

ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT :
WHAT DO THEY INDICATE ACROSS THE MEMBER NATIONS ?

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Introduction: National rather than European Elections

What is lacking under the present system is an election about European issues. Such a campaign would force those entitled to vote to look at and examine the questions and the various options on which the European Parliament would have to decide in the months and years ahead. It would give the candidates who emerged victorious from such a campaign a truly European mandate from their electors; and it would encourage the emergence of truly European political parties. (Hallstein 1972: 74; as cited in Smith 1996: 275)

When Walter Hallstein, the former President of the European Commission, wrote these words in 1972 the European Parliament was not yet an elected body but still an appointed (and often 'seconded') one. As of late 1996, there have been direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in all 15 member nations, with 10 members having had four such elections. Yet as Smith (1996: 284) notes, not much has changed in the sense that European elections are still not truly European.

Smith (1996: 284-285) identifies five reasons for this ongoing situation (see also McCormick 1996: 150-151). First of all, EP elections are indecisive in the sense of not having a clear winner, do not lead to much change in policy, and until recently have had no effect on 'government' formation. Even though the EP must now approve the Commission and its President, and indeed even though the term of the the Commission now runs in parallel with that of the parliament (Westlake 1994: 99, 116), certainly back in June 1994 almost nobody outside Luxembourg knew who Jacques Santer was.

Secondly, EP election campaigns (with some exceptions to be noted later) remain conducted by national parties and national politicians. Thirdly and related, many parties remain internally divided on European issues, certainly more so than traditional left-right issues and religious-secular cleavages (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1996: 370-371). Consequently, parties wish to minimise the embarrassment of public splits by keeping European

issues out of the EP campaign; in other words, "national parties essentially 'hijack' European elections for partisan and national ends, thereby shutting out public discussion of European issues" (Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1996: 371).

Fourthly, to the extent that they take an interest in EP elections, the media tend to focus overwhelmingly on the national campaign (as waged by the national parties). More analysis is thus devoted to the consequences of EP elections for national politics than for EU affairs.

Fifth and finally, personal feelings of 'Europeanness' are invariably less than national identities, and quite low in some member nations. Thus many voters may see European affairs as largely irrelevant to their daily lives. Even when there is an interest in an issue, it is often unclear how voting (a certain way) in an EP election will affect it (point one).

Yet even if elections are still essentially conducted by national parties focussed more on national politics, one does not always get the same national results. Table One gives data on dissimilarity values (that is, the Pedersen index) between EP elections and the nearest national election. Even though in most of the original members the results do not differ hardly at all, this is not the case in most subsequent members or in France.

In order to aid in the explanation of what European Parliament elections are 'all about', this paper will assess two contrasting hypotheses about such elections. The first is the view of these elections as being second-order contests, especially the expectation of an anti-government swing vote. The second view is the expression of anti-integration sentiment. It will be shown that for most member countries, one of the given explanations clearly fits better statistically than the other.

TABLE ONE :
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN EP AND NEAREST NATIONAL ELECTION

	1979-81	1984-87	1989	1994-96	MEAN
Denmark	27.6	23.2	27.0	33.4	27.8
Sweden				19.6	19.6
Ireland	15.9	14.0	20.4	18.6	17.2
France	6.6	10.6	26.7	22.8	16.7
United Kingdom	6.6	10.5	25.7	18.1	15.2
Portugal		13.9	22.2	9.1	15.1
Greece	12.5	7.1	7.0	15.9	10.6
Austria				10.2	10.2
Finland				8.1	8.1
Spain		7.9	7.7	8.3	8.0
Belgium	8.5	5.4	11.0	6.5	7.9
Germany	6.9	3.7	10.1	9.7	7.6
Luxembourg	7.6	4.2	10.1	3.3	6.3
Italy	3.8	3.2	6.5	10.2	5.9
Netherlands	3.4	5.2	4.9	8.4	5.5

Second-Order Elections and Anti-Government Swings

The main traditional analysis of European elections is that of Karlheinz Reif. Reif (1985: 7-8) distinguishes two types of elections; on the one hand there are 'first-order' elections which determine ultimately 'who has the power'. In parliamentary systems, for example, the national parliamentary election is the first order election. All other elections - senatorial, local, regional, parliamentary byelections, etc. - are considered to be less important 'second-order' elections, as are mid-term Congressional elections in presidential systems.

Reif (1985: 8-9) demonstrates three main differences between

first-order and second-order elections: first of all, turnout will be lower in second-order elections, since less is at stake. Secondly, votes for smaller and/or newer parties will increase at the expense of the main traditional parties, since the voter can express a true opinion rather than voting 'usefully', that is, using her/his (sole) vote to pick amongst potential governments. Thirdly, unless they are still enjoying a 'honeymoon', national governing parties will see their vote drop off as voters express discontent with government performance. Such protest voting is certainly strategic in that it can get the attention of a government without risking an actual *change* of government (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk, and Franklin 1996: 302). The 'good news' for governments, however, is that, all else being equal, after bottoming out in mid-term, support for governing parties will head back to 'normal' levels by the next election. Consequently the loss of for example mid-term by-elections is no reason for a government to panic. Indeed, Reif (1985: 9) stresses that "[t]he most important lesson to be drawn from these observations is that it is **not** justified to predict a likely loss of office for a governing party at the next first-order election just because this party has suffered an even considerable setback at the occasion of mid-term second-order elections".

Marsh and Franklin (1996), in their examination of EP elections through 1994, confirm the continuing validity of Reif's arguments, although the changes are only large in the case of declining turnout. (Indeed, overall declines in turnout would undoubtedly be higher if it were not for compulsory voting in certain countries - see Table Two - as well as the occasional simultaneous holding of EP and national elections [Portugal 1987, Ireland 1989].) Regarding the shift from larger to smaller parties (increased fragmentation) and the decline in support for government parties, much variance still remains to be explained.

In terms of short-term response, and possibly also long-term consequences, it is the effects on national governments that seem the most interesting. Thus I wish to reassess Reif's model through

TABLE TWO: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION TURNOUT LEVELS AND
DIFFERENCES FROM NATIONAL LEVELS (percentages)

	1979-81	1984-87	1989	1994-96
Belgium *	91.4 - 3.4	92.2 - 1.4	90.7 - 2.9	90.7 - 0.5
Luxembourg *	88.9 0.0	87.0 - 1.8	87.8 + 0.5	90.0 + 1.7
Greece *	78.6 - 2.9	77.2 - 6.6	79.8 - 4.7	79.9 + 1.7
Italy *	85.5 - 5.6	89.9 + 0.9	81.5 - 9.0	74.8 -11.3
Austria				65.1 -18.8
Spain		68.9 - 1.7	54.8 -14.9	59.6 -16.8
Finland				58.8 -13.0
Germany	65.7 -22.9	56.8 -27.5	62.4 -15.4	58.0 -21.0
France	60.7 -22.5	56.7 -21.8	48.7 -17.5	53.5 -15.8
Denmark	47.8 -37.8	52.3 -36.1	46.1 -39.6	52.5 -31.8
Sweden				41.3 -45.5
Ireland	63.6 -12.7	47.6 -25.2	68.3 - 0.2	37.0 -31.5
United Kingdom	32.6 -43.7	32.6 -40.2	36.2 -39.2	36.4 -41.4
Portugal		72.2 - 0.4	51.3 -21.3	35.7 -31.1
Netherlands	58.1 -22.9	50.5 -35.3	47.2 -33.0	35.6 -43.2

* compulsory voting


1996. Three qualifications are in order, however. First of all, whereas Reif postulates a cubic (third degree) regression as providing the best fit, a simpler quadratic (second degree) model is likely to capture as much of the variance. Secondly, where no new government had been confirmed in office at the time of the EP elections – as was the case in Italy in 1979 and the Netherlands in 1994, both of which use positive parliamentarianism – the election is excluded from the data set. Thirdly, following Marsh and Franklin (1996: 22 [note 17]), European elections that occur simultaneously with national ones are coded as being at the end of the electoral cycle, even though these are normally early national elections (except in Luxembourg).

Figure One thus plots the decline in turnout against the position in the electoral cycle, indicating on the whole a curvilinear relationship of the latter on the former. What is more of interest, though, are the residuals: do certain countries fit the model better? Table Three gives the actual, predicted, and residual amount of the decline in the government vote. It also gives the mean and standard deviation for each country of that country's residuals, the standard deviation of course indicating variability of the pattern. Since residuals can be both positive and negative, and in such a case they may 'cancel each other out' in the case of a mean, I have also given the mean of the absolute value of the residuals. Indeed, I shall use this as the measure of 'goodness of fit' of each nation, and the countries in Table Three are thus ranked in increasing order of their absolute residual means.

One can see a very good fit for the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Austria, and Luxembourg, as well as very low standard deviation in Germany. In these countries it does seem that European elections are indeed second-order elections, at least in terms of government versus of non-government parties. On the other hand Sweden, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Denmark have very high residuals, and Portugal and Denmark also have quite high variability. For Portugal and the Netherlands, however, this is in

Figure One

**Change in Government Popularity by Position in Electoral Cycle
(Quadratic Model)**



Position in Electoral Cycle

variable	b	SE(b)
x	-43.793287	13.16768
x ²	35.83496	11.304017
constant	2.87861	3.106258
r = .44978		
F = 5.57939		

TABLE THREE :
POSITION IN ELECTORAL CYCLE AND CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

country and election	cycle position	change in government support			national residuals	
		actual	predicted	residual	mean (s.d.)	absolute mean
U.K. 1979	0.017	4.5	2.144	2.356	-0.482	2.136
U.K. 1984	0.200	-3.6	-4.447	0.847	(3.304)	
U.K. 1989	0.400	-8.8	-8.905	0.105		
U.K. 1994	0.433	-14.6	-9.365	-5.235		
Germany 1979	0.667	-6.7	-10.389	3.689	2.228	2.228
Germany 1984	0.313	-5.0	-7.318	2.318	(1.362)	
Germany 1989	0.604	-10.1	-10.499	0.399		
Germany 1994	0.875	-5.5	-8.004	2.504		
Spain 1987	0.250	-5.5	-5.830	0.330	1.084	2.770
Spain 1989	0.750	-4.0	-9.809	5.809	(3.689)	
Spain 1994	0.250	-8.0	-5.830	-2.170		
Austria 1996	0.208	-7.55	-4.680	-2.870	-2.870	2.870
					(0.000)	
Lux. 1979	1.000	-1.6	-5.080	3.480	1.730	3.240
Lux. 1984	1.000	-1.3	-5.080	3.780	(3.201)	
Lux. 1989	1.000	-8.1	-5.080	-3.020		
Lux. 1994	1.000	-2.4	-5.080	2.680		
Italy 1984	0.200	-2.7	-4.447	1.747	4.024	4.024
Italy 1989	0.400	-4.6	-8.905	4.305	(2.151)	
Italy 1994	0.050	6.8	0.779	6.021		
Finland 1996	0.396	-3.9	-8.844	4.944	4.944	4.944
					(0.000)	
Greece 1981	1.000	-10.5	-5.080	-5.420	-3.054	4.999
Greece 1984	0.667	-6.5	-10.389	3.889	(4.648)	
Greece 1989	1.000	-9.9	-5.080	-4.820		
Greece 1994	0.167	-9.3	-3.435	-5.865		
Ireland 1979	0.400	-15.9	-8.905	-6.995	-5.027	5.027
Ireland 1984	0.317	-8.0	-7.403	-0.597	(3.147)	
Ireland 1989	1.000	-12.6	-5.080	-7.520		
Ireland 1994	0.317	-12.4	-7.403	-4.997		
Belgium 1979	0.125	0.0	-2.036	2.036	5.164	5.164
Belgium 1984	0.646	-2.5	-10.457	7.957	(2.690)	
Belgium 1989	0.375	-4.6	-8.505	3.905		
Belgium 1994	0.646	-3.7	-10.457	6.757		

TABLE THREE continued:

Denmark 1979	0.583	-12.6	-10.473	-2.127	-2.204	5.970
Denmark 1984	0.140	3.5	-2.550	6.050	(8.547)	
Denmark 1989	0.271	-5.1	-6.358	1.258		
Denmark 1994	0.875	-22.0	-8.004	-13.996		
NL 1979	0.417	2.0	-9.152	11.152	7.437	7.437
NL 1984	0.350	-3.6	-8.059	4.459	(3.407)	
NL 1989	0.617	-3.8	-10.500	6.700		
Port. 1987	1.000	6.8	-5.080	11.880	-0.052	7.971
Port. 1989	0.479	-16.3	-9.876	-6.424	(10.341)	
Port. 1994	0.667	-16.0	-10.389	-5.611		
France 1979	0.250	-0.9	-5.830	4.930	-5.443	8.177
France 1984	0.600	-20.75	-10.497	-10.253	(7.053)	
France 1989	0.200	-13.9	-4.447	-9.453		
France 1994	0.250	-13.9	-5.830	-8.070		
Sweden 1995	0.271	-17.2	-6.358	-10.842	-10.842	10.842
					(0.000)	

part driven by their having the top two positive residuals. For Portugal, this seems to come from a landslide national reelection victory of the conservatives on the same day as the European election (with the national election being called early). In the case of the Netherlands in 1979, Reif (1985: 25-26) notes how the record-long formation process after the 1977 elections means that the Dutch could be argued to be somewhat earlier in their cycle in terms of the actual amount of time the ultimate government of Christian Democrats and Liberals was in office. By my calculations this would place it at 0.267 of an electoral cycle. As Reif (*ibid.*) notes, this European election would nevertheless remain a positive residual, and it seems equally important to note that for whatever reason the Christian Democrats in this case were much better in mobilizing their supporters to turn out than was the main opposition Labour Party (Kok, Lipschits, and van Praag 1985: 160-161).

In terms of the highest negative residuals, France in 1984 can it seems be somewhat explained by the extraordinary unpopularity of

the Socialist government, indicating that they **did** need to worry about the upcoming legislative elections. (To this end, they did change the electoral system, but were still thrown out of office in 1986.) Yet in 1989 and 1994 France also had quite high negative residuals, indicating that something else has been going on there.

Indeed, Denmark in 1994 produced the highest negative residual, yet only three months later the Social Democrat-led coalition returned to national office, with the Social Democrats themselves doing relatively well (Table Four). In Denmark, one must note three crucial points. First of all, there is a wide range of party opinion on European issues, ranging from the federalism of the agrarian-based Liberals to the desire for withdrawal of the far left (Nielsen 1996: 55). For the sake of convenience, most scholars group Danish parties into three categories based on the views of party leaders, and I have done likewise in Table Four (although the libertarian Progress Party has various strands and thus cannot be perfectly placed). Secondly, there has existed right from the first European election the non-partisan (although largely leftist) People's Movement Against the EC (EU), which is opposed to Danish membership and which only competes in European elections. In 1994, there was also the non-partisan June Movement which accepts membership but opposed and remains opposed to the Maastricht Treaty, even with the Danish opt-outs negotiated at Edinburgh. Thirdly and consequently, in Denmark there "exists two rather different party systems, one for national elections and one for European elections" (Borre 1984: 271). The People's Movement retains its mobilization capacity at European elections even without participating in national ones, and is always able to draw off from the Social Democrats their national supporters who are more hostile to Europe than the official party position. Thus when comparing national to European elections in Denmark, the biggest single decline is invariably the drop off in support for the Social Democrats (Table Four), *regardless of whether this party is in government or not*. A simple second-order election model cannot therefore apply to Denmark.

TABLE FOUR : VOTING IN DENMARK

	selected national elections				European Parliament elections			
	Oct. 1979	Jan. 1984	May 1988	Sept. 1994	June 1979	June 1984	June 1989	June 1994
pro-European parties:								
Liberals	12.5	12.1	11.8	23.3	14.5	12.5	16.6	19.0
Conservatives	12.5	23.4	19.3	15.0	14.0	20.8	13.3	17.7
Centre Democrats	3.2	4.6	4.7	2.8	6.2	6.6	7.9	0.9
Christian People's Party	2.6	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.7	1.1
sub-total	30.8	42.8	37.8	43.0	36.5	42.6	40.7	38.7
conditional-European parties:								
Progress Party	11.1	3.6	9.0	6.4	5.8	3.5	5.3	2.9
Radical Party	5.4	5.5	5.6	4.6	3.3	3.1	2.8	8.5
Social Democrats	38.3	31.6	29.8	34.6	21.9	19.5	23.3	15.8
Socialist People's Party				7.3				8.6
sub-total	54.8	40.7	44.4	52.9	31.0	26.1	31.3	35.8
anti-European parties:								
Socialist People's Party	5.9	11.5	13.0		4.7	9.2	9.1	
small left-wing parties	8.2	5.0	4.7	4.1	6.9	1.3
People's Movement	20.9	20.8	18.9	10.3
June Movement				...				15.2
sub-total	14.1	16.5	17.7	4.1	32.5	31.3	28.0	25.5

Voting Against the "European Consensus Party"

If in other countries parties offered a similar range of European views, this would make for clear comparisons with Denmark (and perhaps would also be more democratic). However, in fact most EP voters are given much less choice, sometimes because divisions on Europe are greater within parties, and thus they would rather not expose these (see above), but perhaps more often (especially in the Benelux and German core) because parties are in basic agreement on continued integration and any real differences between party elites are thus minimal. For example, if one is an ardent pro-European voting in EP elections in Belgium, it is unclear which single party one should vote for, given that almost all parties seem equally pro-integration. Consequently Belgium has way too many parties running in European elections given that most stand for the same thing.

On the other hand, in each country there remain parties (in some cases significant ones) which remain opposed to the general (pro-)European consensus. Although one cannot be as nuanced as for Denmark, one can make a general dichotomy of parties in all member nations. In short, I wish to distinguish between European consensus parties and non-European consensus parties, using as key litmus tests official support for the Single European Act and for the Treaty on European Union / Maastricht (even if internal minorities were opposed). The various parties buying into the European consensus are thus merged into a *single* European consensus party, or ECP, thus factoring out any internal shifts amongst components. One can then ask to what extent do national ECPs lose votes in European elections, and to what extent is this related to anti-integration feelings amongst the voters. Table Five gives data on national ECPs, as well as their component parties.

Nations thus do vary in the extent to which their national European consensus party loses votes in EP elections. One can hypothesise that this loss is greater the more sceptical the voters are of European integration.

TABLE FIVE :
 EP VOTE SHARES AND DIFFERENCE FROM NEAREST NATIONAL ELECTION
 FOR THE "EUROPEAN CONSENSUS PARTY" IN MEMBER NATIONS

	1979-81	1984-87	1989	1994-96
Italy	97.1 - 1.7	97.6 + 0.3	94.6 - 3.4	93.2 + 2.0
Spain		85.5 - 4.5	82.8 - 6.5	91.3 + 1.5
Ireland	96.4 + 3.7	89.9 - 3.9	93.9 + 0.4	85.6 - 2.7
Greece	40.9 + 3.7	41.5 - 1.1	90.7 + 7.0	85.3 - 3.8
Germany	99.2 - 0.3	88.2 - 5.8	89.0 - 9.7	85.2 - 6.9
Netherlands	91.2 + 1.3	84.9 - 4.4	84.9 - 4.8	83.3 + 1.6
Belgium	94.4 + 2.4	95.0 + 0.9	94.7 + 0.8	82.5 - 3.4
Luxembourg	85.8 - 1.4	86.8 - 2.0	80.3 + 4.5	75.1 + 0.1
Denmark	67.5 -18.0	68.7 -14.8	72.0 -10.2	74.5 -21.4
Finland				71.8 + 0.2
Portugal		79.7 - 3.8	75.3 - 8.2	69.2 - 8.7
Sweden				65.2 -21.5
Austria				63.0 - 8.8
United Kingdom	61.0 + 3.3	57.3 -10.5	45.1 - 8.3	58.8 + 6.5
France	72.0 + 0.2	67.3 - 8.9	71.5 - 4.4	57.1 -15.0

	members of the "European consensus party"	main non-members of the "European consensus party"
Italy	DC and successors, PLI, PCI/PDS, PSI, PSDI, PRI, MSI/AN, PR, Greens, Forza Italia, Lega Nord	DP, RC
Spain	PSOE, PP, CDS/UCD, IU, CiU, PNV	Herri Batasuna, Ruiz Mateos
Ireland	Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Labour, PD, independents, Workers Party from 1988	Sinn Fein, Greens, Democratic Left
Greece	ND, KODISO, KKE-interior, PASOK from 1985, Political Spring (POLA)	PASOK until 1985, KKE-exterior, DIANA
Germany	CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, Greens except for 1984	Greens in 1984, Republicans, PDS
Netherlands	CDA, PvdA, VVD, D'66	SGP/RPF/GPV, Centre Party, Green Left
Belgium	Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, Greens, Volksunie, Walloon Rally / FDF	Vlaams Blok, FN
Luxembourg	CSV, LSAP, DP	KPL, Greens, ADR, National Bewegong
Denmark	Liberals, Conservatives, CD, KrF, SD, Radicals, Progress Party, Socialist People's Party (SFP) from 1992	People's Movement, Left Socialists, Communists, SFP until 1992, June Movement
Finland	SDP, Conservatives, Swedish People's Party, Centre Party	Left Alliance, Greens
Portugal	PSD, PS, PDR, CDS until 1993	UDC, CDS from 1993
Sweden	Moderates, Liberals, SAP, Centre, KDS	Greens, Left Party
Austria	SPÖ, ÖVP, Liberal Forum	FPÖ, Greens

U.K.	Liberals, Alliance, Conservatives until 1986, Labour from 1986	Labour until 1986 Conservatives from 1986
France	UDF, PS, Radicals, RPR, Greens	PCF, FN, Other Europe

Although various pro- or anti-integration questions have been asked of Europeans, I shall use the Eurobarometer measure of the percentage of a nation's population who see national membership in the EC/EU as being a "bad thing". Other questions may be even more useful, but they do not go back as far (as it is I must use 1981 data for 1979 EP elections).


Figure Two plots a linear relationship between voter hostility and change in ECP support, with the residuals noted in Table Six. There is certainly a modest overall relationship. Yet there are also very high positive residuals in the United Kingdom, and very high negative residuals in Denmark, France, and Sweden. Apparently the decline in ECP support in Denmark cannot be fully accounted for by national hostility, especially when the level of hostility has been no greater (or not by much) than in the United Kingdom, or earlier on in Greece and Ireland, or today in the newest members and Spain too.

Of course, part of the reality here is that, contrary to a Downsian view, parties do not always immediately form to meet a 'demand'. Thus non-ECP parties may not exist in a country, or may be weak organizationally. Moreover, relevant national non-ECP parties may exist, and may stress their opposition to European integration, but they may also have a lot of domestic "baggage". For example, opposition to European integration may not be sufficient for some (many?) voters to vote for the PCF, the French National Front, or the German Republikaner, given their extremist images. Indeed, a non-ECP party is quite unlikely to be centrist (Table Five), given that Christian Democratic and Liberal parties especially are staunchly pro-European. I would thus hypothesize

Figure Two

Change in ECP Vote by Percentage Believing that EC/EU Membership is Bad

(Linear Model)



Percentage Believing that EC/EU Membership is Bad

without dummy...

variable	b	SE(b)
x	-.242596	.086094
constant	-.785212	1.399515
r	.38016	
F	7.94000	

with dummy...

variable	b	SE(b)
x	-.112308	.077646
dummy	-12.003473	2.630649
constant	-1.203599	1.1777317
r	.64116	
F	16.05436	

TABLE SIX :
PERCENTAGE VIEWING NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP AS BAD AND CHANGE IN ECP SUPPORT

country and election	membership is bad	change in ECP support			national residuals	
		actual	predicted	residual	mean (s.d.)	absolute mean
Austria 1996	27 %	-8.8	-7.335	-1.465	-1.465 (0.000)	1.465
Italy 1979	5 %	-1.7	-1.998	0.298	0.965	1.999
Italy 1984	3	0.3	-1.513	1.813	(2.999)	
Italy 1989	4	-3.4	-1.756	-1.644		
Italy 1994	6	2.0	-2.241	4.241		
Lux. 1979	4 %	-1.4	-1.756	0.356	2.177	2.420
Lux. 1984	3	-2.0	-1.513	-0.487	(3.227)	
Lux. 1989	6	4.5	-2.241	6.741		
Lux. 1994	5	0.1	-1.998	2.098		
Belgium 1979	6 %	2.4	-2.241	4.641	2.537	2.753
Belgium 1984	5	0.9	-1.998	2.898	(2.131)	
Belgium 1989	6	0.8	-2.241	3.041		
Belgium 1994	9	-3.4	-2.969	-0.431		
NL 1979	5 %	1.3	-1.998	3.298	0.241	3.207
NL 1984	4	-4.4	-1.756	-2.644	(3.714)	
NL 1989	3	-4.8	-1.513	-3.287		
NL 1994	5	1.6	-1.998	3.598		
Ireland 1979	20 %	3.7	-5.637	9.337	2.559	3.726
Ireland 1984	20	-3.9	-5.637	1.737	(4.129)	
Ireland 1989	8	0.4	-2.726	3.126		
Ireland 1994	5	-2.7	-1.998	-0.702		
Germany 1979	8 %	-0.3	-2.726	2.426	-3.010	4.223
Germany 1984	6	-5.8	-2.241	-3.559	(4.000)	
Germany 1989	7	-9.7	-2.483	-7.217		
Germany 1994	10	-6.9	-3.211	-3.689		
Portugal 1987	4 %	-3.8	-1.756	-2.044	-4.497	4.497
Portugal 1989	4	-8.2	-1.756	-6.444	(2.243)	
Portugal 1994	12	-8.7	-3.696	-5.004		
France 1979	9 %	0.2	-2.969	3.169	-4.178	5.762
France 1984	5	-8.9	-1.998	-6.902	(6.283)	
France 1989	8	-4.4	-2.726	-1.674		
France 1994	12	-15.0	-3.696	-11.304		

TABLE SIX continued:

Greece 1981	21 %	3.7	-5.880	9.580	5.450	5.865
Greece 1984	17	-1.1	-4.909	3.809	(4.952)	
Greece 1989	6	7.0	-2.241	9.241		
Greece 1994	9	-3.8	-2.969	-0.831		
Finland 1996	24 %	0.2	-6.608	6.808	6.808	6.808
					(0.000)	
Spain 1987	6 %	-4.5	-2.241	-2.259	0.368	7.274
Spain 1989	8	-6.5	-2.726	-3.774	(5.911)	
Spain 1994	20	1.5	-5.637	7.137		
U.K. 1979	42 %	3.3	-10.974	14.274	5.449	8.120
U.K. 1984	31	-10.5	-8.306	-2.194	(9.402)	
U.K. 1989	18	-8.3	-5.152	-3.148		
U.K. 1994	23	6.5	-6.365	12.865		
Denmark 1979	30 %	-18.0	-8.063	-9.937	-8.825	8.825
Denmark 1984	29	-14.8	-7.821	-6.979	(5.131)	
Denmark 1989	26	-10.2	-7.093	-3.107		
Denmark 1994	22	-21.4	-6.122	-15.278		
Sweden 1995	42 %	-21.5	-10.974	-10.526	-10.526	10.526
					(0.000)	

that opposition to integration would translate easier into voting when there is a *sui generis* anti-integration party campaigning in the EP elections that is not extremist or even is non-partisan (on internal issues). Moreover, such a party (or movement) is likely to be very united, and definitely will want to make the campaign about Europe. In fact, outside of Denmark the only such *sui generis* party has been de Villiers' List of the Majority for Another Europe which was presented in France in 1994. Nevertheless, this gives us five such cases, all of which had negative residuals in Table Six.

Consequently, if one adds a dummy variable to the relationship in Figure Two for those cases with a *sui generis* anti-integration party, the overall r markedly improves. Table Seven provides the residuals for such a model, and one can see a reasonably good fit for Denmark and especially France.

TABLE SEVEN :
 PERCENTAGE VIEWING NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP AS BAD AND *SUI GENERIS*
 ANTI-INTEGRATION EP PARTY WITH CHANGE IN ECP SUPPORT

country and election	membership is bad	change in ECP support			national residuals	
		actual	predicted	residual	mean (s.d.)	absolute mean
Italy 1979	5 %	-1.7	-1.765	0.065	1.009	1.866
Italy 1984	3	0.3	-1.541	1.841	(2.409)	
Italy 1989	4	-3.4	-1.653	-1.747		
Italy 1994	6	2.0	-1.877	3.877		
Lux. 1979	4 %	-1.4	-1.653	0.253	2.009	2.239
Lux. 1984	3	-2.0	-1.541	-0.459	(3.070)	
Lux. 1989	6	4.5	-1.877	6.377		
Lux. 1994	5	0.1	-1.765	1.865		
Belgium 1979	6 %	2.4	-1.877	4.277	2.109	2.701
Belgium 1984	5	0.9	-1.765	2.665	(2.323)	
Belgium 1989	6	0.8	-1.877	2.677		
Belgium 1994	9	-3.4	-2.214	-1.186		
Ireland 1979	20 %	3.7	-3.450	7.150	2.067	2.759
Ireland 1984	20	-3.9	-3.450	-0.450	(3.713)	
Ireland 1989	8	0.4	-2.102	2.502		
Ireland 1994	5	-2.7	-1.765	-0.935		
France 1979	9 %	0.2	-2.214	2.414	-1.866	3.073
France 1984	5	-8.9	-1.765	-7.135	(4.012)	
France 1989	8	-4.4	-2.102	-2.298		
France 1994 *	12	-15.0	-14.555	-0.445		
NL 1979	5 %	1.3	-1.765	3.065	0.106	3.109
NL 1984	4	-4.4	-1.653	-2.747	(3.598)	
NL 1989	3	-4.8	-1.541	-3.259		
NL 1994	5	1.6	-1.765	3.365		
Denmark 1979 *	30 %	-18.0	-16.576	-1.424	0.111	3.684
Denmark 1984 *	29	-14.8	-16.464	1.664	(4.920)	
Denmark 1989 *	26	-10.2	-16.127	-5.927		
Denmark 1994 *	22	-21.4	-15.678	-5.722		
Spain 1987	6 %	-4.5	-1.877	-2.623	-0.690	3.990
Spain 1989	8	-6.5	-2.102	-4.398	(4.964)	
Spain 1994	20	1.5	-3.450	4.950		
Finland 1996	24 %	0.2	-3.899	4.099	4.099	4.099
					(0.000)	

TABLE SEVEN continued:

Germany 1979	8 %	-0.3	-2.102	1.802	-3.601	4.502
Germany 1984	6	-5.8	-1.877	-3.923	(3.963)	
Germany 1989	7	-9.7	-1.990	-7.710		
Germany 1994	10	-6.9	-2.327	-4.573		
Austria 1996	27 %	-8.8	-4.236	-4.564	-4.564	4.564
					(0.000)	
Greece 1981	21 %	3.7	-3.562	7.262	4.142	4.934
Greece 1984	17	-1.1	-3.113	2.013	(4.813)	
Greece 1989	6	7.0	-1.877	8.877		
Greece 1994	9	-3.8	-2.214	-1.586		
Portugal 1987	4 %	-3.8	-1.653	-2.147	-4.948	4.948
Portugal 1989	4	-8.2	-1.653	-6.547	(2.433)	
Portugal 1994	12	-8.7	-2.551	-6.149		
U.K. 1979	42 %	3.3	-5.921	9.221	2.154	7.599
U.K. 1984	31	-10.5	-4.685	-5.815	(8.791)	
U.K. 1989	18	-8.3	-3.225	-5.075		
U.K. 1994	23	6.5	-3.787	10.287		
Sweden 1995	42 %	-21.5	-5.921	-15.579	-15.579	15.579
					(0.000)	

* *sui generis* anti-integration party

Conclusions:

(Usually) Simultaneous Elections about Different Things?

In this analysis I have tested two models of European elections, the first being the anti-government swing notion of second-order elections, and the second being an anti-integration sentiment model which ultimately allows for the presence of a *sui generis* anti-integration party. Based on the national residuals for each model (Tables Three and Seven) or more precisely the absolute mean of a nation's residuals, one can see which model is more appropriate for a given nation.

Figure Three thus plots the absolute mean of the residuals in each case, with a smaller number of course indicating a better fit. There seems to be tentatively four groups of member nations. In the first group, consisting most strongly of the United Kingdom, but also including Germany, Austria, and Spain, European elections really are second-order national elections. It is thus logical that in each of the United Kingdom and Spain "European elections [are] taken seriously by media and politicians as pointers to the possible outcome of a forthcoming national election" (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk, and Franklin 1996: 302). Consequently a less than expected loss by the Spanish Socialists in June 1989 (Table Three) led them to call early national elections for October of that year. Likewise the greater than trend drop for the British Conservatives in 1994 foreshadowed their 1997 national electoral defeat.


In contrast, in a greater number of nations - France, the Netherlands, Portugal (although with difficulty), Denmark, Ireland, and Belgium - European elections do seem to be, horror of horrors, more about Europe, at least in the sense of expressing anti-European sentiment at the expense of the national European consensus party (ECP).

In a third group, that of Luxembourg and probably Italy, it seems that both models fit, so it is unclear which is better. In the case of Luxembourg, however, one must always remember that every EP election has been held on the same day as a national election, complicating any true assessment of national electoral cycles. One could quite possibly include both of these nations in the second category.

Finally, in the case of Greece, Finland, and Sweden neither model seems to fit very well. Of these, Finland and Sweden have had only one EP election, each in a different year from most members, so generalizations may be too early. Greece, though, seems to be a candidate for further research, leading perhaps to a third model?

Figure Three
Mean of Absolute Residuals

anti-integration sentiment model



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
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Figure One
Change in Government Popularity by Position in Electoral Cycle
 (Quadratic Model)



Variable	b	SE(b)
x	-43.793287	13.16768
x ²	35.83496	11.304017
constant	2.87861	3.106258


r = .44978
 F = 5.57939

TABLE FOUR : VOTING IN DENMARK

	selected national elections				European Parliament elections				
	Oct. 1979	Jan. 1984	May 1988	Sept. 1994	June 1979	June 1984	June 1989	June 1994	
Pro-European parties:									
Liberals	12.5	12.1	11.8	23.3	14.5	12.5	16.6	19.0	
Conservatives	12.5	23.4	19.3	15.0	14.0	20.8	13.3	17.7	
Centre Democrats	3.2	4.6	4.7	2.8	6.2	6.6	7.9	0.9	
Christian People's Party	2.6	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.7	1.1	
sub-total	30.8	42.8	37.8	43.0	36.5	42.6	40.7	38.7	
conditional-European parties:									
Progress Party	11.1	3.6	9.0	6.4	5.8	3.5	5.3	2.9	
Radical Party	5.4	5.5	5.6	4.6	3.3	3.1	2.8	8.5	
Social Democrats	38.3	31.6	29.8	34.6	21.9	19.5	23.3	15.8	
Socialist People's Party				7.3				8.6	
sub-total	54.8	40.7	44.4	52.9	31.0	26.1	31.3	35.8	
anti-European parties:									
Socialist People's Party	5.9	11.5	13.0	4.1	4.7	9.2	9.1	...	
small left-wing parties	8.2	5.0	4.7	4.1	6.9	1.3	
People's Movement	20.9	20.8	18.9	10.3	
June Movement	15.2	
sub-total	14.1	16.5	17.7	4.1	32.5	31.3	28.0	25.5	

Figure Two

Change in ECP Vote by Percentage Believing that EC/EU Membership is Bad
(Linear Model)



without dummy...

variable	b	SE(b)
x	-.242596	.086094
constant	-.785212	1.399515
r = .38016		
F = 7.94000		

with dummy...

variable	b	SE(b)
x	-.112308	.077646
dummy	-12.003473	2.630649
constant	-1.203599	1.177317
r = .64116		
F = 16.05436		

Figure Three

Mean of Absolute Residuals

anti-integration sentiment model

