

## Methodological Piedmontism and the Re-writing of early Yugoslav History

The article deals with the uprisings in Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1875 and their appropriation by Serbian nationalists (which continues to this day). Since the uprisings opened an important chapter in Europe's past and had a significant impact on the course of history, the author believes it merits far more attention than has been accorded to this topic in recent decades. More or less the only exception are the works of Serbian scholars, who treat both uprisings—wrongly—as Serbian.

Methodological Piedmontism is the naturalisation of the ideological assumption that nothing can come out or arise among the Serbian people unless it comes from their "Piedmont." The scholars who assume this conflate Serbian national interests with the purpose of writing history. Thus, in their works, methodological Piedmontism reflects and reinforces their identification with Serbian (religious) exclusivism.

The Nevesinje Rifle marked the outbreak of the armed uprising of the Herzegovinian masses, which took place on 9 July 1875. Although it had no central leadership, this peasant uprising grew into a long-lasting bloody struggle "for the cross of honour and golden freedom." It is estimated that 150,000 people died during the uprising and by the end of 1875, more than 200,000 non-combatants had sought refuge in Austria-Hungary, while another 70,000 people fled to Montenegro and Serbia (PAVLOWITCH 2002: 64; EKMEČIĆ 2007: 280). Government troops set fire to and destroyed Christian villages, plundered and killed the population, while the insurgents exacted vengeance against the "Turks" as much as they could (STILLMAN 1877: 16). In addition to mass executions in retaliation, another consequence of the uprising was the large-scale looting of everything that could be carried away on horseback and in sacks. In the decades that followed, a narrative joke circulated that explains much about it. As the joke goes, there was a fellow who, after such a looting and pillaging raid, said that all he got from the school was a wooden door because nothing else was left (EKMEČIĆ 2007: 271).

European governments and public opinion did not attach much significance to the uprising when the first news about the outbreak appeared. As the French daily *Le Figaro* reported on 20 August 1875, contemporary citizens of Paris were for the most part curious to know what the name L'Herzégovine itself meant: Was it

the name of a ballet dancer at the Opera or the new model of a piano produced by Henri Herz? (Anon. 1875c: 1).

But with the support that came from many sides, and laden with many conflicting interests, the uprising exceeded itself and opened a much larger question. The fact that Herzegovina and Bosnia were surrounded on all sides by closely related peoples on the one hand, and the rivalry between the great powers struggling for prestige on the other, meant that this uprising reverberated far beyond the borders of these two provinces. The uprising ignited a spark in the “Balkan powder keg,” which set off a chain reaction whose effects shattered the image of a world enjoying a “long peace,” as portrayed by the Austro-Hungarian diplomat Aloys Freiherr von Seiller just one day after the uprising broke out (see WERTHEIMER 1913: II, 248).

The Yugoslav insurgents were derisively dismissed by Bismarck as “sheep thieves,” but they eventually managed to impose themselves on him and his successors (TAYLOR 1954: 23). One year later, in 1876, everything changed, as an entirely different situation ensued (ARGYLL 1879: I, vii). The Nevesinje Rifle sounded far over the hills of Herzegovina, and in the most brutal way it opened what became known as Eastern Question. The ruling circles of the Dual Monarchy and Tsarist Russia saw the uprising as an opportunity to realise their own imperialist aspirations by dividing the European part of the Ottoman Empire among themselves, while the neighbouring principalities of Serbia and Montenegro saw it as a favourable opportunity to fulfil their territorial ambitions, citing their ethnic kinship with the insurgent peoples in these regions. Both principalities supplied the Christian population with weapons and from the very beginning they sent volunteers to Herzegovina and Bosnia under the pretext of “liberating their brothers,” although their real aim was to expand their territories and reinforce their still rather precarious national independence (MANDIĆ 1910: 10).

Thus, the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1875–1878 turned into a major political crisis and became not only a topic of daily conversation among the highest state dignitaries, but also an inevitable topic in the reports that an entire network of consulates in the Balkan Peninsula constantly sent out. The Austro-Hungarian, Russian, British and French press published daily news about the uprising, and the biggest publishers sent their special correspondents to report from the region. Thanks to their coverage of the insurgency and the general situation in these provinces, the readers of European newspapers, even in the remotest parts of Scotland, as well as the readers of leading American newspapers, were regularly and extensively informed about the course of the insurgency. Thus the two provinces at the Ottoman Empire’s western border area became – as the Gorizia-based newspaper *Glas* wrote – “the centre of the whole world” (Anon. 1875: 2 e–3).

*Dynasties fishing in muddy water*

Both the population and the authorities of Montenegro and Serbia showed great interest in events in Herzegovina and Bosnia. However, since Prince Nikola was under pressure from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to keep away from the insurgency and maintain Montenegro's neutrality, its support was not sufficient to meet the expectations of both the insurgents and the Montenegrin people. The vast majority of Montenegrins desired war against the "Turks", in accordance with their centuries-old tradition of hostility towards these "Turks"; however, due to the interests of the great powers, i.e., Russia and Austria-Hungary, Prince Nikola in the first place could not give in to the people's will while at the same time concealing their involvement in events in Herzegovina from the European public. Serbian Prince Milan was also unwilling to become involved, although an agitated mass of his subjects loudly urged him to declare war. Both Serbian principalities supplied the Christian population with weapons and sent many volunteers to Herzegovina and Bosnia. In return for this support, however, the dynasties demanded that the insurgents declare their respective candidate as their ruler and that the insurgent troops, in the event of an attack, would shout the name of their prince and not that of the other. The liberation and unification of their Serbian brothers served as a pretext for the both dynasties to realise their claims, expand their territories and reinforce their still unstable national independence (MANDIĆ 1910: 10; HARRIS 1936: 125).

The attitude of the Serbian government before the uprising led to great dissatisfaction among the uprising's leaders. A group of them who had gathered around Miroslav Hubmajer, were displeased with Prince Milan and elated by Montenegro. They openly expressed their opinion and demanded that Serbia should not get any part of the Bosnian territory, and in case Montenegro could not get the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should at least seize some parts of its territory, while the rest should go to Croatia (RADONIĆ 1938: 221; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 144). Under these circumstances, the Croatian flag was at one point raised in the village of Jamnica as a telling sign of dissatisfaction over the fact that Serbia failed to declare war on the Ottoman Empire (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 144).

The rivalry between the Obrenović and Petrović dynasties prevented Montenegro and Serbia from working hand in hand, and it was not long before there was friction between the two principalities. Herzegovina became the apple of discord between Belgrade and Cetinje, because Prince Milan wanted to annex this region to the Principality of Serbia together with Bosnia (JAROSLAV 1875: 1; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 58). He was unwilling to let Montenegro annex Herzegovina, because he feared that this would strengthen Montenegrin separatism, prompting its rivalry with Serbia, and put Prince Nikola, who enjoyed huge popularity among

the youth, in a more advantageous position in the competition for the Yugoslav throne<sup>1</sup> (HARRIS 1936: 123; VUKOVIĆ 1925: 84, 170; RADONIĆ 1938: 221; MILUTINOVIĆ 1953: 38, 48; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 58; ALEKSIĆ 2016: 236). On the other hand, Prince Nikola tried to suppress Serbian influence in Herzegovina because he envisaged a great Montenegrin state that would encompass the entire territory between the Lim and Neretva Rivers, which would bolster his position vis-à-vis the Obrenović dynasty (JAROSLAV 1875: 1–2; WERTHEIMER 1913: II, 252; VUKOVIĆ 1925: 84, 170; ALEKSIĆ 2016: 245). The mere thought that Serbia could claim Herzegovina for itself seemed to Montenegro not only “absurd but also insulting.” Such public claims, which Serbia maintained, were presumptuous and insulting to the Montenegrin ego, especially since the Montenegrins were already “drenched in blood” in Herzegovina<sup>2</sup> (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 67).

The rivalry between Belgrade and Cetinje was sharpened in the arena of the Herzegovinian uprising: Supporters of the Serbian party were angry because fighters from Cetinje only helped the insurgent leaders who explicitly supported Prince Nikola, while supporters of Montenegro complained that the Serbian committees aiding the insurgents only supported insurgent leaders who were fighting for the interests of the Serbian Principality (Anon. 1875q: 2009).

Montenegro was most troubled by the commander Mićo Ljubibratić, who according to some descriptions was “a Pan-Serbian agitator, a sort of Serbian Mazzini” (RÜSTOW 1877: 103). Ljubibratić was an envoy of the Serbian government, sent by Ilija Garašanin to influence popular movements in the Ottoman Empire, and worked for the interests of the Obrenović dynasty (GJURGJEVIĆ 1910: 96; PRELOG 1913: 121; EKMEČIĆ 1959: 206–7; 1973: 147; CF. GRABOVAC 1991: 140). With his knowledge of foreign languages, Ljubibratić attracted many volunteers from all over Europe to Herzegovina, but at the same time his aversion to “barbarous customs,” such as cutting off the heads and noses of dead and wounded enemies,<sup>3</sup> which he tried to replace with “civilized warfare,” alienated him from

<sup>1</sup> This attitude was sharply criticised in the newspaper *Slovenski Narod*, which on 11 August 1875 published an article, probably written by Miroslav Hubmajer, that rebuked the Serbian leaders for “not allowing the liberation of the Herzegovinians from the Turks, if it meant coming under Croatia instead of Serbia.” The writer considers this attitude an “ugly egoism, an ugly fratricidal hatred, which the Serbs must discard and free themselves from, otherwise the people will not be with their fellow men and it will only be death for them all in the South” (Anon. 1875b: 2).

<sup>2</sup> In Montenegro, an insurgent leader, warrior or volunteer who spoke, acted or thought in any other way than to assume that Herzegovina must join Montenegro was considered a traitor and as such could be brought to justice to be tried (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 147; JOVANOVIĆ 1977: 207).

<sup>3</sup> Miroslav Hubmajer told the correspondent of the newspaper *Slovenski Narod* that every Herzegovinian, when he killed a “Turk,” cut off his head according to an old “Turkish custom” in order to obtain evidence of his heroism, and that he personally saw 55 severed “Turkish” heads in one place (Anon. 1875m: 2; cf. also HOLEČEK 1878: 99–100; VUKOVIĆ 1925: 211; MRKONJIĆ 1983: 52, 58; TEPIĆ 1988: 398). This custom was only abolished by Prince

the mountain dwellers “who had no respect for those refinements” (STILLMAN 1877: 48; HOLEČEK 1878: 99–100; MRKONJIĆ 1983: 52, 58). During the uprising, Voivode Ljubibratić showed little political or military acumen in his hostility towards Montenegro. A correspondent for the London daily *The Times* portrayed him as a dreamer and enthusiast who showed “as little political sagacity as military talent,” because he did not understand that the only part of Herzegovina that could resist the Ottomans “was, and must necessarily be, under the sole influence of Montenegro” (STILLMAN 1877: 49; see also SUMNER 1937: 141).

The plan of Ljubibratić to organise the uprising in a central location, to abandon the small cross-border shootings and to try to conquer parts of the Bosnian territory was seen in Montenegro as an attempt to put the uprising under Serbian influence (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 147). Prince Nikola did not simply sit there with crossed arms waiting to see what this “Herzegovinian Šćepan Mali” would do (KOS 2006: 67). He did not want him to establish formal, legal leadership for the uprising, nor to convene the Serbian National Assembly and publicly announce the unification of the Serbian people as their goal (EKMEČIĆ 2007: 281), so he sent Voivode Peko Pavlović to Herzegovina to pacify the uprising. The “old Turk-fighter” did this *modo suo* by capturing Voivode Ljubibratić and marching him bodily across the border with his hands tied behind his back after seizing his weapons, money and personal belongings (STILLMAN 1877: 11; 1901 II: 111–12; 1932: 16; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 147; 2007: 281; ALEKSIĆ 2016: 238–39).

However, the already complicated situation was made even more complicated by another contender for the Bosnian throne. Petar Karadjordjević, the son of Serbian Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević, believed that the uprising in Bosnia was an opportune moment for him to achieve his ambitions. Something of a playboy before that time, he gathered a large group of volunteers and set off for Bosnia under the nom de guerre Petar Mrkonić<sup>4</sup> to improve his political rating<sup>5</sup> (PAVLOWITCH 1999: 109). Thus, at a time when less than a quarter of its

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Nikola, who signed the Geneva Convention About the Treatment of the Wounded. Prince Nikola strictly instructed insurgent leaders to abandon this “archaic vandalism.” The new order was “fundamentally opposite” to the heroic spirit of the insurgents, although it was very important in practical terms: “In an effort to slaughter so many dead and wounded enemies, individual heroes piled their heads, five and ten per head, so that instead of chasing and killing the enemy, they foolishly got killed themselves” (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 211).

<sup>4</sup> This name was primarily intended to denote the dark complexion of his face, i.e. to serve the same purpose as the name Karadjordje (Black George), and to draw a picture of a relentless fighter against the “Turks,” such as Petar (Pero) Mrkonjić, a famous *haiduk* from the Littoral who was praised in epic poetry in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and an iconic guerrilla fighter. According to Ferdo Šišić, Petar Karadjordjević chose this name after reading the Serbian Folk Songs collected by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (ŠIŠIĆ 1937: 215).

<sup>5</sup> Petar Karadjordjević accomplished his aim, but only in 1903, when he was proclaimed Serbian king (PAVLOWITCH 1999: 109).

territory was liberated, there were already two Serbian rulers in Bosnia: Prince Milan Obrenović and the pretender Petar Karadjordjević (RŪSTOW 1877: 138; PETROVIĆ 1924: 13; JOVANOVIĆ 1926: 284; MILUTINOVIĆ 1953: 59; CF. MRKONJIĆ 1983: 30–1).

Cetinje did not attach any importance to the arrival of Petar Mrkonjić in Bosnia, but the Serbian government sent a standing army battalion to the border to prevent volunteers from Serbia from joining his cheta (*četa*/band), and ordered Captain Djoko Vlajković to leave Bosnia with his troops (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 79–80, 175). Various stories circulated about the arrival of Petar Mrkonjić in Bosnia, some of which were true, others dubious and fanciful. According to some accounts, Petar Mrkonjić was supported by the Hungarians, who supplied him with weapons to oppose Prince Milan, while others claimed that he received money from Dervish Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, and that the Ottoman Empire morally supported him in his claims to the Serbian throne<sup>6</sup> (SUAVI 1875: 15; Anon. 1875I: 4; 1876W: 1; GJURGEVIĆ 1910: 84; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 136; RISTIĆ 1940: 28–9; GUTIĆ 1980: 122; EKMEČIĆ 2007: 281). General Despotović helped the insurgents by sending them money and volunteers from Serbia on behalf of the Obrenović dynasty while Karadjordjević adopted a wait-and-see attitude, trying to preserve his money and blood. Everyone rebuked him for this by saying: “Why didn’t Petar Karagjorgjević bring ten thousand Swiss men, those good archers, and several millions in cash, which would ensure him great success, because three times as many Bosniaks would flock around these Swiss men” (GJURGEVIĆ 1910: 84).

At the same time, there were also some members of Main Committee for Aid to the Uprising in Zagreb who were striving to politically dominate the uprising in Bosnia, which they considered to be a “Croatian territory” (SLIPIČEVIĆ 1952: 127), and who also wanted to fish in these muddy waters. In contrast to the Serbian radicals, who wanted to use the uprising in Bosnia for the restoration of the Serbian medieval empire of Dušan the Mighty, the Croats of Starčević intended to resurrect Greater Croatia (BIANKINI 1925: 12–3). However, in their longing to rebuild their glorious past, the Serbs and Croats became rivals in the present. The Bosnian insurgents proclaimed the Serbian ruling dynasty as their sovereigns, while the Herzegovinian insurgents declared the Montenegrin dynasty their rulers, with the Croats becoming open adversaries of the Serbian cause. In Zagreb, a group of young Croatian academics wrote a statement that was published in the press, claiming that there were no Serbs and no Serbian uprising in Bosnia, and calling Bosnia a “jewel in the crown of Croatian King Zvonimir” (RŪFFNER 1877: 292; PELAGIĆ 1880: 85).

<sup>6</sup> “It is true that since the outbreak of the Eastern crisis, leading Turkish circles have been using his name to intimidate Prince Milan and threaten to overthrow him and reinstall the Karadjordjević dynasty,” according to the historian Čubrilović (ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 136).

On the other hand, Prince Nikola wanted Serbia to help the Herzegovinian insurgents, but he did not want this aid to go directly to them (so as not to enhance Serbia's influence there), but through the Montenegrin authorities. The Montenegrin prince distrusted all who maintained close relations with Belgrade, while he himself tried to mobilise as many Herzegovinian chieftains and educated people from Herzegovina to work for the interests of Montenegro (ALEKSIĆ 2016: 236).

*Volunteers here and there*

When the insurgency broke out in Herzegovina and Bosnia, committees were set up in all neighbouring areas to help the insurgents and their families. There were committees in Belgrade, Cetinje, Zagreb, Kostajnica, Sisak, Stara Gradiška and Nova Gradiška, Knin, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Dubrovnik, Herceg Novi, Metković, Ljubljana and Trieste, but also in Moscow, Rome, Vienna, Prague, Paris, London and many other cities. The committees administered the flow of weapons, supplied the insurgents with equipment and food, and even organised workshops for repairing weapons and producing ammunition. According to the historian Vaso Čubrilović, the aid committees contributed most to the expansion and strengthening of the insurgency, without their help “the uprising of 1875–1878 would eventually have been no different from the uprisings of 1834 and 1859,” which were but “local small revolts, poorly organised, raised by peasants and quickly wiped out by the Turks” (ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: 393).

The Dual Monarchy was officially neutral toward the uprising that broke out in Herzegovina and Bosnia. This fact served as a reason for it to impose a ban on the dispatch of humanitarian aid, and it also banned the export of arms. However, the proclaimed neutrality was rather declaratory and was primarily intended to prevent Montenegro and Serbia from intervening on the side of the insurgents, that is to say, to keep Russia out. In fact, it was impossible to impose orders or implement measures to prevent weapons and ammunition from flowing into Herzegovina over the long border inhabited by a large number of “loyal subjects of His Imperial and Royal and Apostolic Majesty,” who wore hats bearing the initials of Prince Nikola embroidered in gold, as the English correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* noted (EVANS 1878: 69). “Turkish” oppression, past and present, real and fictitious, aroused the awareness of the Yugoslav peoples and awakened the people's solidarity with the insurgents. In the Bay of Kotor, for example, there were people who were contributing as much as a sixth of their income to support of the insurgents (STILLMAN 1877: 28–9). “Turkish” killings and bloodshed, past and present, real and imagined, ignited the spirit of the Yugoslav peoples and awakened solidarity among them. As Juraj Biankini, the then editor of the Zadar newspaper *Narodni List*, recalled, both the rich and the poor were eager to contribute (BIANKINI 1925: 11). Prince Nikola also recalled that

these committees managed to collect considerable aid and explained that the committee in Trieste alone bought grain worth 104,967 forints, while in Montenegro goods worth 28,877 forints were purchased (PETROVIĆ NJEKOŠ 1988: 306).

There were many volunteers who joined the struggle of the insurgent masses who not only came from the areas bordering the two insurgent provinces. From the beginning, the insurgents in Herzegovina were actively assisted by Montenegrins, who were joined by volunteers from “all European nations” (-n- 1875b: 2); among them a Dutchwoman named Jeanne Merkus (RÜSTOW 1877: 132; ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 27–8). Their total number remains unknown, as does the duration of their stay there. However, according to an article published in the Novi Sad newspaper *Zastava* on 22 December 1875, their number was anything but small. On 3 December 1875, a total of 284 French, 390 Italians, 53 English, 2 Americans, 1 Swede, 83 Greeks and 22 Germans registered in Dubrovnik alone, all waiting to join the insurgents in Herzegovina (Anon. 1875ah: 2). Two months later, *Zastava* published an article by its special correspondent from Sutorina, which stated that Italian volunteers were arriving there daily (Anon. 1876r: 3). A Swiss doctor who visited Dubrovnik during the uprising had the impression that he was in a city that was “in open war” because he saw so many foreign volunteers there (KOETSCHET 1905: 24). War correspondent William James Stillman remarked that volunteers, rifles, ammunition, provisions and so on would come *ad libitum* to Herceg Novi. He noticed that the volunteers crossed the border “absolutely freely” without any need to cover up anything (STILLMAN 1877: 15, 32; 1901: II, 129). On the basis of these and similar observations, Antonio Gallenga, for example, said that what happened in Bosnia “was not so much an insurrection of the helpless native population as an outright invasion by Slavic bands from the Austrian districts” (GALLENGA 1877: I, 325).

With regard to the aid that the Herzegovinian insurgents received from abroad, the Sublime Porte complained to the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Vienna that in Herceg Novi there was an entire arsenal of weapons for the insurgents in Herzegovina and that there were fully armed insurgents who walked freely through the streets of Dubrovnik and roamed without restriction throughout Dalmatian territory (GRABOVAC 1991: 68).

Despite the extensive activities of aid committees and the large number of volunteers, especially Slavs, Vasa Pelagić<sup>7</sup> complained that the Slavic peoples (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Croats) did not help enough in the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia before the Serbian- and Russo-Turkish war. According to him, they “all together” did not even send “a hundred volunteers” to help Bosnia, while their aid in money, allegedly, amounted to a meagre 20,000 ducats.

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<sup>7</sup> According to historian Kosta Milutinović, Pelagić was one of the agents sent by Ilija Garašanin to disseminate Serbian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina (MILUTINOVIĆ 1953: 7–8).



Such an estimate, which was wrong and rather dubious in its true intention, led Pelagić to draw the wrong conclusion. He believed that these figures were, on the one hand, “clear evidence of a lack of sympathy and congeniality among the Slavs” and, on the other, a specific expression of the fact that there was “even less” willingness for Pan-Slavic unification and the establishment of a Pan-Slavic empire (PELAGIĆ 1953: 167).

*Like Prometheus chained to the rocks of Herzegovina*

Despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian authorities did not allow the volunteers to cross the border freely and join the insurgents, and despite the poor quality of the roads leading into Herzegovina, there were a number of Slavs from the Dual Monarchy who joined the foreign volunteers. Miroslav Hubmajer (Friedrich Hubmayer) was one of the first to respond to the call from the “Slavic Mother”. During his military service in Hungary he earned the rank of artillery sergeant; he also demonstrated a great talent for engineering and patented several innovations. In 1874, while working as a typographer in the Swiss town of Chur, he became acquainted with socialist ideas and the modern labour movement. He returned to Ljubljana in the first half of 1875 and found a job at the Bamberg printing works. He won the confidence of (Slovene) printers and publishers, who elected him president of their society on 14 July 1875 (F. H. 1875: 3). Although he came from a German family, the German members of the Society found him unacceptable because he often said: “*Zuerst bin ich Slovene, dann erst Buchbruder!*” (‘First I am a Slovene, then a book brother!’; Anon. 1875a: 3). The German members of the Society rejected the newly-elected president, which they expressed in the letter dated 10 September 1875 to the board of directors of the Austrian printers *Vorwärts!* in Vienna. In this letter, they further explained that the Society was left without its head, because its newly elected president set off on an adventure among the Herzegovinian insurgents in order to “receive laurels that we did not give him” (Anon. 1875a: 3).

Hubmajer joined the company under the leadership of Voivode Ljubibratić in the Orthodox monastery of Duži near Trebinje (Anon. 1876t: 4; 1910: 2; RÜFFNER 1877: 25; ZIMMERMANN 1878: 63; UZELAC 1910: 1; TOMAN 1926: 10). After his arrival in Herzegovina, he changed his “Swabian” name Friedrich (nicknamed Fritz), to Miroslav, and there he became known as “Black Miro” because of his long black beard. His heroism earned him great prestige and respect among the people, and soon he became one of the most famous fighters against “Turkish” oppression. His name was brought up in many newspapers in various European languages; he was immortalised in several books (see e.g. HOLEČEK 1878; ZIMMERMANN 1878) and many newspapers. The Viennese *Humoristische Blätter* and the Prague newspaper *Světozor* published his portrait on their front pages

on 10 October and 5 November 1875 respectively, while the *Illustrated London News*, then a very popular magazine, published the drawings by Melton Prior, an illustrator and special war correspondent, in its Christmas issue in 1875.

Hubmajer became renowned for his heroism during the siege of the Drijen border outpost, which lasted from 25 to 29 August 1875. He and a group of about fifty volunteers, armed with a small cannon, besieged the fortress and its towers. But even after four days, their weapon proved inefficient at damaging the towers, so Hubmajer decided to challenge the outpost's commander, Ahmet Begović, to a duel. He challenged commander to come out if he dared. Hubmajer pledged that he would not move and let the commander take aim and shoot at him. Begović came out of the fort and fired at Hubmajer, who stood absolutely still, but he missed (ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 17–8; HOLEČEK 1878: 59–60). Hubmajer then called on him to surrender, which Begović refused, but he did not want to engage in an open combat, either. Therefore, on the fourth day of the siege Hubmajer took a cartridge of dynamite with the aim of destroying the fortress. Under the cover of darkness at night, he approached the tower, found a niche and inserted the dynamite. But as soon as he lit the fuse with a match, one of the defenders threw the explosive out. The dynamite fell near Hubmajer, who began running while the “Turks” opened fire, shouting “La illaha illallah” as they shot at him “like mad” (HUBMAJER 1875A: 2; 1875B: 4; ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 18; ZIMMERMANN 1878: 87; see also GRUJIĆ 1956: 69).

This battle took place on the road from Duži Monastery to Dubrovnik. The Viennese daily newspaper *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* sent its special correspondent there, who dispatched a series of telegraph reports about the four-day siege of the fortress (-n- 1875a: 2; 1875b: 3; see also Anon. 1875f: 3). News about Hubmajer's heroism spread all over the world. There were press reports about him in many languages, which portrayed him as a national hero, the fearless leader of the Herzegovinian insurgents who inflicted great losses on the “Turks” (see e.g. Anon. 1875d: 1; 1875l 2; 1875w: 2; HOLEČEK 1878: 59). During the eight weeks he spent with the Herzegovinian insurgents, his name became known not only “in the whole of Herzegovina, but in all of Europe” (Anon. 1875o: 531). He became known among the insurgents as a fearless and invincible insurgent leader (see e.g. HOLEČEK 1878: 59; ZIMMERMANN 1878: 71; TOMAN 1926: 10), while the Herzegovinian masses believed he possessed supernatural powers that “miraculously protected him from enemy bullets.” There were all kinds of rumours about him “which sounded like fairy tales” (TOMAN 1926: 10). For example, according to one such rumour he had chased away 2,000 Ottoman soldiers by himself (Anon. 1938: 6).

*Cherished memory of a visit to Cetinje*

In late summer 1875, Hubmajer went to Cetinje together with the lawyer Kosta Grujić, “to persuade the prince to go to war as soon as possible” (Anon. 1875l: 2; 1875o: 531), or at least to supply the insurgents with weapons and to decorate them with Montenegrin medals (GRUJIĆ 1956: 102). On 9 September 1875, they were received in the Montenegrin capital by the Internal Affairs Minister, Voivode Mašo Vrbica. He greeted them “very warmly” and introduced them to his guests, including the war correspondent Stillman, an English cavalry captain, a Russian correspondent and Stanko Radović. The insurgent envoys were asked many questions, especially Hubmajer. One of the topics discussed was the conquest of Shkodra. At the end of dinner, a letter was brought to Voivode Vrbica; the letter came from Shkodra and informed them that a huge Ottoman army was approaching. After making extensive inquiries about Shkodra, Hubmajer suggested that he and Grujić go there that same night with several Montenegrins and attack the city at dawn; they would either perish in Shkodra or make the city Montenegrin the next day. In Hubmajer’s opinion, the attack would scare the “Turks”, who would be taken by surprise, while Montenegro would bear no responsibility for the insurgents’ attack. The voivode accepted the offer with a smile, but postponed it until the “right time” (HUBMAJER 1875a: 2; Anon. 1875o: 531; GRUJIĆ 1956: 102).

As for weapons, Voivode Vrbica promised them a thousand revolvers and a hundred breech-loading rifles, as well as Montenegrin medals, which they requested so that the Herzegovinian insurgents would not shoot at foreign volunteers. Vrbica informed them that he had already given the order to provide them with aid in the form of men, but that he needed a permit from the prince to provide weapons. He asked Hubmajer and Grujić to stay in Cetinje and wait until the next day. The next day, however, he said that he could not give them rifles and revolvers because only a few days prior all of the weapons had been distributed to the army (Grujić 1956: 101–2). They were therefore disappointed and ready to leave Cetinje. Just when they wanted to leave and already mounted on their horses, Voivode Vrbica called them back and handed Hubmajer, as he proudly wrote in a letter to his parents on 12 September, “a very nice revolver with a belt and 60 additional bullets” (Anon. 1875j: 2; 1910: 1; see also GRUJIĆ 1956: 102–4; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 201; HARTMAN 2000: 16). In his diary, Grujić wrote that Voivode Vrbica gave him this gift to pull the wool over his eyes (GRUJIĆ 1956: 104). However, this opinion was not shared by Petko Luković, who edited the Grujić’s diary for publication. According to him, Prince Nikola gave Hubmajer a revolver, “not only because of his heroism in the fight against the Turks, but also because Cetinje officials trusted him” (LUKOVIĆ 1977: 201).

Hubmajer returned to Ljubljana at the end of the following year with many memories and souvenirs, including a “beautiful revolver,” a gift from Montenegrin Prince Nikola (Anon. 1910: 1–2). In the above-mentioned letter to his parents,

Hubmajer wrote that he would always fondly remember the time spent in Cetinje as a pleasant memory, unlike the time in Herzegovina, where he felt like “Prometheus chained to a rock” (HUBMAJER 1875a: 2).

*Banquets talked about around the world*

In early November 1875, Miroslav Hubmajer, insurgent leader of the Bosnian insurgents, returned to Ljubljana for a short time. As the Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* reported, the people of Ljubljana welcomed him and organised a reception worthy of a “triumphant general” (Anon. 1875t: 1). On Wednesday, 10 November, 61 eminent members of the Slovene national intelligentsia and political scene gathered in the evening in the National Reading Room’s Glass Hall in Ljubljana, among them the deputies Valentin Zarnik, Ivan Murnik and Janez Horak (Anon. 1875p: 3; 1875r: 3; 1875u: 3; 1875v: 1). The many distinguished guests attracted the attention of the press, including the London newspapers *The Times* and *The Standard*, which reported on the banquet organised in honour of the “insurgent leader” (Insurgent Chief). As *The Times* correspondent reported, the main toast was dedicated to the Austrian dynasty, which, true to its traditions, would protect the Slavic insurgents, while Hubmajer toasted the unity of all Yugoslav peoples (Anon. 1875s: 5). According to *The Standard*, during his visit to Ljubljana Hubmajer received “a substantial sum for the needs of warfare against the Turks”. The money was collected by Slovenian bankers and merchants from southern Austria (Anon. 1875ad: 7).

According to the correspondent for the newspaper *Zastava*, who dispatched his report from Zagreb on 15 November 1875, there were “some things” Hubmajer had with him that were sent from Ljubljana (Anon. 1875aa: 1). Obviously he could not disclose what exactly these things were. However, we learn from other sources that on the day after the insurgent assembly in Jamnica, a cannon manufactured according to Hubmajer’s specifications, as well as guns and ammunition, were smuggled across the border of Austria-Hungary and taken to the insurgent camp. The insurgents thought that these weapons would enable them to attack cities such as Novi, Kostajnica and Prijedor, as the “Turks” did not have cannons suitable for direct confrontations anywhere in northern Bosnia. The trenches around their fortresses were empty or guarded by “decrepit old men from the days of the General von Laudon” (Anon. 1875ag: 1; see also VOŠNJAK 1912: 59).

However, the correspondent of the Viennese daily *Neue Freie Presse* was not impressed with this enthusiasm shown by the people of Ljubljana when they welcomed Hubmajer. Instead, he pointed out that Hubmajer was an Austrian military reservist who travelled to a province belonging to Ottoman Empire to wage war against its legitimate government and that, furthermore, he did not officially announce his departure (Anon. 1875t: 1).

Three days after the banquet in Ljubljana, Hubmajer was invited to a gala dinner organised by the university students of Zagreb. As *Zastava* reported, Hubmajer was also warmly welcomed in Zagreb, where “people went to see him as if it were a miracle” (Anon. 1875aa: 2). Approximately 180 students and other guests were present at the dinner, and they all greeted the hero enthusiastically, who was ready to sacrifice his life for the liberation of their Slavic brothers “from the fetters of the bloodthirsty Turks”. There were resounding toasts to the Yugoslav people, “who are fighting for their freedom, as the Italians and Germans had recently done,” and there were also voices calling on Bosnia and Herzegovina “to join Zvonimir’s Kingdom.” Hubmajer said that the Herzegovinians were fighting for the freedom of all peoples (Anon. 1875y: 1; 1875x: 3; 1875ab: 388; 1875ac: 2). Glasses were raised to celebrate the Yugoslav people who fought for their freedom, while Hubmajer warned that this was not the time to celebrate, that the Bosnian episode was not yet over and that evening would crown the day; therefore, as he said, it was not the right time for any “triumphal celebrations” (Hč. 1875: 1; Anon. 1875x: 3).

### *Insurgent order and discipline*

After eight weeks spent with the insurgents in Herzegovina, Hubmajer was deeply disappointed with the troops, “which lack order and discipline, where no one obeys those in command” (GRUJIĆ 1956: 118; CF. YRIARTE 1876: 301–2; VUKOVIĆ 1925: 75; PETROVIĆ NJEKOŠ 1988: 298). In November 1875, Hubmajer left Herzegovina and went to Bosnia to assume command over the insurgents and to keep the insurgency alive there until spring (Anon. 1875n: 2; 1875aa: 1). His intention was to organise an insurgency movement along the border of Austria-Hungary, which would liberate parts of Bosnian territory, abandon minor cross-border firefights and penetrate into the lower reaches of the Neretva River with decisive military strikes, so that his troops would join forces with those under the command of Voivode Ljubibratić (GRUJIĆ 1956: 196, 205, 211; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 150; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 191).

The lack of a unified organisation and discipline among the insurgents led to a “chaotic situation” among the fighters and their leaders. There could be no common leadership in Herzegovina, mainly because of the rivalries between the individual leaders, who each did what he wanted, so that their campaigns were uncoordinated and they lacked unity. Even if they were successful in their actions, individual leaders could have harmful effects on the insurgency as such. The more one leader gained renown and prestige among the insurgent chetas and in the wider world, the more envious and malicious the other leaders felt (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 124, 140).

However, the problem was not only the rivalry between the individual leaders of the insurgency. For some of them, the uprising was a great opportunity for personal enrichment. For example, Gavro Vuković quotes the words of a person who appeared before the Montenegrin prince and told him “incredible things about *Pop Žarko* and his company,” accusing them of looting and pillaging, robbing soldiers, and selling their booty and sending the money home, and receiving contributions from a number of committees in Serbia (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 75–6). This did not go down well and was reflected in the insurgents’ general morale and definitely influenced their readiness to fight.

Besides all the above factors, another cause of Hubmajer’s disillusionment can be traced back to his expectation that illiterate peasants would take up arms to support the idea of Pan-Slavism or world-wide revolution (see EVANS 1877: 336). In fact, Hubmajer was an enthusiastic advocate of the emancipation of the Slavic peoples, who were supposed to become the “giant of the coming century,” as he wrote in a telegram he sent from Belgrade on 10 August 1890 to the participants of the great Slovenian Song Festival in Maribor. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, he thought, the Slavic peoples had begun to claim “their right to be recognised by all nations in Europe as fully equal, since the unfortunate days when the Slavs were slaves of foreigners were over” (HUBMAJER 1890: 3). This thought was his guiding principle as he set out for Bulgaria at the end of 1878, when he wrote that he considered himself “one of the happiest people” because he had “the opportunity to help his Slavic brothers in their struggle for the most precious thing, namely freedom” (HUBMAJER 1878: 3).

As indicated by the words in Hubmajer’s telegram, which he sent to the participants of Sokol Jamboree in Ljubljana on 10 July 1893, this former deputy head of Slovenian Sokols remained true to this idea. In it, he expressed his “fervent wish” that the Sokol organisation would serve as a beacon of “hope and refuge for ‘Slovenia’ and Slavic thought, and for the triumphant vanquishment of all enemies of the Slavic people.” The telegram ends with the exclamation: “Long live our brother Sokols! Long live Slovenia! Always in honour of our beloved Mother Slavia!” (Anon. 1893: 2).

The lofty principle of Slavic unity that Hubmajer brought to the camp of the Herzegovinian insurgents did not meet the expectations of the peasants who rose up to secure basic freedoms and fight for more just conditions for their agricultural work. The discrepancy between ideal expectations and insurgent reality not only disappointed Hubmajer, but also distanced him from local insurgents. Moreover, Miroslav Hubmajer was dissatisfied with the work of certain committees formed to assist the insurgents; he was particularly critical of the work of the committee in Kostajnica. His criticism was met with great hostility from the committee’s members, especially Vasa Pelagić, who tried to oust him from his leadership po-

sition and exclude him from the insurgent ranks (L. 1875: 2; KRASIĆ 1884: 87; IVIĆ 1918: 50; KARANović 1921: 35–6; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 193–94). Pelagić did not hesitate to play the xenophobia card by saying that foreign volunteers who came to Bosnia under the pretext of striving for the liberation and welfare of the people were in reality “telling lies” and attempting to “beat down proud Bosnia” and win over its inhabitants in order to make them “either subjects or slaves” (PELAGIĆ 1953: 149–50; see also ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 20–1).

*Unanimous commitment to Serbian unity*

The insurgents were aware of the adverse effects caused by the lack of a unified organisation and coordination among their forces. On 16–17 December 1875, an assembly was convened in the village of Jamnica with the aim of overcoming this disunity and uniting the insurgents in a “fraternal agreement.” According to a report by the Austrian correspondent of *The Times*, most of the credit for convening this session of the insurgent assembly went to Miroslav Hubmajer, who was supported by the Serbian Youth (Anon. 1876a: 4). The assembly was attended by about eighty representatives of larger villages from all over Bosnia, from Bihać to the Drina River, as well as representatives of all chetas and members of insurgent committees. The first matter on the agenda was the reforms offered by the Porte as a way out of the impasse; the Assembly found the reform proposal deficient and unworkable and voted against it.<sup>8</sup> They also discussed the question of whether the uprising should be kept alive during the winter and concluded that the armed uprising should continue until the overthrow of the Ottoman government. The representatives agreed that it was necessary to overcome all discord and dissension and achieve unity, and they also decided to attack the town of Turska Kostajnica. The assembly elected a committee which was given full authority to lead the insurrection, and Hubmajer was, as expected, elected commander-in-chief of all Bosnian insurgents “because his dauntless bravery was a guarantee for a successful outcome” (Anon. 1875z: 1; 1875ae: 2; 1875af: 2; 1876a: 4).

All participants at the Jamnica Assembly fervently advocated unity and accord, and they maintained and agreed that these were necessary conditions for the success of the uprising. However, they abandoned these lofty principles as soon as the next question was on the table, namely the election of the commander-in-chief.

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<sup>8</sup> The Bosnian beys also had a negative attitude toward the reforms offered by the Porte. According to *Zastava*, an assembly of Bosnian beys was held in Travnik on 8 February 1876, and on that occasion they decided to reject the proposed reforms and, if necessary, take up arms. It was decided to only spare the lives of those who gave half of their earnings to their beys, because the year before the Christians had left their houses without bringing in their harvest, which remained in the fields, so that the landowners were incurred damages because they did not receive their tributes and tithes (BESARović 1951: 102).

Already on the way to Jamnica the supporters of Prince Milan agitated against Petar Mrkonjić and tried to convince the delegates that he was a pretender to the Bosnian crown (IVIĆ 1918: 48). At the assembly, supporters of Mrkonjić claimed that he was worthy of leadership, “being a Serb and the grandson of Karadjordje, who distinguished himself in the Franco-Prussian war and in the insurgency” (VUKIĆEVIĆ 1922: 12; ZELJKOVIĆ and BANJAC 1929: 11). Following Petar’s instructions, they also said that they would agree with all conclusions of the assembly, that they had no separatist intentions whatsoever and that all they were striving for was coordinated and unified action to liberate Bosnia (IVIĆ 1918: 48).

Despite the significant presence of volunteers in his cheta, Mrkonjić’s claims did not fall on fertile ground there. The newspaper *Zastava*, for example, wrote that Petar Mrkonjić was a “scoundrel” and described his followers as agitators who “intrigued against Serbian unity” (Anon. 1875x: 3). However, when this issue was discussed at the Assembly, the participants were divided into three groups: those from the Serbian Youth movement, supporters of Prince Milan and Serbia (this group was the largest); supporters of Petar Mrkonjić (this group was smaller than the first); and supporters of Austria-Hungary (who were the smallest of all). Even barely literate traders from the committee realised that Prince Milan would not be inclined to spend its money to make himself a combatant in Bosnia, so they did not hesitate much in their decision; in the words of Vasa Vidović they accepted the “leadership of the one who was in power in Belgrade” (cit. ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 136). Finally, the party that supported Prince Milan and the supporters of Austria-Hungary elected Miroslav Hubmajer as commander-in-chief (IVIĆ 1918: 49; VUKIĆEVIĆ 1922: 14; ČOROVIĆ 1933: 527). They also urged Petar Mrkonjić and his supporters to stay away from Bosnian territory, as his presence was “harmful” to the insurgency (Anon. 1875af: 2; 1875ah: 2; 1876a: 4; 1876c: 1).

Hubmajer and his heroic deeds, his triumphs on the battlefield and the fact that he had a certain education spread quickly and only contributed to his fame (TOMAN 1926: 10). The press reported not only of his exploits on the battlefield, but also of his organisational skills. The Zagreb-based newspaper *Obzor*, for example, described him as a very intelligent and highly qualified man, adding: “If there is someone who can create something from nothing, it is he” (cit. ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 141). He also had other advantages, e.g. the fact that he did not take sides with any group or fraction within the insurgency and was not compromised as a Serbian nationalist before the authorities of Austria-Hungary (KRASIĆ 1884: 87; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 141). However, not all participants in the assembly were satisfied with Hubmajer’s election as commander-in-chief,

<sup>9</sup> In this context it is interesting to cite the article by the correspondent of *The Standard*, who wrote that Hubmajer actually represented Montenegrin interests at the assembly in Jamnica (Anon. 1876e: 3).



which led to disputes and bickering. The mere fact that a “Swabian” was elected commander-in-chief of the insurgency, considered exclusively Serbian by Serbian nationalists, raised the ire of certain participants (TOMAN 1926: 10). Petar’s supporters, for their part, felt that the assembly made a “grave error” in electing Hubmajer commander-in-chief, even though “there were so many brave heroes, Bosnians by birth.” As Vladimir Krasić later recalled, two of those present at the assembly even grabbed their yataghans in protest, shouting, “Why did you elect a Swabian commander-in-chief?” (KRASIĆ 1884: 86).

It was finally agreed that Hubmajer should lead the main force, while the others should be divided into three smaller chetas (IVIĆ 1918: 49; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 141). However, some of the insurgent leaders (Golub Babić, Trivo Amelica and Janko Bajalica) refused to submit to Hubmajer even after the assembly in Jamnica, so that each of them continued to fight alone, without regard for him (IVIĆ 1918: 50). The lack of a unified organisation and coordination of the insurgent companies became particularly apparent in mid-December 1875, when the insurgents in Bosnia withdrew to their winter quarters and the volunteers were disbanded (Anon. 1876v: 71).

The discord and strife among the insurgents continued, however, and there was no harmony in their ranks. Petar Karadjordjević did not give up. Although he declared in Jamnica that he would abide by all the decisions of the assembly, he rejected them, and claimed that the assembly had no right to prohibit him from fighting “for the freedom of his people.” “Serbia and patriotism cannot be leased to anyone,” he stated. “Serbia belongs equally to every single member of the Serbian nation.” And he affirmed that whether in Herzegovina or Bosnia, he would continue to fight as a “simple volunteer” (Anon. 1876g: 2; see also IVIĆ 1918: 49; BIANKINI 1925: 17; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 141; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 146). Mrkonjić not only continued the war on his own, but also conspired with certain groups of people who were under his influence. On 22 December 1875, the *Zastava* correspondent wrote that on one occasion a priest named Ostojić said that “Hubmajer must be removed by any means” so that someone else could take command of the Bosnian insurgents. He allegedly added that “he [Hubmajer] would be killed either in Kostajnica or in Jamnica, where Pera Karadjordjević, also known as Mrkonić, has set up camp” (L. 1875: 2).

In a letter dated 11 January 1876, sent from the main camp to the address of the newspaper *Slovenski Narod* (which was not published), Hubmajer himself wrote that he was in a very difficult situation in Jamnica because the party of Karadjordjević distrusted him<sup>10</sup> and spread dissent and falsehoods, so he was “in

<sup>10</sup> Petar Mrkonjić came into contact with the Bosnian insurgents through the Serbian socialists and remained with them “on a friendly footing” throughout his time in Bosnia. The town of Hrvatska Kostajnica, where he often passed by, was the centre of social democratic circles (Vasa Pelagić, Simo Bilbija, Manojlo Horvaćanin, Vlado Milojević) during the uprising and a meeting place for foreign revolutionaries, socialists, Garibaldi’s supporters and others who took part in the uprising (ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 138–39).

a fog” and did not know who to trust and what to do. In this letter he explicitly mentioned the names of Vasa Pelagić and Simo Bilbija (HUBMAYER 1876: 1).

The last clashes between Mrkonjić’s troops and the “Turks” took place on the Catholic Christmas of 1875, when his cheta conquered the village Dobro Selo, killed several “Turkish” inhabitants and seized many head of cattle (IVIĆ 1918: 50; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 142). According to an article published in *The Standard*, Mrkonjić had “a considerable sum of money” at the beginning of 1876, while Herr Hubmajer had “very little,” so that the first of them had a cheta that was “much larger than that of the commander-in-chief” (Anon. 1876b: 4). In a short time, however, the Mrkonjić’s situation changed considerably. On 24 January 1876 a war correspondent from the Bosnian battlefield reported for *Zastava* that Mrkonjić was bedridden with fever, allegedly because “his cheta had fallen from 100 to only seven men.” According to the same source, the reason for the division of his cheta was that he had no more money (B. p. 1876: 1). Shortly thereafter Petar Mrkonjić left Bosnia and went to Vienna, and his great ideas and plans vanished into thin air, like fog blown away by the wind. “He just came and went,” remarked Gavro Vuković, “without leaving any trace of his presence in Bosnia” (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 175).

### *The Heirs of Miloš Obilić*

Hubmajer’s idea, adopted by the Jamnica Assembly, was to create a large military formation that would invade Bosnia and absorb numerous smaller peasant cheta, take Turska Kostajnica and use it as a base for his troops (IVIĆ 1918: 49; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 82, 141; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 146). In order for this plan to become reality, sufficient financial resources and a homogeneous and strongly manned combat unit that was well-armed, trained and disciplined were required. Such a plan should, on the one hand, have the full moral and material support of the Bosnian uprising aid committees on the one hand, and be sincerely supported by prominent insurgent leaders who would mobilise the people for its success on the other. None of these conditions were sufficiently met, but what was lacking most was the support of prominent insurgent leaders. In such a situation, the long winter march on Turska Kostajnica was simply doomed to failure (LUKOVIĆ 1977: 191–92).

In mid-January Hubmajer had about 500 men under his command, most of them from Bosnia. Half of the men in Hubmajer’s cheta were border guards from Croatian territory and Bosnian refugees, while the other half were volunteers from other regions, mostly Serbs. Because of this company’s heterogeneous composition and its colourful appearance, it was derisively called the Foreign Legion, although it seems that this was in fact the unit’s official name (Anon. 1875k: 326; ALÉŠOVEC



*Vođe hercegovačkog ustanka; iz knjige Moritz B. Zimmermann. 1878. Illustrierte Geschichte des Orientalischen Krieges von 1876–1878. Wien, Pest. Leipzig A. Harleben's Verlag.*

1878: 20; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 150). Like Petar Mrkonjić before him, Hubmajer was also highly dependent on volunteers (see e.g. Toman 1925: 143). This was partly due to his experiences in the Herzegovinian uprising and partly due to the fact that Bosnian refugees showed no enthusiasm for joining this unit (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 150). This is why Hubmajer wanted to form a “foreign legion” in Bosnia, which should consist exclusively of “men from Carniola and Catholics,” as Petar Karadjordjević wrote in his diary (MRKONJIĆ 1983: 64; see also PETROVIĆ NJEKOŠ 1988: 312). This way of thinking was based on the experience that the disorganised peasant masses were unable to liberate the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but at the same time it showed that the uprising’s leadership did not have enough confidence in the people (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 150).

In late 1875 and early January 1876, groups of volunteers began streaming to the Bosnian border, most of them from Serbia. They were well trained and skilful, and Hubmajer was able to supply breech-loading rifles for up to 300 men (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 150). On the first day of 1876, the first meeting of the cheta took place in

the main campsite. Hubmajer stood in front of the men, surrounded by all of the leaders, while Rev. Djordje Karanović delivered the benediction. At the end, the priest ("*pop*") asked the insurgents if they were ready "to go through thick and thin for the freedom of the people?" – "Yes, we are!" the multitude shouted in response. The *pop* replied with a loud greeting: "God bless our commander!", and the boisterous crowd echoed: "Long live the commander!" (Anon. 1876d: 1). On the Epiphany, 6 January, the insurgents consecrated their flag, and the Bosnian army swore a solemn oath. Prayers were led by three priests who swore allegiance to the army with the following words:

We pledge and swear to God Almighty, the Creator of Heaven and Earth, our glorious Bosnian people and their legitimate Commander Miroslav, to be faithful and loyal, to protect the interests of the people in every way and to do everything to liberate the people. We will never abandon our flag and our leaders even in the face of the greatest danger, and we will defend it nobly and bravely on land and on water, and we will rather perish than betray our flag, so help us God, the Holy Cross, and the Holy Gospels. In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. (Anon. 1876j: 1)

After the solemn oath, Vasa Pelagić delivered a speech in which he said, among other things, "that those who endure the struggle are the true heirs of Miloš Obilić, and that the descendants of all of those who would betray it shall be cursed." He went on to explain that Serbia was liberated and that the time had come for the Bosnian people to throw off the "Turkish" yoke. After Pelagić finished his speech, the flag was handed over to Commander-in-Chief Hubmajer. He announced a new meeting of the cheta in a few days at the same place where he would carry it to Bosnia, "to our true homeland to gain our freedom" (Anon. 1876j: 1).

Two weeks after the swearing-in ceremony, Hubmajer set off for Dvor with a company of roughly 450 men from Jamnica to launch an attack on Turska Kostajnica. In addition to the main attack on that town, which was to be led by Hubmajer, three other smaller assaults were planned to help the main contingent of insurgent forces (IVIĆ 1918: 49; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 82, 141; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 146). The insurgents believed that they would capture the town with ease, as the Ottoman army had moved toward the town of Bužim in the expectation that the insurgents would attack there (Anon. 1876k: 2).

The flag was flown at the head of Hubmajer's company, while the sounds of a trumpet and a tamboura alternated. When night fell, the cheta began their march with the intention of crossing the Una River in boats, which they had already paid for in advance, and to move from the town of Hrvatska Kostajnica to the village of Kuljani (IVIĆ 1918: 52; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 82; EKMEČIĆ 1973: 151; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 192–94). But when Hubmajer's company came to the riverbank, no boats awaited for them at the appointed place. On the following day, a participant

in the march wrote about his personal experiences of that long night-time hike:

The winter cold was terrible, we walked for seven long hours, and when we reached the place where we were to cross the Una, there were only two small boats there. Vasa Pelagić had been assigned to find boats to take us across the river and he assured us that everything was prepared but nothing had really been arranged, so our plan was thwarted. We had to spend the night in the village. The men protested because there was nothing to eat. We hoped that when we arrived in Kostajnica there would be food and everything, and that we would take this town, you can bet on that, because we were all armed with breechloaders, and we even had a cannon and rockets. That is why Miroslav Hubmajer went to Zagreb and asked that all authority be completely entrusted to him and to leave out Pelagić and others who are not able to do even minor tasks properly. Otherwise the whole thing will fail, and in this case you can bet that the insurgency in Bosnia would simply wither away, which should not happen. (Anon. 1876k: 2)

The presence of Petar Mrkonjić on the battlefield was perceived as a major cause of dissension and discord among the Serbian insurgents, so his departure was seen as a necessary means of maintaining Serbian unity. However, the temptation to take advantage of the situation was simply too great. As soon as Mrkonjić withdrew from Bosnia, volunteers were again recruited from Serbia and sent to Bosnia. When these new recruits arrived, they brought to Bosnia strange flags with the inscription: “One nation, one Serbia,” and on the other side decorated with the four firesteels of the Serbian coat of arms. Some of these flags were also taken to Herzegovina, but there they were trampled and set on fire by the insurgents (VUKOVIĆ 1925: 175).

#### *Fulfilment of the Jamnica Assembly's commitment*

However, the seeds of discord among the insurgents were sown not only from outside but also by various groups associated with the insurgency, and each of them had their own interests. There were many reports of struggles for leadership among the insurgents, which led to many disputes and squabbling. Socialists were particularly prone to this, so “everyone and their mother” complained about them (KRASIĆ 1884: 88) as well as a group of five priests that included Vasa Pelagić, the former archimandrite of Banja Luka who was known as the “master of intrigue” and for his thirst for fame. Pelagić was not pleased with the Jamnica Assembly's decisions, and according to some reports, when Hubmajer's company wanted to cross the border on the Una River, the ferrymen were paid by Pelagić not to take them across (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 152).

Since the insurgents could not cross the Una, they were forced to stay overnight in a village without food (Anon. 1876k: 2; see also 1876e: 3). Thus their

long-planned march failed in such an embarrassing way due to the intrigues of the Bosnian committee, which were reported in some European newspapers (see e.g. Anon. 1876f: 2; 1876m: 204; 1876p: 5; 1876q: 3).

As Hubmajer explained in an interview for the newspaper *Edinost* from Trieste, it was a deliberate act by the “traitorous Pelagić,” who acted in collusion with Petar Karadjordjević and strove to turn the situation to his advantage and restore him to the Serbian throne (Anon. 1876t: 4). Hubmajer’s words were confirmed in an article published in the Viennese newspaper *Das Vaterland* on 28 January 1876. In it, it was noted that the “former archimandrite of Banja Luka, current insurrectionist leader Pelagić, as result of the failed campaign at Turska Kostajnica, succeeded in ousting Hubmajer from his post and thus leaving him to the same fate as Ljubibratić” (Anon. 1876h: 4; 1876i: 2; see also 1876l: 1).

According to some reports from the insurgents’ camp, all this led to furious arguments and altercations. Some of the foreign volunteers (mostly Slovenes) even took up arms and attacked Dukić’s company. Subsequently, all foreigners were expelled from the camp, the insurgent headquarters were immediately transferred to Bosnia, and the priests Karan and Dukić were elected leaders instead of Hubmajer (Anon. 1876o: 1). Dejected, Hubmajer left the insurgency and Bosnia and travelled to Switzerland, via Trieste and Venice, to the town of Chur, where his Swiss comrades organised an evening welcome reception in his honour (Anon. 1876u: 4; KERMAVNER 1966: 628).

An attempt to unite the Bosnian insurgents under common leadership and take control of at least a part of Bosnian territory as a base from which the insurgency could spread further failed. The Bosnian insurgency did not succeed in rising above the level of an intense three-year guerrilla war “without significant battles, important events or outstanding personalities, nor internal homogeneity in military, political and territorial terms” (PAVLIČEVIĆ 1973: 130). Historian Milorad Ekmečić believes that the main reason for this was the fact that the Jamnica Assembly in reality failed in its primary aim: the unification of the various factions within the uprising. The leaders of the insurgents remained so relentless in their rivalry and divisions that the question was not if, but when their antagonism would have flared into open hostilities in case of a successful crossing of the Una (EKMEČIĆ 1973: 152).

*Zastava* cited two reasons that explain why the Bosnian insurgency’s leaders distanced themselves from Hubmajer. Allegedly he could not speak Serbian, and he was also surrounded by some “undesirable foreigners” (Anon. 1876n: 1). Three weeks later, the same newspaper reported that the Bosniaks had driven Hubmajer out of Bosnia together with “his gang of foreign adventurers.” Command of the uprising was then assumed by the priests Karan and Dukić, who did not want the uprising to be dishonoured by the so-called “Žirovac party,” and because the committees were no longer able to provide sufficient funds for those people “who

spent more money than a thousand Bosniaks.” Allegedly “almost 3,000 francs” were paid over a period of three weeks to Hubmajer’s bodyguards, who numbered sixteen men in all (Anon. 1876s: 1).

### *Balkan war and peace*

The term “nationality,” which came to the fore with the French Revolution, deeply touched the hearts and minds of people all over the continent, even on the “Mountainous Peninsula”. From the very beginning of the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia, public opinion in Montenegro and Serbia was extremely sympathetic and supported the insurgents and their cause and called on their governments to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and begin liberating their “brothers” languishing under the “Turkish yoke”. National romanticists in both principalities were confident that the uprisings heralded the long-awaited day of liberation and unification of “the entire Serbian nation” (MILUTINOVIĆ 1953: 58). In Serbia, the enthusiasm for war grew so much that hesitation would not only have threatened the crown of Prince Milan and his own life, but would have also led to the “complete ruin of his state” (GALLENKA 1877: II, 170). Under public pressure, the governments of both principalities could not stand by peaceably, and on 18 June 1876, they both declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The short war made it clear that it was not enough to organise brief military training for the peasants and equip them with rifles, and that the Serbian military command in particular lacked sufficient competence. The Serbian army planned its military actions so badly that Ottoman forces were able to repel their attack and launch a strong counter-offensive. The Serbian army was defeated and the Ottoman army managed to capture Aleksinac and advance towards Belgrade. At the request of Prince Milan, Russia intervened as a mediator, and on 28 February 1877 a ceasefire was declared, which prevented the destruction of the Principality of Serbia (MANDIĆ 1910: 14–5).

Thousands of volunteers from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy and other countries fought in the Serbian army’s ranks, and a particularly significant role was played by Russian officers and war veterans, who were hardened to wield the sword and selflessly supported the cause of emerging Slavic nationalism; General Mikhail Chernyaev even assumed supreme command of the Serbian army (see e.g. Anon. 1876x: 1; 1876y: 3; see also GALLENKA 1877: II, 187–92).

Miroslav Hubmajer was one of the volunteers in the Serbian army. From 20 June 1876 until the end of the war, he served as an artilleryman on Mount Javor and in the village of Deligrad. In an article for the newspaper *Slovenski Narod*, the Slovene volunteer Janko Stibil explained that from the outset the Serbian Ministry of War resented Hubmajer “because he told them the truth to their faces” (Anon. 1876y: 3). Foreign volunteers fighting on the Serbian side were

outraged by the poor supply of food, clothing and footwear, and the equally poor supply of weapons and military equipment, but above all by the chauvinistic attitude of certain Serbian leaders toward foreign volunteers, especially non-Serbs from Austria-Hungary (LUKOVIĆ 1977: 224). According to Stibil, the Serbian ministry even sent a letter to General Chernyayev asking him not to recommend Hubmajer for promotion; however, contrary to their request, Chernyayev promoted Hubmajer to the rank of officer at his own risk in recognition of his abilities and heroism (Anon. 1876y: 3; 1877a: 95; 1910: 2; ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 35; KRASIĆ 1884: 89; TEINOVIC 2006: 25).

The Serbian army was defeated in the war and the Principality of Serbia was on the verge of bankruptcy; most officers were dismissed from the army, especially all foreigners, including Hubmajer (Anon. 1910: 1; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 224).

Hubmajer left Serbia and returned to Ljubljana. He worked as a typographer at the National Printing House and actively participated in the city's social life; he was also elected vice president of the Sokol Society. When the Russian army conquered the town of Plevna during the Russo-Turkish War, nationalists held mass celebrations in many Slavic cities across the Dual Monarchy. On 13 December 1877, a mass of people gathered in the National Reading Room in Ljubljana. During the celebration, toasts were raised for the unity of the Slavs and the glorious future that awaited them. A politician named Zarnik raised a toast to the "heroic Russian army," the editor of the newspaper *Slovenski Narod* Josip Jurčič drank to all Slavs, while Miroslav Hubmajer raised his glass to the "heroic Montenegrins who are the only ones who know what true freedom is," and so on (Anon. 1877b: 4).

In early December 1878 Hubmajer went to Vidin, where he was warmly received and took command of the Macedonian uprising against the "Turks" (Anon. 1878a: 3; 1878b: 413; 1879d: 4; KATARDŽIEV 1978: 45). The uprising broke out there due to the specific situation in Macedonia and the Balkans after the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, and due to the decisions of the Berlin Congress in the following year, the interference of the great powers and the expansionist idea of Greater Bulgaria. The Bulgarian exarch proclaimed that the aim of the uprising was to oppose the decisions made at the Berlin Congress and to restore the "unity of the Bulgarian people" (KATARDŽIEV 178: 40). According to the press reports of the time, the Macedonian insurgents achieved significant victories on the battlefield (see e.g. Anon. 1879a: 2; 1879b: 3; 1879c: 1). Nevertheless, Commander Hubmajer was strictly ordered from Russia to dismiss the insurgent troops; he carried out this order on 20 March 1879 (HUBMEIER 1879: 3; Anon. 1879c: 7; KERMAVNER 1966: 628).

After the Kresen Uprising was quelled, Hubmajer returned to Ljubljana in April 1879. The following year he travelled first to Sofia, then to Belgrade, whence he went to Bucharest in 1881. There, in 1884, together with Vasa Pelagić, he formulated the principles for the union of Slavs and Romanians and the establishment



of the Balkan-Carpathian Federation (KERMAVNER 1966: 629; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 202–3). In 1885 he asked the Ljubljana magistrate for a passport to travel to Constantinople, Athens and Italy. His lithography workshop there was not doing well, so in 1890 he moved from Bucharest to Belgrade to belong to the “nation for which he repeatedly risked his life against the ‘traditional enemy of Christianity’.” (S. R. 1893: 1). He also married in Belgrade, but his wife died in 1895, leaving him with six children. After that he married again and took as his second wife the daughter of the Sarajevo-born pharmacist Herzig (S. R. 1893: 1; Anon. 1896: 4; 1910: 2; KERMAVNER 1966: 629–30; LUKOVIĆ 1977: 203). The following year he moved to Sarajevo, where he was invited by the editorial board of the local magazine *Nada* to work for them (Anon. 1896: 4; Uzelac 1910: 2). When it became known in Belgrade that he was moving to Sarajevo, which was then under Austro-Hungarian rule, he was condemned as a traitor, although he was not guilty of treason<sup>11</sup> (UZELAC 1910: 2).

Later he was hired to work as an archivist at the National Museum and became one of the top experts for South Slavs, a political advisor to the Austrian government and a “political envoy” of Minister Kállay (HOLEČEK 1901: 36; 1911: 382; Anon. 1910: 2; KERMAVNER 1966: 629–30, LUKOVIĆ 1977: 203). As he himself explained to the Czech writer Joseph Holeček, his old friend from the time of the Herzegovinian uprising, the political ideal for which he strove was that one day “at least the whole of Serbia up to Thessaloniki, if not the entire Balkans, would come under Austria.” According to Holeček, this was not a new idea, since “such efforts had already been made in 1875 and 1876 by many agents, among them some of the leaders of the uprising” (HOLEČEK 1901: 36). It is not surprising that this was not well received in Serbian nationalist circles.

### *Methodological Piedmontism*

The uprisings in Herzegovina and Bosnia attracted great interest in the press at the time, while their historical significance proved to be a turning point, which is why they also attracted the attention of many writers and historians. As a result, there is a huge collection of books and treatises on the subject, written in many European languages. However, despite the extraordinary amount of information gathered and the numerous interpretations that have been developed using a variety of methods and techniques, it seems that the true causes and effects

<sup>11</sup> At the end of the war, when Trivun Bundalo and his friend Trivun Amelica, the commanders of the Bosnian uprising, were offered a pension by the “infidel Bosnian government”, they rejected it on the grounds that they “would rather live a life of misery than live on charity,” and for this reason they remained in the “glorious memory of the people” as Serbs, noble heroes and righteous people.

of these events, as well as the importance and role played by certain historical figures in them, have become less clear and rather more obscure. There is an obvious tendency to take credit for any deeds and triumphs and attribute them to the rival Obrenović, Petrović and Karadjordjević dynasties. Until 1918, their followers among current affairs writers and historians portrayed both uprisings from their respective narrow perspectives, paying far more tribute to the individual participants in the uprising than they really deserved, while at the same time playing down the role and importance of the others. In reading their reports and interpretations, we are faced with a very difficult task, namely the question of how to find our way correctly in such a large number of sources, which in many cases contradict each other, and how to extract credible information from more or less arbitrary hypotheses, i.e. more or less skilfully disguised misrepresentations and mystifications. The existing work of historiography, which is mostly based on the ideological assumption that nothing can come out or emerge among the Serbian people if they are not from the “Piedmont” (GUTIĆ 1980: 10), certainly does not make this task any easier.

After the May coup of 1903, the Karadjordjević dynasty was restored to the Serbian throne, and the crown worn by King Petar cast a new light on events from the past, including his time in Bosnia. Due to dynastic resentment and methodological Piedmontism, Serbian journalists and historians tended to ascribe to Petar Mrkonjić the leading role in the entire Bosnian uprising. The story of his guerrilla warfare became a significant part of the narrative of Serbian primacy in the efforts for liberation and unification. Of course, in this context, it could no longer be a story about an “adventurer” and an “agitator” who had his egocentric motives for interfering in the national liberation struggle, but instead had to be turned into a story about a worthy individual who was well suited to assume supreme command of the entire uprising. Consequently, historian Aleksa Ivić claimed in his book published in 1918 that the Herzegovinian uprising was “a time of great struggles in which outstanding leaders came to the fore, while the Bosnian uprising was marked by the presence of Petar Karadjordjević, today’s Serbian King and the greatest ruler of the Serbian people, far more powerful than Dušan the Mighty” (IVIĆ 1918: 20).

“Daily criticism determines the tone of popular opinion, just as the stock exchange determines currencies,” according to an aphorism published in the newspaper *Bosanska Vila* (Bosnian Fairy) in the year of Petar Karadjordjević’s coronation (Anon. 1903: 112). This was the case with the Bosnian uprising and those who took part in it. From the moment Petar Karadjordjević was proclaimed Serbian King in 1903, he has been spoken of as a peasant king and the people’s king. It was repeatedly stressed that King Petar the Great was committed to the idea of liberty, which was confirmed by the fact that he translated John Stuart Mill’s treatise *On Liberty* into Serbian. Apart from praising the king, there was

praise for the Serbian people's freedom-loving tradition and democratic institutions in Serbia, which limited his power and were supposedly as progressive as those in Switzerland. "Some progress is greater," the front page of the newspaper *Jug* reads. "Switzerland has only recently introduced proportional representation in elections, whereas we in Serbia have had it for a long time. Civil liberties in Serbia are equal to those in Switzerland, while economic liberty is even greater" (quoted in GLIGORIJEVIĆ 1983: 417).

It is very likely that the known facts were neither inspiring nor convincing enough, so that writers and historians were eager to discover alternative facts and sacrificed the principles of historical objectivity and scientific analysis of historical events and personalities in favour of the idea of Piedmontism. Although Petar Mrkonjić played a relatively minor role in the Bosnian uprising, from which he withdrew in January 1876, he was retrospectively portrayed as "the only person of rank and importance in the entire Bosnian uprising" (IVIĆ 1918: 47; ZELJKOVIĆ and BANJAC 1929: 11; ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: I, 135). With each passing year, the story of the key role played by Petar the Great grew larger and larger until his guerrilla warfare eventually became a "tremendous achievement" that supposedly found a strong echo among the inhabitants of the Krajina region (VUKIĆEVIĆ 1922: 14). In light of Piedmontism as the notion that served to describe the uprisings by the Christian masses in the Ottoman Empire, the Bosnian uprising of 1875–1878 became known in Serbian journalism and historiography as "Petar Mrkonjić's uprising," a designation that has survived to this day (GUTIĆ 1980: 10).

The most striking material demonstration of this new truth was the monument to King Petar the Liberator in Varcar Vakuf, which was unveiled on the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the uprising (Anon. 1925a: 21). By royal decree from King Aleksandar on 27 March 1925, the name of the town was changed from Varcar Vakuf to Mrkonjić Grad (Anon. 1925b: 3), and the entire region of western Bosnia was named "Petar Mrkonjić's Krajina" (TEINOVIĆ 2006: 5). At the Vrbas Banovina Museum in Banja Luka, painter and then current museum director Špiro Bocarić painted several figurative compositions and portraits for the permanent display. The stately figure of the insurgent leader Petar Mrkonjić stands out among them.

This new account of the guerrilla war waged by Petar Mrkonjić acquired a touch of drama from the appearance of alleged anti-heroes in the form of agents sent by Prince Milan and his government, who allegedly plotted against him and tried to thwart actions that would increase his fame among the population, and even tried to "wipe him off the face of the Earth" (IVIĆ 1918: 35, 47–8, 51; VUKIĆEVIĆ 1922: 14; PETROVIĆ 1924: 14–5; TOMAN 1926: 10; MRKONJIĆ 1983: 51–2, 58–9). According to Ivić, Hubmajer said that Ilija Guteša and Vasa Pelagić tried to persuade him to "kill Petar in a treacherous way, which he refused to do" (IVIĆ 1918: 51).

*Everything changes yet Black Miro remains black*

On the solemn 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the popular uprising, Aleksander Toman, a former Slovenian volunteer in the Petar Mrkonjić's cheta, wrote an article for the newspaper *Jutro* in which he affirmed that "Hubmajer's name will shine among the brightest" when he is immortalised in "the Golden Book of History, together with all of those who have lived, worked and suffered for the people and the survival of our state" (TOMAN 1926: 10). But this would not be the case. To be sure, "Black Miroslav" was widely known and acknowledged as a hero and military leader among the insurgents, but also far beyond the borders of Herzegovina and Bosnia. But even if his heroism saved him from enemy bullets, it could not shield him from political machinations.

In the narrative strand of the story about the legendary guerrilla warfare of Petar Mrkonjić, there was no room for Hubmajer, his more successful rival, to be portrayed as a great hero, as a fearless insurgent leader who inflicted heavy losses on the "Turks" (TOMAN 1926: 10). Such a picture could have given the impression that the Jamnica Assembly actually chose Petar Mrkonjić as the better of the two candidates. That is why authors who wrote about the life and deeds of Black Miro downplayed his role and achievements, because the more Black Miro was blackened, the brighter the star of Petar Mrkonjić shone. Over time, they used this method to turn many "facts" into generally accepted truths. For example, according to this principle the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* wrote on the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of national liberation and unification, more than half a century later that in 1875 "Voivode Petar Mrkonjić assumed leadership of the uprising" in Bosnia, while according to the same source Miroslav Hubmajer, who stood out in Bosnia and Herzegovina for his "extraordinary heroism," became the leader "of a cheta among his Serbian and Bosnian brothers" (MILANOVIĆ 1938: 12).

Some authors, proponents of the Karadjordjević dynasty who were more inclined to imaginative fiction than history, described Black Miro in a rather picturesque way as a nefarious figure. Thus, many years after leaving the Bosnian uprising, it was claimed that Hubmajer, when he was a volunteer in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was actually acting on behalf of Austria-Hungary and against the Serbian cause (see e.g. KRASIĆ 1884: 86; IVIĆ 1918: 49–50; KARANOVIC 1921: 41). In 1921, the ethnologist Milan Karanović published a book about the guerrilla warfare by Petar Mrkonjić. As he himself confessed, he wrote this book rather hastily after King Petar's death, with the intention of providing "some sketches about the glorious days and heroic deeds of the king as a guerrilla fighter." The book mostly shares the stories told at Petar's behest, spiced with some memories of other participants in these events and other sources, but only "insofar as they logically overlap with the history of the uprising" (KARANOVIC 1921: 5; see also

PAVLIČEVIĆ 1973: 126). In this book, the reader learns among other things that during the Bosnian uprising “*Pop*” Samuil Ostojić received the following advice regarding Hubmajer: “Chase this scoundrel away from your doorstep, he’s after something else” (KARANOVIĆ 1921: 69).

The historian Emilian Lilek, who worked as a teacher in Sarajevo for some time, even without any proof, claimed that Hubmajer had fought in the Bosnian uprising “in the cheta of Petar Mrkonjić,” probably as a spy, and after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the provincial government allegedly hired him as a “secret political agent” (LILEK 1927: 41).

This method was used not only by current affairs writers and commentators, but even by some historians. Thus we learn from Vladimir Krasić that Hubmajer made preparations for transport across the Una “with so much noise and commotion that it is no wonder that the Austrian and Turkish authorities found out about it and sent an army after him” (KRASIĆ 1884: 89). Similarly, Vasa Čubrilović, a former member of the organisation Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) and historian, pointed his finger at Black Miro and blamed him for the failed march on Turska Kostajnica. According to Čubrilović this failure aptly illustrates “how things turn out when serious matters are handled by reckless men” (ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: 141). Ignoring the thin line that distinguishes historiography from polemics and plain propaganda, Čubrilović did not hesitate to discredit Black Miro two decades after his death. In his monograph on the Bosnian uprising, Čubrilović asserted that a few months after the outbreak of the uprising, Hubmajer joined the Serbian army as a volunteer in the war against the Ottoman Empire and was given the military rank “that best suits him, namely sergeant” (ČUBRILOVIĆ 1930: 141; cf. Anon. 1876y: 3; 1877a: 95; 1910: 1; ALÉŠOVEC 1878: 35; KRASIĆ 1884: 89).

In his comprehensive survey, *A History of Yugoslavia*, Vladimir Ćorović accords attention to the Bosnian uprising as one of the decisive moments in Yugoslav history. In this monograph he also mentions Miroslav Hubmajer as one of the anti-heroes from Yugoslavia’s past, although he, like all other Slovenian volunteers, fought against the “Turks” because he felt committed to the idea of Slavic unity and brotherhood (UZELAC 1910: 2; TOMAN 1926: 10). Ćorović took for granted the claim that the Jamnica Assembly elected Hubmajer as commander-in-chief over Mrkonjić because its members were “divided and confused.” Since the assembly was in such a state, it did not elect a suitable person and rather chose a man “without any significant skills.” To Ćorović, Hubmajer was not only “unsuited to the task entrusted to him,” but later in life served “as an Austrian confidant in Sarajevo” (ĆOROVIĆ 1933: 527).

Remembering Hubmajer, whom he knew personally from the time of the Bosnian uprising, Pero Uzelac described him as a person whom everyone liked and no one disliked, and hoped that God would grant his soul rest (UZELAC 1910: 2). The image of Miroslav Hubmajer, as created by Serbian journalistic reports

and historiography, remained permanently anchored in the structure that served as the basis for the construction of dynastic myths on the one hand and subjected Bosnia and Herzegovina to a nationalisation process on the other. It seems that the creators of dynastic glory and nationalisation of the past, who simply followed in the footsteps of the builders of the Shkodra Citadel, believed that such a sacrifice would reinforce the stability and endurance of their construct (JEZERNIK 2018: 50). But in the case of Black Miro this sacrifice was not only symbolic. We learn from a letter his daughter Olga sent to the ORJUNA (Organisation of Yugoslav Nationalists) that immediately after the liberation and unification in 1918, the authorities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes deprived Hubmajer's widow of the pension she was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian government. Lacking the necessary means of subsistence, Hubmajer's family could not even adequately mark his grave (HUBMAJER 1926: 1).

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## Metodološki pijemontizam i novo ispisivanje rane jugoslavenske povijesti

Nevesinjska puška najavila je početak oružanog ustanka u Hercegovini 9. srpnja 1875. godine. Hercegovci, koji su zbog svog pastirskog načina života sa svojim stadima redovito pohodili planinske krajeve, znali su gdje pronaći zaklon i kako preživjeti s oskudnim sredstvima. Za trajanja ustanka svojim su se planinskim utočištima koristili za napade na osmanske postrojbe, muslimanska sela i karavane trgovaca. U tek nekoliko tjedana uspješno su izolirali vojne posade u Hercegovini, uništili određene komunikacijske pravce te razorili i opljačkali stanovita „turska” sela. Nekih mjesec dana kasnije ustanak se proširio na Bosnu, gdje je bio ograničen na pravoslavno stanovništvo, dok su ga u Hercegovini vodili katolici.

Premda je započeo kao seljačka buna, hercegovački ustanak prerastao je u povijesni događaj od golemo značaja. Otvorio je tzv. istočno pitanje i pobudio veliko zanimanje europskih novinara, političara i široke javnosti. Zbivanja su s velikim zanimanjem ponajprije pratili slavenski žitelji susjednih zemalja. Za njih su se njihova slavenska „braća”, koja su bila izvrgnuta „turskom” ugnjetavanju, nedvojbeno nalazila na pravoj strani povijesti. Kako bi im pružili pomoć, osnovali su mnogobrojne odbore u Hrvatskoj, Dalmaciji, Slavoniji, Srbiji, Crnoj Gori, ali i slovenskim zemljama. Ti su odbori prikupljali, novac, hranu, lijekove i oružje, a slali su čak i dragovoljce kako bi se borili na strani ustanika.

Među prvima koji su odgovorili na poziv Majke Slave bio je i Friedrich Hubmayer, mladi slovenski nacionalist iz Ljubljane. U Hercegovini je svoje „švapsko” ime promijenio u slovensko prozvavši se Miroslav Hubmajer te se proslavio kao ustanički vođa Crni Miro. Zbog svoje neustrašivosti uživao je veliko

poštovanje i ubrzo se prometnuo u jedno od najpoznatijih lica ustanka. 1870-ih godina svojom je slavom uvelike natkrililo svoje slovenske suvremenike. Novine su redovito izvješćivale o njemu i njegovim pothvatima, a 10. listopada 1875. godine u bečkom glasilu, *Humoristische Blätter*, izašao je njegov portret, djelo glasovitog češkog slikara Karela Klíča, dok je u božićnom izdanju tjednika *The Illustrated London News* iz 1875. godine objavljen rad posebnog ratnog dopisnika i ilustratora, Meltona Priora.

Na Jamničkoj skupštini održanoj 16. i 17. prosinca 1875, Crni Miro izabran je za glavnog zapovjednika bosanskog ustanka glasovima predstavnika svih bosanskih ustaničkih skupina. Glavni suparnik na izborima bio mu je Petar Mrkonjić (pseudonim Petra Karađorđevića), koji je 1903. godine proglašen kraljem Srbije. Pobornici Petra Mrkonjića skovali su mnoge spletke protiv Hubmajera. Nakon stvaranja prve jugoslavenske nacionalne države na čelu s kraljem Petrom, zapao je i u nemilost povjesničara. S gledišta metodološkog pijemontizma, tj. naturalizacije ideološke pretpostavke da se u srpskom narodu ne može početi ni dogoditi ništa što nije poteklo iz „Pijemonta”, a koja je bila popularna među srpskim novinarima i povjesničarima, Crni Miro bio je bio je suvišna povijesna ličnost. Autori koji su metodološki pijemontizam prigrlili kao svoje stajalište brkaju srpski nacionalni interes sa svrhom ispisivanja povijesti, tako da metodološki pijemontizam u njihovim radovima odražava i pojačava njihovo poistovjećivanje sa srpskim (vjerskim) ekskluzivizmom.

*Ključne riječi:* hercegovački i bosanski ustanci, metodološki pijemontizam, Miroslav Hubmajer (Friedrich Hubmayer), istočnjačko pitanje, Petar Mrkonjić (Petar Karađorđević), slavenski nacionalizam

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