

Knowing America's Colony
A Hundred Years from the Philippine War



Reynaldo C. Ileto

Foreword by Belinda A. Aquino

Philippine Studies
Occasional Papers Series No. 13

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Center for Philippine Studies
School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies
University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Cover Graphics and CPS Logo: CORKY TRINIDAD
Layout Design: CLEMEN C. MONTERO
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Printed by: HAWAII CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES

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Foreword

In Fall 1997 the Department of History, University of Hawai'i at Manoa, invited Prof. Reynaldo C. Ileto, prominent Filipino historian, to be the holder of the John A. Burns Distinguished Visiting Chair in History. His appointment was supported by the University's Center for Philippine Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Asian Studies Program of the School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies. The Burns Chair is a prestigious institution on campus which is named after the late Governor John A. Burns of the State of Hawai'i, and has been in existence since 1974. Governor Burns was best known for revolutionizing Hawai'i politics by expanding the participation of the various underrepresented ethnic minorities in the affairs of the state. He was a U.S. mainland "haole" raised in the working class district of Kalihi in Honolulu, who started his public career as a policeman. His experiences on the Honolulu police force brought him in contact with all the ethnic groups that made up Hawai'i's multicultural society. He had a deep sense of the importance of history in the development of the larger Hawai'i community. During his many years as Governor, Burns also promoted the growth and development of the University of Hawai'i as a major center of learning in the whole Pacific region. The University Medical School is also named after him.

Professor Ileto, Reader in History and Convener of the Graduate Program in Southeast Asian Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, is one of the most distinguished and accomplished Philippine historians in the world. A product of Cornell University, where he obtained his PhD in Southeast Asian history, and the Ateneo de Manila University (B.A. Humanities, *cum laude*), he has taught at the University of the Philippines, De La Salle University in Manila and James Cook University in Queensland, Australia. In 1992 he was a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. He is the author of several major works on social and cultural history, including the highly acclaimed *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*. The book was hailed as a landmark contribution to the existing scholarship on Philippine history. His latest book, *Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography*, was recently published and launched by the Ateneo de Manila University. He has also co-edited *Discovering Australasia: Essays on Philippine-Australian Interactions* and written a local history, *Magindanao, 1860-1888: The Career of Datu Uto of Buayan*.

Professor Iletto has received several distinguished awards including the Ohira Memorial Foundation Prize for scholarship on Japan and the Pacific in 1986 and the Harry Benda Prize in Southeast Asian Studies in 1985. He also held the Tañada Distinguished Professorial Chair in History, De La Salle University, in 1984–85. He has written some of the most critical and provocative pieces on Philippine local history, popular movements, revolution and nationalism.

The following volume puts together the three lectures Professor Iletto delivered in Hawai'i during his term as the Burns Chair Visiting Professor. It is a most timely publication in light of the various activities both in the Philippines and internationally marking the centennial of the declaration of Philippine independence from Spain in 1898 and related events. The lectures, which are interrelated, analyze more deeply the fateful events in the country at the turn of the century which marked the high point of Philippine nationalism. Professor Iletto also critiques with reason and careful reflection some of the major works on Philippine history and social science, which have made a significant impact on current thinking on the nature of Philippine contemporary society.

The first lecture explores the Philippine revolutionary years, particularly 1896–98, and their role in shaping the development of the modern Filipino “nation-state.” There can be no doubt, Iletto argues, that the events of that revolutionary period “form the core of any modern Philippine history.” He analyzes with penetrating insight two colonial textbooks, written by David Barrows and Conrado Benitez, which had served as “canons” of Philippine history in the early stages of nationhood.

The second lecture moves into the arena of the Philippine-American War and explores the critical events of 1899–1903, particularly the U.S. “pacification efforts” and the role of the “ilustrados” in promoting the ideals, e.g., proper citizenship, of the modern “democratic state.” He also focuses in this lecture on “disciplinary strategies” behind the American pacification and colonization efforts.

The third lecture is a provocative analysis of “Orientalism” and Philippine politics. Here Iletto argues that even in this era a century after 1898, there persists an “American colonial discourse” in current knowledge on Philippine society as manifested in such award-winning books such as Stanley Karnow’s *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines*. Iletto also critiques the works of other contemporary authors on Philippine history and politics.

We would like to thank Shiro Saito, former Philippine bibliography specialist at the Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i, who made a generous donation to the Center for Philippine Studies upon his retirement. His generosity has enabled us to resurrect our Occasional Papers Series, which has been moribund for some time because of lack of funds. It is hoped that we can continue to put out truly outstanding works of Philippine specialists in the years to come.

We also extend our special appreciation and thanks to Marissa C. Garcia, Clemen C. Montero and Amelia Liwagan-Bello for attending to the various computer-related and other production matters involved in putting out this publication.

Inquiries regarding submission of articles or manuscripts for publication in the Occasional Papers Series may be directed to Center for Philippine Studies, University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 1890 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, Phone: (808) 956-2686, Fax: (808) 956-2682, E-mail: lyndy@hawaii.edu.

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LECTURE 1

The Philippine Revolution of 1896 and U.S. Colonial Education

When the appointment to the John A. Burns Chair in the History Department arrived, I naturally began to wonder who this man Burns was. I thought Burns must have been a successful land developer, or even a pineapple magnate whose family endowed a Chair to turn its wealth into something honorable and worth remembering. When I arrived here at midnight, some two months ago, one of the first things I asked a colleague who had met me at the airport was: who was John Burns? The unwavering reply was: “Oh, Jack Burns! Why, he revolutionized politics here in Hawai‘i. Brought the Democrats to power for the first time. If not for him, Ben Cayetano (a Filipino-American) wouldn’t be governor today.”

I wanted to know more about this revolutionary Jack Burns, particularly about his connection with Filipinos. While leafing through some transcripts of interviews with Governor Burns in 1975, I came across a revealing detail: an admission that one of his formative experiences as a 10 year-old — an experience that helped push him into politics later on — was that of seeing striking Filipino laborers literally spilling over into his backyard in 1919 or 1920:

...that stuck with me. These guys were all kicked off the plantation. Lucky they had this big Spanish-American war veteran[s] lot..., right in the back of our home where we lived [in Kalihi]... It was a big empty space, and these guys moved in and I think they moved into the Spanish American War veterans hall, or something like that... I remember mom going over there in a social way... My mother handed them out a little bit. (Burns, tape 1, p. 10)

It was mere coincidence I suppose, but the Filipino laborers had taken refuge in a hall for veterans of the Spanish-American War, also

called the Philippine insurrection or the Philippine-American war when the U.S. decided to occupy the country by force in 1899. Mother Burns' generosity towards the strikers in 1919 prefigured her son's campaign to harness the energies of the Filipinos, together with the Japanese, Chinese, Hawaiians, and other marginalized groups, in the elections of the 50s and 60s. In the crucial election of 1970, the Filipinos would respond by voting Jack Burns back into office with a margin of two to one.

Filipinos who know even the slightest bit about their history are familiar with the word "revolution." As Luis Teodoro shows in his volume on Filipinos in Hawai'i, even the plantation workers who came earlier in this century brought with them memories or stories of those momentous years, 1896–1901, when the Philippines was in revolutionary turmoil. Rizal Day, commemorating the execution of the nationalist agitator Jose Rizal on December 30, 1896, used to be the biggest celebration in the plantation camps. Whether or not the Ilocanos, Visayans or Tagalogs understood its significance, the word "revolution," or at least "revolt," would not have been alien to their discourse. This, labor organizers like Pablo Manlapit knew when they let loose their oratory to urge laborers to unionize and join strikes in the 20s and 30s. Manlapit had finished his intermediate grades in the Philippines before coming to Hawai'i in 1910. He knew his Philippine history. But what kind of Philippine history was it, and how did the revolution figure in it?

In this lecture, I want to explore how the history of the revolutionary years, particularly 1896–98, became the origin myth of the present Filipino nation-state. There can be no doubt that the events set in train by the uprising against Spain in 1896 form the core of any modern Philippine history. The Revolution removed the Spanish Church from its central position in society and politics, and generated a new set of events and characters — now called "national heroes" — that has served as the charter of the present nation state. Thus the importance of the centennial celebrations that began in 1996 and culminate in June 1998, a hundred years after the declaration of independence from Spain and the birth of the nation-state.

As the story goes, soon after birth, the fledgling nation had to undergo "tutelage" under surrogate father America. The events of 1896–98 were accordingly recast by the colonial education system to serve its nation-building goals. I wonder to what extent Filipinos today continue to reproduce certain meanings of the Revolution that in fact

originated in American-era textbooks. Two high school history textbooks appear to have been particularly influential during this period. David Barrows, an American colonial educator, published *A History of the Philippines* in 1905. Testimony to its importance was its reappearance in a new edition as late as 1924. Soon afterwards, in 1926, a Filipino nationalist educator named Conrado Benitez published his *History of the Philippines*, which continued to be set as a high school text through the 1950s.

I realize that there were competing textbooks from other sectors, such as the private schools. In fact, Barrows in his 1907 edition refers to heavy criticism of his first edition by the Catholic church; although he refused to budge from his interpretations. It is fair to say that the official textbooks for public school use were much more influential than their rivals in shaping Filipino consciousness through this crucial period of nation-state formation. This paper thus focuses on the Barrows and Benitez texts.

Barrows wrote to fill the need for a basic textbook for use in the new public high school system. Since he was Director of Education for the Philippines from 1903 to 1909, his textbook is obviously tied to the American colonial project. And when one considers that the text was read by Filipino public high school students — the future professionals and politicians of the country — for at least two decades, its impact cannot be overstated.

As far as I know, this was the first time that an English-language textbook located the events of 1896–98 within a broad narrative sweep. And it is hardly surprising that the metanarrative, the overarching story, is that of Progress; in fact, the chapter is titled “Progress and Revolution, 1837–1897.” “The rebellion of 1896,” asserts Barrows, would not have happened were it not for “the great mistake committed by the Spaniards” in blocking “the further progress of the native population.” The Spanish friars are singled out as being “the center of opposition to the general enlightenment of the race...” Resentment against the friars, however, is said to have begun at the higher levels of *indio* society. To Barrows the actual uprising by the Katipunan secret society was the outcome of a trickle down process: “the ideas which had been agitated [sic] by the wealthy and educated Filipinos had worked their way down to the poor and humble classes. They were now shared by peasant and fisherman...” This view is consistent with the accepted periodization of events as an upper-class reform movement (1870s–1880s) which influenced and was succeeded by a mass move-

ment with separatist goals (1892ff). The events of 1896 are narrated as follows:

...there now grew up and gradually spread, until it had its branches and members in all the provinces surrounding Manila, a secret association composed largely of the uneducated classes, whose object was independence of Spain, and whose members, having little to lose, were willing to risk all. This was the society which has since become famous under the name of "Katipunan." This secret organization was organized in Manila about 1892. Its president and founder was Andres Bonifacio. Its objects were frankly to expel the friars, and, if possible, to destroy the Spanish government. (Barrows, 282)

If its objective was to expel the enemies of progress (the friars) then the Katipunan was more a successor of the *ilustrado* Reform or Propaganda movement rather than being truly "popular." What is the significance of this employment of late nineteenth century events, this structuring of the revolution's memories by a colonial writer?

Barrows states in the introduction to the 1924 edition that he wrote the book "for Filipino students seeking information not only of their own race and island home but of the place of that race in the history of the Far East and of Europe." The book would also reveal "how progress and struggle *elsewhere* affected the human spirit on the shores of Luzon and the Bisayas." It is quite clear from this and other statements that Filipinos were being educated to think of themselves as belonging to a race that has its own place — not just a habitat, or "island home," but a place in a racial hierarchy. Students were to locate the position of the Filipino race in an evolutionary ladder that featured the most advanced (or European) at the top to the most primitive (as found in areas like "the Far East") at the bottom.

According to Barrows, a race can only progress if it has a history. But not just any kind of history will do. "The white, or European, race is above all others, the great historical race," Barrows asserts, because it was the first to experience the transition from the medieval to the modern age. It was in Europe that religion gave way to science, feudal loyalties gave way to national allegiances, and powerful states emerged with the consent of the governed. The secular state, as the highest expression of the "human spirit," was born in Europe, and the process of this historical transition was to be the template for the rest of world history.

The discourse of race is thus intimately linked to discourse of Progress, specifically the development of “the human spirit,” an allusion to Hegel. Barrows wants his Filipino readers to reflect upon “how progress and struggle *elsewhere*” affected the human spirit on their soil. The rebellion of 1896, like just about everything else that Barrows finds worth mentioning about the Philippine past, is an effect, a following up, a repetition, of happenings *elsewhere*, and this “elsewhere” is Europe. For Barrows and other textbook writers — both American and Filipino — who followed them, Europe is the subject of all histories. I would argue that the history of the 1896–98 revolution, insofar as it has been instilled in the public through the colonial educational system and its Filipino successor, is itself still largely framed by the metanarrative of European history.

To put it another way, the history of the Philippines constructed by Barrows is, to echo Dipesh Chakrabarty’s parallel observations on Indian historiography, a history of the “already-happened.” Late 19th and early 20th century Philippine history is a repetition or replay of European history in an Oriental setting. The Orient, the East, is imagined as a place where, in terms of world history, time had stood still. In classic Orientalist fashion, the Philippines was made a site of the exotic, despotic, and childlike; it was the negative opposite of post-Enlightenment Europe. But Barrows also recognized what would have been obvious to the Americans: that the Philippines occupied a special place in the otherwise “same” Orient. As an old, Christianized Spanish colony it had a headstart in the race for Progress. Thus Barrows figures it as the initial site for the replay of European history, in the hope that the whole of the Orient would be incorporated into this process.

The *ilustrados* — educated, Hispanized Filipino children of the Enlightenment — had been arguing this since the 1880s. Barrows, however, was uniquely empowered to write into an official *textbook* the liberal interpretation of Philippine history and, as well, admit America into the process. The Spanish period, he wrote, had already raised the Filipino race to a reasonably high level of civilization, but the liberal enlightenment vanguard of the world spirit was blocked from entering the Philippines by conservative Spain. So Europe’s enlightenment had in the end to be transported to the Orient via America:

The modern ideas of liberty, equality, fraternity, and democracy... having done their work in America and Europe, are here at work in the Philippines today. It remains to be seen whether a society can be rebuilt here on these principles, and whether Asia too will be reformed under their influence. (Barrows, 232)

Given the European master-narrative outlined above, certain features of the textbook representation of the 1896 Revolution are better understood. If late-eighteenth century European history was to repeat itself in the Philippines a hundred years later, then Philippine society in the 19th century would have had to be constructed as medieval, or feudal. This is precisely what Barrows does.

Writing just a few years after the U.S. takeover, Barrows describes the Filipino race as still being family and communally oriented. There is no sense of belonging to a state or acting for “the public good.” Religion still holds a powerful grip over society. Social ties are based on master-serf relations. Leaders act out of private/family rather than public interests. Warfare and violence are endemic, often conducted in an uncivilized manner. Above all, people, even leaders, are ruled by their passions rather than by reason.

Some of you here will have heard this refrain before. In 1926 Stanley Porteus and Marjorie Babcock published *Temperament and Race*, a book that portrays Filipinos as “highly emotional, impulsive and almost explosive in temperament.” It concludes that “the Filipinos represent a fine example of a race in an adolescent stage of development.” This was based on a study emerging from the Psychological and Psychopathic Clinic of the University of Hawai‘i, and contributed to anti-Filipino prejudice becoming “quasi respectable” in this territory.

Of course, any society, Filipino, American, certainly Australian (from my experience) can exhibit so-called “adolescent” features even today. The effect of Barrows’ characterization, or caricaturing, is that it enabled the Philippines to be slotted into the category “feudal” or “medieval.” And any society that was labelled in no uncertain terms as medieval in the context of world history could not be anything but flawed, lacking, and inadequate. Conclusion: this race could not possibly act on its own; it needed superior guidance or tutelage.

Barrows’ view of Filipino society facilitated his interpretation of the 1896 Revolution as somehow lacking and inadequate. Barrows acknowledged that the revolution, being a trickle-down effect of the *ilustrado* Propaganda movement, was an expression of visions of freedom, justice, and equality. But these were raw, untamed visions, contrasted with the “ideal life for man... found only in governed society, where there is order and protection, and where there also should be freedom of opportunity.” The Katipunan revolt was deemed inadequate because it manifested the untamed violence of the “un-

educated classes” who were governed by passions rather than reason. Moreover, being a secret association with strange rituals the Katipunan did not appear to be leading towards a state and a proper citizenry. It was only when Emilio Aguinaldo, a local mayor of merchant background, captured the leadership in 1897 that the movement began to evolve towards a nation-state.

Notwithstanding his approval of Aguinaldo's rise to power and declaration of independence from Spain, Barrows asserts that the budding republic of 1898 was bound to fall to the Americans. Why? Because, he says, the state was weak and Filipino society was still feudal; Filipinos still lacked “political experience and social self control.” Ignoring the U.S. army's own excesses, Barrows criticizes Aguinaldo's army for conducting irregular warfare which sometimes featured the letting loose of “the very worst passions” in men. In any case, the war with America was only a great big misunderstanding, he laments. If only Filipinos realized sooner that only with American guidance could they enter the modern era, they wouldn't have resisted the takeover.

Barrows' *History of the Philippines* exhibits the first textbook emplotment of Philippine history along the medieval-to-modern axis or time-line. It is, in effect, a narrative of transition that makes the reader see failure, or at least lack and inadequacy, in the thoughts and actions of Filipinos, until their race has become fully hitched onto the bandwagon of European history. In textbooks of this genre American tutelage, or fatherhood, or big brotherhood fits in naturally, leading Filipinos out of the medieval age through the development of a modern state peopled by modern individuals, or citizens whose passions have been subordinated to reason. Neither of these — a modern state or modern citizens — are said to have been generated by the Philippine revolutions of 1896 and 1898.

In 1926, a Filipino-authored history textbook appeared and shortly displaced Barrows' text in the schools. Conrado Benitez had been an instructor in history and government at the Philippine Normal School before becoming Head of the Department of Economics and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts of the University of the Philippines (U.P.). His *History of the Philippines* was adopted by the Board of Texts of the Philippine-American government for use in public schools. The foreword was written by no less than U.P. president and nationalist writer, Rafael Palma.

It should come as no surprise that Benitez's textbook builds upon the chronological framework established by Barrows. After all, Benitez himself says, he was a product of the American educational system; unlike his Hispanized father, he learned his history in English. It should not come as a surprise, either, that the discourses of "progress" and "race" dominate the Benitez textbook. The first few pages confidently announce that the spirit of Progress had at last taken root in the Orient. A map fronting the first page shows what Benitez proudly calls "the central position of the Philippines in relation to neighboring islands and to Asia" — from being a great commercial market and a great religious center in the past, it now is the nerve center of the spirit of democracy and progress in Asia. The map reflects the American-educated Filipinos' consciousness of their country's new positioning in History which, as I have argued, is really European history as it marched on to the Orient.

Benitez also reflects the Filipino internalization of the discourse of Race. No one then dared to deny that the Malay / Filipino race was still down there among the less developed (or primitive) races of mankind. But now Benitez can confidently announce that the "future faced by the Malay race is not a hopeless future... the Filipinos, unlike some other peoples, are not disappearing as a race." Why? Reflecting recent trends in ethnology, Benitez points to the "mental adaptability" of the Filipino, a trait "which characterizes all progressive peoples [and] is evident from the success he has had in absorbing and assimilating the useful elements of foreign cultures with which he has come in contact." Whereas Barrows stressed the Filipinos' shortcomings and deficiencies as a race, Benitez argued for the dynamism of that race as it was confronted with external challenges. It really is a minor difference, however. Both authors agree that Filipinos had to grow up and mature as a people in order to become part of World History. It is just that for Benitez, Filipinos were allowed a more active role in the process.

So what does the 1896 Revolution look like in this earliest Filipino-authored textbook? As in Barrows' pioneering work, the Revolution is a replay of European history. The ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau which underpinned the French and American revolutions, trigger a similar set of events in the Philippines a hundred years later:

On the whole, the specific reforms which the propaganda at home and abroad aimed to attain were, in truth, no other than the legitimate demands of a people growing into social and political maturity and imbibing liberal ideas

The image here is a biological one: the Filipinos as a child grows and matures whilst fed with liberal nourishment from Europe and America. The transition from medieval to modern would have been gradual and peaceful, except that Spain failed to continue the nurturing. The friars in particular, says Benitez, fought “to keep the Filipinos in the Middle Ages.” The wheels of Progress would have come to a halt if Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan had not given the cart of Progress a big push.

Reflecting some new research by Epifanio de los Santos, Benitez says a lot more about Bonifacio than Barrows does. We are told, for example, that the “first cry of rebellion” was held at a place “now marked with the Balintawak monument.” Nevertheless, the main compliment that he can render to the Katipunan’s founder is that he “was imbued with the ideal of the French Revolution.” Bonifacio is given some sort of recognition because he sparks a set of events which really is a replay or rerun of a revolution against the feudal order that took place in Europe some one hundred years earlier. But he falls short of becoming a hero in the world historical stage. For the replay of the French revolution in the Philippine context has a downside to it. As Barrows had pointed out earlier, the French Revolution brought the modern era to France, but only *after* “the bloody acts of the years from 1793 to 1795,” the years of anarchy brought about by the unruly French masses. Similarly, the Bonifacio-led uprising of 1896 in Benitez’s textbook is made to signify a moment of disorder and chaos in the steady march of Philippine Progress. So while Benitez acknowledges the spirit of the French revolution working in Bonifacio’s activities, he also keeps these events at a distance. The Philippine revolution in this 1926 high school textbook becomes another sign of Filipino lack and inadequacy.

On the subject of the Revolution-as-anarchy, Benitez openly takes his cue from another American scholar, James LeRoy. In 1907, LeRoy argued that Bonifacio’s “ideas of reform” came from reading Spanish works about the French Revolution. More than that, Bonifacio “imbibed also a notion that the methods of the mob in Paris” were best suited for the Filipino situation. Based on all the evidence he was able to secure, LeRoy saw “a socialistic character” in the Katipunan’s “propaganda from below,” for this contained “an element of resentment toward the wealthy, upper-class Filipinos, the landed proprietors in general, as well as toward the friar landlords and the whole fabric of government and society resting on them.” The Katipunan, however, like the mob during the French Revolution, was to LeRoy and his protégé Benitez, a sign of political immaturity, where passions rather

than reason and the rule of law prevailed. Katipunan leaders are described as filled with self-importance, with “grandiloquent” (but presumably empty) thoughts, “who led their humble followers in the towns around Manila most affected by the propaganda to indulge in futile and ridiculous dreams of a coming millennium...” LeRoy sums up the Katipunan revolt as follows:

Though in a sense this was a movement for independence, we have seen that only vague ideas of a political organization were in the minds of the leaders, while the deluded masses who followed them... had virtually no idea of such an organization except that Filipinos should succeed Spaniards. (LeRoy, 205)

There are two ways we can read these descriptions by LeRoy: first, that the Katipunan was a socialistic threat from below that needed to be contained and second, that the behavior of the Katipuneros rather paradoxically betrayed their immature, medieval character.

Benitez, in order perhaps not to agitate Filipino students (since in the 1920s the seeds of socialism and Bolshevism were already being sown in central Luzon), does not repeat LeRoy’s characterization of the Katipunan as fundamentally subversive. What he does is shift the topic to Jose Rizal. Rizal was the most accomplished of the 19th century Filipino *ilustrados*, a medical doctor whose two novels are read and admired up to today. Benitez portrays him as the “chief spokesman of the *sterner judgment* of the *saner* element among the people.” Bonifacio, implicitly, heads the less rational, more fanatical, element. And whereas Bonifacio’s Katipunan revolt of 1896 revolution is seen as local, Rizal’s execution in December of that year is seen as an event of national significance. Rizal, then, appears in Benitez’s 1926 textbook as a more effective, more advanced, agent of the world historical spirit. To him goes the honor of being a world historical figure.

In the context of the medieval-to-modern transition narrative, the struggle in early 1897 over the leadership of the revolution has an inevitable textbook ending. An angry and emotional Bonifacio insists on preserving the secret society, while the cool and calculating Aguinaldo wants to combine all revolutionary factions into a government. Reason again triumphs over emotion. Furthermore, suggests Benitez, isn’t Aguinaldo’s goal not the first step towards state formation, and is not the state the highest manifestation of the World Spirit?

Of course, almost all textbooks of the American era repeat the following sentence from Aguinaldo’s manifesto of October 31, 1896:

following sentence from Aguinaldo's manifesto of October 31, 1896: "the form of government will be similar to that of the United States of America, based essentially on the most strict principles of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality." Aguinaldo, as a sign of the modern, as the link between two crucial periods in the transition narrative, has to prevail in the power struggle against Bonifacio. He then goes on to proclaim the first Filipino republic in June 1898, and leads the Filipino Army against the American invasion forces the following year.

It would appear that by late 1898 the Philippines has finally been admitted into History. But in American-era textbooks, the Republic of 1898 cannot possibly be the high point that it has come to be today. Benitez, like Barrows before him, posits a gap between the nation-state dreams of the likes of Aguinaldo and the persistence of feudalism. The Filipinos, after all, are still in a stage of adolescence, unable to implement, nay even comprehend, the workings of a modern nation state. U.S. tutelage has to follow. So why the war that cost the lives of thousands of American soldiers, and hundreds of thousands of Filipinos? Such horrifying statistics are, of course, censored in both the Benitez and Barrows textbooks. Instead, the Philippine-American War is portrayed as some kind of unfortunate misunderstanding. When Aguinaldo and his generals finally realize that they can pursue their goals "with the aid of the United States" they lay down their arms in order to begin "a new type of struggle within the bounds of law and order."

Moving *within the bounds of law and order*, or acquiring sterner judgment and sanity: this is the organizing principle behind the textbook narratives of 1896 to 1901. Bonifacio's revolution of 1896 signifies anarchy, thus the deep desire to contain it within the transition narrative and exorcise its threatening features. 1901 signifies order; after all, it is the beginning of the American new era.

In the concluding paragraph of his 1926 textbook, Benitez again reminds the reader that the Filipinos are not a dying race. Far from it, this "people" is destined to be an agent of History, "destined to carry on as an independent democracy in the Far East the political idealism of America — her greatest contribution to human progress..." Filipino students in the mid-1920s were encouraged to think that theirs was a dynamic race that, having become part of the great chain of modernity emanating from post-enlightenment Europe and extending through America, would now carry the light to the medieval lands of the Orient.

To a great extent this pride in being the bridge between East

experienced the granting of independence in 1946 after the trauma of the Japanese occupation. Benitez disseminates and evokes this “feeling” among the young postwar generation through a major revision of his textbook in 1954. The inaugural speech of Manuel Roxas, first president of the postwar republic, thus features prominently in part six of this edition. Our independent nation state, he says, is the fruit of

...the westward surge of the pioneers of liberty. They planted its seeds in this land... seeds which bear today their richest fruit.. So as we embrace our national freedom, we must see in it, as other peoples of the world do, not alone the product of our struggles and strivings, not alone the altruism of America, but also the final product of the world's age-old quest for liberty. (Benitez, 1954, 471)

Independent Philippines is the “final product” of a quest, a history, that started in Europe. Now, in the 1950s, its role is to help incorporate the rest of Asia into that narrative: thus Benitez’s characterization of his country as “the interpreter of the East to the West as well as *vice versa*,” its services to be “in demand as the ‘honest broker’ in disputes between conflicting civilizations.” In fact the book ends with a rather quaint passage, which to be sure was a dead serious belief in the mid-50s: “We stand at the crossroads of the Pacific, the bulwark of democracy in the Orient, the citadel of human freedom in the Far East.”

What was really going on at that time, and how was the Revolution represented in this 1954 revised edition of the Benitez textbook? Chapter 15 states in no uncertain terms that 1896 is about “a national revolution” against Spain. It is striking when one compares this with previous histories, how much space is devoted to a discussion of Bonifacio’s *Decalogue*, and Jacinto’s *Kartilya*. These are said to contain, not just the teachings of the Katipunan founders, but principles “enunciated by the Fathers of our Revolution and handed down to us as a legacy. They are still valuable guides in our present-day problems...” The move here is to represent the 1896 revolution as part of the heritage of the newly independent nation-state. Just as the French and the Americans have their national revolutions and national heroes (or Founding Fathers), so do the Filipinos have theirs.

Bonifacio and Jacinto are made out to be true liberal democrats, advocating love of God, love of country, and love of one’s fellow citizens. The unity of the family is to be “the bulwark of social solidarity and national strength”; the good citizen is one who works hard and is imbued with social responsibility. Whether Bonifacio and Jacinto actu-

ally preached these things is beside the point. These key texts of the 1896 revolution are made to serve as charters of the state and its citizens. Again the 1896 revolution's ambiguous and threatening features are suppressed. This reading of the *Decalogue* and *Kartilya* enables Benitez to accomplish the previously impossible feat of conflating Bonifacio and Rizal. Says he, "both the Katipunan and Rizal believed in an intensive campaign of re-education of the people for civic purposes."

The great pains taken to harness the revolution for civic purposes reflects the importance of state building in the progress of the world historical spirit. But in this 1954 textbook it also betrays anxieties about threats to the unity of the new Filipino nation-state. The strongest hint of this is in the chapter on "problems of peace and order," where for the first time Communism is mentioned. Benitez refers to the Huks as originally an agrarian movement influenced by Communism, which came "from the outside" via Soviet Russia and China. Such internal problems reflect a troubled world which

...seems to be dividing itself more and more into two opposing camps — on the one side, the countries defending the right to live a free, democratic life under constitutional processes of government; on the other, the countries under the iron heel of Communism, determined to impose on the rest of the world their autocratic system of government in which no freedom of any kind is accorded the individual. (Benitez, 1954, 499)

As noted earlier, Benitez, in the tradition of Barrows, constructed a Philippine history that makes a necessity of the Spanish and American interventions which brought the Philippines into line with Europe's history, the history of the world spirit. But the march of Progress just happened to split into two ranks. History was also marching to a different tune, composed by Marx and Lenin but really a variation on Hegel's. The Philippines gets caught in between two rival metanarratives of Progress. Clearly Benitez is on the side of "the Free World" portraying his country in no uncertain terms as the torchbearer of democracy against the forces of totalitarianism. This is the specific context in which the Philippines figures, as stated earlier, as the bridge between East and West.

Try as hard as he might, though, Benitez was unable to fully harness the Revolution of 1896 to *his* cause. On page 494, in describing the Philippine Army's campaign against "armed dissidents," he writes:

But the [dissidents] had the advantage of surprise and, in some cases, of half-hearted support of those in rural sections who lived in terror of the Huks. The depredations came to a head with the simultaneous and well-prepared attacks on August 26, 1950, timed to coincide with the historical “Cry of Balintawak” Day...

Somehow the Huk (People’s Liberation Army) “enemy,” too, was reading the history of the 1896 Revolution [i.e., the Cry of Balintawak] in a way that would legitimize and inspire its own revolutionary activities. The socialistic and subversive Katipunan alluded to with concern by LeRoy, watered down by Barrows, and censored by Benitez, appears in the form of the Huks to haunt this textbook of 1954.

Benitez’s reference to the Huk appropriation of the “Cry of Balintawak” is a reminder that other narratives of the 1896 Revolution continued to thrive outside of the public school system. After all, there were still a lot of Katipuneros and Filipino-American war veterans around until the 1940s and even 50s. And there were other forms in which “unofficial” memories could circulate, such as literature and drama in the vernacular and popular religious cults incorporating heroes of the revolution into their pantheons. Rizal could be hailed as a martyr for the revolutionary cause and a Christ-figure, rather than the pacifist educator that official textbooks made him out to be. Labor and peasant unions certainly took a different view of Bonifacio, constructing him as the model of the man of action, the voice of the masses, rather than as an incompetent leader or a liberal democrat.

The state — colonial or nationalist — certainly has had a stake in the reproduction of certain meanings of the revolution that served to underwrite it. If Bonifacio and Rizal can both, together, be seen as crucial to the birthing process of the modern Philippine nation-state, then there is no problem. A government-sponsored event such as the centennial celebration is a good example of the state’s interest in promoting certain meanings of 1896–98.

Benitez’s 1954 textbook, however nationalist, epitomizes the tame, civics-oriented, colonial-vintage representations of 1896. The suppression of the Communist-led Huk rebellion, however, led radical intellectuals to concentrate on revamping the histories taught in the public school system. And so from the late-1950s on Benitez’s and similar liberal textbooks had to compete with, and eventually yield to, more radical interpretations of the events of 1896–98: Bonifacio-centered, anti-*ilustrado*, and class struggle-oriented. Teodoro Agoncillo’s

Revolt of the Masses (1957) became a new master-text of the revolution, later fine-tuned by the Marxist Renato Constantino.

The new readings of the 1896–98 Revolution and its transmission to a generation of students in the 1960s and early 70s, gave historical depth to student participation in the so-called First Quarter Storm of 1970. It is striking how so many of the students saw themselves as latter day Andres Bonifacios, youth organizations such as the *Kabataang Makabayan* as latter-day Katipunans, and anti-Marcos/anti-U.S. rallies as replays of the Cry of Pugad Lawin and/or Balintawak.

Above all, the interpretation of the 1896 Revolution as a “revolt of the masses” facilitated among the studentry the spread of new appeals for joining with the farmers and the working classes and, later, fomenting “People Power.” Naturally, Amado Guerrero saw his new Communist Party as continuing the “unfinished revolution” of 1896. Ferdinand Marcos himself joined the fray by hooking his own Democratic Revolution of 1972 onto the 1896 Revolution — but not before he had proscribed Bonifacio and negated the Revolution’s supposedly anarchic tendencies. In the end Marcos modeled himself after Aguinaldo the general and the statesman, and even to his dying days in Hawai‘i he dreamt of returning to the Philippines to continue *his* revolution.

By way of recapitulating, let me return to the figure that I began this talk with: Jack Burns, the man who revolutionized Hawai‘i’s politics. I wonder what Burns would have thought of the Philippine histories I have discussed.

I’m pretty sure that Burns, the sympathizer of the ILWU (International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union), would have understood why Bonifacio the Tagalog warehouseman did what he did: recruiting Katipunan members among the workers of Manila, fanning their resentments against the Spanish guardians of the Old Order. Mass organization was necessary for change, Burns believed. And he spoke, as well, of freeing ordinary workers from what he called “the hegemony” of the Big Five (Burns, tape 3, p. 6). He is said to have “held the union in high regard for its part in overturning the feudal economic system which had prevailed in Hawai‘i before World War II.” (Coffman, 76)

Burns alleged in one of his early campaigns that the Republicans wanted to keep power out of the hands of “an unruly mass of natives and Orientals.” (Fuchs, 332) Acutely sensitive to the Orientalism

underpinning the exclusion of Asians and Hawaiians from mainstream political life, Burns advocated their empowerment. In this light he would certainly have appreciated Barrows' attempt to instill racial pride in being Filipino, and Benitez's celebration of the Filipino renaissance in the Orient. He would also have understood why Benitez harnessed the history of the 1896 revolution to serve the cause of citizenship in the independent, postwar nation state. After all, Burns was also "first and foremost the politician of first-class citizenship... This was the real point of the consensus." (Coffman, 28) Everyone, regardless of racial background, was entitled to participate in American political life.

In line with our rereading of Barrows and Benitez, we should also stress that these textbook historians' taming of the volatile events of 1896–98, in order to turn a see-saw story of revolutionary violence and upheaval into a seamless narrative of progress and modernity, would have met Burn's approval, too. Despite his association with some members of the radical Left, which earned him the nickname "the man with the red socks" among McCarthyite journalists, he was for consensus and the incorporation of marginalized groups into the wider body politic. When asked if there was such a single idea as reform, or change, that his party propaganda clearly got across to the voters, he replied: "*Oh, yeah. We wanted revolution by evolution, and that came across...*" (Burns, tape 10, p. 3)

For in the final analysis, Burns thought and spoke within the same discursive framework as his political counterparts in the Philippines. He saw Hawai'i, too, as hooked onto the Euro-American narrative of the march of Progress. After all, before the Agents of History reached the Philippines, they had swept through Hawai'i first, eventually rewriting its history to conform to the dominant metanarrative. This is the context in which we might situate the books which Burns was fond of. He told his interviewer:

...I like particularly a lot of romantic books, the idealistic books of the British... I like historical novels. I used to read a lot of those and that's another thing that I think contributed. Funny thing for a high school kid I got four years of history. No repeats. Greek and right on down the line. [To the] Modern, etc... (Burns, tape 1, pp. 15–16)

Burns particularly liked to read about great men who changed the course of history. And within that grand saga of historical change, he located Hawai'i and his own role in changing it. He, too, was an agent of History.

One feature of History (with a capital H) is its repression of those narratives and other elements that it cannot incorporate into its sweep and steady march forward. One question that emerges from this paper is whether, or how, we can effectively break away from the discourse of Progress, Enlightenment, and History that has framed the narratives of the past — particularly the Philippine Revolution — since the beginning of this century. Have Filipino textbook histories really cared to listen to radically different interpretations of 1896? Or do they still cling to Barrows' view of history as, in essence, the work of Reason, to be based solely on "reliable" written documents, and looking to the modern nation-state as its end-point? Unless we interrogate our traditional ideas of history, a legacy of the 19th century, and write against the grain of the Enlightenment, all histories of the 1896-98 Philippine revolution are bound to be variations on a European theme.

LECTURE 2

Knowledge and Pacification: The Philippine-American War

Filipinos celebrating the centennial of the declaration of independence from Spain have practically forgotten how traumatic those events of 1896–98 were. The Christianized inhabitants of the islands had come to regard Spain — for all her faults and shortcomings — as “mother country,” and now they were being called to form a new identity. As Andres Bonifacio put it:

At the horizon, Mother, has risen
the sun of Tagalog fury;
for three centuries we kept it
in the sea of woes wrought by poverty.

Your children's hut had nothing to hold it up
during the terrible storm of pains and troubles;
all in Filipinas are of one heart
you are no longer a mother to us.

(Sumikat na Ina sa sinisilangan/ ang araw ng poot ng katagalugan,/ tatlong daang taong aming iningatan/ sa dagat ng dusa ng karalitaan.// Walang isinuhay kaming iyong anak/ sa bagyong masasal ng dalita't hirap,/ iisa ang puso nitong Pilipinas/ at ikaw ay di na Ina naming lahat.)

A mother Filipinas was coming of age, but would all the inhabitants of the country become her children? A native son, Jose Rizal, had become a Christ and martyr, but how many knew this and understood it as such? High expectations marked the events leading to the declaration of independence in June 1898, but were these expectations met?

General Emilio Aguinaldo had set a mood of enthusiasm in train by announcing, in May 1898, “Compatriots! Divine Providence is

about to place independence within our reach." An American squadron would soon arrive to bring arms for the revolutionists: "There where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers." The destruction of the Spanish fleet was widely regarded as an omen portending the demise of Spanish rule. Backed, at least temporarily, by U.S. power, Filipino forces enthusiastically laid siege to Spanish garrisons and convents and proclaimed a new era in liberated towns. For a couple of weeks, at least, many Filipinos experienced being the masters of their own destinies.

Aguinaldo's proclamation of independence, however, was not about the blissful fruits of armed struggle. It was about the formation of a nation-state that would take its place in the family of nations. It sought to reconcile all citizens of the republic whether they had participated in the redemptive process, waited in the sidelines, or even aided the Spanish forces. Old social and economic hierarchies were to be maintained. There were understandable reasons for such pragmatism. The revolution, after all, did not extinguish earlier modes of association such as between Spanish priests and their flock and between landlord and tenant. Powerful families controlled many districts, even provinces. Arguably, the new nation could not survive without the talents and resources of the wealthy and educated. But to many, these practical considerations were beside the point. Separation from Mother Spain was a traumatic event that, it was felt, should have led to a truly new community of Mother Filipinas' children. The condition of *Kalayaan* (liberty) under the new mother had brought forth expectations of the good life for all which the first Filipino republic was hard pressed to fulfill.

Critics of Aguinaldo's government who fall back on stock representations of native corruption, personal rivalry, *caciquism*, and ineptness should remember, however, that the first republic had precious little time to set its own house in order. Almost from the day it was born, it had to deal with threats of annexation by the United States. In December 1898, ignoring the Filipino nationalist clamor for recognition, the U.S. purchased the Philippines from Spain for 20 million dollars. In February of the following year the U.S. occupation began in the face of massive resistance which was then called "the Philippine insurrection," or "the great misunderstanding" (to paraphrase Barrows).

It was a great misunderstanding to the Americans because they claimed to have warded with the best of intentions. President McKinley

announced that he had no choice but “to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them...” His instructions to the First Philippine Commission of 1899 were that Filipinos were to be treated as wayward “Orphans of the Pacific.” As Vicente Rafael puts it, they were cut off from their Spanish fathers — meaning the Spanish state — and desired by other European powers. They would now be adopted and protected by America as “Father.” Colonization would neither be exploitative nor enslaving, but would mean cultivating “the felicity and perfection of the Philippine people” through the “uninterrupted devotion” to those “noble ideals which constitute the higher civilization of mankind.” The head of the Commission, Cornell professor Jacob Schurman, rationalized the taking of the islands as an act of nurturing the Philippines, here figured as new-born “daughter,” into an American-style democracy:

The destiny of the Philippine Islands... was not to be a State or a territory... but a daughter republic of ours — a new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific... (which would stand as a monument of progress and) “a beacon of hope to all the oppressed and benighted millions” of Asia.

The idea that an Americanized Philippines would be the vanguard of Euro-American progress in Asia was thus already present in 1899. But why were Filipinos rejecting the precious gifts of “liberty” and “progress?” “Why these hostilities?,” the Schurman Commission asked, “What do the best Filipinos want?” By wanting independence, said Schurman, they appear to have misinterpreted “the pure aims and purposes of the American government and people” and instead attacked U.S. forces. It was a misunderstanding, due to the incapacity of Filipinos to immediately recognize a higher purpose in the entry of the Americans. Filipinos resisting the takeover were thus viewed as unreasonable, “errant children” who needed to be taught the right attitudes. McKinley declared that the Filipinos needed to be disciplined “with firmness if need be, but without severity as far as may be possible.” The U.S. must “maintain the strong arm of authority to repress disturbances and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessing of a good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.” The “measured use of force” was to make the Filipinos submit to the rule of the American father, under whose guidance they would learn how to be more civilized, democratic, and thus be ready for independence.

This ideology of “benevolent assimilation,” of what Rafael

calls colonialism as “white fathering,” helped to assuage U.S. guilt about the violence of the takeover. Half a million Filipino lives were lost or unaccounted for. Torture was regularly used, reconcentration and scorched earth policies applied towards the end. But the rhetoric always was that this was a necessary and measured use of force for a higher purpose. American troops practiced, said Secretary of State Elihu Root, “self-control, patience, [and] magnanimity.” All this violence, in any case, was part of a transitional stage to self-rule — “self-rule” in this context ultimately meaning, to cite Rafael again, the mastery of self, the colonizing or molding of the self so that it conforms to the standards set by the disciplining Father. Another way of putting it is that measured violence was deemed needed to wean Filipino children away from the influence of their female nurturers — mother Filipinas, Mother Mary, grandmother Spain — all signs of the premodern, the rule of passions, emotions, and religion, rather than the modern, “male” rationality represented by stepfather America, fondly addressed as Uncle Sam. The goal of American colonial rule was the formation of a modern, democratic, and patriarchal state, later to be handed over to the now-developed alter-egos of the white colonial fathers: the Filipino “little brown brothers” as they would be fondly addressed.

Now if the U.S. were to successfully behave as an authoritarian father wanting to discipline and mold its children, the first thing it had to do was to watch over them as a strict parent. By knowing what they were up to through continuous and discrete observation, problems could be identified and the appropriate disciplinary measures applied where needed. In other words, the most effective tool of the policy of benevolent assimilation was intimate and continuous surveillance. In this lecture I explore three ways in which colonial surveillance was deployed in the course of the war and its immediate aftermath. I examine, first, the establishment of protected zones or the reconcentration of populations in late 1901 to 1902; second, disease control and sanitation in the context of the cholera epidemic of 1902–1903; and third, the making of a census in 1903–1905. These events were part and parcel of “the Philippine-American war.” Conquest involved the imagining of and desire for an altered social order in the new possessions. To implement these dreams it was necessary to deploy techniques of knowing, ordering and disciplining — the basic tools of pacification.

Forging the Ideal Society, 1899–1902

American officials were almost totally ignorant of the Philippines even while the Treaty of Paris was being signed in December 1898. They tried reading up extensively on British Malaya hoping to find guidance on how to run their similar tropical colony. But this literature proved next to useless. The Americans found that, with a few exceptions, the Philippines had no sultans, no “hereditary chieftains or rulers,” no “established sovereign to whom the people owed and recognized allegiance.” With Spanish sovereignty now gone, there appeared to be “no constituted authorities, no natural leaders, who [could] speak for the inhabitants of the archipelago.” So the Americans felt early on that there could be problems because there was no one immediately apparent through whom they could rule — that is, no one through whom they could channel their gift of civilization. Of course they refused to recognize the Filipino republic’s claims to sovereignty.

Since American knowledge of the structure of Philippine society was practically nil in 1898, an effective policy of “pacification” could not be implemented. To rectify this, in mid-1899 the Schurman Commission interviewed dozens of Philippine-born witnesses of the “respectable and influential” class — lawyers, doctors, merchants, planters, and engineers. These *ilustrados* who lived in Manila were asked: What sort of social order existed? Why had there been a widespread rebellion against Spain? How could the present insurrection be dismantled?

The Commission was presented with a picture of a fractious but peace-loving society that was being terrorized or seduced into fighting the U.S. forces by a small group of middle-class revolutionaries driven *not by reason but personal ambitions*. The Commission thus concluded that “the masses of the Filipino people, including practically all who are educated or who possess property, have no desire for an independent and sovereign Philippine state.” Two key ingredients of a modern state were deemed lacking: a true public-spirited leadership, and a people conscious of its nationality and sovereign rights. The civil and military authorities could then claim to be filling this lack as agents of development (i.e., fatherhood) and thus proceed legitimately with suppressing the revolutionary forces.

Rereading the early Philippine Commission reports, one is struck by the extent to which American knowledge of the Philippines was almost totally shaped by their contact with the witnesses who

testified before the Schurman Commission. These were members of the *ilustrado* elite, some of whom had earlier served in the revolutionary government. According to Norman Owen, *ilustrado* power was based on wealth, education, and a personal following. Americans saw the *ilustrados* as mirror-images of their rational and liberal selves; the *ilustrados* were also for the most part Chinese or European mestizos — a racial mix which suited the Americans even better. But it was assumed, also, that the *ilustrados* were linked to the so-called “ignorant” masses. The latter, of course, were never consulted by the Commission. The “symbiotic relation” established as early as 1899 between *ilustrados* and American officials is seen by Owen as the precursor to the patron-client ordering of colonial society: the Americans would be at the apex of a pyramidal structure of person-to-person ties reaching down, via the *ilustrados* and other elites, to the village and the ordinary *tao*.

The statements of the *ilustrados* during the interviews of 1899 provided the U.S. commissioners with a rough outline of a social order that had the glimmerings of a hierarchy. The picture was that of either a two or three-tiered society. Some informants simply made a distinction between the “wealthy and intelligent” class which wanted peace, and the “poor and ignorant” mass, some of whom had been deceived into resisting the Americans. Others spoke of a third, intermediate, class, composed of clerks and writers from whose ranks the agitators came. Most spoke of the passivity of the masses, their willingness to follow the wishes of those in power. To the Americans, *it was enough that a leading class could be identified*, through whose collaboration the colonial system could be established.

What emerged was a representation of Philippine society that reflected the desires of both the Americans and the *ilustrados*. This was not necessarily how things really were. A careful reading of the interviews shows that the *ilustrados* had few ties left with their original villages; there was no claim on their part to having actual influence over any constituency. The American interviewers, generally, were the ones who suggested that this elite should go out and influence the masses to accept America’s good intentions. The *ilustrados* for their part simply repeated over and over again that *those who had rational faculties* would be obeyed.

The flip side to the *ilustrados*’ insistence on their right to lead, was their anxiety about their future. They were preoccupied with their problems: very often they talked about bandits or religious fanatics who menaced their towns. They spoke disparagingly of the people who

made up Aguinaldo's army, calling them bandits or vagabonds. There are copious references to the anarchic situation (as they saw and perhaps experienced it) brought about by the uprising against Spain and, now, the war with the U.S. Wealth and education they had, but nonetheless their positions in society, outside of Manila, either had never existed, had crumbled during the past war, or were being threatened by the revolutionists and the ignorant, misguided rabble.

To understand the anxieties of the *ilustrados*, and to understand as well why the Americans had problems "pacifying" the rural areas, a brief excursion into the Spanish colonial era is necessary. The town or *pueblo* during Spanish rule had never been much of a stable entity in the first place. Almost as soon as the missionary established his church-center and persuaded or coerced converts to live within hearing distance of the bells, other centers appeared in the hills beyond the Spanish domain. These were controlled by figures variously referred to in Spanish records as bandits, fanatics, sorcerers, rebels, vagabonds or simply *indocumentado* (the undocumented).

In many towns distant from Manila and other colonial strongholds, the parish priest (most likely a Spaniard) was the sole representative of both political and ecclesiastical authority. Not a few observers were surprised at how towns could be kept orderly by a single person. The fact is, however, that the parish priest could not see much beyond the center. There was an almost unhindered circulation of people between the colonial *pueblo* and other centers in the peripheries. Villagers were continually leaving their domiciles, some simply to live in the "boondocks," others specifically to journey to pilgrimage sites where "unapproved" rituals were conducted and where assertions against authority often originated.

The *principalía* or gentry which lived in the town center had a lot of influence over ordinary farmers and villagers, but it cannot be said that the rest of the populace naturally, and in a stable fashion, aligned themselves with these elite families. Followers abandoned their bosses with impunity, gravitating towards other leaders or simply heading for the hills. The elected town mayor derived much of his prestige from sharing the same personal qualities as the bandit chief, his shadowy "other." What gave cohesion to the town at certain periods of crisis was the experience of reacting to threats and attacks from the outside.

The picture of rural society presented by the *ilustrados* to the Schurman Commission in 1899 contained these dissonant and contra-

dictory elements. But, generally, the *ilustrados* imagined that if the situation were to become “normalized,” a social order would emerge in which they, the rich and educated, would be the natural leaders. The Americans, on the other hand, ignored other possible representations of society and jumped at the opportunity to rule through this elite. They felt an affinity for the *ilustrados* not just because the latter wanted peace and the protection of individual and property rights, but because they were mostly *mestizos*. On racial grounds the Americans felt they could be entrusted with a rational implementation of colonial policy. The unlettered *indios*, on the other hand, were seen to be largely governed by “impressions of the sense and the imagination”; they were likened to “young children.”

In the spirit of establishing what the Filipinos really wanted (as articulated by their *ilustrado* informants), U.S. Army volunteers in captured territory quickly organized town administrations, established schools and implemented sanitation programs. Indeed, their efforts seemed to be met with success. But by the following year (1900), there was more and more talk of the “duplicity” of the native. What frustrated the Americans most were the lack of fit between Filipino appearance and intention, the switching of identities, and the haziness of what lay beyond the garrisoned town-centers. The only people they could deal with, and talk to in Spanish, were the few *principales* who had proclaimed themselves *Americanistas*.

The fact is, physically controlling the town centers meant very little. Take the district of Tiaong in the southern Tagalog region whose history I have studied in some detail. Its *población* had always been run down in the nineteenth century. Rather than being the “heart” of the *pueblo* it was really just the place where people congregated for Sunday mass or to do their marketing. Whatever transpired in the surrounding barrios and on Mount Banahaw in the distance was never of much concern to the few Spanish officials, unless a “disturbance” was reported. The Filipino mayor and other notables owned houses near the church, but really preferred to live in their more substantial dwellings in the barrios. It is not surprising, then, that despite the area having been officially declared “pacified” by the U.S. Army in 1901, and elections held in July, the revolutionary movement there remained as strong as ever.

Eventually the U.S. Army command realized that much of what they thought was pacified U.S. territory really continued to be controlled by shadow guerilla governments. Typically they called

Tiaong a “criminal community,” where “every form of perfidy, duplicity and crookedness that could possibly exist anywhere was found.” The culprits, as far as the Americans were concerned, were the *principales*, the rich and educated, of the towns from whose ranks the *ilustrados* came. In fact, in some key regions of the “pacified” islands the Americans were discovering that the gentry class was not properly responding to the colonial blueprint for an ordered society. Some had abandoned their oath of allegiance to the U.S. and were leading hostile forces against the government. Most were suspected of at least aiding the guerrillas. But because the *principalía* elite were deemed to be the key to controlling the whole of society — a conclusion derived from the 1899 interviews — great efforts were made to buttress the influence of the “genuine” pro-Americans among them, and to apply surveillance over the rest.

The extent of American frustration over the situation in some areas is illustrated in Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell’s address to the officers of his brigade (which was based in Southwestern Luzon). From the very start of Bell’s address, terms such as “arrogant,” “conceited,” “presumptuous,” “ungrateful,” “unscrupulous,” “cunning,” and “aggressive” are routinely used to describe the enemy’s character. The enemy’s exact opposites are the Americans soldiers who are described in Bell’s account as being fair, trusting, gentle, benevolent, full of forbearance, “cool,” and “collected” in manner.

This was December 1901, and General Bell was essentializing the Filipino enemy in order to justify the hard-line methods he was about to implement. But Bell was careful to identify two different types within that overall mass of Filipinos exhibiting the general characteristics of emotional immaturity and Oriental cunning. On one hand were those who dominated (i.e., the *principales*) and the rest who blindly followed. The key to success in the war was getting the *principalía* elite into line:

...the people of Batangas can have peace whenever they want it, and it should be our mission to make them want it as soon as we can by legitimate methods.

It is not possible to convince these irreconcilable and unsophisticated people by kindness and benevolence alone that you are right and they are wrong, nor could you likewise convince the ignorant *tao* that what you advise him to do is best and what his *principal* orders him to do is wrong, because the only argument the majority of either class can understand and appreciate is one of physical force.

To successfully deal with the common people, the headmen, the leaders, the *principales* are the ones we need to influence. The common *hombre* is dominated body and soul by his master, the *principal*. He is simply a blind tool, a poor down-trodden ignoramus, who does not know what is good for him and cannot believe an American. You can no more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can fly. He is going to do whatever he is told to do by his master or his leaders, because he is incapable of doing anything else.

Therefore, to succeed in our purpose, we must *make it to the interest of his leaders to order and counsel him to do that which we want him to do*. To bring this about, we must make the *principal* the object of our especial study and effort. (Bell, iii)

What is significant here is the assumption that Filipino society is a simple arrangement of elites who lead and masses who obey. Therefore, if the Americans were to control the elites (the *principales*) then everyone else would blindly follow and the insurgency would be over. But did this picture of a "clientelist" relationship capture the essence of Filipino society or was it merely a reflection of American and *ilustrado* desires for an ordered society that pacification and colonialism could produce and keep under control? Bell knew that this project would take a lot of work, in the information-gathering as well as combat fronts, to accomplish. Note his coupling of "especial study" and pacification effort, confirming that alongside military campaigns would run a program of information gathering and knowledge production.

During the height of the Philippine campaigns, Col. Wagner stated with dismay that the U.S. Army was a "blind giant," "powerful enough to destroy the enemy, but unable to find him." (Linn, 160) This is not surprising to those familiar with the Spanish period, when beyond the *pueblos* lay a vast unknown, the terrain of the "undocumented." The Philippine-American war was, in a sense, all about filling in that vast knowledge gap. Thus we see a proliferation of intelligence reports about the landholdings, educational attainment and family connections of both pro- and anti-American local leaders. American commanders were able to use this data to draw clearer lines distinguishing the various factions in the towns, to track down kinsmen of guerrilla chiefs, and to build up their allies among the *principales*. Today these writings are an important source of empirical data about Philippine social structure. But do they reflect what was out there, or simply the American and *ilustrado* desire for order? The Americans were

limited by the only language they could use to communicate with their informants: Spanish. They were limited by their own cultural assumptions about what “leadership” entailed and meant. And they could only gain an image of the social order refracted through this *principalía/ilustrado* class.

Army intelligence gathering had the effect of reducing the common soldier or subaltern to a passive subject, bound by debt, fear or other “traditional” ties of their social betters. The reduction of enemy resistance to such essentials is due to the *principalía* having been the primary target of U.S. Army action in the first place. Only the *principales* speak. The behavior of the subalterns is encoded in terms of elite constructions of their relationship, not to mention the “feudalism” that the Americans assumed was at the core of Philippine society. There are in fact other documents — Tagalog proclamations and letters, and even certain enigmatic statements in interrogation reports — that indicate how little debt and fear seemed to matter compared with something called, vaguely, “morale” specially, but not exclusively, imbued by the language and presence of the chief. And the assumption that despotism basically framed social relationships is belied by the remarkable fluidity of the structure of the guerrilla armies. Groups were constantly scattering, fading away, then reconstituting, perhaps around another leader with superior abilities. The fluidity of the structure of the guerrilla armies irked the pacification authorities who sought to identify stable leader-follower clusters so as to be able to take action against them.

Instead of a simple society of big men and little people, what the U.S. Army faced was a complex scene of competing definitions of proper leadership, as well as a multiplicity of sites where this was manifested. In the Tiaong district, many peasants joined the religio-political movement called “Colorum” which was also adamantly opposed to American rule. But because this fell outside the scope of gentry leadership, it was labeled “fanaticism.” When General Bell in late 1901 unleashed the full force of the U.S. army and gathered the populace into “protected zones,” many peasant soldiers abandoned their surrendering gentry officers in order to continue the resistance under non-gentry leadership. But because the latter fell outside the U.S. Army’s definition of proper Filipino leadership, it was named “banditry.”

The context of General Bell’s statements I quoted above was the U.S. Army’s decision to firmly resolve the stalemate caused by “Orien-

tal duplicity” and the isolation of the garrisoned centers. Increasingly the majority of soldiers in the district grew disenchanted with policies based only on benevolence and agreed with Capt. Jordan that, “This business of fighting and civilizing and educating at the same time doesn’t mix very well. Peace is needed first.” (Linn, 128) The lynchpin of the new policy implemented in December 1901 was to gather up people in the barrios into “protected zones,” a typical euphemism of this period of scorched-earth tactics. The stated aim was to deprive the enemy of food and other forms of sustenance, as well as to “protect” peace-loving villagers from guerrilla depredations. Glenn May estimates that malnutrition, poor sanitary conditions, disease and demoralization may have cost as many as 11,000 Filipino lives in the “protected zones” of Batangas province alone, and made the population susceptible to the cholera epidemic of 1902. (Linn, 155) My point is not to dwell on the injustice and cruelty of that policy, but to underline its effects on the construction and surveillance of colonial society. The establishment of protected zones (also referred to as concentration camps) was a way of “fixing” space, establishing boundaries, preventing the movement of people in and out, enabling their surveillance, and inducing them to want and to do what the occupation army wanted.

The “protected zones” were no other than the town centers. Formerly ambiguous and largely empty of power, the town centers became forcibly transformed into real centers of power. The hub of a typical “protected zone” was the church and U.S. garrison. From the church tower (which usually was clearly visible from all corners of a town) one had a panoramic view of the surrounding streets and houses. And what did one see? The “protected zone,” a compact, bounded and fully controlled version of the town itself. It was a mirror held up to townspeople, a display of what they would be — orderly, visible, disciplined — when they stopped fighting and went along with the occupation army’s ideology of benevolent assimilation.

On each of the streets surrounding the center a barrio was relocated, properly labeled and all. The gap between town and countryside, center and periphery, known and unknown, was for the time being collapsed. The Americans could stroll about the town like tourists and view, as well as count and document, the whole population street by street. Within the bounded confines, they began to establish dependency relations by distributing food and other necessities. They penetrated into individual houses and tents in the name of hygiene and sanitation. And they could be seen as well by “ordinary” Filipinos without the distortions of gentry mediation. As Bell put it, “Hundreds

of people have been brought into intimate contact with Americans, whom they had never seen or known before, and as a consequence no one will again be able to mislead them as to the real character of Americans.”

Within the zones the *principales* were interrogated and sorted out. No neutrality or ambiguity was permitted: one had to demonstrate through deeds (like bringing in an insurgent from the field or leading an auxiliary force) that he was a “friend” of the Americans. In Tiaong, practically everyone was implicated in the guerrilla movement, and hundreds were sent off to exile and hard labor in the Malagi island prison camp. Furthermore, within the zones gentry privileges were suspended; everyone was deemed equal before the eyes of the colonial power. This period can be regarded as a transitional phase in a rite of passage, where a perverse form of *communitas* reigns prior to entry into another ordered phase of existence. The *principales*, who were being carefully observed by the American officers, would emerge from all this properly constituted into leading citizens of the new colonial era; their local factions would be made to feed into the democratic electoral process.

Meanwhile, having consolidated the town centers, the U.S. forces proceeded to make their presence felt throughout the countryside. General Bell’s account is worth quoting in full, for it seems to capture the exhilaration that the U.S. Army must have felt in finally being able to penetrate every nook and cranny of a formerly resistant and intractable domain. The discourse of penetration, and of filling in the void, is unmistakable:

...We have pursued them ever since with relentless persistence. Not waiting for them to come out of hiding, we have penetrated into the heart of every mountain range, searching every ravine and mountain top. We have found their barracks and hidden supplies in the most unexpected and remote hiding places... At the time of Malvar’s surrender we had every mountain range in the brigade full of troops...
(Bell, in Wheaton, 13–14)

The saturation of the countryside with U.S. troops and selected contingents of Filipinos led by loyal *principales*, after this countryside had been largely emptied of people through the hamletting program, was tantamount to a reconstitution of that district in America’s image, a reconstitution around a privileged center called “the town.” This is one way we might read General Bell’s “satisfaction of realizing that the

most determined, ignorant and persistent enemy of *good order* had been literally and unequivocally thrashed into unconditional *submission to properly constituted authority.*”

The “protected zones” policy worked. Massive burning of food stocks outside the zones led to hungry guerrillas turning themselves in. *Principales* from the town centers, including some ex-guerrilla officers, “responded” to U.S. Army pressure and helped to round up the rest as a precondition for the lifting of the hamletting policy. This is not to say that resistance, passive or active, was finished once and for all. But since most of the guerrilla forces by 1903 were led by blacksmiths, woodcutters, peasants and the like, they were naturally quite alien to the colonial ordering of society where only town-based *principales* and *ilustrados* were considered rational-enough to lead. So these die-hard revolutionaries (the best known being Macario Sakay, a barber and stage actor by profession) were treated as mere bandits and punished without leniency. Other forms of association and “traditional behavior” were marginalized. If deemed to be potentially subversive, such as those religious cults which worshipped nationalist heroes, they were infiltrated and disarmed by the center. The Philippine-American War officially ended with the surrender of General Miguel Malvar (Aguinaldo’s successor) on April 16, 1902.

Sanitation and Pacification, 1902–1903

There was another factor that induced Malvar to surrender: the appearance in his area of cholera. Cholera had arrived in Manila in March through a shipment of infected vegetables from Hongkong. Its rapid spread all over the archipelago was greatly facilitated by the movement of American troops and the failure to police quarantine lines in rural areas. When it hit the “protected zones” of Southwestern Luzon in April, the villagers were trapped in unsanitary, crowded quarters that soon became death camps. Hurriedly, but too late for some towns, General Bell rescinded the hamletting policy and Malvar soon surrendered.

Colonial textbook histories locate the 1902–03 cholera epidemic in sections often called “progress and sanitation in the New Era.” The apparent victory over the cholera is assimilated into the universal history of medical progress originating in Europe. Forgotten are its original moorings in a colonial war and pacification campaign. Ironically, Philippine nationalist historiography reproduced this myth by locating the 1899–1902 war of resistance and the 1902–04 cholera

epidemic in two distinct series. The former is a moment in the epic struggle for independence from colonial rule, the latter a Philippine chapter of the saga of scientific progress. According to Teodoro Agoncillo in his 1970s textbook,

Before 1900, ravages of cholera, smallpox, dysentery, malaria tuberculosis, and other deadly diseases plagued the people... When the Americans came, they immediately set to work to minimize the spread of diseases and to improve, on the other hand, the health of the people.

The task in educating the people on the “elementary principles of hygiene and sanitation” was difficult, continues Agoncillo, because the Filipinos were

superstition-ridden and ignorant of the strange power of the minute germs to cause deadly diseases, [and] were not easily convinced by the efficacy of medical methods in combating the cause of death from various sickness. The early Americans, then, were up against a formidable wall of ignorance and superstition... (Agoncillo and Guerrero, 425–26)

The origins of this discourse can be traced back to the very architects of the anti-cholera campaigns: the Secretary of the Interior, Dean Worcester, and the Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. Victor Heiser. Worcester sensed that the rumor-mongering and the popular resistance to his policies were really extensions of the war, but by hooking his health policy to the discourse of progress, all of the contrary voices were identified with forces of backwardness and superstition. Furthermore, the epidemic set the scene for another round of “fathering,” another chapter of “benevolent assimilation” as suggested by one veteran army surgeon who wrote: “the sanitary work of combating this disease among an ignorant and suspicious people, impoverished by war, locusts and rinderpest and embittered by conquest was an extremely difficult task, calling for *much patience, tact and firmness*, the brunt of which fell on the Army.”

The war did not in fact end with Malvar’s surrender. The discourse of “pacification” simply gave way to the discourse of “germ warfare.” We can regard the military surgeons as the next wave of “pacifiers” after the Cavalry officers and combat troops of the earlier period. In fact, American cavalymen and soldiers were recruited by Worcester to serve as crack officers of his sanitation brigades. The image

of the conquering soldier became quickly transformed into that of the crusading sanitation inspector. But just as guerrilla warfare frustrated the "benevolent" policies of the army, so were the sanitation campaigns met with various kinds of resistance on the part of the populace. This was the scene of another war, a "combat zone" of disputes over power and definitions of illness and treatment, involving American military surgeons, Filipino physicians, parish priests, the *principales*, stricken townspeople, and alternative curers in the fringes of the towns.

Dominating this battle zone was the stern figure of the U.S. army surgeon, less open than the regular military officers to compromise with the local elite. As one Captain C. de Mey put it, their job was ideally "to rule with a rod of steel." A health officer "should be the commanding officer of a city when that city is threatened with or has an epidemic, and must be left free to act according to his judgment." In the context of an epidemic the surgeon displaces the military commander as the enforcer of discipline.

Search and surveillance operations were of particular importance in this war against the concealment of cholera cases. For this purpose, Worcester organized platoons of inspectors led by surgeons from the Army Volunteer brigades. Initially, most of the inspectors were Filipinos. But they were soon relieved owing to their ineffectiveness. Americans of all kinds were enlisted: clerks, schoolteachers, policemen, and ex-soldiers. Among them were some "who had slight regard for the natives and who enforced the already distasteful regulation in an unwarranted manner, increasing the popular opposition." Several of them were killed as a result. The issue here was that of the wanton entry into family homes by the inspectors in order to flush out concealed victims. This was tantamount to extending the "hamletting" policy, which authorized the penetration of houses, to all towns affected by the cholera.

Various combat zones can be identified in what we may call the "sanitation war." Prominent among them was the issue of confinement. Strict confinement was premised on the notion then prevalent in American medicine that disease was a purely biological and physical entity, a foreign agent, which must be excised from the healthy parts of society. The Filipino public, however, generally refused to dissociate the cholera from the network of social relationships in which it appeared; how could a victim not be attended to by family? Rumors, concealment, and evasions were various modes of resistance to an imposed definition of sickness and treatment. The conflict became so intense that as a concession to the "ignorant classes" tents were pitched

on the grounds of cholera hospitals to accommodate relatives or friends of patients. Once or twice daily they were allowed to visit the wards. Filipino doctors were also allowed in to practice their "mixed treatments" which involved keeping the patient in a familiar and reassuring environment, where his morale as well as body was attended to.

Sometime in mid-May, the removal of contacts to detention camps was finally stopped in Manila since this measure only made concealment of cases the rule. On the first of July, even detention in houses was scrapped. In Batangas and Laguna, General Bell abolished forcible detention on May 23. Henceforth, people were to be isolated in their houses, over which municipal authorities were to place guards — not Tagalog guards but Filipino scouts recruited from other ethnic groups.

Another combat zone involved the burning of houses. During the first few weeks of the epidemic in Manila, not only were members of a stricken household sent off to detention camp, but their house itself was burned down if it happened to be of nipa palm construction. Since the cholera germ lay in the filth and vermin associated with infected "native dwelling," these had to be destroyed, germs and all. In the towns of Southwestern Luzon under General Bell's control, there would have been quite a few medical officers like the one who wrote, "I went next to Cavite, where cases had occurred in a populous market place. The market was burned down. Result, no more cholera for more than two months." Since the burning of whole barrios outside the protected zones during Bell's military offensive had already created mass resentment against the U.S. Army, well-meaning anti-cholera measures such as burning cannot have been accepted passively. There can be no doubt that the threat of burning figured largely in the concealment of more than fifty percent of cholera cases in the region.

Army surgeons and their inspectors policed mainly the town centers, while in the outlying villages either a vigorous local-led campaign was carried out, or the epidemic was simply allowed to run its course. Thus, in the barrios concealment was a simple matter. Relatives, neighbors, and children visited the sick or the dead without constraints. Some came to pay their respects, to join in the feast called *katapusan*; others just wanted to see what the dying and the dead looked like, and cholera victims were a horrible sight. The same utter disregard for prohibitions was reported in towns all over the Philippines. "They have no fear of anything," sighed a frustrated teacher in the Visayas. At Ibaan, Batangas, infected houses were required to display a red flag,

“but the natives gave no heed to this warning and to them the presence of the flag was seemingly only a kind of a joke.” Americans and educated Filipinos saw this as a sign of fatalism and ignorance. On the other hand, it can be read as an insistence that death and dying remain a social event.

One effect of the cholera war was the convergence in attitudes towards sanitation by American surgeons and local *principales*, some of whom were Spanish-trained *medicos* and pharmacists. Being the traditional agents of disease control, locally run boards of health invariably collided with the American military surgeons during the early stages of the epidemic. Their lethargy under U.S. supervision can be explained by the fact that the revolution was not yet over for most of them; memories of the guerrilla war lingered; their traditional dominance over the town centers was threatened by a still-unfamiliar, colonial ruler. Eventually, however, strict surveillance by U.S. Army surgeons from the local garrisons brought the *principales* around to the colonial fold. Faced, as well, with the brute fact of accelerating cholera death rates, they became partners in upholding the anti-cholera measures against lethargy or resistance from the “unlettered” *tao*. Many *principales* demonstrated in this manner their readiness to participate in the new political order. This was an important step towards local autonomy.

Self-rule in the towns did not, however, mean a closing of the gap between centers and peripheries. In Southern Luzon, for example, Mt. Banahaw and its foothills were the base of operations of curers who, rather than licensed physicians, were the first recourse of peasants in the region. *Curanderos* commonly prescribed a cholera medicine extracted from the *manunggal* tree (*Samadera Indica*) grown in Tayabas province. A particularly gifted curer combined medicinal treatment with rituals involving the intervention of a guiding spirit. A condition of treatment was for the patient to undertake some form of pilgrimage to Mount Banahaw in fulfillment of a *panata*, or pledge, to supernatural beings. Cholera epidemics clearly offered ideal conditions for the appearance of healers who attracted villagers away from town-centers and to their fold. In fact, it was common for U.S. authorities in 1902 and subsequent cholera years to forcibly disperse people gathered in places considered to be sources of infection: sacred springs, pilgrimage sites, even churches, and cockpits. At times a proscribed healer was the center of attention and promptly suppressed. Increasingly, however, it became clear to the authorities that alternative medicine and anticolonialism were closely linked. Those very areas where healers held sway, were in a state of unrest in late 1902, to the extent that some

Tayabas towns had to be reconcentrated again. Various post-Malvar guerrilla leaders like “Pope” Ruperto Rios and the Katipunan chief Macario Sakay, roamed these hills in late 1902 and 1903.

A 1903 report on the religio-political movements based on these hills states that “Independence” had become a religion among them. “The magical condition of *independencia*” was their goal. In Tagalog, the word “independence” is *kalayaan*, one of whose meanings is derived from *kaginhawaan*: relief from pain, a life of ease. “Relief from the cholera” would certainly have registered in 1902–03. Notably, the password among members of such movements was, and still is, *Ave Maria purissima... sin pecada concebida*: the first line of a prayer, posted on doors during the cholera epidemic, imploring the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ for deliverance from the pestilence. What were the contours of the knowledge that the healers possessed? What lay behind pilgrimages to Antipolo and Banahaw besides “fanaticism?” The sources are silent. Little emerges from the world of the native inhabitants that is not mediated by medico-sanitary discourse, a subset of the discourse of Progress.

The irony of the cholera war is that germ warfare methods, including the use of powerful drugs, strict quarantine, and attempted cremation of the dead, all failed for various reasons. In the end, it was the combination of heavy rains and the growing immunity of the populace that caused the epidemic to subside. This fact notwithstanding, modern medicine and sanitation is said to have been implanted in the Philippines during the cholera epidemic; not even nationalist histories deny this. Humanitarian objectives, however, mask other dimensions of colonial health and welfare measures: the surveillance and disciplining of the populace, the supervision and regulation of more and more aspects of life, and the suppression or elimination of what the U.S. government perceived as forms of resistance, disorder, and irrationality. The participation of Filipinos in colonial health and sanitation matters implicates them in the process; after all, this was part of their maturation towards independence.

Cataloguing the New Possessions

By 1903, the establishment of law and order had progressed to the extent that the U.S. government felt it was time to take stock of things, to take an inventory of their new possessions. The four-volume *Census of the Philippine Islands* was started in 1903, and published 1905. The census wasn't just a confirmation of conquest and acquisition, but

in fact was also a means of taking "pacification" still another step farther.

As in the anti-cholera campaigns, the U.S. Army and the newly formed Philippine Constabulary were involved in the census. Before it could be taken, insisted the U.S. Congress, the "insurrection" must have ended. Since guerrilla resistance, now classified as "banditry" (*ladronism*), persisted in certain areas, the Constabulary was called upon in many cases to "pacify" a region before it could be canvassed by the census takers. When certain localities refused to cooperate, Army garrisons would put on a show of force to intimidate the *principales*. When peace and order conditions were met, an army of census takers, Filipinos and Americans working together, then descended upon the towns all over the archipelago led by General Joseph Sanger, director of the Bureau of Census. They expected full support from local officials, but the U.S. Army hovered in the background, just to be sure.

This American-directed exercise involving mainly Filipino census takers was seen as a means by which Filipinos could prove their ability to perform a disciplined task. If successful, they would be able to move a step closer to independence; the census was a precondition for Filipino representation in the National Assembly. One might wonder what connection the census had with another precondition for Filipino representation: the surrender or capture of General Macario Sakay, the most prominent of the guerrilla chiefs (or "bandits") continuing to resist U.S. occupation. The answer is fairly straightforward: the census was itself a sophisticated weapon for pacification. It was meant to delineate and police colonial borders, to annex local populations into the space of colonial knowledge. It, moreover, refined the intelligence-gathering operations of the war period, creating a system of collecting and classifying statistical data that would enable colonial authorities to keep watch over the population. It reduced the population to several huge boxes of cards, seven million of them, in which individual identities were flattened out into a limited set of categories. As Vicente Rafael has pointed out, one's census identity had nothing to do with biography or life experience. The individual was identified as the possessor of a range of qualities, essentialized and regulated. Each one had a place in the census just as each one had a place in the "protected zones" or in the quarantined cholera towns.

According to Rafael, the census was a way in which Filipinos could represent themselves under the watchful eyes of American tutors. The census is about *them*, but they construct it in the process of growing up as children of the New Era. This was the beginning of self-

rule; to train oneself within the parameters set by the white father. General Sanger states in his introduction to the volumes that Filipinos, as census takers, were able to follow orders from white supervisors, and thus had shown their potential for running their own state. But it would take time before they could *as a people* be ready for self-rule. In that possible future, “the tribal distinctions which now exist will gradually disappear and the Filipinos will become a numerous and homogeneous English-speaking race, exceeding in intelligence and capacity all other peoples of the tropics.”

What the census did was to survey the “tribal distinctions” that existed and account for them. In a sense it produced the differences among the people, because everyone had to specify his or her qualities that established difference. The schedule sheets, for example, were designed to identify an individual’s race (blanco?, amarillo?, negro?, mestizo?), ethnicity (Ilocano?, Tagalog?, Cebuano?, Igorot?, etc.; you had to belong to one or the other group), gender, education, domicile, language spoken, and so forth. These differences were then organized according to a conceptual system that made sense to the Americans and that addressed the question of benevolent assimilation. One effect of the census was to demonstrate that the inhabitants were not ready for independence because they were divided along tribal and linguistic lines.

The census also had the effect of racializing Philippine history. The population was divided into two broad categories: Wild and Civilized. “Wild” included nomads, pagans, Muslims, i.e., those unaffected by Spanish rule. These people were the ideal colonial subjects, more easily disciplined by the Americans. The “Civilized” included the majority, Hispanized population, halfway through the adolescent stage because they had experienced Spanish fatherhood, but still immature, and really semi-civilized. They were deemed good at copying, very sly, and natural imitators. According to the Census: “The Filipinos are merely in a state of Christian pupilage. They are imitative. They are glad to be educated, glad to study some languages other than their own, glad to follow European and American ideals... Like all Orientals, they are a suspicious people, but when their confidence is won, they follow with a trust that is complete.”

Racial categories tend to be valorized over the wild/civilized scheme. Thus both wild and civilized Filipinos are at one level similar because they are brown-skinned Orientals. The more injection of whiteness into them, as in the case of the mestizos, the more civilized they

become. Since the (white) Americans are at the top of the racial hierarchy, their occupation of the Philippines was not only justified, it was beneficial. Photographs accompanying the census show the hierarchy of civilization and skin-color from dark-skinned and naked highlanders to lighter-skinned and well-dressed Christian natives. The more advanced Filipinos (i.e., the census takers, just below the Americans) are depicted as the ideal types to which everyone must evolve before self-rule is possible.

The image of Philippine society produced by the census seems to dovetail significantly with the kind of society imagined and desired by both the *ilustrados* and the Schurman Commission during the 1899 interviews. In fact, like the policy of reconcentrating populations in order to produce ideal towns and social orders, like the cholera campaigns that established the boundaries between progress and backwardness in affairs of both the physical and social body, the census was a sophisticated technology of surveillance, perhaps the most sophisticated at that time. It served to discipline the population by classifying it and making inevitable and natural the road to take for self-rule. "The measured use of force" was to make the Filipinos want what the colonial authorities wanted of them, to make Filipinos accept the supremacy of the U.S., accept the position of children to a father (as Rafael puts it), and then learn how to be more civilized, democratic, and eventually independent.

I began this lecture by alluding to "benevolent assimilation" as an ideology that publicly, at least, undergirded the U.S. occupation of the Philippines. This has no doubt facilitated representations of the events of 1899-1902 as a great misunderstanding or, at most, "a splendid little war," and may explain its absence from most American textbooks (except, perhaps, as a footnote to the Spanish-American War). The occupation *was* a bloody event. But in this lecture I have focussed on benevolent assimilation itself as a mode of warfare. A certain kind of Philippines today was produced by that war, particularly through the reordering of society, the surveillance and disciplining of people, and the suppression of alternative orderings that accompanied the deployment of U.S. troops. Eventually, control of the reins of the colonial state would pass on to Filipinos whose attitudes towards forms of undiscipline, disorder, irrationality, and deviancy were no different from their American fathers'. Most Filipinos did in the end take up the challenge of "tutelage," and as they deemed their education and "upbringing" sufficient, they demanded that independence be given. The effects of "white fathering" are still with us.

*Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics**

From the very first lecture of this series, I have repeatedly stated that colonial knowledge was caught up in ideas of evolutionary development, racial difference and hierarchy, and superiority of “the West” vis-à-vis “the East.” There is nothing new about this view. The complex interplay between knowledge and colonialism from the eighteenth century to the present has been recognized and explored in multifold ways since Edward Said’s book *Orientalism* appeared some two decades ago. In Philippine studies, however, there lingers the assumption that colonial knowledge is a thing of the past, the break between colonial and “modern” scholarship having occurred with the transfer of sovereignty to the Philippines in 1946. Was there, indeed, a discursive transformation with the departure of American officials from the scene? In my second lecture, I suggested that it was in the early interactions between the Schurman Commission and the Manila *ilustrados*, together with the policies and practices of U.S. pacification, that an “indigenous social structure” and perhaps even a “Filipino identity” were constituted. I wish to turn now to how Philippine politics has been characterized in certain key texts from the 1960s on, how political behavior has been codified in ways that reflect the desires and fears of contemporary observers. Ultimately, the question I ask is whether elements of colonial discourse continue to inhabit, in suitably amended and updated terms, recent writing on Philippine politics. Mesmerized by the trappings of modern scholarship, have we failed to interrogate the conditions for positing what is “true” and “essential” about Filipino political behavior?

* An expanded version of the Burns lecture later presented at the symposium “After the American Century? 1898–1998,” sponsored by the Latin American and Caribbean Studies Center and the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 15 September 1998.

I was provoked into examining the persistence of American colonial discourse after reading Stanley Karnow's book *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines*, which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1990. Writing in the aftermath of the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship, Karnow asks why America's democratic experiment had failed, allowing the likes of Marcos to take over. Though sympathetic to Cory Aquino's People Power revolution and wishing her new, democratic government well, there was an air of condescension about the book. I was bothered by the all-too-simplistic portrayal of the Spanish colonial period as the "dark age" of the Philippine past supplanted in this century by an enlightened American new age. Filipinos in Karnow's drama seemed to be portrayed as juveniles, dominated by their emotions and untrammelled personal ambitions. But I was even more bothered by the immense popularity of Karnow's book in the U.S. Even here in Hawai'i, well-meaning individuals recommend Karnow's book to me as a "must-reading" on the Philippines. What was it about the book, I asked myself, that readily connected with the American national imaginary, the dominant ways in which "others" — in this case, Filipinos — are perceived?

Karnow identifies the root of the Philippine problem as the decision, at the very outset (1899), to accommodate to tradition, meaning "the customs and social life of the islanders." American administrators expected that the system of mass education that would simultaneously be instituted with U.S. rule, would spawn future generations with truly democratic sentiments. Unfortunately, writes Karnow, echoing other contemporary American writers, traditional values prevailed.

What were these values? And who are the other American writers or scholars subsumed under the Karnow signature? Philippine society, he claims, is based on a "complicated and often baffling web of real and ritual kinship ties — the antithesis of the American ideal of a nation of citizens united in their devotion to the welfare of all." (20) The crucial term here is "antithesis," the notion that the Filipinos are the negative opposite of what Americans are supposed to be. But the word "antithesis" also suggests to me that the so-called "American ideal" is the *prior* term of the relationship; that the Filipino tradition Karnow speaks of is already an effect of the positing of an American tradition. This is not what Karnow means, however: for him, the Filipino tradition is an "already there" and "always there" — an essence. He speaks of the obsession among Filipinos with "shame" (*hiya*), with saving face; importance is placed on respect for elders and deference to superiors.

“Filipinos are absorbed into alliances from infancy” and later on their political behavior is conditioned by the fact of being “enmeshed in coils of mutual loyalties.” (230)

Karnow’s point is that the U.S. involvement was apparently flawed from the start since, in contrast to America where authority “reposed on impersonal institutions, power in the Philippines revolved around the complex kinship networks of the *compadrazgo* system.” (228) Therefore the tragedies and problems of the present are the consequence not so much of American intervention but of the tenacity of Philippine traditions. This is what earned Karnow the Pulitzer Prize, I think: the idea that America had always dealt with Filipinos in good faith, but that somehow the resilience of Filipino culture had managed to frustrate the grand scenario of democratization or “benevolent assimilation,” to use an older term.

As Karnow commences his narration of the American colonial period, the various themes fall neatly into place. America, like Spain centuries earlier, attempts to export its political and social values. The islands are deluged by American teachers, surgeons, social engineers of all kinds. And in a relatively short time Filipinos begin to speak English, worship George Washington, and dream of white Christmases. But have they been reconstituted in America’s image? No, insists Karnow. Americanism was, and still is, a thin veneer. Karnow revels in narrating the “things American” that Filipinos admire and display, while reminding the reader that the Filipino value system never really changed — neither under Spain nor under the U.S. Absolute difference characterizes the relationship between East and West, the Philippines and America.

The strategy of highlighting cultural differences enables Karnow to argue that America’s democratizing mission largely failed because of the strength of Filipino traditions. American colonial officials became enmeshed in the same sorts of patronage relationships Filipinos “naturally” formed among themselves. The most vibrant and bombastic of the Filipino politician, Manuel Quezon, was really a client of the Americans, while such a dominating figure as General Douglas MacArthur became entangled in the Filipino web through his role of godfather to Quezon’s son. Because Americans in the Philippines tended to become part of the ruling Mafia, they let the oligarchs remain in power. Thus, nothing was done to solve fundamental social problems. In the end, argues Karnow, Americans *cannot be blamed* for the failures of their ex-colony. No matter how much advice and support

they gave to such political stalwarts as Magsaysay and Marcos, all this came largely to naught thanks to the enduring Philippine value system, and the tenacity of the ruling oligarchy.

The sense of negative otherness is reinforced by Karnow's descriptions of his frequent trips to the Philippines. Instead of order, he saw and experienced chaos: "The disarray was visible, widespread and, after a while, monotonous. The port of Manila was a hive of graft, with gangs protected by politicians working with customs officials to smuggle in everything... Violence had reached epidemic proportions... Ninoy Aquino... cruised around town in a bulletproof limousine, its upholstery fitted with slots for machine guns... [President] Macapagal concocted nationalist issues as a distraction." (364) Not even the Communists are exempted from this picture of chaos: "[The Communists were] scarcely Robin Hoods, they murdered, plundered and feuded among themselves. But they were far better disciplined than the police and the army, whose abuses drove numbers of normally passive peasants into the Communist ranks..." (386) All this endemic chaos, tyranny, and abuse "left [Karnow] doubting whether American institutions, implanted there at the turn of the century, could really take root in its soil." (360)

What I find intriguing is this so-called Filipino tradition that had always been there, that survived centuries of colonialism and now supposedly underpins a flawed democracy. The Filipino actors in his text are doomed from the start because they are ruled by their passions, kinship ties, debts of gratitude and personal loyalties, and even exhibit such petty defects as vanity and the propensity to lie. But in order to give his view of culture some structure and authority Karnow harnesses highly contentious and often outdated social values and personality studies from the 1960s. There is much to be explored in, say, Tagalog notions of *utang na loob* ("inner debt") and *hiya* ("shame") upon which reciprocal social relationships are constructed. Karnow, however, ignores more recent and non-essentializing studies of Filipino culture and politics. His aim is to establish a binary opposition between positive "American" and negative "Filipino" values and this resonates well with his audience, for much of what he claims to lie beneath Filipino exteriors conforms by and large to Euro-American myths of backward, undeveloped peoples.

Karnow, in effect, constructs Filipinos in terms of a variant of America's classic image of their Pacific wards. Images of the Filipino elite (oppressive *caciques*, bosses, patrons) and masses (blindly loyal

and manipulated *tao*, clients of the bosses) constructed by James LeRoy, Fred Atkinson, David Barrows and many other American writers a century or so ago, reappear in modern journalistic garb. But just as these older images are complicit with the colonial project to pacify and tutor the Filipinos, Karnow's portrayal of a starkly different Filipino tradition has its political implications. In the book, though the physical setting is the Philippines, the Filipino actors in the drama are outnumbered at least two to one by Americans. The Filipinos are nevertheless crucial to the narrative, as the negative "others" of the Americans whose story the book is really about. The American national imaginary is established and continually reinforced in writings about its cultural "others," and the Filipinos have occupied this position since the so-called imperial "blunder" of 1899.

A careful look at Karnow's sources will reveal an intertextual relationship with predominantly American writings on the Philippines. The building blocks of Karnow's book are, in fact, what these scholarly texts tell us about the Philippine-American war, the special (or should I say, exceptional) colonial relationship, collaboration and resistance under Japanese occupation, the U.S.-inspired political party system, and the family politics that hijacked it. Not surprisingly, these texts subscribe to the notion that, somehow, "tradition" has prevailed in the Philippines, and that American colonial officials, although partly to blame for having enmeshed themselves in this mode of politics rather than living up to its democratising claims, had no choice as benign rulers but to allow "tradition" or the "essence" of the Filipino character to survive and eventually to reassert itself.

The earliest work of modern scholarship that can be said to have "enabled" Karnow's book is *Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations: 1898-1946*, published in 1971 by the University of Michigan's Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies and subsequently by Solidaridad Publishing House in Manila. The blurb on the back cover states the book's central concern: "Colonialism, by its nature, is one-sided, arrogant, exploitative; *compadrazgo* is bilateral, amicable, helpful. Could the United States rule the Filipinos against their will and still claim to be benevolent? Could the Filipinos resist American imperialism and still cooperate with it for the benefit of the country?"

The basic theme developed by the five authors, all students of David J. Steinberg, is that American colonial officials in the Philippines had often to compromise or even put aside their ideals of transforming

the Philippines in accordance with American ideals, because of resistance from Filipino leaders, or the practical need to govern the masses through these local leaders. Americans constantly bewailed the so-called *caciquism* that demonstrated the Filipinos' unpreparedness for self-rule, while at the same time running the colony in conjunction with the educated subgroup of these *caciques*, called *ilustrados*. Because Americans allowed themselves to be enmeshed in clientelist relationships with the *caciques*, they ended up running the colony in harmony with traditional Filipino customs and values. What the book *Compadre Colonialism* did was to highlight the uniqueness of the Philippine colonial experiment, and also the problems faced by "giving in" to the feudal-minded Filipino nationalist leaders. We can see here where Karnow got his basic ideas about the force of Filipino traditions undermining the idealism of the Americans.

Compadre Colonialism's strength is that it is meticulously researched, the authors exploiting the advantage of being in a place, Ann Arbor, where libraries and archival holdings are particularly rich on the American colonial period. But faithfully representing what American officials thought and said about their Filipino wards can lead to a reproduction of colonial images and discourses, and I think this is one effect of the book. When Taft complained about the *caciques* and their traditional values being a hindrance to Americanization, he was writing in the context of an ongoing pacification of the populace and continued American efforts to get these *caciques* (many of whom were leading nationalists) to cooperate by rewarding some and punishing others. The "problem" of *caciquism* was, in fact, originally articulated by the U.S. Army in various war zones. By being uncritical or even probably unaware of what we now can identify as an American colonial discourse on their Filipino subjects, the authors of *Compadre Colonialism* helped to reify or essentialize certain features of Philippine social relationships that Karnow would later pick up.

Compadre Colonialism's silence about the the Philippine-American War (1899–1902) is certainly not a feature of Karnow's book, which details the various stages of the conflict, cruel atrocities on both sides included. Karnow's interpretative framework on the war is derived from another American historian of the Philippines: Glenn Anthony May. In 1984, May aggressively challenged Filipino historians' often weakly-documented assertions that the "masses" were enthusiastic supporters of the war, by insisting that the rank-and-file were just loyal followers of their officers who came from the local gentry and were often landlords as well. These officers themselves were generally not

fighting for grand ideals but on behalf of more powerful patrons and factions. May offers as evidence the statements of a few survivors of the 1899–1902 war whom he managed to locate in 1976. One of his star witnesses, Emilio Vergara, a mere boy of thirteen when drafted to fight the Spaniards in 1896, is quoted as saying that he joined the war against the Americans because he was drafted and feared punishment from his commanding officer if he refused to fight. May goes on to reconstruct Vergara's world from the interviews (conducted through an interpreter).

What emerges is a classic picture of premodern existence in rural Philippines, probably derived from his Yale Professor Harry Benda's essay on the evolution of popular movements in Southeast Asia. May depicts Vergara's world as entirely local (his village) and his only goal to return to it after the war. Vergara had no real feelings about the country's independence or the American enemy; "he had no concept of, or loyalty to, a nation-state; his only loyalty was to local authority figures." May is careful to note that other soldiers may have had other reasons for fighting, but these dimensions are not pursued at all. He concludes:

Here was a man who was not interested in fighting, who was not especially interested in Philippine independence, but who fought all the same. Why? The answer lies in the nature of his society. He fought because he was a client and his patrons asked him to fight. Many peasants, no doubt, fought for different reasons; but it should be emphasized that others too fought because of patron pressure. In a sense, the patron-client link was the real "underside" of the Philippine-American War.

If it was in the very nature of Vergara's society to be somehow bound to his officer or "patron," what were the precise meanings and dimensions of this relationship? May is silent on this; nowhere is there a textual explication of Vergara's language of clientelism. Instead, the relationship between Vergara and his officer is simply encoded into functionalist social science theory, or specifically into a definition of the patron-client tie as "the dyadic relationship between superordinate and subordinate in which each provides services for the others." Clientelism is reduced to a personal (or particularistic) relationship pervaded by loyalty or fear. This, May emphasizes, has no connection whatsoever with revolutionary impulses and visions. In a roundabout way he repeats the U.S. imperial view that Filipinos at the turn of the century had not transcended particularistic ties and were thus cultur-

ally and politically unfit for independence. Somehow this resonates with a certain imperialist reasoning that certain peoples, not having evolved into modern nations, could or should be subjugated in order to drag them up the evolutionary ladder.

Glenn May's work on the Filipino "motives" for resisting the U.S. allows Karnow to make that difficult transition from the narrative of a brutal imperialist conquest to that of benevolent colonialism. But Karnow is equally indebted to May for revisionist interpretations concerning the main goal of colonial tutelage — the implantation of American democratic institutions — and how this was frustrated by Filipino traditions. In his study of elections during the late Spanish period, May discovers "perhaps the greatest curiosity about political power in late nineteenth-century Philippine communities." Power, it seems, "resided neither in the electorate — who could be, and generally were, bribed, cajoled, threatened, and otherwise influenced — nor even in the elected — who may have been surrogates — but rather in the men who often took no official part in municipal political life." May locates power in a handful of local bigwigs at the top, and this repressive, manipulative but hidden power from above prevents everyone else in the community from engaging meaningfully in politics. The municipal election was, May concludes, "a marionette play, where the puppets on the stage performed according to a script and the men behind the scenes pulled the strings."

When the Americans took over, continues May, they transformed the election rituals, expanding the electorate, sanctioning political campaigns, and introducing a new system of electoral supervision. But "the reality of municipal politics proved to be far more resistant to change." The Americans blamed this on "corruption," failing which they tended to attribute to such causes as "racial deficiency" and "political inexperience." None of these, argues May, identified the real cause of the problem. Rather, it was that

under Spanish rule, the leaders of Philippine communities had learned not how to serve government, but rather how to use it. The holding of office was seen to be not an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of promoting particular interests. Finally, the process by which those officials were chosen — the election — was seen to be not a ritual worthy of respect but rather a charade, silly and laughable.

So on the eve of the American takeover, Filipinos were already participating in elections, but these were basically flawed. They weren't

authentic (in the American liberal, democratic sense), asserts May, because they were driven by personal grievances, factional contests for dominance, and repressive power from above. And notwithstanding the claims of Filipinos, including some participants, the well-known revolutionary showdown in Tejeros in early 1897 was just a grubby and corrupt election involving factions and patronage, because — May reminds us in his latest book on the nationalist invention of heroes — that was the *nature* of local politics in the 19th century Philippines, and still is.

It is easy to see how May's account feeds into Karnow's central theme of a Filipino tradition that not only resists U.S. tutelage but is actually liberal America's opposite. For May reduces the complex relationships among townspeople, and between colonized and colonizer, into a contest of despotisms. The municipal puppeteers are also the big patrons, the sources of repressive power that turns the masses into mere electoral puppets. May's Spanish records may have given him that impression, but my research into the war in southern Luzon, a study which makes use of manifestos and letters in Tagalog, reveals a community in which power flows from the bottom up, as well, and in which indebtedness is not simply a one-way, oppressive, relationship but rather a reciprocal one. Tagalog metrical romances just as readily offer this alternative picture. May's paradigm fails to explain why, during the revolution, many of the big local patrons leading guerrilla armies behaved quite unlike the selfish and rapacious bosses they are made out to be in the colonial records.

Glenn May's revisionist interpretations of nineteenth and early-twentieth century Philippines are echoed in Alfred McCoy's work on the Japanese occupation and later periods. In his work on the Japanese occupation, McCoy claims to have identified the most basic driving force of elite political behavior: factional loyalties. Take the following statement:

Deprived of any clear ideological or legal guidelines, members of the Ilongo elite determined their wartime political affiliation primarily on the basis of prewar factional loyalties. ...With their moral compasses spinning, Iloilo's political leaders generally chose factional loyalties as their political touchstone and let personal circumstance determine their affiliations with either the resistance or collaborating government. (205)

McCoy concludes that, "Once the importance of factional

alignments is recognized as the *determining factor* in wartime conflicts, nominally ideological issues, such as the collaboration conflict, can be understood as an extension of the continuing elite contest for political dominance." (206)

There is a pattern in McCoy's rhetoric. First of all, he seems to contrast "factional loyalties" with ideology (reason), legality, and moral rectitude. Factional man is thus the negative opposite of, or at least the precursor to Enlightenment man. Then he argues, as does May with clientelism, that factionalism is the "determining factor" or the essential driving force in Philippine politics. The drive to protect, consolidate, or expand factional power is the essence of Filipino politics; everything else is empty rhetoric and posturing. For example, the guerrilla hero Tomas Confesor is said to have attacked puppets and collaborators for having "refused to bear the cross to redeem our people," and "having joined the Japanese in inflicting terror on the civil population for refusing to cooperate with the puppet government." McCoy claims to have uncovered the reality of things: this was all hype, Confesor's clever way of tapping religious rhetoric to criticize the rival Zulueta-Roxas faction. (219)

On a more general vein, McCoy claims that historians of Southeast Asia have become less concerned with the traditional approach to questions of colonialism and nationalism. Emphasis has shifted from "the ephemera of an external anticolonial conflict to the continuity of internal development — social, economic and political." "Continuity" in the socio-political realm here refers to the patron-client tie, the supposedly *fundamental mode* in which Filipinos relate vertically. The Philippine-American relationship itself became caught up in patron-client networks. Stanley Karnow would later build on McCoy's conclusion that while reciprocity, fictive kinship, factionalism and the like may be inborn in Filipinos, Americans soon learned to play the game. They got caught up in clientelist networks and thus contributed to subverting the democratic political system they introduced.

McCoy, May, and others from the Philippine social history group emanating largely from the Universities of Michigan and Yale in the late 60s and early 70s, press the view that vertical, patron-client ties link politically passive villagers to municipal and national politicians. However, they acknowledge, because the evidence is overwhelming, that there were aspirations for change, even "independence" (whatever that meant) coming from below. Elite patrons somehow had to address and appropriate such demands. At these critical junctions,

rhetoric is seen as the lubricant. Politicians learned to say what the masses wanted to hear. But what was this rhetoric all about? There isn't much examination of rhetoric, in fact, the assumption being that behind all that talk Filipinos behaved as Filipinos "traditionally" did: in terms of personal loyalties, alliances, and so forth. Opposition groups, including their mass constituents, are constructed along the same lines: they are factional entities. Thus McCoy depicts Pedro Abad Santos, the charismatic leader of the peasant-based Socialist Party in the 1930s, as still, despite the socialist ideological rhetoric, typically Filipino and therefore entangled in personal relationships. McCoy claims to have found evidence that Santos acted as a patron to his party members and that he in turn sought the patronage of sympathetic American officials. The constant, unchanging element in all this is the patron-client-faction network, or clientelist politics. Karnow calls it "tradition."

One of the reasons for such bold assertions on the part of the historians May and McCoy is that social science research — political science in particular — was providing empirically-derived models of Philippine political behavior. One book which they never fail to cite is Carl Lande's classic work, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics*, based on his Harvard PhD dissertation and published in 1965. Norman Owen, editor of *Compadre Colonialism*, admits in fact that his elaboration of the special relationship between American and Filipino *compadres* is derived mainly from the work of David J. Steinberg, Bonifacio Salamanca, and Carl Lande. Because Lande's work has enjoyed hegemonic status in the field of Philippine politics studies, it deserves a detailed examination of its claims, the circumstances underwriting such claims, and the silences in the text itself.

In his preface to this Yale-sponsored publication, Harry Benda — then the guru of Southeast Asian Studies at Yale — lavishes praise on Lande's "pioneering contribution." Philippine democracy, he says, "emerges clearly as a rare example of successful adaptation to an Asian environment of imported Western institutions." Benda identifies the underlying narrative of the work, "modernization," through whose processes Asian environments become plugged into the universal, humanist project of democracy in their own way, shaped by their own pasts. The overt question raised by the book is: How does the Philippines emerge as a "rare example of successful adaptation?" To put it in Karnow's terms, what kind of politics arises out of the interaction between Filipino tradition and American liberal democratic models?

There is nothing unusual about a book that focuses on political

elites, political parties, and elections. The American political science tradition, as many have pointed out, has tended to associate "politics" with "good government," "rational administration" and the practices of nation-building. It has focused on political elites and the institutions which they control. But I want to reorient the whole problematic: rather than seeing Lande as someone who has documented and theorized how Filipinos have adapted to imported or colonial models of nation building, I want to look into how he reads the Philippine data in order to encode it in terms of the modernization model. In his mind he has an image of what the ideal ought to be; it mirrors what is found in "advanced Western democracies." In his fieldwork, however, he is confronted by difference. Lande's theory of Philippine politics is what comes out of his own struggle to accommodate difference to his image of the ideal, smoothly-functioning party-based democracy which I guess is to be found in the United States.

If we pay close attention to Lande's language, the images he employs, and his imagined audience, the play of sameness and difference can be delineated. Philippine politics is built on the American model; it is the politics of the same. But there are key differences and these are put in terms of "peculiarities" in the sense of quirks, oddities, and (to use a further synonym) abnormalities. The word *peculiarity* is a key word in Lande's text, in both a substantive and performative sense. The first peculiarity he notes is that the two political parties are really one. This is to him "the single most distinctive feature of Philippine politics." He spends a lot of time trying to figure this out, for in his mind there ought to be two discrete identities, two choices, two platforms, two programs of government. Sometimes, he says, there appear to be two distinct parties and so on, but upon closer look the two are indistinguishable from each other!

Another peculiarity Lande finds is the phenomenon of "switching" affiliations. People move in and out of parties instead of staying firm and loyal, as it should ideally be. Thus party identity is "unstable." Because there is a lot of movement and switching, power therefore cannot be concentrated in any party center. Rather, Lande observes, power is widely dispersed among local leaders. The loci of power are not to be found in the nationwide political parties, but in local factions and alliances based on personal ties. And so the system is seen to revolve around personal ties (dyads) rather than collective organization. Philippine parties fall far short of being "proper" political parties; they don't function to enable the work of government to be conducted "with a minimum of disorder." Here we find Lande associating

clientelism with disorder. This probably reflects, more than anything else, his Hobbesian view that personal relationships are basically founded upon domination and fear. Individuals being selfish and greedy by nature, dyadic ties can only lead to oppressive, feudal relations. Collective organization and, particularly, good government (a basic function of the state) are needed to regulate social relationships and implement the rule of law. These, Lande finds weak and immature in the Philippines; most political observers today in fact attribute the country's political problems to a "weak state."

Lande seems particularly disturbed by his observation that the private and public domains are not kept separate. A patron-client relationship is a private (in the sense of personal rather than communitarian) relationship, assigned by him to the category of "non-political." Such ties, which constituted the private, nonpolitical mode of relationships antedating the election system (and, by implication, American colonial rule), had infected, been carried over into, the U.S.-introduced political system operating in the public mode. This confounds the private versus public, personal versus impersonal binary divide that underpins the ideal mode of politics. Lande bemoans the "entanglement" of local, private, personal concerns, with conflicts in the national scene. Putting it another way, he states that local factions, built on patron-client ties, have been brought over into the sphere of the political. The problem is that factions have "a range of concern and activity far *exceeding* the sphere of politics proper." The notion of "excess" appears at several places in his work. It is this "excess" that keeps the Philippine system from being identical to the American model from which it derives, the "excess" that upsets the perfect ordering of the system.

From "peculiarities" let us move to another idiom which Lande employs in the text: "fluidity." Philippine politics is composed of a system of "fluid" parties, he says, and this is related to the notions of "switching" affiliations and unstable factional alignments. The inability to "think categorically," to plan for the long haul, and the ease with which changing public "moods" are reflected in voting patterns, all make for a political system that is extremely fluid and unpredictable. I want to call attention here to Lande's language, particularly his feminization of Philippine politics in the use of the terms "moods," "unpredictable," and even "fluid." All of these attributes are paired with their opposites: rigidity, permanence, stability, rationality — which are identified with some aspect or other of "modern" systems operating either in Europe or the U.S. and which are also "masculine."

Naturally, the former attributes, associated with the feminized Philippine system, occupy a position of negativity and lack in relation to the masculine Western and American ideal.

If the Philippine political system consists of pale imitations, distortions, or outright contradictions of the ideal, why doesn't Lande just dismiss it? Far from it, Lande has a stake in the system. For one thing, it is the product of decades of "American tutelage" — it has come to resemble the American "self" while persisting in being different. To resolve this seeming contradiction, Lande locates the Philippine system in the archaic past of a universal history of Progress. In that way it can still be accommodated to a universal project: the development of the "modern state." Specifically, the Philippines is compared to early 18th century England, and to a few backward spots in America like the deep south. We associate this, not just with a certain feudal stage of development, but with pre-Enlightenment politics, before a certain idea of political rationality emerged and proceeded to subsume differences into it.

In one of his many sweeping statements, Lande says that the "great mass of [Filipino] political actors" from voters to a large proportion of the political elite, "are but dimly aware of the major policy decisions a modern state must make" or if they are aware, do not see that the choices government must make are categorical and not to be confused with "primary ties." But "some distance in the future," he hopes, Filipino politicians will be "converted" into "power-shy ideologues or docile public servants devoted to the task of 'aggregating interests.'" From being "dimly aware" of what a modern state must be, presumably they will be come to know better. The "taming of the politicians" will only come when the electorate itself has learned to "think programmatically" and to force its leaders to do the same.

The language of "conversion" and "taming" is familiar. It resonates with the story of Philippine history from the "conversion" to Christianity onward. It resonates with the story of an emergence into the light — thinking "programmatically" means thinking "rationally." Writing in the late 1950s, Lande still speaks like the history textbook writer Barrows and his army of American teachers or "tutors of democracy." Filipino subjectivities were to be transformed through education in order to prepare them for citizenship in a modern state. Lande's discourse fits in perfectly with that of conversion and tutelage, except of course that (as a presumably passive academic observer) he merely "hopes" for this change rather than actively intervening as the

former colonialists or “tutors” had done. But is this so—is Lande merely being a passive observer? Or can we see his work as performative, a text that exerts some force in the political scene? Certainly the facility with which his work has been harnessed into overtly political tracts like Glenn May’s polemics against Filipino nationalist and Marxist scholars, suggests that the book itself is one more node of power in the Philippine political scene.

Let us go back to Lande’s text. Aside from resembling early 18th century England, the Philippine system, he says, also resembles politics in many other “developing countries” of today. This is provided, however, that their peoples haven’t been subjected to “massive doses of indoctrination by modern-minded leaders, whether Marxists or others, who want to reform their habits and teach them to think and act categorically.” (107) So change is possible, or can be accelerated, through massive indoctrination by Marxists — the named competitor — and others (there are allusions to Sukarno). One wonders, though, if Lande’s work isn’t in fact an attempt to shore up a construction of a “normal” Philippine politics that is already under threat. Radical political parties, he says, have appeared and partly succeeded, but their “impermanence” or “brief periods of existence” cannot be explained away by charges of persecution or the use of superior force against peasants. He repeatedly states that class-based appeals haven’t and won’t succeed because of the essential, particularistic nature of Philippine politics — that is, the primacy of relations of patrons, clients and factions that negate “class feelings” that, he admits, do emerge from time to time.

All this does not necessarily imply that Lande was wrong while his shadowy rivals offering class-based paradigms were correct. It is enough to point out that Lande’s construction of Philippine politics, through repetition or intertextual citation, or even its Yale Southeast Asia Council/Harry Benda endorsement, came to be regarded as a more faithful representation of Philippine political behavior. This “truth,” however, was in fact established against competing interpretations. It emerged at a time when the “showcase of democracy” was beginning to reveal its cracks and a new intervention was needed. Allusions are made to changes taking place in Lande’s time. Towards the end of the book he warns that “new Filipino industrialists,” “nationalistic intellectuals,” and “a welfare-minded peasantry” are having a “growing influence” on the administration of the two political parties. This spells danger, a threat. Denied access, these new forces might “suddenly make their presence known through

extraconstitutional outbursts of mass violence.” Lande fears that the American-style party system will end up *not* being the sole vehicle of politics. Thus far, the “frustration of the deprived reveals itself mainly in a widespread but directionless undercurrent of dissatisfaction with ‘politics’ among the electorate at large.” Or this frustration is expressed through a disposition to “throw out” the current holders of office at frequent intervals and to “give a chance” to other politicians and their followers. He consoles himself with the thought that “practically no one thinks of remedies in categorical terms” — that all this is emotional and “directionless.” Nonetheless, the “danger” clearly exists that some person or party will really get to overturn the system.

A couple of pages later, in the final chapter of the book, Lande makes his strongest allusions to what his clientelist model of Philippine politics is being established against. “Thoughtful Filipinos,” he says, are among the first to see the shortcomings in their party system. They can see as well as he can that there is no real choice, that there are no coherent programs, and so forth. But Filipino critics, he bemoans, tend to overlook the advantages of this system. It minimizes hostility and conflict between various sectors of the public, between diverse regions and social classes. And this is an asset Filipinos should exploit. We are in an age and in a part of the world, Lande says, where “the rivalry of classes, regions and communal groups has often played into the hands of those who would abandon attempts to create institutions of constitutional democracy in favor of the institution of dictatorial rule either by a single strong party or by a strong individual leader.”

So, in Lande’s view, no matter how flawed it is, the Philippine party system should be the sole vehicle of politics: first of all because it is posited as being naturally “Filipino,” a political expression of basic cultural traits; and secondly, because adopting the increasingly available alternatives spells disaster, a total break with the American tutor. The implication is that the kind of politics offered by totalitarian rivals is unFilipino, and not the fruit of a historical process, i.e., the period of American colonial tutelage. Early American scholars like Dean Worcester and David Barrows established and disseminated a certain model of Philippine society in order to facilitate and justify the pacification of Filipinos. Discursively, Lande’s thesis furthers the colonial project. The war he was embroiled in, however, was rather different.

The critical decade that Lande speaks of, roughly 1955 (when he was researching the thesis) to 1965 (the publication of the book), saw the confluence of several developments in politics and the academe.

The defeat of the *Huk* rebellion in the early fifties and the outlawing of the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) in 1957 saw a number of talented intellectuals — either former members of the PKP or sympathizers of the *Huks* — take the struggle for what they called “true independence” into the classrooms and the pages of newspapers and weekly magazines. There was also a significant group of civil libertarians and nationalists who, without necessarily embracing Marxist ideas, were critical of the continued American military and economic presence in the country. In an international environment of assertive nationalisms and the Cold War, it was felt by an increasing number of Filipinos that the independence granted to them by the U.S. in 1946 was quite meaningless. This view, however, was not shared by the vast majority. The state and its educational system, both offsprings of the American colonial period, seemed committed to reproducing an evolutionary view of change with both Spain and America (and their native wards) as key actors. A re-education process, it was felt, had to be undertaken.

At the very core of this struggle to “de-colonize” the Filipino mentality was the dissemination of alternative histories and biographies. The party politics of the time contributed to these intellectual changes. From the late 1950s, competition among top politicians required them to hire the best writers, bankroll publications, and even sponsor meetings and organizations. As long as a “freewheeling democracy” existed — a function of belonging to the “Free World” — political patronage guaranteed a space for radical intellectuals. For example, they rallied around President Diosdado Macapagal who was fond of using the term “unfinished revolution” in his writings and speeches. Macapagal attached limited and rather evolutionary meanings to this slogan; nevertheless, it could be read and recycled in a variety of ways. In magazine articles, conferences and colloquia, it came to have anti-imperialist, neutralist and socialist meanings. From this period originated the radical student movement that was to confront Macapagal’s successor, Marcos, specially from 1969 on.

Philippine politics, then, in Lande’s time was a site of anxiety about the threat of Communism. The perception that there was a threat from the region enabled certain images and metaphors to gain influence. The so-called “domino theory” is well-known. But I suggest that “patron-client-factions” is another. Lande’s work — and *Compadre Colonialism* as well — ought to be seen in the context of mainly Marxist-nationalist challenges to the postwar construction of history and politics. There are other matrices of power within which Lande’s research was done and his book published: the “special” Philippine-American

relationship, his academic training, his close friendship with senators and congressmen, his race, even his gender. All of these have to be considered critically in discussing the birth, or should I say rebirth, of the clientelist paradigm in the 1960s.

Lest we think that the problems in Lande's 1960s text have been surmounted in more recent scholarship, let me jump to 1993 and the appearance of an enormous, 541-page volume titled *An Anarchy of Families: State and Society in the Philippines*. This book project was envisioned in the light of Marcos' downfall and the need to explain the swift restoration of the old oligarchy under Cory Aquino's purportedly revolutionary (i.e., "people power") government. According to editor Alfred McCoy, the book responds to the crying need for detailed empirical studies of political families and their exemplary (or notorious) leaders, in order to offset the tendency of most Filipino accounts to be "more hagiography than history." The almost blanket criticism of Filipino writings is striking. McCoy, as the impartial, impassionate outsider looking in, presumes to be getting at the reality beneath the heroic claims or pretensions of nationalist historiography. This "reality" is the familism, localism, corruption, and violence that essentially underly Filipino political behavior.

McCoy draws on Latin American Studies to provide him with a suitable template for understanding the Philippines: the "weak state and powerful political oligarchs" combining to make the familial perspective on national history relevant. By "family," McCoy does not mean household. Rather, it is the kinship network that is mobilized in politics and feeds into the "paradoxical relationship between weak state and strong society" that one finds rampant in the "Third World." In the extreme, families even turned the state into their own "fiefdoms." Latin American Studies notwithstanding, there is something familiar in all this. These are Lande's views employing slightly different jargon.

In McCoy's introduction we get the image of the rational, modernizing, disciplinary state/centre — originating in colonial rule — being resisted, challenged and eventually corrupted by provincial forces exhibiting feudal characteristics such as despotism, family-centredness, and the routine use of violence (warlordism and thugery). The state/centre signifies the workings of enlightened reason, democracy, capitalism, order and the public sphere, whilst the provincial countryside signifies a premodern condition where particularistic interests of family, clan and faction prevail. McCoy depicts the Philippines as persisting in a kind of historical time-warp, unable to make that

leap into the fully modern. That is why it could produce the grotesque figure of Ferdinand Marcos, “a politician who combined a statesman’s vision with the violence of a provincial politician.” The net result has been “anarchy,” a lack of order, perhaps even a state of irrationality. Anarchy bespeaks of violence because contending forces are let loose amongst themselves. The front-cover photo is of a “warlord” surrounded by bodyguards. This is what “family” signifies. Against it is the order and rationality of the state. In the Philippines, disorderly families have hijacked the high purpose of the state.

Perhaps we need to be reminded at this point that one justification for the U.S. conquest of the Philippines was the claim that the First Republic was not a modern state, that it was led by a warlord (Aguinaldo), and that the revolutionary armies were nothing but *cacique*-led gangs. Is it surprising, then, that McCoy sees American colonial rule as a positive, modernizing project? He stresses that through the police and other colonial state mechanisms the Americans were able to keep at bay predatory provincial politicians. This harks back to the U.S. military argument, ca. 1900, that they were rescuing the masses from domination by their local strongmen. Why so many resisted the U.S. takeover, to the loss of nearly half million lives, is not the sort of question the book addresses, although there is a hint of another perspective in Resil Mojares’ chapter which I will discuss later. Just like Karnow, McCoy repeatedly points out that “cunning” Filipino politicians, who combined landed wealth and local office, managed to frustrate the ideals of the American colonial state and later on plundered the independent Philippine state. He insists that the Lopez brothers, for example, could have been nothing else but “master manipulators of the state, operators without peer within their respective realms.” Other works (coincidentally, perhaps, written by Filipinos) that have something positive to say about the character and personality of some of these elite politicians are dismissed by McCoy as hagiography. History is made to demonstrate how the naturally base instincts of man prevail without a strong state or a modern form of rationality to tame them.

Michael Cullinane’s chapter on the Durano family pretty much adheres to McCoy’s paradigm. The warlord whose photo graces the book’s cover could very well have been Ramon Durano, who used violence to establish political control over Danao City and deliver votes to national politicians. Cullinane seeks to analyze “the mechanisms [the family] uses to maintain political and economic control.” The story that emerges is a perfect example of the politics of “guns, goons and

gold." Durano is depicted as holding total power over his "fiefdom." Only his "national patron" Marcos could keep him in check. "People power" was certainly ineffective against this "entrenched and distant warlord."

Like McCoy, Cullinane is dismissive of the native's rhetoric. He brands as lies Durano's claims about caring for his people and constituency. The "truth" about the people of Danao is that they are helpless victims of warlord power; at best they are portrayed as hopelessly mired in "a culture of dependency." But what are the dimensions of this "culture of dependency?" Does it offer an alternative view of human behavior and social relationships from Hobbes's and Locke's? Can it reveal a form of power that circulates within society — limiting, localizing or even enabling the warlord's power? No further explanations are offered. And what is gained by simply heaping scorn upon Durano's later embracement of religion, his "awkward identification with Christ," his philanthropy? Cullinane brushes aside the "rhetoric" and from his social science standpoint claims to uncover the "real" reason for the native's retirement gestures: here, he says, was the ex-warlord, in a typical Filipino manner, making a deal with God (the "final patron") to ensure passage to heaven. Here the tropes of Oriental despotism and clientelism are interwoven. (This reification of family politics, however, makes it difficult for Cullinane to explain why Durano's son, Deo, turned against his father, accusing the family of abusing its power.)

John Sidel's study of the Montanos of Cavite is another variation on the McCoy theme. Lopez-types the Montanos aren't; there are limits to their rise because they lack a solid base in proprietary wealth to fall back on. Sidel proposes a comparison not with royalty (they don't form a "dynasty") but with the "big man" phenomenon in precolonial Southeast Asia, particularly the "man of prowess" explored by Oliver Wolters. The "big man" is transposed into the figure of Justiniano Montano, a provincial warlord who exploited opportunities in the postwar political situation.

The Montanos are located within a generalized situation of small-town clans dominating Cavite since the late Spanish period. Sidel paints a fairly detailed nineteenth-century scene of competing clans and "big men," a picture which deliberately undermines the nationalist portrayal of Aguinaldo and his officials. Instead of revolutionaries they appear as "big men" spearheading local political machines, precursors of the "nationalist" politicians of later eras who really were

warlords. In another assault on mainstream Filipino historiography, Sidel sees the “watchful friars” functioning just like the U.S. police in the next century: as a check on the disorderly activities of the “big men.” The continued lawlessness in the region in the early years of U.S. occupation is attributed to “banditry” under the aegis of powerful clans, rather than continuations of resistance against American occupation. So for Sidel, Macario Sakay *was* a bandit, not a hero. One wonders, however, why the bandits bothered to wear smart uniforms and proclaim revolutionary Republican ideals. Again, in the manner of McCoy and Cullinane, such rhetoric is dismissed in favor of some apparent knowledge by Sidel of the “hard realities” behind them — a knowledge actually claimed by U.S. pacification authorities nearly a century ago.

What Sidel shares intimately with McCoy and Cullinane is the propensity to spot a particularistic, familial, tie in just about every Filipino political relationship they encounter. It is not difficult to detect their essentializing strategies. They work through binaries: family versus state, particularistic versus nationalistic, violence versus law, clientelism versus genuine democracy, where the former is the negative pole. The nationalist agenda is made to look plain silly in the avalanche of classmates, friends, relatives, bodyguards, proteges, and patrons all out to further their narrow, selfish, Hobbesian agendas. One cannot, in the view of McCoy, Cullinane, and Sidel, simultaneously occupy, or oscillate between, the public (i.e., nationalist) and private (local and familial) spheres. And there appears no other meaning to the “dyadic” or personal relationships engendered by this politics except a kind of political backwardness, sometimes called feudalism.

The book, *An Anarchy of Families*, is not, however, a seamless whole. Among the eight chapters are a few which resist the essentializing strategies of the editor. One of them stands out, in my view, as a model for future scholarship: Resil Mojares’ chapter on the Osmeña family of Cebu. In his introduction, one senses a distancing move exemplified by such passages as, “[the Osmeñas] don’t conform to certain stereotypes about political kingpins, or ‘warlords,’ in the Philippines.” Based in Cebu City, Mojares expresses concern about the preoccupation with why Philippine politics fails to conform to ideal patterns, the focus on “rulers, leaders, and big men,” on their practice of terrorism and fraud, their “subordination of issues to particularistic concerns,” and so forth. In fact, he notes, these kinds of activities fall within the perceived category of *pulitika*, the politics of stratagems and spoils — electoral battles included — dominated by the elite. This field of action certainly

dominates politics but it is also constantly changing in scope and meaning, and by no means does it exhaust the multifold ways in which politics is practiced.

Despite their dominance, elite families and the unusual men who publicly lead them are not in total control of the field of *pulitika*. Political families do not move in a void, Mojares reminds us; they are also *made* by the community. Rhetoric *is* to be taken seriously because (here Mojares cites Gramsci), “parties and politicians propagate conceptions of the world and organize the spontaneous consent of the ruled.” Hegemonic domination, nevertheless, “is far from total.” Followers and audiences “can reinterpret and negate,” and that’s why there is political instability. Mojares avoids the trap of subsuming the politics of the Osmeña family into the family (private) versus state (public) binary with the hierarchies this suggests. The Osmeñas negotiate the divide and render it meaningless. They “skillfully combine public benefit with private gain.” They “are not only instrumentalists but true believers in the precepts of liberal democracy and free enterprise.” Yes, they can engage in the politics of thuggery and bribery, but they also speak and act in ways that animate their audiences and evoke consent. Political power is not just a repressive force emanating from above; it circulates throughout the social body and in fact enables the rule of the big men.

Mojares’ chapter points towards alternatives to the Orientalist construction of Philippine politics. But the discursive hold of Lande’s “clientelism and Philippine party politics” or McCoy’s “anarchy of Filipino families,” based as it is on a tradition of scholarship dating from the pacification era, is going to be hard to break away from. An example of how scholarship can be caught in this discursive net, despite the best of intentions, is Benedict Anderson’s “*Cacique* Democracy in the Philippines.” His first sentence is, “... President Aquino told a most instructive lie... that her great-grandfather had been a poor immigrant from southeast China’s Fukien province.” The truth, Anderson reveals, is that she “is a member of one of the wealthiest and most powerful dynasties within the Filipino oligarchy.”

In fact, great grandfather Cojuangco was a relatively poor immigrant who made it rich. Anderson needs to begin his essay with an image of a dissimulating oriental, and his subsequent procedure is to reduce the history of the Filipino elite to the formation and development of a “Chinese mestizo,” “*cacique*,” “dynastic,” “nationalist,” “collaborationist,” “corrupt,” “feudal” oligarchy. Writing in the after-

math of the fall of Marcos (“the Supreme *Cacique*”), there is in Anderson, as in Karnow, a desire to construct a history and a Filipino “tradition” that will explain the present. Anderson identifies that tradition in “political dynasties” which are precisely what “make Filipino politics so spectacularly different from those of any other country in Southeast Asia.”

Anderson’s essay depends heavily not just on the work of the social historians (e.g., Wickberg, Owen, McCoy, May, Cullinane, Sidel) but on Latin American models. The paradigm of world historical stages is applied to the Philippines, with the Chinese mestizo social and political behavior falling all too neatly into the category of a backward feudalism. We see shades of Sidel in Anderson’s depiction of the Philippine revolution as led by mestizos and *caudillos* (cf. *caudillaje*: leadership, tyranny, bossism) who, he imagines, would have set themselves up as independent warlords had not the American forces arrived. Literally at the stroke of a pen, the revolution and resistance to U.S. occupation cease to exist, becoming instead an anarchy of ambitious families. Anderson’s attempt to racialize and “feudalize” the Filipino leadership sounds in fact like the efforts at representation by American observers and pacification authorities at the turn of the century. U.S. conquest became, at that time, a matter of civilizing need. Anderson carries the argument further: indigenous politics during the American colonial regime is reduced to juvenile *cacique* contests in what he calls “a civilized ‘ring’ sternly refereed by the Americans.” Independence in 1946 restores the country to a state of premodern disorder, a condition of warlord domination of national politics that makes inevitable renewed American intervention in the 1950s (e.g., their backing of a non-oligarchic President Magsaysay), and the appearance of a Marcos in the 1960s.

The problem is not so much that the saga of socio-political development presented by Anderson is a total misrepresentation, but that this narrative is derivative of the research produced by scholars I mentioned earlier, and has its roots in colonial writing itself. Curiously, unlike in Anderson’s study of Javanese and even Thai politics, there is no attempt to describe Filipino elite politics in terms of its own categories. No study of “rhetoric” is attempted. Anderson tries to emulate Jose Rizal and Nick Joaquin in their relentless criticism of the Filipino ruling class, but his efforts are hampered by the lack of complexity in his depiction of the elite, his reductionism, his subsuming of the elite into a race-and-class category. Rizal’s sensitive pen, in contrast, brought out the variety of positions and experiences produced by this elite.

I have tried in these lectures to show how a certain kind of politics, which has not really been understood (and therefore critiqued) on its own terms by American observers, initially was constructed as a “problem” that needed fixing up by the U.S. pacification forces. In my first lecture I spoke of how colonial textbooks wrote about the revolution of 1896 in order to contain its dangerous implications, to reduce it to lack and failure. I spoke of how Filipinos were represented as a juvenile race unable to distinguish between the private and public domains, thus the need for American fathering. In my second lecture, I focused on the disciplinary strategies that accompanied pacification. Filipinos were to be known and reconstituted in the light of American and *ilustrado* desires and fears. Physical movement and the switching of identities were to be contained and arrested. A proper and modern citizenry was to be developed, fitted for future independence in a democratic state. Throughout the process of “re-forming” and interacting with their colonial wards, American officials encoded the behavior they encountered in terms of their ideas of what modern subjects (epitomized by an idealized “American people”) should be.

More recent studies have since been largely attached to the preoccupations of these colonial officials, since the English-language archive is dominated by their voices. The key questions still are: how has Philippine politics been the same yet the other of the universal—read American—norm? Where to locate it within the manichean extremes of private versus public, family versus state, anarchy versus order, warlords versus statesmen? Philippine history and politics encoded in terms of such binaries only reproduces colonial discourse, and will forever continue to represent lack and failure.

Let me end by quoting once more from the blurb on the cover of the Philippine edition (Solidarity) of *Compadre Colonialism*:

The authors individually analyze specific historical problems in factual terms, yet they all return to the great central questions of cooperation and conflict that haunted not only the ‘American period’ in the Philippines, but also the post-war years.

True, but even beyond those “great central questions,” I would suggest, is the question of America itself, how it defines itself, which has haunted representations of its colonial “other” — the Philippines — from 1898 on. This is the ghost that haunted those “five young scholars from the University of Michigan” who sought to strike

out on a new course in 1971. It continues to haunt every page of Karnow's book, and it subtly bedevils even modern scholarship on the Philippines.

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