School of Media, Creative Arts, and Social Enquiry

Educational Environments and Preventing Violent Extremism Policy Agendas: Perspectives and Implications

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Human Ethics: The research presented and reported in this thesis was conducted in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) – updated March 2014. The proposed research study received human research ethics approval from the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (EC00262), Approval Number #HRE-2017-0540.

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Abstract

As global efforts to counter violent extremism increase, the need to perfect best practices and develop a better comprehension of successful interventions is necessary. This research project considers the possibilities of educational programmes as an avenue through which preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) measures may be approached. P/CVE policy has been implemented across a wide range of contexts but the educational field is a relatively newer approach. However, as yet, there is little consensus on how best to go about this for effective outcomes and there have been noteworthy negative impacts in some experiences.

There is a general progression amongst P/CVE policy implementation that has moved towards targeting younger people and one such way to do this has been through educational spaces. However, the approaches vary considerably and overall it is apparent that the threat of violent extremism still persists and such policy implementation has not been broadly effective in reducing this threat. As such, this research project seeks to explore the input that frontline educationalists and parents/guardians can offer to better understand how effective policy could be developed. Working with young people can present challenges unique to this group so the insights from experienced and frontline individuals that work with young people regularly is considered valuable.

Methodologically, by utilising existing data to shape case studies and then qualitatively and quantitatively generating new data specifically targeting parents and teachers involved in the educational field, the project identified a number of existing gaps in the P/CVE space. Specifically, this project sought to discover what Australian parents' and teachers' expectations and understandings are surrounding the implementation of P/CVE programmes in Australian schools. The findings revealed overwhelmingly that Australian teachers' and parents' primary concerns for their students/children are not related to radicalisation and/or violent extremism; however, there was obvious support for awareness and education on the matter. Findings also revealed that any such education should only be taking place after intensive teacher training and in collaboration with specialists from other fields. Moreover, the conclusions also made clear that the broader school community and local stakeholders have an integral role to play in any such education if it is to be

successful. Finally, the data generated a wealth of suggestions and considerations from the teacher and parent participants useful for future policymaking.

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List of acronyms

ACT	Australian Capital Territory – a territory of Australia incorporating Australia’s capital city
CONTEST	UK’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NSW	New South Wales – state of Australia
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VIC	Victoria – state of Australia

Glossary

Term	Definitional understanding used in this thesis
Countering Violent Extremism	In Australia, the objective of the countering violent extremism program is to combat the threat posed by home-grown terrorism and to discourage Australians from travelling overseas to participate in conflicts (Department of Home Affairs, 2019).
Deradicalisation	An ideological transformation stemming from a willingness to renounce a belief in violent extremism; the latter implies a disavowal of the use of violence or a change in behaviour without necessarily rejecting extremist ideas (Romaniuk & Chowdhury Fink, 2012, p. 5).
Extremist Attitudes (Attitudes Supportive of Political Violence – APV)	Values or beliefs that condone or support Behaviours Contributing to Political Violence in pursuit of these same stated objectives (Khalil, 2014, p. 199).
Extremist Behaviour (Behaviours Contributing to Political Violence – BPV)	A set of activities applied by non-state actors that directly (e.g. explosive detonation, mortar attack) or indirectly (e.g. explosives manufacturing, reconnaissance, attack logistics) further violence against non-military targets ostensibly in pursuit of stated political (including ideological, ethno-nationalist, and religious) objectives (Khalil, 2014, p. 199)
Hard Power	

	A military-centred approach to countering terrorism that consists primarily of increased policing and intelligence and special forces operations, and is very much enemy-focused (Rineheart, 2010, pp. 37-8).
Protective Factors	Biological or environmental factors that promote resilience and can be circumvented by risk factors, depending on the balance between the two (Zolkoski, & Bullock, 2012)
Radicalisation/Radicalised	The process by which individuals come to accept violent extremism as a legitimate means of pursuing their political, ideological, or religious goals. The radicalisation process is unique to each individual. However, it often includes a combination of exposure to violent extremist propaganda and adverse social and economic factors (Council of Australian Governments, 2015, p. 7). Psychological radicalisation does not necessarily equate to violent actions.
Resilience	The process of overcoming the negative effects of risk exposure, coping successfully with traumatic experiences, and avoiding the negative trajectories associated with risk (Fergus & Zimmerman, 2005, p. 399).
Risk Factors	Biological or environmental factors that inhibit resilience and can be circumvented by protective factors, depending on the balance between the two (Zolkoski & Bullock, 2012)
School Community	

	An environment in which the school plays a central role in forming partnerships with community-based networks so as to expand the traditional educational mission of the school to include health and social services for students and their families and engagement with the wider community.
School Connectedness	A term used to describe the feelings a student possesses towards their school environment, the support within the school and also within the school community, and the positive adult relationships that are formed and available to them (Niehaus, Rudasill, & Rakes, 2012, p. 443).
Soft Power	A population-centric approach to counter-terrorism that focuses on capacity building, economic development, counter-radicalisation, and promoting the rule of law and democratic values (Rineheart, 2010, pp. 37-8).

Terrorism	Australia's legal definition of terrorism reads:
	A terrorist act is an act, or a threat to act, that meets both these criteria:
	• It intends to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause.
	• It causes one or more of the following:
	    o death, serious harm or danger to a person
	    o serious damage to property
	    o a serious risk to the health or safety of the public

	◦ serious interference with, disruption to or destruction of critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network. Advocating, protesting, dissenting or taking industrial action are not terrorist acts where the person doing the activity does not intend to cause serious harm to a person or create a serious risk to public safety (Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.-a).
Violent Extremism	• A person or group who is willing to use violence; or • Advocates the use of violence by others, to achieve a political, ideological or religious goal (Living Safe Together, 2020).

Chapter One

Introduction

There has been a growing attempt in the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism to better understand radicalisation and violent extremism in order to explain a number of terrorist acts and ways to circumvent these. This understanding is central to the impetus behind contemporary efforts to utilise educational spaces for such purposes, especially for engaging with young people. Understanding the developments that take place before an act of violence or act of terrorism occurs will identify key factors and likely foster more effective preventative measures.

This research seeks to explore the varied educational approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) worldwide and to understand how these experiences, approaches, successes and failures may shape the Australian experience in this area for the future. An assessment of non-educational approaches to P/CVE is also covered as a means of situating educational P/CVE in the broader policy design framework. Then, uniquely drawing from the specific perspectives of teachers and parents in Australia, this research highlights the need for a collaborative effort between policymakers and frontline workers, including teachers, to ensure safe and effective P/CVE programmes in educational environments. If educational P/CVE is to become more prevalent in Australia as a counter-terrorism measure, research into how best to approach the matter is vital for ensuring accepted and effective initiatives. Research that considers the impact – both long and short term – is crucial if we are to better understand the types of interventions required for successful outcomes. As yet, this remains largely unknown, and it is this lack of knowledge that this research project seeks to contribute.

1.1 General topic and background

Studies and research into radicalisation and violent extremism have generated focus from fields such as psychology, criminology, and behavioural analysis. Other research has explored community-centric initiatives from families, friends, and local community members in order to better understand what takes place in the life of a person progressing through a radicalisation route or showing support

for extremist violence (Grossman & Tahiri, 2015). Factors for radicalisation and violent extremism are varied and complex and *may* include a wide array of issues each being unique to an individual, therefore assessing how teachers and educationalists understand their role in this complex issue as policy agendas are implemented in educational spaces, is important for ensuring success and limiting adverse outcomes.

A gradual policy shift has taken place that emphasises the need to address the root causes of terrorist incidents much earlier than current policy agendas to prevent future cases of extremist violence in all its forms. Policies that seek to prevent and reduce the development of violent extremism in its very earliest stages have become the preferred approach worldwide for addressing radicalisation and violent extremism and the newer term Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) has emerged – or, now more commonly, a blend of CVE and PVE in the form P/CVE. While variations in the uses of the terminology exist, the acronym P/CVE will be used throughout this thesis (except in the findings chapter due to the use of the acronym CVE during data collection). This more preventative approach allows experts to not only reduce the threat of violence but will also help to create a cultural shift for the future across communities that will ideally minimise the development of any violent extremism before it presents. Sjøen and Jore (2019) contextualise this as a 'non-specific' approach that lays the foundation for prevention across a larger audience. Others have described this as a logical step due to the often-interchangeable use of the terms CVE and PVE (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier, 2019). P/CVE is often now turning much of its attention towards young people as a rise in extremist attitudes and acts of terrorism remain a concern amongst this demographic. This desire to address radicalisation and violent extremism amongst young people has resulted in the use of educational spaces to achieve these aims.

Educational P/CVE policy is a relatively newer approach following efforts in other contexts, like community cohesion policies, that is still adapting in order to establish best practice and to reach younger individuals. Schools and other educational institutions, like universities, are gradually being incorporated into wider P/CVE agendas as younger adults and adolescents become a focus. With the intent to intervene early and broadly, P/CVE policy programming continues to transform as these best practices are sought.

1.2 A distinct lack of best practice

An analysis of the literature indicates that the impact of P/CVE policy agendas in multiple different contexts is contributing to a number of negative outcomes, with only a small number of distinct positive results and no widespread examples of best practice backed by empirical evaluations. This creates cause for concern and reveals the need for further exploration into why this is the case. Some studies are available that consider the impact P/CVE policy agenda has had and continues to have on frontline communities (Broadbent, 2013; Cherney et al., 2017; Grossman & Tahiri, 2015; Lindekilde, 2012b; Moffett & Sgro, 2016), however educational specific evaluations are less common and often short-term in nature. The broader literature points to an overwhelming array of negative consequences, especially on Muslim communities, following the implementation of policies and programmes. These negative consequences are likely to be hindering the development of best practice in the field. With regard to Australia, there is a distinct lack of evidence to demonstrate how these fairly new educational initiatives are being received, how they are being developed and implemented, and how frontline individuals and communities, like teachers and wider school staff, are interpreting and understanding the expectations placed upon them.

The variety of P/CVE programming that may be considered to be educational in nature is continually being designed and established worldwide with many programmes being implemented as a test case that further works towards some establishment of best practice. Much of the focus of existing efforts can be categorised into three broad categories, as follows:

a) In-school education programmes: these generally focus on democracy and civic responsibilities, such as the Civics and Citizenship component in the Australian School Curriculum, described as essential for ensuring that values of respect, civility, equality, and justice are developed (for further information regarding the Civics and Citizenship component of the Australian Curriculum across Foundation to Year 10, see Australian Curriculum, n.d.). They may also be counter-extremism subject-specific, such as programmes like Beyond Bali (Aly, Taylor, & Karnovsky, 2014, pp. 376-83) and Extreme Dialogue (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015).

b) Out-of-school programmes: these platforms aim to provide youth with alternative activities and opportunities to develop their extra-curricular abilities. For example, the Football United programme works alongside highly multicultural schools to

ensure their students have an organised and engaging after school activity that benefits the social development of the youth (Football United, 2009).

c) Community engagement/awareness raising activities: activities that are not necessarily targeted at school-aged youth, but rather young adults, for example, the Australian Muslim Youth Leadership and Mentorship Programme (Australian Multicultural Foundation, n.d.). These programmes are frequently directed towards providing opportunities for youth considered at-risk, in this case Muslim Australians, to enable them to engage with their communities and build new skills (Australian Multicultural Foundation, n.d.). These programmes may be one-off specialised interventions or may be implemented into the curriculum or current method of instruction as part of a day-to-day, long-term approach that is more likely to see results over time and may appear less intrusive and temporary to the participants.

This research will focus on the perceptions and understandings of, and receptiveness to the role of programmes that fit largely into category a) of the above listed in-school education. In the United Kingdom (UK), educational P/CVE has transformed from legislating components of the curriculum, like citizenship education, to ensure it is taught across all schools, to placing a statutory duty on teachers to 'prevent people being drawn into terrorism' (Durodie, 2016, p.4). In Denmark, educational P/CVE has been implemented together with existing crime prevention structures. In Australia, in-school P/CVE-related programmes are becoming more prevalent, especially in New South Wales (NSW) with one of the latest programmes, *School Communities Working Together,* transitioning into schools in 2016 and 2017 (NSW Department of Education, 2016a). Especially in regard to Australia, there is little evidence to assess how P/CVE, especially educational P/CVE, is being received, understood, and implemented by educationalists. As such, with this continued growth in using schools and other educational spaces, it is imperative to fully assess the implications so as to limit the development of adverse outcomes for young people and to also better support those required to implement P/CVE policy agendas. However, across each of these case examples there is little consistency in approaches and no conclusions as to the most effective method.

1.3 Aims of the research

This thesis sets out to explore how educational environments are being used under P/CVE policy agendas and the impact this has had and continues to have on those on the 'frontline' of such programming – teachers and parents. The research seeks to situate educational P/CVE amongst broader P/CVE policy agendas in a variety of contexts to better understand how concerns amongst younger people are being addressed. A better understanding of this impact will assist minimising negative outcomes, provide better insight into the content and contexts, and will contribute to some potential key considerations for future policymaking. Addressing this gap will hopefully lead to improved success rates and increased engagement with P/CVE policy agenda. As such, an analysis of the expectations and attitudes of frontline staff (and the students for future research and research outside of this project) may provide some useful insights into how to improve the ratio between positive and negative outcomes.

In Australia, there is significant opportunity to move forward successfully and effectively due to the early stages of educational P/CVE programming. Drawing upon examples from other countries, tried and tested approaches, and public perceptions and expectations, Australia has ample opportunity to implement well-researched, effective programming. It is vital to explore the reception to this, especially amongst those expected to implement the policy agendas, and to better understand what these programmes aim to achieve in school institutions and communities. It is important to explore how local contextual factors, wants, and needs influence effective outcomes (Weine et al., 2009).

In this thesis, the UK, Denmark, and Australian experiences are assessed through a consideration and analysis of the existing literature surrounding educational P/CVE policy design and implementation in these countries. The analysis considers how educational P/CVE has come about from broader/earlier P/CVE policy in other contexts; the impact it has had on frontline individuals such as teachers, wider school staff members, and parents; and identifies what lessons can be drawn from their experiences to shape future P/CVE policy design. Then, primary data in the form of an exploratory survey of parents and teachers is collected to complete the Australian analysis.

While education is the focus of attention for this research, it is important to note that the question being examined is not whether convicted terrorists and those

radicalised to the point of violence are educated or not. Research has already revealed that a number of people who participate in violent acts around the world have often obtained a high level of tertiary education (Coughlan, 2015; Fox, 2016; Macaluso, 2016, p. 4; Miletic, 2016; Pels & de Ruyter, 2012); rather, the focus for this thesis is on whether using the educational environment for P/CVE policy implementation– and this includes staff, teachers, and school communities – is considered an appropriate approach with anticipated positive outcomes that can outweigh the negative ones experienced so far. This will inform policymakers on how to best influence certain aspects of a young person's educational experience in order to address any potential contributing factors to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Additionally, the focus for this research was not specifically extremist acts conducted in the name of Islam, but it is important to acknowledge that this form of violent extremism, and the resulting literature and research, has dominated the past two decades and is thus key to understanding how P/CVE has developed during this period.

1.4 Research problem and questions

There is an obvious lack of consensus amongst policymakers and experts on how to best implement educational P/CVE for effective outcomes. As has already been noted, P/CVE in schools is growing in popularity but there is little evidence to support its effectiveness and only a small number of evaluations are available that assess its impacts, especially on those at the frontline of being in charge of implementation and those receiving the initiatives. Considering the various array of programmes and policies past and present and the lack of evaluations that pinpoint exactly what works in the field of P/CVE more broadly, it may be suggested that P/CVE policy and implementation is still very much in a trial and error phase. This may be what is contributing to adverse outcomes for educational spaces where target participants are still in their formative years and may have lasting impressions.

It is clear that countries like the UK, and more recently Australia, are continually moving towards more widespread educational P/CVE however, the challenges have been noteworthy and some of these are a throwback to broader P/CVE failures, like community funding that stigmatises certain communities: In the

UK, the experience has been clouded by stigmatisation of Muslim communities and young Muslims in school environments; In countries like Denmark, this too has dominated the outcomes. Additionally, one of the most noteworthy challenges is that P/CVE policy in educational spaces is yet to find consensus on an approach that can demonstrate actual evidence of achieved outcomes, which are often also unclear.

Given the trend towards adopting P/CVE programmes into schools, it is worth considering whether school staff and other educationalists are receptive to the approach, feel the approach is appropriate, and in what ways it could be most effective. Additionally, it is important to consider what the goals are of implementing P/CVE in educational spaces. It could be argued that the intentions are often broad and require long-term evaluation to ensure effectiveness and yet, no such longitudinal studies appear to have been undertaken.

With that in mind, for two key reasons, this growing popularity of using educational spaces without conducting thorough and open evaluations demonstrates a need to be cautious in the area of educational P/CVE – firstly, in regards to the language and terminology used, and secondly, due to the sensitivity of the topic itself, especially with younger individuals, and the consequences that may result from getting it wrong. The sensitive nature of P/CVE in general and the relative newness of P/CVE with little empirical evidence to support its use in educational spaces mean policymakers must be watchful that any such programming can achieve key outcomes and is not going to result in adverse consequences.

In order to address the overall research problem of growing P/CVE in educational spaces without empirical evidence of effectiveness and investigate the role of an educational approach in countering and preventing violent extremism in Australia, this thesis seeks to explore the following question:

What are the challenges, opportunities, and implications of implementing P/CVE policy agendas in educational spaces?

As a means of examining the overall question, the following considerations will also form a key component of the research in order to compare experiences and better understand how future policy should look and to explore the receptiveness of such policy programming, especially for Australia:

- What are the understandings of and experiences with P/CVE programming from frontline educationalists and parents and how do they perceive its appropriateness?
- What are some of the major concerns and expectations of P/CVE policy in schools?

In other words, this thesis seeks to explore P/CVE policy in educational environments by firstly considering how P/CVE policy has been implemented in a variety of contexts, then, seeks to understand what frontline educationalists understand this policy implementation to look like, and what they expect from it. How can we draw upon these voices to better shape policy development? It is expected that by accommodating these understandings, experiences, and expectations, more effective policy can result.

1.5 Outline of thesis

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two explores P/CVE literature across various contexts. Here an analysis of wider P/CVE policy implementation in varying situations and the impacts aids an understanding of how educational environments have gradually become a focus across many countries. A more specific analysis of the educational P/CVE field occurs in Chapter Three. This chapter addresses more detailed educational-focused case studies from the UK, Denmark, and Australia to compare and contrast the educational policy approaches employed to address radicalisation and violent extremism and the impacts these policies are having. The UK and Denmark have been forerunners in using educational spaces for their P/CVE work and therefore provide a grounding for Australia to consider in future programme development. Chapter Four outlines the methodology employed for this research project. It describes how the primary data was collected from Australian parents and teachers regarding their experiences, expectations, and perceptions of using school spaces for countering violent extremism. This forms a unique contribution to the P/CVE field, as teachers become the central conductors for such programming – a new expectation of the teaching role. A mixed methods approach using an exploratory survey and structured interviews was developed in order to obtain primary data. Limitations, including a disconnection with a key

informant and a change in commitments from key informant inhibited the undertaking of interviews but the exploratory survey was conducted on teachers and parents as data collected from these sources was identified as a gap in the literature. It was anticipated that by using an exploratory survey with a variety of quantifiable and qualitative response options, respondents could open up and respond freely whilst exploring an often sensitive and marginalised topic. Finally, these findings from the input from teachers and parents are provided in Chapter Five, lending a fresh aspect to the field of utilising education to combat radicalisation and violent extremism before being discussed further and applied to the research questions in Chapter Six.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The implementation of P/CVE policies varies in rates of what is deemed successful and the impacts of such policies have the potential to create adverse consequences, and as mentioned, there are few empirical evaluations that provide a strong basis to support best practice and effectiveness. Overwhelmingly, the growth in P/CVE policies has created cause for concern for impacts on aspects like human rights and freedoms, especially on minority communities (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). This is of concern for the P/CVE field if the initiatives cannot be supported by evidence of effectiveness.

This lack of empirical, and especially longitudinal evaluations, is keeping the P/CVE field in a trial and error phase of implementation, which can contribute further to adverse consequences as governments experiment with different approaches on the path to best practice. Moreover, despite the expanding research field and evolving policy design and implementation, the threat of violent extremism and terrorism still remain high across the globe (Spalek & Weeks, 2017). Thus, the need for additional and continued research into the impacts of this trial and error process is important for future policy direction.

Kundnani and Hayes (2018) contend that there is a lack of a formal legal framework for the implementation of P/CVE policies in addition to limited publicly available information making it difficult to assess how and where P/CVE policy is being implemented and by whom. This expansive nature of the field may, in part, be due to varying definitions of the key terms like violent extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism. What this means is that the types of programmes that have been described as P/CVE initiatives have covered a wide range of concerns, examples include community-based initiatives in targeted areas (Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Mirahmadi, 2016), mentoring programmes (Spalek & Davies, 2012), prison-based projects (Jones, 2014), gender-specific interventions (Gielen, 2018), deradicalisation programmes (Horgan & Braddock, 2010), disengagement programmes (Barrelle, 2015), and community policing initiatives (Spalek & McDonald, 2009). What this

means is that *if* evaluations take place following such a programme, they often provide evidence for a niche contextual field that may or may not provide approaches that are transferable to other locations, communities, cultures, or countries and thus, provide little evidence to progress and develop future policy from.

There are three key themes that can be identified in the P/CVE literature and will be the focus of this chapter. Firstly, it is apparent that the P/CVE field has gradually developed as a need to soften overarching counter-terrorism policies that may often be considered as failing – evident as the persistent high threat of a violent act in many countries. This transition from harder policies usually termed counter-terrorism, to softer policies more often labelled countering or preventing violent extremism has however, maintained some legacies from earlier counter-terrorism policy. One of the more recent softer measures incorporates educational environments, which is central to this thesis and addressed on its own in the next chapter. This transition to softer P/CVE measures has had an overwhelmingly significant impact on Muslim communities around the world carrying on from the earlier and harder counter-terrorism policies evident from the immediate post-9/11 period.

Secondly, activities and interventions labelled as P/CVE are very broad in nature and there is a distinct lack of evaluations that demonstrate which of these wide-ranging initiatives are effective and worth replicating for different contexts or locations. This has also resulted in a variety of adverse outcomes but particularly, has demonstrated that at almost 20 years on from 9/11, governments are still unsure *how* to effectively and efficiently prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Thirdly, there is an emerging and dominant aspect of P/CVE that calls for building resilience to form a central component of preventing violent extremism, however, thus far this too has not been supported by empirical evidence to determine that this would be an effective long-term solution to countering and preventing violent extremism and how this is actually implemented in context. This call for building resilience is commonly found amongst the educational P/CVE literature and policy recommendations as an approach for younger individuals.

A consideration of the literature from the broader P/CVE field in this chapter creates the opportunity to inform the newer educational P/CVE field (in the next chapter). There exists more evidence to draw from across the wider cross-contextual

P/CVE field of knowledge as to aspects of P/CVE programming that may be likely to be more successful, more well-received, and empirically supported to help build a field of best practices. This chapter will use the available literature to outline these three persistent themes across different contexts and will map a policy transition leading to a specific analysis of educational interventions in the next chapter. The literature discussing anything P/CVE is so widespread and saturated, so it will be separated into two chapters for this thesis. Examples across the two chapters are largely drawn from the US and UK policy experiences as they have often been forerunners in these fields and are heavily examined in the literature. The literature in this chapter will provide an opportunity to identify future points of consideration for the P/CVE field, however, revealing a distinct lack of empirical evaluations, especially longitudinal evaluations, that can support the development of best practice for the field.

2.2 Key theme 1: The development of P/CVE policy and its impacts

The 9/11 effect

P/CVE policy has developed largely in the post-9/11 era as a need to soften broader counter-terrorism policies that were not eliminating the threat of violent extremism or terrorism, but Muslim communities have been significantly affected by these developments. The attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001 changed the world dramatically. From the economy, foreign policy, legislation to everyday community suspicion, all corners of the globe suffered from post-9/11 consequences following this tragic event. The response, commonly known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT), sought to counter any future threat through on-the-ground military engagement in the Middle East. This threat was also most commonly considered to be arising from Islamist extremism, above any other form. Groups like Al Qaeda and later, ISIS as global organised extremist groups, were the most significant target in the period following 9/11. In the days following the September 11 attacks, President Bush declared: “our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Whitehouse Archives, n.d., p. 68). Since then, the globalisation of P/CVE policies has developed and been the most significant change in counter-terrorism policy since the mid-2000s (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

Originally, the post-9/11 environment led to new or adapted counter-terrorism policies that contributed to intervention in the Middle East and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Early-2000s counter-terrorism policies, often a reaction to the events of September 11, were dominated by how to counter the threat through military interventions, improved domestic security measures, strengthening policing powers, and broadening surveillance measures. Whilst these hard power elements will likely always remain in counter-terrorism policy, if conducted incorrectly, they can be an opportunity to propagandise and recruit on behalf of the extremist and terroristic organisations (Selim, 2016). As Selim (2016) describes: "for every terrorist we arrest or take off the battlefield, their co-conspirators may use our action to recruit and radicalise more" (p. 95). This reflects the limits that a solely hard-power approach can have over the longer term.

Since September 11 there have been significant increases in counter-terror spending and a broadening of policy development around the world as governments and non-government think tanks work to establish initially effective hard, but now largely soft, power approaches (Aly, Balbi, & Jacques, 2015). Such soft approaches aim to cover a broad range of tactics intended to dull the threat of terrorism and soften public concern, especially through a non-military style. It can be suggested that the GWOT was not addressing the root causes of terrorism and thus a new approach was desperately required (Rineheart, 2010). As Romaniuk (2015) contends, the introduction of P/CVE as a soft power approach to counter-terrorism has been a welcome development in the post-GWOT environment. Although this threat is global, countries have adopted their own contextual P/CVE policies to address local concerns.

To best understand the concept of soft policies in the context of counter-terrorism it is important to consider when the term originated. Joseph Nye first proposed the concept of a soft power approach in the late-1980s. It was defined as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies" (Nye, 2008a, p. 94). In terms of diplomacy, Nye's argument for a soft power approach to global diplomacy (or at least a combined soft and hard power approach – smart power) has grown in popularity since the end of the Cold War. Nye's argument favours diplomacy through non-coercion; an opportunity to draw upon shared political values, culture, and goals, and thus foreign

policies (p. 95), rather than a military (i.e. hard) approach to conflict resolution. A dominant theme in the broader counter-terrorism literature is how the approach to counter-terrorism has changed from an offensive – hard – approach to a defensive – soft – approach. Before the calculated and devastating act now commonly known as 9/11 that killed thousands of everyday citizens, counter-terrorism policy worldwide was very much a 'hard' approach: military solutions were generally considered effective and necessary and very rarely was a 'soft' approach utilised (Aldrich, 2014; Chowdhury Fink, 2014; Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006; Pickering, Wright-Neville, McCulloch, & Lentini, 2007; Romaniuk & Chowdhury Fink, 2012). That said, it may be argued that when fighting terrorism, hard power is required to bring down and capture the terrorist themselves, whilst a process of winning hearts and minds (soft power) is vital for the long-term (Nye, 2008b).

In a globalised world witnessing substantial flows of digital information, the fight has become about the most attractive message, rather than who has the biggest and strongest military muscle. Nye (2008b) claims the current soft power battle is searching for a better counter-narrative to that which is being put forward by the terrorist groups. It has become about 'whose story wins' rather than being measured in successes and failures on the battlefront. This idea of counter-messaging and its effectiveness as a means of countering extremist narratives and hindering the recruitment of individuals into such groups, has been considered by authors and bodies such as Romaniuk (2015), Zeiger and Aly (2015), Akbarzadeh (2013), the Qatar International Academy of Security Studies (2012), and the UN in its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (United Nations, 2014). Countering extremist messages with a narrative that draws upon alternative voices to those preached by ideological extremists is considered to be an important aspect of P/CVE. Nye's concept (1980s-1990s), whilst pre-9/11, reflects current practices in the P/CVE field.

Adverse consequences and the legacies of harder counter-terrorism policies

Two of the most distinct legacies of harder counter-terrorism policy from the immediate post-9/11 period are firstly, the securitisation of communities and everyday public spaces, like schools, and secondly, the persistent association between Muslim communities and violent extremism and terrorism. The policing, militaristic, and surveillance aspects that align with traditional harder policies have tarnished the transition to P/CVE and stigmatised such policies and interventions. Many elements

of harder counter-terrorism policies still exist within P/CVE programming with arguably, the most prominent example of this being the monitoring and statutory reporting of individuals within the UK's counter-terrorism policy, CONTEST, which will be detailed later in the thesis.

In the mid-2000s after the initial few years of the GWOT, policies took a turn to countering extremism and neutralising support for groups like Al Qaeda through a winning 'hearts and minds' style campaign. This often developed as a result of increasing support for extremist and terrorist groups and the need to address this from a more community-centric standpoint (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). Counter-terrorism policy began to include terminology like 'countering violent extremism' rather than the previously favoured 'countering terrorism'. Yet, this attempt to address the threat through altering and countering extremist narratives rather than simply disrupting attempted attacks, struggled to identify itself as separate from the broader counter-terrorism policies. Kundnani and Hayes (2018) argue that this approach however, was broader and less defined than just 'tackling terrorism' was because it now meant that the enemy was ideological and not just specific individuals or groups. Many of the earliest post-9/11 counter-terror policies sought to defeat the enemies that conducted the attacks on September 11. However, this contributed to an 'us and them' mentality amongst communities and led to stigmatisation of Islam and Muslims as the enemy and the goal was often to defeat "Islamic extremism" rather than simply "extremism" (Selim, 2016).

Counter-terrorism and P/CVE policies have been difficult to disentangle (Thomas, 2014). Romaniuk (2015) considers P/CVE agendas to be a branch of broader counter-terrorism policy with most countries being able to identify two distinct waves – their first wave of uncharted testing of policy and implementation most often taking place as a reaction to 9/11, followed by amendments and a change of course in the later-2000s following what was learnt from the earlier immediate post-9/11 policy approaches. Romaniuk (2015), while writing about what has been learnt from P/CVE policy, concludes that a number of nations progressed through a change in policy direction transitioning from the harder counter-terrorism polices to softer P/CVE policies.

One of the most distinct and cross-contextual legacies of harder counter-terrorism policies, particularly surrounding the GWOT, is the significant impact on Muslim communities around the world (Davies, 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Spalek &

McDonald, 2009; Stevens, 2011). This experience exists in many Western nations where Muslim communities are in the minority, such as the UK, the US, and Australia. Engagement with Muslim communities was a common initial approach to counter-terrorism and later P/CVE in many countries (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). However, due to the testing nature of what Romaniuk (2015) terms the first wave, this engagement was often seen as stigmatisating an association between Islam and terrorism. It is apparent, almost 20 years after 9/11, that P/CVE has been unable to shake the legacies of this association. It has even been suggested that contemporary US P/CVE policy has regressed and returned to a focus on Muslim communities (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

Kundnani and Hayes (2018) have evaluated the globalisation of P/CVE policy concluding that the lack of a formal legal framework for the implementation of P/CVE policies is compounded by the secretiveness and limited public information of P/CVE objectives and programming. Together, this has made it difficult to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness and impact of P/CVE across most nations. Kundnani and Hayes' (2018) paper provides some valuable key points for a consideration of the wider P/CVE field. Firstly, the authors contend that "amid the groundswell of global interest in CVE policy, however, none of these organisations have paused to question the impact, legitimacy, or effectiveness of the policies within the countries in which they were first developed" (p. 10). What this emphasises is that whilst the P/CVE field is continually evolving, modifying existing and developing new policies, there is a desperate need to undertake empirical evaluations and also, assess how these policies are affecting those on the receiving end. Secondly, whilst the paper is largely focused on the US, UK, and wider EU, it reveals similarities across each of these locations suggesting that there have been missed opportunities to learn from other countries' errors. For example, the authors evaluate the impact on Muslim communities in each of these countries with findings drawing many similar conclusions. The authors argue that current P/CVE policy is still focused on Muslims, despite claims to the contrary (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

The United Kingdom response

Initially, the UK began expanding their post-9/11 counter terrorism policies with the release of CONTEST in 2006. CONTEST, as a new policy, first began being developed as early as 2003, was formally introduced in 2006, and then later

strengthened a number of times (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). The literature commonly describes the phases of the CONTEST policy by naming them CONTEST 1 (2006-2009) and CONTEST 2 (post-2009) (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). The latest edition available at the time of writing was updated and released in June 2018. From its establishment, CONTEST has maintained four streams to the policy: Prepare, Protect, Pursue, Prevent with each focused on differing aspects of counter-terrorism. The overall policy remains much the same today with the four streams still named as such. CONTEST 1 was dominated by the Pursue strand of the policy which was heavily associated with hard power tactics like intelligence gathering and developing new anti-terror laws (Spalek & McDonald, 2009). Spalek and McDonald argue that this contributed significantly to a distrust of Muslim communities because the focus of government policy was almost solely on Islamist-based terrorism. Kundnani and Hayes (2018) claim that the turning point for UK policy was an acknowledgment that an understanding of what causes an individual to undertake an act of violent extremism goes beyond recruitment into a group. The authors point to an increase in the use of the term extremism. This changing terminology directly corresponds to changes that can be described as a shift away from focusing on formal groups and movements to a consideration of attitudes, mindsets, and dispositions. This reflected a similar transition in the US and other parts of Europe, namely the Netherlands, in the mid-2000s. These authors interpret what may be seen as turning points in UK counter-terrorism policy and similarly, the emphasis placed on Muslim communities or groups as a whole.

CONTEST 2 was modified with a stronger focus on Prevent due to a need to address the homegrown threat of violent extremism (Stevens, 2011). The UK initiated a more preventative feel through legislative changes and new policies. Whilst CONTEST 1 was militaristic in many aspects, such as gathering intelligence and working with allies overseas, it is important to note that it has always maintained its Prevent strand that seeks to address the radicalisation of individuals and prevent acts of violent extremism and terrorism well before they occur. Yet, CONTEST 2 now directed more attention to this stream of the policy. The UK's CONTEST policy is considered one of the first significant implementations to address terrorism from a soft power perspective (Counter Extremism Project, 2017; Frazer & Nünlist, 2015; Thomas, 2016).

In 2011, the UK government conducted another evaluation of CONTEST and its progress reiterating that the central focus of CONTEST was to "reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence" (HM Government, 2011a, p. 9). The evaluation report also stipulated four specific key areas that required addressing in order to limit the continual hold on power and growth of terrorist groups. These are: (1) conflict and instability; (2) access to modern technologies; (3) a widespread ideology; and (4) radicalisation. The evaluation report asserted that the terrorist threat to the UK, at the time of its writing, remained strong despite a decline in the power of Al Qaeda. Thus, the report claimed, a continuation of methods that were effective, transparent, flexible, affordable, collaborative and proportionate would prove most effective for addressing both the threat from religiously extreme groups similar to Al Qaeda, as well as the threat originating from Northern Ireland-related terrorism (HM Government, 2011a, pp. 40-42). The specific focus on radicalisation (point 4) and the growing concern for domestic threats reveal an important consideration for what was now a movement away from harder counter-terrorism to softer P/CVE.

The next evaluation report (2018) describes the terrorist threat as more severe than in 2011, largely stemming from the emergence of ISIS and the group's ability to coordinate attacks on British soil (HM Government, 2018, p. 7). Fresh 2018 measures added to the CONTEST strategy included improving domestic investigative capabilities for MI5, new legislation to intervene earlier, and closer relations with communities to address radicalisation and recruitment to extremist groups (HM Government, 2018). This indicates the same trend that was transitioning even further towards more preventative interventions. This is noteworthy because it would lead to an expanding inclusion of P/CVE into the education sector in order to intervene earlier and with younger individuals.

The UK model is an early example of the measures that many states are now taking in their counter-terrorism strategies, yet it has not developed without a significant share of criticisms. Whilst some of the adverse consequences of counter-terrorism policy were mentioned earlier, specific to the UK experience is the impact of the 7/7 bombings in 2005 and the resulting turn to an increased focus on communities and the Prevent strand of CONTEST (Spalek & McDonald, 2009). This increased engagement with communities was heavily directed towards Muslim communities, which resulted in increased alienation and an air of distrust within and

towards Muslims. Spalek and McDonald (2009) evaluated data from a study examining partnerships between Muslim communities and police in the UK. The findings indicated a contradictory dilemma in that individuals deemed best placed to aid in the prevention of terror related crime are those being most stigmatised and perceived as suspect. The authors conclude that the overall focus of CONTEST on shared fundamental British values is fuelling this stigmatisation and promoting assimilation, which is only harming the effectiveness of these partnerships (Spalek & McDonald, 2009).

Stevens (2011) draws similar conclusions by arguing that the implementation of CONTEST as a policy has the potential to drive more radicalisation and extremism rather than less. The paper argues that CONTEST policy aims to develop a 'moderate' Muslim through the specified shared British values but this runs the risk of alienating the very communities they are trying to work with (Stevens, 2011). Furthermore, and in line with Spalek and McDonald, (2009), Stevens (2011) contends that the polices are contradictory in that they seek to focus on community cohesion, yet they label entire communities, usually Muslim communities, as vulnerable to violent extremism.

Taylor (2020) also identifies the central problem in UK P/CVE policy as being counter-productive because it sows distrust of Muslims. Taylor (2020) looks specifically at the concept of 'suspect' and 'risky' communities within UK counter-terror policy and concludes that these soft measures have resulted in alienation due to their focus on young Muslims and British identity. Writing more recently than Spalek and McDonald (2009) and Stevens (2011), Taylor (2020) suggests that UK counter-terror policy has potentially reached its "lowest ebb" (p. 868). What can be drawn from these arguments is that UK policy has ostracised the very communities it seeks to engage with because of this pre-emptive suspicion that entire communities, specifically Muslim communities, rest in a 'pre-criminal' space (or what Kundnani and Hayes (2018) term the 'non-criminal space') where an individual from said community *might* one day, be at risk of committing a violent act. What these analyses also indicate is that the same adverse consequences have persisted across time and the UK has continually failed to address these issues.

The United States response

While the UK model for P/CVE was in its youth, the United States government released a renewed approach to P/CVE intended to address domestic challenges and coordinate best practice in a collaborative manner. This new US strategy, released in December 2011, was also intended to delve deeper into the preventative needs of countering violent extremism. The document, *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, was updated later in October 2016 to evolve with the ever-changing threat of violent extremism (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). The original version was dominated by a desire to counter the ideology of Al Qaeda because the group was still considered a significant threat at the time and the elimination of Osama Bin Laden had only occurred shortly before the document's release. However, this focus was not its sole objective. The publication outlined the government's efforts to counter violent extremism through utilising existing networks and activities as well as developing new P/CVE-focused campaigns. This new course of action was more community-focused than previous efforts and endeavoured to engage with local partners and networks on a level previously untried, through initiatives like funding for community organisations. It also demonstrates a transition towards incorporating the education sector in broader P/CVE policy agendas. The key was empowering local stakeholders to build resilience to violent extremism and was a blueprint for domestic resilience-building initiatives. This followed on from the 2010 National Security Strategy that brought forth the importance of well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions as the country's best defence to violent extremism (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). The three chief pillars of both the 2011 and 2016 versions of the document remained the same, and these were:

1. Enhancing engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists.
2. Building government and law enforcement's expertise for preventing violent extremism.
3. Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. (Department of Homeland Security, 2011; Department of Homeland Security, 2016).

The original 2011 document considered in greater detail the requirements of the government departments, the measures of engagement with local bodies, and the current and anticipated activities that would strengthen ties and expand awareness of the new government approach. The updated document provides a closer focus on local and community-based initiatives to achieve preventative objectives. At a local level, P/CVE initiatives are framed around the need to empower and equip families, communities, and institutions through internet safety education, community service activities, and resilience-building approaches that are locally constructed and tailored. Furthermore, a deeper consideration for individual-level requirements that provide concerned family members and peers with information and resources for guidance before turning to law enforcement for assistance are raised (Department of Homeland Security, 2016).

Similar to the UK experience, P/CVE initiatives in the US have, at times, created division between culturally and racially diverse groups within communities, amplifying an 'us versus them' segregation that is unhelpful to P/CVE efforts. Community members have reported stigmatisation and feelings of distrust. The 2016 document reiterates that efforts must protect civil liberties and rights that respect privacy and freedoms, rather than focus on intelligence gathering and law enforcement; an emphasis that is unique to this later version. The intention of upholding these rights through safeguarding measures is to build trust and thus, over the longer term, create resilient and united communities. Similar to the UK approach, the US has also focused on working with and empowering communities as an approach to combatting the threat of violent extremism and terrorism (Szmania & Fincher, 2017).

Kundnani and Hayes (2018) argue that in the US, the turn to focus on violent extremism occurred at a "moment of crisis for counter-terrorism policy-making in the United States" (p.4). What this implies is that counter-terror policy post-9/11 had struggled to achieve its aims; the GWOT was central to US strategy but the attacks in the UK in 2005 and other parts of Europe, like Madrid the year earlier symbolised the failures of US counter-terror policy and the GWOT specifically. The transition from a militaristic battle to a battle for ideas was a major shift for the Bush administration in 2005 (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

Ellis and Abdi (2017) argue that America lives in a post-9/11 era where the legacies of September 11 and the resultant polices still shape the experiences of

American Muslims. The authors consider the concept of community resilience as an approach to P/CVE that may help rectify this. Reflecting upon the aforementioned US policy —*Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*— and particularly point 1 of the chief pillars, the authors question what existing structures can be built upon to make whole communities resilient to violent extremism. Ellis and Abdi highlight the US' concern with the "grave and growing threat" (p. 289) of Americans joining or supporting foreign terrorist organisations and consider the need to change policy direction in order to address this surge, particularly amongst younger Americans (2017). The authors' suggestions are valuable in that they seek to redirect some of the adverse consequences that have been felt within US Muslim communities. American Muslims have also experienced increased discrimination and stigmatisation due to the post-9/11 policy agendas which the authors claim needs to be reframed through genuine partnerships that build strong and resilient communities. Suggesting the use of Community-Based Participatory Research, Ellis and Abdi (2017) contend that this will allow communities to feel as if they are equal partners in this policy implementation, which will in turn reduce the feelings of being targeted and stigmatised.

Kundnani (2012) is also concerned for the legacy of post-9/11 US policy and the stigmatisation of Muslim communities, but differs in his analysis in that he also considers the resultant rise of the focus on radicalisation as a concept. Attempting to better understand the radicalisation process and thus develop counter-radicalisation policies has become a central component of many P/CVE policies. Yet, Kundnani (2012) argues that this is what has led to the construction of suspect communities of Muslim populations, abused civil rights, and fails to understand the nature of political conflicts. This attempt to understand the thoughts and behaviours that take place prior to a violent act has inherited a number of assumptions from post-9/11 counter-terror policy. Firstly, that the perpetrators stem from a larger group of extremist sympathisers driven by a style of Islamic theology that drives their actions. Secondly, that entry into this group can be better understood by psychological or theological factors. And thirdly, that an understanding of these factors would better shape government policies to reduce the risk of violent acts (Kundnani, 2012).

Whilst authored in the early 2010s, Kundnani's analysis is useful in that it helps map the trend amongst the literature that post-9/11 policy has continued to

affect P/CVE policy. This persistent concern with Muslim communities is arguably one of the most noteworthy legacies of harder counter-terror policy. P/CVE has attempted to move away from harder approaches, such as by better understanding radicalisation (Kundnani, 2012) or by engaging on the frontline with communities (Ellis & Abdi, 2017) but it has struggled to shake the harm that developed in the early-2000s.

Both the US and UK offer early examples of a transition from harder counter-terrorism responses to softer P/CVE programming that are worthy of consideration due to the potential influence they have had on P/CVE policy and programming elsewhere. Frazer and Nünlist (2015) and Thomas (2016) argue that the concept of P/CVE, as opposed to simply stopping terrorism, was first introduced into European countries, such as the UK, after the Madrid attacks of 2004 and the London transport bombings of 2005. Whilst both the UK and US were early to adopt more soft power measures in their approaches to stopping terrorism, there are differences in how they went about implementing these changes. The US was still heavily involved and focused on the GWOT and was especially leading the counter battle from a military standpoint. Despite the earlier harder approach to countering the group through the GWOT, the US was first to implement steps to work towards responding to the threat through on-the-ground resistance measures. The US was especially focused on the importance of trust, relationships, and partnership building within communities, which for the UK appeared to come a little later. Both the US and UK sought better collaboration across government departments but the US also had a distinct and deeper focus on community engagement in the earlier days.

Elsewhere

Elsewhere in Europe, the Netherlands provides another example of P/CVE developing as a need to soften broader counter-terrorism policy. Here, counter-terrorism policies were quick to transition to a softer approach with a focus on the radicalisation process. Shortly after 9/11, the Netherlands sought to better comprehend the radicalisation process to more thoroughly understand the threat of terrorism. The Netherlands identified a need to develop a model of radicalisation to aid this understanding (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). Similar to the US and UK approaches, the Netherlands also sought to build and utilise relations with local Muslim communities in their P/CVE efforts. P/CVE policy continued to develop as

the country implemented a system that could identify individuals at risk of extremism, described as an “early warning system” (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 6). This led to the establishment of the Information House which acted as a central hub for coordinating preventative interventions for individuals requiring support, such as educational or apprenticeship opportunities. Whilst this policy of surveillance and identifying individuals might still largely reflect harder counter-terrorism polices, it was an attempt to intervene earlier before any illegal actions were taken.

A further example of the adverse legacies of harder counter-terrorism policy failing to succeed is within India’s implementation of policy. India has taken a slower turn to softer measures in an attempt to better understand the root causes of terrorism. However, this transition has been more gradual than in many other countries (Hearne, 2012). Hearne (2012) argues for India to pursue a broader P/CVE approach that targets radicalisation with counter-radicalisation initiatives to improve intercommunal relations. Additionally, it is suggested that India strive to better incorporate communities in the implementation of policies to build community-wide resilience to violent extremism.

Furthermore, Hearne (2012) contends that India’s policy at the time was more focused on state measures rather than the people, which ignores long-term prevention. These failures are highlighted by a significant growth in home-grown terrorist groups and transnational terrorism “to an unusually high degree” (pp. 527-528). This is supported by Singh (2019) who states that, at the time of writing, India was ranked fourth in the world for its number of homegrown terrorist groups and transnational attacks, only after Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Singh’s analysis is also supportive of Hearne’s work from seven years earlier, claiming that India’s counter-terror policies are “short-sighted”, “inconsistent and often contradictory”, and “rarely includes long-term preventative measures” (p. 169). Together, these assessments point to the failures of harder counter-terror policies which in India’s case have persisted for longer as a transition to P/CVE has not been as rapid as in other nations.

India’s experience differs from the UK and US experiences in that it does not appear to have impacted Muslim communities to quite the same degree, yet, there have still been reports of wrongful arrests of Muslims (Hearne, 2012) and discrimination and deprivation as a minority (Singh, 2019). What this indicates across all of these examples is that harder counter-terrorism policies from the post-

9/11 period have done little to address the spread and reduce the risk of violent extremism and terrorism and instead, have produced an array of adverse consequences that are proving difficult to rectify. As such, a move towards softer measures appears to be a step in the right direction, but the legacies of these harder measures are hindering the development of positive and effective best practices.

Australia's response

Following the events of 9/11, Australia's leading policymakers established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee, with its first meeting held a month after the Bali Bombings in 2002 (Australian Government, n.d.-b). This new formation would review existing counter-terrorism policies and set the course of policy for the next decade. As such, in Australia, significant changes in counter-terrorist policy have taken place over the course of the last two decades. Patterns and trends have developed along similar lines to those in many other countries, such as amending legislation and implementing new policies, engaging closely with communities, and funding new initiatives that seek to address the root causes of terrorism. Australia has also witnessed a divergence from hard power defensive approaches to counter-terrorism, to more widespread programming that seeks to disrupt the root causes as a preventative, softer approach.

The Australian Government publication *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, released in 2004, reported on the threat Australia was facing in the immediate years after 9/11 and the Bali Bombings (Australian Government, 2004). The report covered a number of historical concerns and future-planning considerations and a solid hard power feel was obvious. It was clear that policy priority at this time lay with a reactive/defensive approach, namely how best to predict and respond strategically to a terrorist threat or act in Australia. This policy was very much hard power focused and little attention was given to preventative measures.

Whilst specific P/CVE measures were not a significant component of policy then these were "precursors" to later P/CVE policy (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit 2016). Following the London bombings in July 2005, the Australian Government, together with the Council of Australian Government (COAG) members, established the National Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony, and Security. This was an earlier indicator that social cohesion and preventing terrorism could be

related in some way and that engaging with communities could prove to be an effective approach to countering terrorism.

The establishment of a Countering Violent Extremism Unit in the Attorney-General's Department took place under the Rudd-Gillard government from 2007; it was a first of its kind in the P/CVE field in Australia and a clear indication of the new direction countering terrorism was taking (note: this unit now sits in the Department of Home Affairs). The 2010–11 budget released $9.7 million to this unit for the forthcoming four-year period for targeted programmes to reduce violent extremism (Barker, 2015). The newly established unit developed a national P/CVE strategy for the first time in 2011, a decade following the events of 9/11. This was a classified document, but a fact sheet was made available for public access. Additionally, in 2010, a P/CVE agenda emerged in the White Paper – *Securing Australia: Protecting our Community* (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Countering extremism became a more widely used term in Australia's counter-terrorism policy and was intertwined with community-centric efforts. The White Paper would soon be followed by the Building Community Resilience Youth Mentoring Grants Programme (for NSW and Victoria) and Building Community Resilience Grants Programme (nationwide).

The Building Community Resilience Grants Programme funded with the 2010-11 budget continued until 2013 at a cost of $5.3 million. What was a new countering violent extremism unit within the Attorney-General's Department and the fresh approach to P/CVE reflected efforts to centralise activities and implement a renewed focus on the following goals and tasks: community cohesion; on-the-ground community initiatives and training of community organisations; combatting online extremist propaganda; establishing and funding early intervention programmes; and building networks internationally and with academia to perfect best practices (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.-b). This latest direction was an indication that Australia was directing its broader counter-terrorism efforts to initiatives that were much more preventative in nature and accessible to the public. However, these community-centric approaches that use strategies of cohesion and harmony have raised questions regarding their effectiveness if done incorrectly because of the potential impact of stigmatisation and regulation of certain communities, which are common criticism of P/CVE policy more broadly (Aly, 2013).

It was now apparent that the Australian government was moving away from hard-power counter-terrorism approaches which made calls for building resilience, improving community cohesion, engaging with communities and young people, and supporting at-risk individuals with disengagement and mentoring (Barker, 2015, pp. 1-2). More than half of the allocated $9.7 million mentioned previously was to go towards the community grants funding scheme, most of which involved training and mentoring young people. This was then expanded to a broader range of programmes that were not just youth focused and could show clear community engagement (Barker, 2015).

In 2012, the National Counter Terrorism Committee expanded to incorporate New Zealand, to ensure the closest possible collaboration between the two countries; it was thus renamed the Australia-New Zealand Counter Terror Committee (Australian Government, n.d.-b), representing a new direction in counter-terrorism priorities for the region. The third edition of the *National Counter-Terrorism Plan* was released in the same year, setting out Australia's new strategic approach to preventing and responding to terrorism, 10 years after the original Committee was formed. It was considered Australia's "primary document" on counter-terrorism policy (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2012, p. 3).

Four key streams were presented in the document – Preparedness, Prevention, Response, Recovery – and each was outlined individually, with recognition of their overlap highlighted. Each target area can be summarised as: (1). Preparedness: this includes regularly reviewing counter-terrorism plans, ensuring staff of key agencies are obtaining specialist skills, testing those skills and responses and learning from them, offering up a clear definition of a terrorist act, and sound legislative provisions; (2). Prevention: this aspect of the plan refers to the measures taken to eliminate or reduce the occurrence or severity of a terrorist act, which is largely achieved through the intelligence, law enforcement, and security services; (3). Response: this part of the plan refers to the actions taken immediately after a terrorist attack, including protecting future loss of life, preventing additional damage to critical infrastructure, and prosecuting the offenders; and (4). Recovery: this final stream is the coordinated process of what is involved in reconstructing a community after a terrorist attack, involving coordination between agencies to ensure that critical infrastructure and the psychological, social, and economic environment are restored as quickly as possible.

During this period, many hard-power elements of counter-terrorist policy were still embedded in the agenda. This third edition of Australia's *National Counter-Terrorism Plan* was the first example of targeting prevention in the country's counter-terrorism efforts. Prevention was now a key focal point of Australia's central objectives, but the focus of the prevention remained with intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and security services, albeit hard power-style measures yet to address the underlying root causes of terrorism. Australia eventually joined many other nations in gradually turning their attention to violent extremism as an underlying solution to its problems with terrorism.

The first Australian Government four-year plan specifically for countering violent extremism was released covering the period 2010–2014 was *Countering Violent Extremism Programme.* This plan had a solid focus on educating the public about what violent extremism is, what it looked like in the community, and what the government was doing to help limit its spread. Whilst there were emerging examples of P/CVE related planning prior to this first four-year plan (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016) this was the first time a plan was made available with P/CVE at its core, rather than simply counter-terrorism, as a broad target, and an intent to educate the public on P/CVE as a clear component (Attorney-General's Department, 2010; Harris-Hogan, 2020).

Within Australian communities around this time there had been indications of an increased concern with radicalisation, violent extremism, and the risk of a terrorist attack. Statistics have reported a growth from only one per cent of the population expressing concern in 2014, to ten per cent in the following year (Markus, 2017, p. 3). Later, the Scanlon Foundation's 2017 Social Cohesion Survey confirmed that terrorism and national security were not the leading concern for Australians; more pressing issues were found to be the economy, unemployment, and poverty, and the quality of the government and its politicians. These concerns have been the leading issues for Australians since 2012 (Markus, 2017).

It was obvious that the government held increasing concerns for violent extremism and how to address it, but a useful analysis of the public's perceptions of the same issues was explored. A 2010–11 study titled *Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia* provides information relevant to these policy developments from the same period. The study is not educational P/CVE focused, but it is a large

data set that provides an insight into how broadening P/CVE policy was being received and understood by communities and is useful for an understanding of perceptions of P/CVE at the time. The study identified public perceptions of Australia's issues with violent extremism and the initiatives taking place in communities, yet at this time, it was a period before the significant rise of ISIS, thus offering insights into the almost 'in-between' period of Al Qaeda and ISIS as global threats. A thorough primary collection of data from 542 respondents (interviews and focus groups) took place between November 2010 and June 2011 via collaboration between the Victoria Police, Victoria University, and the Australian Multicultural Foundation; the research was funded by the countering violent extremism sub-committee of the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) (Tahiri & Grossman, 2013). The results provide an alternative analysis of how the various programmes and funding were being received and how everyday Australians perceived the concerns with terrorism at the time. It is important to note that this research was conducted before many of Australia's most significant recent domestic terrorist occurrences like the Martin Place siege (2014) and the shooting of Curtis Cheng (2015). Perceptions before these major events may have changed thoughts and feelings towards the issues. The key aims of the data collection were: to identify how communities understood the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism; to examine how communities perceive the underlying drivers of radicalisation and extremism; to explore perceptions of the impact of radicalisation and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion; to solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism; and to provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies (Tahiri & Grossman, 2013, p. 7).

The findings from Tahiri and Grossman's (2013) research suggest that radicalisation is understood as a process that involves an individual moving outside of social norms and what is considered acceptable by the majority of society. It was clear however, that participants' understandings of extremism were confused – is it an end point of radicalisation, or a starting point (p. 8)? For many of the respondents, radicalisation was considered a process and extremism was the ideological end point of this process. On the other hand, some participants saw extremism as the starting point to the radicalisation process – one must be extreme to become radicalised.

However, both terms were understood as an intolerance of the views and beliefs of others (Tahiri & Grossman, 2013).

In regard to the causes of the two phenomena, participants offered up a range of suggestions but there was strong support for a combination of factors as the contributor, rather than one individual trigger. Identity and a sense of belonging stood out as significant and were considered fuelled by socio-cultural factors, like marginalisation, racism, and social exclusion. Despite these factors being present, the majority of participants felt that homegrown extremism and radicalisation in Australia was rare. The end result of violence was considered to be a combination – "a perfect storm" – of such factors (Tahiri & Grossman, 2013, p. 10).

Additionally, the role of the media in fuelling both radicalisation and extremism was a persistent theme amongst the respondents and perceived as a legacy of 9/11 policies. Many considered the media to be inflammatory and a key contributor to forging a link between terrorism and Islam. This was exaggerated, participants considered, by a lack of understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims that was generating an us-versus-them rhetoric, which had become even more difficult to counteract because of the events of 9/11 (Tahiri & Grossman, 2013). Arguably, the media, and social media, have the potential to influence the public heavily, both domestically and in relation to international issues, and therefore have a noteworthy role to play in social cohesion and counter-narratives, a consideration worthy for future policy developments. Findings like Tahiri and Grossman's allow for an analysis of how P/CVE policy was being received, understood, and interpreted at the time and provides a point of comparison with more recent studies as policy develops.

P/CVE policy then received an update for the next period, entitled the *New Countering Violent Extremism Programme*, which for the next four-year period (2014-18), would focus its attention on even earlier stages of intervention. This version of the policy provided some clear distinctions from the previous policy agendas but overall, the updated version of the programme was to expand on the existing government initiatives. The approach stated that the preliminary programme was dominated by funding for community-based pilot projects and relevant research that directed its attention towards future work whilst the new programme would widen the reach and target areas of these projects (Attorney-General's Department, 2014). In keeping with contemporary changes to the threat of violent extremism and

terrorism, the current programme also seeks to address the online threat as well as the issues surrounding foreign fighters, including individuals who are feeling disenfranchised with overseas conflicts and may seek to act on those feelings of frustration either domestically or by travelling overseas to fight (Attorney-General's Department, 2014). Of note is a new addition to the text stating, "the emphasis is on prevention and early intervention" by working with communities and establishing intervention programmes (p. 1). However, there remains plenty of emphasis on the measures in place when responding to an immediate threat.

One such outcome of these policy developments was the establishment of the Living Safe Together website, which provides basic information for understanding violent extremism and how to recognise it. It was founded as one of the early P/CVE initiatives to provide accessible information to the public regarding the government's countering violent extremism efforts (Barker, 2015). The public can download a document from this website titled *Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia*, published in 2015, which outlines the challenges to Australia in this era. The document reveals some opportunities to identify changes in terminology and approaches to P/CVE by Australia's policymakers and is useful as an insight into the transition from hard to soft measures taking place over time. This publication is one of the first Australian documents to now differentiate between violent extremism and radicalisation. Additionally, it demonstrates a further transition in the trajectory towards softer counter-terrorism programming. A chronological reading of government policies before this document reveals that the term 'radicalisation' was rarely found in the government literature. This document, along with downloadable one-page fact sheets, now makes a clear distinction between the two concepts.

Additionally, in 2015, the Attorney-General's Department developed a Countering Violent Extremism Early Intervention Programme to intervene and manage individuals considered at-risk (Harris-Hogan, 2020). Intervention programmes have been established across Australia's individual states and territories and each government is responsible for its implementation. Publicly available data that provides more detailed information regarding these programmes and their reach is limited, but experts and professionals screen potential candidates for the programme, which is similar to referral processes in the UK. These experts and professionals identify potential candidates but participation is voluntary (Harris-Hogan, 2020). Due to the variations in how Australia's states and territories

implement the programming, it is difficult to evaluate and identify whether objectives are being met, especially at a Federal level. Research into the Early Intervention Programme identified the complexity and difficulty with measuring the success of a programme of this nature and called for streamlining and refining such programming in order to better assess effectiveness – a consideration for evaluating future P/CVE initiatives.

In 2015, the same year as release of the *Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia* publication, came *Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening Our Resilience*, released following the Martin Place siege in December 2015. A change of direction in the dialogue and goals of Australia's counter-terrorism approach is clear from the outset. In the foreword by the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott a focus on cohesion and unity is evident. He states: "the resilience and cohesion of the Australian community is our best defence against violent extremism and our greatest asset when responding to and recovering from a major terrorist attack" (Council of Australian Governments, 2015, p. iii). This is in stark contrast to the 2004 report, which claimed: "at the hard edge of Australia's whole-of-government contribution to the global campaign against terror is the use of military force" (Australian Government, 2004, p. 79). The 2015 strategy has been modified to align with the newest threat to Australia and the rest of the world – ISIS – and sets out the comprehensive counter-terrorism arrangements required to meet the threat. This includes an early mention of "community engagement" and a statement that Australia's agencies and government departments are "doing everything they can" to prevent and respond to attacks (Council of Australian Governments, 2015, p. iii). This new release of Australia's counter-terrorism strategy at a similar time to releasing a prevention publication for the public to access, demonstrates the government's efforts to adapt to new threats whilst developing more bottom-up approaches to prevention.

A common message that arises in the newer policy is the involvement with the community in countering terrorism, which was not present in either of the previous federal government strategies. The strategy makes it clear that government and the community must face the challenge together; according to the document, this challenge largely stems from individuals and groups generating their own interpretation of Islam that is foreign to most Muslims, as well as threats from other forms of right- and left-wing extremism (pp. v-vi). This statement is noteworthy, as

the *Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia* public resource utilised the unique examples of extremism discussed earlier rather than addressing this type of threat, arguably the one of most concern to Australians.

It is at this stage that Australia's change in policy towards an early preventative approach to counter-terrorism and an adoption of countering violent extremism, is making its most significant expansion. This has taken place not just in the post-9/11 era, but particularly in the second decade following the 9/11 events. Arguably, like the experience of many countries, the development of the P/CVE field in Australia has been a matter of learning and experience, with much trial and error and many adjustments needed in order to establish exactly what works and does not. Australia's policy developments covered above reveal that the government has developed and refined its approach over the course of the last decade to transition to a softer approach that draws similarities with other countries. However, the focus is somewhat blurred, as the government attempts to combat a few key issues of concern in the P/CVE space, with little previous experience of dealing with a threat like violent extremism (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). Additionally, as mentioned, measuring the effectiveness of P/CVE policy is a difficult task due to the long-term nature of such programmes, a limitation that applies worldwide, not just in Australia. Without a global definition of terrorism and related terms to align initiatives against, and as experiences with terrorism vary between states and communities, it is difficult to establish global standards in the P/CVE arena (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016).

The primary criticism of Australia's P/CVE programmes is that references to 'homegrown' threats generate a stigma against Australia's Muslims and Muslim communities that creates a false sense of concern. Again, this theme is evident across many countries. Angus (2016) argues that this style of terminology, coupled with media portrayal of issues such as young Australians travelling to foreign conflict zones, has contributed to an 'otherness' when considering Muslim Australians and generating a sense of Muslims as non-Australian. In the long term, this reduces communal harmony and divides Australia's communities at a time when community resilience is considered a vital component of the P/CVE battle. Independent criticisms from the academic community have also arisen regarding matters such as the role of Muslim community leaders, the risk of further segregation and isolation, and how exactly at-risk students are identified (Angus, 2016). These criticisms have

largely been directed towards the NSW Government initiatives, but similar reproaches have been heard in Victoria (Angus, 2016).

Cherney and Murphy (2016) provide evaluation data that endorses the adverse impacts of P/CVE policy implementation on Muslim communities in Australia. The research sought to evaluate the impact of the GWOT on Australian Muslim communities. Drawing from a moderate sample of 104 participants, the study found that government policy resulted in three distinct adverse consequences. 1. Stigmatisation and attribution; 2. Self-imposed censorship and being told how to practice Islam; and 3. Increased policing and securitisation. In addition to this, the findings indicated that Muslims have coped with this impact by distancing themselves from terrorism, explaining acts as conspiracies, reaffirming their Muslim identity by trying to be a "better Muslim", and developing distrust of policy and policing (Cherney & Murphy, 2016 p. 490). This data is noteworthy in that it draws from three different cities – Brisbane, Queensland; Sydney, New South Wales; and Melbourne, Victoria – which is important to consider when remembering that many of Australia's policies vary between the country's States and territories. Also, again whilst noting the moderate sample size, the authors have contributed to the gathering of perceptions of frontline voices for the P/CVE filed, which is likely to improve accuracy and effectiveness in policy development.

As the transition to earlier prevention continued and the need to assess the outcomes of P/CVE programming arose, the Australian Government initiated a mapping project in 2016 of community-based organisations and their capabilities and challenges in implementing P/CVE-related work in their respective communities. This study is an example of early government attempts to thoroughly map and assess P/CVE measures providing a chance to identify gaps in P/CVE programming in Australia. The mapping project provided insight into how prepared organisations felt to work with young people who may need some form of deradicalisation, disengagement, or radicalisation prevention programming. Three research teams were set up to conduct research in their local areas over the course of two months. Each team was to identify service providers in its local area who would be capable of and willing to provide services to individuals at risk of radicalisation. Teams identified 177 providers and then conducted 52 qualitative interviews with willing service providers, seeking information about the concerns, best practices, and recommendations of frontline workers. The results indicated that there are specific

conceptualisations amongst community workers of what constitutes violent extremism and how it should be addressed (Cherney et al., 2017, p. 1). P/CVE approaches for community organisations may form a new branch of existing youth programmes or may form an entirely new community-based initiative that specifically focuses on deradicalisation and preventing violent extremism (Cherney et al., 2017, p. 2). With research undertaken across the three locations (Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane) the researchers identified culturally diverse geographical areas already heavily involved in some youth work in order to gauge the types of services being provided and their capability and willingness to provide P/CVE-related programmes in addition to their usual target areas of concern (Cherney et al., 2017, p. 5).

A number of key themes arose in the responses provided by caseworkers of the selected organisations. Overall, the study identified that official definitions of violent extremism went some way to conceptualising the problem but lacked key factors that were considered essential for such on-the-ground work to be completely effective. Participants identified that there is a key difference between radicalisation and violent extremism – carrying out the actual act of violence as opposed to no more than what may be considered radical thoughts and perceptions. Respondents made clear that not all people considered to be radicalised will pose a violent threat to society and identified this as a concern for any work targeting young people; it needs to be targeted accurately (Cherney et al., 2017, pp. 7-8). The interviewees, identified only subtle differences between the terms radicalisation and violent extremism, which reflects the blurred use of the terms in the literature, media, and official publications. This reinforces the need for clear, accurate definitions to be established and employed in the field. The research by Cherney et al. (2017) also revealed that slight contextual understandings of the term exist, which may be somewhat unique to the field of youth work. This impacts on how the problem is addressed across varying fields where many interviewees identified key aspects that they had experienced in their specific work setting, mostly related to their specific field, for example youth services, counselling, and social work. In particular, the causes of violent extremism among young people were repeatedly perceived to be associated with marginalisation and social isolation. These elements were considered key risk factors in providing an accurate understanding of violent extremism amongst Australia's young people (p. 8). The researchers thus argued that the

understandings of terms like radicalisation and violent extremism make sense to practitioners in the context of their field and therefore these understandings will likely differ from those of specialists in alternative fields of work (Cherney et al., 2017). As such, the imperative need for accuracy in language is once again a repeated theme in the discipline.

The researchers also established that practitioners identified the lack of preparedness as an issue, especially as P/CVE becomes more of a concern amongst young people (Cherney et al., 2017, p. 10). All agencies interviewed indicated a need to be more prepared in order to best address the needs of young people specifically seeking preventative engagement work. Interviewees noted a lack of specific training in the area as well as an absence of guidance on dealing with the sensitivities of the issues at hand and how to be sure that trust is established and maintained between the organisation and their client base (Cherney et al., 2017). It is important to consider the perceptions of these frontline workers, as they engage regularly with large numbers of young people in their communities and act as an early port of call for adolescents requiring specialised interventions.

Often times the service providers reported that they deployed intervention strategies that were community-focused or peer-influenced and at times also involved civics-type education interventions (Cherney et al., 2017, p. 11). With a lack of empirical evidence about best practice in the field of reducing radicalisation and violent extremism, the workers are often left to establish their own conclusions based on socio-structural explanations, drawing from their existing experiences with young people. This means practitioners are left to intervene as they see fit and hope their strategy has a positive impact on the young person in need. The requirement for more adequate training was supported by a call by interviewees for increases in funding to help address this new area when working with young people. Practitioners identified the long-term nature of these programmes and the fact that children in need required continued support and could not be removed from radicalisation and violent extremism in a short period (Cherney et al., 2017, pp. 12-13). Funding would thus have to cover a longer period in order to sustain the intervention work and increase the chances of a successful turn away from violent extremism. When future research into how exactly radicalisation and violent extremism can be halted and/or reversed, input from these individuals, who interact with adolescents on a day-to-day basis, will help shape intervention programmes and ensure that a variety of

experiences are considered when designing ideal programmes. These perspectives contribute to addressing the need for P/CVE programming in Australia, how it should look, and how such interventions should engage with communities and frontline workers for acceptance and supported over the long-term.

Australia's policy development and implementation experiences share similarities with other countries, like the UK. It has been argued that Australia's post-9/11 community engagement policies are also contradictory in nature in that they disproportionately target Muslim communities whilst simultaneously seeking to use and build relations with these exact communities (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007). Spalek and Imtoual (2007. P. 190) argue that Australia's softer approaches have been more "patchy" than elsewhere. This is because of Australia's system where Federal initiatives have traditionally been harder-style policy agendas, whilst Australia's States and Territories are left to determine their own programming, often softer in nature than the federal policies but varying considerably in implementation. It is suggested that in Australia's experience, the harder and softer approaches have been inextricably linked and can overlap. This means that harder approaches stemming from the Federal level can undermine local community-based softer initiatives (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007).

Again, in drawing similarities with the UK and US experiences, Australia's Muslim communities have too been disproportionately affected by post-9/11 policy implementation. The attention and responsibility placed on Muslim communities to engage and assist in reducing the threat of violent acts whilst simultaneously constructing a notion of a 'moderate' Muslim have alienated the Muslim communities and impacted levels of trust (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007).

This argument is endorsed by Abdel-Fattah (2020), in which the author declares that there are three key ways in which post-9/11 policy has adversely impacted Muslim communities since 9/11. Firstly, *offensively* through wars in the Middle East; secondly, *defensively* in domestic laws and security operations; and thirdly, *pre-emptively*, through counter-radicalisation soft programmes for Muslim communities and individuals. Additionally, it is also argued that Australia's initiatives have also targeted individuals in the 'pre-criminal' space, like in the UK's experience, which serves to further alienate communities and diminish trust (Abdel-Fattah, 2020). At present, Australia's states and territories are receiving Federal support to develop and establish intervention programmes whereby individuals are referred and their risk of

becoming radicalised to violent extremism is assessed. This draws similarities with the UK's referral system, Channel, and engages community services and supports to assist in channelling "their energies in a more positive direction and/or change their views" (Department of Home Affairs, 2020).

What this persisting theme of 9/11 legacies points to is that despite the softening of counter-terrorism policies and evolving them and reframing them into P/CVE polices, they have struggled to move on from the harder and reactive approach that was common after the 9/11 events. The harder policies targeted and stigmatised entire communities – most commonly Muslim communities – in multiple countries and contexts, which has left a legacy that is difficult to move on from. Mapping the policy developments that have taken place over the course of the last two decades reveals a desperate need to counter and prevent violent extremism from developing but also reveals that governments have struggled to do this effectively without adverse outcomes.

Some studies have attempted to assess the impacts of these policy developments which reinforce the need to move away from the 9/11 stigma by reframing P/CVE approaches. The next persisting theme found in the literature addressed in the next section highlights some of the assessments available but points to a lack of significant empirical data that may actually allow governments to develop policies that do indeed effectively move away from the legacies of 9/11 and actually diminish the threat from violent extremism.

2.3 Key theme 2: P/CVE policy is broad but evaluations to support effectiveness are rare

P/CVE policy implementation has covered a wide range of activities and programmes thus far. P/CVE policy is broad in what it encapsulates but there is a distinct lack of evaluations that demonstrate which of these wide-ranging initiatives are effective. As the examples in the previous section have shown, governments have attempted to address P/CVE by engaging with communities, providing financial assistance and grants, and developing policies that move to softer measures. However, harder measures like modifying and developing new laws, increasing surveillance and security measures, and strengthening intelligence gathering services are also common developments. The wide-ranging array of activities that can be labelled a P/CVE initiative has left the field in a complex state where there is little

understanding of what is actually the best approach for reducing the risk of violent extremism. Australia's P/CVE experience has been described as overwhelmingly focused on broadly targeted prevention programmes that are difficult to evaluate and risk stigmatising entire communities (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). This is a common theme in other Western contexts like the UK, whose policy experiences dominate the literature.

Similarly, the research literature on P/CVE is also considerably broad in what is being researched. The P/CVE field has sought to better understand a multitude of aspects of radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism. When the breadth of the P/CVE research field is considered, it is possible to pinpoint three key focus areas that may provide useful empirical data to support future policy development. Firstly, societal considerations that look at factors like communities and their role in P/CVE as well as how they have been affected. Secondly, research is commonly focused on the act itself, which is often analysed through fields like criminology and law and the ways P/CVE policy can be amended through frameworks like crime prevention models. Finally, the literature is heavily concerned with individual considerations, like behavioural and psychological factors that contribute to violent acts and how individuals can be supported by policies that steer them away from a support for violence. Whilst the research is widespread, the majority of the field identifies *potential* approaches and theories with available evaluations usually providing only limited evidence of actual effectiveness. Where evaluations are available they do not point to a long-term solution that is actively and effectively reducing the incidences of these acts or diminishing the threat worldwide. The field lacks distinct evaluations, particularly longitudinal evaluations, that can offer an insight into long-term policy implementation that works and is supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, this is particularly lacking from a cross-contextual standpoint as experience thus far has not only differed between countries but also within countries.

This section will cover some of the available theories and suggested approaches to P/CVE policy development and implementation available in the literature. Examples of programmes and initiatives that offer findings from evaluations to provide some insight into effectiveness of initiatives are covered. It will also provide examples from various countries and communities so as to offer an understanding and comparison of global P/CVE approaches. The evaluations and literature considered in this section is by no means exhaustive, but highlights some of

the dominant P/CVE conceptual understandings and areas of concern from an expansive field of knowledge. There is a multitude of small-scale interventions with some sort of evaluation data to support but they are relatively limited in comparison to being able to actually reduce the threat from violent extremism. This collection of evaluations covered in this section (and more broadly across the three identified themes in this chapter) highlight some repeating considerations for future P/CVE policy development.

A useful evaluation worth considering when looking at the P/CVE field as a whole is work by Gielen (2019). Gielen argues that it is time to move beyond simply trying to understand 'what works' in the P/CVE field, and instead, attempt to better understand "what works, for whom, in what circumstances, and how?" (p.1149) due to varying contextual and outcome factors. It is emphasised that the P/CVE field has progressed and broadened rapidly, but this has not been supported by a similar process of progression in terms of evaluations. Effect evaluations are highlighted as particularly scarce (only 14 from 73 were found for Gielen's study) – evaluations that consider the actual outcomes of interventions. The author summarises the types of evaluations that have been applied in the P/CVE field thus far including: effect evaluations, pragmatic evaluations, theory-driven evaluations, process evaluations, and realist evaluations (Gielen, 2019). Each of these varies slightly in what it is trying to assess but the author identifies that they are limited in that they do not consider the contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes to provide a better understanding of the value certain programmes can add to the P/CVE field. A realist review is proposed as it would allow for an opportunity to consider these wider factors that influence the effectiveness and outcomes of P/CVE initiatives. This is because the realist approach does not evaluate one specific programme or intervention, but rather systematically evaluates a range of existing interventions.

Gielen (2019) then applies this realist review to the P/CVE literature – involving 73 studies – then groups them into the type of evaluation (effect, process, theory driven or a combination) and contextual factors (resilience programme, exit programme, counter-narrative initiative etc.). What Gielen (2019) contends is that this approach provides more contextual understandings for the sorts of programmes that can offer recommendations above and beyond simply "this works, but this does not."

Gielen’s (2019) work is worth considering because it offers a way to move forward in the P/CVE research field that takes into consideration aspects of programmes that may work, rather than simply whether an entire initiative is of use or not. It also identifies the specific gap in effect evaluations – or evaluations that can identify empirically supported outcomes of effectiveness – with a potential approach for addressing this gap.

Social considerations

The field of social sciences appears to have been most extensive in its research compared with other fields of study. The social sciences have in particular, focused attention on how P/CVE policies have impacted communities. As well, the social sciences field has provided an abundance of information about the consequences of P/CVE in various contexts. Yet, there remains little agreement in the field about how best to minimise or even avoid negative impacts in future policy development. Spalek and Lambert (2008) argue for more critical evaluation of community engagement initiatives that seek to address concerns with radicalisation and violent extremism in the UK. Engagement with Muslim communities in the UK in post-9/11 era sought to use Muslim citizens to practice internal community surveillance amongst their fellow community members and UK policy then relied upon individuals from these communities to report any concerns. As covered in this previous section, the results of this were far from positive. It is suggested that at the time there was a critical need for research and evaluation into the ways in which Muslim communities could be engaged for effective outcomes. Furthermore, the authors call for more empirical analysis that uses the voices, perceptions, and understandings from Muslim community members themselves (Spalek & Lambert, 2008). These frontline voices are likely to provide more accurate evaluations about what does and does not work at the forefront of P/CVE policy implementation because they can offer first-hand experiences.

An evaluation by Spalek in 2011 sought to explore the engagement and partnership work between UK Muslim communities and the police. The study is useful for providing data to understand the impacts of P/CVE policy implementation on Muslim communities specifically and points to a significant factor that should be avoided in future policy developments. 42 interviews and six observations of meetings were conducted between December 2007 and July 2008. The findings

revealed a level of distrust of government policy amongst Muslim communities. The study reports that in 2006, 91 per cent of British Muslims disagreed with UK foreign policy and 81 per cent believed the GWOT to be a war on Muslims (Spalek, 2011, p. 194). These statistics are significant when considering the impact of the adverse consequences resulting from post-9/11 counter-terrorism policy. The author contends that research up to that point had been dominated by state-centric perspectives founded on secondary research rather than primary evaluation analysis. What this reveals is that the distinct lack of evaluations was evident from earlier on and there remains a notable lack of evaluations that provide knowledge on what actually works to reduce the risk of violent extremism.

A mentoring scheme in the West Midlands of England provides additional evaluation data that offers valuable insights into how to implement a mentoring programme for individuals at risk of violent extremism, as well as what factors to avoid. Spalek and Davies (2012) argue that evaluation data that looks at the impact of mentoring schemes is a notable gap in the research field and thus seek to contribute to this dearth of knowledge. Using 16 interviews and observations in 2009-2010, the findings suggest that mentoring programmes addressing individuals at risk of violent extremism must be distinct from other areas of criminal behaviour due to the unique nature of violent extremism. Noting that there are generic cross-contextual factors that are useful from other types of mentoring schemes, the ideological factors associated with mentoring for these particular individuals meant that there was very specific ideological knowledge that was required. Secondly, the findings revealed an unclear comprehension about whether mentoring for violent extremism is about changing beliefs or changing behaviours, or both. Finally, the notion of community was found to be important when working with individuals in order to consider the broader effects of the communities and networks in which they operate and belong (Spalek & Davies, 2012).

There are, however, limitations to note from this study: the findings are drawn from a small sample and from only one particular P/CVE programme that was a short-term initiative and implemented in only one locality in England. Therefore, it does not provide even UK-wide data. Yet, these findings do offer considerations for the broader P/CVE field that may be useful for other programmes to achieve effective outcomes. For example, it highlights that objectives need to be clear – what factors are trying to be modified, behaviours, thoughts, actions? It also pinpoints the

uniqueness of the required knowledge for working within the field of P/CVE. This brings into question the use of teachers in the educational space explored in the next chapter. Also, it repeats a common theme amongst the literature that wider communities have an influence and a role to play in P/CVE policy implementation.

An example of a broader evaluation but with considerations for violent extremism is the Stocktake Research Project commissioned by the State Government of Victoria, Australia. The project evaluated the literature from 2011-2015 to consider the role of social cohesion and community resilience in "redressing the risk of socially harmful forms of exclusivism, including violent extremism and racism" (Grossman, Peucker, Smith, & Dellal, 2016, p. 3). The project is worthy of consideration due to its extensive assessment of the literature, albeit not solely specific to violent extremism. Some 415 articles were analysed that addressed either social cohesion or violent extremism. Whilst extensive in its evaluation and findings, there are some key aspects worth considering for the P/CVE field. Firstly, the researchers argue that the P/CVE field continues to suffer from a definitional crisis in which no agreement is reached on key terms in the field, like terrorism and violent extremism (Grossman, et al., 2016). This may be a factor contributing to the complexity of the field and may be detracting from other significant issues. Furthermore, other findings align with the themes covered in this chapter including, securitisation of Muslims and the formation of suspect communities and the risk of alienation. The authors also point to debates surrounding the differences between extremism and violent extremism and causes of violent extremism and emphasise the challenges to the P/CVE field, including who is best placed to implement P/CVE policy agendas, the risks of adverse consequences to poorly managed and implemented policies, and the challenges of identifying any aspects of programmes that may be cross-contextual for use elsewhere, or remain unique to specific communities (Grossman et al., 2016). The information covered highlights the association between social cohesion and the role of communities in violent extremism. This may be a noteworthy factor to integrate into P/CVE future policy development.

Overall, what makes this evaluation worthy of consideration is the extensiveness of the included publications. Whilst, as mentioned, it is somewhat limited in that it is not solely exploring P/CVE research. Rather, it combines social cohesion and community resilience, which at times have been popular aspects to

have been included in P/CVE research. This emphasises the breadth of the P/CVE research field and how it has become intertwined with many other aspects of research as best practice and effective measurement.

Another study involving Belgium and the Netherlands set out to assess parents' perspectives on radicalisation from those who had experienced extremism in their family unit (Sikkens, van San, Sieckelinck, & de Winter, 2018). 82 interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2015 with teens and young adults with extreme ideals, in addition to interviewing their parents or siblings to better understand the perspectives and impact on immediate family members. The findings grouped the impacts into four categories, including: rejecting, applauding, discussing, or ignoring the extreme ideals. The findings identified a sense of powerlessness amongst parents who felt they did not have the tools available to them to guide and assist their child or sibling. These "tools" (Sikkens et al., 2018 p. 2283) included things like knowledge and information, help with how to respond to such changes in their child, and clear access to professional support. Such tools could vary across contexts but their inclusion is something worth considering in future P/CVE policy development in order to equip close contacts with knowledge and power to guide and assist their family or friends. Developing tools for parents could be a consideration the educational field may benefit from. This study is unique in its gathering of parental perspectives, which is a marked gap in the literature. This is especially important for future evaluations as P/CVE programmes more readily seeks to target younger individuals.

Mirahmadi's (2016) evaluation is also worth noting when considering what lessons have been learnt from the implementation of P/CVE policy programming, in this case in the US. The author offers some noteworthy insights into best practices drawn from experience. Mirahmadi (2016) calls for P/CVE programmes to meet four key criteria, namely: 1. use a whole-of-community approach that specifically does not single out Muslim communities; 2. incorporate a bottom-up, top-down agenda that puts communities at the forefront; 3. is consistent in engaging and collaborating across a range of issues, not just violent extremism concerns; and 4. use a research-based framework to evaluate and provide metrics. The criteria could be useful for other P/CVE programmes as they are drawn from a programme that has engaged with thousands of young individuals, which is rare in the P/CVE space.

The evaluation does not provide nor draw from an empirical evaluation of the BRAVE programme – a US-based initiative that seeks to empower communities to prevent and counter violent extremism – but what is of most use from Mirahmadi's recommendations is that they stem from years of close, frontline experience with the BRAVE programme over the course of a number of years. This programme has expanded to engage with more than 3000 participants at the time of the paper's publication, which is a significant number in the field of P/CVE evaluations. Again, whilst empirical data is not provided in this evaluation paper, above and beyond mentions like "there were statistically significant outcomes in twelve of the fourteen indicators measured" (p. 139), it does enable a clear opportunity to replicate overarching aspects to other P/CVE initiatives being developed elsewhere.

The act

In fields like criminology, P/CVE-related theories and studies have been largely associated with how to prevent acts of violence through adaptations like new legislation, policing and security measures, intelligence gathering, and even in-prison programmes to reducing reoffending rates. Criminologists have argued for terrorism and violent extremism to be approached through the lens of crime prevention because at their core, these acts are criminal acts. There are also branches of the field that consider the legal implications of new laws and the impacts on human rights and the day-to-day functioning of society. The fields of criminology, which often crossover law and social justice perspectives, appear to be more concerned with how to effectively prevent actual acts of future violence, rather than being concerned with individual and influencing risk factors. It is clear however, that this area of P/CVE research is also lacking agreement on the best crime prevention framework to prevent acts of violence and terrorism.

Bjørgo (2016) calls for a broad crime prevention model to be applied to P/CVE agendas to holistically balance short-term and long-term objectives. Bjørgo (2016) draws from existing models of crime prevention that alone, are too narrow in scope to be effective in P/CVE, in order to combine their most useful aspects into a holistic approach of crime prevention specifically for P/CVE. Bjørgo (2016) identifies broad crime prevention aspects that can be applied to all forms of crime, including extremist criminal acts, and incorporated into P/CVE agendas to establish more barriers to committing future acts of extremism. These aspects include:

"establishing and maintaining normative barriers; reducing recruitment; deterrence; disruption; protecting vulnerable targets; reducing harm; reducing rewards; incapacitation; desistance; and rehabilitation" (Bjørgo, 2016, p. 26). However, this approach may be more appropriate for sophisticated or organised group situations and less transferable to the unique and individual factors that influence an act of violent extremism or the development of radicalisation.

In support of some of the suggestions made by Bjørgo (2016), Hardy (2020) argues for a crime prevention framework for P/CVE. Hardy contends that one such advantage of this approach is that it would eliminate the stigmatisation of communities that has been common to other approaches to P/CVE. A crime prevention approach focuses specifically on criminal acts, rather than entire communities being targeted for their beliefs or religion. In particular, Hardy (2020) puts forward a number of non-coercive strategies that avoid traditional crime prevention approaches that may be seen as "harder" in nature. Such non-coercive strategies may align better with the softer approach inherent in P/CVE.

Hardy's (2020) non-coercive strategies include arguably simple methods like improving security in public spaces with CCTV and improved lighting to reduce the opportunity for crime to take place. The idea behind approaches like these termed *situational prevention* is that potential offenders are deterred by the increased chance of being caught. This is then supported by *developmental prevention* that involves reducing the risk factors that are broadly common to criminal behaviour like addiction problems, mental health concerns, and previous involvement with crime. Next, *community crime prevention* is suggested which involves changing the social conditions that contribute to crime, like lack of social cohesion. Then, *third-party policing* is recommended which involves regulating aspects of society so as to reduce the opportunities for crime, such as fines for technology companies for failing to monitor illegal content. Finally, *procedural justice policing* is the approach of improving relations and trust between communities and the police so as to increase the reporting of crimes and criminal behaviours.

Overall, Hardy's (2020) argument contributes a significant central point for consideration for P/CVE. The framework draws broad similarities with existing approaches already found in the P/CVE field, like building trust with communities and reducing risk factors. However, the crime prevention framework suggested by Hardy (2020) would potentially remove the P/CVE layers, or stigmas common to the

P/CVE field, so as to assess the core elements of reducing acts of violence, arguably if such a 'list of objectives' for P/CVE existed, would likely be the number one priority. However, a crime prevention framework could potentially then overlook the unique characteristics of violent extremism, like political or ideological motivations; the individual factors that contribute to someone committing an extremist act of violence.

Another aspect of criminology studies in P/CVE considers the use of previous offenders to prevent acts of violence. Within this approach, the unique characteristics of violent extremism that may be neglected in a crime prevention model, are central to better understanding and preventing future acts of violent extremism. One study in Canada has considered the approach of using former extremists (formers from herein) to counter and prevent future violent extremism. However, rather more uniquely, this study evaluated how the actual formers perceive this approach to P/CVE and whether these formers consider it to be an effective approach (Scrivens, Venkatesh, Bérubé, & Gaudette, 2019). This evaluation differs to the bulk of the literature in that it considers right-wing-based extremism, rather than focusing on Muslim and their communities, which dominates the literature. It also offers evaluation findings from a more recent project which assists with mapping how evaluations have progressed in the course of the P/CVE era.

The findings offer first-hand accounts, which can be difficult to obtain when gathering data in the P/CVE field. This research study was also somewhat unique in that it generated the interview questions from key stakeholders like community activists and police officers. This enabled the researchers to ask the questions that are at the forefront of public curiosity. Whilst the study is somewhat limited in its sample (n=10; 8 males, 2 females), it identifies four key areas from the perspectives of formers and their perceptions of how they think P/CVE should work. Firstly, it highlights that youth are the most vulnerable and susceptible and P/CVE programming should thus be targeting them. Secondly, it highlighted the importance of key stakeholders and networks, like families, communities, and teachers, which is in line with the findings from Spalek and Davies' (2012) UK-based evaluation. Thirdly, the formers believed that they are in the most effective position to be helping others leave extremist organisations, which speaks to an aspect of P/CVE that could be more effectively utilised. Finally, the formers also believed they were in a unique position to help educate policymakers, stakeholders, and communities

about what draws youth to extremist organisations and how to counter it (Scrivens et al., 2019). These findings highlight the importance of incorporating frontline voices and experiences to better serve the development of effective P/CVE policy and adds strength to the P/CVE research field by expanding and improving the balance between right wing and Islamic-based extremism research. Future research would benefit from employing the same approach to other forms of extremism.

Criminological studies in P/CVE often attempt to apply existing crime prevention principles and methods to countering and preventing violent extremism. Models and frameworks often suggest the use of what may be considered 'harder' approaches than the analyses and suggestions found in fields like the social sciences. There is less focus on considerations like the developments of radicalisation and more focus on the actual acts of violence.

The individual

Within fields like psychology research, the analyses have commonly sought to better understand the thinking and behaviours surrounding radicalisation and violent extremism, which is often individual-centric, differing from the fields like criminology and the social sciences, which are often concerned with the act itself or the role of and impact on communities. What is commonly agreed upon when considering the individuals behind acts of violent extremism and terrorism is that no definitive and clear-cut list of risk factors can be applied in order to predict who will carry out a violent or terroristic act. Policy design and implementation regularly stresses the need to address the root causes of violent extremism but struggles to identify the ways to go about this.

A number of models of radicalisation have been proposed over the past two decades but experts and scholars agree that no one particular model can be applied to all cases. There are too many unique factors to consider that contribute to the actions taken by an individual in an act of violent extremism or terrorism. Porter and Kebbell (2011) cover some of these models and previous studies, including Krueger (2008), Sageman (2004), and Silber and Bhatt (2007) before turning to the Australian context. Some studies have attempted to evaluate and pin-point identifiable factors that contribute to understanding who might commit an act and why. Porter and Kebbell (2011) analysed 21 convicted Australian terrorists to map the concept of radicalisation amongst these individuals. The exploration of the 21 convicted

Australians used law reports and newspaper articles to compile a picture of their backgrounds, networks, and movements prior to their conviction. Key themes across the 21 individuals were then identified. These can be summarised as: a mean age of 21-29 years old; approximately 50 per cent were born in Australia; the majority had no reported significant childhood experiences; 18 were married with 16 of these having children; education information was available for 18 of the 21, of which seven completed high school and two completed tertiary education; seven individuals had reported psychological disorders; there was a common element of lack of attachment to community/society amongst the sample and an attraction to the identity of terrorist involvement; six had a previous criminal record; and 14 of the total had converted or renewed their interest in Islam (Porter & Kebbell, 2011).

The authors conclude that overall findings of the Australian sample drew similarities with experiences in other countries in that the profiles of those convicted indicate that these men (all men in this Australian sample) are “unremarkable” and “ordinary” individuals (Porter & Kebbell, 2011, p. 226). What these findings suggest is that if P/CVE policy development is to address the individuals at risk of violent extremism, there is an almost unlimited array of factors that could be targeted. If any future acts of violent extremism or terrorism are to be in fact undertaken by “ordinary” individuals, this makes it very difficult to shape and implement policy to reach these exact individuals. This may be an unproductive approach because no policies may ever be able to effectively target every factor that may influence an individual to undertake an act of extremism. What this reveals to the broader P/CVE field is that policy development may need to be holistic, engaging with and addressing a multitude of factors across agencies and contexts.

Contrastingly, Gielen (2018) assessed the impact of a Dutch exit programme specifically for female jihadists, which differs to the dominance of male studies in the literature. Gielen argues that little is known about the effectiveness of exit programmes, especially in regard to women who have previously largely been seen as victims, drawn into the sphere of extremism. Gielen suggests a four-step realistic evaluation to demonstrate how it can be applied to other exit programmes to measure effectiveness and build empirical data for the field to learn from. Summarised, the four steps include: 1. Developing hypotheses; 2. Identifying multiple methods for data collection; 3. Analysing the data in terms of relevant contexts, mechanisms, and outcome patterns; and 4. Developing a refined programme theory. It is argued that

this approach broadens the scope for including case studies and programmes for evaluation because it incorporates multi-method approaches and considers contextual conditions to ultimately identify aspects of programmes that work rather than simply trying to establish if an initiative works or does not work (Gielen, 2018), which was built upon in Gielen's later publication (2019), discussed in the early pages of this section.

Exit programmes and the subsequent research into their effectiveness are growing, with some evidence to suggest that a significant factor behind exiting from a group or organisation is actually individual or voluntary (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Like engaging with these groups or organisations, further evidence is required to thoroughly understand the factors contributing to exit. Similarly, some research has considered how these individuals then reengage with society with findings suggesting that they need somewhere else to belong and identify with in order to reduce the chances of reengagement (Barrelle, 2015). Whilst Gielen's (2018) analysis does not provide empirical data to draw from, it does utilise a real-life case study to demonstrate how the realistic evaluation may work in practice and a hypothesised application of a contexts, mechanism, and outcomes (C-M-O) approach that may be applied to an individual's situation. What Gielen's work contributes to the P/CVE field is an approach that supports theories like Porter & Kebbell's in that it is wider and more holistic to accommodate a broad array of influencing factors affecting individuals. Ideally, it is argued that this sort of an evaluation will contribute to more empirical data for the field of P/CVE, the lack of which has been highlighted as a significant concern.

In sum, these studies have shown the very different aspects to P/CVE that the field is trying to better understand in order to progress and develop effective policy. Evaluations covered in this section draw attention to some of the most repeated theories and arguments in the field. First, a distrust of authorities and government policy is found in different contexts (Mirahmadi, 2016; Spalek, 2011). Sound future policy development would address this key factor that has the potential to influence how well P/CVE policy is received and implemented at the grassroots level. Second, P/CVE programmes and interventions may require specific and unique knowledge and development from experts to operate to the most effective capacity (Spalek & Davies, 2012). One avenue in which this could be achieved is through the use of formers (Scrivens et al., 2019). Third, P/CVE policy and its implementation need

clear objectives (Spalek & Davies, 2012) and similarly, need to clearly define and form closer agreement on some of the key terms used in the field because the definitional crisis is adding an obstacle to P/CVE policy moving forward (Grossman et al., 2016). Fourth, there may be an important relationship between community/social cohesion and violent extremism that if considered together, may improve the chances of effective policy interventions (Grossman et al., 2016). Fifth, the research has identified the imperative need to provide support and tools to loved ones and close contacts of individuals involved with or at risk of being involved with violent extremism (Sikkens et al., 2018). Supporting networks like parents may contribute to more effective interventions by ensuring families do not feel alone and without assistance. Six, the recommendation that P/CVE policy design does not overlook the fact that violent acts of extremism and terrorism are indeed criminal acts may best be served through a balance of soft and hard measures, or even a crime prevention model (Bjørgo, 2016; Hardy, 2020). Finally, the evaluations have shown that overall, actual and measurable outcomes are scarce, especially evaluations that assess the impact and outcomes of interventions over a longer term (Gielen, 2019; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; Romaniuk, 2015) and future P/CVE policy implementation would do well to incorporate a method for evaluation *into* policy design to ensure this does in fact take place and progresses beyond simply recommending it take place.

2.4 Key theme 3: Building resilience as P/CVE policy

Building resilience has become a popular suggested approach to P/CVE policy but as yet, there is little evidence to support *how* to do this in a manner that is empirically supported as effective. P/CVE has turned much of its attention towards young people as a rise in extremist attitudes and acts of terrorism remains a concern amongst this age group. As such, ideas focusing on how to build resilience towards extremist attitudes and behaviours in younger people is emerging as a repeated theme in the field (Pistone, Eriksson, Beckman, Mattson, & Sager, 2019, p.25). Such programs include: BRAVE in Kenya; Harnessing Resilience Capital in Culturally Diverse Communities to Counter Violent Extremism; and Barriers to Violent Radicalisation: Understanding Pathways to Resilience Among Canadian Youth (braveprogram.org; Grossman et al., 2017). The methods are varied, like P/CVE work in general, but this literature theme will consider the research that calls for

resilience building as an approach to P/CVE. The preventative stand point often calls for developing resilience to withstand the push and pull factors to violent extremism and radicalisation in their very earliest stages. This may be resilience in the context of countries, communities, or individuals but generally speaking, strives to build strength to resist and cope with extremism and violent events.

Resilience is a concept that is transferable to a variety of fields but is generally universally defined in a similar way: "it is the process of overcoming the negative effects of risk exposure, coping successfully with traumatic experiences, and avoiding the negative trajectories associated with risks" (Fergus & Zimmerman, 2005, p. 399). Understanding resilience in individuals means a consideration of both risk and protective factors and how they interact among and between individuals, peer groups, communities, and society. It is the interaction and balance between risk and protective factors that determines whether the outcome to the stressor is a positive or a negative one (Fergus & Zimmerman, 2005). For a young person juggling the push and pull factors of radicalisation and violent extremism, lessons learnt from the field of resilience studies may be of benefit if this research continues to overlap with the P/CVE field.

Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier (2019) conducted a recent review of the P/CVE literature drawing out four key themes suggesting that the concept of resilience could provide a solid foundation for a common preventative approach in the field. The researchers assessed 73 papers and found that one prominent theme in the literature was the emphasis on preventing violent extremism by developing some capacity, skill, or characteristic in individuals – whether that be cognitively, characteristically, or by promoting and strengthening values. However, some critics contend that there is a lack of understanding around the conceptualisation of resilience and what exactly it refers to (Hardy, 2015; Ryan, Ioannou, & Parmak 2018). Ryan, Ioannou, and Parmak identified three levels of resilience – individual, community, and national – and found that there are relationships between each, but findings also revealed that individually resilient members of a community do not directly correlate to resilient communities or resilient nations. This indicates that resilience building interventions may need to go above and beyond identifying at-risk individuals and only working with them on an individual level. Furthermore, these authors conducted two separate studies between students in one study and community members in another, which resulted in different relationships between

the three levels of resilience for each group. In particular, in the community study, community resilience correlated negatively with both individual and national resilience whilst national resilience correlated positively with individual resilience. What this indicates is that building resilient individuals or communities alone, may not necessarily "complete the picture" (p. 678) and build national resilience and as such, building resilience amongst the three levels is complex and not a straightforward trajectory between each.

However, a cross-cultural study by Kimhi et al. (2018) found that community and national resiliency correlated significantly and positively across their five countries of study (Australia, the UK, Greece, Israel, and Germany), namely the higher the level of national resiliency reported, the higher community resilience was also, and vice versa. Both studies indicate that community resilience alone may be a useful focus for future research to more deeply identify the role communities play in people's lives and for a nation as a whole.

Hardy (2015) drew similar conclusions to Ryan, Ioannou, and Parmak arguing that whilst the calls for resilience building are widespread, the concept, as applied to policy development, is complex and contested. Hardy considers the concept in relation to the UK's CONTEST policy – focusing on the Prepare and Prevent strands of the policy – and finds that the meaning of resilience when applied to the branches of policy is "diametrically different" (p. 90). The author claims that the meaning of resilience can change across contexts and as a result, it can be unclear as to how resilience is understood and implemented in specific situations. What Hardy's analysis reveals is a useful insight into how resilience may be applied to different contexts especially in the UK experience, which is useful for gaining insight into how resilience policies may be contextualised and implemented. However, due to the "diametrically different" meanings in the UK experience alone, it is difficult to draw from the analysis to better understand how the experience may serve other contexts or other countries. What may in fact be learnt from resilience in the UK experience, is that there is little to learn if transferred to other contexts.

A turn to resilience building in US policy occurred under the Obama Administration when it broadened its approach to P/CVE to encapsulate a community-wide responsibility for the battle, replacing a sole focus on the individual push and pull factors to radicalisation (Weine, 2013, p. 81). The new approach considered the environment in which individuals situate themselves so as to

investigate the impact this environment has on the push and pull factors, rather than a single focus on the individual's ability to withstand or withdraw from violent extremism. This new approach was revealed in the 2011 *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism* with a central focus on building resilience in individuals and communities alike (Weine, 2013). However, resilience-building initiatives are a long-term goal and are rarely successful as an immediate quick fix to a problem within societies. Building resilience is a gradual process that takes time (Weine, 2013).

The principle of building resilience in children to combat various anti-social and delinquent behaviours, like violence and substance abuse, is not new to the field of child development (Alvord & Grados, 2005, pp. 238-9; Pasqualotto, Löhr, & Stoltz, 2015, p. 1842; Zolkoski & Bullock, 2012). However, it is only more recently that building resilience in individuals and in communities as both separate and integrated concepts have joined the field of P/CVE (Weine et al., 2009; Zolkoski & Bullock, 2012, p. 2298). Engaging with an entire community, its population, its various cultures, political persuasions, religions, and its core structures are what builds resilience for a unified group, as well as strengthens the protective factors that can be felt by the whole community. Resilient communities can then impact upon their individual citizens (Weine, 2013, p. 84). To support this, Weine (2013) considers the case study of the community of Minneapolis-St. Paul in the United States. In 2007 and 2008, this community experienced an outflow of teenage boys destined for Somalia to join al-Shabaab militant training camps after being recruited by a well-organised administration. This was a community that desperately needed an injection of resilience to combat such an event occurring again (Weine, 2013). The strategies required for successfully building resilience within this community were developed with a new model to help identify prevention techniques for a whole-of-community approach to enhancing resilience as a community. The model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), produced three levels of opportunity that, if ignored, eventually resulted in the potential for violent extremism:

1. Youth's unaccountable times and observed spaces: when youth are out of sight and unaccounted for by parents or significant others.

2. Perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism: diminishing the perspective that violent extremism is a legitimate mode of thinking.
3. Contact with recruiters or associates: eliminating contact between companions who facilitate involvement in such activities.

(Weine, 2013, p. 85)

The DOVE model reinforced the imperative role that protective factors play in building individual and community resilience, especially through collaborations across families, community, government, and individuals themselves (Weine, 2013, p. 84). Furthermore, the study's findings solidified the centrality of resilience to P/CVE approaches and additionally, the full value of community resilience, not just individual resilience. This means that due to the interaction of multiple risk and protective factors, any changes made to an individual's social environment – such as peer networks, external support, engagement with education – will likely reduce the likelihood of involvement with violent extremism (Weine, 2013). Weine (2013) argued that resilience of the family unit is an important, but often overlooked, component of P/CVE. Reinforcing family resilience can be achieved through parents communicating with their children, supervising their activities, and monitoring their behaviours; however, Weine contends that to achieve this families often need support from the community. According to Weine, if the community is resilient, there is more chance the individual will be resilient to the push and pull factors (Weine, 2013). This was a factor evident in theme 2 discussed earlier. If the community is resilient, there is more chance the individual will be resilient to the push and pull factors. The findings highlighted the importance of social environments and their role in both facilitating and hindering involvement in violent extremism. Thus, community resilience may be considered a useful starting point.

Similar findings around the role of community socio-cultural assets for resisting violent extremism were identified by Grossman et al. (2017) and Ellis and Abdi (2017). Grossman and co-authors (2017) developed a five-factor, 14 item scale that could be used for identifying and understanding young people's resilience to violent extremism. This scale, termed BRAVE-14, was developed from two initial studies in Canada and Australia and recognised the importance of cultural identity, connectedness, and relationships of trust within and between communities, as well as attitudes and beliefs surrounding violence. The five factors revealed the significance

of what were termed *bridging capital* and *linking capital* which included support and engagement with other communities and their citizens as well as engagement and relationships with agencies of power or higher authorities. The authors also considered the role of *cultural identity and connectedness* finding that culturally and linguistically diverse individuals and communities derive significant resilience from their identity and connectedness. Ellis and Abdi (2017) identified three central factors for capitalising on community assets that should be harnessed for resilience to violent extremism, these being: social connections within and between communities (*social bonding*), social connections from communities to institutions or governing bodies (*social linking*), and then using community-based participatory research for building and strengthening true partnerships and community collaboration. The authors identified the significance of identity and culture as protective factors to violent extremism, which draws similarities to Grossman et al.'s identification of embracing both new and previous cultural identities together, rather than feeling as if one identity/community should be chosen over the other. Embracing one's cultural identity and where an individual "comes from" means consideration of the role of the immediate and wider family unit and how this impacts identity.

Researchers like Ungar and Liebenberg (2011) endeavoured to develop a tool for assessing resilience in youth from various backgrounds and cultural contexts, although not specifically related to violent extremism. The authors' mix-methods study across 11 countries led to the development of the Child and Youth Resilience Measure (CYRM-28) and highlighted the importance of considering the role social locations play in risk and protective factors. The research suggests that there are common factors that exist in regard to resilience across each of the cultural sites used in the study, which contributes to a consideration for employing a cross-cultural preventative resilience assessment specifically for P/CVE purposes. Such a measure could aid the development of cross-cultural P/CVE interventions, improving best practice and offering more widespread intervention opportunities.

The social environment that teens and young adults inhabit plays a significant role in the balance of risk and protective factors and is also a consideration in P/CVE research, but a more widespread and thorough analysis is required of how these factors have contributed to the development (or combat) of violently extreme thinking and actions. As an example, an evaluation of the influence of sport as a means to resist violent extremism was the focus of a mentoring scheme in

Melbourne, Australia which found that sport contributes in some way to breaking down barriers between different groups and communities. The study focused on young Muslim men and sport as an opportunity to enhance coping skills, develop a sense of belonging, and ultimately build resilience (Johns, Grossman, & McDonald, 2014). Building upon a consideration of community resilience and cultural resilience, the authors sought to assess whether sport could eliminate social differences between communities and build trust and respect between different cultures and backgrounds. The findings were positive indicating that through sport, participants were able to develop mateship, experience comraderies, break down stereotypes and barriers, strengthen discipline, and experience more self-control around conflict and disagreements. What this study indicates is that the concept of resilience can be applied in a multitude of contexts including P/CVE agenda goals. This approach may result in positive outcomes, but this study is quite niche in its sample. Research into the benefits of sport on social inclusion and personal development are expansive (Bailey, 2005; Coakley, 2011; Sandford, Duncombe, & Armour, 2008), but less-so specifically for violent extremism. Additional research would benefit from applying a similar analysis to a different age group, or to females in sport, or to non-Muslim men, perhaps with a consideration of preventing far-right violent extremism to assess whether the same positive outcomes can also be found.

Studies of adolescent resilience theory and the influence of school environments demonstrate a number of key findings that provide a starting point for P/CVE resilience research in educational contexts. Authors like DeWit and colleagues (2000) have revealed the importance of a positive school environment for building resilience in school-aged children. School culture not only impacts upon a child’s school connectedness, but also affects academic success rates. This is a factor arguably important for all at-risk youth, regardless of the behaviours that may be of concern. A negative school culture directly impacts upon not only the behavioural pathways of a child, but also their mental health. This suggests that similar interventions to improve school connectedness and academic achievement may be warranted. Similarly, Hemphill, Heerde, and Scholes-Balog (2016), reached similar conclusions: that low academic performance in grade nine was more likely to result in violent offending in young adulthood (p. 97). An ability to connect with one’s school environment and produce achievements that are self-esteem boosting will contribute to an improved chance of following a meaningful and successful pathway

in the early adult years and may also contribute to a steering away from violent extremism. Pessoa, Coimbra, Bottrell, and Noltemeyer (2017) found that if the student felt academically unsuccessful, they would feel a sense of inadequacy, thus academic success can act as a protective factor for teens. The academic achievements of young radicalised violent extremists are generally not of concern in the field, as many perpetrators are highly educated individuals (Macaluso, 2016) rather these findings demonstrate the importance of individuals having a feeling of belonging in their school 'team'; children and adolescents may benefit from feeling accepted and feeling as though they have a role to play in their school environment. Without this, antisocial behaviour of varying extremes may be the outcome. Similarly, Pessoa et al. discovered that aiding others and establishing a role as a helpful peer was empowering for adolescents and thus demonstrated the protectiveness of maintaining a valuable position in the school environment. When a child feels like they do not have a place, they seek one out elsewhere.

Hemphill and colleagues (2016) also found that there is a significant increase in violent offending between the ages of 16–17 and 18–19. This increase was four times greater at age 18–19. In this short space of time, certain factors are contributing to a surge in antisocial behaviour. Lodewijks, de Ruiter, and Doreleijers' (2010) research found that young violent offenders had fewer protective factors available to them raising the question as to why and in what ways protective factors are reduced as young people age. It may be inferred that no matter how much the field of resilience theory is broadened, investigated, and hypothesised, we may never be able to answer why some adolescents choose to lead positive lives that fit within society's most accepted norms and behaviours, whilst others become involved with crime, violence, and violent extremism, aspects arguably outside these norms. Whilst these findings are not specific to violent extremism, they provide a point of consideration for future research into building resilience towards radicalisation and violent extremism in young people. If this approach is to continue to be put forward as a potential avenue for P/CVE policy, findings like these that consider how schools should or should not be incorporated effectively may prove useful for policy development.

Schools have the opportunity to build resilience through teaching young adults to take initiative in their own lives; improve self-belief in effectiveness to make changes and decisions; assume responsibility and build empathy through

helping others; and develop impulse control to foster positive peer and mentor relationships (Alvord & Grados, 2005, pp. 239-40). In addition, schools can provide a community-minded environment that works towards an integrated learning approach with parents and guardians. When a child can share their progression with their family, the success will have more of an impact; involved parenting solidifies resilience in young people (Alvord & Grados, 2005, p. 240). Furthermore, the classroom and the classroom teacher are an opportunity to continually reinforce these self-improvement developments and build a positive perception of life at school. Children spend the majority of their youth in the school classroom, so the role schools can play in developing a resilient child cannot be ignored.

The wider community can foster resilience in young people by integrating relationships with local schools. Local community businesses, organisations, youth groups, and sporting clubs have a great opportunity to establish a solid link between academics and extra-curricular activities. These community groups are also just as much at the forefront of identifying adolescents who need extra support to avoid the wrong pathway as schools and school educators. Community-based activities provide youth with an opportunity to enhance their skills, build confidence, and take ownership of an important role in their community. The activities outside of school can also develop relationships with the families of the young participants to yet again strengthen ties between parent and child. Overall, individual resilience of young people is fostered equally through an integrated and collaborative relationship with family, school, and community.

Being relatively new, the field of P/CVE could learn from other disciplines as to what works in certain contexts. Key themes arise in the literature that highlight the need to move beyond the individual when addressing cases of violent extremism. In order for P/CVE to be fully preventative in nature, it is important to use a whole-of-community approach. Research like Weine (2013) and Grossman et al. (2017) have supported this in their analyses whereby a community-centric basis will likely improve chances of successful interventions. Ungar and colleagues (2019) also noted that their results were most impactful when collaboration occurred with the wider community and families, whilst DeWit and colleagues' (2000) earlier work identified the role of families to be significant for success and the negative impact that can result from a lack of family support. The role of schools in the P/CVE area is widely debated but studies have revealed that academic success is a good starting point and

can play a noteworthy part in prevention (Hemphill et al., 2016; Pessoa et al., 2017) – simply achieving good results at school cannot be overlooked.

Whilst families and parents have been considered as essential components for successful interventions, the role of teachers is less discussed. Before expanding into the wider community, P/CVE programming may find success in taking a step back and incorporating the experiences and voices of teachers in the early developmental stages of interventions. Teachers are crucial to understanding their students' needs, challenges, and thinking in a different light to families and parents. As Weine (2009) suggests, it is important to hear experiences. If it is worthy to consider that prevention is more than just working on the individual level, it is also important to consider the perspectives of significant community members that can influence or play a key role in the lives of individuals. Teachers' voices can aid a bottom-up approach to P/CVE that is also repeated throughout the literature. A bottom-up approach incorporates the community to work with authorities and include their experiences and on-the-ground knowledge. The recent research into resilience against radicalisation and violent extremism have made noteworthy gains by developing models like DOVE and BRAVE, yet a broader implementation in school settings prior to the development of future P/CVE educational initiatives may help to produce more positive outcomes. In Australia especially, teacher and parental input and not just teacher training may bring new ideas for community-centric intervention.

2.5 Concluding remarks

Across the P/CVE policy field there exists a lack of evidence-based evaluations that can provide future policy design and implementation with empirical guidance as to what works, in what context, and how. More specifically, there is little evidence to support cross-contextual transferability for nation states to learn from what has and has not worked elsewhere because of the little empirical data to accurately pinpoint successful interventions. This is limiting the advancement of the P/CVE field. There are some evaluations available that assess specific, and often local programmes, that can highlight certain aspects of P/CVE programming that *may* also work elsewhere, but overall, broader cross-contextual P/CVE policies and programmes that are supported by empirical data, especially longitudinal data, remain limited. Part of this problem may be because the P/CVE field is very broad in

nature; what can constitute a P/CVE intervention programme is vague and the types of programmes that have been implemented are very different in their objectives and methods. P/CVE policy has been described as a policy spectrum that is poorly defined and often unclear on whether objectives have been successful (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016).

It is apparent from an analysis of the literature that P/CVE policy and its effects have been widely analysed and critiqued in an abundance of contexts and situations. An obvious pattern amongst the literature is the attention given to the UK experience of P/CVE policy implementation. It is easy to become saturated by UK-based information and research when assessing the broader P/CVE field. This is for perhaps two key reasons, firstly, with the UK being a forerunner in developing softer and preventative polices for addressing violent extremism the literature covers a broad time period, and secondly due to the widespread criticism that said policies have received means the available literature is significant. Many of the available evaluations are UK-based and much of the literature is focused on UK policy. Second to this, is US policy and experiences around preventing and countering extremism. This dominant literature base is also heavily skewed towards Muslim and Islamic based literature, with a notable gap in experiences associated with other forms of extremism over the past two decades.

An assessment of the literature covered in this chapter highlights a few key considerations for future P/CVE policy development. It is apparent that many times P/CVE policy agenda and government interventions have caused more harm than good. The adverse consequences are significant and concerning. With almost 20 years having passed since the events of 9/11, it is troubling that these adverse consequences still appear to outweigh the positive experiences and narratives.

Furthermore, evaluations that provide significant and longitudinal empirical data that speaks to how to limit these adverse consequences over an extended period and implement effective P/CVE policy with measurable outcomes is scarce and often small-scale (Ragazzi, 2016). This too is of concern as policy agendas broaden their reach into multiple areas of society, like the educational space.

It is also clear that as yet, governments do not know how to actually effectively address violent extremism and reduce the threat to communities over the long term. Moreover, experts and researchers are also not in agreement or have drawn definitive conclusions as to how to address violent extremism effectively, but

three key themes can be drawn from the literature: policies have softened since 9/11 but consequences persist; P/CVE evaluations are broad and usually can be grouped into assessing social considerations, the act itself, or the individual; and building resilience is a widespread considered approach for reaching young people

In the latter half of the P/CVE policy development period, a turn towards encapsulating the education sector and these institutions are beginning to take on some of the responsibility for offering support to young people deemed at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism. As calls for building resilience in young people become more frequent, educational spaces appear to be the avenue in which this reach can be most easily realised. P/CVE policy has failed to diminish the threat of acts of terrorism and violent extremism and this threat is commonly stemming from younger individuals. As a result, the education sector is now more commonly experiencing the impact of P/CVE policy implementation and this will be considered in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

The Education Context: Policies and Perspectives

As touched upon in the previous chapter, a move towards using schools and other educational spaces has developed as policymakers seek to engage with younger individuals. The potential benefit of education and the use of safe-space educational institutions in countering violent extremism has been put forward for a number of years, but with long-term results as to its efficacy yet to be seen (Davies, 2009; Francis, 2015; Malek, 2017; Pels & de Ruyter, 2012; UNESCO, n.d.).With continued terrorist attacks and a growth in radicalisation and acts of violent extremism perpetrated by young adults and even adolescents, schools and educators are now at the forefront (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014; Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015). At present, radicalisation and violent extremism are a most pressing concern in regard to young people, more often males, with the average age of a young Australian convicted jihadi being just 27 years of age (Harris-Hogan, 2017). Moreover, 85 per cent of Australia's convicted jihadist offenders were aged between 18 and 35 at the time of their arrest; a total of 93 people have been charged as a result of 41 counter-terrorism operations in Australia as at April 2019 (Liberal.org.au, 2019). These are similar statistics to those for Canada, the UK, and the US (Harris-Hogan, 2017). These statistics indicate that young people are of most concern and thus should be at the forefront of targeted prevention efforts. Scholars have suggested this, and it also shapes the opinions of some citizens, as indicated by this research. Despite this, are school environments outside the parameters of such intervention? Where does the educating stop? However, the alternative side to the argument reflects a theory that compulsory education institutions have extensive opportunity to shape minds in the best way possible and thus cannot be an ignored element in this battle of ideology.

Educational P/CVE policy and programming has developed gradually and educational environments have been slowly recruited into the battle against extremist thinking as nation states have continually sought out new ways to get on top of extremist messaging and recruitment amongst this demographic. Some of these

approaches and programmes will be examined in this chapter to assess any available consideration of the implications for schools, students, and school communities.

Analysts have considered the use of a variety of educational contexts or approaches such as incorporating P/CVE into existing religion classes (Quartermaine, 2016; Webber, 2011), or focusing on the role and impact of identity formation and tolerance of ‘others’ (Davies, 2009). Some experts have argued for improving critical enquiry and reasoning skills in schools. These experts have regularly stressed the importance of developing critical thinking skills among youth and allowing an element of free speech so thoughts and opinions can be shared in a structured and safe way, free from ridicule (Jerome & Elwick, 2019; Macaluso, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2006, Zeiger, 2014). Additionally, this could be supported by incorporating such education into classes of citizenship and social studies-related material where sharing thoughts and opinions on social topics is more common than in other school subjects (Davies, 2009; Thomas, 2016).

This chapter will examine how educational spaces are being used to implement P/CVE policy agenda and the impacts this has had. To do this, it will firstly introduce some of the wider policy debates and suggestions that can be found in regard to best practice from a more global perspective, before outlining three more specific case studies – the UK, Denmark and Australia – in the latter half of the chapter. The wider policy debates and then specific case studies of policy implementation will offer an opportunity to compare with the teacher and parent experiences gathered through the data collection for this research project discussed in the final two chapters. From a global perspective, there are a number of recommendations that provide some guidance as to how schools may be used for P/CVE policy goals. These vary in scope but some similarities can be found. Some of these recommendations are outlined below to offer an understanding of how educational P/CVE is being implemented in various situations. Additionally, these recommendations are significant in that they reveal the growing trend for using educational spaces to meet P/CVE agendas. Together they demonstrate this gradual growth that has taken place post-9/11 that seeks a more preventative approach that has gradually incorporated schools and other places of learning for young people. These global recommendations provide some understanding as to how specific countries have chosen to implement P/CVE policy agendas in schools and other educational spaces,

3.1 The problem: A lack of consensus on how to best implement educational P/CVE for effective outcomes.

At present, three key issues can be identified within the field of educational P/CVE. Firstly, it is difficult to find policy consensus on how best to incorporate schools into the P/CVE agenda and to limit negative outcomes. Moreover, amongst the scholarly literature it is also difficult to find a consensus on how and where such content should be included. Whether in existing curricula or elsewhere; whether as an inbuilt, long-term programme or one-off stand-alone initiative; at what stage of the schooling process to include P/CVE educational material, and whether such programming is actually going to be effective in reducing radicalisation and violent extremism. This contributes to a trial and error approach that may increase the chances of adverse outcomes resulting.

Secondly, assessments that consider the impact of educational P/CVE on those closest to the programming is limited. For example, a consideration of the perceptions about and attitudes towards these policies from teachers and parents is largely absent in the literature, especially in regard to the Australian experience. Yet, the impact on teachers and schools may be significant and is thus important for future planning. Furthermore, research has indicated that peer networks may be a valuable avenue for reaching at-risk teens, but the sensitivity of reporting fellow friends or intervening within peer groups would likely raise some challenges and the impacts of this need further exploration (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016; Williams, Horgan, Evans, 2016). Research has considered the role of families and friends in instances of reporting with some findings revealing that these individuals would likely try and seek help, persuade, or build their knowledge before reporting (Grossman & Stephenson, 2015). Findings drew similarities in a replicated study in the UK whereby respondents often felt it important to build their knowledge and gather more information or talk with the individual in question before reporting their concerns to authorities (Thomas, Grossman, Miah, & Christmann, 2017). Assessing the impacts of P/CVE programmes should also include assessing the impacts on those closest to individuals of concern or at-risk.

Evaluations that assess the impact on both those implementing the policies and those receiving will aid the development of best practice in the field. There is little empirical evidence available to assess the anticipated impact on schools, teachers, and students *before* such programmes are implemented, and a limited

amount of evidence to evaluate the impact *after* they have been rolled out. Additionally, there is little evidence that also provides insight into what is expected of these programmes, how well-received they may be, and how frontline educationalists think they should look. Further research and evaluations are needed into the role that these recommended forms of educational interventions can play in the push/pull scenario of radicalisation and violent extremism and the efficacy of such programming. It is difficult to find the consensus on best practice when evaluations are lacking that pinpoint effective outcomes. Clear outcomes that go along with policy recommendations and implementation will better serve the opportunity to empirically evaluate the intervention. Future research would benefit from longitudinal assessments of the impacts of P/CVE policy programming in places like schools to ensure the long-term impacts are not developing into additional adverse outcomes.

Together with this, a consideration of the role of the wider school community and local community in P/CVE policy programming and the impact which may be felt beyond the school receives some attention in the debate but with little agreement found. Much like the work conducted within school boundaries, there is little agreement on how the wider community can be involved for the most effective outcomes to be reached and understanding as to how the community may also be affected. As the last chapter revealed, this is considered an important consideration when developing and planning such interventions. Moreover, with much of the focus being on an individual level and identifying those 'at-risk' the community-centric aspect has not received as much attention within the policy design above and beyond recommendations that the community should ideally be included in some way. Helping educational facilitators and teachers to address what are sometimes sensitive issues and also to foster community dialogue are considered important for future P/CVE success (UNESCO, 2017).

Thirdly, from the limited evaluations that have been conducted on educational P/CVE implementation worldwide, both positive and negative outcomes can be identified, however, the negatives largely outweigh the positives. Stigmatisation and stereotyping of minority communities like Muslim communities have been experienced across all three examples and a concern for surveillance and security is also common. This chapter will outline three case studies from the UK, Denmark, and Australia to reflect upon the varying policy agendas and how they

have been implemented. Each case study will highlight the effects of their implementation from various P/CVE initiatives.

With these points in mind, there still remains a need to assess the impacts – short and longer term – of educational P/CVE policy implementation. The impact on teachers and school staff, students, and the wider school community will add value and direction to future policy development and likely reduce the chances of adverse consequences if the voices and perspectives of these such groups are heard and incorporated. There is much agreement that educational environments are a good potential avenue to undertake P/CVE, but less agreement on how best to go about it.

3.2 Key Recommendations and approaches

In the earlier stages of a turn to educational P/CVE, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (September 2006) highlighted the importance of education as a method of addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (Pillar I of the Strategy) and this encouraged UNESCO to play an active role in boosting inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue in educational institutions in order to promote tolerance and respect across cultures and religions (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). Over the course of the last few decades it is possible to witness a development in policy that emphasises that education can play a role in P/CVE agendas. These recommendations touched upon in this section offer some background information as to how and when these recommendations emerged. In addition to the UN, global think tanks such as The Global Centre and Hedayah have previously stressed not only the importance of a sound curriculum, but also the development of school-community relationships to ensure collaboration and safe learning environments (Global Centre on Cooperative Security, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2006; Zeiger, 2014). The recommendations from key global bodies have paved the way for countries to develop their own approaches to educational P/CVE and provide an insight into how such policies have developed and adapted to address unique challenges within countries.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum – a working group of 30 countries and non-member partnerships – signed a memorandum on good practice in September 2014, which set out agreed key recommendations for future P/CVE education planning. In total, 26 recommendations were put forward and these are similar to the recommendations presented in the scholarly literature. In sum, the recommendations

focused on cross-collaboration between government and non-government; early prevention; the enhancement of critical thinking and problem solving skills; offering safe spaces for sharing thoughts and opinions away from criticism; absorption of local communities and families into the school environment; improving teacher training for dealing with such issues; involving the youth in the design and implementation process of programmes; and encouraging cross-curricula education to ensure broad opportunities are presented (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014). This memorandum was significant in that the measures considered the varying opportunities presented through both primary and secondary level schooling as well as touching on the role of tertiary institutions. The contributing researchers and the resulting recommendations also acknowledged the importance of assessing how education can be used in the reverse, that is, how it can be used by extremists to recruit and sometimes be used as a tool to radicalise. However, the recommendations identified work towards solutions that avoided securitising the education sector (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014).

Also, early in the following year in Europe, the Radicalisation Awareness Network - a group of frontline practitioners (like teachers, social workers, and healthcare professionals) from all EU Member states - drafted a manifesto called "Empowering educators and schools" to address the growing threat of violent extremism and they agreed upon a number of key goals for the future. These directions are similar to those outlined by governments and think tanks like the above recommendations from the Global Counterterrorism Forum and reiterate the importance of teacher support (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2015). More than 90 educators contributed content, experiences, and best practices to the conference to provide leaders with material to contribute to the development of policy through first-hand accounts. The manifesto called for a focus on teaching critical thinking skills, preparing schools with plans of action, improving access to extra-curricular activities, and involving the wider school community (including law enforcement personnel, parents and families, and charity and aid organisations) in creating safe spaces and trusting environments for discussion and debate. In sum, the manifesto outlines the imperative for teacher training in this field of knowledge, as well as the importance of using voices external to those developing P/CVE policy by bringing in frontline input for future policy development.

Similarly to the EU-based recommendations from the Radicalisation Awareness Network and Global Counterterrorism Forum, which reflect recommendations from global and EU-based countries respectively, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has brought forward a number of key recommendations for preventing violent extremism in US schools that will assist schools to establish cross-collaborative relationships with the community so as to strengthen the approach, a factor identified in both sets of EU findings. The FBI recommendations are unique in that they are specific to schools rather than broader education-related recommendations. These recommendations include:

1. Establish threat assessment teams that intervene with students who exhibit concerning and threatening behaviour.
2. Educate school staff on the role of interventions.
3. Empower school committees, administration staff, and faculty members to embrace diversity, initiate appropriate activities, and dissuade youth from dangerous paths.
4. Maintain a local collaborative network of practitioners, experts, and leaders who can be accessed as required.
5. Strengthen family outreach and engagement to improve awareness and foster healthy relationships.
6. Implement annual violent extremism training for older teens to improve awareness.
7. Establish student-led focus groups to share concerns and encourage open communication.
8. Focus on after-school programming that builds confidence, promotes leadership, cooperation and teamwork.
9. Leverage alumni for affirmative messaging on how to cope with life in high school.
10. Develop relational lifelines with the community that promote unity and resilience.
11. Educate school staff about bystanders and the consequences of not speaking up.

(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016)

The recommendations from the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Radicalisation Awareness Network and the US-based FBI recommendations reveal a number of similarities. Each organisation prioritises teacher training. Sound support for teachers ensures content is accurate and relevant, and that teachers feel empowered to take on what is traditionally a difficult area to address. Secondly, working with the community is recommended by all bodies who endorse a collaborative approach to P/CVE in schools that engages with the local community and its organisations. Additionally, each body highlights the importance of teaching young people about diversity, tolerance, and differences so as to unify students and help them to relate with one another. Finally, both the EU contributors and the FBI in the US consider the importance of extra-curricular activities that provide youth with an outlet to socialise, learn new skills, and engage with other peers outside of school.

These recommendations reveal it is easy to find an array of suggestions from global authorities and researchers like those above, that clearly outline a wide variety of potential approaches that could assist P/CVE goals. Many of them are repeated across contexts and countries, so some establishment of best practice is possible. Yet, they remain recommendations only and how P/CVE policy agenda is implemented remains varied. From these recommendations, it is possible to identify that education is well-supported as a worthy avenue for P/CVE programming, but as yet no clear consensus on what exactly works best, or which countries have successfully used education to prevent violent extremism can be identified.

3.3 Implementation – how should educational P/CVE policy be implemented?

A particular question within the literature relates to which subject or base P/CVE material should be included within schools or in what area of learning would result in the best outcomes. In the literature, it is also difficult to find a consensus on the best classroom practices, or otherwise, and the specific content required for incorporating P/CVE-style instruction into everyday learning for it to have the most significant impact. In other words, *how* to implement educational P/CVE policy programming for effective outcomes is undefined.

As one example of *how*, it is possible to identify in the literature support for embedding the material in the curriculum as it may be best for long-term impact. In order to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of P/CVE policy, material that engages with students more regularly through their usual classes and curriculum

content, rather than as short-term programmes, may have a longer-term impact. This is supported by Davies (2014) who considers the type of education that may best interrupt the route to violent extremism, contending that current education systems do little to protect young people from radicalisation and recruitment, thus calling for curriculum changes to subjects like social studies that will ideally be effective in the longer-term. Changing a pathway of radicalisation and violent extremism can mean changing attitudes or changing behaviours, or both, via a process of "unlearning" (Davies 2014, p. 464) that takes place over time and thus requires an embedded approach.

In earlier work, Davies highlights the importance of teaching children respect for others from a young age as an opportunity to counter extremist narratives that often portray an intolerance of this 'other' (Davies, 2009). According to Davies, we must be able to respect, yet at the same time critique, contentious topics like politics and religion and we must teach children how to do so with "sophistication and expression" (Davies, 2014, p. 455) so as to be able to interpret messages and understand others' behaviours, and these understandings take time to teach.

Similarly, Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks, and De Winter (2015) contend that sensitive political and ideological issues must be addressed as part of everyday teaching practices so young adults can learn about the world in which they live and have the opportunity to ask questions and obtain answers in an open environment. Moreover, the authors contend that by ignoring such issues for fear of offence only encourages the students to draw their own conclusions, which may or may not be factual. Sieckelinck et al. (2015) also suggest that schools may need to explicitly address the processes of radicalisation, alternative views, and conspiracies so that students can experience opinions away from the mainstream and receive a more well-rounded understanding of topics that can often present as one-sided.

The role of religious education classes and the opportunity they may hold to potentially implement resilience-building P/CVE education is, for other analysts, an ideal starting point for integrating P/CVE-based education through focusing on the teaching of world religions and tolerance. Webber (2011) contends that within the school environment children should be taught about world religions, the part they have played in history, tolerance of others' religious choices and beliefs, and respect for those who choose to not invest in religious beliefs. Webber's thoughts are in response to a resolution passed in Texas in 2010 that tightened rules on the sorts of

social studies texts being used in classrooms. This tightening restricted some texts, but Webber argues that religious tolerance education is an extremely valuable counter-terrorism tool. The author shows concern about similar moves that restrict the freedom of schools to teach certain content and claims this can lead to alienation of minorities, a factor which has been attributed to radicalisation. Webber contends that religion lessons have the opportunity to teach tolerance amongst young people, build awareness of different religions, and create a level of respect for the 'other', which in turn helps reduce the alienation felt by students from various minorities in school environments (p. 275).

Webber's text uses a case study from Modesto, California, which followed the implementation of a world religions course for grade nine students. No complaints were received about the content of the course because it actively sought to describe the impact world religions have had, rather than compare world religions. The course also taught some of the major modern-day beliefs of various religions relatable to the present world environment, an approach which works towards providing safer, more inclusive school environments and communities. After the nine-month course, students were surveyed and responses indicated that the course bolstered the youths' respect for religious freedom amongst their peers (Webber, 2011). This trial programme used religion lessons to develop the resilience and confidence to speak up, ask questions, and think critically about 'other' groups of people. It is clear from an analysis of the literature and wider recommendations that there are a number of suggestions for what may work, such as Davies (2014) curriculum changes to social studies classes or Webber's (2011) focus on studies of religion, and in which aspect of schooling such material should be included but the long-term nature of assessing the success of P/CVE instruction means that it has simply not been in place anywhere worldwide long enough to determine which of these suggestions is the best solution for effective outcomes. Many initiatives are short-term like in Webber's (2011) analysis so it is difficult to conclude how effective they may be in reducing the risk of acts of violent extremism.

In addition to these considerations of *how* to address P/CVE in educational spaces, the age at which these initiatives should be applied for maximum effectiveness has been debated – the *when* (Macaluso, 2016). Macaluso (2016) argues that interventions at the primary school level should be the goal, rather than during the secondary schooling years because this would allow prosocial and

positive behaviours to be developed in the nurturing and sculpting period, rather than attempting to correct ingrained behaviours in the teenage years (Macaluso, 2016). This was also supported by Davies (2009) in her suggestion that the work begins early by teaching about 'others' to foster respect and tolerance. Arguments for the need to put more resources into programmes that listen to the opinions and perspectives of young people on this issue have emerged (Roy & McKinnon, 2016). Regardless, the schooling years, both primary and secondary, are a time when youth are exploring new ideas, perspectives, and identities, thus these formative years are a prime opportunity for accurate and open discussion about the world, cultures, religions, and the importance of toleration and respect for the 'other' (Sieckelinck et al., 2015).

Overall, a key theme that can be identified is that much of the policy design thus far has centered on identifying 'at-risk' students and less-so on the actual education component of P/CVE initiatives. P/CVE policy in educational contexts has somewhat focused on awareness raising, defining key terms, and bringing some level of awareness and understanding to the topic, but it is also clear that a process of selecting and identifying has formed a significant part of such policies. In addition to input from young people, the significance of teacher voices into the development and anticipated impact of P/CVE programming is not widely emphasised and is a consideration worth evaluating for not only a positive reception to new policies and programmes but also to increase the chances of effectiveness.

3.4 Outcomes of implementation

With no distinct approach to implementation available, it is possible to identify a persistent premise that exists amongst the literature indicating that approaches thus far have led to more negative outcomes than positive ones. As the previous chapter revealed, issues like stereotyping and stigmatisation are evident in a number of examples from different countries. Studies like Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim (2019) identified widespread Islamophobia in the UK which also draws similarities with Denmark's experience (Lindekilde, 2012a). Furthermore, a consideration of the impact of such policies on teachers and school staff identified three key considerations: firstly, concerns regarding apprehension to teaching such content and material (Busher, Choudhury, Thomas, & Harris, 2017); secondly, confidence (or lack thereof) in guiding students without bias and influence from

personal values and beliefs (Jerome, Elwick, & Kazim, 2019), and, thirdly, especially in the UK example, fear of 'missing' opportunities to identify genuine cases of students at-risk of radicalisation and violent extremism (Busher et al., 2017). This suggests a need to conduct assessments with teachers and utilise their input when designing such programmes to reduce these impacts and improve the chances of successful interventions.

Thus, with no clear consensus on *what* works best, or *how* to go about it there exists a wide array of criticisms against educational P/CVE. P/CVE programmes in schools have even been labelled "disastrous" and "tried, tested and found to have failed" elsewhere in the world (Armstrong, 2017; Nadim, 2016, para. 2). Programmes have been criticised for the stigmatisation and the stereotyping that has resulted, especially for Muslim students (Armstrong, 2017; Jerome & Elwick, 2019; Nadim, 2016), and also for the costs associated to stop vulnerable youth being attracted to groups like ISIS (Armstrong, 2017), something that has not as yet been averted.

In-school P/CVE programmes are very much in their early stage and this may ensure that they are receiving a share of criticism as they navigate a new area. Sukarieh and Tannock (2015) have considered the rise of deradicalisation programmes in European schools that emerged following 9/11. The authors also identified much criticism for the stigmatising and irregular attention to Muslim students, which can generate further alienation and exaggerate the stigma, whilst simultaneously only scratching the surface of the problem. The authors suggest however, that the problem lies deeper, asserting that the education system and curriculum have steered away from critical thought, fostering of discussion, and open debate and instead the focus has become about how best to set oneself up to compete in a highly-competitive global world and ever-fluctuating market economy. Other suggestions like Davies (2014) argue that much focus in P/CVE research is on the pathway towards violent extremism with much less attention being paid to what triggers an individual to change their thinking and reverse their direction.

It is clear that the literature emphasises the need to consider broader factors beyond the individual but these factors are so widespread that no consensus exists. Taylor and Soni (2017) analysed qualitative UK-based studies from 2013-2016 identifying key themes amongst the literature and found that there was a persistent focus on individual vulnerabilities, especially in the Prevent training called WRAP

(Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent). The authors argue that an underlying focus on individual factors like a person's traits, attributes, and vulnerabilities and the profiling of these factors undermines the role of wider community factors that may be having an influence on an individual's radicalisation process. Whilst the study was relatively minimal in scope (seven papers) it identified a number of repeat themes amongst the literature that are evident elsewhere, namely: pedagogical inefficacies like the "flawed" (p.6) fundamental British Values and a restriction of academic freedoms, and the problematic focus of Prevent regarding its surveillance and securitisation as well as its focus on individual vulnerabilities. Other examples include the work by Jerome and Elwick (2019) which also reviewed the empirical literature and identified a number of key themes also, including a focus on safeguarding the individual from risks. This safeguarding is a persistent theme in the UK-focused literature as it has formed a central aspect of UK policy covered more extensively in the UK case study later in the chapter.

3.5 What next?

Indeed, from the literature it is apparent there are a number of possible opportunities put forth for within the education field which hold potential for this field to play a more robust role in P/CVE, despite the lack of agreement thus far. This includes the school environment itself, not simply the curriculum or stand-alone education components and materials. The argument that terrorists and extremists are uneducated has already been disregarded (Coughlan, 2015; Fox, 2016; Macaluso, 2016; Miletic, 2016; Pels & de Ruyter, 2012) and the inverse has even been suggested: that more educated individuals with refined skill sets and a passion for fighting for their expectations to be met by society are more appealing to terrorist recruiters (Macaluso, 2016). Yet, the broader educational environment, school community, social and psychological atmosphere, as well as the quality of education, levels of school connectedness, engagement with all things school life have to offer, effective education policies, and community-centred interventions during the schooling years may altogether play a more noteworthy role in counter-narrating violent extremism.

Some efforts have already been made to rectify these environments to provide more safe and welcoming school settings (Chowdhury Fink, VeenKamp, Alhassen, Barakat, & Zeiger, 2013; Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014;

Macaluso, 2016). It is commonly agreed that school environments, school communities, and any P/CVE-related programmes that operate in these locations must be designed collaboratively and must address the local push and pull factors that contribute to radicalisation, violent extremism, and recruitment in order to be effective and in order to incorporate local contextual considerations like existing values and beliefs (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016; Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2014; Jerome & Elwick, 2020; Zeiger, 2014). However, with widespread and varying recommendations, implementation of policy resulting in negative outcomes, and no distinct approach that can prove its value, it is important to then draw from what examples and evaluations are available to build towards more specific recommendations that improve the chances of best outcomes which are backed by empirical evaluations.

The following three case studies provide a more specific comparison from countries that have steered towards an educational P/CVE approach in their counter-terrorism battle. Whilst the focus is to evaluate education-specific policy, other contextual areas are also covered to reveal how educational P/CVE has come about, such as in Denmark's experience whereby much of the P/CVE work overlaps with existing programming in crime prevention. Most often, P/CVE initiatives have been absorbed into educational spaces after previous policy and programming has taken place in other areas, so this is also outlined for the purposes of contextual understandings.

The UK serves as the opening case study due to the historical nature of its initiatives – the UK may be considered a forerunner in this field – as well as the similarities that can be drawn between the UK and Australia regarding political and cultural makeup. Secondly, Denmark is used as the focus of an additional case study because of the success Denmark has experienced in integrating its counter-terrorism policies and programmes into existing crime prevention initiatives. Finally, Australia's experience is analysed as Australia is the local base for this research project. Each case study offers unique insights into what may later be built into a collection of key principles worthy of consideration for future policy and planning as well as identification of aspects that may be considered less successful. Each country's experience has witnessed both support and criticism for the decisions made and policies implemented, yet these states serve as fundamental leaders in the field of preventative counter-terrorism.

3.6 Case study one: United Kingdom

The need for a thorough counter-terrorism prevention plan was firmly in the pipeline in the UK following the issues with Northern Ireland in the decades prior to 9/11. However, global events of the early 2000s, like 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings in the UK, have contributed to a turning point in counter-terrorism policy more broadly and a development of a range of policies that seek to counter the extremist and terrorist narrative.

The UK is often considered a leader in this field of policy development, especially in regard to the 'soft' counter terrorism approach that implements changes at home, on-the-ground, in this battle (Thomas, 2017). The education sector has been drawn into this struggle gradually, much like elsewhere in the world, however the UK has already witnessed an array of educational P/CVE policy developments striving to reach best practice and the education sector is now arguably fully immersed in this area of broader counter-terrorism policy. This case study will review the changes to policy that have taken place in the post-9/11 era with a specific consideration for how the education sector has been used. It will then review how these policies have been received and how they have affected teaching staff and schools.

In the UK, as early as 2002, the Labour Government made citizenship education compulsory through a statutory duty in all secondary schools in England (with various other non-statutory approaches employed in other parts of the UK) with the intention of bridging divides within and between communities, as well as addressing the general disengagement of youth from UK politics (UK Parliament, 2007). Whilst the intent at the time was not from a P/CVE standpoint, the developments that have come about from this initiation have contributed to the education-as-P/CVE field (Thomas, 2016).

The introduction of citizenship education into the curriculum was designed to be flexible and adaptable to varying educational institutions with the overarching goal of building a modern, cohesive, British society (UK Parliament, 2007). A change in young people's attitudes towards politics and democratic processes was sought, as well as lower levels of disengagement and anti-social behaviour. Such education was to bolster support for Britain's institutional and historical roots in democracy and the rule of law. It was anticipated that this style of education would

mould the upcoming British generations into a group of young people possessing national pride and support for the multicultural British community. Citizenship education has been described as the "most obvious curriculum vehicle for anti-extremism work" (Thomas, 2016, p. 178) and an opportunity to build shared values in a multicultural society. It has been argued to have the potential to "celebrate hybridity" (Davies, 2005, p. 362) when implemented correctly and not used as a mechanism to develop nationalistic and narrow constructions of citizenry (Davies, 2005).

Lynn Davies (2009) later argued for a specific type of citizenship education, which would allow students to critically analyse fundamentalist messages and idealism as well as build the skills required to analyse the messages portrayed in the mass media and develop a basic understanding of human rights. This initial policy approach would pave the way for subsequent developments in the educational field and later become closely aligned with more-specific P/CVE agendas.

In 2007, following the London terror attacks of 2005, the UK government took a further step and made community cohesion education statutory, building upon the previous policy of compulsory citizenship education (Shepherd, 2010). This new policy was devised to further foster cohesion and quell a rise in support for the British National Party and Islamophobia following the local terror attacks (Shepherd, 2010). The Department for Children, Schools and Families (2007) publicised the move as necessary because:

> …schools should promote the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society, and prepare pupils at the school for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of later life. Schools have a duty to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different groups. (p. 1)

Again, this new policy was not asserted to be from a P/CVE standpoint. Rather, it was seen as an opportunity to break down stereotypes and prejudice that was contributing to displaced cohesion in UK communities (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2007). It may be viewed as a policy development that sought to build multiculturalism in a society that appeared somewhat fractured in the post-

9/11 era. Paul Thomas (2010) described this displacement between ethnic communities in Britain as communities leading “parallel lives” (p. 442) contributing to an alienation of young Muslims from British values.

A statutory duty was placed on schools to promote community cohesion, which was also subject to inspections to ensure that it was in fact taking place. This policy remained in place until a review in 2010 concluded that it was no longer obligatory (Engel, Kington, & Mleczko, 2013). This policy of community cohesion paved the way for the UK’s first Preventing Violent Extremism initiative that would endeavour to win the “hearts and minds” of its young citizens, especially Muslim citizens (Thomas, 2010, p. 443). Whilst the new initiative was first revealed in October 2006, the initial overall counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST was first developed in 2003, with CONTEST 2 being released in 2009. As an overarching policy, CONTEST still contains four streams – Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare – with most P/CVE programming aligning with the Prevent category. The most significant update between the two strategies was a more developed focus on the ‘Prevent’ strand of CONTEST in the 2009 update (Thomas, 2010).

In 2007, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown first drew attention to the role of schools in the success of Prevent with a statement declaring:

> We know that young people of school age can be exposed to extremist messages. The Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families will be convening a new forum of head teachers to advise on what more we can do to protect young people and to build bridges across communities. To ensure that young people have the opportunity to learn about diversity and faith in modern Britain, we will work in partnership with religious education teachers to promote the national framework for teaching religious education in schools, including making sure that children learn about all faiths.
> (Moulin, 2012, p. 164)

Now, the role schools could play in an early preventative approach to counter-terrorism was being considered. The following year, schools were included as part of the Prevent strand of CONTEST and guidance was offered to schools on how to best prevent violent extremism in their environments: schools were now expected to

identify extremism, take steps to reduce radicalisation, and reduce motivation to radicalisation through their schooling (Arthur, 2015).

The phases of Prevent have been categorised into what has been termed 'Prevent 1' and later, 'Prevent 2' (Busher et al., 2017, p. 12) to distinguish between the changes in policy focus during the two phases. Prevent 1 policy was characterised more-so by a focus on connecting with young British Muslims and their communities through financial assistance to guide programmes and engagement initiatives that were intended to steer these young individuals away from extremist pathways. Prevent 2 (post-2011) saw the focus turn towards schools and the education sector as well as other public sector divisions like health (Busher et al., 2017).

There were, however, elements of Prevent 1 that reached school environments as part of the overall policy direction. In 2008, a toolkit was provided to schools to help them meet the requirements of existing policies. The *Learning Together to be Safe: A Toolkit to Help Schools Contribute to the Prevention of Violent Extremism* was issued to educational institutions to help teachers tackle violent extremism and build long-term resilience (Moulin, 2012). The aims of the toolkit were to build awareness, provide information, help schools make a positive contribution to resilient communities, protect young people's wellbeing, and manage risks (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008). The toolkit placed emphasis on identifying the risk and protective factors to radicalisation and is an example of the individual-centric approach that has often dominated educational P/CVE. Yet, with a more refined implementation process, the practice of supporting children, generating awareness and discussion of violent extremism, and enabling safe-space school communities that address, rather than avoid, sensitive topics is a viable future direction.

Critics emphasised the extent of the demands now placed upon teachers and school staff. Schools were now expected to promote cohesion, deradicalise, prevent violent extremism, and breakdown "suspicion and misunderstanding that can result from ignorance" (Moulin, 2012, p. 165). Arguably, the aims of the toolkit regarding raising awareness and providing information as well as trying to better support teachers were well-intentioned, yet, in practice, it has been reported that teacher training was neglected and the actual educational component was insubstantial

(Thomas, 2016). Elsewhere it has been criticised as a surveillance mission that fuels Islamophobia and unfairly singles out Muslim students (Coppock, 2014).

Next, in 2009, the UK government sought to provide a new initiative to support teachers, specifically of religious education, to prevent violent extremism. This included training such teachers to be confident enough to challenge extremist views; developing teachers' theological knowledge and cultural awareness; and building their theological knowledge of Islam, so they could confidently challenge Al Qaeda inspired messages (Miller, 2013). This became known as the REsilience project and ran for 22 months. It was designed to be an educational and mentoring initiative for teachers of religious education to improve their confidence for dealing with sensitive topics, such as religious extremism, as well as increase cultural awareness. The project provided these resources to almost 500 schools, many of which were situated in the Home Office's identified Prevent areas (Moulin, 2012). Again, the project proved controversial, yet the final evaluation demonstrated an improvement in teachers' cultural awareness, knowledge of religions and beliefs, and their confidence in dealing with delicate issues in the classroom (Miller, 2013, p. 189). However, part of the controversy was surrounding the intent behind both educational programmes. This may be a result of the broader Prevent strategy, which Quartermaine (2016) describes the aims as "confusing" (p. 18). As such, how schools deliver and meet the policy requirements of Prevent are not always clear (Quartermaine, 2016) and these intentions have raised suspicions about possible manipulation of the next generation of British subjects and the broader intent of shaping citizens through this process. Coppock (2014) states that *Learning Together to be Safe* contributes to a process of disciplinary normalisation in an effort to produce "governable subjects" (p. 115). Similarly, Miller quotes Gearon's analysis of REsilience as an attempt to serve and cohere with the state rather than critiquing it (p. 192). Miller surmises that as such, this "places even greater responsibility on teachers and curriculum designers to enable informed, critical engagement with these issues and, further, the question of who holds power and ownership of RE (religious education) in maintained schools" (p. 192).

It is apparent that there remains an element of Prevent that is open to interpretation. Whilst there is an overarching aspect to Prevent that dictates what should be taught, the *how* it is taught is less structured. Education materials that take place through government issued programmes like the *Learning Together to be Safe*

example may be more constraining in regard to the specific content, but other aspects of the Prevent duty like teaching fundamental British values, is left open to some interpretation. There is some opportunity to tailor such content to local contextual factors and this leaves teachers to develop content reflective of their own knowledge, skills, and situations. Today, whilst the achievements and success of these initiatives are widely debated and equally criticised (Arthur, 2015; Moulin, 2012; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015; Thomas, 2010) the efforts made by the UK to be one of the first governments to transfer from harder style counter-terrorism to a preventative approach are noteworthy.

Making changes to the previous CONTEST strategies, July 2011 saw a revised version presented to the UK parliament which briefly reviewed the progress made on educational initiatives undertaken through the Prevent branch. This 2011 review can be seen as a turning point in Prevent policy —it is here that 'Prevent 2' (Busher et al., 2017) begins to take shape. The 2011 revised version, under new leadership, was to now include a dedicated section for "Schools and Children" (HM Government, 2011b). A change in government and leadership contributed to the reasons behind the new release, with the newer version designed to more effectively target the extremist ideology at the heart of the terrorist threat, especially for young people, following a comprehensive review that indicated a number of necessary changes (HM Government, 2011b).

The 2011 version of CONTEST described the previous government's versions as "flawed" (p. 6) with the most pressing changes being made in the Prevent stream of CONTEST, including the preventative educational and school-based initiatives. This version of the strategy now drew attention to the young individuals who had been convicted of terrorism offences, a number within the 15–19-year age range. It broadened the government's focus from a largely Al Qaeda directed policy to a consideration of all forms of extremism, and not solely violent extremism (Busher et al., 2017). Significantly, the 2011 revision was to now include a consideration of simply extremism, as well as the declaration that no engagement or dialogue would take place with groups engaged in violent extremism (Bryan, 2017). Given this, the strategy now specifically outlined that teachers could help safeguard children from extremist messaging in the same way they help children avoid drugs and gang violence. Similar measures were outlined for Higher and Further Education places of learning noting that more than 30 per cent of Britain's convicted terrorists

(as at 2011) had attended university, another 15 per cent had pursued some other form of vocational or further education, and about ten per cent at their time of arrest were enrolled students (HM Government, 2011b).

The Prevent measures would support such institutions to ensure their environments were safe and welcoming and would work alongside local police forces to ensure security. Some emphasis was placed on the importance of screening external speakers on university campuses and for engagement with local Prevent groups and organisations to be strengthened. Later, such speakers were obligated to be presented with an opposing voice at the same presentation in order to offer debate rather than one-sided content (Travis, 2015). However, arguably the most significant changes to the Prevent policy were now placed on schools with the new compulsory requirement to teach what was termed fundamental British Values, the training that came with it called WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) and soon after, in 2015, a statutory duty to report and refer students considered 'at-risk' to the government's Channel process. These fundamental British Values were stated as: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs, and extremism, as understood by policymakers, was any opposition to these values (HM Government, 2011b, p. 107).[*]

This element of Prevent has received much criticism due to the unclear defining of such values and how to actually incorporate them into everyday teaching practice, especially because it was now compulsory that teachers do so and they could be faced at any time with an inspection to ensure this was happening. The teaching of these values also brought with it the underlying connotation that if you disagreed in any way with such values you were somehow less British and fuelled stigmatisation of such individuals (Busher, Choudhury, & Thomas, 2019). Studies like Busher et al., (2019) analysed responses from teaching staff and found that their concerns surrounded the fact that these values were specifically branded as British, not necessarily that teaching values was the problem, it was more so the labelling that came along with it.

Other studies have revealed that teachers, unsurprisingly, obey the statutory guidance to teach these values but that does not necessarily indicate agreement or support for the content, making statements such as "we do, but my heart is not in it"

[*] The Prevent Duty and the teaching of fundamental British Values does not cover Northern Ireland, so it is considered a policy of Great Britain - England, Scotland, and Wales (Thomas, 2020, p. 16).

(Bryan, 2017, p. 220). Busher et al.'s extensive study found that the promotion of these designated values formed one of the most substantive criticisms of the Prevent policy as a whole due to the specifically British nature and labelling as well as the unclear direction about how to actually transfer this to classroom lessons to ensure government requirements were being met accurately (Busher et al., 2017). One respondent even went as far as suggesting that "whoever thought that up should have been shot, in my opinion" referring to the widespread and confusing connotations associated with the title (p. 26). However, the study also found that for many respondents, the requirement to teach fundamental British values was somewhat flexible and could be used to adapt lessons around identity and belonging, rather than more exclusionary avenues like nationalism and imperialism (Busher et al., 2017). This reveals that there are various levels of acceptance and ambiguity amongst teaching staff regarding the policy indicating a need for future policy to more clearly define intentions and expectations.

Along with the statutory requirement to incorporate these values into classroom lessons was the next significant stage of the newer phase of Prevent. In 2015 the UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was introduced which set out a new legal duty for teachers and other public sector employees, such as those in the health field, to refer those individuals considered 'at-risk' of radicalisation and violent extremism to the government's Channel programme. This programme involved an assessment of this 'risk' and then either a referral elsewhere, a denial, or an acceptance of them into the Channel process. In its initial year, over 7000 people were referred and most of these individuals were referred from the education sector (Home Office, 2017; Jerome, Elwick, & Kazim, 2019).

However, under the Channel referral system once an individual is referred to the system, they are screened to ensure the referral is justified and then the appropriate next step is decided upon. Following the initial referral and screening, the individual may be considered 'not appropriate' for further Channel engagement and are either simply exited from the process or referred to an alternative support. Of the approximately 7000 referrals in Channel's first year, 36 per cent of these people did not require any further action and were exited from the system, yet the impact of this on the lives of these individuals is likely to be significant, such as in regards to the labelling and stigmatisation that may follow (da Silva, Fontana, & Armstrong, 2020).

Additionally, only 14 per cent were deemed suitable for Channel's programming which results in a specific action plan being developed to support the individual. The impact of referrals under the Prevent policy on those being referred, especially for those who are not required to take any further action, has been described as "troubling" and the situations and justifications for such reporting "laughable" (Thomas, 2017, p. 306). Analysis by Elwick and Jerome (2019) highlight this concern regarding the impact even just being referred may have on students. One teacher stated: "I believe he's OK but I don't know what happened afterwards at all. I wouldn't expect to know with Prevent" (pp. 342-343). Some of these children being referred were of primary school age, which draws attention to the branch of the literature highlighted earlier that considers at what age P/CVE programmes should be implemented. Further to this, a report released in late-2016 found that the Prevent duty creates a feeling of needing to over-refer which is likely to fuel already existing stigmatisation of minority groups, like Muslims (Busher et al., 2017) and may reflect the reporting of children as young as primary school age. Thomas (2016) describes this as a controversial 'future crime' approach whereby individuals experience a sort of remedial process when no actual crime has actually taken place (p. 179).

Whilst the impact on those being referred is one consideration, it is also important to acknowledge the impact on those doing the referring. Busher et al.'s (2017) research from 2016 sought to assess the impact the Prevent duty was having on teachers and educationalists to compare how it was being interpreted, how it was affecting school and college staff and their interactions with students and parents, and also staff members' attitudes towards the policy. The results from this research offered the field extensive new data that reveals the extent of the impact and points to suggestions that could shape future policy developments. However, this study is a rare example of research that assess the impacts on frontline staff expected to refer as part of their daily work practices. This is a point for future research to assess the impact on staff in schools who might not hold as much confidence in a clear support and information sharing process and confidence in their actions to pass on the right information to the right channels at the right time. One Designated Safeguarding Lead's (DSL) response implies this with their comment: "So, I think they feel supported" (p. 33), which suggests that there remains an element of uncertainty as to

whether the agenda is working as effectively as it could be for all staff in all environments.

Overall, Busher et al.'s findings indicate that the Prevent duty is still experiencing the effects of a trial and error period apparent amongst the various positive and negative reactions and an indication that there remains work to be done to ensure effectiveness and acceptance of the agenda. Despite this, there were positive reflections obvious within the data. A selection of responses indicated that employing the P/CVE agenda as a safeguarding measure in line with existing measures allowed it to be more well received: "I think it sits there (within safeguarding) really well because it kind of belongs there;" "I don't see it as much different from safeguarding;" and "I think as soon as people said 'it's a type of safeguarding' then it kind of clicked into place" (p. 23). This approach to implementing P/CVE policy into existing safeguarding channels may prove to be an example of best practice that might also be useful in other countries' agendas that are still in the trial and error phase, like Australia. Whilst these responses were of a more positive note, other responses highlighted the apprehension towards incorporating the content specified under the Prevent duty and meeting all of the obligations placed on school staff. One teacher stated they felt confident, but because they held confidence in their superiors – the individual they would pass their concerns onto: "…confident because I feel that I know to go to [name of DSL]…because she's confident, then I'm confident" (p. 33). This response highlights the importance of a strong internal network between staff that offers a supportive environment, but also raises a consideration that perhaps not all school staff in each and every school feel as supported or feel like the channels are as available and open.

A consideration of the Channel referral process highlights a number of key points. Firstly, it is important to note that the Channel process is a voluntary process whereby individuals are referred by professionals, like teachers, because something has concerned the professional that they believe requires addressing or looking into. Yet, the individual in question can choose whether to accept the support or not. Individuals are not forced to access the support or undertake the programmes suggested. This leaves the individual in question with options. Furthermore, it is collaborative in nature – there are multiple agencies working together to attempt to provide the most suitable support. This may mean other non-extremist related

support may be obtained, such as drug and alcohol help, again providing choices to the individual.

However, of concern is the ability for referrals to be made by a large number of public sector employees which likely increases the referral numbers overall and thus heightens the chances of these denied referrals. With opportunities for referral being more widespread – i.e. through more and more frontline teachers, healthcare workers, social workers – it can be anticipated that the referral numbers are likely to increase and thus alongside this, an increased likelihood that a portion of these referrals will not be required to undertake any Channel programming. As mentioned earlier, only 14 per cent of referrals in the first year were required to undertake the programming. In the 12 months ending March, 2019, this had decreased even further with ten per cent (of 5738 referrals) adopted as a Channel case (Home Office, 2019). The training for these frontline staff members – WRAP – is a one-hour long DVD session. With only one hour of non-face-to-face training designated to what is often a sensitive and controversial issue, it could be suggested that this training may not be the most effective approach for ensuring accurate referrals are made and limiting the number of 'incorrect' referrals because, as the statistics indicate, it is resulting in overreporting. Additionally, the training was also developed by the police forces which may contribute to the already securitised nature of Prevent.

Moreover, when an individual exits the Channel process they are reassessed at later points, which leads to questions regarding the impact of being 'tagged' in this manner and the consequences this may have on an individual's ability to move on following a referral. Whilst teachers quite possibly have the best interests of the child in mind when undertaking such referrals, statistics like the above reveal two key factors. Firstly, there appears to be a disjuncture in the training provided to school staff that advises on what to actually 'look for' when being alert to radicalisation and violent extremism amongst their students. And secondly, there exists a need to empirically evaluate the impacts a denied referral can have on these individuals. Do they simply go home and continue life as previously? Or does the referral fundamentally change how they live their lives? Do they now feel stigmatised and carry anger and frustration at being singled out? These factors require exploration.

Finally, the most contemporary version of CONTEST was released in the month of June 2018, following the more recent London and Manchester terrorist attacks. The new version was shaped by the changing environment caused by the

conflict in Syria, and other parts of the Middle East (which was contributing to a growth in British nationals participating as foreign fighters and at times attempting to return home), as well as the change in UK leadership that had taken place (HM Government, 2018).

The domestic attacks, however, served as the trigger to undertake a comprehensive review of the previous government's strategy to ensure it was as effective as possible and to adapt to the increased threat that had developed since 2011. As a result, findings indicated a need for a more systemic coordination across the public sector, including between local authorities, intelligence services, and health providers. Additionally, the more recent version placed less emphasis on the Prevent stream of CONTEST, yet the overarching aims changed little from the previous version. Rather, the lessons learnt from the London and Manchester attacks served as a point of consideration.

The 2018 document concentrates on the reviews and outcomes following the attacks in order to highlight any necessary operational changes to organisations like MI5 and the police. Four key recommendations emerged from these reviews, including: (1) improved use of intelligence data; (2) greater multi-agency work to manage the risks by closed persons of interest (individuals who have previously been investigated by Counter-Terrorism Policing or MI5); (3) a new approach to domestic extremism; and (4) technical changes to existing counter-terrorism processes (HM Government, 2018). No significant changes regarding schools and the broader education sector were made.

As the CONTEST policy, and more specifically Prevent strand of the strategy, has been refined over the course of its life it is clear that prevention and targeting the threat at the earliest stage possible is a focal point each time. Whilst the overall CONTEST strategy is broad in nature and draws little attention to specific educational interventions that focus on the content of such education, the initiatives that stem from the Prevent strategy have very much encompassed the education fields. This is evident by a reinforcing of the safeguarding practices and the duty for teachers to report individuals that cause concern, as well as a continuation of the WRAP training – stated to have been "completed over 1 million times" (HM Government, 2018).

Overwhelmingly, the most commonly cited critique of the Prevent strategy has been the stigmatisation of British Muslims. Stereotyping has been a persistent

concern and Islamophobia has led to further issues within communities (Coppock, 2014; Moulin, 2012; Novelli, 2017). The way in which Prevent and the broader CONTEST strategy were employed meant that Prevent areas were identified as locations in which a large Muslim population was living and therefore the programmes automatically targeted Muslim populations, which is where the sense of these communities being stigmatised came about (Moulin, 2012). This stereotyping has been a consistent concern expressed by critics for a number of years throughout the various versions of Prevent. Within the education field, this has had an effect on young Muslim children within their classrooms and playgrounds. Coppock (2014) describes this as "extremist = Muslim = threat" (p. 115) and Novelli (2017) describes it as "evident and worrying" (p. 846).

Additionally, this stigmatisation has somewhat evolved from the emphasis on British values that is dictated by the overall CONTEST strategy, of which this approach has been critiqued for idealising a "moderate Muslim" and distorting citizenship education in school environments (Coppock, 2014, p. 122). Whilst elsewhere, it has been argued that the stigmatisation that resulted from the earlier phase of Prevent that specifically targeted young Muslims and their communities has tarnished any future Prevent policy (Jerome, Elwick, & Kazim, 2019). Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim (2019) reviewed the empirical literature regarding teacher responses to Prevent post-2015 and found four key themes – Islamophobia, Britishness, Safeguarding, and Teacher agency. The authors concluded that there is evidence to suggest that white British teachers are more likely to focus their attention on Muslim students and this is received as suspicion and surveillance (p. 833). The authors identified that this safeguarding element of Prevent policy has overpowered the core education aspects.

Whilst using a moderate sample of 27 papers, the authors findings are consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature. For example, Taylor and Soni (2017) analysed qualitative UK-based studies from 2013-2016 and found two central considerations – pedagogical inefficacies and a problematic focus of Prevent. Like Jerome, Elwick, and Kazim (2019), Taylor and Soni (2017) – touched upon earlier – identified a problematic focus of surveillance and securitisation, especially for Muslim students, and an emphasis on individual vulnerabilities to be a key concern, as well as the pedagogical inefficacies, such as the impact on academic freedoms and

the “flawed” (p. 6) fundamental British values, that were often neglected in favour of the security and reporting aspects.

Moreover, the leaking of Prevent into religious education classes has led to cases of linking 9/11 with Islam, which has contributed to an indirect fuelling of this stereotyping of the Islamic religion and its followers (Moulin, 2012). For some, this has been perceived as an attempt to modify the identity and attitudes of non-traditional British citizens (Novelli, 2017, p. 844). Conclusions that point to issues of Islamophobia, stereotyping, and suspicion of minority communities highlights two key points of consideration. Firstly, it emphasises the impact a policy like Prevent can have on citizens and communities that is an ongoing impact. When a policy is first implemented it arguably leaves a legacy that will remain with those most impacted, in the UK example, British Muslims. Secondly, it raises questions as to how a policy like Prevent is going to adapt to a change in the extremist and terrorist threat – such as adapting to issues of far-right extremism – and how this will impact those already feeling the effects of the policy implementation. Is Prevent adaptable to a change in the nature of where this threat stems from or in which culture/religion it claims to be acting on behalf of? And how will this affect those feeling the consequences of Islamophobia and stigmatisation within Muslim communities?

Above and beyond the content specifics of an education response, a persistent theme in the literature covering the UK experience emphasises the domination of a focus on securitisation rather than the education aspect. Jerome and Elwick (2019) have considered this securitisation-versus-education response highlighting a skewed direction towards securitisation over and above a focus on educational content and material. The authors argue instead for education that nurtures and builds critical thinking skills with less focus placed on the monitoring and reporting of students. The authors review a small project called the *Building Resilience Project* and conclude that the effectiveness of distinct education responses should be prioritised over the security aspects of the Prevent policy, like reporting to Channel. Most especially, the authors stress the influence in these modern times of heavy media and social media absorption and thus, the need to teach critical media skills, for example, to be able to filter what is accurate and what is not forms a potential educational response that could be employed more broadly.

Of note in this study also was the importance of trust in the teacher-student relationship. Within the literature there exists examples whereby the potential risk to

a hindering or breaking of trust in this relationship is questioned. Bryan (2017) underscores the contradiction that exists under the Prevent duty whereby teachers are required to host discussions and lessons around topics like extremism and terrorism and the teaching of the aforementioned fundamental British Values, yet all the while looking out for anything that may trigger a referral to Channel.

A consideration of the teacher responses to the Prevent policy reveals more criticism than support, but positive responses can be found. Busher et al.'s findings revealed that just over half (56%) of the respondents did not feel that the requirements of the Prevent duty had altered the level of trust in relationships between staff and students with some (11%) even indicating that there was now more trust. The study also revealed findings that indicate that Prevent has even fuelled opportunities to address issues often neglected in classrooms, such as strengthening work around racism, prejudice, and inequality. Additionally, the authors' research indicated there was much confidence amongst the teaching staff surveyed, albeit most commonly amongst more experienced members of staff. Another such positive was the finding that the Prevent duty has not had the 'chilling' effect (p. 65) on free speech and open dialogue amongst the sample of respondents that it has had elsewhere, such as within particular pockets of the UK and its communities, like some Muslim communities (Husband & Alam, 2011). Finally, the research discovered that the element of framing the policy around existing safeguarding principles led to wider acceptance and engagement with the requirements placed upon them as teachers (Busher et al., 2017). What these factors reveal is a need for future research into the impacts the Prevent duty is having on these relationships and how best to increase positive responses like these findings, especially after a referral has taken place and how this affects aspects of teacher-student relationships, like trust, going forward. Studies have revealed trust is a matter of concern for teaching staff, especially in regard to encouraging students to open up on sensitive matters while at the same time policing their responses (Elwick & Jerome, 2019).

Elwick and Jerome (2019) conducted interviews across 10 schools to assess the impact of Prevent and the level of teacher agency when meeting strategy requirements. The authors found that the policy is enacted in quite different ways and some staff have even felt quite removed from Prevent and its requirements. There was however, two clear contrasting perceptions to Prevent: firstly, the desire to look out for concerning behaviours and follow the protocols placed on them – for the

wellbeing of the young person but also for the individual job security about doing what was now required of them as a teacher. Secondly, there was the alternate perception about the importance of students learning about these sorts of things – "it's something we have to do when something comes up" (p. 345). The study's findings reflect other studies in the literature in regard to the balance between the securitisation aspects of prevent with the educational demands, like teaching fundamental British Values. Above all, studies like these reveal the need to further evaluate the impact these somewhat contradicting demands are having on teachers, but also students, as to how trust is affected and how open students are prepared to be in these discussions knowing the Channel referral process exists.

The Prevent duty has, in part, changed the role of the teacher. Instructing classroom content and safeguarding children from harm may arguably have been a traditional element of teaching practice. However, reporting (overreporting) young people to a referral process for reasons they may be 'at-risk' of radicalisation and violent extremism has potentially permanently altered the role of a teacher and this may result in a permanent negative legacy, much like the Prevent policy has seen with stigmatisation of Muslims. In some regards, the expanding of Prevent policy to include simply extremism and not just violent extremism, possibly contributed to a broadening of the grey area between something that is worthy of reporting or referring to an avenue like Channel and something that is not. It has brought about unique considerations for the role of the teacher for what may be considered a specialist area, reflected through the mass over-reporting and rejected referrals in Channel's first year of operation. The UK experience highlights the changing nature of educational P/CVE policy and the trial and error that is taking place. What the UK example reveals is that the value of teacher input and the impacts on teachers and school communities is significant but poorly considered thus far. It also speaks to the importance of teacher experience when delivering such content, but also the need for thorough teaching training that heightens staff confidence. Whilst there are undoubtedly tighter controls under the Prevent and wider CONTEST policies in contemporary British society, especially in schools, there is room for bottom-up approaches that better incorporate the voices and perspectives of frontline individuals so as to improve the likelihood of positive engagement and outcomes.

Above all, a policy analysis and a review of the existing literature on P/CVE policy approaches reveals that policy design and implementation is still very much in

a trial and error period. The UK has not found ‘the answer’ to preventing acts of violent extremism and policy has also not identified an inclusionary approach to P/CVE that limits unintended consequences for those on the receiving end of such polices. Much of the negative damage surrounding Prevent can be linked to the earliest stages of the policy and its flaws, of which are proving difficult to rectify. In regard to the education field, there is an obvious premise that actual education has been neglected for securitisation and policing, which in reality, has been “problematic and possibly even counter-productive” (Thomas, 2016). It is here the input of teachers and parents may be most useful for future policy. Teachers may be able to guide policy that accurately develops an educational component that is truly educational. Furthermore, parents may be able to offer guidance as to the wider aspects of development that could be incorporated, or ‘tools’ that could assist, for a holistic approach to educational P/CVE. As yet, this appears to be largely absent from the planning and developmental stages of policy design and is sparsely available in the literature.

3.7 Case study two: Denmark

An analysis of Denmark’s P/CVE policies also reveals a growing trend towards using schools and educational environments in the wider policy agenda, yet, like the UK there is also little evidence to support its effectiveness thus far. Preventing radicalisation and violent extremism in Denmark is long rooted in a traditional approach to crime prevention in the country. The experiences of Denmark’s educational P/CVE approach is less direct than in the UK example. This system targets crime amongst young people (originally under the age of 18 but later expanded to young people under 25) and is a cross-collaborative design between schools, social services, and the police – the SSP model. Danish policy under the national action plan calls for a stronger involvement of civil society in prevention work and initiatives work towards outreach, knowledge sharing, and training (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016). The Danish model has been applauded for its multi-agency and collaborative approach (Kotajoki, 2018) and studies have identified the importance of incorporating local communities in P/CVE policy (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016). Yet, others have expressed concerns at the ‘blurring’ of boundaries between policing and welfare (Johansen, 2020).

The SSP model, in place in Danish society since the 1970s, has been expanded and strengthened over time, and now covers Denmark in its entirety. Every local authority district in Denmark has its own SSP system in place, which provides locals with a touchpoint for all things related to radicalisation, extremism, and general crime prevention (Danish Government, 2014). Crime prevention needs in Denmark have changed over the decades, but the foundations of the SSP model have remained the same and have been transferable to address the varying criminal issues that present among young people. Nowadays, radicalisation and violent extremism are proving to be a central point of concern for much of Danish society (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

Denmark has experienced a number of young people being recruited by or to foreign terrorist organisations overseas, and there are also examples of young people being inspired to conduct a terrorist act on Danish soil (Danish Government, 2014). The Danish approach to P/CVE is based upon the work already undertaken through the SSP model of crime prevention and seeks to provide radicalised individuals with a way back into Danish society. With this in mind, the educational aspects of the Danish model are less pronounced as they form a component of the wider Danish policy model. However, there are examples of programmes and in-school initiatives that utilise the education field and working with young people as an approach under the wider P/CVE policy agenda. This second case study will outline how Denmark has incorporated its P/CVE policy agenda into existing programming. This approach differs to the UK experience outlined in the first case study whereby most policy approaches resulted in new initiatives or major changes to existing agendas. This case study will map the policy changes in the post-9/11 era with a consideration for how the education sector has been integrated to achieve P/CVE objectives. The case study will demonstrate how the education sector has been incorporated in a less-direct manner than the UK example showed, revealing a more positive response. However, the Denmark case study will also highlight the outcomes of stereotyping and stigmatisation of Muslim communities that was also evident in the UK experience.

As early as 2007, the Danish Government began planning for a new approach to P/CVE that would take a more preventative – earlier – approach to the radicalisation issues facing Danish society. In January 2008, the government established a working group of officials from a number of government departments

who would together develop a proposal for an action plan (Danish Government, 2009). The working group consulted with similar organisations and officials in other countries to establish best practices and then convened regularly with a draft presentation of the action plan put forward in June of the same year. The report set out the unique challenges facing Danish society and it was then agreed that the draft should be made available to the Danish public for input, suggestions, and recommendations. Local SSP-affiliated groups like schools, police units, and local governments were all consulted in the process to ensure a collaborative approach to countering radicalisation and violent extremism (Danish Government, 2009).

Denmark's 2009 strategy *A common and safe future: An action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among young people* – took a somewhat more militaristic approach to counter-terrorism than later publications, but it was clear from the document that the Danish Government could also see the value in a community-based, collaborative, soft-power approach. Concern with gangs and youth crime was made obvious as a high government priority for combatting antisocial behaviours amongst young people, especially when originating from gang associations (Danish Government, 2009). The government set out its intentions to combat both hardened gang criminals as well as young people who might be deemed "maladjusted" and susceptible to the appeals of gang membership – a more preventative strategy – and may reveal indications as to the future policy direction of working with young people in educational spaces. This was supported by the formation of a specialised Youth Commission to focus attention solely on youth crime.

From the early stages, the Danish Government saw the potential transferability between initiatives that targeted general youth crime and more specific programmes for addressing violent extremism. Education was highlighted as a key focus area for future routes that would seek to improve the skills of socially vulnerable young people and children as young as primary school age in the longer-term hope of improving school dropout rates. A campaign – Need For all Youngsters – would begin this initiative through school visits, activities, and recruitment drives to employment (Danish Government, 2009). Whilst not P/CVE specific, it was an attempt to use education to bolster opportunities and maintain young people on a structured path of education. This earlier strategy received similar criticism to the UK model in that it was seen as unfairly targeting Danish Muslims and was

restricting the freedoms of Danish citizens (Lindekilde, 2012a). However, somewhat unique to the Danish policy is the inclusion of the public in the consultation process during the developmental stages of the plan. This collaborative effort may arguably increase the chances of such policies being accepted by the general public following implementation and may even reduce the impacts and consequences.

It was made clear that the action plan did "not only constitute a new effort…[but] represents a further development and coordination of existing efforts" (Danish Government, 2009, p.7). The Danish approach to P/CVE saw the potential in transferring the benefits from existing initiatives already in place for alternative concerns to counter-extremism-specific programmes and methods. Two main objectives were presented along with a number of sub-initiatives. Firstly, the countering of extremist propaganda was to be widespread and factual and should extend outside of Denmark. Secondly, a refinement and advancement of Danish democratic values was to support the counter-narratives in order to enhance community resilience to extremism (Danish Government, 2009, p. 11). Seven focus areas included 22 specific initiatives for Danish society to counter extremism and radicalisation in all its communities. A number of these 22 initiatives were largely focused on earlier interventions and more preventative programming that was designed to engage with young people well before they had reached the point of planning or supporting the use of violence. A well-rounded role in society for young people was considered the basis for successful transitions to adulthood. Schooling, extra-curricular community activities, prosocial leisure time, and engaging in employment were believed to provide young people with viable alternatives to those being presented by recruiters (Danish Government, 2009). Targeted preventative talks, mentoring schemes, and specialised interventions where needed were planned as support for local actors to engage with their young people in the community. Local actors would also receive professional development and training so as to successfully implement the frontline community work for preventing radicalisation in young people (Danish Government, 2009, pp. 12-13). These prevention approaches would then be supported by education initiatives.

It is clear from this initial action plan that improving knowledge, raising awareness, and developing solutions for the whole of Danish society was embedded in the blueprint. In addition, the plan called for a strengthening of parental responsibility in order to better support young people. It was stated that specialised

programmes that were already in place for supporting parents to guide their children away from delinquent behaviours would also be utilised for concerns about violent extremism (Danish Government, 2009). The approach was collaborative and cross-contextual and incorporated schools as well as a number of other public bodies and authorities.

Under this earlier policy, an increase in dialogue and communication between departments, civil society, and communities was expected to assist young people to find their place. The goal was to present young people with facts, accurate information, a chance to have their voices heard, an opportunity to engage with society's democratic processes, and a broadened knowledge base of international issues (Danish Government, 2009). In addition, an enhancement of resilience in young people would be backed by public school curricula that reiterated the democratic values of civics and citizenship, comparable with the UK experience, with the particular involvement of school principals. This education focus would also extend to religious mentors and preachers as well as to new citizens making a new life in Denmark (Danish Government, 2009). The Danish model of countering violent extremism was quick to transition from a militaristic, hard-power approach to a preventative soft-power process. While the Danish Government had also developed new legislation, broadened intelligence efforts, and strengthened police powers, the transition to preventative methods to support freedoms and equality in Danish society was developed early in the post-9/11 era and has allowed for more regular refinements of best practices and ways forward.

Following the 2009 policy, in 2014 the Danish Government released an updated version of its policy agenda now called *Prevention of Radicalisation and Extremism Action Plan*, which was revised after persistent concern about young people being recruited to radicalised or extremist groups or behaviours (Danish Government, 2014). Since the original 2009 plan, the nature of the challenges had changed and a refinement of preventative measures was required as well as fresh, new initiatives that would address the more contemporary concerns, such as the movement of young Danish citizens into overseas conflicts. Denmark's 2014 P/CVE action plan remained aligned with traditional approaches to youth crime prevention, which again demonstrates the potential transferability between P/CVE programmes and prevention programmes in general. In regard to schools and educational institutions, the 2014 plan made clear that educational environments were at the

forefront of identifying radicalisation amongst their student bodies and this required additional support networks to enhance preventative efforts.

The report stated that in Denmark educational institutions had previously struggled with how to cope when faced with a student demonstrating signs of radicalisation. This new plan proposed additional initiatives particularly designed for school environments. Educational institutions would be supported by the National Board of Social Services, civil society organisations, local authorities, and police districts to design new initiatives and action plans specific to the needs of schools and other places of learning (Danish Government, 2014). More recent developments in Denmark, as well as in other countries, had revealed the importance of not only targeting young people who appeared disenfranchised with their place in society but also focusing on teens and young adults who appeared well-adjusted. It was clear a new direction dedicated to schools and learning establishments was vital to preventative efforts that broadened the knowledge and skills sets of frontline educational workers.

A number of other initiatives already in place at that time in Denmark were proving successful and paved the way for future directions. An example was the collaborative initiative between the Danish Government and the city of Aarhus who together designed a targeted programme for intervening to stop people travelling to and from Syria. The Aarhus Model was first designed in 2013 in collaboration with the police service in the city and arose out of concern that individuals travelling to conflict zones often return more radicalised than when they left (Danish Government, 2014). The initiative works on reporting by friends, family members, or concerned others to the ‘Info-house,’ which is staffed by the local police force; three types of interventions then follow. Firstly, individual guidance and advice is provided about the risks and consequences of travelling to Syria. Following this, similar guidance and advice is provided to the relatives of these individuals. Finally, dialogue and work within the local community forms part of the intervention as this bolsters the individual work being undertaken and solidifies the community-based side of the intervention (Danish Government, 2014). The Aarhus Model has been critiqued as a ‘hug a terrorist’ solution, but thus far has been considered effective in providing young people with some empathy and understanding to bring them back from extremist associations (Williams & Tozer, 2017). Furthermore, evaluations have suggested that the model is based on assumptions that immigrants are the main

source of radicalised individuals because emphasis is placed on integrating immigrant communities into wider Denmark society as a solution (O'Halloran, 2017). Yet, the initiative was seen as leading model that soon became known as the "Danish Model" (Johansen, 2020) and it has remained throughout the policy changes to P/CVE which indicates that the model holds some strengths that ensure its longevity.

Just over two years later, the Danish Government released the October 2016 version of the action plan after identifying new challenges and a need to intensify existing efforts. The 2016 plan was a revised version following the 2015 attacks in Copenhagen which saw a gunman open fire on a café hosting an Islam and free speech debate with one death and injuries to three police officers (Johnston, 2015). The newly agreed upon plan would strengthen the relationship between the Danish police and the Public Prosecution Service to build on previously established legislation changes (Danish Government, 2016). The 2016 plan reiterated the importance of both hard power and soft power approaches to counter-terrorism, especially through a solid foundation of preventative measures that work with civil society and authoritative bodies, a consistent pattern throughout Denmark's P/CVE policies. The revised plan was also consistent with the previous 2014 and 2009 versions by calling for further interventions in day care centres, schools, and other educational institutions so as to ensure Danish children and adolescents were being provided with social skills, critical thinking capabilities, and a concrete role in a democratic Danish society, as well as helping to build their resilience to extremist narratives (Danish Government, 2016). The plan maintained its multi-agency approach and focused on extremism and not just violent extremism (Kotajoki, 2018).

The 2016 plan argued for the importance of maintaining the work already in place for Denmark and noted that the revised version was simply a bolstering of the work already being undertaken from the previous plans. The SSP still forms the focal point of Denmark's P/CVE and deradicalisation initiatives from 2016 onwards, with the core contact point remaining as the Info-houses.

Denmark's widespread collaborative approach to P/CVE is unique in its integration. A number of bodies have a role to play, including the health and psychiatric fields, the National Agency for Education and Quality, the National Crime Prevention Centre and the National Organisation for Knowledge and Specialist Consultancy in relation to social affairs and special education (Danish

Government, 2016, pp. 14-15). In Denmark, P/CVE programmes form part of the traditional roles of these departments and governing bodies. Counter-radicalisation thus becomes an essential component of the day-to-day workings of these institutions, rather than a stand-alone approach. This demonstrates the expected longevity of the presence of violent extremism in Danish society, but also reveals the trends that may be addressed through previous experience with issues surrounding young people in society. "Radicalisation is considered a risk behaviour along with other types of risk behaviour that may lead to criminality" (Danish Government, 2016, p. 16).

It has been highlighted, however that the Danish action plans of 2009, 2014, and 2016 each define radicalisation as an individual process, which dictates that deradicalisation is thus the responsibility of the individual (Lindekilde, 2012b). According to the documents, P/CVE will likely also require novel responses to suit this individual nature to counter the unique patterns that present in ideologically motivated violence, but these can work in line with already tried and tested crime prevention responses (Danish Government, 2016).

The Danish approach to prevention, whilst less education-focused than the UK model, is more widespread across multiple agencies, organisations, and departments. It is more difficult to identify education-specific proposals in the implementation of Denmark's policy agenda as it shares targeted intervention outcomes with many other institutions. This is likely due to its ongoing broad nature (Kotajoki, 2018). However, some initiatives are outlined below.

The SSP model, which includes the work of schools, has formed the central component of the prevention scheme, and Danish schools are integral to the collaborative approach that is undertaken. The 2016 action plan prioritised schools and education as one of the nine new focus areas maintaining a focus on improving young people's critical thinking capacities and expanding civic values instruction (Danish Government, 2016). The Danish Folkeskole – 'people's school' or 'public school' – implemented changes in the 2015–16 academic year to bring about an increased focus on pupils' "sense of citizenship and critical faculties" (Danish Government, 2016, p. 21). In order to achieve this, a fresh focus on human rights education was to become a fixed component of the national curriculum with a central element on health, sexuality, and family education (Danish Government, 2016). Moreover, the study of Danish and History would place greater emphasis on critical

analysis of sources – both digital and print – whilst also ensuring Danish language skills build communication competencies in younger children (Danish Government, 2016). These initiatives may be considered less-P/CVE specific in their content and direction but offer similarities with the UK's experience regarding the role of citizenship education and the desire to build critical thinking capacities.

A number of other resources would be implemented across Denmark to encourage the involvement of school environments in building resilience to violent extremism and radicalisation. In 2017, the Ministry for Children, Education, and Gender Equality instigated a theme week for democracy and community citizenship. This week would place emphasis on democracy in Denmark through community feeling and engagement approaches. In addition, the National Agency for Education and Quality would design new resources and materials for teachers and staff of educational institutions that would help guide them to implement appropriate and suitable activities directed towards preventing marginalisation and radicalisation (Danish Government, 2016). Additionally, the agency would hire specialist learning consultants to assist schools on the best practices for preventing radicalisation and violent extremism and how to employ these in their own environments. These consultants would also organise events across Denmark that would focus on school-specific democracy, citizenship, and the prevention of radicalisation (Danish Government, 2016).

These initiatives find parallels with the UK policies of building P/CVE into existing citizenship studies classes. Also, counselling for educational institutions regarding the steps to be taken if recruitment to radicalisation was taking place within the school, or even within the local school community, would also be put in place. As well as face-to-face counselling, an advisory hotline for school staff, run by learning consultants, would be established to allow teachers and administrators an opportunity to seek assistance and support and have their questions answered regarding prevention in schools. Additionally, day care facilities, primary schools, and secondary schools would receive increased attention to aid their resilience to violent extremism. Involving parents in their children's learning was a goal, and enhanced pedagogical methods would look to build more well-equipped professionals and teachers (Danish Government, 2016). This would extend to the communities and local out-of-school clubs and associations also considered necessary to help foster resilience in children through identity building and

togetherness. However, as mentioned, Denmark's initiatives, similar to the UK approach, have also been critiqued for their stigmatisation of minority communities, namely Danish Muslim communities, and the potential polarisation that can take place when dealing with sensitive deradicalisation and P/CVE work (Hemmingsen, 2015).

Denmark's approach to counter radicalisation and P/CVE has also been criticised for difficulties in assessing the impacts of the interventions, which may be a result of the general lack of consensus in this regard which can be found in the field. Recent studies like Parker and Lindekilde (2020) have attempted to offer some empirical evaluation data for educational interventions. The authors report findings for a state-funded educational intervention in Denmark that utilised former extremists to provide their stories through a theatre-style monologue. The authors evaluated feedback from 1931 participants concluding that educational interventions that use former extremists increase the ability to identify and navigate extremist messaging, improve confidence in knowing where to turn to access support, and can be successful in lowering the perceived legitimacy of political violence. Recent evaluations like Parker and Lindekilde (2020) emphasise the need to continue to evaluate educational P/CVE interventions and the impacts they have on participants. No data was provided as to the impact on teaching staff, which were present for the interventions and assumedly may experience continued feedback in the days/weeks following the intervention or be able to experience noticeable impacts over a longer term. These considerations pinpoint a factor for future research.

It is clear that the Danish approach to P/CVE in educational environments is widespread and spans schools and educational institutions of varying contexts. However, again like the UK example, there have been suggestions of securitisation and policing that reflects this broad scope of the policy and the blending of security into welfare (Johansen, 2020). Studies like Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack (2016) have however, pointed to the importance of including civil society in such policy agenda and moreover, the significance of developing trust between citizens and authoritative bodies. The study considered the building of resilience as a P/CVE approach to discover which local actors are central to community resilience to militant Islamism concluding that the benefits of social capital outweighed economic capital even in socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Thus, on the one hand, analyses point to the need to be cautious about how wide and deep governments

combine security and monitoring into everyday societal structures in order to identify individuals. On the other, it is also clear that there are some benefits to building state government initiatives into local contexts, like the opportunity to be transparent in the implementation of policy and the significance of working on-the-ground within societies to conduct P/CVE agendas.

The Danish approach to countering violent extremism and radicalisation has been admired and used as a basis for other states yet has also received criticism for its softness towards individuals returning from foreign conflict zones (Hemmingsen, 2015). The uniqueness of Denmark's approach receives attention for its integration and utilisation of existing structures and initiatives developed for other purposes. This method means that policymakers are able to draw from decades of experience in other areas and utilise existing networks and resources, which can then be tailored as needed to address specific radicalisation concerns and violent extremism targets. This learning by doing and trial and error method encourages collaboration across Denmark and is reflective of the UK example, also. Yet, it is the unique understanding of terrorism as a crime comparable with other crimes present within Danish society that is unique to the Danish approach.

A consideration of the Danish policy developments across the 2009, 2014, and 2016 plans demonstrates this global growing trend towards using schools and other education providers to combat violent extremism in young people. As yet though, there is little empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of these interventions in reducing occurrences of radicalisation and violent extremism or widespread empirical evidence to assess the impacts of these policies on teachers, staff, and students. This leaves room for future research to assess this impact to better understand the effects of these P/CVE policies.

3.8 Case study three: Australia

Within Australia, interest in school-based P/CVE initiatives began to generally take shape around 2014 and 2015 (Aly, et al., 2014) as the state and federal governments moved to address a growing threat with violent extremism amongst adolescents. This is, in part, a result of the incidences of young people being attracted to violently extreme or radicalised pathways and taking steps towards such actions. In Australia, 85 per cent (n=22) of convicted jihadis were aged between 18 and 35 at the time of their arrest, which indicates a need to develop programmes that

target younger Australians, such as during their schooling years (Harris-Hogan, 2017, p. 7). Recent examples of Australian teens like Abdul Numan Haider (aged 18 years), Farhad Jabar (15 years of age), and Jake Bilardi (18 years of age) reveal there is a pocket of young adolescents of school age that require additional support.

Educational P/CVE in Australia has generally been selective in where it is implemented and reflects this more individual-centric approach to at-risk individuals and locations; it has not been a nationwide, or even state-wide policy implementation yet. At present, there is no indication that schools and the wider education community are implementing any broad educational components, like Britain's fundamental British Values (albeit controversial) to address violent extremism. Rather, Australia's policy thus far has been more selective in who it addresses and where. In contrast to the UK and Denmark examples, Australia's experience with P/CVE policy agenda has largely been employed through state governments. Following Australia's federal system and government, the country then is separated into six states and two territories, which all maintain their own governments and legislation. Whilst there exists federal policies and initiatives, like the Living Safe Together website, schools operate under state or territory government authority and any school-based initiatives vary across each state and territory. Australia's educational P/CVE thus far has been different in each state and no compulsory federal educational initiative exists.

The most recent P/CVE initiatives in Australia are being rolled out in secondary school environments and P/CVE material is most often addressed in more senior classes (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Smith, 2019; NSW Department of Education, 2016b). However, with young people able to leave school prior to senior years, there remains a portion of older adolescents who would be less likely to experience these programmes. In NSW, Australia's most populous state, actual programming has only taken place in more recent times and at present, this exists as a programme called *School Communities Working Together* (NSW Government Education, 2020). In Victoria, two incidents involving teenagers in late-2014 and early-2015 (an attempted beheading of two Victorian Joint Counter Terrorism Team employees by an 18-year-old and the death of another 18-year-old during a suicide bombing in Iraq) propelled educational P/CVE policy. Broadly speaking, educational P/CVE programming in Victoria has occurred more-so as awareness training for senior school staff to then be disseminated to teachers, which was then broadened to

other jurisdictions across Australia (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, Smith, 2019). Prior to this there have been examples of mentoring and workshop-style initiatives that had been funded under the federal government's Building Community Resilience Grants Programme (covered below) but these were often short-term, even one or two days, with little available information on their impacts with some suggestions that certain initiatives were only lightly directed at actual P/CVE related material (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2016; Lauland, Moroney, Rivers, Bellasio, & Cameron, 2019). Examples include Aman: Youth for Victoria Peace-Building and Development of a common Curriculum Framework in Islamic Studies for Islamic Schools (NCEIS). Australia's experience thus far appears to be based on the objective of targeting specific individual or groups of individuals from areas or communities considered at risk and is not as widespread in its policy agenda as the UK and Denmark have shown.

Initially, in 2011, the Australian Government's Department of Defence funded a literature review on the best practices for countering violent extremism across multiple areas (Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011) but at that time, no mention was made of the use of schools or other educational institutions as a method for implementing P/CVE approaches. The research focused on the post-2000 period and argued that little had changed in the field of terrorism studies. Specifically, the review argued that there remained a lack of primary analysis and research into P/CVE interventions was obvious as well as a gap in evaluation practices. The report is thorough in its critique of the existing literature (at the time) with a detailed P/CVE chapter presenting studies from a variety of schools of thought. Within this P/CVE chapter, however, it is clear that an education intervention had yet to be drawn into the discussion.

In 2010–11, as part of the Australian Governments continued advancement of P/CVE efforts the Australian Government also moved to release its first round of funding under the Building Community Resilience Grants Programme. This was an initiative intended to "support community-based non-government and local government organisations to build capacity to deliver services to help radicalised individuals move away from violent ideologies or extremism" (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.-b). Funding for these programmes continued until the end of the 2013–14 round, then in mid-2014 the Attorney-General's Department launched the Countering Violent Extremism Unit to continue the work with local organisations

and other government departments (note: at present, the Countering Violent Extremism Unit now operates out of the Department of Home Affairs) (Counter Extremism Project, 2016b). Projects that received funding under this initiative were varied, with no other major requirement aside from a goal of reducing violent extremism and radicalisation in the community (Attorney-General's Department, n.d.-c). As yet, there was still no obvious focus on educational initiatives as an area in which funding was being directed.

Then, in August 2014, the *New Countering Violent Extremism Programme* was released with additional funding and a new emphasis on prevention and early intervention (Attorney-General's Department, 2014). New deradicalisation programmes, further community partnerships, and a focus on addressing online radicalisation became the fresh emphasis, with the first mentions of "educational pathway support" and equipping "local institutions" appearing (Attorney-General's Department, 2014, p. 1). The new release highlighted the need to build on experience and research to "provide much needed education and support programmes for vulnerable Australians at risk of radicalisation and violence" (Attorney-General's Department, 2014, p. 2).

This was the initial beginning of a new focus in Australia on the role of educational institutions in the P/CVE arena. With these new measures came an increase in literature that considered the educational context and what it might mean for Australia. Shahram Akbarzadeh (2013) has considered this new educational approach, but within the realm of educating in Islamic theology. Akbarzadeh contends that there is an underlying assumption in government policy that radical Muslims have a narrow and inaccurate understanding of their religion and, as a result, education programmes (at least in the beginning) were directed towards correcting this (Akbarzadeh, 2013). Akbarzadeh reviews the Building Community Resilience Grants Programme, as well as the Peer-to-Peer: Building Capacity and Resilience programme by the Australian Multicultural Foundation. According to Akbarzadeh, both these initiatives work towards countering any skewed interpretation of Islam in order to combat extremism.

The importance of education programmes of a variety of types, as a component of a comprehensive countering violent extremism approach, is becoming increasingly acknowledged in Australia as beneficial for resisting the pull factors identified with violent extremism (Aly et al., 2014). This was endorsed by

Australian-based research conducted by Grossman and Tahiri (2015) in which community perceptions of radicalisation were investigated. Respondents noted the importance of education, especially critical reasoning skills, amongst other factors, for addressing the drivers of violent extremism. Similarly, participants highlighted the need for developing counter-narratives to online radicalised messages and the need for educational plans to ensure a balanced understanding of extremist-driven online content. Overall, respondents identified “understanding” and “education” as the most important solutions for combatting the drivers towards radicalisation and extremism (Grossman & Tahiri, 2015).

A large proportion of P/CVE educational work has taken place in New South Wales. In late 2015, the state government announced a significant increase in funding for countering violent extremism in schools which also included a focus on preparing school staff and raising awareness. This additional funding would be directed towards providing more counselling staff and support services as well as the training to help identify vulnerable youth (NSW Government, 2015a). The new measures were to begin with the new school year in 2016 to better support young people at risk of being drawn into, or already engaged in, violent extremism, and their families (Coultan, 2015).

A NSW Government media release dated 2 November 2015 announced $47 million worth of measures put forward in response to the murder of Curtis Cheng – a police worker shot and killed outside Police headquarters by a 15-year-old. The release was brief, but opened with an intent to provide students with more counselling and support services and for school staff to be trained in identifying young people who might be vulnerable (NSW Government, 2015b). These new methods would be put in place for the start of the 2016 school year and would feature “up to” five specialist school support teams to work with “identified” schools and “respond to critical incidents” (NSW Government, 2015b). It is difficult to find criteria or evaluations as to how these schools were identified but highlights the more targeted approach that Australia’s educational P/CVE policy has taken whereby P/CVE agenda has often been implemented in selected schools identified as at some sort of risk, rather than an across-the-board approach. In addition to the school-based measures, the funding would also allocate provisions to focus on building community cohesion and maintaining cultural harmony as well as $8 million for community resilience initiatives (NSW Government, 2015b). The media release

provided limited details as to the specifics of the programmes involved, however the turn towards an educational approach to P/CVE with roots in community engagement was apparent.

As part of these policy measures, the NSW Government has initiated an in-school programme titled *School Communities Working Together*, which guides teachers and school staff on how to manage “anti-social and extremist behaviour in NSW schools” (Association of Independent Schools NSW, 2016, p. 1). The guidelines encourage schools to prepare for and then respond to such behaviour by:

- Fostering resilient and inclusive school communities;
- Identifying and supporting young people who require additional assistance; and
- Having effective incident management and support plans.

(Association of Independent Schools, 2016, p. 1)

This new programme has currently been implemented in 19 identified schools in NSW considered at risk, mostly in western and south-western Sydney, on a voluntary basis (Urban & Loussikian, 2017), yet it is simply too early to assess the success of the new programme or obtain substantial publicly accessible information regarding the finer details of the programme. Whilst only 19 schools have taken on the pilot stage of the programme, all NSW schools are advised to utilise the resources made available through the new programme (NSW Government Education, 2018).

Additionally, all NSW principals have been encouraged to complete an online module through the *School Communities Working Together* programme to build awareness and ensure the right strategies are implemented. It is difficult to obtain details about the programme above and beyond the parental fact sheet available from the NSW Department of Education, which states that the role of schools is to work alongside parents and the community as a whole in order to ensure students feel connected to their school and their community (NSW Department of Education, 2016a). The programme will arguably prove most successful if supported by the school community as a whole and if it works towards reconnecting disconnected students with their school and their immediate community (Armstrong, 2017).

The fact sheet “for parents and carers” outlines the role of schools in supporting student wellbeing and addressing antisocial behaviour. However, any P/CVE-related

terminology has been left out of the document. There is almost no mention of terms like violent extremism, countering violent extremism, radicalisation, or deradicalisation. This is noteworthy and likely a deliberate move to ensure the highly charged terminology from the P/CVE field does not blur the message being relayed in the document. Often the terminology from the P/CVE field receives criticism for the lack of clear understandings and a removal of these terms altogether may reduce the stigma associated with P/CVE initiatives. This is in contrast to the document published for executive teams in schools, which describes its purpose as guiding school staff in managing anti-social and extremist behaviour (Association of Independent Schools NSW, 2016).

This Association of Independent Schools' (AISNSW) publicly available guidelines for the *School Communities Working Together* initiative is the most detailed document available to the public regarding the programme. As such, it has been used in this section to provide information, noting that the public school NSW Department of Education website offers extremely limited public information. The guidelines, intended for executive teams of independent (privately funded, not government-funded) schools, are more thorough in describing recommendations and processes, and how the initiative ties in with existing work on respect for others, creating safe educational environments, building partnerships, and fostering resilience in both students and teachers. The parental fact sheets for NSW public schools, together with the Association of Independent Schools' document, are the only publicly available sources of information in regard to the initiative. The AISNSW publication highlights the collaborative background that the initiative stems from and the ongoing need to work with community organisations, the public school sector, NSW Police, and Multicultural NSW. Unique to this document, which is in contrast to the parental fact sheets, is the description of the relationship between antisocial behaviour and extremist behaviour. Both behaviours are addressed simultaneously yet defined separately and the need to respond to both types of behaviours is considered equally important (Association of Independent Schools NSW, 2016). However, the document highlights some other crossover options already present within AISNSW schools, such as using existing support networks, which may be of use in reducing the incidences of support for violent extremism.

Additionally, in the NSW public school system, a compulsory grade 11 and 12 transition programme called *Crossroads* has in recent years been adapted to

include the concerns that may present amongst adolescents regarding radicalisation and violent extremism. The programme's stated intent was to build the skills of senior students in their transition to adulthood through empowerment, self-respect, respect for others, identity exploration and formation, and overall health and wellbeing (NSW Department of Education, 2016b). The programme was designed to allow students a safe space for challenging their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours as well as those of other individuals they may encounter in their day-to-day lives. The concept of identity is at the core of the programme, as it seeks to provide students with the sense of empowerment that comes with self-confidence.

The programme incorporates specific lessons that address violence, violent extremism, and radicalisation. Of note in the program the emphasis is placed on the difference between violence and violent extremism. Both concerns are addressed and students taught to identify these and differentiate between the two. Critical thinking was an imperative skill to the programme, and students were provided with the necessary critical thinking skills to be able to navigate situations of violence and violent extremism. The *Crossroads* material and lesson outlines are available for public access on the department's website, which again provides full transparency for what instruction young adults are receiving in regard to violent extremism and radicalisation. The resource is also thorough in its advice and recommendations to teachers undertaking the 25 hours of mandatory *Crossroads* instruction.

As an example of the material in *Crossroads*, within the content is a 60-minute lesson called "Why Violence?" that endeavours to equip students with the ability to critically analyse situations they may find themselves involved in, reflect on personal actions and perceptions of violence, be able to identify and select the appropriate response to a situation, respect the beliefs and rights of others, and build resiliency skills to establish effective mental health and general wellbeing. There are three key activities with the "Why violence?" lesson, with the first activity focusing on defining and categorising types of violence. This is essential for young people as it allows them to identify the appropriate response required to various situations of violence. This is followed by an activity called "Violence or violent extremism?" which uses scenarios for active discussion amongst the participants. Finally, the students are introduced to the #NotInMyName campaign, using a number of case studies focused on defeating the misrepresentation of Islam by terrorist organisations and individuals alike (NSW Department of Education, 2016b). Students are

encouraged to discuss what might lead someone to commit violence against another human, what ideological roots are associated with acts of violence, and whether the violence is effective, and then are asked to suggest alternative approaches to dealing with grievances similar to those expressed in the content.

The *Crossroads* initiative reflects another attempt by the NSW government to use schools for P/CVE policy agendas and is a rare example of a type of intervention that was education-specific and broad in its intended targets – all senior students at all NSW schools. This sort of material reveals the first efforts the government has made to incorporate anti-violent extremism material into classrooms. It was a compulsory module but only for Personal Development Health and Physical Education (PDHPE) students (an elective subject) and only for those students in grades 11 and 12, which, as noted earlier, is an optional part of secondary schooling for anyone 17 years of age or over in NSW, pending alternative education or employment. *Crossroads* however, received much criticism from the public for its approach to its content like gender and sex education and was thus removed and replaced in 2019 (Baker, 2018).

After making *Crossroads* redundant, the new programme called *Life Ready* places more emphasis on life skills like financial management but remains a mandatory component (25 hours) for senior students (NSW Government Education, 2019). However, a review of the available content information on the Department's website indicates no reference to extremism, radicalisation or similar suggesting that such content has been removed. It does recommended teachers "review the content of sensitive or controversial material to ensure it is appropriate to the development, experiences and cultural values of their students" (para. 2) but makes no explicit mention like previously in *Crossroads*. This may be perceived as a turn away from educational P/CVE policy but it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why the *Crossroads* extremism material was removed without any empirical evidence as to its impact, effectiveness, acceptance or outcomes.

Similarly, in the state of Victoria, the Victorian Department of Education and Training took steps in 2015 to address what was seen as a growing concern of radicalisation and violent extremism amongst young people of school age. Initially, this would involve 'advice and support' for school principals and then later, resources and materials for schools and the wider teaching staff (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Smith, 2019). Early funding would provide $600 000 for schools to

develop emergency management plans and prepare for any incidents that were a result of racial or religious intolerance (Cook, 2015). These initial Australian measures are in line with the recommendations also found across the UN, EU, and the US, as well as global think tanks, highlighted in Chapter Three, in regard to community-centric initiatives and adequate staff training. However, little information was offered to provide guidance to any specific educational materials offered to or implemented into schools.

Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, and Smith (2019) have evaluated the train-the-trainer style initiative originally employed in Victoria concluding that whilst such initiatives are valuable in assisting young people, there are limitations to how effective such initiatives can be in what may be considered very complex phenomena. The initiative emerged gradually from 2015 from consultations between law enforcement and the Victorian Department of Education and Training to ensure clear support points and referral pathways were established for when needed. This later developed into a resource for school leadership teams in Victoria and then was further developed after consultations with such school staff. In the following year, the programme was broadened to be shared with leaders from any secondary school throughout Australia. Whilst not specifically P/CVE educational content directed at students, the awareness training for staff initiated in 2015 can be considered one of the earliest approaches to engaging with schools to implement P/CVE policy agenda.

Feedback from the training workshops resulted in a 90.4 per cent satisfaction rating and participants were asked to indicate any gain in knowledge and confidence following the training, which resulted in significantly positive ratings. This indicates the importance of adequate training in building teacher confidence to deal with any radicalisation to violent extremism in school environments. However, future research would benefit from an assessment of the impact after the teachers return to schools and how it affects their forthcoming interactions with their students and classroom commitments. These sorts of impacts are longer term in nature but are important in order to assess the wider outcomes of P/CVE training policies, such as how P/CVE awareness training for teachers makes its way back to students in the classroom. Whilst the intervention was not educational content-based and not directly targeted at students, it may indirectly affect student-teacher dynamics and even the content and knowledge that returns to classrooms following such training. Future research may benefit from exploring this.

Differing from a teacher training response is the Beyond Bali intervention – an educational classroom programme for students, originally implemented in Western Australia. The educational content looked at the roles of moral disengagement and moral development in building resilience to violent extremism and was trialled in two Western Australia secondary schools in 2012. A focus on the relationship between Australia and Bali, Indonesia, and the effects following the Bali Bombings of 2002, resulted in the development of this educational intervention later employed in more than 400 Australian schools (Aly et al., 2014). The researchers identified a need to develop interventions for resilience to violent extremism that built upon understandings of moral disengagement as a process for justifying the use of violence and then turning this into an educational intervention strategy. Beyond Bali is an in-school intervention that seeks to build resilience through real-life stories of experiences with acts of violent extremism and understanding of the impact of the Bali bombings of 2002. Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky (2014) argue that interventions in Australia prior to Beyond Bali were often targeted at at-risk groups that resulted in stigma and neglected the broader psychosocial aspects of radicalisation to violent extremism. As such, Beyond Bali sought to build resilience to violent extremism through developing skills of critical analysis, awareness raising, engaging in open dialect, and encouraging students to consider how to resist the influence of violent extremism. Student responses to the programme were positive, especially in relation to the chance to discuss openly and foster self-reflection. Student feedback included statements such as:

> This course has begun to teach principles that are very relatable about tolerance, forgiveness and finding out other people's perspectives. It has really put it into a whole new light as it [Bali Bombing] was something that happened to us not just as individuals but as Australian people and we all experienced it together. (Aly et al., 2014, 383.).

> This gave us an opportunity to discuss the motivations behind it [Bali Bombing] and in a way it is really important because it will give us, the next generation who are people who are going to [*sic*] in parliament and running the world the opportunity to what motivates them and what we can change, it's about finding solutions to these problems.

In-school interventions like Beyond Bali provide the opportunity to intervene at key adolescent developmental stages. Educational initiatives supported by the school and wider community support this development on a positive trajectory. Beyond Bali is also an earlier example of actual educational content employed in schools, beyond security measures and awareness training for staff.

Considered together, Australia's approach to educational P/CVE generates three important considerations. Firstly, Australia's experience is largely decentralised which reveals the variations that can occur under educational P/CVE policy agendas when federal initiatives are not the standard and states and territories are in control of the initiatives, rather than nationwide policies like the UK and Denmark examples. As has been shown, Australia's educational P/CVE thus far has been different in each state and no compulsory national educational initiative exists, which is in contrast to the UK and Danish experiences. This may be a positive – allowing states to develop interventions based on their own unique circumstances. However, it may be seen as a negative – hindering the establishment of best practices and efforts at cross-collaboration which could possibly extend the trial and error period with little evaluations and evidence to suggest any of them are achieving set goals.

Secondly, Australia's experience thus far is largely restricted and it remains difficult to thoroughly assess the impacts and effectiveness when public information on educational P/CVE policy agendas is limited. For example, at the time of writing, a simple search for P/CVE related content on the Victorian Department of Education's website results in zero findings, be that current or historical information. With P/CVE objectives, programmes, and results difficult to obtain, it remains challenging to find or develop empirical evaluations for building best practice. Thirdly, it is clear that Australia's experiences with policy towards educational P/CVE thus far has been more so about awareness training and educating staff to be prepared than actual in class, curricular-style content. Whilst some educational content has been employed in schools, there remains little consistency in its use.

3.9 Concluding remarks: Educational P/CVE policy - A need to be cautious

An analysis of the implementation of P/CVE policy agendas in educational spaces pinpoints some important considerations for future developments. Firstly, it is apparent that *how*, *where*, and *when* to implement such policies varies across

contexts as there is little empirical evidence to clarify these unknowns. As a result of this ambiguity, P/CVE educational policy can be said to be in a trial and error phase.

Evaluations assessing the impacts and outcomes of this process are limited in scope and number. Educational spaces like schools and their associated environments during the schooling years play a major role in the development of a child, as such, any introduction of P/CVE programmes and content into places like schools needs to be approached carefully as the impact can be significant and the sensitive content worthy of a cautionary approach. One potential significant impact of P/CVE in educational spaces is the effect on young people when learning about, what can be, a highly sensitive and complex topic. School-aged children and adolescents are progressing through unique developmental stages and identity formation (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013). As a result, when implementing P/CVE agendas that are not supported by empirical evaluations that endorse their effectiveness, the trial and error approach has the potential to result in adverse outcomes and we do not know the long-term effects of such consequences.

With the impact of educational P/CVE programming likely to be significant on young, developing adolescents, it is important that governments work towards establishing best practice backed by empirical evaluations to monitor and limit any adverse consequences. As each of the case studies have revealed, adverse consequences like stigmatisation of certain groups, which has been a concern across the UK, Denmark, and Australian experiences, as well as concerns with securitisation of educational spaces have dominated the outcomes. Future research would benefit from longitudinal assessments of the impacts of P/CVE policy programming in places like schools to ensure the long-term impacts are not developing into additional adverse outcomes.

Each case study has also highlighted positive results from various P/CVE initiatives. Australia's experience with Beyond Bali and teacher awareness training has thus far received largely positive feedback, whilst the UK experience has shown signs of a positive reception to reporting concerns when aligned with existing safeguarding protocols. In Denmark, the overall approach to implementing P/CVE initiatives through existing crime prevention channels and the SSP system appears to have been largely well received.

With these points in mind, there still remains a need to assess the impacts – short and longer term – of educational P/CVE policy implementation. The impact on

teachers and school staff, students, and the wider school community will add value and direction to future policy development and likely reduce the chances of adverse consequences if the voices and perspectives of these such groups are heard and incorporated.

The next chapter will present the findings from the research conducted through this project. The findings are gathered from teacher and parent perspectives that were sought in order to begin to address this gap in the wider evaluation data of educational P/CVE. It is anticipated that findings like this will provide an opportunity to consider the impacts on teachers and parents as well as better understand their perceptions and understandings of what can be a complex and multifaceted topic.

Chapter Four

Methodology

4.1 Data collection and methodology

With a focus on education for the research project, the case studies of the UK, Denmark, and Australia were offered as early examples of educational P/CVE and form a central secondary collection of information for this research. These case studies allowed for the identification of key issues that would help guide the questions for an exploratory survey. The broader literature and the case studies revealed that it is clear that governments, policy makers, and organisations have established, trialled, and tested strategies, and theorised broadly in the P/CVE field. It is also clear that preventing young people from participating in the radicalisation process and endorsing violently extreme behaviours and acts is, as yet, unachieved. Many of these governing and authoritative bodies have argued that education is a key approach to countering these attitudes and behaviours, especially amongst younger people, and some states have attempted to implement such initiatives, with varying success rates. However, the voices and perspectives of teachers, parents, and students at the forefront of this challenge are rarely heard, as the literature and case studies reveal. Building on the case studies and the perspectives and impacts from these global examples, this project sought to gather primary data from teacher and parents in Australia. This data is rare but offers a chance to assess the impact and perspectives of P/CVE policy agendas from those responsible for its effective implementation.

Thus, this present chapter will outline the methodology used in this thesis project to examine the impact of P/CVE policy on those at the forefront. This includes the perceived acceptance of this role amongst teachers and parents, the need within Australian society for such programmes, the suggested ideal methods to go about teaching P/CVE content and the impact it has or may have on frontline staff. To recap, the research question presented in Chapter One is as follows:

What are the challenges, opportunities, and implications of implementing P/CVE policy agendas in educational spaces?

As a means of examining the overall question, the following considerations will also contribute:

- What are the understandings of and experiences with P/CVE programming from frontline educationalists and parents and how do they perceive its appropriateness?

- What are some of the major concerns and expectations of P/CVE policy in schools?

Additionally, with particular reference to Australia, this research, both the secondary case studies and the primary collection of data through the survey, sets out to compare the differing perspectives of those closest to the programmes, including teachers, parents, and community members working closely with children and adolescents. The survey data and case studies can then be used together to identify some key principles for future policy development to consider. It is unclear whether Australia's P/CVE and deradicalisation school-based initiatives thus far have been established with consultation and engagement with the communities in which they are operating. Again, any deradicalisation effort in schools was an extremely new method in Australia at the time this research was undertaken and the collection of data is vital to map the successes and failures of these programmes. Therefore, it was intended through this research to collate a collection of teacher and parent perspectives on how necessary P/CVE programmes are deemed in Australian schools, as well as gathering teacher suggestions on the best way to implement these programmes.

Supported by the research from the UK and Denmark case studies, the Australian perspectives present a fresh understanding of the impact of such policies. The exploratory survey was designed to allow for what may have potentially been new discussions regarding P/CVE in schools in Australia. The survey respondents – both teachers and parents – were each approached personally via a messaging medium - either email, Facebook Messenger, or text message – and provided with a link to an online survey. These were considered the simplest and most open forms of

communication. The initial contact points were personal acquaintances of the researcher – either previous colleagues, teacher friends, or previous school teachers of the researcher – then, a number of respondents offered to pass on the survey link to fellow teachers or friends and family thus generating a snowball effect of survey respondents. The initial contact points began as personal teaching acquaintances. This gave the survey a snowball distribution approach that was ideal as it allowed for the survey link to be passed between trusted colleagues and acquaintances that may have been difficult to reach otherwise (Strunk & Mwavita, 2020). This approach was used to ensure as many teachers were targeted as possible from a variety of disciplines and geographical areas. Individuals based on the east coast of Australia were targeted initially, as the intervention programmes are predominantly taking place in Sydney, NSW and Melbourne, VIC. It was apparent during personal discussions that teachers and parents residing on the west coast of Australia were very much unaware of such initiatives and it was believed that any survey data received from west coast teachers or parents would be limited in scope and value.

The exploratory survey remained open for six months and whilst it is acknowledged that the sample size is relatively small in comparison to the number of teachers in Australia, it provides a snapshot from the most impacted states under P/CVE policy. The methodology used was devised in response to the variable availability of data and literature on what is still, for Australia at least, a relatively new idea. This necessitates combining data and methods from multiple areas in order to understand and consider some of the issues and challenge as that might arise for this new area: the case studies examine the experiences and learnings drawn from implementation and analysis in overseas cases and distil from these key learning opportunities that are worth being mindful of when considering the form and practices of possible Australian implementation. The survey offered an opportunity to explore some of the concepts that the case studies revealed but also to gain some initial impressions about the understandings of Australian respondents within a location that has had relatively little exposure to violent extremist activities or outcomes.

The exploratory survey design included closed and open-ended questions about the forming of relationships between P/CVE and the school environment in Australia. A benefit to this style of survey was the opportunity to provide extended responses and raise what could later prove to be key discussion points. It allowed for

individuals to respond in an unrestricted manner that may not have been achieved with a different method, such as a focus group. The narratives and extended responses could then develop a qualitative analysis drawing out key themes and principles. A mixed-survey instrument was designed to collect data to examine responses in both a quantifiable and qualitative manner. This style of using a mixed survey instrument allows for an analysis of both frequencies and narratives ensuring an ability to compare responses statistically as well as thematically (Gorard & Taylor, 2004). Creswell and Poth (2018) describe qualitative research as the opportunity to explore a problem or issue (p. 45) and thus written as well as quantitative responses were sought. Qualitative data allows for an analysis of discourse and narrative through text-based responses, whilst alternatively, quantifiable responses allow for an assessment of aspects like frequencies and to design clear visual aids like tables and graphs (Gorard & Taylor, 2004). What this means is that the responses obtained could provide principles and lessons based on both statistics as well as written responses that were completely open with no word count limitations. The survey endeavoured to collect statistical information, but also to allow the respondents a chance to provide further written analysis to some questions. Furthermore, "the exploration is required because of a need to study a group or population, identify variables that cannot be measured, or hear silenced voices" (Creswell & Poth, 2018, p. 45). In the case of this research, the voices of the teachers being required to implement P/CVE programmes in their schools are critical to the implementation and success of the programmes and therefore their 'voices' are highly valuable. Additionally, input from parents and carers of the young people undertaking these initiatives is important to explore as it allows for a comparison from alternative sides, including their understandings and perceptions from differing standpoints. The complex, detailed understandings that qualitative research seeks can only be fully established by interacting with these teachers and the wider school community (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Furthermore, it was anticipated that the use of an exploratory survey would allow for respondents to 'open up' on an issue that is often sensitive, more so than in a face-to-face and/or group situation.

The survey was designed and administered in an online format via the platform Typeform and was completed by 49 participants. The survey was conducted using Typeform as this was considered slightly more interactive and engaging than some other mediums. It was anticipated that this would ensure respondents were

more likely to finish the survey, rather than leave it incomplete. No surveys were left incomplete. The survey link received 135 total visits or hits, resulting in a completion rate of just over 36 per cent. The opening webpage of the exploratory survey included an introduction to the topic and why the research was being conducted as well as the aims and objectives of engaging with the individuals completing the survey. It may be hypothesised that the sensitivity of the survey topic and/or unfamiliarity or lack of experience with it may have been a deterrent to some visitors to the site despite the introduction, however no potential respondent ever raised this concern via the survey contact details. In regard to demographics of the sample, 73 per cent identified as a teacher and 53 per cent identified as a parent (note: the survey allowed the responder to identify as both parent and teacher, if applicable). No respondents identified as a legal guardian. Data about the age of the participants is presented in the bar graph in Figure 1 below. The largest portion of participants were aged between 21 and 30 years (41%); the second largest grouping was between 51 and 60 years of age (31%). This reveals a widespread inclusion of adults from various generations and age ranges, which adds to the credibility of the results and provides a broader scope of experiences and values. Those aged 41 to 50 years represented 16 per cent of the respondents and the categories 31 to 40 years of age and over 60 years each included six per cent of the participants.



Figure 1. Age ranges of participants for primary collection of data. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

The majority of survey participants identified as female (84%) and only sixteen per cent identified as male. This means that the results are heavily skewed towards female perceptions; however, Australia has a much more significant representation of female teachers as opposed to male teachers (McGrath & Van Bergen, 2017), which therefore ensures this female representation of survey respondents is more applicable to the Australian context. In terms of geography, 90 per cent of survey participants were based in NSW with the remaining participants spread across Victoria, Western Australia, and the ACT. Whilst this is heavily skewed towards NSW responses, responses from this state are considered most important for this research due to the increased support for schools in NSW to counter violent extremism (NSW Government, 2015c) and because at the time of conducting this research the new P/CVE policy was receiving much media attention and discussion. Many respondents offered to share the survey with their colleagues and professional networks leading to a snowball effect but limiting the researcher's ability to monitor geographic representation. This resulted in the unintentional largest proportion of the results coming from NSW. In addition, the researcher was previously a NSW resident, and possessed more points of contact in NSW than other states. Of all parents (including parents who were also teachers), 22 per cent of respondents had children aged in the primary school years; 20 per cent had students aged in the secondary schooling and 31 per cent of respondents had children who had either completed school or were not of school age at the time of completing the survey. This confirmed a broad reach, generating opinions and perceptions from parents with children of various ages. This is useful, as parents with children who are yet to reach school age may possibly differ in their opinions from those with children in secondary school, where the majority of programming is taking place or designated to take place. In terms of teacher-only respondents, 62 per cent were secondary school teachers and 32 per cent identified as primary school teachers. Again, secondary schools have largely been the target of P/CVE programmes thus far (Reid, 2017), which therefore means that responses from secondary teachers are particularly valuable.

Survey respondents were not provided with any incentive, monetary or otherwise, to complete the survey and all were offered to respond anonymously and their participation was voluntary. It was believed that this type of approach to explore a sensitive and marginalised topic would generate more candid responses.

On average, the survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete and could be successfully undertaken on any style of electronic device, ensuring accessibility for computer, mobile, or tablet users. The respondents were not given a deadline to complete the questions and were instructed that the survey had no set close-off date and therefore they could approach it at a time most suited to their personal schedule. As noted earlier, the survey was conducted between September 2017 and March 2018. The survey was closed off after a period of inactivity in regards to responses.

Responses from teachers were especially important for the design of a school-focused P/CVE intervention, as experiences like those explored in the UK case study such as regarding the Prevent model have been critiqued for its apparent ‘spot a terrorist’ approach. The model enforces a requirement for teachers to report radicalised or violently extreme ‘signs’ in children which receives a general lack of support from teachers (Coppock, 2014). Teachers and parents were chosen as the target sample population due to their close involvement from an instructing standpoint and as role models (both teachers and parents) to children who may or may not participate in a P/CVE programme during their schooling years. Being a teacher and/or a parent was the sampling criteria for the research. If Australian intervention programmes, current and future, are to be considered a success, understanding the criticisms of other experiences like the UK’s will likely help shape more effective policy. The UK experience demonstrates the importance of working alongside and collaboratively with teachers so they may feel prepared and well equipped to carry out such work.

Originally, the intent was to create a triangulation of data for a more thorough analysis and the goal was to support the survey data with interview data from policymakers, employers, and frontline staff involved in developing and implementing the in-school programmes. Initially, a gatekeeper was arranged to foster engagement with close contacts and policymakers – key informants – of such programmes and facilitate access to the individuals best placed to answer the research questions (Okumus, Altinay, & Roper, 2007). It was anticipated that engagement with close contacts would be difficult due to the sensitivity of the topic (Okumus, Altinay, & Roper, 2007) so this was perceived to be the most effective approach. The lack of publicly available information on the programmes and policies surrounding P/CVE in schools generated assumptions that it would be difficult to get questions answered. As such, it was expected that a gatekeeper would make this

process smoother and they explained that there was a number of potential interview candidates that they could provide access to. However, changes in circumstances meant that all attempts at obtaining interviewees for this purpose failed and the original recommended individuals were unobtainable. The gatekeeper was unable to provide the contacts for two main reasons. Firstly, the gatekeeper advised that they had tried to contact some of the individuals but had received no reply, and secondly, the gatekeeper then failed to respond to further attempts at contact from the researcher. As such, the researcher compiled a list of other substitute individuals or organisations which were then contacted but no approached candidates were willing or able to participate in the interviews. Each individual approached was also offered the opportunity to answer the interview questions in a questionnaire style instead, if this was more suitable to their schedule, however this still did not result in any individuals agreeing to discuss the topics. As a result, the case studies then formed a central component to the research and they were expanded to include data from previous studies to help shape a comparison between experiences in varying countries. Initially, six emails were sent to potential interviewees from the following organisations: FRIENDS Resilience, Batyr, *Crossroads*, Together for Humanity, Friendly Schools, and Bully Zero Australia. Some of these programmes/organisations already engage specifically with P/CVE content and some work alongside 'at-risk' youth, so their input was considered worthy with the hypothesis that at times, their work may encounter individuals expressing radicalisation and/or violent extremism. Furthermore, specific community organisations solely dedicated to issues of radicalisation and violent extremism are rare in Australia so the experiences and knowledge of other youth-related organisations was considered important, such as in the approach taken in the government-funded mapping project (see Cherney et al., 2017 discussed in Chapter Three). If deradicalisation approaches are to be successful, it is hypothesised that a whole-of-community approach is required in order to develop the necessary resilience for the communities, and then the individual youths within the communities, and thus the perspectives of these individuals are important in order to develop more successful interventions. Thus, this research sought to gather perspectives from a wide array of organisations that are involved in youth work with 'at-risk' young people who may play a role in P/CVE policy agendas. These organisations each have a unique approach to building skills in adolescents to

promote and support prosocial behaviour, whether directly related to P/CVE or not. Of the six emails, two responses were received, one of which advised that a lack of time would not allow for participation in the interview, whilst another expressed a lack of experience with the topic area and thus an inability to participate. All interviewees were offered the opportunity to receive a list of questions to answer in their own time if this was preferred to dedicating a set time to a phone or Skype interview. However, none of the approached individuals took up this offer, with no reasons offered.

As a result, the focus of the data collection was adapted to further embrace the secondary data and case studies, explore them more broadly, and increase the amount of specific data from already conducted explorations. The case studies encapsulated some key points of discussion that were considered worthy of further exploration for the Australian context. Considerations such as the suitability of the school environment for such programmes and the support options available to students for these types of concerns offered lessons that could benefit from being discussed in the Australian context. This study has been completed from an analytical as well as a descriptive standpoint. The objective was to compare new data as well as utilise existing information already available to the field (Kothari, 2004). The data utilised in this work has originated from two key sources: firstly, through a literature review of the central theories, statements, and policies that have emerged over the post-9/11 period in various contexts. This has demonstrated the changing nature of the field of counter-terrorism and has especially highlighted a transition from hard power approaches to soft power preventative work in the field. This transition gradually encapsulates educational environments in order to reach younger individuals. Secondly, data was collected through an exploratory survey (see Appendix A) of Australian teachers and parents to provide a point of analysis to compare with other experiences and to gauge their perceptions and understandings of preventative P/CVE work amongst young people, especially in school environments.

The survey was then an opportunity to explore some of the key issues identified in the case study data and analysis and apply these to the Australian context. Some guiding principles can then be drawn from the two data streams to better inform policymakers and educationalists in the future, which are discussed in the final two chapters. Once again, because educational P/CVE is so new in Australia, and because access to any programmes, findings, and success rates is

limited and at times altogether unavailable, a thorough analysis is difficult and worthy of future research as this area evolves. The majority of Australia's P/CVE-focused work thus far has been evident as community-based and government-funded programmes that were often quite broad in scope. Therefore, following a presentation of these P/CVE trends in Australia, this research sought to analyse perceptions, understandings, and expectations of on-the-ground P/CVE programmes rooted in educational spaces, with a particular focus on teacher and parent/guardian perspectives as this was a fundamental, yet largely untouched, area of the field.

The research literature that formed the opening part of this exploration was predominantly sourced through internet searches and relevant journal searches so as to incorporate a broad base of information covering policy documents, academic input, and recommendations and analyses from global bodies and think tanks such as the UN, all with an intent of providing a global analysis. There was no specific focus on any one region or geographical area for the initial literature covering P/CVE policy. This broad perspective was taken in order to cover a wide range of approaches and policies. Following this, the literature review turned to focus specifically on countries that had endeavoured to incorporate an educational paradigm into their P/CVE initiatives. This was a much more niche area of work, as many countries have expressed the desire to utilise education in the P/CVE field, but only a limited number have yet to concretely employ this approach. Thus, the case studies of the UK and Denmark in Chapter Four present these countries as leaders in the educational P/CVE focus areas. The UK especially has made great efforts to utilise schools and their respective environments to counter radicalisation and violent extremism, albeit with much criticism. However, criticism aside, the UK's attempt to utilise the educational space, rather than simply participate in the discussions surrounding its use are worthy of consideration as a leader in educational P/CVE policy. Additionally, Denmark was presented as a case study due to the country's efforts at incorporating P/CVE work into general crime prevention methods, including through engagement with schools. Denmark has made less of a targeted effort to focus on the educational space than the UK, but it has made significant strides in helping young people to move towards a proactive and prosocial pathway in life, which does include a focus on reaching them in educational environments. Both of these case studies were developed so as to provide grounding and context for

the Australian case study and to explore and compare how developments in this space are being implemented and received in Australia.

4.2 Data analysis

In order to analyse the qualitative data, a thematic analysis approach was utilised due to its broad applicability to various qualitative research projects as well as its usefulness in "identifying, analysing, organising, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set" (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 2). Thematic analysis is a flexible approach that is able to provide rich detail from even large amounts of data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is useful for examining perspectives, highlighting similarities and differences, and generating unanticipated insights (Nowell et al., 2017). Thematic analysis allowed for an inductive approach to analysis allowing themes and patterns to emerge from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Nowell et al. (2017) and Braun and Clarke (2006) describe six key phases in the process of a thematic analysis and these steps were employed in the analysis of the data for this project. The six phases are:

1. develop familiarity with the data
2. generate initial codes
3. search for themes
4. review themes
5. define and name themes
6. produce the report
   (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Nowell et al., 2017).

For this research project these steps were used as a guide as follows:

1. The data was read in entirety twice.
2. Statistics were generated for quantitative responses and manual coding of qualitative data took place. This involved listing interesting information, noting key ideas and repeated key terms, and combining them in similar or contrasting groups.
3. At this stage, an inductive approach was taken to identify similarities and differences within the data set as a whole. These patterns were assessed more closely to identify potential themes. A consideration for more dominant and

less dominant themes took place in order to better understand issues of most and lesser significance. Common themes were identified and coded through repeated key words and topics to better inform the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

4. Key themes were colour coded to group similar discussion points.
5. Key themes were provided with an overall heading or concept that would be used to set out the discussion chapter.
6. The data was arranged into chapters five (Findings) and six (Discussion) for the write up.

4.3 Research Limitations

Any research that seeks to address understandings in the fields of terrorism/counter-terrorism, radicalisation/counter-radicalisation, and violent extremism/countering violent extremism is limited by the long-term nature of the solutions. More specifically, how to evaluate the effectiveness of such programmes is confused in the field and a continuing evaluation process will be required in order to be able to confidently contend that a particular program has stopped the growth of violent extremism in a specific individual/community/generation. Hemmingsen (2015) claims that it will never be possible to conduct a quantitative evaluation of the preventative efforts by counting the number of individuals who have not become radicalised as a result of intervention programmes (p. 40). However, a qualitative study of intervention and exit programmes from various communities is a possibility but must include participant perspectives and any side effects, so as to be sure that the outcomes have been worth the efforts when compared with not undertaking any initiatives at all in the same environment (Hemmingsen, 2015). Additionally, it is hypothesised that the data has been limited in its collection and scope due to the sensitivity of the topic, which is a limitation for this project. It can be assumed that the very nature of the topic may have steered away some interview candidates or survey respondents and its taboo-like character may have discouraged people from sharing their thoughts, however, for those that completed the survey, it appeared to be a well-received opportunity to share experiences and opinions on the matters. Whilst attempts were made to secure interviewee candidates through the use of a gatekeeper and key informants, this proved unsuccessful and caused significant delay to the research project but allowed for an opportunity to further explore and develop

the secondary data from those with more lived experienced of engaging with educational P/CVE policies. Additionally, the relative newness of the initiatives in Australia may have limited the capacity for the respondents to offer up deeper information. Public understanding and awareness and a less-secretive nature of P/CVE policy must result for future research endeavours to produce detailed data and outcomes that includes significant public input.

Another key limitation of this research is that participants of any P/CVE programmes were not interviewed or surveyed, nor were any individuals under the age of 18 included in the survey. Whilst adults only were the target sample criteria, there is certainly an opportunity for research to assess the impacts of such programmes on the young participants. The literature has indicated that the opinions of young adults are vital to developing programmes that are directed towards them, and additionally that they want their voices heard on the matter (Roy & McKinnon, 2016). However, young adults were not chosen for participation due to the sensitivity of the issue as well as their potential participation in these P/CVE programmes, which in themselves are highly sensitive and with information about them largely unavailable at the time of writing. Furthermore, minors were not included as part of the target audience for the study as the focus was intended to engage with what was considered a gap – teachers and parents. In addition to this, engaging with minors would have likely been more difficult to achieve with proper approvals that would have varied between state and territory education departments. These P/CVE programmes in NSW schools are a new initiative in the early stages of establishing efficacy, thus engaging young people who could be potential participants of these programmes was not considered viable at this stage. If such programmes were to become a consistent opportunity in schools, then future research should consider addressing the opinions and input from those in the target age bracket.

In addition, the survey responses were overwhelmingly from female teachers and mothers. The input from fathers and male teachers was limited and future research would benefit from a more balanced understanding of any differences in perceptions between genders. Furthermore, all survey respondents were approached via a communication medium such as email, rather than in a face-to-face manner due to the location of the researcher. This approach may have reduced the chances of gaining more responses. Then, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic limited the later and final stages of the thesis project as movement was inhibited and workplaces

experienced significant shifts in daily practices. Closures, varying priorities, and balancing new commitments and expectations are factors that hindered the expectations and communication during the final stages of the project.

Additionally, public familiarity with these programmes appears limited. At the time of writing, only 19 selected high schools had been chosen to trial the newest NSW programmes and, despite media attention, the awareness that these programmes were taking place was limited, even amongst the teacher respondents. As mentioned previously, educational P/CVE in Australia is very much in its infancy and the limited public awareness lends support to the argument that little public consultation occurred prior to the development and implementation of these programmes. Within the coming years in Australia, more publicly available information on the reasons behind these programmes, their success or failure rates, and student experiences may become more available to the public. However, for this project, the general lack of awareness would have limited the information and perceptions being provided in the surveys.

Finally, as mentioned, whilst the exploratory survey data offers a snapshot of distinct perceptions and understandings of P/CVE policy in educational spaces, it is representative of a relatively small portion of teachers Australia-wide and largely NSW-based. It is thus not a representative sample, but rather an exploratory study to build upon as policy further develops. The researcher followed the recruitment process through snowballing and tried to remedy the NSW-focus by recruiting elsewhere but the significant number of contact points based in NSW was apparent at the conclusion of the survey. Measures were taken to increase the number of participants and broaden the geographical reach, these included follow-up emails, providing contact details so individuals could ask any questions before participating, providing a detailed introduction to the survey that included why the information was being sought, ensuring the survey could be completed on a variety of devices/mediums, undertaking the survey on an engaging and easy-to-use platform, and sharing the survey link on social media to garner more respondents. It is an important consideration to include these voices in the development of policy and increasing engagement with the topic through as many avenues as possible was sought. Future policy design would benefit from continuing to include these perspectives and inputs. Government P/CVE programmes would likely gain valuable

data from a broader collection of responses to improve P/CVE policy design in the future.

4.4 Ethical considerations and informed consent

All research projects face a multitude of ethical considerations when interacting with the public and collecting data. This research project has focused on a highly sensitive topic, resulting in a new array of ethical issues. As discussed earlier in the case studies, some P/CVE related work has led to stigmatising of Muslim communities here in Australia, in the UK, and in Denmark. The correct use of terminology goes some way to ensuring an elimination of stigmatisation. For example, it is important to refer to Muslim communities in the plural, rather than the Muslim community as homogeneous as this develops appreciation for the differences that exist among and between groups. This is similar to the discussion surrounding the terms extremism and radicalisation explored in earlier chapters – there are differences but the terms are often used interchangeably, so it is worth exploring this cross over to better understand the issues. In the field of P/CVE and counter-terrorism, varying definitions and a lack of agreement on key concepts establishes a substantial grey area. Terminology is often used interchangeably so assessing and presenting a distinction between terms like violent extremism and radicalisation goes some way to providing clarification.

To address some of the ethical considerations that exist in this field of research it is important to thoroughly consider what factors may or may not arise during the course of the research to challenge both personal and socially acceptable understandings of what is ethical and what is not. This project did this and received approval for research with human subjects from Curtin University's Research Integrity Committee (HRE2017-0540). The initial part of this research – the literature research and review – did not require any direct contact with human subjects in order to collate the data. The survey was dependent upon establishing contact with willing individuals happy to dedicate some time to sharing their knowledge, information, beliefs, and experiences. All survey participants were greeted with an opening statement describing the overall project, what the survey was designed to obtain, what it would be used for, and a reminder that their responses were anonymous and that participation was voluntary. This opening

statement can be found in Appendix A, along with the survey questions and the invitation for interview email (Appendix B).

4.5 Concluding remarks

The literature has revealed a significant lack of engagement with parents and teachers involved in P/CVE programming in schools. The case studies identified key principles to guide the development of an Australian-based exploratory survey. Principles like teacher engagement, aligning with existing safeguarding practices, and working collaboratively with professionals from other backgrounds. As such, this research project sought to gather information, perspectives, and perceptions of such programming from these individuals in order to best inform future policy development. Originally, a survey and interviews were considered the best approach to receive these responses. The survey was completed by 49 Australian-based parents and/or teachers but the interviews did not come to fruition, limiting the ability to compare the parent/teacher responses with perspective and information from education department staff, policymakers, or organisations engaged with young people. In order to remedy this, the secondary case studies formed a central component of the research to triangulate the survey responses with responses from teachers and parents gathered through research in other countries, like the UK.

These case studies identified the avenues worth exploring further and can be used together with the survey data to distinguish repeated key issues or themes to be addressed or embraced as policy develops. Going forward, the case studies and the survey can be used together to generate a picture of both lived experience (case studies) and expectations and concerns (Australian context) which together can better inform policy development. The data drawn from the case studies allows for the consideration of existing data in line with new and evolving situations, like that in Australia, to highlight key issues or engage further with positive outcomes. The secondary case studies and their data allows a reassessment of previously collected data to combine with primary data in a different context to answer/inform new research questions and avenues for exploration. The case studies allow for a lived experience to be shared and understood about what it has been like adapting (teaching/implementing) to P/CVE policy in educational spaces, which is largely in contrast to the primary data in this study, which focuses on collecting expectations, concerns, and attitudes to evolving policy.

Chapter Five

Findings

This research project was initiated during a time of contentious P/CVE programming in Australia and around the world. As the literature and case studies have indicated, P/CVE programming and deradicalisation initiatives have been very much a practice of trial and error thus far. It could be argued that no nation or region has successfully implemented a 'sure thing' when it comes to P/CVE programming. Violent extremism continues to be a persistent threat and there are no examples of a perfect, foolproof initiative that effectively and efficiently solves all of a society's concerns with radicalisation and violent extremism. With that being said, some gains have been made in certain areas, such as in the case of Denmark's Aarhus Model, yet many attempts, such as the UK's Prevent experience, have also been considered unsuccessful in their initial stages (Hardy, 2016). In Australia, the threat of terrorism, radicalisation, and violent extremism is less severe than in many other parts of the world (Harris-Hogan, 2017, p. 1), yet successive governments have continued to work towards eradicating radicalisation and violent extremism within Australian communities. A number of other countries have perceived Australia's efforts as a success and a potential learning opportunity for other countries (Rosand, 2017).

However, there is debate surrounding the need for such programmes in Australia and with this concern the question is raised as to the extent of spending that should occur on such initiatives when the outcomes are unclear (Olding, 2016). How pressing is the problem in Australia and therefore how much effort should the government be putting into such programmes above and beyond other areas of concern? What is the government doing and what has it learnt from recent history? The role of schools in this debate is also questioned. The school environment upholds a duty of care to address all antisocial behaviour that threatens the safety and security of the school environment (NSW Government Education, 2018, p. 1). This includes "bullying, harassment, discrimination, racism, illegal or criminal behaviour, physical violence, or damaging school or other property" (NSW Government Education, 2018). Arguably, behaviours typical of violent extremism would fall into more than one of these areas of concern. The context of the behaviour cannot be

ignored when considering cases of support for violent extremism and, like all examples, the context will be unique to the individual case and not necessarily reflect past or future examples. In NSW, schools are supported by a Case Management and Specialist Support Unit, which was established to assist schools to address antisocial and extremist behaviours holistically (NSW Government Education, 2018, p. 2). The unit seeks to strengthen a school's capacity to handle such cases and ensure the correct systems are in place for maximum safety and security. When faced with a potential case of violent extremism, teachers are to direct their concerns to principals or alternative executive staff members who will then determine the next step based on risk, context, and need for additional support (NSW Government Education, 2018). This chapter will consider the findings discovered through this research project before considering the key lessons learnt and points of consideration in the final chapter.

The amount of federal and state funds dedicated to P/CVE programming in Australia reveals the importance placed on these measures by present and past governments. However, public perceptions may not be as supportive of such spending or perhaps of the specific initiatives being funded when other issues of concern present within communities, such as unemployment and illegal drug use. The intent of this research project was to compare attitudes and perceptions present within school community situations, and explore expectations of the realities of P/CVE programming in Australia. More specifically, the research endeavoured to query how P/CVE programming in educational spaces should look for the future, based on expectations and perceptions from the community. The results demonstrate that input from on-the-ground sources provides detailed and abundant considerations beneficial to future policy development. Community support for these initiatives is vital if a whole-of-community approach is to be successful. The field of P/CVE has largely ignored the input of teachers and parents from educational spaces when searching for solutions to violent extremism and radicalisation. The literature thus far lacks analysis of communities' roles and best practices, and is also limited in presenting clear and accurate data that highlights the benefits of using communities in the planning and implementation of these methods, especially in regard to school and school-like environments. Yet, such perspectives in regard to factors including interpretation, understanding, and impact are important for ensuring P/CVE agendas

are conducted with the support of those at the forefront. Increased, widespread support may in turn improve impact.

This chapter will now present the findings gathered from the online survey data collected from teachers and parents over the course of approximately six months during the period September 2017 to March 2018. As noted in the methodology chapter, the survey was provided via the online medium Typeform administered through a variety of platforms, such as computer, tablet, or smartphone. Together, these results have been compiled to offer a clear picture of how P/CVE is recognised, disputed, and shaped by a sample of the Australian public. Specifically, the focus remains on educational institutions and their role, hence the specific and unique engagement with teachers and parents for the collection of the data. Key themes in the results were apparent and these themes have been categorised into subheadings below in order to group the data into relevant findings. This data contributes to the literature, in Australia especially, surrounding the field of P/CVE as a whole, but also lends support for a new approach to P/CVE, focusing on hearing frontline voices in educational contexts. The data collected through this research project contributes to future research about and important considerations for the implementation of P/CVE approaches to educational P/CVE for school communities. Please note, the remainder of this chapter will use the acronym CVE, rather than P/CVE, as this acronym was used in the survey for simplification and due to the likely greater familiarity of respondents with this term than the P/CVE acronym.

5.1 Significant concern for radicalisation and violent extremism is not present.

The survey used for collecting data for this research project queried participants as to how concerned they were regarding recruitment of young people in their local community by radicalised individuals. Approximately 61 per cent of respondents selected the “no” option and 22 per cent declared they were “unsure”. Thus, only an approximate 16 per cent of respondents were clearly concerned with recruitment and radicalisation amongst the local young people in their respective communities. This was posed as a quantitative question with the options of yes, no, or unsure. There was also an option for additional qualitative comments, however none were offered. The responses are graphed in Figure 2.



Are you concerned about youth in your area being influenced by radicalised individuals? (online or offline)

Response	Frequency
No	30
Yes	8
Unsure	11

Figure 2. Responses regarding concern for local youth being influenced by radicalised individuals. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

When asked the question "within your community, what issues do you consider to be of greatest concern" not a single respondent identified terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism, or any similar associated issues. The response option to this question was open-ended and intended for the community as a whole (the following question was similar but asked for issues facing young people specifically) and thus a wide array of suggestions was gathered. There were common themes and recurring mentions of certain issues. The top three have been summarised in the below table and graph, Figure 3. All the responses are displayed as a word cloud in Figure 4 below (word clouds depict a computer-generated image of the most common repeated words in a group of text with the size of the text increasing for more commonly repeated phrases. The text has been inputted directly from the responses so spelling errors have not been corrected).



Within your community, what issues do you consider to be of greatest concern?

	Frequency
Drugs and/or alcohol	16
Unemployment	9
Racism/Intolerance/ Discrimination	8

Figure 3. Most common responses regarding local issues present within the community. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

Figure 4. Responses regarding local issues present within the community. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

The responses collected through this survey indicated that teachers and parents have very little concern about issues of countering terrorism and extremism in their respective communities. A failure to even mention radicalisation and/or violent extremism demonstrates the more pressing concerns that these communities face. One major concern raised in this survey data was the impact of drugs and alcohol on communities (note: drugs and alcohol were counted together because most respondents named both, however some named one or the other). In 2013, the NSW Government estimated that alcohol abuse alone costs the government $1.029 billion per year (NSW Auditor-General, 2013, p. 2) and in addition, the NSW budget of 2019–20 allocated $231.6 million to drug and alcohol services (NSW Government Health, 2019) with $273.1 million allocated in Victoria in the same year (Victoria State Government, 2019). In the same budget, the government allocated a much lower $62 million for CVE initiatives in the correctional system and broader counter-terrorism operations (NSW Government, 2017). In regard to spending alone, the government's dedication to drug and alcohol concerns over and above CVE-related initiatives is clear. This reflects the most concerning social problems identified in the community-centric data collected for this research. Radicalisation and violent extremism have not been expressed as a major concern. However, prevention of future occurrences of acts of terrorism or radicalisation and violent extremism are arguably necessary as the world continues to globalise and Australia continues to experience complications with issues like foreign fighters and Australians disgruntled with overseas conflicts.

The question regarding local issues of concern was then repeated, but with a specific reference to young people. Respondents were again provided an open-ended response option for sharing their thoughts on the issues of most concern to them, and through this a wide variety of social problems were identified. These ranged from mental health issues, unemployment, inappropriate use of technology and social media, social (in)equality, racism and respect for others/tolerance, and the environment. The concern about violence within the communities of the survey respondents was an important one, however, those who expressed apprehension about the perpetration of violence were more concerned with other forms of violence, such as domestic violence and violent crimes. Across questions three and four (Appendix A), the term "violence" was used eight times, with half of these references indicating domestic violence. Of the three types of violence, domestic

violence received the most attention. Unemployment and lack of opportunities for young people to build solid futures for themselves in prosocial atmospheres was also raised as a serious concern and received much attention from the respondents. The significance of naming employment opportunities/unemployment in both questions denotes that the respondents are equally concerned about employment opportunities for both young people and adults in their community. This unease for future opportunities was clearly at the forefront for participants when asked what they thought was the most worrying problem for young people as reference was made to job opportunities, unemployment, further education opportunities and even simply concern for "the future". Drugs and/or alcohol and employment were in the top two concerns for both the community as a whole and for youth concerns more specifically. The top three issues facing young people are tabulated and graphed below (Figure 5) and a word cloud depicting the responses is presented as Figure 6.



Within your community, what issues do you consider to be of greatest concern for your children an/or students?

	Frequency
Drugs and/or alcohol	13
Employment/opportunities*	11
Social Media/Technology/ Online life	8

*responses included here also referred to further education opportunities and responses that referred to "the future"

Figure 5. Responses regarding local issues present within the community, specifically regarding young people. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

Figure 6. Responses regarding local issues present within the community, specifically regarding young people. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

In terms of understanding and defining the term 'radicalisation', participants were asked to offer up their personal awareness of the meaning of this term, as well as the expression 'violent extremism'. There were obvious similarities between the definitions offered for both terms, which may point to a lack of understanding of the terminology and how it is used in various instances. Due to the lack of agreed definitions in the field of CVE and terrorism research, as well as the converging uses of the two phrases in question (especially in the media), it is not surprising that members of the general public are also confused. The most noteworthy difference between the understandings offered by the participants for the two terms was in the use of the words "brainwashing", "manipulation", and "coercion" or their respective synonyms. 40 per cent of respondents used one of these words in their attempt to define these terms indicating that many believed the radicalisation process to be one where some control or independence has been removed from the decision making. When defining radicalisation, the participants employed these terms and the various synonyms which are often used interchangeably, which suggests that the public perceive radicalisation as a process that often cannot be completely attributed to the choices of the individual and that there is some element of influence involved in cases of radicalisation and violent extremism. Many respondents suggested improved online and offline awareness for young people as the most necessary form of

education about violent extremism and radicalisation. Support for programmes that build awareness appeared to garner the most backing amongst those surveyed with the term "awareness" raised 12 times across the breadth of the survey in various contexts to suggest that further improvements should begin with broader awareness of the issues. This reflects previous discoveries regarding the importance of awareness education, such as the findings discussed earlier in Tahiri and Grossman's (2013) community perceptions survey. One respondent described the type of thinking present in extremist and radicalised ideologies as being "outside social parameters", whilst another described it as similar to the ways in which cults have operated throughout history. This indicates a deep concern for young people being brainwashed.

Suggestions were similar for defining the phrase 'violent extremism'. A number of respondents described violent extremism as behaviour outside of what is considered normal to society. Additionally, the respondents were aware that this thinking is then supported by acts of violence against those who do not hold the same beliefs. Approximately 31 per cent of respondents specifically identified violent extremism as being influenced by religiously, ideologically, and/or politically motivated forms of thinking. Additionally, a further 24.5 per cent of respondents mentioned the broader terms of "beliefs", "ideas", and "views". Combined, approximately half of the survey participants referred to the root causes of violent extremism – the beliefs and ideologies that lie within such actions. This aligns with the majority of definitions found in the field of CVE and demonstrates the public is only somewhat aware of the root causes associated with the term and what motivates those who perpetrate violence against others in the community. A broad range of suggestions as to the root causes have been hypothesised and repeated in the broader terrorism and counter-terrorism literature. An individual's own belief system is arguably a major component of this, but other factors still play their part, like socioeconomic considerations and foreign policy objections (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 36-8). Only one respondent utilised the term 'radicalisation' in their defining of violent extremism, which supports a hypothesis that community members do recognise there are some differences between the terms, most notably, the actual use of violence to invoke social change, which distinguishes the thinking from the doing. Furthermore, when defining violent extremism, some participants mentioned the victims of this violence. Four of the 49 (8%) individuals surveyed referred to the victims in their

defining of the term, which speaks to the sympathetic feelings of the rest of society following a terrorist incident. These victims are often unknown to the perpetrator, thus a key theme amongst those surveyed was that violent extremism targets innocent bystanders. As mentioned, most of the respondents made clear that they were aware that both radicalisation and violent extremism are ideologically, politically, and/or religiously motivated. Additionally, it was also apparent that the majority of respondents believed victims of terrorism became victims because they did not share the same ideological, religious, or political beliefs as those executing the acts of violence. This randomness is a unique characteristic of violent extremism compared with other acts of violence (Ourwatch.org, n.d.). Definitional and conceptual understandings are important to address in the CVE field, as it has long been contested which cases should be labelled as terrorism and which should not ("'He is not a victim'," 2018).

Participants of the survey were asked whether they believed the government was doing enough to combat violent attitudes within Australia's communities and an overwhelming 57 per cent stated they were unsure. This demonstrates a lack of awareness amongst the population of what initiatives are actually taking place within communities across Australia. 14 (29%) of the 49 respondents did not believe the government was doing enough and only seven (14%) of the respondents considered the government to be doing a satisfactory level of intervention work. Thus, it is clear that the majority of those who were surveyed believed the threat to be minimal, but in a somewhat contradictory fashion, also believed more could be done. Contributors who selected a "no" in response as to whether enough was being done by the government to combat violent attitudes were then offered an open-ended opportunity to suggest what more could be in place in this field. The suggestions were varied but a trend calling for community engagement and awareness education was obvious amongst the responses. 36 per cent of those who answered this question put forward suggestions for such initiatives. These suggestions included working closer with community leaders, school-based education that builds connections with the local community, and the development of better relationships within the community. Some of these ideas were school-based and the respondents explained the benefit of teaching such awareness in school environments. This included broadening the curriculum to foster a more widespread education about different societies and cultures, establishing educational instruction that focuses on social skills and

developing a sense of belonging, and a establishing a core element in the school system that teaches positive attitudes towards others and a sense of understanding towards peers. More specifically, one respondent specified that there needed to be better education surrounding the signs of radicalisation and/or violent extremism and "what to look for" if a child is being unduly influenced. Additionally, other respondents emphasised the need for online education and awareness training for young people in a manner similar to the way that children are taught about online predators, as well as improved methods for monitoring the online activity of children and adolescents.

Suggestions were also made regarding the consequences of violent extremist behaviours. Two participants (4%) suggested that deportation should be a consequence for individuals who choose not to embrace Australian culture. It is unclear as to what constitutes "Australian culture" and this suggestion is grounded in the assumption that the individual would be a citizen of another state in order to be deported elsewhere. If the individual in question is an Australian citizen and an Australian citizen only, their presumed lack of acceptance for Australian culture does not mean they have an alternative homeland to be deported to. Yet, at least two participants considered removing these individuals from Australia as a viable option, which is a somewhat high rate in the context of the sample size. Similar to this, another respondent called for tighter restrictions on known radicals traveling to Australia, as well as deporting overseas nationals who offend in this regard and jailing Australian citizens for the same reasons. Australia has made a number of legislative changes that address these concerns, as discussed earlier. Tighter laws have limited the actions Australians can take if involved with terrorism, whether physically or monetarily. One survey participant recommended tougher consequences for young people who commit acts of this nature, so that younger individuals who may be experimenting or testing the boundaries of what is acceptable are more aware of the consequences of their choices. The respondent indicated that the younger generations are less concerned with punishment and consequences and needed to understand that their decisions affect others and their futures.

It was apparent amongst the suggestions that participants perceived a lack of respect and values amongst young people in contemporary Australia. Numerous mentions were made of what is perceived as an obsession with technology and online

culture and a belief that this has contributed to poor familial relationships; a lack of respect for elders, parents, and teachers; minimal outdoor time and interaction with others in a face-to-face manner; and a reduction in basic social skills. Specifically, references to "social media" and "too much technology time" were mentioned 12 times across the survey and the respondents indicated a clear frustration with modern-day technology use, which they also considered as often unsafe if not monitored correctly. Online behaviours and education that targets how to interact safely in a no-human-contact-world may be a key lesson worth considering for educational P/CVE programmes.

5.2 CVE prevention efforts should only be taking place in schools after intensive teacher training and in collaboration with specialists.

As the review provided in the case studies has shown, CVE agendas in educational environments have resulted in a number of undesirable outcomes, like overreporting and stigmatisation. How exactly to target the right groups of young people within the schools most requiring additional support is a contentious area of discussion, and issues have arisen whereby individuals have been incorrectly targeted for intervention programmes. Incorrectly targeting an individual for any range of offences is likely to result in stigmatisation, feelings of alienation, possible desires for retribution, and incorrect labelling and branding. This has not just been an issue in the case studies covered. A key example from the US occurred in 2015, when a young Muslim boy was arrested after he took a homemade clock to school for a project and was mistakenly reported by his teacher as having brought a homemade bomb. The repercussions and stigmatisation following this event forced his family to move to Qatar for close to a year in order to remove themselves from the hate mail and death threats received after the arrest (Contrera, 2016). As the UK experience showed, similar stories have emerged from the UK when incorrect assumptions have been made due to teachers being legally obliged to report any behaviours that may be deemed radical (Weale, 2017). The broadness of what constitutes radical behaviour of concern means that over-reporting is presenting as a problem (Hamid, 2017). With teachers being legally obliged to report suspicions, school staff feel pressured to ensure they are doing what is now required of them, regardless of the severity of the incident. This style of identifying any behaviour that an individual teacher or staff member perceives to be as of concern is problematic

because what one person considers ‘radical’ may not be considered as such by the next person, and this method, as an approach to CVE, is troublesome. However, this raises questions as to the effectiveness of the teacher training that has been used to prepare school staff for making such decisions.

Based on the data analysed from the UK and Denmark, the ability to identify concerning behaviour accurately was considered important to this research, so the teachers and parents participating in this exploratory survey were provided with a scale of 0–10 to indicate their level of agreement with the question: “as a parent or teacher, how confident are you that you could identify a turn in your child/student towards violent extremism?” Selecting 0 indicated “not at all confident”; selecting a 5 meant “unsure”; and 10 on the scale equated to “very confident”. Only one individual selected option 10 and two selected option 9, denoting that there is only a small selection of parents and teachers who feel confident and familiar with the ‘signs’. Option 8 was selected by 24.5 per cent of respondents and 26.5 per cent chose option 7; this incorporated the largest proportion of respondents, revealing that there is some level of confidence among respondents in being able to notice a change in the behaviours of the young people closest to them. A further 24.5 per cent selected the unsure (number 5) option and approximately 10 per cent (n=5) of participants selected a number between 2 and 4. No respondents picked the numbers 1 or 0, which demonstrates that none of the teachers or parents believed they could not, in some way, identify behaviours of concern.



Figure 7. Responses to personal level of confidence in being able to identify a turn to violent extremism. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

However, it is also clear from the 59 per cent who selected a 5, 6, or 7 – the middle ground – that the majority of those surveyed feel only somewhat prepared to play a part in monitoring and identifying young people who need steering away from radicalisation and violent extremism. This demonstrates the urgent need for adequate training for frontline workers like teachers, and improved awareness for parents, to help them comprehend these 'signs' for 'at-risk' students and young people. At present, this is expected of teachers, but the contexts in which these signs are most concerning is poorly explained. This lack of preparedness on behalf of parents and teachers reveals one of the major concerns held by teachers more specifically when it comes to CVE in the school environment. It suggests that teachers do not feel equipped and capable at present, and an increase in training is required before the introduction of CVE programmes into Australian classrooms. This was also a concern present in the UK case study provided earlier. Yet, if statistics reveal that young people are of most concern of being recruited to violent causes, school-based workshops and programmes, with sufficient training of presenters and teachers, may prove to be useful in shaping young Australians to succeed throughout their youth into adulthood and avoid the pulls of radicalisation and violent extremism. However, teachers need to feel well equipped and capable before this can take place.

The participants in this research were then asked whether they believed the school environment was a suitable space for improving youth resilience to antisocial and delinquent behaviour, including violent extremism. This question provided the respondents with four options to choose from, namely:

1. Yes, the school is a crucial environment for educating about such dangers to youth.
2. Yes, in some ways the school is suitable but only if taught by professionals in their respective fields.
3. No, I think these issues should be taught in the home or an out-of-school programme.
4. Neutral, I have no previous experience with such programmes and I'm not sure about their suitability.

Half (49%) of the respondents agreed with option one (n=24) and 35 per cent with option two; collectively, 85 per cent of respondents believed the school environment was, in some way, ideal for curbing antisocial and delinquent behaviour, including

violent extremism. Ten per cent agreed with option three and only two respondents (4%) selected option four and one respondent did not answer. It is clear teachers and parents are in support of either modifying or adding to the current educational space in order to work towards improvements in a wide array of antisocial behaviours. 28 of the 35 teachers (80%) agreed the school environment was suitable and 20 of the 26 parents (76%) agreed the same. Again, some respondents are included in both the teacher and parent categories if they identified as such. The question is how to go about this for long-term change to take place. Community support for any school-based interventions or programming is vital, including support from parents, and these results indicate that there is support from teachers for some sort of intervention work that improves the social wellbeing of Australia's young people. This is a start, and arguably the first hurdle when implementing new programmes, especially ones as sensitive and contentious as those directed towards radicalisation and violent extremism.

When asked about what these CVE programmes should look like in school environments, two key themes emerged from the responses. Firstly, it was clear that the input from teachers and parents showed concern for the social dexterities of young people in today's society. This was linked closely with concerns about the moral grounding of adolescents. Many participants suggested that children need access to programmes that are designed to help them improve their views of others, learn tolerance and acceptance of difference, and build on basic social competencies that allow them to feel confident and grounded. This was a similar view to those expressed in response to the previous questions regarding community concerns and concerns for local young people. There is a strong pattern present in the survey responses that reveals that both parents and teachers are concerned about the lack of core values that they believe children deserve to be taught, that many deem is being neglected in the present generation. Many respondents also highlighted that this starts in the home and that schools support this instruction. At times, if this learning is absent in the home life, schools bear the brunt of teaching values that may be in contrast to what is being learnt at home. This was a frustration present in the participants' responses. Teachers likely want to feel they are reinforcing the values that are taught at home, but many expressed that this was not always the case and that at times this makes the teaching of morals and principles very difficult for teachers and school staff members.

Secondly, the participants stated that any CVE-style programme in schools should also focus on teaching children the ‘signs’ of what to look for when a peer or acquaintance is showing markers of radicalisation or violent extremism. Thus, there are two layers of monitoring to consider here – teachers being aware of changes in their students and students being aware of changes in their peers. Similarly, the indicators of targeted recruitment and what this may look like, especially in an online space, were considered a necessary component of any school-based CVE programming. Being able to “recognise and report” for young people was put forward by one participant and another emphasised the need to make it clear to young people how to go about following precise procedures of reporting if they do have concerns for someone. The respondents indicated the advantage adolescents have in this regard, as their close peer relationships means they may be one of the first to notice any concerning changes in behaviours. Thus, children must be able to make sound decisions and know clearly what they are to do if ever faced with such concerns for their friends or classmates. One participant stated that society must work towards “making the issue a general issue to take away the fear and taboo nature of the topic”. Being able to identify the signs and feeling comfortable enough to report concerns goes hand-in-hand with ensuring these topics are approachable and conversational. If stigma continues to surround the topic, then efforts to teach children to speak with adults when they are worried or wish to query something of concern will likely be limited. At present, it can be argued that the very nature of anything CVE-related, counter-terrorism based, or deradicalisation-focused is shrouded in controversy and carries with it a stigma that means those who are ill-equipped or unprepared to speak on the topic will avoid addressing it at all, often out of fear (Cherney et al., 2017).

Additionally, this question regarding identifiable changes drew attention to a number of other key concepts that may prove to be fundamental components for future CVE programming. A lack of instruction that teaches critical thinking skills was raised amongst the responses, as well as the need for any school-based education to be supported by external networks: “it should be in combination with programmes run outside the school, so the role should be part of a multidisciplinary approach”. Moreover, one respondent noted “schools have a responsibility to provide the students with the environment to learn resilience…[also] schools should outsource to other people…to provide students with the right information”. Teacher input such as

these suggestions are important considerations for any future school-based CVE-related programming. However, five respondents (10%) believed that CVE programming was not the responsibility of schools and instead should be addressed in the home or with the parents or simply handled by the "relevant authorities". In contrast, one respondent affirmed that it should form part of existing teaching programmes, but only for schools that are "prone to these problems". This draws attention to the issue of whether all schools should be incorporating programming that may result in a long-term reduction in radicalisation and violent extremism, or whether only targeted or identified schools that fall into the undefined 'at-risk' category should receive such interventions, as is generally the case in Australia at present and in the UK.

It has been identified elsewhere that the lack of empirical evidence in the literature regarding which approaches are the most effective in the CVE field is to some extent a product of the long-term nature of CVE programming (Cherney et al., 2017). Thus, the teachers and parents participating in the exploratory survey were probed as to whether they believed CVE programming in schools should be for immediate/short term outcomes or with a view to long-term change for the future. Four choices were included in the question and 51 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement "both short- and long-term outcomes are required". A further 31 per cent selected the long-term only option; nine of the 49 (18%) participants selected the unsure option and no respondents agreed with the statement "short-term outcomes would be best".



Figure 8. Opinions regarding short or long-term nature of CVE programming. From *Counter-Radicalisation in Australia* Typeform survey, September 2017 – February 2018.

Teachers and parents thus consider any CVE-related activities to be a long-term process with elements that need to address some short-term concerns as well. This may indicate that deep structural changes to Australia's curriculum or approaches to learning may be required if long-term results in schools are to be seen. This suggests that CVE as a counter-terrorism tool is perceived as persistent and perhaps one that is likely to present for some time. Moreover, long-term perceptions may suggest that such programming needs to be embedded and regular to have the long-term impact sought. With this in mind, the survey respondents were then asked to reflect on the question: "Do you consider violent extremism of any kind (religious, non-religious, environmental etc.) an issue that needs introducing in the teenage years?" and a noteworthy 67 per cent agreed with the question. A further 19 per cent noted they were unsure and the smallest number – seven of the 49 respondents (14%) - selected the "no" option. Again, the majority was in support of some form of education that guides our young people around the dangers of violent extremism. It is imperative here to note the importance of teaching about violent extremism in its entirety. Whilst many may be inclined to consider extremism exhibiting in the name of Islam to be the dominant concern, many other forms exist, such as far-right extremism, that present an equal, if not more significant, problem.

However, a number of these factors were raised in the survey conducted for this research. It is clear that parents and teachers are concerned by a number of risk factors, including bullying behaviours, a lack of individual values and moral beliefs, inadequate parental nurturing and home life, and abuse of drugs and alcohol. With comments such as: "lack of parental support and concern"; "the influence of social media"; "teens who don't identify with friends and spend an inordinate amount of time on all types of social media and are thus susceptible to radicalisation"; and "disengagement at school and anxiety issues". It is clear that the relatable risk factors in young people's lives are concerning for parents and teachers. Additionally, the respondents presented a number of protective factors which, when enhanced and nurtured, may prove to be defining elements that lead a young person away from violent extremism. The protective factors identified by both parents and teachers in the data represent those considered most pressing by people who interact with young people the most. Examples include: "provide multiple opportunities for students to identify with a group at school…using inclusive community-based language"; "engaging social clubs in schools"; "fostering relationships…where every student

feels they matter"; "daily conversations"; "more community involvement"; "lessons focused on difference and acceptance"; and "the need for parents to support the school and its decisions". Parents and guardians in the home and teachers in the classroom and playground can collaboratively shape most of these factors. They are moulded and nurtured in the school environment, which means the right education can play a most significant role in prosocial upbringing for a young person and ensure a happy and positive transition to adulthood. If countering violent extremism in Australia's future is to be successful, the school environment must contribute to developing children who are capable of resisting the push and pull factors of violent extremism and able to challenge any recruitment to such behaviours by violently radicalised individuals, similar to the manner in which other antisocial problems are confronted.

5.3 Determining the role of teachers, by teachers.

School-based CVE-style programmes have the potential to be established as an essential component of school curricula in the future if radicalisation and violent extremism continue to present as an issue amongst young people. As noted earlier, the current patterns of counter-radicalisation research identify education as a crucial avenue in which radicalisation and violent extremism can be addressed because of the heavily skewed trajectory of younger individuals being caught up in support for extremist violence. These individuals have been within school age and also just outside of school age and whilst it is impossible to know what the future holds for patterns of radicalisation, if these current trends were to continue, schools may prove a fruitful basis for addressing these concerns. Schools may be the ideal base for addressing the drivers of violent extremism due to the significant amount of time spent by children in schools, the opportunity for schools to build protective factors and reduce risk factors, and the need to address the most pressing problem/s amongst younger individuals. However, as mentioned, this type of education may be recognisable as one of two forms: firstly, an entrenched component of existing school curricula, and secondly and alternatively, it may also prove most effective when undertaken as an independent extra-curricular mode of content run either inside or outside of school hours. Both options were considered in this research and survey participants were asked for their thoughts on these options. The perspectives of the teachers and parents who may be closely involved with such programming in

the future are helpful in ensuring that the most accepted option is supported for increased efficacy of programming. A number of questions were put to the respondents to gather views on how this programming should fit into the educational system in Australia.

Firstly, participants were asked: “do you consider teachers to be the ideal individuals to teach about violent extremism? Why/Why not”. Responses were quite equally balanced between yes and no. Many respondents (25%) indicated a yes, but included an afterthought, such as one respondent who stated: “yes and no. They can only teach so much but need to be supported in the teachings of it”; and another participant similarly stated “yes, but with training and guest speakers”. Only six (12%) respondents indicated a clear “yes” without a follow-on consideration. These respondents, more firm in their answers, believed teachers were best suited for reasons such as being able to offer balanced viewpoints, their significant impact on a child’s development, and an ability to be non-judgmental in a safe and open environment. Many of the responses that were leaning towards a “no” indicated that they believed teachers’ workloads were already overwhelming and adding a new component to focus on was not the best option; or they considered the instruction to be best undertaken by trained professionals. Comments made included: “no, the curriculum is over packed as it is”; “the school curriculum is already overcrowded, so it would be a matter of time”; and “no, not their job, the responsibility lies with parents”.

Additionally, there was noteworthy concern regarding the lack of training of teachers for this area of teaching. Respondents were concerned about the specialist skills that were deemed necessary for teaching content about violent extremism, and there were also suggestions that teachers should play a “sit-in” role or act under the guidance of specially trained professionals. It was apparent amongst the 49 respondents that an overarching concern was about the lack of training of teachers to teach any content related to radicalisation and violent extremism. In addition to this, a common theme regarding personal bias from teachers was also a concern. A number of respondents indicated that they believed it would be difficult for teachers to remain neutral to such sensitive topics and that their personal bias and opinions might influence their instruction. This perhaps is closely associated with the lack of specialist training in how to teach any content related to issues of violent extremism and radicalisation, especially to adolescents. Many participants showed hesitation in

selecting “yes” or “no” and many offered a combination of both answers. One respondent started with “possibly” and then proceeded to explain that it would depend on the individual teacher’s teaching style, as this differs, as well as how they have interpreted the content. This may be where personal bias and feelings play a part unless very specific training is provided and specifications are made clear. Another common theme present in all the responses was the suggestion that individuals who had been directly involved in a case of radicalisation and/or violent extremism would provide invaluable teaching experiences on the topic to young adolescents. Personal anecdotes from individual experiences, trained professionals, and engagement with parents/guardians were well-supported approaches to education-based CVE programming.

Following this, some questions were then posed solely to the teachers participating. Firstly, their capability and preparedness as a teacher was queried, as it is important to consider how educators feel about being required to incorporate CVE programming into their classrooms. Overwhelmingly, the majority of respondents initially stated that they did not feel capable or prepared, but this was often supported by the fact that they had personally received no training on the issue. Many stated that they had no experience with the topic or the issue in their lives and therefore felt they were not well suited to teaching the content. One respondent indicated that “life experience, knowledge, and skills” would be necessary to offer the accurate information required. A number of respondents reiterated that it was a “specialist skill” that fell outside the parameters of the teaching role and a “big ask” of teachers. It is clear from the initial responses that teachers, in what might have been their first consideration of teaching CVE-style content, were clear in their “no” reaction and many could not see it as being a component of their usual teaching role. Further research would benefit from reiterating this same question following teacher training on the topic. The perceptions of frontline teachers and how confident they feel to teach such content is imperative to the success of any school-based CVE work, as without the full support from the teaching staff the efficacy of the programming would be hindered.

Next, the teachers were asked if they considered CVE-related content to be best taught as a stand-alone topic area or whether it should be embedded into various areas of the curriculum. This question was asked of the teacher respondents because experiences around the world have differed as to how best to incorporate educational

CVE (Ghosh, Manuel, Alice Chan, Dilimulati, & Babaei, 2016). Some countries have used the first option and attempted to educate young people with specialist external programmes, whilst various other cases have used formal educational avenues to ingrain CVE programming, like the UK has implemented. Of the teachers surveyed, 13 (36%) of the 36 clearly indicated that they believed stand-alone to be the best choice. These 13 respondents were firm in their selection of the stand-alone answer. The reasons offered for this opinion varied; some were again concerned with what was considered an already overloaded curriculum whilst others thought the content would work best as a stand-alone area taught by outside agencies and staff because of the specialist skills required. Some trepidation was apparent regarding the potential blurring of the relationship between teacher and student when engaging in topics that may indirectly offend the students or make them feel as if their teacher is judging them. This was thus a concern expressed if classroom teachers were to be the sole providers of this content to their students. Guest speakers and a "one-off thing for more senior students" run by outside staff were also suggested as potential methods.

However, the other option put forward for this question was whether CVE education should be integrated, so as to be included in important content already being taught, perhaps most suited to discussions around world affairs, current news, history, or politics. 11 teachers (22%) steadfastly supported integration of CVE awareness education because many agreed it would ensure greater viability than offered in a one-off workshop or programme. Teachers indicated that when new content is integrated into existing teaching curricula, there is a smoother transition of instruction. One teacher stated: "teachers can make comparisons and show contrast with the topics they are currently teaching" whilst another supported inclusion with existing content because it provides a basis to build on and the familiarity or routine that can form part of teaching something new allowing teachers to draw connections between topics. A selection (12%) of the teachers surveyed (6 respondents) were in support of both integration or stand-alone approaches, as they could either see benefits to both avenues or were unsure as to which one would work best over the other option. One teacher suggested: "there are pros for both methods; however, I think when initially introducing the content that stand alone would have the biggest impact and then into the future look at an integrated approach". These findings suggest it is important to consider a mixed approach to teaching CVE-related content

as this may improve its efficacy and ensure that students grasp the weight of the content and cannot "just brush it off as meaningless", as one teacher's response suggested.

The teacher respondents were also asked how they felt about an obligation to report suspicious behaviour among their students. It was possible to identify a common theme amongst the answers that positioned this reporting in line with mandatory child abuse and neglect reporting and the majority were accepting of this component of teaching CVE. One respondent described this process as "integral to the role of the teacher" as it is an essential component of providing a duty of care to the students. Another response stated that it has now simply become a part of society and it is the teacher's responsibility to report anything they believe could affect their students' wellbeing and safety. This was supported by many respondents who drew the comparison to already established mandatory reporting rules and is supported by the findings from the UK data indicating that it is simply an extension of existing safeguarding practices (Busher et al., 2017). Only one teacher highlighted a concern with any reporting to a law enforcement agency that may need to take place. This individual's response also drew attention to the moral obligation that goes with reporting an individual, arguably most especially a young student, to a formal legal and authoritative body, which may have some "grey areas" for teachers. This same respondent raised the idea that this may also affect teacher-parent relationships, possibly forcing the parent to feel as if they had lacked in their parental responsibilities; however, as another respondent argued, any reporting should be anonymous to protect the teacher involved.

It was clear that the majority of the teachers surveyed for this research had no concerns about the obligation to report any suspicious behaviour amongst their students as they already felt that this would fall under their duty of care commitments and was simply another behaviour to consider. It was apparent that the wellbeing of the students in their care was of utmost importance and if they were required to report signs of radicalisation and violent extremism in an effort to protect the school community they would not hesitate to do so. So, how are teachers to identify the types of behaviours, language, or conversations that require reporting? A distinction between a child 'mouthing off' and genuinely concerning comments may be a difficult distinction to make for teachers and school staff and these errors have occurred elsewhere. Again, training and standards are a must here in order to provide

teachers with the awareness and confidence to report accurately and reduce stigmatisation and fear of monitoring. However, the data collected for this research reveals that teachers are yet to feel adequately prepared for this.

5.4 Families and the school community are integral to the success of prevention, but it must be a collaborative effort.

With teachers indicating a lack of preparedness and confidence in regard to teaching CVE-related content in their classrooms, it is therefore important to consider how teachers can be best supported if Australia broadens its school-based CVE programming. If Australia was to widen its CVE efforts in the future, teachers would need to feel capable and supported to teach such content and this may require support from the broader school community and potentially also engaging with the families of the students. As raised in the previous section, it was clear that both teachers and parents were concerned about the neglect of teaching moral values and respect for others that may occur in some homes; the solution to this may be to work alongside families, rather than just the children and adolescents themselves. When this neglect takes place, schools and teachers who are working to build a moral grounding in children may be competing with a different experience in the children's home, which makes this task all the more challenging for teachers. Being taught what is 'right' in school may be in stark contrast to the way others are treated in their home life. This can be confusing for children and the correct way to treat others may be overlooked by these children and could play a contributing role in support for violence against unknown and seemingly innocent victims.

Additionally, variations in what is considered moral conduct will likely differ based upon competing priorities between families, communities, environments, and experiences. Moral values will vary and may have already played a part in choosing the type and style of the school to send one's children to. Choosing an environment that aligns with personal moral values goes some way to forming a bridge between school and home, but there will likely always be instances of disjuncture, especially as teaching staff changes, variations occurring in a child's home life, and the developmental growth that naturally takes place as young people age and form their own independent identities and values. Moral disengagement as a process that reconstructs moral values to justify violence and its consequences has been considered in studies like Aly et al. (2014). Here, educational intervention includes

the building of social cognitive resilience to challenge the process of moral disengagement to resist extremist violence. This type of educational approach could be supported by parents and teachers, like those who participated in this study, as a means of addressing what some respondents considered a lack of morals amongst young people.

Strong school communities that are welcoming to students' families, accessible and approachable, and that promote equality amongst the school population have been suggested as vital protective factors to the overall wellbeing of young people moving through the schooling years (Department of Homeland Security, 2016; NSW Government, 2015a; Weine, 2012; Weine, 2013). This is further endorsed by a sense of belonging and feeling a part of the 'team' that is the school environment, which together form protective influences against youth delinquency (Pessoa et al., 2017). With this in mind, the exploratory survey for this research sought participants' thoughts about how their personal school community could best foster these concepts. A distinguishable trend was evident amongst the responses, as repeated calls were made for ensuring children feel they belong and matter at school. Ensuring that a child enjoys going to school in an environment that promotes acceptance of all was one obvious approach put forward amongst the answers. Helping students develop their self-esteem was promoted as a way to achieve a sense of belonging and generally improve their overall wellbeing. In addition to this, feeling safe at school and welcome regardless of gender, background, or ethnicity were all mentioned in the responses. One participant contended that this is difficult to achieve in bigger schools with more students, which is perhaps an important consideration in itself for effective CVE work in schools in the future. Contributing to a sense of belonging through initiatives like providing students with a role in some decision-making processes at school gives students ownership of their school environment. If the school environment were to be used for any CVE-related programming, these considerations would benefit the planning and promote increased effectiveness.

The broad range of suggestions made by the participants provided a significant number of ideas and therefore these have been summarised into the list of approaches provided in the table below. The suggestions are extensive in their reach but tell us that both teachers and parents have much to share and input into the design and running of CVE programming. What exactly works in the field of CVE is very

much unknown. In addition, as highlighted previously, it is difficult to assess best practices and effectiveness or outcomes because of the long-term nature of the work and the fact that measuring the success of violent extremism means measuring an absence of a phenomenon. However, by seeking out and absorbing the perceptions from frontline faces like teachers and parents it may perhaps be more possible to develop programmes or educational curricula that have an increased chance of success. Without the support of these individuals, the chances of successful intervention work are already limited, so by designing programmes with input, such as the comments summarised below, from those closest to the target area, best practices and effectiveness may be realised sooner.

Building a strong school community – the perspectives of parents and teachers

Ensure children enjoy going to school	Include parents and carers in school activities
Ensure access and equity	Increase community involvement
Show leadership in respect and dignity	Give students a voice
Build rapport between teacher and student	Rebuild the TAFE (Technical and Further Education) system to foster more opportunities for employment
Have zero tolerance for harassment and anti-social behaviour	Improve youth employment
Build social skills	Foster daily conversations
Give students ownership	Reward excellent effort
Make school fun	Counter bullying
Ensure open communication between all stakeholders	Have peer buddies for new students
Establish a feeling of safety	Gain parental support of the school and its decisions
Promote self esteem	Value young people as human beings
Encourage narratives	Celebrate differences, more so than simply tolerating
Provide student leadership opportunities	Foster an environment of acceptance
Offer a social and emotional learning programme	Ensure every student feels they matter
Foster relationships	Have daily pastoral care
Establish peer support programmes	Create opportunities to celebrate individual backgrounds
Include multicultural celebrations	Ensure disability access
Employ group work projects	Establish lunchtime special interest clubs
Improve academic levels	Encourage performing arts
Offer sports	Create opportunities to participate in events

Overall, these suggestions contribute to our understanding of how policies can best be shaped to impact young people in the most positive way possible. They lend valuable insight into the expectations of teachers and parents regarding CVE work with young people in school environments. Furthermore, the participants' input gives value to the design of CVE and aids the development of any future in-school CVE programming. Again, if CVE education is to broaden further in Australia and form a component of standard school education, then these types of suggestions should form the basis for this new norm. A number of these suggestions involve the wider school community and the potential role outside bodies can play in this process.

If CVE programming were to become ingrained in the Australian curriculum and form a part of normal education in schools, newly established support networks with out-of-school bodies would arguably need to form part of the design and encompass a permanent position within schools. The recent Australian programme – *School Communities Working Together* – sets out a variety of additional support networks for the designated schools in order to help the school address and implement the new content. Any programming in schools that seeks to address radicalisation and/or violent extremism is unique to each school, as its endeavours and goals would pertain to that school's most pressing needs; it would thus require the additional support to ensure sound implementation and increase the chances of success. When asked about the support networks already available to their school population, the survey respondents offered a number of new suggestions that could form this unique support required for any CVE-related education, whether specified as such as a stand-alone intervention or added to the existing content without the CVE label. The respondents were also asked whether they felt their school support networks available to children were adequate and if they had any suggestions their school might be able to offer to other schools.

45 per cent of the survey participants firmly agreed that their child's school and/or the school at which they taught had the appropriate support available to children – culturally, religiously, and in terms of general support. 31 per cent clearly disagreed and explained why they considered there to be a lack of support networks. The remaining respondents were unsure or did not address the question (responses such as "not applicable here"). For those who firmly agreed, many followed up their "yes" with comments like "but always need more!"; "although I think there is always

room for more support to be made available"; and "it would always be good to have more school counsellor time". Some respondents offered an answer like "yes and no" and then further explained that the counsellor was vital, but the size of the school made it difficult for the counsellor to fully offer a proactive role. In regard to other types of support services, one respondent indicated the school had a chaplain, but this chaplain did not have a counselling qualification, and the respondent considered this as a missing support network for the children. Another respondent stated their school had a strong welfare framework, but that this would not necessarily prove adequate for cases of radicalisation. Generally, the respondents referred to counselling support when answering this question and whilst the majority responded in the affirmative, many had reservations as to whether the support in place was sufficient.

Interestingly, whilst many firmly agreed with the question, those that disagreed were just as strong in their response. Some answers were capitalised and included exclamation points to place emphasis on their disagreement with the inquiry. Many stated their school counsellor was not a full-time employee and was inconsistently present within the school. Arguably, this would make it difficult for students to form a bond with such a support person if the face is less familiar. Comments included statements such as "my public high school doesn't even have a full-time counsellor" and "as a rural school we struggle to employ qualified quality staff to support students". One respondent referred to the lack of support for teachers also and suggested that, if improved, this could enhance the teachers' ability to help the children rather than relying on strained counselling services. One response referred to a lack of external support for students and a need to improve access to support networks outside of the school. The respondent was satisfied that their school's learning support team and counsellor "works well" but could always improve, and that this team could benefit from closer alliances with external support networks for the children. This was similar to another response that stated: "not at all. There is high demand but not enough people or organisations to assist". This same respondent also referred to the relationship with the local police and how this may be of assistance. It was regularly repeated amongst the suggestions that generally speaking, there is already a lack of support in school environments due to overstretched resources and a lack of full-time qualified practitioners to meet the wellbeing needs of the students. Many of those that considered the support network

as adequate added additional suggestions and ways to improve the existing framework, and expressed concern that, despite the support being in place, it would benefit from some improvement. It is clear that there not only exists a lack of support for teaching staff in regard to training and professional development but a gap also exists in the support schools provide to teachers through extra professional staff and experts in various other fields, like counselling.

This extra support may need to come from the school community and local providers and stakeholders in order to enrich the work being undertaken within the schooling environment. The respondents were asked whether their school provided a choice of extra-curricular activities available to their children/students that could be participated in outside of the usual learning structure. Extra-curricular activities provided through the school may encourage involvement and participation in a different manner to activities that are completely unrelated to the school. Extra-curricular activities that are not associated with the school in any way typically cost money for participation, and this may be out of reach for many families and their children. If increased extra-curricular activities are set up or organised with the school this may allow for a reduction in costs by utilising school facilities, or integrating with the school and the school's funding. Whilst for many schools funding may be stretched, for others, school community involvement with outside organisations to provide the students with extra-curricular options may be a viable opportunity that would benefit the students in their care. 73 per cent of respondents who addressed this question agreed that their school provided a sufficient spread of extra-curricular activities. However, some respondents also indicated that whilst these activities were available to the students, the limited school time left spare outside of lessons made it difficult for them to have a significant engagement with the kids. Being "time poor" was a factor for some of the teachers responding, whilst some raised concerns regarding the ability of the school to engage the more vulnerable and at-risk kids into these activities. A lack of interest was suggested by some respondents, who expressed concern about a number of factors such as costs, students' preferred interest in the use of technology and social media for their spare time, and activities that require a special skill to be able to participate, such as choir.

For those who answered no to the question, reasons for this varied and included lack of time, cost, activities being limited to "certain kids", and a jam-packed curriculum. Some suggestions were made as to the types of programmes that

these teachers would like to see in their schools; these included lunchtime sports games that focused on participation rather than winning; library games for students who wish to participate but are generally not high achievers; greater community and parental involvement for community cohesion; an expression-based programme that builds mental health in young people, supported by the principal; and "anything low-cost". One participant explained that their school had a number of choices for students, but they needed additional activities for students who feel they do not excel at something in particular. They need a place where these students can attend and feel connected to other students and the school, but which do not require certain physical or academic abilities in order for them to play a role. This suggestion is noteworthy as the underlying concept here is inclusion.

The role of the school community in countering radicalisation and violent extremism is a new concept that fosters a close relationship between a school environment and the local community in which it is situated. This is a relatively new theory for the field of CVE with little empirically backed examples to draw from, but the survey participants were asked how they thought their school community could best play a role in the prevention of violent extremism among young people. A wide array of suggestions was offered but a key theme identifiable amongst the responses was the fostering of inclusivity and a sense of belonging for all young people as a means for addressing a turn towards violent radicalisation. Clearer awareness and identification of students who appear to be isolated was also advocated, as well as improved knowledge about warning signs for this type of behaviour. For many, these sorts of behaviours may be new and unique, and without adequate training into the identifiable behaviours, teachers will be unable to play a more substantial role in supporting young people to move away from such pathways. Maintaining a young person's engagement with their school was put forward by a number of respondents; however, within the counter-radicalisation literature it remains unclear how best to re-engage a child who may have disengaged from school and is following a radicalised pathway. Every case would be unique and, as yet, it appears that these newly emerging concerns among young people bring some confusion to schools and teaching staff.

Whilst all respondents offered what they thought was the ideal solution to the issue at hand, the exact initiatives to achieve these outcomes were absent. Suggestions such as: "awareness"; "create a sense of belonging"; "social skills";

"educate about the risks"; and "knowledge" still leave unanswered questions about the ideal educational basis or awareness knowledge that would effectively reduce the incidences of young people resorting to a pathway of radicalisation and violent extremism. The most specific response suggested by the survey participants was the use of personal narratives from individuals previously closely involved with an extremist or radicalised direction in their life as part of this awareness raising education. A number of the teachers and parents throughout the survey made this suggestion as a means for really reaching out to children and emphasising the dangers and risks. It may be that previous teaching experiences about antisocial and delinquent life choices among young people have demonstrated to teachers the effectiveness of first-hand accounts and real-life stories. This approach has been used by organisations such as Extreme Dialogue, which provides classroom resources based on the stories of 'formers' of a radicalised or hate group lifestyle; this has received positive feedback from schools engaging with the material (Extreme Dialogue, 2018). The ability to participate in lessons like those supported by the Extreme Dialogue content can allow students a safe space for conversing and for sharing their thoughts and opinions, and the environment can promote discussion of the topics seen in the media and in the online world, as noted by one survey participant. This respondent encouraged the use of safe spaces for discussion in order to emphasise the importance of the issue, even if there is currently no direct or obvious problem in the immediate local area. Other respondents also raised the importance of discussing such issues so children are able to ask their questions and engage with world affairs. One participant recommended dropping religious classes and replacing them with ethics classes and incorporating world affairs into these. However, the respondent also called for specialist teachers for this task, which would likely limit the capacity of some schools to bring in new teaching staff for new subject areas to teach these classes.

Again, the parents' and teachers' perceptions of how to address and prevent radicalisation and violent extremism were varied and offered up a number of unique contributions from those workers and families at the forefront of childhood development. The emphasis on communication and inclusivity, as suggested by the respondents, reveals the need to enhance school connectedness and a sense of belonging for students. Once children feel 'at home' in their school environment, safe spaces for communication and the sharing of ideas can be used effectively to air

grievances or share concerns. Without this sense of belonging and feeling included, adolescents are likely to be less inclined to share their opinions. Thus, these suggestions support the proposition that school connectedness should play a key role in school-based CVE-style education.

Next, the exploratory survey asked the participants if they would turn to a community role model to receive support and assistance if they were at all concerned about the behaviour of their child or a student in their care. This question was asked of the participants in order to better understand how the respondents perceived potential networks and relationships between the school and wider community organisations and to explore whether they felt supported or alone in these matters. Also, it was seen as an opportunity to explore how the school was situated in the broader school community and whether the respondents felt connected to and aware of other support networks because this opportunity to reach out has been found to be a "critical disconnect" in studies (Williams, Horgan, & Evans, 2016). 24 of the respondents – more than 50 per cent – clearly stated that they would seek out help elsewhere if they felt they required the help to deal with a difficult situation. Six respondents (12%) were firm with their "no" response and a few of these answered the final part of the question – why/why not – by admitting they would only address the problem themselves or within the family. The remaining answers were some form of "unsure", such as: "maybe or someone I know or they know, that they respect"; "it would depend on the circumstances"; and "very situation dependent I think"; "perhaps in some cultures/communities". One of the "no" responders explained that they would turn to their principal first and then leave the next steps to the responsibility of the principal, whether that be engaging with community leaders for help or not. It was evident that the majority of the respondents believed the issue to be severe enough to warrant doing "whatever they could" to help the child, including turning to community leaders. Three respondents did not answer the question and one provided a response of "N/A". An additional respondent simply answered with "I can't imagine being in this situation!" These unanswered responses may be because of the participants' doubts about how they would handle a concern about radicalisation or violent extremism if they have never experienced this issue before. Perhaps, also, the unanswered responses may be indicative of the sensitive nature of this topic and a fear of confronting the steps that may be necessary if they were forced to act regarding their child or a student in their care.

Moreover, it is clear from this question, as well as in general from the study, that, overall, many of the respondents have not considered what they would do if faced with this situation. This reveals the uniqueness of this problem and also speaks to the geographical nature of radicalisation and violent extremism in Australia. Whilst this survey largely resulted in participants living on the east coast of Australia, where the majority of the cases of young radicalised individuals have appeared, many of these respondents have clearly been little affected by violent extremism and radicalisation in their day-to-day lives. However, it may be that those individuals who have had first-hand experience with a case of radicalisation and/or violent extremism, had also perhaps previously considered the issue to be far-fetched and removed from their reality. Certain communities in Australia have yet to witness a personal case of a young person participating in this pathway and perhaps there remains an element of 'it won't happen here', which has left the topic a loosely considered one for many teachers and parents. For some, radicalisation and violent extremism is likely to feel 'far-fetched' and, as the earlier questions in the survey indicated, lower down respondents' lists of priorities after issues with drugs, alcohol, and unemployment.

The final item in the survey asked the respondents to offer any additional methods or comments they felt would help deter their child or student away from antisocial behaviour, especially violence. This question did not specifically ask the respondents for CVE-related suggestions, rather it was used as an opportunity to hear ideas that the respondents supported for other concerning behaviours, which may in the long term prove useful for any CVE-related interventions. This was a chance to collect specific examples of other best practices used within respondents' communities, especially for those who were yet to experience a first-hand situation of radicalisation or violent extremism in the local area. An additional comment for this question was provided by 62.5 per cent of participants, which speaks to the value of the information that these teachers and parents have to share. The most common identifiable themes in the responses to this query can be summarised into four key areas to consider for future CVE-programming:

1) open communication
2) belonging, acceptance, inclusion
3) parental involvement/engagement with their children
4) knowledge and awareness.

These four factors were consistent suggestions amongst the answers, and did not just appear in answer to the final question of the survey. These factors were repeated throughout the survey and arose as areas of concern for a number of the questions posed. Self-worth, positive peer relationships, and community connections (such as through sporting clubs) were also encouraged. These four key themes emerging from the final open-ended question reflect the entire breadth of survey responses.

5.5 Concluding remarks

The findings from this research project emphasised four significant findings. Firstly, the data collected reinforced the complex nature of P/CVE in schools and demonstrates the multidimensional understandings and perspectives that are present. Secondly, it was clear that radicalisation and violent extremism were not a primary concern amongst the respondents. Rather, other social issues were of utmost concern regarding young people, such as employment opportunities and drug and alcohol use/abuse. Radicalisation and violent extremism were noted as a newer problem presenting amongst some young people and it was apparent that schools were considered a potentially important factor in combating this and should play their part when needed. However, the role schools should play in combatting violent extremism and radicalisation was less clear and suggestions were varied.

The third most prevailing finding was that any P/CVE efforts should only be taking place in schools after intensive teacher training and in collaboration with specialists external to the school. As yet, this was not considered widespread and an important factor for many teachers before implementing any P/CVE material in their classrooms. Fourthly, families and the school community were perceived as integral to the success of prevention but must be collaboratively proactive in moral guidance and developing resistance to violent extremism for young people. It was clear that the majority of respondents believed that young people could benefit from a holistic, well-rounded approach to supporting them in their development that would also ideally encapsulate support to steer away from any radicalised or extremist behaviours.

With these four key themes drawn from the findings in mind, the final chapter, Chapter Six, will revisit the research questions outlined in Chapter One, summarise the study, and note some future research opportunities.

Chapter Six

Discussion – Conclusions – Considerations

The role of education in countering violent extremism is a topic that still needs much future research and refinement if this approach is to be fully and effectively utilised. As has been highlighted, the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism is still present in most parts of the world, despite the significant policy developments that have taken place, and presents in a multitude of contexts and situations. This results in a challenge to present a straightforward and effective approach that will transfer across and between forms and cases of violent extremism with confidence that such programming will see the desired results. However, the findings of this research highlight the significance of teacher and parent experiences in bringing to light key issues to be considered in future initiatives. The uniqueness of these issues in various experiences of radicalisation and violent extremism create contextual considerations that somewhat limit cross-community collaboration. As such, each community dealing with radical behaviours and ideologies must discover what works best for their particular community. This thesis has explored the ways in which P/CVE policy has developed across various contexts before then focusing on educational spaces and how they have been used around the world for implementation of policy seeking to reduce radicalisation and violent extremism. A global exploration was undertaken to generate a picture of some of the best practices internationally. This research then set out to explore the Australian context in more detail due to the very recent and limited introduction of educational P/CVE within Australia. There are many unknowns in the field of educational P/CVE and P/CVE-related work; these leave noteworthy gaps in the counter-terrorism literature, which require further exploration. Specifically, the Australian context is little explored due to the contemporary nature of the issue and this research contributes to ongoing conversations about P/CVE issues and the role educational environments may play in this.

P/CVE is well placed to occur in the school environment and any prevention efforts will likely be well received in schools if they involve the community, target multiple concerns simultaneously, and utilise professionals from specific adolescent fields. The amount of time children spend in educational institutions has put schools

at the forefront of these efforts (Ghosh et al., 2016). Moreover, it is important to consider the extent of the role schools play in providing a duty of care to their students, an aspect explored through this research. As noted in a publication by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, if we are to assume that education is a moral enterprise to develop and shape the minds of young people, any transformation of a student's beliefs towards violent extremism should be of utmost concern to educators (Ghosh et al., 2016). Arguably, schools exist to shape children through their most formative years and children spend a significant portion of their lives in educational institutions, and potentially a further period of time in tertiary studies, thus, the school environment has the opportunity to heavily influence a child's growth, mindset, and wellbeing. Moreover, recent history has shown us that highly educated individuals may be influenced or inspired to undertake acts of violent extremism against others and these individuals have spent a considerable amount of time in educational institutions (Ghosh et al., 2016). Thus, there may be an element to education that can be modified and bolstered to ensure the most educated people in societies are not attracted to the use of violence as a solution to their grievances.

6.1 Summary of the study

This study set out to consider the implications, perspectives, and understandings of P/CVE policy agendas, particularly on communities and individuals. Then, the study endeavoured to narrow this exploration to the educational space. This was identified as a priority because of the early signs that intervention in schools was increasing in recent popularity in Australia. The study used a mixed-methods approach by developing and analysing international case studies before using these case study insights to design an exploratory survey to be undertaken with Australian-based parent and teacher participants. The development of the survey was informed by gaps in the secondary case studies which together generated a number of noteworthy issues and lessons learnt that may help guide policymakers and educationalists as approaches continue to develop. There were two major takeaways arising from findings that are worthy of consideration for future policy development. Firstly, it appears that bringing P/CVE educational programmes into schools would be better received if it addressed support mechanisms for adolescents for a number of anti-social issues, like drugs and alcohol as well as P/CVE concerns. That is, interventions implemented as specifically preventing or

countering extremism, radicalisation, or violent extremism appear to be less likely to be well-received than interventions that seek to support young people to build resilience to a variety of challenges. A broader approach that is perhaps less confrontational due to being cross-contextual in nature that enables young people to feel empowered and provides them with the tools to avoid extremism, amongst other issues like violence in general, or drugs and alcohol, seems to generate more support.

Secondly, it was apparent that these types of interventions would likely be embraced more enthusiastically if teachers and school staff felt supported by other professionals to communicate the material, rather than being solely responsible for bringing P/CVE education in to the classroom. The sorts of issues that young people face during their key developmental years can be complex and multifaceted. In addition, the demands of teaching the typical educational content already means that adding in material or programmes for complex issues is likely to be overwhelming for teachers. External support from professionals and experts with unique knowledge will potentially improve the outcomes of such interventions.

In addition, the surveys identified a number of key issues that were repeatedly expressed amongst the respondents. Firstly, there was concern that P/CVE education was understood to be something that simply is not needed in Australia, especially if it is prioritised other matters, like drug and alcohol use and mental health. Whilst there was support for P/CVE education, there was apprehension that there were more pressing matters to address. Next, the support P/CVE education did receive was particularly for awareness and knowledge, including better understanding of the language and terminology, how to support each other, and how to access help when needed. More than half of the respondents admitted they did not know any details about what the government was doing to address P/CVE concerns but generally seemed supportive about opening up conversations and making the topic less taboo through improved awareness. Further, intensive teacher training that collaborated with specialists was widely called for and many study participants considered that they would feel more confident and at ease about the material once they had been trained on the content. Next, there was reservations about whether teachers are the right individuals for teaching P/CVE material, but many attributed this to the already large workloads and limited curriculum space faced by teachers. Following this, there was more support for integrating P/CVE material than stand-alone interventions, perhaps due to the concerns with time and curriculum space. In

regard to the material, there was much support for content that considered issues like teaching moral values, tolerance and respect; safe, yet reduced screen time; and critical thinking skills. These were considered to be significant issues for the respondents and may be worth considering in the development of well-rounded approaches to preventing violent extremism. Finally, teachers want to feel that they are supported in the teaching of any P/CVE material by including experts from other professions and to ensure they are not shouldering all the responsibility for P/CVE instruction. These central issues arising from the survey respondents together form some noteworthy principles worth incorporating into future policy development to continue to improve the support for any future P/CVE policies and programmes in schools.

Now, drawing upon the key discoveries from the secondary case studies, there are some noteworthy points for consideration that can be applied to the key survey issues. Firstly, the stigmatisation, securitisation, and feelings of surveillance during the first phase of the UK's Prevent, especially for Muslim communities and individuals, caused significant damage that was difficult to rectify under Prevent 2. As Australia is in earlier stages of policy development, there could be benefits from reflecting upon how to avoid causing such damage as policies develop. In order to limit or even avoid stigmatising communities or individuals, Australia could learn from the UK's experience and perhaps by opening up conversations and consultations during the planning stages of policy development, this could be avoided. Consultation and collaboration may be a beneficial approach here. Secondly, the UK experience has identified that thorough teacher training works. Research findings identified in the case study indicated that training improves teacher awareness, knowledge, and confidence – factors that the survey respondents identified as important steps to be undertaken early before content is brought into classrooms.

Next, the UK case study identified that by modifying the focus of preventing extremism to align with traditional safeguarding practices, teachers and school staff felt more at ease with what was expected of them and this received a more positive response. It also revealed that the referral system for individuals considered at risk was shrouded in confusion and many redundant referrals were made. It was also clear that there was a persistent concern that the focus was on security, rather than actual education. As the Australian-based survey respondents identified, the

approach to protecting children and young people from any sort of harm through standard duty of care practices was widely accepted and teachers felt confident they would act if they feared any risk of harm. But, any sort of referral system that is developed in future should consider the UK example and ensure a better understanding of who needs referring. Thus, Australian policymakers could learn from this approach and adapt future policy to consider this avenue for identify young people that need P/CVE-related support and a well-developed, clearly stated referral system could not only reduce incidences of redundant referrals but also limit the feeling that security is prioritising actual education and real progress is made in improving knowledge and awareness.

Additionally, the UK case study found issues with forcing teachers to teach material that may not align with their values and beliefs, namely teaching of the fundamental British Values. The statutory duty to teach this material received much criticism and lacked support. In contrast, the Denmark experience was cross-collaborative in its development which has appeared to make the introduction of P/CVE-related work less aggressive. It had a broader focus during the development stages and also included addressing concerns like gang membership which led to it being more collaborative in nature. Furthermore, it was considered an extension of existing efforts, like using the SSP model, which may have ensured a smoother introduction. Thus, future policy development should firstly consider the implications of placing statutory duties on teachers or establishing obligations that do not align with teachers' values. The educational content may benefit from including material that has been considered through consultation with those teaching the material and other organisations and professionals. The sample of teachers in the primary survey made some suggestions worth considering for P/CVE content, such as critical thinking skills and teaching moral values, and identified the importance of feeling supported in teaching this material by collaboratively integrating the material in the classroom. A cross-collaborative approach gives future policy development a chance to implement programmes that support people in a variety of ways and may be more well received if it is built into existing policies and programmes, which was the more supported approach in the primary exploratory survey findings.

As a result, the overall intent of the primary research in the study was informed by the lessons learnt identified in the case studies to compare the approaches to, implementation, and effects of educational P/CVE in Australia with

on-the-ground perspectives of teachers and parents. Whilst the secondary sources of information, like policy documentation, have provided useful background information for understanding the when, why and how of educational P/CVE, the failure to generate any interview data from policymakers and education officials has unfortunately limited the ability to fully compare the two sources of information. Before making this comparison, it was important to first consider the birth of P/CVE as an approach to counter-terrorism. Whilst earlier counter-terrorism efforts (pre-9/11) have not been extensively assessed in this project (due to the wide range of literature already available), the P/CVE pathway that has taken shape in the previous two decades or so has contributed significantly to the use of educational P/CVE.

The following sections will address the research questions that this exploration was built upon. Overall, the results demonstrated that there is indeed much stigma associated with educational P/CVE and much of this originates from a concern in Australia that it is not needed as a sole intervention. The parents and teachers in frontline situations with young people instead revealed their perspectives on the importance of addressing what they deem more pressing concerns, like drug use and employment opportunities. Additionally, the findings demonstrated that the collaborative nature of any such work – that is, with external stakeholders, professionals and the like – is of utmost importance. In other words, both teachers and parents indicated that this sort of instruction should not simply be the responsibility of teachers alone.

6.2 Sub-question 1: What are the understandings of and experiences with P/CVE programming from frontline educationalists and parents and how do they perceive its appropriateness?

An assessment of the wider P/CVE literature and a primary exploration of experiences from Australia revealed that in general, the experiences are in stark contrast. In the UK, British communities have, for the most part, had poor experiences with P/CVE policy interventions, especially educational. The policy agendas were blunt, confronting, and not well-received in many contexts. In Denmark, the experiences were a little more positive. This may have been due to the way P/CVE policy objectives were intertwined with existing crime prevention policies and thus, may have felt less confronting that in the UK. In Australia, the

experiences thus far have been a little more relaxed with an element of a more laidback ‘it happens elsewhere’ attitude. It can be suggested that P/CVE policy experiences create conflict and apprehension and distrust amongst communities, and this was particularly evident amongst Muslim communities across all three case studies.

In regard to educational environments, the UK experience revealed the importance of teacher preparedness. This too was a major concern from the primary Australian analysis. In the UK, experiences appear to perceive P/CVE policy as something that was forced upon them, bringing with it new requirements that may not always be agreed upon and are backed by legal obligations. This has contributed to their poor experience with P/CVE policy. In the Australian exploratory data sample, most respondents could not name or describe a P/CVE intervention from any field. This reveals the less widespread nature of P/CVE programming in Australia, than in other places like the UK and Denmark.

In Australia, violent extremism and radicalisation were not perceived to be of utmost concern for the majority of survey participants. Regardless, most respondents were confident they could identify a turn towards radicalisation or violent extremism in their child or students and the majority perceived any interventions to be a combination of both short-term and long-term engagement to be effective.

It may be hypothesised that this low level of concern is a result of a lack of a personal relationship with experiences of radicalisation and ideological violence for many Australians or a lack of understanding of the topic. Moreover, the localised nature of experiences with terrorist acts in Australia so far means that many communities feel removed from such issues and thus consider such programmes unnecessary when they perceive more pressing matters at hand.

Many Australian communities remain untouched by radicalisation and/or violent extremism and therefore have little or no first-hand experience of this kind of threat. Stemming from this, a lack of awareness is apparent, as well as a lack of awareness surrounding what Australia’s policymakers are actually implementing to address the threat. Moreover, the programmes currently in place are shrouded in secrecy and the ability to gather an accurate representation and understanding of the programmes being rolled out is near to impossible. This leaves citizens unaware, uneducated, and frustrated. In addition to this, it was clear from this research that understandings of the two key concepts – radicalisation and violent extremism – are

similar and little differentiation between the two definitions could be identified by survey respondents. This, coupled with the aforementioned issues surrounding awareness and understanding, means perceptions of preventative radicalisation programmes are not overwhelmingly positive, especially when discussing in-school initiatives. At present, Australia's programmes in schools are not widespread and familiarity appears to be based on media reports. This has generated a clear consensus that these initiatives are considered simply unnecessary in many communities across Australia.

In the UK case study, there was some misunderstandings amongst teachers about what was expected of them and how P/CVE interventions should look in their classroom. This was especially evident with the teaching of fundamental British Values and this revealed differing understandings and perceptions between teachers.

Yet, if current global trends continue, the need for counter-narratives will likely increase and any future programming must take this into account, along with public expectations that these initiatives be collaborative, transparent, and local in context. With Australia less affected by radicalisation and violent extremism than many other parts of the world, policymakers must consider the negative impacts that may result from implementing programmes that do not meet these expectations and are not well received, thus potentially doing more harm than good. Schools are well placed to address many teen antisocial problems and this sample of parents and teachers expected these problems to be addressed before efforts to tackle radicalisation and violent extremism. The government's work thus far in the field of educational P/CVE is a mystery to many of the teachers and parents who participated in this exploratory survey but, above all, these teachers and parents also identify a lack of programming for the problems they consider more pressing, like drug and alcohol abuse and future employment opportunities for young people. In addition, building resilience to schoolyard issues such as bullying and intolerance, and fostering respect for others were of significant importance to this sample of survey respondents. Potentially, by focusing on these issues first, a positive and indirect impact may also be made on reducing support for violence connected to ideological grievances. Focusing on improving the overall wellbeing of young people and their environment with their peers is an approach that may simultaneously reduce support for violent extremism.

An obvious confusion when discussing radicalisation of young people was apparent in the primary data responses, indicating an almost absence of familiarity and apprehension in some pockets of Australia about this issue. This must be overcome in order to create a collaborative approach that is widely supported. Many survey respondents made clear that they had hardly ever needed to ponder these concerns before and the survey was their first opportunity to really consider what they might do if confronted with suspicions of radicalisation. There was an indication amongst the results of some level of surprise from respondents when faced with questions about radicalisation being a concern for the young people closest to them. It was apparent that, for many of the respondents, this might have rarely crossed their minds as a concern for their young people, which reveals that some Australian communities remain largely unaffected by radicalisation and violent extremism. This may perhaps be attributed to an attitude of 'that will never happen to me or my children' and an understanding of the issues as being relevant to 'other' places, not their own communities. Whilst this may be true for many communities, it could be suggested that the unsuspecting parents of radicalised young people may have felt the same way at some point before being confronted with the consequences of their child's change in behaviours.

In addition, it was made apparent in the exploratory survey results that the community understands radicalisation to be a form of indoctrination. The influence of others plays a part when young people are recruited to a radicalised cause or mode of thinking; this radicalised form of thinking is in contrast to 'the norm' of society and this was supported in the results obtained through this study. This perhaps is what influences the support for certain P/CVE-related programming for young people in educational spaces. Given this, if and when a student or child presents with signs of radicalisation and coercion, expert assistance must be sought and meeting the needs of this individual will go beyond the role of the teacher. So again, collaboration between the potential identifier as the teacher and the expert mental health practitioner, or the like, as the intervener generates a unified approach to deal with the concerns at hand.

In regard to how appropriate the school environment is for P/CVE agendas, the perceptions analysed in this study indicate, for Australia especially, that there are broader concerns regarding communication, relationships, and attitudes to antisocial behaviour, including violence, that need addressing in schools first. Working with

young people in relation to these aspects of their lives may indirectly reduce cases of radicalisation and violent extremism at the same time as communities together develop morally grounded young people who observe otherness and reject intolerance. Yet, there was still clear support for education and awareness regarding these issues and the use of schools to achieve this.

The majority of respondents from the primary Australian-based collection of data believed that schools had a role to play and agreed that P/CVE-related education should be included. The disagreement more-so arose in regard to how to go about this and whom should be teaching such material. Data collected from UK-based explorations covered in the literature also was generally supportive of such measures, but also were in conflict with how this has been done so far and how it should look for future policy implementation. There were some positive experiences from teaching and school staff in the UK that can be drawn from, despite the overwhelming negativity that was reported.

Both the UK and Australian examples demonstrate more support for a collaborative approach to P/CVE that covers other issues as well. Supporting young people through a number of anti-social issues including violent extremism and radicalisation seems to be the most supported, especially in Australia. This could look a little more like the Danish approach that is a somewhat less confrontational method of implementing P/CVE policy, especially in educational environments. Teachers and parents were generally supportive of programmes and policy agendas that support young people that may need some extra guidance and help. The concerns were largely surrounding what was believed to be expert and unique knowledge for issues like radicalisation and violent extremism that may require working with external partners. As mentioned previously, initiatives that were designed to address immediate concerns as well as long term education and awareness were the most supported.

Above and beyond the preventative work are questions surrounding the processes expected in the school environment when concerns emerge that a student may already be beyond the prevention work and that mandatory reporting may be necessary. In Western Australia, the Department of Education advises that “teachers and support staff are skilled in identifying changes in the behaviour of all at-risk students, assessing potential concerns and providing appropriate support when needed” (Government of Western Australia Department of Education, n.d.).

According to the NSW Department of Education, it is not the job of the school to investigate issues with violent extremism, nor is the school required to report its concerns to the National Security Hotline in Australia (according to the Department of Education in NSW this is the responsibility of the Incident Report and Support Hotline – a dedicated hotline for the Department of Education in NSW for teachers teaching within the state) (NSW Government Education, 2018). However, mandatory reporting for teachers is also a factor to consider, much like neglect and abuse which can at times fall to the responsibility of teachers to report to the appropriate bodies or lead them to access the Child Wellbeing Unit for advice (NSW Government Education, 2018). The findings of this research, through both the secondary case studies and collection of primary data, clearly support the mandatory reporting principles and the requirement to report such behaviours forms part of a teacher's normal day-to-day role. This is a key principle that can be drawn from the study. The teachers participating in this study made clear that if the child's wellbeing or the wellbeing of their other students were under threat, then revealing these concerns to the right bodies was of the utmost importance and this may be perceived as an appropriate expectation for schools and their staff. Whilst teachers' duty of care may largely be considered as a mitigation of risks in what may be deemed a reactive manner, there is scope for a preventative approach that is more long term in nature for school environments (see Appendix E: Students Exhibiting Anti-Social and Extremist Behaviour Checklist as published by the NSW Education Department for a checklist for school staff to follow when faced with such concerns for a student in their care). Department of Education websites for Australia's other states and territories provide no clear information regarding policies or procedures surrounding extremism.

There nevertheless remains an essential requirement to report suspicious behaviour, discussions and the like amongst students; human intuition would make it very difficult to ignore 'gut feelings' about a child's behaviour or communication. However, as discussed in previous chapters in reference to the UK experiences, mandatory reporting of concerns about radicalisation or violent extremism has received great criticism after teachers in the UK were legally required to report such behaviours. This was more positive when aligned with existing safeguarding protocols, but it was clear that many teachers were apprehensive about monitoring their students. Teachers also expressed confusion and were often unclear as to what

exactly was deemed ‘suspicious’ and this ‘grey area’ led to over-reporting and public disapproval. Reporting suspicious behaviour or thought patterns is important in any sense, especially on sensitive topics, as addressing such concerns may greatly improve the wellbeing of the student and others, but it is often unclear what is suspicious and what is not, as the UK model has shown. Adequate training and preparedness, identified in this research as of utmost importance for Australian teachers to proceed with any P/CVE content, must be sure to cover the classifiable behaviours that raise red flags and require reporting. However, this is an aspect of the wider literature where there is no agreement as to what behaviours should be monitored. Reporting cannot be ignored for the safety of students and others, but it must be conducted accurately.

Furthermore, the role of the school may be preventative in the sense that the school is obliged to provide an environment that is safe, secure, and free from risks like violence, crime, and even violent extremism (NSW Government Education, 2018). In particular, the NSW Department of Education states that if the risk of violent extremism is related to an individual committing a criminal offence, it is the responsibility of school staff to make this known to the police and other relevant authorities (NSW Government Education, 2018, p. 3). In NSW, the *Crimes Act 1990* ensures it is a criminal offence to threaten sabotage, be a member of a terrorist organisation, retain documents containing threats, or commit assaults within schools (NSW Government Education, 2018.), thus the preventative context of such acts is the responsibility of the school in these specific examples. In Western Australia, the department of education states that “ensuring students are safe and supported in our schools is an absolute priority” (Government of Western Australia Department of Education, n.d.). However, is it the school’s responsibility to implement preventative efforts towards awareness raising, educating, and building resilience to violent extremism within its school population? This was a point of contention across the exploratory survey and case studies. To meet legal obligations under the duty of care and work health and safety laws, schools are obliged to identify any risk posed to their environment that is antisocial or extremist in nature. As the UK case study revealed this placed significant pressure on teachers. As Harris-Hogan (2019) explains, safeguarding children is “largely uncontroversial” (p. 733), however expecting teachers to be completely aware of how to recognise and respond to violent extremism is more problematic due to the complexity of the issue.

Additionally, schools are required to assess the risks and “implement strategies to eliminate or minimise the risk,” which could mean an external preventative radicalisation programme or embedded curriculum component (NSW Government Education, 2018). Whilst this may or may not be largely related to any immediate fears posed to the school, such as a direct threat of violence, it may also be of benefit to the school to work towards minimising the risk over the longer term – through a number of avenues like awareness, building cohesion, fostering resilience, and eliminating marginalisation. The interpretation may differ and some schools may see this as necessary for long-term benefits, whilst others may gauge little to no risk and therefore will not consider that implementing such initiatives is required. Perhaps, however, the outcome of this decision would be best made by the executive teams within schools, rather than forced upon them by policymakers who single out the schools considered most at risk.

School staff respondents varied in their perception of whether to make changes to the curriculum that will impact all schools or whether to simply target some schools. Both examples can be found in various countries but as yet there is no clear consensus on which is more effective. Furthermore, in addition to the teaching elements to improve awareness and understanding is the role that local communities can play in this educational instruction. Obviously, further empirical research is required to determine the most effective approach that will generate the most significant reduction in cases of radicalisation and violent extremism, and this may not be known for some time. Much work is still to be done, especially in Australia where experiences are currently minimal. The sensitivity of the material and the stigmatisation associated with anything P/CVE-related means practitioners and policymakers must tread carefully to ensure the material does not have the reverse impact. Removing the P/CVE title and approaching the material as a form of instruction that delivers education focused on togetherness, awareness, and understanding for a globalised and extremely interconnected world may reduce this likelihood. This was the most supported approach apparent through this research. The perspectives of teachers and parents identified through this research offer some indications about what P/CVE-rooted programming should look like if it is to be supported. Education that focuses on individual self-worth, value for ‘others’, social skills for communicating and interacting with differing communities and individuals,

and awareness of 'signs' that are undisputedly concerning will contribute to supported P/CVE-style programming in Australian schools.

Whether or not to ingrain this sort of education or maintain it as a stand-alone intervention, engagement with the local school community to assist with this education will perhaps contribute to see more effective long-term outcomes. Potentially playing a vital role in deterring young people from the appeal of violent extremism and radicalisation, the influence of possible relationships with influential and relatable local community members comes into question. Role models away from the school environment can be crucial to a child's development. Which people or organisations are best placed to engage with schools to result in an effective education base that generates awareness of the issues and eradicates the likelihood of young people steering towards such behaviours and influences would possibly be most effective if local in nature. Children and adolescents may benefit from a better understanding of what to look for amongst their peers, how to help their peers, and who to turn to if they have concerns. External experts who can provide accurate information may best support this education and awareness-raising in collaboration with teaching staff, but trained professionals who are most qualified to deal with the issues should also be engaged.

Moreover, the exploratory survey highlighted there is also potential for community groups and organisations to engage with teaching staff to produce a well-rounded style of school-based and community-based education. Extra-curricular activities as well as everyday school-based learning should be equal for all young people, and students could benefit from feeling they belong and have a role to play in their school environment. A wide range of activities to choose from – both within the curriculum and outside of it – allows children to find their place and experience the sense of belonging that has been suggested as a key focal point for reducing incidences of radicalisation and violent extremism and the benefit of extra-curricular activities was a key principle that can be drawn from the parent and teacher responses. Community organisations, volunteer groups, and outside role models could potentially form a concrete relationship with the school and its pupils so as to provide the young people with extra-curricular activities to complete their learning and foster a successful transition to adulthood.

The importance of online safety education was also a persistent theme and any P/CVE education policy could consider the element of dangerous online

communities in their planning and development. The educational approach to P/CVE extends beyond the classroom and broader online awareness and skills are necessary in modern times. Preventative P/CVE in classrooms may benefit from including material on online safety, for a variety of concerns, not just P/CVE-related. In particular, building resilience to coercion, manipulation, and brainwashing that can occur online would likely be of benefit to young people. Both online and offline education should connect people with differing views so as to remove the 'them and us' labels. Establishing communication channels between individuals and groups who may have previously spent little time in each other's company could foster inter-cultural relationships and awareness and understanding, building the protective factors that promote resilience in young people. This resilience-building must also address violence as a whole and approach it from a broad standpoint that considers other forms of violence, such as domestic violence, as these are more common to Australian communities than ideologically motivated violence. The survey respondents were adamant that many forms of violence need addressing in their communities.

The school is well placed to incorporate some form of educational P/CVE, but this education does not need to be P/CVE-specific – the majority of respondents agreed that education needs reform to include more of a focus on issues such as intolerance, respecting others, and understanding 'other' communities and societies. Additionally, globalisation has contributed to a need to ensure young people understand their place in the world amongst many other groups, beliefs, and perceptions. Findings from this research indicated a persistent concern that governments were not focused on the most important local matters, especially for young people, and the focus on radicalisation and violent extremism was poorly directed. A key consideration worth noting is thus perhaps providing equal attention and equal spending to many of the major concerns held by society – such as unemployment and drug and alcohol abuse, as indicated by these findings.

6.3 Sub-question 2: What are some of the major concerns and expectations of P/CVE policy in schools?

Overwhelmingly, the core concern for the teachers (as well as parents) identified through this research is the lack of training and time, which would make teaching any P/CVE related content very difficult to incorporate into the traditional

role of the teacher. Yet despite this, many of the teachers were open to the addition of this content, pending the correct structure and appropriately planned goals with support. Many of the teachers indicated the importance of ensuring a safe environment for their students and saw required reporting of concerns that may be affecting a pupil's wellbeing or that of the broader school as a necessary component of the teaching role. Furthermore, the capability of the teachers was in no doubt, with the right training behind them. However, without this very specific and thorough preparation, respondents considered it unlikely that teachers would touch upon such sensitive material in their classrooms and open up the avenues for such controversial discussions. Preparedness appears to be key to teachers adopting a role in education about radicalisation and violent extremism, and the vulnerabilities associated with these issues means preparing teachers thoroughly through training. Teachers have been trained to look for signs of abuse and neglect in children but, as yet, not the signs of radicalisation. The teacher responses collected over a period of six months for this project revealed that accurately recognising 'signs' was important in order to avoid stigmatisation. The UK experience has also demonstrated this.

Only five survey respondents were clear in their response that the school and teacher are not suitable for taking on this role – a clear majority believe the school is ideal for this type of education. Again, the support is there for the right programme with the right backing; the teachers made clear their willingness if the right support was also offered. P/CVE-related education would also likely benefit from the collaborative effort of professional mental health workers, community representatives, and youth workers to offer multiple perspectives and multiple avenues for discussion, as indicated earlier. This may reduce the potential for personal bias and would possibly also reduce the pressure on the role of the teacher. Schools require more permanent support staff to assist with all of the problems that young people face, but the teacher is also vital in this.

The impact P/CVE policy implementation may have on the students was also a common concern amongst both the secondary research and primary data. Teachers and parents both expressed apprehension with the consequences that may result if policy programming was not done correctly or poorly. In addition to this, teachers felt pressured to be accurate and appropriate in their teachings of such material and it was apparent that some were concerned that, despite training, they may still not hold

what was perceived to be expert knowledge on the material or be able to provide accurate answers to students' exploratory questions.

6.4 Central research question: What are the challenges, opportunities, and implications of implementing P/CVE policy agendas in educational spaces?

Whilst there is still a lot that is unknown about the effectiveness of P/CVE interventions in many contexts, not just educational, the findings and conclusions from this research project generate some key insights worth considering in future policy development. Australia in particular is at a unique point whereby educational policy has started to emerge but is not widespread as yet. If P/CVE policy is to be further expanded in schools and other educational spaces, there is still time to ensure this is done accurately and effectively so as to avoid experiences like the UK have had. Firstly, a key principle across the secondary and primary data is the incorporation of teachers in the planning and development of such programmes, before teachers are asked to implement them in their classrooms. An examination of the secondary research covered in this thesis project, together with the primary responses, draws conclusions that the majority of frontline educationalists understand P/CVE educational interventions to be a necessary component of modern-day schooling and would be more well-received if their voices were heard in the planning stages. This appears to be partly because extremism and radicalisation are understood to be issues that are unlikely to be disappearing anytime soon, so teachers see the value in ensuring young people understand the issues accurately. With improvements in the transparency of P/CVE policy agendas, an expansion of evaluation data, and a collaborative approach to programme development and implementation, future P/CVE policy will likely be better understood and more well-received.

Secondly, if P/CVE policy is to continue to expand into educational environments it will likely be more well-received if done correctly and collaboratively. Whilst it was clear that many perceive the issues to be complex and at times sensitive because it is often understood as a way of protecting children from harm, then it is more well-received. Whilst there were obvious patterns in the analysis that pointed to concern regarding the complexity of the content that may be involved in P/CVE policy programming, the majority of the study respondents were confident that with the right training they could effectively implement the interventions.

One of the most noteworthy elements that stood out from the secondary case studies and the primary research was that adequate training was an essential element of any policy implementation. In the UK, this has been implemented for all teachers, whereas in Australia, this has not been compulsory for all, so there remains significant work to be undertaken in regard to teacher training.

Thirdly, one of the most noteworthy similarities and key principles drawn from this project between Australia and the UK is that P/CVE education is seen as a child protection opportunity. The UK case study revealed some positive reception to this approach and Australia could learn from and build upon this style of intervention in some way. Keeping children safe from any harm was a key repeating theme in both the primary and secondary data.

What can be drawn from Denmark's experience is the benefits of building P/CVE policy into existing frameworks, like crime prevention, which has been suggested amongst the criminology literature. This appears to make the interventions less confronting and forced upon professionals and thus more well-received.

What was unique from the Australian focused research was that issues with extremism and radicalisation are not at the forefront of concerns for teachers and parents, which could be because Australia has not had the same experiences with incidents of violent extremism and terrorism as places like the UK and Europe. As such, if P/CVE policy programming expands and is implement as a priority teaching matter, it may not be as well-received if teachers or parents do not receive additional support or interventions to help with matters seen as more pressing, like drugs and alcohol.

It is clear that the respondents' expectations for any P/CVE work in schools encourages policy makers to consider a wide array of young people's needs so programmes could potentially be integrated with existing or cross-contextual material and not implemented as a sole intervention. This could improve the chances of broad, successful outcomes across a range of concerns. Concerns about radicalisation and violent extremism amongst the sample population in this data, as well as in additional research (Markus, 2017; Tahiri & Grossman, 2013) reveals the low level of priority placed on radicalisation and violent extremism in some local Australian contexts. Thus, uniquely P/CVE-related programmes are less likely to be well received by their audiences when it appears that more urgent concerns are being ignored. The results collected from the exploratory survey data, in addition to the

existing literature and case studies, indicate that the very nature of educational P/CVE is highly contentious, and much work still needs to be done if these programmes are to remain and/or expand further into educational settings. This research has found that for the teachers and parents who responded to the survey, the focus is very much on other antisocial and community concerns and the very nature of radicalisation, violent extremism, and countering terrorism, for many, is indeed at the back of their minds. Instead, local on-the-ground anxieties, especially concern for Australia's up and coming generations, are directed towards illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, lack of values, and employment prospects. Concerns about young people radicalising were minor for the majority of the sample surveyed. P/CVE therefore is dominated by considerations for programming which encapsulates a wider target of adolescent delinquent activities, and perhaps just simultaneously touches upon radicalisation also.

Finally, as a preventative initiative, any in-school programming should make use of local settings and community engagement practices in order to be more positively received by school staff and parents of participating students. It is clear that the teachers and parents surveyed for this research expect a level of involvement and inclusion so that P/CVE-related programming is transparent and not perceived to be a target programme originating from an unknown, external source that has crept its way into a school. The data collected from the teachers and parents in this research has reinforced the importance of considering local contextual factors when addressing issues of radicalisation and violent extremism and it was clear that no initiative would be supported without full transparency.

6.5 Limitations

As mentioned, this project set out to compare what was being implemented and why this was taking place, with how programmes were being received on the ground. Unfortunately, one of the most significant limitations to achieving this was the inability to attract willing interviewees to discuss the new in-school programmes or even organisations or individuals working with young people outside of school on antisocial behaviours. This meant a reliance on secondary documentation, such as policy documents, was necessary to provide the background information and demonstrate the transition to educational P/CVE. As a result, the case studies then formed a more central component for comparing experiences, perceptions, and

impacts. Such documents allow some conclusions to be drawn between why and how the current in-school programmes have come about in Australia, but with a lack of commentary from those behind the planning and implementation.

Additionally, the very early nature of educational P/CVE means that there is little data and background information in existence to work from. Much of the funding, programming, and engagement with schools in Australia has taken place during the course of this research project, and this has led to many adaptations and changes. Additionally, the relative secrecy surrounding what is actually being taught in schools about P/CVE makes it very difficult to obtain factual information for a researcher outside these immediate boundaries. Publicly available government information is extremely limited, if available at all, and this may lead to assumptions and misinterpretations by the public, especially if the media is then to be relied upon as the sole source of information.

Whilst the exploratory survey data offers a snapshot of distinct perceptions and understandings of P/CVE policy in educational spaces, it is representative of a relatively small portion of teachers Australia-wide and largely NSW-based. It is thus not a representative sample, but rather an exploratory study to build upon as policy further develops. As discussed in Chapter Four, the researcher followed the recruitment process through snowballing and tried to remedy the NSW-focus by recruiting elsewhere. The findings represent a small sample of teachers and parents that could contribute to further exploration.

Moreover, the timing and impact of COVID-19 during the review stages of this thesis severely impacted the ability to further explore and access any new options for building upon the collection of primary data.

6.6 Concluding remarks

The research questions set out in this thesis project sought to open up conversations regarding P/CVE programmes in schools, explore the support for them, examine the expectations of what they should look like, and explore the challenges that exist for this type of programming. Opening up these conversations with teachers and parents in Australia was an avenue under-investigated and one considered worthy of pursuing. Overall, it is clear there exists a number of challenges facing policymakers if teachers are to be the individuals conducting P/CVE programming in schools. Teacher training, individual values and personal

perspectives, and the overall applicability of material are all issues repeatedly raised amongst the respondents. Furthermore, ensuring teachers perceive value in P/CVE education is considered an important first step and as the survey indicated, could present as a key issue going forward for policymakers. This did not present as clearly in the case studies where there appeared to be a more general consensus amongst the secondary data that P/CVE education was needed.

However, there remains noteworthy opportunities to conduct P/CVE programming in schools if done correctly. Generally, the exploratory survey and the case studies together indicated that if the challenges are addressed, there is support for such educational initiatives. If teacher and parental concerns are explored further and considered in the planning stages then educational P/CVE programming could be well-received. Teacher confidence and lack of resources, including time, was a concern present in both the secondary and primary data. The impact of additional classroom material to be taught and the sensitivity of P/CVE education were noted apprehensions across all the data. A consideration for policymakers should be the impact additional material could have on teachers' workloads if it is to form a significant component of classroom learning. Furthermore, preparing teachers adequately to provide this instruction to ensure they are informed and capable of supporting children in discussing this material is a key principle worth addressing.

Thus far, there are many schools that have not experienced significant P/CVE programming as yet and this has likely contributed to some apprehension and confusion. The topic can be complex and sensitive and teachers and parents appear to be aware of this and anxious about teaching such material accurately. However, exploring these expectations, challenges, and opportunities further will likely lessen this apprehension and develop more supported and effective P/CVE materials for school environments.

The secondary case studies have provided an opportunity for countries like Australia to explore a lived experience and develop policy that considers the outcomes – both positive and negative – in their planning and development. Countries that are less experienced with developing and implementing P/CVE policy could benefit from considering the key lessons from examples like the UK and Denmark. The lack of curriculum space, teacher confidence and lack of resources, and adequate external support like counsellors are some key factors that have emerged through the case studies that also present as concerns in the primary

analysis. These challenges could be addressed through measures that have been raised by the survey respondents. Adequate teacher training before programmes take place in classrooms; sufficient support for teachers with other experts, like mental health professionals or community leaders; integrating the material into existing lessons so as to not overload teachers' workloads; and ensuring other key matters are also considered, like drugs and alcohol and violence, as an opportunity to also address these concerns.

Moreover, an analysis and development of secondary case studies allowed for an exploration that extracts applicable and potentially cross-contextual key points from these lived experiences. Aggregate data, which has already been analysed and summarised, contributed to the refinement of the case studies to consider key principles that may also be applicable to the Australian experience. The secondary case studies have strengthened the limited primary data by offering a chance to compare and consider the 'what if' this was the approach in other countries, like Australia's case. Without the use of the case studies it would be fair to assume it would be more difficult to draw from lived experiences, as the primary data collection revealed that this was an early exploration of the topic for many respondents. Future policy direction that considers the repercussions as well as the favourable aspects of lived experience could better inform a more positive reception to and adoption of policy and programming in countries like Australia. Combined with the frontline voices of key individuals like parents and teachers, the development of policy could be shaped to not only be more well received but also more effective.

6.7 Future research

Keeping in mind the limitations discussed above, future research in the field of educational P/CVE (and even in the P/CVE field more broadly) should be able to be undertaken with open and honest sources of information. The field will be unlikely to establish best practices without the analysis from external organisations and individuals, like academics, drawing upon clear and factual data. Additionally, developing best practices depends upon elapsed time. Future research into the impact of educational P/CVE in Australia (and globally) will need to be conducted after the programming has been in place for some time. It will be important to future research

to consider the impact this sort of education is having on not only young people, but teachers also.

The use of terminology and the impact of such terminology is also important to future research. There are grey areas between and within the terminology found in the broader P/CVE field and many of the terms have developed certain stigma and associated negativity when in use. The vulnerability of young people when participating in education about sensitive matters means language is even more important to consider, and the branding of any educational programming may not even necessarily require specific P/CVE labelling. Once educational P/CVE has been in place for some time in Australian schools, future research will need to be able to generate solid evaluations and conclusions to inform best practices. This is something which the broader P/CVE field lacks, resulting in a wide array of initiatives with few qualitative or quantitative outcomes to consider.

In addition, the need to conduct research with young people, both adolescents and young adults, is a key component of an in-depth understanding of how such programming will impact young people, their environments, their peers and networks, and their schooling. Young people are at the heart of educational P/CVE and garnering their perspectives before and after in-school P/CVE programming will likely open up valuable understandings for the effectiveness of outcomes, especially over the longer term.

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Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted or incorrectly acknowledged.

All available hyperlinks accessible and accurate at the time of release.

Referencing style throughout is APA 6th due to this being the current APA style at the time of first submission.

Appendices

Appendix A: Online survey available via Typeform

Around the world we face an ever-increasing concern from a growth in violent extremism and terrorism. In response, governments are doing what they can to target the causes of violent actions and attitudes, rather than simply responding to an incident. This survey is designed to gain an insight into the public's opinions and perceptions on what is being done in this preventative space. Here in Australia, the government has previously offered a significant number of grants to local organisations, however it has been suggested that more needs to be done in the near future. One such proposal that has recently taken shape is the employment of specific programmes in schools. These programmes aim to provide schools with more resources to help students that may exhibit concerning behaviour. This survey seeks to assess parental and teacher perceptions of these programmes in schools, the suitability of these initiatives, and whether the public deems this a good idea that will successfully help reduce radicalisation in young adults. The questions will aim to evaluate your awareness of existing initiatives in the community before turning more closely to the school community in which you live and the opportunities available to your child, both in-school and in an extra-curricular space.

Demographic Questions:

1. Are you a:
   a) teacher
   b) parent
   c) legal guardian
   d) both

2. Please select your age group.
   a) 18-22
   b) 23-27
   c) 28-32
   d) 33-40
   e) 40-50
   f) 50-60
   g) over 60

3. Do you identify as:
   a) Male
   b) Female
   c) Prefer not to say

4. In which state/territory do you live?
   a) NSW
   b) ACT
   c) VIC

d) TAS
e) QLD
f) NT
g) SA
h) WA
i) Overseas Australian Territory
j) I don't live in Australia

5. Please provide the suburb in which you live:

6. If you are a parent/carer, are your children in:
   a) primary school
   b) secondary school
   c) I have children in both primary and secondary school
   d) My children haven't reached school age as yet
   e) My children have finished school

7. If you are a teacher, do you currently teach:
   a) primary students
   b) secondary students
   c) tertiary students
   d) I teach both primary and secondary

<u>Survey Questions:</u>

1. What do you believe is meant by the term 'violent extremism?'

2. What do you believe is meant by the term 'radicalisation?'

3. Within your community, what issues do you consider to be of greatest concern?

4. Within your community, what issues do you consider to be of greatest concern for your children and/or students?

5. Are you concerned about youth in your area being influenced by radicalised individuals? (online or offline)
   a) yes
   b) no
   c) unsure

additional comments:

6. Do you think the government is doing enough to combat violent extremism within our communities?
   a) yes
   b) no
   c) unsure

7. If you answered yes to the previous question, which government CVE programmes or initiatives are you aware of?

8. If you answered no, what more do you suggest the government could do to curb the development of violent attitudes?

9. Do you believe that the school environment is a suitable space for improving kids' resilience to anti-social and delinquent behaviour, such as drugs, alcohol, bullying, gang affiliation, violent extremism and violence?

   a) Yes, the school is a crucial environment for educating about such dangers to youth.
   b) Yes, in some ways the school is suitable but only if taught by professionals in their respective fields.
   c) Neutral – I have no previous experience with such programmes and I'm not sure about their suitability
   d) No, I think these issues should be taught in the home or an out-of-school programme
   e) Other:

10. What do you think are the roles/purposes of countering violent extremism programmes in schools and other educational institutions?

11. Do you think these roles/purposes should be for an immediate/short-term outcome, or a more long-term goal?

12. Do you consider violent extremism of any kind (religious, non-religious, environmental etc.) an issue that needs introducing in the teenage years?
    a) yes
    b) no

c) unsure

13. Do you consider teachers to be the ideal individuals to teach about violent extremism? Why/Why not?

    (if you are NOT a teacher, please proceed to question 14).

14. As a teacher, do you consider yourself capable and prepared to bring countering violent extremism programmes into your classroom? Why/why not?

15. Do you think CVE programmes would be best taught as a stand-alone programme or integrated throughout the curriculum? Why/Why not?

16. As a teacher, how do you feel about an obligation to report suspicious behaviour amongst your students?

17. As a parent/teacher, how confident are you that you could identify a turn in your child/student towards violent extremism?

< a scale of 0 – 10 was provided for this question with 0 stating "not at all confident" and 10 stating "very confident">

18. The school community and a sense of belonging have been identified as a vital protective factor to youth delinquency. When considering your own children or students, how do you think the school community can best prevent them from resorting to violent behaviour?

19. Do you think you child's school/the school at which you teach has the appropriate cultural, religious, and general support available to them, e.g. counselling staff? If no, what improvements would you suggest? If yes, what do you believe works well and would recommend other schools employ?

20. Do you believe your child/students have adequate access to extra-curricular activities available through the school? If no, what activities would you suggest?

21. Within your school community, what do you think could be the best approach to preventing violent extremism from targeting your youth?

22. If you were concerned about your child's potential involvement in anti-social activities of any kind, would you turn to a community role model to help you and your child? Why/Why not?

23. Are there any additional methods that you believe would help deter your child/student from anti-social behaviour, and specifically violence?

Appendix B - Recruitment Email for interview participation

Dear XXXX,

As a research student at Curtin University, I am seeking participants to complete a survey/interview (ideally via Skype or telephone due to my geographical location) about countering violent extremism programmes in educational institutions. I wish to invite you to participate in sharing your knowledge through a semi-structured interview. You have been selected due to your organisation's involvement with young people and the valuable input you may be able to provide.

Within Australia, and particularly NSW and Victoria, there is a growing trend towards funding such programmes in schools. My research is to consider how these programmes intend to help curb the behaviour towards violent extremism; how such programmes may or may not be similar to other youth delinquency programmes; how teachers feel about implementing targeted CVE in their classrooms; and how school communities and families can play a role in this form of education so as to be the most effective.

- The broad research considers the role of education in preventing young people from steering towards violent extremism.
- However, more specifically, I am looking into the concept of building resilience in young people as a longer-term approach that would benefit preventative efforts in the field of countering violent extremism
- I'm interested in speaking with you or a member of your team because your programmes work to build pro-social young people and I would like to consider the potential crossover.

Participation and Confidentiality
Your participation is completely voluntary and anonymous; your contact details will not be shared or published alongside your answers and you may withdraw from the process at any time. Your answers will be collated with other survey and interview participants in order to assess trends, perceptions, and recommendations. For interviewees, you will receive a transcript of your answers for approval before they form part of the data collection.

Reimbursement
There is no reimbursement available for participating in this research.

Benefit
Your input will prove valuable for future direction and understanding of the place of countering violent extremism in schools and will guide future research on the topic.

Participation – what's next?
For further information, please see the attached information sheet and if you wish to proceed with the informal interview, please reply to share your interest and I will respond with some further details. If you would prefer, I am happy to send through a collection of questions that could be answered in your own time via email, if this is more suited to your schedule.

Questions
Any questions or queries can be directed to Lyndsay.andrew@postgrad.curtin.edu.au or m.willson@exchange.curtin.edu.au.

Lyndsay Andrew Freeman
PhD Candidate – Curtin University (18070389)
HRE Ethics approval number: HRE2017-0540

Appendix C – Participant Information Statement for Interviewees

HREC Project Number:	12325
Project Title:	How does education help in the fight against violent extremism?
Principal Investigator:	Dr. Michele Willson
Student researcher:	Lyndsay Andrew Freeman
Version Number:	1
Version Date:	25-4-2016

What is the Project About?
This research will explore the role that educational programmes can play in reducing the development of violent extremist ideals amongst individuals within the community. Violent extremism is understood to be the thought processes and actions developed within an individual or group that can often lead to violent acts, terrorism, and/or lead to the establishment of linkages with known terrorist organisations. We know the path to violent extremism is varied; every individual that takes this path has different reasons to the next person. It is becoming evident that various forms of education within the community may help deter individuals from following an extremist path. This idea hasn't yet been fully examined so this project seeks to assess this idea further. You are being asked to participate because you are a member of an organisation/programme that is working towards better community engagement within your community. We would like to hear about your thoughts and ideas on the programme.

Who is doing the Research?
The project is being conducted by Lyndsay Andrew Freeman and supervised by Dr. Michele Willson. The project will contribute to the attainment of a PhD for Lyndsay. In accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) 2.2.6h, the results of this research project will be used by Lyndsay to obtain a Doctor of Philosophy at Curtin University and is funded by the University. There will be no costs to you and you will not be paid for participating in this project.

Why am I being asked to take part and what will I have to do?
You have been asked to take part as a volunteer as you are involved, either directly or indirectly, with a community organisation or programme that is actively working towards improved relations within the community itself. Your participation will involve answering a number of voluntary questions. The conversation will be recorded on an audio device, with your consent. The study will take place at a mutually convenient location. You may also be asked to complete a voluntary one-off survey/questionnaire. The questionnaire will be focused on the programme itself and your opinions of it as a participant/organiser. The questionnaire will be issued to

you either in hard copy/in person or via an electronic form, which can be returned in the same manner. It is anticipated that the interview and questionnaire would take no more than three hours of your time.

Optional Consent Future Research:
We would like you to consider letting us share the information we collect during this research with other researchers working in this area. We consider this topic to be one that will be assessed in a number of ways in the future. If we choose to share the data you will not be identifiable and your answers will be only identifiable as a number, not your name. You will be re-identifiable to this research team, but not in any further research projects.

Are there any benefits to being in the research project?
There may be no direct benefit to you from participating in this research. However, Sometimes, people appreciate the opportunity to discuss their opinions/ feelings. We hope the results of this research will allow us to:

- Further develop education programmes and community engagement initiatives
- add to the knowledge we have about this social problem

Are there any risks, side-effects, discomforts or inconveniences from being in the research project?
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participating in this research project. We have been careful to make sure that the questions in the survey do not cause you any distress. But, if you feel anxious about any of the questions then you do not need to answer them. If the questions cause any concerns or upset you, we can refer you to a counsellor. Apart from giving up your time, we do not expect that there will be any risks or inconveniences associated with taking part in this study.

Who will have access to my information?
The information collected in this research will be re-identifiable (coded). This means that the stored information will be re-identifiable, meaning we will remove identifying information on any data or sample and replace it with a code. Only the research team have access to the code to match your name if it is necessary to do so. Any information we collect will be treated as confidential and used only in this project unless otherwise specified. The following people will have access to the information we collect in this research: the research team and the Curtin University Ethics Committee.

Electronic data will be password-protected and hard copy data (including video or audio tapes) will be in locked storage for seven years and then destroyed.
You have the right to access, and request correction of, your information in accordance with relevant privacy laws.

The results of this research may be presented at conferences or published in professional and academic journals. You will not be identified in any results that are published or presented.

Whilst all care will be taken to maintain privacy and confidentiality of any information shared at a focus group or group discussion, you should be aware that

you may feel embarrassed or upset if one of the group members repeats things said in a confidential group meeting.

Will you tell me the results of the research?
You can request a copy of the final research results by contacting any of the researchers listed above. Results will not be individual but based on all the information we collect and review as part of the research.

Do I have to take part in the research project?
Taking part in a research project is voluntary. If you decide to take part and then change your mind, that is okay, you can withdraw from the project If you choose not to take part or start and then stop the study, it will not affect your relationship with the University, staff or colleagues. If you choose to leave the study we will use any information collected unless you tell us not to.

What happens next and who can I contact about the research?
For any questions you may have, please contact:
Lyndsay: Lyndsay.andrew@postgrad.curtin.edu.au
Michele: Michele.willson@exchange.curtin.edu.au; or +61 8 9266 7699

If you decide to take part in this research we will ask you to sign the consent form. By signing it is telling us that you understand what you have read and what has been discussed. Signing the consent indicates that you agree to be in the research project and have your answers used as described. If you are under the age of 18 your parent/guardian must also sign the consent form indicating they have also read this information statement. Please take your time and ask any questions you have before you decide what to do. You will be given a copy of this information and the consent form to keep.

At the start of the questionnaire, available via the link provided, there is a checkbox to indicate you have understood the information provided here in the information sheet.

Appendix D – Participant Consent Form for Interviewees

HREC Project Number: 12325

Project Title: How does education help in the fight against violent extremism?

Principal Investigator: Dr. Michele Willson

Student researcher: Lyndsay Andrew Freeman

Version Number: 1

Version Date: 25-4-2016

- I have read, the information statement version listed above and I understand its contents.
- I believe I understand the purpose, extent and possible risks of my involvement in this project.
- I voluntarily consent to take part in this research project.
- I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the answers I have received.
- I understand that this project has been approved by Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee and will be carried out in line with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007).
- I understand I will receive a copy of this Information Statement and Consent Form.
- I am over the age of 18; or
- I am under the age of 18 and I have included my parent/guardian's signature

Participant Name

Participant Signature

Parent/Guardian Signature (if under 18 years)

Date

☐ I do	☐ I do not	consent to being audio-recorded
☐ I do	☐ I do not	consent for my results to be utilised in a non-identifiable matter in future research

Declaration by researcher: I have supplied an Information Letter and Consent Form to the participant who has signed above, and believe that they understand the purpose, extent and possible risks of their involvement in this project.

Researcher Name

Researcher Signature

Date

Note: All parties signing the Consent Form must date their own signature.

Appendix E – Students Exhibiting Anti-Social and Extremist Behaviour Checklist

1. Is the behaviour complained of anti-social and extremist behaviour?
   (if yes, proceed to question 2)
2. Is the report of anti-social and extremist behaviour from a credible source?
   (If yes proceed to question 3, if no contact the Incident Report and Support Hotline for advice)
3. Is it a situation of imminent risk to the school community?
   a. If yes – ring 000 (Triple Zero) and then call the Incident Report and Support Hotline
   b. If No – ring Incident Report and Support Hotline
4. Has the Director Public Schools been notified?
5. Has consideration been given to notifying the student's parents?
   (Consult police before taking this action)
6. Has consideration been given to notifying staff?
7. Has consideration been given to notifying the broader community?
8. Have any child protection implications been considered?
   (if unsure undertake the Mandatory Reporting Guide and seek advice from the Child Wellbeing Unit)
9. Does a report need to be made to the Health and Safety Directorate?
   (consider both the impact of the behaviour itself and having to deal with that behaviour and any incident which may have occurred on the school site)
10. Does the student have a disability? If yes:
    a. Has consideration been given to making a reasonable adjustment for the student?
    b. Has the student and their parent(s) been consulted about the reasonable adjustment and during the risk assessment process?
11. Has the media unit been notified?

12 Does the school have any court orders (incl. Family Court orders and AVOs) that impact on the student while they are at school?

13 Should action be taken under the student welfare and discipline policy?

14 Has an assessment of the risk posed by the student's behaviour begun?

(NSW Government Education, 2018)