

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Florence
Department of Political and Social Science

**The US Presence Within The EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) System: The Relevance of Neorealism and of the
Security Community Concept**

by
Catherine GEGOUT
Catherine.gegout@iue.it

Comments are welcome!
Please do not quote.

EUSA, Nashville
March 27-29, 2003.

The US Presence Within The EU's CFSP System: The Relevance of Neorealism and of the Security Community Concept

ABSTRACT OF THE PAPER

The EU's foreign policy is currently facing major changes: firstly, the Amsterdam Treaty has provided visibility and analysis capacity with the creation of both the post of the High Representative and of the Policy Unit. Secondly, the Member States have also decided to give the EU a military capability named the European Rapid Reaction Force and an institutional structure with a Political and Security Committee, military staff and a military committee. Finally, the EU succeeded in adopting a common view on its policy towards the Balkans. What are the reasons for these changes?

I argue that the main reason for these changes is the position of the US on both EU foreign policy and on US foreign policy (in this case, the EU Member States react to the US foreign policy). What can we say about the impact of transatlantic relations on the CFSP? The aim of this paper is to evaluate how and under which conditions the US influences a change in a Member State's position to reach a common EU agreement in the CFSP field when highly sensitive issues are at stake. When the US influences a state's position, this means the state can change position, either to agree or to disagree with the US.

Theories of European integration (liberal intergovernmentalism and institutionalism) leave very little room for the possibility of an external actor to the EU to influence a state's change in position. I contend that these theories are incomplete for understanding the origin of a state's change in position, as an "external" actor, the US, seems to play a determinant role in the European Union's IGFP. Both neorealism and the security community concept are relevant to understand the role of the US in highly sensitive EU foreign policy issue.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part (I) looks at the normative and theoretical reasons for which one would expect the US to incite the EU Member States to change position in order to reach a common position. The second part (II) details the conditions under which the US is the reason for a change in policy on the part of a EU Member State in order to reach a common EU position. The third part (III) focuses on the study of a special informal link between the EU and the US, namely the Quint, during the Balkans crises.

*Draft,
Please do not quote,
Comments are welcome!*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	4
II. WHY SHOULD ONE EXPECT THE US TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE EU’S IGFP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS?	4
I. THE NORMATIVE REASONS FOR WHICH ONE SHOULD EXPECT THE US TO PLAY A ROLE IN A MEMBER STATE’S CHANGE IN POSITION TO REACH A COMMON EU AGREEMENT	5
1. The Extent Of The US Power	5
2. The Past Relation Between European Integration And The US	7
3. A Constant Comparison At The EU Level, Of The EU With The US	7
4. The Extensive Official Institutional Links Between The US And The EU	8
II. THE THEORETICAL REASONS: THE INSIGHTS OF NEOREALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY COMMUNITY	10
1. Neorealism.....	10
2. Security Community.....	11
III. WHEN DOES THE US HAVE AN IMPACT, WHICH CAUSES A MEMBER STATE TO CHANGE POSITION, IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON EU AGREEMENT?	12
I. WHEN THE EU MEMBER STATES DO NOT NEED THE US, THE US HAS THE IMPACT OF CAUSING A MEMBER STATE TO CHANGE POSITION IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON EU AGREEMENT AGAINST THE US	13
II. WHEN THE EU MEMBER STATES NEED THE US, THE US’ IMPACT DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE US POSITION IS STRONG OR WEAK	14
1. When The US Advocates Its Position At The Highest Level (President), The EU Member States Seem To Either Reach A Common EU Position That Is Similar To The US Position, Or Not To Reach Any EU Agreement.....	14
i. In the case of a unilateral US policy	15
ii. In the case of the US wanting the EU to adopt a policy that corresponds to the US policy	16
2. When The US Has A Position Which Is Not Advocated At The Highest Level, It Is Not A Factor For A Member State’s Change In Position, But The Member States Still Ask For US Authorisation, When Other Factors Induce Them To Change Position	20
III. WHEN THE CFSP DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IS IN ITS EARLY STAGE	22
IV. THE QUINT: INFORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US, AND INFORMAL DIRECTOIRE WITHIN THE CFSP SYSTEM.....	22
I. THE QUINT’S CHARACTERICS	22
II. THE QUINT AND THE EU: THE US AS A PRESENCE IN THE EU’S CFSP SYSTEM	24
V. CONCLUSION	25
I. THE OFFICIAL US ROLE IN THE CFSP SYSTEM: US-EU COOPERATION	25
II. THE EFFECTIVE US ROLE: A MAJOR HIDDEN ACTOR WHEN THE EU CARES ABOUT THE US POSITION	26

I. Introduction

What can we say about the impact of transatlantic relations on the CFSP¹? The aim of this paper is to evaluate how and under which conditions the US influences a change in a Member State's position to reach a common EU agreement in the CFSP field when highly sensitive issues are at stake. When the US influences a state's position, this means the state can change position, either to agree or to disagree with the US.

Theories of European integration (liberal intergovernmentalism and institutionalism) leave very little room for the possibility of an external actor to the EU to influence a state's change in position. I argue that these theories are incomplete for understanding the origin of a state's change in position, as an "external" actor, the US, seems to play a determinant role in the European Union's IGFP. Both neorealism and the security community concept are relevant to understand the role of the US in the IGFP system.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part (I) looks at the normative and theoretical reasons for which one would expect the US to incite the EU Member States to change position in order to reach a common position. The second part (II) details the conditions under which the US is the reason for a change in policy on the part of a EU Member State in order to reach a common EU position. The third part (III) focuses on the study of a special informal link between the EU and the US, namely the Quint, during the Balkans crises.

II. Why should one expect the US to play a role in the EU's IGFP decision-making process?

¹ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the EU's foreign policy decided upon by the Member States, generally by unanimity. CFSP deals with "political" issues and not trade and aid issues.

I. The Normative Reasons For Which One Should Expect The US To Play A Role In A Member State's Change In Position To Reach A Common EU Agreement

There are four reasons for which we could expect the US to influence a Member State's change in position to reach a common EU decision: 1) the extent of the US power; 2) the past relation between European integration and the US; 3) a constant comparison on the part of the EU with the US; and 4) the extensive official institutional links between the US and the EU would seem to favour a communaute de vues between the two of them.

1. The Extent Of The US Power

The US is considered as a "hyperpower" in virtually all the fields². The US shares power with the EU in the world in economic terms³. The US GDP is higher than the EU's GDP (Billions \$ 10 100 versus 7 900 in 2001). The US is the largest importer of goods in the world (23.5 % versus 18 % for the EU in 2000). The EU is the largest exporter of goods in the world (17.5 % versus 15.6 % for the US in 2000) (Source Eurostat, OECD, European Commission, 2002, and Eurostat News Release, 08/11/01).

The US is also the most powerful state in military terms. In general defence terms, defence spending of the Europeans in NATO is 40% (the US 60%)⁴. The EU's annual defence budget in 2002 is € 150 bn, whereas the US defence budget ranged from about \$260bn in the middle of the decade to \$ 329bn in 2001, and \$ 379 bn in 2002. The gap between the EU and the US is likely to widen as the Pentagon budget is due to increase by 48 % over the next 5 years (\$ 141 billion increase)⁵. The defence expenditure in the big EU Member States (F, UK, D, I, S) represents 1.41% of the GDP (€

² Already in the 1950s, "all German leaders were so well aware of the disparity in power between France and the United States that they were not likely to trade American nuclear protection for France's greater vigilance on political issues" (KISSINGER Henry, *Diplomacy*, Touchstone, 1994, p. 607).

³ However, the financial assistance of the EU is twice as big as that of the US, the public aid for development of the EC is three times as big as the US, and the external trade is twice as big as that of the US.

⁴ A rise in the budgets is needed (Heisbourg 1999). In addition, there should be a rationalisation of the structures as "not only does Europe spend considerably less as a share of its national wealth on the defence as the US, it spends that smaller amount of money less efficiently" (O'Hanlon 1997, p. 12).

⁵ However, the US might need the support of some EU states. For example, in Afghanistan, the military (General Tommy Franks) had to ask the British forces to come to the rescue. This was not wanted by Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary.

323/European), and in the US 2.8% of the GDP (€ 1029 per American). The reductions in the German defence budget are set to continue for the next five years (the Military Balance, 2000, p. 38), despite Germany's decision to invest in "eye-in-the-sky" satellites (The Economist, 23/11/00). The EU cannot create an equal to American military weight in world affairs.

The US spends much more on research and technological development than the EU. In 2000, the US spent EUR 288 bn, and the EU spent EUR 164 bn (Commission document, 2000). NATO European research spending is 25% of that of the US⁶.

In terms of troops, the EU has 2 million, but "only a fraction is deployable" (Robertson, in The Guardian, 09/11/02), and the US has 1.5 million.

In terms of equipment, the Rapid Reaction Force is inadequately provided for in significant areas. Autonomy is not really possible. Indeed, as regards heavy lift, until the creation of the A 400M (which will be bought by France, Germany, the UK and Spain) in 2003, the EU will remain dependent on the US. For the moment, the EU has 11 large transport planes to deploy troops, and the US has 250. Only 10% of the EU combat planes can fly at night compared to 50% of the US'. In sea lift, only 10 roll-on/roll-off ships are pledged out of 60 required.

In addition, the EU remains dependent on the US for intelligence (despite the possible use of the satellite Helios): only 30 out of 60 electronic jamming aircraft to suppress enemy air defence facilities are available, logistics and precision-guided munitions are non-existent (Oxford Analytica Brief, 28/11/00).

The EU therefore lacks up to date command and control, the right equipment (communications and precision weapons), transport aircraft and ships. This absence of long term defence objective and of security means for crisis management led one interviewee (02/05/00) to remark that "the EU member states are putting the cart before the wheels: they are establishing a minimal structure without a

This gave the UK more leverage to be influential vis-à-vis the US on the future strategy (and not merely offering advice from the sidelines), particularly in Iraq (Financial Times, 21/03/02).

⁶ The defence spending as percentage of GDP in 1999 is as follows: the US is at 3.2, France at 2.8, the UK at 2.7 (The Economist, 24/06/00).

common agreement on the final product. It is as if we were printing the € notes without agreeing on a common monetary policy". This view of the EU is reflected by some academics, such as Gordon (1997), who doubt both the availability of European military capability and the ability to come up with common policies and decisions.

Finally, the US has an active foreign policy (be it multilateralism or unilateralism). Its foreign policy is therefore most definitely taken into account by the EU Member States.

2. The Past Relation Between European Integration And The US

The US is a key actor for understanding the evolution of European integration. For William Wallace (speech, 10/05/01), "the biggest justification for European integration is that it enables the EU to gain more weight in the US". Von Geusau⁷ also underlined that "the search for a European role primarily reflects a desire for more autonomy from the United States". This idea is also carried out by practitioners. For Chris Patten (2000), the EU foreign policy has three goals: "work closely with EU neighbours, apply the experience of multilateral cooperation to a wider stage, and to become a serious counterpart to the United States". Burdett⁸ finally wrote that in general, "the major EC countries made sure that US wishes were taken into account during the formulation of EPC proposals because US support was seen as vital".

3. A Constant Comparison At The EU Level, Of The EU With The US

The EU compares itself to the US. It takes the latter as an example of diplomatic efficiency: a high EU official (interview on 07/04/00) emphasised that "the idea would be to articulate our priorities on our means, and this has never been done. The US does exactly the opposite". The EU also justifies its policy vis-à-vis that of the US. Javier Solana (Le Figaro, 26/01/00), the EU's High Representative stated that "concerning the EU position towards Russia, the hesitations in the EU are not bigger than

⁷ VON GEUSAU Aling, The external relations of the European Community, Saxon House, Lexington Books, 1974, p. viii.

⁸ BURDETT Elizabeth Jane, The effectiveness of European political cooperation as a system of collective diplomacy. a study of the CSCE process, 1972-1992, LSE PhD thesis, 1997, p. 311.

those expressed by the US, which merely has one minister, and not fifteen. Hubert Védrine (24/06/99), the French Foreign Affairs Minister, also stressed that "in the political, diplomatic and strategic management of the Kosovo crisis, the Europeans played a role as important as the US".

4. The Extensive Official Institutional Links Between The US And The EU

The extensive official institutional links between the US and the EU would seem to favour a communaute de vues between the two of them. Relations between the US and the EU have been tightened by both sides:

a) The US wants to take part in the EU's institutional structures. It was the first country to accredit a diplomatic representation to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1958. Since the creation of the EPC, the US lobbying's objective has been to require to take part in the EU's institutional set-up. In 1974, when the Gymnich formula was set, the US was not granted a 10th seat at the table (Hill 2001, lecture given at the L. S. E.). However, foreign ministers agreed to consult regularly with "allied or friendly" countries on EPC issues⁹. In the year 2000, the US is still trying to attend EU meetings: it for instance asked to attend the EU management committee relative to the sanctions towards the FRY (interviewee 22/03/00).

b) The EU has set up official meetings with the US. In 1990, the EU and the US adopted a Transatlantic Declaration laying down the principles for greater EU-US consultation and cooperation¹⁰. In 1995, they agreed on a New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and Action Plan to promote cooperation, partnership and joint action in areas ranging from trade liberalization to security. There are increasingly dense CFSP-US consultations, for example five special joint Council working groups from

⁹ REGELSDERGER Elfriede, "Introduction", in PIJPERS Alfred, REGELSDERGER Elfriede and WESSELS Wolfgang, European Political Cooperation since the 1980s, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, p. 15.

¹⁰ However, these meetings do not necessarily mean that the relations between the US and the EU, or that the relation between the US and some Member States, are stronger than they were before. According to Gardner (GARDNER Hall and STEFANOVA Radoslava (ed), The new transatlantic agenda : facing the challenges of global governance, Burlington, VT : Ashgate, 2001, fn. 4 p. 86), "the meetings [of the US Secretary of State with all EU foreign ministers on the margins of the UN General Assembly – cf. Transatlantic Declaration 1990] began and have continued because they provide the Secretary of State with a useful opportunity to pay courtesy to the foreign ministers and an excuse not to spend time seeing many of them again during the course of the following twelve months".

1995. There is one meeting per Presidency. Within the NTA framework, the EU and US can cooperate to promote peace and stability in South East Europe, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and Colombia (Patten 2001, p. 287).

Official EU-US meetings:

- Twice-yearly consultations among the Presidents of the United States, the European Council and the Commission;
- Twice-yearly consultations among the US Secretary of State, the EU Presidency Foreign Minister and the Commission;
- Twice-yearly EU-US consultations between the European Commission and the US Government at subcabinet level;
- Senior Level Group consultations 4-6 times a year, to prepare twice yearly summits;
- NTA Task Force meetings (frequent) to coordinate action under the NTA for the Senior Level Group and Summit leaders;
- Working Groups of EU representatives with their US counterparts to discuss a wide range of foreign policy issues

c) The US mission to the EU increased its staff after the creation of the CFSP¹¹. In 1985, the US State Department appointed an official responsible for following European Political Cooperation matters at the American Representation in Brussels. Richard Morningstar (23/01/01) states that “before I took this job the US Ambassador to the EU dealt almost exclusively with trade issues... I now spend half of my time on political and security issues. The USEU mission now works with our NATO mission on a daily basis”.

¹¹ BRETHERTON Charlotte and VOGLER John, The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge, London and New York, 1999, p. 187.

d) The US lobbies both at the EU and at the national level. At the EU level, Cameron¹² emphasises that “few in Brussels will forget the US lobbying against the idea of a common European defence in the run up to Maastricht in 1991”. At the national level, according to an interviewee (14/05/01), “the US does not lobby the European correspondent, but it does lobby the department responsible for the Middle East in the foreign affairs ministry”. Morningstar, the US Ambassador to the EU (23/03/01) stressed “the Political and Security Committee is a very important body. We are dealing more and more with it”. The US receives via the EU Member States and its NATO connections, the working papers of the EU meetings since 1974: “in practice, the US did not find it difficult to see papers” (Hill 2001). In addition, the US holds regular informal meetings with *some* EU member states.

II. The Theoretical Reasons: The Insights of Neorealism and the Concept of Security Community

1. Neorealism

In the high politics sphere of strategy and diplomacy¹³, cooperation would be unlikely and qualified as a “fiasco”. Neorealism would argue that the EU Member States only change their foreign policy position if there is a change in the geopolitical situation, an external threat and a need to adapt to the external environment. It focuses on the relevance of power politics and the impact of the international system on states which is stronger than that of internal dynamics.

¹² CAMERON Fraser, “Review of KJELL A. Eliassen (Ed.), Foreign and security policy in the European union, in European foreign affairs review, Vol. 4, n. 1, Spring 1999, pp.147-149, p. 148.

¹³ HOFFMANN Stanley, “Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe”, in Daedalus, Vol. 95, n. 3, summer 1966, pp. 862-915. Low politics correspond to technocratic and uncontroversial issues. A high politics issue is where the autonomy of governments (and their sovereignty) or components of national identity are at stake. More precisely, Hoffmann qualified high politics as concerning traditional interstate politics, where grandeur and prestige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at stake. There is no or little solidarity among the contenders. As early as 1983, Webb stressed that the autonomy of high politics was doubtful as EPC developed into the foreign policy sphere of the EC. In addition, economic instruments of foreign policy have become at least as important as diplomacy and force (LIGHT Margot, “Foreign Policy Analysis”, in GROOM A. J. R. and LIGHT Margot, Contemporary International Relations: A guide to Theory, Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 93-108, p. 100): the definition of high politics can therefore change over time, and include different policies.

A state cooperates to counterbalance another powerful state. Waltz¹⁴ developed this concept. When some states are threatened by the growth in power of one state, they will form alliances to restore balance. Balancing is automatic, it is the product of the system. Vasquez states that this concept is “the great new law that turned out not to be so”¹⁵. Bandwagoning is also a concept developed by realists. It is defined as allying with the strongest power (for Waltz 1979), against a source of danger (for Walt¹⁶), or with the strongest power or against a source of danger (for Schweller¹⁷). Bandwagoning was dangerous for the survival of states and very unlikely in Waltz’ view¹⁸: “balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behaviour induced by the system”. However, Schweller argues that bandwagoning is more common than balancing. For some realists, bandwagoning is a reason for cooperation among states.

The EU Member States would thus either not cooperate at all or cooperate in order to counterbalance or bandwagon the US.

2. Security Community

The concept of “pluralistic security community” is developed by Karl Deutsch¹⁹: a collective identity could emerge when democracies interact in an institutional setting. A group of states share similar values and neither use nor threaten to use force to resolve disputes with each other. States are subject to learning processes and influenced by changing norms in international relations. A security community requires a high degree of political, economic and social integration.

¹⁴ WALTZ Kenneth, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, in *International Security*, Fall 1993, Vol. 18, n. 2, pp. 44-79.

¹⁵ VASQUEZ J., The power of power politics, from classical realism to neotraditionalism, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 251.

¹⁶ WALT Stephen, “Alliances in theory and practice - what lies ahead?”, in *Journal of international affairs*, Summer-Fall 1989, Vol. 43, n.1, pp.1-17.

¹⁷ SCHWELLER Randall, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, in *International Security*, Summer 1994, Vol. 19, n. 1, pp. 72-107.

¹⁸ Waltz, *idem*, p. 126.

¹⁹ DEUTSCH Karl et al., Political community and the North Atlantic area : international organization in the light of historical experience, New York, Greenwood Press, 1957.

As regards the relation between the US and the EU, Thomas Risse²⁰ sees a security community between the US and the EU, where conflict is possible. In ex-Yugoslavia, it was “not the US against the Europeans. Rather, major European powers disagreed among themselves, to begin with. Transnational and transgovernmental alliances formed across the Atlantic which held diverging preferences. This pattern of cross-cutting transnational coalitions is precisely what one expects in a security community of open societies and democratic states”. He adds that:

“The typical response of the Europeans to perceived US arrogance and unilateralism has been to tighten the norms of the community in the various institutional settings. In other words, the strategy has been typically one of binding rather than balancing... Binding constitutes an institutionalist response to perceived unilateralism”²¹.

Finally, even if there is a bullying attitude, Risse argues it is not normal superpower behaviour in an anarchic world. The US feels uncomfortable, it tries to repair the relationship. The states bullied should react by binding, not balancing.

According to the concept of a security community, the EU and the US should share the same values and the EU as a whole would not necessarily cooperate in order to respond to the US. There could be intra-European disagreements. If the EU Member States do cooperate, they would be inclined to follow the US position.

III. When Does the US Have An Impact, Which Causes A Member State To Change Position, In Order To Reach A Common EU Agreement?

As the EU and the US have “a unity of values, a shared history, and a shared belief in human rights, freedom and democracy” (Patten, 19/06/01), one could expect the EU Member States to change position in order to reach a common EU agreement similar to the US position. However, under the US

²⁰ RISSE Thomas, “A Liberal World Order: The Democratic Security Community and US Power”, prepared for the conference on “American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power”, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, 19 May 2000. Draft, p. 23.

²¹ Idem, pp. 17-18.

influence, a Member State can change position to reach a common EU agreement both to agree and disagree with the US.

The following sections examine when the US is the reason for a state's change in position to reach a common position. When the EU Member States do not need the US, the US has either no impact, or that of causing a Member State to change position in order to reach a common EU agreement against the US (section I). When the EU Member States need the US, the US impact depends on whether the US position is strong or weak (section II).

I. When The EU Member States Do Not Need The US, The US Has The Impact Of Causing A Member State To Change Position In Order To Reach A Common EU Agreement Against The US

A Member State changes position in order to reach a common EU agreement against the US when the issue discussed concerns:

- 1) a general foreign policy problem (i. e. international treaties or US foreign policies) that is not directed at a third party, or;
- 2) a third party, which considers the EU as an independent and credible actor, and the EU is independent (without the need of US military and diplomacy).

When the issue discussed is a general foreign policy problem that is not directed at a third party, there are disagreements between the EU Member States on the one hand and the US on the other concerning for example climate change, anti-personnel landmines, comprehensive nuclear test-bans, UN Conventions on small arms or biological weapons, and the future of the US missile defence project.

When the issue discussed is a third party which considers the EU as independent and credible, the EU states disagree with the policy of the US. For instance, the EU disagreed with the US policy vis-à-

vis the so-called rogue states (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) named as sponsors of terrorism in an "axis of evil" (The Guardian, 07/02/02). EU diplomats (Financial Times, 04/02/02) specifically said they had no intention of ending their dialogue with Iran, and the EU sent a troika to North Korea in early 2001, despite the US position. Interestingly, it is when the EU has a first pillar policy, or a policy of implementation of a second pillar decision in the first pillar (during the implementation phase of a EU decision), that the EU is credible vis-à-vis a third party, and that the Member States can change position, either as a reaction to the US position vis-à-vis the same third country, or on an independent decision, without having to justify its policy to the US, or to ask for US "authorisation".

II. When The EU Member States Need The US, The US' Impact Depends On Whether The US Position Is Strong Or Weak

EU Member States need the US, when the issue discussed concerns a third party which does not consider the EU Member States as an independent and credible²², and the EU Member States are not independent militarily²³. The impact of the US is different according to whether the US position is strong (1) or weak (2).

1. When The US Advocates Its Position At The Highest Level (President), The EU Member States Seem To Either Reach A Common EU Position That Is Similar To The US Position, Or Not To Reach Any EU Agreement

When the US has a position and advocates it at the highest level (at the President, and not at the Secretary of State level), it seems extremely hard for the EU to adopt a different position from the US;

²² The Middle East Peace Process is an example of a third party that does not consider the EU as a credible actor. For dealing with the MEPP, the EU Member States are totally dependent on the US. France, for instance, knows it has to rely on the US as it has the most means to intervene in the conflict (Point de presse, ministere des affaires etrangeres, 29/03/02.). According to a Quay d'Orsay official, "Europe, and it is not new, does not have the means to weigh on Israel" (Liberation, 04/04/02). Josep Piqué, the Spanish foreign affairs minister, declared to the BBC that "we are all convinced that it will be impossible to find a solution to the conflict without the US" (Liberation, 04/04/02). Effectively, the High Representative Solana and Josep Pique, holding the Presidency of the EU at the time were rebuffed by Israel on 04/04/02, when they wished to visit Arafat, whereas on 05/04/02, the US special envoy, Anthony Zinni, was allowed to do so.

²³ The war against Afghanistan is an example of the EU Member States not being independent militarily: they rely on the US. For Joschka Fischer (Speech, 17/01/02), September 11, 2001 was "a sign of European weakness; even the big MS are not strong enough for Afghanistan".

on the contrary, the EU Member States seem likely to change position in order to reach a common EU position.

The aim of the EU states, when they decide to reach a common EU position, is to bind the US in order to have some leverage on US action: for Chris Hill²⁴, "by adopting a European Foreign Policy, the EU sets "constraints" on the US activities²⁵. This aim is not recent: Wallace²⁶ noted that "official in Washington commented on the uniformity of arguments presented by the three European countries. The great achievement of political cooperation in 1980-81 was its solidarity in the face of American pressure and its contribution to moderating American attitudes on a range of international issues of direct concern to European governments".

Two situations can occur: the US can either have a unilateral US policy and totally ignore the EU, or want the EU to have the same policy as itself.

i. In the case of a unilateral US policy

In the case of a unilateral US policy, the EU Member States are likely to reach a common EU position in order to bind the US²⁷.

They do not even necessarily need to "change position", as their initial position can be that they should reach a common EU agreement in order to influence the US. This is what seemed to have happened for the military intervention in Afghanistan. The big EU Member States agreed to support the US policy: France, Britain, Germany (and Australia) all offered unlimited support to the US government in

²⁴ HILL Christopher (ed.), National foreign policies and European political cooperation, London, Winchester, Mass., USA, Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by G. Allen & Unwin, 1983, p. 49.

²⁵ The EU Member States are trying to adopt the same attitude as the UK in the 1950s. For Kissinger (KISSINGER Henry, Diplomacy, Touchstone, 1994, p. 597), "British leaders of both parties managed to make themselves so indispensable to the American decision-making process that presidents and their entourages came to regard consultations with London not as a special favour toward a weaker ally but as a vital component of their own government".

²⁶ WALLACE William, "Political Cooperation: Integration Through Intergovernmentalism", in WALLACE Helen, WALLACE William and WEBB Carole, Policy-Making in the European Community, Second Edition, 1983, pp. 373-401, p. 396.

²⁷ It would seem that when most of the EU Member States disagree initially with the US, it is very unlikely they will reach a common EU position in order to openly disagree with the US. In such a case, the potential disagreements are likely to be only rhetoric. For instance, at the GAC on 28/01/02, EU foreign ministers rejected Washington's threat to cut off relations with Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader. They stated that "Israel needs the Palestinian authority and its elected President, Yasser Arafat, as a partner to negotiate with, both in order to eradicate terrorism and to work towards peace" (GAC Press Release, 28/01/02). For the Financial Times (01/02/02), "not since September 11 have the European Union and the US been so far apart". However, in this case, the opposition is more rhetoric than implying major oppositions between the EU and the US.

its "war against terrorism", including military assistance. All the other EU Member States also supported the US.

Member States can also change position in order to reach a common EU position similar to the US position. This seemed to be the case for Iraq. The High Representative gave the impression that there was a common EU agreement on the position to adopt at the international level vis-à-vis Iraq. Solana argued that "the views of the European Union are fully reflected in this text, particularly the key objective of the EU, namely vigorously to address the disarmament of Iraq and to do so within the framework of the UN Security Council" (Statement by Javier Solana, 08/11/02). However, straight after September 11 events, it was clear that some Member States disagreed with a military intervention in Iraq. France and Germany argued vehemently against US intervention²⁸.

Even if, eventually, the Member States decide to act at the national level, they are likely to have at least discussed the issue at the EU level.

ii. In the case of the US wanting the EU to adopt a policy that corresponds to the US policy

Two cases can be foreseen here:

- a) When all or most of the EU Member States initially disagree with the US, it is likely that either an EU agreement in favour of the US position is reached in order to bind the US, or no EU agreement is reached**

²⁸ Mr Védrine said that Europeans "are friends of the United States and will remain so". But, he added: "we are threatened today by a new simplism which consists in reducing everything to the war on terrorism. We cannot accept that idea. You have got to tackle the root causes, the situations, poverty, injustice". He said US rhetoric was confirmation that the Bush administration approached foreign policy "unilaterally, without consulting anyone, based on their interpretation and on their interests" (The Guardian, 07/02/02). As regards the intra-EU cooperation, Jacques Chirac was "sure a nation with a history and culture such as Britain's would never be content to tag along after the US". He noted that both Paris and London had been jointly influential in Washington in pressing the case for the US to limit the military campaign against terrorism to Afghanistan (Financial Times, 01/12/01). Joschka Fischer (Le Monde 16/02/02) also reminded Washington, that "the partners of an alliance are not satellites".

Several examples of Member States changing position in order to reach a common agreement similar to the US can be given both in the early days of EPC and under the CFSP framework.

In the past

Throughout the winter of 1979-80, the states' ambassadors in Teheran had operated as a group, going together to make representations to the new Iranian government on European interests. The decision to impose sanctions on Iran was, strictly speaking the first non declaratory action taken within the framework of political cooperation. According to William Wallace²⁹ (1983, p. 393), this was "taken as a necessary response to intense and sustained American pressure, and it was taken reluctantly"!

In 1982, according to Nuttall³⁰, it was under rising pressures from the US to impose economic sanctions, that the EC finally acted against Russia, following the Afghanistan crisis. For Christopher Hill³¹, "in practice, the Community states could not avoid – especially when under American pressure – facing the issue of what practical response to make to perceived provocations by third countries". During the Gulf war, according to Pfetsch³² (1994, p. 126): "the EC had not developed a standpoint of its own, but more or less consistently followed the line of the US government and the Security Council"

Under the CFSP Framework

Now, a distinction can be made between the EU policies that concern the US directly (CESDP) and the policies that concern the US indirectly.

²⁹ WALLACE William, "Political Cooperation: Integration Through Intergovernmentalism", in WALLACE Helen, WALLACE William and WEBB Carole, *Policy-Making in the European Community*, Second Edition, 1983, pp. 373-401, p. 393.

³⁰ NUTTALL Simon, "Two decades of EPC performance", in REGELSBERGER Elfriede, de SCHOUTHEETE Philippe et WESSELS Wolfgang, *Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Boulder, 1997, pp. 19-40, p. 32.

³¹ HILL Christopher, "European Preoccupations With Terrorism", in PIJPERS Alfred, REGELSBERGER Elfriede and WESSELS Wolfgang, *European Political Cooperation since the 1980s*, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 166-193, p. 180.

³² PFETSCH Frank, "Tensions in Sovereignty: Foreign Policies of EC Members Compared", in CARLSNAES Walter and SMITH Steve, *EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, London, Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 120-137, p. 126.

In the CESDP field, for Solana (2000, p. 589), “politically and technically, transparency and concertation with NATO is a necessity”. The Member States know they have to rely on the US for the EU relations with NATO, and their final EU position has to be accepted by the US at the highest level.

As regards policies that concern the US indirectly, the following example can be given: by examining the discussions that led to the creation of the Stability Pact, Anna Murphy and Lykke Friis³³ (2000, p. 8) state that “there was a feeling that the US was using the Stability Pact to increase pressure on the EU to enlarge its membership”. They also state that the US was the only state to support the idea of a Stability Pact. The External Relations’ Commissioner Chris Patten³⁴ also reported that “outside pressure including that from the US may be an important stimulus to effective implementation [of the Stability Pact]”. The US seems to have been a trigger for the creation of the Stability Pact.

Another example is the change in position of the EU Member States to reach a common EU position that agrees with the US position on the status of the International Criminal Court. The EU and the US held a different view on the role of the International Criminal Court. Indeed, France and the UK wished to preserve the authority of the ICC and the integrity of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of UN peacekeeping operations. The US was against the setting up of the Court, as it was built “on a flawed foundation. These flaws leave it open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions” (Grossman 2002).

The divergence of position was made clear in July 2002, both by the EU and the Member States, notably the UK. At the EU level, Chris Patten (Washington Post, 09/07/02), the Commissioner for External Relations, was extremely critical of the US policy. The UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary on Anglo - American relations, 01/07/02), plainly declared that “he did not share the Americans’ antipathy toward the International Criminal Court”. He emphasised that he compared the UK’s relation with the US with the one the UK has with France and Germany in the European Union:

³³ FRIIS Lykke and MURPHY Anna, « Negotiating in a Time of Crisis : The EU’s Response to the Military conflict in Kosovo », EU Working Papers, RSC n. 2000/20, European University Institute, Florence, p. 8.

³⁴ Idem, p. 25.

"We are close allies with France and Germany, European Union, they're big countries like ourselves. We have agreement about values, but sometimes we have the most intense disagreements about specifics. That doesn't affect the underlying relationship. Now the same ought to be true with the United States and I just point to the fact that yes there are these difficulties at the moment".

However, eventually, all the EU Member States accepted the US position on the ICC: the EU agreed to a deal with the US giving American citizens a degree of immunity from prosecution by the new International Criminal Court, and the ICC could be set up. The Guardian (30/09/02) states that Britain persuaded the other Member States to step back from their hardline opposition to prevent a transatlantic row.

John Peterson (conference, 09/02/02³⁵) argues that in the Balkans, "an important force for European unity in Foreign Policy –perhaps even a precondition- is American prodding".

It is rather difficult to find examples of Member States acknowledging they did not reach a common EU position, because of the US. One can however see the relevance of the following quote. According to the French Foreign Minister: "the EU is divided on the crisis in the Middle East, because certain Member States think nothing can be done that would annoy the US" (diplomatie-actualites, 03/04/02).

b) When one EU Member State initially disagrees with the US (and all the other Member States agree with the US), it is likely that an EU agreement similar to the US position, and mainly because of the US influence, is reached

When an isolated EU Member State finally accepts to change position in order to reach a common EU agreement which is similar to the US position, it would seem that the US is often a reason, if not the main reason, for this change in position. A distinction can be made here between big and small

countries. It is more costly for a big Member State than for a small Member State to refuse a EU common position which is also wanted by the US.

As regards the attitude of an isolated small Member State, Greece's attitude during the Balkan crises shows that that a small country might block an EU process (for instance, the EU recognition of FYROM) despite US pressure. However, such cases are extremely rare. In fact, Greece has already changed position in order to reach a common EU agreement under US pressure. For instance, interviewees seemed to think that Greece agreed with the other EU Member States to impose sanctions on Serbia in May 1999, partly under US influence. A high level official (interviewee, 02/05/00) also indicated that US pressure was the reason why Greece accepted to include Turkey in the enlargement process at the Helsinki summit in December 1999.

As regards the attitude of an isolated big EU Member State, it is unlikely that a big Member State stays isolated from both the other EU Member States and the US. Several interviewees believed that a big country would no longer act as Germany did with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, as the price to pay was too high vis-à-vis the other EU Member States and the US.

2. When The US Has A Position Which Is Not Advocated At The Highest Level, It Is Not A Factor For A Member State's Change In Position, But The Member States Still Ask For US Authorisation, When Other Factors Induce Them To Change Position

The EU Member States can change position to reach a common EU position, after having discussed the issue with and received the assent of the US.

In the CESDP field, the fact that the US did not react in 1998 as it did in February 1991 (the Bartholomew letter by President George Bush to a WEU ministerial meeting warned the Europeans

³⁵ PETERSON John, "US and EU in the Balkans, America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes", EUI conference, 09/02/02, unpublished paper.

that the US might review its commitment to NATO, if the EU created a security policy separated from NATO³⁶) is one of the reasons why the UK changed its policy and accepted the creation of the CESDP.

In the “pure” CFSP field, the EU recognition of the “unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state” (Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 24-25/03/99) was surprising³⁷. However, it was not obtained thanks to the existence of EU institutions: Germany accepted to recognise the Palestinian entity because the US had accepted it. Indeed, Germany only agreed to this recognition, after having negotiated with the US. Germany did not want to irritate the US. According to an interviewee (02/05/00), the US congratulated the EU, and said that the EU could go on with its policy. The Washington Post Foreign Service (27/03/99) also stated that “a European diplomat said the United States was told in advance about the EU statement, which was tentatively worked out by EU foreign ministers on Monday and approved by the national leaders of the 15 EU nations during their Thursday session”.

Another example of the Member States asking for the US assent in order to adopt a common EU agreement which is different from the US position, is when the EU Member States negotiated both the lifting of the flight ban, and the reinforcing of the financial sanctions vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At first, the US totally disagreed with the lifting of the flight ban. In the end, the EU finally accepted to lift the flight ban. During the negotiation process, this “new” EU policy was announced in Washington with the agreement of the US, and the issue was not taken up to the Presidential level in the US. If it had been, some interviewees stressed the policy would certainly not have been passed at the EU level.

Finally, sometimes, the EU Member States do not even realise (interview, 08/02/02) that they are reaching a common EU agreement which is similar to the US position.

³⁶ This was considered as a peremptory intervention in the European debate by some European officials, who were evidently embarrassed (MENON Anand, FORSTER Anthony and WALLACE William, “How common a European Security Policy”, in *Survival*, Vol. 34 n.3, Autumn 1992, pp. 98-118, p. 105).

³⁷ Moratinos, the EU special envoy to the Middle East, stressed that “the situation will be a delicate one because the Member States are not unanimous when it comes to the proclamation of a Palestinian State” (Agence Europe, 23/01/99, n. 7389, p. 6).

III. When The CFSP Decision-Making Process Is In Its Early Stage

The US can only have an impact on a Member State's position, when no former EU decision has been taken on the issue discussed. For instance, once the Member States had decided on the reinforcement of the financial sanctions against FRY in Spring 2000, the US could only lobby the Commission for the latter to present a white list, but it could not impose its vision on the Commission. Another example is when Tony Blair could not renegotiate the Nice agreement on CESDP issues, although the US was unhappy with the agreement. Once the EU process is launched, the CFSP *acquis* is stronger than the US influence.

IV. The Quint: Informal Link Between The EU And The US, And Informal Directoire Within The CFSP System

The Quint is a discreet informal group focused on highly sensitive EU policies. It seems distinctly essential to the EU's foreign policy decision-making process. The Quint includes only five States: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy (named hereafter the Big Four) and a notable outsider - the US. The Quint is considered here as a *Directoire*, in the sense that it seems to be a leadership group in the EU decision-making process that dominates the other EU Member States: on some occasions the final EU decision seems to reflect the outcome of the discussions made within this *directoire*. The Quint therefore appears to be more than a mere consultative group that pools ideas; it is a group that takes initiatives, discusses EU's foreign policy issues and small EU countries have to accept its authority. The existence of this group has implications on the nature and conditions for an EU Member State changing position in order to reach an EU common agreement. Despite the difficulty in fully grasping the functionality of the Quint, this section first studies the characteristics of the Quint, and second attempts to examine the implications of the existence of the Quint for the EU.

I. The Quint's Characteristics

The Quint is extremely limited in its membership. There are no reports or summaries and no record of the meetings. It meets whenever it is necessary on an ad hoc basis, and quite frequently: during the Kosovo crisis for instance, "the five would speak by telephone conference every evening" (Lockwood 1999). The Italian Foreign Minister Alberto Dini emphasised in 1999 that "the Quint consists of those five countries' foreign affairs ministers, who often negotiate over the phone in telephone conferences" (Luzi 1999). The US Ambassador to the European Union Richard Morningstar did not mention the Quint per se. However, he did stress that "in addition to the NATO alliance, the US and the EU are cooperating very closely in other fora on important political and security issues such as Southeast Europe, Russia, Ukraine and in a host of other areas around the world" (Morningstar 2000, p. 4) and that "the Political and Security Committee is a very important body. We are dealing more and more with it" (Morningstar 2001).

The Quint can be categorised as what academia considers as a "coalition of the willing"³⁸, a coalition of Member States willing to reach an agreement outside the CFSP official decision-making process. The Quint could also be defined as a coalition of the unsuccessful willing, as the disagreements among the states involved are apparently not always solved. For instance, the Quint "first improvised, at Germany's insistence, Nato's five conditions for an end to the war: an offer which was immediately rejected by the White House" (The Observer 1999).

The Quint was especially active during the Balkan crises. It held regular meetings to discuss EU matters related to the Balkans. For instance, as regards the Kosovo crisis, "the Quint had begun on 29 March [1999]... At tea-time each day in London - and after lunch for Madeleine Albright in the US- they would review the progress of the war and the prospects for a negotiated peace. And the original Quint of Foreign Ministers developed throughout the campaign so that by the end there were parallel Quints of Chiefs of the Defence Staff and political directors from the five Chancelleries, all teleconferencing each evening" (The Observer 1999). In addition, the Quint met to discuss the Macedonian question (Strauss and Smith 2001).

³⁸ MISSIROLI Antonio, "European Security and Defence: The Case for Setting Convergence Criteria", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 485-500.

As regards the Quint's concern for other sensitive issues, an EU official stressed that "with Rambouillet the Contact Group ceased its "effective" existence. However, the Quint continued its meetings on different issues: Turkey, the enlargement process and Russia" (interviewee, 18/02/00). As regards the policy towards Russia, "during the Istanbul summit of the OSCE, the night before the summit opened, the five dined together to coordinate their stance toward Russia. They agreed that Russia would not be directly condemned for its excesses in Chechnya" (Lockwood' 1999). Dini reported that "intensive consultations and discussions had been held during past days, firstly between the main European countries and then more particularly, ... by the Quint" (Luzi 1999). Finally, an interviewee (03/05/02) mentioned that "it still goes on. The Political directors are on the phone every day. It is a quad now (Italy is out)". The Quint therefore seems to discuss major sensitive issues addressed by the EU.

II. The Quint And The EU: The US As A Presence In The EU's CFSP System

The existence of the Quint is not a surprise *per se*, as it seems quite normal that the US and the Big Four should meet to discuss highly sensitive foreign affairs issues. However, the Quint can be considered both as a threat and as an asset to the EU.

The Quint can be considered as a threat to the EU, as it takes decisions that are then "forced upon" the other Member States. Small Member States dislike the directorate framework. The Netherlands is particularly against the Quint: its slogan at the Council meetings is known to be "no taxation without participation"³⁹. The Quint also reveals the presence of the US in the EU's decision-making process even if the US does not formally have a veto right.

The Quint can also be considered as an asset to the EU, as it enables the EU to be perceived as a cohesive block with a unique position. It also enables the EU Member States to reach a common position: without meeting in the Quint structure, an agreement among big EU Member States is unlikely.

³⁹ The Netherlands is indeed a large contributor in terms of aid to the Balkans; it thus "stresses it should be able to decide on a policy that it is "paying" for" (interview with an EU official, 11/06/01).

To conclude, the existence of the Quint reveals the importance of both unofficial relations and the United States when looking at the European Union's CFSP decision-making process. Firstly, the Quint as a new form of diplomacy must be acknowledged. It is highly probable that it worked on a regular basis during the Kosovo crisis and it seems to be involved in discussing sensitive issues, for instance Chechnya. It enables EU Member States to change position in order to reach a common EU agreement. Secondly, it indicates that the relations between some EU Member States and the US are extensively developed.

V. Conclusion

I. The Official US Role In The CFSP System: US-EU Cooperation

Both the EU and the US acknowledge the importance of their relation. On the one hand, the EU officials are always careful to stress in their speeches the importance of the US for the EU. Chris Patten (2000), for instance, stated that "it is a fallacy to imagine that there is a choice to be made between Europeanism and Atlanticism. They are mutually reinforcing. We need to work closely with the United States, which has been, and remains, a staunch friend of Europe". For the Commission (2000, p. 6), the US is a "major partner and the comprehensive relationship is particularly close on a range of issues stretching from trade and politics to foreign policy and security".

On the other hand, the US considers the EU as part of a community, as Madeleine Albright (Agence Europe, 01/02/00) said: "We are cousins, not clones. We have disputes over trade. We differ, at times, on sanctions". The US Ambassador to the EU, Richard Morningstar (2000, p. 4), mentioned that "in addition to the NATO alliance, the US and the EU are cooperating very closely in other fora on important political and security issues such as Southeast Europe, Russia, Ukraine and in a host of other areas around the world". Morningstar (13/09/01) also believed that: "as is particularly obvious at this moment, the US is not just another "third country" for the EU... We are big and important and

special for each other". Behind the scenes, the European governments know they have to work with the US. Even "France has a very responsible attitude towards the US" (Wallace, 10/05/01).

In the literature, the role of the US is underestimated. The US is sometimes not even mentioned in CFSP books⁴⁰, or its role is disregarded (for Zielonka⁴¹, "France, Germany and the UK have a tendency to settle European matters by private bargains among themselves and maintain a largely independent policy towards the US"). However, as we have seen throughout this paper, the US is often mentioned as an important trigger for a EU agreement. John Peterson⁴², for instance, believes that:

"However more mature the EU is now than it was in the early 1990s, it often still needs the Americans to surmount its fissiparous tendencies. This role is emerging as one as the most important played by the US as a European power".

II. The Effective US Role: A Major Hidden Actor When The EU Cares About The US Position

The US role is not emerging. It has always been there, and the Member States have always wanted a link with the US. In the past, the US has mainly played a role in informal groups with the big EU Member States. This still seems to be the case today, as we have seen with the analysis of the Quint. In effect, this situation has been acknowledged by the Danish representative of the European convention, who said that: "the real problem is that 4 or 5 representatives of big EU Member States should not rush to phone Mr. Kissinger (i. e. the US Secretary of State) (Le Monde, 12/07/02). The Big EU Member States want to be in constant link with the US.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this paper:

⁴⁰ see for instance CARLSNAES Walter and SMITH Steve, EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London, Sage Publications, 1994.

⁴¹ ZIELONKA Jan, Explaining Euro-Paralysis, Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 58.

⁴² PETERSON John, "US and EU in the Balkans, America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes", EUI conference, 09/02/02, unpublished paper, p. 17.

- 1) the US position is generally discussed at the EU level in the CFSP system;
- 2) when the EU does not need the US, the US position is discussed, but ignored; and
- 3) when the EU cares about the US position, the US position is taken into account and mostly followed.

When the EU cares about the US position, there is a three level game: the Member State takes into account: 1) the domestic level; 2) the EU level (Commission and other Member States); and 3) the US⁴³. This is because the Member States effectively have a double EU foreign policy at the EU level: one towards a third country or at an international organisation, and another towards the US. This was acknowledged by the European convention discussions in July 2002⁴⁴.

When the EU Member States need the US, they can rarely afford to take a position which is contrary to the US position: the Member States can only agree to be partners. Hiester⁴⁵ considered that "one thing that does seem clear in 1990 is that even with the end of the Cold War, the role of the US as a Power in Europe seems set to continue into the indefinite future". The US presence in the EU is noticeable in the national discourses. In the UK, the US is still mentioned before the EU in foreign policy speeches⁴⁶. Germany still has strong links with the US⁴⁷. Finally, in France, there is a gap between the French discourse and the French reality of its relations with the US⁴⁸. The EU Member States do not change position in order to reach a common EU agreement similar to the US, just to bandwagon the US. The EU aims at binding the US. There is a mother-daughter relationship. The

⁴³ The US level can be considered as more important than the domestic level. For instance, when Germany and France created the Eurocorps on 14 October 1991, the decision was taken by the Chancellerie in Germany and the Elysee in France. According to Art (ART Robert J., "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", in *Political Science Quarterly* 111, spring 1996, pp. 1-39, p. 26), "the Chancellerie briefed the Americans on the proposal but did not consult its own Foreign and Defence Ministries before announcing it. Much the same happened in Paris".

⁴⁴ M. Hain and Henning Christophersen, the British and Danish representatives at the European Convention, acknowledged that each Member State wants to act on the international scene and vis-à-vis the US (*Le Monde*, 12/07/02).

⁴⁵ HIESTER Dan, "The United States as a Power in Europe", in JORDAN Robert (ed.), *Europe and the Superpowers, Essays on European International Politics*, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, pp. 27-47, p. 46.

⁴⁶ For Blair (23/11/01), "The USA will continue to play a vital role, and the present crisis has proven that our relationship with the Americans is as strong as ever. Indeed the UK has a powerful role to play as a bridge between USA and Europe - we are economically strong and politically influential in both. Britain's friendship with the United States is an asset for our European partners. We want to be fully engaged in a united Europe, working with an internationalist USA".

⁴⁷ The US is the first country to have come out in support of Kohl's ambition to reunify Germany (Aggestam 2000, p. 78). Germany is "a keen proponent of the idea of the Euro-Atlantic Union, which extends cooperation beyond security policy to include economics and culture" (Aggestam 2000, p. 79).

daughter EU will mostly follow the mother US, but she will also try to tell the mother when she thinks the mother is wrong.

The EU Member States check whether the US position is weak or strong:

- When the states know the US position is weak, they and reach a common EU agreement (under the influence of other factors, for instance, the pressure of other Member States) and go against the US.
- When the US position is strong, the Member States tend to reach a common agreement in order to either bind the US on the same issue, or to be credible vis-à-vis the US in the future.

The theory of hegemony seems to be confirmed. Howorth⁴⁹ (2001, p. 783) speaks of “hegemony through the back door”. Unipolarity also seems to be confirmed: the US is the only superpower, it sets the agenda, the balancing power vis-à-vis the unipole is reduced, the “secondary states flock to the unipole side”⁵⁰. The US has truly become a “European power”⁵¹.

Overall, the presence of the US in the EU's decision-making process reveals that Member State interests are not merely determined by domestic arenas and the international economic situation as suggested by liberal intergovernmentalism, nor by the institutions, the socialisation process and a learning process as stressed by institutionalist theories. Neorealism and the security community concept have to be brought back in the study of the CFSP system.

The neorealist theory, in the high politics sphere of strategy and diplomacy (Hoffmann 1966), is useful to bring back into consideration the role of the US in the CFSP system, but only when: 1) the EU

⁴⁸ “We have, with our American partners, permanent contacts on every subject, including, obviously, the Middle East” (Déclaration du porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay, 19/02/02).

⁴⁹ HOWORTH Jolyon, “European defence and the changing politics of the EU: hanging together or hanging separately?”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, November 2001, Vol. 39, n. 4, pp.765-790, p. 783.

⁵⁰ HEURLIN Bertel, “Constraining and Disposing Structural Forces: The Role of the United States”, in WIVEL Anders (ed.), *Explaining European integration*, Core, Copenhagen 1998, pp. 190-214, p. 201.

⁵¹ HOLBROOKE Richard, “The United States, a European Superpower”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, n. 2, March / April 1995, pp.38-51. In the CFSP system in general, the notion of “transatlantic community” can also be useful to understand the role of the US in the EU's decision-making process. An EU official (interview, 16/03/01) even foresaw the creation of an Atlantic Union that would replace the EU and NATO in the long run. For Kupchan (KUPCHAN Charles A., “From European Union to Atlantic Union”, in ZIELONKA Jan, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Kluwer Law International, 1998), the solution to the West's dilemma is an Atlantic Union that would subsume the EU and NATO.

Member States need the US, and 2) no previous EU decision constrains the EU's decision-making process.

The concept of security community is also useful, as it underlines the importance of the EU-US link. However, unlike the security community concept, this paper shows that the attitude of a Member State is not indeterminate: I argue a state first tries to find a common EU agreement in order to bind the US, before deciding to unilaterally bind the US.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Literature

- ART Robert J., "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", in *Political Science Quarterly* 111, Spring 1996, pp. 1-39.
- BRETHERTON Charlotte and VOGLER John, The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge, London and New York, 1999.
- BURDETT Elizabeth Jane, The effectiveness of European political cooperation as a system of collective diplomacy. a study of the CSCE process, 1972-1992, LSE PhD thesis, 1997.
- CAMERON Fraser, "Review of KJELL A. Eliassen (Ed.), Foreign and security policy in the European Union", in *European foreign affairs review*, Vol. 4, n. 1, Spring 1999, pp.147-149.
- CARLSNAES Walter and SMITH Steve, EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London, Sage Publications, 1994.
- DEUTSCH Karl et al., Political community and the North Atlantic area : international organization in the light of historical experience, New York, Greenwood Press, 1957.
- FRIIS Lykke and MURPHY Anna, « Negotiating in a Time of Crisis : The EU's Response to the Military conflict in Kosovo », EUI Working Papers, RSC n. 2000/20, European University Institute, Florence.
- GARDNER Hall and STEFANOVA Radoslava (ed), The new transatlantic agenda : facing the challenges of global governance, Burlington, VT : Ashgate, 2001.
- HEURLIN Bertel, "Constraining and Disposing Structural Forces: The Role of the United States", in WIVEL Anders (ed.), Explaining European integration, Core, Copenhagen 1998, pp. 190-214.
- HIESTER Dan, "The United States as a Power in Europe", in JORDAN Robert (ed.), Europe and the Superpowers, Essays on European International Politics, Pinter Publishers, London, 1991, pp. 27-47.
- HILL Chris 2001, lecture given at the L. S. E.
- HILL Christopher (ed.), National foreign policies and European political cooperation, London, Winchester, Mass., USA, Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by G. Allen & Unwin, 1983.
- HILL Christopher, "European Preoccupations With Terrorism", in PIJERS Alfred, REGELBERGER Elfriede and WESSELS Wolfgang, European Political Cooperation since the 1980s, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, pp. 166-193.
- HILL Christopher, interview at ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) Summer School on « EU External Capability and Influence in International Relations », Geneva, September 2000.
- HOFFMANN Stanley, "Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe", in *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, n. 3, summer 1966, pp. 862-915.
- HOLBROOKE Richard, "The United States, a European Superpower", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, n. 2, March / April 1995, pp.38-51.
- HOWORTH Jolyon, "European defence and the changing politics of the EU: hanging together or hanging separately?", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, November 2001, Vol. 39, n. 4, pp.765-790.
- KISSINGER Henry, Diplomacy, Touchstone, 1994.
- KUPCHAN Charles A., "From European Union to Atlantic Union", in ZIELONKA Jan, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
- LIGHT Margot, "Foreign Policy Analysis", in GROOM A. J. R. and LIGHT Margot, Contemporary International Relations: A guide to Theory, Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 93-108.
- MENON Anand, FORSTER Anthony and WALLACE William, "How common a European Security Policy", in *Survival*, Vol. 34 n.3, Autumn 1992, pp. 98-118.
- MISSIROLI Antonio, "European Security and Defence: The Case for Setting Convergence Criteria", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 485-500.
- NUTTALL Simon, "Two decades of EPC performance", in REGELBERGER Elfriede, de SCHOUTHEETE Philippe et WESSELS Wolfgang, Foreign Policy of the European Union, Boulder, 1997, pp. 19-40.
- PETERSON John, "US and EU in the Balkans, America fights the wars, Europe does the dishes", EUI conference, 09/02/02, unpublished paper.
- PFETSCH Frank, "Tensions in Sovereignty: Foreign Policies of EC Members Compared", in CARLSNAES Walter and SMITH Steve, EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London, Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 120-137.
- REGELBERGER Elfriede, "Introduction", in PIJERS Alfred, REGELBERGER Elfriede and WESSELS Wolfgang, European Political Cooperation since the 1980s, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988.
- RISSE Thomas, "A Liberal World Order: The Democratic Security Community and US Power", prepared for the conference on "American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power", Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, 19 May 2000. Draft.
- SCHWELLER Randall, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", in *International Security*, Summer 1994, Vol. 19, n. 1, pp. 72-107.
- VASQUEZ J., The power of power politics, from classical realism to neotraditionalism, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- VON GEUSAU Alting, The external relations of the European Community, Saxon House, Lexington Books, 1974.
- WALLACE William, "Political Cooperation: Integration Through Intergovernmentalism", in WALLACE Helen, WALLACE William and WEBB Carole, Policy-Making in the European Community, Second Edition, 1983, pp. 373-401.
- WALLACE William, "The Euro-Atlantic relations", London Goodenough Trust Port Talk, 10/05/01.
- WALT Stephen, "Alliances in theory and practice - what lies ahead?", in *Journal of international affairs*, Summer-Fall 1989, Vol. 43, n.1, pp.1-17.
- WALTZ Kenneth, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", in *International Security*, Fall 1993, Vol. 18, n. 2, pp. 44-79.
- ZIELONKA Jan, Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998.

Articles

- "EU caves in to Washington over international criminal court", *The Guardian*, 30/09/02.
- "EU Nations Agree to Consider Recognition of Palestinian State", *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 27/03/99.

"EU to go ahead with Satellite system", Financial Times, 27/03/02.
 "Europeans reject Bush 'axis of evil' line on Iran", Financial Times, 05/02/02.
 "French anger at US policy on Israel", The Guardian, 07/02/02.
 "Javier Solana, l'homme pressé de Bruxelles", Le Figaro, 26/01/00.
 "Kosovo: The untold story; How the war was won", The Observer, 18/07/99.
 "La Convention à la recherche d'une politique extérieure de l'UE", Le Monde, 12/07/02, <http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3214--284588-,00.html>.
 "Lost in space: Europe's ambitions to launch a satellite navigation system to compete with the US's monopoly risk being thwarted by a dispute over funding", Financial Times, 22/12/01.
 "Summit reveals complexities of EU's shifting allegiances: the new entente cordiale between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac", Financial Times, 01/12/01.
 "The Middle East's tangled web", Financial Times, 01/02/02.
 Agence Europe n. 7389, 23/01/99.
 ALBRIGHT Madeleine K. and DINI Lamberto, Rome, Italy, 28/07/99, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990728.htm>.
 ALBRIGHT Madeleine K. and KINKEL Klaus, Bonn, Germany, 17/02/97, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970217.htm>.
 ALBRIGHT Madeleine, Agence Europe n. 7645, 01/02/00.
 BARBER L. "Italy warns on domination of 'Big Three' states", Financial Times, 18/11/01.
 BLAIR Tony, Prime Minister Opens University's European Research Institute, Birmingham, 23/11/01, http://www.bham.ac.uk/POLSIStony_blair.htm.
 DAVIS D., Commons Written Answers (13 Feb 1995), House of Commons Hansard Debates, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
 Déclaration du porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay, 19/02/02.
 Diplomatie-actualites, 03/04/02.
 FISCHER Joschka "Les Etats-Unis dilapident le capital de sympathie qu'ils avaient recueilli lors des attentats du 11 septembre", Le Monde, 16/02/02.
 FISCHER Joschka, speech at the European University Institute, 17/01/02.
 GROSSMAN Marc, "American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court", Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 06/05/02, <http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm>
 HANNAY David, speech at the seminar « Europe in the Global Community : Economics, Diplomacy, and Security », Schloss Leopoldskron, Salzburg, 23/03/01.
 Liberation, 04/04/02.
 LOCKWOOD C., "The Quint Emerges as Seat of West's Political Power", London Daily Telegraph, November 1999.
 LUZI G., "How we managed to convince the Russians", La Repubblica, 19/11/99.
 MORNINGSTAR Richard, "A Comprehensive Review of US/EU Relations", Salzburg seminar, session 385, 23/03/01.
 MORNINGSTAR Richard, "Farewell Speech to a Joint meeting of the European Policy Center and the Center for European Policy Studies", 13/09/01.
 MORNINGSTAR Richard, "Remarks to the EU committee of the American Chamber of Commerce Plenary Session", 23/01/01.
 MORNINGSTAR Richard, "The US-EU Relationship: Working Towards a Stronger Partnership for the 21st Century", The World Affairs Council of Boston, October 16, 2000, 6 p.
 MORRISON J., "Policy times five – Embassy Row", Washington Times, 26/11/99.
 PHILLIPS J., "Using stealth bases as pawn in power game", The Times, 14/09/95.
 Point de presse, ministère des affaires étrangères, 29/03/02.
 STRAUSS J. and SMITH M., "SAS is preparing Macedonia for Nato to intervene", The Daily Telegraph, 15/06/01.
 VEDRINE Hubert, interview of the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Le Nouvel Observateur, 24/06/99.
www.auswaertiges-amt.de
www.bollettino.it/English2000/eurodefence.htm.
www.esteri.it
www.fco.gov.uk
www.france.diplomatie.fr
www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/95-02-03.ana.txt
www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/defence0103-en.pdf
www.secretary.state.gov/www/statements.html

EU documents

Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 24-25/03/99.
 Commission document, 2000)
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guestfr.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=iP/02/939/0|RAPID&lg=FR&display=
 Eurostat News Release, The EU figures for the Doha Conference, 08/11/01, <http://czso.vse.cz/eng/eurostat/nr/081101b.pdf>, consulted 10/11/02.
 Eurostat Source, OECD, European Commission, Facts and Figures on the European Union and the United States, www.eurunion.org/profile/facts.htm, consulted 10/11/02.
 GAC Press Release, 28/01/02.
 PATTEN Chris, "Commissioner Chris Patten sets out guidelines and goals for European Union external relations", Europe Documents n° 2194, 21/06/00.
 PATTEN Chris, "Devotion or Divorce? The Future of Transatlantic Relations", European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, 2001, pp. 287-290.
 PATTEN Chris, "Europe's Leaders Welcome American Display of Partnership", 19/06/01.
 PATTEN Chris, "Why does America Fear this Court?", Washington Post, 09/07/02, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp->
 SOLANA Javier, "le développement de la politique européenne commune de sécurité et de défense de l'Union Européenne", Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne n°442, October-November 2000, p. 589.
 SOLANA Javier, Statement by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on the UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq, Brussels, 08/11/02, S0206/02.