

# Botnets for scalable management

*Jérôme François, Radu State and Olivier Festor*



Nancy-Université

# Outline

---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management
- 3 Analytical model
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

# Outline


---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management
- 3 Analytical model
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

# Network management challenges

- ▶ Increased number of devices to be managed
- ▶ Increased diversity of devices to be managed
- ▶ Not well delimited domains
- ▶ Multiple obstacles: addresses translators, firewall...

→ reach many hosts wherever there are



# Outline

---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management**
- 3 Analytical model
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion


# Malware communication paradigms

---

- ▶ attackers faced the same problems
  - ▶ control multiple machines through the Internet
  - ▶ goals: distributed denial of service attacks, mass collecting of sensitive data
- ▶ worm capabilities
  - ▶ infection of multiple machines by various ways
  - ▶ execution of a payload
- ▶ construction of a botnet
  - ▶ control mechanism to send orders to the bots and get the responses
  - ▶ decentralized and scalable: example of 400 000 zombies in one botnet
  - ▶ bypass most of the security equipments due to the self connection of zombies (outgoing connection)

# Botnet based network management

- ▶ use a botnet to perform management operations
- ▶ IRC (Internet Relay Chat) protocol: chatting
- ▶ decentralized architecture, spanning tree



# Botnet performances

---

- ▶ current knowledges: observation of malicious activities
- ▶ scalability proof needed
- ▶ **main goal: send a management request to multiple devices with the minimal delay**

Addressed questions:

- ▶ what is the probability to reach 80% of the devices ?
- ▶ how much time is needed to perform the operations ?
- ▶ how many servers should be deployed ?
- ▶ what is the best topology ?




# Outline

---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management
- 3 Analytical model**
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion

# Parameters

- ▶ consider only the servers
- ▶  $N$ : total number of servers
- ▶  $m$  is the maximal branching factor which is equal to the maximal number of neighbors




$$N = 8$$


$$m = 3$$

# Parameters

- ▶ a server can crash if it has to maintain too many connections  $\rightarrow \alpha(m)$  is the probability for a server to be able to forward the messages, decreasing function
- ▶ the risk to be discovered by an attacker and to be attacked:  $\beta$



**Goal:** determine the reachability = the number of servers reached at a certain distance



- ▶ a server can have between 0 and  $m$  neighbors
- ▶ the probability  $p_k$  for a server to have  $k$  neighbors

$$p_k = \begin{cases} 1 - \alpha(m) & \text{when } k = 0 \text{ (overloading)} \\ \frac{\alpha(m)}{m} & \text{when } 1 \leq k \leq m \text{ (random, uniform)} \\ 0 & \text{when } k > m \end{cases}$$

# The generating functions

For  $p_k$ :  $G_0(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k x^k$

▶  $k = 0 \rightarrow p_0$

▶  $k = 1..m \rightarrow p_k x^k = \frac{\alpha(m)}{m} x^k$

▶  $k = m + 1... \infty \rightarrow 0$

▶  $G_0(x) = p_0 + \frac{\alpha(m)}{m} \times \sum_{k=1}^m x^k$

Useful function to compute the average number of

neighbors:  $\mathbb{E}(k) = \frac{dG_0}{dx}(1)$

# The generating functions

- ▶ average number of servers at the  $j$ th hop<sup>1</sup>

$$z_1 = \frac{dG_0}{dx}(1) \quad z_2 = \frac{d^2G_0}{d^2x}(1) \quad z_j = \left[ \frac{z_2}{z_1} \right]^{j-1} z_1$$


---

<sup>1</sup>Ramachandran K. and Sikdar B.: Modeling malware propagation in gnutella type peer-to-peer networks. Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2006

# Reachability

- ▶ number of reached servers at a maximal distance  $k$  divided by the total number of servers

$$\text{reachability}(k) = \frac{\min(\sum_{j=1}^k z_j, N)}{N}$$





# Reachability

---

- ▶ one compromised server  $\rightarrow$  all the network is compromised
- ▶  $(1 - \beta)^N =$  probability to have no compromised servers
- ▶ the number of reached servers is limited by the probability to have a functioning network

$$reachability(k) = \frac{(1 - \beta)^N \times \min(\sum_{j=1}^k z_j, N)}{N}$$

# Average reachability

---

- ▶ average reachability over all possible distance in a tree


$$avg\_reachability(k) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^N reachability(k)}{N}$$

- ▶ random uniform connection of bots  $\rightarrow$  same values for bots

# The load of the system

- ▶  $load_S$ : load of a server to maintain connections with other servers
- ▶  $load_C$ : load of a server to deal with the connected hosts

○ Devices ○ Servers



# The load of the system

---

- ▶  $C$  devices in the system
- ▶  $C_{server}$  is the average number of bots per server.
- ▶ simple and centralized approach:

$$load\_server_{centralized} = C \times load_c$$

- ▶ our solution:

$$load\_server_{botnet} = C_{server} \times load_c + m \times load_s$$

# Outline


---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management
- 3 Analytical model
- 4 Results**
- 5 Conclusion

# Average Reachability

▶  $\beta = 0.01$

▶  $\alpha(m) = e^{(3-m)}$



▶ N varies from 1 to 200


▶ m between 3 and 10

▶ tree = chain for  $m = 2$

▶ small branching factor  
 → better reachability →  
 $\alpha(m)$  impact

▶ using more than 20  
 servers is useless for  
 reachability

# Absolute reachability




- ▶ goal: reach the maximum number of servers
- ▶ more than 100 servers is totally inefficient
- ▶ 35 servers can be reached in the best case

- ▶ 100 hosts per server  $\rightarrow$  3500 hosts
- ▶  $load_{centralized} = 3500 \times load_{host}$
- ▶  $load_{botnet} = 100 \times load_{host} + m \times load_{server}$
- ▶ botnet is more efficient if  $load_{server} < \frac{3400}{m} load_{host}$

# Reachability and the number of hops

- ▶ The number of hops varies from 1 to 10

- ▶  $N = 20$  servers
- ▶  $m \in 3, 5, 7, 10$




- ▶ impact of  $\alpha(m)$ : high connectivity and low  $N \rightarrow$  low reachability



# Reachability and the number of hops

- ▶ The number of hops varies from 1 to 10
- ▶  $N = 100$  servers
- ▶  $m \in 3, 5, 7, 10$




- ▶ lowest reachability for  $m = 3$   
 $\rightarrow m$  has a greater impact than  $\alpha(m)$  due to the value of  $N$
- ▶  $m$  and  $\alpha(m)$  are antagonist
- ▶ important curves to determine the servers topology

- ▶  $m = 5$  is a good choice for a 20-100 servers network
- ▶ maximum reachability  $\rightarrow 7$  hops

# Reachability and the number of nodes

- ▶ distance = 5 hops



- ▶ N varies from 1 to 100
- ▶ first stage limited by  $\beta$ , second stage limited by  $\alpha(m)$
- ▶ competitive impact of  $\alpha(m)$  and  $\beta \rightarrow$  **one limitative factor at a certain time**

# Outline

---

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Malware for management
- 3 Analytical model
- 4 Results
- 5 Conclusion**

# Current solutions

---

- ▶ centralized solution
- ▶ decentralized solutions with mid-level managers (requests translations, results aggregation)
- ▶ management by delegation
- ▶ active networks
- ▶ salutary worms: CodeRed / CodeGreen

# Advantages of IRC botnets for network management

---

- ▶ the servers have just to forward the messages (light software)
- ▶ the IRC clients for the devices do not need many resources
- ▶ the devices have to connect themselves to the botnet  
→ bypass active network equipments

# Topology and Scalability

---

Evaluation → help an administrator to choose the right topology

- ▶ maximum number of servers: 100, 20 for the best “profitability of servers”
- ▶ 100 servers → 35 reached servers (35%)
- ▶ 20 servers → 16 reached servers (81%)
- ▶ maximal distance: 7 hops
- ▶ best branching factor:  $m = 5$
- ▶ 200 bots per servers → the same management operation can be sent to 7000 devices simultaneously

## Future works

---

- ▶ implementation and deployment of the solution on a large testbed (PlanetLab, EmanicsLab)
- ▶ case study: configure a large distributed honeypot for detecting cyber predators on P2P file sharing systems
- ▶ study the other botnets communication mechanisms

# Botnets for scalable management

*Jérôme François, Radu State and Olivier Festor*



Nancy-Université