

THE IMMIGRATION-SECURITY NEXUS:  
A VIEW FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada May  
17-19, 2007

**Abstract:** Utilizing data from our surveys of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 1992-93 and 2003-04, this paper offers an attitudinal portrait of the degree to which European elites have successfully navigated the contradictions posed by the increasing securitization of immigration after September 11th. We specifically asked to what degree MEPs: view immigration as a salient and multi-dimensional security threat; support greater rights for immigrants; and prefer an EU over a national policy making venue to regulate immigration policy. Our analysis of the data yielded mixed results. On the one hand, a majority of contemporary MEPs concluded that immigration was “very important,” favored increasing economic immigration, and rejected the suggestion that immigration poses a cultural threat. On the other hand, and contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights declined from 1993 to 2004 and, most surprising, MEPs were less inclined in 2004 than in 1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas. Although a robust majority agreed that a European immigration policy is more urgent after September 11th, it is fair to conclude on the basis of the aggregate data that MEPs in 2004, as in 1993, were not especially inclined to view immigration through the prism of national or European security.

## Introduction

Among its other important political effects, the association of immigration with terrorism in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> security environment has imposed upon West European governments and the institutions of the European Union the burden of reconciling the contradictions posed by what hitherto had been a stable but relatively fragmented immigration policy equilibrium (Figure 1) . This segmented equilibrium has been historically comprised of three discreet and fairly insulated dimensions: 1) *economic*: securing an adequate and appropriate supply of foreign workers for the many tight domestic labor markets across Western Europe (Martin et al. 2006: 55-120); 2) *social*: fostering good social relations between native populations and immigrants and facilitating the incorporation of the latter into their host societies (Favell 2001); and 3) *physical safety*: safeguarding Europe’s external borders and deterring cross-national crime and terrorism (Koslowski 2001; Bigo 2001). Indeed, the intersection of the aforementioned dimensions within public and political elite discourse and their increasing “securitization” since September 11<sup>th</sup> raise reasonable doubts about whether their previously distinct agendas *can* be politically reconciled.

(Figure 1)

The central purpose of this article is to assess to the degree to which one group of European political elites, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), has successfully

navigated the contradictions posed by the multidimensionality of a security-linked migration threat. In so doing, it considers the implications for public policy of the incremental emergence of immigration as a perceived cultural, economic and physical safety threat. Utilizing data from our surveys of Members of the European Parliament in 1992-1993 and 2003-2004, we specifically seek to discover to what degree MEPs: 1) view immigration as a salient and multi-dimensional security threat; 2) support greater economic, political and social rights for immigrants; and 3) prefer an EU over a national policy making venue for regulating immigration policy. Finally, we assess the implications of changing attitudes for the emergence of a comprehensive common European immigration policy.

### **Theoretical Overview**

As numerous scholars have astutely observed (Alexseev 2005: 175-176; Bigo 2001; Carrera 2005; Heisler and Layton Henry 1993; Huysmans 1994; Huysmans 2000a; Levy, 2005: 54; Weiner 1995: 87-88), the so-called “securitization of immigration” within contemporary Western Europe has been rooted in, and is inextricably linked to, the permanent settlement of large and ethnically and culturally distinctive ethnic minority populations within the major immigration-receiving countries. Although posing a modest threat to physical safety before and after the so-called turning point,<sup>1</sup> it is primarily the economic and cultural fears aroused by mass immigrant settlement that have proved especially politically potent and universal (Betz 1994: 85; Commander et al. 2006; Huysmans 2000b).

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<sup>1</sup> The “turning point,” or the juncture at which governments initiated aggressive efforts to reduce dramatically the influx of foreign labor after WWII, arrived at different moments across the immigration-receiving countries (Hammar 1985: 7). In Britain and Switzerland, for instance, the turning point arrived relatively early. In both countries outbreaks of mass xenophobia and the rise of virulent anti-immigrant popular sentiment persuaded policy makers to curb labor immigration during the 1960s (Hoffman-Nowotny 1985: 217; Messina 1989: 34-44). For the other immigrant-receiving countries within Western Europe, on the other hand, the turning point came later and was primarily triggered by the economic slump and mass unemployment precipitated by the first oil shock of the early 1970s.

Well before September 11, 2001, constructivists presciently captured the rise of ‘new security’ threats such as identity, immigration and ethnic conflicts in a global era (Huysmans, 2000a: 752; Waever, 1998; Buzan et al, 1998; Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993). On this score, Huysmans (2000a: 752) observed that immigration “has been increasingly presented [in public political discourse] as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labor market stability; it has been securitized.” Echoing Huysmans, Kicingler (2004: 2-3) cited social stability, demographic concerns, risks to cultural identity, increasing levels of crime, and the threat to a generous and universal welfare state as the core features of the immigration-security nexus. To be sure, the political aftershocks following the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the Madrid bombings of 2004, and the 2005 London terrorist attacks have accelerated the securitization of immigration (Alexseev 2005: 37). Nevertheless, it was not until the general public’s anxieties about “societal security” (Waever 1998)<sup>2</sup> intersected with its fears about immigration as a threat to physical safety during the 1990s that the securitization of immigration became firmly embedded within the domestic and regional politics of Western Europe. In Faist’s view (2002: 11), immigration was now elevated to the status of a “meta-issue,” an overarching concern in which the boundaries of immigration as a threat to “external” and “internal” security have become increasingly blurred (Bigo 2001: 121-122; Geddes 2001: 29-30).

Whatever its causes, the inclusion of immigration-related issues in a new European “security continuum” (Aradau 2001) has had a three-pronged political effect. First, it has reified immigration in the popular mind as a phenomenon that imperils the quality of life in Europe (Alexseev 2005: 66-67; Huysmans 2000a: 752; Tsoukla 2005). As Ederveen et al. (2004: 82) have demonstrated, more than half of all respondents in 19 EU countries currently view ethnic

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<sup>2</sup> According to Waever (1998), societal security is the sustainability, within acceptable limits for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, custom and religious and national identity within a given country. It advances the view that societies, which include ethno-nationalist groups, religious groups and potentially other communities founded on gender, sexuality or class, can be threatened from many sources, including immigration which poses the greatest threat. Immigration threatens the identity of a society by causing the composition of society to shift in a manner that may undermine the hegemony of the prevailing socio-cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998).

minorities as posing some level of cultural and/or economic threat (see Table 1). In general, citizens within the least affluent member state countries (i.e., Greece, Czech Republic, and Hungary) are more inclined to perceive ethnic minorities as threatening than those within the most affluent countries. Among the major immigration-receiving countries, the perception of threat is highest in Belgium and the United Kingdom.

(Table 1)

Second, the current immigration-security nexus fuels further public doubts about the wisdom of the decision of national governments to permit permanent mass immigrant settlement and, in its wake, the multi-culturalization of European societies (Bauböck 2002; Feldblum 1999; Leiken 2005). However, in contrast to its earliest detractors, many of the contemporary critics of immigrant settlement are not inspired by overt racism, petty nationalism, or xenophobia. Rather, their primary concern is that, as a consequence of mass immigrant settlement, European societies have become too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations that underpin a secure society *and* a generous welfare state; that is, mass immigration has created a precarious tradeoff between national social solidarity and ethnic and cultural diversity. According to Goodhart (2004: 30), this tradeoff paradoxically presents an “acute dilemma for progressives who want plenty of both solidarity – high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system – *and* diversity – equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life.”

Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, the elevation of immigration to the status of a “meta-issue” has destabilized the policy equilibrium that has hitherto prevailed across Western Europe. Until the political earthquake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, this equilibrium was founded upon the premise that each of the three dimensions of contemporary immigration policy – labor immigration policy, immigrant incorporation policy, and border control policy – could be formulated in relative isolation. That is, decisions taken along one policy dimension of immigration did not much intersect nor circumscribe decisions made along other dimensions. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, the veracity of this premise has been undermined. Specifically, the

aforementioned and subsequent terrorist attacks have suggested to some that open economic borders and liberal immigrant incorporation policies, the twin pillars of Hollifield's (1992) "embedded liberalism," are now in conflict with the core responsibility of liberal states and governments to safeguard the physical safety of their citizens.

Indeed, as immigration-related issues have become more politically salient in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world, intra-European policy goals have become more conflicted, lurching toward the exclusion of immigrants in some contexts and their inclusion in other contexts. On the one hand, the increasing proclivity of national governments in Europe to view immigration-related questions through the prism of physical safety has precipitated greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation to regulate the flow of persons, and especially asylum seekers and illegal migrants, across countries (Huysmans 2005; Levy 2005). In particular, the inability of European states to stem unilaterally the flow of so-called "unwanted" immigration has facilitated the expansion of the policy making competence of the European Community, and especially the European Commission (Uçarer 2001) and the European Parliament (Lahav 1997; 2004a), over Europe's territorial borders. The overarching logic of inter-governmental cooperation and EU decision-making on the control of borders is one of exclusion or closure (Hollifield, 1998: 597).

On the other hand, other EU sponsored proposals and initiatives primarily have been inspired by the logic of inclusiveness or greater openness. For example, in the face of demographic aging trends (European Commission 2005), a steep and unabated decline in the size of national labor forces (Schoenmaeckers et al. 2006), and abundant evidence of the insufficient and uneven incorporation of immigrants within European societies (Leiken 2005; Niessen et al. 2005), both the European Parliament<sup>3</sup> and the European Commission have strongly advocated the

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<sup>3</sup> At a two-day hearing on March 14-15, 2005, MEPs from the Civil Liberties Committee and the Development Committee convened to discuss the EU's immigration policy, especially focusing on the links between legal and illegal migration and the integration of migrants into society. At the meeting they agreed that the EU must formulate a consistent policy to ease the path for third country nationals seeking to enter and work in the EU and to promote their becoming a full part of the community in which they settle. In this way, the Committee concluded, illegal immigration could best be combated.

adoption of common labor immigration policies and the expansion of the rights, including voting rights, of non-citizen immigrants, or third country nationals, across the member state countries. Moreover, prominent actors both within institutions have pushed hard for common policies that would facilitate *greater* legal immigration, including secondary immigration.

To complicate matters further, within a cooperative framework, as the immigration-security linkage becomes more salient, it is possible that some nations are likely to seek more protectionist and go-it-alone policy strategies while others may prefer a multi-lateral framework (see Lahav, 2003). Public opinion polls in November 2001 (exactly 2 months after September 11<sup>th</sup>) revealed that Europeans overwhelmingly delegate to EU authority in some form or other (either exclusively or with national authority), the fight against terrorism (EU average = 88%).<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, there were important variations among the EU countries, with countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany and Belgium more likely to delegate to the EU than the smaller, more recent members of the EU, such as Austria, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, the UK and Finland. Interestingly, these trends amidst the height of international terrorism suggest that the smaller, less economically developed and more EU peripheral countries prefer a “go-it-alone” attitude in the face of heightened physical threat.<sup>5</sup> These variations compel us to consider the effects of the multi-dimensions of threat perceptions on prospects for EU communitarization.

### **Propositions**

In light of the aforementioned policy tensions, this article raises and seeks empirical verification for three propositions. First, in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> international security environment and after the influx of millions of new immigrants and asylees into the European Union over the past

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<sup>4</sup> This derives from a short flash survey by the European Commission, *Eurobarometer* 114 on “International Crisis” taken between 13-23 November 2001.

<sup>5</sup> These findings are not too surprising, given our prior understanding of differences between large and small (Feld and Wildgen, 1976), and between old and new members (Deheneffe, 1986: 28-33; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 517-520; Niedermayer, 1995: 227-245). What is surprising, however, is the substantial stability of this opinion given changing levels of international threat.

decade (Table 2), contemporary MEPs will be more likely than in 1993 to view immigration as a salient public policy challenge. If so and logically following from the first proposition, we anticipate a greater number of MEPs favoring a reduction in the level of new immigration; moreover, post-September 11th MEPs (inspired by the logic of exclusion) will view immigration as security threat along all three dimensions specified in Figure 1.

(Table 2 about here)

Second, following the lead of their national governments,<sup>6</sup> and motivated to mitigate the “internal” security risks posed by the uneven or inadequate incorporation of settled immigrants (Leiken 2005), contemporary MEPs will be more likely than in the previous decade to favor the extension of economic, political and social rights to settled immigrants. Inspired by the logic of inclusion, MEPs should be more willing than previously to support the extension of immigrant rights in order to improve “native”-immigrant social relations.

Finally, given the contradictory agendas posed by contemporary immigration (i.e., immigrant exclusion vs. inclusion), we expect that a higher percentage of MEPs in 2004 than in 1993 will prefer the responsibility for regulating immigration policy to reside at the EU rather than the national level; moreover, MEPs who are most inclined to view immigration as an “urgent” problem for physical security will prefer a European rather than a national decision making venue. As social psychologists and political behaviorists have shown, increasing physical threat and issue salience promotes consensus and cooperation (Lahav 2004). Specifically, we anticipate that “security conscious” MEPs will be more inclined than others to cooperate and to prefer to “escape to Europe” to address and resolve the contradictions and dilemmas posed by contemporary immigration (Geddes 2001; Guiraudon 2003).

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<sup>6</sup> As a general marker of the cross-national trend toward greater inclusiveness, immigrants are now permitted to hold dual citizenship in more than a half dozen of the major immigration-receiving countries (Niessen, Peiro and Schibel 2005: 35).



## **Methodology and Profile of the Members of the European Parliament**

The data presented and described below derive from two surveys of the Members of the European Parliament administered at different points in time. The first study, conducted in 1992-1993 during the third assembly (1989-94), coincided with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), but before the EU had expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In this first survey, each of the then 518 MEPs was sent a close-ended questionnaire in English, French, or Italian.<sup>7</sup> The 167 MEPs who responded to the survey (32 percent of the total) were broadly representative of the then 12 country parliamentary delegations and the 9 official party groupings, excluding the Independents in the European Parliament (Lahav, 2004a: 238). The representativeness of the sample in terms of the distribution the larger MEP population by country is verified by a chi-square test of association that is statistically significant at the .05 level. In order to pursue the issues raised in the survey in greater depth, 54 MEPs were personally interviewed.

The second survey repeated many of the questions posed by the first but expanded upon the latter in an effort to account for the changes in the international security environment and on the immigration front that had occurred since the first questionnaire was executed a decade earlier. In 2003-2004 each of the 625 MEPs<sup>8</sup> of the fifth assembly (1999-2004) were sent a written questionnaire in one of 5 languages: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, or English. In all, 148 MEPs responded, a sample representing 24 percent of the total group. In addition to administering a written questionnaire, 15 MEPs were personally interviewed. As in the earlier survey, the respondents were drawn from each of the member countries (15) and the then eight formal political party groups. As in 1992-1993, the backgrounds of MEPs in our second sample fairly well reflected the proportional distribution of MEPs by country and party family within the

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<sup>7</sup> For a detailed description of the original study see Lahav 1995.

<sup>8</sup> With the inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, the number of MEPs increased to 626, but at the time of our survey one seat in the European Parliament was vacant.

Parliament (Lahav and Messina 2005: 857). However, since chi-square tests of the sample and population based on country and party family were not statistically significant, we are less sure that our 2004 sample is as representative as our 1993 sample.

Why privilege the study of MEP opinions? We submit three reasons. First, the opinions of MEPs and political elites are pertinent because they influence public political debate on a range of policy issues at both the national and European levels (Tsebelis, 1994). In so doing, elite opinions circumscribe the parameters of policy choice (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981). Second, in stark contrast to their peripheral position prior to the mid 1980s, Members of the European Parliament are now significant policy making actors (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2000). Most importantly, the European Parliament has acquired expansive decision-making competence on immigration and asylum-related issues since 2004. And finally, the attitudes of the Members of the European Parliament are worth investigating because they likely reflect the full spectrum of elite views on immigration issues prevailing within the national context (Lahav 2004a). Indeed, for some countries, such as France, political elite opinion was far better represented within the 1999-2004 European Parliament than it was in the French National Assembly.<sup>9</sup>

### **The Evolution and Trajectory of MEP Opinion**

#### *Increased Salience of Immigration?*

Based upon the evidence taken from our two surveys, there is little doubt that MEPs view immigration related issues as more salient in the current than in the previous decade. As might have been reasonably anticipated in the light of the recent deterioration in the international and

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<sup>9</sup> On the basis of garnering 5.7% of the national vote for the 1999-2004 European Parliament the National Front, for example, had 5 MEPs in Brussels. Conversely, although it received 11.3 % of the vote in the elections for the French National Assembly in 2002, the Front had not a single representative in the lower legislative house.

regional security environment, fewer (10%) MEPs in 2004 than previously identified the issue of immigration as “not important” (Table 3).<sup>10</sup>

Table 3 about here

As Table 3 also indicates, beneath the surface of change in aggregate elite opinion are important shifts in the distribution of MEP attitudes among the 12 original national delegations. Specifically, while the percentage of MEPs who identified the issue of immigration as not important remained relatively constant in Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal between 1993 and 2004, the percentage endorsing this perspective changed substantially (i.e. between 9 and 83 per cent) in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. With the exception of the Belgian respondents, every instance of substantial change involved a migration away from the view that immigration is an unimportant issue.

### *Less Immigration?*

Given the aforementioned increase in the percentage of MEPs perceiving immigration as an important issue and the deterioration of the international security environment since 1993, we might also reasonably expect a higher percentage favoring a decrease in the overall level of immigration in 2004. Somewhat surprisingly, this expectation did not materialize. As Table 4 illustrates, MEP opinion on the question of immigration levels changed relatively little from 1993 to 2004, as the percentages of parliamentarians who favored one of three respective options – increasing immigration, keeping immigration at current levels and decreasing immigration – remained virtually constant over the period. Having said this, the continuity in aggregate opinion masked decided shifts in national preferences. Fewer MEPs in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy and Spain, for example, supported decreasing immigration between 1993 and 2004, while, on the other side of the coin, more Irish and British Members backed such limits. In contrast, MEP

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<sup>10</sup>These differences were statistically significant at the .05 level based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which was used as a non-parametric alternative to a *t* test. See <http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/notes2/analyze.htm>.

opinion remained virtually unchanged in France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. Parliamentarians from Austria and Sweden, two of the three newest members of the EU's third wave of expansion, ranked highest in preferring that the level of immigration be decreased (75 per cent and 50 per cent respectively).

Table 4 about here

### *Securitize Immigration?*

Given that MEPs view immigration-related issues as more salient in the current than in the previous decade, do contemporary Members see immigration equally as threatening along all three of the security dimensions specified in Figure 1 or, alternatively, do they discriminate among them?<sup>11</sup>

As Table 5 demonstrates, with respect to the linkage of immigration problems with other issue areas, there is little doubt MEP opinion shifted somewhat in the interval between the first and second survey. Although the linkages drawn between immigration problems and social welfare, unemployment, education and drug trafficking remained relatively constant between 1993 and 2004, the connection of immigration to crime, citizenship and integration increased while race relations, unemployment and "other" issue areas decreased.

Table 5 about here

Several results especially stand out with respect to the securitization of immigration. First, when offered a choice of nine possible responses, almost half of all MEPs cited one issue, immigrant "integration," as the *first* area with which they linked immigration-related problems in 2004. Second and somewhat surprisingly given the inordinate attention it has attracted in the popular press, not a single MEP linked immigration with "drug trafficking" in either 1993 or 2004. Third, the connection MEPs drew between immigration and unemployment was

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<sup>11</sup>Although our 1993 and 2004 surveys did not directly pose these questions, several questions that we posed did tap into MEP opinion on the securitization of immigration.

conspicuously weak in 1993 (12%) and weaker still in 2004 (8%). And finally, despite increasing from 1993, relatively few MEPs (7%) linked immigration with “crime” in 2004. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that contemporary Members *do* discriminate among immigration-related problems; that is, for most MEPs immigration problems *have not* posed and *do not* pose an equal threat along every security dimension. Rather, problems related to “internal security” and, particularly those pertaining to citizenship and social harmony, loom larger in the minds of MEPs than those posed by externally-driven security threats (i.e. drug trafficking) or internal economic problems (i.e. unemployment).

The data presented in Table 6 corroborate these conclusions. As these data indicate, in contrast to the majority of their constituents who view immigrants as economically threatening (Ederveen et al. 2004: 82), most MEPs (56%) advocated greater economic immigration. Moreover, although a super majority of contemporary MEPs (74%) believes that extreme right groups are successfully exploiting immigration-related problems, three-quarters reject the argument that immigration poses a cultural threat. At the very least, these findings suggest that most contemporary MEPs do not view immigration as a significant economic or cultural threat.<sup>12</sup>

Table 6 about here

Having generally devalued immigration as an imposing cultural and economic threat, however, there is some evidence that the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> have influenced MEP opinion and, specifically, heightened awareness of the implications of September 11<sup>th</sup> for physical safety. As Table 6 demonstrates, more than half of MEPs (58%) agreed that a common European immigration policy is more “urgent” as a consequence of September 11<sup>th</sup>.

*Extend Immigrant Rights?* What of our proposition that, following the logic of inclusion, contemporary MEPs should be more inclined than in 1993 to favor expanding immigrant rights?

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<sup>12</sup> It is important however to note that the surveys were conducted 2 months prior to the Madrid 2004 attacks, which along with the murder of Dutch writer Theo van Gogh unleashed a spate of anti-Muslim attacks and public preoccupations with the cultural threats.

As indicated in Table 7, this proposition generally was not validated by our survey results. Contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights in general declined from 1993 to 2004, while both the percentage of those advocating maintaining the status quo and restricting immigrant rights increased. Having said this, these findings require framing and, upon further consideration, may not be as negatively suggestive as they initially appear. First, despite declining from 1993, the percentage of MEPs who supported extending the rights of immigrants was still very high in 2004 (63%). Second, and more important, the percentage of MEPs who preferred maintaining the status quo increased from 1993 to 2004, a shift that may be explained in part by the objective expansion of immigrant rights in the period between our two surveys (Niessen, Peiro and Schibel 2005). If so, part the drop off in the percentage of MEPs supporting the extension of immigrant rights may have been driven by the perception that immigrant rights were already at historically high levels in 2004 and, thus, did not require further expansion.

Table 7 about here

Some support for the latter thesis is contained in Table 8, which records the preferences of MEPs with respect to extending the political, social and/or economic rights of immigrants. When the “rights” of immigrants were parsed into the aforementioned three categories in 2004,<sup>13</sup> support among MEPs for extending immigrant rights declined and their endorsement of the status quo significantly rose from the general results (24%) in Table 8, with 43 percent of MEPs preferring the status quo on immigrant political rights, 30 percent on social rights, and 34 percent on economic rights, thus possibly suggesting that contemporary MEPs are especially satisfied with the post-1993 progress of the rights of immigrants. Perhaps reflecting the negative their constituents’ negative sentiments on the issue (Lahav 2004a: 95-96), contemporary MEPs were most ambivalent about extending the political rights of immigrants.

Table 8 about here

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<sup>13</sup> This question was not posed in 1993.

*Escape to Europe?*

Given the increased securitization of immigration in the period between our two surveys, are contemporary MEPs more likely than in 1993 to prefer a European rather than a national venue for regulating immigration policy? Moreover, do MEPs who view immigration as an “urgent” problem for physical safety especially prefer a European venue to address and resolve immigration-related problems? Are “physical safety” conscious MEPs especially inclined to “escape to Europe” to address and resolve the contradictions posed by immigration in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world?

As we reported with surprise elsewhere (Lahav and Messina 2005), contemporary MEPs are in fact less inclined than those in 1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas (Table 9). A sizeable minority (almost 40%) of MEPs in 2004 embraced the view that the responsibility for regulating immigration policy should exclusively reside in the hands of national governments. More importantly, MEP support for this position rose by 12% over 1993, a change that was statistically significant at the .05 level as confirmed by rank-sum tests; furthermore, eight of 12 national delegations within the Parliament were more inclined to support this position in 2004 than previously.

Table 9 about here

The shift in MEP opinion between 1993 and 2004 in favor of maintaining the prerogatives of national governments coincided with the erosion of MEP support for the position that responsibility for immigration policy should reside in the institutions of the European Union, subject to the potential of a national veto. Whereas almost a third of MEPs in the aggregate endorsed the latter position in 1993, slightly greater than a fifth did so in 2004. In contrast, support for the view that immigration should be regulated by the institutions of the EU on the basis of a majority vote was virtually identical in 2004 (41%) and 1993 (40%).

Although MEPs are less inclined in this than in the previous decade to look to Europe to resolve immigration-related dilemmas, physical safety conscious MEPs, as we expected, are much more inclined than non-safety conscious Members to support an EU venue for regulating immigration policy. As Table 10 demonstrates, MEPs who saw a common immigration policy as “urgent” as a consequence of September 11<sup>th</sup> preferred a European to a member state decision-making venue by approximately 2 to 1. Conversely, among the Members who *did not* agree that a common immigration policy was urgent, most preferred that the member states bear the primary responsibility for regulating immigration policy. Of course, these results may be skewed by the fact that embedded within our question about the urgency of a response to September 11<sup>th</sup> was an explicit association with the need for a common immigration policy. Yet, having said this, the possible ambiguousness of our question did not deter the 20 percent of MEPs who conceded a need for a common European immigration policy from preferring that such a policy be forged on an inter-governmental level, an especially surprising result given the EU’s ever expanding role in regulating immigration policy (Messina 2002).

Table 10 about here

### **Multidimensions of the Migration-Security Threat and Attitudes towards a Common EU Policy**

Since we are interested in how European policy-makers reconcile the various sources of threat related to migration, we focus in the next part of our analysis more closely on the implications for a comprehensive EU immigration policy. Given that issue salience has grown among MEPs, as the previous section suggested, then it is possible that issue politicization has been mitigated in favor of more consensus and cooperation (Lahav 2004, 2007). Thus, in addition to investigating whether and to what the degree to which MEP attitudes on immigration-related issues have changed over the period of 1993-2004, we are also interested in understanding the factors that have influenced MEP attitudes on the proper approach and venue (i.e., national or supranational)



for regulating immigration policy at a time when its salience is high, and at a single point in time when controlling for other, alternative explanations. We give special attention to this question because of its implications for the emergence of a comprehensive common European immigration policy.

In this section, we exclusively focus our analysis on the 2004 survey responses for two reasons. First, it is the most recent of our two surveys and therefore the mostly likely to reflect current and near future MEP opinion. Second, since it was distributed and collected after the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the 2004 survey includes data pertaining to the physical safety dimension of the immigration-security nexus.

### *Models and Analysis*

How do variables related to cultural, economic and physical security influence MEP preferences concerning which venue is best for regulating immigration policy? In order to investigate these factors we rely upon ordered probit regression analysis to model categorical outcomes.

Our first pair of models in Table 11 examines the influence of the variables pertaining to MEP concerns about cultural, economic and physical security to unilateral approaches to regulating immigration policy. In Model 1, concerns about traditional culture had a positive effect on unilateral approaches to immigration policy that was highly statistically significant. As we anticipated, as an MEP/s view of immigration as undermining his/her country's traditional culture increases, he/she is more likely to support unilateral approaches to regulating immigration policy. However, neither of the other security oriented study variables was statistically significant.

Our second model introduces an array of theoretically relevant control variables (i.e., ideology) so we can better identify whether concerns that immigrants undermine traditional culture alone has as strong an effect on unilateral approaches when controlling for other rival

explanations. Ultimately, we find that in the presence of control variables, the statistically significant effect of concerns about traditional culture evaporates.

(Table 11 about here)

As for the control variables, perceptions of state ineffectiveness in dealing with refugees has a negative and statistically significant ( $p \leq .005$ ) effect on unilateral approaches to regulating immigration. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that the perception that problems of asylum-seekers and refugees are so difficult that they can't be effectively or exclusively dealt with on a national level would negatively effect support for unilateral approaches and promote support for a common immigration policy. We also find support for the hypothesis that the perception that extreme right groups are exploiting immigration-related problems lead to more support for a common immigration policy. Indeed, the variable for perceived right-wing exploitation has a negative effect on unilateral approaches. We believe this suggests that MEPs who fear right-wing exploitation of immigration domestically wish to "escape to Europe." We are drawn to two possible explanations for such behavior. First, MEPs who fear domestic, right-wing actors may be afraid that their adversaries will successfully manipulate the symbol of September 11<sup>th</sup> to thwart favorable immigration policies. A second explanation is that MEPs may fear the political fallout from having immigration policy crafted within their respective states where right-wing players could politically exploit immigration-related debates. Of course, these explanations — the first being policy oriented and the second being politically motivated — are not mutually exclusive.

In Table 12 we use two models to estimate the effects of several variables on MEPs' personal support for a common immigration policy. In Model 1, we find that concerns about the threat immigration poses for a country's traditional culture and the benefits of EU law enforcement cooperation have highly significant coefficients with respect to MEP support for a common immigration policy. However, these relationships do not persist in the presence of the control variables. It is important, nonetheless, to take note of the performance of the variable for

perceptions of state ineffectiveness with regard to refugees. The coefficient for this variable has the predicted positive sign and achieves high levels of statistical significance consistent with our hypothesis about the ineffective role of state institutions to deal with asylum-seekers and refugee policy.

Table 12 about here

The results for the models of urgency for a common immigration policy following September 11th are represented in Table 13. Unlike the two previous models, the variable for effective EU police cooperation has a positive, statistically significant coefficient that is robust across both the small and expanded models. Another study variable that was statistically significant was concern about traditional culture. This finding raises two possibilities. First, MEPs who are concerned about the effect of immigration on traditional culture may recognize that their fears are best addressed by a common immigration policy post-September 11th. Of course, this begs the question why traditional culture did not also display a similar relationship in Model 2 from Table 10 when the outcome was MEP support for common immigration policy? We suspect that the difference in the performance of traditional culture in Model 2 of Table 11 (but not in Model 2 of Table 10) results from an urgency born of political opportunism. We contend that MEPs concerned about protecting traditional culture see the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> as creating a favorable opportunity for opposing a common immigration policy.

Tables 13 about here

A similar process may also be working in the opposite direction with respect to one of the control variables in the second model of Table 11. In that model we find that concerns about the exploitation of immigration by right-wing groups have a positive and highly significant association with expressions of an urgent need for a common immigration policy after September 11<sup>th</sup>. This result dovetails nicely with and supports our supposition that MEPs who most earnestly identify right-wing exploitation of immigration problems want immigration policy crafted outside of the national arena for either considerations related to policy, politics or a

combination of the two motives. This is not altogether surprising as many MEPs may fear that the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> could open a window of opportunity for domestic right-wing actors to thwart desirable immigration policies.

In all cases, these preoccupations may presciently explain why EU policy-making related to migration and security assumed a more serious upsurge in the post-2004 period than following September 11, 2001 (Lahav 2007). The murder of Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh by an Islamic extremist on 2 November 2004, was shocking to those who considered that his murderer was actually born and raised in the Netherlands (despite holding dual Dutch and Moroccan nationality). The Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004 and the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London Underground indeed fostered the perception that Islam was a threat to the European social and political system. In all cases, the findings reinforce developments in the post-2004 period. They suggest that the interaction effects of cultural insecurity with physical threat may promote a consensus based on restrictivism (Lahav, 2004). That is, such cooperation may represent the reconciliation of the immigration counter-pressures.

### **Conclusions**

It was reasonable to presume, as we did in our original propositions, that in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> “new security” world, immigration-related issues would become more politically salient and be perceived as such by Members of the European Parliament. Moreover, its increased political salience would motivate contemporary MEPs to be less disposed than previously to support new immigration and influence most Members to view it as a potent threat along all three dimensions (culture, economy, and physical) of the new immigration-security nexus. Moreover, in order to mitigate the “internal” security risks spawned by the uneven incorporation of settled immigrants, MEPs would be more inclined in 2004 than in the previous decade to favor extending their economic, political and social rights. Finally, given the conflicting agendas posed by contemporary immigration (i.e., immigrant exclusion vs. inclusion), we could reasonably expect a

higher percentage of MEPs in 2004 than in 1993 to prefer the responsibility for regulating immigration policy reside at the EU rather than the national level; moreover, the MEPs most inclined to view immigration as an “urgent” problem for physical security would prefer a European over a domestic decision making venue.

In fact, our data yielded mixed results with regard to these propositions. On the one hand, a super majority (85%) of contemporary MEPs did conclude that immigration was “very important” and the percentage who viewed it as “not important” was significantly smaller in 1993 than in 2004 (Table 3). On the other hand, and contrary to our expectations, a majority of MEPs in 2004 wanted immigration to remain at its current levels, a majority that actually increased from 1993 (Table 4).

Equally surprising in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>, and seemingly at odds with the preferences of most of their constituents, is the extent to which MEPs in 2004 favored increasing economic immigration and the very high percentage of Members who rejected the suggestion that immigration poses a cultural threat (Table 6). Although a robust majority agreed that a European immigration policy is more urgent after September 11<sup>th</sup>, it is fair to conclude on the basis of the totality of the data that MEPs in 2004, as in 1993, were not especially inclined to view immigration through the prism of national or European security. This conclusion must be tempered, of course, by the results reported in Table 5 which indicate that a high percentage of contemporary MEPs were concerned about the current state both of immigrant incorporation (i.e., integration and citizenship) and native-immigrant social relations (i.e., race relations). Nevertheless, as we remarked above, their concern about drug trafficking and crime, the signature issues of domestic political far right groups and political parties (Mudde 2000:173-174; Veugelers 2000), was conspicuously weak both in 1993 and 2004. Minimally, the data suggest that contemporary Members differentiate among immigration-related problems and that, for most MEPs, immigration problems do not pose an equal threat along every security dimension. At the very least several problems related to “internal security,” and particularly those pertaining to

citizenship and social harmony, loom larger in the minds of MEPs than those posed by externally-driven security threats (i.e., drug trafficking) or internal economic problems (i.e. unemployment).

Also contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights generally declined from 1993 to 2004, while both the percentage of those advocating maintaining the status quo and restricting immigrant rights increased. Moreover, when the rights of immigrants were parsed into three core categories (economic, political and social) in 2004 (Table 6), MEP support for extending immigrant rights further declined from the general results (Table 5). Contemporary MEPs were especially ambivalent about extending the political rights of immigrants.

Perhaps most surprising is that MEPs were less inclined in 2004 than in 1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas (Table 9). Almost 40% of MEPs in 2004 embraced the view that the responsibility for regulating immigration policy should exclusively reside in the hands of national governments. Although Members were less inclined to look to Europe to resolve immigration-related dilemmas, however, physical security conscious MEPs, as we had anticipated, were much more inclined than non security oriented Members to support an EU venue for regulating immigration policy, with those seeing a common immigration policy as “urgent” in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup> preferring a European to a member state decision-making venue by a wide margin (approximately 2 to 1).

What can we conclude from these mixed and sometimes counterintuitive results? One unimpeachable conclusion is that the general public’s alleged conflation of the cultural, economic, and physical threats to domestic and European security (Tsoukala 2005), a proposition put forward in much recent scholarship (Faist 2002; Huysmans 2000a), is not mirrored in the collective thinking of contemporary Members of the European Parliament. To the contrary, most Members differentiate one dimension of immigration from the next and, perhaps more importantly, they have successfully transcended the atmospheric political pressures to restrict all new immigration, and especially economic immigration (Table 6). Put somewhat differently, the

events of September 11<sup>th</sup> do not seem to have precipitated a “fortress Europe” mindset among most MEPs (Geddes 2000). Nor have Members become especially xenophobic (Table 6).

Having said this, to the extent that the European public may be looking to the Parliament and/or other Community institutions to resolve the contradictions raised by contemporary immigration flows, of whatever type (Messina 2002: 106-110), it is likely to be disappointed. This is so for at least two reasons. First, as we reported elsewhere (Lahav and Messina 2005: 869-870) MEP attitudes do not appear any more convergent in 2004 (post-September 11<sup>th</sup>) than in 1993 (pre- September 11<sup>th</sup>). Indeed, with regard to the subject of immigration restrictions, Member attitudes are fairly polarized, with approximately one-quarter of MEPs in favor of increasing restrictions, one-quarter against, and approximately half in favor of maintaining the status quo. Similarly, while obviously cognizant of the problems associated with immigrant incorporation (Table 5) and generally supportive of extending immigrant rights (Table 7), MEPs in fact are much more divided on the question of whether the political, social and/or economic rights of immigrants should be extended (Table 8). On each of these core rights a sizeable percentage of MEPs (52, 42, and 42 percent respectively) preferred either the policy status quo or restrictions, thus leading to the obvious conclusion that there is no consensus among Members to move forward in this policy area.


Second, the results in Table 9 make evident that there is similarly no consensus within the Parliament on the preferred venue for regulating immigration policy. Indeed, on the question of where the primary responsibility for regulating immigration policy should lie, MEP attitudes were generously distributed among three very *different* and *conflicting* poles. Perhaps more importantly because of its negative implications for forging and sustaining a coherent a truly European immigration policy, 60 percent of MEPs in 2004 supported the proposition that immigration should be regulated either by national governments or by the EU, subject to the retention of an individual member state veto. In short, even in the wake (or perhaps because?) of

the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, most Members preferred to defend their country's traditional prerogative to regulate immigration policy.


While there is no current consensus among MEPs on the best venue for immigration policymaking, our regression results do, however, tentatively suggest how variation in other underlying factors could alter support for unilateral approaches to immigration or support for a common immigration policy more broadly. If perceptions of state ineffectiveness spread among MEPs, it could erode support for unilateral regulatory approaches and increase support for a common immigration policy. Also, if another calamity on the magnitude of 9/11 occurs in the future, it could create a political opportunity in which the outcome regarding immigration policy would be influenced by not only the sense that European law enforcement cooperation has been effective, but also by the political power of MEPs who fear either the erosion of traditional culture or right-wing exploitation of the event.



**Figure 1. Three Dimensions of the Securitization of Immigration**



**Table 1. Perceived Threat from Ethnic Minorities in 19 EU Member Countries, 2004**



Note: Figures represent the averages of multiple questions put to respondents about the economic and cultural threat posed by immigrants. They included questions about whether or not immigrants “steal jobs,” “cost more money than they contribute,” “are bad for the economy,” “undermine the culture,” and “make the country a worse place to live.”

Source: Ederveen et al. 2004: 82.

**Table 2. Number and Percent of Foreign Populations in EU countries, 1990s vs 2000**

Country	Total Pop (thousands)	Number of Foreign Population (thousands)	% of Foreigners/ Total Pop (1995-98)	Total Population (2000-2) <sup>e</sup>	Total no foreign population thousands ) <sup>e</sup>	% of foreigners Total Pop (2000)	% change
Austria	8,040	728.2	9.0	8,080	756	9.4	4.4%
Belgium	10,143	910	9.0	10,249	879	8.6	-4.4%
Denmark	5,251	223	4.3	5,320	304	5.7	32.6%
Finland	5,117	69	1.4	5,172	134	2.6	85.7%
France <sup>b</sup>	56,577	3597	6.4	59,238	6,277	10.6	65.6%
Germany	81,817	7173	8.8	82,017	7,349	9.0	2.3%
Greece	10,465	155	1.5	10,610	534	5.0	233%
Ireland	3626	117	3.2	3,803	310	8.1	153%
Italy <sup>a</sup>	54,780	1095.6	2.0	57,530	1634	2.8	40%
Luxembourg <sup>c</sup>	419	142.8	34.1	437	162	37.2	9%
Netherlands	15,494	726	4.7	15,864	1,576	9.9	111%
Portugal	9,921	169	1.7	10,016	233	2.3	35.3%
Spain	39,742	499	1.3	39,910	1,259	3.2	69.2%
Sweden	8,837	531	6.0	8,842	993	11.2	86.7%
UK	56,652	1992	3.4	59,415	4,029	6.8	100%

**Source:** LAHAV 2007, EUROSTAT 1999 (reporting on 1997 figures, unless noted otherwise; SOPEMI, OECD, 1992, 1999; UN Population Division, 2002

\*Note: OECD and Eurostat data are derived from population registers of foreigners, except for France (census), Portugal and Spain (residence permits), Ireland and the United Kingdom (Labour Force Survey). Figures do not equal total due to the differences in reports.

<sup>a</sup> OECD 1999 (reporting 1996 figures)

<sup>b</sup> OECD 1992 (reporting 1990 figures)

<sup>c</sup> EUROSTAT 1999 (reporting 1996)

<sup>d</sup> EUROSTAT 1994 (reporting 1992 figures)

<sup>e</sup> UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration 2002 (reporting 2000 figures)

**Table 3. Importance of Immigration by Country, 1993-2004 (in percent)**

Country	Not Important		Neutral		Very Important		Net Change in Not Important 1993- 2004
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	
Austria	--	0	--	0	--	100	---
Belgium	0	17	20	0	80	83	+17
Denmark	0	0	25	14	75	88	0
Finland	--	50	--	50	--	0	---
France	4	0	9	19	87	81	-4
Germany	9	0	5	13	86	83	-9
Greece	13	0	50	0	38	100	-13
Ireland	83	0	0	0	17	100	-83
Italy	4	0	12	7	84	95	-4
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	100	100	0
Netherlands	14	0	0	0	86	100	-14
Portugal	14	17	29	17	57	67	+3
Spain	26	6	21	12	53	82	-20
Sweden	--	0	--	25	--	75	---
U. K.	12	0	36	13	52	88	-12
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>-10</b>

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: "How important do you think the immigration issue is to you?"

**Table 4. Preferences about Immigration by Country, 1993-2004 (in percent)**

Country	Increased		Kept at Present Level		Decreased		Net Change in Decreased 1993-2004
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	
Austria	--	25	--	0	--	75	--
Belgium	11	25	56	75	33	0	-33
Denmark	0	25	33	63	67	13	-54
Finland	--	50	--	50	--	0	--
France	16	15	47	54	37	31	-6
Germany	41	17	26	50	35	32	-2
Greece	43	25	14	50	43	25	-18
Ireland	0	0	83	67	17	33	+17
Italy	32	40	45	47	23	13	-10
Luxembourg	0	0	100	100	0	0	0
Netherlands	16	0	62	80	23	20	-3
Portugal	17	0	83	100	0	0	0
Spain	44	46	44	54	11	0	-11
Sweden	--	50	--	0	--	50	--
U. K.	15	7	75	57	10	36	+26
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-3</b>

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: "Should immigration in general be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"

**Table 5. Immigration Problems and their Linkage with Other Policy Areas, 1993-2004 (in percent)**

Issue Linkages	1993	2004
Integration	35	47
Citizenship	4	12
Race Relations	25	10
Social Welfare	7	8
Unemployment	12	8
Other	15	8
Crime	1	7
Education	1	1
Drug trafficking	0	0

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: "When you think of immigration problems, to which other area do you relate them *first*?"

**Table 6. Securitization of Immigration, 2004 (in percent)**

<b>Opinion Statements</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>No Opinion</b>
Immigration is a Cultural Threat	19	75	5
Economic Immigration Should be Increased	56	29	15
Extreme Right is Exploiting Immigration-Related Problems	74	23	3
European Immigration Policy Urgent after September 11th	58	30	12

N = 148.

Responses to the statements:

“Immigrants and asylum seekers undermine my country’s traditional culture.”

“Legal, economic immigration to my country should be increased.”

“Extreme political right groups in my country are successfully exploiting immigration-related problems.”

“The events of September 11, 2001 have made the pursuit of a common European immigration policy more urgent.”

**Table 7. Support for Immigrant Rights, 1993-2004 (in percent)**

<b>Preference</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>2004</b>
Extended	77	63
Status Quo	19	24
Restricted	4	13

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: “What should be done about the rights of immigrants?”

**Table 8. Support for Immigrant Rights, 2004 (in percent)**

<b>Preference</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Social</b>	<b>Economic</b>
Extended	48	58	58
Status Quo	43	30	34
Restricted	9	12	8

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: “Should the following rights for immigrants be extended, left as they are, or restricted?”

**Table 9. Preferred Venue for Regulating Immigration Policy, 1993-2004 (in percent)**

Country	National Governments		EU, with Member State Veto Option		EU Institutions, on the Basis of Majority Vote		Net Change toward National Governments
	1993	2004	1993	2004	1993	2004	
Austria	--	25	--	0	--	55	--
Belgium	10	33	20	0	70	67	+23
Denmark	25	75	50	13	25	13	+50
Finland	--	50	--	0	--	50	--
France	29	45	33	30	38	25	+16
Germany	43	41	24	9	33	29	-2
Greece	13	25	50	25	38	50	+13
Ireland	0	33	50	0	50	67	+33
Italy	20	21	16	21	64	58	+1
Luxembourg	33	33	67	67	0	0	0
Netherlands	31	20	31	40	38	40	-11
Portugal	29	67	57	0	14	33	+38
Spain	16	6	48	19	37	75	-10
Sweden	--	25	--	50	--	25	--
United Kingdom	46	64	21	18	33	18	+18
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+12</b>

N = 167 (1993); 148 (2004).

Responses to the question: "Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy: 1) national governments acting independently; 2) national governments, through prior consultation with other EU governments; 3) EU institutions, with member governments retaining the right of veto; 4) EU institutions, through majority vote."

**Table 10. Post-9/11 Security Consciousness and Preferred Venue for Regulating Immigration Policy, 2004 (in percent)**

		Venue for Regulating Immigration Policy		
		<i>EU</i>	<i>Member States</i>	Total
<b>Common Policy Urgent Post-Sept. 11<sup>th</sup></b>	<i>Agree</i>	39	20	59
	<i>Disagree</i>	13	17	30
	<i>No Opinion</i>	9	2	11
	<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>

N = 148

Responses to the questions:

“The events of September 11, 2001 have made the pursuit of a common European immigration policy more urgent.”

“Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy: 1) national governments acting independently; 2) national governments, through prior consultation with other EU governments; 3) EU institutions, with member governments retaining the right of veto; 4) EU institutions, through majority vote?”

**Table 11: Models of MEP preferences for a Unilateral Approach to Regulating Immigration**

	Model 1	Model 2
Traditional Culture	.373***	.073
Support for Economic Immigration	-.165	-.334
Police cooperation	-.175	.190
Conservative Ideology		.126
Public Support		-.290
Support Faster Integration		-.455
State Ineffective w/ refugees		-.657***
Right-wing Exploitation		-.301*
Support > Immigrant Rights		-.446
Support < Muslim Immigration		-.150
N	110	76
Log Likelihood	-127.84	-62.44

$p \leq .05^*$

$p \leq .01^{**}$

$p \leq .005^{***}$

**Table 12: Models of MEP Support for a Common Immigration Policy**

	Model 1	Model 2
Traditional Culture	-.542***	-.024
Support for Economic Immigration	-.109	-.052
Police cooperation	.601***	.348
Conservative Ideology		-.101
Public Support		-.165
Support Faster Integration		.529
State Ineffective w/ refugees		.577***
Right-wing Exploitation		.116
Support > Immigrant Rights		.318
Support < Muslim Immigration		-.157
N	111	77
Log Likelihood	-88.94	-51.62

$p \leq .05^*$        $p \leq .01^{**}$        $p \leq .005^{***}$

**Table 13: Models of MEP Urgency for Common Immigration Policy Post-September 11th**

	Model 1	Model 2
Traditional Culture	-.221	-.449*
Support for Economic Immigration	-.146	-.127
Police cooperation	.563***	.573**
Conservative Ideology		.117
Public Support		-.084
Support Faster Integration		-.096
State Ineffective w/ refugees		.296
Right-wing Exploitation		.458***
Support > Immigrant Rights		-.275
Support < Muslim Immigration		.228
N	101	70
Log Likelihood	-127.87	-81.29

$p \leq .05^*$        $p \leq .01^{**}$        $p \leq .005^{***}$



*Dependent Variables*<sup>14</sup>

**Regulating Immigration Policy: National or supranational venue for regulating immigration policy?** Those MEPs in our 2004 survey who indicated that the responsibility for regulating immigration policy should reside with national governments acting independently or through prior consultation with other EU member state governments were coded as 4 and 3 respectively. Alternatively, those who indicated that regulatory responsibility should reside with EU institutions, either with member governments retaining a right of veto or through a majority vote, were coded as 2 and 1 respectively.

**Support for a Common Immigration Policy?** Variable measuring the degree to which MEPs agreed that there should be a common immigration policy. The responses were coded 4 for strongly agree, 3 for agree, 2 for disagree and 1 for strongly disagree.

**Common Immigration Policy Urgent post-September 11<sup>th</sup>**: While the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 in the United States were obviously disconcerting to European political elites, the fact that they were executed by Muslim and Arab men must have been especially troubling for those MEPs whose countries are home to many persons of a similar background. Thus, we are curious about which factors may have contributed to inspiring a sense of urgency among MEPs for forging a common European immigration policy. This variable measured the degree to which MEPs acknowledged that a common immigration policy is urgent in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th. This four part categorical variable is coded as 4 for strongly agree, 3 for somewhat agree, 2 for somewhat disagree and 1 for strongly disagree.

*Independent Variable:*

Each of the following main independent variables represents a different dimension of the immigration-security nexus.

**Threat to Traditional Culture:** This variable measures the degree to which MEPs perceive immigrants and asylum seekers as undermining their respective country's traditional culture, with values ranging from 4 to 1 for responses ranging from strongly agree and somewhat agree to somewhat disagree and strongly disagree.

**Support for Increased Economic Immigration:** This variable allows us to get a sense of how MEP attitudes on economic security influence the outcomes. This variable was operationalized in four categories with respect to whether or not MEPs thought legal, economic immigration to their country should be increased. Responses were located on a four point scale with the highest score assigned for "strong agreement" followed by modest agreement, modest disagreement and strong disagreement, respectively.

**Value of Police Cooperation:** This variable pertains to the perceived benefits of police cooperation within the EU to reduce crime. Of all our variables, this one best approximates the European Union's capacity to safeguard physical security.

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<sup>14</sup> In addition to being interested in these dependent variables, in several models they are also used as independent variables as indicated below.

## Control Variables

**Ideology:** This variable has 9 levels on an ideological spectrum ranging from conservative (9) to liberal (1) reflecting Members' ideological self-placement.

**Perceived Public Support for a Common Immigration Policy:** This trichotomous variable was coded from 3 to 1 representing responses that were respectively favorable, indifferent and unfavorable.

**Support for Speeding up European Integration:** This categorical variable was coded as having three levels. MEPs preferring accelerated European integration were coded as 3, those supporting the present rate of integration were coded as 2, and finally, those wanting to slow the progress of integration were coded as 1.

**State Ineffectiveness at Dealing with Refugees and Asylum Seekers:** MEP's attitude toward his/her country's ability to address issues related to refugees and asylum seekers effectively. This variable ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 representing the value of the greatest skepticism of national government effectiveness (based on the response "strongly agree") to 1 for the least skepticism (for the response "strongly disagree").

**Perceived Extreme Right Wing Group Exploitation:** The degree to which MEPs perceived immigration-related problems are being successfully exploited for political gain by domestic extreme right groups. We coded their responses from 4 to 1 in accordance with whether an MEP agreed strongly, agreed only somewhat, somewhat disagreed and strongly disagreed.

**Support for Immigrant Rights:** This trichotomous categorical variable assumes a value of 3 for MEPs supporting an extension of immigrant rights, 2 for those backing the status, quo and 1 for those who want immigrant rights to be restricted.

**Support Decreased Muslim Immigration:** We include this variable to control for how MEP opposition to Muslim or Arab immigration influences overall attitudes. To operationalize this dummy variable we pooled responses indicating that MEPs wanted decreased immigration from the Middle East, North Africa or Turkey. Such responses were coded as 1, while responses favoring present levels or increased immigration from these areas were assigned a 0. While we realize that non-Arabs and non-Muslims also emigrate from these areas, we reasonably assume that most immigrants from these areas are either Muslim or Arab.

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