

Assessing EU Foreign Policy in the UN: Capacity, Identity, and Context

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INTRODUCTION

The recent diplomatic imbroglio that played out in the UN Security Council led many observers to conclude that divisions over Iraq had not only deeply divided the trans-Atlantic relationship but it also poisoned relations among Europeans themselves. As the French and Germans took a firm stand against the use of military force to disarm Iraq, Britain, Spain, and several other “new” European states, including the Vilnius group comprised of largely applicant states from Eastern Europe, supported vigorous US calls for precisely such action. An angry French President Jacques Chirac essentially told the applicants states that they were being ungrateful and should know when to hold their tongues (*New York Times*, Feb. 2003). This very public display of EU disunity on the world stage and within the UN Security Council suggested that a common foreign policy for the EU within the UN was out of reach. In fact, this very high profile European divide flies in the face of a strong and steadily growing EU unity within the UN since the early 1990s. Indeed, the growth of the EU presence in the UN is such that representatives from other member states charge that nothing gets accomplished in many UN bodies unless the Europeans are on board (Interview, UN Headquarters, January 9, 2003).

This paper explores the growing role of the European Union within the United Nations by establishing its capacity, identity, and context. The first and largest part of the paper uses the concept of “actorness” developed by Caporaso and Jupille to provide empirical evidence of the growing **capacity** of the EU to speak with one voice at the UN (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998). The authority, cohesion, recognition and autonomy of the EU as an actor in its own right are detailed and it is shown that while the EU foreign policy within the EU is authoritative, cohesive and broadly recognized, the autonomy of the EU as an actor remains problematic. The paper then explores the **identity** of the EU within the UN, its corporate identity. EU foreign policy represents particular values quite often associated with the notion of “civilian power.” Finally, the last section of the paper explores the **context** of United Nations for EU foreign policy. The multilateral environment, as opposed to EU “bilateral” or regional relations, is particularly congenial for the articulation of a common foreign policy. In addition, there are institutional factors that account for the expanding scope of EU influence in the world body. The paper

makes extensive use of UN documents to present the growing capacity of the EU as well as dozens of interviews conducted in New York over the past three and a half years to gauge the impact of the EU's foreign policy in the UN context.

CAPACITY: GROUP ACTORNESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

To what degree can we even speak of an EU policy within the United Nations? A number of authors have explored the idea of states coordinating their foreign policies and acting as a single unit, or group, toward the rest of the world. Most of these studies have centered on the European Community/European Union and the degree to which it can be understood as a coherent actor in world affairs (Sjøstedt 1997; Hill 1993; Caporaso and Jupille, 1998; Holland, 1995; Ginsberg 1999). All emphasize the hybrid nature of the beast, and the challenges of disentangling the intergovernmental features from the collective institutional features of a common foreign policy. As Ginsberg notes, "The EU is a partially constructed international actor, neither a state nor a political union of states. It does not act consistently or uniformly across the gamut of international politics: at times it does not act, and at other times too slowly or timidly. However, when it does act with results, it often gets little recognition" (Ginsberg, 2001:9). While this assessment of the impact of EU foreign policy holds in the highly charged foreign policy cases that Ginsberg examines (Yugoslavia, the Middle East and relations with the US), this paper argues that recognition of the political impact of the EU within the UN is markedly on the rise.

Caporaso and Jupille essentially agree that the nature of EU foreign policy is not only hybrid but in dynamic flux. "The EU can be thought of as an evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays varying degrees of "actorhood" across issues and time" (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998:214). In their effort to assess the degree to which the EU can be understood as an actor in international environmental policy, they identify four criteria that are critical in measuring the extent of international "actorness" of the EU in its foreign policy efforts. These criteria include:

1. **Authority:** the entity's joint activities have some sort of legal sanction;
2. **Cohesion:** the degree to which the group is able to formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences;
3. **Recognition:** other actors recognize, accept and interact with the entity;
4. **Autonomy:** the entity has a distinctive identity and interests that are independent of other actors, including its most prominent constituent members.

Caporaso and Jupille refine these concepts in rather useful fashion. The concept of authority is the most straightforward. The states forging a common policy must have some legal basis or competence for doing so. Member states have contracted to empower agents to act in the principals' interest. "Such contracts at once limit the action of principals and constrain the scope of agents' competence to that which principals accept" (216). Fundamentally, member states give legal sanction to the effort to speak with one voice. This should not be confused with one-off cooperation, but signals an intent to act in concert, to bind themselves together in their interactions toward third parties or on particular issues.

Perhaps the most defining criterion for establishing actorness on the entity for Caporaso and Jupille is the concept of cohesion. They argue that without cohesion, the EU would still be a consequential *presence* by virtue of its external effects (Allen and Smith, 1990). They note that while a random collection can have external impact, "to be an actor implies a minimal level of cohesion" (219). Importantly, they suggest that cohesion does not necessarily imply substantive agreement on values and goals, and indeed this paper will address such substantive agreement further below when assessing identity rather than capacity of the EU in the UN. For Caporaso and Jupille, cohesion can be measured along four dimensions: value (goal) cohesion, tactical cohesion, procedural, and output cohesion. "Value cohesion refers to similarity or compatibility of basic goals. If goals are somewhat different but can be made to fit with one another through issue linkages and side payments, we speak of tactical cohesion" (219). Of greater import for sustained group cohesion are procedural and output cohesion. Procedural cohesion refers to the institutionalization, either formally or informally, of rules governing common

policies. The most formal procedural cohesion is likely to be articulated under legal authority of member states to act. Finally, output cohesion refers to the articulation and formulation of common policies, the most visible sign of actorness or joint activity. This can be measured by the artifacts that emanate from the procedural processes of forging cohesion, either in policy documents, pronouncements, stated common positions, etc.

With regard to recognition, they differentiate between *de jure* recognition which is formal under international law and for membership in international organizations, and *de facto* recognition which is discretionary for third parties. They argue that the EU can be opaque in international organizations where it is active because it may not be clear whether the EU or members uphold the responsibilities of membership and so “third parties are reluctant to fully ‘recognize’ the EU through formal I.O. membership” (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998: 215). Thus, the criterion of recognition of the EU is most profitably focused upon a *de facto* definition of recognition, which occurs when “a third party interacts with the Union rather than, or in addition to, going to one or more EU member states...” (216).

Finally, autonomy refers to the “institutional distinctiveness, and to some extent independence, from other actors, particularly state actors” (217). Here Caporaso and Jupille attempt to differentiate the EU as a corporate entity, rather than the sum of its constituent parts. Does the EU enjoy, apart from its constituent members, discretionary goal formation, decision-making ability, and implementation? Observers such as Smith have noted the challenge of the “boundary problem” in distinguishing EU policies from those of member states particularly in areas where the Council of Ministers rather than the Commission is responsible for articulating a common foreign policy (1994). This criterion is particularly challenging within the context of the UN where member states enjoy *de jure* membership and the EU, represented by the Commission, enjoys only observer status.

Caporaso and Jupille note that these concepts are interrelated and “form a coherent ensemble, depending upon one another for full meaning” (220). For instance, autonomy is impossible without member states providing the authority for agents (the presidency or commission) to act on behalf of all members. This necessarily makes the application of these concepts a challenge. Nonetheless, in the next section after a brief

overview of the development of European foreign policy cooperation, we will apply these concepts to European actions the main political bodies of the United Nations.

ASSESSING EU CAPACITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Foundation for a Common European Foreign Policy

The European Union has attempted to increase its foreign policy profile and to speak with one voice to the rest of the world, as Kissinger demanded more than 30 years ago. The founding Treaty of the European Community, the Treaty of Rome, was primarily concerned with the creation of a single market.¹ However, the 1957 Treaty did foresee a common global political role for the community particularly in economic areas such as trade negotiations and economic relationships with overseas territories as well as concluding international economic treaties. In the area of economic foreign policy, the EU has achieved an international presence as the Commission speaks on behalf of member-states in external economic relations. The European Community has legal competence to represent member states in international organizations that deal with issues in which the EC has competence within the single market. Thus, in FAO, UNCTAD, and the WTO, the Commission has legal authority to make statements and represent member states. Within the political bodies of the UN, however, this competence has emerged most notably in the 1990s, though diplomatic cooperation among EU has developed over the course of the last 30 years.

In the late 1960s, the EU created a dense network of international agreements and networks that go far beyond commercial and economic relationships. This process of foreign policy cooperation, called European Political Cooperation (EPC), attempted to harmonize the foreign policies of member states. It began as an inter-governmental process that required unanimity for common action (Nuttall 1992). According to the Luxemborg Report, the objectives of EPC were to “ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly; in increase solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable” (1970). To share information, a telex network known as Coreu was established between member-

states' Foreign Ministries. Members agreed to consult with each other on all important foreign policy questions, and to refrain from taking up final positions without prior consultation within the EPC framework. This cooperation did not necessarily compel joint European policies, merely consultation.

The EPC was not intended to replace the foreign policies of member-states reflective of some sort of federalist political development in Europe. The "foreign policies" of the European Community could not be equated with a single, coherent foreign policy, but could be understood in the context of on-going European integration (Holland, 1995). The institutional arrangements and the actors involved in policy-making represented a complex process of communication and information sharing among members, but did not result in extensive "output cohesion." Despite EPC, at the UN national efforts and policies were pre-eminent. In general, the intensity of EPC from its inception in 1969 until the mid-1980s reflected the general "euro-sclerosis" infecting all of European integration in that period. This quiescence ended with the Single European Act of 1985 (SEA), which symbolized not only a reinvigoration of development of the internal market, but it created a partnership between the Commission and Council in foreign policy-making. The SEA shifted EPC away from informal consultations to regularized and structured policymaking, and it directed EPC to consider coordinating member-state positions on political and economic aspects of security more closely.

1. Enhancing the Authority for European Foreign Policy in the UN

The European effort to forge a stronger foreign policy profile received a boost in the Maastricht Treaty wherein the objective of creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was elaborated. Under Pillar Two of the Treaty, an intergovernmental framework for pursuing both "common positions" and "joint actions" under the auspices of the Union was created. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated increased coordination by introducing qualified majority decision-making and the option of "constructive abstention" in order to accelerate a common EU political foreign policy profile. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the principle of "constructive abstention" so that a member-state may constructively abstain from a joint action but not prevent the

Union from pursuing a common action so long as there are 2/3 (or 10) EU members voting positively. A semblance of sovereignty remains, however, because a member-state may oppose the adoption of any CFSP decision by qualified majority on the grounds of “important and stated reasons of national policy” (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997, Article 23.2). The Treaty also created the post of High Representative, or Mr. CFSP, that would be responsible for policy planning and early warning to make European foreign policies proactive rather than reactive.

The Maastricht Treaty further emphasized that member states should act as one to the greatest extent possible in international organizations such as the UN. Article J.2. of the Maastricht Treaty requires national foreign policies to conform to common positions, and that common positions be upheld in international organizations and conferences even when all the members are not participants. Specific authority for the EU to act in the most political of bodies at the United Nations, the UN Security Council, can be found in Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union which states that “Member states which are also members of the UN Security Council will concert and keep other Member States fully informed. Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities and provisions under the UN Charter.” These legal developments clearly paved the way for the Union to act in the world body. To what degree did the EU take up the challenge?

2. Cohesiveness of the European Group

The innovation of the Maastricht Treaty was that there was an effort to improve cohesiveness by making all joint actions and positions binding on member-states. While there are no explicit sanctions for member-state non-compliance, Article J.1.4 of the Treaty on European Union clearly states that member-states are to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” Thus, the Union was to make greater effort to speak with one voice in the foreign policy areas deemed of common interest to the Union. The Union under Maastricht went beyond a diplomatic talk shop to a structure that demands compliance in commonly agreed areas.

Procedural cohesion is fairly clear and the EU has developed processes by which a common policy can be articulated. Procedural cohesion by the EU in the UN starts with the annual position paper. The country holding the Presidency prepares an EU position paper on the General Assembly agenda in advance of the annual session, and represents the EU in all committees and fora. Over 1000 coordination meetings are organized by the member-state holding the presidency in New York. The Presidency represents the EU in discussions with other member states, regional groups, and organizations. The process of crafting European policy at the UN is the enterprise of the so-called troika, wherein the Presidency is assisted by the European Commission, which has an observer mission at the UN, as well as the Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat, where meetings are held. Indeed, in the meetings at ambassadorial level, the representatives of the Commission and Secretariat are intimately involved. The Presidency also invites candidate countries as well as Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein to align themselves with EU statements.

The tools that are employed in implementing a common foreign policy for the Union include declarations, common positions, and joint actions. There have been hundreds of declarations in the CFSP period, and the use of declarations is accelerating. Common positions indicate a coordination of member-states individual foreign policies on a given issue. By the late 1990s, Whitman noted 35 common positions have been elaborated in 17 areas, most falling within the scope of the United Nations (1998). Allen and Smith (1998) noted that by 1998, joint actions, the strongest form of coordination, included a number of global policy areas, such as nuclear non-proliferation, landmines and conflict within the African Great Lakes region. As the above suggests, the active foreign policies undertaken by the Union “have been overwhelmingly either inspired by, responded to, or been implemented through, multilateral organizations and/or international agreements” (Whitman, 1998).

Given the growing legal authority for the EU to act in international organizations such as the UN and the procedures/institutions to enable the EU to take action, we can now turn to *output cohesion* of the EU within the UN. A common method of capturing cohesion in UN politics is to measure voting cohesion among groups of states in the political bodies of the UN. On the Commission’s UN webpage (<http://europa-eu-un.org>),

they trumpet the fact that member states share a common position on almost 95% of General Assembly votes. This figure includes the consensus decisions taken by the UN General Assembly (roughly 2/3 of all decisions) where in fact *all* UN member states, not just the Europeans, have a common position. If we examine voting cohesion on *roll-call votes* taken in the UN General Assembly, where there exists the possibility for voting dissention, a more stringent test of cohesion can be applied. As Table 1 suggests, the voting cohesion figure is lower than the figure cited by the Commission, but it does provide compelling evidence that European voting cohesion has grown rather dramatically in the UN General Assembly over the course of the 1990s as greater authority and the establishment of procedures for articulating a common foreign policy were introduced. While voting cohesion was in the fifty percent range in the early part of the decade, by the end of the 1990s, EU voting cohesion had exceeded 84% even as the Union absorbed new members that had the potential to dilute cohesion.

Table 1 here *at back*

However, voting cohesion is a rather blunt indicator for output cohesion because it might reflect only similarity of attitudes. Voting cohesion does not reveal active measures of cohesion that result from conscious efforts to align policy. Klaus Törnudd differentiates between voting cohesion, which could arise capriciously, to situations in which consensus requires negotiation (1982). To examine only outcomes, in these cases voting cohesion, is to ignore the substantial efforts that might contribute to or explain instances of group cohesiveness. Another method of examining cohesiveness is to measure the extent to which we can find specific artifacts that reflect the institutionally distinct EU voice rather than member-state cohesion in voting patterns where member states give voice to common European positions. That is, how often does the EU speak independently, in its own voice?

EU coordination in the form of joint statements, declarations and documents have grown steadily as can be assessed in Table 2. European cooperation in the main committees of the General Assembly shows steadily accelerating cooperation during this period as the number of joint statements and documents reaches a high of 95 in 1996-97.

As Table 2 demonstrates, in every committee except the First (Disarmament and International Security), European coordination has increased since 1990. The greatest level of joint activity is in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Questions). European cooperation in the First Committee has declined rather dramatically over the course of the decade, from 13 joint statements/documents in the 46th Session (1991-92) to only one in the 51st Session (1996-97).

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In addition to the General Assembly, the EU is increasingly speaking with its own voice in the Security Council, where the UK and France have permanent member status. Not only do we see the Europeans making an effort to align their individual positions within the Security Council (with the notable recent exception of addressing Iraqi disarmament), increasingly the Presidency of the EU is speaking on behalf of the Union *in addition to* the member states that have the right to privileged membership in the Council. As Table 3 illustrates, the number of EU statements in the Security Council has increased from none before 1993 to 22 in 2000.

--Table 3 here— *at back*

This does not imply joint European decision-making in the Security Council (permanent Security Council members France and Great Britain jealously guard their prerogatives in that body), but instead a European effort to present a common European view on issues before the Council. Thus, while Article 19 of the TEU requires “concerted” action within the UN Security Council among EU members present, we see the important additive presence of the EU itself. This is not to say the EU is in any way eclipsing member states within the Security Council, but is increasingly recognized as an actor separate from the Brits and French in the Security Council. However, when the French or the British hold the Presidency, this gives rise to questions about the autonomy of the EU position as we shall see below.

3. Recognition of the European Group at the UN

There is a growing recognition that the EU is a force to be reckoned with in the halls of the UN, and as the data above demonstrate, there has been steady growth in the cohesiveness and output by the EU within the UN over the 1990s. Since 1997, observers at the UN have noted the flurry of paperwork and declarations on behalf of the European Union emanating from the member-state currently holding the presidency (Personal communication with UN Library, 15 April 1999).

Symbolic of the growing EU role is the way in which EU declarations and policies are acknowledged. Previously, common EU declarations referred to the "Community and its Member states;" since 1993, however, joint declarations, positions and actions have been signed as "The European Union" which symbolizes a unity of purpose. This is having some impact, as other UN diplomats increasingly recognize the growing role of the EU in the UN. One example of the EU rather than member states interacting with others involves the negotiations on the UN Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative in which the EU Presidency negotiated position papers on the draft resolution that was being crafted by the Organization of Islamic Conference. Participants recognized the EU as an actor in this process, rather than the country holding the presidency at the time (Sweden).

In a series of interviews with both EU and non-EU ambassadors over the last several years suggests the EU is recognized among the UN membership as a formidable force in the policy process. Increasingly, diplomats have argued that "without the EU commitment, the UN would stop" (Interview, Swedish Mission to the UN, January 9, 2003). This EU commitment to the UN was recognized by outsiders as well. The Iranian Ambassador to the UN remarked that the UN is increasingly Europeanized "because the EU attaches more importance to the UN (than the US). There is very seldom an issue that the EU is attached to, where the EU does not get its way" (Interview, Iranian Mission to the UN, January 9, 2003). The Singaporean Ambassador noted that the EU is "particularly united within the General Assembly, and when they get the Latin Americans to come along, they are a strong bloc" (Interview, Mission of Singapore to the UN, January 9, 2003).

Some are critical of this growing EU role in the UN. In the UN system of regional memberships that are used for elections to leadership positions and limited membership bodies in the UN, the EU is increasingly dominating the regional Western European and Other Group (WEOG). An Australian diplomat indicated that this EU dominance of WEOG was unsatisfactory and should lead to reform because non-EU members had a difficult time overcoming united European actions and the electoral group was “too preponderately European” (Interview, Australian Mission to the UN, January 9, 2003). Another claimed that the non-EU Europeans were outmatched: “The EU is more consolidated and integrated. There is a clear disappearance of the Nordic bloc, and Norway, standing alone, is no match for the EU” (Interview, Czech delegate to the UN, UN Headquarters, January 10, 2003).

This limited sampling of interviews by non-EU delegates suggests that *de facto* recognition of the EU is growing in the halls of the UN. The EU does not have *de jure* recognition except in limited areas where the Commission enjoys competence (for instance in the FAO) while member states do enjoy this formal recognition of membership in the UN system. However, in the political process of UN politics, it is the EU that is increasingly recognized as a unified, coherent force. Given that it is member-states that have *de jure* recognition and capacity to act, there is still the possibility that they rather than the EU can take action. Indeed, one delegate suggested that in order to stand up to another powerful bloc in the General Assembly, the G-77 group of developing states, it was necessary to “pick out Europeans in building coalitions” because the EU was seen as too interested in accommodating the South (Interview, Australian Mission to the UN, 2003). What is important about this last statement is that it suggests there outsiders recognize an independent, autonomous EU with its own stance that can be differentiated from member-states. This brings us to the question of autonomy.

4. *The Autonomy of the EU Group within the UN*

How autonomous is EU policy at the UN? Is it distinct from member states’ policies? EU efforts to create a European foreign policy voice are relatively recent, despite decades of consultation through the EPC process. The Commission, as a representative of Europe, has long made statements on behalf of member states in the

areas of Commission responsibility, but these have often been in corners of the UN system where political discourse is not followed as closely, the FAO for instance. Despite being the EU representative in the hinterlands of the UN system, the Commission is rarely confused with the priorities of a particular member state and is understood to reflect a *European* perspective. The more political bodies of the General Assembly and Security Council are more of a challenge because it is often the member states that have the responsibility of representing the EU. Given their *de jure* legal recognition within the UN system, this complicates the autonomy and independence of the EU in these settings.

The Amsterdam Treaty provides for the six-month rotating Presidency of the Council, held by a member-state, to negotiate agreements with states or international organizations that would then be subject to review and acceptance by the Council. While the overall direction and strategies of CFSP are set by the member-states' foreign ministers and the Secretary-General in Brussels, the implementation of the EU's UN policy occurs in New York. At the United Nations, the process of consultation and coordination of joint actions, common positions, and declarations falls to the permanent mission of the member-state currently holding the presidency. Member-states holding the EU presidency often reinforce personnel at their permanent missions in New York to facilitate the coordination of EU policies. Thus, the presidency arranges for meetings of all EU member-states' delegates on site, usually on a daily basis, to cover all issue areas. The objective of these meetings is to work out common reactions to on-going debates, and the presidency then speaks on behalf of the EU. Other EU members are free to speak on whatever issue they like, *but they may not contradict the common EU position that has been negotiated*. Meetings of the EU heads of delegation occurs once or twice weekly, while the counselors or first secretaries with various portfolios have meetings with their EU counterparts once or twice daily.

In terms of autonomy, there may well be a perceptual difficulty for the establishment of a European group identity. Do non-EU delegations accept that the EU declarations are jointly negotiated rather than the predilection of the particular member-state holding that presidency? Do other EU member states accept that what emerges is indeed European rather than national self-interest? To what degree can the presidency direct the EU's policy toward its own preferences? Is there a burgeoning EU policy with

a distinct direction and profile, or does the presidency allow for a more influential platform for what are essentially national interests? These are important questions because they drive at the heart of group identity as well as the autonomy and independence of the EU in UN affairs.. It is perhaps too soon to tell as the arrangements continue to evolve, but an early assessment was made by a Finnish delegate in advance of the Finnish presidency of the EU at the UN in 1999 (Interview at the Finnish Mission to the UN, 29 March 1999). She suggested that in contrast to Nordic coordination, European coordination requires considerable effort to *create* a common European position or policy among divergent national styles and interests. Consequently, coordination requires a more authoritarian leadership style. She felt that the requirement of one voice speaking on behalf of the EU might encourage member states subsume national priorities until they hold the presidency when it would be their “turn” to assert national priorities.

Finland does not have an agenda (with regard to the EU’s UN coordination), but we do have priorities we would like to address. We would prefer to act as a facilitator, but I think that often the EU requires a leader. The coordination style has been set by the larger countries which use the EU to pursue national interests. This is not the Finnish or Nordic way (Interview, Permanent Mission of Finland, 29 March 1999).

This anecdotal evidence suggests that even member-states are not convinced that EU policies are European rather than disguised national prerogatives. More recently, however, another country that recently held the presidency qualified this.. The Swedish Ambassador to the UN agreed with his Finnish counterpart that while there is no clear distinction between the national and EU approach while holding the Presidency:

To a degree you have to hold back on your national position when you hold the presidency. However, if you are organized, and you plan months in advance, you can insert national priorities into the EU platform (Interview, Swedish Mission to the UN, 9 January 2003).

Finally, there is the critical challenge to autonomy within the Security Council, where two EU members--France and the United Kingdom--maintain high-profile, permanent seats with veto power. As Ginsberg has argued, European foreign policy is a system of external relations through which national actors conduct partly common and partly separate international actions (1999). Given this variant nature of membership

within the UN—specifically that the Brits and French have permanent member status within the Security Council—will the EU be able to speak with one voice across the UN system even as the Presidency and Javier Solana, “Mr. CFSP,” regularly address the Council but without permanent member status? This becomes particularly acute when either the UK or France hold the EU presidency. If we refer back to Table 1, it is notable that the most important “dissenters” among EU members in the General Assembly are precisely France and the UK. When do their national interests end and representation of Europe begin? The issue of autonomy of the EU’s UN policy provides the greatest challenge to the creation of a European identity in the UN.

THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS

The foregoing suggests that the EU has dramatically increased its capacity for acting within the UN’s political bodies and is a growing influence. But what is the substantive content of the European approach? What does the EU stand for in the UN? Hill argues that the extent to which group actorness emerges is a function of a clear, shared identity among the members as well as a self-contained decision-making system. That is, there must be *identity* as well as *capacity*. One might be a member of a regional grouping of states, but unless there is capacity to coordinate policies among other members in the region and to pursue common interests, group identities will not emerge. Indeed, WEOG is a grouping of states that has neither a common capacity to present a common position nor a common identity. We established in the previous section that the EU has established capacity, and we now turn to the question of identity. Group identity is not simply derivative of the interests of a few of the member states—it is shared value orientation, or what we previously called value cohesion. What is the nature of shared European values that are promoted by the EU?

One way to assess the preferences of Europe is to examine the documents produced by the EU that indicate priorities. In this regard we can examine the annual position paper that is crafted by the EU before the General Assembly. These statements have been streamlined since 2000; in earlier years the intra-European dynamics in foreign policy coordination were detailed in extensive detail in memoranda that set out European

priorities (see *Memorandum by the European Union at the 53rd United Nations General Assembly* and *Memorandum by the European Union at the 54rd United Nations General Assembly*). Starting with the 55th General Assembly session, the EU produced a simplified position paper that presented priorities of the Union and can be used to gauge the prominence of European interests vis-à-vis the General Assembly. Consistently, the issue of *human rights* headlines the priorities outlined by the position paper. This is consistent with Karen Smith's findings on particular efforts by the EU to focus attention focused on the themes of children's rights and abolition of the death penalty (Smith, 2002).

A second priority is *conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-building*. An article in the *New York Times* reinforced this component of European identity within the United Nations: "In a phrase that has become almost a cliché, the United States is the power that fights, the United Nations feeds, the European Union finances, while European soldiers, as in Afghanistan and the Balkans, keep the peace" (March 16, 2002). The Europeans have made an effort to promote *humanitarian assistance and development* as well, but this Commission driven effort has fallen short by member-state inaction. In a May 2, 2001 communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on EU cooperation with the UN, it was suggested that the "first step in the direction of a more effective partnership could be taken by enhancing collaboration in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs" (<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001>). This came on the heels of member state failure to set a target for aid to less development countries in advance of the Monterrey Conference in 2001. The Commission sought a commitment of development aid equal to .7% of GDP, but this was rejected by countries such as Britain, Spain and Italy whose aid budgets fall below .33% of GDP. Funding for various UN development programs—from UNDP to UNICEF—is voluntary and membership on the boards of these agencies is according to contribution. Some European countries have a very high profile in the areas of development and humanitarian assistance. The Nordics, in particular, rank among the highest contributors to organizations like the UN Development Program, UNICEF, and the UN Fund for Population Activities. In these institutions, the Nordic countries continue long-standing Nordic coordination and cooperation and they have opposed the

“Europeanization” of foreign policy making in these areas because other EU members “don’t pull their weight” in contributing (Interviews at Swedish and Danish UN Missions, March 25, 1999). In this instance, we can see the Commission articulating a priority that wasn’t accepted by member-states. Nonetheless, the EU is widely *perceived* to be an important player in the political bodies on development and humanitarian questions. Europe is understood to be more sympathetic to a social approach to development than other countries of the North, especially the United States.

A second way to assess the identity of the EU within the UN is to ask participants how they understand the European identity. Ambassador John Richardson, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the UN, recently identified the “community of values” held by the EU in world affairs (Richardson, 2003). According to Richardson, these values reflect the development of the EU itself and serves as a guide to the formulation of long term foreign policy. These values are not the result of balancing of interests among member states but an expression of “fundamental values.” Essentially, EU foreign policy is an externalization of the values that have developed in the European integration process. According to Richardson, these core values include:

1. Rule of law as the basis for relations among members of society;
2. The interaction between the democratic process and entrenched human rights in political decision making;
3. The operation of competition within a market economy as the source of increasing prosperity;
4. The anchoring of the principle of solidarity among all members of society alongside that of liberty of the individual;
5. The adoption of the principle of sustainability of all economic development;
6. The preservation of separate identities and the maintenance of cultural diversity within society (14).

For Richardson, the articulation of these values answers the question of what the EU stands for in international affairs. He does not suggest that they are exclusive values to Europe, and in fact the first three are values listed are shared with the United States. For Richardson, however, this particular combination of values can be seen as reflective of an EU value orientation that stems from the integration process. In his account, the EU foreign policy is fundamentally about values, while member-states have *realpolitik* interests. It is these values of the EU, he argues, that dictate EU policy in the UN, so that

the EU is: among the most avid supporters of the International Criminal Court (rule of law); most active in the Third Committee (human rights); supportive of the WTO (market economy); supportive of development and humanitarian assistance (solidarity); keen on the Kyoto Protocol (sustainable development); and sympathetic to the Dialogue Among Civilizations (cultural diversity). This value orientation is consistent with many have come to call *civilian power*. The values and activities of the EU within the UN reflect this image of civilian power, notably distinct from an approach that focuses on *realpolitik* or the use of coercive foreign policy instruments (Smith, 2002).

THE CONTEXT OF THE UN FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY

There are several contextual factors that will influence the continuing effort to craft EU foreign policy in United Nations that should be made in concluding this analysis. The first concerns the question of multilateralism and the advantages of the UN as a context for the articulation of a common EU foreign policy. Unlike the efforts to craft EU foreign policy toward particular regions or countries to which individual member-states might have national interests that could derail the process of formulating a common policy, the UN's multilateral context is conducive to the articulation of a common EU policy. Furthermore, there are institutional attributes in the UN system that will facilitate growing EU foreign policy influence. On the other hand, there may be a growing divergence between how Europeans see themselves and how others perceive their growing power. While the EU purports to follow a values-based foreign policy, it is questionable whether the rest of the international community in the UN will accept this self-definition given the growing structural power of the EU in the UN system. Indeed, we may speculate that the UN faces a new era of bi-polarity in which the UN is dominated by Western powers (Europe and the United States) with divergent interests and spheres of influence, much as the Europeans would like to avoid the association with power politics.

It appears at this early stage of EU foreign policy cooperation in the UN and the development of a unique European profile has resulted in an EU role in the UN that is notably distinct from the "hyper-power" in the international system, the United States.

Robert Kagan suggests that there is a broad strategic and ideological gap between Europe and the United States that springs from the experience of Europeans in the 'miraculous' integration process over the past 50 years (Kagan 2002). The rules of international relations have fundamentally changed for Europeans, from the *machtpolitik* approach traditionally associated with balance of power politics in 19th century Europe to a rules-based multilateralism based upon diplomacy and the use of inducements rather than force and sanctions.

'The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's *mission civilizatrice*. Just as Americans have always believed that they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.' (Kagan 2002)

Kagan argues that Europeans increasingly stand for multilateralism in contrast to the unilateralism exhibited by the US. In fact, US power and unilateralism are fundamentally at odds with the European vision of multilateralism. European mastery of multilateralism finds its fullest foreign policy expression within the context of the UN, where the practices of consensus and compromise honed in the intra-European process are easily applicable and widely appreciated. Time and again UN delegates noted the EU commitment to the UN and their comparative strength in multilateral processes compared to the United States.

Additionally, there are institutional factors within the UN context that will further expand the influence of the European Union. As the Union grows to include Central and Eastern European states, the influence of the European Union that so confounds non-EU members of the UN's Western European and Other Group will flow into other regional groupings. The new members set to join the EU in 2004 are largely members of the Eastern European electoral group in the UN system, and consequently the EU's influence over elections to leadership positions and membership on other UN bodies could extend into a second electoral grouping. Lithuania at one point suggested that the new EU members be shifted to WEOG, but the EU and other applicant states successfully opposed the change because they recognized the potential for expanded European influence.

One of the limitations of the EU approach to the United Nations is that there may be a critical disconnect between the way EU members understand their role in the world body and how others perceive them. The values orientation promoted by the EU purports to be relatively benign. In *Civilian Power Europe*, the EU seeks to be a bridge between advanced, industrial economies and developing states. Essentially, the EU has an approach that echoes the concept of a middle power, where the effort is to mediate and build bridges. This approach is consistent with the traditional middle power preferences, and EU member states that were traditionally thought of as middle powers, such as the Netherlands and the Nordics, would like to see this role developed. As one Swedish diplomat reflected, "There is still a need for bridge-building in the UN, and perhaps Sweden can lead Europe there" (Interview, 23 March 1999). Schirm sees this socio-economic approach as more viable than one in which the EU develops military or traditional defense policy strengths because it "reflects the character of the Union as an organization promoting stability and wealth through the management of interdependence" (Schirm, 1998: 79). Middle powers have traditionally premised their mediation efforts on the recognition of interdependence.

Whether the nascent EU mediator role in the UN, crafted in comparison against the stingy and unilateralist depiction of the US, will be credible remains questionable. As Clapham argues, "because the EU represents an ideological and powerful bloc, other blocs may have to redefine their identity and ideology in counterposition to the EU. There is division in the debate not despite EU consistency but because of EU coherence" (1999). Indeed, many of the traditional European middle powers, particularly the Nordics, defined their middle power role in opposition not only to the USSR and the US, but also Europe (Hansen, 1991; Rudebeck, 1982). Unlike earlier middle powers, many of the constituent members of the EU group were recently colonial powers and the enduring perceptions of European power may undermine the EU's attempt to fashion itself as a civilian power, a mediator, or bridge-builder in UN politics. Essentially, the Europeans may simply be too powerful in the UN already to play the more modest civilian power role that they see for themselves. We might anticipate a future in which the UN is a Western-dominated institution, but with a new bi-polarity in which the Europeans dominate in economic and social areas of the General Assembly and

ECOSOC while the Americans predominantly focus their energy and attention on the Security Council. If the continuing eclipse of the General Assembly by the Security Council continues, the EU could effectively play a middle power role because the US dominance in the Security Council would be pre-eminent. If the Europeans manage to elevate the importance of the General Assembly, re-establishing a balance between the two, their greater influence in that body could create a new, more benign period of bipolarity in UN politics.

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Table 1: EU Member-state Voting Cohesion during UN General Assembly Roll-Call Votes, 1991-2000

Member	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99	1999-2000
	Votes=73	Votes=73	Votes=63	Votes=65	Votes=69	Votes=74	Votes=69	Votes=61	Votes=69
Austria	Non-member	Non-member	Non-member	95.4%	97.1%	93.2%	95.7%	96.7%	95.7%
Belgium	97.3%	100%	98.4%	95.4%	94.2%	94.6%	98.6%	98.4%	98.6%
Denmark	89%	93.2%	93.7%	98.5%	100%	97.3%	95.7%	98.4%	98.6%
Finland	Non-member	Non-member	Non-member	93.8%	94.2%	95.9%	94.2%	93.4%	98.6%
France	89%	90.3% ¹	79.4%	75.4%	79.7%	89%	88.4%	86.9%	84.1%
Germany	93.2%	No data ²	No data	No data	95.7%	97.3%	98.6%	98.4%	95.7%
Greece	75.3%	83.6%	81%	95.4%	89.9%	Insufficient data	97.1%	98.4%	98.6%
Ireland	83.6%	86.3%	87.3%	92.3%	94.2%	91.9%	94.2%	95.1%	92.8%
Italy	98.6%	100%	100%	95.4%	95.7%	98.6%	97.1%	100%	98.6%
Luxembourg	100%	100%	100%	95.4%	95.7%	97.3%	95.7%	98.4%	98.6%
Netherlands	97.3%	100%	98.4%	92.3%	92.8%	95.9%	97.1%	98.4%	97.1%
Portugal	91.8%	93.2%	95.2%	98.5%	98.6%	98.6%	98.6%	98.4%	98.6%
Spain	78.1%	84.9%	82.5%	95.4%	95.7%	95.9%	98.6%	98.4%	98.6%
Sweden	Non-member	Non-member	Non-member	95.4%	97.1%	93.2%	94.2%	96.7%	94.2%
United Kingdom	80.8%	82.2%	81%	76.9%	84.1%	91.9%	88.4%	88.5%	88.4%
OVERALL COHESION	52.7%	54.8%	60.3%	63.1%	66.7%	77.0%	78.3%	85.2%	78.2%

Source: UN Index to Proceedings, 1991-2000.

*The overall cohesion score reflects the number of votes in which all members voted exactly the same way. National figures reflect the percentage of votes in which a country voted with the EU majority. When two member-states dissented on the same vote, this was only counted as a single non-compliant vote in overall cohesion.

¹ France was absent for one vote. Calculation made on basis of 72 votes.

² Data missing for Germany for entire session.

Table 2: European Union* Statements/Documents in General Assembly and its Main Committees

General Assembly:	1990-1991 45th Session	1991-1992 46th Session	1992- 1993 47th Session	1993-1994 48th Session	1994-1994 49th Session	1995-1996 50th Session	1996-1997 51st Session	1997-1998 52 nd Session	1998-1999 53 rd Session	1999-2000 54 th Session
1st Committee/ Disarmament and Int'l Security	10	13	8	6	5	4	1	5	6	6
2nd Committee/ Economic and Financial	13	20	8	9	11	15	16	20	14	21
3rd Committee/ Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs	7	14	12	17	18	15	13	13	16	19
4th Committee/ Special Political and Decolonization	2	2	2	8	9	10	10	8	8	8
5th Committee/ Administration and Budget	12	24	24	24	19	35	43	37	40	27
6th Committee/ Legal	3	8	6	5	9	6	12	5	7	7
Special Political Committee	7	8	7							
Total	54	89	67	69	71	85	95	88	91	88

Sources: UN Index to Proceedings, 1990-2001; UNBIS Index to Speeches, 1990-2001; UN-I-QUE Database (CD-ROM).

* Referred to as the European Community through 1993.

Table3: EU Speeches and Statements in the UN Security Council

Security Council:	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Statements/ Speeches	0	0	0	0	4	4	16	18	21	8	22
Documents/ Letters	15	24	35	44	32	11	35	34	40	55	64
TOTAL	15	24	35	44	36	15	51	52	61	63	86

Sources: UN Index to Proceedings, 1990-2001; UNBIS Index to Speeches, 1990-2001; UN-I-QUE Database (CD-ROM).