


The Changing Family in Comparative Perspective: Asia and the United States

EDITED BY

KAREN OPPENHEIM MASON

NORIKO O. TSUYA AND

MINJA KIM CHOE



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Perspective: Asia and the United States



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**EDITED BY KAREN OPPENHEIM MASON
NORIKO O. TSUYA AND MINJA KIM CHOE**

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PREFACE

The essays in this volume were first presented at Nihon University's Seventeenth International Symposium, Life and the Earth in the Twenty-First Century, held at Nihon University in Tokyo in March 1996. The international symposium series was launched by Nihon University in 1982 under the leadership of its president at the time, Dr. Masaru Suzuki, with the intent of internationalizing the university's outlook. Over the span of a decade and a half, the series has covered a wide range of issues that cut across national and regional boundaries. Topics have ranged from space technology, global communications, and medical technology (including artificial hearts) to the population explosion, urban issues, economic development, culture, and the family.

The internationalization of Nihon University's activities goes back at least as far as 1980, when the Nihon University Population Research Institute (NUPRI) was established in the aftermath of a major international symposium on the fertility transition in Asia organized in cooperation with the East-West Center's Population Institute. Up to that time, Japanese universities had paid little attention to research, graduate education, and training that dealt with regional and global issues. The establishment of NUPRI was a private university's major initiative to internationalize its work. Soon NUPRI became a regional center for collaborative research and training, especially for East Asia and Southeast Asia. Based on the success achieved by NUPRI, Nihon University, under the leadership of President Masayuki Takanaishi, took a bold step to revitalize its research and exchange program by launching a major research effort entitled "Comprehensive Research on Global Society" and establishing the University Research Center (URC). The URC was intended as the mechanism through which topics of interest to the various colleges and schools within Nihon University could attract international attention and through which the university could promote internal and international dialogue. The URC thus provided an expanding basis for the university's international symposium series.

In 1990, Nihon University, in cooperation with the East-West Center's Population Institute and the *Mainichi Shinbun*, organized an international symposium on the family and contemporary Japanese culture in international perspective. Intended to provide a forum at which preliminary results from an international project on the changing family in Asia could be reported, the symposium resulted in the publication of *Tradition and Change in the Asian Family* (1994), which can be regarded as a precursor to the present book.

The Seventeenth International Symposium, Life and the Earth in the Twenty-First Century, was held in March 1996. This symposium was intended to synthesize the issues that had been covered by the series up to that time. One part was devoted to the Contemporary Family in Comparative Perspective. The present book

is based on papers that were presented during the symposium under this rubric. They arise in part from a new comparative project on work and family life in Japan, South Korea, and the United States that was initiated by Nihon University, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and the East-West Center's Program on Population.

The family is one of the most basic institutions of human society. Its form, structure, and functions, however, have changed over the years and vary from culture to culture. Today the changes provoked by economic development and modernization raise serious questions about the viability of the family as a social institution. Can traditional family values be maintained in the face of social and economic changes? How does the trend toward egalitarianism found in many parts of the world affect family cohesion? What are the implications for the family of new educational and occupational roles for women outside the home? How is globalization of communications and transportation—and more recently, of the economy—affecting family systems in different parts of the world? Does this globalization make convergence between Western and Asian family systems inevitable? The research reported in this volume provides timely information on many of these important questions about family change in the modern era.

No book of this kind appears without help from many quarters. The editors and I wish to thank the many individuals and organizations that helped make this volume a reality. The greatest debt is owed to Nihon University, without whose sponsorship of the comparative project on work and family life this book could not have appeared. Particular thanks are owed to the former president of Nihon University, Dr. Yoshio Sezai, and to the current president, Dr. Yukiyasu Sezai, who have provided important leadership for the symposia. Fukuji Kawarazaki, the URC's former director, who was administrator of NUPRI before joining URC, has dedicated himself to developing international research and exchange on behalf of Nihon University. His contributions have nurtured the family project and successful cooperation between the East-West Center and URC. We also extend our heartiest thanks to Mitsuyoshi Kurihara, URC's current director of research administration, who provided moral and financial support, and to the staff of URC, especially Mitsuko Katayama, for the logistical support they provided.

Thanks are due also to the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA)—especially to the former president, Dr. Sung-Woo Lee, to the current president, Dr. Hacheong Yeon, and to the vice-president, Dr. Nam-Hoon Cho, for their willingness to participate in the comparative project on work and family life by replicating, at KIHASA's expense, the Japanese survey in South Korea and for their generosity in sharing the data from their survey. Without their enthusiastic participation, the comparative project would have been far less informative.

Additional thanks are due to the Center for Global Partnership/Japan Foundation, which funded the work and family life project during its second phase through a grant to the East-West Center. Without the support they provided, work on the project could not have continued beyond the initial phase funded by Nihon University and KIHASA.

Finally, thanks are due to the East-West Center's Program on Population, many of whose staff helped to see this book to completion. We are especially grateful to Laura Moriyama, who spent many hours checking manuscripts and corresponding with authors.

Lee-Jay Cho
Executive Vice President
East-West Center

Introduction

Karen Oppenheim Mason, Noriko O. Tsuya, and Minja Kim Choe

The family is one of the most ancient human institutions. Long before humankind had invented states, corporations, markets, schools, or any number of social arrangements familiar to us today, people lived and died in families. Indeed, according to some authorities (such as Lancaster 1975), it is the family—enduring units in which men and women not only reproduce together but cooperate economically and socially—that sets human beings apart from other mammals and makes us what we are: smart, successful, and highly adaptable. For more than 90% of our species' history, families were the primary social security and welfare institution of human society. Families cared for the dependent and infirm, reared and educated children, helped those in crisis survive, and provided basic sustenance and care for their members. Given the centrality of the family for human survival, it is little wonder that human societies develop strong moral strictures about family life—rules that specify who, within the web of affiliation and descent that constitutes the family's basic building blocks, is permitted, required, or forbidden to live in the same household, have sexual relations, cooperate in economic production or consumption, show obedience or dominance, and give or expect loyalty. This is not to say that all human groups have had the same family morality. To the contrary, humankind has been incredibly inventive when it comes to family forms. In all known societies, however, the family has been a central institution and life in families has been governed by a strong code of morality.

Because family life is governed by cherished moral principles, change in the family tends to be greeted with alarm and is often the focus of public debate and political action. For this reason, it has long been of interest to social scientists as well. Of particular concern in the social science community is the impact on the family of industrialization, urbanization, and other aspects of "modernization" such as rising levels of education and changes in values. Does the transformation of society that accompanies full-scale industrialization and rising affluence inevitably reshape the family in particular ways, eroding the strength of the ties that have traditionally bound its members together? Or does the response of family life and family morality to the forces of modernization depend on the preexisting nature of the society? Is there (to use a phrase associated with the writings of William J. Goode) a *convergence* of all family systems to a single model? Or are family systems changing in distinct ways, depending on their history and the code of family morality?

This book addresses these questions through the comparative study of the family in Asia—Japan and South Korea, in particular—and the United States.¹ The family in the United States has undergone a number of dramatic transformations in this century that have also occurred in many of the countries of Europe (Chapter 4 in this volume; Lesthaeghe 1995). These include a postponement of family formation until individuals are well into their twenties or early thirties, an enormous increase in the labor-force participation of wives and hence a shift in the domestic division of labor between husband and wife, rising divorce rates and high but declining remarriage rates, an increase in premarital and postmarital cohabitation, rising rates of out-of-wedlock sexual relations and childbearing, an increase in lone-parent families, and the decline of fertility rates to levels below that needed to ensure the long-term replacement of the population (slightly more than two children per woman).

Not only have these aspects of family life changed in the United States during the past half century: the morality that surrounds family life has changed as well. Family-related behavior and events that were once considered shocking or shameful, such as divorce, premarital sex, cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock childbearing, have become widely accepted by the population, especially the younger generation (Chapter 4 in this volume). Thus both the family and its morality in the United States and the countries of Europe have undergone significant change in the twentieth century.

As the countries of Asia become increasingly industrialized, affluent, and integrated into global economic and communications networks, concern about whether their family systems will follow the path taken in the West has risen as well (Cherlin 1994). There are already signs that Asian families are changing, especially in the more developed countries of the region. Fertility levels in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have fallen to very low levels, comparable to those found in much of western Europe and lower than in the United States (Population Reference Bureau 1996). Age at marriage has risen in virtually all countries in Asia and is now exceptionally high in Japan, Singapore, and South Korea (Chapter 2 in this volume; Tsuya and Choe 1994). Divorce rates are also on the rise in many countries in the region—though levels remain far lower than in the United States, and in some countries where divorce was traditionally common the rates have fallen (Jones 1994). Many countries in the region are also witnessing an increase in married women's labor-force participation, a change that signals a shift in the gender-based division of labor in the family (Mason 1995; Tsuya and Choe 1994). Moreover, coresidence of elderly parents with at least one of their married adult children has declined in a number of East Asian countries (Chapters 9 and 10 in this volume), although in some instances coresidence has been replaced with arrangements that

preserve the traditional pattern of eating together and having close daily contact—for example, living in adjoining dwelling units (Thornton and Lin 1994:323).

Some observers already feel that changes in Asian family patterns are causing problems for family members and the society at large. In both Singapore and Japan, for example, here has been enormous concern with low fertility, a phenomenon that is the immediate by-product of a high average age at marriage among women (Ogawa and Retherford 1993; Tsuya and Mason 1995). In many countries, however, the changes observed thus far seem tolerable to policymakers and social observers. But concern with what the future may bring is widespread. Will divorce rates start to skyrocket in countries like Japan and South Korea as they did in the United States earlier in the twentieth century? Will premarital sex become the norm not only in behavioral terms but morally as well? Will out-of-wedlock childbearing increase? Will the elderly increasingly live on their own without the social or financial support of their offspring (who will be far less numerous than in the past)? Will wives no longer accept the traditional arrangements in marriage and instead insist on greater equality in the family?

Questions like these cannot be answered without an understanding of the forces that drive family change both in the West and in Asia. If family change in the West reflects conditions peculiar to that region, then the consequences in Asia of modernizing forces such as rising affluence and increased exposure to the international communications media may be quite different than in the West (McDonald 1994). By comparing recent change in the family in East Asia and the United States, the chapters in this book speak to the question of whether a society's preexisting nature modifies the impact of economic and social modernization on family relations and morality.

Before citing some of the key differences between conditions in the United States and the countries of East Asia, it is important to understand why industrialization and other modernizing forces may alter family patterns. One of the fundamental reasons that industrialization may stimulate family change is the creation of a number of specialized institutions during industrial development that supplement or supplant the family's traditional role as a social security and welfare institution. These specialized institutions include schools, hospitals, banks, firms, a variety of markets for financial instruments and goods, and the welfare state. Such institutions not only provide many of the services and safety nets traditionally provided by families; they tend to deal with individuals rather than with family units, thus encouraging a tendency for people to think in terms of their individual welfare rather than the welfare of the family (Chapter 12 in this volume).

Important, too, is the rising affluence that accompanies industrial develop-

ment, something that further contributes to the independence of the individual.² For example, when the elderly are able to live off their savings (a phenomenon that requires not only institutions such as banks and financial markets but also enough personal income to permit people to save), then the decision to live independently in old age rather than in a three-generation household becomes possible. Thus even where three-generation households have traditionally been the ideal and are supported by a strong family morality, rising affluence and the development of institutions that service the needs of the elderly may gradually reduce the prevalence of three-generation households.

Industrialization also augurs for family change by reducing the economic dependence of adult children on their parents that is typical in peasant societies. Because ownership of land is critical for survival and social position in a peasant society, parents are able to keep their offspring in a dependent position so long as they control the family's land. With industrialization, however, the way in which families make their living shifts from the collective production of subsistence on a family plot to individual wage earning in a labor market controlled largely by strangers rather than by family members. Under these circumstances, the younger generation's dependence on their parents is greatly reduced because they can earn a living and start their own families without having to wait to inherit the family's land. The competitive demands of the labor market may also force them to move away from their natal area—further reducing parental control over their lives. These changes, too, may reduce the prevalence of three-generation households as well as shifting authority relations between generations within households.

One further effect of industrial development—or, more precisely, an effect of the demographic change that accompanies it—should be noted, however. This is increasing longevity. A higher life expectancy means that the proportion of adults of working age with a parent still alive increases, thereby making the formation of three-generation households possible. Another effect, however, may be a greater sense of burden attached to intergenerational coresidence when adult children must anticipate that aged parents will live (and thus live with them) for many years to come. Whether increased longevity actually promotes greater coresidence between adults and their aging parents is consequently unclear.

Finally, industrialization may encourage family change by altering gender relations in society. Although the process is by no means inevitable and is often delayed by the entrenched interests of men and women, industrial development and the rise of world capitalism and the competitive markets it creates tend to draw women into the workforce (Mason 1995; Tsuya and Choe 1994). And as the demands for formally educated labor rise as industrialization proceeds, pressures to educate girls as well as boys also rise, if only because a stratified marriage market makes illiterate

girls unable to contract high-status marriages. These changes mean that the division of labor between the genders typically found during the early phases of industrial development—in which men are the primary breadwinners and women the homemakers and child minders—tends gradually to be undermined with women's increasing employment and formal education. This in turn may undermine the traditional authority of men and the subordination of women in the family.

All in all, then, there are many reasons to think that industrialization and the social processes which typically accompany it may provoke family change (Goode 1963). The existence, timing, and nature of that change is, however, by no means an inevitable consequence of these forces (McDonald 1992). Women's subordinate position in the family, for example, can be maintained even when wives earn a substantial independent income, if women and men agree that their contributions to family income are part of their traditional role as wives and mothers or as daughters, rather than a venture into economic independence (Kung 1983; Lu 1984). Eventually, however, the reality of women's potential economic independence may start to erode their traditional role in the family, something that may in turn have consequences for the durability of unions or for intergenerational relations. Nevertheless, even if modernizing forces tend to undermine traditional family forms, whether change occurs, how quickly it occurs, and the directions it takes may well reflect a society's unique conditions.

What are some of the differences between East Asian countries such as Japan or South Korea and the United States that might modify the course of family change in an age of modernization? Three differences seem especially important. The first involves the family values predominant in East Asia and North America prior to industrial development: those embodied by Confucianism in East Asia versus the individualistic values of the West. As Moon-Sik Hong and Yong-Chan Byun note in their chapter on changing intergenerational relations in South Korea, Confucian ideology emphasizes the individual's loyalty and obedience to the group and its leader. In the case of the East Asian family, Confucian values promote filial piety—that is, the loyalty of sons and their wives to the patrilineal family and the husband's parents, particularly his father. This principle stands in sharp contrast to the emphasis in North America on individual choice and achievement rather than loyalty and obedience to the family and its leaders.³ Could the changes in family life witnessed in the West during the past half century, which basically involve a movement toward increasing individualism, reflect long-standing values in this part of the world, not just the forces of modernization?

The second difference between East Asia and North America likely to modify the effects of industrial development on the family involves the nature of traditional gender and family systems. Gender inequality, although extant in both parts

of the world prior to full industrialization, was much more strongly embedded in East Asian families than in North American ones. Traditional East Asian families were strongly patrilineal and patriarchal: normally, the family line passed only through men;⁴ a daughter became a member of her husband's family at marriage, thereby losing membership in her father's family.⁵ This system gave sons enormous importance as preservers of the family line (Greenhalgh 1985; Tsuya and Choe 1991). It also gave sons a power base within the household that daughters lost, because at marriage daughters moved to their husbands' households, where they were often viewed as necessary but untrustworthy intruders. The patrilineal system also promoted the socialization of daughters to be obedient to authority in order to ensure that they would suffer the loneliness and abuse often attendant on joining the husband's household without rebellion or complaint. Finally, the multigenerational nature of the East Asian family also meant that brides were controlled by a power structure that incorporated not only the husband but the husband's father and, often most critical of all, the husband's mother. Thus the East Asian family system promoted a far greater degree of inequality between the sexes—in terms of personality, social allies, and structural position—than the bilateral, conjugal family system predominant in North America. This difference may well have modified the effects of industrial development and modernization on the family in these two parts of the world.

The final difference between East Asia and North America that may affect family change is the rapidity of demographic transition in the two regions. The United States was one of the first nations of the world to begin the demographic transition from high fertility and mortality rates to low ones, and family size consequently has declined fairly gradually over a period of more than a century. In contrast, the countries of East Asia have undergone their demographic transitions very rapidly, meaning that family size has plummeted from an average of four, five, or even six children per couple to an average of two children or fewer. The rapidity of these demographic transitions has two potential consequences. First, society must adjust very quickly to a situation in which many couples, rather than just a few, end up without a son.⁶ Whether this pushes families in the direction of the conjugal, bilateral form it has had in the West for many centuries or in some other direction is unclear, however. The second important consequence of the rapid decline of fertility in East Asia is the rapid aging of the populations of this region. Indeed, in Japan, because fertility decline has been ongoing since the end of World War II and because the longevity of the elderly has achieved an unprecedented level, the population is already one of the oldest in the world and will soon become even older (Ogawa and Retherford 1997). This rapid aging of the population poses serious problems for intergenerational income transfers and the care of the elderly. To be sure,

the problems attendant on population aging are being felt throughout the developed world. Again, however, whether a rapid as opposed to a slow transition to this situation creates distinct pressures for family change is an important issue. And here comparisons between East Asia and the United States may offer some insight.

In summary, although industrial development and the processes that accompany it create conditions conducive to family change, the direction and rapidity of this change are likely to be modified by the society's code of values, the structure of family and gender systems, and the nature and rapidity of demographic change. With this in mind, let us review what the following chapters have to say about recent family change in Asia and the United States.

The book is organized into four sections dealing with different aspects of family change. Part I focuses on family formation patterns—specifically, on changes in age at marriage, rates of marital dissolution, and the attitudes that accompany them. In Chapter 2, Shunichi Inoue presents an overview of recent change in family formation and dissolution in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Age at marriage has risen in all three countries and is now higher in Japan and South Korea than in the United States. Divorce, too, has risen in the Asian countries, but it remains far lower than in the United States. Although Inoue interprets these trends to mean that the American family is in trouble because it no longer provides a stable setting for the rearing of children, apparently the family in Japan and South Korea has problems, too. In both of these countries, women tend to regard marriage with skepticism. Young never-married women (and men, too, in some cases) think they would be worse off in several respects if they were married, although better off in other respects. Similarly, married women, especially in South Korea, think they would be better off in most respects if they were not married. Indeed, as an in-depth analysis of these same data suggests (Mason and Tsuya, forthcoming), young people in Japan and South Korea are increasingly postponing marriage or, in some cases, avoiding marriage altogether, thereby lowering the rate of reproduction to a potentially disastrous level. In contrast, young people in the United States are marrying and, whether married or not, are having children, but the majority of marriages end in divorce and children are consequently reared in a much less stable environment than in Japan or South Korea. Whether family problems are more severe in the United States than in Japan or South Korea, therefore, depends on one's point of view. One thing, however, is clear: the marital response to societal change in Japan and South Korea looks quite different from the response in the United States.

Chapter 3 by Minja Kim Choe takes a closer look at recent trends in marriage in South Korea. The extremely rapid rise in women's educational attainment in that country parallels the rise in age at marriage among South Korean women and may well help to explain it. An analysis of survey data on marriage intentions and atti-

tudes among young unmarried adults, however, finds that better-educated women have a more positive attitude about marrying than do less-educated women. Among the well-educated, however, those who work are much more likely to want to postpone marrying than those who do not work. Thus, Choe concludes, the future course of marriage in South Korea is likely to reflect what happens to women's relationship to the labor force. Currently, well-educated South Korean women tend to drop out of the workforce when they marry or have children (even though, over the entire adult lifespan, they are more likely to work outside the home than are less-educated women; see Chapter 7 in this volume). If this tendency to exit the workforce at marriage continues, then most women are likely to marry. Choe suggests, however, that if better-educated women become more committed to having occupational careers, they may well turn away from marriage in increasing numbers. Certainly the data presented in Chapter 3, like those reviewed by Inoue in Chapter 2, raise the question of whether marriage runs the risk of eventually disappearing in Japan and South Korea.

The final chapter in Part I focuses on changes in marriage in the United States. In Chapter 4, Larry L. Bumpass argues that a variety of changes in marriage attitudes and behavior in the United States—for example, persistently high levels of divorce, the increase in sex and childbirth outside of marriage, and the rapid increase in cohabitation—all signal a decline in commitment to marriage. Thus even though a higher proportion of young people in the United States than in Japan are certain they want to marry (Mason and Tsuya, forthcoming), and even though the average age at marriage is much younger in the United States than in Japan or South Korea, a far smaller proportion of Americans who marry will remain married to the same partner than in either of the East Asian countries. Thus in the United States, modernization has meant increasing instability of marriage and the increasing separation of sex and childbearing from the context provided by marriage. In Japan and South Korea, by contrast, modernization has meant increasing uncertainty about the desirability of marrying and having children.

Although the predominant theme of Bumpass's chapter is the changing significance of marriage, he also makes an important conceptual point—namely, that we must incorporate cohabitation into our definitions of family living arrangements. As Bumpass points out, a substantial proportion of children living with only one biological parent in the United States actually have a second adult present in their lives because their biological parent is in a cohabiting relationship. And these relationships look much like those sanctioned by formal marriage in terms of their stability and emotional significance. Moreover, Bumpass notes, if we were to include cohabiting relationships in estimates of children's familial experiences, we would see a *decline* in the proportion of children living with only one parent over the past

decade in the United States, rather than the rise observed when two-parent families are defined strictly in terms of legal marriage and biological parenthood. Bumpass argues that those who study family formation must pay attention to the reality of familial living arrangements, not just to legally sanctioned relationships. Although cohabitation remains rare in Japan and South Korea, the point that such family arrangements are just as real and important for the welfare of children and society as are legally sanctioned arrangements may have universal applicability.

Part II focuses on the internal organization of the family. In Chapter 5, Noriko O. Tsuya and Larry L. Bumpass examine the amount of time spent on housework by husbands, wives, and other family members in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. They also explore the impact of time spent at paid employment on the share of housework performed by husbands. There are enormous differences across the three countries in the gender-based division of labor. A very traditional division prevails in Japan and, to a slightly lesser extent, in South Korea. Japanese husbands spend the least amount of time doing housework—they average 2.5 hours a week compared with 33.5 hours averaged by their wives—and American husbands spend the most time on housework, though far less time than their wives (7.8 versus 32.4 hours). Thus although the traditional patriarchal family structure found in Japan and South Korea has undergone a number of changes since World War II, the traditional division of labor between husbands and wives remains largely intact—especially in South Korea, where only one-quarter of wives of household heads are employed outside the home. (The figure is 60% in the Japanese data and 66% in the U.S. data.) Moreover, the absence of age differences in the share of housework performed by husbands in Japan and South Korea suggests that the situation has changed little over the past decade or two. In the United States, however, younger husbands take on a significantly greater share of the housework than do older husbands, a sign that the gender-based division of labor is lessening in that country. Although Tsuya and Bumpass do not investigate satisfaction with the husband-wife division of labor, other evidence suggests that the relative lack of change in Japanese and South Korean attitudes in this regard, as well as the “double day” that many wives in these countries face, may underlie the discontent young Japanese and South Korean women feel about marriage (Tsuya 1997).

While Tsuya and Bumpass focus on the gender division of labor within the household, in Chapter 6 Karen Oppenheim Mason focuses on the division of authority and power—in particular, on wives’ domestic power and autonomy in the economic sphere. Using data from five Asian countries with very different gender traditions (Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines), Mason focuses on community, household, and individual determinants of women’s domestic decision-making power. Her analysis shows there are large country and community dif-

ferences in this decision-making power that household and personal variables are unable to explain. The results, therefore, suggest the importance of traditional cultural precepts about women's roles in the family for their say in household decisions. There is little evidence, however, that economic development, either of the community or household, influences women's domestic decision-making power. This suggests that industrial development per se has little impact on the gender-based division of authority in the family, at least within the range of development represented by the five countries examined in this chapter.

Part III of the book focuses on the consequences of paid employment for two aspects of family well-being. In Chapter 7, Tim Futing Liao asks how Japanese and South Korean married women's work hours influence whether they suffer from "role strain"—an overload caused by carrying too many roles. He finds that once women's *preferred* work hours are held constant, their actual number of work hours indeed predicts their level of role strain. Long-working women tend to feel overloaded in both Japan and South Korea. This does not mean that longer hours of work necessarily bring role strain, however, because the wives who prefer to work long hours suffer significantly less role strain than those who prefer to work short hours. Nevertheless, Liao's findings are important because attention in Japan and South Korea has focused mainly on the family problems created by *men's* long work hours. That wives' long work hours also have undesirable consequences should not be ignored.

Chapter 8, by Eise Yokoyama and Noriko O. Tsuya, examines the impact of men's work hours on the frequency with which they come home drunk in Japan and South Korea—and the impact of coming home drunk on health, marriage satisfaction, and overall personal happiness. Despite the popular image that men in Japan spend long hours after work drinking, husbands come home drunk in Japan considerably less often than in South Korea: about once every two weeks in Japan compared to once a week in South Korea. In neither country, however, is coming home drunk associated with working long hours. Indeed, men who work the longest hours come home drunk less often than men who work between 1 and 59 hours per week, perhaps because their long work hours leave them little time for drinking. Another surprise is that in Japan, where occupation significantly predicts the frequency with which men come home drunk, it is blue-collar workers who come home drunk significantly less frequently than other employed men rather than salarymen or business proprietors who come home drunk significantly more often than other workers. Thus, while coming home drunk is more frequent when men are employed than when they are not, there is little evidence that coming home drunk is uniquely associated either with jobs as salarymen or proprietors or with working very long hours.

Yokoyama and Tsuya also ask how coming home drunk is related to measures

of health and happiness. Interestingly, in Japan the husband's frequent intoxication is associated with poor health among husbands whereas in South Korea it is linked with poor health among wives. Frequent intoxication of husbands is also associated with reduced marital satisfaction and personal happiness in both countries. Although the causes behind these associations cannot be determined with cross-sectional data, it is evident that frequent heavy drinking by husbands is associated with an unhappy family life.

Part IV of the book turns from a focus on the conjugal relationship to intergenerational relations between parents and their adult offspring. The traditional norms of the stem family in East Asia ensured the care of the elderly through coresidence with the oldest son and his wife. As the countries of East Asia have developed, however, coresidence has tended to decline (Sun and Liu 1994; Thornton and Lin 1994:305–23). As a result, there is great concern in Asia with the impact of modernization on intergenerational relations.

Chapter 9, by Moon-Sik Hong and Yong-Chan Byun, explores intergenerational relations in South Korea—examining not only patterns of coresidence between adult offspring and their parents but also visiting, communication by telephone or letter, and exchange relationships (financial and household help). Viewed from the point of view of the working-age adult offspring, coresidence with surviving parents occurs in only a minority of the cases. But when it does occur, it is overwhelmingly more likely to be with the husband's parents than with the wife's. Thus the traditional definition of the family as patrilineal, while no longer absolute, remains largely intact in South Korea. An enduring sense of commitment to the husband's parents is also seen in asymmetries in family intergenerational contacts and exchange relationships. Although wives visit their parents-in-law and their own parents with equal frequency, husbands visit their wife's parents far less often than they visit their own parents. Multivariate analyses of coresidence and exchange relationships suggest that indicators of modernity (such as education) sometimes depress intergenerational exchanges, but these relationships are far from universal and are not very strong. By far the strongest and most consistent predictor of coresidence is whether the working-age adult is the first or only son. Thus the multivariate analysis confirms the continuation of the long-standing obligation of eldest or only sons to live with their parents or care for them in old age. In concluding their chapter, Hong and Byun examine attitudinal data that tap the primacy given to intergenerational obligations over personal satisfaction or the marital relationship. Both attitude questions show a striking gender difference in responses: women are far less likely than men to give primacy to intergenerational obligations. Thus in this chapter, too, a strong discontent with traditional family arrangements among South Korean women is evidenced. One cannot help but wonder what will happen to the

family in South Korea if women's negative views of the family become even more prevalent.

The exploration of relationships between adult offspring and their parents is continued in Chapter 10. There Ronald R. Rindfuss and R. Kelly Raley compare intergenerational coresidence patterns in Japan and the United States. Unlike Chapter 9 by Hong and Byun, which focuses on married adults' coresidence with parents, Rindfuss and Raley include the unmarried as well. Their analysis also innovates in using information collected from parents as well as from adult offspring and in controlling for the number of siblings—which, because of lower postwar fertility in Japan, is smaller in that country than in the United States. Rindfuss and Raley find that, as expected, coresidence is far more common in Japan than in the United States, even when marital status of the offspring and number of siblings are taken into account. In both countries, coresidence is more common if the child is unmarried rather than married—indicating that even in Japan, where the tradition of the stem family required the eldest son to continue to live with his parents after marriage, such coresidence is less common than the coresidence of unmarried adult children with their parents. Evidence of the persistence of the stem family ideal in Japan is reflected not only in higher coresidence rates among married children than in the United States, but also in a tendency for coresidence to be especially likely if the father is widowed—the opposite of the United States, where coresidence is most likely if the mother is widowed. Also consistent with the traditional obligation to live with and care for aged parents in Japan is the tendency for coresidence with the father to increase as the child (and hence the father) grows older. In the United States, the opposite relationship exists: coresidence becomes less common as the child grows older. Rindfuss and Raley interpret this difference to reflect a difference in whose needs are being met by coresidence. In Japan, with its tradition of filial piety, it is the aged parent's needs that are being served by coresidence—hence as parents get older, coresidence becomes more common. In the United States, it is predominantly the child's needs that are being served by coresidence—hence as children become older and more self-sufficient, the probability of coresidence declines. Thus although there is clear evidence from other sources of a declining probability of adult offspring coresiding with their parents in both Japan and South Korea—and evidence too that a sense of obligation to coreside is waning, at least in Japan (Ogawa and Retherford 1997)—the stem family tradition still survives in these two countries when compared with the United States. Attitudinal data suggest, however, that coresidence between adult offspring and their parents is likely to wane even further as time goes on. Thus, in this respect, the families of East Asia appear to be converging with the families of North America.

The final chapter with a focus on intergenerational relations, Chapter 11 by

Andrew Mason and Tim Miller, examines aggregate data for Taiwan to assess how the relative incomes of the parental versus offspring generations have grown during the course of rapid economic development and to see whether the ability of family members to provide financial support for the parental generation has eroded with the rapid decline in fertility in Taiwan. Mason and Miller also examine actual changes in intergenerational transfers as implied by changes in coresidence as well as by changes in average private transfers between generations. Their findings, based on estimates derived from a variety of sources, including a series of income and expenditure surveys, suggest that the younger generation enjoyed much greater income growth than did the older generation during the period of Taiwan's rapid economic expansion. This is one reason why the extended family's ability to maintain equality of income across the generations has not eroded, even though the decline of fertility means there are far fewer offspring per parent than formerly. Mason and Miller's models suggest, however, that there are life-cycle changes in the extended family's aggregate income that internal transfers cannot erase. At some points in the life course, families will be poorer than at other points. Finally, their analysis of actual intergenerational transfers during the past two or three decades suggests that transfers from working-age offspring to parents past the age of employment have indeed declined in Taiwan, despite a more or less constant ability of the younger generation to fully support the older one. Together with the microstudies from South Korea, Japan, and the United States, then, Mason and Miller's aggregate analysis of Taiwan also suggests a gradual if far from complete erosion of the traditional system of intergenerational exchange in East Asia.

The accumulated evidence presented in this volume implies that some impacts of industrial development on the family depend on the context while others do not. Responses to the increased education and employment of women, as well as to rising affluence more generally and a shift from family-based to industrial production, have been quite different in East Asia and North America with regard to marriage patterns. In North America, where the internal organization of the conjugal family has undergone extensive change, marriage remains very popular as a goal among young people, but it has become a highly contingent relationship that rarely endures for a lifetime. Moreover, marriage is no longer the only acceptable context for sexual relations or childbearing. In East Asia, by contrast, where the organization of the conjugal family has changed much less—and where marriage continues to be regarded as a noncontingent relationship that provides the only acceptable context for childbearing and rearing—skepticism about the benefits of marriage has grown, especially among women, many of whom are uncertain about the desirability of marrying and having a family. Young people are delaying marriage until a very advanced age. Moreover, early indications suggest that a growing proportion of

them will remain unmarried throughout the prime reproductive ages (Institute of Population Problems 1996:107). In a context where the definition of marriage remains relatively unaltered, modernization has thus far resulted in a growing postponement of marriage as well as growing doubts about its benefits.

When it comes to intergenerational relations between adult children and their parents, however, the chapters in this volume suggest a more uniform response to modernization. The traditional obligation of oldest sons to live with their parents throughout their lives appears to be eroding in most highly modernized contexts in East Asia. Moreover, the intergenerational contract appears to be shifting gradually from one in which the oldest generation firmly controlled the younger generation and demanded filial piety, to a much more even-handed relationship in which children, although indebted to parents and mindful of their well-being, highly value their own needs and those of their children. As Ogawa and Retherford (1997) have recently noted, this does not bode well for rapidly aging societies that have traditionally relied on the family to care for the elderly. To be sure, surveys in East Asia and North America suggest that the elderly would often prefer to live apart from their children (if nearby), partly because residing with children often involves becoming a dependent. But even if the disappearance of the three-generation family is generally satisfactory to all parties concerned, this shift poses a potential problem in providing care for the elderly, especially the female elderly, who tend to outsurvive their spouses by many years. This is but one of the many problems that modern societies face as they cope with the inexorability of family change in all its many forms.

NOTES

1. Most of the chapters in this book use surveys on family life conducted in Japan, South Korea, and the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s that were designed to be comparable. (See the appendix at the back of the book for detailed descriptions of these surveys.) For this reason, much of the volume focuses on these three countries. Chapter 6, however, focuses on five South Asian and Southeast Asian countries (Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines), and Chapter 11 looks at Taiwan.

2. Rising affluence has been shown to change societal values concerning family life and personal obligations; see Inglehart (1990), Lesthaeghe (1983), and Lesthaeghe and Meekers (1986).

3. Although the emphasis on individualistic achievement in the West has strengthened with industrial development (Alwin 1990; Inglehart 1990), its roots long predate the modernization of economic life (Levine 1977; Macfarlane 1979; Stone 1977).

4. To cope with instances in which parents failed to bear sons, most East Asian family systems allowed for uxori-local marriages in which a young man (often of inferior status) married into the bride's father's family and took its name to continue the family line. This flexible system of recruiting sons, however, merely illustrates the importance of sons in these family systems. Without a son, the family line died. Uxorilocal marriages are still common in Japan, but they have been rare in Korea since the mid-seventeenth century (Tsuya and Choe 1991).

5. In China, the shift in family membership was symbolized during the marriage ceremony by the bride's brother slamming the door of her natal home behind her when she left for her husband's home (Wolf 1972). Daughters in China who died without marrying were women without a family and thus could not be buried in the family tombs of their father's family. Instead, they were buried in special cemeteries for persons without a family. When wives worshiped at a family shrine, it was the shrine of their husband's family, rather than the shrine of their father's family.

6. Indeed, the possibility of not having a son is so disturbing to parents in some parts of East Asia (China and South Korea, for example) that parents are increasingly resorting to prenatal sex selection of offspring by aborting female fetuses so that a son can be borne while keeping family size small (Park and Cho 1995).

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Family Formation

Family Formation in Japan, South Korea, and the United States: An Overview

Shunichi Inoue

The persistent low fertility in Japan, where the total fertility rate dropped to 1.43 in 1996 (Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Department of Statistics and Information, forthcoming), has been caused mostly by delayed marriages among single men and women (Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Institute of Population Problems 1996). The proportions of never-married persons are notably increasing among relatively advanced age groups between 35 and 45 years. This shifting marriage pattern among the Japanese suggests that their perception of the values and functions of a family is changing in important ways.

In the United States, divorces and remarriages have become so frequent these days that the divorce rate per 1,000 married women jumped from 1.3 in 1950 to 21.0 in the 1980s (Goode 1993), although it has since leveled off. This trend indicates that the traditional childrearing and lifelong support functions of the family in the United States have seriously been weakened. In addition, the increasing frequency of cohabitation outside of legal marriage both in the United States and Japan is casting doubt on the durability of traditional family systems.

In the Republic of Korea (referred to as "South Korea" in this chapter), a gradual increase in the age of first marriages has been observed in recent years. Although the traditional family system seems otherwise almost intact, the vast social changes associated with sustained rapid economic growth must surely have had a fundamental impact on families. The rising age of first marriage might well be a sign of more important changes to come.

This chapter examines these three countries with three basic aims: to compare the patterns of family formation and dissolution; to analyze people's perceptions and attitudes toward families; and to examine the fundamental social and economic conditions that lie behind the changing perceptions of the family. If the formation and dissolution of families are determined solely by economic conditions, Japan and South Korea might very well follow the path of the United States and find themselves having similarly frequent divorces and remarriages sooner or later. This scenario is like three trains running on the same track with different timetables. But it is also possible to compare these countries to three trains running on parallel tracks—trains whose destination, because of different social and cultural traditions, may not be the same at all.

PATTERNS OF FAMILY FORMATION

According to the latest vital statistics, the average age of first marriages in Japan and South Korea is higher than in the United States by roughly 2 years. The latest U.N. *Demographic Yearbook* (United Nations 1993) shows that Sweden had the highest average age of marriage in the world (with 30.7 years for men and 28.1 years for women), followed by other European nations. Japan stood just below them with the average age of first marriages of 28.5 years for men and 26.2 years for women in 1994. The singulate mean age of marriage (SMAM) for South Korea was 28.9 years for men and 25.7 years for women in 1990 (Chapter 3 in this volume). The average age of the first marriages in the United States was 26.7 years for men and 24.8 years for women in 1994.

The average age of the first marriages, however, represents only those who married in a particular year but not those who postponed their marriages. Therefore this average could be misleading with regard to the pattern of family formation when the age of marriage is rapidly rising and the number of those who will stay unmarried for life is increasing. A more suitable measurement under these circumstances would be the change in the proportion unmarried. According to the 1990 population censuses in the three countries, the percentage of population who are never-married was the highest in Japan, followed by South Korea and the United States (Table 2.1). Among those 18 years of age and over, the percentage of men who are never-married was 37.0% in Japan, 32.6% in South Korea, and 25.8% in the United States. (The difference between Japan and the United States is 11.2 points.) For women the percentage was 34.3%, 21.6%, and 18.9% respectively (with a gap of 15.4 points between Japan and the United States).

From Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which show the age-specific proportions of those who are never-married, it can be seen that Americans marry relatively young, Japanese marry relatively late, and South Koreans marry en masse in a narrow span

Table 2.1. Percentage of 18-Year-Olds and Over Who Are Never-Married: 1990

Country	Male	Female
Japan	37.0	34.3
South Korea	32.6	21.6
United States	25.8	18.9

Sources: Japan: Management and Coordination Office, Statistics Bureau (1993); South Korea: Republic of Korea National Statistical Office (1992); United States: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994: table 59).

of ages. The proportion never-married starts to decline early in the United States, while in Japan and South Korea the proportion is quite high under 25 years of age: more than 90% of men and more than 80% of women. This proportion starts to decline after 25 years both in Japan and South Korea, but the decline is much steeper in the South Korea. In the age group 35–39 for men and 30–34 for women, the proportion never-married shrinks to 3.8% and 5.3% respectively in South Korea, while it is as high as 19.0% and 13.9% for the same age-sex groups in Japan. There has been a long history of gradually rising age of first marriages in Japan beginning in the 1920s, but the current steep rise started in the 1970s among men and in the 1980s among women. When one considers its causes, the exact timing of this change may be important.

The proportion of the population who are divorced reflects the incidence of family dissolutions and remarriages. If a comparison is made for the 1990 censuses (Table 2.2), the proportion of divorced persons in the United States was 10 times larger than that of South Korea. The proportion of divorced Japanese men was about the same as South Korean men, but for women it was twice as high in Japan as in South Korea. According to the U.N. *Demographic Yearbook* for 1993, the gross divorce rate—that is, the number of divorces per 1,000 population—was around 4.7 in the United States, which can be compared with 1.3 for Japan and 1.0 for South Korea. The ratio of divorces to 100 marriages was, according to the same source,




Figure 2.1. Proportions of Never-Married Men: Japan, South Korea, and United States.




Figure 2.2. Proportions of Never-Married Women: Japan, South Korea, and United States.

Table 2.2. Percentage of 18-Year-Olds and Over Who Are Divorced: 1990

Country	Male	Female
Japan	.9	1.8
South Korea	.7	.9
United States	7.2	9.3

Sources: Japan: Management and Coordination Office, Statistics Bureau (1993); South Korea: Republic of Korea National Statistical Office (1992); United States: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994: table 59).

50.3 in the United States; in Japan and South Korea the same ratio was 23.8 and 13.2, respectively.

These statistics show a clear contrast of the distinctive patterns of family formation and dissolution in the three countries. In Japan, late marriage is becoming more common both for men and women, possibly leading to an increase in lifelong single persons. This is a clear departure from the traditional pattern of universal marriage with synchronized timing, which is still the predominant pattern in South

Korea today. In the United States, where divorces are common, the traditional family system appears to be in danger. In South Korea, the average age of first marriages has begun to rise in recent years, indicating change in a traditional family system that otherwise appears to be intact: apparently everybody is still marrying at the same ages and couples tend to stay together for life.

APPRAISAL OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Since there are practically no legal or social obstacles to marriage or divorce in the three countries under consideration, the different patterns must be due, at least in part, to different evaluations of the merits and demerits of family formation. The family surveys in the three countries—the 1987–1988 U.S. National Survey of Families and Households, the 1992–1994 Follow-up U.S. Survey of Families and Households, the 1994 National Survey on Work and Family Life in Japan, and the 1994 National Survey on the Quality of Life in the Republic of Korea—provide us with comparable data that enable us to study these differences. This section presents some of the findings.

Perceptions of Single Persons

The disinclination to marry among Japanese young people indicates a serious danger for the continuity of the family system in this country. Let us first see how the potential candidates for a marriage perceive the new family life they are considering. Table 2.3 shows how never-married persons imagine a married life to be—specifically their standard of living, their freedom to do the things they enjoy, their respect from others, their sense of emotional security, their relationship with their parents, and their overall happiness. Here we consider the main findings from the analysis.

Standard of Living. In Japan, only one-quarter of unmarried men and women expect some gain in the standard of living after marriage, while about one-third of them anticipate some loss. This is a clear contrast to the situation in South Korea and the United States, where more than half of unmarried persons expect some gain in their standard of living if they marry. The reason is simple. In the United States, most of the working women do not quit their job after marriage, so they can safely assume a doubling of family income through marriage. In Japan, however, many women stop working after marriage or after having a child, so the per capita family income necessarily declines. In addition, many Japanese women feel poorer once married, because they have to leave a comfortable life together with their parents.

Although the pattern of work participation of South Korean women seems to resemble that of the Japanese, South Korean women are apparently so optimistic

that more than 60% of them expect some rise in their standard of living. South Korean men seem to be a little more realistic: one-quarter anticipate some loss in their standard of living. But the South Koreans mentioned here may not represent the whole single population. In sampling for the survey, only heads of households or their spouses were interviewed; hence only unmarried young people living on their

Table 2.3. Never-Married Persons' Perceptions of Whether Life Would Be Better, the Same, or Worse Were They Married (%)

Perception	Japan		S. Korea		U.S. (1987-1989)		U.S. (1992-1994)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Living standard</i>								
Worse	32	33	11	18	27	13	18	8
Same	43	39	25	21	24	25	37	32
Better	25	28	64	61	50	62	45	60
<i>Freedom</i>								
Worse	61	67	49	50	54	37	—	—
Same	33	25	35	31	34	46	—	—
Better	6	8	16	18	11	17	—	—
<i>Respect from others</i>								
Worse	2	1	1	6	—	—	—	—
Same	62	81	45	57	—	—	—	—
Better	36	18	55	38	—	—	—	—
<i>Emotional security</i>								
Worse	2	7	7	5	8	8	—	—
Same	26	29	4	22	39	28	—	—
Better	72	64	89	74	52	64	—	—
<i>Relations with parents</i>								
Worse	6	4	4	8	6	6	—	—
Same	70	73	40	40	67	71	—	—
Better	24	23	55	52	27	23	—	—
<i>Overall happiness</i>								
Worse	6	10	3	2	9	10	13	10
Same	33	38	11	28	25	21	25	30
Better	61	52	86	70	65	69	62	59
Base N ^a	242	219	77	39	562	713	544	988

Note: In this and all subsequent tables, some percentages do not sum to 100% because of rounding error.

a. Base Ns shown are maximum appearing in this table. There may be slight variations across items due to missing data.

own and qualifying as head of household were included in the sample. Therefore, interpretation of South Korean data in Table 2.3 requires special caution.

Freedom to Do the Things One Enjoys. More than 60% of Japanese single men and women anticipate a decline in their personal freedom if they marry. South Korean women living on their own are more pessimistic: nearly 80% of them anticipate a loss of freedom. Not more than 40% of American women feel the same way as South Korean and Japanese do. As for men, about half of them in South Korea and the United States anticipate a decline of freedom. In other words, Japanese men and women, along with South Korean women, are very pessimistic concerning their personal freedom after marriage. The pessimism of Japanese single persons and especially South Korean single women, who are likely to be living separately from their parents, is perhaps due at least in part to the wide freedom they enjoy while unmarried.

Respect from Others. No question was asked in the American surveys about respect from others after marriage. Perhaps the question is irrelevant in the United States. Even in Japan and South Korea, more than half of the respondents thought that no change could occur in this regard. Japanese and South Korean men, however, seem to be a little more concerned than women about this aspect of marriage. About 36% and 54% of single men in Japan and South Korea, respectively, expected some improvement in the respect they would receive from others by marriage.

Sense of Emotional Security. In all three countries, the majority expected to gain an improved sense of emotional security after marriage and less than 10% expected a deterioration. The Japanese men as well as the South Korean men and women are very optimistic and 70% to 80% of them expect some improvement in this regard. It is noteworthy that the proportion reaches 89% among South Korean unmarried men. Among American unmarried men, by contrast, only 52% expect more emotional security after marriage.

Relationship with Parents. Both in Japan and the United States, about 70% of men and women anticipated no change in the relations with their parents if married; in South Korea about 50% thought the relationship with parents would improve by marriage. Perhaps this figure indicates that South Korean parents are exceptionally interested in the marriage of their sons and daughters or that the children are marrying to please their parents. Or perhaps it reflects a tendency for children who do not get on well with their parents and who therefore live on their own to hope that relations with their parents will improve after they marry. The fact that 8% of South Korean women anticipated a deterioration in the relationship may reflect a possibility of negative reactions from parents if a marriage is not to their liking.

Overall Happiness. Concerning their overall happiness, more than 65% of the South Koreans and Americans expected some improvement if married. Especially among South Korean men, as many as 86% expected an improvement. A much

lower percentage of Japanese unmarried men and women—only slightly more than 50%—expect some improvement in their overall happiness by marrying. This is another indication that Japanese unmarried persons are not very hopeful about forming a new family and are much more pessimistic than the South Koreans and Americans. Moreover, about 10% of Japanese women thought their overall happiness would worsen if they married. Negative anticipations are also expressed by unmarried American men and women.

In short, the high expectations of unmarried South Korean men and women about their new family life after marriage seems to accord with their synchronized universal marriage pattern. The American marriage pattern, in which people begin to marry at a young age, is also backed up by their positive perceptions about married life. Japanese single men and women, however, are not so hopeful in many aspects of married life. Probably these low expectations about family life are related to their late marriage or, possibly, no marriage at all.

Evaluation by Married Persons

The evaluation of family life by a never-married person is in a sense a product of imagination. It may or may not be the same as the evaluation of a person who actually experienced it. How do their evaluations differ? Let us examine this issue by asking married persons a question: "How would your present life differ if you were not married?" This question was included in the Japanese and South Korean surveys but not in the U.S. surveys. Answers to this question are somewhat tricky. If the answer is "worse," it means that the person feels better off by the marriage; if the answer is "better," the person feels worse off by the marriage. Table 2.4 presents the results. Note that the responses from the married South Korean women are unbiased, unlike the case of unmarried women mentioned earlier.

Standard of Living. In Japan there are slightly more people who feel they are better off, economically, married than if they were unmarried. But the largest number, nearly 40%, thinks their standard of living would be unchanged were they unmarried. In contrast to the pessimistic expectations of unmarried persons, the married do not see an economic disadvantage to marriage. Among the unmarried, 33% expect a lower living standard if married; only 25% of the wives and 28% of the husbands feel they would be better off single.

In South Korea, there is a significant difference between husbands and wives in the evaluation of marriage. Among husbands, 53% felt their standard of living would decline were they unmarried and 10% thought it would improve. Among women, about equal numbers felt their standard of living would improve and would deteriorate—29% and 27%—although the largest proportion, 44%, thought it would

remain the same. Moreover, in comparison with the expectations of the unmarried, the assessments of married people are more severe, especially among women. For men the proportion of the unmarried who expected an improvement in the living standard through marriage was 64%; but only 53% of those currently married think they would be poorer if unmarried. For women the difference is more pronounced—61% and 27%—although the figure for the unmarried women may be somewhat inflated because of the special nature of the South Korean sample mentioned earlier.

Freedom to Do the Things One Enjoys. The perception that marriage restricts one's personal freedom is about the same among the married as among the unmarried in both Japan and South Korea. Those who felt they are or would be worse off in this respect by marrying comprise 58% and 66% of Japanese husbands and wives

Table 2.4. Married Person's Perceptions of Whether Life Would Be Better, the Same, or Worse Were They Unmarried (%)

Perception	Japan		S. Korea	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Living standard</i>				
Worse	30	38	53	27
Same	41	37	37	44
Better	28	25	10	29
<i>Freedom</i>				
Worse	9	10	17	9
Same	33	24	35	26
Better	59	66	48	65
<i>Respect from others</i>				
Worse	40	26	38	24
Same	55	64	52	55
Better	5	10	10	21
<i>Emotional security</i>				
Worse	61	52	63	46
Same	27	27	26	34
Better	12	21	11	20
<i>Overall happiness</i>				
Worse	57	46	53	30
Same	28	32	33	42
Better	15	22	14	28
Base N ^a	922	900	973	888

a. Base Ns shown are maximum appearing in this table. There may be slight variation across items due to missing data.

as opposed to 61% and 67% of never-married men and women. Likewise, they comprise 48% and 65% of South Korean husbands and wives as opposed to 49% and 51% of never-married men and women.

The perception that marriage restricts one's freedom is more common among South Korean wives (65%) than among the never-married South Korean women (51%). This finding is surprising in light of the fact that all of the never-married women in the sample are living on their own, rather than in the home of their parents, and therefore enjoy considerable freedom. This suggests that for South Korean women, the reality of marriage restricts personal freedom even more than young women anticipate.

Respect from Others. It is noteworthy that in both Japan and South Korea marriage is not perceived to affect a person's social standing as measured in terms of respect from others: close to two-thirds of Japanese wives and half of the Japanese husbands and South Korean husbands and wives felt that being unmarried would not change the respect shown by others. Yet more than a quarter of the husbands and wives in both countries thought they gained some respect from others by being married, while only a fraction, around 10%, felt they lost respect. The only exception is found for South Korean women: 21% of wives felt they lost respect by marrying, a percentage almost equal to the 24% who felt they gained respect from others.

Almost none of the never-married women and men in Japan and South Korea perceive social respect to decline when married. This finding contrasts with the 10% to 20% of husbands and wives who felt worse off in this regard. Why the difference? It is hard to say without further analysis, but there may be a minority of husbands and wives in both Japan and South Korea who are disillusioned about marriage.

Sense of Emotional Security. A greater sense of emotional security is an important reward of marriage and was most frequently cited as such by unmarried persons in all three countries. What about the experiences among the married? Do they feel they are more secure, emotionally, than if they were unmarried? Many of them do, according to the Japanese and South Korean surveys, but not as many as among the never-married. Around 60% of the husbands and approximately 50% of the wives in Japan and South Korea feel emotionally better off being married. These figures are significantly lower, however, than the percentages of young people who anticipate feeling better when married: 72% of the men and 64% of the women in Japan and 89% of the men and 73% of the women in South Korea.

How can we account for the difference between the unmarried and the married in their appreciation of the emotional aspects of marriage? The difference may reflect unrealistically high expectations among the unmarried or serious marital conflicts between husbands and wives—or both. Without further analysis, there is no way to judge which of these explanations is more important. In light of the male

domination that is thought to exist in both Japan and South Korea, it is interesting to note that the discrepancy between the perceptions of the never married and currently married is no greater for wives than for husbands. The higher percentage of wives than husbands who say they would be better off emotionally if unmarried, however, seems likely to reflect the male domination in East Asian families. Whatever the reason, the substantial minority of wives who find that emotional security is wanting in their marriage is a serious matter in Japan, where emotional security is the strongest incentive for unmarried persons to marry according to the 1994 survey. Several surveys in Japan have shown that most young people, especially women, cite emotional security (*kokoro no yasuragi*) as the most important reason for marrying, surpassing economic and social reasons. Unmarried persons are willing to wait until they meet a suitable partner who can give them the emotional comfort they seek. In searching for the causes of delayed marriages in Japan, more research is needed on the substantial contribution of emotional security young people seek, as well as the reasons why it is not fully attained in some marriages.

Overall Happiness. A moderate to substantial majority of never-married persons in Japan, South Korea, and the United States expected some improvement in their overall happiness after marriage. Among the currently married in the first two of these countries, however, only a moderate majority of the husbands and a minority of the wives think their overall happiness would suffer if they were single. Thus marriage does not loom as large for the happiness of the married as for the never-married.

There is also a noticeable discrepancy between the perceptions of husbands and wives, especially in South Korea. More husbands than wives think their overall happiness would suffer if they were unmarried. Differences between Japanese married men and married women in their perceptions of the costs and benefits of marriage are generally small and go in both directions. In South Korea, however, these differences are often substantial and in all cases arise from a more negative view of marriage among married women than among married men. This is a serious indication that South Korean wives are not fully satisfied with their marriages.

Marital Happiness Among the Currently Married

So far we have examined the assessment of marriage by married persons who were asked to compare their actual situation to a hypothetical situation in which they were not married. Aside from such comparisons, what are the independent evaluations of current marriages by themselves? The family surveys in all three countries asked currently married people about the happiness of their marriage. The questions used in Japan and South Korea had five response categories: very happy; some-

what happy; so-so; somewhat unhappy; and very unhappy. In the United States, respondents were presented with a seven-point scale with only the extreme categories labeled "very unhappy" and "very unhappy." To achieve some degree of comparability, we combined the second and third categories in the U.S. question to form a "somewhat happy" category and likewise grouped the fifth and sixth categories to form a "somewhat unhappy" category. It should be noted that this collapsing was arbitrary, however, and that the middle category in the U.S. item, although the mid-point between very happy and very unhappy, was not labeled "neutral," "so-so," or anything else. This difference between questions may have influenced the distribution of responses shown in Table 2.5.

Despite the differences in questions, Table 2.5 shows that in all three countries only very small percentages of married people report their present marriages to be unhappy: 6% or fewer. No more than 2% felt their marriage was very unhappy. There are substantial differences between countries in reports of happiness, however. In the United States, 88% of the men and 86% of the women were happy with their current marriage and 40% or more placed themselves in the highest category on the marital happiness scale. In Japan, however, only 43% of men and 40% of women were happy with their current marriage, about half the proportion found in the United States. The majority of Japanese said their marriages were "so-so," meaning "not so happy but not so bad either." The percentages reporting happy marriages in South Korea are intermediate between those in Japan and the United States.

At first glance, these findings appear to contradict the high divorce rate in the

Table 2.5. Marital Happiness in Japan, South Korea, and the United States (%)

Happiness	Japan		South Korea		United States ^a	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Happy	43	41	68	57	88	86
Neutral	55	56	29	38	6	8
Unhappy	2	4	3	5	6	6
Detailed classification						
Very happy	13	12	9	5	40	44
Happy	30	29	59	52	48	43
Neutral	55	56	29	38	6	8
Somewhat unhappy	1	3	2	4	4	4
Very unhappy	1	1	1	1	2	2
Base N	920	903	992	898	1,813	2,331

a. The question in the U.S. survey used a seven-point scale with only the extreme categories labeled "very happy" and "very unhappy," respectively. Adjacent categories on this scale have been combined to approximate the five pre-labeled categories used in the Japan and South Korea surveys.

United States and the low divorce rates in Japan and South Korea. In the United States, however, those who are not satisfied with their marriage may have already divorced, so that the currently married people are the remainder after selection. And the way in which the happiness question was asked may have encouraged positive answers. The Japanese are perhaps reluctant to declare their marriages as happy. Or perhaps they are used to accepting marriages that are neither particularly happy nor particularly unhappy.

In South Korea, the majority of husbands and wives say their marriages are "happy." But unlike the Americans, very few say their marriages are "very happy," and a significant minority (29% of husbands and 38% of wives) say their marriages are "so-so." The most striking difference between South Korea and the other two countries, however, is the substantial discrepancy between the views of married men and married women in the sample. Far more husbands than wives in South Korea describe their current marriage as happy: 68% versus 57%. This measure, too, presents evidence that South Korean wives are dissatisfied with marriage.

On Working Wives

The traditional family is formed on the basis of a division of labor between husband and wife: the husband earns the money and the wife takes care of the home. This "ideal family" concept is still alive and defended by many supporters in many countries. A wife working outside the home, they argue, is bad for the children who are left unattended by her. Despite this belief, more and more wives are working outside the home. As a result, new questions are raised among working couples on how to share household chores, including child care, between husband and wife. The family surveys of the three countries under study revealed different attitudes about working wives and the sharing of household chores.

Division of Labor Between Husband and Wife. In the family surveys of Japan, South Korea, and the United States, a question was asked about agreement or disagreement with this statement: "It is better for everyone if men earn the living and women keep house." This question was intended to examine what was traditionally conceived of as the ideal family, especially relating to attitudes toward the working wife. Results of the analysis (Table 2.6) show that there are important differences among these three countries.

Among men, agreement with the statement that "it is better for everyone if men earn the living and women keep house" comprised 82% in South Korea and 63% in Japan; in the United States, agreement reached 42% in 1987–1989 and 36% in 1992–1994. It should be noted that the agreement rate in the United States, already the lowest among the three countries in the first-round survey, dropped fur-

ther in the follow-up survey, indicating a changing attitude along with the aging of the sample and the accumulation of life experience. Among women, the agreement rate was smaller but the country differentials were still apparent: 71% in South Korea, 54% in Japan, and 38% and 36% in the United States. Clearly the proportion of people supporting the traditional division of labor is highest in South Korea and lowest in the United States.

As one might expect, the rate of disapproval of the traditional division of labor between husband and wife is high in the United States—reaching 33% for men and 38% for women in the follow-up survey. Note that the disapproval rate rose from the first-round survey, where it was 23% for men and 33% for women. In Japan and South Korea, the disapproval rate was as low as 7% for men and 10% to 13% for women.

In the United States, there was a notable shift in attitude toward the division of labor between husband and wife from the first round (1987–1988) to the follow-up round (1992–1994). When both sexes are combined, the approval rate for the traditional division of labor declined from 40% to 36% and the disapproval rate rose from 28% to 35%. The changes, which involve the same respondents over time, are in favor of more sexual equality. In both the first and second round of surveys, the age differentials in approval and disapproval rates were small and inconsistent but the

Table 2.6. Attitudes About Working Wives (%)

Attitude	Japan		South Korea		United States (1987–1989)		United States (1992–1994)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Better if husband works and wife stays home</i>								
Agree	64	54	82	71	42	38	36	36
Neutral	29	36	12	16	34	31	31	26
Disagree	7	10	7	13	23	31	33	38
<i>Preschool kids are likely to suffer if mother works</i>								
Agree	42	36	54	48	50	38	51	39
Neutral	46	47	25	31	26	28	27	27
Disagree	12	17	21	21	24	34	22	34
<i>If wife works, husband should help with housework</i>								
Agree	65	74	71	87	85	90	65	69
Neutral	24	22	13	8	12	8	23	20
Disagree	11	5	15	4	2	3	12	11
Base N ^a	1,202	1,242	1,096	1,066	2,908	3,950	2,441	3,467

a. Base Ns shown are maximum appearing in this table. There may be slight variations across items due to missing data.

changes occurred simultaneously to all the age and sex groups (data not shown). It is unclear whether the cause of the change is the accumulation of personal experience during the interval or the growing social acceptance of sexual equality in the 1990s.

In Japan and South Korea, there was a consistent difference in the approval rate between men and women. In both countries, approval for the traditional division of labor is more dominant among men than women. In Japan, for example, the approval rate is 63% for men and 54% for women with a 9.5 percentage point difference between the two sexes. In South Korea the difference is 10.4 percentage points. In the United States, the sexual differentials that existed in the first-round survey (4.1 percentage points) had virtually disappeared in the second round due to the decline of the approval rate among men.

Disapproval of the traditional division of labor was more frequently observed among women than men in all three countries, although the differences are *not so* large and are declining in the United States. In Japan the disapproval rate for women was 10% versus 7% for men. The difference was seven points in South Korea and eight and five points (in the first and second rounds, respectively) in the United States.

Working Mother with Children. It is commonly believed that children, especially infants and preschool children, are affected by the mother's absence from the home. This is the major reason why Japanese men hesitate to let their wives work outside the home. The family surveys of the three countries asked whether or not the respondent agreed with this statement: "Preschool children are likely to suffer if the mother works." Agreement with the statement was almost the same in all three countries: about 50% among men and about 40% among women. The percentage disagreeing was the lowest in Japan (12% for men and 17% for women), intermediate in South Korea, and highest in the United States, especially among women. (Disapproval among American women was 34% in both the first and the second round.) The neutral answer was again the largest in Japan at 46% from men and women; in South Korea and the United States it was much lower, 25% to 28%. In the United States, there was no change of opinion on this question between the first and the second surveys. Unlike the attitudes toward the division of labor between husband and wife, the views on the effects of a working mother on children changed little.

Sharing Household Chores If the Wife Works. Another question asked whether the husband should help with the household chores if the wife works. The percentage agreeing with this question was over 60% in every country and exceeded 80% in the United States in the first survey round. Agreement was higher among women than men in all three countries, but the difference was larger in Japan and South Korea than in the United States. On the other hand, disagreement was higher

among men than women in Japan and South Korea by 6 points in Japan and 12 points in South Korea. Despite this high approval of sharing household chores, whether husbands actually did the household chores in these countries is another question. (This issue is examined in Chapter 5.)

Although a majority of men and women in the three countries said the husband should help his wife if she works, there was an interesting change in the United States between the first and the second round of the survey. Approval for sharing the household chores declined from 85% to 65% for men and from 85% to 69% for women. We do not know if these changes are due to differences in the survey techniques or to substantive changes in the attitude of Americans along with their aging.

Divorce

Here, we examine attitudes about divorce as measured by two questions.

Expected Life After Divorce. The divorce rate is much higher in the United States than in Japan and South Korea. In light of this fact, it is interesting to ask how people in America perceive divorce. The U.S. surveys had a question about the change in the expected living standard if a couple is separated. (It is understood that the word "separated," instead of "divorce," was used in the survey to cover the period of separation before a divorce is legally established.) More than 70% of women and 50% of men anticipated that their living standard would worsen if they were separated (Table 2.7). This percentage increased slightly from the first to the second round of the survey: from 71% to 75% for women and from 52% to 54% for men. Although a few people did expect an improvement in their living standard after separation (9% of men and 3% of women) and roughly one-third expected no change, the overall expectation was a lower living standard if separated.

What, then, can one gain from separation or divorce if the living standard falls? When questioned about their expected overall happiness if separated, nearly 80% of men and women anticipated a change for the worse. Of these people, about half said the change would be "very much worse." Only 6% of the men and 8% of the women expected improvement. There was only a slight difference between the first and the second round of the survey: a lower percentage of women who anticipated a change for the worse, which in turn narrowed the gap between men and women. In sum, it is the overall feeling of Americans that separation and divorce would make them less happy. Does this finding contradict the continuing high divorce rate in the United States? It is hard to tell from data on married people because of the likelihood of selection effects—that is, the people who think they would be happier if separated have already divorced and are no longer in the sample. But at a given point in time,

it appears that most married Americans think they are financially and emotionally better off married than separated.

Divorce and Children. A question on attitudes toward divorce in terms of its impact on children was asked in all three countries. The result shows a clear contrast between Japan and the United States, while South Korea stands in between. In response to a statement, "For the sake of children, a couple should not divorce," 53% of men and 40% of women in Japan replied yes. Positive replies were much smaller in the United States: 24% of men and 11% of women. Those who disagreed with the statement comprised 11% of men and 16% of women in Japan as opposed to 38% of men and 56% of women in the United States. The difference between Japan and the United States was especially large for women. In South Korea, agreement with the statement was about the same as in Japan, but disagreement was much higher: 21% of men and 32% of women. In Japan the presence of a child is seen as a strong obstacle to divorce, but apparently not in the United States. This may reflect different national cultures: one emphasizing the independence of individuals from childhood through adult life, the other putting more value on close parent-child relationships, even among adults.

Table 2.7. Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Divorce (%)

Attitude	Japan		South Korea		United States (1987-1989)		United States (1992-1994)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Standard of living if separated^a</i>								
Worse	—	—	—	—	52	71	54	75
Same	—	—	—	—	39	26	37	22
Better	—	—	—	—	9	3	9	3
Base N					1,755	2,234	1,700	2,258
<i>Overall happiness if separated^a</i>								
Worse	—	—	—	—	77	79	79	79
Same	—	—	—	—	17	13	15	13
Better	—	—	—	—	6	8	5	8
Base N					1,750	2,232	1,693	2,246
<i>Better for kids if parents stay together</i>								
Agree	54	40	51	39	—	—	23	11
Neutral	35	43	28	29	—	—	38	33
Disagree	11	16	21	32	—	—	38	56
Base N	1,199	1,235	1,089	1,065			2,423	3,432

a. Married respondents only.

SOCIOECONOMIC CORRELATES

So far we have seen that there are different viewpoints on family formation, marriage, and divorce among the three countries. Even in South Korea, which appears to have kept the traditional family system relatively intact, there are small but important pockets of dissent, especially among women, against the traditional division of labor between husband and wife and by people expressing dissatisfaction with their present marriage. Let us now consider what factors cause such cross-country differences in the perception of family and attitudes on marriage and divorce. Here we will examine four social and economic forces that may have influenced the life of women and their perceptions: women's work participation, their educational attainment, urbanization, and the women's liberation movement.

Women's Entry in the Labor Market

A significant economic development has influenced the perceptions and attitudes of people toward their private and social life, especially the way they approach marriage and family life. Historically, one of the primary functions of the family was to




Figure 2.3. Economic Activity Rates of Women: Japan, South Korea, and United States.

protect individuals from various hazards for a better chance of survival. Today's high standard of living and social and economic security seem to have changed all that and enabled people to reduce their dependence on family. One of the key elements is the mass entry of women into the labor market outside the home, which has given women economic safeguards enabling them to live without dependence on the earnings of their husbands. This development has been relatively recent, however, and the three countries under consideration are at different stages in this transformation.

Recently, work participation rates of American women of all adult ages are almost constant at around 70%, except under 20 and over 55 years (see Figure 2.3). Age-specific work participation rates of women in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, appear to have two peaks at 20–24 and 40–50 years of age, like the pattern observed in the United States several decades ago. This indicates that many women in Japan and South Korea start to work after finishing school, but stop working when they marry or bear their first child. The Japanese and South Korean patterns of activity, although they look very similar, are different in two respects: South Korean participation rates are generally lower than those of Japanese, and the dent in the middle ages occurs at 25–29 years of age in South Korea, but at 30–34 years of age in Japan. The difference indicates more delayed marriages among the Japanese women than the South Korean.

The implications of the age patterns of women's work participation are clear. In the United States, women are empowered with more or less stable income through their life course; in Japan and South Korea their economic independence is often interrupted in the middle of their career, resulting in their dependence on men's earnings. This may explain, at least in part, why American women divorce more frequently despite all the hardships of a separation and divorce. The double-peak pattern of activity rates may also explain why Japanese and South Koreans correctly anticipate, and actually experience, a reduced standard of living after marriage, although a similar anticipation in the United States does not deter people from divorcing.

It is an open question whether divorce in Japan and South Korea will escalate to the level of the United States as women's work participation in these two countries continues to rise. If women are assured of their earning power, it will eliminate one of the reasons that may have prevented them from divorcing.

Women's Educational Attainment

Educational attainment, especially at the college level and higher, is most advanced in the United States (see Figure 2.4). Reflecting developments in the past half-century or so, the proportion of those with high educational attainment (at the tertiary




Figure 2.4. Educational Attainment (Third Level) of Women: Japan, South Korea, and United States.

level or above) changes conversely with age, but the age differentials are least pronounced in the United States. At age 25–29, some 42% of American women in 1960 had third-level educational attainment; even at age 45–54, the comparable percentage was 24%. In Japan and South Korea, where women’s mass enrollment in higher-level education is more recent, the proportion of those with higher education peaks at 20–24 years and decreases rapidly in the older cohorts. The overall level of women’s higher education in Japan lies between that in South Korea and in the United States.

The education of women is advancing very rapidly both in Japan and South Korea. In Japan, for example, women’s enrollment in college or beyond surpassed that of men in 1989 and exceeded 43% around 1993 (Japan Ministry of Education 1993). South Korean advancement has been equally fast: the percentage of women who had a college or higher education at age 20–24, which was only 3.7% in 1970, jumped to 20.8% in 1985, the latest year for which data are available. There is no doubt that the trends of rapidly advancing women’s educational attainment will have important influences on their economic and social status and on the dynamics of marriage and divorce in the two countries.

Urbanization

Perceptions of family life by the general population are strongly influenced by the speed and volume of information. Urbanization—the concentration of population in cities and metropolises—leads to rapid dissemination of information among people. In all three countries under consideration, the level of urbanization has already reached a high point. According to the latest estimates (United Nations 1996), the percentage of population living in urban places in 1994 was 77.5% for Japan, 80.0% for South Korea, and 76.0% for the United States. When nearly three-quarters of the population live in cities and metropolises, the influence of traditional social norms, which often prevail in rural areas, is reduced. At the same time, urbanized people are more easily exposed to changing lifestyles associated with rapid social and economic change. Together with educational advancement and increasing work participation, the transfusion of information and opinions in urban areas must surely have influenced perceptions of marriage and family life in these countries.

Women's Liberation Movement

People's perception of life can be influenced not only by social and economic forces but also by cultural heritage and shifting ideology. Beginning with the United Nations Women's Decade (1975–1985) and continuing with the successive World Conferences on Women since then, the women's liberation movement has received international recognition and gained a new dimension. Many universities and colleges have established women's courses, and many social activities are conducted to promote the empowerment of women.

Yet the deeply rooted traditional culture continues to influence minds. Especially in a country like South Korea, the Confucian teachings, which formed the ideological basis for the traditional family system, have been held firmly enough to prevent radical change. In Japan, the same Confucian ideals and the traditional close relationships between parents and children have created a social environment that, for the sake of the children, discourages divorce. In the United States, where the cultural tradition is much more individualistic, disagreement between husband and wife often leads to separation and divorce, even when there are negative economic and social consequences for them and their children. In this case, the cultural environment may have been more receptive to the women's liberation movement and its attitudes toward women and the family.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter started by pointing out significant differences in the patterns of family formation and dissolution in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. It has been suggested that these differences may be related to women's advances in terms of earnings and education. The empowerment of women has been promoted by various social and economic changes, including advances in women's employment, higher education, and urbanization. The family surveys in the three countries have provided us with ample data on people's perception of marriage and family.

What is common to Japan, South Korea, and the United States is a high level of economic development and social modernization. As a result, the educational attainment and employment of women, together with the high degree of urbanization, have advanced to a level that affects the people's perceptions of marriage and family. The net results of these changes are the advancing age of marriage and the increasing number of nonmarriages in Japan and the frequency of divorce and remarriage in the United States. In South Korea, the traditional cultural barriers are apparently preventing a drastic transformation in the pattern of family formation. The differences among the three countries are not just economic conditions but also the social and cultural environment surrounding marriage and the family: the Confucian-based tradition of close parent-child relationships in Japan and South Korea and the high regard for individual independence in the United States.

The advances in women's education and work participation in Japan and South Korea will sooner or later catch up to the level of the United States. When such time comes, will these two countries find themselves with a divorce rate as high as in the United States or with cohabitation as common an arrangement as in many European countries today? No doubt the results will be strongly influenced by the cultural and social structure in these countries. Women's economic empowerment and independence may be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for the drastic changes in the patterns of marriage and family formation.

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Changing Marriage Patterns in South Korea

Minja Kim Choe

Since the turn of the century, political, social, and economic life in South Korea has experienced dramatic changes. Certainly the change in marriage patterns has been recognized, especially in its relationship to fertility (Cho, Arnold, and Kwon 1982), but it has not been studied much in detail. This chapter uses statistics from censuses and surveys to examine the changes in marriage patterns in South Korea in the recent past, especially the increasing age at marriage, with particular attention to its relation to changes in women's educational attainment and labor-force participation. Moreover, we will analyze data from a recent survey of single persons on their attitudes toward marriage and intentions of marrying in order to gain a better understanding of the causes for changing marriage patterns. Along the way we will be comparing South Korea's case to the situation in Japan and the United States in order to identify the changes in marriage pattern that may be unique to South Korea.

Modernization can cause changes in marriage patterns for several reasons. The first is related to the economic role of the family. Modernization of the economic system is believed to weaken the family by weakening its economic role and the interdependence of its members (Goode 1963; Ogburn and Tibbitts 1933). Economic development usually brings increased opportunities of employment for women. As a result, one major advantage of marriage for women—economic security—becomes less attractive, leading to their postponement of marriage and to increased proportions who never marry. If women's employment opportunities are limited largely to single women, young women would try to maximize their economic opportunities by postponing marriage. In societies with a strong patriarchal family system, women may postpone marriage in order to contribute to their natal homes financially, because their ties with parents are expected to weaken once they marry (Greenhalgh 1985). But if employment opportunities improve for married women as well as single women, women's employment can enhance their marriage probabilities because their earnings, which are likely to continue after marriage, may be highly valued by prospective husbands. The relationship between women's employment and the timing of marriage would also be affected by the economic status of young men. A recent study on marriage patterns in the United States supports both of these arguments (Oppenheimer 1994).

Modernization can change marriage patterns temporarily for demographic reasons as well. An increased level of women's education, for example, can lower their marriage rates because of the difficulty of finding appropriate husbands. If men

prefer to marry women who are younger and less educated than themselves, a rising level of women's education may produce more women with high levels of education than demanded by their potential husbands who are a few years older, because the average level of education is likely to be higher for younger persons. Studies on the changes in marriage patterns in the United States illustrate this theory (Goldman, Westoff, and Hammerslough 1984; Qian and Preston 1993).

The third way modernization can change marriage patterns is related to changes in the social status of married and single persons and the role of families in providing emotional support to its members. In addition to being an economic unit, the family provides social status, emotional security, and companionship to its members as well as a legitimate place for sexual relationships and reproduction. The importance of these functions of the family may weaken with modernization as the status associated with education and employment becomes more important than that accorded to marital state. People may become more tolerant of variations in individual behavior, especially sexual activity and childbearing.

An increase in women's education can result in delayed marriage and an increase in permanent nonmarriage for all these reasons. Women with higher levels of education are more likely to find well-paying jobs and become economically independent. Before modernization, the level of women's education is typically much lower than men's in most societies and men marry women who are younger and have less education than themselves. Modernization improves the educational level of both men and women. Because women often start with much less education than men, they are likely to experience more improvement. In South Korea, for example, the proportion of women with high school or more education increased from 17% for the 1940 birth cohort to 81% for the 1965 birth cohort, amounting to nearly a fivefold increase in 25 years. During the same time, the proportion with high school or more among men changed from 46% to 88%, amounting to a little less than a twofold increase (Republic of Korea National Statistical Office 1992, vol. 1, Table 4). An increased level of education usually results in attitudes that are more tolerant of individual behavior. Increasing years of education can also result in delayed marriage if the life course is viewed as following a strict sequence—completing education before marriage for both men and women, for example, and obtaining financial security before marriage for men.

TRENDS IN AGE AT MARRIAGE, EDUCATION, AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Reliable statistics on age at first marriage in Korea (South Korea since 1948) can be derived from census data dating from 1930. The estimates of age at first marriage (singulate mean age of marriage, SMAM) computed from census data show a con-






Figure 3.1. Trend in Age at First Marriage: South Korea, Japan, and United States. (Sources: Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Census*; Japan Statistical Bureau, *Population Census of Japan*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Report of Current Population Survey*.)

tinuing upward trend for both men and women (Figure 3.1). By 1990, the SMAM reached 25.7 for women and 28.9 for men. The pattern of monotonically increasing trends in South Korea contrasts with the trend in Japan where the age at marriage did not change much during the 1960s and 1970s and in the United States where the pattern shows a wide swing with slow upward trend (Figure 3.1). Rapid change without pause is characteristic of many other economic and social changes observed in South Korea.

The increase in the level of education for women since the founding of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1948 is phenomenal (Figure 3.2). In a country that had held onto a Neo-Confucian ideology about the woman's role until the fall of the Yi dynasty in 1910 (Kim 1968), the political change followed by rapid economic development in the second half of the twentieth century resulted in dramatic changes in opportunities for education in general and especially for women. Among the 1936 birth cohort who reached age 15 in 1951, only 12% of women had senior high school or more education and just 2% had some college education. Among the 1967 birth cohort, the proportion of women with senior high school or more education reached 86% and women with some college education amounted to 19%. The increase has been faster for women than for men. For men, the comparable proportions with high school education increased from 41% to 91% for high school education and from 16% to 31% for college education (Figure 3.2).

Labor-force participation rates of women in South Korea have increased steadily since 1960 (see Figure 3.3). Their participation rate first increased among adolescents (aged 15 to 19) during the early phase of economic development in 1960s and 1970s, peaking at 41% in 1970. With further economic development and the spread of higher education, the employment rate for this age group declined to 17% in 1990. The labor-force participation rates for women aged 20 and over show a steady increase that is most dramatic for ages 20–24 (Choe, Kong, and Mason 1994).

The age pattern of labor-force participation of women in South Korea shows a distinct M shape with a sharp dip at ages 25–29 (Figure 3.3), suggesting that women's employment is mostly temporary rather than career-oriented. The distribution of occupations of working women shows a striking age pattern that gives additional evidence of the temporary nature of women's employment (see Figure 3.4). In 1990, white-collar occupations accounted for 57% of employed women among 20–24-year-olds but only 13% among 30–34-year-olds and 6% among 40–44-year-olds. Proportions of women working in sales, service, and farming increased with age while proportions of those working in production did not change much by age.

How are these changes in young women's level of education, level of employment, and age at first marriage related to each other? Let us examine the relationship between these factors in more detail.




Figure 3.2. Trend in Educational Attainment: South Korea. (Source: Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office, 1990 Population and Housing Census.)




Figure 3.3. Percentage of Women in the Labor Force by Age: South Korea. (Source: Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Census*.)

EDUCATION AND TIMING OF MARRIAGE

First we examine the relationship between educational attainment and age at first marriage from reports of national censuses. Figure 3.5 shows the proportions of ever-married men and women by age and educational attainment in South Korea in 1970 and 1990. In 1970, the proportions ever-married were lower for men and women with a higher level of education before age 30, but the proportions at age 30 and




Figure 3.4. Percentage Distribution of Occupations of Female Workers by Age: South Korea, 1990. (Source: Choe, Kong, and Mason 1994: table 6.)

above showed little variation by education: virtually all men and women over age 30 were married regardless of their educational level. The pattern had changed by 1990. In 1990 women with a college education were more likely to be single at all ages up to age 39. The relationship between education and proportion married changed also for men between 1970 and 1990 but in a different direction. Among men, those with a low level of education (less than senior high school) were more likely to be single than those with a higher level of education at all ages except the early twenties. Men with a college education were less likely to be married at younger ages, but by age 30 the proportion married was higher than among those with less education. In summary, then, in 1990 the level of education was inversely related to the proportion married at age 30 for women, but the relationship was positive for men. A similar pattern was observed in Japan: according to the 1990 census the proportion of men married at age 35–39 was larger for the more educated, but among women it was smaller for the more educated (Japan Statistics Bureau 1994, Table 9).




Figure 3.5. Percentages Married by Age, Sex, and Education: South Korea, 1970 and 1990. (Source: Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Census*.)

The patterns observed in South Korea and Japan contrast with that in the United States. Studies on the American marriage pattern (for non-Hispanic whites) found that for men the proportion ever marrying was higher among the more educated than among the less educated, but for women there was very little difference in proportion ever-married by educational attainment (Oppenheimer 1994; Qian and Preston 1993). Part of the difference in the relationship between education and timing of marriage in South Korea and Japan, on the one hand, and in the United States, on the other, may be due to the increasing prevalence of cohabitation of unmarried men and women in the United States. Cohabitation, which is similar to marriage in many respects, is found to be more common among the less educated

than among the more educated, which explains much of the difference in proportion married by education (Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991).

EMPLOYMENT AND TIMING OF MARRIAGE

Data that would allow us to understand the relationships between employment and marriage are not readily available. Because most women in South Korea change their employment status at the time of marriage, to examine the relationship between employment and marriage one needs data on both married and single women and the history of employment of married women. One recent survey of married women conducted in South Korea—the 1991 Korean National Fertility and Family Health Survey conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA)—collected information about marital status, school attendance, work status, and fertility for each year since age 18 from all married women covered by the survey (Kong, Cho, Kim, and Son 1992). Using these data, Tsuya and Choe (1994) have estimated the effects of childhood residence, education, and work status at each age on the probability of marriage during the following year. Their analysis shows that while urban upbringing and a high level of education tend to lower the probability of marriage, employment status has no effect. In Japan, an analysis of women aged 20–64 in 1988 showed that although women's employment status in general did not have an effect on the age-specific probabilities of marriage, working in a professional occupation lowered the probabilities of marriage (Tsuya and Choe 1994). In the United States, however, women's employment has been found to raise the probability of marriage (Oppenheimer 1994).

So far we have not been able to explain the delayed marriage of more educated women in South Korea by their increased economic role. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between women's education, economic activity, and marriage behavior, we now turn to the individual-level analyses of data collected from single persons in 1991. At the time of the 1991 National Fertility and Family Health Survey, KIHASA conducted a companion survey of single persons: the 1991 Survey on Marriage and Family. Sampling of single persons was based on a nationally representative sample of 11,540 households used for the Fertility and Family Health Survey. From these households, 5,885 never-married men and women aged 18–34 were identified as potential respondents. The potential respondents were then asked to fill out a questionnaire. Fifty-six percent of the sampled men and women completed the questionnaire, resulting in 3,297 cases for analysis. The response rate was slightly higher among women (57.6%) than among men (54.8%). The survey collected information on respondents' attitude on marriage, plans of their own marriage, reason for being single, and their sexual behavior.

The analyses presented here consist of a series of regression models (binary logistic regression when appropriate) on attitudes and intentions of marriage. The independent variables are age (in single years), residence (metropolitan, other urban, or rural), and education (low: less than senior high; medium: senior high; and high: more than senior high). A multinomial logit regression was used to analyze the reason for being single. The model for the reason for being single includes additional independent variables: work status and the interaction between education and work status. The results are presented in terms of the adjusted values of the dependent variables by respondent's age and education. When appropriate, the effects of work status are also shown. All estimates are made separately for men and women.

The analysis of attitudes toward marriage and the intention of marrying is limited to men under age 30 and women under age 26. This age limit is imposed because attitudes and plans may change once young people have passed the prime ages for first marriage. Moreover, those who remain single at ages when most of their peers have already married may be quite unusual in their attitudes and thus may represent the never-married poorly. Data for the analysis of attitudes and marriage intentions are available for 1,603 men and 1,292 women. In the analysis of reasons for being single, we included men under age 35 (1,726 cases) and women under age 30 (1,412 cases). As we have seen in Figure 3.5, substantial proportions of men marry between ages 30 and 34, and women between ages 26 and 29. Inclusion of older single men and women in the analysis would have provided information on why some men and women marry at later ages.

ATTITUDE ON MARRIAGE

We first examine how respondents' age, education, and residence affect their attitude about the necessity of marriage. The analysis is based on responses to this question: "In our country, most men and women marry when they reach certain ages. Do you think it is necessary for people to marry?" There were five answer categories: (1) it is necessary; (2) it is better to marry than not to marry; (3) not sure; (4) it is better not to marry than to marry; (5) marriage is not necessary. Categories (1) and (2) are combined as "traditional attitude" and categories (3) to (5) as "modern attitude." Table 3.1 shows the estimated effects of age and education on respondents' attitudes toward the necessity of marriage.

Overall, men have a more traditional and uniform attitude about the necessity of marriage. None of the factors included in the estimation model has a statistically significant effect on men's attitude toward the necessity of marriage. Women's attitudes are more modern, by contrast, and vary by age and level of education; the effects of age and education are statistically significant at the 10% level. Not

surprisingly, younger women are less likely than older women to think it is necessary or better to marry. The estimated effect of education on single women's attitude toward marriage is somewhat surprising: when the effect of age is controlled, a high level of education is associated with a stronger tendency to view marriage as a necessity or a better choice than lifetime celibacy.

One possible explanation of this finding concerns the nature of our sample. We have seen that women with a low level of education tend to marry at younger ages (Figure 3.5). According to the 1990 census, the proportion of women who were single at age 23 was 89.3% for women with more than senior high school education, 65.5% for women with senior high school education, and 45.5% for women with less than senior high school education. In our sample of single women consisting of those under age 26, women with a low level of education are more atypical of their peers than are single women this age with higher levels of education. Some women with a low level of education who are still single when more than half of their contemporaries are married may feel discouraged about the prospect of marriage and justify their status by formulating the attitude that marriage is not necessary. Nevertheless, our analysis does not support the hypothesis that women with a higher level of education are less likely to view marriage as necessary.

Table 3.2 shows the adjusted mean ideal ages at first marriage for men and women reported by single men under age 30 and single women under age 26. The

Table 3.1. Estimated Percentages of Single Men and Women Who Think It Is Necessary for Everyone to Marry or That It Is Better to Marry, by Age and Education: South Korea, 1991

Respondent's characteristics	Men age < 30	Women age < 26
All	82.0	65
Age		
20	81.0	64
23	82.4	69
Education		
More than senior high school	80.3	69
Senior high school	81.3	63
Less than senior high school	83.7	47

Note: Estimates are based on logistic regression models that include age, education, and residence as covariates, fitted for male and female respondents separately. For men, none of the factors was statistically significant ($p < 10\%$). For women, age and education were statistically significant.

Source: Individual-level data of the 1991 Survey on Marriage and Family.

Table 3.2. Estimated Ideal Age at First Marriage for Men and Women, by Respondent's Age and Education: South Korea, 1991

Respondent's characteristics	For men		For women	
	Male Age < 30	Female Age < 26	Male Age < 30	Female Age < 26
All	28.4	29.1	24.9	25.9
Age				
20	28.1	29.0	24.8	25.8
23	28.5	29.2	24.9	26.1
26	28.9	—	25.0	—
Education				
More than senior high	28.7	29.2	25.1	26.3
Senior high	28.3	28.9	24.8	25.7
Less than senior high	27.7	28.1	24.2	25.1

Note: Estimates were made by logistic regression models using age, education, and residence as factors, fitted for male and female respondents separately (four models). All factors were found to be statistically significant at the 10% level for all four models with two exceptions: Age was not significant in explaining the ideal age at marriage for men reported by women or ideal age at marriage for women reported by men.

age at first marriage considered to be ideal is very high in South Korea: about 29 for men and about 25 for women. Although some factors are found to be statistically significant in explaining the variations in ideal age at marriage, their effects are small. In other words, the range of ages considered to be ideal for first marriage is narrow for both men and women. Note that the ideal age at first marriage for both sexes reported by women is modestly but consistently higher than the age reported by men.

INTENTION TO MARRY

We next examine respondents' reported intentions to marry and how these intentions are related to their age and education. Table 3.3 shows the adjusted proportions of men and women who intend to marry. The intention of marriage is based on this question: "All things considered, at what age do you intend to marry?" Men and women who gave the intended age at marriage and those who reported that they intend to marry without specifying the age are grouped together as intending to marry. Those who were not sure whether they would marry are classified together with those not intending to marry.

Overall, 77% of men and 68% of women reported that they intend to marry. Education is found to be a statistically significant factor explaining the intention to

Table 3.3. Estimated Percentages of Men and Women Who Intend to Marry, by Respondent's Age and Education: South Korea, 1991

Respondent's characteristics	Men Age < 30	Women Age < 26
All	77	69
Age		
20	76	66
23	77	76
Education		
More than senior high	79	65
Senior high	76	71
Less than senior high	67	67

Note: Estimates were made by logistic regression models using age, education, and residence as factors, fitted for male and female respondents separately. For men, the effect of education was found to be statistically significant; for women, the effect of age was found to be statistically significant.

marry among men: more educated men are more likely to say they intend to marry. Age is found to have a statistically significant effect on women's intentions to marry: fewer younger than older women intend to marry. Comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.3, we see that the effects of education on viewing the necessity of marriage and on personal intentions of marriage are somewhat different. Among men, education has no effect on the general view but some effect on personal intentions. Among women, education has some effect on the general view but not on personal intentions.

Table 3.4 shows the actual age at which those intending to marry say they intend to get married. Respondents' intended age at marriage is affected only by their age. The estimated effects are shown in Table 3.4. Men's intended age at marriage is about 3 years older than women's, and older respondents intend to marry at older ages. Although the intended age at marriage does not vary significantly by the respondent's level of education for either sex, the reported ideal age at marriage varies by the level of education for both male and female respondents.

In summary, a somewhat surprising pattern is found for the effect of education on attitudes about the necessity of marriage and the intention to marry. The level of education is positively associated with general attitudes toward marriage among women and with personal plans for marriage among men. This finding is consistent with the pattern of proportions of single persons by age and education we observed earlier among men. Among women, our finding is contrary to the observed pattern

Table 3.4. Estimated Intended Age at First Marriage, by Respondent's Age: South Korea, 1991

Respondent's characteristics	Men Age < 30	Women Age < 26
All	28.3	25.0
<i>Age</i>		
20	27.4	23.9
23	28.2	25.9
26	29.1	—

Note: Estimates are based on logistic regression models using age, education, and residence as factors. For both male and female respondents, only age was found to have a statistically significant effect at the 10% level. Age is given in Korean age: Korean age starts with 1 at birth and increases by 1 year every new year's day.

of marital status by age in 1990. The difference suggests that the proportion of women who eventually get married may not be the result of their own decisions only. The high proportion of women still single at age 30 among the more educated may result from the difficulty in finding husbands. We turn now to the reported reasons for being single at the time of survey to find further explanations for the relationship between educational level, work status, and marital status.

REASONS FOR BEING SINGLE

Marriage involves two people. A man or a woman who is willing and ready to marry must find the right person to marry and conclude an agreement to marry. Whether a person feels ready to marry or not, as well as his or her probability of finding the right person to marry when ready, may depend on their personal characteristics. Our data provide an opportunity to discover the characteristics associated with readiness to marry and the difficulty of finding the right spouse. The survey posed this question: "What is the reason you are still single?" There were seven possible answers: (1) too young; (2) have not found the right person to marry yet; (3) because of my education or work; (4) not ready financially; (5) have an older sibling who is still single; (6) do not want to marry at all; and (7) other. Here we reclassify the seven responses into three categories treating responses (2) and (6) as separate categories labeled "no right person" and "will not marry," respectively, and combining all others into one category labeled "not ready yet." We then examine how these three categories of responses are related to respondents' age, education, work status,

Table 3.5. Estimated Distribution of Reasons Why Respondents Are Single, by Age (%): South Korea, 1991

Age	Men, age < 35			Women, age < 30		
	Not ready to marry	No right person	Will not marry	Not ready to marry	No right person	Will not marry
All ages	68	25	7	60	21	19
20	84	10	6	73	10	17
23	73	20	8	48	27	24
26	57	34	8	22	54	24
30	35	57	8	—	—	—
33	21	73	7	—	—	—

Note: Estimates were made by multinomial logistic regression models using age, education, work status, interaction between education and work status, and residence as factors, fitted for male and female respondents separately. For men, all factors except residence were found to be statistically significant. For women, age and the interaction between high level of education and work status were found to be statistically significant.

and residence using a multinomial logit regression model. To capture the effect of work status that may differ across educational levels, the model includes interaction terms between two dummy variables indicating three levels of education and work status.

Table 3.5 shows the estimated distribution of reasons for being single by age for male and female respondents. The distribution of reported reasons for being single for men and women differs mainly in the proportions saying they will not marry. Similar to the pattern for general attitudes toward the necessity of marriage, women are more likely than men to say they are single because they do not plan to marry at all. Overall, female respondents are nearly three times more likely than males to say they are single because they do not want to marry. The age pattern is not surprising. Younger persons are more likely than older persons to report that they are not yet ready to marry. The proportion of singles with this reason declines more rapidly with age among women than among men. This difference indicates that the range of age considered to be good for first marriage is narrower for women than for men. Older men and women say they are single because they have not found the right person to marry.

The adjusted distribution of reasons for being single by education and work status is shown in Table 3.6. For both men and women, after controlling for the effects of age and residence, the proportion saying they are single because they do not want to marry at all does not vary much by their education or work status. For both men and women, the proportions saying they are single because they are not ready to marry is highest among those who have more than a high school education and are

not working. This is not surprising because a large proportion of these people are still in school or, in the case of men, in military service. The proportions of men and women saying they are single because they have not found the right person show an interesting pattern. Among working men, the proportion does not vary much by their level of education. Among men who are not working, a lower educational level is associated with a higher proportion saying they have not found the right person. This suggests that for men, economic independence is an important condition for marriage.

Among working women, the relationship between educational level and being single because the right person has not been found is positive: higher education is associated with a higher proportion saying they have not found the right person. Among nonworking women, the relationship is negative. Thus the proportion of women who report that they are single because they have not found the right person is highest among those with a high level of education who are working and those with a low level of education who are not working, the two extreme groups in the modernization spectrum. Women in these extreme groups seem to have more trouble in finding the right person than those in the middle.

In general, women with a low level of education may have a hard time finding husbands because there is a much smaller proportion of men with a low level of education. Among women with a low level of education, however, work status may improve the prospects of marriage because the potential husbands of poorly educated women are likely to have low income and would welcome a wife's additional income. Why have a large proportion of working women with a high level of edu-

Table 3.6. Estimated Distribution of Reasons Why Respondents Are Single, by Education and Work Status (%): South Korea, 1991

Work status and education	Men, age < 35			Women, age < 30		
	Not ready to marry	No right person	Will not marry	Not ready to marry	No right person	Will not marry
Working						
More than senior high	64	30	6	55	26	22
Senior high	63	30	6	58	22	20
Less than senior high	63	28	9	65	19	22
Not working						
More than senior high	78	13	9	67	16	17
Senior high	62	24	6	59	22	20
Less than senior high	62	32	6	54	25	21

Note: See Note to Table 3.5.

cation not found the right person? Here the reasons are likely to be more complex. One likely reason is the demographic composition of men and women of prime marriageable age in South Korea. The tabulation of the preferred level of education for one's future spouse (from the 1991 Survey on Marriage and Family) shows that 52% of men with more than a senior high school education prefer a future wife with a lower level of education than their own. Moreover, we have seen that South Korean men and women prefer husbands to be about 3 years older than wives.

The combination of preferred differences in the level of education and age between husband and wife and the recent trend in the rise of women's educational level is likely to have resulted in more women in their twenties with a high level of education than there are potential husbands. Among women with a high level of education, those who are employed may feel less urgency to marry soon and thus be more selective in choosing future husbands, resulting in a high proportion who have not yet found the right person. Because the range of ideal age at marriage for women is quite narrow, not finding the right person to marry for a while may result in passing the prime age for marriage and then becoming less attractive to potential husbands.

CONCLUSIONS

Age at first marriage has increased substantially in South Korea in the recent past, and the increase is closely related to the increased level of education. Educated men and women are marrying at increasingly later ages. The norm of universal marriage seems to be weakening somewhat. In 1990, substantial proportions of men and women were still single after age 30. Nonmarriage was especially common among women with a high level of education and men with a low level.

A substantial proportion of young people, especially women, have quite liberal views about the necessity of marriage. Women have more liberal and diversified views on the necessity of marriage than do men, and women prefer a slightly higher age at marriage for both sexes. Somewhat surprisingly, educated men and women are more likely to view marriage as necessary, or as better than remaining single throughout life, than are their less educated counterparts. Women with a higher level of education prefer to marry at later ages than those with less education, but they are not more likely to want to remain single.

In South Korea, no clear relationship between labor-force participation and the probability of marriage has been found among women. Indeed, an earlier study found that labor-force participation of young unmarried women had little effect on the probability of marriage (Tsuya and Choe 1994). This chapter suggests that labor-force participation may enhance the marriage probabilities of women with low lev-

els of education, but it may delay marriage and thereby produce a higher likelihood of never marrying among women with a high level of education.

The complex relationship between employment and marriage may be related to the temporary nature of women's employment. The age pattern of women's labor-force participation has a sharp M shape: most women leave the labor force around the time of marriage and the birth of their first child. The distribution of occupations of working women shows a sharp contrast by age: women under age 30 are mostly in white-collar occupations and those over 30 are mostly in sales, services, and farming. Single women with a high level of education who are working are likely to have white-collar occupations. Among married women, the proportion working in white-collar occupations is very small. Unmarried women working in white-collar jobs, therefore, may regard their chance of being employed after marriage in a similar occupation as low. Such prospects may cause postponement of marriage among women with a high level of education—which in turn may lead to a high probability of staying single into their late thirties after they pass the narrow range of ages considered to be ideal for women's first marriage. For women with a low level of education, however, employment is less likely to be disrupted by marriage and their employment seems to enhance their marriage prospects.

Among women with a college education, a lack of available spouses may also explain the delay of marriage and the increased proportion of never-married women after age 30. The proportion of women with higher education has increased rapidly in the recent past, at a pace much faster than among men. Men are found to prefer to marry women who are younger and less educated. Thus an increasingly large proportion of women with the highest level of education (college level) would be left out as preferred brides.

There is no evidence of increasing tolerance of premarital sexual activities in South Korea. According to the 1991 Korean Fertility Survey, over 80% of married women aged 25–29 agreed that a woman should be a virgin at marriage. Another survey conducted in 1994 (Chang, Kim, and Bae 1994) found that two-thirds of men and three-quarters of women held this opinion with respect to men. The increasing availability of contraceptives and easy access to induced abortions, however, may soon reduce the imperative of marriage among those who are sexually active.

While the role of marriage as a legitimate place for sexual relations and child-bearing seems to remain strong in South Korea, other social roles of marriage may be eroding for young men and women. In addition to increased opportunities for education and employment, activities such as recreation and travel have become widely available in recent years. These activities are likely to be more available to single persons than to the married, especially among women. Such changes may cause the further delay of marriage.

A recent study of marriage patterns among urban overseas Chinese documents a rapid increase in the proportions never marrying (Leete 1994). Will the changing marriage pattern in South Korea lead to a similar situation? Our analysis suggests it is not very likely. The increasing proportion of never-marrying women in Taiwan, Singapore, and other urban overseas Chinese communities has been explained by women's increasing economic independence. In South Korea, however, we have found little evidence of the increasing economic independence of women, especially among those with a high level of education. On the contrary, a recent study comparing economic roles of women in Taiwan and South Korea concludes that the economic structure in South Korea discourages labor-force participation of women with a high level of education (Brinton, Lee, and Parish 1995). It is likely that South Korean women will postpone marriage to an even later age, but it is not certain whether the proportion of women never marrying will increase substantially in the near future. The future pattern of marriage in South Korea will depend on the economic roles available to women of different ages and marital status. In this sense, whether women in South Korea choose to marry will continue to be determined, at least partly, by forces beyond their own control.

NOTE

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The Changing Significance of Marriage in the United States

Larry L. Bumpass

The stability and nature of family life are major factors in the well-being of adults and children and indeed the social order at large. It is no surprise that the dramatic changes in family experience in the United States have increasingly become issues in policy debates, but in that context it is all the more essential that we understand both the dynamics and consequences of changing family transitions. This chapter outlines how these changes are deeply rooted in the evolution of a modern industrial economy and its ideologies of individualism, not the consequence of recent social policies. Here we will review the roles of divorce, nonmarital childbearing, and cohabitation in changing the family contexts of children. Cohabitation is a component of these changes that has not been sufficiently understood. Traditional family definitions, based on marriage, have blinded family research and social policy to the increasing prevalence of two-parent families that are unmarried.

With the exception of orphanhood, children's family experience results from decisions made by adults. Consequently, the understanding of family change for children must be set in the context of the underlying transformation in adults' decisions about cohabitation, marriage, childbearing, and the dissolution of marital or cohabiting unions.

The ascription of trends in these decisions to factors such as welfare policy or recent high levels of female employment is a myopic view that fails to recognize the deep historical roots of current trends and their extension throughout all of Western society. The long-term decline in the centrality of family life is reinforced by, but not caused by, the sequence of recent developments (Bumpass 1990). Trends in divorce (Preston and McDonald 1979) or in women's employment (Davis and van den Oever 1982), for example, extend back over a century. The changing family decisions made by adults that directly affect children's lives are rooted in the changing significance of marriage. This changing significance is a central characteristic of recent levels of divorce, nonmarital childbearing, and cohabitation. At the same time, it must be emphasized that these changes do not mean that marriage has become unimportant or is likely to become so (Popenoe 1993). Despite profound changes, marriage and family life continue to be exceedingly important in the lives of most people.

THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF MARRIAGE

As for family change in general, the changing significance of marriage is in large part a working out of the implications of secularization and individuation in American culture (Lesthaeghe 1983, 1995; Stone 1982; Bellah et al. 1985). This individuation has multiple roots including the atomizing effect of market economies and a related but separate ideational force (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). In any event, Western society recognizes the legitimacy of self-interest as the basis of resolving conflicting interests—even when the other interests at issue are those of a spouse or children. “Self-interest” should not be read here as “selfishness,” since it includes such values as empowerment, self-realization, and economic self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, this individuation is accurately characterized as an increased “aversion to long-term commitments” (Lesthaeghe 1983)—a process with clear implications for marriage, cohabitation, childbearing, parenting, and the stability of families. Comparisons between the United States and Japan are important because they allow us to track over time the extent to which the modern world economy will have different effects on family life in the context of profoundly different orientations toward individualism and commitment. Surely the different contexts will matter greatly. But only a decade or so ago, few would have expected the increases in divorce or declines in marriage or fertility in Japan that have occurred since.

Divorce

Figure 4.1 illustrates the trend in divorce in the United States. This graph reveals central evidence on the processes under discussion. While there have been fluctuations around the trend line, the underlying trend has been steadily upward. Note that the divorce rate has not increased further since 1980. This 16-year plateau must be interpreted in light of the history seen in Figure 4.1 and in recognition of the similar plateau that preceded the sharp upturn of the late 1960s. It seems most unlikely that the processes underlying this long-term decline in the stability of marriages have fully run their course. Anyone who concluded in 1950 that the upward trend in divorce was over would have been seriously wrong.

Because parental death was once common, single-parent families are not new. But the increasing prevalence of divorce has brought a qualitative change in this experience. Increases in divorce over the first half of the twentieth century were offset by declines in mortality, so that it was only for children born in the 1960s that there was an actual increase in the proportion experiencing a single-parent family (Bane 1976; Bumpass and Sweet 1989a). What was new in this transformation was the increasing creation of such families by parental decision and the weakening




Figure 4.1. Trend in the Rate of Divorce Per 100 Married Women: United States, 1860–1987.

norms against such decisions (Thornton 1989). By the late 1970s, two-fifths of children of married parents would not make it through childhood in an intact family (Bumpass 1984a; Bianchi 1995). While the increase of the late 1960s was a continuation of the long-term trend, it was nonetheless a major turning point in the significance of marriage in defining family life. With almost half of married parents divorcing, marriage as a contract "until death" had become a very weak guarantee of a two-parent family and hence for the social and financial well-being of children (Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). Thus this trend in divorce is clear evidence of the changing significance of marriage.

Unmarried Sex and Childbearing

Increasing nonmarital childbearing is another of the major factors affecting children's family experience, though the source of this change was initially in the separation of sex from marriage. Unmarried sex and childbearing are not postmodern inventions (Laslett 1980). Nonetheless, there has been a major revolution in age at first sexual intercourse and in relevant social values, perhaps facilitated by the changed expectations about the risk of pregnancy associated with the diffusion of oral contraceptives. Figure 4.2 illustrates how rapidly this change has occurred: a doubling in just two decades of the proportion sexually experienced by each age between 15 and 20. Over three-quarters of U.S. teens now have intercourse before age 20 (Forrest and Singh 1992; Sonenstein, Pleck, and Ku 1989), and less than a fifth of young adults believe that unmarried teenage sex is wrong (Bumpass 1990).

The progressive delay of marriage has further contributed to the number of adult years spent unmarried and sexually active. It can be seen in Figure 4.3 that the joint effect of earlier ages at first sex and later ages at marriage has approximately doubled the number of years spent sexually active and unmarried before age 25. The normative expectation of marriage as a necessary condition to legitimate sexual relationships is eroding so rapidly that it may no longer exist among the younger generation. As we shall see in the concluding section, both secular trends and cohort replacement continue to transform attitudes in the society at large.

A major consequence of this sexual revolution has been a dramatic increase in unintended pregnancies to unmarried women. This outcome is not inevitable, for other countries have experienced the sexual revolution without this consequence (Trussell 1988). Nonetheless, 80% all pregnancies to unmarried women in the United States are unintended. Despite the fact that half are aborted (Forrest 1994), two-thirds of the births to unmarried women result from accidental pregnancy (Williams and Pratt 1990). That unintended fertility plays a primary role in unmarried childbearing is a key insight for considerations of the relationships between social policy

and unwed motherhood. Most analyses have employed theoretical frameworks that implicitly assume that unmarried childbearing results from *planned* conceptions.

The pervasiveness of the changing significance of marriage is indicated by the fact that most of the recent increase in nonmarital childbearing has occurred among majority whites. This is not simply a trend confined to poor urban minorities, nor is it primarily a teen phenomenon. In Figure 4.4 we see that nonmarital birthrates among white women have more than doubled at every age. Only about a third of all unmarried births occur to teens.

As a result of these trends, one out of every three children is now born to an unmarried mother (National Center for Health Statistics 1996). Thus while the majority of children still begin life with married parents, marriage is clearly not a neces-




Figure 4.2. Cumulative Percentage Sexually Active by Age and Age Cohort. (Source: 1988 National Survey of Family Growth, life-table estimates.)




Figure 4.3. Mean Years Between First Sexual Intercourse and First Marriage, by Age Cohort.




Figure 4.4. Birthrates to Unmarried White Women, by Age: 1980-1992. (Source: *Advance Report of Final Natality Statistics 1992*, table 15.)

sary condition for motherhood. It is likely that our high level of divorce has contributed to this change: single motherhood following divorce is already common (and hence not stigmatizing in itself), and unmarried pregnant women recognize that, even if they marry, they will still face a high risk of single motherhood. Social expectations have changed radically on this point as well. What was once commonly described as “illegitimacy” and “bastardy” is no longer so strongly disapproved. A majority of the population do not believe that it is wrong for an unmarried woman to have a child, and only a third of young people disagree with the statement: “It would be all right *for me* to have children without being married” (Bumpass, Sweet, and Cherlin 1991).

Mother-only families created by birth differ in important ways from those created by marital dissolution—ranging from the fact that the child has never lived with the father, through likely lower levels of domestic conflict compared to families where parents about to separate share the same household, to reduced contact and receipt of child support from the nonresident father (Seltzer 1991). Consequently, it is essential to recognize the role of childbearing in creating single-parent families. Even though, as noted earlier, most of this experience results from the separation of sex from marriage, and consequent unintended pregnancy, a significant component derives from planned pregnancy. For these planned unwed pregnancies in particular, marriage has changed in significance for parenting as well as for the legitimization of sex.

Cohabitation

Unmarried cohabitation has evolved from a strongly disapproved arrangement that was often referred to as “shacking up” or “living in sin” to something experienced by half of all adults under age 40 in 1994 (Bumpass and Sweet 1995). As the normative link between sex and marriage eroded, there was progressively less reason for unmarried couples not to share households. In Figure 4.5, which includes data from the 1992–1994 follow-up survey (NSFH-2) of the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), it can be seen that the increase in cohabitation has continued: both within cohorts and by cohort succession.¹ The process of cohort succession will be particularly important in transforming the experience of the adult population. As those who were in their late thirties 5 years ago moved into their early forties, for example, the proportion of persons aged 40–44 who had ever cohabited increased from 25% to 40%. When the cohorts now aged 25–29 reach retirement age, over half of the preretirement population will have lived in a cohabiting relationship, even if there is no further increase within cohorts.

Through the early 1980s, most of the decline in marriage was offset by




Figure 4.5. Percentage Who Had Ever Cohabited, by Age Cohort.




Figure 4.6. Cumulative Percentage Married by Years Since Cohabitation Began, by Cohabitation Cohort. (Source: 1992 Chicago Health and Social Behavior Survey.)

increased cohabitation, a pattern shared by a number of other countries (Bumpass et al. 1991). There is clear evidence now, however, that the probability of marrying following cohabitation is declining, as is the probability of marrying a cohabiting partner. When this evidence was first observed in the NSFH, it was so dramatic that we were concerned it might somehow be an artifact of some error in question sequence or sample coverage between the two surveys. But we have been able to replicate these trends in data from the 1992 Chicago Health and Social Behavior Survey, as can be seen in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Figure 4.6 demonstrates the decline over cohabitation cohorts in the proportion marrying by successive durations since beginning a cohabitation; Figure 4.7 displays the matching increase in the proportion of cohabitations that dissolved without marrying. These data are an important complement to the trend in divorce discussed earlier. As the formation of marriage-like unions falls increasingly outside the official statistical system recording marriages, it is clear




Figure 4.7. Cumulative Percentage Separated by Years Since Cohabitation Began, by Cohabitation Cohort. (Source: 1992 Chicago Health and Social Behavior Survey.)

that divorce trends tell only part of the story. Estimates for all unions, combining marriages and cohabitations, have not yet been prepared from the Chicago data. But among all unions reported in the NSFH-2 data,² the proportion of unions dissolved within 5 years increased from about 25% to about 45% over the 1990s—the period when there was no increase in divorce.

There is a continuing debate in the literature over the location of cohabiting relationships along the dating-to-marriage continuum (Wiersma 1983; Rindfuss and Van den Heuvel 1990). This focus on the nature of the commitment between partners is important, but it often obscures the fact that almost half of all cohabitations have children present (Bumpass and Sweet 1989b)—and consequently constitute parenting households. Thus the changing significance of marriage has extended beyond the stability of unions, sex, and childbearing to the family contexts of two-parent families.

THE CHANGING FAMILY CONTEXTS OF CHILDREN

We turn now to the implications for trends in the living arrangements of children and for the increasing diversity in children's family contexts of the changing patterns of family formation and the stability of different types of unions. The paper then concludes with speculations about the implications of large age differences in relevant family attitudes for the direction of future changes in family life in the United States.

Trends in Children's Family Living Arrangements

Our data and conceptualization are only beginning to accommodate to the implications of cohabitation for family classifications. It is extremely important that a quarter of all children are currently in single-parent families, but this only tells part of the story. From a life-course perspective, about half of all children in the United States spend at least part of their lives in a single-parent family (Bumpass 1984b; Bumpass and Raley 1995). Roughly following the trend in marital disruption, this represents a doubling between the birth cohorts of the late 1950s (Bumpass and Rindfuss 1979) and the late 1970s, with a plateau at this high level subsequently (Castro Martin and Bumpass 1989).

It is also essential from a life-course perspective to recognize that single-parent families are not simply transitional periods before stepfamilies and, furthermore, that subsequent stepfamilies may also be unstable. About half of the children entering a single-parent family reach age 18 without the mother subsequently marrying (Bumpass and Sweet 1989a); and of those whose mother does marry, about

half experience the disruption of that family in childhood (Bumpass 1984a). Stepfamilies provide a two-parent (and often two-earner) family context for children, but multiple family transitions also represent cumulative life-course stress (Wu and Martinson 1993).

Implications of Nonmarital Birth and Cohabitation

While the increase in children's single-parent experience has plateaued over the last 15 years, the composition of that experience has changed significantly as a consequence of the trends in nonmarital childbearing and cohabitation discussed earlier. As we have seen, the proportion of children born to unmarried mothers has more than doubled since 1975, (National Center for Health Statistics 1978, 1996)—while at the same time the proportion born to cohabiting parents has also increased. This conjunction has several implications for the classification and analysis of "single-parent" families. It is conventional to think of nonmarital births as creating single-parent families, but in fact a quarter of nonmarital births in the early 1980s occurred to two-parent, though unmarried, families (Bumpass and Sweet 1989a). These children enter a household with both biological parents, yet their families are officially recorded as single-parent: a parent, this parent's child, and an adult unrelated to the parent.

A similar definitional problem exists with respect to stepfamilies. Stepfamilies are usually thought of as consisting of a married mother, her children, and her new spouse. But it has been argued that families with cohabiting couples and a child of only one of the partners should also be counted as stepfamilies (Bumpass, Sweet, and Raley 1994) and that a quarter of current stepfamilies are missed if cohabiting families are excluded. Figure 4.8 illustrates the composition of current stepfamilies in terms of whether the preceding event was marital dissolution or nonmarital birth and whether they were formed by marriage or cohabitation. The traditional concept of stepfamilies as being formed by marriage after marital dissolution characterizes only a fifth of current stepfamilies in the United States (left side of graph). A third of these stepfamilies followed nonmarital birth rather than marital disruption, and two-thirds were begun by cohabitation rather than by marriage.

While applying a "family" definition to cohabiting couples with children might seem less appropriate when the male partner is not the child's father, the use of this definition is supported by the fact that half of all *married* stepfamilies began as cohabitations (Bumpass, Sweet, and Raley 1994). It is hard to argue that these coresidential parenting units became families only at the wedding ceremony. These definitional issues have serious effects on estimates of children's family experiences. The role of childbearing in creating mother-only families, for example, though still




Figure 4.8. Composition of Stepfamilies by Preceding Single-Parent Status and Whether Cohabiting or Married at Start. (Source: Bumpass, Sweet, and Raley 1994: table 7.)

very important, is less when cohabiting two-parent families are taken into account. Using a definition based on the mother's marital status and transitions, mother-only families created by childbirth would be estimated to have increased from 41% to 47% of all first single-parent entries between the birth cohorts of 1970–1974 and 1980–1984 (Bumpass and Raley 1995). After cohabiting two-parent families are removed from these estimates, the change is from 34% to 36% over these cohorts. Further, the duration of children's first single-parent experience is 40% shorter—and the trend in this duration is in the *opposite* direction—when cohabiting families are included compared to a definition based only on marriage. While the number of years spent in single-parent families appears to have increased when family definitions based only on marriage are used, they actually decline when cohabiting families are included.

ATTITUDES

In the context of the introductory discussion of family change, this chapter concludes with Figure 4.9, which reports age differences (based on age at NSFH-1) in three measures of family-related attitudes as measured in 1987–1988 and 1992–1994.




Figure 4.9. Percentage Disagreeing with Three Measures of Family Attitudes, by Age at NSFH-1: NSFH-1 1987-1988 and NSFH-2 1992-1994.

These are classified to represent the proportion taking a "traditional" position: those *disagreeing* that sex is all right for unmarried 18-year-olds, that cohabitation is all right even if a couple does not plan marriage, and that it is all right for an unmarried woman to have a child. This simple graph has profound implications for future change. There is no single "public opinion" on these matters—rather, there are dramatic differences on each issue by age. While more than three-quarters of the population over age 70 disagrees with these items, the proportion disagreeing declines consistently with age to only about a quarter of the people aged 25–29. These age differences carry clear implications for the future nature of "average" public attitudes through the process of cohort succession as the younger cohorts move through the age structure. Of course, age differences in cross section can represent changes with age rather than across cohorts. On the contrary, however, for the two of these measures that were asked at both surveys, most age groups became less traditional as they aged.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the profound changes in the family and living arrangements of children in the United States that have followed from the changing decisions their parents are making about marriage, childbearing, and cohabitation. The underlying processes are seen as historically continuous with long-term trends in individuation and the impact of these trends on the significance of marriage. Though there are important international differences, these processes are observed in most Western industrial societies (Coleman 1992). One major implication of this interpretation is that, while social policies may have effects at the margin, it is unlikely that legislation can turn back the clock on family change. Hence social policies can best affect the well-being of children, and the productivity of the next generation, by addressing the consequences of children's changing family contexts.

The increasing role of cohabitation in the family lives of children has strong implications for family definitions in both research and social policy. Ignoring cohabitation in family definitions results in a serious misrepresentation of the social reality. It is instructive that a cohabitational definition has long been used for the end of marriage. Recognizing that the timing and occurrence of legal divorce is often an artifact of legal contexts and other circumstances, the date a couple stopped living together is routinely used to classify the end of a marriage (and the beginning of a single-parent family). It is now necessary to apply a similar standard to the beginning of two-parent families. That such a redefinition is likely to be politically volatile is no argument for preserving ignorance by the retention of family definitions so out of touch with current social reality.

The changing significance of marriage documented here does not imply that marriage is about to wither away. Marriage clearly remains very important, and the vast majority of people eventually marry. At the same time, the marriage contract no longer marks the major family transitions or guarantees it once did and the conceptual distinction of marriage as unique from other family arrangements is less clear than it once was. We must treat marriage as a highly significant variable in family life, but not as the defining characteristic of families.

NOTES

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1. Because the youngest NSFH-1 respondents were age 25 and older at reinterview, the 1993 estimates are drawn from the older children survey in NSFH-2. See the appendix at the back of the book.
2. Among unions begun at age 25 or older. This age constraint is required by the fact that the sample was aged 19 and older at the first interview in 1987-1988.

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Internal Organization of the Conjugal Family

Time Allocation Between Employment and Housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States

Noriko O. Tsuya and Larry L. Bumpass

Economic and domestic activities are the two major domains of adult lives in contemporary societies. Traditionally, the family's economic provider role has been assigned to husbands and the homemaker role to wives. Japan and South Korea in particular share Confucian cultural backgrounds, including a strong value orientation toward the strict division of labor along gender lines (Tsuya and Choe 1991). Although there are clear differences in cultural traditions and family characteristics, Japan and the United States have both undergone profound changes in the roles women play within the household and in the labor market in recent decades—most notably, rapid increases in employment of married women outside the home (Ferree 1991; Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Tsuya 1992). Such changes have not brought about similar changes in the husband's domestic roles, however, and homemaking remains the wife's responsibility (Coverman 1985; Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Kamo 1994; Pleck 1985; Thompson and Walker 1989; Tsuya 1992).

Using data from the 1994 National Survey on Work and Family Life in Japan, the 1994 National Survey on the Quality of Life in the Republic of South Korea, and the 1987–1988 U.S. National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH-1), this chapter explores how married couples balance their economic and domestic roles by comparing the patterns of the gender division of labor at home as well as in the “total workload” (time spent both on employment and housework) among married men and women of working ages in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. We first look at the division of household labor among couples and other household members in the three countries and examine the division of total workloads between husbands and wives. We then examine the effects of employment hours of both spouses on the husband's share of housework, simultaneously accounting for the effects of household structure and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of married men and women.

The amount of time spent in the labor market by husbands and wives limits the time available for housework. Thus the husband's longer employment hours may explain his lower contribution to household tasks. This study attempts to capture the relationship between employment and housework in the larger context of “total work” done inside and outside the household boundary by examining total

time spent on both employment and housework by husbands and wives. When we look at the gender division of labor at home, we find that married women shoulder most of the work. But when housework and employment hours are considered jointly, gender inequality in total workload becomes much less pronounced in all three societies than when the focus is solely on household tasks. Although we do not intend to downplay the everyday hardships faced by many married women trying to balance employment and family responsibilities, it is important to examine gender balance in housework allocation by simultaneously taking the worlds of work and home into account.

This chapter also examines the effects of household structure—especially intergenerational coresidence—on the gender division of labor at home. Coresidence with parents is rare in the United States. Though not so prevalent as often assumed, it is substantial in Japan and South Korea. Previous studies have found that coresidence with parents in Japan may affect the division of labor between spouses at home by alleviating the husband's participation in housework and by facilitating the wife's employment, especially full-time employment outside the home (Martin and Tsuya 1992; Morgan and Hiroshima 1983; Tsuya 1992). This study examines how multigenerational coresidence influences the gender division of household labor in the three societies.

DATA AND MEASURES

Data for this comparative study come from subsamples of currently married men and women aged 20–59 and their spouses in the three national family surveys. (For specifics of the surveys, see the appendix at the back of the book.) For Japan, there are 1,837 currently married men and women aged 20–59 and their spouses; for South Korea, there are 1,953 currently married respondents aged 20–59 and their spouses. The U.S. data for this study are a subsample of 3,667 currently married non-Hispanic white men and women aged 20–59. The limits in terms of ethnicity for the U.S. subsample were imposed to maximize comparability with Japan and South Korea by avoiding considerations that may be peculiar to the situation of minority groups in the United States. There was a face-to-face interview with a randomly selected adult member of each sample household; if the primary respondent was married or cohabiting, the U.S. survey also asked his or her partner to complete a self-administered questionnaire.¹ Thus for some questions, including those on housework hours of both spouses, information by both self-reporting and proxy reporting is available in NSFH-1. This study uses the self-reports of each spouse.

We first conduct a bivariate analysis of time spent on housework by couples and other household members and the total workloads of husbands and wives. We

then conduct a multivariate analysis of the husband's share of the time both spouses spend on housework by employing ordinary least-square (OLS) multiple regression. To measure the effects of employment hours, household structure, and other socio-economic and demographic characteristics of couples on the gender division of household labor, the regression includes nine independent or control variables: wife's employment hours, husband's employment hours, coresidence with parents, age of youngest child, husband's yearly income, husband's education, wife's education, husband's age, and respondent's sex.

Dependent Variables

We examine two general dependent variables: housework and total workload. We analyze housework, both in relative and absolute terms, by looking at the husband's relative share (percentage) of housework as well as the absolute number of hours both spouses (and other household members) spend on housework. Here an explanation of "housework" is in order because the South Korean survey defined and measured housework differently from the U.S. and Japanese surveys. The Japanese and U.S. surveys asked the amount of time spent per week on each of household tasks traditionally gender-typed as "female": cleaning house, doing laundry (for the U.S. sample, laundry and ironing), cooking, cleaning up after meals, and grocery shopping.² The time spent on each of these tasks was added and then top-coded at the 97th percentile to minimize the effect of implausibly large values on the analysis. The South Korean survey, however, measured time spent per day on "housework as a whole"—including, in addition to these traditionally female household chores, such other tasks as child care, helping children with homework, work related to education of children, visiting relatives, and all other activities related to running a household. Thus we are unable to distinguish how much of the overall time spent on housework was devoted to traditionally female tasks in the South Korean sample. Given that there are no other alternatives, for South Korea the time spent on "housework as a whole" per day was multiplied by seven, and then top-coded at the 97th percentile. Thus the data on housework for South Korea are not exactly comparable to those for Japan and the United States, a point we must keep in mind. The relative share of housework was computed by dividing the husband's housework hours by the combined housework hours of both spouses.

The upper panel of Table 5.1 shows the mean hours per week husbands and wives spent on housework and the husband's average share of housework in the three countries. We can see that whereas wives' housework hours are almost identical in Japan and the United States (33.5 hours and 32.4 hours, respectively), there are considerable differences in the time husbands spent on housework: Japanese

husbands spent, on the average, 2.5 hours per week on female household tasks whereas American husbands spent a little less than 8 hours per week on these tasks. Consequently, Japanese husbands' contributions to housework were merely 7% of the time both spouses spent on housework whereas American husbands contributed approximately 21%. As expected, given the differences in the definition of "housework," the average times in the South Korean data are much higher than those of their Japanese and U.S. counterparts. The husband's share in South Korea is around 18%, almost as high as that in the United States. If we could extract the time spent only on "female" household tasks for South Korea, however, the husband's share in housework might decline—as shown in the percentage of husbands who do no housework in the three countries: 43% for Japan, 33% for South Korea, and 10% for the United States. Nevertheless, clear gender inequality exists in the division of household labor in all three societies.

Our second dependent variable, total workload, was computed by adding the hours spent on female household tasks and the usual hours spent per week on employment. Because the Japanese survey measured employment hours of both spouses by (identical) categorical variables, the number of employment hours for each spouse was estimated by imputing the midpoint of each category. Exceptions were the category of 35–41 hours and that of 60 hours or more per week: the values

Table 5.1. Mean Hours Spent Per Week on Housework and Average Total Workload of Currently Married Men and Women: Japan, 1994; South Korea, 1994; and United States, 1987–1988

Variable	Japan	South Korea	United States
Housework^a			
Wife's hours per week	33.5	49.8	32.4
Husband's hours per week	2.5	12.6	7.8
Husband's share (%)	7.4	18.4	20.9
Husbands with no housework (%)	43.1	32.5	10.0
Total workload^b			
Wife's hours per week	54.7	62.1	55.2
Husband's hours per week	50.0	62.2	49.6
Husband's share (%)	48.1	50.4	47.7

Note: Figures are based on currently married respondents aged 20–59 and their spouses. Means for South Korea and the United States are weighted; the number of cases is unweighted.

a. Number of hours spent on housework for Japan and the United States is computed by adding the time spent on such traditionally female household tasks as cleaning house, doing laundry (plus ironing in the case of the United States), cooking, cleaning after meals, and grocery shopping. Number of hours for South Korea is for "housework as a whole."

b. Total workload is computed by adding the number of hours spent on housework and the number of hours spent on employment.

of 39 and 66 hours were assigned, respectively, based on data from the 1993 Japanese national wage structure survey.³ The South Korean survey measured employment hours of both spouses by asking the number of minutes they spend per day on workplace activities. After converting time in minutes to hours, we computed the weekly employment hours for South Korea by multiplying the time spent per day on employment by 5.5 (assuming that the regular workdays in the country total 5.5 days per week) and then top-coding at the 97th percentile.⁴

The lower panel of Table 5.1 shows the mean total workload of each spouse and the husband's average share in the total workloads in the three countries. We can see that when household and workplace hours are considered jointly, although the absolute amount of total workload is higher in South Korea than in Japan and the United States because of the differences in the measures, the gender balance in total workload becomes similar among the three countries and the clear inequality we saw in the gender division of housework almost disappears: men's average share in total workload is around 48% for Japan and the United States and 50% for South Korea.

Independent and Control Variables

As mentioned earlier, this study employs nine independent and control variables. We explain here the definition and measurement of each variable.

Employment Hours. The time married couples spend on employment is measured by categorical variables indicating their "usual" weekly employment hours. Table 5.2 presents the percentage distribution of usual weekly employment hours

Table 5.2. Percentage Distribution of Usual Weekly Employment Hours of Currently Married Men and Women: Japan, 1994; South Korea, 1994; and United States, 1987–1988

Weekly work hours	Men			Women		
	Japan	S. Korea	United States	Japan	S. Korea	United States
Zero (does not work)	3.1	5.1	9.5	40.0	73.7	33.8
1–15	3.0	.2	1.0	7.8	.1	5.6
16–34	2.3	3.2	2.8	16.4	2.5	16.3
35–41	16.1	1.7	41.5	12.6	.9	33.0
42–48	30.0	27.7	15.5	13.1	8.1	6.0
49–59	26.0	38.7	17.4	6.0	7.7	4.0
60 or more	19.5	23.4	12.3	4.1	7.0	1.3
No. of cases	1,825	1,744	3,557	1,821	1,795	3,553

Note: These figures are based on currently married respondents aged 20–59 and their spouses. Percentages for South Korea and the United States are weighted; the number of cases is unweighted.

of husbands and wives in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. We can see that South Korean husbands tend to work the longest hours among the three countries and that Japanese husbands work almost as long. Japanese husbands are much more likely to work long hours than are American husbands. The modal category is 49–59 hours for South Korean men, 42–48 hours for Japanese men, and 35–41 hours for American men. These differences in husband's employment hours may be attributable to differences in the number of hours worked per day. But they might also be caused by the prevalence of two-day weekends (differences in the usual number of days worked per week): two-day weekends are customary in the United States; they are becoming prevalent in Japan; they are not yet so prevalent in South Korea.

Turning to wives' employment hours, we can see markedly different patterns between South Korea and the other two countries. Whereas a large majority (almost three-fourths) of South Korean wives are full-time homemakers, less than half of Japanese and American wives do not work in the labor market.⁵ Comparing Japan and the United States, we find that Japanese wives are slightly less likely to be employed, but the differences are small. Among those working full time (35 or more hours per week), however, Japanese wives tend to work longer hours than their American counterparts. Similarly, although the overall percentage of employed wives is much lower in South Korea than the other two countries, most South Korean wives, once employed, work 42 hours or more. These findings suggest that wives holding full-time employment tend to conform to the working-hour standards prevailing in their respective workplaces and societies.

Based on these findings, for the regression analysis we grouped wives' employment hours into three categories: zero (does not work); part time (1–34 hours for Japan and the United States, 1–41 hours for South Korea); and full time (35 hours or more for Japan and the United States, 42 hours or more for South Korea). Using "no work" as the reference (omitted) category, we constructed two dummy variables. The husband's employment hours were grouped into five categories for Japan and the United States: less than 35 hours; 35–41 hours; 42–48 hours; 49–59 hours; and 60 hours or more. Using 35–41 hours as the reference category, we created four dummy variables. For South Korea, husband's employment hours were grouped into four categories, instead of five, by regarding fewer than 42 hours as "less than full time." Using 42–48 hours as the reference category, we then constructed three dummy variables.

Household Structure. We employ two measures of household structure: coresidence with parents of one or both spouses and age of youngest child. The proportion coresiding with parents is highest in Japan, followed by South Korea, and is rare in the United States. Around 32% of currently married Japanese men and women

of working age lived with one or both parents (or parents-in-law); around 20% of the South Korean couples lived with parents; only 2% of the U.S. couples did so.⁶ In our multivariate analysis, coresidence with parents is a dichotomous variable: 1 if living with at least one parent or parent-in-law; 0 otherwise.

Age of youngest child is measured in three categories: preschool age (0–6 for Japan and South Korea, 0–4 for the United States); school age (7–17 for Japan and South Korea, 5–17 for the United States); and no child under age 18. Studies have found that the presence of small children increases parents', especially wives', housework time (Kamo 1988; Rexroat and Shehan 1987), whereas older children help with some housework (Goldscheider and Waite 1991). The distribution by the age of youngest child is similar among the three countries: around one-fourth of couples had their youngest child of preschool age; around one-third had their youngest child of school age; the remaining 40% had no child under age 18. Using the category of "no child under age 18" as the reference, we created two dummy variables for the regression analysis indicating the presence of preschool and school-aged children at home, respectively.

Other Independent and Control Variables. This study also looks at the effect of economic resources. A number of studies have suggested that the economic resources of spouses, either in absolute or relative terms, are important in explaining the gender division of household labor (Ferree 1991; Maret and Finlay 1984; Presser 1994; Ross 1987). In this study, the husband's economic resource is measured by his yearly income. For the United States, the distribution of husband's income was divided into quartiles: less than \$17,000; \$17,000–27,999; \$28,000–39,999; and \$40,000 or higher. To facilitate comparisons across countries, the income data for Japan and Korea were also recoded into approximate quartiles. For Japan, the original ordered variable of husband's income, which had nine categories, was grouped into four: less than 4 million yen; 4–5.99 million yen; 6–7.99 million yen; and 8 million yen or higher. For South Korea, the distribution of husband's income was also grouped into four categories: less than 10 million won; 10–14.99 million won; 15–19.99 million won; and 20 million won or higher. For the multivariate analysis, using the lowest category as the reference, we created three dummy variables. Because we found that wife's income is largely a function of her employment hours, it is not included in our multivariate model.

This study controls for the effects of two sociodemographic indicators that influence the gender division of household labor: education of both spouses and husband's age. Among various indicators of social context for gender-related behavior, education seems to have the strongest effect (Goldscheider and Waite 1991). Whereas intercountry differences in husband's education are relatively small, dif-

ferences are larger in wife's education: the proportion of wives with some college education is around 55% in the United States, 33% in Japan, and 16% in South Korea. Moreover, a large majority of college-educated women concentrate in the younger age groups (in their twenties and thirties). Clearly, gender differentials in education are quite large in South Korea, especially among older men and women, but small or almost nil in Japan and the United States. In our multivariate model, education is a variable consisting of four ordered categories. For Japan and the United States the categories are: less than high school; high school; some college (including junior college and, in Japan, advanced professional school and post-high school professional training school); and four-year college or higher. For South Korea, due to differences in educational composition, education is grouped into these four categories: less than junior high school; junior high school; high school; and some college or higher. Taking the lowest category (less than high school for Japan and the United States, less than junior high school for South Korea) as the reference group, we constructed three dummy variables for the regression analysis.

We included husband's age to measure the likely effect of the gender-related normative environment in which he grew up. Based on findings from studies on age differentials in gender-role attitudes in the three countries (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Tsuya and Choe 1991; Tsuya 1994), we expect younger men (and women) to have more egalitarian attitudes. Ages of spouses are highly correlated, hence husband's age indicates not only when he grew up, but approximately when his wife grew up as well. Our regression model also includes respondent's sex to control for the effect of proxy reporting for Japan and South Korea, as well as the effect of different modes of data collection for the United States. The Japanese and South Korean surveys employed proxy reporting by respondents for their spouses. Because self-reports of spouses are not available for Japan and South Korea, we need to control for the possible effect of proxy reports. For the United States, this study uses self-reports for both primary respondents and their spouses. Thus response discrepancies should not be a problem, but we still must control for a possible "mode effect" because primary respondents were interviewed face-to-face whereas their spouses completed a self-administered questionnaire (Sweet 1989). The variable is dichotomous: it is coded as 1 if a (primary) respondent is female and coded 0 if male.

BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Before discussing the results from our regression analysis, we first look at patterns of housework time of couples and other household members, then examine the total workloads of both spouses.

Housework Time of Household Members

We begin with differentials in the time spent on housework by couples and other household members according to selected individual and household features. Tables 5.3 to 5.5 show the mean number of hours spent per week on housework by different household members according to selected characteristics of couples and households in Japan, South Korea, and the United States, respectively. We can see from these tables that, as pointed out earlier, Japanese wives spend more than 10

Table 5.3. Mean Number of Hours Spent Per Week on Housework by Household Members, by Selected Characteristics: Japan, 1994

Characteristic	Husband	Wife	Parents	Children
Total	2.5	33.5	10.9	2.6
<i>Wife's employment hours per week</i>				
Zero (does not work)	2.2	37.6	8.4	2.1
1-15 hours	1.6	34.0	6.2	2.3
16-34 hours	2.1	35.2	9.4	2.4
35-41 hours	3.4	28.7	12.1	3.1
42-48 hours	3.2	28.1	14.8	3.0
49 hours or more	3.1	26.6	13.7	3.8
<i>Husband's employment hours per week</i>				
Less than 35 hours	3.1	31.2	5.3	3.8
35-41 hours	3.0	33.5	11.3	2.3
42-48 hours	2.6	33.0	11.5	2.4
49-59 hours	2.3	34.3	10.7	2.5
60 hours or more	2.1	34.0	11.0	2.7
<i>Coresidence with parents</i>				
No	2.8	33.9	—	2.9
Yes (total)	1.9	32.5	10.9	2.0
With father/father-in-law only	2.4	37.8	1.8	3.7
With mother/mother-in-law (alone or with father/father- in-law as well)	1.9	31.9	11.9	1.8
<i>Age of youngest child</i>				
0-6	2.5	37.6	13.1	2.0
7-17	2.1	33.6	10.6	2.6
No child under 18	2.7	32.9	10.8	2.7

Note: See the notes of Table 5.1 for the measure of number of hours spent on housework.

times as much time as their husbands on these tasks, whereas in South Korea and the United States, although gender inequality was much less pronounced than in Japan, wives still spend four to five times the time their husbands spend on housework. The degree of parents' contribution to housework is notable in the two Asian countries—especially the contribution of Japanese parents, who contribute, on the average, more than four times the time husbands spend on housework. Other household members in the United States (most of whom are children) also contribute substantially to household tasks.

Wives' employment hours tend to be inversely related to their own housework hours. While it is generally true in all three countries that the husband's housework hours increase as the wife's employment hours rise, in Japan and South Korea there appears to be a jump in the hours of husbands (as well as those of parents and even children) when wives are employed full time (35 hours or more per week for Japan and 42 hours or more for South Korea). Nevertheless, in all three countries increases in household task hours of husbands and other household members are not nearly

Table 5.4. Mean Number of Hours Spent Per Week on Housework by Household Members, by Selected Characteristics: South Korea, 1994

Characteristic	Husband	Wife	Parents	Children
Total	12.6	49.8	16.2	4.2
<i>Wife's employment hours per week</i>				
Zero (does not work)	11.4	55.5	12.3	3.9
1–41 hours	12.9	37.3	10.1	5.0
42–48 hours	11.6	31.5	28.9	3.6
49–59 hours	16.3	30.3	26.7	4.7
60 hours or more	19.0	37.0	20.1	6.2
<i>Husband's employment hours per week</i>				
Less than 42 hours	17.3	43.0	14.6	5.2
42–48 hours	11.2	49.6	17.3	3.9
49–59 hours	10.8	50.0	16.3	3.8
60 hours or more	13.7	51.9	15.5	4.4
<i>Coresidence with parents</i>				
No	11.9	49.8	—	4.3
Yes	14.0	48.1	17.9	3.6
<i>Age of youngest child</i>				
0–6	12.4	55.9	21.8	1.7
7–17	12.9	49.1	11.9	5.1
No child under 18	12.2	47.3	16.4	4.8

enough to compensate for the decline in wives' housework hours resulting from increases in their employment hours.

The husband's employment hours are in general negatively associated with their own household task hours, but they do not seem to have a clear association with the time wives and other household members spend on housework—except for South Korea, where wives' housework hours increase as their husbands' employment hours go up. And when husbands do not work full time (less than 35 hours per week in Japan and the United States, less than 42 hours in South Korea), the husband's own housework time increases notably in South Korea and the United States, and the wife's housework time decreases substantially in South Korea and Japan.

Table 5.5. Mean Number of Hours Spent Per Week on Housework by Household Members, by Selected Characteristics: United States, 1987–1988

Characteristic	Husband	Wife	All others	Others aged 18 or under
Total	7.8	32.4	7.0	5.2
<i>Wife's employment hours per week</i>				
Zero (does not work)	6.1	40.1	7.4	5.1
1–15 hours	6.7	35.5	5.5	3.9
16–34 hours	7.8	32.3	6.4	4.8
35–41 hours	8.8	26.4	7.2	5.4
42–48 hours	9.8	24.5	6.8	5.7
49 hours or more	11.0	24.5	9.6	7.9
<i>Husband's employment hours per week</i>				
Less than 35 hours	10.8	31.8	9.4	5.8
35–41 hours	7.7	32.7	6.4	4.9
42–48 hours	7.8	32.0	8.1	5.2
49–59 hours	7.1	31.2	6.5	5.0
60 hours or more	5.9	34.2	6.6	5.4
<i>Coresidence with parents</i>				
No	7.8	32.4	6.7	5.2
Yes	6.9	30.5	16.1	4.5
<i>Age of youngest child</i>				
0–4	8.7	37.1	5.6	3.6
5–17	7.2	32.4	7.7	6.1
No child under 18	7.6	28.7	6.9	3.2

Note: Means are weighted; the number of cases is unweighted. For the measurement of number of hours spent on housework, see the notes of Table 5.1.

Coresidence with parents tends to reduce the housework time of all other household members in all three countries—except for South Korean husbands, whose time goes up somewhat. Furthermore, we can see from the case of Japan (Table 5.3) that what really contributes to household task allocation is the presence of female parents. When couples are living only with male parents, though this situation is rare, the time wives spend on housework *increases* substantially.

The presence of preschool and school-aged children clearly increases wives' housework hours in all three countries, especially when there are preschool children. The presence of nonadult children, however, shows no clear association with the husband's housework hours in Japan and South Korea. Indeed, when preschool children are present in the household, the time parents (that is, the grandparents of those children) spend on housework becomes notably higher—implying that in Japan and South Korea parents, not husbands, help wives in shouldering extra housework created by the presence of small children. In the United States, by contrast, the husband's housework hours increase when there are preschool children.

Total Workload

When we look at differentials in the total workload by selected characteristics, two points merit attention. As shown in Figure 5.1, although the total workload of wives who do not work in the marketplace is considerably less than that of their husbands, wives' total workload increases dramatically as their employment hours increase in all three countries.⁷ This clearly indicates the existence of a "second shift" of unpaid housework for wives who are also employed (Hochschild 1991). The second shift is especially notable in the two Asian countries: the average total workload of wives doubles when we compare full-time housewives and wives who work 60 hours or more per week in the marketplace (from 38 hours to 85 hours in Japan, from 55 hours to 100 hours in South Korea). In the United States, the average total workload increases from around 40 hours for full-time housewives to 77 hours for wives who work 60 or more hours. Roughly 40% of wives in Japan and the United States and around 23% of South Korean wives are employed full time. These are the wives who bear the especially heavy burden of shouldering both employment and domestic responsibilities.

The husband's total workload also increases as the wife's employment hours increase, but this happens only when the wife works long hours in the labor market—more than 41 hours per week in Japan and the United States and more than 48 hours in South Korea (see Figure 5.2). Moreover, these increases in the husbands' total workload are much less than the increases in wives' total workload.

Although we do not show the statistics here, our data indicate that the aver-




Figure 5.1. Mean Total Workload of Wives by Wives' Employment Hours: Japan, United States, and South Korea.




Figure 5.2. Mean Total Workload of Husbands by Wives' Employment Hours: Japan, United States, and South Korea.

age total workload for wives varies inversely with husband's income in Japan and the United States, indicating the "leisure-time effect" of household financial resources on wives' time in these countries. That is, when women have a husband who earns a high level of income, they can afford not to work in the labor market. In Japan the average total workload for women whose husbands have an income of 10 million yen or more is around 48 hours per week in comparison with 54–60 hours for women whose husbands earn less. In the United States, women whose husbands earn \$40,000 or more have an average total workload of 50 hours per week, while women whose husbands earn less work an average of 56–59 hours per week inside and outside the home.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF GENDER DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present descriptive statistics of the covariates and the results of the OLS multiple regression analysis of husband's share in the time both spouses spend on housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States.⁸ We can see from Table 5.7 that the wife's employment hours affect the husband's share in housework in all three countries. In Japan, the husband's share in housework increases significantly only when the wife works full time in the labor market (primarily because the husband's actual housework time increases only when the wife works full time). In South Korea and the United States, the husband's share in housework increases significantly in proportion to the wife's housework hours because, as wives work longer hours, their housework time decreases and the husband's housework time increases.

The effect of the husband's employment hours on his share in housework is generally linear and negative in all three countries—primarily because the husband's housework time is reduced in accordance with his employment hours. When husbands work less than full time in the labor market, their share in housework increases significantly. Altogether these findings on the effects of couples' employment time on the gender division of household labor show the importance of time availability on the gender division of household labor in all three countries. The effect is stronger in the United States and South Korea than in Japan.

Coresidence with parents significantly reduces the husband's share in housework only in Japan. Although the effect of coresidence with parents is also negative in the other two countries, the effect is insignificant. The presence of preschool children reduces the husband's share in housework in all three countries (especially in the United States) because, although both husbands and wives do significantly more housework when they have small children, the wife's housework hours increase more than the husband's. The presence of school-age children also reduces

Table 5.6. Means for Covariates Used in Analyzing the Gender Division of Household Labor: Japan, 1994; South Korea, 1994; and the United States, 1987–1988

Variable	Japan	South Korea	United States
Wife's employment hours			
Part-time ^a	.24	.04	.22
Full-time ^b	.36	.23	.45
(Reference category is no work)			
Husband's employment hours			
Less than full-time ^c	.08	.10	.12
42–48 hours ^{30–.16}			
49–59 hours	.26	.41	.18
60 hours or more	.19	.23	.12
(Reference is 35–41 hours for Japan and U.S., 42–48 hours for S. Korea)			
Coresidence with parents	.32	.19	.02
Age of youngest child			
Preschool age ^d	.26	.22	.30
School age ^e	.33	.34	.34
(Reference is no child under 18)			
Husband's yearly income			
Level 2 ^f	.32	.34	.25
Level 3 ^g	.20	.18	.23
Level 4 ^h	.19	.21	.23
(Reference is lowest category)			

(continued on next page)

the husband's share in housework in all three countries (and significantly in Japan and the United States) because when couples have school-age children, the wife's housework time increases but the husband's housework tends to decrease. In all, findings on the effect of these covariates of household structure on the gender division of household labor show that the presence of nonadult children and coresidence with parents reduce the husband's share in housework.

The husband's income does not generally affect his share in housework, except for husbands in the highest income group in the United States. (Their share in housework is significantly less than that of husbands in the lowest income category.) Education of both spouses does not generally influence the gender division of labor at home—except in the United States, where college education for either spouse significantly increases the husband's share in housework time. This is a

Table 5.6. Means for Covariates Used in Analyzing the Gender Division of Household Labor: Japan, 1994; South Korea, 1994; and the United States, 1987–1988 (*continued*)

Variable	Japan	South Korea	United States
<i>Husband's education</i>			
Junior high	—	.14	—
High school	.46	.43	.34
College or higher	—	.31	—
Some college or equivalent ^a	.12	—	.24
4-year college or higher	.26	—	.31
(Reference is less than high school for Japan and U.S., less than junior high for S. Korea)			
<i>Wife's education</i>			
Junior high	—	.20	—
High school	.50	.45	.41
College or higher	—	.16	—
Some college or equivalent ^b	.27	—	.25
4-year college or higher	.06	—	.24
(Reference is same as husband's education)			
<i>Husband's age</i>	45.14	42.31	39.84
<i>Respondent = female</i>	.49	.48	.51

a. 1–34 hours per week for Japan and the United States; 1–41 hours for South Korea.

b. 35 or more hours per week for Japan and the United States; 41 or more hours for South Korea.

c. 0–34 hours per week for Japan and the United States; 0–41 hours for South Korea.

d. 0–6 years old for Japan and South Korea; 0–4 years old for the United States.

e. 7–17 years old for Japan and South Korea; 5–17 years old for the United States.

f. 4–5.99 million yen for Japan; 10–14.99 million won for South Korea; \$17,000–\$27,999 for the United States.

g. 6–7.99 million yen for Japan; 15–19.99 million won for South Korea; \$28,000–\$39,999 for the United States.

h. 8 million yen or more for Japan; 20 million won or more for South Korea; \$40,000 or more for the United States.

i. For Japan, consisting of graduates of junior college, advanced professional school, and professional training school.

result of a reduction of the time wives spend on housework and an increase in the husbands' housework time. In sum, in the United States higher education changes the gender division of household labor in a more egalitarian direction, possibly indicating the socializing effect of education in molding gender-role attitudes. In the United States, husbands' age is also associated inversely with their share in housework—that is, older husbands do a significantly smaller share of housework than younger husbands. This suggests a cohort change in gender-typed behavior in post-war American society. We see no such cohort effect in the two Asian countries, however, where husbands' housework time does not vary significantly by age.

Table 5.7. Estimated Coefficients for Covariates of the Multiple Regression Analysis of Husband's Share of Housework: Japan, 1994; South Korea, 1994; and United States, 1987–1988

Variable	Japan	South Korea	United States
Intercept	11.81**	20.09**	21.12**
<i>Wife's employment</i>			
Part-time	-.06	6.41*	4.42**
Full-time	6.42**	12.90**	11.42**
<i>Husband's employment</i>			
Less than full-time	2.42*	7.88**	8.95**
42–48 hours	-.47	—	-.03
49–59 hours	-2.31*	-.42	-1.95*
60 hours or more	-2.49*	-1.39	-4.39**
<i>Coresidence with parents</i>	-2.46**	-.54	-.93
<i>Age of youngest child</i>			
Preschool age	-1.50	-3.00	-2.68**
School age	-2.09**	-1.62	-3.29**
<i>Husband's yearly income</i>			
Level 2	-.49	-1.78	.06
Level 3	.01	-1.71	-1.17
Level 4	-1.02	-.95	-2.12*
<i>Husband's education</i>			
Junior high	—	-2.22	—
High school	1.69	-.68	.78
College or higher	—	-.74	—
Some college or equivalent ¹	.63	—	4.65**
4-year college or higher	2.27	—	5.31**
<i>Wife's education</i>			
Junior high	—	1.12	—
High school	-.34	.64	-.78
College or higher	—	.62	—
Some college or equivalent	-.49	—	1.91
4-year college or higher	2.88	—	5.50**
<i>Husband's age</i>	-.08	-.05	-.19**
<i>Respondent = female</i>	-2.10**	-1.82	-1.71**
<i>Adjusted R-square</i>	.083	.088	.188
<i>F value</i>	8.715**	7.272**	31.439**
<i>No. of cases</i>	1,704	1,241	2,754

* $p < .05$ level; ** $p < .01$ level.

If the primary respondent is the wife, the husband's share in housework is significantly less in Japan and the United States, but not in South Korea, indicating an effect of proxy reporting for Japan and a mode effect for the United States. This is due primarily to the fact that in Japan, if wives were the respondents, they reported significantly less housework for their husbands than when husbands themselves were reporting their housework hours. (No such difference is seen in reporting of wives' housework time.) In the United States, if husbands were secondary respondents (that is, their reporting was done without the supervision of interviewers), they reported significantly less housework time than when they were primary respondents.

CONCLUSIONS

This study reveals similarities and diversities in patterns associated with housework time and total workloads of married couples and other household members as well as with the husband's share of housework in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. First, our analysis shows that whereas wives, on the average, shoulder a lion's share of housework in all three countries, once housework and employment hours are jointly considered, the mean total workload becomes very similar between wives and husbands and the gender inequality we saw in housework time alone almost disappears. This gender equity in the overall average of total workload, however, masks wide differentials in total workload of wives by their own employment hours. The wife's total workload increases dramatically as her employment hours increase in all three countries, clearly revealing the double burden of unpaid housework for full-time employed wives.

This study reveals the overall importance of time availability of each spouse for housework, as measured by employment hours, in determining patterns of the gender division of labor at home in all three countries. We have also seen that household structure (measured by coresidence with parents and age of youngest child) also influences the gender division of labor at home. In all three countries, coresidence with parents tends to reduce the husband's share in housework (although the effect is the largest and significant only in Japan)—suggesting that husbands are more likely to benefit from coresidence with parents than are wives and other household members. The presence of nonadult children also reduces the husband's share in housework in all three countries, though the effect is strongest in the United States.

This study has found, as well, that the underlying mechanism determining the gender division of household labor is simpler in Japan and South Korea than in the United States. In Japan, the gender division of household labor is determined primarily by time availability of both spouses as well as by household structure. In South Korea, the pattern was determined almost solely by employment hours, espe-

cially those of wives. In the United States, however, not only time availability and household structure but husband's income, education of both spouses, and husband's age also matter.

The implications of these findings are important for the prospect of achieving gender equality in household labor in Japan. The only factors that would significantly reduce the gender gap in housework are found to be the wife's full-time employment and a decline in coresidence with parents. Given the rapid increases in full-time employment of married women in recent decades (Martin and Tsuya 1992; Tsuya 1992), the acute gender inequality in housework still present in the Japanese home may well be lessened. Although husbands tend to do more housework when wives work longer hours, the husband's increased contribution is likely to be much less than the reduction in housework that wives make. In Japan today the slack seems to be picked up by coresiding parents, but multigenerational coresidence has been declining (Atoh 1988; Martin and Tsuya 1991; Tsuya 1990). Further, our analysis indicates that the spread of higher education in Japan has not, at least yet, molded gender-typed behavior at home in a more egalitarian direction.

There is still much to learn about the complexities underlying the gender division of labor within and beyond the household boundary. Indeed, we need a better understanding of how adult members of the society balance employment and housework if the quality of family life is to improve in industrialized societies.

NOTES

1. Around 83% of the spouses of married respondents completed a self-administered questionnaire (but were not interviewed) (Sweet 1989).
2. The NSFH-1 also collected information on the time spent in "male" tasks such as household maintenance or auto repair, as well as such gender-neutral tasks as paying bills and keeping household financial records. Since the Japanese survey did not collect this information, we were unable to analyze the time spent on nonfemale household tasks.
3. We are grateful to Yoshio Okunishi of Hosei University for providing us the results of computation of microdata from the 1993 national wage structure survey in Japan.
4. According to our personal communications with Minja Kim Choe of the East-West Center Program on Population, 5.5 workdays per week is the norm for people with paid employment outside the home in South Korea today. At government offices, for example, employees often work a full day on Saturday in one week and then have a two-day weekend the following week. This workday norm does not necessarily apply to people who are self-employed, work at home, or work in primary industries. Thus our computation of employment hours in South Korea does not take into account variations in weekly employment hours due to the number of days worked per week.
5. A comparative study of married women's employment in South Korea and Taiwan by Brinton et al. (1995) indicates that the low rates of labor-force participation, and even lower rates of paid employment among married women (especially young married women), in South Korea in the 1980s were due primarily to the oversupply of male college graduates in the face of modest labor demand in the

nonmanual sector. Chin (1995) has found that young married women with preschool children in urban areas whose husbands have a high income are the women with the lowest probability of working in the marketplace in South Korea in the mid-1980s.

6. The proportion of South Korean couples coresiding with parents is relatively small mainly because the sample consists only of household heads and spouses of heads. For details on the sampling methods of the South Korean survey see the appendix at the back of the book.

7. Given that a substantial proportion of wives who do not work in the labor market are mothers of small children and that child care time is not included in housework time for Japan and the United States, differences in total workload between full-time housewives and wives who work many hours are likely to be exaggerated in these two countries. Nevertheless, even when we limit our analysis to couples who do not have preschool children, this general pattern of the "second shift" still holds.

8. We also conducted multiple regression analyses of the number of hours wives and husbands spent on housework in the three countries; due to space limitations, the results are not shown here.

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Wives' Economic Decision-Making Power in the Family: Five Asian Countries

Karen Oppenheim Mason

This chapter explores the impact of social context on the internal division of power in families in five Asian countries. Like most enduring human groups, families are never entirely egalitarian. The extent to which they are characterized by unequal decision-making power, however, varies enormously in time and space. In the patriarchal extended families that for centuries were viewed as ideal among landowners in India and China, for example, family inequality tended to be extreme: the senior male—and in limited spheres his wife—had disproportionate control over family decisions while in-married brides had virtually none (Srinivas 1976; Wolf 1972). In contrast, the family systems dominant in much of Southeast Asia during the twentieth century have been more conjugally oriented and relatively egalitarian (Dyson and Moore 1983; Mason 1995). Young couples tended to set up their own households, even if near or in the compound of the parents, and wives often had considerable say in a variety of family decisions.

Variation among family systems in decision-making inequality can have important consequences for the way in which the family's resources are distributed and hence for the health, survival, human capital, and happiness of family members. Although decision-making inequality in families may vary because of the ways in which resources are distributed in particular settings, enduring social traditions about the rights of women and men and those of senior and junior generations also are important. This chapter focuses on community and national contexts as determinants of wives' domestic power in the economic sphere in South and Southeast Asia. The impact of individual traits and household characteristics is also considered.

In the field of demography, although the determinants of women's status have received increasing attention over the past two decades (Mason 1993, 1995), only recently have community norms and institutions begun to be viewed as a fundamental source of women's status in the family (Balk 1994; Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996; Morgan and Niraula 1995; Smith 1989). In the past, most studies have been restricted to individual traits such as women's education, employment, age, and age at marriage. Although these variables may indeed play a role in determin-

ing whether a woman has a say in the household's economic decisions or is free to spend money on her own, they may themselves reflect the community context—for example, whether the community encourages families to send their girls to school or provides a school for them to attend. In this chapter I hope to contribute to our understanding of how social context influences the economic decision-making power of married women.

The study on which this chapter is based was designed specifically to gain insight into the role of countries and communities in determining wives' autonomy and power. Instead of focusing on a national probability sample of married women living in one country (the design most commonly used in demographic surveys), we sampled communities with distinct cultural traditions and development levels located in five countries having very different family and gender traditions: Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In each community, married women of reproductive age were interviewed about aspects of their power and autonomy, as well as their socioeconomic situation and their demographic histories and preferences. Community-level data and information from their husbands were also collected, although they are not considered here. The study was thus designed to enable comparisons among social groups (communities and nations) having distinct traditions about the gender-based division of power and authority in the family and to relate these social contexts to the lives and attitudes of individual women.

Although the five-country study questioned women about their power and autonomy in a variety of spheres, this chapter focuses on their decision-making power in the economic domain. This sphere is commonly thought to have particular importance for demographic outcomes (Mason 1993) and offers the analytic advantage of having been measured through multiple items in each of the five countries in our study. The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. After briefly outlining expectations about variation in the gender systems of the five countries and the sampled communities, I explain the theoretical assumptions and detail the nature of the data. Next we consider interrelationships among specific measures in order to determine whether certain measures can be used to form a meaningful scale of wives' domestic economic power. We then turn to intercountry and community variation in economic power and the impact of personal and household traits on wives' economic power. Finally, we examine the extent to which differences in wives' personal and household characteristics can explain community differences in their domestic economic power. The chapter ends with a look at the policy implications of the findings and outlines directions for future analysis.

GENDER SYSTEMS

The five countries in this study were chosen to represent a range of socioeconomic and gender conditions. In terms of socioeconomic status (SES) or development level, the two South Asian countries (Pakistan and India) are considerably poorer on a per capita basis than the three Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines). Gender traditions limiting women's economic authority and power in the family are also stronger in Pakistan and India than in Thailand or the Philippines, with Malaysia holding an intermediate position (Dyson and Moore 1983). We thus expect wives' domestic economic power to be greater in Thailand and the Philippines than in Pakistan or India. Note, however, that socioeconomic status has a theoretically ambiguous relationship with women's power. Although development and exposure to Western ideas often are argued to undermine traditional family and gender systems (Caldwell 1982), higher socioeconomic status may give families the luxury of enforcing ideals, such as female seclusion or an extended family household, that rob women of autonomy. Thus the expectation of greater female autonomy or power in Thailand and the Philippines than in Pakistan or India rests on gender and family system differences between these countries, not on their socioeconomic status.

In addition to selecting countries with varying gender and socioeconomic conditions, we selected communities within each country that varied on these dimensions. In all countries other than Pakistan, for example, we selected both Muslim and non-Muslim communities in order to examine the effects on wives' autonomy or power of Islam, which some writers claim restricts women's freedom compared to other religious traditions. (See Ahmed 1986, for example, but see also Obermeyer 1994.) Other bases of gender variation were also incorporated into the selection of communities. For example, Punjab province in Pakistan, where our data were collected, has three major agro-economic zones that differ in the extent to which their social organization rests on feudal principles, a characteristic thought to be related to wives' autonomy (Sathar, personal communication). We therefore sampled villages in all three zones in order to test this idea. Similarly, North and South India are frequently described as having distinct gender and family systems, the North's more patriarchal in character than the South's (Dyson and Moore 1983). For this reason we included villages from both a northern Indian state (Uttar Pradesh or UP) and a southern one (Tamil Nadu or TN).

The population of Malaysia consists of three main ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) having diverse gender traditions and levels of socioeconomic development. From the point of view of gender institutions, these traditions are somewhat mixed but may nevertheless result in distinct situations for women.

Malays, for example, although Muslim, have Southeast Asian family patterns that tend to be more favorable to married women than either the traditional South Asian or East Asian pattern (Mason and Palan 1981). The Chinese in Malaysia, however, tend to be urban and to have high socioeconomic status, factors that may mitigate the effects of traditional Chinese family structures on wives' domestic power and autonomy. Thus precisely which group in Malaysia can be expected to have the highest level of domestic female power is not entirely clear, although rural Indian women seem likely to enjoy the least autonomy. In general, we expect to observe considerable variation in the situation of wives across both countries and communities.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The fundamental theoretical assumption underlying this study is that social context—national, regional, or local—plays both direct and indirect roles in determining the autonomy and power of women in the family. Social context first of all encompasses the gender and family systems that help to organize families' internal divisions of labor and power along gender and generational lines. Social context also encompasses the infrastructure of the local community and its ties to regional and national settings. This infrastructure—for example, the availability of schools that girls can attend—in turn may influence the authority or autonomy of married women within the family.




Figure 6.1. Theoretical Model.

As Figure 6.1 indicates, social context can not only influence the level of autonomy and power of the women who reside in that setting but can also shape key individual and household characteristics that in turn influence their autonomy and power. Social norms about the acceptability or desirability of educating girls, for example, will help to determine the average level of schooling among married women in a given social context; the average level of schooling may in turn influence how much say the average wife has in family decisions. As depicted in Figure 6.1, moreover, the family's position in the socioeconomic stratification system also can affect the level of power and autonomy enjoyed by wives in the family, although, as noted earlier, the direction of this influence is theoretically ambiguous. Again, socioeconomic position can affect women's power either directly or indirectly through its influence on key individual or household characteristics such as female educational attainment.

This chapter has two goals: first, to ascertain whether national or social context indeed differentiates the degree to which wives enjoy economic decision-making power in the family; second, to ascertain whether this effect is direct or operates primarily through individual and household traits such as women's age and educational attainment. Thus we must first ask whether there are differences in women's economic power among the countries and communities in our study. We then explore how key individual and household characteristics influence women's economic power and, finally, ask whether these individual and household characteristics can statistically explain the community differences initially observed. Before turning to the analysis, however, let us look at the data and examine the measurement of the dependent variable.

THE DATA

The data used here were collected through personal interviews with married women aged 15–39 living in a total of 59 communities in Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. As noted earlier, in each country the intent was to select a set of communities having distinct gender traditions and levels or types of socioeconomic development. Most of the selected communities are rural, but at least one is peri-urban. Because of varying circumstances in the five countries, the operationalization of this design differed in its details in each country. A summary of the communities sampled and dates of data collection is shown in Table 6.1. In all but one setting (urban Malaysia), the married women aged 15–39 interviewed in the study represent either all such women in the selected community or a probability sample of this universe.

Table 6.1. Summary of the Communities Sampled

Pakistan: Ten communities (villages or clusters of nearby villages) from Punjab province were chosen to represent the three main agro-economic zones in that province and different development levels. Zones 3a and 3b are areas of sandy desert with highly feudal traditions; Zone 4a is the country's northern irrigated plain, the heart of Punjab's agriculture and industrial development; Zone 5 is the northernmost *birani* area of the province, hilly, reliant on rainfall for watering crops, and having the least feudal traditions. Wives' independence is expected to be highest in Zone 5 and lowest in Zone 3. Each zone is represented by three communities having different levels of development, as indicated by household income, ownership of possessions, and men's education; these are labeled Lo (lowest SES), Med (middle level), and Hi (highest level). In Zone 4a, there is also a peri-urban community (labeled Urb) located on the outskirts of Gujranwala city. Fieldwork was conducted in late 1993 and early 1994.

India: Eleven communities (villages or clusters of nearby villages) were chosen to represent North (Uttar Pradesh) versus South (Tamil Nadu) India, Muslims versus Hindus, and relatively well developed, higher-SES conditions versus poorly developed, lower-SES conditions. The markers used to name the communities are: UP = Uttar Pradesh, TN = Tamil Nadu, M = Muslim, H = Hindu, X = mixed, Lo = lower SES, and Hi = higher SES. In the lower-SES district of Tamil Nadu, no mixed village was sampled; hence there are 11 communities altogether. Fieldwork was conducted in late 1993 and early 1994.

Malaysia: Seven communities were chosen to represent the three major ethnic groups that compose the population of Malaysia (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) living in rural versus urban conditions. (For the latter, a small city, Port Klang, approximately 1 hour's drive from the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, was chosen.) Originally, rural Malay women working as market sellers in the east coast city of Kota Bharu were sampled; later an additional sample of Malay women living in these women's home villages was drawn. The latter is referred to as the rural Malay sample and the former is called the Kota Bharu or "KB" Malay sample. The rural Indian community is from a palm oil plantation located on an island near Port Klang; the rural Chinese community is from another island near Port Klang on which almost all inhabitants support themselves through fishing. Most of the fieldwork was conducted in April–May 1993; the rural Malay follow-on was conducted in October 1993.

Thailand: Twenty-one communities were chosen using probability sampling methods (DHS sample frame): four rural village clusters consisting in most cases of two villages from each of the four major regions of the country (South = S, Northeast = E, North = N, and Central = C), one urban community from each region, plus a sample of Bangkok, the capital. Two of the rural communities in the south were predominantly Muslim; two were predominantly Thai Buddhist (as were all other sampled communities, for the Muslim population is heavily concentrated in the south). Fieldwork was conducted in March–June 1993.

Philippines: Ten communities were chosen in total: two Muslim villages from Zamboanga, the province with the greatest concentration of Muslims, subsisting on fishing and trade (Mus 1 and Mus 2); two villages from La Union, an Ilocano-speaking province in the northern part of the country, subsisting on tobacco and garlic farming (Tob 1 and Tob 2); two villages from Camarines Sur, a Bicol-speaking province, subsisting on coconut farming and cottage industry (Coc 1 and Coc 2); two villages from Mindoro, a Tagalog-speaking province, subsisting on fishing and farming (Fish 1 and Fish 2); plus two areas from Metro Manila (Met 1 and Met 2). Fieldwork was conducted in April–December 1993.

The study used a common core questionnaire with small variations across countries. The questionnaires were translated into the local language and administered by trained interviewers under the direction of the country team leaders (in Pakistan, Dr. Zeba A. Sathar; in India, Dr. Shireen J. Jejeebhoy; in Malaysia, Dr. Shyamala Nagaraj; in Thailand, Dr. Napaporn Chayovan; in the Philippines, Dr. Corazon M. Raymundo). The core questionnaire contained eight items concerned with the extent of wives' domestic decision-making power and autonomy in the economic sphere (see Table 6.2). The first four of these questions appeared as part of a battery concerned with the household members making certain decisions—and among all the household members participating in a certain type of decision, the one with the greatest say in that realm. One type of decision concerned major purchases; another, whether the wife should work outside the home. Two further questions asked women whether they felt free to buy two types of personal items (a dress or sari; a small item of jewelry) without obtaining permission from other family members. A seventh question asked whether women felt they had a say in how the household's income was spent. The final question asked whether they would be able to support themselves and their children if the husband were unable to support them.

Table 6.2. Wording of Questions Used in the Analysis of Wives' Domestic Economic Power

-
1. Please tell me who in your family decides the following: whether to purchase major goods for the household, such as a TV/refrigerator/etc.? (Wife = 1, others = 0; note that the item mentioned varied from country to country.)
 2. Please tell me who in your family decides the following: whether you should work outside the home? (Wife = 1, others = 0.)
 3. Who of these people usually has the greatest say in this decision: major purchases? (Wife = 1, others = 0.)
 4. Who of these people usually has the greatest say in this decision: whether you should work outside the home? (Wife = 1, others = 0.)
 5. If you wanted to buy yourself a dress/sari, would you feel free to do it without consulting your husband (or a senior member of your family)? (Yes = 1, no or undecided = 0.)
 6. If you wanted to buy yourself a small item of jewelry, such as a bangle/beads/etc., would you feel free to do it without consulting your husband (or a senior member of your family)? (Yes = 1, no or undecided = 0; note that specific item of jewelry mentioned varied from country to country.)
 7. Do you have a say in how the household's overall income is spent? (Yes = 1, no = 0.)
 8. If your husband were unable to support you, would you be able to support yourself and your children? (Yes = 1, no or uncertain = 0.)
-

Note: Items 1–6 were used to form the Domestic Economic Power scale by summing their values.

Other variables in the analysis include the husband's educational level, an index of six possible nonelectric goods owned by the household,¹ and a three-category classification of the household's total annual income relative to other households in that country. These variables are intended to measure household income and wealth. The analysis also includes a woman's age and educational level, both of which are frequently cited as key determinants of wives' autonomy and power. Included, too, are a dummy variable measuring whether the woman owns any land on her own and another one indicating whether she worked for income (cash or in-kind) during the year preceding the interview—both of which are indicators of her control of economic resources and hence her potential claim to participate in household economic decisions. Also included are two indicator (dummy) variables measuring, respectively, whether the wife holds a position of authority in the household by virtue of being married to the household head or herself being the head (the latter occurred very rarely) and whether she had a kin relationship to her husband prior to marrying, which Dyson and Moore (1983) suggest may give women greater domestic autonomy and power in South Asia because it means they are marrying into a family that already knows and trusts them.

MEASUREMENT OF WIVES' DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POWER

In a study designed around selected communities not necessarily chosen by probability methods, all analysis ultimately should be conducted by community rather than for aggregations of these communities. As a first approximation, however, I have chosen to examine interrelationships among the eight measures of wives' domestic economic power according to country because examining such interrelationships in 59 separate samples is beyond the capacity of a single chapter. Table 6.3 shows the loadings of the eight measures of wives' domestic power on the first principal component as estimated by standard principal components analysis conducted separately for each country. I opted to use principal components analysis as a convenient way to summarize patterns of intercorrelation among the eight items and do not place great faith in the specific loadings estimated by this procedure. At issue here is whether there is *prima facie* evidence that wives' domestic economic power is a single dimension—and if so, which items best index this dimension.

In each country, the principal components analysis produced three factors with eigenvalues above 1.0. The first factor explained 23% to 31% of the total variance, while the second and third factors explained 16% to 19% each. As Table 6.3 indicates, loadings on the first principal component were positive in all cases except one and were relatively substantial. On average, however, the loadings of the last two questions (especially the last one) were weaker than those for the first six

Table 6.3 Loadings of Domestic Economic Power Indicators on First Principal Component (from Within-Country Principal Components Analyses)

Variable	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Decide major purchases?	.40	.36	.39	.37	.44
Decide whether to work?	.32	.23	.43	.49	.46
Greatest say in purchases?	.35	.46	.43	.37	.46
Greatest say in whether to work?	.37	.26	.41	.49	.44
Able to buy dress?	.42	.47	.34	.26	.20
Able to buy small jewelry?	.39	.48	.36	.31	.29
Say in overall spending?	.35	.22	.20	.20	.27
Able to support self and kids?	.17	.18	.14	.22	-.04

items. We do not show loadings on the second and third factors, but inspection of these loadings suggests that these factors are picking up pairs or trios of items with particularly strong intercorrelations that also load strongly on the first principal component. There is therefore little evidence to suggest that scales formed from subsets of the six items that load heavily on the first principal component would better represent women's overall economic decision-making power than a scale formed from all six items. Thus the analysis presented here uses a scale created by summing the six items.² The theoretical and actual range of this scale is 0–6. Means on each of the six constituent items and on the scale are shown in Table 6.4, along with means and standard deviations for the personal and household characteristics used in the analysis. The overall mean for the economic power scale is slightly less than 3.0. Thus the average woman in our sample has a say in approximately half of the six economic decisions we measured.

There is an important caveat about this scale: it rests on items that are subject to socioeconomic influence, not just to the effects of women's gender status. Fieldworkers in the five countries noted that very poor women, when read the questions about feeling free to buy a dress/sari or a small item of jewelry, often responded that their family had so little money that all of it had to go to food and other daily necessities, rather than for discretionary spending. Conceivably, then, variation on this scale could reflect socioeconomic level rather than variation in gender traditions or the empowerment of individual wives. For this reason, a major concern of the multivariate analysis reported here is ascertaining the extent to which family socioeconomic status can explain variation on this scale.

**VARIATION IN WIVES' DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POWER BY
COUNTRY AND COMMUNITY**

Are our expectations about differences in wives' domestic economic power by social context borne out by the data? For country context, the answer is yes. (See Table 6.4.) The lowest levels of economic power are reported by women in Pakistan; women in India are a close second; the highest levels are reported by Thai and Filipino women. As expected, women in Malaysia hold a position intermediate between the other Southeast Asian countries and the two South Asian countries. (All intercountry differences would be statistically significant at the .0001 level were we dealing with probability samples.) To be sure, some of this intercountry difference may reflect variation in income rather than the empowerment of wives. But the differences observed in Table 6.4 are also consistent with differing gender traditions in the five countries.

Having seen that country-level differences in wives' domestic economic power meet our prior expectations, let us examine community differences within countries to see if they, too, vary as we would expect. Figure 6.2 graphs means on the scale across communities within the five countries. To test the significance of community for wives' domestic economic power, we estimated five country-specific OLS regressions in which the economic power scale was treated as a function of community of residence as represented by a dummy-variable classification. These regressions showed that community is a significant predictor of wives' domestic economic power in all five countries. Community accounts for between 4% and 16% of the variation in wives' economic power within each country. Further regressions conducted on the total sample—first using country, then community, to predict wives' economic power—also showed that community explains significantly more variation in wives' reported level of domestic economic power than does country alone (results not shown). Thus even though differences between communities are smaller in some countries than in others—and in most cases are smaller than the average difference between countries—community generally has a strong relationship to the level of domestic economic power that women report.




Is the pattern of variation across communities in wives' economic power consistent with the hypotheses underlying the design of the study? The answer is, in some cases, yes and in others no. In Pakistan, wives' economic power tends to be greater in the least feudal zone (Z5) than in the other zones, as expected (F tests for Zone 5 versus Zone 3 or Zone 4a have $p < .0001$). Wives' power also tends to be higher in the peri-urban community than in the other three Zone 4a communities treated as a group ($p < .001$). Moreover, the highest SES community in Zone 5 clearly

Table 6.4. Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in the Analysis of Wives' Domestic Economic Power

Variable	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Decide major purchases?	.167	.289	.511	.778	.868
Decide whether to work?	.387	.628	.617	.822	.864
Greatest say in purchases?	.048	.060	.281	.577	.528
Greatest say in whether to work?	.145	.229	.477	.717	.584
Able to buy dress?	.396	.282	.661	.887	.699
Able to buy small jewelry?	.161	.163	.506	.550	.468
Domestic Economic Power scale	1.30 (1.39)	1.65 (1.47)	3.05 (1.77)	4.33 (1.47)	4.01 (1.44)
Husband's years of school	4.71 (4.47)	5.63 (4.51)	7.85 (3.38)	7.05 (4.07)	8.22 (3.91)
Household possessions index (range = 0–6)	2.12 (1.38)	1.61 (1.41)	4.08 (1.09)	3.32 (1.37)	1.24 (0.94)
Low income ^a	.324	.321	.424	.330	.326
Medium income	.336	.339	.239	.366	.344
Age in years	28.5 (6.29)	28.3 (6.29)	30.8 (5.53)	29.7 (5.79)	29.4 (5.64)
Years of school	1.08 (2.50)	2.65 (3.38)	7.19 (3.57)	6.46 (3.87)	8.30 (4.03)
Woman owns land	.035	.018	.098	.200	.117
Woman worked for pay in past year	.389	.268	.618	.919	.698
Woman is wife of household head	.655	.737	.847	.691	.914
Husband and wife are related	.796	.384	.261	.133	.099
No. of cases	993	1,842	1,272	2,191	991

Note: Standard deviations are shown only for numerically scaled variables (in parentheses); for dichotomous variables, only means are given.

a. Refers to household's total income in the year prior to the interview; it is measured relative to the mean reported income for the country in which the household is located.








Figure 6.2. Domestic Economic Power Scale by Community and Country.

is lower on the autonomy scale than the two lower SES communities ($p < .01$), but in the other zones there are no consistent differences in wives' economic power according to community SES. Thus while the relative power of wives varies by agro-economic zone and perhaps by rural-urban location, it varies by community socioeconomic level only in the least feudal zone.

In India, the expectation of higher economic power in the South than in the North is borne out by our data ($p < .0001$). The level of reported economic power is significantly higher in the Tamil Nadu communities than in the Uttar Pradesh communities. In Uttar Pradesh, the community's religious composition and socioeconomic level make little difference for the extent of wives' domestic economic power ($p = .40$ and $.95$, respectively). In Tamil Nadu, however, women in the Muslim communities have significantly less say in domestic economic decisions than women in the Hindu communities ($p < .002$), and those in the lower socioeconomic villages have less say than those in the upper socioeconomic settings ($p < .0001$), the opposite of the socioeconomic difference observed in Zone 5 in Pakistan. Thus only in the settings that generally give women a greater voice in the family's economic decisions do women from Muslim and poor villages appear to be at a relative disadvantage. Apparently, the effects of Islam depend on the context in which they occur. The effects of community development may be conditional as well.

The data from Malaysia suggest that Indian and Malay women generally have less domestic economic power than Chinese women ($p < .001$). Not surprisingly, Malay women working as market sellers in Kota Bharu have a level of economic power as high as that of women in the rural Chinese community ($p = .085$) and considerably higher than that of their rural Malay counterparts ($p < .001$). Because the Chinese population in Malaysia is generally better off economically than either the Malay or Indian populations, the pattern of differences in wives' domestic power may have a socioeconomic origin rather than one based in the gender system. Later I explore this possibility using multivariate models that control for the household's economic status. Urban women also have more domestic economic power than their rural counterparts ($p < .001$). Again, whether this reflects socioeconomic level or gender conditions remains to be seen.

In Thailand, region generally has little apparent relationship to wives' economic autonomy and power, although average levels of autonomy are significantly higher in the more prosperous central region than in the poorer northeast ($p = .02$). While urban women consistently report the highest levels of economic autonomy and power (significantly different from all the rural regions combined, $p < .001$), women in certain villages in the south report levels as high as those enjoyed by urban wives. Finally, with regard to the impact of Islam on wives' economic auton-

omy and power, although women from one of the two Muslim communities in the south have by far the lowest levels of economic power in the Thai sample, the women from the other Muslim community have among the highest. Thus even though the two Muslim communities combined are significantly lower on the power scale than the other two communities in the south ($p < .001$), the difference between the two Muslim communities suggests that any effects of Islam on wives' economic power are highly conditional on social context. The significant difference between the northeast and central regions also suggests that some of the differences observed in Thailand may have a socioeconomic rather than a gender origin, a possibility we shall explore.

In the Philippines, region has a significant impact on the reported level of wives' domestic economic power in all cases except for the coconut-growing and fishing areas, which are very similar to each other ($p < .16$). Urban residence also confers greater domestic power on women, a pattern similar to that seen in the other countries. The data from the Philippines again suggest the conditional importance of Islam for wives' domestic economic power. Although Filipinas from one of the two Muslim communities have lower than average levels of economic power, women from the other Muslim community have by far the highest level of any community in the sample; even in the lower of the two Muslim communities, the level is as high as in either of the Metro Manila communities. Because of this, the two Muslim communities together are significantly *higher* on wives' domestic economic power than any of the other regional groupings in the sample, including the two Metro Manila communities. In the Philippines, therefore, not only is the impact of Islam on wives' domestic power conditional; it may in fact enhance their domestic economic power rather than depress it, at least in the communities sampled in our study.

What is the overall conclusion from this examination of community differences? While community generally differentiates the probability of a woman's having a say in her family's economic decisions, the nature of community differences and their likely roots are complex and conditional. Islam may deprive women of domestic power in some settings, but in other settings it may enhance that power. The impact of socioeconomic status also appears to vary by social setting. One generalization suggested by these results, however, is that the community's religious composition and development level appear to have a *greater impact* on wives' domestic economic power in settings that by tradition grant women greater autonomy than in more repressive settings. But before we can be certain about this conclusion, we need to assess the extent to which observed community differences have a socioeconomic rather than a gender origin.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

To explore the issue of socioeconomic versus gender origins of community differences—and to understand the nature of both individual and community influences—we estimated a further set of OLS regressions in which wives' scale values were treated not only as a function of their community of residence but also as a function of the individual and household characteristics described earlier. These variables were entered into the regression containing the community dummy variables in four sets. First, we included husband's education, household possessions, and household income in order to understand the extent to which community differences in wives' economic power could be explained by socioeconomic differences among households. Second, in addition to SES, we added the standard background variables of wives' age and education that are often cited as key determinants of women's status or empowerment. Third, we added the two indicators of wives' economic roles. And finally we included the two kin role measures.

Let us first examine the relationship between the individual and household variables and wives' domestic economic power. Net metric regression coefficients are shown in Table 6.5. In the combined-country (total) equation, two of the three SES measures have significant coefficients indicating that women from higher-status families have a greater say in domestic economic decisions than women from lower-status families. These relationships are not found in every country, however. In Malaysia, for example, neither husband's schooling nor family income has a net relationship to wives' domestic economic power, and the relationship for household possessions is the reverse of the relationship seen in the total equation—that is, women from wealthier Malaysian households have *less* say in domestic economic decisions than women from poorer households. (The same inverse relationship also holds in Thailand.) In the remaining countries, however, at least one SES indicator has a positive relationship to economic power. Hence some of the country and community differences seen earlier could, conceivably, be explained by intercommunity variation in the average wealth or income of women's households rather than by gender-related conditions. We ascertain later whether this is in fact the case.

In almost all countries, wives' age and education are strongly related to their domestic economic power. Older women and those with more schooling have a greater say in economic decisions than younger brides and those with little schooling. These relationships exist despite the fact that the regressions also control for the two measures of wives' economic roles: whether they own any land and whether they have worked for pay in the previous year. Thus age and education are positively related to wives' domestic economic power not solely because of their consequences for wives' economic roles. The economic role indicators also have

strong links with wives' domestic economic power, however. Generally women who own land and those who have worked for pay have more say in the family's economic decisions than do other wives in their communities.³ Community differences in wives' domestic economic power might therefore reflect community differences in the extent of wives' schooling, landownership, or employment. We examine this possibility shortly.

The two final variables shown in Table 6.5 are indicators of wives' kin and family roles. The impact of both variables on wives' domestic power varies considerably across countries. In Pakistan, India, and Thailand—and perhaps in Malaysia, although the coefficient is not significant there—wives of heads have a greater say in the household's economic decisions than women living in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the household head. This finding is consistent with expectations. In the

Table 6.5. Effects of Individual and Household-Level Variables on Wives' Domestic Economic Power

Variable	Total	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
SES						
Husband's schooling	.016**	.001	.025**	.003	.023*	-.006
Possessions	-.014	.013	.039	-.093*	-.059*	-.031
Low income	-.110*	-.258*	-.236*	-.104	-.087	-.192
Med income ^a	-.117**	-.332**	-.104	-.127	.107	-.390**
Background						
Age	.036**	.033**	.023**	.042**	.053**	.034**
Education	.041**	.042**	.009	.063**	.050**	.034*
Work roles						
Wife owns land	.275**	.055	1.139**	.224	.231**	.157
Did paid work in past year	.568**	.197*	.691**	.746**	.815**	.354**
Kin roles						
Wife of head	.358**	.575**	.483**	.202	.299**	.063
Related to husband	-.102*	-.147	-.152	-.129	-.034	-.229
R ²	.499**	.139**	.171**	.231**	.173**	.143**
Number of cases	7,289	993	1,842	1,272	2,191	991

Notes: Each equation was estimated by ordinary least squares and also controls for community. The numbers shown in the first 10 rows of the table are metric regression coefficients.

a. High income is omitted.

*Significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test); **Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test).

Philippines, however, where more than 90% of all the women in the sample live as wives of the head, the few who do not do so have economic power that is no less than the power enjoyed by the majority who do.

Whether the wife is related to her husband also has a variable relationship to her domestic economic power. In Pakistan, India, and Malaysia, women married to relatives have *less* say in the household's economic decisions than women married to nonrelatives (although the relationship fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the within-country equations). In Thailand, being related to the husband (true for only 13% of the wives) is irrelevant to the extent of the wife's domestic economic power; in the Philippines, where only 10% of wives are related to their husbands, having a kin relationship is actually associated with slightly greater domestic economic power. Thus in South Asia, where marriage between kin has been speculated to give wives greater domestic power, there is little evidence for this relationship. In that region, what may appear to be the positive effect of marrying a kinsman may instead reflect the correlated tendency for women marrying kin to live in conjugal households where they occupy the role of head's wife.⁴

Let us now consider how controlling for the four sets of individual and household-level variables influences community differences in wives' domestic economic power. To understand this impact, we have plotted the coefficients for communities from the within-country "zero-order" regressions and from the four multivariate regressions that add the SES, background, work roles, and kin role controls, respectively.⁵ These plots are shown in Figures 6.3 to 6.7. We also performed F tests for the significance of the community classification in the five final multivariate equations. These tests showed that community remains a highly significant predictor of wives' domestic economic power after controls for their personal and household characteristics have been introduced in all five countries ($p < .0001$ in all countries).

What are the specific effects of the four sets of controls in each country? In Pakistan (Figure 6.3), controlling for household SES has very little impact on the relative position of communities vis-à-vis wives' domestic economic power. In all cases, the actual value of the power scale for a community lies very close to the point predicted once SES has been controlled. Making somewhat more of a difference for the position of individual communities are the controls for background, work, and kinship variables. After age and education have been controlled, for example, the rural-urban difference in Zone 4a is no longer significant. Apparently the relative advantage in economic power enjoyed by wives in the peri-urban community in Zone 4 reflects their higher educational level and age. Thus if living in a town rather than a village increases wives' say in household economic decisions in the Pakistani Punjab, it may do so because towns provide greater educational opportu-




Figure 6.3. Effects of Individual and Household Controls: Pakistan.

nities for women or a normative atmosphere that is more supportive of postponing marriage to attend school. In any case, the important point made clear in Figure 6.3 is that, overall, none of the individual or household characteristics examined here, including the measures of household socioeconomic status, can explain the most striking difference among the Pakistani communities—namely, the unusually high level of economic power of wives in two of the three Zone 5 communities. Something other than intercommunity variation in household or individual traits must explain community differences in wives' economic power in Pakistan.⁶

In India (Figure 6.4), introducing the SES controls has very little effect on community differences in wives' domestic economic power. The controls for background, work roles, and kinship roles, however, reduce the original North-South difference quite dramatically, although it remains statistically significant at a high probability level ($p < .0001$). Consistent with Dyson and Moore's (1983) arguments, one reason why women in Tamil Nadu enjoy greater domestic economic power than their counterparts in Uttar Pradesh is because they are better schooled, more able to work for pay, more likely to own land, and more likely to be the wife of the household head rather than the daughter-in-law. Controlling for background, work, and kinship variables also reduces the Muslim-Hindu differences in Tamil Nadu to insignificance. Apparently, Tamil Nadu women in Hindu communities are better off than their counterparts in Muslim communities because they are better educated, more likely to work and own land, and more likely to live as wife of the household head. Thus regional and religious traditions in India appear to influence wives' economic power at least in part by affecting certain personal determinants of that power such as level of schooling, landownership, participation in paid work, and household structure.

In Malaysia (Figure 6.5), the introduction of controls for the household's socioeconomic status again has virtually no impact on community differences in wives' reported level of domestic economic power. As one might expect, however, controlling for wives' work roles greatly reduces the predicted level of domestic economic power among the Kota Bharu market sellers. Indeed, after controls, their predicted level of domestic economic power is no longer significantly different from that of the other rural Malay women in the sample. Thus the high level of economic power originally observed in the Kota Bharu sample appears to reflect the fact that almost all of the women in this sample work for pay. In general, once all the individual and household controls have been introduced, the ethnic differences originally observed in the Malaysian sample remain highly significant although the rural-urban differences do not—despite the high reported level of domestic economic power among urban Chinese women. Thus, in Malaysia, ethnic differences




Figure 6.4. Effects of Individual and Household Controls: India.

in wives' domestic economic power do not appear to reflect differences in the extent to which women are educated, own land, work for pay, or live as wife of the household head; urban-rural differences, however, do. It is the greater educational and economic opportunities for women in urban than in rural areas, or the greater normative support for women's participation in these spheres, that apparently accounts for urban-rural differences in wives' economic power in the Malaysian communities studied here.

Thus far we have seen that family SES has virtually no impact on community differences in wives' power in Pakistan, India, and Malaysia. In both Thailand (Figure 6.6) and the Philippines (Figure 6.7), however, family SES can explain some of the intercommunity differences, especially differences between urban and rural areas of the country. In neither country, however, does the control for household SES entirely explain away the rural-urban difference in wives' economic power. Apparently there is a gender or family system explanation for this difference, not just a socioeconomic one. The same pattern holds for the differences between Muslim and other communities in these two countries. Although SES controls reduce the Muslim-other difference slightly, they do not explain it away. In Thailand, the women who reside in the first of the two Muslim communities remain disadvantaged when it comes to having a say in family economic decisions; in the Philippines, those residing in the first Muslim community remain especially powerful in the domestic economic arena. These differences apparently reflect distinct gender traditions in these communities, not just average socioeconomic differences between them.

In Thailand, urban-rural differences in wives' domestic economic power can be explained entirely by their background, work roles, and kinship roles, in addition to their family's SES. Thus urban wives in Thailand tend to have more economic autonomy not only because their families have more disposable income but also because they are better educated and more likely to work for pay. Many of the urban-rural differences in the Philippines can also be explained in this way. And as noted earlier, the urban-rural difference in Pakistan too is explained by age and education. Thus, in a variety of social contexts, differences in the domestic economic power of urban versus rural women can largely be explained by differences in their educational or employment patterns. This may be especially true where there is widespread acceptance of girls going to school and wives working outside the home. In these contexts, the availability of schooling and employment opportunities may largely determine the extent to which wives are able to acquire a personal basis for participating in the household's economic decisions.




Figure 6.5. Effects of Individual and Household Controls: Malaysia.




Figure 6.6. Effects of Individual and Household Controls: Thailand.




Figure 6.7. Effects of Individual and Household Controls: Philippines.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis presented in this chapter for a sample of married women living in 59 communities located in Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines has confirmed that social context is very important for wives' level of domestic economic decision-making power. In the data analyzed here, country and community have strong and highly significant relationships to reported levels of domestic decision-making power in the economic sphere. Moreover, in no case does household socioeconomic status explain important community differences—a pattern which would have suggested that our measure of wives' economic power was perhaps tapping differences between households in disposable income rather than differences reflecting gender and family systems. In several instances, however, individual and household characteristics—wives' educational level, ownership of land, participation in paid work, and residence as the wife of the household head rather than as a daughter-in-law—were able to explain community differences in wives' domestic economic power. This finding suggests that community differences arise in part because communities offer women distinct educational and economic opportunities or have distinct kinship and family arrangements, not just because they have different traditions about the acceptability of women participating in economic decisions in the family. Thus social context thus has both direct and indirect effects on women's economic autonomy.

While our analysis suggests that the community context is very important for the empowerment of individual married women, it also makes clear that the community conditions which empower women tend to be idiosyncratic rather than universal. For example, there was no evidence in our data that wives in Muslim communities consistently enjoyed less economic power than wives living in communities dominated by other religious groups. Although this was in fact the case in our sample of Tamil Nadu communities—and for one, but not both, of our Thai Muslim communities—one of our Filipino Muslim villages showed by far the highest level of domestic economic power of any community in that sample and, indeed, of the sample as a whole. Thus while an Islamic context may affect wives' empowerment, the nature of its significance varies considerably from setting to setting. The same can be said of urban-rural differences (which are important for wives' empowerment in some contexts but not others), as well as the socioeconomic level of the community.

One generalization about community effects suggested by this analysis is worth emphasizing: social and economic factors such as religion or community development are likely to have a greater impact on wives' empowerment in social settings that normatively give women more autonomy and freedom than in settings

that restrict their movement, participation in extradomestic roles, and say in household decisions. For example, we found that in Pakistan the village's socioeconomic level made a difference for wives' say in family economic decisions only in the least feudal area studied. Likewise in India both religion (Muslim versus Hindu) and village socioeconomic level made a difference for wives' empowerment only in the more gender "liberal" state of Tamil Nadu; they had no impact in the gender-restrictive state of Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, the overall impact of individual and household characteristics on our measure of women's empowerment was smaller in Pakistan (the most gender-restrictive country in the sample) than in any other country except the Philippines. If this generalization is correct, it suggests that development will empower women more rapidly in a setting that traditionally gives women some degree of autonomy and power than in a more restricted setting.

Although this analysis has considered only one form of power and autonomy and has explored the roots of community differences in women's empowerment only superficially, the results nevertheless suggest two effective approaches to altering families' domestic divisions of power and authority in ways that would empower wives. First, the fairly consistent and strong individual-level relationships between wives' education and paid employment and their economic decision-making power suggests that improving female education and enhancing married women's ability to earn an income, either by making their economic participation more normatively acceptable or structurally more feasible, could help to empower them. Second, if normative traditions provide a context that determines the impact on empowerment of individual traits such as education or employment, then an attack on the most restrictive of these traditions may be necessary before programs designed to enhance women's education or employment can hope to empower them significantly. Thus policies that attempt to influence people's attitudes about women's roles may be as important in the long run as policies that directly enhance women's schooling or employment.⁷

An important task for future research is to understand why differences in women's empowerment exist across national and community settings. The analysis presented here has suggested that a community's support for female schooling and employment can be important for the average level of wives' empowerment, as can the types of living arrangements promoted by the dominant family system. Indeed, urban women appear to be advantaged over their rural counterparts because of their higher levels of schooling and employment. Women's education and employment cannot explain all or even most differences in wives' economic power across rural social settings, however, or for that matter across countries. Thus a major question remains to be answered: why does social context affect wives' economic power? That it does so is unquestionable; why it does so remains to be understood.

NOTES

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1. The six possessions are a radio, bicycle, motorbike, clock or watch, automobile or truck, and a sewing machine. We excluded goods normally requiring electricity for their use (TV, fan, refrigerator, electric iron, stereo, or tape recorder) because ownership of these goods may reflect not the household's level of wealth, but whether the community provides electricity; see Desai and Jain (1994).
2. Note that this (unweighted) scale has an individual-level correlation above .99 with scales created by using as weights the factor scores from principal components analysis conducted for all countries combined and within each of the five countries. Thus a different method of creating the scale would have made virtually no difference for the results.
3. The same relationships are found if one substitutes working for income before marriage or working for income in the first year after marriage for the employment measure used in Table 6.5. This suggests that the causal pathway underlying the relationship between paid work and economic power runs predominantly from employment to economic empowerment rather than vice versa.
4. In India, for example, the country where the claim is frequently made that marrying a related man helps to enhance women's autonomy and power, the individual-level correlation between marrying a related husband and living as wife of the household head is .08. The means on these variables also are far higher in Tamil Nadu than in Uttar Pradesh—that is, there is a positive correlation between conjugal living arrangements and marrying related men at the aggregate as well as the individual level.
5. A constant was added to the multivariate coefficients in order to make the community with the lowest reported level on the autonomy scale have an identical value in both the zero-order and multivariate cases. This was done to facilitate comparisons of community variations in a single graph.
6. Controlling for whether the husband is present in the household—a substantial number of husbands are not, especially in Zone 5—also fails to reduce community differences in wives' economic power.
7. Of course, the same policies might simultaneously achieve both ends. Or enhancing women's schooling and employment might in turn liberalize the attitudes of both women and men toward women's autonomy and freedom.

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Consequences of Work for Family Life

Dealing with a Double Day: Role Strain Among Married Working Women in Japan and South Korea

Tim Futing Liao

Women in many societies work outside the home and bear family responsibilities as well. Indeed, married working women have been regarded as working two shifts because of their additional household work, especially compared with men, who traditionally help little inside the home. As a result, these women have two sets of roles: family roles and work roles. The sociological literature on the topic is controversial. Some suggest that having two sets of roles, a special case of multiple roles, tends to produce role strain (overload or conflict) whereas others argue that possessing multiple roles can enhance the roles. Empirical research has provided evidence for both effects, role strain and role enhancement, because of multiple roles. East Asian societies like Japan and South Korea are influenced by patriarchal Confucianism, which advocates that the woman's place is in the home. In contemporary Japan and South Korea, however, many married women work outside the home as well.

How much role strain do married working women in Japan and South Korea experience because of their dual roles as worker and wife/mother? What explains such role strain? Do the factors explaining role strain differ between the two societies? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by analyzing national surveys administered in Japan and South Korea in 1994. After reviewing the theoretical literature on role strain, we will look at the methods and models used in this study. The final section suggests three key factors responsible for role strain in Japan and South Korea: the number of hours women work outside the home, the preferred length of their workweek or workday, and their sex-role attitudes.

THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

Women with two major roles in the home and the workplace epitomize a general theoretical issue about the consequences of multiple roles. Whether the effects of multiple roles are beneficial or harmful has been the crux of the theoretical debate over the last three and a half decades.

The first serious treatment of the consequences of multiple roles is the seminal article by Goode (1960). Because a person's obligations due to different sets of roles are overdemanding, Goode argues, role strain may occur. This thesis rests on two premises: first, people have only limited energy and time (Marks 1977); second,

social organizations and institutions such as a company or the family demand all of a person's allegiance (Coser 1974). According to the thesis, people who have multiple roles do not have the energy and time to fulfill the demands of these roles and thus must make compromises (Barnett and Baruch 1985). Those with more roles are more likely to be exhausted because they cannot adequately perform all the duties—which leads to role strain or conflict and stress. Theorists holding this position perceive the possession of multiple roles as negative. A major consequence for contemporary society is that when both parents work, mothers working full time prefer to reduce the length of their workweek (Moen and Dempster-McClain 1987).

This thesis has been challenged by a number of researchers. Sieber (1974) emphasizes that benefits rather than obligations arise when roles are accumulated. Marks (1977) speculates that role strain results not from too many demanding roles, but when a person is under- or over-committed to one role relative to another. Thus no role strain occurs if the person's commitment to primary roles such as work and parenthood is balanced and positive. This suggests that people with too few or too many roles are more likely to be distressed (Thoits 1986).

There has been much empirical research following this tradition. Pleck (1985), for example, found that women and men deeply involved in their work regard their lives more positively. In fact, despite the centrality of the concept of role strain in sociological theory, study after study has found positive consequences or role enhancement of women's dual roles in the home and the workplace. (See, for example, Crosby 1991; Epstein 1983; Thoits 1986; Verbrugge 1987.) In sum, there is an abundance of empirical evidence supporting the position against the role strain thesis so far as the two sets of roles for working married women are concerned. A further question is whether we may consider role strain and role enhancement on a continuum. Recent research on American women indicates that role strain and role enhancement are better conceived as different types rather than as extremes of a continuum (Tiedje et al. 1990). Gerson's (1985) research comparing returning female college students and housewives also supports the view that multiple roles may create both satisfaction and role strain.

Although the literature cited here is based on research in the United States, the study of women's involvement in multiple roles is not limited to that country. Using a sample of 140 working wives and 140 housewives, Sinha (1987) found that working wives in general suffered from role conflict more than housewives in India. The lack of domestic helpers and absence of modern kitchen appliances affected working wives more. Similarly, women in Bangladesh are confronted with the problem of playing both home and work roles simultaneously. Analyzing a sample of 140 women (63 homemakers and 77 working women), Ilyas (1990) found that the only significant factor explaining role conflict is women's gender-role attitudes: less

traditional attitudes tend to lead to less role conflict. Investigating the balance between role strain and enrichment, Katz (1989) studied 1,500 married couples in Israel and found that dual roles create strain as well as enrichment. Working mothers in Israel use two strategies to cope with the pressure of having two roles—reducing the tasks and enhancing the reciprocal contribution of one role to the other. Clearly, then, the findings of role strain differ from society to society. Therefore, the issue of role strain must be considered in the social context of interest.

This chapter examines the causes of role strain among married working women in Japan and South Korea. Following the theoretical literature, let us assume that a person's time and energy are influenced by such factors as work hours, number of children and the availability of other persons to help with some of the domestic work, among others. We focus both on variables that may increase role strain, such as the number of hours employed outside the home, and variables that may reduce role strain, such as help with chores by others in the household.

METHODS AND MODELS

The data used in this chapter are drawn from the 1994 National Survey on Work and Family Life in Japan and the 1994 National Survey on the Quality of Life in the Republic of South Korea. For sampling design, response rate, overall sample size, dates of fieldwork, and other general information about the surveys, see the appendix at the back of the book.

To make the two surveys comparable for the main analysis, the samples are restricted to include currently married women aged 20 to 59 who were employed outside the home, not necessarily full time. The samples for the analysis are based on listwise deletion of all the variables including those for constructing the two summary indexes of role strain and sex role. There are, however, two exceptions. First, for constructing certain dummy variables such as coresidence with parents, we used the question of how far away parents live. Respondents with no living parents are treated the same as those with parents living separately in the reference category rather than being deleted because of the substantive consideration in the analysis. Second, the main models have the role strain index as the dependent variable and do not include cases with missing information on the index. For the South Korean sample, however, some housewives who were not employed and did not report any minutes of work time answered the questions used for constructing the index of role strain nonetheless. These cases are removed. Moreover, some employed women in both the Japanese and the South Korean samples did not answer the role strain questions. To properly estimate the sample selection models to be discussed here, these cases are omitted as well.

The two surveys share a set of six questions about role strain. The questions sought to elicit responses on a five-point scale to the following statements: (1) "I am able to change my work schedule in order to take care of family matters"; (2) "My job keeps me from spending as much time with my family as I would like"; (3) "My family responsibilities limit the time I can spend to do well on my job"; (4) "I am usually exhausted when I come home from work"; (5) "I am usually tense and irritable when I get home from work"; (6) "I can devote a lot of time to my job because someone else in my family takes care of the home/family."

Because the first and the sixth items measure a concept other than role strain, they are omitted from further analysis. The responses to the remaining four items are scored as follows: 1 = very untrue; 2 = somewhat untrue; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat true; and 5 = very true. This coding is reversed from the original on the surveys for consistency with the concept of role strain and for easier interpretation in the analysis. The low reliability coefficients among the six items (in the .4–.5 range for the two samples) reasonably improved among the remaining four items. (The Cronbach coefficients are .64 for the Japanese sample and .67 for the South Korean sample.) Table 7.1 contains interitem correlations for the two samples. The South Korean sample has higher interitem correlations for four of the six pairs of items.

We constructed a summary index by taking the mean of the four items. The analysis uses this index to indicate role strain: the higher the mean scale, the greater the amount of role strain; the lower the mean scale, the greater the evidence for lack

Table 7.1. Correlation Matrices of Role Strain Indicators for Currently Married Women Aged 20–59: Japan and South Korea, 1994

Indicator ^a	1	2	3	4
<i>Japan</i> ($\alpha = .64$, $N = 471$)				
1. Job limits time to be spent with family	1.00			
2. Family limits time to be spent on job	.25	1.00		
3. Usually exhausted after work	.36	.18	1.00	
4. Usually tense and irritable after work	.29	.24	.54	1.00
<i>South Korea</i> ($\alpha = .67$, $N = 149$)				
1. Job limits time to be spent with family	1.00			
2. Family limits time to be spent on job	.30	1.000		
3. Usually exhausted after work	.42	.25	1.00	
4. Usually tense and irritable after work	.40	.24	.53	1.00

a. Scoring of the items: 1 = very untrue, 2 = somewhat untrue, 3 = uncertain, 4 = somewhat true, and 5 = very true. The coding is reversed from the original for consistency with the concept of role strain and for easier interpretation in the analysis.

of role strain. A value of 2 or below suggests a lack of role strain; a value greater than 3 provides evidence of role strain.

Questions about role strain were administered only to those who were employed. This, however, creates a problem of sample selection similar to that encountered in surveying women's income in economic studies. The problem is that only those women who are in the labor force have observable income. In the current research, women who were not employed might also experience role strain but did not answer the relevant questions on the two surveys. Because ignoring this problem may produce biased estimates, we used a Heckman's model to deal with sample selection bias (Heckman 1976, 1979). The model has an outcome equation and a selection equation. The outcome of interest—role strain in the current study—is observed only for women who are employed outside the home, that is, when the selection criterion is fulfilled. The selection equation is usually analyzed with a probit model and the outcome equation is estimated with two-stage least squares. This two-step procedure adjusts the outcome equation for selection bias estimated by the selection equation. The correlation between the error terms of the two equations is considered to indicate the strength of the link between the selection and the outcome processes.

The analysis of role strain contains two types of variables: those that may produce role strain and those that may reduce it. The variable examined most often in the literature is the length of the woman's workweek, which increases role strain (Moen and Dempster-McClain 1987). For the Japanese women this variable is measured as number of hours per week; for the South Korean women it is measured as number of minutes per day (converted into number of hours per day for the analysis). Because the questions about average work time per week and average work time per day are essentially two different questions whose relationship is not sim-

Table 7.2. Role Strain Index by Hours Worked Per Week (Japan) or Per Day (South Korea) Among Currently Married Women Aged 20–59: Japan and South Korea, 1994

Hours worked per week or day	Japan			South Korea		
	Mean	SD	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	<i>N</i>
1–15/week or 1–3.9/day	2.30	.90	66	2.25	—	1
16–34/week or 4–6.9/day	2.30	.67	135	3.27	1.00	11
35–41/week or 7–8.9/day	2.77	.67	98	3.17	.71	66
42–48/week or 9–10.9/day	2.90	.75	96	3.18	.73	44
49–59/week or 11–12.9/day	2.90	.62	49	3.69	.86	17
60+/week or 13+/day	3.13	1.05	27	3.53	.63	10
Total	2.63	.80	471	3.26	.77	149

Table 7.3. Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations for Variables in the Selection Equation: Currently Married Women Aged 20–59 in Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Employment outside the home	.59	.49	.20	.40
Age	42.49	9.80	38.69	9.41
Age squared	1,901.50	832.01	1,584.97	768.07
Graduate of four-year university (1 = yes)	.07	.26	.12	.32
Graduate of two-year college (1 = yes)	.19	.39	—	—
Graduate of professional schools (1 = yes)	.09	.29	—	—
Graduate of junior high school (1 = yes)	.17	.37	.19	.39
Graduate of elementary school (1 = yes)	—	—	.17	.37
Not completing elementary school (1 = yes)	—	—	.05	.21
Rural upbringing (1 = yes)	.52	.50	.67	.47
Sex role index	3.09	.68	3.20	.60
No. of living children	1.92	.90	2.19	1.26
Presence of child under age 7 (1 = yes)	.25	.43	.34	.47
Presence of child aged 7–18 (1 = yes)	.45	.50	.21	.41
Own parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.23	.42	.28	.45
Spouse's parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.21	.41	.24	.43
Spouse's hours/week or day on chores	5.43	8.76	1.31	2.33
Parents' hours/week or day on chores	5.69	15.88	.36	1.44
Children's hours/week or day on chores	2.14	5.32	.45	1.08
No. of cases		796		729

ply a multiplicative factor of 5 or 5.5, the measurements of the variables are kept in the analysis. Table 7.2 gives the mean scale values of role strain for various levels of hours employed per week or day. An obvious pattern in both societies is the positive correlation between role strain and the level of hours worked outside the home per week. The South Korean sample also appears to present a higher level of role strain. This observation, however, is inconclusive without multivariate analysis that takes into consideration correlated variables and sample selection bias. The length of women's workweek or workday is included only in the outcome equation because it is a version of the dependent variable in the selection equation. The analysis also contains many independent variables including the length of women's workweek or workday in at least two of the equations. We turn now to these variables, their measurements, and their expected effects.

Age. The respondent's age is measured in years. It is well known that women who drop out of the labor force in many industrial societies may come back to work after raising a family and that labor-force participation levels off with age. Because the first peak is rather short in duration, to capture the curvilinear relationship

Table 7.4. Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations for Variables in the Outcome Equation: Currently Married Women Aged 20–59 in Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Role strain index	2.63	.80	3.26	.77
Age	43.46	8.92	37.57	8.48
Age squared	1,968.35	767.44	1,483.02	676.50
Coresidence with parents (1 = yes)	.35	.48	.25	.43
Frequent spousal communication (1 = yes)	.70	.46	.81	.40
Length of workweek or workday in hours	35.02	15.48	8.97	2.20
Preferred workweek or workday in hours	30.39	14.76	6.71	2.00
Sex role index	3.04	.65	3.00	.67
No. of living children	1.93	.91	1.98	1.29
Presence of child under age 7 (1 = yes)	.16	.37	.28	.45
Presence of child aged 7–18 (1 = yes)	.48	.50	.24	.43
Own parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.22	.42	.35	.48
Spouse's parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.23	.42	.33	.47
Spouse's hours/week or day on chores	4.52	7.57	1.40	2.47
Parents' hours/week or day on chores	6.91	17.62	.73	2.09
Children's hours/week or day on chores	2.37	5.54	.52	1.10
No. of cases	471		149	

between age and employment in the form of the second peak and the later leveling off, we used a quadratic function in the selection equation. A preliminary analysis showed that a cubic function of age is not justified. Although the nonlinear effect of age on role strain is yet unknown, women who go back to the labor force in the middle of the age curve may be more likely to experience role conflict because the work environment is no longer as fresh as it was in their twenties. Thus the quadratic function is kept in the outcome equation, though the signs of age and age-squared terms are expected to be opposite of those in the selection equation. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the selection and outcome equations.

Education. Education as well as age and marital status have been suggested as affecting women's employment and income (Heckman 1976). After examining univariate distributions and considering their substantive meanings, we used a sequence of four dummy variables of education. For the Japanese sample, the dummy variables represent graduation from a four-year university, from a two-year college, from a professional school, and from a junior high school; we used graduation from high school as the reference. For the South Korean sample, we used the same reference, while the four dummy variables represent graduation from a four-

year university, from a junior high school, from an elementary school, and having less than six years of education. Women with a two-year college education are expected to be less likely employed; women with a four-year university education are hypothesized to be more likely employed. Neither the literature nor common sense suggests any possible effects of education on role strain. Therefore, educational effects are not estimated in the outcome equation.

Rural Upbringing. Women with a rural upbringing are more likely to be employed because they may have been socialized into the rural division of labor in the past with both sexes working in the fields. This dummy variable is not used in the model studying role strain because there is no reason to believe it has an effect one way or another.

Sex Role. Gender-role attitudes are found to be the only important variable explaining role strain among Bangladeshi women (Ilyas 1990). We used answers to the following five questions to construct a sex role index: (1) "It is much better for everyone if the man earns the main living and the woman takes care of the home and family"; (2) "Preschool children are likely to suffer if their mother works"; (3) "It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself"; (4) "A woman can have a full and satisfying life without having children"; (5) "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work." Similar items are used for studying division of household labor in the United States (Presser 1994). The responses are scored from "strongly agree" (value of 1) to "strongly disagree" (value of 5). The scores for the first three questions are reversed so that the resulting summary index of the averaged five items indicates traditional attitudes if the numerical value is high. The reliability coefficient is .61 for the Japanese sample for the selection equation and .52 for the South Korean counterpart. The sex role index is expected to have a negative effect on women's employment outside the home and a positive effect on role strain (Ilyas 1990).

Hours Per Week or Day Worked Outside the Home. This variable is already measured continuously for the South Korean sample but is divided by 60 to convert minutes to hours. For the Japanese sample, midpoint values are assigned to the ordinal categories, following one of the two traditions of dealing with ordinal independent variables such as income. (The other tradition is recoding an ordinal variable into a series of dummy variables.) For the open-ended interval of a workweek of 60 hours and over, a value equaling 60 plus half of the previous interval is assigned arbitrarily, resulting in a value of 63.5. The length of women's workweek or workday is expected to increase the amount of role stress strongly (Moen and Dempster-McClain 1987).

Coresidence with Parents. One prominent feature of the traditional family

system in Confucian Japan and South Korea is the patriarchal stem family. The eldest son of this family is expected to bring his bride into the family, live with his parents and grandparents until the parents' deaths (while other siblings would form their own households upon marriage or a short while afterward), and inherit a major part of the family property as well as the family headship (Befu 1963; Fukutake 1989; Yim 1969). Coresidence with parents is still quite prevalent in today's Japan and South Korea. In the samples used in the analysis, about 35% of currently married women aged 20–59 reside with parents in Japan and about 25% in South Korea (Table 7.4). Apart from the contribution parents make in housework, having a parent in the house may ease psychological stress if the relationship is good—or cause psychological tension if the relationship is poor. Because of these two possibilities the expected sign can be either positive or negative. A dummy variable records coresidence with parents-in-law (or parents) versus other arrangements.

Frequency of Spousal Communication. Good spousal communication contributes to the quality of marital life (Iwao 1993) and may alleviate role strain because good marital relations ease stress. We created a dummy variable to test this positive effect and coded it 1 if the wife discussed matters with her spouse either very often or every day and 0 otherwise.

Children in the Family. It is widely known that women with small children tend not to be in the labor force because preschool children demand special attention and care. We used a dummy variable to record the presence of a child under age 7. School-age children, especially primary school children, often rely on mother for help with homework. Often she is their counselor and confidante. All this demands her time and commitment. Here we used a dummy variable recording the presence of a child aged 7 to 18. In addition, the number of children may increase the time demands on the mother. In previous research on role strain, two of the three children variables in Ilyas's study (1990) are similar to those used here: number of children and age of the youngest child. The three variables about children in the family are included in both the selection equation and the outcome equation in the analysis. Negative effects on employment and positive effects on role strain are expected.

Health of Parents. Having a sick parent may keep a woman out of the labor force because she is needed at home, or it may keep her employed for needed income. Thus no particular sign of the effect on employment is expected. A parent in poor health may produce stress for a woman because of the additional demand in time and attention. Here a positive effect is expected on role strain. To avoid differential effects due to the health of own parents versus spouse's parents, we used two separate dummy variables, recording the poor health of at least one parent if not both. A preliminary analysis revealed no interaction effects between coresidence and the health status of parents.

Time Spent on Chores by Other Members of the Family. When other members of the family devote time to housework, the woman's burden is eased and her role strain may be reduced. Thus time spent on chores by others is expected to have positive effects on women's employment outside the home and negative effects on role strain. Respondents with nonapplicable answers—for example, with no living parents—are treated the same as those with parents who contributed no time to housework. We constructed three variables to record time spent on chores by spouses, parents, and children. For the Japanese sample, hours spent on various chores per week are summed for spouse, parents, and children; for the South Korean sample, no summing is necessary, though the information is recorded in minutes per day, which is converted to hours per day. In Japan, parents appear to contribute more time to household chores, as suggested by the higher level of coresidence, while in South Korea spouses make the greatest contribution (Tables 7.3 and 7.4).

Preferred Length of Workweek or Workday. As Moen and Dempster-McClain (1987) have shown, parents who have role strain may prefer to work less. On the other hand, it may be that those women who work long hours, but would prefer to work less, may experience role strain. In this study we are less concerned about the causal order of the relationship, and preferred length of workweek or workday is expected to have a negative relationship with role strain. Both surveys have this question measured in hours. For the Japanese sample, conversion from ordinal values to midpoint values is necessary, as noted earlier for the length of workweek.

The husband's work schedule may also affect role strain. A preliminary analysis indicates little variation in this variable: almost all husbands work the regular daytime schedule. Moreover, the effect of the husband's work schedule on his contribution to housework is well established (Presser 1994). If there is an effect on role strain, it is probably mediated by hours spent by husband on chores. For these reasons the variable is not included in the analysis.

To detect potential multicollinearity among the variables, a preliminary analysis using an OLS regression of role strain (instead of the final sample selection model) yielded no significant findings. The only collinear pair of variables is age and its squared term, which are collinear by construction.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Role strain among women cannot be examined without taking into account their selectivity into the labor force. Table 7.5 presents the results from the probit models of the selection equations modeling the probability of employment outside the home in Japan and South Korea. There is a strong effect by both age and age squared on employment, and the function takes on the hypothesized slightly convex shape.

The function is not significant for the South Korean sample, though the signs are identical.

Four years of higher education has an expected, though weak, effect on South Korean women's employment outside the home. In Japan, compared with high school graduates, women with only a junior high school diploma are actually more likely to be employed. This result is not entirely unexpected and may suggest that these women are more likely to be employed in blue-collar jobs. As hypothesized, rural upbringing has a strong positive effect on employment in Japan. Although the same positive effect is not substantiated statistically in South Korea, the impact is in the same direction. The effect of sex role is, as expected, strong and negative in both societies. The fact that the effect is stronger in South Korea than in Japan is also suggested by a comparison of the mean values of the sex role index in Tables 7.3 and 7.4: the difference between the mean values of the index for those who are

Table 7.5. Unstandardized Parameter Estimates from the Probit Models of Employment Outside the Home (Selection Equations): Currently Married Women Aged 20–59 in Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Beta	se (beta)	Beta	se (beta)
Constant	-2.02*	1.13	-.87	1.13
Age	.17***	.06	.07	.06
Age squared	-.00***	.00	-.00	.00
Graduate of four-year university (1 = yes)	-.27	.19	.32*	.17
Graduate of two-year college (1 = yes)	-.01	.13	—	—
Graduate of professional schools (1 = yes)	.06	.18	—	—
Graduate of junior high school (1 = yes)	.48***	.15	-.02	.16
Graduate of elementary school (1 = yes)	—	—	.09	.19
Not completing elementary school (1 = yes)	—	—	.03	.31
Rural upbringing (1 = yes)	.44***	.10	.19	.13
Sex role index	-.29***	.08	-.37***	.09
No. of living children	.02	.07	-.03	.06
Presence of child under age 7 (1 = yes)	-.92***	.17	-.41**	.17
Presence of child aged 7–18 (1 = yes)	-.09	.14	-.11	.16
Own parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	-.15	.12	.18	.12
Spouse's parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.17	.12	.27**	.13
Spouse's hours/week or day on chores	-.00	.01	.00	.02
Parents' hours/week or day on chores	.01***	.00	.11***	.03
Children's hours/week or day on chores	.01	.01	.03	.05
Model chi square	139.93		57.40	

Note: Beta is the unstandardized estimate; se (beta) is its standard error; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of $\alpha < .10$, $\alpha < .05$, and $\alpha < .01$ levels for a two-tailed test.

employed (Table 7.4) and for the combined sample regardless of employment status (Table 7.3) is greater for the South Korean sample than for the Japanese sample.

The only significant effect of children in the family is the presence of preschool children. As expected, having a small child in the house reduces women's likelihood to work outside the home in both societies, and the effect is stronger in Japan. One result regarding the health of parents is statistically significant—that for the spouse's parents. This finding supports the hypothesis discussed earlier: women with a parent-in-law who is in poor health may need to work to generate income. In both societies, parents' time spent on household chores increases a woman's chance to work outside the home. As expected, the more a parent contributes in time, the more likely the respondent will be employed. The effect of help by other members of the household, however, is not substantiated.

In sum, while differences exist, two determinants of women's employment outside the home are at work in both Japan and South Korea. Women's labor-force participation in these societies is strongly influenced by their gender-role ideology: women with traditional views are less likely to be employed. They are also constrained by their familial obligations: women with preschool children have less time and energy to pursue work outside the home. The determinants of employment and those of role strain are related. Ignoring the former would generate bias in the study of the latter. Having examined the determinants of women's employment, let us now consider the factors that predict the extent to which employed women report role strain. As noted earlier, two variables are commonly hypothesized to explain the intensity of role strain: factors such as employment outside the home that place a greater demand on women's limited energy and time (Barnett and Baruch 1985; Katz 1989; Moen and Dempster-McClain 1987) and factors such as domestic help with chores that may alleviate the intensified demand on women's time (Sinha 1987). But there is also a third explanation for role strain: the woman's sex-role attitudes (Ilyas 1990).

Following the classic theory of role strain, the most important variable is the length of the woman's workweek or workday because of competing demands on her time and energy. The relation between role strain and number of hours worked per week or day outside the home (Table 7.2) reveals a positive link between the two variables, a relationship that is further supported by the sample selection models in Table 7.6. The positive effect is the strongest among all explanatory variables, thus giving unmistakable support for the classic theory of role strain in both societies.

Table 7.6 also presents results from the sample selection models of role strain for the other independent variables defined in Table 7.4 for the two samples. The age variables show the expected slightly concave function in both samples, with

role strain increasing with age in a curved-up shape. But the effects are statistically significant for the Japanese sample only; they still bear the same signs for the South Korean sample. Although there is weak evidence that coresidence induces role conflict in South Korea, such evidence is lacking in Japan. In South Korea, this weak effect could reflect an endogeneity problem: when working married women find it difficult to combine work and family roles, they choose to live with parents as a way to solve the problem. Labor-force participation is low among married South Korean women. Often it is the older, rural women from lower socioeconomic households without preschool children who are more likely to work, especially for economic need (Chin 1995). These wives—though choosing to live with parents (most likely the husband's parents)—may find that the arrangement does not do much to relieve their stress because of normative expectations of daughters-in-law and thus may feel guilty and experience role strain. Gender roles are more egalitarian in Japan, however, due to earlier and deeper modernization in the family, a point dis-

Table 7.6. Unstandardized Parameter Estimates from the Sample Selection Models of the Index of Role Strain (Outcome Equations): Currently Married Women Aged 20–59 in Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Beta	se (beta)	Beta	se (beta)
Constant	3.83***	1.04	4.80***	1.71
Age	-.10**	.05	-.13	.08
Age squared	.00**	.00	.00	.00
Coresidence with parents (1 = yes)	.01	.86	.22*	.13
Frequent spousal communication (1 = yes)	-.12	.07	-.26*	.15
Length of workweek or workday in hours	.02***	.00	.10***	.03
Preferred workweek or workday in hours	-.01***	.00	-.10***	.03
Sex role index	.15**	.06	.42*	.24
No. of living children	.02	.05	-.03	.08
Presence of child under age 7 (1 = yes)	.23	.17	.16	.30
Presence of child aged 7–18 (1 = yes)	-.02	.10	.47**	.21
Own parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	.10	.09	-.13	.19
Spouse's parent(s) in poor health (1 = yes)	-.16*	.09	.05	.21
Spouse's hours/week or day on chores	.01***	.01	.02	.03
Parents' hours/week or day on chores	.00	.00	.01	.06
Children's hours/week or day on chores	-.01	.01	-.07	.07
ρ		-.45		-.67
R ² (adjusted R ²)	.19 (.16)		.24 (.15)	

Note: Beta is unstandardized estimate, se (beta) is its standard error, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of $\alpha < .10$, $\alpha < .05$, and $\alpha < .01$ levels for a two-tailed test.

cussed later. This difference may result in more patriarchal vestiges among South Korean men and parents than among their Japanese counterparts, thereby generating greater strain among South Korean women residing with parents.

As hypothesized, frequent spousal communication may reduce role stress; there is a weak effect in South Korea, but the effect is not evidenced statistically for the Japanese sample though the sign is also negative. Married working women in South Korea who communicated frequently with their husbands experienced an expected reduction of over one-quarter of a point in role strain compared to their counterparts with less spousal communication.

The positive relationship between role strain and preferring to work less studied by Moen and Dempster-McClain (1987) now finds support in the Japanese and South Korean data. Whatever the cause, it is quite clear that both the Japanese women and the South Korean women surveyed who experienced role strain also preferred to work less. Table 7.4 demonstrates that the Japanese women in the sample preferred to work on average about 5 hours less per week than they actually worked and that their South Korean counterparts preferred to work on average about 2 hours less per day than they did. Women who find work stressful might regard working too many hours per week or day as the cause of their problems. Women who prefer a long workweek or workday, however, would probably not find it a strain to work while being a wife and mother.

Gender-role attitudes, as expected, have a positive effect on role strain. Women who have traditional attitudes in both societies are more likely to experience role strain, as previous research has suggested (Ilyas 1990). This effect, though more statistically significant among the Japanese women (probably due to the larger sample size), is more pronounced among the South Korean women. Recall that the effect of gender role on employment is also stronger in South Korea. In a society where there are few egalitarian gender roles, gender roles should have a stronger effect on work-related consequences such as role strain. In other words, women with moderately traditional attitudes could still work and have a family life in Japan whereas in South Korea it takes a woman with quite unconventional views to have employment outside the home and be a wife and mother.

Note that the actual effects of sex-role attitudes are slightly smaller than the estimates in the outcome equation because of the negative correlation between the error terms (ρ in Table 7.6). For example, although Japanese women with traditional gender-role attitudes tend to have a higher degree of role strain when they are employed outside the home, it is these women who tend not to work outside the home to begin with. Therefore, the overall effect of gender-role attitudes on role strain is slightly smaller when we also consider the probability of women's employ-

ment outside the home affected by the same attitudes. To interpret coefficients that appear in both the selection and the outcome equations, we need to consider the estimated correlation between the error terms. Because of the negative and large estimated ρ in both samples, an interpretation of an effect significant in both equations will render a true effect that is a little smaller than the effect in the outcome equation alone.

None of the three variables about children in the family has a significant impact on role strain except the presence of school-age children in South Korea. The effect is the most pronounced among all the variables measured on the same scale—that is, the dummy variables—in either sample. The presence of a child under age 7 does not make women feel more burdened in Japan or South Korea, after accounting for the sample selection bias. Working mothers with school-aged children, however, experienced much greater strain than working mothers without such children in South Korea. While both societies have competitive educational (and examination) systems and both expect mothers to ensure the success of their children in school, such expectations will produce greater stress for working mothers in an environment less favorable for gender equality, as in South Korea.

The four estimates for the two dummy variables representing parents' health status in the two models are all rather weak. The only estimate significant at the .10 level is that indicating the health status of spouse's parents. The result has an unexpected sign, though, and should be interpreted with caution. One possibility is that although having a sick parent-in-law demands more time and attention, it could also mean the parent is less likely to bother the daughter-in-law. But such a weak result might just as easily be due to sampling fluctuations.

The truly striking finding in the analysis is that the time spent by the husband on housework had a highly significant positive effect on role strain for the Japanese sample. One cannot be certain, of course, that the time spent by a family member on housework actually reduces role strain. Equally likely is that husbands help as a *result* of their stressed wives' role strain. It is difficult to disentangle these effects without carrying out an experimental design.

How important is it to correct for the sample selection bias? Although we have omitted the OLS regression results that are unadjusted for sample selection, a few quick comparisons are in order. Without correcting for sample selection bias, the age effects would disappear and the sex-role-attitudes effect would be less significant than the .05 level for the Japanese sample; without such correction, the workday effect would be less significant than the .05 level and the preferred hours of work effect would not be significant even at the .10 level for the South Korean sample.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the findings from the sample selection models suggest that women having two sets of roles in Japan and South Korea experience greater role strain than women having just one role. Three major factors account for women's role strain in both Japan and South Korea: the length of the woman's workweek or workday, her preferred length of workweek or workday, and her gender-role attitude.

There are also unique effects found in one sample only, such as the effects of age and the time spent by spouse on housework in the Japanese sample and the effects of coresidence, spousal communication, and presence of school-age children in the South Korean sample. Not surprisingly, the burden of a double day for the married working woman in Japan depends on how much she works outside the home. Overall, there is much greater support for the classical role strain theory, which emphasizes competition for women's time, than explanations based on the idea that help and communication reduce role strain. The suggestion that a woman's gender-role attitudes also explain role strain has found consistent support in the Japanese and South Korean data.

These data reflect decades of social transformation in Japan and South Korea. Economic modernization started in Japan over a century ago, but it has been a much more recent phenomenon in South Korea. The accompanying breakdown of patriarchy and traditional value systems has also proceeded deeper in Japan than in South Korea. Postwar Japan saw more allusions to sexual equality in its constitution than South Korea did in the same period. All this has facilitated an economic, political, cultural, and social environment more conducive to women's employment outside the home in Japan. It is no wonder that South Korean wives regard marriage less favorably than do Japanese wives (Chapter 2 in this volume). This is why coresidence with parents and the presence of school-age children can generate greater strain for South Korean working women while spousal communication may alleviate such strain; all these effects are nearly absent for their Japanese counterparts.

This research has policy implications as well. Because of the concave age effect on role strain, measures should be taken to make women's work duties less demanding in order to ease potential stress among younger married Japanese women who are new to the job and, more important, among middle-aged and older working women who may have long endured their work. In South Korea, government agencies should set up alternative establishments for managing the competitive educational system to ensure the well-being of working married women. Given the competition between work and family duties, the best preventive medicine for role strain among married women working outside the home in both countries is to create a more

egalitarian atmosphere in society. A more progressive gender-role socialization will not only allow women to enjoy more of both work and family but will also let men share more of the double-day deal.

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Husbands' Drinking and Spouses' Well-Being in Japan and South Korea

Eise Yokoyama and Noriko O. Tsuya

The belief that work stress promotes heavy alcohol use is widely held in both Western and Asian societies. (See, for example, Cooper, Russell, and Frond 1990; Gupta and Jenkins 1984; Herold and Conlon 1981; Saito 1986.) In East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea where many men work long hours in the marketplace,¹ stress-induced drinking can have serious effects not only on the physical health and psychological state of drinkers themselves but also on the well-being of family members. Unlike Western countries with Protestant traditions, where heavy alcohol consumption tends to be regarded as problematic or even pathological, however, in Japan and South Korea male drinking and drunkenness have been viewed as socially acceptable masculine behavior (Saito 1986). Despite the widespread acceptance of men's drinking and drunkenness and the serious implications of men's overwork and heavy alcohol use on family members in Asian countries, few empirical studies have systematically analyzed the causes of drinking and drunkenness and their consequences for family life for nationally representative samples of the population.²

Using data from the 1994 National Survey on Work and Family Life in Japan and the 1994 National Survey on the Quality of Life in the Republic of Korea, this chapter examines the relationship between frequency of husbands' coming home drunk and the physical and psychological well-being of married men and women in Japan and South Korea. Because the amount and type of men's work are thought to affect their drinking patterns, we first examine the effects of husbands' work hours and occupations on frequency of their coming home drunk as reported by currently married men and women aged 20–59. Because men's drinking may affect their physical health and that of their wives, as well as the quality of their marriage and psychological well-being, we next examine the effects of husbands' coming home drunk on physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness of married men and women. The chapter concludes with a summary of findings and discussion of implications.

This study looks at married men's drunkenness—more precisely, the frequency of their coming home drunk—rather than the frequency or amount of drinking itself. Given differences in personal vulnerability and adaptability to alcohol use, drinking and drunkenness are not necessarily correlated linearly. Moreover, it

is drunkenness rather than drinking itself that is likely to have serious implications for the quality of marriage and family life. Although gender differences in the prevalence of alcohol use have decreased over the past few decades as fewer women abstain from drinking (Kono and Otani 1993:318; Republic of Korea, National Bureau of Statistics 1988:206; Republic of Korea, National Statistical Office 1995:164–65), this study focuses on husbands' drunkenness because wives' drinking and drunkenness are still a relatively minor problem in these two Asian countries.

DATA AND MEASURES

Data for our comparative analysis are drawn from subsamples of currently married male and female respondents aged 20–59 in the national family surveys in Japan and South Korea. (For specifics of the surveys see the appendix at the back of the book.) We restrict our analysis to currently married men and women because these are the people for whom a husband's drunkenness may have serious consequences. For Japan there are 930 male and 907 female currently married respondents aged 20–59; for South Korea there are 1,019 male and 934 female currently married respondents aged 20–59.

As stated earlier, we look only at husbands' drunkenness because wives' drinking is still a minor problem in these two Asian countries. Thus for male respondents, we look at the frequency of their own drunkenness as reported by the men themselves; for female respondents, we look at their husbands' drunkenness as reported by these women. In other words: for male respondents, this study uses their self-reports on frequency of coming home drunk; for female respondents, we use the perceptions of these women regarding the frequency of their husbands' coming home drunk. This difference should be kept in mind when interpreting the results because the male and female respondents in our data are not couples.

We first conduct a multivariate analysis of the effects of the husband's work hours and occupation on the frequency of his coming home intoxicated by employing ordinary least-square (OLS) multiple regression and including such control variables as husband's education and age, coresidence with parents, and age of youngest child. We next conduct an OLS regression analysis of physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness for males and females separately, employing the frequency of the husband's coming home drunk as the independent variable and also including men's work hours, men's occupation, and the same control variables used in the analysis of husbands' coming home drunk. To simplify the presentation of the results, we compute the estimated values of the dependent variables when the values of all control variables in the regressions are set at their means.

Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable we examine is the reported frequency of husbands' coming home drunk. The surveys asked respondents to indicate frequency of coming home drunk (both themselves and their spouse) by choosing one of five precoded categories: seldom or never; one to two times a month; once a week; a few times a week; and almost daily. The original categories were scored at their approximate midpoints: "seldom or never" = 0; "one to two times a month" = .5; "once a week" = 1; "a few times a week" = 2.5; and "almost daily" = 5.

The second set of dependent variables we examine comprises the reported physical and psychological well-being of married men and women. To measure these two aspects of well-being, this study looks at three items for which comparable data are available in the two surveys: physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness. Physical health is measured by responses to this question: "In general, what is your physical health?" The response categories were: poor; not so good; fair; good; and excellent. Scores from 1 to 5 were assigned to these categories, a higher score indicating better health.

Marital satisfaction is measured by this question: "How happy are you with your marriage?" Respondents were asked to choose from these categories: very unhappy; somewhat unhappy; so-so; somewhat happy; and very happy. Scores from 1 to 5 were again assigned to these categories so that a higher score indicates a higher degree of satisfaction.

Overall happiness is measured by responses to this question: "In general, how happy would you say you are?" Although the two surveys asked exactly the same question, the response categories were different. In the Japanese survey, respondents were asked to choose one of four precoded ordered responses: very unhappy; somewhat unhappy; somewhat happy; and very happy. Scores of 1, 2, 4, and 5 were assigned to these categories, higher scores indicating higher level of happiness. In the South Korean survey, respondents were asked to choose an answer from five categories: very unhappy; somewhat unhappy; so-so; somewhat happy; and very happy. Scores from 1 to 5 were assigned to these categories so that higher scores indicate higher level of happiness. Thus the scores are not strictly comparable between Japan and South Korea.

Independent and Control Variables

We next explain the definitions and measurement of the independent and control variables used in the analysis of frequency of husbands' coming home drunk and its physical and psychological consequences.

Men's Work Hours, Occupation, and Frequency of Coming Home Drunk. The multiple regression analysis of frequency of husbands' coming home drunk employs two independent variables to measure the amount and type of men's work: usual weekly work hours and occupation. To the extent that men drink alcohol to alleviate tension and stress caused by long work hours (Cappell and Greeley 1987; Cooper et al. 1990; Saito 1986), longer employment hours are hypothesized to be positively associated with the frequency of their coming home drunk. Given the finite nature of time, however, the relationship between work hours and frequency of coming home drunk may possibly be curvilinear, because working very long hours may leave little time for drinking. Men's usual work hours per week in both countries are measured by a variable consisting of five categories: zero (that is, not working in the labor market); 1–41 hours, 42–48 hours, 49–59 hours, and 60 hours or more. Using the highest category, 60 hours or more, as the reference, we constructed five dummy variables.

Occupation, too, may influence the frequency of men's intoxication as well as the physical and psychological well-being of married men and women. Certain occupations, especially professional and managerial jobs, are often associated with high levels of stress and tension caused by high job demands, and these demands may result in a higher frequency of intoxication (Cooper et al. 1990). Managerial jobs or running a business may also involve job-related drinking as part of socializing with customers and business colleagues. In the Japanese survey, husband's occupation was measured by a categorical variable representing five categories: professional or managerial; unskilled white collar; blue collar; business proprietor (self-employed as proprietor of a shop, office, or factory); and agriculture, fishing, family worker, or other. Using unskilled white collar as the reference category, we constructed four dummy variables. For South Korea, occupation is available for only four categories: professional or managerial; unskilled white collar; blue collar; and agriculture, fishing, family worker, and other.³ Using unskilled white collar as the reference category, we constructed three dummy variables.

Our multiple regression analyses of physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness employ frequency of the husband's coming home drunk as an independent variable. Using the lowest frequency (seldom or never) as the reference category, we created four dummy variables.

Other Control Variables. This study also controls for the effects of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and household structure of married men and women. First we control for education and age.⁴ Education is one of the strongest indicators of gender-typed behavior and attitudes (Goldsneider and Waite 1991:127–29) and thus may affect drinking patterns (Huselid and Cooper 1992). In

any case, we expect that men with less education will come home drunk more frequently. Education may also influence marital and overall happiness. For Japan, education is measured by a variable consisting of three ordered categories: less than high school; high school; and college or higher (including junior college, advanced professional school, and post-high school professional training school). For South Korea, due to differences in educational composition, education is grouped into four categories: less than junior high school; junior high school; high school; and some college or higher. Using the lowest category (less than high school for Japan and less than junior high for South Korea) as the reference, we constructed two and three dummy variables, respectively, for Japan and South Korea. Age, a continuous variable ranging from 20 to 59, is included in the model to capture the effects of life stage and the general normative environment in which men and women grew up.

Our models also include two measures of household structure: coresidence with parents and age of youngest child. Although we know of no systematic studies of the effects of intergenerational coresidence on men's drinking and drunkenness, evidence for Japan suggests that coresidence with parents or parents-in-law may affect people's well-being both positively and negatively. On the one hand, coresident parents help married men and women to balance their economic and domestic responsibilities (Martin and Tsuya 1992; Morgan and Hiroshima 1983; Tsuya 1992; Tsuya and Bumpass 1996). On the other hand, living in a multigenerational household may be associated with higher levels of stress. In our multivariate model, coresidence with parents is a dichotomous variable: 1 if coresiding with one or both parents or parents-in-law; 0 otherwise.

Age of youngest child is a variable consisting of three categories: 0 to 6 (preschool age); 7 to 17 (school age); and no child under age 18. Using the category "no child under age 18" as the reference group, we constructed two dummy variables.⁵ Previous evidence implies that the presence of preschool children may be a source of stress for parents because younger children increase the amount of time and energy that parents (especially wives) have to spend on housework and child care (Rexroat and Shehan 1987; Tsuya and Bumpass 1996). Given the prevalence of "diploma disease" in both Japan and South Korea (Dore 1976; Brinton, Lee, and Parish 1995), the presence of school-age children can also be a source of stress and anxiety for parents, especially for wives who are regarded as chiefly responsible for children's education. Thus we expect the presence of preschool or school-age children to be associated positively with husbands' drunkenness but negatively with the well-being of married men and women.

RESULTS

We now turn to the results of the multiple regression analysis of the frequency of husbands' coming home drunk and its consequences for the well-being of both spouses. We first discuss the variables that predict the frequency of husband's coming home drunk, then turn to the consequences of coming home drunk for own physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness.

Frequency of Husbands' Coming Home Drunk

Table 8.1 presents the percentage distribution of reported frequencies of husbands' coming home drunk by respondents' sex in Japan and South Korea. We can see that husbands tend to come home drunk much more frequently in South Korea than in Japan. Although the most frequently chosen category in both countries is "seldom or never," in South Korea approximately one-fourth of respondents (26% of males and 24% of females) indicated that men come home drunk at least a few times a week whereas in Japan the corresponding percentage is only around 7%. Indeed, in Japan a majority (56% of male respondents and 58% of female respondents) indicated that husbands seldom or never come home drunk. The mean frequency per week of coming home drunk is only .4 in Japan (slightly less than once every two weeks) but over 1 in South Korea (approximately once a week). Although the two societies have similar cultural backgrounds with respect to the family, South Korea is generally more traditional than Japan in gender-role expectations and value orientations (Choe and Bumpass 1996; Tsuya and Choe 1991). Thus South Korea pre-

Table 8.1. Percentage Distribution of Frequency of Husband's Coming Home Drunk: Currently Married Male and Female Respondents Aged 20–59, Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>Husband's coming home drunk</i>				
Almost daily	1.6	1.3	6.1	4.8
A few times a week	5.0	5.2	19.5	18.9
Once a week	7.3	6.8	21.0	17.2
Once or twice a month	30.3	28.9	22.5	23.7
Seldom or never	55.8	57.7	31.0	35.4
No. of cases	924	896	1,001	892

Note: For South Korea, percentages are weighted; the number of cases is unweighted. Figures for men are based on scores of frequencies of men's coming home drunk reported by male respondents themselves (self-reported) whereas those for women are based on scores of frequencies of husbands' coming home drunk reported by wives.

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serves, to a greater extent, cultural norms that condone drinking among males. The higher frequency of men's coming home drunk in South Korea is therefore consistent with the idea that traditional cultural norms and gender-role expectations affect drinking behavior (Huselid and Cooper 1992). In both countries, the men's self-reported frequency of coming home drunk tends to be higher than the frequency reported by female respondents, but gender differences are insignificant in Japan and significant only at the 10% level in South Korea.

To understand the causes of men's coming home drunk, we examine the effects of hours and types of men's employment on the frequency of their coming home drunk. Table 8.2 presents the estimated mean frequency of husbands' coming home drunk per week by their weekly work hours and occupation computed from OLS equations that also control for their education and age, coresidence with parents, and age of youngest child (not shown). As shown in the first row of Table 8.2, the adjusted frequency of husband's coming home drunk is considerably higher in

Table 8.2. Estimated Mean Frequency of Husband's Coming Home Drunk Per Week by Husband's Weekly Work Hours and Occupation: Currently Married Male and Female Respondents Aged 20–59, Japan and South Korea, 1994

Men's work hours/ occupation	Japan		South Korea	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Total	.43	.43	1.05	1.03
Husband's work hours				
Zero	.08	.23	.94	.54
1–41 hours	.46	.42	1.11	.74
42–48 hours	.48	.43	1.09	1.27
49–59 hours	.42	.50	1.12	1.05
60 or more hours	.37	.39	.91	.94
Husband's occupation				
Manager/professional	.52	.53	.97	1.05
Other white collar	.39	.46	1.11	1.05
Blue collar	.31	.28	.98	1.06
Business proprietor	.56	.46	—	—
Farming/family worker/other	.52	.50	1.09	.81
No. of cases	908	871	835	710

Note: Numbers shown in the table are adjusted means of scores measuring the frequency of husband's coming home drunk, computed by using mean values for all covariates other than the ones specified by the row heading. Scores assigned to categories of the dependent variable are as follows: 0 = seldom or never; .5 = once or twice a month; 1 = once a week; 2.5 = a few times a week; 5 = almost daily. Figures for South Korea are weighted. Data for men are based on scores reported by male respondents themselves (self-reported) whereas those for women are based on scores reported by wives.

South Korea than in Japan. Net of all covariates in the regression model, South Korean husbands are likely to come home drunk almost two and half times as frequently as Japanese husbands. Concerning discrepancies between husbands' self-reporting and women's perceptions, once the effects of all covariates are controlled there are no statistically significant gender differences in either country.

Figure 8.1 graphs the results for the relationship between men's work hours and frequency of coming home drunk. In both Japan and South Korea this relationship is generally of a reverse U shape: men who work in the range of 1 to 59 hours per week have higher scores than those who do not work or those who work 60 hours a week or more. When husbands do not work in the marketplace, the mean frequency is distinctively lower. When men work 60 hours or more per week, the mean frequency of their coming home drunk is also lower, though not as low in Japan as the mean for unemployed men. These findings suggest that men tend to come home drunk most frequently when they work in the marketplace but not for excessively long hours.




Figure 8.1. Estimated Mean Weekly Frequency of Husband Coming Home Drunk by Husband's Weekly Work Hours.

We can also see from Table 8.2 that men's occupations affect the frequency of their intoxication in Japan but not in South Korea. In Japan, husbands in blue-collar jobs come home drunk less frequently than men in other occupations, especially those in managerial or professional, proprietary, or agricultural occupations. In South Korea, however, we do not see any clear patterns of occupational differentials in frequency of husbands' coming home drunk. Thus intoxication rates in Japan appear to reflect job demands, not just hours worked, whereas in South Korea they reflect only hours worked.

Physical and Psychological Well-Being

We next examine the effects of husbands' coming home drunk on the physical and psychological well-being of husbands themselves and their wives. Table 8.3 shows the distributions on the three measures of well-being we consider here by country and gender of respondent. A majority of respondents in both countries indicate their physical health to be good or excellent. South Korean women are significantly more likely to report poor physical health than South Korean men whereas in Japan women are likely to report poor health than men only at the 10% level. These findings generally agree with evidence from previous studies of Western and Asian societies showing that women tend to have poorer health and higher morbidity levels than men even though they have greater longevity (Bird and Fremont 1991; Fuller et al. 1993; Gove 1984; Verbrugge 1985, 1989).

The second panel in Table 8.3 shows distributions for the question on marital satisfaction. Although a higher proportion of Japanese than South Koreans answered that they were "very happy" with their marriage, South Koreans seem to be, in general, happier than Japanese with their marriage. A majority of South Korean respondents answered that they were "somewhat happy" with their marriage whereas a majority of Japanese respondents indicated their degree of marital satisfaction to be "so-so." Gender differences in marital satisfaction are statistically insignificant in Japan, but South Korean women are much less satisfied with marriage than South Korean men are. The third panel of Table 8.3 shows the distributions for personal happiness. A majority of both Japanese and South Koreans indicated that they were "somewhat" or "very happy." There are no statistically significant sex differentials in reported patterns of overall happiness in both countries.

Let us now consider the direct impact of men's drunkenness on these three measures of well-being. Table 8.4 presents estimated mean scores for own physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness by frequency of husbands' coming home drunk. The scores were estimated from models that also controlled for husband's usual weekly work hours and occupation, own education and age, cores-

Table 8.3. Percentage Distribution of Own Physical Health, Marital Satisfaction, and Overall Happiness: Currently Married Male and Female Respondents Aged 20–59, Japan and South Korea, 1994

Variable	Japan		South Korea	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Own physical health^a				
Poor	.8	1.6	.6	.5
Not so good	5.0	6.5	7.3	15.1
Fair	38.9	36.5	23.5	25.3
Good	42.7	41.4	51.0	48.4
Excellent	12.6	14.0	17.7	10.7
No. of cases	926	901	1,009	921
Marital satisfaction^b				
Very unhappy	1.2	.7	.8	.6
Somewhat unhappy	1.2	3.1	3.6	4.5
So-so	55.0	55.7	37.7	38.3
Somewhat happy	29.8	29.0	52.2	51.8
Very happy	12.8	11.5	6.1	4.8
No. of cases	921	903	992	898
Overall happiness^c				
Very unhappy	.4	.4	.5	.2
Somewhat unhappy	3.7	5.1	3.6	4.9
So-so	—	—	37.7	36.8
Somewhat happy	78.0	73.7	52.2	53.7
Very happy	17.9	20.7	6.1	4.4
No. of cases	922	899	1,009	924

Note: For South Korea, percentages are weighted; the number of cases is unweighted.

a. Based on responses to the question: "In general, what is your physical health?"

b. Based on responses to the question: "How happy are you with your marriage?"

c. Based on responses to the question: "In general, how happy would you say you are?"

idence with parents, and age of youngest child (not shown). Figure 8.2 graphs the results from the top panel of Table 8.4. This figure indicates that in Japan, net of all other covariates in the regression model, husbands who come home drunk at least a few times a week show somewhat lower scores on physical health than men who come home drunk less frequently. There are no significant differences in the estimated mean health scores for wives by frequency of husbands' coming home drunk, however. Thus the health effects of heavy drinking in Japan occur among those doing the drinking rather than among their wives. In South Korea, however, women whose husbands come home drunk almost every day show a distinctively lower

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Table 8.4. Estimated Mean Scores on Own Physical Health, Marital Satisfaction, and Overall Happiness by Frequency of Husbands' Coming Home Drunk: Currently Married Male and Female Respondents Aged 20–59, Japan and South Korea, 1994

Frequency of husband's coming home drunk	Japan		South Korea	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Own physical health^a				
Total	3.66	3.59	3.78	3.57
Almost daily	3.46	3.69	3.71	3.21
A few times a week	3.42	3.47	3.76	3.59
Once a week	3.58	3.66	3.85	3.77
Once or twice a month	3.68	3.57	3.76	3.49
Seldom/never	3.69	3.61	3.76	3.57
No. of cases	907	875	837	734
Marital satisfaction^b				
Total	3.52	3.47	3.71	3.57
Almost daily	3.40	3.15	3.68	3.30
A few times a week	3.36	3.38	3.66	3.41
Once a week	3.37	3.37	3.67	3.67
Once or twice a month	3.47	3.36	3.80	3.59
Seldom/never	3.59	3.56	3.70	3.64
No. of cases	901	875	830	720
Overall happiness^c				
Total	4.10	4.09	3.59	3.59
Almost daily	3.90	3.46	3.41	3.27
A few times a week	3.97	3.97	3.57	3.50
Once a week	3.93	4.14	3.64	3.67
Once or twice a month	4.10	4.02	3.58	3.55
Seldom/never	4.13	4.14	3.62	3.68
No. of cases	903	860	838	735

a. Scores assigned to response categories: 1 = poor; 2 = not so good; 3 = fair; 4 = good; 5 = excellent.

b. Scores assigned to responses categories: 1 = very unhappy; 2 = somewhat unhappy; 3 = so-so; 4 = somewhat happy; 5 = very happy.

c. Scores assigned to response categories for Japan: 1 = very unhappy; 2 = somewhat unhappy; 3 = so-so; 4 = somewhat happy; 5 = very happy. For South Korea: 1 = very unhappy; 2 = somewhat unhappy; 3 = so-so; 4 = somewhat happy; 5 = very happy. Thus the scores on overall happiness are not strictly comparable between Japan and South Korea.

score on physical health than we find among other wives, while men's health does not vary by frequency of intoxication. Thus in South Korea men's drinking is associated with poorer health for their wives rather than themselves. We cannot ascertain, however, whether men's drinking causes women's poor health: having a wife with health problems may lead to the husband's heavy drinking, or perhaps the

drinking and the wife's poor health reflect still other sources of stress in the family.

Turning to the relationship between husbands' coming home drunk and marital satisfaction, we can see from the middle panel of Table 8.4 and from the graph shown in Figure 8.3 a parallel pattern for women and men in the two countries. For men, reported marital satisfaction is somewhat greater when the husband never or only infrequently comes home drunk, but no particular decline in satisfaction is associated with daily drunkenness. And among South Korean men, none of the coefficients in the underlying regression equation achieves statistical significance. For women, however, there is generally a negative relationship between the frequency with which the husband comes home drunk and the wife's report of marital satisfaction—and a steep decline in satisfaction among women who say their husband comes home drunk almost daily.

These findings suggest that women's marital satisfaction is likely to be reduced substantially by having a husband coming home drunk frequently (almost daily in Japan and at least a few times a week in South Korea). In contrast, frequency of coming home drunk does not seem to be associated strongly with men's marital satisfaction, although Japanese men who never or seldom come home drunk tend




Figure 8.2. Estimated Mean Score on Own Physical Health by Weekly Frequency of Husband Coming Home Drunk.

to show greater marital satisfaction than those who come home drunk sometimes or more often.

We can see from the bottom panel of Table 8.4 (graphed in Figure 8.4) that, similar to marital satisfaction, husbands' frequent intoxication exerts strong negative effects on wives' overall happiness in both Japan and South Korea—as indicated by significantly lower scores of Japanese wives whose husbands come home drunk almost daily and South Korean wives whose husbands come home drunk at least a few times a week. In Japan, men who come home drunk at least once a week also show significantly lower scores on overall happiness than men who come home drunk less frequently. In South Korea, men who come home drunk almost daily report a somewhat lower level of overall happiness than those who seldom come home intoxicated. Although the causal ordering among variables is unclear, these findings are consistent: the husbands' frequent intoxication strongly and negatively affects the women's overall happiness. Men's drunkenness is also associated with their overall unhappiness in both countries, though not as clearly as in the case of women. Men's frequent intoxication may therefore be a sign of their overall unhappiness.




Figure 8.3. Estimated Mean Score on Marital Satisfaction by Weekly Frequency of Husband Coming Home Drunk.




Figure 8.4. Estimated Mean Score on Personal Happiness by Weekly Frequency of Husband Coming Home Drunk.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have examined the effects of occupation and work hours on husbands' coming home drunk and the effects of their coming home drunk on husbands' and wives' well-being in Japan and South Korea. We found that in both Japan and South Korea, the frequency of husbands' coming home drunk is associated with the hours of work (and in the case of Japan the type of work). In both countries men tend to come home drunk most frequently when they work in the labor market, but not for excessively long hours, suggesting that employment itself tends to promote men's drinking and drunkenness but also that men working very long hours do not have time to get drunk. In Japan, the frequency of coming home intoxicated is also lower among blue-collar workers than other workers, but drunkenness does not vary by occupation in South Korea. South Korean men come home drunk on average two to three times as often as Japanese men, but men's drinking and drunkenness tend to be more strongly associated with their employment in Japan than in South Korea.

Although work hours and occupation are related to men's coming home

drunk, the results in this chapter do not, in general, confirm the usual stereotypes about men's drinking in these countries. We did not find evidence that the men who work very long hours are most likely to come home drunk. Indeed, our evidence suggests that these men have too little time to be able to come home drunk very frequently. Thus it is the fact of working and earning a living, not overwork, that seems to encourage men's drinking in these societies.

Although it is commonly assumed that professional and managerial careers in Japan, or operating a business, encourage or even require after-hours conviviality with coworkers or clients that frequently results in men coming home drunk, the data for Japan do not show markedly higher rates of coming home drunk among professionals, managers, or proprietors than among other employed men. Indeed, the occupational group that stands out from the others is blue-collar workers, who come home drunk less frequently than other employed men (including those employed in agriculture). This difference may again reflect differences in income rather than demands of the job. In any case, the image of the salaryman staying downtown after work to spend long hours drinking, then arriving home drunk, receives little confirmation in this analysis. Japanese men come home drunk relatively infrequently, and salarymen do not do so more often than other men except for factory workers.

With regard to the effects of husbands' drunkenness on wives' physical well-being, our analysis found opposite patterns in Japan and South Korea. In Japan, coming home drunk is associated with poorer health among husbands but not among wives, suggesting a physiological or lifestyle link between drinking and poor health among men. In South Korea, however, husbands' daily intoxication is associated with poor health among wives but has no relationship to husband's own health. The link with the wife's health may be causal—for example, some South Korean husbands who come home drunk almost daily may resort to domestic violence, thus harming the health of their wives. But it must be kept in mind that the link may also reflect a high level of discontent with married life, especially evident for South Korean women, or the effects of their wives' health on South Korean men's drinking. Except for the small group of South Korean wives whose husbands come home drunk daily, however, men's drunkenness does not seem to have a strong direct effect on the physical health of married men and women in either country.

Husbands' drunkenness has a much stronger relationship with psychological well-being, however, especially among wives in both Japan and South Korea. Husbands' frequent drunkenness has a strong negative relationship with wives' marital satisfaction and overall happiness. The relationships of men's drunkenness to their own psychological state are neither as clear nor as consistent as the relationship with their wives' psychological well-being.

The processes that cause these relationships are likely to be complex and can-

not be understood with cross-sectional survey data. The analysis presented in this chapter, however, suggests that heavy drinking does not go along with a happy family life. To enhance the quality of marriage and family life, further research is needed to account more fully for the links between alcohol use, well-being, and the household environment.

NOTES

1. An analysis of the main project data sets by Tsuya and Bumpass found that compared with American husbands, Japanese and South Korean husbands work, on average, considerably longer hours. South Korean men tend to work the longest hours among the three countries: around 23% of them work 60 or more hours per week. Japanese husbands work almost as long: around 20% of them work 60 or more hours per week. The proportion of American husbands who work 60 or more hours is only 12%. For details see Chapter 5 in this volume.

2. Based on our literature review, the vast majority of empirical studies on alcohol use (and abuse) in Japan focus on individuals with alcohol dependency and their family members, using small clinical samples. See Mino et al. (1992); Okazaki et al. (1994); and Takanashi et al. (1990).

3. In the South Korean survey, separate codes were not assigned for self-employed proprietors of shops, offices, and factories. We assume that proprietors of small shops and offices were treated as sales and service workers (in our broad occupational category they are all included in unskilled white-collar jobs) and proprietors of larger operations were treated as managerial workers.

4. Our preliminary analysis showed a high correlation between husbands' and wives' age as well as a high correlation between spouses' educational level. We use husband's education and age for the OLS regression analysis of husband's coming home drunk; we use the respondent's own education and age in the regression analysis of own physical health, marital satisfaction, and overall happiness.

5. Women whose youngest child is of preschool age might also, of course, have school-age children. But given the low levels of fertility in both Japan and South Korea in recent years, only a small proportion of women whose youngest child is of preschool age also have school-age children.

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Intergenerational Relations

Intergenerational Relations in South Korea

Moon-Sik Hong and Yong-Chan Byun

This chapter analyzes the nature of intergenerational relations in contemporary South Korea. Korea has traditionally operated in accordance with the norm that the eldest son provides the fundamental link between generations. Thus the solidarity of the family and the society as a whole ultimately rests on the eldest son, through whom the family line and estate pass. (See Chang, Kim, and Bae 1994; Kong et al. 1987, 1990, 1992.) In this chapter we examine the degree to which the principles of the stem family system survive in South Korea. Specifically, we examine the extent to which married people aged 25–59 coreside with their parents (versus their parents-in-law) and describe the frequency of various exchanges between generations. Then, using multivariate analyses, we explore the factors associated with variations in intergenerational relationships in South Korea. Our analysis is based on data from the 1994 National Survey of the Quality of Life in the Republic of Korea, conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), which is described in the appendix at the back of the book. Our analysis is limited to male and female respondents aged 25–59 who were currently married at the time of survey.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CORESIDING PARENTS

In this section we begin by describing patterns of coresidence with parents among working-age married men and women. We then examine four possible exchanges between generations: financial help; help with housework; visits; and contacts via telephone or letter. For the first two types of exchange, we examine individuals who reside with their parents or parents-in-law separately from those living apart from them. We collected information on visits and contact by telephone or letter only for people living apart from each other.

Extent of Coresidence

Studies of household structure in South Korea have shown a trend away from the traditional patrilineal stem family of residence, which consists of a married couple and at least one member of the older generation (Kwon and Park 1993; Ko 1995; Han 1995; National Statistical Office 1996). Between 1966 and 1990, the proportion of extended or stem families in South Korea declined from 33% to 24% (Byun 1996).

One of the main responsibilities traditionally borne by the eldest son of a family was the care of his parents later in life. Thus the prevalence of coresidence can be regarded as an *important* indicator of the adherence to stem family principles (Cho 1993). Of course, the declining prevalence of coresidence alone does not present direct evidence that the relationship between parents and their adult children is weakening in South Korea. It merely implies that there is a decline in one specific type of living arrangement that once prevailed between parents and their children in traditional Korean society.

According to the 1994 National Survey of the Quality of Life in the Republic of Korea, the proportion of currently married respondents who live with the husband's parents, among those with a surviving husband's parent, was 24% (Table 9.1). It should be noted, however, that because the survey stipulated that the respondent must be the head of a household or the spouse of a head, this figure probably underestimates the prevalence of three-generation households in South Korea. (Cases in which the husband's father is the head of the household are being missed.) It should be noted, too, that fertility in South Korea was high until fairly recently—meaning that many of the husbands represented in the sample have brothers with whom their parents may be living. This is demonstrated in the second line of Table 9.1, which shows that when first or only sons are considered, the proportion coresiding with the husband's parents rises from 24% to 35%. While not a large proportion in absolute terms, this percentage is seven times greater than the proportion living with the wife's parents (5%). Thus our data show that the traditional principles regarding first sons still prevail in South Korean society.¹

The data in Table 9.1 also show that cases in which second or other sons are residing with their parents are relatively common (15%). This is an apparent departure from the idea that it is the eldest son's responsibility to live with and care for

Table 9.1. Percentages of Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59 Who Are Coresiding with Parents

Parent and birth order	Percentage coresiding	Number of cases with surviving parents
<i>Husband's parents</i> ^a	24	1,383
Husband is first or only son	35	639
Other	15	744
<i>Wife's parents</i> ^b	5	1,412

a. Parents of male respondents and parents-in-law of female respondents.

b. Parents of female respondents and parents-in-law of male respondents.

his parents. Whatever the social causes of this departure from tradition, the emergence of this new idea, younger sons coresiding with their parents, can be seen as evidence of a modified principle of the stem family.² Although the proportion of married couples who live with the wife's parents is very small, it is higher than most evidence suggests it has been in the past. For example, one study (Choi 1986) has shown that only 1.5% of the families were coresiding with wife's relatives in urban areas in the latter part of the Yi dynasty (1392–1910).

In summary, the traditional family system of Korea appears to be changing even though the patrilineal tradition remains strong. The declining rate of coresidence with the eldest son may have been caused partly by a recent increase in rural-to-urban migration of younger persons. Some eldest sons may be compelled to reside in a place far from their parents due to career or educational pursuits. Moreover, an increasing proportion of eldest sons whose wives do not get along well with their parents may be choosing not to coreside with their parents and are letting other brothers or sisters live with parents.

Although coresidence with parents is one clear indication of a close relationship between parents and their adult children, it is difficult to conclude that mere coresidence signifies a strong and sound parent-child relationship. Let us examine the quality of the relationship in terms of financial and housework help.

Financial Help

One way to investigate the economic relations between parents and adult children is through the financial help they give one another. Table 9.2 shows the frequency distributions of financial help received from parents and given to parents according to whether it is the husband's or wife's parents and whether the respondent was coresiding with these parents during the year before the interview. Because coresiding with the wife's parents is rare, we do not show statistics for the small number of respondents who are living with the wife's parents.

The percentages in Table 9.2 show that respondents are more likely to give financial support to parents than receive support from them—regardless of whether it is the husband's parents or the wife's and, in the case of the husband's parents, whether they are coresiding with them. This finding is consistent with the stem family principle, which stresses the son's obligation to support his parents, rather than the parents' obligation to support a grown and married son. Although receiving financial help from parents is relatively rare, it is somewhat more common for sons to receive money from their parents than for the wife to receive money from them. In the case of the wife's parents, however, the wife is no more likely to receive

Table 9.2. Frequency of Giving and Receiving Financial Help from Husband's and Wife's Parents, by Gender of Respondent and Coresidence Status: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59

Frequency of help	Received from parents (%)		Given to parents (%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Husband's parents: coresiding</i>				
Frequently/every month	14	8	47	49
Sometimes	18	14	42	40
Never/very seldom	68	77	11	11
No. of cases	196	118	197	119
<i>Husband's parents: living apart</i>				
Frequently/every month	5	5	22	25
Sometimes	28	17	54	45
Never/very seldom	67	77	24	30
No. of cases	500	480	499	481
<i>Wife's parents: living apart</i>				
Frequently/every month	4	5	9	10
Sometimes	22	23	49	48
Never/very seldom	74	72	42	41
No. of cases	629	629	632	626

money from them than is her husband. This, too, is consistent with the stem family principle, because parents are presumably more likely to see helping their son as their major responsibility rather than helping their daughter.

When it comes to giving support to parents, the frequency of giving depends on whether it is the husband's or wife's parents and, in the case of the husband's parents, according to whether the respondent coresides with them. Giving financial support to parents is most common when the respondent coresides with the husband's parents; it is next most common when it is the husband's parents but they do not coreside with them; it is least common when it is the wife's parents who are involved. These patterns, too, follow the stem family principle. Presumably, giving financial help to the husband's parents is less common when they do not coreside than when they live together because often these parents are living with another son. Although only one-half of the respondents who coreside with the husband's parents give them financial help frequently or monthly, undoubtedly there is a lot of hidden financial assistance to parents in the form of housing, food, and other shared household goods. Thus these data suggest that support for parents among married adults in South Korea remains common.

Help with Housework

In addition to information on financial exchanges across generations, the South Korean survey also collected information on mutual assistance with housework provided by the parents and adult children. Table 9.3 shows the frequency of assistance with housework according to which parents are involved and, for husband's parents, whether the respondent coresides with them. The data in Table 9.3 indicate that while financial assistance flows predominantly from children to parents, help with housework flows in both directions about equally. In the case of respondents who coreside with the husband's parents, the reports of women differ quite a bit from the reports of men. While 60% of the men say they both receive and give household help to parents almost daily, only 45% of the women say they receive household help while 75% say they give such help. Because the perception of who is helping whom with housework in a three-generation household is very subjective, we suggest that the discrepancy in the wives' reports about giving versus receiving housework help from the husband's parents may reflect the feeling among

Table 9.3. Frequency of Giving and Receiving Help with Housework from Husband's and Wife's Parents, by Gender of Respondent and Coresidence Status: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59

Frequency of help	Received from parents (%)		Given to parents (%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Husband's parents: coresiding</i>				
Almost daily	60	45	60	75
2 times/year–3 times/week	18	19	20	9
0–1 times a year	22	35	20	16
No. of cases	200	119	175	102
<i>Husband's parents: living apart</i>				
Almost daily	3	1	4	2
2 times/year–3 times/week	27	16	55	57
0–1 times a year	70	83	41	41
No. of cases	494	481	495	479
<i>Wife's parents: living apart</i>				
Almost daily	2	2	1	2
2 times/year–3 times/week	21	22	40	42
0–1 times a year	77	76	59	56
No. of cases	622	622	615	621

some wives that it is a burden to have the husband's parents in the household (a feeling the husband does not share). In any case, in three-generation households there is frequent exchange of housework help in both directions.

When the respondent does not live with the husband's parent, giving help with housework is reported to be much more frequent than receiving such help. This is also true in relation to the wife's parents. Moreover, the percentage saying they give help to the wife's parents at least twice a year (43%), although smaller than the percentage saying they help the husband's non-coresiding parents at least twice a year (59%), is nonetheless surprisingly large. In any case, for non-coresiding parents it is evidence that help with housework, like financial assistance, flows predominantly from the younger to the older generation rather than vice versa. This again is consistent with the traditional requirement that children, particularly sons, care for their parents in old age.

Contacts with Non-Coresiding Parents

Although traditional relationships between parents and their adult children in the form of coresidence have changed, we should be careful not to conclude that the strength of parent-offspring relationships has weakened. Adult children may be living apart from parents for various social or economic reasons. But if close economic, physical, and emotional relations are maintained between the parents and their married adult children, the principle of the stem family can be considered to exist

Table 9.4. Frequency of Visits and Contacts with Husband's and Wife's Non-Coresiding Parents, by Gender: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25-59

Frequency of contact	Husband's parents (%)		Wife's parents (%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Visits				
Once a week or more	23	17	14	16
1-3 times a month	33	34	29	31
Less than once a month	43	49	58	53
No. of cases	498	474	612	616
Telephone or letter				
Once a week or more	47	39	34	43
1-3 times a month	37	40	41	41
Less than once a month	15	22	25	16
No. of cases	487	470	605	617

in substance. That several million people visit their hometowns on traditional holidays such as the Lunar New Year and Choosuk, to see their parents and attend weddings and funerals, suggests that traditional norms still prevail.³

The survey asked respondents not living with parents or parents-in-law about the frequency of visits with them during the past year. It also asked about the frequency of contacts by telephone or letter. Table 9.4 shows responses to these questions by gender and the parents involved. About half of the currently married respondents report visiting husband's and wife's parents less than once a month and the other half once a month or more frequently. Weekly or more frequent visits are maintained by 14% to 23% of the respondents: weekly visits by the husband to the husband's parents are the most common; weekly visits by the husband to the wife's parents are least common. The same pattern can be seen for contacts via telephone or letter. While 47% of the husbands communicate with their own parents in this manner once a week or more, only 34% of them communicate with their wife's parents this frequently. Moreover, wives do not contact their own parents as frequently as the husband contacts his parents, especially when it comes to visits. Thus the traditional stem family is still manifest in patterns of visiting and communication by telephone or letter.

This analysis indicates that the relationship between parents and children, in terms of coresidence and economic support, has departed considerably from traditional norms of absolute filial duties and intergenerational connections through first sons, but the principles embodied in the traditional stem family have survived in a modified form. Of course, one would need to analyze emotional relationships if one wanted to make conclusions about the comprehensive quality of the relationship between parents and their married children. Considering that frequent contacts are required for maintaining a close relationship, we may say that the conditions necessary for fostering an intimate relationship between parents and their married children often are absent in modern South Korean society. Nevertheless, it is only a minority of married adults with surviving parents or parents-in-law who contact them infrequently (less than once a month), suggesting that there are still enduring ties to aging parents in much of the population.

DETERMINANTS OF INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

In this section we use binary and multinomial logit regression analysis to discover the factors that affect coresidence with parents, direct and indirect contact with parents, and financial assistance to and from parents among currently married men and women aged 25–59.

Method

There are six dependent variables: whether the respondent coresides with the husband's parents; whether the respondent coresides with the wife's parents; whether the respondent visits or contacts the husband's non-coresiding parents weekly or daily; whether the respondent visits or contacts the wife's non-coresiding parents weekly or daily; whether the respondent receives or gives financial help to the husband's parents; and whether the respondent receives or gives financial help to the wife's parents. Each analysis is limited to respondents who have one or more of the relevant parents or parents-in-law still living. There are several independent variables: sibling order of husband (eldest/only son vs. others); gender of respondents (male vs. female); age of children (some preschool vs. nonpreschool vs. no children); wife's employment status (full time vs. part time vs. not employed); childhood and current residence (urban-urban vs. rural-urban vs. rural-rural residence); educational level; age; and, for the last two dependent variables, whether the respondent coresides with the parent in question (coresides vs. other). The first five independent variables and the final one are categorical variables; in these cases, the categories named last serve as reference groups. Level of education is measured by number of years of formal education; age is measured in completed years.

Because interpretation of the coefficients estimated in logit analysis is not always straightforward, we use these coefficients to calculate estimated conditional probabilities of falling into the "high" category on the dependent variable. We calculated the estimates for a given independent variable by using the mean value on all the other independent variables. We present the estimated probabilities only when the underlying logit coefficient is significant.

Correlates of Coresidence

Table 9.5 shows the estimated probabilities of living with the husband's or wife's parents according to categories of the significant predictor variables. The probability of living with the husband's parents among couples whose husband is the first or only son is more than twice the probability among other couples. The husband's sibling order has no effect on coresidence with wife's parents, however. Thus the tradition of first sons inheriting the family line and taking care of their parents continues to influence living arrangements of married couples.

Male respondents are more likely than female respondents to report coresidence with husband's parents. This finding is difficult to explain, given that our survey is based on currently married individuals from a sample of households in which the head of household or spouse was chosen randomly. One possible explanation is

Table 9.5. Estimated Percentages Living with Husband's and Wife's Parents Among Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59 with Surviving Parents or Parents-in-Law

Covariate	Value	Husband's parents	Wife's parents
<i>Sibling order of husband</i>	First or only son	29	n.s. ^a
	Others	14	n.s. ^a
<i>Sex of respondent</i>	Male	23	n.s. ^a
	Female	17	n.s. ^a
<i>Childhood and current residence</i>	Urban/urban	19	6
	Rural/urban	17	2
	Rural/rural	29	5
<i>Education</i>	16 years	16	n.s. ^a
	12 years	20	n.s. ^a
	9 years	23	n.s. ^a

Note: The estimates for husband's and wife's parents are based on separate logit equations, each of which contains all the covariates shown in the table plus age of children, wife's employment, and respondent's age.

a. The estimate coefficient is not statistically significant.

related to the response rate. The response rate among potential male respondents may be higher for those who live in a stem family or extended family than for those who live in a nuclear family, whereas the response rate of potential female respondents is not affected by the family structure.

The probability of coresidence with husband's and wife's parents varies with respondent's residence and migration status, though in somewhat different ways. Coresidence with husband's parents is high among rural residents and low among urban residents. This pattern may reflect the fact that parents of urban respondents who grew up in rural areas are likely to be living in rural areas and often are unwilling to relocate to urban areas to live with their children (Moon and Byun 1992). Urban residents may have a low probability of coresiding with parents because most urban housing consists of apartments that may not accommodate three generations. Urban residents also tend to be more modern and value privacy. Coresidence with wife's parents, a nontraditional arrangement, is lowest among migrants—which is not surprising since migration may occur at marriage, in which case it is likely to involve moving away from the wife's parents. Unlike coresidence with the husband's parents, coresidence with the wife's parents is no higher among lifelong rural residents than among lifelong urban dwellers. This finding may mean that coresidence with the wife's parents occurs only in exceptional cases—for example, when

the husband has no living parents and the wife has no surviving brothers to look after her aging parents who are in desperate need of care.

In terms of education, higher education is associated with lower probability of coresidence with the husband's parents. Education has no effect on coresidence with the wife's parents. The negative correlation between the level of education and the probability of coresiding with the husband's parents suggests that married couples who can afford their own housing may be less likely to live with the husband's parents or that the parents of these couples may be able to afford to live independently. A stronger preference for privacy among the more educated is another likely explanation.

Correlates of Contacts

We next examine factors affecting the frequency of contact with non-coresident parents. We defined "frequent contact" as having contact once a week or more often via visits, telephone calls, or letters. Table 9.6 shows the effects of the statistically significant covariates on having frequent contact with the husband's and wife's non-coresident parents.

Eldest and only sons contact their non-coresident parents more often than other sons do. This finding suggests that the first son's traditional duty to look after his parents still affects the everyday lives of South Korean people. Surprisingly, when the husband is the eldest or only son, frequent contact with the wife's parents is also more common than if the husband is a second son. Frequent contacts are less

Table 9.6. Estimated Percentages Who Visited Non-coresident Parents or Contacted Them by Telephone or Letter at Least Once a Week: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59

Covariate	Value	Husband's parents	Wife's parents
<i>Sibling order of husband</i>	First or only son	55	50
	Others	46	43
<i>Childhood and current residence</i>	Urban/urban	53	50
	Rural/urban	44	41
	Rural/rural	62	50
<i>Age</i>	50 years	n.s. ^a	41
	40 years	n.s. ^a	45
	30 years	n.s. ^a	50

a. The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.

common among urban residents who grew up in rural areas than among lifelong rural and urban residents. This is true for both husband's and wife's parents. Those who grew up in the countryside but currently live in a city are likely to have parents still living in rural areas and visits with them are likely to be more costly.

Younger respondents have more frequent contact with the wife's parents than do older respondents. This difference by age may either reflect changes in young women's attitudes—the traditional norm that a woman owes her loyalty and support to her husband's parents rather than to her own parents may be weakening—or it may reflect a life-cycle shift in women's attitudes. Newly married wives may maintain strong emotional ties with their parents and keep close contact but become emotionally more independent as they age and therefore contact their parents less frequently. Because contacts with the husband's parents are motivated by social obligations as well as emotional ties, the level of contact does not change with age or over time.

Correlates of Financial Help

Factors associated with financial help to and from parents are determined through multinomial logit models. These models examine how different factors affect the exchange of financial help between married couples and husband's or wife's parents regardless of coresidence status. The dependent variable is a typology of four combinations of "frequent" or "monthly" exchange during the year preceding the survey: the couple gave to and received financial help from parents frequently or monthly; the couple received but did not give; the couple gave but did not receive; and neither.

Table 9.7 shows the estimated effects of five factors that significantly predict frequent financial interchange with husband's parents. (Results for the wife's parents are discussed later.) The five significant factors are respondent's sex, wife's employment, education, age, and whether the respondent coresides with the husband's parents. Because receiving financial help from parents is rare, most of the variation across categories of these predictors occurs for giving financial aid; we therefore pay closest attention to this category of the dependent variable. It is noteworthy that with the control for coresidence, whether the husband is the first or only son makes no difference for whether the respondent reports giving financial assistance to the husband's parents frequently. When the coresidence variable is not included in the logit model, however, first and only sons are more likely to give frequent financial assistance to their parents. Thus these results suggest that the predominant way in which oldest or only sons fulfill their financial obligations to their parents is by residing with them.

Wife's employment has a statistically significant effect on financial assistance

to husband's parents. Frequent financial assistance is more common if the wife is employed than if she is not. More educated respondents report more frequent financial assistance to the husband's parents than do less educated respondents. The findings for these two factors suggest that the extent of financial assistance depends partly on the resources available for giving.

The positive effect of age on giving frequent financial assistance to the husband's parents suggests that assistance depends on need. The older the respondent, the older the husband's parents are likely to be and hence in need of financial assistance. Although receiving financial assistance from the husband's parents is rare, it tends to vary inversely with the respondent's age. This, too, may reflect the level of need—in this case, however, the level of need in the younger generation rather than the older one.

Table 9.8 shows the estimated percentages of respondents who receive or give financial assistance to the wife's parents frequently. Frequent financial assistance to the wife's parents is rare and variation consequently is small. Nevertheless, gender of respondent, age of children, wife's employment, and coresidence are found to have statistically significant effects. Female respondents are more likely than male respondents to report frequently giving assistance to their parents. The lower rate among male respondents may reflect a tendency for the wife to give her parents money from her own funds—or, if from joint funds, which South Korean wives often manage, of her doing so without her husband's knowledge.

Table 9.7. Estimated Percentages Who Received or Gave Financial Help to Husband's Parents Frequently or Monthly: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59

Covariate	Value	Received and gave	Received only	Gave only	Neither
Respondent's sex	Male	2	4	23	72
	Female	1	3	29	66
Wife's employment	Yes	2	3	33	62
	No	1	3	25	71
Education	16 years	1	5	35	59
	12 years	1	3	26	69
	9 years	2	3	21	75
Age	50 years	1	2	34	63
	40 years	1	3	27	68
	30 years	2	5	21	72
Coresidence	Yes	3	6	45	46
	No	1	3	22	75

Having children is negatively associated with giving financial assistance to the wife's parents frequently. When there are no school-age or preschool children at home, the respondent is more likely to report frequently giving financial assistance to the wife's parents than when there are children present. This finding may reflect the availability of disposable income as well as life-cycle changes in the husband's earnings. When children are older and the husband is in a later stage of his career, earnings are likely to be higher and domestic expenses lower—making available money that some wives feel free to give to their parents.

The wife's own employment does not seem to have much effect on whether she gives financial assistance to her parents frequently. Although the effects of wife's employment are statistically significant, the predicted differences in rates of giving and receiving assistance between working and nonworking wives are very small and do not appear to be meaningful. Indeed, the only predictor of giving financial assistance to the wife's parents with a sizable impact is coresidence. When the respondent lives with the wife's parents, the estimated percentage giving frequent financial assistance to the wife's parents is about 24 points higher than when the respondent does not live with the wife's parents. Thus the one situation that involves frequent financial interchange with the wife's parents is when couples live with her parents.

The multivariate analyses, therefore, confirm the impressions conveyed by the descriptive data presented earlier and in some cases clarify how effects operate. Being an oldest or only son is an important determinant of coresidence and contact with the husband's parents; but once coresidence is held constant, it no longer predicts whether frequent financial assistance is given to the husband's parents. Thus it is through coresidence, rather than directly, that the oldest or only son typically ful-

Table 9.8. Estimated Percentages Who Received or Gave Financial Help to Wife's Parents Frequently or Monthly: Currently Married Men and Women Aged 25–59

Covariate	Value	Received and gave	Received only	Gave only	Neither
<i>Respondent's sex</i>	Male	1	2	6	90
	Female	0	3	10	87
<i>Age of children</i>	Some preschool	1	2	8	89
	Non-preschool	0	4	7	88
	No children at home	1	2	10	88
<i>Wife's employment</i>	Yes	2	2	8	88
	No	1	3	8	89
<i>Coresidence</i>	Yes	4	3	28	64
	No	1	3	7	89

fills his financial obligations to his parents. To some extent, the logit analyses also confirm the impression that modernization may erode traditional intergenerational relations—except that it tends to produce higher disposable incomes in the younger generation and hence the ability to be more generous in providing financial assistance to the husband's parents. Specifically, urban living reduces coresidence with the husband's parents and the frequency of visiting them. Being highly educated also reduces coresidence. Education increases the frequency of financial assistance, however, as does age (presumably an indicator of parental need as well as son's income). Although the principles underlying the stem family have begun to erode, there is still a strong bias toward the husband's parents and a tendency among the most modern sectors of the population to give direct financial assistance rather than coreside.

In summary, three features of intergenerational relations emerge from both the descriptive and multivariate analyses. First, we see that despite the declining prevalence of coresidence of married couples with the husband's parents, such coresidence remains far more common than coresidence with the wife's parents. Second, some of the traditional norms regarding intergenerational relations continue to be practiced. The relationship between married sons and their parents is much stronger than that between married daughters and their parents; and among sons, first or only sons have more coresidence and other interchanges than do later-born sons. And third, intergenerational relations have become more diverse. Coresidence of married couples with parents among sons who are not first or only sons, although practiced by only a minority, is nonetheless noteworthy. The proportion of married daughters living with their parents is small but larger than in the past, and married daughters keep close contact with their parents at about the same rate that sons do. Close intergenerational relations are maintained by some married couples without the two generations living together. Married couples with such modern traits as urban childhood residence and high levels of education are less likely to live with parents but are more likely to give them financial assistance.

ATTITUDES ON INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

To gain some insight into the future relations between parents and children through the values held by married adults, we now turn to two attitude questions in the survey concerned with the primacy of intergenerational obligations over personal satisfaction or the marital bond. The first question asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that "for the sake of children parents should not divorce." This question examines whether people think their relationship with children should take priority over the marital relationship, which accords with traditional thinking. Slightly more than half of the men agreed with the idea that "for the sake of chil-

Table 9.9. Percentage Distribution of Attitudes on Intergenerational Relations, by Gender of Respondent Aged 25–59

Response	For the sake of children, parents should not get divorced		Children should live with parents when parents get old	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Agree	53	40	55	43
Uncertain	27	29	22	24
Disagree	20	31	23	32
No. of cases	959	877	959	877

dren parents should not divorce” and less than 20% disagreed (Table 9.9). The proportion of women agreeing with this idea was much smaller, however, only 40%. Because we do not have data on this issue from an earlier period, we are unable to say whether support for staying together for the sake of the children has weakened or remained unchanged. It is noteworthy, however, that only a bare majority of men supports this idea and only a minority of women does so. This suggests that attitudes have probably changed in recent years. In any case, women are much less supportive of intergenerational obligations than men.

The second question asked whether children should live together with their parents when the parents become old. Again, the responses to this question differed by sex of the respondent. More than half of the men (55%) favored coresidence with elderly parents, but only four-tenths (43%) of the women agreed while one-third (32%) disagreed. Although there is still support for the idea that living with elderly parents is the children’s responsibility, it is no longer the dominant view among women. Thus the primacy of intergenerational ties appears to be weakening, especially among South Korean wives.

CONCLUSIONS

Like the family in China and Japan, the Korean family is rooted in the principles of twelfth-century Neo-Confucianism. In Korea, however, the manifestation of Confucian morality has differed from its practice in Japan. Of the two pillars of Confucian ideology—obedience to the ruler and filial piety to parents—Japan chose to emphasize the former and Korea the latter (Chang 1993). In both countries, however, filial piety has been a principle far more powerful than in Western societies.

In Korea, the close-knit family system, with deep roots in the traditional culture of the society, was at the forefront of the nation’s development. This system

has changed much in the process of development over the last few decades, however (Byun 1995; KIHASA 1991; Yeon, Baek, and Park 1995). Our analysis suggests that the strength of relations between parents and adult children has weakened in comparison to traditional Korean society. Relations between parents and children—the obligations of which were strictly adhered to in the past—have become more a matter of choice in modern society. Furthermore, respondents with more “modern” traits such as a high level of education and urban upbringing are found to practice a “modified” close relationship with parents. They may choose not to live with their parents but keep close contact and provide financial help. Distinctions between first and other sons as well as between sons and daughters have also become less clear. Such changes are likely to continue in the future.

A weakening of intergenerational relations is likely to affect the social, economic, and psychological well-being of children and the elderly. Social ills such as adolescent problems and poverty among children and the elderly, which have been rising in South Korea in recent years, are thought to be related to weakening solidarity of the family and have caused heated debates (Byun 1995; Sasabe and Katsura 1987). Relations between parents and children, it is argued, form the basis for relations among other members of the family. Healthy relationships within the family, moreover, are likely to lead to good relationships among adult members of society. Sound family policies may minimize some of these problems by reformulating or reinforcing the relationship between parents and children, one of the main axes of family structure. For these reasons, understanding changes in the composition of families and the relationships between their members deserves immediate political and social attention.

NOTES

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Bae Hwa-Ok in the preparation of this chapter.

1. The reason for the extremely low proportion of households that are stem families, as shown in the population census report released by the National Statistical Office, is that the proportion is calculated for all households regardless of the survival status of parents.

2. Regarding coresidence of never-married persons, our data show that 93% of 131 unmarried persons have at least one surviving parent and 38% of them are coresiding with their parents. Meanwhile, 45% of ever-married but not currently married respondents have at least one surviving parent and 21% of them are coresiding with their parents. It should be noted, however, that because the survey sampled only heads of households or their spouses, never-married and formerly married persons in the sample do not represent all never-married or formerly married persons in the South Korean population.

3. Choosuk, sometimes called the “Korean Thanksgiving Day,” is a harvest moon festival when most family members return to their hometowns to pay respect to their ancestors and prepare traditional offerings.

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Intergenerational Contact in the United States and Japan

Ronald R. Rindfuss and R. Kelly Raley

Relations between a senior generation and their adult children have long been of interest to sociologists, economists, and social demographers. In economically developing populations, a frequent argument for having a moderately large number of children is to ensure there are enough children to provide support in one's old age. "Support" generally refers to financial support. The rationale is that without private pensions or government-supplied income maintenance for the elderly, people are forced to rely on their children for support when they can no longer do the physically demanding tasks involved in farming or related occupations. The more surviving children, the greater the likelihood that at least one of them will provide care in one's old age.

With the introduction of pension plans, social security schemes, and other government programs, concern with relations between the senior generation and their adult children has shifted away from financial assistance to other forms of support. From the perspective of the senior generation, higher levels of contact can be related to their psychological well-being and to the delivery of supportive services, along with financial support if needed. (See DeWit and Frankel 1988; Lawton, Silverstein, and Bengston 1994; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Umberson and Chen 1994.) As Caldwell (1982) has pointed out, in contemporary manufacturing and service economies, adult children frequently receive benefits from their parents rather than the reverse. Help from the senior generation can take the form of assistance with child care, financial help, or simply assistance at the time of major life-course transitions such as marital dissolution (Spitze and Logan 1991; Wolf and Soldo 1994). In recognition of the provisional and sporadic assistance adult children (and their own children) receive from the senior generation, Cherlin and Furstenberg (1986) refer to the senior generation as the volunteer firemen of the American kinship system.

In most models of intergenerational support, a prior or proximate determinant is the pattern of contact between the senior generation and their adult children: the general expectation is that the higher the level of contact, the greater the probability of various types of support. Contact itself is a function of cultural or normative prescriptions as well as structural features of the kinship system. In this chapter we examine the effect of the kinship structure on contact within two societies with quite different normative prescriptions regarding intergenerational relations: Japan and the United States.

INTERGENERATIONAL STRUCTURE

Intergenerational relationships, by their very nature, involve relations between people holding different positions in the intergenerational mosaic—mother-in-law, daughter, father, and son-in-law, for example. Indeed, quite frequently people are introduced according to the position they occupy in this mosaic: “This is Mary, my mother-in-law.” Whether these positions are occupied determines the shape of the intergenerational network and hence its complexity. Shape, in turn, is expected to affect intergenerational contact because shape influences the dimensions of intergenerational relationships.

Consider a married couple, her parents, and his parents. This shape is illustrated in Figure 10.1, where the senior generation occupies the top portion of the figure. The lines labeled “a” and “b” are measures of contact (coresidence, visiting, telephoning, or writing) between the generations. There are four distinct dimensions associated with the relationships shown in Figure 10.1. First is lineage: the “a” reports represent contact on the paternal side and the “b” reports represent the maternal side. Second is generation: positions 1 through 4 are members of the senior generation; positions 5 and 6 are members of the junior generation. Third is gender: positions 1, 3, and 5 are occupied by males and positions 2, 4, and 6 by females. Finally, there is type of relationship: blood or marriage. Position 6 has a blood relationship to positions 3 and 4 and a marriage (in-law) relationship to positions 1 and 2. This relationship pattern is reversed for position 5. Potentially all four dimensions (lineage, generation, gender, and type of relationship) could affect the level of contact between generations. For example, there are reports in various settings that women act as kin-keepers (Adams 1968; Moore 1990; Rosenthal 1985; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Stack 1974)—suggesting, other things being equal, that both gender and lineage are important. One would expect matrilineal contact to be more frequent than patrilineal contact. Further, one would expect the male positions (1,




Figure 10.1. Two-Generation Matrilineal and Patrilineal Kin Group.

3, and 5) to be less involved in intergenerational contact than the female positions (2, 4, and 6), given gendered differences in kin contact and social networks.

The extent to which the six positions shown in Figure 10.1 are occupied would also be expected to affect intergenerational relationships. Consider the occupant of position 5. If he is married, position 6 is occupied and positions 3 and 4 might also be occupied. But if position 5 is not married, then the in-law positions (3, 4, and 6), by definition, are not occupied and the shape of the intergenerational network is simplified. If the person occupying position 5 is not married, we expect him to have higher levels of contact with couple 1–2—assuming, of course, that positions 1 and 2 are occupied. Further, any of the senior generation positions could be unoccupied because of the death of the former occupant. In general, other things being equal, we expect that the simpler the shape of the intergenerational network, the higher the level of contact across generations among those positions that are occupied.

In contrast to the relatively simple shape that would derive from Figure 10.1 if the occupant of position 5 were not married, consider the more complex shape that emerges if the occupants of positions 1 and 2 have divorced and remarried. This is shown in Figure 10.2. The potential relationship between the 5–6 couple and the 3–4 couple is still relatively straightforward, but even it is complicated by the relationships that emerge because of the marital dissolution and remarriages of positions 1 and 2. If the couple occupying the 5–6 position wants to maintain relations with both the person occupying position 1 and his new wife as well as the person occupying position 2 and her new husband, then they will have to allocate their intergenerational efforts across three senior generation couples. Again, other things being equal, one would expect a lower level of contact between the 3–4 and the 5–6 positions. Conversely, if the interpersonal complexity resulting from the divorce and remarriages of the original 1–2 couple results in a desire by the 5–6 couple to avoid both the remarried couples in the senior generation on the paternal side, one would expect a somewhat higher level of contact between the 3–4 and the 5–6 couples.




Figure 10.2. Two-Generation Matrilineal and Patrilineal Kin Group with Divorce and Remarriage on the Paternal Side.




Figure 10.3. Two-Generation Matrilineal and Patrilineal Kin Group with Sibship Considerations.

An additional level of complexity involves the sibling structure at the junior generation level (which is the same as the number, sex composition, and marital status of the surviving children of the senior generation). Figure 10.3, a variant of Figure 10.1, adds a brother and a sister of the person occupying position 5 and spouses of the brother and sister. The presence of two additional siblings is likely to affect the relationship between position 5 and his parents. Just considering coresidence, it is highly unlikely that the occupant of position 5 and all his sibs would coreside with couple 1–2. In general, we expect that the larger the number of surviving sibs the lower the probability of coresiding with parents. Similarly, from the perspective of couple 1–2, the more living children the more difficult it is to arrange visits, either serially or simultaneously. Previous research has documented a negative effect of sibship size on coresidence and contact in the United States (Spitze and Logan 1991; Roan 1993; Ward, Logan, and Spitze 1992) and Japan (Kojima 1988). Even the pattern of contact between the occupants of positions 3–4 and 5–6 is likely to be affected by the presence of 5's siblings because of the effort required to maintain sibling relationships.

The next level of complexity involves children of the younger generation. Figure 10.4 shows a variant of Figure 10.1 with the couple occupying positions 5–6 having three children of their own. Assuming that grandparents desire contact with their grandchildren, the presence of grandchildren is likely to lead to a greater desire on the part of the occupants of positions 1 through 4 to see couple 5–6. This may increase the competition between couple 1–2 and couple 3–4 for access to 5–6—again, assuming that positions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are occupied. From the perspective of couple 5–6, having their own children could either increase or decrease their desired contact with couples 1–2 or 3–4. If couple 5–6 needs help with child care—either to allow the combining of work and childrearing or to allow them to go to social events without children—then couples 1–2 or 3–4 become potential suppliers of




Figure 10.4. Three-Generation Matrilineal and Patrilineal Kin Group.

child care with an accompanying increase in intergenerational contact. But if having children complicates the family life of couple 5–6, they might seek to simplify other aspects of their life by reducing contact with couples 1–2 and 3–4, by no longer coresiding, for example, or by reducing visits or other contact.

So far we have been discussing complications to Figure 10.1 a generational step at a time. In practice, some intergenerational groups will be complex at all three generations and others will be quite simple at all levels. We frequently do not know all the complexities, however, because we typically do not collect intergenerational network data. Rather, we interview individuals and collect a partial intergenerational network from them. Here we restrict our attention to the vantage point from the occupants of positions 5 and 6 because the two data sets we use have the most complete intergenerational network data for these two positions. This does not mean that positions 5 and 6 are always the respondents; respondents can occupy any of the positions. It means, rather, that variables such as age or number of siblings are referenced from the vantage point of positions 5 or 6, not from the perspective of the respondent or any of the other positions.

NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS

So far the discussion has not taken into account normative prescriptions involving intergenerational contact. Yet we know that different societies have different expectations regarding contact between generations and that these differences can influence the way in which intergenerational network shape affects intergenerational contact. We have chosen two similar, yet quite distinct, societies to explore how

aspects of intergenerational networks affect intergenerational contact: Japan and the United States.

Both countries are similar, but certainly not identical, in that they have modern, postindustrial economies with increasing portions of the labor force in the service sector. For some jobs in both countries, there is a national, rather than local, labor market, making intergenerational coresidence more difficult than would otherwise be the case. Both countries have relatively low levels of mortality, thus increasing the number of potential years of intergenerational contact. Both countries have relatively low levels of fertility and fairly high levels of consumer or material aspirations, thus putting upward pressure on female labor-force participation. There are similarities, too, in the transportation infrastructure. In both countries, the paved road infrastructure is extensive and most households either own or have access to an automobile. Both countries also have an extensive mass transit network at the local, regional, and national levels. In short, the friction of distance is lower in contemporary Japan and the United States than was the case historically or is the case today in many developing countries.

Despite these structural similarities, there are substantial differences between the two countries in their histories and orientation toward appropriate intergenerational relations. Initially settled by migrants from Western Europe, and subsequently by migrants from most areas of the world, the United States has a "frontier" history. These various waves of migrants came from culturally diverse countries, many of which had dissimilar norms regarding intergenerational relations. Japan can be considered an "older" country with fewer discontinuities in its history. Apart from a Korean minority population, which has not been granted citizenship, Japan is ethnically and racially quite homogeneous and thus more likely to have a consensus on norms regarding appropriate intergenerational relations.

Historically Japan has had a strong normative expectation of intergenerational coresidence: the preferred pattern is that the eldest male child, his wife, and his children live in his parent's household. (See, for example, Bumpass 1991; Kurosu 1994; Martin 1990; Mosk 1983; Taeuber 1958.) The United States, in contrast, has had a long tradition of adult children leaving the parental home—either to establish their own nuclear household through marriage or to leave for educational or occupational reasons. (See Adams 1968; Goldscheider and Da Vanzo 1985; Rossi and Rossi 1990.) The timing of leaving the parental home is governed more by economics than social norms. The United States also has differences along racial and ethnic lines in the timing of leaving the parental household (Hogan, Hao, and Parish 1990; Raley 1995; Tienda and Angel 1982). Japanese expect to have long-lasting coresident households out of feelings of duty (Tsuya 1991), whereas American coresident households tend to result from a "crisis" in either the senior or junior generation (Aquilino 1990;

Bumpass 1991; White 1994). These "crises" are frequently related to the health of the senior generation, the death of a spouse in the senior generation, a marital dissolution in the junior generation, or a spell of unemployment in the junior generation. Further, the typical American coresident housing situation is of relatively short duration—and both generations expect it to be short.

The Japanese family system has a patrilineal emphasis. A wife's primary obligations are to her husband's parents: in terms of Figure 10.1, path "a" should take precedence over path "b." The American family system, by contrast, is nominally bilateral; but with women acting as kin-keepers, there is a de facto tendency toward more matrilineal contact (Adams 1968; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Stack 1974). There are various manifestations of these differences. In Japan, there has been a strong preference to have sons to carry on the family name. Further, eldest sons traditionally were expected to live with their parents and ensure they are cared for in their old age. If a couple does not have any sons, a daughter is likely to take on this duty. Indeed, the institution of uxori-local marriage even allows her to marry someone who will agree to assume the family name, thereby continuing the name for future generations (Shimizu 1987). Typically a male involved in a uxori-local marriage would not be a firstborn son, and quite often he would be marrying into a wealthier family than the one in which he was raised. There are indications that the obligations of the eldest son might be weakening, however, and that care of parents is becoming a shared responsibility among all the siblings. In the United States, norms regarding filial obligations are nowhere near as strong and tend not to favor the paternal or maternal side.¹ Rather, there is variation in the expectations for filial obligations that arise out of the histories and circumstances of individual families and kin groups.

In the next section we examine the effects of components of intergenerational network shape on two measures of intergenerational contact—coresidence and visiting—for the United States and Japan. We would expect to find differences related to the normative expectations in the two countries, and indeed we do find differences.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for the analysis of Japan come from the 1994 National Survey on Work and Family Life. The reinterview (July 1992 through December 1994) of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) provides the U.S. data. We restrict our analysis of this sample to non-Hispanic whites. As a result of culture and economics, race affects intergenerational relationships. Because these effects might be both direct and interactive, analysis should be conducted separately by race. Unfortu-

nately, sample sizes for minority groups cannot support separate analysis for blacks and Hispanics. Thus the United States analysis is limited to non-Hispanic whites.²

In both the United States and Japan, we have imposed a lower age limit of 25 for positions 5 and 6 in the intergenerational group. While this is a relatively late age to mark the beginning of the "adult" years, we wanted to err on the older side to allow sufficient time for the vast majority of the younger generation to finish their schooling and begin to establish themselves in their chosen careers. If a young person is coresiding with his or her parents by age 25, for example, the arrangement probably serves the adult roles, expectations, and needs of both generations, rather than the temporary continuation of the childrearing relationship. The upper age limit of 60 in the Japanese sample restricts our samples of respondents in all six positions but is obviously a more severe selection for the sample of parent respondents. Because the NSFH is not limited to those less than 60 years old, the parent sample in the United States differs from the parent sample in Japan. To determine whether the age restriction in the Japanese sample affects our results, we conducted sensitivity analyses with the U.S. data by imposing a similar age restriction. We conclude that the age restriction does not affect our substantive results.

Because both surveys ask about relations with parents and all adult children (up to three adult children in the case of Japan),³ each respondent can report information on multiple parent-child pairs. We created a separate record for each of these pairs, so long as the child was at least 25 years old. Additionally, for every respondent age 25 or older, we created a record for relationship with parents. If the respondent is married, we created another record for the relationship with parents-in-law. Thus a male respondent with two adult children over age 25, living parents, and living parents-in-law produces four records.

Given the importance of position in the intergenerational network, we were concerned that position might affect the quality of reports of contact. In work reported elsewhere (Raley and Rindfuss 1996) we examine this possibility. The average positional effect tested was not significant. Some, however, were significant. Frequently they involve the in-law reports from occupants of positions 5 and 6. For this reason, we are not including estimates of contact based on in-law reports from occupants of positions 5 and 6 here. We also found that in Japan daughters seem to significantly underreport their visits (but not coresidence) with their own parents. As a result, one must interpret the Japanese results cautiously when the occupant of position 6 is reporting.

Even though we are not including estimates of contact based on the in-law reports from occupants of positions 5 and 6, some respondents will nevertheless be contributing more than one observation. (This is analogous to adding another layer to a stratified random sample design.) Although these built-in interdependencies can

affect the standard errors in multivariate analyses, econometric work has shown that unless the records are repeated more than five times, the problem is not serious and should not affect the results (Guilkey and Murphy 1993). As a result, we use straightforward statistical procedures and do not correct for the potential clustering effect.

The measure of parent-child coresidence is relatively straightforward. The U.S. National Survey of Families and Households collects a household roster that includes the relationships of all the household members to the respondent. The Japanese survey inquires where the respondents' parents and adult children reside—"same household as respondent" is one response category. In Japan, the preference for patrilineal coresidence along with the potential conflict between daughter-in-law and mother-in-law (Matsushima and Matsuoka 1991) has led to a new type of housing construction (Matsuo 1989; Suzuki 1989)—essentially a single building with two residences (that is, two entrances and two kitchens).⁴ This structure differs from the typical American two-family house in that it permits internal circulation between the two units. Thus it allows some features of coresidence combined with the privacy of separate residences. We suspect that the coresidence question might be ambiguous for those living in such a structure: many would say they are coresiding.

Contact, other than coresidence, is measured in terms of frequency of face-to-face visits. In the Japanese survey, if respondents had living parents with whom they were not coresiding, they were asked how often they see their parents. In the United States, frequency of visits with parents is measured using responses to two questions. The first asks respondents how often they see their mother. If the respondent's mother is not alive or this question was not answered for another reason, contact with parents is measured with a question on frequency of contact with fathers. (If the respondent's parents are still married, the question on contact with fathers is not asked.) Because it is quite possible that respondents see mothers more often than fathers, this method is problematic. For example, when we compare reported levels of contact with parents when parents are still together to levels of contact when mother is dead we cannot be certain whether the difference is due to father's widowhood or to the difference in the way contact is measured. Given the way the questionnaire is designed, we cannot determine how this problem might affect our coefficients. We suspect that it will increase any negative effect (or decrease any positive effect) of father's widowhood on intergenerational contact. The same problem might occur in the Japanese data.

In Japan, there is only one question that asks about frequency of contact with both parents. In answering the question, a respondent might reply with the frequency of visits with either parent, not both together. Thus the death of a parent might result in a lower reported level of contact, but the respondent might still see the surviving parent just as often as before. If a daughter occasionally sees her mother

alone, for example, the death of her mother might result in a lower reported level of contact even if she sees her father just as frequently.

In short, there is ambiguity in the way that intergenerational visiting is usually measured. At issue is the conceptual distinction between units contacting one another and *individuals* contacting one another. Again consider the parental side of Figure 10.1. The way it is drawn implies that 1 and 2, as a unit, visit 5 and 6, as a unit, or vice versa. But of course 2 could go alone and just visit her daughter-in-law. If we consider telephoning, rather than visiting, the distinction between unit and individual contact is even more evident. Neither study asks about intergenerational contact in sufficient detail to allow estimation of both unit and individual contact. Nor do other studies that measure intergenerational contact. Indeed, the questions that would be necessary to estimate both unit and individual contact would entail such a heavy respondent burden that it is difficult to imagine their being incorporated in a large survey. Nevertheless, the unit versus individual contact distinction will arise repeatedly in interpreting the significant position effects we find.

RESULTS

We begin by examining intergenerational network characteristics in Japan and the United States as displayed in Table 10.1. The shape component is first divided by whether or not the reference child is married and then by whether the parents are together, alive, and a residual "other." This residual "other" includes various components of the marital dissolution and remarriage process as well as a modest amount of missing data. While it is truly a residual category, most of those in this category involve situations where the senior generation is not currently married and this is how we will interpret the "other" category later in the chapter. In Japan, in keeping with the relatively low rates of marital dissolution and the self-administered format, no information was collected on the marital history of the senior generation. Thus if the senior generation is married we have to assume that both are the biological parents of the relevant member of the junior generation.

The proportions with child not married are somewhat higher in the United States than in Japan. This is a function of several factors. First, the United States has higher rates of marital dissolution than Japan and hence would have higher proportions who were between marriages. Second, the U.S. sample has a slightly younger age distribution, reflecting recent fertility trends in the two countries. The proportions with a deceased father are consistently larger than the proportions with a deceased mother. One reason is the greater longevity of women than men in both countries. Another is that both countries have a pattern of men marrying younger

Table 10.1. Intergenerational Network Characteristics in Japan and the United States

Network Characteristics	Japan (%)		United States (%)	
	Paternal	Maternal	Paternal	Maternal
Shape components				
Child not married				
Parents together	25.1	17.6	14.0	16.0
Father dead	3.7	5.1	4.1	5.8
Mother dead	.8	1.0	.7	.8
Other	NA ^a	NA ^a	14.2	8.4
Child married				
Parents together	41.3	50.5	30.4	40.1
Father dead	23.6	20.5	10.8	13.1
Mother dead	5.0	4.5	1.8	2.1
Other	—	—	24.1	13.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of child's children				
0	38.1	28.0	31.5	22.6
1	14.2	18.7	17.5	17.9
2	34.3	37.7	28.9	33.1
3	11.7	14.3	13.5	16.7
4	1.5	1.2	5.4	6.5
5	.2	.2	1.3	3.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of child's siblings				
0	5.6	5.2	1.7	1.0
1	38.8	42.1	10.1	8.8
2	30.0	28.9	21.2	21.7
3	12.6	11.8	22.9	24.5
4	6.9	6.3	17.0	18.2
5	4.1	3.3	10.4	10.7
6	1.4	1.8	6.1	5.5
7	.4	.5	10.6	9.5
Missing	.2	.1	.1	.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1,258	1,248	5,462	4,682

Note: Totals may not sum to 100% because of rounding error.

a. Not applicable.

women. The upshot is that the "mother dead" category is quite small, and it will be difficult to detect any significant effects for them. The next panel shows the number of children for those in positions 5 and 6. The differences between the two countries reflect well-known differences in their fertility levels that have existed for the better part of a generation.

The final panel in Table 10.1 shows the number of siblings for those in positions 5 and 6. The differences between Japan and the United States are striking, for the Americans have substantially more siblings. In interpreting these differences, keep in mind that the mean age for those in positions 5 and 6 in both countries is about 37 and hence the sibship structures reflect the fertility regimes in existence from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s. In the United States this was the well-known baby boom period when total fertility rates rose to around 3.6 to 3.7 children per woman (National Center for Health Statistics 1994). Japan, by contrast, experienced declines in fertility throughout this period; there is some uncertainty about the levels during World War II (Taeuber 1958; Ueda 1971). By 1960, Japan had a total fertility rate of 2.0, well below the 3.7 experienced by the United States that year.

The result of these different fertility legacies is that the adult children of the senior generation in Japan have substantially fewer siblings than their counterparts in the United States. This means that, on average, the responsibility for care and contact in the United States is somewhat lower than in Japan for the adult children. But the senior generation in the United States has to maintain contact with more

Table 10.2. Additional Control Variables: Japan and the United States

Network Characteristics	Japan (%)		United States (%)	
	Paternal	Maternal	Paternal	Maternal
<i>Child's education</i>				
Junior high	8.3	9.6	—	—
< High school	—	—	9.9	8.2
High school	44.5	46.4	36.0	38.3
Professional	7.1	9.5	—	—
Junior college	6.4	23.3	—	—
Some college	—	—	21.2	22.8
University	32.4	9.9	—	—
College grad	—	—	30.5	28.2
Missing	1.4	1.4	2.2	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean age (years)	37.3	36.8	38.6	38.5
N	1,258	1,248	5,462	4,682

Note: Totals may not add to 100% because of rounding error.

children and grandchildren than in Japan. Further, to the extent that resources are still flowing from the senior to the younger generations, either the aggregate of these flows is greater in the United States or each child or grandchild is receiving less.

Before turning to our multivariate results, Table 10.2 shows two additional variables that must be controlled: education and age. Both are measured with respect to the incumbent in position 5 for the paternal side and position 6 for the maternal side. Child's education controls for a variety of related concepts. The higher the level of education, on average, the higher the status of the occupation and the higher the income of the junior generation. Higher income can facilitate more frequent contact, but the time demands of higher-status jobs could interfere with frequent contact. Children with college or university educations are more likely to be trained for a national labor market than for local employment. Involvement in a national labor market frequently means migration away from the parental home, making coresidence and frequent contact more difficult. Higher levels of education can also expose people to a wider array of ideas, some of which might conflict with traditional ideas. To the extent that modern ideas discourage paternal coresidence and paternal visiting, we would expect the most educated groups in Japan to have the lowest levels of both coresidence and paternal visiting.

The mean age of those in positions 5 and 6 is approximately 37 in both Japan and the United States, with standard deviations of approximately 9. Age here is a broad indicator of the life-course stage of the junior generation. With a mean of 37, for the most part they are well settled into their work careers and well along the way with their families of procreation. The age of the junior generation also serves as an indicator of the life-course stage of the senior generation, although variance in ages at childbearing make this a less than perfect indicator. Age is important not only in terms of the time demands on both generations but also the needs of both generations.

We now turn to a multivariate analysis of intergenerational kinship effects on coresidence. The dependent variable is a simple dichotomy, so we use logistic regression. Since we expect the pattern of effects to differ between the two societies, we run our analyses separately for Japan and the United States. But before we examine the multivariate results, note the large differences in percentage levels of coresidence between the two countries:

	Japan	U.S.
paternal	44.5%	6.8%
maternal	20.7%	5.5%

For both the paternal and maternal lines, Japan has substantially higher levels of coresidence than the United States. The large paternal differences are to be expected

given the strong preference for extended family living on the paternal side. The large maternal differences between the two countries probably reflect two factors: first, unmarried Japanese daughters are more likely to coreside with their parents than their counterparts in the United States; second, the practice of uxorilocal marriage to continue the family name (Shimizu 1987) produces higher rates of post-marital, maternal coresidence in Japan than in the United States.

Table 10.3 shows the results of a logistic regression predicting coresidence in Japan and the United States. Looking first at the coefficients for the shape components, remember that "child married-parents living together" is the omitted cate-

Table 10.3. Results (Betas) from a Logistic Regression Model Predicting Coresidence in the United States and Japan

Variable	Japan (%)		United States (%)	
	Parent-son	Parent-daughter	Parent-son	Parent-daughter
Shape components				
Child not married				
Parents together	2.08***	2.98***	3.52***	3.17***
Father dead	3.12***	2.70***	3.59***	3.86***
Mother dead	2.45***	1.61**	4.17***	3.41***
Other	—	—	2.86***	2.95***
Child married				
(Parents together)	—	—	—	—
Father dead	.20	.40	1.10**	2.14***
Mother dead	.74**	.29	1.63**	1.60**
Other	—	—	.89**	.98**
<i>No. of child's siblings</i>	-.38***	-.02	-.08**	-.12***
Child's Education				
High school or less	.02	-.32	.31	.22
Professional	.14	-.86**	—	—
Some college	—	—	-.01	-.16
Junior college	-.32	-.18	—	—
College grad	—	—	-.64***	-.49***
University	-.56***	-.64**	—	—
Missing	—	—	-.24	-.21
<i>Child's age</i>	.07***	-.04***	-.04***	-.03***
Constant	-2.59***	-.80*	-4.31***	-4.29***
Chi square (11/13)	253.45	355.95	468.10	357.57
N	1,250	1,243	5,462	6,272

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

gory. In both countries, all the coefficients for an unmarried child are significant and positive. Put differently: in both countries, unmarried children are more likely to live with their parents than are married children. The unmarried coefficients are larger in the United States than in Japan, and this is consistent with the strong normative pressure in Japan for certain married children to live with their parents. In the United States, unmarried children whose parents are divorced or separated are less likely to live with a parent than any of the other three categories. Among the unmarried, contrary to our expectations, there is no consistent pattern to the coefficients if one of the parents is deceased.

Among married children, the patterns are quite different in the United States and Japan. In Japan, having either the father or the mother dead tends not to have an effect, presumably reflecting the already high levels of coresidence. The only exception is on the paternal side: if the mother is deceased, the married child is significantly more likely to live with the father. This exception fits well with the patriarchal aspects of Japanese family and kinship patterns. The extended family residence norm is further invoked when the father is a widower.

In the United States, among married children, on both the maternal and paternal sides, coresidence is significantly more likely if either the father or the mother is deceased. Such a pattern is consistent with the American notion that coresidence is a solution to "problems" that can arise in either generation. There is also a hint that coresidence is more likely if the surviving parent is the same sex as the child: for the paternal side, if the father survived, coresidence is more likely; for the maternal side, if the mother survived, coresidence is more likely. Note that coresidence is least likely if the parents are separated or divorced.

As expected, the greater the number of siblings the child has, the less likely that child is to coreside with his or her parents. In the United States, this is significant for both the paternal and maternal lines. In Japan, the sibling variable is not significant for the maternal line. While we have not yet examined this possibility, we expect that the presence of any male siblings is a significant factor in coresidence along the maternal line. This reflects the custom of uxorilocal marriage if no male offspring survive to carry on the family name. In Japan, for the patrilineal side, the effect of number of siblings is not only significant: the size of the coefficient is unusually strong for a continuous variable in a logistic regression. Is this because number of siblings may be partially measuring whether or not the occupant of position 5 is the oldest son? Remembering that the oldest son traditionally had responsibility for coresiding with his parents, we explored this possibility. When we control for whether the occupant of position 5 is an oldest son (not shown), we find that it is significant, as expected, but the number of siblings variable is still significant and quite large. Hence it appears that the pressure for a male on the paternal side to

live with the parents is sufficiently strong that if one has more siblings the chances of coresidence diminish considerably.

Those with higher levels of education are less likely to coreside. Indeed, the highest-education group is consistently and significantly less likely to coreside in both countries. We suspect the explanation is similar in both countries: those who receive the highest levels of education are the most likely to be trained for a national job market, which in turn suggests that they might be living quite some distance from their parents, thus making coresidence difficult.

The effect of child's age operates differently in the two countries. In the United States, the older the child, the lower the probability of coresiding. Given that the American preference is not to coreside, we think the age effect reflects increasing wages and other economic resources that accrue to the child as he or she ages. Coresidence most often occurs in response to children's needs. Thus despite the aging parent's greater potential need for coresidence, age has a negative effect on coresidence in the United States (Ward, Logan, and Spitze 1992). In Japan, the maternal coefficient is significant and negative. This might be the result of older unmarried daughters moving into their own dwelling unit, or it may result from the preference of those who married uxorilocally to establish their own residence eventually. On the paternal side in Japan, the age coefficient is relatively large, significant, and positive. This may reflect the traditionally dominant pattern of paternal coresidence and might be explained by either a life-cycle or a cohort effect. The life-cycle possibility implies that as the child ages, so too does the father, and obstacles to coresidence might therefore be overcome. Extended schooling is finished. The father might retire and then move to the son's location. The son might have risen high enough in the company or bureaucracy to have a job near the father's residence. Undoubtedly many mechanisms are involved. But both sides realize that the time left for coresidence is declining and the son should be dutiful. The cohort possibility suggests that younger cohorts are less likely to coreside than earlier cohorts. Probably both explanations are operating, but longitudinal data would be required to distinguish between them.

Given that the two generations are not coresiding, to what extent are the characteristics of the intergenerational network related to visiting patterns and to what extent do the relationships vary between the two countries? To address this question we limit the universe to those who are not coresiding and use an ordered logistic regression procedure to examine the predictors of visiting. The results are shown in Table 10.4. The effects of the shape components are fairly straightforward in Japan but complex in the United States. In Japan, all the coefficients except one are not significant. Thus, overall in Japan, it appears that shape affects coresidence but does not affect visiting patterns among those who do not coreside. The excep-

Table 10.4. Results (Betas) from a Logistic Regression Model Predicting Face-to-Face Visits in the United States and Japan

Variable	Japan (%)		United States (%)	
	Parent-son	Parent-daughter	Parent-son	Parent-daughter
Shape components				
Child not married				
Parents together	-1.01***	-.35	-.23***	-.12
Father dead	-.69	.27	-.32**	-.13
Mother dead	.87	-.15	-.30	-1.56***
Other	—	—	-.78***	-.51***
Child married				
(Parents together)	—	—	—	—
Father dead	-.20	-.07	-.34***	-.10
Mother dead	-.15	-.45	-.45**	-.49***
Other	—	—	-.60***	-.47***
Number of child's siblings	-.15**	-.20***	-.04***	-.07***
Child's education				
High school or less	.05	.05	.07	.07
Some college	.50*	-.50**	-.25***	-.15**
College grad	-.42	-.23	-.62***	-.68***
Missing	-.37**	-.45**	-1.58***	-1.53***
Child's age	-.03***	-.03***	-.02***	-.01***
Chi square (11/13)	57.64	68.76	297.72	313.20
N	687	986	5,105	5,905

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

tion in Japan is unmarried sons whose parents are alive. Their visiting patterns are significantly lower than their married counterparts. We expect that this is a life-course stage: their job or educational responsibilities keep them from visiting their parents (and their parents from visiting them), but they expect to visit more frequently or coreside after they marry.

In the United States, one generalization about the paternal and maternal sides emerges: all groups tend to have lower visiting rates than the omitted category—currently married junior generation whose parents are currently together. Not all of the coefficients are statistically significant, but most of them are. We had expected somewhat higher rates of visiting if one of the parents was deceased, but this is not the case. Indeed, on the maternal side, if the mother is dead and the daughter is unmarried, the visits between daughter and father are decidedly infrequent. The strength of this effect is somewhat surprising. On the paternal side, the “other” cat-

egory for both the married and unmarried son shows the lowest levels of visiting. Given the expected effects of marital disruption, this is not surprising.

As expected, the greater the number of siblings the lower the frequency of visits. This effect is statistically significant in all four country-by-maternal/paternal line comparisons. Even though it is somewhat problematic to compare the size of coefficients across equations, it is worth noting that the two Japanese coefficients are substantially larger than the two U.S. coefficients. Such a pattern is consistent with the high levels of coresidence in Japan. From the perspective of a member of the younger generation, the higher the number of siblings one has, the greater the likelihood that one of these siblings is coresiding with the parents. If a sibling is living with one's parents, then simultaneously there might be less impulse to visit the parents and also, given the complexity of the parents' household, visiting might be more difficult to arrange. From the perspective of the senior generation, if they are coresiding with one child but not the reference child, they also might feel less need to visit other children. Further, given this situation, visiting other children might be more complicated.

As was the case with coresidence, the better-educated children tend to visit less frequently. There are probably several reasons for this tendency. The better-educated children are more likely to be part of a national rather than local job market. As a result they are probably more likely to live some distance from the parents and must overcome the friction of distance in order to visit. The better-educated are also likely to have more demanding and complicated work lives, leaving less time for visiting.

Finally, older children visit less frequently. The generational influence probably originates from both generations. The junior generation probably has a more complicated life as it ages, thus making visits more problematic. The senior generation probably has more physical infirmities as it ages, again making visits more problematic.

CONCLUSIONS

Intergenerational relationships are embedded in a broad kinship network and cultural setting with prescriptions regarding appropriate intergenerational behavior. But because most studies are confined to a single country, cultural constraints are a constant (and thus invisible) in empirical work. Further, since most studies of intergenerational behavior are based on cross-sectional surveys with individuals as respondents, we rarely get detailed information on the structural properties of the kinship network.

We have examined intergenerational coresidence and visiting patterns in two

diverse settings to see the effects of the intergenerational kinship network. Numerous aspects of our results are different in Japan compared to the United States. These differences are consistent with arguments about the cultural differences between the two countries with respect to expected relations between parents and their adult children. Repeatedly the Japanese patterns were consistent with cultural expectations. But one must approach these results with caution. With only two countries in the analysis, there are a number of explanations for the observed differences that have nothing to do with the different cultural histories of the two societies.

The effects of the structural features of intergenerational networks are repeatedly evident also. The more complex the intergenerational network at the junior generation level, measured simply in terms of the number of siblings, the less contact (both in terms of visiting and coresidence) between the two generations. If the junior-generation index person is unmarried, coresidence is more common in both countries in every senior-generation marital status combination. And finally, in the United States, visiting patterns are most frequent if both the senior and junior generations are currently married.

In interpreting our results it is important to remember that we have one respondent to report on coresidence and visiting patterns for each intergenerational network. And the position occupied by that respondent can affect the report (Raley and Rindfuss 1996). In the present case, the results for the maternal-side visiting patterns in Japan are the most prone to such effects and we must interpret this equation cautiously. The broader implication, however, is that our results would be even stronger if we had reports from more than one member of each intergenerational network.

NOTES

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1. We note, however, that in the case of separation and divorce, relations with the maternal side of the family tend to be stronger. Custody arrangements for children are but one example of children of divorced parents having more contact with their mothers. Indeed, women tend to play a more prominent role than men across a wide variety of kin relationships (Moore 1990; Rosenthal 1985; Rossi and Rossi 1990).

2. Even within the non-Hispanic white population there is considerable variability regarding intergenerational expectations and obligations. This greater diversity within the United States compared to Japan should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.

3. This limitation to only three adult children in the Japanese case does not present a problem


because having more than three children is extremely rare. Only three respondents had four or more adult children over age 25.

4. A variation on this theme is two generations living in separate buildings on the same piece of land (Komuro and Masuda 1989).

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Family and Intergenerational Income Transfers in Taiwan

Andrew Mason and Tim Miller

The economies and populations of East Asia are in the midst of enormous change. They have enjoyed extraordinary economic growth. Not only have standards of living improved, but the structures of East Asian economies have been transformed. A workforce that was once predominantly agricultural is now concentrated in the industrial and service sectors. A population that was once predominantly rural is increasingly urban. Economic success has come to depend far more on one's human capital and less on one's physical capital.

These and other economic changes have had a profound impact on the economic position of younger generations. It is the young who often have the most and highest-quality education. Where the young were previously working on family farms or in family businesses, often as unpaid family workers, they are now employed by international conglomerates. To exploit new economic opportunities, the young are leaving home, moving to industrial centers, and living in company housing or newly constructed condominiums. Current generations of young adults in East Asia are not only better off than ever before, they are more economically independent from their elders than ever before.

Rapid demographic change is having an equally profound impact on Asian society. The countries of East Asia have experienced fertility decline at a speed experienced nowhere else in the world. Life expectancy is high and increasing throughout the region. In Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China the population is aging at an unprecedented speed. Thus at the same time that the economic relationship between generations is changing, the fundamental generational structure of the populations is changing. In the past, the major generational issue was investing sufficiently in new generations of the young; the major generational issue of the future will be fulfilling the health, material, and emotional needs of the elderly.

In Asia, the family has been the primary intergenerational institution. Although the public sector is more involved in the provision of health care than in the United States, publicly funded social security programs are less important in Asia than in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Although the elderly are living independently from their children more than previously, multigeneration households are much more common in Asia than in the West. This chapter examines changes in the economic relations among generations that are accompanying economic and demographic transition in Taiwan. We consider three questions in

particular. First, how has Taiwan's recent experience affected the distribution of income among generations? Second, has the family's capacity to redistribute income among its members been impaired by economic and demographic change? And third, is the family beginning to play a diminished role as an institution for redistributing income across generations?

Our analysis, which is based on economic and demographic data for a 16-year period, 1976–1991, supports the following conclusions. First, younger generations of workers in Taiwan have benefitted financially to a much greater extent than their elders. Second, despite substantial changes in fertility, life expectancy, and the intergenerational distribution of income, the capacity of the extended family to equalize income across generations has not deteriorated. The extended family is, however, subject to a distinctive cycle in per capita income that cannot be purged by transfers within the family. Third, the extent to which the extended family redistributes income has declined in Taiwan. Until 1987, the extended family, relying on coresidence, fully pooled the incomes of its members. After 1987, intergenerational transfers were insufficient to maintain the per capita incomes of dependent generations, especially the elderly, at levels enjoyed by prime-age working adults.

This chapter relies on the construction and analysis of age profiles of income. In the absence of intergenerational transfers, age profiles of income (and consumption) are subject to extreme fluctuations—from very low levels for young children, to high levels for prime-age adults, and back to low levels for the elderly. By sharing resources through coresidence or transfers within the household, much of the life-cycle or age variation in income can be dampened for members of extended families. Thus the life-cycle variation in income or consumption may be entirely muted in a society with a well-functioning extended family system.

The age profile of personal income—that is, income prior to any current intergenerational transfers—can be directly observed using Taiwan's annual survey of income. Likewise, the age variation in household income, which reflects the impact of intergenerational transfers, can also be directly observed using the same data source. The economic characteristics of the extended families to which people belong, as well as the variation of those characteristics over the life cycle, must be estimated indirectly, however. This is done by first estimating demographic characteristics and then economic characteristics of the extended families to which people belong. The basic steps are described briefly in the following two sections. We begin by considering members of adjacent generations, that is, parents and offspring. For males and females by single year of age, we estimate the number of surviving offspring, the number of surviving parents, and the age and sex distributions of both offspring and parents. The information about adjacent generations is used to make intergenerational comparisons and to construct estimates of the demographic

characteristics (sex and age distributions) of the entire patrilineal extended family (or what we call dynasties). Again, we construct age profiles that show how the demographic characteristics of dynasties vary over the life cycle or with the age of members of the population. These demographic data are combined with economic information to estimate how the income of parents, offspring, and the entire dynasty varies with the age of members of the population.

Although analysis of the age profiles created by these procedures yields useful insights about intergenerational transfers and the changing role of the family in Taiwan, the age profiles contain only a limited amount of information. First, we do not estimate within-age-group variation in income and thus do not consider how intergenerational transfers affect an important source of income variation. Second, we do not estimate the distribution of income within households. Thus if family members live together but resources are concentrated on one group or another, this information will not be captured by our analysis.

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF GENERATIONS

Describing the methodology used in this chapter would far exceed space limits and the patience of most readers. Consequently, we will concentrate on the results and provide only a brief description of data and methods. Those interested in more detail are referred to Mason and Miller (1995).

Links Between Adjacent Generations

Determining the links between members of adjacent generations involves two distinct tasks. For single-year age groups of males and females, we estimate, first, the number and proportion who have a surviving parent (upward family link) or a surviving offspring (downward family link) and, second, the demographic characteristics (number, age, and sex) of the persons to whom they are linked.

The age pattern of intergenerational links for males and females in 1970 Taiwan is shown in Figures 11.1 and 11.2. Members of the population with upward links consist of those with a surviving mother or father who is also a member of the population. In a low-mortality population such as Taiwan's, most children and young adults have surviving parents. But the proportion with upward links declines fairly rapidly with age. In addition to survival, there is another important factor that bears on upward links. Many of Taiwan's current residents migrated to Taiwan with the Nationalist army in 1949 and 1950. These people, most of whom were young men at the time, have no upward links because their parents never lived in Taiwan. In 1970, they were heavily concentrated in their forties and fifties. Downward links




Figure 11.1. Generational Links: Women, 1970.




Figure 11.2. Generational Links: Men, 1970.



Figure 11.3. Mean Number of Offspring Per Mother by Age of Mother: 1970–1990.

are established through childbearing. In principle, those with a surviving son or daughter living in Taiwan are said to have a downward link. As can be seen in Figures 11.1 and 11.2, children have no downward links, but by their late teens and twenties, significant numbers of men and women had established downward links in 1970. For women, a very high percentage had established linkages by age 30. A substantial percentage of men were celibate, however, reflecting the unusually high sex ratio that was a by-product of immigration from the mainland.

Estimating downward links relies primarily on data on marital status. Estimating upward links is much more complex. Estimating the impact of immigration requires that we estimate the number, age, and sex of immigrants and the proportion who immigrated with their mother or father. Estimating the proportion with a surviving father or mother relies on estimates of the age distributions of mothers and fathers and a historical series of life tables for Taiwan.

In addition to estimating the proportion at each age with upward or downward links, we also estimate the age, sex, and number of persons to whom men and women at each age are linked. In the case of downward links, we estimate the number of surviving children, their age, and their sex. In the case of upward links, we esti-

mate the number of surviving mothers and fathers and their age distributions. The kind of demographic data the procedures yield is illustrated by Figure 11.3, which shows the mean number of offspring per mother by age of mother in 1970, 1980, and 1990. The impact of fertility decline is very apparent. The number of surviving children for women at age 40 declined from 4.6 to 3.8 to 2.8 children in 1970, 1980, and 1990. The estimates also show quite clearly that although replacement level fertility was reached in Taiwan in the mid-1980s (Feeney 1994), women who had completed their childbearing in 1990 had well more than two children. Although the estimates for elderly women are very noisy, especially in 1970, there is clear evidence of the impact of mortality on the number of surviving adult offspring. In 1990, older women had more surviving offspring than did older women in 1970. Moreover, the number of surviving offspring begins to decline at a much older age in 1990 (around age 80) than it did in 1970 (around age 60).

Comparing responses to a surviving children question in the 1980 census to estimates of the number of surviving offspring provides a means for assessing the reliability of our methods. Census values differ from our estimates by 1.1% on average; the mean absolute percentage difference is 2.4%. In absolute terms, the greatest differences are .16 children per woman for women aged 65–69 and .12 children per woman for women aged 35–39.

Multiple Generations and Dynasties

Although a considerable amount of economic and social exchange occurs between parents and offspring, confining our analysis to adjacent generations would neglect the great importance of the extended family in Taiwan (or elsewhere in Asia). Our analysis of the family is extended to multiple generations by applying chain rules to results from the analysis of adjacent generations. The reliability of the approach depends on the extent to which relevant vital events are independent across generations.

Extending the analysis to multiple generations allows us to describe extended families, called dynasties, at the aggregate level. The definition of a dynasty is based on the patrilineal, Han Chinese family system that predominates in Taiwan. The backbone of the family is the patriarch and his male descendants. Daughters become members of the families of their husbands upon their marriage (Fricke, Chang, and Yang 1994).

Taiwan's population is divided into dynasties—exhaustive, mutually exclusive kinship groups. Each dynasty is headed by a patriarch—an adult male who has no surviving father.¹ Each dynasty consists of up to four generations as illustrated by Figure 11.4, which shows the genealogy of a hypothetical dynasty. Generation I




Figure 11.4. Genealogy of Hypothetical Dynasty.

includes the patriarch and his spouse, if any. In addition, widowed or divorced mothers are assigned to the dynasty of a son. Never-married women with no surviving father are assigned to the dynasty of a brother. Generation II includes unmarried daughters, sons, and their wives. Generation III includes unmarried granddaughters, grandsons, and their wives. Generation IV includes great-granddaughters and great-grandsons, all of whom are too young to be married.

All members of the population are defined by their relationship to the patriarch. Everyone belongs to one and only one dynasty. The dynamics of dynasties are governed by demographic events. Dynasties change in size and composition through the lateral exchange of daughters via marriage. They increase in size through child-bearing as successive generations are added. They decline incrementally at the death (or emigration) of members other than the patriarch. And they experience sudden declines in size via fission at the death (or emigration) of the patriarch.

We offer only a brief description of dynasties here before turning to issues of economics. We estimate that there were 3.4 million dynasties in Taiwan in 1990.

The average size—around seven members excluding one-person dynasties—has varied hardly at all during the last 20 years. Moreover, except for older adults, the average size of dynasties to which people belong varies very little with their age. In 1990, for example, the average dynasty size varied between 6.9 and 7.1 for women under the age of 65 and rose slowly for elderly women, reaching 7.5 members for women aged 90. For men, the average dynasty size increased more significantly with age, peaking at 14 members for men in their nineties. The only significant change in average dynasty size is for older men, for whom dynasty size is declining. For those aged 60, average size dropped from 11.3 in 1970 to 10.1 in 1980 to 8.7 in 1990. Although the size of a dynasty varies little with age, the proportion of members who are dependents exhibits a distinctive cyclical pattern. In 1990, for example, the proportion of dynasty members under the age of 15 varied from a low of less than .15 to a high of nearly .36. As we shall see, the cycle in dependency has a clear impact on the incomes of extended families in Taiwan.

THE ECONOMICS OF GENERATIONS

Combining the demographic information described earlier with economic data available from annual surveys allows us to describe and analyze intergenerational features of Taiwan's economy. In particular, we address the following points. First, intergenerational differences in income are quantified by comparing men and women to the members of adjacent generations, that is, their parents and their offspring. We show that the differences are very substantial, that the incomes of young adults exceed those of their parents at a surprisingly young age, and that shifts in the intergenerational distribution of income between 1976 and 1991, for the most part, have favored younger generations. Second, in the next section we explore the extended family as an institution for solving the life-cycle problem faced by individual generations. By sharing resources across generations, dynasties in Taiwan have the capacity to smooth a substantial portion of the life-cycle variation in income faced by individual generations. Moreover, demographic change during the last 20 years has not impaired the family's capacity to smooth incomes.

Finally, we examine the role the family actually has played. Prior to 1988, dynasties in Taiwan could be characterized as fully sharing the incomes of the members of their dynasty. Being a member of a high-income generation or a low-income generation had no significant impact on household income. The smoothing of income was accomplished almost entirely through coresidence; transfers between households played a small and unimportant role. Since 1988, however, there have been significant changes. Although intergenerational pooling is still important, members of low-income generations have significantly lower incomes than mem-

bers of high-income generations. The major cause of this shift is a decline in coresidence between the elderly and adult children. Transfers between households have increased to some extent, but not sufficiently to offset the impact of declining coresidence.

There are a number of important issues that cannot be addressed using the aggregate age profiles employed in this chapter. To some extent the analysis is limited by the absence of microlevel data on economic and demographic characteristics of extended families. The analysis and conclusions are limited, too, by the lack of information about the distribution of resources within households. No doubt, differential access to household resources by members of different generations is important, but it is difficult to address.

Intergenerational Differences in Income

In any population, at any point in time there are substantial intergenerational differences in income. Children, of course, have negligible incomes, but their parents do not. Prime-age adults are at the peak of their earning power, but they have offspring and parents with low incomes. And the elderly have reduced incomes, but they have offspring with high incomes.



Figure 11.5. Intergenerational Income Differences: Men, 1991.




Figure 11.6. Intergenerational Income Differences: Women, 1991.

Examining a detailed picture of the incomes of males in 1991, the incomes of their fathers, and the incomes of their sons introduces the concepts used to examine intergenerational difference in income and, at the same time, provides a recent snapshot of the situation in Taiwan (Figure 11.5). The average income of males who had not reached their late teens was zero or negligible in 1991. The average income of their fathers varied substantially, rising from around NT\$350,000 for newborn males to reach a peak of about NT\$500,000 for males in their late teens, at the time they were just beginning to enter the labor market. Thereafter, the average income of males rose while father's income declined quite rapidly. By the time men reached age 27, they were, on average, earning as much as their fathers. Thereafter, they were earning more.

Average income for men peaked at around age 40, a relatively young age. In their thirties, their incomes were, on average, twice that of their fathers. In their forties, they averaged more than four times their fathers' incomes. It is during this decade of life that men are most dominant in terms of income. Neither their fathers nor their sons have substantial incomes by comparison. By the time men reached their fifties, however, the transition in earning was well under way. Sons averaged incomes that were two-thirds of their own. Roughly by age 58, men were passed by

their sons. Son's income continued to rise with age, reaching a plateau for men in their seventies. Beyond age 80, the income of sons dropped significantly; this has potentially important implications for intergenerational support for the older elderly. A comparison of women to their mothers and daughters yields a similar picture (Figure 11.6), although the average incomes of women in Taiwan are substantially lower than those of men.

Before discussing intergenerational differences in income in Taiwan more generally, we should look at the methods used to construct Figures 11.5 and 11.6 and similar values for men, women, mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters in other years. The economic data are drawn from a survey of family income and expenditure conducted annually in Taiwan and available beginning in 1976. We used these data to estimate average income by single years of age and sex in each year from 1976 to 1991. We then combined the economic data with estimates of the age distribution of parents and offspring to estimate the incomes of members of adjacent generations. The critical assumption is that income and the demographic variables are independent.²

Intergenerational differences are summarized in two different ways. In Table 11.1 we present the average ages at which there is no difference in average own income and average income of parents or offspring, i.e., the cross-over points in Figures 11.5 and 11.6. Table 11.2 provides more detailed intergenerational income comparisons using 10-year age groupings. What is at first most apparent from these results is just how substantial the intergenerational differences in income are. As noted earlier, men in their late twenties have incomes similar to their fathers, but for any standard 10-year age grouping they are very different. Fathers earned 50% more than men in their twenties and half of what men in their thirties earned. The differences between women and their mothers are even greater. Comparing men and women to their offspring, more or less a mirror image, yields a similar picture. At most points in their lives men and women are earning either far more or far less than their parents or children.

A second feature of these results is the young age at which men and women in Taiwan are achieving incomes that exceed those of their parents. For every year for which we have calculated the value, men older than 27 have incomes that exceed the estimated incomes of their fathers. For women, the age is 18 or 19. Essentially, adult women at every age have higher average incomes than their mothers. Although there are significant elements of stability in intergenerational differences in income, the income differentials have shifted in favor of younger generations over the last 15 years. For the most part, the average ages of equality provide evidence for considerable stability. The age at which men (women) have income as high as their fathers (mothers) has essentially changed not at all—constant at 27 years of age for men and

Table 11.1. Ages of Intergenerational Income Equality: 1976–1991

Year	Age at which own income equals parent's income		Age at which own income equals offspring's income	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
1976	27	18	62	48
1981	27	18	60	45
1986	27	18	60	47
1991	27	19	58	47

Note: Comparisons are between men and their sons or fathers and between women and their daughters or mothers.

Table 11.2. Intergenerational Income Ratios: 1976–1991

Age	Parent's income relative to own income				Offspring's income relative to own income			
	1976	1981	1986	1991	1976	1981	1986	1991
Males								
20–29	1.54	1.44	1.52	1.56	.00	.00	.00	.00
30–39	.51	.49	.47	.46	.00	.00	.00	.00
40–49	.28	.21	.21	.22	.09	.11	.09	.08
50–59	.18	.09	.12	.14	.43	.51	.60	.66
60–69	.10	.03	.13	.08	1.62	1.68	1.76	1.85
70–79 ^a	—	—	—	—	7.01	7.40	6.88	5.52
Females								
20–29	.43	.38	.39	.46	.00	.00	.00	.00
30–39	.18	.17	.15	.18	.08	.07	.05	.03
40–49	.07	.06	.05	.05	.72	.79	.65	.58
50–59	.02	.02	.02	.02	1.73	2.01	2.32	1.77
60–69	.00	.01	.01	.01	5.16	5.25	5.78	6.07
70–79 ^a	—	—	—	—	14.55	22.43	18.99	23.99

a. Insufficient information to calculate income of parents of aged 70–79.

rising from 18 to 19 years of age for women. The age at which women begin to earn less than their daughters has shown some variability (although it may only reflect fluctuations in reported income) but little in the way of a trend. The age at which men are passed by their sons, however, has declined substantially, from age 62 to 58, implying that economic growth in Taiwan has favored the young.³

Detailed analysis supports the idea that younger generations of males have gained relative to older generations. Men in their thirties gained, relative to their fathers, by about 10% between 1976 and 1991. The same can be said of men at older

ages, although all of the gain was achieved between 1976 and 1981. Thereafter, men in their forties and fifties lost ground relative to their fathers. Only men in their twenties were worse off vis-à-vis their fathers in 1991 than in 1976, but by less than 2%. Comparing men with their sons provides further evidence of an intergenerational shift in income. The relative income of sons of men aged 50–59 rose by more than 50% between 1976 and 1991. Sons of men in their sixties also increased their income gap, although the increase was less in percentage terms. The shift for men in their seventies is contrary to the overall trend for males. In all years they had substantially lower incomes than their sons, but the differential narrowed significantly between 1976 and 1991. The change can be traced to a rise in nonlabor income among elderly men relative to that of their offspring. The differential for labor income was relatively stable.

A less consistent picture emerges for women. One would not conclude that younger generations of females gained relative to older generations. Compared with their parents, the income of women changed hardly at all over the entire 15-year period. The differentials between adult women and their offspring changed substantially, though quite inconsistently. The relative income of offspring to women in their forties dropped steadily throughout the period analyzed. The relative income of offspring to women in their fifties rose substantially between 1976 and 1986 but dropped from 2.3 to 1.8 between 1986 and 1991. The values fluctuated widely for women in their seventies, but the estimates are of doubtful reliability given the low earnings of women this old.

There are a variety of interesting features of these results that bear further investigation. Why did some age groups gain while others did not? Why have young adults gained relative to their elders? Why are the trends so different for women and men during this period? In the remainder of this chapter, however, we turn to a different set of issues—namely the response of families to the large and changing intergenerational differences in income we observe.

Dynastic Income

The preceding section offered a quick look at the intergenerational differences in income that persist in Taiwan—differences that would, in broad respects, be characteristic of any economy. This section investigates in more detail the extended family's role in eliminating these differences through intergenerational transfers.

In the absence of intergenerational transfers, the income available to a person would be limited, primarily, to personal income and the income of a marital partner, if any. To measure the pretransfer state, we construct an income measure—own generation income (OwnGen)—that is the personal income of the individual plus

the expected income of a marital partner divided by the expected number of members in the marital partnership. In other words: OwnGen is equal to personal income for unmarried individuals and the average of personal and spouse's income for married individuals. OwnGen income for women in 1990 and other income profiles to be discussed are presented in Figure 11.7. As expected, OwnGen income varies quite substantially over the life cycle. Indeed, we estimate that transfers of about 40% of national income would be required to eliminate the age variation in OwnGen income (Mason and Miller 1995).

One of the primary functions of the family is to smooth the cycle of income by sharing resources among its members. This is accomplished both through co-residence and through transfers between households. The family is not unfettered in its capacity to smooth life-cycle variation in income, however. It faces demographic constraints of several forms. First, generational links are incomplete. Celibacy, migration, and mortality lead to the generational isolation of individuals and, under some circumstances, these individuals may constitute significant groups within a population. If a high percentage of the elderly are childless, it will limit the extent to which they can access the resources of workers through family links. If children are orphaned, they are similarly isolated. In the case of Taiwan, the relatively high




Figure 11.7. Income Measures for Women: 1990.

proportion of childless older men is a clear example of a demographic constraint that limits within-family intergenerational transfers.

A second type of demographic constraint reflects the life cycle of dependency faced by the extended family first noted by Chayanov (1966). Nuclear family systems, which at the extreme involve exchange only between child dependents and their parents, are subject to a substantial cycle of dependency. When parents are young and bearing children, the dependency burden increases; as parents complete their childrearing, the burden declines; as parents reach old age, the dependency burden rises again. Extended family systems smooth the cycle of dependency in two ways. First, there is exchange between adult children and dependent parents. Second, resources may be pooled among siblings, either directly or indirectly through parents. Because the timing of childbearing will vary among siblings, sharing resources helps to deal with the peaks and valleys of dependency. Still, extended families are subject to a cycle of dependency that is quite apparent in the results presented later.

Although demographic constraints influence the capacity of the extended family to smooth the income life cycle, the patrilineal extended family in Taiwan has the capacity to operate as a very effective institution for transferring resources among generations. By way of illustration, Figure 11.7 compares OwnGen income to dynastic income—the per capita income of the dynasties to which women belonged in 1990.⁴ Were income shared equally among all dynasty members, 96 percent of the variation in life-cycle income would have been eliminated. Thus demographic constraints do not appear to pose serious obstacles to the family's ability to smooth the life-cycle variation in dependency faced by its members.

Dynastic income is characterized, however, by a distinct Chayanov cycle that, as we shall see, affects intergenerational transfers and household income. Dynastic income rises and falls in Figure 11.7 in a distinctive pattern that mirrors the variation in the percentage of dynasty members aged 15–64. The pattern is particularly regular for women. Dynastic per capita income in 1990 reached peaks for newborns and women aged 24, 52, and 84. Troughs occurred at ages 12, 38, and 67. The pattern for men (not shown) is somewhat different: dynastic income per capita varies somewhat more for males than for females; the peaks and troughs occur at somewhat later ages for males than for females. Finally, the cycle is dampened or nonexistent for elderly men. We find no evidence that they experience the final upswing in dynastic income that is apparent for elderly women.

The Chayanov cycle is tied directly to whether the dynasty has two generations or only one generation that is economically active. Personal income peaks at about age 40 in 1990, for example, but the children of 40-year-olds are too young and the parents are too old to contribute to the dynasty's income. Consequently, the per capita dynastic income of a 40-year-old is at a trough.

Intergenerational Transfers and Coresidence

OwnGen and dynastic income profiles represent two extremes. In the absence of any intergenerational transfers, the per capita incomes of the households to which individuals belonged would equal OwnGen. If all members of the dynasty shared equally in the incomes of dynasty members, the per capita household income would equal dynastic income.⁵ The observed per capita household income lies somewhere in between, depending on the extent to which intergenerational transfers occur.⁶ Figure 11.7 presents two measures of household income for women in 1990 in order to distinguish the effects of coresidence from the effects of transfers between households. Both measures of income exclude public transfers.

Before describing a more formal analysis, some preliminary observations are in order. First, intergenerational transfers in Taiwan eliminate the great preponderance of the life-cycle variation in OwnGen income. The per capita household income of households containing children and households containing the elderly are much closer to dynastic income than to personal income. Second, however, it is evident that personal income does matter. Those who have low personal incomes, children and the elderly, consistently have household incomes that fall short of their dynastic incomes; those who have high personal incomes, prime-age adults, consistently have household incomes that exceed the incomes of their dynasty. Third, coresidence is the primary vehicle for effecting intergenerational transfers in Taiwan. Only in the case of the elderly is there a significant contribution from private transfers between households. Public transfers, which are not shown, are less important than private transfers as an intergenerational transfer mechanism. Fourth, the Chayanov cycles that characterize dynastic income are also transmitted to per capita household income.

A more formal analysis relies on a simple statistical model to analyze the age profile of transfers. The age profile of intergenerational transfers is measured as the difference between OwnGen income and per capita household income. For one set of analyses, per capita household income is measured excluding all transfers between households. Thus the difference between the OwnGen and the per capita household income profiles measures transfers accomplished only through coresidence decisions. A second set of analyses includes private transfers in per capita household income. Thus the difference between the two profiles measures transfers achieved both through coresidence and through transfers between households.

The average transfer at each age is regressed on the gap between OwnGen income and per capita dynastic income. The results measure the extent to which the gap is eliminated through intergenerational transfers. If the gap is entirely elim-

inated through intergenerational transfers, then dynasty members are fully sharing the incomes of their households and household income is determined solely by the income of the dynasties to which members of each age belong. At the opposite extreme, transfers may eliminate none of the gap between OwnGen and dynastic income or can even exacerbate pretransfer intergenerational differences in income. The model is described further in the chapter appendix.

We carried out the analysis separately for males and females for each year. The estimates are consistent with the foregoing observations. There is a substantial degree of income pooling: 90% of the gap between OwnGen income and dynastic income is eliminated through coresidence and private intergenerational transfers. Who earns the income within a dynasty has a modest impact on the distribution of income within the dynasty. High-income generations are not fully sharing their income with low-income generations.

Coresidence is overwhelmingly the most important means by which intergenerational transfers are effected. Coresidence alone eliminates between 90% and 93% of the gap for males and 88% to 91% of the gap for women. The marginal impact of private transfers is very small. In no year did private transfers reduce the gap by as much as one percentage point. As we shall see, however, transfers between households play a more significant role in the case of transfers to the elderly.

There has been a decline in the extent to which dynasties pool income. Between 1976 and 1991, transfers as a fraction of the income gap declined by three percentage points for males and two percentage points for females. All of the decline can be attributed to changes in coresidence patterns. The incremental effect of private transfers increased fractionally during the 15 years analyzed, but the changes are not statistically significant. In any case, these estimates provide no evidence that private transfers increased as a substitute for coresidence.

A further analysis—which cannot be shown here due to space limitations—separately explores transfers to children and transfers to the elderly. That analysis shows a clear shift in intergenerational transfers after 1987. Prior to 1987, transfers to young dependents eliminated 98% of the gap between dynastic and personal income. Similarly, transfers to old dependents raised their household incomes to levels exceeding their dynastic income, though the difference is not statistically significant. After 1987, the share of the gap eliminated through transfers drops significantly. Changes in coresidence are clearly responsible for the decline in intergenerational sharing. Private interhousehold transfers for the elderly have increased modestly over the years, compensating somewhat for the decline in coresidence.

CONCLUSIONS

Several key points emerge from the analysis of intergenerational economic relations in Taiwan. The first is that despite rapid social and economic change, the extended family is still the primary economic institution for transferring resources from high- to low-income generations, whether they are the young or the elderly. This will come as no surprise to those who have studied the family from a demographic perspective. Although coresidence among adult children and their elderly parents has declined in recent years, it remains an important feature of Taiwan's family system (Weinstein et al. 1994). Change is clearly beginning to come to Taiwan's families. Prior to 1988, Taiwan's generations were fully sharing their incomes. By 1988 this was no longer true. The per capita incomes of the households of children and the households of the elderly, in particular, fall short of dynastic income.

One cannot, on the basis of this evidence, argue that the standard of living for the elderly has declined relative to that of their offspring. Indeed, we know nothing about the intergenerational distribution of resources within the household. The elderly are going from a small piece of a big pie to a large piece of a smaller pie. Exactly how they are faring in this process cannot be judged from the evidence presented here. A further complication is that coresidence involves more than the sharing of economic resources. It affects the exchange of time and the extent of companionship and privacy.

Although we have not emphasized this point, the decline in the elderly's share of dynastic income is not a consequence of a decline in the number of offspring. Indeed, the number of surviving offspring to the elderly has increased over the years. Thus the elderly have just as many options allowing them to choose co-residence with higher-income children, for example. The decline in intergenerational sharing between the elderly and their families may be a consequence of an increase in the number of elderly with no downward generational links, although we have not investigated this issue.

The decline in the extent to which children share the incomes of older generations is smaller than the decline for the elderly, especially elderly women. Nonetheless, the change is quite interesting. Clearly this is not a case of dependent children living separately from their parents. More likely the relative economic decline of children reflects changes in the economic situation of parents in Taiwan. If child-bearing becomes the province of lower-income families, the economic status of children relative to older generations will obviously suffer.

Our analysis shows quite clearly that the family cannot purge income of all of its life-cycle variation. This suggests that alternative mechanisms—such as public-sector transfers and saving—may be needed for life-cycle smoothing, even in a soci-

ety that relies heavily on the extended family. It is quite clear, however, that heavy reliance on the family greatly reduces the need for other life-cycle transfer mechanisms—such as life-cycle saving. Although the results are not presented here, a comparison of dynasties and dynastic incomes in 1970, 1980, and 1990 shows that fertility decline has not generated greater life-cycle variation in extended families or their per capita incomes. Thus the hypothesis that public-sector or private financial institutions develop in response to the family's diminished capacity to smooth life-cycle income is not supported by the Taiwan experience. As Taiwan proceeds further through its demographic transition, of course, the life-cycle variation in dynastic income may increase—thus increasing the need for public and private institutions beyond the family that facilitate resource transfers to older generations.

APPENDIX

The model estimated is:

$$T_{sa}^i = \alpha^i_s \text{GAP}_{sa} + \epsilon_{sa}.$$

where T_{sa}^i is net per capita intergenerational transfer received by males or females, s , aged a . Intergenerational transfers are measured as the difference between per capita own-generation income, y_{sa}^o , and the average per capita income of the households to which males or females aged a belong ($y_{sa}^i - y_{sa}^o$). For each year, total private transfers, $y_{sa}^{h+p} - y_{sa}^o$, and transfers realized through co-residence only, $y_{sa}^h - y_{sa}^o$, are both estimated, where y_{sa}^{h+p} is per capita household income including private transfers and y_{sa}^h is per capita household income excluding private transfers. GAP_{sa} is the difference between per capita own generation and per capita dynastic income, ($y_{sa}^d - y_{sa}^o$). Weighted least squares regression was employed using the population at each age as weights. The model explained between 98 and 99 percent of the variance in the age profile of intergenerational transfers, i.e., the difference between household and own generation income. The estimated coefficients α varied from 0.939 to 0.900 for males and from 0.910 to 0.888 for women. Standard errors ranged from 0.008 to 0.014 for males and 0.007 to 0.012 for females.

NOTES

1. This definition overstates the number of patriarchs to the extent that adult males have surviving grandfathers but deceased fathers.
2. This assumption introduces some biases into the estimates, the extent of which is hard to judge. Young fathers, no doubt, earn more than young men who have not yet married and are still in school. Other examples that violate the independence assumption are obvious. In the analysis that follows, the earnings of ever-married men are sometimes used to estimate the average incomes of fathers.

3. The age at which men begin to have lower earnings than their sons has declined even more substantially: from 58.8 to 53.5 years of age (Mason, Miller, and Tsung 1994). By implication, the unearned income of men in their fifties has risen relative to the unearned income of their sons.
4. Note that the plotted age profile of dynastic income in Figure 11.7 is not income by age of the patriarch or any other reference individual within the household. The age profile is the average per capita dynastic income for all persons at each age *a*.
5. One limitation of this analysis is that we cannot observe, nor do we estimate, the intergenerational distribution of resources within households. When we say that generations are equally sharing, we mean that the way a family distributes income among its households does not depend on their generational composition.
6. There is nothing to preclude intergenerational transfers that raise age groups to levels of per capita income that exceed dynastic income. As we shall see, the per capita household income of the elderly exceeded their dynastic income during much of the period analyzed.

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Conclusions

Family Processes and Their Implications for Families in the Future.

Larry L. Bumpass and Karen Oppenheim Mason

This chapter highlights what we know about family change in advanced industrial societies and traces the implications of this knowledge for future change in the family in the three countries that are the focus of this book. Our basic premise here is that the processes at work in most advanced industrial societies are similar, even if the traditional nature of family structures and values is not. Moreover, underlying family change in most advanced industrial economies are the forces set in motion by the growth of market economies—especially their globalization. Families in Japan and South Korea do not look identical to each other, to be sure, nor do they look identical to families in the United States. These countries have distinct cultural traditions as well as differing histories as market economies that have left unique imprints on family life. In all three countries, however, the direction of family change appears to be similar—in large part, we contend, because of the pressures common to market economies and their globalization.

We begin by considering aspects of market economies having implications for family change. In subsequent sections we review the impact of these forces on family organization in East Asia and North America and suggest the likely future course of family changes. The chapter ends with our comments on the implications of family change for children.

THE MARKET ECONOMY

Change in the Western family over the past half century can be characterized as involving an erosion of commitment and obligation. Contracts between marriage partners and between parents and children that were once regarded as unbreakable, lifelong commitments, contracts that entailed a variety of obligations not lightly ignored, have been transformed into much weaker, more contingent promises to love, honor, and cherish for so long as it is mutually agreeable to do so. This change in the Western family has roots in the demands and evolution of industrial society and the market economy. Early discussions of industrialization's impact on the family emphasized the increased geographic and social mobility that transformed peasant societies (Goode 1963; Parsons 1951). Not only did this increase in mobility erode adult intergenerational relations, early theorists argued, but it required a

particular type of household (the conjugal family) and a particular type of gender-based division of labor and authority (the male as breadwinner/leader and female as homemaker/supporter; Parsons 1955). Emphasized too was the loss of parental authority that occurs when breadwinning shifts from familial enterprises to individual wage earning (Goode 1963; Tilly and Scott 1978). It was because of forces like these that some early theorists argued that all family systems were converging to a single model (Goode 1963).

Although early ideas about the impact of industrial development on family change have been criticized (Oppenheimer 1977) and "convergence theory" has been at least partly discredited (McDonald 1992), recent studies of family change in advanced market economies—including the studies in this volume—lead us to believe that family systems in many culturally distinct parts of the world are indeed being pushed in similar directions, even while each retains distinctive aspects of its unique cultural history. This similarity in change is, we believe, to some extent a reflection of market economies. There are two aspects of market economies that seem especially important in altering family life in the late twentieth century. One is the emphasis on consumption these economies promote; the other is their emphasis on rational efficiency in labor relations. Both aspects of modern market economies have far-reaching implications for patterns of employment and individual values—factors that in turn alter family life.

One critical way that a market economy can erode family commitment and obligations is through its emphasis on consumption. Market growth requires ever-expanding consumption, and rising consumption often leads people to commit an increasing proportion of their time to earning money. Conflicts between work and family, which are of widespread concern in advanced industrialized economies, reflect these pressures. Facilitated by increasing secularism—and hence the decline in the *sacred* nature of obligations—the ideology of consumerism also promotes a focus on self: self-satisfaction achieved through consumption is valued above self-sacrifice on behalf of the family and its survival. This emphasis on individual well-being achieved through consumption, as we shall see, has implications for delayed marriage as well as other aspects of family change.

The other way in which the market economy alters families is through the change in labor relations that occurs when the locus of economic production shifts from the family to the market. The pressures become especially acute when markets become global. Because market economies treat workers from the point of view of rational efficiency, they tend to erode noneconomic obligations to workers. Companies will try to pay workers as little as they can and will shed workers if they believe this will make the company profitable. Both low wages and the risk of downsizing create economic uncertainties that may in turn lead people to alter their

behavior vis-à-vis marriage and family. Although such uncertainty varies from country to country, as do traditions about the treatment of workers, levels of unionization, and laws governing labor relations, one can only wonder how long these differences will resist the pressures of rational economic efficiency in the global economy. A recent erosion of guaranteed lifetime employment in large Japanese firms accompanying the downturn in the Japanese economy suggests that differences in the treatment of workers among market economies are likely to shrink in the future.

The emphasis on consumption and rational efficiency in the context of global competition often leads to long work hours for men. And when men work long hours, their time available for family life is sharply curtailed. In the three countries that are the focus of this book, long work hours appear to be most common in South Korea and least common in the United States (Chapter 5 in this volume). But even in the United States, a substantial proportion of men work much longer hours than the supposedly standard 40-hour week, often combining more than one job in the process. And so-called shift work, or work during the evenings or nights, may further limit the time men spend with their families, although in some cases men take up such work in order to be able to spend time with children during the day (Presser 1989). Later we outline the implications of these pressures on men's time allocation between work and family.

We have emphasized men's work and family roles because considerations of work and family often focus exclusively on women's employment. But the dramatic increase in married women's employment in most advanced industrialized nations, including Japan and the United States, is extremely important. Differences in family norms and ideals between Japan and the United States are often noted (Chapter 2 in this volume; Steinhoff 1994), but in examining married women's employment in these two countries, one is struck more by the similarities than by the differences. The rate at which mothers of young children work outside the home, for example, has grown enormously in both countries. Moreover, reflecting the power of the economic forces involved, this transition has occurred despite widely held beliefs that maternal employment is harmful for children and families. Such beliefs are changing in adaptation to the realities, but it is worth emphasizing that this process has nearly completed its full course. The most dramatic changes in this regard in the United States during the last decade have been among the mothers of infants—half of whom now return to work in the first year of the child's life, usually after the first 3 months.

Although this increase signals increased economic opportunity and power for women, as well as increased economic well-being for their families, it further constrains the time available for family roles imposed by a 24-hour day. Thus pressures on women and men to expand the hours spent earning money tend simultaneously

to erode the time available for family life. Economists have long speculated that these pressures are the major reason behind the decline of fertility in modern, industrial economies (Willis 1973). The increasing dominance of occupational roles as a source of social definition and an increasing commitment to work life may also lie behind the postponement of marriage and other changes in the family.

In thinking about the aggregate economic context of the increase in married women's labor-force participation, it is worth noting the concerns of the advanced industrial nations regarding the consequences of low fertility. Low fertility creates a relatively small workforce and at the same time increases the population at older ages who must be supported by this shrinking group of workers. In this context, female workers represent a skilled labor force that cannot be ignored. While the economic pressures to exploit this resource may well do more for women's equality of opportunity than any amount of moral exhortation, these pressures are also likely to exacerbate conflicts between work and family. Because earlier increases in married women's employment have already lessened the traditional prohibitions against such work, employment seems likely to expand rather than contract in the future. Thus a world in which women work outside the home for as many hours as men would appear to be the direction in which most advanced industrial economies are headed.

The increased emphasis on work for both women and men leads in turn to a cultural degradation of the family as a social marker and people's weakening commitment to it. Men's worlds have long been dominated by their worker roles. In the United States, at least, when people meet each other, the man's expected response to the question "what do you do?" has long been in terms of his occupational position rather than his family position. This expectation is becoming increasingly true for women as well. "I am a mother and a wife" or "I am married to so-and-so" are increasingly seen as incomplete or even embarrassing answers. With the growth of market economies, people's identification with their family role has gradually been replaced by their identification with their role in the economy. This inevitably contributes to a widespread sense that obligations to family are secondary to obligations to work life and the consumption that it enables. These tendencies, of course, are strongly reinforced by the ideology of consumerism.

Finally, it is worth revisiting the idea that the geographic mobility required by industrial economies erodes traditional family patterns. Occupational opportunities are not evenly distributed geographically, and they shift with changes in the economy. As pressures for labor-force participation for both husbands and wives have grown and the hours devoted to paid employment have increased, two-career families who face unequal occupational opportunities have become increasingly common. We are familiar with the upper-middle-class version of the two-career family

in which the best opportunities for one partner require an occupational compromise for the other (or both must compromise their careers in order to remain together). Similar processes are likely to occur even when the occupations are not career-oriented. This puts a strain on family commitments that was far less common when most families earned their subsistence through a family enterprise—or when the employment of married women outside the home was relatively uncommon and seen as a secondary role.

The geographic dispersion and shifting of economic opportunities is likely to affect intergenerational ties, as well, as earlier theorists noted. Young people seeking opportunities as they leave school may often find their best opportunities in communities far removed from their parental families—a factor reducing intergenerational contact and integration. As the average educational level of the population has risen (itself at least partly the result of the pressures in market economies for an increasingly productive workforce), the tendency for young people to leave the communities in which they grew up has also increased. Not only does a higher proportion now leave the home community to attend college, but a higher proportion seeks jobs in markets that are regional or national, not just local.

In addition to the competitive pressures experienced by market economies operating in a global system, the globalization of communications and social interaction has implications for family life. The spread of consumerism has arisen through the ever-increasing reach of television. Even when television is restricted to state-run broadcasting systems, audiences living under simple material conditions often learn about new forms of consumption that are glamorized simply by appearing on television. And commercial broadcast systems expose audiences to the deliberate seduction of product and service advertisements. As we shall see, globalization of communications and transportation also spreads new ideas about sexual and family relationships.

In summary, then, market economies that operate in a global competitive system feel pressures that play an important role in the erosion of family commitment and obligation that is occurring in many of the world's industrialized countries. These pressures include the need to promote a lifestyle dependent on consumption, the need to base labor relations on considerations of competitiveness and profitability, rather than social obligations to workers or the community, and the need to employ a well-trained but increasingly scarce labor force. The globalization of communication and transportation media has also had a destabilizing impact on family systems. In this chapter we consider specific impacts of these pressures on family life and their implications for the future course of family change. The next section focuses on marriage and divorce, while subsequent sections focus on fertility and intergenerational relations.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

We have already hinted at ways in which the pressures generated by market economies may alter family patterns. In this section we try to make these links explicit.

Decline of Arranged Marriage

One of the most important transformations experienced by family systems in East Asia is the shift from arranged marriage to self-selection of mates based on personal attraction and compatibility—the shift, that is, to “romantic love.” With the declining role of the kin group and the increasing focus on the wishes of the individual, traditionally collectivist societies are undergoing an explicit process of individuation at the very heart of the institution of marriage. Indeed, the individualized search for a willing marital partner is no doubt playing a role in the delay of marriage that has occurred in Japan and South Korea. The individuation of marriage also erodes the moral basis for marriage as a lifelong contract. If the purpose of marriage is to enjoy the companionship of a compatible partner—and surveys in several East Asian societies show this to be an increasingly predominant reason for marrying—then having a partner that one does not find compatible can justifiably be interpreted as grounds for ending the marriage. This interpretation contrasts with marriage as a contract formed by the elders for the purpose of perpetuating the family line. In that moral context, personal dissatisfaction with one’s partner is a burden to be tolerated rather than a reason for dissolving a marriage.

Although divorce can be used for dynastic or political ends—as the case of Henry VIII of England makes amply clear—in modern societies divorce rates are a key indicator of the extent of individuation in the family. Several chapters in this volume have noted that the belief that a couple should stay together “for the sake of the children” is much higher in South Korea and Japan than in the United States, which some observers explain as a matter of “national culture.” While a cultural explanation has a credible ring to it, recall that several decades ago the vast majority of *Americans* agreed with this item—with an absolute collapse in approval since then. Already in Japan and South Korea, young women agree with this item much less than young men do, a point to which we will return shortly.

Further, we believe the shift from arranged marriage to romantic love is clearly reflected in the increases in divorce in Japan over the last decade or so (Ogawa and Retherford 1993). While divorce rates in Japan declined steadily from the turn of the century until around 1940 (Fukurai and Alston 1990), the higher rates in the earlier times reflected the disavowal of daughters-in-law under the kin-dominated system. The current increase indexes evaluations of best self-interest by

at least one of the married partners, as in the United States. With the increasing individuation of marriage, we can expect divorce rates to increase in most parts of East Asia. Although divorce rates in East Asia may never reach the heights they have attained in the United States in recent decades—young people in East Asia seem to be more cautious about marrying in the first place (Mason and Tsuya, forthcoming)—the increasing family individuation makes it almost inevitable that people will more frequently choose to end dissatisfying marriages than they once did.

Separation of Sex from Marriage

We should not underestimate the power of sex as an incentive to marriage, especially when unmarried sex faces strong normative sanctions. The United States has undergone a dramatic erosion of the link between sex and marriage. Initially the behavior changed without much shift in the norms surrounding this behavior, but eventually the norms changed as well. Sexual activity without marriage now meets with the approval of the vast majority of Americans, at least when the partners have reached young adulthood. This weakening of the normative as well as the behavioral link between sex and marriage means that the sexual incentive to marry or to stay married has been greatly weakened in the United States. Is the same thing happening in East Asia?

We think so. As Rindfuss and Morgan (1983) noted over a decade ago, the increase in romantic love as a basis for marriage promotes sexual experimentation before marriage between prospective marriage partners. In a cultural context that did not permit such experimentation, this shift can be seen as the first step in the loosening of traditional restrictions of sexual activity in the context of marriage. And as several chapters in this book have noted, age at first marriage has increased dramatically in both Japan and South Korea. Young people are now marrying in their mid-to-late twenties or even in their early thirties. It seems highly unlikely that sexual activity has been delayed to the same extent. Indeed, rising rates of first births occurring within 6 months of marriage and increased abortion among teens in Japan both suggest increasing sexual activity before marriage. Premarital cohabitation may never become as open or widespread in Japan or South Korea as it is in the United States. After all, cohabitation depends on housing availability and not just on norms about sex before marriage. But with increasing pressures to postpone marriage for more than a decade past the onset of puberty, the separation of sex from marriage seems likely to increase—and will itself contribute to the delay of marriage.

Changing norms about sex before marriage seem likely to reflect not only the pressures of market economies but also the globalization of communications. The entertainment media frequently use sexuality to promote consumption. Moreover,

the media often explicitly depict and implicitly condone sex between unmarried partners. Indeed, depictions of sex between *married* persons on the screen are so rare as to be surprising. The act of viewing taboo behavior does not automatically undermine the taboo, of course. But in the case of sex before marriage, media depictions seem likely to contribute to a loosening of the traditional norm that sex belongs only in marriage. This is especially an issue for women's behavior.

Delayed Marriage and the Economy

We tend to take it for granted that delayed marriage is often linked with increasing education, but we often fail to articulate all of the links involved. Education is part of the preparation of the skilled labor force that advanced market economies require, but it also brings with it enhanced consumption aspirations. Whether expressed as a desire for a "better lifestyle" or as the need for a minimal material base for forming a family, the implications are the same: meeting these goals requires the allocation of more time to employment.

Although human capital investment can be highly family oriented—as when men feel they are preparing themselves to provide well for their future family—there is strong anecdotal evidence of blatant self-oriented consumption among young adults that is short-term and individualized in its character. One example involves the economic benefits that young people in Japan may enjoy by remaining unmarried and living in their parental household (Mason and Tsuya, forthcoming). Under these circumstances, to get married is to experience a substantial reduction in consumption. When this is combined with a market-driven escalation of what is required for the "good life," it is little wonder that marriage is progressively being delayed.

Gender Differences in Marriage Expectations

The surveys that form the basis for this book often show dramatic differences between men and women with respect to their views on marriage and the proper roles of men and women within marriage. For example, attitude trends by age in both the South Korean and Japanese surveys suggest that women are changing their views of marriage much more rapidly than men. (This point was illustrated earlier with respect to attitudes toward divorce with young children; Choe and Bumpass 1996.) This more rapid change in women's attitudes than in men's means that young men and women are bringing to marriage increasingly different expectations for the roles the other is to play. We should not be surprised, then, that it takes longer for many marriage bargains to be struck and that some people are turning

away from marriage altogether. In effect, some women facing the joint demands of employment and traditional domestic roles are saying "who needs that?" (Men faced with brutally long hours of work and pressure to adopt a "second shift" at home may respond similarly.) Although we do not want to overstate the extent of a gender gap in expectations about marriage and family roles, clearly there are areas of difference that may be contributing to the increasing postponement, even avoidance, of marriage among young women and men in East Asia.

FERTILITY

Although none of the chapters has focused on fertility, several have noted that fertility in Japan and South Korea has reached very low levels, a fact that is of great concern to government. Women in Japan are now estimated to have fewer than 1.5 children in their lifetimes, a rate so low that it could lead to serious depopulation in less than a century. It is understandable, then, why some observers take comfort in the fact that *marital* fertility in Japan is at replacement—that is, approximately two children per couple. Although this indicates that the very low fertility experienced on average by all women results from the extreme postponement of marriage, there are several reasons we should not be lulled into a sense of security for the future.

The first reason for pessimism is potential simultaneity. Low fertility rates may result from the postponement of marriage, but to what extent is marriage being delayed because of a desire to delay or avoid parenthood? Indeed, the delay of marriage may also reflect as a strong desire to delay parenthood because of consumption patterns and lifestyle. In this context, the finding that one-third of never-married young adults in Japan are uncertain about whether they ever want to have children is startling (Mason and Tsuya, forthcoming). A person's uncertainty about parenthood does not appear to be the only reason for postponing marriage, but some of the postponement of marriage indeed represents a weak interest in becoming a parent.

Another reason for concern is the likely inflation of the marital total fertility rate by timing changes within marriage. It is well known that a period fertility rate is deflated with respect to actual completed family size when births are being delayed and is inflated when births are being accelerated. The marital fertility rate in Japan—about two children per married woman—occurs in a context of delayed marriage. It is possible that the pace of fertility within marriage is being accelerated to make up for this delay in marriage. If this is the case, then the acceleration in marital childbearing would make the marital fertility rate overestimate the number of children that recently married couples will eventually have.

A third reason for concern is the possible inflation of the marital total fertility rate as a consequence of premarital pregnancies. To the extent that premarital

pregnancies exist or are increasing (as recent evidence suggests), this inflates the marital fertility rate by attributing to the early months of marriage a high rate of pregnancy that reflects more the effect of pregnancy on marriage than decisions about childbirth after marriage. If this is the case, then any improvement in avoiding pregnancy would bring down the marital fertility rate.

Yet another reason for pessimism is the possible inflation of the marital total fertility rate by unintentional fertility. In Japan, abortion is easily available and readily used. Even so, there is a distinct possibility that some births result from pregnancies that are not intended or wanted at the time they are conceived. If the low-dose estrogen contraceptive pill ever becomes available, what we know about contraceptive efficacy would suggest a subsequent reduction in unintended pregnancy. It is at least plausible that this will result in an actual reduction in the birthrate through a reduction in unintended pregnancies.

Of course, the prospects for the long-term replacement of the population in Japan and other low-fertility East Asian countries are not necessarily bleak. In at least some of these countries, the desired number of children among married couples tends to exceed the number that is actually being born. Assuming that preferences remain unchanged (which is not necessarily true), marital fertility might therefore rise if the constraints that prevent couples from achieving their desired family sizes were eased. The constraints on fertility are obviously powerful, however, and seem unlikely to ease in the near future without a concerted effort to alleviate them—and family size preferences may fall.

Even if some of the reasons for pessimism are incorrect or their magnitude is small, they nevertheless suggest the strong possibility that in Japan, at least, and perhaps in South Korea and other East Asian countries as well, the long-term prospects for population replacement are problematic. This, too, is likely to have implications for the family, particularly when it comes to intergenerational relations involving adults and their aging parents. We turn now to this topic.

INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS

Several chapters in this volume and elsewhere have documented declining intergenerational coresidence in East Asia, declining contact, declining preferences of the elderly for coresidence, and declining expectations of receiving support from their children. It is important to recognize that a variety of forces—demographic, economic, cultural, even legal—are reshaping relationships between adult offspring and their aging parents in this region. With regard to demographic forces, the changes in fertility and mortality in this century have had profound consequences for traditional patriarchal family structures in which eldest sons were duty-bound

to live with and care for their aging parents. Low fertility, for example, means that fewer families have sons. (An increase in prenatal methods of sex detection followed by sex-selective abortions in some countries—most notably, South Korea and China—has raised sex ratios, however, at least partially compensating for the increased risk of not having a son, given smaller family sizes; Park and Cho 1995.) Partly because of the lower availability of sons, there is evidence of an increasing reliance on daughters for coresidence and contact as parents age.

Further, the reduction in mortality has profound implications for the nature of the intergenerational contract involved in coresidence. The extended period of life of the elderly implies a very lengthy term of coresidence that neither generation seems to prefer. Where incomes and access to housing permit, both aging parents and their adult children often opt for separate living. Because the level of income enjoyed by families in East Asia has risen dramatically, more families today can afford to create separate households for senior and junior generations.

Cultural change, especially the secularization of family ideology, has been another potent force in altering intergenerational relations in East Asia. In the West, industrial development has eroded the traditional, sacred obligations of the individual to the family, replacing them with a secular ideology that emphasizes the primacy of the individual over the family group (Lesthaeghe 1995). In East Asia, a similar process appears to be leading to an individuation of intergenerational relations. In the East Asian family systems of the past, the religious basis for the obligations of the young to support the old meant that family resources were redistributed across the life course in a manner that ensured the care of dependent family members (both children and the aged). In a rational choice model, such obligations tend to erode—if, indeed, they are not eliminated entirely. Self-interest dictates self-oriented, individualistic behavior of those who control the family's wealth and income unless this tendency is countered by firmly entrenched ideas about the sacred roles of family members. The secularization that seems to follow our industrial economy, and has become part of our emerging global society, thus erodes the basis of collective as opposed to individual objectives, a process abetted by the growth of consumerism. These shifts mean that it becomes in the best interests of midlife parents to save for their own old age rather than to disperse their resources freely for the current or future needs of their children and grandchildren—an idea captured by a popular American bumper sticker that proudly proclaims: "We're spending our children's inheritance!"

Finally, it is important to remember that legal changes enacted by governments in the interests of gender equity or increasing justice to all citizens may inadvertently contribute to the transformation of traditional intergenerational relationships. As an earlier comparative analysis of intergenerational coresidence and

contact in Japan and the United States makes clear (Bumpass 1994), it is only for eldest sons that one observes a stronger familial orientation in Japan than in the United States. For other children, contact with parents is actually higher in the United States than in Japan. In the context of the Japanese inheritance law requiring equal treatment of all children, a major incentive is removed for eldest sons to fulfill their traditional obligations to parents. A further erosion of the ties between adult children and their parents in Japan would not be surprising.

CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN

The declining commitment to family life has aspects that can be seen as both good and bad. As emphasized in the introduction to this book, for example, declining commitment and obligation can be viewed as part of the democratization of family life and hence part of an increasing equality of opportunity and reward for all members of society regardless of gender, generation, or age. As feminist writers have frequently noted, women have traditionally borne the greatest burden of family obligations. In the patriarchal families of East Asia, it was the eldest son's wife who physically cared for her aging parents-in-law, not the son himself. A declining commitment and sense of obligation may thus be an essential part of moving toward equality of the sexes.

There is a dark side of declining commitment and obligation in family life, however, involving potentially deleterious impacts on children and future generations of society. Human children take an inordinately long time to grow up and become independent adults. The key to their successful rearing is stable, long-term relationships with adult caretakers. The decline of family commitment and obligation may therefore result, not only in the failure of populations to reproduce themselves demographically, but also in the destabilization of the familial contexts in which children are reared and hence a failure to reproduce future generations psychologically, socially, and culturally.

Such failures can have several undesirable effects for society. One is a reduction in the human and social capital that future generations bring to the labor force. This may mean a lowering of the economic productivity of labor and hence a drop in the affluence currently enjoyed in many countries. Moreover, so long as the economy's need for high-quality labor is met through the private investments of families, antenatal pressures are likely to remain strong for parents and birthrates low. Failures of social, psychological, and cultural reproduction are also likely to affect the values and skills that the next generation brings to our societies as citizens. Antisocial behavior may increase, for example, leading either to greater social dis-

order or to a more repressive society. Such changes can affect the quality of life every bit as much as declining real incomes.

Finally, and perhaps most important, failures of social, psychological, and cultural reproduction will affect what future generations bring to their own marriages and parenting—and hence to the health of society in the distant future. Children who grow up in unstable environments tend to create unstable environments for their own children—or avoid having children altogether. In either scenario, the long-term health of the society may be threatened. Thus the issues with which this book has dealt are indeed important for society's future. Further research of the kind represented here is much needed if we are to understand what is happening to families in all of our societies and how some of the most serious problems of families might be alleviated.

NOTE

This chapter is based on closing remarks written by Larry Bumpass for the Work and Family segment of the Seventeenth International Nihon University Symposium: Life and the Earth in the Twenty-First Century, held at Nihon University in Tokyo, March 1996. Karen Oppenheim Mason helped to rewrite them as a formal essay.

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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF MAIN PROJECT SURVEYS

Most of the chapters in this book use data from at least one of three surveys that were collected in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Although the three surveys are not identical, they were designed to be comparable. Table A.1 summarizes the basic characteristics of the surveys.

Table A.1. Characteristics of the Three Surveys

Characteristic	Japan	S. Korea	U.S. ^a
Year of survey	1994	1994	1987–1988
Sample size	2,447	2,666	13,017
Age range	20–59	20+	19+
Marital status	All	All ^b	All
Sexes	Both	Both	Both

a. Characteristics shown are for the 1987–1988 National Survey of Family and Households (NSFH-1) rather than for the follow-up conducted in 1992–1994 (NSFH-2).

b. Restricted to heads of household and spouses of household heads. Although there are some unmarried heads of household, 2,333 of the 2,666 respondents (87.5% of them) are currently married because of this sample restriction.

UNITED STATES: NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS

The National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) is a large, nationally representative survey of the noninstitutionalized population of the United States designed to answer a variety of questions about family and household relationships. The first wave of the NSFH was collected in 1987–1988 (NSFH-1); a follow-up of the same respondents was conducted in 1992–1994 (NSFH-2). The surveys were designed by a research team located at the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, and were funded by the U.S. National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.

NSFH-1 is based on interviews with a stratified, clustered national probability sample of 13,017 respondents. The sample includes a main cross section of 9,643 persons aged 19 or older living in a national probability sample of households. This main cross section is supplemented by oversampling households containing single-parent families, stepfamilies, recently married couples, cohabiting couples, African-Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans. Only one individual per household was randomly selected as the primary respondent, but information was also collected from the spouses and cohabiting partners of primary respondents. NSFH-2 reinterviewed the respondents from NSFH-1 regardless of their household or living arrangement at the time of the reinterview.

Most of the data collected in NSFH-1 were obtained through face-to-face

interviews, which averaged 100 minutes in length. Primary respondents were also asked to fill out self-administered booklets containing sensitive questions. A self-administered questionnaire was also given to the spouse or cohabiting partner of the primary respondent if such an individual was living in the household. In NSFH-2, in addition to face-to-face interviews of the original primary respondents, information was also collected through personal interviews with that individual's current spouse or cohabiting partner and, if the current partner was not the one with whom the primary respondent was living during the NSFH-1 interview, with the original spouse or partner as well. Moreover, telephone interviews with two sets of "focal" children were conducted (children aged 5–12 and 13–18 as of NSFH-1), and a short proxy interview was conducted with the surviving spouse or other relative in cases where the primary respondent had died or was too ill to complete an interview for NSFH-2. Further technical details of NSFH-1 can be found in Sweet, Bumpass, and Call (1988). Information on NSFH-2 can be obtained via the Internet through FTP of a "read me" file (file name = readme.), which is located on the NSFH anonymous FTP site (144.92.190.33; cd /pub/nsfh). This FTP site may also be reached via the NSFH Web home page (<http://ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/>).

Most analyses of the NSFH reported in this book omit data for African-Americans and Hispanics. This was done to avoid confounding cross-cultural comparisons with internal ethnic differences within the U.S. population. Also, in most analyses presented here, individuals aged 19 and those aged 60 or over were omitted because these were the age limits used in collecting the Japanese data. Further sample restrictions are noted in the individual chapters.

JAPAN: NATIONAL SURVEY ON WORK AND FAMILY LIFE

The National Survey on Work and Family Life of Japan (NSWFL) is a national probability sample of adults aged 20–59 that was intended to parallel the NSFH as well as collect additional information on family and household relationships of concern in Japan. Conducted in 1994, the survey was designed by a research team from Nihon University assisted by researchers from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, the East-West Center, and several U.S. universities, including the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, and the University of Illinois–Urbana. Funding was provided by Nihon University and logistical support by Nihon University's University Research Center.

The NSWFL sample of respondents is based on a national, two-stage probability design, in which 175 locales were randomly selected and then 20 individuals aged 20–59 were randomly selected within each locale (potential $N = 3,500$). Information was collected through self-administered questionnaires distributed to

the selected individual for subsequent pickup. A total of 2,447 usable questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 70%. Sample distributions on basic characteristics closely match those found in the 1990 census of Japan. Further information on the NSWFL can be found in Nihon Daigaku Sogo Kagaku Kenkyusho (1994).

SOUTH KOREA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE

The National Survey on the Quality of Life in the Republic of Korea (NSQL) was a national survey conducted in 1994. Unlike the U.S. and Japan surveys, however, the NSQL sampled heads of household or spouses of heads of household only; a lower age limit of 19 was also imposed. The NSQL thus represents household heads and spouses of heads living in the Republic of Korea in 1994 rather than the country's general adult population. The NSQL questionnaire was based on the NSWFL questionnaire and thus matches it closely. The NSQL was designed and conducted by researchers from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) with funding provided by KIHASA.

The NSQL sample was drawn through a stratified, two-stage probability design in which a national sample of 99 locales was selected, using probability methods, and then 30 household heads or spouses of heads were randomly selected within each locale (potential $N = 2,970$). Prior to selection, locales were divided according to whether they were rural or urban, and rural locales were selected at twice the rate of urban locales. To be nationally representative, therefore, the NSQL data must be weighted, with urban cases given twice the weight of rural cases.

Information in the NSQL was collected by face-to-face interviews in most cases. If a selected respondent could not be interviewed after several visits, however, a questionnaire was left to be filled out by the respondent and picked up by the interviewer at a later date. A total of 2,666 usable questionnaires were completed, representing a 90% response rate. Further information on the NSQL can be found in Chang, Kim, and Bae (1994).

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
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