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# Options for Dealing with Agriculture in a Broader European Economic Area

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## Introduction

The Common Agricultural Policy is once again in trouble. Weaker world markets have increased the cost of export subsidies at a time when price cuts and producer levies have proved unable to stem production. As a consequence, budget limits so painfully negotiated in 1988 are under pressure. The EC is being asked to show itself willing, in the GATT Uruguay Round, to curb the influence of the CAP on world markets, and to renegotiate the rules that govern such trade. A full response would effectively mean a major revision of the CAP instruments. Such a move is strongly resisted by those that benefit from the current policy. On top of these budgetary and trade woes of the CAP are the attacks from environmental groups who argue that it has encouraged environmentally offensive practices. All these have been the subject of extensive analysis in the past few years. No farm policy can ever have had so much of the attention of economists and politicians alike. As if these pressures were not enough, yet another threat to the CAP is on the horizon if anything more serious than those faced in the past. It may well be that the CAP will stand or fall in large part by how it reacts to this latest challenge.

The monster at the gate is the emerging trade relations of the Community with the countries in EFTA and those of Central and Eastern Europe. Agricultural issues are not a part of the negotiations for a European Economic Area (or

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* Professor, Food Research Institute, Stanford University. I would like to thank Lori Ludington for valuable research assistance on this paper.

Space), presently underway between the EFTA countries and the EC. But the EEA talks coexist uneasily with membership application from Austria and that expected from Sweden. If these applications are successful then others will also wish to join. At the time of membership, if granted, agriculture cannot be swept under the rug. Moreover such an enlargement would be difficult to restrict to the rich EFTA countries. Waiting in the wings are other countries who see membership of the Community as a way of cementing their nascent democracies and market economies. The issue of agriculture will certainly be at the heart of those discussions.

The accession of these countries will pose a multiple threat to the operation of economic policies in the Community. The impact on agricultural policy is not the least of these impacts. The expansion of the EC to about 20 countries will change the context in which the CAP has to operate. It will either respond or be replaced. The EC has a number of ways in which it could respond to this challenge. The way that it chooses will influence the type of international trade system in which the Community finds itself. The aim of this paper is to explore at a very tentative level some of the alternative options that face the EC for dealing with this threat to a major common program.

The first section will consider the role of agriculture in the EFTA and in the accords that EFTA has with the EC, including the current talks on an EEA. A second section will raise the issue of agriculture as a part of relations with the Central and Eastern European countries, particularily Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A third section will address the question as to what would happen if these countries were to join the EC, forming a Community of over 20 countries. A fourth part of the paper looks at the internal implications of such a development for Community agricultural policies, and a final section considers the links between external trade policies and the question of adaptation of the CAP to expanded membership.

**Agriculture and the EFTA**

In July 1956, at a time of intensive negotiations on the future trade relations in post-war Europe, the UK suggested the formation of a free-trade area for all the OEEC countries - including the potential EEC members. The Six were not convinced that a mere free-trade area would be satisfactory: it did not hold out the promise of closer political relationships. Moreover, they distrusted the UK's insistence that such an FTA exclude agriculture (to preserve the practice of Commonwealth Preference) and chose to continue on their way toward the Rome Treaty.[1] Several other countries were also wary of the notion of a free trade area, including Greece, Turkey and Iceland. But the UK and six other countries (The Outer Seven) pursued the FTA option, leading to the Stockholm Treaty of 1960. This Treaty was heavily influenced by British trade policy, and contained an agreement that the trade liberalisation provisions would not apply to agriculture and to fisheries (Articles 21 and 26). Though the original reasons for this exclusion are no longer of relevance, the legacy still remains. EFTA is an incomplete free-trade area because it omits these two important sectors of the economy. Some bilateral arrangements were made between Denmark, when an EFTA member and the other members, particularily the UK, to ease the export of farm products. The UK also agreed to allow the import of some fish products from EFTA partners, subject to a minimum-import price, in the late 1960s. Some duties on agricultural products were bound in 1966, and market access improved in 1971, but

[1] For a discussion of this period see Michael Tracy, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1880-1988, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990.

EFTA has yet to tackle the agricultural anomaly.

The same decision was made at the time of the series of bilateral trade pacts among the EFTA countries and the EC, following the desertion of the UK and Denmark from EFTA in 1973. Clearly, trade barriers could not be re-erected among former EFTA partners: free trade between EFTA and the EC looked to be the answer. But in agriculture and fisheries the issue did not arise. No new barriers were erected on farm products as no preferences were eroded. Swiss farm exports, for example, were not allowed free access into the UK market under EFTA rules, so they suffered no loss with UK accession to the EC. It was the UK's Commonwealth Preference system that had to take most of the adjustment to UK membership in the area of agricultural trade.

Whether the EC-EFTA bilaterals could have included agriculture is uncertain. The EC had by that time developed the Common Agricultural Policy, a heavy-handed approach to trade liberalisation within the EC coupled with a restrictive system for controlling third country imports. The protectionist face of the CAP towards third countries was however not the main problem. Austria, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Finland (made a full EFTA member in 1969) and Iceland (which joined in 1970) and Portugal all had restrictive regimes for farm trade. The issue was trade within the EC-EFTA bloc. EFTA countries could hardly have been expected to have adopted the CAP: the loss of control of rural policy, seen as crucial to national security and social policy in several of these countries, was too much to expect of non-members. The supranational nature of the EC was (and is) much more evident in the case of agriculture than in most other areas of economic activity. The full set of regulations governing agricultural marketing together with a sharing of the financial burden and the need to harmonise prices would have been too much to impose on the EFTA countries. But without some fairly extensive revision of EFTA policies in this area, free trade in farm products would have been out of the question.

The talks aimed at establishing a European Economic Area have taken the same approach. Rather than open up the question of trade in agricultural products, both the EC and EFTA have agreed that it be left off the table. This decision was questioned by Spain, perhaps not so impressed with the historical precedents in this matter, who requested better access into the affluent nations of EFTA for Medditeranean products. Rather than open up the whole "can of worms", it was decided to avoid this issue. The question remains whether this is a satisfactory or indeed a stable state of affairs. Agriculture is a small and diminishing part of these economies. It is quite possible, from an administrative perspective, to rule all farm trade beyond the scope of an EEA.[2] But the long term viability of such a decision is doubtful. As the impact of integration is felt one can imagine anomalies arising which would call into question the decision.

These problems are likely to arise most clearly through developments in the food industry. Unlike the small size of the farm sector, the food industry is one of the largest in a European economy. People spend between 25 and 30 percent of their income on food, either prepared at home or eaten out. This industry is undergoing a process of rapid adjustment, including internal structural change and rationalisation and closer integration among countries. The end result will be an inevitable blurring of the national divisions of this sector. Some of the largest firms are located in EFTA countries. One would expect increasing

[2] This does however raise again the position of EFTA and the EEA within the GATT. Article XXIV states that a free trade area must cover essentially all trade. No one bothered to make an issue of the EFTA arrangement, but the same might not be true of an EEA treaty.

pressure to remove anomalies that prevented these firms from seeking the cheapest source of supply for raw materials in a competitive European food market. This industry will also need to maintain its competitiveness in world markets. In spite of these concerns, one would expect that agriculture will be kept formally out of the EEA arrangements for some time to come, with issues being dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

**Agriculture and relations with Eastern Europe**

The role of agriculture in the relations with Eastern Europe raises rather different issues. These countries are potential markets for agricultural goods, both in the short run as their economies undergo the wrenching adjustments to market-based economies and in the longer run as their incomes begin to catch up with those in the West. On the other hand it is clear that these countries would like to sell farm products in the West to gain foreign exchange to purchase other goods. The Community has been careful to avoid any committments to date on the crucial issue of imports of farm products from the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. It has been ready to provide food to these countries (and to the Soviet Union) as a response to short term needs. Though this has some value as a way of saving foreign exchange, it is not likely to prove of lasting benefit. Countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are unlikely to consider a flow of surlus goods from the Community as a satisfactory basis for rebuilding their economies.

Of critical importance to the Community in the future trade relationships with Eastern Europe is the production potential of their agricultural industries. Unfortunately it is difficult to predict how the current economic transformations will influence agricultural production. The presumption is usually made that agriculture has been hampered by the former policies and economic structure of these countries. Tangermann (1990) lists a number of reasons why output and productivity might increase with the change to a more market-based economy. These include "improved resource allocation with the removal of bureaucratic central planning; strengthened incentives as a result of privatisation; more appropriate price structures; better availability of inputs and capital goods and more ready credit facilities; improved efficiency in the livestock industry as a result of more appropriate feeding practices; availability of better genetic varieties and breeds; reduction in losses and waste as a result of improvements in the logistic infrastructure".[3] Add to this the high and stable prices from the CAP and it is not difficult to see a major expansion of output.

On the demand side, several people have commented that food intake (in terms of calories per capita) is not low in Eastern Europe.[4] Diets are however limited in variety, compared with Western Europe. There undoubtedly is considerable scope for the upgrading of diets as well as for reducing waste and distributing supplies more efficiently. On the other hand one would expect considerable increases in consumer food prices as a result of the changes in economic policy. The political difficulty in being able to raise the price level for for basic food products for the bulk of the population to the real cost of producing or importing those goods is one of the main constraints on reform. The combination of an agricultural sector with more incentive to produce and higher consumer prices would suggest a decline in imports or an increase in exports from

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[3] Stefan Tangermann, "United Western Europe and the Agriculture of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," paper given to the World Bank Conference on Agricultural Reform in Eastern Europe, September 1990.

[4] See Nicos Alexandratos, "Effects of Europe's Transformation on Food and Agriculture in the Developing Countries," paper given to the Council of Europe Conference on North-South Cooperation, December 1990; and Tangerman (op cit).

those countries.

## The Agricultural Challenge of New Members

The prospect that the EFTA countries will push for full membership, rather than the EEA, is becoming more likely. It is not clear that the EFTA countries will settle for an EEA which requires them to adopt much of the Community's rulebook with no say in the making or enforcing of those regulations. Austria has already indicated a willingness to seek full membership, and Sweden is expected to follow suit this summer. One could well expect Norway to join these two countries, if internal politics allows, and Finland could well find it necessary to adapt its own stance towards the Community. Though Iceland has to date shown little interest in joining, this could change if other EFTA countries were to accede to the EC. Even Switzerland, usually aloof from such international sovereignty-sharing, is beginning to face up to the problem that it could be left out of the integrated Western Europe market. If these countries pursue the membership option, an EC of about 18 countries is by no means impossible by the end of the decade.[5]

It is most unlikely that EFTA countries could join without acceding to the CAP in its totality--perhaps with some transition arrangements, as happened in previous enlargements. Such an expansion to include the Nordic and Alpine countries would change the political more than the economic aspects of agricultural policy. The EFTA countries have traditionally had rather protective policies, designed to keep population in the hills and in the northern areas of Europe. For the Community to absorb these members would have meant taking on

[5] Liechtenstein is in the Swiss customs zone but is treated as a separate EFTA partner: this would put membership at 19 if all EFTA members joined.

board new problems of small, uneconomic farms required for social and political reasons.

This tendency for the EFTA countries to have high levels of protection has been well illustrated in the OECD monitoring excercise, designed to keep track of the level of support given to agriculture in the OECD countries.[6] The measure chosen to represent the support level is the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), which attempts to indicate the direct output subsidy which if paid to farmers would be the equivalent in terms of farm income to the present set of programs. The PSE in 1989 for the EC-12 ranged from a low of 5 percent for pigmeat, where high cereal prices keep net farmer benefits modest, to 55 percent for beef, 52 percent for milk and for sugar.[7] The PSE for cereal ranged from 24 percent for wheat to 35 percent for coarse grains. Of the EFTA countries, all but Sweden had a profile of support markedly higher than the EC. Cereals in Norway and Finland benefitted from a level of support well above 70 percent, as did milk and beef in those countries. Swiss levels of support in 1989 were above 80 percent for cereals and beef and almost as high for milk and sugar. Support for cereals in Austria, at about 50 percent, was somewhat higher than in the EC, as was the support for sugar, but the level of support for livestock was very similar to that of the EC-12. In general these high EFTA support levels were possible because of the absence of any trade obligations for these commodities, and the weakness of the GATT rules in this area.

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[6] See OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook, 1990 OECD,Paris, 1990

[7] The PSE numbers are expressed as a percentage of the full support price, and therefore would be smaller than the nominal protection levels based on the same relative price information. The PSEs include the effect of input and factor market policies even though converted into an output-price subsidy equivalent. The table of PSEs for the EC-12 and the EFTA countries from 1975 to 1989 is given in Appendix Table 1.

The situation has changed somewhat in recent months. First, several EFTA countries are revising their own agricultural policies to reduce program costs and the distortions in the economy.[8] Sweden has led the way, with a sweeping reform of its agricultural policy in the direction of decoupled income payments and reduced price supports. Finland has introduced a new program of payments per hectare and per cow to take the place of a part of the support through higher prices. Austria is also considering the possibility of decoupled payments, and Switzerland is being urged to convert from high food prices to direct environmental grants to keep the hillsides grazed.

The impetus for these policy changes seems to be as much a reflection of the debate in the GATT Uruguay Round as any desire to align policy with the CAP. The Nordic countries, in particular, have been actively involved in proposals for trade liberalisation in the GATT, though taking a softer line than the US and the Cairns Group. Without the buffer of the common budget, the costs of agricultural support have perhaps been more evident to the EFTA countries than to EC members, and policy reform has certainly been easier. But the result may lead to the unusual situation of the next EC members entering with more defensible policies for agriculture, leaving the challenge for the EC either to adapt the CAP more speedily or to force the EFTA countries to abandon their policy experiments.

Though the effect on the policy debate may be of significance, the economic impact of EFTA membership is likely to be rather slight. The EFTA countries are not major players in world agricultural trade, and so do not bring to the CAP

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[8] See the discussion in Ruth K. Elleson, "EFTA,Europe 1992 and the GATT", in Western Europe: Agriculture and Trade Report, ERS/USDA, November 1990, p.67

problems of large unsalable surpluses.[9] Moreover even if there were to be significant changes in the policies of the EFTA countries their relatively small size means that changes in their market balance would not be large in EC terms. In fact they would most likely contribute more to the EC own-resources than they would absorb in FEOGA payments. High income food importers do not put much of a financial burden on the Community's budget. These countries may however have a strong incentive to expand the Community's programs that deal with hilly and otherwise difficult farming regions, and to develop further at a Community level the concept of environmental payments to farmers.

The challenge to the CAP of membership from the East is a more substantial economic threat than is represented by EFTA membership. It seems reasonable to assume that the countries most likely to attain membership are Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This assumes that economic reforms in those countries are reasonably successful and that political stability and democratic institutions thrive. These countries are more significant agricultural producers, with aspirations to sell their produce in the West. Poland, in particular, has the potential to be a significant agricultural power in Europe. Its wheat acreage is twice that of the EFTA countries combined, and wheat yields are currently lower than other countries in Eastern Europe.[10] Its current output of beef,

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[9] The only commodity where the current EFTA countries would add significantly to EC surpluses is milk. The EFTA countries are net exporters of butter and cheese. For these products it would be in the interests of the EC to encourage a reduction in support and production in the EFTA countries. Appendix Table 2 shows the total agricultural exports and imports for the past five years and Table 3 gives the 1990 net trade balance for the EFTA countries and the EC-12 for the major commodities.

[10] Appendix Table 3 gives the current (1990) market balance for the Eastern European candidates for membership. However the caveat should be noted that the figures for theses countries are subject to considerable doubt. Statements in the text should therefore be treated as tentative rather than firm impressions.

pork and milk is also larger than that of the EFTA bloc. Hungary presently boasts of net agricultural exports, unlike all of the other potential members. That country also has the potential to add to cereal surpluses if encouraged by present EC incentives, but may make its membership felt in other ways such as adding to the wine lake and the surpluses of some fruits and vegetables. The result is a formidible challenge to the stability of EC internal markets and to the budget cost of maintaining high prices. It may be possible to resist the pressure to give these countries access to EC markets while they are outside the gates: it is not easy to see how one can deny them full access once inside.[11] This would inevitably mean adoption of common policy instruments and the structure of common prices.

## Policy Adjustments to Expanded Membership

The CAP is unlikely to be unaffected by these developments. The current debate in the EC on the restructuring of the CAP will begin to shape the options for the future. The choices are essentially three: to continue to have high price supports over the entire Community, of perhaps 21 members, finding some way to finance the additional surpluses that are generated from the Eastern European countries; to find a way of controlling the internal market by quantitative means to reconcile price objectives with market realities; or to allow prices to allocate production among countries and to satisfy income and environmental objectives in other, more direct ways. On past evidence one might expect the Community to chose the "muddling through" option, putting a high price umbrella

[11] The present EC policy of offering very little in the way of import access for farm products is causing problems for the negotiation of expanded trade agreements. The pressure on the CAP could be felt even if membership is not on the cards.

over the agricultural sector on all countries. Whether this policy is feasible depends on what other things the EC wishes to spend money on. Continued high spending on agriculture would seem to preclude any significant expansion of other programs. The new members would in essence be made to take their benefits in the form of hidden support for agriculture rather than as more flexible funds for industrial development and infrastructure.

The second option seems more likely, that the Community will move towards sticter quantitative controls within the enlarged EC-21. There was an intensive debate in the 1950s about whether the EC should allow members to retain quantitative controls on agricultural trade with other members. The Netherlands in particular wanted no part of such an illiberal scheme: they had suffered from such policies under the Benelux agreement. Instead, the principle of free movement of goods was extended to agriculture in the Treaty of Rome. It is this principle that would be violated by quantitative restrictions between Eastern European and other EC members. The restrictions could be justified as transitional measures, but this would only serve to postpone the day of reckoning.

Alternatively, quotas could be imposed on production (or sales) of products. This has the advantage that a violation of free intra-EC trade is avoided, but it brings much the same disadvantage by different means. Patterns of production get decided by an administrative or political process which is likely to have little to do with comparative costs. The relocation of output to take advantage of cost differences needs to be encouraged, for the sake of both the existing EC and for the new members. It would be inconsistent to admit countries to a Europe-wide market and then to restrict their production to some historical pattern. To some extent this can be alleviated by making production quotas tradable within the EC. Farmers in the low cost areas could purchase rights from those with high costs. But if the low cost areas in the Community turn out to be in the current members, then the flow of finance will be from the new members to the old, from lower income farming areas to those already better-off. The Community would probably have to buy the quotas and distribute them to the new members. The politcal acceptability of enlargement in rural areas would be put to a severe test by such overt redistribution policies.

The third option is the least likely, any yet it has a compelling logic. The Community could start on a program of long term price cuts coupled with decoupled payments. The transition period would be a way of allowing the Community to get in position to accept new members, rather than to put all the adjustment on the new members. The Commission plans of January 1991 for the reform of the CAP go some way toward meeting this objective. The proposal, to reduce cereal and livestock prices with the impact on farm income offset by a series of compensation payments, is a bold move in the direction of preparing the CAP for new members. The proposals, however have been already been weakened considerably as a result of opposition from farm groups and from several countries, and their fate is still uncertain.

### External Implications of Internal Decisions

A clear lesson from the experience of the current GATT Round is that external pressure has limited effect on the pace of internal decisions in agriculture. This is not to say that world market conditions do not influence the CAP: the link is fairly direct, through the impact on the budget. Nor does it mean that EC policy makers care not what their trading partners think, or that they do not worry about what happens to trade relations. But policy changes have a dynamic of their own which is inherent in the domestic policy process.[12] This process is more likely to be influenced by an expansion of membership, with the implication of changes in the bureaucracy and in political alignments, than with the reaction of other non-EC countries. Nevertheless it is worth contemplating the overseas reaction to the incorporation of several new countries into the orbit of the CAP.

One thing that can be said with some degree of confidence is that the situation will be closely watched by the "traditional" exporting countries of temperate-zone farm products. The first enlargement of the EC, to include the large UK market (as well as two small exporters of farm products in Ireland and Denmark) was treated with apprehension by the US and aroused considerable concern about the disruption of trade patterns for Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, in 1986, also caused concerns about the extension of the CAP to more countries, and led directly to some trade tensions. The inclusion of much of central europe under an unreconstructed CAP would be even more problematic for the trading partners of the EC.

This fear would be heightened if the GATT Round does not bring its promised stepwise reduction in protection and change of policy instruments. In the absense of an agreement within the GATT, there is a strong possibility of renewed tensions and trade skirmishes between the EC and the other exporters. Moreover, the multilateral trade system would recieve a severe shock from which it might never recover. Bilateralism as always stands poised to answer the challenges of trade policy, and regional groupings might prove to be the preferred form of plurilateral rule making. The EC-21 could under such an arrangement withstand

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[12] For a discussion of the process of policy reform in the EC and its relation to the GATT Round, see Wayne Moyer and Tim Josling, Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the US and the EC, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991

some criticism of its agricultural trade practices from the North American Free Trade Area, since it would be relatively secure in its own internal market.

A strong GATT agreement on agriculture would immediately increase the prospects for a viable CAP for EC-21. A schedule of reductions in support would make the transition to common prices for the EC-EFTA-EE3 countries much simpler. Changes in policy instruments would make adaptation of policies much easier. A tariff-type external trade policy, coupled with targetted internal payments not linked to current production, would be much easier to generalise to the other countries.

The completion of the GATT Round has a significant internal role to play in the future development of the CAP, in particular if the Community is to be expanded. The agricultural policy could probably survive in its present form with the current EC membership for a few more years, though the GATT might not survive the unwillingness of the EC to agree to CAP reform. In these circumstances, new institutions would take the place of the GATT, and lead to new trade groupings based more on regional lines. But such groupings are unlikely to solve global agricultural trade problems, and could lead to severe inter-bloc rivalry. The EC would try to face the problem of absorbing the production potential of Eastern Europe without a reformed global trading system for a backdrop. This would seem to promise either quantitative controls on production and trade or expensive programs which will absorb the Community's scarce funds and lead to incessant arguments over equity. By contrast, a constructive GATT outcome could pave the way for a smooth incorporation of the agricultures of both EFTA and the more advanced countries of Eastern Europe into the CAP.

Appendix Table 1 : PSEs by commodity, EFTA countries and EC, 1975-1989
(percent)

Wheat

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 27 | 60 | 75 | 68 | 48 |
| FINLAND | 59 | 72 | 81 | 80 | 77 |
| NORWAY | 61 | 68 | 78 | 79 | 72 |
| SWEDEN | 29 | 66 | 65 | 35 | 20 |
| SWITZERLAND | 70 | 83 | 86 | 81 | 81 |
| EC-12 | 28 | 63 | 66 | 30 | 24 |

Milk

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 43 | 69 | 62 | 55 | 47 |
| FINLAND | 65 | 72 | 77 | 76 | 73 |
| NORWAY | 78 | 85 | 82 | 80 | 79 |
| SWEDEN | 64 | 75 | 72 | 68 | 62 |
| SWITZERLAND | 72 | 89 | 87 | 82 | 76 |
| EC-12 | 52 | 73 | 68 | 60 | 52 |

Coarse Grains

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 23 | 44 | 61 | 48 | 51 |
| FINLAND | 54 | 81 | 90 | 87 | 78 |
| NORWAY | 76 | 84 | 89 | 85 | 82 |
| SWEDEN | 25 | 59 | 47 | 32 | 26 |
| SWITZERLAND | 72 | 87 | 92 | 88 | 84 |
| EC-12 | 32 | 66 | 63 | 34 | 35 |

Beef

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 44 | 50 | 46 | 56 | 58 |
| FINLAND | 59 | 60 | 67 | 75 | 76 |
| NORWAY | 68 | 70 | 69 | 75 | 74 |
| SWEDEN | 47 | 43 | 52 | 60 | 61 |
| SWITZERLAND | 75 | 81 | 82 | 88 | 86 |
| EC-12 | 47 | 50 | 46 | 56 | 55 |

Sugar

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 57 | 80 | 74 | 74 | 70 |
| FINLAND | 69 | 77 | 86 | 85 | 77 |
| NORWAY | | | | | |
| SWEDEN | 51 | 66 | 63 | 51 | 38 |
| SWITZERLAND | 73 | 86 | 87 | 87 | 77 |
| EC-12 | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 52 |

Pigmeat

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 5 | 27 | 36 | 24 | 11 |
| FINLAND | 35 | 44 | 48 | 50 | 53 |
| NORWAY | 47 | 49 | 53 | 53 | 47 |
| SWEDEN | 20 | 33 | 40 | 35 | 35 |
| SWITZERLAND | 44 | 55 | 65 | 57 | 45 |
| EC-12 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 |

Source: OECD Monitoring Report, 1990

Appendix Table 1 (contd) : PSEs by country, EFTA and EC, selected commodities, 1975-1989
(percent)

AUSTRIA

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 27 | 60 | 75 | 68 | 48 |
| Coarse Grains | 23 | 44 | 61 | 48 | 51 |
| Sugar | 57 | 80 | 74 | 74 | 70 |
| Milk | 43 | 69 | 62 | 55 | 47 |
| Beef | 44 | 50 | 46 | 56 | 58 |
| Pigmeat | 5 | 27 | 36 | 24 | 11 |

SWEDEN

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 29 | 66 | 65 | 35 | 20 |
| Coarse Grains | 25 | 59 | 47 | 32 | 26 |
| Sugar | 51 | 66 | 63 | 51 | 38 |
| Milk | 64 | 75 | 72 | 68 | 62 |
| Beef | 47 | 43 | 52 | 60 | 61 |
| Pigmeat | 20 | 33 | 40 | 35 | 35 |

FINLAND

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 59 | 72 | 81 | 80 | 77 |
| Coarse Grains | 54 | 81 | 90 | 87 | 78 |
| Sugar | 69 | 77 | 86 | 85 | 77 |
| Milk | 65 | 72 | 77 | 76 | 73 |
| Beef | 59 | 60 | 67 | 75 | 76 |
| Pigmeat | 35 | 44 | 48 | 50 | 53 |

SWITZERLAND

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 70 | 83 | 86 | 81 | 81 |
| Coarse Grains | 72 | 87 | 92 | 88 | 84 |
| Sugar | 73 | 86 | 87 | 87 | 77 |
| Milk | 72 | 89 | 87 | 82 | 76 |
| Beef | 75 | 81 | 82 | 88 | 86 |
| Pigmeat | 44 | 55 | 65 | 57 | 45 |

NORWAY

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 61 | 68 | 78 | 79 | 72 |
| Coarse Grains | 76 | 84 | 89 | 85 | 82 |
| Sugar | | | | | |
| Milk | 78 | 85 | 82 | 80 | 79 |
| Beef | 68 | 70 | 69 | 75 | 74 |
| Pigmeat | 47 | 49 | 53 | 53 | 47 |

EC-12

| | 1975-85 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wheat | 28 | 63 | 66 | 30 | 24 |
| Coarse Grains | 32 | 66 | 63 | 34 | 35 |
| Sugar | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 52 |
| Milk | 52 | 73 | 68 | 60 | 52 |
| Beef | 47 | 50 | 46 | 56 | 55 |
| Pigmeat | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 |

Source: OECD Monitoring Report, 1990

Appendix Table 2: Value of Agricultural and Total Trade by Country

Total Agricultural Imports ($million)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 1,541 | 1,979 | 2,252 | 2,386 | 2,418 |
| FINLAND | 893 | 1,099 | 1,302 | 1,278 | 1,319 |
| NORWAY | 923 | 1,295 | 1,398 | 1,433 | 1,467 |
| SWEDEN | 1,941 | 2,425 | 2,710 | 2,979 | 2,903 |
| SWITZERLAND | 2,769 | 3,477 | 4,051 | 4,195 | 4,055 |
| ICELAND | 95 | 116 | 135 | 137 | 133 |
| EFTA | 8,162 | 10,391 | 11,848 | 12,408 | 12,295 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1,744 | 1,868 | 1,933 | 2,239 | 1,861 |
| HUNGARY | 731 | 874 | 895 | 857 | 728 |
| POLAND | 1,375 | 1,287 | 1,391 | 1,783 | 2,099 |
| EE | 3,850 | 4,029 | 4,220 | 4,879 | 4,688 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 89,203 | 106,945 | 124,460 | 135,689 | 135,550 |
| EC-18 | 97,365 | 117,336 | 136,308 | 148,097 | 147,845 |
| EC-21 | 101,215 | 121,365 | 140,528 | 152,977 | 152,533 |

Total Imports ($million)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 20,803 | 26,793 | 32,638 | 36,669 | 38,954 |
| FINLAND | 13,226 | 15,325 | 19,860 | 21,027 | 24,572 |
| NORWAY | 14,519 | 20,298 | 22,578 | 23,220 | 23,657 |
| SWEDEN | 28,538 | 32,493 | 40,621 | 45,715 | 49,013 |
| SWITZERLAND | 30,626 | 41,188 | 50,557 | 56,477 | 58,272 |
| ICELAND | 906 | 1,116 | 1,586 | 1,614 | 1,412 |
| EFTA | 108,618 | 137,213 | 167,840 | 184,722 | 195,880 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 17,627 | 21,063 | 23,237 | 24,251 | 14,269 |
| HUNGARY | 8,190 | 9,598 | 9,864 | 9,398 | 8,803 |
| POLAND | 10,836 | 11,209 | 10,844 | 12,242 | 10,085 |
| EE | 36,653 | 41,870 | 43,945 | 45,891 | 33,157 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 659,853 | 776,818 | 949,674 | 1,102,052 | 1,095,212 |
| EC-18 | 768,471 | 914,031 | 1,117,514 | 1,286,774 | 1,291,092 |
| EC-21 | 805,124 | 955,901 | 1,161,459 | 1,332,665 | 1,324,249 |

Appendix Table 2 (contd): Value of Agricultural and Total Trade by Country

Total Agricultural Exports ($million)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 782 | 930 | 1,014 | 1,146 | 1,247 |
| FINLAND | 703 | 732 | 870 | 629 | 695 |
| NORWAY | 385 | 368 | 491 | 540 | 594 |
| SWEDEN | 928 | 918 | 941 | 1,031 | 1,089 |
| SWITZERLAND | 1,003 | 1,329 | 1,568 | 1,599 | 1,585 |
| ICELAND | 22 | 22 | 31 | 32 | 41 |
| EFTA | 3,823 | 4,299 | 4,915 | 4,977 | 5,251 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 574 | 617 | 647 | 720 | 675 |
| HUNGARY | 1,847 | 1,890 | 1,907 | 2,149 | 2,172 |
| POLAND | 954 | 1,088 | 1,193 | 1,288 | 1,529 |
| EE | 3,376 | 3,594 | 3,746 | 4,157 | 4,376 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 73,516 | 91,102 | 109,095 | 118,126 | 124,054 |
| EC-18 | 77,339 | 95,401 | 114,010 | 123,103 | 129,305 |
| EC-21 | 80,715 | 98,995 | 117,756 | 127,260 | 133,681 |

Total Exports ($million)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 17,102 | 22,517 | 22,163 | 31,105 | 32,492 |
| FINLAND | 13,609 | 16,325 | 20,039 | 21,663 | 23,290 |
| NORWAY | 18,663 | 18,230 | 21,449 | 22,535 | 24,789 |
| SWEDEN | 30,403 | 37,118 | 44,313 | 49,800 | 54,780 |
| SWITZERLAND | 27,281 | 37,534 | 45,357 | 50,764 | 55,840 |
| ICELAND | 813 | 1,093 | 1,374 | 1,443 | 1,409 |
| EFTA | 107,871 | 132,817 | 154,695 | 177,310 | 192,600 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 17,553 | 20,446 | 22,985 | 24,936 | 14,457 |
| HUNGARY | 8,479 | 9,175 | 9,588 | 10,026 | 9,584 |
| POLAND | 11,489 | 12,074 | 12,205 | 13,959 | 13,155 |
| EE | 37,521 | 41,696 | 44,778 | 48,921 | 37,196 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 643,903 | 788,346 | 950,831 | 1,068,710 | 1,020,096 |
| EC-18 | 751,774 | 921,163 | 1,105,526 | 1,246,021 | 1,212,696 |
| EC-21 | 789,296 | 962,858 | 1,150,304 | 1,294,942 | 1,249,892 |

Appendix Table 2 (Contd): Value of Agricultural and Total Trade by Country

Net Agricultural Imports (million $)

| | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 759 | 1,049 | 1,238 | 1,240 | 1,171 |
| FINLAND | 190 | 367 | 432 | 649 | 624 |
| NORWAY | 538 | 927 | 907 | 893 | 873 |
| SWEDEN | 1,013 | 1,507 | 1,769 | 1,948 | 1,814 |
| SWITZERLAND | 1,766 | 2,148 | 2,483 | 2,596 | 2,470 |
| ICELAND | 73 | 94 | 104 | 105 | 92 |
| EFTA | 4,339 | 6,092 | 6,933 | 7,431 | 7,044 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1,170 | 1,251 | 1,287 | 1,519 | 1,186 |
| HUNGARY | -1,116 | -1,015 | -1,012 | -1,291 | -1,444 |
| POLAND | 421 | 199 | 199 | 495 | 569 |
| EE | 475 | 434 | 474 | 722 | 312 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 15,687 | 15,843 | 15,365 | 17,564 | 11,497 |
| EC-18 | 20,026 | 21,935 | 22,298 | 24,995 | 18,541 |
| EC-21 | 20,500 | 22,370 | 22,771 | 25,717 | 18,852 |

Source: FAO Trade Yearbook, various issues

Appendix Table 3: Market Balance for Major Commodities, Potential EC Members, 1990

*Wheat*

| Country | Area 000 Ha | Yield t/Ha | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 265 | 5.2 | 1,370 | 550 | 310 | -240 |
| FINLAND | 160 | 3.1 | 500 | 50 | 25 | -25 |
| NORWAY | 40 | 4.4 | 175 | 250 | 60 | -190 |
| SWEDEN | 336 | 5.6 | 1,890 | 40 | 800 | 760 |
| SWITZERLAND | 90 | 6.0 | 540 | 210 | 790 | 580 |
| ICELAND | | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 891 | 5.0 | 4,475 | 1,100 | 1,985 | 885 |
| | | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1,239 | 5.1 | 6,356 | 24 | 80 | 56 |
| HUNGARY | 1,242 | 5.3 | 6,559 | 0 | 1,426 | 1,426 |
| POLAND | 2,195 | 3.8 | 8,462 | 1,797 | 0 | -1,797 |
| EE | 4,676 | 4.6 | 21,377 | 1,821 | 1,506 | -315 |
| | | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 15,595 | 5.2 | 80,296 | 12,975 | 31,777 | 18,802 |
| EC-18 | 16,486 | 5.1 | 84,771 | 14,075 | 33,762 | 19,687 |
| EC-21 | 21,162 | 5.0 | 106,148 | 15,896 | 35,268 | 19,372 |

*Corn*

| Country | Area 000 Ha | Yield t/Ha | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 189 | 8.5 | 1,600 | 20 | 250 | 230 |
| FINLAND | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NORWAY | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 15 | 0 | -15 |
| SWEDEN | 3 | 4.0 | 12 | 5 | 0 | -5 |
| SWITZERLAND | 25 | 8.0 | 200 | 150 | 0 | -150 |
| ICELAND | | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 217 | 8.4 | 1,812 | 190 | 250 | 60 |
| | | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 190 | 5.3 | 1,000 | 120 | 0 | -120 |
| HUNGARY | 1,124 | 6.2 | 6,949 | 142 | 219 | 77 |
| POLAND | 51 | 4.8 | 244 | 409 | 0 | -409 |
| EE | 1,365 | 6.0 | 8,193 | 671 | 219 | -452 |
| | | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 3,693 | 6.6 | 24,000 | 9,900 | 7,030 | -2,870 |
| EC-18 | 3,910 | 6.6 | 25,812 | 10,090 | 7,280 | -2,810 |
| EC-21 | 5,275 | 6.4 | 34,005 | 10,761 | 7,499 | -3,262 |

Appendix Table 3 (contd): Market Balance for Major Commodities, Potential EC Members,1990

*Barley*

| Country | Area 000 Ha | Yield t/Ha | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 288 | 4.7 | 1,350 | 0 | 150 | 150 |
| FINLAND | 540 | 3.0 | 1,600 | 0 | 950 | 950 |
| NORWAY | 170 | 3.3 | 560 | 150 | 0 | -150 |
| SWEDEN | 470 | 3.9 | 1,825 | 20 | 10 | -10 |
| SWITZERLAND | 53 | 5.1 | 270 | 200 | 0 | -200 |
| ICELAND | | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 1,521 | 3.7 | 5,605 | 370 | 1,110 | 740 |
| | | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 751 | 4.3 | 3,550 | 1 | 15 | 14 |
| HUNGARY | 282 | 4.7 | 1,339 | 640 | 1,725 | 1,085 |
| POLAND | 1,175 | 3.4 | 3,909 | 5,050 | 0 | -5,050 |
| EE | 2,208 | 4.0 | 8,798 | 5,691 | 1,740 | -3,951 |
| | | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 11,634 | 3.9 | 44,940 | 4,112 | 10,535 | 6,423 |
| EC-18 | 13,155 | 3.8 | 50,545 | 4,482 | 11,645 | 7,163 |
| EC-21 | 15,363 | 3.9 | 59,343 | 10,173 | 13,385 | 3,212 |

*Sugar*

| Country | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 460 | 0 | 67 | 67 |
| FINLAND | 168 | 76 | 24 | -52 |
| NORWAY | 0 | 160 | 0 | -160 |
| SWEDEN | 401 | 45 | 45 | 0 |
| SWITZERLAND | 150 | 134 | 0 | -134 |
| ICELAND | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 1,179 | 415 | 136 | -279 |
| | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAK | 755 | 294 | 125 | -169 |
| HUNGARY | 576 | 11 | 105 | 94 |
| POLAND | 1,850 | 226 | 207 | -19 |
| EE | 3,181 | 531 | 437 | -94 |
| | | | | |
| EC-12 | 15,298 | 2,511 | 6,128 | 3,617 |
| EC-18 | 16,477 | 2,926 | 6,264 | 3,338 |
| EC-21 | 19,658 | 3,457 | 6,701 | 3,244 |

Appendix Table 3 (contd): Market Balance for Major Commodities, Potential EC Members,1990

*Beef and Veal*

| Country | Slaughter '000 head | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 805 | 216 | 3 | 52 | 49 |
| FINLAND | 467 | 100 | 3 | 1 | -2 |
| NORWAY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SWEDEN | 558 | 137 | 14 | 7 | -7 |
| SWITZERLAND | 802 | 161 | 15 | 2 | -13 |
| ICELAND | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 2,632 | 614 | 35 | 62 | 27 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 160 | 409 | 1 | 43 | 42 |
| HUNGARY | 435 | 120 | 12 | 35 | 23 |
| POLAND | 3,425 | 660 | 90 | 48 | -42 |
| EE | 4,020 | 1,189 | 103 | 126 | 23 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 28,067 | 7,509 | 1,889 | 2,148 | 259 |
| EC-18 | 30,699 | 8,123 | 1,924 | 2,210 | 286 |
| EC-21 | 34,719 | 9,312 | 2,027 | 2,336 | 309 |

*Pork*

| Country | Slaughter '000 head | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 5,250 | 397 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| FINLAND | 2,205 | 172 | 0 | 11 | 11 |
| NORWAY | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SWEDEN | 3,640 | 292 | 16 | 29 | 13 |
| SWITZERLAND | 3,360 | 281 | 2 | 0 | -2 |
| ICELAND | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 14,455 | 1,142 | 18 | 45 | 27 |
| | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 9,117 | 937 | 2 | 10 | 8 |
| HUNGARY | 11,000 | 1,010 | 0 | 132 | 132 |
| POLAND | 19,210 | 1,753 | 146 | 4 | -142 |
| EE | 39,327 | 3,700 | 148 | 146 | -2 |
| | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 160,018 | 12,480 | 2,404 | 2,766 | 362 |
| EC-18 | 30,699 | 8,123 | 1,924 | 2,210 | 286 |
| EC-21 | 34,719 | 9,312 | 2,027 | 2,336 | 309 |

Appendix Table 3 (contd): Market Balance for Major Commodities, Potential EC Members, 1990

*Oilseeds*

| Country | Area 000 Ha | Yield t/Ha | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 83 | 2.6 | 214 | 14 | 0 | -14 |
| FINLAND | 75 | 1.6 | 120 | 144 | 0 | -144 |
| NORWAY | 7 | 1.6 | 11 | 318 | 0 | -318 |
| SWEDEN | 175 | 2.2 | 376 | 33 | 69 | 36 |
| SWITZERLAND | 18 | 3.1 | 55 | 146 | 0 | -146 |
| ICELAND | | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 358 | 2.2 | 776 | 655 | 69 | -586 |
| | | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | | | | | | |
| HUNGARY | | | | | | |
| POLAND | | | | | | |
| EE | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 5,494 | 2.3 | 12,710 | 16,988 | 3,399 | -13589 |
| EC-18 | | | | | | |
| EC-21 | | | | | | |

*Milk*

| Country | Cows '000 head | Yield tons/yr | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 830 | 4.0 | 3,330 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| FINLAND | 495 | 5.2 | 2,576 | 10 | 0 | -10 |
| NORWAY | 340 | 5.6 | 1,900 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SWEDEN | 567 | 6.2 | 3,533 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| SWITZERLAND | 782 | 4.8 | 3,772 | 23 | 10 | -13 |
| ICELAND | | | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 3,014 | 5.0 | 15,111 | 33 | 24 | -9 |
| | | | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1,775 | 4.0 | 7,101 | 1 | 28 | 28 |
| HUNGARY | 580 | 4.8 | 2,812 | 0 | 56 | 56 |
| POLAND | 4,800 | 3.3 | 15,700 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| EE | 7,155 | 3.6 | 25,613 | 1 | 84 | 84 |
| | | | | | | |
| EC-12 | 24,496 | 4.4 | 108,841 | 2,781 | 2,555 | -226 |
| EC-18 | 27,510 | 4.5 | 123,952 | 2,814 | 2,579 | -235 |
| EC-21 | 34,665 | 4.3 | 149,565 | 2,815 | 2,663 | -152 |

Appendix Table 3 (contd): Market Balance for Major Commodities, Potential EC Members, 1990

*Butter*

| Country | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 41 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| FINLAND | 58 | 0 | 24 | 24 |
| NORWAY | 21 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
| SWEDEN | 70 | 0 | 21 | 21 |
| SWITZERLAND | 34 | 8 | 0 | -8 |
| ICELAND | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 224 | 8 | 53 | 45 |
| | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 150 | 0 | 12 | 12 |
| HUNGARY | 38 | 1 | 6 | 5 |
| POLAND | 290 | 28 | 3 | -25 |
| EE | 478 | 29 | 21 | -8 |
| | | | | |
| EC-12 | 1,690 | 729 | 920 | 191 |
| EC-18 | 1,914 | 737 | 973 | 236 |
| EC-21 | 2,392 | 766 | 994 | 228 |

*Cheese*

| Country | Production 000 Tons | Imports 000 Tons | Exports 000 Tons | Net Exports 000 Tons |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUSTRIA | 85 | 10 | 38 | 28 |
| FINLAND | 75 | 2 | 24 | 22 |
| NORWAY | 76 | 2 | 22 | 20 |
| SWEDEN | 111 | 19 | 3 | -16 |
| SWITZERLAND | 133 | 23 | 62 | 39 |
| ICELAND | | | | 0 |
| EFTA | 480 | 56 | 149 | 93 |
| | | | | |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 232 | 2 | 8 | 6 |
| HUNGARY | 86 | 1 | 14 | 13 |
| POLAND | 447 | 6 | 4 | -2 |
| EE | 765 | 9 | 26 | 17 |
| | | | | |
| EC-12 | 4,481 | 1,179 | 1,510 | 331 |
| EC-18 | 4,961 | 1,235 | 1,659 | 424 |
| EC-21 | 5,726 | 1,244 | 1,685 | 441 |

Source: ERS, Western Europe Situation and Outlook Report, June 1990, and FAO Trade and Production Yearbooks (various issues)