Robert Schuman

Searching for the Origins of Civic Community in the Newly Expanded European Union

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Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series
Vol. 4 No. 18
December 2004

This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission.

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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center.

These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer of 2003. The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the European Union. While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at home and abroad. The main issues of this Convention were Europe's role in the international community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process. In order for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization. As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event.

The following is a list of tentative topics for this series:

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5. The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals.
6. Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration.
7. Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.
8. The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world.
9. How important is European integration to the United States today?
10. The failure of a necessary partnership? Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to understand each other? Under what conditions?
11. Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia?
12. Russia: a member of the European Union? Who would be interested in this association?

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Searching for the Origins of Civic Society in the Newly Expanded European Union

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December 2004

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Searching for the Origins of Civic Community in the Newly Expanded European Union[φ]

Abstract

Although many scholars stress the importance of a civic political culture for a functioning democracy, there is little consensus about where such a culture originates. The 'bottom up' approach argues that the civic culture has centuries old, enduring roots that in turn shape political and economic institutions. The 'top down' approach implies that political culture itself can be shaped by political institutions. Both schools of thought, however, stress the interrelatedness of civic behaviors; voluntary group membership, newspaper readership, and voting are expected to all be high in civic cultures and low elsewhere. In contrast, this article argues that these four components of 'civicness' are differently influenced by contemporary political institutions and are therefore less interrelated than previous scholars have hypothesized.

Germany and its neighbors in a newly expanded EU provide an excellent laboratory in which to empirically investigate these conflicting hypotheses about the origin of the civic community. If the 'bottom up' approach were correct, there would be no differences in the level of civic community between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany and Central Europe since they were separated by the Iron Curtain for only four decades. If the 'top down' approach were correct, forty years of communist rule would have indeed reduced the level of civic community in Eastern Germany and Eastern Central Europe. Instead, I find marked differences in voluntary group membership across the former Iron Curtain, but much less divergence in terms of newspaper readership and voter turnout.

[φ] Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this article were presented at meetings of the Council for European Studies, the Southern Political Science Association, and the University of Miami Latin American Political Economy Niche Group. Thanks to all discussants, audience members, and to an anonymous reviewer for their helpful feedback. Thanks also to the University of Miami European Union Center for financial support.

Introduction

A significant strand of the literature on democracy and democratization stresses the importance of a civic political culture to a functioning democracy.[1] Within this literature, however, there is little consensus about where such a culture originates. Some observers, taking a 'bottom up' approach, argue that the civic culture has centuries old, enduring roots that in turn shape political and economic institutions.[2] Others, who take a 'top down' approach, imply that political culture itself can be shaped by political institutions. This school of thought is prominent among scholars who study Eastern Europe and stress the impact that communism had on civic culture.[3]

This tension also manifests itself in Robert Putnam's seminal *Making Democracy Work*.[4] In it, Putnam studied the varying performance of regional governments across Italy and attributed differences in government performance to the presence or absence of what he termed civic community. Such communities, he argued, are characterized by a high density of voluntary associations, high levels of newspaper readership, and high voter turnout, both in elections and for referenda. Putnam believed these mutually-reinforcing factors create the feelings of trust, efficacy, and life satisfaction that are conducive to democracy. Like the literature on political culture as a whole, however, Putnam's work is ambiguous about the origins of the civic community. For the bulk of the book, Putnam argued that it had centuries-old roots, but later in *Making Democracy Work* he also argued that civic community can change over a matter of decades if political institutions change. His work therefore embodies the two, mutually-exclusive, schools of thought about the origins of civic community. Both schools, however, stress that the components of the civic community are highly correlated.

In this article I argue that both of these schools of thought incorrectly assess the ability of political institutions to shape civic community. The 'bottom up' approach underestimates the ability of political institutions to influence civicness whereas the 'top down' approach fails to distinguish how the different components of civic community are differently influenced by political change. By disaggregating the components of civic community, we can paint a more nuanced picture of its origin.

If a civic political culture is indeed essential for the functioning of democracy, then understanding its origin is of vital importance. If it is centuries-old and basically immutable there is little policy makers can do to promote democratization in contexts with low levels of civicness. In contrast, if political institutions do shape civic community, there are steps that policy makers can take to promote levels of civicness and ultimately improve democratic performance. If the components of civicness are differently influenced by political institutions, however, understanding these differences will help policymakers know where to target their resources in order to increase the aspects of civic community that they can influence in pursuit of a working democracy.

Germany and its neighboring countries in the European Union provide an excellent laboratory in which to empirically investigate the origin of the civic community.[5] If civic community is indeed centuries old, there should be no differences in the level of civic community between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany since they were separated by the Iron Curtain for only four decades.[6] Germans in both halves of the country should exhibit the same levels of civicness as their German-speaking neighbors in other countries.[7] If civic community can change from decade to decade, forty years of communist rule would have likely reduced the level of civic community in Eastern Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Central Europe. If the different components of civic culture are differently sensitive to political change, however, we would expect to see mixed levels of civicness across the different indicators in each region. In this article, I examine whether or not differing levels of associational membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout in general elections and referenda are present in the two parts of Germany and its Central European neighbors.

Contrary to the expectation that these indicators of the civic community are closely interrelated, I find marked differences in voluntary group membership across the former Iron Curtain, but much less systematic divergence in terms of newspaper readership and voter turnout. The different components of the civic community, then, are differently influenced by political change. To develop this conclusion, I first discuss the concept of civic community and the debate about its origin. Next, I derive some testable hypotheses vis-à-vis Germany and Central Europe. I then empirically examine levels of civic community across Germany and seven neighboring countries and find the above-mentioned mixed results. I conclude by calling for a more nuanced understanding of the origins of civic community and discussing the policy implications of my findings for the consolidation of democracy.

The Concept of Civic Community

In this article I rely on the definition of civic community put forth by Robert Putnam. He explains the difference in government performance between northern and southern Italy in the following way:

> Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read eagerly about community affairs in the daily press. The are engaged by public issues .... They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compromise with their political adversaries. ... The community values solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation, and honesty. Government works. ... At the other pole are the 'un-civic' regions... public life is organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally.... From the point of view of the individual inhabitant, public affairs is the business of somebody else.... Political participation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collective purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. ... All things

considered, it is hardly surprising that representative government here is less effective than in more civic communities.[8]

He argues that four factors, including 'the vibrancy of associational life[9],' newspaper readership[10], and voting behavior, including turnout in both general elections and referenda[11], help promote a range of civic attitudes within the population, including feelings of life satisfaction, trust in others and in government, a feeling of political efficacy rather than a belief in clientelism, and support for political equality. These civic attitudes are held to be highly conducive to a functioning democracy.

The importance of associational life for democracy has long been recognized.[12] When citizens band together to achieve common goals, whether it be putting on a choral concert, organizing a soccer tournament, or 'adopting' a littered highway to clean up, they are influenced in ways which go beyond music, sports, or aesthetics. They learn to trust their fellow citizens, a vital component of representative democracy. Further, citizens gain a feeling of efficacy; they learn that they can organize and work together to achieve common goals in much the way interest groups and political parties can come together to influence public life. The organizational and communication skills that citizens develop in voluntary organizations can be used in other realms to transmit demands to political leaders. Further, contacts with like-minded fellow citizens or elites which may occur in voluntary associations provide individuals with an opportunity to discuss public issues. These types of horizontal communication networks help elected officials learn what their constituents want and act on their demands. Citizens can trust that government will work in their interests and, as a result, they will be more satisfied with their government.

The importance of newspaper readership for a well-functioning polity has also long been asserted. As Tocqueville put it, 'only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before a thousand readers.... So hardly can any democratic association carry on without a newspaper[13]'. The higher the number of newspaper readers, the more likely citizens are to be informed about public issues, to develop and discuss opinions about these issues, and to communicate their preferences to elected officials. Informed citizens are likely to feel efficacious and leaders are more likely to know what their constituents want. As a result, communities with a high level of newspaper readership are likely to report a high level of satisfaction with government.

In addition to joining associations and reading newspapers, citizens in the civic community should be willing to participate in more overtly political actions such as voting in general elections or for referenda. Voting is one of the primary mechanisms through which citizens can communicate their policy preferences to elected officials. Citizens who actively take part in elections should be more likely to feel satisfied with the actions taken by their elected representatives. Referenda voting provides citizens with an even more specific opportunity to communicate their opinions on critical issues. As Putnam argues, 'the primary motive of the

referendum voter is concern for public issues[14]'. Democracy is more likely to work when citizens are willing to express opinions on the political issues of the day. Thus higher citizen satisfaction with government should occur in communities where referenda turnout is high.

In a civic community, then, citizens are hypothesized to get to know each other through cooperation in voluntary organizations, read the newspaper to find out what is going on in their community, and react to events by expressing opinions in elections and referenda. As a result of their engagement, citizens often believe that others are trustworthy and that government is effective. These expectations will generally be met – creating a virtuous circle. In 'un-civic' communities, it is hypothesized, citizens do not learn to cooperate with others in voluntary associations, remain uninformed about current events, and rather than voting in elections and referenda rely on patronage and clientelism. These citizens tend to distrust each other and are dissatisfied with their government. Their expectations are also likely to be met – creating a vicious circle. Putnam hypothesizes that these patterns are 'self-reinforcing and cumulative,' creating 'two broad equilibria toward which all societies … tend to evolve[15]'. Another prominent student of the civic culture agrees, defining it as a 'coherent syndrome' of traits.[16] The logic of these arguments implies that all components of civic community (voluntary organizations, newspaper readership, and voter turnout) will either all be common or all be scarce in a given community.

The Origins of the Civic Community

While the virtues of civic community and its self-reinforcing nature are generally agreed upon, its origins are more disputed in the literature. The disagreement in this area can be illustrated by the tension over the origins of the civic community in *Making Democracy Work*. On the one hand, Putnam argues that the groundwork for today's civic northern Italy and un-civic southern Italy was laid in the 1100s.[17] This centuries old view of civic community is similar to the approach to political culture taken by such prominent scholars as Max Weber and Ronald Inglehart.[18] On the other hand, however, the last few pages of Putnam's book add a new dimension to his arguments. There the author claimed, a 'second lesson of the regional experiment is ... that changing formal institutions can change political practices' but that 'time is measured in decades. This ... will be true of the ex-Communist states of Eurasia even in the most optimistic scenarios[19]'. This view is today echoed by many students of post-communist countries who stress the depressing legacy of communism on Eastern European political culture.[20]

Thus there are two mutually exclusive hypotheses about the origins of civic community: The 'bottom up' approach believes the level of civicness in a given community has deep historical roots that do not change from century to century regardless of political change. The 'top down' approach, in contrast, argues that the level of civicness in a certain place can vary from decade to decade as political institutions change. In either case, however, both hypotheses

imply that, because the four components of civic community are mutually reinforcing, all four should be equally (un)likely to change.

I believe, however, that there are several reasons to expect that associational membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout are not as interlinked as the conventional wisdom implies. Some components of civic community are more likely to be responsive to changes in political institutions than others, meaning that at any given time, a community may simultaneously score high on some indicators of civic community and low on others. Below I discuss each component of the civic community in turn, from the least time consuming (voting in general elections and referenda) to the most time consuming (joining a voluntary group).

Voting

Compared to other facets of civic behavior, voting in an election or in a referendum involves the least amount of commitment on the part of a citizen. While voluntary groups require dues and newspapers have subscription fees, there is no charge for voting. While newspapers arrive daily and associations meet regularly, in most countries national elections and referenda occur only every few years. The act of voting only takes a few minutes. Thus the decision to vote – or not – does not represent a major investment for most citizens and is therefore subject to short term influences, hence poll watchers often predict that bad weather will depress voter turnout.

The literature on voting in established democracies also indicates that voter turnout is strongly influenced by political institutions.[21] For example, turnout is routinely found to be lower in plurality than in proportional representation electoral systems. Among countries using PR, Switzerland stands out for its low voter turnout. The Swiss constitution mandates both that key decisions be made via referendum and that seats in its seven-member executive be reserved for members of specific political parties; this institutional configuration reduces the importance of voting in general elections to otherwise civic-minded citizens and depresses voter turnout.[22]

In Eastern Europe, turnout in almost all communist elections approached 100%, as did the number of votes for communist parties. Under communism, taking part in elections, as well as in the few early referenda which were held, was far from voluntary, however. Citizens were required to vote and, if they did not appear at the polls, officials often voted for them. Proponents of the 'top down' approach to the origins of civic community argue that these experiences have made citizens in post-communist countries cynical about the value of voting and expect that Eastern Europeans may view democracy as the freedom *not* to participate in elections.[23]

However, while voting in communist-era elections was coerced and offered citizens no political influence, the introduction of free elections after 1989 changed the meaning of Eastern European elections overnight. Citizens' calculus about the merits of voting likely changed just as quickly. Elsewhere in the world high levels of voter turnout have observed the first time a democratic election is held[24], and there seems to be little reason why Eastern Europeans should

respond any differently. Because voting in an election or referenda is not a time consuming commitment, it is likely to be the component of civic community that most quickly responds to political changes. As a result, I expect voter turnout to differ across Central Europe on the basis of current political institutions rather varying than along Cold War lines or remaining uniform in Central Europe as a result of deep seated cultural factors. In other words, I agree that voter turnout has 'top down' origins, but I believe this component of the civic community is more sensitive to political change than others have implied.

Newspaper Readership

Newspaper readership represents an intermediate case between voting and associational membership, both in terms of sensitivity to political institutions and in terms of time commitment. While voting is free, subscribing to or purchasing a newspaper has (albeit minimal) financial costs. Furthermore, while voting takes only a few minutes every few years, regular newspaper readership takes at least some time everyday. Thus it is more likely to become a habit (or not) and is less subject to short term changes – political or otherwise – than voting is. For example, the Newspaper Association of America has tracked the average weekday newspaper readership in the United States for decades, and since 1980 the percentage of Americans reading a weekday newspaper has never changed by more than 2% from year to year. Habits can, and do, change over time, however. With the advent of cable news, internet, and other instantaneous outlets for news, newspaper readership has *gradually* declined not only in the United States, but in the advanced industrial countries as a whole.[25] Similarly, newspaper publication and readership only initially emerged in Germany over an extended period of time in the late 1700s.[26]

Proponents of the 'top down' approach to the origins of civic community suggest that the communist period depressed newspaper readership. While censorship was rampant in East Central Europe during the Cold War, Western Europeans have had access to a free press for decades. Since World War II, West Germany has had a range of local daily newspapers as well as ones with national appeal, such as the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Readers can also choose from many news weeklies such as *Die Zeit*. Furthermore, the country is home to a number of tabloid newspapers such as the *Bild Zeitung*. The situation has been the same in Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland since World War II. Under communism in contrast, Eastern Europeans, including Eastern Germans, had a much more limited choice of newspapers. The German Democratic Republic's main national paper, *Neues Deutschland*, as well as local dailies such as the *Berliner Zeitung* and the *Ostsee Zeitung*, were closely censored by the government. The same was true of the widely circulated *Junge Welt*, a paper targeted at students and other young people. Reading a newspaper was often not an accurate way to learn more about current political controversies or the opinions of one's fellow citizens; in contrast to western countries, citizens had to rely on other sources than the mass media to keep abreast with news events.[27] These experiences are now hypothesized to have curtailed Eastern Europeans' habit of reading newspapers.[28]

However, while communist-era censorship may have dampened Eastern Europeans' enthusiasm for reading newspapers prior to 1989, the end of the communist party monopoly on news in the early 1990s soon provided citizens with a completely different set of news outlets. The introduction of the freedom of the press, combined with laws allowing the financing and formation of new publications, created a boom in new and improved papers in the decade after the fall of communism.[29] Those previously not interested in reading a daily paper may have changed their minds when tempted by colorful new options at the newsstand. After the fall of communism, reading a daily paper likely became an attractive option to many Eastern Europeans. While newspaper readership is unlikely to have dramatically increased immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, over the course of a decade the civic habit of reading the paper will have had time to develop. Thus I expect little East-West variance in terms of newspaper readership. Here again, I believe a component of the civic community has top down origins, but I believe it more quickly responds to changed political institutions than is currently hypothesized.

Associational Membership

Of all of the indicators of civic community, associational membership represents the greatest investment in terms of resources and time. Associations often require dues to join and membership meetings and activities last far longer than voting or reading the daily news. Furthermore, joining a group such as a bowling league or bird watching club involves face-to-face interactions with others. Thus, the decision to drop out of a social body is a much bigger one than deciding not to purchase a newspaper on a given day or to stay home from the polls once every few years. As a result, associational membership is the component of the civic community that is the least sensitive to political change or short term fluctuation.

Under communism, societal interests were highly organized in state-run associations, such as trade unions, women's associations, and youth organizations. These groups, however, were organized from the top down and membership was often coerced or at least highly encouraged,[30] hence the groups which did exist could hardly be considered voluntary organizations. Furthermore, because of their hierarchical organization, these groups did little to build horizontal ties among citizens, a central characteristic of a civic community. Current proponents of the 'top down' approach argue that these negative experiences with forced participation will leave a long-term distrust and avoidance of voluntary groups in Eastern Central Europe.[31]

This legacy is compounded by contemporary logistical issues. Because communists banned truly voluntary groups, and because most communist-sponsored groups disappeared after 1989, few voluntary associations existed when democracy was introduced in Eastern Central Europe. As a result, citizens interested in joining such a group would have had to start their own – clearly much more of an investment in terms of time and possibly money than simply reading a newspaper or dropping by a polling place. While founding a voluntary organization is a major undertaking in the best of circumstances, the post-communist transition to the market economy

has disrupted people's lives, making it difficult for them to find the time or energy to participate in voluntary groups[32], let alone start one. Further, changing conditions may make some citizens unsure of what their interests and preferences actually are.[33] Thus, even if a voluntary group manages to form, it still may not find many members. To join, individuals must make the time commitment to attending activities as well as make the financial commitment of paying dues. Both resources will be scarce in a society undergoing rapid political and economic change.

Voluntary groups, once destroyed, are time-consuming and costly to recreate, meaning that even after the freedom to form autonomous associations was restored in East Central Europe, voluntary groups will likely be slow to (re)emerge. In contrast, Western Europeans have been free to join a range of voluntary organizations for decades. Today these organizations are well established, citizens clearly know their interests, and have the resources to join. Thus, as the 'top down' approach expects, we will likely observe stark East-West Central European differences in terms of voluntary group membership.

Expectations

In sum, if the roots of civic community lie far in the past, as the 'bottom up' hypothesis implies, there should be no differences in the level of civicness across Eastern and Western Germany today. If the roots of civic community truly are centuries old, the brief forty year division of the region should have no impact on contemporary citizen behavior. Similarly, other German-speaking countries or areas of Central Europe historically governed by German speakers should have the same degree of civicness as Germans do.[34] Voluntary group membership, newspaper readership, and voting in elections and referenda should not vary greatly across Germany nor across the Iron Curtain.

According to the current 'top down' line of reasoning, in contrast, the forty year division of Germany and Central Europe into communist and non-communist parts should have altered the levels of civic community across the two sides of the Iron Curtain. As a result of forty years of communism, associational membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout in general elections and referenda should all be lower in Eastern Germany and East Central Europe than in Western Germany and West Central Europe.

Both of the above hypotheses expect that the levels of associational membership, newspaper readership, and voter turnout observed should be equally high or low in the two halves of Germany and the adjoining Central European countries. These factors are expected to be interdependent, building either a virtuous or a vicious cycle of (un)civic community. In contrast, I expect that different components of civic community are differently influenced by political institutions. Associational membership is less likely to experience short-term fluctuations as political institutions change. In contrast, voter turnout in elections and referenda may change almost as quickly as electoral rules can be rewritten. Newspaper readership should also gradually respond to changes in rules governing freedom of the press. In Central Europe,

then, associational membership should vary along the lines of the Iron Curtain whereas voter turnout and newspaper readership should not differ systematically from East to West but instead vary from country to country depending on current political institutions. As a result, rather than uniform patterns of 'civicness' across countries, I expect mixed results within countries.

An Empirical Investigation

Here I evaluate how these expectations perform using empirical evidence from Germany and seven neighboring countries (Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) about the four components of the civic community: voter turnout in elections and referenda, newspaper readership, and associational life. The German case is akin to the 'experiment[al]' conditions Putnam enjoyed in Italy[35] in that it allows me to hold constant a number of factors that might influence civic community, including institutional and, for the most part, economic factors. While the individuals in Eastern and Western Germany spent four decades under two very different political regimes, today they are all citizens of the Federal Republic. As a result, the laws governing the incorporation of voluntary groups, the newspapers available, and the electoral laws are identical across Germany. Because formal institutions are held constant, this factor can be ruled out as the cause of the variance in civic community. Moreover, since unification the federal government has spent billions of Euros trying to revive the Eastern German economy and infrastructure. In keeping with Germany's tradition as a social market economy, extensive welfare and job creation programs were implemented. While economic differences continue between Eastern and Western Germans, roughly half of the citizens in both halves of the country assess their personal financial situation as 'very good' or 'good'.[36] Similarly, multivariate analysis indicates that the remaining economic differences among Eastern and Western Germans cannot completely explain differences in life satisfaction, a variable closely linked to civic culture and satisfaction with democracy.[37] The other Central European countries do not have the advantage of these controls, but are incorporated nonetheless in order to assess the generalizability of the German case.

Voter Turnout in General Elections and Referenda

Table 1 depicts the average voter turnout in Central European national elections held between 1990 and 2004. As expected, no statistically significant East-West Central European differences were observed. Long-democratic Switzerland, with its consociational parliament and frequent use of referenda, had the lowest voter turnout whereas post-communist Slovakia, with its highly proportional electoral system, had one of the highest turnouts in the region. When Eastern and Western German voter turnout in the four national elections held since unification is compared, weakly significant differences do appear. While western turnout is higher, 80% compared to 75% in Eastern Germany, this five percentage point difference pales in comparison to the 42% gulf between Danish and Swiss voter turnout.

Voter turnout in referenda followed a somewhat similar pattern (See Table 2). National-level referenda are constitutionally prohibited in Germany. They are permitted at the state level,

however, and thirty such democratic referenda have been held since World War II. Most were held in the 1990s, but in order to increase my sample size, I measured turnout in all state level referenda held in (West) Germany since 1948. Eastern referenda turnout (56.1%) was actually *higher* than western referenda turnout (52.9%), although these differences were not statistically significant. Table 2 also compares turnout in democratically-held national referenda across the rest of Central Europe between 1945 and 2004; here I find only weakly significant differences. The western countries of Austria and Denmark had the highest voter turnout in referenda but were followed by areas east of the Iron Curtain including Eastern Germany and the Czech Republic. Further down the list, Switzerland and Poland had similar referenda turnout. Thus, as expected, no clear 'Iron Curtain' emerged in terms of this component of the civic community.

Newspaper Readership

The National Federation of German Newspaper Publishers (*Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger* or BDZV) routinely tracks newspaper readership across Germany. (See Table 3.) Their research found that initially after unification, Eastern Germans had a significantly *higher* rate of newspaper readership than their western counterparts. This continued throughout the 1990s; in 1996, 74.8% of Eastern Germans read a daily newspaper compared to 70% of westerners. In 2001 for the first time the figures reversed, with 73% of Western Germans compared to 71.7% of Eastern Germans reading a daily. By 2004 the eastern figure remained constant but the western figure rose to 77.2%. These differences are not statistically significant, however. Today both Eastern and Western Germans live in a similar media market with identical laws governing the freedom of the press, and read newspapers at roughly similar rates.

The decline in Eastern Germans' engagement with the news over the fifteen years since unification may be due to the nature of the news that is available in post-unification Germany. Eastern Germans are a minority within Germany and most major news outlets are owned and dominated by western Germans. As a result, the news is biased toward western concerns and often overlooks or even belittles Easterners.[38] Because they feel ignored in the national media, Eastern Germans do not subscribe to national newspapers as often as Westerners. They do, however, frequently read regional newspapers and the tabloid *Super Illu*, specifically targeted at an Eastern German audience, sells more than 600,000 copies a week to a population of 15 million.[39] This trend underscores the sensitivity of newspaper readership to current political conditions and suggests support for a gradual 'top down' origin for this component of the civic community.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) systematically tracks newspaper circulation across the globe. Table 4 shows the average number of daily newspapers circulated in Central Europe per 1000 citizens in 1996-97; the data for Germany was not disaggregated along East-West lines.[40] Here again, no statistically significant East-West Central European pattern emerges. The number of daily newspapers circulated is

much higher in Hungary and Switzerland than in Austria or Poland. These findings are especially striking given that that more than one person may read a given newspaper. Because incomes in East Central Europe are lower than those in West Central Europe, people in the former region are less likely to have their own newspaper subscription and more likely to share a newspaper with family members, colleagues, or friends, driving down the number of papers sold without reducing the percent of the population reading dailies. Given these reading habits, it seems likely that newspaper readership in the region may be even more similar to that in west Central Europe than the UNESCO data implies. Thus, as expected, newspaper readership has a 'top down' origin that, over the course of a decade, responded to the political changes in East Central Europe as communism crumbled and a free press emerged.

Associational Life

In contrast to voting and newspaper readership, however, there were marked differences between both Eastern and Western Germans' and Europeans' involvement with voluntary organizations. The German *Statistical Yearbook* routinely measures membership in sports clubs and choral societies across Germany. Table 5 shows that between 1991 and 2002 Eastern citizens remained significantly less likely to be involved with these kind of voluntary groups than their western neighbors. While 28% of western Germans were a member of a sports organization in 1990, only 11% of their Eastern counterparts were; this gap actually widened slightly in the subsequent decade. Similarly, while 2.5% of Western Germans were members of non-church choirs in 2002, only 0.3% of Easterners were. This weakness of associational life has been found in numerous other studies of German citizens,[41] across types of voluntary organizations. [42] Some observers have found these differences replicated at the elite level as well.[43] In sum, Eastern Germans are significantly less involved in voluntary groups than their Western German counterparts.

When the scope of the analysis is broadened to a comparison of Germany's neighbors, similar differences are found along the lines of the former Iron Curtain. Finding membership figures in comparable voluntary groups across eight countries is difficult. However, in all of the countries examined the national statistical office collects data on membership in sports clubs. Table 6 shows the number of members in registered sports organizations as a percentage of the total population in each country.[44] The results show clear Eastern-Western European differences. Sports club membership is highest in those countries that found themselves on the western side of the Iron Curtain; approximately one third of Austrians, western Germans, Danes, and the Swiss are members of a sports organization. In contrast, former Soviet bloc countries have far less active sports associations. Only 24% of Czechs, 12% of Eastern Germans, 6% of Slovaks, 4.6% of Hungarians, and a mere 1.0% of Poles are members of official sports clubs. This finding is consistent with many studies of the weakness of civil society in post-communist Eastern Europe.[45]

In terms of sports club membership Eastern Germans tend to resemble more their Eastern neighbors, and Western Germans more their Western neighbors, than Germans from different sides of the Berlin Wall resemble each other. In this regard, then, decades of communist have had a 'top-down' dampening on associational membership that even a decade of democracy has not been able to undo.

Discussion

Thus, in contrast to the conventional wisdom on civic community, not all components of 'civicness' were closely interlinked. Contrary to the expectations of the 'bottom up' hypothesis, for example, no clear national patterns emerged. Swiss voters rarely vote but they avidly follow the newspaper. Over 80% of Slovaks turn out for national elections but only a fraction of that percentage are willing to join a sports club. And in contrast to today's popular 'top down' hypothesis, no clear cut East-West pattern of newspaper readership or voting was found. This evidence clearly shows that the components of civic community are *not* always interrelated, challenging one of the core assumptions of the literature on civic community to date.

In short, rather than the immutable 'bottom up' variant postulated by many observers, the evidence presented here supports a 'top down' conception of civic community – but one whose components are influenced by political institutions *at different rates and to different degrees*. Democratization and democratic performance can be either positively or negatively influenced by changes in political institutions, but the rate of change will depend on which component of the civic community is investigated.

Because some aspects of the civic community respond quickly to political change and others less so, what emerges is a hybrid level of 'civicness' determined in part by the current political system and in part by the previous one. This finding is not a new one to political science. Indeed, students of Soviet bloc countries during the communist era frequently observed that even totalitarian governments only had a limited influence on shaping political culture. What emerged in each country during the Cold War was a political culture combining previous national characteristics and communist influences.[46] As communism crumbled and new, democratic political systems took its place, scholars began to discover that contemporary East Central Europe is shaped both by communism and the transition to democracy.[47] Jonathan Grix and Paul Cooke make this observation with regard to East German identity.[48] William Mishler and Detlef Pollack, in their study of political attitudes in post-communist countries, distinguish between 'thick' and 'thin' aspects of political culture, the former more immutable and the latter as dynamic as political institutions change.[49] My findings about the origins of civic community contribute to this more nuanced strand of literature.

If communities are not equally civic in all respects, is there one component of the civic community that is particularly tied to democratic performance? The Central European case suggests that the component least easily shaped by political institutions – voluntary associations

– might be the most closely tied to satisfaction with democracy. In the decade since unification, Eastern Germans have had quite different assessments than westerners of the way in which their identical democratic institutions perform. Both citizens and elites in the eastern part of the country have been consistently less satisfied than their western counterparts with the functioning of democracy at both the national and the local level.[50] Similarly, East Central Europeans are less satisfied than their western neighbors with the way democracy works in their countries. (See Table 7) Since Eastern and Western Germans do not read the paper or vote in referenda at significantly different rates, these aspects of the civic community cannot be what make democracy 'work.' Because the differences in general election voter turnout across Germany are so small, they are also unlikely to explain this persistent pattern of differences in satisfaction with democracy.

Thus Germans' varying involvement with voluntary associations appears the most likely aspect of the civic community to explain their diverging satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, this factor can help explain why Easterners and Westerners express different assessments of the *same* national government. The concept of civic community suggests that because westerners are organized into voluntary associations, they can effectively voice their preferences and make demands on government. If the state responds, westerners are likely to think that democracy works. Because Easterners are less organized into such associations, in contrast, they are less likely to see democracy work for them.

What policy implications emerge from these findings? The evidence presented here suggests that if the European Union is interested in promoting democracy, it should pay careful attention to the design of the formal institutions that can influence voter turnout, as such institutions have considerable influence over turnout and this influence manifests itself quite quickly. Newspaper readership is somewhat less responsive to political change than voter turnout, but the introduction of a free press – especially one that represents the concerns of all potential readers – can promote regular newspaper readership.

In contrast, associational membership reacts more slowly to political change and as a result is difficult for those in favor of democracy to influence in the short run. This component of the civic community also seems to be the most important for democratic performance, however. The German experience makes clear that political institutions *can* shape the level of voluntary associations, albeit over the course of several decades. While four decades of communist rule in East Germany ultimately depressed associational membership there, studies of West German political culture report that although citizens there emerged from the Nazi dictatorship with a low propensity to join voluntary groups, they became increasingly involved over the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.[51] Thus political institutions promoting voluntary group membership are still a worthy policy goal, although their effects may only be seen over the course of decades.

Table 1: Average Voter Turnout in National Elections (1990-2004)

Country	Turnout
Denmark	86.05%
Austria	83.86%
Slovakia	82.15%
Germany – West	80.80%
Czech Republic	77.85%
Germany – East	75.05%
Hungary	68.64%
Poland	50.30%
Switzerland	44.22%

Notes: East-West European difference of means not statistically significant.
East-West German difference of means significant at 90% confidence level, 2-tailed test.

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Electoral Turnout From 1945 to Date (Available at www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm).

Table 2: Average Voter Turnout in National* Referenda (1945 – 2004 western Europe; 1990-2004 in Eastern Europe)

Country	Turnout
Demark	72.2%
Austria	72.1%
Germany – East	56.1%
Czech Republic	55.2%
Germany – West	52.9%
Switzerland	44.8%
Poland	44.7%
Hungary	36.3%
Slovakia	32.4%

Notes: * Germany has no national referenda, so German figures represent state level referenda
East-West German figures not significantly different.
East-West European figures significantly different at 90% confidence interval, 1-tail test.

Sources: Outside of Germany: Research and Documentation Center on Direct Democracy, University of Geneva (Available at http://c2d.unige.ch/). German data complied by author from State Statistical Offices. For a complete list of German state statistical offices see www.destatis.de/wahlen/lwls.htm.

Table 3: Newspaper Readership in Germany

	West	East
% of population reading a daily newspaper 1996	70.0%	74.8%
% of population reading a daily newspaper 2001	73.0%	71.7%
% of population reading a daily newspaper 2004	77.2%	71.8%

Notes: East-West German difference of means not statistically significant.

Sources: 1997 data: Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Media-Analyse '97 (Available at http://www2.bdzv.de). 2001 data: Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Reichweiten in den alten Ländern leicht gestiegen (Available at www2.bdzv.de). 2004 data: E-mail from Anja Pasquay, Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger.

Table 4: Newspaper Circulation in Central Europe

Country	Average Number of daily newspapers circulated per 1000 citizens (1996-7)
Hungary	459
Switzerland	369
Germany (all)	307
Denmark	307
Austria	296
Czech	254
Slovak	246
Poland	108

Notes: No statistically significant East-West differences

Sources: The data for 1996 come from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Available on-line at http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/yearbook/YBIndexNew.htm) and the data from 1997 come from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 'Press: The Number of Titles and Circulation of Daily and Non-Daily Newspapers', (Available on-line at http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=5057_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC).

Table 5: German Voluntary Group Membership

	1990	1995*	2000*	2002*
Sports Clubs West	28%	31.8%	33.9%	32.5%
Sports Clubs East	11%	10.3%	12.1%	12.7%
Secular Choirs West	6%**	2.7%	2.6%	2.5%
Secular Choirs East	1%**	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%

Notes: *Berlin excluded from analysis as its data not disaggregated along East-West lines.
**1990 figures include church choirs.
East-West German difference of means statistically significant, 95% confidence interval, 2-tailed test.

Sources: 1990 figures come from Noelle-Neumann, Problems, p. 222. Other figures from Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1996, 2000, 2003), Tables 17.7, 17.14, and in 2003 17.16.1.

Table 6: Percentage of Population in Sports Clubs

Country	**Percentage**	**Date**
Austria	41.7%	2003
Denmark	36.7%	2003
Germany – West	32.5%	2002
Switzerland	29.1%	1988
Czech Republic	23.9%	1999
Germany – East	12.7%	2002
Hungary	4.6%	1990
Poland	1.0%	2002
Slovakia	6.0%	2003

Note: East-West European difference of means statistically significant, 95% confidence level, 2-tailed test.

Sources: All countries except Switzerland and Hungary: Most recent statistical yearbooks, available from national statistical offices. Switzerland: Bundesamt für Statistik, Freizeit und Kultur: Mikrozensus 1988Grunddaten: Amtliche Statistik der Schweiz Nr. 305, (Bern: Bundesamt für Statistik, 1988), p. 38. Hungary: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 1990 (Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1991), p. 310.

Table 7:
Percentage of Citizens Very or Fairly Satisfied with Democratic Performance (1995)

Country	Percent Satisfied
Denmark	83%
West Germany	67%
Austria	63%
East Germany	48%
Czech Republic	41%
Hungary	22%
Slovakia	21%

Notes: No data available for Switzerland.
East-West difference of means significant, 95% confidence interval, 2-tailed test.

Source: Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis', in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31-56. Data from p. 50.

Endnotes

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[2] Max Weber, 'The Social Psychology of World Religions', in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 267-358. Ronald Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', American Political Science Review, Vol.82, Issue 4 (1988), pp. 1203-30. Tom W. Rice and Jan L. Feldman, 'Civic Culture and Democracy from Europe to America', The Journal of Politics, Vol.59, No.4 (199 7), pp. 1143-72.
[3] Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Richard Rose, 'Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies', Party Politics, Vol.1, No.4 (1995), pp. 549-63. Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003). Stephen E. Hanson, 'The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.28, No.2 (1995), pp. 306-314.
[4] Putnam.
[5] For the purposes of this paper, I also discuss Switzerland, a non-EU member.
[6] I remain agnostic about whether Germany's long term past suggests a high level of civic community (as the peaceful revolutions of 1848, 1918, and the Weimar Republic might suggest) or a low level of civic community (as the militancy of Prussia, the rise of Hitler, and the Holocaust might suggest). It might also be that, because Germany only became a nation state in 1871 civic community differs along regional lines. Again, I remain agnostic. What is important here is that such regional variation would not be expected to take on East-West lines along the Cold War division of Germany nor does this hypothesis expect mixed indicators of civicness within any one region.
[7] It might also be that although Germany once occupied parts of its present-day neighbors, and although they may have German-speaking minorities, these countries have national patterns of civicness distinct from Germany's. What is of importance here is that if this were indeed the case, we would not observe significant East-West differences in civicness nor, according to the conventional wisdom, mixed indicators of civicness within countries.
[8] Putnam, p. 115.
[9] Ibid, p. 91.
[10] Ibid, p. 92.
[11] Ibid., pp. 93-95.
[12] Tocqueville.
[13] Quoted in Putnam, p. 92.
[14] Putnam, p. 93.
[15] Ibid, p. 177.
[16] Inglehart, 'The Renaissance', p. 1203.
[17] Putnam, p. 121.
[18] Weber, Inglehart, 'The Renaissance'.
[19] Putnam, p. 184.
[20] For example, Jowitt and Howard.
[21] Markus Freitag, 'Wahlbeteiligung in westlichen Demokratien. Eine Analyse zur Erklärung von Niveauunterschieden', Swiss Political Science Review, Vol.2, Winter (1996), pp.101-34. Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, 'Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies in the 1980s', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.27, January (1995), pp.467-92.
[22] Jörg Steiner, European Democracies Fourth Edition (New York: Longman, 1998), p. 58.
[23] For a discussion on Eastern Europeans and 'freedom from' see Rose, pp. 557-59. For a discussion on post-

communist political apathy see Ghia Nodia, 'How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?', Journal of Democracy Vol.7, No.4 (1996), pp.15-29.
[24] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.62.
[25] Newspaper Association of America, 'Daily Readership Trends' (Available at http://www.naa.org/artpage.cfm?AID=1468&SID=1113, 2004).
[26] Eckhart Hellmuth and Wolfgang Piereth, 'Germany', in Hannah Barker and Simon Burrows (eds.), Press, Politics, and Public Sphere in Europe and North America: 1760-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 69-92.
[27] Thomas Remington, 'The Mass Media and Public Communication in the USSR', The Journal of Politics, Vol.43, No.3 (1981), pp.803-18.
[28] Jeffrey J. Mondak and Adam F. Gearing, 'Civic Engagement in a Post-Communist State', Political Psychology, Vo.19, No.3 (1998), pp. 615-34. For a discussion of this hypothesis and mixed empirical evidence see Christopher Marsh, 'Social Capital and Democracy in Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.33 (2000), pp.183-99.
[29] The Euromonitor marketing agency, which tracks print media sales in East Central Europe, confirms that the number of newspapers in Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia rose dramatically over the course of the 1990s with changes in government regulations, privatization of state monopolies, and increased foreign investment. Euromonitor Global Reference Database, World Consumer Lifestyles 2000 (Available at www.euromonitor.com).
[30] Rainer Weinert, 'Internediäre Institutionen oder die Konstruktion des "Einen"', Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol.35 (1995), pp. 237-53.
[31] This view is most clearly articulated by Howard. He also argues that East Central Europeans' personal networks and disappointment with the transition to democracy reinforce this legacy.
[32] Joyce Marie Mushaben, 'Auferstanden aus Ruinen: Social Capital and Democratic Identity in the New Länder', German Politics and Society, Vol.15, No.4 (1997), pp. 79-101.
[33] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Björn Wittrock, 'Conclusion: Contrasting Patterns of Participation and Democracy', in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Participation and Democracy in East and West (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp.266-84.
[34] Or they will have distinct national patterns that will not necessarily fall along East-West lines.
[35] Putnam, p.6.
[36] Volker Kunz, 'Einstellungen zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in den alten und neuen Bundesländern', in Jürgen Falter, Oscar W. Gabriel, and Hans Rattinger (eds.), Wirklich ein Volk? (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), pp.509-38; p.514.
[37] Jan Delhy and Petra Böhnke, 'Über die materielle zur inneren Einheit? Wohlstandslagen und subjektives Wohlbefinden in Ost- und Westdeutschland', Working papers from the Social Reporting Group at the Social Science Center Berlin, 2000.
[38] Kersten Sven Roth, 'Wie man über den "Osten" spricht: Die neuen Länder im bundesdeutschen Diskurs', Paper presented at the Conference on Transformationsprozesse in den Neuen Bundesländern. Goethe-Institut, London, England, 24-25 April 2004.
[39] Manuela Glaab, 'Viewing the "Other": How East sees West and West sees East', in Jonathan Grix and Paul Cooke (eds.), East German Distinctiveness in a unified Germany (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2002), pp. 75-98; pp. 82-3.
[40] This measure is obviously not an accurate measure of the number of people reading a daily paper since more than one person can read a given paper. A more precise measure of newspaper readership involves surveying the population to determine newspaper reach, or the percentage of the population that actually reads the paper on a given day. Such surveys are common in western Europe but I was unable to locate any source which systematically collects this measure for the East Central European countries. Other scholars have been plagued by this limitation as well; one frustrated student called his search for systematic studies on Eastern European newspaper readership

'going exploring in fog.' Michael Schmolke, 'Pressemarkt Ost -- keine Aussicht auf eine Wien-Prag-Budapest Renaissance?', in Walter A. Mahle (ed.), Pressemarkt Ost (Munich: Verlag Ölschlager, 1992) pp. 157-65, quote from p. 157.

[41] Stephen Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest Groups in Post-Communist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Bernhard Boll, 'Interest Organization and Intermediation in the New Länder', German Politics, Vol.3, No.1 (1994), pp. 114-28. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'Problems with Democracy in Eastern Germany after the Downfall of the GDR', in Frederick D. Weil and Mary Gautier (eds.), Political Culture and Political Structure: Theoretical and Empirical Studies Volume 2 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994). Howard 2003.

[42] Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher (eds.), Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie: 1984-1992 (Munich, Germany: K. G. Sauer, 1993), p. 309. Interestingly, in 1991 Eastern Germans were considerably more likely to be a member of a gardening club. Many Eastern Germans held small plots of land on the outskirts of cities and were thus likely to join garden or animal-raising clubs. The tradition of having a *Kleingarten* is not unique to Eastern Germany and garden colonies were also prevalent in West Germany. However, given that East Germans faced a shortage of fresh produce in grocery stores, limited opportunities to take vacations abroad, prevalent spying in the workplace and public areas of apartment houses, and did not often own their own homes with yards, they were especially prone to take refuge in their 'dacha.' This involvement is an excellent example of the 'top down' creation of civic community; over decades of communism, the SED regime was able to significantly shape the associational life of its citizens, dampening it in most areas but causing it to thrive in private niches like garden colonies.

[43] Werner J. Patzelt, 'Ostdeutsche Parlamentarier in ihrer ersten Wahlperiode: Wandel und Angleichung', Historical Social Research, Vol. 22, No.3/4 (1997), pp. 160-80.

[44] This way of counting ignores the (very likely) possibility that a single individual might be a member of more than one sports club, for example one for soccer and one for swimming. However, because I am more interested in comparing across countries than in assessing the exact number of athletes in a given country, I believe that this method of counting is merited.

[45] Barbara Geddes, 'A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.28, No.2 (1995), pp.239-74. Andrzej Rychard, 'Institutions and Actors in a New Democracy', in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Participation and Democracy in East and West (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 26-50. Michal Illner, 'Local Democratization in the Czech Republic After 1989', in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Participation and Democracy in East and West (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 51-82. Ferenc Miszlivetz and Jody Jensen, 'An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?', in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Participation and Democracy in East and West (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 83-98.

[46] Robert C. Tucker, 'Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society', Political Science Quarterly, Vol.88, No.2 (1973), pp.173-90. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (London: MacMillian Press, 1977). Archie Brown (ed.), Political Culture and Communist Studies (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1984). Henry Krisch, 'Changing Political Culture and Political Stability in the German Democratic Republic', Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol.XIX, No.1 (1986), pp. 41-53.

[47] A recent volume by Ekiert and Hanson makes a similar argument in terms of post-communist political and economic systems. The contributors also stress the influence of pre-communist legacies as well. Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[48] Jonathan Grix and Paul Cooke (ed.), East German Distinctiveness in a Unified Germany (Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 2002).

[49] William Mishler and Detlef Pollack, 'On Culture Thick and Thin: Toward a Neo-Cultural Synthesis', in Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (eds.), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe (Aldershot:

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[51] David P. Conradt, 'Changing German Political Culture', in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), p. 255.