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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NEPAL'S PEACE BUILDING PROCESS

Dr. Drew Cottle

Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia
d.cottle@westernsydney.edu.au

Mr. Sunil Thapa

Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia
max_thapa2005@yahoo.com

Abstract

After ten years of civil war in Nepal (1996 - 2006) the combatant forces brokered the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). The war had ended but peace was never established and Nepal's political economy remains weak and barely functioning. The CPA has been inoperative because of power struggles of the numerous parliamentary political parties in the post-insurgency Nepalese Governments. The political parties see no use for the CPA in these power struggles. Their sole and continuing objective is to secure political power. The causes of and the problems created by the civil war have been ignored in the power struggles of the parliamentary parties. The peace process in Nepal is now paralysed. The political parties have ignored, avoided, isolated and derailed the peace building process in Nepal. Hence, this paper analyses the political reality and the paralysed peace process in Nepal. It also examines how the activities of political parties have deliberately failed to bring the process of peace building to Nepal. And finally, it proposes practical peace building measures by which peace building could occur in Nepal which would bypass the power struggles of the political parties in Nepal.

Keywords

Achievements, Failures, Paralysing, Personal Interests, Democratic Activities

1. Introduction

Nepal was entangled in the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006 (Dhruba, 2005; Gyawali, 2009, Nepal et al., 2011) which was stopped with the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006. The agreement occurred between the then Royal government and the rebellion party the Maoist. The CPA is a very good directive document for the establishment of peace and economic development of the country and its people. Unfortunately, its 11 years after the agreement, the peace process has not been completed yet and the political-economic condition of the country is becoming worse day by day.

The political parties are the main driver of the country, its policies, and plan for the country. In the case of Nepal, the political parties and their politicians/leaders are playing the musical chair to grab the opportunity in the government only. This made the country poorer. The root causes of the insurgency have not been addressed yet. Importantly, the Maoist 40 point demands have also not been addressed even by the Maoist government.

Nepal and its people could not feel the permanent peace in Nepal as the country is facing blockade from own political parties as well as its southern neighbour. Even though the political parties could solve all these problems, they are not working actively for peace building in the country yet.

2. Situation of Peace Process

(The Peace processes and their progress since the end of the Insurgency/How is the Peace process working after the Insurgency in Nepal?)

The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) of November 2006 between Maoists rebels and the Seven Party Alliance ended the insurgency of the bullet in Nepal (CPA, 2006). The key elements of the CPA were the elaboration of a new constitution, a reorganisation of the state, more involvement of disadvantaged groups, the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants, the return of confiscated property, the revision of the structural reasons for the conflict, the protection of human rights, and a social, economic, and political transformation of Nepal (CSS, 2012). Some of the significant achievements were gained in

Nepal but most of the promises remaining even worse condition. On the other hand, most of the processes are in the very slow movement which paralysed the peace process in Nepal.

Some of the achievements took place through the CPA between 2006 and 2008 in Nepal. One important achievement was the transition of the Maoists into parliamentary national political parties. Other political parties and the Maoists formed an interim government in 2006 which maintained consensus to until the new constitution was promulgated. Given the weakness and fractiousness of Nepal's political system, it is remarkable that these parties would collaborate during this period, and work with the Maoists. Notably, it was an attack on democracy rather than the conflict that provided the primary impetus for the parties to collaborate (Martin, 2008). On 21 November 2006, an agreement on the monitoring of arms and army management (AMMAA) was established in accord with the CPA (GoN, 2007). It monitored the soldiers and weapons of the Maoist rebels with the help of the UN.

Another achievement in the peace process was 330 member interim parliaments which included the Maoist representatives in 2007. This parliament, with the Government, promulgated Nepal's interim constitution on 15 January 2007 (UN, 2007). The interim constitution was amended further through the First Amendment on 13 April 2007, the Second Amendment on 13 June 2007 and the Third Amendment on 28 December 2007. These amendments included provisions that would allow for the removal of the prime minister and the king by a two-third vote of the interim legislature if they posed an obstacle to the Constituent Assembly elections (UN, 2007) whereas the third amendment ensured that Nepal was to be a republic. These amendments were implemented by the first CA session (UNDP, 2007).

The interim constitution provided different mandates of elections to the Government for a constitutional assembly (CA) that was held on 10 April 2008. The election was monitored by the UNMIN and the Maoists emerged as the most powerful party. The CA was elected mainly to prepare a new constitution for Nepal. In the same year, the CA abolished the monarchy, declared Nepal to be a secular, constitutional republic, and elected the Nepali Congress (NC) representative Dr. Ram Baran Yadav as its first President (CSS, 2012).

The major function of the CA was to write a new constitution for Nepal within two years. Unfortunately, it took eight years to write and for its promulgation. When the new constitution was promulgated in 2014, some political parties, especially from the Terai region

of Nepal, refused to accept it leaving one function of the peace process in a precarious situation.

The new constitution which took 8 years to complete faced many obstacles. As the promulgation of the new constitution was scheduled before the tenure of the CA expired on 28 May 2010, the CA began to work on the draft. The CA approved the set of regulations, procedures, the 82-week calendar to complete it, and 14 committees on drafting the constitution. The core committee was the 610 member Constitutional Committee, a 61-member that was worked on the concept papers prepared by the 10 thematic Assembly committees. The constitution making process was protracted because the major political parties were unable to reach a consensus (Karki & Edrisinha, 2014; UN, 2009).

After the formation of the Constitutional Committee on 13 January 2010, 40 teams comprised of CA members visited all the districts of Nepal to solicit public opinion on the constitution. Despite all these efforts, the constitution making process continued to face major obstacles, as the dominant political parties could not find common ground on many issues including federalism, the modality of Government, the management of arms, and the Maoist combatants (UN, 2009).

The CA failed to deliver the final constitution on 28 May 2010 because unresolved contentious issues such as state restructuring and the future form of governance (Karki & Edrisinha, 2014; UN, 2010). The CA's term was extended for another one year until 28 May 2011 to resolve the constitutional dispute. To achieve this objective, a high-level political mechanism was established with the representatives from seven parties and chaired by the Maoist leader 'Prachanda'. This mechanism could only resolve the 100 disputed issues only out of 210 (The Kathmandu Post, 2010).

Because of this failure, the CA's tenure was extended to 28 August 2011 for three months. It was failed to deliver the new constitution because of Maoist party's reluctance to initiate the rehabilitation of its combatants. Another reason was the ideological of gap between the Maoists and other parties. The Maoists argued for a people's constitution whereas the other parties favoured a democratic constitution. Meanwhile, three other major parties agreed to establish a state reconstructing commission through a viable federal provinces system (My Republica, 2011). To resolve the problem of government structure, the Constitutional Commission proposed a mixed form of government. These developments also failed to bring all political parties and stakeholders together. All these obstacles remained unresolved and obstructed the finalization of the constitution. These remained a complete

absence of consensus among political parties over the constitutional drafting process (nepalnews.com, 2011).

In 2012, the political parties finally agreed on the composition of Government and federal legislature which divides the country into 11 provinces (Hove & Vandernoot, 2015; Myrepublica, 2012). Unfortunately, the Maoist political party backtracked from this agreement because of the pressure from Madesh-based (Terai-based) political parties which demanded an ethnic federalism to meet their aspirations for autonomy and took increasingly polarized positions to form of ethnically based federalism (Kathmandu Post, 2012). These developments failed to resolve the contentious issues and mistrust among the parties grew leading to the demise of the Constituent Assembly on 28 May 2012.

One positive development occurred in 2012 in the peace process of Nepal. As one of the key elements of CPA, a minority of the Maoist soldiers were voluntarily integrated into the Nepal Army (Hamal, 2013; Shah, 2012). They numbered of the 19,602 of the Maoist fighters, only 1450 were integrated. A group of 4002 were denied integration as they were underage with and/or joining too young the Maoist army after the ceasefire (Hamal, 2013). The remainder returned to civilian life or given early retirement. By this method, the difficult problem of “one country, two armies” was resolved (CSS, 2012). Nevertheless, many of the ‘Moist fighters’ refused to give up their weapons and opposed this process (Bhatta, 2012).

On 19 November 2013, the Constituent Assembly election was meant to draft the new constitution for Nepal again but no process was made because of objections of the political parties. To fix this problem, the Committee for Constitutional, Political Dialogue and Consensus building (CCPDC) was created on 25 April 2014. The CCPDC which settled key issues the federalism of disagreement (Kathmandu Post, 2014).

Following the massive earthquake (25 April 2015) the political situation in Nepal dramatically altered. On 31 May 2015, the leaders of the four major parties met and agreed to settle the key issues within a few days and produced a draft constitution (MyRepublica, 2015). In June 2015, the four major political parties reached a 16-point agreement to resolve the contentious issues (Kathmandu Post, 2015). In protest at their decision, the 30 small political parties resigned from the CA (Castillejo, 2016). Nevertheless, the draft constitution was submitted to the CA on 30 June (Kathmandu Post, 2015) and completed by 7 July. The CA’s draft constitution was published in the Nepal Gazette to collect people’s reactions to it (Himalayan Times, 2015). The major points of accord in the new constitution were:

- Eight provinces would compose the Federal Democratic Republican of Nepal.
- Two-thirds of the federal legislature must endorse a delineation proposal.
- Two-thirds of the majority of the provincial assembly to name the provinces.
- Parliamentary system with a titular president and an executive Prime Minister.
- 275-seat in the lower house where are 60% directly elected and 40% elected on a proportional basis and 45-seat in the upper house where 40 members come from the provinces and 5 were nominated by the president.
- Constitutional Court for 10 y
- Ears. (Peace Direct, 2015)

For eight years the CA failed to draft the constitution in Nepal. The Maoists also failed to draft a new constitution when in the government. During their insurgency the Maoists proclaimed a new constitution which recognised the identity of all Nepalese people in chiding as [provided] the Dalits...women, the landless and ethnic and indigenous minorities – with a wider political space to articulate their grievances (Sunam & Goutam, 2013).

The major political parties (Nepali Congress, CPN-United Marxists-Leninist, CPN-Maoist Centre and Rastriya Prajatantra Party) failed to articulate and negotiate this identity-based agenda which had resulted in the extremism, ethnic tension and violence before and during insurgency (Castillejo, 2016). Currently, there is a deep anger among a number of marginalized ethnic groups as well as the Madhesi groups against the new constitution. They believe that their aspirations were not taken into account and were excluded from the constitutional process in the new constitution which only reflects the interests of the traditional elites (Castillejo, 2016). This led the Madhesi-Tharu mass movement in Nepal's southern plains to protest for about three months for substantial amendments to the new constitution to address their grievances over citizenship, revision of the federal boundaries and making the statute more inclusive. The Nepalese Government refused to address these concerns and 49 people died during this political crisis (ICG, 2015).

The Government gave to local bodies' control of the polls across the country in for the endorsement of the constitution. The protests were ignored to the constitution prior to the poll. The last Local Elections were held in Nepal in May 1997. Unfortunately, the Madhes-based political parties of Nepal refused involvement in the local election and demanded to the changes to the constitution according to their interests (The Himalayan Times, 2017).

One institution established to the peace process upholds was Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR). It was to support the technical aspects of the peace process and implement the provisions of the CPA. Basically, it was to provide assistance in a sustainable peace building process to promote the peace, support the conflict management, promote the public participation in the peace process, and recommend policies and strategies for peace building (Tandukar et al., 2016). The MoPR assisted the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) to fund peace initiatives. Local Peace Committees (LPC) were set up in 75 districts for assisting in the local implementation of the CPA, facilitate conflict transformation process, and work on reconciliation, healing, and trust-building. However, its effectiveness has been challenged by the political parties dominance, lack of local involvement, much unclear mandate and a lack of capacity (Carter Center, 2011, pp.7-11).

The five-member Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established on 10 February 2015 in accordance with the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2014. The TRC was established to investigate the reality of human rights violations during the Maoist insurgency and recommend the justice to the victims as well as the perpetrators so that both groups may live together in the same community peacefully (TRC of Nepal, 2017).

The TRC submitted an interim report to the President of Nepal on 7 Feb 2016 which recommended the temporary and quick relief measures to the victims of Maoist insurgency (The Himalayan Times, 2016). On 17 April 2016, it called for victims' testimonies of for complaints human rights violations during the Maoist insurgency. By 29 Nov 2016, it received 58,052 complaints. It called for public suggestions over reparation policy formulation (TRC, 2017). On 9 Feb 2017, its tenure was extended by one more year to complete its tasks of peace building (MyRepublica, 2017).

3. Political Parties and their Activities

(How are the Activities of the Political Parties Paralyzing the Peace Process?)

Nepal's political parties are the drivers of the change. They are capable to resolve grievances related to class, caste, and gender, as well as to other political, economic, social and cultural challenges facing Nepal (Dahal, 2014). In reality, the political parties are entangled in their own interests and demands instead of the peace process and peace building for the nation and its people.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) had launched a civil war in 1995 against the state and political system so it could serve the country and its people. For this, it raised the 40-Point List of Demands, its key demands were a people-centred governance, a self-reliant economy, and nationhood (Bhusan, 2016; Thapa & Sharma, 2009). Although it took leadership in the government three times, it could not fulfil its own demands.

Since the end of the insurgency and the signing of the CPA in 2006 (Luitel et al., 2013), Nepal's political environment has never been stable. After the CPA, the election of the CA was postponed because of disagreements between the political parties. A Cabinet minister and three members of the legislature representing the Terai plains resigned in order to launch the Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party (Terai Madhes Democratic Party or TMLP), which joined with other regional parties such as the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party or NSP) and Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (Madhesi People's Right Forum or MJAF) to fight for greater representation of the Terai (Bhusan, 2016; Thapa & Sharma, 2009).

The political parties are riddled with factionalism and opportunism. The leadership clashes frequently occur in major political parties or the Nepali Congress, CPN (UML) and the Maoists cause party fragmentation. The parties are unable to manage the interests of a range of rest members and experience factionalism and splits. The three large national parties, the Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist and Leninist) (CPN-UML), and ex-rebel Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) have all been riven by divisions over key political issues and have experienced constant dissent and leadership crises. Beyond the three largest parties, there are a number of smaller parties, including recently emerged parties which pursue their own interests and have their own problems. The Terai-based parties have also their own separate agenda. Many other political parties have emerged based on one issue (Upreti, 2009). The consolidation of the peace process is not possible unless the political parties cooperate with each other for the betterment of the country. They seem to be more concerned about their own political future (Bhatta, 2016; Upreti, 2009).

The political parties played a role to end the civil war but they are not able to restore the peace in the country. In two CA periods between 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2015, the political parties with the leaders frustrated, delayed and obstructed peace process. The process was bogged down in wrangling and internal divisions, stalling the constitution-drafting process and preventing any progress on peace. There has been the lack of

compromise within the political parties as the priority is retaining power for them. Political brinkmanship is a feature of the activities which only frustrates or delays the peace process (CSS, 2012).

The drafting of Nepal's new constitution hardly took progressed because of the political parties struggles for power and influence. The Federalism question over its the number, size, geographic determination, the name and authority of federal units, were a matter of controversy within the parties. The CPN-Moist, the Terai-based parties, and certain ethnic and regional groups were favourable of federalism and for the regions in which they were dominant. The NC, the CPN-UML, and forms dominant ethnic groups and castes fear their loss of influence on federalism (ICG, 2011). In 2015, the three main parties agreed to new constitution but excluded smaller parties such as Terai-based parties from this process leaving them angry and alienated (Castillejo, 2016).

Nepal's political parties exhibit the weaknesses most which are common in conflict-affected contexts. The unstable nature of Nepali politics, the frequent changes of government and fragmentation of the political groups keep parties focused on gaining power rather than performing their representative functions or developing and delivering a policy agenda. Nepal has had 10 governments/prime ministers between 2006 and 2017 (BBC, 2017). Because of competing ideologies and power struggles there was an absence of coherent agendas on policies. The peace process and peace building were neglected or given no impetus (Kumar & De Zeeuw, 2008: 278 cited in Castillejo, 2016). The lack of democratic processes, political discipline, and a common interest deny any commitment to the peace process within the political parties.

The quest to monopolise power is another factor which betrays the peace process in Nepal. The Nepali political parties never saw the peace process as a power-sharing agreement. They are keen to monopolise. Democracy and the peace process were never concrete. All matters of Nepalese politics are struggled over interests and benefits. The peace process was hijacked by the major political leaders in the course of power sharing. For example, issues such as federalism, a republic, and secularism were decided without consulting the people. This is one reason the peace process has become a winners' game (Bhatta, 2012).

The crisis of good governance, as a fundamental problem, is making more challenges power or difficulties for peace building in Nepal (Bhatta, 2012). The governance lacks legitimacy on power. Instead the power shifted to political parties, armed non-state actors,

party wings and sister organizations so they define the rules of the game in their own ways and share the spoils of office. As a result, the state institutions are becoming weaker eroded the rule of law, undermined human rights, promoted a culture of immunity for the political classes, institutional corruption, halted development, scared off foreign investors, and constrained economic activities. Similarly, the absence of good governance has resulted in the absence of local elected government which has reduced democratic space for ordinary people (Bhatta, 2012).

Corruption is widespread. The human rights situation continues to be unsatisfactory. The mechanisms envisaged in the CPA for dealing with the civil war era in legal terms (“transitional justice”) have not been implemented. Political discourse is marked by severe disagreements between and rifts within the parties. Demonstrations and strikes are frequent and futile (CSS, 2012).

The division of the spoils (Bhagbanda) and a syndicate approach of the political parties is unfortunate for the peace building in Nepal. This sharing for power in every sector by the political parties is spoiling Nepali democracy. Whether the people are suitable or not, major political parties share the posts in every sector. Even though such political interference would seriously impact the conduct of foreign affairs, they forced by the political syndicate. For example, on 12 Feb 2017, the government recommended 14 names for 13 vacant posts of ambassadors according to ruling political parties’ decision to share amongst them for sustaining the coalition. Among the nominees, six are from the “quota” of the Nepali Congress, four from the CPN-Maoist Centre and three from the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, and one is from the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum-Loktantrik (The Kathmandu Post, 2017). Another example of this political syndicate was in election commission on 28 Jan 2017. The three commissioners were appointed by Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and the Maoists (MyRepublica, 2017).

The present crisis of peace process and peace building is largely an outcome of the failure of the political leadership of Nepal. The political parties and their leaders have made mistakes repeatedly and are not committed the national interest. There exists a deep mistrust between political parties, the people and the peace process is being paralysed (Sangroula, n.d.). It resulted in the TRC being established nine years after the CPA in 2006 although it had to be legislated in 2006, with the assumption it would be functioning within a year. The TRC’s objectives are to deliver the victim-centric justice. But such outcomes remain uncertain because of the absence of regulations, its lack of support from the government and

the stalemated negotiations between the different political parties (The Kathmandu Post, 2015). Unless the TRC can function properly, the people/victims and the nation will neither receive justice nor peace. The implementation of the peace agreement remains at an impasse (CSS, 2012).

In the struggle for power by the Nepali political parties, the main opposition CPN-UML has launched the 'Mechi-Mahakali' campaign in Nepal's southern plains to boost its image ahead of the polls for local government elections. Another party, the SLMM opposed this campaign. It resulted on the death of five people (The Kathmandu Post, 2017).

The Prime Minister 'Prachanda' a Maoist leader increased his cabinet on 9th March 2017 to make his government more stable. The members of RPP were included in the cabinet. They supported a democratic monarchy whereas the Maoists had fought 10 years insurgency to uproot the monarchy. This Cabinet expansion was as PM's a bid to achieve a two-third parliamentary majority to support amendments and the local elections. The government has already tabled an amendment proposal in but the amendment process failed because the Terai-based political parties opposed both the constitution and local elections as their demands have not been fulfilled (OnlineKhabar, 2017).

In summary, the hindering factors for the peace building, threatening social stability and order and promoting a culture of impunity which are present in the political parties in Nepal are-

- Factionalism in big parties
- Personalization of parties by leaders
- Lack of internal party democracy
- Absence of constitutional habits
- Failure to enforce party laws and codes of conduct
- Proliferation of regional parties
- Cross-coalitions of leaders in order to remain in power with the help of factional leaders from other parties or even parties with polar opposite ideologies;
- Militarization of parties' sister organizations (especially youth and trade unions);
- Rise of armed non-state actors in southern flatlands bordering India and the eastern hills;
- Parties' and their leaders' links with local thugs – who are often used for extortion, the enforcement of political power and exertion of influence on both state and non-state agencies and intimidation (criminalization of politics); and

- Involvement of party leaders in corruption and crime (Bhatta, 2012).

4. The Role of Political Parties in Peace Building Process

(What can the Political Parties do for Peace Building Practically?)

Political parties can play an important role to end the conflict, misunderstanding, and shaping the roadmap of peace building for the country. They can utilize their potential in expressing the grievances associated with the insurgency, articulate the people's interests and begin state building through peace building (Castillejo, 2016). They can address the grievances and follow closely peace building process of South Africa (S. African TRC, 1998).

The political parties a great potential for peace building. Even the small political parties can play a crucial role in such process as they can ensure the interests of minority groups. However, they must embrace a national vision to enhance the peace process. The political parties of Nepal are struggling to articulate a national vision which is acceptable for everyone. The weaknesses regarding the civil values of trust, mutual understanding and willingness to solve the problem should be corrected by multiparty democracy of Nepal (Kumar & De Zeeuw, 2008 cited in Castillejo, 2016).

At present, almost all the political parties are losing their legitimacy because of their lack of internal democracy, bad governance, and corruption, the game of power sharing and not committing to the national interest. They can correct themselves by developing the democratic habits by following the laws and rules, providing the equal opportunity to all, listening and respecting their opposition, helping in the eradication of corruption and bad governance. Problems related to the peace and constitutional processes can be addressed provided that political parties rise above their partisan interests, create common ground based on a national perspective, resolve all constitutional issues and engage in reconciliation (Bhatta, 2012). In the course of attending to the crisis induced by the insurgency, the political leaders are presented with a landmark opportunity to re-evaluate and redesign all aspects of politics, governance, and democracy and to introduce structural reforms in the management of the state (IDEA, 2016; Thapa, 2008).

A bitter competition over power is the pre-occupation of the political parties. The major political parties represent different interests either the Maoist aimed revolutionary transformation, the Nepali Congress (NC) mission of incremental reform, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) which seeks the conservation of traditional politics and a democratic

monarchy. These conflicting agendas complicate the dynamics of the Nepalese politics; prevent the achievement of constitutional and political stability (Dahal, 2008). This is the reason why there is an extreme division over issues such as federalism and integration. The political parties and their leaders clash over the issue of federalism are based on their political interests, gains, and advantages. Such behaviour will leave Nepal as a failed state (Thapa, 2008). It is essential that the political culture must change for peace building to proceed. For this to occur, the political parties must support the peace process.

The culture of cooperation and consensus on fundamental issues of the constitution is an important act of nation building. The political parties need to develop a culture of consensus to adopt a common process of goal formulation based on new mandate from the people and common process of political socialization about the goals of political parties, media and civil society, and a collective will to formulate and co-ordinate through a common minimum program acceptable to all sides, and a cooperative distribution of the outcome of coalition politics to representing all Nepalese society to create their shared stake in a culture of mutual accountability (Dahal, 2008).

Successful 'peace building' in war-torn countries like Nepal is said to involve a triple transition: a security transition from war to peace; a political transition from authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) to a more participatory form of government; and a socio-economic transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities (Thapa, 2008; Zeeuw, 2001). Peace is not just the absence of war, but also economic prosperity, social harmony, unity, and solidarity among the multi-ethnic Nepali people. There should be a purposeful development to create democratic institutions for more open, participatory and successful society (Thapa, 2008). For this to occur, the political parties should commit for the peace settlement as to work way to build Nepali democracy.

Practically, there are some important measures to the Nepali political parties including their leaders, politicians, and cadres should embrace for peace building process in Nepal.

- ❖ They should build internal democracy, constitutional habits, respect laws and rules, instead of their personal interests and demands.
- ❖ They should follow their political objectives and national demands such as the Maoists should pursue the 40 Points Demands for which they fought a 10 year insurgency.
- ❖ They should be mutual respect and trust in their parties instead of fragmentation, factionalism and personal interests.

- ❖ They should stop the singular struggle to gain power in government.
- ❖ They should solve the controversies in new constitution by respecting all political views.
- ❖ They should seek enduring political stability rather than frequent changes in government.
- ❖ They should stop the power sharing struggler (Bhagbanda) simply to gain power or remain in power.
- ❖ They should always establish good governance. For the prosperity of the country, there should be the economic development and the equal distribution of national incomes and resources as well the provisional of providing equal opportunities to all without discrimination.
- ❖ They should root out corruption. Those found guilty should be punished.
- ❖ They (political parties and their leaders) should seek to govern only in the interests of the nation.
- ❖ They should work together for peace building by insuring this justice to both the victims and perpetrators of the 10 years' civil war through TRC (Reilly, 2013).

5. Conclusion

Nepal is an economically poor country which is still burdened by the legacy of a ten-year civil war. The Peace in Nepal has not been established yet even the conflict has ended. The country's political economy has been worsening in since the end of the insurgency. Except for the re-integration of the Maoists, the nation's political system has failed to build the peace. The numerous political parties urge a constant struggle for power to fulfil their own wishes and interests. The political parties are the driving force in Nepal so they could and should solve the economic and social problem and build the peace in Nepal. They should participate in the peace building process. The fate of the nation to make the political parties and its peace remain their responsibility positively and practically.

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