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Information Security Theory and Practice

Securing the Internet of Things

Springer

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Preface

Future ICT technologies, such as the concepts of ambient intelligence, cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things, provide a vision of the information society in which: people and physical systems are surrounded with intelligent interactive interfaces and objects, and environments are capable of recognising and reacting to the presence of different individuals or events in a seamless, unobtrusive and invisible manner. The success of future ICT technologies will depend on how secure these systems may be, to what extent they will protect the privacy of individuals and how individuals will come to trust them.

The 8th Workshop in Information Security Theory and Practice (WISTP 2014) addressed security and privacy issues of smart devices, networks, architectures, protocols, policies, systems, and applications related to the Internet of Things, along with evaluating their impact on business, individuals, and society. WISTP 2014 was organized by the FORTH-ICS during June 30 – July 2, 2014, in Heraklion, Greece.

The workshop received 33 submissions. Each submission was reviewed by at least three reviewers. This long and rigorous process was only possible thanks to the hard work of the Program Committee members and additional reviewers, listed on the following pages.

This volume contains the eight full papers and six short papers that were selected for presentation at WISTP 2014. Furthermore, the proceedings include the two keynotes given by Bart Preneel and Timo Kasper, to whom we are grateful.

WISTP 2014 was collocated with the 7th International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST), and keynote talks of each event were delivered to both, with the attendees having the possibility to attend sessions of both events.

We wish to thank all the people who invested time and energy to make WISTP 2014 a success: first and foremost all the authors who submitted papers to WISTP and presented them at the workshop. The members of the Program Committee together with all the external reviewers worked hard in evaluating the submissions. The WISTP Steering Committee helped us graciously in all critical decisions. Thanks also go to the 2014 General Chairs Ioannis Askoxylakis, the local organizer Nikolaos Petroulakis and their respective teams for handling the local arrangements, to the Trusted Computing Group, Intel, and Microsoft for financial cosponsoring WISTP 2014, IFIP WG 11.2 Pervasive Systems Security for scientific cosponsoring of WISTP 2014, and to Sara Foresti and Cheng-Kang Chu for their efforts as publicity chairs.

April 2014

David Naccache
Damien Sauveron

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WISTP 2014 was organized by FORTH-ICS.

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Main Sponsors

Since the early stages of the workshop inception the workshop organizers received positive feedback from a number of high profile organizations. With the development of a strong program and organizing committee, this was further capitalised into direct financial support. This enabled the workshop organizers to strengthen significantly their main objective for proposing a high standard academic workshop. The support helped significantly to keep the workshop registration costs as low as possible and as the same time offer a number of best paper awards. Therefore, we would like to express our gratitude and thank every single organization. We are also looking forward to work together in future WISTP events.

Abstracts of Invited Papers

Lightweight and Secure Cryptographic Implementations for the Internet of Things (Extended Abstract)

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Abstract. There is a growing insight that if we build Internet function-
ality into every object, it will be essential for broad acceptability that se-
curity and privacy features are protected from day one. The old approach
of first rolling out the system and thinking about security and privacy
later will no longer work. Cryptographic algorithms form an essential
element to protect the Internet of Things; moreover, this environment
will impose ever higher requirements for the algorithms in terms of per-
formance, security, and cost. For many settings algorithms tradeoffs are
expected that offer an improvement of one order of magnitude compared
to existing standards. This extended abstract presents a brief overview
of the issues that need to be addressed for such an optimization to be
successful.

The design of cryptographic algorithms corresponds to finding a tradeoff between
performance, cost, and security. It is rather easy to obtain any two of these, while
giving up the third one. As an example, it is easy to develop a highly secure and
very fast algorithm if the implementation can be expensive.

- Performance is typically thought of as speed or throughput: how many cycles
  or seconds are needed to process a single byte or message. It is difficult to
  express performance in a single number, as the performance depends on the
  hardware platform (even performance numbers on two hardware platforms
  with the same cost can be very different) and the time to process one byte
  varies depending on the length of the message (there are typically setup
  costs). Moreover, parallelism is playing a more important role (for high end
  systems).
- Security can typically be expressed in number of bits of the effective key
  length; a more accurate but harder to estimate measure is the monetary
  cost for the opponent. The difficulty with estimating security is that there
  are a range of attacks that assume different access of the opponent to the
  device and that achieve difference goals. As an example, cryptographers
  typically consider only attackers that try to break a single instance of a
  cryptographic scheme, while attacking multiple instances frequently brings

economies of scales, e.g. through time-memory tradeoffs. Moreover, in the past two decades the insight has grown that implementation attacks (also known as grey box attacks), that exploit physical properties of the implementation, can be much more effective than black box attacks that only exploit the input-output behavior. Finding low-cost protections against such attacks is notoriously difficult.

– The third element is the cost: ideally, cost can be expressed in financial terms. Hardware cost depends on the gate count or chip area, but for small devices packaging costs can play a very large role. Moreover, in environments such as the Internet of Things money or hardware may not be the only constraint: devices such as passive RFID tags that receive power from the reader or devices that harvest their energy from the environment will have power constraints. Other devices are battery operated, and the challenge is to minimize energy to maximize the life time. Note that energy is the product of power and time, so an algorithm that minimizes power does not necessarily minimize energy.

The interest in lightweight cryptography has grown in the last decade. Many algorithms have been published, including block ciphers, streams ciphers, MAC algorithms, hash functions, authenticated encryption and public key algorithms. For symmetric cryptography, the focus was initially on reducing the area or gate count, but the attention has shifted to reducing energy consumption, to algorithms for low-end micro-controllers and to resistance against implementation attacks. For public-key cryptography, research has concentrated on demonstrating that it is indeed possible to implement current algorithms such as ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) and NTRU on low-end platforms.

The main conclusion so far is that there is no such thing as a cryptographic algorithm suited for the Internet of Things. If one wants to push the boundaries by an order of magnitude and also resist implementation attacks, it will be essential to optimize both the algorithm and the implementation for a specific environment. At this stage it is not clear how many algorithms will be needed to satisfy the demand, but one can expect that a set of – perhaps tunable – standard algorithms will emerge. Next to the algorithm, the cryptographic protocol in which it is used plays a central role: the protocol should not use too many cryptographic algorithms and should again be optimized for a specific setting; the optimization should consider the algorithm(s), but also the communication and storage costs.

Sweet Dreams and Nightmares:
Security in the Internet of Things

Timo Kasper, David Oswald, and Christof Paar

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Abstract. Wireless embedded devices are predominant in the Internet of Things: Objects tagged with Radio Frequency IDentification and Near Field Communication technology, smartphones, and other embedded tokens interact from device to device and thereby often process information that is security or privacy relevant for humans. For protecting sensitive data and preventing attacks, many embedded devices employ cryptographic algorithms and authentication schemes. In the past years, various vulnerabilities have been found in commercial products that enable to bypass the security mechanisms. Since a large number of the devices in the field are in the hands of potential adversaries, implementation attacks (such as side-channel analysis and reverse engineering) can play a critical role for the overall security of a system. At hand of several examples of assailable commercial products we demonstrate the potential impact of the found security weaknesses and illustrate "how to not do it".

Table of Contents

Short Papers