



Universidade de Aveiro
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**Rita Ilse Pinto de
Loureiro Himmel Leite**

**Nós e eles: ideologias sobre as identidades
portuguesa, alemã e europeia nos media**

**Us and them: ideologies about the Portuguese,
German and European identities in the media**



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Tese apresentada à Universidade de Aveiro para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Estudos Culturais, realizada sob a orientação científica da Doutora Maria Manuel Rocha Teixeira Baptista, Professora Catedrática do Departamento de Línguas e Culturas da Universidade de Aveiro

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palavras-chave

Estudos Culturais, identidades nacionais, Europa, crise, media, *outrização*

Resumo

No contexto europeu, discursos sobre identidades nacionais coexistem com - e são desafiados por - uma ideia de identidade europeia. Crises recentes, como a crise económica e a chamada “crise migratória / dos refugiados”, evidenciaram fronteiras internas e externas de *outrização* no contexto europeu, quer entre o Norte e o Sul da Europa, quer entre europeus e “não europeus”. Os media desempenham um papel particularmente central na (re)produção da perspectiva *nós* e *eles* sobre as identidades coletivas. Nesta tese propomos responder à seguinte questão de investigação: Quais são as ideologias sobre as identidades nacionais e europeia nos media, em Portugal e na Alemanha, em momentos de crise, e quais as suas contradições e oposições? A primeira parte desta tese explora os conceitos teóricos em que se baseia a investigação, nomeadamente ideologia, hegemonia e identidades. Na segunda parte, é delineada a investigação empírica e são apresentados e discutidos os resultados da análise qualitativa de artigos mediáticos em meios de comunicação portugueses e alemães, entre 2011 e 2017.

keywords

Cultural studies, national identities, Europe, crisis, media, *othering*

abstract

In the European context, discourses about national identities coexist with - and are challenged by - an idea of a European identity. Recent crises, such as the economic and the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis” have made internal and external *othering* borders apparent in the European context, whether between Northern and Southern Europe or Europeans and “non-Europeans”. The media play a particularly central role in the (re)production of this *us* and *them* perspective on collective identities. In this thesis we propose to answer the following research question: What are the ideologies of national and European identities in the media, in Portugal and Germany, in moments of crisis, and what are their contradictions and oppositions? The first part of this thesis explores the theoretical concepts that the research is based on, namely ideology, hegemony and identities. In the second part, the empirical research is outlined and the results of the qualitative analysis of media articles in Portuguese and German news outlets, from 2011 to 2017, are presented and discussed.

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List of Abbreviations

CM	Correio da Manhã
DN	Diário de Notícias
DE	Germany / German
EU	European Union
PT	Portugal / Portuguese

List of Political Parties

List of the political parties mentioned/quoted in the analyzed articles, grouped by European Parliament Political Group in 2020, when applicable (European Union, 2020; Conradt, 2013, 2018, 2020; Albert, 2021):

Elected

- Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)
 - Germany
 - CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) – center right
 - CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria) – conservative right
 - Portugal
 - PSD: Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party, Portugal) – center-right
- Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
 - Germany
 - SDP: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) – center-left
 - Portugal
 - PS: Partido Socialista (Socialist Party) – center-left

- Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
 - Germany
 - Die Grünen (The Greens, Germany) – green left
- Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left
 - Germany
 - Die Linke (The Left, Germany) – left
 - Portugal
 - Bloco de Esquerda / B.E. (Left Bloc, Portugal) – left
- Identity and Democracy Group
 - Germany
 - AfD: Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) – far-right

Non-elected

- Portugal
 - POUS: Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista (Workers' Party of Socialist Unity) – far-left
 - PNR: Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renovator Party, Portugal) – far-right
 - PPM: Partido Popular Monárquico (Popular Monarchic Party) – monarchic/conservative right

Introduction

Cultural Studies have revolved around a critical approach to the concept of culture, seeing it as transversal to all levels of social life and as much more complex and contradictory than traditionally theorized. As such, the field has had an significant contribution in contesting essentialist theories and concepts, such as that of identity, be it individual, cultural, or national. Identities, whether collective or individual, have been, and still are, to a large extent, (re)presented in an essentialist manner. However, as the poststructuralist turn and the contributions of Cultural Studies, have demonstrated, identity does not have a stable core, it is performative (Butler, 2004, 2009), a “process of becoming rather than being” (Hall, 1996a, p. 3). Nonetheless, discourses about collective identities, namely national identities, have been instrumental in constructing political (and cultural) divisions, often based on myths of cultural commonality, of an *us*, different from *them* (Anderson 1983/2016; Bauman, 2013; Braidotti, 2010; Geary, 2013; Hall, 1996b). Representations built and shared about national identities have practical consequences on processes of identification, the way in which we perceive *ourselves* and those we see as the *other*. And these national identities presuppose that geographical territories are naturally connected to political delimitations and to a cohesive identity, to which those who live in said territory belong and are part of (Fraser, 2020). Discourses about identities, particularly those within and concerning Europe, are marked by a multitude of borders along which *othering* trenches are dug, both internal European *others*, as well as external *others*.

This thesis explores how representations of national and European identities, identities based on “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016), are drawn upon in the media in moments of crisis. This empirical research, which focuses on discourses in German and Portuguese media outlets, explores the ideologies and hegemonies and the struggles and contradictions (Hall, 2016) within these representations.

In moments of crisis, when there is a sense of threat, of moral panic or social anxiety (Hall, et al., 1978; Cohen 1972/2002), discourses are often built upon more visible processes of *othering*, which allow us not only to observe how the identities of these *others* (*them*) and, consequently, *our* own identities (*us*) are constructed, but also what the ideological hegemonies are, as well as its main points of struggle and resistance. The media play an

instrumental role in this process, mainly in the reproduction of representations about *others*, with whom the audience often does not have direct contact.

The centrality of identity in constructing Nation-States can, arguably, be mirrored in relation to the construction of the transnational European political, social and economic space, the European Union, raising similar issues regarding essentialist discourses about extremely complex and constantly mutating realities. Thus, the European context is a strategic one in which to explore the concept of national identities. The hegemony of the Nation-State played an important role in constructing discourses and practices, that gave shape to imagined national communities in Europe, while it coexisted with, or was challenged by, an idea of Europeanness, or a European “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983/2016).

The global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008, which, in Europe, gave way to a sovereign debt crisis followed by economic adjustment programs implemented in several European countries (for example, Greece and Portugal), here referred to as “economic crisis”, had a profound impact on this idea of Europeanness. With some (Southern) countries placed on the side of the defaulters, and other (Northern) countries as the creditors, the potential for the construction of discursive identity division between Northern and Southern Europe, in general, and Portugal and Germany, in particular, was expected. Furthermore, the so-called “migrant crisis” or “refugee crisis” also had a particular impact in the discourses about identities, not only regarding these internal divisions of two, or various Europes, but also in the construction of who is and isn’t perceived as European (El-Tayeb, 2011).

Thus, using Germany and Portugal as specific points of intersection (Frow & Morris, 2006) between these “two Europes” (Lourenço, 1988), the main objective of this research is to explore if and how ideologies, as “systems of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another” (Hall, 2016, p. 136), about these identities based on “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016) are constructed, in the context of the 2007-2008 economic crisis and the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”. This will be done by describing how, in these two European national contexts, one from the North and one from the South, the *other* and Europe are represented in the media, and exploring, in as complex a detail as possible, the subtleties of the circumstances in which identities are discursively performed.

Starting from the concepts of ideology and hegemony as developed by Stuart Hall (2016), based on Marx (1932/1998), Althusser (1971/2014) and Gramsci (1971/1999), we focus on journalistic coverage, as a practice that has ideology as an object (Hall, 2016, p. 137). In addition to Stuart Hall's development of the concepts of ideology and hegemony (Hall, 2016), our project is based on the poststructuralist approach to identity (Hall, 1996a, 1996b), informed by the idea of "imagined communities" (Hall, 1996b; Anderson, 1983/2016), and particularly Judith Butler's (2004, 2009) contribution with the concept of performativity.

The question of identity has been at the heart of social theory in general, and Cultural Studies in particular, for a very important reason: it is an essential element to understanding the current world in which social referents are seen as having become largely unstable, causing both uncertainty and the opening up of unprecedented possibilities in the way social life at a global scale is conducted (Bauman, 2000). Identity has been theorized in a myriad of different ways, and scholars continue to work to understand how individuals and societies build and transform identities.

Ideologies and narratives that become common sense, are so naturalized that they often become unquestionable (Hall, 2016). By critically deconstructing media discourses, which have practical consequences in people's lives, in their ability to feel recognized and recognize *others* (Butler, 2004), and underlining the complexity of identification processes, it is possible to continue to question the basis for these elements of identity, which are so often presented as stable and permanent, more or less violently so (Maalouf, 2000), but always with a deep impact in who is recognized as belonging (Butler & Spivak, 2007).

The complex and subtle linkages and struggles about identities, about *us* and *them*, the various *us* and *them* that we perform, the ones we are given freedom to perform and the ones that are erased and rendered impossible, have to be understood and explored as much as possible, if we want to even begin to uncover how they transform and are transformed by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses, movements and forces, with very concrete power over very real lives. So, our main research question is: What are the ideologies of national and European identities in the media, in Portugal and Germany, in moments of crisis, and what are their contradictions and oppositions? To help us answer this question, we will ask: What are the ideological hegemonies in the historical context under analysis?

What are its contradictions? How are the media discourses encoded within this dominant hegemony? What does that say about power relations in the European context, namely between the South and the North?

Our work is organized in two main parts. In Part I, we will lay out the theoretical approach used in our work. This research, aside from being inserted in the poststructuralist approach essential to the field of Cultural Studies (Frow & Morris, 2006; Hansen, 2011), is founded upon three main theoretical constellations, in which the centrality of Stuart Hall's contributions is paramount: a poststructuralist approach to the concept of national and European identities, as performative and unstable imagined communities, crossed by power, informed mainly, albeit not exclusively, by Anderson (1983/2016), Hall (1996a, 1996b) and Butler (2004, 2007, 2009) (Chapter I); the concepts of ideology and hegemony as theorized by Stuart Hall (2016), developed in continuation of Gramsci (1916-1935/2000; 1971/1999) and, ultimately, Althusser (1971/2014) and Marx and Engels (1932/1998) (Chapter II); and the centrality of the media in this respect, and the interplay between media and power, as well as the concepts of primary definers and moral panics, as developed in *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, The State, And Law and Order* (Hall et al., 1978) (Chapter III).

In Part II, we will present our research design and the results of the empirical component of this work. The study encompasses the coverage, during strategic timeframes, of the two most-read online tabloid and elite news outlets (Chomsky, 1997; Público, Comunicação S.A., 1998, DFJV Deutsches Journalistenkolleg GmbH, n.a., Gossel, n.a.), at the time of the beginning of the data collection (Markttest, 2018, Schröder, 2018): *Diário de Notícias (DN)* and *Correio da Manhã (CM)*, in Portugal, and *Spiegel* and *Bild*, in Germany, using a qualitative methodology. For this qualitative analysis, we conducted a strategic timeframe selection, around each of the legislative electoral periods in each country, as well as for the European Parliament elections, in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017. To analyze the selected articles, we developed a model, based on Bardin's (2007) content analysis and a combination of Stuart Hall's *Encoding/Decoding* (1993) model and the work on *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978). With this model, it is possible to explore discursive frames, narratives and representations present in the analyzed articles, according to definer and news outlet. This empirical analysis, sustained by our theoretical framework, is what will allow us to answer our research question, and, hopefully, widen the scope of academic knowledge on

the topic, as well as point in the direction of possible future studies and recommendations to the media sector.

Regarding the broader setting of our research, there are already academic studies which seem, at first glance, to approach similar topics to those here proposed. The media's responsibility in the construction of the image of the *other* is a topic tackled by Barbosa (2012), for example, who argues that the media have played an important role in the dissemination of negative imagery related to the *other* and argues in favor of media responsibility in the promotion of a culturally inclusive citizenship. There are also several reception studies about media stereotypes that focus on the impact the media have had on stereotypes of ethnic groups (Cabecinhas, 2002).

More particularly, some studies have been carried out about the two “crises” shaping the context of our analysis. The analysis of the impact of crises in the construction of representations of the *other* in the context of the economic crisis has been explored mainly in/about Greece (Mylonas, 2012; Chalániová, 2014; Adler-Nissen, 2017; Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2014), Germany (Beck, 2014; Möller & Parkes, 2012; Macmillan, 2014; Goerne, 2016), and both Germany and Greece (Adler-Nissen, 2017; Ntampoudi, 2014). Regarding Portugal, we can highlight the work of Goerne (2016) in the context of a master's thesis, but the reciprocal Portugal-Germany has not been studied yet.

Daniela Chalániová (2014) studies the image built about the Greek identity through political cartoons, in the context of the economic crisis. In *Turn the Other Greek. How the Eurozone Crisis Changes the Media Image of Greeks and What Do Visual Representations of Greeks Tell us about European Identity?*, Chalániová analyzes political cartoons from Austria, France, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, and concludes that, with the start of the crisis, the Greek appears as the *other*, being “depicted as a fat, lazy loungeur or just as a poor sod suffering at the hands of fate and European institutions” (Chalániová, 2014, p. 46).

Another author researching German and Greek representations is Ntampoudi, who found a “tendency to construct essentialising ideas of the two nations, Germany and Greece, and the economic regions they were made to represent, implying the existence of an essential national character (i.e., the lazy nation, the industrious nation)” (2014, p. 12). The author describes a “passionate ‘blame-game’”, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, in which “both

Greeks and Germans have occupied the throne of guilt at numerous intervals and have been both attributed the characterisations of Bad ‘villains’ and Good ‘victims’ on different occasions” (Ntampoudi, 2014, p. 16). The following observation from this study is particularly relevant for the present project:

[...] beyond the division between economically functional and dysfunctional countries, there are numerous other binary oppositions that are constructed in the Eurozone discourse and pose false dilemmas; national identity versus European identity, nationalisation versus Europeanisation, backwardness versus modernization, instrumentality versus passion, abstinence versus indulgence, ideology versus markets, politics versus economy, democracy versus technocracy, austerity versus growth, villains versus victims, us versus them (Ntampoudi, 2014, p. 13).

Adler-Nisson (2017) makes a very interesting and pertinent argument regarding the issue of power and hierarchies within Europe, namely with Germany at the top and particularly Greece, which became a symbol of the economic crisis, at the bottom, and the fact that these hierarchies are internalized and (re)produced by subordinate actors themselves. According to the author, the way in which the media labels Greece and Germany, for instance the former as “lazy” and the latter as “Nazi”, and the stereotypes used, limit the possibility of political decisions (Adler-Nisson, 2017).

The analysis of *Bild*'s portrayal of Greece by Yiannis Mylonas (2012) is also extremely relevant to the findings in this research, as the author concludes that “hegemonic discourses that produce public explanations of the European economic crisis reproduce the neoliberal social values and express the interests of the capitalist class” (2012, p. 667). Adding that:

The fetishization of “Greece” and “Greeks” seems convenient to neoliberal social engineering, as it obscures the systemic and ideological foundations of the particular crisis and blocks public critique towards the economic objectives and policies managing the crisis (Mylonas, 2012, p. 668).

The centrality of Germany and German power, within the European context, is visible, for instance, in the 2012 European Policy Institutes Network paper *Germany as Viewed by Other EU Member States* (Möller & Parkes, 2012), which presents a selection of articles about how Germany is viewed in times of economic and political crisis. This study highlights the differences between the “rather positive” (Vitorino, 2012, p. ii) attitude that Northern and Eastern European countries hold towards Germany, in opposition to that of Southern Europe, namely those countries more affected by the crisis, who “sometimes express very strong criticism” (Vitorino, 2012, p. ii). In the study’s foreword, by Portuguese politician and president of Notre Europe, António Vitorino, despite denouncing Germany’s “ordoliberalism” (2012, p. ii), and the need to balance it with economic growth, the following question is posed: “if we also enjoyed its level of economic success, wouldn’t we also be tempted to persuade others of the merits of our own methods?” (2012, p. ii). This is in line with a dominant view of Germany as not only the most powerful country in Europe, but the model for economic success, that all other European countries should aspire to and follow.

Regarding, specifically, the Portuguese views on Germany analyzed within that paper (Freitas & Fernandes, 2012), during the analyzed period, which partly overlaps chronologically with the present research, the authors found that Portugal “has pursued the role of ‘bon élève’ throughout the crisis, setting a counter-example to the Greek drama and embracing austerity” (p. 20). The authors point to two different moments, corresponding to the leaderships of José Sócrates and Pedro Passos Coelho, and the impact caused by the “Greek stigma” (p. 23). They conclude that, in 2012,

[...] a gap is emerging between a Portuguese government that approves Germany’s requests for austerity under the troika method and an opposition and civil society that is increasingly losing faith in the belief that growing austerity under EU/German auspices will pay off for Portugal (Freitas & Fernandes, 2012, p. 23).

Angela Merkel is a central figure in this Germany, namely a Germany governed by her party, the CDU, as part of her four terms in office coincided with the timeframes under analysis, and the solidification of German’s power within the European Union.

Catherine Macmillan (2014) analyzes discourses about Germany and Angela Merkel in the EU periphery, in France and in the UK, and concludes that these discourses about Germany and Angela Merkel present Europe as being colonized by Germany, in the format of a “Fourth Reich”. This negative portrayal of Germany, and Merkel, based on “gothic narratives” about the ‘Fourth Reich’ “depicts contemporary Germany, and Chancellor Merkel in particular, as monsters endangering the so-called ‘European home’” (Macmillan, 2014, p. 35). An observation in Macmillan’s work, which we find particularly poignant and in line with the findings in our research, is that this narrative:

[...] can also be viewed as a discursive means of giving the moral upper-hand to those who protest against austerity and against Germany’s increasing economic power in Europe, just as the anti-Greek (or anti-Southern European) discourse in the German press juxtaposing supposedly hard-working, thrifty Germans against lazy, spendthrift Southern Europeans can be seen as an attempt to morally justify German reluctance to ‘bail-out’ the struggling Eurozone countries (Macmillan, 2014, p. 35).

On the subject of representations in the Portuguese media, interesting research has been done by Goerne, in the context of a master’s thesis, analyzing representations of Germany and Merkel in the Portuguese media as well as street art, finding similar narratives to some of the identified in our analysis, and in our literature review, such as “the narrative of the Fourth Reich and the narrative of submission and superiority” (2016, p. 86). The author identified two discourses: one also based on an idea of a “Fourth Reich”, connected to “draconic economic measures [imposed] on other European countries” (Goerne, 2016, p. ix) in which Goerne echoes Macmillan’s findings in observing that “the fear of the development of a Fourth Reich under Hitler’s doppelgänger Angela Merkel is evoked” (Goerne, 2016, p. 78), and a second narrative based on the “unequal relationship between Portugal and Germany” (p. 60), with the use of “metaphors of the puppeteer, the doctor and the teacher” (p. 78).

Also relating to representations of Germany’s power, Ioanna Ntampoudi (2014) argues, when analyzing media and elite rhetoric regarding Germany and Greece:

Germany appears to be in the most awkward and peculiar position of ‘doing no right’; if it leads too much, it will be accused of acting as a European hegemon, if it leads too little, it will be attributed with irresponsibility. However, the increasing dissenting voices inside Europe have rendered German crisis management questionable and demands are made for a ‘more European’ Germany that would agree to alternatives that are framed as good for Europe as a whole, but not for Germany individually (Ntampoudi, 2014, p. 14).

Aside from the reciprocal approach in relation to German and Portuguese media, the combination of representations regarding the economic crisis, and the so-called “refugee crisis”, allows us to have a better and deeper understanding of the dynamics of representation of European identity not only within Europe but regarding the “non-European” *other*.

Apropos the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”, we underline that representations of migrants, refugees and minorities represented as the “non-European” *other* is not the focus of this research, and, consequently, terms related to it were not included in our keyword search, and which is also why an extensive literature review on representations of refugees and migrants is outside the scope of this research.

However, since this *other* also appears as a significant one, regarding the construction of the representation of Europeanness, a brief mention of some of the relevant studies carried out in this respect is called for. In the Portuguese context, a recent issue of the journal *Comunicação e Sociedade*, titled *Public discourses on migrants, refugees and minorities: the 21st century in debate* (Martins, Marques, & Ramos, 2020), in which exploratory data from our research project was published, was dedicated precisely to this topic.

Furthermore, there is a research project exactly with that focus, and with a similar theoretical basis as the present one, is recently being conducted under the title *(De)othering* (Centro de Estudos Sociais, 2021), hosted by the University of Coimbra, and coordinated by Gaia Giuliani and Sílvia Roque, that focuses on Portugal, the UK, France, Italy and Germany.

Regarding Germany, the “country that received the most refugees in 2015”, Santos, Garraio, Giuliani, Roque and Santos refer to an acute “battle of images” (2019, p. 104), with

the emergence of the “Willkommenskultur”, which “counted with the adherence of a large part of the mainstream media” (p. 105), and a counter-narrative to it, which feeds “on rumors, resentments, various racisms, phobias and some legitimate concerns”, a “narrative that claimed that the raise in the number of refugees was overburdening Germany” (p. 105).

Concerning Portugal, a country which has “remained alien to the large majority of these flows” (Santos et al., 2019, p. 105), and leaving aside very poignant observations about other European countries, at the “climax of the so-called “European refugee crisis”” most elite newspapers focused on the difficulties faced by the populations, as well as life stories, but, at the same time, some tabloid outlets reiterated “some of the representations of refugees as illegitimate (fake refugees) and as a threat to the Social State, resorting to the racist cultural based imaginary” (p. 108). These observations have very much been confirmed by our analysis, even if its focus is somewhat different.

As will be underlined, once more, in the empirical analysis, often representations about those presented as “non-European” *others*, in the context of the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”, are connected to representations of Islam and of Muslim people, with religion operating as a signifier of symbolic identity.

Namin (2009) studied the representations of Islam in the same German news outlets selected for the present project, namely *Bild* and *Spiegel*, in their print versions, concluding that both outlets convey a “conflict-ridden and violent image, with which [...] the majority of Muslims cannot and will not identify” (293), with these media representations creating a sort of “vicious circle”: “Resignation and withdrawal determine the relationship between the majority society and the ethnic minority” (p. 294). And, according to the author, in order to break this cycle, it is necessary to integrate minorities in the media:

In this way, a greater participation of Muslims in the media editorships or in entertaining media formats could mean that the strong focus of the media on a conflict-oriented image of Islam is weakened and Islam is presented in a more balanced and multi-faceted manner (Namin, 2009, p. 294).

Thus, even though several studies have been conducted on topics close or even similar to the one proposed here, our particular object and our research design, the fact that

we combine the German and Portuguese media contexts, as well as our theoretical and epistemological approaches renders this research a quite unique one, that has the potential of enriching the field of Cultural Studies, as a contribution to a better understanding of discourses on national and European identities, in the media, in times of crises, as well as of the underlying and intersecting elements of power, political and economic ideas and gender.

Part I – Theoretical Approach

Chapter I - Performing National and European Identities

1.1 Cultural Studies and the Poststructuralist Approach

As we have stated at the beginning of this thesis, Cultural Studies have contributed immensely to a critical approach to concepts, traditionally seen in an essentialist manner, such as culture and identities. The field is rooted in poststructuralism, a form of theory which holds a particular viewpoint, namely, an anti-foundationalist one, that “assumes that different theories pose different questions and, as such, there is no such thing as essentialist facts, or truths – these are dependent on the perspective in question” (Hansen, 2011, p. 169). It is essential that this point of departure is laid out clearly at the start of our research, since the same data, and perhaps even the same research question, could be analyzed from a purely foundationalist or positivist perspective, arriving at different conclusions and being unable to achieve what we are trying to accomplish, which is a critical approach based on a particular set of theory and methodological choices which are also shaped by this point of view. The anti-foundational, post-positivist and poststructuralist (Hansen, 2011) approach inevitably shapes the way in which elements such as the (Nation-)State, power and discourses are understood, since “[f]or Cultural Studies, power defines the nature of subjects’ historical, social, cultural and political relations” (Maia, 2020, p. 53).

From a formational standpoint, poststructuralism has a particular perspective on ontology, by calling “attention to how much the ontological assumptions we make about the state actually matter” (Hansen, 2011, p. 168), as well as on epistemology, by rebutting the causal relations of positivism and embracing that cause-effect approaches are inadequate since “the social world is so far removed from the hard sciences where causal epistemologies originate” (p. 168), and privileging constitutive theories, where variables are seen as mutually constitutive of each other, rather than in a causal relationship. Poststructuralism also differs from structuralist approaches, in which causality is seen as “structural pressure” (p. 169), by acknowledging the existence of these structures but arguing that they are “constituted through human action” (p. 169).

As argued by Frow & Morris (2006), Cultural Studies depend on a theoretical paradox: they presuppose an opposition, for example between culture and society or representations and reality, while, at the same time, committing to deconstructing this opposition. If representations are seen as representing a reality with an autonomous existence, one loses the possibility of exploring the textual construction of reality, but, if on the other hand, reality is simply the assembly of its representations, there is no “urgency” in the cultural studies project (p. 328). This reality forces the researcher to constantly deconstruct these oppositions while, at the same time, using them as tools, which is mainly the case, in our research, with the concept of identity.

At this point, the central concepts of discourse and deconstruction become unavoidable. The former allows us to understand how “the words we use to describe something are not neutral, and the choice of one term over another has political implications” (Hansen, 2011, p. 170). Regarding the concept of deconstruction, differently than in structuralist approaches, sign structures are seen as “unstable” (p. 170). Thus, the “way we describe events, places, peoples, and states are neither neutral nor given by the things themselves” (p. 170). Several poststructuralist philosophical contributions have been essential in this shift and have influenced the way in which it is possible to think about critical issues.

So, although we depart from the concepts of ideology and hegemony, in the post-Marxist tradition of Stuart Hall in *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), i.e. an approach “which emphasizes the analysis of the relations between culture and politics within determinate historical conditions ultimately derived from capitalism” (Hall & Birchall, 2006, p. 55), as will be explored in Chapter II, we are not indifferent to the developments in the field of Cultural Studies, and the importance of contributions such as the concept of deconstruction for these transitional times, in which we must still use a language that may not serve us to understand and talk about the world around us (Hall & Birchall, 2006).

The concept of deconstruction is inextricably linked to Jacques Derrida (1970), who claims that structures always presuppose the existence of a center, a core, an essence or fixed origin, that allows for the existence of the structure itself, and limiting the possibility of freeplay. “Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the structure, while escaping

structurality” (Derrida, 1970, p. 279). The questioning of the structurality of the structure, or reflexivity, is what lead to the rupture, to the need to surpass this paradigm, once it became possible and even necessary to think that the center does not exist as such but was merely functional. At the same time, the thinking beyond the structure does not shield us from the need to continue to use the language appropriated by and constructed within said structure. A language which is made of dichotomies that “are not ‘neutral’” (Hansen, 2011, p. 171).

Derrida uses as an example the concept of sign, inserted in the intelligible/sensible dichotomy, dividing appearance and essence, which is a structure built on itself and thus limiting the possibility of thinking outside of that dichotomy (Derrida, 1970). The structure presents as natural the existence of a sensible world separated from an intelligible one, which allows for the difference between significant and signifier. This is extensible to other concepts which are shaped by a strict structure in which the dichotomy seems to exhaust all the possibilities. However, the thinking beyond the structure does not shield us from the need to continue to use the language appropriated by and constructed within said structure. A language which is made of these dichotomies that “are not ‘neutral’”: “Deconstruction shows how such dichotomies make something, for instance of how developed a country is, look like an objective description although it is in fact a structured set of values” (Hansen, 2011, p. 171), and it is this deconstruction that allows us to explore the discourses surrounding the performances of national and European identities.

One also cannot reference poststructuralism without mentioning the contribution of Gilles Deleuze, whose questioning of, and reaction to, structuralist and phenomenological currents offered the Deleuzian concepts of difference and becoming (Colebrook, 2002). Deleuze’s concept of the difference is based on the critique of its subordination to representation or identity (Young, Genosko, & Watson, 2013, pp. 91-94), arguing that being is, in fact, difference, while posing the question: “Cannot difference become a harmonious organism and relate determination to other determinations within a form – that is to say, within the coherent medium of an organic representation?” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 29). Also relevant to our work is the fact that his theory has been influential in the critique of the notion of the State, as Deleuzian radical thinking “means seeing classes, states and identities as results of active and ongoing creation, and not as norms or laws which we ought to fulfil or obey” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 148), which leads to approaching politics as active living, becoming, and not a set of constituted powers and relations.

Even though we are not directly operating with Derridean or Deleuzian concepts or theory in this project, both authors' contributions to the poststructuralist turn are essential to understand and situate the critical thought brought about by the field of Cultural Studies. Our use of the concepts of identity and representation are marked by this poststructuralist turn, as they are operationalized in order to deconstruct discourses about what are often presented as essentialist structures. And our exploration of these discourses on what are presented as cohesive identities, which constitute themselves in opposition to what is different, to an *us* that is not a *them*, is meant to cast light on how these discursive practices produce *otherness* and difference, rather than embrace the different within. We propose to tackle the issue of identity (albeit not at the individual level) not unlike Maalouf (2000), who proposed to deal with the issue of the "desire for identity", as one would a panther, since it "kills you if you persecute it and kills if you leave it alone, and the worst thing you can do is to leave it alone after you've wounded it. But also because a panther can be tamed" (p. 141). And that is what we shall attempt to do.

Cultural Studies operates exactly in the contradictory position marked by the deconstruction of oppositions and, at the same time, the failure to completely resolve the tension between them (Frow & Morris, 2006, p. 328). Due to this fluidity and negation of limits and borders, Cultural Studies is a field rather than a closed subject, which has focused on numerous different topics and has taken up many different shapes in its different practices worldwide.

Inside the field of Cultural Studies, this project follows a line of research which has been prominent in recent years: identity construction, touching upon questions of Nation, race, ethnicity, diaspora, colonialism and postcolonialism, sex and gender, among others (Baptista, 2009, p. 457). The practice of Cultural Studies focuses on cultural aspects of society, which means regarding culture as the central practice of society and not as an exogenous element, or even a dimension which is given more relevance, but as something which is present in all social practices and is, in itself, the result of these interactions (p. 455).

Johnson, Chambers, Raghuram and Tincknell (2004) define seven agendas which guide researchers' interest in the discipline: culture and power, culture as 'value', culture as policy, culture as cohesion, culture as standardization and culture as language or

understanding. These agendas are what motivate researchers to approach a certain topic. In this research the motivation behind the topic falls into the “culture as cohesion” (p.11) agenda. This agenda pushes the idea that cultures are grouped in cohesive units which are internally homogenous. Rooted in the idea of national identity, this is present both in conservative and liberal discourses: in the first case by “stressing the essential unity of the (white) Nation goes along with identifying the (black, immigrant, asylum seeker or ausländer) other as the source of social disorder” and in the second case “as the peaceful coexistence of whole, discretely bounded cultures, not as the living out of power-laden differences or basis for border crossing and cultural syncreticism” (p. 12).

In sum, Cultural Studies were born out of the challenging of traditional views of culture, whether cultural production or cultures in the more anthropologic sense. The features of the field, identified by Baptista (2009), are also present in this study. The first, “complexity”, is at the core of the whole research. Social issues are seen as much more complex than traditionally assumed and required to be presented by positivist and causal social science traditions. This is the case here, since the whole research is based on a complex conception of identity, and the deconstruction of its naturalness, even if the concept is still used as a tool to understand these discourses. The second feature is civic and political engagement (p. 453), as Cultural Studies consist of academic practices with the aim of producing some sort of social or political change. This is also subjacent to this investigation. Although the exploration of hegemonic representations is not in itself civically engaged, the general objective of deconstructing representations and openness to complex and possibly contradictory practices and discourses on identity, has in its basis the ideal of promoting a model of society, in which national cultures are not seen in an essentialist manner, and power relations are made evident through the media discourses under analysis.

In Europe, this idea of a people bound together by common features has a long history (Braidotti, 2010), and this essentialism in thinking about groups of people has had a strong and important opposing force in “the growth of systematically anti-essentialist thinking in cultural and social theory” (Johnson, et al., 2004, p. 12). As explained, this “thinking” is central in Cultural Studies, which also question the whole concept of culture, seen as “a level or aspect of social practice within the social formation as a whole” (p. 30).

Although the concept used here is that of national identities, and not culture, they are closely intertwined, and, according to our operationalization of the concept for the purpose of this project, the former is based on the latter. In fact, as Stuart Hall argues, national identity is one type of cultural identity (Hall, 1996b, p. 611). In the field of Cultural Studies, culture is seen as operating on different and sometimes overlapping levels, such as nations, class, gender, race, sexuality, age, ethnicity, community (Frow & Morris, 2006). Cultural Studies' impetus is to imagine culture as a process which is, at the same time, unifying and dividing, lying in the intersection between the view of identity as purely fictional and the notion of culture as essentialist. This view of culture is what shapes the concepts and theories used in this research, thus undoubtedly putting it at the center of the field of Cultural Studies.

Thus, we follow Hall's (1996a) argument regarding the relevance of theorizing about identity, namely the need for "bridging the gap" between the notion that individuals are discursively constituted into their social places, and the notion that individuals assume their subject positions in a non-permanent, stable, or conflict-free manner, i.e., between the psychic and the discursive dimensions of identity. When answering the question of the relevance of theorizing about identity, Hall uses two arguments: Firstly, we need to think about identity because, although its original essentialist meaning was deconstructed or "put under erasure" (p.1) with the poststructuralist turn, the concept has not been replaced with a better one. So, identity is a concept which "cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all" (p. 2). The second argument is related to the issues of contemporary politics as 'identity politics' and agency, in a reconceptualized form, through the "attempt to rearticulate the relationship between subjects and discursive practices" (p. 2).

This articulation is what Hall names "identification", not in its commonsense definition based on an essentialist commonness, but as a non-stable and never completed discursive construction. It is "a process of articulation, a suturing" which "operates across difference", i.e., it constitutes itself in contrast to what it is not, to its "constitutive outside" (Hall, 1996a, pp. 2-3). As the author himself puts it: "The concept of identity deployed here is therefore not an essentialist, but a strategic and positional one" (p.3), in which certain resources (like history, language and culture) are used "in the process of becoming rather than being", which leads to a fictional "narrativization of the self" (p. 4). Identities are constructed in specific historical contexts, through discourses of power, and are "points of

temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us” (p. 6). To be successful, this assuming of a position requires both that the subject is hailed and that he invests in the position – which is why identification is seen as an articulation. Hall’s proposal is clearly inserted in the general Cultural Studies move towards a questioning and deconstruction of essentialism, which still underlines most of the hegemonic discourses on these matters.

In the case of this research, the concept of national identity, which is based on a structure shaped by the current historical period in which the Nation-State is (still) regarded as a dominant organization of social groups, and nationality and culture are perceived as primary forms of identity, is also used strategically. Thus, following the poststructuralist approach to critical thinking, it is not considered that there is a “true” and unified Portuguese/German national/cultural identity, which is either truthfully or wrongfully represented, it is considered that the concept of identity is in itself a complex process of becoming, continuously changing through practices and discourses, but, at the same time, producing real effects, because they are seen and portrayed as referring to an outside real object, which is why all of these concepts are operationalized in depth in the current chapter.

The concept of identity used in this research is a relational and performative one, as proposed by Judith Butler (2004, 2009), and is extremely useful to cast “light on the symbolic boundaries that are constituted within and across states” (Hansen, 2011, p. 177). In a nutshell, and as we will explore further, when we talk about identity in this research, we are referring to it as “not something that someone has, but (...) a position that one is constructed as having” (p. 177).

1.2 Performing National identity: Power and Symbolic Identity

We have touched upon the idea that national identity is a concept, which, as we have previously outlined, has been naturalized as essentialist, fixed and cohesive, to the extent that often it is not questioned how it is in fact constructed through social and individual discourses and practices, in the context of a specific historical period – marked by the supremacy of Nation-States, and the need to justify such a division of the world into national communities – and, oftentimes, with violent consequences, since identities can kill (Maalouf, 2000), especially when essentialized. In fact, identities are not homogenous nor stable, they

are complex and not fixed, they arise in the interplay between discourses and practices, both socially, and individually, and, regarding individuals, there is even a mutable hierarchy of what “overriding affiliation” is most important (p. 13). It is through our discourses and practices that not only individual or subjective, but also cultural, and national, identities are shaped, reshaped and constantly transformed.

This process is molded by a variety of different factors, whether psychological, historical, social, economic, even if they are presented in a simplistic essentialist manner. The media play an particularly important role in this process, mainly in the reproduction of representations about collective identities of *others*, with whom most of their audience doesn't have direct contact. This view of national identities is often intensified in moments of crisis, where there is a sense of threat to some extent, and a need to reinforce the idea of stability and cohesiveness, as the “identity a person lays claim to is often based, in reverse, on that of his enemy” (Maalouf, 2000, p. 14). At the same time, these moments of crisis present themselves as the ideal context in which to observe the fluidity of identity, its transformations both by individuals and societies. This is true for personal as well as collective identities, and, particularly, in the context of our study, to (trans)national identities, in an age in which the State still plays a central role.

According to the poststructuralist approach, the State is “absolutely central to world politics”, however it is not seen as a “‘unit’ that has the same essence across time and space”, it is, rather, “a particular way to organize a political community” (Hansen, 2011, pp. 173-174). In fact, “sovereign, territorial state has an unrivalled position as *the* political community, but it only came to have this position as a result of a series of events and processes that began with the Treaties of Westphalia” (Hansen, 2011, p. 174; Fraser, 2020).

1.2.1 Anderson's Imagined Communities

Perhaps one of the most influential concepts when thinking about the State and the idea of a national community and related nationalisms is that of “imagined communities” developed by Benedict Anderson (1983/2016), who, stressing the “cultural roots” (p. 9) of nationalism, departs from the idea that “nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind” (p. 4), created at the end of the 18th century, and transplanted

to a “great variety of social terrains”, that “have aroused [...] deep attachments” (p. 4). Proposing to tackle nationalism, which he sees as “an uncomfortable *anomaly* for Marxist theory” (p. 3), Anderson claims that these artefacts are shaped by three paradoxes: the fact that nations are objectively modern, “to the historian’s eye”, but subjectively ancient “in the eyes of nationalists”; the contradiction between the fact that nationality, “as a social-cultural concept”, is formally universal, i.e. that everyone “can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a gender”, and the fact that the “concrete manifestations” of these nationalities are irremediably particular; and the paradox between nationalisms’ “‘political’ power” and their “philosophical poverty and even incoherence” (p. 5).

Thus, Anderson proposes an extremely useful definition of the nation: “it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p. 6). It is imagined because members of a nation will not have direct contact with each other, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 6) - which does not mean that these communities are false or fabricated, in opposition to a sort of true or real community; imagined as limited because it has “finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (p. 7); imagined as sovereign, since the concept of the nation was created in a historical context marked by the destruction of “the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”, and nations’ freedom is based on the sovereign state; and it is imagined as a community, “because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p. 7).

With the decline, in 18th Century Western Europe, of the centrality of religion, and the related rise of rationalism, secularism and the Enlightenment, Anderson claims that what “then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning”, which the idea of nation suited perfectly, tapping into an idea of a “immemorial past” (Anderson, 1983/2016, p. 11), on which these modern nation-states were founded. The novel and the newspaper are two “forms of imagining” that were central to the creation of the nation, as they “provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation”, connected to a notion of “homogenous, empty time” (p. 25), since the nation “is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history” (p. 26). The centrality of the newspaper, or the media, in general, in this respect is also at the forefront of the present empirical research project.

Another element presented by Anderson (1983/2016) as crucial to the rise of the nation and the idea of a national consciousness is capitalism, which boosted a “revolutionary vernacularizing” (p. 39) through the publishing industry, and that was further driven especially by the impact of the Lutheran Reformation and its print propaganda efforts, as well as by administrative centralization by absolutist monarchs, which was accompanied by administrative vernaculars (pp. 40-41), denoting the importance of languages. In sum: “What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print) and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (p. 43).

As Bauman (2013) similarly argues, “modern Nations and modern states are twin products of the same historical constellation” (p. 71), through the attempt to connect politics and culture and present this connection as natural. Of which the author gives one very simple but extremely illustrative example: the French state was “preceded” by Provençals and Bretons, not Frenchmen; the German state by Bavarians, Saxons or Prussians, not Germans” (p. 71). In fact, conceiving of “cultural formations” as cohesive is a longstanding European tradition, based on a “more or less explicitly racialized conception of a people, a Nation, ‘the folk’ or ‘volk’” (Johnson, et al., 2004, p. 35).

From this notion of a national *us*, the process of *othering* inevitably occurs, sustaining both sides of the nationalism/patriotism coin:

Nationalism locks the door, pulls out the door-knockers and disables the doorbells, declaring that only those who are inside have the right to be there and settle there for good. Patriotism is, at least on the face of it, more tolerant, hospitable and forthcoming - it passes the buck to those who ask admission. And yet the ultimate result is, more often than not, remarkably similar. Neither the patriotic nor the nationalist creed admits the possibility that people may belong together while staying attached to their differences, cherishing and cultivating them or that their togetherness, far from requiring similarity or promoting it as the value to be coveted

and pursued, actually benefits from the variety of life-styles, ideals and knowledge while adding more strength and substance to what makes them what they are - and that means, to what makes them different (Bauman, 2000, p. 177).

1.2.2 Stuart Hall's cultural identities

Stuart Hall, as one of the main theorists in Cultural Studies, and one of those who more closely dealt with the issue of identity, defines national identity as one type of cultural identity (1996b, p. 611), one which the post-modern transformation has largely impacted. The notion of a stable cohesive group, who shares a common identity, is a discourse produced in a specific historical context, marked by the supremacy of the Nation-State. Not unlike identity in general, national identity is not something that exists in itself, it is constructed, performed (Butler, 2004), rooted in representations, ideas we have of what a person from that culture looks, talks and/or acts like (Hall, 1996b). It is produced and reproduced through discourses and practices made, remade and constantly transformed by societies and individuals: "We only know what it is to be "English" because of the way "Englishness" has come to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English National culture" (p. 612). Most Nations actually "consist of disparate cultures which were only unified by a lengthy process of violent conquest – that is, by the forcible suppression of cultural difference" (p. 616), which is usually hidden or deemphasized in historical discourses. Nations are also based on symbolisms that hide their true complexity, which eliminate for example social, gender and ethnic differences. Finally, western Nations were also colonial empires, forcing "cultural hegemony over the cultures of the colonized" (p. 617) either by eliminating the latter or by discursively constructing them as inferior, to which academia contributed a great part.

Hall also uses the phrase "imagined communities" to refer to National cultures, which are seen as one of "the principal sources of cultural identity" (Hall, 1996b, p. 611). They are imagined in the sense that they are symbolic, narrated based on five main elements: the "narrative of the Nation" (p. 613), considering that national history, literature, media and popular culture draw on stories, images and symbols which represent the Nation to narrate the idea of a shared destiny throughout history; the "emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness" (p. 614), as some features of the Nation are presented as natural

and unchanged; “the invention of tradition” (p. 614), i.e. often events or behaviors are presented as traditions, being interconnected with the identity of the Nation, when in fact they are inventions, often rather recent ones; “a foundational myth” (p. 614), or a focus on a symbolic story which helps make sense of historical events and justifies the idea of an origin of the Nation; the “idea of a pure, original people or “folk”” (p. 615), since, although this is very rarely the case, the discourse of national culture is usually sustained by the idea of a homogenous “primordial folk who persist or exercise power” (p. 615).

Geary (2013), recovering Joep Leerssen’s enumeration of the three aspects that make up the national contemporary thought, underlines the core ideas that sustain this division of the world into cultural formations, or Nations: that the Nation is the most natural subdivision of humanity, that the Nation-State’s sovereignty is based on the incorporation of a constitutive Nation, and that ideally there is an overlap of the State and the Nation according to cultural, linguistic and ethnic lines: “These characteristics of national thought continue to cast a powerful spell over much of humanity, even in the new Europe of the twenty-first century” (p. 38).

The division of the world into States, or Nation-States, the drawing of borders between territories, is based on a conception of space as discontinuous. Gupta and Ferguson (1992) explore this notion of space as discontinuous, the basis for the “distinctiveness of societies, Nations, and cultures” (p. 6), which is paradigmatic in the organization of the world in divided countries represented by maps. “It is so taken for granted that each country embodies its own distinctive culture and society that the terms “society” and “culture” are routinely simply appended to the names of Nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand “Indian culture” and “Indian society,” or Thailand to experience “Thai culture,” or the United States to get a whiff of “American culture”” (pp. 6-7). This “assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture” (pp. 7-8) has profound consequences for those who live in the actual and figurative borders, for the inner complexity of countries, for the postcolonial world and for the understanding of social change as being set in interconnected and not fragmented spaces.

1.2.3 Judith Butler's performativity and precarity

One of the most groundbreaking contributions to the questioning of identity has been made by Judith Butler, through the concept of "performativity" (2004, 2009). In fact, Hall (1996a) argues that Judith Butler's concept of performativity may be the contribution to the field that best allows for the bridging of the gap between the discursive and the psychoanalytical aspects of identity.

Butler's concept of performativity, focused on gender identity, is based on the idea that discourse has the power to produce people's identities. It is highly regulated by social norms which constrain the possibilities of identification, as is the case with gender norms. So, one's identity is a process of making oneself, but restricted by social norms. Gender is not fixed, neither biologically nor socially, it is performed (Butler, 2004).

The importance of Butler's contribution with the concept of performativity, is that it represents a step in the direction of a conception of identity in the intersection between discourse and practice, essence and fiction, not ignoring the role played by social norms nor the possibility of autonomy, giving space for the individual to exist and be recognized as such, as well as have power over their own narrative.

Building on the idea of performativity, Butler added the idea of precarity, which applies to all those who, due to the norms that constitute them, are not recognized as subjects (Butler, 2009). In her essay on this topic, the issue of the Nation-State comes up, following Hannah Arendt's notion of the Nation-State as "transient and historically contingent nexus" (Butler, 2009, p. viii).

Nation-States produce statelessness (Butler, 2009) but they also produce the *other*, the division between "monolithic and monolingual" groups of people (p. viii). As the author points out "we cannot pretend to have transcended the nation-state", since we can be reproducing relations of inequality when presuming everyone participates equally: "those who emphasize porous boundaries, transnational circuitry, and the end of the nation-state are not realizing that migrancy and deportation are forcibly regulated throughout the globe, and that such ideas of hypermobility are based on patterns of mobility within the European Union or between first-world countries" (p. viii).

In sum, national identities exist to the extent that they are performed, as ideologies with a material existence in discourses and practices, always in transformation and never stable (Butler, 2004, 2009; Hall, 1996a, 1996b). It is also a performance which was solidified with the rise of the Nation-State ideology, creating strong social norms according to which these political units have a core essence that binds them together. It is the basis of what Althusser names the State Apparatus (1971/2014), it is probably the strongest ideology sustaining the existence of the State itself in contemporary democracies: our State represents us, its people, because we are a unity.

What does this mean for collective, and thus cultural, identities? Although Butler's (2004) argumentation departs from and mainly focuses on gender identity, the fact that this element of identity, which is seen and presented as being natural and truly essentialist, is questioned, leads to the inevitable questioning of all kinds of essentialist, permanent or solid identities, including National ones.

So, even though, theorists have put these concepts "under erasure" (Hall, 1996a, p.1), Butler points out that "we cannot pretend to have transcended the Nation-state" (2009, p. viii), not only because it continues to be a hegemonic ideology, but also because the globalized world of free mobility, often portrayed, is a European, or "first world", reality, not applicable to the world in general, as recent events in the Mediterranean sea show all too well. Ideologies built on the idea of National culture not only produce it, since discourse has the power of producing the subjects it constructs, they also produce the difference regarding the *other*, the one who does not share the same narrative, origin, traditions, folk. So, even though they are imagined communities, National identities are still represented as natural and unified (Hall, 1996a, 1996b).

1.2.4 The issue of power

Power is, thus, another key concept regarding issues of identity, as the growing knowledge produced in the context of Cultural Studies has continuously shown. In Cultural Studies, culture, and identity, are seen as operating in many and often overlapping or even contradictory levels, from Nations to race, gender or class (Frow & Morris, 2006). In order to understand the dynamics of representation that occur in and between groups and individuals, it is absolutely crucial that there is attentiveness to these issues of power, and

these are expected to be present in peoples' discourses about identity, in what Foucault designates as the "'discursive regime,'" i.e. "the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements" (Foucault, 1984, p. 55) which are governed by "'general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (p. 73). Power, in the sense it is operationalized in this research, is understood mainly in terms of hegemony and ideology (Hall, 2016; Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000), concepts that are explored in detail in the corresponding chapter, while remembering that "the concept of power can be discussed and analyzed through numerous (repressive or productive) perspectives: cultural, political, negotiating, governmental, institutional, organizational, sexual, ethnic, individual, social, etc." (Maia, 2020, p. 60).

1.3 The European Imagined Community

As we have explored thus far, Europe is the birthplace of the Nation-State, which it forcibly imposed in its colonized territories, but it is also presented as the birthplace of the transcendence of the Nation-State (Pieterse, 1993, p. 226). As Geary notes, "increasingly the citizens of the European Union are being evoked as a different imagined community: as Europeans, an identity perhaps as problematic as the particularist National identities it is intended to replace" (2013, p. 39). European Nation-States have been built on the basis of contradictory discourses about their origins (Baptista, Franco, & Cieszynska, 2014). These myths, or these stories that are told about the peoples, or folks, from whom current Nations are said to descend, still play an important role in current identity politics (Geary, 2013).

With the birth of the European Community as a political and economic institution, the idea of Europe as a cohesive whole, the construction of the imagined community of Europe, became an important part of European integration. As Maalouf puts it, when relating how everyone is, in some way, marked by overriding identitary affiliations:

Is there any citizen of present day Europe who doesn't sense a kind of tug-of-war, an inevitably ever-increasing conflict between on the one hand his affiliation to an

ancient country like France, Spain, Denmark or England, and, on the other, his allegiance to the continental entity that is in the process of forming? (Maalouf, 2000, p. 4).

But what consequences does this change have for the question of National identity? “What are the new National myths on which a European National identity might be based?” and, a maybe even more important question, “What might be the dangers of such a new identity?” (Geary, 2013, p. 45). This is answered by the author through another question: is replacing instrumentalist myths of National history with instrumentalist myths of European integration any more legitimate? Does this not carry its own perils? (p. 46).

Most commonly, European identity is presented as being rooted in its combination of Greek politics, Roman law and Christian religion (Pieterse, 1993). However, as Pieterse points out, this is not only a “boring” view of European identity, “in addition to being chauvinistic, elitist, pernicious and alienating, it is wrong” (p. 225). Europe is much more multiple, complex than that, and what is presented as European culture is, in fact, “the culture of imperial Europe” (p. 226). Europe’s internal complexity and global connections are an expression of its relation to other continents, usually still based on a post-imperial idea of superiority, no longer supported by imperialist theories, but by the notion of development, progress, and modernity.

Zygmunt Bauman (2013) discusses Europe’s experiences and future in relation to ‘Reading the Other’, while arguing that there have been in Europe’s History various moments in which states “based on multiculturalism and multinationalism” existed, that Europe has the mission to develop this sort of society, and, as such, act as a reference point to the rest of the world regarding these lessons. For Bauman, “to acquire and share the art of learning from each other” is “Europe’s fate waiting to be recast into destiny” (p. 74).

The author starts by arguing that Europe’s position in the global context has drastically changed. It is no longer the “reference point for the evaluation, praise or condemnation of all alternative, past and present, forms of human life”, it is no longer “that center that made the rest of the planet a periphery” (Bauman, 2013, p. 68). It “invented global solutions to locally produced problems”, based on the “re-cycling” of other parts of the

planet, but now it must “invent “geographically local” solutions to globally produced problems” (p. 69). To sum it up, Bauman sees the emergence of a politically unified Europe as the result of the “fall of European self-assurance”, which, on the one hand caused a “tide of neo-tribal sentiments” which will be further discussed below, but also the “bringing back together” of “power and politics” in the form of an emergent European Federation, even if its concretization often falls victim to a lack of political will (p. 70).

As the state’s power seems to be falling, especially in the European context, there are no guarantees of the survival of nations either. The European Union, he argues, arrives exactly at this point, when “we (Europeans) are all equal in our own, separate, insufficiency – and in our need to be protected/strengthened by a power greater than each of us may boast alone” (Bauman, 2013, p. 72). In Bauman’s view, an institutional framework is necessary in order for there to be human solidarity at a European level, which is what the EU aims to be, even though there is often a lack of political will to see this mission through. Unable to compete with other global powers in military or industrial terms, Europe’s mission is “to make the planet hospitable to other values and other modes of existence” than those perpetuated by the US, “to enter and to follow the road leading to Kant’s *allgemeine Vereinigung der Menschheit* and perpetual peace” (p. 73).

This, according to the author, is achievable by drawing on Europe’s most valuable asset: its diversity, its variety, the coexistence of difference and *otherness*, since, in Europe, “the Other is a next door neighbor” (Bauman, 2013, p. 74). Quoting Lionel Jospin, according to whom Europe has learned how to “live with a prospect of permanent cultural diversity no longer seen as only a temporary irritant”, Bauman looks at Europe as a “laboratory where the tools necessary for Kant’s universal unification of humanity keep being designed”, and as having the tools to separate political legitimacy from “national/territorial sovereignty” (pp. 74-75), i.e., a post-national community. Bauman sees Europe’s future as hanging on the shoulders of “European culture”, based on difference, and its “(far from perfect, yet relentlessly growing) capacity to live, permanently and beneficially, with cultural difference” (p. 78). For this peaceful unity in diversity, Bauman recalls historical experiences lived in Europe, namely the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Union. These memories shared in Central Europe, of “communal identity separated from the issue of territorial administration” as well as the habits from an “era of cohabitation free from

Kulturkämpfe and assimilatory pressures are recent enough to be recalled and re-embraced” (p. 81).

This view raises some questions, in the context of our theoretical perspective: is Europe really such a good example of multiculturalism and multinationalism? Or can it become one? And what implications does the idea of Europe acting as a reference point to the rest of the world bring about? Can we really develop a model of the “*allgemeine Vereinigung der Menschheit*” on a regional European basis?

We propose that, firstly, the creation of a European model may not be *globalizable*; secondly, it may be dangerous to present Europe as a model of society to export to the rest of the world, bordering an idea of superiority reminiscent of colonialism; and, thirdly, it is very arguable to what extent Europe really is able to thrive through difference. As we will explore further in this chapter, the idea of Europe’s ability to thrive on the basis of its diversity is challenged by internal divisions, between two or multiple Europes, namely, in the context of this project, Northern and Southern Europe, as well as by an invisibilization of those perceived and presented as non-Europeans, in processes of *othering* that defy the official E.U. motto “united in diversity”. Furthermore, the dangers of a European *globalizable* model also come to mind.

As Rosi Braidotti points out:

Such rational self-assurance has historically played a major role in the construction of a civilizational model that equated Europe with the universalizing powers of reason and progress. This hegemonic cultural model was instrumental to the colonial ideology of European expansion: “white Man’s burden” as a tool of imperialist governance assumed that Europe is not just a geopolitical location but also a universal attribute of the human mind that can lend its quality to any suitable objects, provided they comply with the required discipline. Europe as universal consciousness posits the power of reason as its distinctive characteristic and humanistic universalism as its particularity. This makes Eurocentrism into a qualitatively more pervasive trait than a matter of attitude: it is rather a structural element of Europe’s self-

representation, implemented in both theoretical and institutional practices (Braidotti, 2017, p. 23).

It should be pointed out that our own study is centered on the European context, and is focused on exploring discourses that are not centered on those *othered* by discourses on who is allowed to be considered “European”, whether on a national or communitarian basis, but, in doing so, our aim, as explained, is to try to deconstruct the idea of Europeanness and its underlying Eurocentric and/or nationalistic myths, by bringing awareness to them, and, thus, to lay the ground to the possibility of imagining a less essentialist and excluding community.

In 2002, Manuel Castells wrote, in a policy-oriented document written for the former Portuguese presidency of the European Union, that it is important to construct a European identity in the context of a global unstable economic climate, “the increasing multiethnic character of most European countries” and the rise of new geopolitical threats such as fundamentalism (p. 233). He laments that, although there is a European project, this is not enough for Europeans to identify with, and as such it is necessary to develop a European identity to accompany national and local identities. For Castells, “European identity does not exist” and cannot be taught and diffused (p. 236). This is a clearly discursive perspective on identity, even though local and national identities are seen as “existing”, and the fact that European identity would be “artificial”, the ability of discourse producing identity is there. He argues that institutions can develop mechanisms, through education, Internet diffusion, linguistic policies, and media policies, which could give birth to “new values” which in the future would lead to the construction of a European identity. “Identity is built by sharing cultural and social practices throughout Europe” (p. 237).

In line with our reasoning considering challenges to an idea of a cohesive Europeanness, approaches to this topic often point out the idea that European identity is a “weak” one (Pieterse, 1993, p. 230). Ribeiro (2011), for example, notes that, in the Portuguese case, the self-definition as Europeans aims to be first and foremost a reaffirmation of being Portuguese. Similarly, Geary points out that the “myths that created the Nations of Europe are, if not gone, undermined and increasingly rendered passé; the myths that would create a European identity do not yet exist” (2013, p. 46). As Baptista

(2012) points out, the postmodern turn has put identity at the center of academic, social and political concerns especially in Europe, and with a new focus, the focus on the *other*, who is our neighbor, it is “no longer a distant reality” (p. 406). At the same time, Europe and the West have had an historically hegemonic position in the world: “With no significant and true Other(s) that could require an effective cultural dialogue, European identity becomes an obvious and weak reality, and people lose interest, in particular the Europeans” (p. 406).

Our research seems to point out two major challenges to this narrative of Europeanness: the “internal” *others* of Europe, and the “external” *others* of Europe. We refer to “internal” and “external” *others* for the purposes of our arguments and theoretical exploration, since, as the theories we explore demonstrate, those presented as “external” are, in fact, very much “internal” to the European realities, but are nonetheless *othered* as “external”.

1.3.1 Two Europes

Discourses about identities within and concerning Europe, are plagued by a multitude of lines along which *othering* trenches are dug. In the case of this research, the starting point has been the one carved deeply during the economic crisis, in whose media coverage analysis we are often faced with the same myths: a progressive, innovative, hard-working, cold, mechanical, Northern Europe; and a Southern Europe, which is conservative, backward, traditionalist, warm, lover of the pleasures of life - both of which are here represented by Germany and Portugal. These narratives, these myths, these discourses are diluted and evident, depending on the economic and cultural political tides. There has been a recent phenomenon, very close to the discussion about work ethic, responsibility, and efficiency, which seems to have contributed to their resurgence, especially obvious: the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that has divided Europe into compliant and defaulting, creditors and debtors, responsible and irresponsible, hardworking and lazy.

1.3.1.1 DAINOTTO’S ORIENTALISM WITHIN EUROPE

Often, portrayals focused on or influenced by economic factors (but not only those), namely the Eurozone crisis, are based on notions of “development”, underlined by ideas such as modernization, evolution, with a discourse in which “the ‘delay’ of the European

South in relation to Europe's modern, northern states" (Segnini, 2016, p. 4), in what is coined as "orientalism within Europe" (p. 4), within a text that also points to Dainotto's argument about the PIGS being Europe's internal *other*. In the book titled *Europe (in theory)*, a title which is intended to illustrate the position of Italy, in particular, and the PIGS, or the "South" (the margins) in general, regarding their belonging to Europe, Dainotto proposes a "a genealogy of Eurocentrism" and argues that a "modern European identity (...) begins when the non-Europe is internalized - when the south, indeed, becomes the sufficient and indispensable internal Other: Europe, but also the negative part of it" (2007, p. 4).

Dainotto develops his argument based, namely, on Said's *Orientalism* (1979), a term which embodies the academic tradition of researching about the "Orient", the "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"" (p. 2), as well as "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (p. 3). Said's work, Dainotto claims, has been received in southern Europe most often "with the highest degree of enthusiasm" (Dainotto, 2007, p. 172). As the author points out: "southern Europeanists seem to have found in Said a new lexicon to discuss the old facts of Europe's internal colonialism" (p. 172), even if these southern Europeans also played a part in Orientalisms and colonialisms (p. 174), posing the question: "How can you be a southern European Orientalist without twisting the very concept of Orientalism?" (p. 174).

Dainotto (2007) underlines the "damaging assumption that the archive of European theory is located somewhere between Franco-Scottish Enlightenment and Anglo-German Romantic nationalism" (p. 5). This has very strong consequences, relating to previously explored notions about imagined communities. With roots in Montesquieu and sedimented in the Coppet group, Dainotto describes the construction of this idea of Europe:

The definition of Europe proceeded instead, dialectically, from the antithesis of north and south-an antithesis that, dialectically indeed, was imagined as a spiritual progress from an old past to a modern north. This dialectic was sustained by the religious unity of Christian Europe, which provided the fundamentals for its culture. Even this unity-

Christianity-was in turn dialectically split between Protestantism and Catholicism (Dainotto, 2007, p. 164).

This definition, aside from marginalizing Greece, Turkey, Malta as well as Eastern Europe, expresses a representation that is particularly interesting in the context of this research project, and the north-south divide:

Southern Europe was Italy, Spain, and Portugal: it was Romance, somewhat Oriental, "ancient," and Catholic. Northern Europe was England, Helvetia, Scandinavia, and above all, Germany: it was Germanic, Western, modern, and Protestant. The status of France, uncertain between north and south, was that of an eclipsed hegemonic power. Now it was *Deutschland über Alles* (Dainotto, 2007, p. 165).

This imagining of a European community has been at the center of numerous discussions, namely regarding the drawing of its borders in relation to those seen as non-European, and the tension between the idea of a geographically bordered continent, and a *cultural* entity. But the presence of these internal *others* against which European identity is constructed is equally if not more relevant for us to understand Europeanness.

1.3.1.2 EDUARDO LOURENÇO'S TWO EUROPES AND WEBER

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Eduardo Lourenço developed, in 1988 (Portugal had joined the EEC two years earlier), a whole line of reasoning about Portuguese identity in the European context under the idea of "two reasons" or "two Europes". Portugal is "aware of the distance, of marginality, perhaps above all, of a fatal dependence or inferiority" (Lourenço, 1988, p. 25) in relation to "the rest of Europe", often referring to Europe as something external (p. 25). This feeling is seen by Lourenço as "relatively recent" having been preceded by a "Portuguese mental existence" that not only did not feel complex but was proud to be a "Catholic nation par excellence" (p. 26). And in the cultural process of the Peninsula, Lourenço notes, this cultural separation of Reformist Europe was born, and at the same time, movements of resistance and assimilation of the rationalist-enlightenment model were built (p. 57).

Historically, the author argues, the idea of universalism, the universalist European culture of the Enlightenment, was dichotomized with another Europe: “It is above all as a Catholic reality that Iberian culture is an outdated moment in the process of self-consciousness that it has in German philosophy (in its, above all), its finished expression” (pp. 61-62) - thus constructing a cultural hierarchy of two Europes: one first and one second class, which began to be, respectively, Protestantism and Catholicism. And Portugal and Spain, were particularly affected, in the context of the so-called Enlightenment, in which “the peninsular culture – like others, in Europe and outside of it – realised itself as *less luminous* and, in the more pessimistic moments, as an almost «absence of light»” (p. 61). However, as the author points out, both of these Europes are complementarily part of Europe, which, being “the object of planetary cultural flow, where everything is center and margin” is no longer distinguished hierarchically in this way, “except in a historical way” (p. 65), since both Europes, both “reasons”, are part of its self-definition:

Europe, of course, is not this «homeland of Reason» with whom cultures that are, apparently or actually, less close to the model that its culture represents in its most effective expressions, in terms of knowledge and transformation of the universe or of society, fictionally maintain a more or less harmonious and fruitful dialogue or communication. However, it is this fiction which is symbolically targeted when we say – especially when the European cultural myth had its quasi-universal validity and effectiveness - «Europe» (Lourenço, 1988, p. 58).

However, we can identify, in these processes that we describe here, a resurgence of this hierarchy of “two reasons”, connected to Dainotto’s (2007) observations, and to the views of a central Europe, distinct from a marginal Europe, or the idea of various Europes at various speeds. In these narratives, and especially those connected with the economic crisis, these articulations with cultural phenomena are clearly visible, namely in what concerns Max Weber’s (1930/2005) thesis of the connection of the protestant work ethic with the success of the capitalist system.

As much as Max Weber’s thesis has been invalidated and contested on numerous

occasions, it continues, undeniably, to be the basis of many discourses about these two Europes. Weber's (1930/2005) argument is that the capitalist spirit could only be born in a protestant context, due to two main elements in the manner in which faith is professed: the individual is certain that he is chosen, and labour performance is seen as the means through which this certainty is demonstrated. Catholicism, on the other hand, is presented as undisciplined, a factor of backwardness in economic development:

Weber finds the answer in the 'thisworldly asceticism' of Puritanism, as focused through the concept of the 'calling'. The notion of the calling, according to Weber, did not exist either in Antiquity or in Catholic theology; it was introduced by the Reformation. It refers basically to the idea that the highest form of moral obligation of the individual is to fulfill his duty in worldly affairs. This projects religious behaviour into the day-to-day world, and stands in contrast to the Catholic ideal of the monastic life, whose object is to transcend the demands of mundane existence (Giddens in Weber, 1930/2005, p. xii).

1.3.1.3 BECK'S GERMAN EUROPE AND MERKIAVEL

This idea of a twofold Europe seems to have deepened during the economic crisis, from the standpoint of a first-class Europe, a "German Europe" (Beck, 2014). Beck's essay is based on the analysis of Angela Merkel's policy during the economic crisis as an adaptation of Machiavelli's "The Prince" teachings, supporting the thesis that Europe had become German. Unintentionally, by virtue of its economic superiority, Germany had become not only the leader, but also the reference, the model, for the "right" way of acting, and all the other countries, with the main focus on those who had been hardest hit by the crisis, and "bailed out" by financial aid packages.

In the same essay, Beck (2014) notes that the economic crisis has had a paradoxical effect on Europeans: on the one hand, it has united them "in anger over a policy that saves banks with unimaginable amounts of money but wastes the future of the young generation." (p. 20), and at the same time created gaps between Europeans, between "down" Europeans,

citizens who do not feel European, insecure, afraid, angry, powerless, and Europe from above, ie, the decision centers (pp. 22-23), between countries in the North and South of the European Union, and between those inside and outside the European Union and the Eurozone.

The author summarizes this by mentioning three major splits, each of which reinforced Germany's role in Europe: split between eurozone and EU countries, split between creditor and debtor countries, and split in a two-speed Europe. Let us focus on the second case, which largely translates into the widespread gap between northern and southern Europe:

The arrogance of Northern Europeans towards allegedly lazy and undisciplined Southern countries demonstrates simply brutal forgetfulness of history and cultural ignorance (Beck, 2014, p. 37).

And it will not be difficult to bridge the narratives that have their origin in the Reformation. Protestantism is synonymous with “rigor” (Beck, 2014, p. 73), and the German formula, based on austerity, is presented as the formula for success, reason, progress - always linked to the mythical Protestant work ethic, but not only:

The German justification for this ascetic [austerity] policy could be given by Martin Luther and could be drawn from Protestant evangelical ethics: "suffering in a crisis purifies. " The way through hell, the way through the dictatorship of austerity leads to the sky of economic healing (Beck, 2014, pp. 82-83).

Merkel's role or the “Merkiavel model”, according to Beck, is based on four components. Firstly, economic help is conditional upon meeting the conditions of German stability politics: “her position is neither a clear yes, nor a clear no, but the «yes and no» of a power game” (2014, p. 72). Secondly, “hesitation as a tactic of domination” (Beck, 2014, p. 72), with coercion not through money but through its refusal (and, in this respect, discourses about a Fourth Reich are described as ridiculous (p. 73), since hegemony is not imposed by force or violence, but through blackmail and the logic of risk). Thirdly, the

“«German Europe» trump card”:

At the level of internal politics, the chancellor reassures those Germans who fear for their pensions, their little houses, their economic miracle, by defending, with protestant rigor, the politics of the dosed «no», thus transforming herself into the master of Europe. At the same time, in terms of external politics, she assumes the «European responsibility», enveloping the Euro countries with a politics of the lesser evil. Her seductive offer is the following: a German euro is better than no euro at all (Beck, 2014, pp. 73-74).

Finally, the German “magical formula” based on saving and an “extremely tough neoliberalism” (Beck, 2014, p. 75), with consequences for pensions, research, infrastructure etc.

This idea of a 'German Europe' (Beck, 2014) being presented as the only valid way to exist, allegedly proven, in the context of economic crisis, because the country is the main European power, gives a new twist to this German universalism:

This nationalism which can be expressed in the formulas 'we are important again and we know the solutions' is based on what we may call 'German universalism'. It is not only Europe that becomes German: the truth also becomes German, namely the truth of austerity policy, with a link between both (Beck, 2014, p. 80).

And what was true for culture, is, in the current economist context, even more so for economics, with its apparently obvious and simple measures of numerical comparison, under the discourse that puts the responsibility (or, borrowing from the most religious terminology, the “blame”) of the economic collapse on the economic and financial mismanagement of southern European governments (after all, Germany survived and thrived even in times of crisis. apparently neutralizing the discourse of the "world crisis" that no one has escaped). As we shall see in the course of our empirical research, this is very clear in media narratives concerning the economic crisis.

As is often pointed out, discourses about the economic crisis, although, in the case of this research project, reinforcing narratives about national and European identities, are also firmly rooted in what can be generally called neoliberalism, as is pointed out by Garcia (2020), for whom the socioeconomic crisis of 2007-2015, which impacted Southern Europe particularly, “was, simultaneously, a result and possibility of intensification and radicalization of these currents generally associated to liberalism, anchored in the so-called neoliberal economic doctrines” (pp. 22-23).

But the Protestant work ethic, or capitalist, discourse is not the only one reinforcing this *othering* process between Northern and Southern Europe, or Portugal and Germany, in particular. There is another “ghost” haunting discourses about identity in this context, and that is the Nazi or Third Reich ghost. Just as negative discourses about Southern Europeans are rooted in capitalist ideas of efficiency and progress, negative discourses about Germany, specifically, are often rooted in historical references to Nazi-Germany and the Third Reich. Germany’s power is, in some cases, seen as based on this “factual” economic superiority for productivity-related reasons, or even Machiavellian strategies employed by Merkel (Beck, 2014), but, in some instances, discourses that correlate Germany’s power in Europe to the dictatorial horrors of Adolf Hitler’s rule are also to be found, completely delegitimizing this power, but also promoting solid grounds and justification for hate. Thus, Germany, at times, is also a sort of European internal *other*, the ghost of whose past lurks constantly as a threat to Europe.

1.3.2 “Non-European” *others*

Aside from the economic crisis, which allows us to explore narratives about these two Europes, and Europe’s “internal” *others* more directly, the context of the so-called “refugee crisis” has a strong potential of allowing us to understand if and how these narratives are shaped by the introduction of those represented as non-European *others* by the discourse of Europeanness, not only for representations of German and Portuguese identities, but mainly for the representation of a European identity, which is marked by “[h]istorically powerful constructions of Europe as white, Christian, civilized and modern” (Hansen, 2011, p. 177). According to Braidotti, Cultural Studies, along with other areas such as media, feminist queer and postcolonial studies, among others, which brought new methods and

concepts, have as a point that consensus the idea “that humanist ideals of reason, secularism, tolerance, equality, and democratic rule need to be balanced against the historical reality of European imperialist practices” (Braidotti, 2017, p. 27), which is a perspective that is often absent in discourses about Europe, rooted in ideas about neutrality and diversity.

As argued, what has been stated about the discursive production of national imagined communities, can also be translated to the European level. And, weaved into the making of Europeanness, is the *othering* of those presented and seen (discursively, socially, politically, and even legally) as “non-European”, since the “status of the migrant itself is the first victim of a “tribal” notion of identity” (Maalouf, 2000, p. 38) having to choose between (national) affiliations.

In *Who Sings the Nation-State?* (Butler & Spivak, 2007), a conversation between Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, Butler develops an argument, based, among others, on the contributions of Hannah Arendt about the idea of State power, connected to the idea of the Nation-State. As Judith Butler explains, the State “is supposed to service the matrix for the obligations and prerogatives of citizenship” (p. 4), but, at the same time, it “can signify the source of non-belonging, even produce that non-belonging as a quasi-permanent state” (p. 4), which we find is an argument that can be expanded to the European realm, mainly since the birth of the European citizen in Maastricht, in 1992.

Taking Stuart Hall’s aforementioned idea of national identity being represented “as a set of meanings” (1996b, p. 612) a step further, Butler, by connecting power, the State and these set of meanings (constructed as the idea of nation), as a way to create *commonness* and, at the same time, reject *otherness*, argues that “if the State binds in the name of the nation, conjuring a certain version of the nation forcibly, if not powerfully, then it also unbinds, releases, expels, banishes” (Butler & Spivak, 2007, pp. 4-5). This leads to a construction of a fiction of homogeneity, of which one must be critically aware:

[...] to produce the nation that serves as the basis for the nation-state, that nation must be purified of its heterogeneity except in those cases where a certain pluralism allows for the reproduction of homogeneity on another basis. This is, needless to say, not a reason to favor pluralism, but, rather, a reason to be suspicious of any and all forms

of national homogeneity, however internally qualified they may be (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 32).

We also find that Butler's critique, in this same work, of Hannah Arendt's idea of polity as a substitute for a nationalist-based commonality is noteworthy, in the context of our own deconstruction of nation/European-ness.

In her analysis of the post-World War I Peace and Minority Treaties, guaranteed by the League of Nations, in which the idea of human rights was tied to that of national sovereignty, in the tradition of the French Revolution, Arendt (1958) points to the conviction that "true freedom, true emancipation, and true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national emancipation, that people without their own national government were deprived of human rights", as the "worst factor" in the situation (p. 272). For Arendt, these Minority Treaties admitted the "transformation of the State from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation" (p. 275):

The Minority Treaties said in plain language what until then had only been implied in the working system of nation-states, namely, that only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin (Arendt, 1958, p. 275).

Thus, for Arendt, in the period between the two World Wars, two great shocks affected the idea of the nation-state, created by statelessness and the arrival of refugees: the right of asylum, and the "realization that it was impossible to get rid of them or transform them into nationals of the country of refuge" (1958, p. 281). In this analysis, the author makes a distinction between the public and the private sphere, with the former allowing each individual to be part of a community and take part in political struggles, making "equality" possible, and the latter based on a "mere existence" (p. 301):

Since the Greeks, we have known that highly developed political life breeds a deep-rooted suspicion of this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each of us is made as he is – single, unique, unchangeable. This whole sphere of the merely given, relegated to private life in civilized society, is a permanent threat to the public sphere, because the public sphere is based on the law of universal difference and differentiation. Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights (Arendt, 1958, p. 301).

Butler departs from Arendt's division between the public and private spheres to question if, by substituting of the nation-state by a "public sphere" and a "polity", Arendt hasn't "simply substituted the class and race politics of classical Athens for the nationalism of the nation", arguing that the "public sphere does not elude the criticisms waged against the nation-state, though it alters the means through which statelessness is both assumed and induced" (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 23).

Arendt opposed the Nation-State because it relies on nationalism to expel national minorities, thus creating the stateless, "the nation-state assumes that the nation expresses a certain national identity, is founded through the concerted consensus of a nation, and that a certain correspondence exists between the state and the nation" (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 30), and advocates for a polity, a public sphere, that is not nationalist, and that is meant to "oppose the idea that national modes of belonging supply a legitimizing ground for a polity" (p. 25). However, as Butler notes, this raises the concern "that the elision or marginalization of the economic or, indeed, its demonization as a threat to politics as such, severely restricts this effort to rethink the terms of concerted action and conditions of stateless alike" (pp. 26-27).

Given the complexity and heterogeneity of modes of national belonging, the nation-state can only reiterate its own basis for legitimation by literally producing the nation that serves as the basis for its legitimation. Here again, let us note that those modes of national belonging designated by “the nation” are thoroughly stipulative and criterial: one is not simply dropped from the nation; rather, one is found to be wanting and, so, becomes a “wanting one” through the designation and its implicit and active criteria (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 31).

This analysis is central in shaping our theoretical approach to discourses about those arriving at the borders of Europe, and how the so-called “refugee/migrant crisis” impacts discourses about national (Portuguese and German) and European identities. Although we cannot equate the representations of these supposed/presented as “non-European” *others* with representations of Islam, or “the Muslim”, and who is / can be a “real European”, it is undeniable that it has a particular position in this respect:

Obviously, some subject positions are more desirable than others because they provide a superior position compared to other identities. Take “the Muslim” in Western discourses. Here the starting point is that the Muslim is inferior to the European, Western, or Danish subject. Thus, when institutions and individuals try to present a more positive view of Muslims, this happens in critical response to a reigning discourse of “the Muslims” as not quite as good as the “real” European. A superior subject position also usually provides the subject with more room for agency (Hansen, 2011, p. 177).

We refer to this context as the so-called “refugee/migrant crisis” because the use of the concept of “crisis” as commonsensical already frames the issue in a way that is particularly not neutral, it “is a choice that is steeped in racial, gender, and colonialist politics” (Nawyn, 2018, p. 1), since “while crisis language can also motivate quick action and additional resources for refugees, in the current climate refugees are the losers in crisis

language, as it has motivated hardened borders rather than compassionate assistance and protection” (p. 14).

And the same idea is reinforced by Fatima El-Tayeb:

The scant references to migratory movements that are present show them as a very recent phenomenon, largely reduced to stories of desperate refugees—presenting migration firstly as an anomaly, caused by some kind of crisis in the region of origin and secondly as something that happens to Europe without the continent having any active part in it (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 166).

The *othering* of the “tragic” refugee or migrant, whose “jettisoned life is thus saturated in power, though not with modes on entitlement or obligation” (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 32), is precisely one of the modes in which the imagined community of the State, or the supranational European Union, are discursively produced as a homogenous whole, separating who belongs and who doesn’t, and defining degrees of acceptability of different lives, mainly filtered by an assumption of an alleged colorblindness, with often dramatic consequences:

The continued inability or rather unwillingness to confront, let alone overcome, the glaring whiteness underlying Europe’s self-image has rather drastic consequences for migrants and minority communities routinely ignored, marginalized, and defined as a threat to the very Europe they are part of, their presence usually only acknowledged as a sign of crisis and forgotten again in the ongoing construction of a new European identity (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. xxv).

By proclaiming to be in a sort of evolved state of value superiority, Europeanness and European identities create borders around and inside of Europe, being “projects rather than realities, mirrors of power and rhetorics of control” (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 229). So, it is important to incorporate lessons learned in different political and geographic contexts on how to deal with *otherness* (Baptista, 2012).

We underline, once again, that discourses about refugees and migrants were not a direct object of study in our research, but the chronological broadness of our data led to its introduction as a possible factor of influence in the discourses that are the object of our study: ideologies and hegemony in the discourses about the Portuguese, German and European identities.

Chapter II - Ideology and Hegemony

Ideologies, including that of cultural identity, tied either to political belonging, to the Nation-State or Europe (European Union), “construct some narrative, however impoverished and impure, to connect the past and the present: where they came from, with where they are and where they are going to” (Hall, 2016, p. 144). The construction of Nation-states as political-geographical entities was accompanied by the promotion of an ideology that gives a group of people a unifying sense of community, constituting them as a collective subject, based on cultural features. Who are we as a unified nation that justifies the building of a unified State? This has, since the 19th Century, become the basis for many claims of political independence as well as the formation of new States – cultural identity.

The establishment of the European Union was a groundbreaking moment of transformation of elements of this ideology of national cultural identities. When building Europe as a political unit, political and legal advances were always accompanied by ideological views of a European identity (Pieterse, 1993). So, before diving into the current hegemonic ideologies about cultural identities explored in this thesis (in the Portugal-Germany-Europe axis), it is crucial to dissect, historically contextualize and operationalize the concepts of ideology and hegemony.

We are focusing on a line of thought which takes us from Marx and Engels, through Althusser and Gramsci, to end up at the core of Cultural Studies, with Stuart Hall. We are following Hall’s own thought trajectory from his eight lectures, delivered in 1983 at the University of Illinois, gathered in the book *Cultural Studies 1983*, in which he takes us through a critique of Marx and Marxist theorists to present his, and Cultural Studies’, approach, which is the one adopted in this research. Being in line with Hall’s views and critiques of the path that has brought us to the Cultural Studies field, we agree that theorizing about our social world must be based upon the concepts of articulation, overdetermination and the specificity of particular contradictions (Hall, 2016, p. 187). Following this line of thought, we will attempt to deepen it with contributions from more contemporary theories and views, borrowed from other fields that have made tremendous advances in helping us theorize about our society.

2.1 Marx and *The German Ideology*

As Althusser, almost half a century after *The German Ideology* (written around 1846) was published in 1932, put it: “it was the practice of the ideological, and later political, struggle that compelled Marx to acknowledge very early on, beginning in his early works, the existence and reality of ideology, as well as the necessity of its role in ideological and, ultimately, political struggle: class struggle” (1971/2014, p. 171). But, more than Althusser’s analysis of Marx, we want to stress Hall’s comment on this text, which he describes as being “a vulgar text in a sense”, “written in sharp contestation with other philosophical and political forces” (2016, p. 84), and that it must be read keeping that in mind.

Marx’s (and Engel’s) concept of ideology, in *The German Ideology* (1932/1998), departs directly from the concept of historical materialism and the critique of German ideology. The highly recognized tradition of German Historians and philosophers, of which Marx is vehemently critical, focuses on ideas and mental production as driving forces of historical development. Whereas Marx’s materialism is rooted in the role of concrete “men” and their material life, in reality as shaped by the division of labor. As is put in *The German Ideology*: “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men - the language of real life” (p. 42), or, in other words “circumstances make [...] men just as much as men make circumstances” (p. 62).

Put simply: this concreteness, or materiality, of history is modelled by relations of economic power. The division of labor and concrete economic relations shape dominant ideas in society, since the production of ideas is controlled by ruling classes, and ruled classes are simply subjected to them. This is best expressed in the authors’ own words:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material

relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 67).

Thus, from the perspective present in this text, dominant ideas in a specific historical period are the ideas of the ruling classes, created by them to sustain or produce certain circumstances that serve them, on the basis of the division of labor, “one of the chief forces of history up till now” (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 67), and historical changes are not produced by ideas, but men, in their actual lives, produce conceptions and ideas, constrained by their concrete situation: “If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (p. 42).

This view of ideology is centered on individuals and their agency, constrained by relations of class and power, in a material perspective, which eliminated ideas’ (“[m]orality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these” (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 42)) independence from life. The Marxist criticism focuses mainly on German historical idealism, reserving some exceptions for its French and British counterparts, and calls for a materialistic approach based on empirical data rather than concepts:

(...) a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a “productive force”. Further, [...] the aggregate of productive forces accessible to men determines the condition of society, hence, the “history of humanity” must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 49).

Hence, material life produces ideas which, in turn, are a productive force in themselves, and “[d]ivision of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 50)

From Marx and Engels’ (1932/1998) perspective, viewing History in an ideological (as in idea-based) way, that is, detaching “the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself

and [attributing] to them an independent existence” (p. 68), is in itself serving of the dominant ideology, because it frames ideas in a neutral way, naturalizing them, rendering them universal:

For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones (Marx & Engels, 1932/1998, p. 68)

The expression most commonly used to translate Marx and Engel’s view on ideology which is that of a “false consciousness”, however it only appears in Engels’s letter to Franz Mehring in 1893. Engels himself tried to find solutions to “the theoretical problem in Marx”, pointing to the insufficiency of the concept’s development. As Hall put it: “[t]he relationship between the material and the ideological relations was inadequately theorized by Marx” (2016, p. 86).

Of course, Marx’s contribution, as essential as it has been in the questioning of the roles of ideas and their relation to human practice and material economic conditions, has been critiqued, developed, and questioned, directly and indirectly, by both Marxist and non-Marxist authors throughout the last century. Giddens (1972), for instance, counters Marx’s view of ideology with that of Weber and his subjective idealism and Durkheim, mainly in its religious aspect, which is not the direct concern here, as we are approaching this subject from a Cultural Studies perspective.

Hall, pointing out that Marx’s works are all very different from one another, but rejecting Althusser’s categorization of them in two phases, objects to what he refers to as the “economic reductionism” and the “class reductionism” in Marx’s view of a structure composed of social relations and forces of productions, which determines the superstructure of political and legal structures and institutions and ideological forms of social consciousness (Hall, 2016, p. 79). But he also finds in Marx’s own writings, albeit ones that adopt what he calls a lower level of abstraction, i.e., which revolve around concrete historical events, such

as *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, “an alternative to the classical base-superstructure metaphor without giving up the ground that the metaphor has won” (p. 96).

The “falseness” of ideology is rejected by Stuart Hall’s (2016) Cultural Studies approach, which renders this conceptualization inadequate: “all ideologies which have ever organized men and women organically have something true about them. They have truth that people recognize; they really allow us to grasp and define what our experience is” (Hall, 2016, p. 84).

2.2 Gramsci and the concept of Hegemony

One of the biggest contributions of Gramsci’s writings was that of the concept of hegemony, which is closely linked to that of ideology. In his development of the concept in *The Prison Notebooks*, hegemony, in a nutshell, means the ideological and cultural leadership or power of one group or class over others, regardless of the legal and coercive leadership (Gramsci, 1971/1999).

Gramsci understood that Marx’s general framework had to be constantly developed theoretically, applied to new historical conditions, related to developments in society which neither Marx nor Engels could have possibly foreseen, and expanded and refined by the addition of new concepts (Hall, 2016, p. 157).

It is important to note that Gramsci’s hegemony is not the static ideology of a dominant class, but rather it is dynamic, a process of “unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point” (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p. 206). Differently than Marx, for whom the structure defines the superstructure, ideology, Gramsci’s focus is on the relations between structure and superstructure as “integral and irreversible” (Hall, 2016, p. 158), with the economic structure creating the plain that can be more favorable to certain ideas, but not utterly determining the superstructure.

The Marxist philosopher divided the superstructure in two: on the one hand, there is “civil society”, or the private sector, which corresponds to the function of hegemony, and,

on the other hand, there is “the State”, or public sector, which corresponds to the function of “direct domination”. And the role of the intellectual, a prominent one in the author’s view, is that of “exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p. 145).

The hegemonic power of what Gramsci calls the “directive center” over these intellectuals is exercised through “a general conception of life” based on intellectual dignity and a pedagogic and educational frame “which interests that fraction of the intellectuals which is the most homogeneous and the most numerous” (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p. 285). However, in the sphere of civil society, it is possible to organize opposition and alternative hegemonies, through praxis.

Gramsci focuses on how, in advanced capitalist societies, the State’s noncoercive activities actually take center stage, even if the coercive role of the state cannot be minorized. Ideological and cultural consensus is created through a combination of both. Thus ideology, for Gramsci, is constituted of philosophy, or a formal coherence, and common sense, or non-coherent and contradictory “practical everyday consciousness of the masses” (Hall, 2016, p. 165). The common sense is socially presented as ahistorical, a sort of universal wisdom, and it is at this level that “more coherent ideologies and philosophies must contend for mastery” (Hall, 2016, p. 165). But the State’s coercive force is always there to reinforce and support, when necessary, “the terms of consensus and domination over others” (Hall, 2016, p. 171). Coercion and consent are independent but mutually reinforcing moments.

So, the idea is that the legal and coercive apparatus of the State only acts in the areas in which a ““spontaneously and freely accepted” [correspondence] between the acts and the admissions of each individual” (Gramsci, 1971/1999, p. 248) is not achieved by the hegemonic function. This hegemony, that we associate to civil society, and which is engraved in the State’s educational and formative role, “operates without “sanctions” or compulsory “obligations”, but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.”. It is a question of “turning necessity and coercion into “freedom”” (p. 502).

According to Forgas, in his collection of Gramsci’s writings (2000), Gramsci developed his theory of complex superstructures (political, legal, and cultural) due to Marx’s shortcomings in this respect and leading him to critique the “mechanistic forms of historical

materialism”, as well as “expand the space occupied by politics in the Marxist tradition” (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 189). This led to the development of political concepts, mainly that of hegemony. Gramsci works on the basis of the deficiencies of looking at materialism in a mechanist way (that ideology politics mechanically derives from the economic structure), which would not allow for a more complex analysis of historical processes (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 191).

And here we can introduce the concept of ideology, tied to hegemony, as a part of it, but always keeping in mind that hegemony is a dynamic concept. Based on Lenin’s theory of Philosophy, as well as Croce’s theories, Gramsci states that “[t]he realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact” (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 192). Proletarian hegemony becomes possible (and necessary) in the battlefield of ideology, through the philosophy of praxis (“philosophy of praxis” is a replacement term for his conception of Marxism (p. 429)). In this sense, the combatting of ideologies as “real historical facts” and the revelation of their nature as “instruments of domination” becomes a necessity “not for reasons of morality etc., but for reasons of political struggle: in order to make the governed intellectually independent of the governing, in order to destroy one hegemony and create another, as a necessary moment in the revolutionizing of praxis” (p. 196).

Gramsci goes one step further in pointing out that the philosophy of praxis (i.e., Marxism) is in itself a superstructure, but that it differs to other ideologies in that it “does not tend towards the peaceful resolution of the contradictions existing within history” but “is itself the theory of those contradictions” (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 197). This philosophy undermines ideologies as transient complexes of superstructures:

It [philosophy of praxis] is not an instrument of government of dominant groups in order to gain the consent of and exercise hegemony over subaltern classes; it is the expression of these subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowing all truths, even unpleasant ones,

and in avoiding deceptions (impossible) by the ruling class and even more by themselves (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 197).

This concept of philosophy of praxis is juxtaposed to that of historical bloc, in order to explain the “vital connection” (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 197) between structure and superstructure. Ideology is then riddled of its, at the time, most common, wrongful, meaning, a “bad sense”, formed as a result of a process which distinguishes it from the structure and is seen as not changing the structure but the structure changing it, views it as useless, as in “insufficient for changing the structure”, and as “‘pure’ appearance, useless, stupid, etc” (p. 199). In order to rid the concept of ideology of this error, Gramsci categorizes it into two types: historically organic ideology and arbitrary ideology:

To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are 'arbitrary' they only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on (though even these are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it) (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 199).

Gramsci draws from Marx himself, especially considering his ideas on the energy of popular conviction, to

[...] reinforce the conception of 'historical bloc' in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely indicative value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces (Gramsci, 1916-1935/2000, p. 200).

2.3 Althusser and the structuralist critique of Marx

Another Marxist author who built upon the concept of ideology is Althusser, who bases his approach on the premise that “ideology has no history”, which is the same statement Marx makes in *The German Ideology*, in a positivist sense, meaning that it is “sheer illusion, sheer dream, in other words, nothingness” in comparison to reality (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 174). However, Althusser’s approach to ideology and history is “radically” different, mainly in two ways: first, the author claims that “ideologies have a history of their own (although it is determined in the last instance by the class struggle in the apparatuses that reproduce the relations of production)” and that “ideology in general has no history, not in a negative sense (its history lies outside it), but in an absolutely positive sense” (p. 175), which means that it is eternal, i.e. “omnipresent and therefore immutable in form throughout all of history” (p. 176).

In terms that bear resemblance to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, but cannot be equated to it, Althusser develops his theory of *Ideological State Apparatuses* (1971/2014). The legal State system is a part of these apparatuses, as well as many others, and they all fall under what he calls the “State Ideology”:

[...] each apparatus [is] the realization of an ideology (the unity of these different regional ideologies - religious, moral, legal, political, aesthetic, and so on - being ensured by their subsumption under the State Ideology) (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 184).

Again, the main idea is that it is not the repressive or coercive apparatuses of the State that in themselves reproduce relations of production, but rather it is ideology that ensures “the reproduction of the relations of production better than anything else” (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 180). The French philosopher goes on to attempt demonstrate “by what mechanism ideology makes individuals 'act all by themselves', without there being any need to post a policeman behind each and every one of them” (p. 177), describing ideology as the mechanism which “makes [individuals] “go”” (p. 181).

The main thesis on ideology is supported by two sub-theses: that ideology represents individuals' imaginary relation to their real conditions of existence and that it has a material existence. The first thesis is a response to the theories that portray ideology as something

imaginary, meaning that it does not translate reality, but only alludes to people's conditions of living. These theses, which Althusser contradicts, explain the need for ideology either in its fabrication by religious and political leaders in order to maintain power, or, in Marx's terms, in the "material alienation reigning in people's very conditions of existence" (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 182). Althusser contradicts this view and proposes the following line of thought: "people' do not 'represent' their real conditions of existence in ideology (religious ideology or some other kind), but, above all, their relation to those real conditions of existence" (p. 183). By putting the issue in relational terms, it becomes possible to understand the "imaginary distortion that we can observe in all ideology (unless we live in its truth)" (p. 183). In a nutshell: "What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of real relations governing individuals' existence, but those individuals' imaginary relation to the real relations in which they live" (p. 183).

The second thesis, that ideology has a material existence, unlike Marx's view of ideology as something that is separated from reality and concrete life, is based upon the material practices, and rituals, that are experienced and exercised concretely by individuals:

[T]he ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every subject endowed with consciousness/a conscience and believing in the ideas that it inspires in her or freely accepts should 'act in accordance with her ideas' and therefore inscribe her own ideas as free subject in the acts of her material practice (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 185).

The ideology of ideology is based upon concrete, material acts which ascertain whether someone's ideology has a material existence consistent with the professed one, that an individual's "ideas are his material acts inserted into material practices regulated by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which (hardly by accident!) his ideas derive" (p. 186).

[The role of ideology is to] impose self-evident facts as self-evident facts (without in the least seeming to, since they are 'selfevident') which we cannot not recognize and before which we have the inevitable and eminently natural reaction of exclaiming (aloud or in

'the silence of consciousness'): 'That's obvious! That's right! That's true!' (Althusser, 1971/2014, pp. 262-263).

This does not mean that one cannot escape a certain ideology - Althusser clearly states that each subject experiences an interplay of various ideologies, all under the same State Ideology, and combines them in concrete acts, rituals, practices, which can result in a “conflict of duties” (Althusser, 1971/2014, p. 200). Individuals are interpellated by ideology as a subject, they recognize other subjects and themselves and receive a guarantee of the self-evident nature of certain fact. In sum, the individual is “caught in this triple system of subjection, universal recognition, and absolute guarantee” (p. 197), which makes subjects “go” without the need for a repressive apparatus behind it.

Thus, the ideological state apparatus plays the dominant role, by functioning in individuals' consciousness, in ensuring the relations of production, in the “knotting together of superstructure and base” (Althusser, 1971/2014, pp. 203-204). Let us end this excursion into Althusser's structuralism by citing a few of his examples on how ideology and the relations of productions are tied together: ideology creates this triple system of subjections in relation to proletarians, who work not only for necessity but due to a “moraleconomic ideology of work”, and on capitalists, who are also not driven solely by need but by a “legal and moral ideology of property, profit and the benefits that they themselves bestow on their workers thanks to their capital” (pp. 204-205).

Our criticism of Althusser's ideological state apparatuses is an echo of Hall's:

[...] this unquestioned functionalism, where ideology is always effective for and recuperated to the dominance of the mode of production, for there is no place in which to insert contradiction – and hence its very possibility – not to mention the concrete reality of struggle, which is absent (Hall, 2016, p. 110).

This is a critique that is related to a more general innovation brought by Cultural Studies when thinking of society: mainly the bridge between structural constraints and agency, seeing people as able to resist, negotiate and act, while not denying the existing power forces and constraints on their agency.

2.4 Stuart Hall and the Cultural Studies framework

2.4.1 Cultural Theory, Marxism and Structuralism

Having outlined some of the main contributions to the operationalization of the theoretical concepts used in this thesis, now, we finally arrive at the Cultural Studies paradigm, and its critique of the exposed theories, which is the gaze held in this project. We do so, once again, under the guidance of the main author in Cultural Studies - Stuart Hall - who, in his lectures (2016), draws from each of the authors to propose his conception of both ideology and hegemony, as well as a theoretical that allows us to, under the paradigm of Cultural Studies, analyze a particular political situation.

Before going into the operationalization of the central theoretical concepts used in this research, it is worth briefly mentioning Hall's critique of the shortcomings of the mainstream sociological tradition's (Hall, 2016 p. 17) approach to studying culture, namely how culture as "the realm of integration" doesn't question "around which specific cultural values the integration is made", neither does it go into "what alternative cultural values had to be marginalized or subordinated in order to achieve and maintain the degree of consensus which keeps the society stable" (Hall, 2016, p. 18).

He points out that, although it is successful in being aware "of the plurality of culture", it is "not able to talk about [...] the relationships between culture and power, the relations of dominance and subordination that may exist between these different cultures" (2016, p. 18).

And so, it cannot tell you how particular cultural patterns and values achieve their dominance, how dominant cultural patterns are formed. It cannot say anything about the power relations between the centralized and the marginalized cultural formations (Hall, 2016, p. 18).

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979), of course, made a crucial contribution to thinking about the way in which cultures are subject to power relations not only within societies, but also across societies, which has been deepened and enriched by fields such as postcolonial studies in particularly interesting ways.

It is not only 20th Century mainstream sociology that, according to Hall, got it wrong when discussing culture. Some of the early cultural theorists are also seen as insufficient, namely Raymond Williams and Edward Thompson's humanism and anti-abstractionism, privileging rich and detailed analyses of "lived experiences which constitute the distinctiveness of different groups or classes or communities or societies" (Hall, 2016, p. 47). Of course, the differences between them must not be ignored, namely Thompson's criticism of the absence of the struggle in Williams' work (p. 30), but "[b]oth Williams and Thompson argue that the work of abstraction diminishes the human lives you are trying to give account of" (p. 47), since cultural analysis is based on identifying "significant patterns" (Hall, 2016, p. 34) that allow us to understand different societies, through "the key ideas, the key words, the key definitions, which hold the whole culture together" (p. 35).

We agree with Hall's response to the culturalists' critique of abstractionism. Although accepting that, especially considering more rigid structuralist approaches, the excessive neatness of categorization and structuring of human practices seems to be, not only difficult when analyzing the present, but even disconnected from reality, there is a need for a certain degree of abstraction in order to be able to think and theorize about social practices and culture. This was also the early culturalists' project, to "incorporate both sides of the idealist and materialist debate" (Hall, 2016, p. 52), namely by acknowledging that people are part of structures they do not control, but that, at the same time, culture is crucial because "social practices do not exist outside of the meanings we negotiate for them" (p. 51).

Williams' tries to do so with the concept, rejected by Hall, of "structures of feeling" as "the description [...] of how life is actually lived" (Hall, 2016, p. 37). But they seem to have failed short in many ways, and, again, Stuart Hall's contribution to the theoretical debate, with a proposed third view on theory is the one adopted in this thesis. It is relevant to draw on Hall's account of the way in which cultural theory has engaged in with structuralism, mainly Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss, and how structuralist theories dialogue with Cultural Studies. The structuralist approach allowed for a "break from the humanist tradition of Williams and Thompson" (p. 71) through the "so-called unconscious level at which the structure operates" (p. 71). It is also a structure which is different from that proposed by Marx. From Durkheim's "collective representations" (p. 58) to Lévi-Strauss's "myths" (p. 66), symbolic systems gain self-sufficiency, with internal contradictions

between nature and culture, whereas the Marxist tradition sees the symbolic systems which inform myths as contradictory to the material reality of social structures.

But structure has to be thought of in a more complex way:

Of course, a social formation is not complexly structured simply because everything interacts with everything else – that is the traditional, sociological, multifactorial approach which has no determining priorities in it. Rather, a social formation is a “structure in dominance”. It has certain distinct tendencies; it has a certain configuration; it has a definite structuration. This is why the term “structure” remains important. But, nevertheless, it is a complex structure in which it is impossible to reduce one level of practice to another in some easy way (Hall, 2016, p. 119).

Hall finds a third way between the classical formulations of Marxist theories of ideology, which argue that there is a “necessary correspondence” (Hall, 2016, p. 123) between “political, legal, and ideological practices” (the superstructure) and “what is mistakenly called “the economic”” (structure), and the post-structuralist discourse theory view that there is “necessarily no correspondence” (p. 123) between them. What Hall proposes is that “there is no necessary correspondence, which is different” (p. 123), mainly because it is a perspective founded on “open-endedness” and the possibility for struggle, contradiction and negotiation, while, at the same time, accepting that there is a structure in place, one that is “the result of previous practices” (p. 125). Put simply: “We make history, but on the basis of anterior conditions which are not of our making. Practice is how a structure is actively reproduced” (p. 125).

This is the theoretical basis on which we develop this research: we are neither in the realm of idealism or discourse theory, where materialism and determinism are neglected, and ideas, with no rooting in concrete practices, are paramount, nor do we accept that structural constraints leave individuals and groups agency-less and powerless, that materialist forces of production fully determine ideological forms.

In order to analyze and theorize about culture and ideology in general, as well as “for the analysis of a particular political situation” (Hall, 2016, p. 187) Hall proposes a focus on

notions of “articulation, overdetermination, and the specificity of the different contradictions” (p. 187), borrowed largely from Althusser but thought of in a new way. The theory of articulation, searches for the “differences within a unity”, it is a theory “of “no necessary belongingness”, which requires us to think the “contingent, nonnecessary connections between and among different social practices and social groups” (p. 122).

Issues of power are central when discussing culture, and power, ideology and hegemony are closely interlinked. But power is not, as more classically Marxist approaches would argue, all about class, cultural power struggles, resistances and negotiations are made in terms other than class and way beyond the traditional view of class warfare. But the complexity of power relations in defining one’s culture, and, thus, one’s identity, is even higher than a mere negotiation between formations within a society, it is often about negotiations not only within classes, but within the formations, and even the individuals themselves:

Culture is not, and can never be, outside of the structuring field of the central contradictions that give shape, pattern, and configuration to a social formation, that is, contradictions around class, ethnicity, and gender. It is not outside of them, but it is not reducible to them (Hall, 2016, p. 180).

The State, seen as institutionalized political power, a “contradictory formation” (Hall. 2016, p. 120) that is “pluri-centered and multidimensional” (p. 121), has an unquestionable role. The following, rather long but immensely rich and pertinent for this study, passage of Hall’s lecture on Marxist Structuralism will allow us to segue into the next chapter on issues of national identity and imagined communities:

[...] the State remains one of the crucial sites in a modern capitalist social formation where political practices of different kinds are condensed. The function of the State is, in part, to bring together or articulate into a complexly structured instance, a range of political discourses and social practices which are concerned at different sites with the transmission and transformation of power. Some of those practices have little to do with the political domain as such, being concerned with other domains which are

nevertheless articulated to the State – for example, family life, civil society, gender, and economic relations. The State is the instance of the performance of a condensation which allows that site of intersection between different practices to be transformed into a systematic practice of regulation, rule, and norm, of normalization, within society. The State condenses very different social practices and transforms them into the operation of rule and domination over particular classes and other social groups. The way to reach such a conceptualization is not to substitute the difference for its mirror opposite – unity – but to rethink both in terms of articulation (Hall, 2016, p. 121).

2.4.2 Ideology and Hegemony

When discussing ideology specifically, Hall (2016) draws from Althusser's scissions with Marxism: the idea that a multitude of ideologies coexist in a sort of battlefield in each individual and class, denying Marx's idea of an "empirical identity between class and ideology" (p. 128); the critique of ideology as a "screen" between subjects and reality, that doesn't allow them to see concrete reality; and the idea that "knowledge has to be produced as the consequence of a particular practice" and is not "the reflection of the real in discourse" (p. 128).

Ideology, for Althusser, has the function of reproducing relations of production, socially and culturally, through agents who are not direct participants in production but "cultivate" "that kind of labour which is willing, morally and politically, to be subordinated" to capitalist interests (Hall, 2016, p. 129). It is important to note that Hall explains quite well that Althusser takes this concept of reproduction from Marx (for whom it includes reproduction of "social relations of possession and of exploitation" and of the "mode of production itself" (p. 130)), but gives it a more restrictive meaning, limited to the reproduction of labour power. This is also where Hall criticizes Althusser, since, by giving ideology the function of reproducing, ideology becomes always the ideology of the dominant class, with no explanation of how contradictions could be possible, nor are there any answers for the "ideologies of resistance, of exclusion, of deviation, et cetera" (p. 130) – which is

where it is “utterly foreign to Marx’s conception of reproduction” (p. 130), since there is no framing for class struggle.

The notion that “ideology is a practice” (Hall, 2016, p. 130) is one that Hall warmly welcomes. As is the notion that “ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world – the “ideas” with which people figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it, and what they ought to do” (p. 131). Althusser gives an answer for how to deal with these mental processes: by focusing on their social materialization, through language and rituals and practices of social behavior. As Hall puts it, “language and behavior are the media, so to speak, of the material registration of ideology, the modality of its functioning” (p. 131). Hall notes, and it is important to underline this, that ideologies are not solely practices, but practices are “the material forms in which thought appears” (p. 131), having real material effects.

It is in bridging Althusser and Gramsci that Hall’s contribution is particularly interesting. Althusser identifies the State with civil society in terms of ideology. Gramsci, on the other hand, raises exactly the question of how it is possible that entities independent from the State reconstitute de dominant ideology, through the development of the already dissected concept of hegemony. “Gramsci has had a greater influence on Hall’s thought than any other intellectual” and it is his “notion of ‘hegemony’ that has had the most productive impact on Hall’s thinking” (Procter, 2004, p. 26). And Hall’s main contribution to the concept of ideology is illustrated in the following passage:

[...] in democratic societies, it is not an illusion of freedom to say that we cannot adequately explain the structured biases of the media in terms of their being instructed by the State precisely what to print or allow on television. But precisely how is it that such a large number of journalists, consulting only their “freedom” to publish and be damned, do tend to reproduce, quite spontaneously, without compulsion, again and again, accounts of the world constructed within fundamentally the same ideological categories? (Hall, 2016, p. 132-133).

This is Hall's main critique of Althusser, that by not dividing civil society and State, as Gramsci does, there is a simplification of processes that are very complex, processes that lead to the production of ideologies where the State has no direct control.

There is an important contribution of Althusser's that we have not explained in its corresponding subchapter, because its assessment by Hall seems to be a more appropriate way of discussing: that of the subject and its constitution by ideology. Althusser's third proposition is that "ideology only exists by virtue of the constituting category of the subject" (Hall, 2016, p. 133). Subject here is not seen as a concrete individual but as the "'I' of ideological statements" (p. 134), through which ideological discourses constitute their subjects, through the already explained process of "interpellation". Hall puts it shortly: "We are constituted by the unconscious processes of ideology, in that position of recognition or fixture between ourselves and the signifying chain without which no signification or ideological meaning would be possible" (p. 134).

Hall criticizes the fact that Althusser divided his essay into two parts: one about ideology and the other about the constitution of subjects, because the theory of the subject, which should be one element of the theory of ideology, becomes the whole theory itself, making it so that the subsequent theories (from Lacan to Foucault) have all revolved around the question of the constitution of subjects and these interpellation processes of ideologies, and none of them analyzed the first part, and what Hall describes as Althusser's "inadequate formulations about the reproduction of the social relations of production" (2016, p. 135).

This has also resulted in a never reconciled theoretical divide, according to Hall, with "the most disastrous consequences for the unevenness of the development of the problematic ideology, not to speak of its damaging political effects": the question of reproduction having been "assigned to the Marxist (male) pole, and the question of subjectivity [...] to the psychoanalytic (feminist) pole" (Hall, 2016, p. 135). Hall reconciles these two poles, through the concept of identity. But let us retrieve his own steps in critiquing Althusser.

He does so by departing from Althusser's use of "representation", or the definition of ideology as systems of representation. What this means is that ideologies have a discursive center, that they are "systems of meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another" (Hall, 2016, p. 136). These meanings are then materialized in social practices, which all exist within ideology, albeit in different ways.

“It does not follow that because all practices are *in* ideology, or inscribed by ideology, that all practices are *nothing but* ideology” (Hall, 2016, p. 137). Hall, then distinguishes between practices which operate in ideology but do not have ideology as their object, and those that do (for example, the media). These systems operate in “discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic fields, in discursive formations”, in which each idea or representations triggers a “chain of connotative associations” (p. 137). This leads to the realization that there is no dominant and subordinate ideology, given that the existing ideological chains or discourses in each moment and context are highly complex.

Another important contribution from Althusser, which Hall reuses, is that of the role of experience, in that it is always inside of categories of representation that we experience the world. It is not possible to “live” or experience life outside of cultural and ideological categories. This, however, does not mean that there are not some representations that are “more adequate or more profound” (Hall, 2016, p. 139) than others. For Althusser, real conditions of existence are an objective, separate entity from representations of them, which, for Hall, is seen in a different way: of course, social relations exist on their own, but it is impossible to conceptualize them outside of thought and, thus, of representations, of which we are not aware. The fact that we are often not aware of them, however, does not mean that it is not possible to “inspect the categories which generate” them (p. 140), otherwise works like the present one would be purposeless. And this possibility then leads us to the idea of subjectivity, the “feminist” pole, which is to say, “the relationship between individual subjects and the positionalities of a particular ideological discourse” (p. 140).

For Hall this relationship, even if it does stitch us into place, “in our relation to the complex field of historically situated ideological discourses” before we are even born, or during our infancy, that is, when we acquire language and, consequently, discourse - this process is not limited to this moment, since we “remain open to be positioned and situated in different ways, at different moments throughout our existence” (Hall, 2016, p. 140). The mechanism of interpellation is proposed by Althusser as the sole moment of constitution of the subject by ideology. Hall, however, sees this differently: interpellation provides “the general conditions for language” but does not exhaust the process, calling for the need for a theory that “accounts for the recognition of the self within ideologic discourse” (p. 141). For this purpose, drawing from Althusser’s earlier works, Hall proposes a theory of articulation:

The theory of articulation asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enables them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socioeconomic or class location or social position (Hall, 2016, p. 143).

Articulation means that different elements of ideology, of discourse, of representations are articulated and rearticulated in numerous ways, having no unity, “no necessary, intrinsic, transhistorical belongingness” (Hall, 2016, p. 143), deriving its meaning from its “position within a formation”, which can always be shifted and transformed. This transformation is often done by reorganizing existing elements in a “new discursive formation” (p. 145).

And it is here that Hall introduces the issue of social forces, the main aspect of which is that of identity and identity formation. Ideology, “transforms a people’s consciousness and awareness of themselves and their historical situation” (Hall, 2016, p. 145), and it is this dialectical process that constitutes social forces, and not economic conditions. A social force only becomes unified “through the constitution of itself as a collective subject within a unifying ideology”, only after it has “forms of intelligibility which explain a shared collective situation” (p. 145). It is the result of an articulation, not “necessarily given in socioeconomic structures” (p. 146).

What does this process have to do with identity? Everything. Articulation is the process through which individuals construct their identity processes, in a non-rigid manner, in an interplay between socioeconomic structures, ideologies, and social and cultural forces. Individuals are interpellated as belonging to ideological categories with different meanings in different contexts (Hall gives his own personal experience of ethnicity, race and color). The terms used to *interpellate* an individual have different meanings in the same moment, depending on context: it is “the position within the different signifying chains which “means”, not the literal, fixed correspondence between an isolated term and some denotated position” (Hall, 2016, p. 147). Hall gives the example of what blackness means for identity

in Jamaica or in the UK, we can transcribe this same logic to what it means to be Portuguese, German, European, North-European, South-European, “non-European” etc. And these terms are not only relevant for what they signify in themselves, but they are also defined in relation to what is not said: “Meaning is relational within an ideological system of presences and absences” (p. 148).

The individual’s own process of identification is constructed on the basis of this extremely dynamic interplay: “there is no essential, unitary “I” – only the fragmentary, contradictory subject I became” (Hall, 2016, p. 147). And this is not a free process, since “we are spoken by and spoken for, in the ideological discourses which await us even at our birth, into which we are born and find our place” (p. 149). But we will get back to this process of identification. What is relevant now is to delineate its connection with ideology, and that identities are tied with “semantic fields” (p. 151) that have particular connections in each historical period, interleaved into what Gramsci calls “commonsense thinking”. This, again, does not mean that there is no possibility of transformation even using the same terms and categories, “by changing or rearticulating its associations, for example, from the negative to the positive” (p. 152) or changing its meanings.

If then, ideology can also be a field of struggle, of transformation, of resistance, let us go back to Gramsci’s hegemony, as recovered by Hall. One of Gramsci’s most important ideas for Hall is the construction of class unity as an *a posteriori* moment and not a pre-existing condition, it is constructed “as a result of specific economic, political and ideological practices” (Hall, 2016, p. 162). This class consciousness is built in three stages: the economic corporate stage, where common interests are recognized but there is no class consciousness; the class corporate stage, in which economic solidarity develops; and thirdly the hegemonic stage, or hegemony, of not only economic but also intellectual and moral unity. As explained previously, the hegemony of a particular historical bloc is constituted through the coordination of interests of a dominant group with those of other groups, it is the moment that allows for the possibility of a “collective will” (p. 162).

The role of the State is central for Gramsci, an innovation regarding classical Marxism, and it is described as a “new kind of structuring force which often interposes itself between the direct play of economic or class forces and the relationships of culture” (Hall, 2016, p. 163). The State will be understood in the context of this work, for the purposes of

the theory of ideology and hegemony, in a broad sense, accommodating the European Union as a State, since it falls in the category of “the point where the rule of an economic class is converted into political power; it is where it becomes centralized and condensed, invested with the power and authority of the State itself” (p. 163). Through law and rule, the State also holds the power to regulate the technology and means “of the formation of people’s identities”, i.e., the production of culture and ideology, but always in a contradictory way. The production of the common sense and the states noncoercive power is central to Hall’s focus on popular culture.

As for Hall’s review of Gramsci’s conceptualization of the subject, both recognize the existence of several identities in the individual, and identity related to ideology can sometimes result in contradictions within the subject. Ideology, however, is always social, and never a unified coherent single ideology, it is interdiscursive, composed of contradictory “discursive currents” with “points of juncture and break” (Hall, 2016, p. 167). As said before, hegemony does not mean domination in Gramsci, and neither in Hall (2016): society is presented as extremely complex, and “hegemony is not ideological mystification [...] [nor] is it merely cultural domination as total incorporation” and nor does it “mean rule by an economic class” (p. 169). Hegemony is the process of subjugating other ideologies: “the actual establishment of domination in hegemony is more that of having the capacity to actively contain, educate and reshape oppositional forces, to maintain them in their subordinate places” (p. 169), rather than eliminate them. Dominated sectors of society are kept in place, they are given their own spaces to exist, “as long as they are constantly contained within the horizon of political practices and ideological systems of representation which place them always in the subordinate position” (p. 170).

Hegemony here is evidenced by the fact that the dominant culture need not destroy the apparent resistance. It simply needs to include it within its own spaces, along with all the other alternatives and possibilities. In fact, the more of them that are allowed in, and the more diverse they are, the more they contribute to the sense of the rich open-ended variety of life, of mutual tolerance and respect, and of apparent freedom. The notion of incorporation points to the extremely important idea that the dominant ideology often responds to opposition, not by attempting to stamp it out,

but rather by allowing it to exist within the places that it assigns, by slowly allowing it to be recognized, but only within the terms of a process which deprives it of any real or effective oppositional force (Hall, 2016, p. 50).

Often, the establishment of a hegemony is connected with moments of crisis, an especially important insight in the context of this work. As Hall puts it, hegemony “involves the way in which political forces are able to win or mobilize popular support for historic tasks” (Hall, 2016, p. 170): the overcoming of a financial and economic crisis is a very good example of one of those historic tasks, as is what is now often referred to as the “refugee” or “migrant” crisis. Actually, the use of the concept of crisis in relation to each one of these moments can in itself be a useful tool to gather hegemonic ideological mobilization for a particular task. And the role of alternative or contesting views is to exist in its confined space, always under the idea that “[w]e don’t belong up there” (p. 170). This is an extremely interesting dynamic that may allow us to understand how, in the context of both of these crises (economic and refugee/migrant), alternative ideologies and power relations were constructed: which ideologies are hegemonic, which are voiced but always contained within their subordinate status, which power relations appear in this dynamic (North/South, European/Non-European)?

Thus, hegemony is never a state but a process that requires constant work and, in order for it to be effective, it has to infiltrate in all aspects of social life, and it is a constant battle zone. In democratic societies, which are extremely complex, there is, in Gramscian terms, a “war of position” (Hall, 2016, p. 177), in which civil society is quite independent from the State power, and political struggle is “extraordinarily diverse and often displaced” (Hall, 2016, p. 177), and is held through culture, language, ideology and morality as well as through direct confrontation with the State’s coercive power, or the economic power.

On this note, Hall condenses what this theory of ideology and hegemony means to the possibility of practicing actual change: in order for there to be a hegemonic politics it has to “occupy each and every front”, including “cultural apparatuses, the discourse of moral languages, in the economic struggle, in the political space”: “Victory is the seizing of the balance of power on each of those fronts of struggle” (Hall, 2016, pp. 177-178). For an ideology to be hegemonic, it has to infiltrate in all domains of life, so as to work “on the

ground of common sense” (p. 178) it has to “block out the spaces and to define the new reference points for the entire social landscape” (p. 178), it has to create a “new common sense”, because common sense “can be won, colonized, turned around, and made to speak in the idioms in which hegemony is produced” (p. 179).

Hall’s (2016) view of ideology and how hegemony is a constant process of power (im)balances is the theoretical framework on which this thesis will be developed. What are the ideological hegemonies in the historical bloc, or context, under analysis? What are its contradictions and oppositions? How are the media discourses encoded within this dominant hegemony? What does that say about power relations in the European and global contexts? Using this operational concept of hegemony and ideology, that is what we propose to explore in this study. Within the context of the economic and the so-called “migrant/refugee” crises, moments which have the strong potential of destabilizing hegemonic ideologies, we want to understand what discourses appear in the media regarding collective identities as tied to political belonging, which of them are rendered subaltern and which are presented as common sense (i.e. hegemonic), what conflicting ideologies are at the forefront and what power relations might be on their basis and reinforced by them.

The theorization of the possibility of struggle and resistance is, in our view, the central contribution of Hall’s review of these concepts, along with the importance of analyzing the specific contradictions in a certain social formation, which allow for resistance and struggle. Hegemony – advanced capitalism – even counter-hegemonies use their language to negotiate and are given space to exist.

Chapter III - The Role of the Media

The media are a particularly interesting site in terms of culture, ideology and hegemony, because not only do they operate *in* ideology, but they have ideology *as its object* (Hall, 2016, p. 137). And, what is even more interesting about these practices is that they are inserted in a field that portrays itself (and is portrayed as being) particularly objective, impartial, neutral, unbiased, factual, truthful and all other synonyms which help to make it, arguably more so than any other cultural ideological practice, a fruitful product and, at the same time, a potential producer of hegemony, of the so-called “common sense”, because it seeks to present itself as corresponding to “reality”, rather than a narrative, a myth, a story, a system of (ideological) symbols (Bird & Dardenne, 1999; Hall et al., 1978; Hall, 2016).

For a long period of time, Media Studies focused mainly on the concepts of mass media and mass society (Hall, 1993). These models, usually based on quantitative large-scale research methods and stimulus-response paradigms, were questioned by research conducted at the Centre for Cultural Studies, at the University of Birmingham, the cradle of Cultural Studies. The preconditions that support traditional Media Studies were gradually overcome by the Center: firstly, the stimulus-response behaviorist model was replaced with more complex models based on the media’s ideological function; secondly, the vision of news as a transparent message was questioned, to the detriment of a posture which is open to linguistic complexity. Both of these changes allowed for the emergence of subsequent studies in which the media’s audience was no longer seen as an indistinguishable mass, and the work on the ideological role of the media underlined its importance in maintaining dominant representations (Hall, 1993). More recently, these models have been improved upon, by expanding them in a way that allows for the analysis of the more varied and complex positions that all of the involved actors may assume (Morley, 2006; Ross, 2011).

3.1 News values and journalistic practices

As Hall, Critcher, Jefferon, Clarke and Roberts demonstrate in *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, The State, And Law and Order* (1978), and as we have extensively explored through the theorization of ideology and hegemony, the “media do not simply and transparently report events which are “naturally” newsworthy in themselves” (p. 53), the regular production of news stories is marked by what the authors call “professional

ideology”, which leads to editors and journalists to choose one story over another, according to news values that are not neutral, and are based on numerous factors such as unusualness, the perceived importance of the actors involved, personalization etc.

Bird & Dardenne (1999) problematize the distinction, made not only by journalists, but by people in general, between so-called hard and soft news, the former being seen as objective, factual and serious facts, and the latter as more of interesting stories. This distinction, together with a view of journalism as a factual narration that corresponds to reality, overshadows the true nature of news items as narratives, as stories, not only each piece of news presenting a unified story, but all of them being a part of a culturally constructed idea of a unified reality, made of myths and built through ritual processes. News stores have “mythical qualities” and constitute a “symbolic system” which acts as a model of and for a culture (p. 266).

One way in which they do this, is by drawing boundaries of acceptability, of normalcy and deviance in day-to-day life, by pointing out what is out of the ordinary, what is worth being told, and this has a specific strength in narrating difference. The narration is in itself a ritual practice, a materialization of hegemony (or ideology, in Althusserian terms), they are a particular mythological narrative with its own symbolic codes (Bird & Dardenne, 1999, p. 267). These myths, or narratives, are constantly retold in every news story, resonating with previous stories, creating the sensation of an “infinitely repeated drama” (p. 268), while journalists operate under the illusion of simply using the most efficient technical methods to portray reality according to objective criteria of the news values of immediacy, unusualness, simplicity etc. (p. 269), but, in fact, always repeating or reusing old narratives to portray new facts.

And the way in which these stories are told, drawing from narrative codes, such as villains and heroes (Bird & Dardenne, 1999, p. 275), is not simply a neutral technique to make news items more engaging, it reflects culturally pre-established “maps of meaning” (Hall, 1993), which represent the interests of the status quo, or hegemony. So, in similar terms used by Hall (2016) when speaking of practices that have ideology as their object, journalists and the media are not simply channels through which existing maps of meaning and myths pass through, but they also have a privileged status. They have an amount of power to define and redefine these narratives, since “the telling of a story necessarily

excludes all other stories that are never told” (Bird & Dardenne, 1999, p. 277). This power is especially strong in mainstream media outlets (Chomsky, 1997) since news stories are part of a set of practices socially regarded as trustworthy, and with the medium acting as an authority figure towards the public (Bird & Dardenne, 1999, p. 275). What the authors point out is that what are seen as the new “facts” in a news article are in fact just details that are easily forgotten, what matters and what remains as maps of meaning are the larger narratives, that give meaning to these details in a more permanent way, and which, thus, tend to repeat themselves.

Opinion articles (op-eds) do not operate under the disguise of objectivity and are seen as a newspaper’s outlet for partiality, as well as context from an assumed point of view. However, it cannot be dissociated from the unity of the stories themselves, becoming part of how topics and issues are framed by the media. Certain specialists, or social authorities are given a voice to explain current events, and this is, too, part of the narrative, informed by the hegemony. Even so, from a methodological standpoint, it is crucial to separate the analysis of op-eds, where ideologies are expected to be more obviously present, from the news stories themselves, as the authors of *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978) found, an analytical distinction between primary news, feature articles, editorials and op-eds/columns is crucial in understanding the way in which newspapers can tilt or overcome the formal balance of representations, seen as objectivity, that is on the basis of newswriting:

The formal shifts – from news to editorials, or from news to features – both depend on elaborating some of the themes already present in first-order news presentation. But they inflect these themes in opposite directions: the first (editorials) toward a judgement, the second (features) towards ‘deeper explanations’ or ‘background’. The separation is therefore not a technical matter of good journalistic practice, but arises from two different ways of effecting an ideological closure (simple and complex). If primary-news stories are presented in the ‘form of a question’, editorials and features provide two, different kinds of ‘answers’ (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 88).

An equally routine topic is that of elections and electoral disputes. In the late 1970s, Michael Gurevitch and Jay G. Blumler (1999) underwent an observational study inside the BBC newsroom during the British general elections in 1979. The authors focused on the contradiction, during electoral races, between journalists' two often opposing duties: reporting interesting news stories (according to news values) but also being "fair" or "impartial". At the time of the study, the BBC adopted a time-based criterium for balance, by attributing, daily, to each of the parties an amount of news coverage time proportional to the total votes on the previous election. This precluded them from possible accusations of partiality.

The authors observed how political campaigns made use of journalistic routines and their rules for balance, as well as news values in order to set the agenda (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1999, pp. 204-205). By knowing what journalists were looking for, especially in the case of television, in which "soundbites" are particularly important, political campaigns were often able to set the tone or the topic of the day. This is mainly so because in television news, the evening newscast is presented as a unity, where editors look for a unifying topic and sometimes fabricate dialogues between campaigns in order to obtain a narrative, by rearranging often fragmented discourses, topics or events as a "coherent package" (p. 205). The most interesting point, regarding Gurevitch and Blumler's study, for the purposes of this project, is the particular richness of electoral news coverage, because these contradiction between journalistic routines and practices, news values and a particularly acute attentiveness to the perils of partiality are arguably at its most fertile state, intensifying the potential for exploring existing hegemonies and ideologies, not only in political movements with their own agenda, but also in the media.

Even we as academics, or intellectuals, in the field of Cultural Studies, have to be aware that we are operating in and on ideology and hegemony, and through narratives masked by the technical and methodological specificities of our practices. We are not exempt from the hazards outlined for all other aspects of human practices. The only thing we can do is be aware of their existence during every step of the way. This is part of our methodology in Cultural Studies, but it is important to underline, once more, that we are ourselves operating within certain ideologies and hegemonies which inform our search for knowledge (not truth). We have to actively combat the temptation of creating our own ideology or hegemony, and

always search out the tension points and resistances which allow us to acknowledge the existing hegemonies.

3.2 Encoding/Decoding

Our theoretical foundation derives mainly from two of Hall's main contributions to Media Studies from the Cultural Studies perspective: the *Encoding/Decoding* (Hall, 1993) model, developed still in a structuralist "phase", and *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), a sort of evolution of the former.

The notion of the news story as socially produced is related to the famous encoding/decoding model of communication developed by Stuart Hall, and it marks Hall's "turning point [...] towards structuralism" (Procter, 2004, p. 57). In line with Cultural Studies' challenging of stimulus-response and simplistic communication models, Hall develops this model that aims to surpass the linearity of previous ones, namely allowing for the complexity of the process to be considered (Hall, 1993). According to this model, the production of a communicative message is regarded as being constituted by moments of production and reception, which are related to each other in that they are "differentiated moments within the totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole" (Hall, 1993, p. 93). The production of a message by the media is made in a certain context, according to certain structures and codes, frameworks of knowledge, relations of production and technical infrastructure. This context shapes how the media encode the message as discourse and then broadcast or publish it. These messages encoded as discourse are then decoded by the audience as meaning.

However, the decoding of this discourse is done in a different (even if sometimes similar) context, and thus the message decoded is not necessarily the same that was encoded. And the meanings produced by the audience are often not the ones intended by the media (see Figure 1). The process is finalized when these meanings are translated into social practices, considering that "if the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect" (Hall, 1993, p. 91). Just as all ideology is materialized into practices. This approach highlights the necessity of each of the moments, however it establishes that none of them "can fully guarantee the next moment with which it is articulated" (Hall, 1993, p. 91). The production, i.e., the construction of the message, is a moment framed by institutional

structures and discursive aspects, such as routines of production, technical skills, ideologies, assumptions, etc. These structures, of course, are also not a closed system and are influencers and influenced by other sources of society.

When reaching the audience, the message is then decoded according to different structures of understanding as well as social and economic relations. These differences between encoded and decoded message can create what the author calls “misunderstandings”, which are caused by the level of symmetry/asymmetry between the position of the encoder-producer and the decoder-receiver, and the identity/non-identity of codes, which is molded by structural differences as well as different codes, since discourses are only possible through the use of codes.




FIGURE 1 – STUART HALL’S ENCODING/DECODING MODEL (HALL, 1993, P. 94)

The apparent “naturalism and 'realism' (...) is the result of a discursive practice” (Hall, 1993, p. 95). Of course, in certain contexts, certain codes are so widely distributed that they are simply regarded as not being constructs, as being, in fact, natural. “This has the (ideological) effect of concealing the practices of coding which are present”, when, in fact, the “articulation of an arbitrary sign – whether visual or verbal – with the concept of a referent is the product not of nature but of convention” (Hall, 1993, p. 95).

Codes refer to “the 'maps of meanings' into which any culture is classified”, maps which have usages, practices and interests that shape them (Hall, 1993, p. 98). Another important feature of this model is its denial of neutrality, by claiming that the distinction between denotation and connotation is merely analytical. In its classical sense, the former is perceived as a natural sign without the intervention of a code, and the latter as less fixed and

changeable in meaning. In Hall's model, the connotative level is that in which significations are clearly altered and ideology becomes visible. The denotative level, by appearing to be natural, evidences the fixed and less contested side of ideology, that is the most universally accepted one. Some misunderstandings arise from the receiver failing to comprehend the language or argument, but mostly misunderstandings arise from the discourse not being decoded with the same interpretation as it was encoded.

Thus, the coding moment cannot guarantee the decoding moment, it only sets some of the limits to the interpretation, offering "no necessary correspondence" (Hall, 1993, p. 100). The author then offers three hypothetical positions "from which the decodings of a televisual discourse may be constructed". First, the "dominant-hegemonic position", when the viewer decodes the message in the same terms in which it was encoded, "operating inside the dominant code" this produces "perfectly transparent communication" (p. 101). Second, the "negotiated code or position", which draws on "adaptive and oppositional elements" by acknowledging that the codes are legitimate in representing an abstract general signification but may adopt exceptions to this rule in a situational context (p. 102). Third, the "oppositional code" (p. 103), in which the viewer understands the denotative and connotative signs but decodes the message in a "globally contract way", i.e., interprets the message as encoded within a certain structure and code, in which he/she does not see him/herself.

But, if we take into consideration Hall's own focus on the idea of struggle, the question remains: how does "such a large number of journalists, consulting only their "freedom" to publish and be damned, do tend to reproduce, quite spontaneously, without compulsion, again and again, accounts of the world constructed within fundamentally the same ideological categories?" (Hall, 2016, p. 132-133).

'Encoding/decoding' argues that televisual discourse plays a key ideological role in reproducing and securing, by consent rather than force, the values and meanings of the dominant cultural order. However, these dominant or preferred meanings are always open to contestation and transformation as they are made to signify otherwise. The media do not express ideology in this context, rather the media becomes a site of ideological struggle (Procter, 2004, p. 72).

More recently, the encoding/decoding model has itself been subject to some critiques and complexification, as a consequence of its shortcomings. Mainly, the critiques do not discard of the model or deny its importance and relevance, but rather expand it. Authors who have tackled this task focus on both the decoding, or audience, side of the model, as well as on the encoding side of the model. David Morley (2006), for instance, points to many “unanswered questions” in the model, regarding the audience decoding moment, and underlines many of its issues such as the fact that it “over-valued the explicitly political dimension of the media’s relation to their audience”, but he also recognizes “that the model, despite its limitations, still has much to offer” (p. 14).

This is one of the critiques pointed to Hall’s encoding/decoding model, namely that it “assumed that news texts mostly are encoded within the dominant ideology” (Ross, 2011), when, in fact, the model has to be expanded, since the media texts themselves, i.e., the encoding, can have differing positions regarding the hegemony. Ross himself also focuses on the audience side of the model and expands it to “handle texts that are not dominant-hegemonic” (p. 5), mainly what he titles the “typology” of Hall’s model: the three categories of hypothetical decoding positions - dominant-hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional. The problem, Ross argues, is that the “encoded ideological tendency of any message is taken for granted and is not contingent” (p. 4), but we should “assume other encoding possibilities” (p. 4), namely, a text that assumes an oppositional position to the dominant hegemony:

If the reader understands the text and agrees with it, he or she is probably oppositional in relation to the dominant ideology of society but not oppositional to the message of the text. And the other way round, if you read it from a dominant-hegemonic ideological position, you will be oppositional in relation to the text, but not in relation to the dominant ideology (Ross, 2011, p. 4).

This is why Ross divides Hall’s typology into two alternative models, which expand on the original typology: one which focuses on different decoding positions regarding the text (the “text-relative” model), and another one which focuses on the ideological hegemony.

If we also do the same partition between dominant-hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional regarding the encoded meaning, we can cross-tabulate the encoding and

the decoding typologies and get a more complex typology consisting of nine distinct combinations of encoding and decoding positions (Ross, 2011, p. 6).

This allows for the phenomenon of “neutralization”, in which “as well as media texts encoded within the dominant ideology may be interpreted in an oppositional way, texts which could be said to be encoded from an oppositional position may in some cases be neutralized because they are decoded from the point of view of the dominant ideology” (Ross, 2011, p.6). The two proposed typologies can be best summarized in the tables presented by the author:

		ENCODING POSITIONS		
		Dominant-hegemonic encoding (Hall's assumed mode)	Negotiated encoding (partly critical text)	Oppositional encoding (a radical text)
DECODING POSITIONS (ideological)	Dominant-hegemonic position	Dominant-hegemonic reading of dominant-hegemonic text	Dominant-hegemonic reading of negotiated text <i>=Neutralization</i>	Dominant-hegemonic reading of oppositional text <i>=Neutralization</i>
	Negotiated position	Negotiated reading of dominant-hegemonic text	Negotiated reading of negotiated text	Negotiated reading of oppositional text
	Oppositional position	Oppositional reading of dominant-hegemonic text	Oppositional reading of negotiated text <i>=Amplification of critique</i>	Oppositional reading of oppositional text <i>=Agreement with oppositional text</i>

FIGURE 2 – MODIFIED ENCODING/DECODING TYPOLOGY (IDEOLOGY VERSION) (ROSS, 2011, P. 7)

		ENCODING POSITIONS		
		Dominant-hegemonic encoding (Hall' assumed mode)	Negotiated encoding (partly critical text)	Oppositional encoding (radical text)
DECODING POSITIONS (text-relative)	Text-accepting position	Text-acceptance of dominant-hegemonic text	Text-acceptance of negotiated text	Text-acceptance of oppositional text
	Text-negotiation position	Negotiation of dominant-hegemonic text	Negotiation of negotiated text	Negotiation of oppositional text
	Text-oppositional position	Text-oppositional reading of dominant-hegemonic text	Text-oppositional reading of negotiated text	Text-oppositional reading of oppositional text <i>=Neutralization</i>

FIGURE 3 – MODIFIED ENCODING/DECODING TYPOLOGY (TEXT-RELATIVE VERSION) (ROSS, 2011, P. 8)

The model seems to exhibit shortcoming regarding the non-homogenous nature of all media institutions and messages. As Ross states, the encoding/decoding model “assumes we can identify one encoded meaning, or preferred reading, prior to decoding” (Ross, 2011, p. 9), and it is exactly this point we are trying to address in this study: the way the media present a certain message, i.e., encode it.

Overall, we agree with these criticisms, and are taking these complexifications of the model into account in our own research. But Hall himself seems to have overcome many of them in his poststructuralist turn with *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), in a way that seems almost inevitable given his own view of how ideology and the media work, namely the idea that the media do not merely reproduce dominant ideology, but that it is, in fact, a site of ideological struggle (Procter, 2004, p. 72).

3.3 Moral Panics, Framing and Primary Definers

The move beyond the structuralism of Encoding/Decoding allows us to problematize media practices and the relationships between media, power and ideology. In *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, The State, and Law and Order* (Hall, et al., 1978), several key concepts are explored which help us to understand the interplay between media and power, within this view of ideology and hegemony, mainly those of moral panics and primary definers, to which we add that of framing - all of which are central for the research presented here.

What this work also allows us to understand regarding the authors’ view of the role played by the media in reproducing dominant ideology is that this happens, in their view, mainly because of the three aspects of the social production of news: “the bureaucratic organisation of the media which produces the news in specific types of categories”, “the structure of the news values which orders the selection and ranking of particular stories within these categories” and “the moment of the construction of the news story itself”, in which the story is “made to mean” by the media (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 54). The consensus is constructed because “the process of signification - giving social meanings to events - *both assumes and helps to construct society as a “consensus”*” (p. 55). This is an idea that shapes a certain ideology of culture that has direct political, social and economic consequences. Of course, there is some degree of commonness, that allows certain groups of people to inhabit and exist in a certain social-political context, however, in the late seventies, the authors

pointed out that “this basic cultural fact about society has been raised to an extreme ideological level” (p. 55), and it is exactly the level of domination and the existence and possibilities of struggle regarding this “social fact” that we are exploring in this research.

Because we occupy the same society and belong to roughly the same ‘culture’, it is assumed that there is basically, only one perspective on events: that provided by what is sometimes called *the* culture, or (by some social scientists) *the* ‘central value system’. This view denies any major structural discrepancies between different groups, or between the very different maps of meaning in a society. This ‘consensual’ viewpoint has important political consequences. when used as the taken-for-granted basis of communication (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 55).

When discourses are paved with distinctions that assume the consensual nature of certain taken-for-granted groups of people, often tied to the (mis)use of the concept of identity, the struggles and conflicts between groups are hidden away and made invisible. This idea helps us to understand the construction of discourses about *us* and *them*, about Northern Europe as a certain consensual “culture” as opposed to “Southern Europe”, about a consensual “Portugal” or “Germany”, about a consensual “Europe” as opposed to non-European migrants, consensual Muslim migrants, or consensual refugees.

3.3.1 Moral Panics

Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (Hall et al., 1978) explores the appearance of reporting about “mugging” crimes in the UK and the ideological control exerted during the news coverage. The authors observed that the phenomenon of mugging had existed for a long time, but that the use of the term, imported from the USA, associated with youth cultures, and the increase of the attention it got in the media and the way these stories were narrated, contributed to a situation that the authors describe in the following terms:

When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’, in the form of police chiefs,

the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk ‘with one voice’ of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations universally stress ‘sudden and dramatic’ increases (in numbers involved or events) and ‘novelty’, above and beyond that which a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic (Hall et al, 1978, p. 16).

The concept of moral panic is borrowed from Stan Cohen (1972/2002), and basically signifies a social reaction in which a person or group is scapegoated as a threat, in a way that involves stereotyping by the media, and moral judgements by those in the “power bloc”: editors, politicians, experts, creating a sense of panic and a narrative that explains how these people are a “threat to societal values and interests” (p. 1).

This idea of moral panics, as well as the importance of labels, “especially when applied to dramatic public events” (Hall et al, 1978, p. 19), is directly relevant to this research. We ourselves have been using, in a simplifying manner, labels such as the “economic crisis”, and, even more pertinently, the labels of “migrant crisis” and “refugee crisis”, which, could be argued, are also part of the creation of moral panics spanning throughout the chronological scope of this project.

3.3.2 Framing

The concept of framing is central to our research, albeit in its operationalized form considering the theoretical, epistemological and ontological basis of the theory underlying Cultural Studies. However, before operationalizing the concept as used here, and in order to understand its departures from the constructivist tradition, we must first present it as it is formulated in Media Studies’ constructivist tradition, namely in the already famous Giles and Shaw (2009) technique of Media Framing Analysis (MFA).

As the authors argue, “[d]espite – or perhaps because of – the enormous prevalence of framing research, the term “framing” has itself managed to escape precise and consistent definition both conceptually and methodologically” (Giles and Shaw, 2009, p. 377). This prevalence in Media Studies is also connected to the highly debated nature of “framing” – is

it a paradigm, a theory, a method? It does not seem to be clear, since the concept is used in multiple contexts and for different purposes and methods (p. 378). At the same time, the authors argue, research in Psychology has not been taking into account the particularities of the Media field. In this study we would be more in line with the approach related to the idea of frames as templates, “seeing media and their audiences as joint producers of meaning and understanding. Media templates, or discourses, are shared cultural material that both news sources and audiences draw on to explain events” (p. 390), but, in our view, this definition takes on a much more critical approach, when embodied in complex concepts such as ideology, hegemony and struggle, which are completely absent in Framing Theory, and represent processes involving power relations and struggles that go way beyond a construction of meaning.

One of the most interesting points made by Giles and Shaw (2009) is an ethical and epistemological issue that we have already mentioned regarding the role of the academic in relation to the hegemony, and the fact that one does not operate outside of the social world, and, as such, the possibility of bias has to be taken into account at all times. This is a point of contention between our approach and the more traditional concept of framing, since we would argue that it is not an issue of “bias” but the recognition of a necessary point of view, a standpoint. We approach the research with a theoretical paradigm which is exposed, criticized, argued and then used, within its potential and limitations. Once again, our departure from the whole basis of the theory becomes evident, when the authors claim that “the coding and interpretation processes themselves are subject to the same selective bias as the media material they are examining” (p. 382). What is crucial, and where a bit of an overlap can be found with our view, is that these authors argue that, even though “all research involves some element of framing”, this does not mean it is merely subjective, since “the difference is that the spotlight is, or should be, guided by theory rather than agenda” (p. 382). This guidance by theory is what leads us to discard the term “bias” altogether.

Having laid out the constructivist approach to framing, we can now better operationalize it to work for our view of social facts and themes, which is highly informed by the research on mugging conducted in *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), in which the term “frame” is used, that we attempt to operationalize, so as to distance ourselves clearly from the constructivist concept of “frame”.

When exploring how the media approached the subject of mugging, the authors (Hall et al., 1978) are, in fact, trying to understand the framing processes used, by the media and the definers, as they themselves put it, the “ideological frame”: “What the agencies and the press were responding to was not a simple set of facts but a new definition of the situation - a new construction of the social reality of crime”, which is tied to the idea of facts as related to the “ideological constructions of reality” (p. 29).

This is not to say that these facts, these events, do not actually occur in the real world, but that they are perceived and presented, encoded and decoded, according to these frames, creating “discrepancies (...) between threat and reaction” which lead to an “ideological displacement” that the authors call “moral panic” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 29).

As we explained supra, the process of news production, or encoding, according to the authors is based on three aspects: the routine organization of the newsroom, which creates news categories, the structure of news values, which organizes stories within these categories, and, finally, the construction of the news story. This third part of the process corresponds to the transformation of the news item in relation to the presumed audience in a way that makes it understandable, by identifying it and inserting it into a social context, i.e., by framing it. It is by these means that the media undergo the social process of making events understandable, through “cultural maps of the social world” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 54), and it is this critical definition of “frame” that we use in our research.

3.3.3 Definers

In *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), the authors propose that the media tend to reproduce dominant views mainly because of what they call “primary definers”, or their main sources. The consensual nature of society, the “common sense”, or hegemony (Hall, 2016) is often based on the reproduction by the media of the perspectives of those in power, not in a stimulus-response, straightforward, or controlled manner, neither because of some sort of “conspiracy theory” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 57), but because of the way in which news is produced.

The media depend on “regular and reliable institutional sources” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 57) for stories, mainly for two reasons: the pressure of deadlines and the idea of objectivity, both of which lead to journalists routinely accessing certain sources, or definers,

seen as authoritative on certain issues. The ideological rules of journalism, based on this idea of objectivity, often lead to the reproduction of discourses of what are seen as credible sources, objective and representative of certain social groups or institutions, more often than not, direct representatives of the hegemony.

These routines and journalistic ideology create a privileged access by those who hold powerful positions, or that are seen as high up in the “hierarchy of credibility” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 58), who end up becoming the primary definers. So, even if alternative views of secondary definers are presented, the matrix for the interpretation of the story is always the primary definers’, their version becomes the reference against which all others are measured, their language is the one normalized and their view is the one which ends up framing the whole issue: “the primary definition sets the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the problem is. This initial framework then provides the criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labelled as ‘relevant’ to the debate, or ‘irrelevant’” (p. 59).

Analyzing mugging reports in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mirror*, the authors (Hall, et al., 1978) found a reciprocal relationship between the use of the term “mugging” by the newspapers and the coverage of mugging cases, and the primary definers, the hegemony, in this case, represented by the judges, and their framing of the issue as a public issue that needs to be controlled. The news reports themselves also serve to confirm and legitimize the police and the courtrooms’ actions, creating an ideological control over the issue, making it so that the media, at a certain point, themselves, become an apparatus of the process of control.

They (Hall, et al., 1978) consider the relationship between the media and primary definers essential, since news coverage is not only driven by news values but also by a reciprocal relationship between the media and primary definers, which allows for this ideological control. However, it is not a straightforward process, since the media are independent institutions from the State, they have their own motives and agendas which may collide with those of the primary definers and institutions in power may have themselves conflicting agendas (Traquina, 1999, p.140).

Structural constraints which lead to the reproduction of dominant ideologies do not eliminate the possibility for autonomy on the part of the media. In their selection of stories, for example, they exercise this autonomy, based on their own criteria. These, of course, are used differently, according to what the authors name the “social personalities” of the

newspapers (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 60). Even the same event, based on the same sources, can use different discourses and language. However, the authors also stress that these differences are quite constrained by the ideological limits, based on the value consensus (hegemony), so this autonomy is limited. The translation of the dominant's points of view into publicly understandable language by the media is what naturalizes them.

As we explore the data collected for this research, the identification of the sources used and the classification of definers is essential, if we want to have a complex and rich view of the hegemonic ideologies and struggles in play. It is, however, of equal importance to always keep in mind that some potential definers are not even consulted, i.e., some frames are not even taken into account, not even in a secondary position. We are not able, for obvious reasons, to identify and explore the voiceless' discourses, but the possibility that they exist must be taken into consideration during our analysis.

The existence and possibility for reproduction of counter-ideologies, for struggle, is dependent on the level of organization of those who promote them:

If the tendency towards ideological closure - the prevailing tendency - is maintained by the way the different apparatuses are structurally linked so as to promote the dominant definitions of events, then the counter-tendency must also depend on the existence of organised and articulate sources which generate counter-definitions of the situation (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 64).

Hall, Critcher, Jefferon, Clarke and Roberts' (1978) work is on a particular site subjected to social control, that of crime, which, in that case, is tackled within a particular context of social and political crisis, however, the types of crises undertaken in our research are not fundamentally different. The authors identify four crises at the time of their study: a crisis of an advanced industrial capitalist nation (Britain); a crisis of the relations of social forces; a crisis of the State; and a crisis in political legitimacy, in social authority, in hegemony, and in the forms of class struggle and resistance (Hall, et al., 1978, pp. 317-319).

Although we are in no position to develop an equivalent analysis of our particular historical and political context, there are a number of historical developments that point at some possibilities in the context under analysis: a crisis of the European Union as a

supranational project, which seemed to be presented as a consensual project and began being highly questioned with the first mentions of Grexit; at the same time, the continuation of the crisis of the State; a global economic and financial crisis which had particular effects in the European context as the Eurozone debt; a “migration” or “refugee” crisis...

It is relevant, going into the analysis of the data, to keep in mind the dynamics of these crises in hegemony, as the whole concept of crisis and the use of that label in the context under analysis is absolutely central. The idea of a crisis, be it the economic crisis or the “refugee/migrant” crisis, whether they constitute an actual crisis or not, is a discourse that has a particular role in the context of ideology and hegemony. This does not mean that there may not be an actual crisis. The point is that the discourses about it, the “ideology of the crisis” is the important issue: “It is how the real crisis is perceived and controlled which contains the seeds of political and ideological distortion” (Hall et al, 1978, p. 322).

And here, moral panics play a major role, because it is through the projection of various fears, combined into an enemy that “becomes both many-faceted and ‘one’” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 323), that it is possible to build support for social control and coercion for extraordinary measures to fight this “enemy”. In the case of *Policing the Crisis...*, this control was the traditional State control exercised by State Apparatuses such as the police and the courts. But in the case of this research, evidence seems to point to a different type of control, whether it is an economic and financial form of control, exercised both by entities outside and above the State (budgetary stability pacts), or of the State authorities regarding its citizens (austerity measures), or a military-like control of European borders, for example.

There are several variations of this discourse that allows for more social control, depending on the political viewpoint, whether it was the conservative, populist or social-democratic discourses, they all more or less point to the same:

In these disparate voices we can hear the closure occurring - the interlocking mechanisms closing, the doors clanging shut. The society is battening itself down for the ‘long haul’ through a crisis. There is a light at the end of the tunnel - but not much; and it is far off. Meanwhile, the state has won the right, and indeed inherited the duty, to move swiftly, to swamp fast and hard, to listen in, discreetly survey,

saturate and swamp, charge or hold without charge, act on suspicion, hustle and shoulder, to keep society on the straight and narrow (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 323).

It is these points of convergence and dissonance we have to be alert to when undergoing the empirical analysis of our data. We want to pinpoint and pull apart the subtleties in the discourses that differentiate them, but also, and mainly, the overarching frames that pull them together.

Part II – Empirical Research

Chapter IV – Research Design

The concept of framing used in this research is undeniably tangled up in the concepts of ideology and hegemony (Hall, 2016), as well as with the idea of moral panics (Hall et al., 1978). Moral panics about crises pave the way to control. When people are afraid, subjected to social anxiety, through a moral panic, created not only by the State, but sometimes also by counter-hegemonic forces, solutions based on increased control (be it political, social or economic) become more acceptable.

In the period under analysis, two major crises are in the public debate: the Eurozone (economic and financial) crisis, and the “refugee/migrant” crisis. Each of these crises is based on presenting a certain threat, depending on the viewpoint. This viewpoint is key, which is why we have tried to complexify the models we are working on, in order to identify the discourses of each definer present in the media coverage. Often, these threats have been personified along the axis of national/European identity with cultural (religious) and economic undertones and ignoring other elements of possible solidarity or counter-hegemony.

As explained in Part I, we adopt a combination of Hall’s *Encoding/Decoding* (1993) model, and its upgrades by Ross (2011), as well as the methodology and theory used in *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall, et al., 1978), to create our own model for answering our main research question: What are the ideologies of national and European identities in the media, in Portugal and Germany, in moments of crisis, and what are their contradictions and oppositions? Using the “text-relative” model (Ross, 2011), we regard the definers (Hall, et al., 1978) of each news piece as the encoders, and the media outlet as the decoder of the text. As such, the media can adopt different text-relative positions regarding the definers’ discourses. On a second level, having gathered all of our data, it becomes possible to define what the dominant ideology is, and then position not only the media, but also the definers, in relation to it, according to the “ideology” version of the model. Neither do we assume that the media simply encode according to the dominant ideology, nor do we assume what the “preferred reading”, or the dominant ideology itself, is, which can only be done by tracing

the patterns of how different ideologies and counter-hegemonies interact in the different political, social and mediatic discourses present in the media. We also explore what frames are used by whom and in what way, under what conditions each frame appears and the particular dynamics of each newspaper, taking into account the differentiation between primary news, feature articles, editorials and op-eds/columns (Hall, et al., 1978).

		Encoding Positions - Definers		
		Dominant-hegemonic	Negotiated (partly critical)	Oppositional (radical)
Decoding positions – News Outlets	Accepting	News outlet encodes hegemonic definers’ dominant representation	News outlet encodes definers’ negotiated representation	News outlet encodes oppositional representation
	Negotiation	News outlet negotiates hegemonic definers’ dominant representation	News outlet negotiates definers’ negotiated representation	News outlet negotiates definers’ oppositional representation
	Oppositional	News outlet opposes hegemonic definers’ dominant representation	News outlet opposes definers’ negotiated representation	News outlet opposes definers’ oppositional representation

FIGURE 4 – ADAPTED ENCODING/DECODING MODEL

Therefore, we find it necessary to categorize the definers themselves, according to their national context, relation to power and political affiliation - to deepen the understanding of who is a definer, who is heard and whose discourse is hegemonic, as well as the opposite, regarding potential counter-hegemonic discourses in the mainstream media. We sustain that

the more thorough and detailed we are when looking at *who* is saying *what*, *in what context* and with *which authority*, the more likely we are to strengthen the body of knowledge about this issue.

How we categorize the “who” is based on pragmatic classifications, not just for practical reasons, but also because we are, in a sense, dissecting ideologies, ideas that have become “common sense” (Hall, 2016), so using these commonsensical classifications allows us to explore how they interplay with media discourses. As such, the interplay between nationality, political affiliation (when applicable), occupation/position and relation to power (when applicable), regarding the definers, and nationality and social personality, in relation to the media outlets, allows for a more intricate exploration of what are expected to be hegemonic discourses, since they are broadcasted by mainstream media outlets, but may not be completely so. And, if not, we want to be able to see where non- or counter-hegemonic discourses come from, and when and where they are given a voice.

Our methodological model allows us to tackle the sub-questions step by step, following our theoretical framework. Having operationalized the theoretical concepts of ideology, hegemony and identities based on “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016), as well as the theoretical framework of this thesis, based on Media Studies in the Cultural Studies approach and the revisited encoding/decoding model, we will now outline the methodological framework for the empirical analysis component of this study. Our own adapted version of Hall’s encoding/decoding model (see Figure 4) is based on contributions from other authors (Ross, 2011; Morley, 2006), keeping in mind that we are focusing only on the production stage of media messages and not the reception side of the communicative process, or audience studies. Following the general Cultural Studies approach, we underline that context is key when analyzing our data. If we are to explore power relations underlying cultural practices, we must always be aware of their complexities, and refrain from simply enumerating existing narratives: we have to be conscious of who is saying what and in what context (Hall, 2016).

In Ross’s (2011) model, the encoded media text can be dominant/hegemonic, negotiated (partly critical) or oppositional (radical). In this research, however, since we do not want to assume what the hegemonic position is, we must dive deeper into the relation between the definers/sources and the media texts. As such, we propose a model in which the

sources/definers are regarded as encoders of political/ideological discourse, and the media outlets are, at the same time, decoders of this discourse and encoders of the media discourse. The audience, who is left out of the current analysis, is, then, a decoder of the media discourse, and a potential encoder, too (for example, through social media, as is proposed by Wieringa (2017)). Thus, as Ross (2011) argues, the encoding by the media outlet can be hegemonic, partly critical or radical, but the definers themselves can also assume either of the positions.

To define what the hegemony is, we need to carefully explore each definer's discourse (encoding), and the way these discourses are narrated (decoded and encoded) by the media outlets. Each text can have several sources/definers and unravelling who is saying what allows us to identify what narratives, what ideologies, are given a voice by the media. The media, then, assume different positions regarding these narratives, and are not simply reproducing them without framing them in some way. As such, the media's role as a producer and reproducer of the hegemony is not denied, since, at the end, only the discourses selected by the media outlets are allowed to speak, or given enough importance, but the interaction between power holders and other actors in defining the media outlets' encoding strategies is complexified, which allows us to identify the existing ideological struggles and oppositions. For instance, a certain narrative can be promoted by a political power holder, who is, at first glance, part of the political hegemony, but if all the media outlets assume an oppositional position towards it, can it be considered hegemonic or dominant? Or, if a definer who does not hold any type of formal political power, promotes a discourse that is accepted and promoted by media outlets, in opposition to the official political discourse, what does this mean for the existing struggles and oppositions within the hegemony? In order to begin to think about these questions, the model has to be complexified, following Stuart Hall's own arguments regarding research in the Cultural Studies field, mainly that, although the structure cannot be denied, it is its complexity that must be analyzed. We must move from the unity that appears at high levels of abstraction, and work at lower levels of abstraction, where the differences appear, we need to "examine the many determinations, in concrete analysis, of particular linguistic or cultural formations and the particular aspects which differentiate them from one another" (Hall, 2016, pp. 119-120).

It is also relevant to note that, even though a big part of our theoretical basis is made up of Stuart Hall's work, and with particular relevance *Policing the Crisis...* (1978), we

cannot ignore that the Media Studies landscape has suffered deep structural, technological and social changes in the past years and decades, from the birth and development of online media, to the consumption of constantly updated and potentially infinite news pieces in mobile devices, as well as the growingly powerful phenomenon of social media and the possibilities for interaction with an alternative to “mainstream media”, much has changed since the days in which the media possessed a “near-monopoly over ‘social knowledge’, as the primary source of information about what is happening” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 64).

However, firstly, even though this research focuses on the online version of the analyzed news outlets, it still focuses on these mainstream media outlets and in a time of transition, but which is still very much marked by an “encoding” method that is very similar to the pre-Internet media era. Not disregarding the importance of complementing research about these types of outlets with new forms of communicating and circulating information, of producing and reproducing hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses, we consider that the fact that they are mainstream allows us to look exactly at what we are trying to explore: the existing ideologies and consensuses, or hegemonies, and the possible struggles or sites of struggle. The latter would benefit from subsequent studies that consider (even if only apparently) alternative media discourses, but that is not the scope of this project.

In electoral periods, political discourses often consist of ideological displacement creating a moral panic, a fear, to convince voters to vote for a solution to that fear, that crisis, whether it almost completely fabricated or has a real importance (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 322). The risky defaulting South, the austere controlling North, the different refugees, the uncontrollable migrants, the markets, the Euro, the EU, the end of the EU, ... All these sources of social anxiety, these crises, are framed according to different variables and agents, creating and destroying consensuses, dissensus, struggles and hegemonies, which have to be explored and picked apart in order to understand in which conditions they are drawn upon and reproduced.

4.1 Framework

The research question that guides this project is the following:

RQ - What are the ideologies of national and European identities in the media, in Portugal and Germany, in moments of crisis, and what are their contradictions and oppositions?

To aid in answering the main question, operational sub-questions were drawn out, to be applied to every piece of data:

OQ1 - What are the ideologies regarding *us* and *them*?

OQ1.1 - What are the conditions under which different types of hegemonic / negotiated /oppositional discourses are reproduced in the media?

OQ1.2 - What are the conditions under which differences between countries / news outlets / social personalities / political affiliation arise ...?

This research question is based upon the main hypothesis that the conditions that shape these narratives are potentially modelled by the following elements:

The definers

The main purpose of this question is to identify not only who is *given a voice* by the news outlet, but also to distinguish the authors of the different discourses reproduced by the media. Different sources or definers have different levels of legitimacy and occupy different levels in the power structure of society. Knowing who is promoting which discourse regarding identity is essential to find these differences. It is also important in order to understand how the news outlet, as a potential promoter of the hegemony, positions itself in relation to each of these discourses. As such, considering the theoretical basis of this research, each source will have to be identified by relation to power, political/social/professional affiliation and national context:

- National context

The highly discussed and theorized concept of nationality and national identity is of course not irrelevant and occupies its own chapter in this project. However, for the purpose of categorizing the definers, it will assume a pragmatic form, because, as explained previously, the purpose is to question these categories themselves, by identifying what is the common sense. So, using them is absolutely necessary. As such, the questioning of this concept is not expected at this stage: Angela Merkel is classified as German, and Pedro Passos Coelho as Portuguese, without further problematization. Issues could arise for potential definers “in-between” nationality categories, and the description used by the media will serve as anchor.

- Political/professional/social affiliation

Regarding political definers, to be able to compare and find patterns in the overall data set, it is important to cluster political parties together, especially those in different countries, according to political ideology (see list of acronyms). Thus, the classification used by the parties themselves, or by the political groups they are a part of, will be used to characterize them, together with database and encyclopedic classifications, namely within the left-right spectrum. We acknowledge that this classification is not unquestionably straightforward (Scherer, 2020; Tavares, 2015), but to tackle this is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the list of acronyms, we have listed and briefly described the Portuguese and German political parties present in this research, as well as the European political groups. Non-political definers are categorized according to their professional or social group (for example, opinion makers, diplomats, cultural sector).

- Relation to power (when applicable)

When it comes to definers who are politicians, if a certain definer is a holder of executive power, they will be defined as being in power, if they are in the opposition as MPs, or the party they belong to is in the opposition in Parliament, they will be defined as being in the opposition, as is the case for definers who are politicians but do not hold power, and their party does not have parliamentary seats.

Context of the news event

Context is key in the Cultural Studies approach to research, since we need to work on the double articulation between structure and practice (Hall, 2016, p. 125). As such, statements and discourses cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, but have to be thought of as part of a broader discourse that justifies the article in itself. The most straightforward and telling way to identify not only the context but also the main frame used by the media is by exploring the headlines, which are “frequently an accurate, if simple, guide to the themes implicit in a story which the newspapers consider to represent its most ‘newsworthy’ angle” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 84).

The news outlets’ social personalities

This concept is an important one in the selection of the data for analysis, and is relevant as a potential variable, since one can expect the more usual simplification of issues

connected to tabloid journalism, with less space for complexities, and the elite outlets to allow for a more nuanced discourse. Differences must be taken into account when identifying hegemonic discourses.

Regarding news values and the “selectivity” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 60), i.e., the media’s space for autonomy and potential criticism to the hegemony, the possibility of the media to “impose their own criteria on structures ‘raw materials’” (p. 60), not all media outlets exercise this in the same way, even if there is a professional ideology. The criteria imposed is “differently appropriated, evaluated and made operational by each newspaper. To put it simply, each paper’s professional sense of the newsworthy, its organisation and technical framework (...), and sense of audience or regular readers, is different” (p. 60). The range for each of these different “languages” used by each newspaper is still constrained by “ideological limits” (p. 61), but it is, nonetheless, important to account for this potential variation.

Time period

This element can be seen as a sort of macro approach to the “context” one, in the sense that while the event that informs that particular story can frame the *us* and *them* discourses, the overall time period, marked by broader and somewhat more lasting topics that are relevant during that period. This could be the elections (campaigns and results) that are the center of the timeframe selection themselves, but also other topics that are “hot” in the news during a larger timeframe.

4.2 Methodology

This research is based on a qualitative methodology, since it is made based on the idea, not only that the positivist model is not applicable to the social world, but that it may even destroy the essence of social reality, since it tends to ignore the freedom and individuality of the human (Goldenberg, 1997, p. 18). Qualitative research sees the researcher as part of the world and aims at interpreting it and the meanings people make of it, while transforming it in the process (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). It sees reality as highly complex and thus does not aim at finding universal conclusions or causal relations between elements.

Based on this theoretical framework, the research will have an empirical component, according to Bardin's (2016) model of qualitative content analysis. Content analysis is a combination of polymorphous and polyfunctional tools, based on the denial of the transparency of social facts. It can be quantitative, based on frequency, or qualitative, based on other references such as, for example, presence and absence. In this case, as stated, a qualitative approach is preferred.

Having no fixed structure, each process of content analysis must be adapted to the research, but the methodology has some common features: it applies to communications, it uses systematic procedures for describing the content of messages and it aims at drawing inferences about the conditions of production or reception of the message (Bardin, 2016). There are three phases in this analysis: pre-analysis, exploring the materials and interpretation.

In this research, the phases consist of the following tasks:

Phase 1: Pre-analysis is the preparation of the research. It includes the fluctuating reading and the definition of objectives, as well as the choice and clipping of texts for analysis. This phase, aside from the initial literature review, includes the definition of what data do select, and the subsequent clipping of 658 units (each article is approached as a unit) of potentially relevant data. Aside from the first wave of data selection, this phase includes the creation of the analysis matrix, based on the theoretical framework and literature review. It is out of the constant dialogue of the material with the literature that analysis categories arise. The matrix serves codification purposes, by deconstructing each unit in a way that allows us to answer the necessary questions, which, in turn, answer the research questions.

Phase 2: The exploration of the material consists of the filtering of the large amount of data gathered in the pre-analysis and submitting the most relevant units to two types of tables (see Table 11 and Figures 5 and 6) based on the operational sub-questions. Each article is treated as a unit. This codified material is the basis for the categorization.

Phase 3: The treatment and interpretation of the data is mainly based on its categorization. Categorization is the classification of data elements according to common categories shared by them. The principles of mutual exclusion, homogeneity, pertinence, fidelity, and productivity must be observed (Bardin, 2016). In this phase, the codified

material from Phase 2 is made relevant, by answering the remaining sub-questions, and inquiring about what the results mean and contribute, academically, socially and politically.

Although, in theory, and for practical organization purposes, these phases are separated from each other, the praxis of the research consists of a constant back and forth between these moments, with literature informing analysis and vice versa, interpretation informing exploration and vice versa.

4.3 Content Analysis

4.3.1 Phase 1: Pre-Analysis

Our research focuses on media discourses, specifically Portuguese and German media, to explore the ideologies on identities based on “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016). In defining the concrete objects of our research, we have opted for online versions of press media, not only for practicality and breadth, but mainly because online journalism has been increasing in importance and it has deeply affected the media (Bastos, 2012), creating a “radical change in reading choices of customers when it comes to reading the news” (Statista, Inc., 2019).

There are not only technical but professional, ethical, stylistic, and numerous other specificities to online journalism that make it a medium and genre, and not a mere transposition, in case of online newspapers, of print contents into a web portal (Viana & Frias, 2017; Canavilhas, 2014). Its multimedia and hyperlinked features lead to a non-linear consumption, which widens the traditionally stiff inverted pyramid structure of newswriting. There is also the new possibility for immediate interaction with the reader, and a way of archiving of news items differently, which allows the consumer to have direct access to related content, regardless of its publication date (whereas a newspaper is somewhat of a whole unity with a restricted quantity of information). Tied to this is the lack of regular periodicity, a constant update, and a potentially global audience (Viana & Frias, 2017, pp. 400-401). All these features, unique to this new medium, have to be taken into account when exploring the way news is encoded and decoded in contemporary digital societies.

As alluded to above, the way in which certain topics, issues or events are portrayed by the media, even though they tend to reproduce the hegemony, does vary between news

outlets, not only because of the organizational structures and economic constraints, but because of the media outlets' "social personalities" (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 60). Therefore, in this study, we have selected outlets which are representative of the main material distinction when it comes to reporting styles, which can be encompassed in the concepts of "tabloid" and "elite" journalism. It is important to operationalize these concepts given that they are not devoid of theoretical particularities. Even though we are distinguishing these styles or personalities, it is crucial to keep in mind Bird & Dardenne's (1999) insight into the apparent distinction between more factual "hard" news and more emotional "soft" news, since both tend to fit into and reproduce hegemonic narratives.

What we, in this study, call "tabloid" journalism refers to what in Portugal is known as "jornalismo tablóide" (Público, 1998) and in Germany as "Boulevardjournalismus" (Borgers, 2018). The use of the name "tabloid" is originally linked to the size of the actual newspaper. Tabloid newspapers were smaller than regular broadsheet newspapers, but what mainly distinguished them was their content, which is the main characteristic of tabloid journalism nowadays: a "type of popular, largely sensationalistic journalism" (Gossel, 2017) which has much exceeded only print, and can be found in television and, more than ever, in online media. Similar concepts are those of "yellow journalism", "popular journalism" or "sensationalist journalism". For the purposes of this study, and based on a review of most descriptions associated to this concept, by "tabloid journalism" we mean a news outlet focused on "sensationalistic journalism", mainly made of "short stories, short paragraphs, and simple sentences", focusing on the emotionalization of contents:

Facts are deliberately simplified, glossed over, dramatized or distorted in order to interest the reader. Favorite topics of tabloid journalism are catastrophes, calamities, crimes and human destinies, but also the world of celebrity and fashion, delivering content that is demanded by the mainstream (DFJV, n.a.).

In Germany *Bild* is the main example of tabloid journalism (Borgers, 2018). In Portugal, *Correio da Manhã* is its most well-known case. Both newspapers have an online version, which were, in each country, at the time of the start of data collection (december 2017) the most read generalist online news outlets (Schröder, 2018; Grupo Marktest, 2018).

In contraposition to this style of journalism, there is what we here allude to as “elite” journalism, which is a more debatable term, and the boundaries between both are not always clear (Magin, 2021). In Portugal, the concept of “jornalismo de referência” is quite widespread to designate this journalistic style, but it seems to not have a direct universal translation. Noam Chomsky uses the concept of “elite journalism” to refer to the media which “set a framework within which others operate”, and whose “audience is mostly privileged people” (1997). Chomsky problematizes why it is that these media set the agenda, but this is not the focus of our incursion into these topics.

“Elite media” is, thus, operationalized in the context of this research in this sense, as what is at times referred to as “quality journalism” (Beckett, 2018). As such, departing, again, from the list of the most-read online generalist news outlets, we have identified *Spiegel Online* as Germany’s most relevant elite online outlet, and, in Portugal, *Diário de Notícias* (Schröder, 2018; Grupo Marktest, 2018). It is important to note that, in Portugal, at the time selected for defining the most read news outlets (which varies over the span of the study, i.e., from 2011 to 2017), *Jornal de Notícias* is the second most read online newspaper. However, *Jornal de Notícias*’s style is generally considered “popular”, somewhat in between outright tabloid journalism, and elite journalism. As such, it was left out for the purposes of this study. We also left out online versions of television channels, and focused only on online versions of print media, since television channels offer a broader range of contents which are not solely journalistic, and audiovisual rather than solely verbal.

Regarding the choice of *Spiegel Online*, even though its print version is a news magazine, and not a newspaper, it is the most read text-based elite media outlet. In fact, *Bild* and *Spiegel* are traditionally regarded as Germany’s “opinion-leading media”, both being “widely accepted and consumed by the population” (Namin, 2009).

Bild

The *Bild Zeitung*, usually known as *Bild*, is a daily national German newspaper, founded in 1952, part of the Axel Springer group, one of the biggest media companies in Europe. It is the daily paid newspaper with the largest circulation in Europe, as well as the 16th one worldwide (World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, 2016, p. 58). Its headquarters are in Berlin. It has had an online presence since 1996, marketed as *Bild.de* since 2008 (Bild, n.a.). *Bild* has been, throughout its history, the subject of numerous

controversies, being known for having “a reputation for aggressive reporting that blurs the line between reporting and editorializing” (Deutsche Welle, 2015).

One of the most interesting polemics involving *Bild*, and which we consider relevant to the topic of this study, was the one regarding the Greek bailout discussion. In 2015, the Deutscher Journalistenverband (the German Journalists Union) strongly criticized the newspaper for muddling the distinction between tabloid journalism and political activism with an “anti-Greece campaign” on the week in which the bailout was scheduled to be debated in the German parliament. On the online news portal of *Bild* readers were asked to send a selfie to the editors with the published sentence “No - no further billions for the greedy Greeks!” (Spiegel, 2015). The Union made a public statement condemning this:

“You can like or dislike the Government’s policy on Greece,” said DJV President Michael Konken. However, a campaign that seeks to directly influence political decision-making is prohibited by the descriptive role of journalism. “The fact that tabloids use a different language and journalistic style is self-explanatory. But the selfie action of *Bild.de* goes beyond the border to the political campaign”, Konken criticized (Deutscher Journalisten-Verband, 2015)

Spiegel

Der Spiegel, or *Spiegel*, is the only analyzed news outlet that is not a daily newspaper but a weekly magazine. Based in Hamburg, it was founded in 1947. The online version, *Spiegel Online*, was launched in 1994 with an independent editorial staff, as the first online news magazine in the world. *Spiegel* is known for being one of Europe’s most influential journalistic publications (The Economist, 2002), with a reputation of investing in investigative journalism. *Spiegel Online* also has an international section with articles published in English, since 2004. *Spiegel* is owned by the Spiegel Gruppe.

Diário de Notícias

Diário de Notícias (DN) is a daily paid newspaper founded in 1864, with its headquarters in Lisbon. It was a groundbreaking newspaper, at the time of its foundation, in that it proposed to be impartial at a time when news was mostly openly partial to political

movements. In 1995, the newspaper launched its online presence. Its history accompanied that of the country, and it was nationalized after the 1974 Revolution. In 1991 *Diário de Notícias* was privatized again, and it is now part of the media conglomerate Global Media Group. It is known for having had the participation of the country's most relevant intellectuals and politicians.

Correio da Manhã

Part of the Cofina media conglomerate, *Correio da Manhã (CM)* is a daily newspaper, launched in 1979. In 1998, it launched the portal *Netc* for online news, and in 2002 it launched its autonomous online news site (Correio da Manhã, 2009). In 2013, the outlet launched its own private cable television channel. As with *Bild*, and most tabloid newspapers, its controversies are also many, with many critiques regarding journalistic deontology (Lusa, 2017; Sindicato dos Jornalistas, 2017).

Timeframes

As explained, elections are seen as particularly interesting periods in which to study issues of ideology, identity and hegemony in the media, with political conflict and discourse heightened and media coverage on political issues more prolific. Since we are analyzing the interplay between politics and media, it is important to briefly outline the electoral moments under analysis here, as well as the electoral results in each suffrage, since it is expected that media coverage and political affinities may help us explore existing hegemonies.

- Legislative Election in Portugal in 2011 (05/06/2011)

The first electoral moment under analysis has a particularity regarding the rest of them: its date was forestalled from the regular election date due to the resignation of then Prime Minister José Sócrates on 23rd of March 2011, which led to early elections, scheduled by the President António Cavaco Silva for 05/06/2011. There were 17 candidate parties, coalitions, and political movements, of which five had enough votes to fill the 230 parliamentary seats. The government was formed with the majority of PSD and CDS-PP.

Political Party	Elected MPs
PPD/PSD	108
PS	74
CDS-PP	24
PCP-PEV	16
BE	8

TABLE 1 – PT 2011 ELECTION RESULTS

- Federal Election in Germany in 2013 (22/09/2013)

The German federal elections were held on 22 September 2013 for 631 seats to the Bundestag. There were 25 candidates, of which five were allocated parliamentary seats (in reality there were 4 parties/movements elected, since CDU and CSU run in different districts, and are allied parties, in the parliament they form one group). Due to Germany's 5% threshold (only parties with more than 5% of votes are allowed into the Parliament), percentile results are adapted posteriorly to distribute seats among the candidates above the threshold. After the elections, a period of five weeks of negotiations to form a government ended with a coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD, led by CDU head Angela Merkel.

Political Party	Elected MPs
CDU	255
SPD	193
Die Linke	64
Grüne	63
CSU	56

TABLE 2 – DE 2013 ELECTION RESULTS

- European Parliament Election in 2014 (25/05/2014)

Elections to the European Parliament are sui generis regarding national legislative elections: they take place by direct universal suffrage, but the 751 Members to the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected in national campaigns, with the allocation of seats to each member state based on degressive proportionality (in 2014, Germany had 99 seats and Portugal had 22 seats, which decreased to 21 when Croatia joined the EU) and each state enforcing their own voting systems. Usually, national political parties are part of European Political Parties which form parliamentary groups inside the European Parliament, but campaigns are national.

The general results in 2014 had the following European Parties elected (in descending order): EPP - Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats); S&D - Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists; ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, GUE/NGL - European United Left/Nordic Green Left, Greens/EFA - The Greens/European Free Alliance, EFDD - Europe of freedom and direct democracy Group, and the non-attached Members – Members not belonging to any political group.

Political Group	Elected MEPs
EPP	221
S&D	191
ECR	70
ALDE	67
GUE/NGL	52
Greens / EFA	50
EFDD	48
N.I.	52

TABLE 3 – EP 2014 EUROPEAN RESULTS

Political Party (Group)	Elected MEPs
CDU (EPP)	34
SPD (S&D)	27
Grüne (Greens/EFA)	11
Die Linke (GUE/NGL)	7
AfD (ECR)	7
FDP (ALDE)	3
Freie Wähler (ALDE)	1
PIRATEN (Greens/EFA)	1
Tierschutzpartei (GUE/NGL)	1
NPD (N.I.)	1
FAMILIE (ECR)	1
ÖDP (Greens/EFA)	1
Die Partei (N.I.)	1

TABLE 4 – EP 2014 GERMAN RESULTS

Political Party (Group)	Elected MEPs
PS (S&D)	8
PSD+CDS-PP (EPP)	7
PCP-PEV (GUE/NGL)	3
MPT (ALDE)	2
BE (GUE/NGL)	1

TABLE 5 – EP 2014 PORTUGUESE RESULTS

- Legislative Election in Portugal in 2015 (04/10/2015)

In the 2015 legislative elections, in Portugal, there were 20 party/movement/coalition candidates, out of which, 6 were voted into office. A government formed by members of the PSD CDS-PP coalition took power, but was ousted shortly after, being replaced by an alliance between left-wing parties PS, PCP-PEV and B.E., lead by the PS leader, António Costa (Chrisafis, 2015).

Political Party	Elected MPs
PSD+CDS-PP	102
PS	86
B.E.	19
PCP-PEV	17
PPD/PSD	5
PAN	1

TABLE 6 – PT 2015 ELECTION RESULTS

- Federal Election in Germany in 2017 (24/09/2017)

With at least 43 candidates in total, representatives from 7 parties (6 if CDU and CSU are associated) were elected into office in the 2017 federal elections in Germany, for a total of 709 seats (due to the German system of mixed-member proportional representation and overhang mandates (Brady, 2020).

Political Party	Elected MPs
CDU	200
SPD	153
AfD	94
FDP	80
Die Linke	69
Grüne	67
CSU	46

TABLE 7 – DE 2017 ELECTION RESULTS

In each electoral period, a strategic timeframe selection was made. There were two methods to selecting the dates, depending on the relation between the news outlet and the elections in question, which lead us to collect relevant articles published:

- On the day one month before the election date, on the day one month after the election date, and on eight consecutive days around the national election date (six days before the election, on the day of the election and on the day after the election) – this selection was used for national elections held in the country of origin of the news outlet in question (for *Spiegel* and *Bild* in 2013 and 2017, for *CM* and *DN* in 2011 and 2015)
- On the day one month before the election date, on the day one month after the election date, and on the four weeks around the election date (three weeks before and one week after) – this selection was used for European and national elections held in the country other than that of the news outlet in question (for *Spiegel* and *Bild* in 2011, 2014 and 2015, for *DN* and *CM* in 2013, 2014 and 2017)

There is one exception to this method. Due to the abnormal circumstances of the first electoral period under analysis (2011), which, unlike other electoral news coverages which are routinely expected and organized by the media, disrupted the normal electoral cycle, instead of including the day one month before the elections, we included the days from 23rd to 24th of March, the day of the announcement of the Prime Minister's resignation and the following day.

For each newspaper, a folder was created, in which sub-folders for each electoral period were inserted, under the codes: I PT 2011, II DE 2013, III EP 2014, IV PT 2015, V DE 2017, and in which the relevant news articles were saved.

The timeframes for data collection are the following:

Spiegel and *Bild*:

I PT 2011: 23 -24/03.2011; 14/05 – 12/06/2011; 05/07/2011

II DE 2013: 22/08/2013; 16-23/09/2013; 22/10/2013

III EP 2014: 25/04/2014; 11/05-01/06/2014; 25/06/2014

IV PT 2015: 04/09/2015; 13/09-11/10/2015; 04/11/2015

V DE 2017: 24/08/2017; 18-25/09/2017; 24/10/2017

Correio da Manhã and *Diário de Notícias*:

I PT 2011: 23/03-24.03/2001; 30/05-06/06/2011; 05/07/2011

II DE 2013: 22/08/2013; 01-29/09/2013; 22.10.2013

III EP 2014: 25/04/2014; 11/05-01/06/2014; 25/06/2014

IV PT 2015: 04/09/2015; 28/09-05/10/2015; 04/11/2015

V DE 2017: 24/08/2017; 03/09-01/10/2017; 24/10/2017

For each of the timeframes, and for each one of the news outlets, collection started with an online search through the search engine Google, according to strategically selected keywords filtered by date (according to the timeframes) and limited to results inside the news outlets' websites. The selected keywords were the same in each language:

Bild and *Spiegel*: Portugal, Portugiesen, Portugiesin, Portugiesisch, Südeuropa, Südeuropäer, Europa

DN and *CM*: Alemanha, alemão, alemã, alemães, "Europa do Norte", "europeu do norte", "europeus do norte", Europa

Due to the differing configurations of each news website, this search alone was not always sufficient, and, to ascertain that we were obtaining the most relevant results, Google search results were always confronted not only with the search results from the internal search engines of each website, but also completed with additional news articles from the "related news" section of each outlet, if they fit in the timeframes. This process is crucial to obtain a rich and dense range of data for analysis.

What is also important to note is that different online news outlets have different strategies regarding the financing of their online news sites. Often, there are certain free contents as well as paid ones. In this study, we selected only the freely available articles. This is done for strategic reasons, since free contents are expected to have potentially reached a wider and broader audience, rendering them more influential.

After obtaining all the search results, a preliminary selection was made, through which each article was scanned for relevance, to select only those texts which may contribute

to the topic under analysis. After this first preliminary selection, 658 articles were gathered digitally.

This is the distribution of the collected texts by news outlet and electoral period:

	I PT 2011	II DE 2013	III PE 2014	IV PT 2015	V DE 2017
Bild	16	3	19	15	9
Spiegel	11	54	34	28	23
CM	35	42	91	26	87
DN	16	41	12	11	85

TABLE 8 - DATA COLLECTION PER NEWS OUTLET AND PER ELECTORAL PERIOD

Total	658
Total PT	446
Total DE	212
Total tabloid	343
Total elite	315

TABLE 9 – DATA COLLECTION AGGREGATES

Aside from the data selection and collection, in Phase 1 we also developed an analysis matrix, which was applied, in Phase 2, to the final selection of articles. It consists of three questions which allow us to break down the discourses present in each analyzed article, which are then our units of analysis:

1. Who are the sources/definers?

The main purpose of this question is to identify not only who is “given a voice” by the news outlet, but also to distinguish the authors of the different discourses reproduced by the media. Different sources or definers have different levels of legitimacy and occupy different levels in the power structure of society. Knowing who is promoting which ideological discourse regarding identity is essential in order to find these differences. It is also important to understand how the news outlet, as a potential promoter of the hegemony, positions itself in relation to each of these discourses, which is why the outlets themselves can be considered “definers”, in this respect. As such, taking into account the theoretical basis of this research, each source will have to be identified by name, position, political/social affiliation and national context.

2. In what context? What is the “event” that sparks the news article?

Context is key in the Cultural Studies approach to research, since we need to work on the double articulation between structure and practice (Hall, 2016, p. 125). As such, statements and discourses cannot be analyzed in a vacuum, but must be thought of as part of a broader discourse that justifies the article in itself.

3. What is he/she saying about us/them?

In Phase 2 of the research, we highlight and put together the discourse of each of the definers/sources regarding these issues of identity, by identifying how they narrate who is the *us* and the *them* in that particular context, and what differentiates them.

4.3.2 Phase 2: Exploration of the material

The qualitative analysis of over 650 articles is ineffectual but the collection and scanning of all potentially relevant pieces is a fundamental first step to identify those that are, in fact, relevant and essential to answer the research question at hand. Our first step in Phase 2, is, then, to filter the collected data according to relevance, discarding the articles that are too short, or off-topic to identify relevant discourses, and selecting those that allow for a broad sample of diverse answers to the operational sub-questions, to achieve data saturation (Frow & Morris, 2006), resulting in a total of 155 qualitatively analyzed articles.

	I PT 2011	II DE 2013	III PE 2014	IV PT 2015	V DE 2017	Total
Bild	6	2	6	4	1	19
Spiegel	5	4	7	8	7	31
CM	10	9	17	5	12	53
DN	1	22	3	4	22	52

TABLE 10 – FINAL DATA ANALYSIS

To aid us in the process of qualitatively analyzing our final articles, after applying the matrix to each article, we created two types of tables: definer tables and media outlet tables. For every media outlet, there is one set of definer tables, and one long media outlet table, following the aforementioned expected relevant elements:

- The news outlets’ social personalities (tabloid/elite)
- The definers

- Nationality/Country of Origin
- Occupation
- Political affiliation (when applicable)
- Relation to power (when applicable)
- Context of the news event and type of text (primary news, feature article, editorial, op-ed)
- Time period

Each article, after having their various discourses broken down according to the analysis matrix, is then analyzed and processed into these tables, that are the basis for the creation of categories and the analysis of potentially relevant patterns, predictably according to these elements, but keeping in mind other possibilities, which, in turn, will signal the discourses that are most relevant for a more in-depth qualitative analysis of hegemony and counter-hegemony, discursive struggles and resistances.

For every individual definer identified in each article, a table was created, in order to identify what they are saying about *us* and *them* in each context and time period. Each definer was identified by name, and also according to their nationality, political affiliation and relation to power.

Media outlet tables serve mainly to identify discourses that are not directly attributed to a source/definer. They have to be analyzed along with the set of definer tables of that specific media outlet in order to make sense in exploring issues of hegemony and encoding.

All of this is taken into account when treating the data, since the media outlets' discourses are also made by their choice of definers, and the framing of their discourses. Also, some definers are not technically definers, as in sources, but are journalists or columnists of the newspaper writing opinion articles (op-eds). These were included in the definers category, because these discourses are clearly signed and attributed to a specific person. This is the model table with each section captioned below:

a) Definer / Outlet	b) Context	c) Us	d) Them
e) - PT2011			
DE2013			
EP2014			
PT2015			
DE2017			

- a) MEDIA OUTLET / DEFINER ELEMENTS: Each definer is classified according to
- Country: Portugal – P / Germany – G
 - Occupation
 - Political Affiliation (See list of acronyms)
 - Relation to power (regarding politicians): power, opposition
- b) CONTEXT: The media event that is the topic of the article and its identification
- c) US: who is presented as *us* and what is said about *us*
- d) THEM: who is presented as *them* and what is said about *them*
- e) TIMEFRAME

TABLE 11 – MODEL DEFINER TABLE

Angela Merkel – German chancellor, CR, Power

G,CR,P	Context	Us	Them
PT 2011	IPT2011S5 "Euro crisis: Myth of the lazy Southern European	Germany: "It's also about not being able to retire earlier in countries like Greece, Spain or Portugal than we do in Germany, but that everyone strives a bit the same - that's important. "	Southern Europe –Merkel indirectly criticized the southerners for being particularly holiday-friendly: "We can not have a single currency where one (country gets a lot of holidays and the other gets very little."
	IPT2011S6 "Euro-crisis: Merkel attacks holiday-friendly Southern Europeans"	Germany – "Of course we want the euro and of course we do not want anyone to go bankrupt and then we all get involved," Merkel said. The help is linked to conditions. "Yes, Germany will help, but Germany will only help if the others make an effort, and that has to be proved.""	Southern Europeans "The CDU chairperson has criticized the early retirement age and holiday arrangements in some countries, given the billions in assistance to troubled EU countries. It is not just about not making debts, said Merkel on Tuesday evening. "It's also about the fact that you can not retire earlier in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal than in Germany, but that everyone works a bit the same - that's important," Merkel is quoted by the news agency dpa."
	IPT2011S7 "78 billion euros: Euro finance ministers approve emergency aid for Portugal"	Germany and paying countries – "Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) appealed to all EU states with strong words, not to jeopardize the achievements in Europe. She emphatically defended financial aid for troubled euro states during a discussion at a school in Berlin." " The other euro states should not be overburdened in their help, because otherwise there right-wing populist parties continued to get boost, Merkel said."	"Troubled euro states" "The Chancellor rejected a withdrawal or expulsion of a country like Greece from the euro zone. Apart from the fact that there are no legal rules, this is not in the German interest. The exclusion of the weakest euro-state would immediately increase the pressure of the financial markets on the next weaker euro-zone. This would be "a very, very bad sign that we can divide ourselves apart," said Merkel. The pressure of the financial markets on the euro would be so high that it would not benefit anyone."

FIGURE 5 – EXAMPLE OF ANGELA MERKEL DEFINER TABLE (SPIEGEL)

After this first analysis, and having an overview of all of the present sources, definer tables were grouped according to the following types:

- Political Definers (grouped by political party)
- Opinion makers (including journalists, intellectuals etc.)
- Economic Sector
- Diplomats
- E.U.
- Cultural Sector

A new column was added to the table: the “representation” column. This column allows us to identify patterns in the existing narratives and form the basis for the in-depth qualitative analysis of Phase 3. Both of these sets of tables, created in Phase 2, served exploratory purposes, thus the final set of tables will be included as an appendix.

Spiegel – Definers
DE Political Definers

CDU - P	Context	Us	Them	Representation	
PT 2011	<u>Angela Merkel – Chancellor</u> IPT2011S5 “Euro crisis: Myth of the lazy Southern European	Germany – where people work more, for more years and have less holidays than in the South	Southern Europe – “It’s also about not being able to retire earlier in countries like Greece, Spain or Portugal than we do in Germany, but that everyone strives a bit the same - that’s important” “We can not have a single currency where one (country gets a lot of holidays and the other gets very little.”	German Work ethic, Moral Superiority	Southern Europe Lazy, Long Holidays, Retire Early
	<u>Angela Merkel – Chancellor</u> IPT2011S6 “Euro-crisis: Merkel attacks holiday-friendly Southern Europeans”	Germany – “We can not just be in solidarity, and say, these countries should simply continue as before,” said the Chancellor. “Yes, Germany will help, but Germany will only help if the others make an effort, and that has to be proved.”	Southern Europeans – “early retirement age and holiday arrangements in some countries, given the billions in assistance to troubled EU countries”	Germany Good hegemon, Superiority, Paymasters	Southern Europe Troubled, Need Help, Lazy, Retire Early
	<u>Angela Merkel – Chancellor</u> IPT2011S7 “78 billion euros: Euro finance ministers approve emergency aid for Portugal”	Germany and paying countries – “appealed to all EU states with strong words, not to jeopardize the achievements in Europe. She emphatically defended financial aid for troubled euro states during a discussion at a school in Berlin.”	“Troubled euro states” - The exclusion of the weakest euro-state would immediately increase the pressure of the financial markets on the next weaker euro-zone. This would be “a very, very bad sign that we can divide ourselves apart”	Germany Good Hegemon, German Interest, Savior	Troubled euro states Need Help
EP2014	<u>Angela Merkel – Chancellor</u> “Angela Merkel on Hartz IV: “The EU is not a social union” IIIIEP2014S7	Germany – “The EU is not a social union,; Merkel’s government plans to ban EU foreigners from re-entering Germany if they have abused social benefits.”	EU-Foreigners - Angela Merkel (CDU) has condemned alleged social abuse by immigrants from the European Union.	Germany Paymaster, Abused by Immigrants	EU Immigrants Abuse of German benefits

FIGURE 6 – EXAMPLE OF POLITICAL DEFINERS TABLE WITH REPRESENTATION (SPIEGEL)

4.3.3 Phase 3: Treatment and interpretation of the data

In Phase 3, based on the analysis of the definer and outlet tables, it was possible to identify some patterns which lead us to divide the data according to two main contexts: the economic crisis, and the so-called migrant/refugee crisis. Each of these contexts shapes

particular constellations of discourses that are relevant to our exploration of the discursive representations of the Portuguese, German and European identities. In this phase, a different set of tables was created, in which the data is organized according to frame, discourse and representation, within each context. Three main frames were identified: “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”.

The concepts that form these frames are not unambiguous. Thus, it is necessary to operationalize them, keeping in mind that they follow from the theoretical basis of this research. Thus, the “Power” frame includes those discourses in which power relations are visible, not within the State, but from an international point of view, between States and States and supranational institutions, i.e., in this case, the discourses that highlight Germany’s hegemonic power within Europe, and, less frequently, the European Union’s power. It is the most relevant category, as others exist, with few exceptions, as intersected with it: The “Symbolic Identity” frame is also based on the theoretical basis outlined in our operationalized concept of symbolic national identity, as related to “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016; Hall, 1996) and the myths and narratives surrounding these symbolic representations.

In the “Political-Economic Ideas” frame, the concept of ideology is not to be equated with Hall’s concept of “ideology” (2016), based on Marx and Engels (1932/1998), Althusser (1971/2014) and Gramsci (1971/1999), and which we use as a theoretical tool to understand power dynamics, but is operationalized, in this specific context, in its use within the party political system, i.e. as the identification process of political parties’ representatives, as their discursive performance of a certain “Political-Economic Ideas”, without dwelling on the accuracy and essence of their denominations and policies.

Aside from this division between two “crises”, and the ways in which they influence these representations, our data showed us an unexpected element which could not be ignored by our analysis: the element of gender in connection with power, regarding the representations of Angela Merkel in the Portuguese media outlets.

Chapter V – Results and Discussion

5.1 Performing success: the economic crisis

When analyzing the representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe, in the context of the economic crisis, we have found that these are not merely mutual (re)productions of narratives about *us* and *them*, but that they are mainly shaped by the hegemonic frame of “Power”. Within these representations marked by power dynamics, aside from those marked solely by the frame of power, there are intersections between this frame and two others: “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”.

What transpires from this analysis of power dynamics is, mainly, the idea of Germany as Europe’s hegemon, presented both in a positive (German Model) as well as in a negative (Bad Hegemon) light. Aside from Germany’s power, Europe, or, more specifically, the European Union, is also represented as power-holding, and its representations can also be divided between an idea of a benevolent, or even useful, power (Europeanism) or a divided Europe (European Divisiveness). A third, somewhat marginal representation of power, centers it on the “system”. In the case of the intersection of “Political-Economic Ideas” with “Symbolic Identity” we identified representations regarding the presence and absence of far-right movements in Portugal and in Germany, as well as discourses regarding an East vs. West division.

In both of these sets of narratives, those shaped by power dynamics, and those at the intersection of the “Political-Economic Ideas” and “Symbolic Identity” frames, which constitute the majority of our data, an *us* and *them* approach transpires in the analyzed discourses, namely one that is based on a certain ideology of performing economic success. Whereas, when discourses are solely framed by political-economic ideas, or, even more so, when an attempt of complexification is made, this pronounced form of *othering* seems to dissipate.

When discourses are framed solely by political-economic ideas, we find representations not regarding the “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016) of Germany, Portugal or Europe, but rather regarding “austerity”, “liberalism” and the “left”, which cross borders and are not confined by representations of identity.

The last identified category of representations is the one in which the whole approach to the representations is completely different from the former. We have named it “Complexification”, as it is tied to an overcoming of the binary *us* and *them* divide and seeks more complex and nuanced representations.

5.1.1 *Us and them*

5.1.1.1 POWER DYNAMICS

The centrality of relations of power for these representations becomes obvious in our analysis. As explained, there are two other frames interacting with the “Power” frame, that shape the narratives that mold the representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe, and shape the narrative about that power: “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”. It is not always possible to untangle the braiding of representations of Germany, as a “Symbolic Identity”, or its government, led by the CDU for the whole duration of the period under analysis (“Political-Economic Ideas”), and specifically chancellor Angela Merkel (as we explore in section 5.4), which is why we follow an empirical intersectional (Hancock, 2007) approach in our data analysis.

There are also instances in which all three categories intersect each other: “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”. We explore the different discourses that arise within each category, and each intersection, as they relate, on the one hand, to the representations of Germany and Portugal, and, on the other hand, Europe and the European Union.

Discourses framed by “Power”, as such, that is, not intersected with the categories of “Symbolic Identity” or “Political-Economic Ideas”, highlight either Germany’s or the European Union’s power, each of which either in a good or in a bad light. When looking at the type of narratives that emerge when the “Power” frame is used by itself, although there is no necessary connection to ideas about a cultural or national identity that leads to this power, nor to a certain political-economic ideology that promotes or perpetuates it, there is an underlying discourse about power and strength, from a *realpolitikal* point of view, which shows and promotes both the acceptance of this power as something good (Germany as the savior, and Portugal as saved, and European power as positive) as well as a reaction to this

power (Germany as the dictator, Portugal as dominated, and European power as bad). In all cases, the playing field is never levelled, nor is it ever in favor of Portugal, from either perspective.

In the intersection between “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” we introduce those representations located at the intersection between these two frames. Understanding these narratives about the symbolic identity of *us* and *them* was the starting point of our analysis, but it became evident that it cannot be analyzed disjointly from the other identified frames.

When “Power” is intersected with “Political-Economic Ideas”, we find discourses in which these ideas are represented as imposed by power-holding entities. This includes Germany represented as imposing austerity policies on other countries, namely Southern Europe/Portugal.

At the intersection of all three categories - “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” – are the discourses that combine the view of power-holding Germany or Europe, with narratives about cultural/national identity and political ideology, namely, in the case of Germany, regarding “austerity”, here taken as a set of political-economic ideas that promote certain policies.

In sum, regarding the economic crisis, our data lets us understand mutual representations of Portuguese, German and European identities, nevertheless most of the time, due to the centrality of “Power”, what becomes apparent is how the media, and their definers, represent Germany’s hegemony in Europe, and whether it is a benevolent or bad hegemon: is it powerful because of its societal model’s superiority, or its self-interest? Is it a powerhouse because of the success of its leading party’s ideology, or is that ideology bad? Is it powerful because of its superior “cultural identity”, or dominating because of its “villainous” history? Portugal’s representation is inevitably linked to this hegemonic representation of Germany, but in different ways according to each frame: is it the good student of the German model, or a victim of its power? Is it in crisis because of a “cultural inferiority”, or because of an unfair Political-Economic Ideas? And what does this do to representations about Europe?

Hence, it is not an issue of mutual representations of identity, but of representations of power and other categories, such as symbolic identity and political-economic ideas.

We will now explore the two main types of representation, or narratives, that we have identified, for each of the power-holding entities (Germany and Europe): the positive and the negative one, as well as the one relating to what we referred to as the “system’s power”.

5.1.1.1.1 GERMAN POWER

Making an overall analysis of our data, in which the “Power” frame is relevant, we can conclude that we can draw two types of representation: one in which German power is seen as good (“Savior”), a representation, that is, at times, supported by its symbolic identity features (“Disciplined”) or a combination of power, symbolic identity and the government’s political-economic ideas (“German Austerity”), accompanied by contrasting narratives regarding Portugal as having been saved (“Rescued”) from its problematic situation, either successfully or unsuccessfully, at times due to its national features (“Undisciplined”) or all three of the frames intersected (“Student of German Austerity”); and the other one in which German power is seen as bad (“Dictator”), at times supported by its symbolic national features (“Villain”) or political-economic ideas (“Austerity Diktat”), or all three (“German Disciplinarian”), with the corresponding representations of Portugal as dominated, a victim, dictated to, or disciplined, depending on the frame used.

This allows us to conclude that the presence of a “Power” frame, on its own or with its various intersections, draws a line that connects the narratives around Portugal and Germany, in the context of the economic crisis. Thus, whether we talk about Power in itself, or intersected with these other categories, the overall discourses found are similar – however, they are not all used in the same way by all media outlets nor all definers, leading us to take a closer look into how these narrative lines are encoded and decoded within the media discourses as well as their definers’.

Before we explore the comparative analysis regarding these two types of representations, or narratives, one positive (German Model) and one negative (Bad Hegemon), we will delve into each of them.

Narrative	Representation	Media	Definers
German Model	Savior vs. Rescued	Bild	Bild, CDU, PS-O, SPD, FDP, Econ. PT
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT, PSD – P, PSD – O, PS – P, CSU, CDU
		DN	DN, Media DE, Media USA, CDU, SPD, PT Diplomat, DE Diplomat, Cultural Sector PT/DE, Opinion Makers PT
	Disciplined vs. Undisciplined	Bild	Bild, CDU, FDP, AfD
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	CM, Eurogroup, Opinion Maker PT, CDU
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Econ. DE, CDU, FDP-P, Diplomat PT, Diplomat DE, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT
	Student of German Austerity	Bild	PSD - P
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, PSD-O, Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CDU, Diplomat PT
		DN	Diplomat PT, Econ. PT, FDP-P, CDU
Bad Hegemon	Dictator vs. Dominated	Bild	PT Union
		Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CM, Opinion Makers PT, Economic Sector PT, Cultural Sector PT, PPM, BE,
		DN	DN, Opinion Makers DE
	Villains vs. Victims	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, EC
		DN	Opinion Makers PT, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT/DE
	Austerity Diktat	Bild	SPD
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, SPD
		DN	DN, SPD, PS-O, Opinion Maker GR
German Disciplinary	Bild	/	
	Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE	
	CM	PS-O	
	DN	Opinion Maker PT	

TABLE 12 – GERMAN POWER

A. German model

Representations of Germany’s power in Europe as relating to an idea of a superior “German model” appear through the “Power” frame (“Savior vs. Rescued”), and through the intersections of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” (“Disciplined vs. Undisciplined”) and “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” (“Student of German

Austerity”). They are not present at the intersection of “Power” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, indicating that the political-economic ideas, or austerity policies, are only seen as positive when crossed by ideas about symbolic identity.

We will briefly explain each representation, and its overall presence in the discourses of the media outlets and definers, and then proceed to explore and illustrate each representation according to each media outlet, as well as regarding the type of definers employing them.

Within the “Savior vs. Rescued” representation (“Power” frame), we find narratives in which Portugal is presented as a “problem”, as being “sick”, as having been saved, and Germany as being a savior, as well as a “weak vs. strong” dichotomy between Portugal and Germany, as is the case in the following question posed by *Bild* in an interview: “If the permanent crisis fund comes, will the euro zone still be different from a “transfer union” where the strong have to constantly help the weak?” (Bild, 2011). This representation is present in all media outlets, in the outlets’ own discourses as well as in those of the definers. Regarding political definers, present transversally, all news outlets quote representatives of the CDU as using this discourse. Definers from the SPD are quoted only in the German outlets and those from the Portuguese PS by both the tabloid outlets.

At the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, i.e. the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation, rather than narratives about each national context, we found that there are certain representations informed by ideas of power and symbolic identity that frame both. The representation based on the idea of “discipline” is one of the strongest ones identified in our data. It expresses the crossing of the idea of Germany as the savior, present when there is an exclusive “Power” frame, with ideas about national/cultural identity, both regarding Portugal (and Southern Europe) and Germany (Northern Europe). Some of the narratives are similar but connect the previous notion of strength/weakness with notions of identity and culture: Germany is the paymaster and powerful because it is, in a way, “culturally superior”, and Portugal is poor, a debt sinner because it is “inferior”. An example of this can be found in the answers of Angela Merkel to the aforementioned interview, in which she claims that “Germany was and is ready to help the weaker [states]. [...] But there will not be a transfer union with me. Each country is responsible for its own debt.” (Bild, 2011).

As we have seen in Chapter II, meaning exists through the “the position within the different signifying chains” (Hall, 2016, p. 147), i.e., what it means to be German, or Northern European, Portuguese, or Southern European, or European is not defined merely in itself, but meaning “is relational within an ideological system of presences and absences” (Hall, 2016, p. 148). In this case, the power relations are visible in the discourses in which the German model (presented as “German” and not as stemming from certain political-economic ideologies perpetrated by its government – cases which will be explored in the corresponding section) is assumed as the best one, even if, at times, it is seen as tough, and the failures or problems in Portugal as a matter of discipline, or lack thereof, to “become more German”. This position of power, at times, is seen as prejudicial to Germans themselves. It also includes, as it did in the “Power” frame, those discourses in which it is pointed out that Germany used to be the “sick one” in Europe, but overcame the situation with discipline, as well as the idea that Portugal has already made progress in that direction, as is the case with the *Spiegel*’s criticism of the false “myth of the lazy Southern European” (Böll & Böcking, 2011).

In this frame intersection, we also find, in the elite media, the idea that Germany used to be the one in trouble but overcame it with exactly that discipline: “How times are changing: a few years ago, Germany was the sick man of Europe. The republic of five million unemployed was considered to be encrusted, and the hope of improvement seemed pointless in view of the huge reform backlog” (Böll & Böcking, 2011).

In the tabloid media, there is the idea that Germany’s position as a model, in which its discipline explains its power, is often damaging to Germans or Europeans, for example with an opinion article by a journalist in *Correio da Manhã* claiming that “Europe does not know what to do to its weakest links, and there is a temptation to simply drop them: to exclude them from the Eurozone” (Guerreiro, 2011). From a political standpoint, unlike what happened in the “Power” frame, this view of Germany as a model is only present in the discourses of the power-holding German center-right (CDU) and liberal-right (FDP), and the far-right (AfD) in *Bild*.

At the intersection of all three frames – “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” - we include representations that follow the same narrative, that, in a way, combines ideas present in previous ones, while focusing on the success of austerity

measures, thus also including the “Political-Economic Ideas” frame. In it we find a discourse in which Portugal is presented as the “good student”, as having followed, successfully, the (sometimes seen as tough but necessary) austerity policies (“Political-Economic Ideas”) imposed by (“Power”) the German model of work ethic and discipline (“Symbolic Identity”), for instance, when a Portuguese diplomat is quoted as saying that “we are very important to Germany because we can represent the success story that Germany and the EU need” (Viegas P. , 2013g), or as a “problem child” (Spiegel, 2011) that has (still) not been able to catch up.

In general, this representation is present in political discourses from the center-right, in both Germany (CDU and FDP) and Portugal (PSD), with CDU being present in almost all media outlets (except Bild) as using this representation, and PSD, in the German media. The elite media have a wider variety of definers using this representation, than the tabloid media, where it seems to be less prevalent. But it seems to be especially significant in the case of *Spiegel*.

An overall look at these representations within the “German Model” narrative, lets us conclude that they exist in all media outlets. Within these representations, all frames and intersections seem to be present in the outlets’ overall coverage. Regarding political definers, this narrative is present in the discourse of the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and AfD, in Germany, and the PS and PSD in Portugal, both in power and in the opposition, thus it is a narrative used by the mainstream center right and left, in both countries, as well as the liberal and far-right in Germany.

Hence, in general, the narrative of Germany as a model, which Portugal is/should be following, seems to be connected to ideas about its benevolent use of its power, the symbolic identities of Portugal and Germany and the political-economic policies executed by its government.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	Savior vs. Rescued	Bild	Bild, CDU, PS-O, SPD, FDP, Econ. PT
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT, PSD – P, PSD – O, PS – P, CSU, CDU
		DN	DN, Media DE, Media USA, CDU, SPD, PT Diplomat, DE Diplomat, Cultural Sector PT/DE, Opinion Makers PT

Power + Symbolic Identity	Disciplined vs. Undisciplined	Bild	Bild, CDU, FDP, AfD
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	CM, Eurogroup, Opinion Maker PT, CDU
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Econ. DE, CDU, FDP-P, Diplomat PT, Diplomat DE, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT
Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Student of German Austerity	Bild	PSD - P
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, PSD-O, Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CDU, Diplomat PT
		DN	Diplomat PT, Econ. PT, FDP-P, CDU

TABLE 13 – SUMMARY TABLE: GERMAN MODEL

Media outlets

The widespread presence of this narrative, in all media outlets, using a variety of definers, mainly mainstream primary definers, points to this being, in general, the dominant ideology, presented as shared amongst the news outlets themselves, in line political definers from the political center and conservative and liberal right, from both countries (and even from third parties such as the US Media in *Diário de Notícias*), diplomats, the economic sector and opinion makers from both countries. These instances in which Germany’s power is seen as a burden to Germans themselves were not considered as equivalent to a portrayal of Portugal as the “villain” and Germany as the “victim”, as this would overshadow the clearly discursively present power imbalance – Germany is portrayed as having to sacrifice to save weaker States, not as a powerless victim of them.

Regarding the representations that sustain the “German model” narrative, the German media seems to decode the power-holders discourse in an accepting way, encoding a dominant discourse, whereas the Portuguese media assume a more negotiated position within these positive representations. Nonetheless, since there is not necessarily a contradiction, but complementarity between these various representations, according to frames and intersections, these distinctions are more of a curiosity than necessarily analytically relevant.

In *Bild*, the definers using the narrative of the “German Model” are, aside from the outlet itself, representatives of the German center-right (CDU), liberal right (FDP), center-left (SPD) and far-right (AfD), the Portuguese center left (PS), and center-right (PSD), and the Portuguese Economic sector. However, the representations used by these definers are

not all the same. In *Bild*'s own discourse, when Germany is presented as the model, it is mainly through representations based on its exercise of power as a good hegemon, a savior and Portugal as having been saved, as well through its superior disciplined symbolic identity in comparison to undisciplined Portugal.

Regarding the "Savior vs. Rescued" representation, the news outlet itself uses this discourse, claiming, for instance that "Portugal had been supported by its European partners" (Bild, 2015). Included in this representation are instances in which this power position is seen as detrimental to Germany, as is the case, for example, in the aforementioned interview question posed by the outlet: "If the permanent crisis fund comes, will the euro zone still be different from a "transfer union" where the strong have to constantly help the weak?" (Bild, 2011). Qualitatively, in *Bild*, it is quite a strong discourse, in which aggressive narratives such as the question "'Portugal gets 78-billion-euro aid package - Does the German taxpayer have to bleed too?" (Bild, 2011) or the idea that "Portugal puts the EU in a state of fear and terror" (Bild, 2011) are used. The "Disciplined vs. Undisciplined" representation is also used by the outlet itself, in 2011 and 2015, including the representation of this being bad for Germans, conveying ideas such as "we must now probably also pay for the poorest country in Western Europe" (Bild, 2011) or "[w]e made the necessary reforms, but the others didn't ..." (Bild, 2011).

Within this narrative, the idea that Germany's hegemony is framed by its power as well as by its symbolic identity, is also the one underlying the discourses of the definers from the German center-right (CDU) and liberal-right (FDP) in power. This is the dominant encoding in *Bild*, aligned with the discourses from the power-holding center-right: the representation of Germany as both a savior and as being disciplined, and Portugal as having been saved and being undisciplined or progressing towards discipline.

In the case of the CDU, the view of Germany as the good hegemon and Portugal as being rescued is also present, with a representative quoted saying that "We [Germany] are making the euro and Europe sustainable" (Bild, 2011). A definer from the CDU also conveys the idea of the burden placed on Germany, or rich Member States: "The Economic and Monetary Union was not created to be a redistribution system from rich to poor Member States" (Bild, 2011). When it comes to the "Disciplined vs. Undisciplined" representation, it is visible, for instance, in the following quote of a representative of the CDU: "also

important that in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, you cannot retire earlier than in Germany, but that everyone makes the same effort” (Bild, 2011).

The same combination of representations is present in the discourse of representatives of the liberal-right (FDP), a representative of which is quoted as saying that “[we, the FDP] want the EU to be successful so that we don't have to pay for Greece again” (Bild, 2014), a discourse framed by the “Power” frame. As for the intersection of this frame with “Symbolic Identity” we can point to the use, in the same article, of the expression “budget offenders” (Bild, 2014), regarding countries undergoing bailouts.

The discourses from the definers from the center-left opposition, both in Portugal (PS) and Germany (SDP), are framed solely by “Power”, as is the one from the only non-political source: a definer from the Portuguese economic sector. Thus, in *Bild*, the center-left opposition’s discourse within the narrative of the “German Model” leaves out the “Symbolic Identity” frame, focusing solely on Germany’s representation as a savior, and of Portugal as having been saved.

The narrative of the bailouts being detrimental to Germany, framed by “Power”, is used by definers from the German SPD, namely in an interview in which it is claimed that: “At the latest in the course of the year 2014, we Germans - especially because of the difficult economic situation in Greece, in Portugal and in other countries of Southern Europe – will be asked to pay from all sides” (Anda & Starnick, 2013).

The “Savior vs. Rescued” discourse is also used by a representative of the Portuguese center-left (PS), while in the opposition, in an indirect quote: ““Ex-President Jorge Sampaio called all political actors to reason and warned that the highly indebted EU country [Portugal] was heading for perdition” (Bild, 2011). Additionally, in the same article, this representation is also present in the discourse of a definer from the Portuguese economic sector, as is the case with the following passage in which the President of the National Trade Association is quoted: ““Only with a strong government, can we escape the crisis”, he warned, but this is not in sight in the deeply divided country” (Bild, 2011).

The intersection of the “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” frames (“Student of German Austerity”) only appears marginally, in the discourse of a Portuguese political definer from the center-right in power (PSD), namely the recently

elected leader of the party, who is indirectly quoted as promising “in his victory speech, to keep the country's strict austerity obligations” (Bild, 2011), thus aligning with this view of Portugal as the good student of German austerity.

The representation based solely at the intersection of the “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” frames appears only in the discourse of the German far-right (AfD). The “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation on its own is used in an article which described the AfD as a party that “wants to dissolve the Eurozone and push the Southern Europeans out of the common currency” (Solms-Laubach, 2013). Even if the AfD’s representation may be presented as rather extreme, and is quoted indirectly, it still in line with this hegemonic encoding of the narrative around discipline.

In *Spiegel*, the definers using the “German Model” narrative are representatives of the German center-right (CDU) and from the Portuguese center-right (PSD), as well as by German opinion makers, and the outlet itself. As is the case in *Bild*, the way in which this narrative is framed varies according to these definers.

The dominant discourse of the news outlet is also aligned with that of the German center-right in power (CDU), as well as that of German opinion makers. All three positive representations shape *Spiegel*’s discourse: “Saviors. Vs Rescued”, “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” and “Student of German Austerity”.

In the outlet’s own discourse, the “Savior vs. Rescued” representation also includes instances in which this power is seen as a burden, as, for example, when it is stated that “Germans see their money sink into southern Europe” (Böll & Böcking, 2011), as Germany is put in the position of the paymaster or being taken advantage of. And the discipline-related narrative is also present in the discourses of the news outlet, namely in the same article, the aforementioned piece titled *The myth of the lazy Southern European*, which is a particularly interesting and rich example of this representation.

The article departs from the question: “Lots of vacation, early retirement - and not exactly hard-working. Many Germans have this image of Southern Europeans. Now the Chancellor personally: Angela Merkel only wants to help other euro countries if they become more German. Sounds good. But are the prejudices even true?” (Böll & Böcking, 2011). It is claimed that debtor “countries have lived beyond their means for too long”, but that

“Merkel’s criticism of the holiday enjoying southern Europeans is a myth” (Böll & Böcking, 2011), because these countries have already begun reforms. So, the underlying idea regarding German discipline is still present, supported in the notion of progress in becoming “more German”, since Germany itself is presented as having overcome similar difficulties:

How times are changing: a few years ago Germany was the sick man of Europe. The republic of five million unemployed was considered to be incrustated, and the hope of improvement seemed pointless in view of the huge reform backlog. Whichever international comparisons determined the debate about their position, the Germans came off badly. Too much vacation, too high salaries, too early retirement, too few work incentives for the jobless - and not even fresh bread on Sundays. And now that the fourth largest economy in the world is booming, other Euro countries are facing bankruptcy (Böll & Böcking, 2011).

Spiegel’s use of this representation also includes the idea that Europe needs a European Constitution, modelled according to the German Basic Law (Fischer & Wittrock, 2011). However, these notions about discipline are often mitigated by it being presented as a “tough” discipline, thus not neglecting possible negative effects, this is the case in the *Spiegel’s* own discourse, for example when claiming that “[w]hat happens after the [German] election is viewed with a mixture of fear and hope, as well in many crisis states. Fear, because Merkel Germany is regarded as hard-hearted *Sparmeister* (master of savings)” (Peters, 2013), and also in that of opinion makers, such as in an op-ed by an academic where it is written that: “Unlike Germany, where the economic situation is good and there is a shortage of labor, the vast majority of Europe remains economically depressed” (Müller, 2015b). The qualitative depth and length of the exploration of this representation is notable in *Spiegel*.

Regarding the intersection of all three frames – the “Student of German Austerity” representation - in the own outlet’s discourse, we find the idea of Portugal as “the big problem child of the Eurozone” (*Spiegel*, 2011), as well as instances where austerity is often presented as tough but still necessary and beneficial, such as the idea that criticism of

Merkel's "harsh austerity policy towards Southern Europe" has "become much quieter since the economy picks up again in former crisis countries" (Becker & Wiemann, 2017), or the fact that "Portugal, now only three years after the near-bankruptcy, is freed from the stranglehold of its saviors, is only possible because the Portuguese have never revolted too violently - although a good quarter of the population now lives on the edge of the poverty line, because of the reforms" (Schultz, 2014a). Similarly, as mentioned, the Portuguese PSD Prime Minister Passos Coelho is described as having "the reputation of being a cold-hearted model student of Angela Merkel" (Zuber, 2015).

The view of Germany as the paymaster, within the "Savior vs. Rescued" representation is also present in the discourse of a representative of the CDU, regarding immigrants: "Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) condemned alleged social abuse by immigrants from the European Union. "The EU is not a social union,"" (Spiegel, 2014). Regarding the "Disciplined vs. Undisciplined" a representative of the CDU is quoted as claiming that ""Yes, Germany will help, but Germany will only help if the others make an effort, and that has to be proven" (Spiegel, 2011). The "Student of German Austerity" is also used by representative of the German center-right in power (CDU), praising the Portuguese PS Prime Minister José Sócrates as being on a "constant path towards consolidation and reform" (Peters K. G., 2011).

The idea of Germany as the savior of Europe is also present in the discourses of opinion makers, as in the op-ed of a journalist, in which Germany is compared to Ancient Rome: "We Germans cannot be indifferent to the future of a united Europe - not just out of solidarity with the rest of the continent, but out of pure self-interest. We should keep the fate of the Romans in mind. They were doing too well too, and their great empire fell apart because they disliked it." (Schmitz, 2014).

Opinion makers also convey the representation that Germany "has benefited from this Union like no other country" (Schmitz, 2014) and also recalling its own history: - as well as the idea that "it wasn't long ago that the Germans were anything but a happy nation" (Müller, 2015a). Additionally, the idea of Portugal as a student of German austerity is also present in the discourse of the same author, according to whom "[t]he path, pushed through by Germany, of saving and cost cutting seems to have an effect" in "former crisis States such as Portugal" (Müller, 2017). The "Student of German Austerity" representation is also the

one used by the Portuguese center-right (PSD), but here, while in the opposition, who claims, for instance: "With cheating we will never mature into a developed society" (Spiegel, 2011).

Correio da Manhã is the only news outlet in which this narrative is almost only present in the discourses of definers, and not of the news outlet itself, is *Correio da Manhã*, indicating a negotiated decoding (Hall, 1981; Ross, 2011) of this hegemonic representation.

Apart from the outlet itself, the definers using the "German Model" narrative, are representatives of the Portuguese center-left (PS) and center-right (PSD), as well as of the German center-right (CDU), and, regarding non-political definers, opinion makers, a diplomat and a definer from the Eurogroup. Again, the representations used within this narrative is varied.

The outlet itself shares the same combination of representation as Portuguese opinion makers, namely the combination of the "Savior vs. Rescued" and the "Disciplined vs. Undisciplined" representations, but *Correio da Manhã's* own encoding tilts to the side of the intersection with "Symbolic Identity". The view of this as negative to Germany is present in news outlet's own discourse, for instance when it writes that: "The German Constitutional Court (BVG) began this Tuesday to consider three complaints against financial aid to Greece and against guarantees given by Berlin to the European rescue fund, which has already served to support Ireland and Portugal" (CM, 2011).

The "Disciplined vs Undisciplined" representation is also present in the outlet's discourse, for instance, as implied in the question posed in an interview: "How do we pay what we owe?" (CM, 2011) as well as the idea, like the one present in Spiegel's coverage, that progress in the direction of discipline is already being made: "A study by French bank Natixis says that Europeans in the South are working longer and longer than the Germans, contrary to Chancellor Angela Merkel's statements" (CM, 2011).

Regarding opinion makers, in an op-ed by a journalist, it is stated that the "German chancellor saved the Euro, and, thus, the European project" (Rodrigues, 2017), a discourse clearly framed by the representation of Germany as the savior. An example of the "Disciplined vs. Undisciplined" representation can also be found in the already mentioned discourse of a Portuguese opinion maker: "Europe does not know what to do to its weakest

links, and there is a temptation to simply drop them: to exclude them from the eurozone” (Guerreiro, 2011).

Political definers’ discourses, in CM, are framed only by “Power”, in the case of the Portuguese center (PS, while in power, PSD in power and the opposition) and the German conservative right, while in power (CSU); while the German center-right in power (CDU) resorts to representations that include all three frame combinations.

When in power, in 2014, a representative of the PSD is quoted indirectly as saying that “the European partners avoided a social disaster in Portugal” (CM, 2014) and, when in the opposition, in 2017, when praising Angela Merkel, as “the leader in Europe who has most persistently contributed to the reform of institutions and to complete what remains to be done” (Lusa, 2017). This representation is also used by the PS when in power, in the same article, when it is said that “the vast majority of the Germans voted for forces defending European integration and deepening European integration” (Lusa, 2017).

The presence of all three representations is only identified in the discourses of representatives of the German center-right in power (CDU). Regarding the “Power” frame, the leader of CDU is quoted as affirming that “We need a strong Germany that is respected in Europe” (CM, 2013) and CSU, in whose discourse this narrative is shaped by the idea of Germany as the paymaster: “Christian Democrat politician Peter Gauweiler, the underwriter of another financial aid complaint, accused Angela Merkel of not defending German purchasing power and not preventing inflationary trends by joining European bailouts” (CM, 2011). The aforementioned article about the study by a French bank, when categorized according to its indirect mention of Merkel’s discourse, also contains the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation, given that it mentions “that Europeans in the South are working longer and longer than the Germans, contrary to Chancellor Angela Merkel's statements” (CM, 2011). The representation which is intersected by all three frames can also be found in the discourse of a representative of the CDU, while referring to the Portuguese PS Prime Minister José Sócrates: “For Angela Merkel, Socrates was “right” and was “brave” in taking the new austerity measures to the Portuguese Parliament for a vote.”” (CM, 2011).

The representation at the intersection of the “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” frames, on its own, is used by a definer from the E.U., namely the President of the Eurogroup,

who is quoted as having “said, referring to the countries of southern Europe, that "you can't spend all the money on drinks and women and then ask for help"” (CM, 2017).

A Portuguese diplomatic definer is the one solely using the “Student of German Austerity” representation, in an op-ed, in which it is written that: “in Berlin there never ceased a certain hope of making Portugal a successful case in the task of recovering the European economy” (Falcão-Machado, 2013).

Diário de Notícias, an outlet in which this narrative is quite strong, does not portray it from the perspective of a burden to the German people, but rather as an overall positive representation of Germany’s power. At times this narrative includes the idea that Germany used to be the “weak” one, was helped by others, and is now reciprocating.

Diário de Notícias frames its discourse both through the “Power” frame and the intersection of it with “Symbolic Identity”, but with a shift towards the former. This combination is, as in *CM*, present in the discourses of opinion makers, with the “Power” frame on its own framing the discourses of external definers such as foreign media and a source from the Portuguese-German cultural sector.

Regarding the “Savior vs. Rescued” representation, the news outlet resorts to this representation in its own discourse, as is the case in a feature in which it is written that “[a] lot of people in the EU, especially in the countries of southern Europe, have their eyes on this [German] election because of the weight Germany has or may have in resolving the euro crisis” (Viegas P. , 2013a).

In *DN*’s discourse we also find the idea that Germany used to be the “sick one”, was rescued and is now rescuing others, for example, in an article, in which the following historical perspective is used: “In the postwar period, Portugal distinguished itself in supporting German reconstruction by participating in economic aid to Chancellor Adenauer's weak Federal Republic. Germany, which, thanks to the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s and 1960s, quickly became Europe's 'locomotive', reciprocated” (Ferreira R. , 2013).

Regarding the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation, in the discourse of the outlet, it mirrors the idea present in other outlets, that works as a contestation of Portugal’s portrayal as lazy: “Regarding the number of hours worked, in 2012 the Portuguese worked on average 294 hours more than the Germans: the Portuguese worked 1,691 hours that year

and the Germans worked only 1,397 on average, the OECD estimates” (DN, 2013), as well as the portrayal of Germany as the E.U.’s “locomotive” (Tecedeiro, 2017b), or “the pillar of European stability” (Tecedeiro, 2017b).

The “Power” frame also frames the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers, namely in an op-ed focusing on Germany’s powerful position: “today's Germany is a dominant Germany in the European Union, it is a very strong economy, it is a top country in the current world order” (Tadeu, 2017).

At the intersection with “Symbolic Identity”, a Portuguese academic writes the following in an opinion article: “The human and territorial dimension, the geographical location, the national product and the robustness of the industry make Germany the unmatched European leader. Their organizational skills, dedication to work and realism confirm and reinforce their attributes” (Barreto, 2017).

The “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation, on its own, is used by German definers: sources from the German economic sector and opinion makers. What is also interesting to observe, regarding *DN*, is that its qualitative and quantitative presence of German definers as well as “in-between” definers, compared to the other media outlets. This representation is present in the discourse of source from the Deutsche Bank, who states that “[German parties] are willing to give support in exchange for reforms in crisis countries like Portugal” (Viegas P. , 2013h). In the case of the German opinion maker, we include the example of a German academic pointing to German’s satisfaction “with the way things are” (Lusa, 2013).

Political definers quoted in *DN*, within this positive representation, are all German, and, more specifically, from the German center-right (CDU), liberal-right (FDP) in power, and center-left opposition (SPD).

The representations of CDU, as well as diplomatic definers, are framed by all three combinations, whereas the FDP aligns with a source from the Portuguese economic sector, in using the “Power” frame as well as the intersection of all three frames. SPD, on the other hand, aligns with definers from the cultural sector and foreign media, having its discourse framed solely by “Power”.

The representation framed only by “Power” is present in the discourses of the German center-left opposition (SPD), by “foreign media” and definers from the Portuguese-German cultural sector. This recourse to external and in-between definers seems to show a sort of external validation of the narrative, creating an image of consensus.

Representatives of the German center-left in the opposition are indirectly quotes, in two instances, as using this representation. One definer points to the fact that Germany itself used to be the one to need rescuing, as is apparent in the following example: “The SPD candidate recalled that, after World War II, Germany was greatly helped under the Marshall Plan, and now it is its turn to help” (Viegas P. , 2013a). In another instance, the idea of the German savior is manifested in the summary of the party’s political program: “Still in the context of the European crisis, the program speaks of the need for Germany to help solve the serious problem of youth unemployment in the EU” (Viegas P. , 2013b).

Regarding the German cultural sector connected to Portugal, we can identify the discourse of the director of the Goethe Institute in Lisbon, who talks about Germany’s friendship with Portugal: "For tens of years, Germany was a friend of Portugal and did not generate major controversies. Now it generates controversies. We were not used to that, they are necessary and legitimate voices, but there is no general opinion that hates Germany, nothing like that" (Lusa, 2013).

When it comes to discourses in foreign media outlets, we find discourses by the German media, which is quoted as writing about how “Portugal scares Europe before the Brussels summit” (Lusa, 2011); and the US Media, stating that “at the top of the list of [the Eurozone’s] urgent problems” is what to do about Portugal” (Lusa, 2013).

Regarding the representation of Germany as the “savior”, the German center-right (CDU), is, for example, quoted as asserting that “European governments should feel encouraged to comply with the rules of the stability and growth pact and the so-called fiscal pact” (Viegas P. , 2013b), or, for instance, the idea that “Europe does not have to worry, we [Germany] will continue our role” (Tecedeiro & M., 2013).

Within the “Power” frame, we can find the discourse of a Portuguese diplomat “convinced that Germany will continue to defend a strong Europe” (Viegas P. , 2017c); and

a German diplomat claiming that the newly-elected German government “is good for Portugal” (Tecedeiro, 2017a).

When intersecting with the “Symbolic Identity” frame, the Portuguese ambassador in Berlin, is quoted as stating that the “most striking feature of the Germans is this quest for stability and predictability” (Viegas P. , 2013g), and the German ambassador in Lisbon as describing Germany, in a positive way, as a “politically boring country” (Tecedeiro, 2017a). Regarding the “Student of German Austerity” representation, it is present in the discourses of the Portuguese ambassador in Berlin, according to whom “we [Portugal] are very important to Germany because we can represent the success story that Germany and the EU need” (Viegas P. , 2013g). In the discourse of the liberal party FDP, the same representation is present: “Liberals argue, moreover, that the largest central banks of the single currency, such as the German, should have a veto right within the ECB's board when it comes to the purchase of debt securities of certain countries” (Viegas P. , 2013b). In the same article, regarding the representation of Portugal as a “Student of German Austerity”, FDP argues “that indebted countries should continue on the path of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms” (Viegas P. , 2013b).

Likewise, regarding the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation, we identify the discourse of a source from the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry claiming that “there is a huge challenge in our country to increase productivity, because that is what will enable us to increase wages and workers' welfare” (Pinto, 2017). And a definer from the Portuguese economic sector, who also focuses on Germany’s praise of Portugal’s reforms, claims that: “Germany greatly respects the way we have been going through this period of crisis, and was very concerned when, about two months ago, we went through a political crisis from which we knew how to get out well, and even more stable, and recognizes our merit” (Lusa, 2013).

Definers

Political definers representing Germany as a savior, disciplined and/or a political-economic role model, and Portugal as rescued, undisciplined and/or (good or bad) student of this model include political representatives of the German far-right (AfD), conservative right (CSU), liberal right (FDP), center-right (CDU) and center-left (SPD); and of the Portuguese center-right (PSD) and center-left (PS).

Aside from the political definers, these representations are also employed by sources from the economic sector and opinion makers from both countries, as well as other sources, such as definers connected to the E.U., diplomatic definers, the media and definers from the Portuguese-German cultural sector.

In sum, regarding political definers, the narrative of the “German Model” is present in the discourses of representatives of parties in the center (left and right), in both countries, and of the right (conservative, liberal and far-right), in Germany. The array of other types of definers also sustaining this narrative is also noteworthy.

Looking at the definers framing of Germany as a model, we can observe the following distribution in relation to each representation:

- The “Savior vs. Rescued” representation is used by almost all of the definers within this “German Model” narrative, making it a quite dominant representation. Considering political definers, it is reproduced by the German center- and conservative-right in power (CDU, CSU), the Portuguese and the German center-left opposition (PS, SPD) the latter also when in power, the German liberal left (FDP), the Portuguese center-right (PSD) both when in power and when in the opposition;
- The “Disciplined Germany vs. Undisciplined Portugal” representation is not as cross-cutting as the previous one. Regarding political definers, it is used by German political definers from the center-right (CDU), liberal right (FDP) and far-right (AfD). Other definers using it are German and Portuguese opinion makers, diplomatic definers, definers from the E.U. and from the Portuguese and the German economic sectors. It is mainly not used by Portuguese political definers and the German opposition:
- Lastly, the “Student of German Austerity Model” representation is the least prevalent of the representations. It is only present in the discourses of the Portuguese center-right (PSD) and the German liberal right (FDP), as well as economic and institutional sources. Regarding the political definers, it is interesting to note, that in the German media, it is only present in a definer from the Portuguese center-right, whereas in DN, the political definer using this representation is the German liberal-right (FDP).

From this distribution, we can observe that, although the German model is a quite widespread representation, encompassing definers from different points of the political

spectrum, there seem to be some tendencies according to party-political alignment and position to power.

Our main conclusions regarding this cluster of representations, according to definer (excluding the news outlets' own discourses), are that relation to power, national context and political affiliation are the influencing elements within these representations, as well as the type of definer/article (whether it is an opinion maker):

- The German power-holding center/liberal-right (CDU and FDP) sustains the narrative of a German model based on ideas about power, symbolic identity and political-economic ideas, as do diplomatic sources – thus employing an all-encompassing view of Germany as the model; The Portuguese center-right (PSD) frames the issue in a similar way to the German center-right, way but leaves out representations of “Symbolic Identity” frame;
 - Political affiliation, relation to power and national context are relevant;
- Portuguese definers (aside from the news outlets themselves and diplomats) do not use the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation – thus, they do not employ a representation of their own symbolic identity as somewhat “inferior” to the German one, or of the German symbolic identity as superior;
 - National context is relevant;
- The center opposition only uses the “Savior vs. Rescued” representation – thus, framing it as an issue of Germany exercising its power in a benevolent way, and not an issue of identity nor political-economic ideas. The center-left in both countries (SPD and PS) only uses the “Power” frame. The PS also uses this frame when in power;
 - Relation to power and political affiliation are relevant;
- The German conservative-right frames the issue according to the same categories as the center-left (although it is important to note that this is one of the instances in which the German exercise of power is seen as detrimental to the Germans themselves);
 - Relation to power is relevant;

- The German far-right opposition (AfD) frames its discourse about the “German Model” only through the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined” representation – thus, using an identity-based representation to sustain the idea of a German Model;
 - Relation to power, political affiliation and national context are relevant.

Regarding the news outlet’s own discourses, the distribution according to frame is quite homogenous, with the outlets using both the “Savior vs. Rescued” and the “Disciplined vs. Undisciplined”.

The exception is Spiegel, in which the “Student of German Austerity” representation is also present, in addition to the former two. Thus, both the social personality and the national context of the outlets seem to be relevant.

B. Bad hegemon

Representations of Germany’s power in Europe as relating to an idea of a “Bad Hegemon” appear through the “Power” frame (“Dictator vs. Dominator”), and through the intersections of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” (“Villain vs. Victim”), “Power” and “Political-Economic Ideas” (“Austerity Diktat”) and “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” (“German Disciplinarian”).

The representation of Germany as a dictator, within the “Power” frame (not intersected with either of the other two frames), includes narratives that portray Germany as exercising its power in self-interest and to the detriment of other countries, namely Portugal, for example, in the article titled *Researcher: Germany ensures its wellbeing at the expense of weaker partners* (CM, 2014). Often this representation of Germany is made through the personalization in Angela Merkel (see section 5.4).

It is interesting to note that, in most media outlets, this is quite a marginal representation, denoting an oppositional or negotiated decoding (Hall, 1981; Ross, 2011) between most of the outlets’ dominant-hegemonic discourses and the one present here, conveyed by non-primary, or secondary, definers, and, in the case of *Bild*, and *Diário de Notícias*, mostly external definers.

At the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” we find the representation of Germany as the villain and Portugal as the victim, in a way that does not directly question

its power but is used as a reaction to it. At times, this vilification is based on representations connected to Germany's past, namely the Third Reich and Nazism, not in relation to current far-right movements, but equating this power within Europe with reminiscences of the Nazi past, as the basis for a sort of anti-German sentiment.

Just as negative discourses about Southern Europeans are often rooted in ideas of efficiency and progress, as portrayed in the "Discipline" representation, negative discourses about Germany, specifically, are, at times, rooted in historical references to Nazi-Germany. Even when not linked to this historical referent, this narrative is based on a representation of Germany, and Germans, as being selfish, cold, ruthless. In general, the references to Nazi Germany all come from the Portuguese media, specifically, Portuguese opinion makers, as is the case in an op-ed in *Correio da Manhã* titled *The Fourth Reich?* (Silva, 2011).

When "Power" is intersected with "Political-Economic Ideas", we find discourses in which these ideas are represented as imposed by power-holding entities, namely Germany represented as "imposing" austerity policies on other countries, for example, a definer from the German SPD is quoted in *Bild* as stating in an interview that "the European neighbors tell us: We do not want to hear an austerity-Diktat from you" (Anda & Starnick, 2013). The "Austerity Diktat" representation portrays the political-economic policies of austerity in a negative light, while also being imposed by Germany in other European countries (including Portugal) with adverse consequences.

We can observe that this representation has a connection to political definers from the center-left, in the opposition. The relevance of political definers is expected when intersecting power with Political-Economic Ideas. *Bild*, *CM* and *DN* all quote the SPD in this representation. In *Bild*, it is the only source, indicating its marginality. In *Correio da Manhã*, it is also sustained by opinion makers. In *Spiegel* it is present in the news outlet's discourse. While *Diário de Notícias* seems to encompass all of these definers, adding a Greek definer as well as a Portuguese political definer, in the same position as the SPD.

Thus, it is a representation used by the political opposition, still within the political center. The fact that it is used by a German political definer also indicates that there is a distinction made between the representations of the use of power by German government, with a certain ideology, and "Germany" as a broader concept. It is also relevant to note that these representations, both by the SPD and the PS, were made in 2013, in the context of the

German legislative elections, also pointing to the possible relevance of electoral disputes to heighten dissenting discourses, in relation to the dominant ones, used, as we have seen regarding political definers, mostly by representatives from the center-right in power.

Regarding the intersection of all three frames, within the “Bad Hegemon” narrative, the “German Disciplinarian” representation constitutes the other side of the coin of the “Student of German Austerity” one, considering that it presents Germany as a self-righteous disciplinarian, imposing its model on others, rather than a teacher or model to be emulated, as can be exemplified in this passage from an op-ed in Spiegel: “[...] Germans, in the years of Schäuble's "Zuchtmeister" [disciplinarian] had adopted an absurd self-righteous idea of what kind of crisis Europe is currently experiencing. In short: We are exemplary, the others a disaster - to blame” (Fricke, 2017).

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	German Power: Dictator vs. Dominated	Bild	PT Union
		Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CM, Opinion Makers PT, Economic Sector PT, Cultural Sector PT, PPM, BE,
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT
Power + Symbolic Identity	Villains vs. Victims	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, EC
		DN	Opinion Makers PT, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT/DE
Power + Political-Economic Ideas	Austerity Diktat	Bild	SPD
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, SPD
		DN	DN, SPD, PS-O, Opinion Maker GR
Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	German Disciplinarian	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE
		DN	Opinion Maker PT
		CM	PS-O

TABLE 14 – SUMMARY TABLE: BAD HEGEMON

Media Outlets

An overall look at these representations lets us conclude that they exist in all media outlets. However, it seems to be quite marginal in the German tabloid *Bild*. Regarding the frames used, all media outlets, except for *Bild*, use a combination of all frames and intersections, in their overall coverage. This indicates that the narrative of Germany as a bad hegemon, and Portugal as a casualty of that authority, is connected to the representation of Germany's power as being exercised in a dominating way, its symbolic identity as a villain, its position as a harsh disciplinarian and of its imposition of a political-economic "austerity Diktat".

In *Bild*, this narrative is quite marginal, and only two representations are used, neither by the outlet itself: Dictator vs. Dominated, in the discourse of a definer from the Portuguese economic sector, and Austerity Diktat used by a definer from the German center-left opposition (SPD). The former appears only once, and through a Portuguese definer, namely a representative from a confederation of workers' unions: "'This is pure colonialism," railed union president Manuel Carvalho da Silva, the president of the CGTP, saying it is "lacking any bit of solidarity'" (Bild, 2011).

The "Austerity Diktat" representation is only used by a representative from the SPD, in an interview, from which the designation of the representation derives: "And that's why the European neighbors tell us: We do not want to hear an austerity-Diktat from you" (Anda & Starnick, 2013).

Considering the prevalence and definers using these representations in *Bild*, we can conclude that it is presented as an oppositional discourse, both to the political powerholders as well as the overall discourse of the outlet.

In *Spiegel*, all four representations are present. However, the news outlet itself only uses the one framed by the intersection of Power and Political-Economic Ideas ("Austerity Diktat"), whereas the other three are used by German opinion makers. Regarding the distribution of this narrative within *Spiegel*, it seems to be presented as not being employed by power-holding definers, however, the fact that opinion makers and the outlet itself use it, indicated that it employs a negotiated encoding of these narratives.

Spiegel itself frames the idea of Germany as bad hegemon, as an issue rooted in a particular political-economic policy of austerity, not symbolic identity. Whereas the opinion makers do not portray it as solely based on this intersection (“Austerity Diktat”), but rather on the other frames and intersections, when political-economic ideas do play a part, but together with representations based on symbolic identity (“German Disciplinarian”).

The “Austerity Diktat” representation is present in the discourse of the outlet itself, as, for instance, in an article about the German election night:

Anyone who has looked at the pictures of the CDU election party as a Greek, Spaniard or Portuguese is likely to be scared: As the much-feared Angela Merkel is dancing in the face of her triumph, faction leader Volker Kauder is shouting the Toten Hosen hit "Tage wie diese" into the microphone – that same Kauder, who had threatened in the past legislative period, that, in Europe, from now on, German would be spoken. Will German be sung, and German danced in the future? After Merkel's election victory, fear is going around in the South of the euro zone (Kaiser, 2013).

Concerns about the consequences of austerity are also present: “Portugal is leaving the Europe bailout, but citizens pay a high price for it. Hard austerity programs have destroyed the middle class, shredded social networks. 2.5 million people live on the verge of poverty” (Schultz, 2014b).

Discourses framed by “Power” and by the intersections of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” as well as both of those frames with “Political-Economic Ideas” are present in the discourses of German opinion makers.

The “Dictator vs. Dominated” representation is present in two instances, both of which opinion articles, as can be seen in the following passage, by a German academic: “Unpredictable, unavoidable, unsolvable? Not at all. The Eurozone - under Berlin leadership - has not created the conditions for a resolute tidying up after the credit boom of the noughties” (Müller, 2015b).

Regarding the “Victims vs. Villains” representation, it is present in the discourses of German opinion makers, at times, with what seems to be an ambivalent outlook, but is an

illustration of how elite outlets tend to present more complex and multifaceted discourses, as is the case with an op-ed by a journalist/academic:

[...] from a European point of view, the judgment is ambivalent: In many areas, the Federal Republic today plays an overwhelmingly dominant role. This knowledge gives rise to an obligation: to self-restraint, to be considerate - to interpret leadership that occasionally puts one's own interests and preferences aside. Threatening European partner states - be it expulsion from the monetary union (see the last crisis in Greece), be it with sanctions because of the refugee policy - does not fit this role (Müller, 2015a).

This can also be seen, for instance, in an op-ed by a journalist qualifying Germany's vision for Europe as "neurotic": "Schäuble's mania of controlling what other governments are doing even more in the future" (Fricke, 2017).

In *Correio da Manhã*, this seems to be quite a dominant narrative, and the overall coverage includes all frames and intersections. However, the news outlet itself uses solely the "Power" (Dictator vs. Dominated) frame to support this narrative. This is also the case of definers from the Portuguese economic and cultural sectors, as well as from the political definers from the non-center opposition, both from the monarchic right (PPM) and from the left (BE).

It appears to be a discourse fueled by a reaction/resistance to the hegemonic ideology, as it appears as existing in both sides of the political spectrum, and to not be present in the center, thus *CM*'s own encoding of "German Power" is presented as politically dissenting from the parties in power and in the center – hegemonic definers, decoding these non-hegemonic definers' representation as accepted.

Correio da Manhã is the outlet in which this representation seems to have a stronger presence, not only in the number of instances (which cannot be accounted for, since this is not a quantitative study), but from a qualitative perspective as well. The news outlet itself promotes this representation in several moments, stating, for instance that "The German narrative that the euro crisis has to do with the South wanting to take German money is

incorrect” (CM, 2014). Other definers using this representation are representatives of the agricultural sector, regarding the E.Coli outbreak, and calling out German official’s “irresponsibility” (CM, 2011), and of the cultural sector, a definer of which criticizes Portuguese subservience: “Obedient and subservient, they are very impressed with what they say about us out there” (Botelho, 2015).

Furthermore, it is also used, in the context of the European Parliament elections, representatives of two parties from the opposition, one with a parliamentary seat to the left (BE), censuring the Portuguese government’s “extreme subservience” (CM, 2014) in relation to Germany.

The other political definer using this representation does is from a party without a parliamentary seat, namely from the conservative monarchic right (PPM), quoted as claiming that the “Euro is an “enemy” currency of the economies, “overvalued” and “hostage” of the German economy, leading Portugal to lose competitiveness” (CM, 2014).

The “Disciplinarian” representation is only used by a definer from the Portuguese center-left (PS) while in the opposition, while the German center-left (SPD) in the opposition uses the representation based on the intersection of Power and Political-Economic Ideas (“Austerity Diktat”) – both include the political-economic ideas in their negative portrayal of German power, indicating a party-political critical stance, which is understandable taking into account their position as the mainstream opposition. Thus, definer only using the “Austerity Diktat” representation in *CM* is a representative of the SPD, who claims that “[Merkel] should not be allowed to continue with the savings policy” (CM, 2013).

The representation crossed by all three frames, within the “Bad Hegemon” narrative, in *CM*, is present in the discourse of a Portuguese political definer from the center-left, in the opposition (PS), through the criticism of German Finance Minister: “we know that Mr. Schäuble's path does not serve us, it is detrimental to the Portuguese economy” (Lusa, 2015).

All political definers using this narrative in *CM* are in the opposition, both in the left and the right, as well as other sectors of society. Thus, it seems to be a narrative that *CM* portrays as oppositional to the powerholders, but not to the outlet’s own discourse. Thus, it is an accepting decoding of what seems to be an oppositional, or negotiated, representation.

Some of the quotes denote a quite aggressive tone, with one even implying the benefits of the contamination of chancellor Merkel with a deadly bacterium.

The representation based on the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” (“Villains vs. Victims”) is used by a source from the E.U., as well as by Portuguese opinion makers, who also use the representations of “Dictator vs. Dominated” and “Austerity Diktat”. Regarding the former, the European Commission president’s advisor is indirectly quoted as saying “that the German narrative that the euro crisis has to do with the South wanting to take German money is incorrect” (CM, 2014).

All three representations, within the “Bad Hegemon” narrative, in *CM*, are present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers. Regarding the “Dictator vs. Dominated” representation, when it comes to as Portuguese opinion makers, we can even find a call from a journalist to infect the German chancellor with E.Coli, a common topic in *CM*’s negative portrayals of German power:

The trip is cheap and patriotic. Take the plane to Madrid, buy some beautiful Spanish cucumbers, hide them in the suitcase and leave quickly for Berlin. When you get to the capital of Germany, try everything to see Ms. Merkel and offer them the cucumbers. With luck, you will save Portugal from certain bankruptcy (Ferreira A. R., 2011).

Intersecting “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, the “Villains vs. Victims” representation is quite a qualitatively strong one, when it comes to Portuguese opinion makers, with references to Germany’s Nazi past, as in the aforementioned article titled *The Fourth Reich?*, in which the author writes:

[...] under the persistent German intransigence, lies the reviving of the project of dominating the Old Continent, over the wreckages caused by bankruptcies. This time hitched on the vaunted moral superiority of the German people (Silva, 2011).

Mirroring *Bild*’s aggressive language when describing the negative effects of German benevolent hegemony, the Portuguese tabloid also entails vivid negative

descriptions of Germany, when intersecting power and Symbolic Identity, especially in op-eds, which at times resort to irony, and in connection to the aforementioned E.Coli outbreak:

The fortress commanded by Angela Merkel has discovered, in terror, an invasion by legions of E.coli - a bacterium horrified of soap and disinfectant. It could only come from the barbarians of the South. The German Intestine, accustomed to sausages, pork and sauerkraut cabbage, is a little bottle of rose water. Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks and even Italians - who pose a serious risk to public health (Catarino, 2011).

In another example, it is written that the “expiatory vegetable was found, just by chance from one of the PIGS. Those which, at risk of contagion, must be isolated and given to their fate” (Dias, 2011).

Regarding the intersection of “Power” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, a Portuguese opinion maker focuses on the effects of austerity measures imposed by “Merkel's 'dictatorship’” (CM, 2013), and another one calls for “more toning therapies than the financial austerity recipes” (Falcão-Machado, 2013).

In *Diário de Notícias*, several definers employ this narrative of Germany as the bad hegemon. *DN* resorts to several external definers in order to cover these issues, especially opinion makers, including German, Greek and also an in-betweener, Portuguese-German opinion maker, especially when it comes to negative representations of Germany. As in the rest of the media outlets, political definers using these representations are all in the opposition, in this case, in the center-left in both countries.

In the outlet’s own discourse, both the “Dictator vs. Dominated” representation as well as the “Austerity Diktat” representations are present. The former is apparent in an article based on a study according to which “[t]he Portuguese are the ones disapprove of the management of the crisis by German Chancellor Angela Merkel the most (65%)” (L.M.C., 2013). Regarding the latter, the outlet names German’s Finance Minister Schäuble the “face of financial orthodoxy in the eurozone” (Viegas P. , 2017f). Political definers using this

narrative in *DN* are from the center-left opposition in both countries (PS and SPD) and frame it as a political-economic ideas issue (Austerity Diktat), as does a Greek opinion maker.

A representative of the German center-left opposition (SPD) is quoted as criticizing austerity measures served in "deadly doses" (Viegas P. , 2013a) in countries under financial assistance. Regarding Portuguese center-left, while in the opposition (PS), a representative calls Merkel "bad news for Europe" (Tecedeiro & M., 2013). The former Greek Presidency Minister, and academic, claims that Merkel's electoral win means "the economic devaluation and impoverishment" of southern European countries" (Lusa, 2013).

German opinion makers in *DN* use both the "Dictator vs. Dominated" representation and the "Villains vs. Victims" intersection. While all four representations can be found in Portuguese opinion makers' discourses. The Portuguese-German opinion maker uses the "Villains vs. Victims" representation.

The "Dictator vs. Dominated" representation can be seen namely an article which quotes German academic, who accuses Merkel of "having Germany "sleep on a volcano" and of feeding a "sovereignty of fiction" to European countries in crisis" (Viegas P. , 2013a). In an op-ed by a Portuguese academic, the following passage illustrates the complexity of the reputation of Angela Merkel (see chapter dedicated to representations of Merkel):

There are those who admire her for the conduct of the German Chancellery and control of the European machine. But there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave to the world in the last century (Lima, 2013).

Regarding the "Villains vs. Victims" representations, there are instances in which these definers refer to Germany's Nazi past, namely an op-ed in which it is pointed out, regarding Angela Merkel, that "there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave to the world in the last century" (Lima, 2013), or the idea that "[s]uddenly the Union became German, one of the reasons against which it was made decades ago. Without the French foundational weight, without the English liberal creativity, without the American sympathy and without the Soviet threat, but with the old identity

problems, the sovereign debts and the productivity losses, the Union disappears or becomes German and ... fades away!" (Barreto, 2017).

In the case of the "Disciplinarian" representation, we highlight the discourse present in the op-ed of a Portuguese academic, again, resorting to a Nazi-era reference:

When in 2011 Günther Oettinger, the man Merkel placed at European Commission, asked countries that had committed the "sin" of excessive debt to compulsorily have their half-masted flags in the EU institutions, no one fired him. AfD's neo-Nazi nationalism is a problem of "normality" in overdose (Marques, 2017).

Regarding the use of the "Victims vs. Villains" representation on its own, it is present in the discourse of a Portuguese-German journalist writes in an op-ed that: "The German government has long been tempted to isolate the country on its prosperous island and move closer to the Eurasian bloc, starting with Russia at the expense of the European project" (Szymanski, 2017).

Definers

In general, political definers using the "Dictator vs. Dominated", "Villains vs. Victims", "Disciplinarian" or "Austerity Diktat" representations to portray Germany and Portugal, i.e. representing Germany as a "Bad Hegemon", are all from the political opposition, the center-left in both countries (SPD and PS) as well as the monarchic right (PPM) and the left (BE) in Portugal, and none from the center-right (which is the party in power in Germany during the whole period under analysis). Regarding other definers using these representations (excluding here the news outlets themselves), they include mainly opinion makers, as well as sources from the Portuguese economic and cultural sectors, as well as from the E.U.

The representations used, however, are not always the same. We observe the following distribution of the representations (and corresponding frames) according to the definers using them:

- The “Austerity Diktat” representation (Power + Political-Economic Ideas) is used by definers from the center-left (opposition) in both countries (SPD and PS), as well as by Portuguese and Greek opinion makers.
 - The SPD is quoted using this representation in almost all media outlets, except for Spiegel (which uses this representation in its own discourse); and the Portuguese PS is quoted by both Portuguese media outlets. Opinion makers using this representation are also quoted in the Portuguese media.
- The “Disciplinarian” representation (Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic ideas) is present in the discourses of the Portuguese center-left opposition (PS), and of Portuguese and German opinion makers.
 - The elite media outlets are the ones quoting opinion makers using this representation
 - CM quotes the PS as using this representation
- The “Dictator vs. Dominated” representation (Power frame) is used in the discourses of the Portuguese non-center opposition, both from the monarchic right (PPM) and left (BE), as well as by Portuguese and German opinion makers, and sources from the Portuguese economic and cultural sectors.
 - The political sources are quoted in the Portuguese tabloid (*CM*)
 - The Portuguese union and agricultural sector sources are quoted in both tabloid outlets (*Bild* and *CM*) and the source from the cultural sector is quoted in the Portuguese tabloid
 - The German opinion makers using this representation are quoted in the elite outlets (*Spiegel* and *Bild*)
 - The Portuguese opinion makers using it are quoted in the Portuguese tabloid (*CM*)
- The “Villains vs. Victims” representation (Power + Symbolic Identity) is only present in the discourses of Portuguese, German and Portuguese-German opinion makers and a source from the E.U.
 - German opinion makers using this representation are quoted in both elite outlets (*Spiegel* and *DN*)
 - Portuguese opinion makers are quoted in both Portuguese outlets (*CM* and *DN*)

- The Portuguese-German opinion maker is quoted in the Portuguese elite outlet (*DN*)
- The source from the E.U. using this representation is quoted in the Portuguese tabloid (*CM*)

From this distribution, we can observe that, this narrative of Germany as the “Bad Hegemon” is used by a particular cluster of definers. Our main conclusions regarding this cluster of representations, according to definer (excluding the news outlets’ own discourses), are that relation to power, political affiliation and type of definer/article (whether it is an opinion maker) are the main influencing elements within these representations, as well as national context, to a lesser extent:

- The center-left in the opposition in both countries (SPD and PS) sustains this narrative based on ideas about power as intersected with political-economic ideas, with the Portuguese PS also intersecting these with narratives about Symbolic Identity - thus there is party-political positioning by the center-left in the opposition according to political ideology, but, in the Portuguese context, it also includes a “symbolic identity” framing
 - Political affiliation, relation to power and national context are relevant
- The non-center opposition, both from the left and the right sustain this narrative framed by Power, as do sources from the Portuguese economic and political sectors, and Portuguese and German opinion makers
 - Relation to power and type of definer are relevant
- Opinion makers and a source from the E.U. are the only definers resorting to the intersection of the “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” frames
 - Type of definer/article is relevant

Regarding the news outlets’ own discourses, a combination of national context and social personality seems to be relevant:

- It is a narrative that is absent in the German tabloid (*Bild*), is represented within the “Austerity Diktat” in the German elite outlet (*Spiegel*), as “Dictator vs. Dominated” in the Portuguese tabloid (*CM*), and as both in the Portuguese elite outlet (*DN*).

German model or bad hegemon? Comparative analysis

Our data indicates an overall stronger presence of discourses supporting the narrative of the “German Model”, framed mainly by “Power” and by the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, and to a lesser extent, adding “Political-Economic Ideas” to the latter. When the opposite narrative, of the “Bad Hegemon” is conveyed, the element of “Political-Economic Ideas” seems to gain importance.

Thus, we conclude that, overall, both narratives about Germany are supported by contrasting representations about power and symbolic identity, but when portraying German power as negative, this is more often in relation to political-economic ideas, namely austerity policies, than when this power is portrayed as positive.

Aside from this general conclusion regarding our frames and intersections, we can draw some distinctions regarding the various elements that influence our data.

Media Outlets

The Portuguese media outlets both present a vast array of definers using the “Bad Hegemon” narrative (mainly from the political opposition and other sectors of society), in comparison with the German media. This indicates a certain reaction to the hegemonic discourse of a “German Model” by the powerless. Regarding the “Bad Hegemon” narrative, *Bild* is the only news outlet in which not all the four representations are present, but only the “Victims vs. Villains” and the “Austerity Diktat” representations. *Bild* is also the only outlet in whose own discourse the “Bad Hegemon” narrative is not present at all.

CM is the only outlet in which the presence of the “German Model” narrative, in the totality of the outlet’s coverage, is not distinctly stronger than the “Bad Hegemon” narrative (not in the outlet’s own discourse).

Thus, the tabloid outlets tend to promote a more positive self-representation (*Bild*), and negative hetero-representation (*CM*). *Correio da Manhã* is the news outlet whose overall coverage stands out the most, in relation to the other three, with a distribution that is completely opposite, indicating that the connection between social personality and national context of the news outlet plays a major role in these representations. The elite media outlets are the only ones where the intersection of “Power” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, i.e., the

representation of an “Austerity Diktat”, is present in the own outlet’s discourse, regarding the “Bad Hegemon” narrative.

Type of definer

Opinion makers, mainly in opinion articles, seem to be the types of definers that convey a broader range of representations and narratives. Thus, they seem to serve as way of presenting not only hegemonic, but also negotiated and oppositional representations, in relation to the outlets’ overall coverage. They are the types of definers in which there is no clear tendency regarding the narratives. These definers are absent in *Bild*’s coverage, with the own outlet often resorting to the more emotional tone that, for example, in *CM* appears in the opinion makers’ discourses.

Regarding the political definers, very clear tendencies can be drawn, according to three factors - political spectrum, position to power and national context:

- The center (CDU), liberal (FDP), conservative (CSU) and far (AfD) right, in Germany, and the center-right (PSD), in Portugal, whether or not in power, only use the “German Model” narrative.
- The center-left in the opposition, in both countries, are the only ones using both narratives
 - The Portuguese center-left (PS), when in power, uses the “German Model” narrative, but, when in the opposition, uses both the “Bad Hegemon” and the “German Model” narratives
 - The German center-left (SPD), in the opposition, also uses both the “German Model” and the “Bad Hegemon” narratives
- The Portuguese opposition from the monarchic right (PPM) and from the left (BE) are the only ones only using the “Bad Hegemon” narrative.

This leads us to conclude that there is a clear hegemonic tendency towards the “German Model” narrative, in line with the power-holding political definers, and the German right, tempered, or negotiated by the center-left, and completely rejected by the Portuguese non-mainstream opposition.

However, the frames used do vary and allow us to complexify this analysis:

- The German center (CDU) and liberal right (FDP), sustains this narrative of a “German Model” based on the representation of Germany as the savior, as disciplined and as the teacher of austerity policies, and Portugal as saved, undisciplined and a student of German austerity;
- The German conservative right in the opposition (CSU) sustains it based solely on the idea of Germany as a savior and Portugal as saved (and, as mentioned above, sees this as negative for Germans);
- The German far-right sustains this narrative based solely on the representation of Germany as disciplined and Portugal as undisciplined;
- The Portuguese center-right (PSD), both when in power and in the opposition, sustains the narrative of a “German Model” based on the representation of Germany as the savior and a teacher of austerity, and Portugal as saved and a student of German austerity – the view based on “Symbolic Identity” (“Disciplined vs. Undisciplined”) is absent
- The Portuguese and the German center-left (PS and SPD) sustain the “German Model” narrative solely based on a representation of Germany as a savior and Portugal as being saved;
- Both center-lefts sustain their “Bad Hegemon” narrative when introducing the element of “Political-Economic Ideas”
 - The Portuguese center-left (PS), in the opposition, sustains the narrative of Germany as a “Bad Hegemon” with the representations of both an “Austerity Diktat” imposed by Germany on Portugal and of the “German Disciplinarian”
 - The German center-left, also uses the “austerity Diktat” representation, but not the “German Disciplinarian”
- The Portuguese non-center opposition (PPM and BE) sustain the “Bad Hegemon” narrative solely on the basis of the representation of Germany as a powerful dictator and a powerless dominated Portugal.

Thus, the elements of Power and of Symbolic Identity cross almost all representations, also intersected, at times, with Political-Economic Ideas, when it comes to the “German Model” narrative. When it comes to the “Bad Hegemon” narrative, political definers, the “Political-Economic Ideas” category becomes more relevant, in the discourse

of the center-left, with the “Symbolic Identity” category only being relevant in the discourse of the Portuguese center-left.

Discourse	Representation	Media	Definers	
German Model	German Power: Savior vs. Rescued	Bild	Bild, CDU, PS-O, SPD, FDP, Econ. PT	
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE	
		CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT, PSD – P, PSD – O, PS – P, CSU, CDU	
		DN	DN, Media DE, Media USA, CDU, SPD, PT Diplomat, DE Diplomat, Cultural Sector PT/DE, Opinion Makers PT	
	Disciplined vs. Undisciplined	Bild	Bild, CDU, FDP, AfD	
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE	
		CM	CM, Eurogroup, Opinion Maker PT, CDU	
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Econ. DE, CDU, FDP-P, Diplomat PT, Diplomat DE, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT	
	Student of German Austerity	Bild	PSD - P	
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, PSD-O, Opinion Makers DE	
		CM	CDU, Diplomat PT	
		DN	Diplomat PT, Econ. PT, FDP-P, CDU	
	Bad Hegemon	German Power: Dictator vs. Dominated	Bild	PT Union
			Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE
			CM	CM, Opinion Makers PT, Economic Sector PT, Cultural Sector PT, PPM, BE,
			DN	DN, Opinion Makers
Villains vs. Victims		Bild	/	
		Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE	
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, EU	
		DN	Opinion Makers PT, Opinion Maker DE, Opinion Maker PT/DE	
Austerity Diktat		Bild	SPD	
		Spiegel	Spiegel	
		CM	Opinion Makers PT, SPD	
		DN	DN, SPD, PS-O, Opinion Maker GR	
German Disciplinarian		Bild	/	
		Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE	
		CM	PS-O	
		DN	Opinion Maker PT	

TABLE 15 – SUMMARY TABLE: DISCOURSES ON GERMAN POWER

5.1.1.1.2 EUROPEAN POWER

When it comes to Europe, a similar distinction between a positive and a negative perspective on the power of “Europe”, or of European institutions, can be drawn. The former supported by ideas about “Power” (“European Power: Good”), intersected, at times, with ideas about “Symbolic Identity” (“Europeanism”), is based on an idea of Europeanness and commonality, for example, portraying Europe as being “built on solidarity and the mobilization of all Europeans” (CM, 2014). The latter is supported by ideas about “Power” (“European Power: Bad”), intersected, at times, with a view on “Symbolic Identity” (“European Core vs. Periphery”) and adding “Political-Economic Ideas” (“Two Europes”), denoting a divided Europe, as can be seen for example in the mention of a “Brussels regulatory rage” (Lambeck, 2014). Thus, the positive views of Europe, in the context of the economic crisis, are based solely on “Power” or on this frame intersected with “Symbolic Identity”, whereas, when political-economic ideas come into play, the only representations are negative. Regarding representations of Europe, it is interesting to note that, when the “Symbolic Identity” frame is present, the issue is no longer that of an institutional European power-holder, but rather of a commonness or divisiveness within Europe. So, we have two different constellations regarding representations of Europe: one regarding Europe as an institution, and the other as an imagined community.

A. Europeanness

Representations of European power as relating to an idea of “Europeanness” appear through the “Power” frame (“European Power: Good”) and through the intersection of that frame with “Symbolic Identity” (“Europeanism”). They are not present whenever the frame of “Political-Economic Ideas” comes into play, in either of its intersections.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	European Power: Good	Bild	CDU
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	PSD – P, PS - O
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT, EC
Power + Symbolic Identity	Europeanism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Opinion maker DE
		CM	PS - O
		DN	Opinion makers PT, E.U.

TABLE 16 – SUMMARY TABLE: EUROPEANNESS

Regarding the “Power” frame, the assessment of European Union institutions’ power as something positive is mainly made from the standpoint of instrumentality, of how useful or advantageous they have been for us, for example, the idea that the E.U. brings “peace and freedom, prosperity and economic power, more competition, which ensures low prices” (Fischer & Wittrock, 2011).

Even though it is not particularly strong in any one of the media outlets, regarding the representation of the European Union as positive, within the “Power” frame, we can discern a pattern according to the outlets’ “social personalities”: in the tabloid outlets it is encoded by internal (from the outlet’s national context) political definers from the center (CDU in *Bild*, and PSD, while in power, and PS, while in the opposition, in *CM*), whereas, in the case of the elite media outlets, it is present in the own outlets’ discourses, with the addition, in *DN*, of also being present in the discourses of an opinion maker and a source from the E.U. itself. Thus, *DN* seems to stand out, as this representation seems to have more weight than in the other media outlets.

At the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, within this “Europeanness” discourse, Europe is represented as being, or rather having been, exceptional, historically and culturally, referring to a “European spirit” or superior “European values”, often crossed by feelings of nostalgia for Europe’s recent past and the idea that this spirit is decreasing, as can be seen in the following example:

The construction of a European cultural identity, which is not and cannot be immobilized in time but a process in progress, still extends today to the dynamics of the second half of the 1940s, although it no longer gives rise to the enthusiasm it gave rise to in that period (Moura, 2013).

The “Power” frame is still there, since Europe is seen as potentially powerful, as well as these ideas about a European symbolic identity. It is a discourse that almost only appears in the elite media especially in the Portuguese elite outlet.

This representation is closely linked to ideas about Europeanism and tries to overcome national-based divisions to draw on a mythical European spirit. As said, it is present in elite media outlets, and not in the outlets’ own discourses, but in that of opinion

makers, thus pointing to a negotiated positioning, and not a dominant one. It must be pointed out, however, that this representation is much more present in *DN* than in *Spiegel*. In the tabloids, it is absent in *Bild*, and in *CM* only appears in the discourse of a political definer, from the mainstream opposition, also indicating a mainly negotiated decoding (Hall, 1981; Ross, 2011).

Media outlets

An overall observation of these representations lets us conclude that they are present in all media outlets' total coverage, but not in the own discourses of the tabloid outlets. The definers using these representations in the tabloids are political definers, and the ones using them in the elite media outlets are the outlets themselves, opinion makers, and, in the case of *DN*, definers from the E.U. institutions. Clearly, a distinction based on the social personalities of the outlets can be drawn.

In the German tabloid, *Bild*, this narrative framed by "Power" is only present in one instance, through the "Power" frame, i.e. within the constellation of Europe as an institution, and in the discourse of a political definer from the German center-right in Power (CDU), quoted as saying, about the Euro: "It provides jobs, economic growth, tax revenues." (Bild, 2011). It is, thus, a narrative used by the political powerholders, but very marginal in this outlet. It is the only outlet in which only the Power frame is used, and representations of Europeanism are absent.

In *Spiegel*, the narrative is framed according both to the "Power" frame as well as the intersection of it with "Symbolic Identity". However, the outlet itself only refers to the institutional constellation ("Power" frame), whereas the definers using the "Europeanism" representation, i.e. Europe as an imagined community, are German opinion makers.

It is the news outlet itself that uses the positive representation of European power, in a piece in which it presents both arguments Germans usually use to criticize the E.U. and those used to praise it and is an interesting example of how elite media outlets tend to present more complex representations:

The doubters point to Greece, for example. There, they read it in the "Bild" newspaper, the employees of President Papandreou allegedly get 16 monthly

salaries, employees in state enterprises receive bonuses for hand washing and punctuality, bus drivers, premiums for warming up the engine. And should we still pay for these lavish bankrupt Greeks? That's the question that resonates. Should that be the meaning of Europe? The fervent EU fans contradict this. With the well-known lists, of why Europe is so important for Germany and the continent. There are really good arguments, peace and freedom, prosperity and economic power, more competition, which ensures low prices (Fischer & Wittrock, 2011).

The combination of the positive representation of European power and the “Europeanism” representation is present in the discourses of German opinion makers. Regarding the “Power” frame, a German opinion maker writes about a “(this) Epoch: that of the peaceful and still prosperous European Union - and in its heart lies Germany, which has benefited from this Union like no other country” (Schmitz, 2014).

As for the “Europeanism” representation, it can be found in the discourse of a German academic, rooted in a sort of nostalgia about a European past, conveying the idea that the “European spirit of earlier years is permanently damaged” (Müller, 2015b).

As in the German tabloid, in the Portuguese tabloid, *Correio da Manhã*, this narrative is absent from the outlet’s own discourse and appears only in that of political definers, namely from the center. In this case, the Portuguese center-right (PSD) uses it, while in power, through the “Power” frame, and the Portuguese center-left (PS), while in the opposition, uses the representations both framed by “Power” and by the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”. Thus, as happens in *Bild*, the political center seems to convey this narrative.

The representative of the Portuguese center-right (PSD), when in power, is indirectly quoted as arguing “that the European Union does not deserve criticism, but gratitude from the Portuguese for its solidarity” (CM, 2014)

Both representations framed by “Power” and its intersection with “Symbolic Identity”, within the “Europeanness” narrative, are present in the discourse of a representative of the Portuguese center-left (PS), while in the opposition, who is quoted as

criticizing "the prejudices that dominate between the north and the south [of Europe], between the rich and the poor, between the workers and the lazy" and claiming that "Europe is built on solidarity and the mobilization of all Europeans" (CM, 2014).

In the Portuguese elite outlet, *Diário de Notícias*, the distribution also shares some similarities to the German elite outlet: the outlet uses this narrative as according to the "Power" frame, while Portuguese opinion makers and sources from the E.U. convey representations of "Europeanism", here adding to the "European Power: Good" representation. The positive representation of European power is used by the news outlet itself, particularly in an editorial piece, in which it is written that:

(...) Europe, even before our accession to the EEC in 1986, was always on our side and was responsible for the tremendous progress and qualitative leap that the country and our lives have made in the last almost 30 years (DN, 2014).

The combination of the representation framed solely by "Power" with the "Europeanism" one is present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers as well as a definer from the E.U. The former is used in an op-ed by a Portuguese academic, who writes that "[i]t is fair to recognize that the EU has helped Portugal. It gave a deadline and an opportunity to democracy. The EU has strengthened the state and society" (Barreto, 2017).

Regarding the "Europeanism" representation, it is mainly present in op-eds, featuring ideas based on a nostalgia for a past Europe, including the idea, present in the article cited above, that there "was also the awareness that Europe had a set of spiritual, rational, scientific and humanistic characteristics, the combination of which distinguished it from other continents", and the notion of a "European identity" (Moura, 2013).

Considering the definers from E.U. institutions, the President of the European Commission is quoted as saying that: "Staying together as Europeans is indispensable for Europe to shape a global order in which we can defend our values and interests" (Viegas P., 2014), and former EC President Jacques Delors, is quoted as calling for leaders to "revive the good old spirit" (Lusa, 2013) of the E.U. founders.

Definers

Definers using the narrative of Europeanness are either political definers from the center-right and left (CDU, PSD, PS), in both countries, whether or not in power, German and Portuguese opinion makers and sources from the E.U. We observe the following distribution of the representations (and corresponding frames) according to the definers using them:

- The center-right, in power, in both countries (CDU and PSD) frames this narrative as an issue of “Power” – thus, for the powerholding center-right the idea of Europeanism comes from European institutions’ positive use of its power;
- German opinion makers frame this narrative as an issue of “Europeanism” – thus, it is at the intersection of a positive use of power, combined with a sense of European identity that this narrative of Europeanism occurs;
- Other definers, including Portuguese opinion makers, the Portuguese center-left (PS), while in the opposition, and sources from the E.U., use both representations in their portrayal of Europeanness.

B. European divisiveness

The representations of European power in a negative tone, based on internal divisions within Europe, or on criticism of the use of power by the E.U., as an institution, is present in the overall coverage of all media outlets, including in all the outlets’ own discourses.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	European Power: Bad	Bild	Bild, AfD
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CM, BE, PS-O, PNR, Opinion Makers PT, Union PT
		DN	Opinion Makers PT
Power + Symbolic Identity	Core vs. Periphery	Bild	Bild
		Spiegel	/
		CM	Opinion makers PT, PS
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Opinion maker PT, Opinion maker PT/DE
Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Two Europes	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	Unions: ETUC, CGTP; UGT

TABLE 17 – SUMMARY TABLE: EUROPEAN DIVISIVENESS

When it comes to representing the European Union as exercising its power in a negative way, a qualitative analysis allows us to understand that the type of power represented is different in the Portuguese and German media, with the former portraying it as having a dominant kind of power, for instance, with a political definer talking about a “increasingly dictatorial Europe” (CM, 2014), while the latter portrays it as a rather purely regulatory hindrance, for example with an opinion maker expressing frustration that “politicians of all parties are acting as if they were disgusted by "Eurocrats" who wanted to dictate the details of their shower heads or coffee machines to the Germans” (Schmitz, 2014).

However, some patterns emerge transversally, according to the social personalities of the media outlets: in the tabloid media, this representation is encoded by political definers from the opposition – in *CM* from all sides of the spectrum including the “center”, and in *Bild* from the far-right (AfD). In the elite media it is mainly present through the discourses of opinion makers. Given the wide variety of definers encoding this representation, *CM* decoding and encoding stands out in respect to this representation.

The social personalities of the news outlets, as well as their national context seem to play a part in the distribution of the different representations: as in the previous narrative, in the tabloids we can find political definers, with Portuguese opinion makers and sources from the economic sector also present in the Portuguese tabloid’s coverage, while, in the elite outlets, there are no political definers, but rather opinion makers, and, in the Portuguese outlet, sources from the economic sector and unions. Thus, in the German outlets there is a smaller variety of definers than in the Portuguese outlets.

When intersecting “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, one of the representations found is the one in which Europe is presented as divided into two. This is done both in a critical tone, underlining this existence of two Europes, not only in the sense of a Northern and a Southern one, a core (essential) and a peripheral (disposable) Europe, but also by using narratives that reveal quite disparate power positions within Europe’s symbolic imagery: the one of Germany as the “European 'people of destiny' (Schicksalsvolk)” (Marques, 2013), which presents the historic and cultural importance of the country in the European context, and one of Portugal as the “Florida of Europe” (Lusa, 2013), which presents the country as a tourist or retirement sunny destination for Northern Europeans. It is not necessarily, in all cases, a negative view of power relations within Europe, as is the case in the “European

Power: Bad” representation, and cannot be compared directly to it, in general. But rather it intersects those power relations within Europe with ideas about symbolic identity.

What the analysis of this representation allows us to conclude is that, within the European context, *Diário de Notícias* tends to present Germany as a core country and Portugal as an appealing resort, the latter also appears in *Bild*. In *Correio da Manhã* we find a more critical undertone, with the Portuguese opinion makers criticizing Portugal’s weak status within the E.U., and somewhat directly acknowledging its inferiority, and the political opinion maker from the Portuguese center-left opposition (PS) criticizing the fact that Europe is divided by North-South based prejudices. This representation contains multiple different narratives, but it allows us to understand this portrayal of a split Europe, when crossed by the “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” frames, and how it is almost absent from the German media, and somewhat relevant in the Portuguese media, as well as the particularities between a more critical-aggressive stance (*CM*) and a apparently neutral one (*DN*).

Regarding the intersection of all three frames - “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” there is one representation that, again, resorts to this narrative of two Europes. It does not necessarily point to a European power but equates the power distribution within Europe with internal divisions which seem to point both to a “Symbolic Identity” as well as a “Political-Economic Ideas”, namely by pointing to a fairer labor system in Northern Europe, than in Southern Europe, and it is only present in Portuguese elite outlet (*DN*), in the discourses of representatives of the European and Portuguese union sectors.

Media Outlets

In *Bild*, this narrative is present in the outlet’s own discourse, framing it as an issue of “Power” and of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, and in the discourse of a definer from the German far-right (AfD), framed as an issue of Power.

In the case of *Bild*’s own discourse, the representation of European power as bad is, for instance, present in the questions posed in an interview, such as: “Can you understand that criticism of Europe in Germany is met with so much echo?” and “What can one do against the Brussels regulatory rage?” (Lambeck, 2014). The latter appears, rather implicitly, when the outlet lists Praia da Marinha, in Portugal as an “idyllic beach” (Bild, 2011).

The “Power” frame on its own is present in the discourse of a representative of the German far-right party (AfD), through a roundup of AfD’s ideas: “The AfD sees the EU as failed, wants reforms and (if they fail), if necessary, an exit from the EU and the abolition of the euro (back to the D-Mark)” (Vehlewald, 2017).

In *Spiegel*, the only frame used within this narrative, is the “Power” frame, and it is present in both the outlet’s own discourse and in that of German opinion makers. It is the only outlet in which this is the only representation used. The news outlet itself uses this representation, in various instances, such as a reference to the “schizophrenia in the control center of Europe” (Pauly & Schmitz, 2014), and the idea that “[a]bove all, it [the E.U.] needs more democratic legitimacy for this power” (Fischer & Wittrock, 2011).

It is also present in the discourse of a German journalist, who, as happens in the aforementioned *Spiegel* article, balances the faults and strengths of the E.U. but underlines how it is seen in a negative light: “Instead of historical joy, it is more of a historical frustration to feel that politicians of all parties are acting as if they were disgusted by “Eurocrats” who wanted to dictate the details of their shower heads or coffee machines to the Germans” (Schmitz, 2014).

In *Correio da Manhã*, just as in *Bild*, the overall coverage, within this narrative, is based both on the “Power” frame and the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”. However, the outlet itself only uses the Power frame, as do definers from the Portuguese non-center opposition, both from the left (BE) and the right (PNR), and from the Portuguese economic sector. The discourses of Portuguese opinion makers and political definers from the center-left (PS), while in the opposition, within this narrative, are framed both by “Power” and by the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”.

The representation framed by “Power” is apparent in the outlet’s own discourse, when reporting on a speech by Jean-Claude Juncker, in the following way: “Juncker 'removes' Portugal from the European Union - President of the European Commission has forgotten our country and said that 'Europe extends from Spain to Bulgaria” (Gonçalves, 2017). When it comes to political definers from political parties in the opposition, the criticism of a representative from B.E. regarding Jean-Claude Juncker’s speech, is related to the new outlet’s own discourse quoted above, as, in the same article, it is reported that the

“lapse had immediate reactions on social media, with Bloco de Esquerda MEP Marisa Matias asking: "Have you already assumed that we are out?"” (Gonçalves, 2017).

Another political definer in the opposition using this representation is a representative of the PNR, who describes a "federal and increasingly dictatorial Europe, where the big command and the small obey” (CM, 2014). It is also used by a definer from the union sector, who claims that "[w]e [Portugal] have to have an assertive voice in Europe, that does not submit, does not squat down, that is not ashamed to be Portuguese" (CM, 2014).

The combination of both the representation framed by “Power” and the “Core vs. Periphery” one, is present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers and a representative of the center-left party (PS), while in the opposition.

As for the representation framed by the “Power” frame, it can be seen in the discourse of a representative of the PS, according to whom “The European Commission failed to fulfill its mission under the treaties and last week threatened and blackmailed the Portuguese State” (CM, 2014). Whereas the idea of a European core and a periphery is present in discourse of a representative of the PS, while in the opposition, but in a critical way, in which he criticizes “the prejudices that dominate between the north and the south [of Europe], between the rich and the poor, between the workers and the lazy” (CM, 2014).

The view of the E.U.’s power in a negative light is apparent in the discourse of journalist in an op-ed, who describes Iberia as a resistant and the idea that the “wind that blows from Europe is so cold” (Ribeiro O. , 2014).

Concerning the “Core vs. Periphery” discourse, in *CM*, the narrative directly points to the existence of two Europes, with Portugal being irrelevant or peripheral, as is the case in an op-ed by Portuguese journalist: “Europe does not know what to do to its weakest links, and there is a temptation to simply drop them: to exclude them from the eurozone” (Guerreiro, 2011)

Diário de Notícias is the only outlet in which, aside from the “Power” frame and the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, the intersection of “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” is also present in the coverage, thus adding the “Two Europes” representation. It is also the only outlet in which the only representation in the outlet’s own discourse is the “European Core vs. Periphery”, which is also the case in its

definers from the Portuguese economic sector, and a Portuguese-German opinion maker. The Portuguese opinion makers use both the “European Power Bad” and the “European Core vs. Periphery” representations, and, finally, the only case within all of the coverages in which we find the “Two Europes” representation is in the discourses of several definers from Portuguese and European unions.

In the outlet’s own discourse, we can find both narratives of Germany’s cultural and historic importance, namely an article titled *Almanac to better understand Germany and the Germans*, where we find the idea that “the Germanic peoples have been central to European history since the first century” (Ferreira L. P., 2013), and in which German figures such as Beethoven, Goethe and Kant are named, as well as gastronomical references such as beer and sausages, and of Portugal as a holiday destination (Viegas P. , 2013h), as well as the idea that it “can become a 'Florida of Europe'” (Lusa, 2013), in its own discourse. It is also implicitly mirrored, in the same article, by a representative of the foreign homeowners association, who claims that the “weather is a "huge factor" for Portugal to be chosen as a second home for European retirees” (Lusa, 2013).

The representation is also present in the discourse of Portuguese-German opinion maker, who described Portugal as “a mix of Silicon Valley and Florida” with “[f]oreign investment in real estate, adherence to tax privileges for foreigners, (opaque and suspicious) golden visas, unbridled tourism, actresses, actors and retired stars” (Szymanski, 2017).

In *DN*, opinion makers are the ones using both the “European Power: Bad” representation, as well as the “Core vs. Periphery” one. The former is used, for instance, a piece in which “lack of dialogue between politics and citizens” (Lima, 2013) is criticized, and the another in which the idea that the “EU is not itself democratic” is conveyed (Barreto, 2017). Regarding the latter, it is present in the discourses of a Portuguese academic, who takes on a tour of Berlin and its history: “Berlin returns to the summit stage of history, just as Germany is once again becoming the European 'people of destiny' (*Schicksalsvolk*)” (Marques, 2013).

The “Two Europes” representation only appears in *DN*, and through the discourses of several representatives of the Portuguese and European union sectors. In an article, representative of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is quoted as claiming that:

Northwest European workers are better paid because they have a fairer and more transparent system of wage setting, involving trade unions in negotiations with employers. This is the key ingredient in the prosperity and industrial success of Germany, Austria. from the Netherlands and other countries to the North (Pinto, 2017).

While, in the same article, representatives of the Portuguese union sector also point to a Europe that is "increasingly unequal" (CGTP) and marked by "'abysmal differences" in workers' incomes" (UGT) (Pinto, 2017).

Definers

Definers using the narrative of "Divisiveness" are both political definers from the opposition (AfD, BE, PNR, PS), in both countries, both from the Portuguese left and center-left (BE and PS) and the Portuguese and German far-right (PNR, AfD), Portuguese, German and German-Portuguese opinion makers, sources from the Portuguese Economic Sector and from Portuguese and European unions. But, again, the distribution according to the frame used is not the same:

- The non-center opposition, in both countries, both in the left (BE) and the right (AfD, PNR) frame it as a "Power" issue, i.e., addressing Europe solely as an institution, as do German opinion makers;
- The Portuguese center-left (PS), in the opposition, as well as Portuguese opinion makers and sources from the Portuguese Economic sector frame it both according to the "European Power Bad" representation and the "European Core vs. Periphery";
- The Portuguese-German definer solely uses the European Core vs. Periphery representation;
- The outlier in the generality of coverages is in the discourses of sources from the Portuguese and European union sector, which are the only ones using the "2 Europes" representation, at the intersection of "Power", "Symbolic Identity" and "Political-Economic Ideas".

Taking into account the type of definers using this narrative, we can see that it is tendentially oppositional to powerholding sources, but quite present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers, thus indicating a point of discursive struggle, especially in the Portuguese context.

Divisive- or togetherness? Comparative Analysis

Our data indicates an overall stronger presence of the narrative of “Divisiveness”, framed mainly by “Power”, i.e. E.U. as an institution, and by the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, i.e. as an imagined community, and to a lesser extent, adding “Political-Economic Ideas” to the latter. When the opposite narrative, of Europeanism is conveyed, the element of “Political-Economic Ideas” is absent, but the both the “Power” frame and its intersection with “Symbolic Identity” are influential.

Aside from this general conclusion regarding our frames and intersections, we can draw some distinctions regarding the various elements that influence our data.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers		
Power	European Power: Good	Bild	CDU		
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Maker DE		
		CM	PSD – P, PS - O		
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT, EC		
	European Power: Bad	Bild	Bild, AfD		
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Makers DE		
		CM	CM, BE, PS-O, PNR, Opinion Makers PT, Union PT		
		DN	Opinion Makers PT		
Power + Symbolic Identity	Core vs. Periphery	Bild	Bild		
		Spiegel	/		
		CM	Opinion makers PT, PS		
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Opinion maker PT, Opinion maker PT/DE		
	Europeanism	Bild	/		
		Spiegel	Opinion maker DE		
		CM	PS - O		
		DN	Opinion makers PT, E.U.		
		Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Two Europes	Bild	/
				Spiegel	/
CM	/				
DN	Unions: ETUC, CGTP; UGT				

TABLE 18 – SUMMARY TABLE: EUROPEAN POWER

Media outlets use these narratives and corresponding representations in diverse ways. Regarding the social personality of the news outlets we can observe that the tabloids, in their own discourse, only present a negative narrative about European power, whereas the elite media conveys both positive and negative representations. Again, this is in line with our previous observation that the tabloids tend to present more negative hetero-representations, with the additional relevant observation that this indicates that the E.U., or Europe in general, tends to be *othered* by these outlets. The tabloids also resort mostly to political definers, who are absent in the coverage of the elite outlets. The national context of the outlets also seems to be a relevant factor, considering that, in the Portuguese media's general coverage, there is a larger range of definers present using these narratives, especially the negative one.

Opinion makers, in the elite outlets, are the only definers, aside from the outlets themselves, using both a positive and a negative narrative regarding Europe's power. These types of definers are not present in *Bild*, and in *CM* only use the negative narrative. These definers seem to sustain the outlets' own discourses.

Considering the political definers using these narratives, a clear tendency can be observed according both to position to power and to the political spectrum:

- The center-right in power, in both Germany (CDU) and Portugal (PSD) solely portrays the narrative of "Europeanness", and framed by Power
- The Portuguese center-left (PS), in the opposition, uses both narratives, both of which framed by Power and by the intersection of Power and Symbolic Identity
- The non-center opposition in both countries, both in the right (AfD, PNR) and the left (BE) uses the negative narrative only, also based on the Power frame.

Thus, there seems to be a clear distinction on how European power is portrayed according to the level of powerful- or -lessness of the political definers, with the center-left, once again, positioning itself in the middle portraying both narratives. The fact that the main frame used in this respect is the "Power" one, also sustains this conclusion about the importance of the relation to power. The exception is, once again, the Portuguese center-left, which also uses the "Europeanism" as well as the "European Core vs. Periphery" representations.

Discourse	Representation	Media	Definers
Europeanness	European Power: Good	Bild	CDU
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Maker DE
		CM	PSD – P, PS - O
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT, EC
	Europeanism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Opinion maker DE
		CM	PS - O
		DN	Opinion makers PT, E.U.
European Divisiveness	European Power: Bad	Bild	Bild, AfD
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Makers DE
		CM	CM, BE, PS-O, PNR, Opinion Makers PT, Union PT
		DN	Opinion Makers PT
	Core vs. Periphery	Bild	Bild
		Spiegel	/
		CM	Opinion makers PT, PS
		DN	DN, Econ. PT, Opinion maker PT, Opinion maker PT/DE
	Two Europes	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	Unions: ETUC, CGTP; UGT

TABLE 19 – SUMMARY TABLE: DISCOURSES ON EUROPEAN POWER

5.1.1.1.3 SYSTEM POWER

This representation promotes a criticism of the economic-financial elites as the powerholders, or of the “system”, rather than Germany or the E.U.

It appears in *Bild*, through the discourse of the German left party Die Linke, claiming that there is a “justice gap” in Europe, between the banks that are “saved with tax money” and “workers, pensioners and the unemployed [who] pay the bill and are left in the rain” (Bild, 2014).

In *Correio da Manhã*, we find this representation the discourses of the Portuguese far-left POUS, in an interview in which a representative of the party argues that the “key issue is to unite workers from all over Europe against the measures that come from the Euro” (CM, 2011) and the German center-left party SPD, opposing workers and speculators or tax evaders:

[...] workers cannot always be called upon to finance Europe, but those who made profits during the crisis, who speculated in banks and stock exchanges and who are still evading taxes in Europe today, those are the ones that must be called upon to finance the crisis on our continent (CM, 2014).

Again, this greater relevance of political definers is expected at the intersection of the “Power” and “Political-Economic Ideas” frames.

In *Diário de Notícias*, the idea of a system is present in an article about a study according to which the “Portuguese are those who, after the Italians, think that the economic system is more unfair and only benefits some (92%)” (L.M.C., 2013).

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power + Political-Economic Ideas	Powerful System	Bild	Die Linke
		Spiegel	/
		CM	POUS, SPD
		DN	DN

TABLE 20 – SUMMARY TABLE: SYSTEM POWER

It is a quite marginal representation, that appears in *Bild*, *CM* and *DN*, in the discourses of political definers from the far-left, left and center-left opposition, and through a study in *DN*.

5.1.1.2 POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IDEAS AND SYMBOLIC IDENTITY

Our findings indicate that “Power” decidedly frames the representations about Portugal, Germany and Europe in the context of the Economic Crisis, as the majority of our analyzed data demonstrates. However, some of the representations fall outside of the undeniable framing by power dynamics, while still creating discursive divisions between *us* and *them*. We have found that these are framed by ideas about one another’s symbolic identities, albeit intersected with political-economic ideas.

The representations of Portugal or Germany as being characterized by the presence or absence of far-right movements, in the context of the economic crisis, i.e., far-right movements described as Eurosceptic or resulting from the crisis or bailouts, are only present

in the discourses of the elite outlets. They denote a way of portraying the *other*, based on political-economic ideas, and the reaction to the economic crisis as arising from the far-right in Germany, but not in Portugal, represented as moderate and lacking in extreme political movements.

Regarding the far-right, within the context of the economic crisis, there is the representation of Portugal as having no significant far-right movements, in the German elite outlet *Spiegel*, namely an article, connected to an interactive map of Europe, in which the Portuguese weekly paper *Expresso* is quoted as a source, and it is admitted that:

[t]here is bitterness, but hatred of the EU is alien to the Portuguese. Far-right or right-wing populist parties therefore have no chance in elections. The discontented in the country vote on the left (Spiegel, 2014).

In the context of another interactive map, about the far-right in Europe, the outlet states that the “weakness of the right-wing populists in Portugal probably also lies in the fact that established parties serve corresponding interests: the co-governing CDS-PP is right-wing conservative, but it renounces racist undertones” (Peters K. G., 2014).

In the Portuguese elite outlet, *Diário de Notícias*, representations of Germany’s far-right surge are twofold. A German opinion maker represents it as having been made possible by “[m]istrust of traditional parties and the current policy followed with bailouts in the Eurozone” (Viegas P. , 2013e), whereas a Portuguese diplomat points to it being caused by “deeper reasons” than the “former division between West Germany and East Germany” (Viegas P. , 2017c), namely the East/West differentiation. One particular view, only present in *Diário de Notícias*, assumes this perspective. At times Eastern Germany is presented as having economic difficulties and sympathy for the far-right, thus intersecting Germany’s “Symbolic Identity” with “Political-Economic Ideas”, as is the case of the discourse of an interviewee in a feature story in Berlin, who states that:

I have a 40-year-old former neighbor who says loud and clear that he will vote for AfD just in protest. People in the East have the strange feeling that they don't belong to anything at all (Viegas P. , 2017b).

A similar view is present in an interview with the Portuguese ambassador in Berlin, for whom: “in Germany there are still issues of social inequality, indices of economic, human development and employment opportunities between the two former German states” (Viegas P. , 2017c).

5.1.2 Political-economic ideas

Until this point, we have analyzed the discourses in our data that are framed, even if partly or in combination with other categories, by “Power”, as held by Germany, the E.U./Europe or by what we have named the “system”, and/or by “Symbolic Identity”, all of which create or point to an *us* and *them* division, or *othering*. However, we have also identified discourses in which this *othering* is mitigated, to a certain extent, and that is done through the frame of political ideology, the “Political-Economic Ideas” frame, uncoupled from the “Power” or “Symbolic Identity” frames. When the focus is not on the idea of a “German model”, but of political-economic ideas, such as austerity (which often equated with the “German model” in the duration of our period of analysis and in the context of the economic crisis) as such, liberalism, or the left, the focus on ideas and policies enables a decoupling in terms of national identity representation. The fact that our data was collected around electoral periods, are quintessential sites of dispute about ideas and possible alternative models, is particularly relevant in this regard.

It is important to note, at this point, that discourses about these ideas were not the focus of our data selection, and, thus, this analysis cannot be taken as a well-rounded analysis of how political ideologies are represented, but rather how, when these are the focus, the *us* and *them* discourse is altered, namely by focusing on policies and ideas, which have the potential to change and are in constant competition. It is also noteworthy to explain that these discourses were grouped according to the terms used in them, i.e., we are not discussing the use or conceptualization of the political-economic ideas at hand (far-right, austerity, liberalism or left), but rather follow the concepts used in the discourses themselves. So, the summary table regarding this frame serves only as an overview of these findings.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Political-Economic Ideas	Far-right in Germany vs. No far-right in Portugal	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	/
		DN	Opinion Maker DE, Diplomat PT
	Good Austerity	Bild	Bild, PSD(P)
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	CDU
		DN	/
	Bad Austerity	Bild	“People of Portugal”
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Unions PT, Civil Society PT, Left PT
		CM	SPD
		DN	/
	Good Liberalism	Bild	FDP-O
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	/
	Bad Liberalism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	PS-P, PS-O
		DN	/
Left Success	Bild	/	
	Spiegel	/	
	CM	/	
	DN	SPD	

TABLE 21 – SUMMARY TABLE: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IDEAS

5.1.2.1 AUSTERITY

Austerity, as a political-economic idea, is portrayed either as positive or as negative, by different outlets and definers. Comparing both representations of austerity, in a positive and negative tone, and the definers and media outlets employing either one in their discourses, we can observe a pattern according to the political spectrum positioning of the definers, as is to be expected, considering the ideological basis of austerity policies.

Thus, its positive representations come from the center-right, in power, in both countries – a discourse which is present in the tabloids (PSD in the German tabloid and CDU in the Portuguese tabloid). The Portuguese “left”, “opposition”, “civil society” or “unions” are portrayed as using this discourse in the German media, whereas the Portuguese tabloid

attributes it to the German center-left opposition. When it comes to the outlets themselves, only the German outlets employ either representation in their discourses, with *Bild* portraying austerity as “positive”, and *Spiegel* portraying both representations.

Interestingly, apart from the outlets’ own discourses, the definers tend to be from each other’s national context: Portuguese definers in *Bild* and *Spiegel*, and German definers in *Correio da Manhã*. This may be explained by our research design in itself, given that our data collection was not designed to find representations of political-economic ideologies, but of representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe.

However, this does point to a representation, by the German media, of the Portuguese left as being anti-austerity, and the Portuguese center-right as being pro-austerity, and, by the Portuguese tabloid, of the German center-right of being pro-austerity, and the center-left as being anti-austerity. This allows us to observe that the focus on these ideas promotes, or is promoted by, a shift to an exclusively political-economic ideas-based frame.

A. GOOD AUSTERITY

Positive representations of austerity policies and ideas are present in all media outlets except *Diário de Notícias*.

In *Bild*, this representation is used by the outlet itself, while indirectly referring to a representative of the Portuguese center-right, while in power:

Passos Coelho would be the first Prime Minister to implement austerity measures in a euro crisis country and then to be re-elected. After three years of recession, the economy has been picking up again since last year (*Bild*, 2015).

In *Spiegel*, the idea that austerity was able to solve the crisis in Portugal is present in several articles, namely the idea that the “government coalition of the bourgeois Social Democrats with the right-wing liberal People's Party can point out that they successfully led Portugal out of the crisis after four tough years” (Zuber, 2015).

In *Correio da Manhã*, the same notion is present in the discourse of a representative of the German CDU, for whom the events in Portugal show “that a policy can succeed, and

be supported by a majority, even if it imposes tough measures on the population” (Lusa, 2015).

B. BAD AUSTERITY

Negative representations of austerity are also present in all outlets, except *Diário de Notícias*.

In the German tabloid, *Bild*, they are indirectly associated with “the people of Portugal” who “used the European ballot as a protest election”, by voting for the “opposition socialists [who] were able to score a clear victory” (Bild, 2014).

In *Spiegel*, the outlet itself uses this representation, through articles focusing, for instance, on rising suicide rates in Portugal, Greece and Spain, where “austerity is shaking people’s everyday lives” (Ballwieser, Elmer, & Niestedt, 2013), or on the low pensions and high unemployment rates caused by it (Peters K. G., 2011), as well as a feature story in Lisbon, about difficult living conditions:

Around 300.000 Portuguese have left the country in recent years and tried their luck abroad. Pires does not want to be one of them. But even in Portugal, he sees no perspective. He feels tired, discouraged, frustrated (Schultz, 2014b).

The representation is also used Portuguese definers, as is the case, for example, of a representative of the civil society organization Caritas Portugal, for whom:

In a country where the minimum wage is 475 euros and the unemployment rate has already reached a record level of 12.5 percent, you can no longer demand sacrifices from families (Spiegel, 2011).

It is also present in references to broader entities such as unions and the “left”, quoted indirectly: “a broad alliance made up of the opposition, trade unions and intellectuals is lamenting widespread impoverishment, the destruction of the middle class and the weakening of the welfare state” (Schultz, 2014a).

In *Correio da Manhã*, on the other hand, it is present in the discourse of a German definer, namely the German center-left opposition (SPD), according to whom “austerity

policies left the Portuguese in a state of pain and uncertainty, while public services were worsened, unemployment increased drastically and growth stagnated” (CM, 2014).

Thus, in the German media, through these indirect definitions of Portuguese definers, Portugal, mainly its left and opposition, is represented as being “anti-austerity”, while in the Portuguese tabloid, this disapproval of austerity is present in the German opposition.

5.1.2.2 LIBERALISM

Regarding the representation of “Liberalism”, we also find positive and negative representations, with the negative representations usually adding an adjective to the general concept of “liberalism” (“savage liberalism”, “radical ultraliberal”), thus pointing to an issue of degree as well. These representations are only present in the tabloids.

A. GOOD LIBERALISM

The positive representation of “liberalism” is present in the German tabloid, *Bild*, in the discourse a political definer from the German liberal right (FDP) while in the opposition, that does not see the German Grand coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) as being liberal, thus it is a critique to the German powerholding party’s policies: “Countries with strong liberals are doing better. Proof? Sure: Liberals rule in Holland - not in Greece. In Scandinavia - not in Southern Europe” (Bild, 2014).

B. BAD LIBERALISM

The negative representation of “liberalism” is present in the Portuguese tabloid, *Correio da Manhã*, through the discourse of political definers from the center-left (PS), both when in power and in the opposition, namely an op-ed in which a representative from the party criticizes the PSD leadership as “a mix of a power-hungry apparatus-populism with some theoretical veneer of savage liberalism given by homemade gurus who have learned nothing from the 2008 global crisis” (Cabrita, 2018), or in the allegation that the E.U.’s “main institutions have been colonized by a radical ultraliberal line” (CM, 2014).

5.1.2.3 LEFT SUCCESS

The Portuguese elite outlet, *Diário de Notícias*, the coverage of which is absent in the previous representations of both “austerity” and “liberalism”, there is an instance, in which

the Portuguese progress is attributed to political-economic ideas, but, this time, from “left-wing parties”, and it is done through the discourse of a representative of the German center-left opposition (SPD), in an interview in which it is stated that: “Left-wing parties have shown what to do when a crisis is going on.” (Dias J. S., 2017).

5.1.3 Complexification

We have seen how framing discourses in terms of political-economic ideas and models allows for a certain overcoming of the discursive *us* and *them*, or *othering*, divide, which is connected to the national- or European-based “Power” frame. However, there is one other frame which seems to go even further in overcoming this *othering*, what we have called the “Complexification” narrative. This narrative is often present in two particular types of articles, namely on-site feature stories in the *other*’s context, or longer commentary articles, which try to complexify the representation of the *other*. These types of stories are only present in the elite media and gain more significant relevance in the case of the Portuguese outlet, *Diário de Notícias*.

5.1.3.1 THE DARK SIDE OF THE GERMAN MODEL

In *Spiegel*, a feature story in Lisbon focuses on the social and economic consequences of the “German model” for Portugal. As this model is often equated with “austerity”, it is also included in the “Political-Economic Ideas” category. The piece demonstrates difficult living conditions, including, for example, those of a couple, who “[f]or 45 years, the two have worked here, five to six days a week, eight to nine hours a day. Even today, because their pension is not enough for retirement, certainly not now, because the government has cut their already modest pension again by ten percent” (Schultz, 2014b).

In *Diário de Notícias*, the feature included in this category focuses not on how this model has harmed Portugal, as a recipient of these policies, but how it has harmed the people in Germany itself, the “emitter” of this model, focusing on the existence of poverty, inequality, precarity, and badly distributed wealth in Germany. These features include the telling of stories of “the dark side of the German model” (Viegas P. , 2017b) such as that of a middle aged German man who “receives social support, 400 euros per month, plus help to pay the rent”, in a country in which “, in a country, which, although it is presented as a model,

is plagued by “[c]heap work, minijobs, part-time and temporary work, salaries of 450 euros exempt from paying social security” (Viegas P. , 2017b).

Aside from the feature story, the news outlet also conveys the idea that, in Germany, “not everything is rosy, and the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened in recent years, with a section of the population living in precarity” (Tecedeiro, 2017b), a notion that is also present in the discourse of a political definer from the German center-left opposition (SPD), who claims that: “We [Germany] are a rich country but this wealth is not being well distributed, we want everyone to have access to a good system of health, education, etc.” (Dias J. S., 2017).

5.1.3.2 HISTORIC COMPLEXITY

Aside from the representations of the “dark side of the German model”, this proximity also includes an article in *Diário de Notícias* that seems to have a quite different discourse and approach than the rest. It is long commentary article by *DN* in 2013 (Ferreira R. , 2013), titled *Between Hate and Friendship*, and points to the historical connections between Portugal and Germany from a point of view of the interconnection of the two countries and the alleged “love and hate” nature of the relations.

The article includes examples such the persecution of people of German descent by the Portuguese State during WWI, when “the [Portuguese] government withdrew Portuguese nationality from children of German descent and concentrated the citizens of that country in an internment camp in the Azores” (Ferreira R. , 2013). It also recalls the history between the two countries during WWII, and during the reconstruction after the war, when “Portugal distinguished itself in supporting German reconstruction by participating in economic aid to Chancellor Adenauer's weak Federal Republic” (Ferreira R. , 2013). Among other examples of the historical relations between the two countries, it also recounts “How they saw us”, meaning how a German traveler described the Portuguese in the 15th Century, which the writer still finds relevant today, in relation to representations of the already heavily discussed issue of discipline:

Nicholas of Popplau, a Silesian-born knight (a region now divided between Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic), traveled around Europe from 1483 to

1486 and wrote a book about what he saw. Here are his impressions of the Portuguese over five hundred years ago - before, therefore, the bailout and the measures imposed by the troika: “Dedicated to leisure, they don't like work (...) they are rude, people without kindness or mercy” (Ferreira R. , 2013).

It also touches upon the importance of historical German-Portuguese figures, such as Hintze Ribeiro, Alfredo Keil and Carolina Michaelis de Vasconcelos.

5.1.4 Economic crisis: final observations

Regarding the representations of Portugal and Germany, i.e., what it “means” (Hall, 2016, p. 147) to be either, through our data analysis we have identified a largely hegemonic discourse based on the idea of a powerful Germany, and of a “German model”, which is either seen as positive or reacted to negatively, depending on factors such as national context and/or social personality of the media outlet and national context and/or political affiliation of political definers. In all cases, the issue of power is central, whether on its own or coupled with ideas about symbolic identity and/or political-economic ideas. As we have observed from our qualitative analysis, there is an overall hegemonic tendency towards the “German Model” narrative, in line with the power-holding political definers, and the German right, tempered, or negotiated by the center-left, and completely rejected by the Portuguese non-mainstream opposition, with all the pointed out nuances in the discourses.

The Portuguese media, as explained, tend to present, in general, a more negotiated encoding of these representations than the German media. However, the social personalities of the outlets play an important role. The tabloids hold more extreme positions: the “Bad Hegemon” narrative is almost absent in *Bild*, and *Correio da Manhã* is the only outlet where the “German Model” narrative is not distinctively stronger than the “Bad Hegemon” one.

This hegemonic discourse about a “German Model” is linked to power relations that enforce and are enforced by a notion of a linear time axis (Bargetz & Ludwig, 2015, p. 11) that is the basis of the idea of development and validity. This is in line with Ntampoudi's (2014) findings, albeit in the Greek-German context, that reflected a “tendency to construct essentialising ideas of the two nations, Germany and Greece, and the economic regions they

were made to represent, implying the existence of an essential national character (i.e. the lazy nation, the industrious nation)” (p. 12).

At times, as we have seen, the power exerted according to this idea, produces a reaction to it, villainizing the power-holder, also in an essentialist manner. This discourse, as Macmillan argues, “can [...] be interpreted as a warning to Germany to stay within its limits, in this case the limits of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights on which the EU is based” (2014, p. 35) as well as

[...] a discursive means of giving the moral upper-hand to those who protest against austerity and against Germany’s increasing economic power in Europe, just as the anti-Greek (or anti-Southern European) discourse in the German press juxtaposing supposedly hard-working, thrifty Germans against lazy, spendthrift Southern Europeans can be seen as an attempt to morally justify German reluctance to ‘bail-out’ the struggling Eurozone countries (Macmillan, 2014, p. 35).

Regarding representations of Europe, we have identified positive and negative portrayals of European Power, regarding two constellations of narratives: Europe as a power-holding institution (“Power” frame) and Europe as an “imagined community” (when “Power” is intersected with “Symbolic Identity”). Even regarding European power, the differences between how the type of power is seen by the German media (as regulating) as opposed to the Portuguese media (as controlling) speaks volumes about the importance of identifying the “Power” frame when exploring these discourses.

The portrayal of Europe as an imagined community in itself, although it could be argued that it is a discourse that overcomes *us* and *them* divisions, by drawing on a sense of communality, it is, in fact, the construction of another us, an exceptional European *us*, echoing the concern that “increasingly the citizens of the European Union are being evoked as a different imagined community: as Europeans, an identity perhaps as problematic as the particularist National identities it is intended to replace” (Geary, 2013, p. 39).

As we have seen, our data indicates a stronger presence of a narrative of “Divisiveness”, framed mainly by “Power”, i.e., E.U. as an institution, and by the

intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, i.e., as an imagined community, and to a lesser extent, adding “Political-Economic Ideas” to the latter. When the opposite narrative of Europeanness is conveyed, the element of “Political-Economic Ideas” is absent, but both the “Power” frame and its intersection with “Symbolic Identity” are influential. The social personalities of the news outlets are also central in this respect: the tabloids, in their own discourse, only present a narrative based on criticism of the E.U. as an institution or its internal divisions, whereas the elite media convey both positive and negative representations. The national context of the outlets also seems to be a relevant factor, considering that, in the Portuguese media’s general coverage, there is a larger range of definers present using these narratives, especially the negative one, which adds to the previous observation about the type of power represented in the German (regulatory) and in the Portuguese (controlling) media.

Thus, there seems to be a clear distinction on how European power is portrayed according to the level of powerful- or -lessness of the political definers, with the center-left, once again, positioning itself in the middle portraying both narratives. The fact that the main frame used in this respect is the “Power” one, also sustains this conclusion about the importance of the relation to power. The exception is, once again, the Portuguese center-left, which also uses the “Europeanism” as well as the “European Core vs. Periphery” representations.

In our literature review, we have found that some authors (Ntampoudi, 2014; Goerne, 2016) have focused on representations of villains and victims, in the context of the economic crisis. In our findings, we also identified a “blame-game” (Ntampoudi, 2014, p. 2) dynamic, in some instances, with a narrative of Germany as the “villain” and Portugal as a “victim”. Goerne, analyzing representations of Germany in the Portuguese media as well as street art, found similar narratives to some of the identified in our analysis, such as “the narrative of the Fourth Reich and the narrative of submission and superiority” (2016, p. 86), as well as the centrality of Merkel. However, our methodological and theoretical approach allowed us to take these analyses one step further. Even if, in general, both Portugal and Germany are, at times, blamed as the culprits for the crisis, it does not appear to be an interchangeable “victims versus villains” narrative, since, when the roles are reversed, and the blame is put on Portugal (or Southern Europe), it is not as a “villain”, which implies power, but as an irresponsible child, or undisciplined backwards country, that causes problems to the rest of

Europe, the power always remaining in the hands of Germany, or, at best, the EU institutions.

Our findings seem to be more in line with Catherine Macmillan's analysis of popular discourse on Germany and Angela Merkel in the Eurozone periphery, France and the UK, according to which the monstrous the "resentment and sense of crisis has resulted in a Gothic narrative of the resuscitation of the monstrous Third Reich in popular European discourse" (2014, p. 31).

This analysis sustains our interpretation of the discourses' underlying power dynamics: struggles in hegemonic discourses about German power, be it that of solidarity (good) or of dominance (bad), are visible in our data, and are influenced by the way in which the narratives are framed.

So, whether from a positive or negative perspective, the "German model", which also becomes the European model, due to Germany's power, is hegemonically seen as the yardstick for success. Of course, with nuances and differences regarding *who is speaking* about that power in each moment, as we have extensively explored.

What we do conclude from our analysis, aside from the various representations of Germany and Portugal, within the us/them approach, is that there is a great tendency to present these "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1983/2016) as essentialist wholes, always shaped deeply by power relations between them (the "Symbolic Identity" frame is never dissociated from the "Power" frame), and often confusing the people with their governments, whether based on myths and narratives of their "cultural identity", or the political-economic ideas of said governments and its leaders.

This tendency is slightly tempered when the issues are framed on the basis of "Political-Economic Ideas", even when connected to the "Symbolic Identity" frame, with the *us* and *them* divide shifting to political-economic ideas and policies. We propose that one of the reasons for this is that, in electoral periods, and in news coverage dedicated to the electoral dispute, the possibility of other models is open to discussion, even if still largely limited by the hegemonic discourses (Hall, 2016). There is a certain questioning of the dominant-hegemonic model, which is not based on a divide between people but between ideas, criticizing their efficacy or pointing out their practical failures.

In our data collection, representations of political-economic ideas such as the far-right, liberalism or austerity were not the focus, so we cannot claim a comprehensive analysis in this respect but can only point to them as they emerge related to, or in contradiction with, representations of Germany, Portugal and/or Europe. Analyses of representations of austerity in the media have been conducted by other authors. One of these studies, in which Portuguese media discourses about austerity are analyzed, is authored by Sousa and Santos, according to whom:

The troika and the “arch of power” discourses were basically absorbed and reproduced by the mainstream media. Alternative discourses did exist but they were either marginalised or framed as radical (anti-patriotic even). Differently from social network movements and street demonstrations, generalist and economic media have been part of the “manufacture of consent” about the troika’s programme (Sousa & Santos, 2014, p. 59).

5.1 Who are we and who are they? The so-called migrant/refugee crisis

Having explored how different discourses about Germany, Portugal and Europe are shaped by power, symbolic identity and political-economic ideas, in the context of the economic crisis, we now will explore how adding the element of an external, “non-European” *other* shapes these narratives, within the same frames. Even though a thorough or targeted exploration of representations of migrants and refugees is not the focus of our work, from our data analysis, it surfaced as an element that influences the way in which representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe emerge, which is why, in this chapter, we explore discourses about refugees and migrants in order to understand how this “crisis” shapes narratives about Portugal, Germany and Europe in the media. It should also be pointed out that we use the terminology of “non-European” *other*, to mean those *othered* as non-European by these discourses. Also, the term “refugee/migrant crisis” is used to designate this context, for practicality reasons, but what we have written about the problematization of the use of the word “crisis” in itself, connected to the coverage of recent migratory movements, is to be taken into account.

The *othering* of the “tragic” refugee, whose “jettisoned life is thus saturated in power, though not with modes on entitlement or obligation” (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 32), is precisely one of the modes in which the imagined community of the State, or the supranational European Union, are discursively produced as a homogenous whole, separating who belongs and who does not, and defining degrees of acceptability of different lives.

In a similar outcome regarding findings explored in the previous chapter, here we also find that “Power” is a central frame when analyzing the representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe in relation to the migrant or refugee “crisis”. Again, those presented as powerholders are Germany and Europe, or the E.U., with Portugal assuming an almost irrelevant role on its own. However, this time, this power is shown as exercised towards what is presented as the “non-European” *other*, and not “internally” – with the divisions within Europe relating to the distribution of responsibility. This does not mean that the other frames are absent here. Much to the contrary, they are clearly present, and, also, at times, crossed by the “Power” frame. The presence of other frames, aside from “Power”, whether intersecting it or not, somewhat modifies the narrative regarding *us* and *them*.

When discourses are framed by “Symbolic Identity” a different process of *othering* surfaces, in which *we* are either equated to Germans, Portuguese or Europeans, and *they* are equated to this *other*, presented as “non-European”, and issues of identity become particularly evident. This leads to a different set of self- and hetero-representations, which highlight what Geary (2013) points out as the possible perils of a European imagined community.

The “Political-Economic Ideas” frame, in this set of the data, focuses not on the ideas of austerity or liberalism, but rather, on what is represented as the “far-right” as an unquestionably negative ideology. It is crossed with the “Symbolic Identity” frame, since these ideas are represented as non- or un-German/European, or as being particularly characteristic of Germany (or East Germany).

Finally, the representations that allow for an overcoming of these *us* and *them* discourses, are, similarly to what was observed regarding the economic crisis, those that seek complexification, and, in this case particularly, those that seek to speak *to* the *other*, rather than just *about* *them*.

5.2.1 Representations of *us*, Europeans

Here the centrality of “Power” is also apparent. Nonetheless, the relations of power are quite different, as the recipient of the exercised power is the “non-European” *other*. Even so, Germany and Europe appear as the powerholders in this regard. Portugal, on the other hand, is represented either as implicitly part of Europe, or as an irrelevant agent within these power dynamics. In every case, these discourses crossed by the “Power” frame see the refugees or asylum-seekers as being in need, and Germany and/or Europe as being in the position of power to save them, based on an underlying narrative that this is desirable, which is not necessarily the case in the other frame intersections, as we will see.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
German Power	German Savior	Bild	Bild
		Spiegel	CDU, DE Opinion Makers, Foreign Press, CSU
		CM	CM/Vox Pop, PT Diplomat, PT Opinion Maker, Dutch Definer
		DN	DN, DN/Vox Pop, DE Opinion Maker, UK Definer, PT Opinion Maker
	Bad Hegemon	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Foreign Press, DE Opinion Maker
		CM	CM, TK Definer
		DN	DN, DE Opinion Maker, PT Opinion Makers, TK Definer, DE Economic Sector
European Power	Europe of the Nation States	Bild	Bild, SPD, FDP
		Spiegel	Spiegel, DE Opinion Maker
		CM	/
		DN	PT Opinion Maker, UK Definer
	Europeanness	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	PT Opinion Makers
	European Power: Bad	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	PT Opinion Makers
Portugal	Irrelevance	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	PSD
		DN	/
	No Extremism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	CM
		DN	/

TABLE 22 - MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF *US*: GERMANY, EUROPE, PORTUGAL

5.2.1.1 REPRESENTATIONS OF GERMANY

The idea of Germany, namely the German government, as the powerful hegemon within Europe is also present in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, not only in the context of the economic one. And, once again, this representation can be both of a benevolent or leader or savior, or as the bad hegemon. Its positive portrayal is linked to a welcoming policy towards migrants and refugees and the fight against far-right movements (“German Savior”), while the negative portrayal (“Bad Hegemon”) can also be divided into two representations: the one in which Germany is presented as not as welcoming as portrayed, and the one where the far-right is presented as part of Germany.

Narrative	Media	Definers
German Savior	Bild	Bild
	Spiegel	CDU, DE Opinion Makers, CSU, Foreign Press
	CM	CM/Vox Pop, PT Diplomat, PT Opinion Maker, NL Academic
	DN	DN, DN/Vox Pop, DE Opinion Maker, UK Definer, PT Opinion Maker
Bad Hegemon	Bild	/
	Spiegel	Spiegel, Foreign Press, DE Opinion Maker
	CM	CM, TK Definer
	DN	DN, DE Opinion Maker, PT Opinion Makers, TK Definer

TABLE 23 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF GERMANY

The representations related to the far-right are framed at the intersection of “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” and portray Germany as opposing them (“Anti-Nazi Germany” representation, part of the “German Savior” narrative) or as being shaped by them (“Neo-Nazi Germany” representation, part of the “Bad Hegemon” narrative). Comparing the positive and negative portrayals of Germany, in the overall coverage, there is no clear hegemonic narrative, and there are clear differences according to the outlets’ social personalities and national contexts.

The “German Savior” narrative is present in all outlets and in the discourses of a number of different definers, whereas the “Bad Hegemon” representation is not present in the German tabloid. The importance of the “German Savior” narrative is particularly visible in the case of the German tabloid, since it is the only representation present in it, where several German political definers from the green left to the liberal right, passing through the center are portrayed as using this representation. The fact that the “Bad Hegemon” narrative

is not present in the German tabloid outlet, but is present in the Portuguese one, and in both elite outlets, points to the already observed tendency of elite outlets to convey more plural representations, including more critical self-representations (in the case of *Spiegel*), as well as that of tabloids (*Correio da Manhã*) to convey more negative representations of the *other*, in this case, Germany.

This indicates the presence of a negotiation within these representations, or even an oppositional decoding regarding the “German Savior” representation. In *Diário de Notícias*, opinion makers using both narratives are present, albeit with a more diverse and qualitatively stronger presence of the “Bad Hegemon” narrative. And *Spiegel*’s coverage is also clearly marked by complex and plural representations, particularly regarding the portrayal of the far-right in Germany.

Thus, the German tabloid seems to align itself with the official hegemonic narrative of the ruling political definers, portraying the “German Savior” narrative as being shared by different political forces, including the opposition, with the “Bad Hegemon” narrative being completely absent in the analyzed articles. In all other cases, this official hegemonic narrative seems to be challenged by a diversity of sources, thus denoting a negotiated or oppositional decoding of this hegemonic narrative.

5.2.1.1.1 GERMAN SAVIOR

This discourse corresponds to a positive portrayal of Germany’s power, regarding the so-called migration crisis, namely by pointing out how the country has been welcoming to refugees (“Power” frame), or how the far-right is a foreign or polluting body regarding Germany’s symbolic identity (“Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” frames). What is clearly visible in the overall positive coverage regarding Germany, is that it is present in all outlets, but the representation at the intersection of all three frames is absent in the German tabloid.

Regarding the definers using this narrative, they are mainly opinion makers, from several contexts, or, in the case of the Portuguese outlets regarding the “Anti-Nazi Germany” representation, feature stories in Germany. But this narrative is also present in the discourses of political definers in the German elite outlet, *Spiegel*, in which a definer from the center-

right party CDU is quoted as using the “German Savior” representation, and a definer from the conservative right party CSU is quoted as using the “Anti-Nazi Germany” representation.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	Refugees Welcome	Bild	Bild
		Spiegel	CDU, DE Opinion Makers
	CM	PT Diplomat, PT Opinion Maker	
	DN	DN, DE Opinion Maker, UK Definer	
Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Anti-Nazi Germany	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Foreign Press, DE Opinion Makers, CSU
		CM	CM/Vox Pop, NL Academic
		DN	DN/Vox Pop, PT Opinion Maker

TABLE 24 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF GERMANY: GERMAN SAVIOR

A. Germany Welcomes Refugees

Here we find a discourse that presents the German government, or, in the cases of most of the representations in *Spiegel*, *Correio da Manhã* and *Diário de Notícias* (not *Bild*) Angela Merkel specifically, as being welcoming to refugees arriving in the country, which is present in all media outlets. This personification in the figure of Angela Merkel is quite significant within the positive portrayal of Germany’s power regarding the so-called migration crisis.

Definers using this representation of Germany, or Merkel, as the savior, in this particular context, are mainly opinion makers, both German and Portuguese, diplomatic definers, and political definers from several German political parties - namely the German center-right in power (CDU/CSU), the center-left in the opposition (SPD), the liberal right (FDP) and the green left (Die Grünen), as well as a source linked to the British Labour party, but in a cultural context. The rather widespread presence of this representation denotes its importance in the overall coverage regarding Germany’s power in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”.

In the case of the outlets themselves, only *Bild* and *Diário de Notícias* use this representation in their own discourse. Again, this could point to the already observed

tendency of tabloids resorting to more positive self-representations, and elite outlets seeking more positive, or, at least, plural, hetero-representations.

Media Outlets

This discourse appears in all the analyzed media outlets. It presents the German government (or Angela Merkel specifically), as well as German society, as whole, as being welcoming to refugees arriving in the country. Regarding the outlets' own discourses, it is only present in that of the German tabloid (*Bild*) and the Portuguese elite outlet (*Diário de Notícias*).

In the discourse of *Bild*, the idea of Germany as a savior is represented in the following passage: “states like Germany, Austria or even Sweden face up to the challenge, they show a great receptivity and welcome culture” (Bild, 2015). This same article is also integrated in the “Europe of the Nation States” representation, as often the representation of Germany as a savior, and of there not being a fair or equal approach to this “crisis” between the E.U. member states go hand in hand. In another article, in which refugees are also presented as a potential economic threat (see “Refugees are a Threat” representation), the idea of the German savior is also clearly present and assumed directly by the outlet as its view:

From the beginning, BILD has taken a clear position in the refugee crisis: We must not leave people who are fleeing war and misery alone! "We help" - that's the name of the BILD campaign, which is also supported by politicians, celebrities and athletes. At the same time, we are convinced that we also have to ask uncomfortable questions! (Bild, 2015).

In *Spiegel*, this representation is present in the discourse of two German opinion makers and of a representative of the center-right in power (CDU). The positive view is, at times, personified in Angela Merkel, and connected to the political ideology of her party, CDU, as we can see in the following quote from an opinion article: “It's not the political tactician, but the compassionate pastor's daughter from the Uckermark, a politician who remembers exactly why her party wears the C [Christian] in its name” (Nelles, 2015).

It is also present in an op-ed, in which a journalist criticizes the fact that Germany is alone in this endeavor, referencing both the government's as well as society's welcoming policy:

The friendly press should not fool us. As long as the refugees stay in Germany, the neighbors like to watch as we open hearts and barns. However, as soon as we ask them to join the rescue work, the fun stops. Should it have been the Chancellor's calculation that the neighbors would make an example of our charity, she has thoroughly miscalculated. We are becoming more and more lonely (Fleischhauer, 2015).

The use of this representation by a source from the CDU is apparent, namely in the following excerpt:

Now she is the refugee chancellor, who is outraged when she is accused of admitting too many refugees into the country: "I have to honestly say: if we have to start apologizing now that we show a friendly face in emergency situations, then this is not my country (Nelles, 2015).

In *Correio da Manhã*, the representation is present in the discourses of two definers: a Portuguese diplomat and an opinion maker. Both of these representations are accompanied by a reference of the downside of this welcoming policy: in the first case, as we will see further down in our analysis, the Portuguese diplomat stresses the criticism faced by it, and, in the case of the Portuguese opinion maker, the characterization of the policy as a "risky gamble" demonstrates the same idea. Nonetheless, they are representations of the welcoming posture of the German government, as "exemplary".

In the case of the diplomatic definer, this representation is visible in the following statement: "Berlin has given exemplary support to these refugees" (Falcão-Machado, 2017). It is also present in the discourse of a Portuguese journalist in an op-ed, in which, regarding Merkel, where it is stated that:

After 11 years in power, the fourth term is a prize for a risky gamble: opening the door to refugees from the war in Syria, setting an example for the whole of Europe (Ganhão, 2017).

In *Diário de Notícias*, this representation is present in the outlet's own discourse, as well as in that of a German opinion maker and a British definer tied to the Labour Party. In DN's coverage, this welcoming posture is often attributed to Angela Merkel. The fact that it resorts to non-Portuguese sources in this context can be seen as a way of legitimizing this discourse.

The representation is visible, for instance, when Merkel is named the "Refugee Lady" (Gouveia, 2017). Aside from Merkel, whether or not representing the German government, it also refers to German society, in general, for instance in the following article: "Edeka is Germany's largest supermarket chain and is expected to continue campaigning for the acceptance of refugees and against xenophobia" (DN, 2017).

Within another article, a professor is quoted in the following manner: "The chancellor may have wanted to have the moral regency of Europe by practicing a welcoming policy for refugees at war" (Tecedero, 2017b).

The same idea is shared by a definer from the UK's Labour party:

"Angela Merkel is right when she says that everyone in Europe has to share the responsibility [in welcoming refugees]. The UK, for example, is not doing what it should," explained Alfred Dubs. For the former MP and labor lord, on the issue of refugees, "Germany is a kind of conscience of Europe" (Tecedero, 2017c).

B. Anti-Nazi Germany

This category portrays the far-right as not being part of the idea of Germany, as a "shock", and as something that must be fought against. Although it does recognize the existence and growth of right-wing movements and parties in Germany, this is seen as a sort of anomaly. It is at the intersection of the "Symbolic Identity" and "Political-Economic

Ideas” frames, as it portrays Germany’s symbolic identity as shaped in contrast to right-wing movements.

Media Outlets

In *Spiegel*, many of the articles included in this representation are also included in the opposite one (“Neo-Nazi Germany”), as discourses are often marked by the contradiction of a country which was defined by its fight against far-right movements but is now also confronted by their growth. Here we included the instances in which the focus is on Germany’s fight against these movements, thus portraying *them* as non-German.

A review of the foreign press coverage of the German elections focuses on this idea of Germany no longer being the exception in terms of the growth of far-right movements in Europe. Some instances portray this idea of Germany’s history as anti-far-right:

This is in every respect a turning point in the history of the Federal Republic, never since its early history has a rabid nationalist, anti-Islamic, in part racist and right-wing party sit in parliament, not at all in this size - the old federal consensus, these forces to exclude the political discourse, is spectacularly broken (Spiegel, 2017).

The same article includes several instances which were also included in the “Germany is right-wing” representation, thus demonstrating the outlet’s plural and complex coverage.

German opinion makers, namely in opinion pieces, also convey this idea of an abnormality in the rise of the far-right, as can be seen in the following passage by a journalist:

[T]he AfD is not a normal party. In their ranks, even at the top, there are people who flirt openly with right-wing extremist positions, who like to remember the Wehrmacht's aggressive war, who want to talk down the Holocaust and abolish the memory of it. And such people will soon be sitting in the German *Bundestag* (Kuzmany, 2017).

In the same article, the tone is set on how the far-right is a sort of polluting element to the country's symbolic identity:

[...] this is more than the everyday European right-wing populism. It is an attack on our liberal democracy. These must be ward off by the other parties in the Bundestag, by our society as a whole - this is their first task in the next four years (Kuzmany, 2017).

Another piece focuses on the country's history as being marked by the fight against these movements, but claiming that that fight has been fading away, which makes us also include this example in the opposing representation:

On this Sunday, a right-wing populist party will be elected in parts with right-wing extremist members in the Bundestag. It is a break in the self-image of this country. And the strange silence, even apathy, before this historic quake is depressing. [...] the history of Nazi Germany and thus the responsibility before the Holocaust, a basic social consensus that was staged again after the reunification of Germany with the Holocaust memorial in the middle of Berlin, but that has lost more and more of its naturalness in recent years (Diez, 2017).

Regarding political definers, in a short passage, this same idea of the far-right as foreign polluting body can be seen in this quote from a representative of the German conservative party CSU: "Neo-Nazis harm our homeland" (Roth, 2013).

In *Correio da Manhã*, Germany is, at times, described as being particularly sensitive or opposed to far-right movements and ideas. This representation is present in a feature by a news agency published by the outlet and in the discourse of a Dutch definer.

The resistance to the far-right growth in Germany is identifiable in the following example of an anti-Nazi protest in Berlin: "Shouting "all of Berlin hates the Nazis," or "Nazis" or "racism is not an alternative," the rather young protesters were demonstrating their revolt" (Lusa, 2017).

At other times, this anti-Nazi sentiment is portrayed as part of German historical conscience, as is the case of this quote by a Dutch academic:

Germany continues to be much more sensitive than other countries to nationalism and xenophobia as a result of World War II and as a product of the so-called '*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*', that is, the way Germany looks at its past, with much collective guilt (CM, 2014).

In *Diário de Notícias*, an example of the contradiction between an anti-Nazi vs. Neo-Nazi society can be found in a feature story in Berlin:

Charlotte is not surprised. "I think there has always been a racist basis in German society that now sees AfD as what it has always wanted. In Saxony this is so. I don't see myself going back there. The people of Saxony are afraid of what here in Kreuzberg is normal "A mixture of all. I'm not exactly surprised by the result of AfD, I was already prepared, but I'm still shocked" (Viegas P. , 2017d).

In the case of a Portuguese opinion maker, Germany's focus on history and memory to avoid the growth of these movements is highlighted:

This year 2013, Berlin is immersed in a true 'politics of memory'. A multitude of initiatives evoke the eighty years of the establishment of the Hitler regime. Perhaps most impressive is the exercise of remembrance of the unique victims of Nazism. Throughout the city, especially at subway stations, we catch faces, accompanied by short biographies of men and women (Jews, Democrats, trade unionists, homosexuals) to whom Nazism has stolen the future and often life itself (Marques, 2013).

5.2.1.1.2 BAD HEGEMON

This category encompasses the discourses that contradict the (presented as) dominant discourse that refugees are being welcomed by the German government, thus emphasizing that they are not as welcoming as portrayed (“Power” frame”), as well as the focus on the German far-right, namely its portrayal as xenophobic and the representation of far-right ideas and movements as being part of German symbolic identity (intersection of “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” frames).

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	Refugees Are Not Welcome	Bild /	
		Spiegel Spiegel	
		CM /	
		DN PT Opinion Maker	
Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Neo-Nazi Germany	Bild /	
		Spiegel Spiegel, Foreign Press, DE Opinion Maker	
		CM CM, TK Definer	
		DN DN, PT Opinion Makers, TK Definer	

TABLE 25 - MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF GERMANY – BAD HEGEMON

In the first case, the representation framed solely by “Power” is only present in the elite media outlets, which, due to their social personalities, as we have already observed in other instances, present more complex and multifaceted portrayals.

Regarding the intersection of “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, it is present in the elite outlets, as well as in the Portuguese tabloid, which also is in accordance with our observations that tabloids tend to be more critical of the *other*, the *other* here being Germany. In the same line, it also points to the ever-present “Nazi ghost” regarding negative representations of Germany.

A. Germany does not welcome refugees

This representation challenges the previously outlined one of the Germany government as being particularly welcoming in the face of the so-called refugee crisis. It only appears in the elite news outlets, *Spiegel* and *Diário de Notícias*, having as definers *Spiegel* and a Portuguese academic.

Media outlets

In the German elite outlet *Spiegel*, this representation is only present in the outlet's own discourse, with a qualitatively significant incidence, which points to the outlet's negotiated, or even oppositional, decoding of the dominant discourse.

In one instance, it resorts to data to counter the representation of Germany as the exemplary savior:

Internationally, it looks like this: Malta (5,000 asylum seekers per million inhabitants), Sweden (4,600) and Austria (2,100) are clearly ahead of Germany, where 930 asylum seekers came for every 1 million inhabitants in 2012. Switzerland, which is criticized because of its rigid rules for refugees, had a significantly higher rate last year than Germany: 3575 asylum seekers per million inhabitants. (...) On average, according to the BAMF, it takes about eight months to decide on an asylum application. Months in which people with often tragic fates live in the smallest space. "Inhumane", "isolation", "jail": Again and again, there are some strong criticism of the type of accommodation, the victims themselves make hunger strikes about their situation (Roth, 2013).

In the same article, the author highlights the ways in which responsibility is shifted within the E.U., which can also be seen as a representation fitting the "Europe of the Nation States" category:

The Dublin II Regulation of 2003, [...] it easy for Germany to send refugees back to EU countries: It shifts the responsibility for asylum procedures to the member state into which the refugee first entered - in other words, the coastal states of Italy, Greece and Spain (Roth, 2013).

In *Diário de Notícias*, an op-ed by an academic demonstrates the counterpoint to the previous positive representation of German power, namely by denouncing an alleged self-

interest in these welcoming policies, when claiming that Merkel “takes advantage of this opportunity for the entry of a cheap, almost slave labor, that can certainly work at minimal prices in the German economy” (Almeida, 2015).

B. Neo-Nazi Germany

This frame focuses on the ways in which civil society, in Germany, is not being welcoming to refugees, namely through electoral expression of the far-right, among other demonstrations. There are also instances in which the far-right is represented as being, in fact, part of the identity, and not a shock, or alien. Often this representation is linked to mentions of Nazi Germany. This representation is used by both Portuguese outlets, *Correio da Manhã* and *Diário de Notícias*, and by the German outlet, *Spiegel*, being absent from the German tabloid, *Bild*.

It is important to note that, at times, this representation of Germany shoulders, or even overlaps, another representation which will also be explore in this chapter, namely the “We are not far-right” representation, in which the presence of far-right movements, nowadays, is portrayed as a shock, or a result of despair and/or fear. However, in the instances included here an idea of connection of these movements with symbolic representations of Germany, and its History, is present.

Media Outlets

In *Spiegel*, this representation is present in the outlet’s own discourse and in a press review of foreign press outlets writing about Germany, both referencing Nazi history.

The outlet publishes, for instance, an article in which it describes demonstrations of xenophobia towards refugees in Germany, which are not attributed solely to supporters of far-right parties, but to fear:

Refugees are being labeled as criminals and welcomed in the neighborhood with Hitler salute. Not just members of the right-wing parties. But also - and that is actually dramatic in the current events - frightened citizens (Roth, 2013).

A review of the foreign press coverage about Germany, titled *Germany is not that extraordinary* presents a similar idea, with it being portrayed as the “country from which the Nazi terror once originated” (Spiegel, 2017).

Thus, Germany is presented as being the origin of the “Nazi terror”, as well as a special case that was able to shut out the far-right for a long period of time, that is now also marked by these movements: “Germany is no longer a "holy special case", the "moral superiority" to its European neighbors and the USA will, therefore, “decrease rapidly”” (Spiegel, 2017).

At times, this representation overlaps the idea that this is a break in the continuity of the image of Germany, thus, it is also included in the “Anti-Nazi Germany” representation, as this particular quote illustrates quite well:

This is in every respect a turning point in the history of the Federal Republic, never since its early history has a rabid nationalist, anti-Islamic, in part racist and right-wing party sit in parliament, not at all in this size - the old federal consensus, these forces to exclude the political discourse, is spectacularly broken. (...) Conversely, one can say that it merely 'normalized' the political situation: Germany was the last country in Central Europe without a big right-wing protest party (Spiegel, 2017).

As we have also observed regarding the opposing representation (“Anti-Nazi Germany”) and the way in which elite outlets tend to present more plural and complex views, we also highlight the previously referenced article in which Germany is presented as losing its anti-far-right consensus:

[...] the history of Nazi Germany and thus the responsibility before the Holocaust, a basic social consensus that was staged again after the reunification of Germany with the Holocaust memorial in the middle of Berlin, but that has lost more and more of its naturalness in recent years. The racism and resentment that emerge behind it are always terrifying, especially since the basic assumption of the reason-controlled being is that things get better the longer they last, so that progress is possible; a guess

that often goes against historical evidence, but the terrible examples, which also seem to lie in human nature, tend to be forgotten (Diez, 2017).

In *Correio da Manhã*, this representation is used by a spokesman for the presidency of Turkey, as well as by the outlet itself.

Even if it is not a direct representation of Germany as shaped by the far-right, the Portuguese tabloid alludes to this idea when it reports that the: “Party leader 'Alternative for Germany' praised the achievements of German soldiers in World War II” (Lusa, 2017).

Another definer, who does use the representation quite explicitly is a spokesman for the Turkish presidency, quoted as saying: “German majority politics, which slip into populism and the intention to see the 'other' only as an enemy, only encourages discrimination and racism” (Lusa, 2017)

In *Diário de Notícias*, the presence of this representation in two feature stories in which vox populi definers in Berlin are interviewed, in several opinion articles by Portuguese opinion makers, as well as in the discourse of a Turkish political opinion maker, makes it a quite significant one in the context of the outlet’s coverage.

In a feature in Berlin, in the context of the 2017 elections, the following passage illustrates this representation:

The AfD, whose leaders reject the far-right label, came in third, after Merkel's CDU/CSU and Martin Schulz's SPD. Charlotte is not surprised. "I think there was always a racist base in German society that now sees AfD as what it has always wanted. In Saxony it is like that (Viegas P. , 2017d).

This quote also points to an East/West division within Germany, which was also identified in the chapter dedicated to representations in the context of the economic crisis.

In another feature, also in Berlin, in the same context, and, also, again, pointing to the German East/West division, a vox populi interviewee is quoted in the following manner:

"German reunification never happened because the East has always been placed at a lower level." In his view, this partly explains, in addition to the issue of refugees and immigrants, the rise of AfD in voting intentions for Sunday's legislatures in Germany. (...) "I have a 40-year-old former neighbor who says loud and clear that he will vote for AfD just in protest. People in the East have the strange feeling that they don't belong to anything at all" (Viegas P. , 2017b).

Regarding an opinion article by a Portuguese intellectual titled *A fearsome normalcy*, the author argues that:

Helmut Kohl was the last chancellor to consider that "German guilt" (die Deutsche Schuld) for the catastrophic search for power, culminating in the Holocaust, had not yet been prescribed, and this was positive not only for Europe but to defend Germany from its own devils. [...] Gauland [AfD leader] is the extreme version of an aspiration for the "normalcy" of national selfishness. [...] The neo-Nazi nationalism of AfD is a problem of "normalcy" in overdose (Marques, 2017).

In another opinion article, this time by a Portuguese journalist, the idea that the "affliction" of the German people is leading them to vote for those who revive these Nazi ideas is present in the following passage:

There is, therefore, an affliction in the lives of millions of Germans, certainly aware of the Nazi horrors, that makes them not afraid to politically support people who speak in this way, too close to the family of ideas that fueled the hatred that gave rise to the conquest. of power by Adolf Hitler, cooked by the resentment and desire for revenge of Germany of 1930, starved to death and stupidly humiliated by the victorious countries of the great war (Tadeu, 2017).

In this case, it is seen as a sign of despair, but still connected to an idea of a phenomenon that is somehow German.

In a similar way to *Correio da Manhã*, in *Diário de Notícias* a Turkish political definer is also quoted as using this representation, but, curiously, it is not the same person. In this case, it is a member of the Turkish government, who is indirectly quoted as accusing “German political leaders of encouraging "Islamophobia"” (Lusa, 2017)

5.2.1.2 REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE

When it comes to representation of Europe’s, or the European Union’s, power, we identified three main narratives, all of which, unlike what was observed regarding Germany, are critical of the way in which this power is exercised. So, all of them correspond to a narrative of a “Bad Europe”, but in different ways.

The three representations European Power are: “European Power: Bad” (“Power” frame), “Europe of the Nation States” (“Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”) and “Europeanness” (“Power” and “Symbolic Identity”).

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	European Power: Bad	Bild /	
		Spiegel /	
		CM /	
		DN	PT Opinion Makers
Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	Europe of the Nation States	Bild	Bild, SPD, FDP
		Spiegel	Spiegel, DE Opinion Maker
		CM	/
		DN	PT Opinion Maker
Power and Symbolic Identity	Europeanness	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	PT Opinion Makers

TABLE 26 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE

The different frames correspond to different views of Europe: Europe as a *them*, and Europe as an *us*. When the focus is solely on “Power”, the internal divisions within Europe become apparent, and the differences between Member States are highlighted, but, when “Symbolic Identity” elements also cross representations of Europe, in the context of the so-

called “refugee crisis”, an idea of commonality arises. This idea of commonality is here directed at representations of Europe; however it is also the underlying narrative concerning the representations of those presented as “non-European” *others*.

When it comes to the media outlets conveying each of these narratives, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. One of the most obvious observations that can be made refers to the fact that the only outlet in which both narratives are present is *Diário de Notícias*, and in the discourses of opinion makers. In direct contrast with the Portuguese elite outlet, the Portuguese tabloid’s complete absence in this regard is also quite telling. In the analyzed articles in *Correio da Manhã* no representation regarding Europe’s power, in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, was identified, differently to the discourses identified regarding Germany’s power in the same context.

Regarding the German outlets, their coverage is only framed by “Power”, i.e., Europe as a *them*, namely pointing to internal divisions within Europe, often in connection to an idea of the aforementioned “German Savior”, given that Germany is often presented as taking up a more active role than other European Member States. In the case of *Bild*, this representation of a divisiveness within Europe, is used in the outlet’s own discourse, as well as in that of two German political definers: one from the center-left (SPD) and one of the liberal right (FDP). Spiegel also uses this representation in its own discourse, and it is present in that of a German opinion maker. What is also apparent in these representations of Europe, especially the ones focusing on internal divisions within Europe, is that some European Member States, namely Hungary, appear as an internal *other*.

Hence, considering the overall coverage of European power in the context of this “crisis”, there is a clear hegemonic negative portrayal of the E.U.’s actions, and of the common action of European Member States, depicting a failure in addressing this crisis, whether for purely realpolitikal reasons (“Europe of the Nation States”), or for issues of symbolic identity which inform this power (“Europeanness”). Opinion makers in the Portuguese elite outlet are the only instances in which Europe is portrayed as an *us*.

Regarding definers using each of these representations, the weight of opinion makers is clear, which is not of any significance per se, but it is, again, noteworthy that opinion makers are the type of definers we have identified as being present as a way of portraying a vaster array of representations, namely, to contradict official discourses. Political definers,

SPD and FDP, are only portrayed as using the “Europe of the Nation States” representation in *Bild*, which can be mirrored to the discourses regarding “German Power”.

5.2.1.2.1 EUROPEAN POWER: BAD

The negative representation of European power contains the discourses that present the European Union, and its main decision makers, as an institutional *other*, regarding the response to the “crisis”, criticizing the way in which the E.U. has handled the situation, namely its lack of effective response to the “crisis”. It is only present in opinion pieces by Portuguese opinion makers in *Diário de Notícias*.

The use of the specific idea of hypocrisy is present in an opinion article by an academic: “it is almost impossible - unfortunately - to fail to observe how the hypocrisy of realpolitik and the world of geostrategic and political interests intersect for (...) offer an even more inhumane dimension to this tragedy” (Almeida, 2015).

Another opinion article by a journalist includes the following revealing passage, regarding this representation:

Before immigration was a common problem in so many European countries, there was another process that took them so far. It was a long process of disintegrating European society, built on top of a top-down Union: political corruption; financial scandals; immeasurable fortunes; dramatic bankruptcies; frauds; manipulation of democracy; instrumentalization of justice; degradation in the last 10 years of living conditions of the poorest; unemployment; job insecurity; inequalities; indifference to the sovereignty of the peoples; neo-colonialist militarism and deliberate concealment and contempt for the progressive experiences of twentieth-century human history (Tadeu, 2017).

5.2.1.2.2 EUROPE OF THE NATION STATES

This representation includes discourses focused on the internal divisions within Europe, namely between Member States, based on alleged hypocritical interests. It portrays a

division within the European Union, between countries that are welcoming to refugees in contrast to those who are not or criticizing an alleged unequal distribution of resettlement efforts.

Media Outlets

In *Bild*, this representation is present in the own outlet's discourse, in the following instance: "But whether such images of misery, helplessness and exhaustion, created on European soil, will really be a thing of the past here depends very much on whether the European Union finally manages to agree on a common refugee policy" (Bild, 2015). In the same article, it is written that "other EU states, such as Hungary, are presenting themselves from an ugly side and are putting their faith in a martial deterrent without compassion" (Bild, 2015).

The SPD's representation of this issue is present in the outlet's summary of the political parties' programs, namely in the following proposal: "Asylum applications should be submitted before entry into the EU, asylum seekers distributed "fairly" in Europe" (Vehlewald, 2017). In the same article, FDP is portrayed as defending that "EU states without refugees should pay" (Vehlewald, 2017), which signals at this idea of an uneven, or unfair, division within Europe.

In *Spiegel*, this representation is present in its own discourse as well as in that of a German journalist in an opinion article. It can be seen in the following passage from the article *The Europe of Borders*:

In refugee policy, Europe is experiencing a return of nation states that have their own interests in view, at the cost of European values. [...] In the dispute over a refugee quota, a majority of EU states simply overruled deviants from Eastern Europe (Deggerich, et al., 2015).

Regarding the opinion article by a German journalist, the article which was also included in the category devoted to the representation of Germany as a savior, as mentioned, also represents Europe as divided:

The friendly press should not fool us. As long as the refugees stay in Germany, the neighbors like to watch as we open hearts and barns. However, as soon as we ask them to join the rescue work, the fun stops. Should it have been the Chancellor's calculation that the neighbors would make an example of our charity, she has thoroughly miscalculated. We are becoming more and more lonely (Fleischhauer, 2015)

The coverage of **Diário de Notícias** regarding this representation is based on an opinion article by a British opinion maker:

There are no easy solutions to the refugee crisis in Europe. In a world of fragile states and increasing mobility, people will continue to come, regardless of whether or not they fit the legal definition of "refugee" correctly. Europe needs a clear strategy on who it wants to protect and where and how to assess people's asylum applications (Betts, 2015).

5.2.1.2.3 *EUROPEANNESS*

The negative portrayal of Europe's power connected with ideas about its symbolic identity is present in the discourses of other opinion makers in DN.

In **Diário de Notícias**, this is the case, for example, in this passage of an opinion article by a journalist about the drowned Syrian boy:

Especially because the reason why Aylan [sic] came to our beach is too complex, too difficult (who has a solution for Syria and ISIS, raise your arm), too contradictory to our vision of Europeans who despair at low birth rates but don't want to nor dream of compensating it with non-Europeans. Even because hosting and integrating the Aylans [sic] costs money (Câncio, 2015).

The same criticism of how Muslims are represented in Europe is also present in an opinion article by an academic: “[...] because this child [Alan Kurdi] is dressed like a Westerner, and in his dress in Europeans we recognize someone like our children, nephews, cousins or grandchildren” (Almeida, 2015).

We find one instance in one particular opinion article, in which all previous representations of Europe are present: Europe as a facing a tragedy, *othering* the victims of that tragedy for religious reasons, and being internally divided, with its symbolic identity and values in crisis. It is a piece by a Portuguese academic in the elite outlet *Diário da Notícias*. What is also particular about this article is that it puts responsibility on the “West” for this crisis, rather than seeing it as an external tragedy it is bound to respond to.

In an opinion piece titled *Islamophobia*, (Moreira, 2015) a Portuguese academic condemns “[r]eligious differentiation” while noting that:

[...] what we face now is a human drama that has, among many other causes, Western errors, namely unsubstantiated military interventions, or forgetting the prudential rule of choosing a lesser evil, as, for example, happened in Iraq. The only way to stop this emigration is to be able to establish a good government in the origin of the fugitives, and in the elimination of the companies that grow profits as they cause the transformation of the Mediterranean into a cemetery (Moreira, 2015).

The reference to a European identity and “values” in the context of this “crisis” is also ascertainable, when the author claims that:

[...] the process of migration that is disturbing Europe is birthing and reinforcing Islamophobia, which, above all, puts fear before humanistic values. Nationalist and Eurosceptic movements that support the formation of forces opposed to Europeanist of unity, affirming the risk to European cultural values and of Europe's very identity, cannot be ignored (Moreira, 2015).

Regarding the internal divisions, he writes that:

Fear is not the best state of mind, humanitarianism is the priority requirement, and it is therefore inexcusable that a European Union ruler [referring to Hungarian PM Orbán] has shown complete ignorance or forgetfulness that fortuitous acts trigger great catastrophes: the death of a prince was enough to trigger the First World War (Moreira, 2015).

So, Europe is portrayed as having a certain identity and values that are not Islamophobic, and, at the same time, is seen as plagued by movements that contradict these values and identity, while also being portrayed, as part of an idea of the “West”, as having responsibility in the causes of these migratory flows.

5.2.1.3 REPRESENTATIONS OF PORTUGAL

Representations of Portugal, in the context of the migration crisis, are almost absent, with two exceptions, both of which are only present in the Portuguese tabloid’s discourse: Portugal’s role explicitly portrayed as irrelevant in this context, and Portugal represented as not having extremist movements.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power	Irrelevance	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	PSD
		DN	/
Symbolic Identity + Political-Economic Ideas	No Extremism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	CM
		DN	/

TABLE 27 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF PORTUGAL

5.3.1.3.1 IRRELEVANCE

One of the two instances in which Portugal appears, in relation to the refugee crisis, in the analyzed data, is, in fact, to frame the issue as virtually non-existent in Portugal, due to the alleged absence of migrants or refugees. It creates the idea that this is a non-issue for Portugal, only being one for “Europe”, portrayed as a separate entity.

It only appears in the Portuguese tabloid *Correio da Manhã*, having a representative of the PSD as a definer, quoted as stating that: "In Portugal we have no reason to have the kind of concerns that are felt in Germany and in the center of Europe, which have been particularly sought after by movements of refugees" (Lusa, 2017).

5.3.1.3.2 NO EXTREMISM

This is a discourse that promotes the idea of Portugal as a country that has no or weak extremist parties or movements, namely far-right ones, in the context of the growth of these parties in several European countries, and particularly in the 2014 European Parliament elections. It is a representation we have also seen in the context of the economic crisis, however, regarding the so-called refugee crisis it only appears in one instance, in the discourse of *Correio da Manhã*: "Expected far-right growth may mark this month's European elections, but not all countries have strong extremist parties for historical reasons, such as the Portuguese case" (CM, 2014).

5.2.2 Representations of *them*, "non-European" *others*

When discourses focus on representations of the "non-European" *other*, not directly connected to representations of Germany, Europe or Portugal, the refugee or migrant is portrayed as either a threat, a symbolic *other*, a potential economic asset, a victim of tragedy, or as the "good" migrant.

When discourses are framed by "Symbolic Identity", the "refugee" or "migrant" *other* is no longer a tragic being in need of help, that Germany and the E.U. succeed or fail at saving, but rather a symbolic *other* that is, at best, not a part of us – in this case connected to representations of Muslim people specifically - and at worst, a threat. The discourses are no longer about what is and should be done to "save" *them*, but rather, that *they* should not be welcomed, because *they* are a threat, or that *they* constitute a symbolic *other* to a common *us*.

Although both have been included in this analysis, and under the representations of migrants/refugees, we underline that, in the case of the representations of Muslim people in Europe, we do not mean to imply that there is a necessary correspondence between

migrants/refugees and Islam, nor vice-versa, but the analysis of the discourses of the presented as “non-European” *other*.

When discourses are framed by “Power”, the idea that they are welcome is tied to the portrayal of *them* as an economic asset, as displaying “good” behavior or as a tragedy.

Frame	Narrative	Media	Definers
Symbolic Identity	The refugee/migrant <i>other</i>	Bild	Bild, CDU, CSU, AfD, DE PR
		Spiegel	Far-right/DE Opinion Maker, Spiegel
		CM	CM, PT Diplomat, PNR
		DN	AfD, AfD voters, DE Opinion Maker, DN, CDU
Power	Refugees are welcome...	Bild	Bild, SPD, CDU/CSU, Die Grünen, FDP
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	/
		DN	DN, UK Definer

TABLE 28 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF “NON-EUROPEAN” *OTHERS*

We can see that, considering the overall coverage, the number and variety of definers whose discourses are framed by “Symbolic Identity” is larger than those framed by “Power”, regarding representations directly about refugees or migrants. This could also be due to the fact that discourses framed by “Power” often represent the powerholders themselves, and are, thus, included in the previous category of analysis.

Still, we can observe that, in the case of discourses framed by “Symbolic Identity”, including the idea that refugees are a threat and/or that Islam is not part of what is portrayed as the “European identity”, are present in all media outlets, including their own discourses, as well of, aside from German opinion makers and a Portuguese diplomat, in the discourses of definers from German parties from the right, ranging from the conservative right (CSU), center-right (CDU), far-right (AfD) and Portuguese far-right (PNR), as well as by the German President, who is politically independent. Qualitative differences regarding these representations are particularly important, as will be explored below.

Regarding discourses framed by “Power”, the presence of the discourses of elite outlets is visible, as well as, in the case of the German tabloid, of several political definers, but, this time, ranging from the green left (Die Grünen), including the center-left (SPD) as well as the center-conservative-right coalition (CDU/CSU) and the liberals (FDP). The

differences in how these representations are shaped is also extremely important, demonstrating, once again, the relevance of qualitative approaches in this regard.

5.2.2.1 THE REFUGEE/MIGRANT *OTHER*

In general, discourses framed by “Symbolic Identity”, composed of the “Refugees are a threat” and the *us* and *them* representations, are present in all media outlets, even if with different approaches and nuances, as will be explored in depth in each representation’s exploration. Overall, what can be observed is a predominance of German definers in all media outlets, except for *Correio da Manhã*, where also the only Portuguese political definer is quoted. In terms of the media outlets’ own discourses, both tabloids use the “Refugees are a threat” representation, whereas the outlets use the *us* and *them* representation, with specific tones, namely with the latter focusing on a critical stance regarding the discrimination of these *others*.

Narrative	Representation	Media	Definers
The Refugee <i>Other</i>	Refugees/migrants are a threat	Bild	Bild, CDU, CSU, AfD
		Spiegel	Far-right/DE Opinion Maker
		CM	CM, PT Diplomat, PNR
		DN	AfD, AfD voters, DE Opinion Maker
	<i>Us and them</i>	Bild	AfD, DE PR
		Spiegel	Spiegel
		CM	PNR, CDU
		DN	DN, AfD, CDU

TABLE 29 – MIGRATION CRISIS: THE REFUGEE *OTHER*

Regarding political definers, both representations are mainly attributed to definers from the German right, whether center (CDU), conservative (CSU) or far-right (AfD) as well as center-left (SPD), and the Portuguese far-right (PNR). The lack of Portuguese sources and the specificity of this political definer are related to the previously explored representation of Portugal as a country which “remained alien” (Santos et al., 2019, p. 105) to these migratory flows.

The presence of opinion articles in elite outlets, particularly of a German opinion maker in *Diário de Notícias*, is also noteworthy to understand how these representations are encoded by each outlet, according to their social personality. In *DN* particularly, opinion

makers point to the existence of this representation but always adopting a critical stance about it, rejecting it.

5.2.2.1.1 Refugees are a threat

Differently than the previous frames, that portray the negative attitude regarding refugees in a critical way, the following frames represent the views of those who reject the presence of refugees, using a series of justifications, often bundled together: security, economy and symbolic identity or culture. The discourses on symbolic representations of identity, or culture, that present refugees as a threat, specifically target Muslim refugees.

This representation is present in all news outlets, however, regarding the outlets' own discourses, it is only used by the tabloids, *Bild* and *CM*. In all outlets this representation is also attributed to the discourses of the political right. In the case of the tabloids, who share the representation themselves, in *Bild*, it is attributed to the center-right (CDU), conservative right (CSU) and far-right (AfD), whereas *CM* attributes it to the Portuguese far-right (PNR) as well as to a Portuguese diplomat. Regarding the elite outlets, this representation is attributed mainly to the German far-right, with *Spiegel* mentioning it in general, and *DN* quoting a representative of the AfD and mentioning its voters, with the representation also being present in an interview with a German journalist.

Media Outlets

In the German tabloid *Bild*, as mentioned, this representation is present in the outlets own discourse as well as in those of several German political definers, from various parties on the right (CDU, CSU and AfD). The outlet and the CDU frame the threat as an economic one, whereas the definer from the CSU focuses on security and the one from the AfD on symbolic identity elements.

In the tabloid's own discourse, this threat is presented as an economic one, namely in an article titled *Eight Uncomfortable Questions* regarding the "refugee crisis": "Is our German asylum law really an incentive for refugees to come to us? Asylum seekers in Germany receive accommodation, meals and up to 359 euros/month" (Bild, 2015). It is important to note that this article starts, as mentioned in the "German Savior" representation's analysis, by outlining that Bild defends a campaign named "We help"

regarding the refugee crisis, but, in their own words, consider they “also have to ask uncomfortable questions” (Bild, 2015).

Regarding the representation present in the CDU’s discourse, this threat is also framed as mainly economic one, in the same article and following the previous quote: “The government still wants to reduce the payment (...) The reason: "No false incentives should be set"” (Bild, 2015). Also in the same article, a representative of the conservative CSU presents this threat in a different light, namely as a security threat, as can be seen in the following passage: “Bavaria's finance minister Markus Söder (48) warned: Many refugees come from the civil war - "maybe also civil warriors"” (Bild, 2015).

As regards the AfD’s discourse, the threat is general, with identity-related undertones regarding the reference to Muslim symbols, as the party is portrayed as defending: “Border closure! Stop immigration, deport refugees rigorously ("negative immigration"), reduce the brain drain. Burka- / minaret ban. No asylum without papers. No German passport for migrant children.” (Vehlewald, 2017).

In *Spiegel*, in an article named *The Merkelization of Europe*, the outlet blames Merkel’s refugee policy for the rise of the populist right, thus indirectly portraying “right-wing populists” as seeing refugees as a threat: “Merkel must accept the accusation of having favored the rise of right-wing populists with her refugee policies” (Becker & Wiemann, 2017). Thus, this seems like a clearly oppositional encoding of this kind of discourse by the German elite outlet.

The Portuguese tabloid *Correio da Manhã* uses this discourse of the refugee as a threat in its own discourse, namely presenting it as a security threat. In the same outlet, a Portuguese diplomat presents the threat as both an identity-related one and an economic one, while a representative of the Portuguese far-right (PNR) presents it as a threat on all three fronts: security, economic and identity. The outlet, through an article about a crime committed by a refugee, frames this threat as a security one: “Refugee rapes and kills daughter of EU consultant” (CM, 2017).

An op-ed by a Portuguese diplomat entails the representation of refugees as seen as a threat to German “identity”, by “many” - “Berlin has given exemplary support to these refugees, but many are those who criticize such openness, as they fear the effects it will have

on (...) German identity” (Falcão-Machado, 2017), as well as an economic threat: “many are those who criticize such openness, as they fear the effects it will have on employment levels” (Falcão-Machado, 2017). So, the author is not directly assuming this representation, but attributing it to “many” Germans.

A definer from the Portuguese far-right party PNR uses all three bases to portray this threat:

"We are the only party in Portugal that denounces this situation and warns of the danger that this represents against our internal security and against our identity", claimed Pinto-Coelho, considering that the announced support for refugees "represents an affront, an offense "to many Portuguese people who" are not given a home, are not given subsidies" (Lusa, 2015).

In *Diário de Notícias*, this representation is attributed to a definer from the German far-right party AfD, as well as to its voters in general, as well as to a German journalist in an interview, referring to the German “population” as a whole. In most cases the threat is seen as a security-based one, but economic concerns are also visible. Contrary to the German elite outlet’s encoding, in DN, although this representation is attributed to the AfD, it seems to be more legitimized, thus not clearly oppositional, mainly in the interview with a representative of that party, as well as with the German opinion makers, who sustains the legitimacy of security concerns, but less so in the feature story. The fear-based narrative is rather accepted, or, at the most, negotiated.

In an interview with a definer from the German far-right party AfD, titled *We don't feel that we are far-right*, it is claimed that:

“[...] there are security problems, there was an attack in Berlin here, because there is no real border control. This is not xenophobia. It's a fact”, as well as the idea that “the refugee crisis, which is no natural disaster, is a crisis generated by Merkel’s hand” (Viegas P. , 2017a).

Regarding the reference to AfD voters, it appears through a feature article in Berlin, in which an interviewee describes them in the following way:

“Many people voted for AfD because they are afraid of refugees and think the State gives them more money than they do. It’s not true. The state helps all the people who are poor” (Viegas P. , 2017d).

In an interview with a German journalist, the idea of the security threat looming over people’s heads is visible in the following quote: “After the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks, the population wants to feel safe, better protected” (Schuster, 2017).

5.2.2.1.2 *US AND THEM*

This category draws on a symbolic representation of identity, naming the *other*, whether explicitly or implicitly, often based on the axis of religion, understood in the broader sense as a symbolic cultural referent, as Islam is often portrayed as connected to the so-called “refugee crisis”, and refugee is often made to mean “Muslim”. This happens in relation to Germany, to Europe and to Portugal. Here we also include the narratives in which the *other* is seen as welcome but focusing on the need to accept certain “values”, become more “like us”, i.e., stressing issued of symbolic identity that still indicate a process of *othering*.

Within this narrative, we find representations Germany as not being Muslim, or Islam as not being German, even though Muslim people reside in the country. This does not mean that the discourse explicitly rejects the possibility of Muslim presence, or “integration”, but, nevertheless, the underlying idea, is that *they* are not a part of the idea of *us*. The same type of frame can be also found regarding Europe’s symbolic representation as not being Muslim. Almost absent from the discourse, in the case of Portugal, the issue of Islam is only raised by a representative of the PNR party, in *Correio da Manhã*.

It also includes the discourses based on a conditional view of the welcoming policies: refugees are seen as welcome, but being an *other*, their presence is conditional regarding their “acceptance” of “our values” or “our culture”. Instead of using an obviously essentialist symbolic representation-based *othering*, it uses a civic type of language to draw the *othering* line.

These two types of this representation are, of course, very different from one another, however, for the purpose of exploring what the hegemonic discourses about German, Portuguese and European identities are and how these are made to mean, they still serve to point out this “non-European”/German/Portuguese *other*.

In the elite outlets, the focus on discrimination and criticism of this representation is present explicitly, thus, it is a qualitatively very different framing of this representation, indicating an oppositional decoding of it, differently to the tabloids, in which it seems to be decoded uncritically, or, at least, not obviously critically. This clearly oppositional encoding also feeds into the notion of self-representation as discriminatory.

Media Outlets

In the German tabloid *Bild*, this representation is attributed, indirectly, to the far-right party AfD, regarding Germany. And the representation that focuses on the need for *them* to become more like *us* is present in the discourse of a definer from the German center-left opposition (SPD).

In the already quoted article that summarizes political parties' electoral programs, the same instance which we have included in the “Refugees are a Threat” discourse, specifically regarding symbolic identity, is also connected to this representation of Germany as not being Muslim, mainly the reference to a “Burka- / minaret ban” (Vehlewald, 2017).

Regarding the representation based on a civic language, the German President, a political independent, is quoted in the following manner:

[...] integrating refugees will pose a greater task to Germany than German unity. The common goal: to create an inner bond between locals and newcomers. "Unlike back then, what did not previously belong together should now grow together," he said. Much greater distances would have to be overcome than between East and West Germans, who would have had a language and a common culture and history", also adding that it “takes time for newcomers to get used to a social order that often brings them into conflict with their traditional norms” and that “[o]ur values are not up for discussion” (Bild, 2015).

Spiegel uses this representation in its own discourse, both regarding Germany as well as regarding Europe. However, qualitatively, this discourse is quite specific, as the focus is on how Muslim people feel discriminated against in Germany and Europe. So, even though, the underlying idea is that there is a *they*, an *other*, the tone is still in denouncing their discrimination, thus an oppositional decoding of this *othering*.

In the same article, about a study conducted on Muslims living in Europe, the German elite outlet writes that:

Muslims living in Germany are less likely than most other EU countries to feel disadvantaged because of their skin color or origin - Germany is in the middle of discrimination because of religion (Reimann & van Hove, 2017).

Regarding Europe, as a whole, it is claimed that “[m]ore Muslims complain of discrimination because of their religion” (Reimann & van Hove, 2017). The outlet also underlines some intersectional discriminations, namely gender-based - “[p]articularly often headscarf or veil-wearing Muslim women reported from hostility to physical attacks” (Reimann & van Hove, 2017), and race-based:

According to FRA, when comparing different groups within a country, the most striking differences were found in Germany: in this country, only 18 percent of Turkish-Muslim Muslims felt discriminated against, compared to 50 percent of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa (Reimann & van Hove, 2017).

In *Correio da Manhã*, we find this representation regarding Europe, and it is also the only outlet in which it appears regarding Portugal as well, namely both cases, in the discourse of the Portuguese far-right party PNR. Regarding the civic-based *othering*, it is present in the discourse of a representative of the German center-right party in power (CDU). A representative of the far-right party PNR mentions the “Islamic conquest of Europe”, or an “Islamic invasion” threatening “the country [Portugal] and Europe” (Lusa, 2015).

As for the representation of this *other* as needing to accept our values, in an article titled *Berlin demands that refugees respect its culture and laws*, a representative of the CDU is quoted as saying that:

Accepting German laws and values means "to tell the real name and country of origin to employers, not to fight, to have patience and to respect others, regardless of religion or gender (Lusa, 2015).

Several definers use this representation in the Portuguese elite outlet, *Diário de Notícias*, namely, aside from the outlet itself, representatives of the CDU, of the AfD and a Portuguese opinion maker, referring to the AfD.

Diário de Notícias references the same study present in the German elite outlet, *Spiegel*, also focusing on discrimination of Muslims in Europe. In the article titled *The majority of Muslims feel connected to the country they live in* (Lusa, 2017), the outlet uses a complex portrayal of this *other*, portraying it, on the one hand, as an internal *other*, when writing that the study's results "completely discredit the claim that Muslims are not integrated into our societies", as well as that the agency conducting the study "considers Muslim acceptance by the rest of the European population is low, with one in five people on average saying they would not like to have neighbors of Islamic faith", and, on the other hand, defining this *other* as part of Europe: "[a]bout 20 million Europeans are Muslims, representing about 4%" (Lusa, 2017).

A representative of the CDU is quoted indirectly as using this representation, in which the idea of a possible incompatibility between Islam and Germany is brought up, and, even though it is presented as "compatible", it, nonetheless, implies a process of *othering*: "Asked about the compatibility between Islam and German culture, the chancellor stressed that these are compatible realities as long as the German Constitution is respected" (Gouveia, 2017).

Also mentioning the respect for the Constitution, as well as symbolic identity references tied to religion, a representative of the German far-right party AfD, claims, in an interview:

This is a question that goes beyond morality. Of course, anyone who accepts our values, our Constitution, is welcome, but we do not want within a few generations to have Sharia established here (Viegas P. , 2017a).

In one instance, a Portuguese journalist is attributing this representation to a representative of the AfD, claiming that he [Gauland] “does not defend the superiority of the Aryan race over the others but says that Germany should not receive Syrian refugees because, I quote, "Islam is not part of German culture”” (Tadeu, 2017).

5.2.2.2 REFUGEES ARE WELCOME...

At the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity”, when representing this “non-European” *other*, representations tend to present this *other* as being welcome, but with strings attached. *They* are either presented as welcome because they are economically useful, as long as/because *they* are “good” or due to their status as victims of a tragedy, unlike what happens in the next narrative (“Immigration Society”), in which migration is seen as positive and desirable, regardless of specific qualification.

Of course, in the *us* and *them* representation, this idea is also present at times, namely that *they* are welcome as long as *they* respect our values, but here the focus is not so much on the “Symbolic Identity”, but rather on “Power”.

Narrative	Representation	Media	Definers	
Refugees are Welcome...	As an Economic Asset	Bild	SPD, CDU/CSU, Die Grünen, FDP	
		Spiegel	/	
		CM	/	
		DN	/	
		The “good refugee”	Bild	/
			Spiegel	/
	CM		/	
	Tragedy	DN	DN	
		Bild	Bild	
		Spiegel	Spiegel	
		CM	/	
		DN	UK Definer	

TABLE 30 – MIGRATION CRISIS: REFUGEES ARE WELCOME...

The different representations within this narrative are all based on an idea of refugees/migrants as being welcome, but due to very different reasons. In the German tabloid, *Bild*, through discourses attributed to several political definers from different sides of the spectrum, representations of *them* as a potential economic asset and, in the own outlet’s discourse, as victims of tragedies are present. In the German elite outlet, *Spiegel*, the only representation present within this narrative is the “Tragedy” one. In the Portuguese elite

outlet, *DN*, an anecdotal representation of a refugee teenager doing “good” is present, as well as, in the discourse of a British definer, the tragic representation. In the Portuguese tabloid, as mentioned, this narrative does not seem to be present at all.

5.2.2.2.1 AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET

Within *Bild*'s coverage, a particular representation comes to light in the context of the presentation of political parties' electoral programs, namely one in which refugees and/or migrants are presented as a potential economic asset. This representation is attributed to several political definers, from the center-left (SPD), center- and conservative-right (CDU/CSU), liberal right (FDP) and the green left (Die Grünen), but only in the coverage of the German tabloid. Thus, this is a representation in which the “refugee” is seen as welcome, but only to the extent to which they are economically useful.

The political definers using this representation coat it with a particular perspective, namely that of refugees/migrants/asylum-seekers as an economic asset. All of these political definers' discourses are part of the same article, in which each party's program for the upcoming elections is summarized, including their views on migration. This type of discourse frames the arriving refugees as being potentially useful economically, i.e., instrumentalizing *them* as welcome, because *they* may be an economic asset, for the workforce.

Regarding the SPD, it is described as wanting to “take on refugees in need, specifically recruit skilled workers as needed” (Vehlewald, 2017). As is the case with *Bild*'s own discourse and of that of the FDP, SPD's view, in this article, is also attributable to the “Europe of the Nation States” representation, as will be seen below. The Greens, are presented as proposing that “skilled workers will be lured by an immigration law (points system)” (Vehlewald, 2017). In the case of this portrayal of the green party, part of it is also included in another category, namely the “Immigration Society” representation.

In *Bild*'s account on the CDU/CSU coalition's view on migration, it can be read that the “Union wants to control immigration "wisely" by a "skilled labor immigration law”” (Vehlewald, 2017). In a similar perspective, the FDP is said to want “No upper limit for asylum! "Pick" immigrants as needed”, even if “[a]sylum is to be applied for abroad” (Vehlewald, 2017).

5.2.2.2.2 THE “GOOD REFUGEE”

Inserted in the same category, this frame uses an anecdotal story in *Diário de Notícias* about a refugee, presenting a positive view through exemplification. It is interesting to note the contrast to the anecdotal story that was referred to in the “is not welcome” representation, by *Correio da Manhã* (CM, 2017), in the opposite sense.

Although we cannot state that this “good behavior” is presented as the condition for the welcoming of refugees, but it is nonetheless illustrative of a certain need to present good examples in order to foster the so-called “welcome culture”.

In *Diário de Notícias*, an article promotes this representation of the “good migrant” in an article in which it is written that: “German police reported that a 16-year-old Iraqi refugee teenager is in the process of receiving a reward for delivering a lost handbag with 14.000 euro inside” (Lusa, 2017).

5.2.2.2.3 TRAGEDY

This representation, to some extent underlying the general coverage of the “crisis”, presents the situation of refugees, mainly Syrian, as a tragedy, and focuses on the horrors experienced, either in their homeland, or during the migratory process to Europe. It appears in *Bild*, *Diário de Notícias* and *Spiegel*, and its definers are an academics and a journalist, in op-eds, and the German news outlets themselves.

In *Bild* this can be seen, for example, through the reference to the idea that refugees come from “miserable regions and in their desperation often do not fear the dangers of life to find a place of refuge with the perspective of a better life” (Bild, 2015).

In *Spiegel*, a similar tone marks the depiction of this *other*: “Most of the asylum seekers in Germany have fled Russia, Syria, Afghanistan and Serbia, from persecution and hunger, from war, from fear of dying in their home countries” (Roth, 2013).

Diário de Notícias also portrays a similar scenario, in an opinion piece by a British academic: “The powerful images of people traveling long distances on railways and motorways have created a general feeling of crisis in Europe. But much of this tragedy and chaos is preventable” (Betts, 2015).

5.2.3 Immigration Society

When the focus is on “Political-Economic Ideas” we find representations in which the promoted ideal is that of a society made of immigration, of a symbolic identity that is multiple in itself (“Immigration Society”).

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers
Power + Political-Economic Ideas: Immigration Society	Immigration Society	Bild	Die Linke, Die Grünen
		Spiegel	/
		CM	/
		DN	/

TABLE 31 – MIGRATION CRISIS: IMMIGRATION SOCIETY

This representation is present in *Bild*, in short summaries of two German left-wing political parties’ electoral programs (Die Linke and Die Grünen). The “Immigration society” representation frames German society as being, or urging it to be, solidary, and welcoming of migrants and/or refugees, as a feature of society itself.

As mentioned, in *Bild*, this representation appears in articles summarizing the electoral programs of several political parties, in the references to two political parties: the left-wing Die Linke, and the green left Die Grünen.

The left-wing party Die Linke is quoted twice as using this representation, once in the context of the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, when a representative of the party claims for a “humane treatment of refugees”, but more specifically in 2017, when *Bild* writes that “Die Linke wants to facilitate immigration (“solidary immigration society”). Specifically: Right to work, health and social care for all immigrants (not only those persecuted) after 3 months at the latest” (Vehlewald, 2017). In the same article, the green party is portrayed in the following way: ““Die Grünen call for “safe and legal ways” to Germany, better family reunification (...) skilled workers will be lured by an immigration law (points system)” (Vehlewald, 2017).

5.2.4 De-othering: Representation

Even though there are different discourses about migrants and refugees in the media, the *othering* process in itself is hegemonic. There are only two instances, both in *Diário de*

Notícias, in which the migrant or refugee is not talked about but talked to, as a definer in the media articles. This is particularly impactful in the case of the feature story in which a Syrian refugee establishes, through the reference to material historically charged heritage, a rapprochement between *us* and *them*. This paradox of an idea of Europe as internally diverse, but with clear barriers to this diversity, based on a certain European symbolic sameness, becomes evident in these discourses.

However, both articles are written in Germany, by a Portuguese news outlet: the Syrian refugee and the Turkish community representative are portrayed as internal *others* to the German imagined community, being part of the representation of Germany. Again, this is most likely due to our research design, which is not aimed at analyzing representations of refugees and/or migrants, but that of Germany, Portugal and Europe. Thus, potential representations of this *other* by German outlets would not have been caught in our data collection, as it was not the focus of this research.

Nonetheless, it points to processes that open up the possibility of *de-othering*, in a similar way to the ones found in the context of the economic crisis, in which the focus of our research is more relevant. Even if seen as representations of Germany, they are complexifying representations of the imagined community of Germany, as containing a complexity of those presented as “internal” *others*.

In a feature story in Berlin, in *Diário de Notícias*, a spokesperson for an organization of the Turkish community in Germany is quoted as saying:

We always knew that there was a potential here for the extreme right of 20%, which previously could be contained by the CDU and the SPD. Now, with immigration and refugees, the situation has gotten out of control. There is racism and, for this, some will vote for AfD, which in my view is a party that did not accept globalization. But there are also those who vote out of fear or fatigue of the big parties (Viegas P. , 2017b).

Another feature story, *Berlin explained to tourists by a Syrian*, in which a Syrian refugee gives a tour of Berlin allows for an even stronger *de-othering* representation:

Mohamad fled because he did not want to serve in Assad's army. In Germany, he studies and takes guided tours comparing the history of Germany and Syria. (...) The tour, which lasts two hours, then ends with a visit to a Syrian restaurant "This is where, in 1953, people displeased with the GDR communist regime protested", explains Mohamad, to a group that includes people from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Poland, Uzbekistan, Lithuania etc ... Along the way, parallels between the history of Germany and Syria are established, "Do you see Checkpoint Charlie? In Syria, checkpoints are something very present in everyday life- It is something that may seem strange to you. But it is something that intimidates. It causes fear ", recalls the Syrian, who just received a scholarship to study Economics and Political Science (Viegas P. , 2017e).

5.2.5 Migrant/refugee crisis: final observations

Our data collected in the context of the so-called "migrant/refugee crisis" allows us to explore whether and how the introduction of the element of the (portrayed as) "non-European" *other*, namely the refugee and/or migrant, influences the representations of Portugal, Germany and Europe. As was the case regarding the context of the economic crisis, here we also found instances in which these *us* and *them* divisions, based on "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983/2016), are (more or less) overcome.

Regarding representations of Germany, when inserting this element of the presented as "non-European" *other*, the migrant or refugee, we, once again, as was the case regarding the economic crisis, find mainly two narratives: a positive and a negative one. In the first case, Germany is seen as a savior, as welcoming refugees and as being anti-Nazi. In the second case, Germany is seen as not being as welcoming as it is portrayed to be, and as being marked by neo-Nazi movements and ideas.

Considering representations of Europe, these are always negative, namely presenting it as being divided amongst its Member States, with no common policy towards refugees/migrants, when Europe is seen as *them*, or as *othering* refugees and as being

responsible for their plight, when it is portrayed as an *us*. Relating to Europe's representation as an *us*, it is also implied in the representation of those presented as the "non-European" *others*, whether othered explicitly, presented a threat or merely as an *other* against whom European commonality arises, or as being welcome as an economic asset, as a "good refugee" or as a victim of a tragedy.

This is in line with our previous observation that the "refugee crisis" is, for the most part, portrayed as such, as a crisis, and one that is independent from European history and policies. In this sole case in which European responsibility is mentioned (Moreira, 2015), it is still in the frame of European exceptionalism.

Representations of Portugal particularly in this context are almost absent, except for two instances in *Correio da Manhã*, one referring to the irrelevance of the "issue" in the country, and one referring to the absence of extremist parties. In the context of this crisis Portugal is often portrayed as part of Europe, differently than what happens regarding the economic crisis, with Europe becoming an *us* regarding the refugee/migrant *them*, even when from a critical standpoint, in the discourses of opinion makers in the Portuguese elite outlet *DN*. This points to a Portuguese perspective of the migration crisis in which responsibility can be attributed to Germany and/or Europe as a whole, as disconnected from Portugal itself. The refugee crisis is portrayed as a German or a European issue, not as a Portuguese issue. This facet of Portugal's perceived powerlessness could be seen as entailing a washing of hands, of sorts.

Departing from these *us* and *them* representations of imagined communities, in two quite marginal instances, ideas of an ideal society based on migration are present in the discourses of two German parties in the left, in the German tabloid, *Bild*.

And finally, instances of de-*othering* representation, i.e., seeking those portrayed as *others* to speak for themselves, are scant but present in feature stories, in the Portuguese elite outlet *DN*. As we have pointed out, however, these instances also refer to a portrayal of Germany by the Portuguese elite outlet, as a country that is shaped by the presence of migrants and refugees.

Once again, we find the need to underline that representations of this "non-European" *other* were not the focus of our research, which could explain differences in the coverages

of the Portuguese and German outlets, since, in the Portuguese outlets, these arise in the coverage about Germany and Europe, which could lead to an absence or weaker presence in the German outlets, as the data collected referred to representations of Portugal and Europe.

5.3 *Us* and *them*: power and symbolic identity

Having explored, in depth, the narratives and corresponding representations of Germany, Europe and Portugal in each of the “crisis” contexts, we will now proceed to carry out an overall analysis of the data, including both crises.

Before proceeding, it is important to bear in mind the limitations and particularities of our research design and data collection, particularly how the identification of “absences” of representations or narratives, mainly according to outlet, may be explained by different strategies in online availability of articles, or types of articles. The large amount of data across several time periods allows for some mitigation. Nonetheless, we believe a reminder of this respect is warranted, even if tendencies and patterns are still discernible within this design.

Our analysis allowed us to identify two discursive tendencies, one shaped by an *us* and *them*, or *othering*, perspective - which includes representations of Portugal, Germany, Europe and the “non-European” *other* in which the “Power” and/or “Symbolic Identity” frames are present – and one shaped by a perspective based on the possibility of overcoming borders – which includes discourses framed solely by political-economic ideas, and, even more meaningfully, by a search for representation of the *other*, and complexification.

As we have explained in the chapter dedicated to our research design, we will adopt Ross’s “text-relative” model (2011), as an adaptation of Stuart Hall’s “encoding/decoding” model (1993). According to this model we regard the of each news piece as the encoders, and the media outlet as the decoder of the text. As such, the media can adopt different text-relative positions regarding the definers’ discourses. Having now gathered and analyzed all of the data, we can define what the dominant-hegemonic discourse is, and then position not only the media, but also the definers, in relation to it, according to the “ideology” version of the model.

We recall that, in our research model, we question the assumption that the media simply encode according to the dominant ideology, as well as that the “preferred reading”, or the dominant ideology itself, is, and will try to define it by tracing the patterns of how different ideologies and counter-hegemonic discourses interact in the different political, social and mediatic discourses present in the media.

5.3.1 Europe’s internal division: Representations of Germany and Portugal

As we have concluded, with “Power” being a central element in the overall data analysis, Germany’s position as the hegemon of Europe holds a particular centrality in the analyzed representations, with two symmetrical narratives about that narrative, in either context: Germany as the good hegemon, as the “German model” in the economic crisis, tied to ideas about productivity and a capitalist work ethic, or the “savior” in the so-called refugee crisis, or as the bad hegemon, in either crisis, often with either implicit or explicit references to its Nazi past. This places Germany as the central referent, as our theoretical model pointing to the idea of a German Europe (Beck, 2014) has laid out.

In the context of the economic crisis, this representation of Germany corresponds to representations of Portugal as the “rescued undisciplined student”, connected to ideas of unproductivity or progress to become “more German”, or as a “victim” of a dictatorial German hegemon, respectively. Whereas, regarding the so-called refugee crisis, representations of Portugal are almost absent, with two small exceptions. Thus, even if representations of both “imagined communities” are explored, Germany clearly appears as the benchmark.

When the “Power” frame is not directly present, but the “Symbolic Identity” one is intersected with “Political-Economic Ideas”, thus representing each imagined community as shaped by a certain political ideology, the same *us* and *them* perspective is present, within the European context, whether representing Germany as being anti-far-right or shaped by it, as well as Portugal as shaped as not being “extremist”.

5.3.1.1 POWER DYNAMICS

Starting with the discourses framed by power dynamics, In the overall coverage of each outlet, regarding how Germany and Portugal are presented, the case of *Bild* stands out

particularly, in comparison with the other outlets, being the only one where the positive narrative, of Germany as the “good hegemon” and Portugal as the “rescued, undisciplined student”, in the case of the economic crisis, and Germany as the “savior” in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, is clearly decoded as accepting of the dominant-hegemonic encoding of power-holding, or primary definers. Whereas, in the cases of *Spiegel*, *Correio da Manhã* and *Diário de Notícias*, between both narratives, there seems to be negotiated decoding, in which the positive narrative is still attributed to power-holding sources, but in a negotiated decoding of the negotiated or partially critical encoding, since the counter-narrative, of Germany as the “Bad Hegemon”, attributed to sources in the opposition, or to non-primary definers, is also decoded in a negotiated manner.

Context	Representations	Media	Definers		
Economic Crisis	DE: Savior, Disciplined Model PT: Rescued, Undisciplined, Student	Bild	Bild, CDU, PS-O, SPD, FDP, Econ. PT, AfD, PSD-P		
		Spiegel	Spiegel, CDU, Opinion Maker DE, PSD-O		
		CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT, PSD – P, PSD – O, PS – P, CSU, CDU, Eurogroup, PT Diplomat		
		DN	DN, Media DE, Media USA, CDU, SPD, PT Diplomat, DE Diplomat, Cultural Sector PT/DE, Opinion Makers PT, Econ PT, Econ DE, FDP-P, PT Diplomat, Opinion Maker DE		
	DE: Dictator, Villain, Diktat, Disciplinarian PT: Dominated, Victim, Disciplined	Bild	PT Union, SPD		
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Makers DE		
		CM	CM, PT Opinion Makers, Economic Sector PT, Cultural Sector PT, PPM, BE, EC, SPD, PS-O		
		DN	DN, PT Opinion Makers, DE Opinion Makers, PT/DE Opinion Maker, GR Opinion Maker, SPD, PS-O		
		Refugee Crisis	German Good Hegemon	Bild	Bild
				Spiegel	CDU, DE Opinion Makers, Foreign Press, CSU
CM	CM/Vox Pop, PT Diplomat, PT Opinion Maker, Dutch Definer				
DN	DN, DN/Vox Pop, DE Opinion Maker, UK Definer, PT Opinion Maker				
German Bad Hegemon	Bild		/		
	Spiegel		Spiegel, Foreign Press, DE Opinion Maker		
	CM		CM, TK Definer		
	DN	DN, DE Opinion Maker, PT Opinion Makers, TK Definer, DE Economic Sector			
Portuguese unimportance	Bild	/			
	Spiegel	/			
	CM	CM, PSD			
	DN	/			

TABLE 32 – OVERALL ANALYSIS: POWER DYNAMICS – GERMANY AND PORTUGAL

Summing up each outlet's overall representation of Germany and Portugal - and underlining, once again, that the keyword-search favors hetero-representations, since we have searched for keywords related to Portugal in the German media and vice-versa – the German tabloid, *Bild*, conveys positive representations of Germany, in the context of both crises, in its own discourse. Considering the economic crisis, aside from definers from the economic sector, this representation of the “German Model” is present in the discourses of definers around the political center and in the right, in both countries, such as the German center-right in power (CDU), the German liberal right (FDP), the German far-right (AfD), and the German center-left (SPD), as well as the Portuguese center-left in the opposition (PS) and center-right in power (PSD).

Conversely, negative representations (“Bad Hegemon”) are completely absent in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, and, regarding the economic crisis, are only attributed to a definer from the Portuguese union sector, and the German center-left opposition (SPD). Which is why we consider that the hegemonic narrative is quite obvious in this outlet, and the hegemonic discourse is decoded in an accepting way by *Bild*, with the negative representation of Germany rendered to an oppositional decoding.

In the case of the German elite outlet, *Spiegel*, the positive representations of Germany are attributed to power-holding definers, namely from the center-right in both countries, as is the case with the German center-right in power (CDU), regarding both crises, the German conservative right (CSU) regarding the so-called “refugee crisis”, and the Portuguese center-right (PSD) regarding the economic crisis. This hegemonic narrative is also attributed to opinion makers, the foreign press, and the outlet itself. On the other hand, the negative narrative is also used by the outlet itself as well as by opinion makers and the foreign press. The presence of this narrative in the discourses of these definers, although not necessarily primary definers, still points to a negotiated decoding by the outlet of the narrative conveyed by the power-holding primary definers.

The same negotiation can be found in *Correio da Manhã*, the Portuguese tabloid, in which the positive narrative, regarding the so-called “refugee crisis”, is presented as shared by various definers such as the outlet through vox pop in a feature in Germany, a Portuguese diplomat, opinion maker and a Dutch definer, and, regarding the economic crisis, also by the outlet and opinion makers and diplomats, as well as by political definers from the center-

right in both countries (CDU and PSD, both in power and in the opposition), by the German conservative right (CSU) and by the Portuguese power-holding center-left (PS), and by a source from the European Union. Thus, by political definers in the center-right, and the center-left when in power, which points to it being the narrative of the primary definers.

Turning to the negative narrative, of Germany as the “Bad Hegemon”, regarding the so-called “refugee crisis”, it is used by the outlet itself and to a definer from the Turkish government, and regarding the economic crisis, which corresponds to the representation of Portugal as the “Victim”, aside from the outlet itself, it is also attributed to Portuguese opinion makers, sources from both the Portuguese cultural and economic sectors, and from the European Union, as well as political definers from the opposition, namely from the German and Portuguese center-left in the opposition (SPD and PS), as well as definers that are not in the center, namely the Portuguese left party (BE) and the monarchic right (PPM). Thus, this negative narrative is attributed to non-power-holding definers, but to a myriad of definers and in a qualitative tone that lead to the conclusion that there is a negotiated to accepting decoding of this counter-narrative, which, in turn points to a negotiated to oppositional decoding of the hegemonic narrative.

In *Diário de Notícias*, a negotiation also seems to arise. Representations of Germany as a good hegemon are present, regarding the so-called “refugee crisis” in the own outlet’s discourse, as well as in vox populi in feature stories in Germany and German and Portuguese opinion makers, a quite eclectic mixture of non-power-holding sources, whereas, in the context of the economic crisis, with the corresponding narrative of Portugal as the “Rescued Undisciplined Student”, the political definers using this narrative are from the German center (left (SPD), center-right (CDU) and liberal right (FDP)), joined by other definers such as foreign media, diplomats, sources from the cultural and economic sectors and opinion makers, corresponding to a range of primary definers, a lot of them German. This frequent recourse to German sources is a feature of *Diário de Notícias*’ coverage.

When it comes to the narrative of Germany as the bad hegemon, in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, it is shared by the outlet itself, by Portuguese and German opinion makers, a source from the German economic sector, and a Turkish government representative, i.e., several non-power-holding (in the European context) sources. While regarding the economic crisis, with Portugal represented as the “Victim”, the outlet,

Portuguese and German opinion makers, as well as a Greek academic are joined by political sources from the center-left opposition, in both countries (SPD and PS) in the use of this narrative. This points to a negotiated encoding of the representation of German power, also in *DN*.

Comparing the representations in both “crises”, we observe that there seems to be no significant difference in the representation of Germany when the context changes, i.e., negative representation regarding the economic crisis and positive regarding the refugee crisis, or vice-versa. Regarding Portugal, as we have already mentioned, its representations in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis” are quite marginal.

As is clearly visible, the discourses of non-marginal political definers to the center-right and right in both countries represent Germany as the “good hegemon”, regarding both contexts in the case of the German power-holding CDU/CSU, and only regarding the “economic crisis” in the case of the German liberal and far-right (FDP and AfD) and the Portuguese center-right (PSD).

The center-left, in both countries (PS and SPD), holds a negotiated, or partially critical, position, by having a discourse that relays both positive representations and negative representations, in the context of the economic crisis.

Regarding political definers only using negative representations, namely in the context of the economic crisis, thus performing an *othering* of Germany as purely a “bad hegemon”, we find two non-power-holding Portuguese political definers, one from the monarchic right (PPM) and one from the left (BE), the former with no parliamentary seat and the latter, having parliamentary representation, both being in the opposition.

Other types of definers are more difficult to classify given that they represent very different types of discourses and of society’s sectors. It is less relevant to categorize these discourses as often categories are too broad to draw any relevant conclusions, serving mostly to understand the overall coverage of each outlet.

The most blatant example of definers whose discourses hold all types of representations, at times as their only authors, are opinion makers, usually academics, intellectuals or journalists, mainly in opinion articles.

Aside from opinion makers, diplomats are also present in the analyzed data, and we can see from their discourses, confined to representations of Germany as the “good hegemon”, that these are aligned with that of power-holding hegemonic political definers.

Sources from the economic and cultural sectors also hold different types of definers, thus explaining the presence of different and contrasting representations.

Regarding those whose discourses represent Germany purely as a “Bad Hegemon” and Portugal as the “Victim”, in the context of the economic crisis, we find definers from the Portuguese union sector and a Greek definer, pointing to the importance of national context in this respect.

As for the so-called “refugee crisis”, external definers, namely Dutch and British ones, present Germany as the “good hegemon”, with the opposite representation being present in the discourse of Turkish definers.

5.3.1.2 THE FAR-RIGHT: SYMBOLIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC IDEAS

When it comes to discourses framed by the intersection of “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, we find representations mainly connected to what is presented as the far-right, in the case of the economic crisis, what is presented as the Eurosceptic far-right motivated by the bailouts, and, in the case of the refugee crisis the xenophobic far-right. However, unlike the representations that are solely framed by “political-economic ideas”, in this case, the “symbolic identity” frame is also present, thus serving to represent Germany and Portugal as being, or not being, shaped by the far-right, as part of their symbolic identities. In the overall coverage, in the context of the economic crisis, Germany is only portrayed as marked by the far-right, but, in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, it is both represented as being shaped by the far-right (“neo-Nazi”) and its opposition to the far-right (“anti-Nazi”). Regarding Portugal the hegemonic narrative is clearly one of absence of extremism and far-right movements, with the few portrayals of Portugal decoding this view in an accepting way. Again, the coverage of *Bild* stands out because this intersection is completely absent from their coverage.

Spiegel, in the context of the economic crisis, represents Portugal as having no significant far-right movements, and, in the context of the refugee crisis, there are representations of Germany as being marked by both “anti-Nazi” and “neo-Nazi”

movements, with the former conveyed by the foreign press, German opinion makers and representatives of the German conservative right (CSU), and the latter by the outlet itself, also by the foreign press, and by a German opinion maker.

In *Correio da Manhã*, this intersection is absent in the context of the economic crisis but is present in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, namely, also to represent Germany as being both what we have labelled “anti-Nazi”, in a feature and in the discourse of a Dutch academic, and “neo-Nazi”, in its own discourse and in that of a Turkish government definer. *CM* is also the only outlet in which Portugal is mentioned, at this intersection, in the context of migration, and that is to represent it as having “no extremism”, in the outlet’s own discourse.

In the coverage of *Diário de Notícias*, Germany is represented as being shaped by the far-right in the context of the economic crisis, in the discourses of a Portuguese diplomat and a German opinion maker, and in the outlet’s own discourse in a feature, with the particularity of the *othering* of Eastern Germany. Whereas, in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, again, both representations are present, namely of Germany as being “anti-Nazi”, in the discourses of the outlet in a feature and of a German opinion maker, and as being “neo-Nazi” in the discourse of the outlet itself, of Portuguese opinion makers, and of a Turkish government’s representative.

Context	Representations	Media	Definers
Economic Crisis	DE: Far-Right	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Spiegel
	PT: No Far-Right	CM	/
		DN	PT Diplomat, DE Opinion Maker, DN/Vox Pop
Refugee Crisis	DE: Anti-Nazi	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Foreign Press, DE Opinion Makers, CSU
		CM	CM/Vox Pop, NL Academic
		DN	DN/Vox Pop, PT Opinion Maker
	DE: Neo-Nazi	Bild	/
		Spiegel	Spiegel, Foreign Press, DE Opinion Maker
		CM	CM, TK Definer
		DN	DN, PT Opinion Makers, TK Definer
	PT: No extremism	Bild	/
		Spiegel	/
		CM	CM
		DN	/

TABLE 33 - OVERALL ANALYSIS: THE FAR-RIGHT - GERMANY AND PORTUGAL

As political definers are almost absent at this intersection, except for a definer from the German conservative right (CSU), in whose discourse Germany is represented as “Anti-Nazi”, an analysis of the definers encoding these representations is not based on political affiliation.

Considering the definers, what stands out is that, aside from opinion makers, and press reviews, and the outlet’s themselves, which are all types of definers that are not clusterable per se, is the presence of German vox populi interviewees in features in both Portuguese outlets, representing Germany as not being far-right, or of the far-right being a trait of Eastern Germany, in the case of the economic crisis. The presence of definers from the Turkish government, representing Germany as xenophobic, in both Portuguese outlets, also stands out in the analysis. Thus, we reiterate that there are no clear hegemonic discourses regarding this intersection.

5.3.2 Representations of Europe

In the overall analysis, two different natures of Europe become apparent in the narratives: one in which Europe is presented as a community that is either internally divided (including the representations “Two Europes”, “Europe of the Nation States” and “Core vs. Periphery”) or cohesive, based on an idea of commonality, of a common European imagined community (“Europeanism” and “Europeanness”), and one in which Europe itself, usually the European Union, is *othered*, as an institutional *other* (including the representations “European Power: Good” and “European Power: Bad”).

The representation of the E.U. as an institutional *other*, both regarding the economic and the refugee crises, appears when the discourse about Europe is framed solely by “Power”. Regarding the economic crisis, this power is, at times, portrayed as benevolent and, at times as damaging, while, in the context of the so-called refugee crisis, it is always represented in a negative light.

At the intersection of “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”, Europe is always portrayed as being internally divided, into two Europes, in the case of the economic crisis, and into Nation States, in the case of the so-called “refugee crisis”.

In the case of the intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” narratives about Europe are twofold in the case of the economic crisis: on one hand Europe appears as a

benevolent cohesive commonality (Europeanism), while, on the other hand, it appears as having a central core and a periphery. When the context's focus switches to the "non-European" *other*, Europe always appears as a cohesive unity, but in a negative light, that criticizes how "*we*" *other* migrants/refugees.

So, unlike the representations of Portugal and Germany, the context of the crisis in question is relevant to the representations of Europe, which was expected with the introduction of the so-called "refugee crisis" into the analysis. In this case, representations of Europe are always negative, namely presenting it as being divided amongst its Member States, with no common policy towards refugees/migrants, when Europe is seen as *them*, or as *othering* refugees and as being responsible for their plight, when it is portrayed as an *us*.

The fact that, in discourses framed by the intersection of "Power" and "Symbolic Identity", in the context of the so-called "refugee crisis", only negative portrayals of the European *us* appear, does not overshadow importance of the representations of the presented as "non-European" *others* to the implicit representation of Europeanness. The critical stance to the European *us* appears when Europe is explicitly represented, but we refer to what has been written in the corresponding chapter about the implicit representations of European commonality through the representation of the "non-European" *other*.

Frame	Context	Representations	Media	Definers
Power	Economic Crisis	European Power: Good	Bild	CDU
			Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Maker DE
			CM	PSD – P, PS - O
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT, EC	
		European Power: Bad	Bild	Bild, AfD
			Spiegel	Spiegel, Opinion Makers DE
	CM		CM, BE, PS-O, PNR, Opinion Makers PT, Union PT	
	Refugee Crisis	European Power: Bad	DN	Opinion Makers PT
			Bild	/
			Spiegel	/
			CM	/
			DN	PT Opinion Makers, UK Opinion Maker
Power + Symbolic Identity + Political-	Economic Crisis	Two Europes	Bild	/
			Spiegel	/
			CM	/
			DN	Unions: ETUC, CGTP; UGT

Economic Ideas	Refugee Crisis	Europe of the Nation States	Bild	Bild, SPD, FDP
			Spiegel	Spiegel, DE Opinion Maker
			CM	/
			DN	/
Power and Symbolic Identity	Economic Crisis	Core vs. Periphery	Bild	Bild
			Spiegel	/
			CM	Opinion makers PT, PS
			DN	DN, Econ. PT, Opinion maker PT, Opinion maker PT/DE
		Europeanism	Bild	/
			Spiegel	Opinion maker DE
			CM	PS - O
			DN	Opinion makers PT, E.U.
	Refugee Crisis	Refugee <i>Others</i>	Bild	/
			Spiegel	/
			CM	/
			DN	PT Opinion Makers

TABLE 34 – OVERALL ANALYSIS: REPRESENTATIONS OF EUROPE

In *Bild*, regarding the portrayal of Europe, or the E.U. as an institutional *other*, regarding the economic crisis, the representation of European power as positive is present in the discourse of a representative of the German center-right (CDU), and the one of it being negative in that of the outlet itself and of a representative of the German far-right (AfD). This points to a negotiated decoding of the power-holding definer’s representation, and a negotiated to accepting decoding of the negative representation.

Considering the narrative of Europe as being internally divided, in the context of the economic crisis, the representation of a core and periphery Europe is present in the outlet’s own discourse, thus decoded in an accepting way, as is the representation of a “Europe of the Nation States”, in the case of the refugee crisis, a representation that is shared by the outlet and by representatives of the German center-left (SPD) and liberal right (FDP). This is also the dominant-hegemonic portrayal in the German media (*Bild* and *Spiegel*), and a representation which is only present in the German media, which can be connected to the representation of Germany as being the “savior”, taking up more of the responsibility than other European countries.

As for the narrative of a European commonality, it is absent in the context of either crisis, in the discourse of *Bild*. Thus, *Bild* clearly portrays Europe as internally divided and tending to a negative representation of its power.

Spiegel's coverage contains a negotiated decoding of Europe as either a good or bad power-holder, in the context of the economic crisis, with both representations present in the discourses of the outlet itself and of German opinion makers. As is the case in *Bild*, here, in the context of the migration crisis, the dominant representation in the German media of a "Europe of the Nation States" is decoded in an accepting way, as it is present in the discourses also of *Spiegel* and a German opinion maker.

As for the idea of a European commonality, in the context of the economic crisis, a German opinion maker uses the representation of "Europeanism". So, we find a distinction according to the "crisis" in question: an idea of internal division in the case of the migration crisis, and one of commonality in the case of the economic crisis.

Correio da Manhã, in the case of Europe as an institutional *other*, in the context of the economic crisis, portrays E.U.'s power as "good", through the discourses of representatives of the Portuguese center-right (PSD) and center-left (PS), while representing it as "bad" in its own discourse, as well as that of representatives of the Portuguese left (BE), center-left (PS), far-right (PNR), opinion makers and union representatives. Thus, there is a negotiated to accepting decoding of this negative representation in *CM*, and a negotiated to oppositional decoding of the positive representation.

Considering the narrative of Europe as divided, the only present representation is that of a "Core vs. Periphery" Europe, in the context of the economic crisis, which is conveyed by Portuguese opinion makers and a definer from the Portuguese center-left (PS).

Finally, considering the idea of a European commonality, the only representation present, "Europeanism", is also related to the economic crisis, in the discourse of a representative from the Portuguese center-left (PS). This points to a negotiated decoding regarding the narrative of Europe as divided and cohesive, both being present in the coverage, but with a slight tendency towards accepting the narrative of a divided Europe.

Lastly, the coverage of *Diário de Notícias* stands out particularly, as it is the one in which three specific representations are exclusive to, and all representations are present, except for that of "Europe of the Nation States", which is exclusive to the German media outlets. Considering the narrative of European power as either "good", or "bad", in the context of the economic crisis, we find a negotiated to accepting decoding of the positive

narrative, present in the discourse of the outlet itself, as well as of a Portuguese opinion maker, and a source from the European Commission. Whereas the negative narrative is decoded in negotiated to oppositional way, being present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers. In the context of the migration crisis, however, the only representation, as mentioned, is a negative one, and here it is shared by Portuguese opinion makers and a British opinion maker. Thus, there is a clear difference considering the context of the “crisis” at hand.

Regarding Europe as a divided or cohesive community, in the context of the economic crisis, the representation of “two Europes” is conveyed by Portuguese and European union representatives, and the one of a “core vs. periphery” is present in the discourses of the outlet itself, as well as that of Portuguese economic definers, opinion makers and a Portuguese-German opinion maker. This seems to point to a negotiated to accepting decoding of this representation of a divided Europe, considering that idea of a European commonality, of “Europeanism”, is present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers and a definer from the E.U., point to a negotiated to oppositional decoding of this representation. In the case of the migration crisis, as mentioned, the internal divisions narrative is only present in the German outlets, and, here, the only present discourse is the one that criticizes Europe’s *othering* of refugees as “non-European”, present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers.

In the overall coverage, regarding representations of Europe, the only outlets quoting political definers are the tabloids, *Bild* and *Correio da Manhã*. In *Bild*, discourses from the German center-right (CDU), center-left (SPD), liberal right (FDP) and far-right (AfD) are present. In the Portuguese tabloid, political definers present are from the Portuguese center-right (PSD), center-left (PS), left (BE) and far-right (PNR). So, the cluster of political definers is rather symmetrical, with few exceptions, in both tabloid outlets. The definers from the center-right in both countries (CDU and PSD) are portrayed as representing European Power as “good”, in the context of the economic crisis. The definers from the Portuguese center-left definers (PS) aggregate the most varied number of representations, all in the context of the economic crisis, pointing to a negotiation: both the “core vs. periphery” and the “Europeanism” representations are present, as well as the portrayal of the E.U.’s power as “good” and as “bad”. The ones from the German center-left (SPD), as well as the German liberal right (FDP) are portrayed as representing a divided Europe, in the case of the

migration crisis (“Europe of the Nation States”). While, finally, representatives of both the German and the Portuguese far-right (AfD and PNR) as well as the Portuguese left (BE) are portrayed as representing Europe’s power in a negative light, in the context of the economic crisis.

Considering the positioning of these political definers to power positions and the mainstream, we can point to there being a partly critical encoding of Europe as good, in the context of the economic crisis, and as internally divided in the context of the migration crisis, with the center-left tending to a more partly critical discourse in both contexts, and the center-right to an accepting one in the case of the E.U. as an institutional *other*. Non-center political definers portray the institutional E.U. *other* in a negative light.

As was the case with the analysis of other, non-political definers, in the case of representations of Germany and Portugal, here, too, we cannot draw conclusions from certain types of definers due to their nature being too broad, as is the case with opinion makers. However, some observations about these definers can be made.

Firstly, the presence of definers from unions, both Portuguese and European, stands out, in the context of the economic crisis, as they convey the representation of European Power as being “bad”, and of Europe as being divided into “two Europes”.

Secondly, definers from the E.U. also convey a particular combination of representations about Europe, also in the context of the economic crisis, namely that of “Europeanism” and of the E.U.’s power as “good”, clashing with the previous representations.

5.4 Merkel: at the intersection of power, gender and national identity

In the past fifteen years, the German government has been led by chancellor Angela Merkel, who, being the leader of one of the most powerful (if not the most powerful) countries in the European Union, has played a central part in the European political space during some of its most challenging crises, namely both crises that mark the context of our research, the Eurozone economic crisis, and the so-called migrant/refugee crisis.

While analyzing the discourses which are the object of this research project, the undeniable centrality of Angela Merkel in discourses about Germany, and the consequent

relevance of the issue of gender, became apparent, and warranted a chapter dedicated to the various representations of Merkel in the Portuguese media outlets included in this study. Representations of Merkel in the German media were not included, as this was not the focus of our data collection, since the keywords used in the German media focused on Portugal, Southern Europe, and Europe, which leads to irrelevant and inconsequential results for this specific purpose. Nonetheless, the exploration of these representations in the Portuguese media, considering the relevance of the element of power in our analysis, could not be overlooked, and the erasure of Angela Merkel from our analysis, as a particular object of representations would conceal the issue of gender, which undoubtedly came up in the data.

Bearing this in mind, our analysis is influenced, partly, by Davidson-Schmich's (2011) analysis of Angela Merkel's policies, based on the paradigm of intersectionality, as developed by Hancock (2007), since "Merkel is not simply a female Chancellor, she is also an eastern, Protestant, scientifically-trained CDU Bundeskanzlerin" (Davidson-Schmich, 2011, p. 326). "Intersectionality" is a term coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), in the field of critical legal studies, as a proposal for addressing issues of exclusion, namely in US antidiscrimination laws, that marginalize the intersectional experiences, of racism and sexism, of black women. The origin of the term and the way in which it allowed for the understanding of multiple forms of oppression should be emphasized, namely as: "Rooted in Black feminism and Critical Race Theory, intersectionality is a method and a disposition, a heuristic and analytic tool" (Carbado, et al., 2013, p. 303).

The impact of intersectionality in terms of studying discourses of marginalization and resistance cannot be ignored and we have to acknowledge the perils of deviating from "intersectionality's grounding as a counterhegemonic and transformative intervention in knowledge production, activism, pedagogy, and non-oppressive coalitions" (Carbado, et al., 2013, p. 308). This is observed, by the authors, to have happened in the European context, where efforts have been made by "some European feminists to distance intersectionality from its association with race in the United States" (p. 308). In this mapping of intersectional theory's movements, the authors note how "[Sirma] Bilge explores the discourse around intersectionality that has emerged in several European conferences and texts to highlight argumentative rhetorics that she maintains have neutralized the political potential of intersectionality" (p. 308). Nevertheless, as the authors point out, "[u]nderstanding

intersectionality as a work-in-progress suggests that it makes little sense to frame the concept as a contained entity” (p. 304)

This, paradigm, as used by Davidson-Schmich (2011), regarding Angela Merkel, who cannot obviously necessarily be described as a marginalized or oppressed subject, is based on Hancock’s (2007) proposed approach to it, as a paradigm of empirical research. In this light, the “term “intersectionality” refers to both a normative theoretical argument and an approach to conducting empirical research that emphasizes the interaction of categories of difference (including but not limited to race, gender, class, and sexual orientation)” (pp. 63-64). As the author points out:

In recognizing both aspects of “intractable political problems”, intersectionality bridges part of the theoretical gap between critical theory, which often faces the dilemma of overemphasis on structural explanations, and liberalism’s privileging of the atomized individual. Intersectionality plays a mediating role between the yin of conspiracy-theory levels of structural research and the yang of pathologizing individual-level microanalyses (Hancock, 2007, p. 74).

Through this approach, one is able to identify “the hegemonic (ideas, cultures, and ideologies), structural (social institutions), disciplinary (bureaucratic hierarchies and administrative practices), and interpersonal (routinized interactions among individuals) playing fields upon which race, gender, class, and other categories or traditions of difference interact to produce society” (Hancock, 2007, p. 74).

This perspective is, in fact, in line with the way in which Stuart Hall understands the concept of identity, as a non-essentialist, “but a strategic and positional one” (Hall, 1996a, p. 3), in which certain resources (such as history, language and culture) are used, “in the process of becoming rather than being” (p. 3). In our research, we, too, have found frames that point to the suitability of the lens of intersectionality to understand the representation of Angela Merkel, around categories such as gender, power and national origin, having in mind that “intersectionality posits an interactive, mutually constitutive relationship among these categories” (Hancock, 2007, p. 67).

Gender, as a performance, is prompted by more or less evident, more or less coercive, social obligatory norms “to be one gender or the other (usually within a strictly binary frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power” (Butler, 2009, p. i). When it comes to exercising political power, these social norms trace, in the Western European context, clear distinctions about the expectations that fall upon the dividing axis of the gender binary. Literature about executive power exercised by women is highly contradictory, illustrating the inadequacy of essentialist approaches on the subject (Davidson-Schmich, 2011). However, approaching the category of “gender” allows us to identify media representations that can act as coercive mechanisms of the patriarchal structure:

These mechanisms will range widely in the consequences they visit on women, from life-threatening violence to subtle social signals of disapproval (e.g., when people are unconsciously slightly “taken aback” when women are as interpersonally direct or unapologetic as their male counterparts) (Manne, 2018, p. 47).

In the European context, more specifically, Germany, as Northern Europe, and Portugal, as Southern Europe, power dynamics further complexify these media representations of Merkel, not only as a leader who is a woman, but as a head of State of a particularly powerful country. This has expectable consequences regarding Portuguese media representations of the figure of Merkel, that will bring to the surface entanglements between gender and power narratives, with an interesting potential for allowing us to think about the enormous complexity of “politics of domination” (hooks, 2015, p. 44). The “focus on patriarchal domination” (hooks, 2015, p. 45) allows us to examine the placement of the woman in a position of weakness and inferiority, but the dynamics of domination are complexified when women are also holders of power, and possible dominators:

Clearly, differentiation between strong and weak, powerful and powerless, has been a central defining aspect of gender globally, carrying with it the assumption that men should have greater authority than women, and should rule over them. As significant and important as this fact is, it should not obscure the reality that women can and do

participate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims—that we dominate, that we are dominated (hooks, 2015, p. 45).

As an “imagined community” (Anderson, 2016; Hall, 1996b) and “the principal source[s] of cultural identity” (Hall, 1996b, p. 611), national origin, also from a non-essentialist perspective, is one of the sections interacting in the media representations of Angela Merkel, mainly from the Portuguese, i.e., external, gaze. Thus, being “German” has certain connotations, from history (including references to the eternal Nazi ghost), to religion (and the myth of the protestant work ethic unleashed by Weber (1930/2005), which influence these representations. But this idea of “Germanness” is also complexified, since Merkel grew up in a context that is *othered* within Germany, the GDR, in a protestant family. Using the intersectional paradigm, it is possible to place ourselves “ontologically between reductionist research that blindly seeks only the generalizable and particularized research so specialized that it cannot contribute to theory” (Hancock, p. 2007, p. 74).

5.4.1 Gender: The Personal is Public

The famous slogan of “the personal is political” originated in a specific response to the ridicule that second-wave feminists encountered in the context of their early attempt at organizing around gender discrimination” (Zerilli, 2016, p. 633), shed light on how the distinction between public and private “presupposes structural forms of injustice that render oppression invisible by concealing it in highly individualized conceptions of gender roles” (p. 633). In this context, we borrow the underlying idea of this slogan to explore how, when a woman is in the political arena, her personal life becomes public, in a specific, gender-laden, way.

Regarding the representations framed by gender issues, the focus is on Merkel’s private life. In this frame, the following narratives were identified: “Family and Home”, focused on marriage, divorce, and intimacy, “Looks and Style”, focused on Merkel’s sartorial choices, and “Lifestyle”, on her living habits. Through these references, Merkel is portrayed as someone who performs the female gender in a dissonant or even defiant way to the image of the “traditional woman”: divorced, badly dressed, a nudist – a non-palatable performance according to conservative social norms, reinforcing social norms that restrict gender performance (Butler, 2004).

Narratives about “Family and Home”, present in both outlets, in their own discourses, include, for instance, the reference, in *Correio da Manhã*, to Merkel’s partner “Joachim Sauer, divorced and father of two boys, with whom Germany’s ‘iron lady’ maintains a “cordial” relationship””, the fact that she is divorced and that she doesn’t have any children (CM, 2013). In *Diário de Notícias*, her divorce and childlessness are, again, present, including the detail that she “kept her ex-husbands name to this day”, as well as her statement that “she likes to cook for him [her partner] every chance she gets” (Viegas P. , 2013f).

5.4.1.1 FEMININE POWER

At the intersection between the gender and power frames are the narratives in which issues of gender frame the exercise and/or holding of power by Merkel, with various connotations, both legitimizing and delegitimizing, of this gendered power. Thus, Merkel is “Europe’s (most) powerful woman”, mommy (*Mutti*), a cold “iron lady” or a girl (*Mädchen*).

In the first case, in both news outlets she is described as the “most powerful woman in the world”, in *Correio da Manhã*’s own discourse (CM, 2013), and in *Diário de Notícias*, in an opinion piece by a Portuguese academic, who also names her as the “woman who rules Europe” (Lima, 2013). In the case of opinion pieces in *Correio da Manhã*, the representations are more expressive. In one opinion piece by a Portuguese journalist, she is given the aura of a female savior religious figure: “If the country is not able to get out of the quagmire into which it fell, it will not be Our Lady of Berlin who comes to help us” (Pereira, 2013). And, in another opinion article, also by a journalist, two traditional gender-based characters are evoked, to describe how contradictorily Merkel is portrayed, stating that “[in] the days of the PS governments, she was José Sócrates’ fairy godmother” whereas in other times there were “campaigns to show her as an ugly witch of austerity” (Vaz, 2013).

These narratives that gender the exercise of power are, in two cases, representative of two contrasting views on power based on a feminine gender performance: the caring mother-woman, and the cold, iron-woman.

When it comes to the narrative of Merkel as an “Iron Lady”, it is also present in both outlets, in *Correio da Manhã*, in the own outlet’s discourse, with *CM* referring to Merkel as “Germany’s “Steel Lady”” (CM, 2013), as well as that of a journalist, in an opinion article, similarly calling her “Berlin’s iron lady” (Pereira, 2013). In *Diário de Notícias*, an academic

in an op-ed expresses an analogous idea in the following manner: “Merkel is as cold as to her idol [Helmut Kohl] as she is pragmatic with the consequences” (Lima, 2013), referring to the CDU’s financing scandal and subsequent electoral defeat against Gerhard Schroeder, in 1998.

Regarding Merkel as a caring mother, in *Correio da Manhã*, in an article actually titled *The great German mother*, the outlet states that “Germans now call her ‘Mutti’ [sic] – mother” (CM, 2013). In an opinion article by a Portuguese opinion maker, the tone is quite different, as the woman who, in one instance, is presented as being warmly called “Mutti” by her people, is ironically referred to as an educator for people in Southern Europe: “should Southern Europe do its homework without assistance from ‘mutti’ Merkel?” (Coutinho, 2013). In *Diário de Notícias*, a similar idea regarding Merkel’s portrayal by Germans is present, while reporting about the electoral night, when the “chancellor’s supporters celebrated “Mutti”’s – “mommy” – victory” (Tecedeiro & M., 2013).

But, when she appears as a *Mädchen* (girl), there seems to be a delegitimization of the exercise of power, since these narratives represent Merkel as an inexperienced girl, protected by Kohl, a hard-working, a good student and diligent, but never causing waves, even somewhat subservient. In an article in *Correio da Manhã*, she is described as “the minister, whom Helmut Kohl, in the 90s, referred to as “my girl””, and biographers are said to “portray Angela Merkel as a diligent student, always the best in class, but who was not competitive” (CM, 2013). Whereas *Diário de Notícias* makes similar references, with the outlet recalling how Kohl, “given her youth, referred to her as “my girl” (Viegas P. , 2013f), and an academic, in an opinion piece, calling her the “girl who became chancellor” and also pointing to her youth: “An ace at Mathematics and not very social during her youth” (Lima, 2013).

Reflecting the imbalances of power at the European level, the narratives in which Merkel appears as *Mutti* (mommy), as having adhered to “relevant social roles – as, for example, loving wives, devoted moms, “cool” girlfriends, loyal secretaries, or good waitresses, to name just a few of the most obvious examples” (Manne, 2019, p. 47), refer to her representation within the German context, regarding her fellow citizens. From the Portuguese gaze, the connotations of being a cold or ruthless woman, a “powerful woman” or “iron lady” demonstrate the interactions between the use of these patriarchal mechanisms as a way to react to the exercise of political-economic power within the European space.

5.4.1.2 POWER: QUEEN OF EUROPE OR MERKIEVEL

Regarding the frame focused on power that is not necessarily, or, rather, not obviously, gendered, we found the narrative of “Merkievel” (Beck, 2014), as the bad powerful leader in Europe, in contrast with the “Queen of Europe” narrative, in which she is represented as the savior, or someone who is carrying the continent on her back. Here, too, the two views of the figure of Angela Merkel are revealed: the cold calculating leader and the diligent caretaker.

In the first case, there are several instances, in both outlets, where this representation is visible. In *Correio da Manhã*, for instance, it is present in the discourses of Portuguese journalists in op-eds, calling her “a cold and ruthless stateswoman” (Rodrigues, 2017), or, more aggressively, indirectly calling for her infection with the E.Coli bacteria: “The trip is cheap and patriotic. Take the plane to Madrid, buy some beautiful Spanish cucumbers, hide them in your suitcase and quickly leave for Berlin. When you arrive in the capital of Germany, try everything to see Mrs. Merkel and offer her the cucumbers. With luck it saves Portugal from certain bankruptcy” (Ferreira, 2011). The idea of her hegemonic power over Europe is also implied in a comment by a representative of the Portuguese leftist party Bloco de Esquerda, cited in CM: “BE's European head candidate wondered how Paulo Rangel managed to say, "without laughing," that PSD and CDS have put their foot down regarding Angela Merkel about the banking union, underlining an "extreme subservience" of the Government” (CM, 2014).

In *Diário de Notícias*, it is present in the outlet’s own discourse, claiming that “in Southern countries, the chancellor is not very popular” (Tecedeiro & M., 2013), or presenting her as a self-interested leader: “German Chancellor Angela Merkel, more than ever seen as the European Union's boss, has never shown great enthusiasm in a Parliament and a Commission capable of asserting themselves at the expense of States” (T. & AFP, 2014). But this narrative is especially present in the discourses of opinion makers, in opinion articles, in *DN*, as is the case with an academic who describes Merkel as “someone who the overwhelming majority of Europeans consider to be inhumane and responsible for the protection of Germany’s financial interests in detriment of the people of other countries” (Almeida, 2015), or pieces noting her ambitious and calculating nature (Lima, 2013). The topics surrounding this representation are not limited to the economic or Eurozone crisis, but

also encompass the so-called refugee crisis, with a Portuguese academic, in an opinion piece, questioning Merkel's motives behind her refugee policy: "why wouldn't Merkel take this opportunity for the entrance of a cheap, almost slave labor, who can certainly work at minimal prices in the German economy? Solidarity? I do not think so" (Almeida, 2015).

These are also the topics present in her positive portrayal, denoting the ambivalence or even polarizing nature of her representations. In the case of the narrative of Merkel as the "Queen of Europe", in *Correio da Manhã*, we find discourses in which Merkel's handling of the Economic crisis is praised, as is the case of a Portuguese journalist, who claims, in an opinion article, that the "German chancellor saved the Euro, and, thus, the European project" (Rodrigues, 2017). We also find discourses of those who challenge Merkel's critics, as, for example, a Portuguese diplomat, who, regarding the German elections results in 2013 writes that "[p]erhaps this is not the result desired by those for whom Merkel (why this insistence on calling her "Mrs. Merkel"?) has become a symbol of European selfishness. There is some injustice in this image of the German Chancellor" (Falcão-Machado, 2013).

Aside from Portuguese opinion makers and the quoted diplomat, in *CM*, this representation is also shared by a political representative from the Portuguese center-right, PSD, who claims that: "Mrs. Merkel was not one of the laborers of European architecture, but she was certainly, after Maastricht, the leader in Europe who has most persistently contributed to the reform of the institutions and to complete what remains to be done" (Lusa, 2017). Regarding the so-called "refugee crisis", Merkel also emerges as the "Queen of Europe" in the words of a Portuguese journalist: "After 11 years in power, the fourth term is a prize for a risky gamble: opening the door to refugees from the war in Syria, setting an example for the whole of Europe" (Ganhão, 2017).

5.4.1.3 GERMAN POWER

From the intersecting frame of power and the representation of German identity, the narrative focused on Germany's dominance in the European context is present, in which a critical position to this exercise of power is assumed, sustained by identity representations, references to Germany's Nazi past and to its current hegemonic position.

Regarding references to this past, *Correio da Manhã* makes the following comparison: "German leaders seem to have a natural inclination towards hiding their true family origins.

Before the most powerful woman in the world did so, Adolf Hitler also omitted his Austrian origin...” (CM, 2013). Whereas, in *Diário de Notícias*, we find, in an article about the many paradoxes regarding how Merkel and Germany are regarded, the following reference: “there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave the world in the last century” (Lima, 2013).

Specially following the Eurozone crisis, and its social-economic consequences:

[The] resentment and sense of crisis has resulted in a Gothic narrative of the resuscitation of the monstrous Third Reich in popular European discourse (...) Much European resentment, particularly in the Greek, Spanish, Italian, British and French press (...) has been focused on the figure of German chancellor Angela Merkel herself (MacMillan, 2014, p. 31).

The narrative of a “European Hegemony”, explored thoroughly regarding representations of Germany in its respective data analysis, is also present regarding representations of Angela Merkel, namely in two opinion pieces by a Portuguese academic, one in 2013 and one in 2017, in *Diário de Notícias*. Referring to “Merkel’s German leadership”, in the same opinion article in which the “Nazi ghost” narrative is present, this opinion maker writes about how “it is not realistic to think that it is not in this Europe that Merkel decides and in this Germany that she seeks to be elected”, and that “Germans like leadership, trust in their model and many admire the way in which she exercises power” (Lima, 2013). In 2017, a similar idea is conveyed: “The German question, reopened in this election, is, thus, twofold: the future of the euro (and the European Union) requires a German leadership that is culturally reluctant and Merkel's electoral campaign only apparently brings stability. Germany remains overwhelmed by its paradoxes” (Lima, 2017).

5.4.1.4 GERMANNESS

In this frame, Merkel is presented as being German, a European *other* to the Portuguese media, represented through the protestant religious heritage and a set of identity traits, such as frugality, pragmatism and stability, but also coldness, arrogance and monotony, which are, ambiguously, traces that are connotated with a certain superiority, but also a false sense

of superiority. However, Merkel, in addition to being a woman, also represents an added identity mark as an internal other in the German context, having been brought up in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Regarding the narrative on “Germanness”, in *Correio da Manhã* we can find, for example, a reference to Merkel’s alleged “rigor, pragmatism and frugality, quite in the German spirit” (CM, 2013), or, in the words of a journalist in an opinion piece, regarding the already mentioned E.Coli outbreak, an ironical take on German government’s handling of that outbreak: “Angela Merkel found, terrified, an invasion by legions of E.coli - a bacterium with a horror of soap and disinfectant. It could only be something that came from the barbarians of the South. The German gut, used to sausages, pork and sauerkraut cabbage, is a little bottle of rose water” (Catarino, 2011).

In *Diário de Notícias*, an allusion to these ideas about “Germanness” can also be found, within an already quoted opinion article by an academic, in which Merkel is described as having “a very particular style, without exuberance of states of mind, in a growing, self-confident and changing Germany” (Lima, 2013). When it comes to Merkel’s protestantism, it is also present in discourses in both outlets, namely references to her pastor parents (CM, 2013; Tecedeiro & M., 2013; Viegas, 2013).

Also referring to her origins are the discourses about the fact that she grew up in the GDR. In an article in *Correio da Manhã* we can find a discourse about these complex dynamics of belonging and *otherness* regarding Eastern Germany. In it, *Correio da Manhã* recalls her family as having moved to “communist Eastern Germany”, where they, however, were “never like Eastern ones”, because they “received correspondence and packages from the West side”, but at the same time evokes that Merkel’s father “could have had a short relationship with the Stasi (the former GDR’s secret services)”, and that her SPD opponent (Steinbrück) “blamed Angela for “not being passionate about Europe because she grew up in the GDR”” (CM, 2013). In *Diário de Notícias*, this narrative includes references to Merkel being “the first head of government from the East” (Lima, 2013), and “that thanks to having lived with the communist regime, she knows how to speak Russian well” (Viegas P. , 2013f).

5.4.2 Merkel in the Portuguese Media

After undergoing the above qualitative analysis of the investigated discourses, we will now explore how they are distributed in terms of outlets, definers and timeframes, in order to understand if and which elements are relevant in shaping these different, and, even, at times, contradictory discourses about Angela Merkel.

The “Gender” frame, i.e., the narratives concerning her personal and family lives and personal style, appears in the discourses of both the news outlets, in one article in each case, both published in 2013, in the context of the German legislative elections. All narratives are present in both outlets, except for the “Lifestyle” narrative, which is only present in the CM article.

The intersection of “Gender” and “Power” also appears only in 2013, but, in this case, aside from the outlets in their own discourses, it is also present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers in both outlets. With no particular distribution or relevance regarding the corresponding narratives.

The most varied frame is the “Power” frame. In *Correio da Manhã*, the “Queen of Europe” representation is more present than the “Merkievel” one, with the former present in the discourses of Portuguese opinion makers, a diplomat and a representative of the Portuguese center-right party PSD, and the latter present in the discourse also of Portuguese opinion makers and of a representative of the left party Bloco de Esquerda.

In *Diário de Notícias*, on the other hand, the “Merkievel” narrative is used both by the outlet itself, as well as by Portuguese opinion makers, while the “Queen of Europe” one is also present in the discourse of a French opinion maker, as well as the other two definers. Regarding the timeframes, an interesting finding is that the “Merkievel” narrative, i.e., the negative portrayal of Merkel, is present in all timeframes: 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017, whereas the positive representation of her as “Queen of Europe” is only present around the German elections of 2013 and 2017.

The intersection of “Power” and “Symbolic Identity” is more present in *Diário de Notícias* than in *Correio da Manhã*. In the latter, it is only present through the “Nazi ghost” narrative, in its own discourse, while in the former, this narrative is present in the discourse of an opinion maker, and the narrative of Germany as the “European Hegemon” also exists,

namely in the discourse of opinion makers. Regarding the timeframes, it is present in those corresponding to German elections (2013 and 2017).

The “Symbolic Identity” frame is also present in both outlets, also in their own discourses as well as opinion makers’. *Correio da Manhã* used all narratives of “Germanness”, “Protestantism” and “GDR” in its own discourse, and opinion makers in it use the first two. Regarding *Diário de Notícias*, the outlet itself uses the last two narratives, and opinion makers in it use both the “Germanness” and the “GDR” narratives. Most of the articles in question are from 2013, with the exception of the one which refers to the E.Coli outbreak, which is from 2011.

Frame	Representation	Media	Definers	Timeframes
Gender	Family and Home	CM	CM	2013
		DN	DN	2013
	Lifestyle	CM	CM	2013
	Looks and Style	CM	CM	2013
		DN	DN	2013
Gender + Power	Powerful Woman	CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT	2013
		DN	Opinion Maker PT	2013
	Iron Lady	CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT	2013
		DN	Opinion Maker PT	2013
	Mutti	CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT	2013
		DN	DN	2013
	Mädchen	CM	CM	2013
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker	2013
Power	Merkievel	CM	Opinion Maker PT, BE	2011, 2014, 2017
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT	2013, 2014, 2015, 2017
	Queen of Europe	CM	Opinion Maker PT, Diplomat PT, PSD	2013, 2017
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT, Opinion Maker FR	2013, 2017
	Power + Symbolic Identity	Nazi Ghost	CM	CM
DN			Opinion Maker PT	2013
European Hegemon		DN	Opinion Maker PT	2013, 2017
Symbolic Identity	Germanness	CM	CM, Opinion Makers PT	2011, 2013
		DN	Opinion Maker PT	2013
	Protestantism	CM	CM, Opinion Maker PT	2013
		DN	DN	2013
	GDR	CM	CM	2013
		DN	DN, Opinion Maker PT	2013

TABLE 35 – MERKEL: AT THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER, POWER AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

So, it seems that the news outlet’s social personality does not seem to play a role in defining the types of representations of Angela Merkel, when it comes to Gender and Power.

Regarding the definers, opinion makers, namely journalists (in *CM*) and academics (in *DN*) seem to have been the most relevant types of definers regarding this topic, which translates to the importance of opinion articles in this context, as well. Regarding the timeframes, the vast majority of the discourses grouped in this chapter appear in 2013, in the context of the German legislative elections, whereas almost only those framed solely by Power appear in other timeframes as well, with a few exceptions.

5.5 Media, *othering* and the possibility of *de-othered* representations

Our empirical analysis allows us to ascertain that media discourses tend, to a large part, to (re)produce essentialist representations of *others*, following and *us* and *them* dynamic, that is strongly shaped by power. We were also able to conclude that discourses about national and European imagined communities, and the different meanings (Hall, 2016, p. 147) ascribed to these communities, are deeply rooted in, and marked by the hegemonic vision of economic development in advanced capitalism (Braidotti, 2017). This vision, and the centrality of power, are the basis for the confirmation of a hegemonic discourse about a German Europe (Beck, 2014), which is, to the most part, unquestioned, even in discourses that are a reaction to this power.

The analyzed discourses are, then, shaped by a dynamic framed by power and/or symbolic identity, based on processes of *othering*, and are deeply marked by “moral panics” (Hall et al, 1978), which, through fear, either of a defaulting lazy South, or a dictatorial North, of the arrival non-European *other*, and their “integration”, can lay the foundations of support for social control and coercion, whether financial and budgetary or at the level of external defense. In the analyzed contexts, culture is mainly reduced to national/European culture, that is, culture based on imagined communities, diluting the relevance of the various other levels at which culture operates, such as class, gender, ethnicity and race (Frow & Morris, 2006; Hall, 2016).

This is, however, not always the case, as issues of class gain relevance within the frame of political-economic ideas, and the symbolical referent of religion, are visible in relation to representations of those presented as “non-European” *others*, and gender issues inevitably shape discourses about Angela Merkel, since, as we have stated in our theoretical basis:

Culture is not, and can never be, outside of the structuring field of the central contradictions that give shape, pattern, and configuration to a social formation, that is, contradictions around class, ethnicity, and gender. It is not outside of them, but it is not reducible to them (Hall, 2016, p. 180).

The identified hegemonic view, that of essentialist imagined communities, whose value, or even right to belong, is based on a particular political-economic worldview, is breached, in some rare instances, by the possibility of struggle. What this points to is that the possibility for struggle and resistance regarding the dominant power-related ideology about *us* and *them*, and the corresponding “common sense” (Hall, 2016, p. 178), when the focus is moved away from the reproduction of, or simple reaction to, these power relations, and other points of view are adopted. This is the case when the focus shifts to representations of political-economic ideas as such, as projects or ideas that can be questioned in themselves and that are transnational and mutable, but the real possibility for a breach in the dominant perspectives comes from the search for a complexification and a nuanced approach to the *other*. In this respect, the element of the social personalities of media outlets becomes quite clear. As we have seen in the exploration of the theoretical basis of this research, ideology is never a unified coherent single whole, it is interdiscursive, composed of contradictory “discursive currents” with “points of juncture and break” (Hall, 2016, p. 167).

Our data allows us to conclude that news outlets’ social personalities are quite relevant in this respect, namely considering that, when faced with representations of these national communities, in an *us* and *them* manner, tabloids tend to convey a more essentialist coverage, that is more negative regarding *them* and positive regarding *us*, while elite outlets present a more complex, multifaceted and less essentialist coverage.

Thus, there seems to be a higher possibility for bridging the *us* and *them* divide, in feature stories, where the journalist has direct contact with non-hegemonic definers. When this happens, the dominant-hegemonic ideological representation of the German model is questioned and complexified in its roots, not accepted as the only type of “respectable life” (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 141), nor reacted to through a “Gothic narrative” (Macmillan, 2014).

This idea that on site feature stories open up the possibility for counter-hegemonic discourses, nevertheless, does not necessarily eliminate the ideological framework behind the “journalistic common sense” theorized in Hall, et al.’s (1978) model of the dimensions of feature news values. As the authors point out, the “move to feature”, the “[a]ssessment of events as having a background not covered by hard news story”, with the ideological function of placing “the events and the actors on a 'map' of society”, could in the general coverage by the media outlet, end up playing the part of “[r]eintegration of feature into paper's dominant discourse”, in which the media make “the event and its implications ‘manageable’, i.e. not destructive of, or demanding changes in, basic structure society” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 99).

Nevertheless, we would argue that the potential remains, and is reminiscent of Braidotti’s concepts of politics of location and nomadism:

To become political, you have to take distance from your habits, you have to take a walk. Leave behind familiar notions. Take critical distance from what you know best, because what we know best is *Kinder, Küche, Kirche* – it’s land, it’s family, country – this is the home. And home is a very dangerous place. Homes are places that we have to leave behind (Braidotti & Butler, 2016).

Lastly, our data also pointed to the relevance of the issue of gender, in the dynamics of discourses shaped by power relations, and the reaction to these relations. As late capitalism’s hegemonic view on worthiness and success informs the representation of who is worthy and powerful, reactions to this power, mostly not questioning the underlying hegemonic ideology, at times resort to gender referents as a way of legitimizing and delegitimizing Germany’s power within Europe.

Circling back to our research question, and our model, some global observations about hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses regarding representations of Germany, Portugal and Europe can be made.

Concerning the representatives of the *two Europes*, North and South, Germany and Portugal, the dominant-hegemonic discourse is that of Germany as a model and a savior, and

of Portugal as a rather powerless rescued, (un)disciplined student, or simply irrelevant and powerless. Within this context, the idea of “development” is often based on or producing a connection between time and space, underlined by ideas such as modernization, evolution, with a discourse in which “the ‘delay’ of the European South in relation to Europe’s modern, northern states” (Segnini, 2016, p. 4), or the idea of “Orientalism within Europe” (Dainotto, 2007). This parallels the study by Mylonas, mentioned in our literature review, which showed that discourses about Greece in the context of this crisis reproduce “neoliberal social values” (2012, p. 667). These ideas about a North and a South, and Europe’s internal *others*, mirrors transversal internal national discourses about economical imbalance and class, at times intersected with race, namely myths and stereotypes such as that of the welfare queen (Masters, Lindhorst & Meyers, 2014) – echoing in numerous representations of “internal *others*” - which inevitably come to mind, even if they are outside of the scope of our research.

Our findings support our theoretical basis regarding the essentialist discursive construction of an idea of a European North and South (leaving aside, for the purpose of this study, the contraposition between Eastern and Western Europe) along the axis of a progressive protestant developed/advanced Northern Europe and a conservative catholic archaic Southern Europe (Lourenço, 1988; Beck, 2014; Weber, 1930/2005; Dainotto, 2007). The capitalist hegemonic ideology, based on these ideas of “development” and “work ethic”.

In a context in which economic and financial success is the measure of the success and validity of a society, discourses about *us* and *them* transform communities into valid or invalid, worthy, or not of respect, through the economic indicators they present, which are often simply attributed to questions of "backwardness" and "development" that is, states of evolution. The empirical analysis carried out in this study allowed us to identify this hegemonic vision, both in Portugal and in Germany, which places labor and the consequent accumulation of capital as the central axis of valorization of a society, dividing Europe into trustworthy creditors and untrustworthy debtors.

This perspective on economic worthiness and success justifies the centrality of Germany, visible both in the context of the economic crisis, in which Germany is represented as the (economic) model of success (narrative of the “German Model”), even when the way in which its power is exercised is criticized (narrative of the “Bad Hegemon”), as well as in the context of the so-called migration or refugee crisis, in which Germany is represented as

both a benevolent leader (“German savior” narrative) or as an unwelcoming hegemon, marked by the far-right (narrative of the bad hegemon).

The essentialist view of identity based on this idea of development, which is especially strong when the category of “Symbolic Identity” is present, supports the observations made in *Policing the Crisis...* (Hall et al., 1978), regarding discourses about class division, which, we propose, can be extrapolated to processes of national or regional *othering*, in Europe, as is the case with North/South divisions:

It is work, above all, which is the guarantee of respectability; for work is the means – the only means – to the respectable life. The idea of the “respectable working classes” is irretrievably associated with loss of occupation and with poverty. Poverty is the trap which marks the slide away from respectability back into the “lower depths”. The distinction between the “respectable” and the “rough” working class, though in no sense an accurate sociological or historical one, remains an extremely important moral distinction (Hall, et al., 1978, p. 141).

The same centrality of power dynamics which places Germany at center stage, relegates Portugal to a position of apparent powerlessness or even irrelevance, at times. This serves to present it as aspiring to become “more German” (economically), or a victim of its economic policies, always, to an extent, passive or secondary. This discourse becomes even more evident in the context of the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”, in the context of which representations of Portugal are almost absent, or based on its total lack of responsibility, as if it were not a “Portuguese issue” at all.

Regarding representations of Europe, aside from having to distinguish representations of an institutional Europe from representations of Europe as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983/2016), they are more negotiated in general, making it less clear what the hegemonic discourse about it is, and pointing to the existence of a struggle, even if with a tendency to an overall negative portrayal. Differently to what transpires in representations of Germany and Portugal, when it comes to representations of Europe, the context of the crisis at hand is a relevant element in shaping narratives, since these

representations become solely negative in the context of the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”. In the context of the economic crisis, discourses are divided between an idea of European commonness and a divided Europe.

Ideas about Europe, and European identity are also marked by a commonality that is implicit in the portrayal of the “non-European” *other*, namely the migrant/refugee, and, often, the “Muslim” *other*. So, implicitly, through representations of the “non-European” *other*, we can also identify representations of Europe itself.

Even though there are different discourses about migrants and refugees in the analyzed media, the *othering* process, i.e., the representation of migrants and Muslim people as “non-European” *others*, is hegemonic. There are only two instances in which the migrant or refugee is not talked about but talked to, as a definer in the media articles. This paradox of an idea of Europe as internally diverse, but with clear barriers to this diversity, based on a certain European symbolic sameness, becomes evident in these discourses.

Regarding the relevance of the political-economic ideas, aside from those connected to austerity and liberalism, the hegemonic discourse is based on the idea that the far-right is intrinsically non-European or anti-European, a diametrically positioned *other*, that has to be eliminated because it logically does not belong, differently to what happens, at times, in relation to Germany. Regarding Europe as a whole, the presence of the far-right is seen as an outlier, a “shock”, a logical glitch in the system of Europeanism. This contrasts with the, at times, critical stances taken in relation to the *othering* of “non-Europeans” as part of the lack of appropriate policies, which, nonetheless, is a discourse that does not see far-right ideas as part of *us*. Europe is framed as having a set of common values, and movements and ideas that go against these values, such as the far-right, are seen as a “shock”, an “abnormality”, as if they are intrinsically not possible in Europe.

Far-right supporters are Eastern Europe, ill-informed people, fearmongers – not “real Europeans”. Even when there is a criticism of xenophobia or islamophobia, it is under the assumption that these are un-European, based on the “European ideology of colorblindness” (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 177). A small breach in this commonsensical approach appears in the op-ed by a German journalist, when it is explicitly said that this consensus “has lost more

and more of its naturalness in recent years” (Diez, 2017), but, again, this is a shock, and the idea of consensus is the starting point.

Hence, as the collected data point out, there is not only a construction of the idea of Europe in which migrants or refugees are the *other*, even when talking about their “integration”, but also of an idea of Europe that is intrinsically incompatible with far-right or xenophobic ideas and movements. Being European, thus, is narrated as being not a Muslim, not a refugee, and not xenophobic.

Quite interesting in this respect was the coverage *Diário de Notícias* gave to sources from the German AfD, particularly regarding its labelling as a far-right party (Viegas P. , 2013; Viegas P. , 2017; Tadeu, 2017). This particular aspect - representations of political ideologies and parties - as explained, is not contemplated in our research design, but, nevertheless, it evoked some curiosity, for possible future scientific studies, as an interesting perspective from which to explore hegemonic ideologies in the mainstream media, as our results also indicate, could be to explore how different political-economic ideas are represented.

What the data has also shown us is that the centrality of the individual figure of Angela Merkel in the context of this research is undeniable, as both crises coincided with her terms in office as chancellor, often leading to a personalization, which contrasts with, or is aligned with, discourses about the German imagined community. Analyzed discourses in the Portuguese media, about Angela Merkel, are informed by gender narratives, based on binary performances (Butler, 2004) of the role of women (Manne, 2018), by narratives of power, in the context of European power dynamics, in which Merkel represents the powerful Germany vis-à-vis an idea of a powerless Portugal (Beck, 2014), and narratives about German culture itself, based on ideas about history and cultural and national identity. These three frames interact discursively in the construction of media narratives about Merkel.

When the “Power” frame is present, in the context of a German Europe (Beck, 2014), Portuguese media, at times, resort to intersectional identity representations, focused on gender and national origin, to legitimize and/or delegitimize Angela Merkel’s exercise of power. In the analyzed data, in the frame focused on power, Merkel is represented as the oppressive Merkievel or the worthy Queen, leader of the most powerful government in

Europe. In gendered representations of power, we can observe both legitimizing views, as well as others marked by expectations of a certain gender performance associated with power, which could be understood as a form of delegitimization through a gendered *othering*. This delegitimization becomes more evident when Merkel is represented as a “girl”, contrasting with a legitimate view of a charismatic political leader. However, when the discourse is framed exclusively by gender issues, specifically in the intimate sphere, Merkel is represented as deviating from a certain standard of femininity. Regarding the frame of national origin, Merkel appears, once again, as doubly *othered*: disciplined and rigorous when formed by German protestant “culture”, but also the internal *other*, as “Eastern”.

The contrasting and, at times, ambivalent representations of Angela Merkel in the Portuguese media speak volumes about the dynamics of domination and power, and their internal contradictions and conflicts. Hancock (2007) reminds us of how “intersectionality theory to date has emphasized intra-category diversity—that is, the tremendous variation within categories such as “Blackness” or “womanhood”” (2007, p. 66). This can be related to bell hook’s observation:

Emphasizing paradigms of domination that call attention to woman's capacity to dominate is one way to deconstruct and challenge the simplistic notion that man is the enemy, woman the victim; the notion that men have always been the oppressors. Such thinking enables us to examine our role as women in the perpetuation and maintenance of systems of domination. To understand domination, we must understand that our capacity as women and men to be either dominated or dominating is a point of connection, of commonality (hooks, 2015, p. 20).

Merkel is a woman in a position of power and privilege, both within her national context, as the chancellor and head of the Christian-Democratic Party (CDU), and in the European (and international arena), because of the relative power of the country she leads, especially, from the Portuguese media’s gaze, in the context of the economic crisis. But, within this position of power, she is also *othered*, as a woman, and as a person that grew up

in Eastern Germany. And representations of her, particularly of her power, are crossed by these multiple referents and corresponding attitudes towards her exercise of that power.

6. Intersecting identities, imagined communities and the media

With this thesis, we intended to explore existing hegemonies and ideologies around national and European identities, in Portugal and Germany, during two crisis moments: the economic crisis and the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”. We departed from a theoretical model based on Stuart Hall’s concepts of ideology and hegemony (2016), the work on media discourses carried out in *Policing the Crisis...* (1978) and a poststructuralist approach to the concept of identities, as performative and unstable imagined communities (Anderson, 1983/2016; Hall, 1996a, 1996b; Butler, 2004, 2007, 2009). Based on this paradigm, we developed a methodological model (Bardin, 2016; Hall, 1978, 1993) that allowed us to categorize representations into narratives and representations, and critically explore the identified discourses.

The research carried out in this project has allowed us not only to continue to critically deconstruct the concept of identity, but also to better understand how the media and its definers tend to represent these imagined communities. Crises tend to boost identity-based preoccupations, often tied to “moral panics” (Hall et al., 1978), and are usually a catalyst of discourses based on an *us* and *them* dichotomy. These discourses (re)produce ideologies, which permeate what is known as the commonsense language. We have found that, even if elite outlets tend to be more complex and less essentialist than tabloid outlets, in all cases there is a dominant-hegemonic division of the world into these imagined communities, be it national or supranational, and one that is deeply marked by a hegemony based on late capitalistic views on economic success as a measure of validity. Even so, when the media discourses are framed by political-economic ideas, devoid of their connection to symbolic identities, as elements that cross borders, and, even more significantly, when there is an active focus on making that *other* the protagonist, mainly through historical or proximity-based approaches, there is the possibility of opening a breach in these borders.

Regarding our main research question - what are the ideologies of national and European identities in the media, in Portugal and Germany, in moments of crisis, and what are their contradictions and oppositions? - our data has shown us that three frames are relevant and interact with each other in media discourses in this context: “Power”, “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas”. Concerning discourses framed by “Power”, on its own or intersected with the other two frames, in relation to Germany and Portugal, two main narratives arose, centered around the powerful Germany: Germany as a model, and Germany as the bad hegemon. The centrality of Germany as a powerholder, whether from a positive or a negative perspective, was clearly visible in our exploration of discourses about Portugal and Germany, in line with our theoretical observations about internal divisions within Europe (Dainotto, 2007; Beck, 2014).

In the first case, the narrative is of Germany as the good hegemon, as the “German model” in the economic crisis or as a savior in the context of the so-called “migrant/refugee crisis”. In the context of the economic crisis, we find representations of Germany as the savior, and Portugal as being rescued; Germany as disciplined, and Portugal as undisciplined; and Portugal as the student of German austerity. In the context of the refugee crisis, Germany is represented as welcoming to refugees, or being marked by a strong opposition to the far-right (“anti-Nazi”). In this case, these representations do not contrast with representations of Portugal, as the *other* is an “external”, or presented as “non-European” *other*. So, Portugal appears as irrelevant in this context, or a country with no extremism.

In the second case, Germany is presented as a bad hegemon, in either crisis, often with either implicit or explicit references to its Nazi past. In the context of the economic crisis, the second narrative includes the representations of Germany as a dictator and Portugal as dominated; Germany as a villain, and Portugal as a victim; a German “austerity Diktat” imposed on Portugal; and Germany as the disciplinarian of Portugal. In the context of the migrant crisis, Germany is represented as unwelcoming to refugees, or not as welcoming as reported, and as being marked by neo-Nazi movements.

Comparing discourses regarding Germany in both crises, we can conclude that the context does not alter the narrative about Germany within each outlet and in the discourses of definers. Overall, *Bild* stands out particularly as accepting the dominant-hegemonic

encoding of power-holding or primary definers (Hall, 1993; Ross, 2011), of Germany as the model or savior, and Portugal as a rescued undisciplined student. In the other three outlets, *Spiegel*, *Correio da Manhã* and *Diário de Notícias*, the positive discourse about Germany is attributed to power-holding definers, but in a negotiated or partially critical encoding, as the negative counter-representations are decoded in a negotiated way and attributed to political definers in the opposition, or non-primary definers.

The discourses of power-holding or non-marginal political definers to the center-right and right in both countries represent Germany as the model or savior, the “good hegemon”. This happens regarding both contexts in the case of the German power-holding CDU/CSU, and only regarding the “economic crisis” in the case of the German liberal and far-right (FDP and AfD) and the Portuguese center-right (PSD). The center-left, in both countries (PS and SPD), holds a negotiated, or partially critical, position, using both positive and negative representations, in the context of the economic crisis. Purely negative representations of Germany, in the context of the economic crisis, can be found in the discourses of two non-power-holding Portuguese political definers, one from the monarchic party (PPM) and one from the left (BE), the latter in the parliamentary opposition, and the former not having been elected to parliament. Other types of definers use all types of different discourses, as they are grouped in quite broad categories, namely opinion makers, diplomats, definers from the E.U., from the economic sector and the cultural sector.

When the “Power” frame is not present, but the “Symbolic Identity” and “Political-Economic Ideas” ones intersect, an *us* and *them* dynamic is still visible in the discourses, that portray Germany or Portugal as being characterized by the presence or absence of far-right movements, with Germany, at times, divided into East and West Germany. At this intersection, we identified representations about the xenophobic far-right, in the context of the so-called migrant crisis, or the Eurosceptic far-right motivated by the bailouts, regarding the economic crisis. In the overall coverage, in the context of the economic crisis, Germany is only portrayed as marked by the far-right, but, in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, it is both represented as being shaped by the far-right (“neo-Nazi”) and its opposition to the far-right (“anti-Nazi”). Regarding Portugal the hegemonic narrative is clearly one of absence of extremism and far-right movements, with the few portrayals of Portugal decoding this view in an accepting way.

Regarding discourses about Europe, a distinction becomes clear between Europe as an institution, i.e., the E.U., which exercises its power in either a positive or a negative way, and Europe as an imagined community, that is represented as internally divided or as a united by commonness. The institutional representations of Europe appear in discourses framed solely by “Power”, and include this power being presented in a good way, in the context of the economic crisis, and in a negative way, in the context of both crises.

When other frames intersect with “Power”, Europe appears as a (potential) imagined community, which, in the context of the economic crisis, is presented as divided into two Europes, or into a core and a periphery, or, in the context of the refugee crisis as divided into its Nation States. On the other hand, at times, Europe is also represented as a unified entity, whether in the “Europeanism” representation, in the context of the economic crisis, or by negatively defining its identity in relation to those presented as “non-European” *others*, namely (often Muslim) migrants and refugees.

Here, the context of the crisis is relevant in shaping discourses, since, in the context of the “refugee/migrant crisis”, representations of Europe are exclusively negative, whether critical of its internal divisions in handling the crisis or as *othering* migrants and refugees. This finding, however, needs to be articulated with the implicit representations of European commonality, through the (either implicit or explicit) representation of refugees and migrants as the “non-European” *other*. Discourses about this “external” *other*, include the narrative of a refugee *other*, with the representations of refugees as threats, or an *us* and *them* division, as well as the narrative of refugees as being welcome, because they constitute economic assets, are “good” or are the victims of tragedies.

Political definers’ discourses about Europe point to a partly critical encoding of Europe as good, in the context of the economic crisis, and as internally divided in the context of the migration crisis, with the center-left tending to a more partly critical discourse in both contexts, and the center-right to an accepting one in the case of the E.U. as an institutional *other*. Non-center political definers portray the institutional E.U. as exercising its power in a negative way.

These were the narratives and corresponding representations of Germany, Portugal and Europe identified in our collected data. However, our frame-based analysis, which emerged after the exploration of our material, allowed us to identify two discursive

tendencies, one shaped by an *us* and *them*, or *othering*, perspective - which includes representations of Portugal, Germany, Europe and the “non-European” *other* in which the “Power” and/or “Symbolic Identity” frames are present – and one shaped by a perspective based on the possibility of overcoming borders – which includes discourses framed solely by political-economic ideas, and, even more meaningfully, by a search for representation of the *other*, and complexification, in the case of the elite media outlets.

In the first case, we have found that framing discourses on ideas (or ideologies, but not in the operational sense of the concept used in our theoretical basis, but rather as the more common-sense notion of political ideologies, connected to political parties) shifts the narrative from an *us* and *them* essentialist approach to the German, Portuguese or European identities, based on cohesive imagined communities, to the fact that some of these representations are not based on identities, but on the underlying and potentially altering political-economic ideas and movements, in power and struggling to gain power. What we have found, however, as representations of political-economic ideas was not the focus of our data collection, i.e., not included as keywords, were rather superficial mentions of these ideas, which does not allow for a more profound exploration of this phenomenon.

In the case of complexification, in both crisis contexts, what we have been able to conclude is that journalism based on proximity, in on site feature stories, on representation, and on the complexification of the approach to those who are usually presented as an *other* creates the potential for *de-othering*, for understanding the complexity, multiplicity and shifting nature of these identities. Even if these instances were tremendously rare, they point to the possibility of struggle and resistance to the hegemonic view of identity, although these features, being rare and marginal tend to serve to manage the hegemonic view, not destroy it nor demand “changes in, basic structure society” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 99).

Finally, our data unequivocally required the introduction of the issue of gender in our analysis, sustaining the importance of the interplay of the multiple referents of culture to understand these phenomena. Angela Merkel, as a German, conservative powerholder, is often represented, in the Portuguese media, through the lens of gender, used both to legitimize and de-legitimize this German power, and to introduce nuance to representations of Germany as an imagined community.

In the future, our findings could benefit from further expansion in different methodological directions: an audience study, to explore the decoding processes of these representations in particular contexts; a study focused on the authors of the articles, i.e., the journalists and columnists; and a study focused on the overall (not only media) discourses of political definers. The former would allow for the exploration of decoding processes of these discourses, and to ascertain whether and how the ideologies (re)produced in the media reverberate with their audiences. A supplementary study, based on the findings presented here, but focused on audiences and/or social and political movements could also enable a more profound and intricate understanding of potential points of struggle and resistance, and even counter-hegemonies. The latter would assist in better understanding the newsmaking processes and potential internal struggles and resistances a priori to the encoding of the media message. The introduction of other types of media, namely television and regular print, and the broadening of the number and types of outlets could also contribute to a more nuanced and insightful understanding of these phenomena.

The main internal axis explored in this thesis is the one dividing Northern and Southern Europe. However, as our findings also seem to point to, mainly in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis”, further studies would benefit from introducing other European internal *others*, such as the imagined community of “Eastern Europe”, in relation to “Western Europe” (Dainotto, 2007), as this division emerged sporadically but meaningfully in our data.

Future studies should also focus on the issue of political-economic ideas, and how these are represented in the media. A study about which political parties and actors are represented, those who are given a voice, and those that are absent in media discourses, appears to be a potentially interesting approach to understanding hegemonic ideologies in this historical bloc (Hall, 2016). Since this was not the focus of our research, and, thus, not considered in our research design, it is not possible to draw conclusions on this topic, but our findings indicate that this could be a fertile field in which to explore and better understand discourses about identities. One issue that warrants further analysis is, for instance, the issue of why Portugal is represented as a non-extremist country, particularly regarding the far-right, especially considering the more recent development of the party-political landscape, in which the far-right is indeed quite present.

The media, being singular fora in which to explore and understand ideologies and hegemonies in its discursive elements, play a particularly central role in the (re)production of these discourses and, to a lesser extent, their internal struggles and resistances. Thus, our research has allowed us to outline recommendations regarding the role of the media in shaping the portrayal of imagined communities and intersecting identities, since only the “yearning for sustainable futures can construct a livable present” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 416).

We argue that media responsibility in promoting a culturally inclusive citizenship should be based on “nomadism” and the rejection of what Braidotti (2010) names “methodological nationalism”, by viewing the subject in its multiplicity rather than “along the axis of self-reflexive individualism and scientific rationality, which are indexed on a linear and progressive temporal line” (2010, p. 408). Braidotti calls for a “renewed political and ethical agency”, the conditions of which

[...] have to be generated affirmatively and creatively by efforts geared to creating possible futures, by mobilizing resources and visions that have been left untapped and by actualizing them in daily practices of interconnection with others (2010, p. 416).

The media’s responsibility must go beyond national, European, Western borders, beyond the idea that we have more “moral responsibility” with individuals who happen to be part of the same nation-state (Beck, 2002, p. 20), and be based on the “call for more vision” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 416), which is emerging in critical theory. The changes we advocate for based on these recommendations must be “grounded in a profound sense of responsibility and accountability” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 417), and would mainly be aimed at the education and training of journalists and other media actors.

Hence, based on our research, we would argue, first, for the importance of understanding and learning about representativity, namely the active pursuit of the inclusion of the voice of the protagonist of the news story, in order to promote processes of *de-othering*, as well as the promotion of the participation of those often presented as *others* in media editorships (Namin, 2009; Barbosa, 2012).

What our data also clearly indicates is that the complexification of the image of the *other*, which denies the “outgroup homogeneity effect” (Cabecinhas, 1998, p. 6), is mainly achievable through proximity to this *other* and a focus on a broader historical perspective. Thus, we would recommend these types of approaches, on site feature stories and historical analyses, when dealing not only with the obvious external “*others*” (migrants, minorities), but also multiple internal (racial, gendered, economic, social) *others* in each context, in line with Braidotti’s call to enlist “affectivity, memory and the imagination to the crucial task of inventing new figurations and new ways of representing the complex subjects we have become” (2010, p. 417).

The promotion of a critical approach to issues of identity among media players and of an awareness of active ideologies and hegemonies and their underlying power relations, as well as an attention to active struggles and resistances, by means of, for instance, lifelong training of media actors in cooperation with academia, would allow for the construction of a media discourse that, at the very least, questions and is critical of “the established tradition of methodological nationalism”, possibly promoting “a different image of thought [...] that rejects Euro-universalism and trusts instead in the powers of diversity” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 417).

There are multiple warnings, both in academia and in social movements, regarding “the danger of a single story” (Adichie, 2009), and we believe these recommendations, based on the data we have gathered and analyzed, could contribute to the introduction of more complex and multifaceted stories in the media, especially concerning “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983/2016).

This research hopes to be a contribution in the direction of a more open and critical understanding of identities (Hall, 1996a, 1996b) based on imagined communities (Anderson, 1983/2016) and their performances (Butler, 2004, 2009), which shape, not only discourses, but social and political practices, as well as individuals’ and communities’ ability for recognition and fulfillment. It is crucial to contribute to a better understanding of how we communicate ideas about identities and naturalize them as beliefs or theories or live them in their complexity and constant contestation, which is why the field of Cultural Studies is essential, as culture is seen as a set of contested and conflicting representation practices,

which shape social groups, and which rely on oppositions while, at the same time, deconstructing them (Frow & Morris, 2006, p. 328).

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Appendix – Empirical analysis tables

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A. The economic crisis

a) *Us and Them*

I. *Power Dynamics*

i. German Power

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IPT2011B2: "BILD: If the permanent crisis fund comes, will the euro zone still be different from a "transfer union" where the strong have to constantly help the weak?"	Interview	2011 PT
		IPT2011B3: "For the third time in a year, the Europeans and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are saving a staggering eurozone country from bankruptcy."; "Portugal gets 78-billion-euro aid package - Does the German taxpayer have to bleed too?"	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B4: "Portugal puts the EU in a state of fear and terror"	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B6: "Election winner Coelho wants to economize/save Portugal into health [gesundsparen]"	News Article	2011 PT
		IVPT2015B2: "Portugal had been supported by its European partners"	News Article	2015 PT
CDU		IPT2011B1: "The Economic and Monetary Union was not created to be a redistribution system from rich to poor Member States."	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B4: "Merkel praises the Euro: "It provides jobs, economic growth, tax revenues." It was important to strengthen it. The rescue package pursues three goals: "More stability, greater competitiveness and a fair balance between personal responsibility and solidarity." Merkel emphasized: "We are making the euro and Europe sustainable.""	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B7: "Germany has a "national interest in the continued existence of the euro with all its members," says the position paper. Condition: The euro must be "geared to German stability interests". That was "a trade-off for Germany, as the largest economy in the euro area, forming the anchor of stability".	News Article	2011 PT
PS - O		IPT2011B4: "Ex-President Jorge Sampaio called all political actors to reason and warned that the	News Article	2011 PT

		highly indebted EU country was heading for perdition.”		
	SPD	IIIEP2013B2: “At the latest in the course of the year 2014, we Germans - especially because of the difficult economic situation in Greece, in Portugal and in other countries of Southern Europe – will be asked to pay from all sides. And this, even though Mrs. Merkel has tuned the people to the idea that we will not pay. This is a very unpleasant situation, and many will not like to hear that. But it will turn out in just a few months that it's the truth.” *	Interview	2013 DE
	FDP	IIIEP2014B3: “We want the EU to be successful so that we don't have to pay for Greece again.”	News Article	2013 DE
	Econ. Sector PT	IPT2011B4: “The pressure of international markets on Portugal will increase in the coming weeks. "Only with a strong government, can we escape the crisis," he warned, but this is not in sight in the deeply divided country.” (President of the National Trade Association)	News Article	2011 PT
Spiegel	Spiegel	IPT2011S7: “Lots of money, hard demands: The euro finance ministers have released 78 billion euros for Portugal. The almost bankrupt state now has to undergo a radical cure.”; “Germany shouldered the bulk and is liable – all three pots taken together – with more than 14 billion euros”	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011S5: “Germans see their money sink into southern Europe”	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011S6: “The EU finance ministers also finally approved the aid package worth 78 billion euros for Portugal on Tuesday. A decision in principle had already been made on Monday evening. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is assuming a third of the 78 billion euros. The rest of the sum comes in parts of 26 billion euros each from two pots from the EU and the euro zone. If the entire German share is added up, the German taxpayer guarantees around 14.5 billion euros.”	News Article	2011 PT
		IIIEP2014S9: “Above all, migration has increased within Europe: every third comes to prospering Germany; Most from central and eastern Europe, but also from southern European crisis countries, are increasing their immigration”	News Article	2014 EP
		IIIEP2014S2: “After all, the three-year aid program of the EU, ECB and IMF has expired in mid-May, the economy of the country is recovering slowly.”	News Article	2014 EP

		IIIEP2014S8: “Progress is also attested to some euro crisis states. Ireland (15th place), Spain (39) and Portugal (43) improved the ranking.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IIIDE2013S1: “The Chancellor is therefore stronger than ever in Europe. But that does not mean that she has to drive an aggressive policy. On the contrary: The new constellation also offers Germany the chance to act as a savior, as the investor George Soros calls it - ie to increase its own power and at the same time to help Europe.”	News Article	2013 DE
		IIIDE2013S2: “What happens after the election is viewed with a mixture of fear and hope, as well as in many crisis states.”	News Article	2013 DE
CDU		IPT2011S7: “Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) appealed with urgent words to all EU states not to jeopardize the achievements in Europe. During a discussion at a school in Berlin, she explicitly defended financial aid for ailing euro countries. “	News Article	2011 PT
		IIIEP2014S7: “Shortly before the European elections, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) condemned alleged social abuse by immigrants from the European Union. "The EU is not a social union," Merkel told the "Passauer Neue Presse".”	News Article	2014 EP
Opinion Maker DE		IIIEP2014S1: “We Germans cannot be indifferent to the future of a united Europe - not just out of solidarity with the rest of the continent, but out of pure self-interest. We should keep the fate of the Romans in mind. They were doing too well too, and their great empire fell apart because they disliked it.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2014 EP
		VDE2017S2: “The election campaign is just over, a new governing coalition is far from being formed, as Germany is already confronted with gigantic expectations. Our neighbors want clarity.”	Opinion	2017 DE
CM	CM	IPT2011C3: “The German Constitutional Court (BVG) began this Tuesday to consider three complaints against financial aid to Greece and against guarantees given by Berlin to the European rescue fund, which has already served to support Ireland and Portugal.”	News Article	2011 PT
Opinion Maker PT		VDE2017C19: “Angela Merkel will go down in history. The German chancellor saved the Euro, and, thus, the European project.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE
		IIIDE2013C3: “On the way to the fourth year of recession, with public debt growing, there are reasons to fear a Portuguese storm.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2013 DE

		IIDE2013C4: “Germany did not waste much time talking about Portugal and the remaining 'little pigs' here in the south. I wonder why? Forgetfulness? Embarrassment? Nausea? Or does Germany understand that southern Europe should do its homework without aid from 'mutti' Merkel?”; “If, luckily for us, the German economy was on the carpet and unemployment was at Portuguese levels (not to mention the Spanish), perhaps Germany would have a 'solidarity' discourse, weighing common debts and shared losses. Bad luck. The German economy grows. Unemployment does not reach 7%. And Germany today deals with the whole world - not just with this sad and rickety corner where we find ourselves.” (Intellectual)	Opinion	2013 DE
		VDE2017C12: “With a new victory, but no majority, and in need of a broad coalition (...) Merkel has as a major challenge to lead Germany and Europe to a way of prosperity. Only in this way is it possible to maintain peace on this continent.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE
PSD – P		IIIEP2014C11: “The PSD president and prime minister defended today that the European Union does not deserve criticism, but gratitude from the Portuguese for its solidarity, saying that the European partners avoided a social disaster in Portugal.”	News Article	2014 EP
PSD - O		VDE2017C14: "Mrs Merkel was not one of the laborers of European architecture, but she was certainly, after Maastricht, the leader in Europe who has most persistently contributed to the reform of institutions and to complete what remains to be done" in matters of Economic and Monetary Union and security and defense”	News Article	2017 DE
PS - P		VDE2017C15: “The minister also noted that "the vast majority of the Germans voted for forces defending European integration and deepening European integration"”	News Article	2017 DE
CSU		IPT2011C3: “Christian Democrat politician Peter Gauweiler, the underwriter of another financial aid complaint, accused Angela Merkel of not defending German purchasing power and not preventing inflationary trends by joining European bailouts.”	News Article	2011 PT
CDU		IIDE2013C9: "We need a strong Germany that is respected in Europe," said Merkel to thousands of supporters in Berlin at the last big rally before the elections.”	News Article	2013 DE
DN	DN	IIDE2013D6: “Much of what happens in Portugal goes through Brussels and Berlin, but also through Frankfurt's skyscrapers.”	Feature	2013 DE

	IIDE2013D17: “Portugal and Germany share the same currency, but they live in very different situations: the former has been bailed out and has an unemployment rate above 16%, the latter has the largest European economy and just over 5% unemployed.”	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D25: “The number of Portuguese enrolled in the Goethe Institute, the main German language learning center in Portugal, rose by almost 70% between 2010 and 2012 (...) The increase in students, in fact, has been a constant in recent years at this institute, signaling that the economic crisis that Portugal is going through and the need to learn a language to facilitate integration in a foreign labor market are two factors that the Portuguese consider important.”	News Article	2013 DE
	VDE2017D7: “(...) Portuguese, Greeks and citizens of other countries who needed some form of external financial assistance during the crisis (...)”	News Article	2017 DE
	VDE2017D10: “The average Portuguese salary is about 561 euros lower than the German, which already takes into account the different costs of living in each of the countries.”	News Article	2017 DE
	IIDE2013D22: “Portugal at the top of Merkel's problems”	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D12: “A lot of people in the EU, especially in the countries of southern Europe, have their eyes on this [German] election because of the weight Germany has or may have in resolving the euro crisis. (...) Germans are very reluctant to finance other people's debts and demand from others the rigor they say they have experienced in their own skin.”	Feature	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D5: “In the postwar period, Portugal distinguished itself in supporting German reconstruction by participating in economic aid to Chancellor Adenauer's weak Federal Republic. Germany, which, thanks to the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s and 1960s, quickly became Europe's 'locomotive', reciprocated.”	News Article	2013 DE
Media DE	IPT2011D2: “Germany's leading economy newspaper Handelsblatt says that "Portugal scares Europe before the Brussels summit", noting that "Socrates' resignation triggered a serious crisis", generating "concerns and uncertainties in Lisbon and beyond".”	News Article	2011 PT

Media USA	IIDE2013D22: "Now that the German elections are over, the eurozone needs to go back to fighting the crisis" and "at the top of the list of urgent problems" is what to do about Portugal" reads the article titled "Portugal Could Be Cooking Up a Storm"	News Article	2013 DE
CDU	IIDE2013D13: "With regard to the Eurozone crisis, the conservatives' program explicitly rejects the introduction of European debt securities, the so-called 'eurobonds', considering that this would lead to a "European debt union, in which German taxpayers would have to assume almost all the debt of other countries "."	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D11: "Europe does not have to worry, we will continue our role"	News Article	2013 DE
SPD	IIDE2013D12: "The SPD candidate recalled that, after World War II, Germany was greatly helped under the Marshall Plan, and now it is its turn to help"	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D13: "Still in the context of the European crisis, the program speaks of the need for Germany to help solve the serious problem of youth unemployment in the EU."	News Article	2013 DE
Diplomats	VDE2017D1: "We are going to have a pro-European government in Germany and this is good for Portugal" (German Ambassador in Lisbon)	Feature	2017 DE
	V2017D21: "We are convinced that Germany will continue to defend a strong Europe, in the economic and monetary area, but also in defense, internal security, foreign policy." (Portuguese Ambassador in Berlin)	Interview	2017 DE
Cultural Sector PT/DE	IIDE2013D26: "For tens of years, Germany was a friend of Portugal and did not generate major controversies. Now it generates controversies. We were not used to that, they are necessary and legitimate voices, but there is no general opinion that hates Germany, nothing like that" (Director Goethe Lisbon)	Feature	2013 DE
Opinion Makers PT	VDE2017D9: "It just so happens that the Germany of 2017 is not a Germany at risk of survival, as it was in 1930. On the contrary, today's Germany is a dominant Germany in the European Union, it is a very strong economy, it is a top country in the current world order." (Journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE

Table 1 –German Power: German Model - Savior vs. Rescued

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
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Bild	Bild	IPT2011B7: “The direction is already clear: A new institution should provide emergency aid to euro states in the event of an emergency and take care of disciplining the member states - a sort of superintendence.”	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B4: “But now everything points to it: we must now probably also pay for the poorest country in Western Europe!”	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B1: “The pressure on Europe's <i>Schuldensünder</i> (debt sinners) is growing”; “Europe puts the screws to the heavily indebted Greeks: German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for longer working lives in the debt-ridden countries of Europe”	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011B2: “We made the necessary reforms, but the others didn't ...”	Interview	2011 PT
		IVPT2015B1: " Most Europeans, on the other hand, benefit from cheap money (...) The countries on the periphery such as Portugal, Greece and Spain are among the big winners," says the study. In these countries, since 2010, people have been able to look forward to interest gains of more than 1200 euros per capita.”	News Article	2015 PT
		IPT2011B7: “The direction is already clear: A new institution should provide emergency aid to euro states in the event of an emergency and take care of disciplining the member states - a sort of superintendence. (...) However, Germany will bear a major burden. For example, the federal government has prepared a plan that describes in detail the structure and rules for a "European Stability and Growth Investment Fund.””	News Article	2011 PT
CDU		IPT2011B1: “It is also important that in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, you cannot retire earlier than in Germany, but that everyone makes the same effort - that's important”	News Article	2011 PT
		IIEP2014B2: “The finances must be put back in order. Everyone is called upon to assume their responsibilities, the Member States as well as Brussels.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IPT2011B2: “If you need credit, you have to fulfill our conditions. And many countries act voluntarily, for example when we look at the far-reaching reforms of Portugal and Spain.”; "Germany was and is ready to help the weaker [states], as we show each year with our contributions to the EU budget. But there will not be a transfer union with me. Each country is responsible for its own debt.”	Interview	2011 PT
FDP		IIIEP2014B3: “budget offenders”	Interview	2014 EP

AfD	IIDE2013B1: “The AfD wants to dissolve the Eurozone, and push the southern Europeans out of the common currency”	News Article	2013 DE
Spiegel Spiegel	IPT2011S5: “The countries have lived beyond their means for too long. And they accepted that their economy has increasingly lost competitiveness.”; “Greece, Portugal or Spain still have a lot of work to do. But Angela Merkel’s call to “make a little effort” is misleading. The show of strength has already begun. According to figures from the EU agency Eurofound, Merkel’s criticism of the holiday enjoying southern Europeans is a myth.”; “According to figures from the EU agency Eurofound, Merkel’s criticism of the holiday enjoying southern Europeans is a myth. According to it, Spaniards and Portuguese are entitled to an average of 22 vacation days per annum, the Greeks one day more. Germans, on the other hand, are at the top of the list in Europe with an average of 30 days of leave - and are also clearly in the lead, when public holidays are counted.”; “How times are changing: a few years ago Germany was the sick man of Europe. The republic of five million unemployed was considered to be incrustated, and the hope of improvement seemed pointless in view of the huge reform backlog. Whichever international comparisons determined the debate about their position, the Germans came off badly. Too much vacation, too high salaries, too early retirement, too few work incentives for the jobless - and not even fresh bread on Sundays. And now that the fourth largest economy in the world is booming, other euro countries are facing bankruptcy.”	News Article	2011 PT
	IPT2011S1: “Europe needs a European constitution including a Charter of Fundamental Rights. Short and concrete as the German Basic Law. So that it can be understood by any EU citizen without a legal background. And so that both the German Constitutional Court plays along and the British skepticism is overcome.”;	News Article	2011 PT
	IPT2011S6: “The sentences of Chancellor Angela Merkel were aimed at party friends in North Rhine-Westphalia Meschede. But they reached governments of the hard-hit euro countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal - and were met with anger: The CDU chairman has criticized the early retirement age and the holiday arrangements in some countries in view of the billions of aid for troubled EU countries.”	News Article	2011 PT
	IIIEP2014S2: “But the government in Lisbon must also save in the coming years, the boom years will not come back so quickly. The Portuguese know that, they are now wavering between fear and hope.”	News Article	2014 EP

	<p>IIIEP2014S9: “Above all, migration has increased within Europe: every third comes to prospering Germany; Most from central and eastern Europe, but also from southern European crisis countries, are increasing their immigration. (...) The most beautiful side effect of immigration to Germany: Almost without the intervention of the Federal Government, it also alleviates the often-deplored skills shortage of employers' organizations. In comparison with the immigrants who came before 2007, the new migrants work more frequently and are better qualified.”</p>	News Article	2014 EP
	<p>IIDE2013S3: “Merkel remains Chancellor. What happens after the election is viewed with a mixture of fear and hope, as well as in many crisis states. Fear, because Merkel Germany is regarded as hard-hearted <i>Sparmeister</i> (master of saving/economizing/thriftiness).”</p>	News Article	2013 DE
	<p>IIIEP2014S9: “While Europe as a whole is still suffering the consequences of the severe crisis, Germany has long been regarded as the island of the blessed.”</p>	News Article	2014 EP
CDU	<p>IPT2011S6: “Merkel attacks holiday-friendly Southern Europeans” (...) Chancellor Angela Merkel wants to make Germany's help for troubled euro countries increasingly on conditions: The crisis-ridden countries would have to make demonstrable efforts, said the head of the CDU party at a party - and criticized pension and holiday arrangements in southern Europe.”; “Yes, Germany will help, but Germany will only help if the others make an effort, and that has to be proven”</p>	News Article	2011 PT
	<p>IPT2011S5: “Regarding the question of what the tumbling crisis nations have to do in order to receive billions from Germany to survive, Angela Merkel was quoted on Wednesday as follows: "It is also about the fact that in countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal you cannot retire earlier than in Germany, but that everyone makes a little effort - that's important. " In addition, Merkel indirectly criticized the southerners for being particularly fond of vacation: "We can't have one currency and one person gets a lot of vacation time and the other very little. That doesn't work together in the long run." To put it less chancellorally, this means: "We will no longer give good German money to lazy southern Europeans.””</p>	News Article	2011 PT
Opinion Maker DE	<p>IIIEP2014S1: “Instead of historical joy, it is more of a historical frustration to feel that politicians of all parties are acting as if they were disgusted by "Eurocrats" who wanted to dictate the details of their shower heads or coffee machines to the Germans. They complain about the expensive euro rescue and complain that the Germans would have to pay for the mistakes of the southern Europeans.”; “(this) Epoch: that of the peaceful and still prosperous European Union - and in its heart lies Germany, which has</p>	Opinion	2014 EP

		benefited from this Union like no other country.” (Journalist)		
		IVPT2015S2: “Unlike Germany, where the economic situation is good and there is a shortage of labor, the vast majority of Europe remains economically depressed.” (Academic)	Opinion	2015 DE
		IVPT2015S1: “It wasn't long ago that the Germans were anything but a happy nation. At the turn of the millennium, surveys revealed the outlines of a depressed society: a large proportion of citizens felt that their living conditions were getting worse and worse. Nowhere in the EU was pride in one's own nation so weak as in this country. And a large majority stated that the years of German division between 1945 and 1990 were the happiest phase in German history. Unity was a reality, but the Germans struggled with it. Quite different today: 25 years after reunification, the majority of Germans are satisfied with themselves. Large majorities in East and West believe that after the state, mental unity is now also successful, as the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy found last autumn. The economy is running, employment and life satisfaction are high, also in the east.” (Journalist/Academic)	Opinion	2015 DE
CM	CM	IPT2011C12: “How do we pay what we owe?”	Interview	2011 PT
		IPT2011C5: “A study by French bank Natixis says that Europeans in the South are working longer and longer than the Germans, contrary to Chancellor Angela Merkel's statements.”	News Article	2011C5
	EU	VDE2017C6: “Following his controversial interview last March with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in which he said, referring to the countries of southern Europe, that "you can't spend all the money on drinks and women and then ask for help".” (President of the Eurogroup)	News Article	2017 DE
	Opinion Makers PT	IPT2011C8: “Europe does not know what to do to its weakest links, and there is a temptation to simply drop them: to exclude them from the eurozone” (Journalist)	Opinion	2011 PT
	CDU	IPT2011C5: “A study by French bank Natixis says southern Europeans work harder and longer than Germans, contrary to Chancellor Angela Merkel's statement.”	News Article	2011 PT
DN	DN	IIDE2013D17: “Regarding the number of hours worked, in 2012 the Portuguese worked on average 294 hours more than the Germans: the Portuguese worked 1,691 hours that year and the Germans worked only 1,397 on average, the OECD estimates.”; “Portugal and Germany share the same currency, but they live in very different situations: the former has been bailed out and has an	News Article	2013 DE

	unemployment rate above 16%, the latter has the largest European economy and just over 5% unemployed.”		
	VDE2017D13: “First EU economy, Union locomotive, Germany wants to maintain leading status.”	News Article	2017 DE
	VDE2017D13: “With a more isolationist and alienated US since Donald Trump's coming to power and the process of the UK leaving dominating at least the next two years in the EU, the new German government emerges more than ever as the pillar of European stability.”	News Article	2013 DE
Economic Sector PT	VDE2017D10: “CCIP's Bruno Bobone acknowledges that "there is a huge challenge in our country to increase productivity, because that is what will enable us to increase wages and workers' welfare."”; “A CIP source says that the "significant differential" in the productivity levels of the Eastern countries and Portugal compared to Germany explain the disparity between wages. "It is interesting to note that the study identifies Portugal as an exception, saying that the different composition of the workforce explains, at least in part, the pay gap with Germany.”	News Article	2017 DE
CDU - P	IIDE2013D12: “Merkel (...) has in turn rejected a "false solidarity" and vowed to maintain "pressure." That is, she admits to continuing to help the European partners in need, but maintains the demands that these same countries continue their fiscal consolidation efforts and structural reforms.”	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D19: “In crisis countries, "weaknesses have to be overcome, (...) we want a successful Europe, we have to be competitive”; “Germans do not have to be arrogant, because 10 years ago we were Europe’s sick ones”	News Article	2013 DE
FDP - P	IIDE2013D13: “Liberals argue, moreover, that the largest central banks of the single currency, such as the German, should have a veto right within the ECB's board when it comes to the purchase of debt securities of certain countries.”	News Article	2013 DE
Economic Sector DE	IIDE2013D6: “They [German parties] are willing to give support in exchange for reforms in crisis countries like Portugal. My impression is that there is a positive view of the Germans about the Portuguese. For as long as the German electorate sees that aid is being used to improve the conditions of countries and to reform, I think it will continue to support it. Of course, it is neither eternal nor unlimited.” (Deutsche Bank)	News Article	2013 DE
Diplomats	IIDE2013D23: “The German electorate voted unsurprisingly for stability. The most striking feature of the Germans is this quest for stability and	Opinion	2013 DE

	predictability.” “There is a perception in Germany that the crisis that affects us all can only have a lasting solution in the context of deepening European integration. We are aware that the crisis has affected us precisely because European integration, especially in terms of the coordination of macroeconomic policies, was not sufficiently consolidated. That is why we are on our way to such a genuine economic and monetary union.” (PT Ambassador Berlin)		
	VDE2017D1: “And to those who complained that this was a boring campaign, the ambassador assured with a smile that he was "completely at ease in a politically boring country.” (DE ambassador Lisbon)	News Article	2017 DE
Opinion Makers PT	VDE2017D26: “The human and territorial dimension, the geographical location, the national product and the robustness of the industry make Germany the unmatched European leader. Their organizational skills, dedication to work and realism confirm and reinforce their attributes.” (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE
Opinion Makers DE	IIDE2013D26: “Many Germans are satisfied with the way things are, with the economic situation, for example (...)” (Academic)	Interview	2013 DE

Table 2 - German Power: German Model – Disciplined vs. Undisciplined

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	PSD - P	IPT2011B6: “PSD leader Pedro Passos Coelho announced a swift formation of a government and promised in his victory speech to keep the country's strict austerity obligations.”	News Article	2011 PT
Spiegel	Spiegel	IPT2011S2: “Apart from Greece, Portugal is the big problem child of the Eurozone - now the citizens have punished their government. In the parliamentary election, the Socialists of Prime Minister Sócrates lost significantly. Now others have to lead the highly indebted country out of the crisis.”	News Article	2011 PT
		IVPT2015S4: “Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, 51, therefore has the reputation of being a cold-hearted model student of Angela Merkel - and yet he hopes that the Portuguese will honor his successes.”	Feature	2015 PT
		VDE2017S6: “Another accusation against Merkel was that, with her harsh austerity policy towards Southern Europe, she was instigating the division of the EU. This criticism has become much quieter since the economy picks up again in former crisis	News Article	2017 DE

		countries such as Portugal and Spain, and even Greece can again provide itself with money in the markets.”		
		IIIEP2014S3: “The fact that Portugal, now only three years after the near-bankruptcy, is freed from the stranglehold of its saviors, is only possible because the Portuguese have never revolted too violently - although a good quarter of the population now lives on the edge of the poverty line, because of the reforms.”	News Article	2014 EP
	CDU	IPT2011S3: “It is "regrettable" that the prime minister has not received any parliamentary regulation for his "constant path towards consolidation and reform". She wanted to express her "respect" for Sócrates.”	News Article	2011 PT
	PSD - O	IPT2011S2: “"Big problems are coming to us, but our country will return to normal," promised Passos Coelho. He emphasized in the election campaign, however, also: "With cheating we will never mature into a developed society"	News Article	2011 PT
		IPT2011S3: “"You cannot prescribe bread and water to a country." He [Passos Coelho] has stated several times that he wants to accept the rescue package for Portugal.”	News Article	2011 PT
	Opinion Maker DE	VDE2017S2: “Even former crisis States such as Portugal are again considered creditworthy and can borrow new debt at low interest rates. The path, pushed through by Germany, of saving and cost cutting seems to have an effect.”	Opinion	2017 DE
CM	CDU - P	IPT2011C4: “"I am grateful to Socrates" for taking responsibility for the public accounts of her country, said Angela Merkel. The German leader recalled that the new measures taken by the Portuguese Government to reduce the budget deficit were "far-reaching" and supported the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Union. For Angela Merkel, Socrates was "right" and was "brave" in taking the new austerity measures to the Portuguese Parliament for a vote.”	News Article	2011 PT
	Diplomat	IIDE2013C11: “(...) in Berlin there never ceased a certain hope of making Portugal a successful case in the task of recovering the European economy.” (Diplomat)	Opinion	2013 DE
DN	Diplomat PT	IIDE2013D23: “(...) we are very important to Germany because we can represent the success story that Germany and the EU need. We can build this success story in southern Europe. It's in our hands. And I have no doubt that we will find the collective will and means to overcome the crisis, project growth and create jobs.” (PT Ambassador Berlin)	Interview	2013 DE

Economic Sector PT	IIDE2013D4: “Meyrelles stressed that "Germany greatly respects the way we have been going through this period of crisis, and was very concerned when, about two months ago, we went through a political crisis from which we knew how to get out well, and even more stable, and recognizes our merit, (...)"”	News Article	2013 DE
FDP - P	IIDE2013D13: “The Liberals [FDP] argue that indebted countries should continue on the path of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms.”	News Article	2013 DE
CDU	IIDE2013D13: “With regard to austerity, it is said that European governments should feel encouraged to comply with the rules of the stability and growth pact and the so-called fiscal pact, namely with regard to deficit and debt limits, under penalty of being sanctioned.”	News Article	2013 DE

Table 3 –German Power: German Model – Student of German Austerity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	PT Union	IPT2011B1: “The criticism of the Federal Chancellor has sparked outrage and protests in Portugal, which is at risk of bankruptcy. "This is pure colonialism," railed union president Manuel Carvalho da Silva, the president of the CGTP, saying it is "lacking any bit of solidarity."” (CGTP)	News Article	2011 PT
Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE	IVPT2015S2: “Unpredictable, unavoidable, unsolvable? Not at all. The Eurozone - under Berlin leadership - has not created the conditions for a resolute tidying up after the credit boom of the noughties” (Academic)	Opinion	2015 PT
		VDE2017S2: “A German plan for the stabilization of the euro? A personal vision for Europe? All that was missing in this election campaign. The potential for frustration is correspondingly high if major decisions are soon to be taken in the direction of more European integration. Because no one has advertised and argued for it. Nobody tried to convince the citizens.” (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE
CM	CM	IPT2011C2: “Farmers angry with Germans”; “Agents of the Portuguese agricultural sector blamed the German Minister of Health yesterday for the sharp drop in consumption of fruit and vegetables, saying that the E.coli outbreak had originated in Spanish cucumber”	News Article	2011 PT
		IIDE2013C8: “Europeans, especially in southern countries like Portugal, are looking forward to Germany's elections tomorrow with anxiety. They live in anticipation of what will change in the European Union, the euro, financing and the economy.”	News Article	2013 DE

		IIPE2014C15: “Portuguese emigrants in Germany are at risk of being repatriated after three months of unemployment.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IIIEP2014C1: “Aid to Portugal and Greece rescues German banking”; “The German narrative that the euro crisis has to do with the South wanting to take German money is incorrect.”	News Article	2014 EP
Opinion Makers PT		IPT2011C11: “The trip is cheap and patriotic. Take the plane to Madrid, buy some beautiful Spanish cucumbers, hide them in the suitcase and leave quickly for Berlin. When you get to the capital of Germany, try everything to see Ms. Merkel and offer them the cucumbers. With luck, you will save Portugal from certain bankruptcy.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2011 PT
		IIIEP2014C12: “Germany's management of the European crisis aims to ensure its well-being at the expense of weaker partners, resulting in a breakdown that threatens Europe's future, warns researcher Viriato Soromenho Marques.” (Academic)	News Article	2014 EP
		IPT2011C10: “And, unfortunately, this Europe, which had a chancellor in newly unified Germany 20 years ago, who, despite the costs of eastern integration, has always been generous to the Union's partners, now has Mrs Merkel in Berlin, who cannot explain to her voters that they benefit a lot from Europe, that they think they pay for.”; “The most important questions about our future are already decided more in Berlin, or in Frankfurt, the seat of the ECB, than in Lisbon. And, considering the path that this Europe walks, nothing good augurs.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2011 PT
Economic Sector PT		IPT2011C2: “The Portuguese agricultural sector officials yesterday blamed the German Health Minister for the sharp decrease in the consumption of fruit and vegetable products”; “It was a moment of some irresponsibility, which brought very serious losses in terms of consumption”	News Article	2011 PT
PPM - O		IIIEP2014C16: “The head of the Popular Monarchist Party (PPM) list running for the European election, Nuno Correia da Silva, claimed that the Euro is an “enemy” currency of the economies, “overvalued” and “hostage” of the German economy, leading Portugal to lose competitiveness .”	News Article	2014 EP
BE - O		IIIEP2014C4: “BE's European head candidate wondered how Paulo Rangel managed to say, “without laughing,” that PSD and CDS have put their foot down regarding Angela Merkel about the banking union, underlining an “extreme subservience” of the Government”	News Article	2014 EP
Cultural Sector PT		IVPT2015C4: “There is also an unsettling behavior in ordinary Portuguese people, who love to bet on those who they are told will win. Obedient and subservient, they are very impressed with what they say about us out there.” (Filmmaker)	Opinion	2015 PT
DN	DN	IIDE2013D7: “The Portuguese are the ones disapprove of the management of the crisis by German Chancellor Angela Merkel the most (65%), while the European average of disapproval is 42%.”	News Article	2013 DE

Opinion Makers	IIDE2013D12: “Merkel, who recently, in an article published in SPIEGEL, was accused by philosopher Jürgen Habermas of having Germany "sleep on a volcano" and of feeding a "sovereignty of fiction" to European countries in crisis (...)" (Academic)	News Article	2013 DE
	IIDE2013D10: “Power and leadership are the two sides to a coin that makes Angela Merkel one of the most controversial political figures of recent years. There are those who admire her for the conduct of the German Chancellery and control of the European machine. But there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave to the world in the last century.” (Academic)	Opinion	2013 DE

Table 4 –German Power: Bad Hegemon - Dictator vs. Dominated

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE	IVPT2015S1: “On the other hand, from a European point of view, the judgment is ambivalent: In many areas, the Federal Republic today plays an overwhelmingly dominant role. This knowledge gives rise to an obligation: to self-restraint, to be considerate - to interpret leadership that occasionally puts one's own interests and preferences aside. Threatening European partner states - be it expulsion from the monetary union (see the last crisis in Greece), be it with sanctions because of the refugee policy - does not fit this role.” (Journalist / Academic)	Opinion	2015 PT
		VDE2017S5: “Europe - a German drama”; “(...) according to Schäuble’s mania of controlling what other governments are doing even more in the future. Great idea. Why not immediately transfer a larger donation to the right-wing populist International? German visions for Europe. Neurotic.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE
CM	Opinion Makers PT	IIIEP2014C14: Article title “The Fourth Reich?”, “The German Energy Commissioner has now come to suggest that the flags of non-complying Eurozone countries should be half-masted in all EU institutions. This outrageous and intolerable punishment project, which did not succeed, (...) leaving us with the doubt that, under the persistent German intransigence, lies the reviving of the project of dominating the Old Continent, over the wreckages caused by bankruptcies. This time, hitched on the vaunted moral superiority of the German people” (Intellectual)	Opinion	2014 EP
		IPT2011C6: “The fortress commanded by Angela Merkel has discovered, in terror, an invasion by legions of E.coli - a bacterium horrified of soap and disinfectant. It could only come from the barbarians of the South. The German Intestine, accustomed to sausages, pork and sauerkraut cabbage, is a little bottle of rose water. Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks and even Italians - who pose a serious risk to public health.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2011 PT

		IPT2011C7: “The killer cucumber is a good symbol of the state of Europe. Faced with E. coli infections, Germany decided, without evidence, to blame the Spanish product. (...) Largely thanks to Germany, Europe is today governed under the motto "each for himself."”; “The expiatory vegetable was found, just by chance from one of the PIGS. Those which, at risk of contagion, must be isolated and given to their fate.” (Intellectual)	Opinion	2011 PT
	EU	IIIEP2014C1: “Durão Barroso's independent economic adviser says that the German narrative that the euro crisis has to do with the South wanting to take German money is incorrect.”	News Article	2014 EP
DN	Opinion Maker DE/PT	VDE2017D28: “For better or worse: by the hand of the new German government, the EU will have its biggest transformation and deepening in the next four years. Just for worse: if it is not a deepening, it will be a disintegration by the effect of centrifugal forces in southern and central European countries such as Poland or Slovakia, and by the nationalist policies of Germany. The German government has long been tempted to isolate the country on its prosperous island and move closer to the Eurasian bloc, starting with Russia at the expense of the European project.” (German-Portuguese journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE
	Opinion Makers PT	IIDE2013D10: “Power and leadership are the two sides to a coin that makes Angela Merkel one of the most controversial political figures of recent years. There are those who admire her for the conduct of the German Chancellery and control of the European machine. But there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave to the world in the last century. (...) Beyond Merkel lies a permanent, geographically imposing and politically shocking reality called Germany. To disassociate Angela from Germany after re-reunification is to see the tree without looking at the forest (...)” (Academic)	Opinion	2013 DE
		VDE2017D12: “Even though the expectation is high about the exercise of an assumed (for many Machiavellian) German hegemony in Europe - in a context of the UK leaving, Macron's inexperience, and a lack of confidence in Trump - there is nothing that is more off target for Berlin. (...) On the contrary: the impressive numbers that Die Linke and AfD will have there mirror a factiously inward-looking, deeply identitary, nostalgic version aligned with Moscow and never with Brussels. Germany coming out of these elections has no intention of meeting the expectations of those who want to see it lead the "free world" in place of the US.” (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE
		VDE2017D26: “German leadership is assumed (though not ostensibly), indisputable (though criticized), acknowledged (despite resistance) and feared (even by friends). (...) What it lacks, flexibility, culture and military strength is a serious shortcoming, but it is no obstacle to the assumption of its powers and	Opinion	2017 DE

strength.”; “Suddenly the Union became German, one of the reasons against which it was made decades ago. Without the French foundational weight, without the English liberal creativity, without the American sympathy and without the Soviet threat, but with the old identity problems, the sovereign debts and the productivity losses, the Union disappears or becomes German and ... fades away!” (Academic)

Opinion Makers DE	VDE2017D22: “The truth about the German elections is that nothing will change much. Greece has not obtained debt relief because the German political system generally rejects transfers of any kind. Moreover, the German legal interpretation of EU law is that debt relief is illegal. There is no conceivable outcome of the upcoming elections that could soften the current position, but there are one or two that may harden it.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2017 DE
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Table 5 –German Power: Bad Hegemon – Villains vs. Victims

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	SPD	IIDE2013B2: “And that's why the European neighbors tell us: We do not want to hear an austerity-Diktat from you. We are ready to reform. But we also want to be treated fairly.”	Interview	2013 DE
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIDE2013S3: “Merkel remains Chancellor. What happens after the election is viewed with a mixture of fear and hope, as well as in many crisis states. Fear, because Merkel Germany is regarded as hard-hearted <i>Sparmeister</i> [master of saving]”	News Article	2013 DE
		IIDE2013S1: “Anyone who has looked at the pictures of the CDU election party as a Greek, Spaniard or Portuguese is likely to be scared: As the much-feared Angela Merkel is dancing in the face of her triumph, faction leader Volker Kauder is shouting the Toten Hosen hit "Tage wie diese" into the microphone – that same Kauder, who had threatened in the past legislative period, that, in Europe, from now on, German would be spoken. Will German be sung and German danced in the future? After Merkel's election victory, fear is going around in the south of the euro zone.”	News Article	2013 DE
		IIIEP2014S4: “Portugal is leaving the Europe bailout, but citizens pay a high price for it. Hard austerity programs have destroyed the middle class, shredded social networks. 2.5 million people live on the verge of poverty”	Feature	2014 EP
CM		IIDE2013C7: “A new Merkel term means the continuation of the austerity policies that have left the country torn up. The only hope is that a possible	Opinion	2013 DE

	Opinion Makers	coalition with the SPD will be able to soften Merkel's 'dictatorship'" (Journalist)		
	PT	IIDE2013C11: "(...) post-election relief can be expected to make it clear to the Germanic power that the economic recovery of the so-called peripheral countries is in their interest. Which means more toning therapies than the financial austerity recipes of the troikas that be." (Intellectual)	Opinion	2013 DE
	SPD	IIDE2013C10: "She [Merkel] should not be allowed to continue with the savings policy", considers Schulz, urging his own party to emphasize, during the negotiations, the need for growth policies in the Eurozone. In this regard, Schulz draws attention, from Brussels, to his party colleagues, namely with regard to the high rates of youth unemployment in Southern Europe. "Merkel must now convert her social promises into facts," she said."	News Article	2013 DE
DN	DN	VDE2017D7: "The face of financial orthodoxy in the eurozone, well known to Europeans, especially Portuguese, Greeks and citizens of other countries who needed some form of external financial assistance during the crisis, Schäuble has been a member of the Bundestag for 45 years..."	News Article	2017 DE
	SPD	IIDE2013D12: "In this debate Steinbrück criticized the austerity policies that Merkel has been helping to impose on countries under financial assistance programs that, in the opinion of the Social Democrat, have been served in "deadly doses." The SPD candidate recalled that after World War II Germany was greatly aided under the Marshall Plan and now it is its turn to help."	News Article	2013 DE
	Opinion Maker GR	IIDE2013D28: "Former Greek Presidency Minister Georges Contogeorgis said today in Coimbra that Angela Merkel's victory in Sunday's German election means "the economic devaluation and impoverishment" of southern European countries."	News Article	2013 DE
	PS - O	IIDE2013D11: "In Portugal, the Left Bloc and PS were the first to react, with the socialists asserting that Merkel's victory is "bad news for Europe.""	News Article	2013 DE

Table 6 – Economic Crisis - German Power: Bad Hegemon – Austerity Diktat

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Opinion Maker DE	VDE2017S5: "When it comes to Europe's future, German politicians give a miserable picture. They cling to self-righteousness and disciplinary doubts - even though they have proved fatal in the euro crisis."; "What is just revealed in terms of poverty of ideas could have much to do with the fact that the Germans, in the years of Schäuble's "Zuchtmeister" [disciplinarian] had	Opinion	2017 DE

		adopted an absurd self-righteous idea of what kind of crisis Europe is currently experiencing. In short: We are exemplary, the others a disaster - to blame. Alright, we'll help."		
DN	Opinion Makers PT	VDE2017D2: "When in 2011 Günther Oettinger, the man Merkel placed at European Commission, asked countries that had committed the "sin" of excessive debt to compulsorily have their half-masted flags in the EU institutions, no one fired him. AfD's neo-Nazi nationalism is a problem of "normality" in overdose. The countdown to European fragmentation has accelerated again." (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE
CM	PS - O	IVPT2015C2: "We will always look for an alternative path to Mr. Schäuble because we know that Mr. Schäuble's path does not serve us, it is detrimental to the Portuguese economy",	News Article	2015 PT

Table 7 - German Power: Bad Hegemon – German disciplinarian

ii. European Power

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	CDU	IPT2011B4 "Merkel praises the Euro: "It provides jobs, economic growth, tax revenues." It was important to strengthen it. The rescue package pursues three goals: "More stability, greater competitiveness and a fair balance between personal responsibility and solidarity."	News Article	2011 PT
Spiegel	Spiegel	IPT2011S1: "The doubters point to Greece, for example. There, they read it in the "Bild" newspaper, the employees of President Papandreou allegedly get 16 monthly salaries, employees in state enterprises receive bonuses for hand washing and punctuality, bus drivers premiums for warming up the engine. And should we still pay for these lavish bankrupt Greeks? That's the question that resonates. Should that be the meaning of Europe? The fervent EU fans contradict this. With the well-known lists, of why Europe is so important for Germany and the continent. There are really good arguments, peace and freedom, prosperity and economic power, more competition, which ensures low prices."	News Article	2011 PT
	Opinion Maker DE	IIIEP2014S1: "(this) Epoch: that of the peaceful and still prosperous European Union - and in its heart lies Germany, which has benefited from this Union like no other country." (Journalist)	Opinion	2014 EP
CM	PSD - P	IIIEP2014C11: "The PSD president and prime minister defended today that the European Union does not deserve criticism, but gratitude from the Portuguese for its solidarity, saying that the European partners avoided a social disaster in Portugal."	News Article	2014 EP
	PS - O	IIIEP2014C2: "Europe is built on solidarity and the mobilization of all Europeans. Europe is a project of values, not interests and markets."	News Article	2014 EP

DN	Opinion Makers PT	VDE2017D26: “It is fair to recognize that the EU has helped Portugal. It gave a deadline and an opportunity to democracy. The EU has strengthened the state and society.” (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE
	DN	IIIEP2014D6: “Firstly, because Europe, even before our accession to the EEC in 1986, was always on our side and was responsible for the tremendous progress and qualitative leap that the country and our lives have made in the last almost 30 years. Secondly, because there is no solution to the problems we face other than Europe. To think that the crisis ends the day after we break with the EU only exists in the minds of those who have no idea of reality.”	Opinion (Editorial)	2014 EP
		IIIEP2014D4: “European leaders are under pressure today after the historic advance of Eurosceptics in Sunday's European elections.”	News Article	2014 EP
	EU	IIIEP2014D2: “European Commission President Barroso has called on all forces in favor of the process of European construction to mobilize after the rise in these anti-European Union elections. "Staying together as Europeans is indispensable for Europe to shape a global order in which we can defend our values and interests," said Mr. Barroso, referring to the political forces "represented in the Commission [conservatives, socialists and liberals]"	News Article	2014 EP

Table 8 – European Power: Europeanness - Good E.U.

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Opinion Makers DE	IVPT2015S2: “The dispute over the common currency has lost a lot of confidence. The European spirit of earlier years is permanently damaged.” (Academic)	Opinion	2015 PT
CM	PS - O	IIIEP2014C2: “criticized (...) "the prejudices that dominate between the north and the south [of Europe], between the rich and the poor, between the workers and the lazy". "Europe is built on solidarity and the mobilization of all Europeans. Europe is a project of values, not interests and markets." *	News Article	2014 EP
DN	Opinion Makers PT	IIDE2013D1: “In these intellectual and political sectors there was then a very active awareness of European belonging, guided by ethical and humanist values, perceptions of historical, civilizational and cultural order, philosophical and political will, obeying the imperative to ensure the existence of conditions for peace between nations and the construction of a new humanism and new social models on the fringes of totalitarian veil. There was also the awareness that Europe had a set of spiritual, rational, scientific and humanistic characteristics, the combination of which distinguished it from other continents. There was the capacity to express and promote these initiatives and their conclusions. And, finally, there was a reasonable public interest in such matters, at least in the cultivated	Opinion	2013 DE

strata. From the concomitance of all these vectors, there was a reinforcement of a European spirit and a European conscience that today, in the face of the most recent vicissitudes and crises, would be said to be on the brink of evaporation.”; “Following World War II, an intense movement of reflection was triggered on Europe, the European spirit, European construction, humanism, violence, war, culture, technical progress and moral progress, and other related topics. The construction of a European cultural identity, which is not and cannot be immobilized in time but a process in progress, still extends today to the dynamics of the second half of the 1940s, although it no longer gives rise to the enthusiasm it gave rise to in that period.” (Academic)

VDE2017D26: “The Europe we joined was a politically attractive and economically promising continent. Besides being a cultural guarantee and a scientific future. Perhaps there were already signs of unease in the 1980s, but, to all intents and purposes, the European horizon rightly seduced any country, starting with Portugal, out of dictatorship, war and revolution. The Europe we belong to today is politically in decline, in difficulty and in uncertainty.” (Academic)

EU IIDE2013D8: ““What we need is two or three leaders who lead and revive the good old spirit” of the founders, Delors said.” (Former EC President)

Table 9 - European Power: Europeanness - Europeanism

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IIIEP2014B6: “Can you understand that criticism of Europe in Germany is met with so much echo?”; “What can one do against the Brussels regulatory rage?”	Interview	2014 EP
	AfD	VDE2017B1: “The AfD sees the EU as failed, wants reforms and (if they fail), if necessary, an exit from the EU and the abolition of the euro (back to the D-Mark)”	News Article	2017 DE
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIIEP2014S6: ““Brussels officials are highly qualified. They have a very power-conscious corps spirit, unfortunately they do not understand politics that much.”; “It is the everyday schizophrenia in the control center of Europe.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IPT2011S1: “So the EU needs more power. Above all, it needs more democratic legitimacy for this power.”	News Article	2011 PT
	Opinion Makers DE	IIIEP2014S1: “Instead of historical joy, it is more of a historical frustration to feel that politicians of all parties are acting as if they were disgusted by “Eurocrats” who wanted to dictate the details of their shower heads or coffee machines to the Germans”; “Criticizing Europe is right and important. Bureaucracies often create new powers for themselves”” (Journalist)	Opinion	2014 EP

CM	CM	VDE2017C9: “Juncker 'removes' Portugal from the European Union - President of the European Commission has forgotten our country and said that 'Europe extends from Spain to Bulgaria'”	News Article	2017 DE
	BE - O	VDE2017C9: “The lapse had immediate reactions on social media, with Bloco de Esquerda MEP Marisa Matias asking: "Have you already assumed that we are out?"”	News Article	2017 DE
	PS - O	IIIEP2014C7: “The European Commission failed to fulfill its mission under the treaties and last week threatened and blackmailed the Portuguese State.”	News Article	2014 EP
	PNR - O	IIIEP2014C5: ““I think they say that the 'troika' is leaving today [this Saturday], which is a fallacy, because they will continue to rule us, the country will be under these institutions for many, many years”(…) stressing that it is necessary to recover political independence from a "federal and increasingly dictatorial Europe, where the big command and the small obey”	News Article	2014 EP
	Opinion Makers PT	IIPE2014C3: “The wind that blows from Europe is so cold that it reminds us of how far away the time of all plagues is, in the memory of these atavistic leaders. However, Iberia resisted in moderation, even if harmed.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2014 EP
	Union PT	IIPE2014C8: "We have to have an assertive voice in Europe, that does not submit, does not squat down, that is not ashamed to be Portuguese" (UGT, Union)	News Article	2014 EP
DN	Opinion Makers PT	IIDE2013D10: “(...) renationalization of many leaderships in Europe, the closing of many societies to the problems that go beyond their borders, the lack of dialogue between politics and citizens” (Academic)	Opinion	2013 DE
		VDE2017D26: “Europe was ... There is almost only talk of Europe and the Union in the past. (...) After a few years, the EU no longer makes direct or indirect contributions to democracy. The EU is not itself democratic. It is not an example of democracy. But a democracy lives better in the European Union than outside it. For Portugal, outside the Union, everything will be more difficult.” (Academic)	Opinion	2017 DE

Table 10 – European Power: European Divisiveness – European Power Bad

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IPT2011B5: “Praia da Marinha, Algarve, Portugal: The idyllic beach at the foot of a long staircase is divided into several mini-bays. If you climb over the big rock formation, you will find a pristine beach, which you have all for yourself.”	News Article	2011 PT
CM	Opinion Makers PT	IPT2011C1: “And on the 6th, if the exception is confirmed, we will also know that Portugal will cease to be just another poor and irresponsible country on the periphery. It will surely be the biggest joke in Europe.” (Columnist)	Opinion	2011 PT
		IPT2011C8: “Europe does not know what to do to its weakest links, and there is a temptation to simply drop them: to exclude them from the eurozone. It would be our degradation, poverty, annihilation. Let us do everything, but really everything, so as not to give them the pretext.” (Journalist)	Opinion	2011 PT
	PS - O	IIIEP2014C2: “criticized (...) "the prejudices that dominate between the north and the south [of Europe], between the rich and the poor, between the workers and the lazy". "Europe is built on solidarity and the mobilization of all Europeans. Europe is a project of values, not interests and markets." *	News Article	2014 EP
DN	DN	IIDE2013D6: “On the 24th floor of one of them is Barbara Böttcher, chief analyst for Deutsche Bank (DB) in European politics and economics. Just returned from an Algarve holiday, this 55-year-old German (...)”	Feature	2013 DE
		IIDE2013D24: “Portugal can become a 'Florida of Europe”	News Article	2013 DE
		IIDE2013D2: “the Germanic peoples have been central to European history since the first century, when they defeated three legions of Augustus and imposed the Rhine as a limit to the Roman Empire. Reunited since 1990, Germany is today Europe's leading economic power. If you want to toast to the country of Goethe, Beethoven and Kant nothing like a beer ... to accompany a sausage.”	News Article	2013 DE
	Economic Sector	IIDE2013D24: “The weather is a "huge factor" for Portugal to be chosen as a second home for European retirees, because northern Europe is much colder and these people, coming to Portugal, do not need to be so far away from their families who stayed in their country of origin and can at the same time enjoy temperate weather, he explained.” (Foreign Home Owners Association in Portugal)	News Article	2013 DE
	Opinion Maker PT/DE	VDE2017D28: “Foreign investment in real estate, adherence to tax privileges for foreigners, (opaque and suspicious) golden visas, unbridled tourism, actresses, actors and retired stars. The wave of invasion is deep: over half of the master’s students at the New University of Lisbon, in the area of Economics and Management, are foreigners. (...) Lisbon and Porto are	Opinion	2017 DE

	becoming European cities full of young people from around the world. On the Algarve coast or Costa da Caparica, Dutch, German, Scandinavian and Brazilian retirees stroll. Portugal is currently a mix of Silicon Valley and Florida”		
Opinion Maker PT	IIDE2013D15: “Today's Berlin is a building site under construction. A city that, in its own way, is a living metaphor of a Germany that, after the reunification of 1990, seeks its new place on the international scene, and particularly in a Europe in painful turmoil. It remains to be seen if the pain is that of a European decline, or if, on the contrary, it marks a new beginning for Germany and Europe.”; “Berlin returns to the summit stage of history, just as Germany is once again becoming the European 'people of destiny' (Schicksalsvolk), citing an expression by historian E. Spranger in 1951. There are many possible criticisms of the German steering of the Eurozone crisis, but it is undeniable that no other European country has such a critical awareness that knowledge of the past is vital not to make the same mistakes. (...) The vital force of Berlin, from its successive rebirths, has always been in its capacity for acceptance, in its choice of a cultural and pluralistic way.”; “Contradicting Max Weber, material wealth in Germany today is in the Catholic South, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria.” (Academic)	Opinion	2013 DE

Table 11 – European Power: European Divisiveness: European Core vs. Periphery

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	ETUC, PT Unions	VDE2017D10: “Northwest European workers are better paid because they have a fairer and more transparent system of wage setting, involving trade unions in negotiations with employers. This is the key ingredient in the prosperity and industrial success of Germany, Austria, from the Netherlands and other countries to the north” (European Trade Union Confederation - ETUC); "Seeing work as a secondary component of competitiveness is destructive to work, business and the economy," says the union leader, underlining: "This study confirms it, Europe is increasingly unequal" (CGTP); “The UGT Secretary-General acknowledges that there are "abysmal differences" in workers' incomes in Europe and believes that an effective increase beyond inflation and productivity to "narrow the gap" would be needed.” (C. Silva, UGT)	News Article	2017 DE

Table 12 - European Power: European Divisiveness: Two Europes

iii. System Power

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Die Linke	IIIEP2014B5: “In Europe, a justice gap opens up. Banks are saved with tax money. Workers, pensioners and the unemployed pay the bill and are left in the rain”	News Article	2014 EP
CM	POUS	IPT2011C12: “The key issue is to unite workers from all over Europe against the measures that come from the Euro.”	Interview	2011 PT
	SPD	IIIEP2014C6: “Moreover, workers cannot always be called upon to finance Europe, but those who made profits during the crisis, who speculated in banks and stock exchanges and who are still evading taxes in Europe today, those are the ones that must be called upon to finance the crisis on our continent.”	News Article	2014 EP
DN	DN	IIDE2013D7: “The Portuguese are those who, after the Italians, think that the economic system is more unfair and only benefits some (92%).”	News Article	2013 DE

Table 13 – System Power

II. Political-Economic Ideas and Symbolic Identity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIIEP2014S2: “There is bitterness, but hatred of the EU is alien to the Portuguese. Far-right or right-wing populist parties therefore have no chance in elections. The discontented in the country vote on the left.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IIIEP2014S5: “The weakness of the right-wing populists in Portugal probably also lies in the fact that established parties serve corresponding interests: the co-governing CDS-PP is right-wing conservative, but it renounces racist undertones.”	News Article	2014 EP
DN	Opinion Maker DE	IIDE2013D20: “If AfD does manage to enter the Bundestag this will be unheard of in Germany, as it was a party created a few months ago. Mistrust of traditional parties and the current policy followed with bailouts in the Eurozone has made this party possible in this country”, Günther Lachmann, journalist for 'Die Welt', told DN in Berlin today.”	News Article	2013 DE
	Diplomat PT	VDE2017D21: “It would be simple to explain the AfD phenomenon only on the basis of the former division between West Germany and East Germany. There are other deeper reasons. However, in Germany there are still issues of social inequality, indices of economic, human development and	Interview	2017 DE

		employment opportunities between the two former German states.” (PT Ambassador Berlin)		
DN		VDE2017D18: ““I grew up in the former GDR, I can live with that,” he says wryly, stressing that the true “German reunification never happened because the East has always been placed at a lower level.” In his view, this partly explains, in addition to the issue of refugees and immigrants, the rise of AfD in voting intentions for Sunday’s legislatures in Germany. (...) “I have a 40-year-old former neighbor who says loud and clear that he will vote for AfD just in protest. People in the East have the strange feeling that they don’t belong to anything at all.””	Feature	2014 EP

Table 14 – Political-Economic Ideas and Symbolic Identity

b) Political-Economic Ideas

I. Austerity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild, PSD (P)	IVPT2015B2: “Passos Coelho would be the first Prime Minister to implement austerity measures in a euro crisis country and then to be re-elected. After three years of recession, the economy has been picking up again since last year. The upswing is gradually making itself felt on the labor market.”	News Article	2015 PT
Spiegel	Spiegel	IVPT2015S3: “The general election took place against the background of a difficult economic situation. Although the government has been able to rehabilitate government finances over the past four years through austerity measures, the economy is only recovering slowly from the financial crisis.”	News Article	2015 PT
		IIIIEP2014S3: “It is a great day for the reformers, not only in Portugal but throughout Europe. For with Lisbon’s return to the financial markets, the euro crisis is shrinking back to the Greek crisis together. Ireland, Spain - and now Portugal - have left the bailout.”	News Article	2014 EP
		IVPT2015S4: “And so the government coalition of the bourgeois Social Democrats with the right-wing liberal People’s Party can point out that they successfully led Portugal out of the crisis after four tough years. Even if it was not easy, because the government increased taxes sharply, it liberalized the labor market, laid off state employees and cut civil servants’ salaries, pensions and social benefits.”	Feature	2015 PT
CM	CDU	IVPT2015C3: “This shows that a policy can succeed, and be supported by a majority, even if it imposes tough measures on the population”	News Article	2015 PT

Table 15 – Austerity: Good austerity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	PT	IIIIEP2014B1: “Portugal: The people of Portugal used the European ballot as a protest election. The opposition socialists were able to score a clear victory. They received 30 to 36 percent of the vote, according to forecasts, while Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho's coalition, which consists of his conservative PSD and the right-wing conservative CDS-PP party, only got 25 to 29 percent.”	News Article	2014 EP
Spiegel	Spiegel	IPT2011S3: “PEC4 is what the Portuguese called the fourth austerity package, a sober name for a dreaded venture. The minimum pensions of around 200 euros should be frozen; Poverty pensions, some say. Many older Portuguese live in modest circumstances. And the young people are just as little optimistic. 21 percent of the under-25s are unemployed. Many young academics move from a weekly or monthly contract to the next and get miserable wages.”	News Article	2011 PT
		IIDE2013S2: “But, in crisis States, in Greece or Spain, for example, austerity is shaking people’s everyday lives. Now, an international analysis supports the gloomy suspicion that the crisis could drive up the number of suicides.”	News Article	2013 DE
	Unions, Left, Civil Society PT	IIIIEP2014S4: “Around 300,000 Portuguese have left the country in recent years and tried their luck abroad. Pires does not want to be one of them. But even in Portugal, he sees no perspective. He feels tired, discouraged, frustrated. (...) For 45 years, the two have worked here, five to six days a week, eight to nine hours a day. Even today, because their pension is not enough for retirement, certainly not now, because the government has cut its already modest pension again by ten percent.”	Feature	2014 EP
		IPT2011S2: “The trade unions, left-wing parties and numerous civil movements have announced further protests against the austerity plans for the coming months. In a country where the minimum wage is 475 euros and the unemployment rate has already reached a record level of 12.5 percent, you can no longer demand sacrifices from families, warned Eugénio Fonseca, President of Caritas Portugal.”	News Article	2011 PT
Left PT	Left PT	IIIIEP2014S3: “The social consequences are already enormous, and a broad alliance made up of the opposition, trade unions and intellectuals is lamenting widespread impoverishment, the destruction of the middle class and the weakening of the welfare state.”	Feature	2014 EP
		IVPT2015S8: “Since no new, large-scale left-wing protest party emerged in Portugal, such as Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece, the Socialists scored with their demand for an end to austerity. (...) Both the Left	News Article	2015 PT

		bloc and the Communists maintain a far left-wing radical discourse and demand, for example, the renationalisation of newly privatized state enterprises. The socialists will not support this idea because of the tight budget situation.”		
CM	SPD - O	IIIIEP2014C13: “Portugal is one of the countries that suffered the most during the financial crisis. The only austerity policies left the Portuguese in a state of pain and uncertainty, while public services were worsened, unemployment increased drastically and growth stagnated”	News Article	2014 EP
		IIIIEP2014C6: ““Families, young people, pensioners cannot be held hostage to austerity, but we have to consolidate public finances with growth and employment.”	News Article	2014 EP

Table 16 – Austerity: Bad austerity

II. Liberalism

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	FDP – O	IIIIEP2014B3: “Countries with strong liberals are doing better. Proof? Sure: Liberals rule in Holland - not in Greece. In Scandinavia - not in Southern Europe.”	News Article	2014 EP

Table 17 – Liberalism: Good liberalism

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	PS - P	IPT2011C9: “The current PSD leadership is a mix of a power-hungry apparatus-populism with some theoretical veneer of savage liberalism given by homemade gurus who have learned nothing from the 2008 global crisis. Passos’ and his friends’ student leader spirit is disconcerting, launching reckless initiatives like the constitutional revision, longing for a ride from the IMF, from Mrs. Merkel or Cavaco Silva to open up a political crisis....”	Opinion	2011 PT
	PS - O	IIIIEP2014C7: “Francisco Assis, considered today that Portugal lives in "a neoliberal ideological enclosure" (...) “The first democratic break we have to make is political. We need a new majority in Europe, whose main institutions have been colonized by a radical ultraliberal line.””	News Article	2014 EP

Table 18 – Liberalism: Bad liberalism

III. Left Success

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
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DN	SPD	VDE2017D15: “Left-wing parties have shown what to do when a crisis is going on. Portugal has been in crisis for several years, has had to ask for foreign aid to balance the public finances. The government has been doing a much better job than we had been expecting for two years. They now have a 2% deficit, which is very low compared to other EU countries. Your economy is moving forward, largely because of tourism, but also because of various policies of the Portuguese executive. Portugal is on the right track”	Interview	2017 DE
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Table 19 – Left success

c) Complexification

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIIEP2014S4: “Around 300,000 Portuguese have left the country in recent years and tried their luck abroad. Pires does not want to be one of them. But even in Portugal, he sees no perspective. He feels tired, discouraged, frustrated. (...) For 45 years, the two have worked here, five to six days a week, eight to nine hours a day. Even today, because their pension is not enough for retirement, certainly not now, because the government has cut their already modest pension again by ten percent.”	Feature	2014 EP
DN	DN / Vox Pop	IIIDE2017D18: “In front of Pankow's employment center in East Berlin, Elbrandt explains that he lives in a kind of limbo, because in the eyes of the law he is young to retire, but most employers think he is old enough to give him a job in sports. He receives social support, 400 euros per month, plus help to pay the rent. (...) In Germany, the unemployment rate is 6.8%, very low compared to other EU countries. The precariousness in which many workers live is, however, the dark side of the German model, sometimes presented as an example. Cheap work, minijobs, part-time and temporary work, salaries of 450 euros exempt from paying social security ... These forms of work occupied, in 2012, eight million Germans.”; “In a ZDF show, a 75-year-old German woman left Angela Merkel unresponsive when claiming it is a shame that after 40 years of work, she earns a 654 euros pension and still has to pay for health insurance.”	Feature	2017 DE
	DN	VDE2017D13: “But not everything is rosy, and the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened in recent years, with a section of the population living in precarity.”	News Article	2017 DE
	SPD - O	V2017D15: “We are a rich country but this wealth is not being well distributed, we want everyone to have access to a good system of health, education, etc.”	Interview	2017 DE

Table 20 – Complexification: Dark Side of German model and high price of austerity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	DN	<p>IIDE2013D5: “Portuguese and Germans maintained a good relationship for centuries, interrupted by the First World War, almost a hundred years ago. At that time the government withdrew Portuguese nationality from children of German descent and concentrated the citizens of that country in an internment camp in the Azores.”; “Since the end of the Roman Empire in the early 5th Century, Germanic barbarians - ancestors of the Germans - had fought each other over the territory that is today Portugal (...) D. Henrique de Burgundy's (frank) Germanic rib was inherited by his son D. Afonso Henriques, who had the help of German knights in the conquest of Lisbon from the Moors. (...) In the 19th Century it was Germany’s turn to give Portugal a king: D. Fernando II (1819-1885), second husband of Queen D. Maria II, was the son of the Duke of Saxony-Coburg-Gotha. Father of D. Pedro V and D. Luís I, he brought Germanic blood to the Bragança dynasty”; “In the postwar period, Portugal distinguished itself in supporting German reconstruction by participating in economic aid to Chancellor Adenauer's weak Federal Republic. Germany, which, thanks to the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s and 1960s, quickly became Europe's 'locomotive', reciprocated.”; “Nicholas of Popplau, a Silesian-born knight (a region now divided between Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic), traveled around Europe from 1483 to 1486 and wrote a book about what he saw. Here are his impressions of the Portuguese over five hundred years ago - before, therefore, the bailout and the measures imposed by the troika: “Dedicated to leisure, they don't like work (...) they are rude, people without kindness or mercy. »</p>	Article	2013 DE

Table 21 – Complexification: Historical Complexity

B. The so-called migrant/refugee crisis

a) Representations of *us*

I. *Representations of Germany*

i. German Savior

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IVPT2015B3: ““While states like Germany, Austria or even Sweden face up to the challenge, they show a great receptivity and welcome culture...”	News Article	2015 PT
		IVPT2015B4: “From the beginning, BILD has taken a clear position in the refugee crisis: We must not leave people who are fleeing war and misery alone! "We help" - that's the name of the BILD campaign, which is also supported by politicians, celebrities and athletes. At the same time, we are convinced that we also have to ask uncomfortable questions!”	News Article	2015 PT
Spiegel	DE Opinion Maker	IVPT2015S6: “Now she is the refugee chancellor, who is outraged when she is accused of admitting too many refugees into the country” (Journalist)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
	CDU	IVPT2015S6: "I have to honestly say: if we have to start apologizing now that we show a friendly face in emergency situations, then this is not my country."	Opinion Article	2015 PT
	DE Opinion Maker	IVPT2015S5: “The friendly press should not fool us. As long as the refugees stay in Germany, the neighbors like to watch as we open hearts and barns. However, as soon as we ask them to join the rescue work, the fun stops. Should it have been the Chancellor's calculation that the neighbors would make an example of our charity, she has thoroughly miscalculated. We are becoming more and more lonely” (Journalist)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
CM	PT Diplomat	VDE2017C1: “Berlin has given exemplary support to these refugees...”	Opinion Article	2017 DE
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C3: “After 11 years in power, the fourth term is a prize for a risky gamble: opening the door to refugees from the war in Syria, setting an example for the whole of Europe”	Opinion Article	2017 DE
DN	DN	VDE2017D23: “Refugee lady wins confrontation with Mr Europe”	News Article	2017 DE

	VDE2017D6: “Edeka is Germany's largest supermarket chain and is expected to continue campaigning for the acceptance of refugees and against xenophobia”	News Article	2017 DE
DE Opinion Maker	VDE2017D13: ““The chancellor may have wanted to have the moral regency of Europe by practicing a welcoming policy for refugees at war”, Jérôme Vaillant, professor of German Civilization, assured.”	News Article	2017 DE
UK Labour	VDE2017D27: ““Angela Merkel is right when she says that everyone in Europe has to share the responsibility [in welcoming refugees]. The UK, for example, is not doing what it should,” explained Alfred Dubs. For the former MP and labor lord, on the issue of refugees, “Germany is a kind of conscience of Europe””	News Article	2017 DE

Table 22 –German Savior: Germany welcome refugees

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Foreign Press	VDE2017S7: “(...) country from which the Nazi terror once originated”; “Germany is no longer a "holy special case", the "moral superiority" to its European neighbors and the USA will, therefore, “decrease rapidly””; “This is in every respect a turning point in the history of the Federal Republic, never since its early history has a rabid nationalist, anti-Islamic, in part racist and right-wing party sit in parliament, not at all in this size - the old federal consensus, these forces to exclude the political discourse, is spectacularly broken. (...) Conversely, one can say that it merely 'normalized' the political situation: Germany was the last country in Central Europe without a big right-wing protest party.”	News Article	2017 DE
DE Opinion maker		VDE2017S3: “[T]he AfD is not a normal party. In their ranks, even at the top, there are people who flirt openly with right-wing extremist positions, who like to remember the Wehrmacht's aggressive war, who want to talk down the Holocaust and abolish the memory of it. And such people will soon be sitting in the German Bundestag”; “[...] this is more than the everyday European right-wing populism. It is an attack on our liberal democracy. These must be ward off by the other parties in the Bundestag, by our society as a whole - this is their first task in the next four years” (Journalist)	Opinion article	2017 DE
		VDE2017S1: “On this Sunday, a right-wing populist party will be elected in parts with right-wing extremist members in the Bundestag. It is a break in the self-	Opinion Article	2017 DE

		image of this country. And the strange silence, even apathy, before this historic quake is depressing.” (Journalist)		
	CSU	IIDE2013S4: “Neo-Nazis harm our homeland”	News article	2013 DE
CM	CM	VDE2017C4: “Shouting "all of Berlin hates the Nazis," or "Nazis" or "racism is not an alternative," the rather young protesters were demonstrating their revolt”	Feature	2017 DE
	Dutch opinion maker	IIIEP2014C10: “Germany continues to be much more sensitive than other countries to nationalism and xenophobia as a result of World War II and as a product of the so-called 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, that is, the way Germany looks at its past, with much collective guilt” (Academic)	News article	2014 EP
DN	DN / Vox Pop	VDE2017D24: “The AfD, whose leaders reject the far-right label, came in third, after Merkel's CDU/CSU and Martin Schulz's SPD. Charlotte is not surprised. "I think there has always been a racist basis in German society that now sees AfD as what it has always wanted. In Saxony this is so. I don't see myself going back there. The people of Saxony are afraid of what here in Kreuzberg is normal "A mixture of all. I'm not exactly surprised by the result of AfD, I was already prepared, but I'm still shocked”	Feature	2017 DE
	PT opinion maker	IIDE2013D15: “This year 2013, Berlin is immersed in a true 'politics of memory'. A multitude of initiatives evoke the eighty years of the establishment of the Hitler regime. Perhaps most impressive is the exercise of remembrance of the unique victims of Nazism. Throughout the city, especially at subway stations, we catch faces, accompanied by short biographies of men and women (Jews, Democrats, trade unionists, homosexuals) to whom Nazism has stolen the future and often life itself” (Academic)	Opinion article	2013 DE

Table 23 - German Savior: Anti-Nazi Germany

ii. Bad Hegemon

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIDE2013S4: “Internationally, it looks like this: Malta (5,000 asylum seekers per million inhabitants), Sweden (4,600) and Austria (2,100) are clearly ahead of Germany, where 930 asylum seekers came for every 1 million inhabitants in 2012. Switzerland, which is criticized because of its rigid rules for refugees, had a significantly higher rate last year than Germany: 3575 asylum seekers per million inhabitants. (...) On average, according to the BAMF, it takes about eight months to decide on an asylum application. Months in which people with often tragic fates live in the smallest space. "Inhumane", "isolation", "jail": Again and again, there are some strong criticism of the type of accommodation, the victims themselves make hunger strikes about their situation (...); “Dublin II Regulation of 2003, because it makes it easy for Germany to send refugees back to EU countries: It shifts the responsibility for asylum procedures to the member state into which the refugee first entered - in other words, the coastal states of Italy , Greece and Spain.”	News Article	2013 DE
DN	DE Opinion Maker	IVPT2015D1: “[Merkel] takes advantage of this opportunity for the entry of a cheap, almost slave labor, who can certainly work at minimal prices in the German economy? Solidarity? I do not think so.” (Academic)	Opinion Article	2015 PT

Table 24 – Bad hegemon: Germany does not welcome refugees

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIDE2013S4: “Refugees are being labeled as criminals and welcomed in the neighborhood with Hitler salute. Not just members of the right-wing parties. But also - and that is actually dramatic in the current events - frightened citizens.”	News Article	2013 DE
		VDE2017S1: “On this Sunday, a right-wing populist party will be elected in parts with right-wing extremist members in the Bundestag. It is a break in the self-image of this country. And the strange silence, even apathy, before this historic quake is depressing.”; “[...]”	Opinion Article	2017 DE

		the history of Nazi Germany and thus the responsibility before the Holocaust, a basic social consensus that was staged again after the reunification of Germany with the Holocaust memorial in the middle of Berlin, but that has lost more and more of its naturalness in recent years. The racism and resentment that emerge behind it are always terrifying, especially since the basic assumption of the reason-controlled being is that things get better the longer they last, so that progress is possible; a guess that often goes against historical evidence, but the terrible examples, which also seem to lie in human nature, tend to be forgotten” (Journalist)		
	Foreign Press	VDE2017S7: “(...) country from which the Nazi terror once originated”; “Germany is no longer a "holy special case", the "moral superiority" to its European neighbors and the USA will, therefore, “decrease rapidly””; “This is in every respect a turning point in the history of the Federal Republic, never since its early history has a rabid nationalist, anti-Islamic, in part racist and right-wing party sit in parliament, not at all in this size - the old federal consensus, these forces to exclude the political discourse, is spectacularly broken. (...) Conversely, one can say that it merely 'normalized' the political situation: Germany was the last country in Central Europe without a big right-wing protest party.”	News Article	2017 DE
CM	CM	VDE2017C7: “Party leader 'Alternative for Germany' praised the achievements of German soldiers in World War II.”	News Article	2017 DE
	Turkish Political Definer	DE2017C18: “German majority politics, which slip into populism and the intention to see the 'other' only as an enemy, only encourages discrimination and racism” (Spokesman for the presidency of Turkey)	News Article	2017 DE
DN	DN / Vox Pop	VDE2017D24: “The AfD, whose leaders reject the far-right label, came in third, after Merkel's CDU/CSU and Martin Schulz's SPD. Charlotte is not surprised. "I think there was always a racist base in German society that now sees AfD as what it has always wanted. In Saxony it is like that”	Feature	2017 DE
		VDE2017D18: “"I grew up in the former GDR, I can live with that," he says wryly, stressing that the true "German reunification never happened because the East has always been placed at a lower level." In his view, this partly explains, in addition to the issue of refugees and immigrants, the rise of AfD in voting intentions for Sunday's legislatures in Germany. (...) "I have a 40-year-old former neighbor who says loud	Feature	2017 DE

		and clear that he will vote for AfD just in protest. People in the East have the strange feeling that they don't belong to anything at all.”		
PT Opinion Makers	VDE2017D2:	“Helmut Kohl was the last chancellor to consider that "German guilt" (die Deutsche Schuld) for the catastrophic search for power, culminating in the Holocaust, had not yet been prescribed, and this was positive not only for Europe but to defend Germany from its own devils. (...) Gauland is the extreme version of an aspiration for the "normalcy" of national selfishness. (...) The neo-Nazi nationalism of AfD is a problem of "normalcy" in overdose. The countdown to European fragmentation has accelerated again.” (Academic)	Opinion Article	2017 DE
	VDE2017D9:	“There is, therefore, an affliction in the lives of millions of Germans, certainly aware of the Nazi horrors, that makes them not afraid to politically support people who speak in this way, too close to the family of ideas that fueled the hatred that gave rise to the conquest. of power by Adolf Hitler, cooked by the resentment and desire for revenge of Germany of 1930, starved to death and stupidly humiliated by the victorious countries of the great war” (Journalist)	Opinion Article	2017 DE
Turkish Political Definer	VDE2017D4:	“In a statement, his ministry also accused German political leaders of encouraging "Islamophobia”	News Article	2017 DE

Table 25 - Bad hegemon: Neo-Nazi Germany

II. Representations of Europe

i. European Power: Bad

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IVPT2015D1: “(...) it is almost impossible - unfortunately - to fail to observe how the hypocrisy of realpolitik and the world of geostrategic and political interests intersect for (...) offer an even more inhumane dimension to this tragedy” (Academic)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
		VDE2017D9: “Before immigration was a common problem in so many European countries, there was another process that took them so far. It was a long process of disintegrating European society, built on top of a top-down Union: political corruption; financial scandals; immeasurable fortunes; dramatic bankruptcies; frauds; manipulation of democracy;	Opinion Article	2017 DE

instrumentalization of justice; degradation in the last 10 years of living conditions of the poorest; unemployment; job insecurity; inequalities; indifference to the sovereignty of the peoples; neo-colonialist militarism and deliberate concealment and contempt for the progressive experiences of twentieth-century human history” (Journalist)

Table 26 – Representations of Europe: European power: bad

ii. Europe of the Nation States

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IVPT2015B3: “But whether such images of misery, helplessness and exhaustion, created on European soil, will really be a thing of the past here depends very much on whether the European Union finally manages to agree on a common refugee policy”; “other EU states, such as Hungary, are presenting themselves from an ugly side and are putting their faith in a martial deterrent without compassion”	News Article	2015 PT
	SPD	VDE2017B1: “Asylum applications should be submitted before entry into the EU, asylum seekers distributed "fairly" in Europe”	News Article	2017 DE
	FDP	VDE2017B1: “EU states without refugees should pay”	News Article	2017 DE
Spiegel	Spiegel	IVPT2015S9: “In refugee policy, Europe is experiencing a return of nation states that have their own interests in view, at the cost of European values. (...) In the dispute over a refugee quota, a majority of EU states simply overruled deviants from Eastern Europe”	News Article	2015 PT
	DE Opinion Maker	IVPT2015S5: “The friendly press should not fool us. As long as the refugees stay in Germany, the neighbors like to watch as we open hearts and barns. However, as soon as we ask them to join the rescue work, the fun stops. Should it have been the Chancellor's calculation that the neighbors would make an example of our charity, she has thoroughly miscalculated. We are becoming more and more lonely” (Journalist)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
DN	UK Opinion Maker	IVPT2015D4: “There are no easy solutions to the refugee crisis in Europe. In a world of fragile states and increasing mobility, people will continue to come, regardless of whether or not they fit the legal definition of "refugee" correctly. Europe needs a clear	Interview	2015 PT

strategy on who it wants to protect and where and how to assess people's asylum applications.” (Academic)

Table 27 – Representations of Europe: Europe of the Nation States

iii. Europeanness

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	PT Opinion maker	IVPT2015D2: “Especially because the reason why Aylan came to our beach is too complex, too difficult (who has a solution for Syria and ISIS, raise your arm), too contradictory to our vision of Europeans who despair at low birth rates but don't want to nor dream of compensating it with non-Europeans. Even because hosting and integrating the Aylans costs money” (Journalist)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
		IVPT2015D1: “[...] because this child [Alan Kurdi] is dressed like a Westerner, and in his dress in Europeans we recognize someone like our children, nephews, cousins or grandchildren.” (Academic)	Opinion Article	2015 PT
		IVPT2015D5: “[...] what we face now is a human drama that has, among many other causes, Western errors, namely unsubstantiated military interventions, or forgetting the prudential rule of choosing a lesser evil, as, for example, happened in Iraq. The only way to stop this emigration is to be able to establish a good government in the origin of the fugitives, and in the elimination of the companies that grow profits as they cause the transformation of the Mediterranean into a cemetery”; “[...] the process of migration that is disturbing Europe is birthing and reinforcing Islamophobia, which, above all, puts fear before humanistic values. Nationalist and Eurosceptic movements that support the formation of forces opposed to Europeanist of unity, affirming the risk to European cultural values and of Europe's very identity, cannot be ignored”; “Fear is not the best state of mind, humanitarianism is the priority requirement, and it is therefore inexcusable that a European Union ruler [referring to Hungarian PM Orbán] has shown complete ignorance or forgetfulness that fortuitous acts trigger great catastrophes: the death of a prince was enough to trigger the First World War” (Academic)	Opinion Article	2015 PT

Table 28 – Representations of Europe: Europeanness

III. Representations of Portugal

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	PSD	VDE2017C14 ""In Portugal we have no reason to have the kind of concerns that are felt in Germany and in the center of Europe, which have been particularly sought after by movements of refugees," he [Pedro Passos Coelho] said."	News Article	2017 DE
	CM	IIIEP2014C10: "Expected far-right growth may mark this month's European elections, but not all countries have strong extremist parties for historical reasons, such as the Portuguese case"	News Article	2014 EP

Table 29 – Representations of Portugal: irrelevance and no extremism

b) Representations of *them*

I. *The refugee/migrant other*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IVPT2015B4: "Is our German asylum law really an incentive for refugees to come to us? Asylum seekers in Germany receive accommodation, meals and up to 359 euros/month"	News Article	2015 PT
	Bild, CDU	IVPT2015B4: "The government still wants to reduce the payment (...) The reason: "No false incentives should be set"."	News Article	2015 PT
	CSU	IVPT2015B4: "Bavaria's finance minister Markus Söder (48) warned: Many refugees come from the civil war - "maybe also civil warriors""	News Article	2015 PT
	AfD	VDE2017B1: Border closure! Stop immigration, deport refugees rigorously ("negative immigration"), reduce the brain drain. Burka- / minaret ban. No asylum without papers. No German passport for migrant children"	News Article	2017 DE
Spiegel	Right-wing populists	VDE2017S6: "Merkel must accept the accusation of having favored the rise of right-wing populists with her refugee policies."	News Article	2017 DE
CM	CM	VDE2017C16: "Refugee rapes and kills daughter of EU consultant"	News Article	2017 DE
	Portuguese Diplomat	VDE2017C1: "Berlin has given exemplary support to these refugees, but many are those who criticize such openness, as they fear the effects it will have on (...) German identity."; "many are those who	Opinion	2017 DE

		criticize such openness, as they fear the effects it will have on employment levels”		
	PNR	IVPT2015C5: "We are the only party in Portugal that denounces this situation and warns of the danger that this represents against our internal security and against our identity", claimed Pinto-Coelho, considering that the announced support for refugees "represents an affront, an offense "to many Portuguese people who" are not given a home, are not given subsidies"	News Article	2015 PT
DN	AfD	VDE2017D17: “And then there are security problems, there was an attack in Berlin here, because there is no real border control. This is not xenophobia. It's a fact.”; “the refugee crisis, which is no natural disaster, is a crisis generated by Merkel’s hand”	Interview	2017 DE
	AfD voters	VDE2017D24: “A supporter of the CDU, she thinks that "(...) Many people voted for AfD because they are afraid of refugees and think the state gives them more money than they do. It's not true. The state helps all the people who are poor”"	Feature	2017 DE
	DE Journalist	VDE2017D14: “After the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks, the population wants to feel safe, better protected.”	Interview	2017 DE

Table 30 – The refugee/migrant other: refugees/migrants are a threat

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	AfD	VDE2017B1: “Burka- / minaret ban”	News Article	2017 DE
	DE President (independent)	IVPT2015B5: “[...] integrating refugees will pose a greater task to Germany than German unity. The common goal: to create an inner bond between locals and newcomers. "Unlike back then, what did not previously belong together should now grow together," he said. Much greater distances would have to be overcome than between East and West Germans, who would have had a language and a common culture and history”, also adding that it “takes time for newcomers to get used to a social order that often	News Article	2015 PT

		brings them into conflict with their traditional norms” and that “[o]ur values are not up for discussion”		
Spiegel I	Spiegel	VDE2017S4: “Muslims living in Germany are less likely than most other EU countries to feel disadvantaged because of their skin color or origin - Germany is in the middle of discrimination because of religion. (...) According to FRA, when comparing different groups within a country, the most striking differences were found in Germany: in this country, only 18 percent of Turkish-Muslim Muslims felt discriminated against, compared to 50 percent of Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa”; “EU study: More Muslims complain of discrimination because of their religion”; “Particularly often headscarf or veil-wearing Muslim women reported from hostility to physical attacks”	News Article	2017 DE
CM	PNR	IVPT2015C5: “Islamic conquest of Europe”; “On Wednesday, the National Renovator Party (PNR) warned, during a street raid in Lisbon in the late afternoon, against the "Islamic invasion" that threatens the country and Europe”	News Article	2015 PT
	CDU	IVPT2015C1: “Accepting German laws and values means "to tell the real name and country of origin to employers, not to fight, to have patience and to respect others, regardless of religion or gender"”	News Article	2015 PT
DN	DN	VDE2017D20: “These results “completely discredit the claim that Muslims are not integrated into our societies”; “About 20 million Europeans are Muslims, representing about 4%”; “The agency considers Muslim acceptance by the rest of the European population is low, with one in five people on average saying they would not like to have neighbors of Islamic faith.”	News Article	2017 DE
	CDU	VDE2017D23: “Asked about the compatibility between Islam and German culture, the chancellor stressed that these are compatible realities as long as the German Constitution is respected.”		
	AfD	VDE2017D17: This is a question that goes beyond morality. Of course, anyone who accepts our values, our Constitution, is welcome, but we do not want within a few generations to have Sharia established here	Interview	2017 DE
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017D9: “He [Gauland, AfD] does not defend the superiority of the Aryan race over the others but says that Germany should not receive Syrian refugees	Opinion Article	2017

because, I quote, "Islam is not part of German culture"" (Journalist)

Table 31- *The refugee/migrant other: Us and them*

II. Refugees are welcome...

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	CDU / CSU	VDE2017B1: "The Union [CDU/CSU] wants to control immigration "wisely" by a "skilled labor immigration law"	News Article	2017 DE
	SPD	VDE2017B1: "The SPD still wants to take on refugees in need, specifically recruit skilled workers as needed"	News Article	2017 DE
	FDP	VDE2017B1: "No upper limit for asylum! "Pick" immigrants as needed", even if "[a]sylum is to be applied for abroad"	News Article	2017 DE
	Die Grünen	VDE2017B1: "skilled workers will be lured by an immigration law (points system)"	News Article	2017 DE

Table 32 – *Refugees are welcome...: As an economic asset*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	DN	VDE2017D8: "German police reported that a 16-year-old Iraqi refugee teenager is in the process of receiving a reward for delivering a lost handbag with 14.000 euro inside"		

Table 33 - *Refugees are welcome...: The good refugee*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Bild	IVPT2015B3: "[...] miserable regions and in their desperation often do not fear the dangers of life to find a place of refuge with the perspective of a better life"	News Article	2015 PT
Spiegel	Spiegel	IIDE2013S4: "Most of the asylum seekers in Germany have fled Russia, Syria, Afghanistan and Serbia, from persecution and hunger, from war, from fear of dying in their home countries"	News Article	2013 DE
DN	UK Definer	IVPT2015D4: "The powerful images of people traveling long distances on railways and motorways have created a general feeling of crisis in Europe. But much of this tragedy and chaos is preventable"	Opinion Article	2015 PT

Table 34 - *Refugees are welcome...: Tragedy*

c) Immigration Society

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
Bild	Die Linke	IIIEP2014B5: “humane treatment of refugees”	News Article	2014 EP
		VDE2017B1: “Die Linke wants to facilitate immigration ("solidary immigration society"). Specifically: Right to work, health and social care for all immigrants (not only those persecuted) after 3 months at the latest”	News Article	2017 DE
	Die Grünen	VDE2017B1: ““Die Grünen call for "safe and legal ways" to Germany, better family reunification (...) skilled workers will be lured by an immigration law (points system)”	News Article	2017 DE

Table 35 – Immigration Society

d) De-othering: Representation

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	Turkish community spokesperson	VDE2017D18: “We always knew that there was a potential here for the extreme right of 20%, which previously could be contained by the CDU and the SPD. Now, with immigration and refugees, the situation has gotten out of control. There is racism and, for this, some will vote for AfD, which in my view is a party that did not accept globalization. But there are also those who vote out of fear or fatigue of the big parties”	Feature	2017 DE
	Syrian refugee	VDE2017D25: “Mohamad fled because he did not want to serve in Assad's army. In Germany, he studies and takes guided tours comparing the history of Germany and Syria. (...) The tour, which lasts two hours, then ends with a visit to a Syrian restaurant "This is where, in 1953, people displeased with the GDR communist regime protested", explains Mohamad, to a group that includes people from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Poland, Uzbekistan, Lithuania etc ... Along the way, parallels between the history of Germany and Syria are established, "Do you see Checkpoint Charlie? In Syria, checkpoints are something very present in everyday life- It is something that may seem strange to you. But it is something that intimidates. It causes fear ", recalls	Feature	2017 DE

the Syrian, who just received a scholarship to study Economics and Political Science”

Table 36 – *De-othering: Representation*

C. Merkel: Power, gender and national identity
 a) Gender

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “59 years old, married and without children”; “Joachim Sauer, divorced and father of two boys, with whom Germany’s ‘iron lady’ maintains a “cordial” relationship”; “She divorced five years later and met her current partner at 32, to whom she dedicated an acknowledgement in her doctorate thesis in Physics”	Article	DE 2013
DN	DN	IIDE2013D21: “She divorced in 1982, but kept her ex-husbands name to this day”; “The CDU/CSU candidate says she likes to cook for him every chance she gets”; “Merkel and Sauer don’t have children in common”	Article	DE 2013

Table 37 – *Gender: Family and home*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “a photograph allegedly of her, practicing nudism in the 70s, caused a noisy buzz worldwide”; “bathing in the warm waters of Southern Italy, next to her husband, a Chemistry professor”	Article	DE 2013

Table 38 – *Gender: Lifestyle*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
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CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “Shortly after the controversy broke out, Merkel was photographed in an elegant black swimsuit and a bright green cover-up.”; “Politics aside, Angela Merkel's life is rather rigorous and gray than necessarily trendy. Even regarding her clothes. Her pantsuits were famous for being, apparently, always the same, although repeated in all possible colors. The lack of originality led fashion designer Karl Lagerfeld to offer his compatriot an advice: "Wear better cut pants and wear the jackets unbuttoned. "The result seems to have been nil. Austerity rules in Merkel's wardrobe, created by Bettina Schoenbach”; “even with ugly suits and fake smiles”	Article	DE 2013
DN	DN	IIDE2013D21: “Eight years later she was able to give her image more color, literally, since the CDU/CSU candidate became known for her blazers in a thousand colors or for her colorful brand handbags. More recently, it was her necklaces that started to make a splash.”	Article	DE 2013

Table 39 – Gender: Looks and style

b) Gender and power

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “most powerful woman in the world”	Article	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C3: “If the country is not able to get out of the quagmire into which it fell, it will not be Our Lady of Berlin who comes to help us.” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C1: “The diatribes around German Chancellor Angela Merkel are a good example of this. In the days of the PS governments, she was José Sócrates’ fairy godmother (...) to feed campaigns to show her as an ugly witch of austerity.” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2013
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “most powerful woman in the world”; “woman who rules Europe”; “In 2005, Merkel finally reached the top becoming Germany’s chancellor. The first woman” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013

Table 40 – Gender and power: Powerful woman

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “Germany’s “Steel Lady””	Article	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C3: “Berlin’s iron lady” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2013

DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “Merkel is as cold as to her idol as she is pragmatic with the consequences” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
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Table 41 – Gender and power: *Iron Lady*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “the minister, whom Helmut Kohl, in the 90s, referred to as “my girl””; “Biographers portray Angela Merkel as a diligent student, always the best in class, but who was not competitive”	Article	DE 2013
DN	Opinion Maker PT	IIDE2013D10: “The girl who became chancellor”; “An ace at Mathematics and not very social during her youth” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
	DN	IIDE2013D21: “She was a minister of Helmut Kohl, who, given her youth, referred to her as “my girl”	Article	DE 2013

Table 42 – Gender and power: *Mädchen*

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “The great German mother”; “Germans now call her ‘Muti’ [sic] – mother”	Article	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C4: “should southern Europe do its homework without assistance from ‘mutti’ Merkel?” (Columnist)	Opinion	DE 2013
DN	DN	IIDE2013D11: “The chancellor’s supporters celebrated “Mutti”’s – “mommy” – victory”	Article	DE 2013

Table 43 – Gender and power: *Mutti*

c) Power

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C19: “Merkel, a cold and ruthless stateswoman” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2017
	PT Opinion Maker	IPT2011C11: “The trip is cheap and patriotic. Take the plane to Madrid, buy some beautiful Spanish cucumbers, hide them in your suitcase and quickly leave for Berlin. When you arrive in the capital of Germany, try	Opinion	PT 2011

		everything to see Mrs. Merkel and offer her the cucumbers. With luck it saves Portugal from certain bankruptcy” (Journalist)		
	BE	IIIEP2014C4: “BE's European head candidate wondered how Paulo Rangel managed to say, "without laughing," that PSD and CDS have put their foot down regarding Angela Merkel about the banking union, underlining an "extreme subservience" of the Government”	Article	EP 2014
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIIDE2013D10: “Timing and will are two of the most important traits of top politicians and Angela Merkel added them early on to ambition. There is no problem or exceptionality in this: there are vast examples, throughout the world, of paths more or less similar to hers, the point is that we usually do not attribute this refined calculation to it as well.”; “On the night the Wall came down, Angela followed her routine and headed for the sauna. Politics, Western democracy and the struggle for a different Germany from the one she knew until she was 36 years old never made her move a finger of conviction.”;(Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
	DN	IIIEP2014D4: “German Chancellor Angela Merkel, more than ever seen as the European Union's boss, has never shown great enthusiasm in a Parliament and a Commission capable of asserting themselves at the expense of States. And she can take the opportunity to impose her candidate.”	Article	EP 2014
	PT Opinion Maker	IVPT2015D1: “... someone who the overwhelming majority of Europeans consider to be inhumane and responsible for the protection of Germany’s financial interests in detriment of the people of other countries”; : “(...) why wouldn’t Merkel take this opportunity for the entrance of a cheap, almost slave labor, who can certainly work at minimal prices in the German economy? Solidarity? I do not think so.” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2015
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017D12: “(...) the expectation is high regarding the exercise of an assumed (for many Machiavellian) German hegemony in Europe” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2017
	DN	IIIDE2013D11: “in Southern countries, the chancellor is not very popular”	Article	DE 2013

Table 44 – Power: Merkievel

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
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CM	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C3: “Europe shudders again. Tomorrow Angela Merkel will renew her chancellor term. After 11 years in power, the fourth term is a prize for a risky gamble: opening the door to refugees from the war in Syria, setting an example for the whole of Europe.” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2017
	PT Diplomat	IIDE2013C11: “Perhaps this is not the result desired by those for whom Merkel (why this insistence on calling her "Mrs Merkel"?) Has become a symbol of European selfishness. There is some injustice in this image of the German Chancellor”	Opinion	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C12: “Merkel faces the great challenge of leading Germany and Europe to a path of prosperity. Only in this way is it possible to keep the peace in this continent.” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2017
	PSD - O	VDE2017C14: "Mrs. Merkel was not one of the laborers of European architecture, but she was certainly, after Maastricht, the leader in Europe who has most persistently contributed to the reform of the institutions and to complete what remains to be done"	Article	DE 2017
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C19: “The German chancellor saved the Euro, and, thus, the European project.” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2017
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017C17: “But none of this means that the patrols that marched against Merkel will miss her. On the contrary: the decrease in her authority and the growth of the 'austeritarian' phalanx is the best balm to end the slump. What would extremists do without a German scarecrow to fight?” (Journalist)	Opinion	DE 2017
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “There are those who admire her for the handling of the German chancellery and control of the European machine”; “Angela Merkel emerges as a leader on all fronts. Not as much with a clear purpose of becoming European czarina – although, Catherine, the Great is the portrait in her office” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
	DN	IIDE2013D11: “the German press spoke of a "Merkel Republic" and evoked "Merkelism"”; “Merkel, 59, is also seen by the media as the Queen of Europe”	Article	DE 2013
	DN	IIDE2013D21: “Merkel enjoys a high rate of popularity, not least because of the way she has responded to the Eurozone crisis. Demanding rigor, austerity and reforms from the most afflicted states, in exchange for financial assistance”	Article	DE 2013

FR	VDE2017D13: “The chancellor could have wanted to	Article	DE 2017
Opinion Maker	have Europe’s moral regency by practicing a welcoming policy for war refugees” (Academic)		

Table 45 – Power: Queen of Europe

d) Power and symbolic identity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “German leaders seem to have a natural inclination towards hiding their true family origins. Before the most powerful woman in the world did so, Adolf Hitler also omitted his Austrian origin...”	Article	DE 2013
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “But there are also those who paint her as the reincarnation of the worst evils that Germany gave the world in the last century” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013

Table 46 – Power and symbolic identity: Nazi ghost

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “Beyond Merkel lies a permanent, geographically imposing and politically impacting reality called Germany”; “But it is not realistic to think that it is not in this Europe that Merkel decides and in this Germany that she seeks to be elected.”; “Germans like leadership, trust in their model and many admire the way in which she exercises power”; “Merkel’s German leadership” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	VDE2017D12: “exercise of a German hegemony”, “The German question, reopened in this election, is, thus, twofold: the future of the euro (and the European Union) requires a German leadership that is culturally reluctant and Merkel’s electoral campaign only apparently brings stability. Germany remains overwhelmed by its paradoxes.” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2017

Table 47 – Power and symbolic identity: European hegemony

e) Symbolic identity

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “She is the favorite for her rigor, pragmatism and frugality, quite in the German spirit”; “The Economist considered this “frugal, pragmatic and unpretentious” woman the “safest pair of hands” for Europe”	Article	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C5: “On her side, Merkel has the bad taste, Lutheranism, Germanic discipline and half of her electorate” (Columnist)	Opinion	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IPT2011C6: “Angela Merkel found, terrified, an invasion by legions of E.coli - a bacterium with a horror of soap and disinfectant. It could only be something that came from the barbarians of the South. The German gut, used to sausages, pork and sauerkraut cabbage, is a little bottle of rose water” (Journalist)	Opinion	PT 2011
DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “In a very particular style, without exuberance of states of mind, in a growing, self-confident and changing Germany. In other words, we could have an Angela Merkel in any European government, but we couldn’t have this Angela Merkel outsider of this Germany.” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013

Table 48 – Symbolic identity: Germanness

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
CM	CM	IIDE2013C2: “The current chancellor is the daughter of a couple of Lutheran pastors “	Article	DE 2013
	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013C5: “Merkel has bad taste, Lutheranism, German discipline and half of her electorate on her side” (Columnist)	Opinion	DE 2013
DN	DN	IIDE2013D11: “daughter of a Lutheran pastor”	Article	DE 2013
		IIDE2013D21: “Daughter of a Lutheran pastor”	Article	DE 2013

Table 49 – Symbolic identity: Protestantism

Media	Definer	Quote	Type	Timeframe
GDR	CM CM	IIDE2013C2: “traded the city for communist Eastern Germany. But there, Angela’s family was never like Eastern ones. It received correspondence and packages from the West side.”; “There is not much unanimity about her father, who remained between criticism and adaptation to the regime, and who could have had a short relationship with the Stasi (the former GDR’s secret services).”; “Peer Steinbrueck, who	Article	DE 2013

blamed Angela for “not being passionate about Europe because she grew up in the GDR”.”

DN	PT Opinion Maker	IIDE2013D10: “politics only crossed her path because the GDR was stronger than the citizens and left no one out of the scriptures.”; “the first head of government from the East” (Academic)	Opinion	DE 2013
DN		IIDE2013D21: “She belonged to the Free German Youth, and thanks to having lived with the communist regime, she knows how to speak Russian well”	Article	DE 2013
		IIDE2013D11: “the first to have been raised in the East”	Article	DE 2013

Table 50 -Symbolic identity: GDR