of morality underpinning stigma, whereby fostering a strong moral conviction is pivotal to the project of stigmatization.

Climate activists instigated a moral quest against the fossil fuel industry reminiscent of Howard Becker's (1963) conceptualization of moral entrepreneur: "The existing rules do not satisfy him [sic] because there is some evil which profoundly disturbs him [...]. He operates with an absolute ethic; what he sees is truly and totally evil." Like Hampel and Tracey (2017) who described the moral entrepreneurship of institutional intermediaries such as the press stoking moral panic to stigmatize mass travel during Victorian Britain, our case highlights how climate activists sparked a "moral outrage" (McKibben, 2012), attributing climate inaction to the "evil" of the fossil fuel industry. Our conceptualization, however, emphasizes how activists' moral entrepreneurship

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3 involved not only a crusade against evil, but also extensively highlighting their “good” position in  
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5 comparison.  
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8 Analogical contexts in which opposition between “good” and “evil” is established or obvious  
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10 is vital to clarifying and constructing the moral dualism of stigmatization. For instance, contexts  
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12 related to freedom from oppression bolstered the moral position of climate activists by relating  
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14 them to “heroes” who fought against stigmatized racist systems such as slavery, segregation, and  
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16 apartheid, certainly and historically considered evil. Likewise, the negative health effects of  
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18 tobacco now seem obvious, and the morally reprehensible position of the tobacco industry  
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20 unquestionable; those stigmatizers who exposed these “truths” are considered moral, good and  
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22 ultimately “right.” Analogical work thereby facilitates a moral dualism; the power of these  
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24 analogical contexts to convey this moral dualism and prompt stigmatizing action is discussed next.  
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### 28 **Analogical forms and stigmatizing power**

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30 Analogical reasoning employed to perpetuate the moral dualism of stigmatization is  
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32 underpinned by two complementary, reinforcing analogical forms: “deep” and “surface” (Gentner,  
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34 2005). This demonstrates the centrality of language in stigma’s formational processes (Devers et  
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36 al., 2009) and emphasizes the emotive and causal power of the analogical forms (Cornelissen et  
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38 al., 2011; Gavetti et al., 2005; Gentner et al., 2001; Glaser et al., 2016).  
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42 Deep analogies highlight the role that emotions and affect play in cultivating stigmatizing  
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44 action (Thagard & Shelley, 2006) and largely focus on mobilizing a moral “we.” While emotion  
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46 is central to stigma (e.g., Schwarzer & Weiner, 1991), it is typically discussed in conceptual work  
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48 (Devers et al., 2009; Pollock et al., 2019), only implicit to some empirical studies (e.g., Helms &  
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50 Patterson, 2014). Emotion, however, may be as central to stigma as morality. In comparing social  
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52 evaluations including reputation, status, and celebrity, Pollock et al (2019) characterize stigma as  
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54 primarily determined by moral and emotional dimensions. Moreover, Ashworth (2018: 2) argues  
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3 that in the stigmatization process, “a sense of moral superiority can fuel righteous anger.”  
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5 Evidenced by our study, emotions are not necessarily a triggered response to being stigmatized, as  
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7 commonly theorized (e.g., Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009), but propel stigmatizing action (see the  
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9 practice of affective association). Emotive analogical power is particularly salient for actors  
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11 resonating with source domains (Thagard & Shelley, 2006), demonstrated by the affective analogy  
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13 of apartheid. Those who, for emotional and/or moral reasons, identified with struggles surrounding  
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15 apartheid, likewise felt compelled to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry.  
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20 Surface analogies, conversely, provide explanatory, logical, cause-and-effect imperatives for  
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22 stigmatizing the target, namely highlighting its deviance. Surface analogical work focusing on the  
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24 target of stigmatization generates casual power to explain cause-and-effect dynamics of an  
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26 organizational category’s practices in relation to apparently similar, already-stigmatized  
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28 organizational categories. This clarifies why the target organizational category requires  
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30 stigmatization, illuminating the need for its ostracization, as well as the existential flaws it shares  
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32 with already stigmatized organizational categories. Source and target domains are apparently  
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34 similar, their features and characteristics intuitively alike. Therefore, analogical reasoning is easily  
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36 understood by a wide variety of audiences; one need not have experience of or expert knowledge  
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38 about the source domain in order to make inferences and take stigmatizing action. This is  
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40 evidenced by activists referring to the comparison between the fossil fuel and tobacco industry as  
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42 a “no brainer,” with inferences drawn by a multiplicity of stakeholders, e.g., both faith-based and  
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44 healthcare organizations.  
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50 The power of analogy thereby emerges from an effectual combination of deep and surface  
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52 analogies that are intuitive, lucid and compelling and therefore provide an emotional *and* logical  
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54 imperative to drive stigmatizing action. This finding contributes to organization and management  
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3 studies on analogy in two ways. First, inferences drawn from analogical work (e.g., virtue  
4 concepts, affective associations, and negative traits) are demonstrated not merely as cognitive  
5 abstractions, but as strategically produced and reproduced (Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010;  
6 Cornelissen et al., 2011; Ketokivi et al., 2017). This enhances previous research that conceptualises  
7 analogical inferences as a product of the analogy itself, rather than attributing such inferences to  
8 the work of actors who actively produce them as our findings demonstrate (Etzion & Ferraro,  
9 2010). Second, with the exception of Glaser et al (2016), extant studies do not distinguish different  
10 types of analogies and their inferential power. We extend Glaser et al's (2016) work by  
11 highlighting how deep and surface analogies can work interdependently, increasing the inferential  
12 power of analogy. We next discuss this efficacy by illustrating how the moral dualism produced  
13 by analogical work enabled radical fringe actors to gain power and bring marginalized practices,  
14 such as stigmatizing an incumbent, into public discourse.

### 30 **Stigmatization as empowering**

31 A focus on the stigmatizers' perspective elicited a third rather surprising insight not often  
32 addressed in wider literature on stigma that typically frames stigma as a means for incumbents or  
33 elite actors to denigrate already marginalized groups (e.g., the poor [Hampel & Tracey, 2017]).  
34 Through this lens, stigmatization is largely understood as a process of profound disempowerment  
35 (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999). We find instead that stigma can be empowering for those actors *doing*  
36 stigmatization work. This argument should not be confused with theories of stigma empowerment  
37 focused on how the stigmatized can embrace their stigma; e.g., becoming a happier, stronger  
38 person after dealing with the stigma of a physical disability (Shih, 2004). This perspective  
39 considers recipients of stigma, not its producers – i.e., stigmatizers – as we do here. This significant  
40 finding has both theoretical and practical ramifications.

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3 Theoretically, our findings highlight how fringe actors can strategically utilize the power of  
4 analogy to affect a field-level issue such as climate change (Schüßler, Ruling, & Wittneben, 2014),  
5 thereby loosening the grip of an incumbent actor through stigmatization. By engaging in analogical  
6 work, fringe actors acquire the discursive and symbolic resources (Hardy et al., 2000; Oliver,  
7 1991)—including analogical source domains and their associated meanings (see also Glaser et al.,  
8 2016)—to stigmatize the incumbent. This complements existing work in institutional theory that  
9 discusses how institutional entrepreneurs (Lawrence et al., 1999) strategically draw on discursive  
10 mechanisms to create, maintain, and disrupt field-level debates (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald,  
11 1996). Likewise, social movement literature explains how fringe actors gain influence over  
12 incumbent actors by mobilizing support from other radical and moderate actors (den Hond & de  
13 Bakker, 2007), institutional entrepreneurs (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), and wider publics  
14 (Maguire & Hardy, 2009).

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17 Our study instead demonstrates that fringe actors do not need to advance their own agenda or  
18 views to undermine the legitimacy of field incumbents (e.g., Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch,  
19 2003); rather, by harnessing analogy, fringe actors can “borrow” (stigmatizing) meanings. As our  
20 findings highlight, rather than “start from scratch,” climate activists appropriated meanings related  
21 to already-stigmatized source domains to inform stakeholder audiences that the fossil fuel industry  
22 possessed similar deviant traits. The analogical work had, as one activist mentioned, “already been  
23 done;” e.g., historical campaigns likening the tobacco industry’s suppression of cancer research to  
24 the fossil fuel industry’s deception regarding climate science (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).

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27 The significance of stigmatization’s empowering potential is also practical: the stigmatization  
28 process, propelled by the power of analogy, can be used to address grand challenges such as  
29 climate change (Wright & Nyberg, 2017). As management and organization scholars have  
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3 elucidated, a key reason why grand challenges endure is that actors lack the means, voice, and  
4 organization to affect meaningful, scalable change (Claus & Tracey, 2020; George, Howard-  
5 Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016; Porter, Tuertscher, & Huysman, 2020). Climate change is a  
6 particularly salient example based on scientific evidence of its urgency and destructive potential  
7 (IPCC, 2014). However, as climate activists also observe, meaningful action by policymakers and  
8 businesses is sparse and largely ineffectual (Slawinski, Pinkse, Busch, & Banerjee, 2017). As  
9 illustrated by this case, collective action geared toward stigmatizing an incumbent actor directly  
10 implicated with advancing a grand challenge may be an effective tool for “casting out” or  
11 disempowering an incumbent actor, such as the fossil fuel industry (Ferns & Amaeshi, 2019; Ferns,  
12 Amaeshi, & Lambert, 2019).

### 25 **Transferability, limitations, and future research**

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27 While many insights from our study are transferable to contexts extending beyond our specific  
28 case, there are also certain limitations that require reflection. Together, these points elucidate  
29 potential avenues for future research that we outline here.

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31 Our conceptualization of the moral dualism of stigmatization is widely transferable. For  
32 instance, actors attempting to stigmatize industries yet to be severely devalued and ostracized  
33 could ascertain from our model that a moralized ingroup and a vilified outgroup must be clearly  
34 delineated. This extends beyond organizational categories with high carbon footprints such as the  
35 beef or shipping industries that are also susceptible to stigmatization by climate activists to include  
36 industries that exacerbate other grand challenges, for instance related to inequality (Amis, Mair,  
37 & Munir, 2020). A striking example is the financial sector, which has, to varying degrees, evaded  
38 widespread stigmatization (Roulet, 2015). Understanding stigmatization as a moral dualism could  
39 shed light on the relative failure of movements such as Occupy Wall Street to stigmatize the  
40 financial industry (Reinecke & Ansari, 2020) as we observe that (fringe) actors must also do  
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3 (analogical) work to establish their morality to stigmatize effectively. That said, applying a moral  
4 dualism lens to organizational categories understood to be deeply moral may be more complex.  
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6 For example, attempting to stigmatize an organizational category such as the church (Gutierrez,  
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8 Howard-Grenville, & Scully, 2010) may require tools beyond the scope of our model, therefore  
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10 necessitating future research. Going beyond stigmatization, the concept of constructing a moral  
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12 dualism may be transferable to other social evaluations, and therefore also warrants future  
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14 research. For instance, it is conceivable that actors' delegitimizing work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009;  
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16 Vaara & Tienari, 2008) operates dualistically suggesting they must work on their own legitimacy,  
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18 to, in turn, delegitimize a particular target (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 217).  
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24 There are three further avenues for future research generated by our study related to  
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26 stigmatized/stigmatizer dynamics and forms of analogy. Firstly, given that our primary focus was  
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28 on the stigmatizers rather than the stigmatized, the fossil fuel industry's reaction to stigmatization  
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30 was not extensively addressed. The industry attempted to undermine activists' stigmatization  
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32 efforts by publicly questioning their use of scientific evidence and financial analysis (e.g., BP,  
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34 2014; Exxon, 2014; Shell, 2014). The industry also challenged activists' analogical work,  
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36 particularly by attacking activists' moral positioning (American Energy Alliance, 2015; World  
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38 Coal Association, 2015) and generating their own analogies – e.g., comparing society's reliance  
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40 on fossil fuels to romantic love (Environmental Policy Alliance, 2015). As such, a fruitful research  
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42 opportunity may be to examine how incumbent actors defend themselves against stigmatization  
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44 by challenging fringe actor's construction of morality using analogical reasoning. Secondly, in this  
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46 study we took a broad perspective on “analogy” to develop an understanding of its use in  
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48 stigmatization. Future research could analyze its specific forms, such as metaphor, synecdoche, or  
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50 irony, to discover how these are implemented, and why, throughout a stigmatization effort (Kwon,  
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3 Clarke, Vaara, Mackay, & Wodak, 2020; Riad & Vaara, 2011). Moreover, examining the forms  
4 of analogy that the target of stigmatization deploys defensively – and how stigmatizers could in  
5 turn appropriate these defensively-generated meanings – may offer greater insight into the role of  
6 language in the dynamic of stigmatization. A third area of future research relates to multimodality  
7 (Höllerer et al., 2019) and use of analogy in stigmatization. Although where appropriate we  
8 incorporated visual imagery that demonstrated analogical formation (see appendices), this was not  
9 our focus. Future research could pay closer attention to the use of videos and images in analogical  
10 reasoning (e.g., the fossil fuel industry’s use of a video clip in constructing the romantic love  
11 analogy mentioned above), particularly on social media where these modalities proliferate.  
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## 23 **Conclusion**

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25 This research was motivated by the absence of studies that specifically examine the  
26 perspectives of stigmatizers. We drew from the discursive turn in organizational and management  
27 studies, focusing on the power of language and analogy to change meanings associated with an  
28 organizational category. We argued that, to do so, actors must analogically construct a moral  
29 dualism, establishing oppositionality between ingroup morality and outgroup deviance. We hope  
30 that these findings afford fringe actors the empowering means by which to stigmatize those  
31 continuing to profit from the perpetuation of grand challenges.  
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TABLE 1 Data Sources

Actor category	Document Type	Texts	Notable examples
<i>Climate activists</i>	Press releases and conferences	117	350.org press conference during the Paris climate conference (350.org, 2015c) Press release commenting on UN climate talks in Warsaw (350.org, 2013b)
	Public speeches and lectures	15	Student activist Sarah Magee speech (Hamilton College, 2015)
	News media contributions* and quotes	151	Bill McKibben's (2012) Rolling Stone article
	Official "how to" guides and brochures	3	Document on "How to respond to these common complaints about divestment" (350.org, 2016)
	Letters to university endowment boards	56	An open letter to President of MIT Reif and the Executive Committee on divesting from fossil fuel companies (MIT Faculty Divest, 2015)
<i>Celebrities/ opinion leaders</i>	Press releases and conferences	5	Mark Ruffalo statement at Divest-Invest press conference in New York (Democracy Now!, 2016)
	Public speeches and lectures	9	Al Gore speech on climate change at Harvard (Harvard Univeristy, 2016)
	News media contributions and quotes	25	Hank Paulson's (2014) opinion piece in the NYT – "The coming climate crash"
<i>Divestors</i>	Press releases and conferences	62	University statement from Johns Hopkins (2017a)
	News media contributions and quotes	45	Statements in the media from FBOs regarding divestment (Readfearn, 2014)
<i>News media</i>	News reporting on fossil fuel divestment or the fossil fuel industry's role advancing climate change	624	Article in Financial Times "Fossil fuel divestment gathers momentum" (Flood, 2015)
	Opinion pieces and editorials about fossil fuel divestment	28	Wall Street Journal opinion editorial "The Feel-Good Folly of Fossil-Fuel Divestment" (Fischel, 2015)
<i>Policy actors</i>	Press releases and conferences	14	UNFCCC (2014) statement on divestment
	Public speeches and lectures	4	Obama (2013) speech on climate change and divestment
	News media contributions and quotes	29	Statement by Norwegian policy actors about divestment in Financial Times (Milne, 2015a)
<i>Investors and financial institutions</i>	Press releases and conferences	5	HSBC stranded assets report (2015)
	Public speeches and lectures	2	Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (Bank of England, 2015)
	News media contributions and quotes	31	"World Bank, ING, & AXA announce fossil fuel divestment worth billions" (Joshua, 2017)

\* all 'news media' include social media messages (e.g., on Facebook and Twitter)

**TABLE 2 Global fossil fuel divestment movement timeline**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Significance</i>
2011	Carbon Tracker (2011) releases “Unburnable Carbon—Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble?” Swarthmore College calls to divest school endowments	} <i>Global divestment campaign kicks off</i>
2012	Bill McKibben (2012) publishes Rolling Stone article; 350.org launches divestment roadshow Hampshire College (Gillis, 2012a), Unity college (350.org, 2012), and city of Seattle divests (Henn, 2012); Harvard University rejects divestment (Gunther, 2012)	
2013	San Francisco city, and University of California Berkeley divest (Goldenberg, 2013) Billionaire hedge fund manager Tom Steyer divests after meeting with Bill McKibben (Longstreth, 2013) Goldman Sachs (2013) publishes report warning of coal asset divestments in relation to climate change; S&P (2013) release report regarding fossil fuel divestment; HSBC issues first research report of unburnable fossil fuel assets (Spedding, Mehta, & Robins, 2013) Investor groups inquiring about how BP assesses financial risk related to climate change	
2014	British Medical Association, World Council of Churches, Stanford University, Glasgow University, Rockefellers divest (Schwartz, 2014) World bank president Jim Yong Kim endorses divestment (King, 2014; World Bank, 2014) UN Secretary General Moon and UNFCCC boss Christiana Figueres endorse divestment (UNFCCC, 2014) FTSE joins Blackrock to help investors avoid fossil fuels (Clark, 2014) Deutsche Bank declares it will not finance new coal projects given climate risks (Miltner, 2015) HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland also state unwillingness fund new coal projects (Reuters, 2014) Mark Carney warns about climate risks related to fossil fuel investments (Shankleman, 2014) Hank Paulson (2014) promotes divestment Desmond Tutu calls for anti-apartheid style boycott of fossil fuel industry (Carrington, 2014)	} <i>Major policy actors endorse divestment</i>
	Industry responses emerge by: Exxon (2014), Shell (2014), and BP (2014)	} <i>Effects of divestment start to emerge</i>
		} <i>Opinion leaders voice concerns</i>
		} <i>First major industry response</i>

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4	2015	HSBC publish stranded assets report directly implicating the fossil fuel industry (HSBC, 2015)	} <i>Financial players publish new findings</i>
5		Citygroup (Shubber, 2015) stops lending for new fossil fuel projects	
6		Major insurers Allianz (2015) and AXA (2015) divest	} <i>First national government response</i>
7		Leonardo DiCaprio joins the movement (Carrington & Howard, 2015)	
8		Norway's government initiates fossil fuel divestment process (Milne, 2015b)	} <i>Second major industry response</i>
9		Industry responses by World Coal Association (2015); IPAA (IPAA, 2015); American Energy Alliance (2015); BP (2015)	
10		Shell (Carrington, 2015) and BP (Macalister, 2015) pass shareholder resolutions regarding climate risk	} <i>Major media actor endorses divestment movement</i>
11		Guardian launches "Keep it in the Ground" campaign (Guardian, 2015)	
12		CALPERS, City of Oslo, Oxford University, Warwick University, announce to divest	
13		COP 21 (Paris): Paris agreement	
14		518 institutions, \$3.4 trillion divested (Henn, 2015)	
15	2016	Peabody Energy seeks Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Wilson & Crooks, 2016), citing divestment campaign one of the reasons for declaring bankruptcy	} <i>Major win for divestment movement as Peabody goes under</i>
16		BlackRock (2016) issue climate change warning for investors	
17		G20-Financial Stability Board urges companies to disclose climate-related risks	
18		Exxon climate fraud investigation commences in New York (Barrett & Philips, 2016)	
19		Cities of Oslo, Copenhagen, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, and Sydney divest	
20		689 institutions, \$5 trillion divested (Arabella Advisors, 2018)	
21	2017	Irish Government starts divestment process (Osborne, 2017), followed by France (Guardian, 2017), Sweden (Harvey, 2017), and Norway (Vaughan, 2017)	} <i>National governments strengthen stance on divestment</i>
22		World Bank Group (2017) pledges to stop investing in oil and gas exploration	
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**TABLE 3 Climate activists’ use of analogies**

Strategy	Analogical Practice	Theme	Illustrative quotation
<i>Problematizing</i>	Problem recognition	Frustration with lack of change	“We were feeling, like the rest of the climate movement, pretty frustrated with the political situation in the US. We felt that fossil fuel corporations just had too much control over Congress, and it was really hard to see how we could overcome that barrier.” (Welton, 2012)
		Climate emergency as impetus for change	“We are running out of time. While our public policy makers equivocate and avoid the topic of climate change, the window of opportunity for salvaging a livable planet for our children and grandchildren is rapidly closing.” (Mulkey, 2012)
		Specifying a wrongdoer	“We need to be very clear about who is to blame. We want everyone to have an image in their minds of who the real culprits are. At the same time, we also don’t want people to focus on the wrong targets. It’s fossil fuel companies, that’s it, and not other industries like, I don’t know, agriculture or transport or whatever.” Glasgow University divestment campaign leader, interview 2013
	Analogy selection	Divestment as a tool for stigmatization	“By declaring the current activities of fossil fuel companies morally unacceptable, we create the political climate in which the policy changes needed to address climate change are possible. Historically, this approach has proven success. A study from the University of Oxford recently concluded that this ‘stigmatisation’ process is the most important outcome of a successful divestment campaign.” (Go Fossil Free, 2014a)
		Divestment as “choosing a side”	“There’s a choice on what side of history you want to stand. We’re standing on the side that is right, in a moral sense. If you divest from fossil fuels, you stand on the moral side. You stand with us. If you don’t divest you clearly stand on the side of [the fossil fuel] industry. That’s the choice Harvard has made. It’s an immoral choice I believe.” – Warwick University activist commenting on Harvard’s decision not to divest in an interview 2014.
	Transferring stigmatizing meanings	“[We] know that they are not the same. I mean it’s going to be tough convincing people an oil company is racist. But they are both unjust and lacking any morals. We just need to help people get that. When people think ‘oil company’ or, say, ‘Exxon’ they must think ‘Apartheid’”– Interview with an American student activist 2015.	
<i>Establishing ingroup morality</i>	Virtue transfer	Building a ‘moral’ collective	“Corporations understood the logic of money even when they weren’t swayed by the dictates of morality. [...] Once again we can join together as a world and put pressure where it counts.” – Desmond Tutu (in González & Goodman, 2014)
		Linking to political struggles	“As we have seen in the Civil Rights Movement, the anti-apartheid struggle, and numerous indigenous peoples’ struggles, disruption of everyday affairs in the name of a just cause is an essential component of creating the just, equitable, and sustainable future we know is possible.” (Lakotosarah, 2015)
		Justice-based reasoning	“The challenge facing today's divestment supporters is much like that of their anti-apartheid predecessors. When that movement began in the 1970's, few Americans understood the repressive tactics of South Africa's


			regime. As students and other activists disclosed the suffering and injustices underlying apartheid, they provoked the consciences of the nation” (Strauss, 2013b)
		Establishing morality	“The issue then was whether divestment, potentially costly, would have much real effect on companies doing business in South Africa. Even today, historians differ on whether it did. But the campaign required [...] people to grapple with the morality of Apartheid, altering the politics of the issue.” (Davenport, 2013)
	Affective association	Anger linked to morality	“This will indirectly influence all investors—those considering divestment due to moral outrage and those who are neutral—to go underweight on fossil fuel stocks and debt in their portfolios.” (SSEE, 2013)
		Empathy/suffering linked to seeking justice	“Students at Hamilton waged an <i>impassioned</i> campaign for divestment from South African companies on ethical grounds. They constructed shanties and lived in them as a sign of <i>solidarity</i> with those <i>abused</i> by apartheid, a <i>radical and empathetic act</i> of protest..” - (Livingston & Parker-Magyar, 2013)
		Nostalgic pride linked morality to attract stakeholders	“Facts and figures aren’t the only way to make your case. If you can track down the contact info for different board members, send them personal letters urging them to divest. And do your research: if they donate to environmental causes, bring it up, or if they voted to divest from apartheid, urge them to make the right decision again.” (Go Fossil Free, 2014b)
<i>Amplifying outgroup deviance</i>	Reinforcing surface links	Linking to a stigmatized entity	“By divesting we seek to undermine the legitimacy of the fossil fuel industry, analogous to what was achieved [...] by tobacco divestment. Fossil fuel divestment doesn’t aim to cripple fossil fuel companies financially, but to stigmatise these companies to the point where doing business with them is as distasteful to the public as doing business with big tobacco” (Forbes, Vincent, Hildebrandt, & Campbell, 2017)
		Singling out the fossil fuel industry	“Fossil fuel divestment takes the fossil fuel industry to task for its culpability in the climate crisis. By naming this industry’s singularly destructive influence — and by highlighting the moral dimensions of climate change — we hope that the fossil fuel divestment movement can help break the hold that the fossil fuel industry has on our economy and our governments.” (Fossil Free UK, 2014)
		Reinforcing links around health and harm	“Many people have compared the fossil fuel divestment campaign to the well-known divestment campaign that targeted the South African apartheid regime in the 1980s. But the fossil fuel initiative may be more akin to divestment campaigns targeting tobacco companies. Just as those campaigns tried to link tobacco companies with the health effects of smoking in the popular consciousness, the current campaign wants to tie fossil fuel companies' reputations to droughts, rising sea levels, and the obstruction of climate action.” (Jarvis, 2013)
	Coupling negative traits	Disease/death	“Our addiction to fossil fuels has taken us over yet another scary indicator, to a place we’ve never been before in the human history.” (Schuetze, 2013)
		Death and deception	“To me it’s all hands on deck. [...] It’s one of the many tactics that we can use to attach a social stigma to the fossil fuel industry — to say, this is an immoral industry that is betraying our collective future. I think of the fossil fuel industry as a merchant of death, just like I think of the nuclear weapons industry that way, or the chemical weapons industry, or the tobacco industry — these are merchants of death that need to be stigmatized, quarantined, and hopefully driven out of existence through regulation.” (Glickman, 2017)
		Deception	“One can say that the question of <i>what to do</i> about climate change <i>is</i> a political issue. Fair enough. Then



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			investing in companies that deny climate science and contribute to accelerating climate change certainly is an action every bit as much as not investing in them is. Even big tobacco companies have stopped making claims that smoking is not addictive and doesn't cause health problems. Remember the time when their highly paid executives stood before Congress and swore to lies, and made campaign contributions?" – Professor James Engell, <i>Huffington Post</i> 2014
<i>Stakeholder uptake and dispersion</i>	Proximal adaptation	Ally stakeholder harnessing meanings around morality and deviance	"We simply cannot afford to allow the corporate greed of the coal, oil and gas industries to determine the future of humanity. Those entities with a financial interest in preserving this destructive system have denied, and even covered up the evidence of our changing climate. Enough is enough, you know better, the world knows better, history will place the blame for this devastation squarely at their feet." (DiCaprio, 2016)
		Stakeholders sympathetic to analogical contexts	"The UK health profession led the way in the tobacco divestment movement two decades ago, putting the issue firmly on the political agenda and paving the way for stronger anti-tobacco legislation. This report shows why, in 2015, fossil fuels can no longer be considered an ethical investment."(McKee, 2015)
	Distanced enactment	Stakeholder drawing on meanings around morality	"Public funds should not be invested in a company that has repeatedly misled the American people on climate change, the most important issue of our time. Divesting is not only the moral action to take, it is the only action left that can potentially provide an immediate catalyst for change at ExxonMobil." (Lieu, 2016)
		Stakeholder drawing on meanings related to death/disease	"In taking this rare step, the trustees determined that thermal coal poses a unique threat to public health and to the environment [...] and underscored that the university shares responsibility for promoting environmental sustainability in the long run." (Johns Hopkins University, 2017b)  "The university recognises the devastating impact that climate change may have on our planet and the need for the world to reduce its <i>dependence</i> on fossil fuels." (University of Glasgow, 2014)

Figure 1: Model of analogical stigmatization as a dualistic process



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## APPENDIX


## Appendix 1 – We &gt; fossil fuels



## Appendix 3 – Smokestack cigarette



## Appendix 2 – We the people



## Appendix 4 – Joe Camel



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