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Round-Optimal Privacy-Preserving Protocols with Smooth Projective Hash Functions

Olivier Blazy, David Pointcheval, and Damien Vergnaud

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Abstract. In 2008, Groth and Sahai proposed a powerful suite of techniques for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in bilinear groups. Their proof systems have found numerous applications, including group signature schemes, anonymous voting, and anonymous credentials. In this paper, we demonstrate that the notion of *smooth projective hash functions* can be useful to design round-optimal privacy-preserving interactive protocols. We show that this approach is suitable for designing schemes that rely on standard security assumptions in the standard model with a common-reference string and are more efficient than those obtained using the Groth-Sahai methodology. As an illustration of our design principle, we construct an efficient oblivious signature-based envelope scheme and a blind signature scheme, both round-optimal. **Keywords.** oblivious signature-based envelopes – blind

signatures – smooth projective hash functions – bilinear groups – standard model with common-reference string

1 Introduction

In 2008, Groth and Sahai [24] proposed a way to produce efficient and practical non-interactive zero-knowledge and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs for (algebraic) statements related to groups equipped with a bilinear map. They have been significantly studied in cryptography and used in a wide variety of applications in recent years (*e.g.* group signature schemes [8, 9, 22] or blind signatures [2, 6]). While avoiding expensive NP-reductions, these proof systems still lack in practicality and it is desirable to provide more efficient tools.

Smooth projective hash functions (SPHF) were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [13] for constructing encryption schemes. A projective hashing family is a family of hash functions that can be evaluated in two ways: using the (secret) hashing key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas using the (public) *projected* key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain. Such a family is deemed *smooth* if the value of the hash function on any point outside the special subset is independent of the projected key. If it is hard to distinguish elements of the special subset from non-elements, then this primitive can be seen as special type of zero-knowledge proof system for membership in the special subset. The notion of SPHF has found applications in various contexts in cryptography (*e.g.* [1, 18, 29]). We present some other applications with privacy-preserving primitives that were already inherently interactive.

Applications: Our two applications are *Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope* [30] and *Blind Signatures* [12].

Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope (OSBE) were introduced in [30]. It can be viewed as a nice way to ease the asymmetrical aspect of several authentication protocols. Alice is a member of an organization and possesses a certificate produced by an authority attesting she is in this organization. Bob wants to send a private message P to members of this organization. However due to the sensitive nature of the organization, Alice does not want to give Bob neither her certificate nor a proof she belongs to the organization. OSBE lets Bob sends an obfuscated version of this message P to Alice, in such a way that Alice will be able to find P if and only if Alice is in the required organization. In the process, Bob cannot decide whether Alice does really belong to the organization. They are part of a growing field of protocols, around *automated trust negotiation*, which also include Secret Handshakes [3], Password-based Authenticated Key-Exchange [19], and

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Hidden Credentials [10]. Those schemes are all closely related, so due to space constraints, we are going to focus on OSBE (as if you tweak two of them, you can produce any of the other protocols [11]).

Blind signatures were introduced by Chaum [12] for electronic cash in order to prevent the bank from linking a coin to its spender: they allow a user to obtain a signature on a message such that the signer cannot relate the resulting message/signature pair to the execution of the signing protocol. In [15], Fischlin gave a generic construction of round-optimal blind signatures in the common-reference string (CRS) model: the signing protocol consists of one message from the user to the signer and one response by the signer. The first practical instantiation of round-optimal blind signatures in the standard model was proposed in [2] but it relies on non-standard computational assumptions. We proposed, recently only [6], the most efficient realizations of round-optimal blind signatures in the common-reference string model under classical assumptions. But these schemes still use the Groth-Sahai proof systems.

Contributions: Our first contribution is to clarify and increase the security requirements of an OSBE scheme. The main improvement residing in some protection for both the sender and the receiver against the Certification Authority. The OSBE notion echoes directly to the idea of SPHF if we consider the language \mathcal{L} defined by encryption of valid signatures, which is hard to distinguish under the security of the encryption schemes. We show how to build, from a SPHF on this language, an OSBE scheme in the standard model with a CRS. And we prove the security of our construction in regards of the security of the commitment (the ciphertext), the signature and the SPHF scheme. We then show how to build a simple and efficient OSBE scheme relying on a classical assumption, DLin. An asymmetrical version is also sketched in the Appendix C.2: the communication cost is divided by two. To build those schemes, we use SPHF in a new way, avoiding the need of costly Groth-Sahai proofs when an interaction is inherently needed in the primitive. Our method does not add any other interaction, and so supplement smoothly those proofs.

To show the efficiency of the method, and the ease of application, we then adapt two Blind Signature schemes proposed in [6]. Our approach fits perfectly and decreases significantly the communicational complexity of the schemes (it is divided by more than three in one construction). Moreover one scheme relies on a weakened security assumptions: the XDH assumption instead of the SXDH assumption and permits to use more bilinear group settings (namely, Type-II and Type-III bilinear groups [16] instead of only Type-III bilinear groups for the construction presented in [6]).

Organization. The paper is divided into three main parts after a brief recall of standard definitions and security notions. In a first part, we present a high-level version of our OSBE protocol, and prove its security. We then instantiate this protocol with Linear encryption, Waters signature and study its efficiency when compared with existing versions. In a last part, we continue to use SPHF as an effective replacement to proofs of knowledge to instantiate a blind signature. In the appendices, we provide details on our instantiation of SPHF, the detailed security proofs, and a sketch of the asymmetric instantiations of our OSBE scheme and the blind signature.

2 Definitions

In this section, we briefly recall the notations and the security notions of the basic primitives we will use in the rest of the paper, and namely public key encryption, signature and smooth projective hash functions (SPHF), using the Gennaro-Lindell [18] extension. More formal definitions are provided in the Appendix A.1, together with concrete instantiations (linear encryption, Waters signature, SPHF on linear tuples) and the computational assumptions in the Appendix A.3. In a second part, we recall and enhance the security model of oblivious signature-based envelope protocols [30].

2.1 Notations

Encryption Scheme. An encryption scheme \mathcal{E} is defined by four algorithms: $\text{ESetup}(1^k)$ that generates the global parameters param , $\text{EKeyGen}(\text{param})$ that generates the pair of encryption/decryption keys (ek, dk) , $\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, m; r)$ that produces a ciphertext c , and $\text{Decrypt}(\text{dk}, c)$ that decrypts it back. The security of an encryption scheme is defined through the semantic security (indistinguishability of ciphertexts against chosen-plaintext attacks) [5, 20]: after having chosen two messages M_0, M_1 and received the encryption c of one of them, the adversary should be unable to guess which message has been encrypted. More precisely, we will use commitment schemes (as in [1]), which should be hiding (indistinguishability) and binding (one opening only), with the additional extractability property. The latter property thus needs an extracting algorithm that corresponds to the decryption algorithm. Hence the notation with encryption schemes.

Signature Scheme. A signature scheme \mathcal{S} is also defined by four algorithms: $\text{SSetup}(1^k)$ that generates the global parameters param , $\text{SKeyGen}(\text{param})$ that generates a pair of verification/signing keys (vk, sk) , $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m; s)$ that produces a signature σ , and $\text{Verif}(\text{vk}, m, \sigma)$ that checks its validity. The security of a signature scheme is defined by the unforgeability property (existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks) [21]. An adversary against the unforgeability tries to generate a valid signature on a message M of its choice, after a polynomial number of signing queries to the signer: the message M must be distinct from all the queries to the signing oracle.

Smooth Projective Hash Function. An SPHF system [13] on a language \mathcal{L} is defined by five algorithms: $\text{SPHFSetup}(1^k)$ that generates the global parameters, $\text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param})$ that generates a hashing key hk , $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$ that derives the projection key hp , possibly depending on the word W [1, 18]. Then, $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$ and $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W, w)$ outputs the hash value, either from the hashing key, or from the projection key and the witness. The correctness of the scheme assures that if W is indeed in \mathcal{L} with w as a witness, then the two ways to compute the hash value give the same result. The security of a SPHF is defined through two different notions, the smoothness and the pseudo-randomness properties: The smoothness property guarantees that if $W \notin \mathcal{L}$, then the hash value is statistically random (statistically indistinguishable from a random element). The pseudo-randomness guarantees that even for a word $W \in \mathcal{L}$, but without the knowledge of a witness w , then the hash value is random (computationally indistinguishable from a random element). Abdalla *et al.* [1] explained how to combine SPHF to deal with conjunctions and disjunctions of the languages. This is recalled in the Appendix A.2.

2.2 Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope

We now define an OSBE protocol, where a sender \mathcal{S} wants to send a private message $P \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ to a recipient \mathcal{R} in possession of a certificate/signature on a message M .

Definition 1 (Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope). *An OSBE scheme is defined by four algorithms (OSBESetup , OSBEKeyGen , OSBESign , OSBEVerif), and one interactive protocol $\text{OSBEProtocol}(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{R})$:*

- $\text{OSBESetup}(1^k)$, where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param ;
- $\text{OSBEKeyGen}(\text{param})$ generates the keys (vk, sk) of the certification authority;
- $\text{OSBESign}(\text{sk}, m)$ produces a signature σ on the input message m , under the signing key sk ;
- $\text{OSBEVerif}(\text{vk}, m, \sigma)$ checks whether σ is a valid signature on m , w.r.t. the public key vk ; it outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
- $\text{OSBEProtocol}(\mathcal{S}(\text{vk}, M, P), \mathcal{R}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma))$ between the sender \mathcal{S} with the private message P , and the recipient \mathcal{R} with a certificate σ . If σ is a valid signature under vk on the common message M , then \mathcal{R} receives P , otherwise it receives nothing. In any case, \mathcal{S} does not learn anything.

$\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{esc}-b}(k)$ [Escrow Free property]

1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{OSBESetup}(1^k)$
2. $\text{vk} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{INIT} : \text{param})$
3. $(M, \sigma) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND} : \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot))$
4. $\text{OSBEProtocol}(\mathcal{A}, \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, b))$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot))$
6. RETURN b'

$\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sem}^*-b}(k)$ [Semantic security w.r.t. the authority]

1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{OSBESetup}(1^k)$
2. $\text{vk} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{INIT} : \text{param})$
3. $(M, \sigma, P_0, P_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND} : \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot))$
4. $\text{transcript} \leftarrow \text{OSBEProtocol}(\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b), \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, 0))$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : \text{transcript}, \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot))$
6. RETURN b'

$\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{sem}-b}(k)$ [Semantic Security]

1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{OSBESetup}(1^k)$
2. $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{OSBEKeyGen}(\text{param})$
3. $(M, P_0, P_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND} : \text{vk}, \text{Sign}^*(\text{vk}, \cdot), \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}(\text{vk}, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot))$
4. $\text{OSBEProtocol}(\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b), \mathcal{A})$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : \text{Sign}(\text{vk}, \cdot), \text{Send}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot), \text{Rec}(\text{vk}, \cdot, 0), \text{Exec}(\text{vk}, \cdot, \cdot))$
6. IF $M \in \mathcal{SM}$ RETURN 0 ELSE RETURN b'

Fig. 1. Security Games for OSBE

Such an OSBE scheme should be (the three last properties are additional —or stronger— security properties from the original definitions [30]):

- *correct*: the protocol actually allows \mathcal{R} to learn P , whenever σ is a valid signature on M under vk ;
- *oblivious*: the sender should not be able to distinguish whether \mathcal{R} uses a valid signature σ on M under vk as input. More precisely, if \mathcal{R}_0 knows and uses a valid signature σ and \mathcal{R}_1 does not use such a valid signature, the sender cannot distinguish an interaction with \mathcal{R}_0 from an interaction with \mathcal{R}_1 ;
- (*weakly*) *semantically secure*: the recipient learns nothing about \mathcal{S} input P if it does not use a valid signature σ on M under vk as input. More precisely, if \mathcal{S}_0 owns P_0 and \mathcal{S}_1 owns P_1 , the recipient that does not use a valid signature cannot distinguish an interaction with \mathcal{S}_0 from an interaction with \mathcal{S}_1 ;
- *semantically secure* (denoted **sem**): the above indistinguishability should hold even if the receiver has seen several interactions $\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{vk}, M, P), \mathcal{R}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma) \rangle$ with valid signatures, and the same sender's input P ;
- *escrow free* (denoted **esc**): the authority (owner of the signing key sk), playing as the sender or just eavesdropping, is unable to distinguish whether \mathcal{R} used a valid signature σ on M under vk as input. This notion supersedes the above *oblivious* property, since this is basically oblivious w.r.t. the authority, without any restriction.
- *semantically secure w.r.t. the authority* (denoted **sem***): after the interaction, the authority (owner of the signing key sk) learns nothing about P .

We insist that the escrow-free property (**esc**) is stronger than the oblivious property, hence we will consider the former only. However, the semantic security w.r.t. the authority (**sem***) is independent from the basic semantic security (**sem**) since in the latter the adversary interacts with the sender whereas in the former the adversary (who generated the signing keys) has only passive access to a challenge transcript.

These security notions can be formalized by the security games presented on Figure 1, where the adversary keeps some internal state between the various calls **INIT**, **FIND** and **GUESS**. They make use of the oracles described below, and the advantages of the adversary are, for all the security notions,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^*(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^{*-1}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE},\mathcal{A}}^{*-0}(k) = 1]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}}^*(k, t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}, \mathcal{A}}^*(k).$$

- $\text{Sign}(\text{vk}, m)$: This oracle outputs a valid signature on m under the signing key sk associated to vk (where the pair (vk, sk) has been outputted by the OSBEKeyGen algorithm);
- $\text{Sign}^*(\text{vk}, m)$: This oracle first queries $\text{Sign}(\text{vk}, m)$. It additionally stores the query m to the list \mathcal{SM} ;
- $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, m, P)$: This oracle emulates the sender with private input P , and thus may consist of multiple interactions;
- $\text{Rec}(\text{vk}, m, b)$: This oracle emulates the recipient either with a valid signature σ on m under the verification key vk (obtained from the signing oracle Sign) if $b = 0$ (as the above \mathcal{R}_0), or with a random string if $b = 1$ (as the above \mathcal{R}_1). This oracle is available when the signing key has been generated by OSBEKeyGen only;
- $\text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, m, \sigma, b)$: This oracle does as above, with a valid signature σ provided by the adversary. If $b = 0$, it emulates the recipient playing with σ ; if $b = 1$, it emulates the recipient playing with a random string;
- $\text{Exec}(\text{vk}, m, P)$: This oracle outputs the transcript of an honest execution between a sender with private input P and the recipient with a valid signature σ on m under the verification key vk (obtained from the signing oracle Sign). It basically activates the $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, m, P)$ and $\text{Rec}(\text{vk}, m, 0)$ oracles.
- $\text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, m, \sigma, P)$: This oracle outputs the transcript of an honest execution between a sender with private input P and the recipient with a valid signature σ (provided by the adversary). It basically activates the $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, m, P)$ and $\text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, m, \sigma, 0)$ oracles.

Remark 2. The OSBE schemes proposed in [30] do not satisfy the semantic security w.r.t. the authority. This is obvious for the generic construction based on identity-based encryption which consists in only one flow of communication (since a scheme that achieves the strong security notions requires at least two flows). This is also true (to a lesser extent) for the RSA-based construction: for any third party, the semantic security relies (in the random oracle model) on the CDH assumption in a 2048-bit RSA group; but for the authority, it can be broken by solving two 1024-bit discrete logarithm problems. This task is much simpler in particular if the authority generates the RSA modulus $N = pq$ dishonestly (*e.g.* with $p - 1$ and $q - 1$ smooth). In order to make the scheme secure in our strong model, one needs (at least) to double the size of the RSA modulus and to make sure that the authority has selected and correctly employed a truly random seed in the generation of the RSA key pair [28].

3 An Efficient OSBE scheme

In this section, we present a high-level instantiation of OSBE with the previous primitives as black boxes. Thereafter, we provide a specific instantiation with linear ciphertexts. The overall security then relies on the DLin assumption, a quite standard assumption in the standard model. Its efficiency is of the same order of magnitude than the construction based on identity-based encryption [30] (that only achieves weaker security notions) and better than the RSA-based scheme which provides similar security guarantees (in the random oracle model).

3.1 High-Level Instantiation

We assume we have an encryption scheme \mathcal{E} , a signature scheme \mathcal{S} and a SPHF system onto a set \mathbb{G} . We additionally use a key derivation function KDF to derive a pseudo-random bit-string $K \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ from a pseudo-random element v in \mathbb{G} . One can use the Leftover-Hash Lemma [25], with a random seed defined in param during the global setup, to extract the entropy from v , then followed by a pseudo-random generator to get a long enough bit-string. Many uses of the same seed in the Leftover-Hash-Lemma just leads to a security loss linear in the number of extractions. We describe an oblivious signature-based envelope system OSBE , to send a private message $P \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$:

- OSBESetup(1^k), where k is the security parameter:
 - it first generates the global parameters for the signature scheme (using SSetup), the encryption scheme (using ESetup), and the SPHF system (using SPHFSetup);
 - it then generates the public key ek of the encryption scheme (using EKeyGen, while the decryption key will not be used);
- The output $param$ consists of all the individual $param$ and the encryption key ek ;
- OSBEKeyGen($param$) runs SKeyGen($param$) to generate a pair (vk, sk) of verification-signing keys;
 - The OSBESign and OSBEVerif algorithms are exactly Sign and Verif from the signature scheme;
 - OSBEProtocol($\mathcal{S}(vk, M, P), \mathcal{R}(vk, M, \sigma)$): In the following, $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}(vk, M)$ will describe the language of the ciphertexts under the above encryption key ek of a valid signature of the input message M under the input verification key vk (hence vk and M as inputs, while $param$ contains ek).
 - \mathcal{R} generates and sends $c = \text{Encrypt}(ek, \sigma; r)$;
 - \mathcal{S} computes $hk = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, param)$, $hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk, (\mathcal{L}, param), c)$, $v = \text{Hash}(hk, (\mathcal{L}, param), c)$, and $Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$; \mathcal{S} sends hp, Q to \mathcal{R} ;
 - \mathcal{R} computes $v' = \text{ProjHash}(hp, (\mathcal{L}, param), c, r)$ and $P' = Q \oplus \text{KDF}(v')$.

3.2 Security Properties

Theorem 3 (Correct). *OSBE is sound.*

Proof. Under the correctness of the SPHF system, $v' = v$, and thus $P' = (P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)) \oplus \text{KDF}(v') = P$.

Theorem 4 (Escrow-Free). *OSBE is escrow-free if the encryption scheme \mathcal{E} is semantically secure: $\text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}}^{\text{esc}}(k, t) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k, t')$ with $t' \approx t$.*

Proof. Let us assume \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the escrow-free property of our scheme: The malicious adversary \mathcal{A} is able to tell the difference between an interaction with \mathcal{R}_0 (who knows and uses a valid signature) and \mathcal{R}_1 (who does not use a valid signature), with advantage ε .

We now build an adversary \mathcal{B} against the semantic security of the encryption scheme \mathcal{E} :

- \mathcal{B} is first given the parameters for \mathcal{E} and an encryption key ek ;
- \mathcal{B} emulates OSBESetup: it runs SSetup and SPHFSetup by itself. For the encryption scheme \mathcal{E} , the parameters and the key have already been provided by the challenger of the encryption security game;
- \mathcal{A} provides the verification key vk ;
- \mathcal{B} has to simulate all the oracles:
 - $\text{Send}(vk, M, P)$, for a message M and a private input P : upon receiving c , one computes $hk = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, param)$, $hp = \text{ProjKG}(hk, (\mathcal{L}, param), c)$, $v = \text{Hash}(hk, (\mathcal{L}, param), c)$, and $Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$. One sends back (hp, Q) ;
 - $\text{Rec}^*(vk, M, \sigma, 0)$, for a message M and a valid signature σ : \mathcal{B} outputs $c = \text{Encrypt}(ek, \sigma; r)$;
 - $\text{Exec}^*(vk, M, \sigma, P)$: one first runs $\text{Rec}(vk, M, \sigma, 0)$ to generate c , that is provided to $\text{Send}(vk, M, P)$, to generate (hp, Q) .
- At some point, \mathcal{A} outputs a message M and a valid signature σ , and \mathcal{B} has to simulate $\text{Rec}^*(vk, M, \sigma, b)$: \mathcal{B} sets $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \sigma$ and sets σ_1 as a random string. It sends (σ_0, σ_1) to the challenger of the semantic security of the encryption scheme and gets back c , an encryption of σ_β , for a random unknown bit β . It outputs c ;
- \mathcal{B} provides again access to the above oracles, and \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' , that \mathcal{B} forwards as its guess β' for the β involved in the semantic security game for \mathcal{E} .

Note that the above simulation perfectly emulates $\text{Exp}_{\text{OSBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{esc}-\beta}(k)$ (since basically b is β , and b' is β'):

$$\varepsilon = \text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{esc}}(k) = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind}}(k) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k, t).$$

Theorem 5 (Semantically Secure). *OSBE is semantically secure if the signature is unforgeable, the SPHF is smooth and the encryption scheme is semantically secure (and under the pseudo-randomness of the KDF):*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}}^{\text{sem}}(k, t) \leq q_U \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k, t') + 2 \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}}^{\text{uf}}(k, q_S, t'') + 2 \text{Adv}_{\text{SPHF}}^{\text{smooth}}(k) \text{ with } t', t'' \approx t.$$

In the above formula, q_U denotes the number of interactions the adversary has with the sender, and q_S the number of signing queries the adversary asked.

Proof. Let us assume \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the semantic security of our scheme: The malicious adversary \mathcal{A} is able to tell the difference between an interaction with \mathcal{S}_0 (who owns P_0) and \mathcal{S}_1 (who owns P_1), with advantage ε . We start from this initial security game, and make slight modifications to bound ε .

Game \mathcal{G}_0 . Let us emulate this security game:

- \mathcal{B} emulates the initialization of the system: it runs `OSBESetup` by itself, and then `OSBEKeyGen` to generate (vk, sk) ;
- \mathcal{B} has to simulate all the oracles:
 - `Sign`(vk, M) and `Sign*`(vk, M): it runs the corresponding algorithm by itself;
 - `Send`(vk, M, P), for a message M and a private input P : upon receiving c , one computes $\text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param})$, $\text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), c)$, $v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), c)$, and $Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$. One sends back (hp, Q) ;
 - `Rec`($\text{vk}, M, 0$), for a message M : \mathcal{B} asks for a valid signature σ on M , computes and outputs $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \sigma; r)$;
 - `Exec`(vk, M, P): one simply first runs `Rec`($\text{vk}, M, 0$) to generate c , that is provided to `Send`(vk, M, P), to generate (hp, Q) .
- At some point, \mathcal{A} outputs a message M and two inputs (P_0, P_1) to distinguish the sender, and \mathcal{B} call back the above `Send`(vk, M, P_b) simulation to interact with \mathcal{A} ;
- \mathcal{B} provides again access to the above oracles, and \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' .

In this game, \mathcal{A} has an advantage ε in guessing b :

$$\varepsilon = \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 0] = 2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = b] - 1.$$

Game \mathcal{G}_1^β . This game involves the semantic security of the encryption scheme: \mathcal{B} is already provided the parameters and the encryption key ek by the challenger of the semantic security of the encryption scheme, hence the initialization is slightly modified. In addition, \mathcal{B} sets the bit $b = \beta$, and modifies the `Rec` oracle simulation:

- `Rec`($\text{vk}, M, 0$), for a message M : \mathcal{B} asks for a valid signature σ_0 on M , and sets σ_1 as a random string, computes and outputs $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \sigma_b; r)$.

Since \mathcal{B} knows b , it finally outputs $\beta' = (b' = b)$.

Note that \mathcal{G}_1^0 is exactly \mathcal{G}_0 , and the distance between \mathcal{G}_1^0 and \mathcal{G}_1^1 relies on the Left-or-Right security of the encryption scheme, which can be shown equivalent to the semantic security, with a lost linear in the number of encryption queries, which is actually the number q_U of interactions with a user (the sender in this case), due to the hybrid argument [4]:

$$\begin{aligned} q_U \times \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k) &\geq \Pr[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 0] - \Pr[\beta' = 1 | \beta = 1] \\ &= \Pr[b' = b | \beta = 0] - \Pr[b' = b | \beta = 1] \\ &= (2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1^0}[b' = b] - 1) - (2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1^1}[b' = b] - 1) \end{aligned}$$

As a consequence: $\varepsilon \leq q_U \times \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k) + (2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1^1}[b' = b] - 1)$.

Game \mathcal{G}_2 . This game involves the unforgeability of the signature scheme: \mathcal{B} is already provided the parameters and the verification vk for the signature scheme, together with access to the signing oracle (note that all the signing queries Sign^* asked by the adversary in the FIND stage, i.e., before the challenge interaction with $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b)$, are stored in \mathcal{SM}). The simulator \mathcal{B} generates itself all the other parameters and keys, namely the encryption key ek , together with the associated decryption key dk . For the Rec oracle simulation, \mathcal{B} keeps the random version (as in \mathcal{G}_1^1). In the challenge interaction with $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b)$, one stops the simulation and makes the adversary win if it uses a valid signature on a message $M \notin \mathcal{SM}$:

- $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b)$, during the challenge interaction: upon receiving c , if $M \notin \mathcal{SM}$, it first decrypts c to get the input signature σ . If σ is a valid signature, one stops the game, sets $b' = b$ and outputs b' . If the signature is in not valid, the simulation remains unchanged;
- $\text{Rec}(\text{vk}, M, 0)$, for a message M : \mathcal{B} sets σ as a random string, computes and outputs $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \sigma; r)$.

Because of the abort in the case of a valid signature on a new message, we know that the adversary cannot use such a valid signature in the challenge. So, since M should not be in \mathcal{SM} , the signature will be invalid. Actually, the unique difference from the previous game \mathcal{G}_1^1 is the abort in case of valid signature on a new message in the challenge phase, which probability is bounded by $\text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}}^{\text{euf}}(k, q_S)$. Using Shoup's Lemma [32]:

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1^1}[b' = b] - \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_2}[b' = b] \leq \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}}^{\text{euf}}(k, q_S).$$

As a consequence: $\varepsilon \leq q_U \times \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k) + 2 \times \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}}^{\text{euf}}(k, q_S) + (2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_2}[b' = b] - 1)$.

Game \mathcal{G}_3 . The last game involves the smoothness of the SPHF: The unique difference is in the computation of v in Send simulation, in the challenge phase only: \mathcal{B} chooses a random $v \in \mathbb{G}$. Due to the statistical randomness of v in the previous game, in case the signature is not valid (a word that is not in the language), this game is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one:

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_2}[b' = b] - \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_3}[b' = b] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SPHF}}^{\text{smooth}}(k).$$

Since P_b is now masked by a truly random value, no information leaks on b : $\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_3}[b' = b] = 1/2$.

Theorem 6. *OSBE is semantically secure w.r.t. the authority if the SPHF is pseudo-random (and under the pseudo-randomness of the KDF):*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{OSBE}}^{\text{sem}^*}(k, t) \leq 2 \times \text{Adv}_{\text{SPHF}}^{\text{pr}}(k, t).$$

Proof. Let us assume \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the semantic security w.r.t. the authority: The malicious adversary \mathcal{A} is able to tell the difference between an eavesdropped interaction with \mathcal{S}_0 (who owns P_0) and \mathcal{S}_1 (who owns P_1), with advantage ε . We start from this initial security game, and make slight modifications to bound ε .

Game \mathcal{G}_0 . Let us emulate this security game:

- \mathcal{B} emulates the initialization of the system: it runs OSBESetup by itself;
- \mathcal{A} provides the verification key vk ;
- \mathcal{B} has to simulate all the oracles:
 - $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P)$, for a message M and a private input P : upon receiving c , one computes $\text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param})$, $\text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), c)$, $v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), c)$, and $Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$. One sends back (hp, Q) ;
 - $\text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, 0)$, for a message M and a valid signature σ : \mathcal{B} outputs $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \sigma; r)$;

- $\text{Exec}^*(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, P)$: one first runs $\text{Rec}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, 0)$ to generate c , that is provided to $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P)$, to generate (hp, Q) .
- At some point, \mathcal{A} outputs a message M with a valid signature σ , and two inputs (P_0, P_1) to distinguish the sender, and \mathcal{B} call back the above $\text{Send}(\text{vk}, M, P_b)$ and $\text{Rec}^*(\text{vk}, M, \sigma, 0)$ simulations to interact together and output the transcript $(c; \text{hp}, Q)$;
- \mathcal{B} provides again access to the above oracles, and \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' .

In this game, \mathcal{A} has an advantage ε in guessing b :

$$\varepsilon = \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = 1|b = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = 1|b = 0] = 2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = b] - 1.$$

Game \mathcal{G}_1 . This game involves the pseudo-randomness of the SPHF: The unique difference is in the computation of v in Send simulation of the eavesdropped interaction, and so for the transcript: \mathcal{B} chooses a random $v \in \mathbb{G}$ and computes $Q = P_b \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$. Due to the pseudo-randomness of v in the previous game, since \mathcal{A} does not know the random coins r used to encrypt σ , this game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous one.

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1}[b' = b] - \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = b] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{SPHF}}^{\text{PR}}(k, t).$$

Since P_b is now masked by a truly random value v , no information leaks on b : $\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1}[b' = b] = 1/2$.

3.3 Our Efficient OSBE Instantiation

Our first construction combines the linear encryption scheme [7], the Waters signature scheme [33] and a SPHF on linear ciphertexts [13, 31]. It thus relies on classical assumptions: CDH for the unforgeability of signatures and DLin for the semantic security of the encryption scheme. The formal definitions are recalled in the Appendix A.3.

Basic Primitives. Given an encrypted Waters signature from the recipient, the sender is able to compute a projection key, and a hash corresponding to the expected signature, and send to the recipient the projection key and the product between the expected hash and the message P . If the recipient was honest (a correct ciphertext), it is able to compute the hash thanks to the projection key, and so to find P , in the other case it does not learn anything.

We briefly sketch the basic building blocks: linear encryption, Waters signature and the SPHF for linear tuples. They are more formally described in the appendix A.3.

All these primitives work in a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, where $e: \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an admissible bilinear map, for two groups \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T , of prime order p , generated by g and $g_t = e(g, g)$ respectively.

Waters Signatures. The public parameters are a generator $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$ and a vector $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^{k+1}$, which defines the *Waters hash* of a message $M = (M_1, \dots, M_k) \in \{0, 1\}^k$ as $\mathcal{F}(M) = u_0 \prod_{i=1}^k u_i^{M_i}$. The public verification key is $\text{vk} = g^z$, which corresponding secret signing key is $\text{sk} = h^z$, for a random $z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. The signature on a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^k$ is $\sigma = (\sigma_1 = \text{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^s, \sigma_2 = g^s)$, for some random $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. It can be verified by checking $e(g, \sigma_1) = e(\text{vk}, h) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$. This signature scheme is *unforgeable* under the CDH assumption.

Linear Encryption. The secret key dk is a pair of random scalars (y_1, y_2) and the public key is $\text{ek} = (Y_1 = g^{y_1}, Y_2 = g^{y_2})$. One encrypts a message $M \in \mathbb{G}$ as $c = (c_1 = Y_1^{r_1}, c_2 = Y_2^{r_2}, c_3 = g^{r_1+r_2} \cdot M)$, for random scalars $r_1, r_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. To decrypt, one computes $M = c_3 / (c_1^{1/y_1} c_2^{1/y_2})$. This encryption scheme is *semantically secure* under the DLin assumption.

DLin-compatible Smooth-Projective Hash Function. This is actually a weaker variant of [31]. The language \mathcal{L} consists of the linear tuples w.r.t. a basis (u, v, g) . For a linear encryption key $\text{ek} = (Y_1, Y_2)$, a ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ is an encryption of the message M if $(c_1, c_2, c_3/M)$ is a linear tuple w.r.t. the basis (Y_1, Y_2, g) . The language $\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M)$ consists of these ciphertexts. An SPHF for this language can be:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{HashKG}(\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M)) &= \text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \\ \text{Hash}(\text{hk}; \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} (c_3/M)^{x_3} \\ \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}; \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= \text{hp} = (Y_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, Y_2^{x_2} g^{x_3}) \\ \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C; r) &= \text{hp}_1^{r_1} \text{hp}_2^{r_2} \end{aligned}$$

This function is defined for linear tuples in \mathbb{G} , but it could work in any group, since it does not make use of pairings. And namely, we use it below in \mathbb{G}_T .

Smooth-Projective Hash Function for Linear Encryption of Valid Waters Signatures. We will consider a slightly more complex language: the ciphertexts under ek of a valid signature of M under vk . A given ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3, \sigma_2)$ contains a valid signature of M if and only if (c_1, c_2, c_3) actually encrypts σ_1 such that (σ_1, σ_2) is a valid Waters signature on M . The latter means

$$(C_1 = e(c_1, g), C_2 = e(c_2, g), C_3 = e(c_3, g) / (e(h, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)))$$

is a linear tuple in basis $(U = e(Y_1, g), V = e(Y_2, g), g_t = e(g, g))$ in \mathbb{G}_T . Since the basis consists of 3 elements of the form $e(\cdot, g)$, the projected key can be compacted in \mathbb{G} . We thus consider the language $\text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M)$ that contains these quadruples $(c_1, c_2, c_3, \sigma_2)$, and its SPHF:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{HashKG}(\text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M)) &= \text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3 \\ \text{Hash}(\text{hk}; \text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C) &= \\ &e(c_1, g)^{x_1} e(c_2, g)^{x_2} (e(c_3, g) / (e(h, \text{vk}) e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)))^{x_3} \\ \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}; \text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C) &= \text{hp} = (\text{ek}_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, \text{ek}_2^{x_2} g^{x_3}) \\ \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}; \text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C; r) &= e(\text{hp}_1^{r_1} \text{hp}_2^{r_2}, g) \end{aligned}$$

Instantiation. We now define our OSBE protocol, where a sender \mathcal{S} wants to send a private message $P \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ to a recipient \mathcal{R} in possession of a Waters signature on a message M .

- $\text{OSBESetup}(1^k)$, where k is the security parameter, defines a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, the public parameters $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$, an encryption key $\text{ek} = (Y_1 = g^{y_1}, Y_2 = g^{y_2})$, where $(y_1, y_2) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^2$, and $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^{k+1}$ for the Waters signature. All these elements constitute the string param ;
- $\text{OSBEKeyGen}(\text{param})$, the authority generates a pair of keys $(\text{vk} = g^z, \text{sk} = h^z)$ for a random scalar $z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$;
- $\text{OSBESign}(\text{sk}, M)$ produces a signature $\sigma = (h^z \mathcal{F}(M)^s, g^s)$;
- $\text{OSBEVerif}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma)$ checks if $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(\sigma_2, \mathcal{F}(M)) \cdot e(h, \text{vk})$.
- $\text{OSBEProtocol}(\mathcal{S}(\text{vk}, M, P), \mathcal{R}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma))$ runs as follows:
 - \mathcal{R} chooses random $r_1, r_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sends a linear encryption of σ :
 $C = (c_1 = \text{ek}_1^{r_1}, c_2 = \text{ek}_2^{r_2}, c_3 = g^{r_1+r_2} \cdot \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$
 - \mathcal{S} chooses random $x_1, x_2, x_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3$ and computes:
 - * $\text{HashKG}(\text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M)) = \text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3)$;
 - * $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}; \text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C) = v = e(c_1, g)^{x_1} e(c_2, g)^{x_2} (e(c_3, g) / (e(h, \text{vk}) e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)))^{x_3}$;
 - * $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}; \text{WLin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C) = \text{hp} = (\text{ek}_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, \text{ek}_2^{x_2} g^{x_3})$.
 - \mathcal{S} then sends $(\text{hp}, Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v))$ to \mathcal{R} ;
 - \mathcal{R} computes $v' = e(\text{hp}_1^{r_1} \text{hp}_2^{r_2}, g)$ and $P' = Q \oplus \text{KDF}(v')$.

An asymmetric instantiation can be found in the Appendix C.2.

3.4 Security and Efficiency

We now provide a security analysis of this scheme. This instantiation differs, from the high-level instantiation presented before, in the ciphertext C of the signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$. The second half of the signature indeed remains in clear. It thus does not guarantee the semantic security on the signature used in the ciphertext. However, granted Waters signature randomizability, one can re-randomize the signature each time, and thus provide a totally new σ_2 : it does not leak any information about the original signature. The first part of the ciphertext (c_1, c_2, c_3) does not leak any additional information under the DLin assumption. As a consequence, the global ciphertext guarantees the semantic security of the original signature if a new re-randomized signature is encrypted each time. We can now apply the high-level construction security, and all the assumptions hold under the DLin one:

Theorem 7. *Our OSBE scheme is secure (i.e., escrow-free, semantically secure, and semantically secure w.r.t. the authority) under the DLin assumption (and the pseudo-random generator in the KDF).*

Our proposed scheme needs one communication for \mathcal{R} and one for \mathcal{S} , so it is round-optimal. Communication also consists of few elements, \mathcal{R} sends 4 group elements, and \mathcal{S} answers with 2 group elements only and an ℓ -bit string for the masked $P \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$. As explained in Remark 2, this has to be compared with the RSA-based scheme from [30] which requires 2 elements in RSA groups (with double-length modulus). For a 128-bit security level, using standard Type-I bilinear groups implementation [16], we obtain a 62.5% improvement¹ in communication complexity over the RSA-based scheme proposed in the original paper [30].

While reducing the communication cost of the scheme, we have improved its security and it now fits the proposed applications. In [30], such schemes were proposed for applications where someone wants to transmit a confidential information to an agent belonging to a specific agency. However the agent does not want to give away his signature. As they do not consider eavesdropping and replay in their semantic security nothing prevents an adversary to replay a part of a previous interaction to impersonate a CIA agent (to recall their example). In practice, an additional secure communication channel, such as with SSL, was required in their security model, hence increasing the communication cost: our protocol is secure by itself.

4 An efficient Blind Signature

4.1 Definitions

A more formal definition of blind signatures is provided in the Appendix B, but we briefly recall it in this section: A blind signature scheme \mathcal{BS} is defined by a setup algorithm $\mathcal{BS}\text{Setup}(1^k)$ that generates the global parameters param , and key generation algorithm $\mathcal{BS}\text{KeyGen}(\text{param})$ that outputs a pair (vk, sk) , and interactive protocol $\mathcal{BS}\text{Protocol}(\mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m))$ which provides \mathcal{U} with a signature on m , and a verification algorithm $\mathcal{BS}\text{Verif}(\text{vk}, m, \sigma)$ that checks its validity. The security of a blind signature scheme is defined through the unforgeability and blindness properties: An adversary against the unforgeability tries to generate $q_s + 1$ valid message-signature pairs after at most q_s complete interactions with the honest signer; The blindness condition states that a malicious signer should be unable to decide which of two messages m_0, m_1 has been signed first in two executions with an honest user.

4.2 Our Instantiation

We now present a new way to obtain a blind signature scheme in the standard model under classical assumptions with a common-reference string. This is an improvement over [6]. We are going to use the same building

¹ The improvement is even more important for the scheme described in Appendix C.2 since, using standard Type-II or Type-III bilinear groups, the communication complexity is only 3/16-th of the one of the RSA-based scheme.

blocks as before, so linear encryption, Waters signatures and a SPHF on linear ciphertexts. More elaborated languages will be required, but just conjunctions and disjunctions of classical languages, as done in [1] (see Appendix A.2 and A.4), hence the efficient construction. Our blind signature scheme is defined by:

- **BSSetup**(1^k), where k is the security parameter, generates a pairing-friendly system $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ and an encryption key $\text{ek} = (u, v, g) \in \mathbb{G}^3$. It also chooses at random $h \in \mathbb{G}$ and generators $\mathbf{u} = (u_i)_{i \in [1, \ell]} \in \mathbb{G}^\ell$ for the Waters function. It outputs the global parameters $\text{param} = (p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \text{ek}, h, \mathbf{u})$;
- **BSKeyGen**(param) picks at random a secret key $\text{sk} = x$ and computes the verification key $\text{vk} = g^x$;
- **BSProtocol**($\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m) \rangle$) runs as follows, where \mathcal{U} wants to get a signature on M
 - \mathcal{U} computes the bit-per-bit encryption of M by encrypting each $u_i^{M_i}$ in b_i , $\forall i \in [1, \ell]$, $b_i = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, u_i^{M_i}; (r_{i,1}, r_{i,2}))$. Then writing $r_1 = \sum r_{i,1}$ and $r_2 = \sum r_{i,2}$, he computes the encryption c of $\text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}$ with $\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}; (s_1, s_2)) = (u^{s_1}, v^{s_2}, g^{s_1+s_2} \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2})$. \mathcal{U} then sends $(c, (b_i))$;
 - On input of these ciphertexts, the algorithm \mathcal{S} computes the corresponding SPHF, considering the language \mathcal{L} of valid ciphertexts. This is the conjunction of several languages (see Appendix A.4 for details):
 1. One checking that each b_i encrypts a bit in basis u_i : in $\text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i)$;
 2. One considering $(d_1, d_2, c_1, c_2, c_3)$, that checks if (c_1, c_2, c_3) encrypts an element d_3 such that (d_1, d_2, d_3) is a linear tuple in basis (u, v, vk) : in $\text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk})$, where $d_1 = \prod_i b_{i,1}$ and $d_2 = \prod_i b_{i,2}$.
 - \mathcal{S} computes the corresponding Hash-value v , extracts $K = \text{KDF}(v) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, generates the blinded signature $(\sigma'_1 = h^x \delta^s, \sigma'_2 = g^s)$, where $\delta = u_0 \prod_i b_{i,3} = \mathcal{F}(M) g^{r_1+r_2}$, and sends $(\text{hp}, Q = \sigma'_1 \times g^K, \sigma'_2)$;
 - Upon receiving $(\text{hp}, Q, \sigma'_2)$, using its witnesses and hp , \mathcal{U} computes the ProjHash-value v' , extracts $K' = \text{KDF}(v')$ and unmasks $\sigma''_1 = Q \times g^{-K'}$. Thanks to the knowledge of r_1 and r_2 , it can compute $\sigma'_1 = \sigma''_1 \times (\sigma'_2)^{-r_1-r_2}$. Note that if $v' = v$, then $\sigma'_1 = h^x \mathcal{F}(M)^s$, which together with $\sigma'_2 = g^s$ is a valid Waters signature on M . It can thereafter re-randomize the final signature $\sigma = (\sigma'_1 \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^{s'}, \sigma'_2 \cdot g^{s'})$.
- **BSVerif**(vk, M, σ), checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$.

The idea is to remove any kind of proof of knowledge in the protocol, which was the main concern in [6], and use instead a SPHF. This way, we obtain a protocol where the user first sends $3\ell + 6$ group elements for the ciphertext, and receives back $5\ell + 4$ elements for the projection key and 2 group elements for the blinded signature. So $8\ell + 12$ group elements are used in total. This has to be compared to $9\ell + 24$ in [6]. We both reduce the linear and the constant parts in the number of group elements involved while relying on the same hypotheses. And the final result is still a standard Waters signature.

Remark 8. In [17], Garg *et al.* proposed the first round-optimal blind signature scheme in the standard model, without CRS. In order to remove the CRS, their scheme makes use of ZAPs [14] and is quite inefficient. Moreover, its security relies on a stronger assumption (namely, sub-exponential hardness of one-to-one one-way functions). A natural idea is to replace the CRS in our scheme with Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai ZAP [23] based on the DLin assumption. This change would only double the communication complexity, but we do not know how to prove the security of the resulting scheme². It remains a tantalizing open problem to design an efficient round-optimal blind signature in the standard model without CRS.

4.3 Security

In blind signatures, one expects two kinds of security properties:

- *blindness*, preventing the signer to be able to recognize which message was signed during a specific interaction. Due to Waters re-randomizability and linear encryption, this property is guaranteed in our scheme under the DLin assumption;

² Indeed, opening the commitment scheme in the ZAP and forging a signature relies on the same computational assumption, which makes it impossible to apply the complexity leveraging argument from [17].

- *unforgeability*, guaranteeing the user will not be able to output more signed messages than the number of actual interactions. In this scheme, granted the extractability of the encryption (the simulator can know the decryption key) one can show that the user cannot provide a signature on a message different from the ones it asked to be blindly signed. Hence, the unforgeability relies on the Waters unforgeability, that is the CDH assumption.

Theorem 9. *Our blind signature scheme is blind³ under the DLin assumption (and the pseudo-randomness of the KDF) and unforgeable under the CDH assumption.*

A full proof can be found in appendix B.

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³ Our scheme satisfies the *a posteriori blindness* security notion – introduced in [26] – that models exactly what the signer sees in the real world (see appendix B.) As mentioned in [26], it formalizes the security desired for most applications of blind signatures (e.g. e-cash or e-voting).

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A Formal Definitions

A.1 Formal Definitions of the Primitives

Encryption scheme. An encryption scheme is defined by four algorithms (ESetup, EKeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt):

- ESetup(1^k), where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters `param` of the scheme;
- EKeyGen(`param`) generates a pair of keys, the public (encryption) key `ek` and the private (decryption) key `dk`;

- $\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, m; r)$ produces a ciphertext c on the input message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ under the encryption key ek , using the random coins r ;
- $\text{Decrypt}(\text{dk}, c)$ outputs the plaintext m encrypted in c .

An encryption scheme \mathcal{E} should satisfy the following properties

- *Correctness*: for all key pair (ek, dk) and all messages m we have $\text{Decrypt}(\text{dk}, \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, m)) = m$.
- *Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks*: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where the adversary \mathcal{A} keeps some internal state between the various calls **FIND** and **GUESS**. The advantages are

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}-1}(k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}-0}(k) = 1]$$

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k, t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}}(k).$$

$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind}-b}(k)$

1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{ESetup}(1^k)$
2. $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{EKeyGen}(\text{param})$
3. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND} : \text{ek})$
4. $c^* \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, m_b)$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : c^*)$
6. RETURN b'

Signature scheme. A signature scheme is defined by four algorithms (**SSetup**, **SKeyGen**, **Sign**, **Verif**):

- **SSetup** (1^k) , where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters **param** of the scheme;
- **SKeyGen****(param)** generates a pair of keys, the public (verification) key **vk** and the private (signing) key **sk**;
- **Sign****(sk, m; s)** produces a signature σ on the input message m , under the signing key **sk**, and using the random coins s ;
- **Verif****(vk, m, σ)** checks whether σ is a valid signature on m , w.r.t. the public key **vk**; it outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.

A signature scheme \mathcal{S} should satisfy the following properties

- *Correctness*: for all key pair (vk, sk) and all messages m we have $\text{Verif}(\text{vk}, m, \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)) = 1$.

- *Existential unforgeability under (adaptive) chosen-message attacks*: this security notion can be formalized by the following security game, where it makes use of the oracle **Sign**:

- **Sign****(sk, m)**: This oracle outputs a valid signature on m under the signing key **sk**. The input queries m are added to the list \mathcal{SM} .

The success probabilities are

$$\text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{euf}}(k) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{euf}}(k) = 1] \quad \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}}^{\text{euf}}(k, t) = \max_{\mathcal{A} \leq t} \text{Succ}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{euf}}(k).$$

$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{euf}}(k)$

1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{SSetup}(1^k)$
2. $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{SKeyGen}(\text{param})$
3. $(m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{vk}, \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, \cdot))$
4. $b \leftarrow \text{Verif}(\text{vk}, m^*, \sigma^*)$
5. IF $M \in \mathcal{SM}$ RETURN 0
6. ELSE RETURN b

Smooth Projective Hash Function. An SPHF over a language $\mathcal{L} \subset X$, onto a set \mathbb{G} , is defined by five algorithms (**SPHFSetup**, **HashKG**, **ProjKG**, **Hash**, **ProjHash**):

- **SPHFSetup** (1^k) , where k is the security parameter, generates the global parameters **param** of the scheme, and the description of an \mathcal{NP} language \mathcal{L} ;
- **HashKG****(\mathcal{L} , param)** generates a hashing key **hk**;
- **ProjKG****(hk, (\mathcal{L} , param), W)** generates the projection key **hp**, possibly depending on the word W [1, 18] from the hashing key;
- **Hash****(hk, (\mathcal{L} , param), W)** outputs the hash value $v \in \mathbb{G}$, on W from the hashing key;
- **ProjHash****(hp, (\mathcal{L} , param), W, w)** outputs the hash value $v' \in \mathbb{G}$, on W from the projection key and the witness.

A Smooth Projective Hash Function \mathcal{SPHF} should satisfy the following properties:

- *Correctness*: Let $W \in \mathcal{L}$ and w a witness of this membership. Then, for all hash keys hk and projected hash keys hp we have $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W) = \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W, c)$.
- *Smoothness*: For all $W \in X \setminus \mathcal{L}$ the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:

$$\Delta_0 = \left\{ (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}, W, \text{hp}, v) \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{param} = \text{SPHFSetup}(1^k), \text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), \\ \text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W), v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\Delta_1 = \left\{ (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}, W, \text{hp}, v) \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{param} = \text{SPHFSetup}(1^k), \text{hk} = \text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), \\ \text{hp} = \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W), v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G} \end{array} \right\}.$$

This is formalized by

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SPHF}}^{\text{smooth}}(k) = \sum_{V \in \mathbb{G}} \left| \Pr_{\Delta_1}[v = V] - \Pr_{\Delta_0}[v = V] \right| \text{ is negligible.}$$

- *Pseudo-Randomness*: If $c \in \mathcal{L}$, then without a witness of membership the two previous distributions should remain computationally indistinguishable: for any adversary \mathcal{A} within reasonable time

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SPHF}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr}}(k) = \Pr_{\Delta_1}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param}, W, \text{hp}, v) = 1] - \Pr_{\Delta_0}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param}, W, \text{hp}, v) = 1] \text{ is negligible.}$$

A.2 Operations on Smooth Projective Hash Functions

We recall the constructions of SPHF on disjunctions and conjunctions of languages [1]. Let us assume we have two Smooth Projective Hash Functions, defined by \mathcal{SPHF}_1 and \mathcal{SPHF}_2 , on two languages, \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 respectively, both subsets of X , with hash values in the same group (\mathbb{G}, \oplus) . We note W an element of X , w_i a witness that $W \in \mathcal{L}_i$, $\text{hk}_i = \text{HashKG}_i(\mathcal{L}_i, \text{param})$ and $\text{hp}_i = \text{ProjKG}_i(\text{hk}_i, (\mathcal{L}_i, \text{param}_i), W)$.

We can then define the SPHF on $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_1 \cap \mathcal{L}_2$, where $w = (w_1, w_2)$ as:

- $\text{SPHFSetup}(1^k)$, $\text{param} = (\text{param}_1, \text{param}_2)$, and $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_1 \cap \mathcal{L}_2$;
- $\text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param})$: $\text{hk} = (\text{hk}_1, \text{hk}_2)$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$: $\text{hp} = (\text{hp}_1, \text{hp}_2)$
- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$: $\text{Hash}_1(\text{hk}_1, (\mathcal{L}_1, \text{param}_1), W) \oplus \text{Hash}_2(\text{hk}_2, (\mathcal{L}_2, \text{param}_2), W)$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W, w = (w_1, w_2))$:

$$\text{ProjHash}_1(\text{hp}_1, (\mathcal{L}_1, \text{param}_1), W, w_1) \oplus \text{ProjHash}_2(\text{hp}_2, (\mathcal{L}_2, \text{param}_2), W, w_2)$$

We can also define the SPHF on $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_1 \cup \mathcal{L}_2$, where $w = w_1$ or $w = w_2$ as:

- $\text{SPHFSetup}(1^k)$, $\text{param} = (\text{param}_1, \text{param}_2)$, and $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_1 \cup \mathcal{L}_2$;
- $\text{HashKG}(\mathcal{L}, \text{param})$: $\text{hk} = (\text{hk}_1, \text{hk}_2)$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$: $\text{hp} = (\text{hp}_1, \text{hp}_2, \text{hp}_\Delta)$ where

$$\text{hp}_\Delta = \text{Hash}_1(\text{hk}_1, (\mathcal{L}_1, \text{param}_1), W) \oplus \text{Hash}_2(\text{hk}_2, (\mathcal{L}_2, \text{param}_2), W)$$

- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W)$: $\text{Hash}_1(\text{hk}_1, (\mathcal{L}_1, \text{param}_1), W)$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, (\mathcal{L}, \text{param}), W, w)$: If $W \in \mathcal{L}_1$, $\text{ProjHash}_1(\text{hp}_1, (\mathcal{L}_1, \text{param}_1), W, w_1)$,
else (if $W \in \mathcal{L}_2$), $\text{hp}_\Delta \ominus \text{ProjHash}_2(\text{hp}_2, (\mathcal{L}_2, \text{param}_2), W, w_2)$

A.3 Our Concrete Primitives

In the following, we consider two different pairing-friendly settings;

- *Symmetric bilinear structure*: $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ that gives the description of two groups \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T of prime order p with generators g and $e(g, g)$ respectively where e is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map.
- *Asymmetric bilinear structure*: $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ that gives the description of three groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T of prime order p with generators g_1, g_2 and $e(g_1, g_2)$ respectively where e is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map.

Linear encryption (in a symmetric structure). The Linear encryption scheme was introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham in [7]:

- $\text{ESetup}(1^k)$: the global parameters param consist of the description of a symmetric bilinear structure $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$;
- $\text{EKeyGen}(\text{param})$ picks a pair of random scalars $(y_1, y_2) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public key as $\text{ek} = (Y_1 = g^{y_1}, Y_2 = g^{y_2})$, and the secret key as $\text{dk} = (y_1, y_2)$;
- $\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, M)$ on input a message $M \in \mathbb{G}$, it picks at random $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $c_1 = Y_1^{r_1}$, $c_2 = Y_2^{r_2}$, $c_3 = g^{r_1+r_2} \cdot M$. It outputs the ciphertext $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$;
- $\text{Decrypt}(\text{dk}, c)$ on input a ciphertext $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$, it outputs $M = c_3 / (c_1^{1/y_1} c_2^{1/y_2})$.

This scheme is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks under the DLin assumption:

Definition 10 (Decision Linear assumption (DLin)). *Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order p . The DLin assumption states that given $(g, g^x, g^y, g^{xa}, g^{yb}, g^c)$ for random scalars $a, b, x, y, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to decide whether $c = a + b$.*

When $(g, u = g^x, v = g^y)$ is fixed, a tuple (u^a, v^b, g^{a+b}) is called a linear tuple w.r.t. (u, v, g) , whereas a tuple (u^a, v^b, g^c) for a random and independent c is called a random tuple.

ElGamal encryption (in an asymmetric structure). In asymmetric structures, the DDH assumption can hold, one can thus use the ElGamal encryption:

- $\text{ESetup}(1^k)$: the global parameters param consist of the description of an asymmetric bilinear structure $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$;
- $\text{EKeyGen}(\text{param})$ picks a random scalar $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public key as $\text{ek} = g^y$, and the secret key as $\text{dk} = y$;
- $\text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, M)$ on input a message $m \in \mathbb{G}_1$, it picks at random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $c_1 = g^r$ and $c_2 = \text{ek}^r \cdot m$. It outputs the ciphertext $c = (c_1, c_2)$;
- $\text{Decrypt}(\text{dk}, c)$ on input a ciphertext $c = (c_1, c_2)$, it outputs $m = c_2 / c_1^y$.

This scheme is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks under the DDH assumption in \mathbb{G}_1 :

Definition 11 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDH)). *In a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. The DDH assumption in \mathbb{G}_i states that given $(g_i, g_i^a, g_i^b, g_i^c) \in \mathbb{G}_i$, it is hard to determine whether $c = ab$ for random scalars $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.*

Waters signature (in a symmetric structure). The original Waters Signature has been proposed in [33]:

- $\text{Setup}(1^k)$: in a symmetric bilinear structure $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, one chooses a vector $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}^{k+1}$, and for convenience, we denote $\mathcal{F}(M) = u_0 \prod_{i=1}^k u_i^{M_i}$. We also need an extra generator $h \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$. The global parameters param consist of all these elements $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e, h, \mathbf{u})$.

- $\text{SKeyGen}(\text{param})$ chooses a random scalar $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public key as $\text{vk} = g^x$, and the secret key as $\text{sk} = h^x$.
- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, M; s)$ outputs, for some random $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\sigma = (\sigma_1 = \text{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^s, \sigma_2 = g^s)$.
- $\text{Verif}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma)$ checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$.

This scheme is unforgeable against (adaptive) chosen-message attacks under the CDH assumption in \mathbb{G} :

Definition 12 (Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH)). *Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order p . The CDH assumption in \mathbb{G} states that for a generator g of \mathbb{G} and random $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, given (g, g^a, g^b) it is hard to compute g^{ab} .*

Waters signature (in an asymmetric structure). An asymmetric variant of Waters signatures has been proposed in [6]:

- $\text{Setup}(1^k)$: in a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, one chooses a random vector $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1^{k+1}$, and for convenience, we denote $\mathcal{F}(M) = u_0 \prod_{i=1}^k u_i^{M_i}$. We also need an extra generator $h_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$. The global parameters param consist of all these elements $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \mathbf{u})$.
- $\text{SKeyGen}(\text{param})$ chooses a random scalar $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, which defines the public key as $\text{vk} = g_2^x$, and the secret key as $\text{sk} = h_1^x$.
- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, M; s)$ outputs, for some random $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\sigma = (\sigma_1 = \text{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^s, \sigma_2 = g_1^s, \sigma_3 = g_2^s)$.
- $\text{Verif}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma)$ checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g_2) = e(h_1, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_3)$, and $e(\sigma_2, g_2) = e(g_1, \sigma_3)$.

This scheme is unforgeable against (adaptive) chosen-message attacks under the following variant of the CDH assumption, which states that CDH is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 when one of the random scalars is also given as an exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 :

Definition 13 (The Advanced Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH⁺)). *In a pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$. The CDH⁺ assumption states that given $(g_1, g_2, g_1^a, g_2^a, g_1^b)$, for random $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it is hard to compute g_1^{ab} .*

A.4 Our Smooth Projective Hash Functions

In this subsection, we present the languages we use in our first instantiations of OSBE and Blind Signatures.

Linear Language. In the following, we will denote $\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M)$ the language of the linear encryptions C of the message M under the encryption key $\text{ek} = (Y_1, Y_2)$. Clearly, for $M = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$, the language contains the linear tuples in basis (Y_1, Y_2, g) . The SPHF system is defined by, for $\text{ek} = (Y_1, Y_2)$ and $C = (c_1 = Y_1^{r_1}, c_2 = Y_2^{r_2}, c_3 = g^{r_1+r_2} \times M)$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{HashKG}(\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M)) &= \text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3 & \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} (c_3/M)^{x_3} \\ \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= \text{hp} = (Y_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, Y_2^{x_2} g^{x_3}) & \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C, r) &= \text{hp}_1^{r_1} \text{hp}_2^{r_2} \end{aligned}$$

Theorem 14. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is correct.*

Proof. With the above notations:

- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} (c_3/M)^{x_3} = Y_1^{r_1 x_1} Y_2^{r_2 x_2} g^{(r_1+r_2)x_3}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C, r) = \text{hp}_1^{r_1} \text{hp}_2^{r_2} = (Y_1^{x_1} g^{x_3})^{r_1} (Y_2^{x_2} g^{x_3})^{r_2} = Y_1^{r_1 x_1} Y_2^{r_2 x_2} g^{(r_1+r_2)x_3}$

□

Theorem 15. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is smooth.*

Proof. Let us show that from an information theoretic point of view, $v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \mathcal{L}(\text{ek}, M), C)$ is unpredictable, even knowing hp , when C is not a correct ciphertext: $C = (c_1 = Y_1^{r_1}, c_2 = Y_2^{r_2}, c_3 = g^{r_3} \times M)$, for $r_3 \neq r_1 + r_2$. We recall that $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), C) = Y_1^{r_1 x_1} Y_2^{r_2 x_2} g^{r_3 x_3}$ and $\text{hp} = (Y_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, Y_2^{x_2} g^{x_3})$: If we denote $Y_1 = g^{y_1}$ and $Y_2 = g^{y_2}$, we have:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log \text{hp}_1 \\ \log \text{hp}_2 \\ \log v \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & y_2 & 1 \\ y_1 r_1 & y_2 r_2 & r_3 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $y_1 y_2 (r_3 - r_1 - r_2)$, which is non-zero if C does not belong to the language ($r_3 \neq r_1 + r_2$). So v is independent from hp and C . \square

Theorem 16. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is pseudo-random under the DLin assumption (the semantic security of the Linear encryption).*

Proof. As shown above, when c encrypts $M' \neq M$, then the distributions

$$\mathcal{D}_1 = \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}\} \quad \mathcal{D}_2 = \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c)\}$$

are perfectly indistinguishable. Under the semantic security of the Linear encryption, $\mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M)$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M')$ are computationally indistinguishable, and so are the distributions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}_0 &= \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M), \text{hp}, v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}\} \\ \mathcal{D}_1 &= \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}\} \end{aligned}$$

and the distributions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}_2 &= \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c)\} \\ \mathcal{D}_3 &= \{\text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c)\} \end{aligned}$$

As a consequence, \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_3 are computationally indistinguishable, which proves the result.

Bit Encryption Language. In our blind signature protocol, we need to “prove” that a ciphertext encrypts a bit in exponent of a basis u_i . That is the language $\text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i) = \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, 1_{\mathbb{G}}) \cup \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, u_i)$. This is thus a simple disjunction of two *SPHF*:

- $\text{HashKG}(\text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i))$: $\text{hk} = ((x_1, x_2, x_3), (y_1, y_2, y_3)) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^6$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i), W)$: $\text{hp} = ((Y_1^{x_1} g^{x_3}, Y_2^{x_2} g^{x_3}), (Y_1^{y_1} g^{y_3}, Y_2^{y_2} g^{y_3}), \text{hp}_{\Delta})$ where

$$\text{hp}_{\Delta} = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} (c_3)^{x_3} \cdot c_1^{y_1} c_2^{y_2} (c_3/u_i)^{y_3}$$

- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i), W)$: $v = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} c_3^{x_3}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i), W, w)$: If $W \in \mathcal{L}_1$, $v' = \text{hp}_{1,1}^{r_1} \cdot \text{hp}_{1,2}^{r_2}$,
else (if $W \in \mathcal{L}_2$), $v' = \text{hp}_{\Delta} / \text{hp}_{2,1}^{r_1} \cdot \text{hp}_{2,2}^{r_2}$

The correctness, smoothness and pseudo-randomness properties of such function directly follow from those of the SPHF on $\text{Lin}(\text{pk}, 1_{\mathbb{G}})$ and $\text{Lin}(\text{pk}, u_i)$. Each projection key is composed of 5 group elements.

Encrypted Linear Language. We also need to consider a language $\text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk})$ of tuples $(d_1, d_2, c_1, c_2, c_3)$, where (c_1, c_2, c_3) encrypts d_3 under the public key $\text{ek} = (u, v)$, such that (d_1, d_2, d_3) is a linear tuple in basis (u, v, vk) . This can also be expressed as $c_3 = \alpha \times d_3$, where d_3 is the plaintext in (c_1, c_2, c_3) under ek , which means that (c_1, c_2, α) is a linear tuple in basis (u, v, g) , and (d_1, d_2, d_3) should be a linear tuple in basis (u, v, vk) .

More concretely, we consider words $W = (d_1 = u^{r_1}, d_2 = v^{r_2}, c_1 = u^{s_1}, c_2 = v^{s_2}, c_3 = g^{s_1+s_2} \cdot \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2})$, with witness $w = (r_1, r_2, s_1, s_2)$. We have $\alpha = g^{s_1+s_2}$ and $d_3 = \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}$, but they should remain secret, which requires a specific function, and not a simple conjunction of languages:

- $\text{HashKG}(\text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}))$: $\text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5)$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W)$: $\text{hp} = (u^{x_1} g^{x_5}, v^{x_2} g^{x_5}, u^{x_3} g^{x_5}, v^{x_4} g^{x_5})$
- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W)$: $v = e(d_1, \text{vk})^{x_1} \cdot e(d_2, \text{vk})^{x_2} \cdot e(c_1, g)^{x_3} \cdot e(c_2, g)^{x_4} \cdot e(c_3, g)^{x_5}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W, w)$: $v' = e(\text{hp}_1, \text{vk})^{r_1} \cdot e(\text{hp}_2, \text{vk})^{r_2} \cdot e(\text{hp}_3, g)^{s_1} \cdot e(\text{hp}_4, g)^{s_2}$

We now study the security of this SPHF:

Theorem 17. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is correct.*

Proof. With the above notations:

$$\begin{aligned}
v &= e(d_1, \text{vk})^{x_1} \cdot e(d_2, \text{vk})^{x_2} \cdot e(c_1, g)^{x_3} \cdot e(c_2, g)^{x_4} \cdot e(c_3, g)^{x_5} \\
&= e(u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1}, g) \cdot e(v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2}, g) \cdot e(u^{s_1 x_3}, g) \cdot e(v^{s_2 x_4}, g) \cdot e(g^{(\text{sk}(r_1+r_2)+(s_1+s_2))x_5}, g) \\
&= e(u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1 + s_1 x_3}, g) \cdot e(v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2 + s_2 x_4}, g) \cdot e(g^{(\text{sk}(r_1+r_2)+(s_1+s_2))x_5}, g) \\
v' &= e(\text{hp}_1, \text{vk})^{r_1} \cdot e(\text{hp}_2, \text{vk})^{r_2} \cdot e(\text{hp}_3, g)^{s_1} \cdot e(\text{hp}_4, g)^{s_2} \\
&= e(u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1} g^{\text{sk}r_1 x_5}, g) \cdot e(v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2} g^{\text{sk}r_2 x_5}, g) \cdot e(u^{s_1 x_3} g^{s_1 x_5}, g) \cdot e(v^{s_2 x_4} g^{s_2 x_5}, g) \\
&= e(u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1 + s_1 x_3}, g) \cdot e(v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2 + s_2 x_4}, g) e(g^{(\text{sk}(r_1+r_2)+(s_1+s_2))x_5}, g)
\end{aligned}$$

□

Theorem 18. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is smooth.*

Proof. Let us show that from an information theoretic point of view, v is unpredictable, even knowing hp , when W is not in the language: $W = (d_1 = u^{r_1}, d_2 = v^{r_2}, c_1 = u^{s_1}, c_2 = v^{s_2}, c_3 = g^t \cdot \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2})$, for $t \neq s_1 + s_2$. We recall that

$$v = e(u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1 + s_1 x_3}, g) \cdot e(v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2 + s_2 x_4}, g) \cdot e(g^{(\text{sk}(r_1+r_2)+(s_1+s_2))x_5}, g) = e(H, g)$$

for

$$H = u^{\text{sk}r_1 x_1 + s_1 x_3} \cdot v^{\text{sk}r_2 x_2 + s_2 x_4} \cdot g^{(\text{sk}(r_1+r_2)+(s_1+s_2))x_5}$$

and

$$\text{hp} = ((u^{x_1} g^{x_5}, v^{x_2} g^{x_5}), (u^{x_3} g^{x_5}, v^{x_4} g^{x_5}))$$

If we denote $u = g^{y_1}$ and $v = g^{y_2}$, we have:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log \text{hp}_1 \\ \log \text{hp}_2 \\ \log \text{hp}_3 \\ \log \text{hp}_4 \\ \log H \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & y_2 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & y_1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & y_2 & 1 \\ \text{sk}r_1 y_1 & \text{sk}r_2 y_2 & s_1 y_1 & s_2 y_2 & t + \text{sk}(r_1 + r_2) \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $(y_1 \cdot y_2)^2 (t - (s_1 + s_2) + (\text{sk}(r_1 + r_2) - \text{sk}(r_1 + r_2))) = (y_1 \cdot y_2)^2 (t - (s_1 + s_2))$, which is non-zero if W does not belong to the language ($t \neq s_1 + s_2$). So v is independent from hp and W . □

Theorem 19. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is pseudo-random under the DLin assumption (the semantic security of the Linear encryption).*

Proof. The fact that c_3 really encrypts d_3 that completes well (d_1, d_2) is hidden by the semantic security of the linear encryption, and so under the DLin assumption. So the proof works as above, on the Linear Language.

Combinations. For our blind signature, we want to consider, on input $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ and $b_i = (b_{i,1}, b_{i,2}, b_{i,3})$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, the language of the (c, b_1, \dots, b_ℓ) such that:

- for each i , $b_i \in \text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i) = \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, 1_{\mathbb{G}}) \cup \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, u_i)$;
- if we denote $d_1 = \prod b_{1,i}$ and $d_2 = \prod b_{2,i}$, then we want the plaintext in c to complete (d_1, d_2) into a linear tuple in basis (u, v, vk) : $(d_1, d_2, c_1, c_2, c_3) \in \text{ELin}(\text{ek}, \text{vk})$.

This is a conjunction of disjunctions of simple languages: we can use the generic combination [1].

B Security of our Blind Signature

B.1 Definition

Definition 20 (Blind Signature Scheme).

A blind signature scheme is defined by three algorithms (BSSetup, BSKeyGen, BSVerif) and one interactive protocol $\text{BSProtocol}\langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{U} \rangle$:

- $\text{BSSetup}(1^k)$, generates the global parameters param of the system;
- $\text{BSKeyGen}(\text{param})$ generates a pair of keys (vk, sk) ;
- $\text{BSProtocol}\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m) \rangle$: this is an interactive protocol between the algorithms $\mathcal{S}(\text{sk})$ and $\mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m)$, for a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$. It generates a signature σ on m under vk related to sk for the user.
- $\text{BSVerif}(\text{vk}, m, \sigma)$ outputs 1 if the signature σ is valid with respect to m and vk , 0 otherwise.

A blind signature scheme \mathcal{BS} should satisfy the two following security notions: the blindness condition that is a guarantee for the signer, and the unforgeability that is a guarantee for the signer. The blindness states that a malicious signer should be unable to decide which of two messages m_0, m_1 has been signed first in two *valid*⁴ executions with an honest user. An adversary against the unforgeability tries to generate $q + 1$ valid signatures after at most q complete interactions with the honest signer. These security notions can be formalized by the security games presented on Figure 2, where the adversary keeps some internal state between the various calls INIT, FIND and GUESS.

B.2 Security proofs

- $\text{BSSetup}(1^k)$ generates $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ and $\text{ek} = (u, v, g) \in \mathbb{G}^3$. It then chooses at random $h \in \mathbb{G}$, $\mathbf{u} = (u_i)_{i \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}} \in \mathbb{G}^{\ell+1}$ for the Waters function. It outputs $\text{param} = (p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \text{ek}, h, \mathbf{u})$;
- $\text{BSKeyGen}(\text{param})$ picks at $\text{sk} = x$ and computes $\text{vk} = g^x$. vk is public and sk is given to \mathcal{S} ;
- $\text{BSProtocol}\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m) \rangle$: \mathcal{U} wants to get a signature on m

⁴ We insist on *valid* executions which end with a valid signature σ of the message used by \mathcal{U} under the key vk . The signer could of course send a wrong answer which would lead to an invalid signature. Then, it could easily distinguish a valid signature from an invalid one, and thus the two executions. But this is a kind of denial of service, that is out of scope of this work. This thus means that one valid execution is indistinguishable from other valid executions. This notion was formalized in [26] and termed a *posteriori blindness*.

$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{BS}, \mathcal{S}^*}^{\text{bl}-b}(k)$ 1. $\text{param} \leftarrow \text{BSSetup}(1^k)$ 2. $(\text{vk}, M_0, M_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{FIND} : \text{param})$ 3. $\sigma_b \leftarrow \text{BSProtocol}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, M_b))$ 4. $\sigma_{1-b} \leftarrow \text{BSProtocol}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, M_{1-b}))$ 5. $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^*(\text{GUESS} : \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ 6. RETURN $b^* = b$.	$\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{BS}, \mathcal{U}^*}^{\text{uf}}(k)$ 1. $(\text{param}) \leftarrow \text{BSSetup}(1^k)$ 2. $(\text{vk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BSKeyGen}(\text{param})$ 3. For $i = 1, \dots, q_s$, $\text{BSProtocol}(\mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{A}(\text{INIT} : \text{vk}))$ 4. $((m_1, \sigma_1), \dots, (m_{q_s+1}, \sigma_{q_s+1})) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{GUESS} : \text{vk})$; 5. IF $\exists i \neq j, m_i = m_j$ OR $\exists i, \text{Verif}(\text{pk}, m_i, \sigma_i) = 0$ RETURN 0 6. ELSE RETURN 1
Blindness property	Unforgeability

Fig. 2. Security Games for \mathcal{BS}

- \mathcal{U} computes the bit-per-bit encryption of M by encrypting $u_i^{M_i}$ in $b_i = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, u_i^{M_i}; (r_{i,1}, r_{i,2}))$, together with the encryption of $\text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}$ in $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}; (r'_1, r'_2))$, where $r_1 = \sum r_{i,1}$ and $r_2 = \sum r_{i,2}$. \mathcal{U} thus sends

$$c = (u^{s_1}, v^{s_2}, g^{s_1+s_2} \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}) \quad b_i = (u^{r_{i,1}}, v^{r_{i,2}}, g^{r_{i,1}+r_{i,2}} u_i^{M_i})$$

- On input of these ciphertexts, the algorithm \mathcal{S} computes the corresponding SPHF, considering the language \mathcal{L} of valid ciphertexts on an encrypted message. This is the conjunction of several languages:
 1. the one checking that each b_i encrypts a bit;
 2. the one checking whether the tuple composed of (d_1, d_2) and the plaintext d_3 in c is a linear tuple in basis (u, v, vk) , where $d_1 = \prod_i b_{i,1}$, $d_2 = \prod_i b_{i,2}$, $d_3 = u_0 \prod_i b_{i,3}$.
- \mathcal{S} then computes the corresponding Hash-value v , extracts $K = \text{KDF}(v)$, generates $(\sigma'_1 = h^x \delta^s, \sigma'_2 = g^s)$ and sends $(\text{hp}, Q = \sigma'_1 \times K, \sigma'_2)$;
- Upon receiving $(\text{hp}, Q, \sigma'_2)$, using its witnesses and hp , \mathcal{U} computes the ProjHash-value v' , extracts $K' = \text{KDF}(v')$ and un.masks $\sigma'_2 = Q/K'$. Thanks to the knowledge of r_1 and r_2 , it can compute $\sigma'_1 = \sigma''_1 \times (\sigma'_2)^{-r_1-r_2}$. Note that if $v' = v$, then $\sigma'_1 = h^x \mathcal{F}(M)^s$, which together with $\sigma'_2 = g^s$ is a valid Waters signature on M . It can thereafter re-randomize the final signature $\sigma = (\sigma'_1 \cdot \mathcal{F}(M)^{s'}, \sigma'_2 \cdot g^{s'})$.
- $\text{BSVerif}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma)$, checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g) = e(h, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_2)$.

Proposition 21. *This scheme is blind under the DLin assumption.*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{BS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{bl}}(k) \leq 2 \times (\ell + 1) \times \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k).$$

Proof. Let us consider an adversary \mathcal{A} against the blindness of our scheme. We build an adversary \mathcal{B} against the DLin assumption.

\mathcal{G}_0 : In a first game \mathcal{G}_0 , we run the standard protocol:

- $\text{BSSetup}(1^k)$, \mathcal{B} generates $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, $h = g^\alpha$, $\text{ek} = (u, v, g)$ and generators u_i for the Waters function. This constitutes param ;
- The adversary \mathcal{A} generates a verification key vk and two messages M^0, M^1 .
- \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} run twice the interactive issuing protocol, first on the message M^b , and then on the message M^{1-b} :
 - \mathcal{B} generates and sends the $b_i = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, u_i^{M_i^b}, (r_{i,1}, r_{i,2}))$ and $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{vk}^{r_1+r_2})$;
 - \mathcal{A} then outputs $(\text{hp}, Q, \sigma'_2)$;
 - \mathcal{B} uses the witnesses and hp to compute v , and so $\sigma'_1 = (Q/\text{KDF}(v)) \times \sigma'_2^{-r_1-r_2}$, which together with σ'_2 should be a valid Waters Signature on M^b . It then randomizes the signature with s' to get Σ_b .
- The same is done a second time with M^{1-b} to get Σ_{1-b} .
- \mathcal{B} publishes (Σ_0, Σ_1) .

– Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs b' .

We denote by ε the advantage of \mathcal{A} in this game.

$$\begin{aligned}\varepsilon &= \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{BS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{bl}}(k) = \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = 1 | b = 0] \\ &= 2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = b] - 1.\end{aligned}$$

\mathcal{G}_1 : In a second game \mathcal{G}_1 , we modify the way \mathcal{B} extracts the signatures Σ_b and Σ_{1-b} . One can note that, since we focus on valid executions with the signer, and due to the re-randomization of Waters signatures which leads to random signatures, \mathcal{B} can generate itself random signatures. Knowing α such that $h = g^\alpha$ allows it to compute $\text{sk} = \text{vk}^\alpha$. This game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one:

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_1}[b' = b] = \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_0}[b' = b].$$

\mathcal{G}_2 : In the third game, we replace all the ciphertexts sent by \mathcal{B} by encryption of random group elements in \mathbb{G} . For proving indistinguishability with the previous game, we use the hybrid technique:

- first, we replace c in the first execution. We then do not need anymore the random coins used in the b_i
- we can now replace one by one the b_i by random encryptions in the first execution
- we then do the same in the second execution

We then use $2 \times (\ell + 1)$ the indistinguishability of the encryption scheme:

$$\varepsilon \leq 2 \times (\ell + 1) \times \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind}}(k) + 2 \times \Pr_{\mathcal{G}_2}[b' = b] - 1.$$

In this last game, the two executions are thus perfectly indistinguishable, and thus $\Pr_{\mathcal{G}_2}[b' = b] = 0.5$. \square

Proposition 22. *This scheme is unforgeable under the CDH assumption.*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{BS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{uf}}(k) \leq \Theta \left(\frac{\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, g}^{\text{CDH}}(k)}{q_s \sqrt{k}} \right)$$

Proof. Let us assume \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the Unforgeability of the scheme. This malicious adversary is able after q_s signing queries to output at least $q_s + 1$ valid signatures on different messages.

We now build an adversary \mathcal{B} against the CDH assumption.

- \mathcal{B} is first given a CDH challenge (g, g^x, h) in a pairing friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}, g, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$
- \mathcal{B} emulates **BSSetup**: it publishes h from its challenge, $\mathbf{u} = (u_i)_{i \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}} \in \mathbb{G}^{\ell+1}$ for the Waters function, $\text{ek} = (u = g^a, v = g^b) \in \mathbb{G}^2$, and keeps secret the associated decryption key $\text{dk} = (a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$.
- \mathcal{B} then emulates **BSKeyGen**: it publishes $\text{vk} = g^x$ from the challenge as its verification key (one can note that recovering the signing key h^x is the goal of our adversary \mathcal{B});
- \mathcal{A} can now interact q_s times with the signer, playing the interactive protocol $\text{BSProtocol}(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A})$
 - \mathcal{A} sends the bit-per-bit encryptions b_i , and the extra ciphertext c hiding the verification key raised to the randomness;
 - Thanks to dk , \mathcal{B} is able to extract M from the bit-per-bit ciphertexts (either the opening leads to u_i and so $m_i = 1$, or $m_i = 0$), and $Y = \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}$ from the additional ciphertext c . One can also compute $d_1 = \prod_i b_{i,1} = u^{r_1} = g^{ar_1}$ and $d_2 = \prod_i b_{i,2} = v^{r_2} = g^{br_2}$.
 - If one of the extracted terms is not of the right form (either not a bit in the b_i , or $(g, \text{vk}, d_1^{1/a} d_2^{1/b}, Y)$ is not a Diffie-Hellman tuple, which can be checked with a pairing computation), then \mathcal{A} has submitted a “word” not in the appropriate language for the SPHF . Therefore through the smoothness property of the SPHF, it is impossible from a theoretic point of view that the adversary extracts anything from \mathcal{B} 's answer, therefore \mathcal{B} simply sends random elements.

- Otherwise, one knows that $d_1^{1/a} d_2^{1/b} = g^{r_1+r_2}$ and $Y = \text{vk}^{r_1+r_2}$. \mathcal{B} computes $H = -2jq_s + y_0 + \sum y_i M_i$ and $J = z_0 + \sum z_i M_i$, $\mathcal{F}(M) = h^H g^J$. If $H \equiv 0 \pmod p$, it aborts, else $\sigma = (\text{vk}^{-J/H} Y^{-1/H} (\mathcal{F}(M) d_1^{1/a} d_2^{1/b})^s, \text{vk}^{-1/H} g^s)$. Defining $t = s - x/H$, we can see this is indeed a valid signature, as we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_1 &= \text{vk}^{-J/H} Y^{-1/H} (\mathcal{F}(M) d_1^{1/a} d_2^{1/b})^s = \text{vk}^{-J/H} g^{-x(r_1+r_2)/H} (h^H g^J g^{r_1+r_2})^s \\ &= g^{-xJ/H} g^{-x(r_1+r_2)/H} (h^H g^J g^{r_1+r_2})^t (h^H g^J g^{r_1+r_2})^{x/H} = h^x (h^H g^J g^{r_1+r_2})^t \\ &= \text{sk} \cdot \delta^t \\ \sigma_2 &= \text{vk}^{-1/H} g^s = g^{-x/H} g^s = g^t\end{aligned}$$

where $\delta = \mathcal{F}(M) \times g^{r_1+r_2}$.

- \mathcal{B} then acts honestly to send the signature through the SPHF.

After a polynomial number of queries \mathcal{A} outputs a valid signature σ^* on a new message M^* with non negligible probability.

- As before \mathcal{B} computes $H^* = -2jq_s + y_0 + \sum y_i M_i^*$ and $J^* = z_0 + \sum z_i M_i^*$, $\mathcal{F}(M) = h^{H^*} g^{J^*}$
- If $H^* \not\equiv 0 \pmod p$, \mathcal{B} aborts. Otherwise $\sigma^* = (\text{sk} \cdot \mathcal{F}(M^*)^s, g^s) = (\text{sk} \cdot g^{sJ^*}, g^s)$ and so $\sigma_1^*/\sigma_2^{*J^*} = \text{sk}$. And so \mathcal{B} solves the CDH challenge.

The probability that all the $H \not\equiv 0 \pmod p$ for all the simulations, but $H^* \equiv 0 \pmod p$ in the forgery is the $(1, q_s)$ -programmability of the Waters function. A full proof showing that it happens with probability in $\Theta(\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, g}^{\text{CDH}}(k)/q_s \sqrt{k})$ can be found in [27]. \square

C Asymmetric Instantiations

C.1 Smooth Projective Hash Function

In this subsection, we present the languages we use in our asymmetric instantiations of OSBE and blind signatures.

Diffie Hellman Language. In the following, we will denote $\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M)$ the language of ElGamal encryptions C of the message M under the encryption key $\text{ek} = u$. Clearly, for $M = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$, the language contains the Diffie Hellman pairs in basis (u, g_1) . The SPHF system is defined by, for $\text{ek} = u$ and $C = (c_1 = u^r, c_2 = g_1^r \times M)$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{HashKG}(\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M)) &= \text{hk} = (x_1, x_2) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^2 & \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= c_1^{x_1} (c_2/M)^{x_2} \\ \text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C) &= \text{hp} = (u^{x_1} g_1^{x_2}) & \text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C, r) &= \text{hp}^r\end{aligned}$$

Theorem 23. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is correct.*

Proof. With the above notations:

- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C) = c_1^{x_1} (c_2/M)^{x_2} = u^{rx_1} g_1^{rx_2}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C, r) = \text{hp}^r = (u^{x_1} g_1^{x_2})^r = u^{rx_1} g_1^{rx_2}$

\square

Theorem 24. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is smooth.*

Proof. Let us show that from an information theoretic point of view, $v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \mathcal{L}(\text{ek}, M), C)$ is unpredictable, even knowing hp , when C is not a correct ciphertext: $C = (c_1 = u^r, c_2 = g_1^s \times M)$, for $s \neq r$. We recall that $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), C) = u^{rx_1} g_1^{sx_2}$ and $\text{hp} = u^{x_1} g_1^{x_2}$: If we denote $u = g_1^y$, we have:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log \text{hp} \\ \log v \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y & 1 \\ yr & s \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $y(r - s)$, which is non-zero if C does not belong to the language ($s \neq r$). So v is independent from hp and C . \square

Theorem 25. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is pseudo-random under the DDH assumption in \mathbb{G}_1 (the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption).*

Proof. As shown above, when c encrypts $M' \neq M$, then the distributions

$$\mathcal{D}_1 = \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}\} \quad \mathcal{D}_2 = \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{Lin}(\text{ek}, M), c)\}$$

are perfectly indistinguishable. Under the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption, $\mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M)$ and $\mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M')$ are computationally indistinguishable, and so are the distributions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}_0 &= \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M), \text{hp}, v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}\} \\ \mathcal{D}_1 &= \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}\} \end{aligned}$$

and the distributions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}_2 &= \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M'), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c)\} \\ \mathcal{D}_3 &= \{\text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c = \mathcal{E}_{\text{ek}}(M), \text{hp}, v = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EG}(\text{ek}, M), c)\} \end{aligned}$$

As a consequence, \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{D}_3 are computationally indistinguishable, which proves the result.

Bit Encryption Language. In our blind signature protocol, we need to “prove” that a ciphertext encrypts a bit in exponent of a basis u_i . That is the language $\text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i) = \text{EG}(\text{ek}, 1_{\mathbb{G}}) \cup \text{EG}(\text{ek}, u_i)$. This is thus a simple disjunction of two SPHF :

- $\text{HashKG}(\text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i))$: $\text{hk} = ((x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^4$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i), W)$: $\text{hp} = (u^{x_1} g^{x_2}, u^{y_1} g^{y_2}, \text{hp}_{\Delta})$ where

$$\text{hp}_{\Delta} = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} \cdot c_1^{y_1} (c_2/u_i)^{y_2}$$

- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i), W)$: $v = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{BLin}(\text{ek}, u_i), W, w)$: If $W \in \mathcal{L}_1$, $v' = \text{hp}_1^r$,
else (if $W \in \mathcal{L}_2$), $v' = \text{hp}_{\Delta}/\text{hp}_2^r$

The correctness, smoothness and pseudo-randomness properties of such function directly follow from those of the SPHF on $\text{EG}(\text{pk}, 1_{\mathbb{G}})$ and $\text{EG}(\text{pk}, u_i)$. Each projection key is composed of 3 group elements.

Encrypted Diffie-Hellman Language. We also need to consider a language $\text{EDH}(\text{ek} = u, \text{vk} = (\text{vk}_1 = g_1^x, \text{vk}_2 = g_2^x))$ of tuples (d_1, c_1, c_2) , where (c_1, c_2) encrypts d_2 under the public key $\text{ek} = u$, such that (d_1, d_2) is a Diffie Hellman pair in basis (u, vk_1) . This can also be expressed as $c_2 = \alpha \times d_2$, where d_2 is the plaintext in (c_1, c_2) under ek , which means that (c_1, α) is a Diffie Hellman pair in basis (u, vk_1) , and (d_1, d_2) should be a Diffie Hellman pair in basis (u, vk_1) .

More concretely, we consider words $W = (d_1 = u^r, c_1 = u^s, c_2 = g_1^s \cdot \text{vk}_1^r)$, with witness $w = (r, s)$. We have $\alpha = g_1^s$ and $d_2 = \text{vk}_1^r$, but they should remain secret, which requires a specific function, and not a simple conjunction of languages:

- $\text{HashKG}(\text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}))$: $\text{hk} = (x_1, x_2, x_3)$
- $\text{ProjKG}(\text{hk}, \text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W)$: $\text{hp} = (u^{x_1} g_1^{x_3}, u^{x_2} g_1^{x_3})$
- $\text{Hash}(\text{hk}, \text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W)$: $v = e(d_1, \text{vk}_2)^{x_1} \cdot e(c_1, g_2)^{x_2} \cdot e(c_2, g_2)^{x_3}$
- $\text{ProjHash}(\text{hp}, \text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}), W, w)$: $v' = e(\text{hp}_1, \text{vk}_2)^r \cdot e(\text{hp}_2, g_2)^s$

We now study the security of our SPHF:

Theorem 26. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is correct.*

Proof. With the above notations:

$$\begin{aligned}
v &= e(d_1, \mathbf{vk}_2)^{x_1} \cdot e(c_1, g_2)^{x_2} \cdot e(c_2, g_2)^{x_3} = e(u^{xr x_1}, g_2) \cdot e(u^{s x_2}, g_2) \cdot e(g_1^{(xr+s)x_3}, g_2) \\
&= e(u^{xr x_1 + s x_2}, g_2) \cdot e(g_1^{(xr+s)x_3}, g_2) \\
v' &= e(\mathbf{hp}_1, \mathbf{vk}_2)^r \cdot e(\mathbf{hp}_2, g_2)^s = e(u^{xr x_1} g_1^{xr x_3}, g_2) \cdot e(u^{s x_2} g_1^{s x_3}, g_2) \\
&= e(u^{xr x_1 + s x_2}, g_2) \cdot e(g_1^{(xr+s)x_3}, g_2)
\end{aligned}$$

□

Theorem 27. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is smooth.*

Proof. Let us show that from an information theoretic point of view, v is unpredictable, even knowing \mathbf{hp} , when W is not in the language: $W = (d_1 = u^r, c_1 = u^s, c_2 = g_1^t \cdot \mathbf{vk}_1^r)$, for $t \neq s$. We recall that

$$v = e(u^{xr x_1 + s x_2}, g_2) \cdot e(g_1^{(xr+s)x_3}, g_2) = e(H, g)$$

for

$$H = u^{xr x_1 + s x_2} \cdot g_1^{(xr+s)x_3}$$

and

$$\mathbf{hp} = (u^{x_1} g_1^{x_3}, u^{x_2} g_1^{x_3})$$

If we denote $u = g_1^y$, we have:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \log \mathbf{hp}_1 \\ \log \mathbf{hp}_2 \\ \log H \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & y & 1 \\ x r y & s y & t + x r \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

The determinant of this matrix is $y^2(t - s + (xr - xr)) = y^2(t - s)$, which is non-zero if W does not belong to the language ($t \neq s$). So v is independent from \mathbf{hp} and W . □

Theorem 28. *This Smooth Projective Hash Function is pseudo-random under the DDH assumption (the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption).*

Proof. The fact that c_2 really encrypts d_2 that completes well d_1 is hidden by the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption, and so under the DDH assumption. So the proof works as above, on the ElGamal Language.

Combinations. For our blind signature, we want to consider, on input $c = (c_1, c_2)$ and $b_i = (b_{i,1}, b_{i,2})$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, the language of the (c, b_1, \dots, b_ℓ) such that:

- for each i , $b_i \in \text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i) = \text{EG}(\text{ek}, 1_{\mathbb{G}}) \cup \text{EG}(\text{ek}, u_i)$;
- if we denote $d_1 = \prod b_{1,i}$, then we want the plaintext in c to complete d_1 into a linear tuple in basis (u, \mathbf{vk}_1) : $(d_1, c_1, c_2) \in \text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \mathbf{vk})$.

This is a conjunction of disjunctions of simple languages: we can use the generic combination [1].

C.2 OSBE Scheme

Instantiation We now define our OSBE protocol, where a sender \mathcal{S} wants to send a private message $P \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ to a recipient \mathcal{R} in possession of a Waters signature on a message M .

- OSBESetup(1^k), where k is the security parameter: it first defines an asymmetric pairing-friendly environment $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$, the public parameters $h_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbf{u} = (u_0, \dots, u_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1^{k+1}$ for the Waters signature and an encryption key $\text{ek} = g_1^y$, for a random scalar y . All these elements constitute the string **param**;
- OSBEKeyGen(**param**), the authority generates a pair of keys $(\text{sk} = h_1^z, \text{vk} = g_2^z)$ for a random scalar z ;
- OSBESign(sk, M) produces a signature $\sigma = (h_1^z \mathcal{F}(M)^s, g_1^s, g_2^s)$;
- OSBEVerif(vk, M, σ) checks if $e(\sigma_1, g_2) = e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_3) \cdot e(h_1, \text{vk})$ and if $e(\sigma_2, g_2) = e(g_1, \sigma_3)$.
- OSBEProtocol($\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{vk}, M, P), \mathcal{R}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma) \rangle$) runs as follows:
 - \mathcal{R} chooses random $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sends an ElGamal encryption of σ

$$C = (c_1 = g_1^r, c_2 = \text{ek}^r \cdot \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3)$$

- \mathcal{S} chooses random $x_1, x_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^3$ and computes:
 - * HashKG(EG(ek, vk, M)) = $\text{hk} = (x_1, x_2)$;
 - * Hash($\text{hk}; \text{EG}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C$) = $v = e(c_1, g_2)^{x_1} \cdot (e(c_2, g_2) / (e(h_1, \text{vk}) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_3)))^{x_2}$;
 - * ProjKG($\text{hk}; \text{EG}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}, M), C$) = $\text{hp} = g_1^{x_1} \text{ek}^{x_2}$;
 - * $Q = P \oplus \text{KDF}(v)$.
- \mathcal{S} then sends (hp, Q) to \mathcal{R} ;
- \mathcal{R} computes $v' = e(\text{hp}^{r_1}, g_2)$ and $P' = Q \oplus \text{KDF}(v')$.

We only use 3 group elements in \mathbb{G}_1 and 1 in \mathbb{G}_2 for the encrypted signature, and we then send back hp, Q . So basically we have 4 elements in \mathbb{G}_1 , 1 in \mathbb{G}_2 and an ℓ -bit string. If we consider standard representation on asymmetric curves, this means the communication costs is approximately of the size of 3 elements on a DLin friendly curve.

Security To summarize the security of this scheme. This instantiation nearly fits in the high-level instantiation presented before. The difference reside in the part where σ_2, σ_3 are not committed but sent directly. However, due to Waters randomizability, this does not leak any information.

Now, as shown for the high level instantiation, assuming the pseudorandomness of the KDF, the escrow-free property comes from the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption (DDH in \mathbb{G}_1), the semantic security comes from both the smoothness of the SPHF (nothing), the unforgeability of Waters signature (CDH^+) and the indistinguishability of the commitment (DDH in \mathbb{G}_1), and the semantic security w.r.t. authority comes from the pseudo-randomness of the SPHF (DDH in \mathbb{G}_1).

C.3 Blind Signature

Let us now present our blind signature, using the above SPHF:

- BSSetup(1^k), where k is the security parameter, generates a pairing-friendly system $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ and an ElGamal encryption key $\text{ek} = u \in \mathbb{G}_1$. It also chooses at random $h_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and generators $\mathbf{u} = (u_i)_{i \in \{0, \dots, \ell\}} \in \mathbb{G}_1^\ell$ for the Waters function. It outputs the global **param** = $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, g_1, \mathbb{G}_2, g_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e, \text{ek}, h_1, \mathbf{u})$;
- BSKeyGen(**param**) picks at random $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, sets $\text{sk} = h_1^x$ and computes the verification key $\text{vk} = (g_1^x, g_2^x)$ (note that the two elements, in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 will be needed);
- BSProtocol($\langle \mathcal{S}(\text{sk}), \mathcal{U}(\text{vk}, m) \rangle$) runs as follows, where \mathcal{U} wants to get a signature on M

- \mathcal{U} computes the bit-per-bit encryption of M by encrypting $u_i^{M_i}$ in $b_i = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, u_i^{M_i}; r_i)$, together with the encryption of vk_1^r in $c = \text{Encrypt}(\text{ek}, \text{vk}_1^r; s)$ where $r = \sum r_i$. \mathcal{U} thus sends $c = (u^{s_1}, g_1^s \text{vk}^r)$ and the $b_i = (u^{r_i}, g_1^{r_i} u_i^{M_i})$;
- On input of these ciphertexts, the algorithm \mathcal{S} computes the corresponding \mathcal{SPHF} , considering the language \mathcal{L} of valid ciphertexts. This is the conjunction of the several languages presented just before:
 1. the one checking that each b_i encrypts a bit: in $\text{BDH}(\text{ek}, u_i)$;
 2. the second one considers (d_1, c_1, c_2) and check if (c_1, c_2) encrypts d_2 such that (d_1, d_2) is a Diffie Hellman pair in basis (u, vk_1) : in $\text{EDH}(\text{ek}, \text{vk})$ where $d_1 = \prod_i b_{i,1}$, $\delta = \mathbf{u}_0 \prod_i b_{i,2}$.

Following previous techniques this induces a projection key composed of $3\ell + 2$ elements in \mathbb{G}_1 .

- \mathcal{S} then computes the corresponding Hash-value v , extracts $K = \text{KDF}(v) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, generates the blinded signature $(\sigma_1'' = h_1^x \delta^s, \sigma_2' = (g_1^s, g_2^s))$ and sends $(\text{hp}, Q = \sigma_1'' \times g_1^K, \sigma_2')$;
 - Upon receiving $(\text{hp}, Q, \sigma_2')$, using its witnesses and hp , \mathcal{U} computes the ProjHash-value v' , extracts $K' = \text{KDF}(v')$ and un.masks $\sigma_1'' = Q \times g^{-K'}$. Thanks to the knowledge of r , it can compute $\sigma_1' = \sigma_1'' \times (\sigma_{2,1}')^{-r}$. Note that if $v' = v$, then $\sigma_1' = h_1^x \mathcal{F}(M)^s$, which together with $\sigma_2' = (g_1^s, g_2^s)$ is a valid Waters signature on M . It can thereafter re-randomize the final signature.
- $\text{BSVerif}(\text{vk}, M, \sigma)$, checks whether $e(\sigma_1, g_2) = e(h_1, \text{vk}_2) \cdot e(\mathcal{F}(M), \sigma_{2,2}) \wedge e(\sigma_{2,1}, g_2) = e(g_1, \sigma_{2,2})$.

The whole process requires only $5\ell + 6$ elements in \mathbb{G}_1 ($2\ell + 2$ for the ciphertexts, $3\ell + 2$ for the projection key, Q and $\sigma_{2,1}'$) and 1 in \mathbb{G}_2 ($\sigma_{2,2}'$), which is way more efficient than the instantiation from [6] where they required a little more than $6\ell + 7$ group elements in \mathbb{G}_1 and $6\ell + 5$ in \mathbb{G}_2 . Depending on the chosen instantiation for the elliptic curve, elements in \mathbb{G}_2 are at least twice bigger than those in \mathbb{G}_1 (and even more for higher embedding degree), so our improvement is quite substantial.

The security of this scheme can be proven like the symmetric one, once we have proven the security of the SPHF. One important thing to note, is that it relies on the XDH assumption (DDH is hard in \mathbb{G}_1), but not on the SXDH (DDH is hard in both \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2) as we are used to with Groth-Sahai proofs.