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SOCIOLOGY | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Sentiment prevalence on *Jihad*, Caliphate, and *Bid'ah* among Indonesian students: Focusing on moderate-radical muslim group tension

Yusuf Hanafi^{1*}, Muhammad Lukman Arifianto¹, Muhammad Saefi², Hanik Mahliatussikah¹, Faris Khoiril Anam¹, Abd Rauf Hassan³ and Muhammad Fahmi Hidayatullah⁴

Abstract: In reality, many students misunderstand several Islamic religious terms that come from Arabic; regarding *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*. This study used qualitative and quantitative data collection methods to investigate students' perspectives on these terms. We collected data through a questionnaire on 122 Muslim students at the university who were suspected of being exposed to radicalism. After examining student responses, our examination led to mapping "positive," "moderate," and "negative" sentiments. The results revealed that few students achieved a positive category. Students expressed their attitudes, beliefs, and evaluations that the term Islam was abused and associated with violence, enforcement of the caliphate, and accusations of *bid'ah* against different groups. Analysis of data on student comments revealed that students' meaning of terms tended to be influenced by the definition of radical Muslim groups. These findings indicate that radical groups can influence the way students interpret a term and create negative sentiments. Through this research, we suggest that "an indicator of moderate-radical Muslim group tension," in the context of this study, between Nahdlatul Ulama and



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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The phenomenon of radicalism and intolerance in educational institutions, including the campuses of Public Universities, has become a hot discourse and deep concern from almost all circles, from academics, clergy, civil society to the government. The issue of radicalism and intolerance continues to strengthen along with the many findings indicating that most campuses in Indonesia have been exposed to radicalism. Radicalism and intolerance are heavily influenced by the misunderstanding of religious terms, which are interpreted deviating from their genuine meanings. This study reveals the prevalence of student sentiment towards *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*, the three Islamic terms most often identified with violent teachings and anti-government calls. This study recommends the importance of implementing deradicalization policies on Indonesian campuses through the sowing of moderate ideology and inclusive theology and the enforcement of vigilance and strict supervision of student organizations from the threat of radical infiltration.

Muhammadiyah versus Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, can be used as material for deradicalisation policies for campuses in Indonesian.

Subjects: Sociology of Knowledge; Islam; Higher Education; Religion

Keywords: Bid'ah; caliphate; jihad; moderate; perspective; radicalism

1. Introduction

A series of arrests of lecturers, students, and alumni on campus has encouraged the government and universities to commit to deradicalisation efforts. However, carrying out reforms in the campus environment will be complicated, considering that students have misunderstood the interpretation of the term Islamic originating from Arabic (Bostom, 2005; Gerges, 2009; Moniruzzaman, 2008; Phares, 2005). Just like the opinion of Western society, students tend to interpret Islamic religious terms such as *jihad* as “war” and “acts of violence” (Johnson, 1997; Silverman & Sommer, 2019). Furthermore, they saw this term as an effort to reject the practice of *bid'ah* and the Pancasila democratic system in Indonesia. Violent *jihad* is aimed against traditional Islam and modern democratic systems (Sirgy et al., 2018). On the other hand, the moderate groups that try to re-interpret and counter-discourse the term *jihad* are actually accused by the *Takfiri* group as heretical and infidels.

Besides, there are efforts to commodify religion by organisations with radical views by utilising students' religious understanding, which is relatively immature, incomplete, and narrow. In the religious context, commodification will position religion as something suitable for public consumption through its spiritual function (Kitiarsa, 2010; Mawani & Mukadam, 2011; Ornella, 2013). Practically, the commodification of religion is the transformation of the use-value of religion as a way of life and the source of normative values—which are based on religious beliefs—into commodities that have exchange value (York, 2001).

Much of the debate around *jihad* occurs among Muslim students and scholars. This phenomenon has shown that Islam and its terms is a controversial topic and forces students to become accustomed to the abuse of the term Islam by radical groups to achieve their politics and goals (Moniruzzaman, 2008). Furthermore, the misuse of these terms has created multiple competing identities within the Muslim student community. On the one hand, radical groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) are committed to establishing a caliphate through *jihad* (Kartini, 2016; Mohamed Osman, 2010).

An Alvara Research Center poll in 2017 showed that many students supported the formation of an Islamic state and caliphate promoted by HTI. The debate among students was more about the essence of Islam as opposed to the diverse expressions of local Indonesian culture and the development of *bid'ah* practices and the future of the Indonesian nation, which is considered to be better by implementing the caliphate system. On the other hand, moderate groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) have actively promoted the concept of contextual *jihad* by seeing the form of Pancasila democracy under and in line with Islamic teachings (F. Ismail, 2011).

Although radical groups such as HTI are a minority of the Indonesian Muslim population, they have political power and thought control mosques in the campus area and target student *da'wah* institutions (Mohamed Osman, 2010; Salim, 2006). They were very vocal in echoing the perception of oppressed Islam, claiming to speak for a community, and defining the terms of the Arabic language for their political struggle among students. Considering that the political influence of these radical groups has spread to the campus environment, university stakeholders must immediately take quick action in the deradicalisation process to ward off the movement of these influences.

Regarding students' understanding and perspectives on Islamic religious terms, of course, we cannot blame it for granted because basically, these terms contain many meanings, both in terms of linguistic

and contextual meanings. The word has been adopted or agreed to be a term in a particular scientific field. However, for some groups, understanding the meaning of a term that has been used or standardised in a specific field usually tends to be followed by setting aside other meanings—even the original meaning—contained in the word. This needs to be watched out for because this thinking is undoubtedly hazardous and will lead to narrow religious views and negative sentiments.

The author intends to contribute to radicalism efforts and impart knowledge to Islamic religious educators in universities. The author examines three passionate Islamic terms—*jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*—which have sparked debate among many students. This study will investigate students' perspectives on these terms. The perspective and prevalence of student sentiment are essential keys to understanding the direction of their thoughts, views, and logic flow. By knowing and mapping these things wisely, the negative impact of student understanding can be minimised.

2. Materials and methods

2.1. Design

This study used qualitative and quantitative data collection methods to produce data in assessing the perspective and prevalence of student sentiment regarding the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah* as terms that were often debated and controversial among students in higher education. The independent variables are gender, age, family, study programs, length of study, regional origin, and religious affiliation. To obtain a deeper understanding of the problems in this study, the questionnaire was also equipped with open-ended questions to complement the quantitative data from the survey. This mix-method was intended to document comprehensive findings, using qualitative data to support the quantitative data findings.

2.2. Participants

In recruiting participants, the university as the research setting was first determined. We set the research out in three universities in Malang, East Java, Indonesia. The research site was chosen purposively where there were reports of allegations of a radicalism campaign among students, which were closely related to the issues of *jihad* and the caliphate. This purposive technique was combined with the snowball technique to select the participants. Our criteria for these participants were undergraduate students, Muslim, and accustomed to knowing *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*. Participants who claimed they were educated below and above the bachelor's level, non-Muslims, and had never heard of the three terms were eliminated. A total of 122 undergraduate students participated in this study. Their average age was 20.30 ± 1.96 years with a range of 19–29 years.

3. Data collection

Data collection was conducted between July and August 2020. Before the study commencement, a questionnaire and a short description were written and submitted to the university committee concerned for research approval. We conducted a series of meetings with Islamic religious education lecturers to obtain informed consent. In this meeting, the objectives and design of the study were explained. The primary research team was introduced, and lecturers were assured that all information gathered would be confidential. The main research team also used this opportunity to obtain approval from the lecturers. The lecturer gave unanimous consent to participate, provided avenues, and facilitated data collection. After the participants gave informed consent, they completed the online questionnaire consisting of open- and closed-ended questions for 15–20 minutes. The questionnaire was designed and executed using a Google Form, and the link was disseminated to the participating students in the three universities.

4. Measurement

The measurement in this study used three questionnaires, namely questionnaires A, B, and C. They asked students about their perceptions and the prevalence of their sentiments regarding the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*. We analysed and investigated students' perceptions toward three-term from some literature. Two professors, one from the Islamic education program and the other

from the Arabic education program, reviewed the concept and instrument. We developed the proportional knowledge statement as a fundamental concept of instrument arrangement from these results. Experts have examined the face and content validity of all closed and open questions with the Content Validity Index (CVI) results of more than 0.8. This means that there are no severe problems with sentence structure and structure.

Questionnaire A consists of 15 statements with four negative statements, while questionnaires B and C each consist of 18 questions with five negative statements. All questionnaires were made on a – 5 point Likert scale, from strongly agree (5) to disagree strongly (1), and reversed for negative statement scores. The maximum expected score on questionnaire A is 75, and the minimum is 15, while for questionnaires B and C, the maximum score is 90, and the minimum is 18. To determine the prevalence of “positive” sentiment, it is based on Bloom’s cut-off point of 80%. (Goni et al., 2019), namely 60 out of 75 (Jihad) and 72 out of 90 (caliphate and bid’ah), while to determine the “moderate” sentiment, namely 60% –79%, and less than 60% are stated to have “negative” sentiments. A RASCH analysis was carried out on the questionnaire to ensure validity and reliability. The complete results of the analysis are presented in Table 1.

The results of the assumption test use unidimensionality (Linacre, 1998) and local independence (Christensen et al., 2017) have met the criteria so that the analysis can be continued. Judging from the reliability and separation item, it can be qualified in a particular category (Bond & Fox, 2007). In contrast, several items do not meet the MNSQ, Zstd, and PTMEA parameters, but only one of the criteria to maintain all items (N. E. Ismail et al., 2020). From the rating scale analysis, the questionnaire functions well, where the choices are given that are not confusing and easy to interpret (Kim & Kyllonen, 2006). Finally, the TIF analysis shows that the questionnaire was given to students to produce very high levels of information when given to students with moderate abilities. At the end of the questionnaire, students were given three open questions, namely:

- (1) When you hear the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid’ah* right now, what is the thing that comes to your mind or memory?
- (2) What if your friends, relatives, and family understand the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid’ah* that are different from yours?
- (3) Should there be some effort from religious institutions and academics to examine and review the understanding of the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid’ah* and disseminate it to the public?

5. Data analysis

Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics to understand the distribution of each independent variable and inferential statistics to examine the relationship between the independent variables (participants’ demographic characteristics) and the dependent. Descriptive statistics use frequency and percentages, while inferential statistics use an independent t-test and one-way ANOVA analysis to assess differences in mean scores based on the independent variables. Pearson rank correlation analysis is to understand the relationship between student responses to *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid’ah*.

The qualitative data were analysed and arranged thematically based on objectives. The analysis was carried out in four stages. Data were analysed using content analysis, with four main stages: decontextualisation, recontextualisation, categorisation, and compilation (Bengtsson, 2016). In the decontextualisation stage, we read the entire transcript to learn how the student’s perceptions of *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid’ah* were enacted. After that, the transcript was broken down into meaningful units and labelled with a code, such as a “struggle,” “striving,” “bomb,” “terrorist,” “war,” and “suicide.” In the recontextualisation stage, we read and check the final list of meaningful units. We provided different text colours to facilitate coded labelling.

Table 1. Summary of the results of the validation of the questionnaire using RASCH analysis

Aspect	Parameter	Questionnaire A.	Questionnaire B.	Questionnaire C.
Unidimensionality	More than 30%	Assumptions are met	Assumptions are met	Assumptions are met
local independence	Maximum 0.30	Assumptions are met	Assumptions are met	Assumptions are met
Reliability item	More than 0.90	0.98	0.94	0.91
Separation item	More than 2.0	7.23	3.89	3.07
Outfit and Infit MNSQ	0.60–1.50	All items meet the criteria	All items meet the criteria	One item does not meet the criteria (N2)
Outfit and Infit Zstd	± 0.20	Three items do not meet the criteria (N8, N14, and N15)	Five items did not meet the criteria N3, N7, N11, N15, and N16	Six items do not meet the criteria (N3, N7, N8, N9, N15, N18)
PTMEA	0.30–0.70	Five items do not meet the criteria below 0.3 but are positive (N5, N6, N7, N9, and N10)	All items meet the criteria	All items meet the criteria
Rating scale	Move from none to negative, then positive with MNSQ in range	Fulfilled with MNSQ in the range 0.87–1.24	Fulfilled with MNSQ in the 0.92–1.43 range	Fulfilled with MNSQ in the 0.97–1.28 range
Wright map	The most straightforward and most challenging item to answer	N5 and N7	N7 and N4	N8 and N10
Test information function (TIF)	–	Optimal for students with moderate ability	Optimal for students with moderate ability	Optimal for students with moderate ability

We used inductive and iterative processes to identify descriptive categories in the categorisation stage. This process led to the category mapping tree employed clustering of the extracted segments into the representing categories of the different sentiments, such as “struggle,” “striving” in neutral sentiment, “bomb,” “terrorist,” “war,” and “suicide” in negative sentiment. This process concluded with counting the categories’ extracted segments. We have been trained to achieve consistency in criteria and quality of data coding (Cohen’s Kappa for intra- and inter-observer reliability of 0.65 with p-value 0.000). Finally, in the compilation stage, we concluded. In reporting the results, participants are given a number, namely S1 for the first student and so forth. This aims to maintain the confidentiality of respondents and observe the ethics of qualitative research.

6. Results

6.1. Resources

All participants have heard the terms *jihad*, *caliphate*, and *bid’ah*. Participants prefer to follow the news or learn the three terms from various sources. In terms of *jihad*, mostly from religious books (68.03%) and social media (62.29%) (see, Figure 1). In terms of the *caliphate*, most of them come from social media (63.94%) and religious books (62.29%) (see, Figure 2). Meanwhile, most of the terms of *bid’ah* came from religious books (72.13%) and virtual recitation (68.85%), while social media was in third place (66.39%) (see, Figure 3).

6.2. Student sentiment perspective and prevalence

The average score of student responses to questionnaire A was 51.43 ± 4.75 , questionnaire B was 67.85 ± 11.85 , and questionnaire C was 67.13 ± 9.92 . Based on the average student response

Figure 1. Profile of sources of information related to the term *jihad*.




Figure 2. Profile of sources of information related to terms of the caliphate.





Figure 3. Profile sources of information related to the term *Bid'ah*.




score, the prevalence of moderate sentiment is close to positive. Based on Bloom's cut off criterion, students who indicated a positive sentiment in the term of *jihad* were 4.09%, in the term of the caliphate it was 40.16%, and the term *bid'ah* was 30.33%, a summary of the prevalence distribution of students is presented in Figure 4.

6.3. Jihad

Student responses to the terms of *jihad* are presented in full in Table 2. Based on the percentage of agreeing and strongly agreeing, the highest is the statement that *jihad* can be understood and used positively and universally moral philosophy and principles utilised for greater social and global benefits (91%). The lowest is the statement that the ISIS movement and the Imam's struggle Samudra et al. is in the context of *jihad* (2.5%). Students were the most hesitant when

Figure 4. The distribution of the prevalence of student sentiment regarding the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *Bid'ah*.



asked to respond to the statement that the extreme interpretation of the absolute truth in the Qur'an is the driving force for jihad (32%).

What questions come to your mind or memory about *jihad*? Some students confirmed that *jihad* is a term that a group often understands. Some of the statements are as follows.

Jihad is severe in the way of Allah, which is trying to improve the quality of worship or charity for the hereafter. The point is how we are serious about achieving the vision of the afterlife. But now it is widely rumoured that jihad is war, destroying everything different from our beliefs, of course, belief in religion and carrying out its shari'a;

It crossed the sentence "Jihad Fii Sabilillah," which some groups (affiliations; streams) did not interpret correctly and adequately and was implemented with not true/should not be.

Most of the students gave a neutral response by providing a short statement in the form of the main word "struggle" or "striving" in the path of Allah and upholding Islam (62.3%). Only 12.3% of students responded with negative words such as "bomb," "terrorist," "war," and "suicide." Students responded more positively that *jihad* should be directed more towards doing good in everyday life. Some of the statements are as follows.

Fighting in the way of Allah, in jihad, we can seek as much knowledge as possible to enforce Allah's law or Allah's orders as stated in the Qur'an, and fight, in this war against infidels who resist against Muslims first, but still, there is another way, namely by studying, working, and caring for parents to achieve the pleasure of Allah;

Jihad is a form of action that states a struggle or hard work right; the greatest jihad is jihad against lust. Apart from that, for me, jihad is a struggle to remain steadfast in the path of truth and an effort to become a human being beneficial to religion, homeland, nation, and state.

When students were asked how to respond to differences in understanding *jihad* with other people, most students chose to respect the differences (63.1%). The remaining 32.8% decided to agree with themselves, and the rest preferred not to know. Some notes conveyed by participants that respecting differences does not lead to extremes.

If the understanding they have is under what has been explained in the Qur'an, Hadith, and Pancasila, then I will respect their understanding. However, if their understanding contradicts what has been presented in the Qur'an, Hadith, and Pancasila, then as much as possible, I will try to straighten their understanding;

Table 2. Student responses to the term jihad

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
<i>Jihad</i> has become a misunderstood concept today due to its misuse by headline Islamic groups	2 (1.6)	5 (4.1)	9 (7.4)	65 (53.3)	41 (33.6)
The extreme interpretation of the absolute truth of the Qur'an is the driving force behind <i>jihad</i>	3 (2.5)	10 (8.2)	39 (32.0)	53 (43.4)	17 (13.9)
Terrorism <i>jihad</i> is an organization that uses violence to perpetuate extreme interpretations of the Qur'an	13 (10.7)	22 (18.0)	30 (24.6)	39 (32.0)	18 (14.8)
<i>Jihad</i> is a war against unbelievers in all forms	28 (23.0)	49 (40.2)	36 (29.5)	1 (0.8)	8 (6.6)
<i>Jihad</i> is a war, at the cost of soul and wealth without strings attached, only to achieve the pleasure of God	0 (0.0)	4 (3.3)	9 (7.4)	59 (48.4)	50 (41.0)
The blood of an infidel and his property is lawful	28 (23.0)	37 (30.3)	38 (31.1)	17 (13.9)	2 (1.6)
ISIS movement and the struggle of Imam Samudra et al. is in the context of <i>jihad</i>	64 (52.5)	43 (35.2)	12 (9.8)	3 (2.5)	0 (0.0)
The Qur'an permits violence as an act of defense to protect the Shari'a	24 (19.7)	28 (23.0)	32 (26.2)	33 (27.0)	5 (4.1)
<i>Jihad</i> through war is allowed as long as it aims to uphold Islamic law	8 (6.6)	25 (20.5)	22 (18.0)	56 (45.9)	11 (9.0)

(Continued)

Table 2. (Continued)

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
<i>Jihad</i> with violence is justified if it is in the name of God and with pure and noble intentions, never for self-improvement.	17 (13.9)	45 (36.9)	26 (21.3)	32 (26.2)	2 (1.6)
<i>Jihad</i> with violence is justified to protect and enhance the integrity of Islam and to defend the ummah against hostile infidels	9 (7.4)	38 (31.1)	27 (22.1)	44 (36.1)	4 (3.3)
<i>Jihad</i> contains a universal humanitarian philosophy that is more aimed at human welfare than social war	2 (1.6)	4 (3.3)	20 (16.4)	62 (50.8)	34 (27.9)
<i>Jihad</i> manifests in constant self-control against evil desires	11 (9.0)	18 (14.8)	36 (29.5)	41 (33.6)	16 (13.1)
<i>Jihad</i> manifests in applying the basic principles and values of justice, cooperation, non-aggression, and fighting against the abuse of human rights, social disorder, and terrorism.	0 (0.0)	4 (3.3)	21 (17.2)	70 (57.4)	27 (22.1)
<i>Jihad</i> can be understood and used in a positive sense and universal moral philosophies and principles that are utilised for greater social and global benefits	1 (0.8)	1 (0.8)	9 (7.4)	76 (62.3)	35 (28.7)

Note. 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = doubt, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree

As long as it does not lead to things that are not true, still respect each other's opinions. However, if it plunges, you should try to get him back on the way he should.

Meanwhile, in terms of influencing others to agree, most students choose subtle ways, not forcing, and still prioritising differences.

6.3.1. *Respect opinions, but still educate and show which ones are according to the law*

Exchange opinions, I will respect what he believes. However, if he believes in jihad, it is dangerous and even can injure others. I will try to approach and provide a good and correct understanding of jihad;

If their understanding does not lead to extreme action, we must respect it. Nevertheless, if these differences damage Aqidah, it is necessary to call for explicit opinions and under the understanding of the Ulama (Salafus Salih).

Finally, when asked whether religious and educational institutions need to overcome this, almost all students responded very needlessly (97.5%). Some of the questions are as follows.

It is essential because the misinterpretation and understanding of the question of jihad has a significant impact on religious life in particular and for the nation in general;

It is necessary because today's society needs strengthening related to religion. Nowadays, many people learn from virtual recitation, for example, from YouTube, and they learn from anyone, including the new ustadz, without knowing any explicit scientific knowledge. The need for NU ulama continues to strengthen the understanding of anti-jihad terrorism and violence in society so that they do not waver by provocations of a new group in the name of takbir.

6.4. **Caliphate**

Student responses to the complete terms of the caliphate are presented in Table 3. The highest agree and strongly agree responses (80.3%) are to the two statements, namely the caliphate have become a misunderstood concept at this time due to deviations in their use by the group that supports the state of the caliphate to replace the basis of the state, and the statement that if the caliphate is implemented completely, it will make it difficult to distinguish which one instrument (caliphate) and which one is the goal (good government). The response to disagree and strongly disagree is that the caliphate is the right system, while Indonesia's form of government and ideology is wrong (77.9%). Meanwhile, students appear to be the most hesitant in responding to statements in the Indonesian context. The foundation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is a form of "caliphate," which is valid according to Islam/Al-Quran (45.1%).

When students asked what comes to their mind when they hear the term caliphate, the majority of students relate it to the words "a government system that applies Islamic law" "leadership in Islam" (59.8%). Students also associate the caliphate with the "Islamic state" (19.7%), "past leadership in the era of *al-khulafa al-rasyidun*" (13.9%), and "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)" (6.6%). Student responses to the term caliphate tend to be positive and good but consider it a form of government that is not appropriate to apply in Indonesia. Some of their statements are as follows.

Many people misunderstand the concept of the caliphate and want to apply it in Indonesia. Whereas in my opinion, it is not possible because Indonesia is a pluralistic country and already has principles in the state, namely Pancasila;

Now the caliphate is often misinterpreted and used to change the anomy of Indonesian society. Indonesia is a multicultural and multi-religious country. If the caliphate is implemented, it is unsuitable for Indonesian society with various religious backgrounds. We who are Muslims should respect other religions and appreciate the services of heroes who have

Table 3. Student responses to terms of the caliphate

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
The caliphate has become a misunderstood concept today due to the deviant use of the caliphate state advocates to replace the basis of the state.	2 (1.6)	5 (4.1)	17 (13.9)	67 (54.9)	31 (25.4)
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia misuses the term caliphate and an organisation that instills an ideology that rejects or ignores diversity.	3 (2.5)	3 (2.5)	24 (19.7)	62 (50.8)	30 (24.6)
A large part of society misunderstands the caliphate because it cannot differentiate between Arabism and Islamism	1 (0.8)	2 (1.6)	24 (19.7)	74 (60.7)	21 (17.2)
The caliphate is the correct system, while the form of government and ideology promoted by Indonesia is wrong	48 (39.3)	47 (38.5)	17 (13.9)	9 (7.4)	1 (0.8)
The enforcement of the caliphate is a solution to all problems of the ummah and is an absolute must in Indonesia	41 (33.6)	48 (39.3)	25 (20.5)	5 (4.1)	3 (2.5)
Caliphate is an ideal form of religious and state life for the Republic of Indonesia	36 (29.5)	46 (37.7)	24 (19.7)	15 (12.3)	1 (0.8)
The caliphate must endure until the end of time to carry out a mission so that the role and prophetic mission will continue in the world	18 (14.8)	30 (24.6)	42 (34.4)	18 (23.0)	4 (3.3)

(Continued)

Table 3. (Continued)

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
The caliphate needs to be fought for the kaffah application of Islamic law	18 (14.8)	32 (26.2)	41 (33.6)	30 (24.6)	1 (0.8)
Caliphate is an ideal concept of the past, but it is not necessarily used to achieve prosperity in the present, especially in Indonesia	2 (1.6)	11 (9.0)	25 (20.5)	45 (36.9)	39 (32.0)
If the caliphate is implemented completely, it will not be easy to distinguish between the instrument (caliphate) and the goal (good government).	0 (0.0)	5 (4.1)	19 (15.6)	61 (50.0)	37 (30.3)
Indonesia is a country that has a strong commitment to protecting and facilitating religious life, so there is no need to adopt the Caliphate system ultimately.	0 (0.0)	5 (4.1)	20 (16.4)	58 (47.5)	39 (32.0)
In the Indonesian context, the foundation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is a form of "caliphate," which is legal according to Islam/ Al-Quran.	0 (0.0)	6 (4.9)	55 (45.1)	47 (38.5)	14 (11.5)
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution have carried the spirit and principle of the caliphate under what is required by Islam or the Qur'an.	0 (0.0)	1 (0.8)	37 (30.3)	61 (50.0)	23 (18.9)

(Continued)

Table 3. (Continued)

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
The caliphate is very dangerous because it destroys the commitment of the nation-state of Indonesia (NKRI), the 45 Constitution, Pancasila, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.	4 (3.3)	20 (16.4)	42 (34.4)	38 (31.1)	18 (14.8)
The caliphate might accommodate Islam as the majority religion, but it is dangerous for inter-religious harmony	4 (3.3)	9 (7.4)	22 (18.0)	56 (45.9)	31 (25.4)
Muslims are given the freedom to use a system compatible with the identity and socio-political reality they live in. The caliphate is very irrelevant to life in Indonesia.	1 (0.8)	14 (11.5)	28 (23.0)	59 (48.4)	20 (16.4)
The caliphate has the potential to produce religious radicalism and endanger nationalism	6 (4.9)	16 (13.1)	17 (13.9)	53 (43.4)	30 (24.6)
The caliphate has the potential to destabilise the security of a country, and rampant terrorism and violence	4 (3.3)	17 (13.9)	28 (23.0)	53 (43.4)	20 (16.4)

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = doubt, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree

formulated the basis and constitution of the country. Islam exists to bring peace, not incite hostility and conflict;

In my mind, when I hear the term caliphate, that is a group that wants to make Indonesia a caliphate state, for example, HTI. In my opinion, the Caliphate system is sound, but it is not suitable to be applied in our country.

When students were asked about their attitude towards people who have different understandings and views about the caliphate, most students appreciated differences (68.9%). The rest preferred to influence to have the same view. Many student statements provide an important note that controlling views can be done by discussing the conditions and characteristics of Indonesia.

I will influence by discussing the positive and negative sides of the implementation of the Caliphate system in Indonesia;

Invited to find out what the true meaning of the caliphate and what if it is implemented in Indonesia because Indonesia does not only have Islam;

If his opinion deviates from the Qur'an, hadith, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution as the constitution of the Indonesian state, then I will try to invite him to discuss and help straighten it out;

I am trying to understand the way of thinking and discussing it with respect and appreciation so that the person concerned does not do things that endanger the common good with his understanding.

Finally, when asked whether educational and religious institutions need to participate in studying the terms of the caliphate and disseminating it, 92.6% of students stated that it is necessary. Several reasons given by the students were as follows.

6.4.1. I feel that the understanding of the majority of society today is still inaccurate and diverse It is necessary and reasonably explained. After all, the caliphate is part of Islam and should not be stigmatised with negative views such as violence and radicalism. On the other hand, this concept cannot be forced to be applied in Indonesia;

It is essential because a wrong understanding can influence people to apply it. This condition can threaten the integrity and unity of the Indonesian state.

6.5. Bid'ah

In terms of *bid'ah*, students most agree with the statement that the misuse of the term *bid'ah* is because they do not fully understand the normative basis of the concept of *bid'ah* itself and some of the opinions of scholars and their respective arguments (83.6%), and at least agree with the statement that whatever form of *bid'ah* must be sinful and not part of Islam (62.3%). Students are very hesitant in responding to statements that the concept of *bid'ah* is a new solution introduced by Muslims in their lives (45.1%). A summary of student responses to the term *bid'ah* is presented in Table 4.

Many student statements show the pros and cons, depending on the nature of the *bid'ah*. In students' minds, when they heard the term *bid'ah*, the majority interpreted it as a baseless act and was not exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad (57.4%). Some other students interpret *bid'ah* as something new (16.4%) and sinful (11.5%).

Bid'ah did not exist at the time of the Prophet, a practice that the Prophet did not do. Heresy can be done as long as it does not contradict Islamic law. For example, driving an aeroplane as long as it has a positive impact is allowed as long as it does not contradict Islamic law. However, some innovations should not be done, such as increasing the rakaat for the dawn prayer to 4 rakaat, because it is against Islamic law;

Table 4. Student responses to terms of Bid'ah

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
The misuse of the term is because they do not fully understand the normative basis of the concept of <i>bid'ah</i> itself and some of the opinions of the scholars and their respective arguments	1 (0.8)	2 (1.6)	17 (13.9)	72 (59.0)	30 (24.6)
<i>Bid'ah</i> is often used to label brothers in the same faith (fellow Muslims) as a heretical group (experts on <i>bid'ah</i>)	5 (4.1)	9 (7.4)	17 (13.9)	71 (58.2)	20 (16.4)
Nowadays, Muslims who are mutually hostile and mistrust each other by using the issue of <i>bid'ah</i>	2 (1.6)	5 (4.1)	20 (16.4)	72 (59.0)	23 (18.9)
Whatever form of <i>bid'ah</i> must be sinful and not part of Islam	34 (27.9)	42 (34.4)	23 (18.9)	21 (17.2)	2 (1.6)
<i>Bid'ah</i> deeds cannot be justified because without previous examples, which were fabricated, and were creations that did not previously exist at the time of the Prophet Muhammad.	19 (15.6)	49 (40.2)	27 (22.1)	23 (18.9)	4 (3.3)
<i>Bid'ah</i> always contradicts syara	22 (18.0)	42 (34.4)	46 (37.7)	11 (9.0)	1 (0.8)
Whoever thinks his <i>bid'ah</i> is acceptable, that means he is accusing Muhammad of betraying (not delivering) the message of Allah SWT	27 (22.1)	36 (29.5)	44 (32.0)	11 (9.0)	4 (3.3)

(Continued)

Table 4. (Continued)

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
<i>Bid'ah</i> is not justified because it directs people to do practice as the implementation of a new shari'a	14 (11.5)	40 (32.8)	39 (32.0)	25 (20.5)	4 (3.3)
In understanding the issue of <i>bid'ah</i> , we do not need to claim each other's activities as the most correct and under Islamic teachings	1 (0.8)	6 (4.9)	16 (13.1)	71 (58.2)	28 (23.0)
<i>Bid'ah</i> is not always <i>madzumah</i> / <i>bid'ah</i> that is despicable, so it is not appropriate to label fellow Muslims as <i>bid'ah</i> experts	1 (0.8)	4 (3.3)	25 (20.5)	55 (45.1)	37 (20.3)
Heresy <i>hasanah</i> exists and needs to be understood as a guideline	3 (2.5)	3 (2.5)	35 (28.7)	56 (45.9)	25 (20.5)
As long as it does not conflict with <i>syara'</i> , the creations of Muslims should not be questioned	2 (1.6)	6 (4.9)	22 (18.0)	61 (50.0)	31 (25.4)
Every time there is a sentence of Allah, every word of Muhammad, as well as other actions that have never existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad but do not contradict the core teachings of Islam, it is permissible to do	1 (0.8)	4 (3.3)	35 (28.7)	56 (45.9)	26 (21.3)

(Continued)

Item	1 n (%)	2 n (%)	3 n (%)	4 n (%)	5 n (%)
The understanding of <i>bid'ah</i> must be well understood as a regulatory mechanism for encouraging creativity in Islam	0 (0.0)	6 (4.9)	27 (22.1)	57 (46.7)	32 (26.2)
The concept of heresy as a whole must be viewed as a standard of excellence and not just a condemnation of any unknown practice	0 (0.0)	4 (3.3)	42 (34.4)	52 (42.6)	24 (19.7)
The concept of <i>bid'ah</i> is a new solution introduced by Muslims in their lives	2 (1.6)	17 (13.9)	55 (45.1)	37 (30.3)	11 (9.0)
Ignoring the concept of <i>bid'ah</i> can create intellectual and social helplessness that befell Muslims	1 (0.8)	6 (4.9)	37 (30.3)	64 (52.5)	14 (11.5)
The implementation of <i>bid'ah</i> as a creative process began with the emergence of Islam and was practised by the Prophet Muhammad. those who succeed have a balanced, holistic understanding of religion	1 (0.8)	7 (5.7)	51 (41.8)	51 (41.8)	12 (9.8)

1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Doubt, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree

Bidah is something new that did not exist at the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. Bid'ah there are two hasanah and sayyi'ah; if hasanah then it is proper to be practised, and if it is sayyi'ah then it must be abandoned;

The Prophet did not do something, there is a bid'ah hasanah, and there is a bid'ah dhalalah. A dholalah bidah is a bidah that violates religious rules, for example, Fajr prayer 4 Rakaat. A bid'ah hasanah, which does not conflict with religious rules, is okay, for instance, eating Soto Rawon Pecel (typical Indonesian East Java food) using a telephone/laptop.

What is interesting about the above statement is that students associate it with goods, transportation, and food. Some students associated bid'ah with Tahlilan and Yasinan, identified with Muslim customs affiliated with NU religious organisations, and accused bid'ah experts against NU (8.2%).

Just like in the concept of the caliphate, students prefer to discuss and find common ground in understanding the differences. When students were asked about their attitude towards different understandings and views, about three-quarters, 76.2%, of students chose to respect. The rest, preferring to influence to agree. Several student statements are as follows.

Each school has different laws. So what has to be done is plant a mindset that what is contrary to your truth is not always wrong. Remember that absolute truth is only with Allah;

Must respect each other because not all of these innovations are prohibited/violate Islamic law, are returned to their positive and negative impacts and intentions, and do not consider heresy to be haram. Because Islamic law is not only obligatory, sunnah and haram, it is permissible, makruh agreed by majority scholars through Ijma' and Qiyas.

Finally, most students stated that educational and religious institutions need to conduct studies and disseminate them (89.3%); the rest said they were unnecessary. The most often stated why this step needs to be taken is that some people are still doubtful about their understanding of the term bid'ah, and others understand bid'ah with a wrong understanding and tend to be extreme.

6.6. Correlation and univariable analysis

Correlation analysis shows that students' responses to the terma *jihad* are positively and significantly correlated with caliphate and *bid'ah*. The terms caliphate have a positive and significant correlation with the terma *bid'ah* (see, Table 5). The results of the univariable analysis show that significant differences are found based solely on the demographic factors of religious affiliation in terms of the caliphate and *bid'ah*, where students who are religiously affiliated with NU have far more positive sentiments than others. The lowest is for students affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (see Table 6).

7. Discussion and conclusion

The purpose of this study was to provide information on the perspectives and prevalence of student sentiments regarding the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah*. Based on student response scores to the three questionnaires given and the analysis results, it is construed that most Indonesian students have a moderate prevalence of sentiment. Indonesian students with NU affiliations have a more positive perspective and sentiment prevalence on the caliphate and *bid'ah* than students affiliated with Muhammadiyah and HTI and who are not affiliated with any organisation. However, there was no difference in terms of the *jihad*. On the other hand, we found no significant differences based on different demographic factors. The results of this study may reflect the information landscape of student perspectives and sentiments regarding the current terms of *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah* in Indonesia. Furthermore, because the study results indicate that the prevalence of student sentiment is only related to the affiliation of religious organisations, this discussion will focus more on this independent variable.

Table 5. Correlation of student responses in terms of jihad, caliphate, and Bid'ah

	Jihad	Caliphate	Bid'ah
Jihad	1		
Caliphate	0.194*	1	
Bid'ah	0.262**	0.667**	1

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table 6. Univariable analysis of demographic determinants of prevalence sentiment about jihad, caliphate, and Bid'ah

Variable	Jihad			Caliphate			Bid'ah		
	Mean ± SD	Statistic	p-value	Mean ± SD	Statistic	p-value	Mean ± SD	Statistic	p-value
Gender									
Male	51.72 ± 4.31	0.526	0.600	65.30 ± 12.46	-1.867	0.064	67.23 ± 9.09	0.074	0.941
Female	51.25 ± 5.01			69.39 ± 11.26			67.08 ± 10.45		
Age (year)									
≤ 20	51.22 ± 4.87	-0.666	0.507	66.62 ± 10.89	-1.630	0.106	66.68 ± 9.62	-0.706	0.482
> 20	51.83 ± 4.52			70.30 ± 13.35			68.02 ± 10.56		
Major education									
Sciences and technologies	52.87 ± 4.85	1.936	0.055	68.47 ± 12.77	0.326	0.745	68.57 ± 10.91	0.912	0.364
Social and Humanities	50.96 ± 4.64			67.65 ± 11.60			66.66 ± 9.60		
Spent a year in university									
1 year	50.82 ± 4.83	0.928	0.430	66.69 ± 9.80	1.104	0.350	65.44 ± 10.39	0.915	0.436
2 year	52.21 ± 4.15			66.34 ± 10.88			66.63 ± 9.27		
3 year	50.39 ± 4.32			70.67 ± 13.69			67.83 ± 10.19		
4 year and above	51.23 ± 6.07			70.52 ± 14.46			69.83 ± 10.60		
Place of residence									
Cities	51.77 ± 5.12	0.506	0.614	69.16 ± 11.94	0.804	0.423	67.30 ± 11.53	0.121	0.904
Rural	51.28 ± 4.60			67.28 ± 11.83			67.06 ± 9.21		
Religious affiliation									
Nahdlatul Ulama' (NU)	50.94 ± 4.98	1.247	0.296	70.56 ± 10.20	6.094	0.001**	69.26 ± 8.87	5.538	0.001**
Muhammadiyah	51.00 ± 4.19			59.83 ± 10.98			60.66 ± 12.69		
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia	52.33 ± 1.15			54.33 ± 21.94			58.00 ± 12.86		
Not affiliated	52.89 ± 4.14			62.78 ± 12.77			62.71 ± 9.89		

** p < 0.01

In terms of sources of information, most students stated that they received information related to the three terms from social media and religious books. Students may elaborate on the information obtained from these two information sources. It is worth mentioning that nowadays, people are more likely to use social media because of the ease of access and attractiveness, but the information available on social media tends to be negative, untrue, without evidence, misleading, and difficult to account for (Dwivedi et al., 2018; Kapoor et al., 2018). Interestingly, students also provided information that they continued to use religious books as a medium for obtaining information, which was a contrast to social media. Religious books about the treatment of radicalism are not much different from social media. Books also often distort the meaning of Islamic religious terms such as *jihad*; even books do not even mention the word *jihad* in the name of tolerance between religious communities (Pipes, 2003).

There are other interesting findings of the types of information sources selected by students. Suppose it is related to religious affiliations or organisations. In that case, likely, the students' perspectives regarding *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah* are more influenced by the understanding spread by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Religious books and the internet, particularly social media, are the preferred media for HTI (Mohamed Osman, 2010). Previous research has also analysed social media contributing to the increasing number of people accepting and joining radical organisations (Abdullah et al., 2020; Mariatul Kibtiah & Tirajoh, 2019). Another evidence is regarding the words that come to the mind of students when asked about the three terms. The keywords most frequently used by students are "*jihad* is fighting in the path of Allah," "caliphate is the Islamic government system," and "*bid'ah* is an act that the Prophet does not exemplify." This is the definition and meaning of the terms *jihad*, caliphate, and *bid'ah* conveyed by HTI. In the following, we will review how the perspectives of NU, Muhammadiyah, and HTI form different perspectives and sentiments, especially on the concepts of the caliphate and *bid'ah*.

As for what we can understand from the results of this study that most of the students—including those who are not affiliated, state that the term *jihad* has undergone serious manipulation of meaning (Peters, 1996), we also realise that some students still associate *jihad* with religious violence such as terrorism and bombs. Tausch (2019) also states that few Muslims in most countries, including Indonesia, say that sometimes suicide bombings are justified against civilian targets to defend Islam from its enemies. However, The few students who agree that the IS and Imam Samudra movements as a form of *jihad* indicate that students have a solid and unanimous understanding that *jihad* is not only meaningful and in the form of war, and this is confirmed by other statements that *jihad* should be for the benefit of social welfare (Moniruzzaman, 2008). In general, these results are similar to previous studies (Kosasih & Firmansyah, 2018).

Students are more likely to understand *jihad* as a form of struggle; some associate it with spiritual battles and struggles. Students choose to broaden their understanding of *jihad* so that there is plenty of room for other activities in the meaning of *jihad*, such as studying, working, and caring for the elderly. This finding aligns with some scholars' explanations that *jihad* is interpreted as good deeds, increasing understanding of oneself, and fighting without weapons (Pipes, 2003). Students agree that *jihad* should be used for greater social and global benefits to create a just, moral, and non-discriminatory socio-political order. So, *jihad* should refer to the moral struggle to achieve justice and social equality (Lewis & Churchill, 2015; Pipes, 2003; Reza, 2009). In the Indonesian context, *jihad* must support the development of national awareness among Indonesian Muslims to form a community aware of the nation and aware of Islamic solidarity (Rahman, 2017).

The students' hesitant attitude towards various statements, whether the Qur'an prohibits *jihad* in the form of war or under certain conditions it is permitted, is inseparable from the scope and meaning of the term *jihad*, which is so broad, not much is known what this means right (Bakircioglu, 2010; Peters, 1996), starting from the terminology means hard and earnest effort (Khadduri, 2010), in fiqh, it

is associated with worship (Al-tustari & ibn 'Abd A, 2011), up to the meaning of attacking disturbing unbelievers (Khadduri, 2010). Even in the Al-Qur'an, there are 41 terms of *jihad* with various derivatives. The term *jihad* is only synonymous with war when it is grated against the reality of the Badr war. This indicates the theological narrative that "jihad is physical war" has tiny historical roots (Keshavjee, 2016) and reflects partial reinterpretations (Rahman, 2016). This condition needs to be watched out for because it can give rise to the seeds of Islamic terrorism if it turns out that students are inclined to agree that the Al-Qur'an permits violent jihad (Venkatraman, 2007).

NU views the war of Badr, the war against the invaders, and wars like the Middle East as minor *jihad* (Akbar, 2003), while the grand *jihad* is a war against lust (Khadduri, 2010). This indicates that the two largest organisations emphasise the interpretation of jihad as a struggle in education, welfare, and economic development (Rahman, 2017). The biggest one is jihad which combines physical and spiritual struggles such as teaching and building madrasas (NU Online, 2012 September 10). In line with what is defined by NU which states directly to the example, Muhammadiyah says more in general explanation but has the same meaning. Muhammadiyah is of the view that jihad is an effort to mobilise all abilities for the life of all humanity. Humans are faced with various complex life problems, and Muslims are required to provide the best alternative solutions and answers (Tanfidz Decree of the 47th Congress of 2015).

In contrast to NU and Muhammadiyah, which defend their homeland, HTI emphasises offensive *jihad*. This *jihad* is intended to eliminate *shirk* (the association of God with other deities) and exalt and glorify Allah SWT's words (Khadduri, 2010). In another sense, they want to spread monotheism throughout the earth. HTI relies on private and public (state) affairs on the Qur'an and hadith, with two main tasks, namely inviting Islam which is interpreted as Islamic law, and ruling virtue by forming an Islamic caliphate (Kartini, 2016; Mohamed Osman, 2010). To carry out this task, HTI does not use physical strength but rather preaching in political activities and forms of thought upheaval. Thus, although HTI has different perspectives on *jihad* from the two mainstream Muslim organisations in Indonesia, one thing in common is that they refuse to equate jihad with just physical warfare, and jihad can occur without violence (Khadduri, 2010; Moten & Islam, 2008). The reader needs to understand that there is no argument in the Al-Qur'an or hadith (as-sunnah) that justifies the use of violence in the name of Islam (Keshavjee, 2016).

HTI, with its primary mission, is to form an Islamic caliphate as exemplified by Muslims since the time of the Prophet, *Khulafaur Rasyidin*, and the caliphate afterwards (Kartini, 2016; Mohamed Osman, 2010), perhaps it is clear and not surprising that students with this religious affiliation have a prevalence of negative sentiment towards the term caliphate. Student responses by linking the caliphate with three short phrases, namely the government system, the era of the prophet and al-khulafa al-rasyidun, and HTI, have confirmed that the caliphate and HTI become an interlocking unit, which then strengthens the student's response to the questionnaire statement that HTI has misused the term this.

According to HTI, the caliphate is an indispensable nomenclature. The establishment of the caliphate is the only solution to all problems in the world. The caliphate system is considered a political system that is correct, Islamic, permitted by the Qur'an, and is recognised by Allah SWT. The consequences of this view have resulted in the rejection of the democratic system. This group tends to frame democracy as a system that competes with Islam while framing *jihad as fardhu ayn* (Rogan, 2010). They underestimate fellow Muslims who agree with the democratic system because they are considered ignorant (Fine, 2008) and fail to fulfil jihad's obligations; therefore, it needs to be cleaned up. The reader needs to understand that the construction of this opposition is not entirely from Islamic history but appears as an ethnocentric critique that only serves to represent Islam and is a manifestation of the western fear of Islam (Mishra, 2008).

Up to this point, the HTI movement was at the extra-parliamentary level. The government's decision to dissolve HTI because it is considered anti-Pancasila has made it further away from their expected level. However, it remains aware that HTI continues to operationalise its excellent ideas

with various simultaneous and gradual stages and pays more attention to the younger generation in cadre patterns. Of course, this pattern has a long-term effect and is getting stronger with the emergence of issues related to the role of Islam in Indonesia (Mohamed Osman, 2010). What is encouraging from the results of this study is that most students, as the younger generation have a perspective and the prevalence of sentiment that is close to positive. Students consider the caliphate to make it challenging to create a just government. They reject the caliphate and stick to Indonesia's government and ideology.

The exciting aspect is that the students have not given a unanimous agreement. However, they are still hesitant in expressing their attitude when asked whether the basis of Pancasila and the Indonesian state constitution is a valid form of the caliphate and under what Islam requires. From the students' responses to all questionnaire items, it is as if they cannot deny that the caliphate is part of Islamic history. They considered that the caliphate could not be accused of endangering the state, nor could they simply agree that the caliphate could be used as a system of government suitable for Indonesia. More precisely, students want an agreed-upon state foundation, namely Pancasila, as a maintained ideology. The Caliphate and Pancasila probably need not be compared and do not need to be matched.

NU and Muhammadiyah accept the concept of the Indonesian state, seeing Pancasila, not as a rival to Islam, let alone positioning the role of religion in life, but as a view of life and the ideology of the Indonesian people (Rahman, 2017). Both maintain and develop Islamic teachings in Indonesia but do not idealise an Islamic state. Substantially, all the precepts in Pancasila, especially the first precepts, do not contradict the teachings of Islam or any religion in Indonesia. They are even part of implementing the teachings of various religions (McDaniel, 2017). Pancasila's democratic system, which is in the "middle" between secularism and the Islamic state, answers the relationship between religion and the state. In other words, this ideology will create a collective awareness of the Indonesian people to harmonise the relationship between religion and nationality in a positive construct. Religious understanding does not confront Indonesian ideology and entities but leads to vital religious moderation.

One of the primary keys to being loyal to Pancasila is religious moderation. It will be the key to answering the questions on the extreme or radical religious sentiments. On the other hand, religious moderation will also strengthen the ideology of Pancasila as the nation's glue that can strengthen the spirit of togetherness amid the reality of Indonesia's pluralism.

Finally, we will discuss the final form of *jihad*, which was described by Ibn Qoyyim, namely *jihad* against heretical experts (Meijer, 2009). Students affiliated with any organisation or not agree that *bid'ah* that leads to evil and is against the Islamic religious law is prohibited and must be shunned. However, in interpreting which limits on behaviour are allowed by religions, it varies depending on how individuals and organisations rely on the Qur'an and hadith. Based on the study results, students with NU affiliations had a more positive sentiment prevalence than those affiliated with Muhammadiyah and HTI. These results are not surprising; Muhammadiyah and HTI are at the same level because these organisations have the same movement, namely the renewal and purification of Islamic teachings from *bid'ah* practices. For them, all forms of worship that have no basis in the Al-Qur'an or Hadiths, such as Tahlilan and Yasinan are forms of *bid'ah*.

The decisive thing is that some of them, especially HTI, think NU practice is deviant. Framing like this is done to generate conspiracy stories and scapegoat different groups, with the ultimate goal of fostering an "us versus them" mindset among its members. (Rogan, 2010; Stern, 2004). They will give total denial to fellow Muslims who fail to live according to the Qur'an and hadith according to their interpretation as heretical groups. This condition negates NU's belief in accepting the practice of worship, no matter how baseless it is, as long as it reflects goodness (*bid'ah hasanah*). For NU, not all forms of *bid'ah* were rejected. This context reflects the moderate character of NU in the field of customs in Indonesia and makes it the basis for the behaviour of its congregation.

On the other hand, HTI still exists in the space provided by Indonesia's religious-political landscape, which encourages restricting Indonesian art forms that are considered un-Islamic (Mohamed Osman, 2018). These differing views emphasise that it is necessary to recall the negative impact of misinterpreting bid'ah and how damaging the misunderstanding of bid'ah can be for Indonesian society. This could, for example, result in a lack of tolerance for customs, culture, and the arts in Indonesia.

In line with these various explanations, most students agreed that an incomplete understanding of the term 'bid'ah could abuse terms. The responses of students who associate the word bid'ah with the *takfir* group indicate that organisations use this term to corner NU as an absurd and heretical group. Interestingly, although most students disagreed if bid'ah was confirmed to be heretical, unjustified, and contrary to *syara* ', students also did not agree that bid'ah was a new solution for Muslims. This response is most likely related to the orientation of NU's teachings, which only stopped at habituation, not yet understanding the arguments according to the Al-Qur'an and hadith. When there were blasphemies and attacks aimed at NU residents, the congregation felt culturally shocked, which in the end led them to think that what they had been doing had not yet provided a solution for their lives.

Although most students have a perspective influenced by HTI, NU affiliations generally have a much more positive prevalence of sentiment on the caliphate and *bid'ah*. This indicates that HTI's infiltration into NU through the delivery of ideas or ideas through their various da'wah platforms has not just succeeded in influencing understanding, let alone shifting the understanding of NU residents to incline towards their ideology. It is impossible to convey ideas only through the media without having a supportive social environment (Kepel & Jardin, 2017; Nilsson, 2022). However, this does not apply to every individual. In our notes, some NU students are inclined towards fundamentalist Islam. Previously there were also reports that several NU and Muhammadiyah youths had joined HTI (Mohamed Osman, 2010). This phenomenon may be related to the order and the idea that jihad is an individual obligation (Nilsson, 2022; Roy, 2017). It also shows that NU is still weak in responding to the challenge of escalating fundamentalist Islamic movements such as HTI.

We were aware of different interpretations between students in one religious affiliation, and there is almost no complete agreement between them. Therefore, investigating how the voices and views of students as a whole in one affiliation is a more logical and rational way to determine the direction of each group. We can explain from this that on a personal level, there is freedom for every Muslim in interpreting the words of the Koran and determining the extent to which it will affect their private and public lives (Venkatraman, 2007). However, all decisions resulting from interpretation should be made after having a detailed understanding of Islamic teachings. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in students to interpret personally even though they do not have a comprehensive understanding. As a result, the resulting interpretation is lost from the Quranic verse context and is far from its true purpose and meaning. In general, several factors allow the Jihadi ideology to develop, in the context of this research also the development of the caliphate ideology and the cornering of heresy, namely misreading jihad and personal tendencies (Bakar & Aslam, 2019), which are influenced by a lack of knowledge about the teachings of Islam. Islam, personal challenges, social media propaganda (Abdullah et al., 2020).

In addition, the characteristics of Islamic texts (Qur'an and Hadith) are sometimes multi-interpreted. The exact text can be interpreted differently. From the responses given by students regardless of their affiliation, there are two patterns in interpreting, namely those who interpret the text about the three terms specifically (e.g., jihad in war situations and the like) and interpret it in general (applies to all situations). The different approaches used in understanding the text by students also vary. Some use a textual-normative approach (rigid), but most use a historical-contextual approach (flexible; Zuhdi & Masduki, 2018). Students with textual interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith pay much attention to the history of the text and have the assumption that all messages in the Quran and Sunnah can be directly implemented (Amin et al., 2019).

Compared to current population statistics in Indonesia, this study sample appears to be represented as the majority are NU residents. However, the percentage shown in this study represents too much NU and seems to “ignore” other religious organisations. Therefore, there is a limit to the representativeness of the findings of this study. A further limitation is that this study uses self-reported data from students; students involved may have given more positive attitude statements than they are. On the other hand, students affiliated with religious organisations outside NU may be reluctant to respond and participate. Due to administrative and ethical challenges, we could also reach a larger sample of HTI-affiliated students. However, in this study, we still try to pay attention to the demographic characteristics of the study sample.

While most of the online-based research that relies on platforms like Whatsapp has the drawback of not expanding its domain to villages, as a strong point, our research has reached where nearly three-quarters of our respondents come from rural areas. This can provide additional evidence of rural communities’ perspectives on Islamic terms. However, this condition can also be limited because it represents rural communities. On the other hand, urban communities with more comprehensive internet access are more vulnerable to radicalism exposure.

To summarise the results of this study, we can conclude that NU, Muhammadiyah, and HTI are still on the same path in seeing the term jihad. In the interpretation of the term *bid’ah*, Muhammadiyah has a different view from NU; Muhammadiyah considers that *bid’ah* is behaviour without foundation, even deviant. However, on the other hand, HTI is dangerous because this hardline group emphasises efforts to purify Islam from the practice of *bid’ah* and the ambition to make it happen with an Islamic state (caliphate *Islamiyah*). At least, HTI fulfils three aspects of being a radical group: anti-democracy, intolerance, and asks for total commitment and fanaticism from members (Agbiboa, 2014).

The results of the study, which showed a strong correlation only on the variable of religious affiliation, showed that student activities were considered integrated into the physical environment and social context because students regulate their actions (how they respond to the three terms) based on the information they receive from the environment (especially from books and social media). For future research, it is necessary to examine this research in a theoretical framework, action regulation theory, to analyse student interactions and their organisations. Action regulation theory can be discussed how all forms of organisational demands affect student actions.

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