

**Strength in Diversity? French and German Regional Responses
to European Union Education Initiatives**

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Abstract:

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to European Union Education Initiatives**

This paper examines the relations between the regional, national and supra-national levels of government within the European Union (EU). Specifically, it compares the responses of the 22 French regions and the 16 German states to the European Union's initiatives in education policy. The hypothesis set forth is that both the French and German regional governments have greatly benefited from EU policies such as *Socrates/Erasmus* and *Leonardo* that aim to integrate the education policies of the EU member states.

The evidence suggests that by participating in these programs the national governments of France and Germany have lost policy-making competence to the higher level of government, i.e. the European Union, and to the lower level of government, the French regions and the German *Länder*. This is called the "sandwich hypothesis" because the national governments are seen to be squeezed between the growing power of the EU supra-national institutions, on the one hand, and the increasing influence of the regional governments, on the other hand. Our paper thus sheds some light on the theoretical discussion of the changing role of the nation-state facing the twin forces of internationalization and regionalization within the European Union.

Introduction

With the introduction of the Single European Act in 1986 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 the scope and depth of policy-making at the European Union (EU) level have dramatically increased. Growing EU policy-making authority has led to a revived debate about the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority of the state in Europe (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996, p. 341).

Recent research on European integration and its effects on national political systems has alternatively posed the questions whether the new Europe will be a “European superstate” or a “federal Europe”, a “Europe of nation-states”, or a “Europe of the regions”. As Alberta Sbragia (1992) has pointed out, “[t]he notion of a federal Europe is used by both opponents and supporters of a tightly integrated Europe to symbolize a decline in the influence of national governments” (p. 259).

Education and training policies represent major challenges for the EU. Although both topics affect the lives of all EU citizens, Community-wide policies in these areas were introduced only recently, in conjunction with the single market, and have faced serious financing problems and political obstacles on the grounds of national sovereignty (Wood and Yesilada 1996, p. 175-6; Ambler 1990).

This paper explores the impact of EU education policy initiatives on the institutions and governance of the French and German education systems. What have been the effects of EU higher education initiatives on the intergovernmental relations between supra-national, national and subnational authorities of the French Fifth Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany?

Our paper builds on research by Marks et al. (1996) and Ladreche (1994) who argue that most discussions of the EU political configuration miss the crucial part developing on the part of subnational governments. Ladrech (1994) introduces the concept of “Europeanization”, which he defines as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree

that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policymaking” (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69).

According to Ladrech, “[w]hat makes Europeanization different from terms such as internationalization or globalization is first of all the geographic delimitation and, secondly the distinct nature of pre-existing national framework which mediates this process of adjustment in both formal and informal ways.” (Ladrech 1994, p. 71).

More recently, Marks et al. (1996) have argued that “European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government--subnational, national, and supranational” (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996, p. 341). They conclude that “[f]rom the 1980s, a system of multi-level governance arose, in which national governmental control became diluted by the activities of supranational and subnational actors” (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996, p. 373).

We argue that the French regional governments and universities and the German states (*Länder*) and their representative body at the national level, the Federal Council or *Bundesrat*, have been among the chief beneficiaries of European integration in the education policy sector. The EU’s education policy initiatives such as Erasmus are reinforcing processes that have strengthened the role of subnational governments in policy making, such as French decentralization measures of the 1980s and the results of German unification and new party alliances at the regional level. Overall, European education policy initiatives have strengthened the position of the French regions and German states in the national policy-making processes of the Fifth Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

France, the EU, and Higher Education: Decentralization and Regionalism

One of major questions concerning European integration are its effects on member states. This analysis concerns itself with France who has made major adjustments since the 1980's in national

education policy. Referring to the theory of Europeanization, these changes are a result of pressure from the EU, local institutions, and "consumers" (students, faculty and administrative staff). France in turn has followed a more decentralized policy for higher education. These new developments have made implementing the subsidiarity principle (EU's regional development principle) found in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty easier for France, but not nearly as such when compared to federalist countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany.

This paper examines European integration through a policy area, education. France is the selected case to illustrate EU education initiatives and integration. First, recent trends in national education policy, the overall structure of French education, national goals for education and education and decentralization will be discussed. Second, is an explication of EU programs and the French case. A conclusion will follow these two sections emphasizing the relationship between EU integration and education policy through the French case.

Recent trends in national policy: Decentralization

One of the most significant reforms by the Socialist government from 1982-1986 was decentralization (Ehrmann, Schain, 1992). There were 14 pieces of legislation passed during this period to grant more authority to local governments. Local governments were given a number of new responsibilities which were all designated by the central government. This section describes the three levels of government at the local level and highlights the main components of the decentralization laws.

Local government in France consists of communes, departments and regions. Communes are responsible for the most basic level of government all with the same legal status, but not the same geographical or population size (Stevens, 1992). Communes also decide town and county planning, various public services within the community and some responsibility for infrastructure, especially local roads. The next largest component of the local government is the

departments. They were formed in 1790 and divided into 89 departments (later 90), based on geographical location (Stevens, 1992). They have remained unchanged for nearly 200 years. Their purpose was to implement the central government's policies. Not until 1871 were departments given elective powers and perceived as a means of local democratization. The last and for this paper most important aspect of local government is the regions. The 22 regions have since the 1982 decentralization laws received more autonomy than previous years, consisting of executive powers, extended regional responsibilities and more freedom over regional investments and running costs (Stevens, 1992). Though regions' budgets are only slightly larger than departments (not large in the least), they contribute greatly to French economic development. Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, regions can request funds from the Regional Fund designed under the EU framework.

Legislation related to decentralization consisted of 14 detailed laws in the 1980's. This trend though began in 1964 when regional prefects were created under national legislation and in 1972 another piece of legislation was passed to consolidate the regional administration under the prefects (Ehrmann, Schain, 1992). Prefects were the representative government and executive agent of each department appointed by the central government (Blondel, 1974). They have since lost most of their power and are responsible for local security (law and order) (Ehrmann, Schain, 1992). The most important decentralization law was the framework law (loi cadre) in 1986 (Ehrmann, Schain, 1992). This established regions as political units, transferring all administrative powers from the department and prefects to elected officials (Ehrmann, Schain, 1992). French leaders view decentralization laws as successful, but when compared to other countries, France remains highly centralized. The 1980 reforms demonstrate France's willingness to dilute the central authority's power and promote a new adherence to EU's emphasis on regional development.

A decentralization trend is also prevalent in higher education. Regions and higher education institutions have more autonomy over administrative functions than ever before. This again reinforces France's new desire to align itself with standards of both other member states and the EU. First the structure of higher education will be discussed followed by regional trends in the context of French education policy.

Universities, Grandes Ecoles and IUTs

The higher education structure in France is comprised of four main sectors: universities, Grandes Ecoles, Institutes Universitaires de Technologie (IUTs) and research institutes. Though research institutes have become more important in higher education in recent years, this analysis will focus on the first three sectors (Clark, 1987). IUTs have only since De Gaulle become an integrated part of higher education. Universities and the Grandes Ecoles demonstrate France's traditionally academic focus, affirming a national pattern of elitism and centralization especially in higher education (Moehlman, 1957). In 1992-93, the total number of students in the EU higher education systems was 10.7 million with 16% from France students, only 2% lower than Finland, ranked first that year (European Commission, 1996). There was a one percent increase in 1992-93 in French higher education from the previous year (European Commission, 1995).

There are a total of 75 universities all found under the National Ministry of Education's authority (Luchaire, Massit-Follea, 1993). Each university offers courses in particular disciplines in order to avoid competition among the universities (Moehlman, 1957). Three main points clearly describe the French universities (Clark, 1987). First, during the French Revolution which abolished traditional universities, universities were closely linked with the secondary school level, "le lycée". This was a result of Napoleon's opposition to a religiously dominated school education which led to the creation of a public education system. The system was structured around national examinations, securing a particular level of training in the medical and

legal field. Scientific research, except in the natural sciences has had little place in universities, preventing separate training for research and liberal arts to occur in the French system (Clark, 1987). The Ministry of Education has tried to diminish the research lag by creating research institutions which are independent from universities and publicly funded (Clark, 1987). Second, universities experienced difficulties coordinating university curricula among themselves and locally in various disciplines. Numerous laws were passed to bridge the differences, but the non-disciplinary factor remains. Only sixteen universities can truly be considered multidisciplinary, reinforcing the difficulties of inter-university cooperation. Third, centralization remains a strong element in higher education. In the past, centralization referred to a geographically location, namely Paris. The Parisian center is not as strong as it once was in both a quantitative and qualitative sense. The current connotation of centralization applies more to administrative affairs such as diplomas, national curricula, admission requirements, staff salaries, and other personnel and actives of the Ministry of Education. Universities have gained some autonomy from the Ministry of Education, but numerous administrative functions remain controlled by the state (Clark, 1987).

Alongside the universities are the "Grandes Ecoles" which are the most prestigious universities in France. These schools were established in the 18th century as training centers for governmental elites, military officials, and engineers (Clark, 1987). After the French revolution, a number of new institutes and schools were created including, the Ecole Normale Supérieure specifically for training teachers. Another prominent school, the Ecole Polytechnique became one of the most prestigious universities for civil servants and technical bureaucrats (Clark, 1987). Later, the Grandes Ecoles were created in a number of disciplines ranging from architecture to political science. The vast majority of these schools are state funded, but a number of them are financed either by local chambers of commerce or private sources (Clark, 1987). The Grandes Ecoles are closely linked to the professional sector, giving their students both academic and

practical skills. Between the schools though competition is fierce for recruiting the best students in the field to their schools (Clark, 1987).

The third sector in French education is composed of the IUTs or Technical Institutes. IUTs were created to solve the overcrowding issue in universities during the 1960's once the student population reached the university level (Clark, 1987). Curriculum in IUTs is mainly vocational training and pursued by students after passing the bac or immediately following the DEUG (Diplôme d'études universitaire générales) after 4 years of study. Students with the DEUG continue with a master's degree in a vocational training area rather than a bachelors degree. IUTs are "semiautonomous" within the university and though were intended to solve the overcrowding problem, they have not attracted a wide numbers of applicants as was anticipated (Clark, 1987). The most respected education path continues to be either the Grandes Ecoles or universities rather than the IUTs. Technical schools may begin to flourish though in the next few years particularly if unemployed students begin searching for new skills other than academic ones.

National Goals for Higher Education

There are three main concerns for French education in the late 1980's and early 1990's. These problems relate to France's commitment to "democratize" and increase participation in the tertiary sector. First, the national government is concerned that not enough students are continuing beyond the post-secondary level. In recent years, education ministers have advocated that 80% of secondary students pass the entrance exam (the baccalauréat) which allows them entry into a university (Neave, 1991). Second, is the desire to invest more in education than in previous years. This includes both financial backing for universities as well as giving students an education that allows them to compete in an international economy. Third, is France's continued effort to develop a system of mass education where more students from various economic and educational backgrounds obtain a higher education degree (Neave, 1991). These three anxieties

by the French government are derived from both France's commitment to democratizing education and increasing participation in education. As a result, France has reexamined the structure of its education system and as a result has given universities more autonomy over policies than previous years. The specifics of decentralization in education will be explained in a later section.

Related to France's commitment to increase democratization of education or as some refer to "massification" of higher education, France has been forced to examine the number of students obtaining the baccalauréat (bac) which allows entry into a higher education institution (Neave, 1991). After evaluating higher education in the 1980's, the French government realized that the number of students who passed the bac following their secondary studies was far too low (Neave, 1991). This was illustrated by a 7.4% decrease in students passing the bac from 1975 to 1987 (Guin, 1990). In 1987, slightly more than 30% of 18 to 19 year olds passed the bac and 83.8% of those applied to a university (Neave, 1991). The Socialists beginning with Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the last Socialist Minister of Education before the 1986 elections, advocated that 80% of 18 to 19 year olds should qualify for the bac (Neave, 1991). The Ministry's anticipated goal of 80% was an overambitious leap in "Bachiers" rates. Immediately following Chevènement, René Monory, his successor reduced this percent to 74% by the year 2000 (Neave, 1991).

These pretentious goals will effect a number of sectors involved with education, including primary and secondary as well as higher education. Teachers at the primary and secondary school level will be forced to prevent failure in order that more students pass the bac (Guin, 1990). This could decrease the level of education quality in schools simply to increase the number of students eligible for the bac. In higher education, universities will be faced with an increase in more applicants requiring more professional staff and physical space for these new

students. Besides these difficulties, it is questionable whether the government will reach its 74% goal by the year 2000.

French Regionalism: A new shift?

The brief overview of the institutes of higher education in France and national goals provides an understanding of the main focus in French education, traditional academics rather than a technical based education. Despite the differences in philosophy between the universities (including the Grandes Ecoles) and the IUTs, they share a significant commonality: the state oversees most functions within these institutions. Parallel to the 1980's decentralization reforms in national and local government, education has followed a similar trend. Though 1980 education reforms attempted to decentralize education, the Ministry of Higher Education and Research continues to maintain a great deal of authority over education as compared to other education systems. Before affirming this observation, an analysis of the past twenty years, termed as "regionalism" must be examined.

Regionalism has developed much more extensively since the 1980's through numerous pieces of national legislation. There are two forms of regionalism: first, is "top-down" regionalism which occurs through national regional policies and second is "bottom-up" which is derived from "regional political and economic mobilization" (Jones and Keating, 1995). In the case of France, regional practices were adopted during the 1960's and initiated by the central government (top-down), but were most extensive in the 1980's. Regionalism is caused by both political and economic factors (Jones and Keating, 1995). Politically, regional autonomy has given more legitimacy to the central government through direct elections. Economically, the state was financially burdened specifically by the rising costs in education and now is able to acquire funds from public and private sources. These developments forced France to revise past policy-making and resulted in more regional autonomy.

Regionalism has become more than Jones and Keating's definition to a new relationship between three different levels of government: the EU, the national government and local government. This is the theory of Europeanization as outlined in the introduction. Regionalism is affected by the national government who appropriates regional autonomy through legislation and funds, the EU who initiates education programs and funds and the local governments who interact with both the private and public sector in decision-making and funding. This recent focus in European politics towards the "region" or local government development and how it interacts with the two other levels of government is the result of new economic and political constraints within national governments. In France, regionalism has advanced because of the 1980 French reforms and EU's principle of subsidiarity. It is also the result of an awareness to legitimize government in both an EU and national context to strive for more democratic conditions at all three levels of government. This is observed through changes in regional governmental structures and national legislation, particularly in higher education.

Regional Governance

Another way France has tried to decentralize its strong state is through regional governance. There were two plans which guided the relationship between the state and local governments, known as the Ninth and Tenth National Plans. Under the Ninth National Plan, the government attempted to build a regional authority, but failed (Guin, 1990). The 1989 Tenth National Plan was far more comprehensive and specifically addressed the position of the university between the state and the regions. The details will be discussed in the higher education section.

In the area of administrative control, reforms during 1982 and 1986 gave regions more autonomy. Instead of the state appointing members to Regional Councils, direct elections were held (Guin, 1990). Executive powers were also transferred from the local Prefects to elected Presidents of Regional Councils improving legitimacy at the regional level and emphasizing

decentralization. Finally, regions were able to receive financial backing from other sources such as industry and other local resources. Included in this new arrangement was an increase in coordination between the regions, for example a number of southern French regions formed "le grand Sud" linking both the local level with that of the European Community and avoiding the central government (Guin, 1990). The new emphasis on regional governance and legitimacy not only enhanced regional autonomy, but spilled into the legislation for higher education.

Regionalism and Higher Education

Regionalism has only recently been developed in the field of higher education. Since the 1980's, a number of reforms occurred under the Socialist government. Regionalism has become the policy for higher education. Economic problems, high unemployment, and concern for local development have all contributed to this shift from the state to the region (Guin, 1990). Regionalism also corresponds to France's national goals, democratization and participation because it allows for more involvement outside of the traditional elite in Paris. At the supranational level, the principle of subsidiarity found in the Treaty of Rome and the EU's Regional fund both reinforce the European commitment to regional development. French legislation that has fostered this regional arrangement is the 1989 Tenth National Plan (Guin, 1990). This plan made 2000 million French francs available to local authorities for higher education. This has allowed regions greater access to available governmental funds and has permitted them to use their own funds for local universities (Guin, 1990). Unlike the past, universities have become more financially stable because of these reforms and are better evaluators of where funds should be spent in their local universities.

National Legislation, Regionalism and Education Policy

Aside from the factors mentioned above, French legislation clearly demonstrates a trend of decentralization and regionalism in education policy. Specific laws, such as the Loi Faure, Loi Sauvage and Loi Savary were all contributors to decentralization. The first initiative began in 1968 as a result of student protests in Paris and throughout France. Since this time, the French government has been forced to evaluate education policies and reform them in significant ways. The greatest changes in education policy have occurred specifically in higher education. In the 1980's, France ignored complaints made by students, professors, and administrators in the universities (Guin, 1990). It wasn't until the 1990's that the government again attuned itself to the problems in higher education as it had done in the 1960's. This was because of various political disputes, particularly from 1986 to 1988 when cohabitation was prevalent with a Right wing majority in the National Assembly and a Socialist President overseeing the government. Since 1986, reforms in higher education have emphasized decentralization through various legislative initiatives.

Major higher education policy reforms began in 1968. The "Loi Faure" granted universities greater authority and independence, but was extremely difficult to implement because of the attitudes prevalent in French society (Guin, 1990). These attitudes expressed concern over diploma regulation and allocation of resources by the state rather than the regions. These feelings prevented the Loi Faure from being fully implemented. This law wanted to give the state a lesser role in education policy, but because of public opinion, the state remained the central authority in university affairs (Guin, 1990). An attempt to reform the Loi Faure was initiated by a politician, Sauvage and became known as "Loi Sauvage" (Guin, 1990). This legislation wanted to restore authority exclusively to senior professors within universities, but was quickly repealed in 1981 by the Socialist government during the time of cohabitation.

In 1983, the Savary Act was initiated by the Education Minister of that time, Alain Savary (Baumgartner, 1989). Two years later, it was officially adopted by President Mitterrand (Staropoli, 1987). This legislation, also known as the Higher Education Guideline Law is was an important attempt by the French government to "democratize" and increase participation rates in the tertiary sector (Neave, 1991). It was one of the most ambitious attempts by the French government to link higher education with national economic and social strategy (Neave, 1985). This law not only enhanced regional authority, but extended the universities research base, deepened relations between the university and industry and finally revised undergraduate and doctoral level studies (Neave, 1991). In essence, nearly all sectors of higher education were revised. The main issues surrounding this law consisted of improving relations between junior and senior faculty, creating closer ties between universities and industry, diminishing the competition between universities (Grandes écoles and universities), and changing the power of authority in academic departments (Baumgartner, 1989). This Act became controversial because of the political climate (a time of cohabitation) and the specifics which it outlined (Guin, 1990). The Savary Act, though unsuccessfully implemented because of resistance from universities to comply and political parties in power would not accept the conditions of the Act, was unlike previous legislation a major attempt to reform higher education (Guin, 1990).

A second component of the Higher Education Guideline Law was the creation of an evaluation committee, the Comité National d'Evaluation (CNE) or the National Evaluation Committee. The CNE is an independent administrative agency which assesses all activities under the tertiary sector and institutions under the Ministry of Higher Education (European Commission, 1995). It is responsible for evaluating the "quality of research and teaching, teacher training, continuing training, the administration of staff and service, the academic environment, the admission and supervision of students, local integration, and national and

international contacts" (European Commission, 1995, 162). An annually report is submitted to the President of the Republic on this issues.

Considering regionalism and decentralization, the CNE has played a prominent role in the process. In the 1985-1989 CNE final report sent to President Mitterrand the committee took a firm stance on continuing with regional development based on Jules Ferry's emphasis on community authority over education policy (Guin, 1990). The report mentions that the central state is far too distant from the concerns of students and staff involved in higher education. Most especially was the CNE's commitment to financing higher education through more regional resources rather than the central government (Guin, 1990). Unlike the difficulties faced under most legislative efforts, the CNE has become more successful with advocating decentralization and its views supported by regions, local authorities and politicians alike (Guin, 1990).

Following the Guideline law, new attempts again were made to reform higher education. The new education minister, Alain Devaquet was asked to draft higher education legislation after the 1986 elections. The Devaquet Bill modified university fees, called for a more selective admission process into universities, and granted more autonomy to individual universities (Guin, 1990). This Bill was an "expression of the trend towards economic liberalism in the West" whereas in the early 1980's France was considerably reluctant to favor market forces and capitalism (Guin, 1990). Like previous legislation, the Devaquet Bill failed because of protests from students.

Another important aspect of education and regionalism are the Regional Committees and Departmental Committees. Both are consultative committees for issues related to higher education (Neave, 1985). Their main objective is to form closer ties with regional industries and higher education institutions particularly because of excessively high unemployment rates. Regional Committees have two functions: first, inform regional administration of latest developments in qualifications for specific sectors and second, act as a liaison between the

various higher education institutions and training schools within the region (Neave, 1985). Departmental Committees acts in a more horizontal nature rather than top down as do the Regional Committees (Neave, 1985). Their focus is at the departmental level evaluating courses at the post-secondary level and conducting experiments related to education. Though both committees consult and recommend policies and procedures to universities, they have created a more defined balance of power between "the government, administration, the representatives of the public and academia as it is exercised outside the individual university and at the various intervening levels-local, regional and finally, national" (Neave, 1985). This new shift of power has decreased the centralized state's autonomy in higher education policy, but not to the extent of a federalist country like the Federal Republic of Germany.

Though legislative reforms to decentralize higher education were controversial in the 1980's, the French government continued to support a less centralized authority. Regions now have full administrative powers: they participate in direct elections for Regional Council seats, elected Presidents of Regional Councils have authority over the local Prefects, and regional bureaucrats have greater control over their budgets (Guin, 1990). There are also more links with the tertiary sector and the private sector which has helped resolve some of the financial distress experienced in a number of universities. Finally, higher education in France is the relationship between three levels: the state, regions and the local authority rather than the internal structures within the university (Neave, 1985).

EU Programs and French Participation

Despite France's highly centralized education system, regionalism has changed operations between administration at the central and local level as well as financial aid. Another factor added to these recent additions are the EU's education initiatives. These initiatives (Erasmus/Socrates, Lingua and Leonardo) have mobilized French students to study in another

member state and have helped France continue to maintain similar education programs despite economic difficulties.

Since the 1980's, the EU has moved from exclusive areas in education, vocational training to a broader area, general education. These changes are demonstrated through the various initiatives accepted by the member states. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was one of the first EU documents that gave education more attention than in previous years. In chapter two, the events leading up to this treaty will be outlined. For this section, there are two main points: first a general description of EU education and second a discussion of three EU education programs. The three selected include ERASMUS/SOCRATES, LINGUA (the Program for the Promotion of Foreign Language Knowledge in the European Community, and LEONARDO, a program adopted to implement vocational training policy. A description of their individual goals, aims, budgets and justification for their selection will be discussed in this section.

General characteristics of EU education initiatives

In the 1980's, the EU began promulgating education policy for member states. The philosophy surrounding EU education policy has been co-operation (Guide to the European Community Programmes, 1994). Programs have opted to encourage relationships between member states, rather than imposing specific criteria and structure on countries. The results have shown that these programs have been successful because of the increase in the number of applicants and money invested into these programs (Wielemans, 1991). Precise statistical figures will be examined in a later section.

ERASMUS/SOCRATES

There are a number of programs available particularly for university students. One of the largest EU education programs is Erasmus. This program is crucial to this study because it acts as a

foundation for a number of EU programs and serves as an umbrella organization for initiatives, including Lingua. Hans de Wit points out that since 1987, more than 1,500 institutions have participated in more than 2,500 "Interuniversity Cooperation Programs" (ICP's) under ERASMUS. More than 300,000 students have participated in Erasmus since 1987 (Doulsan, 1997). This program specifically focuses on higher education and in 1997-98 will bear the new name of "SOCRATES" (deWit, 1996). The program starting date was originally the 1996-97 academic year, but because of discrepancies between member states and university bureaucrats, it was postponed for one year (deWit, 1996). The change in name is a result of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which gave the EU a greater role in education policy and reassessed past program success (deWit, 1996). The main difference between SOCRATES and ERASMUS is the former encompasses not only higher education, but all levels of education policy (deWit, 1996). The sections it includes are first higher education (ERASMUS), school education (COMENIUS), language learning (LINGUA), Open and Distance Learning (ODL), Adult Education and the exchange of information and experience through a number of initiatives under Socrates (<http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg22/socrates/info.html>, 1997). The projected 1997-98 budget for Socrates is 850 million ECU, of which 55% will go towards the ERASMUS program (deWit, 1996).

Erasmus was created in 1987 as a means of formalizing exchanges between member states (deWit, 1990). When it was first developed, its goal was both political and economic: to foster an understanding of European identity and enhance international competition through education (deWit, 1990). The specific objectives outlined by the EU were to increase the number of university students studying in other member states, encourage cooperation between higher education institutions through teacher exchanges, and offer graduates personal experiences in other member states in order to strengthen the notion of a European people (Guide to the European Community Programmes, 1994). In 1996, Erasmus continues to promote

educational exchanges for students, teachers, and administrators (Europa, 1996). Since its creation, more than 1,500 institutions have participated and worked under this program (Teichler, 1993). In 1989, Erasmus experienced an 46% increase of student exchanges as compared with the preceding year. One year later, there was a 90% increase of these student exchanges (Teichler, 1993). Its budget was also expanded from 11.2 million ECU in its first year (1987-88) to 52.5 million ECU in its third year (1989-90) (Wielemans, 1991). This budgetary increase represents the EU's strong commitment to these programs and belief that they can help foster greater co-operation among member states.

LINGUA

Another EU program under Socrates is Lingua, the Program for the Promotion of Foreign Language Knowledge in the European Community. This program began in 1989 and has two main objectives (Wielemans, 1991). First, as stated by the Commission of the European Communities "to develop the ability of citizens in the Community to communicate more effectively, as a result of a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the teaching and learning of foreign languages (Wielemans, 1991). Second, LINGUA was adopted to enhance student's language skills to better prepare them for a competitive market. Aside from these two objectives, Lingua attempts to promote the least widely used languages within the EU as a reinforcement of the diversity between the member states (European Commission, 1995). A unique feature of this program is that it addresses all levels of education involved in foreign language teaching (SOCRATES Bureau, 1995). It includes teacher training programs, adult education, and the development of language curricula particularly for school teachers (SOCRATES Bureau, 1995). Lingua reaches numerous target groups within member states for the promotion of language learning.

LEONARDO da Vinci

Third, is LEONARDO, the EU's action program for developing vocational training policy. It began in 1995, and like ERASMUS encompasses a variety of programs under its name such as COMETT (Cooperation Programme between Universities and Enterprises for Education and Training for Technology), PETRA (Community Action Programme for the Vocational Training of Young People and Their Preparation for Adult and Working Life), FORCE (Action Programme for the Development of Continuing Vocational Training in the European Community), and EUROTECNET (Community Action Programme in the field of Vocational Training and Technological Change) (Action program, 1997). LEONARDO will last for a total of five years (1995 to 1999) under the direction of the European Commission to further advance vocational training for students in member states (Action program, 1997).

Despite the advancements made in education policy including a number of new initiatives in both general and vocational education, education continues to remain low on the political agenda. There have been several monetary increases since the 1980's, but they were not significant enough to lead to drastic changes in education policy. The total EU budget in 1991 was 55.6 billion ECU (European currency unit) (Eurostat, 1992). Only 8% of the total budget was designated for social policy without any specific reference to education. The EU's largest expenditure is agriculture and fisheries at 63.5%. Under the limited funding for social policy, ERASMUS was forced to operate with a low budget. During the program's first year, 3,000 students received ERASMUS study grants under a 11.2 million ECU budget (Wielemans, 1991). In the fourth year, the program received 52.5 million ECU to offer 20,000 to 25,000 student grants (Wielemans, 1991). The increased budget does signify a commitment by policy-makers to education, but compared to other areas within the EU's budget, education remains less of a concern.

The French Response

France has, in most of the EU programs, had the highest participation rates of any other EU member state. This demonstrates France's openness and willingness to comply with new initiatives and further move away from a highly centralized authority to one where numerous levels of government interact with each other. The only statistics excluded here are for the Socrates program, since it is in its first year of operation. The other programs' participation rates will be compared with countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom who are leaders in EU integration.

Erasmus participation rates for the case of France have been quite high in total percentage of French students participating, ICP's, the number of participating higher education institutions and sending and receiving partners. First, in 1989-90, there were a total of 18,276 students participating in Erasmus (Teachler, 1993). 20.7% of these students were from France with the Germans close behind at 19.7% (Teachler, 1993). In 1995-96, 17.4% of the 137,599 Erasmus participants were French with 14.8% from Germany (gopher://resul.ulb.ac.be:70/00/Regional Statistics/.france.asc, 1997). Second, the number of French ICP's coordinated in 1988-89 was 189 as compared to Germany at 127 and the UK at 163 (Teachler, 1993). The following year, again France maintained a slightly higher total with 247 ICPs with Germany at 171 and the UK at 239 (Teachler, 1993). Third, the number of eligible institutions in France is quite higher than that of other member states. In 1989-90, 1,982 (47% of total number of institutions) French institutions were eligible to participate while only 461 were from the UK (11.2%) and 348 from Germany (8.5%) (Teichler, 1993). Fourth, the total number of active partners in 1989-90 again was highest in France with 601 total compared to the UK's 583 and Germany's 577 (Teichler, 1993). Active partners shows the correlation between total number of eligible institutions with those that are actually participating in the Erasmus program. France maintains first place.

Another program which France has received favorably is the Lingua action under Socrates. From 1991 to 1994, France has maintained second place behind that of the UK with joint projects and exchanges for young people aged 16 to 25 (European Commission, 1995). In 1994, nearly 7,000 exchanges and projects were supported in France and over 8,000 in the UK (European Commission, 1995). Overall, France has continued to have the highest number of participants received in 1991-92 with 4,860, in 1992-93 with 4,801 participants, and in 1993-94 with 6,120 participants (Lingua Programme, 1995). The same trend is true for the number of participants France has received during the 1991-94 period (Lingua Programme, 1995).

As with the Erasmus/Socrates program and Lingua initiative, the French have strong participation rates in the Leonardo program. In 1996, France was first in projects selected for Leonardo with a total of 286 financed by 20 millions Ecu from the EU (La Lettre France: Leonardo da Vinci, 1997). There were slightly more projects financed in 1996 with 271 projects with 18 million Ecu (La Lettre France: Leonardo da Vinci, 1997). These high participation rates are quite significant for the French case especially since education was typically viewed as an elite project until the 1960's and even more profound in the 1980's. France is taking interest in improving technical training especially through EU programs and funding sources.

The analysis of these three EU initiatives vis a vis the French case represent a strong interest in promoting EU programs. France has in most instances been receptive to new programs and received funding for its efforts. EU programs have possibly helped finance the vast difficulties experienced by the French government and universities. This could explain French enthusiasm for EU initiatives. Second, returning to the notion of Europeanization, changes have occurred on local, regional and national levels and France has realized it can no longer fulfill all educational requests through a central bureaucracy. France has turned to new sources and innovations to maintain a higher level of education quality as emphasized by Education Ministers through students passing the bac. The French government as well as

regional and local governments have developed a new working relationship which allows for more flexibility particularly with financing education. Politicians, the CNE and university bureaucrats view these changes as positive especially to resolve the numerous problems in higher education (Guin, 1990).

Decentralization and the French Commitment

When evaluating France itself, a significant amount of decentralization has occurred. Decentralization suggests that local authorities now have more control over institutional policies, but also that France has expressed support for EU education initiatives. These are the two components of decentralization. Nationally, decentralization has so far been accomplished through the 14 laws, mainly promulgated in the 1980's and through the CNE. The regions now play a greater role in allocating financial resources to universities under the tenth National Plan. It also seems that there is more support from politicians and the public for a regional university system. The mayor of Lyon, Michel Noir fully agreed with decentralization by saying, "Whether one likes it or not, higher education has got to be decentralized. The universities need to be independent and form partnerships within their social and economic environments, which they cannot do under a centralized system" (Guin, 1990, 128). Another strong supporter of decentralization policies is the Haut Comité Education-Economie (HCEE) which was created to offer advice to the national government on education relevant to labor market issues (Ambler, 1990). The HCEE favors a more practical based school curricula giving students skills necessary for a competitive market (Ambler, 1990). This view conflicts with the traditional French view of education solely for academic use and for comprehensive understanding of the French culture and language. Aside from the CNE and the HCEE, the strongest support is from the national government (Ambler, 1990). The government has initiated policy specifically under Mitterrand's term and he even went so far as to announce one of his priorities in the late 1980's was to create a

"Citizens' Europe" (Ambler, 1990, 48). The Ministry of Education (MEN) closely linked with the national government, has also shown support for a European dimension to education. MEN supports an annual "Europe Day at School" for school children to better understand Europe and European affairs (Ambler, 1990). In 1988, regional academies were asked to submit reports of their plans for the day and were rewarded for promoting Europe. The former Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin has also reinforced a European dimension in the school curriculum following the death of Jean Monnet (EU integration pioneer). He asked teachers to read one of three suggested texts to their students as a reminder of international cooperation (Ambler, 1990). Higher education is moving away from a centralized authority to regional governments as a result of financial difficulties faced by both the universities and the state. France is also looking to new options for education such as EU initiatives. So far, French students and university administrators have favored these programs as demonstrated through participation rates. France will most likely continue to decentralize authority which will improve the financial difficulties experienced in the 1980's and enhance its relationship with the EU.

France has made considerable efforts to change its higher education policies since the 1968 student protests. This has occurred because of a number of factors: the EU, local protests, and student/faculty/administrators concerns over the direction of higher education. France has also demonstrated approval for EU programs through its high participation rates in recent education initiatives. Despite the 1980's education laws and the EU's programs, France still faces the centralization dilemma. Some scholars argue France is moving closer towards decentralizing education while others view education laws as an increase in bureaucratic authority.

Decentralization: How far?

To what extent then is France decentralized in the field of education? When comparing France only to itself, it has made significant progress in increasing local participation. Since the 1980's,

14 laws were passed related to decentralization and regionalism. Included in these laws were the establishment of direct elections in the regions. During the first regional elections in 1986 for regional councilors, participation was quite high at 77.6% (Balme, 1995). This percentage was equivalent to municipal elections and higher than department elections. Significant for these elections too was that regional councilors were elected rather than appointed as they were in the past. The 1986 law also promoted regions to full local authority status rather than controlled by the central government (Balme, 1995). In the area of expenditure rates, the regions saw an increase of 26.3% between 1982-88 (Balme, 1995). This has changed the elitist view slightly since regionalism requires citizen input in the form of regional and locally elected officials versus appointed ones. The effects though are viewed more as a new element in political life rather than as an improvement in democratic conditions, but regionalism has added an important dimension to the French political system (Balme, 1995).

On the other hand, France remains quite centralized compared to other EU member states. These changes are recent and in many instances still do not hand complete control over to the regional governments or the universities. For example, national standards are still set and published each year by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, including an approved list of textbooks for schools (Baumgartner, 1989). Second, France maintains utmost control over teachers, continuing to treat them as civil servants rather than local employees (Baumgartner, 1989). Third, it is the government who has given the local governments all of their autonomy, not the governments themselves (Balme, 1995). Legislation is initiated from the top down to the region, reinforcing the national government's control over regional development. Related to legislation is a law restricting the number of regional positions politicians are allowed to hold (Balme, 1995). This has caused prominent politicians to abandon the regional mandate allowing less established politicians with little influence to support regional policies (Balme, 1995). Another limitation for the regions was Mitterrand's rejection of regional elections rather than

departmental elections (Balme, 1995). This was a political strategy by the Socialists who feared losing seats at the departmental level, especially when right-wing parties were winning more seats in local elections. Finally, new higher education laws have not decreased government control, but increased it because of all of the new measures that require implementation (Neave, 1991). There are now more bureaucrats required to enforce and implement changes in education policy. Considering the 1980 legislation, politicians and university officials desire far more autonomy from the central government and implicit pressure from the EU for regional development, France is most likely to proceed with decentralize in education. A prominent influence impacting this trend is the diminishing financial resources from the central government. The French government has and most likely will become more dependent on resources from local, regional and supranational governments to fund education. The regional structure, though not complete has just begun to develop. Support from the central government, education evaluators and politicians is likely to continue for regional development.

The German States and the European Union

Until the the 1970's, the Federal Republic of Germany was the only European Union member state with any substantial regional tier of government. Moreover, even in Germany "the federal system was generally seen to be moving in a more unitary direction as central government increased its powers at the expense of the *Länder*" (Newmann 1996, p. 111-12.). Indeed analysts were asking whether the German system should be regarded as a Federal one at all (Bulmer, in Smith, Paterson, and Merkl, 1989, pp. 40-41).

Elsewhere in the Europe, the dominant pattern was that of unitary states with varying degrees of administrative decentralization. However, this situation then changed rapidly with the introduction of regional devolution and constitutional decentralization measures in Italy, Spain, France and Belgium. (Newman, 1996, p.112).

Still, the FRG remained the only truly federal system within the EU until the accession of Austria to the EU in 1995. Moreover, if Germany's system has been characterized as "unitary federalism", this is even more true for Austria's federalism.

According to Klaus von Beyme, "[o]f all the regions of Europe only the German states have the characteristic of democratic statehood. The EC does not care about this peculiarity. But this is hardly surprising, since even the Basic Law permits (Art. 24.1) to transfer rights of the states to supranational institutions" (Beyme, 1993, p. 365)¹.

Despite or because German federalism guarantees a role for the *Länder* (state) governments in the national policy-making process, the *Länder* in the 1980s started to increasingly complain that decisions at the level of the European Community were being taken over their heads (Huelshoff, in Huelshoff, Markovits and Reich 1993, p. 309).

Since 1987, the German *Länder*, having long experienced a dilution in the powers originally granted to them under the Basic Law, have struck back. Exploiting their power in the *Bundesrat* they ensured that, in return for agreeing to the Maastricht Treaty, they recovered lost rights and gained strong constitutional guarantees to maintain them (Newman 1996, p. 112-13)

Beginning with the "10 Munich Theses" regarding European policy of October 1987, the chief executives of the German states developed their own concept for European integration and specifically demanded the realization of the subsidiarity principle in the continuing integration of Europe (Borchmann and Memminger in Borkenhagen et al 1992, p. 20). Based on a decision by the *Länder* minister presidents of December 1990, the *Bundesrat* established a Europe-Committee and charged it with the representation of the interests of the *Länder* within the framework of European integration.

Prior to that, on June 7, 1990, the minister presidents of the states had agreed on four basic demands:

¹ My translation.

- incorporation of the subsidiarity principle in EU treaties
- establishment of a Committee of Regions
- participation of the *Länder* in the EU Council of Ministers
- right to sue for the *Länder*, regions and autonomous communities

The Federal government responded by calling these demands “very German” and by refusing to present them at the negotiation table in Brussels.

The German *Länder* have been most vocal in demanding that EU policy must conform to the substantive principle of subsidiarity if powers granted to them by the Basic Law are not to be eroded. The view of the *Länder* was that German EU policy was no longer “German foreign policy, but European domestic policy” or that “European politics [in future] will be seen as domestic rather than foreign politics” (Scott, Peterson and Millar 1994, p. 56).

In 1992, North Rhine Westphalia’s delegate to the Europe Committee of the *Bundesrat* argued that “for the German states it has proven to be the right decision, up to now, to jump onto the bandwagon of European integration, and to move from riding on the running board [*Trittbrettfahrer*] up to the tender and already place a foot in the cockpit.” (Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper in Borkenhagen et al. 1992, p. 12).²

The *Bundesrat*, in particular, has won a position from which it can substantially influence the degree and pace at which the European Union (EU) is integrating (Thaysen 1994, p. 1). The new article 23 of the Basic Law stipulates that the central government may only transfer either Federal or *Länder* powers to the EU if it secures a two-thirds majority in both the *Bundesrat* and the *Bundestag*. Any transfers which amend or supplement the content of the Basic Law are also subject to article 79/3 which prohibits any amendments which would alter Germany’s Federal structure (Newman, 1996, p. 113).

² My translation

In his article on the effects of European Union regional policy on the German federal system, John Ryan examines four main hypotheses about the relationships between the EU and national and regional levels of government. The four alternatives might be summarized as follows:

1. Central dominance: The EU takes over most of the functions;
2. Regional dominance: The regions gain power and govern the EU from below;
3. Double-pressure: The EU and the national level government increasingly govern from above; and the
4. "Sandwich" hypothesis: The EU makes the national government increasingly redundant. Its competences are shared by the EU and the region (Ryan 1995, p. 32).

Analyzing the effects of the Single European Act of 1986, the reform of the EU structural funds in 1988, and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty on the German federal system, Ryan comes to a mixed conclusion: "The old West German *Länder* will become increasingly independent regarding regional policy implementation, which strengthens the trend towards the Sandwich hypothesis. An independent regional policy in the East German *Länder* is hardly possible due to the lack of financial resources. Therefore, a trend towards the Double-pressure hypothesis has to be expected" (Ryan 1995, p. 39).

Most analysts would probably agree that "German unification and the deepening of European integration proposed at Maastricht both represent major challenges to the established structures and procedures of the federal system" (Jeffery and Yates in Jeffery and Sturm 1993, p. 58). However, there exists much less agreement on the specific effects unification and integration will have on German federalism.

According to one argument, European integration undermines the role of the German *Länder* in different ways. For almost four decades, Germany remained the only federal state in the EU, and the EU institutions were more clearly tailored to the workings of unitary states. As

Europe took over powers from its member states, some of these were transferred from the *Länder* to the EU by virtue of German membership without the formal consent of the *Länder*. (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995, p. 140). In compensation for these transfers of sovereignty, national governments of the member states have dominated the EU-decision-making system, especially the EU Council of Ministers. But in the case of Germany this power over EU decisions is wielded by the federal government. The net effect is to weaken the power of the *Länder* and to strengthen the power of the federal government (Burgess and Gress, pp. 169-76).

An alternative thesis posits that “European integration has tended to affirm, if not reinforce, key structural principles of German federalism” (Goetz 1995). Similarly, Stanley Hoffman has pointed out that the European Union’s “institutional system is far closer to the German Federal model than to the French unitary one” (Hoffman 1992, p. 33). Richard Deeg claims that intergovernmental relations between Germany and the EU have assumed a federal-like character and thus represent a de facto (but limited) federalization of the EU—even though there is yet no formal, constitutional basis for such.” (Deeg in Rhodes and Mazey 1995, p. 197)

Subsidiarity, the European Union and German Federalism

With the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht in December 1991 the concept of subsidiarity appeared as the guiding principle to delineating the competences of the European Commission versus other political and administrative authorities within the European Union, such as national, state, and local governments.

According to Kersbergen and Verbeek, “the role of the German *Länder* in putting subsidiarity on the European agenda has been critical” (Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, p. 225). The German states basically demanded that future European arrangements confine the responsibilities of the European Commission and respect existing federal arrangements in

member states which grant autonomy to sub-national units (Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, p. 225).

Thus, “[t]he idea that relations between the [EU] Member States and institutions of the European Community (EC) should be guided by the principle of subsidiarity has become accepted across a wide spectrum of opinion on Europe.” (Scott, Peterson, and Millar 1994, p. 47)

“The Kohl government’s need to grant the *Länder* the power to co-determine certain aspects of German EC policy in order to guarantee ratification of the Maastricht treaty in Germany is indicative of wider pressures throughout the Community” (Scott, Peterson, and Millar 1994, p. 65).

“Germany’s intergovernmental system is becoming less domestic and increasingly Europeanized in substantive, structural and procedural terms. This progressive Europeanization has been a relatively smooth process since the ‘allocative principles’ of the intergovernmental system have not had to be redefined. sharing arrangements had to be adjusted to accommodate a new player, but sharing, not division, remained the dominant element in the distribution of powers, responsibilities, and resources.” (Goetz 1995, p. 98)

To sum up, in the German case

- the incorporation of the subsidiarity principle in Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and in Article 23 of the German Basic Law strengthens the power of the German states, both in regards to the national government and European institutions; and
- the addition of five new Eastern states has led to more variation of government coalitions at state level and increased incongruity of Federal governing coalition with *Land* governing coalitions. This “disappearing *Land*-federal coalition nexus” (Sturm 1992, p. 124) will lead to increasing attempts by the *Bundestag* opposition party to use its *Bundesrat* majority to

influence federal policies and will force the national government to bargain with the state governments concerning an increasing amount of national and supra-national legislation.

In addition to domestic pressures, German unification and European integration are putting a further strain on the German system of federalism. According to Roland Sturm, there are at least five dimensions which after unification affect the process of collective decision-making at the *Land* level:

- differences of interests between the German *Länder* in the West and the *Länder* in the East;
- differences of interests between a coalition of the poorer *Länder* and the federal government on the one hand and the richer *Länder* on the other;
- the reduced relevance of the coalition pattern at the federal level for party political cooperation in the *Länder*;
- an increased importance of the veto power of the four large *Länder* with regard to constitutional changes; and
- an increased awareness of all *Länder* of the dangers to their relative autonomy through intervention both at the national and the EC level (Sturm 1992, p. 121).

“The growing need for overarching (federal) regulations in the course of German and European unification has constrained the power of the *Länder* parliaments but not of the *Bundesrat*. The latter remains the body for asserting the rights of the *Länder* (Thaysen 1994, p. 23).

It is only ostensibly a paradox that the importance of the *Bundesrat* increased because of the development toward a centralized and unitary federal system. The transfer of legislative competences to the federation, combined with the substantive erosion of the legislative activities of the state parliaments, inevitably had to lead to an expansion of the participatory role of the Federal Council. (Badura in *Vierzig Jahre Bundesrat*, p. 335).

According to Sontheimer, the distinctive justification for German federalism is no longer based on the safeguarding or promotion of the interests of the states and of their populations, because these interests are hardly any longer *Länder-specific*, but rather in the objective to realize the principle of a division and limitation of political power, both through a regional decentralization of power and the intra-executive control of federal and state governments. (Sontheimer 1993, p. 293). Yet another justification for German federalism now derives from its possible contribution to overcoming the 'democratic deficit' in the European Union (Hrbek 1995).

In a recent article, Deeg argues that "intergovernmental relations between Germany and the EU have assumed a federal-like character and thus represent a de facto (but limited) federalization of the EU" (Deeg 1995, p. 197).

In Germany, European integration has led to a debate about German federalism, and the powers of the German political institutions. The debate focuses upon the apparent and potential loss of sovereignty and policy-making initiative to European institutions which suffer from an oft-noted democratic deficit. Additionally, German unification renewed discussion within both Germany and Europe over the proper German role in the EU. According to Huelshoff, "German domestic politics generally favors more over less European integration. Yet there is no guarantee that this distribution of values and interests is fixed." (Huelshoff, in Huelshoff, Markovits and Reich 1993, p. 307).

Christopher Allen argues that "the German practice of federalism--specifically, marble-cake federalism--has given German politicians at all levels an idea of what European federalism might look like. The political process of European integration will ultimately entail a diminution of influence of national governments. The inability of the FRG to establish a strong central government has enabled the *Land* governments to take on many of the tasks and responsibilities that accrue to centralized governments in other countries. In an important sense, political success

for European countries in an integrated Europe will depend on political and institutional skills that can produce effective policies. It seems that the states that have had direct experience with regional and/or federal government structures at the national level (such as Italy and Germany) may prove more adept at dealing with the process of European integration than more centralized or unitary states (such as Britain and France)” (Allen 1992, p. 322).

Some Preliminary Conclusions: French and German Education Policy between Regionalization and Europeanization

John Ambler in his study of “French education and the Uniting of Europe” (1990) concluded that “[t]he incentives for harmonization in the field of education, while significant, are very unlikely to create anything resembling an ‘educational Europe’ in the foreseeable future. If a European nation eventually emerges, education most probably will be one of the last domains to be fully integrated.” (p. 52).

Ladrech (1994) found that “French regions are increasingly involved in activities aimed at Bruxelles and in transfrontier relations. The nature of their activities varies with the internal complexion of each region” (p. 83). And, “some regions are also developing a certain clout beyond the tutelage of Paris, structured in times around a dynamic city” (p. 83).

[Table 3 about here]

These dynamics seem clearly borne out by the data on the participation rates of the French regions in the Erasmus program. Table 3 shows that the participation rates are highest in such “frontier” or “multinational” regions as Alsace (28 %), Rhone-Alpes (25 %), Aquitaine (24 %), Languedoc-Roussillon (22 %) and Midi-Pyrenees (22 %). In fact, the Alsace region with the University of Strasbourg as its educational center, even beats the traditional cultural and educational center of France, the Ile-de-France, with a participation rate of 27 percent for first place in the rank ordering.

[Table 4 about here]

In the German case, there exists no clear pattern in terms of regional Erasmus participation rates. Regional participation is about equal to or higher than the national average (61%) in the ‘new federal states’ of former East Germany, i.e. Berlin (77%), Brandenburg (60%), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (83%), Sachsen (62%), Sachsen-Anhalt (77%), and Thüringen (100%). This might be largely explained by the “catch-up” effect of the higher education institutions in the former East, which did not have any substantial exchange relations with Western European universities before unification. Among the rest of the German states, participation seems slightly lower in the so-called “A-Länder, that is the states governed by the Socialdemocratic party or by a coalition government dominated by the Socialdemocrats, such as Schleswig-Holstein (53%), Nordrhein-Westfalen (46%), and the Saarland (42%), the major exceptions being the city-state of Bremen (80 %).

Overall, our findings regarding the regional responses to EU education policy initiatives like Erasmus seem to confirm previous research by Marks et al. (1996) which concluded that “[d]irect connections are being forged among political actors in diverse political arenas. ... With its dispersed competencies, contending but interlocked institutions, shifting agendas, multi-level governance opens multiple points of access for interests, while it privileges those interests with technical expertise that match the dominant style of EU policy-making (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 372).

Similarly, Ladrech concludes that “[i]n unitary systems, as in the French case, EC inputs may provide additional conduits of resources and political legitimacy for subnational actors through consciously designed EC programmes aimed at regional economic development. ... In federal systems, such as Germany, ... EC development may actually upset the national/subnational balance, thus stimulating constitutional or other design reforms” (Ladrech, 1994, p. 85).

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Table 1

European Union Education Initiatives

Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and Lingua

<u>Erasmus/Lingua Action II</u>						
<u>Approved</u>	<u>Initiated</u>	<u>Estimated budget</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Type of Programme</u>	<u>Study length</u>	<u>Participants</u>
May 1987	June 1987	85 M Ecu for first three years	Unlimited	student mobility	3-12 months	All EFTA countries as of 92/93 and EU member states, the US and Canada
						<u>Goals increase student mobility w/in the EU by 10%</u>
<u>Socrates</u>						
March 1995	1997-1999, (scheduled for 1996, but was delayed for one year)	850 MEcu for total duration	1995-1999	action program for transnational co-operation in education	3-12 months depending on the particular program section	15 member states, EEA countries EU plus Iceland Liechtensten Norway.
						student mobility and encompasses a number of EU actions (Lingua, Erasmus)
<u>Leonardo da Vinci</u>						
December 1994	January 1995	620 MEcu for total duration of 5 years.	1995-1999	student mobility within enterprises professional environment	3-12 weeks or 3 to 9 months	same as Socrates
						encourage vocational based skills and develop closer links between schools and industry
<u>Lingua</u>						
July 1989	January 1990	153 MEcu spent (200 MEcu allocated)	1990-1994 Phase I	linguistic training for EU teachers and students	2-4 weeks or 3 to 12 months depending on the specific action	same as Socrates
						improve linguistic skills for students at all levels in education and better train language teachers

1 Ecu=\$1.13 US dollars (1997 May) The Economist.

Table 2

Erasmus Students 1988-89 and 1989-90 by Country of Home Institution Compared to the Proportion of the 18-25 Age Cohort and of all Higher Education Students in EU Member States; Ratio of Students Received to Sent 1988-89 and 1989-90

EU Member State	Number of Erasmus Grantees		Percentage of Erasmus Grantees		18-25 year olds (%)	All Higher Ed students (%)	Ratio of students received to students sent	
	1988-89	1989-90	1988-89	1989-90			1988-89	1989-90
B	403	731	4.0	4.0	2.8	3.3	0.78	0.97
D	1,715	3,603	17.2	19.7	21.5	22.9	0.90	0.73
DK	187	404	1.9	2.2	1.5	1.5	0.80	0.65
E	1,064	2,123	10.4	11.6	12.1	13.2	0.85	0.88
F	1,779	3,776	17.9	20.7	15.6	17.8	1.36	1.14
GR	194	444	2.0	2.4	2.8	2.6	0.60	0.50
I	1,390	1,918	14.0	10.5	17.6	16.3	0.64	0.71
IRL	193	340	2.0	1.9	1.0	1.0	1.27	1.68
L	31	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-
NL	664	1,219	6.7	6.7	4.7	5.2	0.89	0.80
P	161	272	1.6	1.5	3.2	2.2	0.99	0.95
UK	2,164	3,446	21.8	18.9	17.2	14.0	1.20	1.48
Total	9,945	18,276	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.0	1.0

Source: Teicher, U. (1993) Student Mobility within Erasmus 1989-90. Brussels: Erasmus Bureau: (absolute numbers and percentages; ratios)

Table 3**Regional Participation in Erasmus 1994-95****France**

	Number of outgoing students	Number of incoming students	Number of eligible institutions	Number of institutions with ICPs	Rate of Regional Participation
Total	24,045	24,829	1,985	400	20
Ile de France	4,935	5,413	362	99	27
Champagne-Ardenne	522	485	51	7	13
Picardie	282	259	48	5	10
Haute-Normandie	635	644	46	10	21
Centre	615	559	78	7	8
Basse-Normandie	412	461	49	6	12
Bourgogne	441	505	58	3	5
Nord-Pas-de-Calais	1,961	1,772	151	28	18
Lorraine	734	739	93	16	17
Alsace	1,031	1,153	59	17	28
Franche-Comté	256	271	47	6	12
Pays de la Loire	1,278	1,302	104	24	23
Bretagne	1,139	1,039	106	21	19
Poitou-Charentes	521	600	46	7	15
Aquitaine	1,685	1,555	82	20	24
Midi-Pyrénées	932	1,018	87	20	22
Limousin	155	156	37	5	13
Rhône-Alpes	3,441	3,623	185	47	25
Auvergne	472	461	46	9	19
Languedoc-Roussillon	927	1,053	70	16	22
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	1,521	1,605	144	24	16
Corse	37	28	10	1	10
Départments d'Outre-Mer	113	128	26	2	7

Source: WWW: gopher://resu1.ulb.ac.be:70/00/.RegionalStatistics/.france.asc (January 1997)

Table 4**Regional Participation in Erasmus 1994-95****Germany**

	Number of outgoing students	Number of incoming students	Number of eligible institutions	Number of institutions with ICPs	Rate of Regional Participation
Total	20,470	18,789	351	213	61
Schleswig-Holstein	452	426	13	7	53
Hamburg	542	576	9	6	66
Niedersachsen	1,880	1,619	25	19	76
Bremen	472	462	5	4	80
Nordrhein-Westfalen	3,823	3,563	65	30	46
Hessen	1,790	1,608	24	15	62
Rheinland-Pfalz	1,402	1,279	25	14	56
Baden-Württemberg	3,226	2,952	73	40	54
Bayern	2,794	2,562	33	23	69
Saarland	529	549	7	3	42
Berlin	1,579	1,546	18	14	77
Brandenburg	126	122	10	6	60
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	214	162	6	5	83
Sachsen	1,128	929	24	15	62
Sachsen-Anhalt	197	197	9	7	77
Thüringen	316	237	5	5	100

Source: WWW: [gopher://resul.ulb.ac.be:70/00/RegionalStatistics/france.asc](http://resul.ulb.ac.be:70/00/RegionalStatistics/france.asc) (January 1997)