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BUREAUCRATIC THINKING: A STUDY OF BLOCK DEVELOPMENT
OFFICERS OF RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH IN INDIA

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an examination and analysis of bureaucratic perceptions towards development and democracy. It is an effort to provide greater understanding of the individual bureaucrat in his performance as an agent of change. It is also an attempt to build an empirical base for formulating meaningful propositions about Indian bureaucratic behavior. It is addressed to the following research goals:

1. To delineate the major dimensions of thinking and perceptions of the bureaucrats
2. To place the individual bureaucrat in his work and social setting
3. To investigate the relationship between the social background of bureaucrats and their perceptions
4. To develop typologies of bureaucrats in the total developmental context.

Data for this study were based on a survey questionnaire administered to a random sample of Block Development Officers (BDOs) of the two states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. BDOs were chosen because they are local administrators coming in direct contact with the people and political leadership. They are also important functionaries of Community Development Administration and are thus agents of change.

We found that bureaucrats in our study came from a rural and parochial background and showed no evidence of elitist

character. In their social aspirations, they showed a strong indication of a desire to move from rural to urban and enter the urban elite. We found that rural background did not lead to rural affinity. If given a choice, they would not join the government service again and also would not ask their children to follow them in their governmental profession.

The general views of bureaucrats were marked by a widespread suspicion of the social environment and intense hostility towards the politicians. They perceive common people as lacking in ability to discern their own good and easily swayed by parochial influences. They are corruption to be rising in the villages with the advent of democracy. But the bureaucrats hold themselves in high regard and are confident that if they had power a well administered state will emerge. They display, therefore, a desire to monopolize all power in their own hands in order to be effective. We have classified such bureaucrats as 'Power Monopolizers.'

BDOs are pessimistic and widely believe that there is a progressive deterioration in the general conditions and administration. We have classified these bureaucrats as 'past oriented.'

Seven major dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions emerged from factor analysis. They were named Cynicism, Power Monopolizer, Decision Maker, Departmental Skepticism, Hierarchical Barriers, Democratism and Trust. From the factors of Democratism and Trust, which form one group, to the other

five factors, which form a group by themselves, the wide Trust/Cynicism syndrome is tapped. Political perceptions and personal perceptions were related.

Socio-cultural variables failed to predict effective variation in the above dimensions. However, we found that Technical Education and Seniority were more important predictor variables. Both canonical and regression analyses demonstrated that Negative Seniority and Cynicism, and Technical Education and Power Monopolizer were associated. We have suggested that these perceptions may be better explained by the socializing experiences of the bureaucratic institutions themselves.

Discriminant analysis demonstrated that bureaucrats of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh differed significantly along these dimensions. Profiles showed that Rajasthan bureaucrats scored higher on Power Monopolizer dimension. This difference could be possibly due to differing career patterns, educational background and political heritage in the two states.

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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

Introduction

Development without a well organized and effective bureaucracy is not conceivable in the developing nations.¹ Heavy emphasis has been placed on the role of administration in these countries for it is now unanimously recognized that administration is a neglected factor in economic development and that the machinery for implementing development programs is tremendously inadequate.² Paradoxically, however, wherever bureaucracies were well established from the colonial era they are deeply resented by the political leaders. Usually, because of the past colonial record where the bureaucrats symbolized all that imperialism stood for a deep cleavage between the political and the administrative elite has prevailed.³ Lack of a high rate of perceivable progress does

¹ For an excellent review of the literature on role of bureaucracy and its relation to the general problems of development in the new nations see Ferrel Heady, Public Administration A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); see also Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

² In an early article Riggs maintains that public administration and economic change have an interdependent relationship: see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1964), pp. 243-59.

³ Competition for power is an important aspect of this cleavage: see Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1962); Fred R. von der Nehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964); LaPalombara, op. cit.

not help matters and the poor performance of development programs is easily blamed on bureaucracy against which a detailed catalogue of complaints is built up.⁴

In India the nationalist leaders realized very soon that plans beautifully prepared and contemplated become meaningless visions unless effectively carried out and implemented. This led to increasing attention to bureaucratic problems and the government has maintained an impressive output of studies and reports.⁵ Varied conclusions were reached but the main thrust of the arguments of most observers was that there existed a dichotomy between bureaucratic dispositions and needs of development today. Though Paul Appleby judged the government of India "among the dozen or so most advanced governments in the world" he also pointed out that it was "designed to serve the relatively simple interests of an occupying power" and that it was not adequate for an independent India and also that "personnel administration has too much feudalistic heritage."⁶ Hoselitz,

⁴ Leonard Binder, Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 337-42; David Hapgood and John D. Montgomery, Policies for Promoting Agricultural Development (Cambridge Mass.: MIT, 1965).

⁵ The Five Year Plans in India have placed great stress on administration whether in the Community Development program or in running a huge public enterprise unit like the Hindustan Steel. For a detailed bibliography see Administrative Reforms Number, Indian Journal of Public Administration IX, 3, 1963.

⁶ Paul H. Applebey, Public Administration in India Report of a Survey (Delhi: Government of India Publications, 1953); pp. 8 and 14.

discussing the problems of economic growth, has remarked "anyone coming in contact with government bureaucracy in India will encounter forms of behavior which are not logical in the context of modern government of an independent state but are survivals from the time when India was a colony administered by the foreigners."⁷ Taylor, Ensminger and their associates discussing the sociological problems of rural administration in India have commented that "...the inadequacies of Indian bureaucracy are not due to the fact that it is a bureaucracy but due to a considerable extent to the fact that it carries too much baggage from the past."⁸ Snowiss has suggested that the new administrators have not developed a new tradition but continue to draw strength from the ICS tradition which is not suitable to the administrative needs of modern India.⁹ While Tinker has concluded from his observations that much of the British Indian Civil Service tradition has been adopted by the administrators of

⁷ Bert F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth," in Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development, ed. Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1961).

⁸ Carl Taylor and Douglas Ensminger and associates, India's Roots of Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1966); p. 579.

⁹ Leo M. Snowiss, "The Education and Role of Superior Civil Service in India," Indian Journal of Public Administration, VII, 1, 1961; p. 24.

today,¹⁰ LaPalombara has summed up the arguments that in the context of political and economic development

public administrators steeped in the tradition of Indian Civil Service may be less useful as developmental administrators than those who are not so rigidly tied to the notions of bureaucratic status, hierarchy and impartiality. The economic development of a society, particularly if it is to be implemented by the massive intervention of the public sector, requires a breed of bureaucrats different (e.g. more free wheeling, less adhering to administrative forms, less attached to the importance of hierarchy and seniority) from the type of man of law and order.¹¹

The critical appraisals of the Indian bureaucracy and its behavior coming from the commentators above seem to rest on a simplistic cause and effect approach. Most of them are really stressing the point that India bureaucrats do not carry orientations that are production oriented and then are finding the British administrative legacy as the single most important cause of the phenomenon. In under-developed countries, however, it is not uncommon to find bureaucratic orientations that are not consonant with the requirements of developmental activity. For, frequently, much of bureaucratic pursuit is directed towards goals other than

¹⁰ Hugh Tinker, "The Village in the Framework of Development," in Administration and Economic Development, ed. by Ralph Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (Durham, N.D.: Duke University Press, 1963).

¹¹ Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit., p. 12.

achievement of program objectives.¹² But, of interest, is the inference that the British administrative legacy is the most important source of such phenomenon.

The British administrative legacy under attack consists usually of the functional orientations of the British Indian Civil Servants.¹³ The Indian Civil Service which really ruled the country was a closely knit group often referred to as the "steel frame." It was a highly select cadre which allowed Indians into its fold only after the First World War.¹⁴ All the senior positions in government were held by them and they perpetuated the myth of a powerful and strict imperialist power however remote. Braibanti has pointed out that among the foremost characteristics of ICS (Indian Civil Service) tradition, which dominated the ethos of bureaucracy were the assumptions of Platonic guardianship and of being

¹² See, for example, the characterization of administration in under-developed countries in Heady, op. cit. p. 71.

¹³ The structural aspects of the British legacy have not come under so severe an attack and have largely survived. Braibanti has pointed out that reform in administration has been based on modifying the system rather than abandoning it. See Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," in Administration and Economic Development op. cit. p. 9.

¹⁴ The ICS examinations were first held in India in 1922. Before that year, Indians desirous of joining the Service had to go to London to appear at the examinations. For details about the recruitment and training of the ICS see N.C. Roy, Civil Service in India (Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1960).

men of superior virtue.¹⁵ In practice what this really meant was they believed in their own superiority over the common masses and took upon themselves the monopoly of understanding and providing for public good. This belief manifested itself in "mai baap" administration wherein they assumed the role of parents and guardians of the population. This led automatically to distrust in non-bureaucratic institutions that were willing to share in the responsibilities. A feeling of monopoly of virtue lent further to the complex of superiority so despised by the Indian nationalist movement.

Together with this orientation, a premium was placed on quick decision, independent and firm action, not unlike the field military administration.¹⁶ Memoirs of former ICS officers are replete with romantic descriptions of their decision making abilities exercised sometimes in most difficult circumstances. Independence and impartiality were the cherished goals and many a district officer prided himself in having disagreed with his Secretariate colleagues.¹⁷

Finally, maintenance of law and order enjoyed absolute

¹⁵ See Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections...", op. cit.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ S. K. Chettur, The Steel Frame and I (Bombay: Asia, 1962).

priority among the ICS.¹⁸ The ICS officer was in charge of the district and he considered internal peace crucial to good administration in his area. His esteem among his group depended largely on how he performed his duties in this sphere. Lack of initiative or lack of judgment in face of an unruly mob or failure to exercise authority to quell a riot were the most despised qualities an officer could possess.

Thus the heritage from which the present Indian bureaucrats are accused of drawing their strength has been a collection of such type of orientations so aptly summed up in two categories:

that in exercising imperial authority maintenance of law and order enjoyed absolute priority attention and that members of the ICS were responsible and considered themselves responsible to themselves.¹⁹

Together with these heavy indictments of carrying on such a tradition and legacy so grossly inadequate to the needs of democracy and development after independence India's political leaders placed tremendous demands of excellence on Indian bureaucrats.²⁰ In all the Five Year Plans heavy

¹⁸ David C. Potter, "Bureaucratic Change in India," in Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition ed. by Ralph Braibanti Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966); p. 143; see also S. S. Khera, District Administration in India (Bombay: Asia, 1964).

¹⁹ David Potter, op. cit.

²⁰ Reinhard Bendix, Nation building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley, 1964) pp. 215-301.

reliance has been put on the administration to achieve developmental targets. With the initiation of Community Development Programs for rural upliftment administrators were asked to elicit rural cooperation. The administrators were told that the administrative orientation must shift completely from making decisions and giving orders to helping the people make decisions.²¹ Nehru had already said

I am quite sure that no new order can be built up in India so long as the spirit of the ICS pervades our administration and our public services. That spirit of authoritarianism...cannot coexist with freedom.... Therefore it seems essential that the ICS and similar services must disappear completely as such, before we can start real work on a new order.²²

He now asked the official to develop the qualities of a popular leader.²³

The intricacies of the assignment given to the administrators were best expressed in a statement by a former Union Home Minister of India, Mr. G. B. Pant. He pointed out that officials cannot work with an attitude of condescension towards the villagers as "superstitious men who deserve contempt" for

²¹ Douglas Ensminger, "Democratic Decentralization A New Administrative Challenge," Indian Journal of Public Administration, VII, 3, 1961; p. 293.

²² Jawahar Lal Nehru, Autobiography (London: Meuthen, rev. ed. 1953); p. 282.

²³ "Building up a New India," Kurukshetra, (Delhi, Govt. of India Publications, 1967 rev. ed.) p. 6.

To serve the villagers, you have to identify yourself with rural life; to find joy in the air you breathe and consciousness of the fact you are engaged in the act of building of a new society. You have to train people in the art of life and in the art of living. You have to see that they move, they move onward and they are not pushed onward artificially. Let them learn the art which will enable them to secure for themselves what we want them to possess. Unless you try to influence without imposing something from above, your success will be short lived.²⁴

The whole thing is not a "mercenary undertaking." The officials are told to identify themselves with the villagers. "You have to work in the filth and the cowdung and out of it create a clean and wholesome atmosphere."²⁵ Such exhortations are easy to find and the writings and speeches at the meetings of Indian Institute of Public Administration are revealing in this regard.²⁶

It is intriguing, however, that even though such comprehensive indictments have taken place and a judgment passed on the behavioral orientations of the present bureaucracy, little serious effort has been directed toward establishing an empirical base for such propositions. Little effort has also been made to measure the extent of absorption of the new

²⁴ G.B. Pant, "The Right Approach to the People," Kurukshetra, op. cit. p. 59.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 60.

²⁶ See particularly C. Rajagopalachari, "The Good Administrator," Indian Journal of Pacific Administration, I, 2, 1956, pp. 1-6; N.R. Pillai, "The New Civil Servant," Indian Journal of Pacific Administration, I, 1, 1955; p. 1; Jawhar Lal Nehru, "Towards a Dynamic Administration," Indian Journal of Pacific Administration, V, 2, 1959; pp. 129-34.

values adumbrated above. Enough systematic data to describe and analyze the perceptions, attitudes and behavior of Indian bureaucrats is lacking. Braibanti with his associates has provided initial scholarly work in analyzing the content of the administrative legacy and has provided invaluable insight into the ethos and dispositions of the British Indian Civil Service.²⁷ These studies are primarily of historical nature though attempts have been made to explain the current traditions in terms of the old.

A few excellent inroads have been made into the analysis of socio-economic background of the recruits to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), successors to the ICS. Trivedi and Rao have done a pioneering work in the field and it has been supplemented by some others.²⁸ These attempts have been directed at investigating the elitist nature of the higher civil service and its recruitment pattern. Evidence has been collected to support the view that a marked shift has occurred from the picture of the ICS but the IAS is still dominated by an urban and an higher income background with biases of region and type of education.

²⁷ See the various writings and volumes edited by Ralph Braibanti already cited.

²⁸ R.K. Trivedi and D.N. Rao, "Regular recruits to the IAS--A Study," Journal of the National Academy of Administration, V, 1960; pp. 50-80. A recent contribution has been that of C.P. Bhambhri, "Higher Civil Service in India," Journal of Administration Overseas, VIII, 4, 1969; pp. 363-69.

Eldersveld and others have made an attempt to find out whether bureaucratic contacts with the common masses in India are functional and relevant to socio-economic change.²⁹ One of the important conclusions of their study suggests that "despite their social background, long tenure and limited training, majority of these officials (in Community Development) are incorporating welfare-state and public service perceptions of their roles."³⁰ They came to this conclusion from a survey of village and urban officials in and around Delhi and an intensive study of the administrative system of three blocks.

Only recently has an attempt been made to study bureaucrats in their own work setting. Taub, in an excellent study, has investigated bureaucratic attitudes towards work, community and their own group in Bhubanashwar, a small state capital in India.³¹ The bureaucrats under study were the members of the IAS. He has identified sources of stress and strain on Indian administrators and in terms of the demands placed on the Service feels that "no bureaucratic organization can carry so heavy a load and acquit itself well under

²⁹ S. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A.P. Barnabas, The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Society (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresmann, 1968).

³⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

³¹ Richard P. Taub, Bureaucrats Under Stress (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1969).

democratic conditions."³²

Focus of the Present Study

With these studies as immediate background, our intention is to move the focus away from the IAS. As can be seen from the illustrations from above, the major focus of attention of scholars of Indian bureaucracy has been the ICS and its successors the IAS. Subordinate units of bureaucracy have received scant notice.³³ We acknowledge its (IAS) importance in the total political system but we feel it is more important to turn our attention to those bureaucrats who are easily identified as developmental and are actively involved in eliciting public cooperation for developmental tasks. Our concern has been directed towards functionaries of Community Development (C.D.) Administration which has a greater contemporary relevance in terms of major responsibility in overall development of India. The administrator at the base of the hierarchy is the Block Development Officer (BDO) who is surely a vital cog in the system. He is at the "cutting edge of government interaction with the citizen."³⁴

³² Ibid., p. 203.

³³ This may have also something to do with the prime attention being given to national political systems at the neglect of the state and local politics. See the argument in Myron Weiner, "Political Development in the Indian States," in State Politics in India ed. by Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968); pp. 4-6.

³⁴ The phrase has been borrowed from Eldersveld, op. cit.

and moulds and influences public attitudes towards development in a significant way.³⁵ It is also at the local level that the hardest core of traditions and beliefs are found and policies undergo their most severe test for implementation. It is also here that economic development programs seem to falter and obstacles to change appear to be insurmountable.

Thus, to provide immediate relevance and a contemporary context of development we have chosen to study Block Development Officers of the Community Development Program. This program is the single most important vehicle of government initiated change. The government has devoted great attention to it and its hopes and expectations of the fulfillment of the development needs are largely hinged on the performance of this massive effort.

³⁵ LaPalombara in a similar discussion of public attitudes toward government that bureaucrats help to inculcate or fortify, writes "for the great mass of people in most countries, government is scarcely much more than the specific public officials with whom they come in direct contact. The upper reaches of public administrative hierarchy may constitute a paragon of skill, rationality and humaneness, but all of this will go relatively unnoticed if those who deal directly with people are arrogant, aloof, arbitrary and corrupt in their behavior. Those at the center of administration may spin out beautiful and extremely insightful national plans but these will appear not very meaningful-- or even bizarre--to the population if field administrators do not have the talent for translating what exists on paper to meet the requirement of human situation." See LaPalombara, op. cit., p. 7.

Community Development Administration is tied to the scheme of democratic decentralization, popularly known as Panchayati Raj. The real and immediate purpose of Panchayati Raj was limited--better implementation of Community Development programs. The C.D. program was introduced in 1952 but it failed to elicit people's enthusiasm and participation.³⁶ To strengthen the program by providing a channel for people's participation Panchayati Raj was introduced.³⁷ In this convergence, the Block was recognized as the focal point of planning and administration and it became the single most important unit of both Community Development and Panchayati Raj.³⁸ The three tier system has the District level Zila Parishad in an advisory role, the Panchayat Samiti at the Block level as the key functional institution and the Panchayat at the village level as the executive agent. The officials and non-officials in direct contact with each other at each level are the district Collector and Zila Pramukh, the BDO and the Pradhan or Adhyaksha and Village Level Worker and the Sarpanch respectively.

³⁶ Nehru wrote "I regret to say that Community Development Movement has only partially succeeded. Why is it so? Why? when increasing criticism of the program became evident and when public cooperation was found lacking. See Kurukshetra, Dec. 1958, p. 262.

³⁷ Government of India, Planning Commission, Report of the Team for the Study of Community Development Projects and National Extension Service (Delhi: Government of India Publications, 1957).

³⁸ This pattern follows the Committee's recommendations. Some states like Maharashtra have deviated slightly.

This injection of grass-roots democracy implied an impact of non-officials on officials of community development administration. A new context of power was introduced which brought problems of personal equation in its wake. At the Block level, the elected head of the Panchayat Samiti, the Pradhan in Rajasthan and Adhyaksha in U.P. and the BDO have to work in harmony in order to be effective.

This further raised the significance of the role of the BDO. He interacted with the political leadership within his area and had to cope with problems of competing interests that came frequently to the fore; he represented administration and developmental ideology before the rural masses toward whom the whole effort is directed and he was a member of the hierarchy of community development administration and was thus held responsible for the implementation and achievement of developmental objectives. He has often been called the king pin of the Program.

Focussing our attention on the BDOs, the purpose of the present study is to see what the bureaucrats regard as the outstanding attitudes, behaviors and practices of their public administration system. Our interest is in investigation of the perceptions of the bureaucrats and we are concerned with their evaluation of various bureaucratic situations and the kinds of meanings they attach and attribute to these events. We are interested in identifying their own self-images. This major concern, that of self-identification and self-image of

bureaucrats is justified by the importance we think this aspect of human behavior has in determining how energetic and hopeful any individual will be in assuming the tasks that confront him. We also think that this effort in sorting out the various dimensions of self-image will help us in understanding their implications and in identifying the individual in his work setting.

This assertion of attaching importance to the individual perceptions and to the determination of energy and hope in a bureaucrat emanates from the view that development depends in the final analysis upon certain changes occurring in the realm of the subjective. A number of scholars have advocated that modernization is a state of mind, and a modern political system can be operated effectively only by people who share the lively and rational ingredients of the modern outlook.³⁹ Development thus becomes the capacity to perceive new ways of life. Lerner has suggested empathy or the ability to place oneself in others' roles as the hallmark of the modern man.⁴⁰ Pye seems to place stress on the associational sentiments

³⁹ Lucien Pye has summed up the views of theorists believing in changes in personality as an important task of development in Lucien Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966). His work on Burma is based on the exploration of attitudes of key groups in the polity and their crises of identity. See his Politics, Personality and National Building New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

⁴⁰ David Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill. Free Press, 1958).

and the capacity to sustain complex organizations.⁴¹

McClelland talks of an achievement motive in the same vein.⁴²

The essential point appears to be that development involves a certain change in the older order and more traditional value system. This change or stubborn refusal to do so is reflected in the reactions of an individual in a developing society to an environment which is rapidly changing and is sometimes difficult to comprehend. But, in any concrete situation, in which an individual participates, he is faced with choices of alternative action. He evaluates these alternatives in his mind according to certain abstractions embodied in his past experience, some political ideology or tradition. It is these assumptions that serve to attach meanings to all aspects of his environment. The objective validity of these perceptions is less significant than is the fact that they are believed to be true and present the realities of the situation from which emanate the bases of all action and reaction.⁴³

⁴¹ Pye Aspects, op. cit.

⁴² David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁴³ See Brewster Smith, Opinions and Personality (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965, especially Chapter 3. Hadley Cantril, "Transaction Inquiry Concerning Mind," in Theories of Mind edited by Jordan M. Scher (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962) pp. 332-54; Hadley Cantril, "Perception and Interpersonal Relations," American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 114, 1957; pp. 119-127.

The key point is that this reality world acts as the central conditioner for decision making. Each actor in the decision making process attaches his own meaning to the problems confronted before disposing of them.⁴⁴ Thus the problem is not the physical problem or the objective problem but it is the problem as it appears to the actor. For, after all, the ghost in the dark is real for the child whether it exists or not; his behavior is governed by this "image of reality." He will not doubt the validity of his own views and will assume that he is basing his behavior on "objective" facts. In understanding this behavior it is not necessary to know what the problem "actually" was.⁴⁵

Therefore, if we want to evaluate bureaucratic traditions or measure the extent of absorption of new values, we think it is necessary to map the dimensions of a bureaucrat's images. We are suggesting that much that is desired of the future depends on the dedication, commitment and high hopes of those who have been made responsible to initiate and bring about change. Their capacity to maintain favorable images of themselves and others who their partners in this adventure are necessary for the accomplishment and achievement

⁴⁴ Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, op. cit., esp. Part I.

⁴⁵ Donald Snygg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Behavior (New York: Harper, 1949), especially Chapter I.

of developmental objectives. We are also suggesting that bureaucrats are men accepting or rejecting changes and acting favourably or unfavourably to them. Whichever way they react has an impact on the way development proceeds and on the influence they cast on the people in their contact. It is in this context that our study becomes important and the discussions of administrative legacy or exhortations of political leaders assume significance in terms of evaluating bureaucratic approaches to administration, development and society in general.

We have also undertaken to investigate the social background of the bureaucrats in this framework. The importance of this investigation is two-fold. First, this will provide a context to the attitudinal analysis and help us to place the individual bureaucrat in his social environment. Secondly, we will be able to use the background items as a predictive index for the perceptions of the bureaucrats. This would help us in providing greater meaning to the bureaucrats' perceptions and understand their socialization processes.

From this formulation, our main effort in this study is to contribute to a better understanding of Indian bureaucracy. However, in the context of developing nations, the contribution cannot be narrowed down to such terms alone. Even though each country can be considered unique, under-developed countries are facing largely similar problems in their trials

of political and economic development and similar types of resistance to change. Bureaucrats have more features that are common than are unique and display a style which is familiar to most in these nations. Therefore, systematic studies help in generating hypotheses that assert a regularity of behavior and provide a common ground in the endeavour of theory building. Hopefully and ambitiously our study will contribute to such an endeavour. It will help in filling the gaps in the field termed by Presthus as "the absence of raw data about social variables that shape public administration."⁴⁶ Thus to the extent our study is empirical, describes and analyses information without being prescriptive, generates hypotheses that assert regularities of behavior and recognizes environmental variables in the analysis it can be placed in the larger framework of comparative administration.⁴⁷

We conclude this discussion of introducing our problem with the major research concerns:

1. To delineate the major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking and perceptions
2. To place the individual bureaucrat in his social and

⁴⁶ Robert V. Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, XIX, 1, 1959.

⁴⁷ See Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration Concerns and Priorities," in Papers in Comparative Public Administration edited by Heady and Sybil Stkes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1962); also Fred W. Riggs, "Trends in Comparative Study of Public Administration" International Review of Administrative Sciences, XXVIII, 1, 1962; pp. 9-15.

work setting

3. To investigate the relationship between the social background of the bureaucrats and their perceptions
4. To develop typologies of the bureaucrats in the total developmental context of two states.

CHAPTER II

SETTING AND THE SAMPLE

Setting

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the setting of our study and place our respondents in their social and work context. It has now been accepted that bureaucratic organizations do not operate in a vacuum and to understand how a bureaucrat perceives reality it is also necessary to map the various societal forces that influence this perception. However, even this context presents difficulties of identification when one comes down to the specifics and the choice of outstanding characteristics is made on the basis of individual interests and evaluations. We have chosen to stress the political experiences of two states--Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh--within their socio-economic situations. We shall then discuss the background characteristics of the respondents after lightly touching on their position in the State bureaucracy of which they are a part.

Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) are two neighboring Hindi speaking states in North India. Rajasthan borders Pakistan on the West and U.P. Nepal on the North. Rajasthan is larger than U.P. in area but much smaller in population. Education is more widespread in U.P. while literacy rates in Rajasthan are low. The level of urbanization also shows a wide disparity in the two states with Rajasthan having only one-third the number of cities in U.P. with more than 100,000

population. But as a proportion of the total population there is a lesser number of people living in urban areas in U.P. Table 2.1 depicts and compares this information between Rajasthan and U.P.

TABLE 2.1

RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH:
CERTAIN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Rajasthan	Uttar Pradesh
Area (in sq. miles)	132,152	113,654
Population (in mill.)	20.2	73.8
Density per sq. mile	152	176
Urban pop. as per cent of total population	16.3	12.8
No. of cities above 100,000 population	6	17
Literacy per 1000	181	207

Source Statistical Abstract of the Indian Union (Delhi Government of India) 1968.

On economic characteristics, the state income of Rajasthan was nearly one-fourth that of Uttar Pradesh in 1965-66. Rajasthan had a lower per capita income. As shown in Table 2.2: the per capita income in Uttar Pradesh was Rs. 370.3 and in Rajasthan Rs. 324.6. However this does not give the full picture of the economic conditions in the two states unless we also know the rate at which economic changes are taking place. But the figures of changes in this decade

Rajasthan's income rose by 66.0% and that of Uttar Pradesh by 32.8%. A higher rate was registered in the rise of per capita income too in Rajasthan. It is on the basis of these figures that Rosen has argued that Rajasthan is among the two states in the country which have shown the most rapid rate of economic growth.¹ Brass has also suggested that the political implication of these economic conditions in Uttar Pradesh is that it is not a society which is experiencing the disruptive impact of rapid economic change.²

TABLE 2.2

RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH:
STATE AND PER CAPITA INCOME 1965-66

	Rajasthan	Uttar Pradesh
Total Income in mill.	Rs. 740	Rs. 3006.9
Per capita	Rs. 324.6	Rs. 370.3

Source: S.P. Ahuja Fiscal Disparities among States, The Indian Economic Journal, XV, April-June 1968 pp. 567-68.

Politically, Uttar Pradesh was the cradle of Indian independence movement. Many contemporary developments in Indian politics can be traced to U.P. and its three cities

¹ George Rosen, Democracy and Economic Change in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); pp. 317-323.

² Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); p. 2.

of Benaras, Aligarh and Allahabad. Hindu communal politics had its roots in Benaras while Muslim communal politics took shape in Aligarh with the establishment of Aligarh Muslim University. Allahabad was the home of the Nehrus and the great liberal leader Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. It was the seat of the High Court and attracted the best legal brains in the State. In contrast to the other two cities, Allahabad could genuinely boast of liberal and secular politics. Thus, U.P. provided tremendous sustenance to the various political streams in the country and became an important arena for many mass protest movements. It was severely involved in communal rioting when independence and partition came in 1947. The intense feelings of hostility leading to an unprecedented social turmoil have left their scars behind and even today U.P. is not completely free of the political prejudices that created havoc years ago. On the other hand, Rajasthan was well insulated from the mainstream of the Indian independence movement. This state was formerly a conglomeration of Princely states ruled by feudal Rajas and came on the map as a single entity only in 1949. The relations of the British with the Rajas were governed by the doctrine of 'Paramountcy' and they never ruled this part of this country as the other which was popularly known as British India. The 'Indian' India was largely left alone in administration and the British only supervised in a general way by maintaining a representative of the Crown, the

Resident, in each state. He rarely played an overt role in the state administration and left the Raja to his benevolent despotism (usually) manifesting itself and operating through a network of feudal lords. Establishment of municipal institutions or legislative assemblies was a function of the personality of each individual Raja and no uniform picture can be drawn about their incidence and character. Iqbal Narain believes that an implication of this one-man rule, unquestioning loyalty and habitual obedience to his orders has been the development of a 'beck and call' psychology so evident in Rajasthan.³ Communal politics was not heard of and the Congress party had no base in any of the states. When partition came no large scale rioting erupted. Both freedom and prejudice and absence of politicization may have played an important role in the maintenance of peace. Whatever the reason, the successful enforcement of law and order was certainly a tribute to the strong rule of the Rajas.

In the post-independence era, personal and factional politics have dominated the scene in U.P.⁴ This has had a serious impact on the stability of the state. G.B. Pant was

³ Iqbal Narain, "Democratic Decentralization and Rural Leadership in India: The Rajasthan Experiment," Asian Survey, IV, 8, 1964; pp. 1015-1022.

⁴ Brass has analyzed the trends in his excellent study already cited.

the first Chief Minister of U.P. and remained in office till 1955 when he was called to Delhi to become the Union Home Minister. During this period came the fight for Presidentship of the Congress Party in which the leading political figures of U.P. were involved. The ultimate outcome was in favor of Nehru, Pant and the national leadership, but it left the challengers of the established power in complete disarray and shook the Party in U.P. Extremist contenders were eased out of the political arena and the Party was left with no issues to fight for.

This saw the rise of a new style of politics in which the party manager and the party politician developed personal loyalties and forced decisions with no ideological overtones. Both Pant and his successor Sampurnanand were men without personal following and were not identified with any faction; this cast them frequently in the role of arbitrators in personal quarrels and confrontations. However, this was more true of Pant than of Sampurnanand and the latter could succeed only up to the time he could play one group against the other effectively. This lasted until 1960 when Gupta, a factional leader, ousted him and came to power. It set in motion a series of events that are plaguing U.P. politics today.

Gupta remained Chief Minister till 1963 when he resigned at the suggestion of Nehru to devote more time to party work and to strengthening and unifying the Congress organization. This was preceded by months of factional politics and his

resignation only served to intensify the struggles. Mrs. Kripalani, a compromise candidate and a comparative newcomer to state politics, became the Chief Minister. After the Fourth General elections Gupta returned to power but could not last long. No party commanded an absolute majority in the Legislature: President's rule was imposed in February 1968. Mid-term elections took place in 1969 and Gupta once again became the Chief Minister. He has already been displaced (February, 1970) by his arch rival Charan Singh, and so the politicking goes on. The main actors in this political drama are Congressmen and those who have left the Congress to form their own group, party or faction to fight it. The action is not confined to Lucknow, the state capital, but has been carried to the remote villages and districts where the conflicts have been reinforced by communal, caste and regional prejudices.

In contrast Rajasthan, newly arrived on the democratic scene, has been comparatively stable all these years. Sukhadia has been the leader of the Congress party and government since 1954 and has effectively asserted his leadership. Before 1954, three Chief Ministers had assumed office but their power had been short-lived. Intense conflict did develop between the old elites and the new generation of political professionals immediately after the First General elections in 1952. But the change in generation in 1954 did not constitute a revolution and the workers neither banded

together in a new political organization nor formed a permanent front within the Congress party itself.⁵ The protest movements were never consolidated to become a danger to the leadership and quickly disintegrated.

The only real threat to the dominance of Sukhadia and the Congress came from the Swatantra party led by the Rajas and the feudal lords. After the Fourth Elections in 1967, the decision of the Governor to ask Sukhadia to form a Ministry on the basis of a dubious majority in the Legislature was challenged. Mass demonstrations and riots ensued. President's rule was imposed. However, Congress was able to establish a clear majority in the House and Sukhadia formed the government. The only casualty of the episode was the Governor who had to go, having lost the goodwill of the opposition.

In summary then, despite its poverty and backwardness. Rajasthan has done better on the economic front and registered greater political stability than U.P. Independence and democracy were a crowning achievement of the intense nationalist struggles centered in U.P. among other states. Independence, on the other hand, was a gift to Rajasthan, a challenge and an adventure into the unknown.

Uttar Pradesh was also ahead of Rajasthan in experience

⁵ Richard Sisson, "Institutionalization and Style in Rajasthan Politics," Asian Survey, VI, 2, 1966; pp. 605-613.

relating to Community Development. When independence came, U.P. was already experimenting with its philosophy and a pilot project had been set up in Etawah.⁶ This project established the pattern for the projects that followed after the First Five Year Plan. When it was accepted that the Community Development Program had failed to elicit the people's enthusiasm and their participation, Rajasthan led all the states in the country in introducing democratic decentralization or what was known as Panchayati Raj in 1959. The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee proposed a three tier system of local self governing bodies upon which all development work within their jurisdiction should be devolved. At the village a Panchayat should be set up, at the Block level Panchayat Samiti and at the District level Zila Parishad.⁷ In this convergence the Block was recognized as the focal point of planning and administration and it became the single most important unit of both Community Development and Panchayati Raj. Basically this structure has been followed throughout the country although the nomenclature of the institutions has differed sometimes. Panchayat Samiti and its Pradhan in Rajasthan are known as Kshetra Samiti and

⁶ Albert Mayer, Pilot Project India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

⁷ Report of the Team for study of Community Projects and national Extension Service, op. cit., popularly known as Mehta Committee Report.

Adhyaksha in U.P.⁸

The Sample

The Block Development Officer (BDO) is the administrative head of his block and also secretary to his Panchayat Samiti. Known as the Vikas Adhikari, the BDO is responsible for carrying out the decisions of the elected body, the Panchayat Samiti. He is also responsible of the coordination of all administrative and technical activity within the Block as the head of the official team. Thus for all administration and achievement of plan targets, he is responsible to the District Collector. For the implementation of the local schemes he gets directions from the Pradhan who also writes his confidential report. Dual control has been set up to satisfy the needs of democracy and administration.

The problem of recruitment of the BDO has exercised the minds of the planners from the very beginning. But it was fairly early decided that there should not be a separate cadre for the BDOs and the "intention is to transform the existing administrative services into developmental services."⁹ Initially, therefore, members of the State Civil Service or the Indian Administrative Service came on deputation to serve as BDOs. This was sometimes a period of training or sometimes

⁸ Government of India: Important Letters D.O. Letter no. CPA/(109)18/53-pp/dated 3 January 1954 (Delhi: Government of India Publications, 1955).

⁹ The system in Maharashtra differs slightly. It has made the Zila Parishad the most important agency.

a period of waiting before the bureaucrat was sent up the traditional ladder of hierarchy. Due to various difficulties this method has been abandoned.¹⁰

Uttar Pradesh has established a separate cadre for BDOs. The State Public Service Commission conducts the examinations, and candidates between 20 and 30 years of age are eligible. Graduates in agriculture, economics or sociology are preferred. In case of government servants, both age and qualifications are relaxed. Only in rare cases are they promoted to be District Planning Officers: otherwise they retire as BDOs at the age of 55 having risen through a graduated scale of pay.

Rajasthan has classified blocks according to their potential for quick development.¹¹ Three categories have been established and the blocks have been divided according to their importance in agriculture and animal husbandary. Some blocks deemed to have equal importance in both have been placed in a general category. Subject matter specialists like the Agriculture Science graduates and Veterinary Science graduates have been made BDOs of the two types of Blocks.

¹⁰ Howard Beers, Relationship Among Workers in C.D. Blocks (Mussoorie: National Institute of Community Development, 1962). See also K. Seshadhri, "Coordination of Development Programs," Indian Journal of Public Administration XIII, 1, 1966, and also Taylor, Ensminger and associates op. cit. pp. 555-583.

¹¹ Government of Rajasthan order no. F. 149(39) Insp/Conf/PD/64/2472 dated 4.10.67.

Generalists continue to be BDOs of the third type. The specialists belong to their parent departments viz. Department of Agriculture and Department of Veterinary and Animal Husbandary and come as BDOs on deputation.

The size of the Block varies according to area and population but generally Rajasthan blocks are smaller in population and larger in area than those in U.P. The total number of blocks is 232 in Rajasthan and 657 in U.P. Our sample of 89 BDOs is about 10% of the total number of blocks in the two states. The blocks were randomly selected by a simple method of arranging them in alphabetic order. Most of the interviews, usually lasting for about an hour and half, were conducted at the Block headquarters in the BDOs' offices. A few were completed at their homes or at the district headquarters when they came there on some official visit or meeting.

The average Block Development Officer in our study is about 37.5 years of age, is a male, was born in the same state in which he is presently serving and has put in around 12 years of government service. He has predominantly rural or small town background, calls himself Hindu by religion and belongs to higher castes in society. According to his own evaluation, he is getting by economically in the present circumstances but does not consider himself worse off than his father. He is at least a graduate, has studied in government or government aided schools with Hindi as the

medium of instruction and has switched over to English as the medium of education in college or University. If given a chance he will not choose government service again.

The description given above of a typical BDO is a statistical construct, product of the central tendencies found in the background data of the BDOs in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Now let us look at the real life BDO.

The average age of the BDOs in Rajasthan and U.P. is 35.5 and 38.9 years respectively. About 56% of the BDOs are in their thirties and as Table 2.3 shows Uttar Pradesh has a greater number falling in the 40 and above category. Between the two states Rajasthan has a younger band of administrators: 77.5% are below 40 years of age. In the total group too, 66% of BDOs fall in this category.

TABLE 2.3

BDOs DISTRIBUTED BY AGE

Age Groups	Rajasthan (40)	U.P. (49)	Total (89)
20 - 30	17.5%	4.1%	10.1%
30 - 40	60.0%	53.0%	56.0%
40 and above	22.5%	42.8%	33.6%

* In this and subsequent tables in this chapter, variations in total per centages from one-hundred percent are the result of rounding errors.

** Figures in brackets throughout the tables in this chapter, show the number of respondents in each category.

In considering the social origins of our respondents, the data reveal that the birthplaces of 63.8% of BDOs were in rural areas. This means that more than half of the bureaucrats are close to the environment in which they work. This is further strengthened by the fact that all the BDOs in Uttar Pradesh and all except three in Rajasthan were born and raised in their own states. Table 2.4 presents this data.

TABLE 2.4

RESIDENTIAL ORIGINS OF BDOs

Residential area	Rajasthan (40)	U.P. (49)	Total (89)
Rural	62.5%	65.3%	63.8%
Urban	37.5%	34.7%	35.9%

With respect to the occupation of the fathers' of BDOs, it seems noteworthy that most of the occupational strata of society find representation. Yet the largest group is that of agriculturists. There seems little inbreeding in recruitment. There are about 74% BDOs whose fathers are not in government service. 48.2% are self-employed in business, trade and mostly in agriculture. Data on the IAS officers from 1948 to 1960 show a different picture. It reveals that 44.5% are sons of government officials, 8.0% of agriculturists, 9.9% of businessmen and approximately 29.8% are sons of professional people namely, teachers' (14.3%), lawyers'

(10.6%), and medical doctors (4.9%).¹² Table 2.5 shows the details of this distribution in our data.

TABLE 2.5
MAIN OCCUPATIONS OF BDOs' FATHERS

Occupations	Rajasthan (40)	U.P. (49)	Total (89)
Agriculture	35.0%	38.8%	37.0%
Government	30.0%	22.4%	25.8%
Law & Teaching	7.5%	22.4%	15.7%
Business	15.0%	8.2%	11.2%
Medical & Engineering	7.5%	--	3.4%
Others	5.0%	8.2%	6.7%

Further data on the social composition also revealed that 87.6% of BDOs are Hindu by religion. Interestingly, one respondent differed from the classification that we were trying to make and preferred to call himself Hindu by nationality and Vedic by Religion!¹³ One respondent called himself, an atheist, another Buddhist because he had forsaken Hinduism in order to break away from the caste system.¹⁴ Table 2.6

¹² Trivedi and Rao, op. cit., pp. 50-80.

¹³ He quoted some Sanskrit and berated me for lack of knowledge of my own religion. We proceeded with the interview only after he had explained the origins of the terms in detail!

¹⁴ At the behest of Dr. Ambedkar, a remarkable leader of the Untouchables and one time Union Law Minister, a large number of them renounced Hinduism and joined Buddhism.

presents this distribution.

TABLE 2.6

BDOs BY RELIGION

Religion	Rajasthan	U.P.	Total
Hindu	92.5%	83.6%	87.5%
Muslim	2.5%	12.2%	7.8%
Others*	4.4%	4.1%	4.5%

*Others include 1 Christian, 1 Sikh, 1 Buddhist, and 1 athiest.

In a further classification of the Hindu BDOs we find that 93.6% of them belong to the higher castes. Historically, according to the varna scheme of caste grouping, there are four varnas: the Brahmans (priests), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas (business and trade), and the Sudras (craftsmen). Ranking of this classification is generally agreed upon and by custom and consensus Brahmans have been placed above all followed by Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras in that order. But for practical purposes, the jati concept is more relevant and understood. It is more meaningful for categorization purpose because it governs behavior more often. We have presented distribution of BDOs according to their 'jati' and then classified as belonging to high or low caste keeping the varna framework in mind. This distribution is shown in Table 2.7.

A fifth group of scheduled castes has grown after independence. It is not a homogeneous group socially or

economically but has been so defined by the Constitution to distinguish the outcastes who had been the underprivileged sections of society. Their social conditions have been governed in many important ways by the Hindu concept of 'pollution.' They have been debarred by tradition from full participation in many of the collective activities of the community. Their economic, social and ritual status continues to be depressed although the practice of untouchability has been declared illegal.¹⁵ We find only 6.4% of them represented in our sample and they have been included among the low caste category.

TABLE 2.7

HINDU BDOs BY CASTE RANK

Castes	Rajasthan	U.P.	Total (78)
Brahmins	35%	28.6%	31.4%
Rajputs	20%	16.3%	17.9%
Jats	10%	4.1%	6.7%
Kayasthas	17.5%	14.3%	15.7%
Banias	2.5%	16.3%	10.1%
Low castes	3.6%	2.4%	5.6%

¹⁵ Andre Beteille, "The Future of Backward Classes: the Competing Demands of Power Status in India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity edited by Philip Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

In terms of educational attainment and specialization, the BDOs form a highly qualified group since 95.5% of them are graduates and among these 34.1% hold Master's degrees. About 32.8% are specialized in agriculture and animal sciences. This is not surprising from the recruitment policy discussed earlier. Table 2.8 depicts the distribution between the two states.

TABLE 2.8
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF BDOs

Educational Level	Rajasthan (40)	Uttar Pradesh (49)	Total (89)
Graduates (General)*	37.5%	87.7%	65.0%
Graduates (Agriculture)	42.5%	6.1%	22.4%
Graduates (Animal Sc.)	22.5%	--	10.1%
M.A./M.Sc.	5.0%	55.1%	32.5%
Non-graduates	2.5%	6.1%	4.5%

*Social sciences and Humanities.

The early school background presents quite a uniform picture. Only 13.5% have had education in English medium and the rest in Hindi. None of them have attended the prestigious English medium or missionary schools.

Economically, 73.0% of BDOs place themselves in the 'getting by' category. None called themselves rich and only 7.8% thought they were poor. Comparing themselves to their father's economic condition, only 24.6% considered their

economic conditions worse. The rest of them thought either they were better off or in the same condition. Tables 2.9 and Tables 2.10 present the data in full.

TABLE 2.9

BDOs' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Perceptions	Rajasthan (40)	U.P. (49)	Total (89)
Rich	--	--	--
Well off	30.0%	10.2%	19.0%
Getting by	65.0%	79.6%	72.8%
Poor	5.0%	10.2%	7.8%

TABLE 2.10

BDOs ECONOMIC CONDITIONS COMPARED
WITH THEIR FATHERS'

Perceptions	Rajasthan (40)	U.P. (49)	Total (89)
Better off	52.5%	42.9%	47.1%
About the same	30.0%	26.5%	28.1%
Worse off	17.5%	30.6%	24.6%

If given a chance, 74.2% of BDOs would not join the government service again. The proportion of BDOs in both the states is nearly the same. This is also dramatically expressed in their career plans for their children. None of the BDOs would like them to follow in their professions. Overwhelmingly, about 91.0% would recommend medical or

engineering as a vocation for them. It seems that for the BDOs government service is no more an attractive career and even IAS does not hold that charm. They believe that medicine and engineering hold much greater potential for status and wealth.

In concluding this part of our chapter, BDOs seem to be more rural and less elitist in character than the higher civil servants--the IAS.¹⁶ Father's with rural occupations dominate and there is no evidence that the BDOs have been introduced to a culture of exclusivity either through education or upbringing.¹⁷ Unlike the IAS who usually serve in a state not their own, the BDOs in our study work in the same state in which they have been born and bred. It can be expected that they will exhibit more parochialism and also more understanding of the local problems than their senior counterparts.

But the BDOs present some evidence of frustration of a personal nature. Even though by social background they are more rural oriented and less elitist their perceptions of rewards and benefits in life lie away from the environment

¹⁶ See the discussion of elitist character of India's higher civil service in Administration and Economic Development op. cit., Bureaucratic Change in India, op. cit., and Trivedi and Rao study, op. cit.

¹⁷ Andre Beteille, "Elites, Status Groups and Caste in Modern India," in Philip Mason, op. cit. This is also an excellent discussion of the role of exclusive schools in building elite status.

in which they serve. This is brought out by their aspirations for their children. Overwhelmingly, the BDOs would like to see their children educated in English medium public schools even though none of them have attended those themselves. These schools have traditionally been the training grounds of bureaucratic and professional elites and have had as their pupils the children of the most successful in India. Education in these schools was a mark of entry into the highly Anglicised social life in the country. The most important of these schools are like the British public schools and are mostly boarding schools, exclusive, very expensive and generally train students (or did until recently) for the Senior Cambridge rather than the Matriculation or Higher Secondary certificate. These schools even today are passports to elite status in the country.¹⁸

Purely from the economic standpoint, it is not possible for a BDO to send his child to any of these schools. Inability to do so and knowledge of the benefits that accrue from public school education presents the gap between aspiration and reality. This situation must be considered in light of the fact that rural areas or Block headquarters do not carry even well known schools of indigenous character. Therefore, it is not unusual for a BDO to constantly keep his gaze towards urban areas and consider his service in the Block

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 223-243.

as a period of suffering.

Such an aspiration is coupled with the desire of the BDOs to send their children to professional schools. Medicine and engineering, as already pointed out, are the two most common careers mentioned. Government service at any level does not find a mention. Taub has found a similar attitude in his study of higher civil servants in Orissa.¹⁹ Technical vocations have replaced the IAS as the most desirable occupations and top and lower hierarchy present an identical position over the issue. It seems to be a universal phenomenon, for Berger in his study of Egypt also came to the same conclusion.²⁰

Among the BDOs in our study, this aspiration can also be seen as part of a movement away from traditional occupation. The BDOs who come from agricultural families exhibit greater satisfaction economically with the government service. Table 2.11 presents how BDOs coming from different family backgrounds compare their economic conditions with their fathers'. Only 18.1% of BDOs who come from agriculture families consider themselves worse off than their fathers' economic conditions. A similar figure for the sons of government servants is 30.5%. Thus, 81.8% of the BDOs coming from agricultural families feel that they have done

¹⁹ Taub, op. cit.

²⁰ Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 88.

at least equally well as their fathers. There seems to be not only an intense desire to move to an urban occupational value structure but also satisfaction with what they have done themselves. This movement, added to the preferences for children's education, can be considered perceptions of strong mobility.

TABLE 2.11

ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Economic Perceptions	Fathers' Occupations Agriculture	Government	Other
Better off	48.5%	56.6%	39.4%
About the same	33.3%	13.1%	33.3%
Worse off	18.2%	30.5%	27.3%
	(33)	(23)	(33)

But this mobility even though a sign of modernity also develops symptoms of frustration and tension when current economic status does not offer opportunities to attain the goals set. It seems natural therefore that high personal aspirations can lead to acute dissatisfaction with the service. The overwhelming refusal to join the government again if a choice is presented is an evidence in this regard. It is a crisis of rising expectations.

In summary then our bureaucrats are not elitist in character from the points of birth, education or family occupation. They have lived and studied in their own states

where they also serve. But their personal aspirations for their children are elitist in nature. This is frustrating and is reflected in their refusal to opt for government if given a chance again. We shall now proceed to examine their views of the administrative world and see whether such views prevail in that domain also.

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATORS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

One of the objectives of this study has been to learn about the problems of Indian administration from the administrators themselves. We have been interested in investigating the images that the Block Development Officers (BDOs) have of administrators in general, the administrative system and the noncomitant problems of implementation and execution of policies. It seemed to us that the Kilpatrick and Cantril self-striving scale was a good instrument for such type of administrative research.¹ This is a device in which each respondent locates himself, in terms of his own perceptions, values and goals, on a ten step ladder, the top and the bottom of which become the anchoring points of scale measurement. It has the virtue of not imposing the views of the researcher on the respondents for it does not employ rigidly predefined dimensions, verbal categories, prepared phrases or sentences, adjective check lists or the like. Instead, it consists of open ended probing interviews, content analysis and verbal scaling.² Thus we asked our

¹ F.P. Kilpatrick and Hadley Cantril, Self-Anchoring Scale A Measure of Individuals' Unique Reality Worlds (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1960). A good example of its use in administrative research on developing societies is Glenn D. Paige and Doo Bum Shin, "Aspirations and Obstacles in Korean Development Administration: An Application of Self Anchoring Scale," Public Policy 1967.

² Kilpatrick and Cantril, op. cit., p. 2.

respondents to describe for us the best possible and the worst possible administrations. Then they were asked to locate the present administration on the ten step ladder after they were told that the best possible and the worst possible administration, just described by them, are represented by the top and bottom of the ladder respectively. They were also asked to show where they thought administration was five years ago and would be five years hence. We also asked a supplementary question about the reasons they thought were responsible for the current state of administration.³

Together with the above, we also included two other items of similar interest in this analysis. In one question we asked the BDOs to describe a good administrator. In this way we expected to get an insight into their images of how good administrators should work and behave in the present circumstances. This description seemed important to us for we assumed that the bureaucrats used these images to evaluate other administrators and the system in which they worked. The second question related to their perceptions of bureaucratic corruption. It is needless to emphasize the lively interest that everyone takes in discussions of corruption in developing societies and we were interested in investigating how the bureaucrats themselves, against whom most of the

³ We have used the version devised by the South East Asia Development Group Development Administration Seminar Report. New York: 1967, unpublished document.

public ire is directed, evaluate the extent of the problem and its incidence. This also gave us a chance to learn how they saw themselves in relation to this topical issue.

TABLE 3.1

PERCEPTIONS OF BEST POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATION

Categories of Response	Number of BDOs in %
Separation of politics and administration	69.3
Efficiency and effectiveness	60.7
Removing corruption	56.2
Sense of dedication to development	38.2
Democratization of administration	34.8
Unsuitability of democracy	19.1
More power to technicians	11.2
Free enterprise not planning	5.6

*Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses are permitted.

In their perceptions of the best possible administration the bureaucrats were very much concerned with the presence of many practices which they disliked and wanted removed to attain the level of perfection they desired in government. They pointed towards weaknesses that had crept in and thought that once these weaknesses were eliminated, administration would achieve the level they were looking for. We have coded the responses in eight categories and present

their distribution in the Table 3.1 above.

In response to our second question about their perceptions of the worst possible administration, we had fewer categories to frame since the respondents seemed to be far more specific and sure of themselves. Therefore, their description has been grouped under three categories as shown in Table 3.2 below.

TABLE 3.2

PERCEPTIONS OF WORST POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATION

Categories of Responses	Number of BDOs in %
Breakdown of law and order	68.5
Increasing selfishness and corruption	59.6
Increased trend of political interference	33.7

Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses are permitted.

In presenting greater details about the categories in the above two tables of responses about best and worst possible administration, we find an overwhelming evidence of antagonistic attitudes of bureaucrats against the politicians and elected representatives at every level of government.

There is bitterness in their tones. One BDO says:

Today the animals are dying and tomorrow human beings will start dying because of lack of attention. The political leaders are utterly selfish, corrupt and dishonest. The people are already losing faith in the government and if things keep on worsening then the government will fall before our eyes and anarchy will prevail.

Another BDO says:

The unnecessary interference in administration must be minimized. The politicians can get any good administrator transferred to satisfy their own whims. Our former Collector was the best administrator but he was transferred because he did not fulfill the interests of the politicians.

Politicians are blamed for indiscipline in administration as

Politicians themselves are not disciplined. So long as they are in power they talk of idealism but once they are removed from power, they produce the worst possible atmosphere of demonstrations, strikes, etc.

One BDO has called the politicians "just a great nuisance."

There seems to be great feeling that politicians merely work on the basis of parochial interests of caste, region and community and their only selfish interest is to pile up money. Another main concern is that

if political interference is not checked, there will be no administration. For the officials will not be able to control the subordinate staff without which no work can be accomplished.

A number of them have mentioned concrete instances where "strong" administrators have had to suffer because of political manoeuvrings and promotions and transfers have been effected to show political favour or wrath.

The BDOs perceive bureaucracy as the only effective and efficient instrument of implementation and execution of programs. They believe that this is possible only when they are free from the interference of the politicians. They consider their judgements superior to those of the elected representatives, against whom, to say the least, they harbor

hostile attitudes. They blame the politicians and their way of doing things for the continuous rise of corruption and dishonesty in administration. They claim, rather implicitly, that they themselves are free from all bureaucratic prejudice and only if bureaucracy could be made more powerful the impending disaster and mass chaos can be averted. A number of BDOs have said:

Full authority must be given to the officials to implement policies and enforce rules and regulations.

In their concern for better government, BDOs have also expressed their views on the general administrative and political framework. Commenting on the cabinet at the state level, one BDO favors a small size while another has gone on to limit the number "in no case to exceed 10." Another concern was about political stability: some strongly deprecated the multiparty system and the frequently changing of colors by party members. Some BDOs wanted sharpening of the lines of authority, greater manipulation of the budget by the executive officers, reduction in the number of government departments and better coordination among the various agencies working in the Community Development program. All of these suggestions were part of their advocacy for greater effectiveness and efficiency in administration and for making bureaucracy a strong instrument for the implementation of policies.

A number of BDOs have lamented the decline of sense of

duty and dedication to public service, nationalistic ideals and patriotic sentiments among the administrators.

The concept of public service has not entered the officials. They still think that they are the rulers of the country.

Another BDO has referred to the ideals of development and the developmental mentality:

Officials are interested in maintaining their prestige and therefore their only concern is in the achievement of targets however that might be done.* The department heads in the development departments are from revenue agencies and they have never done any extension work nor will they do any. Without understanding any problems of the field all they can do is to employ coercion. They only come to this department for fun and then go back to their more important magisterial duties.

*This refers to the paper manipulation of the targets. BDOs have mentioned considerable lack of honesty in reporting achievements.

Among these BDOs there seems to be a great conviction that both the bureaucrats and politicians must be inspired by a high sense of sacrifice, public service and dedication to the ideals of development.

In the same vein some of the BDOs have stressed a changed administrative environment necessary for working in a democracy. One of the BDOs has expressed himself in terms of the structure of the Civil Service. He says:

The stratification of the civil service into a federal and state one must be abolished. This breeds complexes of superiority; there is no free communication; the expression is stultified. This leads to hesitation in social interaction and the upper level is ignorant of what is happening below.

Generally the feeling is that

Administrative behavior must be more in keeping with the democratic set up.

A few of the BDOs have expressed themselves strongly in favour of giving greater power to the technicians in the administrative hierarchy. This is in sharp contrast to the power and position the generalists hold. Indian administration is dominated by the generalists who come into the civil service through the Public Service examinations and rise in their cadres on the basis of their seniority and partly only on the basis of merit. They are assured of higher positions by virtue of their success in the entrance examinations. They generally hold higher executive positions which carry great power. This view is confined to the technicians in our sample.

What is interesting is that some BDOs (though very few) have questioned the basic tenets of the program they are administering. The whole effort of which they are a part is that of planned change. They have, however, expressed themselves against planning and have shown preference for free enterprise. They would like to see the government less and less involved in economic activities and leave them in the hands of private individuals. One of the BDOs says:

There should be free competition in the economic sphere. If there was free marketing there would be no black market in cars and dalda (cooking oil).

In terms of the future and worst possible administration, substantial numbers of BDOs fear the breakdown of law and order and resulting chaos and anarchy. Conflict and strife within the society like student riots, industrial lockouts and strikes, communal tensions and language riots and the ensuing violence and increase of crime are cited as symptoms of impending peril and disaster. One BDO has graphically summed up the situation when he says:

There will soon be a state of anarchy in the country. There will be no security to life and property. There will be no law and order and the whole of administration will be paralyzed.

For one BDO this evaluation is accompanied by the fear of control of the government by the Communists and for another by the military.

Nearly equal numbers of BDOs fear what they term as the "declining moral and religious standards in administration."

A BDO has remarked:

Education has become too scientific. All religious values and our own Dharma are being ignored.

There is a general feeling that corruption in government is on a steep rise and nothing can be accomplished unless money passes hands. A respondent says:

In government circles the only motive is to earn money. Everybody is concerned with his own selfish interests and seeking methods to fill his own personal treasury.

In the gambit of corruption BDOs have also included casteism, regionalism and communalism. They feel that administration

will be increasingly biased in favour of one group or another and no real justice will be meted out in society.

A final source of alarm mentioned by the BDOs is the increasing politicization of administration. We have already presented some of their views of the politicians and their ways.

With this type of administrative world that BDOs find themselves in, it is no surprise that they perceive corruption to be widespread in the government. Table 3.4 shows that 97.8% of BDOs think that private pull is important in government if some private individual wants some problem to be solved. This is no idle belief for at least 82.0% of them admit that they personally have had experiences of pull in dealing with the government. 92.1% of BDOs also do not believe that everybody is given a fair treatment at the hands of the government.

TABLE 3.4

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT

	No. of BDOs	
	Yes	No
Political pull plays an important role in government	97.8%	
Any personal experience which indicates the above	82.0%	
Are all people treated fairly by government?	7.9%	

N=89

However, when it comes to estimates of number of corrupt government officials BDOs seem to be rather hesitant and do not reflect the extreme views expressed earlier. Table 3.5 shows how only 30.3% of BDOs believe that the majority of government officials are corrupt while an equal number mentions just a few. At least 3.4% of them believe that none are corrupt among government officials! Whatever way one may look at it, it is reasonable to assume that at least they do not believe bureaucrats to be as corrupt as the others in the society.

The self anchoring ladder ratings have captured these assumptions on a ten point scale where the highest number represents the best and the lowest the worst possible perception of administration. The average evaluations of the past (five years ago), the present and the future (five years hence) are presented in Table 3.5.

TABLE 3.5
AVERAGE LADDER RATINGS

	Past	Present	Future
Mean	6.2	5.2	4.2
Median	6.0	6.0	4.0
Mode	7.0	5	4.0

The average BDO views the present about midway between the best and worst possible administrations a position he does not adopt in his views if the past or the future. The past seems to have been better at least by one step and the

future is expected to be worse by one step too. The BDOs see their administration undergoing a continuous downward trend; the modal step goes down from 7 in the past to 5 in the present and 4 in the future. Similarly, the median step is 6 in both past and present but goes down to 4 in the future. This is reflected in one respondent's query: isn't there any step lower than 1? Figure 3.1 presents the distribution graphically.

Past and present views can also be considered separately. Table 3.6 shows that at least 77.5% of BDOs consider the past on a higher level than the present. Only 15.6% consider the present better than the past. If the no-change category is computed with the past higher category, then most BDOs (84.4%) consider the present at least no better than the past.

In evaluating future with the present, it seems again that only 22.5% of BDOs are hopeful about the future and the

TABLE 3.6

PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE: PAST TO PRESENT

	No. of BDOs in %
Past higher	77.5
No change	6.7
Present higher	15.8

N=89




FIGURE III-1. DISTRIBUTION OF BDOs BY THEIR LADDER RATINGS.

things to come. (see Table 3.7) Even those who suggest a static condition in the continuing setup are only 10.1% of the number of respondents. From the ladder ratings we also find that 59.6% of bureaucrats have consistently rated the present lower than the past and higher than the future. This group which is three-fifth of the total sees the administration continuously going downhill.

TABLE 3.7

PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE: PRESENT TO FUTURE

	No. of BDOs in %
Present higher	67.4
No change	10.1
Future higher	22.5

N=89

In trying to enumerate the reasons for the present state of administration the BDOs have apportioned the major blame on the advent of politics and politicians on the administrative scene. (see Table 3.8) All ills seem to have one single source--political influence or interference with administration. Politicians have been blamed for the increase of casteism, regionalism and communalism in public life, for lowering the moral standards of public administrators and making justice a farce in society. One BDO sums up this position thus:

There is dishonesty, bad character and corruption among the political leaders. They are most corrupt and make the government servants corrupt. These are the only things on account of which we are unable to have the best type of government.

A major thrust in the arguments of BDOs is interference in the day to day administration and lack of support in their decisions from their political bosses. A BDO has explained:

Even in cases where no interference is made, decisions are made very cautiously and half-heartedly because of the constant approaches of the politicians. This has demoralized administration because even subordinates or juniors may humiliate the high ups at times on account of their political affiliations and approaches.

More than half of the BDOs have also blamed the general societal conditions for a continuous fall in the administrative standards. Their argument is that administration merely mirrors a society at a particular time. Lack of education, illiteracy, poor economic conditions, lack of will to work hard, rise of parochial feelings have all resulted in the administration "we deserve." Some believe that "inefficient" administration is an inherent weakness of democracy and nothing much can be done about that. Politicians are after all elected by the masses who are themselves open to all types of prejudicial influences.

TABLE 3.8

REASONS OF PRESENT STATE OF ADMINISTRATION

Categories	No. of BDOs in %
Politics and Politicians	73.3
General societal conditions and malaise	56.2
Personnel policies and inter-personal behavior	21.4
Organizational rationality and effectiveness	19.1
	N=89

Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses are permitted.

A small percentage of BDOs has cited personnel policies or organizational problems as reasons for the present state of administration. Less authority to technicians, lack of coordination among departments working in the Community Development program, lack of proper job placement and limited opportunities for promotion have been mentioned as some of the reasons for the present state of affairs. BDOs have suggested:

There has been no proper selection of personnel in government. There is no recognition of good work.

Finally, we were interested in the perceptions of BDOs of a good administrator. The responses were quite straight forward and we have classified them in six categories as shown in Table 3.9 below.

TABLE 3.9

QUALITIES OF A GOOD ADMINISTRATOR


Categories	No. of BDOs in %
Moral qualities	66.3
Personality and sociability	58.4
Leadership and team spirit	55.1
Strength in making decisions	53.9
Job qualifications	48.3
Sense of dedication to public service	27.0

N=89

Percentages do not add up to 100 because multiple responses are permitted.

The central problem that emerges from the description of the data above reflects the classic bureaucratic myth. Administrators left to themselves without the meddling of the politicians, would be able to achieve the epitome of rationality--a well administered state.⁴ Superior virtue of the bureaucrats, parochialism of the politicians and the lack of public mindedness of the common people neatly fits into the conventional mould. Bureaucracy is perceived as the only effective instrument of execution and implementation of programs. Politicians are looked at with hostility and only the formal election process held on a periodic basis is

⁴ Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State (New York: Ronald Press, 1948).



considered a legitimate link between the electors and the elected. But the politicians are accepted and political bargains are considered as inherent part of democracy. However, the role of the politician is seen sharply compartmentalized within the narrow confines of policy formulation and within the legislative box. The common people are perceived as lacking in the ability to discern their own good and in the capacity to make rational choices, for they are easily swayed by the politicking of the elected representatives. Thus the link between the common people and the elected people is accepted only if the election process is at work otherwise the informal network of communications presents regionalism, casteism and communalism at play. The model presented above shows this image of the administrative world.

Bureaucrats themselves are above all common prejudices and do not concern themselves with the common squabbles of the politician. Administration left to the bureaucrats would bring justice and fair play to the people and corruption will be reduced. Earlier, in discussing corruption bureaucrats freely blamed the politicians for its high incidence in government. But when asked to estimate corrupt government officials, they have quoted a disproportionately low number and the views are divided. The perception of corruption in government is very high but the perceptions of officials being corrupt is low. Apparently, corruption is seen with

two value patterns and bureaucrats are seen considerably less corrupt.

We should, here, also refer to the behavioral orientations of the ICS that we have presented earlier. We have pointed out that two functional orientations--those of Platonic guardianship and law and order--held the key to the traditions of British administrators during the colonial era. These two claims in combination gave birth to claims by those administrators of superior virtue, pride in upholding honesty and integrity in government, insistence on efficiency and effectiveness, objectivity in face casteism, familism and communalism and lastly suspicion of anybody or any agency that tends to corrode these attitudes or interfere with their Service. This description seems to find an echo in the orientations of the present BDOs. The model that we have presented as describing the way the administrative world should look demonstrates the similarity between the two approaches.

Tensions between the administrators and politicians have found evidence elsewhere.⁵ In developing societies where the elected representatives have only recently arrived on the political scene, relations with bureaucracy, long entrenched in power from the colonial days, have been far

⁵ T.N. Chaturvedi, "Tensions in Panchayati Raj," The Economic Weekly, May 30, 1964. Iqbal Narain, "Administrative Challenge in Panchayati Raj," Indian Journal of Public Administration, XII, 3, 1966 pp. 564-578. Taub, op. cit.

from cordial. Social distance and elitist nature of the bureaucrats⁶ and often conflicting aims and motivations have aggravated the issue.⁷ Only recently has the problem been looked at from the angle of bureaucratic power.⁸

With the rise of non-bureaucratic institutions, the bureaucrats have behaved with a sense of injured pride, of loss of power, status and prestige. Riggs has devoted himself to analyzing the unbalanced growth of institutions in developing nations. One of his arguments has been that with the rise of non-bureaucratic institutions in a polity the traditional power of the bureaucratic institutions will go down. This would result in a struggle between the entrenched bureaucrats and the untried centres of bureaucratic power. The nature of the struggle leads to mutual suspicion and what he calls an "interference complex" develops.⁹

To describe the variation of bureaucratic power in a polity, Riggs has proposed a neologism "bureaucratism" and "bureaunomia." He holds that a system in which bureaucrats dominate is bureaucratism and in which they wield no influence

⁶ See Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit. Taub, op. cit.

⁷ LaPalombara, "An Overview," op. cit.

⁸ See the various essays in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development op. cit.

⁹ See Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1964) and his more recent essay "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Comparative Administration, I, 1, 1969.

at all is bureaunomia.¹⁰ The bureaucrats in our study resent sharing of power with the political sector and believe in their own monopoly. We have called such bureaucrats "power monopolizers." If they are placed at one end of the continuum, then at the other end are the bureaucrats whom we have preferred to call "power sharers." The power monopolizer typifies the bureaucrat who resents erosion of power away from bureaucracy while a power sharer accepts it as a natural consequence of democracy. From the responses of bureaucrats of best possible administration, we have constructed a simple index to describe power monopolizers. Responses regarding efficiency and effectiveness, unsuitability of democracy, separation of politics and administration have been taken to be highly indicative of this orientation. On the other hand, responses like those of democratization of administration, more power to technicians, sense of duty and dedication to plans and development indicate power sharing orientation.

The following table 3.10 presents the distribution.

TABLE 3.10	
POWER MONOPOLIZERS AND POWER SHARERS	
	No. of BDOs in %
Power Monopolizers	58.2
Power Sharers	41.6

¹⁰ Riggs, Administration, op. cit., pp. 231-32 and 273; Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics," op. cit., pp. 29-36.

We have also attempted to describe a bureaucrat on the basis of his image of a good administrator. We wanted to find what qualities they admire the most. Those who admire the attributes of decisiveness, effectiveness and strong administration we have called "decision makers." On the other hand those who have admired the qualities of democratic administration, team spirit and leadership we have called "persuaders." Table 3.11 presents the distribution.

TABLE 3.11
DECISION MAKERS AND PERSUADERS

	No. of BDOs in %
Decision maker	39.3
Persuader	60.7

Another attempt to describe our bureaucrats has been made from their time orientation. Those who have rated the past higher than the present and also higher than the future we have called "past oriented," and those who have consistently rated the future higher than the present and the present higher than the past we have called "future oriented" bureaucrats. There are some bureaucrats (32.6% whom we will call ambivalent in their perceptions. They have no consistent rating in comparing the present with the past or the

future.¹¹ Table 3.12 presents the distribution of past and future oriented bureaucrats.

TABLE 3.12
PAST AND FUTURE ORIENTED BUREAUCRATS

	No. of BDOs in %
Past Oriented	59.6
Future Oriented	7.9

The orientations of power monopolizers and decision makers are not related to each other. There are 58.2% power monopolizers and only 39.3% decision makers. Chi-square is not significant. This is rather intriguing. The apparent incompatibility seems to be due to the presence of an erratic environment not easily understood by the bureaucrats. The unpredictability of the changes within administration and outside and their impact on the daily working of the bureaucrats influences their mood. They seem to take postures most advantageous to them. Loss of power traditionally belonging to them leads to more autocratic attitudes while fear of harsh regulations and frustrating inter-personal behavior again traditionally their lot within bureaucracy leads to more democratic orientations. The power monopolizer index

¹¹ Hahn Been Lee has developed a typology of time orientations. See his "From Ecology to Time: A Time Orientation Approach to Study of Public Administration," International Review of Administrative Sciences, XXXIII, 2, 1967 and Korea: Time, Change and Administration (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1969).

has been constructed from items primarily dealing with perceptions of others--politicians, common people, society etc. The index sums up how bureaucrats like to deal with others. The decision maker index has been constructed from items which essentially describe how bureaucrats themselves would like to be dealt with by their superiors. A good administrator has been seen mostly in relation to themselves. Therefore, when bureaucrats talked of their internal administration they use democratic and more liberal jargon but when they talk of others they become more autocratic.¹² In the context of a newly emergent democratic administration pressured by unknown political pressures, such contradictory perceptions are really options of safety.

For all political changes appear as threats to their identity. Politicians are perceived as their powerful opponents. Of considerable significance is their low opinion of the politicians. Charges of parochialism, corruption and orthodoxy are levelled against them. There appears to be a complete lack of understanding of the role of the politician and the mechanisms of the political processes. We have already shown (Fig. 3.2) how bureaucrats consider politics as a totally isolated social phenomenon. Legislators and periodic elections completes for them the total picture of democracy. The mechanics of its working are despised.

¹² See also Eldersveld, Jagannadham and Barnabas, op. cit., pp. 67-96.

It seems the whole idea of politics is held in contempt.

An important influence on this type of conception of local politics may be what Morris-Jones has termed the idiom of saintly politics.¹³ Jai Prakash Narayan is the leading advocate of this theme and is opposed to all political conflict in Panchayat institutions. He pleads for political consensus and believes in partyless democracy. The central idea is of participation and the rule of the majority over the minority.¹⁴ A former colleague of Nehru from the independence movement and a leading Socialist of that time, Narayan commands high respect for rationality and wisdom and personal integrity in the country. Vinobha Bhave, known as the "Saint on the March" is another leader in the true traditions of Mahatma Gandhi. He roams the countryside asking for donations of land from the landlords. He hopes to bring land reform by changing the hearts of men. Bhave appeals to the Hindu concepts of renunciation and sacrifice and to the goodwill of fellow-men. It is difficult to know the actual impact of such men and their sentiments on the actual behavior of people. But it does provide a framework for assessing other people's behavior. It is easy to find an audience when issues of corruption and dishonesty emanate

¹³ W.H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp. 52-61 and 214-15.

¹⁴ For J.P. Narayan's exposition see his A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity (Rajghat, Kashi: Sarva Sena Sangh Prakashan, 1959).

from these sources.

Another interesting finding is that past orientation is not related to the orientations of power monopolizer or decision maker. There seems to be equal penetration of past orientations among the bureaucrats. This is an overwhelming evidence of pessimism. Only 7.9% are consistent hopefuls. Such low percentage looking to the future also means that the great majority perceive the past as better--it is not only a disgust of the present but an appreciation of the past. However, it is difficult to say what past they are talking about even though they were asked to reflect upon past five years ago. Most of them are not old enough to be talking of pre-independence days; for it is more than 20 years of democracy now. Either they see their ratings as a trend or they feel actually that the immediately preceding five years have been bad. However, the most important point seems to be that they tend to be past oriented when the whole concept of development is future oriented.

Linking this past orientation to an earlier finding in the last chapter, we find that bureaucrats are personally hopeful but nationally depressed. As we have seen, 24.6% bureaucrats feel that their present economic status is worse than that of their fathers. Most feel that they are at least economically equal or have even done better than them. Of those who are nationally depressed, 73.0% are personally hopeful. This means that while they have done better in comparison to the past, society has not done so. Perceptions of

personal progress and societal progress do not go together.

In summary, then, we have found BDOs with an hostility towards the politicians and the political environment. They place the responsibility of the current poor state of affairs on the faults of the politicians and believe once bureaucracy is given adequate power and authority, it can bring about a well administered state. The BDOs perceive corruption to be widely prevalent and are convinced overwhelmingly that government does not treat private citizens fairly. However, they do not view members of the bureaucracy to be corrupt.

We have used above perceptions to show some resemblance with the old ICS tradition. Both BDOs and ICS consider themselves men of superior virtue and set great store by their own ability to do good to the people. Both envision politicians as parochial and the common people lacking in public mindedness. Both imagine that left to themselves, they would be able to achieve the epitome of rationality--a well administered state.

Finally, we have also found that BDOs are incongruent in their perceptions. None of the indices of power monopolizing, decision making, past orientation are related to each other. However, bureaucrats who are nationally depressed are not so personally.

CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS
A FACTOR ANALYTIC STUDY

In light of our concern with gaining more precise empirical knowledge of the bureaucratic perceptions our current analysis is directed toward investigating interdependence of political and non-political aspects of such perceptions. We decided to use factor analysis for this purpose because of its capacity to reduce the original number of variables to a smaller number of independent factors in terms of which the whole set of variables can be understood, its ability to provide us with a simpler, more compact explanation of the regularities apparent in the empirical results and to delineate structure in the attitudinal space of our interest.¹ Thus, the main interest in this chapter is in description and an attempt to find out "what goes with what." Excellent mathematical and technical discussions of the technique on which we have relied have been given elsewhere.² We shall deal below only with some of the practical decisions that were involved in employing the factor analysis model.

The common factor model was used to delineate the major

¹R.J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 4, December 1967, pp. 444-80.

²R.J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press) forthcoming and H.H. Harman, Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

dimensions of the BDOs.³ Originally, 65 items on our questionnaire were inter-correlated and factor analyzed.⁴ The principal axis solution technique was used with squared multiple correlations in the principal diagonal as estimates of communality.⁵ The structure was then rotated to an orthogonal solution using varimax technique.⁶ For the purpose of generating inputs for the various analyses discussed later, factor scores were also calculated.⁷ We carried out many analyses eliminating variables that had low communality in the rotated factor matrix. Low communality means that a variable has a very low affinity with any of the factors.

³ The common factor model assumes that data on a variable consists of common and unique parts. The common parts of the variable defines the common factor space. A basic assumption is that the number of dimensions needed to span the common vector space is much less than the basis for the vector space of the data. The component factor model analyses the total variance including common and unique variance. For a choice between the two based on conceptual and mathematical grounds see also Raymond Cattell, "Factor Analysis An Introduction to Essentials," Biometrics, March 1965.

⁴ Product moment correlation has been used. It is applicable to both continuous and dichotomous data. See J.B. Carroll, "The Nature of the Data or How to Choose a Correlation Coefficient," Psychometrika, XXVI, 1961.

⁵ A basic indeterminacy of the common factor model is the determination of communality. However, squared multiple correlation has been accepted as the best estimate of communality on theoretical and empirical grounds.

⁶ Orthogonal rotation defines uncorrelated cluster of variables. Varimax technique is generally used as method of rotation for its ability to define the cluster more sharply.

⁷ Factor scores give scores for each case; they can be treated as data on any variable. Mathematically, common factor model does not give exact scores; regression technique is used to get the best estimate.

This helped to eliminate any random association of any variable with a factor(s).⁸

Forty-four items from our perceptions questionnaire were finally selected and are presented in Table 4.1. Group means are shown following each item. On a five point scale, five represented "Uncertain" and two and four "Disagree" and "Agree" respectively. Items 1-30 have been scored thus. Perceptions about "Best Possible" and "Worst Possible" administration and about "Good Administrators" have been scored on a dichotomous scale. One represented presence of a particular trait and zero absence of it. Items 31-34 and 36-43 have been scored on this basis. The two indexes, those of "Decision maker" and "Power Monopolizer," (items 35 and 44) developed in last chapter have also been included here. The former is scaled from 1 to 7 and the latter 1 to 8.

The mean scores on the items above present interesting--often conflicting--facets of the perceptions of the BDOs. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works (items 1, 2, 3, 10) has not led to a loss in faith in the Supreme Court (item 9) or to great demand for a dictator (item 4). Stronger discipline for the young people (item 5) has not precluded

⁸ Adelman and Morris have used a similar technique in an attempt to reduce their number of variables and also to pull out variables with possible random correlation. See Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967).

TABLE 4.1
PERCEPTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

<u>Items</u>	<u>Group Mean*</u>
1. In the long run public administration will be more effective if politicians will leave administrators alone to decide what programs to carry out and how to carry them out.	3.84
2. The trouble with democracy is that we spend too much time arguing and too little for the work that must be done.	4.25
3. A few strong leaders could make our country better than all the laws and talk.	3.92
4. In fact what we probably need is a dictator at least for some years.	3.16
5. What young people need most of all is the strict discipline by their parents.	4.14
6. Women should stay out of politics.	2.34
7. On the whole newspapers do more harm than good.	2.11
8. Most of our newspapermen are paid propagandists of influential men.	3.63
9. You can depend upon the Supreme Court to uphold the law or the supremacy of the Constitution at all times.	3.98
10. By and large our elections have been free and honest, inspite of the cases of violence and fraud.	3.12
11. Most of my superiors are excessively conscious of their high status in the department.	4.16

*For items 1 to 30, in a scale of 1-5, 1 indicates Strongly Disagree, 5 Strongly Agree; 2, 3 and 4 represent Agree, Uncertain and Agree. For items 31-34 and 36-43 1 indicates presence of the attribute and 0 absence of it. Item 35 has been scores on a scale from 1 to 7 and item 44 on a scale from 1 to 8.

12. If you participate actively in staff meetings by suggesting your ideas and commenting on the ideas of others they will think you are showing off. 3.55
13. Most superiors I know welcome suggestions and criticisms if they are offered constructively and diplomatically. 3.58
14. Most employees in my department get recognition for their good work regardless of their rank or position. 3.09
15. However careful you are in giving your criticism, you are often misunderstood because most people feel that you are really criticising them and not their ideas. 3.84
16. When you try to have your ideas and solutions accepted by the department you usually make enemies and get hurt. 3.53
17. In our staff meetings most of us communicate freely forgetting individual ranks and positions. 2.86
18. No matter what the books say our superiors do not welcome disagreement however honest and well meaning it may be. 3.83
19. Most people can be trusted. 3.50
20. If you are not careful people will take advantage of you. 4.30
21. No one really cares what happens to you when you really think about it. 3.96
22. Very few people are truly dishonest. 3.52
23. Unfortunately, human beings are just selfish by nature. 3.83
24. A good rule to follow is never to trust anyone completely. 3.46
25. If you are the kind of person who trusts people you will always be disappointed. 3.21

26. The world would not work without trust.	4.25
27. The only sensible thing is to act as if the other person is capable of cheating you.	3.24
28. If you are suspicious of everyone life is not worth living.	4.26
29. If you trust people and let them know it they will very seldom disappoint you.	3.97
30. People are likely to be honest if you trust them.	3.84
Qualities of good Administrators	
31. firmness and strength in decisions	.54
32. leadership and team spirit	.55
33. personality and sociability	.58
34. sense of dedication to development	.27
35. Decision Maker	4.16
Best administration Perceptions	
36. separation of politics and administration	.71
37. There ought to be free enterprise	.06
38. Removal of corruption	.56
39. democratization of administration	.35
40. sense of dedication to planning	.38
41. fear of chaos and anarchy in the future	.66
42. fear of selfishness and corruption increasing	.60
43. increasing politicization of civil service	.34
44. Power Monopolizer	5.26

the acceptance of a role for women in politics (item 6). Even though newspapermen are perceived as paid propagandists of influential men (item 8), newspapers are not considered to be doing harm (item 7). Superiors within the department project a poor image; excessive consciousness of their high status (item 11) and lack of receptiveness to ideas and suggestions coming from below (items 13, 17, 18) are generally agreed upon. There is hesitation in interacting with colleagues and superiors (items 12, 15, 16) and uncertainty about departmental recognition of good work (item 14). In matters of trust there is hesitation and caution (items 20, 29, and 30) and general uncertainty in passing unqualified judgements (items 19, 22, 25, 27). Even though it is accepted that human beings are selfish by nature (item 23), strong agreement is expressed with the statements that the world would not work without trust (item 26) and if you are suspicious of everyone life is not worth living (item 28).

The choice of the number of factors for rotation was decided on the basis of the scree test.⁹ The proportion of total variance explained by the factors included in the

⁹ The scree test requires an examination of the number of factors plotted against the total variance accounted for; where this percentage drops off to more or less straight line a demarcation line would be drawn. Only these factors above this 'rubble factor variance' can be included in rotation. See R.B. Cattell, "The Scree test for Number of Factors," Multi Behavioral Research, I, 1966, pp. 245-276.

rotated factor matrix was about 60%. In the first run when all the thirteen factors extracted were rotated, the proportion of total variance explained was 83.6%. Conforming to the above criterion of rotation, however, seven factors were rotated. The seven factors have been labelled Cynicism, Democratism, Trust, Power Monopolizer, Decision Maker, Departmental Skepticism and Hierarchical Barriers.

The first factor, presented in Table 4.2, has been identified as Cynicism. It broadly indicates the cautious atmosphere in which a bureaucrat lives. There are four items that show distrust in human nature and personal relationships. Selfishness is accepted as part of human nature and trust leads to disappointment. Newspapers are also looked at with suspicion and are considered more harmful than good. Greater faith is put in strong leaders to make the country better. This item also suggests a distrust of democratic discussions and formulation of laws to improve things. Democracy within the department is also seen with cynical eyes. Thus this factor includes strong attributes of personal cynicism and cynicism regarding the newspapers, present democratic leaders and departmental organization.

The second factor, named Democratism, is presented in Table 4.3. Four items relating to autocratic behavior are negatively correlated with it. Bureaucrats loading highly on this factor would not like the politicians to leave the administration alone and do not believe that it ought to

TABLE 4.2
 FACTOR I CYNICISM

Item number	Rotated Loadings*	Communality* H-sqr
25. If you are the kind of person who trusts people you will be disappointed.	.73	.58
27. The only sensible thing is to act as if the other person is capable of cheating you.	.71	.57
24. A good rule to follow is never to trust anyone completely.	.59	.46
23. Unfortunately, human beings are just selfish by nature.	.51	.52
7. On the whole newspapers do more harm than good.	.49	.35
3. A few strong leaders could make our country better than all the laws and talk.	.44	.33
16. When you try to have your ideas and solutions accepted by the department you usually make enemies and get hurt.	.43	.37

% Common variance 23.7

% Total variance 11.0

* Factor loadings .30 given.

* Communality is across seven factors. This is true for all subsequent factor tables in this chapter.

TABLE 4.3

FACTOR II DEMOCRATISM

Items No.	Rotated Loadings	Communality H-Sqr
1. In the long run public administration will be more effective if politicians leave administrators alone to decide what programs to carry out and how to carry them out.	-.58	.49
31. There ought to be greater firmness and strength in decision making.	-.57	.40
8. Most of our newspapermen are paid propagandists of influential men.	-.51	.38
5. What young people need most of all is the strict discipline by their parents.	-.42	.45
34. A good administrator should have a sense of dedication towards developmental programs.	.41	.50
9. You can depend upon the Supreme Court to uphold the law or the supremacy of the Constitution at all times.	.35	.21
10. By and large our elections have been free and honest in spite of the cases of violence and fraud.	.39	.37

% Common variance 18.6

% Total variance 9.5

* Factor Loadings .30 given.

have greater strength in decision making. They do not think that newspapermen are paid propagandists of influential men or that young people need strict disciplining by their parents. There is also belief in the current democratic institutions like the Supreme Court and elections. A quality of a good administrator is highly associated with this factor. It deals with the desire that the administrators should have greater dedication towards the development programs that they are implementing. There seems to be an expression of general satisfaction with what is happening today. The political institutions are accepted and so also is the political environment.

The third factor is named Trust. It is presented in Table 4.4. All the items correlated with it show a high faith in human nature. With trust is also correlated the desire to see best possible administration as a democratised one. In this perception of the best administration, the bureaucrats are talking of better inter-personal behavior and greater say in the decisions that concern them. The Indian administration has suffered from certain procedures that emanated from distrust the British held of the Indians. These procedures have in many instances not changed at all.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cohn has argued that many of the Indian administrative procedures emanate from the image the British held of Indians. See Bernard Cohen, "The British in Benaras: A nineteenth Century Colonial Society," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV, 2, 1962; pp. 613-28.

TABLE 4.4
 FACTOR III TRUST

Variable No.	Rotated Loadings	Communality H-Sqr
29. If you trust people and let them know it they will very seldom disappoint you.	.80	.67
19. Most people can be trusted.	.61	.49
30. People are likely to be honest if you trust them.	.58	.44
28. If you are suspicious of everyone life is not worth living.	.42	.24
26. The world would not work without trust.	.36	.37
39. Democratization of administration.	.32	.23
<hr/>		
% common variance	15.4	
% total variance	8.5	

TABLE 4.5

FACTOR IV POWER MONOPOLIZER

Item No.		Rotated Loadings	Communality
44.	Power monopolizer	.72	.59
40.	Good administration should be dedicated to development.	-.66	.47
4.	In fact what we probably need is a dictator.	.56	.48
6.	Women should stay out of politics.	.49	.48
<hr/>			
% Common variance	12.4		
% Total variance	8.4		

It is no surprise then to find trust and desire to democratize loading together.

Items relating to the desire of increasing bureaucratic power are loaded on the fourth factor, presented in Table 4.5. It is named Power Monopolizer. The power monopolizing index that was constructed in the last chapter has the highest loading on this factor. This index primarily is concerned with such attributes like efficiency and effectiveness of bureaucracy, separation of politics and administration and unsuitability of democracy. Thus this index expresses the perception of bureaucracy as a pure instrument for the implementation of policies. It is correlated with the desire of a dictator at least for a few years. This again expresses a basic dissatisfaction with democracy. Bureaucrats loading highly on this factor also would not like women to play a role in politics. Significantly, therefore, a desire to increase bureaucratic power goes together with authoritative rule. It seems then that the bureaucrats seeing bureaucracy as a strong instrument of implementation also see democracy as hampering this role.

The fifth factor, presented in Table 4.6, has been named Decision Maker. At first glance it may appear similar to the factor of Power Monopolizer. This is not so for this factor empirically taps different perceptions. These are mainly the perceptions of good administrators. Two attributes of good administrators like team spirit and leadership

qualities and those of personality and sociability are negatively correlated with this factor. The decision maker index constructed in the last chapter is associated with this factor. This index reflects strong administration and strength in decision making. An attribute of best possible administration has been mentioned with these items too. It is that of removal of corruption. Fear of chaos and anarchy is also associated with this factor. The strong willed administrators have been talked of only in the context of removing corruption and saving the administration from chaos and anarchy. Therefore, in this factor we find the decision maker index loaded positively with what the performance expectation is of a good administrator.

TABLE 4.6

FACTOR V DECISION MAKER

Item No.		Rotated Loadings	Communality H-Sqr
33.	A good administrator should possess the qualities of leadership and team spirit.	-.55	.38
32.	A good administrator should possess high social qualities.	-.55	.44
35.	Decision maker	.53	.76
38.	Removal of corruption	.33	.33
41.	Fear of chaos and anarchy	.37	.16
<hr/>			
% Common variance	11.5		
% Total variance	7.2		

The sixth factor, presented in Table 4.7, has been named Departmental Skepticism. It reflects a poor estimate of superiors. The bureaucrats do not think that good work is rewarded in their department. They also feel that their superiors do not welcome disagreement and are not ready to listen to criticism in no matter how it is offered. With these perceptions there is associated the fear of selfishness and increasing corruption. There is a sense of alienation from the organization in which they work and also lack of participation. It is significant that an item of personal cynicism is loaded with this factor. General distrust is correlated with the distrust of ones superiors in the department. It also leads to the fear of increasing selfishness and corruption.

The seventh factor, presented in Table 4.8, conceptually belongs to the dimension of Departmental Skepticism. It is concerned with the peculiar aspects of superior-subordinate relations. Staff meetings are perceived as talking sessions serving no particular value and this is extended to the whole process of democracy where it is thought that too much talking is done. Superiors assert their status and this may be an important inhibition in communication. This factor is named as Hierarchical Barriers. It appears that this factor expresses acute dissatisfaction with the way discussions take place in the staff meetings. There is a feeling that giving suggestions and criticisms leads to personal animosities.

TABLE 4.7

FACTOR VI DEPARTMENTAL SKEPTICISM

Items No.		Rotated Loadings	Communality H-Sqr
14.	Most employees in my department get recognition for their good work regardless of their rank and position.	-.57	.44
18.	No matter what the books say our superiors do not welcome disagreement however honest and well meaning it may be.	.42	.38
42.	I fear selfishness and corruption increasing.	.41	.32
13.	Most superiors I know welcome suggestions and criticisms if they are offered constructively diplomatically.	-.39	.31
22.	Very few people are truly dishonest.	-.32	.22

% Common variance 9.8

% Total variance 6.8

TABLE 4.8

FACTOR VII HIERARCHICAL BARRIERS

Item No.		Rotated Loadings	Communality H-Sqr
11.	Most of my superiors are excessively conscious of their high status in the department.	.58	.41
2.	The trouble with democracy is that we spend too much time arguing and too little for the work that must be done.	.51	.64
15.	However careful you are in giving your criticism, you are often misunderstood because most people feel that you are really criticizing them and not their ideas.	.45	.36
12.	If you participate actively in staff meetings by suggesting your ideas and commenting on the ideas of others they will think you are showing off.	.38	.45
21.	No one really cares what happens to you when you really think about it.	.33	.39

% Common variance 8.5

% Total variance 6.7

They are taken as personal affronts.

The seven major dimensions that we have delineated above are uncorrelated or independent of each other. At this point therefore, it might be interesting to enquire whether the independence among the factors is empirical or imposed upon the data by the model. For this purpose, an oblique solution to the rotation of factors was employed. A virtue of oblique rotation is that it allows a better fit of the factors to simple structure. If the clusters of variables are themselves somehow related, oblique rotation will enable these clusters to be distinctly defined and the correlations between the factors to be measured by inter-factor correlations. Oblique rotation provides two factor matrices--a pattern matrix and a structure matrix. Pattern matrix is best for determining the cluster of variables defined by oblique factors.¹¹ Various techniques are used to give oblique solutions and we have used the biquartimin solution.¹²

The P-factor matrix showed no dramatic departure from the orthogonally rotated factor matrix already discussed and described. The inter-factor correlation matrix is shown below in Table 4.9.

¹¹ Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," op. cit.

¹² Oblique rotation is still at an experimental stage. It is far more complicated than orthogonal rotation. However, it has been argued that it approaches reality and identifies clusters better.

TABLE 4.9
INTER-FACTOR CORRELATION MATRIX

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Democratism	1.00						
2. Trust	.03	1.00					
3. Cynicism	-.07	-.02	1.00				
4. Power Monopolizer	.04	-.01	-.10	1.00			
5. Decision Maker	.23	-.24	-.03	-.06	1.00		
6. Hierarchical Barriers	.27	-.04	.06	-.19	.17	1.00	
7. Departmental Skepticism	.28	-.01	-.03	-.17	.22	.32	1.00

The factors present very low correlations among themselves. The highest correlation, showing at least 10% variation, is between Departmental Skepticism and Hierarchical Barriers. We have already suggested that conceptually these two factors appear to be very similar and 2 higher correlation could be expected. There seems to be a difference between the perceptions of the department in an overall fashion and specific perceptions of the hierarchy. However, it is also safe to assume that factors so delineated are empirically independent of each other.

In summary, then, we have delineated seven major orthogonal dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions. They are Cynicism, Democratism, Power Monopolizer, Decision Maker, Departmental Skepticism and Hierarchical Barriers. The

major variation in the data is generated by several dimensions or forms of cynicism. From the factors of Democratism and Trust, which form one group, to the other five factors, which form a group by themselves, the wide Trust/Cynicism syndrome is tapped. At least one item of personal cynicism is associated with each of the five factors of the second group. This holds true also of the factor structure of Democratism. It appears that personal trust/distrust is related to political trust/distrust. There is association between personal cynicism and some form of political cynicism. It seems that those who are contemptuous of people in general, the personally cynical, tend to be political cynical as well and those who are personally trusting tend to be politically trusting too.¹³ Thus, whether the perceptions are regarding the general political system or the administrative system, they are related to the perceptions toward people in general.

Political cynicism has taken various categories and has emerged in factors relating to form of government, attributes of good administrators departmental organization and hierarchy. It seems that the first two factors reflect a position on many social and political problems. The first factor, as such, is concerned with changes in the whole

¹³ Agger, et. al., have come to a similar conclusion. See Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," The Journal of Politics, XXIII, 1961; pp. 477-506.

system of government while the second only with the qualities of administrators. Both are concerned with effective implementation of laws and policies but the line of thought is quite different. It appears that, for the BDOs, attributes of good administrators are not a function of the administrative system; strong willed and powerful decision makers can persist in a democratic system.

It could also be expected that general departmental perceptions would form a single dimension. But a more specific factor reflecting attitudes towards hierarchy and interaction within it has also emerged. This has taken the form of perceptions of how superiors behave and how staff meetings are conducted. Thus the total picture of the department is separate from the partial picture of hierarchical relationships.

CHAPTER V

BUREAUCRATS' PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR BACKGROUND:

CANONICAL AND MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES

In our earlier chapters, we have presented two types of discussions. We have described the social background of the BDOs and have then gone on to describe and analyze the major dimensions of their perceptions. In this chapter we shall strive to investigate the inter-relationship between the two.

Social background studies have been undertaken to increase our understanding of the behavior of men interacting in an institutional framework. The purpose usually has been to express background variables as contexts for the attitudes and perceptions of the political actors. More recently effort has been directed towards prediction of attitudinal variables by a select few background indicators.¹ Our interest in analyzing and investigating the social background characteristics in this study is not only to provide a context for the attitudinal analysis but also to use them as a predictive index for attitudinal dimensions.

Thus, the two major research questions with which we

¹ For excellent summaries of these types of attempts and methodological issues involved see Lewis J. Eddinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXI, 2, pp. 428-45 and Donald Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political Studies, 1, 4, 1969; pp. 471-500.

are concerned here are:

1. Is there any relationship between the background and perceptions dimensions taken as two sets?
2. What is the extent of variation predicted by background dimensions on each of the perceptions dimensions?

The first question seeks to investigate the inter-relationship between two groups or sets of variables. For such an analysis canonical correlation is the appropriate technique. A canonical correlation is the maximum correlation between the linear functions of two sets of variables. Several linear combinations of the two sets are frequently possible. Each pair of functions is so determined as to maximize the correlation between the new pairs of canonical variates, subject to the restriction that they are independent of the previously derived linear combinations.²

The second question seeks to develop relationship between a single variable and two or more predictor variables. It examines the effect of background variables on individual attitudinal dimensions and may take the form

$$Y_1 = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + \dots + e$$

This is a simple slope-intercept equation for a straight line. Such type of a technique is multiple regression analysis which develops a straight line fit to the data

² W.W. Cooley and P.R. Lohnes, Multivariate Procedures for The Behavioral Sciences (New York, Wiley, 1962), pp. 35-45.

through the least squares method. The degree of fitness to this regression line is determined by the multiple correlation (R) and tests of significance of b_1 b_2 ... determine the significance of the contribution of each independent variable x_1 x_2 .. to the variation in dependent variable Y_1 . The standard error e determines the degree of fit of the model to the empirical data.³

To test the significance of regression coefficients, regression model requires that predictor variables must be independent of each other. The canonical model requires that the columns of variables in each set should be independent of each other. In the case of attitudinal variables we already have orthogonal dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions which are one side of input for the analysis. The other side of the input is background items and we have also extracted orthogonal factors to fulfill the demands of independence.

Most of the discussion of the background of the BDOs has already been done in the second chapter. Table 5.1 presents the background items that were factor analyzed. Under each item is given the method of coding the information and in the right hand column mean scores are given.

³ On regression analysis see M. Ezekiel and K. Fox, Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1959). N.R. Draper and H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

The factor model used has already been discussed in the last chapter. Table 5.2 presents the rotated factor matrix. Five orthogonal factors generating more or less equal amounts of variance emerged. There does not seem to be great difficulty in identifying the factors and they have been named Self-Employed Fathers, Technical Education, Rural Identity, Negative Seniority* and High Caste Hindus respectively. In the second factor it is not surprising to find an association of State and Technical Education, for in Rajasthan most of the BDOs are graduates in either veterinary sciences or agriculture (see Chapter II).

For the purposes of canonical and multiple regression analysis, we now have seven perceptions' dimensions viz. Cynicism, Democratism, Power Monopolizer, Decision Maker, Departmental Skepticism and Hierarchical Barriers and five background dimensions viz. Self-Employed Fathers, Technical Education, Rural Identity, Negative Seniority and High Caste Hindus. Factor scores give us the location of each individual on each of the dimensions and are used to derive relationships in canonical and multiple regression models.

The results of the canonical model as applied to our data are presented in Table 5.3 in a matrix form. The perceptions' matrix is organized into seven columns and the background into five. The canonical correlation is the

*Negative seniority has been used to define the dimension where the bureaucrats are young in years and have few years of service to their credit.

TABLE 5.1
BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE

<u>Items</u>	<u>Mean scores</u>
1. State Rajasthan = 1	.45
2. Age 20 - 30 = 1 30 - 40 = 2 40 and above = 3	2.14
3. Religion Hindu = 1	.88
4. Place of birth Rural = 1	.63
5. Length of service up to 15 years = 1	.74
6. No. of different gov. pos. held developmental = 1	.75
7. First 12 years of residence rural = 1	.58
8. Father's occupation professions = 1	.17
9. Father's occupation self-employed = 1	.48
10. Father's occupation government service = 1	.32
11. Caste if Hindu High caste = 1	.83
12. Academic qualifications technical grad. = 1	.38
13. medium of ed. in school English = 1	.20
14. medium of ed. in college English = 1	.84
15. kind of school attended government = 1	.54

TABLE 5.2
 ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF 15 BACKGROUND VARIABLES

<u>Variables</u>	Rotated Factor Loadings*					H-SQR
	F ₁	F ₂	F ₃	F ₄	F ₅	
9. Fathers' occ.	.91					.92
10. Fathers' occ.	-.73					.79
12. Tech. ed.		.70				.51
1. State		.63				.45
15. Kind of school		.41				.26
6. First 12 yrs.			.85			.76
4. Place of birth			.82			.69
5. Length of service				.76		.65
2. Age				-.56		.68
11. Caste					.74	.58
3. Religion					.72	.59
% Common variance	22.54	20.81	19.00	18.63	18.07	
% Total variance	21.41	20.00	17.95	17.84	17.80	

* Factor loadings = .40 given.

correlation between two corresponding columns of perceptions and background. Both of these variates are independent of all other variates. The communality estimates (H-SQR) show the percent of variance that is accounted for by the variables. All of the variance in the background matrix is accounted for in this analysis, thus all communalities are 1.00. Since this is the smaller of the two matrices all of its variance will be accounted for and there will be as many variates as

TABLE 5.3

CANONICAL COEFFICIENTS MATRIX

<u>Perceptions</u>	H-SQR	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Cynicism	.58	.49	-.31	-.10	.48	.05
Power M.	.83	.30	.74	.16	-.20	-.43
Dept. Skpt.	.40	.28	-.37	.34	-.26	-.07
Decision M.	.79	-.22	.19	.06	.79	-.27
Trust	.62	-.60	.11	.40	-.03	.27
Hierar. Barriers	.90	-.24	-.37	.23	-.08	-.81
Democratism	.81	-.32	-.15	-.80	-.13	-.17
Canonical Correlation		.51	.44	.29	.19	.16
<u>Background</u>						
Self Emp. Fathers	1.00	.11	-.42	-.75	.48	.14
Tech. Ed.	1.00	.50	.74	-.25	.01	.38
High C. Hindus	1.00	-.26	.48	.01	.63	-.56
Neg. Seniority	1.00	.75	-.31	.46	.35	-.12
Rural Identity	1.00	-.32	.03	.42	.46	.72
Trace Correlation	.43					

there are independent column factors in this matrix.⁴

Some of the dimensions of perceptions show a high relation with the canonical variates. For Hierarchical Barriers, Power Monopolizer, Democratism, and Decision Maker variance accounted for is high (above .7). There is a second set of dimensions which are moderately distinguished between a communality of .5 and .7 by the perceptions variates. These are Trust and Cynicism. The only dimension that seems to be poorly related to the canonical variates is Departmental Skepticism falling below a communality of .5.

The first combination of variates yields a correlation of .51 explaining a variation of 26.01%. Taking the coefficients equal to or greater than .30 we have the following equation:

$$.49 \text{ (Cynicism)} + .30 \text{ (Power M.)} - .60 \text{ (Trust)} - .32 \text{ (Democratism)} .51 \quad .50 \text{ (Tech. Ed.)} + .75 \text{ (Negative Sen.)} - .32 \text{ (Rural I.)}$$

This presents a relationship in which a cynical, power monopolizing and anti-democratism orientation is associated with the social background of technical education, negative seniority and urban identity. The largest association seems to be between cynicism and negative seniority. It is

⁴ For application of the canonical model see W.R. Philips and D.H. Hall, The Importance of Governmental Structure as a Taxonomic Scheme for Nations (Honolulu: DON Project, University of Hawaii, 1968).

surprising that low age and lesser years of service are associated with distrust. Usually it has been suggested that aging process brings with it increased political cynicism.⁵

The second combination of variates with a correlation of .44 explains 19.36% of variance. The following equation emerges:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & - .31 \text{ (Cynicism)} + .74 \text{ (Power M.)} - .37 \text{ (Dept. Skpt.)} - \\
 & .37 \text{ (Hier. Barr.)} .44 \quad - .42 \text{ (Self emp.)} + .74 \\
 & \text{(Tech. Ed.)} + .48 \text{ (High C. Hindus)}
 \end{aligned}$$

This presents a relationship in which a positive orientational characteristic of power monopolizing is associated with two positive background characteristics of technical education and high caste Hindus. The two variables loading the highest on these variates are those of Power Monopolizing and Technical Education. The kind of orientation that technically trained men carry has been a subject of unending debate in public administration. It has often been alleged that technicians develop a narrow outlook with biases towards their own specialty.⁶ We seem to be finding another facet of this problem. WE are finding that technical education is leading to a tendency or is associated with the

⁵ Agger, et. al., op. cit.

⁶ Jaleel Ahmad, The Expert and the Administrator (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959) see also W. Rideley, The Specialists and the Generalists (London, Allen & Unwin, 1968).

desire to increase bureaucratic power. This may be happening because of the frustrations felt in not being able to satisfy and fulfill apparently technically competent decisions. It must also be pointed out that when Rajasthan appointed BDOs who were technically trained, it assumed that specific problems of the Blocks needed special training. But it seems that attention was paid to only one aspect of Block administration. It was not imagined that technical knowledge may also bring with it certain orientations or create certain orientations.

The two combinations, discussed above, do present some interesting hypotheses regarding the working of bureaucracy. But the variation predicted is too low to warrant any firm conclusions.

These two combinations of variates present the major variation in our data. The remaining three combinations generate less than 10% of variation each and we have chosen not to present them. The average correlation between the two sets known as trace correlation is .43 generating just about 10% of variation. We find that background characteristics as a whole are able to predict only a limited variance in the perceptions of our bureaucrats.

Multiple regression takes the form of an equation as shown in the earlier part of this chapter. On the left hand side is the dependent variable which is sought to be explained by a number of independent variables. In the

step-wise regression technique that we have applied one variable is added to the regression equation at each step. The variable added is the one which makes the greatest contribution to the correlation coefficient and makes the greatest reduction in the sum of the squares.⁷ This enables us to find the contribution of each variable to the increase of variance generated. The contribution of each variable may differ and therefore it is possible to eliminate those variables whose contribution is negligible or nearly so.

TABLE 5.4
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE R RESULTS*

<u>Dependent Variables</u>	R**	% Variance
Cynicism	.31	9.28
Power M.	.37	13.75
Dept. Skpt.	.25	6.11
Decision M.	.22	4.66
Trust	.34	11.36
Hier. Barr.	.25	6.24
Democratism	.30	8.85

*Independent variables are the 5 background variables.

**The discrepancy between the correlation coefficient and the percent of variation is due to the rounding error.

We find that in all seven cases the multiple R is consistently low and most equations generate less than 10% of variance in the data. Table 5.4 above presents a summary of

⁷ For computational details see W.J. Dixon, Biomedical Computer Programs (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 233-257.

the results. The maximum variation is in the case of the equation for Power Monopolizing, 13.75% which is also statistically significant at .05 level. However, the variation is too low to generate any specific discussion on the relationship of the dependent variable to the predictors.

We would like to make one further investigation by presenting those background variables that contribute at least 1% variance in each equation. This effort is directed at finding the 'most' important background characteristics that can be considered of greater utility in such predictive exercises.

TABLE 5.5

BACKGROUND VARIABLES CONTRIBUTING AT LEAST 1%
INCREASE IN MULTIPLE R IN EACH EQUATION

<u>Dependent Variables</u>	<u>Independent Variables*</u>
Cynicism	Negative seniority, self-employed fathers
Power Monopolizer	Technical education, self-employed fathers, High caste Hindus, Rural id.
Departmental Skpt.	Negative Seniority, High caste Hindus.
Decision Maker	High caste Hindus
Trust	Negative seniority, Rural identity, Self-employed fathers
Hierarchical Barr.	Technical Education
Democratism	Negative Seniority, Self-employed Fathers

*Mentioned in each case in order of their incremental magnitude.

The three variables that seem to have the 'best' predictive ability seem to be Negative Seniority, Technical education, and Self-Employed Fathers. Table 5.5 presents the background variables in each equation, identified by the dependent variables, which add at least 1% variance to the multiple correlation.

Within this limited variance we find that background characteristics relating to social origins like place of birth and upbringing, religion and caste and even fathers' occupations are less significant in predicting bureaucratic perceptions than age and length of service and technical education. It must be noticed that such experiences that relate more to later adult experiences are more relevant.

In six out of the seven equations either Negative Seniority or Technical Education is the 'best' predictor. In four perceptions' dimensions that concern themselves with the trust/cynicism syndrome, negative seniority maximises the variance while in the dimensions concerning themselves with bureaucratic power syndrome technical education does the same. We find similar results from the canonical analysis. In the two canonical variates that we have presented earlier, we find that Negative Seniority is associated with Cynicism and Technical Education with Power Monopolizing if only those variables are included which have the maximum coefficients.

Apparently, background variables have very little

influence in moulding bureaucratic perceptions.⁸ The data suggests that the socialization of bureaucrats is not restricted to the early years of life cycle. It is possible that such bureaucratic perceptions that we have delineated can be explained in terms of later experiences particularly those that come after entering the bureaucracy. For attitudes towards the politicians, the administrative system and the governmental environment may be formed by exposure to the specific political stimuli. They can be formed by the intentional and unintentional exposure to the opinions of the group of which a bureaucrat becomes a member. Prevailing views and their intensity may have greatly to do with how a newly recruited individual perceives reality.

Attributes like individual's place in hierarchy, his career patterns, executive or staff nature of his job or frequency of exposure to the outside pressures may also be relevant. These characteristics may be playing a greater role in moulding his perceptions than the earlier experiences of life. Thus, whether a person belongs to an upper caste or lower caste perhaps may have nothing to do with his measure of suspicion of the local politician when he is a BDO. This argument is also supported by the analysis that

⁸ See Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1967) pp. 266-74; also H. Eulau, L. Ferguson, J.C. Wahlke, "Political Socialization of State Legislators," Midwest Journal of Political Science III, 1959, pp. 188-206.

negative seniority and technical education are the more influential variables. It seems plausible that attention must be paid to later life experiences and also to bureaucracy as an agent of socialization.

It is quite possible that choice of bureaucracy as a profession may be dependent upon the earlier experiences or conventional background attributes. For example, fathers' governmental occupation may be an important variable in the fact that the single largest group of entrants into the IAS in India come from this background. But once having entered the service, however, it seems the internal influences supersede all the earlier ones.

Finally, another conclusion that can be tentatively presented is that some background characteristics are more important than others. It seems futile to expect all the variables to have the same predictive capacity. This helps in choice of background characteristics for particular research purposes.

CHAPTER VI
BUREAUCRATIC PROFILES

Our earlier analysis of bureaucratic backgrounds and perceptions did not differentiate between the two states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh from where the sample comes. We have treated the BDOs as belonging to a single group. But this might be an artifact of our own imposition and empirically the two groups may not only be geographically distinct but also attitudinally so. Thus the question before us is: Are the two groups based on geographical areas also two groups based on their behavioral orientations? If yes, then the next question is: What is the profile of each group of bureaucrats?

To answer the first question, multiple discriminant function analysis is the appropriate technique. The primary problem with which it has been associated with is categorization and in psychological tests it answers the question, "How can I analyze the data so I may determine the group in which an individual is most like?"¹ What discriminant analysis does for us is

1. To maximize the ratio between group variance to within group variance and
2. To select variables used in the formation of

¹ D.V. Tiedman, "The Utility of the Discriminant Function in Psychological and Guidance Investigations," Harvard Educational Review, XXXI, 2, 1951; p. 73.

dimensions (the discriminant functions) so as to assure the ratio in criterion (1) is maximum of statistically maxima of the ratio.²

Our first interest, thus, lies in maximizing the between group variance to within group variance and determining whether the ratio is statistically significant or not. Mahalanobis' D-square statistic is constructed for this purpose and F-ratio is formed to determine its statistical significance. Our second interest lies in finding those variables that contribute most to the discriminant function. Again, the contribution of each variable can be tested for statistical significance through an F-ratio. Finally, our interest is in the classification of the bureaucrats in their most likely group. To summarize, the three research questions are:

1. Do the dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions discriminate significantly between the BDOs from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh?
2. What are the dimensions that make significant contributions to the discriminant function?
3. How many BDOs can be classified in their own group on the basis of the discriminant function?

Table 6.1 presents a summary of results of the discriminant

² Robert E. Pendley, Multiple Discriminant Analysis in Political Research, (Honolulu: Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, 1969), unpublished paper.

function analysis. First, the variables and the discriminant function/F-ratio are laid out. The last column tells us whether an F-ratio is statistically significant or not. The last row presents the D-square statistic/F-ratio and its significance.

TABLE 6.1
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSIS
SUMMARY OF RESULTS

<u>Variables</u>	Discriminant Function/F-ratio	Significant p = .05
Power Monopolizing	8.95	Yes
Hierarchical Barriers	4.36	Yes
Democratism	3.51	Yes
Trust	1.52	No
Cynicism	1.41	No
Decision Maker	1.26	No
Departmental Skepticism	.10	No

D-Square/F-ratio = 2.93 significant p = .05

The first important conclusions that can be drawn from the above is that the BDOs from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are significantly different from each other along the dimensions of bureaucratic perceptions. The second important conclusion is that only three variables Power Monopolizing, Hierarchical Barriers and Democratism make a significant contribution to the discriminant function.

On the basis of discriminant function, the bureaucrats have been classified as follows:

TABLE 6.2
NUMBER OF BDOs ASSIGNED TO
RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH

	Rajasthan	Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan	72.5%	34.2%
Uttar Pradesh	27.5%	65.3%
	N=40	N=49

72.5% of BDOs in Rajasthan and 65.3% of BDOs in U.P. have been classified in their own group. This means that bureaucratic perceptions have discriminated remarkably well between the two groups.

We are now in a position to develop a profile of the two groups of bureaucrats along the dimensions of their behavioral orientations. A computer technique has been developed to plot the underlying similarity of groups. What this program basically does is to present the group averages on the population mean of the perceptions dimensions. If the mean profile score of each group is far removed from the mean profile score of the population a distinguishing characteristic has been found. It can be said that that group members are similar on that characteristic. Since we normally find a variation about the group mean score, group standard deviation can measure group cohesion on that




FIGURE VI-1. PROFILE OF BDOs OF RAJASTHAN




FIGURE VI-2. PROFILE OF BDOs FROM UTTAR PRADESH

characteristic.³ Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 present a profile of the bureaucrats from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Rajasthan is well above the mean on the dimension of Power Monopolizing while U.P. is well below it. This seems to be the dominant characteristic and it has also been brought out by the discriminant analysis. The two other minor distinguishing features are the negative scores of Rajasthan on Democratism and Hierarchical Barriers. Let us recapitulate a little about the content of the factors that describe Rajasthan in contrast to U.P. Power Monopolizing was concerned with the desire to increase bureaucratic power even at the cost of democracy. The need of a dictator at least for a few years was associated with it. It expressed the conviction of bureaucrats that the country would do much better if bureaucracy was allowed considerable power in implementing laws and governmental policies. Democratism was concerned with the acceptance of the current political institutions and processes. It also expressed wider trust in human relationships. The profile of Rajasthan bureaucrats shows that they score positively on the former and negatively on the latter. The total picture that emerges is that greater autocratic and anti-democratic orientations are exhibited by Rajasthan than U.P.

³ For the description of the computer technique employed see D.H. Hall, Computer Program Profile, (Honolulu: DON Project, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, 1968).

At this point, we can raise the interesting question, though a little difficult one, Why are the two states different? Why is one more autocratic than the other? A host of factors can be responsible for this difference. General cultural formulations are wide in scope and no specific studies have been made to show cultural differences in this framework. For most practical purposes, the two states have been considered more like than unlike each other.

Let us turn our attention to three factors where greater specificity can follow in the discussion. In the last chapter, we had found that background characteristics do not predict significantly bureaucratic perceptions. But we also found that technical education and power monopolizing dimension go together. If we look back at the background characteristics, we find that they are largely similar in both the states but for the type of education. If central tendencies can be taken as an indication for comparative purposes, the only remarkable difference is that BDOs in Rajasthan are graduates in agriculture and veterinary science while in U.P. they come more from general humanities and social sciences background. This gives strength to the hypothesis that technical education leads to power monopolizing orientation.

TABLE 6.3
 COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
 OF BDOs IN RAJASTHAN AND UTTAR PRADESH*

<u>Background Characteristic</u>	<u>Rajasthan</u>	<u>Uttar Pradesh</u>
Age	35.50 yrs.	38.9 yrs.
Place of Birth	Rural	Rural
Education	Technical	General
Father's Occupation	Agriculture	Agriculture
Religion	Hindu	Hindu
Caste	High	High
Length of Service	10.9 yrs.	11.3 yrs.
Kind of school	Government	Government
Medium of education (school)	Hindi	Hindi
Medium of education (college)	English	English

*For age and length of service, arithmetic mean has been computed, for the rest mode.

BDOs in U.P. are about three years older but have put in only about 0.4 years more in service than the BDOs in Rajasthan. On the rest of the characteristics the BDOs from the two states are identical. Table 6.3 presents the comparative data. Thus, one important reason that we can posit for the difference between the two states is that of educational background. Technical people have been alleged to carry a narrow outlook in administration because of their specialization. They tend to see the general problems from a more

technical standpoint. If this is so, then it is easy to see why they get frustrated quickly and why they desire that more power should be put in their hands to achieve and implement given policies. We have already pointed out that Rajasthan's decision to appoint such people was taken specifically to help solve the technical problems of Block development. It was not foreseen, however, that such people would carry such orientations to their responsibilities which are opposite to what is desired of them in democratic administration.

Let us also turn our attention to the career patterns of the BDOs in the two states. Some interesting contrasts can be found. In Rajasthan, BDOs come to serve in the Community Development and Panchayati Raj Administration on deputation from their departments namely, Department of Agriculture in the case of agriculture graduates and Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandary in case of graduates of Vet.Sc. A number of them have been Extension Officers in the Blocks or have served them in another capacity. Thus when they are appointed as BDOs they are already acquainted with the problems of Block administration. But Block administration is not their career for their ladder steps in the hierarchy lie elsewhere in their respective departments. Merit or seniority are departmentally decided and service in the Blocks may not be necessarily useful as a criterion of promotion.

In contrast, BDOs in U.P. have been recruited for

primarily that office through a regular civil service examination. The career pursued is that of a BDO and a graduated scale of pay with promotions in salary scales is provided. Two kinds of persons are eligible for the service; graduates between 21 and 30 years of age and persons who are already in government service and are below 35 years of age. The State Civil Service Commission advertises the positions and holds the examinations for selection. Till their retirement, candidates continue to serve as BDOs and only in rare cases are they promoted to be District Planning Officers. However, about 10% of the total number of BDOs are usually in senior scale of pay. One interesting aspect of this career is that candidates have to go through a three month training on their own expense before being given charge of the Blocks. It is hard to say whether the large number of applicants in spite of this initial expense is due to attractive job prospects or scarcity of employment. But the fact remains that they bear with it.

It seems then, that the BDOs with at least a theoretical choice of foresaking the job and following the usual steps in departmental career are different from those who are pursuing Block administration as a career and their promotion lies on what they do and do not do in the Block. The tendency to treat his assignment as important appears to be of considerable influence in moulding the outlook of the BDOs. The

compulsion to develop more understanding of the political environment should exist in greater intensity where the whole career is at stake. After all, each individual when he is under pressure usually opts for some safety in order to protect himself. For a bureaucrat this option of safety may just lie in going along with the turbulent politics and in accepting the political leaders as the legitimate sources of command and power. The acute bitterness and distrust that characterizes bureaucrats in a developing political system like the one under study, emanates primarily from the non-acceptance of the new elements and sources of power. Possibly, the protection that technical independence provides to each BDO in Rajasthan seeks to encourage precisely the image that comes in constant confrontation with the new forces of politics.

Finally, another factor that may have considerable import in explaining the differences between Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh is the political experience and heritage of the two states. In describing the research setting earlier, we have pointed out two important features. The first feature is about the exposure of the State to politics and democracy. Uttar Pradesh has been the home of the nationalist movement; many contemporary trends in Indian politics can be traced to what happened here. On the other hand, Rajasthan has been essentially isolated from the mainstream of politics and has really arrived on the political scene only after

Independence. The longer tradition of actual involvement in politics in U.P. must have helped in building a rapport between the administrators and the politicians. It at least provided a useful process of learning about each other.

In Rajasthan, administrators were trained in a feudal system where loyalty to an individual Prince was placed above all priorities in governance. There was a clear cut line of control and supervision and source of command could be easily identified. The state was also deprived of modern political and administrative experience gained in other areas of British India. There were few advisory assemblies or municipalities. Political leaders who emerged in post-Independence era had little or no previous experience in administration. We are suggesting that this background of state politics and administration may still be a powerful influence in moulding the outlook of the bureaucrats.

In conclusion, it appears to us, that the three important factors that have led Rajasthani BDOs to be more inclined towards 'autoractism' are technical education, lack of career into the general framework of Community Development and Panchayati Raj administration and a general lack of exposure to politics and a comparative short time of working with democracy. Whenever a new administration has been created in India a debate to introduce another cadre of civil service to man it has always followed. With Community Development Administration the question that was faced early

by the planners was whether to create a new cadre of BDOs or borrow from the existing cadre of civil services. Rajasthan has switched to technical personnel to man their blocks from the State Civil Service cadre only recently. U.P. has always had a separate cadre for the BDOs. Most of the discussion has centered round administrative and technical competence but much less attention has been paid to the ability to work with the new political elite and within an atmosphere of constant political tension. From the discussions in the present research, this is equally if not more important. Much of administration of development seems to be administration of confrontation. Conflicts seem to increase when bureaucrats are permitted to use career independence as a weapon of aggression or protection.

Also, the capacity of the bureaucrats to develop a working relationship with the new forces of politics seems to grow as exposure to democratic forces increases. This is merely saying that considerable time is required for an adjustment to take place. U.P. has long been in the independence struggle and the present generation of bureaucrats has at least grown up in an atmosphere of political upheaval and the rise of social aspirations. There is no doubt that people in U.P. have had much greater acquaintance with the individual politician than those in Rajasthan. It is reasonable to contend then that time is an important factor in developing more congenial perceptions towards

democracy and greater exposure to politicians will lead to greater adjustment over time.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation has grown out of two major concerns. The first one has been the examination and analysis of bureaucratic perceptions towards development and democracy. The aim of this effort is to provide a greater understanding of the individual bureaucrat in his performance as an agent of change. The second concern has been the building of an empirical base for further formulation of meaningful propositions about Indian bureaucratic behavior in relation to the strains of development. Thus we addressed ourselves to the following research goals:

1. To delineate the major dimensions of bureaucratic thinking and perceptions
2. To place the individual bureaucrat in his social and work setting
3. To investigate the relationship between the social background of the bureaucrats and their perceptions
4. To develop typologies of the bureaucrats in the total developmental context of two states.

The thread of argument in this dissertation has grown out of the peculiar experiences of the developing societies. For them the easiest part of the developmental effort has been laying out beautiful plans and schemes; the hardest part has been their implementation. We are thus assuming the great importance of implementation in the total context.

We also feel that much of the success of this implementation depends on the quality of men responsible for it. Their enthusiasm or indifference, their favourable or unfavourable perceptions of their own rôle seems to be of considerable significance in this activity. For much that is desired of the future depends on the dedication, commitment and high hopes of those who have been made responsible to initiate and bring about change. Their capacity to maintain favourable images of themselves and of others who are partners in their effort are necessary for accomplishment and achievement of developmental objectives. We assume that bureaucrats cast their influence on the way development progresses by the way they react to it.

To explore the content of such orientations we concerned ourselves with the self-identification and self-images of the bureaucrats. We attempted to investigate the bureaucrats' perceptions of the outstanding attitudes, behaviors and practices of their public administration system. The objective validity of these perceptions was less significant than the fact that they were believed to be true. They were the realities of the situation as far as the bureaucrats were concerned and their actions and reactions were governed by this subjective world. The key point was that this world of 'reality' acts as the central conditioner for decision making. Each actor in the decision making process attaches his own meaning to the problems before disposing them off.

It was this meaning, we assumed, that would help us in building propositions about bureaucratic behavior and lead us to greater understanding of the performance of the individual bureaucrat.

Our concern for providing systematic data about bureaucratic orientations has been motivated by two types of commentaries on the contemporary Indian bureaucrats. Many students have observed that Indian bureaucracy still carries a heavy baggage from the past. This baggage primarily consists of ICS traditions and orientations of colonial administration. On the other hand, India's nationalist leaders have placed heavy demands of excellence on the bureaucracy. They have demanded not only great competence but dedication, sacrifice, austerity and qualities of popular leadership. But very little empirical research has been undertaken to investigate the extent of the bureaucratic legacy or the extent of the absorption of the exhortations of the political leaders. Our research is an attempt to fill this gap.

Data for this study were based on survey questionnaires administered to a random sample of Block Development Officers (BDOs) of the two states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh through personal interviews. BDOs were chosen because they are local administrators and also important functionaries of Community Development Administration. Local administrators are significant because at that level

the government and the people meet, the hardest core of traditions are found and the policy undergoes its most severe test for implementation. Community Development Administration is significant because it is the most important single agency for government initiated change in the rural areas. Thus we attempted to provide contemporary context and relevance to our study.

Most of the BDOs in our study joined the government service after India became independent. They are mostly young people in their thirties. They come from a rural or small town background and only a very few have been born and raised in large metropolitan cities. Their fathers too come mostly from rural occupations and do not exhibit great contact with the urban areas. There is no sign of elitism from the character of their education; none of them have studied in the prestigious English medium schools or colleges or gone out of their state to get higher education. However, most do belong to the higher castes.

In spite of this rural orientation, which is in sharp contrast to that of the higher civil service, the BDOs have an urban bias in their aspirations of the future. All would like their children to be educated in the prestigious English medium schools and go to professional schools of medicine and engineering. Not only do the bureaucrats reject government service as an option for their children, they also reject any rural occupation like agriculture.

Even business or industry is not opted for. Overwhelmingly, the choice is for engineering and medicine and in that order. Choice of entry into the elite status is perceived to be through the professions. This is a change from the past when government service was perceived to be the best passport. From the social point of view this is a welcome diversification in attaching prestige to professions but the options are so narrow that the choice may be frustrating personally.

Economically, the prestigious schools and professional institutions are very expensive and it is unlikely if not impossible that the BDOs can afford to fulfill their aspirations. Salaries are comparatively low between the income brackets of Rs. 275 and Rs. 900 in contrast to those of the IAS between Rs. 400 and Rs. 2250 or more. The salary at which an IAS can send his child to such a school will be the maximum a BDO can reach in his life. BDOs are undoubtedly aware of this wide disparity between ambition and achievement. The consciousness of this fact is bound to spread frustration among them.

This aspiration apart from the point of view of economic frustration must also be looked at as an expression of a strong desire to move away to urban occupations and environment. Most of the bureaucrats coming from agricultural families consider themselves better off than their fathers economically. When they compare themselves with their family

past, their current bureaucratic occupation is looked at with satisfaction. This is not true when they compare others with themselves. Hence the choice of technical professions for their children. The dissatisfaction with government service is therefore not when they compare themselves with their fathers but when they look at the whole social environment.

However one may view this, there seems to be strong indication of a desire to move from rural to urban and enter the urban elite. The proposition that emerges from this discussion is that rural orientation (in terms of background) does not lead to rural affinity. In most of the discussions of bureaucratic dispositions and how they are at odds with the mass culture it was widely assumed that urban character and elitist nature of the civil service had much to do with it. Once the civil service was rural based an identity with the rural masses will emerge. Our research does not support this view. It also substantiates the view that bureaucrats under study have also not absorbed the exhortations of the politicians in this regard.

This contention is further reinforced by the views that bureaucrats hold of the society and the people. It is reasonable to assume that these opinions are primarily shaped by the rural environment in which they work and live. Common people are perceived as lacking in ability to discern their own good and in the capacity to make rational

choices. They are assumed to be easily swayed by parochial influences of region, caste or community. They are ignorant, uneducated and illiterate. Politicians are looked at with marked hostility and all the ills of today are blamed on them. Corruption of all kinds, moral or otherwise, is rising with the advent of democracy in the villages. Rarely is there a word of appreciation for the villager or his village. The research suggests that a view that comes of understanding is completely lacking.

General suspicion of the environment and intense hostility towards politicians is marked by a high regard in which the bureaucrats hold themselves. They do not consider themselves enmeshed in corruption as the rest of the society is. They are confident that if they had power the political atmosphere will be purged of its evil and justice and fair play will reign. A well administered state will emerge.

These orientations can be easily recognized as following a pattern by which the colonial administrators were known. Such close similarity does unfold a linkage between the past and the present. We consider this important but we would like to place the problem in the wider perspective of developing nations. We may be oversimplifying the phenomenon and ignoring the total political chess-board. It is quite possible that extreme confidence in bureaucratic efficacy is a compensation of a feeling of helplessness and impotency. Psychologically, among the many consequences of being

threatened is rigidity of mind. All these orientation may be merely displaying aspects of this rigidity. Therefore bureaucrats react to a threatening and insecure political environment by building a protective wall around themselves; high self-esteem is a wall of this kind. It is suggested, in addition, that the intensity with which the bureaucrats hold themselves in esteem is a function of the intensity with which they look at those who are perceived to be sources of threat. It will be interesting to find out how bureaucrats have reacted to a political environment of a developing society not part of the British administrative heritage. Our suspicion is that such bureaucratic perceptions are shaped more by the experiences of the present and less by the heritage of the past.

One consequence of such an unfavorable view of the present is general pessimism. BODs widely believe that there is progressive deterioration in the general conditions and administration in the society. The past is conceived as better and the future as worse than the present. We have classified BDOs holding this consistent view as 'past oriented.' The whole concept of development is future oriented and is based on the assumption of a better tomorrow. It seems that the bureaucrats do not subscribe to this ideology.

Another evidence of such a lack of commitment is the cynical opinion bureaucrats have of politics, politicians and democracy. Their whole job is dependent upon their

constant interaction with the very objects they view with disfavor. Such bureaucrats display a desire to monopolize all power in their own hands in order to be effective. We have classified them as 'power monopolizers.' These BDOs do not appear to accept the larger framework by which the politicians and the common masses establish priorities for things to be done. Strikes, riots and turmoil further reinforce their impressions of their helplessness in the situation and they react against the distribution of power and the general system.

Thus, the evidence in this study, leads us to suggest that the BDOs have not imbibed the public service or democratic exhortations of the political leaders. Their commitment to the whole ideology is weak. They would not continue here if alternative employment were available.

In an effort to develop the concepts that best captured the basic underlying dimensions in our data on bureaucratic perceptions we delineated seven major dimensions from factor analysis. Items on personal cynicism were grouped together and the factor was named Cynicism. Distrust of democracy and desire for increase in bureaucratic power correlated on a single factor and it was named Power Monopolizer. Qualities of a good administrator grouped themselves together. They were describing a strong decision maker and the factor was named Decision Maker. Lack of faith in departmental justice and lack of organizational ability to

give recognition or reward to its members formed a single factor which was named Departmental Skepticism. Inhibitions within the hierarchy and perceptions of superiors being status conscious correlated to form the factor named Hierarchical Barriers. Personal trust and faith in democracy and current political institutions like elections and the Supreme Court formed into two separate factors called Trust and Democratism.

The various grouping of the items brought out the underlying features of bureaucratic perceptions. The concept of democracy meant faith in human nature, in persuasion, and in current political institutions. It ruled out strong discipline in bringing up the children or newspapers being instruments of propaganda of influential men. The concept of power monopolizer meant not only a desire to increase bureaucratic power but also anti-democratic orientation. It professed belief in efficacy of a dictator in the present time and also in strengthening bureaucracy. The concept of a strong decision maker was isolated from any anti-democratic orientation. It did not appear to be associated with dissatisfaction with the present system and saw improvement in the situation through personal qualities of individual bureaucrats. The larger concept of administrative trust/distrust broke into two factors relating to organization and hierarchy. These two factors conceptually form one dimension but have been separate empirically.

Contrary to our expectations, socio-cultural background variables failed to predict effective variation in the above dimensions. However, we did arrive at two preliminary conclusions. We found that more important variables for prediction were Seniority and Technical Education. We also found that Negative Seniority and Cynicism, and Technical Education and Power Monopolizing were associated. It seems further investigations are warranted in this direction.

Both canonical and regression exercises demonstrated, however, that early socialization experiences have little influence in shaping political perceptions. We suggest that these perceptions may be better explained by the socializing influence of bureaucratic institutions themselves. This is related to our earlier argument that the administrative legacy may be less important in shaping bureaucratic perceptions. Bureaucracy provides exposure to the opinions of others in a similar position, it provides exposure to the political environment of pressures and manipulation and also exposure to organizational system of rewards and punishment. It is possible these are such strong influences that they supersede the past influences. We would suggest greater research in this direction.

Finally, BDOs from Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh differed significantly along these dimensions. It was found too that Rajasthan exhibited higher score on Power Monopolizing dimension and lower on Democratism than Uttar Pradesh. This

means that Rajasthan bureaucrats carry greater distrust towards politics and democracy and also a stronger desire to increase bureaucratic power. We have suggested three possible reasons for this difference. Rajasthan BDOs look to their parent departments for career and promotion and are not part of the Community Development hierarchy as such; Uttar Pradesh BDOs belong to a separate cadre that has been formed to serve only Community Development. Rajasthan BDOs are predominantly graduates in technical subjects of agriculture and animal sciences and are professionally trained; Uttar Pradesh BDOs are graduates in the general subjects and are not professionally trained. This is also corroborated by our earlier finding that Technical Education and Power Monopolizing orientation go together. Finally, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh also present a contrast in their political heritage. Rajasthan has had a feudal background. There were small rulers and Princes who perpetrated autocratic rule; whatever happened in the individual states was willed mostly by a single man. In most cases even advisory councils were absent and elections were unknown. Democracy came to it only after India became independent. Uttar Pradesh was the home of the independence movement. It experienced struggles and mass movements against the British; it was the home of the Congress movement. Thus, it has had much greater experience of interaction between the politicians and the bureaucrats. We suggest that these factors have led the bureaucrats to perceive reality quite differently.

In conclusion, then, this study has forcefully presented bureaucratic expectations and images. We have attempted to build a clear picture of bureaucratic perceptions. We find that administration of developmental programs is not merely a technical matter. It is not an issue that can be taken care of merely by changing organizational structures and procedures. Much depends on the mutual relationships of men participating in it. More often than not, administration of development becomes administration of confrontation. Everybody seems to be demanding goods and services of the government. By the very nature of things government is unable to provide them. Scarcity leads to the complication of the problem. Ultimately, government becomes an arbiter in the distribution and accepts the role of minimizing conflict in the process. Thus, when a BDO gets only one well dug when five were needed or distributes only 100 bags of fertilizer when 500 were asked for, he is confronted with demands which he cannot basically satisfy. He is now expected to cool the frayed tempers and satisfy the disappointed.

We suggest that this role of his is more important in the Block than any other. His capacity to get along with the colleagues, with the political leaders and the people supersedes all other requirements of the job. His failure here is a failure at the job. His technical competence does not seem to be an adequate compensation for this. What is needed

is understanding of the environment and the people. Widening of technical horizons without the absorption of motivational goals leads to orientations not consistent with the aims of the developmental programs. Going back to Lerner, the ability to understand a wide variety of men and situations is the prime need.

If this quality is so important--and this study leads us to believe that it is so--we would forcefully argue that the government should pay greater attention in finding and developing such a quality in their administrators. Decisions regarding recruitment and training must also be based on how greater understanding of the political environment and sympathy for the politicians can be evoked among the bureaucrats. We do not think, for example, that Rajasthan government had these types of considerations in mind when it chose to appoint BDOs with technical qualifications. How they would react to an environment and should that be an important criterion in appointments may have found no appeal. We would emphasize that democracy and development are ways of life and the establishment of institutions does not usher them. Men are important and in the formulation of policies they must not be forgotten.

Panchayati Raj and Community Development are bold experiments in bringing democracy and development to the door step of large majority of men in India. The quality of bureaucrats involved should not be brushed aside. Beliefs

in efficacy and trust in government are to a great extent moulded by these BDOs. They are very important components of the whole system. The problem of the new nations is not so much of competent bureaucrats at the top but effective administrators at the bottom. Beautiful plans and schemes can be laid out but failure lies at the implementation stage. Therefore, this study presents strong argument to turn research attention to the local administrators from the higher civil service. It is well known that the national administrative system has usually attracted the interest of the greater number of researchers. The local and state level bureaucrats have been largely ignored. This study has attempted to fill the gap with regard to local administrators and presented data pertaining to their social background, experiences and perceptions.

One of the important expectations of this study--the social background characteristics will be related to bureaucratic perceptions--has not been confirmed by the data. We propose that bureaucracy as an institution must be further investigated for socializing influences. We would suggest that career structure, organizational sanctions and the whole system of reward and punishment may be useful avenues in this field.

Finally, we think that bureaucratic orientations can be very useful in distinguishing one from another. Much greater understanding of the Indian bureaucratic system can

be attained if the peculiar bureaucratic world of each state can be mapped out. This may show the necessity of suiting bureaucratic organizations to the environment of each state and not simply emphasizing uniformity and homogeneity. We can also attempt to use bureaucratic orientations to distinguish one administration from another. This would help develop typologies of administrations concerned with law and order or public welfare. This would be an important contribution in classification of men and administration.

We would like to conclude by saying that the role of bureaucrats rises in significance with the creation of every new public institution in the new nations. It is still intriguing how to get the bureaucrats into the spirit of the system and breed such enthusiasm that it becomes infectious. Replacing one official or providing him with more impressive position has failed to provide the necessary impetus. The problem has to be tackled from a psychological perspective and ways must be found to elicit their commitment to the developmental ideology.

APPENDIX A
CORRELATION MATRIX WITH SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION
COEFFICIENT IN THE DIAGONAL (44 ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES)

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES						EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION							
VARIABLE		MATRIX TO BE FACTORED IS CORRELATION MATRIX											
NO.	NAME	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1		0.667											
2		0.292	0.789										
3		0.180	0.423	0.670									
4		0.342	0.200	0.105	0.688								
5		0.314	0.320	0.365	0.340	0.697							
6		-0.021	0.133	-0.043	0.314	0.092	0.666						
7		0.071	0.185	0.196	-0.143	0.157	-0.149	0.642					
8		0.256	0.415	0.100	0.243	0.324	0.010	0.238	0.650				
9		-0.273	-0.006	0.142	-0.140	0.024	-0.051	-0.174	-0.255	0.633			
10		-0.121	-0.280	-0.177	-0.258	-0.181	-0.099	-0.331	-0.277	0.274	0.619		
11		-0.101	0.293	0.068	-0.019	0.197	0.132	-0.023	0.057	0.126	-0.004	0.675	
12		-0.125	0.209	0.171	0.072	0.076	-0.070	0.102	0.082	-0.049	-0.125	0.176	0.640

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES

EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION

		MATRIX TO BE FACTORED IS CORRELATION MATRIX											
VARIABLE NC.	NAME	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13		0.663											
14		0.171	0.649										
15		0.012	-0.082	0.675									
16		-0.138	-0.100	0.147	0.692								
17		0.124	0.160	-0.153	-0.165	0.768							
18		-0.174	-0.225	0.254	0.258	-0.149	0.597						
19		0.048	0.122	-0.193	0.082	-0.021	0.184	0.760					
20		0.330	0.104	-0.011	0.120	-0.001	-0.061	0.094	0.511				
21		0.026	0.003	0.182	0.163	-0.053	0.261	0.298	0.164	0.639			
22		0.132	0.135	-0.023	-0.190	-0.015	-0.011	0.270	-0.136	0.206	0.635		
23		0.144	-0.095	0.121	0.252	-0.163	0.086	-0.167	0.068	0.192	0.026	0.737	
24		0.168	0.161	0.004	0.093	0.024	-0.019	-0.036	0.115	0.165	0.018	0.344	0.696

VARIABLE NO. NAME	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
25	0.691											
26	-0.113	0.678										
27	0.460	-0.094	0.806									
28	0.048	0.271	0.010	0.622								
29	-0.267	0.167	-0.081	0.364	0.826							
30	-0.335	0.234	-0.071	0.221	0.645	0.702						
31	-0.101	-0.074	0.014	-0.052	-0.011	0.013	0.768					
32	0.164	-0.244	-0.115	-0.099	-0.208	-0.240	-0.155	0.663				
33	-0.099	-0.155	0.015	-0.203	-0.093	-0.160	-0.094	0.154	0.717			
34	-0.110	0.092	-0.386	-0.008	0.026	0.151	-0.099	0.040	0.050	0.731		
35	-0.071	0.083	-0.003	-0.028	0.045	0.099	0.594	-0.370	-0.468	-0.370	0.842	
36	-0.109	-0.148	-0.040	0.143	0.004	-0.026	-0.093	0.204	0.200	0.001	-0.281	0.632

VARIABLE	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
NO. NAME								
37	C.709							
38	-C.080	0.758						
39	-C.076	-0.067	0.743					
40	C.005	-0.145	0.050	0.780				
41	0.060	-0.062	-0.114	0.184	0.636			
42	C.002	0.103	0.122	0.035	0.033	C.590		
43	0.032	-0.260	0.027	-0.023	-0.080	0.103	0.616	
44	-0.010	-0.174	-0.250	-0.616	0.038	-0.173	0.021	0.848

APPENDIX B

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX SEVEN FACTORS: ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES		EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION						
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX								
FACTOR NUMBER SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		1 3.444	2 2.568	3 2.079	4 2.189	5 2.596	6 2.075	7 2.883
VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 7 FACTORS							
1	0.458	-0.025	0.186	0.198	-0.178	-0.129	-0.039	-0.578
2	0.636	0.324	-0.070	0.062	-0.326	-0.078	0.512	-0.385
3	0.326	0.437	-0.038	0.175	-0.020	0.024	0.219	-0.231
4	0.484	0.023	0.557	0.048	-0.187	0.034	0.140	-0.340
5	0.450	0.195	0.294	0.079	0.116	0.044	0.360	-0.418
6	0.476	0.019	0.488	-0.407	0.013	-0.138	0.226	-0.037
7	0.346	0.494	-0.224	0.024	-0.021	-0.031	-0.044	-0.219
8	0.376	0.060	0.087	0.084	-0.122	0.143	0.250	-0.508
9	0.211	-0.090	-0.078	0.014	-0.107	-0.051	0.242	0.351
10	0.372	-0.369	-0.192	-0.131	-0.074	0.147	-0.015	0.393
11	0.413	0.010	-0.062	0.037	0.164	-0.208	0.575	0.081
12	0.447	0.340	-0.154	0.289	0.120	0.244	0.384	0.046
13	0.310	0.205	0.009	-0.390	-0.027	0.104	-0.137	0.292
14	0.441	0.055	0.216	-0.567	0.191	0.026	-0.179	-0.065
15	0.304	0.384	-0.102	0.258	0.123	-0.001	0.317	0.156
16	0.371	0.432	-0.134	0.265	-0.152	0.204	0.084	-0.157
17	0.325	-0.022	0.479	-0.181	0.120	0.107	-0.170	0.095
18	0.382	0.181	-0.079	0.415	0.006	0.360	0.201	0.032
19	0.488	-0.132	-0.179	-0.224	-0.053	0.606	-0.104	0.088
20	0.212	0.242	-0.087	-0.204	0.102	0.233	-0.092	-0.073
21	0.388	0.272	-0.087	-0.201	-0.007	0.376	0.327	0.135
22	0.215	-0.074	-0.218	-0.322	-0.103	0.090	0.020	0.197
23	0.523	0.510	0.011	-0.100	-0.436	-0.063	0.228	-0.086
24	0.458	0.591	-0.004	-0.318	0.041	-0.062	-0.046	-0.004
25	0.581	0.733	0.041	-0.069	-0.087	-0.129	0.034	0.106
26	0.373	-0.067	0.010	0.037	0.168	0.359	0.454	-0.063
27	0.569	0.714	0.181	0.101	0.099	-0.034	-0.050	0.052
28	0.241	0.044	0.157	0.170	0.048	0.424	0.055	-0.006
29	0.669	-0.147	-0.001	-0.022	0.064	0.800	-0.056	-0.006
30	0.442	-0.241	-0.141	0.018	0.203	0.567	0.017	0.017
31	0.396	0.054	-0.203	0.019	0.104	-0.062	-0.091	-0.573
32	0.435	0.101	-0.093	-0.104	-0.546	-0.197	-0.170	0.196
33	0.381	-0.139	0.040	0.007	-0.554	-0.179	0.114	0.086
34	0.499	-0.355	-0.151	-0.208	-0.166	0.122	0.313	0.409
35	0.759	0.083	-0.089	-0.065	0.534	0.019	-0.053	-0.672
36	0.529	-0.154	0.361	0.269	-0.465	0.032	-0.292	-0.006
37	0.149	-0.102	0.056	-0.148	0.024	0.111	0.020	-0.316
38	0.333	0.179	0.178	0.266	0.327	0.110	0.030	0.281
39	0.229	0.152	-0.043	0.155	-0.261	0.316	-0.033	-0.097
40	0.474	-0.054	-0.655	-0.042	0.089	0.056	0.170	-0.019

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES

EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

FACTOR NUMBER		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		3.444	2.568	2.079	2.189	2.596	2.075	2.883
VARIABLE NO.	COMMUNALITY NAME	7 FACTORS						
41	0.157	-0.062	-0.034	-0.036	0.373	-0.053	0.093	-0.014
42	0.317	0.122	-0.266	0.412	0.069	-0.023	-0.236	-0.034
43	0.244	-0.016	0.112	0.289	-0.246	0.240	-0.069	-0.157
44	0.591	-0.116	0.719	-0.094	-0.002	-0.186	-0.012	-0.126

APPENDIX C. FACTOR SCORES - ATTITUDES

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES

EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION

FACTOR SCORES -- ROTATED

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
-0.410	0.522	-0.536	-0.663	-0.351	-0.041	-1.670	
0.246	-0.905	-2.039	0.053	-1.350	1.696	1.899	
-1.941	0.332	0.004	1.075	-0.106	-1.490	1.839	
0.376	-0.245	-2.046	-0.371	-0.744	-0.056	-0.171	
-0.314	-0.250	0.346	0.049	-0.727	-1.324	-1.012	
-0.565	-0.773	1.066	-1.263	0.094	-2.639	0.250	
1.113	-1.453	-0.281	0.074	-0.342	0.156	-0.998	
-2.526	1.230	1.377	0.052	1.224	0.712	2.065	
0.246	1.467	0.895	1.869	0.700	0.508	-0.445	
0.649	-0.363	1.324	0.185	-1.672	-0.985	1.956	
1.265	0.106	0.165	-0.166	0.660	-0.950	0.413	
0.896	0.340	-0.578	-0.488	0.757	-1.317	-1.684	
-1.276	-0.572	-0.626	0.677	0.175	-1.669	-0.780	
0.323	-0.060	-0.663	0.811	-0.402	-1.117	-0.746	
-0.629	0.825	1.769	-0.008	-2.261	1.692	-0.814	
-0.600	-0.342	1.137	-1.159	0.125	-0.548	-0.617	
-1.737	-0.554	0.596	0.190	1.142	1.133	-1.900	
0.010	0.176	0.223	-0.551	0.399	-0.114	-1.054	
1.154	0.322	1.042	-0.322	-2.026	-0.127	-0.646	
-0.716	-0.813	-0.431	0.104	0.540	1.273	-0.336	
0.337	-0.103	-2.118	1.516	0.593	1.008	0.751	
-1.678	-0.870	0.096	-0.247	-0.580	0.249	-0.391	
-0.323	0.337	-0.596	0.951	0.634	0.125	-1.664	
-0.046	1.509	-1.037	0.060	0.643	0.452	0.439	
0.068	1.526	-0.431	0.430	-0.713	-0.698	-0.395	
-0.362	1.101	0.013	0.585	-0.206	-0.927	0.084	
0.070	-0.143	0.050	0.256	-1.138	-0.293	0.324	
-0.840	0.245	-0.197	-0.056	-1.684	-0.305	-1.213	
0.683	1.366	0.364	0.166	-0.749	-0.077	1.153	
2.018	1.295	-0.461	0.317	2.439	-1.162	-1.384	
0.629	0.053	-0.668	-1.022	0.249	0.104	-1.041	
0.567	0.830	0.481	-0.981	-1.585	0.941	0.514	
-0.014	0.359	-0.333	0.453	0.457	0.294	-0.023	
-0.707	0.070	0.700	1.418	-0.673	-3.715	0.323	
-2.051	1.747	-0.168	-0.154	-0.442	0.080	-1.445	
-1.041	-0.913	-0.393	-1.646	-0.254	0.083	-0.759	
0.827	0.595	1.678	0.054	-0.287	0.156	-0.879	
0.253	1.431	0.242	0.511	0.993	1.367	1.121	
0.603	1.324	1.189	-0.329	1.326	-0.821	0.018	
0.812	0.627	-0.600	-0.905	-0.226	-0.579	-0.484	
-0.121	0.927	1.004	0.085	0.522	-0.016	0.062	
-0.094	1.085	-1.376	-0.576	0.369	0.999	0.312	
-1.266	0.345	0.432	1.577	1.005	-1.016	1.290	
0.469	0.222	1.499	-0.647	-1.585	0.108	-0.644	
-0.585	-1.054	1.458	-1.534	0.472	0.125	0.062	
0.836	0.399	-0.496	-1.548	0.330	0.398	-0.195	
0.818	-0.176	2.105	-0.961	-0.272	0.454	0.291	
-0.878	-1.157	-0.391	0.497	0.749	0.029	0.868	
-1.413	-0.972	-0.095	-1.186	1.216	1.023	0.806	
-0.752	1.699	-1.672	0.837	-1.081	0.487	-0.330	

COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF FORTY FOUR ATTITUDE VARIABLES

EIGENVALUE 1.00 FOR MINIMUM ROTATION

FACTOR SCORES -- ROTATED

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
-0.748	0.521	-0.213	-0.852	1.171	0.766	0.251	
-0.783	0.385	0.329	-1.100	0.276	1.068	0.894	
-0.536	-1.061	-0.377	-0.430	0.569	-0.718	0.116	
0.786	0.116	0.146	-1.446	2.146	0.676	-0.117	
0.842	0.627	1.607	-0.029	0.619	0.273	-0.764	
-0.025	-1.961	0.510	-1.604	-0.424	0.586	0.155	
1.256	1.401	-0.772	-0.688	-2.369	1.032	0.815	
-0.617	0.922	-0.839	-0.519	-0.617	-0.741	-0.495	
0.393	-0.708	0.718	1.498	1.783	0.826	0.497	
1.070	-1.565	0.866	-0.446	1.297	-1.409	-0.417	
-1.475	0.070	-1.781	-0.875	-0.298	-0.915	1.617	
-0.650	-0.396	-1.461	0.461	-0.559	-0.313	-1.081	
0.812	-0.385	0.149	1.427	-1.886	0.656	-0.384	
0.219	0.570	0.536	-0.316	-0.112	-0.346	-0.585	
-0.554	-0.055	0.789	-1.182	-0.203	1.078	1.358	
0.870	-1.291	-0.151	-0.621	-1.014	-0.229	-0.240	
0.711	1.891	-0.397	-0.360	-0.399	0.669	0.882	
1.164	-0.279	0.275	0.581	1.690	0.079	0.393	
0.517	0.957	-1.111	0.058	-0.041	-0.870	-0.969	
-0.829	-1.174	-1.486	1.400	0.075	-0.011	-1.657	
-1.364	-0.934	1.396	2.262	-0.441	1.289	-1.292	
0.859	-1.729	-0.208	0.754	1.488	1.414	0.067	
-1.308	-1.248	-0.697	-0.567	0.258	-1.322	0.846	
-0.121	0.927	1.004	0.085	0.522	-0.016	0.062	
0.836	0.399	-0.496	-1.548	0.330	0.398	-0.195	
-0.780	0.618	-0.469	-0.596	1.288	1.082	0.223	
-0.025	-1.961	0.510	-1.604	-0.424	0.586	0.155	
-1.475	0.070	-1.781	-0.875	-0.298	-0.915	1.617	
0.870	-1.291	-0.151	-0.621	-1.014	-0.229	-0.240	
-1.364	-0.934	1.396	2.262	-0.441	1.289	-1.292	
1.313	-0.787	-0.278	1.611	-0.046	-0.234	-0.476	
0.437	-1.183	-0.072	1.284	-0.169	0.291	1.235	
1.605	-0.574	-0.175	0.685	0.504	-0.361	1.325	
0.770	-1.784	-0.619	0.246	-0.072	-0.106	-0.383	
0.883	0.133	0.065	0.481	0.540	0.079	1.445	
1.393	-0.637	0.085	0.398	0.023	0.140	0.638	
1.173	-0.244	0.347	0.452	0.076	-0.650	1.670	
1.285	-1.150	-0.358	1.887	-0.977	0.818	0.649	
0.680	-0.503	-0.372	-0.007	0.798	0.427	-0.949	
MEAN	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
ST. DEV	0.958	0.954	0.924	0.941	0.953	0.930	0.953

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