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Threads and Stitches of Peace- Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace?

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Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace?

By

Hippolyt Akow Saamwan Pul

A Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Nova Southeastern University
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Nova Southeastern University
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This dissertation was submitted by HIPPOLYT AKOW SAAMWAN PUL under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

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
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Dedication

To my Grandfather, Norbert Guribie, who taught me the joy and dignity of hard work, dedication, and gave me the gift of multi-tasking. Without all of the above, I would have walked the single lane of life without the courage and motivation to take on more than one thing at a time.

To my mother whose sacrifices of self and unquestionable devotion to us, your children, gave life beyond expectations to my siblings and me. Where many a young widow would have jumped off the boat, you stuck through the storm just so you could give us a hope and a life that you never had. The glory is yours.

Uncle Philip of blessed memory, you had faith in me and sponsored my education from the secondary school to my first degree level. You did what many would have turned away from. The honor of this work is yours.

To my wife Florence, and children Victor, Annette, Albert and Reuben, you anchored me in life and served as the compass for my journey in life.

Acknowledgments

“The cow does not say thank you to the pasture or the salt lick.” This Dagara proverb, my native tongue, translates at two levels. The first, the common one, says the cow feels it cannot and should not be expressing gratitude to the pasture or the salt lick each time she visits because she knows she will definitely come back, again, and again, for the same nourishment. How many times, then, can she say she is grateful? The second rendition of the proverb says the cow’s stance is that, even if this visit to the pasture or the salt lick were a one-time affair, she is nonetheless so deeply grateful for the nourishment so freely given that she cannot really express her gratitude in words. Silence and the interiorized gratitude is more expressive of her appreciation than any amount of words can ever express.

I have seriously considered borrowing the wisdom of the cow and keeping mute on this page because there are so many people to thank for their generosity of time and knowledge shared that it might be better not to attempt saying thank you; lest I fail to do so profoundly enough. Worst still, I fear the risk of omitting to reach out to all the numerous people whose front and/or back stage support has made my venturing into academia after such a long sojourn in the world of work so fulfilling. But a log does not become a crocodile, no matter how long it stays in the water. Hence, no matter how much I wish to be a cow, human I am, and unto humans I must return. Therefore, the words of thanks, no matter how inadequate they are, must I offer.

My decision to venture back into academia would not have been possible without the support of family and colleagues at work who had faith in me and offered their unwavering support as I took on the task. To Florence, my wife, I would probably go

with the wisdom of the cow and not attempt to express my gratitude for your love and support. Victor, Annette, Albert, and Reuben, you were already used to having me as an absentee dad, as work kept me out of the house for much of the time over the last 25 years. In the last four years, you have had to further tolerate my unavailability even when I was home, as I locked myself up with books, headphones, and other academic accoutrements that made me unapproachable. Thank you for the love and support. Your own strides in your studies gave me the energy to trudge after you. To all members of my extended family, young and old alike, without your prayers and support, I may have dropped the ball along the line. Your cheers worked. In particular, but for the hospitality and mail delivery services that Dr. Valerian Nakaar and his wife, Laetitia Nakaar offered from the US side, this venture would have gone nowhere. Not only did you open up your home to me when I was in the United States, you religiously received and re-mailed every single book I required for my course work to me.

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Many on the faculty and administrative body of the Department of Conflict Analysis and Resolution of Nova Southeastern University have been very influential in shaping my thinking and direction since I enrolled in the PhD Program of the Department in January 2010. I am grateful to all. In particular, am eternally grateful to Dr. Mvingi who, as Chair of my Dissertation Committee, nudged and goaded me on when fatigue and work schedules nibbled away motivation and will power; especially when the preliminary stages of the field work for the dissertation research were taking longer than I anticipated. I am most grateful for your faith in me and all the guidance I received. To Dr. Robin Cooper and Dr. Elena Bastidas, you both agreed to serve on my Dissertation Committee, even though I did not get to take courses with you at DCAR. Nonetheless you found value in my research topic and had enough faith in my commitment not to disappoint you to accept to be on the Committee. Thank you for your trust and support.

I committed to protecting the identities of the 1,460 individuals across Ghana whose views and voices, as research interviewees, created the pool of reflections and ideas for this dissertation. I shall respect my promise to you. Nonetheless, each of you must know that if this piece of work has any value to society, it is because you had faith in it to participate in interviews. In a country that is either overzealous or overly cynical about its state of peace, answering a series of questions on why Ghana is peaceful is probably not the most interesting conversation you would like to have. Yet, you gave off your time and your ideas to inform the outcome of this research. You spoke, but I take full responsibility for how your views have been represented in this dissertation research. Thank you.

Collecting data from 50 Polling Areas that constituted the study sites across the country for the quantitative component of this study is daunting enough. Having to grapple with different local languages; navigate different terrains to get to sometimes difficult to reach study sites; managing cultural nuances related protocols for gaining entry into and acceptance in the study sites; as well as, getting access to and gaining the confidence of the interviewees, are all part of the multiple layers of challenges, for carrying out the field work. In a country where most communities are already fatigued from similar research assignments from state and nonstate actors and institutions, some handholding was essential to gain admittance into the selected study sites and the participation of the interviewees. To Ms. Irene Angbing of the University for Development Studies, Tamale, and Andrew Asamoah of Catholic Relief Services, I am very grateful to you for separately introducing to me the students and field agents from different parts of the country who guided me into the communities and facilitated access to respondents for the survey interviewees.

Transcribing 31 hours of audio interviews all by myself would have taken me several more months to get through it for the analytical work to begin. Mr. Thomas Sentu, I am profoundly grateful for putting at my disposal your professional verbatim audio to text transcription skills that enabled me to speed up the transcription of the interviews from the key informants. Without your help, I would not be where I am today. Thank you. To all others who gave me a hand here and there over in the course of my adventure into academia and in the course of the research for this dissertation, I express to you the eternal gratitude of the cow – my inability to mention you specifically is not a sign that I am not grateful; the gratitude is eternal.

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List of Acronyms

- AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
- BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
- CADA - Center for African Democratic Affairs
- CBC - Catholic Bishops' Conference
- CCH - Christian Council of Ghana
- CDRs - Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
- CEPA - Center for Policy Analysis
- CPP - Convention Peoples Party
- CRQ - Core Research question
- CSOs - Civil Society Organizations
- DCAR - Department of Conflict Analysis and Resolution
- FBOs - Faith-based Organizations
- FGD - Focus Group Discussions
- GIBA - Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association
- GJA - Ghana Journalists Association
- GNA - Ghana News Agency
- IPAC - Inter Party Advisory Committee
- KII - Key Informant Interview
- KPC - Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage
- NAL - National Alliance of Liberals
- NDC - National Democratic Congress
- NLM - National Liberation Movement,

NPP - Northern Peoples Party;
NPP1 - Northern Peoples Party
NPP2 - New Patriotic Party
NUGS - Union of Ghana Students
PDCs - Peoples Defense Committees
PNDC - Provisional National Defense Council
PRINPAG - Private Newspapers and Publishers Association of Ghana
PSA - Polling Station Agents
SPSS - Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SRQ - Sub research questions
TCP - Togoland Congress Party,
UGCC - United Gold Coast Convention
UN - United Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UP - United Party

Abstract

Ghana is considered an oasis of peace despite having the same mix of ethno-political competitions for state power and resources; north-south horizontal inequalities; ethno-regional concentrations of Christians and Muslims; highly ethnicised elections; a natural resource dependent economy; and a politically polarized public sphere, among others, that have plunged other countries in Africa into violent and often protracted national conflicts. Use of the conflict paradigm to explain Africa's conflicts glosses over positive deviance cases such as Ghana. This study used the peace paradigm in a mixed method, grounded theory research to examine Ghana's apparent exceptionalism in staving off violent national conflicts. From the survey of 1429 respondents and 31 Key Informants, findings indicate Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They are equally divided on classifying the state of peace in Ghana as negative or positive. Instead, they have identified sets of centrifugal and centripetal forces that somehow self-neutralize to keep Ghana in a steady state of unstable peace. Among the lift forces are strongly shared cultural and Indigenous African Religious values; symbiotic interethnic economic relationships; identity dissolution and cultural miscegenation due to open interethnic systems of accommodation and incorporation; and the persistence of historical multi-lateral political, sociocultural, and economic relationships. On the drag side are the youth bulge; emergent religious intolerance; elite exit from the state in using private solutions for public problems; and highly politicized and partisan national discourses that leave the country with no national agenda. In sum, Ghana is no exception to the rule. The four interconnected meso theories that this study identifies provided pointers to what factors Ghana needs to strengthen to avert descent into violence.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Statement of the Research Problem

Naming the Oasis of Peace

Amidst the proliferation and protraction of intrastate conflicts that have earned Africa the accolade of being "...the continent of conflicts" (Golaszinski, 2007, p. 5), poverty and disasters, Ghana has won praise as "...an oasis of peace, harmony and tranquility" (UNDP, 2012; GNA, 2012); a beacon of democracy (Asante-Antwi, 2013; BBC News, 2013); and an icon of economic progress "in a subregion perpetually in turmoil" (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). Businessmen and politicians compete to acclaim that "... the best thing going for Ghana is stability and peace [as it has managed to remain] an oasis of peace in a turbulent continent" (Gadugah, 2012, p. 1). However, a review of Ghana's evolution as a nation-state would show the country shares the same historical fates that have underscored conflicts in other countries. Indeed, its image as a peaceful country disguises a multiplicity of fractious points inherent in its historical and contemporary political set up.

For starters, it should be noted that the territories that constitute Ghana today were, until 6th March 1957, four disparate political entities independently administered by the British as the coastal colony (covering what is the Western, Central, the lower part of the Volta region comprising Keta and Denu (Bening, 1973, p. 21); and all of the Greater Accra region today); the Ashanti Protectorate (including the present day Ashanti, Eastern, and Brong Ahafo regions); the Northern Territories (covering present day Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions); and the Transvolta Togoland, covering much of the current Volta Region, which the British managed under a UN Trusteeship after World War I. These territorial units "...that were tied to this entity [called Ghana],

... had little in common apart from being part of the British Empire” (Weiss, 2005, p. 2). In other words, like many other states in Africa, Ghana is equally an amalgam of disparate peoples lumped together as a nation-state by the colonial act. Ghana therefore has the same history of being an artificially erected state at the dawn of independence as all African countries have. Hence, there is nothing inherently unifying that predisposes it to peace more than others.

Additionally, this amalgam of a nation-state did not come into being without resistance from its constituent members. When Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) pushed for “independence now” (Morrison, 2004, p. 423) in the late 1940s, the majority of the people of the Northern Territories, under the leadership of the Northern People’s Party (NPP) opted to stay out of the independence movement and union with the other constituent territories of the emergent state, citing unequal states of development between the north and the south (Soeters, 2012). Accordingly, the chiefs and political elite of the north sent a delegation to petition the Queen to have the North’s independence delayed to enable it catch up with the south developmentally. The delegation, led by S.D. Dombo failed in its mission and the north was compelled to participate in the pre-independence elections (Ladouceur, 1979). The political leadership of the Ashanti Protectorate, on its part, also opposed the idea of joining the colony for independence. It preferred a separation at best, and at worst a highly decentralized federal system that would preserve Ashanti’s autonomy and control over its natural resources (Bourret.1960; Brukum, 1998;Morrison, 2004). To the east, the conglomerate of ethnic groups in the Transvolta Togoland had to resort to a highly contested plebiscite to decide whether or not to join the colony for independence (Kwaku, 1976). Even after a decisive

majority vote to join the emerging union that became Ghana, “a violent uprising took place in Transvolta Togoland [compelling the Governor] to send the Ghana army in to quell the disturbances” (Williams, 1984, p. 358) as the celebrations of independence went on. The lingering discontent with the absorption of the transvolta into Ghana produced agitations for secession of the Komkombas (Bening, 1983) and the Ewes (Amenumey, 1989; Brown, 1980) from Ghana. These threats of secession heightened in the 1970s through the early 80s. To the south west, the Buem ethnic groups have always expressed their wish for secession from the union (Bening, 1983). To date, groups exist that demand the decoupling of the Transvolta Togoland region from Ghana so that it can be recognized as a “sovereign state” ([Western Togoland General Assembly, 2015](#)).

In addition to the initial resistance to the union and subsequent threats of secession, Ghana also has the same geo-political and economic disparities that have plunged Nigeria and La Cote d’Ivoire into protracted civil conflicts and wars (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). Historical and contemporary political and economic inequalities largely define the north south divide, as all communities in the north share a common history of political and economic marginalization under colonial rule and thereafter. Deliberate colonial policy kept the north economically underdeveloped and preserved it as a labor pool for the mineral mines and cocoa farms in the south (Bening, 1990) for the simple reason that the north was economically too unproductive to merit any investment of resources for its development. In the words of Governor Hodgson:

...in place of pouring the small surplus revenue that there is every indication that the Colony is now likely to obtain, into such an absolutely unremunerative country as the Northern Territories is, and I fear always

will be, I should like to devote it to the development of districts within the colony and which are ripe for development and every penny expended on which would come back again in the shape of increased revenue (Bening, 1990a, p. 251)

For this reason, “The colonial administration undertook almost no infrastructural or human capital development in northern Ghana” (Langer, 2007, p. 8). The resultant deficits in infrastructure and human resource development have ensured that the north has remained “much poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical services ...” (Armin, 2007, p.9). These historical tensions and regional inequalities have underscored the political evolution of the country. Even before it attained independence, the country grappled with ethno-political and regional conflicts that threatened to tear it apart (Anglin, 1958; Meredith, 2006, Sakyi, 2013b). In particular, Anglin chronicles a number of events that threatened to break up the country within the first nine years of its independence. He recalls, for instance, how the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the main opposition party based in the Ashanti hinterland had “...resorted to violence, intimidation, dynamiting of houses and even political murders” (Anglin, 1958, p. 43), as its “Action Groupers [in Ashanti sought to counter the CPP’s] Action Troopers [that equally] terrorized political opponents in the South” (Anglin, 1958, p. 44). The creation of the Action Troopers of the CPP and Action Groupers of the NLM effectively initiated the institutionalization of a culture of violence in Ghana’s body politic.

The historical differences between the geopolitical blocks that constitute Ghana today have continued to have relevance in the geo-ethnic politics of the country and her

attempts at democratic rule. Unlike La Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, once peaceful countries with no histories of military coup d'états, but which suddenly found themselves under siege of violent conflicts, Ghana has witnessed four successful and often violent military coup d'états in 1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981. This is in addition to several unsuccessful counter coups (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), and at least one successful palace coup (Adofo, 2012 Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012). Hence, from 1966 till January 1993, Ghana lived much of its political life after independence under military rule. In comparison, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya never experienced coup d'états; and yet they descended into violent national level conflicts or civil wars.

Military interventions derailed civilian rule as each attempt at democratic transitioning of power "...lasted only for a few years before they were aborted" (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). All the coup d'états had thinly veiled ethno-political divisions undergirding them (Adofo, 2012 in Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012; Agyeman-Duah, 1987). The period witnessed various forms of summary executions, murders, and disappearances of people that instilled fear and a culture of silence among the population (Oquaye, 1995; Chazan and Le Vine, 1978). Indeed, between 1979 and 1992, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), both under Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, legitimized and institutionalized the use of violence in politics when Rawlings declared the "democratization of violence" (Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Bofo-Arthur, 2012). In fulfillment of this declaration, the period between December 1981 and December 1992 saw the systematic training and arming of civilians under the umbrella of the Peoples Defense Committees (PDCs) which mutated into the Committees for the Defense of the

Revolution (CDRs) in the late 1980s through the 90s. This militarization of civil life was considered necessary to contain internal dissent and rebellion. In particular, the PNDC, which emerged from the December 31, 1981 coup d'état, needed these 'revolutionaries' to counter the multiple counter-revolutionary military coups and other forms of civil discontent and agitations that challenged its legitimacy. Rawlings would later admit that the leadership of the PNDC had to "devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our nation's security instead of being there with the people" (People's Daily Graphic, Accra, 6 April 1987 cited in Agyeman-Duah, 1987).

Besides military coup d'états, Ghana has all the other ingredients that have plunged other countries with similar mixes of challenges into violent national clashes. A highly heterogeneous population of 24 million people divided into at least 52 different indigenous ethnic groups sets the stage for intense inter-ethnic rivalries for political power at the local level (chieftaincy succession and parliamentary elections) and national level positions (presidential elections, ministerial appointments, and positions in civil and public services). It is also the basis for interethnic contestations over access to, ownership of, and control over economic resources. Consequently, Ghana has been home to many violent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts around the issues of landownership, chieftaincy succession disputes, and competition for political power within and between ethnic groups (Arthur, 2009; Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Bofo-Arthur, 2011; Nambiema, 2012; Pul, 2003), especially in the northern half of the country. Notable among the protracted violent conflicts are the Mamprusi-Kusasi conflict in the Upper East Region; and the Bimoba-Konkomba, Gonja-Nawuri, Konkomba-Nanumba, Dagomba-Konkomba, and the intra-Dagbona chieftaincy succession conflict, all in the

Northern Region. The Upper West Region has the intra-Wala Chieftaincy dispute which adds to the list of protracted violent conflicts in the north of Ghana that have histories dating back to the pre-colonial and/or colonial times, but which have periodically erupted violently onto this day. Elsewhere in the country, the violent conflicts between the Nkonyas and Alavanyos, and the Pekis and Tsitos, both in the Volta Region also date back close to a hundred years or more (Ghana News Agency, 2009; Yakohene, 2012). The Techiman-Tuobodum conflict in the Brong-Ahafo region also has roots dating back several decades. Nonetheless, like volcanoes that run different cycles of dormancy and activity, they continue to simmer and explode periodically in violent forms.

Overlaying the inter and intraethnic conflicts are politico-economic policy challenges that perpetuate the north-south, and rural-urban poverty divides in the country. For instance, despite various attempts in the postcolonial era to bridge the north-south wealth gap, the general trend in national development planning has been “an ‘endogenous’ tendency to favour the south over the north in terms of the location of economic activities” (Langer, 2007, p. 9). Consequently, the north has remained “much poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical services ...” (Langer, 2007, p. 8). To date, there remains a “... very high incidence of poverty in the northern parts of the country” (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008, p. 107). More than half of the country’s poor are concentrated in the three northern regions where the poor are also much poorer than in the rest of the country (World Bank, 2010).

Recent economic progress and poverty alleviation interventions have done little to reduce the poverty disparity between the north and the south of the country. National poverty reduction initiatives since the late 1980s have higher impact in the south than in

the north. This is partly because of the large historical development deficit in the north and the quantum of investment required to bridge the gap or sustain minimal investments. For instance, while the proportion of the population in the urban north that is poor moved from 45.4% in 1992 to 31.3% in 2006 (a drop of 14.1 percentage points); their counterparts in the south that started from 25.7% of the urban south population being poor dropped to 8.9% by 2006 (a 16.8 percentage point). The differences in rural poverty between the south and the north, and the impact of efforts to reduce them are more staggering. The proportion of the poor in the rural north stood at 74.2% in 1992, moving down to 68.5% in 2006 (i.e. a 5.7 percentage point reduction). In contrast, the proportion of the poor in the rural south started at 60.6% in 1992 and moved to 28.2% in 2006 – a large 32.4 percentage point drop in poverty over the same period (World Bank, 2010). Indeed, the north-south poverty gap is set to grow as “... geographical inequalities further widen: by 2030, poverty could be broadly eliminated in the South, while still affecting two-fifths of the North’s population” (World Bank, 2010, p. 10).

The persistence of this north-side divide in the poverty profile of Ghana has geopolitical, religious, and ethnic connotations. Within the north, it heightens the sense of political and economic marginalization and therefore increases the stakes in interethnic competition for access to and control over political power and natural resources such as land. Underscoring this interethnic competition for political power and economic resources in the north is the colonial legacy of indirect rule that institutionalized political inequalities under the chieftaincy institution, which have been maintained in the administrative systems of the postcolonial state. Consequently, the north of Ghana is

highly volatile, with several violent clashes every year on issues of land, chieftaincy, and belongingness (Lund, 2003).

The persistence and continued deepening of poverty in the north has prompted the voicing of concerns that resonate with the fears of the founding political fathers of the north in respect of the Northern Territories' joining the rest of the country for independence. As one young northern politician recently put it, the North's participation in the political space that Ghana constitutes has not brought it the much needed development. All the northerners "have gotten is hunger, chieftaincy conflicts, illiteracy and ignorance" (ThinkGhana.com, 2012). The increasing awareness of the north-south poverty gap among the youth, coupled with an equally widening youth bulge due to high levels of unemployment in the north, especially in the urban centers, creates conditions for potential violent north-south confrontations. This puts "...into doubt the vaunted cohesiveness and unity of the Ghanaian society" (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 49).

Superimposed on this geo-economic divide is a religious dimension, as the northern part of the country has a predominantly Muslim population, as is the case in Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire (Assefa, 2001). In all, 97.3% of Ghana's Muslim population are found in the three northern regions of the country, with the Northern Region alone accounting for 35.2% of the national Muslim population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). While most of the conflicts in Ghana are not about religious rivalry per se, religion [has nonetheless] played a role in reinforcing the fault lines in the conflict[s]" (Assefa, 2001, p. 167). In the interethnic conflicts of northern Ghana, for instance, ethnic identities of the belligerent groups are often confounded with the dominant religious affiliations of the members of the ethnic groups. In some cases, communities at war consciously invoke

the emotive force of their dominant collective religious identity as the mobilizing force for fighters and the glue that holds them together against their common enemy (Kirby, 2006-2007).

In addition to the geopolitical and ethnic tensions that keep Ghana's peace fragile, Ghana also has a history of civil resistance to state rule or misrule. Such mass actions date back to the protests by the Aborigines Rights Protection Society of West Africa organized against the colonial government through to violent agitations that the Convention People's Party organized as it championed the strikes and demonstrations in the struggle for independence (Morrison, 2004). Strikes and protests against military rule, especially in the 1970s through the 80s, were also instrumental in forcing military governments to change their courses on crucial national issues. In 1979 alone, professionals, university lecturers, students, and politicians of all political affiliations joined hands to organize more than 80 separate strikes in the space of four months to demand political changes from the military junta of the Supreme Military Council (Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1982). Similarly, spades of strikes and demonstrations by students and other professionals triggered and propelled the decision of the PNDC government to initiate a return to constitutional rule in the late 1980s through the early 1990s, despite its initial resistance to the idea of ever handing over power.

As a sequel to these civil actions the PNDC government initiated the decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other local government structures, in the hope that "...the democratisation of national politics may diffuse the incessant security threats, unify the people, and give the P.N.D.C. the domestic support required for social transformation" (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 625). The

decision was also designed to address the perceived lack of legitimacy of the PNDC government, which fueled the incessant attempts by armed groups to overthrow it.

Several of the otherwise peaceful demonstrations and strikes in the country's history turned violent as governments and state functionaries resorted to the use of force to quell them. In the 19970s, for instance, "...the excessive use of force by the government in subduing demonstrations on secondary school and university campuses" (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979, p. 187) became the norm anytime the students took to the streets to protest against one issue or the other. In the 1980s, the PNDC government had frequent running battles with students, most of which turned violent. The government repeatedly closed down the country's universities in an effort to break the organizational capacity of the students, keep them at home, and off the streets (Akonor, 2006). Similar violent government-civilian confrontations continued into the early days of the return to democratic governance in the 1990s. In 1994, a peaceful march to demand the liberation of the broadcast airwaves by supporters of Radio Eye, a private radio station set up in defiance of the reluctance of the government to license private FM broadcast radio stations to operate, turned violent when unidentified assailants, believed to be associated with the government, attempted to block the demonstrations (Nketia, 2013; Public Agenda, 2005). In 1995, popular discontent and protests against the introduction of the Value-added Tax system culminated in the Kumepreko (i.e. "just kill me") and Siemepreko, (i.e. just burry me) demonstrations. These turned violent with several people killed (Osei, 2000).

Student activism on the political front has been an epicenter of civil unrest in Ghana. Starting off from a position of non-engagement, it witnessed increasingly super-

active engagement over time. Finlay (1968) remarked that before the 1980s, "...unlike [...] in many developing nations where students have been a significant force in making or breaking governments" (p. 51), Ghanaian students remained largely apathetic to the political life of the country. Even when students engaged the state on political grounds, it was usually the government that initiated the engagements (Finlay, 1968). Finlay attributed the absence of student activism in the 1960s, in part to "...the strong Ghanaian tradition of deference to authority [which had] mitigated against student hostility and protest" (Finlay, 1968, p. 55). It would seem, however, that cooptation in a suffocating political environment rather than deference may have explained the seemingly apathetic response of students to political life in the 1960s.

Since the 1970s, students have been at the forefront of political agitations that have made and unmade governments. While students were part of Nkrumah's support structure (Hettne, 1980; Chazan & Le Vine, 1979), they were in the forefront of civil society opposition to the Union Government concept of the Acheampong regime (Hettne, 1980). Similarly, under the auspices of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), they championed the agenda of Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ; constituted the base for the June 4th Movement; and led the demonstrations against the Limann regime that paved the way for, and gave a legitimate voice to the junta that constituted the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to overthrow the Limann government in 1981(Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Kpessa, 2007). The students were, ironically, also pivotal in the demonstrations that eventually forced the PNDC to launch the processes of returning the country to constitutional rule (Kpessa, 2007). In these

strikes and demonstrations some lives were lost and organizers were subjected to human rights violations of all kinds, especially under the military regimes.

In recent times, contestation for political space and power in Africa has shifted from the battle grounds and the use of coups d'états to the ballot boxes. Consequently, geo-ethnic politics have triggered election related violence in several countries in Africa since the re-introduction of democratic rule in the 1990s. Recourse to violence has been unavoidable, especially in many instances where results of presidential polls have been too close to call or the potential for interethnic or interregional transfer of political power is eminent. In Togo the sudden death of the northern political strongman, Gnassingbe Eyadema, while holding onto power, and without a clear successor, had revived the hopes of the longtime political rivals in the south to recapture power. In the compromised elections that followed the forcible imposition of Faure Gnassingbe as a successor, up to 800 people died in the post-electoral disputes of the results and the violence that followed the declaration of Faure Gnassingbe as the winner (France24, 2010; Noyes, 2013). In Madagascar, similar elections in 2013 led to incidents of violence with some loss of life (Today's Newspaper, 2013). In the 2011 elections in Nigeria more than 500 people died, another 17,000 people were internally displaced, and 360 others were injured in post-election violence in eight northern states (BBC News, 2011a; CNN Wire Staff, 2011). In Cote d'Ivoire's election of 2000, disputes over the winner of the elections culminated in the first civil war in 2002 that split the country into two for eight years. Earlier in 2000, at least 170 people died in electoral related violence in October with another 42 recorded dead in the December of the same year (Skogseth, 2006). Attempts to resolve the crisis through another presidential election in 2010 deepened the political and social rift in the

country. The Independent Electoral Commission declared Alassane Ouattara as winner of the elections, while the Constitutional Court routed for Laurent Gbagbo as the winner (BBC News, 2011b; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011). It took another civil war, with the backing of the French army on the pro-Ouattara side, to oust President Gbagbo, at the cost of 3,000 lives, 200,000 refugees, and thousands more internally displaced (Djoman, 2013). Kenya's election in 2007 ended in violence when Mwai Kibaki was declared winner. Similarly, Mugabe's win in Zimbabwe's 2008 presidential elections also ended in violence (Amnesty International, 2008).

Violence has been part of Ghana's, hotly contested and contentious elections since 1992 (The Center for African Democratic Affairs, 2012) as well. The country's return to multiparty democracy compelled the PNDC to shed its military image and transform itself into a political party christened the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Other members and sympathizers of the PNDC formed other political parties that all retained Flt Lt J. J. Rawlings as their presidential candidate. To ensure victory for the PNDC coalition, the electoral process was tightly controlled with legal limitations on funding amounts and sources for political parties (Oquaye, 1995a). The scheduling of the elections was similarly configured to make the presidential elections come several weeks before the parliamentary one. After Rawlings was declared winner of the 1992 presidential elections, all the major political parties, except those affiliated to the PNDC, boycotted the parliamentary elections over protests of perceived manipulation of the electoral process and the attendant rigging of the presidential race in favor of J.J Rawlings. The boycotts nearly derailed the redemocratization process.

The 2000 elections marked a crucial turning point when the constitutionally imposed term limit mandated the exit of J.J. Rawlings, whose name and face had dominated the national politics for nineteen years. With the eminent exit of Rawlings, however, came the prospect of transfer of power from the hitherto dominant political force, the Ewe supported PNDC/NDC (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), to a different party - the Akan-based New Patriotic Party (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). This eminent change in the political landscape increased the stakes in the elections, especially when J.J Rawlings declared that should the NPP win the elections, "...there would be a 'fight' because he was not prepared to hand over to 'rogues and thieves'" (Oquaye, 1995, p. 263). When the NPP did win, the transfer of power from the NDC to its arch rival political party, the New Patriotic Party, was also almost aborted. A plan to fake an invasion of the country as the pretext for placing it under a state of emergency, and thereby cancelling the results of the elections was hatched. The country escaped a return to military rule only by the intervention of one brave military officer who reportedly sprang a surprise visit on the coup plotters and ordered that they abandon their scheme (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012; The New Crusading Guide, 2012). In 2008, the election was won by the slimmest of margins – 40,000 votes. The country was brought to the brink of war when the NDC, fearing they would lose the elections, began to mobilize its supporters and "troops ...to make the country ungovernable" (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012).

Of the six successive elections since the return to democratic rule in 1992, however, the 2012 elections was the one that brought the country closest to war. Two political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the Convention People's Party, refused to recognize the results of the 2012 Presidential elections that the Electoral Commission

declared. They alleged that the results were flawed by massive and systematic fraud perpetrated by the collusion of the Electoral Commission and the ruling National Democratic Congress. To prove their case, the NPP went to the Supreme Court, as the Constitution prescribes, to demand the annulment of the results (Daily Guide, 12 December 2012; Jale & Antwi, 2012) on the grounds that some "...1,340,000 votes cast for Mr Mahama - enough to swing the outcome in favour of Mr Akufo-Addo" (BBC News, 7 January, 2013) were illegitimate votes or votes wrongly assigned to John Mahama from the votes of other parties. Subsequently, the NPP amended its writ to call for the annulment of results of the presidential elections in "11,916 Polling Areas... instead of the 4,709 in the original petition" (Owusu, 2013, p. 3). If granted, this would have been enough to reverse the declared results to "bring John Mahama's total valid votes cast to 39.1% (2,473,171) and Akufo-Addo's to 3,775,552; making him (Akufo Addo) the clear winner by 59.69%" (Owusu, 2013, p. 3).

Few believed the NPP would actually go to court to seek to reverse the results of the elections. However, when the party executed its intent and actually filed the petition, that act raised political tensions and the stakes for peace in the country. The outcome of the court decision would be pivotal for Ghana's peaceful and democratic credentials, since this was the first time ever that a legal challenge tested the limits of Ghana's constitution, the electoral laws, and election management systems. Many feared the outcome of the petition, whichever way it went, would not be accepted by the losing party.

The televised election petition travelled eight (8) months in the Supreme Court, with FM radio stations across the country providing coverage of the actual proceedings as

well as soliciting and broadcasting views and comments from all parties in court. The contending political parties took advantage of this unbridled media coverage of the trial to take their case to the court of public opinion, as various spokespersons on both sides freely dished out their personal opinions or made statements that were sometimes prejudicial to the legal process. The trade in insults and prejudicial statements inflamed passions and heightened tensions in the country (Ofori, 2013; Yayra, 2013) . The Supreme Court had to invoke its power to convict and sentence people for contempt of court before it could rein in the press court phenomenon (Joyonline, 2013).

So tense was the situation that before the date for judgment was announced, media houses brimmed with calls for peace. Mosques, churches, and other faith-based organizations launched prayer sessions; civil society groups organized meetings and workshops to call for peace; traditional rulers and all recognizable groups seized every opportunity by the minute to call for peace before and after the verdict was given. Nonetheless, media coverage of the fear of violence created so much panic that some people started to withdraw their monies from banks; make plans to travel out of the country; or stock up provisions in anticipation of a war (Adom FM, 2013). Airlines operating in the country to foreign destinations were alleged to be all fully booked as people scrambled to leave the country before or shortly after the verdict was read (The Herald Newspaper (2013). The government took the cue and put 32,000 heavily armed Police Officers and several thousands of military patrol personnel into the streets across the country, with particularly heavy presence in anticipated flashpoints such as Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale (Myjoyonline, 2013b).

When the Supreme Court justices delivered their verdict, a split decision saw the petition thrown out by a majority vote of the judges. The lead petitioner, the Presidential Candidate of the NPP, immediately called President Mahama, whose election he was contesting, to congratulate him. At a Press Conference, he announced that even though he disagreed with the judgment, he would nonetheless accept it, and foreswore his option for seeking a judicial review on the matter. Although this gesture doused the tensions, it was far from abetting anxiety and fear of war, as several factors contributed to keep tensions high. First was a report that the judgment delivered in open court was amended in chambers to correct an error that gave a 6-3 ruling on one of the issues at trial. Media announcement of the correct ruling of 5-4 raised concerns about the accuracy of the entire judgment. The legality of correcting a judgment in chambers was also debated passionately (Baneseh, 2013). Second, public perception that the judgment was politically influenced received support from no less a person than the lead counsel for the third respondent in the case, the National Democratic Congress. The counsel said in a post-trial television program that one of the judges was politically blinded in his judgments because he was appointed under President Kuffuor. Kuffuor was President of Ghana on the ticket of the NPP, whose members were the petitioners in the case. The lead counsel for the NDC accused the cited judge of consistently siding with the petitioners (Public Agenda, 2013). This accusation triggered counter accusations that three of the judges who consistently threw out all the cases of the petitioners were also appointed under the NDC regimes.

Allegations of corruption of some of the judges who sat on the case heightened when a member of the legal team of the NPP also said on a hosted radio program that the

judgment was corrupt (Otchere-Darko, 2013; Radioyzone.com, 2013). Another allegation in one of the private media that the Asantehene, the paramount chief of the Akans was implicated in the bribery of some of the Supreme Court judges to deliver judgment in favor of the ruling party (Myjoyonline, 2013c, 2013d) further fueled perceptions that the judgment was not without political influence. Subsequent allegations in a leaked tape recording from a Deputy Minister of Communication that a Minister, whose husband happened to have been the lead counsel for the President in the election petition, played an influential role in securing the pro-government judgment from the judges re-ignited the perception of collusion and corruption between the government and the judges in the determination of the case (Daily Guide Reporter, 2013; New Statesman, 2013). This prompted the NPP to file a request for probe into the Supreme Court's handling of the election petition case (Essel, 2013), despite denials put out by the person who was alleged to have mediated the collusion on the case (The Chronicle, 2013).

Be that as it may, the trade in allegations of political bias among the judges who heard the election petition did not only give political colors to the judgment and thereby erode public confidence in the legitimacy of the judgment; it extended the polarization of the country beyond the frontiers of the last bastion of democracy – the judicial system. The refusal of Tsatsu Tsikata, Counsel for the NDC, to apologize for his statement that one of the Supreme Court Justices was biased by his political colors (T. Tsikata, 2013), as well as Gabby Otchere Darko's insistence that the supreme court judgment was corrupted (Otchere-Darko, 2013) sparked speculations on both sides about the ability of the judiciary to be neutral and objective in their judgments in future electoral disputes. Some interpretations of the verdict in the media concluded that the Supreme Court's rejection

of the petitions gave the impression that the judiciary had actually sanctioned the alleged irregularities as non-issues, and therefore, such malpractices can be accepted as valid electoral practices (Odoi-Larbi, 2013). Regardless of the validity or otherwise of these perceptions, the trades of accusations and counters in respect of the perceived collusion and corruption in the election petition case tarnished the image of the judiciary as an impartial arbiter in electoral disputes. Some commentators averred that the judiciary could no longer be trusted as the last arbiter in future electoral disputes (Adofo, 2013). This view further undermined public confidence in the judicial process (Adofo, 2013; The New Statesman, 2013).

While the worst for Ghana in respect of the 2012 election petition seems to have passed without violence, concerns over the import of the remarks by the legal experts on both side of the election petition pose grave questions for the future conduct of elections in the country. If the statement that the judgment was corrupted could be substantiated, what would it mean for subsequent elections? Would that mean the judiciary is to be ignored in the future in electoral disputes? Does this mean going to court is no longer an option for deciding electoral disputes? If so, what is the final arbiter in electoral disputes, if the judiciary cannot be trusted to deliver justice fairly?

Away from the national capital, election related violence is common, especially in locations where local politicians have ridden on the back of pre-existing chieftaincy and land conflicts to further their political interests (IRIN News, 2008a). The Bawku conflict between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, for instance, has served as the pendulum that determined the political fortunes of all political leaders in that constituency since 1992. Candidates from all political persuasions “capitalise on the Bawku conflict for political

gains” (Dramani, 2009). In December 2001, sixty people were reported dead, 2,500 displaced, and at least 190 houses burnt down when the conflict erupted in relation to local government elections (Ghana Review, 2001; Lund, 2003). Other localities have reported similar recurrence of election related violence. In 2008, supporters of the two major political parties in the country “...vandalised registration centres on 2 August and gun shots were heard in Tamale, the capital of the northern region, during voter registration” (Ghana Elections, 2008). Similar clashes four days later in the Volta Region left one person wounded. In September of the same year, the re-eruption of the electoral violence in Tamale left several houses in char, with “...walls riddled with bullets, and burnt cars [marking the extent of the] violence in the Northern Region's capital of Tamale” (IRIN News, 2008b). In election years, the use of violent language in the form of threats, harassments, and actual calls to violence in the print and electronic media across the country is common. However, such violent language is more pronounced before the launch of political campaigns and shortly after the conduct of the elections. In 2012, supporters of the two main political parties, the NDC and the NPP, accounted for 74.6% of the reported cases of use of election-related violent language and threats of violence in the media (Amponsah, 2013).

In sum, Ghana has all the internal geopolitical contradictions and political tensions that have prone other countries to the eruption of violence as conventional theories on conflict predict. It shares the same historical, ethno-demographic, as well as, inter and intra-ethnic confrontations that have triggered very violent and protracted conflicts in many African countries. Yet somehow, the country has successfully staved off sustained violent conflicts at the national level. She has managed to keep her

protracted and violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts localized rather than escalated into national level ones. Electoral disputes brought the country to the brink of war in 2008 and 2012, but the country managed to pull back from descending into the outbreak of full scale national level violence.

Questioning the Peace

Despite this achievement, Ghana has been through and still is going through multiple challenges with keeping the peace. The country is rated 71st on the 2012 Positive Peace Index (PPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), with a score of 3.021. While this is below Botswana (rated 43rd with a score of 2.561), South Africa (51st, with a score of 2.684), Namibia (53rd with 2.783) and Tunisia 62nd with a score of 2.915, Ghana tops the West Africa list, ahead of Senegal ranked 88th, Mali 98th, Burkina Faso 102nd, and Nigeria 106. This notwithstanding, Ghana is still counted among the “...top ten positive peace deficit countries [which are defined as being] relatively peaceful but lack the institutions to adequately deal with external shocks” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 89, Table 3.4). In other words, Ghana’s peace is very fragile as the country can easily descend into violence, given the right shocks. Yet, somehow, Ghana has always managed to pull back from the cliff of descending into national level violence right where other countries have taken the plunge.

Statement of Research Problem

The foregoing shows that contrary to the perception of Ghana as a peaceful country, it has had its fair share of confrontational politics (Finlay, 1968) and national level political agitations. Ghanaians are neither apathetic nor shy of confrontational

engagements in the public sphere. On the contrary, "...it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent Ghanaians from openly and forcefully expressing themselves on important political issues" (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The localized frequent outbursts of violent conflicts around the country only suggest that Ghana may have been quite successful in containing such violent conflicts. However, such successful suppression of conflicts from escalating into national level violence is neither an indication of nor a guarantee for peace. In contrast, Ghana's peace is neither secured nor can be taken for granted. There are enough reasons for it to have descended into war; and the potential violent national level conflict remains real.

Ghana's outlier position triggers a need to find out what kinds of threads have been so successful at holding the stitches of nationhood together. Hence some explanations on why and how Ghana has managed to remain relatively peaceful despite its internal centrifugal ethnic, political, economic, and socio-cultural challenges are required. Questions that require answers are: What has made it possible for Ghana to avoid violent national conflicts, despite having all the ingredients that have plunged other countries with similar mixes of economic, social, and ethno-political challenges into violence? What has enabled Ghana to more successfully manage its internal centrifugal ethno-political and geo-economic forces of division than other countries with the same or similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and political challenges? What are the constitutive elements of the threads and stitches that seem to be holding Ghana together? Are these threads and stitches peculiar to Ghana? If so, what makes Ghana's case special, given that it has similar ethnic groupings with its neighbors, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo, both of which have witnessed sustained national level political

violence? Are Ghana's threads and stitches replicable in or exportable to other politico-cultural settings? If not, why not? If yes, why has the osmosis of these values across national boundaries, especially those contiguous to Ghana, not happened?

Research Questions

The Core Research question (CRQ) that this research seeks to answer is: What makes it possible for Ghana to avoid violent national conflicts, when other countries with the same or similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and political systems of exclusion, deprivation, and disparities have descended into violent conflicts? Under this core question, the research uses four sub questions to guide its probe of the views, perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of participants on what keeps Ghana from descending into national level conflicts. The sub research questions (SRQ), which are further detailed through survey questionnaires and the guides for the key informant interviews, are:

SRQ1 asks: What factors have enabled Ghana to keep the peace, when it has the same or similar mixes of factors that have plunged other countries into violence?

SRQ2 asks: What systems have prevented local conflicts from escalating into violent national level confrontations?

SRQ3 asks: What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into national level electoral violence?

SRQ 4 asks: To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and between Ghana's 52+ different ethnic groups?

The CRQ and SQRs provide the broad framework of inquiry in this study. The survey questionnaires and interview guide for the Key Informant Interviews use further sub questions to explore answers to the CRQ and the SQRs under the following broad levels of enquiry:

1. Socio-economic and political force fields level of enquiry: What factors and forces have enabled Ghana to keep the peace despite having similar contextual issues that led other countries into violence? Sub questions to be pursued are:

a. How differently have the same historical and contemporary factors played together to avert violent national conflicts in Ghana but not in other countries?

b. What approaches has Ghana used to more effectively manage the same balance of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts?

2. Systems level of Enquiry: In the absence of a sustained constitutional order for much of Ghana's life as an independent state, and amidst the proliferation of violent local conflicts across the country, as well as, the widespread distrust of state actors, institutions, and processes:

a. What systems could have been in place that regulated interethnic engagements to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into violent national level confrontations?

b. What contributions, if any, have individuals and/or institutional actors (local, national, or international; governmental, civil society, or religious) made to the maintenance of peace in Ghana?

c. What kinds of threads (rules, regulations, shared values, cultural mores, etc.) have held together the stitches of peace for Ghana?

3. Elections and Contested Arenas level of Enquiry: Successive elections without widespread violence since 1992 have been used as a major indicator of peace in Ghana. Yet, elections in Ghana and their outcomes have been split along regional, ethnic, and religious lines. All but one have been keenly contested and largely won by very slim margins. Despite contestation and/or rejections of the outcomes, elections have not triggered widespread violence at the national level in Ghana.

a. What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into full scale national level violence before, during, and after elections, despite:

i) the contestations and local violence associated with electoral disputes?

ii) the regionally/ethnically partisan nature of electoral processes and their outcomes?

b. How have aggrieved political parties managed their dissents on elections and electoral processes to prevent them from escalating into national level violent conflicts?

c. What restrains aggrieved political parties from taking their grievances to the street?

4. Culture and Values level of Enquiry: The tendency towards violence or peace are said to be learned behaviors.

a. To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and between Ghana's 52+ different ethnic groups?

b. What role, if any, do traditional leaders play in maintaining Ghana's peace?

5. Contribution of Formal Education

a. What contribution, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in creating a culture of peace?

- b. What tenets of the formal educational system of Ghana may have contributed to a culture of peace in Ghana?
- c. What behaviors could the formal education system in Ghana have fostered that promotes a culture of tolerance in Ghana more than in other countries?

A much detailed set of questions is provided in the Appendices 5 and 6.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Explaining Ghana's Peace – theoretical challenges

Various theories have tried to explain why Africa is trapped in some of the world's most violent and protracted conflicts. Theories of ancient hatreds (Kaplan, 1993); out-group resentments (Petersen, 2002); fear-induced self-protection initiatives (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; Posen, 1993); or the manipulation of ethnic identities for political ends (Gagnon, 1994; Kaufman, 2001), among others, have been used to explain the prevalence of violent conflicts in some countries, especially those in Africa that have suffered violent and protracted unrests. Africa's rich natural resource base has also offered a theoretical frame for explaining the prevalence of violent conflict on the continent (Collier, 2007). Others have argued that relative political and economic deprivations are the sources of intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts (Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Stewart, 2005).

Generally, relative deprivation theorists focus on the horizontal political and economic inequalities afflicting Africa's multi-ethnic population groupings as the source of the conflicts. In particular, economic deprivation theorists emphasize a vicious cycle in which "... poverty begets conflict and conflict begets poverty" (Stewart and Brown, 2007, p. 219; see also Rice, Graff, & Lewis, 2006). However, "it is not absolute poverty but relative poverty" (Stewart and Brown, 2007 p. 228) they argue, that instigates violent reactions as segments of population groupings compare their economic fortunes and opportunities to what their compatriots have. Political deprivation theorists, on the other hand, focus on political inequalities as they contend that political exclusion in the post-colonial state in Africa is the source of conflict (Levy, 2007). According to this view,

after African states fought to obtain their independence “...segments of some of these states now fight ...to make sure that their destiny is in their own hands” (Zartman, 2001, p. 219).

Building off the theories of relative political and economic deprivation, other theorists attach a religious dimension to the conflicts in Africa by pointing out that across Africa “... more heavily Muslim regions are often relatively marginalised economically and politically and that leaves plenty of ground for radicalism to sprout” (Tostevin, 2011, p. 1). This argument on the pauperization of religious communities has become a popular framework for explaining the conflicts in Nigeria (Adesoji 2011; Herskovits, 2012; Tostevin, 2011), and Cote d’Ivoire (Collett, 2006; Dabalen, Kebede, & Paul, 2012). In both Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire the transposition of geo-ethnic poverty disparities over religious identities along the north-south boundaries led to the transformation of “religious polarization ... into identity polarization [which] made civil war inevitable due to the religious fault lines” (Dabalen et al., 2012, p. 3).

Fearon & Laitin (1999) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004), however, argue that there is little evidence to support the ancient hatred, relative deprivation, and collective grievance theories of civil wars and protracted internal conflicts that the foregoing theories have proffered. In their view, ethnic diversity, ethno-geopolitics, and deprivation theories do not seem sufficient to explain the causes of civil wars, especially since they do not broach the topic on why some countries with similar or the same mix of ethnic and economic factors do not experience civil wars whilst their neighbors do. Instead, they believe that weak states create opportunities for insurgencies, especially where dissent groups have access to commercial natural resources that can fund their rebellions. This weak state

theory finds support in Galtung (in Augsburger, 1992) and Wehr (1998) who consider the process of state formation in post-independent Africa as the genesis of much of its conflicts. It also finds support in Mamdani (1996) who faults colonial rule for much of post-independence Africa's conflicts. In particular, Mamdani chronicles how colonial administrators used territorial and institutional segregation and the active promotion of "decentralized despotism" (1996, p. 39) to derail the evolution of Africa's governance and development trajectory, thereby creating the conditions for interethnic resentments and rivalries.

Ametewe (2007) builds on Mamdani's proposition and points out that pre-colonial interethnic relations often "...tampered with values of mutual respect and rules for accommodating one another" (p. 27). However these values were often destroyed through the deliberate acts of the colonial administrators. Hawkins, (1996) and Lund (2003) both lend support to this theoretical frame when they point out that in pursuance of the system of indirect rule, colonial administrators tinkered with significant differences in the sociopolitical organization of the different ethnic groups to create the conditions for inter and intraethnic conflicts that have projected into the national politics of the post-independence state. In recent times, competition for land, political, economic access, and religious rivalries have compounded the nature of these conflicts (Weiss, 2005).

Taking the debate beyond the colonial legacy theories of conflicts in Africa, Horowitz (2000) introduces the nature and structure of political contestation in the modern state as the source of conflict in much of Africa. He discusses the interplay between ethnic parties and political systems based on political parties and argues that "societies that are deeply riven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage ...tend to throw up

party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291). According to this frame of thought, increasing competition between ethnic groups within the post-independence states for access to political power, economic resources, and other socio-economic opportunities trigger and reinforce ethnic cleavages that become the footholds for individuals and groups seeking space and opportunities in the public sphere. As such, the public sphere becomes a highly contested arena where ethnic groups try to “outdo one another in the struggle for the scarce resources of society; be it power, wealth, status and prestige, education, access to land for housing and other economic ventures” (Ametewe, 2007, p. 28). In other words, interethnic competition for footholds in the public space and for access to resources is the basis of conflict in Africa. Toft (2003) agrees with this line of reasoning and argues further that the concentration of ethnic groups in defined geopolitical spaces heighten the stakes and accentuates the conditions for turf wars between ethnic groups.

While these theories offer some explanation on why Africa is the continent of war and violence, they fail to account for the fact that several countries in Africa that have the same ingredients of historical, economic, and political inequalities; natural resource dependency; and asymmetric religious configuration of their populations have not descended into violent national conflicts as the theories predict. Ghana, for one, has all the ingredients that have plunged other countries, such as La Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Togo, to name a few, into violent national level conflicts. Ghana also hosts similar historical interethnic hostilities and “horizontal inequalities”(Stewart, 2005, p. 6), some of which still throw up violent confrontations periodically (Brukum, 2000-2001; Pul, 2003) or become manifest

in the struggle for political power in the electoral arena (Chazan, 1982; Craig, 1969; Morrison, 2004). Brown (1982) recalls that the existence of "...deep socio-economic and cultural cleavages between interacting communities produce mutual resentment and thence political confrontation [an argument that] has been frequently used to explain the north-south tensions which have dominated the politics of Ghana's eastern neighbour, Togo" (p. 46). Within Ghana, the same argument has been used to predict a north-south confrontation, with the "...assertions that, even if north-south confrontations have not occurred so far, they are surely inevitable and imminent [...] north-south conflict is merely 'latent' and about to explode" (Brown, 1982, p. 46; see also Ladouceur, 1979).

With respect to the natural resource dependency theories, it is noteworthy that since independence Ghana has remained "... dependent on primary resource-based products of gold, cocoa and timber" (Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2011, p. 126; see also Bank of Ghana, 2010; Williams, 1966). When foreign exchange earnings from timber and wood products and other minerals such as manganese, bauxite, and diamonds are added, Ghana's reliance on natural resources for its foreign exchange earnings comes to 82% as of mid-2011 (Center for Policy Analysis, 2011). This is more than thrice Collier's (2007) threshold of 23% as the tipping point for resource-based violent conflicts. Yet, Ghana has not succumbed to national level violence on account of its dependence on natural resources.

Several theorists have suggested that the existence of horizontal political and economic inequalities is not enough to trigger violence. On the contrary, it requires the presence of agents of war who are capable of mobilizing the collective grievances of the marginalized into war efforts (Hamon, 1965; Stewart and Brown, 2007; Vreÿ, 2010). The

prevalence of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts; the visible, persistent, and ever-widening poverty gap between the north and south of Ghana; and the bitter political rivalries between various parties in the country certainly provide plenty of fodder for predatory agents of war to use to foment national level conflicts. Hence, if the postulation on the role of agents of war in Africa's conflicts is true, what explains the absence of any such opportunistic leaders in Ghana capable of turning the fault lines of Ghana's geoethnic and economic relative deprivation and horizontal inequalities into motives of war? In particular, why have conflicts in the north, the poorest part of the country, not spilled over into the rest of the country? Why aren't there aggrieved regional groups, especially from the north and other deprived parts of the country, that articulate a northern agenda to stake claims to greater entitlements from the rest of the country?

The argument that political parties that articulate their agendas and claims for access and space in the public sphere on the basis of their ethnic constituencies tend to "deepen and extend" (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291) the pre-existing ethnic divisions finds little support in Ghana, as well. For, while it is common knowledge that political parties tend to have their strongholds in certain ethnic enclaves; and that ethnic affiliations play crucial roles in the voting patterns of most Ghanaians (Craig, 1969), these facts have not exacerbated the interethnic conflicts to the point of widespread violence as witnessed in countries such as Burundi, La Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda. Not even the military coup d'états that had ethnic connotations nor the overt stacking of important positions in the army and other public services along ethnic lines (Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Hettne, 1980) have succeeded in polarizing the country to the point of triggering open interethnic violence at the national level. Hence, why Ghana's manifest inter-ethnic competitions in

politics have not resulted in national level violence as in other countries on the continent still requires explaining.

Ancient hatreds and historical interethnic relationships usually infuse ethnopolitical competition and serve as the identity marker for ethnic mobilization in the political space of the modern state. Even when the political elite tend to be cross-ethnic in the composition of their party affiliations, social relationships, and economic ties, ethnicity nonetheless remains a strong and emotive rallying point for their supporters who tend to have more homogeneity in their geographical enclaves (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010; Skogseth, 2006). Hence, in Cote d'Ivoire, Gbagbo's invention of the *ivoirité* concept, later embraced by Konan Bedie, was an effective rally cry for "the baoulisation' of the political system, the economy and the army [and the concomitant marginalization and political exclusion of the] predominantly Kru and northern Mande" (Meehan, 2011) ethnic groups. In Kenya, ethnicity has been a critical factor in the country's democratic transition from the post Kenyatta-Mwai eras in the late 1990s (Ndegwa, 1997). This ethnicized politics would culminate in the political violence that pitched Raila Odinga's coalition of the Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba and Luhya, among others on the one hand, against Mwai Kibaki's Kikuyu political base in the 2007 elections (Hawke, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2008; Roberts, 2009). Ironically, five years on, it is the same ethnicized politics that would create the "tyranny of numbers" (Kimemia, 2013, p. 1) from an unusual alliance of Kalenjin and Kikuyu politicians to stave off a repeat of the 2007 violence in the 2012 elections (Ngunyi, 2013; Kimemia, 2013). While political leaders would deny it, Zimbabwe's political crises are equally mired in ethnic competition, as local politics

continue to be read through “ethnocentric prisms” (Dachs, 2009; Phiri, 2013; Sithole & Makumbe, 1997).

As already noted, Ghana has its fair share of similar historical and contemporary interethnic competition for political power, with ethnicity defining membership of or support for political parties and the voting lines to a large extent (Fridy, 2007; Nugent, 1999; Nugent, 2001). Historically, the Ashantis, the single dominant ethnic group in Ghana, have fought wars of domination with the Dagombas and Gonjas to the north; the Fantes and Nzemas to the south and south-west; the Akyems and Ewes to the East, among others (Johnson, 1965). The north in particular has bitter memories of its association with the Ashantis, as the Dagomba and Gonja chiefs were bonded to provide 1,500 and 1,000 slaves each respectively in annual tributes to the Ashantis for a hundred years or more. Doubtless, such slaves were supplied through raids among the other ethnic groups in the north (Arhin, 1967; Johnson, 1965). In some cases, “the Ashanti often sold into slavery a whole village full of his people, and [...] no-one's life or property was safe when the Ashantees were in the country” (Gouldsbury cited in Johnson, 1965, p. 39). The memories of these humiliations are kept alive through traditional oral historians who pass them on from one generation to the next in the form of songs such as the one recounted in Salaga to the effect that “Every year we had to send 1,000 of our brothers to the Kumasi knife, and to the Kumasi King all our money without grumbling” (Glover cited in Johnson, 1965, p. 39). But somehow, these memories of ancient humiliations have not pitched the people of the north against the Ashantis in revenge battles; neither has it dragged Ghana into violent national confrontations in direct or diffused proxy wars.

The political split between the northerners, the Ashantis, the transvolta groups, and the coastal grouping in the run up to independence has already been discussed in Chapter 1. Since independence, political allegiances have been split along ethnic lines. In the early years of state formation, northerners coalesced around the Northern People's Party (NPP); while the Ashantis rooted for the National Liberation Movement (NLM). The Convention People's Party was the only party that provided an umbrella for a coalition of some of the coastal and other ethnic groups in the country (Nambiema, 2012). It is noteworthy, however, that of all the historical interethnic competitions for political space and power in post-independence Ghana, the "Ashanti-Ewe rivalry is [the one that has lasted into the modern state system and has become] one of the major political divides in Ghana" (Nambiema, 2012, p. 32). Consistently, the two ethnic groups have tended to veer towards diametrically opposed political axes since the country came together as one unit. And this happens under all the civilian and military regimes the country has witnessed. We have noted how the political elite of Transvolta Togoland opposed the Nkrumah regime from start. After the overthrow of the CPP in 1966, the military regime of the National Liberation Council rapidly descended into the Ashanti-Ewe split when Kotoka, an Ewe, was killed in a counter-coup and Afrifa, an Akan, took over as head of state (Nambiema, 2012). When the country returned to civilian rule in 1969, Gbedemah's Ewe-dominated National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) pitched battle against the Akan-led Progress Party with Busia as its leader (Craig, 1969). When Flt J.J Rawlings took over power after the 1981 coup, the dominance of Ewes in the affairs of government gave rise to "...the widespread perception that the P.N.D.C. had become the preserve of the Ewes" (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a, p. 624).

With the return to civilian rule since the 1990s, Morrison (2004) has argued that ethnicity is not a major factor in Ghana's political discourse, when viewed against election results from 1992 to 2008. He points out that the electoral fortunes of the two dominant parties in the country, the NDC and the NPP, have swung with the moods of voters in different regions, with both parties making significant inroads into the traditional strong holds of their counterparts. Inchino and Nathan (2012) further contend that ethnic geographies are more important than ethnic demographics in the determination of electoral outcomes, even in remote rural communities, where "theories of instrumental ethnic voting" (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) do not seem to work, at least in the case of Ghana. According to this view, in multi-ethnic localities, the choice of candidate is largely based on voter perception of which candidate is more likely to deliver "non-excludable" (Nathan, 2012, p. 1) public goods and social services such as roads, schools, healthcare, etc. Under such circumstances, voting for "co-ethnics as an instrumental action" (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) is not a valid proposition, since voters tend to migrate towards the candidate that is more likely to deliver development services, even if that candidate is not of their ethnic group. This view affirms in Morrison's (2004) observation about the lack of generalizable and discernible patterns across all regions in Ghana in voting outcomes. He argues that differences in stability and fluidity in voting patterns between regions make "ethnicity ... more difficult to determine, although Volta and Ashanti are often deemed to reflect the phenomenon" (Morrison, 2004, p. 429).

Morrison's argument is hard to sustained, given that the Volta and Ashanti regions have epitomized the ethnic tendencies in voting patterns in Ghana since the return to constitutional rule in 1992, with the NDC attracting the label of being Ewe-based while

the NPP takes on the Akan-based label (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). Morrison's view would only hold true when the criterion for making the discernment is the aggregated regional votes. However, this aggregated data blurs the picture. This is because discerning ethnic tendencies from aggregate votes of regions, especially those that have more cosmopolitan natures, is tricky given the masking effect of different levels of migration into the regions. For instance the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, and Greater Accra Regions have been net recipients of permanent and cyclical migrants from the Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and the Volta regions of Ghana, as well as, from other countries further to the north such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger since colonial times. In contrast, the Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and the Volta regions are net losers of migration (Anarfi, Kwankye, Ababio, & Tiemoko, 2003; Kwankye, Anarfi, Tagoe, & Castaldo, 2009). Hence, the clearest way to deduce any ethnic tendencies in voting patterns is at the constituency levels, as ethnic groups tend to congregate around geographical enclaves at the micro-level.

Viewed from this angle, it becomes obvious that the ethnic concentration of populations around certain geographical areas sets boundaries for electoral success of political parties; a phenomenon that has become known as the electoral "world banks" in Ghanaian political parlance (Anebo, 2001; Ghana News Agency, 2004). Political parties associated with the Ashantis have had very hard times winning majority votes in the Volta Region. Similarly, parties perceived to have Ewe dominance have had a hard time as well getting majority votes in the Ashanti Region. In the 1969 elections, for instance, the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by Gbedemah, an Ewe, won 14 out of the 16 seats in the Volta Region, while the Progress Party, which was associated with the

Ashantis, won only two seats in that region (Craig, 1969). Overall, "...83.5 per cent of Ewe voters supported Gbedemah, and Busia got 77.7 per cent of the votes in the predominantly Akan regions of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Central" (Brown, 1982, p. 58). As Morrison, writing in conjunction with Hong (2006) would later admit, "Ethnic-based regional cleavages show much more complex varieties of electoral support for the two major parties" (Morrison & Hong, 2006, p. 623).

This entrenched system of "ethnic block voting" (Jockers, Kohnert, & Nugent, 2009, p. 2) in the two regions have persisted through the elections of 1980, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Since 1996, "three regions remain one-party-dominant (NDC): Upper East, Upper West, and Volta [with the Volta Region being virtually] noncompetitive, with the opposition [obtaining] under 13 percent in three polls" (Morrison, 2004). This trend has prompted the observation that the world bank phenomenon and the "...long history of fraudulent voting, amounts to a dangerous time bomb of unresolved conflict which could explode in future elections" (Jockers et al., 2009, p. 1; see also Sikanku, 2008).

Added to this is the intense and entrenched political rivalry between the duopoly of the NDC and NPP, which have dominated the political field since 1992. Given that the NDC claims its roots from the Nkrumaist tradition (Kelly & Bening, 2007), it might even be said that this rivalry dates back to the split between Nkrumah's CPP and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) of the Danquah-Busia traditions, which subsequently metamorphosed into the United Party (UP) tradition when the Northern Peoples Party and the National Liberation Movement merged after the 1956 elections (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007; Morrison, 2004). However, the ever tightening competition between the two parties

is manifested mainly in the electoral more than the ideological levels. In a field of seven presidential candidates, in 2000, candidates of the duopoly (i.e. NDC and NPP) shared 93.2% of the valid votes between them, with the remaining five candidates splitting up the 6.8% of the valid votes left. In 2004, in the first round of voting that had four (4) presidential candidates; the NPP and NDC candidates garnered 96.8% of the votes between them. The 2008 presidential race had 8 candidates, but the NPP and NDC flag bearers shared 97.05% of the votes between them. Although the results of the 2012 presidential elections were disputed at the Supreme Court, the trend was repeated in the declared and upheld results in which the NDC candidate was declared winner with 50.7% of the votes, while the NPP candidate received 47.74%, giving a total of 98.44% between the two. This means that the remaining six (6) presidential candidates shared the residual 1.56% of the votes between them – see summary in Appendix 1.

Despite this tight dualistic competition between the two main parties, Ghana has escaped widespread electoral violence even when the two dominant parties compete over margins of win of less than 1% of valid votes cast. In other words, Ghana although Ghana has had its fair share of ethnicized violent conflicts in both the northern and southern parts of the country; she has been successful in containing such ethno-electoral conflicts within localized geo-ethnic spaces (MacLean, 2004). Somehow, "...most of the conflicts have been limited to a particular traditional area or region and have not threatened the stability of the state" (Tonah, 2007, p. 3). This raises questions about what makes Ghana different. How Ghana has been able to do contain its ethno-electoral conflicts when other countries have failed is a central question for this study. Why have ancient hatreds or historical interethnic competition in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and other countries fueled violent

ethno-political conflicts but not in Ghana? Why have previously suppressed groups not sought to revenge the bondage they served under other ethnic groups? Why have the Ashantis not used their numerical strengths and economic hegemony to try to impose their rule on the rest of the country? In short, why has the “tyranny of numbers” (Kimemia, 2013, p. 1) not worked out for the Akan ethnic group, which needs only 3% more votes from other ethnic groups in presidential elections to add to its 47.5% command of the national population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012) to win outright in any national elections?

In apparent response to these pertinent questions, some analysts have suggested that rather than engage in open and violent confrontations in the political arena, Ghanaians have actively chosen to avoid violence because they have lost faith in the state system. According to this view, the “...great accumulation of unfulfilled promises” (Bush, 1980, pp. 86-87) of freedom, justice, and accelerated economic development that many expected from independence have bred cynicism and apathy among Ghanaians towards politics. In other words, due to state failure to deliver the dividends of independence, the majority of Ghanaians have retreated into their shells in their “...desire for a peaceful life” (Goody, 1968, p. 339; also see Bratton, Lewis, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) to avoid further disappointments with politicians. This withdrawal from the public space has created a culture of silence that has effectively stifled open political dissent among Ghanaians. As a result, a “... community of dissent” (Goody, 1968, p. 339) capable of turning personal and collective grievances into war efforts does not exist. But if political disconnection, apathy, and a desire for peace through conflict avoidance were the only

things that keep Ghana from having violent national level encounters, should that earn it the accolade of being an oasis of peace?

Be that as it may, the available evidence does not support the notion that Ghana's peace can be attributed to the avoidance of conflicts. On the contrary, Ghanaian's are politically active and willing to engage with governments, even in violent confrontations, to assert their rights and demand accountability from public office holders. Indeed, active and assertive political engagement is what enabled Ghana to emerge as the first country south of the Sahara to attain political independence. Notably, Nkrumah's declaration of "positive action" (Sakyi, 2013b) against colonial rule triggered a series of strikes, boycotts, and other forms of mass action that culminated in the shooting of ex-soldiers on a peaceful march to the seat of government to demand better post-service conditions. A desperate act of the colonial government, this 28th February, 1948 killing further fueled the mass political activism that culminated in the British decision to grant Ghana independence (Austin 1964; Tordoff 1997). In the post-independence era, students, workers, professional associations, and groups of ordinary citizens have not hesitated to embark on strikes and demonstrations to press home their demands for responsive governance and attention to their particular needs (Finlay, 1968; Osei, 2000).

In respect of elections as a form of civic engagement, "Ghanaians have not yet become so politically disillusioned that they stay away from the polls" (Bratton, Lewis, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). On the contrary, active interests and participation in elections have often brought the country to the brink of national violence (Center for African Democratic Affairs, 2012). Voter turnout in elections has steadily risen from a low of 53.75% in 1992 to more than 70% over the subsequent five elections (Electoral

Commission of Ghana, 2000; Ghana News Agency, 2008); with the 2012 elections registering a turnout of 79% (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012). Intense public interest and participation in these elections have occasioned localized electoral violence in several places since 1992 (Ochill, 2012).

Chazan (1982) takes a state-centric view to explaining why Ghana is peaceful and attributes Ghana's peace to the central role the state has played in creating space for civil society actors to engage in building peace in the country. She highlights in particular, civil society participation in facilitating the peaceful transitioning of political power between the major contending ethnic groups in the country. However, Chazan's view begs the question whether state action is the only thread that keeps Ghana together, since the centrality of the state in the political space is not peculiar to Ghana. The state plays an omnipresent and directive role in all African countries. Ghana is therefore no special case in that respect. Indeed, Ghana shares historical and structural colonial legacies with countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Why has the state machinery in these countries not played the same neutralizing role to prevent national level conflicts in them? What makes Ghana different? Besides, civil society groups have been equally active and engaging in political transition processes in countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, to name a few. Nonetheless, these countries have experienced violent national level conflicts during political transitions. Why has civil society engagement resulted in peace in Ghana and not in these other countries?

Hopp-Nishanka (2012) takes an institutional approach to explaining the peace in Ghana and attributes Ghana's success at averting violent national level confrontations to the presence of "peace infrastructure [that brings together diverse agencies to work on]

...promoting cooperative problem-solving and institutionalizing a response mechanism to violent conflict” (p. 1). Like Chazan, Hopp-Nishanka credits the government for creating the peace infrastructure through engineering civil society participation in the public space. Hopp-Nishanka’s view is, however, at odds with the historical realities that underscore Ghana’s evolution as a nation. First, the peace infrastructure that Hopp-Nishanka credits for Ghana’s peace is but a recent creation, having coming into existence only in the post 1992 democratic era. Hence, it does not explain why Ghana did not descent into violent national conflicts prior to 1992. Second, the history of contestations between civil society groups on the one hand, and sitting governments since independence, on the other hand, for entry into and engagement in the public sphere abounds (Sagoe, 2011). In accord with the Westphalian concept of the State as the only and principal actor in the public sphere, Governments throughout the history of Ghana have tried to keep civil society groups out of the public sphere. In reverse, these groups have had to battle the State to assert their right to be in and to engage actively in the public space. The Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference; the Christian Council of Ghana; the National Union of Ghana Students; the Professional Bodies Association of Ghana, which once comprised the Ghana Bar Association, the Ghana Medical and Dental Council, the Nurses and Midwives Council, the Ghana National Association of Teachers; to name a few, have all jointly or severally engaged sitting governments on different contentious issues (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The Catholic Church, in particular, had head on coalitions with the Nkrumah regime (Pobee, 1988) on issues of governance and human rights. Similarly, the PNDC regime of Flt Lt. Rawlings had a running battle with the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and organs of the church for daring to condemn the

military brutalities of the regime and calling on it to hand over power to a transitional civilian body (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a). Apart from direct attacks on the persons and characters of leading members of the church (Oquaye, 1995b), the Catholic Standard Newspaper had its "...licence [...] withdrawn when it became a major channel for the publication of news which was politically unfavourable to the PNDC" (Rockson, 1990).

Other faith-based organizations, especially the Christian Council of Ghana, faced similar challenges of their own. The PNDC would later promulgate the Religious Bodies (Registration) Law 221 and its amended version, Law 2989 in 1989, as instruments for muzzling the mainstream Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church, which was its most ardent critic at the time (Effah-Yeboah, 2012). In particular, PNDC Law 221 required that all religious bodies, new or old be registered under the law within three months of its promulgation or cease to operate thereafter in the country (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Registration under the law would have meant submitting to regulation of the activities of the religious bodies by the state. Predictably, the religious bodies refused to comply with the law.

Ayee (2003), on his part, credits Ghana's success at averting violent national confrontations during elections to her ability to build "elite consensus" (p. 214), particularly through the institutionalization of the Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), which provides a forum for political party leaders and officials of the Electoral Commission to dialogue on and iron out issues that would otherwise have provided the flares that spark violent confrontations. While the IPAC's interventions may have helped to avert electoral disputes in the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, it appears to have failed to do so for the 2012 one, whose results have been disputed. At

any rate, the tensions that push Ghana towards the abyss go beyond electoral disputes; and the IPAC is only a post-1992 invention in Ghana. Therefore, its existence and role cannot fully account for why Ghana has managed to avoid descent into national violence. In brief, the various theoretical frames that seek to explain why Ghana has avoided descent into national level violence do not fully account for Ghana's peace. Hence, alternate explanations are required to understand how and why Ghana has managed to escape the fate of ancient hatreds; the resource curse; inter-ethnic competition for power; acrimonious ethno-political contestations; ethno-regional inequalities in socioeconomic development, among others, to maintain a face of peace.

Part of the reason for the failure of contemporary theories to account for Ghana's peace is the fact that much of the literature on why Africa fights within its countries is based on the use of the conflict paradigm, which unduly focuses the search for the negative generators of conflict rather than the positive elements that keep otherwise conflictual groups and communities within states from escalating their conflicts into national ones. In other words, contemporary theories neglect to examine the cases of positive deviance in which "...intentional behaviors that depart from the norms of a referent group in honorable ways" (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004, p. 832) provide explanations of why some countries are able to keep themselves from descending into civil wars or other forms of violent national conflicts. Accordingly, not much attention is given to positive deviant cases such as Ghana, "...whose uncommon behaviors and strategies enable them to find better solutions to problems than their peers, while having access to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges" (Positive Deviance Initiative, 2013, p.1).

The limited scholarship on behaviors that promote peace in some settings under circumstances that would have led to war in other contexts is also due to the fact that peace research has focused mainly on three theoretical frames, namely, integration, competition, and polarization (Schmid, 1968). The point of departure for such theories is that human interactions are generally centrifugal in nature; hence, ways must be found to either integrate conflicting parties, regularize the competition between them, or help them acknowledge and work with their polarization, which may be static or dynamic (Schmid, 1968). However, managing conflicts or making peace through successful programs of integration, constructive competition, or nonviolent polarization do not constitute peace. Such conceptions lead to an emphasis on the maintenance of law and order or stability as the means for achieving peace. Under this conception, as long as law enforcement agencies can keep the incidence of violence low, peace is presumed to exist. This conception of peace will "...obviously be in the interest of the status quo-powers at the national or international levels [who constantly seek ways to maintain their power, keep the status quo unchanged, or manipulate] the underdog so that he does not take up arms against the topdog" (Schmid, 1968, p. 223).

The peace that obtains from such suppression constitutes "Negative peace [which] is 'the absence of organized collective forms of violence' or the absence of war" (Schmid, 1968, p. 223). In other words, true "...peace is not merely and (sic) absence of direct violence (negative peace) but also absence of structural violence (positive peace)" (Grewal, (2003, p. 2). Nonetheless, it is this conception of peace that has underscored the focus on safety and security concerns in the definition of the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012). Hence, this view of peace as the absence of

violence is what has ensured that much of “peace research has been organized around the value of negative peace” (Schmid, 1968, p. 224). But as Schmid argues, “...one of the important tasks of peace research is to give the concept of peace a more precise meaning” (Schmid, 1968, p. 224). Hence, peace research “...should explain not how manifest conflicts are brought under control, but how latent conflicts are manifested” (Schmid, 1968, p. 219) and managed before they explode into violence. In other words, peace research must move away from the conflict paradigm to embrace a peace paradigm that offers insights into how and why some communities are able to manage or transform their latent conflicts to prevent them from escalating into violence.

The progression from the concept of negative to positive peace provides a broader framework for investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst others with the same or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about the conflict management systems of the countries in question. Ironically, the concept of positive peace, which has been developed as the counterpoint to negative peace, defies a single definition, as it is “...an umbrella concept, devoid of meaning of its own, which people fill with their own subjective values.” Given its elastic scope, “positive peace means something equivalent to ‘the good life’ or ‘the best state of things’” (Schmid, 1968, p. 223). The Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), however, “...defines positive peace as “the set of attitudes, institutions and structures which when strengthened, lead to a more peaceful society” (p. 69). This definition offers a framework for examining how peace happens in some contexts but not in others, as it provides indicators of “...appropriate attitudes, institutions, and structures which when strengthened lead to a nation’s capacity to harmoniously and non-violently resolve

conflict” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 70). It offers a peace paradigm as an alternative to the conflict paradigm that has dominated research in peace and conflict studies. The peace paradigm emphasizes the fact that “...peace research shouldn’t merely deal with the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence at a direct or structural level but seek to understand conditions for preventing violence” (Grewal, 2003, p. 4) or resolving violence conflict. Secondly, unlike research on conflicts, peace research “...values theoretical consistency of norms and values more than empirical validation” (Grewal, 2003, p. 2) of some externally determined criteria. In other words, it enables us to look beyond the tangible causes of conflict to see the underlying intangible values and norms that hold otherwise fractious societies together.

Byrne and Keashly (2000) use the theory of Social Cubism to provide a comprehensive six dimensional approach to examining the interrelationships of factors that affect the generation or resolution of conflicts, especially those deriving from a protracted and interethnic or inter-territorial nature. This multi-dimensional approach compels analysis to move away from the single-strand explanations that often characterize the description of the causes of conflicts and the solutions that are usually prescribed. It also enables researchers to look across time boundaries to examine how the ever changing interactions between historical, economic, religious, demographic, political, and psycho-cultural factors interplay to sustain intergenerational conflicts in particular. The theory brings out the point that conflicts are not static, but dynamic; hence explanations of any one conflict must adopt non- static perspectives.

Besides providing a multidimensional view of the issues at stake and how they interrelate to create and perpetuate the conditions that fuel and sustain conflict or promote

peace, the social cube approach recognizes that conflicts are dynamic and the different factors affecting any conflict "...will interrelate in dynamically different ways" (Satya, 2004, pp. 21-22) to influence the evolution of new phases of the conflict. This is because the issues that drive them may take on different meanings and levels of emphasis from one period to another. In other words, conflicts do not happen in a vacuum, neither do conditions of peace exist out of context; conflict and peace are both creators and creatures of the social cube constructed of the six inter-related dimensions of "history, religion, demographics, political institutions, non-institutional behaviour, economics, and psycho-cultural factors" (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1). Hence, given the same set of circumstances, the gravitation towards violence or peace is a function of how the mix of factors is managed. Managed in certain ways, these factors underscore the triggers and sustenance of conflicts. Managed differently, they constitute the basis for peaceful coexistence of otherwise conflictual groups.

Social cubism therefore forces us to "... isolate key factors to show how they combine to form complex patterns of ethnic politics" (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1) and by extension, its impact on conflict or peace. This acknowledgement of the multi-dimensionality and dynamism of conflicts sits well with the progression of the perception of peace from negative to positive peace, as it provides a broader framework for investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst others with the same or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about the conflict management systems of the countries in question. It brings into focus the nature and role that various actors play in the conflict management system of the country since, from a systems perspective, conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play

different roles in initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). It is within this framework that it is pertinent to ask in what ways have the interaction of the same factors of historical and contemporary relevance played to keep Ghana from degenerating into violent national conflicts? What has Ghana done differently in managing the same balance of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts when other countries have succumbed to the same pressures?

Consideration of the conflict management systems in Ghana and other countries is critical because, from the perspective of systems theory, conflicts are perpetuated or resolved only when members of the conflict system cooperate in some way or the other to keep the chain reactions or feedback loops functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007) or alter them for an alternate desirable outcome. By extension, change in the conflict pattern such as gravitation towards violence or peace has to be initiated by one or several of the parties. Otherwise, the system will keep feeding itself, as "...patterns, interlocking sequences, function of the parties, and methods of processing information" (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 179) all work together to influence the dynamics of the conflict. In such cases, either a "morphostatic system designed to sustain the status quo or no change" (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 181) prevails, or a process to move the conflict toward "...the runaway spiral" (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 180) or peaceful resolution emerges, depending on the nature and direction of the interactions between the factors.

In respect of Ghana's image as a peaceful country, it is essential to be reminded that peace is fragile (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012), given the persistence of multiple flash points of historical, economic, and geographical inequalities, as well as the contentious competition for political power in an electoral system that is the subject of

suspicious of collusion and fraud. Hence what is perceived as peace in Ghana may in fact be “...negative peace which is essentially the absence of violence” (Galtung in Baruch, 2012, p. 1; also see Bloomfield, 2003; Schmid, 1968). That notwithstanding, the question that arises is – how has Ghana managed to create and maintain its negative peace when others with the same or similar mixes of factors have failed to keep this semblance of national peace? What factors stitch and hold together Ghana’s negative or fragile peace system?

Since systems, including systems of protracted conflicts or those of negative peace function synergistically, it is essential that we use a holistic approach to understand “how the different parts of the system work together”(von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39). But systems are either resilient, with an “...ability to survive and persist within a variable environment” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or brittle. The ability of a system to withstand pressure or breakup is, however, dependent on its capacity for self-organization or the “capacity of a system to make its own structure more complex”(Meadows, 2008, p. 79). This, in other words, represents the ability of the system “...to create new structure, to learn, diversify, and complexify” (Meadows, 2008, pp. 81) by using sometimes very simple rules. Hence, for Ghana to have maintained its fragile peace, it must have some inherent capacity to complexify to meet the new challenges that she faced it in every generation. What gives Ghana this capacity? Where does it derive the energy for this capacity enhancement from?

While the systems perspective is valid for understanding what factors come into play to stabilize, escalate, or resolve conflicts in most settings, it fails to fully explain Ghana’s persistence for peace in the absence of durable systems of governance since its

independence. The purpose of a system is "...deduced from the behaviors, [of its members] not from rhetoric or stated goals" (Meadows, 2008, p. 14). States, as systems, are founded on constitutions which are the basic laws, the point of interconnections, as it were, between the disparate groups of citizens. Constitutions and associated laws, rules, and regulations of the state provide the framework for regulating the behaviors of all citizens within the territorial boundaries of the state, as well as, provide guidance for the interactions of the state and its functionaries with other states and their members. Since becoming a nation-state at independence, however, Ghana has struggled to establish a basic and lasting constitutional arrangement. As previously noted, the best part of its fifty odd years of existence to date as a nation-state were spent under military rule, as coup d'états interrupted attempts to build a culture of democratic governance. From 1957 to 1992, military juntas that overthrew established constitutions and popularly elected governments ruled the country by decrees. Ethnic polarizations were at their zenith during these periods, and popular discontent with the military rules expressed themselves through strikes and demonstrations that often turned violent. Yet, throughout these periods, the revolts did not escalate into sustained violent national level conflicts.

Besides the military interventions, Ghana has suffered similar discontinuities in the development of a brand of constitutionalism as its system of democratic governance. The country has consistently flirted with various systems of constitutional rule since independence. Starting with the inheritance of the British Parliamentary system at independence, Ghana's constitution changed to the Presidential system under Nkrumah in 1960; switched back to the Parliamentary system under the 1969 constitution; and back again to the Presidential system under the 1979 constitution. Today, it runs a hybrid

system that combines elements of a separately elected Executive Presidential system and the parliamentary system in which the majority of ministers are chosen from parliament. Hence, in the absence of sustained constitutional orders and practice, what systems could have been in place that regulated interethnic engagements in the public sphere to prevent the degeneration of the tensions into war?

This notwithstanding, an important contribution of systems theory to our understanding of stable chaos or negative peace is the role that subsystems play in keeping an otherwise dysfunctional macrosystem staggering along, albeit inefficiently. The stability and growth of a system depends on the existence and effective functioning of hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing subsystems that accept and operate by coordinating instructions from higher level subsystems to create “stable, resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82). The hierarchies facilitate the work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities are, in turn, directed to help achieve the overall goal of the whole system. Hence, to the extent that the subsystems keep functioning, albeit inefficiently due to inadequate guidance from the central system, some form of functionality or system performance is still possible. In this regard, it is essential to interrogate what role, if any, state and non-state subsystems such as the variegated traditional authority systems; religion and faith institutions and systems; political parties and their operations; the electoral system; the judicial system; the educational system; the family systems; systems of inter-ethnic marriages and migration, culture and traditions, economic systems of the formal and informal sectors, among others, have played in maintaining Ghana’s peace, however, negative.

It is for this reason that the shortcoming of systems theory in explaining Ghana's peace on its face value notwithstanding, its use "gives us the freedom to identify root causes of problems and see new opportunities" (Meadows, 2008, p. 2). In this, a key guiding principle is that we must look for the most effective and sustainable changes in systems at the level of interconnectedness and/or purpose/functions of the system. Changes in elements alone will not lead to profound and lasting changes in the behavior patterns of the system nor its outcomes, "unless changing an element also results in changing relationships or purpose" (Meadows, 2008, p. 17). Merely changing the people involved would not lead to any profound changes. This is why, from the experiences of Ghana, changing the leadership of a country alone, whether through the ballot box or the bullets of coup d'états has not led to lasting and impactful changes in the way that the country operates nor its status as a peace deficient country. Every one of the civilian and military regimes that Ghana has had come into office on the promise of righting the fundamental structural and systemic deficiencies that have afflicted the country's governance and national development processes. Despite their best efforts, all succeeding governments have cited exactly the same reasons to justify taking their turn in governing the country. If these leadership changes since 1957 have not succeeded in moving Ghana from a perpetual state of fragile or negative peace to a more positive place, what accounts for the country's ability to maintain a kind of equilibrium in balancing the otherwise fractious forces that should have torn it apart? Beyond the conceptions of negative and positive peace, is there another frame that explains Ghana's peace?

Goals of Research

This research is designed to contribute to the theories of peace. It hopes to create greater insights into how and why Ghana has managed to stave off national level violent and protracted conflicts when its neighbors in West Africa and other parts of the continent have failed to do so. What factors have contributed to sustaining peace in Ghana? By focusing on the example of Ghana, the research hopes to initiate the unearthing of positive deviant factors that contribute to our understanding of why countries that have the same or similar mixes of centrifugal historical backgrounds; socio-demographic distributions; ethno-political rivalries and competitions for power; and incidents of economic marginalization or exclusions from the development processes, do not fight. What factors restrain them from fighting? How are they able to manage their internal dissents to prevent them from escalating into national level conflicts in the form of violent and protracted civil wars? Insights from Ghana's experiences should inform a search for the constitutive elements of the threads of peace that peacebuilders can fall on to stitch together otherwise fractious communities and countries in Africa.

Contribution of the Research to the Field of Peace Studies and Peacebuilding

Peace research tends to take statist approaches, placing emphasis on understanding what states do or do not do right to promote peace or escalate conflicts into violence. While this focus on how states create enabling or disabling environments for peace is important, it portends two levels of risks. First, it risks masking how sub-state level actions and inactions of citizens, acting as individuals or in groups, impact on a country's peace. Secondly, it leads to the prescription of statist solutions such as constitutional

reforms, legal reforms, institutional reforms, organization of elections, and other state-managed processes as the remedy for conflicts or the prophylaxis for preserving whatever peace is in place. In the process, the contribution of nonstate processes such as the stock of values, beliefs, and attitudes of citizens between themselves and towards the state; the voluntary actions or inactions of groups of citizens within and outside the state mechanism that impact, negatively or positively on the conflicts or the peace environments are glossed over. Incidentally, the only way of surfacing such subnational processes is to ask the people who operate outside the state system or work from the outside into the state system to maintain or escalate conflicts or promote peace.

By using the peace paradigm to directly engage a broad range of Ghanaians to explore their perspectives on how and why Ghana has staved off descent into violence, this study hopes to contribute to enriching the literature on what subnational cultural, socioeconomic, and ethno-political strands have held Ghana together. Broadening our understanding of the sources of Ghana's peace beyond the state centric process should provide signals to how the field of peace research can be enriched through in-depth contextual studies of deviant cases such as Ghana's. For peace practitioners, insights into Ghana's strong and weak points in the causal chain of forces and factors that have sustained its peace should provide pointers to other states and societies on what to look out for in their specific contexts as potential retooled instruments for peacebuilding or resolving conflicts. For Ghana, the findings should provide a framework for re-evaluating her peace, and determining what can be done to sustain or enhance it. Hence, this research stands to contribute to the literature on peace from both a theoretical and a praxis perspective.

Chapter 3: Methodology

General Thrust of Research

Following from the contextual analysis and the review of the literature above, this study uses a systems-based peace paradigm as its theoretical frame for investigating Ghana's peace for several reasons. First, "A peace paradigm does not conform to nor accept the status quo..." (Yesufu, 2009, p. 83). On the contrary, it pushes the boundaries of investigation to dig into the constructive elements of peace to unveil the nature of that peace (negative or positive); how that peace is constructed; who are its architects or maintenance agents, among others. Hence, the use of the peace paradigm provides a more holistic platform for understanding what keeps Ghana from descending into nationwide conflict despite being a positive peace deficit country, with a fragile capacity to absorb conflict shocks.

The holistic approach to this research aligns it with the use of systems thinking in peace research. No other theoretical frame has influenced peace research as much as general systems theory has (Mesjasz, 1988). Indeed, "Peace research has long been closely linked with General Systems Theory" (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 296). As a result, an original and lasting "...mutual relationships [exists] between systems theory and peace research [as] systems thinking [seems to have] been programmed into the future directions of development of peace and conflict studies" (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 327). Hence, the intricate "...interdependencies of systems theory and peace research" (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 327) provide a comprehensive platform, especially in peace research that adopts a grounded theory approach, to unearthing what makes Ghana peaceful when others with the same conditions have failed. Harnessing the "...long-standing interdependencies

[between peace research and] systems theory, may stimulate some new solutions, and certainly, posit new questions ...” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 325) that inform our understanding of why Ghana is peaceful.

Second, from the epistemological and methodological perspectives, the theories that have been offered to date to explain Ghana’s peace have been based largely on speculative theorization, rather than being empirically rooted in the voices and views of Ghanaians to offer insights into how they have managed to keep the peace. This research therefore differs from previous ones in its use of multiple frameworks and meta-data from desk studies, quantitative surveys, and key informant interviews to bring in the voices and views of ordinary Ghanaians on how they have managed to stitch together and keep their peace, however, fragile, going.

Third, in contrast to previous research on why Ghana is peaceful, this research used the grounded theory approach to allow the voices and views of Ghanaians to speak for themselves on whether they agree on why Ghana is peaceful and how the country has managed to stave off violent confrontations at the national level to keep the peace. Consistent with the Type 3 peace research categories (Mesjasz, 1988), rooting the study in the lived experiences of respondents allows the research to probe and explore the deeper meanings and cultural underpinnings, as well as, the values, beliefs, perceptions and attitudes, that more appropriately capture and describe respondents’ views on the subject of study. It permits the identification of “Situations in which interconnections are cultural, situations dominated by the meanings attributed to [the] perceptions by autonomous observers” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 302) on why Ghana has been successful in

staving off violent national level conflicts. This would be the first time anyone has tried to explain Ghana's peace from the perspective of the people.

Choice of Approach to Research

This study used the grounded theory methodology because it is best suited for this research for several reasons. First, the methodology provided an opportunity for the study to adopt an open mind in the quest for answers on why Ghana is peaceful. Second, grounded theory is concerned with the "fitness" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 164) of the theory generated to the context or situation it purports to describe. Consequently, it ensures that "the theory [that emerges from the study] should fit the data" (Glaser & Strauss, 2010, p. 261), since they would have derived from the data. Thirdly, the existing theories that seek to explain why Ghana is at peace are not grounded in the lived experiences of the ordinary men and women in the country. The use of the grounded theory approach in this study would make the findings reflect the lived experiences of ordinary Ghanaians (Glaser & Strauss, 2010). Fourth, use of the grounded theory methodology in this study allowed for the simultaneous processes of "generating theory and doing social research" (Glaser in Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 159).

Though the grounded theory approach is more frequently used for the development of substantive theory, it can also be used for general theory development (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as it allows for the generation of theory that is best "suited to its supposed uses" (Glaser & Strauss, 2010, p. 3). It also permits the generation of new theories, or the modification of existing ones. Hence, findings from this research can lead to the validation of existing theories through cross-matching of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) or the emergence of new theoretical perspectives to explain Ghana's

apparent exceptionalism as an oasis of peace. Finally, grounded theory uses the same sources of data as other study methodologies. More importantly, the approach is amenable to using a wide range of primary and secondary sources of data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that other research approaches may cut out. Hence, within the broad frame of grounded theory methodology for the study, the following approaches were used for the collection and analysis of the data:

Use of Mixed Methods for Data Collection, Analysis, and Reporting: The study used both quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures. Mixed method research was the best match for the grounded theory approach in this study because it allowed the study to "...tap into participants' perspectives and meanings" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp. 17-18) on the issues under investigation in this research. It also permitted the inclusion of "a broader and more complete range of research questions [that provided multiple sources of data to enable the researcher to] generate and test a grounded theory" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp. 21). Used in a grounded theory study, mixed methods data collection techniques also provide the possibilities for the use of multiple tools and "...documents of all kinds" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 160; see also Creswell & Clark, 2011) as data sources, since grounded theory "...encourages the use of multiple worldviews, or paradigms (i.e. beliefs and values)" (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 13). Mixed method research also brings out the voices and views behind the numbers that quantitative research alone would otherwise have left out.

With respect to feasibility and validity of the mixed method approach, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) reject the incompatibility thesis which posits that qualitative and quantitative methods of research "...cannot be mixed" (p. 14) in the same study. On

the contrary, mixed method research draws on “...the strength and minimize[s] the weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies” (pp. 11-15). Hence, the qualitative component of this research highlighted the context for the responses to the quantitative questions. In sum, it provided more evidence for the research findings than only either of the methods would have done standing alone.

Choice of Mixed Method Research Design: Creswell & Clark (2011) identify two approaches to designing mixed method research. The “typology-based approach” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 55) stresses the cataloging of mixed method designs that can be useful to the research before choosing or adapting one to suit the research goal. The dynamic approach to mixed method research design, on the other hand, picks and chooses from an array of mixed method typologies to suit the research needs. Two subdivisions emerge from the latter approach – the “systems-based approach” and the “synergistic approach” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 59). Systems approach is iterative and emphasizes the interconnection between various components of the research process. The synergistic approach, on the other hand, allows for the combination of two or more research approaches that ensures that the end product of the research is greater than what a quantitative or qualitative method alone would have achieved (Creswell & Clark, 2011).

With respect to the structuring of the data collection process, Onwuegbuzie & Leech, (2006) point out that research questions can be structured to allow data to be collected concurrently, sequentially, or iteratively. Creswell and Clark (2011), also, suggest there are three timing arrangements for data collection – the concurrent, sequential, or multi-phase combination. This notwithstanding mixed methods design for

data collection is a continuum of processes. Hence, mixed method research may "...fall somewhere in the middle with both fixed and emergent aspects to the design" (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 55) alternating.

This study used the "cross-stage mixed-model design" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20) or what Creswell and Clark (2011) call the "embedded design" (p.71) in which qualitative and quantitative data were collected in the initial phase, through a desk study to provide themes and categories that are used for a quantitative survey and a qualitative key informant interviews. This multi-phase research process permitted the use of multiple methods to unearth the voices and views of a cross section of Ghanaians on how and why they have managed to keep the peace in the country. Besides providing "convincing answers to the question that the investigation is intended to settle (Thomas, 2003, p. 7), this approach also enabled the research to generate results that are "meaningful to both the researcher and the people in the researcher studies" (Thomas, 2003, p. 10). The triangulation and saturation of data from multiple sources in the research provided a broader range of answers on how and why Ghana has survived the temptations to degenerate into nationwide violent conflicts. Hence, apart from creating "structure and flexibility" (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 60) for the study, this synergistic approach ensured that the combined outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative data are greater than the sums of each method standing on its own (Creswell & Clark, 2011).

Data Collection and Study Architecture

To ensure ampleness, constant comparison, complementarity, and data saturation, the study adopted the following architecture for the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data.

i) Desk Study: The study first carried out a review of available documents on conflicts and their management in Ghana. These included but were not limited to the review of Reports of Commissions of Inquiry into various conflicts in the country since the 1980s; library and electronically archived academic literature on conflicts in Ghana immediately before and after independence; and newspaper reports from the 1980s. This helped to establish the types and nature of conflicts that could have plunged Ghana into a nationwide violence and what accounted for their diffusion or non-escalation.

Preliminary markers of themes and categories emerging from the desk study were used to frame questions for the quantitative survey and the key informant interviews. In this way, findings from the survey and key informant interviews were used to validate, drill down, or reject emergent themes and/or categories from the desk study.

ii) Quantitative Survey: A nationwide survey on the perceptions, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of a sample of 1,429 out of the targeted 1,500 interviews provided the quantitative data that complemented and reinforced the findings in the qualitative data from the study desk study and key informant interviews. The survey collected data that enabled the study to gauge the depth and spread of views, perceptions, attitudes and behaviors of a representative sample of Ghanaians on factors that have enabled Ghana to maintain the peace. Survey questionnaires were administered in 50 Polling Areas nationwide selected through the use of the cluster sampling methodology, as detailed below and in Appendix 2. The survey questionnaires captured the profile of respondents, enabling the research to establish the spread and depth of views expressed across the demographic spectrum of respondents. On the substantive aspect of the study, the questionnaires covered broad areas related to respondents’:

1. Knowledge and Perceptions of whether Ghana is peaceful
2. Assessment of the role of development on the peace in Ghana
3. Evaluation of how the respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law impact on the peace in Ghana
4. Views on the effect of the state of gender equality, equity, and parity in the country on the achievement and maintenance of peace in Ghana.
5. Perceptions on the role of democratic participation on the peace in Ghana
6. Observations on the role of Government in promoting peace
7. Thoughts on the relationship between religion and peace in Ghana
8. Opinions on how culture, traditions, and customs impact on the peace in Ghana; and
9. Attitudes, behaviors, and practices as indicators of the presence of a culture of peace in Ghana.
10. The role of formal education and the schooling system in Ghana in promoting a culture of interethnic tolerance, coexistence, and peace among Ghanaians.

Hypotheses for Quantitative Survey

This study used 14 hypotheses as the frame for a broad investigation into how and why Ghana is considered a peaceful country. Table 1 presents the statement of the null hypotheses and their associated key variables for the study.

Table 1:

List of Variables and Associated Hypotheses for Quantitative Study

Variables of the Study	Associated Hypotheses
Participants Knowledge and Perceptions on peace in Ghana	H ₀₁ There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country
	H ₀₂ There are no differences in the level of perception of respondents on the nature and sources of peace Ghana enjoys.
Role of Development on peace	H ₀₃ Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country
Impact of respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law on peace	H ₀₄ There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for the rule of law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana
	H ₀₅ There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country
Impact of gender equality, equity and parity on peace	H ₀₆ The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys
Role of democratic participation on peace	H ₀₇ The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys
	H ₀₈ There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country
Role of Government on peace in Ghana	H ₀₉ The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Impact on religion on peace in Ghana	H ₀₁₀ Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Influence of culture, traditions and customs on peace	H ₀₁₁ The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Respondents' attitudes and behaviors on peace	H ₀₁₂ Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Role of formal education and schooling system on peace in Ghana	H ₀₁₃ Ghana's formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys
Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices on social cohesion and peace	H ₀₁₄ Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

iii) Key Informant Interviews: The findings from the desk study provided the basis for framing questions for the Key Informant interviews. Besides providing an opportunity to confirm or reject themes and categories from the desk study, the key informant interviews were used to reach out to representatives of institutions and groups whose active engagements in the public sphere may have contributed to the disturbance or maintenance of peace in the country. The arcane knowledge of such institutional representatives enabled the study to assess the nature and extent of the role of civil society organizations and individual actors in developing the peace infrastructure that has contributed to peace in Ghana. The key informant interviews also provided the opportunity for the analysis of the role of cultural values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes that contribute to Ghana's peace.

The sequencing of the various stages of the study was designed to provide complementarity and triangulation of the data and findings. The various research instruments were therefore mutually reinforcing in their design. Qualitative data collection was the primary focus of this study. Hence, the study deployed various qualitative research tools to capture and categorize the information provided. The multiple data sources allowed for the triangulation and saturation of data in the search for answers on how and why Ghana has survived the temptations to degenerate into nationwide violent conflicts.

Sampling and Sample Size considerations

a) Sample Size for the Survey component: To ensure representativeness and high level of confidence in the data generated in the survey, a multi-stage cluster sampling approach was used to select respondents. In nation-wide surveys, such as the

Afrobarometer studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is usually determined to be adequate for ensuring representativeness of the study population and validity of the outcomes. This "...substantially larger sample size [is required] to achieve the same level of accuracy as a simple random sample" (Murphy & Schulz, 2006, p. 6). For Ghana, Afrobarometer's "randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allows inferences to national adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent" (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p.).

In this study, a sample size of 1,500 (i.e., $n = 1,500$) was used. The sample frame (N) was the total registered voter population for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012). Hence, the survey used the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling. This is because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the population statistics per localities were not yet available at the time of design of this study. In contrast, the Electoral Commission compiled a fairly detailed biometric electoral register of voters, which provided population data down to community levels in all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the country. The electoral register and boundaries of the Polling Stations therefore provided a more accurate and up to date database for the selection of respondents.

The survey adapted the 30-cluster sampling methodology that John Hopkins University (JHU) developed for use in Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage (KPC) surveys. This is a multi-stage cluster sampling approach used to select respondents for large population groups. In this study, the methodology allowed for a fair representation of all communities across the country. Given the wide variation in population sizes

between Polling Areas (ranging from $n < 500$ to $n > 150,000$), instead of 30, this study selected a cluster of 50 Polling Areas out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas in the country as study sites. This larger number of study sites is necessary to compensate for the clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socio-economic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban; differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions; cultural variations across regions, etc. (Murphy & Schulz, 2006). Appendix 3 provides details of the procedures used in the selection of the 50 Polling Areas.

Level two of the participant selection process was carried out at the 50 selected Polling Areas. The study had planned to use electoral registers for the selected Polling Areas as the sub sample frame from which interviewees were to be selected. However, the Electoral Commission cited legal reasons for its inability to make the register of voters for the selected Polling Areas available to the researcher. Hence, to select the 30 respondents at each Polling Area, the researcher used the spin the bottle method (Core Group, 2008; Espeut, 2001) to randomly select the first household from which the first interviewee would be identified and interviewed. Details of the procedure is provided in Appendix 3.

Sampling Precautions: Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics (Sakyi, 2013a; Citifmonline News, 2011). Given the legal challenge to the 2012 Presidential election results that pitched the two major parties in a political battle, it was essential that all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan bias in the selection of the interviewees be dispelled upfront and transparently. In fulfillment of this, Polling Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected Polling Areas were

invited to participate in the procedure for selecting the first household for interviews as outlined under Appendix 3. They were briefed on the purposes, as well as, the apolitical and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all political parties helped to eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of the interviewees.

b) Sampling for Key Informant Interviews: The inherent iterative processes of data collection, analysis, and collection of more data for constant comparison that grounded theory research demands implies that the best cutoff point for recruiting research participants is established when no new data codes emerge from repeated data collection. Hence, the sampling frame and procedures for the Key Informant Interviews followed the advice in the use of “theoretical sampling” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp. 176) which holds that sample sizes and “sampling [processes] cannot be planned before embarking on the study” (Bitsch, 2005 p. 79). Nonetheless, Creswell (1998) suggests that between six and 30 participants would be adequate for a grounded theory study. With respect to the purposive choice of respondents, this study followed the advice for qualitative researchers to “...choose those interviewees who can give you the greatest possible insight into your topic” (Esterberg, 2002, p. 93). Accordingly, the research used the snowball sampling methodology to identify potential respondents for the interviews. However, given the potential wide variation in the kinds of people to be interviewed in this study, the researcher targeted interviewing a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 50 respondents across the spectrum of population groups. This provided a data range wide enough to allow for saturation of the data for categories and themes that emerge during the research. Appendix 4 provides a list of a broad category of institutions and

organizations from which the 30 to 50 key informants were drawn. The categories include the Ghana Medical Association, Ghana Bar Association, Ghana Nurses and Midwives Council, Ghana Registered Nurses Association, Ghana Association of Bankers, Ghana National Association of Teachers, among others. Collectively known as the Professional Bodies Associations, these institutions have been individually or collectively active in engaging state actors on issues of national interests. Representing the highly educated class of citizens, their engagements in the political sphere may have contributed to the creation of the “elite consensus” that Ayee (2003, p. 214) credits for the peace in Ghana. Interviews with this category of respondents unearthed the reasons why they chose to engage or not engage in the political sphere and how that contributed to the peace in Ghana.

Similarly, the leadership of labor unions, represented by the Trade Union Congress and its affiliates, as well as, other collective workers unions were contacted for interviews. Collective workers groups have played very active roles in Ghana’s politics before and after independence. Their alignments with one political grouping or the other have often defined the boundaries of political contestations and electoral fortunes in democratic eras. Worker agitations and confrontations with governments over conditions of service have also been vital in determining the temperature of the political sphere, and in some cases, have contributed to changes in governments, through coup d’états or the ballot box. Understanding the motivations of workers in the political choices they have made over the years, and how these have affected the peace of Ghana, was essential for the objectives of this study.

Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of the governance systems of Ghana. They have championed campaigns, strikes, and demonstrations for or against governments, with some engagements turning violent. Their historical record of making and unmaking governments has made students a vital part of Ghana's body politic. Past and present student leaders were interviewed to document their voices and views on why Ghana has remained peaceful. The interviews sought to find answers to the following questions: What roles have students played in the stability and peace in Ghana? How do they perceive the role of youth groups in stabilizing the balance of power between and across political entities such as political parties? To what extent are students bridges of peace across the ethnic divides in the country? What makes them effective bridges, if any?

Faith-based and civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing national Christian and Islamic Councils (i.e. The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH), the Ghana Catholic Bishops' Conference (GCBC), the Islamic Council, the Pentecostal Council), and other affiliated faith-based organizations have been instrumental in shaping the political space in Ghana. Representatives of these institutions, among others, were considered useful in the study because of their i) arcane knowledge and perceptions on why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level confrontations ii) recollections and experiences on the role of Faith-based Organizations (FBOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), if any, in creating and maintaining peace in Ghana iii) perceptions on the role of culture, values, and faith in Ghana's ability to maintain peace.

Finally, Lederach (1997, p.94) points out that localized knowledge and institutional frameworks for change management are "the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the

long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture”. To tap into this indigenous knowledge base on why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level conflicts, traditional leaders comprising of the chiefs, queenmothers, and elders of ethnic groups were contacted for interviews. In line with the advice of Esterberg (2002), the researcher targeted respondents from the pool of recommended participants based on their roles and participation in managing/mediating some of the national conflicts in Ghana; their personal knowledge and association with events that held the potential for national level violence; their positions with the regional and national houses of chiefs, among other criteria. From them, the research sort to understand the role that customs, traditions, and values have played in creating a culture of peace within and between ethnic groups. The role of traditional authorities in promoting peace and the challenges, if any, they faced in this exercise were explored. This enabled the research to assess the nature and role that the “sociocultural resources” (Lederach, 1997, p. 93) have played in holding Ghana together.

Instrumentation

i) Survey: The survey component used 77 largely closed ended structured Likert scale and multiple choice questions to gauge the respondents’ views, knowledge, and perceptions on why Ghana has remained peaceful in spite of the challenges the has experienced. The last 11 questions assessed respondents’ personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices that provide insights into how individual beliefs, actions, and behaviors might have contributed to the building of social cohesion in Ghana. Appendix 5 presents the questionnaire that was used in the study.

ii) Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews: Based on the outcomes of the desk study, the researcher developed and used structured questions to guide the interviews with key informants. The open-ended questions were designed to tease out respondents' views and voices on the study topic. Appendix 6 provides the interview guide that was used in this study. Although the guide provides a structuring of the questions, the sequence of questioning was varied to ensure that the interviewee followed leads in the thoughts of the respondents to provide coherence and consistency in the responses. More critically, the interviewer probed the responses, with follow-on questions not included in this guide, to create the opportunity for respondents to deepen their thoughts and reflections on issues raised in the course of responding to listed questions. In this way, the guide did not serve as foreclosure to the open-endedness of the interviews. On the contrary, it merely provided a frame for structuring the thoughts of respondents and the data collection process. This open-minded approach to engaging the respondents enabled the researcher to triangulate, validate, and saturate data in order to confirm, strengthen, or reject concepts, themes, and categories that had already emerged from prior segments of the study or interviews.

Data Collection Process

i) Prior Consent of Respondents: All interviewees reviewed and signed a consent form prior to participating in the interview. Where the interviewee was unable to read, write, and/or understand English, the pre-translated and approved consent form was read out to him or her in a language that he or she appeared to understand. The consent form explained the purpose of the interview and assured interviewees of the

confidentiality of the information they provided in the course of the interview. It also guaranteed the anonymity of their participation in the study. Interviewees were also informed of their right not to answer any question, should they find that too invasive of their privacy, too emotional to recount, or painful for their memories.

ii) Data Collection Processes for Quantitative Survey: The research used the PoiMapper comprehensive mobile geomapping, data collection, and management software mounted on android cell phones, Ipads or Ipod Touch platforms for the collection of data. The researcher procured the software as well as vendor technical support services in migrating the MS Word-based questionnaires into the PoiMapper platform. The researcher and the assistant were equipped and trained to use the devices on which the survey forms were mounted for the collection of the data. The researchers moved in a team into selected clusters for the selection of respondents and the data collection process to ensure quality and integrity of the data collected. Daily uploads and synchronizing of data on a central field server was carried out to minimize risk of data lost due to equipment failure. The use of the PoiMapper software eliminated the need for paper-based data collection. With the PoiMapper data collection mechanism, the data collected was recorded electronically, and uploaded into a central database at the close of day. This eliminated the need and cost for transporting bulky papers to the field and time for entering data after the field work. Data entry errors were minimized and the cost of data entry was eliminated as well.

iii) *Recording of Data*: With prior consent of the interviewees, key informant interview data was collected using both a digital audio recording device and hand written notes. Audio-recording was necessary not only to allow for the complete capture of the proceedings; it also provided an opportunity for the researcher to focus attention on the interviewee to provide positive feedback and show respect. This enabled the researcher to capture any nonverbal data and cues (such as body language cues in the form of hand gestures, eye movements, shifts in views, etc.) that interviewees let out in the course of the interview, and which evinced emotional states or reactions in relation to issues being discussed.

iv) *Field notes and memoing*: The researcher took down notes by hand during the desk study and in the course of the field work. Field notes were particularly important during the key informant interviews, where notes on verbal and non-verbal cues, as well as, body language of respondents were captured in note form. The handwritten field notes from the desk study and Key Informant Interviews were typed out in Microsoft Word and incorporated in other notes for the textual analysis.

Procedures for Data Capture and Preparation for Analysis

i) *Data Capture*: Quantitative data collected using the PoiMapper software was downloaded as Excel Spreadsheets. Questions that had been presented in table form on the questionnaires had their responses downloaded in columns rather than rows. Hence, considerable time was spent translating the responses from columns into rows. Due to challenges with internet connectivity in the field, as detailed below, several of the

interviews lost significant portions of responses during upload of completed interviews to the cloud server. Hence, time was spent verifying completeness of interviews and eliminating uncompleted ones. The final data set was then exported into Version 20 of the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) platform for analysis.

ii) *Transcription of Audio Recordings*: The audio recordings from the key informant interviews were transcribed, using the help of professional transcription services. The researcher verified all transcribed texts against the initial audio recordings to ensure fidelity of the texts to the original recordings. Verified and/or corrected transcribed texts were then analyzed to isolate emerging categories and themes. Additionally, the audio recordings were downloaded and converted into WAV format for upload into the Atlas/ti software for analysis. I then used the Atlas/ti Software to code the texts of the transcribed interviews and to generate open and axial codes, families, and networks of data. Appendices 4S1 through 4S4 present the data maps, which served as the frame for the scrutiny and analysis of the data.

Encounter and Resolution of Field Level Challenges

Distribution of data collection location for the quantitative survey: The country wide cluster sampling methodology produced a wide geographical distribution of the selected study sites. Several of these were in very remote locations with limited road and transport infrastructure and far away from urban centers. Hence, accessing such locations was difficult and time consuming.

Community Cooperation: In general, community members in the study sites were cooperative and willingly participated in the interviews. In one case, however, a prospective interviewee challenged the motive of the interview, insinuating that it was for political purposes. However, when he finally agreed to review the consent form and the questionnaires, he changed his mind, willingly participated in the interview, and apologized afterwards for his initial objections. He subsequently supported the recruitment of other interviewees in the community through explaining the purpose of the survey.

Internet connectivity for GPS data verification: The POI Mapper data collection platform provided for the collection of GPS coordinates of the locations where the interviews were conducted. This was to support the production of a distributional map of the data collection points. It also provided a guarantee that the data is collected in the selected study area. Appendix 7 provides a map of the distribution of locations of the sampled clusters where the data for this survey were collected. Interviews were stored on the cellphones and uploaded to the cloud database on return to the urban areas.

POI Mapper also allowed data to be uploaded to the service providers cloud server. Data upload and the collection of GPS coordinates, however, required that the data collection instrument (cellphone or notebook running on Android platform) has internet connectivity at the start of the data collection. The only source of internet connectivity in Ghana outside office environments is via cellphone data services. Hence, access to cellphone connectivity was crucial for the internet access. In several cases, however, the selected communities did not have cell phone coverage at all, or had technical problems with the cellphone service providers at the time of visit for data

collection. Consequently, it was not possible to collect the GPS data at the time of the interviews for such locations.

Data Clean Up Process and Outcomes: The quantitative survey targeted to interview 1,500 respondents in 50 Polling Areas across the country that were pre-selected using the cluster sampling methodology. Interviews were conducted using POI Mapper Software, in lieu of paper-based questionnaires, to electronically capture and document the responses that participants gave. Captured responses from each interview were uploaded using cellphone-based internet connections. Data upload faced challenges in areas where cellphone connectivity bandwidth was small or the signal was weak. As a result, upload error messages prompted the re-uploading of the same interviews, even though in effect the data would have been uploaded. Consequently, several interviews were uploaded multiple times. Multiple uploads for the same interview was traceable using a combination of the interviewee unique data identifiers, the POI Mapper data identifier, the date and time of the interview, and/or the GPS coordinates. This process allowed the cleaning up of the data to eliminate the repeated interviews.

In other instances, responses to a set of questions in an interview failed to upload to the server. This created data gaps. To resolve this, a rule of thumb decision was made to eliminate any interviews that had responses to five consecutive questions or more missing in the dataset. This data cleanup process pruned down the data to a fairly complete set of responses for 1429 interviews. This represents 95.3% of the target of 1500 interviews. As indicated in earlier under considerations for sampling and sample size determination, sample sizes of at least 1,200 are considered adequate for nationwide

surveys. Hence, the sample of 1429 interviews was considered more than enough to proceed with the analysis of the data for this study.

Regional representation in the dataset did not suffer much from the data clean up exercise. The Central and Volta Regions were the only ones which had 85 and 81 per cent respectively of their interviews included in the study. All other regions had more than 90% of their interviews included. However, to ensure the adequacy and representativeness of the data for a national level study, additional verification and validation steps were used. Of the 125 variables in the study, responses to the question on whether Ghana is an oasis of peace had the lowest number of respondents ($n=1369$). Given that this is a key variable in this study, the n value for this question served as the threshold for a test to establish how representative this sample size would be of the larger Ghanaian population who might answer to the same question. In other words what proportion of Ghanaians in the actual population of the country would respond to the question on whether Ghana is an oasis of peace? To determine an estimate of the actual proportion of the Ghanaian population that would agree that Ghana is an oasis of peace, I generated descriptive statistics on the variable “Oasis of Peace” using SPSS Version 20. The variable is an ordinal level one with more than four categories; hence I used the descriptive function to generate the basic statistics for this estimation (Healey, 2012, Kindle Edition). Table 2 presents the results.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics of the Variable with Lowest Response Rate

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Oasis of Peace	1369	1	4	1.64	.848
Gender	1414	1	2	1.46	.499
Valid N	1354				

Since the standard deviation of the larger Ghanaian population is not known, I used the procedure in the formula below to compute the confidence interval based on the mean of the sample (Formula 7.2 in Healey, 2012, Kindle Version) to determine the confidence interval of a large sample. Table 2 provides the Mean of the sample, the standard deviation and the sample size used in the computation. The procedure for the computation was as follows:

$$\text{Confidence Interval} = \bar{X} \pm Z \left(\frac{s}{\sqrt{N-1}} \right)$$

From the descriptive statistics in Table 2:

- i) The sample mean of the variable belief that Ghana is peaceful = 1.64
- ii) The Standard deviation = .848
- iii) The Sample Size = 1369
- iv) Given a $P_u = 0.05$, therefore $Z = 1.96$

Substituting the above in the equation,

$$\text{Confidence Interval} = 1.64 \pm \frac{1.96(.848)}{\sqrt{N-1}}$$

$$N-1 = 1369-1 = 1368 \quad \therefore \sqrt{1368} = 36.986$$

$$\square \text{ Confidence interval} = 1.64 \pm \frac{1.96(.848)}{36.986} = 1.64 \pm 1.96(0.0229) =$$

$$\text{Confidence interval} = 1.64 \pm 0.0449$$

The foregoing means if multiple samples were taken from the Ghanaian population to gauge the extent of their belief that Ghana is an oasis of peace, in 95% of the times, the mean will fall between 1.595 and 1.685. Since the sample mean of 1.64 falls within this range, we are confident that the sample used in this study is representative of the Ghanaian population. Based on this, we can say that we are 95% confident that the 94.5% of the survey respondents who agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that Ghana is an oasis of peace are also representative of the wider Ghanaian population. In other words, we can say with 95% confidence that 94.5% of Ghanaians would agree to varying extents that Ghana is an oasis of peace.

Field Challenges with Key Informant Interviews: The Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) took place in two time slots between breaks for the conduct of the quantitative surveys, work, and securing appointments with prospective interviewees. Lot 1 covered fourteen (14) interviews conducted between 5 February and 5 March, 2014, while Lot 2 comprised nineteen (19) interviews carried out between 15 October and 14 December 2014. Pinning down interview schedules with identified interviewees was the major challenge, as all interviewees ran very busy schedules.

Interview Transcriptions: Transcription of the interviews also took longer than expected, given the emphasis I placed on verbatim transcription of every interview. Procuring of professional transcription services to support the process became necessary.

Ethics and reflexivity section

Ethical Concerns: This research used open and close ended questions for collecting data. Consequently, substantial portions of the data collected came from participants' recollection of their personal and collective lived experiences, events, and knowledge of personalities that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. These recollections were done through multiple lenses that included the cognitive, semiotic, experiential, ethical, and hermeneutic ones (Fox, 2006). Hence, participants' input into the data collection process came from the "... fusion of both historical and fictional" (Fox, 2006, p. 47) recalls of the events, people, and values that have shaped and contributed to the peace in Ghana.

The multi-layered data collection process and the use of triangulation in the analysis of findings provided opportunities for interrogating data from different sources. This enabled the research to isolate fictional accounts of individuals from the shared realities of the generality of participants. Triangulation of data sources also provided opportunities to isolate consensual, as well as, contested themes that emerged from the analysis of the narratives from the interviews. It provided the forum for participants "...to dissolve [the perceptual] boundaries [that divide their viewpoints], to break down barriers and to reinterpret [their] two-dimensional dichotomies" (Fox, 2006, p. 56) in order to build a common narrative of why and how Ghana finds itself peaceful.

Reflexivity: As a Ghanaian who has been actively engaged in the development and peacebuilding field in Ghana and across Africa for more than 25 years, I had some views and perceptions on why Ghana is at peace while other countries with similar characteristics are not. Therefore, I was keenly aware that "the political and personal perspectives of researchers [can] inform the intentions we have for the research" (Gilles

& Alldred, 2002, p. 33 in Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, and Miller). Hence, my personal knowledge of some of the people that were interviewed; their experiences of the wars or violence in other contexts; my own perceptions of the issues being discussed; and my reflections and discussions with colleagues on the subject of peace in Ghana, all risked introducing biases into the selection of my sample; the structuring of the interviews; the way interview questions were chosen and framed; and the interpretations that I put to some of the findings. Therefore, I needed to be constantly aware of these potential intrusions of personal views into the design and outcome of the research. Aware of these dangers, I took care at every stage of the study design, conduct, analysis of the data, and reporting to ensure that my personal impressions did not intrude into the data. I constantly strove to make the data speak for itself as I bracketed my personal views.

Additionally, Ghanaians are literally split in two halves along the lines of the two main political parties in the country – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Against this polarized political arena, the caution of Gilles and Alldred to researchers against allowing our political biases to infiltrate into the research agenda is pertinent. Hence, in dealing with research participants, it was essential to constantly remember that research of this nature can become “explicitly [a] political tool [that some participants would attempt to use] strategically to make political interventions” (Gilles & Alldred, 2002, p. 32). To forestall this, I took care to make the research process and outcomes as neutral, objective, and transparent as possible.

Results or Analysis

Both quantitative and qualitative results were analyzed and are reported in the findings.

Quantitative Data Analysis: The quantitative results focused on aggregating perceptions, views, and experiences of survey respondents, using descriptive statistics. This allowed for the disaggregation of findings from the survey to isolate any differences in perspectives that emerged due to differences in age, gender, levels of education, geographic region of origin, ethnicity, among others, of participants. The study used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to analyze the quantitative data collected from the survey. Preliminary data generated provided descriptive statistics on the profile of respondents, as well as, on some of the non-profile responses to the questions. This initial descriptive statistics guided more in-depth data analysis. Chi-Square values derived from the cross-tabulation of study responses with various categories of participants helped determine significant differences in responses as a result of demographic variations among respondents. Independent Sample t-Tests were carried out when the independent “variable [had] exactly two categories” (Healey, 2012, Kindle Edition, Location 7209). Although gender is the only independent variable in this study that potentially presents two categories, the question on the gender of participants allowed for a third gender category. However, respondents responded to only two categories. Hence, a T-test was not conducted to determine if there were any differences of opinion on the various dependent variables as a result of gender differences. ANOVA tests were, however, carried out, using the remaining independent variables such as age categories, educational levels, region of origin, and occupation of respondents, where

necessary. This was to determine whether any differences in opinions, perceptions, attitudes and behaviors existed within and between these categories that would help explain why Ghana is peaceful.

Analysis of Qualitative Data: Reporting on the qualitative aspects of the study focused on capturing and documenting the voices and views of respondents. However, triangulation with other sources of data, such as the desk study and key informant interviews, enabled the report to draw out theoretical conclusions reflective of the full range of data sources. For the analysis of the qualitative data from the Key Informant Interviews, a choice was made between the Glaserian versus the Straussian approaches to the analysis of data emerging from grounded theory field studies. While Glaser prefers “abstract conceptualization” which focuses on “units of meaning”(Lamp & Milton, 2007, p. 2) derived from the data, Strauss and Corbin prefer more detailed analysis of interviews based on “word by word analysis” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990 in Lamp & Milton, 2007, p. 2). Both approaches have their merits, depending on the kinds of research being conducted. Given the focus of this study, however, the “Glaserian approach [was] more applicable here as it [tried] to see the reality by collecting and fixing the needed data” (Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349). It allowed data collected at any stage to “...guide and suggest the next level data requirements” (Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349).

In accordance with this approach, qualitative data from the desk study, key informant interviews, as well as, field notes of the researcher, were incorporated into one set of typed notes to provide a complete set of data for the analysis. The data was then

analyzed using open coding techniques to sort and categorize the themes emerging from the data. Major themes that emerged from this round of analysis were organized into categories. The study then identified associations between categories to create “broader, more general explanations from the categories and their relationships” (Willis, 2007, p. 307). Where applicable, the study linked emerging categories to create overarching categories that provided a broader view of the issues participants were raising. The triangulation of the findings from the key informant interviews with the responses from the desk study and quantitative data enabled the research to unearth and engage any other pieces of information that may not have emerged already.

To ensure depth and consistency in the analysis, the study used ATLAS/ti research software for the analysis of the qualitative data. ATLAS/ti was selected because it allows for the analysis of transcribed interview texts in ASCII format, sound in the WAV format, as well as, graphics. The software helped to create codes, memos, and networks of text elements using “...individual letters, words, phrases, sentences...” (Lewis, 1998, p. 4). Coding was done manually or automatically, and once produced, codes were grouped into families, merged or searched (Lewis, 1998). Compared to NUD*IST software, ATLAS/ti’ offered a more intuitive coding system (Lewis, 1998). The generation of super codes allowed for higher level analysis and the creation of networks between coded data. Methodologically, ATLAS/ti was best suited for this study because the grounded theory approach influenced the development of the software (Smit, 2002). Hence, it “provides the tools to be consistent and rigorous if the user wants to follow a grounded theory (or type of) approach” (Contreras, 2009).

Analysis of the KII produced four (4) major nested webs of positive and negative cultural and religious factors that, in the view of respondents, explain Ghana's state of peace. The family of codes related to the effect of culture on Ghana's peace came up with 27 nodes; the contribution of religion to peace had 14 nodes, while the classification of Ghana's peace had 10 nodes. A fourth cluster related to the coping mechanisms or exit strategies respondents believed have helped to maintain Ghana's peace in its current state. Citizens' disengagement/resignation; recourse to using private solutions to addressing public problems; migration out of poverty areas, either temporarily, cyclically, or permanently; entry into politics as a means of accessing public resources, legitimately or illegitimately; youth occupation of the streets of urban areas to sell anything they can lay their hands on, also known as streetism in NGO parlance; and finally the recourse of the youth to regulated or illegal small-scale mining, logging, and other forms of natural resource exploitation constituted the unexpected finds under this category. Details of the findings are incorporated under each hypothesis of the study. They provide explanatory insights into the findings of the quantitative survey.

Reliability and Validity

Ensuring Data Reliability: In the use of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss have pointed out that the process of collecting data and cross-checking it multiple times allows the researcher to have a detached enough perspective on the issues to formulate "...workable guides to action and therefore [provide] credibility" (Glaser & Strauss, 2010, p. 227) to the findings. The extensive nature of the data that this study collected, coupled with the multiple levels of comparison, verification, and reworking of the data

provided the degree of detached emersion with the data that led to the “conceptual density” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 161) required to lend credence to the findings of this research.

Reliability of quantitative data resides on how consistent, stable, and dependable the data collection process is. Hence, to ensure reliability of the data in this survey, the same set of questions was used for all the interviews. In the few cases where translators were needed to mediate interviews, the researcher worked with the translators to develop a lexicon of words that ordinarily do not have direct equivalents in the local languages. These working dictionaries, where developed, were then used for the translation of such technical words to the interviewees. In all cases simultaneous voice recording of the interviews was taken and used later to double check the accuracy of the entries made during the course of the interview.

Ensuring Validity in the Data: The validity of any theory is time and context specific, as changes in the matrix of conditions under which a theory was developed “affects the validity of [such] theories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 171). Sandelowski (1993) further notes that validity in qualitative research outcomes is a function of judgment. Hence, the use of standardized objective, and repeatable procedures in qualitative research to establish scientific rigor of findings is unrealistic and “...completely alien to the concept of narrative truth” (Sandelowski, 1993, p. 4). Willis (2007) defines two levels of validity of research findings, namely internal and external validity. While internal validity deals with the reliability of the data collected, issues of

external validity raise “the question of generalizability”(Willis, 2007, p. 216) of the findings of a study.

The overlapping use of desk studies, survey results, and key informant interviews in this study, was designed to address the concerns of validity. The multilayered data collection, analysis, constant comparison, and theory validation processes in this research aimed “to build a theory that fits every set of data and thus is generalizable” (Willis, 2007, p. 306). The constant comparison of findings between data sets ensured that the data was kept current, complete, and therefore reflective of the changing contexts in the course of the research. This enhanced the validity of the findings from the qualitative survey.

To ensure validity of the data from the quantitative survey, the study developed and used a matrix of the hypotheses, the definition and operationalization of the variables, and the statement of indicators for each of the variables tested in the hypotheses - See Appendix 8. Each set of indicators was tracked to a question in the survey instrument. This ensured that the questions asked in the survey collected the intended data. A pre-test of the questionnaire was done to provide opportunities for revising them and their associated variables, definitions, and indicators. This was to ensure that the quantitative component of the research generated the data it needed to have for assessing the factors that contribute to Ghana’s peace.

Chapter 4: Findings from Field Research

Profile of Respondents

A total of 1429 interviews form the basis for the analysis of the quantitative survey outcomes. However, not all the respondents answered all the questions in the survey. Out of the 1,414 respondents who reported their gender category, 651 (i.e. 45.6%) were females and 763 (i.e. 53.4%) were males. Regionally, the Central Region had the highest female participation rate of 51% (52/102) in the interviews, with the Upper West Region having the lowest participation rate of 23.3% for women. The Northern Region, however, recorded the highest male dominance in the interview at 64.8%. Age-wise, of the 1382 respondents who gave their ages, 49.3% were 35 years or younger. The mean age of respondents was 38.88, with a standard deviation of 36 – see Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3

Percentage of Respondents 35 years old or younger

Age <= 35 (FILTER)

Case Selection	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	705	49.3	51.0
Selected	677	47.4	49.0
Total	1382	96.7	100.0
Missing System	47	3.3	
Total	1429	100.0	

Table 4

Mean Age of Respondents

N	Valid	1382
	Missing	47
Mean		38.88
Median		36.00
Std. Deviation		14.239

The majority of respondents (55.1%) had some education not exceeding the middle school or Junior High School levels. In all, 38.8% of respondents (554/1429) indicated that they had an education from the Primary up to the Middle School or Junior Secondary School, while , 16.3% (233/1429) had less than six years of education at the primary school level. Additionally, 15.5% of the respondents (221/1429) said they had never been to school. Respondents who said they had a secondary school level education accounted for 18.7% of the respondents (266/1429), while those who indicated they had tertiary level education (i.e. university or polytechnic level education) represented 10.6% of the total number of respondents in the study. While 99/1429 (6.9%) said they had a diploma or a Higher National Diploma (HND) from a tertiary institution, 44/1429 (3.1%) indicated that they had a Bachelor's degree from a university; 7/1429 had Master's level education and only 1 person reported holding a PhD Degree. By gender and educational levels, women respondents constituted 56.4% (255/452) of the total number of respondents who indicated that they had either never been to school or had less than six years of primary education.

By religion, 75.7% of respondents (1068/1410) who provided information on their religious affiliations indicated that they were Christians, while 18.5% said they were Moslems. Adherents of Indigenous African Religion came third with 70/1410 or 5.0%.

The remaining of respondents either did not indicate their faith tradition or mentioned other faiths such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or combinations of different faiths. While 35.7% of respondents (504/1429) said they lived in villages or rural areas, 44.6% said they lived in either the district capitals (18.4%); regional capitals (15.8%) or national capital (10.5%). However, 19.6% respondents indicated that they lived in towns outside the national, regional, or district capitals. In all, 95.7% (1367/1429) indicated the regions they called home regions i.e. regions they consider their native regions even though they may not have been living there at the time of the interview. Compared to the data on the regions where interviews were actually carried out, six (6) regions (Central, Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta) recorded more people claiming them as home regions than the total number of valid interviews in the study that were carried out in those regions. This implies that respondents living in other regions were claiming the Central, Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta Regions as their home regions. Noticeably, Greater Accra Region, had the lowest percentage of respondents (30%) who claimed it as their home region, even though 20.5% of all valid interviews (293/1429) were conducted in this region. This means the majority of interviewees in the Greater Accra Region are natives of other regions in the country – see Table 5.

Table 5

Distribution of Respondents by Region of Residence and Region of Birth

Region	Valid Interviews	Home Callers	% Home Callers
Ashanti	268	250	93.3%
Brong Ahafo	114	106	93.0%
Central	102	123	120.6%
Eastern	150	170	113.3%
Greater Accra	293	88	30.0%
Northern	142	210	147.9%
Upper East	60	81	135.0%
Upper West	30	42	140.0%
Volta	121	163	134.7%
Western	149	134	89.9%

Occupationally, respondents who described themselves as self-employed private businessmen or women who own and manage their own businesses or persons who are self-employed individuals in the informal sector such as Masons, Carpenters, Hairdressers, Seamstresses, Traders, etc. accounted for 36.7% of interviewees (524/1429). Those who said they were farmers engaged in crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc. constituted 28.4% (406/1429) of the respondents in the study. Respondents who described themselves as employed in “other sectors” represented 7.1% (102/1429). Students in Polytechnics, Universities, or other Tertiary or Secondary level educational institutions accounted for 4.9% (70/1429). Employment categories with less than 5% representation in the study sample were - Academics such as Lecturers, Researchers, or Teaching Assistants in an Academic institution (1.6%); Civil or Public Servants working in Government ministries, departments or agencies (3.6%); Corporate Business Executives including Managing Directors, Managers, Chief Executive Officers

of medium and large scale companies or businesses (0.3% - 5/1429); Elected or Appointed Political Leaders including Members of Parliament, Government Minister of a Sector, at the Presidency, or Region; as well as, Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Chief Executives (0.1% - 2/1429); House wife (4.7% - 67/1429); Members of the Security Services including the Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service; Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services (0.8% - 11/1429); Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political Party). Others included Professionals (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.); Religious leaders (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion); Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or Village; Worker in the NGO Sector; and employee in the Private Sector – see Table 6. Compared to the population census results, the profile of respondents represents a cross-section of the general population of Ghana.

Table 6
Primary Occupation of Respondents

Primary Occupation	Frequency	Valid Percent
System Missing	7	.5
Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an Academic institution)	23	1.6
Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, department or agency)	52	3.6
Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief Executive Officer etc.)	5	.3
Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament, Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency, Region); Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive	2	.1
Employee in the Private Sector	62	4.3
Farmer (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.)	406	28.4
House wife	67	4.7
Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services)	11	.8
Other(specify)	102	7.1
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political Party)	6	.4
Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.)	48	3.4
Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion)	15	1.0
Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman	110	7.7
Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, Seamstress, Trader, etc.)	414	29.0
Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary level	70	4.9
Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or Village levels	6	.4
Worker in the NGO Sector	23	1.6
Total	1429	100.0

Study Results from Hypotheses testing and Key Informant Interviews

The quantitative component of the study set out to test fourteen (14) hypotheses that examined the extent to which various factors may have contributed to the peace in Ghana – see Appendix 8. Data analysis therefore focused on testing all the fourteen (14) hypothesis of the study to establish whether or not they can be rejected. Results of the tests are presented in the sections below. Additionally, results from the qualitative component of the study provide complementary insights for the assessing the issues raised under each hypothesis. Perspectives from the Key Informant Interviews therefore provide complementary or qualifier insights on the statistical data from the quantitative testing of each hypothesis

Perceptions on Ghana as an Oasis of Peace

Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country

Under this hypothesis, the study assessed the degree to which respondents with different socioeconomic characteristics (age, regions of origin, gender, educational levels, religious affiliations, occupations, and places of residence) agreed with the perception that Ghana is a peaceful country. Table 7 shows that 90.5% of respondents (1294/1429) agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country. In all, 52.6% of all respondents “very strongly” agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country, with 30.3% indicating strong agreement as well.

Table 7


Degrees to which Respondents Agree that Ghana is a Peaceful Country

Oasis of Peace	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Mildly Agree	75	5.2	5.2
Agree	109	7.6	7.6
Strongly Agree	433	30.3	30.3
Very Strongly Agree	752	52.6	52.6
Skipped	55	3.8	3.8
Missing	5	0.3	0.3
Total	1429	100	100

Figure 1 shows that more than 94% of respondents in all regions of Ghana, irrespective of their educational levels, gender, and age categories agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that Ghana is an oasis of peace.

Figure 1

Percentage Of Respondents Who Said Ghana Is An Oasis Of Peace.



Personal experiences influence the perceptions on whether or not a country is peaceful.

Since age differences greatly influence personal experiences, and therefore, respondents'

perception of peace, a One-Way ANOVA test was conducted under the following assumptions:

- a. Model: The data for the survey is based on Independent Random Samples
- b. Interval-ratio levels of measurement is used
- c. Populations are normally distributed
- d. Population variances are equal (Healey, 2012, Kindle Version)

The descriptive statistics of the ANOVA test in Table 8 shows variations in the means for all age categories are sizeable, ranging from a high of .915 for the 28-37 years age category to a low of .558 for the 78-87 years age category, with equally sizeable differences in the standard deviations for different age categories. This indicates that variations within and between the age categories in their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace are not small.

Table 8

Within and Between Age Variations on Perception of Peace in Ghana

Age Categories of Respondents	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
18 - 27 years	313	1.78	.827	.047	1.69	1.87	1	4
28-37 years	409	1.76	.915	.045	1.67	1.84	1	4
38-47 years	290	1.62	.857	.050	1.52	1.72	1	4
48-57 years	166	1.47	.728	.056	1.36	1.58	1	4
58-67 years	93	1.31	.675	.070	1.17	1.45	1	4
68-77 years	47	1.34	.815	.119	1.10	1.58	1	4
78-87 years	5	1.40	.548	.245	.72	2.08	1	2
88-97 years	1	1.00	1	1
98 years or older	1	2.00	2	2
Total	1325	1.65	.851	.023	1.60	1.69	1	4

The One-Way ANOVA test of the hypothesis that age categories of respondents has no effect on their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace produced a mean square of 3.962 at 8 degrees of difference for an F statistic of 5.618 – Table 9. Since the

associated significance level of 0.000 is less than the decision point of 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the age categories of respondents and their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace. In other words, differences in age categories do affect the agreement among Ghanaians on whether their country is an oasis of peace or not.

Table 9

Effect of Age of Respondents on Perception of Peace in Ghana

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	31.699	8	3.962	5.618	.000
Within Groups	928.112	1316	.705		
Total	959.811	1324			

Table 10 presents the Chi Square values from the cross-tabulation of the responses to the question on whether Ghana is a peaceful country with different socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. Apart from results for cross-tabulation of the responses to the question with gender categories, all scores returned two-tailed significance measures of less than 0.05 for their respective chi square values. Hence the hypothesis that there is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country can be rejected. In other words, there are differences in the perceptions of respondents of different **age categories, regions, religious affiliations, employment categories**, and for those living in different **localities** that Ghana is peaceful. For gender, however, the hypothesis cannot be rejected since the Chi Square value of 8.936 has a two-tailed significance of .538. In other words, the finding is coincidental and we cannot reject the

hypothesis that there is no difference between the perceptions of men and women that Ghana is a peaceful country.

Table 10

Significance Of Socio-Economic Characteristics Perception Of Peace in Ghana

Level of Measurement	Chi Square Value	Difference	Two-tailed Significance
Perceptions of different age categories of people on why Ghana is peaceful	114.419 ^a	45	.000
Perceptions of respondents from different regions on why Ghana is peaceful	580.059	45	.000
Perceptions of different gender categories of people on why Ghana is peaceful	8.936 ^a	10	.538
Perceptions of respondents with different levels of formal education on why Ghana is peaceful	94.745	45	.000
Perceptions of respondents of different religious affiliations on why Ghana is peaceful	364.223	50	.000
Perceptions of respondents of different employment categories on why Ghana is peaceful	107.961	85	.047
Perceptions of respondents living in different localities on why Ghana is peaceful	189.253	30	.000

Analyses of responses to the same question from the key informant interviews confirm the existence of differences in opinion among Ghanaians on whether or not the country is peaceful. Similar to the results from the survey, while participants in the key informant interviews generally agreed that Ghana enjoys some peace, many of them promptly provided qualifiers to underscore that they do not “...agree a hundred percent” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) with the view. On the contrary, they agreed largely that “...Ghana is a relatively peaceful country, relative in terms of comparison with our neighboring countries” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February,

2014). While “to the extent that we have not had violent national level conflicts or wars, we can say Ghana is peaceful” (interview 201, 15 October, 2014), the peace is “... also relative in terms of when you look within the country that the country as a whole may be described as peaceful but there are areas in the country that cannot be described as peaceful” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In brief, Ghana’s peace is relative i.e. in comparison to other countries and when viewed only from the total national perspective. Otherwise, there are areas in Ghana that cannot be described as peaceful.

Nature and Sources of Peace in Ghana

H₀₂ there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of peace Ghana enjoys.

The hypothesis is tested using two independent questions. Question 9 in the interview protocol assesses participants’ classification of the type of peace Ghana has, while question 10 assesses participants’ assessment of the factors that contribute to the kind of peace they have observed in Ghana. On the type of peace, the hypothesis defined negative peace as the absence of direct or physical violence even though there may be other forms of violence such as structural and cultural violence that cause suffering, pain, and death. Positive peace, on the other hand, was defined as the absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence. In all, 79% of respondents indicated that Ghana enjoys positive peace. For the 1409 respondents to the question who also indicated their gender category, the Chi Square value of 1.330 gives a two-tailed significance test result of 0.514 for the cross-tabulation of responses on the type of Ghana’s peace with gender categories of respondents. By age categories, the test result showed a Chi Square value of

22.244 with a two-tailed significance measure of .135. Cross tabulation of the responses with respondents' religion gave a Pearson Chi Square value of 24.848 with a two-tailed significance of 0.732.

Since all three measures of significance are greater than 0.05, the findings in all three cases are insignificant and we conclude that there is no difference between men and women, age categories, and the religious affiliations of respondents in their classification of Ghana's peace as positive or negative. Indeed, for gender about the same percentages of men and women believed that Ghana's peace is positive (79.7% for men and 78.7% for women). Similarly, more than 75% of respondents of all age categories indicated that Ghana has positive peace. At least 78% of respondents who declared their religious affiliation as atheists, adherents of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous African Religion or combinations thereof said Ghana's peace was a positive one. It is observable that by creed, 78.0% of Christian respondents (833/1068), 80.5% of their Moslem counterparts (210/261), and 85.7% of believers in Indigenous African Religions (60/70) said Ghana's peace is positive.

With respect to the level of educational attainment and respondents' perception of the type of peace that Ghana has, the cross tabulation returns a Pearson Chi Square value of 28.280 with a two-tailed significance of 0.029. Similar significant findings are reported for cross-tabulations of the perception of the type of peace in Ghana with respondents' region where the interviews were conducted (two-tailed significance measure of .000 for a Chi Square value of 49.81); and locality of residence of respondents (Chi Square Value of 91.042 two-tailed significance measure of .000). Since for these cases, as well, the significance values are less than the *p-value* of 0.05, the

findings are significant and we can reject the assertions that there are no differences between the level of educational attainment of respondents; respondents of different regions; and rural/urban dwellers in their assessment of the type of peace that Ghana has. Age and gender cross-tabulations, however, turned up insignificant findings of Chi square value of 22.244 with $p = .135$ for age, and 1.330 with $p = .515$ for gender – Table 11.

Table 11

Significance Levels of Respondents' Perceptions on Type of Peace in Ghana

Level of Measurement	Chi Square Value	Difference	Two-tailed Significance
Gender	1.330 ^a	2	.514
Religion	9.184 ^a	14	.819
Age Category of Respondents	22.244	16	.135
Educational Level	28.280 ^a	16	.029
Region of interview	480.850 ^a	18	.000
Locality	79.098 ^a	10	.000

Respondents in the KII were, however, less sure about the degree to which Ghana's peace can be described as positive or negative. Asked to indicate whether Ghana's peace was positive or negative peace, the majority of participants indicated that Ghana's peace is such that "...sometimes it is difficult to even rule the line between the negative peace and the positive peace" (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). More than half of the participants in the KII (16/31) said Ghana's peace is "... a mixture of both [negative and positive], but increasingly, in recent times, the negative dimensions are outweighing the positive" (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). To illustrate this perception, another respondent indicated that "if I were to put a range positive 1 to 10 [and then the] negative 1 to 10 I will give positive may be 4 or 5 [out of 10) and I will

give negative 6 or 7” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014), also out of 10. In other words, while Ghana can be considered to be a 40-50% positive peace country, it has to be classified as a 60-70% negative peace country.

These ratings derive from the fact that even though “seen from the outside it may look peaceful [...] there are areas in the country that cannot be described as peaceful” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Hence, “even though from a national perspective you may consider Ghana’s peace to be positive, when you look at it area by area, you will definitely see it as negative peace” (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014). In other words, although Ghana has escaped the ravages of war, its peace is “... a lot more on the negative side because we do have institutions that have sort of mediated and which have drawn the country from the brink of war” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Hence, even though Ghanaians may not have “... taken up arms on a large scale against each other [and] are not shedding blood, but it is an uneasy peace” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). This is probably why another participant found “...it comfortable and easier to describe Ghana as negative peace. Why because poverty is still very pervasive; and you can check the figures, in fact in some instances we can even say that poverty is growing” (interview 2, 7 February, 2014). One respondent believed that whatever there is of negative peace in Ghana it “...is largely because of weakness in the social protection thing” (interview 217 13 December 2014). This tilting of Ghana’s peace to the negative is in spite of the cultural abhorrence of conflict and strife which mandates “...leaders in the traditional set up [to constantly find] ways and means ...to bring about peace and then reconciliation” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). This suggests that but for the interventions of various institutions and actors, Ghana would not have been any different from its neighbors.

Notably, however, eight (8) out of the 31 respondents categorically stated that Ghana's peace is positive, since "we are able to name what is going on, [and] we are able to struggle to overcome that" (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) or because "Ghanaians have tended to absorb them, [because of] the attitude of ooh leave it to God one day there will be a solution" (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). Access to "...an enabling environment that allows you to exercise your fundamental human rights" (interview 213, 9 December, 2014) was also cited as a reason for classifying Ghana's peace as positive. On the other hand, participants who placed Ghana categorically under negative peace cited "...structural underpinnings in the system that can easily lead the country to explode" (interview 215, 10 December, 2014). Poverty and corruption were frequently cited as structural and systemic roots of negative peace. In particular, persistent high levels of poverty which make people suffer and die "...even though you may not hear of it [because] it's not reported in the media (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014); and the "...injustice in the system which is leading to unnecessary deaths of children [or creating the conditions for] many people [who are] suffering in silence" (Interview 201, 21 November, 2014) were cited to support the classification. In brief, respondents in the KII who had an opportunity to discuss Ghana's peace are more definite in their assessment of the type of peace Ghana enjoys – it is more negative than positive.

H₀₂ also assessed respondents opinions on the extent to which the level of civic awareness among Ghanaians; the degree of agreement among political leaders on important issues affecting Ghana; the presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the public and civil Services; the value of peace in the cultures of all ethnic groups; the level of influence of religious beliefs on

peace; recourse to prayers and intercessions by religious groups; the strength of bonds of intermarriages between ethnic groups; Ghanaians' degree of respect for the rule of law; and the fear of being singled out for punishment, contribute to peace in Ghana. To ascertain the degree of convergence on the responses from the survey, a construct of the mean of responses for all nine (9) variables was computed. Table 12 below presents the results of the construct, which indicates that on average 55.3% of all the respondents agreed from a moderately high to a very high extent that all the nine variables contributed towards the peace that Ghana has.

Table 12

Means for Factors Contributing to Ghana's Peace


Case Selection: FacCon \geq 7.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	635	44.4	44.7
Selected	787	55.1	55.3
Total	1422	99.5	100
Missing	7	0.5	
Total	1429	100	

Figure 2 presents a summary of the responses on the contribution of various factors to Ghana's peace, filtered at ≥ 6.5 on the 9 point Likert scale to represent responses that ranged from moderate extent to very high extent for the nine (9) factors for the variables detailed above. The results show that more than two thirds of all the respondents in the survey (at least 66.9%) agreed that all the nine factors contribute in large measure's to the peace that Ghana enjoys. Of the nine, however, prayers and intercessions by religious groups for peace recorded the highest rate as a contributor to peace (88.9%), while the culture of peace among ethnic groups in Ghana comes up next at 84.5%; with religious beliefs that value peace coming close with 81.6% rating by

respondents. The contribution of the level of civic awareness among Ghanaians attracts the least mention of all the nine indicators (66.9%). This suggests that received or socially engrained religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to peace in Ghana than the knowledge of civic awareness gained from the public sphere. Between religion in the form of prayers and intercessions and culture, however, the former trumps as a stronger contributor to peace. Notably, the contribution of religious leaders to peace closely matches that of culture; giving religion an overall higher rating as a contributor to Ghana's peace than culture.

Figure 2

Summary of Responses on Factors Contributing to Ghana's Peace



Appendix 9 presents a summary of the Chi Square test results for the individual variables when cross-tabulated with the profile of respondents. Only four out of the 45 tests did not report significant findings. These were in respect of the cross-tabulation

between level of civic awareness among Ghanaians and age categories of responses ($p = .067$), as well as, for gender ($p = .074$). The cross-tabulation between the presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the Public and Civil Services and religious affiliations of Ghanaians also turned up a two-tailed significance level of .054, while “Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic groups” produced a two-tailed significance level of .088 when cross-tabulated with gender. In other words, the study cannot reject the hypothesis that age and gender differences have no effect on participants’ perception of the contribution of citizens’ level of civic awareness on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Similarly, we cannot reject the supposition that both men and women respondents did not find that the existence of strong bonds of intermarriage between different ethnic groups had an effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Respondents of different religious backgrounds did not also find that the presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the Public and Civil Services had any effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Besides these 4/45 cases, all other Chi Square test results have produced significant findings, thereby suggesting that on the whole, other demographic factors influence respondents’ appreciation of the extent to which the nine different factors have contributed to the peace in Ghana. Except for the nuances detailed above then, we can reject H_{02} that there are no differences among respondents in their perceptions of the nature and sources of peace in Ghana.

Results of the key informant interviews confirm the trends in the assessment of the role of prayers as an anchor for Ghana’s peace. As one responded noted, Ghanaians “...do pray a lot for the country [and] that also is very very important [in attracting] the

mercies of God” (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014) to keep Ghana peaceful. Indeed, it has become “...a standard practice for many years ... that many people pray for peace” (Interview 218, 14 December, 2014) during times of national crises. In the run up to every election since 1992, “...there is an overwhelming mobilization from a religious perspective about why the elections must be peaceful including organizing all night prayer sessions, prayer camps, erm all manner of religious activities for the elections to be peaceful” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This mobilization for prayers cuts all religious divides, as Christians, Muslims, and people of other faiths are known to hold prayer sessions to pray “...for the peaceful elections” (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014).

Praying for the nation is perhaps, the only place participants have credited women with a frontline role in the quest for peace in Ghana. It was noted, for instance, that “Women’s Aglow ... hold a monthly intercession pray at the independence square for the peace of this country and it’s something that we need to recognize” (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014). Another interviewee would add that “...if it comes to mobilizing people for prayers, fasting, and all that most of them are women [and] ...most of the prayer meetings we attend they are mainly women [because] at the end of the day they are [concerned] more about their maternal instincts, fending for their spouses and the children” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; see also, Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). In brief, interviewees credited divine interventions in part for the peace of Ghana due to the role of prayer and active engagement of faith-based organizations in intercessions for, and the preaching of peace before, during, and after elections. The National Chief Imam sums up this view in respect of the 2012 elections when he observed that:

Before the 2012 general election, we cried before Allah to make a choice for us without any bloodshed, we prayed for peace before, during and after the election. Yes, our prayer was answered and there was no bloodshed, no blows on the street and no insult but the dispute rather in court.”(Sharubutu, 2013).

While the efficacy of prayers as a contributor to Ghana’s peace remains beyond the realms of objective verification, several ancillary benefits of Ghanaians recourse to divine interventions lend themselves to verification. For instance, respondents have noted that joint prayers of different faiths during public functions “...helps [us] to identify ourselves with each other and [reinforces] the bonding” (Interview 218, 14 December, 20014) among the different religious and ethnic groups in the country. Beyond promoting interfaith tolerance, respect, and peaceful coexistence, the religiosity of Ghanaians endows religious leaders with legitimacy that political leaders can only envy. As one respondent indicated because “...religion plays a big role in all sectors of society in Ghana, we still listen to our religious leaders; we listen to them when they come up with an issue... we flock to them, and they have played [and] they do play a strong role in promoting peace. (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). This legitimacy has served as strong footholds that have anchored the intrusion and engagement of Ghana’s faith leaders and institutions in the public sphere. Hence, since the coming into being of Ghana as a nation-state, faith leaders in the country have leveraged the legitimacy they have from the population to intervene directly and proactively in matters of state to ensure that duty bearers at all levels live up to their responsibilities in ensuring peace. At all times, “...the religious bodies, the Catholics, the protestants have often stood up for social justice; they

have stood up, commented on, advocated for, or supported issues on social justice but not issues on partisan basis” (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).

KII participants strongly endorsed the adherence of Ghanaians to a culture of peace as a major contributor to the country’s ability to stave off violent national level conflicts. They pointed out that despite the fact that the country is made of more than 50 ethnic groups with different cultures, a certain level of cultural osmosis and homogenization has resulted in the development of a set of shared core values that prize peace over violence. As one respondent summed up the view:

Even though we have many different ethnic groups with different cultures, we have over the years seen a convergence or commonalities in some cultural values and practices; so in a way you can say we have a Ghanaian culture, which is hospitable, welcoming. It’s part of the culture to give whatever we cannot manage to God (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014).

Respondents cited intermarriages, the ability of Ghanaians to migrate to and settle anywhere of their choice in the country without fear; as well as, friendships struck from shared educational, work, and religious affiliations as indicators of the intercultural accommodation, and even assimilation, across all ethnic groups in Ghana. This strongly underscores the culture of peace in the country. Explaining why Ghanaians will find it difficult to engage in widespread national violence, a respondent pointed out that “...where you have people from different tribes mixing and they see themselves as brothers and sisters, and not as somebody coming from the north or from the south; that we live together, we eat the same food (smiles), if you cut me it is the same blood that I will shed, it is the same blood that you would shed” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014); that

is enough to restrain people from fighting. To illustrate the culture that underwrites Ghana's peace, another respondent recounted an incident of confrontation between the Police and a youth group during the tensed moments in 2008, when the election results were inclusive. The scene was set for a violent confrontation as the youth "...charged on the Police. [But] "All of a sudden they stopped and started chanting: 'We want peace; we want peace; we want peace' (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). This kind of situation, in the view of another respondent, demonstrates that Ghana's cultural predisposition is "...not the culture of violence, but the culture of peace" (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

Probed on how it can be said that Ghana has a culture of peace when the country is host to several protracted violent intra and interethnic conflicts, respondents were quick to point out the fact that these conflicts are quickly contained and not allowed to spread. This, in their view, is proof that the wider Ghanaian culture abhors violence and would do anything to quell it before it engulfs the entire country. One respondent took a philosophical twist to the question in saying in the Akan language that "*ε yie sie ε tu a enu na ma a yie ε yε dε*" meaning, it is the brawl at a funeral that lightens the atmosphere. In his view such isolated cases of localized conflicts do not represent general disposition to violence. On the contrary, "there are other factors that are coming into play that make Ghana so solid I don't see how we can fight the way even Ivory Coast fought" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

Consistent with the findings of the survey, participants in the KIIs also placed limited emphasis on the contribution of civic education to the peace of Ghana. This is essentially because the state institutions, including the educational system and the National Commission for Civic Education were faulted for failing to live up to their

expectations of developing and prosecuting programs that would inculcate the culture of peace among Ghanaians. Citing specifically the National Commission for Civic Education, a participant observed that "... Ghanaians want to see them more present in the type of civic education about elections. I don't want to sound too critical of them, but I thought they were absent in the [2012] election" (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Echoing the sentiment, another respondent advocates that Ghana needs to "... find a way either through actual peace education as we know elsewhere or strengthening civic education, democratic education so that these can become the tools for pursuing peace" (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). In brief, the findings from the KIIs support the views from the survey that religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to peace in Ghana than the acquired knowledge of civic awareness. In other words, the propensity of Ghanaians to avoid violence is more innate and socio-culturally engrained from their cultural and faith upbringing than cognitively acquired from the state sponsored civic and formal educational systems.

Contribution of Development to Peace in Ghana

H₀₃ Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country


This hypothesis tested respondents' view on the extent to which horizontal inequalities or the geopolitical disparities in economic development in the country affect the peace in Ghana. It examined respondents' perceptions on the contribution of the overall level of economic development of Ghana to its peace; perceptions of the impact of geographical (north-south; rural-urban) disparities in the level of development on the

peace in Ghana; the contribution of transparent and equitable contracts for natural resource exploitation and management to peace; the effects of perceived equitable returns on Ghana's natural resource contracts on peace; perception of equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country; and the perceived effects of effective and efficient use of proceeds from natural resources for the common good or the development of the country as a whole on peace in Ghana.

The survey used six questions hinged on national policies, programs, and procedures for development to gauge the views of respondents on the said variables. Figure 3 summaries the 4.5 midpoint responses to the six 9 point Likert scale questions. For five variables, more than 60% of respondents agreed very strongly, strongly agreed, simply agreed, or mildly agreed that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government. The same proportion of respondents also believed that transparently negotiated natural resource management contracts contribute to Ghana's peace. Similarly, the equitable and fair returns to Ghana on the exploitation of her natural resources contribute to the peace in the country. In the same way, the equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana. They also agreed that proceeds from the exploitation of Ghana's natural resources are used in ways that benefit the whole country. Noticeable, however, more than 30% of respondents disagreed on all scores. Similarly, with respect to the statement that Ghana is more peaceful than its neighbors because it has a high level of economic development, only 51.5% of respondents agreed with the statement, while 48.5% disagreed to various levels – see Figure 3.

Figure 3

Perceptions of Contribution of Economic Development to Peace in Ghana



Put together, the construct of means for all six variables shows that 68.2% of respondents who provided answers to the questions for all the variables agreed to various extent that the policies, programs, processes, and outcomes of economic development in Ghana have contributed to the peace that the Ghana has – see Table 13.

Table 13

Construct of Mean of responses on Effect of Economic Development on Ghana's Peace.

Case Selection: DevCon <= 4.5 (FILTER)	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	451	31.6	31.8
Selected	967	67.7	68.2
Total	1418	99.2	100.0
Missing System	11	.8	
Total	1429	100.0	

Disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics of respondents and the different variables, however, several nuances emerge. On the effect of the state of economic development in Ghana as compared to other countries as a contributor to peace, significant findings ($p < 0.05$) among respondents of different educational level, regions of interview, and primary occupation. However, gender and age categories reported insignificant findings ($p > 0.05$). A review of the data shows that while 44.3% of male respondents (321/609) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply with the statement that Ghana's level of economic development has contributed to its peace in comparison to its neighbors, only 37.9% of women (206/543) had the same level of agreement on the subject. With respect to the impact of regional disparities in economic development, significant findings emerged for only the educational levels and regions of residence of the respondents. Age category, gender, and primary occupation of respondents turned up p-values > 0.05 . On the level of transparency in the management of natural resources, significant findings emerged for all socio-economic characteristics except gender, occupation, and educational level of respondents. Gender alone recorded insignificant results when cross-tabulated with respondents' perception on whether Ghana is receiving

equitable returns on her natural resource exploitations. Similarly, it is also only gender that came up with insignificant findings ($p > 0.05$) on the question on how effectively proceeds from natural resources are used for development purposes – see Appendix 10.

In brief, the study finds mixed reactions from respondents on the notion that the level of economic development in Ghana, and how the processes associated with the management of its revenue base – natural resources – have contributed to the peace of the country. While about two thirds of respondents agree in some measure that Ghana's peace is attributable to its level and processes of development, a third of the respondents do not agree with this suggest. These nuances notwithstanding, since the p -values on the Chi Square measures for the hypothesis report significance results > 0.05 , we cannot reject the null hypothesis (H_{03}) that disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country.

The Key Informant Interviews provide insights on the apparent lack of agreement among survey respondents on the role of economic development on Ghana's peace. The participants brought up four categories of responses to the question on whether or not Ghana's state of economic development is a contributor to its peace: the affirmative, the dismissive, the ambivalent, and the false-positives. Respondents who agreed that Ghana's level of development has contributed to its peace (the affirmatives) cited increased access to education and communication technology, specifically cellphones and television, as major development factors that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. This is because increased information flow through these media is facilitating changes in perceptions and attitudes, especially among ethnic groups that once exhibited repressive attitudes towards others (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Others suggested that official State

acknowledgment of the existence of the development gap between the north and the south, and the visible attempts of governments to bridge that gap through various interventions are attenuating factors to the emergence of any collective grievance that can trigger north-south conflict (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In particular, respondents cited visible state efforts such as Nkrumah's accelerated educational development policy (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014); the agricultural development initiatives of the Acheampong era, which saw the development of large scale irrigation projects, as evidence of conscious efforts to bridge the north-south divide in development. They also averred that recent initiatives for the accelerated development of the north such as the proposed Northern Development Authority in the NPP era that was subsequently rechristened the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority under the NDC, have all signaled to northerners that there is a national intent to bridge the development gap, even if the outcomes from the implementation of these projects have fallen short of expectations.

Overall, respondents noted that the country's educational systems and level of infrastructural development seems to be ahead of many other countries in West Africa. To emphasize the point a respondent recalled that on "...the few occasions when I had the opportunity to travel outside ... and anytime I came back to Ghana, I felt I had come to heaven; that is the way I felt" (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). And that feeling of pride in the comparative advancement of the country, in the view of respondents, held Ghanaians back from taking up arms at the national level. Finally, there is a heightened awareness among Ghanaians, dating back to the pre-independence era that all the territorial units that eventually came together as Ghana must function together for the

survival of the country and the common good. As one respondent pointed out, the sitting Governor had made this clear in 1951 when he said “That the Gold Coast cannot function as a country, except the three parts come together [and that northern] Chiefs in the Gold Coast Legislative Council, [subsequently] made it abundantly clear that the Colony cannot stand alone. Ashanti cannot stand alone. The North cannot stand alone; our future lies in unity” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). In the view of the respondent, this recognition on the part of the traditional and political leadership of Ghana of the need for unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the mutual benefit of all has underscored the conscious effort at national integration. It engrained the consciousness of economic interdependencies in the national psyche.

Respondents who did not agree Ghana’s level of economic development had anything to do with its peace (the dismissives) subscribed to the view that even though “development does influence conflicts, but [the impact is generally] not much... [because] we have also seen situations where people are living in very deplorable conditions and yet they are not fighting among themselves or against other people.” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). Another respondent would add that “...There are countries that are stable, you don’t hear about them not because they are more prosperous [and] there also very prosperous countries” (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014) that are trapped in violent conflicts. In view of this category of respondents, the state of development does not seem to be an indicator that a country will not fall into violence. They cited the counterfactual example of “Cote d’Ivoire [which was comparatively] well-developed, and yet political tensions erupted” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). If the state of development were a factor for peace, “Nobody would have thought that in West Africa that Cote d’Ivoire

would have had the problem they had” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Respondents also cited Kenya as a counterfactual argument.

The Ambivalent among the KII participants held that with respect to the impact of development on Ghana’s peace “it’s difficult to measure that in Ghana; it’s very difficult” (interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the view of this category of respondents, this is because it is not the total development of the country or the north-south divide in development that are risk factors for conflicts; it is the perceived inequities in the distribution of development resources at the interpersonal levels that creates tensions and conflicts (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In the view of another respondent:

It is very difficult to say that development has played a positive or negative role because frankly speaking if you look at the disparity in the development certainly there is that divide between the north and the south and the north has been underdeveloped since colonial time... the north has been highly underdeveloped ...lagged far behind the south in development terms; you see very little effort being made to address that” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).

For this group of respondents, even recent development such as the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) which was set up to bridge the development gap between the north and the south has failed and poverty between the two is widening. Hence, if “the development divide was a contribution to conflict in the country then you should have seen a lot more antagonism between the north and the

south [but] we don't see that kind of antagonism..." (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).

Explaining the lack of mobilized antagonisms in the north against the south on account of the horizontal inequalities cited a number of factors. According to one of the respondents, the lack of mobilization of the north against the south is attributable to the resignation of the northerners to their fate of underdevelopment, as "the north has been made to accept [...] second rate status in the country" (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Another opines that the north that could have been the "...flash point" for relative deprivation related conflicts has not triggered the kind of geo-ethnic conflicts witnessed elsewhere on the continent because the north is "...still caught up in the euphoria of party politics [as] the parties have in the way blurred the lines between north-south" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Besides, we "...have people in the northern elite who benefit if one's party is in office." (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). As a result, the opportunity to satisfy one's personal and family needs without having to deal with the wider question of north-south economic disparity and deprivation has "blurred the lines and it is difficult to build consensus within the north" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Another respondent insinuated that northern leaders, especially the chiefs, have not been as assertive as their counterparts in other regions who are seen to be "pushing...more assertively than the northerners have done" (Interview 3, February, 2014) to project the needs of their citizens and use same to mobilize their constituents for action.

Other respondents pointed out northerners, especially the younger ones have found escape routes out of their poverty traps through seasonal migration to the south or elsewhere during the off-farm seasons in search of jobs and income. As a result, there is

no critical mass of angry young people who can mobilize to instigate a north-south confrontation. Illustrating the point, a respondent in this study cites the case where:

...in Pusiga for example, you go during the harshest part of the year and almost all the young men have migrated to the south. So you don't then have this group of angry young men in the community saying that this, that, that, but they've found other measures to cope" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

Complementing this view on the anger displacement effect of migration, another respondent noted that the freedom of movement and settlement of Ghanaians across the country creates opportunities for "people in the north who may be peeved or angry that they are marginalized in terms of the economic divide" (Interview 215, 10 December 2014) to relocate and work in the south. This gives people in the north "...a stake in what goes on well in the south because it helps to take them up; in the same way that you have people from the south who also invest and do business in the north". Hence, even though the north-south divide in terms of development exists, the possibility of migration to and from the south, and the attendant economic benefits and interests is "...an insurance that sort of helps us to avoid conflict" (Interview 215, 10 December 2014), especially related to violent reactions to the development gap between the north and the south. In other words, ease of cross regional migration and access to economic opportunities in the south (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; Interview 215, 10 December, 2014; Interview 210, 21 November, 2014), is effectively a disincentive to the people of the north to mobilize to fight those in the south, since doing so could jeopardize their ability to access the

resources of the south. Be it as may, the combination of these factors have created the situation where the opportunity for anyone to latch onto the “frustration-aggression” potential energy of the north, and especially of the youth in that part of the country and channel that into “anger-driven behavior” (Ametewe, in Tonah, 2007, p. 26) against the south is lost. Other respondents suggested that self-complacency among those most affected by relative deprivation attenuates their anger. According to this view, the non-materialistic nature of Ghanaians sets a low material satisfaction threshold for most people. As a result, people are happy with the little that they have; they do not depend on external others, especially government to satisfy their needs; and “they are not comparing themselves to other people; they are satisfied with whatever they have and they depend upon whatever they have to survive; [therefore], they are not ready to go and indulge in violence before they survive, they are satisfied (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).

Respondents cited the activities of nonstate development actors in the north as a major shield against this anger-driven behavior that Ametewe has indicated. As one respondent put it, although unequally distributed, the investments of development-focused Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) provide substantial relief and development services to the north. This, in the view of the respondent, has contributed to the mollification of communal anger against the state for its failure to right the wrongs of policy failures of the past and the present that perpetuate the development gap between the north and the south, and for that matter other parts of the country that receive similar non-state development support. In the words of the respondent, “NGOs have found a way of calming [community anger]...rather than being organizations that facilitate citizens’ agency, their voices, we rather serve as a palliative, we go in and you know calm down

things” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Citing the case of the eastern corridor of the Northern Region, another respondent noted that the peacebuilding efforts of NGOs have equally been effective in helping communities at conflict to contain their grievances, without exploring the wider structural and systemic factors that may have exacerbated their grievances in ways that lead them to violent conflicts (Interview 6, 18th February, 2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014). According to these respondents, by shielding the state from the potential anger of marginalized citizens, development NGOs are temporary displacing the anger of the deprived.

Beyond the north-south development divide, issues of relative deprivation exist in other parts of the country. Even though there is some development in the south in general, it’s not evenly distributed. Large differences exist between the rural and urban areas, and within the urban areas as well. As one respondent noted, “over the past 20 years the gap is widening between the very poor and the very rich” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014) as evidenced by the “...abundant display of wealth” in some areas, especially in the urban areas, in comparison to the dire poverty in the same cities. Consequently the incidents of violent conflicts are concentrated in and tend to be contained within poor rural areas and urban slums. The attendant threat to the peace of the country lies in the fact that “a country is as strong as it is able to take of its vulnerable and I am not yet sure that we have done, (pause) we have worked sufficiently to protect our weak and our vulnerable; and so we have social justice issues” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).

Respondents who believed that the contribution of Ghana’s state of development to its peace is a false-positive essentially argued that the impact of development on peace

in Ghana is a mirage. This is because the contribution of Ghana's state of development on peace in the country is "Not very much in the positive domain as far as I am concerned ... if you go to certain rural areas in this country, they still live in the same conditions, excuse my language, huts, mud houses, errm, that our ancestors, our forefathers lived in over 100 years ago" (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). In the view of this category of respondents, the state of development in Ghana has not been the trigger for conflicts because of the existence of multiple escape routes that allow aggrieved citizens to mortify their anger against failures of the state and other duty bearers. For the elite and middle-class, a conscious distancing, disengagement, or even exit from any confrontational engagement with state institutions and officials who have failed the citizenry is the escape route. In the words of a respondent, "...the so called middle class in Ghana [that should have championed the collectivization of citizens' anger against the failures of duty bearers, have rather] opted for private solutions to public problems" (interviewer 4, 12 February, 2014). Rather than take on political leaders and other duty bearers for failures in the delivery of social services and public goods, they disengage and try to fix the problems privately. Hence, "... if water is not working rather than engaging to find out what we need to do, you go and sink boreholes; ... The roads are not working [you buy] bigger four wheel drives; ... no electricity, you go for a generator" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Those who do not want to go through the trouble of finding their own solutions to state failure and inadequacies simply exit the state system through migration to other more functional countries, usually Europe and North America. Even when they stay back, they send their children to schools outside to escape the challenges with the educational system; when the local health insurance is collapsing, "...we are going in for

private insurance” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) instead of engaging the system to make sure that it functions. Those who can afford it fly out for medical attention since they cannot rely on local health services. In parallel, “...the other social groups I think they also have found ways of disengaging from the state” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) through refusal to pay taxes or resort to occasional demonstrations that have little to no effect on changing the situation. Buttressing the point on elite recourse to the use of private solutions to address public problems, another respondent highlights the individualism and exclusivism that cocoons the middle class, not only from the state, but from engagements with their peers for more effective ways of managing state failures for a greater common good. Citing his own example the respondent notes that “I have a borehole, it cost me GHC7,500 to do the borehole, I pump it once a week, and the water is underground, why can’t the five of us, come together, and pump the borehole and share the water, the cost and the water and agree on how it is managed? (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014).

A career in politics is another escape route, respondents indicated. In their view, citizens without the means to solve their problems by themselves find refuge in politics as the route for private wealth accumulation and exit from the poverty trap. This, according to respondents, is why “...you see young people come [out of school] and go into politics and within two three months he’s already starting a house” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). Even party activists such as the “foot soldiers” who have no direct access to power and state resources, “have a way of benefiting” when their party is in power. For those who cannot access the spoils of power, they take their refuge in the wanton exploitation of any natural resource that lies in their way, without due regard for its effect on the

environment, the communities, the economy, or any other negative consequences their acts may wrought (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014; also, Interview 215, 10 December 2014). In parallel, the horde of unemployed youth in the urban areas latch onto any “...type of business being labeled as lucrative ... Whether it is [selling] pure water as they call it or selling phone cards, or pushing trucks, any type of buying and selling, you see people engaged in those things [to try to] make a living out of it” (Interview, 9, 26 February, 2014). In sum, rather than engage with duty bearers to demand that the right things are done to improve their conditions of living, Ghanaians tend to avoid conflict by fending for themselves, using whatever means is at their disposal.

Respondents, however, observed that the younger generation of citizens is increasingly linking their economic fortunes and livelihood conditions, especially in the provision of electricity, roads, and other social amenities to public policy making processes, including elections. In election years for instance, it is common to see in some communities protest billboards such as “no electricity, no vote; no road, no vote” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, such community anger at state failures is not sufficiently galvanized to have a direct and large scale impact on peace.

In sum, respondents have emphasized the geo-ethnic interdependencies as a key factor for the accommodation and cooperation between northerners and southerners in Ghana for the country’s peace to prevail. This economic interdependencies between the north and the south that has served as a stitch for peace, has historical antecedents, in the view of one respondent (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). As he illustrated, the geo-ecological composition of Ghana constituted natural trading blocs between the people of the coast, the central forest belt, and the northern Savannah, dating back to the pre-

colonial times. Being business-oriented, the Ashanti kingdom in the center took advantage of the differences in economic resources that this natural geographical and environmental partitioning of the country wrought to organize a unified trade system that inured to its benefits. They leveraged their location in the center; their wedge between the coastal areas with its access to the Whiteman and his goodies; and their access to the northern savannah countries with their demands for kolanuts and other forest products, as well as, their offer of woven cloth, to create economic interdependencies that greatly benefitted the Ashantis. The same interdependencies remain today, even though the commodities of trade may have changed in their composition and values.

Other interviewees have referenced the same regional economic interdependencies and asserted that Ghana's peace is possible largely because private businesses want to have a peaceful environment for their businesses to thrive. As one respondent noted, "...if you have property ...that is [worth] about a hundred thousand dollars you don't want it to be destroyed; [besides] businesses know that their businesses will prevail when there is peace, so they are interested in ensuring peace" (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). In sum, state-initiated development interventions have not had much impact on the lives of people. As such "the majority of Ghanaians are apathetic with political governance or activity. Most of them will say "country broke or country no broke we de inside" (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In other words, it does not matter what happens to the state of development in the country, all citizens have to fend for themselves. The best then is for peace to prevail so that everyone can try to irk out a living (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014).

State's Respect for Human Rights, Rule of Law and Peace in Ghana

H₀₄ The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the country enjoys.

This hypothesis sought to establish the extent to which perceived respect for human rights and freedoms of the citizens affects the peace in Ghana. Accordingly, respondents were asked to state their level of agreement or disagreement on whether Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa because Ghanaians have more freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested; Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians enjoy more political freedom than their neighbors in other countries; and Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of political opponents are minimal.

The frequency run for the variable on respect for freedom of expression shows that 87.7% (n=1419) of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed that Ghana's peace is in part due to the ability of Ghanaians to express themselves freely. An additional 7.0% mildly agreed with the statement. On whether the level of political freedom in the country is a contributor to peace in Ghana, 83.3% of the respondents (n=1420) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the statement. Similarly, 87.4% of the respondents (n= 1423) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of political opponents are minimal. The construct of means for the three variables with a 4.5 level cut off to include respondents who mildly agreed as well shows that 94.4% of respondents to all three questions very strongly, strongly, simply, or mildly

agreed that Ghana's peace is in part attributable to respect for human rights in the country.

Table 14

Effect of Respect of Human Rights on Ghana's Peace

Selection of Cases HRCons <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	74	5.2	5.2
Selected	1349	94.4	94.8
Total	1423	99.6	100.0
Missing System	6	.4	
Total	1429	100.0	

In a cross tabulation of the three variables with the age category, gender, educational level, region in which interviews were conducted and the primary occupation of respondents, all the tests turned up significant findings with two-tailed significance levels less than or equal to .05 – Appendix 11. This means that a the hypothesis that there is no difference among respondents in their perception of the level of contribution of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana has on the peace that the country enjoys can be rejected. In other words, the findings that 94.4% of respondents agree to vary the extents that Ghana's peace is attributable to the level of respect for human rights and the rule of law is a significant find. Therefore, Ho4, which posits that the level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the country enjoys can be rejected.

KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that respect for the freedom of expression and political freedoms, as they currently exist have contributed to sustaining Ghana's current peace. However, this has not always been so historically. In the view of respondents, it is the liberalization of the air waves in the late 1990s and the

repeal of the libel laws in the mid-2000s that has created the new dispensation of freedoms (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). Otherwise, many respondents recalled the periods when the freedom of speech and the media were suppressed or were tightly controlled to serve the interests of the governments of the day, especially when the culture of silence reigned in the 1980s (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).

Respondents saw the current political dispensation as largely positive, but with inherent dangers for the peace of the country. First, the guarantees of human rights have not necessarily translated into the creation of opportunities for the attainment of those rights. Hence, for example, "...there is a difference between having the space [or] freedom of education or rights to education, however, if you are not given the means to school, if you don't have a school near your home, you don't have access to it, it makes it difficult" (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). This brings back to focus the question of development opportunities and its impact on peace in the country. Beyond the physical and financial ability to access their rights, however, respondents also raised a wider question of the cognitive ability of citizens to claim their rights and live out their responsibilities, as a result of the dearth of knowledge on such rights. As one respondent summed it:

we talk about human rights in the system [but] people don't even know what that means. I do take educated people and talk to them about human rights, even workers' rights and sometimes I am surprised that they don't know even the rights of workers as spelt out in our constitution, as spelt out in the labor act and errr, and women's rights issues, we talk about

them on platform but no one, they do not mean anything; it's not acted on...(Interview 206 29 October, 2014).

With respect to the contribution of the absence of extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of political opponents to the peace in Ghana, respondents said it is not so much what is happening now as the memory of what happened in the past that is contributing to Ghana's ability to eschew national level violence. They frequently recalled the periods of military rule in 1960s, 70s, 80s and the 90s, when human rights abuses held sway. Accordingly to respondents, the experiences from these periods "...have taught us lessons that it does not pay for the Military to take their guns and seize power. That is why the average Ghanaian will go for democratic governance rather than opting for military rule" (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). In particular, they recalled "the experiences of '79 and early 80 [when] a lot of blood was shed in the name of the development of the country and ... have taken a lesson [that] they would not want to see that happen again (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the words of another respondent:

...the remembrance of those times make us not want to sink into state of anarchy where the military will take over, people will be shot; [Ghanaians do not] want a repetition of that. So if something happens we say let's live together we are brothers lets live together so that we don't go to the past where we suffered; so yeah, the past reminds us and it informs us to live in peace" (Interview 203, 28 October 2014).

Added to this is the deception that Ghanaians suffered under the military, who came to power under the cloak of bettering the lot of Ghanaians only to enrich themselves and their immediate friends and families. People now understand that “...the military always [had] their own reasons ...people accepted it and they realized that what the military people were telling them they saw its more easily said than done” (Interview 214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of respondents, the military in power became as corrupt, if not more corrupt than the civilians they overthrew. Mindful of these, most Ghanaians want to “... be careful so that we don’t create the space for the military to come in to take us back; and so even when we get to the tipping point, we try to manage that” (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In brief it is not the respect for human rights as currently experienced that contributes to Ghana’s peace; it is more the fear of returning to military rule where respect for human rights cannot be guaranteed that keeps Ghanaians from fighting.

Private Citizens’ and Public Officials Respect for the Rule of Law

H₀₅ There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for the rule of law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana

This hypothesis tested the extent to which respondents’ perceptions on citizens’ respect for the laws of the land; public officials’ respects for the laws of the land; and citizen’s respect for decisions of the courts, have contributed to the peace in Ghana. Responses to the three questions that assessed the three variables constituted the basis for this assessment. The frequency run of responses to the three variables show that more than two thirds of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed with the various statements in respect of their contribution to the peace of Ghana. For

instance, 82.1% of respondents (n=1418) said Ghanaian's respect for the decisions of the courts is a contributor to peace. Notably, 40.1% of the respondents fell in the "very strongly agree" response category. However, 67.0% (n=1425) said public officials' respect for the laws of the land is a contributor to the peace of Ghana; meaning a third of the respondents (33%) thought otherwise. On citizen's respect for the laws of Ghana, 62.1% of respondents (n=1422) agreed from a very strong to a simple degree that this contributes to the peace of Ghana. Again, more than a third of respondents did not agree with the statement.

A cross-tabulation of the results for the three variables by age category of respondents, gender, educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation of the respondents shows non-significant findings of Chi Square Values for the following: respect for the rule of law and age categories ($p = .075$); respect for the rule of law and gender ($p = .142$); respect for the rule of law and educational levels ($p = .155$). Public officials' action in accordance with the law turned up a two tail significance of $p = .229$, while the cross-tabulation of citizens' respect for the laws of the land with gender also gave a significance p -value of .285 – See Appendix 12. In other words, we cannot reject the view that no differences exist between respondents' assessment of the degree to which these factors contribute to the peace of Ghana.

A closer examination of the cross-tabulated results of age categories with the variable on respect for the rule of laws of the country shows that older respondents were more likely to agree with the assertion than younger ones. For instance, 72.7% of persons aged between 68 and 77 years very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed that citizens' respect for the rule of law accounted in some ways for Ghana's experience

of peace. However, only 60% of those in the 78-87 age bracket, and between 63% to 64.9% of those in the 18 through 67 years' bracket expressed similar levels of agreements with the role that the respect for the rule of laws has played in Ghana's peace. Notably, 29.9% of respondents in the 28-37 years age bracket disagreed to various degrees with the assertion on the role that the rule of law plays in Ghana's peace.

With respect to gender differences, only minor differences exist between men and women who agreed strongly and very strongly with the suggestion that the Ghanaian's respect for the rule of law contributes to the peace of the country. While the men came in at 62.8%, the women stood at 61.12 % with n=1407. However, the differences between men and women showed at the level of disagreement. While only 3.9% of women strongly disagreed, disagreed, and merely disagreed with the statement, as much as 10% of men expressed the same levels of disagreement with the statement – Appendix 13. Overall, however, 90.5 of the respondents (n = 1426) agreed very strongly, strongly, simply agreed, or mildly agreed with the three statements that evaluated their perceptions on the contribution of the reign of the rule of law to Ghana's peace, as illustrated in the construct of means for the three variables in Table 15. This suggests that despite some reservations along age and gender lines, the majority of respondents believed that Ghana's peace has a lot to do with the respect that Ghanaians in their private and public lives have for the rule of law.

Table 15

Effect of Respect for the Rule of Law on Ghana's Peace

Selected Cases RoLCons <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	133	9.3	9.3
Selected	1293	90.5	90.7
Total	1426	99.8	100.0
Missing System	3	.2	
Total	1429	100.0	

KII respondents endorsed the idea that Ghanaians in general respect the laws of the country and the decisions of the courts. This is because as part of the socialization process in all cultures, most Ghanaians “were brought up to respect law and order, to respect authority, [and] to respect older people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a result, “there is a general level of law abiding sentiment” (Interview 202, 2 October, 2014) among Ghanaians. The colonial administration noted this compliant disposition of the people and christened the land and the people that now constitute Ghana “...as the model Colony, one because we were peaceful, generally law abiding. We were the model colony, peaceful people, generally law abiding. And fortunately, the country was paying for its administration. (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014).

It is this predisposition to respect law, order, and peace in the Ghanaian culture that gives religious leaders and their civil society counterparts the legitimacy and convening power to bring together political leaders at critical moments in the country's history in order to facilitate consensus building among political parties that led to the avoidance of election related violence. Respondents cited examples of how religious leaders who have chaired the National Peace Council, since its inception, have been instrumental in organizing fora such as the Presidential debates for candidates in the 2008

and 2012 elections, and particularly, the meeting of political leaders in Kumasi in 2012, where they signed “the Kumasi Accord [in which they] all promised to be law abiding” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and to accept the results of the 2012 elections, irrespective of who won or lost. It is this Accord that gave the religious leaders the lien to engage the leadership of the NDC and the NPP to ensure that they got their supporters off the streets and into the court rooms for the resolution of the disputes over the 2012 presidential elections.

The law abiding upbringing has also been credited with the willingness of political leaders to respect the law, accords, decisions of the courts, and the rules and regulations governing elections. As one respondent summed it, “... our political leaders have been very very errm (pause) understanding and they respect the laws of the land and that has helped us because no political party has taken the law into its own hands, as far as I am concerned” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Similarly, respondents commended political parties for using the courts, and not the streets, to resolve electoral disputes. As a respondent framed it, political parties would usually say “...lets go to court and let the court decide instead of taking the law into our hands; and so because of that instead of resorting to violence they followed the appropriate channel for addressing their grievances” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 11, 3 March, 2014; and Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is evident in the decision of the two major political parties to use the courts in 2008 and then in 2012 when they had issues with the presidential elections. Even though in both cases the decisions of the Supreme Court went against the wishes of the petitioners, they nonetheless accepted the results. In particular, respondents cited Nana Akufo Addo, the Presidential Candidate of the NPP in the 2012

elections for his respect of the rule of law when, after the Supreme Court had given its verdict on the election petition he and others brought before it, he said that even though he disagreed with the ruling of the Supreme Court, he nonetheless accepted and respected it. In the words of one respondent, that "...wonderful speech [he made] changed the whole thing" (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014); turning an otherwise very volatile situation into a nonviolent outcome. This example summed the view of respondents that the law abiding nature of Ghanaians has sustained the peace of the country. Even when they do not agree with a rule, they nonetheless accept to work with it and to work according to the rules to change it, if possible.

Some respondents, however, opined that Ghanaians' respect for institutions of state and rule of law is important for Ghana's peace, but not sufficient to account to a significant extent for its peace. For such respondents, it is the attitudes and actions of people that have determined and will continue to determine the kind of peace that Ghana gets (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Adding another cautionary note, one respondent recalled what Governor Guggisberg once said of the law abiding nature of Ghanaians. He paraphrased the Governor to have said that "Ghanaians are nice people, law abiding, but malcontents, we should watch out for malcontents" (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). Another respondent would add Ghanaians may have shown respect for the rules and institutions of the law because "...we were not pushed to the wall enough for us to become confrontational and become violent to get it" (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In otherwise, the respect that public officers and ordinary citizens show for the rule of law and the courts could be breached if people are pushed to the wall.

Perceptions on Contribution of Freedom of the Press to Ghana's Peace

H₀₆ There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country

This hypothesis tested how the freedom of the print media, the liberalization of the electronic media, and the unrestricted access to news and information from the internet may have contributed to Ghana's peace. The dimensions that measured freedom of the press included the presence or absence of legal and administrative controls on newspapers and other print media of information dissemination; the ability of the press to carry news stories without fear of repression or censorship by the state and other interest groups; as well as, the abolition of libel laws. Freedom of expression on radio and television for all citizens is measured by how the liberalized airwaves for radio and TV broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs, have contributed to the peace in Ghana. Finally, unrestricted access of Ghanaians to news and information on the internet, as well as, their unrestricted use of social media platforms to freely access and share news and views through the internet constituted part of the set of variables for testing the hypothesis.

The survey results show that with respect to freedom of the print media, 86.9% of respondents (n = 1422) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the statement that the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves in the print media without fear of being cited for libel has contributed to peace in Ghana. Of this, 36.8% of the respondents were in the "very strongly agreed" category. For freedom of the electronic media, 81.8% (n= 1418) said they very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or just agreed that freedom of expression on radio stations and televisions through broadcasts of

news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs has contributed to the peace in Ghana. The majority of the responses (40.4%) were in the strongly agreed category. On unrestricted access to the internet and social media, however, it was 78% of the respondents (n = 1419) who very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed with the statement that unrestricted access to news and information from the internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana's peace; with 32.2% of the responses falling in the "strongly agreed" category.

A cross tabulation of all three variables with respondents' age category, gender, educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation all returned two-tailed significance *p* values of less than .05 for their respective Chi Square values – See Appendix 14. Since these results are not coincidental, we can reject the hypothesis that there is no difference among respondents in their perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country. The construct of means with a 4.5 midpoint filter of responses show that 93.3% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed that the existence of freedom of the print, electronic, and internet-enabled media have contributed to Ghana's peace – Table 16. In sum, most respondents believed that the freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed significantly to the peace that the country enjoys.

Table 16

Effect of Free Media on Ghana's Peace

Case Selection FreeMed <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	96	6.7	6.7
Selected	1328	92.9	93.3
Total	1424	99.7	100.0
Missing System	5	.3	
Total	1429	100.0	

Respondents in the KII however saw the current state of the media as a double-edge sword (Interview 7, 19 February; Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; Interview 6, 18 February); as it has both positive and negative effects. Positively, the liberalization of the airwaves and increased access to information and communication platforms were particularly noted as being instrumental in getting Ghanaians to let off their steams in ways that avert the build-up of anger and subsequent recourse to violence to address pent-up grievances. In the words of one respondent:

I believe very strongly that in a political situation where people are not gagged to speak their mind, when they speak and air their views I believe that the tension, the greater portion of the tension in them is quite released and it does not foster (sic) them to go at each other's throats and have violent conflicts; that's how I see it (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

Secondly, respondents indicated that the media's exposure of wrongdoings by public officials has a soothing effect on the population. They get the feeling that someone, at least, is watching the public purse on tier behalf. The ability to freely discuss these issues also allows people to vent out their views and frustrations. Media penetration

into rural areas, especially via the local FM Radio Stations broadcasting in local languages, has increased access to information in those areas. This has served as a conflict early warning mechanism, especially during elections when those stations flag potential areas or issues of conflict (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). During elections, the announcements of election results on the airwaves as the counts are completed at the polling stations "...make it almost impossible for people to cheat because their reporters are everywhere" to provide live coverage of the events (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014).

On the negative side, respondents noted that partisan reportage, sensationalism, provocative statements, and biased or judgmental reporting often skews views and raise political temperatures. Hence, some respondents worried that the new found freedom of expression and the media is a potential risk to the peace and stability of the country, especially since "...individual politicians are beginning to set up their own newspapers and radio stations as a way" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 213, 9 December, 2014) to serve their parochial and partisan interests. In the 2008 elections, for instance, some radio stations "almost went overboard in agitating the public towards possible conflict" (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; see also Interview 215, 10 December, 2014) or in the propagation of hate speech as was the case in 2012 (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). Respondents fear this unbridled and unscrupulous use of the media through the machinations of politicians is a key flashpoint of violent national level conflict (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).

Another worrying trend is the increasingly partisan postures of most newspapers and radio stations in the country. Most of them "...are aligned to political parties ... and

they don't ever see any good from any other political party apart from their party, which is very very bad" (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Because of this development, we now have decidedly "...pro-government press, and we have anti-government press, which is not good for the development of the country" (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The politically polarized and partisan nature of most media houses make them unconstructive in their contribution to the political discourse in Ghana. The consequences of their disruptive approaches have only been mollified by the work of other actors (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).

The irony of double negatives also operates to attenuate the effects of the partisan press. In the view of respondents, because Ghanaians are heavily politicized, they are quick to label and stereotype media houses and their outputs. As a result, people then readily discount, discredit, and disregard media content coming from their 'chosen other' media houses. This selective stereotyping and discounting of views from the other side has the positive effect of dousing anger and averting conflicts because people just brush what is being said aside, "...dig in their heels and say, leave them alone [...] so that has been helpful, but if it were just left to just their messages and so on it would have become trouble" (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014).

Other respondents were worried that press freedom and the freedom of the media is being taken to the excess to breach personal freedoms. In their view, some people are taking advantage of the removal of the libel laws to mount radio stations or use the internet to say or write "...certain things that is not good for public consumption" (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) or that border on outright defamation of characters (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 13, 5 March,

2014). This has led some respondents to caution that "...the freedom of speech in Ghana is too much [but unfortunately] ...the Media Commission [has no] teeth to bite" (Interview 213, 9 December 2014) to bring such errant persons or media houses to order.

In sum, while the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves may have helped in preserving the peace, there are inherent dangers to the peace of the country if the unbridled use of the press to prosecute partisan political agendas or personal vendettas are not checked.

Perceptions on Role of the Judicial System to Ghana's Peace

H₀₇ There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country

This hypothesis assessed the perception of respondents on the contribution of the judiciary in Ghana to the country's peace, using three variables, namely, perceptions of the independence of the courts as measured by respondents' perceptions on the ability of judges to dispense justice without interference from state officials or other influential persons; the perceived impact of corruption in the judiciary on the peace in Ghana, as measured by respondents' perception on the ability of judges and court staff to administer justice without being influenced by personal interests or gains. The third variable focused on perceived equality of all citizens before the law and its contribution to peace in Ghana, as indicated by the level of agreement among respondents on the equal treatment of all citizens before the law.

The frequency of responses shows that on the perception of independence of the judiciary, 70.60% (n = 1424) very strongly agreed (38.1%), strongly agreed (19.1%) or simply agreed (13.4%) that the independence of the judiciary contributes to peace in

Ghana. On the other hand, only 50.90% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed very strongly, strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that the level of perceived corruption in the judiciary is a contributor to peace in Ghana. With respect to equality of all Ghanaians before the law, 62.8% of respondents (n = 1421) agreed very strongly (29.9%), strongly (21.7%) or merely with the statement that the fact that all citizens can expect to be treated equally before the law contributes to peace in Ghana.

Appendix 15 presents the Chi Square values and associated two-tailed significance levels for the cross-tabulation of responses for the three variables with the profile of the respondents. Apart from gender which showed significance levels $> .05$ for the cross-tabulation of gender and judicial independence, as well as, gender and perceptions on the corruptibility of the judiciary, all other tests turned up significance levels $< .05$. Scrutiny of the results of cross-tabulation on judiciary independence and gender shows that 71.90% of the female respondents (n = 650) very strongly agreed, strongly agreed or simply agreed that Ghana has peace because the courts are independent from political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or favor. This compares to 69.3% of men who gave similar levels of agreements with the statement. Similarly, a review of the data for the cross-tabulation between gender and the perceived corruptibility of the judiciary, shows that while 51.90% of female respondents (n = 649) agreed very strongly, strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly, only 49.9% of male respondents (n=760) committed to the same degree of answers on the question. Conversely, while 23.7% of men disagreed, strongly or very strongly disagreed with the statement, 19.8% of female respondents expressed the same level of

disagreement with the statement. The foregoing suggests that respondents make distinctions between the courts as institutions and their perceptions of the actions of judges as individual officers. Since the cross-tabulation between gender of participants and their perceptions of the independence of the judiciary on the one hand, and the incorruptibility of judges on the other hand both produced p -values $> .05$, we cannot reject H_{07} which states that there is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country. The construction of means for the responses to all three questions, however, indicates that 77.6% of all respondents ($n = 1426$) agreed in various degrees to the statement that the judicial system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country

Table 17

Perceptions about the contribution of the Judicial System to the Peace in Ghana

Selected cases: Judicon <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	319	22.3	22.4
Selected	1107	77.5	77.6
Total	1426	99.8	100.0
Missing System	3	.2	
Total	1429	100.0	

While the judiciary is generally commended for trying to make the laws work, some respondents in the KII have cited the increasing politicization of the judiciary, especially through appointments and direct interference, as a critical factor to watch in the operations of the rule of law. In the view of one respondent, "... the judiciary... have the power to do almost everything but politics is one thing in the judiciary [as] it is also perceived that politics plays a role there" (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). As a result,

“Respect for Courts is eroding because people do not see them as fair arbitrators” (Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). Hence, despite the general tendency of Ghanaians to abide by the rules and the law, respondents see a high risk that Ghana could face a breakdown of the rule of law due to political interference and corruption in the judiciary. According to this view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice from the courts, they will take the law into their own hands. One respondent relates a conversation he had with a friend who is a judge:

... I told the judge one source from personal experience that people would find reason to fight is the breakdown of our judicial system. When they [citizens] begin to feel that when you go for justice [and] through bribery and corruption you cannot get justice, that’s when people will begin to take arms for they know that they have to settle issues directly; the rule of law would break down because the judges have broken down the rules and the law (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

This view correlates with statements by some political parties that in the next elections, people would seek to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level, as they have lost confidence in the ability of the Supreme Court to be able to deliver justice. This waning confidence in the courts notwithstanding, respondents believe by and large Ghanaians still have confidence in the judiciary, despite perceptions of bias and corruption. As one respondent summed it:

people have complained a lot about the judiciary, it is in favor of the rich, it is this; but the judiciary has also played a key role; a lot of respect for the judiciary; they still think that you can get issues resolved through

them. For instance if the NPP had not felt confident that they would be given an impartial hearing if they took the case to the Supreme Court and that the case was doomed at birth if it went through the judiciary system I don't know that they would have been able to control their people from taking the law into their hands and that would have erm ... resulted" in violence (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)

H₀₈ The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys


This hypothesis tested respondents' perceptions of gender issues on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Specifically, the study used seven questions to assess the level of agreement of respondents with the suggestions that Ghana is a peaceful country because i) men and women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes; ii) of the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; iii) women have the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, markets for their produce, etc.) as men; iv) women have the same opportunities for education as men; v) women have the same employment opportunities in the public and civil services as men; vi) women play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level; and vii) the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace at the national level is an important contributor to the peace in Ghana.

Figure 4 presents the differences in levels of agreement and disagreements on the contribution of various gender associated factors to the peace in Ghana, when the frequency run is filtered at 4.5 to include some of the responses in the mildly agreed

category. More than 80% of respondents consistently agreed that all but one of the gender-based variables have contributed to peace in Ghana. Only 63.9% of respondents agreed that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that women occupy in parliament.

Figure 4

Distribution of Responses on Women’s Contribution to Peace in Ghana



Appendix 16 presents Chi Square values and significance levels for the variables measuring perceived contribution of gender-related factors to peace in Ghana. It shows that insignificant findings were reported for the cross-tabulation of age category with women in parliament ($p = .393$); and the equal opportunities that women in the country have in economic life ($p = .057$). Cross-tabulation with gender categories also turned out insignificant findings for gender and equal access to public fora, as well as, equality of

economic opportunity for women ($p = .181$). Similarly, the cross-tabulation on whether men and women have equal access to educational opportunities in the country by gender gave $p = .055$. With respect to whether men and women have equitable access to employment opportunities in the public sector of the country, p value was $= .121$. Likewise, the cross-tabulation of the role of women in mediating conflicts in Ghana with gender turned up a p -value of $.110$. Other variables reporting insignificant Chi Square values on cross-tabulation with profile of respondents were equality of access of gender groups to public fora cross-tabulated with educational level of respondents ($p = .084$); and to the perceived role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the traditional systems of governance to contribute to peace in the country ($p = .156$). All the measures above lead us not to reject H_0 which states that the level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

Table 18 presents the results of a cross tabulation of age categories against case selection of responses at 4.5 to include views that mildly agreed was carried out. The results show that in general more than 60% of respondents in all age categories agreed to some degree that the current level of representation of women in Ghana's parliament contributes to peace. However, more than a third of respondents between the ages of 18 and 77 disagreed that the extent to participation of women in Ghana's parliament contributes to the peace of the country. At least 40% of respondents in the 58-67 years age category did not agree with the statement.

Table 18

Views on Women's Participation in Parliament filtered at ≤ 4.5 by Age of Respondents

Selection	Age Category of Respondents									Total
	18 - 27 years	28-37 years	38-47 years	48-57 years	58-67 years	68-77 years	78-87 years	88-97 years	98 years or older	
Not Selected	112 34.70%	150 35.80%	114 37.70%	65 38.50%	41 40.60%	21 38.90%	1 20.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	504 36.70%
Selected	211 65.30%	269 64.20%	188 62.30%	104 61.50%	60 59.40%	33 61.10%	4 80.00%	1 100%	1 100%	871 63.30%
Total	323 100%	419 100%	302 100%	169 100%	101 100%	54 100%	5 100%	1 100%	1 100%	1375 100%

In Table 19, the construct of means for all seven variables indicate that 91.3% of all respondents (n=1426) agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes. Other aspects included the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; as well as the gender equality in access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, markets for their produce, etc.); educational opportunities; and employment opportunities in the public and civil services. The active roles women play in mediating conflicts at the national level; and the role of queen-mothers and female chiefs in the promotion of peace at the national level were also considered important contributors to the peace in Ghana. In sum there is general agreement that women play a crucial role in the peace that Ghana enjoys.

Table 19

Women's Contribution to Peace In Ghana

Selected Cases: Gendcon <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	124	8.7	8.7
Selected	1302	91.1	91.3
Total	1426	99.8	100.0
Missing System	3	.2	
Total	1429	100.0	

Under gender, respondents to the KII raised several issues related to the equality of opportunities for men and women to participate in public decision making processes; the participation rate of women in Ghana's parliament; and the equitable access of women to economic, educational, and employment opportunities. In particular, they explored the roles that women play in mediating conflicts at the national level, and more specifically, the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace at the local and national levels. Findings from the interviews generally reflect those from the quantitative survey i.e. that the women in Ghana are major contributors to the country's peace. However, respondents provided different types of qualifiers to explain how and why they viewed the contribution of women to the peace in Ghana. Three categories of responses emerged: women as peacebuilders; patriarchy and the subordinate role of women in peacebuilding; and women as instigators of violent conflicts.

Women as Peacebuilders

On the positive side, respondents commended the increasingly visible roles that women are taking in the national governance structure as a major contributor to peace. They noted that women are now occupying key positions in the country: The Chief Justice; the Attorney General and Minister of Justice; the Minister of Education; the

Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice; and the Government Statistician, among others are all women. Additionally, there “...are many women who are CEOs who are in charge of, you know, large industries” (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014). In the view of respondents, these are key positions that allow women to play important roles in the delivery of services that contribute to the peace of Ghana.

At the community levels, gender-based development programming and donor requirements are increasing opportunities for women’s involvement in peacebuilding. These initiatives have helped to create the spaces for increased participation of women in promoting peace. Through these programs, “...women are encouraged to go into political elections; women are encouraged to [participate in the] district assembly elections; women are encouraged to be educated so that they can also rub shoulders with men” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Even in “...the traditional settings we are beginning to see the role of women, either as queen mothers or whatever titles they may give them” signaling increasingly visible roles of women in decision making.

Respondents’ views on the specific contribution that women make, aside from these visible national and community level positions, however, ranged from the uncertain, through the doubtful or minimalist, to the negative. Asked what role women play in securing Ghana’s peace, one participant first sighed, took a long pause, and then started the response rhetorically: “...have they played any role? It’s a difficult question (laughs). I haven’t seen them play any role in pushing for conflict because traditionally women have been in the background in terms of decision making, influencing decisions” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). On the converse side, another respondent questioned the

role of women in peacebuilding in stating that: “I haven’t actually seen women clearly playing any serious role because we don’t see it; the way our culture is women are usually at the background so even if they do, like exercising influence on their husbands or many leaders and all that it’s not in the public domain and you would not actually know” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). The respondent in Interview 4 wavered between the potentiality and actual roles of women in Ghana’s peace in stating that:

I think they have potentially important roles to play in bringing about peace, but whether they have actually played that role is something that I would not be able to say for sure because within the communities, you know, do their voices matter so that they are able to be a restraining force?...at the national level errm most of the women’s voices that have been heard at the national level are really those who are seen as the elite middle class – errm you know, and the extent to which they have an influence on [...] women in the rural areas I don’t know”. (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

The vanguard role of women in praying for peace has already been noted in the KII responses on the role of religion in Ghana’s peace. In addition, respondents noted that women are usually restraining forces for their men and youth who would prefer to settle disputes through violence. Beyond prayers, therefore, respondents who affirmed that women do play a role, however, confined women’s role in Ghana’s peace to their biological functions of nurturing and caring for their children; their natural disposition to peace and nonaggression; as well as their natural peaceable instincts which trigger their

nurturing roles of socializing and influencing their children not to engage in violence. In the words of a female respondent, the preoccupation of a woman in crisis situation is to do "...everything she can to keep the peace in their homes, first and foremost, and then of course, publicly and in within both the private and public spheres" (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). Corroborating this, another respondent held that such roles are played behind the scenes "So the women are not really errr (laughs) neglected; they play a very critical role in the background; they may not be seen, they may not be visible, but they play a very significant role because men do consult them before taking decisions in most cases" (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).

This background role of women in peacebuilding is perceived to extend beyond the household and community levels to national level – the Presidency. As one respondent put it, "even the President when he is making appointments he listens to the wife (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). A female respondent confirmed the "behind the scenes" nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles of women in Ghana's peace. Women, in her words, "support community systems any time there are community activities, they are the ones behind the scenes who hold it together" (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). In other words, they are not seen as frontline activists for peace; instead they play the moderating, mediatory, and conciliatory roles behind the scenes.

While playing the backstage nurturing roles, the contribution of women have focused more on interrogating and pushing for actors to consider the future implications of current political decisions and actions (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). However, the reverse of backstage negative influences is also true, in the view of respondents. Queen mothers, some of whom now have the statuses of paramount chiefs, are said "...to play a

role, a very strong role; if they want to cause conflict they can cause conflict” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). Even then, respondents observed that despite this power to make or unmake peace, queen mothers play out their roles in the form of advising the male chiefs, rather being the direct protagonists. Similarly, within political parties, respondents thought that the creation of “...women’s wings can be both positive and negative, because there are tendencies to just tell the women to wait and just take positions in the women’s wings” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014) of the parties, instead of vying for more executive leadership positions within the parties. This is in spite of the fact that women actually played avant-garde roles in pre-independence politics when “Women took an early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and organize Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). That history notwithstanding, the summed up view is that:

where women have played a role they have contributed a lot in bringing out the substantive issues that should invite people to listen to and I have noticed that the women have always talked more in terms of the future and they’ve asked questions about the future of their children rather than the ethnic group of their children and so women by and large have been major bridge builders (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014)

Patriarchy and the Role of Women in Peacebuilding

The behind the scenes role of women in the public sphere, especially in respect of peacebuilding is largely because “...most of our cultures are patriarchal cultures where norms, ideas, all those things rather uphold the man and then downgrade the woman” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). Women are particularly scared off the competitive

arena of politics not only because of the “...tension, the name-calling, and the abuses, [but more because of] the culture and society seem to be harsh on women who take part in these really competitive political game. They are given names and if you do not want those names just stay at the back” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). At the level of traditional governance systems, women are assigned similar backstage roles. Citing the case of the traditional chieftaincy structure of the Dagombas, a respondent noted that in that structure:

...we don't have queen mothers but we have the *worigyira*, the first wife concept; the first wife of the chief, and sisters of the chief, princesses; they play a strong role in the governance structure mostly, albeit, behind the scenes... but they play a strong role, advising on matters that bother on community development but also peace; when they speak people listen” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).

Even in the matriarchal cultures of the Akans, the women chiefs played background roles, as they usually would transact business in the presence of, or through the intermediation of male chiefs or linguists. Thankfully, educational policies and interventions and donor requirements have institutionalized inclusion of gender sensitivity and gender-based programming that have created spaces for women's participation in decision making in an otherwise patriarchal social system. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donor driven microeconomic development initiatives also create economic opportunities for empowerment for women. Other NGO and donor-sponsored initiatives are targeting empowerment of the girl child through

educational support initiatives. Similar initiatives target reduction in domestic violence and the promotion of women's rights (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

Additionally, a respondent believed that the existing women's leadership structures at the traditional authority level through the increasing inclusion of queen mothers, as well as, the increasing visibility of women in the national governance structures are entry points for engaging women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These positions are platforms that can be leveraged to break into the patriarchal structure at the community levels (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, respondents recognized that breaking the patriarchal jinx to create spaces for women for frontline participation in peace work will take some doing. A female respondent summed up the frustrations of women on societal confinement of the role of women in public life to the background in the following words:

Women have played a very important role, but one that has not been recognized. I think that women have been very influential in our political process, but they have not been given the space to be in front, to be actually seen to be making that but behind the scenes, in the homes, in the bedrooms, in the quite spaces, women have a voice and are able to speak some sense. However [even] in political parties, [where] the women leaders [...] are asked to lead the women's groups, ... most at times they are the ones doing the cooking and the singing of the praises, you know, but when it comes to decision making, you don't see women being given a role (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).

Despite all the rhetoric of inclusivity of women in public decision making processes, respondents believed that patriarchal world views have continued to induce gender-blind policy formulation and implementation. To make the case, a respondent cited the particularly poignant example of the legal framework that legitimated and institutionalized the National Peace Council. In the view of the respondent, the composition of the National Peace Council Act has reduced the role of women on the Council to a token representation – by design and by default, simply because policy and lawmakers were gender-blind in the selection of the institutional representations on the council. In the words of the respondent, “... the Act has been done in such a way that it does not favor the inclusion of women. People have to be nominated by the various institutions; institutions that are usually dominated by men” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Section 4(1) of the National Peace Council Law (Act 818) stipulates membership of the Governing Council. Of the thirteen members of the Council, eight (8) are expected to come from the leadership hierarchy of male-dominated Christian, Muslim, and African Traditional religious institutions, with a ninth person coming from the National House of Chief, another male-dominated institution. Of the four members left, the Law only requires the President to mandatorily appoint one woman among them. This, obviously, does little to ensure equitable representation of women on the Council, as men by default and by design would dominate on the council.

Women as instigators of violence

Respondents also noted the agential role of women in instigating or fanning conflicts (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014), especially the localized intra and interethnic conflicts that Ghana has experienced. When the question on women’s

contribution to peace was posed, one of the respondents first laughed and then answered “A woman can build a house and woman can break a house. So sometimes, they start, and they are always at the background, and when trouble starts, then they run back. So they can be a source of conflict too (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Hence, women, like the media, play a double-edged sword role in which “when husbands are misbehaving it is women that can calm them down [but] when the women decide that there should be war the men hardly resist” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Respondents recounted “...occasions where a woman will just come and say you you are a coward; bring your [genitals] and take [mine]” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014; see also Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) as a way of provoking the men into going to war with their perceived enemies. Among the Dagombas, even though the wives and sisters of the chiefs play background advisory roles to the chiefs, they are noted to have the potential to “...cause conflict if they want but most of the time they try to be patient and look at the bigger picture [as] they are seen as custodians of our customs and they want to maintain that customs (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). Tracing the chain of causality for conflicts and the role of different actors, another respondent recalled how his community level engagements in a decades’ long intra-ethnic episodically violent chieftaincy succession conflict revealed that men go to fight because women insult them. According to the respondent, when he contacted the women, they confessed that they instigate men to fight because they (the women) have lost contact and control over their children (nurturing concerns) as the children, especially the young men, are out of the house in times of crisis (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). They are therefore pushing the men to go and fight to bring their children back home. Another respondent cited the example of

“...places like Bungkpurugu where I know the Konkombas and the Bimobas have fought in those communities where the women have been aggressive; they have tended to cause very frequent outbreak of conflict” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)

In sum, although women play a role in Ghana’s peace, positively or negatively, much of it is played out behind the scenes. Hence while the effects of their actions may be surmised or felt, women are generally not seen as active peacemakers beyond their backstage places in the pews, mosques, and homes. Increasing visibility of women in public offices create opportunities for more forefront role for women in promoting Ghana’s peace. However, continued gender-blind policy formulation and implementation, especially in ensuring equitable representation of women in policymaking platforms, risk undermining this opportunity.

Practice of Democracy and Peace in Ghana


H₀₉ The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys

Five questions representing an equal number of variables provided the platform for testing this hypothesis. Collectively, they assessed the extent to which respondents agree or disagree that the regular organization of elections that are said to be free, fair, and transparent; political freedoms related to the freedom of citizens to stand for Presidential, Parliamentary, District Assembly or Unit Committee elections; freedom of Ghanaians to join any political party of one’s choice; and the degree of influence of ethnic considerations in the way Ghanaians vote at elections, all contribute to peace in Ghana.

Responses captured in Figure 5 indicate that more than 80% of respondents believed that Ghana's ability to stave off violent national level conflicts is due to its ability to organize relatively freed, fair and transparent elections; the freedom of its citizens to stand for election at any level within the political structure of the country; the freedom of citizens to vote in all elections, as well as, the freedom to join any political party of one's choice. Also, voter behavior and attitudes count in Ghana's peace, as most respondent indicated that they do not focus on the ethnic background of candidates when making their choices for candidates for any given position in the political structures of the nation.

Figure 5

Percentage Distribution Responses on Effect of Democratic Practices on Ghana's Peace



The study also probed the nature of Ghana's political culture by examining why electoral disputes have not escalated into national level violence. For this, the study asked respondent to indicate the extent to which factors such as the fear of war; apathy towards

who wins; capacity of the courts to handle electoral disputes effectively; and political parties abhorrence of violence, affect the peace in Ghana. The measures also included the extent to which lack of support for violence-mongers mitigate the spread of violence over electoral results for parliament; extent to which the inability of political parties to mobilize fighters; the recourse of political parties to court; intervention by traditional leaders; intervention by religious leaders; and the willingness of Ghanaians to die for politicians and their courses all contribute to the peace in Ghana.

Asked which factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary elections do not spill over into national level conflicts 52.3% of respondents (n=1405) said Ghanaians are afraid of war while 34.2% indicated it is because the courts in Ghana are effective in handling electoral disputes – see Table 20. Five respondents who cited other reasons for the non-escalation of electoral disputes at the parliamentary level said it was “Because of love for the country” (2/5); “Ghanaians are God fearing”; “Ghanaians do not like bloodshed”, and “God is merciful.”

Table 20

Responses on why Electoral Disputes do not lead to national level violence

Reasons Why Elections do not lead to national violence	Frequency	Valid Percent
Ghanaians are afraid of war	735	52.3
Courts effective in handling electoral disputes	480	34.2
Political Parties do not support use of violence	92	6.5
Ghanaians do not really care who wins elections	65	4.6
Those who want violence are ignored	31	2.2
Other	2	.1
Total	1405	100.0
System Missing	24	
Total	1429	

Similarly, when respondents were asked what factors best explain why disputes over results of presidential elections do not escalate into national level violence, 66.9% of respondents attributed it to the fact that political parties usually opt to take their electoral grievances to the courts for resolution. Another 13.6% of respondents cited the intervention of traditional rulers to prevent fighting over electoral results. A further 9.4% credited religious leaders for intervening to mediate peaceful resolution of the conflicts – see table 21. Four respondents who cited other reasons for the non-escalation of disputes over presidential election results cited “Fear of losing family members”; “God is merciful” (2/5) and “the rule of law is supreme and people are aware of that” (This Study, 20).

Table 21

Reasons Why Disputes Over Presidential Elections Do not lead to Violence

Reasons Assigned	Frequency	Valid Percent
Political parties take their case to court	939	66.9
Traditional Rulers prevent fighting	191	13.6
Religious leaders mediate peaceful resolutions	132	9.4
Ghanaians won't fight and die for politicians	101	7.2
Political Parties can't mobilize people to fight	37	2.6
Other	4	.3
Total	1404	100.0
System Missing	25	
Total	1429	

Cross tabulations of the responses to the seven questions with the profile of respondents yielded Chi Square values with two tailed significance levels $< .05$ for all the variables except for the cross between age categories of respondents and why disputes

over parliamentary elections do not lead up to national level violence. For this, the Chi Square value of 45.724 had a significance level of .810. The cross between the same variable and gender produced a significance level of .810 for a Chi Square value of 2.275. The cross between age categories and why disputes over presidential elections do not escalate into national level violence also yielded a two-tailed significance level of .193 for a value of 47.512, while responses on the freedom to stand elections when cross-tabulated with gender produced a Chi Square value of 11.301 with a two-tailed significance p -value of .185. Educational level of respondents also produced two coincidental outcomes when crossed with freedom of citizens to vote ($p = .060$) and freedom to choose one's political party ($p = .110$). The findings suggest that we cannot reject a plausible hypothesis that the contributions of these components of respondents' characteristics to the state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys.

Notably, the cross tabulation of the variable that Ghanaians do not take into account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during elections yielded a $p < .05$ for respondents of key socioeconomic backgrounds – see Appendix 17. In other words, the finding that 90.2% of respondents agree that Ghanaians do not take into account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during elections is not a coincidental finding. This suggests that the voting behavior of Ghanaians that puts little weight on the ethnic background of candidates to various political offices does have an effect on the peace that Ghana has. Indeed, a construct of means of responses for five of the variables (role of free, fair, and transparent elections; freedom to stand elections; freedom of citizens to vote in elections; freedom of

Ghanaians to join any political party of their choice; and consideration of ethnic backgrounds of candidates in voting choices) indicates that 96.8% of the respondents agreed in varying degrees that the foregoing elements of Ghana's democratic culture has contributed to the peace the country experiences – Table 22.

Table 22

Effects of Democratic Systems and Practices on Ghana's Peace

Case Selection at ElecDemo <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	45	3.1	3.2
Selected	1379	96.5	96.8
Total	1424	99.7	100.0
Missing System	5	.3	
Total	1429	100.0	

KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that Ghana's ability to hold six successive general elections since 1992 has contributed to the peace in the country, despite the imperfections witnessed in each successive election. They noted that given "...some of the democratic closeness we have had in terms of elections, many countries should have tipped over" (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Respondents, however, cited several reasons why these very tight elections did not spill over into violent national level conflicts. First, they credited Ghanaians' early embrasure of the use of the ballot box to decide who governs them for creating a culture of democracy in the country. According to this view, the colonial administration's use of elections, referenda, and plebiscites to enable Ghanaians "determine whose idea prevails and who therefore should form government [or how they should be governed made Ghanaians see] elections to be a conflict resolution mechanism" (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is why all military dictatorships had to confront and eventually cave in to popular demands for the

organization of elections as the means to choose who rules them. Second, having embraced elections as a decision making tool, Ghanaians developed “the political psyche that once the elections are well organized we would accept the results” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Hence, political leaders have adopted the mindset that even though “...we are fighting for political power, you have won, if I do my homework well, I can come back to power the next time; so why destroy what we are looking for (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). As a result, the politicians in Ghana “...have exhibited good leadership, rallying their people behind them all in the hope that if they lost this time, they could win the next time; that has kept us together” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).

Thirdly, Ghanaians recognize that their democratic experimentation since 1992 is a piece of work in progress. They understand that “If we’ve all learnt anything from the last election, we have learnt that the system is not foolproof; it must be more equitable, more just, more transparent, and we believe that we can work towards a cleaner and better elections” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Besides, they have witnessed the efforts the Electoral Commission has made since 1992 to make the electoral process more transparent, free, fair, and inclusive. As a respondent recalled:

From 1992 when we had the Voter ID with just thumbprint; when we had the Ballot Box which was not transparent; situations where the 10th person goes to vote and the ballot box is full; we have move to having transparent ballot boxes, to having picture Voter ID Cards in the cities; to biometric. You cannot get anything better than that. There may be a few infractions, a few disagreements, but the Electoral Commission has done very well, collaboration with stakeholders like the donor community, and the IPAC,

the Political Parties Forum (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014) to improve the credibility of the electoral processes.

Much of these reforms, in the view of respondents, have happened because of the agential role of the leaders of faith-based organizations of all creeds who proactively engaged with all duty bearers to ensure that elections do not become the excuse for violent encounters. As one respondent framed it, "...our faith-based organization in Ghana have never shied away from involving, proactively engaging in the electoral process with the view to containing peace and broad acceptance of the population of the election results, and as much as staying nonpartisan. (Interview 2, February, 2014). As a respondent recalled, the late President Evans Fiifi Atta-Mills officially commended religious leaders for intervening in electoral disputes to ensure peace prevails. With reference to the tensions surrounding the 2008 elections in which he was eventually declared winner, the late President is reported to have "... said that he knew the role that the church played, especially the Cardinal (Peter Kodwo Appiah Turkson) to have that election being peaceful and not Ghana going to war" (Interview 14, 5 March, 214). As noted earlier, irrespective of the contribution of religion to Ghana's peace, all the direct engagement was in parallel to the FBOs preaching peace to their congregations and mobilizing their faithful to pray and act for peace, and to seek God's divine interventions (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

Political education by the churches and politicians also played a role to keep citizens from over reacting to the result of the elections. As respondents noted, politicians are keenly aware that, win or lose, they need a peaceful environment to govern or reorganize themselves for the next round of elections. Therefore, in the tense moments

before, during, and after the elections, they are heard crying at the “...top of their voices and calming people and telling people that to be a political opponent doesn’t mean you are enemies” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). This political education, coupled with the significant role the churches and mosques “...play in preaching and teaching members of the churches that peace is very very important” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) helps to douse the political passions and keep aggrieved groups from taking up arms.

With respect to the role of ethnicity in voting behavior and its contribution to Ghana’s peace, respondents recognized that in Ghana, “...ethnic differences are strong, they’re quite high, let us recognize that” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). However, Ghana’s interethnic animosities are not as intense and divisive as in other African countries. Referencing the north-south divide in Cote d’Ivoire; “the competition between the Ibos, the Hausas and the Yorubas for supremacy” in Nigeria; and “...the divisions between the Americo-Liberians and the native Liberians in Liberia”, among others, a respondent argued that “...yes, we do have ethnic differences, yes we do have ethnic [...] competitions in Ghana but it is not at the same level as those other countries.” In his view, whereas the interethnic “...hostility has been very high in all those countries” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014), Ghana is blessed to have cross-ethnic voices of reason that champion the cause of peace any time the potential for violent conflicts emerge.

This, in part, is attributable to the Constitutional requirement that political parties be representative of all regions. This has served to minimize ethnic exclusivity in the composition of any of the political parties in Ghana. Hence, while the NDC may consider the Volta Region as its World Bank, it is not an exclusive party for people of that region. Similarly, “even the NPP which has been criticized or been tagged as an ethnic party has

a lot of key members coming from the other ethnic groups” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; Interview 202, 27 October, 2014, and Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

Added to this is the high degree of interethnic settlements, integration and incorporation across all regions of the country. As a respondent remarked, the reality in Ghana “... is that we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of where we actually come from” (Interview, 19 February, 2014). As a result, no region in the country is a pure enclave of any particular ethnic group. Therefore respondents cited fears of reprisal actions, should any one group decide to use violence to redress electoral grievances. This, in their view is a sufficient deterrent for people to “...handle the situation coolly, in the hope that my brothers and sisters also living there will be treated likewise” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). A layer of restraint in this respect is the intermarriages across ethnic groups, which creates the situation where in the event of a war I could be “...fighting against my in-laws, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and so on and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

Successful alternation of power between the two main political parties has reinforced a culture of acceptance of electoral results, if clarity and credibility can be demonstrated (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). In general, Ghanaians are willing to accept the defects of a system, defer their perceived gains, or conversely accept their perceived losses, and work towards the improvement of the system, rather than fight for immediate gains. That notwithstanding, respondents noted that losing elections with very narrow margins does not make the acceptance of the results easier for the losers. There is a lot at stake down the chain of party activists when a party loses elections. For it is usually

“...not just a matter of somebody losing political power, but it is losing my economic means of living as well” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

For this reason, respondents cited the practice of the Winner Takes All approach to the access and control of political power as a risk factor, especially since margins of win have been so narrow and constantly narrowing over electoral seasons. In their view, this is the reason for the “Do or Die” approaches that sometimes breach the peace, since it essentially means that “...if I lose, we are going to lose our jobs”. This is what underscores the notion that “It is better to be a messenger in a party in power than to be a Chairman of a Party in Opposition” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). To manage this risk, some respondents have advocated for a more inclusive system through proportional representation, especially at the local government level to ensure that there is dispersion of power and allocation of political resources among different political groupings to increase the sense of belongingness. It is also a way to create space for smaller political parties to cultivate, grow, and showcase their capacities for governance at the national level. This is the way to help break the duopoly in the country. This is also a way to attenuate the building and perpetuation of the negative consensus phenomenon (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014), which respondents say has come to characterize Ghana’s political landscape.

The Saving Grace of Ghana’s Democracy

A saving grace for Ghana, respondents noted, is the presence of a conjunction of forces between faith-based organizations, civil society, and the media that creates a powerful coalition of convening forces and organizing agents for peaceful elections. This, incidentally, is not part of the formal institutionalized national peace architecture. On the

contrary, it is merely a coalition of the willing; a group of peace-loving individuals using their personal commitment to peace and their respective institutional platforms to create the spaces and processes of dialogue and engagement between the political parties and other duty bearers in the electoral processes. This coalition becomes yet stronger than any political party when the National Peace Council grafts its initiatives onto this platform to create a much bigger voice that can speak for citizens, convene political leaders, and construct alternative pathways for overcoming the electoral disputes (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). In 2012, when one party unilaterally declared victory, this coalition, led by the Chairman of the National Peace Council was able to make a counter announcement to annul the declaration and by that act, calm the nerves of members of the other party and citizens at large. This platform was then able to convene a meeting of the two contending political parties and got them to agree that the Electoral Commission would exercise its mandate of announcing the results, and when that is "...announced and somebody is not happy, they should use the courts instead of violence (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to seek redress for their grievances. This, in the view of respondents, paved the way for the use of the courts instead of the streets to resolve the electoral impasse in 2012.

Role of Government in Ghana's Peace

H_{o10} The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.


Criteria for assessing this hypothesis consisted of five elements, namely, the role of government in creating peace in Ghana; collaboration between government and civil society for peace; successful resolution of conflicts by government before they escalate;

neutrality of Government in managing ethnic and communal conflicts; and collaboration between Government and faith-based organizations in securing the peace of the country.

Asked to indicate to what extent they agreed that it is the deliberate and proactive actions of government that has created the peace that Ghana enjoys, the case selection at 4.5 on a 9 point Likert scale question indicates that 68.8% of respondents (n = 1418) agreed from a partly moderate to a very high extent with the statement. The remaining 31.2% of respondents did not agree with the statement from a partly moderate to a very low extent. For all other variables, more than 90% of respondents agreed that government’s actions and engagements have contributed to the peace in Ghana – see Figure 6.

Figure 6

Reponses on Government’s Role in the Peace of Ghana



The construct of means of responses with a 4.5 cut-off for a 9 point Likert Scale questions confirms the trend, as illustrated in Table 23. While 68.2% of the respondents

agreed in various degrees that government's engagement in activities that promote peace have contributed to the peace in Ghana, 31.8% of respondents disagreed. In other words, about two thirds of the respondents agreed that the government of Ghana has deliberately taken actions that have created the peace the country enjoys. It also consciously created identifiable platforms for civil society groups and organizations to engage in building a culture of peace in the country; as well as, taken deliberate and proactive actions to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. The government has also been neutral in the way it intervened in ethnic or communal conflicts. It has also actively engaged faith-based organizations to resolve or prevent conflicts at all levels from degenerating into violence. However, a good third of the respondents did not agree with these statements.

Table 23

Perceived Contribution of Government Actions to Peace in Ghana

Case Selection for EconDev <= 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	451	31.6	31.8
Selected	967	67.7	68.2
Total	1418	99.2	100.0
Missing System	11	.8	
Total	1429	100.0	

KII findings provide some insights into the split in views among survey respondents on the role of government in Ghana's experience of peace. Respondents spoke to the intentional policies, programs, and actions of the executive arm of government in promoting the peace of Ghana. Among others, their responses touched on the collaboration between government and civil society for peace; successful resolution of conflict by government before they escalate; neutrality of Government in managing

ethnic and communal conflicts; and the collaboration between Government and faith-based organizations in securing the peace of the country.

Natural and Legal Reality Checks

Respondents observed that ensuring geo-ethnic equity in participation in governance is one way governments have contributed to peace in Ghana. Be it under military or civilian rule, all governments have made visible efforts to ensure that all geo-ethnic regions of the country are represented in the governance structure. Reality and law have ensured this national orientation. At the level of reality, respondents pointed out that the ethnic composition of the country is such that no one ethnic group has a numerical dominance to annex power. Even “the Akans [who] constitute about 48% [and are therefore] the largest ethnic group [...] cannot form a government and impose themselves on all the others”. Assuming all Akans voted en bloc for a given party, they would still need other ethnic groups to make the 50% plus one cut off for annexing the Presidency of Ghana. As a result, “it has become part of our political culture, [and] people realize that if you form a political party you will have to form alliances, you have to form interethnic alliances” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

In addition to this structural reality, the constitution of Ghana mandates equitable representation of all geo-ethnic regions in the composition of political parties, as well as, in government appointments. Observance of this requirement means that political power is also dispersed across geo-ethnic and religious lines by law and by convention. Hence, all governments that have been in power since independence have endeavored to acquit themselves well on these natural realities and legal requirements. For this reason, “when it comes to appointments, a President is by law obliged to [to ensure that] his

appointments [--] have a national character addressing all regional needs, [hence] the effort has been made to preserve the national character of us as a people even though these ethnic and religious undertones are there” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). On the religious front, in particular, all political parties make overt efforts to showcase manifest presence of Muslims and members of other minority faith groups at the top of their party hierarchy, as well as, in ministerial and other appointments when they are in power. As a result, “You go into the government and you have Christians, you have non-Christians, you have Ashantis, you have Ewes, you have this, you have that. So I think we have relatively integrated” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Erratic State Engagement in Conflict Resolution

There is, however, a down side to this structural reality and constitutional requirement for geo-ethnic representation in government. Latching onto the underlying principles, appointing authorities in government often come under intense pressure to appoint certain people irrespective of their competence for the simple reason that they come from a certain geo-ethnic region. Respondents noted situations where sitting leaders have had “...to give into certain pressure groups or kingmakers to ensure that he also stays in power, [and Presidents have had to] meet most of these demands as part of the package” for their own candidature in subsequent elections (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). Under such circumstances, political patronage, party activism, and other partisan considerations take precedence over merit in the appointment of people to key national positions. As a result, parties in government are reluctant to reach out to qualified persons in opposing parties who are better suited to handle certain portfolios. Apart from fostering mediocrity in state institutions and a win-at-all-cost in elections, the practice has

institutionalized job insecurity, as all government appointees fear to lose their jobs when their party is out of power (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

State Response to Conflicts

On the security front, respondents note that Governments have ensured that "... the rule of law always comes into play very strongly to ensure that people with dissentments (sic) do not go beyond bounds and misbehave into violent conflicts; [and where the need arises] "security officials have enforced the rule of law" (Interview 5, 18 February, 2014) even handedly. Respondents credited governments' rapid response to conflicts for the ring-fencing of localized conflicts to stem escalation and spread across the country. In the words of one respondent, "the response of the Government, [is rapid, as] they send Police and Military there quickly" (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Deployed law enforcement agencies were also credited with being generally fair and firm in their dealings with the citizenry. In particular, respondents commended the neutrality and professionalism of the security services, especially the military and the police during moments of high tension in the country, as major institutional contributory factors to Ghana's peace. In the view of a respondent, "...we have been lucky to have a united armed force, a united security service ... a professional and disciplined security up to this point... (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a result, "...their security role can be seen as dispassionate, as objective, [and directed] towards national peace" (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). In brief, a strong collective desire for peace has ensured localized conflicts are contained and prevented from escalating. As one respondent put it, "... the national agenda for peace has been very very strong ... such that anytime there was a

pocket of conflict arising out of either inter-ethnic conflict or chieftaincy or whatever, the security agencies were very smart and swift to move to those areas to quell the conflict” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2015).

Confirming that rapid state response has helped to stem the spread of violent conflicts, another respondent cited a counter factual instance where delays in the deployment of security agencies fueled conflicts. In the view of the respondent, the escalation of the 1994/95 Guinea Fowl War in northern Ghana was precisely because government failed to respond quickly to the rumours and later the onset of the violence. Rather, in that particular instance, statements from government officials gave the impression that government was “...lining up with one side against the other” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). Respondents also cited the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis which is so “...infested with the interplay of competition of the two main political parties to the extent that when you talk about Abudu, Abudus themselves will tell you that yes, majority of us are allied to the NPP and when you talk to the Adanis, the majority of us are allied to the NDC” (Interview 12 4 March, 2014). When this political polarization of local conflicts happens, the hands of the government and, indeed, other political parties are tied. Consequently, they lose their moral authority as disinterested arbiters and are incapable then of helping the parties resolve their conflicts.

Government involvement in the resolution of local conflicts is often further complicated when state-centric approaches are employed in the resolution process. As a respondent captured it, “...from our independence the central government was simply the continuation or at best the existing legacy of the colonial administration; our colonial system always saw the center to be the provider of all solutions to the periphery so even

if you fought, even if you fought, the solutions lies in Accra” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This Accra-centered approach to conflict management persists partly because “...we have concentrated all our national institutions in Accra” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). Hence, the first manifestation of the state-centered approach to managing local conflicts is the dislodgement of the conflict resolution processes from the natural environment in which the conflicts occurred, as feuding parties are brought to Accra or elsewhere to resolve the conflict.

The second is the attitude of state officials who assume the know-it-all approach to engaging the feuding parties. Using the lenses of their training and offices, they focus on the dyadic and legalistic conflict resolution frameworks that usually discount the use of indigenous knowledge, practices, and resources for resolving conflicts. Accordingly, the customs, traditions, values, and beliefs of the feuding parties seldom count. Such practices do not only distance the conflict resolution process from those who need to participate, it effectively alienates the people from the process and its outcomes. Incidentally, most of these conflicts are rooted in indigenous beliefs systems, customs, and traditions.

Several respondents cited the decades old Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict, which “...has been going on for 91 years now” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014) for different illustrations of the dynamics of state-centric conflict resolution. From the state perspective, a respondent noted that “... at any given time when there is violence, it is the security officials who go in there, they impose curfew, and after some time you see that sanity comes back , even though the situation may not be completely resolved” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The process is repeated as often as the violence re-

erupts. Non-security approaches to addressing the conflict have equally been state-centric. In a recent recurrence of the conflict, another respondent cited the case where “...the minister of interior [invited] the Alavanyos and Nkonyas to Accra for them” (Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to resolve the conflict. In the view of the respondent, this portrayed the government to feuding communities that “I am your solution”; an impression which encourages the conflicting parties to externalize responsibility for the search for a solution to their conflict and to look outward to the Minister, and the government for that matter, for the solution to their conflict. Even if the Minister managed to broker a solution, the challenge in the view of the respondent, is that these people “are going to leave your office and go back home [without any mechanisms in place to] support them in their own environment to talk [next time] rather than [wait for government to come and] take them out of their environment and be the solution provider” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).

To buttress the inutility of the state-centered approaches to conflict resolution, a respondent cited a counterfactual example of the building of local capacity for peace in the same conflict system when “...church leaders [got] involved in committees, peace committees, to go and speak to them” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). According to the respondent, that initiative opened the doors for the youth to take leadership roles in finding lasting solutions to the problem. It created the opportunity for:

the youth [who then] played a very important role in the peace process to the extent that it is the youth who went up physically to open up the path that had been closed to the two communities [for decades]; it is the youth who culturally celebrated their unity and the youth said we want to go out

in the night and look for our girlfriends on the other side; we don't care where the girl comes from, I am a boy and I'm at an age in which I'm looking for love; I don't want the barrier to stop me (Interview 12, March 4 2014).

The lesson learned, in the view of the respondent, is that a conflict that was once an issues-based conflict (land) is now refocused on the interests of the people who live daily the consequences of the wars. They no longer need an external body, government or its functionaries, to provide them a solution; they generate, implement, and monitor the solution by themselves.

Forced Spaces of Engagement

Respondents also cited the regular communication and interfacing between government and the faith-based organizations as an important contributor to the peace of the country. They recalled instances where the Christian Council, the Catholic Secretariat or Catholic Bishops' Conference and other religious councils usually come together, deliberate on issues of national interest and present common fronts to government (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014; Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). These open channels of communication have effectively brought the voice of faith into matters of the state. Respondents, however, pointed out such engagements between the State and faith-based organizations have not always been the product of mutual consensus. On the contrary, they have not always been receptive of the interventions of the FBOs to advance such courses. In general, governments have often been wary of the engagement of the FBOs in the public sphere and often invoked the principle of separation of church

and state in attempts to scare them off the public sphere. Hence, the FBOs have had to bulldoze their ways into national discourses in order to express their perspectives on the way forward as they deem fit. In many instances, governments have waited to act on key public interest issues only under pressure from the religious bodies and civil society organizations. For an example, respondents indicated that there have been cases where sitting governments have not shown interest in pursuing proposed electoral reforms or providing the requisite resources for the needed changes that would enhance Ghana's democratic credentials. They also cited government's reluctance to send the Political Transition bill to parliament for passage, as well as, Parliament's feet dragging when the bill came before it. Eventually "the Ghana Catholic Bishops' Conference pushed very strongly, had meetings with Parliament and persuaded them to pass the act" (Interview 2, February, 2014). Similarly, the mentioned Governments reticence on the need to provide the budgetary resources for the implementation of the biometric voter registration and identification exercise in the run up to the 2012 elections, as the two main political parties bickered over the issue. Again, it would take the Catholic Bishops' Conference and other Civil Society groups to push government into action on the matter.

Respondents further recalled that even the creation of the National Peace Council, which has been lauded as the base for the national peace architecture, is a post hoc reaction from government to institutionalize hitherto private initiatives of faith-based leaders for peace; it was not an *ab initio* intentional creation of government. In other words, government never conceived of and implemented the idea of establishing the National Peace Council; it merely followed the lead of civil society and faith-based actors who had already self-organized and were engaged in structured actions for peace in the

country. As one respondent described it, “Certain people got themselves together and because they did a good job, the Government saw to it that we would make it a statutory body; and the UNDP also contributed immensely towards the establishment of this peace architecture, peace initiative, peace council, and all that” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Even then, respondents questioned government’s commitment to make the National Peace Council functional and effective. They decried the fact that even after the National Peace Council became institutionalized through Act 818; it has not been adequately resourced to carry out its functions. In the words of a respondent “the Peace Council also they have no money. I was just with [name withheld] the other day and he was saying there is no money given to them that’s making the work difficult” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Respondents also identified several risk factors for Ghana’s peace, as a result of actions or inactions of government. For instance, the lack of transparency and honesty in explaining government’s persistent failure to deliver public goods and services efficiently, in the midst of what seems to be deliberate deceit of the public, is seen as a high risk trigger for violence in Ghana (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). In particular, they pointed out that the major risk factors for descent into violence are economic marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment. They made the case that the youth have unmet needs in the midst of observable unresponsive and unaccountable government systems and structures that seemingly superintend over the misappropriation of public resources for private gain and at the expense of the common good. The youth are exasperated by this and are beginning to demand accountability, sometimes in not so peaceful ways (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 210, 21

November, 2014; and Interview 2011, 5 December, 2014). The risk of outburst from the youth is particularly high when they endure unemployment and other economic hardships “...in the midst of opulence displayed by corrupt government officials” (Interview 2013, 28 October, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).

Collective National Amnesia

Other respondents argued that Ghanaians have a high conflict tolerance capacity embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people accept otherwise intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on with their lives. Alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that they can't expect anything good from governments. In a somewhat confirmation of the concept of negative consensus rooted in the system of political patronage that pervades the Ghanaian society, a respondent believes Ghanaians have lost hope in the ability of their government to deliver on the common good. Instead:

What they see Government after Government doing is treating the economy to give a semblance of improvement. But the underlying issue leading to unemployment, better infrastructure, limited opportunities and growth, pervasive growth that will impact on growth are still limited irrespective of the ideological foundations of the Government that comes into power. It becomes more or less a Government by the elite, for the elite. It has no political partisanship. What it has is a system of political patronage that both sides seek, whether in power or out of power (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014)

Having witnessed the repeated failed promises of government's, Ghanaians have simply chosen to ignore government's failures and inactions and move on with their lives (Interview 214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of many, "At the end of the day the politicians, they are the same group of people [...] That may be a negative consensus because whatever concerns them at the end of it they all know what game they are playing (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, while the politicians can be ignored, the dangers that loom for Ghana's peace cannot. The caution that the National Security Apparatus has served signals that the tendency to play ostrich has come to an end. Recalling his engagement with the security agencies, a respondent reports that:

...One of the things we heard from the National Security, talking about peace, they said their greatest fear in this country is not political or even a Military Coup d'état. Their greatest concern is this socio-economic inequality, injustice that may be the [breaking] point. When the hungry man is angry and he takes the law into his hands, then he does not care because his life does not mean anything to him. So when the Security Forces said those things we asked them and I have also observed more and more, that may be the point. This unemployment, the hardships, people who have lost their livelihood, they have nothing to lose. So for them, guns, bullets do not make any difference. If they can kill and eat, they will do it (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

The reality and urgency of this concern is brought home when another respondent referenced the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria where poorly or under-educated, unemployed youth have served as the recruitment pool for the

fighting forces. The respondent then remarked that even though “...we have not experienced it [in Ghana yet] the population is growing, the population of that class of lowly educated, school dropouts, frustrated, low self-esteem youth is growing and that is what makes me feel that over the next five years if there was a minor skirmish, we would get out of hand” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). In brief, government needs to do a lot more especially in bridging inequalities and attending to the needs of the burgeoning unemployed youth in the country. Government may have done its best to create conditions for peace, but respondents feel whatever government has done to date is not enough to secure the peace for Ghana in the long term.

Contribution of Religion to Peace in Ghana

H₀₁₁ Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

H₁₁₁ Religion has an effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys

This hypothesis gauged the role that religion, comprising the faith values, faith leaders, and faith-based organizations, has played in Ghana’s peace. It measured the extent to which i) religious beliefs and values influence the attitudes of Ghanaians towards the maintenance of peace; ii) extent to which Ghanaians’ observance of the teachings of their faith promote peace in Ghana; iii) extent to which the religious nature of Ghanaians affect the peace in the country; iv) presence or absence of discrimination on the basis of religion in employment practices and peace; v) ability of people of different faiths to coexist in the same spaces and its impact on peace; vi) presence or absence of restrictions on marriages of people of different faith traditions and peace; vii) the use of

religious differences to canvass for votes in national and local elections; viii) the effect of leaders and agents of different religious traditions working together for peace and; ix) the role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils such as the Catholic bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. in promoting a culture of peace.

Table 24 presents the frequency run of responses to the question “How important is religion in the lives of Ghanaians”. Of the 1425 respondents who answered the question, 94% said religion was very important (81.3%) or important (12.7%) in the lives of Ghanaians.

Table 24

Importance of Religion in lives of Ghanaians

Importance of Religion in lives of Ghanaians	Frequency	Valid Percent
Not at all important	1	.1
Not very important	15	1.1
Somewhat important	67	4.7
Important	181	12.7
Very important	1158	81.3
I don't know	3	.2
Total	1425	100.0
System Missing	4	
Total	1429	

Table 25 presents and extract of Appendix 18, which details the range of results for the Chi Square values and significance levels for all nine (9) variables tested under this hypothesis against selected characteristics of the respondents. Table 25 and Appendix 18 both show mixed significance levels for Chi Square values for the respective characteristics of respondents. While the respondents of all age categories and in all regions of interview turned up p-values < 0.05 for all the variables, respondents of all

occupational categories also turned up $p < 0.05$ except for gender, where p was $> .05$. All other variables showed one or two cases where p was > 0.05 . Overall, then, the hypothesis that Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys can be rejected – see Table 25.

Table 25

Respondents' Profile and the Perception of the Importance of Religion in Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	<i>p</i>	Value	<i>p</i>	Value	<i>p</i>
Importance of Religion	154.99	.000	300.546	.000	99.053	.368
Respect for Faith Values and peace	149.903	.000	627.541	.000	325.384	.000
Religious nature of Ghanaians	144.164	.000	538.724	.000	218.199	.000
Religions discrimination in employment	140.541	.000	706.111	.000	259.800	.000
Coexistence of people of different faiths	122.343	.000	588.267	.000	232.173	.000
Intermarriages between people of different faiths and peace	91.196	.014	407.204	.000	211.953	.001
Use religion in political campaigns	233.893	.000	646.095	.000	277.773	.000
Interfaith collaboration for peace	154.818	.000	677.945	.000	324.485	.000
Role of religion in creating a culture of peace	120.912	.000	598.492	.000	223.772	.000

Hence, for respondents of these profiles, the alternate hypothesis that religion does have an effect on the peace of Ghana is admissible. Indeed, in a midpoint case selection on a 9 point Likert scale of the construct of means for all responses ranging from very strongly agreed to very strongly disagreed, 98.3% of respondents ($n = 1405$) agree in varying degrees that religion does have an influence on the peace that Ghana enjoys – Table 26.

Table 26

Means Of Responses On Contribution Religion to Peace in Ghana

Case Selection with Relicons ≤ 4.5	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Not Selected	24	1.7	1.7
Selected	1405	98.3	98.3
Total	1429	100.0	100.0

In other words, the majority of respondents agree that the religious nature of Ghanaians as witnessed through respect for their religious beliefs and values; the observance of the teachings of their faith in their daily lives; the absence of discrimination on the basis of religion in employment practices; the coexistence of people of different faiths in the same spaces; limited restrictions on marriages of people of different faith traditions; the nonuse of religious differences as an instrument to canvass for votes in national and local elections are important contributors to peace in Ghana. In the same way, the collaboration of leaders and agents of different religious traditions on issues of peace and the role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils such as the Ghana Catholic Bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. in promoting a culture of peace are major contributors.

KII respondents sided with their survey counterparts that religion in its belief and institutional form has contributed greatly to Ghana's peace. Preceding sections in this chapter have already documented respondents' views on how recourse to prayers and intercessions; the role of religious leaders, acting alone or using the platforms of their respective faith-inspired institutions; and religious institutions such as the Christian Council of Ghana, the Ghana Catholic Bishops' Conference, the National Catholic

Secretariat, the Ghana Muslims Council, among others, have intervened directly and indirectly, separately or jointly, to direct the ship of state towards the port of peace. What has not been sufficiently raised so far is how religion informs and directs the attitudes and behaviors of individual Ghanaians in their interpersonal engagements, as well as, interactions with the public sphere to promote peace. This is the aspect this section would focus on.

All KII respondents agreed that Ghanaians are deeply religious by nature. In the words of one respondent “the majority of Ghanaians about 99.5% are religious. The greater percentage claim to be Christians”. Whether they actively practice and live by their creeds or not, the “...fact that they identify themselves with some form of religion in itself is positive” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). From the perspective of national psyche, respondents also noted that this religiosity among Ghanaians is manifest in the writings on “on our Mammy Trucks and all that: “Fear God and Live”, “God Lives”, “Give it to God” etc. These are not things people are simply saying; it is something that stems from them” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Hence, respondents’, “... believe it is the deeply spiritual nature of the people, in the sense that whatever their persuasions, religious persuasions or faith beliefs, there is an underlying inherent message of peace and a state of peacefulness and forgiveness within the faith messages which are dominant” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) that account for the aversion to violence among Ghanaians. According to respondents, this predisposition to forgiveness, peace, and reconciliation is manifested in the Ghanaian maxim of “*Fa ma Nyame*” or “Give it to God”, or “Leave it to God” (interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). This adage, in the view of respondents is a

summation of the deeply cultural and religious belief of Ghanaians that it is not in their place to avenge any wrongs done them. Rather than seek retaliation, Ghanaians tend to adopt the typical attitude of “You have done me wrong, but I give it to God – He will be the one to punish you”. I leave it to Him [and] that also helps and pulls [people] back” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). For this reason, most Ghanaians “...feel that even when a wrong is done and when they make their case they are prepared to leave the rest” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) or let the “Fa ma Nyame syndrome take over” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

Part of the tendency to avoid revenge derives from the deep seated “fear of spilling blood” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014), because bloodletting is a sacrilegious act that offends and affects not only the living, but the dead and the unborn as well. Bloodshed is not something that the Ghanaian spirit really goes for (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Hence, “...most Ghanaians do not like spilling blood [because] in our tradition if you spill human blood you have to cleanse the earth” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). It is this fear of God or fear of blood worldview that ensures that even when Ghanaians “...are pushed up to a certain point the “*Fa ma Nyame*” syndrome takes over” and they back off” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). This is how “...religion plays a greater part in terms of the peaceful atmosphere we find ourselves in” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Some respondents, however, believe there is a risk to Ghana’s peace inherent in the over subscription to any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in religiosity as a pillar of its peace. Such respondents have pointed out that other countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were equally, if not more religious. And yet,

they fell into very violent and protracted conflicts (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Ironically, in some cases, the violent conflicts they experienced were prosecuted in defense of religion. Hence, while the “*Fa ma Nyame*” mentality in itself is a very good thing, it may actually nurture some negative tendencies as it merely postpones the inevitable need to confront and deal with the issues that threaten Ghana’s peace. It is a postponement “...because for how long are people going to say that?” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Yet others have argued that “...the “*Fa ma Nyame*” syndrome is a high digit of the religious language [which] has not helped in some instances. It is that factor that not only perpetuates the negative peace, but also has quote unquote helped us not to go to this full-scale war blown...” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, as another respondent pondered, how far can the *Fa ma Nyame* culture sustain Ghana’s peace:

When people feel that the system of justice only serves some, the economic system only serves some, and the social privileges serve some; and that there is nothing for them, then what do I have to gain carrying on as it is?” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).

In other words, can people continue to resign to their fate and leave it to God to sort out their temporal needs when they see that duty bearers who should have been creating the opportunities for them to meet their needs are rather their stumbling blocks to any form of social advancement? For this reason, some respondents have averred that, from the perspective of religion, the real fear is not that faith will begin to lose its restraining influence on the people when such visible exploitation of the public purse for

private ends continues with impunity; it will not come from the loss of legitimacy of religious leaders to continue to engage in the public sphere on behalf of their faithful simply because the faithful have lost faith in their power to secure for them their bread and butter; it comes from the fear that under such trying circumstances, the “Religions themselves [could] become hijacked and [...] used for other purposes” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). Should that happen, religion could become the weapon that destroys Ghana’s fragile peace; for “there are none who do evil with great abandon as those who do it in the name of religion” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

Another weak link in the role of religion as an instrument of peace relates to the question of reciprocity in opportunities for the practice of faith. Respondents observed that inter-faith dialogue, especially between Moslems and Christians, is challenged due to ongoing tensions over rights of worship of Moslem students in Church-managed schools. Perceived unwillingness of the Moslem to arrive at a quid pro quo arrangement on the matter of equal rights of worship of Christians in Moslem educational institutions has been cited as the potential block to a dialogue of action between Christians and Moslems. As a respondent remarked, the Moslems “... want their children to attend our schools, have their own mosque in our compounds and all that but when our children are going to their institutions it’s very difficult for them to allow them space to worship” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). Should an amicable reciprocal arrangement not be found, this could prove the breaking point for Christian-Muslim relations in Ghana.

Contribution of Culture to the Peace in Ghana

H₀₁₂ The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

The five variables used to test this hypothesis are respondents' perceptions on the extent to which the values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote peace; ways in which socialization processes in all cultures in Ghana inculcate the values of peace in their members; extent to which cultural sanctions for the breach of the peace deter adherents from promoting violence; extent to which traditional rulers in Ghana exert their authority on their members to ensure the promotion of peace; and ways in which traditional rulers promote peace through accommodating people of different ethnic groups, faith traditions and political affiliations within their areas of jurisdiction.

Asked to what extent they believed that the values and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own citizens, 97.8% of the respondents said they very strongly believed, strongly believed or simply believed the proposition to be true. Figure 7 below presents the summary results of respondents on their level of agreements with the proposition that the traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana are openly welcoming to strangers; ethnic groups have strong sanctions against the perpetration of violence; and traditional rulers have strong influence over their subjects' use of violence to resolve conflicts. The graphs show that consistently more than 96.5% of respondents to all three questions indicate that they believed very strongly, strongly, or simply in the propositions.

Figure 7


Perceptions on How Culture Contributes To Ghana's Peace



Asked to what degree they accepted that the culture and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana train people to be peaceful, 94.5% of the respondents indicated that they believed this to be so from a very high to a high extent. Similarly, when asked how effective traditional leaders have been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups living within their jurisdictions feel at home, 95.6% of respondents indicated that this is done very effectively or effectively - see figure 8. Similar trends are reported for variables measuring influence of traditional leaders in preventing violence; the use of cultural sanctions as deterrents for anti-peace engagements of citizens, and respondents' belief that ethnic values and traditions welcome strangers.

Figure 8

Case Selection: Contribution of Cultural Factors to Peace in Ghana



Appendix 19 presents the results of the cross-tabulation of the various cultural variables with the profile of respondents. It indicates insignificant findings for gender against all the variables; respondents' educational levels against the variables for xenophobic cultural traits ($p = .501$); cultural sanctions against violence ($p = .268$); and the influence of traditional rulers over the war making intentions of their subjects ($p = .097$). By primary occupation of respondents, p -value for non-xenophobic traditions of ethnic groups was $.550$, while religion reported p -values of $.206$, $.812$, and $.069$ respectively for cross-tabulations with the non-xenophobic cultural traits; socialization for peace within all ethnic groups, and the influence of traditional leaders over their subjects. The p -values obtained for presence or absence of non-xenophobic attitudes in Ghanaian cultures ($p = .248$); socialization for peace ($p = .113$); existence of cultural sanctions against recourse to violence for settling differences ($p = .17$); preventive

influence of traditional rulers over warmongering ($p = .144$); and the effectiveness of traditional leaders in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups living within their jurisdictions feel at home ($p = .133$) show the different age categories of respondents did not affect their responses to the questions.

Age and region of interview of respondents, however, turned up p -values of less than .05. In other words, it is a significant finding that, irrespective of their age categories or regions in which they were interviewed, there was no difference in respondents' belief that the culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Differences, however, exist between gender groups in their evaluation of all the statements. Similarly, respondents of different educational levels also had differences in their assessment of the statements that all ethnic groups have welcoming (non-xenophobic) customs and traditions; have sanctions against the use of violence; and that traditional rulers have a strong control on the war making behaviors of their subjects. People with different occupational backgrounds also appreciated differently the statements on non-xenophobic cultures of all ethnic groups in Ghana and the influence traditional rulers have in preventing war-making by members of their ethnic groups. Respondents with different religious affiliations also differed in their assessment of the statements on non-xenophobic cultures, socialization for peace, and the influence of traditional rulers on their subjects against warmongering; contribution of culture, customs, and traditions to peace in Ghana. Given the preponderance of cases in which $p > 0.05$ for the Chi square values generated in the cross-tabulations above, we cannot reject H_0 's proposition that there is no difference in respondents' view that the

culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

Reporting on the findings of the KII on previous hypotheses has already captured different ways in which culture has contributed to the creation and sustenance of Ghana's peace. The views of KII respondents also provide insights into the shades of opinions that may have guided the findings from the quantitative survey. Five clusters of views emerge from the KII participants.

Cross Cultural Values for Peace

The impact of intercultural exchanges leading to cross-fertilization, adaptation, and harmonization of major belief systems, values and practices across the majority of cultures in Ghana came up for mention in discussing the findings of the KII under hypothesis two. Even respondents who wondered

...whether 50 or 60 years is enough for us to talk about a Ghanaian culture [nonetheless conceded that] we have cultures of the various Ghanaian ethnic groups that largely coincide – peace loving, give it to God, etc. and that bar a few small ethnic groups, we don't have what you'd describe as a warlike ethnic groups or ethnic cultures" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).

As another respondent framed it, "we have over the years seen a convergence or commonalities in some cultural values and practices; so in a way you can say we have a Ghanaian culture, which is hospitable, welcoming" (Interview 201, 15 October, 2015). This theme of the cultural foundations of the

predisposition of Ghanaians to peace is taken up again under hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 8 discussed the cultural underpinnings of the role of gender in building Ghana's peace, while hypothesis 9 dealt with questions of Ghana's political and democratic culture. Hypothesis 11 raised and discussed the collective abhorrence of blood shedding as an attribute that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. As was noted, "...among many cultures it would be very absurd to draw blood and if you did inadvertently you needed to atone for it in many ways" (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). The sanctions include the possibilities of banishment or capital punishment for the offender. Hypothesis 9 also broached the topic of the ease of intercultural migration, integration, incorporation, and how this has facilitated the co-habitation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in the same spaces without fears of violence. Hence, in the view of respondents, all ethnic groups in Ghana share certain cultural traits which have served as binding factors in their coexistence and collective desire for peace.

African Faith Foundations of Peace

Respondents noted that "Africans from their traditional routes are a deeply spiritual people" (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). In particular, according to respondents, Ghanaians are very religious and religious beliefs and practices underwrite everything that Ghanaians do. This is because irrespective of their professed creeds, the customs, traditions, beliefs, and value of Indigenous African Religion (IAR) provides the base for this deeply spiritual nature of the Ghanaian. Its tenets underwrite the lived values, beliefs, and behaviors of everyone. Hence,

IAR defines the world views of Ghanaians, especially in matters of interpersonal relationships, of which conflict management is a part.

Respondents considered IAR “...the most tolerant religion in Ghana [because] it is a sort of personal relationship with God [with] the elders of the family [as] the main intermediaries” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). According to respondents, IAR is very accommodative of other faiths and traditions. Therefore, it has a pervasive influence on the peaceable nature of Ghanaians. In the view of a respondent, IAR dispenses this influence because all the cultures in Ghana “...believe in the Superior Being, whether it’s God, whether it’s a Jujuman or something [...] you are actually told to love your brother, be your brother’s keeper” (Interview 11, March, 2014). The newer religions such as Christianity and Islam are transposed on this pre-existing belief system. The result is a mutually reinforcing religiosity deriving from the fact that “When you add the powerful influences of [these] dominant World Religions like Christianity and Islam, through all their cultural mix, [to the belief systems of IAR, religion] certainly can be relied on as one of the key factors” that constructs the worldviews and guides the behavior of Ghanaians. Respondents, therefore, identified several peacebuilding cultural traits and values that cut across all ethnic groups in Ghana.

This religious foundation of the culture of most ethnic groups in Ghana underscores the second cultural trait – the Ghanaian penchant for discussions over brawling in conflict situations. According to respondents, all ethnic groups in Ghana encourage disputants in any conflict to talk rather than resort to violence. As a respondent recalled, the Akan proverb which says that “*Asem biara nyi ho won fa*

num ka” (to wit “there is no conflict or volatile situation that cannot be addressed through discussions” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) has its parallels in other languages across the country. It sums up the wisdom that talks, either by arbitration, dialogue, mediation, negotiation or the circle process type of community-supported problem-solving initiatives are prized over recourse to arms. Hence, “...engagement in the Ghanaian culture which usually produces good results has been part of the peace that we are enjoying” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).

Closely associated with the preference for talk over war in resolving disagreements is the cultural value for patience and tolerance. As one respondent captured it, “tolerance is also a value that we cherish as Ghanaians” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014; see also Interview 5, 14 February, 2015). Indigenous conflict resolution processes take time, especially when extended parties such as relatives and ethnic groups are involved. For this reason, patience and tolerance for the slow processes are required. Hence, the maxim that “*Abotɛr tutu nkokwa – to wit: patience moves mountains*” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) guides all participants in the conflict resolution processes.

Intercultural Accommodation and Integration

For both religious and humanitarian reasons, most Ghanaian cultures promote “...hospitality and a welcoming disposition to a person who is different from you” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). This is because in many cultures in Ghana “...you are expected to treat the stranger with courtesy and with respect

because you don't know where the person is coming from; it might even be erm, a reincarnate god or something, you know (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; see also Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). It is this open-arm policy among the majority of ethnic groups that has made pervasive the internal migration, resettlement, and incorporation of people of different ethnic backgrounds in areas outside their home regions.

Closely associated with this open-arm, open-door policy is the readiness of most ethnic groups in Ghana to accept intermarriages across ethnic and faith lines. The openness of all ethnic groups to accepting cross-cultural and cross-faith marriages has two dimensions. While voluntary intermarriages are the normal routes for building conjugal interethnic bridges, a respondent recounted a historical incident in which conjugal alliances transformed into military pacts, mutual defense pacts, as well as, treaties of non-aggression between the contending ethnic groups that, in contemporary public view, are political rivals. According to the interviewee, the Ashantis went to war with the Anlos (or Ewes) to the east simply because they found the women from the Eweland - statelier, fairer in complexion, and therefore more desirable. That "...war came to an end with a settlement that they would never ever fight again, and that each would come to the defense of the other in the event of any attack on one" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Similar intermarriages between ethnic groups in the north and the Ashantis have been known to history as well.

Intermarriages, either by personal volition or conquest has a deeper cultural value in Ghana than the immediate value of spousal relationships. All ethnic groups

in Ghana run one of two systems of inheritance – matrilineal or patrilineal. While the Akans, the largest ethnic category go by the matrilineal system, most of the other groups emphasize the patrilineal system. The two systems have immense implications for not only material inheritance, but also the right of accession to chiefships. For the Akans, only children born to a female royal has the right to ascend to the stool, irrespective of whether or not the child's father is an Akan or even a royal. Hence while it was astonishing for one respondent to find an Odikro (a lower chief in the Akan tradition) in a village in the Western Region who spoke fluent Dagara (a language from the Upper West Region), the subjects of the said chief had absolutely no problems with it. They explained that the said chief's mother was an Akan royal, although his father was a *Dagao* migrant from the Upper West Region (Interview 216, 11 December 2014). Similarly, several eminent Ghanaians who self-identify with one ethnic group would nonetheless trace their ancestry to other ethnic origins (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

Finally, respondents noted that in addition to the voluntary migrations and marriage induced admixture of people of different ethnic backgrounds, there was considerable movement of people across the country during the slave trade and/or as a result of pre-colonial interethnic wars. People of different backgrounds therefore were often uprooted and replanted in different locations. This has resulted in a situation where the original stock of "...the population [that constitutes Ghana today] got so mixed up that one can hardly identify a Ghanaian who can claim to be purely Ga, purely Ewe, or purely Asante; and that [knowledge] makes us reasonably humble (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

Traditional Authority Structure and Peace in Ghana

The chieftaincy institution is one that has varied cultural origins for different ethnic groups in Ghana. While larger ethnic groups such as the Akans, Dagombas, Ewes, Gonjas, Mamprusis, and Nanumbas among others had established hierarchical chiefships before the advent of colonialism, others such as the Dagara, Gurune, Konkombas, among others, mainly in the north, ran more dispersed authority structures. The latter were mistakenly described as acephalous (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014; Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Based on this classification, the colonial administration either regrouped the so-called acephalous ethnic groups under pre-existing chiefs or replicated the hierarchical structure of the cephalous groups among the acephalous ethnic groups. This effort to harmonize the traditional governance system for the ulterior motives of indirect rule culminated in institutionalization of the structured chiefship system across the country. Hence, all ethnic groups now have chiefs after the structure of the cephalous ethnic groups.

Even without a harmonized structure, respect for the authority and legitimacy of traditional institutions of governance and their officers, however organized, is another trait that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. Respondents recalled that traditional leaders, including chiefs and clan heads once exercised “a stabilizing, a cooling effect on the people” in times of conflicts. [Hence] in any situation of potential conflict it is just a matter of bringing them over and they will be able to calm the people behind them (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Although much of this adjudicatory role of chiefs has been curtailed in the post-independence

governance systems, chiefs remain important reference points for the resolution of conflicts that local traditions, customs, and practices govern.

However, unlike during the colonial period when chiefs had considerable authority to preside over the settlement of a wide range of cases, the Constitution of Ghana and various legal provisions have severely curtailed the jurisdictions of chiefs and other traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution since independence. Consequently, access to justice is distanced from the community. Even the lowest grade courts are located in district capitals, requiring people who need to access their services to travel long distances at their costs. Women face additional challenges as the “court system is not friendly to them [as they are even subjected to] sexual harassment even within the court system” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). As a result of this physical and psychological distancing of the courts from the populace respondents have remarked that most communities still try to “... resolve our differences through arbitration, through an elder” (Interview, 7 February 2014), even though they are not vested with the power to do so. Hence, “... in this country, every day to day cases are settled out of court may be with the chiefs, traditional rulers, with elders settling, most cases don’t go to court” (Interview 206, 19 October 2014). In some cases, religious leaders are the ones called in to mediate the conflicts (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Hence, informally, traditional leaders continue to play important roles in resolving conflicts at the community levels.

Chiefs that have been quick to redefine their roles in the postcolonial state have retained their legitimacy, respect, and influence. Respondents noted the

current Asantehene as one traditional leader who has set the pace for redefining the space and role of chiefs in Ghana today for the promotion of peace and development. Through his numerous development initiatives, he has effectively reconstructed the role of traditional rulers by placing greater emphasis on their developmental roles. As one respondent noted, "...when the Asantehene speaks he says in those days as a Chief, I was supposed to be the Military Leader; leading my people to war. Now I lead them to war against ignorance; promoting education" (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Because of the tangible benefits his initiatives bring to his people and beyond, he has recloaked himself with the legitimacy that his forebears enjoyed before the colonial and postcolonial state robbed it away. As one respondent captured it, today, when "...the Asantehene says something, the people listen to him even more than the government (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). And this is because "when the chief speaks, it's not just the chief speaking, people see him as the custodian of everything that represents the society; so it's not just the human being speaking, he represents something so when he talks he has the backing of the people (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).

Other chiefs that have emulated the Asantehene in redefining their roles from warrior-leaders to champions of development for their people are also held in high regard, and therefore, are capable of speaking up in the name of their subjects in matters of national interest. Hence, in places where chiefs have held themselves to the honor of their customs and traditions, citizens have sometimes believed "...the chieftaincy institution is more important than who is president of the country" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Where they have adhered to the cultural

injunctions to demonstrate “...neutral, inclusive, and objective leadership [they have also] played critical roles in rallying ethnic groups to support common courses in the new state. Unfortunately, however, current partisanized leadership within some traditional areas is posing threats to the unity” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014) of some ethnic groups. As a result, in some places the authority of traditional leaders is waning due to their indulging in corruption and the abuse of their offices for personal gain (Interview 3, 7 February 2014).

Cultural Change and Peace

Respondents were also keenly aware that culture is not static; it is ever changing, influenced by and influencing other cultures in their external environments. In a globalized world, not only is the rate of change ever faster, the content of change also moves in multiple and uncoordinated directions. For this reason, respondents expressed fear that our youth are losing that cultural touch and rather embracing the culture of the “hip hop generation” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) because they are bombarded with “...films that seem to reflect western values [...] and the western lifestyles that they want to bring to us” (Interview 11, 5 December, 2015). As a result the youth are becoming “.... products of only what is hidden and seen rather than what you imbibe as an integral part of your upbringing” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). The implications, a respondent asked rhetorically is: “If that is not part of you, what are you?” In a self-response, he cautions that “We will never, no matter how well we speak English, conducted language in international affairs; we will always remain Africans in our

core values” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). And when the Ghanaian loses that Africanness, the values that once restrained them from violence would have been lost. To that extent, the restraining influence of religion and culture on people in conflict situations is fast disappearing among the youth.

Contribution of formal Education to Peace

Ho₁₃ Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys

Educational systems have a broad range of socializing and nurturing influence on people who pass through them. In addition to the centrally determined content of educational curricular; other characteristics of Ghana’s educational system include the nationalized system of selection and placement of students from one educational level to the other; the predominant role of boarding school systems in post-primary education; the system of placement of teachers and staff within the educational system; the post tertiary studies state-instituted national service scheme; and the emergence of associational forms of life such as the alumni and alumnae associations, popularly called the “old boys” and “old girls” association, and even cross-institutional past students associations. All these factors create cross-regional, cross-ethnic, and cross-faith interactions and relationships among citizens who pass through the country’s schools. Hence, questions that guide the testing of this hypothesis are: to what extent do respondents believe the formal educational system in Ghana has contributed to the building of a culture of peace among Ghanaians; does the content of history courses give equal value to the history of all ethnic groups; what is the contribution of the content of the educational curricula to peace; how does the centralized posting of students to post

primary educational institutions contribute to peace; how does the boarding school system contribute to peace in Ghana; specifically how does the boarding schools system contribute to inter-cultural prejudice reduction. Other questions explore the extent to which the existence of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations create strong cross-cultural bonds among alumni and alumnae of the same schools; to what extent does the practice of posting teachings to schools outside their home districts or regions increase knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians; has the promotion of sporting events between schools of different districts and regions increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians; what role, if any, has interschool intellectual competitions played in reducing cross cultural stereotypes and inferiority or superiority complexes among Ghanaians; and has the compulsory national service scheme helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians?

Figure 9 presents a comparative graph of the mean responses of the participants for the various variables filtered at ≥ 6.5 , ≥ 7.5 , and ≥ 8 . It is observable that more than 60% of respondents credited all aspects of Ghana's education system for contributing to peace when the response ranges covered those who agreed to a moderate extent. However, when case selection is restricted to respondents who agreed to "High Extent or Very High Extent" on all the factors, only two of the variables were able to muster at least 30% of agreement rates among respondents. This suggests that the level of certainty with which respondents are willing to credit Ghana's educational system as a contributor to the country's peace is wobbly. Indeed, between those who indicated to a moderate or moderately low extent and respondents who were definitely sure education contributed to

the peace of Ghana from a high to a very high extent, there is an average of 47.5 percentage point differences for all response categories – Appendix 20.

Figure 9

Mean Scores Contribution of Ghana's Educational System to Peace




Figure 10 presents the construct of means for the responses for all the variables measuring the contribution of Ghana's formal educational system to peace, filtered at ≥ 6.5 , ≥ 7 , and ≥ 8 on the 9 point Likert scale responses. Responses for the ≥ 6.5 cut off point include part of responses that indicated that Ghana's educational system has contributed from a moderate extent to a very high extent to the peace in the Ghana. The ≥ 7 cut off point covered responses ranging from "moderately high extent" to a very high

extent, while the ≥ 8 cut off point represents responses that indicated that contribution of the formal educational system to peace was to a “high extent” or a “very high extent”.

The figure shows that only a third (33.7%) of respondents were definitely sure that all the factors enumerated above as part of Ghana’s educational system made definite contributions to the peace that the country enjoys from a high to a very high extent, while close to another third (26.8%) indicated that the contribution of education to peace in Ghana was only a “high extent”.

Figure 10




Table 27 presents a summary of the Pearson Chi Square test results for the ≥ 8 point filtered responses (i.e. respondents who agreed from a High to Very High Extent) cross tabulated with the profile of respondents. Apart from the educational level and religion of respondents which turned up $p > .05$, indicating insignificant findings, all other respondent characteristics had significant findings with $p < .05$.

Table 27

Respondents' Profile and Perceived Contribution of Education to Peace in Ghana

Responses Characteristics	Pearson Chi-Square			Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
	N of Valid Cases	Value	Df	
Age Category	1382	27.459a	8	0.001
Region of Interview	1429	131.607a	9	0.000
Gender	1414	5.325a	1	0.021
Educational Level	1425	11.265a	8	0.187
Religion	1410	9.901a	7	0.194
Primary Occupation	1422	47.206a	19	0.000

In other words, the survey finding that only 33.7% of respondents (n-1429) are willing to stake out that Ghana's educational system has contributed to the nation's peace from a high to a very high extent is a significant find. Indeed, for respondents of all age categories, gender, region of interview, and primary occupation, we can reject the hypothesis (Ho13) that Ghana's formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys. In other words, respondents believe that Ghana's formal educational system has had an effect on the peace that the country enjoys (H₁13).

The factors within the educational system that have contributed to Ghana's peace include the history lessons taught in schools in Ghana and how they promote inclusiveness and unity among Ghanaians; the curricula of the formal educational system that teaches values of co-citizenship; and how the centralized posting of students to secondary and vocational schools promotes inter-cultural learning among citizens. The use of the boarding system in post-primary educational institutions has promoted cross-cultural and cross ethnic friendships that have lasted into adult lives of Ghanaians. The

boarding school system has also decreased ethnic and religious identity barriers, stereotypes, and prejudices among Ghanaians.

Additionally, the activities of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations have created strong cross-cultural bonds among people who attended the same schools; while the posting of teachings within the Ghana Education Service to schools outside their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians. Furthermore, the organization of sporting events between schools of different districts and regions has increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians; just as the engagement of students in interschool quizzes, debates, and other forms of intellectual competition have reduced the complexes of inferiority and superiority among Ghanaians. Finally, the posting of students graduating from secondary and tertiary institutions to work in regions or communities other than their own under the National Service Scheme has helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians from a High Extent to a “Very High Extent”.

Disaggregation of the responses by characteristics of respondents, however, shows that they differed on the basis of their religion and levels of education as p -values for the cross tabulation yielded $p > .05$. In other words, while all the other characteristics of respondents cited above did not seem to have influenced their perceptions on the contribution of Ghana’s educational system to the peace of the country, the religious affiliations and educational levels of respondents influenced their perceptions on the extent to which Ghana’s formal educational system has contributed to the peace that the country enjoys.

These nuances in the recognitions of the contribution of the educational system to peace notwithstanding, the results of this study suggest that while a larger percentage of the respondents believe that the educational system has made some contribution to the peace of the country, they were not sure or willing to credit it with a high level of contribution. Instead, the majority of respondents believe the contribution of the formal educational system to the peace of Ghana ranges from a moderate to a moderately low extent.

Parallel to the results from the survey, respondents in the KII were also divided on the extent to which Ghana's educational system can be credited with contributing to the peace of the country. Several respondents eulogized the cultural assimilatory role that the educational system, especially the boarding school system, offered as an instrument for building social cohesion. They pointed out that the boarding school effect goes beyond the ethnic and regional amalgamation of students; it cuts deep into and across the social strata of Ghana, as students from rich and poor homes often find themselves in the same dormitories, classrooms, and other common spaces within the educational establishments (Interview 217, 13 December 2014). Boarding schools therefore were melting pots that helped to gel and foster a sense of oneness among ethnically and socioeconomically diverse people within and across generations.

In the view of respondents, without the boarding school system, most Ghanaians would have gone to post primary schools in their locality or not advanced in education at all, if there was no post-primary educational establishment in their vicinity. In such cases, their exposure would have been limited to their ethnic group and their immediate environments. However, with "the boarding school structure system people from

different areas converge in a boarding school and they begin to learn about each other; they grow to know each other; it fosters peace among them (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). As another respondent noted, "...if you are from Greater Accra and you went to school in Sunyani where you met somebody from Wa, you met somebody from Takoradi you realize that you became friends and after the five years [of being together] you were able to understand the culture of that person" (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). Hence, "...the idea of boarding houses [...] encouraged interethnic mix (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Bringing students from different parts of the country together for several years exposed them to different ideas and ways of doing things, including nonviolent approaches to problem solving. It also increased the sense of stewardship and common good; greater awareness of one's environment; and built competencies in engagement with the world beyond us, including globally. (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 12, 4 March 2014). For one respondent, the boarding school system:

...has made people tolerant to each other's cultures, each other's temperaments. People who have not gone to the Boarding House would find it difficult to relate to a particular group because of certain perceptions. If you are in a dormitory, the guy lying on top of you, and next to your face is from one of them, of those that you haven't from, I am sure you realize that boardinization has helped a lot" (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014).

This gelling effect of boarding schools, in the words of a respondent is "...why I have a passion for boarding houses. For most of us it is through the formal education system, boarding houses that we first got real very close interaction with other ethnic

groups and made friends.” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Lamenting the weakening of the cohering effect of boarding schools among the younger generation due, in part, to the reduction of the number of years of secondary school education, another respondent observed that

Our boarding system that took children from the communities and made them live together with other people in a neutral environment bound by certain principles, and a sense of nationhood, created a people who had the vision that transcended their cultural setting that they were born into.. That generation they still have the sense of nationhood in them. But if you want a cut-off point you can easily say, most of the people who are 58 and above are the people in which you can find such sentiments. Those who are 30 and below for the majority of them even 40, they do not have those sentiments because it was not inculcated through the educational system. (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).

Beyond the direct personal experiences of changes in perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in interethnic engagements as a result of the contacts in living, learning, and playing with people from different ethnic groups, the boarding school system engendered several spinoffs that have positive effects on the peace that Ghana enjoys. First, the boarding schools create opportunities for friendships that last long after one has graduated out of the boarding house. In particular, the “old boyism, girl old girlism” or alumni and alumnae associations have provided a platform for extending and expanding those friendships beyond the walls of the school and across generations, since

membership of these associations cut across generational or cohort lines of friendships. People who have attended the same school grow up to be like “...sisters [and the] sisterhood, brotherhood, [that past students associations create] tend to let us live with each other, work with each other, and support each other...” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). This is because “...when you meet as classmates you don’t see yourselves as Ewe, Konkomba, Nanumba, you see yourselves as classmates who have gone to training college, who have gone to secondary school, who have gone to university together” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The bonds of friendship seem to grow stronger outside the school system and in later years. As a respondent recalled,

...the sense of bonding [in such associations]; it’s like a family, I mean, and it wasn’t like that when we were in school; I don’t remember it to be like that; you had a few friends, but here, you know, everybody remembers the other person, is interested in the other person” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014).

This sense of familial bonding derived from the relationships built out of the boarding schools “... has permeated the whole country [so much so that] before you do something you say oh, this is my old...” school mate (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The implication for peace is that, in the words of a respondent:

all of that in fact socializes Ghanaians so much that even if there is a conflict between the people of Saboba and the people of Yendi and then you are traveling to go and fight the people of Yendi and you go and meet your classmate [laughs] I’m just wondering how you would feel, you see?

So that has actually brought us to understand that we are one people with one destiny and I think that's really very very important.” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014)

A bonus from the boarding school systems is the “intermarriages [it has fostered] between people from different geographical, ethnic, and religious backgrounds” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) who were once school or classmates. This reinforces the position of the alumni and alumnae associations of boarding schools as platforms for peace. It is common to hear in discussions that people would say “... oh my wife comes from there, my sister is married to this – that intermarriage thing, the old students’ association thing, the intermarriages and all that are glues that bond Ghanaians together” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).

The creation of boarding schools effectively created concentrations of schools in certain geographical spaces. This warranted the posting of teachers and other educational workers from geo-ethnic regions that were more advanced educationally to the less endowed ones. The consequential “Free movement of people to different parts of the country for work” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) allowed “...Ghanaians to mix up with southerners coming to the north, northerners going to the south” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

Beyond the world of social engagements and work, respondents said boarding schools also created the springboards for the formation of political alliances out of school contacts (interview 207, 29 October, 2014). A major contributory factor in the alliance building lies in the extracurricular activities such as sports, debates, and different learning clubs and associations that created spaces for students from different schools to encounter

peers from other schools. Such encounters created lifelong friendships that have spilled over into adult life. Even for members of associations such as the Young Catholic Students who recently discovered their members tended to shun going “... into politics, maybe [because] they see the political environment to be too hostile” (Interview 12, 4 March 2014), there are nonetheless strong influential roles and relationships that cut across political divides. So strong are such bridge-builder effects of their student days experiences that when one of such persons (name withheld) recently “... died you had the representation from all parties, because of the gravitas of the person, at the funeral” (Interview 12, 4 March 2014).

A third spinoff is that the boarding system of “education comes with its own culture” (Interview 1, 3 March 2014) In the case of Ghana, that culture was the non-adversarial, nonviolent, and integrative type. To illustrate the point, a respondent narrated how

...when we were in the Pan African Parliament, it is only the Ghanaian delegation that you could see moving together as a group. And the other delegations would ask us how we are able to do that. Other African states delegations you could see clearly opposition and government – you could see; they were not mixing” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).

Another example was when in 2009 Ghana’s Ambassador to Namibia personally went to the Airport at Windhoek to welcome a Pan African Parliamentary delegation that the Deputy Minority (Opposition) Leader in Ghana’s parliament was leading to monitor Namibia’s elections. According to the respondent, the scene prompted delegates from

other countries to remark “we can never be like Ghana” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). Not only was it surprising that the Ambassador would come to meet someone from the opposition in his country; the cordiality the two exhibited did not indicate they were political adversaries.

Non-intentionality of Peace Outcomes from Education

In sum on the positive side, Ghana’s educational system, in the view of some respondents, has been very helpful in promoting interethnic integration and social cohesion. However, other respondents observed that “...it is kind of difficult to establish a direct relationship between education and peace in Ghana (Interview 201, 15 October 2014), especially when viewed from the angle of policy intentionality in the set up and management of the educational system. Indeed, most respondents in the KII lamented the lack of intentionality in the use of education as an instrument for social cohesion and peace in Ghana. They viewed the contribution of education to peace as a coincidental or even accidental, as most of the positive examples cited derive from the incidental spin-offs of the effects of boarding schools and the posting of teachers, rather than the intentional acts of curriculum development and implementation, for example. In the view of respondents, the major contribution of the educational system lies in the extra or non-curricular activities that created spaces for students from various schools and backgrounds to encounter peers from other communities and schools (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Summing up the view that the contribution of education to peace in Ghana is a byproduct, not an intentional product of the educational system, a respondent had this to say:

I will not sit down here and say our educational system has not played a role in contributing to producing individuals who saw themselves as Ghanaians rather than as ethnic individuals [but] is it the cause of education? No. I think our system may not have been directly informed to promote peace; the content does not promote peace, but the space and the structures that we put in place may indirectly; it's a byproduct of that space (Interview 215, 10 December 2014).

Respondents attributed the defects in the educational system of Ghana as an instrument of peace, now and in the future, to a number of interlinked factors. First, the content of education does not emphasize the teaching of history of Ghana to provide a shared understanding of how the ethnic groups in the country came to be together; are interrelated; and have managed to coexist largely peacefully. Instead, some text books distort historical facts (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014), and thereby contribute to the protraction of inter and intra ethnic conflicts in some locales. In other words, neither the content nor the delivery mechanisms in schools are deliberately designed to foster the sense of oneness among Ghanaians. Hence, in the view of a respondent:

In terms of curriculum, [Ghana's educational system] hasn't helped much because I think that [...] the education system in Ghana has not emphasized history. People finish a certain level of education even university and all they know is general West African history; what they know is European history; they have not consciously studied the history of settlements, of relationships between the different ethnic groups, [...] if

we have to promote peace we need to know our history”. (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014).

Another respondent puts it this way:

I do not think there is any conscious effort to do that. What many of us, people have referred to is the Boarding House Concept that has become the melting pot. Because I wonder if there are any serious curricula that talk about Peace and Conflict Resolution; they do not seem to be there at the University Campuses (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

To buttress the argument on the non-intentionality of the educational system in promoting the social gel of a nation, and the peace that Ghana enjoys, another respondent would point out that:

you know in Ghana we don't have peace education, in terms of it being part of the curriculum, even in the universities there is no strong conflict studies program in any of our universities and yet we have this peaceful environment ok, so in that respect one would not give full credence to the educational system of being a factor; just that we are lucky that the culture and religion seem to be able to carry us through any such upheavals (Interview 201 – 15 October, 2014).

In other words, religion and culture and the institutions associated with them can take more credit for Ghana's peace than the formal educational system. Indeed, on the wider question of the contribution of education to the building of a culture of peace in the country through the creation of patriotism, attitude of selfless service, and social

conscientiousness among the citizens, there is no conscious educational program. This led a respondent to state that:

I am not too sure we have been very intentional and deliberate in facilitating patriotism in terms of our curricular and the pedagogic and so on and so forth. I think that sector we need to do more. We're studying alright; we're churning out scholars – but it's not just scholars, but people who will love the country and be prepared to die a little for their country; people who would acquire the knowledge, the skills and will not allow themselves to be bought because of the dollar, and would say that even though I am not making it, I want to make my contribution. A lot of people completed school here and they want to go out" (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

Ghana's Educational System as a Source of Conflict

Respondents recalled that the missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a good job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized academic and character formation. Hence, the educational system at the time of independence was very good as it focused on character formation as much as academic attainments. However, with the passage of time in the postcolonial educational system, "...they removed certain lessons like religious studies, [...] and that hasn't contributed a lot" to building a culture of peace in the country (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Underscoring the need for intentionality in the design and implementation of an educational system that supports peace, one respondent pointed out that: "You can educate a lot of people, but if you do not instill discipline in them, patriotism in them" (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), the

essence of education and its contribution to peace and national development would be lost. The fact that one is educated is not necessarily a force for good, and education without character formation is worthless to nation building. Unfortunately, under the current educational system, we have reached a point where "...our values, traditional values are vanishing and they are being replaced by individualism, the desire for wealth, acquire wealth at any cost (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), a respondent stated. This has come about because under the current educational policies "...the principles that should guide us are left out" (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). This is the result of government's persistent threat to de-emphasize the teaching of religion in schools (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

To buttress the argument, respondents cited several examples of how the amoral educational system has increasingly resulted in situations where the educated people are using their knowledge and competencies to manipulate less educated co-citizens into violence (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). With reference to the perpetuation of localized conflicts, for instance, respondents observed that "somebody might say that the higher the level of literacy the greater the prospects for peace; well I don't think it is true because who leads the non-literate sections of the population [into violent confrontations]; well, it is the literate ones" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). In other words, in all the localized protracted inter and intra ethnic conflicts, it is usually the literate people who are the ones who (mis)lead the illiterate ones to initiate and sustain the recurrence of violence.

Limited Social Dividends of Education to Society

Respondents also questioned the social dividends that education has brought to communities from which educated people came. Beyond their immediate families, the societal dividends of education are very limited or missing. Instead, respondents indicated that the educational system has produced negative role models for most communities. Hence, respondents have questioned the transformative function of education as, in some cases, going to school has done little to transform the lives, mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors of those who claim to be educated. Rather than use their acquired knowledge for good, some educated people are using their knowledge to foment troubles and mislead others into conflicts. As a respondent remarked:

On the negative side we also have people who have had education but education has not passed through them. Their behaviors show that well, as if they had not been to school at all; and some through the little education they had, they try to influence others not for good but rather to take to violence” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

In the view of a respondent, the “...educated people who are the ones, [though] fortunately or unfortunately are occupying high positions of political power, have often not shown good example” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Beyond indulgence in corruption and selfishness, there are only “...isolated examples where people, educated people, have gone back [and] given to their people, [...] but largely you don’t see that happening. [Instead] education has sometimes isolated people from [...] their roots because they are educated above [laughs] their local people”. (Interview 2, 7 February,

2014). In other instances, you encounter a "... well-educated, a prominent person of a Political Party and yet [he or she] comes to say things and you wonder whether the person is correct" (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Giving specific examples, respondents noted that in most of the protracted and very violent chieftaincy disputes dotted across the country, you will:

...find well-educated people promoting conflict, taking very hard positions and not negotiating; you would expect that educated people should be better negotiators and by and large maybe they are but there are instances that you can point out examples of educated people taking very hard (stressed) positions in terms of chieftaincy issues which tend to promote more community chieftaincy conflicts in those areas. (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014)

Educational System as the Epicenter for Future Conflicts

Respondents also raised a number of emerging negative trends that, if not addressed, will make education a negative force for peace. In their view, part of the reason why the educational system is failing to deliver high quality, employable knowledge and skills is the constant and multi-directional policy changes the system has witnessed since independence. As a result, "the educational sector is the sector that has been experiencing a lot of turbulence in the sense that every regime that comes wants to make an impact in education" (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). Accordingly, they set out to make changes in accordance with their whims or "Party Manifestoes that their own people are not even familiar with" (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). These partisan approaches to managing the country's educational policy framework do not create shared

values, vision, and direction for change that would serve as the basis for continuity in the evolution of consistent policies and programs for the sector. The policy relevance to the consumer population of such changes is questionable, as these endless changes are:

...usually not in the interest of the thousands of youth that are going through education” [because even though all governments] would claim that [what they have done] is for the good of the system but at the end of the day the products that are coming out [from these schools] become the victims of this ... constant change (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).

As a result, the first flashpoint for violence that respondents signaled is the large number of young people spewed out of the country’s educational system with little to no employable knowledge and skills. They recalled for instance, that tertiary educational institutions have burgeoned since the 1980s, with well over fifty Universities now operating in the country; up from only three in the late 1980s. Together “...they are turning out graduates at a rate that the economy cannot absorb at all. So the mass of unemployment is moving up not just from the literates, illiterates, semi-literates but even to highly qualified people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014; see also Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). This, in the view of respondents is a huge threat to peace (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). A one respondent observed: “I see a situation whereby if things do not change, if the products of this educational system continue coming out and not finding employment because of the way the system has trained them, yeah, we could find ourselves in a serious situation” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).

Respondents made reference to the comment of the National Youth Coordinator that “Unemployment comes with national security threat” (Midley, 2014), to buttress the danger inherent in the current educational system and its contribution to youth unemployment. Already, the situation is exacerbating tensions with better technically trained and equipped foreign workers in the construction and other sectors (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). But the major security threat lies in the future, in the view of one respondent who summarized the situation as follows:

the number of children that have increased on our streets begging and just hawking anything and just to make ends meet has increased, just looking with my eyes, without doing any statistical studies, yeah, is just incredible and very worrying because I see these children and I think in 20 years what would they be doing? They would become the stitchers (sic), they would become armed robbers, they would become thugs because they have to live so they would do everything that they need to do to survive and that child, that boy who was today wiping your windscreen so that you can get them GHC1 or GHC2, they will be breaking it in 20 years' time to steal. So those are the huge concerns; and that's why we need to fix our educational system because it is just crumbling; it is crumbling and the evidence is what we see in the streets. Apart from these young boys you also have those that have been half baked because they've had access to basic education and that's it. So, they're really not skilled to take up any meaningful employment that would give them the kind of life that is decent (Interview 213, 9 December 2104).

Another worrying sign in the educational sector as it relates to its contribution to peace is the intrusion of politics into academia. Respondents noted that political parties' invasion of the educational institutions, especially the tertiary ones, has made them the seedbeds of partisan politics. They have become the political battlefields for capturing and grooming young political leaders into the political parties. Respondents see both positive and negative sides of the development. The positive dimension is that some young members of Parliament and Ministers have emerged out of that system. On the down side, however, respondents worried about the increasingly partisan and politically polarized atmospheres that have taken root on the campuses of tertiary educational institutions in the country (Interview 214, 10 December 2014). So strong are these divisions that the National Union of Ghana Students, which used to be a strong public policy advocate, is now sharply divided along partisan lines; all because "You have all these groups [that] are die-hard political supporters [of the two major political parties] on the campuses. " (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

In sum, the boarding schools of Ghana's educational system created spaces for people of different ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds to get to know each other, and thereby fostered the reduction of interethnic prejudices. However, this outcome was never planned or intended as a direct product of the educational system. That it happened must be due to other circumstantial factors other than the design of the educational system itself. On the converse, respondents see that the current structure and operations of the educational system is eroding this accidental benefit. In the stead, it is producing young people who lack not only the knowledge and skills for gainful employment; they are also missing the character formation and values inculcation that the educational

systems once offered to older generations. This, in the view of respondents, makes the educational system a potential negative contributor to Ghana's peace.

H_{o14} Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

This hypothesis offers an opportunity to explore how the personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians may have contributed or not to the existence and/or promotion of social cohesion and peace in the country. Previous hypotheses focused on respondents' perceptions, beliefs, and views on observed phenomena in the general society that they believe may have contributed to peace or not in Ghana. The guiding questions for testing this hypothesis, however, give respondents a chance to introspectively examine their personal beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, practices, and lived experiences, and by extension those of all ordinary citizens, in daily encounters that have positively or negatively contributed to the building of social cohesion and peace in Ghana.

Social cohesion, however, is a multi-dimensional concept (Jenson, 2010; Reeskens, 2008) whose measurement cannot be restricted to a narrow set of variables. Berger-Schmitt (2002) defines two dimensions of social cohesion. The first is the extent to which members of a society create and promote equal opportunities for all its members through the reduction of disparities and inequalities, as well as, ensuring inclusivity of all in private and public engagements. The second measures the extent to which society manages diversities positively through the creation of operational frameworks, capacities and opportunities for its members to interact, live, and work together across different

lines of diversities such as religion, ethnicity, and race, among others. Jenson (2010) adds a third dimension of social cohesion related to citizen's engagement with the institutions of governance in their respective localities or country.

Kearns and Forrest however proposed five dimensions for the concept. The attributes they evolved ranged from shared values and active civic engagement; presence of social control mechanisms that minimize disruptions; systems and processes for reducing economic disparities within the population; the existence of inclusive networks that facilitate member participation in the public life of the community, and the shared sense of belongingness and collective identity within a common geographical space (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Markus, on his part, views social cohesion as a “never-ending process of achieving social harmony” (Markus, 2013, p. 13); one in which several political, economic, socio-cultural, identity, social justice and equity; opportunities for citizen participation in public life; inclusive and accommodative behaviors, and the experience of self-worth are important contributory factors to achieving and sustaining that harmony.

Building on the foregoing definitions, this study used a set of eleven (11) variables to gauge the contribution or otherwise of personal beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, and practices to the building of social cohesion and the peace that Ghana experiences. These variables include the extent to which respondents would go to i) make an effort to include people of other ethnic backgrounds in group discussions or conversations; ii) ensure that others from different cultural backgrounds accept the respondent's values as more important; iii) ensure that their cultural views are accepted over others in a group discussion; iv) intentionally avoid mixing with people of other


cultures; v) ensure the views of others on national issues are considered important and valid.

Other variables assessed in the study are the extent to which respondents will try to understand issues and events from the perspectives of those directly affected by them; consider the ethnic background of candidates when they vote in an election; and the degree of willingness on the part of respondents to accept posting to any part of the country other than in one's home region. Measures of practices that promote social cohesion included the extent to which respondents would accept that members of their families marry to people of other ethnic backgrounds; the extent to which respondents would use the legal means to address their conflicts with people of other ethnic groups; and indications of extent to which the personality of candidates or the issues they stand for determine the voting choices respondents make at elections. In sum, together, the variables explored different ways in which respondents' personal beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, actions, or inactions provide insights into how the individual attitudes and actions of Ghanaians may have contributed to the creation and maintenance of a cohesive society and the peace of the country.

Figure 11 provides a summary of the results for each variable. The results show that, except for the variable testing attitudes and behaviors related to cultural superiority, all other variables returned out more than 70% response rates on positive attitude and behaviors of respondents that may have contributed to the peace of Ghana.

Figure 11

Effect of Personal Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices on Peace in Ghana.



Crosstabulation of the various responses with the demographic characteristics of respondents yielded significant finds with p -values < 0.05 for all the variables except for the cross tabulation between Age categories of respondents and inclusive attitude, as well as, value for other's views; primary occupation and valuing others' views. Similar results emerged for religious affiliations of respondents cross-tabulated with inclusive attitudes, cultural superiority; conflict avoidance; support for intermarriages, and accepting postings to other places other than one's home region. The cross-tabulation of the variables with gender produced p -values > 0.05 for gender and inclusive attitudes; cultural superiority; avoidance; accepting postings to places outside one's home region,

and support for intermarriages. All other measures had p -values < 0.05 – See Appendix 21. Overall, although different characteristics of respondents influenced their perceptions on how personal values, beliefs, and attitudes contributed to the different dimensions of social cohesion in Ghana, the generality of the results indicate that we can reject the proposition in Ho14 that Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.

The findings from KII reported in various sections of this study have in many ways responded to the questions raised under this hypothesis; namely, the assessment of the extent to which the personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have contributed to the peace that Ghana enjoys. We have observed, for instance, the natural tendency of Ghanaians to be tolerant and receptive of people from all backgrounds (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). We observed how respondents indicated that all the cultures of the ethnic groups in Ghana “are quite tolerant of other cultures” (Interview 213, 9 December 2014). They share common traits of “respect for human dignity, respecting the truth; respecting the institution, respecting the rule of law [while shunning] and superiority complex [so that] you don’t say that I’m from this [therefore] I’m better than you, no; we are all the same” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In particular, inter-religious tolerance is high and the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Ghana has been described as one of the best” [on the continent, as] you don’t have that kind of religious fundamentalism” (Interview 213, 9 December 2014) we see elsewhere.

Respondents pointed out that this predisposition to intercultural accommodation is essentially because most cultures in Ghana are very open, tolerant, and ready to accept people and all circumstances easily (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). Consequently, the socialization processes across all ethnic groups “...teach the people to be tolerant [and] to learn to co-exist (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Hence, the pervasive and nested influence of culture and religion on the lives of Ghanaians makes what “...may have influenced the actions of someone [...] difficult to determine whether it’s coming from the religion or the culture (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The result of this cultural infusion is that Ghanaians do not want to do anything to offend God and the stranger, whom, respondents have observed, could be the reincarnation of a deity. The cultures of all ethnic groups therefore provide support for intercultural comingling of people, accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. Accordingly, a respondent from the south stated that “I will not go to Tumu [in the north] and for people [there] to say he comes from there so we will not help him [...] culturally you are accommodated until you prove yourself that you are evil and of course no society condones that... (Interview 2, 14 December, 2014).

The attendant freedom of all Ghanaians to move to and settle anywhere in the country has enabled them to appreciate each other’s cultures and lifestyles. Intercultural assimilation is therefore a common practice. Many Ghanaians easily adapt to the diet, dance, and dress codes of their host communities without hesitation; and many speak at least one other Ghanaian language other their mother tongues. As one respondent recalled from personal experiences:

I speak Ga very fluently, although I am not a Ga; it is simply because I lived there; I speak Twi but I am not an Akan; it's simply because I lived there; I speak a bit of Ewe, I am not an Ewe. It's simply because I learnt to appreciate other people's cultures and tolerate them more than I would have done if I had not been exposed to them (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

Getting to know each other through the educational system, business travels around the country, intermarriages, or other forms of cross-cultural engagements have also significantly reduced any interethnic prejudices, stereotypes, and superiority/inferiority complexes among the ethnic groups in Ghana. In particular, respondents returned to how the "boarding houses [have] made people tolerant to each other's cultures, each other's temperaments. People who have not gone to the Boarding House would find it difficult to relate to a particular group because of certain perceptions" (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Recounting her personal experience of the leveling effect of education, a respondent pointed out that the fact that she sat in the same class with girls from other parts of the country, and even did better than them in examinations, made her have no "basis for [feeling of] inferiority complex or superiority complex" (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).

Respondents attributed this congealing influence in part to the fact that in the run up to independence, "... the national identity was emphasized more and the diversity less so we felt more as one than 52 different ethnic groups" (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). So strong was this sense of oneness that cultural absolutism was virtually nonexistent. This, in the view of the respondent, "may even explain why we do not have a national language

[since] ...no particular ethnic group has felt so superior [as] to impose its language on the nation.” On the contrary, “...there is that mutual respect among the ethnic groups so that one does not exert itself too much especially against the smaller and the weaker ones” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).

Another respondent who had experience living in other countries in West Africa believes the Ghanaian experience is unique because the socialization systems in Ghana shield children from the negative stereotypes and pejorative discussions about members of other ethnic groups. Hence, the children don't grow up imbibing some sense of cultural superiority or inferiority (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). In addition, past military and political alliances between ethnic groups, as well as, the friendship and joking relationships between ethnic groups is another equalizing factor that suppresses ethnic bigotry and superiority complexes (Interview 206, 29 October 2014; Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

Ethnicity does not affect the voting behaviors of respondents. Respondents recognized that political parties in Ghana do have strong ethnic constituencies and that the two major political parties in Ghana derive large chunks of their votes from certain ethnic enclaves. However, in the view of respondents, this cannot be construed to mean ethnicity necessarily influences the voting behaviors of individuals. As respondents pointed out, political parties in Ghana are, by law and reality, not ethno-regionally based (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). They are national in character. In reality also, all the major political parties make strenuous efforts to ensure that they portray this national character in the choice and presentation of their candidates. Hence, even though the New Patriotic party is “being tagged as an Ashanti party” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014), all its Vice

Presidential candidates have been northerners. Similarly, the National Democratic Congress has had either its Vice Presidential or Presidential candidates being from the north or most of its key ministers are chosen from the north. For this reason, with respect to the use of ethnicity as a criterion for voter choices during elections, respondents have cast doubts on the idea. In their view, the multi-ethnic composition of political parties serves as a bastion against ethnic bloc voting or mobilization for political purposes.

Respondents also cited the political freedoms such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association which allow Ghanaians of all creeds and ethnicity the right to join any political party of their choice, as major contributory factors to the country's peace. Everyone is free to join a party of his or her choice and is free to exercise their vote as they wish. As one respondent noted, it is common to see "...people move from one political party to another; people from one family two brothers; one can belong to NDC, the other for NPP, that is ongoing" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014; see also Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). And as has been illustrated before, the political divisions may even cut across family lines. As one respondent pointed out "... in every community you have political opponents and nobody is ever stopped from commenting his or her views about what is happening" (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Hence, the possibility of articulating an open ethnic agenda in Ghana's election is very limited. As a respondent summarized it:

our political parties may have, you know, people from certain ethnic groups dominating but they've also had a strong presence of people from all ethnic groups. So if a party wins, there isn't that feeling that it is this ethnic group [that has won] so people who are on the other side may be

dissatisfied, but it has been very difficult for them to mobilize an ethnic constituency against the other party because the party that would have won would have a lot of elements from the ethnic groups that would have been mobilized and so they can be a counter force to prevent the other ethnic groups from mobilizing that is one” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)

Because of the conscious effort to ensure ethno-regional balance in the composition of political parties, and especially in the choice of national level candidates, respondents have argued that ethnicity per se is not the determining factor in individual’s choice of candidates in the elections. On the contrary, people vote for political parties, not the individual candidates representing the political parties. This is why, in their view, the Peoples National Convention (PNC), a party that the late President Hilla Limann, a northerner created, a party that has been led largely by northerners in all elections since 1992, has consistently performed abysmally in the north in terms of total votes accrued. In contrast, the NDC won heavily in the north in two successive elections (1992 and 1996) with a South-South ticket.

Beyond the selection of candidates, political parties strive to demonstrate their national outlook even in matters such as the selection of venues for their congresses and other events. Hence, if a political party is seen to be holding its events “...in one region the party begins to say no, we must be seen to be moving round because that’s the way we demonstrate to the whole country that we are for everybody” (Interview 12, 4 March 2014).

Some respondents expressed worries about recent attempts to ethnicize politics, as they noted that "...some politicians are playing the ethnic card against the national identity and if we do not put a halt to this it could affect us. For example somebody wants to be elected and would say that 'vote for me because I am one of you' irrespective of competence, irrespective of the person's capabilities" (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). However, other respondents suggested that the Ghanaian voter has become so sophisticated that even the offer of money by candidates is no longer an enticement for their votes. As one respondent noted,

people try to influence others with monies...but I will say also people are not stupid; if there are four candidates they also know the person who is really qualified and so there have been cases too they take your money but they don't vote for you [instead] in the final analysis they would vote for a person they feel would be able to handle" the position (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).

With respect to the acceptance of job placements in other parts of the country, respondents found no problems with it. It has been a normal practice, although there have been isolated stories of people from the south resisting posting to the north. But there have equally been stories about such people resisting posting back to the south once they have tasted the life of the north. In particular, respondents recalled that in the Acheampong era you had Regional Commissioners superintending regions where they did not come from. So blended and accepted were these Commissioners that, even today "... you go to the Volta region and they are talking about Kabore etc.; you come to the Northern Region and they are talking about Col. Zumah; you go to the Upper Region,

they are talking about Aquaye Nortey” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). This is the example that the concept that we are “...one nation, one people, with a common destiny” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; see also Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; and Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) has taken root in the psyche of Ghanaians.

Summary of Findings from Field Studies

The findings from the quantitative survey and key informant interviews all confirm that Ghana’s peace is relative. It is peaceful only in comparison to other countries in Africa that have the same or similar mixes of historical, economic, ethno-political, and cultural challenges but which have succumbed to violent national level conflicts. Internally, there are parts of Ghana that would not consider themselves as being at peace due to persisting inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts. Nonetheless, to the extent that these conflicts have been containerized within their localities, Ghana is seen as peaceful. Finally Ghana is also said to be peaceful from the perspective of a historical timeline of the nation. In the view of respondents, there are certain periods of the country’s history that cannot be described as peaceful.

Ghana therefore is a country in a state of negative peace equilibrium where a balance of forces has successfully prevented the country from exploding into nationwide violence. Incidentally, the same forces have not been able to lead the country toward positive peace. On the contrary, respondents noted clusters of force fields, or action points whose synergistic engagements cancel out the tilts towards violence or progressive positive peace. Instead, they always manage to restore the country to the state of negative equilibrium at every turn.

On the positive side, the nested relationships between culture and religion constitute the bulwark of positive forces restraining Ghana from a decline to the abyss. The systems and networks of values, beliefs, institutional engagements, and private actors using the platforms of religion and culture constitute the threads and weavers of peace that constantly stitch and hold together the fraying and otherwise centrifugal parts of the socio-political fabric called Ghana. The threads of collective beliefs, values, and practices from religion in particular have crafted a shared sense of oneness among the ethnic groups in Ghana. The faith-based leaders that pop up, when most needed, to weave together the politico-ethnic and geographical divides of the country; heal wounds; and foster reconciliation, are the weavers credited with keeping the fraying social fabric cobbled together. The faith-based organizations that never fail to speak up and out on national issues, when it matters most, represent the interests of the voiceless, as they speak truth to power. In the process, they create and sustain the bonds that keep hope alive and violence at bay.

Closely associated cultural values of hospitality and intercultural accommodation have provided the threads for weaving the webs of inter-ethnic and cross-faith marriages; multi-ethnic and multi-creed human settlements across the country; as well as, historical politico-military inter-ethnic alliances that underwrite unspoken non-aggression pacts between major ethnic groups in Ghana. Culture also underwrites the geo-ethnic economic interdependencies arising from the freedom of movement of persons, capital, and unrestricted access to economic resources across the country. This makes it possible not only for business people to invest anywhere in the country; less endowed citizens are able

to travel to any part of the country in pursuit of their economic interests. This builds cross-ethnic stakes in the peace of any part of the country and the country as a whole.

However, the patriarchal structure of Ghana's traditional and religious establishments provide very limited frontline spaces for women and the youth to be active weavers of the country's peace. Beyond championing the organization of prayers for peace, respondents have cited women in particular as playing largely background, behind the scenes, nature, and nurturing roles in Ghana's peace. Men dominate the decision making spaces, be it in politics, at the pulpit, or in the field of business. Women and the youth bear the brunt of poverty, especially in its relative terms, especially when they add on responsibilities for fending for their families.

Education, particularly with its boarding school system, has been cited as a positive thread that builds cross-ethnic bridges through the lifelong friendships and alliances it creates among alumni and alumnae of post primary educational institutions. However, the non-intentionality of this outcome from the design of the educational system has come under scrutiny. Besides, respondents have also faulted the country's educational system for the burgeoning unemployed and largely unemployable youth who constitute current and future peace and security threats to the country.

Similarly, respondents have positively noted individual and collective acts of some political leaders in the country as the glue that keeps Ghana together. In particular, Kwame Nkrumah's ability to build cross-ethnic bridges in the political landscape did not only disperse and diffuse ethno-centric political organization and mobilization, it sowed the seeds for creating the political alliances that held the nation together. Ghana may be split in the middle along the historical arch rivalry lines of the Nkrumaist tradition on the

one hand, and the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition on the other. However, the cross-ethnic composition of these political blocks, which Nkrumah nurtured through his Convention People's Party, and decreed through the constitutional provisions that debar ethno-political parties, have successfully intertwined inter-ethnic political elites in their party enclaves. This makes it harder for one ethnic group to claim exclusivity of political rights. Power is shared across all ethnic groups, when won by either member of the duopoly. When ethnic inclusivity is construed to equate equity in participation in the public sphere, the room for galvanizing and channeling ethnic grievances into political conflicts is quite restricted. Chapter 5 provides more in-depth consideration of these findings, among others.

CHAPTER 5: Discussion And Implications Of Findings Of The Study

Introduction

Respondents in this study consistently characterized Ghana as a patchwork of geographically, socio-culturally, and eco-economically disparate ethnic groups that the accident of colonialism cobbled together as a nation-state. Although this amalgam of ethnic groups has managed to stay together for 58 years without a major national level violent conflict, findings from the study underscore a split view of Ghanaians on whether or not Ghana is an oasis of peace. In particular, respondents of the Key Informant Interviews, who had the opportunity to explain their assessment of Ghana's peace, were quick to provide qualifiers that relativized or otherwise conditioned their assessments of Ghana's peace on centrifugal as well as centripetal external and internal factors that, on the balance, have managed to hold together the unstable, precarious, and unpredictable semblance of peace that Ghana has. This view of Ghana as a state riding on negative, unstable peace is, incidentally, not a new development. Hansen provides a historical capture of the fragility and unpredictability of Ghana's peace in observing that:

Ghana seems to have a great capacity for deceiving both her admirers and her critics. At times events move in a certain direction, and both groups begin to imagine possible subsequent trends, but then everything changes dramatically to confound all observers. Thus two years after colonial administrators had described the country as a 'model colony' and a 'peace-loving' people, it was to be plunged into a violent conflict with the colonial administration for independence" (Hansen, 1968, p. 24).

Ghana's capacity for deception on the nature of its peace has run through its post-independence history. Barely two years after gaining model status as the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence, and to do so without prolonged violent confrontation with her colonial masters, Ghana quickly abandoned the ideals of multiparty democracy and plunged in for the fashionable single party dictatorship of the time; a choice that would initiate a period of human rights abuses, arbitrary arrests and incarcerations, and various forms of repressions that would trigger a culture of counter violence as witnessed in the bomb throwing incidents of the 1960s (Daily Guide, 2013b). The repressive state system would lead to a military coup d'état that set yet another model for how the country would be governed for the next twenty (26) years. For much of the 1970s confrontational politics that pitched governments of the period against civil groups became the model for how Ghana would manage her political space. Student-government confrontations were the norm of the period, with faith-based institutions and civil society groups lending a hand on the side of the students in the protests over harsh economic conditions and the demands for a return to civilian rule. Hence, during the late 1960s, "Ghana [remained] a particularly interesting case of confrontation politics because the government, rather than the students, assumed the initiative" (Finlay, 1968, p. 51) in the cycle of violent demonstrations that characterized the period. These student-government confrontations continued into the 1970s, as students used their demonstrations against the Supreme Military Council (SMC) government to push for a return of the country to multi-party democracy (Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1979)

The semblance of peace and stability in the politics of Ghana that the bloody military coup d'états of 1979 and then 1981 imposed on the country for the next eleven

(11) years would end with little change to the status quo ante. The PNDC government that prided itself with bringing peace, security, and stability to Ghana's politics from 1981 to 1992 admitted that the peace it so boasted of bestowing on Ghana was neither complete nor durable. Ironically, this was the period when JJ Rawlings declared the "democratization of violence" (Clotey, 2008, p. 1; McDonald, 2010) as a state policy that allowed him to put guns in the hands of non-security service personnel, ostensibly to cow the opposition to his revolution. The attendant "culture of silence" (Agyeman-Duah, 1987b, p. 625; Sangaparee, 2012, p. 2) and fear that ensued created the semblance of peace that his regime would pride itself in. It would turn out, however, that Rawlings was not shielded from the illusory nature of the peace he credited to his regime, as he would openly confess later that his regime had to "devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our nation's security instead of being there with the people" (People's Daily Graphic).

Aware of the unsustainable nature of his kind of peace, Rawlings had to unwillingly concede to democratization efforts to address the perceived lack of legitimacy of his regime, which fueled the incessant public unrests and attempts to overthrow him. As a respondent noted, "but for the pressure that was put on that Regime, [Rawlings and his PNDC cronies] would not have even gone that way" of trying to return the country to constitutional rule. They launched the process "...as a kind of pacification to the people" (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014). Accordingly, the PNDC activated the decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other local government structures. That decision initiated the carefully choreographed and thoroughly mined process that would lead to a return to the use of the ballot box rather than the barrel of the gun to determine who rules Ghana.

But since the uptake of that democratic process in 1992, Ghana's peace has remained as fragile and unpredictable as ever. As respondents in this study have amply illustrated, the contemporary eulogizing of Ghana as an oasis of peace should not be taken on its face value. If anything, attention must be given to Hansen's caution that "The fact that Ghana is noted for deceiving external observers and even perceptive ones like Austin and Apter seems to indicate that the picture usually painted for us is far from reality and that the actual situation is much more complex" (Hansen, 1968, p. 24). Indeed, what is more predictable about Ghana's peace is the unpredictability of what factors and forces have kept and can continue to keep the country in this state of unstable equilibrium of negative peace.

Grappling with the Yins and Yangs of Ghana's Peace

What this study has tried to do is to seek greater understanding of what are the factors or forces that have so successfully maintained this unstable peace equilibrium? What makes it possible for Ghana to successfully wax between the descent into violence and the maintenance of the semblance of peace? Participants in the study have provided various perspectives on how and why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into violent national conflicts despite the very tenuous nature of its peace. In evaluating these perspectives, however, Smit cautions that one cannot rely on the respondents' intentions as an incontestable guide to interpretation. Respondents or participants perceive and define situations – including the researcher's intentions – according to their understanding of their own motivations and of the contexts in which they act" (Smit, 2002, p. 67). Accordingly, the factors that the study participants have isolated as contributing to Ghana's peace must be interrogated to explore if and how they, on their own or in

combination with other factors and actors, have so consistently operated over the years to keep Ghana's uneasy peace from tipping towards the abyss.

Smit's observation highlights the fact that far from being mechanisms for moving toward higher levels of resolution of Ghana's unstable peace situation, whatever factors respondents have identified as sustaining the fragile peace of the country could be mere sets of unstructured and uncoordinated initiatives that have, nonetheless, managed to keep the semblance of peace, but have been unable to find higher level and lasting solutions to the underlying causes of the fragile peace. Hence, the recurrence of the cycles of deceptive peace, as Hansen describes it. The questions that such a situation triggers are: Could it be that the factors and forces that have held Ghana together have reached the ends of their creative potentials and are therefore incapable of inventing newer and higher order solutions to break the jinx of negative and fragile peace that Ghana seems to be trapped in? If so, what steam keeps them holding the country up, and yet is incapable of pushing them to the next level of finding lasting solutions to the cycles of near violence?

Meadows (2008), notes that "...if you see a behavior that persists over time, there is likely a mechanism creating that consistent behavior" (p. 25). Meadows' further observation that "...the consistent behavior pattern over a long period of time ...is the first hint of the existence of a feedback loop" (p. 25), leads us to explore what feedback loops might exist in Ghana's conflict management system to create this state of negative equilibrium. The concept of feedback loops as the mechanisms that hold an otherwise fraying system together reinforces the perception of Ghana as a patchwork of peace, and makes the analogy of the art and science of sewing or weaving an appropriate lens for

searching for the threads, stitches, and weavers that hold this patchwork together; despite the factors and forces that have threatened to pull it asunder since its conception as a nation-state.

This brings into perspective the constitutive elements that give form and meaning to the imagery of sewing or weaving as the process of building Ghana's peace. A thread, a principal ingredient for sewing, usually consists of a "...thin strand of cotton, nylon, or other fibres used in sewing or weaving" (Oxford University, 2014) or to stitch, tie, knot, or hold otherwise separate pieces of things or members of a set together. Intertwined into ropes, combinations of threads can hold things that are not necessarily contiguous or share any natural bonds, together. Depending on their length and strength, threads also permit the binding of things over long distances together. In this respect, the combined strength of threads can build bridges across geospatial and cultural spans to hold together elements that are otherwise asunder.

In its noun form, a stitch, on the other hand is defined as "a loop of thread or yarn resulting from a single pass or movement of the needle in sewing, knitting, or crocheting" (Oxford University, 2014). Stitches hold things together or keep elements of a common group together. Stitching presumes physical contiguity of the elements being stitched together. This could be shared spatial boundaries, identities, or value systems, as in the case of this study. While the initial stitches in surgery bind the separated parts, the ultimate aim is to create a seamless bonding between these parts so that the binding and the binder become no longer necessary.

The concept of a stitch then connotes the *purposive* use of threads to hold or bind otherwise disparate pieces, elements, or in the case of this study, groups of people

together in such a way that they become one piece. Purposiveness means there must be a higher intent beyond the materials and act of stitching. It also requires an actor or weaver who carries out the stitching process. In other words, threads and stitches alone do not produce patches or eventual bonds; there must be an agent who finds need for the thread and uses same to purposively craft a union between disparate entities. But the actors, be they known or unknown; visible or invisible; conscious actors or unconscious ones; may be credited or not credited for their acts of stitching. Regardless, their actions are what create the binds, bonds, and bridges that bring and keep the disparate elements together.

The binding and bonding effects of stitches brings into focus the conceptualization of social cohesion as the product of the binding, bonding, and bridging processes that societies engage in to hold together otherwise centrifugal groups. In that context, **binding** initiatives are viewed as externally engineered acts or processes that bring and hold together otherwise distinct, standalone, or even mutually repelling elements. What is bound together may never gel together into any inseparable form. They require the external bind to keep them together.

Hence, in the context of this study, while a shared territorial unit, such as national boundary or an ideological construct such as a constitution, with its associated symbols and signs of the state, may bind disparate groups together as co-citizens in the same geographical space; such co-citizens are not necessarily a united nation. They may indeed be as distrustful, resentful, and alien to each other as they are to members across another national frontier. In other words, they could be “inner enemies ...whose membership within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it” (Simmel, 1908 in Lemert, 2010, p. 185). Hence, a bond is stronger than a bind.

Focusing on the bonding and bridging dimensions of social cohesion building, Larsen et al define social capital as networks, norms, and trust that promote collective action for mutual benefits. Communities with strong social bonds are more likely to engage in joint problem-solving initiatives (Larsen et al., 2004). They recall the distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital occurs within groups, which in the context of this study would include families in their extended forms; ethnic groups; faith groups, among others. Bonding, therefore, is endogenic i.e. it comes from within the group. It is natural and often derived from deeper emotional attachments or shared values, and beliefs. It is not forced; it is free-willed.

However, as is the case with chemical bonds, social bonding also requires something between the otherwise opposite elements to get them bonded. And, that which comes between to facilitate the bonding must occupy an important and large enough space to, as it were, create the attractive force that brings the opposing elements closer together. The process of bonding must be completed with the sharing of something of value between the opposing elements. In chemical bonds, opposing elements engage in sharing or transferring electrons between themselves. Social bonds must function the same way. There has to be a shared interest or the sustained transfer of valued factors that bring and keep together otherwise disparate and centrifugal individuals or groups. The strength of these factors is what keeps social groups together. When that is lost, they fall apart. Strongly shared mutual beliefs and values from culture and religion are the valued items that respondents in this case of this study have identified as the magnet and glue that keep Ghanaians together.

Unlike the binding and bonding processes which are intra-group by nature, bridging takes the social cohesion process one step further to create engagements between or across groups. This involves crossing the identity gulf to reach out to the other. Social bridges consist of structures, institutions, and processes that create frameworks and channels for the flow and exchange of information and actions between otherwise disparate groups. Hence, the bridging social capital, on the other, are "...cross-cutting ties [that allow] members of one group connect with members of other groups to seek access or support or to gain information" (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66). While bonding serves intra-group interests, bridging has the effect of promoting intergroup actions that have value for the groups involved.

Finally, even though "bonding social capital is a necessary antecedent for the development of the more powerful form of bridging social capital [...] this form of social capital does not necessarily result in collective action" (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65 & 66). This is essentially because bonding social capital is preoccupied with provisioning and serving the survival needs of its members. It is a coping mechanism that allows its members "...to cobble together enough resources to survive, [but] their efforts never extend beyond their immediate network" (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66).

Be it through binds, bonds, or bridges, what is coming out from this study is that multiple forces are at work to create and sustain the intra and inter-ethnic, regional, and religious engagements that keep Ghana in its conditions of stable negative peace. The findings of this study also affirm that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon that can be neatly packaged in dyadic terms into silos of countries that are peaceful or not peaceful; neither can peace be assigned absolutist values such as negative or positive. On the

contrary, respondents in this study have consistently pointed out the relativism in the consideration of Ghana's peace; a point of view that would be applicable to any other country. While aggregated perspectives may permit the classification of a country as peaceful or not peaceful, the views that participants in this study have shared emphasize the need to keep disaggregated perspectives in mind as well; and to recognize that while a nation may not be at war, some of its citizens may well be living in war riven conditions.

Finally, the findings of this study provide field evidence that the business of weaving the fabric of national peace cannot be the work of one actor such as government. On the contrary, it is the work of a multiplicity of actors and institutions, working in tandem or even in different directions. However, the net effect of their actions is what produces the negative equilibrium that constitutes Ghana's peace.

The concept of negative equilibrium has been applied in different fields. According to Poulson, Mosdeq, an Iranian ideologue, applied the concept in the field of international relations and diplomacy to advance a national policy position of neutrality and non-alignment in Iran's search for an independent foothold in the bipolar post World War II environment. The policy was designed to prevent both the United States and the Soviet Union from having any controlling influence on Iran's internal affairs (Poulson, 2005). In the world of finance and economics, Levy, Levy, and Edry (2003) used the term to illustrate how, even in times where economic indicators such as long term real interest rates or "...real cost of debt" (Levy, Levy, & Edry, 2003, p. 97) tend toward zero or even in the negative, an overall stable macroeconomic environment can still be maintained due to the positive trends in other factors such as high inflation. In the context of this study, negative equilibrium defines the situation where the balance of

positive and negative forces underpinning Ghana's peace have operated in such a way that the net effect is the maintenance of a state that can neither be described as peaceful or not peaceful, as respondents have observed. The relevance of the concept in this study rests with the recognition that certain predisposing conditions must exist to ensure that the net effect of the interactions between the negative and positive factors or forces in the country do not tilt the country towards a downward spiral into violence or an upward movement out of the trap of persistent tensions.

Systems theory suggests that the progression of states from negative to positive peace or vice versa is a function of the conflict management system of the country. Conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play different roles in initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). The patterns of reactions are products of the "system stock" (Meadows, 2008, p. 17) or the quantum and nature of the stock of shared values, beliefs, and information storage and "...flows within the system" (Meadows, 2008, p. 18) that determine the direction and rate of interactions between the parties to move the conflict towards violence or peace. Hence, for conflicts to degenerate into national level violence, it is necessary that "... the values of nation and state become biologically [so] nefarious [as to] lead to war and to the killing of innumerable human beings" (von Bertalanffy, 1969 p. 197).

A converse reaction is necessary for conflicts to resolve positively. In other words, in all conflicts a network of processes and actors must work together to influence the dynamics of the conflict (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). In such cases, interactions that maintain the status quo or push the conflicts out of control are often perceptible. In other words, conflicts are perpetuated, exacerbated, or resolved only when members of the

conflict system act in some way or the other to keep the chain reactions or feedback loops functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). By extension, at least one of the parties has to initiate change in the conflict pattern, direction, scale, speed, and outcomes. Otherwise, the system will keep feeding itself and self-maintain at the current levels of inertia.

The foregoing suggests that however incapable Ghana's conflict response mechanism may be in breaking the cyclical ebbs and flows of conflict that keeps it in the state of unstable peace, there has to be some backstage organizing principles that ensure that the unstable equilibrium is kept from tipping over to one end or the other. Hence, the search for the elements that constitute the system stock that have enabled Ghana to weave and sustain its patchwork of negative peace makes systems theory a valid framework to use in this study. It "gives us the freedom to identify root causes of problems and see new opportunities" (Meadows, 2008, p. 2) for catalyzing the pattern of reactions away from a downward spiral towards violence or an upward one towards positive peace. This is important because of participants' observation in this study that while Ghana may have succeeded to sustain a negative peace equilibrium, current challenges such as the growing frustration among the unemployed youth pose new demands that the current system may not be able to contain. As respondents noted, the fact that the youth are beginning "...to identify what they think are the causes [of their impoverishment) and therefore may choose to attack" (Interview 210, 21 November 2014), makes it imperative to delve beyond conventional views on how Ghana has managed to pull back from the brink (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014).

Added to the youth question are concerns about the growing distrust of the conflict management capacity of institutions of state such as the courts and the Electoral

Commission to guarantee justice and hold free and transparent elections respectively (Kumbalonah, 2012). The increasing public disenchantment with perceived corruption in public offices; state failure to sanction identified cases of corruption amidst the display of opulence by some public officials implicated in such acts (Guide, 2014; Peace FM Online, 2013); and the emergence of Christian-Muslim disagreements over rights of worship in Christian administered schools (Daily Graphic, 2015), among others, all constitute flash points for Ghana's peace. All these cannot guarantee that the state of negative equilibrium will not be disturbed and the tilt towards the abyss would not happen. In other words, there is a high risk that the resilience of Ghana's current conflict management systems can be breached, if newer, more effective, and more sustainable structures and systems are not evolved to deal with the emerging conflict dynamics.

As noted previously, conflict management systems are either resilient or brittle (Meadows, 2008), depending on their capacity to self-evolve to handle new and unexpected situations. Even though Ghana's conflict management system may appear stable, its ability to meet the new challenges is suspect, as it is far from being resilient. Resilience is not the same as static stability. Stability is visible by its constancy or changes; resilience is invisible. Hence, a long standing ability to avert violence is not necessarily resilience, since it might actually mean doing the same thing over time without adaptations to suit changing or newer conditions and contexts. Resilience of a system goes beyond the ability to survive from one potentially violent conflict to another. It requires the development of the capacity to "learn, create, design, and evolve ever more complex restorative structures [which] are self-organizing" (Meadow, 2008, p. 76) systems. In other words the ability of a system to adapt to changes is evidence of the

complexity and resilience of the system. This complexity continuously resolves to “resilience at a still higher level” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or meta-resilience where the system of resilience evolves an ability to repair or restore disruptions wrought on a prior system of resilience.

It is against this background that we interrogate how effectively the factors that have been identified in this study as underwriters of Ghana’s peace have functioned, individually and collectively, to keep the patchwork of peace that the country has from fraying and falling apart, despite the cycles of palpable tensions that have taken the country to the brink. What individual or networked factors and forces kept the country from tipping over when it reached the end of the cliff? More importantly, why have whatever web of factors and forces that have continuously held the stitches of Ghana together failed to resolve themselves into higher order initiatives capable of moving Ghana to the higher level of positive peace? How capable are these factors and forces for self-reinvention to be able to confront and deal with the emerging conflicts centered on the youth bulge, religious intolerance, and increasing distrust of the country’s conflict regulatory institutions

This study has identified shared history, culture, and collective mindsets as constituent elements of the system stock that have underpinned Ghana’s ability to maintain herself in a state of negative peace equilibrium up to now. Can Ghana continue to rely solely on these constitutive elements of its conflict management system stock to avert a decline into the abyss, or better still, trigger an upsurge that would enable the systems to “complexify” and take on the higher level responsibility of managing the new challenges more positively? Meadow offers hope in suggesting that “You can use the

opportunities presented by a system's momentum to guide it toward a good outcome" (Meadows, 2008, p. 24). Heeding this, the subsequent sections of this chapter focus on examining the factors that respondents have identified as important underwriters of Ghana's peace with the view to isolating what aspects of that momentum can be strengthened to enable Ghana evolve a more robust conflict management mechanism to face the new challenges.

Super Ordinate Categories, Categories, and Subcategories of findings

The multiple iterations of the coding and categorization processes used in the analysis of the transcripts of the Key Informant Interviews yielded two Super Ordinate Categories, with four second level Categories that produced a total of fourteen Subcategories. Each subcategory comes with its dimensions as well. Figure 12 depicts the knotted relationships between the Super Ordinate Categories, their respective the Subcategories, and between the four sets of categories and subcategories. The Cycle of Super Ordinate Categories at the middle of the diagram presents the magnetic center that pulls together and coordinates all engagements in the various subcategories to ensure harmony and synergy. The religious beliefs, values, and worldviews under SOC 1 permeate the thin line of separation between religion and culture to infuse the lived cultural attitudes and behaviors represented under SOC 2.

The constant interaction between religion and culture constitute the force field that constantly tugs at the actions and engagements in the wider action fields within and between Categories 1 through four. In this way, religion and culture, working together, create the unified field of action in which the centrifugal and centripetal forces balance

out their influences to account for how Ghana holds here peace together. Details of how these elements pull together to produce the peace that Ghana has are presented in the subsequent pages.


Category 1 – Trans Geo-Ethnic Social Bonds

This category groups the various factors that respondents have identified as the threads and stitches that have woven together cultural, economic, social, and political bonds within and across ethnic, regional, and religious lines throughout Ghana. Four main subcategories of factors relating to sanguine and familial bonds; socio-cultural conjugal bonds; multilayered bilateral interethnic friendship bonds; and bonds of historical politico-military alliances bring together the intra and inter-ethnic forces of unity and peace among Ghanaians. The constituent elements of these subcategories are discussed below.

Subcategory 1.1 – Sanguine and Family-centered bonds and Safety Nets

Sanguine and extended family bonds are strong strands that serve as the foundation for Ghana's conflict carrying infrastructure. These relationships have very strong transactional values at the social, economic, and even political levels. There are several dimensions to this subcategory of factors.

Figure 12 Relationship of Categories of Factors that Weave Ghana’s Peace



Social location as footholds in the public sphere:

Socially, every Ghanaian is rooted in a web of sanguine and quasi-sanguine relationships inherent in the intricate network of extended family systems. This web is traceable from the nuclear family into which one is born through to the clan, lineage, and to the ethnic level. This, in the words of one respondent is the "...basic template of social organization" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) across all ethnic groups. And, so seriously is this taken that "every Ghanaian belongs to a lineage; very few can say they don't belong to a lineage if you are a Ghanaian" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Indeed, even the slaves and strangers brought into any social setting had to find their place in this "... template of our culture and social organization" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Accordingly, people who find themselves in certain locations as "...strangers had to attach themselves to lineages or they constituted themselves into groups recognized as outsider lineages ... made to belong" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).

So serious was this need to belong that all ethnic groups developed sophisticated means of identifying their own, even if they came from completely different and distant communities or even ethnic groups. Tribal marks, the structure of names, and/or recall of family/clan taboos were important identifiers. Among the Dagara, recalls of family histories, clan totems, clan or family eulogies, or even palmistry are used to determine the stranger's patrilineal or matrilineal lineage and, by extension, social location within the host community. Even interethnic relationships are similarly traced, especially among the chiefly ethnic groups in the north (Interview 206 29 October, 2014).

Social belongingness has both economic and political repercussions. Membership of a family creates rights of access to productive resources such as land. It also creates rights of ascent to political offices within the traditional authority structure. Hence, giving the rationale for this impulsive structuring of society, the respondent cited above continued that “you can look at this from the Marxist point of view - because the family was property owning, the family has always had the power, political power, first in organizing its own people, giving them the basis of sustenance and so forth” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Hence without family roots, one risked losing out in the political and socioeconomic life of the community. In particular, the political relevance of family belongingness is of high value as would be discussed later in this chapter.

Family Social Safety Nets and the discharged state:

Economically, family ties, even in their extended form provide the only safety net for the majority of Ghanaians without stable sources of income and any form of insurance. As one participant in the key informants’ interviews in this study put it, in “...the extended family system we support one another. So somebody who is not even working may not feel it as much as somebody in Europe would feel because the family structure is such that if you have and I don’t have you try to take care of me; the little you have you share with me...” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Another participant illustrated how these family social safety nets constitute the shock absorbers that cushion society from state failure when they create economic opportunities for the common good. He recounted his own experiences of how he had to bail out a brilliant nephew of his who could not go to the university because of the inability of his biological parents to cough up the money for his fees and upkeep (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). His story

epitomizes the experiences of most Ghanaians with some economic wherewithal. Sizeable portions of their incomes service the payment of fees for nephews and nieces; hospital bills for uncles and aunts; or the provision of start-up capital for the petty trade of one relative or the other.

While there is no data available to quantify the contribution of such internal family-based financial safety nets and transfers, data from family remittances from outside Ghana provide proxy indications of the magnitude and importance of this informal economy as a contribution to GDP. Sophism estimates that of the over \$4.5 billion that Ghana received in 2005 from external transfers, “about 30 percent of this amount (\$1.5 billion) came from individuals” making transfers to families to support consumption and investment needs. The steady increase of the “.... value of migrants’ remittances ... from \$201.9 million in 1990 to \$1.55 billion in 2005 [contributed to making remittances Ghana’s] ... largest foreign exchange earner [and a] more stable than Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)” (Sophism, 2006, p. 165).

In a limited self-report study on Ghanaian perspectives on remittances, it is estimated that as much as 25% of the remittances come through informal channels such as self-carriage, friends, and relations. These informal transfers are unaccounted for in the official records (Sam, Boateng, & Oppong-Boakye, 2013). This means the total contribution of private remittances to families could be much higher than recorded. Indeed, a larger study of the Ghanaian remittance transactions suggests that “...unregistered remittances in Ghana can comprise as much as 65% of total remittances” [which would up the Bank of Ghana’s] estimate of US\$1 billion ...closer to US\$3

billion” (Mazzucaw, Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2005, p. 139). In other words, the contribution of private remittances to the GDP of Ghana in comparison to ODA and FDI could be much higher than estimated.

Apart from buoying up the national economy, such transfers represent substantial let offs on the social safety net responsibilities of governments. Cash savings aside, all Ghanaians in want of some financial support for social service needs pile the pressure on their family members, not the state, to provide the wherewithal to meet such needs. Consequently, the anger that state failure to create the conditions for citizens to earn their living could have unleashed in the public domain is contained within the private sphere. It is not allowed to spill over into collectivized agitations in the public domain. This effectively discharges the state of its responsibilities towards its citizens.

Families, Community, and Ethnic Affiliations as Launch Pads for Access to Political Power and the Public Purse

The role of ethnicity in Ghana’s politics has already been sufficiently referenced. At the political level, family, lineage and ethnic ties have high political values as well. In both the formal and informal sectors, social networks are key to accessing economic resources such as land or political power in the traditional authority systems. In the non-state political arena, chieftaincy succession in all ethnic groups is conveyed exclusively either via agnatic descent or matrilineally. Traditionally, one cannot become a chief or a queen mother if one does not belong to a family recognized to have the right of ascent to the stool or skin. Hence, strict recognition and enforcement of membership of such social networks is central not only to one’s ability to aspire to a chiefship, but also the conferment of the rights for one’s descendants to so do.

The implications of this for the peace in Ghana, especially when considered in relation to intermarriages will be highlighted in subsequent sections of this study. For now, suffice it to say that the political import of social bonds cannot be underestimated as a key underwriter of Ghana's peace. Indeed, most of the intra-ethnic conflicts in Ghana arise from disputes over rights of some individuals to occupy their local stools or skins as chiefs.

In respect of gaining footholds in the modern state system, family ties are important. For instance, many families make strategic calculations in the distribution of family members across political lines. For most ordinary citizens, the postcolonial state or *aban* in the Akan language, is an external entity that has little to no direct impact on their livelihoods. What trickles down by way of jobs and benefits from state-sponsored social programs reach those with political access or connections to power holders. For most people then, it is logical that the State should be avoided, when one can, as in the case of people slipping out of the tax system (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014); or exploited when one has access to its resources, as with the case of the plunder of state resources by public officeholders (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 2014, and Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). What is *aban diε* (in Akan) i.e. what is State property belongs to none; it is a fallen elephant (*wob nu lo*, in Dagara) and anybody who can must chunk off as much meat as his or her resourcefulness permits.

Under the circumstances, the struggles of families and ethnic groups for inclusion in the state systems via representation in government is not a fight for the common good, but a struggle for a foothold in the state for the private, and at best family or ethnic gain. In sum, politics and political participation are all about "what I can grasp for myself and

my family” (Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). It follows the Dagara folks logic that *bie ma mi be ko yir o di ko saab* to wit, it is only when your mother is at the center of affairs in the funeral home that you can expect to partake of the funeral meal.

To explain the operation of this principle in Ghana’s political landscape, KII participants cited several examples where family, community, or even ethnic participation in political parties is a matter of rational economic choice rather than belief in the ideology and programs of a party. To illustrate the point, a participant cited the case where in 1992 when the:

democratic system came about and people formed parties, the brothers came together and the senior one said look, there are three strong parties, let’s take one each; the senior brother said which party do you want; the junior brother take one; you take one; and it’s left with this one, ok I take that one. Whoever wins we are in it; the family will not lose; but if we are all in one party, we may have problems (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014)

Beyond the family, entire communities or even ethnic groups make similar rational choices and cost-benefit calculations in determining how to apportion the investment of their political capital – manifest political allegiances and their votes. In such computations, benefit maximization go hand in hand with risk minimization, as the following example a respondent in this study offered illustrates:

Somebody told me he went to his home town and everybody there was one Party, except one family. So when he went to find out [he was told] that the community selected us to represent their opposite party, so that

when the other Party comes they know they have some people they can count on” (Interview 201, 21 November 2014).

The foregoing epitomizes the depth to which Ghanaians equate access to political power to access to public resources. Chapter 4 cited the perception that being a messenger of the party in power is better than being the head of a party in opposition to illustrate this same point (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Manifestation of the operation of this principle at the ethno-regional levels is evident in the posturing of political leaders across all party lines. Operationalization of the principle became manifest in April 2014, when a sitting Member of Parliament from the Ashanti region berated his fellow MPs from the same region for failing to use their “huge presence in Parliament” (GNA, 2014, p. 1) to influence public policies and programs that would inure to the benefit of their constituents. This ordinarily legitimate and harmless concern, however, takes on a regionalist or ethnocentric tone when the MP goes on to charge the President of Ghana of being discriminatory in imposing what he perceived as a “stupid thing” (GNA, 2014, p. 1) on the people of his region, instead of in the regions where the President has his political strongholds.

On the reverse side, the President received threats from the Volta Region, considered the stronghold of his party, when he reassigned his Chief of Staff to an ambassadorial position. The two week ultimatum that the executives of the President’s party in the Volta region issued speaks for itself:

We give the President two weeks ultimatum to reinstate Prosper Bani else we will not take part in any party activities...If they dare not reinstate Prosper Bani in the next two weeks, we will advise ourselves and they

shouldn't forget that next year is election year and the campaign has just started... They shouldn't forget that if Volta region is peeved, it will be a disaster for NDC (Manu-Quansah, 2014; Starr FM, 2014)

In sum, respondents in this study have cited the sanguine and extended family bonds as a contributor to the peace that Ghana enjoys. However, the foregoing discussions strongly suggest that the national level peace value of these family-based social bonds and safety nets rest on the fact that “our culture provides safety nets, and those safety nets are holding us together and holding us together in a way in which they remind us that there are certain lines that you don't cross and so people are prepared to get to that point and to back off” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Multiple micro-level economic and political incentives discussed later would underscore why such safety nets constitute effective restraints on Ghanaians from pushing national level conflicts towards escalated violence. For the macro-level, however, so crucial is this role of the safety nets in partly underwriting the peace of Ghana that one participant suggested the family-based social safety nets need to take on more to prop up state failures. In his words, the “family systems must come when government is failing to help the social cohesion we are trying to build” (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014).

Some interviewees, on the other hand, have argued that it is precisely this approach of supplanting government responsibility with private or family-based solutions that encourages state disengagement or abdication from its responsibilities to citizens. In turn, state failure reinforces the kind of civic disillusionment, alienation, and disengagement from the state that has perpetuated the negative peace that the country enjoys. It constitutes a dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems (Interview

4, 12 February, 2014) which aids the displacement of the search for solutions for citizens' economic burdens from the state to private citizens. Essentially it enables the state to offload its responsibilities onto the traditional/family social safety net that relies on relations and friends who have to absorb the economic burdens of family members who don't have.

This then shields the state from public anger, making it possible for citizens not to interrogate and demand accountability from the state for the use and misuse of public resources. Conversely, this approach to managing public dissatisfaction with state failures increases pressure on public officeholders, who have access to public resources, to loot and share with their family members. This in turn supports the creation and perpetuation of the vicious cycle of "negative consensus" (interview 4, 12 February, 2014) behaviors which some KII participants have credited with restraining the political elite from pushing the buttons of war in Ghana.

In brief, while the family bonds are effective in keeping networks of individuals together as the base fabric on which Ghana's peace is stitched, these networks have had no transformational effect on the public sphere to move the country towards more positive and sustainable peace. If anything, the findings of this study are consistent with the views of Larsen et. al., (2004) that family-based social safety nets such as those captured above are a form of bonding social capital whose preoccupation with self-preservation of its members do not allow them to reach out and engage the wider society in any transformative way. While they may provide a ladder for some of their members to reach into the public sphere, their agenda is not to engage and transform the public sphere for the common good. Their aim is to see what their own can bring or throw back from

the public sphere for their self-preservation. But as the competition for public resources becomes fiercer or as the economic challenges push family safety nets beyond their tolerance limits, the public anger that has been contained in the private sphere may boil over into the public domain without warning.

Subcategory 1.2 Trans-ethnic conjugal bonds and bridges; identity dissolution; and the peace of Ghana

Webs of Interethnic Marriages

Respondents in this study have made multiple references to the role that intermarriages play in sustaining the peace in Ghana. In the world view of most communities in Africa, marriage is probably the most important institution because of its triple effect of creating bonds, binds, and bridges across otherwise disparate and non-contiguous groups. Consequently, in the cultures of most ethnic groups in Ghana, the customs and rituals for its consummation place a premium on inculcating in the couple the fact that the marriage is not between them; the couples are merely the interface points for bonds that extend to their respective families, clans, lineages, and ethnic groups. In particular, conjugal bonds take on an added peace value as binding cords and bridges when the marriages are exogamous i.e. outside the immediate in-group to involve couples of different ethnic, regional, or religious backgrounds. This is why respondents in the KII have hailed intermarriages in Ghana as the cord that establishes relational bonds between families, communities, and entire ethnic groups. In the words of one respondent:

One of the things Ghana has done differently is that there have been large inter-marriages. You get somebody from Ashanti Region who is married to somebody from the Volta Region, an Ewe. You get up to go and fight

your in-law? The inter-marriages contributed to a very large extent” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

In the view of another respondent, in Ghana:

...we are one of the few countries in which intermarriages go across religion/ that you can have a Christian going to church, but the wife is a Muslim and the wife is not compelled to come to church but they have enjoyed a very healthy relationship and there have been no problem when it comes to even their children and when it comes to the in-laws and how they relate and how they are able to go about doing things” (interview 12, 4 March, 2014) there are no visible problems.

Asked how widespread interethnic marriages are, another participant noted that “It is increasingly wide-spread, especially against the hitherto rival ethnic groups like the Ashanti and Volta Regions” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Another interviewee would note that “In Ghana you have a healthy development of inter-ethnic marriages. What I experience as a member of the Pan African Parliament is that my colleagues in the other African countries tell you ... in other African countries there is taboo in inter-marriages” (Interview 11, March, 2014). A different respondent in the KII highlighted the cohesive force of these intermarriages and their capacity to stem the escalation of intergroup conflicts, with the observation that, what he has “come to appreciate is the whole mix of our interethnic relationships [since] in our country now there is no ethnic group that has no relationship with another ethnic group, either through marriage or one form of engagement” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).

This reality, in the view of the participant, has cushioned Ghanaians against the excesses of conflict because “...anybody who wants to become violent would have a thought in his or her mind that you have relations in that group so why should that group become a target. That has kept us abbey and I we have been able to manage it through that channel” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). Echoing the same sentiments, another participant pondered what would happen should he decide to participate in such a national level conflict. In his view, “Either I am fighting against my in-laws, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and so on and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) or other close relations and friends. Yet another would buttress the point with this personal example:

one of my sisters married in a Mamprusi family so I have a nephew and a niece who are from a marriage that relates to the Mamprusis. So ... I cannot do something to hurt my own nephew; so my mother might be from one side [of the conflict] , but what about my nephew and my niece? What about my sister who married on that side? “(Interview 12, 4 March, 2014)

In brief, intermarriages among Ghanaians have created a wide web of relationships that constitute an effective bond between families, clans, and ethnic groups. It is for this reason that Ghanaians do not look strictly at where they are and create fortresses around themselves; they understand that in one way or the other they are related with one area or the other in the country. Reinforcing that argument, especially in respect of political conflicts at the national level, another respondent provided the following illustration:

Let's take for example if you take Ewes and may be Ashantis, you may say they don't get on well, but if you look at the intermarriages that have gone on between the two, it is very high; so whenever there is a problem, you can get somebody from the Eweland who has some relations at the Ashanti side and vice versa and it cuts across, north-south, east and west, it's like that; and that is also helping. That's how I see it; that is keeping people from fighting; otherwise looking at our situation, the elections that we have had, these things would have happened, but always we have people to intervene. (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).

Intercultural Osmosis

The foregoing highlights how the intricate web of social relations that intermarriages weave in Ghana serves as an important foundational piece for the peace of the country. However, intermarriages are not unique to Ghana. Countries like Burundi and Rwanda that have protracted violent interethnic conflicts also have long and deep histories of interethnic marriages. The questions that Ghana's presumed exceptionalism poses in respect of intermarriages are: why have intermarriages seemingly worked to create and/or sustain peace in Ghana but failed elsewhere such as Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, among others? Why didn't the intermarriages between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda attenuate their conflicts and prevent the genocides and other forms of violent interethnic engagements? What is there in the Ghanaian situation that makes it different from the other cases?

Respondents have already made references to how intercultural exchanges among the ethnic groups in Ghana have led to the blending of beliefs, values, and world views

that have made interethnic accommodation and incorporation possible. As one of them noted in respect of the dissolution of cultural differences:

Yes, we have many ethnic groups but I don't see that their cultural practices are in conflict with each other. [...]I don't see strong differences in the cultures of the different ethnic groups in Ghana. You can look, we defer to authority, we defer to people on the basis of age, women are in the background, we resolve our differences through arbitration, through an elder. I'd say that the cultural practices, the values, the elements of the different cultures are similar (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014).

The intercultural borrowing and sharing that made this cultural blending had a wider significance, especially among the larger ethnic groups, especially the Ashantis.

As one respondent recalled:

...there was this mesh that was already in place through which people were exchanging goods, contacting persons, etc, and carrying on cultural borrowings. It is very important to me to have been told in my own ears by an Ashanti who said that look the Ashanti culture is a composite. When the Asantehene sits and they are bring out the treasures, I told you I sat with this Okyeame – he pointed to me and said “*Wei ye di fir Denkyira na baa ye/ Wei, ε ye Dagomba fo; wei efir ha, wei fir Dormaa, wei fir so and so*” (to wit, this came from Denkyirah; that one from the Dagombas; and that from Dormaa...) but having borrowed, they put them together and created a synthesis that is unique in profile and content you see. So there wasn't only material exchanges, exchanges of ideas, exchanges of norms,

exchanges of proverbs, exchanges of all kinds of things, political ideas.

Ashanti itself, the structure of Ashanti was borrowed. It is the Akwamu people who went and taught them (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

The recollection of this historical borrowing from other ethnic groups for the construction of the architecture of the Ashanti Kingdom has a sobering effect as it makes the Ashantis mindful, and humble about their lack of ethnic or cultural purity. At the same time, the other ethnic groups can find space within the Ashanti culture to relate with them, as they see bits and pieces of their own culture and history in the Ashanti chieftaincy architecture. Either way, the intercultural borrowing leads to the narrowing of cultural boundaries, and so creates spaces for incorporation of members of different ethnic groups into other cultures.

Ethnic Identity Dissolution from intermarriages

The cross identity marriages and the intercultural borrowings and sharing of values have profound effects on ethnic identity maintenance for most groups in Ghana. Several respondents have already pointed out how the uniqueness of Ghana's systems of intermarriages is embedded in the open systems approaches to intercultural engagements across all ethnic groups in the country. At the material and artistic levels, high levels of cultural exchanges have blurred identity distinctions from casual observers. As one respondent in the KIIs noted:

...a lot of Ashantis when they are dancing the *damba* festival you won't realize that they are Ashantis; the Ewes when they are dancing an Ashanti

dance, you won't believe it; *Yɛnara a sa si ni*" is a song that was composed by an Ewe, not an Ashanti, Ephraim Amu. So all of that, more or less weaves us together" (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

The identity blending of Ghanaians alluded to here, however, goes beyond the artistic realm. At the social level, Ghanaians in principle self-classify by the ethnic lineage of either their father or mother. However, cross ethnic marriages have led to identity dissolution, as it blends and blurs the ethnic identities of the offspring of cross-identity marriages. We have referenced how one's location in a social structure is important for the Ghanaian. However, children of cross identity marriages often have difficulty finding their loci in either of their parents' identity group.

Several respondents shared personal stories of their own mixed ethnic backgrounds, as well as, those of prominent Ghanaian citizens, current and past, to illustrate the point. But the complexity of the identity question is best illustrated by two out of several of the examples that came through in the interviews. A participant in the KII gave her life example to illustrate the complexity of this web of relationship and its restraining force in times of conflicts. Responding to a question on how Ghana's state of economic development might have influenced the country's experience of peace, she acknowledged the effect of development on peace, but hastened to state that:


...I would say it is intermarriages and I will give myself as an example. My mother was a Ga, she married an Ashanti, so I am half Ga, half Ashanti. So that's why when you asked me where I came from it was difficult for me to answer. I am married to somebody who is half Ewe, half Ga-Adangbe. Our children therefore are Ga, Ga-Adangbe, Ashanti,

and Ewe. So for example if there should be a war between Ashantis and Ewes it's an issue for me; it's difficult to be part of such a war or conflict.

Figure 13 maps the complexity of relationships that emerges from the scenario given above. It also illustrates the increasingly irreversible dissolution of ethnic identities arising from intermarriages, as the relationships move from heterogeneity, through hybridity to miscegenation. Step 1 in the relationship modeling represents ethno-cultural heterogeneity. The couples on either side retain their ethnic identities. It is their mutually sustained love that provides the only social capital or bond between their respective families and ethnic groups. It's a temporary bond as it can, in principle, easily be reversed through one form or other of the dissolution of the marital bonds such as separation, divorce, or death.

Step 2 begins the irreversibility of the interethnic bonding process. Once the hetero-ethnic marriage produces an offspring, ethnic hybridity kicks in, as the offspring of both sides becomes an incorporation of the ethnicity of both parents. When step 3 involves marriage between two hybrids, as is the case in the story above, then ethnic miscegenation is taken to its highest level. The offspring from such a marriage take on split identities across four cultures, at least. Interethnic relationships become further complicated if either of the hybrid parents have siblings who also have mixed marriages. Then the network of cousins, aunties, uncles, and grandpas and grandmas spiral out of control, literally. When miscegenated offspring have children of their own with other hybrid or miscegenated persons, as a result of Step 4, identity dissolution is taken to a higher level yet.

Figure 13 Mapping of Identity Dissolution Through Intermarriages



By Steps 3 and 4, even if the individual can claim nominal membership of one ethnic group by reason of his or her matrilineal or patrilineal lineage, he or she would still have enough diluted identity and social bonds not to feel so strongly attached to the accepted nominal group. It will be difficult such a person to delink himself or herself from the other constituent elements of his or her ethnic identity. This is the dilemma that the respondent above expressed when she found it difficult to say where she belonged.

The second case we cite illustrates further the complexity of the spiraling relations and identity dissolution for offspring of mixed marriages. It relates to a respondent who indicated that of the family of four boys and one girl, only the female married within their


ethnic group. All the four boys have wives from four different ethnic groups scattered around the country – one from the Upper West Region, the second from the Western Region, the third from the Northern Region, and the fourth wife in the family has roots in the Volta Region. The question that arises is – what is the ethnic group of their children? Figure 14 presents a schema of the complexity of the relationships that this family now lives with. Actual ethnic groups are altered to protect the respondent's identity.

The immediate and practical impact of such multilateral intermarriages and their implications for the peace that Ghana experiences are best captured in the words of one respondent who observed that, when you want to see the complexity at play:

...all you have to do is to sit and listen to the obituary notices being read these days [on radio or television] and you will wonder: Hajia so and so is dead and who are the chief mourners: Nana Kofi Ankobea [an Akan), Togbe Dzasraku [an Ewe] through marriages, there is intermarriages; we are marrying and so I call marriage as a chain – we are linking so that I may be an Ashanti but I may have relatives there in the Volta Region, there in Northern Ghana, in different places. So I think that dimension of two ethnic groups really confronting each other is over-hyped, as far as I am concerned” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).

The term Hajia is a title for a Moslem woman who has performed the Hajj. She is presumably from the north, as most Moslems are. However, she has an Akan and an Ewe chiefs and their relations as the principal bereaved persons for her funeral. This one funeral therefore brings together people from different ethnic, regional, and religious backgrounds.

Figure 14 – Multiple Identity Dissolution and Miscegenated Generations



Respondents cited several other living examples of the capacity to invoke these conjugal relationships as instruments for peace at the local and national levels. In the case of the interethnic conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana, for instance, a respondent observed that: “If you look at the Konkomba-Dagomba war you would see that one of the things that has actually brought the tempo of conflicts [down] is the intermarriages. The current regent in Yendi (a Dagomba); the mother is a Konkomba; his wife is a Konkomba, can you imagine this man getting up and saying my people, Dagombas, go and fight Konkombas?” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

At the national level, the marriage between Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings (an Akan royal) to Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, who has an Ewe mother and considered an indigene of the Volta Region, was repeatedly cited. This marriage established, politically, a significant relational bridge between the Akans and Ewes, who are known to usually belong to opposing political divides since independence. Given the tradition that one marries into a family, clan, lineage, and even the entire ethnic groups, Akans see and have accepted former President Rawlings as their “Akonta” - their brother-in-law. Hence, in the run to the 2000 general elections, when it was feared that then President Rawlings might not hand over power if his party lost the selections, the Akan-based main opposition party invoked this relationship and churned out their campaign message on the slogan that “*Akonta bε si fom*” to wit, – “Our brother-in-law shall come down or our brother in law shall give up power”.

The phrase did not only become an electioneering slogan for the opposition party; it became, what would be termed today, a viral peace message that assured Ghanaians that the long ruling brother-in-law from the predominantly Ewe-preferred party, the

National Democratic Congress, shall hand over power peacefully, presumably to his brothers-in-law in the New Patriotic Party, – an Akan-based party. The slogan did not only serve to put a light emotional touch to the campaigns; more importantly it averted recourse to language that could otherwise have demonized Rawlings and his party, and set the stage for a veritable political showdown. For there were indeed signs that Rawlings was not prepared to hand over power (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).

Subcategory 1.3 Historical Politico-Military Alliances, Interethnic Friendship Bonds, and Peace Bonds of Interethnic Friendships and Joking Relationship

The third subcategory of trans-ethnic bonds derives from historical alliances and friendship arrangements that continue to underpin interethnic relationships in the postcolonial state. Respondents in this study cited interethnic joking relationships and their contribution to peacebuilding. Examples of the joking relationships between the Kokombas and Bimobas; Dagombas and Moshis; Dagartis and Frafras; the Gonjas and Chokosis, among others were mentioned (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 206 29 October, 2014). These relationships are peculiar to the ethnic groups in the north.

A sizeable body of literature exists already on this subject (see for example Zartman, 2001; Freedman, 1977; Hammond, 1964). In the context of this study, however, a respondent narrates how even security officers of the state can invoke such relationships as instruments of conflict management. However, the literature to date on joking relationships in Ghana focuses on describing what it is, with little drilling into how and why it works; or under what circumstances it works best. In the example that a respondent gave in this study provides pointers to how this tool can be used even in a state-centric conflict management framework. As the respondent recounts, the

Commander of a Police contingent dispatched to intervene in an intercommunal conflict in Zaare, in the Upper East region used the tool to great effect as narrated below:

...at that time the Police Commander arrived at the scene and his police officers were in riot gear and they had gone full force to arrest and when they were in this area...very casually the Commander said, aahh, I never knew they are just Frafras fighting over dog meat. Useless people, and they have wasted my afternoon [...] it immediately came across to them [the feuding parties] that this person must be a Dagao and they all started saying ‘useless man how can this man be a Police Commander’; and right there and then the flames were dowsed...(Interview 12 – 4 March 2014).

The example reflects the continued relevance of joking relationships beyond the traditional settings. It points to the potency inherent in such indigenous conflict management practices that can be and have been used as instruments for resolving conflicts within and between ethnic groups, especially in the north of Ghana. Above all, it gives a concrete example of how it has been used in a specific state-centric conflict management context. However, as indicated under Chapter 6 below, further research is required to clearly delineate the possibility frontiers for incorporating these indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in such state-managed contexts. Such research should provide opportunities to fathom how and why such indigenous practices work and to what extent they can be added to the repertoire of tools for peacebuilding practitioners.

Historical Political and Military Pacts

In discourses on interethnic relationships in Ghana, not much is said about the existence of networks of historical politico-military bonds and alliances between ethnic

groups that continue to influence their collective behaviors in the postcolonial state. Several ethnic groups in Ghana lay claims to having established and managed kingdoms prior to the colonial encounter. The demands of survival and consolidation of their political spaces in an ever hostile pre-colonial environment warranted the creation of mutual defense cooperation agreements between some of the larger and powerful ethnic groups in the country. While some of these pacts were contracted in peace times, others were sequels to wars between the contracting ethnic groups.

In an era where military expeditions were largely by foot, the only means for institutionalizing rapid response mechanisms in furtherance of the defense pacts was to station military outposts in each other's backyards. Hence, among the Dagombas of northern Ghana, this phenomenon manifests today in the presence of the *Kambose* unit, headed by the *Kambon-Naa*, who are officially the musketeers of the Dagbon military set up, in the smallest village chiefdom to the apical skin in Yendi. The word *Kambose* and its derivatives such as *Kambon-Naa*, is the name northerners give to the Ashantis. Accordingly, the *Kambose* units were initially made up of the *Kambose* people or people from Ashanti origin that were posted to Dagbon to support the military structure of that kingdom.

To date, the Anufos or Chokosis of Chereponi - a unique linguistic group in the north that is akin to Akan – trace their origins to Nzema, in the Western Region. They were posted to Dagbon as a military detachment of the Ashanti army. A similar Nzema outpost is reported to exist in the northern parts of the Volta Region. In reverse, Bantama, the nerve center of Kumasi's economic and political activity, is reputed to be the home of the immigrant Dagomba military detachment that was attached to the Asantehene's

military and administrative structure. The name “Bantama” is said to be a corruption of the Dagomba phrase “*Mba nti ma*” which means “my father gave it to me” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). It was used in reference to the parcel of land that the reigning Asantehene at the time of their arrival gave to the Dagomba permanent delegation to settle in Kumasi. In the words of a respondent who narrates a story he was told in an interview with the Tumu Kuoro (chief):

...when they (the Ashantis) established Kumasi; for the security of Kumasi, these northern elements who had fought with Osei Tutu, were given that whole area to be close to him; and Bantama, is virtually the center of Kumasi; the traditional Kumasi was given to the Dagombas. So from that time, they have always declared, *Baa nti ma, baa nti ma*; and if you look at the people [...] Bantimahene who died I think during Opoku Ware’s reign was very tall; and you look at some of their chiefs [very tall as well] (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

In Ewe tradition, Okomfo Anokye, the spiritual founder of the Ashanti kingdom is claimed to be an Ewe from Nortsie, who became the spiritual founder of Ashanti. On the reverse side, the Ashantis seem to have impacted, militarily, on the formation of the chieftaincy structure among the Ewes. Although Amenumey (1986) disputes it, Tsikata and Seini (2004) believe otherwise and point out that the Ewe “...chieftaincy titles which are linked to battle formations such as “*dusifia*” and “*miafiaga*” of the Anlo state, for example, are distinctly Akan (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 15).

Be it as it may, the exchange of permanent military detachments induced cultural and biological integrations that have come to further dilute the ethnic purity of Ghanaians

across board. To buttress this view, a respondent recalled an interview with R. P. Baffuor, one time Vice Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and “...an icon of the Elmina elite [who proudly queried the respondent] “...do you know that I am of Dagomba origin, ancestry?” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). The story unravels that as part of the military pact between the Dagombas and the Ashantis, a Dagomba princess was given in marriage to the Asantehene. However, rather than keep the princess to himself, the Asantehene in turn gave the princess to a royal in Elmina, then the trade hub between the Europeans and the local people. In this way, a tripartite pact came into existence.

While Ashanti’s friendship with Dagomba was the product of a mutual defense pact; its friendship with coastal peoples had a militaro-economic objective. First, the pact with the people of the coast ensured access to the arms and armaments from the white man, as well as, opportunities of trade with the Dutch. Second, the Elmina connection had a military purpose because the word *baffuor* in Akan translates into the military equivalence of Field Marshall (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). In other words, the princess was given to the Asantehene’s coastal commander, ostensibly to retain his loyalty. This marriage of the princess became the thread that tied the knots of friendship between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis in the center, and then between the Ashantis and the people of Elmina on the southern coast. Later, through similar intermarriages cited in the previous chapter, the Anlos to the Southeast would be added to the alliance. The militaro-economic pact that emerged would be known as the Kotoko Alliance in which:

...you have Asante Kotoko, you have Dagomba Kotoko, you have Edina Kotoko, and you have Anlo Kotoko – the kotoko alliance – and these were alliances that were created to give military support but more importantly to enable the citizens of these different ethnic groups to feel free in Kumasi. So if an Elmina person went to Kumasi to misbehave, and I will tell you an Elmina person can even go and sleep with the wife of the Asantehene, he cannot be killed [...] that is the essence of it. So an Nzema man, Elmina man can stand in Kumasi and even abuse the Asantehene and if they touch him and he says “mi yε Nzema ni” (I am an Nzema) that is it. It is a privileged relation (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

While the relationship between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis is the one that has currency in the literature, other prominent ethnic groups had similarly had similar mutual diplomatic relationships with Ashanti. As a respondent recalls, this persisting historical relationship dismantles security and protocol barriers between the royals of the north and the Asantehene. In this instance, a Mamprugu chief is reported to have told the respondent that:

... oh when I go to Kumasi and walk into the Asantehene’s palace, I walk in straight and talk to him. I don’t need anybody to direct me because they feel there is some historical linkage between them, the chiefs; generally they feel there is some historical linkage and they support each other one way or the other and they also think that the Nayiri [paramount chief of the Mamprusis] is recognized by the Asantehene as a prominent chief


from the olden days back, linked up to today (Interview 206, 29 October 2014).

Figure 15 illustrates the spatial structure of the alliance. So strong are these alliances to date that "...when the Asantehene dies one of the first groups of people who should be informed are the Zongo community, the Muslim community [descendants of the Dagomba]; they have to be informed to offer prayers before (stresses) the announcement is made" (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). This shows the depth of the persisting pre-colonial interethnic relationships arrangements that continue to serve the purpose of peace and unity in Ghana today. Similar courtesies exist between chiefs of some groups in the Volta Region and the Asantehene's palace, even if it is not to the same elaborate extent (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).

The conflict management relevance of this historical relationship between the ethnic groups would come to the fore, when the government had to turn to the Asantehene, the Yagbon Wura, Paramount Chief of Gonja and the Nayiri, Paramount Chief of Mamprugu, to "find a traditional way to resolving the [long standing chieftaincy] conflict" (Ghana News Agency, 2004, n.p) among the Dagombas which led to the beheading of the Paramount Chief of Dagbon and at least 40 others in March 2002. The configuration of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs charged with the resolution of this conflict took into account the historical relationships between the four ethnic groups i.e. the Ashantis, the Dagombas, the Gonjas, and the Mamprusis. In particular, the appointment of the Asantehene as the Chair of this Committee reflected the governments knowledge of and appreciation of the relevance and the place of historical ties that bind ethnic groups in intermediating in matters of state that lie within the realms of history,

culture, and traditions. While the Committee of Eminent Chiefs is still struggle to keep the mediation efforts on track and moving toward a resolution, its existence per se has provided a safe and more neutral space for the feuding cousins to discuss their differences and seek ways to resolve the conflict. The centrality of the Asantehene in this process lends credence to the continuing relevance of the Kotoko Alliance, depicted in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Map of Spatial Connections of the Kotoko Alliance



Beyond the Dagbon crisis, the alliance remains an effective reference point in interethnic relationships among the ethnic groups that belong to it. As respondent summed it up, the contemporary peace value of these relationships resides in the fact that “... when you take the knife to say that you are going to kill an Ashanti or you are going to kill a Fanti or you are going to kill a Ga, (pause) in your own consciousness, whom are you going to kill? Probably your brother or your ancestral relations; and this is very significant in the consciousness of Ghanaians” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

While this “...historical matrix gives us an indication of why we are so bonded” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014), how much of this historical memory actually percolates into contemporary political behavior and public policy is hard to quantify right now. For one thing, this history is not actively taught in the schools. Therefore, it is doubtful that the younger generations of Ghanaians, who are increasingly taking over political leadership in the country, have this historical knowledge to guide their interethnic engagements in private and in the public sphere.

At the very least, the highly polarized atmosphere that has characterized Ghana’s politics since independence suggests that although the binding, bonding, and bridging force of this history may continue to be powerful at the subconscious level, it definitely has lost its potency in the public domain. The political battle over who rules Ghana at the dawn of independence was fought between sons and daughters of the five members of the Kotoko alliance – Kwame Nkrumah, an Nzema leading the CPP; the Danquah-Busia coalition led the predominantly Akan based NLM; the Northern Peoples Party had prominent Dagombas in its forefront; and the Togoland Congress had Anlo champions as well. One point of research would be why this history, which must have been more

current in the pre-independence era than now, failed to unite the Kotoko Alliance in the fight for independence. In more recent times, why has the alliance not worked to tone down the increasingly vitriolic political discourse in the country? Why have the Ewe-centric NDC and the Akan-centric NPP become the dominate features of the political map and colors of Ghana?

Category 2 – Bonds and Bridges from Education, and Associational Life

Subcategory 2.1 – Binding and Bonding Effects of Boarding Schools

In Africa, education has been recognized as a unifier of the continent’s multiethnic citizenry. Azam (1999) argues that the unifying force of education and its power to create and maintain a culture of peace on the continent rests in the state’s capacity to purchase ethnic loyalties through the cooptation and corruption of the urbanized elite. According to this view:

Not less important is the fact that sending educated members of the ethnic group to the city, via the education system, is a means to ensure political participation for the group. In peaceful African countries, a sophisticated system of inclusion of the educated people from the different ethnic groups in various organisations (students unions, single party, etc.) has evolved, whereby the state purchases loyalty from the groups through their educated urbanite ‘delegates’ (Azam, 1999, p. 2).

In consonance with this view, available literature and responses from both the quantitative and Key Informant Interviews of this study strongly credit Ghana’s educational system, especially the boarding school system, with the peace of the country.

As one literature source noted:

Perceived ethnic bias, while not necessarily an illusion, has been overestimated. Ethnically diverse, Ghanaians have managed this diversity quite well. It is widely believed that decades of interethnic marriages and integration in boarding schools at young ages have lessened the role and impact of ethnicity in the political discourse of Ghana (Arthur, 2009, p. 70).

According to this line of thought, so outstanding is the contribution of the boarding school system to Ghana's peace that it has become the envy of other countries in West Africa. As another source noted "Even some fellow West Africans believe that a similar system may have altered the tragic script of their own country's political history" (Sakyi-Addo, p. 2). For a respondent in this study, however, Ghana's exceptional peaceful nature within Africa is such that:

Nobody has really understood what it is except for the neighborliness and the intermarriage and the classmatism and those things that [have made] the networks ... so strong that when you are talking about something you realize the next person you are talking to is your relative (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

This, in the view of respondents, is because the boarding system has enabled people from all over the country to get to know each other. Most professionals are school mates, dormitory/house mates, or classmates. If not, they know someone who shares a professional or educational affiliation with another person. This leads to the emergence of various forms of formal and informal networks that hold society together. In brief, Ghana's educational system, especially the boarding schools provided the spaces for

increased cross identity interactions which led to reduction in identity-based prejudice and stereotyping. It also facilitated cross-identity lifelong engagements such as marriages.

While the contribution of Ghana's educational system, especially the boarding school system to Ghana's peace cannot be denied, the subject requires some interrogation. Boarding schools are not unique to Ghana's educational heritage. It is a legacy of the British educational system that was bequeathed to its colonies, including Australia, Canada, the United States, Sierra Leone, and other countries in Africa. Indeed, in Sierra Leone's pioneering role as the hub for western education in West Africa, the church and the state joined hands in a rare show of partnership "...to create separate villages [to host boarding schools] as a key strategy for inculcating European and Christian values into children 'untainted' by the influence of their parents" (Smith, 2009, p. 27). The same principle of isolating children from the corrupting influence of their pagan communities informed the establishment and operations of boarding schools in the Gold Coast, and subsequently, other parts of that is Ghana today (C.K. Graham, 1971, 2013).

While boarding schools have played an important role in the education of Africa's political and civil elite, their influence as forces of social cohesion builders is not shared in all contexts. Indeed, the record of experiences with boarding schools in all these countries is not particularly benign. On the contrary "...boarding school experiences [in all these countries are noted to be] particularly brutal" (Smith, 2009, p. 28) with intergenerational traumatic experiences that have scarred lives and societies. Why then is Ghana's experience of boarding school an exceptional cohesive factor when the same system failed to confer similar effects on other countries that ran similar systems?

Second, while the contribution of boarding schools to the creation of a national gel of civil, religious, and political elite in Ghana is not in doubt, the instrumental role assigned to in respect of Ghana's peace, it is questionable on a number of grounds. The 2010 Housing and Population census in Ghana, the most recent in the series, reports that 28.5% of Ghana's population 15 years or older have never been to school. Additionally, 11.6% of the same age category had only a primary school education; while 22.5% had an education to the Junior Secondary, or Junior High School. Another 13.6% had only been to school up to the Middle School. All of these are the terminal points for Ghana's basic education system. In general, except for a very few emerging private basic schools that offer boarding facilities, all pre-second cycle institutions in Ghana are non-residential schools. This means that at least 76.2% of Ghana's current population has never been through a boarding school system (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, pp. 61, Table 22a).

Access to post primary educational institutions was much lower in the pre and immediate post-independence era than now. In 1963, for instance, Foster estimated that the 59 public schools in Ghana could only take in about 14,000 students. Hence, "...the chances of any student who enter[ed] middle school ultimately to enter a public secondary school [was] no more than 5%" (Foster, 1963, p. 155). Hurd and Johnson would even put the chances of progression from basic to secondary school lower in their 1964 study when they noted that "...less than 2% of the output of the educational system was passing through secondary schools" (Hurd & Johnson, 1967, p. 60). Fewer still will progress to the universities and other tertiary institutions where boarding facilities are offered. For this reason, therefore, attribution of the pervasive influence of a culture of peace in Ghana to its boarding school system may be an overstatement, given the small

percentage of the population who had direct experience of boarding schools to have established the kinds of alumni and alumnae relationships considered as the educational threads that weave Ghana's peace.

In sum, while Ghana's boarding school system, and by extension, the educational system has been credited with being a major contributor to the peace of the country, further research is required to solidly root the suppositions in evidence. For instance, in the absence of direct policy intentionality in the set up and use of boarding schools as the spindles for drawing out the threads of relationships that weave Ghana's peace, the boarding school systems can only be said to have provided an enabling medium for some pre-existing, innate or acculturated, peace-centric traits to sprout and grow. Therefore, Ghana's boarding school system may have been one of the seedbeds, not the seed for Ghana's peace.

Similarly, given the lack of consistency in the structure and functioning of past students' associations, the contributions that old boyism, girlism or classmatism make to the politics, and by extension Ghana's peace, is more coincidental than intentional. Again, the fact that these associations may have influenced Ghana's peace may be due to the existence of some predisposing factors that stimulate and sustain the mobilization of peaceable political constituencies out of associations of past students of any school. Consequently, the predictive value of its replication in other settings cannot be established.

At any rate, the evidence so far on the contribution of education to peace in Ghana seems to indulge in post hoc attribution of intent. A couple of issues stand out. First, Kwame Nkrumah has been widely credited in this study and in other literature with the

introduction of the boarding school concept and its use as an instrument for national integration and cohesion building. However, questions that have not been interrogated in the literature include: did Kwame Nkrumah actually create boarding schools with the intent of making them instruments of interethnic unity, marriage, and peaceful coexistence? Was there ever a deliberate policy objective to use boarding schools as melting pots for blending together the disparate ethnic groups in the country or was the boarding school concept simply a pragmatic solution to the pressing challenge of accelerating access to secondary and tertiary education?

Available evidence suggests that Kwame Nkrumah's role in the establishment of boarding schools in Ghana has been overstated in the interviews of this study, as well as, in other literature in the public domain. Boarding schools existed before the emergence of Kwame Nkrumah on Ghana's political scene (Bening, 1990b; C. K. Graham, 1971; Odamtten, 1978). Kwame Nkrumah merely adopted the concept, as a matter of political and economic expediency, to facilitate the expansion of access to post primary education under his accelerated education program. But as has been pointed out above, even then, the impact of boarding schools on Ghana's peace may have been over extended, given the relatively small percentage of the population that had the privilege of going through boarding schools, which were mainly operational at the post-primary level of education.

In brief, however laudable the accidental contribution of boarding schools to the building of social cohesion among the educated elite of Ghana is, there is a great risk of over attribution of Ghana's peace to this single phenomenon as the gel that binds Ghana together. The risk lies in the complacent basking in an accidental occurrence without a more intentional capitalization of the opportunities it offers deepening and expanding the

cohesive strands that the educational system offers. More intentional approaches are required to fully understand how and why boarding schools in Ghana have been successful as social gels when this has not been the experience in other countries. Unearthing the elements that make Ghana's boarding schools fertile grounds for nurturing social cohesion will take the discourse beyond anecdotal speculations.

Subcategory 2.2 Post educational associational life and peace in Ghana

Another area in which Ghana's educational system has been credited with contributing to peace in the country is its creation and sustenance of associational life beyond the walls of the boarding schools in particular, and other educational institutions in general. Alumni and alumnae associations, popularly known as Oldboyism, girlism or old/past students' associations are particularly cited as providing the locus for sustained engagements, friendships, and consensus building in the public sphere. There is no gainsaying that Old boys and Old Girls Associations have social, economic and even political value. They serve as the social and political capital that members leverage to advance their individual or collective agendas within the public sphere.

However, whether or not this was the express aim for these associations is unclear. Similarly, the establishment of past students' associations was never intended as networks for political mobilization, much less as an instrument of peace in the country. For instance, there is no evidence of state-level political agendas ever being designed and executed by members of any alumni or alumnae association. The intent in the formation of these associations was for the preservation of social and friendship ties and networks gained while in a common place of learning. Beyond that, the associations were designed

to maintain some connection with the Alma Mater, as evidenced by the organized visits to and donations members make to their alma mater occasionally.

Indeed, questioning whether they are actually a force for the good of the country, some respondents have argued that the concepts of Old boyism/girlism create bonds of alumni and alumnae of schools which have become associated with political and economic patronage and cronyism. Well-connected past students of older and better endowed schools create and distribute opportunities of political and economic access to their members. In other words, the past students' associations are no more than the social capital bonds that Larsen et al (2004) observed to be only good in promoting the private and survival needs of their members with little to no capacity for impacting on the public sphere.

Buying into the negative consensus theory that a prior respondent proffered, another respondent in this study attributed the force of the negative consensus proposition to the fact that it is founded on the old boyism and old girlism platform. In the words of the respondent, the negative consensus "...factor has quite some merit [because] the elite in this country are made up of groups of old school (chuckles) old school cronies or old school, yeah, affiliations and cuts across ethnicities, cuts across religious faiths and that helps to bring people together" (Interview 202, 27 October 2014). This convening factor is what makes it possible for the principle of negative consensus to operate. This is because these associations often become nodes of counter-state action that allow their members to circumvent the inefficiencies of the state machinery in order to access state power and resources for personal gain.

Subcategory 2.3 Ancillary and Co-curricular educational activities and peace in Ghana Education

Ghana's educational system provides opportunities for cross-ethnic engagement of students through various co-curricular and associational activities. Interschool sports, debates, quizzes, and quasi-religious group activities such as the Ghana United Nations Students Association, the Young Christian Movement (YCS), the Scripture Union, and the equivalents in other creeds, periodically bring students of different educational institutions together. One interviewee from the Upper East Region recalled that it was one such event that first brought him into contact with the Upper West Region and students from other parts of the country (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). Recounting his experiences, the respondent noted:

when I was in secondary school Form 2, I went to the national congress of YCS in Nandom ... I could never have gone to Nandom secondary school if I was just in school; it's because I was a member of the YCS and the YCS sent me to Nandom Secondary School; ...so the YCS opened me to the whole country ...so you have a kind of an open perspective [...] those who were boys scouts, those who belonged to Ghana United Nations Students Association, those types of inter exchanges were provided by our educational institutions (Interview 12, 4 March 2014).

Such engagements have generated lifelong friendships and promoted cross identity respect and recognition, especially when pupils from relatively unknown schools stand up to and even beat colleagues from the bigger name schools in sports or intellectual exercises such as debates and quizzes; or when girls' schools compete favorably with

boys' schools in academic competitions. However, as respondent in Interview 12 noted, such friendships have not been structured and canalized into a form of political capital that can engage and transform the public sphere for good. Worse still, they have not been purposefully used as instruments of peace. In many cases, they were vehicles of student organization without specific contents for civic, political, and peace education.

Subcategory 2.3 Learning Peace Through Education

The concept of peace education has been expanded to go beyond the provision of specific knowledge and skills in conflict resolution (mediation, facilitation, negotiation, etc.) to include general level of formal education of a population (De Rivera, 2004). This, however, makes the measure of the contribution of education to peace complicated and impracticable. Hence, de Rivera (2004) uses reduction in homicide rates as the proxy indicator of the contribution of education to a culture of peace. According to this view, an inverse relationship exists between the level of educational attainments in a society and homicide rates.

By this assertion, Ghana, with a literacy rate of 74.1% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012) for people 11 years and older can be said to have an adequate level of education that should directly impact on peace. However, equating general levels of education in a society to the peaceable nature of its citizens without reference to the content of the education is problematic. A cardinal principle in the evaluation of the outcomes or impacts of social interventions is the need to be careful in the attribution of outcomes to interventions. For, observed results that accompany any development intervention can be the product of any of multiple matrixes of outcomes. What is observed to follow interventions can be planned or unplanned, intended or unintended, positive or negative,

desirable or undesirable (OECD, 2012). A four level matrix of intervention outcomes can include, for instance:

- i) planned, intended, and desirable outcomes - this is the zone of intentionality
- ii) planned, intended, but undesirable outcomes - this is the blind spot
- iii) unplanned, unintended, but desirable outcomes - represents positive spinoffs
- iv) unplanned, unintended, and undesirable outcomes - this is the off guard zone

Viewed against this background the contribution of Ghana's educational system would belong to the positive spin-off category, since the observed positive outcomes of the educational system on the country's peace are unplanned, unintended but desirable consequences. This has happened because the spaces and opportunities in the educational system that Ghanaians used to manifest attitudes and behavior traits that have contributed to the peace of the country were not set out intentionally to create national cohesion and violence avoidance behaviors. In other words, it was never the express objective of the educational curricular, boarding school system, the computerized school selection and placement system, the national service scheme, the system of placement of teachers in schools etc., to foster violence avoidance behaviors, national unity, and cohesion for peace among those who pass through these educational institutions. On the contrary, the educational system simply offered white spaces that accidental groups of citizens chose to use to live out their pre-existing values and beliefs. They voluntarily provided content and processes that have contributed to Ghana's peace.

In terms of intentional creation of instructional frameworks for peace, it is noticeable that the concept of peace education is very new in the Ghana, and has been restricted largely to the domain of post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict resolution

efforts of the NGO community. Peace education is not integrated into the formal educational curricula at any level. Therefore, formal peace education through the educational system cannot be said to be an important contributor to the building of a culture of peace among the 52+ ethnic groups in Ghana. Consequently, there is the need to look into how indigenous non-formal cultural training and socialization processes may have inculcated the values and attitudes for peace across the ethnic groups in Ghana.

On the converse side, the educational system, has unplanned, unintended and undesirable consequences as well. The emergence of highly partisan political camps that have created rifts in the hitherto united front of students that once championed the causes of the voiceless citizens is one example. The reported emergence of occultism in boarding schools is another. The spewing out of large numbers of unemployed and often unemployable youth who are now considered a security threat to the country is a third (Midley, 2014). What these examples signify is that, for the educational system to be the incubator of peace-loving citizens, there is the need for more intentionality and directed policies and programs that recognize, capture, and retool the white spaces in the educational establishment to maximize the positive peace benefits while minimizing the negative ones. Otherwise, the contribution of education to Ghana's peace will continue to be more coincidental than intentional.

Category 2.4 – Migration, Interethnic cohabitation, economic interdependencies, and Ghana's peace

An oft recalled feature of Ghana's peace in this study is the widespread migration, peaceful interethnic cohabitation, and the resulting economic interdependencies among all the ethnic groups in the country. As one respondent captured it:

... we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of where we actually come from. You go to the Ashanti Region and you have a large number of Ewes. You go to the Volta Region and you have a very large number of Akan-speaking [people], especially in Worawora in the Northern part of the Volta, the Akan areas and so on. So the fear has been, if I victimize those from other areas in my place then my brother is at the other person's land too, and the person will be victimized in retaliation. For the sake of these victimizations I tend to tone down (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).

The question that this view triggers is: To what extent then does migration affect the 3Bs of binding, bonding, and bridging and socio-cultural incorporation in Ghana? Portes and Sensenbrenner suggest that among migrant communities, bonding-in becomes stronger than bridging-out when the migrant community faces hostility from the host community. External confrontation does not only reinforce pre-existing in-group sentiments and loyalties, it is actually capable of "creating such feelings where none existed before" (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 118). Since no hostilities exist against migrant communities in Ghana, such in-group feeling that would have created the 'we versus them' attitude is dissipated. But, Portes and Sensenbrenner point out that:

...cultural differences and outside discrimination alone do not account fully for the observed differences in the strength of bounded solidarity among different migrant communities...The missing element seems to be the ability of certain minorities to activate a cultural repertoire, brought from the home country, which allows them to construct an autonomous

portrayal of their situation that goes beyond a mere adversarial reaction”
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 119).

In other words, self-imposed spatial, social, cultural and economic identity enclaves of migrant populations is what creates the differentness that can generate, sustain, or even widen the gulf of estrangement between the host and migrant communities. Put differently, migrant communities that hold unto their imported cultural preferences with little openness to engaging in intercultural exchanges with their host communities are more likely to estrange themselves from their host. Under such circumstances, cultural exchanges in the form of intermarriages, beliefs and values transmissions and reception, among others are limited. Even economic interdependencies can be curtailed. In such cases, social cohesion between the host and the migrants remains illusionary. As illustrated with the example of chemical bonding processes, no sharing of values or interests means no social bonding takes place. In such places, long periods of cohabitation are often not enough to ensure a right to belongingness. In Nigeria, for instance, distinctions are made between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” or “strangers” in many states such that:

...the Tiv in Nasarawa and Taraba states [have] found themselves regarded as strangers or settlers in those states. Ironically, however, the Gwari do not have the same problem in Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa states. But the Hausas in Jos have the same problem as the Tiv (Adamu, 2002).

Similarly, despite generations of cohabitation in the same political space, Liberia's Americo-Liberians and their indigenous counterparts still remain estranged (Frempong, 2001; Konneh, 1996). Although the mutual exchange and assimilation of some values and the construction of a common language derived from English and the native languages gives Liberians a unique identity (Allen, 2010), there is still much to be done to achieve a fully incorporated society. The symbols of national identity continue to "...reflect only the cultural and historical experiences of the Americo-Liberians" (Kieh, 2009, p. 18)

Emphasizing the role of exchange as the unifier in intercultural cohabitations, Simmel, believes the unique contribution that immigrants, as strangers, make to social cohesion rests in the fact that the stranger always brings something that the host community does not have. In Simmel's example, the stranger or "the man who comes today and stays tomorrow... brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it" (Simmel, 1908, p. 185). These new skill sets or know-how that the stranger brings becomes the rallying point for a different kind of social and economic engagements in the host community. In other words, the immigrant's facilitative role in trade creates the catalytic and synergistic scaling up of economic activities and benefits beyond what indigenous "...the primary producer with his more limited mobility and his dependence on a circle of customers that can be expanded only very slowly"(Simmel, 1908, pp. 185-186) can do.

Simmel's use of trade as the medium of interaction between the stranger and the host community is instructive because it highlights the role of sustained and mutually beneficial interactions as the route for gaining entry and acceptance or incorporation

between the hosts and the stranger. Steinberger, (1981) points out that pre-existing “communal ties magnify prior tendencies toward collective action” (Steinberger, 1981 in Larsen et al., 2004, p. 64). However, “Social ties alone are not enough. It takes efficacious individuals to organize and activate a public constituency” (Bandura in Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65). More importantly, the nature and frequency of interactions between the stranger and the host communities are key. An openness to engage and embrace the other is essential for incorporation and peaceful coexistence to emerge and grow.

In the context of Ghana where the stock in trade for migrants is usually their labor services, their special contribution to the host economies is the potential for increased production and productivity that migrants offer. For example, the contribution of migrant labor from the north to the economic advancement of the south is self-evident. Since the colonial times, the north has served as the “labour pool for the cocoa, railway and mining industries in the south” (Brukum, 2005, p. 6). So important was this to the economy of the colony that serious consideration was given to the idea of constructing a railway line from the south to the north to allow migrant labor to more easily move to the labor points in the south. As Cozens-Hardy recommended “...given cheap transport by rail, and fair price for agricultural products, labour may take the same course it has taken in the colony proper namely, to settle along and cultivate saleable produce in the vicinity of the railway” (Cozens-Hardy, 1924 in Brukum, 2005, p. 11).

This consideration to facilitate the movement of migrant labor from the north to the south targeted population concentrations beyond the frontiers of what is Ghana today. It would have cut short the foot trek of the migrant labor from the hinterlands of what are

today Burkina Faso (then known as the Upper Volta), Mali, and Niger to cocoa farms and mines in the Gold Coast by several weeks. It would have consolidated the position of the Gold Coast as the preferred destination of Upper Volta's migrant labor ahead of the Ivory Coast. However, where the British failed to take advantage of this opportunity, the French on the other side of the border succeeded in diverting Upper Volta's labor pool toward the Ivory Coast. The strategies the French adopted and the consequences of that success, however, reverberates in the nature of the social cohesion that La Cote d'Ivoire today experiences.

Tokpa (2006) discusses the Ivorian experiences with migrant Burkinabe communities and notes that while migration of the people from what was then Upper Volta into the then Gold Coast was voluntary, the diversion of this migrant flow into what is today La Cote d'Ivoire was quasi-voluntary at best. Conscious French colonial policy designed and orchestrated the relocation of segments of the Upper Voltarian communities to the northern eco-transitional zones of northern Cote d'Ivoire in a way that would not disrupt their natural settlement plans and native cultures. The choice of settlement zone served two purposes. First, it provided a resident labor pool from the migrant community or the strangers who came and stayed (Simmel, 1908). Secondly, they served as magnets that would attract seasonal migrant labor from the Upper Volta, away from their hitherto preferred destinations in the Gold Coast, into Cote d'Ivoire where they would find natural homes in the settlement communities within the zone, when they came for seasonal work.

The voluntary nature of migrant settlements in the Gold Coast compared to the controlled settlement patterns for the same kind of migrants in La Cote d'Ivoire would

play out differently for the peace of the two countries for several reasons. First, the Ivorian migrant citizenship dilemma presents a particular case that Portes and Sensenbrenner (2001) described where cohabitation might have, by design, not translated into incorporation and co-citizenship. For, by design of the colonial policy, the Voltarian migrant communities settled in clusters of what became known as the colonial villages. Tokpa notes that it was indeed the Governor of the Upper Volta who, at the request of the Moro-Naba, initiated the creation of the Voltarian villages within Ivoirian lands. The settlements effectively became « *ilots constitués des cases voltaïques* » (Tokpa, 2006, p. 21), to wit, tiny islands of Voltarian houses.

As intimated above, some authors have argued that the creation of the colonial villages for the Voltarians was actually the operationalization of an express agreement reached between the colonial administrators responsible for the Upper Volta and the traditional leadership of the Moshis (Djoman, 2013). According to this view, the Moro-Naba agreed to the relocation of the Moshi communities into La Cote d'Ivoire only on condition that they are allowed to retain their cultural and ethnic identities, including the names of their native villages. In other words, it was a strategic move to retain suzerainty over what he considered his split empire (Ginio, 2006). In doing so, the colonial policy of creating Burkinabe villages did not only reproduce and preserve ethnocentric political, economic, social, and cultural enclaves separate and distinct from their host communities; it perpetuated the identity segregation between the migrants and their hosts. It entrenched the sense of differentness between the strangers who stayed and their hosts. Incorporation, therefore, never happened; despite years of cohabitation and interactions

through the trade of labor and services between the Voltarian strangers who stayed but never became co-citizens with their hosts.

This is why in La Cote d'Ivoire today, Ivoirians still make differentiations between the *autochtones*, *allochtones*, and *allogènes* (Djoman, 2013). While the *autochtones* are the natives or sons and daughters of the soil, *allochtones* are those who have come from a different part of the country but now stay in their host communities. The *allogènes*, on the other hand, are the strangers who came and stayed – the immigrants and their descendants. They may have been born on the soil or stayed there for a long time, but they are not of the same ethnic stock as the natives. They are a different ethnic group (translation from Calan et al., 2011). They include the Burkinabes, as the Ivoirians prefer to refer to those immigrants from Upper Volta in the colonial villages.

Hence, if migration did lead to the peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians in all parts of the country, it would not be the fact of migration per se that is the causal factor. One has to look at deeper causes peculiar to the Ghanaian context to find answers to why Ghanaians so easily intermingle and incorporate into different host communities. Lessons from the Ivorian experience and what respondents have shared in this study suggest that while the cultures and traditions of ethnic groups in Ghana seek sameness through accommodation, integration, and even incorporation of other ethnic groups, the cultures of ethnic groups in other countries seem to emphasize, reinforce, and even institutionalize difference. History, traditions, and religion are important cementing factors in Ghana's capacity to foster interethnic accommodation and incorporation.

Category 3: Political disillusionment, Citizen Engagement, Disengagement, And Peace*Subcategory 3.1 Citizen Despondency, Disillusion, Disengagement, and Withdrawal from the public sphere*

Findings from this study suggest that the failure of past governments to deliver the dividend of independence and democracy i.e. promises of rapid development in all spheres, have created public disillusionment, disappointment, and disconnection from the public sphere. People subscribe to political parties and engage in elections with the faint expectation of some benefits from the politicians. They do not understand or care about the manifestoes of the political parties. On the contrary, they see politics as a big game not to be taken seriously (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). They really do not expect any long term improvements in their conditions.

Hence, even though "...people are disillusioned about the way resources are being shared" (Interview 14, 5 March 2014), the urge to stick out and fight to change the situation is smothered because the electorate believes all the politicians are the same anyway. They (politicians) agree only on matters that concern them; they don't care about the common good. Hence, citizens are not willing to "...go out and die for somebody [who] would not do anything that would make my life comfortable" (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014). As a result of this "... disconnect between the populace and the politicians [...] people are not willing to go fanatic over politics. They would rather go fanatic over their ethnicity and their land. Particularly when it comes to land ownership, people would rather die for that than to go and die for somebody to get power" (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014).

In the view of respondents, if Ghana's political disagreements do not boil over into violent national conflicts, it is not because there are no grievances against the political system. It is because citizens feel it will be worthless to fight. It is also because, in a twist of irony, respondents have developed a tolerance and negative accommodation for the corrupt nature of politicians. They cynically credit their corrupt nature with the peace that Ghana enjoys. As one respondent noted "...one of the things that has helped is because of the perceived corruption of the politician. People have seen that in the long run, they take care of themselves. So why should I die for you?" (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). But while Ghanaians may not be willing to go to war in support of corrupt politicians, respondents see that the persistence of corruption is what is likely to "...trigger the country into going into conflict [as people can no longer accept to] remain poor whilst they see people who are just becoming rich within a day" (Interview 14, 5 March 2014) after going into politics.

Respondents also identified the scavenger role of development NGOs as a key factor in the appeasement of rural anger against the failures of duty bearers to deliver on their mandates. The NGOs and FBOs with socioeconomic development agendas are picking up after the lapses of the state, public, and corporate institutions by filling the gaps in their deficient social and development service delivery. By literally cleaning up after governments, the activities of development NGOs effectively mollify collective citizen anger or deflect that anger away from the public sphere. Although data on the quantum of resource investments by NGOs in Ghana is not readily available (Danquah, 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009), one source indicates NGOs in Ghana are estimated to manage "... annual development expenditure of between \$150-

\$200 million [which, among others, is applied to] provide between 45-50 per cent of all health-care services and over 50 per cent of all family planning services” (Danquah, 2011), among others . Similar contributions to the educational sector, agricultural development, among others have helped to cushion the unserved and under-served rural communities around the country.

In many places, especially in the north, NGOs and FBOs are the only providers of development services. As a result, in such places citizens look up to NGOs for solutions to their problems rather than engaging government and other public sector duty bearers to demand that they live up to their mandates to provide what the communities deserve. This, in the view of respondents, takes the Government off the hook. It also keeps the population outside the public sphere, since they are unable then to articulate agendas for engagement with public office holders.

Besides inducing the lull effect on citizens, subcategories of the NGOs and international development agencies in Ghana make direct contributions of NGOs to Ghana’s peace both at the national, as well as, community levels. In the latter case, development initiatives create spaces of (re)engagement in dialogues of action for peace. NGO-sponsored initiatives have encouraged members of rival communities to work together either directly to promote peace, or through engagement in joint economic or community development activities of mutual interests. In the process, community members learn the benefits of interethnic cooperation and peace. This is what has contributed considerably to the maintenance of peace in the eastern corridor of Ghana, which is the most volatile conflict zone in the country.

True as this may be, recent developments, however, suggest the NGOs and their funding partners could be reaching their restraining limits in holding society at bay from the public sphere. The emergence of groups such as the Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG); OccupyGhana movement; InsideGhana; among others represents the mobilization of the urban middle class whose development challenges are beyond the capacities of the traditional development NGOs. Ironically, some of these movements are gaining entry into the public sphere under the banner of NGOs or registered CSOs. Their ability to sustain peaceful means in their pursuit of change in the governance structure will depend to a large extent on the responsiveness of government and the public sector to their issues and demands. Genuine corridors of dialogue and engagement will encourage peaceful engagements. As in the case of urban youth groups recounted below, ignoring these middle class action groups can only push them to the fringes and lead some to consider alternate means of making change happen for them.

Subcategory 3.2 Elite and Middle Class Escapism

The contention that the middle class has chosen to exit the public sphere through the use of private solutions to public problems provides an important frame for examining what makes Ghana peaceful. Respondents who subscribed to this view have pointed out that Ghanaians in the middle class often choose to fill in the gaps of state deficiencies in public service delivery, rather than engage and demand their rights from duty bearers. They would pay for the construction of the road leading to their newly built house; pay for the extension of electricity, water, and telephone services to their premises; or pay for the drilling and mechanization of a borehole to deal with their water needs. The purchase and installation of generators to address public sector deficiencies in

providing regular electricity exempts them from the *Dumsor* phenomenon. Purchase of private healthcare rather than use of the deficient public healthcare system; and decisions to send their children to private schools are ways in which the middle class manages state failures.

As a result of the middle class self-provisioning, they do not feel the pain of public sector failures. Consequently, there is no urge for them to play the agential role of mobilizing and leading the citizenry to demand performance and accountability from public office holders. For this reason, Ghana suffers from the absence of a critical mass of disenchanted activists who can champion protests over the non/poor performance of the state and public sector institutions and demand that the right things be done. This epitomizes how the escape of the middle class from engagement creates a void in the political middle. The masses are left to the mercy of the political elite, as nobody talks about the misgovernance or wants to do anything about it. Instead, citizens seem to have resigned to the fate of the political system and the underperformance of the state system. In the process, what should have become publicly expressed anger at state failures become private concerns.

Part of the reason why the elite is missing in the fight against state failures, in the view of some respondents, is the presence of negative consensus amongst them. In the view of respondents, the elite only agree to disagree on the principle of “*dibi na mi dibi*”, which translates into take your share of public resources and let me also have mine. In other words, there is common agreement that political and public offices must be exploited for private gain. Hence, there is an unspoken acknowledgement that irrespective of who has access to power and state resources, they would practice the same

principle of setting up alliances with political and private sector cronies “...to create, loot and share the resources of this country as if a brigade had been set up for such an enterprise” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1). This summation of the situation that Justice Dotse, (SJ) gave in respect of the “... €40 million judgment debt paid to Waterville Holdings Ltd and the GH¢51.2million (about USD14.6 million) paid to businessman, Alfred Agbesi Woyome” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1; see also The Chronicle, 2014), when passing judgment in the second case, resonates with ordinary Ghanaians. It encapsulates the popular feeling that elites who can have access to state resources, have conspired not to rock the boat of state through organizing agitations, respondents averred.

As an extension of the negative consensus escape route for the middle class, grassroots party members who have access to such elite agree and accept the principle. This has led to the emergence of the concept of “foot soldiers” who do all the footwork and dirty jobs for their political patrons and parties to win. In return they expect that they would be compensated with contracts, jobs, and other booties when their party is in power. As a result, everyone in the party with adequate connections is either satisfied or encouraged to close their eyes to nonperformance of the state, as long as they get their share of the booty. Those in the losing political camp wait for their turn – fight to win the next elections and do same.

The phenomenon has led to the entrenchment of petty crony capitalism, which translates into jobs for the boys, irrespective of the level of their job readiness. The result is the bloated government payrolls as a result of misfits in positions of authority simply because they campaigned for the party (IMANI Ghana, 2015; Vinokor, 2015). Political entrepreneurship has become the most lucrative and surest rewarding business in Ghana.

The depth of its practice would cause the Asantehene to declare that “Politics has substantially eroded the innate creative mind and enterprising spirit of modern day Ghanaians as many resort to it as the surest way of making it in life...” (Myjoyonline, 2014).

In sum, political competition is about access to power to do the same thing as the opponent has been doing. This is why the one thing that “...puts us in the category of negative peace is corruption” (Interview 2, 7 February 2014). And several respondents have “...talked about the negative peace [in Ghana] because of corruption” (interview 2, 7 February 2014) “which now has become a canker in the country” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and it is this “...corruption and injustice in the system that could easily open our doors for violent behavior” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). They conclude that peace built on this ravenous situation is not peace that can be sustained.

Subcategory 3.3 Permanent and Seasonal Migration as the hatch for Rural and Working Class Escapism

Unable to deal with the state’s failure to meet their needs, rural-urban migration offers the hatch for rural people to escape from the traps of poverty. Such migrations are either permanent i.e. people leave and find permanent residences elsewhere or seasonal. In the latter case, people go through an annual cycle of leaving their rural settings to the urban areas, usually during the off-farm season and return only for the brief periods of the cropping season to tend to their farms and to leave again. As a result of this seasonal migration “...people from the North can come down South and tap into the wealth of the South and go back. People in the rural areas can come to the urban areas and tap and go back” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).

In between the permanent and cyclical migrants, are the fortune migrants who may go for extended periods of time in search of resources to come back and start a business, get married, or meet some other social commitments. Counted among these would be people seeking startup capital for their dream ventures or funding to continue their education. These include the exodus of mainly young girls principally from the Northern Region to Kumasi and Accra to serve as head porters “Kayayei”. The proliferation of street vendors in urban areas is another manifestation of this fortune seeking migrations. For the braver ones, it is the staging ground for further migration, as they accumulate resources for that visa and a ticket to take on their Europe, America, or Asia bound sojourns. And if the money is not trickling in fast enough, a trek across the desert is often an option they would consider (Daily Guide, 2010).

The peace dividend of such youth migration lies in the fact that since everyone is busy finding an escape route out of their traps, there is no critical mass of “...angry young men in the community” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) who will engage state institutions and other duty bearers to demand accountability and efficient delivery of services. Respondents, however, noted the emergence of the phenomenon in urban areas, especially in the urban slum areas, where critical masses of enlightened and angry youth are beginning to self-mobilize to take on the state for poor or non-delivery of services. This marks a turning point for Ghana’s peace. If youth in the rural areas can’t organize, they are beginning to do so once they get to the urban areas and find that their escape hatches were false ones. Urban poverty is as bad, if not worse than the rural one. Already, the youth demand for state attention to their plight is done violently, as witnessed in the Ashiaman youth protests over poor road networks (Jafaru, 2013; Myjoyonline, 2013a) or

the violent reactions of Muslim youth in Kumasi over the purported theft of a baby born to an illiterate mother (Abdulai, 2014). Their example could be a precedent for the emerging middle class protesters cited above, if state engagement for peaceful dialogue is not forthcoming.

Subcategory 3.4 Humor as a hatch of escape

Jokes play important cathartic roles in every society. However, in oral societies, they are also effective means for encoding and transmitting historical events and folk wisdom across generations. Jokes can breach social barriers, allowing for the use of role reversals to portray alternate realities. As Cochran recalls, in some jokes, “The message is turned on its head, hierarchy is undone, the mighty are fallen, the would-be-emperor is a window washer” (Cochran, 1989, p. 1). In addition, jokes are effective means for participatory reconstruction of realities and collective narratives, since everyone who retells the joke may add or take away from the original facts to make the joke appealing to the current audience. The multiple recounts of the jokes makes the facts of the trigger event fade; and with that fades also the original emotions (bitter or sweet) attached to the trigger facts and events of the joke. Hence, jokes are ways to reconstruct or deconstruct narratives to make what should otherwise be a painful experience turn into a light one. They are tools for managing memories or helping to soothe and heal hurt feelings.

In consonance with these views, respondents in this study have observed that Ghanaians have a high sense of humor that enables them to laugh at and laugh off virtually everything, including things that should make them angry. As one respondent noted, “We joke about otherwise serious situations and the laughter that comes with it has a very therapeutic effect on all concerned” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014). Another

respondent would add that: “Yes, we laugh over everything; we make jokes over everything, you know” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). These views find support in a recent observation that Ghanaians seem to have a penchant for “...allowing yourselves to make serious things appear funny because it looks like one of the ways to satisfy us is to just give us something to entertain ourselves with and we’ll entertain ourselves with it for life” (Pastor Otabil in Radioxyzone.com, 2014, p. 1). As a result, issues that should ordinarily make Ghanaians angry easily become “national jokes” which dull the collective consciousness to the evil inherent in the trigger event. Consequently there is no critical mass of people that can be mobilized to hold to account political and civil authority or other duty bearers that have failed their obligations to citizens in respect of the event.

Examples of how serious national issues can be trivialized, masked, and tugged away abound. When in 1994 long standing interethnic tensions escalated into Ghana’s most violent and widespread conflict yet, the episode was quickly labeled *The Guinea Fowl War*. Similar derisory accolades and jokes have been conferred on similar conflicts across the country. When the management of the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority could not account for how, after sinking Fifteen Million Ghana Cedis (Azure, 2012) - about US\$4.3 million at the exchange rate of GHC3.5 - into a guinea fowl project they could not produce a single guinea fowl to justify the investment, a joke would be made that the SADA guinea fowls were allowed to fly into Burkina Faso to save them from staging a coup d’état in Ghana (Dorfe, 2014).

Ghanaians also use jokes to blur lines of division when it attracts the therapeutic laughter from all sides. Even if momentarily, such collective laughter eases tensions

between those who partake in it. When the National Secretary of the NPP was hauled before the Supreme Court justices hearing the Election Petition of 2012 to answer contempt charges for making remarks that "...had the tendency to derail the country's peace and endanger the lives of its 24 million citizens" (Daily Graphic, 2013), counsel of the accused resorted to jokes, including a request that his client be pardoned as a birthday gift to he, the counsel. The trick worked in extracting leniency from the bench.

An unanswered question is whether the joking nature of Ghanaians is a conscious strategy designed to enable Ghanaians not to remember the pain that the object of the joke created or exacerbated. For, the joking nature of Ghanaians seems to be closely related to their short memories as well. Ghanaians tend to forget otherwise serious national issues or the pains they have been through once they have been able to laugh it off. President Mahama endorsed this view when he bemoaned the fact that Ghanaians would soon forget his good works when the power crisis, among others, are over. Statesmen such as Dr. K.B Asante would agree that "...President Mahama is not far from the truth for saying Ghanaians have short memories" (Ultimate Radio, 2013, p. 1); and Nana Akufo Addo, Presidential Candidate in 2008 and 2012 for Ghana's largest opposition party is reported to have expressed similar sentiments (Jackson, 2012).

Ghana currently faces its worse power generation and distribution crisis since independence. Factories are reported to be closing down, industries are laying off workers, and private informal sector businesses that depend on electricity for their work are either shutting down or are facing serious disruptions to their operations. But Ghanaians seem to be able to cope with the situation when they joke over the *Dumsor* phenomenon. Coined in the Akan language, the word *Dumsor*, a literal description of the

frequent and unexpected on and off power outages, is an example of the creative use of language to comically express otherwise serious matters. The term “*Dumsor*”, for instance, would soon be appropriated and used in all sorts of ways to make light the crisis that the nation faced. As President Mahama himself would note:

We had the energy crises, which was popularly called ‘Dumsor’ and I was appropriately labeled the “apostle of ‘Dumsor’, ‘Dumsor’ and Ghanaians in their usual humour crafted a very interesting greeting that said “Yema mo dumsor oo,”... then another responds “Yaa Mahama” ...However, very often in Ghana we have a very short memory. [Wait till] The energy crisis is solved and we don’t remember the darkness we were in (Addo, 2013, p. 1).

Some public officeholders latch onto the double doze effects of trivialization and collective amnesia that jokes induce to deflect or dampen criticism against their performance failures or to whittle away important issues into nothingness. A respondent recalled how Members of Parliament from both the NDC and the NPP have appropriated the term “greedy bastards”, once used by former President Rawlings to express his exasperation at the unbridled corruption among officials of his own party that prided itself of being a party of probity and accountability. The MPs are reported to use the term jokingly to tease each other (Interview 26 February, 2014). The joke then trivializes the recriminations the former President intended for them. And since it is a joke, they don’t really have to worry about doing anything to address the concern.

In defense of the culture of jokes and joking, some observers have stated that this tendency to make “somehow serious things [as] a joke to us” (Otabil in

Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1) epitomizes the collective disillusionment of Ghanaians at the persistent failure of duty bearers to address the issues at stake. Jokes therefore are an expression of Ghanaians' resignation to their fate. It is an essential ingredient of the conflict bearing capacity of Ghanaians. As one respondent put it, "Yes, it's good [to joke over serious issues] to help us carry on; it gives us patience, and it gives us capacity for long suffering and all that (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).

However, others believe that Ghanaian's are taking their jovial nature to the extreme, to the point where it is becoming a serious block to a national consciousness and collective will to tackle important national issues with seriousness. As a respondent put it, jokes may be good in easing tensed situations, "but where we over indulge in that we run away from our responsibilities" (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). The danger of abdication from the collective responsibility to confront and deal seriously with national issues would force a senior pastor to recently observe that even though joking is:

...the way we survive' but that way we survive is killing us..."We're polluting ourselves. We have issues we can't solve. We have problems we can't solve. We are overwhelmed all around us, yet we have a lot of time to joke and to laugh and to act as if this is the most normal environment to live in" (Otabil in Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1).

Whatever their forms, Ghanaians have used these jokes as important escape hatches. They enable them bear the pain of the moment in difficult political, economic, and even social times; granting them the space to transition to another place where the pain would not be remembered. But as the concerns of Otabil indicate, glossing over painful situations does not make them go away. If anything, the gloss of laughter leaves

the wounds unattended to. Such wounds can only fester and manifest again, probably, in worst forms sooner or later. The question that Otabil's statement provokes is whether Ghana's inability to dig herself out of her state of negative peace is not precisely because of her inability to take matters seriously; take the bulls by their horns and deal with issues in ways that would break the cycle forever.

Subcategory 3.5 Visible and Invisible Weavers of Peace

Peace is the product of actions or engagements. Even when predisposing elements of peace exist in a community, there is the need for "...agents for peace [who] can act to mitigate or limit the effects of violence" (Neufeldt et al., 2002, p. 91). To be effective, such "...key agents of change, [must have the] capacity for building vertical and horizontal integration" (Neufeldt et al., 2002). In support of this, respondents have amply cited examples of how individuals and institutional actors have on their own or acting in concert with others have steered some of Ghana's very volatile and potentially violent conflicts towards peaceful ends. Such efforts are nested in long histories of similar voluntary initiatives that fostered peace in the country.

A couple of examples will illustrate the point. In the mid-1970s, unarmed students championed the campaign against the military government's Union Government Concept designed to entrench the military in power. Even though the referendum the government was able to force through declared a win for the concept, the students had created enough public aversion to the concept to provide an excuse for a palace coup that stopped the implementation of the plan. In a similar way, students and professional bodies championed the campaign for a return to civilian rule between 1981 and 1990, when it was obvious that the PNDC regime under Rawlings had no intent of handing over power

to an elected civilian government (Ameyibor, 1996; Gyamfi, 2014; also see Interview 212, 9 December 2014). The regime used the composition of the Consultative Assembly to try to dilute, if not eliminate the influences of the professionals and other intellectuals the PNDC considered hostile to its agenda of self-perpetuation (Gyamfi, 2014). Although the Ghana Bar Association and other professional bodies boycotted participation in the Constituent Assembly, certain individuals broke ranks with their peers and worked their way into the Assembly just so they could make sure that a workable constitution was framed. The Transitional Provisions that were inserted into the draft constitution may have been intended to set a trap for its rejection at the referendum, and thereby retain the PNDC in power. Again, realizing the trap that this arrangement was setting, individuals and institutions mobilized the citizenry to vote for the constitution, irrespective of its defects (Interview 212, 9 December 2014). Other examples of individual initiatives to protect the common good abound.

Besides civil actors, respondents in this study have credited matured political leadership of the two major political parties as major contributory factors to Ghana's peace. When the New Patriotic Party felt the 1992 elections had been rigged, it chose to write a book - the *Stolen Verdict* - rather than mobilize its supporters in to the streets to protest the alleged rigging of the elections. In 2009, the National Democratic Congress also chose to go to court to contest the December 2008 Presidential elections instead of taking to the streets. The NPP would use the same route in 2013, when it had grievances over the conduct of the 2012 Presidential polls. The willingness of the political leadership to listen to counsel from the civil society, faith-based, and traditional leaders has also

been mentioned as yet another trait in the Ghanaian political space that has contributed to the peace of the country.

Ghana's transition from the 27 years of rule by a military dictator turned civilian in 1990 is often cited as the high point of Ghana's peaceful nature. What is little known, however, is the plot to botch that transition and maintain J.J. Rawlings in power beyond the two term mandate in 2000. It would take the agency of one individual, the Chief of Defense Staff at the time, who was obviously working with a counter insurgency network of security operatives, to uncover the plot and to botch it to ensure that the transition process went on smoothly (Agyeman-Duah, 2012). Additionally, respondents in this study have highlighted the fact that the much lauded peace architecture that emerged after the 2000 transition could not have come into being without the unsolicited actions of individuals and groups, acting on their own or on behalf of their institutions, to engage duty bearers across partisan and institutional lines to hold them accountable to their duties and make sure that they worked for peace.

The foregoing suggest that all the predisposing conditions notwithstanding, Ghana may just have had a certain crop of individuals who at the most critical times of the nation's evolution, were willing to step out and up from their comfort zones and take on the challenge of steering the country away from the descent into violence. The question that begs to be asked is what has Ghana's political, religious, traditional, and civil society leaders done differently from their counterparts in other countries that have descended into violence for the same or similar reasons that threatened Ghana's peace? What pushes Ghanaian leaders to act the way they do to stem the descent into violent conflicts? Answers to these questions will provide pointers not only on how Ghana might

strengthen her capacity for peace; other countries could learn a thing or two from such experience sharing.

Category 4 – Constitutionalism, The National Peace Architecture and peace in Ghana

Category 4.1 The Constitutions of Ghana and Peace

Respondents in the quantitative survey heavily endorsed the constitutions of Ghana since independence as major contributors to Ghana's peace. In the words of one respondent, "Ghana is a country where the constitution holds us all together" (Interview 6, 18 February 2014). Collaborating this, other respondents in the key informant interviews cited the constitutional provisions that debar ethno-regional or religious political parties by requiring that all political parties have representation in all regions of Ghana; and by extension, provide opportunities for all ethnic groups to be members of the party. The preference for the unitary state system as against the federalist structure has been commended for fostering a sense of unity among Ghanaians. The constitutional requirement on regional balance in the appointment of Ministers and other public officers also improves cross-ethnic inclusivity in the public sphere.

The fact that members of the same family can belong to different political parties reinforces political freedoms and reduces the tendency for regionalism and exclusionary ethno-political organization and political divisions along ethnic or regional lines. These, in their view, are concrete ways in which the constitution has contributed to establishing social harmony, minimizing political polarization, and fostering national unity and peace in Ghana. In the words of one respondent "...the national constitution has epitomized everything to the extent that Ghanaians moving to any part of the country would not see

themselves as visitors or strangers anywhere. I believe that it is one of the strong reasons there has been so much peace in this country” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).

Despite these positive traits of the constitutions of Ghana, respondents identified several challenges, especially in respect of the 1992 Constitution that is currently operational. They noted various aspects of the 1992 constitution as polarizing society and being destabilizing factors or threats to the stability of the country. First, they point out that the Rawlings led PNDC regime which superintended the drafting process of the constitution, carefully managed and mined the process and the outcomes to suit the persona of Rawlings. They find support in the view that “Ghana’s 1992 constitution is ‘Rawlings phobic’ the articles in it are raw and was crafted to suit Rawlings’ persona” (Akwa, 2014, p. 1).

Indeed, “Throughout the drafting process the PNDC retained the right to insert and alter the constitution as it saw fit. The PNDC exercised this right when, at the end of the process, they added a blanket indemnity clause for PNDC members” (Princeton University, 2014). Not surprisingly, respondents cited the inclusion of the Transitional Provisions which preclude any form of holding to account former military officers who used “...brute force that kept us in check” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014), as one of the defects of the constitution. Knowing that “Ghanaians would call for accountability to justify their actions one day [the PNDC had to] plant these mines to prevent it [and to make the possible review of these clauses so difficult that] by the time you get to amending these things, most of the players would have left the scene” (Interview 212, 9 December 2014). The entrenched constitutional clauses that ensure that such people

cannot be held to account for their acts and omissions that infringed on human rights has bottled up grievances that could explode in different ways.

Also, the winner takes it all political arrangement in particular has been singled out as the most dangerous threat to political stability (Interview 214, 10 December 2014; Interview 217, 1 December 2014; Interview 206, 29 October 2014, among others). The concentration of power in the Executive to the exclusion of the other arms of government, especially when the margins of win are less than 1% heightens the stakes at the polls and increases the chances of electoral violence.

The Constitutions have also entrenched inherent contradictions in their forms. In particular, the place and role of traditional rules in the governance structure will be discussed later. For now, suffice it to note that for periods that Ghana's has been under constitutional rule, the provisions of the constitutions have not been exceptional in comparison to what obtains in other Africa countries. Indeed, the basic organizing principles, frames, and content of the constitutions that have been in force in Ghana were imposed or imported from those of the British or American constitutions; both of which also provide guidance for the framing of the constitutions of other countries. Additionally, Ghana has not had one type of constitutional arrangement for any sustained period of time. The country now runs on its fifth constitution. Between the Constitutions of 1957, 1960, 1969, 1979, and 1992, she has flirted with different constitutional models. The immediate post-independence era saw a switch from the inherited Westminster system of government to an executive presidency under the 1960 Constitution, when Kwame Nkrumah transitioned from Prime Minister into President. The country then switched back to the Westminster system when constitutional rule was re-established

under the 1969 constitution. Ghana would return to the executive presidential system under the 1979 constitution; and then back to a hybrid between the executive and the parliamentary system with the 1992 constitution.

From the constitutional point of view, therefore, what may be working for Ghana is not in the letter of the constitutions, but in the spirit that its citizens have breathed into it. Constitutions are social constructs, deriving their essence, principles, and values from the collective experiences and will of the people who adopt them as their rule books. To that extent then, constitutions are only as good as the people want and accept them to be. Once written, people can choose to abide by them or not. We have noted how the constitution making process for Ghana's current constitution was carefully managed to protect the interests of some people. Defective as it was, 92% of Ghanaians voted to approve it at the referendum. In a comical turn of events, both the opposition and the government campaigned for the acceptance of the draft constitution, but with different motives. From the opposition's point of view:

if you rejected the Constitution, it means that you are prolonging the stay of the Government and anything than nothing at all which can later on be looked at. You have been under the yoke of an Authoritarian Ruler for near 19 years. Yes, you just wanted anything that would take them off. That was the idea. [Even though they noticed] some of these flaws [in the constitution] were noticed but to go back and have changed would meant prolonging the process; and people will be eager to get back to Multi-Party Democracy. We have, so to speak, the shell of what will takes us there; we can fill in the blanks later (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).

That spirit of partial solutions, abandoning the quest for perfection by accommodating and working with the imperfect in the hope that time will heal or provide the opportunity for correction, is perhaps, an attribute that makes Ghana sustain its negative peace equilibrium. For the Ghanaian, rather than push the limits for the perfect solution, they adopt the attitude that “whatever that they cannot control we don’t go further to explore ... we just revert to God; leave it to God” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). The origins and import of this philosophical orientation of the Ghanaian to politics and public life would be taken up further in the subsequent section of this study. Suffice it to say, to the extent that the 1992 Constitution is an embodiment of this spirit of accommodation and tolerance, it has served the peace of Ghana, even if tenuously.

Subcategory 4.2 Peace Architecture and Peace Infrastructure

a) The National Peace Council

The concepts of peace architecture (Ojielo, 2007), peace infrastructure (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012), and peace support structures (Berghof Peace Support, 2010) represent overlapping and sometimes interchangeable terms that describe a set of actors, institutions, systems, and processes that directly influence the management of conflicts to prevent their escalation into violence. In particular, peace infrastructure has been defined as the “structured, systematic” (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012, p. 2) network of international and domestic actors or the “dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society” (Kumar 2011, p. 385 in Hopp-Nishanka, p. 2). They comprise of “...anything from a rugged shed housing a local peace

council in a remote South American village, to the elegantly designed high-rise office of a national truth and reconciliation commission in the capital of an African country [with the sole object of assisting parties in conflict] in the process, or the implementation of process results” (Hopp-Nishanka, p. 2) from conflict resolution efforts. In other words, peace infrastructure represent intentionally created institutional frameworks that facilitate the management of conflicts.

In Ghana, the National Peace Council (NPC), is the pyramidal structure that embodies the peace architecture or infrastructure, which has also been credited with the peace in the country (Ojielo, 2007). However, the NPC became a legal entity only in March 2011 under Parliamentary Act 818, which provided for national, regional, and district structures for the promotion of peace. Since coming into being, the NPC has been instrumental in intervening in some conflicts, especially those related to electoral disputes, to prevent them from escalating into widespread violence. It has provided a canopy under which all faith-based and civil society initiatives for peace and good governance can come to confer, strategize, and act in synergy. At the regional and sub-regional levels, the decentralized structures have been active, in some places, in intervening in local conflicts as well. But as noted in Chapter 4 of this study, resource restrictions due to inadequate budgetary allocations have constrained the decentralized deployment and operations of the NPC.

Influential as the NPC is becoming in securing Ghana’s peace, it is essential to recognize that given the recent nature of its creation, its existence and operations as Ghana’s peace infrastructure does not and cannot explain the historical consistency with which Ghana has been able to avoid violent national level conflicts in the country since

independence. Indeed, we have noted elsewhere that its coming into being was merely a regrouping and christening of the efforts of various faith-based and civil society individuals and organizations that championed the course of peace since Ghana's independence. Therefore crediting the national peace infrastructure in Ghana with Ghana's peace since independence overstates the contributions of this infrastructure.

b) The Traditional Authority System

Historically, the chieftaincy institution presented the veritable locus of any form of peace infrastructure in the pre-colonial and colonial times. Chiefs were the major dispensers of justice and mediators in conflicts. The colonial administration recognized and harnessed this to effect under the native courts systems where chiefs had explicit and legally backed jurisdiction over certain cases. For instance, the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1910, made "...local chiefs' courts the first compulsory step in the judicial system" (Sutton, 1984, p. 42). The arrangement consolidated the pre-existing role of chiefs as the adjudicators of conflicts within their jurisdictions, in concert with the councils of elders. This function has however been restricted to original and appellate jurisdictions over chieftaincy succession conflicts only under the 1992 Constitution. Nonetheless, in the rural areas, people still take their cases to the courts of the chiefs for adjudication.

Going by the above, the traditional authority systems are, in principle, are important constitutive institutions of the governance structure of the post-independence state through various constitutional arrangements. In recognition of this, all the Constitutions of Ghana since independence have upheld the relevance of the chieftaincy institution in the governance of the country. This has been a major source of recognition

and appeasement for some ethnic groups, and has helped to secure their allegiance to the state. In practice, however, the evidence suggests that the postcolonial state has persistently tried to hook and containerize the traditional authority system from playing any direct role in the affairs of state. Accordingly, all the constitutions of Ghana since independence have either directly sort to eliminate the chieftaincy institution or applied the principle of exclusion by inclusion to significantly diminish their roles in the affairs of state. Hence, while recognizing the importance of chiefs in their respective communities, the constitutions very adeptly and purposefully confined their roles in affairs of the state to ceremonial ones, at best.

For instance, the restriction on the role of chiefs in partisan politics has been cited as effective instruments of Ghana's peace. However that restriction also means chiefs have limited functional powers in the administration of the state, irrespective of their professional competencies. Besides, chiefs have legitimacy, influence, and even authority that most elected and appointed state officials can only envy. Most politicians will have to align with the chiefs in their constituencies if they want to win their elections.

However, as Kofi Kumado noted in his preface to a recent book on peacemaking in Ghana (Darkwa, Attuquayefio, & Yakohene, 2012), the import of this constitutional duality that co-occupy the public sphere in the country – the traditional and the modern state systems - is masked and often overlooked in the political discourse on Ghana. Chapter 22 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the existence and operation of Chiefs, but Article 276 of the constitution debar chiefs from actively engaging in politics or presenting themselves for election to any public office (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992). This effectively hoodwinks chiefs in the public sphere. Unless

Government appoints them to a post for which they are qualified, they have limited public role in the formal state system.

But as one respondent remarked, despite the attempt to circumscribe the role of chiefs in public life, the reality, however, remains that "...our nation has two levels of political organization – you have the traditional system and then you have the national constitutional body at the top" (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). This has in effect created the dual state system that literally translates Ekeh's "two publics" (Ekeh, 1975, p. 91) into two republics; the postcolonial and the pre-colonial or vestigial colonial traditional authority systems. They command considerable legitimacy from their respective ethnic populations, as well as, wield considerable influence and power in matters of the state. However, they are only nominally integrated into the governance structures of the state. They also have little to no accountable responsibilities to anyone beyond what the customs and traditions of their respective jurisdictions mandate.

Ironically, because of the constitutional cocooning of the functional role of this second tier of political authority in the executive affairs of the post-colonial state that Ghana is, chiefs find themselves in a political limbo in respect of the management of the affairs of state. It is also a contradiction in itself in respect of the roles of chiefs in the development and peace in the country. Even though they have custodial responsibilities over the land and natural resources in their jurisdictions, they do not control their exploitation and use. They have influence over their people, but the country's ability to fully leverage the legitimacy and grassroots connections of this institution for national unity and development is restricted. Other official policies of state or ruling political parties reinforced this seclusion of chiefs from public life even where their role and

influence in the promotion of development and the maintenance of peace are recognized. For instance, chiefs are not allocated any resources of state for any community actions that could enhance their status and spheres of influence among their subjects. Hence, the effective capacity of chiefs to be instruments of peace is greatly minimized.

Ghana's relative peace has been attributed to the localized and containerized nature of recurrent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. Oddly, most of these conflicts have to do with issues related to this second tier of power. For, the issues that generate, sustain, and episodically trigger the outbreak of violence are chieftaincy succession, land ownership and tenure, and disputes over ethnic boundaries. All these squarely fall within the cocooned space of the traditional authority systems.

Paradoxically, also, Ghana's ability to withstand the political stresses in her history and to rebound from the brinks of violent conflicts is attributed to the rootedness, stability, and trust that these same traditional institutions bring to the body politic of the nation. More than half of Ghana's 57 years of independence has been under military rule, where the preceding constitutions were suspended or otherwise rendered non-operational. Therefore, much as the constitutions over time have elements that reduce interethnic, inter-regional and political tensions, they cannot be said to be the sustaining and stabilizing factor in Ghana's ability to avoid national level violent conflicts since independence. Conversely, for all the times that the constitutions have not been operational, the traditional institutions have provided the only form of stability and hope. As a respondent noted, "...when coups happen you see the constitutional body collapsing but the substratum [the traditional authority structure] is firmly in place; the same applies to our economy; when the formal economy is not doing too well, Ghanaians are able to

exist (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) because of the strength and rootedness of the informal economy.

Super Ordinate Categories (SOC)

The discussion of the findings thus far illustrates the extent to which each of the four categories of factors and their subcategories have contributed to Ghana's current state of peace. We have also highlighted the limitations of these factors as standalone categories for explaining why Ghana has avoided descent into violent conflicts. Each category with their associated subcategories constitutes systems of engagement in and of themselves. But as noted, none of the categories can lay sole claim to creating and sustaining Ghana's peace.

Hence, the current state of Ghana's peace is the product of the net effect of the interactions within and between the four categories and their sub components. In other words, the four categories must be interconnected in some way to be able to produce a result that is greater than the sum of the results of the individual subcategories (Bertalanffy, 1969; Meadows, 2008). This "interconnectedness, [is] the relationships that hold the elements together" (Meadows, 2008, p. 13) and ensures that the yins and yangs of their interactions nonetheless produce the "steady state" (von Bertalanfy, 1969) of negative peace that Ghana finds herself in. This state of steady negative peace must be such that "... the composition of the system remains constant in spite of continuous exchange of components" (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 159).

In other words, even if one set of categories of actions slip in and out of the action matrix over time, the net effect should still be the same, since the other components will be able to make compensatory adjustments to the loss of contribution from the

component that is out of service. For instance, if conflict regulatory subsystems of the state such as the Electoral Commission and the Judiciary are failing to uphold the peace of Ghana in one way or the other, other components of the peace sustenance mechanism will compensate for this temporary dissonance to ensure the state of peace is maintained. For this to happen, however, definable values, rules, and regulations or the “system stock” (Meadows, 2008) must be capable of providing adequate and timely “... signals that allow one part to respond to what is happening in another part” (Meadows, 2008, p. 13).

These values, rules, and regulations that comprise the intangibles of the system, are traceable to the religious and cultural foundations of the Ghanaian society. These two components, then, constitute the Super Ordinate Categories of the combination of factors and forces that govern Ghana’s ability to maintain its state of negative equilibrium of peace. The constitutive elements of these Super Ordinate categories and how they operate to provide effective governance to Ghana’s state of steady negative peace equilibrium are taken up next.

Super Ordinate Category 1: Polyroute, polyvalent monotheism

Respondents in this study have consistently highlighted the centrality of religion in the lives of Ghanaians. Ghana, they emphasize, is a religious country, with more than 90% of its population subscribing to one faith tradition or the other. The acclaimed religious nature of Ghana is consistent with what obtains in other countries on the continent. As one writer has observed, “Everywhere on the continent, the bond between religion and society remains strong” (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67). The foundations

of this bond are to be found, not in the new forms of religion that now dominant the face of Africa, but in the beliefs, values, and traditions of Indigenous African Religions.

Indigenous African Religion – The Base for Ghana’s Spirituality

Christianity and Islam, which together account for 88% of Ghanaians as their adherents, are both imported religions that did not come to meet a faith vacuum in their host communities on arrival. On the contrary, they have been grafted onto deep rooted and very vibrant faith foundations of indigenous African Religions (IARs). Belief in a Supreme Being who can only be approached through the intermediation of objects of His creation or objects of nature considered as lesser gods; recognition of the vivan interconnectedness between the material and the spirit worlds; constant awareness of the sustained interest of the dead in the temporal affairs of the living; and the ability of the ancestors to exact punishment and confer rewards for current behaviors, among others, constitute the fundamental tenets of faith for all IARs. These beliefs underwrite the values that govern individual and collective behavior in all societies.

Hence, Christianity and Islam have not supplanted these tenets; they are superimposed belief systems that often serve to clarify or justify the beliefs and practices of IARs; or in other ways, reinforce the relevance and validity of their creeds and practices. Alternatively said, Christianity and Islam, and all foreign religions, for that matter subsist very strongly on the sap of Indigenous African Religion (IAR), which still wields paramount influence on the lives of Ghanaians. This is in consonance with the reality that irrespective of the religion of practice that Ghanaians, and all Africans for that matter, profess their values and worldviews are still grounded in and governed largely by the tenets of IAR. As Houphouet-Boigny is noted to have remarked, all Africans, “From

African archbishops to the most insignificant Catholic, from the great witch doctor to the most insignificant Moslem, from the pastor to the most insignificant Protestant, we all have an animist past” (Houphouet-Boigny cited in Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67).

This animist past or innate religious tenets of IAR creates a common base from which Africans engage in and with the world around them. Its tenets are the first principles that guide action, voluntarily or involuntarily. Indeed,

The existence of this common base is so real that some anthropologist question whether imported religions – Christianity and Islam – have really affected African ancestral beliefs or given Africans different ways of understanding the contemporary societies in which they live (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67).

At any rate, for the open-minded adherents of any of the modern faith traditions, the tenets of IAR are often not considered incompatible with those of the imported faiths. For instance the belief of Catholics in the intercessory powers of saints on behalf of the living equates to the intercessory role of the ancestors in IARs in mediating with the Supernatural Being or lesser beings for blessings, rewards, or the warding off of evils. The belief of other Christian sects in the power of pastors to invoke blessings, healing, or ward off imminent evil, mirrors Muslims’ recourse to Mallams and Imams for similar celestial interventions in temporal affairs. In turn, and both the Christian and Muslim practices map directly onto the IAR’s use of its priests and mediums for similar interventions.

Under such circumstances, boundaries between the fundamentals of the three major faiths – Christianity, IAR, and Islam - are either dissolved or rendered so porous as to permit joint or cross-faith consultations for celestial favors. As one respondent in the key informant interviews noted:

If you look at Dagbon for instance which is very strongly Moslem the influence of tradition in the practice of Islam among Dagombas make them not very much different from the non-Moslem ethnic groups that surround them. So their values, their way of life have been the same (Interview 3, 7 February, 214).

Among the Dagara of the Upper West Region, also, Tengan points out that Christianity, particularly Catholicism caught on rapidly with them because they found strong similarities between the tenets of that faith and their own indigenous religion. Above all, it was easy for them to pick out and incorporate elements of the Catholic belief system into their cosmology centered on their indigenous belief systems (Tengan, 2000). Indeed, one of the pioneer missionaries sent to convert the Dagaaba would later indicate that:

It was not difficult to speak to them about God because ...they believed in Him and had always done so as far back as they could remember in their collective history. [...] The idea of God as Creator was not new to them either. He was the All-Powerful Supreme Being, Master of all Creation, whom they respected ... (McCoy, 1988, p. 63)

Ghanaians therefore see nothing wrong when Christians and Muslims pray for peace of the nation because in the minds of Ghanaians, institutional religion creates no barriers for the practice of the deep seated faith, which is the vertico-horizontal, personal, and ritually unrestrictive faith that IARs instill. Under this world view, there is one God, but there are many ways to getting to Him; and all ways are covalent, depending on your situation at any time. Therefore, irrespective of debarment by their official adopted faith traditions, most Ghanaians believe it is valid for a Christian seeking answers to a life question to consult an Imam or a traditional spiritualist, just as it is valid for a Muslim seeking healing for an ailment to go to a healing service led by a Christian pastor. Hence it is common at mixed faith functions and meetings, from the community to the national levels, to have Christian, Muslim, and traditional African religious prayers said serially; with all present responding to the prayers in the manner of their respective religions. In times like this both Muslims and Christians would bow down their heads and respond to the prayers of either faiths with the Amen or Ameen; and, as the Muslims lift up their palms to their faces to make the sign that concludes their prayer, the Catholics make the sign of the cross.

Under the circumstance, not only is it possible for practitioners of the two faiths to cohabitate in the same space; religious tolerance becomes a matter taken for granted. This implies religious absolutism is suppressed. Instead, interfaith inclusivity and accommodation is the norm. Hence what dyadic thought systems would label as syncretism, the polyvalent thought systems of the Ghanaian society finds very normal expressions of their belief in one Supreme Being who can be approached through many

routes. Each and every institutional religion then is seen as one of the means, but not the only means to an end.

This concept of polyroute monotheism – belief in one Supreme Being, but many routes to reach out to him or her – means in the IAR worldview, there are no societal restrictions or compulsions to adhere to any one faith. Traditionally then, just as members of families are free to join political parties of their choice, they are also free to practice any faith of their choice. Hence, despite the emergence of some degree of family intolerance to religious pluralism as a result of the newer religions, many Ghanaians are still able to freely choose and follow the faith of their choice. In short, “...we do not have what I will call religious fanaticism or bigots in this country - people that hold strong views of their religion; [that] apart we see ourselves as brothers first” (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).

This is what has made intermarriages between people of different faiths possible, as respondents have reported in this study. Religious tolerance remains a cherished ideal among Ghanaians. This is why recent events around the demand of Muslim students for rights of worship and the right not to attend Christian religious services in Christian schools have not garnered widespread support. On the contrary, religious leaders on all sides rallied round in attempts to find non-confrontational solutions to the issue, under the auspices of the National Peace Council. Many have cautioned calm as they describe the issue as alien to the Ghanaian politico-cultural and religious landscape.

Values of Faith as the Foundation for Peace in Ghana

In chapter 4, several respondents captured the fundamental principle of the Ghanaian religiosity encapsulated in the axiom of “*Fa ma Nyame*” – give it to God; the

saying which epitomizes the total dependence on God to provide everything. It is essential, however, to emphasize that spirituality must not be confused with religiosity, or the ritualistic aspects of being spiritual. Spirituality goes beyond ritual religion to include the belief in the innate disposition of all persons to be good and to demonstrate that through a willingness to sacrifice their own desires in order to be good to others. The respondent in Interview 210 provides a good summary of the Ghanaian spirituality behind this apparent self-abandonment to or refuge in the divine that is embodied in the “*Fa ma Nyame*” philosophy when he notes that:

In Ghana we say “*Fa ma Nyame; ε βε ye yie*”, to wit, let us give it to God; it shall be well. That has also been a very important cultural practice in our system – [the attitude] that God will deal with it in his own time. [...this is] the issue of the spirituality aspect which grounds people in something beyond this world. These are some of the things I will say we need to watch. So far these are what has held us together.

Interview 201 already referenced, this God-centered “...attribute of Ghanaians” conditions total reliance on God for answers to whatever they believe they cannot control. Rather than rely on their human capacities and “...go further to explore, we don’t want to get any scientific explanation; we just revert to God, leave it to God and that shows the extent to which religion has influenced the attitudes of most Ghanaians. That [attitude] is very important in looking at why Ghanaians have been seen generally to be peaceful” (Interview 201, 15 October 2014).

This total reliance on divine providence to fill the gaps in their human needs dovetails into another foundational spiritual principle of “*En nyε hwee*” –literally

meaning, this is nothing; it does not matter. Under this principle, Ghanaians are consoled or entreated to let whatever has happened go, even if there is no hope of divine interventions to right wrongs for them. Closely associated with this is another principle that exhorts patience and forbearance - *Ɛhuru a ɛbɛ dju*, to wit, whatever boils will definitely cool down.

Rather than representing attitudes of fatalism, hopelessness, helplessness, or abdication from personal responsibility, recourse to these exhortations have considerable significance and impact on how Ghanaians individually and collectively deal with crisis situations that they encounter. First and foremost, invocation of these principles has a therapeutic effect on those minded to accept them as ways of managing the crisis that confront them. For instance, rather than take matters into their own hands or rely on human means to resolve a conflict, the recourse to divine intervention under the *Fa ma Nyame* principle takes the conflict resolution process out of human hands and places it in that of the divine. Leaving it to God in this way places no obligation on the offended to seek redress, by whatever means, on this earth. In this way, *Fa ma Nyame* fosters disengagement from the conflict situation and has the potential to elicit reciprocal disengagement and abandonment of the course of violence or reprisals to the divine from the opposite side. In other words, the “*Fa ma Nyame* [principle] ... leads us to adopt the let sleeping dogs lie attitudes and mindsets; making us not to pursue things that which otherwise would have escalated conflict situations” (Interview 218, 13 December 2014). Hence, recourse to any acts that can escalate the violence is averted in this way.

The “*ɛn nyɛ hwee*” principle, on the other hand, characterizes a predisposition to forgiveness, or the “... willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, condemnation,

and subtle revenge toward an offender who acts unjustly” (Enright & Human Development Study Group, 1996, p. 108). Faith is the foundation of this principle since “...persons initiate and choose to forgive because granting forgiveness is congruent with their personal or religious beliefs” (Amour and Umbreit in Umbreit & Armour, 2011, p. 233). This predisposition to forgiveness is closely linked to the other two spiritual principles, the first of which has been discussed above.

The last principle invokes patience, tolerance, and forbearance in times of conflict. Rather than use violent confrontations, Ghanaians are exhorted to use the gradual incipient approaches to change – based on the principle that “*ε huru a εβε dju*” – to wit, whatever boils will definitely cool. *ε huru a εβε dju* then invokes patience as it literally points out that since whatever boils will definitely cool at some point, all one needs to do is to patiently wait for the right time for the right temperatures that ensure situations have calmed down before one can engage in any effort at reconciliation.

The Akan renditions these principles have their equivalence in the other 50+ languages that coexist in Ghana. For instance, among the Dagara of the Upper West Region, “*ε huru a εβε dju*” principle finds expression in the symbolic and ritualistic use of water and ashes in conflict mediation and trauma healing processes. These elements have very strong symbolic significance that convey the import of the Akan articulation of the same principle. Water douses fire and cools down anything that is hot, including tempers and anger. It is therefore the symbol of pacification; and its ritual use is always designed to convey and inculcate this reality among the feuding parties or for the traumatized person. Ashes are the products of fires that have cooled down. Their ritual

use in conflict mediation and trauma management convey the same principle that whatever is hot can and will eventually cool down, like the ashes.

These worldviews are counterintuitive to the principle of striking while the iron is hot. For attempting to solve conflicts that way can only knock the process out of shape into an escalating spiral. Nonetheless, they have informed the way Ghanaians choose to manage their personal and national conflicts. We have cited the examples of how Ghanaians have chosen to play by and use the rules, however defective, to make change happen, rather than fighting the rules; the overwhelming vote for the 1992 Constitution, despite its defects being an archetypical case to cite.

Respondents, however, cautioned that while such faith foundations remain very critical to Ghana's peace, there is a danger coming for the newer religious sects which are preaching the gospel of prosperity to the neglect of the transcendental rootedness that faith traditions such as IAR and the original tenets of both Christianity and Islam preached. One respondent believed that as long "As we reinforce these things [IAR values] then we can hold the peace together. The moment we do not (jumps), for instance, some Churches are preaching prosperity and people are having faith more in, if I prosper, if I have material things, then I am ok" (Interview 210, 21 November 2014). This, indicated, is dangerous. Probed on this view, he pointed out that the danger inherent in the gospel of prosperity is that:

The message going out now is rather preaching anti-Christ, anti-Religion, i.e. you are blessed when you are prosperous. It does not matter which means by which you make it. Some of the Church Leaders themselves and their opulent life styles, and some people now get the sense that they

are just fleecing the poor. The moment people begin to lose faith and trust in these Institutions; where else do you turn to? If I do not take matters in hand, there is nobody else to do it (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).

In brief, religion may have held Ghanaians together and enabled them to navigate through challenging political and economic times without recourse to violence. However, that faith foundation is under erosion from the individualistic gospels of prosperity that are undermining the traditional emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. If that view supplants the traditional values of *we* before *I*, then the structural integrity of a critical pillar of Ghana's peace would have been seriously compromised. When that happens, the peace that Ghana has, however, tenuous, cannot be expected to hold for long.

Faith in Practice - Religious Leaders Following the Lead

IAR is a lived religion; not an occasional, closet ritual that one goes through. It is not a dichotomized private affair devoid from one's public life; faith must manifest in the public lives of its adherents. Consequently, adherents are expected to live out the tenets of their faith, as embodied in the values, beliefs, and practices it espouses, at all times. In the view of IAR, "Every activity [is] a religious exercise and the individual [is] left to relate to his or her maker according to how it satisfied the spiritual and material life" (Quashigah, 2009). Indeed, because "...religious beliefs and practices permeate all aspects of life of the Ghanaian [the] ... homo ghaniensis (a Ghanaian) is a homo radicaliter religiosus - a radically religious man – religious at the core of his being" (Quashigah, 2009).

This influence of IAR is carried into the newer religions – Christianity and Islam. Social dissonance occurs when belief is not mapped onto practice. To minimize this, it becomes incumbent on religious leaders not only to preach what they believe; they must also practice what they believe and lead their folk to do the same. Therefore, if peaceful coexistence of different people, accommodation, patience, tolerance, and peace is what they preach, they feel the pressure of duty to step out of their pulpits and prayer bays to intrude into the public sphere to speak truth to power on behalf of their followers, and to engage the public sector actors in ways that create the enabling environment for their congregations to live out their beliefs. In this world view, the concept of separation of church and state is considered a false dichotomy that should be jettisoned in toto. Little wonder then that Church leaders and some scholars have reiterated the inalienable right of the church to participate in national politics, arguing that “We are clear in our minds, that the church has a valid case to be involved in the affairs of the State in all aspects including national politics.” (Kudajie & Mensah, 1991, p. 33).

The demands to make faith manifest in both the private and public lives of citizens mean religious leaders in Ghana can only follow the lead of their congregations in the quest for peace and harmony in a multicultural, multi-faith environment. Subcategory 3.5 already highlighted the role that religious leaders played, overtly or covertly, to direct the ship of state towards nonviolent resolution of national crisis. As one respondent noted, “...in fact the least provocation in the country [and] quickly you find the Christian Council, the Moslem Council, all these other groups, bishops and others coming to register their concerns and all that and making appeals left and right for peace to prevail” (Interview 201, 15 October 2014). Giving more specific examples, a respondent from the

civil society network who has been very closely associated with the leadership role of faith leaders in national crisis would emphasize this critical role when he noted that, in this incessant search for peaceful means of resolving conflicts, especially the political ones:

There are life players involved - Cardinal Turkson, [and other] Eminent [religious] people who are part of the National Peace Council, the kind of work they did behind the scenes, is unknown to most Ghanaians. He [Cardinal Turkson] is interested in the work. Even from the Vatican he calls to find out where we are with what we are doing. He is championing the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC); how far we had gone.

Faith leaders have the courage to enter into and exercise such leadership functions in the political realm, which normally should not be their arena of play, because they know they have the backing of their congregants and that they have the responsibility to speak truth to power on behalf of not only their sects, but the entire nation. It is this knowledge that gives the National Chief Imam the grounding to address all Ghanaians in the period leading up to the announcement of the Supreme Court verdict in respect of the Election Petition that the opposition brought against the 2012 Presidential Polls. His exhortation to the nation was:

Fellow Ghanaians, let us all be calm and kneel before Almighty Allah again as we did in 2012 for peace after the final verdict at the Supreme Court and as we are waiting for the verdict we should try to make up our minds to accepting whatever comes out of the court and also know that Ghana is first always before anything else” (Sharubutu, 2013).

When he addressed the nation in this way, the Chief Imam knew that it is not only members of his Islamic sect, nor Muslims of all sects alone who would be paying attention; he was assured that the Christian majority in the country as well would listen and heed that call. Similarly, when Christian leaders speak, they speak to all, not their own alone. And, Ghanaians heed the exhortations of their religious leaders because they see the prophetic voices of the religious leaders as a guide to moral behavior for public officeholders. But as Interview 210 cautioned, this moral legitimacy that religious leaders derive from the entirety of the Ghanaian society will last only as long as they are seen to be championing the collective interest. That legitimacy will self-erode if the current trend towards the gospel of prosperity paves the way for faith leaders to lead opulent lifestyles at the expense of their poor and suffering congregations (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).

Ghanaians "...have a lot of trust in what their religious leaders say, [...] and ... there is a lot of trust in the faith-based organizations and institutions" (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) that they represent. Therefore, religious leaders have been and continue to be key bastions to Ghana's democracy and peace. In the main, they are seen as honest brokers, even if some of them have been labeled with political colors of one party or the other. They must do everything to retain the legitimacy and trust that their followers have in them. Above all, they must justify this trust through active, non-partisan, and proactive leadership and guidance to their folk in how they might constructively engage with the state to ensure that faith inspires actions in the public domain and guides the ship of state towards the fulfillment of the common good. If religious leaders in Ghana lose their neutrality, credibility, and get sucked into the highly partisanized and politicized public

discourses, Ghana would lose a central beam of its peace architecture. At that point, its ability to resist a descent into the abyss can no longer be guaranteed.

Super Ordinate Category 2: Intercultural Openness to Accommodation, Incorporation, and Identity Dissolution

The predisposition to war or peace in any society is a function of the values, beliefs, behaviors, and practices of the society. Hence, the peace architecture must be built on a solid foundation or sub structure that has a high conflict bearing capacity. That capacity lies in the psycho-social infrastructure such as faith, culture, social networks, intercultural accommodation and other intangibles that constitute the elements that create and sustain the conflict bearing capacity. Without this, no amount of investments in peace infrastructure can stand.

Adams (1995) defines a culture of peace in the following words:

A culture of peace consists of values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of life based on nonviolence, respect for human rights, intercultural understanding, tolerance and solidarity, sharing and free flow of information and the full participation of women (Adams 1995, p. 16 in Ratković & Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 11) .

Boulding (2000) adds that this culture also depends on the contextual or “...institutional arrangements that promote mutual caring and well-being as well as an equality that includes appreciation of difference, stewardship, and equitable sharing of the earth’s resources among its members and with all living beings” (p. 1). This culture of peace also includes larger concerns for the environment, collective security, the creation

of safety nets for the weak and vulnerable in society. A culture of peace is an active, ever changing process that requires the cultural participants to constantly engage in the “...shaping and reshaping of understandings, situations, and behaviors in a constantly changing lifeworld, to sustain well-being for all”(Boulding 2000, p. 1 in Ratković & Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 12).

Ghana is blessed to have these characteristics engrained in the collective psyche, values, and beliefs of the ethnic groups that constitute the country. These in turn underwrite the personal and collective attitudes, behaviors, and practices of the individuals that move the country towards peace more than toward violence. Though weak, Ghana’s public institutions strive to live by these tenets as well. Hence, Ghana’s successful management of the ethnic, regional, religious, economic, and other forms of political and social diversities of its population is founded on the culture of peace inherent in the socialization processes of all ethnic groups, as well as, the commitment of its institutions to play by the rules, even if imperfectly.

Additionally, respondents in this study have frequently cited the spontaneous and successful incorporation of ethnic groups in Ghana through intermarriages between ethnic groups, faith traditions, regions, etc. as attributes of the culture of Ghanaians to embrace the other. We cited the existence of family or friendship safety nets used to mollify the effects of the failure of national economy and by extension, government’s failure to cater for the weak and vulnerable in society as important ingredients of Ghana’s culture of peace. The gelling effects that the freedom of movement of people and capital within Ghana brings to the incorporation of Ghanaians into any community they choose

to settle in are examples of how Ghanaians cherish and embrace diversity. All of these constitute the intangible threads of the culture that help weave the peace of Ghana.

This study highlights the fact that there are many contributory and interacting parts that account for Ghana's ability to maintain the steady state of negative peace. Therefore, any attempt to isolate any of the elements as the major contributor; proportionately attribute Ghana's peace to the elements in isolation of each other; or establish some rank ordering of the relative importance of the contribution of each element to Ghana's peace can only obfuscate the nested and mutually reinforcing nature of what makes Ghana peaceful. Above all, there is a great risk of missing out on *how* that peace is actually created. For it is not the elements standing or acting alone that create the peace; it is the totality of the synergistic interactions between the elements that create something bigger than the sum of the parts of the elements.

Consequently, no one component can adequately explain Ghana's peace. As von Bertalanffy points out, the essence of the saying that "the whole is more than the sum of parts" is simply that constitutive characteristics are not explainable from the characteristics of isolated parts" (1969, p. 55). For instance, to isolate the separate effects of religion, culture, or education on an individual religious leader's decision to wade into the public sphere, as it were, and engage in actions, solicited or unsolicited, that have helped to create the peace in Ghana will be misleading at best. For, the action of an individual may be the product of that person's cultural, religious, and educational upbringing that makes his or her predisposition act in the way they do greater than any one of these factors alone could have produced. This is what would explain, for instance, why people who have been through the same school system; are members of the same

faith group; or members of the same ethnic group with the same kind of cultural upbringing would, nonetheless, find themselves on different sides of the positive and negative field forces that have sustained Ghana's state of steady negative peace.

Additionally, the process and rate of development of the collective trait of peacefulness among Ghanaians can be masked when the contributions of the different elements are viewed separately. As von Bertalanffy (1969), observes, "While we can conceive of a sum as being composed gradually, a system as total of parts with its interrelations has to be conceived of as being composed instantly" (p. 55). Hence, we cannot periodize the development of the different moments when the traits of Ghana's peace-loving or conflict aversion nature congealed into the culture of peace that seems to hold Ghana together. In other words, for any individual or group that has been engaged in the search for peace in Ghana, it will be difficult to isolate and categorically say which factor came first as the initiator and which one came last as the capping factor for the peace in Ghana - is it culture, religion, influences from the educational system, or the practical dictates of economic interdependencies that triggered or sealed the development of Ghana's culture of peace? The congelation process of these elements must have been instantaneous, practically sprouting out from the different seeds of peace inherent in the various elements that respondents have identified as sources of Ghana's peace.

The foregoing suggest that those studying the peace that Ghana has must be careful not to over attribute it to the recently established peace architecture, or the direct actions of the state. Conversely, state actors must be careful not to over ascribe the peace of Ghana to their policies, programs, and actions and thereby take the peace of the country for granted and behave in ways that would threaten the foundations of the values,

systems, and private actions that have shielded public anger from the state. On the contrary, they must strive to understand how the different elements have worked together to create the peace that Ghana has. This understanding must inform how leaders in the state system, traditional authority system, FBOs, CBOs, CSOs among others, can work together to uphold and strengthen the centerpieces that bind and bond Ghanaians together, namely, their faith and their culture. The day these pillars are left to collapse, that would be when Ghana would know no peace.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Emerging Theories

General Conclusions

Available literature holds out Ghana as an oasis of peace in a continent beset by violent and protracted conflicts. Findings from this study, however, indicate that Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They see Ghana's peace only in relative terms – relative to other countries and/or when viewed from a global perspective without taking into account the violent and protracted conflicts that beset various parts of the country. Respondents were also reluctant to classify Ghana's peace as positive or negative, arguing that Ghana's peace can be seen as neither positive nor negative because it is difficult to tell the difference between negative peace and positive peace in the case of Ghana (Interview 207, 29 October 2014). In the view of respondents, there are a host of factors in a force field, some of which are pushing Ghana towards the abyss, while others are propping her up from descent into violent national level conflicts. Somehow, these forces always manage to self-neutralize, leaving Ghana in a steady state of negative equilibrium of peace – neither descending into violence nor progressing into sustainable positive peace. As respondents saw it, the range of forces falls into one of three categories – the positives, the negatives, and the grey.

Among the positive factors, respondents hold that religion and culture provide the backbone support for the other reinforcing positives. Indeed, respondents gave religion and culture more credit for Ghana's peace than the formal educational system, which conventional literature has extolled as being the backbone of Ghana's peace. In particular, they exalted the influential role of Indigenous African Religion to the peace of Ghana, given its personalized, peaceful, open, and therefore accommodative overture to

other faiths and traditions. Its beliefs, values, and practices, are ample and tolerant enough to accommodate those of other faiths.

Although adherents of Christianity and Islam numerically outnumber those who profess to the IAR, the latter still has pervasive influence on the world views of Ghanaians of all faiths as its tenets still underwrite social values, beliefs, and behaviors. In the view of respondents, the overall influence of religion on peace derives precisely from the fact that Ghanaians find a lot of congruity between the deeper spiritual values of their respective current imported faiths – Christianity, Islam, or others – and the foundational values of African spirituality rooted in the Indigenous African Religious beliefs and practices. They debunked the belief that Ghana's peace is attributable to the dominance of Christianity and/or Islam with pointers to the fact Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among others, have predominantly Christian populations as well, and yet they experienced some of the most brutal and protracted violent conflicts in Africa. Similarly, most of the conflict hotspots currently ravaging in Africa are either in countries that self-identify as Islamic or ones that have significant Moslem populations.

Set in a nested relationship with religion, shared cultural values across all ethnic groups in Ghana were also cited as key pillars to Ghana's peace. Family, clan, and ethnic bonds retain strong transactional value in the socioeconomic and political lives of Ghanaians. Socio-political and economic organizations of all ethnic groups emphasize collective property ownership, and shared responsibility for ensuring the common good. Traditional values frowned on private gain at the expense of the public good. Hence

traditional social safety nets ensured that those who have, support those who do not. This serves as a natural bonding factor within and between families.

At the interethnic level, the openness of the cultures of all ethnic groups in Ghana to embracing ethnic and religious diversity have reinforced the automatic integration and incorporation of ethnic groups across cultures, especially through the practice of cross-identity conjugal relationships. This openness to others has not only encouraged extensive permanent and cyclical migration of persons and capital across all regions; it has enhanced economic interdependencies between ethnic groups. This, in itself, has become a stitch for the peace of Ghana.

Respondents repeatedly voiced that Ghanaians, for practical and spiritual reasons, are welcoming to strangers. They also abhor the shedding of blood. Put together, these two factors have promoted intercultural comingling of people, interethnic accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. In furtherance of these, the traditional palaver concept, with its emphasis on let's sit down and talk (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014), has also been recognized as an important cornerstone of Ghana's cultural preference for the use of dialogue over violence to resolve conflicts. This attribute has projected itself into the public sphere in the modern state system.

Culture is rooted in history, and that history continues to guide interethnic engagements in the postcolonial state. Historical interethnic social relationships and politico-military and security alliances have been cited as an important stitch for Ghana's peace. In particular, the existence of pre-colonial military alliances between ethnic groups located in the key cardinal points of the country – the Dagombas in the north, the Ashantis in the center, the Anlos in the south east, the people of Edina (Elmina) in the

south-central, and the Nzemas in the south west, is a factor cited as an important historical thread that still functions to keep the participant ethnic groups bound together. The concomitant conjugal alliances often transformed into mutual defense pacts, as well as, treaties of non-aggression between the key ethnic groups that, in contemporary popular view are political rivals, retain their subtle but powerful force of unity.

Within this frame, the centrality of Ashanti as the organizing and unifying factor in creating military and conjugal alliances between the dominant regional blocs of ethnic groups has been key in building a network of crossethnic alliances between large ethnic states in the pre-colonial era. In other words, rather than using its military might to be a dispersal force, antagonizing the other ethnic groups, Ashanti practiced and promoted intercultural integration and incorporation within its militaro-security structures, enabling all to be part of its greater empire without overt coercion. These historical memories of alliances, reinforced by intermarriages, have run as the background rules and regulations or software that govern interethnic engagements in the public sphere. This is what has given confidence to the view that no matter how much Ashantis and Ewes yell at each other in the public domain, they will never get to the point of going to war against each other (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).

Other bilateral and multilateral interethnic relationships on the basis of chieftaincy lineage across regions in the north, such as exists between Dagbon, Mamprugu, Nanung, Wala, and some groups in Upper East Region, all claiming descent from Mamprugu, are important historical threads as well that tie these groups together underneath the surface. A shared ancestry, history, and socio-political organizational structure – the hierarchical structure of chiefs rotated along the systems of gates – are historical bonds that still have

contemporary relevance to them. Other interethnic threads such as the joking and friendship relationships prevalent largely in the north are key to maintaining a sense of sameness rather than difference among the ethnic groups in this part of the country. This helps in the interethnic incorporation, as people settle in different places across the country. Leaders steeped in this history find strength and reason from these deeper sources to enable them step up and out to champion the courses of peace in times of crises.

The agential role of some political, religious, and traditional leaders in birthing and nurturing Ghana's peace has also been highlighted. Very neutral, inclusive, and objective leadership of the chiefs in all regions played a critical role in rallying ethnic groups to support common courses in the legislative deliberations leading up to independence. In particular, the early recognition of the economic interdependencies that existed between all parts of the country led to the creation of a leadership that championed the need for unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the mutual benefit of all. Hence, starting with willful unions between ethnic groups, as described in the various alliances that emerged, the immediate pre-independence era witnessed the striking of political concessions, especially between the north and Ashanti. This eventually led to the merger of the political parties representing the two geo-political spaces into what is today the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition in Ghana's politics.

In the run up to independence, the nascent nucleus of confederates of ethnic states that the aforementioned pre-colonial politico-military alliances created, and the inter-ethnic consensus building that was emerging in the Legislative Assembly came under strain, when separatist ethnic independence movements threatened to tear it apart. The singular efforts and statecraft of Kwame Nkrumah in avoiding this break up stood out for

respondents in this study. Not only did he succeed in bringing Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and the Transvolta Togoland, into a unitary state structure with the Gold Coast; he successfully suppressed, through legal and constitutional means, the nascent attempts to erect political parties based on religion (the Moslem Association Party) and ethno-regional blocs such as the National Liberation Movement, (NLM) for Ashanti; the Northern Peoples Party, NPP; and the Togoland Congress Party, TCP.

Though controversial in some respect, his redrawing of intra and interethnic boundaries in the post-colonial state served to disperse ethnic power bases and create the relevant spaces and distances that helped to mollify conflicts. For instance, the creation of the Brong Ahafo Region in 1959 separated the Brongs and the Ashantis, while the creation of the Upper Region in 1960 also split the Mamprugu state, resulting in the separation of the Kusasis from the Mamprusis. While these redefinition of ethnic boundaries did not altogether eliminate the conflicts, and in deed, those conflicts still exist, the effect of the creation of jurisdictional boundaries was to separate the influence of existing ethnic overlords over large portions of the country. This pre-empted the entrenchment of ethnic states, which would have hampered the creation and sustenance of the spirit of a unitary state.

Since independence, other leaders have striven to keep the unitary state concept intact. In particular, the role of religious leaders from both Christian and Islamic faiths in proactively engaging in the public sphere, jointly or severally, to speak truth to power and demand that the right things be done to keep the peace of the country, stand out strongly in this study. Backing this are leadership roles of military and other security forces in creating and maintaining a professional and largely neutral security services that have not

lent themselves to political manipulations. Conversely, since 1993, citizens' memories of military brutalities in the past, when they stepped in to govern the country under the banners of redeeming, liberating, revolutionizing, or otherwise provisionally leading the country out of chaos, have served as deterrence to any acts that would give the military course to re-enter politics via coup d'états.

While women are recognized as playing important roles in securing the peace of Ghana, respondents believe such roles are largely behind the scenes and restricted to the nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles normally reserved for women in traditional patriarchal settings. Hence, women are not seen as frontline activists for peace, except when they champion intercessory prayer sessions seeking divine intervention for the peace of the country. Otherwise, they play the moderating, mediatory, and conciliatory roles behind the scenes. For this reason, their roles in the peace of Ghana are not seen in the public domain. Consequently, respondents had difficulties pinpointing what specific roles, if any, women have played in Ghana's peace. This is in spite of the fact that women took an early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and organize Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement.

Although accentuated ethno-regional economic disparities can be the cause of violence, in Ghana, however, the existence of regional economic inequalities are not seen as deliberate acts of neglect, punishment, exploitation, or exclusion. On the contrary, the disparities are largely seen and blamed on colonial policies and natural or environmental disadvantages. Besides, the freedom of movement of persons from the less endowed areas to the richer natural resource zones of the country affords people from the poorer parts of the country – the north and the rural areas – access to the economic

resources of the more naturally endowed south of the country. This happens directly or indirectly through homeward income transfers from migrant workers. Additionally, though limited in scope and impact, there are nonetheless visible efforts of central government to redistribute resources in favor of the poorer areas. Therefore, the poorer segments of communities see no reason for regional or ethnic mobilization for violent inter-regional confrontations on the basis of perceived horizontal inequalities or interethnic deprivation.

Finally, Ghana also benefits somewhat from the looking-glass self effect (Cooley, 2010). Her poster child position as a peaceful country predated the colonial era. Hence, right from colonial times, Ghana has been regarded as a model in different ways. It became the reference point for British colonial administration in Africa. The fact that she is even considered an oasis of peace is yet another model role conferred on her. In the view of respondents, this positive international perception of Ghana as a role model, and the respect she and her illustrious citizens have earned in international circles, makes her leaders and people want to behave in ways that conform to the expectations of the international community. Hence, Ghanaians feel some pressure to keep up this model image. In the view of respondents, it is this “noblesse oblige” (Interview 205, 29 October 214) factor which makes Ghanaians not want to mar their positive reviews to date.

On the negative side, respondents see contemporary politics, especially political exclusion, as posing a higher risk for pushing Ghana towards violent national level conflict than the horizontal inequalities in the distribution of development across geo-ethnic regions. The duopoly that the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party enjoy in the country has so highly polarized the political environment that no single

issue of national significance can be discussed without evoking entrenched partisan positions. Consequently, politicians have failed to forge a unified range of national policies that would guide the governance of the country. On the contrary, the manifestoes of political parties have become the guide books for setting and pursuing the development agendas of the country in all spheres. As such, no sooner has a political party lost power than its manifesto and associated policies and programs are jettisoned, often in totality.

Besides, appointments to ministerial positions and other public offices are carried out on partisan lines, and often without regards to the competence of the appointees. Even the allocation of development resources to different parts of the country are usually made through partisan lenses. These approaches do not foster unity, respondents observed. Hence, while political parties nominally provide the space for the jelling together of the interests of like-minded people from different ethnic groups, and to that extent, can be considered unifiers within the political sphere of the country, their *modi operandi* are sources of worry for Ghana's peace. Consequently, across parties and at the national level, the posturing of political parties is not considered a major unifier, since there is no national agenda that provides a common base for consensus building on national programs. As a result, political accountability is nonexistent as there is no nationally accepted standard for judging the performance of political parties in power. Instead, political parties in and out of power judge themselves by their own standards – their manifestoes and what they claim to have achieved. This only serves to further polarize and even trivialize important national discourse as the parties merely bicker over who has done or not done much of anything.

Additionally, respondents felt political parties are incapable of impacting positively on Ghana's peace because they lack the organizational presence and depth across the country. The majority of them are organizationally weak and operationally not good examples of adherence to the democratic culture that they profess to champion. Of the 23 registered political parties in the country, only two, the NDC and the NPP have met the constitutional requirement of having physical presence and functional offices in two thirds (2/3s) of the districts in the country; are able to prepare and submit annual audited accounts; and are able to furnish the Electoral Commission with the expenditure returns on each candidate after every elections and furnish same with their locations, and physical addresses, within 90s of the conclusion of an election. The rest are noncompliant with the law and therefore, technically, should have been taken off the roll. Many exist only in name, and resurface only during elections. They are unable to sustain the articulation and championing of their own political agendas. Their officers often jump on the bandwagons of or get coopted to champion the agendas of one or the other main parties. Consequently the duopoly that has literally partisanized the country to crippling levels will continue for a long while.

Beyond the parties, respondents have also faulted the political elite for failing to champion the common good of the country and the fostering of peace on a number of grounds. In particular, respondents cited the tendency of the elite to seek private solutions to public problems. This, respondents averred, is one of the challenges to galvanizing the citizenry in ways that would move Ghana beyond the trap of negative peace equilibrium in which the country cyclically manages to stave off violent national level conflicts, while being incapable of finding more sustainable solutions that would

promote positive and sustainable peace. Beyond the procurement of private resources and services to circumvent the failure of the public sector to deliver same, a more insidious dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems resides in the situation where citizens' discontent against inefficiencies and perceived raging corruption in the public domain is individualized. According to this perspective, public outcries of civil society and faith based organizations against corruption have not translated into mobilizing the individual discontents into collectivized and purposive outrage. This is because ordinary citizens see no stake in the state, which is seen as an external entity to avoid or exploit.

Besides, Ghana remains trapped in corruption partly because national discourses on corruption are quickly politicized and partisanized. This stifles the emergence of any form of unified leadership that has an agenda or mechanism for championing the fight against corruption. In the process, any possible group action against corruption is snuffed out. The individual Ghanaian resigns to living and let live those who have access to resources of the state to plunder as they can – a tacit subscription or reinforcement of the negative consensus ideology. It also reinforces political patronage as the means for redistributing national resources, as the foot soldiers and those who cannot directly access state resources wait for their patrons to kickback what they choose, to feed those who wait in queues to vote them into office.

The foregoing surfaced the concept of negative consensus among explanations respondents offered for Ghana's peace. According to this view, the political elite condone corruption because they are wont to indulge in same when they have access to state power and resources. For this reason, respondents believed another elite consensus to

keep out the military from returning to power supersedes the initial negative consensus as the primary organizing principle for elite agreement to avoid political conflict that might give the military an excuse to re-enter the political space. In other words, the elite have an agreement not to rock the boat so that they can have access to state resources when they can. As a respondent in the key informant interviews framed it in respect of the issued “...raised about the elite consensus, the elite believes in that and so the people who are leading political parties, who can use political parties as organizations to cause conflict are people who also believe in maintaining the status quo...” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).

The combination of the effects of elite consensus and the use of private solutions to manage public problems has produced the phenomenon of political entrepreneurship, since having access to political power is a sure way to get rich enough to circumvent the public problems. Consequently, people are willing to invest their money and time into making sure that they or their parties win the elections so that they can gain access to national resources from which they can benefit personally, ethnically or otherwise. This, respondents explained, is one of the reasons why young people coming straight out of school with no professional experience choose to go directly into politics. The pay-off is rapid and substantial as within months of accessing State power and resources such young people flaunt their wealth in houses in ostentatious lifestyles while his mates in school still have no job at all (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). Such political careerism do not only stifle initiative, innovation, and the urge to achieve among the youth, it reinforces the sense of hopelessness and helplessness among those youth who cannot or do not want to get out of their poverty through this route. The frustrations that is

mounting among such youth, accordingly to respondents, is one of the “kegs of gun powder” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) visible around the country that is waiting to explode (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014; Interview 219 – 14 December, 2014; Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).

For the middle class citizens and young graduates from the educational system who do not have the wherewithal to purchase private solutions; cannot access political office and national resources directly; or do not have the connections to do so indirectly; resignation to the fate of the situation and disengagement from the affairs of the state is what they resort to. For the adventurous ones, state exit through migration are the options open to them. Those who stay resort to what has become known as “kpa kpa kpa” – the phenomenon of being in constant movement around one’s environment, looking for anything to do, except stealing, to survive the economic hardships (Joy News, Nov 11, 2014; Myjoyonline, 2015).

Although in recent times, the middle class is beginning to engage in the public sphere to demand more responsive governance, accountability, and the economic dividends of the democratic dispensation, the depth, scale, and sustainability of such engagement remains suspect, given the demonstrated intransigence and recalcitrance of government in responding to the demands of the new middle class. Under the circumstances, apart from physical exit from the battle ground through migration, a return to the status quo ante - finding private solutions to public problems - remains the fall back option for the frustrated elite. As respondent in Interview 9 captured it, “... people get frustrated about the system and either they leave the country or they say let me

stay in my own corner and do my own thing and make exactly the same thing ... I drill a borehole, I buy a tanker, I buy water, etc.” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014)

A greater danger that this phenomenon engenders is the growing feeling among the youth that hard work and honesty do not matter; one only needs to engage in politics, get access to political resources, and make the most of the opportunity to enrich oneself, as noted above. This moral degradation, which is leading to a collective conscience defamation that holds that getting rich is good, irrespective of the means, has some respondents and national figures worried. They fear that this could be the break point for Ghana’s peace. Coupled with the winner takes all electoral system that Ghana has, and the tainted confidence in state institutions to guarantee free, fair, and transparent elections, respondents fear this approach to managing national resources can only lead to more intensified and violent contestations of polls – a development that can only break down the restraints that have kept Ghana peace.

While regional economic disparities are not considered a high risk factor, other forms of economic disparities are. For instance, respondents have cited the economic marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment in the midst of opulence displayed by political leaders and government officials as high risk factors for Ghana’s descent into violence. While they youth struggle with their unmet basic needs, they are equally aware of the unresponsive and unaccountable government systems and structures that facilitate or condone the misappropriation of public resources for private purses. They are increasingly exasperated by this and are beginning to demand accountability, sometimes in not so peaceful ways. Respondents cited examples of violent demonstrations in Ashiaman and elsewhere to illustrate this.

The political elite are aware of the security threat that the persistence of this situation poses to the country. The State therefore needs to demonstrate a higher level of commitment in managing the existing structural and systemic imbalances in the economy to eliminate the poverty-related violence in the social, economic, and political arenas. In the view of respondents, policies and programs that specifically target the growing number of unemployed and largely unemployable youth that are taking over the streets of the country in desperate search for means of survival, is crucially important to averting the descent into violence. Additionally, the ever widening gap between the few rich and the majority poor poses a danger for the emergence of a class-based violence. However, respondents did not see this taking the form of organized armed conflicts as in conventional or guerrilla wars any time soon. Rather it would manifest in increased rates of violent crimes, such as armed robbery, which would nonetheless undermine national security and the peace of Ghana.

Finally, public confidence in state institutions to deliver non-partisan services is fast eroding. Despite continued public faith in Ghana's governance structure, respondents noted that the institutions of state are weak, heavily politicized, and highly partisan in their management of public policy. Respondents cautioned that citizens' resignation to, and tolerance of the weaknesses of public institutions does not amount to an indication of the strength of the institutions in maintaining the peace of the country. Paradoxically, it is rather the high degree of citizens' tolerance for the failures of State institutions that must be credited with the semblance of peace the country has. In particular, respondents expressed fears about the breakdown of the rule of law due to corruption of the judiciary. In their view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice from the

courts, they will take the law into their own hands. They expressed similar sentiments in relation to the capacity of the Electoral Commission to reignite public confidence in its operations. Specifically, they expressed fear that in the next elections, people would seek to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level, as they have lost confidence in the ability of the Electoral Commission and Supreme Court to administer what they believe would be transparent and impartial decision on elections or deliver fair judgments should any electoral disputes wind up in court.

With respect to the grey areas or risk factors that respondents identified as predisposing Ghana to the potential descent into violent conflicts; education came in for strong mention. While the contribution of education to Ghana's peace is recognizable, the evidence suggests that its proportionality to other factors that have also contributed to Ghana's peace seems to have been over hyped in the conventional literature. As respondents observed, it is kind of difficult to establish a direct relationship between education and peace. They noted that missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a good job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized both academic and character formation. However, the evolution of the educational system after independence gradually de-emphasized religious and moral education. Consequently, much of the contribution of education to peace in the postcolonial state derives from incidental spin-offs of the effects of boarding schools; activities of students' associational lives and, to a limited extent, the posting of teachers across ethnic boundaries, rather than the intentional acts of curriculum development and implementation.

The absence of any concrete policy or structured programs of peace education in schools lends credence to the non-intentionality of the educational system in building a culture of peace in the country. Perhaps the only evidence of a direct and intentional policy action that aimed to use the educational system as a unifying force for Ghanaians, according to a respondent, was Nkrumah's debarment of the establishment of religious denominational schools meant solely for adherents of the particular faith. According to this viewpoint, Nkrumah forbade the setting up of such schools in order to liberalize access to education across faith lines. This ensured that the fostering of strong and compartmentalized religious identities did not emerge to supplant efforts at constructing a national identity or Ghanaianess that brought all citizens together, irrespective of region of origin, ethnicity, religion, or the type of school one attended (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). Beyond this, educational policymakers did very little else in the area of intentional educational policies and programs to carve out an inclusive national identity. As respondents pointed out, the real history of the people of Ghana is either not taught in the school, or when it is, the content is so skewed as to produce imbalanced views of what makes Ghana what it is. Rather than promoting peace, such biased historical accounts have been the triggers of violent conflicts in the hotspots around the country.

Even in the case of boarding schools, the fact that only a small percentage of Ghana's population ever goes through the boarding schools system casts doubts on the leveraging effect of this subset within the educational sector as the catalyst for the peace that Ghana has. Conversely, respondents identified the "old boys and old girls" phenomena embedded in the post educational association life of alumni and alumnae of certain schools as a major contributor to the existence of the culture of negative

consensus among the educated elite. This, in their view, makes crony politics and political horse-trading behaviors the bane to the building of transparent and efficient governance institutions, systems, and procedures. Additionally, education that was once a social leveler is gradually losing its egalitarian effect due to the increasing differentials between the private and public school systems. People who attend the relatively more expensive and better equipped private schools are getting uneven head starts in life over children who are condemned to attend the poorly equipped and poorly managed public schools. Hence education which once created a level playing field for all, and gave equal chances of social mobility to all according to their innate abilities, is now becoming a social divider on the basis only of one's conditions of birth, place of origin, social status, or financial abilities. This portends a risk for destroying the social cohesion that has held the country together.

The failures of the educational system have also occasioned the youth bulge phenomenon, which presents a huge human and environmental security threat. Limited employment and income-earning opportunities for the poorly trained and ill-equipped youth exposes them to political exploitation. This then predisposes them to the use of violence as a route to meeting their economic needs, as referenced above. A greater danger, respondents fear, lies in the risk that unscrupulous persons could easily exploit the poverty of the youth and use them as avant-gardes to import and deploy fundamentalist politico-religious conflict models into Ghana, to advance their personal agenda. This is highly plausible as the hope for better times, which once kept the tolerance levels of the youth high and restrained them from recourse to violence, is fast waning due to repeated unmet promises from political leaders. Hence, there is genuine

fear that the throngs of youth begging or hawking in the streets of Ghana's cities today could become the violent adults of tomorrow. In the view of respondents, this is because while Ghanaians may have been patient and tolerant, their stress bearing capacities, especially for the youth, are being overstretched and the breaking point is very close. Concrete results from state policies and interventions must justify hope; otherwise hope dies, giving way to despair, and the recourse to violence as a way to manage differences.

Religion that set the foundation for Ghana's peace could well be its undoing as well, if incipient trends of religious fundamentalism are left to take root. Indeed, respondents in this study have debunked any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in religiosity. They have pointed out that other countries are equally, if not more religious, and yet, ironically, some of the most violent conflicts these countries have experienced have been prosecuted in defense of religion. Cautioning Ghana against any complacency that their religiosity and prayers can protect the country from those who wish to import violence, one respondent paraphrased an unknown source to state that, "they are none who do evil with great abandon as those who do it in the name of religion" (Interview 9, 26 February 2014).

In other words, given the right kind of retooling of their faith, those same people who "flock to the churches" (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and mosques could be the same ones wielding the guns and machetes against their co-citizens. Hence, apart from the fear established earlier in relation to the potential hijack and mercenarization of the desperate youth for political ends, respondents have cited the increasing voice and influence of the gospel of prosperity that newer versions of Christianity are preaching as a potential negative factor for Ghana's peace. Similarly, they have cited recent agitations

from the Muslim community over rights of women to wear Islamic head gear while taking facial identification photographs or in public work places as inklings of incipient extremism.

In the course of this research, media reportage and discussions on the demands by some Muslim youth to skip mandatory morning assemblies or prayer events in Christian schools they are attending have sparked considerable interfaith debates uncharacteristic of the culture of religious tolerance that Ghana has known. In particular, the presentation of these issues in various fora in the format of fights for religious freedoms portends a feeling of long accepted suppression that must now be thrown off. The foregoing episodes have raised fears of incipient religious fundamentalism on both Christian and Muslim fronts that could pose challenges to Ghana's peace.

Respondents observed that Ghanaians have a high conflict carrying capacity embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people accept otherwise intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on with their lives. An alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that they can't expect anything good from governments. Therefore, they simply ignore government's failures and inactions and move on with their lives. However, respondents have also cited this collective short memory and amnesia as a long term risk for violence. In their view, as long as serious defects in the governance institutions and systems are not dealt with but are swept under the carpet, they can only sustain a state of negative peace, at best. At worst, the issues would fester and blow up in more violent forms without warning.

Finally, respondents have viewed the media in Ghana as a double-edged sword because it has the capacity to socialize people for peace or violence. Overall, the media

has played a positive and responsible role thus far. Ghana's free print and electronic media, especially the airwaves, are serving as vents for public anger. However, respondents fear the unbridled and unscrupulous media reportage that some media houses carry out under the machinations of politicians creates highly flammable flashpoints of violent national level conflict. The growing use of vulgar and violent language by politicians and their suffragans runs the risk of socializing the youth towards violence. The converse is also true; if only politicians can retool their use of language in the media to promote peace, violence can be avoided. Unfortunately, under the current trend of events, "...Ghana could be next in line for a state of political unrest if excesses in the Ghanaian media landscape are not checked" (Dadzie, 2014, p. 1).

The foregoing all suggest that Ghana's state of peace, however qualified, cannot be attributed to any one cause or set of causes. On the contrary, there are multiple centripetal and centrifugal factors in a field force that are acting for and against peace. Indeed, the same factor that promotes peace can also instigate a descent into violence, depending on how it is instrumentalized. The examples of religion, education, and the media, to give a few cited in this study, provide insight into the multiplicity of uses to which such social instruments can be used for peace or for war. This is a pointer that the conventional unidimensional view of the instrumental role of such phenomena on peace and conflict risks missing their multi-alternate potentialities and how they might be retooled for peace or violence.

Fortunately, this study points out that these instruments for social engineering are not metal-cast instruments; instead they are themselves malleable products that can be reworked and retooled to achieve purposes otherwise unimaginable. Similarly, they

should not be understood to be stand-alone instruments, totally different from other makes of the same instrument or even of other categories of instruments. As respondents have adduced, there is considerable congruence between the values of Indigenous African Religion and those of imported cultures, even if their scripts and rituals differ in form. Likewise, the congruities between cultural the beliefs and values of the different ethnic groups in Ghana are what have facilitated interethnic miscibility and incorporation.

In the same vein, the study points out that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon under which countries can be neatly classified as peaceful or not peaceful; nor can the nature of the peace be simply dichotomized as negative or positive. Peace is a relative construction embodying different shapes and hues, depending on the time, space, and perception of those who feel or do not feel it. In other words, peace perceived from the outside is not the same as peace perceived from within. In every context, there are bound to be nuances, localized or generalized, that caution against dyadic generalizations or categorization of countries as peaceful or not peaceful.

Like a deep, calm, flowing river, peace is not built from a single source. It gathers its strength and vivifying force from the trickles of water from drains, rivulets, creeks, and streams that run into the tributaries that feed the mightiest of rivers. The waters from these various sources bring with them their flotsam and jetsam, as well as, the life giving minerals eroded from the soils and rocks on their way. The flora and fauna along the path of the river draw their livelihoods - water and minerals for their sustenance and growth – from the river as it meanders by, weaving together a beautiful vegetative landscape of peace for those who have an opportunity of a bird's eye view. Its cleanliness is as much a source of strength as its dirt. Both give life to the environment that feeds on the passing

river. But the degree of cleanliness or dirt may never be discerned from looking at the river from the banks. Only the flora and fauna within can tell, if they had a chance.

In this study, Ghanaians, perhaps, for their first time, have had a chance to talk of the peace that they experience. And the respondents have unequivocally stated that this peace has its hues and contours that the outsider may not fathom. It is culture and faith, not the state or its sponsored policies and programs, that constitute the two major tributaries that feed the river of peace; a river not so pure and not so dirty but whose inadequacies, nonetheless, sustain an environment of peace not so positive and not so negative. While those looking from the outside see peace flowing calmly along, Ghanaians do not agree that they are a peaceful nation or that peace is a calm and graceful one. The semblance of peace is tentative and fragile. There are lots of tensions and kegs of gun power concealed everywhere, to borrow the words of the respondent in Interview 212 that can flare up easily and plunge the country into national level violence. A common agreement, though, is that drawing their inspirations and motivations from both the positive and negative forces that underscore Ghana's peace, individuals and institutions in Ghana have successfully managed to hold the fragile and unpredictable negative peace in a steady state since Ghana's existence as a nation-state.

This study has highlighted the centrality of culture and faith and their associated systems of belief and values, as well as, institutional actors that constitute the cords that hold Ghanaians together, given the failure of the state to do same. Whether via reliance on traditional safety nets to cushion each other from the effects of state failure; the use of private solutions to address public problems; escape from the failures of the public system through migration; or recourse to political entrepreneurship to find the means to

beat the hardships that state failure imposes on citizens, the evidence is that citizens are not waiting for the state to solve their problems. They have revived and retooled the essence of their indigenous knowledge systems and practices to circumvent the state's inability to serve them. Directly or indirectly, citizens' disengagement from the state undermines the legitimacy of the latter while reinforcing that of the traditional systems of socio-economic and political organizations. The paradox then is that citizens' disengagement from the public sphere to manage their affairs in the private realm seems to keep the machinery of state afloat, albeit in a precarious state.

For ordinary citizens, therefore, the relevance of the Westphalian state system as the principal guarantor of social, political, economic, and human security for its citizens is called into doubt, as they can subsist beyond the bounds of its actions, using the multiple and different exit routes available to them, according to their situations in life. However, the escape hatches have their limitations, and indigenous crises management systems have their breaking point as well. Hence, as state failure continues and worsens, without a matched citizen re-engagement to get it back on track to fulfilling its responsibilities, the extended family systems will be hard put to manage the increased offloads of state responsibilities into the private realm.

At that point, the strains of family reliance on members with some economic wherewithal could lead to increased individualism, as they abandon the social capital bonds of communitarianism, in favor of self-preservation. Between ethnic groups, increased competition for natural resources could lead to ethnic protectionism of their resources. The consequential escalation of the Darwinian situation of survival for the fittest in the competition for control of political power and the public purse, will

destabilize the fragile peace, as political conflicts escalate. At that point, what has been the central cords for Ghana's peace, religion and culture or ethnicity, may well become the rallying point for mobilizing the fighting forces. This is the fear and the warning that respondents in this study have expressed.

Emerging Grounded Theories From Study

This research tries to understand how and why Ghana is considered peaceful based on the expressed views and experiences of participants in the research, as well as, supplementary data on the subject from other sources. Charmaz (2006) identifies two categories of grounded theory – the constructivist and the objectivist categories. While the constructivist method follows the interpretive approach to theory generation, the objectivists lean on positivism as the frame for theory making. The analysis and synthesis of the various views and shades of opinion that the participants gave, and the comparison of same to other sources of data, including the researcher's interpretation of the meanings the data from participants and other sources sought to convey, place the theory making for this research squarely in the domain of the constructivist tradition.

While the research has made every effort to ground the emerging theories in the quantitative and qualitative data generated in the course of this research, as well as, in the supporting literature accrued along the line, ultimately, the theoretical perspective derived from the data "...depends on the researcher's view; it does not and cannot stand outside of it" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130). Since the emerging theories are interpretations of participants' perceptions of how and why the various factors and forces they unearthed are crucial to Ghana's peace, the theories offered below are by default larger and much

broader, perhaps, than how the research participants would have framed their perspectives in the form of a grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).

Timmermans and Tavory recall that the “...ultimate goal of grounded theory [is] the construction of new theories [using] creative process of producing new hypotheses and theories based on surprising research evidence” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 170). To achieve this, however, requires a departure from the constraints of traditional inductive and deductive theorization processes, which generally begin with rules or cases that guide the theory making process. Instead, they invoke Peirce’s conception of abductive approach, which is “the only logical mechanism that introduces new ideas into a scientific body of knowledge” (in Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 170). The approach provides both a theory-based and atheoretical approaches to research that requires that “researchers should enter the field with the deepest and broadest theoretical base possible and develop their theoretical repertoires throughout the research process” (p.180). With its emphasis on looking out for surprise findings in research, “Abductive analysis specifically aims at generating novel theoretical insights that reframe empirical findings in contrast to existing theories” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 174). Thorough knowledge of the theoretical frames around the research question often lead to situations where “empirical contradictions” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, 175) emerging from the data as matched to existing theories provide the window for generating new, and previously unforeseen theories.

The broad range of issues explored in this study lends themselves to both theoretical and atheoretical approaches to embracing surprises in the findings. The findings from the study have highlighted a number of cases where respondents’ views

discredited or otherwise devalued standing theories that have been used to explain why Ghana has defied the norm in Africa to remain largely peaceful. First, respondents expressed considerable ambivalence about whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country. Next, for those who affirmed that Ghana is peaceful, the reasons ascribed for this peace have discounted existing theories of why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into national violent conflict, despite having the same or similar historical, socio-political, economic, religious, and geo-ethnic tensions. In particular, respondents of the study point out that the institution of the national peace architecture is too recent to explain Ghana's historical trail of avoidance of national level violence since the country came together as a unitary state.

Similarly, respondents and complementary data available to the research both suggest that Ghana's educational system that has been touted as a major contributor to the country's peace lacks the evidence of policy intentionality to make it a deliberate instrument of peace. In particular, the evidence undermines the credibility and validity of the purportedly singular contribution of the boarding school component of the educational system to Ghana's peace. Incidentally, the literature has exalted this component as an envied backbone of peace in Ghana. If the evidence effectively challenges the validity of the explanations of how Ghana's peace has been achieved; what alternative theories then can emerge from the various insights respondents gave for Ghana's peace?

Abducted Meso Theories Emerging From The Study

Following the abductive model that Timmermans and Tavory have proposed, and rooted in the findings of this research, four tentative grounded theories pop up for this study.

The logic for their proposition and the tentative framing of the theories are detailed below. The specific theoretical formulations are italicized.

Emerging Theory 1: Sprouting the seeds of culture and faith in multi-identity relationships:

We have seen how Ghanaians of different ethnic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, and political backgrounds tend to cohabitate and cooperate within the same physical, socio-economic, cultural, and political spaces for mutually beneficial ends. Faith-based institutions, civil society organizations, citizens' associations, among others have all provided platforms outside the state system for mutually beneficial economic engagements or collaborative efforts for engaging the state to ensure it creates the enabling environment that further the interests of the parties. Such ultra-state spaces also provide the platforms for consensus building among different groups for sustaining opportunities that enable them to make the best out of their private endeavors. It would seem then that *When cultural and religious norms and values of different identity groups are mutually tolerant and accommodative, citizens find it easier to create, move into, and use collectively inhabited physical, socioeconomic, and political spaces, among others, to minimize the propensity to use of violence to resolve conflicts, while promoting cooperation, incorporation, and interdependencies that would uphold peaceful coexistence.*

Emerging Theory 2: Construction of cross-identity value-neutral culture of peace:

Respondents in this study have attributed the aversion of Ghanaians to violence to the fear of blood or abhorrence of murder; fear of retribution from God or the gods for

any acts that spill human blood; and the fear of desecrating the earth through the spillage of human blood. It is considered particularly abominable to spill the blood of a relation, no matter how distant that relation might be. At the same time, the roots of Ghanaian hospitality have been traced to the need to take care of strangers, as they might actually be gods on a visit. Plus, the very extended systems of relationships are such that the so-called strangers are really never strangers in the strictest sense; as some form of relationship - sanguinal, affinal, or historical - can always be traced to link the stranger to the hosts. These sacro-cultural attributes are so internalized across all ethnic groups in Ghana that valuing diversity and peaceful coexistence is almost second nature to most Ghanaians. As a result, Ghanaians seem to have a nag for searching out for opportunities to validate, reinforce, and operationalize attitudes, behaviors, and practices that put a premium on peace. Whether through engagement or disengagement from the public space; use of private solutions to public problems; exit from hardship or conflict situations through migration or any of the other forms of managing conflict that this study has reported, peace is always the ultimate objective.

A plausible theory for explaining this is that groups in multi-identity environments that find common grounds in their cultural and religious beliefs and values, create and use voluntary channels of engagement and incorporation that lead to identity disillusion; the identification and intensification of shared interests; and the development of a value neutral culture of peace that radiates from the private engagements into the public realm. This makes aversion to, and avoidance of violent national level conflicts that could destabilize the achievement of their personal and collective interests and priorities. The value neutrality of this culture of peace rests in the fact that participants may choose to

engage, disengage, escape, or do anything that would minimize opportunities for the occurrence of violence that affects them or maximize their noninvolvement in any form of violence that might disturb their personal and collective peace.

Emerging Theory 3: Perceived Economic interdependencies between otherwise centrifugal groups:

Respondents in this study have emphasized the role that the freedoms of migration, settlements, and trade across all regions of Ghana have contributed to the creation of the sense of We-ness or Ghanaianess among citizens of this country. This highlights Simmel's revelation of the integrative force of trading activities or expanded economic opportunities that the stranger brings to the host community to the building of social cohesion. Where intermarriages between the stranger and host communities are permissible, they can help enhance trust, transparency, and identity conflation between the hosts and their guests or settler communities.

In the case of Ghana, also, the homeward transfers of incomes and economic resources from the migrants to those left behind provides a strong motivation for both the migrant and their families to keep good relationships with their host communities. Beyond securing livelihood and health security needs of communities, the intensity and the perceived direct and indirect benefits of economic engagements would seem to be a strong unifying force for building social cohesion and promoting the culture of nonaggression between groups engaged in such exchanges.

A meso theory that this research offers for explaining Ghana's peace is that *perceived strong economic interdependencies embedded in the open and equitable access to natural resources across ethnic boundaries enhances the sense of belongingness and*

shared symbiotic worldviews between the host and stranger community. This in turn promotes greater awareness among all the parties of their co-responsibility to protect the relationships that feed them and the peace that makes the pursuit of their economic engagements possible.

Emerging Theory 4: Biological, Cultural, And Economic Incorporation And The Disarming Of Potential Ethnic Hegemons

The 2010 Housing and Population Census results show the Akan ethnic group constitutes 47.5% of the population. This ethnic group also happens to be located in the most natural resource endowed parts of the country. They have a proud history of empire creation through conquests and the building of cross ethnic alliances that span the entire country. They are therefore well positioned to exhibit hegemonic tendencies within the postcolonial state. To the contrary, respondents have recounted the unifying force of the Akan, and the Ashantis in particular, who are the dominant subgroup of the Akan. First, the maintenance and respect of the historical alliances with ethnic groups dispersed across the cardinal points of the country keeps a semblance of oneness, at best, among the major ethno-regional blocs of the country. Second, the Ashantis' preference for trade as their economic mainstay enjoins them to seek peace and peaceful relationships at all times to create the enabling environment for their businesses. Third, the sheer demand for extra hands to work their farms and other businesses makes the Ashantis mindful of the need to keep labor inflows from other ethno-regions coming in, not only cyclically, but as permanent residents as well. Fourth, and most crucially, the matriarchal structure of socio-political organization of the Akans places considerable emphasis on the role of

women to produce offspring that would ensure continuity of the political community, be it at the smallest village level or at the apical seat of the Asantehene.

Closely associated with this duty of women to ensure the continuity of political succession within the matrilineal clans of the Akans is the cultural liberty granted to Ashanti royal women to have children out of wedlock to guarantee the continuation of their lineage to political power through the birth of children. In the performance of this duty, they do not have to be saddled with the constraints of marriages that may not be reproductive. In the Ashanti worldview, “a queen mother is not required to be married, [but] is expected to have children, and is permitted to have male friends...” (Stoeltje, 2003, p. 12). This permissiveness is considered critical for the role of the queen mother in Akan culture “...to make sure that the royal lineage remained intact... since a particular royal lineage remained [a contender for the chiefship of their political community] so long as female progeny existed in the lineage” (Boaten, 1992, p. 91). This means that the paternity of children born into an Ashanti matrilineal clan could come from any ethnic group that the queen mother chooses. This fact is the basis for the proverb cited in Interview 205 that “*obi n kyere obia si*” or “*one does not reveal the origins of another person*” (29 October, 2014).

What this cultural trait does then is to open up the Akan, especially the Ashanti sub clan, for the admission or incorporation of people who share identities with other ethnic groups, into the respective lineages. And since some of the hybrid or even miscegenated products of such unions could end up on chiefship positions at any level within the Akan socio-political organization, ethnic purity is decimated and identity disillusion takes root. Under the circumstances, the accommodative overtures of the

historical, geographical, cultural, and economic centrality of the Ashantis has become a coalescing factor for the creation of the culture of aversion to violence that underscores Ghana's peace. A theoretical perspective that can be adducted (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) from this situation then is that *where culture and economic interests of a potential ethnic hegemon disposes it to accept and incorporate, biologically, culturally, and economically, members of the other ethnic groups within the country, enlightened self-interests, and increased awareness of shared identities and interdependencies dissuades mobilization for violence against the out group.*

Directions for Overarching Theory Development

The current formulation of the four theoretical frames offers them as stand-alone theories for explaining Ghana's peace. However, as highlighted above, no single theory is capable of fully accounting for why Ghana has managed to stay peaceful, given the multiplicity and divergence of factors that seem to work together in diametrically opposing directions to create the web of tensions that self-regulate to produce the tenuous but time tested peace that Ghana has experienced to date. Hence, each of the four theoretical frames effectively provides insights into how different subsets of action zones contribute in their own way, some of the forces that feed into the network of factors holding Ghana together.

The preliminary disaggregation of the explanation into these four theoretical components is, therefore, useful in breaking down the "...undifferentiated wholeness [of what makes Ghana peaceful] to differentiation of parts" (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) of that whole. Identifying these components in their own states and how they "...become

fixed in respect to certain action” (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) then permits a greater understanding of how the parts work together seamlessly to hold Ghana together in one piece, when they are progressively mechanized (von Bertalanffy, 1969). It sheds more light on the chain of causality and feedback loops between the different components and how they self-regulate to return to the state of negative peace equilibrium, even when the system is significantly jolted, as in the case of the disputes over the results of the 2012 Presidential Polls, which in any other context would have sent Ghana into the abyss of violent conflict. In the case of Ghana, this did not happen.

Self-regulation between independent or loosely related entities of a system is, however, only possible if these components answer to a higher level or superordinate system from which they take instructions that override their internally generated instructions that might be at conflict with each other. To be effective, systems must function synergistically, as “...the dynamic interactions of parts [makes] the behavior of parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole.” Hence, it is essential that we use a holistic approach to understand “how the different parts of the system work together” (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39).

The stability and growth of a system, in turn, depends on the existence and effective functioning of a hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing subsystems that accept and operate by coordinating instructions from higher level subsystems to create “stable, resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82). The hierarchies facilitate the work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities must be directed to help achieve the overall goal of the whole system. System brittleness, rigidity, failures, or suboptimization occur when the achievement of a “subsystem’s goals

dominate at the expense of the total system's goals" (Meadows, 2008, p. 85). Conversely, overcentralization of control in the hope of achieving overall goals of the larger system can stifle the effective functioning of subsystems. To avoid this, the system has to have "...elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose" (Meadows, 2008, p. 11) which work together to keep the system alive and functioning.

This "hierarchical order [or] hierarchical structure and combination [of lower level, independent components] into systems of ever higher order" (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 4) is an essential part of socio-cultural phenomena that ensures that order is created and maintained out of the divergent forces of society. Hence, while the four theoretical frames that this research offers may explain, individually and jointly, how Ghana's peace is created and maintained, it is essential to look for the higher level order of structures, rules, and regulations that have ensured that the subsystems that these theories represent actually worked together to produce the wholeness that portrays Ghana as an oasis of peace. The four theories identified in this study, therefore, serve as meso level theories whose interrelationships can only be more fully explored beyond the limits of this study. Further research and reflections on the interrelations of these theoretical subcomponents outside the scope of this study should lead to the establishment of a more comprehensive and overarching explanation of how and why these factors interact to keep Ghana peaceful.

Suggestions for further studies

Being more or less an exploratory research, this study has raised a number of interesting issues that warrant further enquiry to deepen the findings here or provide alternate perspectives that would enrich insights into how and why Ghana has managed to stay relatively peaceful in the midst of crippling conflicts in neighboring states. The list of research leads is fairly long. However, the following present key entry points for sequel research on the issues that this study has tried to understand:

Use of Axiological Approaches to understanding the bonding and bridging effects of intergenerational ethno-communication and education systems in fostering peace:

This study used a combination of a national quantitative survey and key informant interviews as the principal instruments for data collection. However, Ghanaians, like most African communities, are oral societies. Historical knowledge and indigenous wisdom are often coded and transmitted across generations using a repertoire of indigenous knowledge accumulation, management, and sharing devices that include songs, proverbs, riddles, and other oral communication techniques. In such oral traditions, it is often easier to communicate volumes of information or to explain very complex phenomena with one proverb than an entire textbook can hope to do.

In the course of this research many respondents used some of these devices to articulate and express views in their respective local languages to better express ideas that they wished to communicate. In this way, they were able to better explain what they intended. In some cases, use of the indigenous communication devices actually kicked up

important issues requiring further probing that would ordinarily not have come up if the normal conversational language in English were used. Despite the onsite probing that this study did, several of the views and ideas captured in the proverbs and adages could be more deeply explored using other qualitative data gathering methods.

One way, therefore, to explore the deeper insights into some of the issues raised in this research and to unearth the cross-ethnic, interfaith, and interregional perspectives on some of the critical factors that respondents identified as the pillars of Ghana's peace will be to use the axiological method of enquiry. In particular, use of the axiological approach to create space for respondents to explore the deeper historical, cultural, spiritual, and socio-political significance of the thoughts they wished to convey. Findings from this kind of research could greatly enrich our knowledge how and why Ghanaians have managed to construct and maintain their state of steady negative peace. Besides advancing knowledge on the why part of the question on Ghana's ability to stay relatively peaceful, such a study could also lead to the amassment of an arsenal of stories, proverbs, axioms, and other folk wisdom that local peacebuilders can use in community peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes.

Exploring extent of validity of culture and indigenous conflict management systems in promoting peace:

The study has highlighted the role that shared cultural and religious beliefs, values, and traditions have played in creating and sustaining Ghana's peace. Ironically, one reason why respondents characterized Ghana's peace as negative or unstable is because of the presence of pockets of protracted violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts

around the country. Nearly all governments that have ruled Ghana have had to deal with most of these conflicts. And yet, several Commissions of Inquiry and/or court cases after, these conflicts remain as entrenched as ever; and groups that invariably share the same ethnic spaces or boundaries, cultures, religious traditions, and socioeconomic fields of transactions such as farms and markets, have proved incapable of resolving their conflicts using their shared values and beliefs.

Questions that require further explorations are a) why has intercultural incorporation seem to have worked at the national level to foster peace among Ghanaians, but has failed to do same at the local levels? b) Why have these groups not been able to use their shared histories, cultural and religious values, as well as, their indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in resolving their conflicts? c) To what extent has recourse to state-centric approaches to managing these conflicts affected the ability of the feuding ethnic groups to find lasting resolutions to their conflicts? d) What needs to happen to enable these ethnic groups regain control of the processes for resolving their conflict and to ensure that sustainable peace is found?

Exploring The Effects of sub-state level Economic Interdependencies within and between ethnic groups as cords of peace:

The study has also highlighted how economic interdependencies, embodied in the free movement of goods, persons, and private capital across ethnic boundaries seem to have encouraged Ghanaians to avert descent into violent national level conflicts. This brings into focus Simmel's seminal works on the role of the stranger-trader as an economic, social, and even cultural integrator. However, conventional literature in the

studies of peace and conflict has not adequately explored the peace dimension of economic engagements and trade-related interethnic migration and incorporation. While literature abounds on the role of trade and economic interdependencies in building détente and peace between states, not much exists to illustrate how the creation of mutually beneficial economic interests can promote peace at the subnational levels. This research provides some pointers. However, further works in this area could help unearth the binding, bonding, and bridging force of interethnic trade in goods and services, and the existence of economic interdependencies as the foundations for interethnic peace. What elements in these exchanges provide the glue for the multi-ethnic settlements in Ghana?

Understanding the role of women in building Ghana's peace:

Although respondents of all gender categories have acknowledged that women do play a role in Ghana's peace, they have qualified such roles as restricted largely to prayers, advisor services, and other "behind the scene" functions. Women are not seen as frontline players in promoting Ghana's peace. Similarly, respondents in this study made observations in relation to the willingness of women to take front stage in other political spaces such as in local government structures i.e. the District, Municipal, and Metropolitan Assemblies. Several respondents alluded to the male dominance of the Ghana political space as the plausible reasons why women take the backstage in Ghana's peace.

A question that requires further interrogation is - is patriarchy the only factor preventing women from step up and out in the political space, especially in the matters of

peacebuilding, which respondents say is the preoccupation of women? Further research of the role of women in building Ghana's peace in particular and in politics in general will create greater understanding of the obstacles that block the participation of women in Ghana's public spaces. In particular, a listening project that solicits and brings in the voices and views of women on how and why they choose or do not choose to engage in the public sphere visibly should provide the foundational blocks for initiatives that foster women's participation in politics and peacebuilding.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Table of Presidential results from 2000-2012

YEAR	NPP	NDC	TOTAL	RESIDUAL	NO. OF CANDIDATES
2000	48.4	44.8	93.2	6.8	7
2000 ROUND 2	57.4	42.6	100	0	2
2004	52.2	44.6	96.8	3.2	4
2008	49.13	47.92	97.05	2.95	8
2008 ROUND 2	49.77	50.23	100	0	2
2012	47.74	50.7	98.44	1.56	8

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, retrieved from various links to <http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php> on 5 May, 2013. Links to data by year of election are:
 2000 - <http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2000%20PRESIDENTIAL%20ELECTION%20RESULTS%28%29.pdf>
 2004 - <http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2004PresidentialResults.pdf>
 2008 - <http://www.ec.gov.gh/page.php?page=395§ion=51&typ=1>
 2012 - <http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php>

Appendix 2: Cluster Sampling Methodology and Determination of Sample Size

Sample sizes were calculated with the following formula:

$$n = z^2(pq)/d^2$$

where **n** = sample size; **z** = statistical certainty chosen; **p** = estimated prevalence/coverage rate/level to be investigated; **q** = 1 - **p**; and **d** = precision desired.

The value of **p** was defined by the coverage rate that requires the largest sample size (**p** = .5). The value **d** was based on the precision, or margin of error, desired (in this case **d** = .1).

The statistical certainty was chosen to be 95% (**z** = 1.96). Given the above values, the following sample size (**n**) needed was determined to be:

$$n = (1.96 \times 1.96)(.5 \times .5)/(.1 \times .1)$$

$$n = (3.84)(.25)/.01$$

$$n = 96$$

It takes much time to randomly select an identified individual from the survey population, and then perform this selection 96 times to identify a sample of **n** = 96. Time can be saved by doing a 30 cluster sample survey in which several individuals within each cluster are selected to reach the required sample size. However, in order to compensate for the bias from interviewing persons in clusters, rather than as randomly selected individuals, experience has shown that a minimum sample of 210 (7 per cluster) should be used given the values of **p**, **d**, and **z** above (Henderson, et. al., 1982). In general, when using a 30 cluster sample survey, the sample size used should be approximately double the value **n**, when: $n = (z \times z)(pq)/(d \times d)$. In this case, a sample size of 300 (10 per cluster) has traditionally been selected using the JHU 30-Cluster method so as to ensure that sub-samples would be large enough to obtain useful information.

The estimates of confidence limits for the survey results were calculated using the following formula:

$$\mathbf{95\% \ confidence \ limit = p \pm z(\text{square root of } pq/n)}$$

where: **p** = proportion in population found from survey; **z** = statistical certainty chosen (if 95% certainty chosen, then **z** = 1.96); **q** = 1 - **p**; and **n** = sample size

Sample Size for the Study

As noted above, traditionally, the 30-cluster sampling methodology aimed for 300 respondents in a survey. However, in nation-wide surveys, such as the Afrobarometer studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is determined to be adequate for ensuring representativeness of the study population and validity of the outcomes. For Ghana, the Afrobarometer's "randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allow inferences to national adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent" (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p). In this study, a sample size of 1,500 (i.e. $n = 1,500$) will be used. This "...substantially larger sample size [is required] to achieve the same level of accuracy as a simple random sample" ([Murphy & Schulz, 2006, p. 6](#)). The sample frame (N) will be the total registered voter population for the 2012 elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012). Hence, the survey will use the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling. This is because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the population statistics per localities have not yet been published. However, the Electoral Commission compiled a fairly detailed electoral registers, which provides population data down to community levels in all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the

country. The electoral register therefore provides a more accurate and up to date database for the selection of respondents.

The 30-cluster sampling methodology developed for use in Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage (KPC) surveys will be adapted for the selection of study. Given the wide variation in population sizes between Polling Areas (ranging from $n < 500$ to $n > 150,000$), instead of 30, this study will select 50 clusters out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas as study sites. This larger number of study sites is also necessary to compensate for the clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socio-economic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban; differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions, cultural variations across regions, etc. ([Murphy & Schulz, 2006](#)).

The cluster sampling methodology was used to select the cluster sites or Polling Areas from which respondents will be drawn, using the principle of sampling by probability proportional to size of the Polling Areas. Under this method, all the 275 Polling Areas in the country will be listed with their respective numbers of registered voters. The cumulative population of all the 275 Polling Areas will then be obtained by successively adding up the registered voters of the Polling Areas from the first to the last. The sampling interval will then be calculated by dividing by the cumulative population of the Polling Areas by the number of clusters to be sampled i.e. 50 clusters. A random number with the number of digits but is less than or equal to the sampling interval will be selected from a table of random numbers or by a random draw of the serial numbers of bills of the local currency. This number will determine the starting point of the selection of the first cluster or polling station from which interviewees will be drawn. The first

polling station which has a cumulative population less than or equal to the selected random number will be selected as the first cluster or polling station for the interviews. The second cluster or polling station will be selected by adding the sampling interval to the random number, and the cluster whose cumulative population is less than or equal to the sum of the two numbers will be selected as the second cluster or polling station for the interviews. Subsequent Polling Areas will be selected by adding the sampling interval to the previous number used in the selection of the prior cluster or polling station until all 50 clusters or Polling Areas are selected. The list of selected Polling Areas or clusters will then be compiled and used as the interview sites.

Level two of the cluster selection process starts after the 50 Polling Areas are selected. The electoral register for the selected Polling Areas will constitute the frame from which interviewees will be selected. For each polling station selected, thirty five (35) people on the electoral register for each polling station will be randomly selected for interviews, using the voter identification numbers listed on the voter's registers for the draw of interviewees. The actual target number of interviewees per polling station is 30. However, the additional 5 potential respondents are replacement respondents in the event that some of the primary selected respondents are unavailable for interviews either due to death, extended travel outside the area, refusal to participate in the interview or failure to make contact after multiple rescheduling of interview sessions. Hence, the sample size, (n) for the survey component of this study will be 1,500.

Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics, and given the legal challenge to the 2012 Presidential election results that have pitched two major parties in a political battle, it is essential that all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan

bias in the selection of the interviewees be displaced upfront and transparently. In fulfillment of this, Polling Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected Polling Areas will be invited to participate in the selection of interviewees and identification of their locations. They will be briefed on the purposes, as well as, the apolitical and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all political parties will not only eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of the interviewees; it will also facilitate the identification of the whereabouts of selected participants; their availability to participate (some may have travelled out of the area, or deceased); and facilitation of access to the selected interviewees.

Appendix 3: Procedure For Selecting Constituencies And Polling Areas For Survey

a) Procedure for Selecting Polling Areas for Survey

The Study used the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling process to select prospective constituencies in which the study will be conducted.

Step 1: The national list of voters per constituency with the total number of voters for each constituency for the 2012 general elections was obtained from the website of the Electoral Commission of Ghana.

Step 2: the cumulative total of voter population was then obtained by adding successive voter population from each preceding constituencies to the next one, in accordance with the order in which they were presented in the Electoral Commission's spreadsheet that was downloaded in Step 1 above.

Step 3: the Sampling Interval (S.I) for the total voter population of **14,031,793** was computed using the formula $S.I = \text{Total Voter Population} \div \text{number of Clusters (or desired study sites)}$. Since the research is using 50 Polling Areas nationwide, the figure 50 was used as the denominator in the following computation:

$$\frac{14,031,680}{50} = 280,635.86$$

The SI of 280,633.60 was rounded off to 280,634 as the SI. This was then used in the following steps for selecting Polling Areas as the sites for the conduct of the study:

Step 4: A six digit random number less than or equal to the SI i.e. 280,634 was generated using the random number generation function of stattrek.com - <http://stattrek.com/statistics/random-number-generator.aspx> . The function produced one (1) random number selected from within the range of 0 to 280,636. Duplicate numbers

were allowed. This table was generated on 7/19/2013. The random number generated through this process was **143,511**

Step 5: The random number (143,511) was used to locate the first constituency with a cumulative population greater than or equal to the random number. Accordingly, the Bokakokole Axim Constituency with Code No. A030502 in the Western Region with a total registered voter population of 469 and a cumulative population figure of 143,925 was chosen as the first constituency where the study will be conducted.

Step 6: The Sampling Interval of 143,511 was then added to the Random number of 280,636 to obtain the figure 424,147. Hence, the second constituency for the study was chosen by locating a constituency with a cumulative population total greater than or equal to 424,147.

Step 7: To select the third Constituency from which a Polling Station will be drawn for the study, the Random Number of 280,636 was added to the computed results of Step 6 i.e. $280,636 + 424,147$ to get the number 704,783, which was used to locate the constituency with a cumulative population figure greater than or equal to this number. This step was repeated until all the remaining 47 constituencies were selected. Appendix 3 includes the list of the 50 constituencies that were selected as study sites, based on the procedure described above.

Step 8: Selection of Polling Area for Study. The Electoral Commissions list of Constituencies used in the exercise above provides the number of Polling Station per each Constituency. The list of Polling Areas is available at the regional offices of the Electoral Commission.

To determine the fifty Polling Areas in which the study will be conducted, the list of Polling Areas with their code numbers in each selected constituency will be obtained from the Regional Offices of the Electoral commission. Two Polling Areas per selected constituency will be randomly drawn from a hat containing the codes of all the Polling Areas for the Constituency. The first Polling Station to be drawn will be the primary study site. The second Polling Station drawn will be the secondary study site.

Step 9: The researchers will random draw a list of 50 names from the voters' register of the Primary Study Site (see step 8 above) from which the first 30 respondents who agree to participate in the study will be interviewed.

Step 10: In the event that the Primary Study Site chosen in Step 8 has less than 30 persons who agree to participate in the study, the researchers will proceed to Study Site 2. Step 9 will be repeated i.e. 50 people selected but only the first set of people who agree to be interviewed to make up the balance on the 30 respondents required per constituency will be interviewed.

b) Sampled Polling Areas For Field Survey

No	Polling Station Code	Polling Station Name	Region Name	District Name	Constituency Name	Total Voters
1	A030502	Bokakokole Axim	Western	Nzema East Municipality	Evalue - Ajomoro - Gwira	469
2	A080104	Asawa Prim. Sch. Mempeasem	Western	Essikadu-Ketan Sub	Essikadu-Ketan	871
3	A130502	Cath. Prim Sch Insu	Western	Prestea/Huni-Valley	Prestea Huni-Valley	702
4	A170505	D C Primary School, Kwaku Attakrom	Western	Aowin	Aowin	478
5	A220701	D C Prim Sch Antobia	Western	Juaboso	Juaboso	977
6	B022603	C P B New Market Adisadel	Central	Cape Coast	Cape Coast South	666
7	B063702	Catholic Prim School, Abaasa	Central	Ajumako Enyan Esiam	Ajumako Enyan Esiam	665
8	B110103B	Zongo 94 Odupongkpehe (B)	Central	Awutu Senya East	Awutu Senya East	829
9	B150902	D C 'B' Pri Sch Foso	Central	Assin North	Assin Central	339
10	C010111	Barbara Int'l Sch, Top Town-Ngleshie Amanfro	Greater Accra	Ga South	Bortianor-Ngleshie Amanfro	1082
11	C030202B	Golden Door Hotel Tantra Hill (B)	Greater Accra	Ga-West	Trobu	835
12	C041004B	Church Of Pentecost Central Taifa No 2 (B)	Greater Accra	Ga East	Dome/Kwabena	859
13	C061023A	Ebony Restaurant 1 Pig Farm (A)	Greater Accra	Ayawaso	Ayawaso Central	652
14	C071509A	Alhaji Abbass Mosque, Nii Boiman (A)	Greater Accra	Okaikwei	Okaikwei North	978
15	C081416	E P Church Lartebiokorshie	Greater Accra	Ablekuma	Ablekuma Central	846
16	C100305A	Fire Protection Co Ltd (A)	Greater Accra	Osu Clottey	Korle Klottey	743
17	C120910B	Presby Church Teshie Tsui Bleoo (B)	Greater Accra	Ledzokuku Krowor	Ledzokuku	649

No	Polling Station Code	Polling Station Name	Region Name	District Name	Constituency Name	Total Voters
18	C132403	Tema Parent J.H.S C.6	Greater Accra	Tema	Tema-Central	674
19	C151702B	Amanier Hotel (B)	Greater Accra	Ashaiman	Ashaiman	693
20	D011302	L A Prim Sch Agorvinu	Volta	Keta	Keta	207
21	D041102	D/A Prim Sch Ayitikope	Volta	Akatsi South	Akatsi South	524
22	D112702	R C Prim Sch Taviefe-Deme	Volta	Ho Municipal	Ho Central	1013
23	D181401	E P Prim Sch Bodada	Volta	Jasikan	Buem	476
24	D251202	D A Jhs Abunyanya No. 2	Volta	Nkwanta North	Nkwanta North	1047
25	E053103	L/A Prim Sch Okomeso	Eastern	New Juaben Municipality	New Juaben South	112
26	E100104	Temp Booth Pampamso	Eastern	Ayensuano	Ayensuano	492
27	E150502	R C Prim Sch Ahenbronom	Eastern	Akyemansa	Ofoase/Ayirebi	910
28	E200901	R/C Primary School Asunafo	Eastern	Atiwa	Atiwa West	803
29	E253102	L/A Prim School Kwachunu	Eastern	Afram Plains North	Afram Plains North	260
30	F040801	R/C Prim Ofoase Kokoben	Ashanti	Bekwai Municipal	Bekwai	736
31	F082003	L A Prim Sch Ntensere	Ashanti	Atwima Nwabiagya	Atwima Nwabiagya North	1088
32	F120404B	Tiger Bay Adoato (B)	Ashanti	Bantama	Bantama	693
33	F151013	Americanus Buokrom	Ashanti	Manhyia	Manhyia North	412
34	F190314	Open Bible Church	Ashanti	Asokwa	Asokwa	748
35	F230601A	D/A Prim School Asenua (A)	Ashanti	Kwabre East	Kwabre East	693
36	F260503	Ataneata D/A Prim School	Ashanti	Asante Akim South	Asante Akim South	397
37	F331301	R/C Pri Sch Nintin	Ashanti	Mampong Municipal	Mampong	525

No	Polling Station Code	Polling Station Name	Region Name	District Name	Constituency Name	Total Voters
38	F383602	D/A Prim Sch Potrikrom	Ashanti	Ahafo Ano South	Ahafo Ano South East	346
39	G053001	L A Prim Sch Asuboi	Brong-Ahafo	Tano South	Tano South	216
40	G110602	St James Jhs Wamanafo	Brong-Ahafo	Dormaa East	Dormaa East	466
41	G172202	Presby Church Nkonsia	Brong-Ahafo	Wenchi	Wenchi	552
42	G230301	R/C Church Amantin	Brong-Ahafo	Atebubu/Amantin	Atebubu/Amantin	654
43	H030803	Forestry Quarters Laribanga	Northern	West Gonja	Damongo	547
44	H100101	Local Council Offices Zabzugu N0.1	Northern	Zabzugu	Zabzugu	748
45	H172305	Kpalsong L/A Primary	Northern	Karaga	Karaga	554
46	H195202A	Kanvilli Baptist Church (A)	Northern	Tamale	Tamale North	567
47	H260303	Temp Booth Kauk	Northern	Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo	Bunkpurugu	490
48	J061302	Akeriba Gunga	Upper East	Bongo	Bongo	357
49	J120601B	Garu Catholic J H S (B)	Upper East	Garu-Tempene	Garu	572
50	K063103	Temp Booth Potuoyiri	Upper West	Jirapa	Jirapa	208

Appendix 4 Sampling Frame for Key Informants Interviews

Key informants are prized for their personal arcane knowledge of the subject matter under study. However, for subject matters such as the quest of this research to understand how and why Ghana has managed to be peaceful, it is essential to enlist historical recalls of times and events that may have influenced the nature, direction, and outcomes of the condition under study in its current state. In such cases, personal memories alone become limiting, especially if the key informants happen to be relatively new to a context. In particular, where institutions have played active roles in shaping the current state of the subject matter, it is doubly essential to elicit institutional memories that go beyond the times of current institutional representatives acting as key informants. For this reason, this study chose to constitute its sampling frame from among the following institution for the reasons assigned to each.

Professional Bodies and Associations: Professional bodies and associations have been at the forefront of various engagements with state actors through dialogues, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of civil action either to demand better conditions of service for their members or general political changes in the governance of the country. They were particularly vocal in the 1970s when they constituted one of the barriers to the attempts of the Supreme Military Council to transform the military regime of General I. K. Acheampong into a civilianized Union Government. To tap into the memories and perspectives from such engagements, the study targeted to draw interviewees from among the leadership of Professional Groups and Associations such as the:

- a. Ghana Medical Association
- b. Ghana Bar Association
- c. Ghana Nurses and Midwives Council
- d. Ghana Association of Bankers
- e. Ghana national Association of Teachers
- f. Trade Union Congress and affiliate institutions

Students Unions: Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of the governance systems of the country. Once presenting a unified front under the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), student political activism has been splintered in recent times under the creation of rival national level associations, and the further polarization of student movements along political lines. The sampling frame for this category of respondents targeted the leadership of national students unions, which includes:

- a. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS)
- b. The National Union of Polytechnics Students

Faith-based civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing national Christian and Islamic Councils: The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH), Catholic Bishops' Conference (CBC), the Islamic Council, and other affiliated faith-based organizations have been instrumental in shaping the political space in Ghana. As the US Library of Congress records note:

The CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs function openly as independent national lobbies to promote common rather than special interests. They insist on negotiation and mediation in the management of national disputes, and they advocate policy alternatives that stress the long-term needs of society. In the past, they have taken bold initiatives to attain the abrogation of state measures and legislation that violate human rights or that threaten law and order. All three bodies share a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and the creation of political institutions that reflect Ghanaian cultural traditions” (Library of Congress, <http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm>).

The study therefore contacted the leadership of the following national level religious institutions for interviews:

- a. Catholic Bishops Conference
- b. Christian Council of Ghana
- c. Pentecostal Council of Ghana
- d. Federation of Muslim Councils of Ghana
- e. Moderator, Presbyterian Church
- f. Moderator, Methodist Church
- g. Presiding Bishop, Anglican Church
- h. National Chief Imam
- i. Ameer of Ahmaddiya Muslim Mission

Traditional Leaders and the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs: As indicated above, although the 1992 Constitution debars chiefs from participating in active politics, they have nonetheless been instrumental in influencing dialogue and processes in the public sphere. They represent an important political constituency as the "... National House of Chiefs and the ten regional houses of chiefs represent more than 32,000 recognized traditional rulers who exercise considerable influence throughout Ghana, especially in the countryside" (Library of Congress, <http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm>) .

To ensure capture of the perspectives of the traditional rulers the study targeted to interview some chiefs, especially those who also serve as representatives of their respective localities in the national or regional houses of chiefs.

Civil Society Organizations: Civil Society organizations have played very prominent roles in the public sphere, especially in respect of shepherding the transformation of the governance landscape since 1981. As the Library of Congress notes these organizations:

played prominent roles in the transition to democracy [as they] took the provisional nature of the PNDC regime quite literally, calling for a quick return to democratic national government. Although NUGS and the GBA consistently demanded a return to multiparty democracy, the CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs favored a nonpartisan national government. While the NUGS and GBA leadership used methods that frequently provoked confrontation with the PNDC, the CBC and the national and regional houses of chiefs preferred a more conciliatory method of political change, emphasizing national unity” <http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm> .

In this study, the leadership of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Groups and organizations, and community-based organisations constituted a sampling bloc from which respondents were sought out and interviewed. The list of institutions contacted included, but not limited to the following:

- i. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA)
- ii. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)
- iii. Media Foundation of West Africa
- iv. Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition
- v. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
- vi. Ghana Journalists Association (GJA)
- vii. Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII)
- viii. Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF)
- ix. Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB)
- x. Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD)
- xi. Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT)

- xii. National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT)
- xiii. Teachers and Educational Workers Union (TEWU)
- xiv. Association of Ghana Industries (AGI)
- xv. Institute for Democracy and Governance (IDEG)

The study successfully recruited several interviewees from these institutions.

Independent Constitutional Bodies: The Constitution has prescribed functions for certain institutions in respect of promoting democracy and good governance. Efforts were made to recruit respondents from among the leadership of national Commissions and Councils such as

- a. National Media Commission
- b. National Commission for Civic Education
- c. Electoral Commission
- d. National Peace Council
- e. Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)

Political parties: Political parties are the vehicles for articulating political views on governance processes. They also represent the mobilizing force for political activities across all regional and ethnic spectra. In this study, the National and regional Chairpersons of political parties were targeted for interviews. The tentative list of parties included, but was not be limited to the following:

- 1. Convention Peoples Party (CPP)
- 2. Great Consolidated Popular Party
- 3. Ghana National Party

4. National Democratic Congress (NDC)
5. New Patriotic Party (NPP)
6. National Reform Party
7. Peoples National Convention (PNC)
8. United Ghana Movement
9. Ghana Democratic Republican Party
10. National Democratic Party
11. Progressive People's Party

The Media: The centrality of the media in shaping the public space cannot be overemphasized. In particular, the proliferation of FM radio broadcast services since 1983 has had a considerable impact on the generation and dissemination of information in various local languages. Community Radio Stations in particular provide avenues for the development and broadcast of local content. The popularization of cell phone usage has also afforded the inclusion of phone-in and SMS texting-in into radio programs. This has given a voice to otherwise marginalized persons in public discourses. The extent to which this liberalization of voices and views, through the combination of the liberalized airwaves and cellphone access, has influenced the political discourse and Ghana's peace is yet undetermined. To gauge this impact, the study targeted and successfully interviewed print and electronic media representatives (i.e. chief executives or editors of TV, Radio, Newspaper editors). Hosts of popular political radio programs on selected radio stations with nation-wide coverage were also targeted for inclusion as interviewees.

Other Opinion Leaders: Several think-tanks and research organizations influence public discourses through their research and publications. Accordingly, the leadership of

such groups were identified and targeted for interviews. The institutions included, but not limited to:

- i. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
- ii. Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA)
- iii. Ghanaian authors and representatives of academia in Ghana
- iv. The Danquah Institute
- v. Imani Ghana

Appendix 5 Questionnaires Used in the Quantitative Survey

**NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION**

**Quantitative Survey Questionnaires For PhD Dissertation Research On
Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of
Peace**

First schedule Date ___/___/2013 Time: _____ (dd / mm /) Tel: _____, _____	Rescheduled interview Date ___/___/2013 Time: _____ (dd. / mm) Tel: _____, _____
Region _____ District _____	
Name of Constituency _____ Polling Station Number _____	
Name of Community where interview takes place _____ House No. _____	
Name of Interviewer _____ Supervisor _____	

I. Profile of Respondents

I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask:

1. To which gender category would you say you belong?

1) Male [] 2) Female [] 3) Other (specify) _____ []

2. How old were you on your last birth day?

1) (*Please Indicate age in years*) _____ 2) Don't know my age (please mark) []

3. What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one)

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1) Never been to school | [] |
| 2) Less than six years of Primary Education | [] |
| 3) Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School | [] |
| 4) Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College | [] |
| 5) Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma | [] |
| 6) University Degree up to Bachelors level | [] |
| 7) University Degree up to the Masters level | [] |
| 8) University Degree up to the Doctorate level | [] |
| 9) Other (specify) _____ | [] |

4. Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region?

1) Ashanti Region []

- 2) Brong Ahafo Region []
 3) Central Region []
 4) Easter Region []
 5) Greater Accra Region []
 6) Northern Region []
 7) Upper East Region []
 8) Upper West Region []
 9) Volta Region []
 10) Western []

5. In what kind of locality are you normally resident?

- 1) National Capital City []
 2) Regional Capital []
 3) District Capital []
 4) Village or rural community []
 5) Town outside national, regional, or district capital []
 6) Other (specify)_____ []

6. What religion to you practice or are you affiliated to?

1. African Indigenous Religion
 2. Agnostic (I do not know if there is a God)
 3. Aeithist (I do not believe there is a God)
 4. Baha'i
 5. Buddhism
 6. Christianity
 7. Hinduism
 8. Islam
 9. Other (Specify)_____

7. How would you describe your current primary occupation?

No.	Employment Category	Please tick one (√)
1	Farmer (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.)	
2	House wife	
3	Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament, Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency, Region); Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive	
4	Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political Party)	
5	Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, department or agency)	
6	Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an Academic institution).	
7	Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief Executive Officer, Other (specify)_____	

No.	Employment Category	Please tick one (✓)
8	Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, Other (specify) _____)	
9	Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or Village	
10	Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion)	
11	Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services)	
12	Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary level	
13	Worker in the NGO Sector	
14	Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman	
15	Employee in the Private Sector	
16	Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, Seamstress, Trader, Other (specify) _____)	
17	Other (specify) _____	

8. Ghana has been said to be an oasis of peace in Africa. To what extent do you agree that Ghana is peaceful?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree [] Skip next question
6. Disagree [] Skip next question
7. Strongly disagree [] Skip next question
8. Very strongly disagree [] Skip next question
9. No opinion [] Skip next question

Knowledge and Perceptions of the nature and sources of Peace in Ghana

9. Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means even though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive laws, rules, and regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or can die silently. Positive peace means there is no open fighting and there are no situations that make people suffer or die in silence. Based on these concepts of peace, how would you describe the peace you witness in Ghana?

- 1) Positive peace []
- 2) Negative Peace []
- 3) I don't know []
- 4) Other (specify) _____

No	Influencing Factors Assessment Criteria	1 Very Low Extent	2 Low Extent	3 Moderately Low Extent	4 Moderate Extent	5 Moderately High Extent	6 High Extent	7 Very High Extent	8 Not At All	9 Can't Tell
	Civic Education									
10	Electoral Commission									
11	National Peace Council									
12	Professional Associations (such Ghana Bar Association, Ghana Medical Association,									
13	Trade Unions (such as TUC, GNAT, NAGRAT, etc.)									
14	Students and Students' Unions such as NUGS.									
15	The Judiciary (Supreme Court, High Courts, and other Courts in Ghana)									
16	Parliament									
17	Political Parties operating in Ghana since 1992									
18	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)									
19	Office of the President									
20	Ghana Police Service									
21	The Ghana Armed Forces									
22	International Development Agencies (UN, World Bank, IMF, etc.)									
23	Governments and Embassies of other Countries									
24	Other (specify)_____									

12. To what extent do you believe that Ghana can still descend into a violent national level conflict such as a civil war, despite the peace it currently enjoys?

1. Very Low Extent []
2. Low Extent []
3. Moderately Low Extent []
4. Moderate Extent []
5. Moderately High Extent []
6. High Extent []
7. Very High Extent []
8. Not at all []

9. Can't tell
13. Which of the following would you say Ghanaians respect most in order to contribute to the peace that Ghana enjoys?
1. The Constitution of the Country
 2. Religious beliefs and values
 3. Traditional values and customs
 4. personal values and principles
 5. Other (specify)_____

Development and Peace

14. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is more peaceful than its neighbors because it has a high level of economic development?
1. Very strongly agree
 2. Strongly agree
 3. Mildly Agree
 4. Agree
 5. Mildly disagree
 6. Disagree
 7. Strongly disagree
 8. Very strongly disagree
 9. No opinion
15. To what extent would you agree that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government?
1. Very strongly agree
 2. Strongly agree
 3. Mildly Agree
 4. Agree
 5. Mildly disagree
 6. Disagree
 7. Strongly disagree
 8. Very strongly disagree
 9. No opinion
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree that transparently negotiated natural resource management contracts contribute to Ghana's peace?
1. Very strongly agree
 2. Strongly agree
 3. Mildly Agree
 4. Agree
 5. Mildly disagree
 6. Disagree
 7. Strongly disagree
 8. Very strongly disagree
 9. No opinion

17. To what extent do you agree or disagree that equitable and fair returns to Ghana on the exploitation of her natural resources contributes to the peace in the country?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

18. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

19. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because proceeds from its natural resources are used in ways that benefit the whole country?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Human Rights and Rule of Law

20. To what degree do you agree that Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa because Ghanaians have more freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []

7. Strongly disagree []
 8. Very strongly disagree []
 9. No opinion []
21. To what extent do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians enjoy more political freedom than their neighbors in other countries?
1. Very strongly agree []
 2. Strongly agree []
 3. Mildly Agree []
 4. Agree []
 5. Mildly disagree []
 6. Disagree []
 7. Strongly disagree []
 8. Very strongly disagree []
 9. No opinion []
22. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of political opponents are minimal?
1. Very strongly agree []
 2. Strongly agree []
 3. Mildly Agree []
 4. Agree []
 5. Mildly disagree []
 6. Disagree []
 7. Strongly disagree []
 8. Very strongly disagree []
 9. No opinion []

Ghanaians' Respect for the Rule of Law

23. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because everyone respects the law?
1. Very strongly agree []
 2. Strongly agree []
 3. Mildly Agree []
 4. Agree []
 5. Mildly disagree []
 6. Disagree []
 7. Strongly disagree []
 8. Very strongly disagree []
 9. No opinion []
24. How far would you agree or disagree that Ghana's peace is due in part to the fact that government officials and public servants always make decisions and act in accordance with the laws of Ghana?
1. Very strongly agree []
 2. Strongly agree []
 3. Mildly Agree []

4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []
25. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is at peace because Ghanaians have respect for the decisions made the courts of law in the country?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Contributions of the Media to peace in Ghana

26. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves in the print media without fear of being cited for libel has contributed to peace in Ghana?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []
27. How far would you agree or disagree with the view that freedom of expression on radio stations and televisions through broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs has contributed to the peace in Ghana?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

28. In way would you agree or disagree that unrestricted access to news and information from the internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana's peace?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Contribution of the Judicial System to peace in Ghana

29. To what extent do you agree that Ghana has peace because the courts are independent from political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or favor?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

30. What is your level of agreement or disagreement to the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

31. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because people from all backgrounds are treated fairly and equally before the law?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []

- 8. Very strongly disagree []
- 9. No opinion []

Gender and Peace

32. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes?

- 1. Very strongly agree []
- 2. Strongly agree []
- 3. Mildly Agree []
- 4. Agree []
- 5. Mildly disagree []
- 6. Disagree []
- 7. Strongly disagree []
- 8. Very strongly disagree []
- 9. No opinion []

33. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that women occupy in parliament?

- 1. Very strongly agree []
- 2. Strongly agree []
- 3. Mildly Agree []
- 4. Agree []
- 5. Mildly disagree []
- 6. Disagree []
- 7. Strongly disagree []
- 8. Very strongly disagree []
- 9. No opinion []

34. What is your degree of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana enjoys peace because women have the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, markets for their produce, etc.) as men?

- 1. Very strongly agree []
- 2. Strongly agree []
- 3. Mildly Agree []
- 4. Agree []
- 5. Mildly disagree []
- 6. Disagree []
- 7. Strongly disagree []
- 8. Very strongly disagree []
- 9. No opinion []

35. How far would you agree with the statement that Ghana is a peaceful country because women have the same opportunities for education as men?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

36. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is enjoying peace because women have the same employment opportunities in the public and civil services as men?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

37. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana's peace is due to the fact that women play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

38. To what extent do you agree or disagree that role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace at the national level is an important contributor to the peace in Ghana?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Elections and Democratic Participation

39. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its elections are usually free, fair, and transparent?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

40. Which of these factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary elections do not spill over into national level conflicts?

1. Ghanaians are afraid of war []
2. Ghanaians do not really care about who wins an election []
3. The courts are effective and efficient in handling such disputes []
4. Political parties do not support such violence []
5. Those who start the violence are usually ignored []
6. Other (Specify)_____ []

41. Which of the following factors best explain why disputes over results of presidential elections do not escalate into national level violence?

1. Political parties lack the capacity to mobilize people to fight on their behalf []
2. Political parties take their cases to the courts []
3. Traditional rulers usually intervene to stop any efforts to fight []
4. Religious leaders usually mediate peaceful resolution of the disputes []
5. Ghanaians would not fight and die for any politician []
6. Other (Specify)_____ []

42. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because everyone is free to run for office at any level within the governance structures of the country (i.e. Unit Committee, District Assembly, and National levels).

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

43. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its citizens can vote freely in all elections?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

44. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because anybody can join any political party of his or her choice?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

45. To what extent do you agree that Ghana's peace is due to the fact Ghanaians do not consider the ethnic backgrounds of candidates in any election important determinants of whom they vote for?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Role of Government in promoting peace

46. To what extent do you agree that it is the deliberate and proactive actions of government that has created the peace that Ghana enjoys?

1. Very Low Extent []
2. Low Extent []
3. Moderately Low Extent []
4. Moderate Extent []
5. Moderately High Extent []
6. High Extent []

7. Very High Extent []
8. Not at all []
9. Can't tell []
47. How far would you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is because Governments over the years have created opportunities for civil society groups to work with State institutions to promote peace?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []
48. To what degree would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments over the years have successfully helped to resolve conflicts before they escalate into large scale violence?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []
49. To what extent would you agree or disagree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments have always been neutral in handling conflicts between different ethnic, political, or religious groups?
1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

50. How far would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Government works very closely with faith-based organizations in resolving major conflicts?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Religion and peace in Ghana

51. How important is religion in the lives of Ghanaians

1. Not at all important
2. Not very important
3. Somewhat important
4. Important
5. Very important
6. I don't know
7. Refuse to answer

52. What is your level of agreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because most Ghanaians observe the teachings of their respective faiths to promote peace, not violent conflicts?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

53. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians are very religious people?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

54. What is the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement that Ghana is at peace because people are not discriminated against on the basis of their religion when they are looking for employment or admissions to schools?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

55. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that Ghana is peaceful because people of different faiths can live together without any problem?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

56. To what degree do you agree or disagree with the statement that Ghana has peace because families readily allow their relatives to marry people from different religious backgrounds?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

57. To what extent would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because politicians do not use inter-religious differences in their campaigns?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

58. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because religious leaders of all faiths and denominations always work together to ensure that conflicts are resolved peacefully?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

59. To what extent do you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is due to the role that religious leaders and various religious councils and committees have played important roles in creating a culture of peace in Ghana?

1. Very strongly agree []
2. Strongly agree []
3. Mildly Agree []
4. Agree []
5. Mildly disagree []
6. Disagree []
7. Strongly disagree []
8. Very strongly disagree []
9. No opinion []

Culture, Tradition, Customs and Peace

60. To what extent do you believe that the values and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own citizens?

- 1) I very strongly believe []
- 2) I strongly believe []
- 3) I Believe []
- 4) I do not believe []
- 5) I strongly do not believe []
- 6) I very strongly do not believe []
- 7) No opinion []

61. To what degree do you accept that the culture and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana train people to be peaceful?

1. Very High Extent []
2. High Extent []
3. Low Extent []
4. Very Low Extent []
5. Not at All []
6. Can't Tell []

62. The cultures and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana have strong sanctions for those who stir up violence or breach the public peace
- 1) I very strongly believe []
 - 2) I strongly believe []
 - 3) I Believe []
 - 4) I do not believe []
 - 5) I strongly do not believe []
 - 6) I very strongly do not believe []
 - 7) No opinion []
63. Traditional rulers have a strong control on members of their ethnic groups and can prevent them from going to war with other ethnic groups.
- 1) I very strongly believe []
 - 2) I strongly believe []
 - 3) I Believe []
 - 4) I do not believe []
 - 5) I strongly do not believe []
 - 6) I very strongly do not believe []
 - 7) No opinion []
64. How effective have traditional leaders been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups living within their jurisdictions feel at home?
1. Very effective []
 2. Somehow effective []
 3. Effective []
 4. Not effective []
 5. Can't tell []

Contribution of formal Education to Peace

65. To what extent would you agree that the formal educational system in Ghana created a culture of peace among Ghanaians?
1. Very Low Extent []
 2. Low Extent []
 3. Moderately Low Extent []
 4. Moderate Extent []
 5. Moderately High Extent []
 6. High Extent []
 7. Very High Extent []
 8. Not at all []
 9. Can't tell []

Social Cohesion Behaviors

67. When I am in a meeting with people from other ethnic groups, I _____ try to ensure that everyone has an equal chance to participate in the discussions.
1. Never [] 2. Seldom [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Frequently [] 5. Always []
68. When I am in a discussion with people from other ethnic groups, I _____ want to show why the values of my culture are important in assessing the issues being discussed.
1. Always [] 2. Frequently [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Seldom [] 5. Never []
69. When I am engaged in activities with people from other cultures, I _____ insist on my views.
1. Never [] 2. Seldom [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Frequently [] 5. Always []
70. Whenever I meet people from other ethnic groups, I _____ try to stay away from them for fear of getting into trouble with them.
1. Always [] 2. Frequently [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Seldom [] 5. Never []
71. When discussing important national issues with people from other parts of the country, I let them know their views, feelings, or experiences are _____ mine
1. More important than [] 2. Equally important as [] 3. somewhat important as []
4. Less important than [] 5. Not as important as []
72. When I listen to people from other ethnic groups express their views on national issues that affect them directly, I _____ put myself in their shoes in order to understand the issues from their perspective.
1. Never [] 2. Seldom [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Frequently [] 5. Always []
73. Whenever I vote in elections I _____ consider the ethnic background of the presidential candidates before I choose whom to vote for.
1. Always [] 2. Frequently [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Seldom [] 5. Never []
74. When I vote for a parliamentary candidate, I _____ consider the issues they talk about as important as their personality and background
1. Never [] 2. Seldom [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Frequently [] 5. Always []
75. I would _____ accept postings to any part of the country other than my home region
1. Very Willingly [] 2. Willingly [] 3. Reluctantly [] 4. Seldom [] 5. Never []

Practice

76. If a relative of mine plans to marry a person from another ethnic group, I _____ support him or her

1. Never [] 2. Rarely [] 3. Reluctantly [] 4. Willingly [] 5. Very Willingly []

77. When I have a conflict with someone from a different ethnic group, I _____ prefer to take the matter to the local chief, police, or court for resolution

1. Never [] 2. Seldom [] 3. Occasionally [] 4. Frequently [] 5. Always []

Thank you.

Appendix 6 Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION

Guiding Questions for Key Informant Interviews For PhD Dissertation Research On
 Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace

First schedule Date ___/___/2013 Time: _____ (dd / mm /) Tel: _____, _____	Rescheduled interview Date ___/___/2013 Time: _____ (dd. / mm) Tel: _____, _____
District _____ Name of Town _____ House No. _____	
Name of Interviewer _____ Supervisor _____ _____	

I. Bio-data of Interviewee

I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask:

1. Gender of respondent (please indicate)
 - 1) Male
 - 2) Female
 - 3) Other (specify) _____ []

2. How old were you on your last birthday?
 - 1) (Please Indicate age in years) _____)
 - 2) Don't know my age (please mark)

3. What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one)
 - 1) Never been to school
 - 2) Less than six years of Primary Education
 - 3) Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School
 - 4) Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College
 - 5) Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma
 - 6) University Degree up to Bachelors level
 - 7) University Degree up to the Masters level
 - 8) University Degree up to the Doctorate level

9) Other (specify)_____

4. Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region?

- 1) Ashanti Region
 2) Brong Ahafo Region
 3) Central Region
 4) Easter Region
 5) Greater Accra Region
 6) Northern Region
 7) Upper East Region
 8) Upper West Region
 9) Volta Region
 10) Western

5. What is your nationality?

- 1) I am a Ghanaian resident in Ghana
 2) I am a Ghanaian resident outside but visiting now
 3) I am a foreigner resident in Ghana
 4) I am a foreigner on a short visit to Ghana
 5) I prefer not to answer this question

6. How would you describe your current major occupation?

No.	Employment Category	Choose One
1	Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament, Minister of a Sector, at Presidency, Region; District Chief Executive	
2	Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political Party)	
3	Farmer	
4	House wife	
5	Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, department or agency)	
6	Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Research, and Teaching Assistant in an Academic institution).	
7	Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief Executive Officer, Other (specify)_____	
8	Professional (Certified Medical Officer, Lawyer, Banker, Teacher, Nurse, Paramedic, Other (specify)_____	
9	Traditional chief or queen mother	
10	Religious leader (Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion)	
11	Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and	

	Preventive Services	
12	Student in Polytechnic, University or other Secondary	
13	Worker in the NGO Sector	
17	Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman	
	Employee in the Private Sector	
18	Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, Seamstress, Trader, Other (specify) _____)	
20	Other (specify) _____	

II. Key Informant Interview Guide

7. What is your opinion on the view that Ghana is a peaceful country?

8. Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means even though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive laws, rules, and regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or can die silently. Positive peace means there is no open fighting and there are no situations that make people suffer or die in silence. Based on these concepts of peace, how would you describe Ghana's peace?

9. What are the critical factors that influence your assertion of Ghana's peacefulness?

10. What role, if any, does the level of economic development in Ghana have on its experience of peace?

11. Ghana has had very tense moments in her political history since 1992 when everyone thought the country would descend into nationwide violence but this never happened. What in your opinion makes it possible for Ghana to stop short of descending into nationwide violent conflicts?

12. Ghana has a high dependency on the export of raw materials; competition between ethnic groups for political power; high differences in poverty levels between the north and the south, and between rural and urban areas. These factors are said to cause violent conflicts in some countries in Africa. What, in your opinion, has Ghana done differently in managing the same issues to avoid violent national level conflicts?

13. Since 1992, elections in Ghana have been highly contested. What has made it possible for Ghana to avoid election-related violent national conflicts despite the high political tensions and electoral disputes?

14. Ghana has witnessed several violent conflicts within and between various ethnic groups in the country. What, in your opinion, has prevented these conflicts from escalating into national level conflicts?

15. Competition for political power has created conditions for national level conflicts in some countries. What in your opinion accounts for Ghana's ability to avoid nationwide violence as a result of elections and other forms of political competition?

16. What are some of the key factors that may have contributed to keep Ghana from degenerating into violent national conflicts when it has faced similar internal challenges as other countries that went to war?

17. Strong institutions are credited with keeping countries at peace. What institutions do you consider as key to keeping the peace in Ghana? How?

18. Culture plays an important role in all communities. Does culture play any part in making Ghana Peaceful? How?

19. Ghana is multi-cultural nation. What makes it possible for these cultures to avoid the types of violent national conflicts that other states with the same mix of history and cultures have experienced?

20. Religion is an important factor for peace or war in the present world. What role, if any, does religion play in Ghana's experience of peace?

21. How do you assess the role of the youth in Ghana on the peace of the country?


22. What role, if any, do women play in preserving the peace in Ghana?

23. How do you see the role of political parties in the peace of the country?


24. How do you assess the role of the media in Ghana's peace?

25. How, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in creating a culture of peace?


26. In what specific ways do you believe the formal educational system in Ghana has helped to create this culture of peace?



27. Is Ghana at any risk of descending into a violent national level conflict such as a civil war, violence?



28. What would it take for Ghana to descend into violent national level conflict?




29. What makes you hold the opinion you have just expressed?

30. Are there any other thoughts or closing comments that you would like to share on why Ghana seems to have peace when other countries on the continent with the same or similar backgrounds and issues have not?

Thank you for your time and responses.

Appendix 7 Map Showing Distribution of Survey Interview Locations



Appendix 8 Matrix Of Hypotheses, Variables And Indicators

Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents			
Gender (Q1)	self-identified gender category of respondent	Male, female or other as self-assigned	• % of respondents in different gender categories
Age (Q2)	Self-report of age of respondent at last birth day prior to survey	Age of respondents 18 years and above as calculated from last birthday.	• % of respondents in different ages 18 years and above as of their last birth day prior to the survey
Educational levels (Q3)	Highest level of formal education completed	Self report on highest level of formal education attained ranging from no education through PhD and other.	% of respondents in different categories of formal education obtained
Region of origin (Q4)	Self-identified region respondents call their home region.	One of the 10 administrative regions of Ghana respondents consider their home region	• % of respondents who select different regions of Ghana as their home regions
Locality of residence (Q5)	Place where respondents regularly live	National capital, regional capital, district capital, village, town outside urban area, others	• % of respondents in indicate the different localities in which they live
Religious affiliation (Q6)	Faith group to which respondents considers self to be a member of or affiliated to.	Self report of faith traditions that respondents consider themselves to be a member of or affiliated to.	• % of respondents who identify religious groups to which they consider themselves as members of or affiliated to.
Primary Employment category (Q7)	Description of kind of work respondent currently does as their main job.	Respondent's self placement in one of 17 occupational categories	• % of respondents in different employment categories

Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country (Q8)			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Perceptions of different age categories of	Level of agreement among respondents of different age	Degree to which respondents of different age	% of respondents of different <i>age categories</i> who agree or disagree

people on why Ghana is peaceful	categories on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	categories agree or disagree that y Ghana is a peaceful country	that Ghana is peaceful
			% of respondents of different <i>ethnic groups</i> who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents from different regions on why Ghana is peaceful	Level of agreement among respondents originating from different regions on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	Degree to which respondents of different age categories agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> % of respondents of different <i>regions</i> who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of different gender categories of people on why Ghana is peaceful	Level of agreement among respondents of different gender categories on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	Degree to which respondents of different gender categories agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	% of respondents of different <i>gender categories</i> who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents with different levels of formal education on why Ghana is peaceful	Level of agreement between respondents of different levels of formal educational attainment on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	Degree to which respondents with different levels of formal education agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	% of respondents of different levels of formal education completed who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents of different religious affiliations on why Ghana is peaceful	Level of agreement among respondents of different religious affiliations on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	Degree to which respondents of different religious affiliations agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	% of respondents of different <i>religious affiliations</i> who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents of different employment categories on why Ghana is peaceful	Level of agreement among respondents of different employment categories on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	Degree to which respondents of different employment categories agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	% of respondents of different <i>employment categories</i> who agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful
Perceptions of respondents living in	Level of agreement among respondents living in different	Degree to which respondents living in different localities	% of respondents living in different localities who agree or disagree

different localities on why Ghana is peaceful	localities on whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country	agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country	that Ghana is peaceful
H₀₂ there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of peace Ghana enjoys.			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Perceptions of respondents on the nature of peace in Ghana (Q9)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •negative defined as absence of direct violence but presence of structural and cultural violence that can lead to open violence or •positive peace defined as absence of direct, structural, and cultural violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Level of agreement or disagreement among respondents on whether Ghana's peace is negative peace or positive peace 	% of respondents in who agree that Ghana has negative peace versus those who agree that Ghana has positive peace
Factors contributing to peace (Q 10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Perceptions of factors that contribute to peace in Ghana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Level of agreement on the extent to which different factors contribute to peace in Ghana 	% of respondents who indicate the extent to which various listed factors can influence Ghana's ability to be at peace.
Role of institutions on Ghana's peace (Q 11)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Perception of what institutions contribute to peace in Ghana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Differences in perceptions of what institutions contribute to peace in Ghana 	% of respondents who identify different institutions listed in the question as the ones that contribute to peace in Ghana
Susceptibility to national level violence (Q 12)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Belief that Ghana can easily descend into violent national level conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Degrees to which respondents belief that Ghana can easily descend into violent conflict at the national level 	% of respondents who belief that Ghana can easily descend into violence at the national level versus those who do not belief.
Role of shared values and beliefs on peace in Ghana (Q 13)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Extent to which respondents attribute Ghana's peace to shared regulations, values, and beliefs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Perceptions of the role of the national constitution, religion, tradition, and customs on Ghana's peace 	% of respondents who identify the constitution, religion, tradition and customs or other factors as the ones contributing to peace in Ghana

H₀₃ Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Level of economic development on peace (Q 14)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions on the contribution of the level of economic development of Ghana on its peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of agreement or disagreement that Ghana's level of economic development contributes to the peace it enjoys 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the current level of Ghana's economic development contributes to the peace in the country.
Equality in geographical distribution of development on peace in Ghana (Q 15)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of impact of geographical disparities in the level of development on the peace in Ghana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Variations in respondents' perception of the extent to which disparities in development across different geographical zones (north-south; rural-urban) affects the peace in Ghana 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that difference in the distribution of development services has an effect on the sustenance of peace in Ghana.
Transparent Management of Natural Resource and Peace (Q 16)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution of transparent and equitable contracts for natural resource exploitation to peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiations of contracts for natural resource exploitation are transparent 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that natural resource management contracts that are transparently negotiated contribute to Ghana's peace.
Equitable and fair returns on natural resource contracts on peace (Q 17)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effects of perceived equitable returns on Ghana natural resource contracts on peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracts for natural resource exploitation are fair and equitable for the country 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that equitable and fair returns to Ghana on the exploitation of natural resources contributes to the peace in the country.
Equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all regions (Q 18)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception of equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of agreement on the contribution of equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana.

		country the peace in Ghana	
Efficient and Effective use of proceeds of natural resources for development of all (Q 19)	• Effect of perceptions of effective and efficient use of proceeds from natural resources on peace in Ghana	• Degrees to which respondents agree or disagree on the contribution of Ghana's management of natural resource proceeds to peace	% of respondents who agree or disagree that revenue from Ghana's natural resources is used in ways that contribute to peace in the country.
H₀₄ The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the country enjoys.			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Effect of respect for freedom of expression on the peace that Ghana has. (Q 20)	Respondents' perceptions on the effects of respect for freedoms of expression on peace in Ghana	Extent of agreement or disagreement on the impact of freedom of expression of citizens on the peace the country enjoys	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the ability of Ghanaians to express themselves freely contributes to the peace in Ghana
Impact of political freedom on peace (Q 21)	Level of agreement on the impact of political freedom on peace in Ghana	The ability of citizens to freely choose their political affiliations, stand for elections to public offices, and to vote	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the level of political freedom in the country is a contributor to peace in Ghana
Effect of presence of extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of political opponents on peace in Ghana (Q 22)	Presence or absence of extrajudicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances.	Level of agreement on the effect of the presence or absence of extrajudicial arrests, detentions, torture and disappearances on peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the presence or absence of extrajudicial arrests, detentions, torture and disappearances have contributed to peace in Ghana
H₀₅ There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for the rule of law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Perceptions on	Level of agreement	Contribution of	% of respondents who

Citizens' respect for the laws of the land (Q 23)	on the effect of citizens' willingness to respect the laws of the country and peace	citizens' willingness to comply with the law, rules, and regulations without coercion or fear thereof.	agree or disagree that citizens' respect for the laws contribute to peace
Public officials respect for the laws of the land (Q 24)	Respect of the law by elected government leaders and public officials	Perceptions on degree to which government and public officers act and make decisions in accordance with relevant laws	% of respondents who agree or disagree Ghana's peace is in part due to the fact that state officials always to make decisions and act in accordance with laid down laws, rules, and regulations.
Respect for decisions of the courts (Q 25)	Respect for the decisions made the courts of law on peace in Ghana	Perceptions of degree to which decisions of the courts are respected	% of respondents who agree or disagree that adherence to the decisions of courts contribute to peace in Ghana
H₀₆ There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Contribution of freedom of the print media to peace (Q 26)	Presence or absence of legal and administrative controls on newspapers and other print media of information dissemination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability of the press to carry news stories without fear of repression or censorship by the state and other interest groups • Abolition of libel laws 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves in the print media without fear of being cited for libel has contributed to peace in Ghana
Liberalization of the electronic media (Q 27)	Freedom of expression on radio and television for all citizens	Liberalized airwaves for radio and TV broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs	% of respondents who agree or disagree that freedom of expression on radio stations and televisions through broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs has contributed to the peace in Ghana

Unrestricted access to news and information from the internet (Q 28)	Citizens' ability to freely access and share news and views through the internet	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unrestricted access to news and information on the internet • Unrestricted use of social media platforms 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that unrestricted access to news and information from the internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana's peace
H₀₇ There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Independence of the judiciary on peace (Q 29)	Ability of judges to dispense justice without interference from state officials or other influential persons.	Level of agreement or disagreement that courts are independent from political interference	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the independence of the courts from political interference is a contributor to peace in Ghana
Corruption judges and peace (Q 30)	Perception on ability of judges and court staff to administer justice without being influenced by personal interests or gains	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of agreement on impact of perceived corruption in the judiciary and the peace in Ghana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of respondents who agree or disagree that the level of perceived corruption in the judiciary is a contributor to peace in Ghana
Equality of citizens before the law (Q 31)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effect of equality of all citizens before the law on peace in Ghana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of agreement on the practice of equal treatment of all citizens before the law and peace in Ghana 	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the fact that all citizens can expect to be treated equally before the law contributes to peace in Ghana.
H₀₈ The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Gender equality in participation in public decision-making process and peace (Q 32)	Equality of participation of men and women in public decision-making processes and peace in Ghana	Level of agreement on how gender equality in participation in public decision making processes affects the peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the level of gender equality in participation in public decision making processes in Ghana contributes the peace of the country

Women's participation in parliament and peace (Q 33)	Level of participation of women in parliament and peace in Ghana	•Level of agreement on whether or not the percentage of women in parliament contributes to Ghana's peace	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the percentage of women in Ghana's parliament contributes to the peace of the country
Women's economic participation and peace (Q 34)	Effect of gender equality in access to economic opportunities on peace in Ghana	Level of agreement that Ghana enjoys peace because women in the country have equal economic opportunities	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana's peace is in part due to the equal opportunities that women in the country have in economic life.
Gender Equality in access to educational opportunities and peace (Q 35)	Effect of gender equality on access to education on peace in Ghana	Level of agreement among respondents that Ghana's peace is in part due to gender equality in access to educational opportunities	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana has peace because men and women have equal access to educational opportunities in the country.
Gender Equity in access to employment opportunities in public services. (Q 36)	Perception of effect of gender equity in access to employment opportunities in the public and civil services on peace	Level of agreement among respondents that Ghana has peace due to gender equity in access to employment opportunities in the public sector	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana has peace because men and women have equitable access to employment opportunities in the public sector of the country.
Role of women in mediating conflicts at the national level (Q 37)	Perception of role of women in mediating conflicts at the national level.	Level of agreement or disagreement on the contribution that women make in mediating conflicts at the national level to promote peace.	% of respondents who agree or disagree that roles that women play in mediating conflicts at the national levels contribute to the peace that the country enjoys.
Participation of women in traditional systems of governance (Q 38)	Perception of the role of queenmothers and female chiefs in the promotion of peace at the national level	Level of agreement among respondents on the role of queenmothers and women chiefs on the peace of Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana's peace is in part due to the role that queenmothers and female chiefs play in the traditional systems of

			governance in the country.
H₀₉ The state of democratic practices in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the country enjoys			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Contribution of free, fair, and transparent elections to peace (Q 39)	The organization of elections declared to be free, fair, and transparent and peace in Ghana	Extent to which respondents agree or disagree that the regular organization of elections declared to be free, fair, and transparent affect the peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the regular organization of elections declared to be free, fair, and transparent affect the peace Ghana enjoys.
Limiting factors on widespread violence over parliamentary elections (Q 40)	Factors that respondents consider important in limit the spread of violence over electoral results for parliament	Fear of war; apathy towards who wins; courts handle disputes effectively; political parties abhor violence; lack of support for violence-mongers; Others.	% of respondents who choose or the other factors listed in the questions as the reason why disputes over parliamentary elections do not spill over into national level violence.
Limiting factors on national violence over presidential results (Q 41)	Factors that respondents consider important in limiting the eruption of violence over disputed Presidential election results	Inability of political parties to mobilize fighters; recourse of political parties to court; intervention by traditional leaders; intervention by religious leaders; Ghanaians won't die for a politician.	% of respondents who choose or the other factors listed in the questions as the reason why disputes over Presidential election results do not degenerate into national level violence.
Absence of restrictions on running for office (Q 42)	Freedom of all qualifying persons to stand for elections at appropriate levels	Freedom to stand for Presidential, Parliamentary, District Assembly or Unit Committee elections and peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the freedom accorded to all qualifying citizens to run for elections at any level of their choice contributes to peace in Ghana
Freedom of citizens to vote (Q 43)	Freedom of all qualifying persons to register and vote in elections	Effect of the ability of all qualifying persons to register and vote on peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the ability of all qualified Ghanaians to register and vote contributes to peace in the country

Freedom of citizens to join political parties (Q 44)	Absence of restrictions on all citizens to join political parties of their choice	Freedom to join any political party of one's choice and peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the freedom of all Ghanaians to join any political party of their choice affects the peace in the country
Role of ethnicity in electoral choices of Ghanaians (Q 45)	Influence of ethnic considerations in voting behaviors of Ghanaians	Level of agreement of agreement or disagreement over the influence of ethnic considerations in the way Ghanaians vote at elections	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghanaians do not take into account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during elections
H_{o10} The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.			
Role of government in creating peace in Ghana (Q 46)	Deliberate actions of Government that have created Ghana's peace	Level of agreement or disagreement on whether the government of Ghana over the years has taken concrete actions that have created the peace that Ghana enjoys	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the government of Ghana has deliberately taken actions that have created the peace the country enjoys
Collaboration between government and civil society for peace (Q47)	Government of Ghana consciously creates identifiable platforms and opportunities that for civil society groups and organizations to engage in promoting peace in Ghana	Level of agreement or disagreement on whether the government of Ghana over the years created identifiable platforms for civil society engagement in building a culture of peace in the country.	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the government of Ghana over the years consciously created identifiable platforms for civil society groups and organizations to engage in building a culture of peace in the country.
Successful resolution of conflicts by government before they escalate (Q 48)	Government of Ghana takes proactive action to resolve or prevent conflicts from escalating into violence	Level of agreement or disagreement on the extent to which the Government over the years has taken deliberate and proactive actions to prevent conflicts	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the government of Ghana over the years has taken deliberate and proactive actions to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence

		from escalating into violence	
Neutrality of Government in managing ethnic and communal conflicts (Q49)	Government officials and agencies have impartially intervened in ethnic and communal conflicts to resolve them or prevent them from escalating into violence	Degree to which respondents agree or disagree that governments over the years have been perceived as impartial in the way they intervened in ethnic and communal conflicts	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana enjoys peace because the government officials and agencies over the years have been neutral in the way they intervened in ethnic or communal conflicts
Collaboration between Government and faith-based organizations (Q 50)	Active engagement of government with faith-based organizations or groups to find solutions to conflicts at all levels.	Degree to which respondents agree or disagree that governments over the years have always actively sought the partnership of faith-based organizations in resolving or preventing conflicts from degenerating into violence.	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana enjoys peace because the government has always actively engaged faith-based organizations to resolve or prevent conflicts at all levels from degenerating into violence
H₀₁₁ Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Importance of religion in the lives of Ghanaians (Q 51)	Extent to which religious beliefs and values influence the attitudes of Ghanaians towards the maintenance of peace	Level of agreement or disagreement on how religious beliefs and values influence attitudes of Ghanaians towards the maintenance of peace	% of respondents who agree or disagree that religious beliefs and values influence attitudes of Ghanaians towards the maintenance of peace
Faith practice and peace (Q 52)	Extent to which Ghanaians' observance of the teachings of their faith promote peace in Ghana	Level of agreement or disagreement that Ghana is at peace because its citizens observe the teachings of their faith	% of respondents who agree or disagree that Ghana is at peace because its citizens observe the teachings of their faith
Religiosity and	Extent to which the	Degree of	% of respondents who

peace (Q 53)	religious nature of Ghanaians affect the peace in the country	agreement or disagreement on the notion that Ghana is at peace because its citizens are very religious.	agree or disagree that Ghana is at peace because its citizens are very religious.
Religions discrimination in employment (Q 54)	Absence of discrimination on the basis of religion in employment practices and peace	Degree of agreement or disagreement that the absence of discrimination in employment practices has contributed to the peace in Ghana.	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the absence of discrimination in employment practices has contributed to the peace in Ghana.
Coexistence of people of different faiths (Q 55)	Ability of people of different faiths to coexist in the same spaces and impact on peace	Level of agreement or disagreement on that the coexistence of people of different faiths in the same geographical spaces contributes to peace in Ghana	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the coexistence of people of different faiths in the same geographical spaces contributes to peace in Ghana
Intermarriages between people of different faiths and peace (Q 56)	Absence of restrictions on marriages of people of different faith traditions and peace	Level of agreement or disagreement that the unrestricted nature of marriages between people of different faiths positively affects the peace in the country	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the unrestricted nature of marriages between people of different faiths positively affects the peace in the country
Exploitation of religious differences in political campaigns (Q 57)	The use of religious differences to canvass votes in national and local elections	Degree of agreement or disagreement that the use of religious differences to win votes from the electoral in all elections contributes to the peace in the country	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the use of religious differences to win votes from the electoral in all elections contributes to the peace in the country
Interfaith collaboration for peace (Q 58)	Leaders and agents of different religious traditions working together for peace	Extent of agreement or disagreement on how leaders and agents of different	% of respondents who agree or disagree that on how leaders and agents of different religious

		religious traditions work together to promote peace	traditions work together to promote peace
Role of religion in creating a culture of peace (Q 59)	Role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils such as the Catholic bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. in promoting a culture of peace.	Level of agreement or disagreement on the view that religious leaders and various religious councils and committees have played important roles in creating a culture of peace in Ghana.	% of respondents who agree or disagree that religious leaders and various religious councils and committees have played important roles in creating a culture of peace in Ghana.
H₀₁₂ The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys.			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Relevance of values and traditions of ethnic groups to peace in Ghana (Q 60)	Extent to which the values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote peace	Degrees to which respondents agree or disagree on the role that values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote peace	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote peace
Role of socialization on peace in all cultures in Ghana (Q 61)	Ways in which socialization processes in all cultures in Ghana inculcate the values of peace in their members	Level of agreement or disagreement among respondents on how socialization within various cultures in Ghana promote peace	% of respondents who agree or disagree that socialization processes within various cultures in Ghana emphasize the promotion of peace
Cultural sanctions for the breach of peace (Q 62)	Extent to which cultural sanction's for the breach of the peace deter adherents from promoting violence	Degree of agreement or disagreement among respondents on how sanctions for the breach of the peace from various cultures in Ghana help to create peace in the country	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the invocation of sanctions in various cultures in Ghana for the breach of the instigation of violence help to create peace in the country
Control of traditional rulers	Extent to which traditional rulers in	Differences in agreement between	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the

on members of their ethnic groups (Q 63)	Ghana exert their authority on their members to ensure the promotion of peace	respondents on the ability of traditional rulers in Ghana exert their authority on their members to desist from acts that breach the peace	ability of traditional rulers in Ghana to exert their authority on their members to desist from recourse to violence acts contributes to the peace the country enjoys.
Effectiveness of traditional rulers in promoting accommodation of people of different faiths, political affiliations, and ethnicity within their traditional areas (Q 64)	Ways in which traditional rulers promote peace through accommodating people of different ethnic groups, faith traditions and political affiliations within their areas of jurisdiction	Levels of agreement or disagreement among respondents on the ability of traditional rulers to promote peace through accommodating people of different faiths, political affiliations, and ethnicity within their jurisdiction	% of respondents who agree or disagree that the ability of traditional rulers in Ghana to create space for the accommodation of people of different ethnic and faith traditions within their jurisdictions contributes to the peace that Ghana enjoys.
Ho₁₃ Ghana's formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country enjoys (Q 65)			
Contribution of formal education to culture of peace	Extent to which respondents believe the formal educational system in Ghana has contributed to the building of a culture of peace among Ghanaians.	Assessed on a scale ranging from Very Low Extent, Low Extent, Moderately Low Extent, Moderate Extent, Moderately High Extent, High Extent, Very High Extent, Not At All, to Can't Tell	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to each category of the grading scale
Contribution of history courses in taught in schools to peace in Ghana	Content of history courses give equal value to the history of all ethnic groups	Respondents' assessment of the extent to which history lessons taught in schools in Ghana promote inclusiveness and unity among Ghanaians	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that the history courses in schools promote inclusiveness and unity among Ghanaians.
Content of Educational curricular and peace	Contribution of content of educational curricula to peace	Respondents' assessment of the extent to which the curricula of the	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which

		formal educational system teaches values of co-citizenship	they assess that which the curricula of the formal educational system teaches values of co-citizenship
Effect of cross-regional posting of teachers on peace in Ghana	Contribution of centralized posting of students to post primary educational institutions to peace	Respondents' assessment of the extent to which centralized posting of students to secondary and vocational schools promotes inter-cultural learning among citizens.	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that centralized posting of students to secondary and vocational schools promotes inter-cultural learning among citizens.
Effect of the Boarding school system on peace in Ghana	Contribution of boarding school system to peace in Ghana	Respondents' assessment of the extent to which use of the boarding system in post-primary educational institutions has promoted cross-cultural and cross ethnic friendships that have lasted into working lives of Ghanaians.	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that the boarding system in post-primary educational institutions has promoted cross-cultural and cross ethnic friendships that have lasted into working lives of Ghanaians.
Contribution of the boarding school to peace in Ghana	Contribution of boarding schools system to inter-cultural prejudice reduction	Respondents assessment of the extent to which the boarding school system has decreased ethnic and religious identity barriers and prejudices among Ghanaians	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that the boarding school system has decreased ethnic and religious identity barriers and prejudices among Ghanaians
Role of Past Students' Associations in promoting peace	The existence of Past Students or Alumni Associations has created strong cross-cultural bonds among alumni of the same schools	Respondents' assessment of the extent to which the activities of Past Students or Alumni Associations have created strong cross-cultural bonds	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that activities of Past Students or Alumni Associations have created strong

		among alumni of the same schools.	cross-cultural bonds among alumni of the same schools.
Effect of posting of teachers to regions or districts other than their home ones on peace	The practice of posting teachings to schools outside their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians.	Respondent's assessment of the extent to which the posting of teachings within the Ghana Education Service to schools outside their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians.	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that posting of teachings within the Ghana Education Service to schools outside their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians.
Contribution of Inter-school sporting events to peace	The promotion of sporting events between schools of different districts and regions have increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians	Respondents assessment of the extent to which the organization of sporting events between schools of different districts and regions have increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that organizing sporting events between schools of different districts and regions have increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians
Contribution of Interschool quizzes, debates and other forms of intellectual competition to peace	The role that Interschool intellectual competitions play in reducing cross cultural stereotypes and inferiority or superiority complexes among Ghanaians	Respondents assessment of the extent the engagement of students in quizzes, debates, and other forms of intellectual competition have reduced the complexes of inferiority and superiority among Ghanaians	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that intellectual competition have reduced the complexes of inferiority and superiority among Ghanaians
Contribution of National Service Scheme to peace	The compulsory national service scheme has helped to create a sense of oneness among	Respondents assessment of the extent to which the posting of students graduating from	% of respondents who provide responses corresponding to the different extents to which they assess that posting of

	Ghanaians	secondary and tertiary institutions to work in regions or communities other than their own has helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians	students graduating from secondary and tertiary institutions to work in regions or communities other than their own has helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians
H₀₁₄ Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.			
Variable	Operational Definition	Dimensions	Indicators
Inclusive attitudes and behaviors (Q 67)	Effort to ensure all parties in a discussion have a chance to express their views	Extent to which respondents make an effort to include people of other ethnic backgrounds in group discussions	% of respondents indicating various extents to which they consciously try to ensure that people of other ethnic groups participating in a discussion are able to express their views.
Ethnic superiority (Q 68)	Tendency to show that the values from one's culture are more important than those of others	Extent to which respondents would go to ensure that others from different cultural backgrounds accept their values as more important	% of respondents indicating the various extents to which they would go to ensure that their cultural values are accepted as more important than those of other cultures
Accommodation of alternate cultural views (Q 69)	Insistence that one's cultural views dominate in a discussion	Extent to which respondents go to ensure that their cultural views are accepted over others in a group discussion	% of respondents indicating various extents to which they insist that their particular cultural views be accepted in discussions with others of different cultural backgrounds
Avoidance of people of other cultures (Q 70)	Intentional staying away from people of other cultures	Extent to which respondents would go to intentionally avoid mixing with people of other cultures	% of respondents indicating the extent to which they will intentionally avoid mixing with people of other cultures.
Accommodation of views of others on national issues	Giving equal value and respect for the views of others on national issues	Extent to which the views of others on national issues are considered	% of respondents indicating the extent to which they would accept the views of other people

(Q 71)		important and valid	on national issues as important and valid
Empathy towards others (Q 72)	Putting oneself in the shoes of others on events that directly affected them	Extent to which respondents will try to understand issues and events from the perspectives of those directly affected by them.	% of respondents indicating the extent to which they accept and respect the thoughts emotions, and views of people who are directly affected by events in their lives.
Ethnic considerations in voting (Q 73)	Weight placed on the ethnicity of candidates in voting during elections	Extent to which respondents consider the ethnic background of candidates when they vote in an election	% of respondents indicating the extent to which they place value on the ethnic background of candidates when deciding whom to vote for in an election
Willingness to accept job postings to any part of the country (Q 74)	Willingness to live and work in cultural milieus other than one's own	Degree of willingness to accept posting to any part of the country other than in one's home region	% of respondents' indication of the extent of their willingness to locate and work in cultural milieus other than their own
Acceptance of ethnic intermarriages (Q 75)	Extent of willingness to accept that family members can marry someone outside one's ethnic group	Extent to which respondents would accept that members of their families marry to people of other ethnic backgrounds	% of respondents' indication of the extent to which they would accept that members of their family marry people of other ethnic backgrounds.
Mode of addressing disagreements with persons of other ethnic groups. (Q 76)	Choice of medium for addressing conflicts with people from other ethnic groups	Indications extent to which respondents would use the legal means to address their conflicts with people of other ethnic groups.	% of respondents' indications of the extent to which they would use the legal means to address their conflicts with people of other ethnic groups.
Criteria for voting for parliamentary candidates in an election (Q 77)	Choice between issues and personalities in voting for parliamentary candidates in an election	Indications of extent to which the personality of candidates or the issues they stand for determine the voting choices respondents make at elections	% of respondents' indication of the extent to which the personality or issues candidates stand for influence their choice of candidates they vote for during elections.

Appendix 9 Significance Levels of Factors Influencing Ghana's Peace

Influencing Factors	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Value	Significance	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
High level of civic awareness among Ghanaians	81.755	.067	14.320	244.413	.000	.074	238.925	.000	358.601	.000
High degree of agreement among political leaders on important issues affecting Ghana	120.102	.000	18.567	194.230	.000	.017	232.757	.000	320.141	.000
Presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the public and civil Services	106.675	.000	33.530	65.842	.054	.000	89.672	.003	200.956	.000
Cultures of all ethnic groups value peace	77.555	.030	20.211	92.472	.000	.005	140.788	.000	218.385	.000
Strong influence of religious beliefs that value peace	110.299	.000	20.788	91.410	.000	.004	116.765	.000	240.583	.000
Prayers and intercessions by religious groups	216.053	.000	23.331	72.521	.000	.001	157.049	.000	191.541	.000
Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic groups	144.063	.000	12.411	60.856	.119	.088	87.377	.005	241.433	.000
Ghanaians have a high degree of respect for the rule of law among	89.553	.003	9.746	126.461	.000	.203	112.779	.000	199.435	.000
Fear of being singled out for punishment	92.607	.002	10.279	130.257	.000	.173	117.855	.000	290.345	.000

Appendix 10: Significance of Economic Development on Ghana's Peace

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Level of Economic Development	70.697	.264	10.733	.215	131.945	.000	156.729	.000	270.628	.000
Geographical Disparities in Development	75.857	.147	8.222	.412	139.571	.000	149.479	.000	166.530	.199
Transparency of Contracts for natural resource Exploitation	114.172	.000	4.543	.805	93.551	.001	74.057	.009	145.531	.632
Returns on Natural Resource Contracts	100.849	.000	5.933	.548	69.818	.027	110.009	.000	182.176	.003
Allocation of Revenue from natural resources	88.793	.022	5.557	.697	105.188	.000	90.179	.000	195.797	.010
Use of proceeds from natural resources	112.294	.000	14.869	.062	79.579	.021	123.767	.000	186.531	.030

Appendix 11 Significance of Respect for Human Rights on Ghana's Peace

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Residence		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Freedom of Expression of Citizens	155.608	.000	15.347	.053	96.488	.005	514.444	.000	203.512	.003
political freedom	383.833	.000	17.478	.026	161.696	.000	731.296	.000	212.523	.001
Respect for Human Rights	239.193	.000	20.136	.010	135.45	.000	760.013	.000	203.189	.004

Appendix 12: Significance respect for the rule of law on peace in Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Citizen's respect for the laws of the land;	80.932	.075	12.223	.142	75.447	.155	442.776	.000	152	.000
Public officials act in accordance with the laws of the land;	98.103	.000	9.335	.229	101.343	.000	774.470	.000	221.269	.000
Citizen's respect for decisions of the courts have contributed to the peace in Ghana		.000	8.569	.285	93.598	.002	805.980	.000	187.379	.001

Appendix 13: Gender Perspectives on Respect for Rule of Law on Peace

Respect for Rule of Law	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Very Strongly Agree	165	129	294
	21.7%	19.9%	20.9%
Strongly Agree	11.7%	9.2%	20.9%
	211	184	395
Agree	27.8%	28.4%	28.1%
	15.0%	13.1%	28.1%
Mildly Agree	101	83	184
	13.3%	12.8%	13.1%
Mildly Disagree	7.2%	5.9%	13.1%
	158	156	314
Disagree	20.8%	24.1%	22.3%
	11.2%	11.1%	22.3%
Strongly Disagree	48	52	100
	6.3%	8.0%	7.1%
Very Strongly Disagree	3.4%	3.7%	7.1%
	60	35	95
No Opinion	7.9%	5.4%	6.8%
	4.3%	2.5%	6.8%
Total	11	6	17
	1.4%	0.9%	1.2%
	0.8%	0.4%	1.2%
	5	1	6
	0.7%	0.2%	0.4%
	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%
	0	2	2
	0.0%	0.3%	0.1%
	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
	759	648	1407
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	53.9%	46.1%	100.0%

Appendix 14: Significance of the Freedom of the Press to peace in Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Freedom of the print media	144.492	.000	21.040	.007	171.811	.000	1073.05	.000	233.515	.000
Liberalization of the electronic media	93.126	.010	17.493	.025	129.604	.000	370.870	.000	232.173	.000
Unrestricted access to news and information from the internet	100.812	.002	20.689	.008	191.449	.000	324.152	.000	239.993	.000

Appendix 15: Significance of the Independence of the Judiciary to peace in Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Independence of Judiciary	161.181	.000	6.671	.575	117.709	.000	897.920	.000	228.095	.000
Corruptibility of the Judiciary	98.858	.000	6.657	.574	106.413	.001	745.613	.000	318.746	.000
Equality of Citizens before the law	105.327	.001	16.505	.036	110.923	.000	801.608	.000	272.011	.000

Appendix 16: Significance of Gender-related factors to peace in Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Equality in Public Fora	86.694	.031	8.211	.413	80.111	.084	656.718	.000	191.219	.017
Women in Parliament	66.447	.393	21.664	.006	144.117	.000	489.639	.000	287.314	.000
Equal Economic opportunities	82.853	.057	11.374	.181	101.289	.002	561.726	.000	205.599	.002
Equal Educational Opportunities	86.672	.031	15.230	.055	289.369	.000	459.368	.000	218.421	.000
Equal Employment Opportunities	118.808	.000	12.733	.121	204.984	.000	574.678	.000	228.449	.000
Women in Mediation	129.109	.000	13.063	.110	117.155	.000	454.390	.000	262.092	.000
Queen Mothers	144.666	.000	17.299	.027	115.892	.000	562.660	.000	169.579	.156

Appendix 17: Elections and Democratic Participation

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Free, Fair Elections	132.660	.000	18.492	.018	176.334	.000	946.458	.000	273.867	.000
Parliamentary Elections, no war	45.724	.810	2.275	.810	94.668	.000	492.346	.000	213.556	.000
Presidential Elections, no war	47.512	.193	20.542	.001	96.968	.000	517.840	.000	158.654	.000
Freedom to Stand Elections	141.258	.000	11.301	.185	88.722	.022	845.749	.000	267.295	.000
Freedom to vote	147.940	.000	19.526	.003	64.102	.060	756.079	.000	291.807	.000
Freedom of Political Association	113.571	.000	12.562	.084	69.232	.110	746.355	.000	178.767	.005
No ethnicity in Voting Behavior	136.610	.000	25.672	.001	88.728	.022	475.798	.000	256.386	.000

Appendix 18: Significance Levels Of Religion To Peace In Ghana

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation		Religious Affiliation	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Importance of Religion	154.99	.000	8.277	.142	30.956	.847	300.546	.000	99.053	.368	135.639	.000
Respect for Faith Values and peace	149.903	.000	17.209	.028	75.139	.161	627.541	.000	325.384	.000	90.454	.002
Religious nature of Ghanaians	144.164	.000	24.270	.002	117.062	.000	538.724	.000	218.199	.000	134.152	.000
Religions discrimination in employment	140.541	.000	28.623	.001	93.800	.043	706.111	.000	259.800	.000	84.368	.037
Coexistence of people of different faiths	122.343	.000	15.816	.045	146.324	.000	588.267	.000	232.173	.000	73.114	.062
Intermarriages between people of different faiths and peace	91.196	.014	10.923	.206	145.952	.000	407.204	.000	211.953	.001	58.895	.370
Use religion in political campaigns	233.893	.000	23.105	.003	119.986	.000	646.095	.000	277.773	.000	73.624	.057
Interfaith collaboration for peace	154.818	.000	13.833	.054	106.997	.000	677.945	.000	324.485	.000	65.104	.062
Role of religion in creating a culture of peace	120.912	.000	8.802	.185	59.335	.126	598.492	.000	223.772	.000	56.737	.064

Appendix 19: Significance of Traditions and Culture to Peace

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation		Religious Affiliation	
	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value
Non-Xenophobic Values and Traditions	103.147	.000	7.869	.248	47.307	.501	381.866	.000	111.452	.550	49.233	.206
Cultural socialization for peace	143.487	.000	8.910	.113	83.249	.000	394.202	.000	130.218	.010	27.536	.812
Cultures sanctions on violence	170.101	.000	9.042	.171	53.622	.268	357.890	.000	218.787	.000	69.177	.005
Strong Influence of Traditional Leaders	127.767	.000	8.228	.144	51.974	.097	394.012	.000	114.600	.083	48.138	.069
Effectiveness of Traditional Leaders	104.448	.000	7.049	.133	68.780	.000	680.627	.000	210.703	.000	56.129	.001

Appendix 20: Summary of Agreements on Contribution of Education to Peace

Variable	Filtration at ≥ 6.5	Filtration at ≥ 7.5	Filtration at ≥ 8	Difference between 6.5 and 8
Education system creates Culture of Peace (n = 1421)	80.3	47	33.3	47
Teaching of History Civic Education (n = 1394)	64.9	37.4	27.5	37.4
Teaching of Civic Education in Schools (n = 1429)	66	46.7	19.3	46.7
Role of CSSP (n = 1429)	68.6	47.9	20.7	47.9
Boarding Schools and cross cultural education (n = 1391)	82.5	57.3	25.2	57.3
Boarding schools decreased barriers (n = 1390)	80.7	59	21.7	59
Past Students' Associations & cultural bonds (n = 1383)	63.6	34.2	29.4	34.2
Posting of teachers (n = 1429)	78.9	56.3	22.6	56.3
Inter-School Sporting Events (n = 1388)	69.4	42.3	27.1	42.3
Extracurricular academic engagements (n = 1380)	67.8	32.9	34.9	32.9
National Service (n = 1372)	77.8	61.6	16.2	61.6
			Average	47.50909


Differences between ≥ 6.5 , ≥ 7.5 and ≥ 8 Filtration Points of Mean Scores for Responses on The extent to which Various Factors In Ghana's Educational System Contribute to Peace

Appendix 21: Significance of Personal Attitudes, Behaviors and Practices for Peace

Variable	Age Category		Gender Category		Educational Level		Region of Interview		Primary Occupation		Religious Affiliation	
	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value	Value	P-value
Inclusive Attitude	50.800	0.256	5.502	0.855	86.316	0.000	373.011	0.000	185.802	0.000	61.874	0.121
Cultural Superiority	104.308	0.000	25.185	0.005	64.936	0.027	761.631	0.000	182.220	0.000	53.930	0.327
Dominant Personal Attitude	131.375	0.000	8.422	0.588	123.191	0.000	817.538	0.000	168.473	0.000	111.281	0.000
Avoidance	73.552	0.005	12.487	0.254	72.422	0.006	327.119	0.000	150.155	0.000	65.237	0.073
Valuing Views of Others	50.835	0.255	2.672	0.988	189.622	0.000	234.172	0.000	97.651	0.164	5.786	1.000
Empathy	86.245	0.000	6.500	0.772	78.042	0.002	447.283	0.000	159.197	0.000	131.56	0.000
Ethnic Affiliations in Elections	73.649	0.004	8.383	0.591	115.351	0.000	480.267	0.000	136.137	0.000	74.781	0.013
Voting Criteria	134.897	0.000	13.298	0.208	86.914	0.000	1052.729	0.000	194.528	0.000	231.260	0.000
Posting to other places	136.909	0.000	26.006	0.004	134.230	0.000	738.487	0.000	197.243	0.000	65.300	0.072
Support for intermarriages	106.7	0.000	22.550	0.013	73.461	0.005	442.450	0.000	142.497	0.000	24.131	0.999
Preferred Mediators in conflict Resolution	109.505	0.000	19.367	0.036	134.064	0.000	686.682	0.000	238.493	0.000	98.552	0.000

Appendix 22: Network View - Type of Peace


Type of Peace



Nodes count: 10
 Code Families (1):
 CF:Type of Peace
 Codes (9):
 Contributions to peace - Affirmative sub {13-1}

Appendix 23: Network View - Effect of Culture on Peace in Ghana


Effect of Culture on Peace2



<p>Nodes count: 27</p> <p>Code Families (1): CF:Effect of Culture on Peace</p> <p>Codes (26): Continued relevance of traditional leaders {3-3} cultural change or loss of moral compass {5-1} Cultural homogenization {7-2} Cultural hybridization {1-4} Culture is important {10-8} Culture of peace {21-5} Economic interdependencies {1-5} Ethnicity - not a problem {11-5} Fa ma Nyame {4-8} Fear of reprisal attacks {1-3} Indigenous religion {0-7}</p>	<p>Intercultural accommodation and assimilation {11-5} Intermarriages {6-12} Miscegenation {3-3} Patriarchy {2-6} Political culture of peace {1-7} Politicians respect law {4-5} Prayers {3-6} Role of women {2-7} Socialized behaviors {2-5} The Ashanti Factor {1-5} Traditional leaders {3-4} Visible institutional efforts {1-3} Women and peacebuilding in Ghana {1-3} Women as peacebuilders {1-3} Women as warmongers {4-4}</p>
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Appendix 24: Network View - Contribution of Religion to peace


Contribution of Religion to peace



Nodes count: 14	Good leadership {1-5}
Code Families (1):	Indigenous religion {0-6}
CF:Contribution of Religion to peace	Interfaith actions {3-4}
Codes (13):	Interfaith dialogues {1-4}
Fa ma Nyame {4-9}	Interfaith dialogues {6-11}
Faith in action {2-3}	Invisible roles {1-5}
FBO Interventions {8-4}	Prayers {3-6}
GOG, FBO, CSO Collaboration {2-5}	Religious leaders {4-6}
	Religious nature of Ghanaians is important {11-5}

Appendix 25: Network View - Exit Strategies

Exit Strategies

**Network View: Exit Strategies**

Created by: Super 2015-02-26T07:05:26

Nodes count: 7

Code Families (1):

CF:Exit Strategies

Codes (6):

Exit - disengagement/resignation {7-1}

Exit - Galamsey {1-1}

Exit - Migration {1-3}

Exit - Politics {2-1}

Exit - Private solutions {2-2}

Exit - Streetism {1-2}

Biographical Sketch.

Hippolyt has more than 27 years of progressive leadership in rural and international development planning and management; governance and civil society programming; and peacebuilding initiatives in across Africa. From October 2009 to September 2014 he served as the Coordinator for peacebuilding, governance, and gender programming for Catholic Relief Services for all of Africa. In that capacity, he led CRS' Africa Justice and Peace Working Group, which serves as the hub for CRS' work in major conflict areas in Africa, to design and implement peacebuilding and governance interventions that contributed to the peaceful elections and referendum in the transition processes for Sudan and South Sudan (2009 through 2011). His team also supported the design and implementation of peacebuilding, governance, and gender programs in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. More recently, he led the Africa Justice and Working Groups engagements with faith-based and civil society leaders, the Anti-Balaka, the Séléka, and other armed but noncombatant groups in Central Africa Republic to explore nonviolent platforms for promoting peace, social cohesion, and peaceful administrative transition in that country's ongoing civil conflict.

Over the same period, he coordinated CRS' annual Institute for Peacebuilding in Africa (IPA), which provides general and specialized capacity development training in peacebuilding and governance programming to staff of CRS, the Church, and Civil Society partners across Africa. Before then, he served in various positions within Catholic Relief Services, including working as the Deputy Regional Director responsible for program quality for the agency, first in Central and West Africa, and then exclusively for West Africa from October 2004 through September 2009. He briefly served as CRS' Regional Technical Advisor on Governance before taking on the DRD/Program Quality position.

In parallel to his work, Hippolyt has researched, written and presented conference papers, and published substantially on justice, human rights, governance, and the role of civil and faith-based organizations in peacebuilding and gender promotion in Africa. He has special interests and capabilities in policy research and advocacy; development research; multi-disciplinary approaches to the planning, monitoring, evaluation, and learning in integrated rural and international development initiatives. He has great facilitation and training expertise in conflict analysis, transformation, and peacebuilding. He is a member of the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR); the International Advisory Board of the Life and Peace Institute; and the Development Management Forum based in Nairobi, Kenya.

Hippolyt holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree and a Diploma in Education both from the University of Cape Coast, Ghana; a Master's Degree in Social and Public Policy and a Certificate in Conflict Resolution both from Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA. He also has a Diploma in Development Planning and Management from the Akademie Klausenhoff, Rhede, Germany. He is married with four children.