

Euro-Turks

A Bridge or a Breach
between
Turkey and the European Union?

A Comparative Study of
German-Turks and French-Turks

Ayhan Kaya
Ferhat Kentel



CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN
POLICY
STUDIES

EURO-TURKS

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GERMAN-TURKS AND FRENCH-TURKS

**AYHAN KAYA
FERHAT KENTEL**

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Assoc. Prof. Dr Ayhan Kaya is with the Istanbul Bilgi University, Centre for Migration Research, Department of International Relations, Inonu Cad. No. 28, Şişli, Istanbul, tel. (+90 212) 311 61 82, fax (+90 212) 216 84 76, e-mail: ayhank@bilgi.edu.tr.

Assist. Prof. Dr Ferhat Kentel is with the Istanbul Bilgi University, Centre for Migration Research, Department of Sociology, Inonu Cad. No. 28, Şişli, Istanbul, tel. (+90 212) 311 61 31, fax (+90 212) 216 84 76, e-mail: ferhatk@bilgi.edu.tr.

Advisors on this study are Assist. Prof. Dr Bianca Kaiser, Istanbul Kültür University, Department of International Relations, Istanbul, tel. (+90 212) 639 30 24 (ext. 3315), e-mail: b.kaiser@iku.edu.tr and Dr Martin Greve, Berlin, tel. 030.854 56 88, e-mail: martin.greve@gmx.de.

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Centre for European Policy Studies
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels
Tel: 32(0)2 229.39.11 Fax: 32(0)2 219.41.51
E-mail: info@ceps.be
Website: <http://www.ceps.be>

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Abstract

Migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants constitute a rather heterogeneous group of persons in Europe with respect to their recent economic, political, cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. In an attempt to challenge the stereotypical representation of these 'Euro-Turks' in their homeland and countries of settlement, extensive qualitative and quantitative research was carried out in Germany and France by the Centre for Migration Research during late 2003 and early 2004.

One of the premises of the work is that Euro-Turks would provide both strong support and an impediment to Turkey's EU membership. Thus the research has aimed at investigating whether Euro-Turks living in Germany and France could become a driving force or vanguard for Turkey in the process of integration into the European Union. It identifies the social, political and cultural discourses of the Turkish diaspora concerning Turkish-EU relations. By gauging public opinion among the Turkish groups in Western Europe, it also seeks to determine whether these communities could provide new opportunities and prospects for the formation of a more open and democratic society in Turkey.

At this stage, the research reveals that there are three major groups of Euro-Turks emerging in the migratory process: bridging groups (who are affiliated with both the homeland and 'host-land') breaching groups (who still have a strong orientation to the homeland) and assimilated groups. Based on a survey of the literature and structured interviews, this report reveals how Euro-Turks demonstrate the fact that Europeanness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing process of being and becoming.

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Preface

This publication is the product of extensive qualitative and quantitative research carried out in Germany and France during late 2003 and early 2004. The research was conducted by the Centre for Migration Research, launched by Istanbul Bilgi University in 2002. The work is an attempt to challenge the stereotypical representation of Euro-Turks both in their homeland and countries of settlement, as well as to reveal their orientation towards the EU, 'Europeanness', their homeland, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship, religiosity, trans-nationalisation and globalisation.

We have created a research team composed of the two principal researchers, Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, two advisors, Martin Greve and Bianca Kaiser, and three survey companies, Veri-SGT Research (Istanbul), Gelszus GmbH (Hamburg) and Socioscan (Paris), in order to accomplish the research. The authors thank the members of the research team for their invaluable contribution. Some of the results of the research have already been publicised through the domestic and international media, interviews, articles, conferences and working papers. The work will also be published in three other languages, Turkish, German and French. The forthcoming Turkish version will be issued by Istanbul Bilgi University Publications.

We would like to express our gratitude to the Open Society Institute, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Istanbul Bilgi University, the Promotion Fund of the Turkish Prime Ministry and the EU Communication Group in Ankara, for their invaluable support in conducting the research. Hakan Altınay from the Open Society Institute has put tremendous effort towards setting up the content of the research. We are grateful to him for his never-ending enthusiasm and feedback. We also thank Lale Duruiz, Şule Kut, Oğuz Özerden, Taner Berksoy, Cathrine Campion, Nermin Abadan-Unat, Nese Erdilek, Fügen Uğur, Ulrike Dufner, Alan Duben, Gülten Kazgan, Nihal Incioglu, Emre Işık, Özge Onursal, Gülşah Çapan, Senem Aydın, Neco Çelik, Nihat Kentel and Rana İren for their continuous support throughout the entire research. Last but not least, we want to thank all of the Euro-Turks who have shared their thoughts with us; they have provided us with a long journey that was extremely enriching, fruitful and enlightening.

Ayhan Kaya
Director
Centre for Migration Research
Istanbul Bilgi University
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Introduction

European Union: A peace project for Turkey

Despite being surrounded by the ethnic, religious and political predicaments of neighbouring countries, Turkey is going through one of the most stable periods in the history of the Republic. At the Helsinki summit (December 1999), the European heads of state and government offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the European Union for the first time, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959. The decision made in Helsinki was in almost direct opposition to the decision made earlier at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. The Luxembourg decision was designed to crush Turkey's hopes for membership of the EU. The response of the public in Turkey was remarkably immediate and harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, Occidentalism and Euroscepticism all reached their peak in the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit. Thanks to the December 1999 Helsinki summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long. The EU prospects offered to Turkey in Helsinki have radically shaken the deep-rooted political establishment in the country, opening up new opportunities for various ethnic, religious, social and political groups. For instance, Kurds and Islamists in Turkey have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a peace project. The EU stands as a great incentive for several groups in Turkey to reinforce their willingness to coexist. What lies beneath this willingness to coexist no longer seems to be the *retrospective past*, full of ideological and political disagreements, but the *prospective future*, embracing differences in a democratic way. The EU seems to be the major catalyst at the moment in the acceleration of the process of peaceful coexistence in Turkey.

“If, in December 2004, the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” states the conclusions of the European Council, which met in Copenhagen in December 2002 (European Council, 2002). Yet both the political establishment and the public of each EU member state are aware of the fact that Turkey's membership of the Union shall stimulate further the discussions of European identity and the limits of Europe. Recently, there have been heated public debates in several countries on Turkey's membership of the Union, mostly disfavouring the membership of a large state such as Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions that are below the EU average. Some put forward the socio-economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline the Islamic character of Turkey, some emphasise Turkey's undemocratic and patrimonial political culture and some even raise the clash of civilisations in order to reject Turkey's prospective membership. Nobody can deny the fact that it is a difficult task to include Turkey in the Union. Nevertheless, a more constructive discourse must be generated with regard to Turkey's full membership in order to revitalise the fundamentals of the EU, which are known to be addressing ‘a peace project’. There is no doubt that a peace project requires a constructive rather than a destructive discourse. The discourse developed by the Independent Commission on Turkey is constructive and thus deserving of admiration.¹

The decision of the 1999 Helsinki summit brought about a great stream of reforms. For instance, Turkey has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the previous decade.

¹ The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March 2004 with the support of the British Council and the Open Society Institute. The Commission is composed of Anthony Giddens, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, Michel Rocard, Albert Rohan (Rapporteur), Martti Ahtisaari (Chairman), Kurt Biedenkopf, Emma Bonino, Hans van den Broek and Bronislaw Geremek. Their purpose is to examine the major challenges and opportunities connected with Turkey's possible accession to the Union. They met regularly for intensive discussions, visited Turkey and analysed expertise from various sources. Close contact was maintained with European institutions. The Independent Commission's work programme did not include issues under review by the European Commission for its forthcoming Progress Report on Turkey. For further details, see the report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, Brussels (September 2004).

Several laws were immediately passed by the national parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria; strict anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced; institutional transparency and liberalism have been endorsed; both formal nationalism and minority nationalism have been precluded; and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been dealt with. But there is still a lot to do and implement.

Despite all these reforms and goodwill, the public in EU countries remain unconvinced concerning prospective Turkish membership. The only feasible way to have a positive impact on European public opinion regarding Turkey's entry into the Union is through the research and dissemination of objective and constructive data, which is devoid of prejudice and cliché. There is no doubt that the decisions of EU member states on Turkey's prospective full membership will also be a decision about the future nature of the Union. The decision about Turkey is actually more complex than it seems. In making this decision the EU will essentially be choosing its own future path: a vote of 'no to Turkey!' will revive the conservative stream in the Union, which tends to define Europe and the EU as a Christian, holistic, static, essentialist, culturalist and civilised bloc, while a vote of 'yes to Turkey!' will wave the progressive flag in the EU, addressing the political, economic, syncretic, dynamic and post-national fabric of the Union.

The leaders of the EU countries made a decision at the Amsterdam summit in December 2004 concerning a starting date for accession negotiations. Yet there are still strong popular stereotypes among the publics of each member state however, which claim that Turkey does not politically, economically, socially or culturally fit into the EU. These stereotypes mostly spring from the perceptions of Euro-Turks by majority societies in the West. The stereotypical judgements concerning Euro-Turks often point out that Turks do not integrate into the European way of life; that Turks are radically Islamist, nationalist, culturalist and conservative; that Turks in Turkey see full membership as an opportunity to flee to the EU; and that Turks do not have a democratic political culture based on equality, human rights, free-market economy and participation. Conversely, the data gathered through the structured interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions held in Germany and France reveal another picture, quite different from the one portrayed above.

Aims of the research

This research aims at investigating whether Euro-Turks living in Germany and France could provide a driving force or vanguard for Turkey in the process of integration into the European Union. The social, political and cultural discourses of Turkish diasporic subjects concerning Turkish-EU relations in these two European countries are mapped out. Migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants constitute a rather heterogeneous group of persons in Europe with respect to their recent economic, political, cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. Thus, one of the premises of this work is that these separate groups would provide both strong support and an impediment to Turkey's EU membership. Gauging public opinion among the Turkish diaspora groups in Western Europe may help us find out if these communities could provide Turkish society with new opportunities and prospects in the formation of a more open and democratic society in Turkey. Another premise of this work is that boundaries between Turkey and the diaspora are no longer that strict, but have become rather blurred. For instance, it has only lately been realised that the Islamic resurgence in the diaspora has resulted in the reinforcement of religious organisations in the homeland. The same process is also applicable to the Kurdish and Alevi revival in Turkey, because both social movements are to some extent constrained by the modern diasporic formations. Hence, these phenomena make it clear that diasporic formations may have a strong impact on homeland formations.

The purpose of this study is to:

- develop an inventory of Euro-Turks to provide user groups with updated information concerning their discourses on Turkey's entry into the EU;
- provide a snapshot of heterogeneous Euro-Turks;

- contribute to the dissolution of the stereotypical image of Euro-Turks in the minds of EU citizens and politicians in a way that may change negative public opinion concerning Turkey's entry into the EU;
- create an incentive for those Euro-Turks of rural origin to contribute to the formation of a positive image of Western Europe among their fellows in Turkey;
- contribute to the growing body of knowledge on transnational communities and ethnic studies;
- understand the major parameters of transnational space developed by Euro-Turks;
- develop and refine the theoretical understanding of fluid cultures;
- develop an alternative perspective in researching minority cultures and cultural diversities;
- contribute to the development of a new project in the aftermath of the discontentment of the ideology of multiculturalism generated by the state *vis-à-vis* minorities; and
- contribute to the peaceful coexistence of culturally and ethnically diversified populations by revealing mutually produced stereotypes and proposing an intercultural way of life for the majority society and Euro-Turks.

Rationale of the project

There is a common belief in western European countries that migrants of Turkish origin and their children do not integrate into the social, political, economic or cultural life of their settlement countries. According to the same common belief, the political motivations of Turks in their countries of settlement are primarily shaped by their homeland. Recently, however, much academic work and many other indicators have come to reveal an alternative picture. Contemporary migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants in Western Europe can no longer be considered simply as temporary migrant communities who live with the 'myth of return' or passive victims of global capitalism who are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West. Rather, they have become permanent settlers, active social agents and decision-makers. For instance, today's German-Turks have little in common with the old 'guest-worker' stereotypes of the past. They are a recognised and highly active section of the population. Around 5,000 Turkish businesses in Berlin currently employ approximately 20,000 workers in 90 differing areas of activity. Only 30% of Berlin's Turkish businesses now work in the restaurant and catering field, 37% are involved in trade and 18% in the services sector. They form a dynamic and flexible business sector that benefits the whole country. There is sufficient evidence that German-Turkish intellectuals who have recently appeared in the German public space have a great impact on the formation and articulation of these active roles and identities. Along with the worldwide emergence of the postcolonial literature and discourses, Turkish diasporic groups have also had the opportunity to express themselves in the German public space through their spokespersons and intelligentsia. This project refrains from perceiving Euro-Turks as passive, obedient, powerless or incompetent; rather it recognises their reflexivity, activity, subjectivity and significance. Hence, the researchers strongly believe that Euro-Turks should be recognised for such reflexive subjectivities.

There is also a lack of awareness in both the homeland and 'host-land' concerning the characteristics of migrants and their children. It is still commonly believed in Turkey that migrants of Turkish origin and their descendants in the West are *gurbetçi*,² with a strong orientation towards the homeland that will someday bring them home. On the other hand, they are also called '*Almanci*', a term that depicts such individuals as being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in the West, losing their Turkishness and becoming increasingly Germanised, Anglicised or Frenchified, etc. They are also stereotypically called 'foreigner' in their own countries of settlement. The common stereotypical labelling of 'Turk' in the West strongly indicates that Turks are conservative, religious, veiled, poor,

² The term *gurbetçi* refers to someone in *gurbet* (diaspora), which is an Arabic word deriving from *garaba*, to go away, to depart, to be absent, to go to a foreign country, to emigrate, to be away from one's homeland, to live as a foreigner in another country.

nationalist, nostalgic for their homeland, non-integrative and violent. This research aims at revealing that Euro-Turks are highly diversified and have very little in common with the *Almanci*, guest-worker or foreigner stereotypes of the past. It uncovers invisible Euro-Turks and their families who also identify themselves as migrants of Turkish origin who somehow do not fit into the category of stereotypical Turks that are visible in the public space with their outer appearance and clothing styles.

This research also seeks to understand whether Euro-Turks have developed Europeanness and certain commitments *vis-à-vis* the EU, as well as the sort of political culture they have generated in the West and the kind of incorporation strategies they have constructed *vis-à-vis* their countries of settlement. It additionally seeks to reveal what they think about some critical issues such as citizenship, democratisation, political participation, globalisation, human rights, equality, the rule of law, justice, religion, multiculturalism, interculturalism, coexistence and political institutions. These questions are all addressed in a way that enables us to compare their views on the homeland and host-land. This research is of particular importance at this conjuncture, characterised by intensive discussions in Turkey and abroad concerning the EU integration process, the EU Constitutional Treaty, the EU enlargement process, the Cyprus question, the secularism debate and religious fundamentalism. This conjuncture is also unique in the sense that there is a shift happening in the West from a multiculturalist discourse to an interculturalist discourse.

A separate note is also needed on the contextual use of the terms ‘Euro-Turk’, ‘German-Turk’ and ‘French-Turk’ in this work. Such identifications are used by neither the migrants of Turkish origin to identify themselves nor are they in the political or academic debate in Germany. We have chosen to use these terms with reference to our findings in both qualitative research and quantitative research. As was seen in the interim report, around 60% of the German-Turks identify themselves as European/Turkish or Turkish/European (Turkish/German or Turkish/French) and around 70% of the French-Turks define themselves as such. Thus, the notion of ‘European Turks’ can also be used instead of Euro-Turks. Furthermore, such a hyphenated identification also addresses the hybrid form of cultural identity in the world of the research. Hence, such terms are helpful to us for two reasons: they distance the researcher from essentialising transnational migrants and their descendants as ‘Turkish’ and underline the trans-cultural character of these diasporic subjects.

Another point to make with regard to the rationale of the project is to challenge the recent process of *securitisation* of migration in the West. ‘Security’ has become one of the most salient notions of recent times, especially since the events of 11 September 2001. The measures taken by states to fight against the sources of insecurity have turned out to be the main ideological tools for states to obtain the consent of their publics for policy-making and thus to sustain their sovereignty. The security discourse has actually become the most efficient instrument for states to govern their citizens and to maintain the survival of the state and governmentality in Foucaultian terms.³ In other words, as Huysmans (1998, p. 571) puts it, securitisation turns into a technique of government that retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. Thus it becomes a political technique with a capacity to politically integrate a society by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an enemy that is fabricated by security agencies (such as the police) through categorising migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, international criminality and terrorism (Huysmans, 1998, p. 572). By stereotypically casting migration and emphasising its disrupting consequences, the media also play a role in the securitisation process of migration in the West.

Security is no longer limited to the protection of national boundaries. Hence, the term ‘security’ at present has a broader meaning than that of the cold war era. The cold war meaning of security was linked to military and ideological threats. The focus here was on the security of the nation-state as an entity. Security used to be defined in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and

³ ‘Governmentality’ refers to the practices that characterise the form of supervision a state exercises over its subjects, their wealth, their misfortunes, their customs, their souls and their habits (Foucault, 1979). Foucault defines governmentality as the art of government.

integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international arena (Doty, 2000, p. 73). Yet the present use of the term goes beyond its conventional limits. Nowadays, security concerns are not only reduced to the protection of states against military threats, they are related to several different issues such as immigration, ethnic revival, religious revival (Islam), identity claims and sometimes supranational entities such as the EU. In other words, issues become security issues by virtue of a process of social construction, that is, securitisation (Doty, 2000, p. 73). The main rationale of the security discourse seems to have shifted from protecting the state to protecting society. Thus, the protection of society against any kind of ‘evil’ has become the pillar of the security discourse in a way that popularised the term ‘security’ in all spheres of life. Immigration resulting from poverty and anti-democratic regimes in the countries of origin has become one of the principal worries of Western countries. Immigration has been defined as a threat, not to the survival of the state, but to societal security. Ethnic or religious revival (or both), which comes out among some migrant groups as a reaction to poverty, unemployment, insecurity and institutional discrimination, seems to be decoded by the state as a challenge to societal security – a challenge that has to be immediately prevented. The goal of this research is to reveal whether ethnic/religious revival should be translated as the *reason* for continuing problems such as xenophobia, discrimination and conflict or as the *outcome* of these problems.

Fieldwork and methodology

The research has been carried out in various steps. In the first step, an extensive literature survey was conducted covering the related literature on Euro-Turks, including recently submitted MA and PhD dissertations. Although there is limited literature on French-Turks, the literature on German-Turks is extensive. In the course of the literature survey several sources by Turkish, German, French, German-Turkish and French-Turkish scholars have been scrutinised. In the second stage of the research, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were held. In September and October 2003, 13 focus group discussions were held in groups composed of eight or ten participants (Berlin, four; Köln, two; Essen, one; Munich, one; Paris, three; and Strasbourg, two).⁴ In addition, 35 in-depth interviews were conducted in both countries. While the focus group discussions were held with a wide range of persons, the in-depth interviews were conducted with opinion leaders such as politicians, businessmen, academics, students and artists, whose thoughts may not have been clearly represented in the structured interviews.

The third stage of the research involved conducting structured interviews – the questions for which were prepared by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, and later discussed with some colleagues, representatives of the Open Society Institute, Heinrich Böll and also with some related academics during the qualitative research period in Germany and France. The research team, with the assistance of the Veri Araştırma Data Processing Company, set up a quota sampling in both countries, paying particular attention to the density of population of Turkish origin in the urban space and rural space (Table I.1). The quota sampling covered the variables of age, gender, occupation and region in order to gather a representative picture of the Euro-Turks.

Interviews resulted in the collection of 1,065 questionnaires in Germany and 600 in France by teams of local research companies, Gelszus GmbH (Hamburg) and Socioscan (Paris), in collaboration with Veri Araştırma. The selection of the interviewers and the methods of interview were supervised by Veri Araştırma in order to ensure that bilingual Turkish interviewers were being employed and interviews were properly conducted. Veri Araştırma also organised orientation programmes in both countries for the interviewers to equip them with some essential interviewing techniques and

⁴ The researchers are very sensitive to avoid calling the participants of the research as either ‘respondent’ or ‘informant’. We believe that both terms are problematic as the former corresponds to the inherent power relations at the expense of the participants and in favour of the researcher, and the latter puts the participants in a role of leaking out information from their communities. The term ‘interlocutor’ is preferred to make it clear that the researchers take the participants as their equal partners. For a detailed analysis of this discussion, see Horowitz (1983), Adler et al. (1986) and Alasuutari (1995, pp. 52-56).

information. The interview consisted of 90 questions. It has been reported that the average duration of the interviews was around 30 minutes. Interviewers were also given a German/French translation of the questions to be used in the event of any participant preferring to communicate in either language. With respect to gender and age, we attempted to obtain a representative selection of Euro-Turks. About 73% of the German-Turks were reported as having been born in Turkey and approximately 27% in Germany. Among those born in Turkey, 70% originally came from rural areas and 30% came from cities.

Table I.1 Sampling distribution

Germany	Number of questionnaires	France	Number of questionnaires
Niedersachsen-Bremen	82	Ille de France	222
Nordrhein–Westfalen	381	Centre	41
Hessen	121	Rhone-Alpes	150
Baden–Württemberg	233	Franche-Comté	32
Bayern	184	Alsace	109
Berlin	64	Lorraine	46
Total	1065	Total	600

The structured interviews were composed of five essential sections of questions: a) demographic information, b) orientation towards the homeland, c) orientation towards the host-land,⁵ d) orientation towards the EU and e) identity-related issues. The questions were designed in such a way as to give us definite clues about the status of Euro-Turks, whether they constitute a *bridge* or a *breach* between Turkey and the EU, between the East and the West or between Islam and Christianity.

⁵ We are aware of the fact that the term ‘host-land’ is problematic as it connotes that migrants could never become permanent settlers and that they are always destined to remain as guests. Nevertheless, the term will be used as a categorical phrase.

Chapter 1

The Migratory Process in Germany and France

Germany and France have long histories of importing labour from other countries – especially Eastern and southern Europe, but also from other parts of the world – during periods of labour shortages. In spite of this fact, Germany has generally been viewed as a labour-exporting, rather than labour-importing, nation. In the late 1880s, for instance, a million Germans migrated overseas, mostly to the United States. By the beginning of World War I, there were over 3 million Germans overseas; in return, Germany had received 1 million foreign workers, mostly from Poland (Sassen, 1999, p. 52). In contrast, France suffered from persistent labour shortages and thus the French were considerably less inclined to emigrate than their German counterparts. Immigration played a far more important role in 19th century France than emigration. The maintenance of a significant agricultural sector until well into the 20th century ensured the possibility of a livelihood in the countryside and created a demand for immigrants (Sassen, 1999, p. 52). Since 1945, both countries have become major immigrant-receiving countries of continental Europe. Today, between 8 and 9% of the population in both countries is made up of immigrants. Muslims, who are predominantly Turks in Germany and Algerians in France, represent large numbers in both countries: 3% in Germany and 7% in France.

The migratory process in Germany

Migration into post-war Germany started as labour recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German federal labour office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* or BFA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned. Employers seeking workers had to apply to the BFA and pay a fee. The BFA then selected suitable workers, tested their work skills, gave them medical check-ups and screened police and political records.¹ Migrants were recruited at first for agriculture and construction, and later for all branches of industry, where they generally had low-skilled manual jobs (Castles & Kosack, 1973). Guest-worker programmes were designed to solve immediate labour shortages in Germany by recruiting workers on temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Castles et al., 1984). The Turkish population in the FRG rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973 (Table 1.1).

In the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more-developed regions of the country (Abadan-Unat, 1976, Abadan-Unat & Kemiksiz, 1986 and Martin, 1991). The proportion of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2%. In the second half of the 1960s, recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers (Gökdere, 1978). Berlin was relatively late in recruiting Turkish workers. Since the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labour, it was conversely women who first migrated to Berlin in 1964. Turkish workers who migrated to Berlin by 1973 were primarily from the eastern provinces and economically less-developed regions of Turkey. As shown in Table 1.1, there has been a continual increase in the non-German population through the post-war period. Since 1973, the composition of the Turkish migrant population has tended to become a more general population migration in the form of family reunification and political asylum rather than mainly labour migration.

¹ The story of migration from the ‘developing’ countries to the FRG was successfully presented by John Berger et al. (1975) through photographs in the book *A Seventh Man*. The photographs taken during the journey from home to Germany partly express the difficulties that the immigrants experienced during the migration. The photos taken during the medical check-ups, for instance, prove how degrading the selection process of workers was as conducted by ‘experts’ of the recruiting country.

Table 1.1 Germany's non-German population and Turkish minority

Year	Non-German population	%	Turkish minority	%
1961	686,200	1.2	6,700	1.0
1970	2,600,600	4.3	249,400	16.5
1973	3,966,200	6.4	605,000	15.2
1977	3,948,300	6.4	508,000	12.9
1987	4,240,500	6.9	1,453,700	34.3
1989	4,845,900	7.7	1,612,600	33.3
1990 ^a	5,342,500	8.4	1,675,900	32.0
1991 ^b	5,882,300	7.3	1,779,600	30.3
1992	6,495,800	8.0	1,854,900	28.6
1993	6,878,100	8.5	1,918,400	27.9
1994	6,990,510	8.6	1,965,577	28.1
1995	7,173,900	8.7	2,014,311	28.1
1996	7,314,000	8.9	2,049,060	28.0
1997	7,365,800	9.0	2,107,400	28.6
1998	7,319,600	9.0	2,110,223	28.8
1999	7,343,600	8.9	2,053,600	27.9
2000	7,296,800	8.8	1,998,500	27.3
2001	7,318,600	8.7	1,947,900	26.6
2002	7,335,592	8.9	1,912,169	26.2
2003	7,334,765	8.7	1,877,661	25.6

Notes: a) Data from 1961-90 for the 'old Länder'.

b) Data from 1991 for the 'old' and 'new' Länder.

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2004).

Despite the significant transformation and upward mobility they have undergone, German-Turks have been continually misrepresented both in Germany and Turkey. The labels attached to them include derogatory terms such as 'in between', 'foreigner', 'German-like' (*Almancı*), 'degenerated', 'conservative', 'radical', 'nationalist' or 'lost generations'. All these problem-oriented representations have acquired wide popularity in both countries. It seems that the popularity of these labels springs from a traditional notion of culture that is widely used in both countries – a point to which we shall return shortly.

Turkish workers have generally been addressed in the official German discourse as '*gastarbeiter*' (guest-worker), '*ausländer*' (foreigner) or '*mitbürger*' (co-citizen) – terms that underline their 'otherness' and displacement (Kaya, 2001). They are officially defined in Turkey as either '*gurbetçi*' or '*Almanya'daki vatandaşlarımız*' (our citizens in Germany). German-Turks are stereotypically defined by their compatriots in Turkey as either '*Almanyalı*' or '*Almancı*'. Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. Their spoken Turkish and the way they dress also contribute to the construction of an *Almancı* image in Turkey. "Here we are called *yabancı* (foreigner) and there in Turkey they call us *Almancı*" is a refrain one hears frequently, especially among the German-Turkish youth.

Towards a limited hyphenated citizenship: German-Turks

The constitution of the FRG, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), recognises two categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the FRG and include freedom of expression, liberty of person and freedom of conscience (Arts. 2, 3, 4 and 5). Reserved rights are restricted to German citizens and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association and freedom of occupation (Arts. 8, 9, 11 and 12). The Basic Law does not prescribe how citizenship is recognised or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship are defined by Basic Law Art. 116, the preamble to the Basic Law and the 1913 Imperial and State Citizenship Law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) and provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child. Art. 116 of the Basic Law reads as follows:

(1) A German within the meaning of this Basic Law, unless otherwise regulated by law, is a person who possesses German citizenship, or who has been received in the territory of the German Reich as of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.

(2) Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be granted citizenship on application.

The Imperial Naturalisation Law of 1913 was designed to make the acquisition of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being invaded by immigrants from the east, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the repatriation of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) from outside the Reich (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 114-19, Klusmeyer, 1993, p. 84 and Marshall, 1992).

The claim for naturalisation has always been difficult for non-EU foreigners in the FRG, and has required repudiation of citizenship of the country of origin. Non-EU foreigners have usually been denied the right to dual citizenship; even the children of migrants born and raised in Germany could not automatically receive the right of citizenship until January 2000.² Foreigners who are willing to renounce their previous citizenship can be naturalised only after they have lived in Germany for at least 15 years. In contrast, the *Volksdeutschen* (ethnic Germans defined by Art. 116 of the Basic Law) – primarily Poles and Russians who can prove German ancestry – have a constitutional right to naturalisation.

The current German government, however, the so-called ‘Red-Green coalition’ of the Social Democrats and the Greens, recently established two mechanisms that endow migrants with the right to acquire citizenship for the first time. According to the new *Ausländergesetz* (1991) and the *Gesetz zur Änderung Asylverfahrens, Ausländer- und staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlicher Vorschriften* (1993), two groups of *Ausländer* have become legally entitled to naturalisation (paras. 85 and 86 of the *Ausländergesetz*). Para. 85 declares that foreigners between the ages of 16 and 23 who have been residents of Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of serious offences have the right to be naturalised. In addition, para. 86 states that those migrants who have been residents of Germany for at least 15 years and possess a residence permit have the right to naturalisation. The absence of a conviction for a serious criminal offence and the financial independence of the applicant are also crucial for the acquisition of citizenship according to this paragraph.

Non-EU immigrants or resident aliens have mostly been given what T. H. Marshall (1992) defined as social and civil rights, but not political rights. The immigrants built a very real political presence in Germany, where their political participation in the system was not legally allowed. The legal barriers denying political participation provided the basis for the Turkish immigrants in Germany to organise

² It was common for Turkish applicants to re-apply immediately after their German naturalisation for the Turkish citizenship they had temporarily lost. Turkey allows dual citizenship once the military service of the applicant has been resolved.

themselves politically along collective ethnic lines. As a response to the German insistence on the exclusionary *Ausländerstatus*, Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. Lack of political participation and representation in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin. In fact, this home-oriented participation has received encouragement from Turkey, which has set up networks of consular services and other official organisations (religious, educational and commercial). Homeland opposition parties and movements have also forged an organisational presence in Germany.

The new law, in force since 1 January 2000, partially changes the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*), which has so far been the country's traditional basis for granting citizenship. Now it is possible to acquire German citizenship as a result of being born in Germany (*jus soli*). According to the new law, children who are born in Germany to foreign nationals will receive German citizenship when one of the respective child's parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and holds entitlement to residence or has held an unlimited residence permit for at least three years. Under the new law, such children acquire German citizenship at birth. The new law also created a transitional arrangement for children up to the age of 10, who were born in Germany before the Act to Amend the Nationality Law was enacted, according to which those children are entitled to automatic naturalisation on application. In most cases, they will also acquire their parents' citizenship under the principle of descent. Such children will have to decide within five years of turning 18 – before their 23rd birthday – whether they want to retain their German citizenship. They must opt for one of their two nationalities.

It is apparent that the number of foreigners applying for naturalisation has greatly increased since the introduction of the new citizenship law. Following the introduction of the new law, the number of naturalisations rose by around 30% in the year 2000 compared with 1999. According to the information provided by the *Länder* governments, 186,700 foreigners were granted German citizenship in the course of the year 2000, compared with 143,267 in 1999. Subsequently, a total of 178,100 foreigners were naturalised in 2001. This is a decline of 8,600 or 4.6% from 2000. In contrast to the increase in the naturalisation of foreigners in general, the rate of naturalisation of Turks in 2000 decreased by around 20% compared with 1999. This trend remained the same in 2001, decreasing by around 9% compared with 2000 (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 Naturalisation of German-Turkish population

Year	Number of naturalisations
1972-79	2,219
1980-89	10,361
1990	2,034
1991	3,529
1992	7,377
1993	12,915
1994	19,590
1995	31,578
1996	46,294
1997	42,240
1998	59,664
1999	103,900
2000	82,800
2001	75,600
2002	64,631
2003	56,244
Total	625,981

Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany, Weisbaden (2004).

There are two essential points to raise about the data in the table. The first point is the decline in the number of persons of Turkish descent being naturalised between 2000 and 2001. In 2000 the new citizenship law came into effect. In general, naturalisation became easier. There was a rule that children of foreign descent up to 10 years of age could be naturalised right away, without any waiting period. Hence, the naturalisation rate was higher than in 2001. The second point is a more complex one and needs further inquiry. We shall touch on this point briefly as we have no substantial evidence to demonstrate our hypothesis. As may be seen in the table, there is a considerable increase in the rate of naturalisation in 1999 compared with 1998, and a significant decline in 2000 compared with the previous year (Kaya, forthcoming).³ The general trend for foreigners to naturalise was upwards: from 143,267 in 1999 to 186,000 in 2000. Yet German-Turks proved an exception, in contrast to Greeks or former Yugoslavs, although the new citizenship law was more liberal and inclusive (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3 Naturalisation of foreigners between 1980 and 2003

Year	Greece	Italy	Yugoslavia	Croatia	Poland	USSR	Spain	Turkey	Hungary
1980	376	1,010	3,475	–	3,303	4,138	217	399	1,868
1981	281	972	3,131	–	4,206	3,583	181	534	1,895
1982	235	1,084	3,201	–	7,807	3,243	211	580	1,669
1983	350	1,134	3,117	–	7,182	2,446	261	853	1,570
1984	264	946	3,334	–	5,988	1,704	323	1,053	1,432
1985	246	797	2,815	–	5,925	1,146	191	1,310	1,200
1986	173	597	2,721	–	7,251	945	171	1,492	1,105
1987	199	551	2,364	–	9,439	1,111	135	1,184	1,203
1988	191	618	2,119	–	13,958	4,810	155	1,243	1,157
1989	179	548	2,076	–	24,882	13,557	108	1,713	1,556
1990	158	437	2,082	–	32,340	33,339	103	2,034	1,532
1991	194	679	2,832	–	27,646	55,620	107	3,529	1,178
1992	285	1,947	1,947	269	20,248	84,660	168	7,377	1,425
1993	301	1,154	1,988	2,196	15,435	105,801	224	12,915	1,663
1994	341	1,417	4,374	3,695	11,943	164,296	185	19,590	1,902
1995	428	1,281	3,623	2,695	10,174	214,927	189	31,578	1,305
1996	493	1,297	2,967	2,391	7,872	194,849	152	46,294	1,027
1997	418	1,187	2,341	1,914	5,763	179,601	172	42,240	911
1998	427	1,156	2,881	2,373	5,151	170,381	141	59,664	652
1999	375	1,185	3,608	1,648	2,865	89,372	152	103,900	537
2000	1,413	1,036	9,776	3,316	1,604	11,358	190	82,800	561
2001	1,402	1,048	12,000	3,931	1,774	12,254	183	75,600	593
2002	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	64,631	–
2003	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	56,244	–

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2004).

There may be several reasons for such a decline. It may be that German-Turks are already satisfied with ‘denizenship’⁴ status, which gives them civil, social and cultural rights but not political rights. Another reason may be that German-Turks had expected a more democratic citizenship law to be put into effect without any limitation on dual citizenship. But perhaps their expectations diminished and they did not see any further benefit in acquiring German citizenship. A third possible reason may be

³ The main reason for the higher naturalisation rate of Turks in 1999 compared with the previous years is the shortening by law of the required duration of residence from 15 to 8 years.

⁴ ‘Denizen’ literally refers to those who reside in a certain location. The term was introduced by Thomas Hammar (1990) in the context of migration.

that Turks, who reside mostly in urban areas, preferred to ignore the new nationality law, which is a relatively more bureaucratic process in cities such as Berlin. This may have had a discouraging effect on the German-Turks in the process of naturalisation. A fourth justification may be that there is already a decline in the voting habits of German-Turks, who have not been given the right to vote in Turkish general elections. The right to vote in their residential areas is an issue of great importance for Turkish citizens living abroad.⁵

Last but not least, the explanation could be the processes of ‘globalisation from below’ (Brecher et al., 1993), which set up the pillars of modern diasporic identity.⁶ The broad networks of communication and transportation between Germany and Turkey play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of a diasporic identity among transnational communities. The modern circuitry connects the diasporic subjects both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. This is the reason it becomes much easier for German-Turks to live on ‘both banks of the river’ at the same time. German-Turks exemplify a growing stream of what Brecher et al. (1993) has called globalisation from below. This constitutive entanglement has become a characteristic of modern diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, cultural and political networks between diaspora and homeland, for instance, points to this growing stream. In the context of the diasporic condition in general, ‘globalisation from below’ refers to the enhancement of the access of transnational migrants and their descendants to those social, cultural, political and economic mechanisms enabling them to transcend the exclusionary conditions imposed upon them by the German nation-state. To put it differently, diasporic identity symbolically enables diasporic subjects to overcome the limitations and oppression of the country of settlement. In this context, traditional national citizenship discourse loses its accuracy and legitimacy for contemporary diasporic subjects. Therefore, this obsolete rhetoric should be replaced by new forms of citizenship such as dual citizenship, multiple citizenship, post-national citizenship, transnational citizenship or diasporic citizenship.

The question here is whether the new laws leave space for such progressive forms of citizenship in Germany. The new citizenship laws permit the descendants of Turkish migrants to acquire dual citizenship for at least a certain period of time. The present legal reforms enable German-born foreigners to go beyond their previously defined denizen status. They can thus enjoy political as well as civic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Hence, the present German citizenship laws have created a possibility for the introduction of a kind of limited ‘hyphenated’ citizenship for non-European foreigners as well as for those of Turkish origin. The partial introduction of the principle of *jus soli* clearly indicates that the definition of Germanness is no longer limited to ethnic descent. It also suggests that ethnically non-German and non-European members of the FGR can be incorporated into the political sphere through civic channels. These legal changes mean, in a way, the transformation of the culturally defined nation-project towards a rather Habermasian ‘post-national society’ project, requiring the political recognition of newcomers (Habermas, 1999). In other words, the new laws partially distance us from the hegemony of once-essentialised ethnic identities such as ‘German’, ‘Turkish’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Iranian’, etc. They have the potential to open the way for the construction of hyphenated civic identities such as ‘German-Turkish’ (in the Turkish language it literally means a Turk from Germany – *Almanyalı Türk*), ‘German-Kurdish’ or ‘German-Iranian’.

Yet, it should be pointed out that these hyphenated civic identities and citizenships are distinct from their equivalents in the American case. In the North American experience, when the hyphenated identities are spelled out, the emphasis is placed on the ethnic origin of individuals as in Irish-American or Italian-American. The fact that the emphasis is on the ethnic origin does not mean that Americanness is undervalued. On the contrary, what is implicitly celebrated is the Americanness in which the particular ethnicities are embedded. Hence, the explicit celebration of ethnic origins implicitly celebrates Americanness. In contrast, in the German experience the emphasis is on the ‘German’ component of the hyphenated identity. Therefore, it seems that the precondition of granting

⁵ For a detailed account of the discussions of the citizenship law in Germany, see Kaya (forthcoming).

⁶ For wider discussion see Clifford (1992, 1994 and 1997), Hall (1991 and 1994), Gilroy (1987, 1993, 1994 and 1995) and Kaya (2001).

a hyphenated identity such as ‘German-Turk’ in Germany is integration into the German way of life. In the US, on the other hand, the granting of the hyphenated identity is relatively less conditional since the US is by definition an immigrant nation. The usage of German hyphenated identities in both official and public discourses is an indication of the discursive shift in the perception of Germany as an immigration country by German authorities. This has actually been confirmed by changes in the citizenship laws as well as by the report prepared by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany (2001).⁷ Citizenship laws not only spring from legal concerns, they are also culturally formed. Thus, in what follows, we explore the cultural elements defining the nature of citizenship laws in Germany. In doing so, we also briefly touch on the changes in academic discourse or paradigm shift, in respect to research on German-Turks. The reason we outline the paradigm shift is to address the similarity of changes in both citizenship laws and related scientific research.

The migratory process in France

Like Germany, France experienced labour shortages in the aftermath of the World War II, in response to which it became an active recruiter of migrant workers from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. But only part of post-war discussions about migration revolved around the need for labour; another part revolved around the need for population growth in the face of a declining birth rate. By unlinking residence permits from work permits the government opened the door to jobseekers who had not yet been hired and to families. This encouraged immigrants to view themselves as permanent settlers rather than labour sojourners (Kivisto, 2002, p. 172). Although no ethnic quotas were laid down, the French government sought as far as possible to encourage European rather than African or Asian immigrants. Algerians, Portuguese, Moroccans, Italians, Spanish, Tunisians and Turks followed each other in terms of recruitment order and numbers. First, French nationals living in Algeria, commonly known as *pieds-noirs*, fled to France, being followed later by the *harkis*, Algerians who had fought on the side of the French during the Algerian independence struggle. After the French defeat, many of these French allies were executed by the Algerian nationalists, but many managed to flee. Shortly after Algeria won independence, both states signed a recruitment agreement, resulting in a concentration of Algerians in Paris, Lyon and Marseille. Spaniards, Italians, Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks followed the Algerians in relatively smaller numbers.

France signed a recruitment treaty with Turkey in 1966. The first workers coming to France were actually some of those who had applied to the Turkish employment office (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) in order to go to Germany (Kastoryano, 1986, p. 165 and Fırat, 2003, p. 76). As the German labour market was saturated at that point by the Turkish labour force, some of the Turkish applicants were given the opportunity to go to France. This stage of migration from Turkey is called *anonymous migration*. The next stage of migration from Turkey to France is called *nominal migration*, when workers were recruited upon calls from the private sector (Strasburger, 1995). Nominal migration was rather more popular in France compared with Germany and it led to the rise of chain migration. This form of migration inevitably resulted in the intensification of migrants from certain ethnic and geographical origins (Table 1.4).

While the recruitment process in France was terminated by the conservative government of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1974, migration from Turkey lingered on by means of family reunification and the illegal overstay of tourists coming into the country. Migration still continues in the form of marriages with partners from Turkey and asylum-seeking in the country. The conservative government also wanted to reduce the number of foreigners in the nation through a campaign of voluntary repatriation involving monetary inducements to leave. Between April 1977 and November 1981, France gave an allowance of 10,000 francs to unemployed immigrants who agreed to return for good to their home country with their family. Although it was primarily directed at non-EU nations, very few third-world immigrants took up the offer. It was the Spanish and Portuguese who accepted the

⁷ The Independent Commission on Migration to Germany was chaired by Rita Süßmuth, MP; the report prepared by the Commission was submitted to the Federal Minister of the Interior on 4 July 2001.

offer to go back to their countries, in which democratic regimes were back in place. The result of these measures taken together was that for the last quarter of the 20th century, foreign population numbers remained steady (Kivisto, 2002). Germany may have drawn some lessons from the French experience. Between 30 October 1983 and 30 June 1984 unemployed immigrants in Germany were encouraged to return to their countries with their families by 30 September 1984. Although 300,000 persons left Germany, the German government decided not to conduct such an operation again owing to its overwhelming financial cost (Kaya, 2001).

Table 1.4 National origins of the Muslim population

Country of origin	Population
Algeria	1,550,000
Morocco	1,000,000
Tunisia	350,000
Black Africa	250,000
Turkey	341,000
Converts	40,000
Asylum applicants/illegal	350,000
Asians	100,000
Other	100,000
Total	4,181,000

Note: These figures are widely seen as undercounting the number of illegal immigrants.

Source: Best estimates of an interior ministry source in ‘l’Islam dans la République’, Haut Conseil à l’intégration, November, 2000, p. 26.

Acquisition of citizenship and the rise of anti-immigrant nationalist discourse in France

Since the French Revolution, France has historically defined citizenship in political rather than ethno-cultural terms and invited all foreigners and ‘friends of liberty’, to join the French state. The decree of 26 August 1792 granted French citizenship to foreigners who by their writings or acts had defended liberty and the principles of the revolution. Alongside the principle of *jus sanguinis* attributing automatic citizenship to those born in France to French parents, the revolutionaries attributed specific conditions to the principle of *jus soli* that guaranteed attachment and loyalty to France. The dominance of the principle of *jus soli* has remained the same since the Revolution. While the 1851 citizenship law gave French citizenship to third-generation immigrants, the 1889 citizenship legislation automatically attributed French citizenship to second-generation immigrants (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 85-86). The 1889 law, with small modifications, still exists today.

French citizenship law contains two provisions embodying the principle of *jus soli*: Art. 23, attributing citizenship at birth to third-generation immigrants and Art. 44, attributing citizenship at age 18 to second-generation immigrants born in France and resident there since aged 13, provided they have not opted out of French citizenship during the preceding year and they have not been convicted of certain crimes. French citizenship law also permits dual citizenship. But lately French citizenship law has been criticised lately by nationalists for turning foreigners into French citizens on paper without making sure that they were ‘French at heart’ (*Français de coeur*). Nationalist critiques of the *jus soli* principle have become even stronger since the early 1990s, after so-called ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ has escalated in the West.

The French saw themselves as an assimilationist nation, but they were unprepared for the presence of large numbers of people of colour and large numbers of Muslims. Alec Hargreaves (1995, pp. 26-27) summarised the situation in the following passage:

The seeming invisibility of past generations of immigrants and of those who are today descended from them is often regarded as proof of the success with which they have been incorporated into French society. Immigrants who have settled in France during the post-war period and more particularly those who have come to the fore during the past twenty years, are often felt to threaten this tradition. It is widely claimed that people of third-world origins are much harder to 'integrate' than Europeans. Far from disappearing without a trace, they have actually increased in visibility at a time when successive governments have been claiming that immigration is at an end...the fear is that immigration is leading remorselessly to the formation of permanently distinct minorities within French society.

For a century France has defined second-generation immigrants as citizens. This practice was uncontested until recently. In the mid-1980s, however, *jus soli* came under sharp attack from the far right. 'Etre Français, cela mérite' [to be French, you have to deserve it] was proclaimed by Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. Under pressure from the National Front, the centre-right parties took up the theme during the 1986 legislative campaign, proposing in their joint platform to denounce 'automatic' acquisitions of French citizenship. Second-generation immigrants would no longer become French *jus soli*, they would have to request French nationality, which would have to be accepted by the state. The new government of President Jacques Chirac proposed to limit the *jus soli* principle as far as immigrants were concerned. Yet the proposal provoked strong opposition and was eventually withdrawn from the legislative agenda. A commission of enquiry was set up, which put forward the idea of extending rather than further restricting access to French citizenship (Brubaker, 1992, p. 138). The Commission's report formed the basis for Law No. 93.933, which has been in force since 22 July 1993. The most important reform introduced the notion of consent by stating that "persons born in France of foreign parents can acquire French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21, by declaration if the five years residence requirement and the non-convictions required are satisfied". Persons who have expressly declined French citizenship during the year preceding their majority and persons who have been convicted of certain crimes are excluded from this provision.

In France, naturalisation is secondary to the acquisition of citizenship. In contrast to the declaration, the naturalisation procedure is discretionary, i.e. subject to the control and approval of the administration. The naturalisation procedure in France requires five years of permanent residence, majority, linguistic competence, assimilation into the French community, and good morals and customs – meaning no prison sentences of more than six months or offences or crimes against state security. Unlike many other countries, France does not require candidates for naturalisation to renounce their original citizenship. The requirements for naturalisation are founded on a presumption of assimilation, attachment and loyalty of foreigners settled in France. Thus the administration usually rejects requests for naturalisation by foreigners whose family members live abroad (Table 1.5).

Sociologist Michèle Tribalat (1996) did a comparative field study among Algerian, Moroccan, Spanish, Portuguese, Southeast Asian and Turkish migrants in France.⁸ Her conclusion was quite striking in pointing out that Turks proved an exception. According to her, French-Turkish migrants were the most resistant to integration or assimilation. French-Turks prefer not to speak French at home despite being quite competent in the language; they set up parallel communities to the majority society in their own ethnic enclaves; they more oriented to religiosity compared with other Muslim communities; they prefer not to engage in intermarriage with the French; and they are less interested in education. These were some of the conclusions of Tribalat (2002). Tribalat's holistic conclusions deriving from a quantitative work have been strongly criticised by scholars (Firat, 2003).

⁸ This research was undertaken in 1992 by the Institut National d'Études Démographiques with the assistance of the Institut National des Statistiques et Études Économiques.

Table 1.5 Naturalisation in France

Year	Acquisition of French citizenship			
	By naturalization		By declaration	
	Total	Spouse and children of a naturalized person	Total	By marriage
1985	26 902	11 978	19 089	12 634
1986	21 072	10 344	22 566	15 190
1987	16 205	7 848	16 052	9 788
1988	16 762	7 948	27 338	16 592
1989	19 901	10 178	26 468	15 489
1990	*	*	*	*
1991	*	*	*	*
1992	22 792	12 349	32 249	15 601
1993	23 283	13 157	32 425	15 246
1994	29 106	15 396	43 633	19 493
1995	24 718	12 041	21 017	16 659
1996	34 650	16 923	21 880	19 127
1997	35 703	18 471	23 191	20 845

Sources: Direction de la Population et des Migrations - André Lebon - 1990 and 1997

The French republican ideal has recently come under attack on several fronts. Some changes in French public life are challenging the conventional assumption that ‘the French Republic is one and indivisible’. The Territorial Laws for New Caledonia and French Polynesia and the granting of legislative powers to the Corsican Assembly have already shown that the French Republic is still ‘one’, but no longer ‘indivisible’. Yet the explicit discrimination in public experienced and expressed by Muslims (especially Algerians) confronts the national education apparatus aimed at reproducing the French citizen and thus the homogenous French nation. As Tribalat (2003) put it “what is the point in working hard for success at school if you are going to be discriminated against?”⁹ She reports that the presence of discrimination raises the problem of coherence between republican principles and the reality of French society. Until recently, it was taboo in France to talk about discrimination because of the threat it poses to republicanism (Tribalat, 2003, p. 135). Pierre Sadran’s (2003, p. 53) words express very clearly the current legitimacy crisis in the French republican ideology:

Contrary to the ‘Astérix’ village of incapable Gauls, the French have become less receptive to the myth of exceptionalism. First, because the nation-state has been destabilized from above and below: by the dynamic of decentralization and that of European Integration. Second, because French universalism has had to lower its ambitions and be content to embody one particular version of the universal ideal...Finally, because the French model of social integration based on the republican school does not work in the same way as in the past. Distinctive cultures have become legitimate in a France which showed in the World Cup of 1998 that it felt more at home with a *Black-Blanc-Beur* team (Blacks-Whites-French of North African origin) than with the blue, white and red of the national flag.

It is certain that the myth of republicanism in France is being threatened on several fronts. There is a paradoxical situation in the country: on the one hand, the French state is changing through decentralisation and European integration; on the other hand, the social and political culture of the country is still shaped by the myth of a unitary and republican state. As far as migration policies are concerned, it seems that migrants are still subject to the idea of universalism, which actually requires assimilation into the conventional political values of the French nation. Assimilationist integration, to which migrant groups are subject, is likely to result in the rise of a politics of identity and culture among the migrants. The politics of identity is expected to reinforce ethnic, cultural and linguistic boundaries between the majority and minorities.

⁹ Our data affirm Tribalat’s findings concerning the discrimination faced by immigrant populations and those of foreign origin. French-Turks, when asked, highlight the problem of discrimination in France (17%).

Towards European citizenship?

One of the questions often articulated when a revision of citizenship is raised is ‘What about our national identity?’ In fact, citizenship and nation are two overlapping institutions. National identity, like all other identities, is dynamic and should not be prescribed. Identity, be it national, individual, political, communal or ethnic, is shaped by the acts of recognition, lack of recognition or misrecognition by others (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). The genesis of the human mind develops in a dialogical sense, not monological. One can construct his/her identity only if he/she is able to experience the other’s reactions to his/her attitudes and behaviour. Thus, it is impossible to build an identity without a dialogue with the ‘other’. If a nation prescribes a holistic notion of culture, then it would be remarkably difficult for a newcomer group to incorporate itself into the existing social system without major resistance by the majority society. Prescribing, or in other words essentialising, the nation may inevitably lead the members of a nation not to recognise newcomers whom they consider to be culturally distinct. Not recognising newcomers may result in the construction of radical and centrifugal identities, and thus conflict. As Kymlicka and Norman stated, “immigrant groups that feel alienated from the larger national identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as well” (2000, p. 39). Recently, ethnicity, culture and religion have come to constitute the most concrete referential points for EU citizens to stigmatise the ‘other’, be it migrants, asylum-seekers, Muslims, Arabs, Turks or the Romany. Islamophobia has become one of the main challenges faced by Euro-Turks. This has even become the decisive point in France, where public opinion relates Turkey’s EU membership to the growing Islamic challenge in the West.

Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to aggravate the advance of the interests of the dominant national group at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of citizenship can resolve issues of coexistence of ‘culturally discrete’ entities. In order to avoid potential conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws should not be based on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic qualities. This linkage between citizenship and a predefined national identity has actually brought about numerous examples of interethnic conflict and violence around the globe.

The idea of the nation-state originating from the holistic notion of culture is essentially rooted in a name, a common ancestry, a set of common historical memories and myths, a national anthem, a common territory for which the forefathers died, a national economy and a set of common legal rights and duties (Smith, 1986). Accordingly, foreigners such as guest-workers, asylum-seekers or refugees who have immigrated to the West in large numbers during the post-war era have been generally excluded from civil, social, political and cultural rights. The model of national citizenship, which is linked to territorialized notions of cultural belonging and primordial loyalty, has been dominant during the period of massive migration since the turn of the 20th century. The recent experience of transnational migrant workers, however, reflects “a time when national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in *deterritorialized* notions of persons’ rights” (Soysal, 1994, p. 3, emphasis added).

The introduction of EU citizenship is a remarkable example where citizenship and nation have been in some way disentangled. One of the most important challenges here is that a cardinal tie of citizenship to a predefined national identity is under dispute. Art. 8(e) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to the dynamic and evolutionary nature of citizenship rights.¹⁰ The Maastricht Treaty inserted a new section into the amended Treaty of Rome (“Citizenship of the Union”), Art. 8. The article declares that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. Moreover, it adds that “Citizens of the Union shall also enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby”. The term ‘Community citizenship’ actually became a debated issue after a letter by Felipe Gonzales, the former Spanish premier, to the Office of the European Council,

¹⁰ For further details see the *European Union Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union* (the Maastricht Treaty), *Official Journal* C 325, 24 December 2002.

proposing that citizenship should be made one of the three pillars of European political union (the other two being the European monetary union and a common foreign and security policy).

Although the Maastricht Treaty's notion of EU citizenship originates from the understanding of 'dynamic' and 'evolutionary' rights, which are not prescribed and thus subject to change, some of the earlier problems remain. These criticisms concentrate on the debates around the political inclusion of *extracommunitari* from non-EU countries such as Turkish migrants in Germany. As Chris Shore (2000, pp. 66-86) rightly observes, there are four major difficulties. First, the EU concept of citizenship focuses exclusively on rights without outlining a set of corresponding duties. Second, the Treaty provides a legal basis for granting voting rights to citizens from any member state, regardless of his/her residence. Nevertheless, the *extracommunitari* residents from EU countries such as the Euro-Turks are not granted such rights. Third, the very idea of a 'Community national' is problematic: that is, one can be a Union citizen only by virtue of being a citizen of a member state. Hence, the status of EU citizenship is subordinate to the framework of the nation-state. This is again particularly relevant in the context of German-Turks. Finally, there are also criticisms arguing that EU citizenship is raising the prospect of a more exclusionist 'fortress Europe', discriminating against non-EU nationals.


Then again, one should bear in mind that the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty expected that EU citizenship would be developmental, expanding beyond civil and economic rights to include political and social rights. This perspective is clearly indicated in Art. 8(e) of the Maastricht Treaty with the emphasis on the dynamic and evolutionary nature of citizenship rights. In a way, Art. 8(e) provides the basis on which one could be optimistic in the sense that the Treaty shortly may embody more inclusive principles for non-EU citizens residing in the EU. Germany's recent efforts, along with the institutionalisation of EU citizenship and the introduction of the new citizenship law during the Red-Green coalition government, testifies to the rupture of the previously established linkage between citizenship and prescribed national identity.

Citizenship has historically been linked to participation. Yet there is a decline in conventional political participation in developed liberal democracies (Hoffman, 2004). The decline seems to be even more drastic among the populations of migrant origin. The question of participation is related to the problem of enhancing involvement in governmental mechanisms – local, regional, national and in the case of the EU supra-national. Formal citizenship does not necessarily provide migrants and their children with the essential foundation from which they can politically participate in the public life of their country of settlement. Even if one receives formal citizenship rights he/she can still be marked as an 'immigrant'. Though France has a more deep-rooted tradition of naturalisation compared with Germany, there is a great discrepancy between the level of naturalisation of the migrants of Turkish origin dwelling in France and their political, cultural and economic participation in French public life. This research underlines that there are significant limitations in France with respect to the political participation of French-Turks in a way that contradicts the 'egalitarian' republican myth. Germany, however, has set up another example, which is more successful in terms of German-Turks' political and cultural participation in the public space. The following chapters reveal that the difference between German-Turks' and French-Turks' level of political participation partly springs from two competing ideologies, which have recently been implemented by the two countries *vis-à-vis* migrants: French *assimilationism* and German *communitarianism* (Grillo, 1998, p. 181). Both qualitative and quantitative data indicate that communitarianism brings about more political participation among the German-Turks.

Chapter 2 Profile of the Sample


Over 2.5 million German-Turks live in Germany and more than 300,000 French-Turks live in France. The total population of Euro-Turks dwelling in the EU countries is around 4 million. The sample was determined by the researchers to reflect a representative picture in terms of age, gender, occupation and region. The gender distribution of the structured interviews reflects the researchers' aim of equal gender representation (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Gender distribution



The age distribution of the structured interviews also reflects the researchers' aim of equal age representation (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Age distribution




The sampling distribution reflects a representative picture in terms of the density of the Euro-Turk population numbers from region to region (Table 2.1). In Germany, a greater proportion of interviewing was done in Nordrhein-Westfalen (35%) and in France in Ile de France (37%). It was possible for the interviewers to conduct the structured interviews in one of the three languages (Turkish, German and French) in accordance with the wishes of the interviewee (Figure 2.3). The number of interviewees who preferred to use the language of the 'host-land' differed remarkably in each country (20% in Germany and 32% in France). This gives us an idea about the competence of Euro-Turks in written Turkish. Combining the quantitative data with the qualitative data it could be argued that French-Turks are less competent in Turkish than German-Turks, although they have a shorter migrancy period. Another essential point to make here is that French-Turks prefer to use Turkish within the family, although the young are very competent in French and the French tradition is very assimilationist in that respect. Yet the act of speaking Turkish is not perceived as so resistant in the German-Turkish families. The difference here could be the resistance developed by the French-Turks against the French ideal of assimilation, in a way that places a barrier between the public space and private space in terms of using the French language (Tribalat, 2002).

Table 2.1 Sampling distribution


Germany	Number of questionnaires	France	Number of questionnaires
Niedersachsen-Bremen	82	Ille de France	222
Nordrhein–Westfalen	381	Centre	41
Hessen	121	Rhone-Alpes	150
Baden–Württemberg	233	Franche-Comté	32
Bayern	184	Alsace	109
Berlin	64	Lorraine	46
Total	1065	600	Total

Figure 2.3 Language of the structured interviews



More than one-fourth of German-Turks were born in Germany and 18% of the French-Turks were born in France (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4 Where were you born?



A great number of the French-Turks (35%) are of urban origin in Turkey, while a lower percentage of German-Turks (26%) have this background (Figure 2.5). German-Turks born in Turkey are predominantly of rural origin (68%). The data indicate that German-Turks are overwhelmingly uprooted peasants who have been turned into proletarians.¹

¹ Oscar Handlin's (1973) classic account of "the uprooted" points to the peasants who were turned into proletarians in the American context.

Figure 2.5 Where were you born in Turkey?




Figure 2.6 shows that chain migration has been the main form of migration among the German-Turks, while it has been less the case with the French-Turks. But it should also be noted here that there are remarkable differences between the migration patterns of German-Turks and French-Turks. French-Turks often speak of the fact that they came to France because they could not make it to Germany. When Turkish migration to France started, Germany had already gone a long way down the road with regard to stimulating migration to Germany through recruiting Turkish workers. Several of the French-Turks have even stated that they were planning to go on to Germany after spending a few years in France.

Migration to Germany has always been regulated by the German state, while the French state has delegated it to individual companies willing to recruit foreign labour. Thus, individual companies prompted those first migrants to recommend their fellow countrymen to come to France. French-Turks originating from the same region in Turkey tend to concentrate in particular places in France (Firat, 2003, p. 76 and Heckmann & Unbehaun, 1999, p. 82). Such a background makes it more practical for the French-Turks to carry on their traditional solidarity networks for a longer period of time in comparison with the German-Turks.

Parents form the highest percentage among relatives preceding the interviewees (Figure 2.6). The number of German-Turks whose grandparents migrated is higher than those of French-Turks. This is an indication of the rising number of third/fourth generation descendants in Germany. There are also similar signs in France (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.6 Is there anybody in your family who preceded your coming here?






Figure 2.7 Who was the first migrant in your family?




The majority of German-Turks reported that they came to Germany for the purpose of family unification (marriage or family reunification, 44%) (Figure 2.8). And those who came to Germany to work corresponded to about 21%. Those born in Germany constitute 26% of German-Turks. On the other hand, 30% of French-Turks came to France to work, while around 49% of those reported that their main motivation in coming to France was either family reunification (22%) or marriage (27%).

Figure 2.8 What is your reason for coming to Germany/France?




The number of married persons among those interviewed is similar in both countries, as revealed in Figure 2.9. As the German-Turks are relatively younger, the number of those who are single in Germany is higher than in France. Although cohabitation is rarely seen in either country, a slightly higher percentage of French-Turks experience it compared with German-Turks.

Figure 2.9 Marital status?




Today, those who see their children marry French/German men or women are very rare. Most of the individuals interviewed are married to persons of Turkish origin (Figure 2.10). Approximately 6% of Euro-Turks are married to persons of either French or German origin. Intermarriage is known to be one of the indicators of amalgamation and recently this has been on the rise among Euro-Turks. To make some comparisons in the French context, however, among Algerian men in France who live with a partner or spouse, half of them share their life with French women; the proportion among young persons of Portuguese origin is around 59%. As expected, unions with native French men are more difficult and rare amongst young Algerian women (24% as compared with 47% of young Portuguese women) (Tribalat, 2002).

Figure 2.10 Is your partner Turkish?




German-Turks are likely to have fewer children than French-Turks. While the percentage of the German-Turks who have at most three children is 47%, it drops to 44% in France (Figure 2.11).

Figure 2.11 Do you have children?



Generally, the households in both countries are composed of four members. It is also notable that the number of single persons in France (9.8%) is almost double that in Germany (5.6%) (Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.12 How many persons are there in the household?



Euro-Turks do not seem to be integrated into the housing market, with 83% living in rented accommodation and only 13.6% owning their own homes (Figure 2.13). About 72% of German-Turks live in houses ranging between 50m² and 100m², as do around 62% of French-Turks (Figure 2.14). Nevertheless, 67% own property in Turkey (87% own apartments, 11% own summer cottages and 46% own fields) (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). There may be several explanations for this. It may be that it is more reasonable to make such investments in Turkey as Germans in general are also increasingly doing the same. As Bianca Kaiser (2001) stated in her latest work, there are more than 20,000 German properties registered in Turkey. Thus, investments made by Euro-Turks in Turkey do not necessarily spring from their ‘unquestionable’ orientation to the homeland; it may also be a rational form of investment as with Germans in general.

Figure 2.13 Do you own the home you live in?




Figure 2.14 How many m² is your home?




Figure 2.15 Do you own property in Turkey?






Figure 2.16 If yes, then what kind of property do you have?




Automobile ownership among the French-Turks (69%) is higher than among German-Turks (61%) (Figure 2.17). As discussed later in chapter 3, French-Turks generally seem to be more prosperous compared with the German-Turks.

Figure 2.17 Do you have a car?




The high ratio of the German-Turks visiting Turkey at least once a year (66%) confirms one of the previous findings that German-Turks have a greater sense of attachment to Turkey (Figure 2.18). This ratio is lower among French-Turks (46%). The difference may also result from the fact that Germany is better connected to Turkey in terms of transportation facilities.

Figure 2.18 How often do you go to Turkey?



Almost all Euro-Turks are likely to go to Turkey in order to visit their relatives and hometowns (94% German-Turks and 87% French-Turks) (Figure 2.19). Around 47% of the German-Turks and 56% of the French-Turks also visit holiday resorts.

Figure 2.19 What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey?



This finding is a great indication of the volume and dynamics of transnational space between/beyond Turkey and Germany/France. Yet the transnational space between/beyond Turkey and Germany is much greater than that between Turkey and France.² Euro-Turks often remain actively involved in their homeland by maintaining kinship and friendship ties, but also by remaining involved politically, economically and culturally in the larger homeland society. For Euro-Turks, transnationalism is aided by geographic proximity, making frequent trips home feasible. They have also become 'global villagers' by taking advantage of communication and transportation technologies to forge transnational identities.

² The volume of transportation, trade, communication, politics and academic studies between Turkey and Germany indicates that the transnational space between the two countries is highly developed and efficient compared with the one between Turkey and France.

Chapter 3

Euro-Turks and Social Classes

Both qualitative and quantitative data show that Euro-Turks are no longer solely manual workers employed in low-skilled jobs, lacking any agency to represent them in the public space. On the contrary, they have many politicians, artists, artisans, businessmen, poets, novelists, bureaucrats, journalists, singers and teachers representing them in one way or another. Most Euro-Turks no longer need the tutelage of their German/French mentors to represent them; they are being represented by their own indigenous intellectuals. This development has, of course, something to do with the fact that Turks are upwardly mobile in social terms and now have a large number of middle-class people in the communities.

There is also a parallel phenomenon to this development in the rising numbers of unemployed people who are not affiliated with any formal job. A number of these persons have the right to benefit from the welfare system by receiving their unemployment benefit from the state, but, an increasing number cannot avail of state aid as they were not in a position to contribute to the welfare system due to their chronic unemployment status. Unemployment is of course an outcome of the global recession. Those unemployed Euro-Turks, whom one easily comes across in places such as Kreuzberg (Berlin), Keupstrasse (Köln) and Villier le Bel (Paris),¹ are in general against Turkey's candidature to the EU. Euro-Turks dwelling in those segregated ethnic enclaves are truly disadvantaged. The world not only continues to be segregated for them, but in some cases there is evidence of greater levels of segregation than in the past, leading some researchers to refer to this as "hypersegregation" (Massey & Denton, 1993). Inner-city Turks in such neighbourhoods attend segregated schools, worship in their own mosques, shop in segregated stores, generate their niche economies and so forth. The exodus of the Turkish middle-class from inner cities to new neighbourhoods has left behind only the poorest of the poor in communities increasingly disconnected from the larger urban economy and bereft of the institutional support that once helped ghetto dwellers survive in a hostile world. These are communities hard hit by deindustrialisation, where residents are forced to cope with the consequences of what happens to neighbourhoods when work disappears (Kivisto, 2002). The most appropriate term for describing the worldview of these hyper-segregated people is 'nihilism'.

Unemployed Euro-Turks (22% in Germany and 11% in France) tend to express their distrust of both the Turkish and German/French states and the view that the states are capable of providing them with better opportunities to survive. Their damaged solidarity with the homeland and 'host-land' was previously replaced by orientation to alternative formations such as community associations, religious organisations (predominantly *Milli Görüş* and *Alevi Cemevis*), fellowship organisations, culture, ethnicity and mosques. Although the history of ethnic/cultural/religious associations in Germany goes back to the 1960s, it was only in 1980s that the Mitterand government enacted a number of measures that moved in a more pluralistic direction. Among these was a relaxation of the Law of 1901 governing clubs and societies, one consequence of which was the emergence of large number of ethnically and culturally specific associations. Many mosques were then founded in France (Grillo, 1998, p. 185). Nevertheless, the crises and corruption faced by the religious organisations and the failure of the other ethnic- or religious-based associations to meet demand have resulted in the decline of such formations. The outcome of this process is that some individuals have fallen into the belief that there is nothing else but themselves to believe in. This is what we call the 'proleterianisation' process, resulting in the rise of nihilist tendencies in a way that belittles the value of politics.


The lives of Euro-Turks (especially German-Turks) of lower social status have been complicated by deindustrialisation and the arrival of new immigrants (*Übersiedler* and *Aussiedlers*)² since the early

¹ The common denominator of these districts that we observed in our own qualitative field research is that they are all ethnically Turkish enclaves. These districts are just some of the examples of such enclaves.

² *Übersiedler* refers to East Germans who migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany during the cold war; *Aussiedler* are ethnic Germans who repatriated from Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the cold war period.


1990s. The decline in manufacturing has prevented many Euro-Turks from engaging in the upward mobility available to unskilled workers in the past. Figure 3.1 indicates that French-Turks are generally speaking better off than German-Turks. While 21% of German-Turks earn less than €1000 month, this ratio is around 15% for French-Turks.

Figure 3.1 Monthly income of the household?



The majority of interviewees are regularly paid workers (Figure 3.2). This ratio is larger in France (36%) compared with Germany (32%). The second largest group is housewives (25% of French-Turks and 23% of German-Turks). The unemployment rate among German-Turks is around 22% and among French-Turks is around 7%. The high unemployment rate among the German-Turks does not necessarily mean that Germany has a much greater unemployment problem than France. It may also be that Germany has a better welfare state system that provides the unemployed with better unemployment benefits. The qualitative research has also indicated that German-Turks are inclined to benefit from the existing welfare system, sometimes even to an abusive extent. The number of self-employed and temporarily working persons among French-Turks (11% and 8% respectively) is higher than among German-Turks (4% and 2%).

Figure 3.2 Present job status?



Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that German-Turks view their prosperity as in decline. While French-Turks are generally happy with their recent economic and social conditions, German-Turks complain more about their recent status. Although both groups agree on their relative prosperity compared with their parents, the ratio of interviewees addressing their rising status in the last ten years is 44% among German-Turks and 66% among French-Turks. This may be the result of the impact of the euro, which began circulating in 2002.

Figure 3.3 How do you find your economic and social conditions compared to those of your parents?




Figure 3.4 How do you find your recent economic and social conditions compared to the last decade?





Figure 3.5 Socio-economic status: Occupational status I




The striking numbers in Figure 3.5 are the unemployment rates: 22% in Germany and 8% in France. The unemployment rate among German-Turks is almost double that among Germans generally (11%). French-Turks are predominantly blue-collar workers, while German-Turks are rather more diversified. The data indicate that German-Turks are economically more integrated than French-Turks.

The notable feature in Figure 3.6 is the difference between the secondary school graduates (35% in Germany and 18% in France). This actually refers to the problematic nature of the German educational system, which does not generate upward mobility among students. The German educational system,

labelled by the latest Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) research³ as the most inefficient among European countries, does actually reproduce the status quo in terms of the existing class structure. The figures in Turkey are quite different from those in Germany and France. The rate of illiteracy among Turks in Turkey was around 13% in 1996.

Figure 3.6 Socio-economic status: Educational status II



Nevertheless, the common denominator in the two countries' education systems is that neither really provides the migrants and their children with a platform whereby they may, on graduation, turn their cultural capital into economic capital. Thus both countries are discriminating against migrant families in the labour market. It is also claimed by Tribalat (2002) that the rate of illiteracy is much higher among Moroccan and Algerian communities. The fact that Muslims cannot socially advance in public life leads to the emergence of strong mental constructs in the country that identify social, economic and educational problems with 'backward cultures'. Such mental constructs make an inclusive education for citizenship extremely difficult to achieve. The sociologist François Dubet observes that:


Relationships in schools, like relationships in society as a whole, are increasingly radicalised. Individuals are perceived as having an 'ethnic' identity and stigmatized. To put it simply, whereas previously schools would have described children as working class, now they describe them as immigrant children. Whereas children were before diagnosed as having problems because their fathers were poor, now they diagnose children as having problems because their fathers are 'immigrants', even if the child is of the third generation. Whereas they identify the behaviour of boys as 'aggressive', now the behaviour is described as 'ethnic' (cited in Starkey, 2003, p. 120).

The racialisation of discourse on social immobility and educational failure goes parallel with the fact that there are not any ethnic minority councillors in France today. A combination of stigmatisation and lack of role models may make it more difficult for ethnic minority pupils in France to identify with a

³ Coordinated by the OECD, PISA 2002 is a collaborative effort among the governments of 28 OECD and 4 non-member countries. The first results, published in December 2001, provided an indicator of the outcome of initial education that is officially recognised across the developed world. Crucially, the survey will be repeated every three years, allowing countries to monitor progress regularly. In 2003, all 30 OECD countries were to take part, while at least 13 more non-members, from China to Chile, were to join the survey. What do the PISA results show? Finnish students did particularly well in reading, and Japanese and Koreans excelled in mathematics and science. Australia, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK were significantly above average for all three types of literacy. Those consistently below average included two relatively affluent economies, Germany and Italy, as well as others with below-average national income such as Greece, Mexico, Poland and Portugal. The US performed bang in the middle. These averages mask important variations in performance within each country. Since most educational systems have been particularly trying to improve the performance of the lowest achievers, the amount of variation in achievement is important. Germany was one of the countries with the greatest inequalities in reading literacy, with poorly performing students dragging down the average.

republican discourse that cannot provide them with any material capital (Starkey, 2003, p. 120). France is lately facing a significant challenge in raising citizens loyal to the republican values of *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité*. Citizenship education through the national education system has always been intended to help integrate a diverse population into a single national culture defined as ‘republican’. Universal and liberal values have always come before cultural, ethnic and religious dispositions. This presents a static and assimilationist view of French society into which pupils have to fit. A dynamic view would suggest opportunities to help shape society, in which individuals could be more reflexive and active social agents.

Figure 3.7 Socio-economic status distribution



Concerning overall prosperity, the data in Figure 3.7 indicate that French-Turks are better off in comparison with their German counterparts. As shown, 52% of German-Turks and 41% of French-Turks are reported as being in the lower middle class and below.

Chapter 4 Homeland vs. 'Host-land'


The data in this chapter indicate that Euro-Turks present quite a different picture from the ways in which they are perceived by both Turks in Turkey and the receiving societies. Euro-Turks no longer essentialise their homeland as a final destination of return and they no longer fit into the stereotypical image developed by the receiving societies. They integrate into the political, cultural and economic spheres of life in both countries, especially in Germany. Hence, both Turkish and German/French societies need to reconsider their perspectives on Euro-Turks.

Perceptions of Turkey

Euro-Turks' orientation to Turkey in various spheres of life is shaped by several factors such as religiosity, ethnicity, gender, social status, length of stay abroad and social capital. It is stereotypically believed in both Turkey and Germany/France that Euro-Turks are tremendously concerned with the political, social, economic and cultural affairs of their homeland, and that they are not engaged in the domestic life of their countries of settlement. The data in this chapter shows that such assumptions are actually stereotypes, and Euro-Turks, far from being blinkered and romantic, have in fact quite realistic and rational perceptions about Turkey.


The number of Euro-Turks who are not interested in politics in Turkey is surprisingly high (42% of German-Turks and 50% of French-Turks) (Figure 4.1). This number actually contradicts the stereotype that German-Turks are still oriented to homeland politics and not at all interested in the domestic politics of Germany. On the contrary, there are plenty of German-Turks and French-Turks who reported an interest in German, French, EU politics and world politics.

Figure 4.1 To what extent are you interested in politics in Turkey?




As Figure 4.2 indicates, most Euro-Turks affiliate themselves with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (32% in Germany and 35% in France). The 10% of Euro-Turks who support the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi* or SP) in Germany seems to be an indication of the power of the communal tendencies among German-Turks. The data show that support for the Republican People's Party (CHP) remains relatively low in both countries. Support for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), however, is also remarkable in both countries (8%). On the other hand, what is also remarkable is the high percentage of people who do not affiliate with any political party in Turkey, which amounts to 30% in Germany and 33% in France.

Figure 4.2 With which political party in Turkey are you affiliated?




The high percentage of German-Turks (25%) who voted in Turkish general elections after settling in Germany is partly a result of the fact that political mobilisation among German-Turks is higher than among French-Turks (8%) (Figure 4.3). As is known, *Milli Görüş* (the National View Association) especially mobilised many of the Turkish electorate to vote in several elections in Turkey. *Milli Görüş* in France is not as organised as it is in Germany.

Figure 4.3 Have you voted in general elections in Turkey at all since settling in Germany/France?




The smaller percentage of those German-Turks voting in the latest elections in Turkey may be a result of the fact that affiliation with radical religious formations such as *Milli Görüş* and Islamic capital has recently decreased. The other reason may be that orientation towards Turkish politics is gradually fading (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4 Did you vote in the November 2002 elections in Turkey?




For German-Turks, democracy and human rights pose the greatest challenge for Turkey (23%); while it is corruption, nepotism and bribery for the French-Turks (22%). What is also remarkable is the difference between German-Turks and French-Turks with respect to their views on the ‘pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism’: 12% of German-Turks placed this problem in third position, while only 7% of French-Turks placed it in fifth position (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 What is the greatest problem in Turkey (multi-response)?



The institution Euro-Turks trust most in Turkey is the government (AKP) (33% of German-Turks and 28% of French-Turks) (Figure 4.6) with its Islamic democratic vision. After that, religious institutions in Turkey attract 20% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks. The army takes third place among German-Turks with 14% and second place among French-Turks with 24%. There may be many reasons for the AKP’s success. Our qualitative research indicates that the priorities of the party make it popular among Euro-Turks: its emphasis on employment, progress, values, justice and the EU.


Figure 4.6 Which institution in Turkey do you trust most (multi-response)?



The institution most distrusted is the media (by 29% in Germany and 22% in France), followed by health care and social security institutions (11% in Germany and 23% in France) (Figure 4.7). The army takes third place in Germany (9%), while it is the police in France (10%). It would be interesting to compare these findings with the results of similar surveys in Turkey and other EU countries.

Surveys in Turkey indicate that the Turkish public finds the army as one of the most reliable institutions, believed to be providing stability, authority and hierarchy in a relatively unstable country. Similar findings could also be seen in the 2003 Eurobarometer Survey held in 15 EU countries, in which the army is seen as one of the most reliable institutions. Euro-Turks, however, seem to find the new government in Turkey as the most reliable institution, representing change and progress.

Figure 4.7 Which institution in Turkey do you trust least (multi-response)?



As Figure 4.8 reveals, around the same number of people believe that Turkey has recently become better compared with previous years (62% of German-Turks and 65% of French-Turks), and both German-Turks and French-Turks are predominantly optimistic about Turkey’s future (Figure 4.9). A similar trend is also visible in public polls held in Turkey. Although Euro-Turks are not so optimistic about their future in their countries of settlement, they have a firm belief that Turkey has better future prospects. This is an important point to keep in mind.

Figure 4.8 Do you think Turkey has become better or worse compared with previous years?





Figure 4.9 Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey’s future?




Perceptions of Germany/France

Turkish migrants and their children in the West are officially defined in Turkey as either ‘*gurbetçi*’ or ‘*yurtdışındaki vatandaşlarımız*’ (our citizens abroad). Euro-Turks are stereotypically defined by Turkish people in Turkey as either ‘*Almanyalı*’ or ‘*Almancı*’ (German-like). Both terms carry rather negative connotations in Turkey. The major Turkish stereotypes about Euro-Turks are those of their being rich, eating pork, having a very comfortable life in Germany/France, losing their Turkishness and becoming more and more German/French.¹ Recently, Euro-Turks have complained about the paternalist approach of the Turkish state towards them. They no longer want to be perceived as being passive, obedient, subject to support or as cash machines making foreign currency for the homeland. Constituting around 4 million inhabitants in the West, they would rather be more active in Turkish-EU relations and supportive of Turkey in adapting to new EU regimes.


The number of German-Turks who either have EU citizenship or are planning to apply is around 59% in Germany (representing around 1.5 million people from a total of 2.5 million German-Turks) and 74% in France (Figure 4.10). These high numbers indicate that Euro-Turks are open to integration and political participation. The latest statistics indicate that the number of German-Turks naturalised has increased almost twofold since the year 2000, when the new citizenship law was put into force. The number of German-Turks having German citizenship was around 350,000 in 2000, which has risen to more than 700,000. The uptake from the new German citizenship law actually signifies that migrants can be quite receptive and incorporating *vis-à-vis* democratic and inclusive political and legal changes.

Figure 4.10 Do you have German/French citizenship?



Around 60% of Euro-Turks are not interested in the domestic politics of their countries of settlement. Some 20 to 25% are reported as having an interest (Figure 4.11).


Figure 4.11 To what extent are you interested in politics in Germany/France?



¹ For a detailed analysis of these labels see Kaya (2001).

Figure 4.12 indicates that German-Turks have recently become more affiliated with left-wing political parties such as the Social Democrats (27%) and the Greens (8.5%). The same trend is also visible among French-Turks (28% with the Social Democrats and 5% with the Greens). It should be mentioned here that in the early stages of the migratory process, Euro-Turks were more oriented towards conservative parties, owing to their scepticism of left-wing parties back in the homeland. This recent shift also implies that Euro-Turks are becoming more involved and reflexive in the daily politics of their countries of settlement in a way that shows they are actually very well integrated. Nevertheless, there are still great numbers of people who are not really engaged in domestic politics. The qualitative research also shows that German-Turks, for instance, are very reflexive to the latest manoeuvres of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which tries to use Turkey’s candidature as an election campaign instrument to attract the nationalist vote. Furthermore, the CDU is not considered a European entity as it reduces Europeanness to cultural and religious homogeneity in an essentialist way. What is also quite striking for both countries is that almost the same percentage of Euro-Turks are not affiliated with any German or French political party (around 53% in each country). Yet cross-tabulation clearly points out that there is a growing tendency among the younger generations towards political integration and also that the indifference to domestic politics is a highly common phenomenon among those of lower social status.

Figure 4.12 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated?



Second- and third-generation Euro-Turks overwhelmingly tend to support social democratic political parties, as indicated in Table 4.1. Green parties also attract the younger generations. But it seems that the younger generations of German-Turks are more interested in the domestic politics of their country of settlement than their French counterparts. This trend again demonstrates the fact that German-Turks are more politically integrated than French-Turks.

Table 4.1 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated? Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Birthplace		
	Turkey	Germany	France
Liberal parties	2.8	4.1	0.9
Conservative parties	2.3	3.1	0
Social democratic parties	25.1	32.9	26.6
Greens and environmentalist parties	8.0	9.0	3.7
Radical right and nationalist	1.1	0.3	0.9
Radical left and communist parties	1.7	0.7	0.9
In equal distance to all	1.1	0.3	0.9
None of the above	54.6	46.4	63.3
Total	100	100	100

The data in Table 4.2 indicate that Euro-Turks of middle and higher classes are inclined to support left-wing political parties. Those of lower social status, however, appear to be less interested in German/French domestic politics.


Table 4.2 With which political party in Germany/France are you more affiliated? Social status? (cross-tabulation)(%)

	Social status							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper middle	Middle	Lower middle	Low	Lowest	
Liberal parties	14.2	7.0	5.6	3.0	2.2	1.1	1.0	3.1
Conservative parties	3.2	4.5	3.0	3.6	1.6	1.3	1.0	2.4
Social democratic parties	36.1	35.0	29.4	29.2	27.1	20.9	20.4	27.1
Greens and environmentalist parties	17.4	17.4	9.9	8.8	6.8	5.9	3.3	8.2
Radical right and nationalist parties	0	2.0	1.8	1.3	0.5	0.5	0	0.9
Radical left and communist parties	0.6	2.8	2.8	1.2	1.6	.0	2.3	1.5
Equally distant from all	3.2	3.1	7.5	4.9	3.2	3.6	3.1	4.2
None of the above	25.2	28.3	40.0	48.0	56.9	66.7	68.9	52.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

A majority of German-Turks are not affiliated with any ethnic or religious association (61%). There may, of course, be several reasons for this. One likely reason is that over the last decade such organisations have failed to ameliorate existing problems. Recent revelations concerning incidences of corruption in religious organisations and *tariqats* have also had a great impact on the proportion of membership. Instead, Euro-Turks are a) becoming more affiliated with political parties (41%, which is a relatively high figure); b) becoming more self-centred; and c) becoming more involved in their own extended family networks. The latter is always the missing link in evaluating individualisation processes in Turkish communities.


Both groups appreciate the social security and health institutions (20% of German-Turks and 30% of French-Turks) (Figure 4.13). What is also striking is the sharp difference between German-Turks and French-Turks in terms of their appreciation of Turkish official institutions such as embassies and consulates (10% of German-Turks and 20% of French-Turks). It may also be seen below how German-Turks dislike such institutions (26%) (Figure 4.14). Again, levels of appreciation of mosques among German-Turks indicate their religiosity and communitarianism

Figure 4.13 Which institution do you trust most in Germany/France?




German-Turks primarily distrust Turkish official institutions such as embassies and consulates, whereas French-Turks dislike the media most (18%) (Figure 4.14).

Figure 4.14 Which institution do you trust least in Germany/France?




The most important problem faced by German-Turks is reported as a contradiction in moral values (26%), whereas French-Turks report that their incompetence in French language is their primary concern (18%) (Figure 4.15). The lack of French language skills among French-Turks actually seems to contradict the myth of the assimilationist republican model in France.

Figure 4.15 What is the primary problem you face in Germany/France?




Discrimination and racism seem to be the second most important problem faced by Euro-Turks in both countries (Figure 4.16).

Figure 4.16 What is the second greatest problem you face in Germany/France?



While there is a great deal of pessimism among German-Turks about the future of Germany, there is optimism among French-Turks on the future of France (Figure 4.17). This is directly related to economic limitations, deindustrialisation, unemployment and inflation in Germany.

Figure 4.17 Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Germany/France?



The results of the Eurobarometer autumn 2003 public opinion surveys held in 15 EU countries also indicate that the predictions of Euro-Turks on the future of their countries of settlement are in parallel with those of the majority societies. As the Eurobarometer results shown in Tables 4.3 through 4.6 reveal, German society is more pessimistic than French society about the future performance of their country in terms of economic, financial and employment indicators.

Table 4.3 Expectations for the year 2004: Country's employment situation (%)

	Worse	Same	Better
France	53	23	18
Germany	62	22	10

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Table 4.4 Expectations for the year 2004: Country's economic situation (%)

	Worse	Same	Better
France	52	26	17
Germany	57	25	13

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Table 4.5 Expectations for the year 2004: Household financial situation (%)

	Worse	Same	Better
France	22	46	28
Germany	34	50	11

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Table 4.6 Expectations for the year 2004: Personal job situation (%)

	Worse	Same	Better
France	10	55	25
Germany	14	63	12

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Around 39% of German-Turks and 29% of French-Turks are involved in various associations (Figure 4.18). The types of organisations they are involved in are shown in Figure 4.19. While in Germany religious associations are most preferred (45%, which is 17% of the total), the figure for French-Turks

involved in religious organisations is only 16%. Cultural centres are most preferred in France (31%). Membership of a labour union is also remarkably high in both countries (12%). It is notable however that political party membership among German-Turks (9%) is much higher than among French-Turks.

Figure 4.18 Is there any organisation of which you are a member or in which you are involved?





Figure 4.19 What kind of organisations are you involved in or are you a member of?



The cross-tabulation in Table 4.7 shows that those born in France (27%) have fewer tendencies to be engaged in any kind of association. Conversely, 39% of those born in Germany are more involved in associations and civil society organisations.

Table 4.7 What kind of organisation are you involved in or are you a member of? Place of birth? (cross-tabulation) (%)


Membership	Place of Birth?			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
No	62.2	61.3	73.4	62.2
Yes	37.8	38.7	26.6	37.8
Total	100	100	100	100

Images in comparison: Homeland and 'host-land'

The data below reveal that Euro-Turks no longer essentialise their homeland as a place of eventual return. Instead, both Turkey and Germany/France have various advantages and disadvantages for them. When asked, they are quite objective in stating which place is better in terms of various factors such as human rights, democracy, education, tolerance, values and job opportunities.

Approximately 49% of German-Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 22% with Germany and 27% with both countries (Figure 4.20). On the other hand, 36% of the French-Turks affiliate more with Turkey, 25% with France and 36% with both countries. The reasons behind German-Turks' low affiliation with Germany may be manifold, but the economic crisis seems to be one of the main reasons. Affiliation with the homeland, on the other hand, may result from either structural outsiderism as in the German case or assimilationist integration as in the French case. Both outsiderism and assimilation may lead to the construction of communal networks having defensive, nationalist, religious, laicist, Kemalist or even Kurdish undertones.

Figure 4.20 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey?



The percentage of those who affiliate equally with both countries is remarkably high: 27% in Germany and 36% in France. These groups seem to form the bridge between Turkey and the European Union as they have constructed more reflexive, active, transnational, post-national, universalist and cosmopolitan identities. These groups generally come from those born in Germany/France. On the other hand, those who have assimilated amount to 22% in Germany and 25% in France. The data indicate that Turks no longer essentialise their homeland and they actually challenge the *gurbetçi* discourse common among the Turks in Turkey. They are no longer *gurbetçi*; they have already become active social agents in their new countries. They have actually accommodated themselves in the transnational space bridging the two countries, homeland and host-land.

Table 4.8 indicates that Euro-Turks of second and third generations are either equally affiliated with both countries or more affiliated with their country of settlement. Hence, the younger generations are more integrated into Germany/France than the older generations. The fact that the younger generations are equally affiliated with both homeland and the receiving country highlights the premise of this research. The younger generations form a bridge between Turkey and the EU. It is striking to see that less than 25% of young generations in both countries are reported to be more affiliated with Turkey.

Table 4.8 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey?
Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Birthplace		
	Turkey	Germany	France
Turkey	55.5	25.0	22.9
Germany/France	17.7	35.2	30.3
Equal affiliation to both	24.2	37.0	43.1
Equal detachment from both	2.5	2.7	3.7
Total	100	100	100

Table 4.9 shows that middle- and upper-class Euro-Turks are either more affiliated with Germany/France or equally affiliated with their homeland and the country of settlement, whereas the lower classes are reported as being more affiliated with Turkey.

Table 4.9 To which do you feel more affiliated, Germany/France or Turkey? Social status? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Social status							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Low	Lowest	
Turkey	34.0	34.2	45.3	42.6	47.2	54.1	65.7	47.2
Germany/France	29.5	21.8	19.5	22.9	25.6	21.0	14.3	22.3
Equal affiliation to both	35.9	39.5	32.8	32.1	24.2	22.8	16.7	27.8
Equal detachment from both	0.6	4.5	2.4	2.4	3.0	2.0	3.3	2.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The interviewees were asked to compare the homeland and the host-land in terms of 14 different topics (the order of the answers are in line with the highest scores addressing Germany). The findings in Table 4.10 indicate that Euro-Turks generally favour their host-lands as far as the health care and social security system, respecting rules, pursuing rights, democracy and human rights, job opportunities, the judiciary system, valuing human capital, equal treatment, attitudes of the police and a comfortable life are concerned. Turkey is reported as having great defects in these areas. In terms of respecting cultures and religions, however, Germany's liberal multicultural structure is more appreciated than the republican and laicist structure of both Turkey and France.

Table 4.10 Which country is better? (%)

	German-Turks		French-Turks	
	Turkey	Germany	Turkey	France
Health care and social security systems	1.3	96.0	0.5	96.3
Respecting rules	3.5	88.2	10.3	70.0
Pursuit of rights	1.8	87.1	3.2	80.5
Democracy and human rights	2.6	86.4	4.0	78.5
Job opportunities	3.3	77.4	2.5	85.0
Educational system	7.4	77.3	9.2	72.2
Efficiency of the judiciary system	2.5	77.3	4.8	61.5
Valuing human capital	7.4	74.8	6.7	77.8
Equal treatment for all	3.6	71.8	7.0	61.3
Attitudes of police	6.0	66.3	10.2	51.0
Comfortable and easy life	28.3	51.6	24.7	49.0
Respecting cultures and religions	25.6	48.5	34.0	34.3
Mutual tolerance	42.9	37.2	41.5	33.5
Moral social values	56.0	19.9	43.0	33.5

Source: Own data (see Annex).

There are only two areas of life remaining where Turkey has an advantage compared with the other two countries: mutual tolerance and moral social values. Cultural differences among which sexual

freedom, gender relations, warmth, hospitality, frankness and respect for the elderly come to the fore. The point to emphasise here is the big difference between Germany and France with regard to moral social values. Germany is reported to be more problematic in terms of moral concerns compared with France. The emphasis on cultural differences seems to be one of the factors giving rise to the emergence of the community support networks in both Germany and France. This doesn't mean of course that cultural differences are the only reason for closed community formations. Exclusionary, formal state practices in Germany until the late 1980s and assimilationist republican policies in France have brought about similar consequences in terms of the creation of ethnic enclaves and closed diasporic groups. Recent policy changes in Germany with respect to more democratic and inclusive citizenship laws seem to have created a shift in the attitudes of German-Turks towards integration and interaction with the majority society. Furthermore, integrationist republican policies are lately being reported by the French-Turks as leading to assimilation and loss of differences. Another explanation for the remarkable difference between German-Turks and French-Turks with regard to the ways in which they problematise the depreciation of moral values in their countries of settlement is the high level of poverty and unemployment, which prompts people to invest more in culture, religion, ethnicity, the past, and norms and values.

Policies of citizenship: Integration/assimilation

German and French forms of statecraft are significantly different when compared. The French form of statecraft springs from the Enlightenment tradition, based on the *material civilisational idea*, which sought to impose Western universalist ideals on remote lands. This tradition was colonial in the sense that it was determined to constitute a homogenous and monolithic world political culture based on Western values: namely fraternity, liberty and equality. The German form of statecraft comes from the anti-Enlightenment idea of *Aufklärung*, which rather emphasised the romantic culture idea of perceiving all cultures as equal to each other. Thus, the two alternative models of statecraft are different from each other: on the one hand, there is the French *civilisationist* project tracing its roots back to Enlightenment philosophers such as J.-J. Rousseau and C.L. Montesquieu; and on the other, there is the German *culturalist* project tracing its roots back to J.G. Herder. This differentiation is a great aid in understanding and comparing the nationhood, citizenship, immigration, integration and assimilation regimes of both countries. Roger Brubaker's work entitled *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992) is based very much on such a differentiation:

If the French understanding of nationhood has been *state-centred* and *assimilationist*, the German understanding has been *Volk-centred* and *differentialist*. Since national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular *Volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact (Brubaker, 1992, p. 1).

Comparisons between the two countries' understandings of nationhood go back to the early 19th century. They were first formulated by German intellectuals who sought to distance themselves from the allegedly shallow rationalism and cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution through a historicist celebration of cultural pluralism (Brubaker, 1992). Brubaker also states that French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood may be stigmatised by conceptual dualities such as universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, Enlightenment rationalism and romantic irrationalism, assimilationist and differentialist, civilisational and cultural, political and ethnocultural. When it comes to migrants, Brubaker praises the French politics of citizenship owing to its universalist and inclusive nature, which easily moulds migrants into citizens. He implicitly condemns German politics of citizenship as it has a particularist and exclusive nature making settlers, but not citizens, of migrants.

But things have changed dramatically since Brubaker wrote his ground-breaking piece. Those countries that were known to have inclusive, democratic and universalist incorporation regimes *vis-à-vis* migrants have turned out to be more restrictive and exclusive. England, the US, Ireland and

Holland are some examples that have adopted a restrictive citizenship regime and giving up the *jus soli* principle in granting citizenship to migrants. On the other hand, Germany, known as differentialist, particularist, culturalist, ethno-nationalist and exclusive in terms of citizenship policies, has become more democratic and inclusive since the year 2000. The data gathered in this research indicates that Brubaker's statements concerning the citizenship regimes of the two countries no longer pertain to the reality of the situation.

Dominant discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and pluralism in Germany have recently led German-Turks to represent themselves with their own cultural identities in the public space. Such popular discourses, reinforced by the Social Democratic and Green policies, have also resulted in the political, economic and cultural integration of German-Turks into all spheres of life. The numbers of parliamentarians of Turkish origin in local and national parliament as well as at the EU level indicate that German-Turks integrate politically into their host-society. Further, the visibility of German-Turks in the cultural sphere also demonstrates that Turks integrate culturally and the rising amount of investment in the domestic economy by the German-Turks is proof that Turks are able to integrate economically as well.

These facts actually contradict the stereotypical belief in Germany that Turks do not integrate. On the contrary, Turks are integrated throughout German political, economic and cultural ways of life. This may be a result of the culturally differentialist features of incorporation policies in Germany or of the existence of the large Turkish population in the country. It is likely, however, that it is the Social Democrat-Green coalition government (in power since 1998) that has had the greatest impact in democratising immigration and integration policies in a way that has changed Germany from a *segregationist* country into an *integrationist* country.

The French form of the republican ideal of integration is said to resemble assimilation: a citizenship model to assimilate those arriving into the French civilisational project through language, laicism, modernism, state-centrism, Western-centric universalism and rationalism. While cultural diversity is usually undermined, citizenship is underlined. Thus, politically defined citizenship has always had a primary place over culture-specific nationality. The dominance of citizenship over nationality, of political over ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood, is perhaps best expressed in J.L. Tallien's remark in the spring of 1975: "the only foreigners in France are bad citizens" (cited in Azimi, 1988, p. 702). Moreover, civilisational discourse has always been implicitly embedded in the French republican model. Integration refers to the acculturation of foreigners. Acculturation in this respect means Franco-conformity. According to Tribalat (2002), the major weakness of the 'French melting pot' resides in its difficulty in producing professional and social mobility, a phenomenon that involves the whole of society, but which is more difficult for populations of foreign origin. One should not forget that around 80% of young people with immigrant roots aged between 20 and 29 are children of workers, i.e. almost twice that of young native French.

Gordon (1964, p. 71) identifies seven types of assimilation/integration:

- 1) cultural or behavioural assimilation (acculturation);
- 2) structural assimilation, which involves entrance into organisations and institutions of the host society at the primary group level;
- 3) marital assimilation (amalgamation);
- 4) identity assimilation (creation of a sense of people-hood at a societal level);
- 5) attitude receptional assimilation (absence of prejudice);
- 6) behavioural receptional assimilation (absence of discrimination); and
- 7) civic assimilation (generating a shared identity of citizenship).

According to Gordon, structural assimilation is the most essential of all. Once it occurs, all others inevitably follow. Table 4.11 displays the form of assimilation/integration in France and Germany as far as Euro-Turks are concerned.

Table 4.11 Form of assimilation/integration in both countries

	Germany	France
Cultural or behavioural assimilation	–	X
Structural assimilation	X	–
Marital assimilation	–	–
Identity assimilation	X	X
Attitude receptional assimilation	–	–
Behavioural receptional assimilation	–	X
Civic assimilation	X	X

Source: Own data (see Annex).

‘Unity-in-diversity’ or ‘unity-over-diversity’?

Recently, several political philosophers have tried to provide some conceptual and philosophical tools in order to lay out a framework around the discussions on diversity. Will Kymlicka (1995), a liberal-communitarian, has attempted in his work to combine ideas of liberal democratic principles as a foundation for a cohesive societal structure (unity) with recognition of communitarian rights for cultural minorities (diversity) within the multinational state (unity-in-diversity). Kymlicka claims that collective rights for minority groups do not contradict a liberal notion of politics – indeed they are pivotal for enabling individual freedoms for the members of the minority group in question (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 46).

On the other hand, Brian Barry, a republican, warns the reader about the cleavages springing from a multiculturalist approach, since respect for diversity threatens the unity necessary for promoting equal distribution among citizens. This issue is not wholly an economic one, but also one of distributing equal rights. Barry (2001) points out the negative consequences of Kymlicka's emphasis on ‘group rights’ when it comes to sectarian religious groups. He argues that these could never be granted group-specific rights, if the (liberal) state is to remain true to its ideal of impartiality and neutrality (Barry, 2001, p. 165). Barry’s priorities lie in the rule of the majority with respect for individual rights over the principles of group-centred multiculturalism, a position that can be described as a kind of unity-over-diversity.

The positions stated above (liberal-communitarian and republican) are the political stances most debated with regard to the management of cultural diversities in the context of nation-states. There is not, however, sufficient discussion concerning the management of cultural, ethnic, national, religious or civilisational diversity within the European Union. Recently, some attempts have been made within the European Commission at creating possible scenarios for the future. These scenarios have lately emerged with the circulation of such notions in public as unity-in-diversity, a Europe of regions, cultural diversity, diversity and European Union citizenship. It should also be stated here that the Commission seems to favour a Kymlickan unity-in-diversity position in order to manage all sorts of diversities. On the other hand, the data actually indicate that the contemporary German model of integration formulated by the Red-Green coalition government complies with the discourse of unity-in-diversity, and that the French model is more in line with the homogenising discourse of unity-over-diversity.

Habitats of meaning for Euro-Turks

It is a common belief that Euro-Turks do not have enough interest in the media of their countries of settlement and that they are rather involved in the Turkish media. Yet our research presents a different picture. Euro-Turks, generally speaking, are quite attentive to the media of their new destinations and widely follow German/French television channels and newspapers. Our data show that 45% of German-Turks watch German television channels every day, while 55.5% of French-Turks do the same. Around 28% of German-Turks either never or rarely watch German television channels, while

this amount is 17% for French-Turks. It is also important to point out that approximately 54% of German-Turks and 35% of French-Turks frequently use the Internet. More than half of German-Turks seem to be engaged in Internet activity while less than one-third of French-Turks are. It should also be pointed out that almost 25% of German-Turks report that they use the Internet almost every day, while only 14% of the French-Turks are reported to have access to it on a daily basis (see the related data at the end of the Annex).

The development of telecommunication technology has made possible the reception of almost all Turkish television channels and newspapers in European Union countries. Turkish media in Berlin have achieved a remarkable cultural hegemony throughout the Turkish diaspora. To understand this, one has to examine the rising interest of the Turkish media industry among the Turkish population living in both countries as well as in several others. The major Turkish television channels all have their own European units that create special programmes for Turks living in Europe. TRT International (a state channel) was the first of these channels. The other channels are Euro Show, Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7 and Lig TV. With the exception of TRT Int., all of these television channels may be received through satellite antennas. Further, TRT International is already available on cable.

The programme spectra of all these channels differ greatly. The state channel TRT International tends to mainly give equal weight to entertainment, education, movies and news. Since it is a state-owned enterprise, it tries to promote the 'indispensable unity of the Turkish nation' by arranging, for instance, fundraising campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the south eastern region of Turkey. There are also many programmes concentrating on the problems of Euro-Turks. This channel is widely received in Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the lives of Euro-Turks, mainly German-Turks, while connecting modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland.

Television channels such as Euro Show, Euro D and Euro Star are private, broadcasting secular-based programmes. The majority of the programmes are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy programmes, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sports programmes, 'reality' shows and news. On the other hand, TGRT and Kanal 7 are religious-based channels. Besides the actual programmes, these channels give priority to dramas and movies with religious themes. Traditional Turkish folk music programmes are also prominent in the programming of these two channels. Satel is another channel broadcasting the Turkish and European pop charts. It is the favourite channel of Turkish youngsters who have a satellite connection. Lig TV is a pay channel, broadcasting the Turkish premier league football matches.

Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also circulated in Germany and France. Journals such as *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Evrensel* are some of the Turkish papers that are printed in Germany. Also available are many other sports and tabloid-style papers from Turkey. Although the content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of news about the homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish diasporic communities in Europe.

The Turkish media partly shape the 'habitats of meaning' of the Euro-Turks.² They attempt to provide a stream of programmes considered as suitable to the habitats of meaning of the diasporic subject. For instance, German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist cultural change. This perception is the main rationale behind the selection of movies and dramas in their programming. A great number of the movies on each channel are old Turkish films that were produced in the late 1960s and 1970s.³ The broadcasting of these films, which touch upon some of the

² The notion of 'habitats of meaning' belongs to Ulf Hannerz (1996). Hannerz has developed the notion in relation to the co-existence of local and global habitats at once. TV and print media have an important impact on the formation of our habitats of meaning. Just as some people may share much the same habitats of meaning in the global ecumene, others may have rather distinct and localised habitats of meaning.

³ The Turkish film industry produced a vast number of films until the early 1980s, prior to the hegemony of the American film industry over the world market.

traditional issues in Turkish culture such as Anatolian feudalism, blood feuds, migration (*gurbet*), ill-starred romance and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora.

As Foucault noted, such films attempt to “re-programme popular memory” and to recover “lost, unheard memories” that had been denied or buried by the dominant representations of the past experienced in the diaspora (quoted in Morley & Robins, 1993, p. 10). Hence, identity is also a question of memory and memories of home in particular (Morley & Robins, 1993, p. 10). Before the private television channels began operating, it was the video industry that provided the Turkish community outside of Turkey with the opportunity to view these films.⁴

The Turkish media seems to contribute to the reproduction of traditions, values and discourses brought from the homeland at the beginning of the migration process, as the programmes have been produced mostly by those who do not have an insight into the current conditions of Euro-Turks. Recently, however, there have been some new initiatives by local Euro-Turks to run private television channels and radio stations. Some of these include Aypa TV, TD1 and Radio Metropol in Berlin, which are operated by local Euro-Turks who are better equipped to understand the social, political and economic context of their communities.⁵

⁴ J. Knight (1986) states that 80% of German-Turks used to watch Turkish videos daily.

⁵ For a more detailed account of the various local television channels run by the German-Turks, see Kosnick (2004).

Chapter 5

Europe and the European Union

Alternative projects of Europe: A holistic Europe or a syncretic Europe?

There are at least two definitions of Europe and the European Union. The first is that proposed by the conservatives, which defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic,¹ essentialist and culturally prescribed entity. The second is that proposed by the Social Democrats, liberals, socialists and Greens, which emphasises the understanding that ‘Europe’ is a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and non-essentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a *cultural* project, the latter definition welcomes a *political* project embracing cultural and religious differences, including Islam. This must be one of the explanations why the inclusive and responsible acts of the Social Democrats and Greens in Germany and France are well received by German-Turks.

Accordingly, the conservative *holistic* idea aims at building a culturally prescribed Europe based on Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the ancient Greek and Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. A holistic Europe does not intend to include any other culture or religion outside this European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. That is why Angela Merkel (CDU leader in Germany) and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union (Poland and Slovakia) both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitutional Treaty regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, the progressive *syncretic* idea proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity and xenophilia as illustrated in Table 5.1 below. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote co-existence with Turkey and Islam and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace project. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder are some of the leaders emphasising the secular character of the EU. Surprisingly enough, the cultural EU project complies with the latest republican idea of unity-over-diversity in a way that denies heterogeneity and opposes the potential of the project as a peace project. Nevertheless, the political EU project goes along with the idea of unity-in-diversity, aiming at constructing a meta-European identity embracing cultural and religious differences. Hence, the perspectives of the Euro-Turks on the EU should be assessed in line with these two antithetical paradigms on Europe. The data indicate that the Euro-Turks’ views foster the progressive ideal of a political Europe embracing diversity.

Table 5.1 Alternate projects for Europe and their characteristics

Syncretic Europe	Holistic Europe
Dynamic	Static
Secular	Religious
Societal	Communal
Post-national	Multinational
Economic	Economic
Political	Cultural
Syncretic culture	Holistic culture
Post-civilisational	Civilisational
Prospective towards the future	Retrospective
Non-essentialist	Essentialist
Xenophile	Xenophobic
Political geography	Physical geography


¹ In anthropological terms, there are two principal notions of culture. The first one is the holistic notion of culture and the second is the syncretic notion of culture. The former considers culture a highly integrated and grasped static ‘whole’. This is the dominant paradigm of classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality are the main characteristics. The latter notion is the one that is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by contemporary scholars to demonstrate the fact that cultures emerge through mixing beyond the political and geographical territories (Kaya, 2001, p. 33).

Euro-Turks' perspectives on the EU

Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and structured interviews show that Euro-Turks are in favour of Turkey's participation in the EU, although there are also a remarkable number of people who are against it.

While around 48% of German-Turks and 64% of French-Turks regard the EU as an economic integration, 21% of German-Turks and 11% of French-Turks regard it as a Christian club (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 What does the European Union mean to you?



The results of the 2003 Eurobarometer public opinion surveys also indicate that both Germans and the French give priority to economic and financial aspects in defining the meaning of the EU (Table 5.2). It is apparent that the euro has the greatest impact on both communities in one way or another, with the second most influential characteristic being freedom of movement.


Table 5.2 The three most common replies as to what the EU means personally to EU citizens (%)

Germany		France	
The euro	56	The euro	57
Freedom of movement	51	Freedom of movement	52
Peace	46	Cultural diversity	39

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Generally speaking, Euro-Turks are positive about the EU (Figure 5.2). Approximately 32% of German-Turks and 54% of French-Turks are in favour of the EU idea; around 28% of German-Turks and 17% of French-Turks are not in favour. Notably, 29% of German-Turks and 23% of French-Turks have mixed feelings about it. Those German-Turks who are negative about the EU are likely to think that the EU has gained a lot from Germany's prosperity (in other words from their prosperity). On the other hand, those French-Turks who are positive about the EU are likely to think that the EU has given them more prosperity. This observation is also confirmed by the fact that 6% of German-Turks are supportive of the euro, while 25% of French-Turks support it.

Figure 5.2 To what extent you are either positive or negative about the EU?



The results of the Eurobarometer 2003 survey correlate with our findings about Euro-Turks (Table 5.3). Both communities have a rather positive image of the EU. It is interesting to note, however, that French-Turks (16%) are less negative about the EU than the French (21%) and German-Turks (28%) are more negative than the Germans (16%).


Table 5.3 Image of the European Union (%)

	Fairly to very negative	Neutral	Fairly to very positive
France	21	31	45
Germany	16	38	39

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

The general trend is that Euro-Turks are in favour of Turkey’s entry into the Union (Figure 5.3); however, this tendency is clearer in France (57%) than in Germany (31%).

Figure 5.3 To what extent do you support Turkey’s membership of the EU?



Eurobarometer results indicate that Germany and France are among the nations that least favour enlargement in general (Table 5.4). Germans are more in favour of enlargement compared with the French.

Table 5.4 Enlargement: For or against? (%)

Enlargement	For	Against
Germany	38	42
France	34	55

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

The interviewees were asked what the EU meant to them and given various items to comment upon (Figure 5.4). Both German-Turks and French-Turks gave similar answers to the following questions:

- Turkey’s entrance into the EU does not really result in a division in the country (53% of German-Turks and 58% of French-Turks);
- it would not result in the end of independence (52% of German-Turks and 58% of French-Turks);
- membership would bring more democracy to Turkey (63% of German-Turks and 67% of French-Turks);
- membership would improve the implementation of human rights (70% of German-Turks and 79% of French-Turks); and finally,
- Turkey’s membership would result in migration flows from Turkey to European Union member states (71% of German-Turks and 69% of French-Turks).

On the other hand, there is a big discrepancy between German-Turks and French-Turks when they were asked to respond to the following questions about the impact of Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU:

- membership will cause moral breakdown in Turkey (52% of German-Turks and 36% of French-Turks);
- membership will bring about the exploitation of Turkey (52% of German-Turks and 34% of French-Turks); and
- membership will increase job opportunities (61% of German-Turks and 83% of French-Turks).

These figures reveal that French-Turks seem to be more in favour of Turkey’s membership in European Union and that they have fewer cultural, moral or communal concerns about it than German-Turks.

Figure 5.4 What does Turkey’s EU membership mean to you?




Figure 5.5 and Table 5.5 compare the views of Euro-Turks and Turks on the assumption that full membership of the European Union may result in division within Turkey. Some 54% of Euro-Turks clearly indicate their disagreement with such an assumption, compared with only 28% of Turks do likewise.

Figure 5.5 Will the EU divide Turkey?





Table 5.5 Will full membership to the EU cause division in Turkey? (%)

	Turkey
Yes	19
No	28
Neutral	39
No response	14
Total	100

Source: Yilmaz (2004).

With regard to the attitude of Euro-Turks to the euro, the results of the Eurobarometer surveys also correlate with the results of our research. The attitude of German-Turks is identical to that of Germans, and the French-Turks' attitude is also identical to that of the French. Hence, the orientation of Euro-Turks to the euro is parallel with their country-fellows (Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6).

Figure 5.6 To what extent you are positive or negative about the euro?*Table 5.6 The euro: For or against? (%)*

Euro?	For	Against
Germany	60	33
France	68	28

Source: Eurobarometer (2003).

Figures 5.7 and 5.8 also indicate the perceptions of the interlocutors about the positive and negative effects Euro-Turks have on the host-land. While a great proportion of people in Germany feel that Turks represent cultural richness and a labour force, a relatively lower proportion believe that Turks have a negative impact because of their disregard for rules, closed community formations and distinct values. The interviewees commonly believe that Euro-Turks primarily provide European countries with a labour force, followed by contributions such as “cultural richness”, “job opportunities” and “familial and moral values”.

What is remarkably different between German-Turks and French-Turks is that German-Turks place emphasis on symbolic contributions such as culture (53%) and moral values (32%) and the French-Turks give priority to material contributions such as the labour force (73%) and job opportunities (42%). The percentage of those who believe that Turks make no contribution is relatively low (4 to 5%).

Figure 5.7 What kind of positive influences do the Turks have on the host society (multi-response)?





Figure 5.8 What kind of negative influences do the Turks have on the host society (multi-response)?



Comparing the two figures above, we see that Euro-Turks believe their positive influence is greater than their negative influence. Approximately 32% of French-Turks and 25% of German-Turks believe that Turks have no negative impact on the host societies. Some 36% of German-Turks state that Turks generally do not obey rules and 25% believe that Turks misuse the social security system. Misuse of the social security system was one of the most debated issues by the young generation of German-Turks in the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In parallel with the misuse of the social security system, 24% of German-Turks reported that Turks are inclined to be lazy. On the other hand, the lack of ability to adapt to local values (33%) and the tendency to construct ethnic enclaves (33%) are the issues raised most by French-Turks in explaining the negative impact of the Turks. The ways in which different issues have been phrased by German-Turks and French-Turks are also subject to the separate incorporation regimes applied by Germany and France *vis-à-vis* the migrants. The issue of constructing ethnic enclaves and communities raised by the French-Turks seems to be strongly linked to the sensitivity of the republican state tradition about homogeneity and difference-blindness. In contemporary Germany, however, the liberal democratic regime's recognition of differences means that ethnic and cultural enclaves are not problematised to the extent they are in France.


Apparently, Euro-Turks have gained much credit in terms of developing a democratic political culture that highlights human rights, democratisation, participation and reflexivity, the rule of law, rights, equality and trust. What is different in this picture compared with the picture in Turkey is that they have generated a rights-specific rather than a duty-specific political culture. Answers given to questions comparing rights, educational systems, police, democracy, human rights, social security systems, job opportunities, legal systems, respect for rules and regulations, human capital value, equality, freedom of faith and cultural dialogue indicate that Germany and France are considered much more democratic than Turkey. All these answers, depicting the drastic differences between

Germany/France and Turkey, clearly reveal deep-rooted democratic institutions and a high level of democracy in Germany/France. Yet Turkey comes to the fore positively when interviewees were asked questions about mutual tolerance and moral values.

EU membership and migration prospects for Turks


One of the most commonly expressed concerns regarding Turkey’s membership of the Union is the possibility of huge migration from Turkey to EU countries. Nevertheless, our qualitative and quantitative research reveals a contrasting picture. In the first place, the interlocutors we interviewed in the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and structured interviews stated that they would not recommend that Turks in Turkey migrate to EU countries if Turkey were to enter the Union (79%). The reasons cited were the difficulties they face in the EU: rising unemployment, homesickness, low wages, disciplined working conditions, lack of tolerance and depreciation of moral values (Figure 5.9). Nevertheless, there is a strong belief among the interlocutors that huge migration from Turkey to EU countries would occur, echoing a commonly held belief in the EU. Hence, the experiences of Euro-Turks should be clearly communicated to Turks in Turkey. On the other hand, previous experience from the integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece to the Union did not result in great flows of migration. In these cases, even reverse migration occurred.

Figure 5.9 Would you recommend immigrating to Germany/France to those in Turkey?



It seems that the same kind of reverse migration could occur in the Turkish case. Around 30% of Euro-Turks reported that they would consider returning to Turkey if it were to join the Union (Figure 5.10). This is an important challenge to the stereotypical judgment mentioned above. Furthermore, Euro-Turks do not recommend other Turks to migrate to the West (80% of German-Turks and 61% of French-Turks).

Figure 5.10 Would you consider returning to Turkey if it joins the EU?



Chapter 6

Building New Identities

'European': A constant process of being and becoming

Both the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in our research point to the fact that a concrete understanding of being European does not exist among the Euro-Turks. Further, the same observation may be made with regard to the receiving societies. There is no doubt that a deep-rooted sense of being European does not exist either among the majority of the public and actually an identity is ideologically being gradually constructed by the political elite of the European Union through education, European citizenship, and common history and future. The EU has clearly displayed a stronger political unity since the publication of the Tindemans Report on the European Union 1975 (Leo Tindemans was Belgian Prime Minister at that time), which was submitted to the European Council at the end of December 1975. The report prompted member states to form a unified political entity with its own flag, anthem, myths, memories, peoples, regions, and rights and duties granted to citizens of the Union.¹

The definition of a European is also dependent on class differences among the Euro-Turks. When members of the working class are asked about the term, their definitions usually accord with the dominant discourse in Turkey. These definitions include notions such as values, democracy, equality, human rights and modernisation in creating the main framework of 'Europeanness'. Thus, being 'European' addresses a teleological project that emphasises constant progress towards a target to be reached.

On the other hand, some of the Euro-Turks among the middle classes state that they are not concerned with being defined as European, since they are already experiencing such an identity without the need to reach any prospective target. Those who engage in such a discourse are third- or fourth-generation youth (or both), mostly born in the country of settlement. Actually, the first and second generation among the middle-classes reproduce the dominant discourse in Turkey. But, the third- and fourth-generation youngsters have developed a cosmopolitan identity that underlines differences, diversity and citizenship.

A separate note is needed here to briefly summarise various discourses developed by the Euro-Turks in a retrospective way. Those first-generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed a discourse revolving around economic issues. The second generation in the 1980s generated an ideological and political discourse originating from issues related to the homeland. Finally, third-generation Euro-Turks have, since the 1990s, developed a culture-specific discourse – which stresses intercultural dialogue, symbolic and cultural capital, diversity, tolerance and multiculturalism.

A final distinction between the middle class and the working class with regard to the definition of a European is that the middle class in general equates the attributes of being European with science, scientific thought, reason, trust, rules and rights. The working class associates it with qualities such as justice, law and equality.

The data shown in Figure 6.1 reveals that Euro-Turks themselves confirm their hyphenated identities (Euro-Turks), amounting to 60% in Germany and 70% in France. Around 60% of German-Turks define themselves as either Turkish-European (50%) or European-Turkish (10%). Among the Euro-Turks in France this ratio is 59% (Turkish-European) and 10% (European-Turkish). On the other hand, 37% of German-Turks and 24% of French-Turks define themselves as 'Turkish'. These findings differ from the survey findings discussed by H. Yılmaz (Bosphorus University) in his recent work entitled *Euroscepticism in Turkey* (2004).

¹ For a detailed account of the Tindemans report, see Tindemans (1975); see also Maas (2004).

Figure 6.1 Which identifications suit you most?




Table 6.1 indicates that young Euro-Turks primarily identify themselves with hyphenated identities such as European-Turkish or Turkish-European (75% in Germany and 85% in France).

Table 6.1 Which identification suits you most? Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
Only Turkish	39.9	24.3	13.8	35.5
First Turkish and then European	48.2	57.5	60.6	50.7
First European and then Turkish	7.7	13.5	22.9	9.4
Only European	3.5	4.5	0.9	3.7
No reply	0.4	0.3	0.9	0.4
None of the above	0.1	0	0.9	0.1
Total	100	100	100	100

The data in Table 6.2 show that Euro-Turks of higher social status stick to the hyphenated identities underlining the European element. On the other hand, those of lower social status underline their Turkishness.

Table 6.2 Which identification suits you most? Social status? (cross-tabulation)(%)

	Social status							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Low	Lowest	
Only Turkish	17.9	17.3	25.5	32.1	36.0	42.6	63.6	35.5
First Turkish and then European	59.6	63.1	58.0	52.8	51.9	42.8	32.9	50.7
First European and then Turkish	14.7	17.3	10.9	9.6	10.1	7.9	1.4	9.5
Only European	7.1	1.7	4.9	4.6	1.9	6.1	2.1	3.8
No reply	0	0	0.1	0.9	0.1	0.6	0	0.4
None of the above	0.6	0.3	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6.3 is comprised of the results of three different pieces of research undertaken in 2003 and 2004. The research on Euroscepticism in Turkey done by H. Yılmaz (2004) indicates that 54% of Turks in Turkey identify themselves as only Turkish, 30% as first Turkish-European, 5% as European-Turkish and 4% as European. Eurobarometer surveys imply that 38% of Germans and 35% of the French

identify themselves with their nationality, while around 60% of both Germans and the French identify themselves with hyphenated identities such as German- or French-European or European-German or -French. Euro-Turks do not differ from their fellows in terms of their hyphenated identities underlining the European element.


Table 6.3 European and national identity

Identity	Nationality	First nationality and then European	First European and then nationality	Only European
Germans ^a	38	45	10	4
German-Turks ^c	37	50	9	4
Turks ^b	54	30	5	4
France ^a	35	50	9	3
French-Turks ^c	24	59	11	4

Sources: a) Eurobarometer (2003); b) Yilmaz (2004); c) own data.

The sum of those defining themselves as German citizens, German-Turks, world citizens and EU citizens is actually quite high (27%) (Figure 6.2). This goes up to 47% among the French-Turks. The difference between those defining themselves as either German-Turks or French-Turks is worth mentioning here. Some 7% define themselves as German-Turks and 18% define themselves as French-Turks. This is probably because of the definitions of a German or a French person. While being German is considered to be an ethnic nomination, being French is defined as a civic nomination that allows the inclusion of outsiders. Among the French-Turks civic identities are more emphasised (36% as Turkish citizens). This is around 24% for German-Turks. Figure 6.2 shows again that such definitions are subject to the dominant regimes of definitions by the majority constraints.

Figure 6.2 Which one of the identities below defines you most (multi-response)?



Euro-Islam: Symbolic religiosity

Islamic diasporic groups in the West, alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West, no longer invent local futures; what is different about them is that they remain tied to their traditional pasts, religions and ethnicities. Remaking or recovering the past serves at least a dual purpose for the diasporic communities. First, it is a way of coping with the conditions of the present without being very critical of the status quo. Second, it also helps to recuperate a sense of self not dependent on criteria handed down by others – the diasporic subjects can claim the past as their own. Hence, their growing affiliation with Islam, culture, authenticity, ethnicity, nationalism and

tradition provides Euro-Turks or Euro-Muslims with the opportunity to establish solidarity networks. Such networks are bulwarks against the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism, industrialism, racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. Accordingly, the Islamic revival emerges as a symptom – the outcome of certain processes of structural outsiderism.

Islam is, by and large, considered and represented as a threat to the European way of life in the West. It is frequently believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the source of the xenophobic, racist and violent attitudes present. On the contrary, one of the main premises of this research is that religious resurgence is a symptom of illnesses brought about by various structural constraints such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion and sometimes assimilation. If so, then in order to tackle such constraints, discourse on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and the past becomes essential for minorities in general and migrant groups in particular. This is actually a form of politics generated by outsider groups.

According to Alistair MacIntyre (1971) there are two forms of politics: the *politics of those within* and the *politics of those excluded*. Those *within* tend to employ legitimate political institutions (such as parliament, political parties and the media) in pursuing their goals and those *excluded* use culture, ethnicity, religion and tradition to pursue their aims. It should be noted here that MacIntyre does not place culture in the private space; culture is rather inherently located in the public space. Thus, the quest for identity, authenticity and religiosity should not be reduced to an attempt to essentialise the so-called ‘purity’. It is a form of politics generated by subordinated subjects.

The intervention of Herbert Gans (1979) on the rise of symbolic ethnicity and religiosity is quite explanatory in this regard. According to Gans, symbolic ethnicity and religiosity are available to those who want to sporadically feel ethnic or religious, without being forced to act ethnically or religiously. The stress on ethnicity and religion is usually something adopted from parental culture as a part of negotiation with the majority society. The way the Euro-Turks employ ethnicity and religion as a source of identity is quite removed from being essentialist. This is a form of what Gans (1979, p. 6) calls ‘symbolic ethnicity’ or symbolic religiosity:


[A]s the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic [and religious], ethnicity [and religiosity] take on an expressive rather than instrumental function in people’s lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family life. Expressive behaviour can take many forms, but often involves the use of symbols – the symbols as signs rather than myths. Ethnic symbols are frequently individual cultural practices that are taken from the older ethnic culture; they are abstracted from that culture and pulled out of its original mooring, so to speak to become stand-ins for it.

Recently, some Islamic-oriented movements (such as the *Cojepiennes* based in Strasbourg), have shown a determination to adapt to the Western way of life with their own identities. Such modern interpretations of Islam prove that Islam does not actually pose a threat to Western values; its main concern is actually to incorporate itself into the mainstream.

Furthermore, Euro-Turks have raised concerns about so many elderly persons passing away last summer owing to the extraordinary heat that prevailed in both countries. Their common argument about the mortalities is that contemporary Western societies lack some essential values such as solidarity, respect for the elderly, family and warmth. They make it clear that Euro-Turks still maintain such values, which contributes to their difference *vis-à-vis* the majority societies in Germany and France.


Both German-Turks and French-Turks define themselves with similar religious affiliations (Figure 6.3). The fact that almost 6% of French-Turks define themselves as atheist is quite remarkable compared with German-Turks (less than 1%). Thus it seems that German-Turks have stronger religious affiliations.

Figure 6.3 Which of those below identifies you most in terms of your religious affiliation?




German-Turks generally define themselves as religious (33%), as patriots (22%), nationalists (17%), democrats (17%) and conservatives (17%). On the other hand, the French-Turks use the following identifications: nationalists (27%), Kemalists (21%), religious (21%), laicists (19%) and patriots (19%) (Figure 6.4). This shows that French-Turks are rather republican and unitarist, while German-Turks are communitarian.

Figure 6.4 How do you define yourself with regard to the identifications below (multi-response)?



Approximately 7.5% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks define themselves as quite religious, a similar pattern to Turks in Turkey (89% of German-Turks and 80% of French-Turks are reported to be relatively faithful) (Figure 6.5). Some 2.4% of German-Turks and 10% of French-Turks seem to be either atheist or agnostic.

Figure 6.5 How do you define yourself with regard to the following statements about your faith?



The cross-tabulation in Table 6.4 displays the correlation between birthplace and faith and indicates that religiosity is still dominant among German-Turks. Religious mobility is quite understandable in a country such as Germany, where religion is still a strong source of identification among the German people. Furthermore, German-Turks are primarily defined by their Islamic identity by the majority society. On the other hand, the secular and republican characteristics of French-Turks are prioritised by the French. Religiosity among the Euro-Turks is not an essentialised one, but a symbolic one. Symbolic religiosity is available to those who sporadically want to feel religious, without being forced to act religiously. As previously noted, the stress on religion is usually something adopted from parental culture as part of negotiation with the majority society. The manner in which Euro-Turks, especially German-Turks, employ religion as a source of identity is quite distant from being essentialist.

Table 6.4 How do you define yourself with regard to the following statements about your faith? Birthplace? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Birthplace			Total
	Turkey	Germany	France	
Quite a religious person, fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	9.3	2.8	5.5	7.7
Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	53.5	51.9	57.8	53.0
Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements	33.3	40.5	28.4	35.2
Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	2.1	4.1	3.8	2.6
Someone who does not have faith	1.8	0.7	2.9	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100

The cross-tabulation displaying the correlation between social status and faith indicates that religiosity increases among Euro-Turks of lower social status (Table 6.5).


Table 6.5 How do you define yourself with the following statements regarding your faith? Social status? (cross-tabulation) (%)

	Social status							Total
	Highest	Upper	Upper-middle	Middle	Lower-middle	Low	Lowest	
Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	7.1	5.9	6.9	7.0	6.5	9.2	13.8	7.7
Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	51.9	42.0	45.4	55.3	54.9	55.2	53.1	53.0
Faithful, but not fulfilling religious requirements	28.2	45.7	38.5	33.6	35.5	33.8	32.6	35.2
Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	10.9	2.0	5.2	2.5	2.7	1.2	0.2	2.6
Someone who does not have faith	1.9	4.2	3.8	1.6	0.4	0.7	0.4	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

French-Turks (72%) are much more secular than German-Turks (43%) (Figure 6.6). *L'affaire du foulard* [the headscarf controversy], however, vividly illustrated that the republican ideal does not necessarily support diversity. The French administration maintained that insofar as state-sponsored education is 'secular', schools could not allow religious expressions that might be construed as acts of

promoting a particular religious belief. In 1994, this view became official governmental policy when the Minister of Education, Francois Bayrou, issued a blanket ban on headscarves. The clash of civilisations evident in this dispute made it apparent that the republican French civilisational project was not ready for multiculturalism, and was rather ontologically assimilationist (Kivisto, 2002 and Wieviorka, 1995). Multiculturalism is not generally regarded positively – citizenship means full membership of the French Republic and migrants are expected to become fully integrated/assimilated. Then it makes no sense to speak of minorities, since all are equally French according to official discourse (Schuster & Solomos, 2002, p. 47).

Figure 6.6 Do you think religious and world affairs should be separate from each other?



The same question as in Figure 6.6 was posed in Turkey in a general survey in February 2000. Around 73% of Turks reported their orientation as towards secularism, while 20% proclaimed a non-secular world view (Table 6.6).

Table 6.6 Religious and world affairs should be separate from each other.

Turkey	Overall	
	Count	%
Yes, they should be separate	2,302	73.3
No, they cannot be separate	645	20.6
No response	191	6.1
Total	3,138	100

Source: Public Survey in Turkey (February 2000), SAM.

Religion vs. secularism: A safe haven on earth!

Secularism has been a great concern of many nation-states since the absolutist tradition of the state became dominant in Europe in the 16th century. Secularism is predominantly believed to be a modern invention *vis-à-vis* the divine authority. Nevertheless, there are claims opposing such a belief. John Gray, in his article “The Myth of Secularism”, asserts that liberal humanism, thus secularism, is “very obviously a religion – a shoddy derivative of Christian faith notably more irrational than the original article, and in recent times more harmful” (Gray, 2002, p. 69). Gray goes on to further argue that “the secular realm is a Christian invention. The biblical root of the secular state is the passage in the New Testament where Jesus urges his disciples to ‘give to God what is God’s and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar’” (Gray, 2002). Coming from the stoic tradition, Saint Augustine refined this thought in his book *On the City of God* in the 5th century, in which he clearly differentiated between the city of God and the city of earth. This early Christian commandment is the ultimate origin of the liberal attempt to separate religion from politics. Hence, Gray believes that secularism is a neo-Christian cult.

Secular societies usually believe that they have left religion behind and distanced politics from religion. This belief is again doubtful because what they have actually done is substitute one set of myths for another. The secular world view is simply the Christian view of the world with God left out and embroidered with science, liberalism, positivism, humanism, Darwinism and rationality.

Contemporary modern societies are constantly exposed to such myths. ‘All men are created equal’ and ‘everyone possesses human rights’ are just two of the proclamations of democratic liberalism. Such popular liberal declarations do not differ from verses in the Bible. By the same token, ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘secularism,’ ‘liberalism,’ ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’ are the kinds of words constantly repeated like a mantra. The process of endless repetition of such words in the ideoscape has a religious connotation. Secularism is one of those words. Hence, it does not have to contradict religious faith; rather it overlaps with religion.

The term secularism was coined around 1852 to describe an ideology organised to counter religious loyalties. The secularist ideology of the 19th century should be analysed in line with other constitutive categories of the same age. These categories were defined in various terms by social scientists such as Auguste Comte, Ferdinand Tönnies, Ludwig Feurbach, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Max Weber. In various combinations, these intellectuals envisaged a form of modern society centred on secular ideals, especially science, knowledge and human self-regulation, but not on religion. Thus, both secularism and religion suggest an alternative kind of society. While the former implies ‘turning towards this world’ and underlines temporality, the latter implies ‘extreme other-worldliness’ where the supernatural is given too much priority. At first glance, secularism and religion may seem to propose two radically distinct projections. Using a Durkheimian paradigm may break up this Cartesian binarism. Durkheim once remarked that what constitutes society is bound to be considered sacred. Hence, secularism is, in a way, constrained by what it aims at challenging, i.e. religion. Thus, aiming at another form of society *vis-à-vis* the religious one, secularism also turns out to be sacred. By the same token, secular political practices replacing religious ones are not construed anew, but rather subject to temporal realities made up by the same public who were previously governed by religious ideology. This is why secular political practices often simulate religious ones.

The term ‘secularism’ designates the temporal world or the temporal aspect of reality. Secularism, in a way, suggests invading the realm of the sacred, the mystical and the religious. Thus, secularist ideology aims at constructing an autonomous subject, who is self-ruled and liberated from the grip of obscurantism. As phrased above, secularism implies turning towards this world but not the other world. What if there is no world of justice, equality, respect, love and fraternity in sight? Then people prefer turning towards the other world where they expect to find happiness. These two antithetical positions can also be expounded under the headings of ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’.

The modern individual is subject to the major clusters of modernity such as capitalism, industrialism, racism, surveillance, egoism, loneliness, insecurity, structural outsiderism and militarism. It seems that these obstacles may be overcome through some solidarity networks. These solidarity networks may lead to two antithetical formations: *autonomy* and *heteronomy*. On the one hand, religious, ethnic and traditional community structures supply migrants with the necessary equipment to struggle against the destabilising effects of these challenges, in other words, to have a safe haven on earth. Such solidarity networks serve as a platform for migrants whereby they may perform a politics of identity, which corresponds to what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls ‘sub-politics’ or what Anthony Giddens (1994, pp. 14-15) calls ‘life politics’. This provides migrants with a kind of politics through which they may emancipate themselves from the arbitrary hold of capitalism, poverty and material deprivation. Such politics of identity corresponds to a shield, which encourages migrants to develop their autonomy. The solidarity network formation may also be conceived of as a survival strategy for migrants against feelings of insecurity and loneliness. Thus, while the community formation, on the one hand, embodies the autonomous self, it also gives rise to what Zigmunt Bauman calls heteronomy in a way that pleases individuals in the secure atmosphere of community.

Multiculturalism and interculturalism

Multiculturalism became one of the most popular discourses in the West in the last quarter of the 20th century. The ideology of multiculturalism aims at providing minority cultures with some platforms whereby they may express their identities through music, festivals, exhibitions, conferences, etc. Yet multiculturalism has lately been criticised by many scholars (Kaya, 2001, Russon, 1995, Radtke, 1994 and Rosaldo, 1995). In fact, the representation of a wide variety of non-Western cultures in the form of music, plastic arts and seminars is nothing but the reconfirmation of the categorisation of ‘the West and the rest’. The representation of the cultural forms of those ‘exotic others’ in multicultural venues broadens the differences between the so-called ‘distinct cultures’. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups. Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their mutual ties and distinction; it also risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity.

Constructed multiculturalism permits supposedly ‘distinct cultures’ to be expressed on some public platforms. The multiculturalist meta-narrative might, at first glance, seem to be a ‘friend’ as stated by J. Russon (1995, p. 524). In a way, these multicultural platforms hone the process of ‘othering the other’ in the imagery of self – in other words lead to a form of ethnic ‘exotification’. He explains that:

Now, it is fairly common gesture, in the name of pluralism, to insist that we treat others as others, and accept their ways as, perhaps, ‘interesting’, ‘private’ to them, and especially not the same as ours. [T]his exotification which ‘tolerates the other’ is another product of the alienating gaze of the reflective ego, and it fails in two important ways. First, it makes the other a kind of lesser entity open to our patronising support, despite our complete rejection of its value as analysing other than the cute contingencies of someone else’s culture; thus there is an inherent power relation here in which the other is made subordinate to our benevolence and superior reason. Second, it fails to acknowledge that, just as *our* programme of tolerance has implications for the other – it contains that other in its view – so too does the ethnicity of the other contain us. Our so-called ‘democratic’ and pluralistic ideal is as much an ethnic expression as that of the other is an ethnicity.

Russon’s remarks on ‘tolerance’ remind us of the way in which public and private spheres are highly differentiated by the ideology of multiculturalism. This ideology, as John Rex (1986) has described, involves nurturing commonality (shared laws, open economy and equal access to state provisions) in the former and ensuring freedom (maintenance of ethnic minority traditions) in the latter. Russon first prompts us to think that multiculturalism tends to promote the confinement of cultures in their own private spheres with a limited interaction with other cultures. The differentiation between public and private spheres has always contributed to the reinforcement of the dominant class or group’s hegemony over the subaltern groups. Cultures that hardly interact with other cultures tend to become a static heritage. Thus, Russon draws our attention to the point that the official discourse of multiculturalism contributes to the reification of culture by the minority communities. Second, he underlines the issue of power relations between the dominant culture and the others. This is the clientalist side of the policy of multiculturalism – a point to which we shall return shortly. Clientelism tends to petrify the existing social conditions without making any change in the power relations between ‘master’ and ‘disciple’.

What Russon attempts to criticise in the notion of ‘tolerance’ is also raised by R. Rosaldo (1989, pp. 198-204) in a slightly different way. Researching the correlation between culture and power, Rosaldo rightly claims that power and culture have a negative correlation. In saying so, he refers to the examples of the Philippines and Mexico. In these two countries, for instance, full citizens are those who have power and lack culture, whereas the most culturally endowed minorities, such as the Negritos and Indians, lack full citizenship and power respectively. Thus, having power corresponds to being post-cultural and vice versa: “the more power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has, the less power one yields. If *they* [minorities] have an explicit monopoly on authentic culture, *we* [the majority] have an unspoken one on institutional power” (1989, p. 202). Rosaldo takes the discussion further and concludes that making the ‘other’ culturally visible results in the invisibility

of the ‘self’. Thus, the policy of multiculturalism attempts to dissolve the self in the minority. Dissolution of the self is also related to the celebration of difference by minorities, as the notion of difference makes culture particularly visible to outside observers. Thus, not only multiculturalist policies, but also minorities themselves contribute to the process of dissolution of the self as well as institutional power within the minority.

Lately, the discourse of ‘interculturalism’ has replaced that of multiculturalism. Interculturalism actually requires interaction and exchange between cultures, and it does not imprison cultures in their so-called ‘distinct’ spheres. Interculturalism seeks to challenge racism, xenophobia, heterophobia, nationalism and ethnocentrism. Hence, we have also tried to understand the ways in which Euro-Turks are oriented to both discourses. Our results demonstrate that Euro-Turks are indeed oriented to both. But they affirm interculturalism (87%) more than they do multiculturalism (66%).

Euro-Turks predominantly argue that they are mostly in favour of a multiculturalist setting (65% of German-Turks and 79% of French-Turks). As is known, however, recently multicultural policies have been severely criticised in the West. The ideology of multiculturalism tends to compartmentalise cultures. It also assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes attached to ethnic groups. Essentialising the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group, multiculturalism risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasising their mutual ties and distinction; it also risks overemphasising the internal homogeneity of cultures in terms that potentially legitimise repressive demands for communal conformity. This is why interculturalism discourse seems to replace multiculturalism. Figure 6.7 indicates that Euro-Turks are inherently in favour of intercultural dialogue (86% of German-Turks and 90% of French-Turks). This majority view is parallel to what the progressive political elite are trying to construct in the West. Thus, it is clear that Euro-Turks neither want to pose a challenge to European societies nor want to see European societies as challenges. Figure 6.8 indicates that Euro-Turks are ready to invest in their similarities with the majority societies more than in their differences.

Figure 6.7 Nobody should adapt to others; everyone should have his/her way






Figure 6.8 Both groups should interact with each other to find similarities



The competence of Euro-Turks in foreign languages also differs in the two countries (Figure 6.9). A great number of German-Turks are reported as having English as their second foreign language (36%). This number is only 24% in France. Furthermore, this figure seems to demonstrate that German-Turks are relatively more open to the outside world compared with French-Turks, despite their communitarian affiliations. This highlights the need to redefine the concept of communitarianism, which does not necessarily refer to the closure of communities.

Figure 6.9 What is your second spoken language?



'Imported' brides and bridegrooms from Turkey

One significant issue among Euro-Turks is the increasing number of marriages with partners from Turkey. Lately, there has been a growing tendency for some Euro-Turkish families to favour marrying their children to partners brought from Turkey. Such partners are known as 'imported' brides or bridegrooms. These marriages are usually arranged marriages preferred by conservative families. Brides from Turkey are chosen as they are believed to be more culturally pure and thus capable of raising better-educated children. On the other hand, bridegrooms are usually chosen from among those candidates who fit into the occupational prospects of the extended family in question. Marriage, for such families, seems to be associated with a traditional meaning: as a purely economic institution or as a child-bearing institution. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 indicate that German-Turks (21%) are more against arranged marriages from Turkey than French-Turks (17%). There may be several explanations for this, one of which may be that German-Turks are more self-sufficient, with their own community settings going back almost 50 years. Meanwhile, French-Turks still prefer to be culturally inspired by Turkey.

Figure 6.10 Are you in favour of or against arranged marriages for Turkish men with partners from Turkey?





Figure 6.11 Are you in favour of or against arranged marriages for Turkish women with partners from Turkey?



Marrying someone from Turkey certainly points to the willingness of migrant families to remain in touch with Turkey as well to the protection of cultural values such as honour. Honour is not only an individual value, but also something social and communal. Cultural values such as honour become a source of distinction and difference in a remote land where the diasporic individual encounters the other. Honour and resistance to intermarriage could also mean a counterattack on assimilation, especially in France. Marrying someone from Turkey not only functions as a tool for keeping culture intact, but also as a tool for sustaining immigration (Bozarslan, 1996). On the other hand, imported brides and grooms may also provide the migrants with the opportunity to generate strong families in which one of the spouses is likely to have a dependence on the other because of a lack of competence in the language and culture of the majority society. Claire Autant and Véronique Manry (1998, p. 73) claim that French-Turkish women are reluctant when their parents decide to marry them to a man from Turkey, even though marrying him could provide them with some advantages, such as the husband becoming dependent on the bride owing to a lack of competence in French and the loosening of parental authority from both sides. Gaby Strasburger (2004) has also claimed that the issue of parental suppression is relevant to a certain degree among Euro-Turks; apart from exceptional cases of suppression, young people decide mainly of their free will to marry someone from their country of origin.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This research has unearthed a number of findings, some of which are listed below. Euro-Turks have constructed *reflexive* identities in a way that contributes to the redefinition of being European, German and French. This report espouses that Euro-Turks have individually and collectively, through new forms of communitarianism, constructed their identities in interaction with the majority societies where they live.

The research, at this stage, also reveals that there are three major groups of Euro-Turks emerging in the migratory process:

- 1) Bridging groups (more than 40%)
 - those who are equally affiliated with both the homeland and ‘host-land’ – young generations with cosmopolitan and syncretic cultural identities (multilingual) fall into this category;
 - those who are also affiliated with both the homeland and host-land, and who construct a dynamic transnational space combining Turkey and Germany/France, such as the Euro-Muslims (e.g. *Cojepiennes* in France and MUSIAD in Germany);
 - those who have hyphenated and multiple identities without essentialising any particular political, religious, ethnic or racial definition;
- 2) Breaching groups (around 40%)
 - those who still have a strong orientation to the homeland, including extreme religious, nationalist and laicist persons/groups (the latter comprising less than 40%);
- 3) Assimilated groups (around 20%)
 - those who have assimilated into the majority societies (who are also usually more prosperous).

Euro-Turks demonstrate the fact that Europeaness is not a prescribed identity, but an ongoing process of being and becoming. Thus, Euro-Turks contribute to the redefinition of the EU and being European with their own social, political, cultural and economic identities. Needless to say, these categorisations are subject to change in the course of the research.

This research has revealed that there are quite a number of migrants of Turkish origin in the West who do not fit into the category of a stereotypical ‘Turk’. The proportion of Euro-Turks in this category is around 40%. But it has also been concluded that the majority of Euro-Turks have become politically, socially, economically and culturally integrated and active agents in their countries of settlement. Around 20% have actually assimilated into the receiving society. On the other hand, 40% have generated a way of life embracing both the homeland and host-land in a manner that forms a bridge between the two. Other essential findings of the research include:

- i) *Ethnic/religious/cultural revival among the Euro-Turks can be interpreted as a quest for justice and fairness, and not as a security challenge.* The research reveals that Euro-Turks do not pose a threat to the political and social systems of their countries of settlement, but rather are willing to incorporate themselves into the system. It is commonly known that western European states, generally speaking, have the tendency to regard Islam as a threat to their national security. Yet the research shows that orientation towards Islam among the Euro-Turks could also be regarded as a quest for justice and fairness. Accordingly, this work presents some of the relevant qualitative and quantitative data gathered on this point during the research, leading in the end to the proposal that EU states should set aside the security discourse and become engaged in a justice discourse in their responses to minority claims.¹

¹ This classification is made by Will Kymlicka (2002) to refer to the ways in which the demands of minority groups have been identified in western and Eastern European countries. He claims that western European

- ii) *The power of fear.* Categorising migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, international criminality and terrorism, countries in the West tend to promote the fear of migration and ‘others’. The securitisation of migration has become a vital issue after September 11th. States seem to employ the discourse of securitisation as a political technique with a capacity to politically integrate a society by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an internal or external enemy. The popularity of the claim that the EU will encounter an influx of migration from Turkey when it joins the Union illustrates such a politically and socially constructed fear. It should not be forgotten that the same fear had also been raised when Spain, Portugal and Greece joined the Union. What happened in those cases was reverse migration. It is notable that 30% of the Euro-Turks report that they would consider returning to Turkey if it were to join the European Union. The rise of the number of the EU citizens buying property in Turkey is another point to take into consideration. Turkey has lately become an attractive destination for EU citizens to live for good.
- iii) *Germany has a culturalist and differentialist incorporation regime and France has a universalist and assimilationist one.* German incorporation policies *vis-à-vis* migrants have so far been culturalist and communitarian. Interpretation of culturalist discourse by conservatives (CDU-CSU) in Germany has brought about segregationist *Gastarbeiter* policies imprisoning migrants into ghettos or colonies. Yet a reading of the same culturalist discourse by the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (*Grünen*) in the last few years results in a more integrationist and liberal set of policies. French universalism and republicanism, on the other hand, has recently been accused of being assimilationist by the French-Turks.
- iv) *Communitarianism in contemporary Germany seems to provide the German-Turks with a more liberal ground whereby they can politically, socially, culturally and economically integrate into mainstream society.* The data gathered by the structured interviews indicate that German-Turks, generally speaking, are more communitarian, religious and conservative than French-Turks. Compared with French-Turks, German-Turks seem to be less in favour of integration, as they are content with their ethnic enclaves, religious archipelagos and traditional solidarity networks. Other findings in the research, however, indicate the converse. Although when compared with German-Turks, French-Turks seem to engage more in the modern way of life, orienting themselves towards integration, French language, secularism, laicism and the French media on the one hand, they are less engaged in French domestic politics, political parties, the Internet, theatres and cinemas. Nevertheless, German-Turks seem to generate more cosmopolitan, hybrid, global and reflexive identities in a way that redefines being European, which is actually subject to constant change. Thus, the experiences of German-Turks actually seem to indicate that Islam does not necessarily contradict being European nor the concepts of cosmopolitanism, modernity or globalism.
- v) *Liberal citizenship regimes are more welcome by migrants and their children.* Western democracies and citizenship regimes seem to fail in treating minority claims as a quest for justice. As Kymlicka and Norman stated, “immigrant groups that feel alienated from the larger national and [religious] identity are likely to be alienated from the political arena as well” (2000, p. 39). Traditional citizenship rhetoric is inclined to advance the interests of the dominant national group at the expense of migrants. Hence, it is unlikely that the classical understanding of citizenship can resolve issues of the co-existence of ‘culturally discrete’ entities. In order to avoid potential conflict and alienation, there is an essential task to be undertaken: citizenship laws must not be based on prescribed cultural, religious, linguistic or ethnic qualities. Moderate and democratic citizenship laws that are formulated in line with the task stated above can be anticipated to resolve the emphasis made on ethnicity, religiosity and nationality by migrant groups.

democracies usually define minority claims as a quest for justice and fairness, while Eastern European states identify such claims as a threat to their national security.

- vi) *Hyphenated identities characterise many of the Euro-Turks.* The data indicate that a number of Euro-Turks identify themselves with hyphenated (multiple) identities such as French-Muslim-Turkish and German-Muslim-Turkish. What is remarkable here is that political identity comes before religious and ethnic identities.
- vii) *Migration, ethnicity, identity, Islam and culture have become embroiled in the politics of security in the West.* The politics of security have become remarkably salient among majority societies in a way that leads to the misjudgement of prevailing problems of unemployment, racism, poverty, xenophobia and violence. The politics of security seems to be endorsed by states in order to sustain governmentality. Migration issues should be de-securitised.
- viii) *Euro-Turks have by and large been misrepresented in the media.* The representation of Euro-Turks in the media has been characterised by strong clichés and stereotypes. Those Euro-Turks who do not fit into the stereotypical ‘Turkish’ image are not represented enough in the media. Stereotypes reiterate ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries between groups. There are a large number of migrants of Turkish origin who challenge such boundaries.
- ix) *Euro-Islam does not contradict the Western way of life.* Euro-Islam, as it is practiced among most of the Euro-Turks, is essentially separate from the fundamentalist Wahabi version of Islam. Euro-Islam is closer to the Anatolian Islam, which has always been exposed to external influences. Euro-Islam is not essentialist and has the capacity for interaction with Judeo-Christian lifestyles.

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Annex

Table A.1 Frequency results of the surveys in Germany and France

	Questions	Germany	France	Total
		%	%	%
I.1	In which region is the questionnaire being conducted?			
	1 Ile de France	–	35.3	3.3
	2 Centre	–	6.7	0.6
	3 Rhone-Alpes	–	24.8	2.3
	4 Franche-Comté	–	6.0	0.6
	5 Alsace	–	17.5	1.7
	6 Lorraine	–	9.7	0.9
	7 Niedersachsen-Bremen	7.7	–	7.0
	8 Nordrhein–Westfalen	35.8	–	32.4
	9 Hessen	11.4	–	10.3
	10 Baden–Württemberg	21.9	–	19.8
	11 Bayern	17.3	–	15.6
	12 Berlin	6.0	–	5.4
	Total	100	100	100
I.2.D.4	Sex of the respondent?			
	1 Female	45.2	47.2	45.4
	2 Male	54.8	52.8	54.6
	Total	100	100	100
I.3.D.5	Age?			
	1) 15-19	12.2	10.8	12.1
	2) 20-29	27.9	26.3	27.7
	3) 30-39	24.8	28.2	25.1
	4) 40-49	11.2	15.2	11.6
	5) 50+	23.9	19.5	23.5
	Total	100	100	100
I.4.a	Country/countries of education?			
	1 Turkey	65.4	72.2	66.1
	2 Germany	54.2	0.3	49.1
	3 France	0.1	43.0	4.1
	4 Others	1.2	0.8	1.2
	96 Illiterate	2.7	2.5	2.7
	Total	100	100	100
I.4.b	In which country did you complete your education last?			
	1 Turkey	43.2	54.3	44.2
	2 Germany	53.5	0.2	48.5
	3 France	–	42.3	4.0
	4 Others	0.6	0.8	0.6
	96 Illiterate	2.7	2.5	2.7
	Total	100	100	100

I.5	What schools have you completed?			
	1 Illiterate	1.7	2.5	1.8
	2 Never completed a school	2.2	3.0	2.2
	3 Primary school (TR)	60.3	36.3	58.0
	4 Secondary school (TR)	32.9	14.5	31.1
	5 High school (TR)	16.4	10.7	15.9
	6 Occupational school (TR)	4.3	2.3	4.1
	7 University-level (TR)	4.2	6.0	4.4
	8 Master/doctorate (TR)	–	0.2	0.0
	9 Kein Schulabschluss/no diploma (GER)	0.4	–	0.3
	10 Grundschule (GER)	36.9	–	33.4
	11 Hauptschule (GER)	27.9	–	25.3
	12 Realschule-Mittlere Reife (GER)	16.8	–	15.2
	13 Fachoberschule-Berufskolleg (GER)	3.8	–	3.5
	14 Fachabitur (GER)	4.3	–	3.9
	15 Abitur (GER)	7.4	–	6.7
	16 Anderer Abschluss (GER)	1.8	–	1.6
	17 Abgeschlossene Berufsausbildung (GER)	8.1	–	7.3
	18 Fachhochschule (GER)	1.5	–	1.4
	19 Universität (GER)	3.7	–	3.3
	20 Postgraduierten-Abschluss (GER)	0.3	–	0.3
	21 Ecole primaire (FR)	–	1.3	0.1
	22 Collège (FR)	–	8.7	0.8
	23 Lycée general (FR)	–	4.3	0.4
	24 Lycée technique (FR)	–	3.5	0.3
	25 Lycée professional (FR)	–	17.3	1.6
	26 Deug (FR)	–	4.3	0.4
	27 Licence (FR)	–	1.5	0.1
	28 Maîtrise (FR)	–	1.0	0.1
	29 DEA or higher (FR)	–	1.5	0.1
	30 Primary school (another country, AC)	0.4	0.2	0.4
	31 Secondary school (AC)	0.3	0.3	0.3
	32 High school (AC)	0.2	–	0.2
	33 Occupational school (AC)	0.2	–	0.2
	34 University-level (AC)	0.5	0.3	0.5
	35 Master/doctorate (AC)	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
I.6.D.10	Present job status?			
	1 Regular salaried worker	32.8	35.8	33.1
	2 Temporarily waged worker	2.0	8.5	2.6
	3 Self-employed	4.2	10.3	4.8
	4 Presently unemployed, receiving unemployment benefit	10.7	5.0	10.2
	5 Presently unemployed, not receiving unemployment benefit	11.5	2.5	10.7
	6 Political asylum, receiving state benefit	0.2	–	0.2
	7 Retired, not working	9.0	4.5	8.6
	8 Student	6.5	7.5	6.6
	9 Housewife	23.1	25.8	23.4
	Total	100	100	100

D.11	(If he/she works) Occupational status? (If he/she doesn't work) What was the latest job you were doing?			
	1 Never worked before	1.5	12.0	2.5
	2 Student	5.0	7.2	5.2
	3 Housewife	8.5	3.7	8.1
	4 Foreman	16.1	21.8	16.6
	5 Tradesman, craftsman	3.1	1.2	2.9
	6 Worker (uncertain)	1.5	3.2	1.7
	7 Civil servant (non-managerial)	2.0	0.5	1.8
	8 Teacher/academic	1.1	0.8	1.1
	9 Cook, waiter, worker in bakery/restaurant (barman, barmaid)	2.9	1.8	2.8
	10 Clerk, master-builder, cashier, delivery worker, florist	3.2	2.7	3.1
	11 Cleaning worker, gatekeeper, watchman, doorman, gardener, day worker	4.9	2.8	4.7
	12 Waged driver	2.1	1.0	2.0
	13 Accounting director, accounting chief, accounting staff (waged)	0.6	0.7	0.6
	14 Street-seller	0.3	0.3	0.3
	15 Contractor, owner of factory/atelier, employer	0.1	2.5	0.3
	16 Nurse, health-sector employees	2.3	1.0	2.2
	17 Worker in the repair shops (auto-repair, carpenter, installer)	1.4	0.2	1.3
	18 Freelance driver (taxi, truck, pickup)	0.5	0.2	0.4
	19 Mid-rank manager in public sector/municipality (director/assist. director)	0.2	0.2	0.2
	20 Waged professional	1.9	–	1.7
	21 Farmer	–	1.8	0.2
	23 Family work	1.5	0.2	1.4
	24 Waged craftsmen such as a barber, hairdresser, tailor	2.8	2.7	2.8
	25 Building or road worker, seasonal worker	2.5	20.3	4.2
	26 Bodyguard, security workers	0.4	–	0.3
	19 Mid-level manager in the private sector (director/assist. director)	1.0	0.2	1.0
	28 Merchant	0.5	0.5	0.5
	29 Employee in a private company (without managerial skills)	2.8	2.3	2.8
	30 Secretary, receptionist	1.6	1.2	1.6
	31 Sales and marketing employee	2.6	–	2.4
	32 Technician	2.6	0.5	2.4
	33 Manufacturer, employer in textile sector	0.3	1.0	0.3
	34 Operator, printer	0.8	0.3	0.7
	36 Professional	1.0	0.2	1.0
	37 Freelance accountant, financial consultant	0.2	–	0.2
	39 Musician (opera), actor (theatre)	0.1	0.5	0.1
	40 Electrician	0.3	0.7	0.3
	41 Real estate agent	0.5	0.2	0.4
	42 Architect	–	0.5	0.0
	43 Fashion designer	–	0.5	0.0
	44 Ironing work in a home	–	0.3	0.0
	45 Repairman	–	0.3	0.0
	46 Imam (prayer)	–	0.2	0.0
	47 Chemist	0.5	–	0.4
	48 Owner of a taxi/taxi rank	0.1	–	0.1
	49 Conductor	0.2	0.2	0.2
	50 Restaurant owner	–	0.8	0.1
	51 Baby-sitter	–	0.3	0.0

	53 Volunteer	0.2	0.3	0.2
	54 Forester	–	0.2	0.0
	55 Translator	0.1	–	0.1
	56 Railway worker	0.1	–	0.1
	57 Advertising	0.1	–	0.1
	58 Welder	0.5	–	0.4
	97 No answer	17.7	0.2	16.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.12	Place of birth?			
	1 Born in Turkey	72.5	80.8	73.3
	2 Born in Germany	27.1	1.0	24.7
	3 Born in France	–	18.2	1.7
	4 Born in another European country	0.2	–	0.2
	5 Born in another country outside Europe	0.2	–	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.13	The place of birth in Turkey?			
	1. Kayseri	6.3	8.0	6.5
	2. Ankara	5.4	4.5	5.3
	3. Trabzon	5.7	1.0	5.2
	4. Sivas	5.3	2.3	5.0
	5. İstanbul	4.5	6.4	4.7
	6. Konya	3.5	6.0	3.8
	7. Yozgat	3.6	5.2	3.8
	8. Aksaray	4.0	1.4	3.7
	9. Samsun	2.8	1.4	2.7
	10. Çorum	2.6	0.8	2.4
	11. Bayburt	2.5	1.0	2.3
	12. İzmir	2.3	1.6	2.3
	13. Nevşehir	2.2	3.3	2.3
	14. Kütahya	2.3	0.2	2.1
	15. Ordu	1.9	2.5	2.0
	16. Kırşehir	1.6	3.5	1.8
	17. Malatya	1.9	1.0	1.8
	18. Erzurum	1.8	1.0	1.7
	19. Kahramanmaraş	1.3	4.9	1.7
	20. Adana	1.7	0.4	1.6
	21. Adapazarı	1.8	0.2	1.6
	22. Afyon	1.4	2.1	1.5
	23. Karaman	1.2	3.9	1.5
	24. Denizli	1.3	2.5	1.4
	25. Gümüşhane	1.4	0.8	1.4
	26. Kars	1.3	1.9	1.4
	27. Bursa	1.4	0.6	1.3
	28. Gaziantep	1.3	1.4	1.3
	29. Eskişehir	1.2	0.8	1.1
	30. Uşak	1.2	0.8	1.1
	31. Tunceli	0.9	1.4	1.0
	32. Artvin	0.9	0.8	0.9

	33. Niğde	1.0	0.2	0.9
	34. Şanlıurfa	0.9	0.8	0.9
	35. Tokat	1.0	0.2	0.9
	36. Kastamonu	0.8	0.8	0.8
	37. Bolu	0.8	–	0.7
	38. Mersin	0.8	0.2	0.7
	39. Muş,	0.6	0.8	0.7
	40. Rize	0.8	–	0.7
	41. Sinop	0.6	1.2	0.7
	42. Amasya	0.6	0.4	0.6
	43. Elazığ	0.1	4.9	0.6
	44. Erzincan	0.5	1.0	0.6
	45. Giresun	0.6	0.2	0.6
	46. Isparta	0.4	2.3	0.6
	47. Zonguldak	0.6	0.4	0.6
	48. Ağrı	0.5	–	0.5
	49. Antalya	0.4	1.4	0.5
	50. Ardahan	0.5	0.2	0.5
	51. Aydın	0.4	1.4	0.5
	52. Diyarbakır	0.5	–	0.5
	53. Edirne	0.5	0.4	0.5
	54. Kocaeli	0.5	0.2	0.5
	55. Manisa	0.5	–	0.5
	56. Mardin	0.5	–	0.5
	57. Balıkesir	0.4	0.4	0.4
	58. Karabük	0.3	1.4	0.4
	59. Adıyaman	0.3	0.4	0.3
	60. Bartın	0.3	0.2	0.3
	61. Batman	0.4	–	0.3
	62. Bingöl	0.3	0.2	0.3
	63. Burdur	0.3	0.6	0.3
	64. Çanakkale	0.3	0.4	0.3
	65. Iğdır	0.3	0.2	0.3
	66. Kırkkale	0.3	0.6	0.3
	67. Çankırı	–	2.3	0.2
	68. Hatay	0.1	1.0	0.2
	69. Muğla	0.3	–	0.2
	70. Van	0.3	–	0.2
	71. Yalova	0.3	–	0.2
	72. Bilecik	0.1	–	0.1
	73. Hakkari	0.1	–	0.1
	74. Kırklareli	0.1	–	0.1
	75. Şırnak	0.1	–	0.1
	76. Tekirdağ	0.1	0.2	0.1
	77. Osmaniye	–	0.2	0.0
	No answer	2.1	0.4	1.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.14	The place of birth in Turkey?			
	1 City centre	26.2	35.7	27.2

	2 District/town	40.3	32.8	39.5
	3 Village	28.1	31.5	28.5
	97 No answer	5.4	–	4.9
	Total	100	100	100
I.8.D.15	(If she/he was born in Turkey) At what age did you leave Turkey?			
	0-9	15.4	18.2	16.7
	10-19	32.6	26.8	30.9
	20-29	41.7	40.4	41.6
	30-39	8.8	11.2	9.1
	40-49	1.0	2.6	1.1
	50+	0.4	0.2	0.4
	97 No answer	0.1	0.6	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.16	How many years have you been living outside Turkey?			
	0-9	13.2	16.8	13.5
	10-19	27.8	28.9	28.0
	20-29	36.1	36.7	36.1
	30-39	22.6	14.7	22.0
	50+	0.2	0.2	0.2
	97 No answer	0.1	2.7	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.17	How many years have you been living in this country?			
	0-9	13.6	16.8	13.8
	10-19	25.8	29.2	26.2
	20-29	35.4	36.7	35.5
	30-39	23.4	13.9	22.6
	40- above	1.7	1.1	1.6
	97 No answer	0.1	2.3	0.3
	Total	100	100	100
I.9.D.18	Is there anybody in your family who preceded your coming here?			
	1 No, I am the first to come	17.1	24.5	17.8
	2 Yes	82.9	75.2	82.2
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.19	Who was the first person to come in your family?			
	1 Grandparents	9.1	4.4	8.7
	2 Parents	60.7	49.7	59.7
	3 Partner	19.5	23.3	19.8
	4 Other relatives	17.7	22.6	18.1
	Total	100	100	100
I.10.D.20	What were the reasons for coming here?			
	1 Came to work	21.1	28.5	21.8
	2 Came for education	6.2	3.0	5.9
	3 Born and raised here	26.2	16.5	25.3

	4 Came to marry (my partner was living here)	23.2	27.5	23.6
	5 Came for political reasons	1.6	3.5	1.8
	6 Came for family-unification	20.9	22.5	21.1
	7 Tourist trip	1.6	1.5	1.6
	8 Problems in Turkey	–	0.7	0.0
	9 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
I.11	Marital status?			
	1 Married	67.1	70.0	67.4
	2 Cohabiting	0.8	2.5	1.0
	3 Single	27.1	22.2	26.7
	4 Widow, divorced	4.9	5.3	4.9
	Total	100	100	100
I.12	(If married or cohabiting) Is your partner Turkish?			
	1 Turkish	93.9	92.4	93.8
	2 German	5.7	0.2	5.1
	3 French	0.1	6.2	0.7
	4 From other European countries	–	0.9	0.1
	5 From somewhere outside Europe	0.3	0.2	0.3
	Total	100	100	100
I.13	Do you have children? If so, how many?			
	0 No	35.3	32.5	35.0
	1	10.9	9.2	10.7
	2	18.3	15.8	18.1
	3	17.4	18.8	17.5
	4	10.3	13.8	10.7
	5 and more	7.9	9.9	8.1
	Total	100	100	100
I.14	How many persons are living in your household (including you)?			
	1	5.7	9.3	6.1
	2	16.4	15.5	16.3
	3	21.6	15.5	21.0
	4	26.0	22.7	25.7
	5	18.2	23.2	18.7
	6	8.0	9.3	8.1
	7 and more	4.0	4.3	4.1
	99 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
I.15	Do you own the house you live in?			
	1 Yes, it is my property	12.4	24.7	13.6
	2 It is rented property	84.5	68.7	83.0
	3 It belongs to the family, paying no rent	2.9	4.8	3.1
	4 Lodging	0.2	1.8	0.3
	Total	100	100	100

I.16.D.27	How many m² is your house?			
	1 Smaller than 50 m ²	10.1	14.8	10.6
	2 50-74 m ²	36.2	25.8	35.3
	3 75-99 m ²	35.7	35.8	35.7
	4 100-124 m ²	11.9	13.8	12.1
	5 125-150 m ²	4.3	5.7	4.4
	6 Larger than 150 m ²	1.7	3.8	1.9
	9 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
I.17.D.28	Do you own property in Turkey?			
	1 No	34.3	20.8	33.0
	2 Yes	65.7	79.2	67.0
	Total	100	100	100
E.29	What kind of property do you own in Turkey?			
	1 Apartment flat or house	87.9	83.8	87.4
	2 Summer cottage	11.0	13.5	11.3
	3 Store	9.2	9.3	9.2
	4 Field	45.9	46.7	46.0
	99 No answer	–	0.4	0.0
I.18.D.30	Do you have a car?			
	1 Yes	100	100	100
	2 No	60.6	68.5	61.3
	Total	100	100	100
I.19A) D.31	Level of language skills in speaking/understanding Turkish?			
	1 Little	0.9	0.2	0.9
	2 Middle	10.1	6.5	9.8
	3 Good	40.4	24.3	38.9
	4 Very good	48.5	67.8	50.4
	5 Not at all	–	1.2	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.32	Level of language skills in reading/writing Turkish?			
	1 Little	4.0	3.3	4.0
	2 Middle	12.5	10.0	12.3
	3 Good	39.0	22.5	37.4
	4 Very good	43.8	60.5	45.3
	5 Not at all	0.8	3.7	1.0
	Total	100	100	100
B)D.33	Level of language skills in speaking/understanding German/French?			
	1 Little	15.9	18.8	16.1
	2 Middle	24.8	24.2	24.7
	3 Good	29.5	20.3	28.6
	4 Very good	29.8	34.2	30.2
	5 Not at all	0.1	2.5	0.3
	Total	100	100	100

D.34	Level of language skills in reading/writing German/French?			
	1 Little	19.4	26.8	20.1
	2 Middle	23.2	18.3	22.7
	3 Good	27.8	15.5	26.6
	4 Very good	28.7	31.5	29.0
	5 Not at all	0.8	7.8	1.5
	Total	100	100	100
C)D.35	What is the other language you know best?			
	0 None	57.0	61.0	57.4
	1 English	35.7	23.5	34.6
	2 German	–	6.7	0.6
	3 French	1.2	–	1.1
	4 Kurdish	2.6	3.5	2.7
	5 Others	3.5	5.3	3.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.36	What is your skill level in the other language in speaking/understanding?			
	1 Little	24.7	23.9	24.6
	2 Middle	41.3	42.7	41.4
	3 Good	27.1	20.1	26.5
	4 Very good	6.8	13.2	7.3
	99 No answer	0.2	–	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.37	What is your skill level in the other language in reading/writing?			
	1 Little	24.9	26.1	25.0
	2 Middle	39.1	35.0	38.7
	3 Good	27.1	22.6	26.7
	4 Very good	7.4	10.3	7.7
	5 Not at all	–	6.0	0.5
	99 No answer	1.5	–	1.4
	Total	100	100	100
I.20.D.38	How are your socio-economic conditions compared to your parents?			
	1 Much worse	3.2	1.8	3.1
	2 Worse	17.1	10.3	16.5
	3 The same	19.8	16.8	19.5
	4 Better	46.4	54.3	47.1
	5 Much better	13.5	16.7	13.8
	Total	100	100	100
I.21.D.39	How are your recent socio-econ. conditions compared to the last decade?			
	1 Much worse	5.4	2.8	5.2
	2 Worse	31.7	15.8	30.2
	3 The same	18.9	15.3	18.5
	4 Better	35.0	46.2	36.1
	5 Much better	8.9	19.7	9.9
	99 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100

I.22.D.40	Monthly income of the household?			
	1 Less than €1000	20.8	15.2	20.2
	2 €1001–1500	28.7	30.7	28.9
	3 €1501–2000	27.8	26.0	27.6
	4 €2001–3000	16.2	19.7	16.6
	5 More than €3001	6.3	8.2	6.5
	99 No answer	0.2	0.3	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
II.1.D.42	Do you feel more affiliated with this country (here) or with Turkey?			
	1 Turkey	48.5	35.5	47.2
	2 Here	22.0	25.5	22.3
	3 Equally close with both	26.9	35.8	27.8
	4 Equally far with both	2.6	3.2	2.7
	Total	100	100	100
II.2.D.43	How often do you visit Turkey?			
	1 More than once a year	12.4	8.5	12.0
	2 Once a year	53.7	36.5	52.1
	3 Once in every two to three years	26.1	39.7	27.4
	4 Rarely	4.3	7.8	4.7
	5 Nearly not at all	3.5	7.5	3.9
	Total	100	100	100
E.44	What are your reasons for not to going to Turkey?			
	1 For political reasons	40.5	35.6	39.6
	2 I do not have time	18.9	8.9	17.1
	3 For economic reasons	29.7	35.6	30.8
	4 I do not have any ties with Turkey	10.8	11.1	10.9
	5 Because of military constraints	8.1	–	6.6
	7 I do not have an ID	–	11.1	2.0
	8 Family	2.7	–	2.2
	97 No answer	2.7	2.2	2.6
	Total	100	100	100
II.3.E.45	What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey?			
	1 Holiday, seaside, sun	46.8	56.2	47.6
	2 Visiting relatives, homeland	93.9	86.7	93.2
	3 Professional	4.0	2.8	3.9
	4 Internship	0.2	–	0.2
	5 To bring our children closer to Turkish culture	0.2	–	0.2
	6 Community trips	0.1	–	0.1
	7 Sport	0.2	–	0.2
	97 No answer	1.5	7.3	2.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.4.D.46	To what extent are you interested in politics in Turkey?			
	1 Not at all	26.3	36.3	27.2
	2 Not really	15.6	14.7	15.5
	3 So-so	20.2	17.0	19.9

	4 As much as I can	25.5	22.7	25.3
	5 Very much so	12.4	9.3	12.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.5.D.47	Which institution in Turkey do you trust most?			
	1 Government	33.0	27.8	32.5
	2 Religious institutions	19.7	10.2	18.8
	3 Fellowship associations	2.4	1.5	2.4
	4 Presidency	6.2	7.8	6.4
	5 Labour unions	1.4	2.3	1.5
	6 Courts	1.6	1.8	1.6
	7 Parliament (TBMM)	3.9	3.7	3.9
	8 Police	3.7	2.3	3.5
	9 Political parties	1.3	1.0	1.3
	10 Educational institutions	3.5	5.2	3.6
	11 Army	14.2	24.0	15.1
	12 Health care and social security institutions	0.7	0.5	0.6
	13 Media	0.3	1.5	0.4
	97 No answer	5.8	–	5.3
	98 I don't know	0.5	–	0.4
	99 None	1.9	10.3	2.7
	Total	100	100	100
II.5.D.48	Which is the institution in Turkey that you trust second-most?			
	1 Government	11.5	15.3	11.8
	2 Religious institutions	14.2	10.7	13.8
	3 Fellowship associations	3.2	3.2	3.2
	4 Presidency	7.4	9.3	7.6
	5 Labour unions	1.8	1.3	1.7
	6 Courts	4.4	3.3	4.3
	7 Parliament (TBMM)	9.8	5.0	9.3
	8 Police	8.2	6.8	8.0
	9 Political parties	3.8	1.7	3.6
	10 Educational institutions	7.1	7.3	7.2
	11 Army	11.0	15.8	11.4
	12 Health care and social security institutions	2.6	2.5	2.6
	13 Media	2.0	2.5	2.0
	97 No answer	10.5	4.8	10.0
	98 I don't know	0.5	–	0.4
	99 None	2.1	10.3	2.8
	Total	100	100	100
II.6.D.50	Which institution in Turkey do you trust least?			
	1 Government	8.8	8.3	8.8
	2 Religious institutions	3.1	7.0	3.5
	3 Fellowship associations	1.8	1.7	1.8
	4 Presidency	7.3	3.5	7.0
	5 Labour unions	2.3	2.7	2.4
	6 Courts	6.4	6.2	6.4
	7 Parliament (TBMM)	2.8	1.8	2.7

	8 Police	7.0	9.7	7.3
	9 Political parties	7.0	8.2	7.1
	10 Educational institutions	1.4	0.5	1.3
	11 Army	9.1	2.8	8.5
	12 Health care and social security institutions	11.4	22.7	12.4
	13 Media	28.9	22.7	28.3
	97 No answer	1.8	–	1.6
	98 I don't know	0.3	–	0.3
	99 None	0.5	2.3	0.6
	Total	100	100	100
II.6.D.51	Which is institution in Turkey that you trust the second-least?			
	1 Government	3.7	5.8	3.9
	2 Religious institutions	2.1	4.7	2.3
	3 Fellowship associations	2.0	2.0	2.0
	4 Presidency	4.3	3.0	4.2
	5 Labour unions	2.9	4.0	3.0
	6 Courts	7.5	7.0	7.5
	7 Parliament (TBMM)	1.7	3.5	1.9
	8 Police	8.9	8.0	8.8
	9 Political parties	12.0	15.2	12.3
	10 Educational institutions	4.2	0.7	3.9
	11 Army	9.1	3.5	8.6
	12 Health care and social security institutions	15.4	17.3	15.6
	13 Media	22.7	21.8	22.6
	97 No answer	2.6	1.2	2.5
	98 I don't know	0.3	–	0.3
	99 None	0.6	2.3	0.7
	Total	100	100	100
II.7.D.52	With which political party in Turkey are you more affiliated?			
	1 AKP (Justice and Development Party)	31.8	35.5	32.2
	2 ANAP (Motherland Party)	4.3	3.2	4.2
	3 CHP (Republican People's Party)	7.1	8.8	7.3
	4 DEHAP (People's Democratic Party)	2.4	5.3	2.7
	5 DYP (True Path Party)	3.4	1.3	3.2
	6 GP (Young Party)	1.7	1.5	1.7
	7 MHP (Nationalist Action Party)	8.2	7.8	8.1
	8 SP (Felicity Party)	10.4	0.7	9.5
	9 ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Support)	–	1.2	0.1
	10 DSP (Democratic Leftist Party)	0.6	0.5	0.6
	11 LDP (Liberal Democrat Party)	0.1	–	0.1
	12 BBP (Great Unity Party)	0.2	0.3	0.2
	98 None	29.8	33.0	30.1
	99 Doesn't want to answer	–	0.8	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.8.D.53	Have you voted in general elections in Turkey at all after settling in Germany/France?			
	1 Yes	25.0	7.8	23.4

	2 No	75.0	92.2	76.6
	Total	100	100	100
II.9.D.54	Did you vote in the November 2002 elections in Turkey?			
	1 Yes	10.7	3.2	10.0
	2 No	89.3	96.8	90.0
	Total	100	100	100
II.10.D.55	(If she/he voted in November 2002 elections) Which party did you vote for?			
	1 AKP (Justice and Development Party)	36.8	31.6	36.7
	2 ANAP (Motherland Party)	5.3	5.3	5.3
	3 CHP (Republican People's Party)	12.3	15.8	12.4
	4 DEHAP (People's Democratic Party)	4.4	10.5	4.6
	5 DYP (True Path Party)	7.0	–	6.8
	6 GP (Young Party)	1.8	–	1.7
	7 MHP (Nationalist Action Party)	3.5	15.8	3.9
	8 SP (Felicity Party)	23.7	5.3	23.1
	9 ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Support)	–	10.5	0.3
	10 DSP (Democratic Leftist Party)	1.8	–	1.7
	11 LDP (Liberal Democrat Party)	2.6	5.3	2.7
	12 BBP (Great Unity Party)	0.9	–	0.9
	98 None	100	100	100
II.11.D.56	What is the most important problem in Turkey?			
	1 Democracy, human rights	23.4	14.2	22.5
	2 Corruption, nepotism, bribery	19.8	21.5	20.0
	3 Pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism	11.9	7.0	11.5
	4 Inflation, poverty	11.5	19.3	12.2
	5 Separatism, terror	5.5	3.2	5.3
	6 Unemployment	10.4	12.3	10.6
	7 The Kurdish question	1.7	3.8	1.9
	8 Threatening laicism, religious fundamentalism	0.7	1.5	0.7
	9 Administrative problems	1.7	1.8	1.7
	10 Diminishing ethical values	3.0	1.0	2.8
	11 Lack of education	4.7	4.5	4.7
	12 Violence	0.4	0.5	0.4
	13 Traffic	1.3	1.2	1.3
	14 Health care and social security problems	3.6	7.8	4.0
	97 No answer	0.4	0.2	0.4
	99 None	0.1	0.2	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.11.D.57	What is the second-most important problem in Turkey?			
	1 Democracy, human rights	8.7	6.2	8.5
	2 Corruption, nepotism, bribery	13.4	10.3	13.1
	3 Pressure on religiosity in the name of laicism	8.1	3.7	7.7
	4 Inflation, poverty	11.1	14.2	11.4
	5 Separatism, terror	7.8	6.8	7.7

	6 Unemployment	11.3	14.0	11.5
	7 The Kurdish question	3.2	4.8	3.3
	8 Threatening laicism, religious fundamentalism	2.2	2.5	2.2
	9 Administrative problems	3.8	2.8	3.8
	10 Diminishing ethical values	6.7	3.0	6.3
	11 Lack of education	9.1	8.0	9.0
	12 Violence	2.1	3.0	2.2
	13 Traffic	3.1	6.0	3.4
	14 Health care and social security problems	8.5	14.3	9.0
	97 No answer	0.9	0.2	0.9
	99 None	0.1	0.2	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.12.D.58	Which country is better in terms of democracy and human rights?			
	1 Turkey	2.6	4.0	2.8
	2 Here	86.4	79.0	85.7
	3 Both of them are good	4.0	10.8	4.7
	4 Both of them are bad	4.4	3.7	4.3
	5 No idea	2.5	2.5	2.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.59	Which country is better in terms of the health care and social security systems it offers?			
	1 Turkey	1.3	0.7	1.3
	2 Here	96.0	96.0	96.0
	3 Both of them are good	1.4	2.5	1.5
	4 Both of them are bad	0.7	0.2	0.6
	5 No idea	0.7	0.7	0.7
	Total	100	100	100
D.60	Which country is better in terms of educational systems?			
	1 Turkey	7.4	9.3	7.6
	2 Here	77.3	71.3	76.7
	3 Both of them are good	9.3	16.0	9.9
	4 Both of them are bad	2.7	0.3	2.5
	5 No idea	3.3	3.0	3.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.61	Which country is better in terms of job opportunities?			
	1 Turkey	3.3	2.5	3.2
	2 Here	77.4	85.7	78.2
	3 Both of them are good	2.9	7.0	3.3
	4 Both of them are bad	14.0	3.5	13.0
	5 No idea	2.4	1.3	2.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.62	Which country is better in terms of the efficiency of judiciary system?			
	1 Turkey	2.5	5.2	2.8
	2 Here	77.3	61.5	75.8
	3 Both of them are good	4.4	9.8	4.9

	4 Both of them are bad	3.8	7.8	4.2
	5 No idea	11.9	15.7	12.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.63	Which country is better in terms of mutual tolerance?			
	1 Turkey	42.9	41.7	42.8
	2 Here	37.2	32.8	36.8
	3 Both of them are good	11.5	18.7	12.1
	4 Both of them are bad	4.9	4.2	4.8
	5 No idea	3.6	2.7	3.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.64	Which country is better in terms of respecting rules?			
	1 Turkey	3.5	10.5	4.1
	2 Here	88.2	70.3	86.5
	3 Both of them are good	3.7	12.0	4.4
	4 Both of them are bad	2.4	4.7	2.7
	5 No idea	2.3	2.5	2.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.66	Which country is better in terms of a comfortable and easy life?			
	1 Turkey	28.3	24.5	27.9
	2 Here	51.6	48.8	51.4
	3 Both of them are good	13.3	22.7	14.2
	4 Both of them are bad	3.4	2.2	3.3
	5 No idea	3.4	1.8	3.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.67	Which country is better in terms of valuing human capital?			
	1 Turkey	7.4	6.3	7.3
	2 Here	74.8	77.7	75.1
	3 Both of them are good	6.1	8.5	6.3
	4 Both of them are bad	7.1	4.2	6.9
	5 No idea	4.5	3.3	4.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.68	Which country is better in terms of social/moral values?			
	1 Turkey	56.0	42.3	54.7
	2 Here	19.9	33.7	21.2
	3 Both of them are good	5.0	13.0	5.7
	4 Both of them are bad	13.4	3.8	12.5
	5 No idea	5.7	7.2	5.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.69	Which country do you find is better in terms of respecting cultures and religions?			
	1 Turkey	25.6	34.0	26.4
	2 Here	48.5	33.8	47.1
	3 Both of them are good	14.9	21.7	15.6
	4 Both of them are bad	7.2	7.7	7.3

	5 No idea	3.8	2.8	3.7
	Total	100	100	100
D.70	Which country is better in terms of the attitudes of police?			
	1 Turkey	6.0	10.3	6.4
	2 Here	66.3	50.8	64.8
	3 Both of them are good	7.8	16.0	8.6
	4 Both of them are bad	11.5	15.8	12.0
	5 No idea	8.4	7.0	8.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.71	Which country is better in terms of equal treatment for all?			
	1 Turkey	3.6	7.2	3.9
	2 Here	71.8	60.3	70.7
	3 Both of them are good	5.2	13.5	6.0
	4 Both of them are bad	11.6	14.7	11.9
	5 No idea	7.8	4.3	7.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.72	Which country is better in terms of seeking rights?			
	1 Turkey	1.8	3.0	1.9
	2 Here	87.1	79.5	86.4
	3 Both of them are good	2.1	8.8	2.7
	4 Both of them are bad	4.0	4.2	4.0
	5 No idea	5.0	4.5	4.9
	Total	100	100	100
II.13.E.74	What kind of positive impacts do the Turks have on the host society?			
	1 Cultural diversity and richness	53.3	42.5	52.3
	2 Labour force	64.6	73.0	65.4
	3 Creating new job opportunities	38.0	39.5	38.2
	4 Bringing new familial and ethical values	32.0	21.3	31.0
	5 Bringing humanitarian quality	26.9	19.0	26.1
	6 Unity and solidarity	0.2	–	0.2
	7 Tax	0.3	0.3	0.3
	8 Population problems	–	0.2	0.0
	9 Contribution to the new generation	0.1	0.2	0.1
	10 Religious beliefs	0.2	–	0.2
	97 No answer	0.3	–	0.3
	98 I don't think they have a positive impact	3.8	4.7	3.9
	Total	100	100	100
II.14.E.75	What kind of negative impacts do the Turks have on the host society?			
	1 Abusing the social security system	25.2	17.8	24.5
	2 Not adapting to local values	26.9	32.5	27.5
	3 Constructing their own closed communities	26.5	32.0	27.0
	4 Being lazy	23.7	14.8	22.8
	5 Not obeying rules	36.3	22.7	35.0
	6 Conflicts because of disintegration	0.4	–	0.3
	7 People coming from Turkey who act inconsiderately	0.1	–	0.1

	8 Language	–	0.3	0.0
	9 Immorality	0.1	–	0.1
	10 Corruption	0.1	–	0.1
	11 Egoism and jealousy	–	0.3	0.0
	12 Turkish men following women of the host society	–	0.2	0.0
	97 No answer	1.1	1.0	1.1
	98 I don't think they have a negative impact	24.6	32.8	25.4
	99 None	0.1	–	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.15.D.76	Which institution is the most influential in Turkish politics?			
	1 Government	16.1	23.3	16.7
	2 Army	40.7	34.7	40.1
	3 National Security Board	6.1	4.5	6.0
	4 Media	11.7	4.0	11.0
	5 Business elites	2.7	3.5	2.8
	6 The US	12.8	11.3	12.6
	7 The European Union	2.5	6.5	2.9
	8 Religious elites	1.4	1.8	1.4
	9 Parliament (TBMM)	1.8	4.2	2.0
	10 Presidency	2.2	2.7	2.2
	97 No answer	1.4	2.3	1.5
	98 No idea	0.6	0.7	0.6
	99 None	0.1	0.5	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.77	Which is the second-most influential institution in Turkish politics?			
	1 Government	9.8	12.5	10.0
	2 Army	16.8	17.3	16.9
	3 National Security Board	9.3	6.0	9.0
	4 Media	19.2	7.5	18.1
	5 Business elites	4.5	9.0	4.9
	6 The US	18.0	10.8	17.3
	7 The European Union	5.6	9.7	6.0
	8 Religious elites	1.7	5.5	2.1
	9 Parliament (TBMM)	6.0	6.7	6.1
	10 Presidency	5.2	9.8	5.6
	97 No answer	3.2	4.0	3.3
	98 No idea	0.6	0.7	0.6
	99 None	0.1	0.5	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
II.16.D.78	How do you find Turkey's recent situation compared to recent years?			
	1 Much worse	3.8	5.5	4.0
	2 Worse	15.4	15.5	15.4
	3 The same	18.5	14.2	18.1
	4 Better	53.2	51.3	53.1
	5 Much better	9.0	13.5	9.4
	Total	100	100	100

II.17.D.79	Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey's future?			
	1 Very pessimistic	2.4	3.8	2.6
	2 Pessimistic	10.3	10.5	10.3
	3 Neither pessimistic nor optimistic	28.5	24.0	28.0
	4 Optimistic	48.5	51.0	48.7
	5 Very optimistic	10.3	10.5	10.3
	9 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
III.1.D.81	What is the primary problem that you face in the host-country as a Turkish person?			
	1 Contradictory moral values	25.8	17.5	25.0
	2 Unemployment	15.0	10.5	14.6
	3 Discrimination	22.6	16.8	22.1
	4 Religious intolerance	5.1	2.2	4.8
	5 Intolerance to our Turkishness	3.6	4.0	3.6
	6 Loneliness and miscommunication	3.4	6.8	3.7
	7 Drug use	4.1	3.3	4.1
	8 Exploitation of our labour	1.8	3.0	1.9
	9 Racism	4.8	6.3	4.9
	10 Poverty	0.5	0.3	0.5
	11 Cultural and linguistic assimilation	5.3	6.2	5.3
	12 Lack of German/French language	7.2	18.3	8.3
	97 No answer	0.6	–	0.5
	99 None	0.3	4.7	0.7
	Total	100	100	100
III.1.D.82	What is the secondary problem that you face here as a Turkish person?			
	1 Contradictory moral values	8.8	9.8	8.9
	2 Unemployment	8.7	6.8	8.6
	3 Discrimination	17.7	12.2	17.2
	4 Religious intolerance	5.4	4.2	5.3
	5 Intolerance to our Turkishness	7.0	3.7	6.7
	6 Loneliness and miscommunication	6.7	10.0	7.0
	7 Drug use	6.8	6.8	6.8
	8 Exploitation of labour	4.0	5.0	4.1
	9 Racism	10.0	10.5	10.1
	10 Poverty	2.4	1.8	2.4
	11 Cultural and linguistic assimilation	11.2	8.0	10.9
	12 Lack of German/French language	9.5	12.2	9.7
	97 No answer	1.3	4.3	1.6
	99 None	0.3	4.7	0.7
	Total	100	100	100
III.2.83	Which institution do you trust most?			
	1 Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)	9.6	21.0	10.7
	2 Turkish associations	4.1	4.0	4.1
	3 Mosques	18.6	7.0	17.5
	4 Fellowship organisations	1.1	0.8	1.1

	5 French government	9.3	12.7	9.6
	6 Labour unions and chambers	2.3	3.5	2.5
	7 Courts	16.8	5.5	15.7
	8 Parliament	1.5	1.2	1.5
	9 Police	6.9	3.2	6.5
	10 Political parties	0.5	–	0.4
	11 Educational institutions	5.8	6.5	5.9
	12 Social security and health care institutions	20.4	29.2	21.2
	13 European Parliament	1.9	3.0	2.0
	14 Media	0.6	0.8	0.6
	97 No answer	0.6	–	0.5
	99 None	0.1	1.7	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
III.2.D.84	Which institution do you trust second-most?			
	1 Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)	4.9	7.2	5.1
	2 Turkish associations	6.3	7.5	6.4
	3 Mosques	9.1	8.7	9.1
	4 Fellowship organisations	1.2	1.2	1.2
	5 French government	8.5	8.7	8.6
	6 Labour unions and chambers	2.2	6.2	2.5
	7 Courts	15.6	5.3	14.6
	8 Parliament	2.7	1.3	2.6
	9 Police	11.6	7.7	11.3
	10 Political parties	0.3	0.8	0.3
	11 Educational institutions	9.7	12.2	9.9
	12 Social security and health care institutions	21.4	22.3	21.5
	13 European Parliament	2.2	5.3	2.5
	14 Media	2.2	1.7	2.1
	97 No answer	2.1	2.3	2.1
	99 None	0.1	1.7	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
III.3.D.85	Which the institution do you trust least?			
	1 Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)	25.7	7.7	24.0
	2 Turkish associations	7.2	8.2	7.3
	3 Mosques	5.0	7.3	5.2
	4 Fellowship associations	3.8	5.3	4.0
	5 French government	6.9	8.3	7.0
	6 Labour unions and chambers	4.2	4.0	4.2
	7 Courts	1.7	3.8	1.9
	8 Parliament	1.9	2.7	2.0
	9 Police	5.3	10.5	5.8
	10 Political parties	12.2	15.3	12.5
	11 Educational institutions	1.2	1.7	1.3
	12 Social security and health care institutions	0.5	0.5	0.5
	13 European Parliament	3.8	2.3	3.6
	14 Media	18.6	18.3	18.6

	97 No answer	1.8	–	1.6
	98 I don't know	0.2	–	0.2
	99 None	0.1	4.0	0.5
	Total	100	100	100
III.3.D.86	Which institution do you trust second-least?			
	1 Turkish official institutions (embassies, consulates)	5.7	2.0	5.4
	2 Turkish associations	9.0	6.5	8.8
	3 Mosques	2.8	6.7	3.2
	4 Fellowship associations	6.1	5.8	6.1
	5 French government	6.1	5.0	6.0
	5 Labour unions and chambers	5.7	6.5	5.8
	6 Courts	3.0	5.3	3.2
	7 Parliament	3.0	4.0	3.1
	8 Police	6.2	9.3	6.5
	9 Political parties	15.1	17.3	15.3
	10 Educational institutions	2.9	1.2	2.7
	11 Social security and health care institutions	0.6	0.8	0.6
	12 European Parliament	7.1	6.7	7.1
	13 Media	22.8	16.3	22.2
	97 No answer	3.4	2.5	3.3
	98 I don't know	0.2	–	0.2
	99 None	0.2	4.0	0.5
	Total	100	100	100
III.4.D.87	Do you have German/French citizenship?			
	1 Yes, I do	26.2	36.2	27.1
	2 I have already applied and am waiting for it	6.9	7.5	7.0
	3 I am planning to apply	26.0	30.5	26.4
	4 I am not planning to apply	40.8	25.7	39.4
	9 No answer	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
III.5.D.88	Is there any organisation here in which you are a member or you are involved?			
	1 No	61.2	71.2	62.2
	2 Yes	38.8	28.8	37.8
	Total	100	100	100
E.89	What kind of organisation are you involved in or are you a member of?			
	1 Labour union	11.6	11.6	11.6
	2 Chamber of occupation	2.7	5.2	2.8
	3 Political party	8.2	2.9	7.8
	4 Ethnic association	5.1	4.6	5.1
	5 Turkish/French friendship association	7.5	30.6	9.2
	6 Cultural centre	20.6	31.8	21.4
	7 Fellowship solidarity association	3.1	4.6	3.3
	8 Alumni organisation	2.4	4.0	2.5
	9 Sports club	21.1	16.8	20.8

	10 Religious association	44.8	15.6	42.7
	11 Aid organisations	2.2	0.6	2.1
	12 Social Democratic Party	0.2	–	0.2
	13 Funeral fund	0.2	–	0.2
	14 Social Democrats (SPD)	0.2	–	0.2
	15 Students clubs	0.7	1.2	0.8
	16 Meditation	–	0.6	0.0
	17 Political associations	0.5	1.2	0.5
	18 Amnesty organisation	–	0.6	0.0
	19 Mosque	–	0.6	0.0
	20 Greenpeace	–	0.6	0.0
	21 General environment	–	0.6	0.0
	22 Handcraft associations	–	0.6	0.0
	23 Insurance	0.2	–	0.2
	24 Kadek-PKK Köln	0.2	–	0.2
	25 Folklore group	0.2	–	0.2
	26 Foreigners' representatives, inter-religious dialogue	0.2	–	0.2
	27 Guardians' associations	0.2	–	0.2
	28 Foreigners' associations	0.2	–	0.2
	97 No answer	1.5	0.6	1.4
	Total	100	100	100
III.6.D.90	To what extent are you interested in politics?			
	1 Not at all	37.1	46.3	38.0
	2 Not really	22.2	13.3	21.3
	3 So-so	17.6	19.0	17.7
	4 As much as I can	17.6	18.2	17.6
	5 Very much so	5.6	3.2	5.4
	Total	100	100	100
III.7.D.91	Do you have the right to vote in local or general elections?			
	1 Yes	24.7	30.2	25.2
	2 No	72.8	68.5	72.4
	3 No idea	2.5	1.3	2.4
	Total	100	100	100
III.8.D.92	(If she/he has the right to vote) Did you ever vote?			
	1 Yes	73.8	44.5	70.3
	2 No	26.2	55.5	29.7
	Total	100	100	100
III.9.D.93	Regarding your all conditions, rights and opportunities, where do you feel in your own society on the scale below?			
	1	2.3	1.3	2.2
	2	1.2	1.3	1.2
	3	4.1	4.0	4.1
	4	6.6	5.5	6.5
	5	10.9	8.7	10.7
	6	19.5	20.5	19.6
	7	17.4	18.2	17.4

	8	14.6	13.7	14.6
	9	9.7	10.5	9.7
	10	7.9	9.0	8.0
	11	2.2	3.3	2.3
	12	3.7	4.0	3.7
	Total	100	100	100
III.10.D.94	With which political party are you more affiliated?			
	1 Liberal parties	3.3	1.3	3.1
	2 Conservative parties	2.6	0.7	2.4
	3 Social-democratic parties	27.0	27.7	27.1
	4 Greens and environmentalist parties	8.5	5.0	8.2
	5 Radical right, nationalist parties	0.8	1.7	0.9
	6 Radical left, communist parties	1.2	3.8	1.5
	7 In equal distance to all	4.1	5.2	4.2
	8 None of the above	52.3	54.7	52.5
	Total	100	100	100
III.11.D.95	Do you think that this country has become better or worse compared with previous years?			
	1 Much worse	18.6	6.0	17.4
	2 Worse	71.5	40.5	68.5
	3 The same	6.0	27.0	8.0
	4 Better	3.2	24.3	5.2
	5 Much better	0.8	2.2	0.9
	Total	100	100	100
III.12.D.96	Are you optimistic or pessimistic about this country's future?			
	1 Very pessimistic	7.4	1.3	6.8
	2 Pessimistic	43.9	21.8	41.9
	3 Neither pessimistic nor optimistic	33.6	32.8	33.5
	4 Optimistic	14.1	39.7	16.5
	5 Very optimistic	0.9	4.0	1.2
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
III.13.D.97	Would you recommend immigrating to Germany/France to those from Turkey?			
	1 I would recommend it	20.7	37.8	22.3
	2 I wouldn't recommend it	79.3	60.5	77.6
	3 It depends	–	1.7	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
IV.1.D.99	What does the European Union mean to you?			
	1 An economic integration	48.2	63.7	49.6
	2 A common cultural policy	5.7	5.7	5.7
	3 A democracy project	6.5	6.3	6.5
	4 A Christian club	21.3	11.2	20.4
	5 Exploitation, imperialism	6.9	3.7	6.6
	6 A political and military superpower	4.8	7.7	5.1

	7 A bureaucratic community that is detached from the public	6.6	1.8	6.1
	Total	100	100	100
IV.2.D.100	To what extent you are either positive or negative about the EU?			
	1 Very negative	5.5	4.3	5.4
	2 Negative	22.3	12.2	21.3
	3 Both positive and negative	29.3	23.2	28.7
	4 Positive	29.4	47.3	31.1
	5 Very positive	2.7	6.3	3.1
	6 No idea	10.8	6.7	10.4
	Total	100	100	100
IV.3.D.101	To what extent you are positive or negative about the euro?			
	1 Very negative	50.4	26.8	48.2
	2 Negative	34.8	28.5	34.2
	3 Both positive and negative	6.7	17.7	7.7
	4 Positive	4.3	21.0	5.9
	5 Very positive	1.6	4.3	1.9
	6 No idea	2.2	1.7	2.1
	Total	100	100	100
IV.4.D.102	Which of these identifications suits you most?			
	1 I am Turkish	36.6	24.2	35.4
	2 First Turkish and then European	49.9	58.5	50.7
	3 First European and then Turkish	9.2	11.5	9.4
	4 Only European	3.8	3.5	3.7
	5 Foreigner in both	0.1	0.2	0.1
	6 World citizen	0.1	0.2	0.1
	7 Human being	–	0.2	0.0
	8 Both French and Turkish	–	0.2	0.0
	97 No answer	0.4	0.7	0.4
	99 None	–	1.0	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
IV.5.	What does it mean to participate in the EU for Turkey?			
D.103	More democracy			
	1 Yes	62.7	65.8	63.0
	2 No	21.1	21.7	21.2
	3 No idea	16.2	12.5	15.8
	Total	100	100	100
D.104	More job opportunities			
	1 Yes	61.4	83.2	63.5
	2 No	26.9	13.2	25.6
	3 No idea	11.7	3.7	11.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.105	More human rights			
	1 Yes	69.3	78.5	70.2
	2 No	17.6	15.5	17.4

	3 No idea	13.1	6.0	12.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.106	Separation			
	1 Yes	23.8	22.8	23.8
	2 No	53.3	57.0	53.7
	3 No idea	22.8	20.2	22.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.107	The end of independence			
	1 Yes	23.9	24.2	24.0
	2 No	52.1	57.5	52.6
	3 No idea	23.9	18.3	23.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.108	Moral breakdown			
	1 Yes	52.0	35.8	50.5
	2 No	29.8	45.5	31.3
	3 No idea	18.2	18.7	18.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.109	Exploitation			
	1 Yes	37.2	34.7	36.9
	2 No	39.4	46.7	40.1
	3 No idea	23.4	18.7	22.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.110	The migration of more people from Turkey to Europe			
	1 Yes	71.2	68.2	70.9
	2 No	16.9	21.0	17.3
	3 No idea	11.9	10.8	11.8
	Total	100	100	100
IV.6.D.112	To what extent are you either positive or negative about the Turkey joining the EU?			
	1 It definitely should	29.4	36.8	30.1
	2 It had better	10.3	19.7	11.2
	3 It definitely should not	14.7	8.2	14.1
	4 It had better not	15.5	12.3	15.2
	5 It doesn't matter	23.6	19.8	23.2
	6 No idea	6.5	3.2	6.2
	Total	100	100	100
IV.7.D.113	What is your prediction about whether Turkey will join the EU?			
	1 It probably could join	37.1	43.7	37.7
	2 It definitely should join	4.3	11.0	5.0
	3 It definitely should not join	15.6	9.7	15.0
	4 I do not believe that it could join	33.8	29.0	33.3
	5 No idea	9.2	6.7	9.0
	Total	100	100	100

IV.8.D.114	Would you consider returning back to Turkey if Turkey joins the European Union?			
	1 Yes, I would certainly return	8.5	9.7	8.7
	2 Yes, I would	19.2	21.3	19.4
	3 I don't know	38.0	28.5	37.1
	4 No, I wouldn't	23.8	27.8	24.1
	5 No, I wouldn't certainly return	10.5	12.7	10.7
	Total	100	100	100
IV.9.D.115	Why do you think the European Union supports Turkey's membership to the Union?			
	1 Because it is an important economic market	24.7	27.2	24.9
	2 Because it has strategic importance	26.9	21.0	26.4
	3 To increase cultural diversity in Europe	0.9	2.7	1.1
	4 Because it bridges the European Union between Central Asia and the Middle East	16.6	17.3	16.7
	5 Because it has rich underground resources	12.9	12.2	12.8
	6 Because it has a cheap labour force	9.0	12.5	9.3
	7 Because of its young population	6.4	5.8	6.3
	8 For no reason	0.5	0.3	0.5
	9 The European Union does not have any interest	0.1	–	0.1
	10b To incorporate a moderate Islamic country into their Union	–	0.2	0.0
	11 Because it is a part of Europe	0.1	–	0.1
	12 Because the European Union needs Turkey	0.2	0.2	0.2
	97 No answer	1.3	0.7	1.3
	98 I don't know	0.1	–	0.1
	99 None	0.3	–	0.3
	Total	100	100	100
IV.10.D.116	Why do you think the European Union is against Turkey's membership to the Union?			
	1 Because of its underdeveloped economy	15.3	13.3	15.1
	2 Because of its bad record regarding democracy and human rights	12.3	13.7	12.4
	3 Because it is a Muslim nation	47.3	48.5	47.4
	4 Because of historical hostility	7.5	3.7	7.1
	5 To avoid the destruction of the cultural structure in Europe	2.7	2.2	2.7
	6 Because of the fear of immigrant flows	11.7	13.8	11.9
	7 To avoid being neighbour to the problematic Middle-Eastern region	1.1	2.7	1.3
	8 Turkey will have the right to comment about the European Union	0.5	0.2	0.4
	9 Because Turkey will be powerful	0.1	0.3	0.1
	10 The Cyprus and Kurdish problems	–	0.2	0.0
	11 Immorality	0.2	–	0.2
	12 The Cyprus problem	0.1	–	0.1
	14 Population potential of Turkey	–	0.2	0.0
	15 Proximity to Iraq	0.1	–	0.1
	16 Fear of unification	–	0.2	0.0
	97 No answer	0.8	1.2	0.8
	98 I don't know	0.1	–	0.1
	99 None	0.2	–	0.2
	Total	100	100	100

IV.11	Which of the features below do you think has changed with Turkey's efforts to enter the EU?			
D.117	Increasing democratic rights and freedoms			
	1 Yes	55.2	60.2	55.7
	2 No	26.6	26.5	26.6
	3 No idea	18.2	13.3	17.8
	Total	100	100	100
D.118	It has been a positive development towards the solution of the Kurdish problem			
	1 Yes	40.3	46.2	40.8
	2 No	32.7	32.7	32.7
	3 No idea	27.0	21.2	26.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.119	Development in terms of human rights			
	1 Yes	54.2	63.0	55.0
	2 No	29.0	25.2	28.7
	3 No idea	16.8	11.8	16.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.120	Development in economic activities			
	1 Yes	45.4	47.0	45.6
	2 No	37.3	43.2	37.8
	3 No idea	17.3	9.8	16.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.121	Breakdown in cultural values			
	1 Yes	39.5	32.5	38.9
	2 No	38.3	52.8	39.7
	3 No idea	22.2	14.7	21.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.122	Our national independence has been damaged			
	1 Yes	24.2	20.2	23.8
	2 No	49.6	62.3	50.8
	3 No idea	26.2	17.5	25.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.123	By the introduction of the Custom's Union, investments have decreased while unemployment has increased			
	1 Yes	32.7	32.8	32.7
	2 No	26.9	36.8	27.9
	3 No idea	40.4	30.3	39.4
	Total	100	100	100
V.1.E.125	Which identity among those below defines you most?			
	1 Turkish citizen	24.0	34.8	25.1
	2 Turkish	22.5	24.0	22.7
	3 Kurdish	4.2	3.8	4.2
	4 Muslim	32.7	16.3	31.1

	5 Muslim-Turk	39.8	41.3	40.0
	6 Alevi	3.3	3.5	3.3
	7 German/French citizen	6.9	9.5	7.2
	8 German/French Turk	7.2	17.2	8.2
	9 Euro-Turk	5.6	6.3	5.7
	10 World citizen	5.3	10.2	5.7
	11 EU citizen	2.1	4.3	2.3
	12 Muslim-Kurdish	0.2	–	0.2
	13 Human being	0.3	0.3	0.3
	14 Euro-Muslim	0.1	–	0.1
	97 No answer	0.3	–	0.3
	99 None	0.1	–	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
V.2.E.126	How do you define yourself with regard to the identifications below?			
	1 Nationalist	17.7	25.7	18.4
	2 Leftist	3.5	5.7	3.7
	3 Democrat	17.2	15.8	17.1
	4 Religious	32.8	21.7	31.7
	5 Conservative	16.9	4.5	15.7
	6 Rightist	3.4	2.2	3.3
	7 Ataturkist	8.7	21.5	9.9
	8 Laicist	3.7	20.3	5.2
	9 Laicist	7.9	6.3	7.7
	10 Ülkücü (ultra-nationalist)	3.9	8.0	4.3
	11 Revolutionary	0.9	2.8	1.1
	12 Patriot	22.3	18.8	22.0
	13 Islamist	13.7	8.3	13.2
	97 No answer	0.3	0.5	0.3
	98 I don't know	0.1	–	0.1
	99 None	0.2	0.7	0.2
	Total	100	100	100
V.3.D.127	Which one of the categories below identifies you most in terms of your religious affiliation?			
	1 Sunni Muslim	49.9	46.3	49.5
	2 Alevi Muslim	3.8	5.0	4.0
	3 Muslim	43.7	40.7	43.4
	4 Christian	0.1	0.5	0.1
	5 Jewish	–	0.5	0.0
	6 Atheist	0.5	5.3	0.9
	7 Turkish	0.4	0.2	0.4
	8 Faithful to God	0.1	0.3	0.1
	9 Agnostic	0.1	0.2	0.1
	10 Materialist	–	0.2	0.0
	11 Humanist/mortal	0.1	–	0.1
	12 Modern Muslim	–	0.5	0.0
	13 Shia	0.2	–	0.2
	14 Kurdish Muslim	0.1	–	0.1
	15 Buddhist	0.1	–	0.1

	97 No answer	0.7	0.3	0.6
	99 None	0.4	–	0.3
	Total	100	100	100
V.4.D.128	How do you see yourself with regard to the following statements about your faith?			
	1 Quite a religious person fulfilling all the requirements of my faith	7.5	9.5	7.7
	2 Someone trying to fulfil religious requirements	53.6	47.3	53.0
	3 Faithful, but not fulfilling the religious requirements	35.4	32.8	35.2
	4 Someone who doesn't really believe in faith	2.4	4.5	2.6
	5 Someone who does not have faith	1.0	5.3	1.4
	9 No answer	–	0.5	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.5.D.129	Has your religious faith become stronger or weaker than before?			
	1 Become stronger	48.5	37.3	47.4
	2 Become weaker	12.3	11.3	12.2
	3 No difference	39.2	51.3	40.4
	Total	100	100	100
V.6	Could you tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements?			
D.131	Religious and world affairs should be separate from each other.			
	1 Agree	43.4	71.5	46.0
	2 Disagree	41.5	18.8	39.4
	3 No idea	15.1	9.7	14.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.132	Religious and state affairs should be separate from each other.			
	1 Agree	45.4	77.0	48.3
	2 Disagree	39.8	16.0	37.6
	3 No idea	14.8	7.0	14.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.133	Western people should adapt to Islamic people.			
	1 Agree	31.5	25.8	30.9
	2 Disagree	42.2	53.2	43.2
	3 No idea	26.4	21.0	25.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.134	Islamic people should adapt to Western people.			
	1 Agree	11.5	22.2	12.5
	2 Disagree	66.8	60.7	66.2
	3 No idea	21.8	17.2	21.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.135	No one should adapt to others; everyone should have his/her way.			
	1 Agree	64.8	79.5	66.2
	2 Disagree	26.6	16.5	25.6
	3 No idea	8.6	4.0	8.2
	Total	100	100	100

D.136	Both groups should interact with each other in order to find their similarities			
	1 Agree	85.9	89.7	86.3
	2 Disagree	8.0	4.7	7.7
	3 No idea	6.1	5.7	6.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.137	Turks have no friends but other Turks			
	1 Agree	32.4	42.5	33.3
	2 Disagree	57.1	52.5	56.7
	3 No idea	10.5	5.0	10.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.138	Freedom of expression, religion and faith is good but the security of the state is a priority above all			
	1 Agree	35.3	50.2	36.7
	2 Disagree	46.5	36.0	45.5
	3 No idea	18.2	13.8	17.8
	Total	100	100	100
D.139	Military intervention in political life is good			
	1 Agree	15.1	38.8	17.4
	2 Disagree	63.6	41.5	61.5
	3 No idea	21.3	19.7	21.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.140	I hope my grave will be in Turkey			
	1 Yes	81.6	81.7	81.6
	2 No	3.2	3.0	3.2
	3 It doesn't matter	15.2	15.3	15.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.141	Turkish children should be sent to Turkish schools			
	1 Yes	33.2	55.2	35.3
	2 No	49.6	24.3	47.2
	3 It doesn't matter	17.2	20.5	17.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.142	Female students should have the right to wear a headscarf			
	1 Yes	80.0	48.3	77.0
	2 No	6.6	29.0	8.7
	3 It doesn't matter	13.4	22.7	14.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.143	There should be Islamic education in German/French schools			
	1 Yes	81.4	49.0	78.3
	2 No	4.5	32.5	7.2
	3 It doesn't matter	14.1	18.5	14.5
	Total	100	100	100

V.8	Do you believe that you are discriminated or pressured by the Turks living in Germany/France?			
D.148	Because of my religious sect			
	1 Yes	11.7	6.3	11.2
	2 No	88.3	93.2	88.7
	9 No answer	–	0.5	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.149	Because of my religion			
	1 Yes	24.0	11.5	22.9
	2 No	76.0	88.2	77.1
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.150	Because of my clothes or turban			
	1 Yes	21.2	13.7	20.5
	2 No	78.8	86.0	79.5
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.151	Because of my ethnic identity			
	1 Yes	16.7	8.2	15.9
	2 No	83.3	91.2	84.0
	9 No answer	–	0.7	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.152	Because of my city or region in Turkey			
	1 Yes	6.2	4.7	6.1
	2 No	93.8	94.7	93.9
	9 No answer	–	0.7	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.154	Because of my dialect			
	1 Yes	10.9	8.3	10.7
	2 No	89.1	91.3	89.3
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.155	Because of my district			
	1 Yes	3.7	4.0	3.7
	2 No	96.3	95.7	96.3
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.156	Because of my age			
	1 Yes	3.6	0.8	3.3
	2 No	96.4	98.8	96.7
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100

D.157	Because of my gender			
	1 Yes	3.0	2.5	3.0
	2 No	97.0	97.0	97.0
	9 No answer	–	0.5	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.158	Because of my job			
	1 Yes	4.4	3.8	4.4
	2 No	95.6	95.8	95.6
	9 No answer	–	0.3	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.9.D.159	Which of the following statements identifies your relationship with the German/French people?			
	1 I have close German/French friends	45.0	56.8	46.1
	2 I have German/French friends with whom we visit as families	13.1	20.3	13.8
	3 There are German/French people whom I see because it is necessary	33.9	15.8	32.2
	4 I do not have friendships with German/French people	9.9	6.7	9.6
	9 No answer	–	0.7	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
V.10.D.161	How do you find the fact that people are punished because of their opinions?			
	1 I find it right	5.5	8.5	5.8
	2 I find it wrong	52.9	44.0	52.0
	3 It depends	33.9	40.3	34.5
	4 No idea	7.7	7.2	7.6
	Total	100	100	100
V.11.D.162	How do you find the abolition of a political party because of the opinions it holds?			
	1 I find it right	6.3	14.5	7.1
	2 I find it wrong	46.4	34.8	45.3
	3 It depends	37.7	39.2	37.8
	4 No idea	9.7	11.5	9.8
	Total	100	100	100
V.12.D.163	Would you consider returning back to Turkey in the future?			
	1 Absolutely yes	25.9	22.2	25.6
	2 Maybe	57.1	59.3	57.3
	3 Absolutely not	17.0	18.3	17.1
	4 No idea	–	0.2	0.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.13.D.164	Do you think laws should be enacted for the security of citizens or of the state?			
	1 They should give priority to the security of the state	23.7	26.3	23.9
	2 They should give priority to the security of the citizen	76.3	73.2	76.0
	9 No answer	–	0.5	0.0
	Total	100	100	100

V.14.D.165	Democracy, freedom of religion and faith, nationalism and livelihood are important concepts for everybody; which of these concepts comes first for you?			
	1 Freedom of religion and faith	53.6	31.2	51.5
	2 Livelihood	24.9	43.0	26.6
	3 Democracy	17.9	20.7	18.2
	4 Nationalism	3.6	4.5	3.7
	9 No answer	–	0.7	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.166	Do you find it right that people are punished because of their opinions about the Kurdish problem?			
	1 Yes	8.9	18.7	9.8
	2 No	45.3	38.7	44.6
	3 It depends	35.4	32.2	35.1
	4 No idea	10.4	10.5	10.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.167	Do you agree with the abolition of a political party because of its opinions about the Kurdish problem?			
	1 Yes	14.6	24.0	15.4
	2 No	41.8	37.3	41.4
	3 It depends	32.7	27.5	32.2
	4 No idea	11.0	11.2	11.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.168	Do you agree with the punishment of people because of their Islamic opinions?			
	1 Yes	3.3	8.7	3.8
	2 No	69.2	61.2	68.4
	3 It depends	21.4	24.7	21.7
	4 No idea	6.1	5.5	6.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.169	Do you agree with the abolition of a political party because of its Islamic opinions?			
	1 Yes	4.6	13.8	5.5
	2 No	63.4	52.5	62.4
	3 It depends	24.8	25.5	24.9
	4 No idea	7.2	8.2	7.3
	Total	100	100	100
V.16	Could you tell us if you agree or disagree with the following statements?			
D.171	Women want a happy family life			
	1 I agree	88.2	86.8	88.0
	2 I don't agree	6.1	7.8	6.3
	3 No idea	5.7	5.3	5.7
	Total	100	100	100
D.172	Women should work in order to be independent			
	1 I agree	34.1	63.2	36.8

	2 I don't agree	50.4	27.5	48.3
	3 No idea	15.5	9.3	14.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.173	Both husband and wife should assist the family budget together			
	1 I agree	61.8	83.3	63.8
	2 I don't agree	26.0	10.3	24.5
	3 No idea	12.2	6.3	11.7
	Total	100	100	100
V.17.D.175	I could say that I am a happy person			
	1 Absolutely suits me	25.2	24.5	25.1
	2 Suits me	53.8	54.5	53.9
	3 It doesn't matter	14.0	14.2	14.0
	4 It doesn't suit me	6.6	5.0	6.4
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit me	0.5	1.8	0.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.176	I live as my heart desires since you cannot know what tomorrow will bring			
	1 Absolutely suits me	8.2	13.7	8.7
	2 Suits me	23.2	34.3	24.2
	3 It doesn't matter	22.0	21.5	21.9
	4 It doesn't suit me	36.2	21.7	34.9
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit	10.4	8.8	10.3
	Total	100	100	100
D.177	I do not expect anything from life anymore			
	1 Absolutely suits me	3.1	2.7	3.1
	2 Suits me	6.9	6.7	6.9
	3 It doesn't matter	9.6	8.3	9.5
	4 It doesn't suit me	46.0	40.0	45.4
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit me	34.4	42.3	35.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.178	I will be rich in the future			
	1 Absolutely suits me	6.4	8.3	6.6
	2 Suits me	10.5	16.2	11.1
	3 It doesn't matter	32.3	28.7	32.0
	4 It doesn't suit me	38.2	32.3	37.7
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit me	12.6	14.5	12.8
	Total	100	100	100
D179	I could even commit an 'honour' crime			
	1 Absolutely suits me	20.1	19.0	20.0
	2 Suits me	20.7	22.2	20.8
	3 It doesn't matter	20.8	12.8	20.0
	4 It doesn't suit me	22.7	22.7	22.7
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit me	15.8	23.3	16.5
	Total	100	100	100

D.180	I think that the degree of sexual freedom is immoral in my country of residence			
	1 Absolutely suits me	37.2	20.5	35.6
	2 Suits me	34.6	31.7	34.3
	3 It doesn't matter	14.2	19.3	14.7
	4 It doesn't suit me	9.3	19.0	10.2
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit ma	4.8	9.5	5.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.181	Homosexuality is one of the most significant dangers to social morality			
	1 Absolutely suits me	47.6	31.5	46.1
	2 Suits me	31.8	29.3	31.6
	3 It doesn't matter	9.9	16.2	10.5
	4 It doesn't suit me	6.1	14.7	6.9
	5 Absolutely doesn't suit me	4.6	8.3	5.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.18.D.183	Family pressure			
	1 Quite often	3.1	3.3	3.1
	2 Partially	22.3	18.2	21.9
	3 Never	74.6	78.5	75.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.184	Intra-family conflict			
	1 Quite often	3.6	3.0	3.5
	2 Partially	30.2	31.3	30.3
	3 Never	66.2	65.7	66.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.185	Anxiety caused by gossip			
	1 Quite often	8.8	8.5	8.8
	2 Partially	25.0	27.5	25.2
	3 Never	66.2	64.0	66.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.19	Could you tell us if you find the following acceptable?			
D.186	Flirting by girls			
	1 Agree	20.6	27.8	21.3
	2 It doesn't matter	23.3	26.7	23.6
	3 Disagree	56.2	45.5	55.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.187	Flirting by boys			
	1 Agree	24.0	36.3	25.2
	2 It doesn't matter	25.1	26.7	25.2
	3 Disagree	50.9	37.0	49.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.188	Women engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage			
	1 Agree	4.1	10.5	4.7

	2 It doesn't matter	9.7	9.0	9.6
	3 Disagree	86.2	80.5	85.7
	Total	100	100	100
D.189	Men engaging in sexual intercourse before marriage			
	1 Agree	9.6	22.0	10.8
	2 It doesn't matter	14.9	21.3	15.5
	3 Disagree	75.5	56.7	73.7
	Total	100	100	100
D.190	Arranged marriages			
	1 Agree	25.7	15.7	24.8
	2 It doesn't matter	30.0	20.5	29.1
	3 Disagree	44.3	63.8	46.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.191	Marriage of Turkish women to German/French men			
	1 Agree	15.7	22.2	16.3
	2 It doesn't matter	27.2	27.7	27.3
	3 Disagree	57.1	50.2	56.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.193	Marriage of Turkish men to German/French women			
	1 Agree	26.2	31.3	26.7
	2 It doesn't matter	34.3	28.7	33.7
	3 Disagree	39.5	40.0	39.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.194	Bringing brides from Turkey			
	1 Agree	40.2	48.8	41.0
	2 It doesn't matter	40.2	33.8	39.6
	3 Disagree	19.6	17.3	19.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.195	Bringing bridegrooms from Turkey			
	1 Agree	38.4	48.5	39.4
	2 It doesn't matter	40.2	33.7	39.6
	3 Disagree	21.4	17.8	21.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.196	Women going to male doctors			
	1 Agree	47.4	70.0	49.6
	2 It doesn't matter	29.1	21.3	28.4
	3 Disagree	23.5	8.7	22.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.197	Marriage of Turkish women to non-Muslim men			
	1 Agree	10.0	24.8	11.4
	2 It doesn't matter	20.8	20.0	20.7
	3 Disagree	69.1	55.2	67.8

	97 No answer	0.1	–	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.198	Marriage of Turkish males to non-Muslim women			
	1 Agree	20.0	30.0	20.9
	2 It doesn't matter	27.7	23.5	27.3
	3 Disagree	52.2	46.5	51.7
	97 No answer	0.1	–	0.1
	Total	100	100	100
V.20	How often do you do the following activities?			
D.200	Go to the cinema			
	1 Quite often	16.3	18.7	16.6
	2 Partially	47.0	39.5	46.3
	3 Never	36.6	41.8	37.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.201	Go to the theatre			
	1 Quite often	2.8	3.7	2.9
	2 Partially	24.6	20.2	24.2
	3 Never	72.6	76.2	72.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.202	Go to Western music concerts (rock, classical, jazz)			
	1 Quite often	1.9	2.7	2.0
	2 Partially	14.2	22.0	14.9
	3 Never	83.9	75.3	83.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.203	Go to Turkish folk or pop music concerts			
	1 Quite often	7.1	14.0	7.8
	2 Partially	39.6	45.5	40.2
	3 Never	53.2	40.5	52.0
	Total	100	100	100
D.204	Go to Turkish restaurants			
	1 Quite often	35.6	46.3	36.6
	2 Partially	51.6	42.5	50.8
	3 Never	12.8	11.2	12.6
	Total	100	100	100
D.205	Go to fast-food restaurants			
	1 Quite often	19.3	32.0	20.5
	2 Partially	39.2	37.0	39.0
	3 Never	41.4	31.0	40.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.206	Go to German/French restaurants			
	1 Quite often	3.9	17.0	5.2
	2 Partially	26.9	41.3	28.3

	3 Never	69.1	41.7	66.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.207	Cook German/French foods at home			
	1 Quite often	3.6	16.2	4.8
	2 Partially	25.6	32.8	26.3
	3 Never	70.8	51.0	68.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.209	Go for a picnic/BBQ			
	1 Quite often	49.5	53.0	49.8
	2 Partially	44.9	35.5	44.0
	3 Never	5.6	11.5	6.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.210	Go to Italian, Chinese or Mexican restaurants			
	1 Quite often	6.3	9.5	6.6
	2 Partially	28.1	20.3	27.3
	3 Never	65.6	70.2	66.1
	Total	100	100	100
D.211	Go to cafés			
	1 Quite often	17.5	31.7	18.8
	2 Partially	26.6	20.8	26.0
	3 Never	56.0	47.5	55.2
	Total	100	100	100
D.212	Visit friends			
	1 Quite often	82.7	85.7	83.0
	2 Partially	16.4	13.3	16.1
	3 Never	0.8	1.0	0.9
	Total	100	100	100
D.213	Visit kin			
	1 Quite often	63.1	68.5	63.6
	2 Partially	32.9	23.0	31.9
	3 Never	4.0	8.5	4.5
	Total	100	100	100
D.214	Go to a mosque			
	1 Quite often	46.9	30.5	45.3
	2 Partially	41.6	37.8	41.2
	3 Never	11.5	31.7	13.4
	Total	100	100	100
D.215	Go out			
	1 Quite often	62.2	82.8	64.1
	2 Partially	36.0	15.7	34.0
	3 Never	1.9	1.5	1.8
	Total	100	100	100

V.21.D.217	How often do you watch German/French television channels?			
	1 Almost every day	45.3	55.5	46.2
	2 3-5 days a week	14.6	11.7	14.3
	3 1-2 days a week	11.8	15.5	12.2
	4 Rarely	15.9	10.3	15.3
	5 Never	12.5	7.0	12.0
	Total	100	100	100
V.22.D.218	How often do you watch Turkish television channels?			
	1 Almost every day	69.7	71.7	69.9
	2 3-5 days a week	14.4	7.3	13.7
	3 1-2 days a week	5.3	7.7	5.5
	4 Rarely	4.9	4.5	4.8
	5 Never	5.8	8.8	6.1
	Total	100	100	100
V.23.D.219	How often do you listen to German/French radio stations?			
	1 Almost every day	14.3	26.8	15.5
	2 3-5 days a week	6.3	8.7	6.5
	3 1-2 days a week	9.2	11.3	9.4
	4 Rarely	18.9	12.8	18.3
	5 Never	51.4	40.3	50.3
	Total	100	100	100
V.24.D.220	How often do you listen to Turkish radio stations?			
	1 Almost every day	9.2	10.7	9.3
	2 3-5 days a week	5.7	6.3	5.8
	3 1-2 days a week	9.5	13.2	9.8
	4 Rarely	21.2	21.3	21.2
	5 Never	54.4	48.5	53.8
	Total	100	100	100
V.25.D.221	How often do you read German/French newspapers?			
	1 Almost every day	17.2	13.2	16.8
	2 3-5 days a week	12.5	11.2	12.4
	3 1-2 days a week	16.6	15.3	16.5
	4 Rarely	21.5	20.5	21.4
	5 Never	32.2	39.8	32.9
	Total	100	100	100
V.26.D.222	How often do you read Turkish newspapers?			
	1 Almost every day	32.8	21.0	31.7
	2 3-5 days a week	14.0	12.0	13.8
	3 1-2 days a week	16.9	15.8	16.8
	4 Rarely	17.7	24.5	18.3
	5 Never	18.7	26.7	19.4
	Total	100	100	100
V.27.D.223	How often do you use the Internet?			
	1 Almost every day	24.3	13.8	23.3
	2 3-5 days a week	8.5	4.3	8.1
	3 1-2 days a week	8.1	7.0	8.0
	4 Rarely	12.7	9.7	12.4
	5 Never	46.4	65.2	48.2
	Total	100	100	100