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Robust Peacekeeping? Panacea for Human Rights Violations

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Abstract

This paper examines the conviction that robust peacekeeping—a strong and forceful peacekeeping force—works better than traditional UN peacekeeping mechanisms in reducing human rights violations, specifically, civilian killing, in areas of deployment. I seek to analyze both the operational and internal characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations in an effort to understand the hindrances to achieving the objective of protecting human rights. Specifically, the study examines the contributions of key structural variables, including the mission type, weapon type, rules of engagement, mission strength, and major power participation controlling for other intervening variables using negative binomial and logit regression models. The empirical results indicated that the core variable ―robust peacekeeping‖ has impact on civilian killings, namely that it lowers civilian killings. The key factor seems to be strength of mission size associated with lower numbers of civilian killings. Great power participation, peacekeeper diversity and affinity with the host state, along with identity conflicts and at least proto-democratic status of the host state appear to be harbingers of potentially higher deliberate civilian killing totals. The findings thus have both theoretical and policy implications in the field of peacekeeping.

Introduction

The failures of the United Nations to stave off intentional civilian killings in Rwanda and Bosnia prompted fundamental reassessment of the continued relevance of

traditional peacekeeping (Griffin 2001, 150) and the adoption of robust peacekeeping—a strong and forceful peacekeeping force (Brahimi Report 2000)—as a better mechanism to stave off intentional civilian killing (Lacey 2005, 1). This study examines whether robust peacekeeping works better than traditional peacekeeping in reducing human rights violations, specifically intentional civilian killing, in areas of deployment. In this study, I examine the contributions of key structural variables, including mission type, weapon type, rules of engagement, mission strength, and major power participation, controlling for other intervening variables such as regime type, conflict type, borders, peace agreements, troops composition, and ethnic affinity using negative binomial and logit regression models. The questions being investigated are: (1) is robust peacekeeping more likely than traditional peacekeeping to be successful in reducing intentional civilian killings? (2) do mission characteristics of UN Peacekeeping matter for reducing the ongoing intentional civilian killing?(3) to what extent does robust peacekeeping affect the number of intentional civilian killings? The study will allow policy and theoretical conclusions about these factors in an attempt to realize the cherished objective of protecting civilians in civil conflict zones.

From Traditional Peacekeeping to Robust Peacekeeping

Problems in Traditional Peacekeeping

The Cold War period missions were characteristically termed ―traditional" and ―first generation" peacekeeping, involving lightly armed UN military observers or interposition peacekeeping forces, deployed after the cessation of an inter-state conflict to oversee and assist with the implementation of peace agreements. Missions were limited

to interdiction between conflict parties and did not generally allow for assertive missions (Goulding 1993).

Traditional peacekeeping missions were originally designed for inter-state conflicts but were adapted to contain domestic conflict situations, first in the tragedy of the Congo in the 1960s (Goulding 1993). They are premised on cooperation of conflicting parties and the methods used are inherently peaceful. Weak force strength, limited resources, small arms, no major power participation and rules of engagement that permit them to use force only in self-defense characterize them. Traditional peacekeeping missions are non-coercive and the troops are not designed to restore order or stop fighting between the belligerents unlike robust and peace enforcement missions. Traditional missions therefore lack both the offensive mission and the capacity to prevent intentional civilian killings as evidenced in the UN's failures in Rwanda and Bosnia.

Demands for Robust Peacekeeping

Ong Heng (2003) defines robustness as having a ‒force that has the credibility to deter those who mean harm with power to take the necessary actions, including the use of force, to defend itself and fulfill its mandate" (UN Press Release, GA/SPD/268, 2003). The demand for a paradigmic shift from traditional to robust peacekeeping was facilitated by the development of humanitarian posture within international peace and political/legal discourse to capture the mood of contemporary security realities (Dale 2005).

Former Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined the shift to ‒robust peacekeeping" when he recommended that the UN should abandon outdated concepts of neutral peacekeeping and replace them with a more muscular form of peace operation if it is to avoid the kind of fiascos in previous missions (Ramo 2000). He acknowledged the

challenges posed by spoilers in the fulfillment of mission mandates and recommended that UN peacekeepers be equipped and given robust mandates to withstand these challenges (UN Press Release, SG/SM/9311 SC/8096 PKO/107).

Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses

Robust peacekeeping was initiated in response to the contemporary turbulent civil war environment, where civilians have become the primary targets. The post cold war era was proliferated by civil wars along national, religious and ethnic fault lines involving both state and non-state actors with disastrous and lethal consequences for millions of civilians (Burk 2000). The difficulties and threats in the operational environment raised doubts about the suitability of traditional peacekeeping in resolving these types of conflict (Mockaitas 1999). This precipitated demands for a paradigm shift from traditional to robust peacekeeping to meet the challenges posed by the changed conflict environment.

Ruggie (1993) observes a doctrinal void, referred to as the ―grey areas,‖ between traditional peacekeeping authorized under Chapter ―six and half‖ and peace enforcement authorized under Chapter seven of the UN Charter that needs to be bridged. Ruggie argues that ―the UN has entered a domain of military activity—a vaguely defined no-man‘s land lying somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement, called the grey area, for which it lacks any guiding operational concepts‖ (Ruggie 1993, 23). Ruggie further observes that the UN finds itself in trouble in this ―grey area‖ because the UN is wrongly applying perfect traditional tools to ―inappropriate circumstances‖ (Ruggie 1993, 29). Jacobsen (2000) observed that the basic thrust of robust peacekeeping is therefore to fill the doctrinal gap identified by Ruggie by deploying deterrent forces in

conflict zones with wider use of force than in traditional peacekeeping but short of war as in enforcement (Jacobsen 2000; also see Woodhouse 1999). The presumption is that robust peacekeeping with its deterrent posture may prevent human rights violations bred by violence and establish minimal compliance with human rights in a state where the rule of law has broken down.

Hypothesis 1:   *Robust peacekeeping missions will be more successful than traditional ones in situations where parties are not yet in stable ceasefire or where rejectionists have organized spoiler opposition to agreements.*

Diehl (1994) argues that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when peacekeeping forces maintain neutrality, have the consent of warring parties, and use their weapons only in self-defense. In robust missions, however, the rules of engagement transcend the traditional notion of self-defense to include the use of force to deter and respond to spoilers' threat and protect civilians (United States Dept. of State, *Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,* 1994). The basic presumption of the use of deterrent force to restore stability is that hostilities harden bargaining positions and attitudes rather than concessions by parties who suffer costs (Greg and Diehl 2005). Until violence is stopped or at least managed, it is unlikely that any attempts to resolve competing interests underlying the conflict can be resolved. The presence of a credible military force deters, denies, neutralizes and convinces spoilers that violence will not succeed (Ruggie 1993).

Hypothesis 1 a: *Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if the rules of engagement permit them to use force to protect civilians from human rights violations.*

A fundamental condition for success of robust and all peacekeeping missions is the provision of sufficient resources including funds, weapons and especially troops.

Successful missions require resource/mandate compatibility (Malaquias 1996; Bratt 1997). There was a huge resource/mandate discrepancy in Rwandan mission that disabled United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from stopping the genocide. A well equipped large force with appropriate rules of engagement could have staved off the Rwandan genocide.

Hypothesis 1 b: *The larger/stronger the peacekeeping force, the more likely it will be Successful.*

Diehl (1994) argues that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when peacekeeping mission forces are lightly armed, and use their weapons only in self-defense. In robust peacekeeping, however, the conception of peacekeeping has broadened from the earlier conception of lightly armed neutral UN peacekeeper to much more activist orientations using heavy combative weapons to hunt down spoilers. Not only do heavy weapons make them combat-ready but also they are thought to deter spoilers through the show of credible force. Secretary General Annan acknowledged the need to rethink how we equip troops and prepare them for all eventualities (United Nations Peace Operations A/55/305/2000/809).

Hypothesis 1 c: *Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if troops are equipped with or deploy heavy, instead of small, weapons.*

In the cold war era, major powers were debarred from participating in peacekeeping missions to guarantee neutrality of UN forces. However, with a paradigm shift to robust peacekeeping, it has become imperative that the well-resourced and trained troops of the developed countries participate in UN peacekeeping missions (Bratt 1997; Ong Heng 2003; Guehenno 2005). Diehl (1994), however, observes that super powers have relatively minor impacts on the peacekeeping outcomes. Bratt (1997) on the other

hand argues that successful mission in an internal conflict demands the support of the five members of the Security Council because they possess great influence over the cost of operations. Ong Heng (2003) also argues that multinational forces with the participation of troops from the developed countries truly reflect collective responsibility and provide robustness.

The basic logic is that major power participation reflects the legitimacy and seriousness of global concern of the conflict. Additionally, the developed countries have the critical resources both human and material that a credible deterrent UN peacekeeping force needs. They also have the political and economic leverages to influence the behavior of combatants by manipulating and raising the costs of continued fighting (Regan 1996). The realization that the world community, especially super powers, supports an intervention may exert pressure on protagonists to halt hostilities (Diehl et al. 1996)

Hypothesis 1 d: *Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed when major power(s) participate in the peacekeeping operation.*

Control Variables

Scholars have argued and supported with case studies that language and cultural differences among peacekeeping forces hinder operational effectiveness and may have negative consequences on mission success (Eron et al. 1999; Duffey 2000). Cultural and linguistic differences may result in disagreement in interpretation of mission resolutions and what actions to take which may delay actions including the protection of civilians under imminent threat. It is presumed that each country is distinct culturally.

Hypothesis 2: *The greater the number of countries contributing to the mission contingents, the less likely the mission success.*

One perspective claim is that peacekeeping forces are most likely to succeed if they are from the same region as the conflict. The argument is that affinity creates trust and legitimacy (Diehl 1994). This claim has been supported by the Brahimi Report that recommended regionalism as a better model measure of responding to a contemporary international security threat. An opposite perspective is that regional peacekeepers are less likely to be regarded as neutral and trustworthy (Diehl et al. 1996). I use as a proxy the ethnicity of the highest field executive in determining whether the group affiliates ethnically or culturally with the parties to the conflict or not. The reason is that the tenor of the mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of the leadership.

Hypothesis 3: *Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if the highest field executive plus troop contingents have cultural or ethnic affinity with the host country.*

Many studies on conflicts have suggested that identity conflicts (ethnic or religious) are far more difficult to resolve than ideological conflicts (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Identity conflicts are based on deep-rooted emotional values that are difficult to compromise on. On the basis of this realization, it presupposes that casualties will be more difficult to be controlled in identity conflicts than in ideological conflicts.

Hypothesis 4: *Mission is less likely to be successful in identity conflicts than in ideological conflicts.*

Some studies argue that neighboring states have the potential to disrupt a peacekeeping process with direct acts of violence or support warring parties that oppose the operation (Green et al. 1998). Neighboring states have a high stake in the outcome of conflicts and consequently act to either support or disrupt peaceful solutions. It is therefore anticipated that more borders will negatively affect peacekeeping success.

Hypothesis 5: *Countries with more bordering states see less peacekeeping success.*

A major finding in peace literature is that the probability of peacekeeping success will be higher when there is a negotiated settlement to the conflict before peacekeepers are deployed than the absence of such agreement (Fortna 1998). Fortna (1998) argues that agreements employ several instruments to change the payoffs and make it costly to cheat, reduce uncertainty about compliance and intentions, and control accidents. Signing a peace agreement reflects the political will of the combatants to end the violent phase of the conflict (Regan 2000; Downs and Stedman 2002).

Hypothesis 6: *Missions are more likely to be successful when deployed after peace agreements among conflict parties.*

Another major finding in the international relations literature is that democracies tend not to fight one another. This democratic peace proposition has more recently been extended to civil wars (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001), human rights (Davenport 1999; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005), and state-sponsored mass-murder (Rummel 1994, Easterly et al. 2006). Rummel (1994) finds, and confirmed by Easterly et al. (2005), that democracies have killed substantially fewer of their own citizens than other forms of governments.

Hypothesis 7: *Mission success is likely to be greater when host states are democracies.*

Research Design

In this study, I examine all intrastate peacekeeping missions in civil wars for the period 1956-2006. The data was created using multiple sources. In this study, there are 240 observations in the dataset covering 46 intrastate conflicts in 29 countries. In order to identify an event, a mission has to be deployed a in civil war during the period of observation in accordance with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program definition of armed conflict: an incompatibility (over either governmental power or territory, or both)

between a government and one or more irregular groups that in one year result in at least 25 battle-related deaths (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). This threshold for inclusion is lower than in many studies of civil war that require 1000 battle deaths a year (e.g. Regan 2000; Singer and Small 1963), and also allows for a study of violence against civilians in low intensity conflicts.

The unit of analysis is *mission year*. In order to test the hypotheses, I employed a negative binomial and logit model regression models. Negative binomial regression model determines the effect of robust peacekeeping on the levels of intentional civilian killings while logit regression model determines either decreased or increased civilian killings or mission success or failure.

Dependent Variable

Civilian Killing: The dependent variable is *the number of civilians deliberately killed.* Following Valentino et al. (2004), civilian is defined as ―any unarmed individual who is not a member of a professional or guerrilla military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause harm to enemy personnel or property" (Valentino et al. 2004, 8). *Civilian Killing* is a count of the number of civilians deliberately killed by either the government of a state or by formally organized non-state groups which results in at least 25 deaths in a year based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) *one-sided violence* dataset. The program defines *one-sided violence as* the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. The UCDP, however, does not cover all my cases so I supplemented with data from United States Department of State annual country reports on human rights practices and Human Rights Watch annual reports by

country. Only deliberate killings through the use of force are coded, which means that civilians killed in crossfire are excluded. Furthermore, indirect killings such as starvation of conflict areas are also excluded.

Civkchang: This variable refers to change in civilian killings either decreased or increased civilian killings to determine mission success or failure. This is a binary or dichotomous variable and is coded as 0=decreased civilian killings (mission success), 1= increased civilian killings (mission failure).

Independent Variables

Mission type refers to the types of UN peacekeeping missions launched into conflict zones that includes observer, traditional, multi-dimensional and ˍrobustʻ peacekeeping missions. The type of mission is coded in the following manner:

 1 = Observer mission

 2 = Traditional mission

 3 = Multi-dimensional mission

 4 = ˍRobust" mission

Data for mission type is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operationʻs website.

Mission strength/size is measured by the total manpower of the peacekeeping mission. Data for mission strength is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operationʻs website. *Rules of engagement* is conceptualized as directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and /or combat engagement with other forces encountered (US Chairman of the Joint of Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2000). I measure rules of engagement by the provisions in the mandate on conditions for use of force. Data is from

the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation's website. Rules of engagement is coded 1 when mission force is permissible to use force to defend civilians from attacks; otherwise it is coded 0 when mission force is not permissible to use force to defend civilians from attacks but used only in self-defense.

Arms types, according to the United Nations weapon classifications, small arms or light weapons are conventional weapons that can be carried by a soldier or on a light vehicle. Small arms thus include revolvers and self-loading pistols, grenade, submachine guns, rifles, machine guns, mines and antitank weapons. Heavy weapons are the major conventional arms that include battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters. Arms type data sources are the UN *Register of Conventional Arms* and SIPRI arms database. Small arms is coded 0 while large or heavy arms is coded 1. *Major power* is measured by the participation of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council in a peacekeeping mission. It is coded as 0 when no major power participates and 1 when at least one major power participates. Data for major power participation is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation's website.

Control Variables:

Field executive affinity is a proxy for the cultural similarity between the mission and host country. Affinity between the field executive (e.g. the force commander) is measured using Vanhanen (1999) categorization of Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid. The source of data is the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation's website. Data on ethnic composition of countries are from *CIA world Factbook 2000* and Encyclopedia Britannica, while Cavalli-Sforza (1991) determines which of the three main categories –

Caucasoid, Negroid and Mongoloid—to which ethnic groups belonged. Host country and country of origin of field executive are identified from mission reports of the Secretary General, UN Peacekeeping Operations' website. *Field executive affinity* is coded as 0 when there is no affinity and 1 when there is an affinity. *Conflict type* distinguishes identity conflict from ideological and revolutionary conflicts. The distinction is based on the coding rule of Regan (2002). The type of conflict is coded as 0 when ideological, revolutionary conflict and 1 for identity (ethnic or religious) conflict.

Border is operationalized in terms of either a shared border or less than 150 miles of water separating two contiguous land masses based on the measures used by the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer and Small 1994). The number of borders is measured as a continuous variable that ranges from a low of one border to a high of nine borders. *Peace agreement* is denoted by a dummy variable indicating whether a peace agreement is signed or not by all principal combatants before peacekeepers are deployed. The data for the presence of peace agreement are from the peace-building dataset created by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) or UN documents pertaining to the conflicts. The variable is coded 0 for absence of peace agreement before deployment and 1 for presence of peace agreement before deployment. *Regime type* refers to either democracy or autocracy of the host country. Source of data for this variable is the combined policy score collected in the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The democracy and autocracy scores are each ordinally scaled, ranging from zero to ten, each measuring institutional aspects of the regime. The regime type score therefore, ranges from -10 to 10. Following Valentino et al. (2000), this variable is coded as a dummy variable: 0 = if the combined Polity score

was less than + 6 (less democratic); 1 = if the combined Polity score was equal to or greater than +6 (highly democratic).

Methodological Justification

The stated hypotheses were tested, using two different statistical models—negative binomial and logit regression models. The dependent variable *civilian killing* is the annual count of the number of civilians deliberately killed by the conflict parties during the period of deployment of the mission force. Accordingly, I use event count model rather than the more familiar linear regression model. In a recent study, Valentino et al. (2004) used Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) analysis for civilian killing, while a study by Eck and Hultman (2007) employed negative binominal regression analysis for one-side civilian killing. Both studies show some disagreement about the choice of methodological models for event count (see King 1989a). According to King (1989a), OLS provides an unbiased linear estimator, and this is unaffected by different distributional assumptions but identifies certain problems in using OLS (King 1989a). First OLS assumes a linear relationship. This is an implausible functional model because often it results in predicted events counts that are less than zero and therefore meaningless. Second, OLS does not take into account neither heteroskedasticity nor the underlying Poisson distribution of the disturbances hence OLS does not use all available information in the estimation. King (1989a) and Long (1997) suggest that linear regression models may result in outcomes with inconsistent, biased, and inefficient estimates. These statistical problems of OLS could result in substantively biased conclusions rendering OLS a statistically inefficient model for event count.

The most common event count model, Poisson regression, determines the probability of an event count based on Poisson distribution (Long 1997). Unfortunately, Poisson regression models may bias standard errors downward, leading to inaccurate assumptions about the level of significance of independent variables. In addition, Poisson regression also assumes that the mean distribution is equal to the variance making the resulting parameter estimates inefficient when a researcher suspects over-dispersion (Long 1997). Over-dispersion or variance greater than the mean is quite likely in political science research (King 1989b).

Given that the dependent variable is a count of civilians killed, the hypotheses are tested applying negative binomial model (NBRM) as used by Eck and Hultman (2007). An alternative approach to NBRM will be Gamma count model (see Alt et al. 2000). A negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is suitable because it is preferred when there is over-dispersion in the data which indicates that there might be both contagion and unobserved heterogeneity (King 1989a, 129; Long 1997, 30-36). Apart from unobserved heterogeneity and contagion, which are defined through the over-dispersion in the data, there are also many zeros, and NBRM predicts a higher number of zeros (Eck and Hultman 2007; Krause et al. 2006). This seems reasonable since there may be fluctuations in civilian killings during the mission period. Within a mission year, there may be civilian killings while in other years there may be no killings.. To determine either mission success or failure I employ logit regression model given that the dependent variable is dichotomous. I turn now to my findings.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

For the period 1956 to 2006 that this study covers, the United Nations deployed 46 missions in 29 civil conflicts. Ultimately, the United Nations engaged in 240 mission years during the period under study. The data depict that within the period of study, the percentage of mission years for the mission types are: observer, 33 percent; traditional, 28.3 percent; multi-dimensional, 18.3 percent; and robust, 20 percent (see Table 1 for percentage of mission years). In my estimation, the lowest number of civilians intentionally killed by conflict parties in a given year was 25 with 500,000 as the highest recorded in the Rwandan genocide. The data depict that 97.7 percent of civilian killings occurred during traditional peacekeeping missions including observer missions, traditional, and multi-dimensional peacekeeping, while robust peacekeeping registers only 1.3 percent of civilian killings (see Table 2).

Table 1. Percentage Years of UN mission types 1956-2006

Mission type	Number of mission years (percentage)
Observer mission peacekeeping	80 (33.3%)
Traditional peacekeeping	68 (28.3%)
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping	44 (18.3%)
Robust peacekeeping	48 (20%)
Total	240 (100%)

Table 2. Percentage intentional civilian killings of UN mission types 1956-2006

Mission type	Civilian killings (percentage)
Observer mission peacekeeping	3916 (.7%)
Traditional peacekeeping	501923 (95%)
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping	11161(2%)
Robust peacekeeping	7073 (1.3%)
Total	524073 (100%)

Statistical Results

Table 3 presents the results of the negative binomial models of intentional civilian killings in United Nations Missions in civil wars between 1956 and 2006. Model 1 tests our basic hypothesis excluding the control variables. In order to test the robustness of the model, Model 2 contains all relevant control variables.

Looking at the results of model 1 in Table 3, our core hypothesis that robust peacekeeping is more likely to be associated with lower number of civilian killings is supported. The variable robust peacekeeping has a negative and statistically significant association with the number of civilian killings meaning robust peacekeeping missions may be more successful in lowering the number of deliberate civilian killings by conflict parties in civil conflicts. The mission strength variable also has a negative and statistically significant relation to the number of civilian killings confirming hypothesis 1b. This implies that large force strength is associated with lower levels of the number of civilian killings. This could mean that such forces shorten the wars, or protect the populations more effectively, or intervene in wars that have low casualty rates to begin with. Interestingly enough and contrary to expectation, however, major power participation has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the number of civilian killings at least under model 1, implying that major power participation in UN peacekeeping operations is more likely to be associated with higher numbers of civilian deaths tending to disconfirm hypothesis 1 d. Similarly, the rules of engagement variable has a positive and statistically significant effect in model 1 indicating that deliberate civilian killings are likely to be higher when the peacekeeping mandate permits mission forces to use force other than for self defense disconfirming hypothesis 1 a.

Table 3. Negative binomial regression models of intentional civilian killings in United Nations Missions in civil wars, 1956-2006

	Model 1 *Coefficients of the number of intentional civilian killings (standard errors)*	Model 2 *Coefficients of the number of intentional civilian killings (standard errors)*
Robust peacekeeping	-2.287 ** (0.922)	1.166 (0.831)
Mission strength (1000 people)	-0.140 *** (0.030)	-.200*** (0.032)
Resources (in US$1000)	4.860 (6.140)	3.850 (3.110)
Major power participation	4.223*** (1.054)	0.209 (0.726)
Rules of engagement	1.020** (0.300)	-1.106 (2.528)
Ethnic affinity		-0.081 (0.702)
Identity conflict		4.280** (1.352)
Borders		0.407 (0.393)
Democracy		0.151 (0.750)
Troops composition		0.057** (0.023)
Constant	4.100*** (0.256)	1.415 (1.558)
Number of observation	197	144
Log pseudo-likelihood	-870.573	-724.046
Wald chi 2	30.01	96.92
Prob > ch2	0.000	0.000

Estimations performed using Stata 9. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on missions). *$p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ All tests are two-tailed

Turning to the results in model 2 that includes the control variables, we first notice that mission type itself is no longer negatively and significantly related to casualty levels, while mission strength as in model 1 has a negative and statistically significant relationship with civilian killings further confirming hypothesis 1 b. It could be, then, that particular aspect of robust deployments (such as size of force levels) rather than the designation of mission themselves, play a key role in dampening human rights abuses. The findings also support the argument in the deterrent model that large troop deployments increase the costs of continued fighting for combatants and thereby reduce civilian killings. This is possible since a large force can effectively monitor a large area

and pose a formidable deterrent to spoilers. However, none of our other core variables had significant effects on the number of civilian killings. Major power participation has positive links to civilian killings but not statistically significant ones.

Examining the control variables, identity conflict has a positive and significant effect on civilian killings tending to confirm hypothesis 4. Thus, identity conflicts are more likely to be associated with higher numbers of civilians killed during internal conflicts than are ideological forms of dispute. The latter point supports the argument that identity conflicts are so much based on deep-rooted emotional values that combatants find it difficult to compromise on those underlying issues and restrain forces. In view of this realization, war becomes the most viable mechanism of the pursuit of group objectives. It therefore presupposes that casualties will be more difficult to control in identity conflicts than in ideological conflicts similar to the Rwandan genocide. Peacekeeping contingent composition also is positively and significantly related to civilian killings confirming hypothesis 2. This finding is in line with the argument that the more the mission force comprises many culturally diverse contingents, the less likely the mission success because cultural differences among peacekeeping forces may result in disagreement in interpretation of the resolution and what actions to take (Eron et al. 1999; Duffey 2000). Such disagreements on the interpretation of the resolution and rules of engagement may delay or prevent actions to protect civilians. For example, during the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone, the disagreement between the Indian command and Nigerian contingents paralyzed the mission and adversely affected to some extent the mission's operational efficiency (Bullion 2001, 78). All the other control variables have no significant effect on civilian killings. Peace agreement dropped due to collinearity.

Table 4 presents marginal effects of statistically significant variables of the negative binomial model on civilian killings in United Nations peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts from 1956 to 2006. Coefficients of negative binomial regression model give us odd values. In order to understand the actual impact of each coefficient, we need to compute the substantive value of each coefficient of the significant variable. These marginal effects offer us more substantive insight into the extent to which robust peacekeeping, mission strength, the use of force, major power participation, identity conflict and troops composition influence civilian killings during the period under investigation.

According to model 1, with robust peacekeeping, about 1442 fewer numbers of civilians are killed per year. In respect to mission strength, I found that an increase in the mission strength by one standard deviation from the mean lowers the number of intentional civilian killings by 142 per year. Considering other factors, I found that conflict parties kill 1611 more civilians per year with major power participation in UN missions in civil conflicts. Furthermore, I found that 1681 more civilians' deaths per year occur when the mandate permits UN mission forces to use force for purposes other than self defense only. These findings might give pause to easy assumptions that involving major powers is a reliable way to stabilize local violence or that broad latitude in use of force by peacekeepers is reliable for purposes of civilian protection.

In respect to model 2 that included our control variables, I did not find these latter cautionary effects, and I found that an increase in the mission strength by one standard deviation from the mean lowers the number of intentional civilian killings by 32 per year. Considering other factors, I found that in identity conflicts, 4240 more civilians' deaths

per year can be expected than in other forms of conflict. In terms of troops' composition,

I found that an increase in troop diversity by one standard deviation from the mean,

results in roughly 10 more civilian deaths per year.

Table 4. Marginal Effects of statistically significant variables on intentional civilian killings in UN Missions in civil conflicts, 1956- 2006

	Model 1 *Approximate change in the number of intentional civilian killings*	**Model 2** *Approximate change in the number of intentional civilian killings*
Robust peacekeeping	-1442	
Mission strength (1000s)	-142	-32.2
Major power participation	1611	
Rules of engagement that permits the use of force other than self defense only	1681	
Identity conflict (ethnic and religious)		4240
Troops composition comprising many culturally diverse contingents		10

Marginal effects are computed with the coefficient from the negative binomial regression models presented in table 2. The values of selected statistically significant variables changed while holding all others constant at their means or modes.

Table 5 presents the results of logit regression model for our binary dependent variable

change in civilian killings coded as ―0 for mission success or reduced deliberate civilian

killings and ―‖" for mission failure or increased deliberate civilian killings. Robust

peacekeeping has a negative and significant relation to civilian killings suggesting that

robust peacekeeping lowers civilian killings in line with the findings in model 1 Table 3

and again confirming the core hypothesis 1. The rest of the independent variables,

however, appear to have no significant impact on civilian killings. Turning to the control

variables, conflict type, troops' composition, ethnic affinity with the host state and

democracy have positive and significant ties to civilian killings. In other words identity conflicts and culturally diverse troop contingents and even somewhat democratic states are more associated with civilian killings confirming some of our earlier findings in model 2 Table 3.

Ethnic affinity of the mission force presents a very interesting finding. The results show that the forces' affinity with the conflict state may increase civilian killings defying the basic argument for regionalism as a better mechanism for peace operations. Since the mission force share the same culture with the conflict parties, they may have interest in the conflict thereby compromising the principle of impartiality and hurting a party to the conflict, ultimately obstructing the peace process. Also, the cultural bond between the mission force and conflict parties, along with concerns about being accused of partiality, may hinder the mission force undertaking certain stringent measures against spoilers of the peace process.

Finally, contrary to expectation, the finding suggests that democracies are associated with more civilian killings. This finding however might confirm the Davenport and Armstrong (2004) discovery that there is a threshold of democratic peace and that lower levels of democracy or transitional democracies are associated with human rights violations (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 551).

Table 5. Logit regression model of intentional civilian killings in United Nations Missions in Civil Wars, 1956-2006

	Coefficients of change in the number of intentional civilian killings (standard errors)
Robust peacekeeping	-2.088*** (0.594)
Major power participation	-1.157 (0.594)
Mission strength(1000)	0.000 (0.000)
Resources(US$1000)	7.850 (7.790)
Identity conflict	2.164**(0.844)
Borders	0.135 (0.388)
Troops composition	0.054** (0.027)
Ethnic affinity	1.520*(0.781)
Democracy	1.435** (0.727)
Constant	1.99217 (1.4501)
Number of observation	102
Log pseudo-likelihood	-45.702813
Pseudo R^2	0.2704

Estimations performed using Stata 9. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses (adjusted for clustering on missions). *p < 0 .1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 All tests are two-tailed.

Table 6 presents marginal effects of statistically significant variables on civilian killings of the logit model. Here we see that, robust peacekeeping decreases civilian killings by about 31 percent per year. In respect to the control variables, I found that democracies increase civilian killings by 29 percent per year and an increase in troops' diversity by one standard deviation from the mean increases civilian killings by 10 percent per year. Finally, I found that identity conflicts increase civilian killings by 40 percent per year and ethnic similarity to host state also increases civilian killings by 24 percent per year.

Table 6. Marginal Effects of statistically significant variables on intentional civilian killings in UN Missions in civil conflicts, 1956- 2006

	Approximate percentage change of probabilities of intentional civilian killings
Robust peacekeeping	-0.31(31%)
Democracy	0.29 (29%)
Troops composition	0.01 (10%
Identity conflict	0.40 (40%)
Ethnic affinity	0.24(24%)

Conclusion

The empirical results presented in this study support the core argument that robust peacekeeping works better than traditional peacekeeping in reducing civilian killings. This finding provides strong support for the theory that a large robust United Nations force deters spoilers from killing civilians. However, the related notions of major involvement and more militarily forceful missions do not appear to restrain killing and in fact are associated with higher civilian casualties. A unique finding is the contribution of large strength to mission success. This resonates with the Brahimi Report's recommendation for large troop size for mission success because large troops may occupy large area effectively monitoring and implementing mission mandate (United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000*). The findings further inform us of the severity of identity conflicts and confirm the argument that highly culturally diverse peacekeeping forces can derail mandate implementation as in the UNAMSIL experience in Sierra Leone (Bullion 2001). The finding that regional cultural similarity results in mission failures is striking since it defies the popular assumption by UN policy makers that regionalism is the better option for international security due to forces' similarity with neighbors. We also observe that borders matter and

countries bordered by many states may be prone to increased civilian killings in civil war situations. It was also found that at least proto-democratic status of the host state appear to be harbinger of potentially higher deliberate civilian killing total. The findings thus have both theoretical and policy implications in the field of peacekeeping.

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