

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Archived Theses and Dissertations

The beginning of the end?

Khaled Karara

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#)

The Beginning of the End?
The U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship
Revisited in A Post-Cold War Era

KHALED KARARA

2001

Thesis
2001/66

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE BEGINNING OF THE END?
THE U.S.-ISRAELI SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP REVISITED IN A
POST-COLD WAR ERA

KHALED KARARA *المؤلف*

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

NOVEMBER/2001

2001/66

The American University in Cairo

The Beginning of the End?
The U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship Revisited in a Post-Cold War era


A Thesis Submitted by
Khaled Karara

To the Department of Political Science
November/2001


In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The degree of Master of Arts

Has been approved by



Dr. Dan Tschirgi
Thesis Committee Advisor
Affiliation -----



Dr. Ivan Ivekovic.
Thesis Committee Reader
Affiliation -----




Dr. Walid Kazziha
Thesis Committee Reader
Affiliation -----



Department Chair

Date



Dean of HUSS

Dec. 10, 2001

Date

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	VII
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Research Problem.....	2
Literature Survey.....	4
Methodology.....	6
Objectives.....	9
Hypothesis.....	11
Scenario A.....	12
Scenario B.....	12
Scenario C.....	13
Materials.....	15
Primary Sources.....	15
Secondary Sources.....	16
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	18
The origins of the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.....	18
The Roosevelt Administration (being introduced to the Middle East).....	22
Transition year 1943.....	24
The Truman Administration (establishment of the state of Israel).....	30
The Anglo-American Committee.....	34
The Cabinet Committee (the Morrison-Grady plan).....	36
Britain refers the Palestine question to the United Nations.....	40

Aftermath of the UN votes on the partition of Palestine to the creation of the state of Israel	43
A conclusion on the period from 1939-1948.....	46
3. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.....	48
Geopolitical Considerations (from Truman to Reagan)	52
Domestic Considerations.....	62
The American Jewish Community.....	63
How does the American Jewish Community influence the United States?.....	64
How does the American Jewish Community influence Israel?..	64
The Jewish Lobby	65
American Public Opinion.....	67
Manifestation of the Special Relationship.....	69
Economic Aid.....	71
Military Assistance.....	74
Conclusion on the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship.....	78
4. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA – REVISITING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.....	81
Identifying changes in the International System.....	81
Implications for the United States	82
Implications for Israel.....	84
The Post-Cold War era in the Middle East.....	85
U.S.-Administrations in a Post-Cold War Era.....	87
The Bush Sr. Administration.....	88
The Arab-Israeli Peace Process.....	88
The Gulf Crisis	94

The Clinton Administration	95
Bush Jr. Administration	105
Initial Predictions.....	105
Back to the Future.....	107
The American Jewish Community	116
American Public Opinion.....	120
Implications for the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship	123
 5. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A DECLINE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL TO THE U.S.?	129
 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	135

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has had an extensive delivery time. It would have never seen the light of day without the generous encouragement and assistance of many people, starting from the perception of the idea to its final fulfillment.

Particularly I would like to thank Dr. Dan Tschirgi, Dr. Ivan Ivekovic and Dr. Walid Kazziha. Dr. Tschirgi as my supervisor provided excellent guidance and opened my eyes to areas previously not thought of. Also the support and suggestions of Dr. Ivekovic and Dr. Kazziha were of utmost importance in shaping up the thesis.

I would also like to mention Mohamed O. Gad and Walid Salem. long time University friends, who were a great source of encouragement and who often had to listen to me while thinking aloud. Of course I failed here to list all the friends who directly and indirectly were inspirational.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents who in the first place made it all possible for me to enjoy a privileged education such as the one provided by the American University in Cairo.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AIPAC	American Israeli Public Affairs Committee
AWACS	Aircraft Warning and Control System
AZEC	American Zionist Emergency Council
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FMS	Foreign Military Support
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
Sr.	Senior
UN	United Nation
UNSCOP	United Nation Special Committee on Palestine
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
U.S.S.R	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
R&D	Research and Development
Jr.	Junior
WZO	World Zionist Organization

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The dramatic demise of the Soviet Union, which brought about the collapse of the bipolar world order, created the need to re-examine the entire field of international relations. Among the issues that need to be re-examined are issues such as security and foreign relations. While the bi-polar world order was carried to its grave, "old" concepts and political arrangements tailored during the Cold War years were put to the test of time in a new era.

The United State's position with regard to the international system, its stances vis a vis various regions in the world, and its relations with certain states in those regions have been affected. Among the political arrangements constructed during the Cold War, which need to be re-examined, is the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel. This relationship has long been deemed as built on solid and strong pillars.

In much the same way as the United States, other regions and states, including the Middle East have also been affected by the rapid changes in the international system. With the elimination of the Soviet Union as a major actor in the region, the Soviet-American race for creating spheres of influence ended. The U.S. became the region's sole superpower. Such changes improved and enhanced America's influence and created the climate for some Arab states to become increasingly pro-American or seek American support.

Manifestation of these developments reflect themselves in the 1991 Gulf War by which Iraq was defeated through a coalition formed of several different states, including Arab states. Arguably this was unthinkable before the decline and demise of the U.S.S.R. Against the backdrop of the changing atmosphere in the Middle East came the peace process with its various components represented in the multilateral talks, the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement, and the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese track, irrespective of the ups and downs that have occurred.

Israel itself, due to the structural changes that have occurred on the global and regional levels, became increasingly legitimized and accepted as a member of the international community by segments, particularly in the "Third World" that once ostracized it. Even in the Arab world, political and economic boycotts imposed on Israel were largely revoked and Israel found new markets for its products. These changes in turn have left a mark on Israel's internal politics shown by the willingness of a large segment of the Israeli public to engage in a peace process and to accept the "Land for Peace" formula. Yet by 2001 after having explored the prospects of peace with the Palestinians and the Arabs through the 1990's and having not achieved much progress on the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese track, the Middle East region once again appears to be at the brink of war. The Arabs increasingly are calling for Israel's isolation in face of Israel's atrocities against the Palestinians.

Research Problem

Israel's uniqueness was partly due to the Cold War period and to the existential fears that gripped the Israeli public since the state's creation in 1948, a product of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Part of this uniqueness was the "special relationship" that developed between the United States and Israel. **The central**

question which is posed in the research at hand, is to what degree can it be expected that the "special relationship" between Israel and the United States will withstand the sweeping changes that have occurred in the international system since 1990? In other words, we will be re-evaluating the United States-Israeli relationship in light of the post-Cold War era. The research will mainly, but not exclusively, focus on the American side of the U.S.-Israeli "special relationship" formula.

From a holistic perspective the special relationship that developed between the U.S. and Israel was part of the U.S. Middle East policy during the Cold War in general. U.S. interests in the Middle East were seen in Washington as requiring the containment of the Soviet Union, protection and access to the regional oil supplies, maintenance of regional stability for the purpose of the aforementioned interests (access to oil, Soviet containment) and the security of Israel with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The special relationship as one aspect of the general Middle East policy developed out of the interplay of the various components and is therefore not a separate phenomenon that was created on its own. The special relationship took the shape of generous economic and military aid as well as political patronage extended by the U.S. to Israel.

Seen therefore, from a broader context re-examining the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel in a post-Cold War era is immensely important. It will shed some light on whether the American foreign policy orientation in the Middle East at large has changed course or not. If through the research alterations, changes or shifts in the U.S.-Israeli special relationship are detected that will indicate that there are also changes in the American interests in the Middle East. This is due to the fact that the U.S.-Israeli special relationship is a component of the intricate web of

relations between the U.S. and countries in the Middle East that served to protect its interests in the region.

Literature Survey

The issue of the special relationship has been extensively examined and has been a popular subject for researchers in the field of international politics. The literature about U.S.-Israeli (Jewish) relations in general goes back prior to the creation of the state of Israel. Numerous scholars investigated the initial U.S. involvement with the Middle East, Palestine question and the role of the U.S. in bringing about the state of Israel. This becomes apparent in the writings of Truman (1956), Snetsinger (1974), Wilson (1979), Bain (1979), Tschirgi (1983), Cohen (1990) and Neff (1995). A common aspect in the works of the aforementioned is references to the strength of the World Zionist Organization (WZO). WZO's shift from Britain toward the United States, which emerged as a superpower in a post-World War II era, and generally the failure of the U.S. administrations under Roosevelt and Truman to understand the complexity, fabric and the dynamics of the Middle Eastern region.

Another common feature, which is apparent in the literature about the U.S.-Israeli relationship, is the consensus amongst the scholars that the special relationship illustrates itself in the generous economic and military aid as well as the political patronage by the U.S. towards Israel. From a historical point of view, academics agree that the special relationship started or matured during the early to mid 1970's. Prior to this date American aid to Israel was limited and took the form of loans. Starting from the 1970's this pattern drastically changed and aid figures reached unprecedented levels. In addition, by the mid-eighties the nature of aid changed from loans to become

on a gift basis as well as the forgiveness of the U.S. of large amounts of previous loans. These findings are reflected in the works of Feuerweger (1979), Reich (1984), Guess (1987), Rabii (1988), Organski (1990), Beenstock (1992) as well as in Ball and Ball (1992).

While the literature review highlighted commonalities as mentioned earlier, it also showed differences among scholars in their perception of the causes that led to the American-Israeli special relationship. Some scholars such as Tivnan (1987), Curtiss (1990), Hadawi (1991), and Bard (1991) argue, to degrees, that the influence of the American Jewish community and the Israeli lobby was a major determinant of U.S. policy. This influence made it possible to see U.S. national interests as linked to the special relationship. On the other hand, other scholars such as Organski (1990) and Mansour (1994) downplay the lobby's impact and put geopolitical Cold War realities at the forefront of the determinants of the American-Israeli special relationship.

Another trend of thought expresses the view that the special relationship, the success of the American Jewish communities influence and lobby as well as the favorable treatment of the Congress to Israel would have been unattainable had it not been for the pro-Israeli nature of broader American public opinion. Such views are thoroughly investigated in Bard's article "Israel's Standing in American Public Opinion" (1985) and Gilboa (1987). These works contrast the perception of Israel with that of the Arabs in American eyes.

Organski (1990) provides a framework, which is the genre this research project intends to emulate. Even though, in his conviction, Cold War circumstances and realities are largely the main determinants of the special relationship, he establishes a framework that can be applied to explaining the relationship. His framework of explaining the relationship is segmented into two main categories. One is focusing on

American domestic considerations and the second on the geopolitical perspective. The first category (American domestic political consideration) in itself is divided into an extreme version that only emphasizes domestic consideration, and the other more moderate outlook adds some elements of geopolitical realities to the explanation. The second category (geopolitical considerations) is similarly divided into an extreme version, which explains the U.S.- Israeli special relationship from a purely geopolitical point of view while the more moderate explanation adds the domestic considerations. His framework became an effective tool in re-examining the special relationship in a post-Cold War era.

Extensive research has been conducted on the American-Israeli unique and special relationship. Yet, perusing the vast array of literature available on this subject, it has become apparent and visible that the fate of the special relationship in a post-Cold War era has largely been under-researched and only limited consideration has been given to this issue. It is therefore the aim of this work to contribute to the enrichment of the field of international relations by examining the U.S.-Israeli special relationship in a post-Cold War era.

Methodology

The U.S.-Israeli special relationship has been the subject of various academic and scholarly examinations, as illustrated in the literature survey. To fully comprehend the nature of this relationship in a post-Cold War setting it is essential to re-examine it in a Cold War context. Three main theoretical trends seem to dominate the explanation of the special relationship, these being (a) the realist approach, (b) the domestic politics approach and (c) the humanitarian or idealist approach.

The realist theoretical framework mainly manifests a power-politics approach to international relations. Researchers up to the end of the Cold War were heavily influenced by this approach, which stressed the importance of structural global conditions and strategic calculations based on rational considerations in the formation of relations between allied countries. In this context the small but military powerful and significant Israel served as a pro-Western fortress in a turbulent, volatile area. It secured and protected Western interests against the Soviet Union, which encroached on the region seeking to establish its own spheres of influence. Accordingly, Israel was a shield against pro-Soviet Arab states.

In addition, realists take into account the importance of Israel's intelligence gathering capacity to the security of the Western bloc in general and American in particular. Based on these grounds the U.S.-Israeli special relationship is legitimized and explained on the grounds of geopolitical and strategic considerations, which especially matured during the late 1960's and early 1970's with the Nixon administration and manifested themselves in enormous economic and military aid. The realist approach, however, fails to account for specific influences on American decision-makers such as the President, his staff, and the various institutions such as the Congress and the State Department.

The domestic politics theoretical framework concentrates on U.S. behavior and policies toward Israel, focusing on the multifaceted interplay of bureaucratic, political and social forces in the United States. This view particularly stresses the strength of the American Jewish community manifested through the Jewish vote, the high quality performance of the Jewish lobby, Jewish campaign money donated to politicians as well as the impact of pro-Israeli interest groups. The domestic approach furthermore, illuminates the effects of Jewish and non-Jewish advisors or members of

various American administrations as well as the impact of various institutions such as the American Intelligence community, Congress, State Department and White House on the decision making process. The essential trend of thought that prevails within the domestic-politics approach is that those forces, which interact in the American pluralist political system, determine, legitimize and explain the U.S.-Israeli special relationship.

While the realist and domestic politics approaches focus on relatively tangible factors, the third theoretical framework, the idealist approach sheds some light on relatively intangible factors. Among these are the Judeo-Christian affinity between Americans and Israelis, American guilt feelings over having been inactive during the Holocaust, the idea of an Israeli David struggling against an Arab Goliath. The general mistrust of Americans towards the Arabs, and the affinity between the democratic ideals, values and principles held by the strongest democracy embodied by the U.S. and the only democracy in the Middle East, represented by Israel. This approach therefore explains the special relationship from the American idealist and humanitarian perspectives.

This work therefore, will incorporate the interplay of these three theoretical perspectives. Each contributes an element toward a comprehensive explanation of the special relationship. The strength of the realist approach is inherent geopolitical considerations, which shaped U.S. policy toward the Middle East and Israel. Its weakness lies in neglecting internal domestic factors such as Jewish influence in shaping the relation and the internal tug of war between various institutions within the American political system.

The domestic politics theory approach remedies this weakness and serves as a supportive addition to the realist theory. In turn the domestic politics theory's

weakness lies in the lack of consideration for U.S. foreign policy logic in the Middle East. For instance, it fails to account for the dramatic increase in U.S. economic and military aid support during Nixon's Republican era. It is known that Jewish sympathy and voter behavior clearly shows a closer affinity between the American Jews and Democrats. This flaw in the domestic approach is clearly bridged by the geopolitical approach.

The idealist approach on its own is unable to explain the special relationship. Common democratic values and other similar elements cannot fully account for creating a special relationship because in that sense the U.S. should, but does not have, similar relationships with numerous other countries. Therefore, the idealist theoretical framework comes in as a complementary element to the realist and the domestic politics theories. It adds the ingredient to the U.S.-Israeli special relationship, which causes it to be more than the sum of its parts.

Objectives

In order to reach a comprehensive solution to the research question, the ensuing discussion comprises the following components:

- 1) A brief historical background that focuses particularly on the ongoing U.S. involvement in the Middle East, especially on their involvement with the Palestine question. This will entail examining the origins of the idea of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The World Zionist Organization's (WZO) shift from the Great Britain to the newly emerging superpower the United States and the slow, but steady emergence and development of the U.S. strategic and economic interests in the area since World War II. Particular attention will be granted to the American role in the creation of the state of Israel. Linking these factors will explain the circumstances

under which the American foreign policy Roosevelt and Truman between the year 1939 to 1948 were shaped. This historical background will serve as a starting point for investigating the components of the special relationship after Roosevelt and Truman planted the seeds of post-World War II American policy toward the Middle East.

2) A discussion of geopolitical and domestic considerations as factors shaping American foreign policy in general and toward Israel specifically. It has become evident that it is difficult in the case of Israel to determine precisely if domestic realities such as the influence of the American Jewish population or Cold War geopolitical realities motivated U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, it will become an objective to shed some light on these circumstances.

3) A discussion of the elements that formed the special relationship in the period between the creation of Israel and the end of the Cold War. During this time span when did the special relationship between both countries emerge and how was it manifested? This will involve linking geopolitical international (the Cold War race to create spheres of influence) and domestic considerations (American Jewish population's influence and effects on the American decision makers and public as well as their relations with the Israeli decision makers and public). Furthermore, the trend of American public opinion toward Israel in contrast to that of the Arabs will serve as an indicator on American foreign policy inclinations. In addition, the Israeli lobby and its effects on the Congress will help us to complete the full cycle on the forces shaping U.S. relations with Israel. Based on this objective it should become apparent why the U.S.-Israeli special relationship is special and unique.

4) An examination of how international and domestic considerations manifested themselves in U.S. policy. This will lead us to examine economic and military aid to

Israel since its inception. Furthermore, it will lead us to delve into the question of whether the aims and goals of the aid program fulfilled U.S. interests in the region.

5) An examination of what, if any changes, has occurred in the U.S.-Israeli special relationship since the end of the Cold War? Approaching this question will entail re-examining objective 3 and 4 in a post-Cold War era to detect possible changes. In the process of doing this it is hoped that a plausible answer to the research question can be formulated.

Hypothesis

The U.S.-Israeli relationship was partly built on geopolitical Cold War considerations, which made Israel a strategic reliable ally to U.S. interests in the Middle East and a shield against Soviet expansions in the region. The relationship was also partly built on the strength of the American Jewish community and Israeli lobby its influence on internal U.S. political dynamics as well as the impact on the public opinion in the United States. Because of the pillars just mentioned the special relationship rests and it takes the form of generous economic and military aid based on lenient and generous conditions.

Therefore, the demise of the former Soviet Union and the sweeping changes associated with it in the international world order brought about the collapse of an essential pillar that supported the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. Hence, one can hypothesize that the special relationship's future in a post-Cold War environment is bound to follow one of the following three scenarios:

Scenario A

To continue at the same level as during the Cold War years. That is if the post-Cold War era creates new threats to U.S. national interests in the Middle East, which will result in Israel continuing to be perceived as a strategic U.S. asset. Such, for example, will be the case if the Islamic threat is equated with the former Soviet threat.

The logic followed then is that if radical Arab regimes continue to pursue radical orientations, U.S. national interests in the region will be gravely threatened. Israel will therefore, continue to be a crucial aspect to uphold U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this scenario, it would be most likely that both the influence and effect of the American Jewish community and lobby will remain essential to encourage enormous economic and military aid packages by the U.S. to Israel.

Scenario B

A second direction that might be manifested is that the U.S.-Israel special relationship will cease to exist at all. Economic as well as political and military support will decline drastically in a post-Cold War era. This will be due to Israel becoming a liability rather than an asset.

Traces of Israel becoming a liability became visible for the first time during the second Gulf War. Detaching Israel from the conflict and Desert Storm operations was a necessary condition for the success of liberating Kuwait. This was due to the heavy U.S. reliance on a coalition formed with Arab States, which most notably and ironically included Syria, a state branded by Washington as supporting terrorist activities. Once again there are recent indications of Israel becoming a liability rather than an asset in the formation of the coalition against terrorism following the terrorist attacks on American soil.

In cases where Israel proves to be a liability and Arab states turn to be assets, the strength of the American Jewish community and the lobby might not be strong and influential enough to maintain the special relationship. That is, this pillar might not be able to solely carry the heavy weight of the relationship in the absence of the Cold War pillar. Furthermore such a decline in influence of American Jewish community would be further perpetuated if it proves to be fragile in itself due to the growing gap between American Jews (Jewish Diaspora in general) and Israel and therefore becomes unable to be effectively influential. Such a possibility might add to the weakening of the U.S. -Israeli relationship due to the decline of influence.

Possible signs of pillar 2 fragility have become evident in the post-Cold War era. For example, a growing demand by American Jews for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, largely a result of immediate threats, may be seen in this light. On the other hand, controversies over religious issues, both among Israelis and between Israelis and the Jewish Diaspora also threaten to break Jewish unity. Such factors ultimately could translate into a decrease of pro-Israeli pressure on U.S. administrations and American public opinion, particularly in an era where the U.S. is starting to become increasingly inward instead of outward oriented. The consequence therefore could mean less generosity in economic and military aid to Israel.

Scenario C

The third scenario is a similar version of both A and B in the sense that there will be a relative decline in the special relationship, but on the whole it will be maintained. Pillar 1 (Cold War), will be replaced by a smaller pillar in the post-Cold War era. This will be the Islamic threat and radical orientation of creation Arab regimes, which constitute a threat to U.S. national interests in the region.

Pillar 2 (American Jewish strength and its influence) will not become as acutely fragile as in scenario B. The cracks will have an effect, however, it will not cause the edifice of the special relationship to collapse entirely. Therefore, despite the replaced pillar 1 and the fragile pillar 2, U.S. economic and military aid will continue to be proclaimed to Israel, but it will be on a less substantial and more fragile level. In short, there would a relative decline to the U.S.-Israeli special relationship in general.

The view here is that scenario C (relative decline in the special relationship) will shape the U.S.-Israeli special relationship's future in the post-Cold War era. Even though one of the main U.S. national interests has been achieved with the elimination of the Soviet Union other dominant perceptions of U.S. national interests continue to legitimize Israel's importance as a strategic ally. However, the changes in the international climate caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the growing tendencies of the U.S. to become more inward oriented. As well as the increasing gap between the Israelis and their Diaspora and an increased awareness within the American public with the Palestinians suffering all indicate that the time for reconsidering the U.S.-Israeli special relationship has become ripe.

Hence, the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the circumstances and the pillars that shaped the special relationship and that accounted for the enormous volume of economic and military as well as political generosity toward Israel have changed. The current generosity is merely a product of U.S. traditional politics vis a vis Israel and eventually there is going to be a relative decline in the future of the relationship, since traditional policies do not change suddenly overnight. The post-Cold War era is still in an embryonic stage and is still subject to changes and alternations to "old" concepts and political arrangements tailored during the Cold War era.

Materials

The material gathered for the research project were gleaned from primary and secondary sources.

Primary Sources

Primary materials to a large extent include documents, reports, publications, memoirs, and interviews conducted directly or published as well as factual material such as economic and military aid figures. In order to determine whether the main hypothesis of a relative decline in U.S.-Israeli special relationship in a post-Cold War era holds water or not the aforementioned primary material played a significant role. Primary sources in this case became especially important due to the fact that an "old" relationship is being examined under "new" and fairly recent circumstances.

Materials, therefore, aiding in achieving our objectives stemmed from congressional records determining debates about eventual foreign aid cuts or continuation not only to Israel but also the second largest aid recipient Egypt. In this respect reports and publications from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) proved relevant. USAID material was available through the USAID office in Cairo. Furthermore, through the Internet, State Department and White House documents were available to consultation in determining U.S. foreign policy changes toward the Middle East in general and Israel in particular. American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) publications and documents were of importance to find out what direction, which form of pressure and which issues Jewish lobby groups are adopting in a post-Cold War era to maintain the steady and generous economic, military and political assistance to Israel.

Valuable information and material was also available through the Web site of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as through interviewing the Desk Officer for Israel at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main issue tackled during the interview was to discover whether there is a growing gap occurring between the Israeli Jews and the scattered Diaspora notably the American Jews. This served as an additional indicator to the state of the U.S.-Israeli relation in a post-Cold War era from the point of view of the American Jewish perspective.

Primary materials were extracted through several ways. Among them were the web sites of the USAID, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Department, the White House, the Library of Congress Catalogs and the AIPAC. The library of the American University in Cairo providing documents through the periodical called Dispatch, the office and library in Cairo of the USAID mission providing reports and publications. Furthermore, interviews with USAID all account for the material gathered.

Secondary Sources

Due to the nature of the research topic secondary sources were quite useful for this research endeavor. The research question delved around re-analyzing factual phenomena, the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. There are numerous secondary materials that proved to be important particularly those that covered the historical background and the coming of the special relationship. While there is no disagreement on the existence of a special relationship between the U.S. and Israel there were various views of what shaped this relationship.

Some scholars viewed the relation as based on the East-West rivalry that accounted for the international politics during the Cold War years. Others viewed it as

the strong Jewish presence in the United States. Analyzing therefore information accumulated by other scholars proved to be essential in developing parts of the thesis especially during the Cold War era.

Organski's The \$ 36 Billion Bargain provided an excellent example in analyzing the special relationship based on domestic and international considerations. Furthermore, Organski's work also provided the necessary basis aiding to predicting the direction of the special relationship if circumstances changed regionally and internationally. Accordingly, the analysis of the secondary sources paved the way for re-analyzing the special relationship under new circumstances and this is the new international world order. What became evident during the compilation of the literature available, is that there is a lack of material written about the fate of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship in a post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before we delve into the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the importance Israel holds for the U.S., it is essential to look at the period before the creation of the State of Israel. It is this period in history that started to set the foundations of U.S.-Middle East relations in general and U.S.-Israeli relations in specific. Patterns established during this period served as guidelines for successive U.S. administrations. The historical background constitutes a starting point at which the stage is set for investigating the components of the special relationship after Roosevelt and Truman set the seeds for American policy towards the Middle East.

The Origins Of The Idea Of A Jewish Homeland In Palestine

The World Zionist Organization (WZO) dates back to 1897. The founding father of this modern Zionist movement was Theodore Herzl. Deeply disturbed by the Dreyfus Affair in France as well as the growing anti-Semitism throughout Europe, often aggravated by the inability of Jews to assimilate fully into the societies in which they lived, Herzl argued that it was necessary to establish a national home for the Jews. Eventually, Palestine was envisaged as the national home. The idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine asserted the historical link of the Jewish people to a land from which they had been exiled for nearly two millennia. Herzl's successor as head of the WZO was Chaim Weizmann, to whom the Balfour declaration of 1917 (one of

the most significant achievements of the Zionist movement toward the creation of a Jewish homeland by that time) was attributed.

Zionism was largely a European movement, however, it began to be increasingly influential in the U.S. during World War II. American Jews were shocked by Hitler's anti-Semitism and therefore supported the Zionist cause in order to help the abused and mistreated Jews of Europe. Rabbis Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver were the leaders of the American Zionist Emergency Council, which represented all American Zionist groups. It is important to note, according to Edward Tivnan, that the American Jews "had remained impressed" by the Zionist movement during World War II. As we shall see below, the well-structured and developed Zionist organization had a significant influence on the U.S. approach to the Palestine question under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations as well as on later developments of U.S. policies toward the Middle East in general.

The First World War caused the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Britain was granted the mandate over Palestine in the wake of the Versailles Conference. In 1948, Britain gave up its mandate after having been drained of its resources and will following two World Wars, and after realizing that its colonial ambitions and role were unrewarding. In the meantime, the U.S. had departed from its isolationist policies that dominated its foreign policy in the inter-war period. By the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the chief global superpower, replacing Britain and other powers whose economies had been weakened by their war efforts.

The World Zionist Organization's political activities started first in Europe then shifted to the United States. Due to the systematic extermination of the European Jews by the despotic Nazi regime, the number of Jews immigrating to America heavily increased. According to Evan M. Wilson, the Jewish community in the U.S.

numbered between four and five million by 1942, and by "the end of the war, roughly half of the Jews in the world would be located in the United States" (Wilson 1979, 17).

The shift in focus from Europe to the United States was clearly manifested in the Biltmore Program of 1942. It was the first time a meeting of the Zionist movement was conducted by American Zionists. The Biltmore Program's significance stemmed from the fact that it was a prestigious event. It included, beside the major American Zionist organizations, Chaim Weizmann and Ben Gurion almost making it a WZO Congress. Furthermore, the Zionist movement for the first time officially declared its goal to be the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Such a declaration departed radically from the gradualist approach that the Zionist had been following under the leadership of Weizmann. Weizmann's gradual approach towards Palestine centered on the notion of strengthening the Jewish community but to refrain from any political demands. By officially declaring the goal of statehood gradualism was replaced by a maximalist approach under the leadership of the American Jews which increasingly shaped the Zionist policy up to the creation of the State of Israel.

To understand the Zionist shift towards a maximalist approach and to comprehend how the American Jewish community became a powerful force to be reckoned with domestically in the U.S., it is essential to track its historical development. It is important therefore, to highlight the difference between Jews in America and European Jews and how they amalgamated to become a powerful force. The main divergence was constituted in the ideological difference over the question of statehood. The Zionist movement was composed of multiple social and political philosophies. A unifying element, however, was that of achieving for the Jewish people, "those attributes which characterize a modern nation" (Tschirgi 1983, 41).

The early perception of Zionism that marked American Jews was that it constituted a threat to their own political and social assimilation into U.S. society. This was reflected in the low numbers of members that long characterized American Zionist organizations. American Jews' charitable interest in Palestinian Jewry increased during World War I. Against the backdrop of the creation of the Palestine mandate, and the establishment of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Zionists wanted to capitalize on American Jewish generosity. Weizman showed his willingness to enlarge the Jewish Agency for Palestine to include American Jewish community or the "non-Zionists" as they were called. By 1929 American Jewish leaders agreed to join and be represented in the council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, as they saw it as a good opportunity to continue helping Palestinian Jews without any commitment to the Zionist political program. In reality, both Zionists and non-Zionists' perceptions were actually not that distant from each other. Both were promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine. Zionists called for the establishment of a national home and were deliberately downplaying the creation of a state following the spirit of gradualism, while the non-Zionists were supporting an undefined national home or as they sometimes referred to as a "spiritual center" (Tschirgi 1983, 42).

The ties that developed during the inter-war period between the Zionists and non-Zionists created the necessary conditions to mobilize the American Jewish community during World War II. During the inter-war period the membership in the American Zionist organizations had considerably increased, though immigration of American Jews to Palestine remained very small. World War II and Hitler's effort to exterminate European Jews created the necessary conditions for American Jewry to help their co-religionists in Europe. In face of Hitler's genocidal threat, the ideological distinctions and the practical differences over the question of statehood between the

Zionists and non-Zionists disintegrated and were swept aside. These conditions and the need for unified actions made it possible for the Zionists to mobilize the American Jewish community under the Zionist banner by establishing organizational links, which formed quickly into effective pro-Zionist pressure groups (Tschirgi 1983, 44).

The Roosevelt Administration (Being Introduced To The Middle East)

Up to 1939, American interests in the Middle East were generally minor. It started with missionaries who came to the Muslim world advocating Christianity. The end of World War I opened up the way for the American government to further introduce American commercial ventures in the region. "Although economic relations with the countries of that region long remained only minimally important, policy makers were anxious that Americans suffer no economic discrimination" (Tschirgi 1983, 5).

Even after the U.S. gained access to the Middle Eastern oil industry in the late 1920's and 1930's American diplomacy showed little interest in promoting U.S. political influence; the isolationism that dominated U.S. foreign policy after World War I still prevailed. Despite various requests by U.S. businessmen for official government support to increase the American share in the commercial life of the region, Washington long remained reluctant to comply. However, this reluctance slowly began to erode after 1939, mainly due to World War II, which caused Washington to perceive economic and strategic interests in the Middle East.

Furthermore, in 1939 the relation between the Zionist movement and the British government had become severely strained and the Zionist movement began to seek help from the influential and large American Jewish community to gain American sympathy to its cause. In the prewar period the British government started

to bid for Arab support and started to run counter to Jewish aspirations, a trend that culminated in the White Paper of 1939. The White Paper restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and linked the issue of Jewish immigration with political conditions in Palestine (Tschirgi 1983, 2-4).

Amidst the aforementioned situation, Roosevelt's policy toward the Palestine question, in the period between 1939 and his death in 1945, witnessed a shift from disinterest to minor involvement. His approach was mainly characterized by avoiding any long-term decisions on Palestine often under the pretext that the ongoing war efforts precluded this because of "military necessity". As a consequence of this policy choice, shortsighted decisions stemming from momentary reactions to situations were often the outcome. One such example is the contradiction between Roosevelt's pledge to Ibn Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia in 1943, and his pro-Zionist election campaign promise of October 15, 1944.

The pledge to Ibn Saud was that the situation in Palestine would not be altered unless both Arabs and Jews were consulted. This came against the backdrop of the increased importance given by the U.S. to the oil in the region, and Washington's understanding that Ibn Saud in turn was interested in the fate of Palestine. Roosevelt's pledge sought to gain Ibn Saud's goodwill. On the other hand, the election campaign promise came against the backdrop of the Zionist leader's announcement that a "friendly" candidate, that is friendly to Jewish aspirations, would secure himself the Jewish vote.

Although American Zionists and their supporters became better organized and able to apply increasing pressure on the U.S. government, Roosevelt overall maintained a static approach by expressing verbal sympathy to Zionist as well as Arab leaders. In a way Roosevelt contained both the Zionist leaders and their supporters. He

allowed himself to express sympathy for Zionist goals, but was careful to stress that no action would be taken until World War II was concluded. Furthermore, together with the State Department the Roosevelt administration took steps to keep public discussions of the Palestine issue at a low level in order to avoid Arab anger that might stir up unnecessary confrontations. This essentially shaped the climate that dominated between 1939 - 1943.

Transition Year 1943

The year 1943 witnessed the start of a transition in the U.S. approach to Palestine. This was due to domestic as well as international changes. On the domestic front, American Zionism expanded and increased in strength after the Biltmore Convention and the American Jewish Conference. From the Biltmore Convention of 1942 the Biltmore Declaration was born, calling for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. At the same time, it marked the change in leadership of American and World Zionism. "The torch was being passed from Weizmann and Wise, the minimalists, to Ben Gurion and Silver, the maximalists" (Neff 1995, 21). This event which was the key step toward the American Jewish Conference in New York in 1943, heralded a more demanding and aggressive Zionist policy, or "loud diplomacy" (Neff 1995, 21).

On the international front, public opinion in the U.S. was increasingly aware of Hitler's barbaric anti-Semitic policies against European Jews and was increasingly sympathetic to their plight. The defeat of the Axis forces in the battles of El-Alamein and Stalingrad and the changing balance of power in favor of the allied forces, largely diminished "the military necessity" policy toward Palestine adopted by Roosevelt. Parallel to these events long-term American interests in the Middle East's oil

resources were developing. To secure those interests the goodwill of Ibn Saud had to be maintained and guaranteed (Tschirgi 1983, 87).

In 1943 King Ibn Saud sent a letter to Roosevelt expressing his concern, as well as the concern of all Arabs, about Zionist intentions in Palestine. Roosevelt replied to the King's letter saying that: "It is the view of the Government of the United States, that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews" (Wilson 1979, 34).

The President's secret pledge to Ibn Saud marked the beginning of official American involvement at the time. It became a policy, which served both Roosevelt and later Truman, to answer Arab opposition to Zionist claims over Palestine as well as pro-Zionist statements by the U.S. government. When the pledge to Ibn Saud became public in 1945, both the Zionist movement as well as the Arabs had already opposed U.S.-Palestine policy. The American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) maintained that the Arabs did not have any valid interest regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Arabs on the other hand, felt that they had never been fully consulted believing that U.S. actions were in support of Zionist aspirations (Wilson 1979, 35).

A genuine long-term idea to achieve a solution in Palestine was presented in the Weizmann - Philby scheme. The scheme failed and short-term solutions corresponding to immediate given circumstances were tailored ever since during Roosevelt's presidency. The Weizmann - Philby scheme was an idea of John Philby, a British confidant of the Saudi ruler, who in 1939 interested Weizmann in a plan that would allow for Arab acceptance of a Jewish state west of the Jordan river. By 1943 Weizmann presented a modification to the original Philby idea and interested

Roosevelt with it. Ibn Saud, however, refused the scheme leading to its abandonment (Tschirgi 1983, 88-90).

Furthermore, the secret M-Project launched by Roosevelt in 1942 "which was given the enormous task of suggesting options for massive population resettlement on a global scale in the postwar period." (Tschirgi 1983, 91) was envisaged to serve him generally as a framework for conducting refugee policies without causing the danger of renewed warfare. Though this project was not exclusively designed as a solution to the Palestine problem it may have had implications for Palestine. However, with Roosevelt's death, the M-Project went to its grave without any significant achievements.

As previously mentioned Roosevelt policy toward the Middle East was static and based on short-term solutions, this was reinforced even more by the environment created in 1944, when Palestine became an issue in U.S. domestic policies. In order to back up the spirit of "loud diplomacy" created in 1943 and to further commit Roosevelt's administration to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Zionist movement made it clear that candidates advocating a Zionist solution in Palestine would be rewarded with the Jewish vote. On January 27, 1944 the Palestine Resolution was introduced to Congress. The resolution basically called upon the United States to "use its good office and take appropriate measures" to allow free Jewish immigration to Palestine "so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth" (Tschirgi 1983, 98).

Hoping to see the resolution passed, the Zionist movement campaigned intensively in both Houses of Congress. The introduction of the Palestine resolution put Roosevelt and his administration in a difficult position. Following the logic of

trying to avoid any form of commitment on Palestine, Roosevelt's administration could not neglect possible repercussions a public denouncement of the resolution would bring on him and his administration as well as political damage on the Democratic Party at large. The issue was further complicated by the fear of violent outbreak and instability in the Middle East by taking a position on the resolution, which in turn could have complicated the military situation for the allied forces during the war.

Due to the aforementioned reasons the administration secretly engaged in defeating the resolution through obstructive tactics that avoided a direct quarrel with the Zionists. Zionists hoped that the introduction of the resolution would confront the administration with two choices. Either, it would voice its opposition, and therefore be exposed in front of the American Jewry in an election year, or approve it and therefore further foster Zionist aims. The administration however, cleverly outmaneuvered the Zionist political trick under the pretext of the "military necessity".

The obstructive tactics took the form of avoiding direct clashes with the Zionists, and giving the impression that no opposition to the resolution was coming from the White House. When the Zionists approached the State Department, with regards to the resolution, the answer they got was that this matter was entirely up to the Congress. This reaction gave the Zionists the impression of an approval for the resolution and consequently it was viewed as a "go ahead" sign to further press the issue.

The War Department on the other hand, voiced its concerns by emphasizing military considerations, which outweighed political ones. President Roosevelt directly intervened to bring an end to the resolution by asking the Secretary of War to publicly announce an opposition to the resolution. This was intended to underline that only

military considerations beyond their control were at work, and to further cement the notion that the White House and State Department had no part in the defeat of the resolution. The Secretary of War suggested that the same solution could be achieved if a high ranking military representative would testify to the Senate committee.

Chief of Staff General Marshall appeared before the Senate committee and outlined the military reasons, which were aimed at halting the resolution. Marshall's testimony facilitated the process for obstructing the resolution, but it did not entirely kill it. The pressure for a public announcement by the Secretary of War mounted. After the War Department failed to persuade the State Department to carry some of the burden for defeating the resolution, the Secretary of War, finally, had no other alternative but to make his opposition to the Palestine resolution public thereby putting an end to the issue (Tschirgi 1983, 99-104).

On the whole the short-term tactics adopted by Roosevelt and his administration were successful. The administration defeated the resolution without a direct confrontation with the Zionists, and with the defeat of the resolution any possible violent outbreak in the Middle East was averted. Despite the defeat of the resolution and its deferment the Zionists extracted a sort of partial victory. They were encouraged by the fact that Congress did not adopt the resolution only, because of the military reasons. The long-term implication was, that once military considerations came to an end the administration could be expected to adopt a clear cut policy on Palestine and Congress would adopt the resolution (Tschirgi 1983, 101-106).

It is worthwhile mentioning, that the Palestine resolution also sparked for the first time a collective Arab position towards the Palestine question. Arab governments opposed the Palestine resolution in the Congress by vehemently protesting against it at the State Department. The protests were led by Iraq and Egypt and supported by Saudi

Arabia, Lebanon and Syria. This collective action by the Arab states did not fall on deaf ears. American diplomats were instructed to explain to the Arabs that even if the Palestine resolution were adopted it would not be binding since U.S. foreign policy was conducted and implemented by the executive branch (Tschirgi 1983, 102).

In the summer of 1944, shortly before presidential elections were to take place, the Palestine issue for the first time in American history became part of the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties. Both expressed pro-Zionist positions in the hope of gaining Jewish votes and pro-Zionist votes of an American public that had become familiar with Hitler's atrocities against the Jews (Neff 1995, 24). During the previous election of 1940 Zionist influence in the U.S. was not as strong as to influence the election campaign. However, the change from minimalist to maximalist Zionist leaders made it possible for the Zionists to apply more pressure on the government in 1944. According to Wilson, Secretary Hull told the president that inclusion of the Palestine issue in the election race would cause negative Arab opinion. Hull urged that both parties abandon pro-Zionist statements during their campaign. Despite Hull's warning the Palestinian issue remained in the campaign platform (Wilson 1979, 44). The Democrats under the leadership of Roosevelt made a pro-Zionist campaign promise that outbid the one of the Republicans, namely by calling for a "Jewish commonwealth" (Neff 1995, 24).

Coming out of the 1944 elections with an unprecedented fourth victory Roosevelt started to prepare for the Yalta Conference with Stalin and Churchill. The Zionist leaders were impatiently waiting for Roosevelt to fulfill his pro-Zionist campaign promise of October 1944. However, at the Yalta Conference the Palestine question was not addressed (Wilson 1979, 48). On his way home, Roosevelt decided

to meet with Ibn Saud on board a U.S. warship in the middle of the Suez Canal. The meeting left a profound impression on Roosevelt who later confessed:

That I learned more about that whole problem, the Muslim problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters. (Neff 1995, 26).

Roosevelt found it essential to re-examine the whole issue and according to Neff, he told Judge Joseph Proskauer of the American Jewish Committee to try to reduce Jewish hopes for a homeland in Palestine because it could not be created without bloodshed and force.

On April 12, 1945 Roosevelt died. At the time, U.S. involvement in the Middle East was still relatively minor. Although, the later Roosevelt years saw a shift toward greater involvement, Roosevelt had managed to follow a course on Palestine that: "did not fully commit him to either side in the dispute. His immense prestige made it possible for him to maintain this position to the end" (Wilson 1979, 56).

Of course, unanswered questions remain as to what would have become of the Palestine issue had Roosevelt lived. Would he have fulfilled the commitments he made to support the creation of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine or would he have honored his pledge to Ibn Saud to consult both the Arabs and the Jews before taking any action? Under those ambiguous and vague circumstances Truman, inherited the American presidency.

The Truman Administration (Establishment Of The State Of Israel)

When Franklin D. Roosevelt died, Vice-President Harry Truman was entrusted with the leadership of the United States. Up to that moment he had little experience in foreign affairs. Yet, Truman was the president who presided over the era of the atomic

bomb, the disintegration of the war time alliance, the Cold War, the reconstruction of Western Europe and war in East Asia.

A few days after taking the office Truman received a letter from Secretary of State Edward Stettinius briefing him on the Palestine question. In this letter Truman was warned that Zionist leaders would try to establish contact with him in order to obtain commitments regarding Jewish immigration and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. He was also advised to handle the Palestine issue with great care since long-term U.S. interests were involved (Neff 1995, 27-28).

Truman claims to have had deep feelings toward the Jewish people, especially those in Europe who suffered Hitler's inhumane policies. In his memoirs he wrote:

The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern for me. I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who have been made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of their race, color or religion (Truman 1956, 132).

A few weeks after Stettinius wrote the letter in which he briefed the president on the Palestine issue, Truman received another memorandum from Joseph Grew, the Acting Secretary of State in the absence of Edward Stettinius. Grew informed Truman that Roosevelt had showed sympathy to the Zionists but had had a meeting with King Ibn Saud earlier that same year (1945) in which he assured the King that no action against the Arabs regarding Palestine would be taken. He added that Roosevelt had confirmed this in a letter.

Roosevelt's assurance to the Arabs complicated Truman's position since he was sympathetic to the plight of the Jews and therefore more willing to help the Jewish cause. The State Department and the Department of Defense were more

inclined to support Arabs due to their views of U.S. strategic and economic interests. They held that a friendly Arab world was essential to western security and therefore warned against supporting the establishment of a Jewish state. Any action considered hostile by the Arabs would endanger the existing friendly bonds between the United States and the Arab Middle East. In fact, the State Department and the Department of Defense advised Truman to strengthen relations with the Arabs, since the U.S. could not afford to lose the Arab friendship, which might then be replaced by a Soviet-Arab friendship resulting in the destruction of the balance of power in the world. This view was largely supported and defended by the Loy Henderson (Director Near Eastern and African Affairs, 1946-48), Dean Rusk (joined Department of State in 1946 and became Assistant of Secretary of State in 1950), and George Kennan (policy planning staff of Department of State from 1947-49 and Chief Adviser to Secretary of State from 1949-50) axis. The Middle East was viewed as a buffer against the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, as we shall see in the coming pages, several key individuals supported the Jewish cause and profoundly affected the course of events. Most of these aided Truman in matters related to domestic politics. Among them were Eddie Jacobson, Clark Clifford and David Niles. Eddie Jacobson held no official post but was one of Truman's old friends of Jewish origin and served as a unique channel of communication into the very heart of the decision making process. Presidential aid Clark Clifford, whose responsibilities revolved around party politics, outlined the general strategy of the party for the 1948 presidential elections. David Niles (from a Jewish family called Neyhus who Americanized the name to Niles) was responsible for Jewish affairs and was the Zionist's key asset in the White House (Fraser, 5-6).

Truman's struggle to reach a solution to a problem in which passions were deeply engaged and over which advisers he respected argued for totally opposite

policies led him to be torn between his "pro-Zionist" advisors and the "pro-Arab" State and Defence Department. Initially, Truman followed the State Department's advice at the beginning of his presidency. However, he changed the direction of his policy after returning from Potsdam. At a press conference he explained America's view on the Palestine issue by saying: "The American view on Palestine is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country" (Truman 1956, 136).

On August 31, 1945, Truman wrote to the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, asking him to accept the plan provided by the Zionists regarding an immediate immigration of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. The outcome of Truman's appeal to the British Prime Minister put him in a dilemma. The British government was deeply disappointed by the appeal since they felt that the President of the United States who did not possess the mandate over Palestine ought to have no commitment towards the Zionists and therefore such a demand was inappropriate as it was pressuring the British Prime Minister. The Zionists were equally disappointed because Truman only mentioned part of their program, namely immigration, but not the establishment of a Jewish state, and because he did not try hard enough to influence the British government. As for the Arabs, they were angered by the appeal and saw it as an action against them. They viewed the appeal as a betrayal of the agreement reached by Franklin Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud.

The Anglo-American Committee

On November 13, 1945, the British and American governments agreed on the formation of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to investigate the Palestine issue. This Committee was composed of six British and six American members.

Truman's main concern was that the Committee should act rapidly. After about four months of extensive investigations, the Anglo-American Committee finally came to a conclusion before the 120 days deadline that was set to ensure swift action (Truman 1956, 142).

The recommendations set out in the report of the Committee in general equated the Arabs and the Jews by pointing out that the Jews have a historic connection to Palestine and that Palestine lies at the crossroads of the Arab world. Given this, the committee voiced its opposition to a Jewish or Arab State, preferring the establishment of a trusteeship under the United Nations instead of the British mandate, in order to prevent any one side (the Arabs or the Jews) from overpowering the other. Following this aforementioned theme, a supplement was included to the report with various suggestions for Palestine's future administration with the aim of avoiding clashes between Arabs and Jews.

The aspect that has received public attention and that has been largely misinterpreted was the issue of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The report recommended that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted to Palestine. The misinterpretation lies in the belief that the report called for an immediate admission of those Jewish refugees to Palestine which in turn led to the assumption that the committee opened the "doors" to Palestine. What was meant by immediate, however, was only the action of authorizing in principle for the future entry of 100,000 immigrants. The mandatory government would set actual immigration schedules according to its own judgement of Palestine's economic and political conditions.

Reaction of the committee's report in Washington was favorable. Truman felt that the report pointed "in the right direction" (Tschirgi 1983, 176), however, in a statement he considered only parts of the recommendations that had pleased the

Zionists. "I am happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed" (Tschirgi 1983, 177-178). This statement showed that Truman separated the issue of immigration from the whole issue of the Palestine problem, which only further fostered the misconception of the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

London did not reject the committee's recommendations but stressed the importance of taking the recommendations as a whole and not separating them as Truman had done. With respect to Jewish immigration, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, expressed London's willingness to permit 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine but not at once. However, the British expressed their concern about the costs of the Palestine problem, asking what role the United States would accept and suggesting sharing these costs with them (Wilson 1979, 89-91).

On the other hand, the stakeholders, Arabs and Zionists, opposed the committee's report. The Arabs made public protests and Arab leaders threatened to take action against British and American economic interests if the reports became the basis of future policy on Palestine. Arab diplomats informed Washington of their disapproval and opposition to the whole inquiry. Zionists, shared the same bitterness toward the report but with less public outrage as that of the Arabs. Ben Gurion said that the report was "a disguised new edition of the White Paper" (Tschirgi 1983, 181).

The whole significance of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry stems from the fact that the U.S. and Britain, for the first time officially conducted a joint effort to determine and reach an acceptable framework for solving the Palestine question. Truman's administration was divided over the committee's report and contradictory suggestions as what to do next were passed to the president. Truman himself launched two contradictory Palestine policies fitting each set of

contradictory information he received. David Niles and Major General John Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, encouraged Truman to focus on pressuring the British government to allow the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. On the other hand, the State Department and Loy Henderson in particular wanted to persuade the president to cooperate and work together with the British government on tackling the substantive issues for the purpose of achieving an overall policy toward Palestine.

The Cabinet Committee (The Morrison-Grady Plan)

In order to keep the momentum on the Palestine issue going, Truman instructed the Secretaries of State, War and Treasury to form a Cabinet Committee to hold consultations with the British. A group was formed that was headed by former assistant Secretary of State Henry F. Grady. The British agreed that the Cabinet Committee would meet in London for further talks with the British government. Prior to the departure to London Truman gave directives to the group to engage in an overall Arab-Zionist settlement, which for the first time marked a framework for a comprehensive political settlement in Palestine.

In London, the British offered a proposal to the Cabinet Committee suggesting the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab provinces. These provinces would have local self-government, but a central authority would be present in order to control important issues. The justification for separating the Arabs and Jews was to limit the growing hostility between both parties that had been on the rise. The proposal, however, would only be accepted after consulting the Arabs and Jews (Wilson 1979, 93).

Even though, Grady could not elicit from the British the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews, he accepted British assurances that they would allow immigration once they were convinced that it could be carried out without military force, after consultation with both stakeholders (Arabs, Jews). Grady in turn recommended that Truman accept the plan because there was simply no faster way to get 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The talks between the Cabinet Committee and the British government, which lasted for two weeks, were secret. However, Jewish agencies were able to find out about the consultations. This was due to information leakage by members of the Grady group who did not see in the proposals any provisions allowing for an immediate admission of Jews to Palestine. An immediate campaign against these talks was launched with the purpose of defeating it. Truman accordingly called his team back and instructed Grady to stop the negotiations by telling Attlee that the United States was considering the proposal. The British government, however, announced the proposal as an Anglo-American proposal in the House of Commons, by Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, hence it was called the Morrison-Grady plan (Wilson 1979, 92-95).

Truman called the six American members of the previous Anglo-American Committee to meet with the Grady committee to discuss the Morrison-Grady plan. Unanimously the plan was rejected on the grounds that it was calling for a partition, which could not be backed up by their report. The Jewish community in the United States by then had organized huge campaigns opposing the plan. On August 7, 1946, Truman, to the disappointment of the British government, rejected the plan. The rejection further complicated the prospects of a joint American-British solution. In his memoirs Truman commented that, "by the fall of 1946 the situation looked, as I wrote to a friend, insoluble" (Truman 1956, 153).

A long period had passed since Harry Truman had asked the British government to accept the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. American supporters of Zionism were annoyed that nothing had happened yet. Accordingly, their support of Truman and the Democrats started to decline. Elections were scheduled for November 1946 and the Republicans started to increase their support for the Zionist cause in order to attract the disappointed American Jews to vote for them. The Democrats, afraid of losing the elections, urged Truman to announce something to please the Jewish voters. Finally, David K. Niles persuaded Truman to make a commitment to the Jews. In spite of the State Department's warning Truman announced a statement on Yom Kippur, a Jewish religious day, October 4, 1946 which went further than any statement before. Truman reaffirmed his commitment to the Jewish immigration into Palestine and, more importantly, he identified with the Jewish Agency move towards partition by saying, "to such a solution our Government could give its support" (Truman 1956, 22).

This announcement, which was very carefully phrased to give the impression of calling for a Jewish state was important for the Jews because it marked the first time that Truman had officially declared that he would favor a state which put him on the side of Zionist aims. The Republicans seemed crippled by Truman's announcement, but they had already been in favor of a Jewish state and challenged Truman's initial demand that 100,000 Jews be allowed to immigrate to Palestine by announcing that 'several hundred thousand' should be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. This struggle between the Democrats and the Republicans for the Jewish votes clearly illustrates the increasing influence of the Jewish community on the policy of the United States. In fact, it can be said that the two Parties were engaged in

bidding, each one trying to bid high enough to gain the support of the Jewish community.

At the time of Truman's Yom Kippur statement, a dialogue between Arabs, Zionist leaders and British officials was taking place in London (London Conference). The London Conference came as a result to the U.S. rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan and the blow this had dealt to Anglo-American cooperation. The British government expressed satisfaction with the dialogues that were taking place in London. In a formal meeting between the Arabs and the British government the Arabs presented a proposal. The proposal called for the termination of the mandate and the independence of Palestine as a unitary state with a governing council composed of seven Arabs and three Jews as well as the immediate halt to Jewish immigration. In an informal meeting with the Jewish Agency the Jews proposed a "viable state in an adequate area of Palestine" (Wilson 1979, 97). Due to the divergence of both proposals the British government opted for adjourning the conference for considering the proposals.

When Truman found out that the conference had been adjourned he informed Attlee, that he was going to give a statement. The contents of the statement would review U.S. efforts in finding a solution to the Palestine question, reiterate the need for an immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews and attempt to "bridge the gap between the Morrison-Grady plan and the Jewish Agency plan for a viable state" (Wilson 1979, 98). Attlee in turn urged the president to postpone the statement. Contrary to Attlee's request as well as the State Department's advice Truman went ahead with the Yom Kippur statement, shattering British hopes in achieving tangible steps towards an agreement with the Zionists and arousing British anger and dismay.

Attlee complained that Truman refused to give "even a few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country that has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine". According to Wilson, "Bevin declared that Truman's action destroyed all hopes that the British negotiations with the parties would succeed" (Wilson 1979, 98). These accusations showed the frustration of the British government with respect to the mounting pressures exerted by the United States to urge the British to take action.

In January 1947 some three months after the Yom Kippur statement the British resumed talks with the protagonists in Palestine, meeting both Arabs and Jews separately. From these meetings it became apparent that no agreement was going to be made due to the reluctance of the Jewish Agency to further give details about the "viable state". As a final step the British proposed a five year trusteeship with some autonomy for the Arab and Jewish areas and the immigration of 100,000 Jews over the course of two years. This proposal has become to be known as the Bevin scheme. The Jews rejected the scheme on the grounds that it did not consider the possibility of a partition, while the Arabs objected to the admittance of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The British government saw no other alternative than to take the Palestine question to the United Nations. Bevin declared in front of the House of Commons that the government is submitting the issue to the United Nations and criticized U.S. policy towards the whole issue specifically mentioning the Yom Kippur statement of Truman (Wilson 1979,104).

Britain refers the Palestine Question to the United Nations

The British formally requested that the United Nations form a special session of the General Assembly on April 2, 1947. The United Nations informed Britain that its mandate over Palestine would still be valid and any solution to the Palestine issue

had to be approved by the British at the end. The United States approved and helped to back the British initiative to let the United Nations handle the issue of Palestine. A United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed and consisted of eleven relatively neutral countries. The task set for the UNSCOP was to investigate the Palestine issue from different perspectives in order to come up with a proper solution that would then be reported to the General Assembly (Neff 1995, 45).

On August 31, 1947, UNSCOP came up with a majority and a minority plan for the General Assembly to consider. The majority plan stated that the British mandate should be ended and a partition should occur in which Palestine would be divided into two states independent of each other, one Jewish and the other Arab. The report also approved a large-scale immigration of Jews and the establishment of a Jewish-Arab economic union. Truman voiced his backing of the partition plan (the majority plan), seeing in it a solution despite opposition from the State Department and the Pentagon (Neff 1995, 46). According to Even Wilson: "The administration was now subject to intense pressure as public opinion in the United States became more and more pro-Zionist" (Wilson 1979, 115). This statement by Wilson offers the explanation of Truman's acceptance of the majority plan. As for the reaction of the British government, it agreed to the termination of the mandate but was not optimistic about partition. The Jews accepted the majority plan because their dream of having an independent state of their own was turning to reality. The Arabs, however, objected strongly to the partition.

The General Assembly was to meet on November 29, 1947 to vote on the partition of Palestine (the majority plan). The period between the emergence of the majority plan and the day on which the vote was scheduled was very active, as well as ambiguous in terms of the role the United States played in convincing other nations to

vote for this plan. Controversy has existed about this point ever since Harry Truman in his memoirs indicated that he didn't approve of the principle of pressure by saying:

Some were suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly. I have never approved of the practice of the strong imposing their will on the weak whether among men or among nations. It is basic to the way of life of democratic people that they respect the opinions of others whether they happen to be weak or strong, rich or poor. (Truman 1956, 158)

There are other sources, however, which claim that Truman apparently approved of the usage of pressure to force nations to vote for the partition plan of the United Nations. John Snetzinger, in his book Truman, the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel states that Summer Wells indicated that orders were given by the White House to use all forms of pressure on countries that were either undecided or against partition. Emmanuel Celler, a Jewish Congressman wrote a confidential letter to Truman after the voting on the partition had taken place to thank him for his efforts.

Of course, it would be inappropriate to accuse the United States government alone of using pressure to influence votes in favor of the partition. Zionists were working feverishly to gain as much support as possible. According to Wilson, the Zionists were working on the Latin American delegations by offering their wives mink coats. They also reached the extent of offering the Cuban representative the chance to become the Cuban president if he would vote with them. The Zionists were not alone in this form of lobbying; Wilson mentions several influential Americans and the countries they were exerting pressure on:

- Former Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle - Haiti,
 - Former Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and economist Robert Nathan Liberia,
 - Supreme Court Justices F. Frankfurter and F. Murphy - the Philippines
- (Wilson 1979, 125).

On November 29, 1947, the votes were taken and the partition plan was supported by "33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions and one delegation (Siam) absent" (Wilson 1979, 127). It was said that the Haitian delegate voted "with tears in his eyes" (Wilson 1979, 127) and the Canadian delegate was heard to say that Canada supported the partition "with a heavy heart and many misgivings" (Wilson 1979, 127). The British, who had the actual mandate over Palestine, abstained from voting.

Aftermath of the UN votes on the partition of Palestine to the creation of the State of Israel

Up to this point, the United States had played an important role in helping Zionists move toward winning a Jewish state. The remaining step was to implement partition. The Zionists once again were depending on the influence of the United States to assist in this final step. However, the United States took an opposite direction in its foreign policy with regard to the Palestine question, a direction that was unexpected by the leaders of the Zionist movement. Truman agreed with a State Department proposal to call on the United Nations to put the partition plan aside and establish a United Nations Trusteeship in Palestine. The sudden change in the direction of the American policy was due to the worsening East-West relations. The Czechoslovakian government had been overthrown and a Communist regime established instead. In Italy pending elections appeared likely to be won by the Communist party. It was also believed that the Soviet Union was exerting immense pressure on Iran, Greece, Austria and Hungary. The apparent threat was that the balance of power that existed would be destroyed and an American-Soviet confrontation might be the result of this growing disequilibrium. Furthermore, the Americans realized that the British were truly going to leave a vacuum in the region.

Contrary to U.S. hopes, Britain proved it would not be maneuvered into presiding over the partition. On March 16, 1948 Secretary of State George Marshall told Warren Austin, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, to inform the General Assembly that the American policy regarding the partition had changed.

The change of the American policy generated tremendous public reaction in the United States. Widely viewed as an error, it led to thousands of telegrams and letters being sent to the White House expressing hostility against the new Palestine policy. Truman issued a statement trying to explain the change of policy. He stressed that he supported the proposed trusteeship plans only after he saw that the partition could not be implemented peacefully (Neff 1995, 59-60).

The change in foreign policy regarding the Palestine issue no doubt weakened Truman's position within the Jewish community. His change in policy came at a crucial time, it was 1948 and later that same year, presidential elections were scheduled to take place. Clark Clifford, special counselor to the president, tried to recapture Jewish political support. It must be recalled that in late March Zionists announced that they would establish a provisional government in the Jewish part of Palestine, according to the partition plan, as soon as the British mandate expired, which was to be on May 15, 1948. The situation in the United States was getting hectic. On one hand, the State Department was working to achieve trusteeship in Palestine since Arab-Jewish hostilities were inevitable and East-West relations were worsening. On the other hand, Clifford and Niles from the White House tried to persuade the president to adopt a policy in favor of the Jews and to recognize the Jewish State in order to secure his own re-election. Important Democratic figures were also advising the president to change his position. Truman was exposed to pressure

from the Zionists and from his own party and administration, so he had to come to a decision quickly (Neff 1995, 62-65).

On May 12, 1948 a meeting was held in the Oval Office to discuss what policy the United States would follow after the end of the British mandate and the creation of the Jewish State. Tensions were high between the participants who represented the White House and the State Department each of whom had strong opinions about the correct solution. Truman's intention at this conference was to listen to the arguments in order to make up his mind as to which direction he should follow. After the conference ended Truman did not give any hint as to what he had decided. It seems rather remarkable that this conference was held only two days before the termination of the British mandate and the announcement of the creation of the Jewish State. This seems to be an indication of confusion since Truman, as was earlier stressed, embarked on policies favorable to Jewish aims. These events illustrate that it must have been a time were Truman must have been rethinking the consequences of his policy because it had become increasingly evident that if a Jewish state were to be created the likelihood of a war breaking out in the region was high. However, it is apparent that the pressure of the Zionists, the upcoming elections, and his own administration had a stronger influence than to find a peaceful solution to this "insoluble" problem.

On May 14, the day the British mandate ended in Palestine and the Jewish State was to be announced. Truman instructed his aide Clifford, to arrange the necessary steps to announce the recognition of the Jewish State. Truman insisted that recognition be announced several minutes after the announcement of the creation of the Jewish State. Zionist leaders met at Tel Aviv Art Museum and announced the birth

of the state of Israel. A few minutes later, Press Secretary Charles G. Ross released the statement that recognized the State of Israel. He said:

this government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as de facto authority of the new State of Israel. (Benson 1997, 166)

With this statement the United States became the first country to recognize the state of Israel.

A Conclusion on the Period from 1939-1948

Evaluating the Roosevelt and Truman administrations it is safe to say in retrospect that both:

did not understand the true dimensions of the Palestine question and, moreover, were blinded to it by the lures of domestic politics... They failed to understand the enormous complexities of Zionism's international ramifications, and certainly none of them understood or sympathized with the unique predicament of the Palestinians. (Neff 1995, 26)

Roosevelt used a static approach and avoided Zionist pressure by myopic measures and contradictory statements, while Truman cracked under Zionist pressure caused largely by the situation he inherited from Roosevelt. In this period the United States made the birth of Israel possible. The United States attended the birth of Israel, now the question was whether it was going to nurture the new state.

Up to this point, we have looked at how the United States became involved in the Middle East specifically with the Palestine question. This involved examining the origins of the idea of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the World Zionist Organization's (WZO) shift from Great Britain to the newly emerging superpower the United States. The slow, but steady emergence and development of U.S. strategic and economic interests in the area since World War II, and the American role in the

creation of the State of Israel. Links between these factors highlight the circumstances under which the American foreign policy toward the Palestine issue was shaped under Roosevelt and Truman administrations between 1939 to 1948.

CHAPTER 3 THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

In this chapter we want to investigate how the special relationship between the newly found state and the U.S. came into being during the Cold War years. In order to understand how the special relationship came to existence we have to look at the geopolitical and domestic circumstances that allowed for such a relationship to mature in the first place then how and in what ways the special relationship manifested itself.

Organski suggests that there are four possibilities through which "American generosity" toward Israel can be explained. Two of these possibilities are extreme versions and they produce two moderate perspectives. The four possibilities are as follows (Organski 1990, 4-6):

1. U.S. support to Israel is the product of Jewish influence through the successful lobbying by the Jewish community. That is, the Jewish community in favor of Israel basically guides U.S. national interest. Furthermore, American friendship toward Israel created problems with the Arab states. If the U.S. would stop its unique form of support and commitment to Israel, Arab hostilities would vanish.
- 2.A more moderate outlook of the above mentioned is that it is true that U.S. support of Israel is the product of the strength of the Jewish community on the American government, however, this alone does not account for American generosity vis a vis Israel. Strategic considerations become a factor.

So far those two possibilities stem from domestic considerations. The third and fourth possibilities of explaining the special relationship are based on international considerations as the primary explanation of the uniqueness in relations.

3. American aid to Israel is based on strategic interests in the region. Aid to Israel is therefore a tool to effectively implement policies beneficial for American interests. Jewish community strength in the U.S. serves to legitimize aid to Israel.
4. Like the first possibility, the fourth is also an extreme version but upside down; that is purely considering international factors to explain the U.S.-Israel special relationship. It basically asserts that American aid to Israel is no different than to any other country since strategic consideration "rightly or wrongly, dictate which countries receive substantial American support" (Organski 1990, 6).

The United States and Israel formed a special relationship in various areas starting from Israel's independence until the present. The relationship is based on general agreements in the form of a commitment to peace on the regional and international levels that is in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the superpower rivalry. The need for securing and maintaining Israel's existence as well as to ensure its economic prosperity. "There has been a remarkable degree of parallelism and congruence between the two states, but there also have been episodes of non congruency of policy that have led to efforts by one party or the other, or both operating, simultaneously, to influence the nature and direction of the policy of the other" (Reich 1984, 211).

Reich asserts that the relationship is based on a positive perception of the American public opinion and through official statements as well as through political, diplomatic, military and economic support. Even though there is a general understanding, there is no overall legally binding formal alliance. Instead the U.S. expresses its interests in supporting Israel's integrity and security through presidential

statements and various limited agreements. In April 1969 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave an outlook of presidential statements more or less committing the U.S. to Israel's security and defense. The policy declarations were (Reich 1984, 207):

- 1948, President Truman's declaration for Israel's independence.
- 1950, British-French-American tripartite declaration opposing any violations of frontiers and armistice lines in the Middle East.
- 1957, President Eisenhower pledging American support for the integrity and independence of Middle Eastern nations.
- 1957, Secretary of State Dulles assertion that the Gulf of Aqaba is regarded as an international waterway.
- 1963, President Kennedy's press conference pledge to American opposition to any act of aggression in the Middle East.
- 1964, President Johnson's statement indicating American support for territorial integrity and political independence of all Middle Eastern nations.

Both the Sinai II accords of 1975 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation in 1981 formed the base of documented U.S. commitment. The Sinai II accords calling for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through diplomacy not by military action as well as a secret pledge at Israel's insistence that U.S. would not recognize or even negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) unless the PLO recognized Israel and accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (Neff 1995, 115). On the other hand, the Memorandum of Understanding and Strategic Cooperation in 1981 cemented the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship. Alexander Haig, Secretary of State under the presidency of Ronald Reagan signed the agreement with Israel. Viewing the Arab-Israeli conflict as a product of the Cold War the agreement

was designed as a deterrent to the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The agreement "created a coordinating council and working groups on weaponry research, military cooperation, maintenance facilities and other areas of mutual interests" (Organski 1990, 12).

However, it is essential to point out that the U.S.-Israeli special relationship is complex and multifaceted. Understanding it in some cases is not an easy task since it is marked by contradictory events. One such example is Nixon, who won the presidency without relying much on the Jewish vote and naturally did not feel constrained by Jewish pressure. Yet his presidency witnessed a tremendous increase in American economic and military aid to Israel. It is true that the relations between the two states reached "maturity" in the inter-war period of 1967 and 1973 and even beyond that time, mainly as a result of the wars, the increasing influence of the Soviet Union, and problems in relations with some Arab States. Yet at the same time parallel to the maturity of the U.S.-Israeli relationship also U.S.-Arab relations gradually improved. All these factors added to the complexity of understanding the special relationship. It has become evident therefore, that the U.S.-Israeli special relationship should be regarded in the whole context of U.S.-foreign policy toward the Middle East in general.

Seth Tillman identified four main pillars of American interest in the region. Among them are the right of Israel to exist and the need for its survival and security (the special relationship). The avoidance of confrontation with the Soviet Union and the avoidance of it establishing patron-client relationship with countries in the region, that would endanger the delicate balance of power. Following principles such as the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the right of people for self-determination. On top of these foreign policy objectives of the United States in the Middle East is the

"reliable access, on reasonable terms, at tolerable prices, to the oil of the region"
(Tillman 1982, 50).

Geopolitical Considerations (From Truman to Reagan)

The Cold War played a crucial role in forming a special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Even in the final years of the Mandate, Washington's fear of Soviet expansion in the Middle East helped shape U.S. president's attitudes toward Zionist ambitions in Palestine.

The Truman administration, even though it eventually contributed to the establishment of the State of Israel in the first place, was fearful of alienating the Arab World. The hesitation and vacillation that marked Truman's approach to Palestine can be explained by the reluctance of the Department of State and Defence to take steps that might offer the U.S.S.R. political advantage in the Arab World. Even after it supported Israel's creation, the Truman administration did not consider Israel to be a strategic asset. In order to incorporate the Arab World against the Soviet Union, to increase American political influence and to foster economic interests in the region, Washington tried to devise a comprehensive approach toward the Middle East. This comprehensive approach had to separate an American moral commitment to Israel from that of pursuing its ambitions toward the Arab World. From this logic the concept of "territorial integrity" was born, compartmentalizing the Middle East (Tschirgi 1983, 264).

The territorial integrity concept was sanctified in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 issued by the United States, Britain and France. First, the declaration banned the sales of arms to regional clients and customers and only allowed it for purposes of internal order and self-defense if necessary. Secondly, it called for the necessity that

assurances of peaceful intent must precede any arms sales. Finally, the signatories of the declaration in their capacity as independent states and UN member states would intervene immediately against an aggressor who violated frontiers and armistice lines "territorial integrity" (Schoenbaum 1993, 83).

From the American point of view, the Tripartite Declaration with its territorial integrity formula gave it the role of a regional policeman alongside its western allies, Britain and France, who also had interests in the area. Any infringement on the territorial integrity of states in the region automatically meant a challenge to the U.S. and its allies. Furthermore, the formula helped Washington to protect itself from the fundamental conflict haunting the area namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestine's political future while it went about the larger task of containing the Soviets (Schoenbaum 1993, 82).

For the Eisenhower administration, Israel continued to be a strategic liability rather than an asset. More than Truman, Eisenhower who had been elected by a landslide and was "under no obligation to the Zionists and therefore immune to domestic forces that had heavily influenced Harry Truman" (Ball and Ball 1992, 42). It was during Eisenhower's administration that the territorial integrity was put to the test. When in 1956 British, French and Israeli troops attacked Egypt, Eisenhower stopped the invasion, made the French and British retreat as well as Israel which had conquered the Sinai Peninsula.

During the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson, relations with Israel warmed notably. American regional strategy as well as aid had not changed from that of the Truman and Eisenhower administration. What has changed and contributed to the warming up of relations was the American recognition that the Soviet Union had managed to get a solid grip in the area. Furthermore, the U.S. recognized that the

U.S.S.R was developing long-term ties with radical Arab regimes, which in turn led the U.S. to consider more forthcoming policies towards Israel in form of limited arms sales. However, both presidents continued pursuing the goal of trying to befriend the Arabs. While these patterns were taking shape in the Middle East, Soviet containment elsewhere in the global arena was also being vigorously pursued. Kennedy had his hands full with the Cuban missile crisis, the erection of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the war in Vietnam. Johnson continued fighting communism in Vietnam (Organski 1990, 33).

Up to the 1967 war, the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations followed the same lines, which were characterized by a closer relationship with Israel, low levels of aid and military sales and limited diplomatic support, unlike the strong support extended by the Soviet Union towards Egypt. Even after Israel's sweeping 1967 victory over the Arab states gave it new territorial gains, the U.S. still remained reluctant to support Israel by becoming its principal arms supplier. On the other hand, the Soviet Union continued to deliver arms and continued to strengthen and deepen political as well as diplomatic ties with both Egypt and Syria. This Soviet posture raised questions for the U.S. The Nixon administration had to confront these.

During the early stages of Nixon's administration it became evident that the 1967 war had not forced the Arabs to opt for peace. Instead of peace treaties, the defeated Arab armies were rebuilding their military capability with Soviet equipment and advisors and engaged in the War of Attrition along the Suez.

The 1967 war also had consequences on the Jordanian side. With the loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem the Palestinian political movement, with the goal of keeping its cause on the international agenda, began using Jordan as a base for guerrilla operations. In 1970 King Hussein cracked down on the PLO. The PLO on the

other hand, with the aid of Syria, which in turn was backed by the Soviets, fought back. During this period, Israeli forces played a crucial role in deterring the Syrian forces from attacking Jordan. This significantly contributed to the U.S. perception of Israel as an important strategic regional ally. All of these events taken together underscored the failure of longstanding U.S. policies. The Arab-Israeli conflict had not been healed by time, but rather worsened. The Soviet Union had become more deeply entrenched in the region and obviously posed problems for the U.S., its economic interests in the region and its Cold War policy of containment.

As a consequence, the U.S. under Nixon faced difficult policy choices related to fundamental geopolitical considerations in a changed strategic environment. For Washington it has become evident that a policy of accommodating Arab regimes was destined to fail and thus a re-evaluation was necessary. The re-evaluation was not focusing on America's goals in the region, but rather on its strategic posture towards attaining its goals. Accordingly, a two-track policy was adopted, one was comprised of initiatives for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the second track was to utilize Israel as a strategic regional asset (Mansour 1994, 95).

The two-track policy was contradictory in its essence. On one side it tried to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the other hand it fostered Israel's position in the region through unconditional aid. This dichotomy is very well articulated in the tension generated on America's Middle East policy between Nixon's Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (who after September 1973 became Secretary of State) during 1969 and 1970. Roger's together with Joseph Sisco, his assistant, attempted during Nixon's first term to formulate a settlement formula. Roger's believed that a settlement would contribute to help weaken Soviet influence in the Middle East. The Roger's Plan consisted of 10 points

on withdrawal, peace, borders, and navigation rights in the straits of Tiran and Suez, negotiation between parties, refugee issues as well as recognition of international law. The Roger's Plan failed once it became public, as Kissinger and Nixon had anticipated. The Arabs were preoccupied in rebuilding their military capabilities. Israel saw itself under pressure from an administration that "seemed resolved to play the role of mediator, negotiator, and map-maker in one" (Schoenbaum 1993, 173).

Kissinger held the belief that any initiative along the lines proposed by Rogers was bound to fail and argued that Israel would be a strategic asset in the region opposing the links that the Soviet Union was establishing with the Arabs notably Egypt and Syria. The Jordanian crisis cemented his beliefs and there is no doubt that this crisis marked a turning point in Washington's perception of Israel. Nixon made a fundamental decision that remained an essential American policy ever since. "We should give Israel a technological military margin to more than offset her hostile neighbors" (Nixon 1992, 179). In other words, the philosophy adopted was that Soviet client states should not be able to defeat countries armed by the U.S., in this case Israel. America would provide the external funding needed for the implementation of that policy. Assistance to Israel was increased seven times over what it constituted before. As a result and consequence of U.S. increased assistance to Israel and U.S. dominance of the region's diplomacy, Egypt under Sadat's rule moved towards getting rid of the Soviets and switched "sides" to the U.S. (Organski 1990, 35).

The 1973 war confronted the United States with a new setting. Prior to the war the Arab-Israeli conflict and the issue of oil were in America's eyes two separate items, however, the introduction of the oil embargo by the oil producing Arab countries refuted this view. As a consequence Washington could no longer solely depend on Israel but had also to start taking Arab demands into account, especially

since Arab countries, such as Egypt, signaled their readiness to improve relations with the U.S. and to follow a diplomatic track. The administration had to devise a new policy, which had to balance the conflicting requirements of taking Arab demands into consideration and preserving Israel's strength at one and the same time. Kissinger's step-by-step approach was the answer. The step-by-step approach aimed at attaining a settlement between the Arabs and Israel, which would achieve a long-range stability in the region and to prevent conflicts that would endanger American interests. The first step towards an overall agreement was to promote a disengagement of forces along the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. This was achieved between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and Syria and Israel in May 1974 (Reich 1984, 31).

The disengagement agreements opened up the way for considering the next steps towards attaining future achievements. Kissinger embarked on multiple shuttle diplomacy missions towards this end, however, he was faced with numerous difficulties stemming from the differences that came to the forefront by his approach between the U.S. and Israel. Furthermore, Ford had replaced Nixon in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal in 1974 and continued along the same path of that taken by Nixon and engineered by Kissinger. The culmination of the step-by-step approach was in September 1975 with the Sinai II agreement. This agreement was different from any other Arab-Israeli agreement at the time. "The Egypt-Israeli agreement provided that the conflict between them in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means" (Reich 1984, 35). At the same time, Kissinger made a pledge to Israel that the U.S. would, within its limits of resources, see to Israel's defense and economic needs.

The step-by-step approach ended with the Sinai II agreement simply because the political situation in the region did not allow for new steps. Syria and Jordan were

unwilling to negotiate with Israel. The occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip was too small to allow for intermediate stages without a predetermined final result. Furthermore, the Lebanese civil war overshadowed the step-by-step approach and no significant achievements followed the Sinai II agreement till the end of the Ford-Kissinger administration (Mansour 1994, 123-124).

The Carter administration brought the idea of a comprehensive approach to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute back to the agenda. The global outlook of Carter was that the U.S. had to develop political and economic ties to Western Europe, and Japan, embark on a *détente* with the Soviet Union and promote economic relations with it. The thrust behind such a policy was the notion that conditions would be created for countries of the South that would allow moderate regimes to emerge. On the other hand, radical countries would get weaker. Thus, Soviet influence would largely diminish and America would stand out as a country that encouraged political participation and social progress (Mansour 1994, 125).

Transposing this broad outlook to the Middle East meant considering the needs of each party with sympathy. For Israel security and peace, for the Palestinians a sort of self-determination, and for the Arab states the recovery of lost territories. Thus, the Carter administration opted for a comprehensive approach, departing from the Kissinger step-by-step style of limited accords. The main difference therefore between the Nixon, Ford and Carter administration again was not found in perceptions of American interest in the region but rather in the methodologies chosen to pursue those interests. While Nixon and Ford, through the policies of Kissinger, opted for compromise only in situations of absolute need, the Carter administration followed the route of compromise as the principle of protection of American interests (Reich 1984, 42).

Soon, however, Carter found his overall settlement policy running into overwhelming difficulties. On one side, Arab countries were unable to define a unified position. On another side, the change of government in Israel complicated matters, as Menachem Begin (Likud party) was more favorable to Kissinger's partial settlement approach. Finally, American conservatives could not understand why the Soviet Union was brought back to the negotiation process after Kissinger had managed to sideline Moscow. Hesitation and contradictions within the administration during the process of preparation for negotiations further aggravated the problem. Drawing his conclusions from American paralysis at the time, Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem "changed the rules of the game for all the players" (Mansour 1994, 129).

The Carter administration moved quickly to profit from the situation created by Sadat. An Egyptian - Israeli settlement seemed to be the quickest and easiest result that could be attained. However, to avoid political damage as well as to avoid undermining the ultimate goal it became necessary to announce progress towards the Palestinian track. The solution was a declaration of principles "to cover the projected Egyptian-Israeli accord" (Mansour 1994, 130). Negotiations between Israel and Egypt eventually culminated in the tripartite summit of Camp David in 1978, attended by Carter, Begin and Sadat. The outcome of Camp David summit led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

The Reagan administration took office in 1981, and was committed to restore American prestige in the international system through a realistic foreign policy, which in its perception Carter had departed from and which largely contributed to the erosion of the American global position. The Reagan administration presented a consistent vision of international relations. It held that all forms of regional instability and all anti-American regimes were related to the East - West struggle. Therefore the notion

of Israel as a strategic asset against Soviet encroachment was again in the forefront, however, the Arab-Israeli conflict as such was downgraded, a departure from Carter's earlier attitude towards the region. What had instead come to be the number one priority for the U.S. in the region, were the Persian Gulf and the containment of the Soviet threat there. "Strategic consensus" was the new policy the administration wanted to introduce. The notion of the strategic consensus was basically an anti-Soviet strategy that would encompass anti-Communist Middle Eastern states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt) into an anti-Soviet strategic consensus." The goal appeared to be the construction of a geopolitical grouping, not a formal alliance, to contain the Soviet Union and its threats to the region" (Reich 1984, 92).

The problem that arose over the strategic consensus concept was that while the moderate Arab states shared the view of the Reagan administration of a Soviet threat, they disagreed with sidelining the Palestine problem and held that a durable and just solution had to be found. Israel on the other hand, despite Reagan's sympathy towards Israel and his repeated assurances that it was a strategic asset, had no interest in recognizing the Palestinian issue as a political problem that had to be addressed. Israel believed that the Palestine problem should not stand in the way of a superpower and its partner and thus was particularly pleased by Washington's separation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the issue of the Persian Gulf security. This view probably reflected Israel's hope of remaining the sole power in the region as was manifested in its opposition to the sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia a measure that was at the core of the strategic consensus plan of the U.S. (Aruri 1983, 4).

Even though, the Arab-Israeli conflict was not at the top of priorities in the American agenda in the region at the initial stage, the administration engaged in "

episodic diplomacy" responding to developments. These developments took the shape of PLO attacks on Israel through Lebanon, the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Lebanon. Furthermore, the suspension of transfers of F-16 fighter planes to Israel, the AWACS debate, the Israel-US memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation, the annexation of the Golan Heights and the war in Lebanon all contributed to the "episodic diplomacy" (Reich 1984, 108).

All the aforementioned developments had an effect on bilateral relations between the U.S. and Israel. Reagan and Begin met in Washington in September 1981 to discuss these. The two leaders agreed to arrangements for strategic cooperation between their countries. The American administration thought that strategic cooperation was a good course of action and would ease tensions that had occurred and more important demonstrate its determination to implement the strategic consensus concept. By November 1981 the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation was signed in Washington. The "United States - Israeli strategic cooperation, as set forth in this memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region" (Reich 1984, 108). The memorandum also reaffirmed the common bonds and the mutual security relationship that existed between both parties.

The memorandum had a short life. In the wake of Israel's decision to annex the Golan Heights the U.S. administration suspended the memorandum. Episodic diplomacy continued until the aftermath of the war in Lebanon in 1982. The war in Lebanon was a watershed in U.S.-Israeli relations as it served as a catalyst that forced

the administration to at least consider a somewhat more comprehensive approach to the Arab-Israeli problem (Reich 1984, 111).

Up to this point we have tried to understand the emergence of the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel from the perspective of geopolitical considerations. What has become evident is that during Nixon's administration the U.S.-Israeli relationship took a special form. Cold War strategic implications guided the Nixon as well as successive administrations. At this point it becomes essential to examine Jewish influence in the U.S. By examining Jewish influence in the U.S. we will be turning toward an analysis that researches domestic considerations to the formation of the special relationship.

Domestic Considerations

As outlined in the introduction of the paper, it is difficult to determine whether geopolitical or domestic considerations (the chicken or the egg) come first in explaining the U.S.- Israeli relationship. However, one can safely assume that in democratic systems the conduct of foreign policy is to a large extent influenced by domestic politics, public opinion, political participation, and voting behavior. In the case of the American- Israeli special relationship we will look at the composition of the American Jewish population, their influence in the U.S. and on Israel itself. Furthermore, we will shed some light on the Jewish lobby and its effects. Finally we will explore how American public opinion is shaped in terms of its view of Israel and the Arabs. By doing the aforementioned, we will gain an insight on what shaped and influenced the conduct of American foreign policy towards Israel in specific and towards the Middle East in general beside the geopolitical realities.

The American Jewish Community

“The role of the American Jewish community is broad: it includes a political effort to influence, and it seeks to create a bridge between the Jewish communities of Israel and the United States and to extend it to the broader U.S. Society” (Reich 1984, 193).

During the early days of Jewish immigration American Jews were primarily seeking to assimilate and integrate into the American society. Zionism during this phase was regarded as a hindrance to the assimilation and thus the majority of the American Jews avoided any involvement with the Zionists. This picture, however, changed with the holocaust, the end of the British Mandate over Palestine, and the creation of the State of Israel as we have discussed in the chapter that dealt with the historical background (Ball and Ball 1992, 199).

American Jews saw themselves as Israel's patron. They concluded that their major political clout was in Congress. Prior to the 1967 War, the American Jewish community adopted the approach of supporting Israel in Congress through the request for aid based on idealistic and humanitarian grounds. With Israel's remarkable six-day victory in 1967, Jewish Americans had to change their approach. The humanitarian approach no longer seemed viable after the performance of the Israeli forces in the war. Instead the strength of the Israeli nation and its defense forces was highlighted. The American Jewish community focused on drawing congressional attention to Israel's strategic value. The change in approach was accompanied by the argument that a prosperous (ensuring economic aid) and properly armed (ensuring military assistance) Israel would be a strategic asset useful for containing the Soviet influence as well as radical Arab States. Furthermore, it could act as a guard over the Gulf and its oil fields (Ball and Ball 1992, 201).

How does the American Jewish Community influence the United States?

According to Reich the American Jewish community numbers about 5.7 million people which comprises about 2.5 percent of the population of the United States. Even though, these figures seem to represent a rather small fraction of the U.S. population, there are certain elements that distinguish Jewish Americans from other ethnic groups in the United States. Around one million Jews in America are heavily engaged in promoting Zionist goals. Belonging to a worldwide Jewish community at the heart of which is Israel, motivates both religious and secular Jews. Relative to other ethnic groups, American Jews are generally better educated and enjoy a higher social status. Furthermore, more than any other ethnic group the Jewish Americans hold a strong tradition of political activism illustrated by charity donations as well as efficient and effective organizations. Although Jews constitute only 2.5 percent of the American population, around 90 percent vote during presidential elections, as opposed to the general average of 40 to 55 percent. Due to their high voter turnout, the understanding of the electoral process, their dedication to causes they believe in, their organizational excellence, their strong traditions and their interest in public affairs they contribute a significant force. The American Jewish community's strength in American politics goes beyond their own population and extends to other segments of the American society (Ball and Ball 1992, 206-207). Moreover, American Jewish communities are particularly concentrated in states having the largest numbers of electoral votes in presidential elections; New York, California and Florida.

How does the American Jewish Community influence Israel?

The American Jewish community is also displaying a degree of influence on Israel and has managed to secure itself a place on Israel's political agenda as it does in

the U.S. Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, probably best describes the relationship in 1951 by the following terms:

As long as the bond between Israel and the American Jewry persists - for all the differences which may arise from time to time on this or that political decision or course of policy between the government of Israel and the government of the United States - there can never be a rupture between the two countries, because Israel will never turn its back on American Jewry and because, so we believe, American Jewry will never turn its back on Israel. (Reich 1984, 194)

Due to the influence of American Jews on American politics on behalf of Israel they also managed to exert a high degree of political influence in Israeli political decision making. The 1988 elections in Israel indicate this fact. From 1984 to 1988 Israel was governed by the grand coalition of both the Likud and the Labor parties. After the 1988 elections both the Likud and Labor parties were seeking to form separate coalitions with minor parties, largely involving religious parties. American Jews were disenchanted by that fact and were hoping to a renewed grand coalition. Despite the fact that Likud already managed to establish a majority in Knesset based on a coalition formed by right wing and religious parties, the American Jews sent a delegation expressing their dismay over the coalition and expressed their fears of a worsening relationships between them and Israel. The ultimate outcome was the reconstitution of the grand coalition between the Likud and Labor parties. This example in my point of view serves as evidence to the extent to which the American Jewish community can go to influence Israel's decision making process (Ball and Ball 1992, 208).

The Jewish Lobby

While the American Jewish community contributes a lot to Israel by serving as a bridge between the United States and Israel there are pro-Israeli organizations in the

United States at which the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lies at the center. "Its officially stated purpose is to maintain and improve the friendship and goodwill between the United States and Israel" (Reich 1984, 199).

This lobbying organization has contacts with members of the Congress, especially, with key members who have access to decision-makers. The lobbyists are found in the hallways of Congress advancing issues of importance to Israel. Furthermore, they write and prepare propaganda pamphlets and publish the Near East Report on a weekly basis which reaches sixty thousand people and is sent free to congressmen, government officials and to the media. In addition, AIPAC sends such pamphlets to Universities and holds meetings influencing the Congress public opinion and the general mood to be pro-Israeli (Ball and Ball 1992, 210).

During the 1980s, AIPAC rose to unparalleled levels of strength under the Reagan administration. Despite the fact that U.S.-Israeli tensions occurred due to the AWACS aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel's air strike against Osiraq (an Iraqi nuclear reactor) and the Lebanon War of June 1982 (Ben-Zvi 1993, 128, 129, 139), Reagan remained a strong supporter of Israel. It is no coincidence that the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation in 1981 was signed during his presidency. Neff argues that during the Reagan administration AIPAC's status shifted to a degree that allowed it to become a partner in shaping U.S. policy toward the Middle East (Neff 1995, 119-120). Commenting on the extent of partnership that had been established AIPAC Executive Director Tom Dine declared that Secretary of State George Shultz was the "architect of the special relationship" (Ball and Ball 1992, 215).

In addition to AIPAC there exists the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (the Conference). This body coordinates different

Jewish organizations and speaks out as a group once consensus on actions and activities are reached. It was created in 1955 and only became significant during the 1967 War, when American Jews increasingly began identifying themselves with Israel. The Conference presents American Jewish points of view to the State Department and the White House and offers recommendations on political actions. Moreover, it endeavors to explain to Israeli officials the official U.S. thinking and action. Generally speaking, the Conference functions are parallel with that of AIPAC. The Conference focuses its attention on the executive branch while AIPAC's main objective is to influence the legislative branch (Reich 1984, 200).

The precise role and success of the Jewish community and Israeli interest groups in influencing the nature of U.S. policy toward Israel is impossible to measure, but it is clear that the United States has extensive ties with Israel, some of which partly reflect the efforts of these groups and the individuals that compose them (Reich 1984, 201).

American Public Opinion

It has become evident by now, that the American Jewish community and the Jewish lobby exert significant influence on U.S. policymaking. This is largely due to their efficient organization and, use of various "marketing" tools, in ways unmatched by other ethnic or interest groups, including those promoting Arab causes. It becomes therefore necessary to look at American public opinion with regard to Israel. While we investigate American public opinion on that matter it is important to keep in our mind that congressional policies, tended to reflect domestic public opinion (Tschirgi 1983, 28). Therefore it is safe to say for the sake of simplification that if articulate public opinion is pro-Israeli, Congress automatically will tend to be inclined to pursue pro-Israeli policies. So let us turn now to American public opinion and its trend toward Israel which if in favor of Israel would create a sympathetic environment under which the Jewish lobby can pursue the attainment of their objectives.

American public opinion has been generally sympathetic to Israel even though there have been fluctuations. Organski conducted a comparison of how the articulate public opinion views Israel and the Arab states and with whom the public is sympathizing. Organski investigated three different periods. The first from 1948 to 1956, the second from 1956 to 1965 and the third from 1967 onwards. In the first period from 1948-1956 American attention was not focused on the Middle East and the Arab Israeli conflict. The general public appears to have felt that both the Arab states and Israel were worth collaborating with. However, they were not deemed as important as major U.S. allies. Americans who expressed an opinion during the period marked by the Truman and Eisenhower administration were more sympathetic with Israel, blaming the Arabs for hostilities but generally both were nearly looked at equally. This was also a reflection of the policies both administrations had adopted, namely courting the Arabs of fear of Soviet expansion and keeping Israel at a distance.

The second period from 1956-1965, which witnessed the end of the Eisenhower era, and both the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson made Israel a clear favorite over the Arab countries. While the Middle East in general was still on the backbench of American concerns and the focus of the Kennedy and Johnson administration was on the Vietnam War. The pro-Israel rhetoric expressed by both presidents (Kennedy and Johnson as opposed to Eisenhower) influenced the perception of the public opinion in favor of Israel (Organski 1990, 41).

The third period from 1967 onwards needs more attention due to the fact that the U.S.-Israeli special relationship matured during this phase. Sympathy for Israel during this period ranged between 33% and 64% of the public. Fundamentally, American support and sympathy fluctuated according to events in the Middle East but stayed always in Israel's favor. Increases in public opinion support were recorded

during the 1967 and 1973 wars (1967, 56% pro Israel and 4% pro Arabs; 1973, 47% pro Israel and 6% pro Arabs). The only time where public opinion drastically dropped and sympathies for Arabs reached unprecedented levels were in 1982. That year witnessed Israeli-supported atrocities in Lebanon. The Shatila and Sabra massacres caused the American public opinion to be nearly balanced between the Israelis and the Arabs. According to a Gallop poll response 32% were pro Israeli and 28% pro Arab in September 22-23, 1982, soon thereafter however, the general trend that guided public opinion, namely greater sympathy for Israel by a large margin continued. By January 21-30, 1983 according to the same Gallop poll pro-Israeli sentiment reached 49% as opposed to only 12% pro-Arab sentiment (Reich 1984, 188-189).

One important aspect that needs to be emphasized is the role of the media. The media has helped to form positive public opinion toward Israel. The American media has generally tended to portray Israel in a positive manner. It is true that events occurring in the region contributed to sometimes different outlooks on Israel. For instance Anwar El Sadat, Egypt's President, when he opted for peace as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict gained the respect of the American media and utilized its strength vis a vis the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin who seemed to be lagging behind Sadat's "grand vision". Nonetheless, on the whole "Editorials have tended to favor Israel over the Arabs and to support Israel, particularly in the major publications and cities" (Reich 1984, 190).

Manifestation Of The Special Relationship

After having researched the geopolitical and domestic determinants that contributed to the formation of the special relationship, it is important to investigate in which form this relationship is manifested and upon which pillars it stands. The U.S.

provides assistance to Israel through financial (economic) aid and military assistance. This section looks at the two forms of aid or assistance separately. The first four U.S. administrations starting from Israel's creation until 1970, including Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and partly Nixon, contributed a small portion of aid in relative terms compared to U.S. donations to other countries. The story dramatically changed during the Nixon administration and assistance to Israel changed to high priority. Nixon launched high levels of assistance and was followed by the successive administrations of Ford, Carter and Reagan (before the end of the cold war) who either kept up the momentum of Nixon, or gradually increased in assistance.

The first successive Republican and Democratic administrations chose not to assist Israel or to assist very little. Somewhere in the midpoint of Israel's existence the pattern sharply changed and successive Republican and Democratic administration helped very generously (Organski 1990, 15).

Israel's became a high priority during the Nixon administration, as we have seen when we discussed geopolitical considerations. This was due to the fact that Arab states had largely become Soviet clients and were depending on Soviet assistance, especially military assistance. Furthermore, Israel turned to be a strategic asset and a useful U.S. client in the Middle East after the Arab's defeat in 1967. Moreover, Egypt and Syria's 1973 war shook the invincibility of the latter. The Nixon - Kissinger era opened the way for providing massive support to Israel. This in turn sent a clear message to the Arabs that support by the Soviet Union would always remain insufficient to allow them to acquire military superiority over Israel. Siding with the U.S. would therefore be the only way to ensure the return of occupied Arab territories. Finally, a factor that also contributed to Nixon's turning to the Middle East and focusing on Israel as a client was that the United States total absorption with the

Vietnam issue was gradually fading away enabling him to conduct new policy directions further hampering down Soviet expansion.

Economic Aid

From its birth until the 1960s, Israel was considered to be an economic success story and a model of growth for developing countries. According to Tivnan, Israel defended itself from Arab hostilities, provided housing and education to millions of Jewish immigrants, and achieved economic growth rates up to about 10 percent. The success was largely attributed to the contributions of the Jewish Diaspora as well as other supporters and German reparations. While German reparations amounted to \$6 billion, and Jewish charities contributed \$2 billion and other \$2 billion stemmed from the sale of Israeli bonds, the United States between 1948 and 1973 contributed \$2.7 billion in both economic and military aid in the shape of grants and loans (Tivnan 1987, 220-221).

During the early years of Israel's existence American economic assistance was directed mainly toward agriculture, industry and private investments. Furthermore, a large portion of aid was used to help Israel to deal with immigration and resettlement needs. In addition, American expertise was granted and Israelis were sent to the U.S. for specialized training.

The U.S. operations mission, which originally administered U.S. technical and economic assistance, dealt with a wide variety of programs and areas; agriculture, fisheries, and forestry; commerce and industry, public health and sanitation; natural financial management; education and vocational training, transportation and communication; survey development, and use of natural resources, including metallic and nonmetallic minerals, water and power; housing; and manpower and labor. (Reich 1984, 150)

Even though U.S. assistance in those early years is viewed as minimal compared to dramatic increases at a later stage, it was still highly significant in relative terms. External support in the form of assistance, German reparations and contributions from Jewish communities all over the globe indicate that Israel was not so much an economic success story and a model for underdeveloped countries to learn from, but rather as a special case defined by unique and special circumstances. Noam Chomsky indicates that before 1967, a phase which the U.S.-Israeli special relationship had not yet fully "matured", Israel was already receiving "the highest per capita aid from the U.S. of any country" (Chomsky 1983, 9).

Following the 1967 and 1973 wars, economic aid to Israel increased dramatically. From 1972 until 1982 the U.S. provided Israel \$6 billion (compared to \$2.7 billion from 1948-1973) under both the Security Supporting Assistance program and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Unlike the early help of the U.S. to promote economic and social development that Israel largely achieved, the U.S. turned to economic aid as a measure to relieve the amounting defense burden. This was closely coupled with the accumulation of modern sophisticated weapons, and to help absorb immigration of Soviet Jews (Reich 1984, 151-152).

According to Tivnan, a consequence of the 1973 war and its geopolitical ramifications, American economic assistance under Nixon increased sevenfold, from \$51.5 million to \$353.1 million (Tivnan 1987, 233). This helped Israel overcome its balance of payments deficit. Following Nixon's visit to Israel in June 1974 a joint U.S.-Israeli statement stated:

The President affirmed that the United States in accordance with Congressional authorization, will continue to provide substantial economic assistance for Israel at levels needed to assist Israel to offset the heavy additional cost inherent in assuring Israel's military capability for the maintenance of peace. (Reich 1984, 152)

President Ford marked the largest amount of economic aid ever received by that time when he doubled aid (over the already seven times increase of Nixon) to Israel to \$793 million (Tivnan 1987, 223). Both Carter and Reagan administration maintained the trend set by Ford: economic aid to Israel remained in the \$700 million region; 1977 - \$742 million; 1983 - \$785 million (Tivnan 1987, 224).

At this point it is interesting to briefly look at U.S. aid to Egypt, the second largest recipient of U.S. aid. In order to encourage Egypt to sign and abide by the Camp David Accords, the U.S. promised Egypt amounts of aid equal or similar to Israel. Congress according to Ball and Ball allocated U.S. aid to Egypt at around 70% of the aid Israel receives. Even though aid to Egypt in practice could be considered as a bonus for Israel, in the sense that Egypt, one of the strongest powers in the region was neutralized, Israel in theory resisted the U.S.-Egypt aid relationship. It viewed "the linkage (as) eroding part of their [the U.S.-Israel] special relationship" (Ball and Ball 1992, 269). Beside the fact that Israel receives a higher amount of aid than Egypt and that aid to Israel is "an ongoing and long term basis" (Reich 1984, 152), Egypt's conditions are different than those of Israel.

Many knowledgeable Egyptians have been highly critical of the aid program, alleging that it reflects American rather than Egyptian priorities, financing U.S. imports which must be brought on American ships and U.S. consultants, when trained personnel are available in Egypt for a fraction of the cost. (Chomsky 1983, 11)

The U.S.- Israeli special relationship is further cemented by the lenient conditions of pay back of U.S. economic aid to Israel. The 1990 speech of Senator Robert Dole on the Senate floor sheds light on these special privileges and concessions provided to Israel. The speech came as a part of proposal to cut 5% of aid to allocate them to the arising needs of Eastern Europe. By 1990 direct economic and

military aid amounted to \$3 billion annually plus special privileges of around \$1 billion making the total annual aid to Israel \$4 billion as opposed to Egypt's 2.1 billion annually (Ball and Ball 1992, 278). Dole stated that the Congress took the decision in 1985 to cancel the repayment of ESF aid (in 1981 and the following years foreign military sales) and put them on a "gift basis" (Ball and Ball 1992, 259). Furthermore, the granted funds that come as a gift were considered part of Israel's general revenues therefore the right of accountability and transparency that the U.S. usually maintains to assert how aid is spent was given up. There are numerous other preferential treatments that Israel enjoys. They were largely coupled with military aid, which will be dealt with below (Ball and Ball 1992, 259).

In general, we can say that U.S. economic aid to Israel has been at the core of the special relationship and has been rarely a point of contention. As a matter of fact, Congress strongly supported economic aid to Israel and has often increased the amount of aid to that proposed by various administrations. In addition, Congress never really considered cuts in economic aid to Israel nor has it called for using economic aid as a political tool to leverage Israel's policies like it does with other aid recipients (Reich 1984, 153). Thus the aforementioned Dole proposal of cutting 5% of aid met strong disapproval and opposition. The actual case is that:

Various administrations have found that aid can be a useful element in its efforts to influence Israel, but in recent years it has taken the form not of proposals to cut aid, which would require concurrence of an often reluctant Congress, but suggestions that additional amounts of aid, or additional aid programs, or more lenient terms might help to reassure Israel or induce it to cooperate in a particular effort. (Reich 1984, 154)

Military Assistance

Another form of American presence in Israel is represented in U.S. military assistance to Israel. Like economic aid, military assistance represents one of the main

pillars of the special relationship. Similar to economic aid from the creation of Israel and through the 50's the U.S. distanced itself from military assistance. Truman embargoed arms that were desperately needed by Israel throughout its War of Independence. Furthermore, the U.S. joined France and England in a tripartite declaration that aimed at controlling a spread of arms race in the Middle East (Reich 1984, 154).

Eisenhower in sharp contrast to later U.S. administrations gave Israel no arms to counterbalance Soviet arms supply to the region. The U.S. continued to follow the tripartite declaration while in 1955 the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was conducted. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal basically was a Soviet decision to supply Egypt as well as other Arab States with weapons. At the same time in parallel, France was supplying Israel with weapons. Those events rendered the tripartite declaration as unnecessary and started to pave the way for the U.S. of assuming the role of arms supplier to Israel. "The U.S. reluctance to become a major arms supplier was tempered by occasional supplies of limited quantities of purely defensive weapons to help prevent an arms imbalance that might lead to conflict" (Reich 1984, 156).

Up to the Kennedy administration, the U.S. did not directly supply Israel with arms. Kennedy was the first American president who started to express an interest in the regional arms balance and decided in small quantities to sell weapons to Israel. It was during Johnson's term that the U.S. shifted towards providing arms to Israel. By the time of the June War in 1967 the U.S. had become a "limited supplier". Organski explains that increasing U.S. aid, and mainly military aid, during the period from 1967-1972 was based on the notion of transfer of the most sophisticated arms in the Soviet arsenal such as the surface to air missiles (SAM) to its Arab clients. This event

led Johnson and later Nixon to break from their reluctance and support Israel with increased volumes of U.S. military supplies (Organski 1990, 162).

During the Nixon administration the U.S.-Israeli arms supply relationship had reached higher levels in terms of "quantities, types, and value of equipment" (Reich 1984, 163). In the wake of the October War of 1973, Nixon requested \$2.2 billion in emergency aid for Israel from the Congress. The oil boycott against the U.S. from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar) was a consequence of Nixon's request from Congress. In order to help Israel rectify its initial losses during the war Nixon ordered a massive airlift of military supplies (Neff 1995, 177). The United States emerged out of 1973 episode as the main arms supplier for Israel.

The October War inaugurated a period of Israeli dependence on the United States for war material. No other country could provide or was prepared to provide Israel with the vast quantities of modern and sophisticated arms required for war. (Reich 1984, 163)

Following the October War, the United States role in the Middle East arms supply changed. The U.S. continued to supply Israel with the most sophisticated weapons becoming Israel's main arms supplier. When the U.S. started to engage in arms sales to moderate Arab states (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) following the logic of enlisting Arab states as American clients and therefore reducing Soviet sphere of influence, Israel was given assurances that its military supremacy would be maintained. The 1978 "package deal" approving the sale of F-5E aircraft's to Egypt and F-15 aircraft's to Saudi Arabia as well as the 1981 approval of AWACS aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia raised Israeli concerns about Arab access to U.S. military arsenals. Reagan very much summarized the arms policy of the U.S. in a letter written to Begin: "I am determined to see that Israel's qualitative technological edge is

maintained and am mindful as well of your concerns with respect to quantitative factors and their impact upon Israel's security" (Reich 1984, 166).

In fact Chomsky points out that already by the late 1970s U.S. military analysts expressed their fear that Israeli military had reached high levels from U.S. military assistance programs that could be uncontrollable for the Americans and that could pose national security problems. That is if Israel decided to undertake any ventures that were contrary to U.S. interests (Chomsky 1983, 464).

Military aid in 1971 during Nixon's tenure increased from less than \$100 million per year to more than \$300 million. In the aftermath of the October war Congress allocated \$1.5 billion to rebuild Israel's military capability. From 1974 through the Ford and Carter administrations to 1981 Reagan's presidency the level of military aid reached \$18 billion (Ben-Zvi 1993, 84).

With respect to Dole's report in Congress, which refers to lenient conditions of pay back and special privileges to aid granted to Israel, Congress decided to waive the repayment of annual FMS aid for 1981 and subsequent years. Despite the fact that FMS loan recipients are required to use FMS funds for the purchase of goods and services in the U.S., and are not permitted to use it to finance research and development (R&D). Israel was granted this special favor by using FMS funds to finance research and development in the U.S. (Ball and Ball 1992, 260). Furthermore, in 1983 Israel and the U.S. agreed on establishing a free trade area over a period of ten years. Israel therefore got access to U.S. markets "at the expense of many American interests" (Ball and Ball 1992, 207). Among other privileges, is the "fair pricing" method banning the U.S. from including Israeli aid costs for "overhead, research and development of weapons - which saves Israel an estimated \$56 million a year" (Ball and Ball 1992, 207).

Conclusion on the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship

Donald Neff calculated that economic and military aid to Israel over the period from 1949 to 1995 as a whole amounted to more than \$56 billion. Since 1979, with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, until 1995 aid amounted to \$40.1 billion. This figure represents 21.5 % of all U.S. aid. Furthermore, from 1985 onwards all aid to Israel took the form of grants that do not have to be repaid. These figures do not include special agreements, which are routinely granted to Israel. There is no better indication, in my point of view, for the existence of U.S.-Israeli special relationship than what Neff points out. Rebuilding Western Europe by means of the Marshall plan after World War II amounted to around \$12 billion, while Israel received alone \$56 billion (Neff 1995, 185).

Without a doubt, the U.S.-Israeli relationship is truly a special relation to which no other country, especially in the region, comes close to receiving. Going back to the four possibilities of explaining the special relationship mentioned at the beginning of this part. It is safe to assume, that the first (domestic considerations are the only explanation for the special relationship) and the fourth (international considerations in the context of the Cold War are the sole reason behind the special relationship) possibilities are both too one-sided and extreme. They cannot account for the existence of the special relationship. Both the second and the third possibility, which consider both domestic and international considerations with a varying degree, are better indicators for explaining the unique relationship. It is debatable which is the correct explanation and probably different people would view it differently.

Personally, I believe that there is a slight tilt in favor of international geopolitical consideration. From our analysis it seems that senior U.S. policymakers

were rather driven by the calculus of a grand strategy more than by electoral or bureaucratic interests. No doubt the American Jewish community and pro-Israeli lobbying groups perpetuated and facilitated support to Israel. American Jews and the pro-Israeli groups always strongly backed Israel by mobilizing the Congress and the public in favor of Israel. They were always highly concentrated in electoral sensitive states and accordingly had an influence on elections. However, pro-Israeli lobbying has always had a constant pattern, it existed before the creation of Israel, in the 1950's when no or little aid was given to Israel, in the 1970's when extensive economic and military aid was provided and through the 1980's. Moreover, the strategy of lobbying on behalf of Israel changed in tandem with the reality on the geopolitical ground. That is when Israel in 1967 defeated the Arabs, pro-Israeli lobbying groups marketed Israel's strategic value and departed from the humanitarian ideological concerns that guided their lobbying efforts. The domestic factor therefore does not explain the sharp change in U.S.-Israeli relations as does the geopolitical aspect but one cannot rule out that the domestic backing and consistent support of the Jewish community serves as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the U.S.-Israeli special relationship.

It will therefore become important in the next part of this paper to see what happened with the special relationship once a vital component of the formula was missing. Will the dismantlement of the Soviet Union carry the strong ties between the U.S. and Israel to its grave, or will the importance of Israel for the U.S. remain the same since it is more than the sum of its parts? Will the strong Jewish community change its "marketing" tools so that the same commodity (Israel) is sold to the same customer (US) whose needs changed with the decay of the bipolar world order and the birth of a New World order? Or will the importance of Israel for the U.S. and

therefore the special relationship maintain the same, basically turning an old game to a new one?

CHAPTER 4

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

The special relationship between the United States and Great Britain has been a subject of much debate and discussion. It is a relationship that has evolved over time, shaped by historical events and changing international circumstances. The relationship has been characterized by a unique blend of political, economic, and cultural ties. In the early 20th century, the relationship was primarily defined by military and strategic interests. However, in the post-World War II era, it has become more multifaceted, encompassing a wide range of issues from trade and technology to human rights and environmental concerns. The special relationship is often cited as a model of partnership between two major world powers, and its future remains a topic of ongoing interest and speculation.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The challenge of the international system is a complex and multifaceted issue. It involves the interactions between various states, international organizations, and non-state actors. The international system is characterized by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty, with a wide range of interests and priorities. The challenge of the international system is to find ways to manage these interactions in a way that is fair, just, and effective. This requires a deep understanding of the underlying dynamics of the international system, as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue and negotiation. The challenge of the international system is a central theme in international relations, and it continues to be a major focus of research and discussion.

CHAPTER 4 THE POST-COLD WAR ERA – REVISITING THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Up to this point we have investigated how the U.S.-Israeli special relationship shaped itself during the Cold War years. It is now necessary to focus attention on how this relationship formed itself in the post-Cold War era. To be able to do so one has to point out the changes that have occurred in the international world order. Once the changes have been identified it will become necessary to examine both the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations (who so far presided over a large period of time in a post-Cold War era) towards the Middle East in general and Israel in particular. Also the formative stages of George W. Bush presidency will be important to be looked at to provide us with a possible direction of U.S. policy in the future.

Identifying Changes in the International System

The end of the Cold War came in an abrupt manner. No one had firmly predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. The threat of superpower nuclear war came to an end, with it the large degree of predictability that characterized international affairs. Instead of facing an opposing ideological, political and military adversary with advanced destructive powers the United States found itself facing an uncertain post-Cold War foreign policy landscape. Old and new disputes emerged, unstable regimes gained control of nuclear weapons and vast economic and social problems came to the forefront.

Ethnic, religious and regional problems, which were once subsumed under the dynamics of Soviet-American rivalry now became problems that merited attention on their own. Under the comfortable nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, countries such as Japan and Germany had developed into economic giants and in the process became economic threats to the United States.

The post-cold war era has turned out to be a complicated, unpleasant, and paradoxical place. Politicians, policy makers, and average citizens alike are still very much in the early stages of grappling with the magnitude, nature, and implications of the changes that have – and have not – occurred. (Yankelovich and Destler 1994, 132)

Implications for the United States

There exists a huge scholarly debate on the implications of the end of the Cold War for the U.S. One trend of thought argues that American foreign policy has shifted from a primarily political/military focus during the Cold War to a primary emphasis on the nation's economic interest. Yankelovich and Destler also argue, that there has been a shift toward greater public engagement in the foreign policy process. This marks a difference from the post-World War II era when international issues were confined to a small number of specialists and leaders who constituted the foreign policy establishment. After the Vietnam War, and especially with the end of the Cold War, public demand in the U.S. for a greater say in international affairs drastically rose (Yankelovich and Destler 1994, 20)

The whole world in general, and the U.S. especially, were, and remained, caught in a transition with historical ramifications and filled with ambiguities and contradictions that are not yet fully visible. Some old patterns established during the Cold War still persist while new ways are struggling to emerge. As indicated above there are huge foreign policy debates with competing priorities struggling to fill the

vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. There is no doubt that during the construction of new durable policies all institutions and segments of the population will have to undergo value conflicts, and face hard choices and decisions in determining the priorities that will prevail in the post-Cold War era.

Questions raised in adapting to a post-Cold War era are diverse and multiple. In the post-Cold War era many of these questions relate to how domestic economic goals will affect American foreign policy as well as how the public will engage in shaping the political life. In the new altered political environment a president is faced with multiple and competing audiences and must give new thought as to how to address political-military and domestic and global economic issues in the absence of the former Cold War consensus.

Irrespective what answers come to be given to the aforementioned questions some new realities have already developed in a post-Cold War era. These have a definite effect on U.S. foreign policy conduct. Among new realities that ensued, were heightened inclinations of the American public, Congress and the Executive Branch to reduce U.S. engagement in global affairs. This does not suggest that the U.S. will turn back to the years of isolationism but rather that it will probably manifest greater caution than in the past. This trend is currently again being reversed with the American involvement of striking against terrorism following the terrorist attacks on the U.S.

Furthermore, the realities of getting one's own house in order (that is improving the economic status of the U.S.) will be accompanied with the tendency to spend less in foreign aid. This has already affected U.S. foreign policy decision-makers in economic and military aid as foreign policy tools. Despite the fact that the Middle East is receiving the "lions share" of foreign aid (notably Israel followed by

Egypt) it will probably become harder in the longer run to convince the public of the need to mobilize and increase U.S. financial support of a particular country.

Finally, there is the lack of a clear blueprint for a foreign policy in a post-Cold War era. The simplified engine of containment that for so long drove the U.S. foreign policy vessel during the Cold War has blown out. Washington is faced with the question of which engine will replace the missing thrust: human rights? The spread of democracy? Environmental concerns? The fundamentalist Islamic threat? Or will foreign policy plow on in an ad hoc manner? (Lesch 1996, 415)

Implications for Israel

"The fortunes of small states are especially dependent upon the power structure of the international system and the fluctuations in the regional power relations." (Inbar, 32)

The breakup of the Soviet Union had both positive and negative ramifications for Israel. On the positive side was the influx of Jewish immigrants from Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and better relations with the government in Moscow. Parallel to this came, as Aharon Klieman calls it, a "far reaching diplomatic revolution" (Karsh 1994, 96): the drastic increase in diplomatic recognition of Israel and normalized relations with over 140 countries.

Part of the "far reaching diplomatic revolution" was the return of Israel's diplomats, envoys and businessmen to African countries, from which they had departed in the wake of the 1967 war. In addition, new diplomatic ties including, relations with the CIS and the Vatican were established. Israel's status changed from being an outcast to being a member of the international community. Alongside the symbolic elements inherent in this new acceptance was a psychological component.

The "collective national memory" (Karsh 1994, 102) of exclusion and rejections is still vivid in the minds of the Israelis. The greater reception of the world community and the process of normalization with it are likely to heal the wounds and give Israel a new Weltanschauung (Karsh 1994, 99-100)

On the negative side and crucial to our topic, is the notion of many Israelis themselves that Israel is no longer regarded as a strategic asset by the U.S. Associated with this notion, is an increased fear of diminishing military support, economic assistance, and political patronage. Israel still deems it necessary to be granted aid in face of the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians and its neighbors. In addition, with the termination of the Cold War on the global scene, human rights issues have increased in salience, including the Israeli infringements on the human rights of the Palestinians (Kemp and Harkavy 1997, 73-74).

The Post-Cold War Era In the Middle East

Without a doubt, as we have seen in the previous chapter while examining the U.S.-Israeli special relationship, the principal American interest in the Middle East was the containment of the Soviet Union. Despite the decline of U.S.-Soviet competition by the end of the Cold War, U.S. interests had more continuity in the region than anywhere else in the world in a post-Cold War era. Steven David gives three arguments why the overall American interest stayed at nearly the same level as it was during the Cold War. For one, he argues that instability and warfare will continue to be the main characteristic of the Middle East. Secondly, as a consequence of those instabilities, key American interests, such as the access to oil and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will be threatened. Finally, ties to Israel will continue to be maintained regardless of security considerations.

Countries in the region such as Egypt, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have responded to motives, conflicts, and ideologies operating independently of historical Cold War patterns. Declining Soviet influence and activities did not significantly alter their motives, conflicts and ideologies nor did it threaten their political systems. The strong American regional position was not only attributed to the Soviet decline. It was rather to America's own political, strategic, military, economic, and technological strength and to the wide variety of alliances with key countries in the region that had been established during the height of its effort to contain the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the United States had established itself as the mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the sole actor capable of influencing both Israel and the Arabs. Such factors contribute to a continued importance of the Middle East for the U.S. and vice versa.

Traditionally, U.S. policy in the Middle East had opposed two types of threats. At one level, the highest priority was given to countering Soviet influence. At the second level, from the American point of view, Washington had to defend against radical anti-American regimes that threatened to disrupt regional stability. The removal of the first level concern did not fundamentally alter the second.

In summary one can therefore safely say that U.S. role in the region had been important for many decades. Furthermore, 1991 witnessed the beginning of an unprecedented U.S. role in the Middle East. Since the mid-1950s, Washington had been engaged in a Cold War with Moscow with significant consequences for regional politics. In 1991, with the decline of the U.S.S.R. and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became the world's only superpower. Its wealth, military might, range of alliances, technological superiority and diplomatic indispensability, made it the most

powerful force in the region. The U.S. was the sole potential mediator for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the only guarantor of security in the Gulf.

Despite the fact that American involvement in the Middle East had developed as a result of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not put an end to tensions between the U.S. and local "radical" countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Those regimes in the Middle East were not acting as Moscow's clients anymore. Washington's power was further enhanced by its ability to respond to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, assemble an anti-Iraq alignment, and win the Gulf War. As a result, the U.S. reached an almost unprecedented degree of authority in the Middle East for any outside power. Even if overall American involvement in world affairs was declining, the post-Cold War Middle East retained a relatively high priority in the American agenda.

US-Administrations In A Post-Cold War Era

Given the aforementioned changes in the international arena, and their implications for the U.S., the Middle East and Israel, it is now essential to turn our attention to the administrations of George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton. Those two leaders have presided over most of the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the George W. Bush Jr. administration will be looked at to serve as an indicator for a possible prediction for the future. Under the Bush Sr. administration two major issues will be examined, namely the Middle East peace process and the Gulf War as the first major international crisis in the post-Cold War era. It is not the intention here to delve too much into detail on the events that took place on both issues, but to examine them with the aim of extrapolating relevant indicators on the U.S.-Israeli special

relationship in an international atmosphere characterized by the absence of the Soviet Union.

The Bush Sr. Administration

When Bush Sr. took over the presidency from Reagan, major global changes had already occurred. In the face of the growing international as well as regional (Middle East) changes the administration lacked a clear foreign policy vision. 1990 could be described as the first test of U.S. Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era. It was a time for dramatic developments and dynamic rethinking, featuring the breakdown of the U.S.-directed Arab-Israeli peace process and the Bush Sr. administration's full-scale intervention in the Gulf during the Kuwait crisis. Thus, the Middle East emerged as a continuing high priority for U.S. policy. On the one hand, the turbulence in the region and the importance the oil resources forced the U.S. to stay involved. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf sub-region continued to play a major role in U.S.-policy, which had its roots in the Carter and Reagan doctrines (the former calling for U.S. involvement to protect the area from aggression, and the latter for U.S. determination to prevent Saudi Arabia's destabilization).

The Arab-Israeli Peace Process

The early Bush Sr. administration was guided by several principles applied to Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. It was striving to find a workable solution rather than to steer toward a specific, predetermined outcome. The Bush Sr. administration believed that the only realizable settlement would be one on which both Israel and Palestinians could agree. Washington tried to be a successful mediator by proposing steps that both sides would find acceptable. A major assumption that guided the administration was that diplomacy could only succeed if the parties involved made it possible through

their own actions and willingness to make concessions. The U.S. saw its role in helping the parties to bridge differences. Moreover, the United States therefore understood that any negotiated settlement had to be accepted by Israel's government, led by Yitzhak Shamir's Likud party. Thus, any U.S. position too much at odds with that leadership would wreck the process. At the same time, a breakdown in diplomacy, even if caused by the Israeli government, would reduce but not terminate the bilateral special relationship. In contrast, the PLO was never regarded as friendly to U.S. interests. Its inclusion in negotiations, or even recognition, was based on U.S.-Egyptian contacts, in which Egypt served as an intermediary to the PLO and Palestinians (Rubin 2000).

With the aforementioned serving as a background the U.S. succeeded in encouraging Israel into producing a peace plan in 1989 that would address Israel's security needs and consider political rights to the Palestinians. This initiative, involving the U.S., Israel and Egypt (as a link to the PLO) became entangled in countless negotiations during 1990 over the composition of the Palestinian delegation, including the inclusion of Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem and of deportees from the territories. PLO leaders also did not want to accept the plan, demanding a direct and open role from the beginning and preferring an international conference (Mansour 1994, 187).

Bush Sr. and James Baker, Secretary of State, pursued a policy of pressure on Israel as an overall leverage on the peace process plan. Rather than offering Shamir new assurances or concessions, the administration pressured and criticized Israel. Publicity was given to allegations that some Soviet Jewish immigrants were settling in the West Bank. Washington withheld accepting Israel's request to guarantee \$400 million in housing loans unless settlements in the occupied territories ceased. The

Israeli government, however, maintained its position on excluding East Jerusalem residents from the Palestinian delegation as well as the concept of the PLO directing the delegation. In addition, the Israeli cabinet lost a no-confidence vote in the Knesset further hampering U.S. policy until a new cabinet was formed. After Shamir formed a new cabinet Bush Sr. suspended the dialogue due to the Shamir government's opposition to the peace plan as well as the PLO's opposition over the proposed framework of the peace plan and its posture towards terrorism.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, many of the circumstances that had previously hindered the progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process were altered. After the Gulf War, Arab countries were seeking to establish good relations with Washington and, therefore, showed some interest in making peace. This gave the U.S. government an opportunity to utilize its power as leverage. Accordingly, Secretary of State James Baker's attempts to get the peace process moving again stressed the following points:

- agreement on the need for a comprehensive settlement based on UN resolutions 242 and 338
- a two-track process involving simultaneous negotiations between Israel and Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians
- the Camp David formula of an interim arrangement to be followed by an agreement on the permanent status of the territories
- Palestinian representation by residents of the territories; and co-sponsorship of a Peace Conference by Washington and Moscow for direct talks.

Guided by the earlier notion that U.S. would not try to impose a settlement Baker made numerous trips to the Middle East to promote negotiations among the concerned stakeholders. Baker's endeavors sought to encourage Israeli participation in talks. To

this end the U.S. also took some steps to improve bilateral relations. Among these steps were the congressional approval to offset costs incurred by Israel during the Gulf War and the administration's efforts to annul the UN "Zionism is racism" resolution. However, the administration also made clear its strong opposition to continued Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Bush Sr. and Baker viewed such activities as the fundamental stumbling blocks in the way of peace. This matter became the most contentious issue in U.S.-Israel relations when Israel requested an U.S. guarantee of \$10 billion in loans Israel to build housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants. Aside from U.S. policy's traditional opposition to Jewish settlements and Bush's own position, the White House's hostility to the proposal was further heightened by a post-Cold War domestic mood in favor of reducing foreign aid and the American economic recession. Congress accepted the administration's request for delaying the loans in the fear of being responsible for damaging the peace process.

The major breakthrough on the Arab-Israeli peace process came with Syria's acceptance of U.S. proposal for direct talks at a peace conference. Baker commented by saying "this is a moment of historic opportunity [since] Israel now has Arab partners willing to engage in direct negotiations"(Rubin 2000). The problems in structuring negotiations were gradually resolved and the outcome of U.S. efforts culminated in the Madrid conference and the bilateral negotiations between the parties thereafter.

Nonetheless, despite a degree of progress in the peace process negotiations U.S.-Israeli relations were characterized by friction up to the June 1992 Israeli elections. Beside the controversy that ensued between Bush Sr. and Shamir over Jewish settlements in West Bank and the rejection for the \$ 10 billion in loan guarantees there were other areas of friction. At the beginning of 1992 the U.S. voted

for a UN resolution that condemned Israel's deportation of Palestinians. This was the harshest condemnation on Israel the U.S. had ever supported. Later that same year, administration officials leaked a State Department report, which stated that Israel illegally sold U.S. military technology to other countries including China, South Africa and Ethiopia. On the other hand, Shamir who saw that the U.S. was trying to affect the results of Israel's upcoming elections accused the U.S. of not being an honest broker in the peace process on the grounds that the U.S. was trying to force Israel to return to its 1967 borders.

Despite such accusations the U.S. attempted to ease U.S.-Israeli frictions. After all, Israel was participating in the U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations. Washington, on numerous occasions highlighted the special relationship and downplayed the "bumps" that sometimes characterize a close relationship. It also must be added that during that period, the administration's actual conduct of the peace talks was relatively friendly to Israel's posture. Washington insisted the talks be conducted along lines coinciding with the Camp David framework, an approach that Israel favored. Moreover, talks were held without the participation of the PLO or Palestinians representing East Jerusalem or coming from outside the territories. In addition, Baker was often critical of Palestinian negotiators for not focusing on negotiating specific proposals (Rubin 2000).

The Labor party's victory in Israel and the change of guard from Shamir to Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister marked a turning point for U.S.-Israeli relations. This event was warmly welcomed in the U.S. In Washington, the pragmatic Rabin seemed to be offering an opportunity for new possibilities for a land-for-peace compromise. Baker traveled to the Middle East after the Israeli election, surveying prospects for continued peace talks. Bush Sr. invited Rabin to visit the U.S. and

hosted him at his Kennebunkport, Maine, home, in a friendly atmosphere. Bush Sr. promised Rabin to seek swift congressional approval of the loan guarantees issue that had stood as an obstacle between the U.S. and Shamir earlier. Bush Sr. also reiterated the strength of the U.S.-Israel strategic partnership, which was based on a "shared commitment to democracy, and to common values, as well as a solid [US] commitment to Israel's security, including its qualitative military edge" (Rubin 2000). The administration also explored ways to improve U.S.-Israeli military cooperation. It announced plans to sell military equipment from its stockpiles in Europe. This had already been approved by Congress, but had been held up by the White House during the era of the Bush Sr.-Shamir friction. These steps were all taken to signal a warmer relationship with the new Rabin government.

With the aim of making progress in the peace talks and helping the administration's image as a successful international leader, President Bush Sr. urged a quick and intensive new round of negotiations. These started in Washington and continued during 1992. The administration generally left the parties meeting in direct talks to pursue their own discussions. It proposed no plan of its own, and when it intervened it did so mainly to resolve procedural difficulties.

Meanwhile, the administration's attention increasingly turned to the November 1992 presidential election. Baker departed from the State Department, on the eve of the new round of negotiations, to devote himself to Bush's Sr. reelection efforts. This ushered in the changing priorities of a White House faced with a difficult election battle. Middle East issues entered presidential election race. With regards to Israel, Bill Clinton, the Democratic nominee, criticized Bush's Sr. policy toward Israel during the struggle over loan guarantees. Bush Sr. had to defend his administration's record as strongly pro-Israel and pledged, as he did to Rabin, to support the loan guarantees

in Congress, which in October 1992 Congress passed as part of the Fiscal Year 1993 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill. By the fall of 1992, with the focus on the elections, the peace process had become secondary for the Bush Sr. administration.

The Gulf Crisis

In the beginning of 1990, the Bush Sr. administration advocated good U.S.-Iraq relations and opposed pressures against the government in Baghdad. After Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, the White House shifted sharply and became the leader of a worldwide coalition opposing Saddam Hussain. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saddam opened the door for bringing direct U.S. military power into the region. U.S. troops massed in Saudi Arabia, upon its request. Bush Sr. was quick to formulate a policy and strategy to deal with the crisis. He declared Saudi Arabia's defense a vital U.S. interest and highlighted four goals:

- the safety and protection of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf;
- the protection of U.S. citizens;
- an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi troops;
- restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

On one hand, the Gulf crisis showed the power the U.S. had gained in the region, which allowed it to intervene in an inter-Arab conflict. On the other hand, and vital to our topic, Israel's vulnerability was exposed.

Disabled by the logic of geography from directly participating in any conflict that does not immediately touch its borders, Israel is severely limited in the deployment of its military power. Precluded by politics from joining any Middle East coalition, it can no longer seriously claim to be an indispensable protective shield for American Middle East interests. (Ball and Ball 1992, 297)

The dangers associated with the Gulf crisis were neutralized by the Americans and not by the Israelis as the latter had done during the Jordanian crisis in 1970. This

called into question Israel's value as a strategic asset. Furthermore, Washington wanted to separate Israel so that it would not enter the anti-Iraqi coalition formed out of several Arab states. In this sense, it saw Israel as a strategic burden. In addition, with the first Iraqi Scuds fired at Israel the U.S. came to its defense with Patriot missiles operated by American personnel. This further cemented Israel's vulnerability under the new circumstances. In other words the Gulf crisis and war showed that the U.S. in protecting its interests in the Middle East can seek the support of other allies than Israel. Furthermore, Israel no more served as a fortress against Soviet threats due to the fact that during the Gulf crisis no threat originated from Moscow. In addition, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the scene and the defeat of Iraq, a vacuum was left in the Middle East that only the U.S. could fill (Mansour 1994, 186).

The Clinton Administration

The election of Bill Clinton as president in November 1992 brought a Democrat to the White House for the first time in 12 years. Clinton came to office at a time of economic recession, and a growing demand for government to focus on domestic issues, which was in keeping with Clinton's personal beliefs. Before taking office, Clinton had promised continued support to the peace process, and expressed sympathy for Israel. In an address to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in New York, Clinton stated that:

Our relationship would never vary from its allegiance to the shared values, the shared religious heritage, the shared democratic politics which have made the relationship between the United States and Israel a special, even on occasion a wonderful relationship. Our support of Israel would be part of all those shared things (Gordan and Danzinger, 8).

Clinton had no previous government experience in international affairs. This inexperience in foreign policy, however, coupled with the declining priority of foreign

affairs and cutbacks in resources, including military spending, made it all the more urgent to show a continuing commitment in the Middle East. In particular, the new administration had to show its commitment to sustaining the Arab-Israel peace process, and its determination to preserve the assets accumulated by post-Cold War and post-Gulf War events. Furthermore, having campaigned against President George Bush Sr. on the grounds that he had been too harsh on Israel, Clinton wished to reverse this emphasis and abide by his campaign promises. Generally speaking, the new U.S. administration and its officials were more favorable toward Israel than any of its predecessors. Clinton inherited from Bush Sr. a favorable Middle East political landscape. Due to the power of the U.S., most key regional actors were friendly or at least seeking to avoid conflict with the U.S. The parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict had already started moving in the direction of a settlement of their conflict based on their own interests, and the experienced Ambassador Dennis Ross who was taken from the Bush administration had managed U.S. involvement in the peace process.

During the first half of 1993, U.S. policy strove to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process through the ongoing bilateral and multilateral talks and by exchanges of visits with regional leaders. While the periodic bilateral contacts were held in Washington, U.S. had agreed to limit its involvement to facilitating talks between Israel and the various Arab parties. At the start of 1993, the PLO responded to Israel's deportation of Islamic fundamentalist activists to Lebanon by refusing to participate in discussions until the expulsions were canceled. Trying to prevent the Israeli-Palestinian talks from ending in deadlock, U.S. officials offered a proposed declaration of principles but neither side accepted the plan (Rubin 2000).

With the next round of bilateral talks the U.S. moved toward greater participation in the negotiations. It offered to give Israel security guarantees in the

context of a withdrawal from the Golan Heights as part of an Israeli-Syrian settlement. In the Israel-Palestinian talks, a paper was prepared in an effort to bridge the differences. However, both sides rejected the proposals. This was followed by a mid-July trip to the region by Dennis Ross to meet with Israeli, Syrian, and Jordanian officials and with Palestinian leaders. The U.S. now hinted at a deadline, trying to pressure the sides toward progress.

The very interest of Israel and the PLO in reaching a solution and their doubt that this would come in the U.S.-brokered negotiations were key factors for holding secret talks in Oslo, Norway. Only at the end of August, when an agreement had already been reached, did Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres brief Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, making a special visit to the U.S. for this purpose.

The American government, though not previously involved in this effort, responded to the agreement enthusiastically, promising its full support. This support was manifested in the historic meeting between President Clinton, Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, who signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in September 1993 (known as the Oslo Agreement) on the White House lawn. The symbolism of Clinton standing between both leaders, his hands on their shoulders, also reflected the reality of the U.S. being the sole power that possesses the clout to see through the implementation of the Oslo agreement. The Oslo agreement called for Palestinian autonomy for parts of the Gaza strip and the West Bank, with gradual Israeli troop redeployments with Palestinian independence as a goal.

Clinton told Rabin after the accord's signing that the U.S. was prepared to share some advanced military technology previously withheld. In addition he added that the U.S. was seeking to strengthen strategic cooperation and promised that

Washington would use its influence to make sure Israel felt more secure because of the agreement. Washington also encouraged the PLO to fulfill the agreement by renewing the dialogue with the organization that had been frozen since June 1990 when Arafat refused to denounce a terrorist attack on Israel by a PLO member group (Rubin 2000).

By 1994 the Clinton administration had developed a regional strategy that included U.S. help in implementing the Israel-PLO accords. Furthermore, it hoped to promote an Israeli-Syrian diplomatic breakthrough, a goal, which the Clinton administration was extremely optimistic about achieving and viewed as a step towards a comprehensive regional solution. The administration's regional strategy was set to safeguard the peace process and ensure Gulf security from radical regimes and revolutionary groups.

In early 1994 the Hebron massacre, in which a Jewish settler killed Palestinians, led to a suspension of the peace talks between the PLO and Israel. Washington continued its own separate dialogues with Rabin and Arafat to suggest ideas on how to restart the talks. The U.S. expressed sympathy for the Palestinian reaction to the Hebron massacre, but still refused Arafat's direct request for an active U.S. role in the bilateral talks, suggesting that the best way to solve problems was for the two sides to move forward in negotiations and implementation. The U.S. sought to encourage Israel and the PLO to move forward in the peace process through practical assistance. For Israel this came in the form of agreeing to sell it U.S. F-18I advanced fighter planes as well as two super-computers, which had military applications. Washington also agreed to provide more aid for the Israeli Arrow anti-missile.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process moved forward again with the signing of the Israel-PLO accord for implementing the Israeli withdrawal and the establishment

of a Palestinian authority in Gaza and Jericho. During these events, the U.S. refused to intervene in bilateral talks and avoided taking positions on controversial issues. That same year a breakthrough was achieved on the Israeli-Jordanian front in October with the conclusion of a peace treaty between both countries. Clinton's administration pledged to grant U.S. aid for Jordan's development and to help it meet its defense requirements.

In 1995, Clinton's policy in the Middle East continued to follow the same basic goals it had set in 1994: to maintain American influence and alignment with a variety of moderate states, promote the Arab-Israeli peace process, and isolate radical regimes. U.S. efforts continued to result in achieving some of its goals in the area. It facilitated Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordan peacemaking and continued to isolate radical regimes such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya. However, American efforts were unable to obtain a breakthrough on the Israeli-Syrian front, or to force radical states into changing their policies. Neither was the Clinton Administration able to increase regional economic cooperation in the hope of fostering peaceful relations. Meanwhile the administration had to confront domestic political battles, as its foreign policy in general and its Middle East policies in particular came under attack from a newly elected strongly conservative Republican-dominated Congress. Congress expressed its criticism of U.S. aid commitments and was advocating tougher stances against Middle East radical forces.

In November 1995, Rabin was assassinated and Shimon Peres took over as Prime Minister. The U.S. government pledged continued support to Peres and upon the new Prime Minister's visit to U.S., strategic cooperation against the threat of radical Islamic regimes such as Iran was discussed and Clinton pledged joint

American Israeli cooperation in space. This included the training of Israeli astronauts to fly on space shuttle missions (Rubin 2000).

In 1996, Washington resumed its role as mediator in the Israeli-Syria talks but was discouraged by a lack of progress on that track. However, 1996 was marked by three new elements, which entered American- Middle East policy calculations. A wave of terrorist attacks within Israel, against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, and even within the U.S. itself pushed American ire over terrorism to an unprecedented high. Middle East terrorism became a domestic problem in U.S. politics and society. In Israel Benjamin Netanyahu's narrow election victory made him Prime Minister. U.S. presidential elections were coming up in November 1996 (Garfinkle 1996, 557-575).

While continuing to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process the U.S. administration for most of the year played a less direct role in comparison to previous years. The first major U.S. engagement of the year came in response to the wave of terrorist attacks against Israel during the months of February and March. Those assaults jeopardized progress in the peace process. As a result, Clinton called an anti-terrorist meeting of world leaders at Sharm al-Sheikh, during March. The Sharm al-Sheikh conference produced promises of international cooperation against terrorism. Following the conference Clinton visited Israel and pledged to provide Israel with anti-terrorist technology (Rubin 2000).

Prior to the Israeli elections, it was clear that Clinton preferred a Labor party led government and he in essence campaigned for Peres. Clinton had made statements which did not directly speak for Peres, however, interpreting between the lines Clinton basically asserted, that a Labor victory was better for the peace process. Even though the U.S. administration was disappointed by Netanyahu's victory it called for granting the new Israeli government enough time to formulate its policies. Meanwhile,

the administration continued promising support for Israel. During Netanyahu's visit to Washington, Clinton stated that despite the change of government the historical relationship between the U.S. and Israel had not changed. Overall, Clinton was preparing for his re-election campaign so in a sense activities in the Middle East were temporarily put on hold (Rubin 2000).

After Clinton's re-election the U.S. became again more engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. During most of 1997 the U.S. had not been able to achieve much progress on the Israel-Palestinian track, and none whatsoever on the Israeli-Syrian track. The Clinton administration had emphasized that regional parties had to be flexible and encouraged them to create an atmosphere in which advances could take place. At best, however, the administration could argue that the peace process was still alive and that no serious confrontations had taken place. The impasses that stalled the peace process were Netanyahu's decision to build settlements in Har Homa near East Jerusalem, the Israeli cabinet's decision to implement only limited withdrawal from the West Bank and Arafat's suspension of security cooperation with Israel and the organization of anti-Israeli demonstrations. Disagreement between Clinton and Netanyahu had developed to an extent that Clinton denied him an invitation to the White House upon a visit to Washington. Furthermore, Madlain Albright, who replaced Christopher as Secretary of State, started to criticize Israeli policies on Jewish settlements and land confiscation (Miftah 1999).

The year 1998 was a frustrating one for U.S. policy regarding the peace process. Washington was trying to get Netanyahu to make progress in negotiations. The U.S. administration had also moved somewhat closer to the Palestinian position in order to encourage Arafat to stay in the peace process. The U.S. in the face of the impasse has become involved in the details of negotiations more than it had in

previous years. These events culminated in the Wye Plantation agreement in October. The agreement was fostering the economic well being of the Palestinians, expanding areas that would fall under the control of the Palestinian authority. At the same time security assurances to Israel and a comprehensive plan against terrorism had to be provided. Implementation of the Wye agreement quickly failed, as Netanyahu charged that the Palestinians had not kept their commitments. In order to help restart the implementation of the Wye agreement, Clinton made a three-day visit in mid-December to Israel and to the PLO-ruled areas. The timing was especially dramatic, given the congressional impeachment process against Clinton back in Washington over the Monica Lewinski affair. In his visit Clinton showed U.S. support for both Israel and the Palestinians. He promised additional aid to Israel for continuing in the peace process. He also became the first president to visit Palestinian-ruled territory and to speak to a PLO meeting (Usher 1999, 1).

Despite U.S. efforts, Netanyahu froze implementation and by the end of December 1999 the Knesset voted to dissolve itself and hold new elections in 1999 further stalling any significant achievement in the peace process. In 1999, Prime Minister Ehud Barak was elected with a landslide. History seemed to repeat itself. The chemistry between Bush Sr. and Shamir had not been the best, similar to that between Clinton and Netanyahu. Accordingly relations between both countries were strained. Improvements in the relation came during Bush Sr.-Rabin, Clinton-Rabin and Clinton-Barak era. Barak promised to continue the legacy of Rabin and initially stopped settlement activities. Furthermore, he visited various Arab countries as a sign of seriousness towards moving the peace process. This culminated in a second Sharm al-Sheikh meeting that revived the peace process. However, nothing significant changed in the Israeli-Palestinian track, apart from some symbolic steps such as the

opening of the safe passage and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Israel withdrew from its self-imposed security zone in Southern Lebanon in May 2000 (a mere change in tactics to reduce its casualties) but still the two sides are not at peace. Israel is still holding a strip of Lebanese land called Shabaa in the foothills of Mount Hermon (Marshall 2000, 2).

The Camp David negotiations in July 11-25 2000 was seen by Washington as necessary to prevent an outbreak of violence in the region and was held between Clinton, Arafat, and Barak. Camp David did not resolve any core issues such as the final status of Jerusalem. It only further reinforced the continued violations of agreed to deadlines of the Oslo Agreement timeline since the 1993 handshake in the White House between Clinton, Rabin and Arafat. The failure to reach any sort of agreement at Camp David could probably be attributed to the fact that Clinton had half a year left in office, Arafat had become immensely unpopular by his Palestinian population and Barak was extremely vulnerable to his coalition in the Knesset (Bird 2000.1-2).

The dynamics in the Middle East turned out to be severely complex and produced one of the worst stages in recent Middle East history. For one the change in leadership after the death of Syrian President Hafez El-Assad and his succession by his son Bashar El Assad further hampered the stalled peace process on the Syrian track as the country entered a transition phase. The Camp David negotiations in July 2000 could not achieve any significant results to hinder a possible outbreak of violence. Indeed violence broke out in October 2000 when frustrated Palestinians launched a second Intifada against the backdrop of continued Israeli provocation of which Ariel Sharon's entrance to the Islamic holy site in Jerusalem was the most flagrant. Resolutions passed at the third Sharm Al-Sheik conference (coming as a result of violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis), the Arab summits in Cairo

and later in Amman, the Islamic conference in Qatar as well as diplomatic measures (recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Israel) did not revert Israel from reacting strongly to the Intifada.

Because of these events Barak, was severely politically damaged, before completing 18 month in office and called for early elections as a means to preserve his leadership. However, he lost the elections, disappeared from the political life, and was replaced by Ariel Sharon. Sharon remembered for the invasion of Lebanon, and his involvement in the Sabra and Shatila massacre and as a foreign minister under the Netanyahu government, came to power as the fifth prime minister in six years under an Israeli public mood that was characterized by growing indifference and alienation. This political indifference suffered by the public was reflected in a low voter turnout by which participation dropped to less than 60% a figure unknown to Israel. "Facts indicate that Barak's crushing defeat rather than Sharon's victory decided the election." (Clayman 2001, 1)

The spiral of violence has again been unleashed. Palestinian stone throwers are increasingly determined to pursue their struggle. The first Intifada in the 80's was a manifestation of the Palestinians to show the world that they were determined to live in Palestine. The second Intifada that started at the end of 2000 was the Palestinians populations frustration over continued Israeli provocation's and non-abidance by the Oslo agreement timelines as well as a determination to live as partners in the peace process and not as prisoners.

While the violence was spreading in the area and attacks as well as counter attacks were intensifying, the U.S. was engulfed by its over contentious Presidential contest between former Vice President Al Gore and Senator George W. Bush. Clinton spent his last days in the White House heavily involved in the peace process offering a

proposed plan that was discussed in Taba, Egypt. The Clinton plan envisioned, that Israel would hand back 95% of the West Bank, 100% of the Gaza Strip and Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to Palestinians. In exchange Palestinians would give up the right of return for 3.7 million Palestinian refugees who lost their homes when Israel was created in 1948. This plan and the talks in Taba resulted in no substantial achievements leaving the burdens of the current crisis in the Middle East to his successor George W. Bush (Middle East online 2001). In history books Clinton will take partial credit for a number of successes in the Middle East but will also go down as having failed to achieve lasting peace.

Bush Jr. Administration

Even during the highly contentious election race both former Vice-President Al Gore and George W. Bush kept tradition by promising to continue preserving the U.S.-Israeli special relationship as they have indicated in their respective speeches to AIPAC. On May 22, 2000 George W. Bush said:

America and Israel have a special friendship. In fact, it's more than a friendship. America and Israel are brothers and sisters in the family of democracy, natural allies- natural allies in the cause of peace. (Bush 2000)

One day later to the same audience Al Gore said:

Our enduring support for a strong and unshakable partnership between the United States and Israel; our commitment, our shared commitment to one of the cornerstones of America's national security, a strong, secure, peaceful and prosperous state of Israel. This will never change. (Gore 2000)

Initial Predictions

Bush Jr. came out victories from the election race. It is still early to determine how the new Bush Jr. administration will precisely tackle the Middle East and how the Bush Jr.-Sharon relationship will take its shape with the swift changing global and

regional circumstances following the September 11, 2001 atrocities against the U.S. and the beginning of the first War in the 21st century against terrorism. At a first glance there seems to be some common aspects shared by both leaders, which might serve us as a forecast of what to expect in the near future. Both leaders are conservative as compared to Clinton and Barak. Clinton searched for compromise in the peace process and Barak was willing to continue the land for peace formula of 1993. Bush Jr. is rather for diplomatic detachment as seen in his refusal to even send an envoy to Taba where Palestinian and Israeli officials were discussing the Clinton proposal signaling criticism to Clinton style of involvement in the peace process. Secretary of State Colin Powell's first trip to the area sought an assessment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the threat posed by Iraq rather than a revival of serious peace talks. Sharon unlike Barak was not even willing to engage in talks that would give up part of Jerusalem. "Sharon doesn't want to be pushed soon into talking with the Palestinians about a permanent peace, and Bush seems disinclined to do much pushing" (Riskind 2001, 2).

According to William Quandt, Bush Jr. and Sharon are more likely to get along better than Clinton and Sharon would have. Quandt believes that the new American administration would like to leave the Israeli situation at its back seat and focus on Iraq and it already got tough with Iraq. However, the Bush administration will find it increasingly hard to remain uninvolved in the peace talks and will be drawn into involvement much more than initially desired (Riskind 2001, 3).

The early signs of the Bush Jr. administration for the hands-off approach towards the peace process as opposed to Clinton's "chief negotiator" approach were encouraging to Sharon. Sharon refused to negotiate from where Barak ended. Similar

to Bush Jr., Sharon is for a step by step approach rather than a comprehensive approach as pursued by Clinton and Barak (Middle East Online 2001).

Even though the new administration distanced itself it did not fall short of criticizing Israel for the planned expansion of Jewish settlements as other administrations did before it. Furthermore, the U.S. criticized the targeted killings undertaken by Israel against Palestinians and called for an investigation on opening fire on Palestinian officials who were returning from Israel after holding talks aiming for ending the violence between both parties. "The U.S. harsh criticism of Israel is unusual, and largely unexpected as it followed several statements made by U.S. President George Bush and top American officials backing Israel's stance and rebuking Palestinian violence" (Middle East News Online 2001). The terrorist attacks on American soil have forced the Bush Jr. administration to depart from its hands off approach. The administration has become fully engaged in a war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which harbours Ossama Bin Laden the alleged mastermind behind the attacks on America.

Back to the Future

To better try to predict where the future will be taking us under the Bush Jr. administration it is important to recapture some moments of recent history. With the end of the Cold War a political climate conducive to a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular the Palestinian-Israeli dispute had been created. Indeed since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference almost all Arab states and the Palestinians have been offering to accept the permanence of Israel in a large area of historic Palestine. In return, the Arabs demanded Israel's withdrawal to its internationally recognized borders and compliance with UN resolutions and

international law. It seemed that the era of an Arab-Israeli war similar to the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars had been finally terminated and that the disputes that occasionally erupted were fought out politically on the negotiation table. After Shamir this process continued under the name of the Oslo Agreement consuming the primership of Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak through the 1990's. Peace negotiations stumbled through many deadlocks. Through U.S. mediation and the efforts of regional partners such as Egypt and Jordan, resumption of peace talks was often accomplished.

After Likud leader Ariel Sharon entered the sacred holy site of the Moslems in Jerusalem at the end of September 2000 the Palestinian masses launched their second intifada, the Al Aqsa intifada. Sharon's action came at a time were negotiations were focused on the final status of Jerusalem and incited not only Palestinian anger but that of the entire Arab world. Sharon's provocative action broke the camel's back and brought to the forefront the frustrations Palestinian's endured during the years of the peace process in which Israel demanded more from the Palestinians and did not abide by the Oslo timeline agreements.

The disproportionate clashes that broke out ever since between Palestinian civilians and the Israeli army soldiers with sophisticated technologically advanced weaponry coincided with the American election race between former Vice-President Al Gore and current President George W. Bush. Usually during election periods U.S. involvement in international politics including the Middle East drastically decreases. Even though, Clinton continued to engage himself heavily in efforts to promote the peace process during his final months in office, (he was of course free from the constraints of seeking re-election) his attempts were unsuccessful.

Parallel to these events, Barak called for early elections in an attempt to save

his political position within Israel, which had been weakened by his policies and the intifada. Due to these events a vacuum had been created. There was no real leadership in the U.S. until the resumption of the presidency (January 20th, 2001) and Israel's leadership was torn between its fight against the Al Aqsa intifada and Barak's election battle against Ariel Sharon. Arafat had lost his legitimacy under the growing anger of the Palestinian masses and it had become difficult for him to curb violence. On the ground conditions were becoming worse by attacks and counter attacks reminiscent of times long thought of as gone.

The havoc that ensued was further inflamed by shifts in the political make-up of Israel and U.S. The violent outburst between the Palestinians and the Israelis started at a time in which a liberal Democrat was leading the U.S. and a center - left coalition was holding the political reins in Israel. In early 2001 the fate of the Palestinian - Israeli conflict was handed over to a conservative Republican in the U.S. and to the conservative right wing of the Israeli political spectrum.

The Republican victory in the U.S. of Bush Jr. has brought conservative politics to the forefront. The Bush Jr. administration, even though the most ethnically diverse in U.S.-history, is politically right wing. Although the new governing team includes a Democrat, key members of the administration are hard-line Republicans of which several served under Bush Sr. and other Republican administrations during the Cold War era. Vice-President Dick Cheney was a high profile member of the Bush Sr. administration and was credited with masterminding the U.S. success in the Gulf War. Current Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dates back to the Nixon administration and served as Defense Secretary once before under the Ford administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell was the first African-American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Bush Sr. administration and gained fame as one of the major architects

of Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait during the Gulf crisis. It seems therefore, that, the new political composition in the U.S. made it possible for powerful men of past times to emerge again.

Similarly, the government composition that arose in Israel made the "old guard" of Israeli politics re-emerge. With the narrow defeat of Shimon Peres by Binyamin Netanyahu it was widely believed that a new era in Israeli politics had been ushered in. The "old guard" represented in Shamir, Rabin, Peres and Sharon which cut its political teeth during the Cold War years was thought to have been pushed aside from the center to the periphery of politics by the "new generation" of politicians represented in Netanyahu and Barak. Yet, the defeat of Ehud Barak brought back the ultra-nationalist Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs.

Ultra-nationalists, such as Ariel Sharon and Shamir, had reached their political height in the early 1980's under the leadership of Menachem Begin. The basic value shared by ultra-nationalists is the unity of the whole land of Israel and they offer territorial concessions only to buy time for increased settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza. They tend to oppose American involvement in the peace process and they favor self-reliance. In their view support of outside powers is secondary to Israel's ability to act directly with force. The best scenario therefore is "American insurance without American interference" (Rynhold 2000, 3).

Sinai was eventually given back to Egypt under the ultra-nationalist Begin. Shamir engaged in 1991 in the peace process. In Begin's case this was only possible because these territories were outside of the historic borders of the land of Israel and in Shamir's case engaging in the peace process allowed ample time to intensify settlement building in Israel. After leaving office in the early 1990's Shamir openly

explained" I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years. Meanwhile we would have reached half a million Jews in Judea and Samaria" (Rynhold 2000, 4). As foreign minister in the Netanyahu government Sharon supported the U.S. brokered Wye Accord but his support did not signal real change. On the contrary, after his departure from the Wye summit Sharon publicly encouraged settlers to expand their settlements in the West Bank defying the agreement and keeping in terms with the ultra-nationalist philosophy of non-territorial concessions.

Bush's Jr. first 100 days in office and Sharon's handling of the current crisis with the Palestinians offers a possible benchmark on the initial direction undertaken by the American administration. The already mentioned composition of the Bush Jr. administration clearly shows that Bush Jr. has turned back the clock and is influenced by older times. Bush Jr. holds the ideas of the make believe past of which America is homogenous at home and unchallenged and dominant abroad. During his first 100 days Bush Jr. proved that point well. In 100 days on the international front he managed to revive episodes of the Cold War with Russia by the expulsion of Russian diplomats, the stand off with China over the American spy plane and further antagonizing China by stating that the U.S. would come to the defense of Taiwan. Furthermore, the Bush Jr. administration unilaterally abundant the Kyoto agreement on global warming. This was distasteful to Europe and a range of underdeveloped countries. In addition, Bush Jr. expressed his scorn over the Korean peace process, and allowed Sharon a free hand in the Middle East and staged an attack on Iraq a la Bush Sr. style while he was on a state visit in Mexico. Finally he embarked on an abundant Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program serving the special needs of the military industrial complex and managing to antagonize the world and especially Russia over a program for an enemy that does not exist (Sid-Ahmed 2001, 1).

On the Middle East, the Bush Jr. administration was nowhere close to staging peace efforts such as the one conducted by Clinton, who had been sometimes dubbed as "chief negotiator". While the crisis in the Palestinian territories was getting darker each day the U.S. did not embark on any significant initiatives to stop the violence. Some statements have been voiced calling for all parties on both sides to restrain themselves but, nothing more than expressing that the situation has become "worrisome" and awaiting the results of the Mitchell Commission report (investigating the causes of the intifada) was done during Bush's Jr. first 100 days.

On the other hand, Sharon's government repressed the intifada with brute force and brutality, utilizing American apathy toward the Palestinian problem. Looking at the method by which Sharon has fought against the intifada one feels that the clock in Israel has been turned back as well. Sharon has been handling the situation as an armed conflict and has been pursuing the goals of (a) crushing Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, (b) destroying the Palestinian Authority, and (c) enforcing and re-imposing Israeli control over the Palestinian autonomous areas. The goals just stated bring back the nostalgia of the operation "Peace of Galilee" conducted by the Israeli defense minister in 1982 Ariel Sharon and the methods he is employing are the same he used in 1982 and even before that, when he created Unit 101 in the late 1950's to dispossess the Palestinians (Farahat 2001, 3).

In pursuing his goals Sharon has permitted local army commanders to attack Palestinian self-rule areas at will as was the case after establishing the "security zone" in southern Lebanon in 1985. Following the experience of southern Lebanon the Israeli army has initiated "preemptive strikes" against individuals and positions which Israelis claim are used by Palestinians to launch attacks on Israeli settlers and are conducting incursions on the areas allocated under full control to the Palestinians by

the Oslo agreement extending Israeli control and sending the message that the Oslo accords have been undone. Israel's massive attacks which have included helicopters and F-16 fighter planes have aimed at ruining Palestinian land important for farming, bulldozing homes and destroying infrastructure such as schools, mosques and shops. By these means Sharon hopes to break the will of the Palestinians to resist while at the same time to destroy the Palestinian Authority by staging assaults on its security apparatus, officials, intelligence personnel and infrastructure.

Summing up with the current formula (Bush Jr.-Sharon), politics in the Middle East is heading back to the future. The conditions bear strikingly close similarities to the conditions that prevailed in the early 1980's in the Reagan- Begin era. Reagan took over from Carter and redirected Washington's attention from the Middle East peace process in which Carter had been heavily involved. When Bush Jr. took over from Clinton he started to redirect official U.S. attention from the peace process in which Clinton was intensively involved.

The Reagan administration committed itself to restore American prestige in the international system because it held that Carter had contributed to the erosion of this prestige. Bush Jr. clearly illustrated in the actions he took during his first 100 days that he was "restoring" American prestige by his unilateral action on Kyoto agreement and the stand off with China and the ABM program that is basically an emulation of the Reagan Star Wars program. In the Middle East, Reagan assigned U.S. priority to the Persian Gulf, and downgraded the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bush Jr. has done the same and attributed higher importance to the Persian Gulf initially by ordering the bombardment of Iraq and the re-assessment of U.S. policy towards it prior to the September 11 attacks.

On the other hand, Begin and Sharon as ultra-nationalists shared the same

perceptions and it was Sharon who served as Defense Minister in Begin's government at the time of the 1982 Lebanon invasion. Now instead of Begin, Sharon is ruling the country. Reagan embarked on "episodic diplomacy" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bush Jr. embarked on similar "episodic diplomacy" as the conflict was worsening between the Palestinians and the Israelis by some statements that called for ending the violence and some statements by Powell condemning settlement activities. After a period of apathy, the 1982 Israeli Lebanon invasion catalyzed Reagan into a somewhat more comprehensive effort to approach the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, routine daily incursions of the Israeli army into specified autonomous areas of the Palestinians provide the Bush Jr. administration its catalyst for a more comprehensive effort to approach the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This catalyst has been immensely reinforced after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, and have led Washington to pronounce itself clearly in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Generally speaking Reagan's policy of assigning a back seat to the Middle East gave a free hand to Israel to pursue policies largely unchallenged. Furthermore, his distancing from the Middle East created the conditions in which Bush Sr. inherited a presidency that culminated in the Gulf War crisis. In this crisis Israel became a strategic liability while the U.S. administration was forming alliances with some Arab countries to oust the Iraqi regime from Kuwait. In the aftermath of the crisis the peace process between the Israelis and the Arabs was the outcome and had a front seat in the American agenda. Ten years later, heading back to the future, Bush Jr. placed the Middle East again in the back seat and once more allowed Israel to have an unchallenged free hand in its actions against the Palestinians. Ultimately this distancing policy from the Middle East culminated in a crisis much worse from the

U.S. perspective than the Gulf War. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon may have contributed to a changed American perception of foreign policy. Once again, Israel appears to be a strategic liability rather than an asset while the U.S. seeks Arab and Islamic support for its "War on Terrorism". As a result of the current situation the Bush Jr. administration has committed itself officially to favor the establishment of a Palestinian state. It will remain to be seen if in the aftermath of the current crisis a Palestinian state as declared by the U.S. will be established or if this commitment was meant to merely gain Arab support for the fight against terrorism.

On the other hand, Sharon is feverishly trying to overturn the notion that Israel has once again become a strategic liability rather than an asset. He has spared no effort trying to portray Arafat as the Bin Laden of the Middle East in an attempt to justify his policy of assassination and to portray Israel as the bulwark against terrorism in the region. Contrary to Sharon's hopes, however, came the Bush Jr. declaration towards establishing a Palestinian state and an increased insistence from the American administration for Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories. These events suggest that there will be a departure from Sharon's most favoured scenario as an ultra-nationalist which is "American insurance without American interference" towards a clash of interests along similar lines of that between Bush Sr. and Shamir following the Gulf Crisis.

One of the paradoxes that might unfold in the near future is that even though the initial foreign policy agenda of the Bush Jr. administration was probably most favourably corresponding to Israeli views, the Bush Jr. administration in its pursuit to abide by its commitments following its war against terrorism will be viewed as a hostile government to Israel. This brings us back to the similar paradox in which Bush Sr. found himself in following the Gulf War. He was labeled as the most hostile

administration ever to Israel.

Currently, however, the Middle East has again entered a crossroad and while the notion of an all out war and instability in the region had seemed to be ruled out during the 1990's, it has re-surfaced again in 2000. Only time will tell what will happen but many questions about the future are wide open again. Was the period of the 1990's only an episode raising a false hope that peace between the Israelis and the Arabs can be attained or will there be a Palestinian state, and how would the latter prospect affect the U.S.-Israeli special relationship?

The American Jewish Community

Ben-Zvi argues that American Jewry is a backbone of the special relationship. Prior to 1982 (Lebanon War) American Jews were unified and supported Israel's position. By the late 80s American Jewry started to split into factions over the issue of finding solutions to the Palestinian problem. Especially among young, educated Jews, criticism was voiced of Israel's violations of Palestinian human rights, which became increasingly visible in Israel's handling of the intifada. The increasing criticism of Israel by the Jewish American community and its leaders partially strained their relationship. As a whole, the American Jewish leadership committed itself to be more dovish in its outlook than the Israeli policy makers (Ben-Zvi 1998, 22-23).

According to Jack Wertheimer, provost and professor of American Jewish history at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, exploring the disaffection of Jews living in America, the American Jewish Committee's (AJC) annual opinion poll in the period between 1993-1997 indicated a decline in the feeling of closeness of the American Jews toward Israel. On the question of "how close do you feel to Israel" the annual opinion poll showed that the number of Jews who felt very close witnessed a

decline while the number of Jews who felt very distant rose. Furthermore, a distinction among younger and older American Jews, as illustrated in the 1990 National Jewish population study of sociologist Chaim Waxman, was found. Half of the older American Jews felt very or extremely attached to Israel while less than 30 percent of the baby boomers (young American Jews) felt the same strong attachment to Israel. In the academic year of 1995/96 between 14000 to 22000 American Jewish University students attended schools abroad. Only 1667 of these students were enrolled in programs at Israeli universities, which marked a significant decline since the early 1990's (Wertheimer 1998, 3).

Of paramount importance, Wertheimer explains, is the religious element. Those who felt distant from Israel in the 1997 AJC survey were also distant from the strong Orthodox form of Judaism while those who expressed closeness to Israel were also closer to the religion. "38 percent of Reform Jews and half of those who eschewed any religious label reported feeling distant from Israel, as compared with 15 percent of Conservative Jews and only 4 percent of Orthodox Jews" (Wertheimer 1998, 4).

Over the past few years the most public difference between American Jews and the Israelis actually involved issues such as religious pluralism. This has become a very critical issue since most of the Jews in the U.S. are either Conservative, Reform Jews or not affiliated at all. Only 9 percent of American Jews are Orthodox (Pinkus 1998, 7). The core of the dispute centers on whether Jewish religious law always applies to the contemporary world, as the Orthodox Jews insist. This manifested itself in the issue of conversion, which is currently undertaken only by the Orthodox rabbis along with religious marriages, divorces and funerals and only accepted as valid by Israel if undertaken by the Orthodox. Over the past years the Reform and

Conservative Jewish movements have challenged the aforementioned monopoly and are pressing for a legitimacy to undertake conversions accepted by Israel. This challenge brought to the forefront differences of opinion in matters such as whether a child born to a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother is Jewish (Abrahamson and Stammer 1998, 5).

The growing disengagement of American Jewry from Israel could be explained in the growing gap between both communities. American Jews are a minority in a largely tolerant multicultural society, while Israeli Jews are a majority dealing with minorities of which some are hostile to its existence. American Jews are within a voluntary society in which their action is a matter of choice while Israeli Jews are compelled by custom and law to participate in Jewish activities such as military service, payment of taxes and marriage by orthodox rabbis. The difference in conditions also projects itself into a distinctive Jewish identity. The thinking of American Jews is guided by American values. Judaism has been affected by individualism, which stands at the core of the American ethos. Many American Jews only embrace those religious activities that seem personally meaningful. Israelis on the other hand are guided by the Jewish calendar and participate in life as a group. An act of an individual throws the whole nation into a debate. Unlike the selective usage of religious practices of some of the American Jews, those who embrace religion in Israel take it as a package deal as defined by the Orthodox practices and it does not become a matter of choice. Israeli Jews are culturally and socially more conservative in their attitudes toward sexuality, women's roles in society and the family structure as compared to their American counterparts (Wertheimer 1998, 4-5).

On political issues American and Israeli Jews also sharply disagree, especially over the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The former heavily supports the

idea while the latter is more deeply divided. In a poll conducted jointly by the Los Angeles Times and the Israeli Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper 68 percent of American Jews support an independent state while 19 percent oppose the state. Israeli Jews in contrast are split into 44 percent supporting the idea and 49 percent disapproving the creation of an independent Palestinian state (Abrahamson and Stammer 1998, 1).

Despite the increasing differences one should not forget that American Jews who remain strongly affiliated to Israel and the Jewish way of life support the Israeli government and philanthropic giving is still very high. Jews pronounce their prayers in Israeli Hebrew and clothes and religious items are imported from Israel. The curricula of the U.S. Jewish schools attribute a central position to Israel and their teachers are either born in Israel or Americans educated in Israel (Wertheimer 1998, 7).

With the latest round of Israeli- Palestinian violence and with the "sight of Israeli helicopter gunships firing missiles into Palestinian cities--so great a contradiction in Jewish ethics and history"(Ellis 2000, 1) some American Jews have expressed concern. However, American Jewish leaders have been calling for a unity on behalf of Israel, "effectively announcing open season on Jews who are critical of Israeli policy" (Ellis 2000, 1).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the American Jewish community serves as a bridge between both the U.S. and Israel. With increasing differences with Israel, American Jewry also extends this criticism to the attentive American public, which is increasingly becoming aware of Palestinian hardships and of Palestinian's right to self-determination. These events coupled with the swift changes in the "global and regional strategic environment", possibly provide grounds for some evaporation of the special relationship (Ben-Zvi 1998, 24).

However, while the coming decade will probably witness the formation of a new relationship between the Arabs and Israel, the American Jewish community can be expected to conduct business as usual. The connection between the Jewish community and Israel will remain strong in the changing post-Cold War circumstances and the community will continue to work to win political support and money for Israel. It is also probable that in the long run, the community will find itself increasingly forced to shift its focus on Jewish interests within the U.S., competing with other minorities within the U.S. which are increasing in number, notably, Afro-Americans, Hispanics and Asian communities. These communities are turning from minorities to majorities and consequently the Jewish community will have to construct new relationships, unlike the relationship it has with the current majority of European origin.

American Public Opinion

As we have already indicated earlier, the dominant American attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict generally favored Israel. Americans nonetheless have gradually become more aware of the endless suffering of the Palestinians, especially with Intifada. Seeing Israeli troops breaking the arms and legs of Palestinian stone throwers on daily news at their dinner tables all contributed to the development of an awareness towards the Palestinians. Furthermore, in the face of constant Israeli aggression on the Palestinians, Americans started to see the atrocities inflicted upon the Palestinians. Among these were:

Destruction of private property and humiliation of residents

Interference with religious rights

Attacks on hospitals and hospital personnel

Physical violence against protected persons
Collective and guilt-by-association punishment
Unjustifiable destruction of private property
Unlawful deportations
Closing of schools in occupied areas
Deprivation of procedural and substantive due process of law, and many other violations (Ball and Ball 1992, 185-186).

An aspect of the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel is the sharing of common values such as democracy. All the aforementioned violations by the Israelis toward the Palestinians go contrary to American sets of beliefs and values.

It is of interest to note, however that since the end of the Cold War there seems to be a considerable gap between the public's critical stance toward aid to Israel and the consistent high level of assistance to Israel. A poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1994 showed that 44% of the public and 50% of the leaders would favor to decrease or stop aid to Israel while only 9% of the public and 4% of the leaders would opt for increasing aid. Another poll taken by the Whirlin Group, which informed respondents first on the amount of aid received by Israel found that 69% of the public wanted to reduce or stop aid to Israel. In 1995 a survey by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland discovered less public support for aid to both Israel and Egypt than other U.S. foreign assistance programs. In this survey, 56% chose aid reduction while only 4% expressed their willingness to increase aid (Clarke 1997, 10). Despite the general public mood to reduce or stop aid, Israel continues to receive its usual aid. The explanation lies in the strength of the special interest groups and the conviction by members of the Congress of the fact that Israel is vital for U.S. interests. The Israeli government and American

Jewish organizations continue to spare no effort to influence American public opinion and focus on leadership opinion. The Israeli foreign ministry alone invites annually 400-500 American opinion makers, mayors, journalists, union leaders and politicians to briefing tours in Israel (Clark 1997, 10).

So far, we have looked at the changes that on the level of international policies (the collapse of the Soviet Union) shed light on Israel's standing in the Gulf War and in the post-Cold War era. As we discovered, the Gulf War illustrated the dispensability of Israel as a strategic asset. Yet, Israel was "rewarded" by the U.S. for refraining from undertaking any actions during the Gulf War by military, economic and political support, as it had been during the Cold War years.

Furthermore, we took a glance at the American Jewish community, which we identified as an essential element in the complex web of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. There too, we found friction occurring with the Israeli leadership over questions of fundamental policy such as the creation of a Palestinian State and religious issues. This friction seems to be increasingly expanding, since younger American Jewish generations are becoming more critical of Israeli conduct. Despite the differences, still the powerful American Jewish organizations manage to control rifts among American Jews, especially in times of crisis.

Finally, we looked at American public opinion toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. There as well, it became evident that sympathy for Israel is declining with the increased awareness of the atrocities committed against the Palestinians. Furthermore, American public opinion increasingly speaks out for the reduction of aid in a post-Cold War era to Israel. Yet aid continues to flow due to the clout that special interest groups still possess in the Congress and among decision makers.

All these factors taken together, however, seem to imply mounting pressures on the U.S.-Israeli relationship and give the impression that there is a decline of Israel's importance to the U.S.

Implications for the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship

For the first time since Israel's existence, after World War II, there exists a world without a polarized conflict between two power blocks. This world is a different place, one in which changes ultimately have an effect on every aspect of international politics with varying degrees from one region to the other, including the Middle East. Despite the adaptations that have and will have to occur, and the multitude of questions that have to be addressed and answered, the U.S. today can largely pursue policy goals of its own choice in a more unrestricted manner than during the Cold War period.

This new "freedom" of choice in pursuing policy goals translated to the U.S.-Israeli relationship means that Washington is now in a position to impose demands on Israel that it has not made before. "America's new freedom to choose foreign policy goals is what enabled Washington to decide to cease to make unquestioning support for Israel a central plank of its policy in the Middle East" (Lesch 1996, 134). This however, does not mean that the absolute guarantees for the integrity and independence of Israel by the U.S. will vanish, on the contrary this aspect of their relationship will be sustained, but previous taboos have been broken. Probably one of the best examples of this trend is illustrated by American peace initiative in Madrid under the Bush administration, which made it clear to the Israeli leadership that an invitation to the peace process in Madrid could not be declined.

Shamir and his ministers have sounded by turns angry and subdued, defiant and conciliatory. But mostly they have appeared dumbfounded by a series of events that has seemed to upset decade old assumptions by Israeli leaders about the politics of their relationship with the United States. (Lesch 1996, 134)

The end of the Cold War has brought about the changes in America view. While the absence of Cold War constraints allowed the U.S. to change its view of Israel's role, a further influential factor has been added to giving the U.S. a new set of strategic priorities to the Middle East. The Gulf War in 1991 unleashed a debate within the U.S. about its traditional foreign policy alignments. The Gulf War underscored the significance of forming new alliances and creating good relations with Arab states. This in return further highlighted the changing American perception of Israel's importance. While during the Cold War the U.S. refrained from pressuring Israel to follow certain political actions with regard to the Arab states, the U.S. in a post-Cold War era increasingly asked Israel to change its policies vis a vis Arabs. This is guided by the notion of bringing about normalization to the region (Lesch 1996, 135).

While the U.S. could have protected its oil interests in the region with its own military capacity, it chose to assemble an alliance in the region in order not to be accused of pursuing unilateral action. Therefore, the cooperation of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States became an integral part of American policy towards the crisis. With the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. chose to try to keep those new alliances intact.

The end of the Cold War can largely explain the developments in the Middle East on one hand, and the Gulf War on the other. The disappearance of the Soviet Union, and with it the disintegration of the Communist bloc brought about a restructuring of the U.S. attitude towards the Middle East. While Israel during the

Cold War period was the pro-western fortress, some Arab states notably Syria and Iraq were Soviet Union clients.

Today, in the absence of Cold War frictions America has no counterbalance in the Middle East. The post-Communist regime in Russia cannot afford to maintain and preserve expensive alliances with the Arab states, as did its predecessor in the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, Russia with its own multiple oil resources lacks the same motivation as U.S. and some of the western countries in securing the oil resources by keeping up ties in the Middle East. The Gulf War came as the first real challenge in a post-Cold War era. The leadership in Moscow saw no gain in opposing a U.S. led alliance even though Iraq was formerly closely linked with the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Moscow opted for a stance of "positive neutrality". The U.S. therefore found itself in the Gulf conflict lacking any ideological confrontation with the former Soviet Union. This in turn further marginalized Israel the bastion against communism in the Middle East (Lesch 1996, 136-138).

As part of the new set of strategic priorities to the Middle East came the desire to bring peace between the nations of the Middle East, that is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Various American administrations had in the past contributed a great deal of time to bring about peace in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict was viewed as part of the east-west rivalry. With the end of the Cold War this perception has changed. In the past the U.S. fulfilled its duty of supporting Israel through diplomatic, economic and military means to ensure its supremacy in the region. Today the American goal has slightly shifted.

The main consideration was nevertheless the desire to regulate Israeli's relations with its neighbors, and thus to ease tensions in an area of the world where the United States would frankly prefer to be able to give priority to the more programmatic goal of protecting its oil interests. (Lesch 1996, 182)

This does not mean that the U.S. has abandoned Israel but it has increasingly started to pressure for a resolution of the Palestinian problem.

In a world beyond bi-polarity based on economic competition, a competition for the ownership of the main sources of energy, the U.S. prefers to protect its oil interests. The Arabs, especially the Gulf States, possess the largest amount of oil reserves and not Israel. As such the Gulf States in a world that is shifting away from military dominance towards economic competition will be bound to have a major role in the new game of nations. The Gulf War further illuminated the fact that the stability of the Gulf region cannot be taken for granted, with that the increased realization that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be allowed to become a destabilizing factor came.

If the United States can no longer support Israel as unconditionally as it once did, it is because the stability of the oil area is acquiring greater importance for the U.S. strategic interests as Israel's strategic value as an anti-Soviet bulwark in the Middle east becomes less relevant. (Lesch 1996, 269)

President Bush Sr. believed that any hope of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict required that the issue of Palestine and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had to be addressed. Therefore, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict required a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian component.

A non-hostile Middle East, in the absence of the former race of spheres of influence, would prove beneficial to the U.S. in protecting its interests in the region. To this end the U.S. will continue its special relationship to support and even step up its assistance to Israel in a post Cold War era as an initial investment on the short and medium term. The notion on which generous American aid to Israel was based during the Cold War, namely the hostility of the Arab states and with it the associated existential fear of Israel, has been re-labeled in the post-Cold War era. The new label

upon which Israel started to and will continue to receive U.S. aid in the near future are security guarantees for its endeavors with the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors. Guarantees are needed for Israel to engage in such an endeavor. Those guarantees are the same that the U.S. developed with Israel during the course of the special relationship in a Cold War setting. It's economic generosity, military assistance ensured the qualitative edge of Israel over that the Arabs as well as U.S. political support. However, the essential difference is that the former Soviet Union has vanished and the special form of support to Israel unlike the past is not bound anymore by infinity.

In the long term, then, the United States would envision a pacified Middle East free from contention. For this to occur the U.S. will search for Middle East peace in which countries in the region are bound together by trade, investment opportunities and treaties. The question that therefore arises then is how long will it take the U.S. to achieve the long-term objective and hence alter its special relationship with Israel, so that a more evenhanded relationship with the Arab world emerges?

Again it is important to reiterate that the U.S. will not cease to come to the aid of Israel, for that is a given fact and priority of the U.S. in its Middle East policy. During the course of their relationship in the Cold War era a solid web of ties and common interests were established. This solid web consists of the fact that more Jews live in the United States (5.6 million) than in Israel itself (5 million). Many American Jews hold a dual citizenship and vote in Israel as well as the U.S. The free trade agreement allows Israeli goods and products to enter the U.S. without any tariffs. American Jews heavily contribute to Israel. The sharing of intelligence and weapons technology, as well as the annual aid flow to Israel. all are elements of this web that cannot be defused instantly by changes in the international arena.

However, Washington will try to create the climate in which it will not have constantly to support Israel. In a pacified Middle East the U.S. will have ample room to focus its attention on other priorities. The continued increase in support to Israel (initial investment) marks the beginning of the end of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship that we have come to be familiar with during the Cold War years.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: IS THERE A DECLINE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL TO
THE U.S.?

During my research I went back in time prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. I looked at the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, which basically were the first to engage the Palestinian question. Looking at the years 1939 to 1948, when the State of Israel became a reality, revealed that the creation of the state was largely the outcome of intense Zionist pressure on the U.S. government. This was further fostered by myopic visions of both Roosevelt and Truman and the general failure of understanding the dynamic, dimensions and complexity of the Middle East and its inhabitants.

By furthering the creation of the State of Israel the U.S. helped give birth to a country built on weak roots. It is no wonder then that up to this very moment in history the region is characterized with violence, wars, shift of boundaries and terrorism on both the Arab and Israeli side, which caused the bloodshed of thousands and endless suffering directly and indirectly to millions of people. Transferring a European problem (Jews unable to assimilate in Europe and the dreadful Holocaust) to the Middle East did not solve the plight of the Jewish people. In fact, they arguably found themselves fighting for their survival once more, in a bigger ghetto called Israel. In addition, while Truman and his administration might have felt that by recognizing Israel they solved finally and permanently the problem of Jewish refugees, they at the same time contributed to a new refugee situation, namely, that of the Palestinians who were deprived of their homes.

130

The second part of the work was aimed at shedding the light on the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. By going briefly through the main events from the Eisenhower to the Reagan administrations it became evident to me that the special relationship matured during the early 1970s, especially during the Nixon administration. It has also become apparent that the special relationship was a complex relation comprised of various elements and often contradictory events. Basically, the special relationship, was a mixture of both the strength of the American Jewish community and, foremost, the impact of Cold War politics on the Middle East region.

The strength of the American Jewish community in many cases influenced various American presidents. Even more importantly Congress more or less became a tool of the Jewish community, since the Jews were able to shape American Public opinion in their favor. On the other hand, Congress reflects public opinion and pursues policies favorable to the public. It is no coincidence then that Congress often exceeded the amounts of aid to Israel requested by various administrations. Besides the fact that the American Jewish community and the AIPC exerted tremendous influence on both the public opinion and Congress, they were largely uncontested by any other pressure or lobbying group, notably any Arab interest group. Having this monopoly and understanding the full extent of the American political system helped a great deal in the creation of a special relationship.

Parallel and even more important than the strength of the Jewish community was the Cold War. The Cold War struggle for power between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union rendered Israel a strategic asset in the Middle East for the U.S. in containing Soviet expansion. During its early phases, the Cold War did not have any significant impact on the Middle East. Once the spheres of influence of both the U.S.

and the Soviet Union were established in Europe, then Asia, the Middle East became a hot spot. While the Soviet Union provided military assistance to the Arabs, Israel grew increasingly dependent on U.S. economic and military aid. In my view, that is the time when both American Jewish strength and Cold War events went hand in hand to forge the main pillars of the special relationship upon which economic and military aid rested and which led to the unprecedented levels this assistance reached during the 1970s. Once the special relationship fully matured it became more than the sum of its parts and lasted throughout the end of the Cold War, despite occasional ups and downs.

The third part of the paper aimed at looking exactly at what happened to the special relationship during the post-Cold War era. It basically asked whether the relationship was bound to end up in a divorce or whether was is going to remain permanent. Organski provided us with conditions which would have an effect on the U.S.-Israeli special relationship and which would terminate or reduce the U.S. assistance to Israel. These conditions are: if Soviet Union ceases to be an expansionist power and the U.S. would not need to counteract any expansionist moves made by the Soviet Union. Or if radical Arab regimes abandon their radical orientation and stop aggression vis a vis Israel, as in the case of Nasser's Egypt which turned to a peaceful solution with Israel and largely became an American ally under Sadat's Egypt. The final condition is that an Arab ally of the U.S. offers an alternative to Israel by becoming economically, politically and militarily powerful (Organski 1990, 216).

The Soviet Union ceased to be an expansionist power and, as a matter of fact, ceased to exist at all. This therefore, suggests that one of the main pillars on which the U.S.- Israeli special relationship rested upon has collapsed. It is important to mention

that the pillar represents a vital pillar. It was in the height of fear over Soviet expansion in the Middle East when the special relationship matured.

With respect to the point of radical Arab regimes abandoning their radical orientations, proponents of continued flow of American aid to Israel in a post- Cold War era most notably Israelis and AIPAC utilized this argument. They argued that as long as there are states such as Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, who promote either terrorism, the development of weapons of mass destruction and/or Islamic fundamentalism the Middle East will remain a dangerous area. As a consequence, U.S. interests and Israel's existence and security will continue to be threatened.

It is important to mention, however, that Libya and Iraq are neutralized and actually are suffering from the embargoes imposed on them. Syria is seeking a peaceful solution to regain the Golan Heights back from Israel, while the Sudanese and Iranian Islamic regimes are not posing any threat to the by far superior Israeli military capabilities. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalism per se does not match the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and therefore can not be regarded as a substitute to it.

With regards to an Arab state as an alternative for Israel if it is economically, politically and militarily powerful and modern, this does not exist. In that sense, there is no alternative for Israel, which speaks out for a continued U.S. support and special relationship in the post- Cold War era. As a matter of fact, what made Israel a regional superpower was and is the continued economic, military and technological and political support of the U.S. which is not matched by any other country regionally, not even Saudi Arabia which has become a huge American arms client.

Other factors, which speak out for a decline of Israel's importance by the U.S. are increased awareness of the Palestinian cause. This is coupled with the rising

criticism of Jewish Americans towards Israeli policies regarding a Palestinian state, and even more important the inter-Jewish religious problems as well as the vulnerable position Israel was in during the Gulf War and is in during the American fight against terrorism. During this event it became apparent that Israel shifted from being a strategic asset to being a strategic liability. Yet, all these factors did not cause the U.S. to reduce its generous support for Israel during the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. On the contrary, Israel received more aid and had been attributed a new role of being a peace-maker in the region, therefore contributing to U.S. interest in the region, namely, order instead of disorder.

Even though some time has already passed since the end the Cold War in which Israel continues to enjoy the same advantages it possessed during the Cold War, I believe that the importance to the U.S. relatively declined. The signs of the decline are inherent in the pillars upon which the special relationship rests, which have become fragile and in some instances replaced by weaker ones. This could ultimately lead to the breakdown of the edifice. Yet we are in an unfamiliar setting, still following explanations and methods adopted during the Cold War period. Sticking to the status quo is often more comfortable than trying to change to unfamiliar settings. The same can be said about the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Modifications do not occur overnight; they need some time. Eleven years of human history that thus far have passed since the end of the Cold War are but a speck. Gradually both countries will have to adapt to new realities, namely, that the peak of their relationship has been already reached. This does not mean that the U.S. will abandon Israel, but it means that more even handedness will have to occur in the Middle East. While the U.S. attempted to stabilize the region through the peace process efforts Israel preserved its special status. However, if in the long run the

Middle East turns out to be a stable region or an obstacle of achieving stability, there is a big possibility that Israel's advantages will decline with it the unconditional form of the special relationship that has been devised during the Cold War.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abourezk, James. "US-Israeli Relationship: A Historical Perspective." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 1, Fall 1990: 15-42.
- Abrahamson Alan, Larry Stammer. "Jews in the U.S., Israel Differ on Palestinian State". Los Angeles Times, Sunday April 19, 1998.
- Alteras, Isaac. Eisenhower and Israel U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960. University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1993.
- Arens, Moshe. Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and The Crisis Between The U.S. and Israel. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1995.
- Aruri, Nasser. Fouad Moughrabi, Joe Stork. Reagan and the Middle East. Association of Arab -American University Graduates, INC. Belmont, Massachusetts, 1983.
- Bain, Kenneth Ray. The March to Zion: United States Policy And The Founding Of Israel. Texas A&M University Press, 1979.
- Ball, George W. "The Unbalanced Triangle: The United States, Israel and Palestine." Arab Studies Quarterly 10, no. 4, September 1988: 375-383.
- Ball, George W. Douglas B. Ball. The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to Present. W.W Norton & Company, New York, London, 1992.
- Bard, Mitchell G. "Israel's Standing in America Public Opinion." Commentary 80, no.4, October 1985: 58-60.
- Bard, Mitchell G. The Water's Edge and Beyond: Defining the limits to Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991.
- Barnett, Michael. "From Cold Wars to Resource Wars: The Coming Decline in U.S.-Israeli Relations." The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no.3, September 1991: 99-119.
- Benstock, Michael. "The Determinants of U.S. Assistance to Israel." Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no.1. March 1992: 65-97.
- Benson, Michael T. Harry S. Truman And The Founding of Israel. Praeger, 1997.

- Ben-Zvi, Abraham. Decade of Transition. Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.
- Ben-Zvi, Abraham. The United States and Israel: The Limits Of The Special Relationship. Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.
- Ben-Zvi, Abraham. Alliance Politics And The Case Of The U.S. And Israel. 1975-1983. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Paper No. 25 April 1984.
- Burki, Uzma S. "US Military Assistance to Israel: Review of a Strategic Relationship." Strategic Studies 13, no.2, 1989: 72-100.
- Chomsky, Noam. The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & The Palestinians. South End Press, Boston, Ma, 1983.
- Clark, Duncan L. "U.S. Security assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?" The Middle East Journal, Volume 5, Number 2, Spring 1997.
- Clayman, David. "Update on What Israelis are Thinking, Reading, Doing and Saying." American Jewish Congress, February 14, 2001.
- Cohen, Michael J. Truman and Israel. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990.
- Curtiss, Richard H. Stealth PACS: How Israel's American Lobby Took Control of US-Middle East Policy. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Trust, 1990.
- David P., Johnson Jr. "Clinton leaves Mixed Middle East Legacy" Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, May 2000.
- Drinan, Robert F. Honor The Promise: America's Commitment to Israel: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1977.
- Eizenstat, Stuart E. Formalizing the Strategic Partnership: The Next Step in U.S. - Israel Relations. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1988. Policy Paper no.9.
- Eizenstat, Stuart E. "Loving Israel - Warts and All." Foreign Policy, no. 81, December 1990: 87-105.
- Ellis, March H. "Jews vs. Jews. (American Jews attitudes toward Israel)." The Christian Century, November 8, 2000.
- Eugene, Bird. "Camp David negotiators Fail to Resolve Core Issue of Jerusalem." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, August/September 2000

Eugene, Bird. "As Clinton's last Days in Office Dwindle, So Do Hopes for Middle East peace in His Term." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 2000.

Eugene, Bird. "Juggler on the Roof: Clinton and the Peace Process." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July 2000.

Farahat, Nur. "The force of law, not the law of force" Al Ahram Weekly Online, Issue no 542. 12-18 July 2001.

Feuerwerger, Marvin C. Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision - Making in the House of representatives. 1969 - 1976. Westport: Greenwood, 1979.

Fuller, Graham E. "The Strategic Irrelevance of Israel." The National Interests, no.22, December 1990: 31 -33.

Garfinkel, Adam. "US-Israeli Relations after the Cold War." ORBIS, Fall 1996: 557-575.

George W., Bush. "Candidate George W. Bush on Israel" The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE), May 22, 2000.

Gilboa, Eytan. American Public Opinion toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Lexington Books, D.C. Health and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, 1987.

Goldfield, Steve. Garrison State: Israel's Role in the U.S. Global Strategy. San Francisco, CA: Palestine Focus. 1985.

Gordon, Bradely, Raphael Danzinger. "End American Aid to Israel? No. it remains vital", http://www.aipac.org/hot_ranart.htm.

Gore, Al. "Candidate Al Gore on Israel." The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE), May 23, 2000.

Guess, George M. The Politics of United States Foreign Aid. New York: St. Martin's, 1987.

Hadar, Leon T. "The Special Relationship: Israeli Decides its Future." Middle East Policy 1, no.1, 1992: 1 - 14.

Hadawi, Sami. Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine. Olive Branch Press, New York, 1991.

Israeli Settlements, American Statements, And The Future of Peace. Miftah, April 11, 1999.

Karsh, Efraim, ed. Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel. Frank Cass & Co. LTD, Ilford, Essex, England, 1994.

- Katz, Shmuel. "Interdependence in U.S. - Israeli Relations." Global Affairs 4, no.2, March 1989: 84-96.
- Kemp, Geoffery and Robert E. Harkavy. Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Cooperation with Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1997.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. "Carrots or Sticks? The Question of U.S. Influence Over Israel." International Journal 38, no.4. 1983: 700-712.
- Leitenberg, M. "United States Aid to Israel Questioned." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 46, no. 4, May 1990: 52+.
- Lesch, David W. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment. Westview Press, 1996.
- Mansour, Camille. Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy. Columbia University Press, New York, 1994.
- Middle East News Online. "U.S. Lashes at Israeli Settlements' Expansion." April 5, 2001.
- Middle East Online. "Sharon encouraged by Bush administration's distance from Clinton plan." February 09, 2001.
- Neff, Donald. Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945. Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C., 1995.
- Nixon, Richard M. Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
- Organski, A.F.K. The \$ 36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics In U.S. Assistance to Israel. Columbia University Press, New York, 1990.
- Pelzman, Joseph. "Sweetheart Deal: The U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement is not a Model; it is mostly Geopolitics." International Economy 3, no.2, March 1989: 53-56.
- Peretz, Martin. "Bush vs. Israel: Why the Presidential Grudge?" New Republic 205, no.15, 7 October 1991: 9-11.
- Pinkus, Susan. "Poll Analysis Part I: U.S. and Israeli Jews Have Many Common Views, Some Striking Differences." Los Angeles Times, Sunday April 19, 1998.
- Pollock, David. The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1982.

- Puschel, Karen. U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in a Changing World: An American Perspective. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, February 1992. JCSS Study no.20.
- Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993.
- Rabii, Muhammed. U.S.-PLO Dialogue. University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1995.
- Rabii, Muhammed. The Politics of Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Assistance and Aid to Israel. New York: Praeger, 1988.
- Rabii, Muhammed. "US Aid to Israel." The Link 22, no.2, May 1989: 1-14.
- Rachelle, Marshall. "Israel Withdraws From Lebanon But Peace Is Not Yet In Sight." Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, July 2000.
- Ray, James Lee. The Future of American-Israeli Relations: A Parting of the Ways? University Press of Kentucky, 1985.
- Reich, Bernard. The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.
- Reich, Bernard. Quest United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.
- Riskind, Jonathan. "Bush to Mideast: You settle it." The Columbus Dispatch, Sunday February 25, 2001.
- Rubin, Barry. "U.S. Middle East Policy Database" Middle East Review of International Affairs, Last updated August 18, 2000.
- Russett, Bruce. "No Sticks, No Aspirins: The Future of U.S.-Israeli Relations." Commonweal 116, no.11, 2 June 1989: 336-337.
- Rynold, Jonathan. "Israeli-American Relations and the Peace Process" Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 4 no. 2, June 2000.
- Sampson, Elissa. "Israel, Aid and American Interests: Does Washington Now See the Middle East Differently?" Christianity and Crisis 55, no.5, 21 October 1991: 333-336.
- Sandvig, Anders. Caught Between Error and Terror: The Peace Process in the Middle East. 1997.

- Schoenbaum, David. The United States and the State of Israel. Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1993.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. U.S.-Israeli Relations At The Crossroads. Frank Cass and Company Limited, London, 1997.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. Dynamics of Dependence: U.S.-Israeli. Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987.
- Shindler, Colin. Israeli, Likud and the Zionist Dream: Power, Politics and Ideology from Begin to Netanyahu. 1995.
- Sid-Ahmed, Mohammed. "No partners, only foes." Al Ahram Weekly Online, Issue no 530, 19-25 April 2001.
- Sneztzinger, John. Truman, The Jewish Vote, and The Creation of Israel. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford; California, 1974.
- Spiegel, Steven L. "America and Israel: How Bad Is It? Will It Get Worse?" The National Interest, no.22, December 1990: 11-12.
- Spiegel Steven L. "U.S.-Israeli Strategic Relations after the Persian Gulf War." Middle East Insight 7, no.6, May 1991: 33-39.
- Tillman, Seth P. The United States in the Middle East. Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Tivnan, Edward. The Lobby: Jewish Political Power And America Foreign Policy. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987.
- Truman, S. Harry. Years Of Trial And Hope. Volume 2, Doublday and Company Inc., Garden City, N.Y., 1956.
- Tschirgi, Dan. The Politics of Indecision: Origins and Implications of America Involvement with the Palestine Problem. Praeger, 1983.
- Usher, Graham. "Beyond the Honeymoon." Al Ahram Weekly Online, Issue no 408. 17-23 December 1998.
- U.S. and Israel: Such good friends. <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/israeli.elections/stories/israel.us/>.
- Van Cleave, William R. "The U.S. and Israel: A new Crisis." Global Affairs 7, no.2. March 1992: 36-55.
- Weiseberg, Jon. "U.S. Leaders Challenge Israeli Policy." Jewish Affairs 20, no.1. January 1990: 6-7, 19.

- Welles, Sumner. "America Policy on Israel." Congress Weekly 15, no.3. 29
November 1948: 5-8.
- Wertheimer, Jack. "The Disaffection of American Jews.", Commentary, May 1998.
- Wilson, Evan R. Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. came to Recognize Israel.
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California. 1979.
- Yankelovich, Daniel, and I.M. Destler, ed. Beyond the Beltway. The American
Assembly Columbia University, 1994.
- Zimmerman, Robert F. Dollars, Diplomacy: Dilemmas of U.S. Economic Aid.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

AMERICAN UNIV. IN CAIRO LIBRARY
3 8534 01074 7735