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Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis

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Abstract

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Author Bio(s)

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Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis

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Abstract

Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western politicians, practitioners, the media, and the general public is a basic understanding of Islamic fundamentalism; specifically, the causes. This is the first quantitative analysis of potential causes of Islamic fundamentalism. I have created a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. This fundamentalist data set has a total number of 16,072 fundamentalist movements. I will utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model and a comparison of each independent variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable's minimum, mean, and maximum score.

Introduction

The field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is one of the most unique fields found within the social sciences in part because of its inherent multidisciplinary roots where multiple academic schools of thought have found a common objective of analyzing and resolving many types of conflicts. The Matrix of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is growing and its scholarly canon is expanding with great robustness; however, there are voids. One such gap in the literature is research that deals with the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its potential

causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Also, anti-system social movements are reactive in nature and occur in reaction to events and forces in the socio-economic, political, and cultural arenas. Islamic fundamentalism forms in reaction to and in defense against the results and consequences of forced assimilation, modernization, industrialization, globalization, Americanization, and westernization, all of which have penetrated the larger Islamic community. There is no consensus as to what causes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or an explanation as to why some states have more Islamic fundamentalist movements than other states. This article provides preliminary answers by quantitatively measuring an Islamic-majority nation-state's degree of fundamentalism in relation to conditions which can cause social movement formation. To do this, Islamic fundamentalist movements are treated as social movements. Classic social movement theory consists of four schools of thought: resource mobilization theory, political process theory, Marxist theory, and new social movement theory. The fundamental conditions associated with each classical social movement school of thought have been quantified and are used as independent variables.

This article is divided into five parts. First, I look at the causes of Islamic fundamentalism as explained by the existing literature. In the second section, I propose my theory that Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements and are best explained through an amalgamation of the four classic social movement schools of thought. I also hypothesize that the fundamental conditions associated with each classical school of thought are positively associated with the degree of Islamic fundamentalism. Third, I explain my analytic design and rationale behind using the negative binomial fixed effects regression

model and a comparison of each independent variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable's minimum, mean, and maximum score. The fourth part is an explanation of my data and both independent and dependent variables. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. The fundamentalist data set I created has a total N (total number of fundamentalist movements) of 16,072. Finally, I explain the results, which indicate a strong correlation between Islamic fundamentalism and the fundamental conditions associated with the classical schools of social movement thought.

The Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism

Scholars offer five significant reasons explaining the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. First, some argue that worsening economics, unemployment, and poverty facilitate fundamentalism (the socioeconomic arguments). A second prevalent reason found in the literature is that cultural tension between Islam and the West, which is the result of modernization, Westernization, and Americanization, is facilitating fundamentalism. Third, many scholars argue that fundamentalism is a result of the Soviet Empire imploding and the political/social vacuum left in its place. Fourth, some argue that individuals become Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis in order to be closer to God. Fifth, some of the literature explains fundamentalism as the result of a specific catalyst, such as the Palestinian refugee problem, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society, or the assassination of Sadat.

The first prevalent argument explains the underpinning causes of Islamic fundamentalism as directly related to socioeconomic issues and assumes that worsening economies facilitate fundamentalism. Chibber (1996) attributes the electoral achievements of fundamentalist political parties to national economic factors. Throughout the Muslim world,

organized Muslim extremists have kept states' infrastructures working during periods of economic hardships or national disaster. Political alienation incited by economic deprivation influence fundamentalist movements which may seek to rectify perceived or real alienation through the creation of either armed or political groups and sometimes through both (Walz 1986; Keddie 1988, 2003; Jaber 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002; and Mortimer 1991). However, Grasso (1995) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of more than just simple economic factors and can be explained by Islamic social structure; specifically, the level of development, degree of urbanization, the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, and differences in patterns of consumption. These factors create a multilayered look into the role economics and related factors play in the development of fundamentalist groups. Dillman (1992) argues that in many post-colonial societies, a single party came to power following independence from colonizing nations, and he asserts those parties instigated the movement to gain independence from colonizers. However, as socioeconomic conditions worsen in post-colonial nations, fundamentalist political parties arise and achieve significant electoral success. Although post-colonial independence movements and subsequent economic conditions influence the development of fundamentalist groups, Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003) argue that the uneven distribution of economic development and natural resources in fact are the root causes of fundamentalist group development. They assert that recessions, depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment, and famine create attitudes and grievances expressed by feelings of relative deprivation among particular groups in the population leading to a rise in fundamentalism.

A second prevalent argument in the literature is that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the loss of traditional Islamic culture because of Westernization, Americanization, and modernization. Many scholars have explained the rise of religion as a political force creating the tensions associated with modernization (Ayoob 1981; Dessouki 1982; Esposito

1980; Keddie 1988; Lewis 1990, 1967;; Mortimer 1991). Pipe (1983) and Tibi (2002) argue that Muslims suffer from a double crisis, which facilitates Islamic fundamentalism. First, Muslims suffer from socioeconomic and political crises deriving from the imposed integration of Islamic civilization into a world dominated by the West. Secondly, Muslims suffer from an identity crisis brought on by exposure to cultural modernity. The general feeling among Islamic fundamentalists is that since the Crusades, the Western world has engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam. In response, Islamic fundamentalists have formed groups as a method of standing up to the Western world (Zarzar 2001). Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003), and Wickham (2002) argue that it is imperative not to underestimate the importance of Western imperialism in explaining the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. As numerous scholars have cited, the disappearance of traditional Islamic civil society over the last century via Western imperialism has led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004; Berman 2003).

The third explanation for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism is the implosion of the Soviet Empire. With the end of the Cold War, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a global security issue that poses serious challenges to state authority in the Middle East (Khashan 2000). The demise of the bipolar international structure associated with the Cold War facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism because the two superpowers had effectively contained the escalation of existing conflicts (Tibi 2002). The bipolar Cold War world was synonymous with global stability; when the Cold War ended, that global stability evaporated. During the Cold War, regional and domestic conflicts within the Islamic world were subordinated via the American-Soviet rivalry. However, with the end of global bipolarity, there is no adequate international political security structure to manage international changes which resulted in the increase of Islamic fundamentalism (Horsman and Marshall 1994). Hilal Khashan (1997) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to Islamic

militancy in three ways. First, extremists saw the fall communism as clear proof of the unworkability of man-made laws. Second, the breakup of Yugoslavia, a by-product of the Soviet collapse, triggered the Bosnia-Herzegovina War which led to the mass execution of tens of thousands of Muslims, and Western governments did very little to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing. As a result, much of the Islamic world became frustrated with Western apathy and the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to human rights. Third, the end of East-West ideological rivalry created a vacuum in international relations whose balance hinged in sustaining balanced conflict. The United States found itself without a major enemy. Finally, Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the Soviet Union's invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 and the formation of the Mujahedeen.

The fourth explanation of Islamic fundamentalism is interconnected with the arguments above. The fourth explanation is that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalism in personal times of crisis and to be closer to God. Phebe Marr (1994) argues that when facing serious socioeconomic problems, crises of cultural identity, government ineptitude, and rapid and disruptive change, the Middle East has turned increasingly to Islam for solace and solutions. Muslims are just like Christians or Jews, during hard times individuals turn to their sacred teachings and religious leaders for guidance and solace.

The remaining explanations argue that fundamentalism is the result of an outside catalyzing event. Specifically, Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the displacement of Palestinians after the establishment of the state of Israel. According to Khashan (1997), Islamic fundamentalism results from the decline of Arab nationalism which took its most significant blow after the Arabs lost the 1967 Six-Day War. In fact, the Egyptian Brotherhood claims that the lack of spirituality caused Egypt's defeat. However, Voll (2004a, 2004b) argues that the birth of modern Islamic fundamentalism began in Egypt in 1928 with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the result of

socioeconomic inequality facilitated by imperialism. Lia (1998), Sagiv (1995), and Kepel (1985a, 1985b) argue that modern Islamic fundamentalism emerged after the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. The assassins were identified as Islamic fundamentalists, members of a group called *al-Jihad*, who hoped to spark an Islamic revolution in Egypt. Finally, many scholars have argued that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. This position has been particularly argued by Abrahamian (1982, 1989, 1993), Khomeini (1989), and Keddie (1988, 2003). Each of these scholars systematically notes the Iranian Revolution's success as the direct result of the Shah's restrictive political institutions that started opening (or cracking) religious ideology, socio-economic inequality, and poverty.

Social Movements and Fundamentalism

The best way to understand the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is to view fundamentalist movements as social movements. Each classic social movement school of thought has competing assumptions associated with the formation and duration of social movements. Interestingly, each of these conditions is positively associated with the degree of fundamentalism as measured by the number of fundamentalist movements found within majority Islamic-based nation-states. The fundamental conditions associated with each of the classic schools of thought include the elements found in resource mobilization theory, socioeconomic structural inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and the sociopolitical structures found in political process theory, and the post-modern ideas found in the new social movement theory.

The first group of conditions are those associated with Marxism. Karl Marx (1978) had a legitimate argument when he asserted that when the state oppresses, enslaves, and ignores the masses long enough, they will revolt. Marx was correct when he argued that individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking

point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of the state. However, it did not occur to Marx to ask what makes individuals engage in collective action; he simply assumed that collective action was a direct result of society's structural development rather than individual choice. This is a legitimate argument; however, it does not explain why Muslims join fundamentalist movements. In this aspect, the resource mobilization theorists (the second classic social movement theory) are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources, of both the group and at state levels, are imperative for a movement's formation and success. What makes resource mobilization theory different from Marxist explanations of social movements is that it focuses on societal breakdown(s). In order to mobilize politically, groups require resources and they must mobilize these resources, that is, use them or put them into effect (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Freeman 1979). I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the resource mobilization theorists by also including education as a resource. Also, resource mobilization theory is based on the idea that participants in social movements are inherently rational.

The third classical social movement theory is political process. Political process theory is a response to resource mobilization theory. Political process theory criticizes resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in both sociopolitical arenas and governmental institutions which significantly influence the trajectories of social movements (Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982, 1986, 1988; and Tarrow 1989). Political process theorists argue that resource mobilization theory falls short because it assumes that social organization, integration, and resources, rather than grievances, discontent, and sociopolitical institutions are most important to a social movement's participants. In other words, resource mobilization theorists are putting the cart before the horse; a movement cannot have resources until it has grievances. The foundation

of political process theory is that political institutions play an integral role in social movement development.

The final classical social movement theory is the new social movement theory. New social theory emerged in the advanced industrial world after the social protests of the 1960s and 1970s subsided. New social movement theorists argue that recent social movements represent an entirely new form of social protest and reflect new goals and values. New social movements are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society (Kitschelt 1981; Melucci 1996; Offe 1985). New social movement theorists assert that one of the most important differences between new and old movements lies in the tactics that each relies on to achieve its goals.

Hypotheses

Based on the literature discussing each of these social movement theories, I derived the following four hypotheses to examine how conditions associated with each social movement school of thought influence the degree of fundamentalism:

H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

H2: Resources as described by resource mobilization social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in systems which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.

H4: Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state

Analytic Design

The goal of this article is to determine the conditions that are influencing the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements in Islamic-majority nation-states by utilizing quantitative methods. To do this, I utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model and a comparison of each independent variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable's minimum, mean, and maximum score. My findings show that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the degree of fundamentalism, as measured by the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. My data on the number of fundamentalist movements are in the form of yearly counts; therefore, I use negative binomial regression. The negative binomial model incorporates observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean (Long 1997). Thus, the conditional variance of my dependent variable (number of fundamentalist movements) becomes larger than its conditional mean, which remains unchanged. Negative binomial regressions are designed to handle continuous variables with distributions containing zero values and large positive skews, which explain my fundamentalist data. According to Robinson, Lawton, and Taylor (2003) negative binomial regressions effectively control for over dispersion by adding a stochastic component to the model. If the numbers of observations within a year are not independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. If such an over dispersion exists, as it does in counting fundamentalist movements, negative binomial models are more appropriate (Cameron 1990), but pooling multiple observations over time for each fundamentalist group violates the independence assumptions required for unbiased parameter estimates. This can be corrected by clustering data through random effects (Guo 1996) or fixed effects models.

Often, as in my data, the variance exceeds the conditional mean, resulting in what is called *over dispersion*. The negative-binomial model actually accounts for over dispersion.

It is essentially a negative binomial model (a variant of the Poisson model) that is commonly used to deal with over dispersion parameter that varies across states. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) suggested further refinement that starts with the negative multinomial model and makes additional assumptions about the distribution of the random effect that effectively allow the over distribution parameter to vary across both regions and time. This approach, called the negative-binomial model with random effects, does not work with my data. After running the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects, I was able to determine that random effects models were inappropriate; therefore, I decided to run fixed effects models. Standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and that error terms are not correlated. These models are inadequate for complex sampling designs, such as my fundamentalist movement data. Finally, I used the Xtnbreg regression command in Stata. Xtnbreg is a convenience command for population-averaged models by using xtgee, family (nbreg) link (log) to obtain estimates.

Data and Variables

Dependent Variable

I have created a data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is, or has been, in operation from 1970 through 2008. If the group, political party, or issue-oriented movement meets the following conditions it was included in my data set: First, the movement, group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement must be non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. Second, it also must encourage, sponsor, or condone the lack of separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions. Third, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-political objectives, and not just religious ones. The theoretical justification behind this definition of a fundamentalist movement must be broad enough to encompass multiple types of movements; thus I use words such as *group*, *political party* and *issue-oriented militant*

movement. This terminology in broad enough to catch most organized movements of people without excluding any. No fundamentalist movement is secular and their proponents do not have to believe in the lack of separation between church and governmental institutions. Finally, to separate religious movements from fundamentalist movements, I note that the movements must have socio-political objectives and not just religious ones.

In the fundamentalist data set I created, there is a total N (total number of fundamentalist movement-years) of 16,072. I obtained this number by taking each Islamic nation-state and counting every fundamentalist movement present for every year, and then summing the years. However, a problem that has arisen with counting the number of fundamentalist movements is that the size of the fundamentalist movement is not taken into account; this could have significant ramifications for the reliability of my data. To rectify this, I counted large movements (over 900 members) three times. I chose 900 because most small fundamentalist movements throughout the Islamic world have less than 400 active members and medium-sized Islamic movements have no more than 700 members. Furthermore, based on my findings there are virtually no differences between a small and medium sized fundamentalist movements. However, there are significant differences between small or medium movements and that of a large movements, specifically influence, membership, resources, and power.

Independent Variables

I only looked at nation-states with a 50% or more Muslim population. All population statistics were obtained from the Department of State's Country Study webpage. This is a 39-year study covering the years from 1970-2008. The following nation-states are included in this paper: Iran, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain (1971), Bangladesh (1972), Brunei (1984), Djibouti (1977), Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Pakistan (1972), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan (1991), Tunisia,

Turkey, Turkmenistan (1991), United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (1991), Yemen (1990),

Kazakhstan (1991), Eritrea (1991), Ethiopia, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and

Kyrgyzstan (1991).

The following are the total numbers of fundamentalist movements in each nation-state

included in this paper. The total number of movements is shown with the number of unique

groups in parenthesis: Iran 1329 (76); Algeria 452 (35); Azerbaijan 8 (4); Bahrain 212 (12);

Bangladesh 803 (39); Brunei 0; Djibouti 0; Egypt 616 (45); Indonesia 1125 (66); Jordan 434

(22); Kuwait 22 (6); Oman 35 (2); Saudi Arabia 421 (37); Syria 872 (35); Tajikistan 168 (9);

Tunisia 159 (9); Turkey 435 (25); Turkmenistan 7 (2); United Arab Emirates 32 (2);

Uzbekistan 96 (8); Yemen 208 (17); Kazakhstan 24 (5); Eritrea 30 (5); Lebanon 1748 (92);

Libya 542 (24); Iraq 1283 (149); Mauritania 49 (3); Morocco 224 (10); Qatar 2 (1); Pakistan

1203 (67); Ethiopia 437 (7); Afghanistan 728 (27); Somalia 349 (10); Sudan 667 (29);

Kyrgyzstan 81 (4); Palestine 1261 (62).

Outside Ideological Force

What I also add here is the presence of an outside ideological force. The presence of

outside ideological force plays a significant role in determining how many fundamentalist

movements a state will have. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the

Islamic world: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iran and Saudi Arabia do what I

call *group facilitate.* Group facilitate is when Iran or Saudi Arabia operates clandestine

operations within different Islamic states via sponsoring domestic movements found within

other states in order to facilitate their own interests and force other governments into

compliance. The United States, on the other hand, does not group facilitate; instead, it

influences the state leadership via economic and/or military aid and the presence of U.S.

troops. Theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than that of

Iranian or Saudi Arabian. American ideological inference is top-down, meaning the aid is

given to the state, not individual Islamic groups or movements. On the other hand, Iranian and Saudi Arabian ideological influence is, for the most part, bottom-up; they give aid directly to movements. There are a few exceptions to my argument concerning the U.S. and its top-down influence, specifically the Taliban and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the current aid it gives to Sunni groups in the Iraq.

During the last twenty-nine years, the international community has seen Iran emerge as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and domestic development of Shiite Muslims. Furthermore, during the same period, the international community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve the same ideological hegemonic standing as Iran but with the Sunni Muslims. Both enjoy a unique position in the world of Islam due to their strategic locations, natural resources, and historical and cultural role in the development of the Islamic civilization. I theoretically define a significant outside ideological force as an outside influence that meets each of the six criteria: firstly, the outside support must be in the form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid from a state other than where the fundamentalist group is located. Secondly, there must be a physical presence of the ideological force within the country via state representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, military, or any group representing the ideological state. Or, the members of the fundamentalist group must be trained in or educated in the foreign state. Thirdly to be considered *significant*, more than one group must receive the above explained influence. Fourthly, the ideological force cannot be working with, for, or influenced by the state in which the fundamentalist group is working. Fifthly, the ideological force must influence a fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years. Sixthly, the United States ideological influence is excluded from this variable because U.S. influence is captured in the presence of *U.S. troops* and *U.S. aid.*

The Marxist variables included here are the nation-state's total percentage of the population's poverty level and unemployment. The World Bank's data on *unemployment* and *poverty* are very limited. To rectify this, I have used the CIA World Fact Book From 1989-2007. For data prior to 1989 I used numerous sources which include books and articles concerning Middle Eastern poverty and unemployment. The Resource Mobilization variables include the *total population* (thousands), *total GDP* (millions of dollars), *total ODA* (millions of dollars), *total American financial aid* (millions of dollars), and *secondary school enrollment* (ratio of the total enrolment in secondary education). All data from the above independent variables were obtained from the World Bank's World data set. The Political Process variables include the polity variables from the Polity IV Project, specifically, *Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints*, and *Political Competition*. Also used to measure Political Process are the variables from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project and they include: *Political Rights, Extrajudicial Killings, Disappearances, Political Imprisonment*, and *Torture*. The following variables were used to measure the post-modern ideas associated with New Social Movement theory*: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Assembly* and *Association*, *Women's Political Rights*, and *Workers Rights*; all of which were obtained from the CIRI data project. Finally, the presence of an *Outside Ideological Force* which is a dichotomous variable that looks at whether there is a significant outside ideological force present. Also used to measure ideas are the *number of United States troops* in each nation-state included here (data was obtained from the Global U.S. Troop Development).

Results

Marxist Theory

The socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory suggest a positive and significant relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the number of

fundamentalist movements within the nation-state. The percentage of the total population within the nation-state living below the poverty is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Also, the percentage of the total population unemployed within the nation-state is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results, we see that socioeconomic inequality is a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypothesis number one, which argues *socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*

For every percentage increase in total poverty there was a .008 increase in Islamic fundamentalism. This indicates that states with more poverty will have more Islamic fundamentalist movements. To confirm this, I looked at the poverty variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score. When the percentage of the total population living in poverty was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.89, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.34, up from the average of 5.06. These results show that states with significant poverty have a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements.

The total percentage of the state's population living in poverty only represents half of the significant variables that make up the Marxist arm of my fundamentalist labyrinth; the second half of it consists of the total percentage of the state's unemployed population. Just as with the total poverty level, the unemployment coefficients were positive and significant. This indicates that unemployment is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the percent of the nation-state's unemployed population increases, the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state also increases.

The model results indicate that every percentage increase in total unemployment was a .011 significance level. To confirm this, I examine the poverty variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the percentage of the total unemployed was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.07, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 9.07, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is still larger than the mean; this indicates that unemployment has an effect on the number of fundamentalist movements.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Regarding Resource Mobilization theory, my results suggest a positive and significant relationship between resources and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state. Interestingly, my results indicate that only total population and education were positive and highly significant. In other words, as the total population increases so do the total number of fundamentalist movements. Also, as the percentage of the total population's education level increases, so does the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results we see that resources are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypotheses number two, which argues: *Resources as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*

The population coefficients were positive and significant in all regressions when I ran the model using the logged value of the total population. This indicates that the total population was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the size of the nation-state's population increases by ten thousand, the

number of fundamentalist movements increases by .0001046; this increase is relatively small. These results suggest that increases in a nation-state's population facilitate more fundamentalist movements. Alone, these results do not indicate a significant amount of information. However, taken with the other variables associated with resource mobilization theory, it is apparent that resources are positively associated with fundamentalism. I looked at the total population variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When the state's total population was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.34, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.8, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state's population increases, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

The education/school enrollment coefficients were positive and significant. The education coefficients were significantly larger than that of the population variables. The results reveal that for every percentage increase in school enrollment there was a significance level of .003. These results indicate that education was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. In other words, the more educated the population, the more fundamentalist movements there will be within the nation-state. Just as with the state's total population, I looked at the education level variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When secondary school enrollment was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.08, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 8.73, up from the average of

5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as population and education increase, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Political Process Theory

The results associated the conditions associated with Political Process theory are twofold. First, there are two linear relationships between perfect autocracies and the perfect democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups. The definition of a perfect autocracy is obtained from the Polity IV data set that ranges from a -10 (a perfect autocracy) and +10 (a perfect democracy). These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, whereas states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. When governments disdainfully kill or torture their citizens with no regard to basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist groups. On the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state has, the fewer fundamentalist movements. Second, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The number of movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect autocracies. In order to prove hypotheses number three: *The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic,* I ran different sets of models utilizing the CIRI human rights data and the Polity IV data sets.

Extrajudicial killings are negative and significant, as expected. Extrajudicial killing is the killing of citizens within the perspective nation-state by government officials without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal

suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. The model indicates that the more individuals a state kills, there will be a .05 decrease in the significance level of the number of fundamentalist movements. From here, I looked at the extrajudicial killing variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When extrajudicial killings were set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 7.33, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.42, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the more citizens the state either murders or facilitates the murder of, there will be a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.

State sponsored acts of torture were also negative and significant, as expected. State sponsored acts of torture refer to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials. The results reveal that the more individuals a state tortures, there will be a significance level decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .11. I looked at the state sponsored acts of torture variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When state sponsored acts of torture were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 6.28, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of movements is 5.49, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the more the state tortures its citizens, the fewer fundamentalist movements.

Thus far, I have not proven an inverted-U relationship exists between political institutions and the number of fundamentalist movements. I have shown that two linear relationships exist between very perfect democracies/autocracies and the number of fundamentalist movements. These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, while states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. However, I suspect a much more complex relationship between political institutions and Islamic fundamentalism. Specifically, an inverted-U relationship; that is, there will be more Islamic fundamentalist movements in nation-states that are not either perfect democracies or perfect autocracies. According to Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 545), polity stands as the best comparative indicator of procedural democracy because of its incorporation of structural constraints on political participation and contestation. It is also one of the most utilized comparative measures of democracy and the best variable to determine inverted-U shaped relationships. Therefore, I squared all variables associated with polity. If the polity variables have a significant positive effect and the squared term has a significant negative effect, then I prove that an inverted-U relationship exists. My polity variable was not significant. This does not necessarily disprove my hypothesis because two of the three multi-dimensional polity variables and their square terms were significant.

Concerning the multidimensional polity variables, executive recruitment was positive and significant. Executive recruitment, which was first conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr (1975), involves the ways in which social superordinants come to occupy their positions of political authority. In other words, how open, institutionalized and competitive are the political institutions that are used in selecting political leaders. The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8, 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open. My analysis of executive recruitment provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship

between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive recruitment is significantly positive while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship exists between executive recruitment and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. In other words, the relationship between fundamentalism and political institutions is nonlinear; political systems with open political institutions facilitate fundamentalism. The executive recruitment coefficient results reveal that the more politically free a state is, the number of fundamentalist movement significance level increases by .013. On the other hand, the squared executive recruitment coefficients reveal that the more politically closed a state is, there will be a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023.

Executive constraints were positive and significant and refer to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The degree of checks and balances between the veto players in the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from the unlimited executive authority (1) to executive subordination (7). Under unlimited executive authority, there would be only one veto player and under executive subordination there would be numerous veto players. My analysis of executive constraints provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive constraints are positively significant while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship between executive constraints and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. As for the executive constraint coefficients, the results reveal that the more veto players in a state means there will be a significance level increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023. On the other hand, the squared executive constraint coefficients reveal that more veto players in a state will cause a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .002.

The results of my executive constraints and executive recruitment variables were similar to that of Regan and Henderson (2002) and Fein (1995), who found that there would be more repression in the middle of the political spectrum and that both democracies and autocracies experience lower levels of repression while semi-democracies experience more fundamentalist groups. I have proven that my inverted-U hypothesis is valid and there will be a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements in opening political systems, just as the political process theorist theory predicts.

New Social Movement Theory

The post-modern ideas associated with the New Social Movement theory, results suggest a positive and significant relationship between ideas and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state; specifically, religious ideas or ideas associated with an outside ideological force. Interestingly, my results indicate that the presences of an outside ideological force, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are significant. Given these results we see that ideas are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypotheses number four, which argues: *Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*

The results reveal that if there is a presence of an outside ideological force, there is an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .35. To confirm this, I looked at the outside ideological force variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the variable is set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.61, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 11.0, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its maximum, the

expected number of fundamentalist movements is twice as much as it is when set at the mean; this and the above statistical results indicate that the presence of an outside ideological force is a significant determinant in the number of fundamentalist movements. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nation-states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As I explained before, theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than either Iranian or Saudi Arabian. For the most part, the outside ideological variable only incorporates the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia. U.S. ideological influence was excluded from this variable but captured with two additional variables: U.S. aid and the presence of U.S. troops. In not in a single model was U.S. aid or the presence of U.S. troops significant.

Religious freedom is positive and significant. Religious freedom measures the extent to which individuals living within the nation-state are able to exercise and practice their own religious beliefs without government restrictions. When governments restrict religious freedom, there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts religious freedom then there will be a .0014 significance level. From here, I looked at the freedom of religion variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist groups by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When religious freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 5.81, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.77, down from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state restricts religious freedom, individuals will turn to fundamentalist movements.

Freedom of speech is negative and significant, as expected. Freedom of speech measures the extent to which the government censors an individual's freedoms of speech and

press. When governments restrict freedom of speech we see a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements by .019. In other words, in nation-states with more freedom of speech and press, there will be more ideas and thus more fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts freedom of speech, then there will be a significance level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .09. From here, I looked at the freedom of speech variable's effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When freedom of speech was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movement is 5.18, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.42, up from the average of 5.06.

Conclusion

Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism on religion. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western politicians, practitioners, and the general public is a basic understanding of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. This paper helps rectify this by quantitatively analyzing the causes of Islamic fundamentalist movements. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. As independent variables I quantified the fundamental conditions associated with each of the classic social movement theoretical schools of thought and my results indicates that each are positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements found within Islamic-Majority nation states.

To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its potential causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Furthermore, it is becoming extremely difficult to determine the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and no phenomena blurs this point more than the rise and actions of Islamic fundamentalists. Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is the greatest threat to the international community and, arguably, the negative results of liberalism, globalization, and the Americanization of global politics have facilitated the growth and success of such movements. The study of social movements is a major subfield in comparative politics, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the most recent of the social movements. The global effects of fundamentalism and their acts of terror have a major impact on the global economy and the state which inherently impacts international relations. This latest threat to the harmony of the international system is created via domestic political systems and is a direct result of the foundations of comparative politics. This paper further blurred the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and in doing so has added to the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

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