

Pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model for environmental planning*

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The advancement of environmental and development planning has been handicapped by a philosophical barrier. An aspect of that barrier concerns the one-sided application of the natural-scientific causal vocabulary to human and social behaviour. Rorty's pragmatism reveals an even more crucial aspect of that barrier: the dominance of natural-scientific truth-seeking in philosophy and social sciences. The paper presents a model in which the explanatory truth-seeking aspect and the interpretative truth-creation aspect of social reality are synthesized. It implies a warning for the hubris of the »planning age» and stresses the importance of democratic institutions of recognition.

Key words: Environmental planning, evolutionary and institutional economics, Rorty's pragmatism, situational analysis, truth-seeking vs. truth creation.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and approach of the paper

The aim of this paper is to give a short description of my philosophical and social theoretical thoughts related to environmental and development planning. They are based on the experiences I have gathered as a practicing forester, as a researcher and as a professor of land use economics from encountering increasingly complex economic and social phenomena, from the management of farm forestry, and the behaviour of forest owners (Hahtola 1967 a and b, 1971, 1973a), to rural development and environmental planning (1983, 1986, 1987).

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During my work I have increasingly felt the discrepancy between academic and professional orthodoxy and the relativity of truths in practical life. Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and later K. William Kapp (1977, 1983, 1985) have offered the first philosophical and theoretical foundations for this scepticism and awakened my interest in the value-ladenness and institutional contingency of scientific theories and, accordingly, in institutional economics. The discrepancies of theory and practice have concerned, for example, the relation of rational forest management and the total economy of forest owner (Hahtola 1973a), and especially the relativity of truths, morals, and rationalities in face of the global environmental and development problems (1986, 1987). This background has played a role in the development of my philosophical orientation towards increasing *relativism*.

In dealing with the problems of farming as an economic unit and the behaviour of forest owners in different socio-economic environments I became concerned with the limitations of causal explanation and so I became interested in teleological reasoning and practical syllogism, and behind that, a *hermeneutical*¹ philosophy (Hahtola 1973a, pp. 9—16). Later on my hermeneutical orientation was strengthened as a reaction to the dominating deterministic theorizing in regional development (Hahtola 1983).

One experience stemming from my efforts to find a suitable philosophical and theoretical basis for approaching the management, development and environmental problems was that a researcher should try to be consistent in his scientific efforts. This means that his *research approach*, the elements of which are:

- (1) philosophical foundations,
- (2) theoretical starting points and
- (3) methodological decisions,

should form a coherent unity. A researcher often receives his research approach directly from the prevailing tradition of his discipline. The reflection and explicit formulation of the foundations of one's research approach ad-

vances both the coherence of methodological settings and the discussion concerning their applicability (Hahtola 1973a; 1973b, pp. 236—238, 252—254).

This conception of a coherent research approach is a reason for my philosophical and metatheoretical concern. In addition, in this specialized world a generalist, e.g. a planner encountering comprehensive development and environmental problems, has to construct the necessary coherent framework, his own »Grand theory» (Ozbekhan 1969, p. 49). Because of the value-ladenness of all social theories, there is no ready framework suitable for all. I believe, that an increasing interest in comprehensive social theorizing is an inevitable condition for the development of planning, despite the danger that everybody exceeding the boundaries of disciplines will be labeled a dilettant (Preiswerk and Ullman 1985, p. XVII).

In accordance with the above conception of my approach to research, the pragmatic-hermeneutical human-action model and planning scheme² (referred later as the PHM), where my philosophical and social theoretical thoughts have been condensed, will be presented in the following order:

- (1) Pragmatic-hermeneutical conception of social reality — basic commitments. (chapter 12. and 2)
- (2) Metatheoretical structure and functioning of human action. (chapter 3)
- (3) Situational analysis. (chapter 4)

1.2 Environmental and development problems — challenge to planning and its theoretical and philosophical foundations

Twenty years ago Hasan Ozbekhan (1969, pp. 83—86) listed 28 problems of uneven development and environmental deterioration. These was given as examples of the »continuous critical problems» addressed by expanding planning practices. He considered that unless a new insight into these problems and a system-wide integrative approach is worked out, sectoral planning efforts are doomed to failure. His epistemological clarifications for a consistent general planning theory which was based on a »Human Action Model» instead of a »Mechanistic Model» (pp. 68—81, 151—155) served as a starting point of the thoughts presented in this paper.³

The environmental problems connected with industrial production and the modern way of

life, the depletion of important natural resources, and the widening gap between industrialized and developing countries have intertwined to create bundle of problems (Our Common Future, 1987). The increasing competition for material wellbeing and limited natural resources is threatening even the social environment of man, and via the armsrace, his very survival (Kapp 1977, pp. IX-XXIII; von Wright 1986, pp. 15, 80—83).

Mankind is facing a historical situation, a turning point, where old economical and social doctrines originating from the industrial revolution and the birth of capitalism no longer hold (e.g. Ozbekhan 1969, p. 50; Mesarovic & Pestel 1975; Giarini 1980, pp. VI—VIII; von Wright 1986, pp. 75—103).

»Continuous critical environmental and development problems» can be characterized as unintended and unprecedented consequences produced by myopic sectorial actions (Kapp 1983b, p. 43). This means a challenge to planning as a coordinating device (Tool 1979, pp. 147—149). Results of the expanded planning systems in different countries have, however, appeared to be insignificant. A relevant political and theoretical basis seems still to be lacking. It might be no exaggeration to state, that a disillusionment is continuously the dominating tune in planning. Criticism of the dominating rational/synoptic planning and claims to a more substantial planning theory seems to continue without any sign of breakthrough of a new planning theory (Alexander 1984; Paris 1982, pp. 3—11).

A similar situation is prevailing in economics. Neoclassical economics, and benefit-cost analysis as its methodology for social evaluation, have both been criticized, especially of their inadequacy in dealing with increasing environmental and development problems (Kapp 1977, pp. 1—20; 1983b, pp. 57—69; 1985, pp. 121—124; Boulding 1970; Giarini 1980, pp. 71—100; Söderbaum 1978, pp. 41—52; 1985, pp. 5—17; 1986, pp. 23—44). Although institutional, structural and dependency orientations have strengthened their positions, the neoclassical school seems not to have lost its dominance in any western country.

A similar discussion, mainly in the form of »positivism critique», has continued in other social sciences without any clear change of paradigm. The dominating paradigm — the theory of industrialising and modernising society —

has been criticized from the 1960's especially by Marxist social theorists and the representatives of the Third World, although the Marxist challenge seems to be weakening (Banuri 1988; Giddens 1979, pp. 234—259; Hettne 1983, pp. 247—265; Skinner 1985, pp. 1—20).

The slow advancement in, and the weak support for, new approaches indicate that more than an ordinary paradigm change is in question. Paradigms usually hold for specific disciplines. This dispute appears to extend over the borders of disciplines and concern all social sciences. In view of these inadequacies of dealing with actual social and environmental challenges a distinguished Finnish philosopher, Georg Henrik von Wright (1986, pp. 14—23), speaks about a crisis of Western intelligence — of its images of science and forms of rationality. He refers to the emphasis of an instrumental rationality at the expense of moral reasonability.

Hasan Ozbekhan (1969, pp. 68—97) made it clear already 20 years ago, that the dominance of the *natural-scientific* philosophy, whose foundations originate from antiquity is disastrous to the development of planning (Tool 1979, p. 29; Rorty 1980, pp. 3—13; 1982, pp. XIII—XVII; von Wright 1986, pp. 13—37). It seems to be a handicap to social theorizing in general (Giddens 1979, pp. 7—8, 235—238, 257—259; 1984, pp. XIV—XXI; 1985, pp. 124—127; Skinner 1985, pp. 6—8). Concerning economics and economic liberalism K. William Kapp (1983d, pp. 76—80) refers to the heritage of Scottish philosophy of the enlightenment.

Because positivistic natural-scientific philosophy relies upon invariant universal truths, it cannot be very responsive to a new historical situation. Nor can it encourage a search for entirely new approaches. The improvement of environmental and development planning especially seems to have reached the philosophical barrier⁴ (Hahtola 1986, 1987).

An *atomistic* Cartesian orientation of natural sciences has until recently offered very scanty preconditions for solving holistic environmental and development problems. Instead of holistic coordination, the philosophy of the natural sciences emphasizes details and their causal relations (e.g. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 144—145; von Wright 1986, pp. 9—11).

A *dualistic* view of reality, subjectivity of man and objectivity of nature, is another Cartesian characteristic of natural-scientific thinking. It appears in the exclusion or underestimation of

the role of values in science (Tool 1979, pp. 86, 278—285). Values in the form of ends, goals, objectives etc. are, however, inevitable elements in all planning (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 68—81; Allardt 1981, pp. 7—8; Albrecht 1985).

The objectifying of nature has led to a *deterministic and mechanistic world view*, the third dominating feature of our time brought to us by the modern natural sciences (Tool 1979, p. 54). This may be the most dangerous aspect of our intellectual situation. For the first time in his history man seems to have means to threaten his own survival (Kapp 1983b, p. 55). Hasan Ozbekhan (1969, p. 89) characterized the intellectual situation by referring to »modern fatalism», a term which originates from Bertrand de Jouvenel. Similarly, G.H. von Wright (1986, pp. 9—11, 43—54, 85) speaks about »dictatorship of circumstances».

Owing to the dominating positivistic philosophy, which tries to fashion the social upon the natural sciences, a mechanistic, deterministic language and practice has been institutionalized in almost all educational, administrative, and other organizations. Regrettably, economists have been accused to be the vanguard in this. The consequence is narrow specialization, exclusively technological methods, piecemeal, incremental planning and sectorial approaches to environmental and development problems (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 56—64, 117—124; Giddens 1985, pp. 124—127; Turtiainen 1985, pp. 95—96; Our Common Future 1987, pp. 310—312). Coordination, if attempted, is also dominated by physical planning. Although holistic thinking has increased both in the physical and social sciences (e.g. von Wright 1986, pp. 88—118), an economist, social scientist or a planner, who becomes assured about the necessity of a more holistic philosophical and theoretical foundation for environmental and development planning finds himself in an embarrassing situation.

Contrary to the requirements of planning and social theory, the developments in philosophy, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, have been from the comprehensive towards more narrow and specialized problems (Rorty 1982, pp. 211—230). Also in Continental philosophy there are such tendencies, for example a post-modernist skepticism and a strengthening anti-philosophical tradition, which does not favour the construction of comprehensive social theories for national and global, environmental and development policies (Rorty 1982, pp. XIII—

XLVII; Skinner 1985). The very idea of holism, when implying a conception of a universal truth, can be labeled morally and politically suspicious — like totalitarianism (Töttö 1985, pp. 39—42).

The pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model, that will be presented in the following pages, addresses the inevitable task of every planning theorist or practician concerned with environmental and development problems: How to elaborate a »broad conceptual framework in terms of which it is possible to define and to interpret all the phenomena and events related to human behaviour and socio-cultural processes» (Kapp 1985c, p. 71). In outlining the framework, an alternative to the dominating natural-scientific paradigm is aimed at.

2 PRAGMATIC-HERMENEUTICAL CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL REALITY — BASIC COMMITMENTS

2.1 Practical syllogism and hermeneutical circle as basic analogies

The basic terms, formalisms and analogies used in a scientific theoretical construct give a hint of its philosophical foundations, basic commitments, and their ideological implications (Tool 1979, pp. 44—58). In this case a choice was made between the following three analogies:

- (1) *Causal relation*, often depicted by a scheme of arrows: these in general point to an inductive reasoning, methodological individualism and a social atomism⁵ (e.g. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 64—67; Tool 1979, pp. 45—47; Hodgson 1988, pp. 53—72)
- (2) *Organism- and machine-analogies*, often defined by hierarchical, system-theoretical models with evolutionistic principles (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 105—111; Niitamo 1980), are dominated by deductive features. These formalisms can be conceived as representatives of natural-scientific holism.
- (3) *Hermeneutic circle*⁶ and *dialectics* (different forms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis-schemes and -processes (see e.g. Tool 1979, pp. 31—33)). They point to holistic conceptions of social sciences and humanities and often include some kind of synthesis of conceptions (1) and (2), a synthesis of atomism-holism, subjective-objective etc. (e.g. Giddens 1984, pp. XIII—XXXVII). Her-

meneutical and dialectical conceptions are heterogenous and overlapping. Owing to its evolutionistic features social dialectics often resembles natural-scientific thinking⁷.

In order to maintain a distance from the often deterministic features of dialectics, the hermeneutic circle — hermeneutic interaction — was taken as a basic analogy of the model. Hermeneutics is not conceived here as an »universal hermeneutics», viz. (1) a method to reach objective incontrovertible truth, or (2) a stance that only interpretative approach is relevant to social phenomena, but as a characteristic aspect of social interaction (Rorty 1980, pp. 315—316; Outhwaite 1985, pp. 37—38). Because hermeneutical and dialectical vocabularies are often entangled, much of the discussion on the following pages concerning social hermeneutics also applies to certain forms of dialectics, e.g. Giddens' (1984, pp. XXVIII—XXIX, 180—185, 193—199) structuration theory.

*Practical syllogism*⁸, which instead of natural-scientific subsumption-scheme is the main explanatory-scheme for human action (Allardt 1972, pp. 63—64; von Wright 1985, pp. 34—41; cf. however Kapp 1985c, pp. 71—72) has a central position in the PHM. It might be considered a natural starting point for all action(praxis)-oriented theorizing, Marxist or other (e.g. Giddens 1984, pp. XXII, 1—3; 1985, pp. 123—124; Töttö 1985, pp. 54—56, 140—148).

Practical syllogism inheres the main presuppositions of the PHM, viz. the existence of human consciousness, purposive action, and human capacity to learn from a critical reflection of experience (cf. Giddens 1984, pp. 1—3, 281—284; Tool 1979, pp. 51—52; Rorty 1980, pp. 10—11). This is the only form of rationality supposed to be »universal». These characteristics of human behaviour can be considered as empirical facts (Outhwaite 1985, pp. 29, 33).

The elements of practical syllogism — consciousness of means and ends, actions and their results — are assumed to interact hermeneutically. This kind of interaction in human behaviour also exemplifies the other central concept of the model, *hermeneutic circle* or *interaction* and describes the way hermeneutical concepts are used here (Outhwaite 1985, pp. 37—38). The basic structure and functional principles of the PHM representing social reality, human and social action, are in turn specified by these concepts.

With environmental planning and decision-making in mind, a practical syllogism was reformulated according to the following schema when applied in the PHM (Hahtola 1987, pp. 37—39; cf. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 93—97, 132—151).

CONSCIOUSNESS (subject)	ACTION (under plan- ning)	ENVIRONMENT (object)
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The environment is defined both as an object, a change of which is aimed at, and a material and structural source of means to desired ends. Any individual, firm, social group or society, which can be conceived as capable of purposive behaviour can be considered as an actor (Galtung 1975, pp. 9—10; Tool 1979, pp. 51—53).

All of these categories are given an equal ontological status in the sense that they can be subjected to empirical inquiry. A conscious acting person is assumed to be as real as the elements of environment, contrary to a conception some »philosopher of science» may hold (cf. Gutting 1984, p. 11). However, the way these categories »exist» is different, presupposing different kind of inquiries. Depending upon the aspect of the study, either consciousness, action or environment can rise to the fore thereby emphasizing either structural, institutional, or cultural explanations⁹ of action (Allardt 1972, pp. 54—64, 67—68; Galtung 1975, pp. 9—10).

Compared with the dominating natural-scientific thinking, this conception stresses the role of consciousness, i.e. the human intelligence in human and social behaviour (e.g. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 93—97, 132—151; Tool 1979, pp. 310—311; Giarini 1980, p. VII). An essential feature from the planning point of view is that in the context of the practical syllogism, a conception of ends, »what is good for us», is explicitly connected with the conception of means and of their use. The starting point is thus a unity instead of separation of means and ends.

2.2 Recognition, ideal society and social hermeneutics

Many central themes of theoretical discourse in planning — the relation of planning and market economy, as well as the possibilities of rational, democratic or participatory planning — are clearly ideological implying value judge-

ments concerning the desired states of society (Faludi 1973; Soderbaum 1973, 1986; Tool 1979, pp. 200—207). Ideological commitments are already involved in the planning schemes, by way of the philosophical foundations and basic analogies (e.g. Töttö 1985, pp. 39—45).

Moreover, planning is explicitly defined as the formulation of an action program based on the comparison of the present state and the desired (Djupsund 1981, pp. 12—20). There is no value-free planning theory (e.g. Ozbekhan 1969, 124—151; Albrecht 1985). Therefore, the pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model as a planning scheme explicitly contains as one of its constituent parts the concept of *ideal society*.

By choosing the practical syllogism for the main analogy of social reality, the consciousness of human behavior was emphasized. It is necessary, however, to take levels of consciousness into consideration (Ozbekhan 1969, p. 107). Cultural, institutional and structural explanations reveal one aspect of such different levels. Further, concepts like »false consciousness», »distorted communication», »colonization of life-world» etc. have an important role, especially in Marxist and critical social theory (Giddens 1979, pp. 165—182; Töttö 1985, pp. 47—57, 99—106). Anthony Giddens (1984, pp. XXII—XXIII, XXXI, 11—14, 282) in his structuration theory stresses the importance of unintended consequences as well as the routinization of action. Marc R. Tool (1979, pp. 25—34), in turn, refers to »ism-ideologies», capitalism, marxism etc., whose adoption does »block the way of inquiry» and thus become coercive of thought and behaviour (cf. Rorty 1982, pp. XLI—XLII).

The idea of commonality of unconscious, institutionalized social behaviour (e.g. Tool 1979, pp. 53, 87) has affected the formulation of PHM, as well as the inherent concept of ideal society. Thus, individual and social *recognition*, a reflective cognition, has been given an important role of the model representing the mental, conscious part of action and behaviour, the interpretative transition from an unreflected social reality to a reflected one (Fig. 1).

By using the reformulated practical syllogism as one classificatory dimension of the model and the levels of consciousness mediated by recognition as the other, the central dichotomy in social theory, explanation-interpretation, is overcome (e.g. Hekman 1984, pp. 333—337).

Figure 1. Action and its recognizing as dimensions of social reality

SOCIAL REALITY

as subjected to explanatory inquiry: *truth seeking*

interpretation: <i>truth-creation</i>	LIFE WORLD:	unreflected consciousness-action-environment
	RECOGNITION:	reflection of different elements of consciousness-action-environment
	REFLECTED WORLD:	categorized consciousness-action-environment

Interpretation and explanation prevail as aspects of the same model, with an equal status but different roles. Interpretative understanding aims not at discovering of objective truth, i.e. »capturing the real structure of society», nor is it a »mere description», but it represents the conscious, reflecting side of »being» and social reality (Rorty 1980, pp. 317—320; Hekman 1984, pp. 335, 337, 344; Outhwaite 1985, pp. 24, 29). The subjective, conscious elements and objective environmental (material, structural) elements, are supposed to interact in a hermeneutical totality, as they do in everyday life (Outhwaite 1985, pp. 24—25, 29, 32—33, 36—38; Hoy 1985; Giddens 1984, pp. XXXII—XXXIII, 284; Töttö 1985, pp. 22—25). None of the elements of the scheme is assumed primary.

This stance means a synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism, idealism and materialism in conceiving social reality (e.g. Giddens 1984, pp. XX—XXI, 1—2; Hahtola 1973a, pp. 14—17; Töttö 1985, pp. 113, 143). I hope that the PHM could illustrate Rorty's pragmatism when applied to social inquiry: because the explanatory truth-seeking and the interpretative truth-creation are intertwined (»double hermeneutics»), the objective, »universal» Truth is no longer interesting. The PHM gives an operational meaning for the »crisis of Western intelligence» which G.H. von Wright (1986, pp. 14—23) speaks about: it means the *dominance of truth-seeking*, i.e. endeavoring towards ultimate truth, *at the expense of truth-creation*: the reflection of all rationalities and morals of man.

The individual consciousness and the social and cultural context are supposed to be closely related. Thus, the model of social action also represents the interaction of individual and so-

ciety (Ozbekhan 1969, p. 94; Elias 1978, pp. XVIII—XXIII; Blum 1977, pp. 49—50; Tool 1979, pp. 46—47).

From the planning theoretical viewpoint the hermeneutical conceptualization of the PHM means that

- (1) in Gunnar Myrdal's and William K. Kapp's (1983c, pp. 67—68) words, »the traditional separation between planning and policy is . . . eliminated. In short environmental planning is politics» and that
- (2) both natural- and social scientific aspects can be included in the model (Kapp 1985c, pp. 69—73; Turtiainen 1985, pp. 33—39, 95—96).

According to the central role given to *recognition* in PHM, the lack of reflection in general, rather than »false consciousness» or »unintended consequences of action», was seen as a major social problem, which leads to carelessness and lack of responsibility. Thus, *consciousness* and *responsibility* were taken as main criteria of ideal society (Tool 1979, pp. 53—54; Giarini 1980, pp. VII—VIII). It means that the content of ideal society is considered contingent on prevailing social values and that the undisturbed recognizing process itself is taken as the primary base. Notwithstanding the contingency of ideologies the definition of PHM and the ideal society imply obvious democratic ideals (Tool 1979, pp. 186—198, 201; Kapp 1985f, pp. 171—180).

The philosophical and theoretical foundations of the pragmatic-hermeneutical human action, and the inherent concept of ideal society, »*social hermeneutics*», outlined above, can be condensed into following three hermeneutic circles, the first one representing practical syllogism:

- (1) Interaction of consciousness, action and environment.
- (2) Interaction of elements of consciousness (meaning, theory, ideology and experience; »hermeneutics of consciousness») (Ahmavaara 1970, pp. 13—16, 117; Töttö 1985, pp. 23—24).
- (3) Interaction of individual and society (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 56—57; Elias 1978, pp. XVIII—XXIII; Töttö 1985, pp. 39—45).

A distinguishing feature of the PHM is that the hermeneutical interaction is assumed to concern all elements of the model (a 4 X 3 scheme), i.e. all elements of the Ideal society with none in primacy. Thus, the ideal society

can be defined by the *undistorted functioning* of the multi-dimensional social hermeneutics, which depicts the contingency of all human and social action (e.g. Giddens 1979, pp. 242—245; Tool 1979, pp. 53—63)

Accordingly, no universal ahistorical criteria for a desired society are assumed. Only immanent, contingent criteria can be formulated for each element, based on their relation to other parts and the hermeneutical totality¹⁰ (e.g. Töttö 1985, pp. 153—155).

The recognizing of the present social situation instead of the seeking for an universal truth is thus the only relevant ground for social criticism (Kapp 1983c, pp. 66—67; Tool 1979, pp. 17—19, 285—289)¹¹. It gives the content to the ideal society, consciousness and responsibility.

The prefix »pragmatic»¹² in the name of the PHM specifies the philosophical foundations and the concepts of social hermeneutics and ideal society of the model and locates it in a heterogeneous hermeneutical vocabulary. The prefix was chosen because Rorty's (1980, 1982) pragmatism feels, according my philosophical and theoretical preconceptions, the most promising philosophical foundation. A pragmatic foundation also connects this approach to the institutional economic thought, which from the planning theoretical perspective looks the most fruitful orientation.

Pragmatism (Rorty 1980, pp. 357—394; 1982, pp. XIII—XLVII, 193) seems to offer philosophical foundations for just that kind of epistemology, which Hasan Ozbekhan (1969, pp. 63—61) considered necessary for a General Theory of planning¹³. Thus, a planning theory ought to be developed in view of the purpose at hand not of its objectivity, moral or rationality according to some assumed universal criteria. The urgency of environmental and development problems does not depend on the universality of descriptions we have of the state of affairs but on the increasing physical, mental, and social stress people are exposed to (cf. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 56—64, 67, 70—71, 78—79, 86—97; Söderbaum 1987, pp. 141—142).

3 METATHEORETICAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF HUMAN ACTION

3.1 A 4 X 3 scheme of social hermeneutics

The detailed structure of pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model is presented in figure 2.

Figure 2. Structure of pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model

	CONSCIOUSNESS	ACTION	ENVIRONMENT
LIFE-WORLD	EXPERIENCE	PRAXIS	PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE-WORLD
	MEANING	ORDER/POWER	HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
REFLECTED SOCIAL REALITY	THEORY	ECONOMY	RESOURCES
	IDEOLOGY	CULTURE	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

The upmost level of the model represents the life-world, i.e. unreflected, more or less routinized and institutionalized, behaviour, consciousness and everyday experience. The elements of life world, categorized in accordance with the reformulated practical syllogism, are named *experience*, *praxis* and *physical and social life-world*.

Three other levels representing reflected social reality are (higher order) abstractions from the first level. The borderlines of these reflected and unreflected parts are supposed to be individual, historical and socially, culturally and situationally contingent. Like Giddens' (1984, pp. XXII—XXIV) practical and discursive consciousness they are also supposed to interact.

While reflected consciousness, action and environment are further categorized in three dimensions each, the whole construct of social hermeneutics consists of 4 X 3 elements¹⁴. The dimensions of reflected consciousness are named *meaning*, *theory* and *ideology*. The reflected action is categorized in *order/power*, *economy* and *culture*, and the reflected environment in *human environment*, *resources* and *natural environment*. These categories are supposed to form a hermeneutical totality. It means that none of the elements are considered primary, as for example labor, production forces, or praxis in Marxist social theories (Liedman 1972, pp. 85, 98; Habermas 1979, pp. 57—87; Tool 1979, p. 47). Depending upon what is recognized as individual or social problem, each of the categories of the PHM can become crucial in turn.

Theory represents the cognitive part of world view and instrumental rationality. *Ideology* defines the moral rationality of society, i.e. the normative aspect of consciousness. They are both considered to be based on experience

thus having an equal philosophical status (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 77—79; Ahmavaara 1970, pp. 13—16, 117; Hahtola 1973a, pp. 14—16). Ideology means here a value system in a neutral sense, not definitely a biased consciousness as in Marxist theories. An ideology, as other elements of the model, can be distorted in relation to the whole situation, but it has not any special primary role (cf. Tool 1979, pp. 25—29). As a basis of social experience and action, a communicative rationality, i.e. a common *meaning*, is also assumed (Habermas 1975, pp. 130—133; Töttö 1985, pp. 48—54).

These rationalities are assumed to be incommensurable, so that none of them can be considered as primary, to which the others were reducible. No other universal rationality is assumed than the presumed capability of man to conscious, purposive action. Concerning *experience* as a part of unreflected life world, it can be roughly maintained that it represents an everyday consciousness which is mostly based on obscure meanings, theories and ideologies of yesterday.

As corollaries of this stance, goal-setting, problem-formulation and other criteria of action become historically and culturally contingent. Individuals and societies continuously define their rationalities within their own historical context. A value-pluralism and conflicts of societies are thus inevitable. Relativism is limited only by the presumed capability of man to reason and to increasingly recognize his historical situation (Stegmüller 1976, pp. 141—145; Lesche 1976, p. 166). This conception emphasizes, as does Ozbekhan (1969), the role of normative planning and decision-making in social policy and restricts the applicability of »objective values», technical rationality, and other technocratic criteria (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 93—97, 132—135, 152; Söderbaum 1978, pp. 133—147).

The reflected environment is categorized by differentiating the means- and ends- aspects of the environment. Environment as an end is further differentiated by man's relation to nature, the *natural environment* and relation to other people, the *human environment*. The instrumental and strategic, i.e. means, aspect of environment, named *resources*, consist of both the social and economic resources and structures thereby referring to a »man-made environment», a »technostructure»¹⁵ (Tool 1979, p. 90). The unreflected environment, the *physical and so-*

cial life-world, can thus be conceived as a composite of all these elements of environment (cf. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 101—105).

The categories of environment can be illustrated by referring to Giarini's (1980, pp. 42—47) term »Our Dowry and Patrimony», indicating environment as the source of wealth and welfare. It also includes the »free gifts of nature», which are neglected in the dominating economic theory, a reason why the »invisible hand» of market has appeared to be disastrous for environment (Kapp 1983c, pp. 57—58). By including in the reflected environment both the instrumental »resources» and the intrinsic »human» and »natural» environments the diversity of wealth and welfare, capital and resource concepts, as well as the multi-disciplinary character of environmental problems is emphasized (Söderbaum 1978, pp. 38, 139—141; Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 60—61).

Welfare can be considered as the overall purpose of human action, i.e. both composite, unreflected *praxis* as reflected action (see Fig. 2). The criteria of welfare¹⁶ will, however, be continuously redefined by individuals and societies. Human welfare does not depend entirely on »objective» material and social conditions of the environment, but also upon the recognition and interpretation of a situation. Accordingly, the function of *culture* (cultural action) is to reproduce the individual and social consciousness, i.e. the mental sources of welfare. Activities concerning socialization and identity belong to this category. Nurture, education, science, art, religion and humanistic sciences in general represent this aspect.

Action aimed at reproduction of the environment, i.e. material and structural sources of welfare, is named *economy*. It means management in a comprehensive sense, which unites economic, environmental and social policy. It presumes an extensive definition of economics in the spirit of political and institutional economics (Kapp 1977, pp. IX—XXIII; Söderbaum 1978, pp. 18—35; Giarini 1980, pp. V—X)

Analogously to the definitions of culture and economy, the function of the third dimension of reflected action, *order/power*¹⁷, can be defined as the distribution of welfare, i.e. reproduction of social order. The double name of this dimension refers to the inevitable role of power in maintaining the social order. It is also logically implied in the central concepts of the PHM, action and agency (e.g. Giddens 1984, pp. 14—16, 331).

Because the control of power is one of the main criteria of ideal society in all cultures, power is an important concept in all social analyses. Galtung's (1974, pp. 16—19) and Galbraith's (1984, pp. 27—84) concepts of multi-dimensional power seem to offer an effective framework for an analysis of social order and power. It must be remembered, however, that in social hermeneutics all elements are supposed to interact. Thus, the model in its totality defines the dimensions of power, as well as its recognition and legitimation.

3.2 Social problems, change and development

Using pragmatic-hermeneutical conceptualization of society social problems can be classified as follows:

- (1) Overall lack of reflection and responsibility for the consequences of action, which implies latent social problems (e.g. Ozbekhan 1973, pp. 65—69).
- (2) Recognized failures in social hermeneutics, i.e. discrepancy of the prevailing and the desired state of affairs (Ideal society) (Tool 1979, pp. 24—25, 53).

Social problems can thus be defined as inconsistencies between different elements of social hermeneutics, including individual and other differences in their definition and recognition. Literally speaking, only changes in consciousness creates problems and can lead to action and agency.

Every action means a change, individual or social. The dimension from an individual recognizing individual problems and changes to social ones has no clear demarcation lines (Elias 1978, pp. XXVIII—LXX; Tool 1986, p. 60). Suffice it to state that a purposive change always begins from an individual reflection and recognition, which in certain circumstances leads to a social recognition (cf. Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 93—97). The subject of a reflection, however, can concern any element¹⁸ of the social hermeneutics in the PHM.

Given that value-pluralism and conflicts are unavoidable features of society, (e.g. Söderbaum 1978, pp. 133—136; Turtiainen 1985, pp. 4—7) recognition and every social change have also a power aspect. The main criteria of ideal society and, accordingly, of solutions of problems, concern the rules as to how social disputes should be settled: which are conceived as normal conflicts of a society with

multitude of values and which as social problems, is arbitrary. Social change and development consists of a continuous process of recognizing, defining and settling of problems, i.e. of a social hermeneutics.

Environmental or development planning aims at progress (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 56—57, 95—96). The above discussion may have illuminated the complexity of the concepts of social problems, change, development and progress when only immanent, situational criteria are available. It means a continuous endeavoring towards ideal society, which, however, is only a temporary resting-place of human mind (Rorty 1982, pp. XLI, 166; Tool 1979, pp. 140—142). Someone, who can believe in universal criteria of development and progress may be in an other position.

4 SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS — PRAGMATIC-HERMENEUTICAL SCHEME OF PLANNING AND ANALYSIS

As a scheme for planning and analysis, the pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model consists of

- (1) pragmatic-hermeneutical conceptualization of human and social action (a 4 X 3 scheme),
- (2) concept of ideal society and
- (3) situational analysis.

In the situational analysis, the pragmatic-hermeneutical criteria of ideal society are applied to the decision situation at hand. The phases of the *situational analysis*, whose principles have been derived from the PHM (a 4 X 3 scheme) and from Peter Söderbaum's (1973, 1978, 1984, 1986, 1987) positional analysis¹⁹, are as follows:

- (1) Preliminary definition of the decision situation.
- (2) Value analysis.
- (3) Resource and impact analysis.
- (4) Power analysis.
- (5) Definition of the procedure and information basis of decision making.

In accordance with the substantial, social theoretical character of the PHM, the scheme of situational analysis emphasizes the first stages of planning and decision-making, the analysis of decision situation, ends and problem formulation, whereas in most planning and evaluation schemes, particularly in a rational/synoptic planning and cost-benefit analysis,

the procedural stages predominate (Paris 1982, pp. 3—11). Owing to the principles of the PHM, the situational analysis addresses both the actual environmental circumstances, as well as their recognition and interpretation.

A *decision situation* is seen in a wide social context as a part of an overall social hermeneutics (systems thinking²⁰). This does not exclude the necessary practical restriction of the scope of the analysis. The problem, as well as the present state, alternatives, and desired state of affairs are defined both as »flows» and as »positions» (positional thinking). The first phase of analysis also include the preliminary definition of the actors and other participants of the situation (analysis of interests).

The aim of this preliminary orientation is to form a basic understanding of the situation before moving from the »life world» to more detailed analysis. An open-mindedness, i.e. the use of many-sided sources of information, and a concern of sectorial biases can be seen as leading principles of this phase (Söderbaum 1986, pp. 153—169; 1987, pp. 152—153; Leskinen 1987).

The decision situation is refined by value-, resource-, impact-, and power analyses.

Value²¹ analysis is addressed to the value contents of different dimensions of consciousness in order to reveal the interests of potential actors and participants related to different alternatives²² in order to make value preferences explicit in the discussion of impacts. The plurality of values and conflicts of interests are given (Turtiainen 1985, pp. 4—7). Both the reflected and unreflected elements of consciousness in the PHM are considered, as well as the corresponding cultural activities and tendencies. Some large-scale undertakings, e.g. the construction of a nuclear power plant, or environmental and development programs, have to be seen in a broad cultural and social context (Kapp 1983c, pp. 62—69). An essential goal of the analysis is to reveal the value-ladenness and latent meanings of prevailing mental institutions²³ and institutionalized practices (Gruchy 1977, pp. 20—21; Tool 1979, pp. 73—74; Giddens 1984, p. 13; Dietz 1988, p. 224).

A taken-for-granted practical experience of the organizations and functionaries in question is a subject of analysis (Leskinen 1987). Every organization has its special vocabulary of some basic terms, for example, economic-, technical-, or »transportational» efficiency, free enterprise, consumer sovereignty, family farm etc. (Gal-

braith 1984, pp. 37, 45, 124, 149—150; Vogeler 1981). Often they are rooted in ordinary language too. Theoretical conceptions, the professional world-views and given truths, are also worth analyzing. The ideological aspects of practices, meanings and theoretical conceptions connected with the decision situation are sometimes clearly articulated, some times latent. Revealing the meanings may bring the decision situation in a new light, for many verbalisms subdue as well as reveal²⁴.

Resource and impact analysis deals with economic, environmental and social impacts of the alternatives from a broad inter-disciplinary viewpoint. Multi-dimensional resource and capital concepts stressed by Giarini (1980, pp. 42—66) and Söderbaum (1986, pp. 78—99; 1987, pp. 155—156) serve as a starting point. K. William Kapp's (1983a, pp. 1—5; Swaney and Evers 1989, pp. 7—33) concept of social costs offers another central perspective to the analysis. In the PHM social costs mean the problems in the resource base, human and natural environment and other institutions which result from the myopic use of resources.

The conceptualization of the environment in the PHM is in harmony with the aim of broadening of the usual economic and social impact assessments. The mainstream economic analysis conventionally considers only the monetary resources of environment and omits the other resources and intrinsic human and natural aspects or presses them into one-dimensional »willingness to pay»-calculations (Kapp 1983b, pp. 48—51; Söderbaum 1987, pp. 146—150; 1989; Tool 1979, p. 312).

A relevant resource and impact analysis can not be carried out from the perspective of a single discipline (e.g. Dietz 1988, pp. 220—227; Söderbaum 1984, pp. 8—12; 1989). On the other hand, owing to the lack or inadequacy of the available holistic frameworks, the interdisciplinary approaches tend to result in a tremendous list of single impacts. It is serviceable in monitoring the state of affairs, but does not remarkably advance a valuation or decision-making (Kapp 1983a, pp. 36—38; 1985b, 50—52, 60—64).

Further, the belief in a common base of assessment has proved to be a mere intuition (Rorty 1980, pp. 373—379; 1982, pp. XXIX—XXXVII, 160—175, 377—378). The emphasis of quantification and commensuration has been an obstacle for the economic and social impact analysis, but the belief in an ultimate base —

the »truth» or universal rules — which the assessments could be based on, seems to be a real barrier (Söderbaum 1987; Dietz 1988, pp. 222—223).

Thus, resource and impact analysis, as with value analysis, does not aim at finding the »correct» values or bases for evaluation (Söderbaum 1987, pp. 146—150; 1989). The aim is to specify the actual decision situation and then base the assessments on it, not on some supposed ideal speech situation or other universal grounds (Rorty 1982, pp. 166, 173—174).

A starting point for the *power analysis* is the conception of multi-dimensional interwoven power. Galtung (1974, pp. 16—19) defines power as a center-periphery-relationship: a sum total of central positions on some or all dimensions of power. The social problem in this context is a recognizable distorted social gradient.

By applying the scheme of the PHM, and reformulating a little the dimensions of power used by Galtung (1974, pp. 9—17) and Galbraith (1984, pp. 27—84), the main dimensions of power can be defined and classified as follows:

- (1) Resource power, based on ownership or other kind of disposition and control of material and intellectual resources accruing from the environment;
- (2) Structural power, based on a central position in different economic, administrative and social structures; and
- (3) Symbolic power, the »cultural hegemony» which means a strong position in the »market» of values and addresses to the control and utilizing of consciousness.

The direct resource power in the form of private ownership of fields, coasts and forests continuously plays an important role in environmental politics (e.g. Ervin et al. 1977, pp. 31—41). In general it has, however, lost its primacy. More subtle symbolic power has increased, for example, in the form of marketing and other indirect persuasion. The structural and symbolic power of great organizations has particularly increased (Galtung 1984, pp. 51—84; Kapp 1977, pp. 170—179; Galbraith 1984, pp. 189—196).

The role of power has, however, been successfully curtailed by the neoclassical economic vocabulary, where only the market has power (e.g. Kapp 1983d, pp. 80—81). In Galbraith's words (1987, p. 286; also 1984, pp. 27—84; Galtung 1975, pp. 21—23)

»the paradox of power in the classical tradition is, once again, that while all agree that power exists in fact, it does not exist in principle».

So, a crucial function of the analysis is simply to reveal all forms of power, particularly the symbolic power, which implicitly and explicitly is legitimizing the other forms of power and which is most difficult to recognize and control (Tool 1979, pp. 165—167, 299).

Power analysis assures the definition of actors and other participants, their positions on different dimensions of power, and thus their roles in the decision situation concerned (Ozbekhan 1969, pp. 153—154; Hahtola 1984, pp. 19—23; Söderbaum 1986, pp. 153—169), thereby giving grounds for the procedures of decision-making and participation.

The situational analysis leads to the *definition of the procedure and information basis of decision-making*. It must be remembered, however, that the situational analysis is more a planning philosophy than a detailed planning technique. Because it represents a »substantial» planning conception, it concerns the whole process of decision-making and participation, not only the handling of the information base.

The criteria of the ideal society, i.e. the consciousness and responsibility of decision makers and other participants, direct also the procedural proposals. The general principles can be reduced to two perspectives:

- (1) Consideration of the present realities of social decision making.
- (2) Outlining of steps towards undisturbed social hermeneutics.

The first point refers to the fact that the procedural proposals must be made with the present decision-making system in view. There are many institutional incentives for inefficiency and inequity, which tend to subdue even the outright planning efforts and procedures to a mere device of legitimation (Ervin et al. 1977, pp. 31—60). The value and power analyses may have prepared an analyzer to consider these realities when decision procedures are proposed.

Social norms, dominant concepts of distributive equity and justice are partial products of the existing distribution of rights, duties and privileges, to the effect that there is strong tendency in all societies to see »what is» as »what is right» (Ervin et al. 1977, pp. 32—33). These realities can be summarized in the fol-

lowing generalizations of Edelman (1971, ref. Ervin et al. 1977, p. 48):

- »(1) Material goods — e.g., money, land, and perhaps power — are given to organized groups in proportion to their relative bargaining strength.
- (2) Symbolic goods reassure the unorganized that their appeals are noted and something is being done, and the unorganized remain unorganized and quiescent.
- (3) Conflict is ritualized and regularized in regulatory agencies to reduce anxiety and uncertainty and to legitimate authority.
- (4) Organized groups use political agencies to make good their claims on tangible resources.»

In this picture of decision-making, which stems particularly for environmental politics, can be seen the overall institutional change in industrialized countries towards centralized corporate state, a composite of economic, trade unionist, bureaucratist and political power, the multinational corporations being the last offshoots of that development (Tool 1979, pp. 105—176; Galbraith 1984, pp. 189—196). This in turn is a background for different countervailing movements, claims for grass roots democracy and participation.

A popular tenet in planning discourse has been the participatory planning. Ervin et al. (1977, pp. 59—60) summarizing the analysis of the sociopolitical constraints on land use politics, noted that

»So long as those who govern are held responsible to the governed through citizen participation, political decision-makers and participants will seek advantages through the system by disadvantaging nonparticipants.»

These remarks may be enough to demonstrate the gap between planning ideals and realities, when moving from the analysis to practical proposals and implementation (see also Ullman 1985, pp. IX—XIII). It also explains why the pragmatic-hermeneutical approach tends to move the main interest from the information base to the structural development of decision making. That a resistance to change and, therefore, incrementalism belong to the picture is also understandable (Ervin et al. 1977, pp. 57—58; Ehrenheim 1984, pp. 45—49; Turtiainen 1985, pp. 61—64). The steps mentioned in point (2) towards undisturbed social hermeneutics are, however, worth taking. A pragmatist need not be frustrated. He has not the burden of ab-

solutes, only commitment to learn from experience (Tool 1979, pp. 206—207, 213).

Concerning technical proposals for the decision making and the information base, reference can be made to Peter Söderbaum's (e.g. 1986) positional analysis (Turtiainen 1985, pp. 79—88). The pragmatic-hermeneutical approach and the positional analysis have much in common: a similiar democratic orientation and a distrust in commensuration. It remains to be seen, to what direction these approaches will develop in the future.

5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Critical environmental and development problems have appeared as the social costs of human actions. K. William Kapp (1983, 1985), an early forerunner in environmental economics, made it clear already in the 1950's that these costs were cumulating at an accelerating speed.

Despite an increasing awareness and concern over the deterioration of environment, many have become pessimists concerning the capacity of man to recognize the situation and to react in time. G.H. von Wright (1986) speaks about the crisis of human intelligence and refers to the emphasis of an instrumental rationality at the expense of moral reasonability.

In view of the slow advancements of regional and environmental policy, I — from my restricted and periferal view — have also conceived that there must be some kind of philosophical barrier which handicaps the theoretical development in these fields (Hahtola 1987). An aspect of that barrier seems to concern the one-sided application of natural-scientific causal terminology to human behaviour. Dealing with comprehensive environmental and development problems would presuppose more holistic approaches. Rorty's pragmatism (1980, 1982) reveals a still more crucial aspect of that barrier: the *dominance of natural-scientific truth-seeking* in philosophy and the social sciences.

The priority given to truth-seeking has many consequences for both development and the environment. The belief in indisputable truth possessed by certain specialists legitimizes, and disguises, the power of technocracy and maintains the faith in sectorial solutions. It disperses responsibility and leads to »modern fatalism». So, notwithstanding increasing in-

strumental knowledge, the capacity of mankind to escape catastrophes and write its own destiny has been decreasing. Mankind is like the pilot of an over-automatized jumbo-jet. When an unprecedented situation occurs and the auto-system is leading the plane astray, he is helpless.

In the pragmatic-hermeneutical human action model presented in this paper, the *explanatory truth-seeking and the interpretative truth-creation are given equal status*. Thus, the endeavoring for truth does not occur at the expense of the other rationalities and morals of man.

From the pragmatic-hermeneutical viewpoint, some central themes of an evolutionary and political economy can be commented. By withdrawing the separation of means and ends, planning and politics, the scope of planning extends. The model also reveals the restrictions of planning: An essential part of human action, reflective cognition by man, cannot be planned. This implies a warning to the hubris of the »planning age«. Planning must be completed by the democratic institutions of recognition.

Another crucial perspective on institutional economics concerns whether this school

- (1) aims at an alternative orthodoxy for the dominant neoclassical paradigm, or,
- (2) holds the models open, thereby not excluding any fresh orientation in different direction. (Myrdal 1977, p. 10; Gruchy 1977, pp. 11, 23—27; Tool 1979, pp. 276, 300—314)

There are differing views concerning these questions. The inter-disciplinary orientation of the institutional economics leads to the application of the different approaches of social sciences, also the less open ones: from technological determinism and ecologism to logical dialectics. The models which are most open seem to be committed only to truth-seeking social inquiry. Rorty's pragmatism thus provokes the comment: If institutional economics aims at the abolition of »isms« and orthodoxies, it ought also to be suspicious of the truth-seeking.

NOTES

- 1 My hermeneutical orientation arose from the scepticism towards atomistic causal explanations in broad social context and had therefore from the begin a social character (Apel 1972). I conceived the teleological reasoning as a characteristic of

human consciousness, but did not extend it to historical or ecological teleology.

- 2 The model and the planning scheme for environmental and development planning has been outlined in the Department of Land Use Economics of Helsinki University (Turtiainen 1985; Hahtola 1987; Leskinen 1987).
- 3 In my earlier works (Hahtola 1973, 1973a) which analyzed the normative and strategic grounds of decision making by forest owners, I applied his scheme of planning and decision making consisting of normative, strategic and operational levels. Many of the conceptions of planning, especially the crucial role of values and normative decisions, therefore, I owe to Hasan Ozbekhan's excellent article (1969), which serves as a main reference in this paper.
- 4 A major aspect, if not the most decisive, of that barrier may concern the hermeneutic features of human action which, according to Giddens (1984, pp. XX—XXI), are an inherent and necessary part of social theory. For the majority of planning theorists and practitioners, as well as for many social scientists who are used to think with causal terms, the hermeneutical reasoning may seem difficult.
- 5 Concepts like a »cumulative« or »circular« causation implies a step towards a more holistic thinking (Myrdal 1957, pp. 8—19; Kapp 1983b, pp. 41—45). Deductive economic models, e.g. econometric multi-equation models which are, however, conceived as causal models, represent a special case (Tool 1979, pp. 45—47; Hahtola 1973, pp. 239—242)
- 6 The hermeneutic circle is in general exemplified by understanding an unfamiliar text as a holistic process, in which we move back and forth between specific parts of the text and our conception of it as a totality (e.g. Outhwaite 1985, p. 23)
- 7 Included in this category are (1) ecologism, which can be found even in some Hasan Ozbekhan's (1969) formulations, (2) Marxist conceptions based on historical materialism, e.g. Althusser (Skinner 1985, p. 18; James 1985) or »logical dialectics«, e.g. Giddens' (1984, pp. XXVIII—XXIX, 193—199) structuration theory, and (3) even some forms of pragmatism and institutional thought.
- 8 A practical syllogism is characterized by its leading to an action, viz. its conclusion is an action. The first premise states an objective, a general principle or a rule that specifies what is good for us, or what constitutes our duty. The second premise sets forth a means to the ends in question. The practical conclusion — inferred from these premises — is accordingly the use of the means to achieve the end concerned.
Thus, when behaviour is explained teleologically, it is understood as an action, and practical syllogism is construed for it (von Wright 1972, pp. 39—40). The contrary relation, however, does not hold. All social action is not assumed to be teleological. Unlike an individual, society can not be ascribed a »real« consciousness.
- 9 Allardt (1972, pp. 54—64, 67—68) has presented the following three-fold classification of sociological explanations:
 - (1) Structural explanations, based upon overtly observable causes.

- (2) Institutional explanations, based partly, at least, upon the habits and traditions, which are independent of the ideas of the participants.
- (3) Cultural explanations, based upon the ideas the participants have about the social reality, available alternatives and criteria of choice.
- 10 In Ozbekhan's (1969, pp. 93—97) »Human Action Model» the primary role was given to values and normative planning on well grounded practical reasons. At the end, however, the primacy of values seems to have been based on the conception that they could be objectively reduced from ecological criteria, e.g. entropia, steady state, or »ecological balance» (pp. 105—118; see also Giddens 1984, pp. XXVIII—XXIX; and Kapp 1985c, pp. 56—60; Tuuriainen 1985, pp. 34—35). The stance of Institutional economics, which by its instrumental value theory is also based on American pragmatism, may be different in this respect. The historical and institutional contingency of Instrumental value is stressed, but at the end its criteria seem to be defined by the conception of a truth-seeking social inquiry (Tool 1979, pp. 17—19, 34—41, 86—87, 285—289, 292—298, 300).
- 11 This pragmatic stance has been criticized for its incapability to offer an objective basis for social criticism (Hekman, 1984, p. 336, 350; Outhwaite 1985, p. 36). In the light of the PHM a consensus of »truth» is possible only on some material »environmental» issues, but not on the more interpretative parts of social reality (cf. Gutting 1984, pp. 4—7).
- 12 In the earlier presentations of the model (e.g. Hahtola 1987, pp. 37—39) the term »critical-hermeneutics» has been used to point to
- (1) the central role consciousness, especially ideology, plays in guiding the social development on the basis of experience,
 - (2) human capability of learning based on critical reflection of experience, and
 - (3) the social nature of human action in general. Notwithstanding the change of prefix these characterizations of the PHM still prevail. The prefix »pragmatic» was considered to resemble better the philosophical stance aimed at, taking particularly into consideration the remnants of universal objectivism in the Critical Theory, e.g. Habermas' ideal speech situation (Rorty 1982, pp. 76, 173—174; Hekman 1984, pp. 349—350; Giddens 1985, pp. 128—133; Tötö 1985, pp. 52—54).
- 13 Hasan Ozbekhan (1969) was like me, obviously bothered with some discrepancies between experiences of practical planning and some prevailing philosophical conceptions. Having just given an illuminating presentation of »continuous critical» environmental and social problems brought forth by the techno-scientific development he had reluctantly to assert that
- »we have as yet failed to invent an alternative hypothesis to the one which postulates that, since the techno-scientific approach (endeavoring objective truth) is effective in one realm of human endeavor it must, therefore, be effective in all (pp.63—64).»
- Ozbekhan (pp. 78—79) also argued against the prevailing positivistic conception that »ought»-statements, »ends», which are central to a theory of planning, do not have an equal philosophical status as »is»-statements, because they are not directly testable. He maintained that for both kind of judgements, the starting point of arguments in an ultimate regression is
- »nothing more than a convention established by the very values, that govern the world view of a particular culture at a particular time.»
- Rorty's (1980, pp. 373—379; 1982, pp. XXIX—XXXVII, 76, 377—379) pragmatism would have offered some years later philosophical foundations for an alternative hypothesis, which Ozbekhan was seeking. It shatters the belief in indisputable blessings of techno-scientific endeavor towards »objective truth» and like Ozbekhan affirms the equal status of »ought» — and »is» — statements. Pragmatic foundation might have saved Ozbekhan from some inconsistencies that still seems to remain in his article. Although he recognized the historical contingency of values and »ultimate» truths, his way to base the normative statements on natural-scientific criteria instead of values of our culture in face of environmental threats, gives an ecologist impression (pp. 97—118).
- 14 I think that comprehensive social phenomena can not fruitfully deal with causal modes consisting of detailed causal chains. By applying the concept of »circular causation» (e.g. Kapp 1983b, pp. 41—45; 1985c, pp. 129, 137), the relevance of the causal constructs may be improved, but the models implied become very complicate. If a researcher has no ontological commitments to a causal vocabulary, the choice between a hermeneutical and causal vocabulary can be made on practical grounds (e.g. Hahtola 1973a, pp. 25—26). In this case a 4 X 3 — dimensional hermeneutical construct seems to be complex enough as a device to analyze human and social behaviours. It must be remembered, however, that according to the hermeneutic vocabulary, all elements of the scheme are supposed to interact and that their differentiation is, therefore, a theoretical abstraction. This concerns, for example, the interrelations of ideology, theory and meaning in consciousness as well as the means- and end-aspects of the environment.
- 15 Depending on the actual decision situation, some other categorization of the environment may prove fruitful. The holistic view is crucial. According to William K. Kapp (1983c, pp. 66—67):
- »Effective environmental planning is nothing less than the systematic investigation and evaluation *before* the introduction of new production processes of advantages and disadvantages for the entire economy, *i.e. for the total environment.*
- ... This necessary interdisciplinary concern with the interdependence of various systems results not only in a general understanding of the relations between economy, humanity, and the environment but the possibility of research on what is necessary and thus the identification of present and future environmental needs and specific tasks.»
- 16 The overdue simplifications and presuppositions of universalism and onedimensionality confine the applicability of the »welfare»-concept of

- welfare-economics (Kapp 1983c, p. 52; Ullman 1985, pp. XVIII—XX; Söderbaum 1986, pp. 23—28; 1987, 144—146).
- 17 The dimensions of reflected action in the PHM (culture, economy and order/power) resemble Allardt's (1976, pp. 9, 37—39; 1983, pp. 174—176) dimensions of welfare, »being», »having», »loving» and also Parsons' pattern variables. The names of different categories are arbitrary. For the name of this third dimension of reflected action, for example, names referring to »keeping order», »organizing», »adminstrating» or »governing» were all potential candidates (see e.g. Galtung 1984, p. 67).
 - 18 Pragmatic-hermeneutical vocabulary (e.g. Rorty 1980, p. 351) leads thus to a different view on social change than Ozbekhan's (1969, pp. 93—97) statement:

»Only changes in the overall configuration of values can change the present situation.»
 - 19 Situational analysis differs to some extent from the positional analysis, of which there are already a lot of practical experiences from Nordic Countries. Until now the development of situational analysis has been mostly based on philosophical and social theoretical conceptions (Hahtola 1971, 1973, 1987; Turtiainen 1985; Leskinen 1987), whereas in positional analysis, practical experiences have been more to the fore.
 - 20 The terms in brackets are originating from Peter Söderbaum's (e.g. 1987, pp. 153—162) positional analysis.
 - 21 In the context of the PHM »value» means: What man will experience
 - (1) in the instrumental, i.e. truth-seeking and applying actions,
 - (2) in the environment, and
 - (3) in the interpretative truth-creating realms of »meaning», »theory» and »ideology»
 - 22 Peter Söderbaum's (e.g. 1978, pp. 143—146; 1986, pp. 108—112) detailed schema for »analysis of interests» would be applicable to this value analysis and his method for »identification of effects» (1978, pp. 141—143; 1986, pp. 100—107) to the resource and impact analysis.
 - 23 In the context of PHM the concept »institution» mainly refers to the dimensions of action according to Allardt's (1972; see also Tool 1979, pp. 73—74) classification of social explanations, but depending upon context it can refer also to other dimensions of PHM.
 - 24 A good example is the mainstream neoclassical economics whose ideological influence is continuously strong, although its theoretical relevance has shattered (Kapp 1983c, pp. 57—69; Galbraith 1984, pp. 149—150; 1987, pp. 284—286, 298—299; Söderbaum 1989, pp. 1—18).
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