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**Does Culture Matter?**  
The Relevance of Culture in  
Politics and Governance in the  
Euro-Mediterranean Zone

with a preface by  
El Hassan bin Talal

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*El Hassan bin Talal*

## **Preface**

The publication of the present volume is a welcome event, since discussions of culture are all too often lacking from policymaking today. Economic and political measures are necessary for human welfare and to build communities; but economic and political security alone do not add up to human security. The Barcelona Process has not, unfortunately, delivered in this respect. The third dimension, culture, must be included – the individual's memory and expectations of his or her human dignity, group identity, aesthetic traditions and unique history.

We are surrounded, at the beginning of a new millennium, by talk of a 'clash of civilisations'. It is easy to forget that global technology and communications now link us together as a single world civilisation in which 'clashes of cultures' can and should be avoided – by discovering and building upon common values. As the contributions below indicate, the role of culture in political systems around the 'Greater Mediterranean' embraces more than administrative and legislative distinctions thought to result from cultural differences. We ought also to be prepared to see how different institutions and codes of conduct have arisen in different times and places to address the same perennial challenges: fair distribution of resources, family and social obligations, property ownership, help for the poor, availability of technology, protection of the weak, control of the strong, recording experience and tradition.

Throughout history the Mediterranean basin has been the scene of territorial, political and sectarian conflicts between rivals for control, whether empires, dynasties, regimes, theocracies; nevertheless the societies and populations that inhabited its shores and hinterlands, south and north, west

and east, have never ceased to share ways of cultivating the land and the sea, to develop common technologies, to exchange not only their products but also their ideas – in short to create a *modus vivendi* that can be called ‘Mediterranean culture’ in its broadest sense. They now share a long and well-documented history of exchange and coexistence that can serve as a useful model for approaching and understanding other *terrae mediae*. Our differences remind us that there may be more than one way to address similar problems that reflect common concerns.

Today, unless we find more and better ways to exchange ideas, experiences and skills among cultures, we risk not just historical misunderstanding but disaster. I would like to see a ‘School of Mediterranean Humanities’ in which to broaden the horizons of Euro-Mediterranean thinking and begin to see our neighbours in terms of shared histories and the expression of identical values in diverse languages. Only in this way can we begin to move from a culture of mere coexistence and survival to a culture of cooperation and peacefulness, not only along the Mediterranean littoral but around the world.

*Andreas Wimmer*

## **Introduction**

Does culture matter? What a strange question to ask since it seems to be so obvious that it does, in everyday life as well as in politics and in the daily business of governing a country. The sultan of Oman rules over his country by traveling, with his huge tent, from one assembly of men to another, giving advice on local affairs and trying to resolve disputes that have arisen between different sections of the local community. Contrast this to how a German city such as Bonn, is ruled. We will certainly find some interesting parallels, especially when it comes to the role of dispute resolution, but we will also find striking differences that we can easily attribute to different political cultures; different ways to understand and define what a government is supposed to do, different notions of the limits of its power, and completely different ideas when it comes to determining who is entitled to rule and who is not.

As soon as we go beyond such contrasting images, however, and the stereotyping associated with them, the issue becomes much more complicated. This is why we have put a question mark behind "culture matters". Just how much of the differences in politics can we attribute to cultural differences and how deep these differences truly reach is a matter of debate. Can we go as far as to say that certain systems of values are not compatible with certain political institutions? These questions are not only of academic concern. They are politically burning, considering, for example, the debate on Asian values. Some authors and politicians maintained that Western style democracy is not able to flourish on the soil of a Confucian culture of authoritarianism. The recent transition to a democracy in Taiwan, however, has caught many adherents of the culture-matters-thesis by surprise.

The link between culture and governance too, needs a question mark. It is by no means sure that a transparent system of government, tightly following the rules of law and avoiding favouritism and corruption, is only possible where Protestantism or some equivalent of it provides the norms for such behaviour. And we do not know enough on how stable and resistant to change everyday cultures of bureaucratic behaviour are. Consider a sheep herder in Eastern Anatolia. He usually does not come into touch with government officials, because he still manages to live the independent life of a villager. However, his son wants to study and to become a white collar worker. In order to get admitted, the father presents a sheep to the director of the high school who gladly accepts the present. Is this a traditional culture of reciprocity transferred into the modern school setting, where it resists change? Or is handing over and accepting the sheep a rational transaction, easy to abandon, as soon as the director of the school can choose pupils on a different basis than on the gifts received, for example on the basis of a nation-wide system of exams?

The debate on Asian values and the example of the sheep growing man speak to the issue of culture in politics and in governance. They are not only important in development research, but also for development practice. If culture matters, then it should be taken into account by development agencies, which is not the case today. Donor countries should not insist on democratisation or on good governance in their co-operation programmes with developing nations. They should be much more culturally sensitive, respecting different, non-Western modes of running a government and organising politics. "We", mostly Western donors, should abstain from demanding from "other" peoples what "their cultures" inhibit them to do or we should help them change their cultures first, not their system of government.

The questions not only touch central concerns of the Southern Hemisphere, but also of the North, and more specifically of Europe. They touch the heart of the European project. After the end of the Cold War, the definition of what holds the European Union together had to change. Expanding the Union eastwards very quickly raised the questions of the limits of this expansionary movement and therefore also of what holds the different states on



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this side of the line together. Will it be possible to include not only the obvious Eastern European candidates, but countries with apparently different political cultures and styles of government? Will Turkey, to jump on the most hotly debated issue, one day be member of the European Union? Is the democratic instability and the poor human rights record of Turkey an expression of its political culture? Will this culture change with the prospects of an integration into the European Union?

Turkey is, obviously, not the only debate surrounding the enlargement issue where the culture argument is common currency. The Southern borders of Europe have become a focus of this debate as well. Why exclude, some policy makers and academics have asked, the Southern rim of the Mediterranean basin, from the European vision, when the oldest and perhaps most developed European civilisation, the Roman Empire, had integrated them? Are there fundamental cultural barriers between Spain, France, Italy, Greece on the one hand, and Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt and the Maghreb countries on the other? Is Israel closer to Spain in terms of political culture than Spain to Morocco? And if there are such fundamental differences at all, do they matter for politics and governance?

Some of these questions and concerns are in the research focus of the Center for European Integration Research (ZEI) and the Center for Development Research (ZEF), both new research institutes of the University of Bonn. The Center for European Integration Research has initiated a research and policy advice programme concerning the enlargement issue. Culture and identity are important aspects of this programme. The Center for Development Research is addressing the developmental aspects of the question of culture.

The Mediterranean Basin is a region of common concern, the Center for Integration Research looking at it from the perspective of the North, the Center for Development Research from the South. Building on these overlapping research interests and regional foci, the two centers have organised, under the leadership of Dr. Zervakis and Dr. de Soysa, a conference which took place in June 2000. The following collections of essays is the fruit of

this common efforts and contains some of the main papers that were given at the conference.

The events following September 11 2001 have given the questions addressed by this collection of essays a new dimension of actuality and urgency. Exploring the commonalities and differences of the political cultures North and South of the Mediterranean, largely corresponding to the Christian and the Muslim part of the old world, takes on a different meaning now that some see a dividing line along these lines being reinforced through the attacks on the symbols of Western economic and political dominance. Given the politically burning nature of these questions, it is all the more important that research contributes with solid empirical arguments and careful analysis to the debate. This collection of articles is but a first and very modest step in this direction, mapping the territory of possible approaches and exploring some hypothesis on the relation between culture and politics in the Mediterranean.

*Indra de Soysa / Peter Zervakis*

## **Culture and Governance in the Mediterranean: A Rationale and Overview**

In the past decade, there has been a ‘renaissance’ in the concept of culture as a crucial determining factor in political and economic life (Inglehart, 1988). At the global level, the celebrated thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’ propounded by Samuel P. Huntington has spurred much debate, a topic that has gained new life and urgency given the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.<sup>1</sup> According to Huntington, the ideological schisms of the Cold War decades have given way to cultural schisms, particularly between the West and the ‘rest.’ This thesis is not simply relevant to security, but it suggests that since the end of the Cold War, ‘the most important distinctions among people is not ideological, political or economic ... [but will be] cultural’ (Huntington, 1997, p.21). The renaissance of culture in political life has gained enormous popularity, partly as a result of Huntington’s bold thesis on cultural incompatibilities as an aggravating force in social and political life. Cultural theories have not been accepted unequivocally, but in fact there has been a debate as old as the science of politics on the salience of cultural factors for understanding political life (Almond and Verba, 1963). Others have argued that culturalists have got it backwards, that institutions and performance themselves determine what some have come to define as ‘culture’ (Barry, 1970; Pateman, 1980).

<sup>1</sup> This conference took place three months before the tragic events. The papers that follow uncannily address the current debates in many salient ways.

There is continued debate in the social sciences as to the relative importance of culture as opposed to structure and the quality of formal institutions, particularly state institutions, as the primary determinants of political outcomes (see Crothers and Lockhart, 2000). The World Bank (2000), as a leading agency of development is explicit, however. Regarding South-East Europe, it states that 'good governance is more than luck and tradition.' Given the ferment in the literature, ZEF's interests in the developmental aspects of culture and ZEI's interests in questions of European institution-building, identity, enlargement, and the Mediterranean region presented a fortunate opportunity for jointly exploring the question of whether or not and to what degree culture (tradition) matters in politics and governance in the Mediterranean region, which encompasses Western and Southern Europe, North Africa, Near East and the western reaches of the Middle East.

The Mediterranean region is geographically well placed for exploring the issue of culture and governance because of its importance and proximity to the European Union and because it contains a mixture of relevant distinct religious cultures such as Christianity (catholic, orthodox, protestant), Judaism (liberal and orthodox), and Islam (orthodox and fundamentalist). Moreover, it contains distinct political systems such as liberal democracy of varying degrees, monarchies, and authoritarian regimes (civilian and military). The Mediterranean region, perhaps more than any other, is the most proximate physical boundary demarcating the West and the Rest, or the so-called faultline between the old Byzantine and Ottoman and Holy Roman empires. The issue of culture and governance becomes all the more salient given that the export of institutions from the EU and its successful adoption is a hallmark of the EU's policy toward its neighbors, especially in the Mediterranean area, where countries of the region are participants in the Barcelona Process. This process after all is viewed as a preliminary step towards greater political integration of this region. Therefore, a major objective of the workshop was to examine, in light of the new debates on culture, whether or not and to what degree culture influences political life and thereby shapes patterns of governance in the Mediterranean region. The questions are not purely academic, but the answers to them hold important

policy lessons given the EU's desire to see 'European-style' institutions and norms abroad for securing better governance. Moreover, if as some suggest, culture is the 'software' that drives society, what is really to be expected from exporting the 'hardware' of western-style, liberal democratic institutions?

The opponents of the cultural position, mainly the rational choice perspective, argue that rational action is constant across cultures but is conditioned by the institutional (structural) constraints within which individuals make rational calculations. Such approaches are likelier to view institutions as being the defining factor of political life and of societal outcomes, whereas cultural factors may in fact be epiphenomena. As some institutional proponents claim, however, culture determines the shape and form that institutions assume, so that even institutions are to some extent culturally determined. On the other hand, institutions reflect the power interests of those making calculations that further self-interest, which is rationally determined. Moreover, institutions may create social conditions that change cultural attitudes in turn. Others argue that social structures, such as the size of the middle class, structure of the economy, inherited colonial structures and social power configurations, not civilizational factors, determine cultural mores and norms, which change themselves with exogenously determined structural change. In an age of globalization, such change is bound to be rapid and affect other aspects of socio-political life. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism thus can be seen as a culture clash between those who feel threatened by those who seem to be rejecting the old ways, not between opposing civilizationally distinct peoples. The papers contained herein reflect some of the confusion surrounding these intertwined questions, particularly the stubborn problem of defining precisely what one means when one describes one or another facet of human action as 'cultural.' Debates on what exactly entails culture and tradition and who determines them are far from being resolved even today, despite many cautionary warnings about the pitfalls of relying on culture (see Elkins and Simeon, 1979).

Some of the papers in this compilation pay close attention to specific countries and topics that highlight the importance or insignificance of cultural explanations in political outcomes. These papers examine the ways in

which culture manifests itself in political outcomes and in questions of governance. The authors explore issues they think highlight best the problems and prospects of cultural explanations over others, teasing out the theoretical implications of their particular cases. The concluding papers focus on drawing out the implications of cultural (mis)understanding for policy and the problems and prospects of improving crosscultural dialogue among the different cultural grouping in the region.

This compilation of papers from the conference is designed broadly to achieve three objectives. First, a group of leading scholars try to conceptualize the importance of culture in explaining political life. Secondly, some of the papers tackle concrete cases drawn from cases in the region. Thirdly, some scholars try to provide a regional view of the question of cultural communication and understanding across the divisions within the region. In the first section, *Lawrence Harrison*, a leading proponent of the importance of culture, suggests that much of what determines 'successful democracy' could be traced to cultural factors rather than others (institutions). However, it was pointed out that long-term structural change, such as that which took place in the Far East during the post-War years was conducive to bringing about democracy. Places such as the oil-wealthy Middle East, which has at least seen rising income, however, have been resilient to democratic change, a resilience attributed partly to culture. *Mohammed Arkoun* argues that Islam and Christianity had a common humanistic tradition in the Mediterranean region in the Middle Ages, and he shows that religious issues are instrumentalized by political motivations so as to create over time the current rift that exists in the popular mind about the antithetical aspects of Islam and Christianity. Contrary to cultural arguments, *Klaus von Beyme* is firm that culture matters less than formal political institutions, highlighting particularly lessons from German experience in Europe.

*Erich Weede* traces the origins of the divergent paths followed by the West in contrast with the Islamic world. He argues that the schisms within Christianity allowed it to secularize and thereby solve the contradictions between religion and state, the individual and the state, which led to the prerequisites that led to the rise of the West. Islam, on the other hand has held secularization at bay, which is a reflection of the unity that exists between

church and state. He sees fragmentation within the Islamic world as inevitable and a force for breaking out of the stagnation. *Ergun Özbudun* looks at the concrete case of Turkey to demonstrate that Turkish political culture persists in shaping the Turkish political system, which has undergone several efforts at reform. Despite political, institutional reforms aimed at making Turkish politics more democratic and participatory, Turkish politics returns to similar patterns of corruption and malgovernance, which he attributes to culture. *Paul Salem* points out that the Islamic world is less monolithic in its political culture as commonly perceived. He points out that it is pluralistic but unable to accept the secularist, western democratic vision as has been the case elsewhere. As he points out, the political tensions and repression in the Arab world can be attributable to this internal schism inside the Arab world—in other words, a clash within the Arab civilization.

Several of the papers bring an international relations perspective by examining the question salient to inter-regional interaction. *Dimitris Xenakis* and *Dimitris Chrysochoou* examine the evolving Euro-Mediterranean partnership, pointing out the prospects and challenges of greater integration. They look closely at the differing understandings of the ‘Mediterranean space,’ between the growing Islamization in the East and the increasing phobia of Islam in the West. They conclude by noting that growing economic ties between states in the region could act as a moderating force on the culturally determined incompatibilities. *Stephen Calleya* examines the Barcelona Process, highlighting the success achieved thus far and suggesting the way forward in the future. He encourages more dialogue and the promotion of cultural, educational, and civil society contacts between the partners so as to overcome common misunderstandings between the peoples of the region. This theme is reinforced by *Franck Biancheri*, who looks at the ways in which the new technology of communication, particularly of the internet, can help in bringing together civil society for strengthening democracy and partnership in the region. *Ludger Kühnhardt*, finally, examines the fascinating historical development of the Mediterranean space and explores the issue of whether or not and to what extent a common Mediterranean identity exists, suggesting that the Euro-Med dialogue serve as a springboard for

improving development cooperation and common-problem solving with important spillover effects into Northern Africa.

As the papers demonstrate, the question of culture and political life is enormously messy. Yet culture is an important determinant of many socio-political manifestations. The divisions in the debate as to the degree of importance certainly will remain with us in so far as new insights and research findings are able to prove otherwise. In terms of the Mediterranean region, there is renewed urgency for cross-cultural understanding and cooperation to solve enduring problems in the social, economic, and political realms. It remains to be seen whether political forces can work towards undoing the damage that history has done in terms of destroying the common bonds that the Islamic Mediterranean world and the Christian one shared. We feel that these papers go some distance towards encouraging more understanding through scholarly reflection.

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*Lawrence E. Harrison*

## **The Relevance of Culture in Democratic Governance – Lessons from the Western Hemisphere**

I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss the role of culture in democratic governance, an issue that has occupied much of my thought during the past 20 years. This conference holds particular interest for me because of its focus on the Mediterranean, an area with which I have had little direct contact but one where I have long thought that cultural differences must help explain the striking contrasts in political systems. Comparable contrasts exist in the Western Hemisphere where, I am convinced, culture matters a great deal in explaining the very different political trajectories of Canada and the United States on the one hand, and Latin America on the other. My hope is that a discussion of culture's role in the Western Hemisphere will shed some light on its role in the Mediterranean.

At the outset, I want to define what I mean by "culture," a word of vast scope and elasticity. My usage is relatively narrow: I will be referring to cultural values and attitudes that influence the behavior of individuals and societies. The central issue for me today is the extent to which cultural values and attitudes influence the structure and performance of government, mindful of the relevant clauses of the UN Declaration on Human Rights:

Everyone has the right of life, liberty and the security of person...human beings shall enjoy freedom of belief and speech...All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection... Eve-

ryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives...

I trust that it is clear that cultural values and attitudes have nothing to do with genes. They are transmitted from generation to generation by many instruments of acculturation, child-rearing practices probably most influential among them, but also including churches, schools, the media, the internet, expressions of "pop" culture, and so forth. And, of course, cultural values and attitudes change, albeit usually slowly.

Culture is one of several factors that influence how societies evolve. Among others are geography, including climate and natural resource endowment; international relationships and the vagaries of history; and leadership. But until recent years, culture's influence has, with some exceptions, been ignored.

I want to define at the outset the fundamental differences in governance one finds in the Western Hemisphere. Canada and the United States are stable, mature democracies. Their elections are held on schedule. The parties *out* of power frequently replace those *in* power. One finds a significant degree of decentralization of power to provinces or states and beyond to cities and towns. Government is substantially responsive to the wishes and preferences of the people as expressed in elections and through communications between constituents and elected officials at various levels. Checks and balances exist among the branches of government. The armed forces are under civilian control. The judiciaries are substantially independent, and the level of corruption is low (Canada was the fifth least corrupt and the United States fourteenth on Transparency International's index last year.)

I hasten to add, particularly for the benefit of any Canadians who may be present, that there are some important differences, too, not the least being the contrast between the Canadian parliamentary system and the American presidential system. But the sign at the border south of Vancouver is substantially true. It reads, "Children of a common mother. Brethren dwelling together in unity."

## The Relevance of Culture in Democratic Governance

Those qualities of mature democracies are for the most part lacking in Latin America. Costa Rica comes the closest—it has experienced democratic continuity since a civil war in 1948. Chile's and Uruguay's democratic traditions were interrupted in the 1970s by military ousters of elected governments. Sadly, what we see going on today in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—not to mention Cuba—is far more typical of Latin American governance during the past two centuries, a governance characterized by frequent coups d'état and civil wars. Most governments are highly centralized; most judiciaries are not independent; checks and balances are weak; and corruption is commonplace. The idea that the military are above the law is widespread, particularly among the military.

In the wake of the demise of the military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, a substantial consensus has existed in Latin America that democracy is the best way to organize human societies. But Latin American democracy remains for the most part incipient and fragile.

A rich literature going back through Montesquieu to Plato addresses the link between culture and governance. From that rich literature I am going to select for comment today a few books that are particularly relevant to my theme.

Book 19 of Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*, published in 1748, is entitled "On the laws in their relation with the principles—we might substitute the word "values"—forming the general spirit, the mores, and the manners of a nation." He goes on to elaborate on Plato's observation in The Republic that governments vary in accordance with the dispositions of their citizenry. Montesquieu says:

Many things govern men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples of past things, mores, and manners; a general spirit is formed as a result...I do not say that the [geographic] climate has not in large part produced the laws, the mores, and the manners of [a] nation, but I say that the mores and the manners...should be closely related to its laws.

Let me place these words in a more modern context. Latin American countries have produced constitutions, often modeled after the American consti-

tution of 1787, since their early years of independence in the first decades of the nineteenth century. But few Latin American countries have abided by these constitutions because they were incompatible with the reality of Latin American cultural values and attitudes, thereby confirming Montesquieu's wisdom.

Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* was published in 1835. It has since become a classic, notable not only for its insights about what makes democracy work—or not work—but also for its prescient predictions, for example, of U.S. infringement on Mexican territory, racial conflict in the United States, and rivalry between the United States and Russia.

Tocqueville was familiar with Montesquieu's writings and took the latter's views on culture several steps further. Anticipating Max Weber, Tocqueville perceived an intimate link between Protestantism and democracy: Most of English America was peopled by men who, having shaken off the pope's authority...brought to the New World a Christianity that I can only describe as democratic and republican; this fact singularly favored the establishment of a temporal republic and democracy. From the start, politics and religion agreed.

This was in striking contrast to Tocqueville's view of what was transpiring in Latin America: A great part of the success of democratic government must be attributed to...good American laws, but I do not think that they are the main cause...Mexico, as happily situated as the [the United States] has adopted these same laws but cannot get used to democratic government...People are astonished to see the new nations of [Latin] America convulsed by one revolution after another...and daily expect them to return to their natural state. But...may not revolution be the natural state for the Spaniards of [Latin America]?

The principal cause of the contrast between the north and the south in the Western Hemisphere is at the heart of Tocqueville's understanding of what most influences patterns of governance: I am convinced that the luckiest of geographic circumstances and the best of laws cannot maintain a constitution despite [a society's] mores, whereas the latter can turn even the most unfavorable [geographic] circumstances and the worst laws to advantage.

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The importance of [habits, opinions, and, in a word] mores is a universal truth to which study and experience continually bring us back. I find it occupies the central position in my thoughts; all my ideas come back to it in the end.

The emphasis on culture as an explanation for the evolution of societies shifted to economic development with the publication of Max Weber's classic *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in 1904. While there are a number of aspects of Weber's work that touch on governance, for example, the political relevance of Benjamin Franklin's dedication to honesty, which Weber highlights, I am going to jump ahead to 1958, the year in which Edward Banfield's study of a southern Italian village was published with the title *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*.

Banfield lived in the village (he gives it the fictitious name of "Montegrano"—its real name is Chiaromonte) for nine months in 1954-55. He had just done a study of St. George, Utah, a Mormon community that was a beehive of organized activity, and was struck at the outset of his visit to Montegrano at the almost total absence of associations—of what is called today "social capital" or "civic culture." As he says, "We are apt to take it for granted that economic and political associations will quickly arise wherever technical conditions and natural resources permit...The assumption is wrong because it overlooks the critical importance of culture." Banfield goes on to label the culture of the Montegranesi "amoral familism," a zero-sum world view in which no one furthers the interest of the group except as his own interest or the interest of his immediate family is furthered. It is a culture rife with mistrust.

In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published *The Civic Culture*, which presented the results of interviews conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, to determine variations in values and attitudes that might be correlated with the degree of political cohesiveness and progress toward democracy of each country. In a sequel, *Political Culture and Political Development*, Verba and Lucian Pye emphasize the importance of "the extent to which members of a political system have trust and confidence in their fellow political actors...a particularly

crucial aspect of a democratic political culture." Evoking David McClelland's *The Achieving Society*, published in 1961, and Banfield, Verba and Pye stress the importance of value inculcation in childhood:

In early social situations, the child will learn certain basic lessons about the nature of authority [and] the trustworthiness and supportiveness of other people...In Italy, children learn to distrust others.

One final jump, this time to 1993 and Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*, also focused on Italy and a book that highlights the concept of social capital—"civicness," or what Francis Fukuyama calls "spontaneous association"—as a crucial factor in development. I want to stress that social capital is essentially a cultural phenomenon—some societies have more of it than others, and in a given society the degree of social capital can change with time, as Putnam's most recent book, *Bowling Alone*, makes clear in the case of the United States.

*Making Democracy Work* contains two paragraphs that are directly relevant to our concerns today *and* to the contrasting political evolution of the north and the south in the Western Hemisphere. I conclude this brief review of relevant literature with these paragraphs:

Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read eagerly about community affairs...They are engaged by public issues, but not personal or patron-client politics. Inhabitants trust one another to act fairly and to obey the law. Leaders in these regions are relatively honest. They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compromise with their political adversaries. Both citizens and leaders find equality congenial. Social and political networks are organized horizontally, not hierarchically. The community values solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation, and honesty...people in these regions are content.

At the other pole are the "uncivic" regions...Public life...is organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally. The very concept of "citizen"...is stunted...public affairs is the business of somebody else—the bosses, the politicians...Few people aspire to partake in deliberations about the commonweal, and few such opportunities present themselves. Political partici-

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pation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collective purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. Private piety stands in for public purpose. Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about democratic principles. "Compromise" has only negative overtones. Laws...are made to be broken, but fearing others' lawlessness, people demand sterner discipline. Trapped in these interlocking vicious circles, nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy.

These generalizations by Robert Putnam about the sharp contrasts between the North and South of Italy are substantially applicable not only to the sharp contrasts one finds in the Americas but also to the sharp contrasts between the advanced democracies of the West and, increasingly, East Asia, on the one hand, and many of the former Communist countries and the Third World on the other. I believe that at the root of these contrasting paradigms are contrasting cultural values and attitudes.

What are the values and attitudes that make democracy work or not work? We do not know with certainty the answer to that question. Several of us are just now working on the design of a research project a key part of which is the development of a detailed typology of values and attitudes that influence the political, economic, and social evolution of nations, for good or for bad.

What follows, then, are the relevant values and attitudes that have evolved in my thinking during two decades as a development practitioner and another two decades as a researcher and writer focused on the role of culture.

One word appears repeatedly in the preceding literature review—"trust." The correlation between trust and democracy is powerfully confirmed by the World Values Survey, whose coordinator, Ronald Inglehart, is with us. In his chapter in *Culture Matters*, Prof. Inglehart presents a graph that demonstrates that:

1. Trust tends to be higher in Protestant and Confucian societies, lower in Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic societies;

2. Of 21 higher trust societies, only one—China—is not a stable democracy;
3. There is also a close correlation between trust and affluence.

In my first book, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*, I emphasized the relevance of the radius of identification and trust to the viability of pluralistic political systems. If one views those outside the family and one's circle of friends as inconsequential or possibly even hostile, as is often the case in Latin America, it is difficult to establish a basis for the kind of trust that lubricates democratic politics and association. A party in power will be more reluctant to transfer that power to an opposition party in a low-trust society than in a high trust society. Citizens in societies where the radius of identification and trust is narrow are more likely to engage in tax evasion and nepotism, and less likely to engage in philanthropy, than citizens in societies with a broader radius of identification and trust. Compromise is likely to be more difficult to achieve. I note in passing that as far as I know, there is no accurate synonym in Spanish for the English word "compromise."

But we have to ask, "Why are some societies more trusting than others?" Three factors come to mind. The first is the degree of homogeneity in a society. Human nature is such that human beings are more likely to trust someone who looks like them, speaks the same language, wears the same clothes, eats the same food, and so forth. It is consequently more difficult to develop trust in multiracial and multicultural societies than in homogeneous ones. The problems that Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and Mexico have encountered in building durable democratic institutions are in part the consequence of the difficulty of building trust among indigenous peoples, whites, and people of mixed blood. I note in passing that Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are all relatively homogeneous societies.

There is a comparable, if smaller, problem in countries like the United States that are becoming increasingly multicultural. I suspect that one of the factors contributing to the decline in trust in the United States in recent decades is this increasingly apparent phenomenon of "differentness" in our society. The same thing may also be happening in Canada.



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The second factor affecting the degree of trust in a society is the rigor of the ethical code. If the ethical code demands "not single good works but a life of good works built into a unified system," as Weber wrote of the Calvinist Protestant sects, people within that group are likely to develop confidence about the motives and actions of others in the group, and to identify with them. At the other extreme is Haiti, where Voodoo, the dominant religion, is without *any* ethical content. What happens to people is assumed to be the consequence of the actions of hundreds of spirits who behave in a very human, capricious way. The only way that one can influence one's destiny is by gaining favor with the spirits through Voodoo rituals. While I have not seen statistics on the level of trust in Haiti, I have lived and worked there, and the degree of mistrust is dismaying. It surely has much to do with Haiti's dismal political history.

The Argentine writer Mariano Grondona, author of *The Cultural Conditions of Economic Development* and now working on *The Cultural Conditions of Political Development*, argues that the ethical code must be based on what Raymond Aron calls "a reasonable egoism." Ethical codes based on the morality of saints and martyrs will not be realizable in human societies. Grondona cites as an example of such ethics Marx's slogan "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." He goes on to say, with reference to the differences between North America and Latin America: In cultures that are favorable to development, there is widespread compliance with laws and norms that are not totally exigent and are therefore realizable. Moral law and social reality virtually coincide. In development-resistant cultures, on the other hand, there are two worlds that are out of touch with each other. One is the exalted world of the highest standards and the other is the real world of furtive immorality and generalized hypocrisy. Grondona goes on to emphasize the importance of what he calls "the lesser virtues."

Advanced societies esteem a series of lesser virtues that are often irrelevant in traditional cultures: a job well done, tidiness, courtesy, punctuality. These contribute both to efficiency and harmony in human relations [and, I might add, to trust].

The third factor influencing the degree of trust in a society is the comportment of leaders and institutions. The steady decline in trust in the United States in recent decades, particularly trust in government, is surely in important part the consequence of Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the war in Vietnam and Richard Nixon's conduct during the Watergate episode.

But trust is not the only factor on which democracy depends, just as it is not the only factor on which economic development depends, although it is surely helpful to both. Effective democracy depends on citizen participation, and this in turn depends on citizens who believe both that democracy is the best way to organize human societies and that they can influence their destinies through participation. Democratic participation will be difficult to achieve in a culture that encourages a fatalistic world view in which the goal is resignation in the face of omnipotent forces. Democratic societies tend to focus on the future, authoritarian societies on the present or the past.

The viability of democratic governance also depends on a culture that encourages heterodoxy and dissent. This has generally not been true of Latin America, where orthodoxy has been a dominant feature and where dissent may be viewed as heresy. A comment by Nobel laureate Octavio Paz about the contrast between the two Americas is relevant: "One, English speaking, is the daughter of the tradition that has founded the modern world: the Reformation, with its social and political consequences, democracy and capitalism. The other, Spanish and Portuguese speaking, is the daughter of the universal Catholic monarchy and the Counter-Reformation."

Finally, some cultures nurture vertical, hierarchical human relationships that are obstacles to democracy, while others nurture horizontal, egalitarian relationships that facilitate democracy. The difficulty that Confucian societies have encountered in building democratic institutions in part reflects the hierarchical, authoritarian currents of Confucianism.

To move beyond cultural factors that nurture democracy, I think it is clear that economic development enhances the probability of democracy taking root. For one thing, a rapidly growing economy conclusively demonstrates that life need not be a zero-sum game in which what I gain is at your ex-

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pense. The pie expands, making it easier to cushion political and social pressures.

Economic development depends on a measure of economic pluralism, on the ability of individuals to enter the market substantially free of government interference. Experience in the market, in turn, encourages the view that people can influence their destinies through their own efforts, precisely the attitude that drives political participation and political pluralism.

You may recognize in what I've just said one of the principal themes in Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*. I share his belief that economic development nurtures political pluralism. The democratization in recent years of Korea and Taiwan is a case in point.

Lest we become too optimistic about economic development transforming societies, we must remember that economic development, like political development, is powerfully influenced by culture. An example is the key role that entrepreneurship plays in economic success. Some cultures are more entrepreneurial than others. For almost two decades, Latin America has tried to reproduce the East Asian economic miracles. Only Chile has approximated the hoped-for results. I might add that Chile enjoys an atypical tradition of entrepreneurship and institutional strength that goes back at least to the nineteenth century.

Cultural change is usually a slow process. But societies *can* be transformed in a generation or two from traditional authoritarian modes of governance to modern democracies. Spain—*la madre patria* for Latin America—is a particularly relevant case.

In the 1950's, Spain was comparable in its governance and economic and social conditions to Argentina and Cuba. Politics were dominated by a military dictator, and poverty and social injustice were widespread. Toward the end of the 1950s, Francisco Franco was obliged by economic stagnation to end his policy of self-sufficiency and to open up the Spanish economy to imports, foreign investors, and tourists. Not long thereafter, Europe no longer ended at the Pyrenees. Not only was the economic sector internationalized, with highly favorable consequences for economic growth. Politicians, intellectuals, the church, the military, and other elite groups soon

developed links with their opposite numbers in western Europe and the United States. Newspapers and magazines sprouted and created an increasingly pluralistic political and intellectual environment in which Spain's tradition of self-criticism, typified by writers like Cervantes and Ortega-y-Gasset, was revived.

Franco's death in 1975 was followed by a rapid transition to democracy. The symbol of opposition to Franco, the Socialist Party, won the 1982 elections, and by 1986 Spain was a member both of NATO and the European Economic Community. Power was peacefully transferred to the conservative Popular Party, led by José María Aznar, in 1996.

The World Values Survey confirms the transformation of Spanish values and attitudes. With respect to democratic governance, Spain's value profile is now essentially indistinguishable from other members of the European Union. Symptomatic of the transformation is a comment made in 1976 by General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in the transition government of Adolfo Suárez. Gutiérrez Mellado had been attacked as a "liberal" by Franco's old guard. He responded:

“I don't mind being called a liberal if that means that I admit to not being utterly right all the time, that I am ready to discuss things with people with whom I disagree, that I prefer that there should be no more fratricidal wars, that I want Spain to belong to all Spaniards...”

The conditions I noted earlier in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela—not to mention Cuba—suggest that Latin America has a long way to go in its quest for stable democratic governance. But there are some hopeful signs. The victory of Vicente Fox in last year's Mexican elections ended what amounted to a one-party dictatorship that had endured for almost three-quarters of a century. Fox's vision of a truly pluralistic, transparent Mexico depends on a cultural transformation comparable to Spain's. And much as the Spanish transformation was facilitated by Spain's links with western Europe, the Mexican transformation may benefit from Mexico's NAFTA links with the United States and Canada. We are reminded of the crucial role that political leadership can play in progressive cultural change both by Fox and by his predecessor, Ernesto

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Zedillo, who made the transition to democracy possible in ways that evoke Adolfo Suárez's role in Spain's transition.

A growing number of influential Latin American intellectuals have turned away from blaming others, particularly the United States, for their problems, and have instead looked inward to explain why Latin America is the least democratic, least developed region of the West. Among them have been Octavio Paz; the Venezuelan Carlos Rangel; Argentina's Mariano Grondona; the co-authors of the best-seller, *Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot*, Cuban exile Carlos Alberto Montaner, Colombian Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, and Peruvian Álvaro Vargas Llosa; and Álvaro's father Mario Vargas Llosa, who a few years called for: "a reform of our customs and ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowledge, images, and forms that we understand by the word 'culture'. The culture within which we live and act today in Latin America is neither liberal nor is it altogether democratic. We have democratic governments, but our institutions, our reflexes, our attitudes are very far from being democratic."

The Guatemalan sociologist Bernardo Arévalo de León put it succinctly last year when he wrote, "We have the hardware of democracy, but our software is authoritarian."

A substantial consensus exists in Latin America today in favor of democratic governance, a consensus shared not only by political leaders and intellectuals but also by people at the grass roots. Civic organizations that promote political participation and transparency now exist in most countries. Corruption has become a major issue in several countries, Mexico foremost among them, and anti-corruption campaigns have been given impetus by the adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption in 1998.

Civic education and character education are growing in Latin America, often as the result of initiatives by private organizations many of which are headed by women. A number of organizations are promoting philanthropy, whose neglect in Latin America reflects in part the very short radius of identification and trust found throughout the region. And some professionals are studying traditional child-rearing practices with a view to introduc-

ing modifications that will promote greater trust, sense of civic and social responsibility, and creativity—and demote authoritarianism.

Octavio Paz's observation about the influence of religion in the Western Hemisphere is relevant to another force that may contribute to cultural change that enhances democratic governance. I have in mind the rapid growth in recent decades of Protestantism, chiefly Evangelical and Pentecostal, which account for as many as forty percent of all Guatemalans, as many as twenty percent of Brazilians and Chileans. Latin America is, for the first time in its history, a region of religious pluralism.

I do not, however, want to paint an excessively optimistic picture of the prospects for stable democratic governance in Latin America. We are continually reminded of the magnitude of the problem by the threatened disintegration of Colombia and by the persistence of the Cuban dictatorship for more than forty years; by frequent examples of electoral irregularities; by the violence and crime that are so widespread, particularly in Latin American cities; by the corruption commonly found in public institutions, including the courts, the police, and the military; by the fact that the most inequitable income distribution patterns in the world are found in Latin America.

At the root of these troubling problems are a set of democracy-resistant values and attitudes that have persisted since colonial times. We can take encouragement, at least viewing the long run, from the fact that these cultural obstacles are increasingly being addressed by Latin Americans.

I hope that you have found this discussion of culture's influence on governance in the Western Hemisphere helpful. I appreciate that there are many differences between the Western Hemisphere and the Mediterranean region. But if culture matters as much as it does in the Western Hemisphere, then it has to be a powerful force elsewhere, too.

*Klaus von Beyme*

## **Culture in Politics and Governance – European Experiences**

Culture has been defined as the “software” that drives society and determines the success of exporting the hard-ware of western-style, liberal democratic institutions. I think the Manichean division of culture on the one hand and institutions and styles of governance on the other hand tends to be less useful the more modernisation affects the various systems. I propose to answer the question “does culture matters?” by an analysis of three determining factors:

There are overarching factors of “political cultures” in various regimes, common to most of the actors within the system.

The modernisation process tends to divide concepts of the most accepted form of political culture along ideological lines.

There is increasingly a uniform pattern of western-style, liberal democratic institutions developing in Europe – including the Mediterranean countries.

1) The venerable truisms of Almond/Verba’s “Civic Culture” underwent a process of uniformisation in Europe. Parochialism may persist in the marginalised areas of the respective “Mezzogiorni”. New parochialism may even bud in the developed parts of such countries, as in the Bask area in Spain or with the Lega Lombarda in the Italian North. But the average political culture in most European countries is more streamlined than 40 years ago when Germany was found to stick to a rather apolitical semi-authoritarian political culture, with legalism in the attitudes as the only virtue of the citizens, or Italian political culture was said to suffer from parochialism and uncivic attitudes.

This happened because the basic insight from Almond and Verba was true, e.g. that political cultures are learned. The process of European cooperation and communication has unified the patterns of political attitudes and behavior unthinkable 40 years ago. According to the Eurobarometer Italy had most of the identifiers with Europe (30%), which was above the level of a small country such as Luxemburg, benefiting most from the process of Europeanisation. The strongest identification with the national state was found in marginal areas, such as Finland (78%) and Greece (74%). Both options were mainly strong because regional parochialism had little political outlet in the institutions of the countries. Predominant identification with regional subunits were strongest, where the institutions offered the deepest possibilities for political participation and federalism: Spain (38%), Belgium (32%), and Germany (27%). These findings of the Eurobarometers did not exclude: that countries showing a rather traditional pattern of national pride in a high degree were ready to accept a European citizenship (Greece: 61%), whereas federalist countries such as Belgium, Germany and Spain were below average in this respect, that countries with little acceptance of European citizenship were below average in xenophobic attitudes, expressed by the answer to the question: "Are there are too many foreigners living in the country?" (Germany: 40%, Spain: 27%). The intervening variable of the percentage of foreigners living in the respective countries does not explain the variance. In countries with so far comparatively few foreigners, Greece proved to be most reluctant to accept more migration (64%). Portugal (30%) and Ireland (8%), however, have expressed more tolerance in this respect than countries with bigger shares of foreigners (Belgium: 57%, France: 55%, UK: 42%, Germany 40%). On the whole concerning problems of national identity the differences among European nations are the biggest, by far more than concerning the acceptance of the democratic process and liberal institutions.

2) The concepts of the desired political culture and patterns of participation the European nations were deeply divided since the French revolution. France and Spain have most frequently invoked the "two countries" and opposed the "pays réel" to the "pays légal". Countries with older traditions of religious cleavages, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and



even Germany, preserved under conditions of democracy patterns of consociationalism. The pillars of society do not agree on “one culture”, but they accept formal rules for mitigating conflicts, most frequently handled by elites. Class cleavages have strengthened the corporatist way of compromise-finding even in religiously homogeneous countries such as Sweden and Austria. Some of these systems - after the erosion of the “Social democratic consensus” of the 1970s and 1980s – developed new models for their neighbours in organizing step by step the withdrawal from a welfare state which became unpayable. They managed to do so by consensus of the major political camps and interest groups organisations, such as Sweden and the Netherlands. This was possible only by a process of deideologisation. But this did not mean that the camps have withered away and that only Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee parties dominate the political arena. This process did, however, develop a kind of middle road between a “unified culture”, in clash with surrounding cultures, and the national traditions of liberal institutions.

3) The third factor is characterized by a “rapprochement” of the institutions in Europe. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century in most bigger countries ideas of a special road of development were showing their impact - from Spain to Germany and Russia. Only Italy – thanks to its privileged position – too much venerated as the cradle of European culture and too small to create a threat to its neighbours – developed in a remarkably “normal” way according to French and British models. We know, however, that even this did not prevent that Italy went through the longest fascist period among all the European countries. But even about the “normal road” to democracy there was no consensus. The British model was accepted by most of the liberal and conservative ideologies, though not by the Socialists and Communists, but it was hard to imitate. The French model of radical Republicanism seemed to be more acceptable to radicals and socialists. But in the ideological debates from Sweden to Spain there was a debate on what is a “liberal institution” and what is “authentic parliamentarianism” - the French or the British model?. Some of these debates have smoothed down to quarrels of ideologues and constitution-makers about the French semi-presidential system – which had many followers in the Italian debates – and the “normal” par-

liamentary system. The British model is, however, no longer unique. New un-British elements such as judicial review, ombudsmen, federalism and institutions of corporatism have upgraded other parliamentary models, such as the German example. Sometimes even achievements, with rather detrimental psychological results in the executive-legislative relations, such as the “constructive vote of non-confidence,” have been borrowed from Germany, as in Belgium, Spain or Hungary.

The debate on a European Constitution – which should not be promoted by Germans, because it will arouse suspicion – will carry on uniformisation. Countries such as Sweden or Britain even below the level of the Constitution have to ponder over the introduction of a Constitutional Court in order to meet the challenges of the uniformisation of law, emanating from the European Court. Even if no Constitution will be accepted in the foreseeable future the European bill of rights will further streamline political institutions and political cultures. The institutions on the one hand are shaped by the underlying cultures, on the other hand they are no passive victims of clashes of civilization. The states influence their cultures by education, migration policies and cultural policies. In many respects the diversity of cultures is diminishing by deliberate action of states. The European citizenship on the one hand has abolished remainders of the “jus sanguine”, on the other hand the European states had to agree on common criteria for “Schengen country”. The Republicanism of the French tradition is no longer sufficient to integrate the minorities as it was two generations ago, though the dominant immigrants – contrary to the Turks who dominate in Germany – have a fair command of the country’s language. New measures of intolerance began to spread. Oddly enough in the questions of the traditional Islamic symbols German schools and bureaucrats were more tolerant than there French neighbours.

The legal system was the first equalizer in history, the national state was added and considered all the citizens equal in one cultural and national respect. This led to the acceptance of political rights for all compatriots in a democratic state. But the underprivileged classes discovered that this did not change their social situation. The welfare state had to be added. The legal state equalizes even non-citizens, and the welfare state does the same

to the level of the subsistence minimum. Only in the national citizen rights and in the democratic rights exclusion of non-citizens prevails, but is progressively diminished by new European law.

The cultural policies which shape the respective political cultures are so far the element which remains most diverse. There are centralized traditions such as France and Italy and federalized traditions such as in Germany. These organisational variances do not explain the performance in terms of expenses for cultural policy. France and the Netherlands are on top, but Germany is closely behind them. Only systems, such as Britain, which had more reluctance to accept cultural policy as an arena for state activities, lag behind. National cultural traditions still determine which country promotes what kind of culture. France and Italy emphasize film, Germany – in international comparison – is almost absent, but does more for literature, libraries and theater. In spite of all these differences there is an increasing common emphasis on social grass roots culture and the promotion of tolerance in multicultural societies. Thus, in the long run, even diversity in the institutional background and predominant areas of cultural promotion, uniformity will increase. Common social challenges provoke functional equivalents in the policy-answers – despite remaining diversity of cultural values and institutions of cultural and educational policies.

### *Conclusion*

The clash of civilisation is no unchangeable fate. The interaction of institutions, political cultures and the uniformisation of ideologies progresses even in the Northern tier of the Mediterranean. The southern tier is still different, but will certainly be affected by the developments – not only because so many non-European countries aim at the integration into the European Community. Culture matters, but Europe has shown that in the long run of political modernisation institutions are more than an “intervening variable”.



Mohammed Arkoun

## Penser l'Espace Méditerranéen

*“ Marx n'a cessé de se débattre avec un dispositif théorique dont il ne franchit les frontières que pour les reconduire plus loin, sans jamais les supprimer ”. (Henri Maler, L'utopie avec Marx).*

*“ My personal conviction is that shying away from engaging in intellectual battle about the paradigms of development results not in more “friendly acceptance” of applied anthropological or sociological work, but in less. By now, you have heard my answer about strategy in conceptual clashes on the battlefields of knowledge. We must assert our conceptual differences, because they make a difference. We must take firm positions without posturing, must be earnest without an offensively earnest tone, and must be opinionated while being free of fixed opinions. For applied social scientists, quibbling only for improving practical fixes is never enough. Winning requires intellectual wrestling and theoretical engagement ”. (Michael M. Cernea, Social organisation and Development Anthropology. 1995 Malinowski Award Lecture).*

*“ Avec l'islam, c'est un nouveau monde qui s'introduit sur les rivages méditerranéens. Une déchirure se fait qui durera jusqu'à nos jours ”. (henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne, Paris 1970, p. 111)*

### Argument

Faut-il, au nom d'un réalisme historique impliquant une philosophie de l'histoire qui resterait à valider, considérer que tout essai d'exploration ou de réactivation de la question du sens si constamment présente dans l'espace méditerranéen, est nécessairement voué à sombrer dans les rêveries spiritualistes, les spéculations idéalistes, les évocations nostalgiques; ou peut-on, malgré la marche triomphante d'une mondialisation sans projet humaniste, identifier dans l'histoire méditerranéenne de la pensée et des cultures, des postures de la raison, des visées de l'esprit, des œuvres de l'imagination créatrice, des témoignages de prophètes, de saints, de penseurs, d'artistes, de héros civilisateurs qui pourraient féconder, éclairer, inspirer, assurer un supplément d'âme aux nouvelles luttes d'émancipation de la condition humaine telles qu'elles se dessinent pour nous en cette veille du 21<sup>e</sup> siècle?

## GENESEE D'UNE PENSEE

Il y a longtemps que je me pose cette question fondamentale et que j'essaye d'y répondre non pas tant à partir d'une littérature pléthorique au sujet des rapports, encore fragiles, entre l'Union européenne et les Etats (très peu ou pas du tout les peuples) de l'aire méditerranéenne, mais en me fondant sur mes liens personnels, mes solidarités historiques avec l'ensemble des cultures méditerranéennes des deux rives. Car, comme Jacques Berque, je n'ai jamais opposé l'une de ces rives à l'autre au nom d'une appartenance religieuse ou nationale. J'ai toujours distingué la légitimité du combat contre les dérives colonialistes, racistes, fascistes d'une certaine Europe et ma solidarité intellectuelle avec les avancées de la culture humaniste en contextes islamiques comme en contextes chrétiens et européens laïcs. Il est essentiel de marquer fortement l'existence d'acteurs historiques qui pensent et agissent dans cette perspective de remembrement historique du destin des deux rives effectivement rivales, séparées, déchirées, travaillées par des contentieux, des ressentiments depuis que le fait islamique et la civilisation d'expression arabe ont substitué pour un temps leur présence hégémonique à celles de la civilisation gréco-romaine et du christianisme.

Le texte qu'on va lire est le résultat de révisions, de réécritures successives après chaque conférence donnée dans divers hauts lieux de culture et d'histoire en Europe et dans le monde arabo-turco-iranien. J'apporte la dernière retouche après le colloque organisé à Bonn en Juin 2001 par deux instituts de recherche nouvellement créés (le ZEI et le ZEF) sur le thème *Does Culture matter? Politics and Governance in the Mediterranean Region*. Que l'Allemagne s'intéresse de la sorte au monde méditerranéen est un signe encourageant pour l'œuvre de remembrement historique d'un espace de culture et de pensée humanistes, de civilisation euro-méditerranéen. Les organisateurs du colloque de Bonn ont choisi d'orienter les contributions vers l'examen d'une question venue des Etats Unis : après son fameux article reçu par beaucoup comme une annonce prophétique, S. Huntington a édité avec son collègue ??? un livre où divers spécialistes s'interrogent sur les rapports de cause à effet entre formes et niveaux de culture et développement civilisationnel. Nous sommes toujours dans la problématique du

clash des civilisations, mais avec une focalisation plus insistante sur les cultures comme facteur d'accélération, de ralentissement ou d'échec dans les processus de développement. La question ainsi posée est délicate ; un mot, une expression peuvent faire basculer le propos dans le culturalisme, le mentalisme, voire le racisme. Outre ce risque, je ferai deux remarques préliminaires au sujet de la question *does culture matter* ?

Venant de chercheurs américains, on peut se réjouir à l'idée que la culture soit promue au premier rang des préoccupations intellectuelles et scientifiques dans un pays où la pensée jetable, les objets culturels confondus avec les produits les plus ordinaires suscités et exploités par le marché connaissent une irrésistible expansion mondiale. La vieille Europe chargée d'expériences historiques irremplaçables n'a plus que des îlots de résistance à la marchandisation de la pensée et de la culture. Quant aux cultures marginalisées du monde méditerranéen, elles se sont effondrées plus vite que les cultures paysannes, montagnardes, urbaines en Europe, parce qu'elles ont subi les effets dévastateurs conjugués de facteurs internes de régression et de stagnation, d'agressions externes d'une modernité médiatisée par l'idéologie colonialiste.

La seconde remarque bien mise en évidence au colloque de Bonn est l'absence totale d'intérêt au cas des cultures non européennes (occidentales) pour inaugurer une recherche vraiment neuve sur une typologie des formations culturelles où les cultures européennes ne seraient qu'un exemple parmi d'autres. Or les cultures ainsi renvoyées à des examens ultérieurs séparés sont celles que les politologues présentent comme dangereuses pour les « valeurs » de l'Occident. Cette thèse sous-jacente à la question initiale *does culture matter* ? n'est guère prise en charge dans le livre cité malgré les interminables discussions alimentées par l'intervention fracassante – parce que d'essence idéologique – de S. Huntington. Il y a démission intellectuelle très nette d'une pensée qui, géopolitiquement, exerce néanmoins une hégémonie sans partage et ouvertement affirmée. De quelle partie de la planète pourrait surgir une pensée gratuite et porteuse d'histoire – je veux dire libérée des solidarités évidentes soit avec les puissances hégémoniques, soit avec les idéologies de combat contre cette hégémonie – capable de radicaliser la question de la culture comme un facteur détermi-

nant ou comme simple produit pour le marché dans la phase actuelle de la mondialisation?

Penser l'espace méditerranéen est une ambition qui prend en charge les démissions, les omissions, les faiblesses, les rejets conscients ou implicites aussi bien de la recherche scientifique que des systèmes de transmission des savoirs et des stratégies géopolitiques et économiques qui continuent de prévaloir dans les rencontres euro-médi-terranéennes depuis Barcelone en 1995. Les ouvertures, les programmes, la vision d'ensemble et les réflexions critiques que je vais proposer sont particulièrement destinés à l'attention des jeunes générations des deux rives. Ce n'est pas seulement la place de l'islam et de son histoire qui fait problème aujourd'hui, comme déjà lors de sa première émergence en 610-632/732; depuis l'expulsion des juifs et des musulmans d'Espagne en 1492, l'Europe, puis l'A -mérique après 1945, ne cessent de secondariser les peuples méditerranéens, d'enfermer les sociétés converties à l'islam dans un monde « oriental » diffus, tandis que sont célébrées les valeurs intellectuelles, spirituelles, éthiques, humanistes de l'Europe chrétienne et gréco-romaine. Le judaïsme lui-même a été longtemps marginalisé et noirci jusqu'à la « solution finale » avec sa suite tragique en Proche-Orient! Curieusement, les civilisations plus anciennes de l'Egypte pharaonique, de la Mésopotamie, de l'antiquité tardive ont trouvé un meilleur accueil à partir du 18<sup>e</sup>-19<sup>e</sup> siècle, tandis que les langues et cultures berbères, coptes, kurdes, araméennes... ont connu le sort des résidus « populaires » ou populistes. Les jeunes générations des deux rives continuent de recevoir un enseignement de l'histoire qui perpétue les stigmates, les définitions idéologiques, les ignorances fortement institutionnalisées et même sacralisées dans les trois traditions monothéistes relayées par les Etats-nations unificateurs en pleines « Lumières » modernes! Il y a encore de l'hagiographie dans bien des manuels d'histoire en usage dans plusieurs pays du monde méditerranéen.

Le contexte intellectuel et politique français est une autre raison importante qui m'a incité à repenser l'espace méditerranéen dans les perspectives que je vais ouvrir. On connaît la rigidité idéologique du débat en France sur laïcité et religion; les calculs électoralistes continuent à raviver le contentieux mal géré entre cléricaux et anticléricaux. L'implantation d'une forte mino-



rité de musulmans en France depuis les années 1960, a introduit un nouvel acteur qui tend à renforcer la tendance cléricale du fait des retards considérables dans toutes les expressions contemporaines de la pensée islamique. Les républicains seraient mieux fondés à se méfier d'un renforcement politique des communautarismes confessionnels qui compromettraient deux siècles de combat pour la construction d'un espace républicain de la citoyenneté, si en même temps, ils mettaient en place une politique éducative moderne de gestion scientifique du fait religieux. On peut mieux prévenir les dérives politiques des formes fondamentalistes des religions en favorisant la créativité intellectuelle et culturelle d'inspiration religieuse. J'ai montré qu'une culture humaniste très féconde a pu s'épanouir en Iran-Irak bûyide du 4<sup>e</sup>/10<sup>e</sup> siècle grâce à la conjonction d'une politique tolérante et d'une classe sociale favorable au pluralisme doctrinal; j'ai analysé aussi les raisons et les conséquences de la disparition progressive de cet humanisme dans les contextes islamiques depuis le 13<sup>e</sup> siècle<sup>1</sup>. Pour éviter de me répéter, j'ai choisi d'approfondir ici un thème historique englobant à la fois l'histoire de la pensée, l'histoire générale des sociétés et les fonctions du religieux dans l'aire méditerranéenne. Malgré les orientations pluridisciplinaires de la nouvelle histoire, l'histoire de la pensée connaît partout plusieurs fragmentations: il y a l'histoire de la philosophie, de la théologie, du droit, des religions, de la littérature, des arts; ces divisions se retrouvent dans le domaine arabo-turco-irano-islamique classé dans l'orientalisme. On force une vision générale de la connaissance et une pratique de l'activité cognitive propre à l'islam classique à entrer dans des divisions et une périodisation qui reflètent le parcours historique de l'Europe depuis le 16<sup>e</sup> siècle. Dans son *Penser au Moyen Age*, Alain de Libéra a beaucoup aidé à dévoiler l'arbitraire de ce regard sur un espace continu de la pensée qui s'étend à celui que j'appelle l'espace méditerranéen. Ces rectifications devraient avoir des conséquences non seulement sur les frontières tracées à l'intérieur de l'histoire européenne entre Haut et Bas Moyen Age, Réforme et Renaissance, Temps modernes et contemporains, mais également sur le rétablissement d'une pensée qui s'intéresse aux liens, aux interactions entre

<sup>1</sup> Voir bibliographie complète dans M. Arkoun, *The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought*, London 2001.

philosophie, théologie, droit, lecture des textes fondateurs, connaissance mythique, connaissance historique, institution sociale de l'esprit, etc. En d'autres termes, le regard d'un Moyen Age remémbré sur l'homme, l'esprit, la con -naissance, l'histoire, le monde... donne à penser à notre modernité. Il en découlerait un autre statut et d'autres fonctions de la culture, d'autres voies et horizons de créativité pour l'esprit.

Ainsi, je ne connais pas d'études sur la sociologie de l'échec de la philosophie du côté musulman après la mort d'Ibn Rushd et de son succès en Europe chrétienne dans la même période ; plus généralement, quelles corrélations peut-on établir entre les devenirs des champs intellectuel, religieux et politique sur les deux rives durant le long affrontement entre l'Europe montante et l'Empire ottoman qui a tenté sans succès de contenir cette montée au moins dans l'aire méditerranéenne ? Cette approche permettrait de sortir des représentations qui structurent encore les imaginaires respectifs de ces puissantes entités mytho-idéologiques nommées couramment « l'Occident » et « l'Orient » avec la variante « l'Occident » et « l'Islam » ou la métonymie politologique *Jihâd versus McWorld*<sup>2</sup>. La déconstruction de ces deux polarisations d'essence idéologique et de facture fantasmatique, est d'autant plus urgente qu'elles continuent d'inspirer la production politologique la plus influente, surtout lorsqu'elles s'abritent sous les thématiques du dialogue inter-religieux, des quêtes d'identités ou, comme à Bonn, d'une interrogation à visée réflexive sur le rôle de la culture dans la production de l'histoire des sociétés. Que la culture soit un facteur déterminant est une évidence pour tous ; mais les signes positifs ou négatifs qui affectent les valeurs et les effets concrets de chaque culture dépendent des liens tissés entre les divers champs de l'activité cognitive pour appréhender la réalité dans sa complexité. L'exemple de la culture arabe montre les dangers qu'il y a à séparer la culture littéraire notamment poétique destinée à transmuier une rude existence en émois esthétiques, de la culture intellectuelle critique qui ouvre des horizons de sens et dévoile les travestissements de la réalité. La culture indépendante du marché ne peut contribuer pleinement et de façon continue à l'émancipation de la

<sup>2</sup> Titre d'un livre de Benjamin R. Barber, New York 1995, que j'ai analysé dans *L'islam actuel devant sa Tradition et la mondialisation*, in *Islam et Changement social*, édité par M. Kilani, Lausanne 1998.

condition humaine que si elle est accompagnée dans toutes ses créations par une relation critique que je définis par trois verbes à l'infinitif : Transgresser, déplacer, dépasser<sup>3</sup>. Ni la théorie du clash des civilisations, ni le livre sur la culture qui cherche à lui donner une assise épistémologique plus défendable, ni la problématique du colloque de Bonn et de bien d'autres n'intègrent les préoccupations radicalisantes de l'épistémologie programmatique annoncée dans ces trois verbes. L'épistémologie programmatique articule ses interrogations critiques au fur et à mesure que se déploie un programme de recherche; elle oblige à surveiller l'usage de chaque concept non seulement au niveau de chaque unité textuelle au cours de l'écriture, mais au niveau plus décisif encore du système de postulats implicites qui commandent les effets de sens et l'interprétation finale de l'objet d'étude. J'ai montré à propos du discours historique de mon maître Claude Cahen, comment se construit à l'insu de l'auteur le plus vigilant, une représentation réductrice du passé quand l'interrogation épistémologique n'accompagne pas chaque moment de l'écriture, sachant que celle-ci comme tout discours oral, est un procès de programmation soit de vérités plausibles, soit d'une nouvelle mythologie surimposée aux mythologies héritées dans chaque tradition de pensée et de culture. Comme on le voit, l'épistémologie programmatique ne se contente pas de prendre en charge les usages du concept et les systèmes de pensée dans les textes déjà écrits ou les discours prononcés; elle s'applique au processus même d'articulation du sens pour y intégrer par anticipation les interrogations propres à la critique de la réception. L'acte de penser un domaine complexe de la réalité comme le fait religieux, ou l'espace méditerranéen, ou la construction de la norme juridique est nécessairement programmatique dans le sens régressif vers le passé et le sens progressif vers le futur. C'est pourquoi il illustre en se déployant les exigences de l'épistémologie programmatique. Mais cet exercice auquel je me livre depuis la rédaction de ma thèse sur *L'humanisme arabe au 4<sup>e</sup>/10<sup>e</sup> siècle* dans les années 1960, est pour moi indissociable de l'écriture de tout chercheur en sciences de l'homme et de la société, ce que j'exprime en parlant de cher -cheur-

<sup>3</sup> On trouvera le commentaire de ces trois verbes au chapitre 2.

penseur, non de penseur-chercheur qui concernerait plutôt le théologien ou le philosophe classique.

La pratique d'une épistémologie programmatique ainsi définie ne s'est pas imposée à moi à partir de l'épistémologie spéculative de la philosophie classique, ou de cette relation critique spontanée que nous exerçons à l'égard de toute proposition de vérité. C'est l'analyse linguistique et sémiotique du discours qui m'a permis d'explicitier cette vérité psycho-socio-linguistique que toute articulation du sens est un acte de solidarité historique. Dans tout énoncé, j'exprime un implicite vécu à mon insu, c'est-à-dire hors de toute emprise critique de la raison, tant que j'ignore les techniques de déconstruction des mécanismes profonds et des procédés normatifs (grammaire, rhétorique, stylistique...) d'articulation de ce qu'on appelle improprement le sens, alors qu'après l'analyse on parlera plutôt d'effets de sens non seulement pour les destinataires multiples, mais pour moi-même non encore devenu l'objet de ma propre analyse. Je ne suis pas psychanalyste et je ne me suis jamais soumis à une analyse autre que celle que j'ai appris à pratiquer sur les textes et notamment ces textes majeurs que sont la Bible, les Evangiles et le Coran. J'ai publié un fragment d'autobiographie où j'explique la genèse d'un discours, d'une écriture à partir d'une situation vécue dans une hiérarchie sociale codée exprimée grossièrement en sociologie courante par la relation dominants/ dominés. Pour simplifier à l'extrême, je dirai que mon regard sur l'espace méditerranéen et l'écriture qui le traduit sont ceux d'un kabyle né à Taourirt-Mimoun socialisé dans l'Algérie coloniale, puis dans la société française, soumis aux tensions éducatives qu'impose la pratique constante de trois cultures dans leurs langues respectives : la culture orale kabyle (on dit de plus en plus amazigh), les deux cultures savantes arabe et française auxquelles est venue s'ajouter plus tardivement la culture anglo-américaine. L'idée d'une épistémologie programmatique grandit dans le passage obligé du registre oral prémoderne de la pensée au registre moderne et même métamoderne de la connaissance critique qui refuse d'abandonner aux usages résiduels deux langues historiquement décalées, mais toujours vivantes de l'espace méditerranéen.

Cette digression théorique permet de déplacer la question *does culture matter?* de ses préoccupations politologiques et de sa visée fonctionnaliste à

partir du haut magistère de l'Université de Harvard, vers l'anthropologie comme critique des cultures, toutes les cultures et en premier lieu, celle qui s'autorise à s'interroger sur le statut cognitif et les fonctions nécessaires ou seulement instrumentales et utilitaires de la culture. Je ne puis pousser plus loin ici ces mises au point méthodologiques et épistémologiques. Je signalerai, cependant, à titre d'exemple éclairant, que l'anthropologie comme critique des cultures s'oblige à rompre avec tous les discours de victimisation des dominés face aux dominants pour ne pas idéologiser l'analyse critique ; elle conquiert ainsi l'autorité nécessaire pour soumettre la culture dominante aux questions de l'épistémologie programmatique rejetées le plus souvent avec dédain par l'establishment académique qui distribue les homologations intellectuelles, scientifiques et culturelles de toute production de l'esprit. Ainsi, il serait facile de montrer comment une certaine production historiographique et politologique de l'après-guerre froide largement médiatisée en « Occident », construit des Figures de l'ennemi, de l'actant dévoyé et menaçant de l'histoire pour combler le vide laissé par la menace communiste dans le fonctionnement mythologique nécessaire à tout imaginaire collectif. Le succès mondial d'un simple article de S. Huntington en 1993 atteste la portée anthropologique d'une pratique des cultures même en situation d'hégémonie pour créer des faire-valoir apologétiques ou des héros négatifs servant de cibles à toutes les formes de la « guerre juste ». Cette expression qui remonte à Saint Augustin, travaillée par le Coran sous le nom de *jihâd*, a été utilisée spontanément, sans concertation préalable, par G. Bush et F. Mitterrand pour légitimer la guerre du Golfe. Saddam Hussein de son côté, avait mobilisé l'imaginaire de ses troupes en parlant de la « *mère des batailles* » au nom d'une cause juste, autre façon de parler du *jihâd* dans la culture musulmane. Nous saisissons là le socle sémantique et sémiotique profond de l'imaginaire commun à toutes les cultures méditerranéennes enracinées par les trois théologies monothéistes médiévales dans un grand récit de fondation commun. Loin d'avoir aboli ce récit par une pratique sémiotique radicalement différente, le nouveau récit de fondation institué par la raison moderne n'a en fait changé que l'outillage technologique de l'investigation scientifique. La confiance eschatologique dans le Salut éternel a été remplacée par

l'espérance fragile, mais technologiquement fondée de l'allongement de l'espérance de vie.

Revenons à l'espace méditerranéen. On commencera par identifier les multiples obstacles qu'il importe de lever pour assigner à la recherche de nouvelles contributions à l'épistémologie programmatique, offrir aux systèmes éducatifs des questionnements critiques plus exigeants et des introductions plus ouvertes à la pratique de interculturalité et de l'intercréativité, créer les conditions irréversibles d'un renversement des rapports entre la priorité de fait donnée à la culture technologique indissociable des volontés de puissance et la primauté de droit d'une culture humaniste vouée à la construction d'un sujet humain capable d'exercer toutes les responsabilités – qui restent à définir par cette culture – d'une gouvernance à l'échelle mondiale.

## IDENTIFIER LES OBSTACLES

Nostalgies poético-culturelles, thématiques politico-religieuses, rêveries romantiques d'Andalousies perdues (la *pax romana*, le miracle grec, l'Andalousie musulmane), joie de vivre de touristes nantis, avides de mer, de soleil et de senteurs introuvables dans les régions riches, mais brumeuses du Nord, stratégies politiques de domination contrastant avec les quêtes obstinées d'un sens et de valeurs toujours revisités : l'espace méditerranéen ne cesse de nourrir tout cela à la fois. Et pourtant, il est inexorablement minorisé, marginalisé, satellisé en tant que référent historique obligé de tous les peuples, tous les états-nations qui constituent l'Europe et ses expansions dans les Amériques, en Australie, en Nouvelle Zélande, en Afrique du Sud blanche. Il est vrai que des mémoires collectives nombreuses se sont construites au sein de l'espace global nommé l'Europe ou l'Occident ; mais on s'autorise aujourd'hui à parler d'une « Communauté » occidentale fondée sur les valeurs partagées de démocratie et de droits de l'homme. Plusieurs peuples de l'espace méditerranéen sont restés en dehors de ce parcours historique récent, vécu en Europe-Occident comme une rupture saine, irréversible avec les sources et lieux de mémoires que le judéo-christianisme, lui-même construit dans la foulée de la modernité, continue de situer dans cet Orient dit Proche bien que, dans les imaginaires politiques actuels, il soit

aussi extrême que la Chine ou l'Indonésie. Même le miracle grec et le droit romain si longtemps et fièrement invoqués pour construire l'identité européenne subissent une éclipse dans la nouvelle culture où l'identité européenne se dilue dans un Occident de plus en plus façonné par la culture de McWorld. Des siècles d'histoire intellectuelle et spirituelle du monde méditerranéen sont rendus obsolètes non seulement par la puissance civilisation technologique, mais par la crise du statut même de la personne humaine et de sa dignité. Les spéculations de la philosophie libérale américaine sur l'idée de justice, ou la culture des sociétés dites pluralistes, les appels de Jean-Paul II à la rechristianisation du monde, les efforts de médiation intellectuelle pour une pratique interactive de la recherche philosophique et de la recherche théologique divorcées dans les conditions d'exclusion réciproques générées par les guerres de religion en Europe, apparaissent dérisoires au regard de la dynamique historique que l'alliance Europe-Occident prétend gérer avec responsabilité. Je laisse aux grands gestionnaires intellectuels, religieux, politiques de cette dynamique le soin d'évaluer les types et la portée des responsabilités qu'ils assument pour la condition humaine, au-delà des nations, des communautés dont ils sont les serviteurs attirés. On ne discerne ni programme mobilisateur, ni volonté politique efficace pour prendre en charge cette évidence historique : aux finalités religieuses et/ou philosophiques assignées jusqu'ici au développement historique de l'homme et des sociétés en contexte historique méditerranéen, s'oppose désormais une mondialisation vécue comme un destin sans finalité clairement définie et dûment intériorisée. L'évidence ainsi énoncée demande des éclaircissements.

Le contexte historique méditerranéen n'a aucun monopole ni dans l'invention, ni dans la gestion des finalités assignées à la destinée de l'homme ; ces finalités sont soumises à la même contingence historique qui condamne toutes les productions culturelles des hommes en société à des évolutions ou à des disparitions. Cependant, cette contingence radicale est travestie, en tout cas domestiquée précisément par les religions monothéistes et la métaphysique classique instaurée par les puissantes traditions platonicienne et aristotélicienne. Les idées de création divine et d'éternité du monde, de Parole de Dieu révélée et d'Intellect agent illuminant la raison

dans ses activités discursives ont dominé pendant des siècles ce que les philosophes et les sociologues appellent aujourd'hui l'institution sociale-historique de l'esprit humain lui-même. Nous savons que cette lecture « matérialiste » - pas du tout au sens marxiste – de l'esprit est loin d'être partagée dans ce que j'appellerai la logosphère occidentale contemporaine. Voyez les usages politico-religieux que les croyants de toutes appartenances font du retour de la religion ou même du Livre, la prolifération des sectes dans les sociétés les plus « rationalisées », la réactivation par des « Eglises » concurrentes comme au Moyen Age, des problématiques de la foi et de la raison, des valeurs spirituelles et du matérialisme athée, etc. La pointe moderne et la culture médiatrice qui permettent de gonfler toutes sortes de discours interprétatifs dans l'Occident privé de finalités spirituelles et éthiques, demeurent celles fournies par Max Weber abondamment citée par tous les chercheurs et penseurs en quête de scientificité sur des problèmes plus embrouillés que jamais.

Quel rôle jouent l'islam et le judaïsme dans cette gestion du destin de la condition humaine monopolisée par la logosphère occidentale ? En tant que forces de soulèvement historique dans l'espace méditerranéen, l'islam et le judaïsme ont une prééminence que je n'ai pas besoin d'explicitier ici. Je m'en tiendrai aux précisions suivantes.

Malgré son antériorité chronologique dans la conceptualisation de la thématique fondatrice, commune aux trois religions monothéistes (Dieu unique, vivant, acteur de l'histoire du Salut des hommes créatures, fonction médiatrice des prophètes et du discours prophétique qui articule la Parole révélée de Dieu ; Loi divine fixant les normes et les voies éthiques, spirituelles, juridiques qui orientent le parcours terrestre vers la Vie éternelle) ; malgré tout cela qui demeure incontestable, le judaïsme est resté sous le régime de la « protection » (*ahl al-dhimma*) en contextes islamiques jusqu'à la création de l'Etat d'Israël ; il n'a été émancipé du contrôle politique et théologique du christianisme qu'après les révolutions modernes. Il n'a connu ni les expansions conquérantes à travers le monde, ni les tensions entre les formations étatiques et l'instance de l'autorité religieuse qui ont conditionné le devenir de l'islam et du christianisme. La singularité historique et sociologique du judaïsme en tant que religion –je veux dire une voie



parmi d'autres de l'expérience humaine divin à travers toutes les contraintes du déploiement social-historique de l'existence humaine – a pris fin avec la création de l'Etat d'Israël. Des penseurs juifs ont ressenti cette rupture et tenté de penser ses conséquences : à savoir l'indépendance trop cher payée de l'instance religieuse par rapport à l'instance politique, ou la nécessité d'instrumentaliser la religion pour conquérir une souveraineté politique sur un territoire porteur de tous les récits fondateurs, de toutes les symboliques religieuses de ce socle commun de la conscience monothéiste évoquée ci-dessus.

Je dois évoquer un autre exemple riche d'enseignements pour l'analyse de la singularité reconnue au judaïsme dans l'espace géohistorique méditerranéen : il s'agit de la communauté ismaélienne réactivée au 19<sup>e</sup> siècle sous le protectorat britannique en Inde avec un Imamat, c'est-à-dire une guidance spirituelle. Il y a aujourd'hui une diaspora ismaélienne aussi étendue que la diaspora juive ; son credo et ses pratiques rituelles ne comportent aucune référence à une terre promise susceptible d'être revendiquée comme la base territoriale d'un Etat indépendant. La communauté fortement soudée autour d'une instance vivante de l'autorité spirituelle (l'Imam Karim Aga Khan) est en train de dépasser ses particularismes sectaires pour s'insérer avec son identité historique non seulement dans l'islam comme religion, mais dans le monde moderne avec ses défis, ses tâtonnements et ses avancées dans l'émancipation de la condition humaine. On peut dire que la communauté ismaélienne assure à une échelle plus modeste la relève historique de cette singularité perdue par le judaïsme.

Cela n'est évidemment pas le cas de l'islam majoritaire dans ses deux grandes versions sunnite et shî'ite. J'ai souvent utilisé une définition heuristique de cet islam pour le situer dans la problématique centrale et récurrente de toute l'histoire de la théologie et de la philosophie politiques dans l'espace méditerranéen : l'islam est théologiquement protestant et politiquement catholique. J'ai lancé cette définition, je le répète heuristique et non fermée, pour atteindre deux objectifs :

montrer l'indigence intellectuelle de toute l'islamologie classique relayée par la politologie « moderne » qui enseignent que « l'Islam » - avec un I

majuscule renvoyant à l'islam orthodoxe construit par la tradition islamique et transcrit avec « objectivité » par l'islamologie classique – a, dès ses origines, confondu les sphères du religieux et du politique ;

mettre fin à cette fausse singularité en déplaçant toute la question de son cadre théologique orthodoxe transformé en clôture dogmatique encore plus rigide par le fondamentalisme actuel, vers une histoire comparée des systèmes théologico-juridiques monothéistes, utilisée elle-même comme une introduction nécessaire à une anthropologie des rapports dans toutes les cultures – y compris la moderne – entre plusieurs triangles anthropologiques comme religion, société, politique; violence, sacré, vérité ; langue, histoire, pensée, etc.

Je ne reprendrai pas ici un parcours théorique et pluridisciplinaire complexe qu'on trouvera plus détaillé dans mes divers écrits déjà publiés. Pour les différences doctrinales entre islam sunnite et islam shî'ite, je renvoie provisoirement à une étude ancienne que je suis en train d'approfondir sur « Le remembrement de la conscience islamique » in *Critique de la Raison Islamique*. Mon propos est de montrer comment la recherche scientifique elle-même sur les traditions de pensée et de culture dans l'espace méditerranéen, consolide et même ajoute des obstacles épistémologiques à la communication entre les cultures au lieu de créer les conditions d'un dépassement des fausses con-naisances que chaque tradition a accumulées sur elle-même. C'est tout le sens de ma *Critique de la Raison islamique*. Car le travail de libération doit commencer à l'intérieur de chaque tradition qui doit apprendre à intégrer le regard critique de ceux-là mêmes présentés comme des opposants, des ennemis, des hérétiques, des infidèles selon les critères de l'hérésiographie médiévale et de nos idéologies modernes d'autoproclamation et d'autopromotion de soi. Dans les conditions géopolitiques qui s'imposent aujourd'hui dans tout l'espace méditerranéen, on peut seulement tenter de nourrir, comme je le fais dans cet essai, une vision neuve et programmatique de ce que seraient la posture cognitive de l'esprit, l'environnement culturel qui rendraient possible et médiatiseraient l'accomplissement de tant de tâches libératrices. Rêver d'une pensée et d'une culture qui permettraient de dénouer tous les nœuds d'ignorances, de fausses légitimités légués par les passés érigés en consciences croyantes, en

mémoires identitaires qui servent encore de refuges ou de tremplins pour mener des actions terroristes et des guerres d'un autre âge. Si un tel travail d'archéologie des consciences croyantes confrontées depuis le 19<sup>e</sup> siècle aux consciences laïques anticléricales et, pire encore, à la culture de la mort de Dieu pendant le long intermède du communisme athée, nous dispose de plus de références culturelles et doctrinales pour relier les deux noms Israël-Palestine avec un trait d'union qui restituerait la richesse révélatrice et non plus révélée, de l'épopée spirituelle vécue sur cette terre sous la conduite de grandes voix prophétiques. Ce n'est point là un rêve d'idéalistes attardés et de croyants nostalgiques : le travail que j'évoque est commencé et se poursuit avec des chercheurs, des responsables religieux, des intellectuels, des hommes et des femmes de culture qui se rencontrent dans les séminaires d'études inter-religieuses, dans le cadre des chaires de théologie récemment créées par l'UNESCO, dans quelques institutions d'enseignement.

Je suis depuis longtemps les travaux qui ouvrent les voies de l'enquête archéologique sur les consciences croyantes islamiques; les plus significatifs par leur richesse d'information, la rigueur de leurs méthodes sont signés par des islamologues comme J. Wansbrough, J. van Ess, M. Cook, Devin J. Stewart, G. Makdisi, U. Rubin... De jeunes chercheurs « musulmans » commencent à penser des problèmes que l'orthodoxie fixée depuis le 11<sup>e</sup> siècle a maintenus dans l'impensable ; cependant, les nœuds de la croyance dogmatique comme le statut cognitif et l'historicité de la Révélation coranique, la déconstruction du *Mushaf*, l'histoire des Corpus Officiel Clos (le *Mushaf* et les recueils de *hadîth* dans les lignes sunnite, shī'ite, khârijite, la biographie critique de Muhammad, la question des fondements de la Loi religieuse...continuent d'être soit contournés, soit réaffirmés avec cette chaleur de foi qui met fin à toute forme de questionnement. Dans cette même perspective, la production catholique et protestante est évidemment plus abondante, plus variée, plus innovante. Quant aux contributions de la pensée juive, elles restent, à mon avis, trop marquées non pas tant par la timidité intellectuelle devant les impératifs de l'orthodoxie – au sens où je l'utilise – que par le poids constant, en arrière-fond de l'écriture, des conditions historiques, religieuses et philosophiques du passage du judaïsme de

la diaspora au judaïsme de l'Etat d'Israël. Comme pour la pensée islamique telle que je la problématise dans mon *Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought*, je tiens l'enquête archéologique sur les conditions de ce passage pour l'impensé majeur de la pensée juive contemporaine. Les chemins à parcourir pour les trois religions monothéistes sont, on le voit, plus ou moins entamés selon les obstacles différents légués par le passé; il reste que l'accomplissement adéquat ou l'escamotage des tâches si longtemps différées conditionneront la construction d'une culture de paix ou la récurrence des imaginaires d'exclusion réciproque dans l'espace méditerranéen, donc dans le reste du monde.

## **POLITIQUE, CULTURES ET GOUVERNANCE DANS L'ESPACE MEDITERRANEEN A L'HORIZON 2010**

Revenons à l'histoire en cours. L'espace méditerranéen reste conditionné pour son avenir par 4 grandes forces: l'Europe-Occident incarné par les puissances du G7 étendu depuis peu à 8; l'Union européenne qui peut soit renforcer un eurocentrisme hégémonique par l'addition ou la juxtaposition des stratégies géopolitiques propres aux Etats-Nations qui la composent, soit affirmer une vocation humaniste transnationale qui lui permettrait d'orienter la mondialisation dans le sens de solidarités nouvelles entre les peuples réconciliés partout avec leurs Etats; le national-totalitarisme récurrent dans le style de l'ex Yougoslavie, et enfin la prétendue alternative islamique nommée islamisme politique ou fondamentalisme islamique par les deux premiers protagonistes. Examinons brièvement la portée et quelques significations de ces forces.

L'instance du G7 pouvait aider à harmoniser les politiques des pays riches vis-à-vis des pays pauvres non pas tant en effaçant périodiquement des dettes ou en lançant des actions humanitaires pour soulager des malheurs liés à des tragédies programmées, mais en redessinant une nouvelle carte des sphères géopolitiques régionales qui auraient vocation à conduire des expériences de démocratisation et de développement économique en harmonie avec les données historiques et culturelles dans chaque sphère. Le G 7 contribuerait ainsi à l'effacement progressif des frontières nationales lé-

guées par les systèmes coloniaux, aiderait à l'émergence d'identités larges, mieux ancrées dans des parcours historiques communs et des impératifs géographiques et écologiques favorables à des développements durables, mieux intégrés dans les courants de mondialisation. De telles visions auraient aussi donné aux Etats-Unis et à l'Union européenne une occasion de dépasser leurs rivalités qui rappellent celles qui ont longtemps opposé les États-nations européens. Mais l'intervention très discutée de l'OTAN au Kosovo et surtout l'échec de la réunion de Gênes ont bien montré les limites de la « gouvernance » des pays riches violemment contestés par des résistances dont il reste à vérifier si elles sont elles-mêmes porteuses d'une philosophie politique plus fiable pour l'instauration d'une instance mondiale de l'autorité politique. S'il se vérifie que l'engagement au Kosovo n'a été rendu possible que par la nécessité de défendre les valeurs de l'Euroland contre l'extension d'un néofascisme à partir des Balkans, il faudra renoncer à l'utopie d'une intégration à terme de la Méditerranée « musulmane » dans la sphère géopolitique et géohistorique de l'Union européenne. Celle-ci a accueilli sans atermoiements la Grèce de culture et de confession chrétiennes orthodoxes, tandis que la Turquie et le Maroc qui frappent avec insistance à la même porte, demeurent en observation. Assurément, la culture importe (Culture does matter) dans la construction de tout sujet humain; le problème qui se pose dans toutes les sociétés à l'horizon 2020 est d'inaugurer une politique de la culture de transition capable d'assurer le passage des identités culturelles fermées promues par les idéologies nationalistes de combat aux pratiques métamodernes de l'interculturalité déjà présentes dans les « maisons des cultures du monde » à Paris et à Berlin par exemple. C'est l'intercréativité dynamisée par la multiplication des festivals internationaux de la jeunesse qui rendra possible l'émergence d'instances de la gouvernance dans le monde et d'abord dans le cadre très prometteur de la sphère géohistorique euro-méditerranéenne. Je tempère cette vision optimiste pourtant à notre portée, par un constat pessimisme: les inspirateurs des rencontres euro-méditerranéennes depuis Barcelonne, sont davantage préoccupés par l'urgence des problèmes posés par l'immigration et l'idéologie islamiste véhiculée par des militants à l'échelle mondiale, que par les perspectives

d'une politique audacieuse de l'interculturalité qui a, de surcroît, l'avantage d'apporter une réponse de fond à la crise généralisée de la culture civique dans toutes les sociétés contemporaines. J'observe dans tous les pays membres de l'Union européenne que les gouvernements se contentent d'apaiser les revendications des immigrés musulmans en leur offrant des mosquées et la possibilité de se procurer de la viande licite. On respecte ainsi la liberté des cultes garantie par les constitutions ; mais on ne s'interroge pas sur les contenus des sermons et plus généralement le discours social qui circule dans l'espace sacré des mosquées. Les fidèles qui fréquentent les mosquées en Europe comme dans tout le monde musulman ont un besoin vital d'une information moderne non seulement sur leur religions, mais sur les religions présentes dans les sociétés pluralistes européennes. Je crie partout depuis des années que cette information de portée civique et strictement scientifique n'est pas disponible dans des formes et des espaces de communication accessible aux catégories socio-culturelles que constituent les immigrés. Je peux témoigner à partir de mes contacts continus dans toute l'Europe que la question cruciale de l'expression intellectuelle et scientifique de la pensée islamique contemporaine n'est perçue ni comme une réponse politique urgente, ni encore moins comme l'un des fondements les plus solides d'une culture civique à l'échelle mondiale (voir mon *The Unthought déjà cité*).

Gilles Kepel a montré dans son dernier livre<sup>4</sup> que les « menaces » de la prétendue alternative islamique ne correspondent à aucune réalité doctrinale, encore moins militaire ou économique, ni dans la sphère méditerranéenne, ni ailleurs dans le monde. L'épouvantail islamiste a cependant servi à voiler les difficultés que les rencontres euro-arabes n'ont pas reconnues les interventions prioritaires qu'on vient d'évoquer. Les irrédentismes confessionnels, nationalistes, identitaristes se sont multipliés et amplifiés dans l'aire méditerranéennes à la mesure des mémoires collectives à la fois très anciennes et toujours vivaces au sein des *millet*, ces organisations confessionnelles communautaristes léguées par l'Empire ottoman, ou ces groupes mafieux de l'Italie et de la France du sud. On a en Syrie une butte-témoin de cette donnée historique et sociologique majeure : le village de *Ma'lûla*

<sup>4</sup> *Jihad. Expansion et Déclin de l'islamisme*, Paris 2000.

parle encore l'araméen déjà délaissé par les Évangélistes qui ont préféré le grec pour transcrire le message de Jésus de Nazareth, consacrant ainsi la première rupture sémantique et culturelle entre une tradition culturelle « sémitique » avec l'hébreu, l'araméen, le syriaque, l'arabe et une tradition « occidentale » avec le grec et le latin. La deuxième guerre mondiale a considérablement aggravé la dialectique sociale et politique des puissances et des résidus à travers le monde, mais plus dramatiquement encore dans l'aire méditerranéenne. Les puissances, ce sont les majorités religieuses, ethnolinguistiques et culturelles dont on peut suivre la montée dans l'histoire depuis le Moyen Âge : les Empires, le califat, les monarchies, les états-nations. À partir du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, il y a eu le panislamisme, le panarabisme, le Pan-turquisme, le Pan-iranisme diversement utilisés par les mouvements nationalistes ; du côté européen, la victoire des alliés a libéré l'Europe occidentale de la tentation fasciste totalitaire, mais renforcé la puissance idéologique du communisme soviétique qui, avec la politique des nationalités semblable à celle des *millet*, a figé l'évolution interne de plusieurs groupes ethnolinguistiques et religieux constitués en résidus d'une histoire universelle et révolutionnaire dirigée par les grands timoniers rivaux. Ainsi, se sont exacerbées des frustrations et des humiliations séculaires : langues et cultures écrasées, persécutions pour des croyances et coutumes non conformes aux orthodoxies religieuses et/ou idéologiques officielles, tensions réprimées entre « élites » dominantes, riches et « cultivées » des villes et masses paysannes, montagnardes ou pastorales « incultes » des périphéries et des provinces éloignées des centres. Les oppositions nord/sud avec leurs polarisations idéologiques se retrouvent dans tout le pourtour de la Méditerranée.

Comment sont gérés les irrédentismes légués par le passé et ceux que génèrent encore les états-partis post-coloniaux ? Enumérons les irrédentismes juif/musulman/chrétien ; juifs/arabes ; berbère/arabe ; kurde/turc/arabe/iranien ; serbe orthodoxe/bosnien et albanais musulman ; arménien/russe/arabe/turc ; grec orthodoxe/turc musulman ; coptes/musulmans ; basques, corses, îles italiennes/métropoles. On peut ajouter les oppositions d'essence idéologique, non moins virulentes et difficiles à dépasser entre les états-nations arabes eux-mêmes après les grands élans romantiques vers

la Nation Arabe Unie du Ba‘th et de Nasser jusqu’à la grande désillusion de 1967, suivie par celle de la guerre du Golfe; entre la Grèce et la Turquie et Chypre toujours divisée; la Syrie et l’Irak ; la Syrie et le Liban ; l’Irak et l’Iran ; l’Egypte et le Soudan ; la Libye contre tous ; l’Algérie contre le Maroc...La longévité politique des chefs historiques ou dynastiques dans les payas arabes a favorisé la formation de groupes de pressions, de mafias politico-financières, d’enclaves socio-économiques dans des sociétés où le chômage, la marginalisation, les idéologies populistes constituent autant d’obstacles à des politiques d’émancipation et surtout d’intégration dans des ensembles euro-méditerranéens plus libérateurs. Je rappelle les dates suivantes : Hussein de Jordanie :1954-1999 ; Hassan II : 1961-1999 ; Kadhafi 1969— ; Arafat 1967— ; Asad 1979-2000 ; Saddam Hussein 1978 — ; Tunisie : deux présidents depuis 1956; Egypte trois depuis 1951. Il faut notamment poser la question du poids politique d’une démocratie arithmétique manipulée par des alliances fondées sur des solidarités néopatriarcales.

Devant ces faits massifs qui relèvent de l’anthropologie culturelle, sociale et politique, de l’histoire générale, de l’économie et de la géopolitique, que disent, que font les chercheurs, les penseurs, les intellectuels, les responsables politiques, les grands acteurs économiques, les hautes instances religieuses de chaque société civile là où elle peut s’organiser et s’exprimer pleinement? Quels leaders ont pesé le plus lourdement sur la manipulation des mémoires collectives, l’orientation du destin historique de chaque peuple en intégrant ou rejetant les dimensions d’une civilisation méditerranéenne? Et comment faire aujourd’hui, devant les obstacles anciens et nouveaux qu’on vient d’évoquer, pour que la personne humaine ne soit plus un concept spéculatif utilisé pour travestir, sacraliser, moraliser des conduites radicalement anti-humanistes? Je pense aux mises en scène de pratiques démocratiques formelles par des régimes totalitaires ou conservateurs; aux discours moralisateurs, non moins formels des défenseurs occidentaux des droits de l’homme alors que le contrôle géopolitique de la carte du monde



et spécialement celle du *Middle East* au sens américain<sup>5</sup>, reste ce qu'elle est depuis le 19<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Dans toutes les traditions méditerranéennes, on enseigne depuis le temps lointain des *Miroirs de princes*<sup>6</sup> que la responsabilité intellectuelle dans la tradition philosophique, la responsabilité spirituelle dans les traditions religieuses sont en amont de la responsabilité morale qui fonde elle-même la construction des légitimités juridiques et politiques.. Dans ses exposés savants et didactiques, la pensée moderne continue de discuter les conditions de légitimité de tout pouvoir selon la philosophie morale et politique; le sujet transcendantal kantien, la *Cité de Dieu* selon Saint Augustin, la *Cité vertueuse* selon Fârâbî, la gouvernance du Juste (*wilâyat al-faqîh*) dans la Tradition shî'ite banalisée par Khomeini, la gouvernance selon la Loi divine (*al-siyâsa-lshar'yya*) selon les Sunnites (Ibn Taymiyya banalisé dans le régime saoudien), demeurent, avec les corrections réalistes de Machiavel et d'Ibn Khaldoun, des références familières dans l'imaginaire éthico-politique méditerranéen. C'est pourquoi on entend même des personnalités politiques faire appel à des interventions plus fréquentes d'« intellectuels » capables d'enrichir des débats sur les nouvelles articulations de l'autorité et du pouvoir. Les cultures populaires méditerranéennes savent en même temps que dans l'histoire concrète, le calcul politique manipule toutes les formes de la responsabilité pour faire prévaloir les impératifs immédiats de la *Realpolitik*. L'arme de la dérision est partout maniée avec une cruelle justesse dans les bons mots, les anecdotes piquantes qui rempliraient des volumes pour chaque pays où sévissent depuis des décennies des Etats contre les peuples. Le regretté Sayyid 'Uways, un sociologue égyptien, a eu l'heureuse idée sous le règne du Za'îm Abd al-Nasser, de publier les lettres adressées au tombeau de Shâfi'î (m. 820) par des paysans lésés pendant la révolution collectiviste; il a donné la parole aussi à une autre catégorie du peuple égyptien réduite au silence en publiant les inscriptions relevées à l'intérieur des taxis du Caire.

<sup>5</sup> Voir le livre alerte, incisif et très nuancé de R. Stephen Humphreys : *Between Memory and Desire. The Middle East in a Trouble Age*, University of California Press 1999. On notera la charge poétique et la pertinence psycho-historique du titre.

<sup>6</sup> Voir Jocelyne Dakhliya, *Le divan des Princes, Le politique et le religieux dans l'islam*, Aubier, Paris 1998.

Ces deux versants savant et populaire de l'imaginaire éthico-politique des peuples méditerranéens traduisent la permanence de structures sociales patriarcales et d'institutions politiques patrimoniales depuis l'antiquité jusqu'à nos jours. L'attente messianique d'une gouvernance juste a accompagné pendant des siècles un système d'organisation sociale et politique que les religions autant que la philosophie politique ont transfiguré en Représentations symboliques idéales qui nourrissent l'attente eschatologique spiritualisée et intellectualisée chez les élites savantes, ritualisée et stigmatisée à la fois par l'arme de la dérision dans les cultures orales populaires. Deux facteurs historiques décisifs ont toujours et partout manqué dans les contextes méditerranéens ainsi délimités anthropologiquement:

La montée irrésistible et continue d'une classe sociale qui brise de façon irréversible les fondements patriarcaux et patrimoniaux de l'ordre économique, social et politique en imposant par la subversion simultanée des champs intellectuel, religieux, politique et économique hérités – comme l'a fait la bourgeoisie conquérante en Europe – une culture de développement du capital social et de l'investissement économique, un système de production et d'échange à vocation mondiale, un droit moderne fondé sur la nécessité pour l'homme de repenser sans cesse l'historicité de sa condition. A cet égard, l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) pourrait jouer un rôle éducatif décisif en contraignant les divers décideurs des pays en quête de modernité à initier des politiques de développement durables et intégrateur dans les circuits mondiaux.

Un processus historique également continu de mise en place simultanée d'un Etat de droit et d'une société civile comme agents interactifs liés par un contrat constitutionnel où sont définis les droits et les obligations de chaque agent pour garantir à tous les citoyens les protections, les ressources, les droits nécessaires au déploiement optimal de leur vocation de sujets humains collectivement responsables de l'émancipation de la condition humaine.

La formulation et la portée historique déterminante de ces deux facteurs demeurent ouvertes à toutes les discussions, à toutes les corrections, à tous les compléments. J'ai essayé d'y inclure tout ce que je sais de l'histoire gé-

nérale de la pensée dans l'aire méditerranéenne, des développements de cette pensée sur les deux rives « islamique-orientale » et « chrétienne-euro-occidentale » (terminologie impropre : tout l'effort de repenser tant d'héritages et de problèmes vise précisément à faire déboucher sur une conceptualisation plus englobante et en même temps plus adéquate). Les objections sur les dérives colonialistes, impérialistes, racistes de la bourgeoisie conquérante ne sont pas pertinentes dans le cadre théorique d'analyse que je cherche à définir pour un ensemble géohistorique dont il importe d'abord d'identifier les données anthropologiques communes et les forces historiques interactives qui ont pesé de façon déterminante sur le partage géopolitique, géoculturel, géoéconomique d'aujourd'hui entre une Méditerranée archaïque, engluée dans des héritages très mal gérés et une Méditerranée tardivement intégrée dans la dynamique historique de l'Union européenne. En outre, la perspective de mes analyses est prospective ; elles ne reprennent les connaissances sur le passé que pour souligner qu'elles sont inadéquates, aliénantes, imaginaires, voire fausses, donc dangereuses pour une pensée qui veut intégrer les chocs du futur sur le présent douloureux, tragique, ingérable de la Méditerranée soumise à des processus régressifs.

Dès le 10<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'historien Miskawayh (m. 1029) a écrit des pages modernes pour dénoncer les méfaits économiques et sociaux du système de *l'iqta'*, concessions faites aux militaires pour l'exploitation de terres riches dans le bas Irak. Ce système a affaibli les pouvoirs politiques, asservi les paysans aux féodaux parasites et prédateurs, appauvri la production, gêné les progrès de l'agriculture jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire ottoman ! On sait que les révolutions socialistes post-coloniales ont achevé la désintégration, à la manière de Staline, des mécanismes de solidarité naturelle et des codes culturels indissociables de la civilisation paysanne méditerranéenne. Certains pays, comme la Tunisie et le Maroc, ont été sauvés de justesse de la collectivisation socialiste ; mais la bureaucratie des États-Partis centralisateurs et les pressions de la démographie ont partout généré des stratifications sociales perverses : une classe riche parasitaire, solidaire de l'État patrimonial, incapable d'animer une culture de développement intégré entraînant tous les secteurs de la société globale ; de larges couches vouées,

selon plusieurs variables, au travail précaire, aux pratiques d'une économie souterraine, au chômage, aux formes populistes de l'expression religieuse et politique, aux conduites de violence ou à l'émigration clandestine; entre ces deux formations, on discerne aussi une classe intermédiaire tiraillée entre le désir d'accéder aux privilèges d'en haut, et les menaces de dégradation vers le bas. A tous les niveaux de l'existence sociale, la publicité marchande véhiculée par les médias suscite l'engouement des riches pour toutes les formes, tous les styles, tous les gadgets de modernisation matérielle, exacerbe les frustrations des exclus aussi bien des protections de la famille traditionnelle que des droits conférés par toute citoyenneté moderne. Dans ces conditions sociologiques, politiques et culturelles, l'accès à la modernité intellectuelle devient aléatoire, fragmentaire, voire impossible pour certaines catégories sociales. Je pense notamment à la condition féminine dans tous les contextes méditerranéens. Même les femmes les plus engagées dans les luttes de libération n'intègrent pas toujours dans leurs pratiques éducatives avec les enfants et leurs programmes d'action, les conditions socioculturelles globales pour les filles et les garçons, d'un égal accès à la modernité intellectuelle sans laquelle la construction d'un espace ouvert de la citoyenneté demeure fragile et illusoire<sup>7</sup>. Il faut souligner qu'une enquête sociologique sur les degrés de pénétration et les modes de présence de ce que j'appelle la modernité intellectuelle dans toutes sociétés « occidentales » contemporaines, révéleraient des négligences, des indifférences, des confusions, des absences, des ignorances, des inconsciences, voire des rejets qui expliquent les larges possibilités laissées aux directeurs de campagnes électorales et aux politiciens en général pour manipuler les imaginaires sociaux.

## **APPROFONDISSEMENTS : DROITS DE L'HOMME, IDENTITES CULTURELLES ET COHESION SOCIALE DANS L'ESPACE MEDITERRANEEN**

On pourrait objecter que tout ce qui précède incite à la réflexion, mais reste trop général. Il est vrai qu'il est nécessaire d'entrer dans des situations

<sup>7</sup> Voir Camille Lacoste, *La mère contre les filles*,

concrètes, des problèmes précis vécus dans les différents contextes propres à chaque société. Les références bibliographiques abondent pour ceux qui voudraient élargir leur information. Pour approfondir l'analyse des contentieux au sein de chaque société, entre les parcours historiques intra-européens et, davantage encore, entre les pays de l'Euroland et ceux de la Méditerranée arabo-turco-irano-islamique, je retiendrai un fait récent qui permettra de mesurer le décalage historique qui sépare aujourd'hui les sociétés des deux rives que les Romains pouvaient appeler *Mare nostrum*. On comparera la charte européenne des droits fondamentaux et les préambules des constitutions des pays arabo-turco-iraniens qui ont été les protagonistes de l'histoire générale de l'espace méditerranéen. La comparaison comprendra un moment historico-anthropologique et un moment philosophique ; sur la base des éclairages et des données indiscutables fournis par cette approche comparée, on se demandera comment l'espace méditerranéen peut dépasser les clivages idéologiques qui continuent de nourrir des guerres civiles à l'intérieur de plusieurs sociétés et surtout de bloquer une politique de remembrement culturel et d'intégration économique de la sphère géohistorique euro-méditerranéenne.

Entre 1543 et 1687, de la révolution copernicienne aux *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* de Newton, l'Europe a eu le privilège de vivre des révolutions scientifiques successives qui ont fait de cette partie du monde un pôle incontournable de la production de l'histoire, un moment décisif de l'aventure moderne de l'homme<sup>8</sup>. Tous les savoirs, toutes les croyances et de larges pans des théologies et des philosophies légués par l'Antiquité et le Moyen Age dans l'espace méditerranéen, ont été subvertis à des degrés divers par la nouvelle manière de penser le monde et la condition humaine. Cela explique les tensions avec le magistère catholique, le succès du protestantisme en phase avec la modernité, les résistances ou la mise à l'écart du judaïsme et de l'islam. Pour celui-ci, la nécessité historique des luttes anticoloniales et anti-impérialistes continue de servir d'alibi mobilisateur pour voiler les processus de régression et de sous-développement à l'œuvre à l'intérieur des régimes politiques, des sociétés, des systèmes culturels de représentation de soi qui ont prévalu depuis les

<sup>8</sup> Voir Paolo Rossi : La naissance de la science moderne en Europe, Seuil 1999.

13<sup>e</sup>-14<sup>e</sup> siècles. On peut parler historiquement de processus de régression et de sous-développement dans les contextes islamiques pour deux raisons: il y a régression par rapport au dynamisme créateur de l'islam classique, sous-développement par rapport aux forces de développement qui soulevaient dans la même période, les sociétés de la rive chrétienne et européenne de la Méditerranée.

La Charte des droits fondamentaux dans l'U.E. stipule en préambule de la Convention 47 du 14/9/2000:

*« S'inspirant de son héritage culturel, humaniste et religieux, l'Union se fonde sur les principes indivisibles et universels de la dignité de la personne, de la liberté, de l'égalité et de la solidarité ; elle repose sur les principes de démocratie et de l'Etat de droit ».*

Le 22/9/2000, L. Jospin téléphone à Roman Herzog pour « rappeler que la France est une République laïque et que la référence à l'héritage religieux de l'Union est inacceptable pour elle ». Pour justifier cette intervention, M. Moscovici, chargé des affaires européennes, invoque la Constitution: *« Il n'y a dans notre constitution aucune référence d'aucune sorte à un héritage religieux. Nous considérons donc que cette mention est contraire à l'esprit laïc de nos institutions et va bien au-delà de nos traditions constitutionnelles qu'elle obligerait à modifier ».* On lit dans le préambule de la Constitution de 1958 : *« La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances ».* Cela se traduit dans la pratique institutionnelle par la gestion des « cultes » par le ministre de l'intérieur. La République « une et indivisible » - comme Allah dans le Coran – fait l'objet de débats passionnés qui prennent des allures de *credo* et peuvent conduire à la démission d'un ministre. Cela fait partie de qu'on appelle « l'exception française ».

On peut mesurer dans l'argumentaire juridique du ministre français à propos de la laïcité à quel point le raisonnement historien est totalement absent. Chaque préambule de toute constitution se présente comme un Moment inaugurateur fixant un encodage juridique explicite de toutes les activités des citoyens à l'intérieur d'un espace politique territorialement

délimité par des frontières reconnues dans des traités internationaux. Les défenseurs de la République indivisible refusent de s'interroger sur les conditions historiques (incluant l'idéologie et les postulats philosophiques des rédacteurs de la constitution) qui ont commandé les options politiques inscrites dans la constitution. Il faut des crises sociales et politiques exceptionnelles pour qu'une constitution change les options de portée religieuse ou philosophique. D'une constitution à l'autre, cependant, on relève une continuité des principes sacrés qui fondent l'être « historique » de la Nation-Communauté. Du point de vue de la critique historique des systèmes de pensée en compétition lors de la rédaction de toute Loi fondamentale, les corpus religieux fondateurs et les corpus « laïcs » des constitutions modernes présentent plusieurs traits communs dans les processus de conceptualisation, puis de promotion aux fonctions d'instance suprême de l'autorité. Une fois votée, une constitution est l'objet de discussions exégétiques par un corps d'experts exactement comme les textes religieux fondateurs le sont pour les théologiens-juristes. La critique moderne de la raison juridique s'abstient de franchir les limites qui protègent la constitution en vigueur, tout comme les corpus religieux sont ouverts aux exégèses, mais non à la subversion de leur statut de Source fondatrice et légimante des lois de la cité. La pensée laïque encourage la subversion des corpus religieux, mais prescrit des limites quand il s'agit de corpus élaborés selon ses axiomes, ses principes, ses postulats philosophiques et juridiques. On sait que la philosophie du droit est une préoccupation secondaire, voire inutile pour les juristes; il en est de même bien sûr pour la Loi religieuse. Pourtant, l'exigence d'une critique de la raison juridique ne pas conduit pas à l'anarchie ou à un refus constant d'une Loi commune; elle permet seulement d'accroître le rôle d'une société civile changeante dans le déclenchement des procédures de révision et de discussion de tous les types de constitution et de construction juridique. La démocratie parlementaire représentative est en train de montrer ses limites non pas dans les régimes autoritaires qui la pervertissent ouvertement, mais dans les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique où les procédures formelles sont respectées.

Qu'en est-il du côté des pays qui se réclament du modèle islamique. On partira de l'exemple égyptien qui a une portée paradigmatique pour les autres.

L'État, la société civile, l'individu, le droit positif, la séparation des pouvoirs, le statut de la personne humaine, les libertés fondamentales de la personne et du citoyen, tout ce qui relève du travail de la modernité sur l'homme, la société, l'histoire, l'économie, la connaissance, la communication, la maîtrise de la nature, sont à l'ordre du jour des discussions courantes en contextes islamiques. Selon les groupes sociaux et leurs références culturelles, ces discussions portent l'accent soit sur les conditions d'accès à un cadre laïc de pensée et de législation, soit sur l'application stricte de la Loi religieuse telle que l'ont articulée les docteurs fondateurs d'écoles, ce qui revient à maintenir la clôture théologique dogmatique également léguée par les docteurs médiévaux. Ceux-ci sont cités par les ulémas contemporains comme l'instance de l'autorité dont il importe de maintenir la fiction. En fait, le clivage entre les deux positions n'est pas absolument étanche : il y a des partisans de la laïcité qui refusent la clôture religieuse, mais acceptent de fonctionner dans la clôture nationaliste laïcisante où le religieux fait son retour comme constituant de l'identité culturelle de la nation. La sortie de l'une et de l'autre clôture n'est guère constituée explicitement comme objet de recherche et de débat pour approfondir l'analyse critique des enjeux d'une troisième voie moins conflictuelle, plus programmatique visant à redéfinir laïcité et religion dans la perspective de dépassement proposée ci-dessus. On verra que cette troisième voie est en train de s'ouvrir en Europe grâce aux interactions entre les débats nationaux et les négociations au niveau de la Commission et du Parlement européens.

En contextes islamiques, les Etats postcoloniaux ont rendu ces distinctions plus inaccessibles que jamais parce qu'ils ont étatisé l'islam de façon systématique. Ils ont ainsi dévoyé les expressions savantes de l'islam, combattu ses expressions dites populaires et superstitieuses, sous prétexte de « modernisation » des croyances, favorisé l'émergence d'une religion et d'une « culture » politique populistes. L'analyse historique, sociologique, culturelle de ces transformations entre 1950-2001 reste disparate, fragmentaire et surtout coupée des données de la longue durée en ce qui concerne la



pensée islamique. Une question par exemple n'a jamais été retenue comme objet d'étude, à ma connaissance, par les chercheurs : parmi tous les ministres de l'enseignement, de la culture, des affaires religieuses, de « l'orientation nationale » qui se sont succédés depuis les indépendances des différents pays musulmans, combien possédaient la culture historique moderne et l'autorité politique nécessaire pour infléchir le système éducatif et l'étatisation de la religion vers une vision moderne de la transformation nécessaire des rapports entre religion, politique et culture (*Dîn, Dawla, Dunyâ*), des conceptions léguées par l'islam classique aux acquits émancipateurs indiscutables de la philosophie politique et juridique moderne ? La même enquête doit être étendue aux cadres sociaux de la connaissance incluant les « intellectuels » pour montrer que la posture intellectuelle requise pour penser et appliquer les transformations rendues plus urgentes encore par la propagation de la violence militante. Ce sont ces manques, ces vides, ces renoncements, les discours officiels régressifs comme en Algérie que je rassemble dans les concepts d'impensable et d'impensé dans la pensée islamique contemporaine.

« Au nom de quel droit » ? Cette question de grande actualité partout est le titre d'un livre que vient de publier Baudouin Dupret, un spécialiste de l'évolution du droit en Egypte notamment. C'est peut-être en Egypte, en effet, que la construction d'un droit positif moderne a connu des avancées significatives depuis les années 1930 grâce à de grands juristes comme Sanhuri et son disciple Chafik Chéhata. Pourtant, on lit dans le préambule de la constitution de 1980 les énoncés suivants : « *L'islam est la religion de l'Etat, l'arabe sa langue officielle, et les principes de la sharî'a la source principale de la législation (mabâdi' al-sharî'a al-masdar al-ra'îsî li-tashrî')* ». Cet énoncé a suscité deux stratégies interprétatives : pour les uns « *il n'y a pas de place en Egypte pour autre chose que la sharî'a* » ; pour d'autres, « *l'article 2 ne peut être sanctionné que politiquement... ; la constitution ne contient aucune norme objective sur laquelle une action en nullité pour inconstitutionnalité pourrait se baser* ». (B. Dupret, *Le prince et son juge*, p. 107)

Il y a des efforts certains des juristes en contextes islamiques pour libérer la sphère juridique de l'emprise dogmatique d'un droit religieux qui, au sur-

plus, est resté à l'abri de toute critique portant sur ce que la pensée islamique a pratiqué sous le nom de sources-fondements du droit (*Usûl al-dîn* et *Usûl al-fiqh*). Mais l'étatisation totalitaire de la religion a atteint un tel niveau de conditionnement des esprits et de fonctionnarisation des gestionnaires du sacré et d'un nombre important « d'intellectuels », continue de maintenir le tabou sur tout projet de sortie de la clôture dogmatique perpétuée depuis le 11<sup>e</sup>-12<sup>e</sup> siècle par ce que j'appelle les Corpus Officiels Clos de la croyance. Conscients de l'impossibilité politique, psycho-socio-culturelle et juridique d'ouvrir directement ce chantier épineux, les juristes les plus éclairés mènent des combats périphériques et purement procéduriers et interprétatifs. On ne met jamais en question l'autorité divine des enseignements et des codes normatifs authentiquement transmis dans les Corpus déclaré orthodoxes ; on s'autorise seulement des audaces procéduriers pour faire prévaloir telle interprétation favorable à la philosophie des droits de l'homme partagée par les signataires de la Déclaration Universelle de l'ONU en 1948. Dans le Recueil des arrêts de la Haute Cour Constitutionnelle égyptienne, on relève un exemple éclairant de cette position réformiste (*islâh*) très ancienne dans la pensée islamique aussi bien que dans les autres traditions monothéistes. On opère un partage net entre les règles dont l'origine et la signification sont *absolues*, dirimantes (*al-ahkâm al-shar'yya al-qat'iyya fî thubûtihâ wa dalâlutuhâ*) et les règles *relatives* reposant sur l'opinion (*Al-ahkâm al-zanniyya*). L'effort d'interprétation du juriste (*ijtihâd*) n'est possible que pour les secondes. Selon la hiérarchie de l'autorité des lois fixée par ce partage, l'application du droit moderne construit par les législateurs humains élus au suffrage universel, ne peut jamais prévaloir sur les principes définis par la Loi religieuse divine (*sharî'a*). Autrement dit, celle-ci demeure à l'abri de toutes les formes de subversion imposée au droit canonique catholique en Europe à la fois par la montée d'une classe bourgeoise capitaliste et le travail de subversion intellectuelle des philosophes, des écrivains, des historiens, des artistes, etc. On sait que la critique philologique et historiciste a commencé, dès le 16<sup>e</sup> siècle, à subvertir l'héritage religieux du Moyen Age en s'appuyant sur les outillages mentaux de la raison classique, puis surtout la raison des Lumières, deve-

nue le guide des constructions républicaines et démocratiques dans le champ historique commun dont on connaît l'expansion dans le monde.

Avec la colonisation au 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, les traditions religieuses et les cultures restées à l'écart de ce qu'il faut bien appeler la subversion intellectuelle et pas seulement politique, ont été exclues de l'imaginaire du progrès scientifique par le regard ethnographique qui contribuait à la légitimation de la mission civilisatrice de la colonisation. Il est vrai qu'en Europe aussi les cultures dites « populaires », paysannes ont connu la même disqualification, le même processus de réduction à l'état de résidus. Ainsi, la même critique historique qui a produit des effets libérateurs en Europe, a généré des champs de ruines dans les sociétés colonisées où la tradition est devenue un refuge, un point d'appui pour résister à la domination étrangère. Lorsque, dans les années 1960, le discours de la décolonisation a proclamé « *le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes* », les contradictions entre l'aspiration aux libertés modernes et les politiques de traditionalisation et de reconstruction identitaire ont été exacerbées, rendant difficile, voire impossible la critique des fondements de la Loi et de la pensée religieuses dans tous les contextes islamiques. On peut faire aujourd'hui les bilans critiques de 40 à 50 ans de souveraineté politique nationale exercée par les « élites » censées éclairer la marche historique des peuples enfin libres de disposer d'eux-mêmes. Malheureusement, même cette tâche vitale est encore retardée ou faussée par le contrôle idéologique de tous les champs de la production historique des sociétés. Ces bilans doivent retenir en priorité les questions de l'Etat de droit et de son vis-à-vis dialectique la société civile, des instances de l'autorité légitimante, de l'autonomie dûment articulée plutôt qu'une illusoire séparation des pouvoirs législatif, exécutif, judiciaire, éducatif, spirituel ; de la critique continue de la raison politique, juridique, économique visant à refonder sans cesse les légitimités.

Il n'est pas possible de conclure cet essai qui propose des horizons de sens et d'espérance, ouvre des chantiers de réflexion et d'action pour une sphère géohistorique qui n'a pas eu depuis l'irruption des subversions modernes, les héros libérateurs, les chefs charismatiques, les créateurs de richesses intellectuelles et symboliques capables de réactiver et de prolonger les visions et les réalisations de la fonction prophétique. Celle-ci est à la fois in-

voquée comme une instance vivante par les fidèles des trois religions « révélées », mais réduite à une survivance obstructive par la culture triomphante de l'incroyance. On ne perçoit pas clairement les suites historiques qu'aura la persistance de cette vieille polarisation de deux imaginaires du Salut: soit par la quête d'une Cité de Dieu sur terre, soit par la maîtrise technologique, mathématique, pragmatique du destin de l'homme grâce à la seule créativité de l'esprit autonome et responsable. Il faut en tout cas sortir de la pensée dualiste, dichotomique, manichéenne, essentialiste, substantialiste, fondamentaliste, qui perdure avec la polarisation idéologique des deux imaginaires. On aura compris que la troisième voie proposée dans cet essai n'utilise l'espace méditerranéen que comme un tremplin historique pour accompagner les combats engagés autour d'une mondialisation plus bénéfique pour tous les peuples que les grandes promesses mal tenues de la modernité des Lumières classiques.

*Erich Weede*

## **Muslim and Western Civilization – Is Co-Prosperity and Peace Possible?**

### **Some Politically Important Differences**

In analyzing past, current, or future relations between Islam and the West, the political characteristics of these civilizations constitute a convenient starting point. To Muslims the West looks incurably secularist - not only because it tolerates atheism or agnosticism among its elites or even in much of the population in Europe (Berger 1996-97), but because it admits the legitimacy of separating politics and religion. A Muslim political scientist teaching at an Islamic University (Moten 1996, p. 8) complains about this Christian peculiarity in the following terms: “The seeds of secularism are found in the doctrine of ‘dual swords’ which urges ‘rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s’. This is interpreted to mean that human society is divinely ordained to be governed by two authorities, the spiritual and the temporal, and that none under Christian dispensation can possess both *sacerdotium* and *imperium*.” In my view (Weede 1996, 2000; also Berman 1983; Bernholz 1995), the Christian separation between spiritual and temporal rule is one of the root causes of Western legal, political, social and economic development. It is not the only one, because the political fragmentation of the West has been at least as important, but rule divided between a temporal and a spiritual sphere is somewhat limited rule which is a prerequisite of individual liberty.

From a Muslim perspective, however, admission of an autonomous temporal sphere of rule is an invitation to apostasy. The core meaning of Islam is

submission of the faithful to the revealed will of God, to the sacred law of the Shari'ah. Faithful Muslims - who are likely to be charged with fundamentalism by their internal and external critics alike - observe the Western way of life with horror and disgust. According to Moten (1996, S. 106), "the laws of the West lay much emphasis on the individual's right that allows him to do anything he pleases. The separation of politics from religion makes morality a matter of personal discretion ... Democracy is, as such, antithetical to the Islamic way of life."

From this perspective, the trouble with Western democracy is not that egalitarianism is merely professed, but oligarchy is actually practiced - as Western critics since Michels (1910) argue. The defects of democracy go deeper: At best, democracy expresses the interests of human beings instead of the will of God. A final quote from Moten (1996, p. 85) elaborates on the contrast: "Unlike the West, the Islamic perspective assumes a single interest, i.e., promoting the cause of Islam, and does not allow groups and individuals to promote their own autonomously defined self-interests. The preferences of the rulers and the ruled alike are constrained by the Shari'ah."

While this view is not the only one you find among Muslims, it seems to be on the ascendancy, as even those who bemoan fundamentalism have to admit (Tibi 1996). Western scholars, such as Gellner (1981, p. 1), agree and insist on the following point: "Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society." At least in principle, divinely ordained rules constrain rulers and ruled alike. By assigning legislation ultimately to God, Islam provides a route to limited government of its own. The Muslim route is similar to the Western notion of 'natural law'. Although 'divinely ordained' and 'natural' laws are vulnerable to human interpretation and distortion, although such doctrinal obstacles to arbitrary rule have frequently been overcome in human history, less than fail-safe obstacles are certainly preferable to no obstacles at all.

For long Muslims have perceived the world in a clash of civilizations perspective (Huntington 1996b; Wang 1996-97, p. 72). They distinguish be-

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tween the realm of Islam and peace on the one hand, and the realm of ignorance (of the Islamic revelation) and war on the other hand. The ideal Muslim polity is a single Muslim society and state, as realized in early Islam under the rule of the Prophet himself and his four rightly guided successors. Tribe and nation should not matter, but submission to the will of God or becoming a Muslim does. Since the tenth century when independent rulers in Baghdad, Cairo and Cordoba claimed to be caliphs, the Muslim aspiration for unity has not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, Muslims reject not only Western secularism, liberty or democracy unconstrained by the Shari'ah, but also nationalism as alien and dangerous ideas coming out of the West.

In principle, Muslims should expand the realm of Islam and peace. There is some disagreement about the role of the sword in propagating the faith. Certainly, however, war against infidels is preferable to war among Muslims. Moreover, Muslims have to fight at least defensive wars to protect the realm of Islam. In principle, their opponents may always get peace under the single condition of submitting to the will of God, i.e., by becoming Muslims. Religious freedom in Islam, however, is a one-way street. Conversion to Islam, i.e., submission to the will of God, is always legitimate. Rejection of the faith after conversion, i.e., rebellion against the will of God, can never be legitimate and has to be fought (see Tibi 1996, p. 68). Already the rightly guided caliphs had to wage war against Arab tribes who rejected the faith after the Prophet's death.

In Islam any title to rule is derived from one's readiness to submit to the will of God. By implication, Muslim rule over non-believers is acceptable, the reverse may be suffered, but it never can be legitimate. So Western power contributes to delegitimizing the West in Muslim eyes. The other reason why Islam and the West find it so difficult to get along is Western secularism. The more secular the West is or becomes, the less it deserves Muslim toleration. Faithful Moslems do not want toleration of their faith at the price of relegating it to the private sphere. Both Islam and the West provide blueprints for toleration. But their blueprints are incompatible. Contemporary Western tolerance largely rests on secularization and a loss of faith. For Muslims, a loss of faith deserves less toleration than failure to

adopt the faith in the first place. In principle, Muslim toleration has been focused on related monotheistic religions (El Hassan bin Talal 1998, p.57). In the past, a special tax on infidels provided a fiscal incentive for rulers to protect religious minorities.

## **Is There a Risk of a Clash of Civilizations ?**

According to Huntington (1993, 1996a, 1996b), the risk of war is higher between nations belonging to different civilizations than elsewhere. Moreover, he specifically points to the bloody borders of Islam - thereby at least implicitly attributing a special war-proneness to Islam. In my view, both claims should be viewed with considerable skepticism. Recent quantitative research (Henderson 1997, 1998; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; and Russett and Oneal 2001) demonstrates that belonging to different civilizations has little effect on the likelihood of war or militarized disputes, once other determinants of war are controlled in large-scale logistic regressions using thousands of dyad-years as units of observation. Moreover, Huntington's view of cultural differences as ever more important determinants of military conflicts is at odds with the fact that the number of interstate wars tends to decline, whereas the number of civil wars tends to go up (Carnegie Commission 1997, pp. 12, 25). Probably, there are more cultural differences between nations than within most nations. According to Huntington, most - though not all - nations belong to one and only one civilization. Finally, mass murder of subjects by governments is usually an intra-civilization affair. In the 20th century, the number of victims is in the order of magnitude of 150 million people (Rummel 1994).

This criticism of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" should not be misread as a denial of the importance of cultural - for example, religious, linguistic, ethnic or tribal - differences or loyalties as a cause of violence and war. In my view, however, most human beings most of the time are far too parochial to fight and to die for their civilizations which are defined by Huntington (1996b, p. 43) as "the broadest cultural entity".



Huntington's reference to the bloody borders of Islam can easily be explained by factors other than assuming a special Muslim war-proneness. If all civilizations were equally war-prone, then one should expect the most centrally located civilization sharing borders with most other civilizations to be the most frequently involved one in inter-civilization conflicts. Islam is the most centrally located civilization, because it is bordering every other one except for Latin America and Japan. For this reason alone, we should expect Islam to suffer from more bloody borders than other civilizations. Huntington himself points out that by contrast to many other civilizations Islam lacks a core state leading the lesser members of the civilization, as the US leads the West. Therefore, there can be nothing like imperial peace in the realm of Islam. Because of Islam's democratic deficit<sup>1</sup>, there can be no democratic peace either. Nor could there be peace through fear of nuclear war, at least not before Pakistan became the first nuclear power in Muslim civilization. Because of its central geopolitical location and because of the absence of pacifying conditions<sup>2</sup> more war involvement by Muslim states can easily be explained without assuming a specifically Muslim proneness to involvement in militarized disputes and wars.

Although cultural differences need not lead to a clash between Muslim and Western civilization, contiguity itself and territorial conflicts itself provide some reasons for concern (Vasquez 1993; Weede 1975, 1996). Moreover, the close relationship between Israel and the American core of the West effectively makes Israel a part of the West. Therefore, the Arab-Israeli conflict might laterally escalate and entangle Western nations other than Israel.

### **Beyond the Clash of Civilizations?**

Western political thinking and Western political practice provide essentially two modes of handling conflicts of interest and power struggles, including clashes of civilization. First, there is the Realist mode of 'si vis pacem, para bellum', i.e., 'if you desire peace, prepare for war'. In essence, this view underlines the anarchical character of the interstate system, the

<sup>1</sup> The prerequisites of democracy will be discussed later.

<sup>2</sup> See Weede (1996, chapter 7.2) for my views about the conditions of peace in the recent past.

absence of organizations and institutions capable of effectively constraining even the most powerful states, and the necessity for self-help, deterrence and war-fighting capabilities (e.g. Waltz 1979, Lieber 1995). Although I believe this approach to be complementary rather than competitive with the next one, I shall not discuss it here.

Although the second mode of handling conflicts of interests and power struggles dates back at least to Kant's writings on perpetual peace in the late 18th century and to British 19th century liberalism, I will discuss it only in its modern guise. By now, there is overwhelming quantitative evidence that democracies rarely fight each other (for example: Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; Weede, 1996). Although there remain some critics of the democratic peace proposition at the dyadic level, the debate seems to shift. More recently, proponents of democracy begin to argue that democracies are indeed less warlike than autocracies (Benoit 1996; Ray 1995; Rummel 1995). Others (Bremer 1996, Oneal and Ray 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997) point out that the risk of war between democracies and autocracies is even higher than the risk of war between autocracies. By implication, a violent or bellicose clash of Western and Islamic civilizations is promoted by the contrast in political regimes between democracies and autocracies.<sup>3</sup>

Democratic constitutions alone cannot guarantee the viability of democracies. Since Lipset's (1959) path-breaking paper quantitative research has firmly established that prosperous nations are more likely to be governed democratically than poor ones (for example: Bollen and Jackman 1985; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Lipset

<sup>3</sup> By now, Russett and Oneal (2001, p. 116) argue that their most recent research refutes this skepticism about the limitations of the democratic peace. In their most recent view, democratization always promotes peace - even among nations surrounded by autocracies. To me, the earlier results of separate analyses of militarized disputes in the post-World War II period look more persuasive than the most recent analyses which begin in 1885 and collapse the multipolar era before 1945, the bipolar era between 1945 and 1990, and even the beginning of a unipolar era thereafter. The qualitatively different alliance effects on militarized disputes found for the multipolar and bipolar periods of observation (Russett and Oneal 2001, p. 113) justify doubts about imposing the same causal structure on different periods of world politics. See also Gowa (1999). Although I agree with her on the need for separate analyses of different eras, I disagree with her pessimistic conclusions about the democratic peace.

1994).<sup>4</sup> If one wants to promote democracy, the most effective way is *not* to advertise or even to write democratic constitutions, as the British and the French did before they gave up their colonies, but the more demanding task of generating prosperity.

Although the most important determinants of prosperity are domestic institutions and property rights which govern incentives to work and to save, opportunities to apply knowledge and to innovate as well as the efficiency of resource allocation (see Weede 1996, 2000 for my own views; or Hayek 1960; Jones 1981; North 1990 and Pipes 1999 for related views), international relations also affect growth. There are few propositions in economics which are as widely supported as the openness prosperity link: Free trade and foreign direct investment promote economic growth and prosperity (for example: Bhagwati 1991, p. 51; Dollar 1992; de Soysa and Oneal 1999; Edwards 1998; Friedman and Friedman 1981, pp. 31-46; World Bank 1993). It is dubious whether Germany (and indeed, Western Europe) and Japan could have recovered as fast as they did after World War II without (comparatively) free trade. It is equally dubious whether the East Asian tigers would have grown prosperous without market access in America and elsewhere in the West. Germany and Japan, South Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan illustrate the causal chain running from free trade via prosperity to democracy and ultimately to the democratic peace.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to the causal chain running from free trade and prosperity to democracy and peace, there are other encouraging findings in recent quantitative research. Free trade and high growth rates *directly* reduce the risk of

<sup>4</sup> While there is as much agreement among sociologists and political scientists on the prosperity-democracy link as one can find in these disciplines, I want to add another (more controversial) proposition: Democracy stands a chance only where a capitalist or market economy exists. The relationship between capitalism and democracy holds not only because of the prosperity effects of capitalism, but also because capitalism provides attractive opportunities for electorally defeated politicians and office-holders. For a full account of my views on capitalism, democracy and peace, consult Weede (1996; 2000; 2002 ). For criticism of the prosperity-democracy link, see Friedman (1994, p. 33) who nevertheless admits that economic growth eases coalition-building and democratization. While I disagree with Friedman on the strength of the impact of prosperity on democratization, I endorse his criticism of 'occidentalism' or the claim that Western culture is a prerequisite of democracy.

<sup>5</sup> Prosperity and democracy made for reconciliation between Germany and Japan on the one hand and the US, Britain or France on the other hand. While democracy in South Korea and Taiwan has some positive impact on their relationships with Japan, democratic peace between both Chinese or Korean states will apply only after (or: if) the People's Republic of China and North Korea become democracies.

militarized interstate disputes and war (Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal and Ray 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001) in addition to the indirect effects via democracy. Elsewhere (Weede 2000, final chapter; 2002), I called the entire package of pacifying conditions running from free trade, prosperity and democracy to the avoidance of war the “capitalist peace”. Russett and Oneal (2001) refer to the “Kantian peace” instead. Their “Kantian peace” also includes the pacifying impact of common memberships in intergovernmental organizations, but disregards the impact of free trade on prosperity and of prosperity on the viability of democracy. Free trade, prosperity and democracy are simultaneously desirable in themselves and means to pacifying the world. By contrast, big armies, high military expenditures or a nuclear balance of terror are necessary evils at best.

Is it conceivable that the free trade, prosperity and democracy route prevents a potential clash of Islamic and Western civilizations? Since the causal relationship summarized above should be understood in probabilistic instead of deterministic terms, one should not expect that free trade or growth or prosperity or even democracy by itself suffices. Instead it is more reasonable to expect stable, peaceful and even amicable relations between Islam and the West only once the trade between Islamic countries and the West stands no longer by itself as a pacifying influence. In the long run, preventing the clash of Muslim and Western civilization requires prosperous and democratic Islamic societies.

Since Israel is part of the West, a secure peace between Islam and the West presupposes peace between Arabs and Israelis, too. Although this paper does not deal with the specific problems of Arab-Israeli peace-making, an analogy between Germans and the Arabs of Palestine points to an important lesson. After a devastating defeat in World War II, Germany lost valuable territories in the east to Poland and to other nations. Two generations later, it seems safe to say that Germans have accepted the finality of these losses. In my view, this acceptance or reassignment depends on two previously established conditions : severe military defeat first and material prosperity for Germans, including refugees and their descendants, later. So far, Arabs from Palestine have experienced only the negative part of this treatment. Without prosperity for Arab refugees from Israel, it is hard to see

how they can ever reconcile themselves to the status quo , i.e., to the final loss of their homes.

## **Economic and Political Prospects of Muslim Societies**

Currently, the fiercest believers in Muslim values come close to regard democracy as an invitation to apostasy. Such an interpretation, however, does not prevail everywhere now, and even if it did, it would not necessarily remain a permanent feature of Muslim civilization. The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century certainly illustrates that religions, their interpretation and their social impact may change. Even after the Reformation we have witnessed radical and important changes in the Christian world. Once upon a time some Christian countries suffered from the inquisition and from witch-burning. It is hard to argue that Christian societies then were more enlightened or tolerant than the Mullah's regime in contemporary Iran is today. If Christianity can and did change, so can Islam.<sup>6</sup>

Faithful Moslems cannot deny the potential for change and the history of change in Islam. In fact, almost all of them would agree that Muslim societies were ruled much more perfectly in the days of the Prophet than nowadays, and still better under the rightly-guided caliphs than under later caliphs or sultans (Moten 1996, p. 59). While one cannot know how the Muslim interpretation of their faith and its commands will change, whether a single interpretation will prevail or whether multiple ones will compete and possibly establish different geographical strongholds, it is possible to point to some aspects of Islam which may affect the prospects of economic development and democratization.

Concerning democratization the message of Islam looks ambivalent to me. The doctrine of the sovereignty of God may conceivably be understood as a prescription for limited government, as Gellner (1981) has pointed out. If God is the only legitimate sovereign, then even the ruler must submit to God and his laws. Although Islam does not constrain rulers by a duality of

<sup>6</sup> The claim that "all cultures are rich in conflicting political potentialities" has been elaborated for East Asia and the West by Friedman (1994, p. 27). For Islam, see Kuran (1997, p.67).

spiritual and temporal rule, the assignment of legislation to God does similarly constrain worldly rulers.

In practice, the limitation of government by divine law suffers from two shortcomings. Firstly, the clear and definite character of the law is necessarily reduced by human interpretation, i.e., by differences of interpretation (Krämer 1997, p. 50; Schmidtke 1998, p.368 ff.)<sup>7</sup>. Secondly, divine law - as established more than a millennium ago - does not necessarily meet all contemporary needs for legal regulation. The Shari'ah, for example, provides much more detail on family affairs than on commercial matters. The more a need for supplementary regulation is admitted, the less useful divine law is in limiting and constraining arbitrary government. In practice, Muslim rulers have always supplemented the divine law by secular decrees (Arjomand 1992; Hodgson 1974a, p. 347 ff.). Moreover, the gap between social requirements for updated laws and divine law must get worse over time, i.e., the more socio-economic structures and economic activities deviate from seventh century practices.

Since “the idea of limited government is inherent and essential in Islam” (Lewis 1997, p. 123 ), the main culprit responsible for autocracy and despotism in the Muslim past is *not* religious doctrine, but what Weber ( 1922/1964, p.191 ) had called ‘sultanism’. Under sultanism the ruler appoints foreigners or slaves as officials. Since foreigners or slaves completely depend on the ruler’s mercy, they are the most effective tools of arbitrary government. Foreigners and slaves had a more important role in ruling Muslim societies during previous centuries than elsewhere ( Hodgson 1974 ). Since slavery and sultanism have been overcome in Muslim countries, the strongest political obstacles against a libertarian interpretation of Islam have been removed.

<sup>7</sup> How clear and definite the divine law, or one of its interpretations, can be is illustrated by the recent rulings of Saudi judges on progressive income taxation. According to the Economist ( 2001, p. 46 ), “they say Islam enshrines the payment of one-fortieth of personal income to charity, and that other taxes are illegal.” If the welfare state is inefficient and if it reduces growth rates, as I have argued elsewhere ( Weede 2000, chapter 7 ), then such constraints on taxation and redistribution could be quite beneficial.

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As far as I see, influential Muslim theologians and jurists did never push a libertarian interpretation of Islam, but in principle they could.<sup>8</sup> Since many Muslims, including so-called fundamentalists, perceive a deterioration of Muslim governments from the Prophet via the rightly-guided caliphates to contemporary rulers, the idea that unlimited or arbitrary government has been bad for Islam and Muslim societies receives additional support. I do not want to predict that Muslim thinkers will arrive at a libertarian or 'limited government is mandated by God'-interpretation of Islam, but I do think that this is one conceivable implication of the sovereignty of God - and the most likely one to promote both prosperity and democratization.

The immediate concern for those who want to overcome or peacefully manage the clash between Islamic and Western civilization should not be democratization, but economic development. Whereas an agenda of democratization highlights different views in Islam and the West, an agenda of common prosperity is likely to be acceptable to everybody. Once Islam and the West are linked by trade *and prosperity*, an intellectual push in the Muslim world would still be required for democratization to occur, but it would no longer be as likely to abort as if occurring under current conditions of widespread poverty (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).

In my view (see Weede 1996, 2000), only the economic order of capitalism permits prosperity for those nations who (unlike some Arab oil producers) do not combine a sparse population and plentiful natural resources.<sup>9</sup> As already Adam Smith (1776/1976) recognized, the hope to attain private property provides essential incentives for hard work. For private property to be safe, there must be limits to confiscation and taxation. As von Mises (1920) added early in the 20th century, private property in the means of production constitutes a prerequisite for scarcity prices in factor markets and a rational allocation of resources. As von Hayek (1945, 1960) added, decentralised

<sup>8</sup> Moten ( 1996, p. 120 ) comes close to it by writing: "The assumptions of the equality of all believers, brotherhood and collective responsibility of the Ummah to enjoin virtue... preclude the acceptance of an 'all-wise' absolute ruler, or the emergence of 'religious experts' who arrogate themselves all powers of decision making to the exclusion of the masses." But Moten does not arrive at the limited government or libertarian conclusions which Westerners like me or even Muslims living in the West (like Tibi 1996) might draw.

<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately, oil or mineral resources as such seem to permit distortions within economies and to retard democratic development (Ross 2001).

decision-making is essential, if knowledge scattered across millions of heads is to be mobilized and exploited. If one accepts these insights from classical and Austrian economics, then neither central planning nor some third way in between capitalism and socialism promises prosperity. Only capitalism and economic freedom do.

Econometric studies (Beach and Davis 1999, p. 10; de Haan and Siermann 1998; de Haan and Sturm 2000; Edwards 1998; Goldsmith 1997; Gwartney, Lawson and Block 1996, p. 109; Knack 1996; Knack and Keefer 1995; Tostensson 1994) also confirm the contribution of economic freedom, in particular of its improvement over time, to economic growth.

Therefore, the question is whether Islam legitimizes or delegitimizes capitalism. Since Islam and the Shari'ah design a social order, Muslims cannot argue that their faith is transcendental and concerns other-worldly-matters only. Again, the faith is ambivalent in its implication for capitalist development. On the one hand one may point to the crucial role of merchants and traders in capitalist development. Neither Jesus, nor Buddha, nor Confucius ever worked as traders, but Mohammed did. Moreover, Mohammed's life is understood as inspired by God himself and together with the Quran it is one of the sources of the Shari'ah. Conceivably, an Islamic legitimization of capitalism might underline this fact and point to those verses of the Koran where economic activity and trade are praised (Rodinson 1986, p. 41).

If a pro-capitalist interpretation of Islam *were* combined with a limited government interpretation of the sovereignty of God, then Islam could become the most powerful religious guardian of private property rights. Since private property rights and the corresponding decentralized economic decision-making provide incentives to work and to save as well as room for innovation and scarcity prices, an interpretation of Islam seems possible which boosts economic growth instead of retarding it.

On the other hand, Islam may be interpreted differently, too. An anti-capitalist interpretation could again start with the Prophet himself. Since he alone among all Muslim rulers was inspired by God, his rule must have been the best government ever experienced by Muslims. If this is so, then it



makes sense to look for political guidance by analyzing the Prophet's rule and, may be, the rule of his immediate successors, the four rightly-guided caliphs. If this aspect of the political implications of Islam is emphasized, then the faith becomes backward-looking, then the main message is a prescription to apply seventh century law and customs - as a non-Muslim perceives the Shari'ah - irrespective of changed economic structures. The backward-looking spirit of the faith would be worse than most of the detailed regulations.<sup>10</sup> The economy can easily survive the proscription of liquor and pork.

At least concerning Muslim men, Islam has always been an egalitarian religion. In the past, this egalitarianism may have impeded the development of safe property rights. In the West, aristocracies and powerful estates first succeeded in forcing rulers to respect their property rights. Pipes (1999, p. 195) has elaborated on this topic: "As Western history demonstrates, general freedoms and rights usually originate in minority privileges. It has proved to be the most reliable way of implanting freedoms and rights, because it gives rise to social groups interested in protecting their advantages." Only later, rights and privileges were extended to the middle and lower classes in the West. The weakness of hereditary ruling classes in Islam compared to the West is rooted in doctrinal egalitarianism, in the practice of *Sultanism* which was based on the institution of slavery, and in social instability arising out of polygamy.

The relationship between polygamy and socio-political instability has first been recognized by Andreski (1968, p. 14). Under polygamy rich and powerful men are likely to take many wives, whereas many poor and common men will not succeed in obtaining even a single wife. Therefore, upper class men will have too many sons aspiring to a position equivalent to their father's position, whereas lower class men produce too few sons who are resigned to a common and poor existence.<sup>11</sup> The imbalance of reproduction rates at the top and at the bottom of the social pyramid generated downward mobility pressure in Muslim societies, made half-brothers fight and

<sup>10</sup> Historically, the backward looking spirit seems to have prevailed because of a fear of public sanctions (Koran 1997). See also Hodgson ( 1974 ) on "timid literalism" in Muslim civilization.

kill each other, and further reduced the already poor prospects of upward mobility for the masses. By contrast, medieval and Catholic Christianity benefited from celibacy which prevented one privileged estate, the priests, from legitimately reproducing themselves. Unintentionally, celibacy made some upward mobility possible and even inevitable. Since upward mobility is a substitute for rebellion, monogamy and celibacy in the West contributed to political stability by providing room for upward mobility.

Socio-political stability is so important because it is a prerequisite for the establishment of secure property rights. The less stable a society and polity is, the poorer are the incentives for members of the ruling classes to desist from plundering their subjects. An autocrat with fairly safe tenure is interested in a healthy economy because it provides a profitable tax base. Without safe tenure a rational autocrat faces no incentives to worry about the long-term consequences of taxation or plundering. That is why subjects are better off under stable autocracy than under political instability (Olson 2000).

Two institutions which prevailed in the past in Muslim civilization - but which no longer exert significant effects - i.e., slavery and polygamy, contributed to arbitrary rule and political instability. These conditions together with Muslim egalitarianism made the safeguarding of private property rights more difficult than it was in the West. Insecure property rights reduced incentives to work hard, to invest in long-term projects, and to innovate. Therefore, Muslim civilization fell behind the West, as the Turks had to realize from the 18th century onward.

## Conclusions

My views on the political and economic prospects of Muslim societies and the clash between Western and Muslim civilizations may be summarized in these terms : Cultures are malleable, even if one insists on a fairly literal reading of the Koran and the life of the Prophet. The effects of one's interpretation of Islam heavily depend on the non-Islamic type of knowledge

<sup>11</sup> The aspirations of wives and daughters are neglected here, because they lacked the power and influence to make their preferences policy relevant.

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applied together with the Muslim revelation i.e., whether Western economics - and which part of it - is accepted. Currently a backwardly-oriented fundamentalism seems to be ascendant in most of the Muslim world. As long as this continues, Islamic civilization will remain weak. The challenge of Islam to the West will remain at the level of desperate acts of terrorism, not a serious bid for economic equality, much less for supremacy. But Muslim civilization is not alone in producing backwardly-oriented intellectuals. The West and Islamic civilization together suffer from a division of labor where many of those who think about culture and the social order do not consider the double absence of business experience and rudimentary knowledge of economics to be a serious handicap. By contrast, the Prophet had business experience.

The fact that Muslims live in a politically fragmented civilization provides reasons for hope rather than for despair. In my reading of Eurasian history and the rise of capitalism (Weede 1996, 2000; inspired by Jones 1981 and von Hayek 1960), no other condition was more important for the rise of the West than European *disunity*. This disunity forced rival European princes to respect the property rights of merchants and of producers and to grant liberties. Conceivably, Arab and Muslim disunity can provide a similar push for a future Muslim 'race to the top'.

As East Asia has demonstrated, Western-invented capitalism can be imitated. Actually, latecomers to the game of capitalism may excel. The contemporary Japanese are richer than the citizens of the first industrial nation, Britain. Per capita incomes in Singapore exceed British, French, German and even Japanese incomes in purchase power parity terms (World Bank 2000, p. 275). In a capitalist world nations become better off, if their neighbors and others are better off.<sup>12</sup> This possibility of co-prosperity provides the base for a capitalist peace. But nobody should expect the 'free trade, prosperity, and democracy'-cure to work miracles in overcoming or mitigating the clash between a (compared to Islam) still confident West and an increasingly desperate Muslim civilization. In the long run, however,

<sup>12</sup> This does not imply that free trade or globalization are always helpful to all groups. Foreign competition, like domestic competition, may bankrupt some enterprises and make the workers lose their jobs (see Weede 2000, final chapter; 2002 for an analysis of these problems).

free trade and capitalism in the West may dangle enough carrots in front of Muslim faces to attract interest and imitation.

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## **Political Culture and Democracy in Turkey**

In the words of Gabriel Almond, who has possibly made the greatest contribution to political culture research in recent decades, “it is evident that political culture research and theorizing has had a ‘return’, or as Ronald Inglehart put it, a ‘renaissance’. And the movements that have most actively polemicized against political culture as an explanatory variable (Marxism of various kinds, and rational choice theory) now seem to have run out of steam, appear to be inclined to negotiate settlements, rather than requiring unconditional surrender.”<sup>1</sup>

One of the most often debated questions in political culture research is whether structures (socio-economic structures, constitutional design, strategic choices of leadership) influence political culture, or political culture influences political structures. Probably, the most reasonable answer to this question is that “causality worked both ways, that attitudes influenced structure and behavior, and that structure and performance in turn influenced attitudes.”<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, it is generally agreed upon that such underlying politico-cultural traits as tolerance, pragmatism, flexibility, moderation, trust, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation play an important role in the consolidation and stabilization of democracy, if not so much in its initial installation.<sup>3</sup>

Another pertinent question is whether such democratic values and attitudes first develop at the elite level and then spread to the masses through a long process of practice and socialization, or whether they are widely shared in the society and therefore inevitably shape elite behavior. The weight of the historical evidence indicates that the former is a more likely course. There

are exceptional cases such as the United States, however where the principal stimulus for democratization came not from the political elites but society itself. Guillermo O'Donnell, in a thoughtful reinterpretation of Tocqueville, underlines the importance attached by Tocqueville to political culture as the most crucial support for democracy and the rule of law, and then asks the following question:

“Tocqueville left us with another puzzle, no less difficult and relevant: Is it possible to reverse the sequence that he depicted? Instead of emerging from the interstices of a society that is already self-conscious of its rights and highly participatory, is it possible for a democratic rule of law to be implanted first in the sphere of politics and legislation and to spread from there into society and into the hearts of the citizens? Although he does not say so explicitly, it is clear that Tocqueville, thinking of France, believed that such an inversion would be very unlikely. We now know, however, that this did happen in France and in much of Europe. The roads to democracy and the rule of law turned out to be more varied than Tocqueville surmised.”<sup>4</sup>

Turkey clearly belongs to this second group of countries. The first steps toward the rule of law and constitutional government were taken in the nineteenth century by a small Westernizing bureaucratic elite. None of the three constitutions of the republican period (those of 1924, 1961, and 1982) was made by a broadly representative popular assembly through a genuine process of negotiation and bargaining. The 1924 Constitution was made by a Grand National Assembly completely dominated by Kemalists, even though a single-party system had not yet been consolidated at that time. The 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions were made by non-elected constituent assemblies in which the military and other state elites had great weight, and the constitutions finally adopted, although essentially conforming to democratic norms, reflected their basic values.<sup>5</sup>

In the first part of this paper Turkish mass political culture will be analyzed based on recent survey data. In the second part, some characteristics of the elite political culture will be discussed.



## Mass Political Culture

Certain values are commonly associated with a democratic regime. Among them one can cite a belief in democracy as the best form of government (democratic legitimacy), participatory values, tolerance, compromise, a rejection of political violence and extremism, a high level of interpersonal trust, and trust in public institutions. Turkish data on these elements of political culture have been collected through two surveys conducted in 1990 and 1997 within the framework of World Values Survey. The cross-national nature of this project gives us the opportunity to compare Turkey with a number of other countries.

Democratic legitimacy : A very large majority (89 percent) of the Turkish respondents wishes to be governed by a democratic system. Similarly, 92 percent of them agree with the statement that “democracy may have problems, but still it is better than any other form of government.” On the other hand, 24 percent thinks that economy works badly in a democracy, 30 percent believes that law and order deteriorates, and 65 percent associates democracy with indecision and the slow functioning of decision-making mechanisms. As far as the last finding is concerned, Turkey is in the same category as Argentina, the Philippines, Sweden, Russia, and Taiwan.

Similarly, 41 percent of the Turkish respondents prefers to have “a strong leader who does not have to worry about the parliament and elections.” 55 percent believes that decisions should be made by experts in the way they believe it best for the country instead of by the government. Even more strikingly, 33 percent thinks positively about a military government. These findings seem contradictory with the strong preference expressed for a democratic form of government. On the other hand, it is interesting that preference for a strong leader and a technocratic government is also observed in important public opinion segments of more highly institutionalized democracies. Thus, the preference score for a technocratic government (government by experts) is higher in Japan and Spain, in addition to Russia, Taiwan, Argentina, and the Philippines, than in Turkey. What makes the Turkish case particularly interesting is that about one-third of the respondents looked favorably upon a military government (only the Philippines

scores higher than Turkey on this point) even though some 90 percent believed that democracy was the best form of government. This paradox can be explained by the unusually high confidence score of the military as will be spelled out below.<sup>6</sup>

*Interpersonal trust:* Theoretical and empirical studies suggest a strong relationship between the level of interpersonal trust and stable democracy.<sup>7</sup> In the 1990 World Values Survey, only 10 percent of the Turkish respondents stated that they could trust a majority of others. This was the second lowest interpersonal trust score among the 43 countries included in the 1990 Survey. In the 1997 Survey, this score fell to 6.5 percent.<sup>8</sup> Such findings explain, among other things, the low level of associability in Turkish society.

*Confidence in public institutions:* It is generally agreed that confidence in public institutions is one of the indicators of democratic legitimacy. One of the most interesting findings of the Turkish values survey is the extremely high confidence scores for the output institutions (particularly the military) and the extremely low scores for the input institutions (government, parliament, and political parties). Table 1 gives the confidence scores (computed by subtracting the percentage of respondents who have no or little confidence in a given institution from the percentage of those who have much or some confidence) for various institutions.

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**Table 1**

	<u>Confidence Score</u>		<u>Difference in</u>
	<u>1990</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>Confidence Score</u>
Religious institutions	34	40	6
Military	82	88	6
Judicial system	27	43	16
Press	- 15	- 1	14
Trade unions	- 16	7	23
Police	27	44	17
Government		2	
Political parties		- 40	
National Assembly	15	5	- 10
Government officials	0	36	36
Big companies	- 43	24	67
Greens, environmentalists		70	
Feminist organizations		51	
European Union	- 28	- 1	27
United Nations		- 5	

Source : Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko, 42.

The unusually high confidence score for the military (much higher than the European average which is 50 in 1990) can be explained by the historically predominant role the military has played in Turkish modernization. For many Turks, the military is still seen as the ultimate guardian of a secular system of government and of a modern way of life. The special prestige of military in Turkey has also been confirmed by a number of other public opinion surveys. With regard to low confidence scores in political institutions, Turkish findings are not appreciably different from European averages. Still, the (-40) confidence score for political parties is untypically low. All impressionistic evidence suggests that today political institutions (parties, government, and parliament) enjoy an even lower level of confidence. Another interesting finding emerging out of a comparison of 1990

and 1997 Turkish data is the substantial increase in the confidence scores of large business companies and the European Union.<sup>9</sup>

Tolerance : One of the questions asked in the World Values Survey to measure tolerance was whether the respondents would be willing to accept certain categories of persons as their neighbors. Table 2 gives the findings obtained from the 1990 and 1997 Turkish surveys.

**Table 2**  
**Percentages of Non-Acceptance as Neighbors**

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1997</u>
Criminals	82	76
People of different races	39	42
People of extremist political views		75
Alcoholics	88	91
People suffering from mental illnesses	73	78
Christians	59	61
Jews	65	
Immigrants, foreign workers	32	46
AIDS victims	91	84
Drug addicts	93	94
Homosexuals	93	92

Source : Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko, 86.

Some of these findings can be understood in terms of the general conservatism of Turkish society, such as the high non-acceptance rates for criminals, alcoholics, drug addicts, AIDS victims, and homosexuals. On the other hand, high non-acceptance rates for Christians, Jews, and people of different races are more difficult to explain, and are higher than in other democratic societies. Another question designed to measure tolerance was

about the values children should be taught at home. 59 percent of Turkish respondents in 1997 cited “tolerance and respect for others” among such values. However, this score is again somewhat lower than the average for World Values Survey countries (68 percent). A related question asked the respondents whether they preferred a party leader who would be willing to collaborate with other groups even if this means making important concessions from his deeply held convictions, or a leader who would firmly stick to his convictions. 54 percent of the respondents chose the first option, while 46 percent the second option. Although such findings are comparable to those in the United States, the percentages of the proponents of compromise are generally much higher in other democratic societies than in Turkey (Japan 66, Spain 85, Australia 72, Sweden 83, Finland 85). Finally, the Turkish respondents were asked whether, to maintain good interpersonal relations, it is more important to try to understand others’ preferences, or to state clearly one’s own personal preferences. Turkish respondents who chose the first option were 34 percent. This is much lower than in Nigeria (59 percent), USA (74 percent), Spain (71 percent), Japan (78 percent), and Australia (72 percent).<sup>10</sup>

The results of the two Turkish value surveys indicate that the characteristics of Turkish mass democratic political culture are not, on the whole, inconsistent with those of other democratic societies. Nevertheless, the low level of interpersonal trust, low level of tolerance for differences, relatively little value attributed to compromise, particularly high confidence in the military, and the extremely low level of confidence in political parties indicate some problems in the way of further democratic consolidation. We will return to the implications of these traits for democratic governance after we deal with the political cultural characteristics of the state elites.

### **Political Culture of the State Elites**

The Ottoman-Turkish state has been characterized by a strong state tradition,<sup>11</sup> by which I mean a strong and centralized state, reasonably effective by the standards of its day, highly autonomous, and occupying a central and highly valued place in the political culture. Status-oriented rather than

market-oriented values were dominant. The relationship between economic and political power was the reverse of its equivalent in Western Europe. Instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading to political power, political power (a high position in the state bureaucracy) provided access to material wealth. The wealth thus accumulated, however, could not be converted into more permanent economic assets because it was liable, in both theory and practice, to confiscation by the state.

The Ottoman State, unlike its Western European counterparts, did not favor the emergence of a powerful merchant class. The much-referred-to “ethnic division of labor” meant that international trade was dominated by non-Muslim minorities, but this economic power could not be converted into a significant political role because of the Islamic nature of the state.

In short, the power of state elites in the Ottoman Empire was not seriously threatened. Neither the mercantile bourgeoisie nor the landowners developed into a class that could effectively control and limit, much less capture, the state. Thus, the fundamental social cleavage in the Ottoman Empire was based on a strictly political criterion. On the one side was the ruling *askeri* (military) class, which “included those to whom the Sultan delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely, officers of the court and the army, civil servants, and ulema (Islamic scholars)”. On the other side were the *reaya* (ruled), who comprised “all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. It was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the military.”<sup>12</sup>

Accompanying the excessive centralization of state authority and its concentration in the hands of state elites was civil society’s weakness, caused by the fragility or absence of corporate, autonomous, intermediary social structures that in the West operated independent of the government and played a cushioning role between the state and the individual. In Europe, the church was the foremost of these corporate structures, and it may have provided a model of organization for other corporate structures such as guilds, autonomous cities, and the like. These structures had no parallels in the Islamic Middle East. As a rule, Islamic law does not recognize corpo-

rate identities. For all of the theoretical supremacy of the *shari'a*, the religious class has no corporate identity but depends on the state (i.e., secular authority) for its appointments, promotions, and salaries.

Similarly, neither the cities nor the artisan guilds played an autonomous role comparable to that of their counterparts in Western Europe. The *ahi* guilds (artisan organizations with a strong religious coloring), which had played some role in the formative years of the empire, were later deprived of their corporate privileges and put under strict government control.<sup>13</sup>

In short, no autonomous structure stood between the political authority and the community of believers. This does not mean pre-modern Islamic Middle Eastern society was totally undifferentiated, atomized, or regimented. One can speak of a high degree of pluralism among craft guilds, the clergy, religious brotherhoods, endowments, mutual aid groups, non-Muslim religious organizations, nationalities, sects, tribes, clans, extended families, and the like. The penetrative capabilities of the Ottoman Empire, although fairly high by the standards of the day, were still too limited to allow it to regulate the entire range of social relationships. The strict separation between rulers and ruled and the absence of a representative system, however, did not permit this traditional pluralism to evolve into the pluralistic infrastructure of a modern democratic state. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century drive by the centralized state to reaffirm corporate exclusivity in response to European challenges further weakened traditional pluralism.

This absence of powerful classes that use the state to serve their own interests, combined with the absence or weakness of corporate intermediary bodies, produced a high degree of state autonomy. The state—which was not the captive of any particular social class—could make decisions that changed, eliminated, or created class relationships.

Regarding the cultural dimension of state autonomy, it has often been observed that the state has a salient role in both Ottoman-Turkish political thought and in the perceptions of the people. The state is valued in its own right, is relatively autonomous from society, and plays a tutelary and paternalistic role. This paternalistic image is reflected in the popular expression *devlet baba* (father state). Another popular saying is *Allah Devlete, Millete*

*zeval vermesin* (may God preserve the State and the Nation). Ottoman writings on politics and government are replete with such terms as *Devlet-i Aliye* (sublime State), *hikmet-i hükümet* (raison d'état), and *Devletin ali menfaatleri* (sublime interests of the State). Such notions readily found their place in the political discourse of the Turkish republic. Indeed, the preamble of the 1982 Turkish constitution described the State (always with a capital S) as *kutsal Türk Devleti* (sacred), adding that no thoughts or opinions could find protection against "Turkish national interests"-presumably meaning state interests as defined by the state apparatus.

The exaltation of the state has been fostered consistently through the educational system and the military. Indeed, the military and (at least until recently) the civilian bureaucracy have traditionally seen themselves as guardians of the state and protectors of public interest. Consequently, they have viewed with suspicion all particularistic interests and the political parties that represent them.<sup>14</sup> Negative attitudes also prevail with regard to most interest groups; in fact, the term *interest group* still has a somewhat pejorative meaning in Turkish. "Throughout the multiparty era," Robert Bianchi argues, "much of the political elite has continued to share a lingering fear that unless partitive interests are repressed, closely regulated, or prudently harmonized, divisions along such lines as class, religion, and region will threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the state."<sup>15</sup>

## **Political Culture and Democratic Governance**

What distinguishes Turkish politics today from the turbulent years of 1970s is the stronger elite and mass commitment to democracy. However, although democracy is seen, both at the elite and mass levels, as the most appropriate form of government, the above analysis indicates some problem areas related to the realm of political culture. Turkish modernization in general and Turkish democratization in particular took place essentially through a process of reform from above. This historical fact has fostered among the state elites (particularly the military and to a lesser extent the civilian bureaucracy) markedly paternalistic and tutelary values that are not



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consistent with a truly democratic political culture. At the mass level, the low levels of interpersonal trust and tolerance, together with a preference for strong political leadership are further obstacles in the way of the development of a democratic political culture. These politico-cultural characteristics go a long way in explaining the fact that, despite more than half a century of multi-party politics, Turkey lags behind not only new Southern European democracies (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) but also some of the Central and East European democracies in democratic consolidation.

### NOTES

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3. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," in Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, 10-11.
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7. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
8. Esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko, 25-26, 33.
9. Ibid., 41-53.
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11. On this point I draw on Ergun Özbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East," in L. Carl Brown, ed., Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 135-139.
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13. Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and History 11 (June 1969): 265-266.
14. Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey," in Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, 247-268.
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*Paul Salem*

## **The Crisis of Political Culture in the Arab World - A Conflict of Paradigms**

The interconnections between political culture, political institutions, and political outcomes are complex and multi-layered. Defining political culture itself is a complex challenge open to various interpretations. In this preliminary draft paper I will explore one aspect of this galaxy of questions relating to the competition among macro paradigms of political objectives, values, and behavior. In a sense, I will be examining the higher, more abstracted or intellectualised aspects of political culture that are partly reflected in explicit ideologies or less explicitly expressed in political world-views. I am not claiming that daily political behavior loyally follows these more intellectualised paradigms, but that they are a relevant part of the debate relating to political culture in the Mediterranean region and its effect on politics.

An important reflection to commence with is the fairly consensual paradigmatic situation arrived at in the post-World War II West, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much already began to be written in the 1950s about the end of ideology; by the 1990s Fukuyama was writing about the End of History and the development of a (albeit, perhaps flawed) consensus about the 'best' form of political, economic, and social organization. This consensus was presumably about a liberal constitutional democratic government, a market economy, and a moderate set of social policies. In a subsequent book, entitled *Trust*, Fukuyama also presumed and argued that a certain type of political culture went along with this final paradigm – a political culture based on trust, cooperation, participation, respect for others, etc. A similar tendency toward a unifying expectation about political

culture was expressed in the work of previous political scientists who examined the presumably, or hopefully, uniform attributes of Civic Culture.

Whether we agree fully with the details of these views and researches or not, the main observation that concerns us here is that the West, has tended to increasingly accept one broadly-defined liberal-democratic-market-economy-civic-culture paradigm as supreme. This has lent an important measure of coherence and cohesion to Western politics in recent years, very much in contrast to its turbulent past in which paradigmatic clashes between capitalism and communism, fascism and democracy, monarchism and republicanism, nationalism and regionalism, imperialism and independentism, Protestantism and Catholicism, tore western societies apart over many centuries. Paradigmatic consensus is an important basis for growth of a common political culture that is internalised by populations and integrated into a set of political institutions for which they make sense and through which they can symbiotically produce a stable political process.

The fact that there is an absence of consensus on political paradigms in the Arab world is a glaring, and politically very significant, reality. Among the reasons for the absence of such a consensus are a number of factors that I will examine, although not necessarily in order of priority or importance:

First, the current increasingly global consensus has been produced and is projected by the West. And for that reason the Arab world has difficulty in accepting it as a consensus paradigm. Since the birth of Islam, the Arab world has been in dialogue but competition with the (Christian) West. As the crucible of a new and immensely successful religion and civilization at a time when the Christian West was somewhat marginal, the Arab worldview is centered around a deep pride in its civilizational and cultural achievements, a conviction that the Jewish and Christian civilizations although original and sacred are surpassed by the Islamic, and a sensitivity to giving up that pride of place in exchange for accepting the worldview or paradigm developed outside the Arab-Islamic center. The culturally competitive worldview grew more embittered with the violent crusades of the Middle Ages and the Spanish conquest of Andalusia through which the opposition of the Christian west was confirmed and the hostility of the two

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civilizational blocs was hardened. The Arab-Western competition – particularly in the Arab East – was put on hold for a number of centuries as a result of the conquest of the Arab world from the East by the Mongols and the various Turkic tribes. This provided an insularity to the Arab world until the west burst back onto the scene in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with the intellectual impact of the French Revolution, the political impact of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1799, and then in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the direct and indirect conquest or control of Arab provinces and regions by the empires of the West.

The brief rebellion against Turkish rule in World War I was quickly over and quickly replaced by anti-colonial movements of liberation against various Western powers and against the Western division of Arab regions into separate states. The conclusion of national wars of liberation coincided with reverse phenomenon of the implantation of what was perceived as a colonial state on Arab land, i.e. the establishment of Israel in Palestine in 1948. In the Arab perspective, this confirmed the nefarious intentions of the Balfourian West and ensured that the national anti-colonial struggles would continue through the struggle against Israel. Finally, the struggle for the Arab world's largest resource, oil, which was symbolized for many by the direct intervention of US troops on the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1991 to secure Western control of Arab oil, has ended in situation in which the West, and particularly the United States, essentially controls the production and price of Arab oil. The latest events of September 11 are a non-representative but still indicative symptom of the level of hostility to the West that still exist in some quarters of the Arab-Islamic world.

Without going further into an analysis of the relationship, it is important to note the depth of competitiveness in the Arab perspective toward the relationship and the great difficulty of willingly and comfortably accepting the worldview of one's civilizational competitor (no to use a stronger word) as one's own. Ownership of the paradigm or worldview is essential to making it credible, and the fact that liberal democratic market economy paradigm that is now the only serious contender for a consensus paradigm on the world stage happens to be a Western-developed worldview, is a major handicap to its being adopted in the Arab world. And as it seems to be, in

many ways, perhaps the most practically applicable paradigm in this epoch, in rejecting it the Arab world is forced to fall back on other paradigms none of which have enough of the elements of practical success and durability.

It is interesting to note that in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, there prevailed, for a time, a much more positive attitude toward the West among Arab elites, in which they found it easy to adopt the general Western paradigm of the time, and indeed introduce a whole set of concepts about nationalism, secularism, civic culture, and democracy that were central to the political culture, political debates, and political movements of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, this positive attitude was short-lived, and more combative attitudes introduced by communist thought, radical nationalism, and a reviving Islamism, as well as real conflicts with the west over their colonial rule, Israel, oil, and other issues, soon confirmed a more hostile attitude.

Second, the liberal democratic market paradigm has a number of inherent opponents and critics:

- a) among the authoritarian state elites of the Arab world, as among the authoritarian states of the former Soviet bloc and other erstwhile dictatorships, there is, of course, an opposition to most aspects of this paradigm. Constitutional liberties are downplayed in favor of national duties and sacrifices with the argument that liberties might be a dangerous breach in national security (viz. Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Egypt) or that liberty is akin to looseness and corruption, amoral pollution from the West that has already taken its toll on the West (drugs, AIDS, divorce, social disintegration) and that a good conscientious state must protect their good societies against. Democracy is grudgingly paid lip service to, but it is painted as factionalism and petty politics that produces instability, fractiousness, and national weakness, while a strong leader is held up as the guarantor of stability, national security, and steady progress. Market economies are also a part of the paradigm that many of the main Arab states have not come to accept as it would mean their ceding of their central role in the economy and society to powerful players in the domestic and



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international private sector that are beyond their control and who would rob them of their patronage and socio-economic power. Reluctant states still propagandise about the rapaciousness of the private sector, the dangers of globalization, and the necessity to maintain large public sectors. Certainly few of them have joined Clinton's or Blair's Third Way.

- b) Among the Westernized intellectual elites of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, their worldview was close to that of the Western radical left-wing which often derided liberalism and democracy as bourgeois, favored more militant and communal moral attitudes, and railed against market economics as the source of all forms of domestic and global inequality and oppression. In the Arab World this intellectual attitude was reinforced by real struggles against the West.
- c) Among the non-westernized non-elites of this same period, Islam became an increasingly relevant paradigm. Chafing as they were from the West and from their own supposedly anti-Western Westernized elites, their attitudes toward the proposed paradigm were decidedly hostile. To begin with, they insisted that they were not at all in search of a paradigm, whether western or eastern as Islam, properly re-centered, was the appropriate framework for political, social cultural, and even economic life. Liberalism was irrelevant as Islam made clear what was allowed and what wasn't. Thoroughgoing democracy in which authority stemmed from the people was in principle unacceptable, as authority was God's alone, although Islam allowed an important role for consultation (*shura*) and collective decision making (the prophet's saying: my nation does not agree on error). Islamists take a more benign view of trade and markets, but they categorize it as subordinate to the overall interests of the Islamic community, bounded by the rejection of profit and regulated by the duties of *zakat*. There is certainly no conception of the supremacy or the hidden-hand goodness of the market, but rather that economic interaction, like human interaction, is healthy and natural as long as it remains regulated by the greater good of the community which is guided by the precepts of religion.

The crisis through which the Arab world is passing can be partly attributed to this particular problem: that the liberal market democratic paradigm for the Arab countries today – working toward building liberal constitutional democracies with healthy market economies and effective but moderate social programs – (a goal, incidentally, that many intellectuals and researchers quietly endorse), has failed to be successfully floated as an enthusiastically embraced popular paradigm. While Chinese students demonstrated for freedom – even carrying replicas of the Statue of Liberty – and while the youth of eastern and central Europe demonstrated for liberal market democracies, and while the middle classes of the Philippines and Chile raised this paradigm as a battle cry, no such politicisation of the dominant paradigm was successful in the Arab world.

The largely failed story of Arab civil society, symbolized by the sad – almost horrific – imprisonment of one of its foremost proponents, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, is a primary symptom and indicator of the depth of the Arab predicament vis-à-vis moving ahead with an acceptable and reasonable paradigm.

Arab civil society was supposed to follow in the footsteps of Central and Eastern European civil society. The argument was that the Arab world, like Eastern and Central Europe, had gone through a time of revolutionary upheaval marked by radical socio-economic change, the rise of strong ideologies, and the dominance of powerful authoritarian socio-ideological states, and that this period, because of socio-economic and historical inevitabilities, was coming to an end. The assumption continued that an embattled civil society had emerged even within these difficult conditions and had identified the paradigm of the future and was bravely expressing it, and that civil society would lead the natural shaking off of the old socialist authoritarian husks and would lead the way in building the new political and socio-economic order. The Arab world would have its own Walesas and Havel and would unseat its own Ceaucescus. This was said to be accompanied by a general democratization trend expressed in more political liberalization and more frequent and meaningful elections for parliaments and local administra-

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tions. Perhaps many governing elites themselves believed that such a democratising and civil society trend was sweeping the world and that they had to adapt to it, at least partially, or collapse like the once solid Soviet states. As it turned out, however, the Soviet collapse turned out to be a Soviet-centric event, and none of the Arab states suffered a similar fate nor even came close to facing serious internal political pressure for change. As the 1990s wore on and the Soviet cataclysm ebbed, Arab states regained confidence that their states were perhaps as solid as before and that, despite some necessary and wise absorption of democratic and participatory demands, they need not worry about a fundamental revolutionary trend that would inevitably sweep them away. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Arab dictatorships that had taken shape at the latest by the late 1960s were still going strong, indeed they were renewing their leases on life by dynastic transfers of power to their sons, as in Morocco, Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere.

Civil society itself, as a galvanizing movement, failed to succeed as a revolutionary political force. There may be several reasons for this:

- a) Unlike in central and eastern Europe, where civil society leaders almost monopolized expressions of dissent and rebellion against the political status quo, in the Arab world, the Islamic movements had already staked out an oppositional position since the 1960s, and had grown immensely in power with the rise of oil wealth in the gulf, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the decline of Arab nationalist and socialist ideology in the 1970s. The lightning rods of discontent were the Islamic movements, and civil society organizations and leaders could garner the support of some members of the middle class and intelligentsia, but had lost the race in reaching out to the larger mass of the population and representing for them an expression of their discontent and a leadership for their resistance or rebellion against domestic oppression or injustice.
- b) The resort of many worried Arab states to local and national elections had the effect of strengthening a new class of electoral poli-

ticians at the local and national level rather than strengthening civil society organizations and leaders, most of which found themselves unable to wage or win elections. This new political class, based largely on patron-client relations and other forms of traditional interaction, seized another significant portion of political life, in addition to that already seized by the Islamists, and left civil society organizations and leaders even more marginalized.

- c) Civil society itself in the Arab world was perhaps less robust than in central and eastern Europe partly because of the makeup of Arab society. As civil society in those countries failed to stand up to ethnic identities (e.g. the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Chechnya conflict, etc.), so civil society in the Arab world could not overcome other ascriptive associational ties of religion, family, tribe region, or even race (Kurd-Arab in Iraq, Berber-Arab in Algeria, etc.). The Soviets had perhaps homogenized many of the eastern and central European societies more effectively than had happened in the Arab world, and hence a national civil society could more effectively represent the national social structure, whereas the more segmented nature of many Arab societies made a national civil society more marginal and less effective.
- d) Western support for these civil society organizations and the harmony of eastern Europe many of whose population was unabashedly saying that they were, after all, Europeans, and they wanted to be like western Europe, whereas in the Arab world, the problem of seeing the west as a hostile 'other' made civil society links with the west almost treasonous and made their rhetoric sound unacceptably like that emanating from western embassies in their capitals.

For three reasons and more, the experience of democratisation through civil society in the Arab world is currently in serious decline. The arrest and sentencing of its most prominent proponent in the largest and most central and most pro-American Arab state is an announcement to all other Arab states,

that they can return to business as usual and that there is no need to fear or to accommodate civil society.

Much of what I have discussed above relates to the central proposition that whereas most regions of the world have moved under the general paradigm of liberal market-economy democracies (with the notable exception of China, and a much less significant handful of much smaller countries), and that most of the rest of the world is seeking to organize its political institutions and political culture under that general paradigm, albeit with varying measures of success. The Arab world, for many reasons, has not been able to move under this overall global paradigm and is still being pulled to and fro among a number of paradigms. As a political result the amount of political cultural confusion and contradiction, at all levels, in the Arab world, is very high, with obvious results in the form of political tension, political repression, and the necessary continuation of authoritarian forms of government.

Of equal importance is the problem that the other paradigms that segments of Arab society are attracted to have not been able to – and perhaps are objectively not able to – provide a basis of political stability and political development. Among the main alternative paradigms are the following:

1. The Islamic paradigm is of course the most dramatically visible and is actually in various forms of implementation in a number of Arab and Islamic countries. The example of Iran – a righteous and victorious revolution against obvious oppression, and an admittedly poor post-revolutionary performance partially saved in the past years by the popular reform movement of President Khatami – has been and remains a strong example for young and radical Islamists that radical Islamic ideals can be realized in practice with some measure of success and durability. The example of Saudi Arabia and some of its more conservative neighbors gives another example to older and more conservative Muslims or Islamists, that Islamic states are viable and durable and that they provide better alternatives, perhaps, than other models in the Arab world such as those in Iraq, Syria, or even Egypt. And certainly that they provide better alternatives than

those in post-Soviet Russia. The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, claiming descendance from the Prophet, and maintaining strong Islamic state identities, provide another less severe model of conservative politics with an Islamic identity; they offer a viable semi-Islamic model of government in contradistinction to the secular republican model of government. The wealth, power, and success of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, as well as their strong communication influence in satellite television and the Arab press, has gone a long way in convincing many in the Arab world, both elites and non-elites, that a form of Islamic or Islamic-oriented government and social framework is the most appropriate one for the Arab world. This conviction is based on a number of perceptions: (i) that the Arab-Islamic world is different than other societies and that its social, cultural, moral, and religious makeup make it such that an Islamic government is most suitable for it, even if other forms of more secular or republican government are more suitable for western Europe or North America. For others, the argument is that (ii) this form of government is actually better than other forms of government, and that the Arab-Islamic world adopts it because it is the best not because it is particular to the Arab world. The belief is partly religious, but also partly moral in that the West as well as the post-Soviet or Chinese East have failed to protect their populations against the social and moral ills of modernization, and that the Islamic alternative is indeed the paradigm for the future. The Islamic paradigm is, of course, a long and complex topic regarding which much has been written, but suffice it here to make this quick reference to it as a strong competing paradigm.

2. the Arab socialist nationalist paradigm was indeed the dominant paradigm in the period between the 1950s and 1970s. It shaped the thinking of an entire generation and became the dominant paradigm in the cultural institutions of power in the central Arab countries of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It was also the dominant paradigm of the intelligentsia (journalists, professors, poets, writers, musicians) that was responsible for most of the cultural production in the various media in that period. Represented by dominant figures such as Abdel

Nasser and hardened by repeated wars with Israel, this worldview, with its ample borrowing from Soviet and nationalist thought, remained a strong paradigmatic presence even after the passing of its heyday a couple of decades ago. Although the states that created, and were created by, it are now cold repressive relics of their once charismatic past, the paradigm remains a touchstone of legitimacy and loyalty to wide sectors of the intelligentsia and middle class. In its vision of a united Arab world – or at least a more unified one – and strong corporatist semi-socialist states that ‘represent’ all sectors of their society, dominate the developmental economy, and tend to the social and welfare needs of their populations, this Arab socialist nationalist paradigm is still a powerful presence that runs in many senses in alternative directions to the global liberal market democratic paradigm.

### **Conclusion**

In this preliminary exploration of the issue of paradigmatic competition in the contemporary Arab world, I have tried to shed some light on the extent to which the global liberal-market-democratic paradigm, although considered seriously by many influential Arabs individually, has failed to become a dominant paradigm in the Arab world, and how alternative paradigms, inherited or renewed, are competing for dominance in the political cultural arena. Much work still needs to be done to develop the theses presented in outline form above. Certainly, however, this paradigmatic dissonance creates waves of political cultural dissonance within various sectors of Arab societies themselves, and prevents the political systems from developing a coherent symbiosis between political institutions and political culture, and leads to the continuations of political tension and political repression. It is also the case that this paradigmatic tension finds its way into high levels of tension in the international relations of the region as well. International relations themselves require a fit between institutions and paradigm, and the absence of acquiescence in the Arab world, at the level of populations and many elites, to the current global paradigm, translates into high levels of

conflict and tension at the international level. This is partly why more than half the countries with which the West, and the US in particular, is in direct or indirect conflict, are in the Arab world. It is the case that most of the task of working toward more paradigmatic consensus in the Arab world, whether it is on the current global paradigm, or one of the alternative Arab paradigms, or some new Third Way, falls on Arab writers, thinkers, leaders, and activists; but it is also the case as well that the West, and Europe in particular, has an obligation and an interest in better understanding the debates and contradictions raging in the Arab world in order to build better relations with the Arab world and in order to refine the global paradigm in ways that take into account the specific perspectives and sensitivities of others.



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## **Euro-Mediterranean Formations – Socio-Cultural Imperatives of System Change**

### **Introduction**

Over the last decade, ‘good governance’ became a term in inflationary use both by comparativist and international relations scholarship. Although its longevity may be questioned by those adhering to the more conventional analytical *foci* of economic liberalisation and democratisation, its pertinence has been consistently hailed by those subscribing to the promotion of flexible but value-driven patterns of (collective) rule-making. This paper aims at assessing the nature and aspirations of the European Union’s (EU) involvement with the promotion of political change in the Mediterranean region, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995. Clarifying some conceptual and definitional problems facing the ‘good governance’ approach to Euro-Mediterranean politics will be central to developing a more penetrating understanding of the emerging regional system.

An important distinction related to the line pursued in this paper is between democratisation and good governance. The former refers to the process of attaining a democratic end-product with reference to the governance of a polity or, as the case of the EU *qua* ‘sympolity’ clearly illustrates, of a plurality of polities. The democratisation philology emphasises the institutional means by which democratic principles and processes are to become part of a polity’s *modus operandi*, with the view to establishing conditions

of public accountability, political legitimacy (both input- and output-oriented) and citizen participation. Although no consensus definition of democratisation (either as a process or strategy) can be said to exist, central to its attainment are the institution of competitive periodic elections, individual and collective executive accountability, meaningful legislative representation of the demos, a participatory civil society, and the rule of law (with or without a formal constitutional expression). This list could well be extended to a variety of good democratic practices in the workings and composition of political institutions, principles referring to some form of separation of powers, civic rights and duties, respect for human and minority rights, promotion of associational-type organisations, etc. The problem associated with the 'democratisation approach' to the promotion of political change in a state or group of states is that its desired end-situation - democracy - is linked with the Western liberal political tradition. Thus, employing the language (and assorted value spheres) of democratisation might not be entirely, partly or at all appropriate as a guide towards the promotion of political change in such areas as North Africa, the Middle East or South East Asia, whose polities are characterised by different belief-systems, cultural traditions, political practices and social structures as compared to the average West European state.

Good governance on the other hand, seen as a flexible policy framework, aims at distancing itself from absolute notions of democracy and democratisation, focusing instead on a set of norms and rules that are associated with what can be described as a system of working relations based on the following constitutive elements: policy and decisional openness and transparency, public accountability, lack of corruption, the institutionalisation of civil society, the socio-political dimensions of legitimacy, civic competence, individual and collective liberties, minority and human rights, efficient public-sector management, equitable distribution of public resources, dialogical or deliberative political processes, the independence of the judiciary, the conception and enactment of well-articulated laws, etc. What it lacks, therefore, as opposed to the democratisation strategy, is a clear focus on a final product of the process of change, be it transitory or transformative, linear or erratic, domestically driven or externally controlled. Instead,

good governance may well focus on issues of political liberalisation, inter-faith or inter-cultural dialogue, and socio-economic governance, without however democracy being logically or necessarily located at the end of a continuum, whose two extreme poles are represented by ‘non-democracy’ (encompassing a variety of autocratic, authoritarian, totalitarian and like-minded political regimes) and full-blown democracy (or, as some realist democratic theorists would probably have it, polyarchy).

In summary, the good governance approach forms the basis of a particular type of socio-political agenda informed by notions of mutualism and reciprocity, rather than by the universal applicability of liberal-democratic ideals in the sense of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis. Its is above all an instrument for capacity-building in furthering inter-systemic convergence, without subsuming the collectivities into an absolutist ideology of good democratic practice. Thus, central to the development of a better understanding of the emerging Euro-Mediterranean system is the need to acknowledge the normative and procedural qualities of diversity and differentiation, as opposed to systemic uniformity and principled universality. Good governance does not easily become, to borrow from Niblock, ‘subject to allegations of cultural bias’.<sup>1</sup> Finally, despite the fact that, much like democratisation, no general agreement exists in the *acquis académique* as to what good governance comprises, unlike democratisation, it ‘constitutes a more diffuse and less directly challenging manifesto ... emphasise[s] values and practices which are not absolutes ... [and] enables concern with democracy to find expression through less direct but nonetheless significant channels’.<sup>2</sup>

### **Definitional Accounts**

The Mediterranean constitutes an interactive system of states and societies, whose mapping remains nebulous. Although ‘different definitions and dif-

<sup>1</sup> T. Niblock, ‘Good Governance: Towards a new Framework to Guide the European Union’s Involvement with Middle Eastern States’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Democratisation’, University of Reading, 15 January 2000, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

ferent criteria often produce different regions',<sup>3</sup> the problem of defining this 'unique body of water' is that those who raise the same type of questions fail to agree on a geographically bounded unit of analysis. But defining the Mediterranean requires taking into account that 'mental maps' and 'imagined spaces' are those that ultimately define communities and political regions.<sup>4</sup> Pre-1945 maps of the region may look today archaic, yet the way in which such maps are drawn offer a powerful policy tool for controlling its component territories. But broad concepts such as the 'West' or the 'Orient' that continue to divide the region cover no well-delineated territories. Their appeal is in the associations they conjure up, mixing geographical space with socio-economic interaction, as well as with political and cultural identity to draw an imaginary but identifiable divide.<sup>5</sup> A more studied analysis reveals that the region offers an efficient line of contact. After all, in the disorderly universe of politics, perceptions generate reality. The ability to manage such perceptions is thus crucial, especially given that there is hardly another topic that have caused such a clear-cut split among its students: Christian Europe and the Islamic world.

Unlike most northern European countries that generally regard North Africa as an incongruent and 'backward region' of no great strategic interest, countries like Italy, Spain, France and Greece hold a different view. Likewise, for many North Africans, the dividing line between Europe and Africa lies in the Sahara and not the Mediterranean. Tempting as it may be to characterise the latter as 'a kind of horizontal dividing line' between the European North and 'an arc of crisis' located in the South, its division into Europe and 'other' fails to capture the dialectic between these distinct yet intertwined geographical spaces. A North-South conflict theoretical framework underestimates the realities of both North-North and South-South frictions and the sympathies that not only prevent the outbreak of autochthonous conflicts but also underlie Western European efforts to develop harmonious and balanced, albeit not symmetrical, relations across the

<sup>3</sup> B. Russett, 'International Regions and the International System', in R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 83.

<sup>4</sup> See also P. Gould and R. White, *Mental Maps* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974); and A. K. Henrikson, 'The Geographical "Mental Maps" of American Policy-Makers', *International Political Science Review*, 1:4 (1980) 495-530.

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Mediterranean.<sup>6</sup> While Calleya argues that the Mediterranean encompasses at least two ‘international regions’ (the EU and the Middle East) and three sub-regional groupings (southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb),<sup>7</sup> one could identify many variations in these divisions, presenting analysts with the problem of regional identity. From the perspective of international regionalism, although sub-regional constellations need a complex re-conceptualisation of wider regional dynamics, it is still useful to think of the Mediterranean as a single system (totality). Some of the many security considerations around the basin derive from similar trends such as unresolved questions of political legitimacy, slow growth to resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, the search for regional dominance, arms supplies, strategic balances, etc. Another paradox arises when considering that it is security, rather than societal, economic or cultural considerations that legitimise a holistic approach to the study of Euro-Mediterranean politics.<sup>8</sup> True as it may be that security problems in the area can best be handled at the regional level, the question is how to achieve coherent patterns of interaction among Mediterranean states, as well as between them and the rest of the world so as to enhance regional stability.<sup>9</sup>

The Mediterranean has been described as a dense network of diversities and dividing lines between different political and socio-economic (sub)systems, cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religious denominations. For a penetrating understanding of the Mediterranean to be reached, one has to recognise that the region has always been a crossing point for conflict and co-operation, unity and diversity. Current discourses assert that the Mediterranean exists as an ‘entity’ or ‘unity’; a view which chimes well with Braudel’s, in that the Mediterranean formed a

<sup>5</sup> W. Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, (London, Pinter, 1990), p.8.

<sup>6</sup> N. Waites and S. Stavridis, ‘The EU and Mediterranean Member States’, in Stavridis, *et al.* (eds.), *The Foreign Policies*, p. 29.

<sup>7</sup> See S. C. Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area* (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997), especially pp. 89-140.

<sup>8</sup> D. Fenech, ‘Ways and Means of Security around the Mediterranean Sea: A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Fondation Méditerranéenne d’Etudes Stratégiques, Seminar de la Tour Blanche, Toulon, 21-24 June 1995.

<sup>9</sup> T. Niblock, ‘The Realms within which Integrated Communities Approach could be fostered’, in G. Nonneman (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach* (London, Federal Trust, 1992), p. 49.

large-scale unity, whose history could be understood only by looking at the factors that tied its coastal parts together.<sup>10</sup> But as Aliboni asserts, the special bonds of Mediterranean solidarity will continue to form part of an open-ended debate.<sup>11</sup> In this context, Lister makes the point that the question of a Mediterranean ‘ideal’ of unity is rarely explicitly spelled out; rather, ‘it is usually a vague expression of goodwill and shared history’.<sup>12</sup> Being a heterogeneous synthesis of religious and ethnic groups along the lines of a ‘hierarchy’, and of unequal economic development, a plurality of regimes, divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic growth, Mediterranean complexity occupies a prominent position between order and disorder. For our purposes, the Mediterranean is defined as a heterarchical regional space, where geography, history and politics intermesh with culture and religion with enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.

## Threat Perceptions and Misperceptions

From a macro-historical perspective, Mediterranean fragmentation constitutes the major obstacle to substantive regional co-operation. Contemporary analysts point to both real and potential conflicts that originate in or impact upon the region. In revisiting their respective causes, Balta distinguishes between conflicts that originate in the distant past and conflicts that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century.<sup>13</sup> Potential conflicts are divided into three categories: those inherited from colonialism (mainly territorial), those stemming from deeply divided societies (e.g., Lebanon), and those originating in minority issues (e.g., Basques, Corsicans, Kurds, etc). Conflicts inherited from the past are closely associated with the three monotheistic denominations affecting Mediterranean societies. These in-

<sup>10</sup> See F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vols. I-II, 5th ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1987).

<sup>11</sup> See R. Aliboni, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension’, in W. Wallace (ed.), *The Dynamics of European Integration* (London, Pinter, 1990), pp. 155-67.

<sup>12</sup> M. Lister, *The European Union and the South: Relations with Developing Countries* (London, Routledge, 1997), p. 72.

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heritances exemplify the denominational fractures among Christianity, Judaism and Islam, as well as the schisms between the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox camps, and between the Sunnis and Shiites. Such conflicts are the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Greco-Turkish rivalry and the continuing division of Cyprus.

Following Spenser's analysis, the prevailing view during the Cold War was that the Mediterranean represented 'a region of importance because of its proximity, potential instability and hence exploitation by the erstwhile Soviet Union, but of less importance as an "out of area" region in NATO terms'.<sup>14</sup> Post-1989, however, the emphasis shifted from global assessments of security issues to regional ones. Lesser argues that in the new strategic environment, problems and interests have shifted towards the South.<sup>15</sup> Although the aftermath of the Cold War gave the impression that certain protracted conflicts might be resolved, the easing of East-West tension was not followed by a similar trend in Mediterranean politics. Rather, the removal of the bipolarity and with it the view that wanted the Mediterranean to serve as a sub-theatre of superpower antagonism introduced an idiosyncratic fragility at both regional and sub-regional level.

Important security issues appear to be products of the new world (dis)order. The Gulf crisis of 1990/91 was the first major international conflict to be recorded in the era of *Pax Americana* post-Cold War, questioning the capabilities of European institutions, the impact of independent national diplomacies and the future of multinational crisis management. The Gulf crisis interrupted Europe's newly-founded complacency about its own security, as it clearly showed that, without the US, Europe lacks the military capability to confront or deter its enemies in its southern flank.<sup>16</sup> Iraq's

<sup>13</sup> See P. Balta, 'La Méditerranée en tant que zone de conflits', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37 (1997).

<sup>14</sup> C. Spencer, 'Rethinking or reorienting Europe's Mediterranean security focus', in W. Park and G. Wyn Rees (eds.), *Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe* (London, Longman, 1998), p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> I. O. Lesser, 'Growth and Change in Southern Europe', in J. W. Holmes (ed.), *Maelstrom: The United States Southern Europe and the Challenges in the Mediterranean* (Cambridge, MA, World Peace Foundation, 1995), pp. 11-30.

<sup>16</sup> D. P. Calleo, 'The United States and Security in the New Europe', in W. Weidenfeld and J. Janning (eds.), *Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow's World* (Gutersloh, Bertelsmann, 1991), p. 172. See also W. H. Taft, 'European Security: lessons learned from the Gulf war', *NATO Review*, 39:3 (1991) 7-11.

invasion of Kuwait also highlighted the fragility of Arab unity. Not only did it disprove the myth that Arabs do not attack their brethren, but also exposed the poorer countries' resentment towards the opulent life-style of the oil-rich monarchies and the shallowness of security arrangements in the Arab world.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, the initial euphoria of a universal collective security system hardly outlived the aftermath of the Gulf War, as the Yugoslav crisis destroyed the illusion of what US President Bush called a 'new world order'. Although the aftermath of the Gulf War sparked an interest in issues of conflict-resolution in the Mediterranean,<sup>18</sup> soon after the termination of the civil war in Lebanon, there was a return to traditional power-relations; the most striking examples being the stagnated Cyprus problem and the erratic Middle East Peace Process.

As Jervis rightly points out, in international relations, it is the threat itself as much as the perceptions of threat that guide policy-makers.<sup>19</sup> Today, most analysts agree that the Mediterranean does not present Europe with a major military threat,<sup>20</sup> as the growing arms races in the region and its militarisation are mainly intended for use on a south-south scale. Not surprisingly, then, EU states are more concerned about losing control over their energy supplies and growing illegal migration. Similarly, they are preoccupied with increased instability in parts of North Africa and the weakness of democratic institutions. Although issue-specific disputes are not to be ruled out, the main security risk is linked to the new challenges posed by radical movements and the growing north-south economic asymmetries. Nor do southern Mediterranean countries perceive any direct military threat from Europe, for they tend to associate 'security' chiefly with domestic concerns. Still though, the international management of domestic crises exacerbates anti-Western feelings: 'Even talking about it may have a destabilising effect'.<sup>21</sup> This perception stems from a chain of events that have fuelled

<sup>17</sup> J. P. Zanders, 'A New Security (Dis)Order for the Gulf', *POLE Papers*, Centrum voor Polemologie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1, 1995.

<sup>18</sup> F. Halliday, 'The Gulf War and its aftermath', *International Affairs*, 67:2 (1991) 223-4.

<sup>19</sup> R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>20</sup> P. Moya, *Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, North Atlantic Assembly, Civilian Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, AM 259, 7 October 1995, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> R. Aliboni, 'Introduction', in Aliboni, Joffé and Niblock, (eds.), *Security Challenges*, p. 10.



a deep sense of strategic insecurity in the Arab world. The Gulf War, the international isolation imposed on Iraq and Libya, and the overwhelming US preoccupation with Israeli security have convinced the Arabs that the West may not hesitate to strike out against them should its interests require so. Most North African regimes are skeptical of Europe's willingness to play a decisive role in Mediterranean security,<sup>22</sup> while they are suspicious of NATO's involvement in the region,<sup>23</sup> despite its initiative for a 'Mediterranean Dialogue'.<sup>24</sup> For their part, finally, EU states exhibit a relative difficulty in dealing with Mediterranean security, in contrast to dealing with similar problems in other transformative regions.

### Islamophobia and Modernity

Mediterranean security is full of misunderstandings about distorted perceptions and images of Islam, as well as about the threat of terrorism used by extremist nationalist movements. Other issues stem from the appropriation of Islam for political ends and the tensions arising from questions regarding universal values and norms of human rights. These misunderstandings emanate as much from mutual ignorance, as they do from intended confusion. One should also guard against the simplification often suggested in the media that 'Islamic fundamentalism' is a violent and merciless force orchestrated by Iran with the help of other radical regimes.<sup>25</sup> As Essid points out, 'there is still a need to define and redefine terms which reduce dialogue to a series of parallel monologues and, at several levels, reinforce misunderstandings'.<sup>26</sup> It is thus of great value that any meaningful debate about Islam should dispel the clouds of deliberate myth-making and revengeful rhetoric that are particularly detrimental to a mutually rewarding dialogue.

<sup>22</sup> G. Joffé, 'Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2:1 (1997) 18.

<sup>23</sup> See T. Greenwood, 'US and NATO Force Structure and Military operations in the Mediterranean', *McNair Papers*, 14, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 1993.

<sup>24</sup> N. de Santis, 'The future of NATO's Mediterranean initiative', *NATO Review*, 46:1 (1998) 32-35.

<sup>25</sup> P. Cuco, *The Eastern Mediterranean*, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee, Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1465, 24 May (1995).

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Faria and Vasconcelos, 'Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality', *Chaillot Papers*, 25, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1996, p. 1.

During the Gulf War, the West was seriously concerned with the possibility of a militant Islamist backlash against intervention, unveiling several fault-lines between and within Mediterranean polities and societies. This signalled the re-arrangement of world order, reducing East-West antagonism to a minimum, while re-emphasising the Orient-Occident and North-South divides, thus offering useful ammunition to those arguing that the dominant conflict post-1989 is between Occidental and Oriental values, or an Occidental economic/technological 'post-historical' world and an Oriental 'historical' world.<sup>27</sup> Rather effortlessly, Huntington depicted multiple (sub)regional 'clashes' as a result of the irrefutable existence of different cultures (civilisations), projecting a historical Mediterranean fragmentation, rather than unity.<sup>28</sup> His *Clash of Civilisations* raised the question of security's cultural dimension, in that the 'clash' occurs along the lines of religiously inspired militancy against Western liberal values. But his analysis missed the underlying causes of Islamic resurgence, as it is obsessed with the cultural symbols or the retrieval of collective historical memories. A related criticism is that, by rewriting Muslim history, he failed to encourage intelligent dialogue between the two opposing cultures. As Sachedina asserts, such scholarship effectively corrupts the common moral and political language of the two cultures, fosters confrontation, and prolongs historical stereotypes.<sup>29</sup> Arguing that the notion of 'Islam vs. the West' will not represent the arena of the next ideological struggle, Fuller and Lesser suggest that a comprehensive reform to break away from authoritarianism is imperative, that political Islam threatens the established order in Muslim countries far more than the West, and that confrontation can best be prevented by integrating Islam into the global process.<sup>30</sup>

Nevertheless, concern of an Islamic 'threat' to the West increased after the Gulf War, by creating a new enemy stereotype after the demise of commu-

<sup>27</sup> F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 1992).

<sup>28</sup> S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London, Touchstone, 1996).

<sup>29</sup> A. Sachedina, 'Religion and Global Affairs: Islamic Religion and Political Order', *SAIS Review*, 18:2 (1998) 59-64.

<sup>30</sup> See G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995).

nism, preparing a climate for a 'new cultural war'.<sup>31</sup> Rising anxiety in international relations is, according to Blunden, contagious.<sup>32</sup> All too often, Western foreign policy-makers have exploited a general public ignorance about 'Orientalism' to advance self-serving objectives. Since 'Islam is both a religion and a polity',<sup>33</sup> several extremist groups have used it for radical purposes. The traditional view of 'Orientalists' in the West is that the Arabs/Muslims 'show lack of coordination and harmony in organisation and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for mutual benefit or common profit is alien to them'.<sup>34</sup> Crucial to the creation of such stereotypes has been the role played by the Western media in equating Islam with 'fundamentalist Islam' and, hence, with a direct threat to the liberal-democratic West. In this context, Said notes, 'there is a consensus on Islam as a kind of scapegoat for everything we do not happen to like about the world's new political, social, and economic patterns'.<sup>35</sup> Likewise, Esposito suggests that the selective presentation of facts and biased analysis have contributed to a negative perception of Islamic religion by mainstream Western society, reducing Islam and its revivalism to stereotypes of 'Islam vs. the West', 'Islam vs. modernity', 'Muslim rage', etc.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, Roberson argues that 'the Islamic threat is essentially a counterfeit issue imbued with stereotypical misperceptions and a casual commitment to analysis ... in some cases, a conscious exercise in image creation for tactical political purposes'.<sup>37</sup>

With the majority of pre-liberal images being influenced by the pre-eminent role attached to a value-driven distinction between the individual and the collective, it was thanks to the legacy of the Enlightenment that certain notions of 'civility' were linked to a more normative political language. Such a legacy has largely survived the present era, with the West attempting to monopolise global discourse on the democratic functions of

<sup>31</sup> M. J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

<sup>32</sup> M. Blunden, 'Insecurity in Europe's Southern Flank', *Survival*, 36:2 (1994) 137.

<sup>33</sup> T. W. Lippman, *Understanding Islam* (New York, Penguin Group, 1990), p. 70.

<sup>34</sup> E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Vintage, 1979), p. 310.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> J. L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 4th ed. (Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1998).

<sup>37</sup> B. A. Roberson, 'Islam and Europe: An enigma or a Myth?', in B. A. Roberson (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit* (London, Routledge, 1998), p. 120.

government and human rights. But much like those in the West, Muslims believe that their faith has a divine purpose too, motivating them to set the world straight. They believe to be the chosen people following the righteous path to 'judgement day'. More than religion and polity, Islam is also a culture with a different perception of the relationship between church and state. Although the roots of this discourse can be traced to the revival of classic Greek ideas and the Renaissance, the coming of modernity clearly exposed the differences between the two cultures.<sup>38</sup> Most Arab societies were introduced to the logic of modernisation under the heavy pressure of colonial Europe. Modernisation was more successful in dismantling the traditional structures than in setting up their modern replacements.<sup>39</sup> The process of adaptation to modernity is still going on for Islamic countries. Although Gellner has argued that Islamic culture is endowed with a number of features that are congruent with requirements of modernity or modernisation,<sup>40</sup> many Muslim leaders still fight for a line 'back to the roots'. Arab governing elites are particularly eclectic in picking out those 'values of modernisation' that best fit their aims for maintaining power and control like modern weapons, surveillance technology and consumer goods. Such processes of 'selective sorting out' and 'selective adaptation' do not allow the Western value system to be accepted by these societies. Instead, modernisation is often reduced to a symbol of moral decay, with Western influence having to be controlled, for it increases the technological, military, economic and scientific superiority and/or hegemony of the capitalist world.

In Western polities, a separation of state and religion (secularism) was necessary to safeguard the modernisation project - and its assorted properties of industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, technology, growth in communications, etc. - but Islam is still against any such separation.<sup>41</sup> Huntington observes that fundamentalist Islam demands political rulers to

<sup>38</sup> See C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York, Harper and Row, 1966).

<sup>39</sup> See G. A. G. Soltan, 'State Building, Modernization and Political Islam: The Search for Political Community(s) in the Middle East', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37 (1997).

<sup>40</sup> See E. Gellner, 'Up from Imperialism', *The New Republic*, 22 May (1989) 35-36.

<sup>41</sup> P. G. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (in Greek) (Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1991).

be practicing Muslims: ‘*shari’a* [Islamic law] should be the basic law, and *ulema* [theologians and jurists] should have “a decisive vote in articulating, or at least reviewing and ratifying, all governmental policy”’.<sup>42</sup> According to Islamists, modernity may only be reached within the framework of indigenous values and not through their assimilation to Western culture. As Aliboni asserts, modernisation through imitation of the West is but a trap leading to subordination.<sup>43</sup> In this context, Huntington notes that, ‘to the extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrines and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics’.<sup>44</sup> This view accords with Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s earlier analysis that ‘the Islamic countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa ... appear to have little prospect of transition even to semi-democracy’.<sup>45</sup> But it comes in direct opposition to Pool’s claims that ‘the view that Islam is utterly incompatible with democracy, whatever form the latter takes, is to view Islam from a limited and simplistic perspective. Contemporary Islam can be democratic, undemocratic and anti-democratic and the political orientations of Muslim and Islamic movements have exhibited similar variations’.<sup>46</sup> Although Curdy argues that democracy and Islam ‘are contradictory only if democracy is defined by certain Western standards’,<sup>47</sup> Pool is right to suggest that ‘presidents and kings remain in charge of a state-controlled process of democratisation as part of strategies of ... regime survival’.<sup>48</sup>

The revival of Islam *per se*, of political Islamism, and of Islamic radicalism are products of these antitheses. Fragmented and struggling with modernity, Islam now faces a variety of challenges including potentially violent movements. The threat of radicalism currently manifested in the Southern

<sup>42</sup> S. P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 19.

<sup>43</sup> R. Aliboni, ‘Factors Affecting Mediterranean Security’, in Tanner (ed.), *Arms Control*.

<sup>44</sup> S. P. Huntington: 19.

<sup>45</sup> J. Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. xx; quoted in D. Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife: democratization and its limits in the Middle East’, in G. Parry and M. Morran (eds.), *Democracy and democratization* (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 197.

<sup>46</sup> Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife’, p. 198.

<sup>47</sup> D. G. Curdy, ‘Security and Peace in the Middle East: Experiments with Democracy in an Islamic World’, *Maxwell Papers*, 4, Air War College, 1996, p. 4.

<sup>48</sup> Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife’, p. 215.

Mediterranean rim lies in the fact that many of its essential aspects represent a reaction to years of intolerable political and socio-economic conditions. In this sense, the fundamentalist threat is not merely a symptom of deeply rooted differences between the West and Islam, but also a means of responding to post-colonial pressures towards liberalisation, which is perceived as threatening the 'inner cohesion' of the Islamic tradition. In this context, religion is used to cover other deficits like economic, social and political, pointing to an alleged inferiority in self-perception, dissatisfaction in terms of social development and the non-acceptance of an organisational/technocratic problem-solving capacity of 'the other'. In brief, the creation of a climate of open dialogue in the Mediterranean is no easy task, given the tendency by both sides to fuel prejudices. But as long as misperceptions persist and differences are not tolerated, then the relationship between Islam and Europe will remain tense, offering an apology for inaction. Therefore, a new 'hermeneutics of civilisational dialogue'<sup>49</sup> emanates as a *praesumptio juris et de jure*: a dialectic of cultural self-realisation through a reciprocal exchange based on a philosophy of mutual understanding that does away with any subjectivist view that wants the 'West' to act as a universal civilising force based on an almost metaphysical obligation to humanity. But let us now turn to the launching of the Barcelona Process and examine the extent to which the latter has marked a break with past European policies towards the region, by means of advancing the socio-cultural dimension of Euro-Mediterranean governance.

## **A Socio-Cultural Partnership**

The political aims of the EMP were not extensively discussed in the Barcelona Conference of 28-29 November 1995 so as to avoid drawing attention to the democratic deficit in the Middle East.<sup>50</sup> Although US foreign policy-makers saw the EU's involvement in the region as a direct invasion of

<sup>49</sup> H. Köchler, 'Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue: The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict', *Occasional Papers Series*, 3, International Progress Organization, 1998.

<sup>50</sup> See R. Gillespie, 'Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37 (1997).

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European diplomacy to an area firmly located within their traditional sphere of influence, all partner states stressed that, while the EMP was not to replace other regional initiatives, it would contribute to their success. Yet, no operational role was foreseen for the EMP in the ongoing Middle East Peace Process, although it was hoped that it could mark a positive economic impact. The Barcelona Conference managed to bring Israeli and Syrian representatives at the same table, which was inconceivable for any previous initiative. The participation of these Arab countries bestowed a considerable degree of legitimacy to the meeting. A contributing factor was the euphoria that stemmed from the achievement of significant progress in the Oslo peace talks.<sup>51</sup> In an atmosphere of ‘high hopes and low motives’,<sup>52</sup> the Conference became the ‘launching pad’<sup>53</sup> for a regional process aiming to preserve peace and stability, set up a shared prosperity zone through and promote a structured political dialogue among the partners. Although the Barcelona Declaration does not in itself represent a historical turning point, in so far as its main objective was not one of regional integration, it did introduce a new co-operative spirit in three areas: political and security; economic and financial; and socio-cultural. These fields were structured into three ‘baskets’ - resembling the 1975 Helsinki Final Act - whose continuity was to be aided by the setting up of a follow-up mechanism, to which we now turn.

To start with, a Commission official described the inclusion of the Social, Cultural and Human basket as a mini-revolution in itself.<sup>54</sup> Its scope was wide-ranging and ambitious, granting NGOs and civil society representatives a significant role in EMP affairs. As Colas put it: ‘The incorporation of civil society into the Barcelona process is a clear case of international regime formation, which seeks to respond to changes of intergovernmental

<sup>51</sup> See J. Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).

<sup>52</sup> See J. Marks, ‘High Hopes and Low Motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’, in *Mediterranean Politics*, 1:1 (1996) 1-24.

<sup>53</sup> See E. Barbé, ‘The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 1:1 (1996) 25-42.

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Partnership’, *Euromed Special Feature*, 3, December 1998.

elitism'.<sup>55</sup> Linkages and networks between civil societies in both Mediterranean shores may lay the foundation for knowledge, understanding and mutual confidence, which are vital components to the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean social space. Co-operation among civil societies should not take the form of assistance or the imposition of the Western liberal-democratic model. Rather, it should incorporate the component civil societies in political decision-making and also take into account their respective particularities. The Declaration underlined that 'the reinforcement of democracy and respect for human rights' are indeed the essential elements of the entire project. But co-operation in these areas is also the most sensitive dimension of the EMP, for the debate on democracy and human rights in the region is linked to issues of identity, rights and reciprocal civilisational interaction. Certain sectors of North African and Middle Eastern public opinion suspect that the West wants to impose its civilisation and hegemony under the guise of universal democratic principles, whilst in the North, in parallel to the explosion of racism and xenophobia, the preconceived idea that there is an intrinsic incompatibility between (political) Islam and democracy has developed at both grassroots and elite level.<sup>56</sup> As Fahmy points out, potential differences may emerge in the various conceptions of democracy and human rights, and the only way for their resolution is through a cultural dialogue to reconcile the contending interpretations.<sup>57</sup>

The EMP aims at bringing the peoples of the envisaged Euro-Mediterranean space closer together, to promote shared or at least mutually compatible understandings of governance and collective rule-making, to eliminate discomfiting cultural stereotypes and, in general, to project positive images among the partner polities. Arguably, such a 'pro-active' approach to fostering a sense of Euro-Mediterranean (societal) security challenges the islamophobic 'clash of civilisations' thesis and its assorted conceptions of religious and cultural conflict. The means for bringing the component collectivities closer together with the view to setting the scene

<sup>55</sup> A. Colas, 'The Limits of Mediterranean Partnership: Civil Society and the Barcelona Conference of 1995', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 8:4 (1997) 75.

<sup>56</sup> See A. de Vasconcelos, R. Aliboni and A. Monem Said Aly, EuroMeSCo Report 1997/98.

<sup>57</sup> N. Fahmy, 'After Madrid and Barcelona: Prospects for Mediterranean Security', paper presented in Conference on 'Prospects after Barcelona', organised by MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.



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for a 'new cultural order',<sup>58</sup> rest on an inter-cultural hermeneutic dialogue in a wide range of issue areas like cultural heritage, media, inter-faith communication, and so on. The third basket highlights common roots (as part of a common experience) and the richness of the region's cultural diversity, in an attempt to do away with negative pre-conceptions. But building the socio-cultural Partnership is a delicate process, not least due to difficulties inherent in sustaining a constructive cultural dialogue among distinct units. All the more so, if such a dialogue aims at transcending images from the region's colonial past, feelings of intolerance and xenophobia, as well as a narrow view of national, and in some cases ethnic, identity.

An additional obstacle may be that any inter-civilisational dialogue implies cultural exchanges and mobility that are not always easy to achieve in the southern rim. In light of the above, what is needed is a new hermeneutics of north-south perceptions, together with the inclusion of religious and socio-cultural rights in the debate on democracy and modernity. Although the third basket is often projected as being only of secondary importance to the politico-economic dimensions of the EMP (focusing on security and free trade issues), the view taken here is that it is potentially the most revolutionary outcome of the nascent regional process. It is a recognition that trade, investment and economic assistance are part of an evolutionary and purposeful process that incorporates a substantive human dimension. After making obligatory references to 'dialogue and respect among cultures and religions' as 'a necessary precondition for bringing peoples closer', the third basket identifies the need for a programme of human exchanges between the two coastal shores, whilst including the utilisation and further development of human resources in the region. In addition, it touches upon the sensitive issues of illegal immigration, organised crime and drugs trafficking, as well as on co-operation between local authorities, trade unions, interest associations, and public and private companies. Finally, the Declaration recognised the challenges posed by ever-alarming demographic trends in southern Mediterranean and declared that these should be coun-

<sup>58</sup> We borrow this term from His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch. Speech delivered at the University of Exeter, 13 July 2000, on the occasion of the conferment of the degree of Doctor of Laws *Honoris Causa*.

terbalanced by appropriate policy measures to advance socio-economic progress.

Turning to the policy level, after the Barcelona Declaration, the whole process moved forward by a series of new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that both updated and enhanced pre-existing bilateral arrangements. In addition to the Customs Union with Turkey, new Association Agreements were signed with Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco and Tunisia,<sup>59</sup> while close to completion were those with Egypt and Algeria. In its communication to the Council of Ministers and the EP, the Commission indicated the priorities of the Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference that was agreed to take place in 1997. After reviewing the first 15 months of the EMP and the state of negotiations in the Association Agreements with the twelve Mediterranean partners, the Commission suggested several objectives for future co-operation.<sup>60</sup> More specifically, it proposed a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability to endorse the achievements of the first pillar, while on the question of social, cultural and human affairs, it reported that efforts had already begun in the spheres of cultural heritage, promotion of human rights, education and dialogue among civil society representatives, and that these efforts should be further intensified along with the introduction of measures to combat drugs-traffic and organised crime.

Still though, no substantive progress has been achieved in third pillar issues. In particular, the 1997 Malta *communiqué* reported serious disagreements over language referring to human rights and referred only *in passu* to 'the rule of law, democracy and human rights' as commonly shared objectives. During 1997, many EU governments took up ratification of the new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the EU had earlier initiated with Tunisia, Israel and Morocco. During the ratification process, parliamentarians and others raised questions of human rights compliance, particularly with reference to Israel, as specified in Article 2 of the Agreements. Several EU states indicated that they would seek to have the

<sup>59</sup> See A. Jbili and K. Enders, 'The Association Agreement Between Tunisia and the European Union', *Finance and Development*, 33:3 (1996) 18-23.

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Commission set-up a human rights monitoring mechanism as part of the implementation process. But no EU member demanded human rights improvements from Israel, Tunisia or Morocco, as a condition for ratifying their respective Association Agreements. In 1997 the EU signed an interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority and was scheduled to sign one with Jordan later in November, while negotiations continued with Egypt and Algeria. As EU and Syrian officials were about to open negotiations, the Council continued to suppress a November 1995 report on human rights in Syria that the EP had mandated as a pre-requisite for economic assistance (along the lines of the conditionality principle).

Central to the process was the need for a renewed political commitment to ensure a close balance in all three baskets, although some partners felt that progress in the first basket was overtaking progress in the remaining two. The Malta Conclusions attempted to redress this imbalance, albeit partially, by indirectly slowing down progress in the first basket.<sup>61</sup> In general, the Malta Conference was unsuccessful in revitalising the Arab-Israeli peace talks and in reviewing progress in the implementation of the Barcelona provisions. But at the rhetoric level, the first Euro-Mediterranean Review Conference stressed that the Partnership is an ‘irreversible process’, albeit not too well equipped to confront the challenges of a turbulent region. In this context, it is fair to suggest that cultural relations have been subject to extensive scrutiny due to the absence of any visible progress post-1995, despite the appearance of a strongly stated political commitment to placing the socio-cultural dimension on an equal footing with the other two. The 1998 Rhodes Ministerial Conference confirmed the priorities of the cultural Partnership. This strategy was outlined also in subsequent meetings in Stockholm and Palermo, and was based on the following objectives: focusing activities on a small number of thematic framework programmes (Heritage, Audio-visual and Humanities); increasing public involvement (particularly by women and young people); and encouraging the establish-

<sup>60</sup> COM(97) 68, ‘Commission communication on the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and preparations for the second ministerial conference’, 19 February 1997, *Bulletin*, 11-1995.

<sup>61</sup> Maltese Prime Ministers’ Closing Statement, Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Malta, 16 April 1997.

ment of regional networks of cultural operators so as to foster exchanges of experience and further develop joint endeavours among the partners.

## **Towards a Common Strategy**

The EMP was not intended to impinge upon other peace processes in the Mediterranean region, but rather to contribute towards them. Today, however, we live in a very different political atmosphere in the Middle East, where confrontation is constant and the prospects for peace are rather bleak. Be that as it may, the third EMP meeting in Stuttgart was very important for it was held three weeks before the end of the five-year period of the Oslo Accords. At the Berlin European Council on 24-25 March 1999, EU leaders remained concerned at ‘the current deadlock in the Middle East’, and called for ‘an early resumption of negotiations on an accelerated basis’. Three weeks later, EMP partners reiterated in Stuttgart their firm commitment to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East based on faithful implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo Accords, and the Wye River Memorandum.<sup>62</sup>

The Third Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart demonstrated that, ‘three and half years after the inaugural conference in Barcelona, the EMP has developed considerably and has given clear proof of its viability in sometimes complex circumstances’.<sup>63</sup> The principal aim of the Conference was to provide additional impetus to the Partnership and to confirm more clearly the goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration. The participants recalled the priority accorded in the EMP for the protection and promotion of human rights and agreed to concentrate activities on priority areas, increase the involvement of actors outside central government level, and make the EMP more ‘action-oriented’ and ‘visible’. They also emphasised the importance of intra-regional and sub-regional co-operation in all three baskets, endorsing the guidelines set out at the 1999 Valencia Conference on the methods

<sup>62</sup> Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The Middle East Peace Process and the Role of the European Union’, *Euromed Special Features*, No 7, 23 April 1999.

<sup>63</sup> Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers - Barcelona III, Stuttgart, Germany, 15-16 April 1999.

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of future co-operative arrangements, and calling for a ‘systematic evaluation’ of the BP and for a ‘concrete follow-up’.<sup>64</sup>

At their meeting in Stuttgart in 1999, the EMP Foreign Ministers agreed the guidelines for a Charter for Peace and Stability. The text was to be agreed at the next ministerial meeting in November 2000 and the Charter would be applicable whenever sufficient progress has been made in the Middle East Peace Process. The Charter’s main purpose was to institutionalise the existing political dialogue and to set up concrete mechanisms to address regional security and stability. The existing *ad hoc* Senior Officials meetings should be converted into an institutional forum for dialogue on political and security issues, and mechanisms should be established for operational joint action on terrorism, conflict prevention and crisis management. Partnership-building measures should be implemented in a flexible way for these issues to be addressed by a smaller number of partners wishing to advance more quickly, without prejudice to the principle that all Barcelona partners have the right to participate if they so wish.

The EU produced in its ‘Common Strategy on the Mediterranean’ at the Feira European Council in June 2000. The relaunch of the process was formalised later in October 2000 with a new Commission report, prior to the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles. The major objective of the Common Strategy was ‘to make significant and measurable progress towards achieving the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and its subsequent acquis’. In dealing with political and security issues, the Common Strategy expressed the strategic importance of Mediterranean stability to the EU, and therefore repeated the objective of establishing ‘a common area of peace and stability’.<sup>65</sup> To that end, the political and security-related dialogue is to be strengthened at all levels, bilateral as well as multilateral, including the Charter for Peace and Stability, and further confidence- and security-building measures are to be elaborated. The Common Strategy has the merit of clearly summing up the

<sup>64</sup> Euromed Internet Forum, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Conference On Regional Cooperation’ *Euro-Med Special Features*, No 5, February 5, 1999.

<sup>65</sup> The *Common Strategy* on the Mediterranean Region is only the third one adopted by the European Council, after the strategies on Russia (1999) and Ukraine (1999), which serves as an indication of the importance the EU attaches to the Mediterranean. The countries in the periphery of the EU are clearly seen as part of the European security space and are therefore among those covered by a common strategy.

actions through which the EU aims to achieve its broad objective of establishing an area of peace and stability and notably of including crisis management and post-conflict peace-building. But being a unilateral document (EU only), in no way can it commit the south Mediterranean partners, whose consent is still needed. Yet, the Common Strategy offered a new development: the EU has now become the main actor in the process and the importance of the Euro-Med Committee has been reduced to that of a coordinator of what is mainly agreed first by the Europeans.

In seeking to improve the initial Barcelona objectives, the Commission worked on a Communication on ‘Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process’, which provided the main input for the EMP Foreign Ministers meeting in Marseilles.<sup>66</sup> This Communication reviewed the experience of the first five years of the process and made specific proposals for taking it forward in a number of areas where difficulties have been encountered. The overriding approach has been to see how to focus on a clear set of short and medium term goals - ambitious but achievable; and, also, how to increase the sense of ‘ownership’ of the Partnership. It also tried to find ways of speeding up progress by promoting cooperation, dialogue and south-south trade on a sub-regional basis (whether Maghreb, Mashrek or any other intra-regional configuration), thus enabling therefore those partners that wished to proceed at a faster pace to do so.

The fourth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers was held in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona meeting. It aimed at reinvigorating the whole process.<sup>67</sup> The Conference was preceded by the outbreak of rapidly escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians, which caused a severe crisis in the Middle East Peace Process. As a result, Syria and Lebanon refused to take part in the Conference. Thus, at the Marseilles meeting, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers decided not to seek agreement on the proposed Charter for Peace and Stability, as this was clearly not the right time. Nevertheless, a good deal of progress was made

<sup>66</sup> Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament to Prepare the Fourth Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers ‘Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process’, Com(2000) 497 Final, Brussels, 6.9.2000.

<sup>67</sup> Presidency’s Formal Conclusions, *Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers* (Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000), Press Release: 439 - Nr: 13434/00, Brussels, 16.11.2000.

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towards agreement on this instrument which will promote respect for fundamental principles of human rights and democracy and facilitate conflict prevention and crisis management. It further called for a reinforcement of the political dialogue to clear up misunderstandings and thus mandated the Senior Officials to deepen the dialogue in a number of specified fields, and to broaden it so as to include issues such as disarmament and regional security developments. As Chris Patten, the External Affairs Commissioner put it: 'We should make sure that we can capitalise on that progress when the time is right so that it becomes a genuinely meaningful document reflecting the EU's active commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability'.<sup>68</sup> Once again, however, the crisis in the Middle East paralysed the EMP and prevented agreement on concrete security projects.

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Brussels on 5 and 6 November 2001 in the new international context in the aftermath of the terrorist attack that changed the outlook of international relations. The Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks committed on 11 September 2001. They regarded these acts as an attack against the entire international community, against all its members, all religions and all cultures. The Ministers formally rejected as both dangerous and unfounded any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world. In this connection the importance of the EMP as a relevant and recognised instrument for promoting a dialogue between cultures and civilisations was emphasised by all. In attempting to go beyond declarations, the Ministers urged all the parties concerned to resume immediately negotiations so as to apply the recommendations contained in the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Plan and to satisfying the legitimate rights and expectations of the peoples of the region for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. That was to be achieved through adherence to UN Resolutions 242 and 338, of the principles of the Madrid Conference, including the principle of the exchange of land for peace, and of the agreements concluded in Oslo and those which had made it possible to register tangible results on the ground in earlier negotiations.

<sup>68</sup> Speech by Chris Patten, *Common strategy for the Mediterranean and reinvigorating the Barcelona process*, European Parliament - Joint debate - Brussels, SPEECH/01/49, 31 January 2001.

## The Emerging Regional System

Jünemann defines the EMP as ‘the climax of a political process that started shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but more than that it marks the starting point of a new era of interregional relations’.<sup>69</sup> Keeping in mind Edwards and Philippart’s view that the EMP has led to a process whose analysis and interpretation encompasses different theoretical possibilities,<sup>70</sup> its philosophy has been summarised by Derisbourg as non-paternalistic, based on recognition of interdependencies, shared interests and the right to development and freedom, the need for decentralised co-operation, as well as the importance of the private sector and of a continuous dialogue at both intergovernmental and civil society levels.<sup>71</sup> A new phase in Euro-Mediterranean relations has thus emerged, consisting of openness, prior dialogue and joint tasks from policy-design to implementation. As Jünemann reiterates, however, ‘the Barcelona concept aims at a careful westernisation of the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an area of economic and political influence’.<sup>72</sup> Regarding the commitment to democracy and human rights, it seems that some non-EU partners will at some stage face the reality that the other participants, European or not, might actually insist on the preservation of the principles and norms agreed in Barcelona. But although the political conditionality underlying the economic and financial Partnership ‘allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of failure concerning democracy or respect of human rights, offering an apparently effective instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... it exposes the MPCs to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their demand for equal partnership’.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>69</sup> A. Jünemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept’, Conference Proceedings, *The European Union in a Changing World*, Luxembourg, 1998, p. 365.

<sup>70</sup> G. Edwards and Eric Philippart, ‘Mare Nostrum - The European Union and the Mediterranean in the 1990s and Beyond’, paper presented at the Fifth Biennial ESCA-USA Conference, Seattle 29 May-1 June 1997, p. p. 18.

<sup>71</sup> See J. P. Derisbourg, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership After Barcelona’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’, organised by MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.

<sup>72</sup> Jünemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa’, p. 383.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, p. 373.



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As Fahmi notes, the EMP resolved the major question of whether regional security would be addressed within a strictly Mediterranean context or within a wider framework encompassing European security concerns.<sup>74</sup> Although the Declaration did not linger over the meaning of security and stability, it produced a clearly Eurocentric perspective of the ‘common threat’.<sup>75</sup> The EMP was a collective attempt to redefine European threat perceptions towards the region by addressing issues of social unrest and economic underdevelopment, rather than by detecting a direct Arab military threat. Although the initial target date for the establishment of a free trade area in the region is the year 2010, EU states made no secret of the fact that the aid plan for the transition period intended to contribute to the slowing of migratory flows to their respective societies. The argument is that with trade growing, jobs will be created in Mediterranean countries and immigration will slow down. From this view, political change in the south is expected to result from large-scale economic liberalisation. In this context, Kienle notes that this approach is a retouched version of the theory of markets as a democratising force.<sup>76</sup>

This ‘automatic pilot’ theory of the market is among the basic tenets of liberalism. For economists and political thinkers such as Adam Smith or Herbert Spencer social harmony is spontaneous. It does not require coercive force to be produced or for that matter maintained. *Laissez-faire*, the argument goes, defined in the context of pursuing individual interests, is capable of producing co-operation in other fields automatically. But the proposition that this theory applies to international markets that consist only of independent agents trading for their own account and competing against each other is largely questionable. For it may well be that economic rationality, along the lines of an ‘exchange *Gesellschaft*’, continues to play a central role in the economic governance of an ever globalising, if not already globalised, market economy, but this is not the case in the Mediterranean,

<sup>74</sup> N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and Barcelona: Prospects for Mediterranean Security’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’, organised by MEDAC, MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.

<sup>75</sup> R. King and M. Donati, ‘The ‘Divided’ Mediterranean: Re-defining European Relationships’, in R. Hudson and A. M. Williams (ed.), *Divided Europe: Society and Territory* (London, Sage, 1999), p. 156.

<sup>76</sup> E. Kienle, ‘Destabilisation through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 3:2 (1998) 4.

where elements of economic rationality coexist with a struggle for power. It is, then, highly unrealistic to subscribe to the view that a kind of automatic governance could spontaneously emerge from the approach adopted in Barcelona.

From a purely economic perspective, the Barcelona document does not represent a radical break with past European policies towards the Mediterranean, but rather it is 'a deepening of past efforts',<sup>77</sup> in that it incorporates in its economic agenda more clearly defined global objectives. In overall terms, the entire project was a sign of the EU's willingness to play an increasingly active economic role in bringing all partners closer together and in reducing political and social sources of conflict. But building the envisaged free trade area pre-supposes that partners will come to understand each other with the view to sharing, albeit gradually, the same practices. Since the Declaration, any rigid distinction along economic, political and socio-cultural lines can only be made at the cost of avoiding the complexity of Euro-Mediterranean social and political reality. Herein lies perhaps the most innovative aspect of the EU's Mediterranean approach post-1995: that in addition to the traditional economic pattern of intra-regional relations, there now appears to be an intrinsic link between security and socio-cultural arenas.

According to Marquina, no existing notion of security gives backbone to the EMP and that the documents themselves contain incoherence and imprecision regarding the concepts of co-operative security, preventative diplomacy and 'good neighbourliness'.<sup>78</sup> He also claims that these principles remain under-explained in both conceptual and operative aspects. Despite such views, however, one could legitimately argue that there exists a degree of coherence, albeit not organisational symmetry, let alone isomorphism, within the EU's intention, in that economic problems can only be tackled once issues of political legitimacy are adequately addressed. Ultimately, most Mediterranean players seem to agree that institutionalised regional co-operation would have to involve, least of all in terms of imple-

<sup>77</sup> S. M. Nsouli, A. Bisat, and O. Kanaan, 'The European Union's New Mediterranean Strategy', *Finance and Development*, 33:3 (1996) 14-17.

mentation, the private sector, business enterprises and individuals.<sup>79</sup> Aliboni argues that such an initiative is the result of a remarkable and successful effort by the EU to innovate and reinforce its Mediterranean policy, in that its efforts towards a 'structured strategy of regionalism' are now clearly marked by elements of change predicated on the establishment of a free trade regime and the search for a common area of peace and stability to provide security and support economic development.<sup>80</sup> But the economic objectives, which are to be met through a series of institutional reforms, hide security risks since accelerated market liberalisation in the southern rim could produce greater waves of socio-political instability. Moreover, the EMP has not yet either operationalised or regularised political co-operation, something that may prove vital in case of further economic recession in the southern rim. These mechanisms are cited in the Barcelona document (encouraging information exchanges and establishing dialogue mechanisms) and in the Action Plan that was set out at the beginning of the process.

Joffé makes the point that the EU, in seeking to employ a meaningful global and comprehensive approach, should provide the following set of mechanisms: support for responsive and participatory political processes sustained by the encouragement of economic transparency and accountability within a codified and independent legal structure; collective co-operative security alongside viable economic restructuring; and a financial commitment to the creation of a vital human and physical infrastructure that will make the economic refashioning of the region into a 'win-win situation for all'.<sup>81</sup> In general, the EMP aims at correcting the structural deficits evident in past European policies and can be seen, in Gillespie's words, as 'emblematic of a process' being constituted from a dynamic set

<sup>78</sup> See A. Marquina, 'Security and Political Stability in the Mediterranean', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37 (1997).

<sup>79</sup> G. Luciani, 'Where to Start with Multilateralism - An Agenda for Cooperation between Europe, the Middle East and North Africa', *Working Papers*, Research Group on European Affairs, University of Munich, August 1996.

<sup>80</sup> R. Aliboni, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Interpretation from Italy', paper presented at the Conference on 'Prospects after Barcelona', organised by MEDAC, March 1996.

<sup>81</sup> G. Joffé, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Today', Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar, *Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue*, Bonn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1999, *EuroMeSCo News*, 5, April 1999.

of international exchanges, but still falling short of a meaningful Partnership.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, it is a vital step in the process of animating some confident expectations towards the emergence of a common 'Euro-Mediterranean consciousness', laying the groundwork for the creation of an international regime.<sup>83</sup>

Indeed, the EMP can be seen as a nascent and multidimensional regime that aims at establishing links between political, economic and socio-cultural arenas. The core claim here is that states obey the rules embodied in international regimes due to the functional benefits the latter provide. For the moment, however, the regional Partnership represents a balance of separate national preferences, rather than a common Euro-Mediterranean interest *per se*. Although it sets up a system of flexible regional arrangements, the substantial differentiation of the ratio with the Community budget for the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe has been the major reason for attracting the interest of southern Mediterranean countries.<sup>84</sup> In particular, the EMP is propelled by a certain 'economism' whose financial rather than trade implications are favourable to the non-EU partners. In return to the above, EU governments linked issues of economic liberalisation to a set of political principles and norms of good governance.

Keohane, in an influential study that straddled the lines of realist and neo-liberalist thinking, suggested that international regimes are 'institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations'.<sup>85</sup> This is of special importance considering that Euro-Mediterranean politics combine both power politics considerations and questions of increased complex interdependence. Keohane's 'lean' definition of the term has the advantage of relieving scholars from the burden of justifying their decision to call a given injunction a 'norm'

<sup>82</sup> R. Gillespie, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2:1 (1997) 4-5.

<sup>83</sup> D. K. Xenakis and D. N. Chrysochoou, *The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system* (Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2001). See also D. K. Xenakis, 'From Policy to Regime: Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Governance', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 13:1 (1999) 254-70; and D. K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 10:4 (1999) 75-90.

<sup>84</sup> E. Barbé E., 'The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process', *Mediterranean Politics*, 1:1, (1996) 32.

<sup>85</sup> Keohane, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism', in Keohane (ed.), *International Institutions*, p. 4.

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rather than a 'rule'.<sup>86</sup> The above definition is helpful since norms are not explicit in the complex framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations and since no substantive level of institutional autonomy characterise the operation of the newly formed mechanisms. Although the EMP offers some general rules of conduct to govern the behaviour of the participants, it remains weak in relation to the development of an identifiable set of norms. *Ceteris paribus*, it can be seen as an international regime *in statu nascendi*, albeit one that accords with Keohane's 'lean' definition of the term. Without a better or less nebulous definition offered by the *acquis académique*, such a claim remains valid.

A distinctive feature of international relations today is that power is becoming more widely dispersed and low politics acquire more salience for scholars and policy-makers. Developments in Euro-Mediterranean politics and attempts at institutionalising the EMP are no exception. The latter, only a handful of years since its inception remains *in limbo* between a loose association of states and an internationalised regional regime. The question is whether the EMP can sustain itself for any length of time without becoming first a system of patterned behaviour, generating a notion of rules of the game to guide and at a later stage structure international behaviour. From a linear projection of Euro-Mediterranean governance, the Partnership could evolve into a fully fledged regional regime with an institutional life of its own. At present, however, and given the rather disconcerting empirical developments in the process, no such entity has fully come into being, in terms of complying with the basic analytic tenet of rule-governed behaviour.

On the other hand, the fascinating element in the evolving Partnership is that, from a dynamic macro-political perspective, it may well prove capable of instrumentalising the principles and norms embedded in the Barcelona Declaration and transform them into concrete rules of the game based on shared beliefs, standards of behaviour and, crucially, decision-making procedures for implementing collective choice. Keeping in mind Olsen's point that '[w]righting rules for a large number of heterogeneous countries is no

<sup>86</sup> Hasenclever *et al.*, *Theories of International Regimes*, p. 7.

easy task],<sup>87</sup> especially with the view to making these rules fit the special conditions and particular situation of each country, implementation is central to the viability of regional regime-formation, for the latter process emphasises the need for institutionalisation and the development of an international co-operative culture among partner states and societies. For it is the combined effects of institutionalisation, in the sense of ‘learning one’s place in a larger order’,<sup>88</sup> and international culture, in terms of developing repertoires of shared understandings, that bring about a purposeful system of mutual governance. The idea here is to regularise a form of co-operation that, as Jervis notes, is more than the following of short-term self-interest (or power maximisation).<sup>89</sup>

But it would be wrong to equate in any deterministic fashion the end-result of the Barcelona Process with the formation of a regional regime *per se*. For these constructs are not regarded as ends themselves. Rather, as Krasner states, ‘[o]nce in place they do affect related behaviour and outcomes. They are not merely epiphenomena’.<sup>90</sup> From this angle, regimes impact on policy outcomes and related behaviour, thus transcending ‘structural orientations [that] conceptualise a world of rational self-seeking actors’.<sup>91</sup> In short, regimes make a difference, in that they often transcend a state-centric realist perspective that primarily reflects calculations of self-interest. The relationship between patterned behaviour and convergent expectations is a key to our understanding of international regimes: those two aspects create an environment of ‘conditionalised behaviour’ that in turn ‘generates recognised norms’ that transcend national boundaries and nurture a broader social space.<sup>92</sup> Contrary to structural arguments made by realists, international regimes have an independent impact on behaviour and are a crucial part of patterned human interaction. The latter view is drawn from the

<sup>87</sup> J. P. Olsen, ‘European Challenges to the Nation State’, *ARENA Reprints*, 97/11, 1997, p. 182.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>89</sup> R. Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in S. D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 173-194.

<sup>90</sup> S. D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences’, in Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*, p. 5.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

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Grotian tradition, where ‘regimes are a pervasive and significant phenomenon in the international system’.<sup>93</sup>

In the case of the EMP, it could be argued that regime-creation is directed at setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a nascent and flexibly arranged structure of governance. Noteworthy in that respect is that the Partnership addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as an overlap of different regions bringing together different dimensions.<sup>94</sup> The flexibility of the EMP sets the limits of ‘consciousness-raising’ in issues of Euro-Mediterranean governance and the possibility of the regional formation to acquire operational capabilities. Its weak institutional structure makes it difficult for individual actors to transcend the pursuit of short-term interests. But regimes also deploy a system of interconnectedness among different arenas of collective action that helps explain the nature and complexity of interdependence among the actors involved who, in turn, are conscious of the need to achieve mutually rewarding outcomes. Yet, being a highly fragmented system of policy interactions, any future attempts to navigate the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean governance need to be differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation embedded within its structures. In particular, the EMP encompasses a multiplicity of norms of behaviour, which in the end determine the degree and intensity of actors’ involvement. Further, a partial conceptualisation of its component baskets as separate pillars is not particularly helpful when assessing its cross-sectional political properties - i.e., what defines it as a nascent regional system.

Conceptualising the EMP through the lens of regime theory has the advantage of moving away from a formalistic approach to multilateralism, institutional linkages and the impact of domestic politics on regional affairs: it could set in train a process for the internationalisation of issues and their inclusion under a flexible management system. But it is still questionable how far the EMP can realise its objectives under its currently weak institutional structure, and without investing in partnership-building measures on

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>94</sup> See A. Bin, ‘Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects’, *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics*, 5, University of Catania, January 1997.

questions with the view to developing a credible socio-cultural dialogue and a Charter for Peace and Stability with proper compliance mechanisms.<sup>95</sup> The envisaged Charter will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy in the form of an institutionalised alliance of co-operative states. In addition, it can provide the levels of transparency necessary for a continuous and structured political dialogue among distinct socio-cultural settings, along with the necessary machinery for managing endemic crises and often protracted conflicts. Also, the emerging Parliamentary Forum could provide the EMP an additional legitimising platform from which to promote peace, stability and a regular dialogue for engendering the awareness of common interests and the creation of symbiotic structures of governance and problem-solving. Both agenda-identification (the acknowledgement of legitimate claims by a partner) and agenda-setting functions (the way in which such claims are included) could be achieved through the institutionalisation of the Forum. A normative implication here is that the proliferation of legitimate arenas will have an important domestic impact on the partners' policy strategy, in that they would now have to direct their claims to, and via, additional legitimate avenues. In any case, it would be interesting to evaluate the endorsement of this parliamentary structure and assess the extent to which its mechanisms can accommodate declared principles and particular interests. All the above beg the question of why states are bound by certain norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures. Regime theory offers a plausible answer: whether or not international cooperation is an *a priori* objective of states, the latter pursue their interests more effectively by being members of a larger association.

## **A Transformative Order**

‘Current political transformations and reforms in Europe as well as in other parts of the world’, writes Olsen, ‘are redefining the terms of political life’,<sup>96</sup> reactivating basic questions of governance. Fundamental changes in

<sup>95</sup> Concluding Statement of the UK Presidency by the Foreign Secretary Mr Robin Cook, *Ad-Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting*, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.

<sup>96</sup> J. P. Olsen, ‘The Changing Political Organization of Europe: An Institutional Perspective on the Role of Comprehensive Reform Efforts’, *ARENA Working Papers*, 97/5, 1997, p. 1.



the conditions of shared rule pose new challenges to the search for viable orders based on stable authority patterns within and between states and societies. These ascending challenges offer the formative context for the integration of domestic and international politics and, by extension, the conditions for developing a better understanding of the process of global change. At the same time, the struggle for social and political equality, the ever widening chasm between rich and poor, as well as the displacement of bipolarity by deep divisions of socio-cultural and political values at various levels, point in the belief that defining elements of separateness proceeds hand in hand with the need to identify degrees of common understanding among a plethora of public, semi-public and private actors operating under conditions of complex interdependence and global interconnectedness.

Against this swiftly changing background, whose intellectual outcome - amongst many - has been the ascendance of 'identity politics' and with it of new, non-territorial and even post-national forms of fellowship and representation, the Mediterranean refers to a heterarchical regional space, whose history, politics and complexity continues to spark the interest of international scholarship. Such composite mosaic of self-images, belief-systems and identities results, as claimed earlier in this paper, in a composite system of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging. Arguably, this largely constructivist definitional approach is specific enough to map the peculiarities of the region and broad enough to allow for the accommodation of complementary variables. Indeed, the relationship between complexity and reality in the region can be understood as having developed from a *uniquely* Mediterranean context. The above syllogisms are themselves testimony to the enduring influence of cultural distinctiveness and civilisational diversity in the politics of regional order-building; with the Mediterranean remaining a divided (social) construct within a transformative globe.

The active engagement of multiple actors in Euro-Mediterranean politics post-1995 may thus exacerbate the possibilities for reaching substantive agreement on many good governance issues, including transparent policy-making, economic security-building, civil-military relations, respect for human rights, co-operative conflict management and, ultimately, intra-

regional (sub-systemic) reconciliation. As Zartman and Bergman note, successful negotiations change established perceptions of conflict from a 'zero-sum' to a 'win-win' situation.<sup>97</sup> Partnership-building and a shared commitment to mutually rewarding outcomes can feed into this process, constituting an crucial adjunct to inter-segmental accommodation and, above all, the emergence of a sense of security at the grassroots. Central to this endeavour is the institutionalisation of the EMP and, in the words of Olsen, arguably the *maître penseur* in this regard, 'the emergence of enduring practices and rules, structures of meaning and resources'.<sup>98</sup> This is all the more so, given the need for a new civilisational dialogue to do away with the subjectivist approach that wants the West to act as a universal human rights protector based on fixed notions of democratic governance and a predominantly liberal understanding of political order.

Limited as it may be, the potential for systematising a new politics of institutional accommodation in the region awaits utilisation. Working on the concept of a socially viable Euro-Mediterranean order implies maximum use of civil society mechanisms and monitoring structures with the view to improving, as opposed to merely increasing, the levels of transparency in the workings of common institutions of governance. A difficulty associated with this line of development is that the socio-cultural Partnership has not yet operationalised or even regularised the normative ambitions of the Barcelona Declaration. The levels of complexity stemming from the particular nature of protracted conflicts and threat (mis)perceptions constrain the implementation of agreed principles and objectives. Linked to the above is the claim that effective order-building can not be realised under the present institutional configuration of the EMP as a whole. Although its flexibility is a positive element in managing interdependence, its weak institutional structure makes it difficult for partners to sacrifice the pursuit of short-term interests on the altar of substantive regional co-operation. But what model of institution-building should the Partnership proceed with so as to reorganise the Euro-Mediterranean order? A plausible answer is that the partners

<sup>97</sup> See W. Zartman and M. R. Bergman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982).

<sup>98</sup> J. P. Olsen, 'European Challenges to the Nation State, *ARENA Reprints*, 97/11, 1997, p. 160.

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would have to foster an atmosphere in which norms of good governance act as a system-steering agency in the construction of a larger pluralist order. In this context, the prospective Charter of Peace and Stability may lay the groundwork for mutual governance based on legitimate patterns of shared rule. Let us for a moment recall that the 1990 Paris Charter, by establishing a timetable of regular political consultations as well as a modest degree of institutional underpinning, has contributed to the structural transformation of the CSCE into an international organisation 'proper', with operational capabilities of its own (OSCE). A Euro-Mediterranean Charter can thus provide the levels of transparency, stability and trust needed for any meaningful regional partnership. But it must also be flexible enough to allow the southern partners to develop their own 'styles' of political liberalisation.

Although the process can not but go ahead by trial and error, it is imperative to keep a fundamental direction: designing efficient systems of internationalised shared rule requires a maximum, not a minimum, of what might be called 'capacity for governance'. At the macro-systemic level, such a capacity is presently lacking, not only because of various institutional weakness *per se*, but also due to the absence of political will and credible commitments by the partners themselves to make effective use of the existing regional arrangements. As Couloumbis and Veremis note, 'the central question, in theory as well as in practice, is whether the Mediterranean region ... will manage to fit into a functionalist paradigm which permitted Western Europe ... to move forward toward economic and political integration employing the geoeconomic premises of Jean Monnet and abandoning the military power considerations of Clausevitzian geopolitics'.<sup>99</sup> From this view, the Partnership, combining both low and high politics areas, may prove instrumental in fostering a new co-operative ethos among its members. The argument goes that interest-convergence around economic tasks acts as a means of contributing to a relaxation of tensions in areas where controversy is more likely to arise than not. The composite nature of the EMP offers a wide range of opportunities for the functionalist expectations

<sup>99</sup> T. Couloumbis and T. Veremis, 'Introduction: The Mediterranean in Perspective', in S. Stavridis *et al.* (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s* (London, Macmillan, 1999), p. 10.

of the partners to form the basis of a consensually pre-determined set of policies, which may prove crucial to overall systemic stability. In other words, the Partnership can be seen as a system of rules governing the interaction of interdependent actors around functionally specific tasks. By elevating the creation of rules of transaction to a systemic property of the Partnership, a certain economic bias may prevail, whose liberalising effects could offer a platform from which substantive rewards can be gained for all. This points to a preference for a functionalist strategy, which is nevertheless embedded within the practise of market-oriented regimes.

Be that as it may, central to the need for accommodating dialogue in the fragmented Euro-Mediterranean system for preserving regional stability is the role of institutions. The problem is one of organising regional politics out of the systemic complexity of a heterarchical regional space, where several civilisations have mutually influenced and enriched each other. But to break down such regional complexity, one has first to realise the importance of diversity as an essential principle: the regional system is itself constituted in the clash of different sub-systems. A heterarchical order minimises homogeneity/universality as the principal referent for sub-systemic co-operation. This form of enhanced particularity through a reflexive appropriation of difference becomes the basic normative unit of the system itself. This resonates with a broader aspiration of partnership that transcends any mono-dimensional configuration of power, stressing instead the complex character of an allegedly common destiny. This is exactly where a heterarchical regime is better equipped to manage the existing levels of Mediterranean complexity. The plausibility of this claim to the importance of reflexivity as opposed to co-ordinated hierarchy rests on a systemic perspective, whereby 'sub-systems do not [necessarily] join together into higher level systems ... nor can they be conceived of as instances of a totality'.<sup>100</sup> True, some hierarchy of norms may prove necessary, but this should also reflect the praxis of mutualism and respect for the 'other'. From a positive interpretation of regional heterarchy, therefore, the aim is for 'others' to be brought into the management structures of the EMP, and for re-

<sup>100</sup> Z. Bankowski and E. Christodoulidis, 'The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project', *European Law Journal*, 4:4 (1998) 350.

gional diversity to transform itself from a self-referential property of distinct units into an identifiable pluralist order.

### Conclusion

Mediterranean politics has gained a higher profile since 1995, sparking new interest in issues of collective governance in terms of studying the envisaged transformation of the region from a dispersed system of bilateral ties to the emergence of institutionalised patterns of joint rule based on shared understandings and symbiotic interactions among diverse socio-cultural units. A new phase of intensified interaction between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners has thus emerged, especially in the economic sphere (mainly trade, financial investment and industrial relations). The problem that persists, however, is that the region's economic accomplishments do not match its potential for political governance to facilitate the identification of common interests, aspirations and, crucially, a shared vision for the shape of things to come. Regional complexity, different conceptions of order and the 'good polity', and a multitude of distinct strategies toward collective conflict-management are the principal reasons underlying this shortfall. As the global market will predictably continue to expand, the Mediterranean will become even more important as a regional economic space, as well as a channel for the movement of vital resources. The emergence of globalised and regionalised markets make the systemisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations increasingly possible, yet not inevitable. While bright opportunities exist post-1995, they could prove passing without adequate levels of institutionalisation and, given that the EU has been more concerned with the perceived threats of migration and Islamic activism, than with the opportunities offered by shared interests, it is hardly surprising that its Mediterranean policy has been criticised for being limited, betraying a lack of long-term credible commitments.<sup>101</sup> Progress in developing co-operative relations is not always irreversible. Failure to empathise with the other's needs could lead to an increase in hostility and mistrust. Also, reactions to socio-economic inequities and suspicions about the

<sup>101</sup> I. Romeo, 'The European Union and North Africa', *Mediterranean Politics*, 3:2 (1998) 21-38.

motives of both Mediterranean rims could conceivably result in the resurgence of forces of disorder. Thus, of crucial importance will be the chosen institutional format to transcend the peculiarities underlying the envisaged regional transformation. But institutionalisation of existing rules alone is not sufficient to manage an ever complex regional agenda. New rules and norms on how to handle change and instability should emerge, given that behaviour, not just proclamations, will determine the outcome of the regional process. Nationalistic and religious cleavages are a major feature of the region's social structure. Such fragmentation is responsible for the slowing down of democratic consolidation and viable socio-economic reform. Beneath such tensions lie the differences in the historical trajectories for constructing and sustaining differentiated identities in the Mediterranean. These trajectories reflect different models of socio-political integration underpinned by different philosophies, ascribing different meanings to such general and even essentially contested concepts as democracy and modernity. There are good grounds for thinking that preventive diplomacy, trust-building, transparency, cultural pluralism, symbiotic association, and an open and structured civilisational dialogue are useful tools for revitalising a cross-fertilisation between heterogeneous units. The search for a new system-wide legitimacy thus depends as much on the partners' capacity to resist the forces of polarisation, as it does on the credibility of their commitment to discovering a sense of process (and purpose too) based on humanism, pluriformity and social justice.

*Stephen Calleya*

## **Cross-cultural Currents in the Mediterranean – What Prospects?**

At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference which took place in Barcelona in November 1995 the twenty-seven partner countries established three principal areas of co-operation: a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. <sup>\*1</sup>

The key question to address when it comes to closer cultural co-operation across the Mediterranean is whether this is worthwhile or not? In actual fact, the majority of those who examine Euro-Mediterranean relations believe that closer co-operation in this sector is the key to nurturing closer co-operation in other sectors. Shifting north-south perceptions of one another in a positive dominant fashion and fostering closer south-south relations is crucial.

When one focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process one notices the following: cultural co-operation is the most advanced area in this sector; social interaction remain the most limited as does the human dimension. In the cultural sector programmes such as the Heritage programme are assisting in raising awareness of cultural riches in the area and helping to find institutional support to preserves such treasures. The Euro-Med Audio-Visual programme is also helping to raise awareness in this area. The Euro-Mediterranean Youth programme is helping to promote cultural interaction

at a grass-roots level by providing educational and cultural exchange services.

One must applaud and support the regional programmes under way in the culture, audiovisual and youth fields in the context of a spirit of cultural identity, and voice its satisfaction at the recent launching of the Euromed Heritage II programme, as well as its support for the implementation, as soon as possible, of the Euromed Heritage and Euromed Audiovisual II programmes.

If the Human, Social and Cultural dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process is to become more effective it is essential that in the next few years more of an effort is concentrated on promoting fundamental values of mutual respect.

When it comes to practical suggestions on how to further social and cultural co-operation in new Euro-Med programmes numerous areas should be considered. These can include exchanging data and enhancing closer co-operation between Euro-Mediterranean partners in areas such as refugees, illegal human trafficking, judicial co-operation, and xenophobia.

## **The Cultural Dimension**

The Mediterranean epitomises many of the problems associated with the North-South debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the lack of human rights. Nurturing co-operative cross-cultural patterns of interaction which address these issues is a prerequisite to improving economic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area.

The Mediterranean is the historic cross-roads for diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious traditions. How can these be safeguarded and respected while at the same time tolerance and understanding are promoted? Can the Barcelona Process' proposals for educational exchanges be turned into concrete and practical programmes?

A concerted effort is required to remove misperceptions and prejudice which continue to exist across the Mediterranean. This is where international cultural activities, such as cultural tourism, may play a strategic role



as culture brings about relations based on trust. Tangible proposals that actually initiate cross-cultural ventures of co-operation and seek to further the principles of respect and understanding which are still lacking are long overdue.

### **Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Training Network**

Five years since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process it is clear that the time has come to upgrade a dimension of the process that remains at an embryonic stage - the human resource training dimension. History has proved that aid and trade on their own will not succeed in transforming a region as diverse as the Euro-Mediterranean area. Like their counterparts in Europe, citizens of the Mediterranean also need to be versed about the rapidly changing global political economy and trained so that they are able to adapt to the competitive system they must operate within. It is for this reason that one should consider establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Training Network (EMTN).

The EMTN should consist of a pool of European and Mediterranean academic and professional specialists that are able to articulate clearly developments taking place in each of the three chapters of the Barcelona process. Above all else, the specialists must be capable of *applying the information* the EMP is generating so as to enhance sectoral co-operative development in the Mediterranean.

The flexible group of Euro-Med envoys could be assembled on an ad hoc basis and their outreach programme coordinated by the EMTN in order to ensure a systematic training programme. This would ensure that the initiative remains cost-effective and is able to offer a service where there is the largest demand. Specific subgroups of the network can also offer outreach training courses around the Mediterranean whenever there is a specific demand for such training - for example short training courses on location could take place for industrialists seeking to adapt to the changing regional and global market economy around them.

Given its positive geo-political credentials and track record in this respect, Malta may be the most suitable location where to set up the EMTN. In addition, this initiative complements the Information and Training Seminar

programme that the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta has already been organising for mid-ranking diplomats of the EU and its Mediterranean Partners during the last 5 years.

In the course of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership process, the necessity for shaping a culture of dialogue and cooperation among the European member states and its Mediterranean Partners has continually been emphasised. The first ten Euro-Mediterranean Seminars that have been held in Malta between October 1996 and May 2001 have provided an up-to-date analysis of the progress registered in each of the three chapters of the Euro-Mediterranean process and a briefing on a working project or programme in a related field.

An additional feature of the Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars is the Mediterranean Internet Forum, a project that the European Commission entrusted the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies to design and to operationalise. This project aims at facilitating the flow of information between the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries and became fully functional at the second Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting in Malta. The significance of this exercise was further underlined in Annex I of the Euro-Med Malta Declaration of April 1997 where direct reference is made to the training sessions as a confidence-building measure.<sup>\*2</sup>

The rapidly growing number of programmes and projects under the auspices of the Barcelona Partnership necessitates regular updates. Apart from its intrinsic value, the continuous and consistent dissemination of information pertaining to the Partnership process will help to overcome inconsistencies in the process and facilitate informal exchanges of views on a wide variety of subjects of common interest.

The EMTN can act as a unique mechanism if it succeeds in facilitating the informal exchange and open dialogue between actual practitioners directly involved in the implementation of the EMP. The networking effect that such a forum can offer is a feature that can later serve as a foundation upon which other forms of co-operation are explored.

The overall objective of the EMTN will be to assist in upgrading sectoral co-operative arrangements that currently take place in the energy, tourism

and infrastructural sectors. Such measures are an indispensable part of the procedure that will have to be established if the overall goal of creating a free trade area is to become a reality.

### **Implications of culture in research and policymaking**

The third chapter of the EMP termed "Partnership in Social and Human Affairs: Promoting Exchanges between Civil Societies" promotes the idea that the countries concerned should work to encourage the participation of civil society in the EMP. This is to involve joint efforts in education and training, social development, policies designed to reduce migratory pressures, the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime, judicial co-operation, the fight against racism and xenophobia, and a campaign against corruption.

Further ideas that have been proposed include joint efforts with regard to culture and media, health policy, the promotion of exchanges and development of contact among young people in the framework of a decentralised co-operation programme. Throughout there has been an emphasis on the importance of dialogue between cultures, and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level, deemed as an essential factor in bringing people closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of one another.

But, whereas the political and security and the economic and financial chapters of the EMP have been met with a "fast-track" attitude by different parties participating in the Barcelona Process, the social and cultural chapter has been the subject of long debates and discussions as the Arab and European views differ sharply on issues such as human rights, immigration, terrorism, the right of political asylum and the role of civil society.

The Barcelona Declaration acknowledges the essential role civil society must play in the EMP. The Euro-Med Civil Forum, which took place in November 1995, was the first formal consolidation of civil society as a partner within the process. It gathered 1,200 experts from very diverse fields, representing civil society in countries from the northern, eastern and

southern shores of the Mediterranean. The second Euro-Med Civil Forum took place in Naples in December 1997. This was followed by similar gatherings in Stuttgart in April 1999 and in Marseilles in 2000 when a smaller number of non-governmental organisations met to discuss issues concerning civil society. Even if one points to the various cultural aspects that have been tackled in these meetings and the numerous projects that were approved in the field of cultural heritage, progress has been slow and difficult. Few tangible results have emanated from the ministerial meetings that have taken place. <sup>\*3</sup>

In its dealings with the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, should the EU turn a blind eye to regimes whose respect for human rights and democratic principles are widely criticised? If not, how can Europe's concerns be turned into actions that receive widespread popular support in the region? What can be done to further strengthen the role of civil society?

### **Suggestions that should be considered:**

- Promote dialogue between the civilisations in the Mediterranean.
- Aim at a more objective portrayal of cultural characteristics found in the Mediterranean in the European and international media.
- Encourage the development of civil society and non-governmental organisations. This would assist in nurturing a sense of national unity and stem the threat of rising ethnic, religious and social conflicts.
- Establish a Euro-Mediterranean Institute for Democracy and entrust it with the implementation of a democracy building programme similar to what has been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. <sup>\*4</sup>

It is essential that a more concerted effort be made to supporting civil society and to far closer involvement by civil society in all its forms in the activities of the Barcelona Process, by means, inter alia, of greater support for

the MEDA Democracy programme and also by promoting participation by local authorities and institutions in the work of the partnership.

In future, the States participating in the Barcelona Process and the institutions concerned should draw up information and communication programmes in order to make all their citizens aware of the activities involved in this Process.

Enhancing co-operative educational exchanges is crucial to a more co-operative cultural Euro-Mediterranean area. There is an urgent need for the implementation of policies for vocational training, universities, technology and education, the definition of local and regional development programmes, the promotion of programmes to further equal opportunities, health and safety at work, and promotion of the role of women in economic development and support for women's organisations, associations, businesses and networks in the countries of the region. <sup>\*5</sup>

There is also a need for the adoption of measures to promote the development of the information society, the use of the Internet and investment in information and schooling so that all opportunities that this mechanism offers can be utilised.

As the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers reiterated at their fourth ministerial in Marseilles in November 2000, one should so far regret that not all the possibilities of the culture, social and human chapter of the Barcelona Process had been fully exploited, especially as regards social aspects, civil society and the human dimension of the Partnership.

Although bridging the cross-cultural gap in the Euro-Mediterranean area is not something that can be done overnight, a number of mechanisms for constructive civil society co-operation should be considered. <sup>\*6</sup> These include involving civil society in Euro-Mediterranean activities in order to give the Partnership a societal base. Civil society can also contribute to the institutional development of the EMP. Good examples are the Euro-Med Youth programme and the activities taking place in the trade union sector. Civil society exchanges have an important function when it comes to spreading mutual knowledge of the different countries participating in the partnership process.

It is clear that civil-society partnership requires the mobility of persons. This can only take place if measures are introduced to facilitate travel and visa requirements, a development that has yet to be taken. In order to muster the political will to overcome those that may be against introducing mechanisms that will facilitate the mobility of persons, the EU and non-EU partner states should promote the fact that civil-society co-operation is a confidence-building measure in itself. The co-operation and exchanges between a wide-ranging spectrum of societal actors may assist in increasing support for the financial and political commitments that are part and parcel of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

### **Guidelines for the future**

The twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean countries should arrive at a consensus on the need to take greater account of the social effects of economic transition in national programmes by placing the emphasis on training, employment, professional requalification and the reform of education systems. A more active programme that seeks to establish a regional programme covering training policies, promoting the role of women in economic development, the reform of social systems and cooperation on health matters, as agreed at the Conference of Health Ministers in Montpellier in December 1999 should also be introduced. <sup>\*7</sup>

While everyone should welcome and support efforts to see conditions making it possible to develop the dialogue among cultures and civilisations in the Euro-Mediterranean area, such an exercise must be implemented gradually and in complete consultation with one another to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings.

Since the end of the Cold War the emergence of several new states has made international relations truly global for the first time in history. Technology, has simultaneously made it possible for every country to participate in events in every part of the world, including the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, the information age explosion has not been accompanied by a similar increase in knowledge. Continents and regions such as the Euro-

## Cross-Cultural Currents in the Mediterranean

Mediterranean area interact, but they do not necessarily understand each another. The uniformity of technology is accompanied by an implicit assumption that politics, and even cultures, will become homogenized.

It is a fundamental error for long-established nations of the West, including Europe, to fall for the temptation of ignoring history and judging every developing and recently independent state by the criteria of their own civilisations.

It is often overlooked that the institutions of the West did not emerge overnight but evolved over centuries which shaped frontiers and defined legitimacy, constitutional provisions and basic values.

It cannot be emphasised enough that history and culture matter. The institutions of the West developed gradually while those of most new states were put in place in elaborated form immediately. In the West, a civil society evolved side-by-side with the maturation of the modern state. This made possible the growth of representative institutions which confined the state's power to those matters which society could not deal with by its own arrangements.<sup>\*8</sup>

Most postcolonial states, such as those along the southern shores of the Mediterranean, have no comparable history. Tasks which often emerged over centuries in the West, have been attempted in a decade or two under much more difficult circumstances.

While one can debate endlessly the differences and merits between the individualism of the West and the priority for social cohesion in several developing countries, it is clear that no one should seek to impose their cultural patterns of interaction on other societies with different histories and necessities. Forcing one's cultural beliefs upon others of a different background will only increase the possibility of a cultural clash and not nurture a co-operative cultural zone of peace which should be the overriding goal of all initiatives introduced in this area of international relations.

## Notes

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- 7) Presidency's Formal Conclusions, Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Marseilles, November 15 – 16, 2000. ([www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/med\\_mideast/euro\\_med\\_partnership](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership)).
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*Franck Biancheri*

## **Democratization and the Internet – Two Cultural Trends and their Influence on Politics and Governance in the Mediterranean Region**

### **Barcelone, c'est fini**

The Barcelona process is almost dead. The only objective it is still seriously pursuing is the building of a the Euro-Med Free Trade Area, when in the meantime, the European and Mediterranean populations are totally unaware of such a project. The rest of the process, built as a mostly European strategy aiming at securing the stability of EU borders in this region and promoted through a huge bureaucratic machine unable to just implement its own programmes and policies, is now lost somewhere in the sea or in the sands. It is the inadequacy of the governance principles applied to the Trans-Med policy which led to its progressive sinking.

On the Mediterranean side, the absence of citizen's involvement in the process may look relatively normal due to the weakness of such civil societies and the reluctance of governments to move towards democracy. And in the EU, as it is obviously shown by the current democratic crisis faced by the EU itself, the fact is that until now citizens and civil society have been mostly excluded from any policy-making or implementation process, including therefore the Euro-Med process.

The Euro-Med Civil Forum which has progressively become a completely unnoticed road show for development and cooperation NGOs does not

even anymore hide this complete lack of democratic support from both side.

**Culture matters...and democratization of the Trans-Med policy making and implementation is required on both side of the Mediterranean sea.**

Culture does matter indeed and it can be considered that the lack of democratic backing of the Trans-Med process is crucial in its general failure, being lost in bureaucratic processes and academic debates. In the future, any attempt to "revive" or "reshape" a new Trans-Med policy will have to take into account the pre-requisite of ensuring that civil society is indeed part of the game. Therefore we face on both sides of the Mediterranean sea the challenge of democratization. As a never-ending process, democratization is indeed required both from the Mediterranean states which seem to be more afraid than anything else by their population and civil societies; as it is required from the EU which is today, on the whole range of its policies, discovering that its own citizens are requiring a more democratic process regarding EU policy making ...including therefore the Trans-Med policy.

**Culture matters .... and the coming of Internet is modifying drastically the parameters for any new Trans-Med policy**

Internet was nowhere ten years ago. It is already today invading Europe's offices, classrooms and houses while in the Mediterranean countries a growing number of access points are emerging in universities, companies and cyber cafés. Tomorrow, in 3/4 years, large sectors of the Mediterranean societies will have an easy access to Internet. This process is already starting to disrupt the usual state to state monopoly of Mediterranean issues; while it helps also in bringing into the process the large immigrant population living in the EU by offering new and cheap tools to interact with their home country and culture.

It is already changing governance patterns in the EU itself by allowing new democratization progresses and by creating easier trans-border debates and cooperation. This trend will affect in the same way the core of all Trans-Med policies, as much as it will affect the governance processes of each country in the region.

### **Education matters ... and the two processes combined put more than ever the young generations at the forefront of tomorrow's Trans-Med policies**

New governance practices, new democratization processes, new technological tools...this is typically the "field" for the new generations. Meanwhile, both in the EU as in the Mediterranean countries (except from "dynastic accidents"), the generations below 40 have no access to the political debates, let not speak of the decision making processes. This may explain while the current policy making processes seem to be so much unaware of those trends which are going to affect drastically the governance and politics in this region and therefore the interactions between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours.

Access to information, both ways, is anyhow the short term priority to prepare the young generations for the next two decades' Trans-Med challenges: democratizing their societies and the way they interact together, contributing actively to global debates and policy-making, developing privileged neighboring relations.

If linked with democratization, Internet may be the missing link which can help the Mediterranean sea to become again a place where people (and not only states) interact in a common space. If efforts in that sense are not rapidly implemented, at least from the EU side (providing tools, platforms, websites, ...), then, "Seattle" in 1999 will look like a peaceful summit compared to the Euro-Med Summit of 2010 ...when the Euro-Med Free Trade Area is supposed to be launched.



*Ludger Kühnhardt*

## **The Mediterranean – New Directions of Research and Policy-Making**

Usually, Europe is defined and designed along the geography it constitutes and the history it accrued. The political organisation of Europe is related to both of it and at the same time not free of contradictions with regard to any reasonable meaning of a „European identity“. There are more institutions than one, given the existence of the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, and - last but not least - the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which institutionalises the United States of America as a European power. Europe is grappling with its borders towards the East and the South East. Can Russia belong to the core institutions of Europe? Is Turkey a European country? In any case, the discussion is following the primacy of territorial thinking. Europe, that is Europe's territory and the ambition to link it both with Europe's past and the future Europe hopes for.

But Europe, that is also Europe's lakes, the seas and waters which are an integral nevertheless peripheral part of Europe's shape. The Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, may be even the Caspian Sea, certainly the Baltic Sea and the North Sea do impact on Europe's self-perception and are related to many of the challenges ahead of Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. They are no less important than the Atlantic Ocean has unquestionably been for the shaping and the destiny of Europe in the course of the last five hundred years, culminating in the important role the north American democracies have played for Europe during the twentieth century.

Intuitively, contemporary Europeans tend to perceive the waters which surround and enclose European territories as borders, as limits and dividing lines. The opposite coast lines constitute „the other“, far away and often strange lands. At least they are likely to divide and to constitute black - and wet - holes without meaning and reason. This, however, may very well change in the course of the next years. A Europe which is defining its identity and is shaping its political organisations can no longer overlook the fact that its surrounding waters are an integral part of the shaping and making of the „new Europe“. The lakes of Europe are part of Europe since they constitute bridges rather than barriers. For better or worse, the opposite coast lines are part and parcel of Europe's future. This seems to be evident in the case of the Atlantic Ocean although the transatlantic relations are going through a period of deep redefinition since the binding glue of the common enmities of the Cold War is no more. The Baltic Sea is rediscovering that it is the magnetic force which brings its adjacent nations closer together than ever before since centuries. The Black Sea has only begun to discover the meaning and potential of the very same fact. The North Sea is still defining the global view of countries such as Iceland and Norway, while the Caspian Sea is being reinvented as a function of its sea-bed and the surrounding oil and gas fields.

A unique case is - and has ever been - the Mediterranean. For almost three thousand years, the world's largest inland sea has been a theatre of world history. The coasts of this arm of the Atlantic Ocean, to which it is connected by the Straits of Gibraltar, divided naturally by the Italian peninsula and Sicily into a Western and an Eastern half, have been the stage for exceptional cultural and political developments. Naturally linked to the Black Sea by the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, and since the nineteenth century by the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean islands have harboured sailors from all directions for thousands of years and its surrounding cities have always looked towards the water as much as towards any of their hinterland. The Mediterranean has been a school for sailors and cartographers, a battlefield for adventurers and conquerors, a market place and both the anchor and the promoter of religious creeds and missionary activities, peaceful and violent alike.

The term „Mare mediterraneum“ reflects the claim of late Roman rule over all its shores and insinuates the character of a geographically defined community of values and habits. The discovery of the Atlantic African coasts and the New World across the unknown Ocean was the beginning of a redefinition of the Mediterranean. It was no longer the unchallengeable center of gravity of all earth. At the same time it opened the eyes for new links with other parts of the globe. More than ever before, the Crimean War (1853-1856) linked the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, thus opening the Mediterranean towards the enormous land masses of Asia. The opening of the Suez Canal (1869) produced an outlet towards the Indian Ocean and reinvigorated the trading potential of the Mediterranean which it had lost since the discovery of the New World in the Americas. The Mediterranean has a size of 2,5 million square kilometers, the maximum length is about 2.300 miles between Gibraltar and the Syrian coast, the maximum width about 1000 miles between Libya and the Adriatic coasts of Slovenia and Italy; its deepest point is 5.267 meter. Millions of tourists are flooding its beaches every year and if it would only be for this reason: among Europeans from Malta to Hammerfest, today it seems consensus that the Mediterranean is theirs.

This claim can however no longer be sustained. In 1950, two third of the population of the Mediterranean lived on its northern shores. In 2000, the opposite had become true. The European Union has defined the Mediterranean as the common market of around 800 million people who are living around its basin. This has been the starting point for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership arrangement which begun in 1995 with a summit meeting in Barcelona, where the „Barcelona Declaration“ has been promulgated by all (then) 15 EU member states, 11 countries of the Southern rim of the Mediterranean and the Palestinian Autonomy Authority. Libya, the former pariah, has reluctantly begun to join the Euro-Mediterranean process since then, although it is still grappling with the fact, that at the beginning it was not welcomed as a terrorist state while now the EU is courting Libya which is vacillating between its European interests and its African mission. Nevertheless, the Euro-Mediterranean

partnership thus accommodates the EU and all governments of the Southern rim of the Mediterranean. This does, however, not imply yet that all are following a common perception and vision of the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup> Although the idea to form a common free trade zone by the year 2010 has found support of all partners of the Barcelona process, it remains questionable whether this alone can already substantiate the modernised version of a joint „mare nostrum“, a lake of all the people surrounding it.

The third question is one of balanced interests. What really does Europe want: Free trade or democracy? Co-operation or containment? Dialogue or a monopoly of norms? And who can speak for the Southern partners? Elite's of authoritarian regimes or civil societies? Politics or business? Pluralistic cultures or religious leaders?

There are manifold reasons for this scepticism. The first one is geographical in nature. The Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue - short hand „Barcelona Process“ - includes all EU member countries, but only the direct coastal countries of the Southern rim, thus leaving open whether such a composition is not by the very nature of its design Euro-centric while neglecting to link it with the strategic peripheries of the Southern side of the Mediterranean, Arab peninsula, Iraq and Iran, but also Mauritania and Western Sahara. The term “Euro-Mediterranean” seems inconsistent. It should rather be a “Mediterranean partnership” with links to the peripheral neighbours in the “Greater Mediterranean Area”. The second question is of political nature. Does the „Barcelona Declaration“ of 1995, the Magna Charta of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, truly reflect the combined interests, perceptions and potentials of all partners or is it more of a superficial declaratory character, neither binding nor free from contradictions, which are inherent in the complexity of the very region? Does it take into consideration all different needs and approaches of all the partners or does it push for economic integration – an European interest -, while neglecting the social concerns of the Southern Mediterranean partners – who have a point by stressing that the economic reforms which they are obliged to implement might cause too

<sup>1</sup> See *Stephen C. Calleya*, *Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean*, ZEI Discussion Paper C75/2000, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies 2000.



much social hardship and thus endanger the political stability Europe is so much looking forward to maintain?

Finally - or firstly - there is the historical argument whether there has ever been a common Mediterranean „feeling“, how it was made possible and why did former efforts to maintain it fail? Anybody only superficially perusing historical maps of the Mediterranean can discover the shifting nature of its centers of gravity, its uniting forces and dividing lines, and - most importantly - the changing determinants which constituted the Mediterranean as a single, rather united region. A former French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, was blatant: in the 1960s he stated „La Méditerranée, ça n'existe pas“ -The Mediterranean does not exist.

Did it ever exist? Greek and Phoenician colonisation spread the model of trading cities around the Mediterranean. The expeditions of Ionians even reached the shores of the Black Sea (Pontos Euxinos) and Phoenicians looked around the Straits of Gibraltar (Tingis, Lixos, Gades). The Greek Wars against the Persians helped to define European identity against „the other“, the barbarians, without incorporating the whole Mediterranean into the purview of this perception. Hellenism, Romanisation, and the beginnings of Christianity refer to the dominant role of the Eastern Mediterranean and its hinterland, while the rise of the Roman Empire was colliding with the ambitions of Carthage in the Western Mediterranean, escalating in two Punic Wars which finally destroyed Carthage.

The world of the Roman Empire during the peak of its power saw the Mediterranean united - and its peripheries spreading beyond Gallia (today's France) into regions which today form part of the European Union or aspire to join it - the British Isles (Britannia Inferior, Caledonia), the Alps (Raetia, Noricum), Western Germany (Germania Superior), Hungary (Pannonia), Western Romania (Dacia Superior) and Bulgaria (Moesia and Thracia). The economy of the Roman Empire linked its European parts with the Southern shores of the Mediterranean which contributed grain, wood, figs, oil, glass, purple and fish to its resources. Christianity started to get rooted all across the Mediterranean. Even the split between East and West Rome in the late fourth century could not fundamentally undermine the integrity

of the Mediterranean, indicating however that the „mare internum“ as it was labelled at the time split into two different halves although both were still breathing Christian spirit and Roman ambition; Libya was, by the way, cut into two, Tripolitania belonging to the West Roman Empire and Libya Superior to the East Roman Empire.

The end of the Western Roman Empire saw a temporary revitalisation of the Mediterranean idea under the Byzantine Empire which was spreading under Justinianus all the way to Numidia (today's Tunisia and Algeria) and Malaga (Southern Spain) with an outlet in Septum (in today's Morocco). It was the Arab migration and the spread of Islam during the seventh century which put an end to the all too romantic idea of the unity of the Mediterranean. The Southern rim became Muslim, Arabs conquered Andalusia and even stood in Poitiers, not all too far away from Paris. The unity of the Mediterranean was lost in religious division and strife, escalating during the Crusades (11-13<sup>th</sup> century), which had a lasting impact on sensibilities and perceptions on both sides until this day. The fall of Byzantium in 1453 and the rise of the Ottoman Empire until it reached its biggest size in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was seen in Christian Europe as the ultimate threat to its very existence. It left a mark on Christian-Muslim relations until today. Most dramatically this has been demonstrated during the Yugoslavian Wars of Succession in the 1990s.

The Ottoman Empire and the Vassals it collected along the Southern rim of the Mediterranean never generated the same homogeneity of rule over the Mediterranean as it has been the case during the heydays of the Roman Empire. In spite of the comprehensive spreading of the Islamic religion to the westernmost regions of the Mediterranean - and deep into sub-Saharan Africa - religious and political unity did never fully overlap in the world of Islam, and Europe was able to put an end to Ottoman expansion in Vienna in the 18th century. Given the important role of Turks in the Ottoman Empire and the fact that both the Balkan part and the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire were located on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, from this time onward there was no doubt any more about differences between the Western and the Eastern part of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean idea became a myth or went into oblivion.

The Europe of the Vienna congress, colonialism and two world wars, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of new nation states on both sides of the Mediterranean, finally the development of the European Union - with a parallel development of Communist states in South Eastern Europe - and the various efforts to create Arab unity in the light of the presence of the Jewish state of Israel - none of these structures or processes was able to reinvent the Mediterranean as a unity. Today the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is lacking participation of the South Eastern European littoral countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. A Mediterranean idea, if there was ever one, never coincided with comprehensive political concepts and structures.

In the light of such cyclical experiences and constant patterns of diversity, it remains indeed doubtful whether the idea of a common market and a free trade zone can re-ignite the myth of a Mediterranean spirit in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Life after all is more than a market, more than goods and services, investments and trading rules. Has there ever been a truly Mediterranean idea based on partnership between the different peoples, religions and traditions on both sides, in all directions of the Mediterranean? Travel books account for it in the name of tourism and education which remains however a pleasure predominantly confined to the Northern inhabitants of the Mediterranean. The magisterial study of French historian Fernand Braudel „La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II“ (1949) is a masterpiece indeed, never copied for any other period in time, but even in all its substance and distinguished differentiation yet somewhat focusing on the Mediterranean through European eyes.<sup>2</sup> Braudel is not to blame for this, since anybody, no matter how cosmopolitan, remains somewhat myopic if it comes to the analysis of own neighbours, let alone adversaries.

In this light, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995 is certainly an ambitious idea. It has basically been driven by the interests of the European Union and can be seen as continuity with a European Mediterranean policy since the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. The first phase, lasting from 1957 until 1972, was

<sup>2</sup> *Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II, 2 Volumes, Paris: Armand Colin 1949*

based on bilateral trade agreements with partial association elements or preferred trade products. The second phase, from 1972 until 1990, was defined by the political and geopolitical parameters of the Mediterranean. The Middle East conflict challenged the EEC to develop a stronger political posture in the region while the Euro-Arab Dialogue was an offspring of the overall North-South policy of the time. It was the end of the Cold War which allowed the European Union to reassess its policies vis-à-vis the Mediterranean. This led to the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the promulgation of the Barcelona Declaration.<sup>3</sup>

Analogue to the approach of the “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe”, the Barcelona Declaration identified three fields of co-operation among the Mediterranean partners: Political stability and security, economic co-operation, and co-operation in cultural, humanitarian and social matters. The process which begun in Barcelona was intended to give a new dimension to the Mediterranean future, „based on comprehensive co-operation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history“.<sup>4</sup> The political declaration was followed by a substantial working programme which the Euro-Mediterranean partners promised to implement in the years to come.

Certain positive effects of the Barcelona process cannot be denied. Continuous diplomatic, political and economic dialogues have been established. New fields of co-operation have been discovered in social and cultural matters. Nevertheless, scepticism has been voiced whether the multilateral and trans-regional approach of the Barcelona process can truly serve its own purpose. In the light of the many historically rooted diversities in the region - with various Eastern and Western sub-regions - it seems appropriate to reconsider sub-regional orientations to make the whole set of ideas defined in the Barcelona Declaration work. Given that the ongoing Middle East conflict permanently impacts on the Barcelona vision and tends to hold hostage other aspects of the Mediterranean co-operation

<sup>3</sup> See *Carlo Masala*, *Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte - Struktur - Prozeß*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 68/2000, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies 2000

<sup>4</sup> *The European Commission* (Ed.), *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27./28.11.1995*, at: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/med\\_mideast/euro\\_med\\_partnership/bd.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/bd.htm).

scheme, „a special and enhanced framework of partnership with the Magreb“ has been suggested, to name but one specific initiative.<sup>5</sup> The EU has begun to recognise the potential of such a Western Mediterranean core by opening up the Barcelona process to Mauritania, the westernmost country with strong Arab influence.

Mediterranean policies remain somewhat obliged to try the squaring of the circle. This is due to two contradictory and mutually reinforcing facts: On the one hand, for geo-strategic and geo-economic reasons the Mediterranean is a unity. As a strategic zone in the back of the Atlantic and in the weak South of Europe, the Mediterranean has to be stable in order to comply with the interests both of the United States and of the European Union. As a geo-economic reality, the Mediterranean as one comprehensive market is of interest both for trade and investment purposes as much as its relevance as source of energy resources and other goods of interests remains confined to the specific local sources; not all Mediterranean countries contribute the same resources or offer the same market potential.

Politically, the Mediterranean is as diverse as it is culturally pluralistic. A monolithic equation „democracies in the North, authoritarian regimes in the South“ is too simplistic, while the dividing line between Islam and Christianity is much more complex as that of a simple North-South-issue: Around 18 million citizens in the European Union are Muslim and originate from the Southern rim, Turkey including, while there are Christian communities all over the Southern rim, in the Levante in particular, and Jews outside of Israel in the Muslim world, particularly in Turkey and Morocco. This cultural and ethnic diversity rather supports the idea of a comprehensive Mediterranean policy, while at the same time the complexity of this diversity makes it extremely difficult to consistently be implemented.

From a European point of view, the most important problem is not one of squaring the circle in terms of bringing multilevel policy approaches into a more or less consistent line. Europe's experiences with the „three basket approach“ of the “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe” has

<sup>5</sup> *Roberto Aliboni*, *New Directions in European-North African Relations*, in: *The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.4/Spring 2001, p. 63

demonstrated the ability of the West to play with various balls while continuously pursuing the same policy goals. The problem is not one of instruments but one of strategy. The European Union has never clearly made up its mind what the Barcelona Process truly stands for. Different actors have different thoughts and the dividing lines are not necessarily based on geographic proximity or national interests.

For some, a Mediterranean policy serves to stabilise Europe's security on its Southern flank. With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean South, - along with the crisis bow stretching from Turkey across Iraq and Iran into Central Asia, - has been identified as the next security challenge to Europe. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration movements, uncooperative regimes, radical political Islam and historical neurosis might form the potential of new and lasting threats to Europe and its desire for peace, stability and prosperity. Is Hannibal truly „ante portas“?<sup>6</sup>

Others define the Mediterranean as a development problem. Both legal and clandestine migration are certainly a consequence of social and economic problems in the Southern Mediterranean, a shortage of employment and limited perspectives for an improved standard of living. The underdeveloped infrastructure in the Southern Mediterranean countries impedes upon a speedy regional development. Environmental disasters could effect the northern Mediterranean countries as much as they do impose their dirty consequences on Europe's poor southern neighbours. Obstacles to integrate into the world economy as competitive partners - only oil rich countries such as Algeria or Libya can offer enough of the desired resources in order to build up a bargaining power - and a limited participation in the fruits of „globalisation“ - i.e. in access to information technologies - define some of the disadvantages of the region in order to boom and as such to become more attractive for European investment and trade. But can a development oriented relationship between the EU and the set of Southern Mediterra-

<sup>6</sup> See *Andreas Jacobs/Carlo Masala*, Hannibal ante portas? Analysen zur Sicherheit an der Südflanke Europas, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000; see also *Roberto Aliboni/Abdel Monem Said Aly/Alvaro de Vasconcelos*, Joint Report on the EuroMesSCO Working Group on Political and Security Cooperation, (Lisbon) 1997

nean countries ever be more than an asymmetric dependency rather than a symmetric partnership?<sup>7</sup>

Again others see the Mediterranean as ancient cradle of civilisations and a modern test case for humanitarian dialogue among cultures. From the point of view of theology and religious sciences, literature and history, as many points of contact and co-operation can be identified as there are differences and opposing, even adversary aspects of Euro-Arab or Christian-Islamic relations. Is the Mediterranean not determined to serve its role as promoter of co-operation and tolerance among the religions of the book - Christianity, Judaism, and Islam - and the cultures and civilisations which developed on both sides of its shores ?<sup>8</sup> On this account there is an enormous, yet untapped potential for co-operation in a spirit of fair partnership. In the past, European humanities including Christianity, Latin and Greek classics were clearly separated from Oriental Studies, including Arab, Ottoman (Turkish) and Persian classics. It would indeed be a fascinating endeavour to combine both approaches and to transform them into joint parameters of “Mediterranean Humanities”. Jordan’s Prince El Hassan bin Talal, President of the Club of Rome, was the first personality of public standing to suggest such a plan<sup>9</sup>

Finally the geo-strategists, which are looking at the Mediterranean with a bird eyes view, having in mind the geopolitical shifts which started to unfold since the end of the Cold War. In the light of necessary energy supplies to the Western world - which might well be advised to be diversified between Persian Gulf resources and new potentials in the Caspian Sea region - stability and co-operative patterns of behaviour are the most important element required from the Mediterranean. Such a view, rather developed in the US than in the EU, although effecting the future of the EU as much as that of the US, views the Mediterranean as a zone of intensive

<sup>7</sup> See *Jürgen Wiemann*, Die Mittelmeerpolitik, in: Franz Nuscheler/Otto Schmuck(Ed.), Die Südpolitik der EG. Europas entwicklungspolitische Verantwortung in der veränderten Weltordnung, Bonn: Europa Union 1992; *Felix Maier* (Ed.), Managing asymmetric interdependencies within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – A German Perspective, ZEI Discussion Paper C99/2002, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies 2002

<sup>8</sup> See *Carlo Masala*(Ed.), Der Mittelmeerraum - Brücke oder Grenze?, Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing House (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Vol.48) 2002

<sup>9</sup> Private correspondence with the author, July 21, 2001

strategic concern and interest for the West.<sup>10</sup> There is always a short-cut from the overall geopolitical perception to a specific view on the role of the Middle East conflict on the Mediterranean partnership.

The related problems are evident. The South Mediterranean countries want to see a higher political profile of the EU in the Middle East peace process, Israel is rather interested in the economic potential of Europe and scared that Europe could politically become too lenient to the Arab arguments, the US is inclined to think along similar lines while not leaving any possibility of good economic relations with Arab countries, Libya including, aside, while the EU tries to be fair and objective in its political assessment, low-profiled in its political posture and not always realising that by doing so, it does not necessarily serve its economic ambitions in the region while restraining its political posture unnecessarily.

The European Union is inclined to start its Middle East strategy with an analysis of the need to organise soft security in this troubled region (confidence building measures, economic and social co-operation etc.) which is neither wrong in itself nor unappreciated by all actors involved. Such an approach does however not eliminate the fact that top priority has to be the creation of a sustainable break-through in the field of hard security, including a solution to the most troublesome question of the future of Jerusalem, the most holy city for Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. The EU has accrued trust and confidence among all actors in the seemingly endless Middle East conflict. It has to capitalise on this by broadening its own commitment to peace and stability by looking beyond the huge agenda of soft-security. A lasting peace in the Middle East seems imaginable only if also the EU would participate in its securing elements; this must finally lead to EU participation in some sort of peace keeping operations in the Middle East.

Depending on the point of departure, the road map of analysis and assess-

<sup>10</sup> See *F. Stephen Larrabee/Carla Thorson*, *Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1996; *F. Stephen Larrabee/Jerrold Green/Ian O. Lesser/Michele Zanini*, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 1997; *Annette Jünemann*, *Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte*, in: *Wulfdieter Zippel*(Ed.), *Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing House 1999, pp. 29 ff.



ment can be extremely different. The point of arrival certainly is. The European Union is therefore constantly challenged to maintain its multi-level and highly diversified approach for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, while it can neither be sure of the consistency of interests of its Southern partners nor of the interests within the European Union. Not the least relevant of them is the question of the role of the United States in the Mediterranean. Strategic commonalities such as those important for resolving problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting against terrorism, stability in energy supply and other natural resources might clash with specific interests such as the European inclination of an inclusive policy towards Libya, the balanced position of the European Union in the Middle East conflict and a differentiated approach to the role of Islam in politics and modern society.

A comprehensive security partnership between the EU, its Mediterranean partners and the US is also dependent upon the resolution of contradictions and shortcomings in the European approach to the region. No trans-regional approach can overcome the primordial importance of the Middle East conflict which is impacting on all dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and holds it potentially hostage. No trans-regional approach should undermine or neglect the special role France is playing in the Western Mediterranean as a consequence of its long standing proximity to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. And no trans-regional approach can overlook conflicts of interests between the EU's Mediterranean strategy and the ambition of integrating the Balkan region into the European structures. The latter has become a top priority of EU policy making since the end of the Kosovo War. Although South Eastern Europe does belong to the Mediterranean, the challenge of integrating the Balkans is more of an EU homework („Europeanising the Balkan“) and thus until now not properly linked to an overall design for the Mediterranean. One could even argue that the EU has to „Europeanise Europe“ by transforming and integrating South Eastern Europe first before it can truly look out for a Mediterranean partnership. Conflicts of aims thus remain inevitable. In terms of political and material resources, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

is definitely and regrettably limiting a more pro-active policy of the EU in the Maghreb region, which requires stabilisation on all accounts.

The effect of the financial support of the Middle East Peace process through the European Union remains dependent upon progress on the very issue of peace making which does - at least so far - not involve the European Union as a key player. Given that the United States is the only actor involved in the whole Mediterranean, any comprehensive partnership in the Mediterranean will have to be based on strategic consistency and complementarity in Euro-American approaches to the Mediterranean. The US have become and will remain a Mediterranean power. They will ever more remain present in the region at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century since they presented themselves for the first time in 1804 by bombarding Libya (for the first time) in retaliation for attacks of Tripolitanian pirates. The Mediterranean, in turn, still is a bay of the Atlantic Ocean as the implications of the courageous explorations of the 15<sup>th</sup> century have already indicated for the first time in modern history.

Europe's perception of the Mediterranean and its activities in the Mediterranean cannot be freed from these constant factors. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership remains based on an integral, comprehensive approach which is intended to support peace, stability and prosperity as much as good governance, democracy and cultural dialogue. Such a complex approach opens ways for compromises, ad-hoc package-deals, diversified policy instruments and a certain division of labour among the EU partners under the broad umbrella of a comprehensive general plan. On the other hand, it is endangered to become hostage of blockade policies by one or the other partner of the process, who tries to pursue specific interests at the expense of the whole process. At the end, there will be no alternative to the Euro-Mediterranean equivalent of a "géometrie variable": A rather diversified and differentiated policy for regions and issues, depending on variable interests, instruments and goals of the European Union and its southern partners. And surely a policy which reckons with the American role and interest in the Mediterranean. How far such a complex and complicated strategy can be handled by the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union is another question. It requires a strong

hand and a clear comprehensive vision, while allowing the highest necessary amount of diversity and adaptation to circumstances and developments without losing sight of the overall idea of Mediterranean partnership. In other words: So far, the European Union has not resolved the agenda of its relationship with the neighbouring South, but has rather defined a tall and ambitious frame for it. The academic reflection on the Mediterranean has all reason to echo this in the years ahead. This alone would be a useful and welcome contribution to the creation of a vital role for the Mediterranean Lake in the shaping of the new Europe.

The success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership remains to be seen. But one consequence is already evident. The Mediterranean is no longer and solely a lake of concern for the direct inhabitants of its shores. No matter how different the emotional and rational proximity of European Union citizens in Malaga or Tartu, Thessalonica or Edinburgh might well be: Belonging to the very same European Union, they are irreversibly involved into the same policy approaches and will be living under the same consequences of it. There is no longer such a thing as a particular Southern European interest into the Mediterranean. The concrete effects of the Mediterranean will certainly continue to have a stronger relevance for the citizens of Spain, Italy or Greece. But by the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, also Denmark, Ireland and Sweden have become Mediterranean countries. This is not free from inconsistencies and also therefore not always understood, let alone appreciated among all Southern Mediterranean partners. But it has become a fact they have to live with. A case in point are the implications of Malta's accession to the European Union. They will have implications for the emigration regime of Malta, which will have to accept the *acquis communautaire* of the "Schengen Accord". Libya, for instance, can no longer maintain its special relationship and privileges with Malta; visas will become inevitable for Libyans visiting Malta. This gives Malta a hard time to explain and Libya some confusion to understand since at the same time it receives signals from Brussels to gradually and substantially opening up to the EU. But so it is, underlining that the EU as a whole has embarked on the project of partnership in the Mediterranean.

In that sense, the Mediterranean has developed into a European lake, no matter what the intensity of its presence and impact for all EU citizens - and let alone no matter what the agenda for dialogue and partnership among the northern and the southern rim countries - might be. But the Mediterranean is also part of the bigger Atlantic Ocean, its scope and strategic implication. In that sense, there can hardly be an autonomous „Mediterraneism“ without recognising the broader circumstances and dependencies which remain vital for the Mediterranean in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

One of the broader dimensions clearly relates to Africa. This continent has clearly been neglected by Europe over the last decades – and mismanaged by many of its own regimes. New efforts to bring Africa back to the attention of Europe have to be organised around strategies of hopes. Libya, the most difficult of all partners in the Barcelona process, has clearly right by stating the need for a greater interest of Europe – and the whole world in Africa. A substantial partnership between the European Union and the developing African Union, founded with strong Libyan encouragement in 2001, is not an easy task. The Mediterranean partnership could certainly play an instrumental role in such noble effort. It would need to broaden the horizon of all partners of the Barcelona process beyond the very goals and instruments of the Mediterranean partnership as such. By looking beyond itself towards a new beginning with Africa, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership could serve its true and timely historic purpose. This would not relatives the Mediterranean partnership, but would rather put into a perspective of broader meaning. The Euro-Mediterranean process would not be left fertile and useless in such a context but could rather become a necessary but transient vehicle to serve more than itself. No matter how long such a development might take: A new beginning by a successful adaptation and consistent development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership would truly position Europe as a world partner, which is looking beyond its geographic peripheries and the historical intricacies stemming from this into the sphere of global visions and responsibilities. In fact, it could one day be the ultimate justification of the Mediterranean partnership.

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