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Parasocial While Meaningful: How Does Exposure to Foreign Cultures Affect One's Opinion of
Foreign Countries?

by

Gong Chen

Under the Direction of Andrew Wedeman, PhD

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2022

ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to study how exposure to foreign cultures affects one's opinion of foreign countries. According to the parasocial contact theory, indirect mediated contact with an outgroup member on screen, similar to direct face-to-face contact, can reduce ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice. However, the parasocial contact effect is conditioned by the media content and producer. I argue that the consumption of foreign-made cultural products, such as TV programs and movies, is a better alternative and categorize it into two types. First, group-specific exposure to a foreign culture is associated with decategorization that strengthens knowledge, affinity, empathy, and identification with the contacted outgroup media character and deemphasizes group-based categorical differences. Second, generalized exposure to diverse foreign cultures contributes to recategorization through which a more inclusive, shared superordinate identity is constructed beyond subgroup boundaries and ingroup members become more cosmopolitan. Both approaches are hypothesized to lead to more favorable attitudes toward foreign countries. Drawing upon the AsiaBarometer Survey and East Asian Social Survey, the overall statistical analyses lend empirical support to the positive effects of group-specific and generalized cultural exposure. Using cable TV ownership as an instrument, the instrumental variable and corresponding sensitivity analyses further add to the robustness of the above findings.

INDEX WORDS: Contact hypothesis, Parasocial contact, Social identity, Intergroup relations, Foreign cultures, Constructivism

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2022

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by

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May 2022

DEDICATION

To my parents, from whom I absorbed my interest in the social sciences and my drive to understand sociopolitical events in the world.

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First of all, I would like to thank my parents in Shanghai, physically separated by the COVID-19 pandemic for three years but emotionally interconnected with each other forever. My family has witnessed the unprecedented political-economic changes in the People's Republic of China. Given the Great Leap Forward and natural disasters, my parents' childhoods were rife with hunger and poverty. Worse still, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution later forced them to drop out of school. But thanks to the Opening-up and Reform, I can grow up and live in an environment with more opportunities and freedoms compared to my parents. Although neither of them is well-educated, my parents emphasize the importance of knowledge in changing fate. Particularly, they always encourage me to develop independent, critical thoughts and to investigate the sociopolitical issues I am interested in. As a first generation scholar, I am grateful to my parents who have been supporting me, materially and mentally, in progressing on my academic path.

I am much obliged to the three professors—Andrew Wedeman, Toby Bolsen, and Charles Hankla—in my dissertation committee. Every one of them provided valuable feedback on my work and demonstrated extraordinary effort in helping me. I do not think there is a finer group of scholars/mentors assembled. Indeed, I benefited a lot from each professor's course that I took previously. In Dr. Wedeman's class on Chinese politics, I wrote a paper that laid the crucial groundwork for my dissertation. The hypotheses and findings at that time, albeit preliminary and exploratory, stimulated me to further reflect on and revise the research design and empirical techniques. Besides, I had a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the literature on intergroup contact and social identity in Dr. Bolsen's class on political psychology. That class also equipped me with knowledge of various scientific methods beyond

“naïve” regression to probe and answer psychological questions. Lastly, Dr. Hankla’s IPE class motivated me to apply social psychological theories to topics in world politics and interstate relations, such as economic globalization, international trade, multinational corporations, multilateral organizations, immigration/immigrants, and global governance. As a result, one of my dissertation’s contributions lies in specifying the microfoundations of constructivism in international relations. Overall, I received numerous insightful suggestions and critiques from the three professors without whom this project would not succeed.

To my chair and advisor, Andrew Wedeman, words fail to convey how important he is to me. Since my first day at Georgia State University and the five years following, Dr. Wedeman has spent countless hours guiding and encouraging me. It is remarkable how much he has taught and inspired me during a number of face-to-face or virtual communications. Dr. Wedeman is the best example of a political scientist as well as an advisor I could have ever hoped for. Many thanks for his patience, constant support, prompt feedback, perceptive comments, and time. Additionally, as a research fellow in the Second Century Initiative Chinese Studies Cluster, I worked with Dr. Wedeman and exchanged ideas with fellow researchers in investigating a variety of sociopolitical issues in contemporary China including corruption, factional politics, censorship and propaganda, state-society relations, and foreign policy. These interdisciplinary academic activities greatly broadened my horizon and provided opportunities for me to learn and borrow useful concepts/methods from other social science subfields like economics, communication, education, and sociology.

Finally, I am thankful that I was accepted by the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University. I learned what it takes to be successful in academia, published my research, taught undergraduate classes, and established professional relationships and friendships

that have substantially benefited me and will last a lifetime. My department is characterized by a high level of inclusivity, transparency, and adaptability. Most notably, the faculty and staff members are responsive to students by taking their views and suggestions into consideration. My experience of comprehensive exams is a case in point. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the department changed the exams to be open-book and take-home, which tremendously relieved students' concerns and stresses. In particular, when a large-scale power failure suddenly occurred during the exam period, Dr. Ryan Carlin, the Director of Graduate Studies, immediately contacted us and kindly extended the deadline so that we would not be adversely affected by the accident. From the perspective of an international student, the department seems to be my "home" in Atlanta where I feel warm and relaxed. Given that individuals are nested within organizations, one's success is, in part, conditional on the specific organizational environment and culture. It is the department—especially its tolerance of diversity, care for students, open and fair rules, and emphasis on independent thinking and active learning—that plays a vital role in my academic progress.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In 2021, the Japanese animated film *Demon Slayer: Mogen Train* earned \$21.1 million during its opening weekend in the United States. Overtaking the Chinese film *Hero* in 2004, *Demon Slayer* broke North American box office record for the biggest foreign language debut.¹ In the meantime, BTS, a seven-member South Korean boy band, whose single *Dynamite* won Top Selling Song at the 2021 Billboard Music Awards, became the first all-Korean pop act to debut at number one on the Billboard Hot 100 chart.² Such worldwide popularity of Japanese and Korean cultures has brought about a new stage of cultural globalization called “Neo-Orientalism” where “the direction of cultural influence has shifted from East to West” (Song 2020: 140). More and more East Asian cultural products, such as pop music, animation, films, TV dramas, and video games, have penetrated into Western societies and have been appreciated by many people outside Asia. At the same time, the global public opinions of Japan and South Korea have also improved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, a recent cross-national survey shows that about 90% of respondents in Southeast Asia, 77% of respondents in Europe, and 82% of respondents in Latin America positively evaluated Japan as a peace-loving nation.³ Similarly, a study conducted by the Korean Culture and Information Service finds that over 70% of foreigners held an overall positive perception of South Korea.⁴ Does the rising popularity of Japanese and Korean cultural products redound to Japan and South Korea’s international images? Does the consumption of foreign cultural products make one more pro-

¹ <https://www.polygon.com/22404379/demon-slayer-kimetsu-no-yaiba-mugen-train-box-office-funmation-aniplex-anime> (Accessed August 1, 2021).

² <https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/awards/9576885/bts-wins-top-selling-song-2021-billboard-music-awards/> (Accessed August 1, 2021).

³ <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/pr/index.html> (Accessed August 1, 2021).

⁴ <https://www.kocis.go.kr/eng/openNews/view.do?seq=1034680&page=1&pageSize=10&RN=37> (Accessed August 1, 2021).

outsider? In this dissertation, I attempt to examine the influence of exposure to foreign cultures on individual attitudes toward foreign countries.

Building upon the parasocial contact theory where indirect, mass-mediated intergroup contact reduces outgroup prejudice (Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005), I emphasize the unique impacts of *foreign-made cultural* products and put forth two kinds of cultural exposure: *group-specific* exposure to a foreign culture and *generalized* exposure to diverse foreign cultures. On the one hand, group-specific exposure centers on the culture of a specific country. Greater exposure improves information and knowledge about the target, arouses outgroup liking and affinity, facilitates empathy, perspective taking, and identification with outgroup characters in the media, and, above all, deemphasizes between-group divergences through *deategorization*, resulting in a more favorable perception of the contacted foreign nation. On the other hand, the positive effect of group-specific exposure can be generalized to other uncontacted foreign nations. Generalized exposure to foreign cultures plays a more fundamental role in *recategorization*. Specifically, it renders ingroup members more cosmopolitan by constructing a more inclusive, shared superordinate identity beyond subgroup categories, so that the narrowly defined ingroup-outgroup dichotomy is transformed and subsumed by a common “we” identity. In brief, group-specific as well as generalized cultural exposure is expected to be correlated with a pro-outsider view.

My research contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. First, I point out the importance of media content that is underexplored in extant parasocial contact research. Exposure to mass media featuring outgroup members does not necessarily make ingroup audiences hold favorable outgroup attitudes. The positive effect of media exposure on prejudice reduction is contingent upon the specific content. That is, only positive content about

outgroupers leads to positive outgroup attitudes. In contrast, viewers exposed to mostly negative media coverages and portrayals of an outgroup tend to have more stereotypical, prejudicial perceptions of the target group. For example, some empirical studies find that higher news consumptions in the United States are correlated with more unfavorable public attitudes toward Muslims, for Muslims are generally overrepresented in American news media as terrorists who are brutal and violent (Abrams, McGaughey, and Haghighat 2018; Andersen, Brinson, and Stohl 2012; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Lajevardi 2021). Hence, I concentrate on culture, a unique content of mass media. Cultural elements, especially multicultural experiences, play a critical part in promoting intergroup relations (Sparkman 2020; Sparkman and Hamer 2020; Tadmor et al. 2012). Consuming cultural products is mainly for leisure and entertainment, which avoids priming the salience of sensitive or conflictual issues like politics, diplomacy, military, and national security.

Relatedly, another underexplored scope condition in scholarship is the producer of cultural products. Because outgroup members—notably ethnic/racial minorities—are more likely to be represented in marginalized, stereotypical, and menacing ways in mainstream ingroup media, I focus particularly on foreign-made cultural products where the images of outgroup characters are less biased or stereotyped. In the American media landscape, for instance, Blacks and Latinos are depicted more as threats (e.g., criminals and illegal immigrants) to Whites. Whites with greater ingroup media consumption tend to perceive that Blacks are violent (Dixon 2008; Ramasubramanian 2013) and that Latinos have lower work ethic (Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, and Ortiz 2007), which can give rise to negative feelings like anxiety, anger, and disgust toward these outgroup minorities. Given this limitation of parasocial contact, I contend

that the cultural products consumed by ingroup members should be produced by foreign nations so as to exert an effective prejudice-reducing influence.

While identity in intergroup relations is investigated by many social psychologists at the micro level, it accounts for interstate relations and world politics at the macro level. My argument on generalized cultural exposure and recategorization thus echoes the psychological microfoundations of constructivism in international relations. From a constructivist perspective, state identity is not fixed but intersubjective and socially (re)constructed by reciprocal interactions that are always in process (Wendt 1992, 1999). In contrast to Waltz's (1979) structural realism where the "security dilemma" prevents self-interested states from mutual trust and cooperation in the anarchic self-help world, Wendt (1992, 1999) argues that the long-term process of socialization and acculturation is conducive to interstate harmony in internalizing new understandings of self and others and converting egoistic identity to collective identity. Despite contribution in formulating a systemic social theory of international politics, Wendt does not take individual-level variations into account. In fact, constructivism is not an inherently state-centric theory. "The foundation of constructivist analysis is communication between human beings" (Rousseau 2006: 210). Both the state and the international system are intersubjective social constructs, so it is necessary for constructivist scholars to "bring the people back in" (Rousseau 2006; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). As Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007: 765) put it, "it is impossible to develop a complete social theory of international politics without explaining the role of people in the process." Kertzer and McGraw (2012) propose the concept of "folk realism" where realism is considered as a generalized predisposition and examine the psychological microfoundations of realism in international relations. They find that folk realists tend to believe that foreign countries are inherently aggressive and that their country should be

prepared to use military force for any purpose. Meanwhile, the empirical analyses in my research are in support of the micro-level logic of constructivism; cultivating a shared, cosmopolitan “global-we” identity via mediated intercultural contact and multicultural experience helps to lay the mass attitudinal groundwork for cooperative interstate relations. According to Mercer (1995: 233), “by understanding that identities are created through interaction, we open the door to systemic change.” The transformation and recategorization of identities may be incremental and slow, but the generalized bias-reducing and friendship-building effect of parasocial intergroup contact across the world is promising over the long haul.

Moreover, this dissertation makes some methodological improvements. First, a rich body of experimental contact research conducted in laboratories or universities has high levels of internal validity due to the exclusion of confounding factors. Nevertheless, causal inference is likely to be reinforced at the cost of external validity. In general, intergroup contact in laboratory and field experiments is arranged to limit competition, avoid negative emotions, include counter-stereotypic group members, maintain equal status, facilitate genuine friendship formation, and/or obtain institutional sanction (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2005). These idealized contact situations are hardly typical of the mundane interactions in our ordinary lives. For example, Bagci et al. (2021) distinguish “volitional contact” that reflects one’s active and intentional choice from “contingent contact” where individuals are assigned by an experimenter to engage in a contact intervention rather than to deliberately choose a contact situation or target themselves. Based on a series of studies, Bagci et al. (2021) find that volitional contact, compared to contingent contact, is associated with more positive outgroup attitudes, which implies that traditional contact experiments may, to some extent, underrate the real-life effect of intergroup contact. Second, extant research overwhelmingly centers on individuals or groups in the West.

More than 70% contact studies in the United States, for instance, are about interracial relations between Black and White Americans (Oliver and Wong 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Despite extensive literature on ethnic, racial, religious, sexual, and partisan identities and on intergroup contact within a same country, national identity and intergroup contact between different countries are relatively underexplored. As a complement, I take citizens and countries in East Asia as examples to check and extend the scope and generalizability of the parasocial contact theory, by use of cross-national public opinion surveys. In addition to conventional regression analysis, I further employ cable TV ownership as an instrument of cultural exposure. Benefiting from this quasi-experimental approach, I can enhance my study's external validity using cross-sectional data and, simultaneously, attenuate the concern about endogeneity.

Finally, my research also provides policy implications and suggestions with regard to some real-world sociopolitical issues. First, recent years have witnessed a new wave of ethnonationalism and xenophobia around the world, such as the border wall dispute between the United States and Mexico, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), and the rise of right-wing populist parties in some European states. Worse still, the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic has considerably discouraged individuals from face-to-face communication. Under such circumstances, facilitating parasocial intercultural contact—especially the consumption of foreign movies, music, and TV programs—may be one of the effective ways to lessen outgroup derogation, promote tolerance of ethnic/racial diversity, ameliorate interstate relations, and maintain international cooperation. Second, on condition that a country attempts to boost its international image, culture—a key ingredient of “soft power”—may play a substantial role. As Hahm and Song (2021: 218) put it, “soft power can be generated from private-sector cultural products, including music, films, TV dramas, and sports, as well as

government policies or public institutions that can attract others.” The United States is a case in point. It is not merely a political, economic, and military superpower but also a cultural superpower. American cultural products and brands, like Hollywood and Disney, help to make the United States globally attractive by constructing a positive image of the nation among foreign citizens (Nye and Kim 2013). Nowadays, even people outside the West consume a variety of American-made cultural products in their daily lives. In consequence, although the power of culture seems to be subtler, its long-term influence over global public opinions may not be overlooked.

The remaining sections are organized as follows. First, drawing upon literature about social identity and the “contact hypothesis,” I summarize the social psychological foundations of ingroup bias and intergroup contact, and analyze the limitations of direct, interpersonal contact. Next, I review empirical studies on the parasocial contact theory, illustrating both the strengths and weaknesses of indirect, mass-mediated contact in prejudice reduction. In particular, I point out the importance of media content and media producer, two of which are relatively underexplored in prior research. Then, as a complement to the parasocial contact theory, I propose this study’s theoretical framework, research hypotheses, and observable implications. Specifically, I elaborate on the mechanisms and advantages of group-specific and generalized cultural exposure, respectively, in generating favorable attitudes toward foreign countries. Thereafter, I explain the operationalization of relevant variables, present the statistical models, and test the hypotheses with data from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey and the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. The dissertation ends with the conclusion and discussion of my theories and empirical findings.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review existing literature related to ingroup bias, intergroup contact, and parasocial contact.

2.1 Ingroup Bias and Intergroup Contact

Ingroup bias refers to the “tendency to favor the ingroup over the outgroup in evaluations and behavior,” which is “a remarkably omnipresent feature of intergroup relation” (Tajfel and Turner 1979: 38). Dozens of social psychological studies have substantiated this ingroup favoritism during the process of cross-group interaction (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Brewer 1979; Eller and Abrams 2003, 2004; Hamilton and Bishop 1976; Maras and Brown 1996; Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992; Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Billig 1974; Turner 1975, 1981; Wilder 1981). As Tajfel and Turner concluded (1979: 38), the “mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups—that is social categorization per se—is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the ingroup.” Given ingroup bias that stems from (perceived) between-group differentiation, prejudice and discrimination against outgroups seem to be spontaneous and prevalent (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Otten and Moskowitz 2000). In terms of interstate interaction, national identification by itself is a strong predictor of chauvinism and xenophobia (Brown, Vivian, and Hewstone 1999). In the words of Fukuyama (2014: 186), “National cohesion may express itself as external aggression.”

However, ingroup bias is not inevitable and can be assuaged by intergroup contact. According to the contact hypothesis, interpersonal contact between different groups lessens intergroup negativity, leading ingroup members to a more favorable perception of the contacted outgroup (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). To date, a great number of (quasi-)experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, and meta-analytic studies have lent empirical support to the contact

hypothesis (Ata, Bastian, and Lusher 2009; Benatov, Berger, and Tadmor 2021; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Brown et al. 2007; Bruneau et al. 2021; Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002; Knappert et al. 2021; Kotzur, Schäfer, and Wagner 2019; Kuchenbrandt et al. 2014; Mironova and Whitt 2014; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000, 2006; Shook and Fazio 2008; Thomsen and Rafiqi 2017; Wilson-Daily, Kimmelmeier, and Prats 2018; Tropp et al. 2018).⁵ In particular, intergroup contact decreases discrimination not only against ethnic/racial outgroups, but also against other groups categorized by gender, sexuality, disability, and religion (Hewstone and Swart 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). Overall, the prejudice-reducing effect of intergroup contact is statistically significant, predominantly positive, and substantively large (Paluck, Green, and Green 2019).

On the other hand, a growing work on the contact hypothesis also indicates mixed or conflicting results of intergroup contact. As suggested by Laurence, Schmid, and Hewstone (2018: 742), “underlying the overall effect of exposure on intergroup attitudes are dual, countervailing pathways of positive and negative intergroup contact.” Some scholars find that intergroup contact, under certain circumstances, engenders more prejudice and less favorable outgroup attitudes (Árnadóttir et al. 2022; Bagci and Turnuklu 2019; Barlow et al. 2012; Bekhuis, Ruiters, and Coenders 2013; Boin, Fuochi, and Voci 2020; Corenblum and Stephan 2001; Dhont and Hiel 2009; Fuochi et al. 2020; Graf and Sczesny 2019; Graf, Paolini, and Rubin 2014; Hayward et al. 2017; Kanas, Scheepers, and Sterkens 2017; Mazziotta et al. 2015; Meleady and Forder 2019; Meleady, Seger, and Vermue 2017; Nijs, Stark, and Verkuyten 2019; Stephan et al. 2000; Stephan et al. 2002; Techakesari et al. 2015; Visintin et al. 2017a; Wölfer et

⁵ The meta-analytic test in Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) includes 36 experimental, 168 quasi-experimental, and 492 cross-sectional studies with over 700 independent samples, which confirms a robust prejudice-reducing effect of direct intergroup contact.

al. 2017). For instance, based on an online survey in the five biggest cities of the Netherlands, Nijs, Stark, and Verkuyten (2019) find that negative intergroup contact with immigrants, such as hindrance caused by loitering youth, strengthens feelings of threat to both the self and the ingroup, prompting Dutch natives to vote for a radical right-wing party. Opposed to the contact hypothesis, intergroup contact sometimes does not breed friendship but evokes animosity between different nations and civilizations (Huntington 1993, 1996; Suh and Smith 2008). As Waltz (1979: 103) noted, “Nationally as internationally, contact generates conflict and at times issues in violence.” Higher degrees of cross-group contact in this increasingly interdependent era appear to aggravate discrimination and intensify ethnonationalism (Machida 2012). “Globalized we all may be but this doesn’t make us cosmopolitans” (Woodward, Skrbis, and Bean 2008: 210).

The negative effect of intergroup contact stated above is one of the shortcomings of the contact hypothesis. That is, mere contact alone is not a panacea for prejudice reduction. Feelings of anxiety and threat are seen as the gravest obstacles to positive intergroup contact (Paolini et al. 2004). Sometimes face-to-face communication is anxiety-provoking and can elicit anxiety-related affect (Dovidio et al. 2002; Greenland and Brown 1999; Plant and Butz 2006; Shelton and Richeson 2005; Stephan and Stephan 1984). In cross-group settings, direct interactions with unknown outgroup members are likely to be psychologically demanding and unpredictable, so people are prone to behave with caution, feel uncomfortable, and experience intergroup anxiety including distress, uneasiness, worry, and apprehension (Amodio 2009; Joyce, Vincze, and Marton 2016; Littleford, Wright, and Sayoc-Parial 2005; Molinsky 2007; Presbitero and Attar 2018). “Negative expectations and anxiety or fear relating to intergroup interactions often dissuade individuals from seeking contact or may even lead them to have superficial or

unpleasant experiences” (White, Maunder, and Verrelli 2020: 78). Compared with ingroup strangers, encountering and talking with outgroup strangers tends to make one experience higher levels of uncertainty and anxiety (Gudykunst 1985; Gudykunst and Shapiro 1996; Ickes 1984; Lee and Boster 1991; Word, Zanna, and Cooper 1974). According to Gudykunst (1988, 1995, 2005), high levels of uncertainty and anxiety can lead interactants to a nervous and tense encounter that is perceived to be aversive. “Individuals may experience more intergroup anxiety where there has been a history of discrimination, where the perceived differences between groups are large, or where the individual has had minimal previous contact” (Greenland and Brown 1999: 505). As a consequence, feelings of anxiousness and nervousness may undermine the positive effects of intergroup contact and consolidate negative stereotyping (Bodenhausen 1990, 1993; Bodenhausen and Wyer 1985; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Islam and Hewstone 1993; Plant and Devine 2003; Stephan 2014; Voci and Hewstone 2003; Wilder 1993; Wilder and Shapiro 1989).

Aside from anxiety, threat is another factor that accounts for the negative contact effect. According to Pettigrew and Tropp (2011), negative intergroup contact typically involves involuntary encounters where the interactants feel threatened. Empirical evidence shows that symbolic and/or realistic intergroup threats significantly mediate the relationship between negative contact experiences and negative outgroup attitudes (Aberson 2015; Corenblum and Stephan 2001; Stephan et al. 2002). When individuals feel insecure or threatened in intergroup contact, they are prone to either avoid future interactions or dismiss outgroupers’ perspectives (Shelton, Richeson, and Vorauer 2006). Workplaces are one of the most frequently mentioned places where individuals experience negative intergroup contact, like being verbally insulted/threatened by an outgroup member (Schäfer et al. 2021). Contact in workplaces is likely

to be competitive, challenging, or involuntary, and may involve explicit/implicit status differentials. In general, employees are compelled into negative workplace exposure since they cannot freely choose their customers, coworkers, or employers. Even though people dislike some relational partners, they may have to physically maintain such involuntary relationships. On the other hand, to attenuate the discomfort, people are inclined to mentally withdraw from the contact and intentionally create a sense of separation between self and other (Hess 2000). Hess (2000) finds that individuals tend to express detachment, reduce involvement, and consolidate psychological distance in involuntary encounters with disliked partners. It is plausible that contact, perceived to be threatening, does not advance but undermine intergroup relations. As evidenced by Laurence, Schmid, and Hewstone (2018), low-enjoyment workplace contact is a significant mediator linking workplace diversity and negative intergroup attitudes.

Another drawback of direct intergroup contact is the high cost and requirement. Linking groups that are geographically distant requires job flexibility and financial resources, which can be expensive (Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna 2006). Besides, there are language barriers to cross-group communication (Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna 2006; Spencer-Rodgers and McGovern 2002). The language proficiency of outgroup members considerably affects their interpersonal exchanges with ingroup members (Wang et al. 2017). For example, Kim and Harwood (2020) find that American students are more likely to talk with international students with high English proficiency than those with low English proficiency. In addition to material costs, linguistic differences are regarded as nonmaterial “cultural contraction costs” (Newman, Hartman, and Taber 2014). By and large, frequently going abroad and directly interacting with a foreigner are inconvenient and costly for ordinary citizens given various travel expenses and a

good command of at least one foreign language. For many ingroup members, the opportunities to engage in face-to-face communication with outgroup members and foreigners are limited.

2.2 Parasocial Intergroup Contact: Mediated While Meaningful

Parasocial contact is an indirect, mass-mediated form of contact. It describes a seemingly face-to-face contact with a media personality where some kind of pseudo interaction occurs within the mind of the audience (Honeycutt 2003; Horton and Wohl 1956). Differing from direct, interpersonal contact, parasocial contact with the media personality is unidirectional, one-sided, imbalanced, and imaged by the audience (Cohen 2014). “Audiences may interact and associate with characters, but the reverse is rarely true” (Bond 2021: 575). For lack of reciprocity and mutuality between interactants, social psychologists seldom take parasocial contact into consideration when examining the contact hypothesis (Lemmer and Wagner 2015; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008; Zhou et al. 2019). For example, Lemmer and Wagner (2015: 153) do not consider parasocial contact to be intergroup contact in that “it does not refer to bidirectional intergroup interactions but to media-based presentations of outgroup members.” Likewise, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008: 754) claim that intergroup contact must involve “actual face-to-face interaction between members of clearly defined groups.” Nonetheless, media and communication scholars maintain that parasocial contact can play a role as meaningful as face-to-face contact (Bond 2021; Cohen 2014; Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005, 2006).⁶ Although there are no real social relationships, audiences are able to establish parasocial—as-if social—relationships with media characters, predicated upon imagination (Cohen 2014). As Cohen (2014: 142) puts it, “Regardless of how fictional or real these people or characters may be, our relationships with them are meaningful to us and in that sense they are very real, even if they are mediated.”

⁶ See Banas, Bessarabova, and Massey (2020) for a meta-analysis on mediated contact including parasocial contact.

To be specific, viewers are likely to develop socioemotional bonds and close relationships with the characters, fictional or real, that they learn from the media (e.g., sports figures, newscasters, fictional characters, and cartoon characters) (Horton and Wohl 1956). Human brains process media experiences in almost the same way as they process in-person ones. Regardless of an indirect, mediated or direct, interpersonal context, people's physiological and psychological reactions depend on the common "communication-related cognitive processes" (Giles and Maltby 2004; Kanazawa 2002; Perse and Rubin 1989). As Perse and Rubin (1989: 59) note, "people and media are coequal communication alternatives that satisfy similar communication needs and provide similar gratifications." "When we experience a televised character, we form impressions, make judgments about their personality, and develop beliefs about them" (Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005: 96). In spite of a seemingly one-way interaction, viewers may identify media characters as friends or idols and perceive that they were experiencing real-world communication (Gardner, Pickett, and Knowles 2005; Giles 2002; Rubin, Perse, and Powell 1985). Frequent parasocial exposure enables viewers to develop a sense of emotional or mental association with media characters and get attached to their favorite personalities. In other words, parasocial contact creates a sense of belonging, affective disposition, or social connection through which viewers feel psychologically engaging and meaningful even though no reciprocity, interactivity, or mutuality actually exists. Empirical evidence reflects that parasocial contact, such as listening to music, reading literary fictions, and watching TV programs, improves a sense of belonging (Derrick, Gabriel, and Hugenberg 2009; Gabriel and Young 2011; Greenwood and Long 2009; Schäfer and Eerola 2020). According to Koenig and Lessan (1985), individuals evaluate TV personalities and their friends/neighbors in a functionally equivalent manner. Eyal and Dailey (2012) find that people's parasocial

relationships with mediated personalities and their real-life relationships (e.g., friendships) are similar in terms of relational maintenance. In this sense, there are minimal differences between media exposure and face-to-face interaction (Reeves and Nass 1996; Worth and Gross 1974).

Akin to direct intergroup contact, indirect parasocial contact is supposed to decrease prejudice and discrimination against outgroups too. On the basis of the contact hypothesis in social psychology, Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes (2005, 2006) argue that parasocial contact via mass media can lead ingroup viewers to more favorable attitudes toward outgroup characters, namely, the parasocial contact theory. Importantly, parasocial contact, to a large extent, overcomes the shortcoming of face-to-face contact because its media-based feature avoids inducing intergroup anxiety and threat. People feel less anxious, nervous and more comfortable, secure in their familiar surroundings like homes as they have more control over the contact process (Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna 2006; Walther 2009). Media-based contact offers a less intrusive and anxiety-ridden approach to intergroup communication than in-person contact. “Most mediated contact occurs at a time and place where people feel relaxed and in control. The perceived risk involved in the contact can also be lower because, in the worst case, people can simply stop using the media if they become uncomfortable with the mediated intergroup contact.” (Park 2012: 150). Meanwhile, parasocial contact is not circumscribed by physical distances or linguistic differences. In a media-rich environment, individuals have more opportunities to learn about foreign cultures. Watching foreign movies online or in local cinemas with subtitles or dubbing, for example, is more convenient and less expensive than traveling to a foreign country. In this regard, mass media play a much greater part in facilitating intergroup communication and mutual understanding (Bowman and Foster 2006; Charles 2003; Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). As suggested by Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes (2005: 95), “Few people have

direct contact with the President of the United States, but virtually everyone in the world has strong opinions about the person holding that office.”

A large body of research has lent credence to the parasocial contact theory (Alrababa’h et al. 2021; Bond 2021; Bond and Compton 2015; Cameron and Rutland 2006; Cameron, Rutland, and Brown 2007; Cao and Meng 2020; Castelli, De Dea, and Nesdale 2008; Lissitsa and Kushnirovich 2020; McLaughlin and Rodriguez 2017; Ramasubramanian 2015; Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005, 2006; Schwab and Greitemeyer 2015; Sink and Mastro 2018; Tukachinsky, Mastro, and Yarchi 2015; Wojcieszak and Azrout 2016; Yoo, Jo, and Jung 2014). For example, Cao and Meng (2020) find that mediated contact through TV dramas and films made ingroup viewers have better knowledge about outgroups and global affairs. Analogously, Schwab and Greitemeyer (2015) find that repeated exposure to foreign cultures on Facebook enabled Facebook users to learn about cultural outgroups and thus foster positive outgroup attitudes. According to Shim, Zhang, and Harwood (2012), frequent exposure to American dramas made Korean participants’ feel that the characters were more attractive and like real persons. Such parasocial contact with American drama characters further led Koreans to more favorable attitudes toward Americans. In a longitudinal experiment where heterosexual participants were exposed to a TV series about a group of gay young adults over ten weeks, Bond (2021) find a significant parasocial contact effect on prejudice reduction. Participants in the treatment group developed increasingly stronger parasocial relationships with gay characters over time and reported lower sexual prejudice toward gays than those in the control group.

On the other hand, however, the scope conditions of the parasocial contact theory are relatively underspecified in the existing literature. I argue that media *content* and media *producer* are two crucial yet underexplored factors which can condition the effect of parasocial contact on

intergroup relations. First of all, the prejudice-reducing effect of mass media exposure is dependent upon the specific content, that is, only positive content about outgroups leads ingroup audiences to favorable outgroup attitudes (Mutz and Goldman 2010). Contrarily, viewers exposed to mostly negative media coverages of an outgroup tend to have prejudicial perceptions of the target group (Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016; Atwell Seate et al. 2018; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Dixon 2006, 2008; Fujioka 1999; Gattino and Tartaglia 2015; Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, and Ortiz 2007; Meeusen and Jacobs 2017; Schemer 2014; Schlueter and Davidov 2013; Van der Linden and Jacobs 2017). Most of the extant research focuses on network and cable news biased toward negative reports like political scandals, socioeconomic problems, and intergroup tensions, where outgroup images are hardly positive (Byng 2008; Dixon and Williams 2015; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Jackson 2010). For instance, negative depictions of Muslims (overrepresented as terrorists) in news media are prevalent in Britain (Greenberg and Miazhevich 2012; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2010; Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008; Morey and Yaqin 2011; Poole 2002; Poole and Richardson 2006; Richardson 2004; Saeed 2007). Compared to Jews, Christians, and other ethnoreligious groups in British society, Muslims are systematically depicted more negatively in press headlines (Bleich et al. 2015). Experimental studies reveal that exposure to news portraying Muslims as terrorists can push participants to perceive Muslims as aggressive and to support policies restricting their civil rights (Saleem et al. 2017). Similarly, content analysis shows that North Africans, Eastern Europeans, and Roma in Belgium are commonly depicted in criminal threat frames and as causes of socioeconomic problems on primetime TV news (Meeusen and Jacobs 2017). Outgroups negatively portrayed, problematized, and linked with threat frames in the news are evaluated unfavorably by local citizens (Meeusen and Jacobs 2017).

Relatedly, the type of media producer (ingroup versus outgroup producer) is another underexplored factor that conditions ingroup viewers' opinions of outgroups on screen. Outgroup members in general and racial/ethnic minorities in particular tend to be negatively and stereotypically portrayed in mainstream ingroup media. As Meeusen and Jacobs state (2017: 232), "Positive news is scarce, negative news is dominant, and especially ethnic minorities are depicted in a negative way." For example, Latinas in American TV shows, serial dramas, and films are consistently found to be one of the most sexualized ethnic minorities (Mastro and Sink 2017; Tukachinsky, Mastro, and Yarchi 2015). According to Figueroa-Caballero, Mastro, and Stamps (2019: 273), "the portrayal of Latinas as sex objects may even be the predominant stereotype of Latinos in the media today." Empirical evidence exhibits that exposure to media stereotypes of Latinos is correlated with unfavorable judgments among Whites toward Latinos (Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, and Ortiz 2007; Mastro and Kopacz 2006; Tukachinsky, Mastro, and Yarchi 2015). Other outgroups often negatively reported in Western media are refugees and immigrants. In recent years, refugees and immigrants have been selectively portrayed in a negative light as spreaders of infectious diseases, terrorists, scroungers, perpetrators, and/or criminals in the West (Benson 2013; Blinder and Allen 2016; Blinder and Jeannet 2018; Eberl et al. 2018; Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018; Gabrielatos and Baker 2008; Jacobs 2017; KhosraviNik 2010; Schemer and Müller 2017). As a result, viewers exposed to these negative portrayals on screen are more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes toward refugees and immigrants (Esses, Medianu, and Lawson 2013; Gattino and Tartaglia 2015; Ju et al. 2016; Pagotto and Voci 2013; Schemer 2012; Schemer and Meltzer 2020; Schemer and Müller 2017; Saleem, Yang, and Ramasubramanian 2016; Seate and Mastro 2017; van Klingereren et al. 2015; Visintin et al. 2017b). Seate and Mastro (2017) find that exposure to a threatening immigration news story

significantly increases US citizens' contempt-related emotions and their support for discriminatory policies.

In the words of Mutz and Goldman (2010: 253), “scholars have been satisfied with merely demonstrating effects, and offering convenient theoretical frameworks to explain them.” Regarding mass media's impact on intergroup relations, there is much room for theory building and development. Scholarly attention should be directed more toward the underlying process to specify the connection between media portrayals of outgroups and the attitudes held by ingroup viewers. Lastly, concerning the empirical research on parasocial contact's prejudice-reducing effect, external validity is not as sufficient as internal validity. Analogous to the shortcoming in face-to-face contact where about one-third of the meta-analytic research was conducted in educational settings using convenience samples like college students (Paluck and Green 2009), most of the existing studies are laboratory and field experiments atypical of the mundane interactions in our ordinary lives. For example, participants in experiments are required to watch TV programs that they may not choose to view in real-world settings (Mutz and Goldman 2010). Besides, the researched ingroup and outgroup are generally two racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual subgroups in a same country (particularly in a Western country), whereas the intergroup relations based on different (non-Western) countries and nationalities are underexamined. While correlational studies are subject to omitted variable and reverse causation, experimental studies characterized by restricted contact situations and participants are potentially short of generalizability and policy implications.

3 EFFECT OF EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN-MADE CULTURAL PRODUCTS

In response to the deficiencies of extant contact research, I point out the importance of media content and media producer. For parasocial contact to have an effective prejudice-reducing effect, I argue that (1) culture should be the main content, and that (2) the cultural products should be produced by foreign nations. Simply put, exposure to *foreign-made cultural* products is expected to make ingroup members more pro-outsider. Moreover, I propose two kinds of exposure to foreign cultures—group-specific exposure and generalized exposure—that affect one’s opinion of foreign countries through two different mechanisms—decategorization and recategorization.

With respect to media content, I emphasize the prominence of culture in propelling positive parasocial contact. When commenting upon present contact scholarship and future research directions, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011: 88) state, “A major possibility involves the learning of specifically cultural information, beyond mere general information, as a means to improve intergroup attitudes.” By comparison to sensitive and conflictual topics like politics, culture appears to be more neutral and less threatening in interpersonal communication. Culture is a “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973: 89). Given such features of culture, Nye (1990) points out the significance of “soft power” in interstate interactions. Unlike hard power growing out of a state’s military, political, or economic capability, soft power arises, in large part, from the attractiveness and popularity of the state’s culture, without coercion or force (Nye 1990, 2004). The odds are that cultural exchanges between different states may mitigate hostility and distrust prevalent in the fields of politics, diplomacy, and military. Through

principal component factor analysis, Stephan and Stephan (1992) find two distinct dimensions regarding intergroup contact. Further regression analysis displays that only contact at cultural events, such as movies, parties, and outings, decreases intergroup negativity. On the contrary, the noncultural contact is viewed as threatening and is associated with increased suspicion and anxiety. Considering mass media in China, news media mostly portrays Japan and the United States as potential threats to China (Brady 2012; Shirk 2011; Stockmann 2011). Based on a Chinese public opinion survey, Sinkkonen and Elovainio (2020) find that individuals with greater media consumption tend to have more perceived threats from Japan and the United States. On the other hand, although many Chinese citizens dislike American foreign policies toward China, they evaluate American cultural products like TV programs and movies positively (Shi, Lu, and Aldrich 2011). More importantly, active participation in intercultural activities is correlated with reduced intergroup bias (Brannon and Walton 2013). Empirical studies indicate that cultural exchanges between Israeli and Palestinian students conduce to mutual understandings (Mollov and Lavie 2001), while discussing issues with political concerns exacerbates intergroup hostility (Ellis and Maoz 2007; Maoz and Ellis 2001, 2008). Accordingly, in contrast to political news featuring intergroup competition, culture-focused TV programs, reality dating programs, entertainment shows, and variety shows are more likely to make viewers experience positive parasocial contact.

Apart from media content, I argue that media producer is an equally important, albeit understudied, factor in parasocial contact. Since outgroup members are often negatively and stereotypically portrayed in mainstream ingroup media, consuming ingroup cultural products may not alleviate intergroup negativity but aggravate cultural chauvinism and ingroup superiority. The image of Japan in Chinese media is a case in point. Despite strict censorship and

propaganda, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television in China is relatively tolerant of anti-Japanese films and TV series. As Sinkkonen and Elovainio (2020: 271) put it, “Negative content on Japan and the Japanese are ubiquitous in Chinese TV dramas.” The televisual representations of foreigners tend to underscore Chinese nationalism—taking pride in being Chinese in transnational relations (Song 2015). The biased representation of Western women is another example. According to Johansson (1999: 382), “The Western female body is made into a stereotype of strength, sexuality, and promiscuity that can be consumed and cannibalized without any fear of losing belief in the traditional virtues of Chinese women. The White female is constructed as the Occident other in a clean-cut dichotomy of West and East.”

For parasocial contact to have an effective prejudice-reducing effect, I thereby suggest that the cultural products consumed by ingroup members should be made by foreign nations. Outgroup members and foreigners in foreign-made cultural products, vis-à-vis those in local/national cultural products, tend to have a less biased, stereotyped image. In other words, what matters is not just culture but *multicultural* experiences. Multicultural experiences of contact include not only personal experiences of face-to-face contact but also non-interpersonal, indirect exposure to foreign cultures via multimedia presentations like music and videos (Leung et al. 2008; Sparkman 2020; Sparkman, Eidelman, and Blanchar 2016; Tadmor et al. 2012). Empirical evidence shows that experience with multicultural elements, relative to in-person contact with outgroupers, is a stronger predictor of prejudice reduction (Sparkman and Eidelman 2018; Sparkman, Eidelman, and Blanchar 2016; Sparkman and Hamer 2020). Additionally, consuming foreign cultural products (e.g., TV dramas, movies, pop music, and video games) is primarily for leisure and entertainment, which avoids priming the salience of conflictual interstate relations. Take, for instance, the region-wide popularity of Japanese cultural products in East Asia. Many

citizens in China, South Korea, and Southeast Asia are highly critical and politicized when evaluating Japan in terms of wartime history, sovereignty disputes, and state-to-state politics. “Nevertheless, when it comes to popular culture, they seem willing to circumvent government censors, reject official interpretations provided by the state, and set aside resentments and suspicions” (Otmazgin 2013: 181).

3.1 Group-Specific Exposure to a Foreign Culture and Decategorization

Group-specific exposure means that the target of parasocial contact is a specific outgroup. Correspondingly, an ingroup member’s opinion is based on the indirectly contacted outgroup in media. I argue that the underlying function of group-specific cultural exposure lies in the deemphasis on group-based categorical dissimilarities as well as the concentration on individual-based parasocial relationships, namely, decategorization (Brewer and Miller 1984; Wilder 1978, 1986). In more detail, group-specific cultural exposure provides information and knowledge, which renders ingroup members more familiar with the outgroup and lessens negative stereotyping. Given growing familiarity with a foreign culture, individuals also tend to express more outgroup liking and affinity, contributing to intimate parasocial relationships. Long-time cultural exposure and parasocial contact via mass media can further cultivate empathy, perspective taking, and identification with outgroup characters, so that intergroup boundaries are blurred, mixed, and even replaced with more meaningful ties at the individual level.

To begin with, prejudice toward outgroup members and foreigners is largely a result of ignorance (Davidson and Thomson 1980; Stephan and Stephan 1984). “When ingroup members know very little about the outgroup, they are likely to perceive the outgroup as threatening. They will think that the other group is dissimilar to them and that its members dislike them. There is a

fear of the unknown, a fear of the unfamiliar. If fear is the father of prejudice, ignorance is its grandfather” (Stephan and Stephan 2000: 38). Devoid of information and knowledge about outgroups, ingroup members will “easily exaggerate the degree of difference between groups, and readily misunderstand the grounds for it” (Allport 1954: 19). Worse yet, the informational void caused by ignorance of outgroups often motivates ingroup members to negative stereotyping (Stephan and Stephan 1984). Following this chain of reasoning, greater exposure to a foreign culture, which provides outgroup information for ingroup members, is supposed to preclude negative outgroup stereotypes and improve intergroup relations incrementally. “With each new cultural experience, people become exposed to more information—including behaviors, values, and norms—that is distinct from, inconsistent with, and even contradictory to their internalized representations of the related cultural group” (Tadmor et al. 2012). Over time, the accumulated new information helps ingroupers revise their extant knowledge structures, so they are less prone to rely on negative stereotypes when evaluating the contacted outgroup. Some studies have shown that more familiarity with an outgroup is associated with a more positive evaluation by ingroup members (Kawakami et al. 2000; Linley, Reilly, and Goldsmith 2012; McClelland and Linnander 2006; Nesdale and Todd 2000; Page, Rabinovich, and Tully 2008). In the United States, partisans, who deem media associated with the other party to be biased, are usually unfamiliar with the content from out-party media and view them in a negative light (Kaye and Johnson 2016). However, online partisan media, for the purpose of a large audience, contain substantial amounts of nonpolitical and neutral coverage (Budak, Goel, and Rao 2016; Munger 2020). Through survey experimental designs, Peterson and Kagalwala (2021) find that cross-cutting exposure to out-party media, notably with nonpolitical coverage and neutral political coverage, can reduce oppositional media hostility by conveying more accurate outgroup

information that challenges negative stereotypes. Analogously, Ahler and Sood (2018) find that participants, when faced with correct information about the partisan outgroup, tend to hold less partisan animus and feel less socially distant from these outgroup members. Increased accurate information helps partisans reduce misperceptions and alleviate hostility toward the opposing party. It can be expected that, with the cumulation of knowledge through exposure to a foreign culture, individuals will be less likely to hold a prejudiced, stereotyped image of the contacted foreign country.

Growing knowledge of the outgroup promotes perceived intergroup similarity and attraction as well (Pettigrew 1971; Stephan and Stephan 1984). That is, group-specific exposure to a foreign culture boosts one's affinity and liking for the targeted foreign nation. Such a positive effect is called the "mere exposure effect" where repeated exposure to a stimulus (e.g., image, mark, and voice) makes one unconsciously shape a unique preference for the stimulus (Zajonc 1968). This phenomenon reveals a general tendency that individuals prefer familiar to unfamiliar beings, objects, and surroundings. Dozens of empirical studies have substantiated this positive exposure effect (Abakoumkin 2011, 2018; Bornstein 1989; Grimes 2008; Harmon-Jones and Allen 2001; Lee 2001; Montoya et al. 2017; Moreland and Beach 1992; Olivola and Todorov 2010; Verrier 2012). As Gundelach (2014: 128) puts it, "the presence and visibility of people from different cultural backgrounds in the media, art and public institutions should lead gradually to familiarity with the unknown other, developing trust toward outgroups over time." In this logic, an ingroup member who frequently consumes an outgroup's media product will develop a likable affective disposition and emotional attachment to the outgroup characters on screen. Perhaps one of the strongest forms of liking and affinity is fandom where fans are fully enthralled by and attached to their favored celebrities (Cohen 2001). Fandom or celebrity

worship is the intense devotional feelings that audiences have toward stars and idols like singers, athletes, and cartoon characters who are regarded as not just friends but soulmates and even gods (Brown 2015; Maltby et al. 2005). When an ingroup member becomes a fan of an outgroup celebrity, it is plausible that the salience of fannish identity mitigates that of ingroup identity, which in turn lessens ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice. The effect of Mohamed Salah, a Muslim elite soccer player, on reduced Islamophobia among his fans in the United Kingdom is a case in point. Alrababa'h et al. (2021) find that after Salah joined Liverpool F.C., local hate crimes considerably dropped and Liverpool F.C. soccer fans were less likely to post anti-Muslim tweets. Despite the mainstream Islamophobia in British culture, Salah's UK fans expressed much warmer feelings toward Muslims, confirming the prejudice-reducing effect of exposure to outgroup celebrities.

What is more, regular intercultural contact “enables one to empathize with and take the perspective of the outgroup” (Pettigrew et al. 2007: 413). Scores of studies have confirmed that empathy or perspective taking is a significant mediator linking intergroup contact to prejudice reduction (Brown and Hewstone 2005; Cehajic, Brown, and Castano 2008; Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Harwood et al. 2005; Mallett et al. 2008; Pagotto, Voci, and Maculan 2010; Swart et al. 2011; Turner, Hewstone, and Voci 2007; Turner et al. 2013; Vescio, Sechrist, and Paolucci 2003; Visintin et al. 2017b). Empathy or perspective taking is a core element of entertainment media enjoyment (Zillmann 1995), based on one's affective disposition and emotional connection with a media character (Chuang and Lee 2013). Viewers, absorbed by a film or TV drama, are prompted to empathize with the character, take on the character's perspective, and feel themselves to be personally, emotionally involved. Therefore, media-based parasocial contact is expected to induce empathy and perspective taking of ingroup audiences

toward outgroup characters. Empirical evidence indicates that parasocial contact via TV series and films enhances empathy for outgroup members, which in turn reduces outgroup prejudice (Visintin et al. 2017b). With the lapse of time, empathy and perspective taking based on greater media exposure can further bring about viewers' identification with their favored characters where they feel close to and enter these characters' lives vicariously (Brown 2015; Cohen 2001; Hoffner 1996). Audience members, deeply absorbed in the plot when watching a TV drama or reading a novel, are prone to identify with the characters portrayed. Unlike spectatorship, a more psychologically distanced model of reception, identification is "a mechanism through which audience members experience reception and interpretation of the text from the inside, as if the events were happening to them" (Cohen 2001: 245). In the words of Morley (1992: 209), "One can hardly imagine any television text having any effect whatever without that identification." In this case, the viewer imagine himself/herself as the character, experience the character's feelings and emotions, internalize the character's points of view, understand the meaning of the character's words and actions, adopt the character's perspective, and replace his/her personal identity with that of the character. A higher level of identification is characterized by a gradual loss of self-awareness and more emotional and cognitive connections with the character (Cohen 2001). In short, the process of empathy, perspective taking, and identification is a psychological, emotional, and cognitive merging, beyond mere familiarity, affinity, liking, or other affective dispositions. Given that an ingroup member empathizes and identifies with an outgroup media character, intergroup relationships at the national level will be blurred and mixed with a parasocial relationship at the individual level. Under this situation, personal identification with the contacted outgroup member and perceived commonalities are likely to predominate over ingroup identification and between-group divergences.

On the whole, information and knowledge, liking and affinity, and empathy and identification, resulting from group-specific exposure to a foreign culture, all redound to decategorization where the salience of ingroup-outgroup category-based distinctions declines and ingroupers see outgroupers as individuals, not in a stereotypical, homogeneous way. (Brewer and Miller 1984; Wilder 1978, 1986).⁷ Following this logic, the positive effect of intergroup contact consists in that ingroupers focus more on the personal attributes of outgroupers and that they develop more personalized perceptions of the contacted outgroup (Fiske and Neuberg 1989; Islam and Hewstone 1993; Miller 2002). Put another way, personalized contact facilitates an individuated pattern of information updating and processing, which is beneficial to the reduction of outgroup stereotypes. When ingroup members learn stereotype-inconsistent information about outgroup members, they will diminish reliance on stereotyped impressions and group-based identification for evaluating and classifying outgroups. As noted by Wilder (1986: 318), “Dissimilar behavior among outgroup members and information emphasizing personal idiosyncrasies may decrease the utility of the outgroup category.” In a similar vein, I argue that decategorization plays a vital part in media-based parasocial contact. As the regular consumption of a foreign-made cultural product engenders familiarity, affinity, empathy, and identification with the contacted outgroupers at the individual level, ingroupers will be discouraged from exclusive categorizing and negative stereotyping at the national level. Since ingroup bias originates from the perception of otherness and divergence between groups, decategorization via parasocial contact can dampen the significance of us-versus-them intergroup dichotomization and render ingroup members more pro-outsider. To summarize, I hypothesize the effect of group-specific cultural exposure as follows:

⁷ Empirical studies demonstrating that decategorization improves outgroup attitudes include Bettencourt et al. (1992), Brewer, Weber, and Carini (1995), Marcus-Newhall et al. (1993), and Miller, Brewer, and Edwards (1985).

Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, individuals with greater group-specific exposure to a foreign culture are more likely to hold a favorable opinion of the contacted foreign country.

3.2 Generalized Exposure to Foreign Cultures and Recategorization

Except for the aforementioned group-specific exposure, I argue that there exists a generalized exposure as well, through which one's world outlook becomes less parochial and more cosmopolitan. Generalized exposure does not concentrate on one specific foreign culture but, in principle, covers all foreign cultures, which can make an individual more open-minded and tolerant of diversity and foreign others. Under the circumstances of generalized exposure, one's opinion of a foreign country need not directly correspond to that country's cultural products. For instance, an ingroup member, who often watches TV dramas produced by outgroups A, B, and C, has positive attitudes toward outgroups D, E, and F. In particular, the prejudice-reducing effect of generalized cultural exposure lies not in decategorization but in recategorization where the ingroup (us) and outgroup (them) are subsumed into an inclusive superordinate category (we) (Gaertner et al. 1989; Gaertner et al. 2000). Given a shared superordinate identity via generalized cultural exposure, individuals are inclined to a more cosmopolitan perspective and a more favorable opinion of outgroups and foreign countries, contacted or not.

When individuals consume a wide variety of foreign-made cultural products in their daily lives, the prejudice-reducing effect of group-specific exposure may spill over to other noncontacted countries. The expanding breadth and depth of intercultural contact will bring about a "secondary transfer effect" where positive contact ameliorates an ingrouper's attitude not merely toward the encountered (primary) outgroup but also toward other (secondary) outgroups not involved in the encounter (Pettigrew 2009; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). A wealth of empirical

research has substantiated the secondary transfer effect (Brylka, Jasinskaja-Lahti, and Mahonen 2016; Eller and Abrams 2004; Harwood et al. 2011; Hindriks, Verkuyten, and Coenders 2014; Lindsay 2021; Mähönen and Jasinskaja-Lathi 2016; Schmid et al. 2012; Schmid, Hewstone, and Tausch 2014; Shook, Hopkins, and Koech 2016; Sparkman 2020; Tausch et al. 2010; Van Laar et al. 2005; Vezzali et al. 2018; Vezzali and Giovannini 2012). For example, Schmid et al. (2012) find that contact with immigrants (primary outgroup) made host national individuals in Europe not only less prejudiced toward immigrants but also more favorable toward Jews and homosexual people (secondary outgroups). Similarly, contact with immigrants (primary outgroup) led local high school students in Italy to more positive perceptions of immigrants as well as less social distance toward disabled and homosexual people (secondary outgroups) (Vezzali and Giovannini 2012). Using data from the American National Election Study, Lindsay (2021) finds that contact with a member of the LGBT community is correlated with warmer feelings toward Muslims, undocumented immigrants, as well as racial minorities like Latinos and Asian Americans, which implies the transferability of outgroup contact. Accordingly, the influence of generalized exposure is predicated upon but beyond that of group-specific exposure.

In light of the secondary transfer effect, I propose that exposure to diverse foreign cultures (not a specific foreign culture) leads ingroup members to recategorization and a more generalized reduction of negative outgroup attitudes. In intergroup contact, advancing intergroup relations by recategorization—the construction of a more inclusive superordinate identity shared by subgroups—is summarized as the “common ingroup identity model” (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). “With common ingroup identity, the cognitive and motivational processes that initially produced ingroup favoritism are redirected to benefit the common ingroup, including former outgroup members” (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami 2003: 11). In

this way, the forces of categorization are “redirected toward the reduction, if not the elimination, of intergroup bias” (Dovidio et al. 2005: 247). Across a range of studies on the contact hypothesis, there is consistent evidence showing that the level of ingroup bias can be lowered by recategorizing a common circle of inclusion (Abu-Rayya 2017; Andrighetto et al. 2012; Cameron et al. 2011; Capozza et al. 2010; Dovidio et al. 1995; Dovidio et al. 1997; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic 1998; Dovidio et al. 2001; Eller and Abrams 2003; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Gaertner et al. 1989; Gaertner et al. 1990; Gaertner et al., 1994; Gaertner et al., 1999; Gaunt 2009; Lemay Jr. and Ryan 2021; Levine et al. 2005; Maunder, White, and Verrelli 2019; Nier et al. 2001; Sparkman and Hamer 2020; Stathi and Crisp 2010; West et al. 2009; White et al. 2019; White et al. 2019; Wohl and Branscombe 2005). For instance, in situations of intergroup contact, priming a common university identity can promote Black and White students’ interracial attitudes (Riek et al. 2010), and highlighting a united American identity over a partisan identity can lessen partisan conflict between Republicans and Democrats (Levendusky 2018). The longitudinal fieldwork experiment conducted by White and Abu-Rayya (2012) encourages Australian Christian and Muslim students to consider, discuss, and collaborate in helping establish an environmentally sustainable future for Australia. The superordinate identity is an environmentalist Australian, while the subgroup identity is two distinct religions. Such an experimental longitudinal design significantly contributes to intergroup bias reduction and long-run intergroup harmony. Analogously, Robinson (2016) finds that experimentally increasing the salience of a common national identity by use of the Malawian national flag can reduce barriers to interethnic trust in Malawi, especially among weak national identifiers who otherwise tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. That is, the national identity prime prompts Malawian citizens to base their trust on conationality instead of coethnicity. Using an online survey

experiment in Tanzania and Kenya, Rosenzweig and Zhou (2021) find that emphasizing a pan-African identity improves natives' perceptions of refugee diversity and their support for government resource allocation designed to help refugee children coming from nearby African countries. According to Garcia-Retamero, Müller, and Rousseau's experimental study (2012), Spanish participants, who believe that Russia is becoming more like the European Union in expanding market economy and freedom of expression (i.e., a shared EU identity), are less likely to see Russia as a threat and are more willing to increase trade with that country. More importantly, framing Russia as an ingroup member heightens support for bilateral trade even when Russia gains more than Spain economically (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007).

Although both result in a pro-outsider view, the logic of recategorization (via generalized exposure) and that of decategorization (via group-specific exposure) are not the same. Recategorization differs from decategorization in that the former does not deemphasize the salience of group-level characteristics and between-group differences as the latter; neither does it motivate one to forsake the subgroup identity. In fact, both ingroup and outgroup members can retain the salience of their subgroup identities within the superordinate identity. Intergroup differentiation and superordinate identity, if simultaneously maintained (i.e., a dual identity), will tremendously enhance the bias-reducing effect of contact (Dovidio et al. 1998; Gaertner et al. 1994, 1999; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000, 2005). Put differently, in lieu of dissolving extant group boundaries (i.e., assimilation), sustaining mutual distinctiveness while pursuing commonness in the contact situation (i.e., integration) is expected to generalize and heighten the positive contact effect (Brown and Hewstone 2005; Hewstone and Brown 1986; Vivian et al. 1997). Perhaps the most inclusive identity is a "global-we" identity where individuals feel close to human beings throughout the world, hold senses of belonging to a common "human family," and look upon all

humans to be ingroup members. This supranational identity is also called “identification with all humanity” (McFarland, Webb, and Brown 2012), “global human identification” (McFarland et al. 2019), or “global citizenship identification” (Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013). A series of empirical studies have confirmed the positive correlation between intercultural contact and the global-we identity (Römpke, Fritsche, and Reese 2019; Sparkman and Eidelman 2018; Sparkman and Hamer 2020). For instance, Sparkman and Hamer (2020) find that more multicultural experiences generate positive intergroup attitudes in part via stronger identification with an all-encompassing humanity. The Green Circle Elementary School Anti-Bias Education Program, run by the National Conference of Community and Justice of Northern Delaware, is another example demonstrating the effectiveness of the global-we identity (Gaertner and Dovidio 2005; Houlette et al. 2004). The Program distills the idea of common humanity and inspires children to expand their circle of inclusion beyond various group boundaries. As anticipated by researchers, the program participants are, on average, more willing to play and make friends with other children of different race, ethnicity, or sex.

In this increasingly globalized era, I expect recategorization to be embodied by the transformation from a localistic worldview (us versus them) to a cosmopolitan worldview (global we). Locals are inward-oriented and liable to ingroup bias, which is closely connected with ethnocentrism. According to Roudometof (2005: 122), ethnocentrism is “a quality that should be conceptually linked to locals, who are expected to adopt the viewpoint of unconditional support for one’s country, putting one’s country first and protecting national interest irrespective of whether their own position is morally superior or not.” People who are ethnocentric tend to see ingroups as virtuous and superior while outgroups as immoral and inferior, see selves as strong while foreign others as weak, and see own standards of value as universal and intrinsically true

while downgrading alternative values (LeVine and Campbell 1972). Conversely, cosmopolitanism “entails an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity” (Held 1996: 103). Echoing the global-we identity, a cosmopolitan perspective “captures the part of an individual’s self that transcends national boundaries and is tied to the international community as a whole” (Bayram 2017b: S138). Generally, cosmopolitans “share an open and tolerant worldview that is not bound by national categories but is based on an awareness of our increasing economic, political, and cultural interconnectedness, which they perceive as enriching rather than threatening” (Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008: 5). Since their inclusive global-we identity opposes the negative us-versus-them categorization, cosmopolitans “see humanity as their moral community and subscribe to the idea of moral obligations owed to all human beings” (Bayram 2019: 760). In international relations, cosmopolitans, embracing a common supranational identity, are more likely to advocate interstate cooperation and peaceful world order. From a constructivist point of view, it is identity that fundamentally accounts for national interests, state behavior, and world politics (Wendt 1992, 1999). To be detailed, identity is not fixed or given but socially (re)constructed by extensive and repeated interactions. The long-term process of socialization and acculturation conduces to interstate harmony and friendship in constructing new intersubjective meanings of self and others and converting exclusive, egoistic identity to inclusive, collective identity. Consonant with the microfoundations of constructivism in international politics, cultivating a common supranational identity via exposure to a diversity of foreign cultures helps to lay the mass attitudinal groundwork for collaborative interstate relations. Drawing upon a survey of German parliamentarians, Bayram (2017a) finds that politicians with a greater cosmopolitan identification with Europe are more supportive of

compliance with EU law and are less sensitive to the compliance costs. Again, for clarity, cosmopolitanism is not tantamount to the negation of national identity. Indeed, cosmopolitanism and patriotism can be compatible with each other. Using data from the World Values Survey, Bayram (2019) finds a significant dual identity where individuals not only identify as cosmopolitan world citizens but are also committed to patriotic obligations like defending their country in war. Therefore, a superordinate identity does not necessarily conflict with a subgroup identity or weaken patriotism. Both cosmopolitans and locals can be patriots who are proud of their nations (Appiah 1996; Viroli 1995).⁸ The major distinction between them is that cosmopolitans are also willing to interact and develop bonds with foreigners and embrace cultural heterogeneity and multiplicity.

In conclusion, generalized exposure to foreign cultures socializes individuals to be cosmopolitans who share a superordinate identity with outgroup members and foreigners. This process of recategorization in turn engenders more favorable attitudes toward outgroups and foreign nations in general, including those with whom one has never had contact before. Empirical evidence reveals that interaction with classmates and schoolmates of different racial, ethnic, or religious backgrounds in schools enhances students' tolerance of cross-group diversity (Pascarella et al. 1996). Based on a representative survey of German citizens, Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann (2008) find that respondents with border-crossing experiences and transnational social relations tend to adopt cosmopolitan attitudes. Given the deepening and widening of transnationalization and globalization, people across the world will have more opportunities to engage in intercultural contact and potentially will identify themselves with world citizens living

⁸ Patriotism and nationalism are conceptually distinguished in this dissertation. Patriotism is one's affection for or pride in his/her nation, while nationalism involves a set of beliefs about the "superiority of one's nation compared to others and the importance of promoting the interests of one's own nation above all others" (Esses et al. 2005: 321). Put simply, patriotism, compared with nationalism, is a more benign form of national attachment.

together in the international community. Consequently, generalized exposure to diverse foreign cultures is hypothesized to bring about more positive perceptions of foreign countries as “self and other relations are mediated through an orientation toward world consciousness” (Delanty 2012: 341).

Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, individuals with greater generalized exposure to foreign cultures are more likely to hold a favorable opinion of foreign countries.

Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, individuals with greater generalized exposure to foreign cultures are more likely to embrace a superordinate identity beyond national identity.

3.3 Moderating Effect: Symbolic Threat and Interest in Global Issues

Building upon the association between generalized exposure to foreign countries and opinion of foreign countries, I argue that there exist two factors—(perceived) symbolic threat and interest in global issues—moderating the effect of generalized cultural exposure. Empirical evidence shows that intergroup contact not only fosters pro-outsider attitudes among ordinary people but has even better effects among more prejudiced, intolerant, ignorant, authoritarian, and conservative people (Hodson 2011; Igartua, Wojcieszak, and Kim 2019). It is plausible that individuals with higher levels of symbolic threats and lower interests in global issues will benefit more from the consumption of foreign cultural products to tremendously improve their outgroup attitudes.

Perceived outgroup threat has been identified in social psychology as a paramount predictor of intergroup negativity (Riek, Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Stephan 2014). According to the integrated threat theory of prejudice, symbolic threats are (perceived) threats to the values, morals, norms, and beliefs of the ingroup (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Some common survey items measuring symbolic threats are: (1) “Immigration harms our culture,” (2) “The outgroup’s

beliefs are not compatible with those of us,” and (3) “The outgroup members living here threaten our way of life and our values” (Landmann, Gaschler, and Rohmann 2019). Such threat perceptions can lead ingroup members to dehumanization, moral exclusion, anti-diversity beliefs, and discrimination against outgroups (Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison 2009). For instance, using both qualitative and quantitative studies in Germany, Landmann, Gaschler, and Rohmann (2019) find that perceived symbolic threats significantly elicit negative intergroup emotions like anger, fear, and disgust among Germans. These negative emotions in turn increase natives’ support for restrictive migration policies and undermine their attitudes toward refugees.

On the other hand, because generalized exposure to diverse foreign cultures is instrumental in reconstructing a more inclusive superordinate identity beyond the negative us-versus-them dichotomy, ingroup members are gradually discouraged from evaluating intergroup relations in an exclusive zero-sum way. It is conceivable that the process of recategorization based on generalized cultural exposure makes those particularly prejudiced people change their prior (mis)perceptions and become less likely to view foreign values and beliefs as threatening. There is more room for improvement in intergroup attitudes as their initial levels of perceived symbolic threat are higher than those of ordinary people. Drawing upon survey data from 11 European countries, Hasbún López et al. (2019) find that natives who have a strong global identification are less willing to engage in collective action against refugees and that the effect is much greater for those who perceive refugees as a menace to their country’s culture. In this case, symbolic threat is a significant moderator that reinforces the prejudice-reducing effect of superordinate identity. Following the same logic, interest in global issues is expected to condition the positive impact of cultural exposure on opinion of foreign countries too. Individuals who are uninterested in global issues tend to benefit more from the consumption of

various foreign cultural products given their higher localist and isolationist orientations at first. By contrast, individuals interested in global issues are already cosmopolitan and open toward cultural diversity, so there is less room for generalized cultural exposure to exert an appreciably positive influence on their attitudes toward foreign nations. Taken together, I hypothesize that the prejudice-reducing effect of generalized exposure to foreign cultures is contingent upon symbolic threat and interest in global issues.

Hypothesis 4: For individuals with higher levels of (perceived) symbolic threat, the positive impact of generalized cultural exposure on opinion of foreign countries will increase.

Hypothesis 5: For individuals more interested in global issues, the positive impact of generalized cultural exposure on opinion of foreign countries will decrease.

3.4 Mediating Effect: From Group-Specific to Generalized Cultural Exposure

Although I differentiate group-specific cultural exposure and decategorization from generalized cultural exposure and recategorization, the two types of parasocial contact are not mutually exclusive but complementary in reducing ingroup bias. First, generalized exposure, to a large extent, builds on group-specific exposure. Without the initial consumption of cultural products made by one foreign country, it is implausible that an ingroup member will consume other foreign countries' cultural products over time. Sequentially, group-specific exposure is expected to precede generalized exposure. Second, decategorization (in group-specific exposure) and recategorization (in generalized exposure), despite distinct logics, are also held to be complementary in generating positive contact effect. On the basis of Brewer and Miller (1984), Hewstone and Brown (1986), and Gaertner et al. (1989), Pettigrew (1998) integrates decategorization and recategorization into a time sequence and brings forth a "reformulated contact theory." That is, contact ought to have optimal effects on intergroup relations through

first decategorization (having more personalized interaction and knowledge about outgroup members) and later recategorization (establishing a more inclusive common identity). Compared to the development of a parasocial relationship at the individual level (e.g., between an ingroup fan and an outgroup movie star), the development of a shared superordinate identity that subsumes subgroup national identities seems to require more extensive, frequent, and longer-term processes of contact (Sherif and Sherif 1969). Some empirical research has found that both decategorization and recategorization account for the positive impact of intergroup contact on prejudice reduction (Beaton et al. 2012; Gaertner et al. 1989; Gaertner et al. 1990; González and Brown 2003). It is conceivable that decategorization based on group-specific exposure takes effect first and lays the groundwork for recategorization based on generalized exposure. In consequence, the two approaches can “operate complementarily and sequentially to improve intergroup relations in lasting and meaningful ways” (Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami 2003: 13). Given the plausibility of sequentiality, I hypothesize a causal pathway of parasocial intercultural contact as follows: group-specific cultural exposure→generalized cultural exposure→superordinate identity→opinion of foreign country.

Hypothesis 6: The positive association between group-specific cultural exposure and opinion of foreign country is partially explained by a superordinate identity based on generalized cultural exposure.

3.5 Contextual Effect: Generalized Cultural Exposure at the Country Level

Hypotheses 2 and 3 focus on the effect of generalized cultural exposure at the individual level and test the micro-level logic of constructivism. However, Wendt’s (1992, 1999) constructivist theory of international politics, in response to Waltz’s (1979) structural realism, is state-centric in that aggregate-level factors, especially state identities and interstate interactions,

play a more central part in accounting for system-level variations. “A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice” (Hopf 1998: 175). From a constructivist perspective, a state identity is influenced by its interaction with others and the social environment. Although realists contend that state identities are homogeneously self-interested in the anarchic world, constructivists expect them to be contingent upon sociocultural contexts with different intersubjective meanings. According to Wendt (1999), anarchy is a social construct that has three major subjective interpretations: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In the Hobbesian world, the self adopts the realist definition of anarchy where all others are considered to be enemies. For the sake of survival, states are self-regarding in maximizing relative gains at the sacrifice of others. Given the principle of self-help, interstate relations are characterized by the right to conquer, the salience of relative power, and the utility of military force. Contrarily, in the Kantian world where the self and others share a superordinate identity, the competitive, zero-sum interstate relations no longer dominate. The international arena is characterized more by other-help than by self-help. States, sharing a strong subjective sense of “we-ness,” view one another as friends and emphasize collective goals and joint gains. In between the two extremes is the Lockean world where confrontation and cooperation coexist. Because identities are an outcome of social contact, states can actively transform international relations from the conflictual Hobbesian world to the pacific Kantian world by long-time socialization and acculturation. In this socializing process, states are likely to reconstruct a more inclusive identity where “us” and “them” are subsumed by a common “we.” In a word, social contact leads states to recategorization through which they collectively embrace a supranational identity and incrementally become more collaborative and cosmopolitan. By reference to the constructivist argument on social contact and identity

reconstruction, I theorize that parasocial contact at the aggregate level generates prejudice-reducing effects as well. That is, a country's level of generalized cultural exposure is a contextual predictor of individual attitudes toward other nations. Corresponding to Hypotheses 2 and 3, I thus put forth two multilevel hypotheses where country-level intercultural contact facilitates recategorization and ameliorates outgroup attitudes.

Hypothesis 7: In countries with greater generalized cultural exposure, individuals are more likely to hold a favorable opinion of foreign countries.

Hypothesis 8: In countries with greater generalized cultural exposure, individuals are more likely to embrace a superordinate identity beyond national identity.

3.6 Beyond Outgroup Attitudes: Opinions on Globalization, Immigration, Transnational Actors, and International Cooperation

Recent years have witnessed growing popular discontent with globalization, such as the United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU and the popularity of Donald Trump in the United States. More and more working-class citizens in postindustrial Western societies are becoming skeptical of and averse to free trade, foreign business, and immigration (Boix 2019; Gest 2016; Iversen and Soskice 2019; Walter 2021). Disappointed by established pro-globalist parties, they are more inclined to vote for extreme right-wing parties that endorse populist, protectionist, and nationalist policies (Inglehart 2018; Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra 2021; Rodrik 2018). More broadly, this backlash against globalization may obstruct interstate collaboration and undermine the stability of the postwar international system. As Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra (2021: 2280) point out, "In areas as diverse as global public goods provision, the management of great power rivalries, and global public health, as well as international economic relations, the anti-internationalist, nativist, and xenophobic rhetoric and policies that have accompanied the

backlash are likely to serve as significant impediments to the cooperation and coordination between states that are needed to address global problems.” The current globalization backlash is characterized by popular dissatisfaction and resentment toward trade, immigrants, international organizations, and interstate cooperation more generally. Take the Brexit vote for instance. Colantone and Stanig (2018a) find that public support for the “Leave” option is stronger in the UK regions hit harder by foreign imports. Anti-immigration attitudes are also found to be a significant determinant of support for “Leave” (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; Hobolt 2016; Kaufmann 2019). Skepticism about the merits of multilateral institutions is another key component of the backlash. Many citizens believe that the EU is overly elite-driven, pro-capital, and unresponsive to their concerns (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Mair 2007). “Brexit as a vote against international cooperation and extensive coordination is a reflection of this public perception of the EU” (Milner 2021b: 1105).

Although globalization, on the basis of comparative advantage, is supposed to enhance allocative efficiency at the aggregate level, it also has distributional effects that may aggravate income inequality. “Some people have benefited economically, and the regions where they are concentrated are vibrant and well-integrated into the global economy; other people have lost jobs and had their wages shrink while the regions they are concentrated in suffer from long-term decline” (Milner 2021a: 2290). In general, global capitalism and international migration render domestic labor markets more competitive and volatile. Owing to this “race to the bottom,” a number of less-skilled workers in advanced democracies have become globalization “losers” who have to experience higher economic anxiety and job insecurity, such as reduced earnings and frequent job displacement (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Autor et al. 2020; Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum 2014; Scheve and Slaughter 2004). More importantly,

the material and nonmaterial aspects of the globalization backlash are tightly interconnected; the economic losers of globalization are prone to adopt authoritarian and populist values (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Empirical evidence reveals that support for extreme right parties is much higher in areas more exposed to trade and immigration (Colantone and Stanig 2018a, 2018b; Milner 2021a). In large part, this effect of negative economic shocks is mediated by cultural grievances (Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; Carreras, Irepoglu Carreras, and Bowler 2019). Following the frustration-aggression mechanism, the economic losers' adoption of illiberal, authoritarian values lies in that globalization immensely threatens their expected social status and living standard. Therefore, intolerance of cultural diversity and prejudice against immigrants/minorities typically rise alongside antipathy to foreign trade and investment.

On the other hand, education is commonly deemed to be correlated with pro-globalization attitudes. Given that educational attainment stands for human capital and/or skill level, better education provides individuals with greater advantages in labor markets and future promotions. Hence, high-skilled people are globalization winners who gain more from cross-border linkages (e.g., trade, migration, and investment) with other nations in global markets (Baker 2005; Frieden 2007). On account of occupational prominence and material well-being, these skilled, educated individuals are expected to be the proponents of globalization. Empirical studies have found that well-educated citizens are more likely to favor regional integration and collaboration (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Seligson 1999), view major trading partners positively (Chung 2015; Fordham and Kleinberg 2011), express warm feelings toward immigrants (Borgonovi and Pokropek 2019; Cavaille and Marshall 2019), and support further deepening of economic interdependence and trade

liberalization (Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rokrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinott 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

On top of the aforementioned utilitarian effect, education has a socializing effect on globalization attitudes as well (Chen 2022). Schooling expands the breadth of social perspective, instills a worldview beyond local/national communities, and socializes people to be tolerant of cultural diversity and ideological nonconformity (Bobo and Licari 1989; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). As a result, better-educated individuals are more internationalist, cosmopolitan, and open-minded toward interstate cooperation (Machida 2012; Pichler 2009). For example, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that trade policy preferences are driven more by psychological dispositions than by cost-and-benefit calculations. Likewise, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that ideas and beliefs, not fears of labor-market competition, explain the correlation between education level and immigration attitudes. Based on empirical evidence in 46 countries, Smith et al. (2017) demonstrate that education is consistently associated with a more inclusive supranational identity. According to Page, Rabinovich, and Tully (2008), an internationalist, cosmopolitan identity (due to formal education) makes people more willing to participate in global anti-poverty and anti-hunger projects, sympathize with refugees in war-torn and poverty-stricken societies, and advocate multilateral cooperation and global governance.

Overall, individual attitudes toward globalization seem to have a material origin, but there are also some nonmaterial explanatory factors. Echoing the socializing explanation of education's impact, I argue that generalized cultural exposure contributes to pro-globalization attitudes. Similar to the mechanism where generalized exposure improves outgroup attitudes, recategorization—a superordinate, transnational identity based on consumption of diverse foreign cultural products—leads one to a more inclusive, cosmopolitan, and collaborative

interpretation of free trade, foreign investment, international migration, and multilateral institutions. Accordingly, people exposed to a variety of foreign-produced cultural commodities tend to be more supportive of globalization, more tolerant of immigrants, and more trusting of foreign business and international organizations. In this regard, global policymakers may take parasocial intercultural contact into account in dealing with the emerging globalization backlash. In addition to welfare spending and skill training, another nonmaterial policy suggestion is the cultivation of a shared “global-we” identity via mediated intergroup contact. In practice, facilitating intercultural contact may be a slow yet promising way to bolster the mass attitudinal foundation of interstate cooperation and to protect the postwar international system and global governance from extreme ethnopopulism and nationalism.

Hypothesis 9: Individuals with greater generalized cultural exposure are more likely to hold favorable opinions on globalization, immigration, transnational actors, and international cooperation.

4 DATA AND MEASUREMENT

I draw data from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey (ABS) and the 2008 East Asian Social Survey (EASS) for empirical analyses. The former survey project covers six countries in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; the latter is a national sample survey conducted in Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Both of them are comparative surveys in Asia with a focus on daily lives of ordinary citizens and their attitudes toward families, societies, nations, and other socioeconomic and sociopolitical issues. More specifically, the AsiaBarometer Project conducts face-to-face surveys and employs standardized methods designed around a common research framework. In every country, a nationwide survey of adults between 20 and 69 years old is carried out by random sampling.⁹ The EASS is a biennial social survey project based on the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), and Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). Rather than conducted as an independent survey, the topical modules of EASS are integrated into a pre-existing survey framework of each society. The 2008 module is “Culture and Globalization in East Asia,” collecting data on social distance and social network, cultural values and tastes, immigration and globalization, and intercultural contact.¹⁰ Since prior research on intergroup contact overwhelmingly centers on individuals and groups in the West

⁹ Data in ABS were collected by the AsiaBarometer Project (2007). AsiaBarometer is a registered trademark of Takashi Inoguchi, President of the University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan, and Director of the AsiaBarometer Project. The AsiaBarometer Project is not responsible for interpretation or inference based on the data analysis in this research. I appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institute and individual stated above. Data application and information are available online from <http://www.asiabarometer.org/>. The postal address of AsiaBarometer: The AsiaBarometer Project, University of Niigata Prefecture, Tokyo Satellite, Koyosha KS Building 9th Floor, 1-17-8 Nishikata, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0024, Japan. The email address of AsiaBarometer: info@asiabarometer.org.

Because the survey questions on opinion of foreign countries (i.e., the dependent variable) were not asked in Myanmar, I exclude the observations in that country.

¹⁰ Data in EASS were provided by the East Asian Social Survey Data Archive (EASSDA). Data application and information are available online from <https://eassda.org/modules/doc/index.php?doc=intro>.

while overlooking other non-Western nations and cultures, cross-national data in Asia, as a complement, can test the scope and generalizability of the parasocial contact theory. In 2007-2008, the interstate relations in East Asia were relatively harmonious and stable. Sovereignty disputes, such as that between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea, were not salient at that time.

4.1 Key Explanatory Variable

Regarding group-specific exposure to a foreign culture, I utilize one's exposure to Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean cultures as examples (respectively corresponding to one's opinion of China, Japan, and South Korea). In ABS, they are tapped sequentially by Questions 4c, 4a, and 4b, "How often are you exposed to TV programs, movies, and animation, produced in the following countries (i.e., China, Japan, and South Korea)?" I reverse the original six-point scale as follows: 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=several times a year, 4=several times a month, 5=several times a week, and 6=almost everyday. Similarly, in EASS, exposure to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures are drawn respectively from the survey questions: (1) "How often do you watch Chinese movies?" (2) "How often do you watch Japanese animation?" and (3) "How often do you watch Korean TV drama?" All three responses are a four-point scale coded as follows: 1=not at all, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, and 4=often.¹¹ The reason I focus on cultural products produced by China, Japan, and South Korea lies in their region-wide popularity. According to Jin and Otmazgin (2014), the three biggest East Asian cultural industries are in China, Japan, and South Korea. Many studies have demonstrated the transnational popularity of Chinese culture

¹¹ The survey questions in EASS are less inclusive than those in ABS. For example, individuals may seldom watch Chinese movies but often watch Chinese web dramas and TV programs. In other words, the cultural products listed in EASS are limited and, to some extent, biased in capturing exposure to foreign culture. Given the potential of measurement error, it is necessary to compare the overall empirical findings and check their robustness based on different surveys, operationalizations, and specifications.

(Curtin 2007; Fung 2008; Zhao 2008), Japanese culture (Allison 2006; Cooper-Chen 2010; Iwabuchi 2008; Napier 2007; Otmazgin 2008; Tobin 2004), and Korean culture (Cho 2010; Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Shim 2006; Sung 2010). The growing consumption of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean pop cultures in East Asia manifests the rise of East Asian media cultures and inter-Asian cultural connections (Iwabuchi 2010). As Iwabuchi (2010: 197) puts it, “Watching Korean TV dramas, listening to Chinese pop music, reading Japanese comic books and enjoying internationally co-produced Asian films are now part of the mundane landscape of East Asian cities.” The wide attractiveness of the three countries’ popular cultures implies that people in other Asian countries are likely familiar with and fond of cultural products produced by China, Japan, and South Korea. It is thereby conceivable that there exist sufficient variations of group-specific cultural exposure, namely, the key explanatory variable. Take exposure to Chinese culture in ABS for instance. As displayed in Figure 4.1(a), approximately 40 percent of the respondents are seldom or never exposed to Chinese culture, whereas more than 41 percent of the respondents consume Chinese cultural products several times a week or almost everyday.




Figure 4.1 Asian citizens’ exposure to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures

Note: 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=several times a year, 4=several times a month, 5=several times a week, and 6=almost everyday.

Source: AsiaBarometer Survey.

Moreover, I use the weighted sum of exposure to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures to operationalize generalized exposure to foreign cultures, through exploratory factor analysis

(EFA). Although it may not perfectly capture one's actual exposure to foreign cultures, this additive scale covering three different countries, to a large degree, approximates the real value. The EFA approach is typically formulated for continuous responses. Given polytomously scored items, I utilize the polychoric correlation matrix in lieu of the conventional Bravais-Pearson correlation matrix (Kolenikov and Angeles 2009). If Pearson correlations are employed for ordinal variables, the factor loadings obtained will be reduced because of a category error effect (Sarlis, Van Wijk, and Scherpenzeel 1998). According to Holgado-Tello et al. (2010), in respect of Likert-scale ordinal data, the factorization using polychoric correlation matrix on average provides a better fit to the theoretical model than that using Pearson correlation matrix. Take the three items of group-specific cultural exposure in ABS. The Bartlett's test for sphericity rejects the null hypothesis that correlation matrix of the selected variables does not diverge from the identity matrix; the three items are significantly correlated so that a data reduction technique is suitable. The result of EFA based on the principal-factor method suggests that there exists only one factor whose eigenvalue is bigger than one. The factor loadings, reported in Table 4.1, range from 0.72 to 0.79. The values of uniqueness are all below 0.5, reflecting that a substantial portion of variance is explained by the common factor. The standardized Cronbach's α coefficient (also called the generalized Spearman-Brown formula) is about 0.78, so the internal consistency reliability of this three-item scale is relatively good.¹² The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is 0.71, indicating that the three items are sufficient to warrant an EFA.¹³ On the whole, the three items can be reasonably incorporated into one scale.

¹² According to Bartolucci, Bacci, and Gnaldi (2015), a test is considered reliable when the standardized Cronbach's α is larger than 0.7. The standardized coefficient is preferred to the raw coefficient in that it relies solely on correlations instead of variances/covariances.

¹³ According to Kaiser (1974), a KMO below 0.5 is considered unacceptable. Small values denote that included items have very little in common. An acceptable KMO is supposed to range from 0.5 to 1 where a larger number suggests a better sampling adequacy.

Table 4.1 Factor analysis of generalized cultural exposure items (principal-factor method)

	Factor loadings (pattern matrix)	Uniqueness	KMO
Exposure to Chinese culture	0.736	0.458	0.726
Exposure to Japanese culture	0.722	0.479	0.741
Exposure to Korean culture	0.788	0.379	0.679

Note: Based on polychoric correlation matrix. Eigenvalue=1.683. Standardized Cronbach's α =0.781. Overall KMO=0.713. KMO: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.

4.2 Dependent Variable

For Hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, the dependent variable of interest is one's opinion of foreign countries, and I use that of China, Japan, and South Korea in East Asia as examples. In ABS, the data are drawn respectively from Questions 27c, 27e, and 27l, "Do you think the following countries (i.e., China, Japan, and South Korea) have a good influence or a bad influence on your country? Please select the response closest to your opinion for each country listed." The response is based on a five-point scale from 1 "good" to 5 "bad." For ease of explication, I reverse and recode the ordinal scale as follows: 1=very negative, 2=negative, 3=neither negative nor positive, 4=positive, and 5=very positive. In EASS, the measures are drawn from three sets of questions, "Can you accept the people who are from China, Japan, and South Korea (1) working alongside you in your job, (2) as close kin by marriage, and (3) on your street as neighbors?" The answers are all dichotomous where 1=yes and 0=no. Hence, for each country, there are three outcome variables reflecting one's attitude toward that country.¹⁴ Individuals who accept a Chinese colleague, family member, or neighbor, for example, are expected to have a positive opinion of China. Conversely, those who do not accept a Chinese colleague, family member, or neighbor are expected to have a negative opinion of China.¹⁵ As

¹⁴ Given space constraints, only the first two outcome measures (i.e., closeness to foreign coworkers and relatives) are employed in the subsequent statistical analyses. The regression results based on the third outcome measure (i.e., closeness to foreign neighbors) are reported in the appendix.

¹⁵ Compared to the measures in ABS, the three outcome variables in EASS seem to focus more on foreigners (e.g., Chinese people) than on foreign countries (e.g., China). However, outgroup attitudes generally consist of both elements. In other words, one's opinion of China, Japan, and Korea can include not only perception of the country and but also that of its people (as a whole), two of which are likely to be consistent and complementary rather than irrelevant or opposed.

exhibited in Figures 4.2(a) to 4.2(c), there are considerable variations in Asian public attitudes toward China, Japan, South Korea. In Southeast Asia, the images of the three countries are basically positive since the modes are all 4=positive in ABS. Two tables (including respondents per country, means, and standard deviations) about cross-national opinion of China, Japan, and Korea are provided in the appendix.




Figure 4.2 Asian public opinion of China, Japan, and South Korea

Note: 1=very negative, 2=negative, 3=neither negative nor positive, 4=positive, and 5=very positive.

Source: AsiaBarometer Survey.

For Hypotheses 3 and 8, the dependent variable is superordinate identity. In ABS, it is tapped by Question 10, “Do you identify with any transnational group?” I construct an ordinal measure as follows: 1=no transnational identification, 2=identification with an ethnic, religious, or other transnational group in Asia (e.g., people of Chinese ethnicity, people believing in Buddhism), and 3=identification with a common Asian group. On average, about 10 percent of the respondents have a superordinate Asian identity while 55 percent do not identify with any transnational group. In EASS, the operationalization is based on the survey question, “How close do you feel to East Asia?” The response is a four-point scale from 1=not at all close to 4=very close. A higher value denotes a stronger superordinate Asian identity. Similar to that in ABS, a vast majority of the respondents (78%) do not feel close to or identify themselves with East Asia.

4.3 Moderating Variable

Concerning Hypotheses 4 and 5, the two moderating variables are perceived symbolic threat and interest in global issues. In EASS, perceived symbolic threat is tapped by the question, “How much do you agree/disagree with the statement that increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our own culture?” The response is a seven-point scale from 1=strongly agree to 7=strongly disagree. For ease of interpretation, I reverse the scale so that a larger value indicates a higher level of threat. Interest in global issues is tapped by the question, “How often do you talk about international issues with you families, friends, or other people?” The response is a seven-point scale from 1=almost everyday to 7=never. Likewise, I reverse the scale so that a larger value represents a higher level of interest. Because comparable survey items are not available in ABS, I only use data from EASS when testing Hypotheses 4 and 5.

4.4 Control Variable

To present a more fully specified model, I also add a series of control variables widely adopted in past research. In ABS, controls are face-to-face contact with foreigners (i.e., travel and job contact), social trust, national pride, traditionalism, right-leaning ideology, democratic value, level of religiosity, and some socioeconomic/demographic factors (i.e., age, gender, education, employment status, and household income). Correspondingly, in EASS, controls are face-to-face contact with foreigners (i.e., travel and foreign acquaintances), national identification, traditionalism, interest in global issues, perceived symbolic threat, and some socioeconomic/demographic factors (i.e., age, gender, education, urban residence, employment status, and household income).¹⁶ Although the two sets of controls are not completely balanced and the measures are not always the same, I try to make the operationalizations in ABS and

¹⁶ In EASS, interest in global issues and perceived symbolic threat are moderating variables when examined in models with interaction terms.

EASS as comparable as possible. The summary statistics of variables mentioned above are reported in the appendix.

5 MODEL AND ANALYSIS

Since individuals are nested within countries, it is reasonable that citizens in one country are more homogeneous than those in another country, with regard to outgroup attitudes. To correct for within-country correlations, I use fixed-effects models testing individual-level hypotheses and random-effects models testing country-level hypotheses. In fixed-effects models, all between-country variations are captured by the fixed intercepts (i.e., country dummies), so within-country covariates are unconfounded by omitted between-country covariates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Based on a series of simulation analyses, McNeish and Stapleton (2016) find that fixed-effects models, compared to clustering and random-effects approaches, consistently provide least biased estimations of individual-level effects given small cluster size. However, fixed-effects models cannot directly estimate the independent effects of country-level predictors. Random-effects or multilevel models outperform fixed-effects models in estimating not only individual-level effects but also country-level effects, generating more efficient and informative results. On the other hand, because maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of variance parameters are likely to have a downward bias when the number of level-2 observations is small, the standard errors of coefficient estimates will be underestimated, making statistical inference anti-conservative in multilevel modeling. According to Bryan and Jenkins (2016) and Stegmueller (2013), estimates of country-level fixed effect and country-level random intercept variance are typically inaccurate if using multilevel models with less than 20 countries. In order to reduce such a small-sample bias, I employ restricted maximum likelihood (REML) instead of ML when testing Hypotheses 7 and 8. As indicated by Elff et al.'s (2020) Monte Carlo simulations, although ML estimates of random intercept variances in multilevel models become increasingly biased with the decline of clusters, REML is less sensitive to few clusters and has an

appreciable bias-reducing effect even under the circumstances of 5 to 10 clusters. Therefore, fixed-effects and random-effects models are respectively utilized to test individual-level and country-level hypotheses.

Nonetheless, as other cross-sectional research on intergroup contact, single-equation regression models (e.g., fixed-effects models) are likely subject to endogeneity. There are three potential challenges to valid causal estimation, which are measurement error, omitted variable bias, and reverse causality/simultaneity. First, the measurement of the key explanatory variable—exposure to foreign culture—is prone to be biased. Some studies have found that the accuracy of measuring survey-based self-reports of news exposure, social media, and Internet use is typically low (Guess et al. 2019; Junco 2013; Prior 2009; Scharkow 2016). Systematic patterns of misreporting are common in conventional public opinion surveys. Under the circumstances of measurement error, the estimated correlation between the independent variable (i.e., exposure to foreign culture) and the dependent variable (i.e., opinion of foreign country) will be downwardly biased.

Second, some latent personality traits, such as agreeableness, extraversion, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation (SDO), are unable to be controlled for based on the current surveys. These unobserved factors are likely to be associated with not only cultural exposure but also outgroup attitudes, so omitting them may cause spurious correlation. For example, extraversion is found to be correlated with benevolent cross-cultural exploration and pro-outsider orientations (Barbarino and Stürmer 2016). Compared with their introverted counterparts, extraverted people are more inclined to intercultural contact (Stürmer et al. 2013) and favorable perceptions of outgroups (Turner et al. 2014). Omitting a relevant variable like extraversion, positively correlated with both independent variable and dependent

variable, will overestimate the causal effect. Contrarily, individuals with higher RWA and SDO are less willing to engage in cross-cultural contact (Pettigrew 2008; Rosenthal and Levy 2012; Stürmer et al. 2013). Meanwhile, RWA and SDO are strong predictors of outgroup threat (Crowson 2009; Curşeu, Stoop, and Schalk 2007) and outgroup prejudice (Hiel and Mervielde 2005). Therefore, the omission of RWA and SDO, factors that have negative correlations with independent and dependent variables, will lead to an underestimation of the causal effect.

The third and most serious endogeneity consists in reverse causality or simultaneity. For instance, people who are pro-China tend to be more interested in Chinese culture (reverse Hypothesis 1), people with lower levels of generalized prejudice tend to consume more foreign cultural products (reverse Hypothesis 2), and people embracing a supranational identity tend to have greater exposure to foreign cultures (reverse Hypothesis 3). As Pettigrew (2009: 61) puts it, “Single surveys have no direct means of removing this source of bias. This factor can be substantial in nonlongitudinal data, and the usual means of controlling for a range of social location variables proves to be an insufficient means of ruling out the prior prejudice bias.” Given reverse causality, the magnitude of estimated causal effect will be inflated.

To deal with the aforementioned endogeneity problems, I utilize whether having a cable TV in one’s house as an instrument of cultural exposure.¹⁷ The instrumental variable (IV) approach, similar to a quasi-experiment, corrects for measurement error, omitted variable bias, and reverse causality/simultaneity. Distinct from conventional single-equation regression, the IV method indirectly estimates the causal effect of the fitted explanatory variable based on the (exogenous) instrument. Under an ideal instrument, the fitted explanatory variable (vis-à-vis the original explanatory variable) will, in theory, no longer be endogenous, so that the estimated

¹⁷ It is a binary variable (1=having a cable TV; 0=otherwise) based on Question 1-7 in ABS. Because similar survey question is not available in EASS, I only use the instrumental variable approach in ABS.

regression coefficient is supposed to be unbiased and consistent (Angrist and Pischke 2008). As a valid IV, “instrumental relevance” as well as “instrumental exogeneity” is required. That is, the IV should be correlated with the explanatory variable (potentially vulnerable to endogeneity) but, at the same time, not directly correlated with the outcome variable of interest.

On the one hand, I expect cable TV ownership to be positively correlated with one’s exposure to foreign-made cultural products since parasocial contact is medium dependent. In addition to books, radios, and networks, televisions are one of the most popular media where ingroup members learn about outgroups (Mutz and Goldman 2010). As Park (2012: 151) notes, “Of the various ways that people experience mediated intergroup contact, consumption of television content that is readily available to domestic audiences can be considered to be the most common and widespread.” Televisions play a major role in fostering local people’s exposure to foreign cultures (Han 2017; Iwabuchi 2008). On account of televisual exposure to dubbed/translated foreign-produced TV programs, movies, and cartoons, natives are better informed of foreign cultures and have more opportunities to construct parasocial relationships with outgroup characters on screen. In comparison to traveling abroad, TV viewing is a much cheaper and more convenient way to gain mediated multicultural experiences where viewers “are thrown into the extraordinary, flowing visual world that lies beyond the domestic regime, an instantaneous mirror reflecting much of the rest of the world that is then mirrored into people’s homes” (Szerszynski and Urry 2002: 470). In particular, the rapid development of cable TV in East Asia has greatly facilitated the popularization of foreign TV programs (Iwabuchi 2008). Therefore, the instrument (i.e., cable TV ownership) ought to have a positive correlation with the explanatory variable (i.e., group-specific and generalized cultural exposure), conforming to instrumental relevance.

On the other hand, I expect that cable TV ownership does not directly influence a person's perception of a foreign nation. First, one's family may be too poor to purchase a TV set, which implies that the instrument is associated with household income.¹⁸ Provided that income is simultaneously associated with outgroup attitudes, the instrument will become invalid. To remove such a confounding issue, I regress cable TV ownership on household income and then use the residuals for IV estimation. Second, the earlier discussed psychological factors (e.g., RWA and SDO) are likely to result in omitted variable bias, but they are unlikely to affect one's cable TV ownership or confound the exogeneity of the instrument. Generally speaking, the prime purpose for an individual to buy a TV set is to have access to local/national news more than international news. Even localistic people who are uninterested in foreign issues or prejudiced people who look upon foreign cultures as a threat can still have TV sets and only consume local/national media content that they prefer. Accordingly, cable TV ownership is not expected to be correlated with other determinants of the dependent variable, in accordance with the "exclusion restriction." Put differently, it is the IV, owning a cable TV, that affects cultural exposure, which in turn explains opinion of foreign country.

5.1 Testing Hypothesis 1

In Hypothesis 1, the outcome variables—opinions of China, Japan, and South Korea—are ordinal in ABS and dichotomous in EASS, so I employ both ordered probit and IV-ordered probit (IV-oprobit) models in ABS while only probit models in EASS. Table 5.1 reports the regression results of ordered probit in Models (1), (3), and (5), and IV-oprobit in Models (2), (4), and (6). The estimated coefficients of group-specific cultural exposure (bolds in table) are much larger and are all statistically significant based on the IV approach, which implies the plausibility

¹⁸ The bivariate correlation between having a TV and household income is about 0.13.

	Opinion of China		Opinion of Japan		Opinion of Korea	
	Oprobit (1)	IV-oprobit (2)	Oprobit (3)	IV-oprobit (4)	Oprobit (5)	IV-oprobit (6)
Age	-0.00*	-0.00*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
τ_1	-1.96***	-1.18***	-1.48***	-0.79*	-0.70***	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.23)	(0.35)
τ_2	-1.29***	-0.56*	-0.59***	0.04	0.11	0.78**
	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.31)
τ_3	-0.43**	0.25	0.33	0.89***	1.30***	1.86***
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.26)
τ_4	0.99***	1.58***	1.67***	2.15***	2.65***	3.10***
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Log likelihood	-6346.72	-17856.49	-5545.03	-16472.65	-5717.32	-17209.32
Number of respondents	5,066	5,708	5,005	5,709	4,615	5,696
Number of countries	6	6	6	6	6	6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey. Instrumental variable is whether having a cable TV in one's house. Country dummies are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.1 Average marginal effects of exposure to Chinese culture on opinion of China

Note: The solid lines represent marginal effects while the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. Figure 5.1(a) is based on Model (1) while Figure 5.1(b) on Model (2) in Table 5.1.

Since the raw coefficients in nonlinear models are not directly interpretable, I present the average marginal effects of group-specific exposure in Figure 5.1. Take China for example.

Holding other variables constant, when exposure to Chinese culture changes from 1=never to 6=almost everyday, the predicted probability of a negative opinion of China will decrease by

about 13.8 percentage points based on IV-oprobit (see Figure 5.1(b)). In contrast, the corresponding effect will be 3.4 percentage points using ordered probit (see Figure 5.1(a)), which suggests a downward bias where the influence of measurement error and/or omitted variable is stronger than that of reverse causality. The probit regression results based on EASS, as reported in Table 5.2, are largely consistent with those in Table 5.1. Take China in Model (7) for example. When exposure to Chinese culture changes from 1=never to 4=often, the probability of a positive opinion of China will increase by 5.8 percentage points. Given endogeneity, this estimated effect is closer to that using ordered probit. In a sense, even though single-equation estimation is biased, it appears to underestimate the true effect, making causal inference more conservative. In short, the above analyses lend credence to my argument that exposure to a foreign country's cultural products leads individuals to favorable attitudes toward that country.

Table 5.2 Probit analysis of the effect of group-specific cultural exposure (EASS)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Chinese culture	0.06** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Japanese culture	0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Korean culture	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Travel abroad	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.23*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.40*** (0.08)	0.15** (0.07)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Interest in global issues	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Symbolic threat	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Male	0.10** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	-0.01	-0.00	-0.11**	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.11***

	Opinion of China		Opinion of Japan		Opinion of Korea	
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.00	-0.00	0.01*	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment status	-0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Household income	0.06***	0.04*	0.02	0.04*	0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log likelihood	-3217.29	-3448.66	-3435.82	-3603.35	-4370.96	-4475.32
AUC	0.63	0.62	0.79	0.78	0.66	0.66
PRE	1.2%	6%	36%	42.6%	9%	18.3%
Observations	5,332	5,326	6,387	6,385	6,852	6,860

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign coworkers and relatives respectively. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. AUC: area under receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. PRE: proportional reduction in error. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

5.2 Testing Hypotheses 2 and 3

Table 5.3 reports ordered probit and IV-oprobit models analyzing the effect of generalized cultural exposure. Both approaches show that generalized exposure is statistically significant and positively associated with opinion of China, Japan, and Korea. Supportive of Hypothesis 2, individuals exposed to a variety of foreign cultural products tend to hold a pro-outsider view. However, the coefficients using IV estimation are much larger, a result similar to that in Table 5.1. Considering opinion of China, Figure 5.2 displays the two different average marginal effects. When generalized cultural exposure changes from 1=never to 6=almost everyday, the probability of a negative opinion of China will decrease by 14.7 percentage points for IV-oprobit (see Figure 5.2 (b)) and 1.3 percentage points for ordered oprobit (see Figure 5.2 (a)). In terms of the corresponding probit analyses, as presented in Table 5.4, generalized cultural exposure still has a significant and positive association with opinion of China, Japan, and Korea, lending additional evidence to Hypothesis 2. Take China again in Model (19). When generalized cultural exposure changes from 1=never to 4=often, the probability of a positive opinion of

China will increase by 19 percentage points. Despite distinct model specifications, the positive effect of generalized exposure on outgroup attitudes is consistently significant.

Table 5.3 Oprobit and IV-oprobit analysis of the effect of generalized cultural exposure (ABS)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	Oprobit (13)	IV-oprobit (14)	Oprobit (15)	IV-oprobit (16)	Oprobit (17)	IV-oprobit (18)
<i>First stage</i>						
TV in house	—	0.47***	—	0.47***	—	0.47***
	—	(0.05)	—	(0.05)	—	(0.05)
<i>F</i>	—	104.63	—	104.63	—	104.63
<i>Second stage</i>						
Group-specific exposure	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Generalized exposure	0.02** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.20** (0.08)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.07)
Travel abroad	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.13** (0.07)
Job contact	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.11)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)
Social trust	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
National pride	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)
Traditionalism	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Democratic value	0.05* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Level of religiosity	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Male	0.06* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Employment status	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Household income	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Education	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
τ_1	-2.03*** (0.22)	-1.02*** (0.36)	-1.49*** (0.23)	-0.96*** (0.36)	-0.71*** (0.23)	-0.04 (0.33)
τ_2	-1.37*** (0.22)	-0.41 (0.33)	-0.60*** (0.22)	-0.09 (0.34)	0.10 (0.23)	0.73** (0.31)
τ_3	-0.51** (0.22)	0.37 (0.30)	0.31 (0.22)	0.80** (0.32)	1.29*** (0.23)	1.85*** (0.28)
τ_4	0.91***	1.67***	1.66***	2.10***	2.64***	3.14***

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	Oprobit (13)	IV-oprobit (14)	Oprobit (15)	IV-oprobit (16)	Oprobit (17)	IV-oprobit (18)
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Log likelihood	-6347.87	-16737.11	-5545.34	-15939.41	-5718.11	-16110.77
Number of respondents	5,066	5,677	5,005	5,677	4,615	5,677
Number of countries	6	6	6	6	6	6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Given multicollinearity, Chinese culture is regressed on Japanese and Korean cultures, taking Models (13) and (14) for example, and the residuals are used for estimation. Data are drawn from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey. Instrumental variable is cable TV ownership. Country dummies are not reported. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.2 Average marginal effects of generalized cultural exposure on opinion of China

Note: The solid lines represent marginal effects while the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. Figure 5.2(a) is based on Model (13) while Figure 5.2(b) on Model (14) in Table 5.3.

Table 5.4 Probit analysis of the effect of generalized cultural exposure (EASS)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Group-specific exposure	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Generalized exposure	0.19*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
Travel abroad	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.23*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.40*** (0.08)	0.15** (0.07)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Interest in global issues	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Symbolic threat	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Male	0.09** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Education	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Household income	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Log likelihood	-3218.43	-3448.67	-3435.82	-3603.36	-4371.52	-4476.37
AUC	0.63	0.62	0.79	0.78	0.66	0.66
PRE	0.9%	6%	36%	42.6%	9%	18.3%
Observations	5,332	5,326	6,387	6,385	6,852	6,860

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign coworkers and relatives respectively. Given multicollinearity, Chinese culture is regressed on Japanese and Korean cultures, taking Models (19) and (20) for example, and the residuals are used for estimation. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. AUC: area under receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. PRE: proportional reduction in error. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Concerning Hypothesis 3, Table 5.5 reports the regression results for both surveys.

Regardless of different measurements and estimations, there exists a significant and positive association between generalized cultural exposure and superordinate identity, which supports Hypothesis 3. All else being equal, individuals who consume diverse foreign-produced cultural products are more likely to embrace a superordinate identity, such as a common Asian identity. According to IV-oprobit in Model (26), when generalized exposure changes from 1=never to 6=almost everyday, the probability of a strong Asian identity will increase by 66.3 percentage points. The corresponding marginal effect is weaker for ordered probit in Model (25) (4.1 percentage points) and Model (27) (3.9 percentage points). Even if taking endogeneity into

account, the effect of generalized exposure on superordinate identity is statistically and substantively significant.

Table 5.5 Oprobit and IV-oprobit analysis of generalized exposure's effect on superordinate identity

	<u>AsiaBarometer Survey</u>		<u>East Asian Social Survey</u>			
	Oprobit (25)	IV-oprobit (26)	Oprobit (27)	Oprobit (28)	Oprobit (29)	Oprobit (30)
<i>First stage</i>						
TV in house	—	0.47***	—	—	—	—
	—	(0.05)	—	—	—	—
<i>F</i>	—	104.63	—	—	—	—
<i>Second stage</i>						
Generalized exposure	0.02*	0.42***	0.19***	0.20***	0.19***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Travel abroad	0.01	-0.02	0.16***	0.12***	0.11**	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Job contact	-0.01	-0.01	—	—	—	—
	(0.11)	(0.09)	—	—	—	—
Foreign acquaintances	—	—	0.16***	0.19***	0.24***	0.23***
	—	—	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Social trust	0.10**	0.08**	—	—	—	—
	(0.05)	(0.04)	—	—	—	—
National pride/identity	0.02	0.02	0.22***	0.33***	0.21***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Traditionalism	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interest in global issues	—	—	0.05***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***
	—	—	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Symbolic threat	—	—	0.04***	-0.01	0.06***	0.06***
	—	—	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.10***	-0.08***	—	—	—	—
	(0.02)	(0.02)	—	—	—	—
Democratic value	0.15***	0.12***	—	—	—	—
	(0.03)	(0.02)	—	—	—	—
Level of religiosity	-0.01	-0.01	—	—	—	—
	(0.02)	(0.01)	—	—	—	—
Male	0.09**	0.07**	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Employment status	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Household income	0.09***	0.07***	0.06***	0.03*	0.06***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	0.11***	0.08***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.00*	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Urban	—	—	-0.02	-0.04	0.03	-0.03
	—	—	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
τ_1	-0.04	1.19***	2.12***	2.49***	2.00***	1.93***

	<u>AsiaBarometer Survey</u>		<u>East Asian Social Survey</u>			
	Oprobit (25)	IV-oprobit (26)	Oprobit (27)	Oprobit (28)	Oprobit (29)	Oprobit (30)
τ_2	(0.24) 1.15***	(0.25) 2.14***	(0.13) 3.25***	(0.16) 3.76***	(0.15) 3.12***	(0.14) 2.98***
τ_3	(0.24) —	(0.21) —	(0.13) 4.50***	(0.16) 5.19***	(0.15) 4.32***	(0.14) 4.07***
Log likelihood	-4544.36	-14925.10	-8457.57	-5737.20	-6110.28	-6872.30
Number of respondents	5,241	5,677	8,418	5,442	6,419	6,981
Number of countries	6	6	4	3	3	3

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Instrumental variable in Model (26) is cable TV ownership. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. Foreign travel and acquaintances focus on Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and Korea in Models (27)-(30) respectively. Respondents in China are excluded in Model (28), respondents in Japan are excluded in Model (29), and respondents in Korea are excluded in Model (30). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

5.3 Testing Hypotheses 4 and 5

According to Hypothesis 4, the impact of generalized cultural exposure on outgroup attitudes is conditioned by perceived symbolic threat. As demonstrated in Table 5.6, the multiplicative interaction terms between generalized exposure and symbolic threat are statistically significant and positively signed, which means that the positive effect of generalized exposure will grow larger for people with a higher level of threat perception. Figure 5.3(a) displays the conditional marginal effect based on the interaction term in Model (31). When the level of perceived symbolic threat changes from 3 to 7, the marginal effect of generalized exposure on opinion of China will increase by 11.5 percentage points. On the other hand, for individuals with lower levels of symbolic threat (below 3), generalized exposure seems to have little significant impact. Hence, those who initially perceive outgroups to be threatening can benefit most from generalized cultural exposure in improving their attitudes toward foreign countries.

Table 5.6 Probit analysis of the moderating effect of perceived symbolic threat (EASS)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Generalized exposure	-0.09 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Symbolic threat	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)
Generalized exposure×	0.08***	0.05**	0.04**	0.03*	0.03**	0.02
Symbolic threat	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group-specific exposure	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Travel abroad	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.23*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	0.40*** (0.08)	0.15** (0.07)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Interest in global issues	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Male	0.09** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Age	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Education	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Log likelihood	-3208.67	-3445.65	-3432.82	-3601.87	-4368.90	-4475.15
AUC	0.63	0.62	0.79	0.79	0.66	0.66
PRE	2.4%	6.9%	36%	42.6%	9%	18.3%
Observations	5,332	5,326	6,387	6,385	6,852	6,860

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign coworkers and relatives respectively. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. AUC: area under receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. PRE: proportional reduction in error. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.3 Conditional marginal effect of generalized cultural exposure on opinion of China

Note: The solid lines represent marginal effects while the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal lines indicate zero effects. Both perceived symbolic threat and interest in global issues are a seven-point scale. Figure 5.3(a) is based on Model (31) in Table 5.6 while Figure 5.3(b) on Model (37) in Table 5.7.

In a similar vein, Table 5.7 shows that the interaction between generalized exposure and interest in global issues is statistically significant and negatively signed, which lends empirical support to Hypothesis 5. The effect of generalized exposure on outgroup attitudes is moderated by interest in global issues. For people more interested in global issues, the positive impact of generalized exposure will become smaller. As exhibited in Figure 5.3(b) based on Model (37), when interest in global issues changes from 1 to 5, the marginal effect of generalized cultural exposure on opinion of China will decrease by 6 percentage points. Conversely, for those already very interested in global issues (above 6), the effect of generalized exposure will become insignificant. Accordingly, individuals who are less interested in global issues tend to gain more from generalized cultural exposure in improving their perceptions of foreign nations.

Table 5.7 Probit analysis of the moderating effect of interest in global issues (EASS)

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
Generalized exposure	0.34*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.10* (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)
Interest in global issues	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)

	Opinion of China		Opinion of Japan		Opinion of Korea	
	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
Generalized exposure ^x	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03**	-0.03***
Interest in global issues	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group-specific exposure	-0.02	0.01	0.10***	0.05**	0.08***	0.07***
Travel abroad	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign acquaintances	-0.00	-0.01	0.12**	0.17***	0.05	0.06
National identity	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Traditionalism	0.23***	0.19***	0.29***	0.08	0.40***	0.15**
Symbolic threat	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Male	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07***	0.03
Age	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Urban	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02**	-0.04***	-0.01
Education	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment status	-0.03**	-0.07***	-0.06***	-0.09***	-0.06***	-0.09***
Household income	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log likelihood	0.09**	0.11***	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04
AUC	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
PRE	-0.00*	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00**	-0.01***	-0.01***
Observations	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
	-0.02	-0.01	-0.12***	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.11***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
	-0.00	-0.01	0.01*	-0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	-0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
	0.06***	0.04*	0.02	0.04*	0.05**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	-3214.54	-3444.45	-3434.96	-3602.40	-4368.93	-4472.67
	0.63	0.62	0.79	0.78	0.66	0.66
	1.5%	5.7%	35.7%	42.9%	9%	18.3%
	5,332	5,326	6,387	6,385	6,852	6,860

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign coworkers and relatives respectively. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. AUC: area under receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. PRE: proportional reduction in error. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

5.4 Testing Hypothesis 6

With reference to Hypothesis 6, the positive impact of group-specific cultural exposure on outgroup attitudes is partially explained by a common superordinate identity based on generalized cultural exposure. To test this indirect pathway, I use generalized structural equation models (SEMs) where generalized exposure and common identity are, sequentially, mediators.¹⁹

¹⁹ See Table A9 in the appendix for the complete report. Given space constraints, only the ABS data set is employed in the following SEM analyses. The corresponding results based on EASS are displayed in the appendix.

As revealed in Figures 5.4 to 5.6, after controlling for the direct effect of group-specific exposure, there exists a significant indirect effect. For example, individuals with greater exposure to Chinese culture tend to consume other foreign-made cultural products at the same time. As a result, they are more likely to embrace a common supranational identity, contributing to a favorable opinion of China. Noticeably, this mediating mechanism is independent of one's direct exposure to Chinese culture. Figure 5.7 further combines the above three SEMs into one single model, the reduced Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) suggest an improved goodness of fit. The overall empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 6. Generalized exposure and common identity are two significant intervening variables linking group-specific exposure to outgroup attitudes. In other words, decategorization and recategorization are complementary in promoting individual attitudes toward foreign countries.




Figure 5.4 SEM analysis of the pathway from exposure to Chinese culture to opinion of China

Note: Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are omitted for space constraints. AIC=38335.25, BIC=38536.03. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.5 SEM analysis of the pathway from exposure to Japanese culture to opinion of Japan

Note: Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are omitted for space constraints. AIC=37849.22, BIC=38050. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.6 SEM analysis of the pathway from exposure to Korean culture to opinion of Korea

Note: Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are omitted for space constraints. AIC=34426, BIC=34626.76. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.7 SEM analysis of the association between cultural exposure and opinion of foreign country

Note: Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are omitted for space constraints. AIC=-131622.4, BIC=-131100.3. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

5.5 Testing Hypotheses 7 and 8

In addition to the same predictors in the fixed-effects models, I generate a new country-level covariate of generalized cultural exposure—a country mean based on the corresponding individual-level covariate—when testing the two multilevel hypotheses.²⁰ Although the number of countries in the data set limits a rigorous examination given few degrees of freedom at the aggregate level, the statistical analyses below can still, to some extent, provide an exploratory test of my arguments. Concerning the outcome variables, in lieu of specific attitudes toward

²⁰ Only the ABS data set is employed in the following statistical analyses because the three countries in EASS are insufficient for multilevel modeling.

China, Japan, and Korea, I employ factor analysis to create a composite latent scale that captures more generalized attitudes toward foreign countries. Moreover, I add four additional items tapping one's trust in the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They are used as an alternative operationalization of outgroup attitudes.²¹ According to the constructivist paradigm, a more inclusive collective identity via social contact gives rise to not only pro-outsider views but also interstate cooperation. In this logic, in countries with greater cultural exposure, individuals are also more likely to hold trusting attitudes toward major international organizations (IOs) that are the basis of a collaborative, peaceful, and harmonious world order. Given that both IOs and foreign countries are generalized outgroups (vis-à-vis local/national ingroups), the new measurements can further check the validity and generalizability of the constructivist proposition.




Figure 5.8 Bivariate correlation between country-level generalized cultural exposure, superordinate identity, and opinion of foreign countries

Note: The solid lines represent the fitted linear correlations while the shaded areas the 95% confidence intervals.

²¹ The four items are recoded as follows: 1=Don't trust at all, 2=Don't really trust, 3=Trust to a degree, and 4=Trust a lot.

Before regression analysis, I first present the country-level bivariate correlation between generalized cultural exposure and superordinate identity (see Figure 5.8(a)) and that between generalized cultural exposure and opinion of foreign countries (see Figure 5.8(b)).²² Intuitively, both illustrate a positive correlation. Countries characterized by greater cultural exposure tend to have a stronger superordinate identity as well as a more favorable opinion of other foreign countries. The results are in accordance with constructivism: Long-time socialization facilitates identity reconstruction and recategorization through which new intersubjective understandings between states bring about a shared supranational identity and a pro-outsider view. Considering Indonesia, the lowest in cultural exposure in Southeast Asia, the country as a whole was short of a common Asian identity and was least friendly toward other nations. On the contrary, Cambodia, with the highest level of cultural exposure, adopted the strongest Asian identity and held the most favorable outgroup attitudes.

Table 5.8 Multilevel analysis of the country-level effect of generalized cultural exposure (ABS)

	Common identity (43)	Foreign countries (44)	Trust in UN (45)	Trust in WTO (46)	Trust in WB (47)	Trust in IMF (48)
<i>Country-level effect</i>						
Generalized exposure	0.23*** (0.08)	0.16*** (0.06)	0.26* (0.14)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.07)
<i>Individual-level effect</i>						
Generalized exposure	0.01* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Travel abroad	-0.00 (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)
Job contact	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Social trust	0.05** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)
National pride	0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)

²² Here, generalized cultural exposure, superordinate identity, and opinion of foreign countries are all country means based on their respective individual-level variables.

	Common identity (43)	Foreign countries (44)	Trust in UN (45)	Trust in WTO (46)	Trust in WB (47)	Trust in IMF (48)
Democratic value	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Level of religiosity	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Male	0.04** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Employment status	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Household income	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Education	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Country-level variance	0.017	0.010	0.059	0.015	0.011	0.013
Individual-level variance	0.410	0.393	0.494	0.511	0.504	0.542
Intraclass correlation	0.041	0.024	0.107	0.028	0.020	0.024
Number of respondents	5,241	4,495	4,961	4,707	4,733	4,671
Number of countries	6	6	6	6	6	6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Multilevel modeling is based on restricted maximum likelihood estimation. All dependent variables are treated as continuous. Data are drawn from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey. Constants are omitted for space constraints. Opinion of foreign countries is the weighted sum of opinions of China, Japan, and South Korea (through factor analysis). UN: United Nations. WTO: World Trade Organization. WB: World Bank. IMF: International Monetary Fund. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table 5.8 reports the results of multilevel analysis. In Models (43) and (44), the country-level predictor of generalize cultural exposure is statistically significant and positively signed. Consistent with Hypotheses 7 and 8, in countries with higher levels of cultural exposure, individuals are more likely to embrace a common superordinate identity and to have a positive perception of foreign countries. Besides, this contextual variable is significantly and positively correlated with trust in the UN, WTO, WB, and IMF. According to Models (45) to (48), in countries with higher levels of cultural exposure, individuals generally hold more trusting attitudes toward the four IOs, which lends additional credence to the constructivist proposition. Specifically, when a country's cultural exposure level changes from "never" to "almost everyday," its citizens' common Asian identity (three-point scale), outgroup attitudes (five-point

scale), and trust in the UN (four-point scale), for instance, will all increase by about one unit. In sum, the effects of generalized cultural exposure at the aggregate level are statistically significant and substantively large.

5.6 Testing Hypothesis 9

The outcome variables of interest here are opinions on globalization, immigration, transnational actors, and international cooperation more generally. In ABS, the selected items are trust in multinational corporations (MNCs) and trust in IOs (i.e., the UN, WTO, WB, and IMF). Each of them is a four-point scale from 1 “Don’t trust at all” to 4 “Trust a lot.” A higher value indicates a more favorable opinion on transnational actors like MNCs and major IOs. Through factor analysis, I combine the three outgroup attitudes and the above five items into a composite index to measure opinion on international cooperation. The regression results based on the IV estimation are reported in Table 5.9. Statistically, the coefficients of generalized cultural exposure are significant in four out of six models. Respondents more exposed to diverse foreign cultural products tend to hold more positive attitudes toward MNCs, UN, WTO, and international cooperation. Supportive of Hypothesis 9, individuals with greater generalized cultural exposure are more likely to evaluate transnational actors and interstate cooperation favorably. Take trust in MNCs and UN for example. As displayed in Figure 5.9, when the level of cultural exposure changes from “never” to “almost everyday,” the probability of a trusting attitude toward MNCs and UN will respectively increase by 19.5 and 23.6 percentage points. Numerically, the estimated marginal effects on attitudes toward transnational actors are comparable to those on attitudes toward foreign countries.

Table 5.9 IV analysis of generalized cultural exposure's effect on globalization attitudes (ABS)

	MNCs (49)	UN (50)	WTO (51)	WB (52)	IMF (53)	IC (54)
<i>First stage</i>						
TV in house	0.47*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
<i>F</i>	104.63	104.63	104.63	104.63	104.63	8.22
<i>Second stage</i>						
Generalized exposure	0.18** (0.08)	0.15* (0.08)	0.21*** (0.08)	0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)	0.40* (0.21)
Travel abroad	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
Job contact	0.02 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
Social trust	0.05 (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)
National pride	0.10*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Traditionalism	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)
Democratic value	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Level of religiosity	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Male	0.04 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Employment status	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)
Household income	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Number of respondents	5,677	5,677	5,677	5,677	5,677	3,919
Number of countries	6	6	6	6	6	6

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2007 AsiaBarometer Survey. Instrumental variable is cable TV ownership. IV-oprobit in Models (49) to (53) while 2SLS in Model (54). Opinion on IC is the weighted sum of eight items including opinion of China, Japan, and Korea and trust in MNCs, UN, WTO, WB, and IMF (through factor analysis). Country dummies, cut-off points, and constants are omitted for space constraints. MNC: multinational corporation. UN: United Nations. WTO: World Trade Organization. WB: World Bank. IMF: International Monetary Fund. IC: international cooperation. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.9 Average marginal effects of generalized cultural exposure on trust in MNCs and the UN
Note: The solid lines represent marginal effects while the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. Figure 5.9(a) is based on Model (49) while Figure 5.9(b) on Model (50) in Table 5.9. MNC: multinational corporation. UN: United Nations.

In EASS, the dependent variables are immigration and globalization attitudes. First, opinion on immigration is tapped by the survey question “Would you like foreign workers to increase or decrease in your country?” The response is a five-point scale from 1 “decrease greatly” to 5 “increase greatly.” Second, opinion on globalization is based on the question “Do you think mobility of people, goods, and capital among countries is good or bad for your country’s economy?” The original seven-point scale is recoded so that a larger number denotes a more positive opinion. Then, outgroup attitudes and the above two items are incorporated into a single scale to capture opinion on international cooperation. Table 5.10 below presents the full regression results. As hypothesized, generalized cultural exposure has a significant and positive association with opinions on immigration, globalization, and international cooperation. According to Figure 5.10, when the level of generalized exposure changes from “never” to “often,” for instance, the probability of both pro-immigration and pro-globalization attitudes will increase by about 3 percentage points. Given endogeneity, the estimated marginal effects of

cultural exposure, albeit statistically significant, are much smaller in magnitude than those using the IV estimation. In brief, the empirical evidence based on different surveys, operationalizations, and specifications reflects that generalized cultural exposure is positively associated with opinions on globalization, immigration, transnational actors, and international cooperation more generally.

Table 5.10 Statistical analysis of generalized cultural exposure's effect on globalization attitudes (EASS)

	Immigration (55)	Globalization (56)	IC (57)	IC (58)	IC (59)	IC (60)
Generalized exposure	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Travel abroad	0.20*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Foreign acquaintances	0.19*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
National identity	0.01 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Traditionalism	0.02* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.00)
Interest in global issues	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Symbolic threat	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Male	0.07*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Urban	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Education	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Employment status	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Household income	0.11*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Observations	8,368	8,142	1,852	3,265	3,604	4,791

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 East Asian Social Survey. Ordered probit in Models (55) to (56) while OLS in Models (57) to (60). Opinion on IC is the weighted sum including immigration and globalization attitudes and opinion of China, Japan, and Korea in Model (57), China and Japan in Model (58), China and Korea in Model (59), while Japan and Korea in Model (58) (through factor analysis). Country dummies, cut-off points, and constants are omitted for space constraints. IC: international cooperation. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure 5.10 Average marginal effects of generalized cultural exposure on immigration and globalization attitudes
Note: The solid lines represent marginal effects while the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals. Figure 5.10(a) is based on Model (55) while Figure 5.10(b) on Model (56) in Table 5.10.

5.7 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Check

On the whole, both single-equation estimation and IV estimation have shown that cultural exposure has a significant and positive association with outgroup attitudes. In particular, the IV models suggest that the conventional regression leads to a downward bias and that the true association seems to be much greater. However, for a valid instrument, the exclusion restriction assumption has to be satisfied.²³ That is, the instrument, in theory, has no correlation with the unobserved error term. Put formally, Y is the outcome vector, X is a matrix of the key explanatory variable, ε are unobservables, and Z is a matrix of the instrument. As displayed in the equation below, exclusion restriction requires that $\gamma = 0$, namely, zero correlation between Z and Y . When this correlation deviates from zero, the estimated β in the IV models will become biased and inconsistent. Because of a just-identified model where the number of endogenous

²³ Because the first-stage F statistics are all above ten, there are no serious weak instrument problems. In other words, cable TV ownership is a relatively good predictor of cultural exposure.

variable is equal to that of IV, the strong assumption of instrumental exogeneity is empirically untestable.

$$Y = X\beta + Z\gamma + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

On the other hand, Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) bring forth the concept of “plausible exogeneity” where γ is likely to deviate from zero but the deviation is not expected to be substantial. Since the precision of the estimated β depends on the value of γ , sensitivity analysis can be employed to check whether the IV estimator is sensitive to the violation of exclusion restriction. According to Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012), there are two kinds of sensitivity analysis given a plausibly exogenous instrument in a linear model. The first is called the union of confidence intervals (UCI) with a relaxed assumption that γ ranges from γ_{min} to γ_{max} . The second is called the local to zero (LTZ) approximation where γ is assumed to have some arbitrary distribution. In what follows, I conduct both analyses on the basis of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) (vis-à-vis ordinary least squares (OLS)). Take the case of China in Hypothesis 1. The endogenous variable is exposure to Chinese culture, the outcome variable is opinion of China (treated as continuous), and the plausibly exogenous IV is cable TV ownership. The parameter β is thus the causal effect of exposure to Chinese culture on opinion of China. Assuming perfect instrumental exogeneity, the estimated β is 0.264 with a 95% confidence interval [0.156, 0.372] under 2SLS (vis-à-vis 0.053 with a 95% confidence interval [0.039, 0.068] under OLS).²⁴ To check the robustness of IV estimation, I loosen the original assumption

²⁴ See Table A10 in the appendix for a complete report of 2SLS and OLS. In addition to 2SLS, the extended regression models (available in Stata) can provide similar IV estimates. Despite small numerical differences, the two approaches are asymptotically equivalent. In more detail, 2SLS implements OLS estimation separately in two stages where one equation is fitted without specifying the functional form of the other. By contrast, the extended linear regression uses ML estimation and takes the two equations jointly into account when estimating structural parameters. It outperforms 2SLS in producing correlation estimates between equation disturbances (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyatt 2011). The full results of extended regression models are reported in Table A11.

and allow a minor correlation between cable TV ownership and opinion of China. On condition that β is less sensitive to a range of non-zero, moderate γ , the earlier inferences based on the IV approach will be considered relatively solid.




Figure 5.11 The union of confidence intervals (UCI) and the local to zero (LTZ) approximation sensitivity analyses
Note: The bold horizontal lines represent the 2SLS point estimate $\beta=0.264$ (given perfect exogeneity). The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals (given plausible exogeneity). In Figure 5.11(a), γ changes from 0 to 0.087. In Figure 5.11(b), $\gamma \sim U(0, \delta)$ where δ ranges from 0 to 0.087.

Given that the linear correlation between cable TV ownership and opinion of China is about 0.087, γ is expected to be positive if it deviates from zero. In the UCI approach, I assume γ to have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 0.087. Taking this potential deviation into account, sensitivity analysis shows that β will have a lower bound of 0.019 and an upper bound of 0.372. As illustrated in Figure 5.11(a), when γ changes from 0 to 0.087, the upper bound of β is consistently 0.372 and the lower bound decreases from 0.156 to 0.019. As the interval gets wider, the precision of 2SLS estimation will correspondingly decline. Alternatively, other than a postulated minimum or maximum value, I assume γ to follow a uniform distribution. That is, $\gamma \sim U(0, \delta)$ where $\delta \in [0, 0.087]$. The LTZ sensitivity analysis suggests that the upper and lower bounds of β are 0.054 and 0.327. According to Figure 5.11(b), compared with the 2SLS

bounds, the LTZ bounds—both upper and lower—will grow smaller in magnitude with the rise of δ , which implies a downward bias. Taken together, the above two sensitivity analyses indicate that the estimation of β will become less accurate when the value of γ deviates from zero. Nevertheless, the new confidence intervals on the endogenous variable do not contain zero but still contain the 2SLS estimator, so the IV estimation does not seem to be very sensitive to the violation of exclusion restriction. To some extent, the new upper bounds are comparable to that of 2SLS, whereas the new lower bounds are comparable to that of OLS. Despite moderately diminished precision, causal inference regarding the effect of cultural exposure on outgroup attitudes remains informative under weaker-than-standard assumptions.

Apart from plausible exogeneity, another way to check the robustness of IV estimation is the kinky least squares (KLS), an instrument-free approach for linear regression developed by Kiviet (2020). Distinct from 2SLS, KLS does not require a valid instrument for consistent estimation in the presence of endogeneity. To achieve (set) identification of β , the KLS regression posits some plausible correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term, without reliance on the stringent yet untestable exclusion restriction assumption. Allowing for a reasonable range of postulated endogeneity correlations, KLS corrects for the bias of OLS and produces consistent point estimates and asymptotically conservative confidence intervals. Moreover, the KLS approach can provide a type of exclusion restriction test that is analogous to a test of coefficient equality between 2SLS and KLS estimates. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, both 2SLS and KLS estimators are consistent and the exclusion restriction holds (conditional on correctly specified endogeneity correlations). Consequently, the KLS inference facilitates sensitivity tests for IV-based procedures.




Figure 5.12 KLS assuming endogeneity correlation

Note: Figure 5.12(a) presents KLS and 2SLS estimates assuming endogeneity correlation between -0.525 and -0.200. Figure 5.12(b) displays p -values for the KLS exclusion restriction test assuming endogeneity correlation to be -0.374. Take the case of China in Hypothesis 1. The endogenous variable is exposure to Chinese culture.

According to the IV-based extended regression models (ERMs), the estimated correlation coefficient between the errors from the primary (second stage in 2SLS) and auxiliary (first stage in 2SLS) equations is -0.374 with a 95% confidence interval [-0.525, -0.200], which implies that the correlation between the endogenous variable and the error term in OLS is likely to be negative. The endogeneity potentially comes from measurement error in cultural exposure and/or an omitted variable that is negatively correlated with both cultural exposure and outgroup attitudes. Given this information, I first assume the endogeneity correlation in KLS to have a range [-0.525, -0.200]. As exhibited in Figure 5.12(a), the KLS and 2SLS confidence intervals largely overlap across the postulated range. The 2SLS point estimate is inside of the KLS interval when the endogeneity correlation is between -0.4 and -0.3, notably containing -0.374. Furthermore, when the endogeneity correlation is assumed to be -0.374, the KLS approach reveals that the estimated β is 0.273, a number approximate to that of the 2SLS estimator

(0.264).²⁵ The p -values for the KLS exclusion restriction test are presented in Figure 5.12(b). The bold horizontal line is the 5% significance level below which the null hypothesis of instrumental exogeneity ($\gamma = 0$) is rejected. Apparently, when the postulated endogeneity correlation is between about -0.5 and -0.2, the null hypothesis is not rejected. The peak of the p -value curve (where p asymptotically equals one) is at a correlation of about -0.356, which is also close to the correlation estimate in ERMs (-0.374). Therefore, conditional on the specified endogeneity correlation, both KLS and 2SLS estimates seem to be consistent, and the IV is less likely to be invalid.

In summation, all of the above-mentioned sensitivity analyses suggest that the IV estimation is generally robust to the violation of exclusion restriction. Even though not perfectly exogenous, the instrument—cable TV ownership—is considered at least plausibly exogenous. The KLS approach further demonstrates this plausible exogeneity and provides estimates similar to those based on 2SLS and ERMs. By and large, the earlier IV-based inference is not very sensitive to the relaxed assumption of exclusion restriction. In spite of attenuated precision and certainty, the plausibly exogenous instrument is still beneficial in producing empirical results that are informative and meaningful. At a minimum, the conventional single-equation (e.g., OLS) estimator can be regarded as the lower bound of the true causal effect, whereas the IV (e.g., 2SLS) estimator as the upper bound.

5.8 From Public Opinion to Foreign Policy

The overall statistical analyses demonstrate that group-specific and generalized cultural exposure have positive impacts on opinions of foreign countries and transnational actors. A further question is whether such pro-outsider attitudes at the individual level (based on parasocial

²⁵ The full results of KLS models are reported in Table A11 where the KLS endogeneity correlations are assumed to equal the correlation estimates in ERMs.

intercultural contact) correspondingly affect foreign policy at the country level. On the one hand, foreign policy is generally negotiated and implemented by political leaders who can, to some extent, manipulate and shift public opinion toward their preferred outcome. Briefly, foreign policy opinion/formation is largely driven in a top-down fashion where elites play a far more decisive role than the public (Almond 1950; Berinsky 2007, 2009; Brody 1991; Cohen 1973; Foyle 1997; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Lippmann 1955; Morgenthau 1973; Zaller 1992). In the United States, for instance, political elites often make unsupported or false claims about foreign nations, especially China in recent years. Although refuted by economic experts in the IMF and US Treasury Department, President Trump has asserted many times that China was deliberately manipulating its currency and disadvantaging the United States in bilateral trade. According to a nationwide survey, a vast majority of Americans believe that the false claim by Trump is accurate and are confident in their misperceptions, in spite of extensive evidence to the contrary (Flynn, Horiuchi, and Zhang 2020). It is also argued that political and media elites attempt to shape public opinion by strategically framing issues (Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Zaller 1992). In political communication, framing effects will occur if the same sociopolitical/economic issue, presented in different ways by politicians, alter public attitudes and beliefs (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016). A successful issue framing implies that “political elites can manipulate popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 120). Meta-analyzing 138 experiments with 237 framing effects, Amsalem and Zoizner (2022) conclude that framing has a statistically significant influence over people’s political attitudes. More importantly, the average magnitude of framing effects is found to be substantive. Therefore, how political elites talk about a foreign country may induce motivated bias, misinformation, and conspiratorial thinking, which in turn shapes popular attitudes and

policy preferences. Under this situation, a pro-outsider public opinion based on mediated intercultural contact will not necessarily lead to a cooperative foreign policy.

On the other hand, elite discourse is likely to follow and reflect the dominant public opinion, rather than the other way around (Bartels 1991; Checkel 1997; Fanis 2011; Hartley and Russett 1992; Holsti 1996; Melanson 2005; Nincic 1992; Page and Shapiro 1983, 1992; Small 1988). In the presence of a common policy preference shared by the elites and the masses, the resultant foreign policy can be predicted, to a large degree, by representative public opinion surveys (Canes-Wrone 2006). In contrast, when the preference of the elites is explicitly at odds with that of the masses, the policy outcome will be less certain and/or be relatively biased in favor of the latter given less room for persuasion, manipulation, or propaganda (Powlick and Katz 1998). The five survey experiments conducted by Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017: 555) reveal that “people are perhaps more resistant to elite manipulation than some of the more pessimistic elite-driven models of public opinion suggest.” Although politicians can ignore public opinion and stick to their preferred policy choice, it will inevitably incur high political costs (Kim and Margalit 2021). The Brexit is a case in point. For all the mainstream party leaders’ inclination to maintain Britain’s EU membership (e.g., David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Jeremy Corbyn, and Nichola Sturgeon), the referendum ended with the victory of those British citizens in the Leave camp who were skeptical of the political establishment, open labor markets, economic globalization, and European integration (Norris and Inglehart 2019). “British political elites shared similar values endorsing social liberalism, multiculturalism, and EU membership, but working-class voters and older social conservatives held values that reflected a more authoritarian, xenophobic, and nativist response to immigration and EU membership” (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 375). More broadly, the worldwide popular backlash against globalization in

recent years has generated a series of foreign policy outcomes, for example, an increase in discriminatory trade policies and a decrease in pro-trade reforms (Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra 2021). In particular, the incidence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—a leading force in economic globalization—has considerably slowed (Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra 2021). As Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra (2021: 2274) point out, “Not only has trade plateaued and FDI declined, but protectionist policies are on the rise, trade liberalization has fallen, investment restrictions have increased, and the average political party has become more opposed to globalization, especially among richer countries.” In this respect, public opinion is supposed to be a key determinant of foreign policy formulation.

If anti-trade public opinion gives rise to protectionist foreign trade policy, then pro-outsider, pro-globalization public opinion will facilitate cooperative foreign policy. To be specific, a country’s pro-China opinion based on exposure to Chinese culture, for instance, is expected to correlate with more cooperative bilateral relations with China. Analogously, a country’s pro-globalization opinion based on exposure to diverse foreign cultures is expected to correlate with more cooperative multilateral relations with other countries around the world. As a preliminary exploration of the above propositions, I employ a country’s trade dependence on Chinese and global markets to operationalize its bilateral and multilateral foreign policy. In detail, dependence on trade with China is measured as the sum of exports and imports between China and a country, divided by that country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Likewise, dependence on international trade is measured as the sum of a country’s total exports and imports, divided by its GDP. As displayed in Figure 5.13, both exposure to Chinese culture and opinion of China have a positive correlation with trade dependence on China. The similar pattern is found in Figure 5.14 where generalized cultural exposure and trust in MNCs are positively

correlated with dependence on global trade, despite a lower correlation strength in Figure 5.14(b). On the whole, the positive bivariate correlations imply that foreign policy outcome is, to some extent, in line with public opinion. Regarding trade policy, Asian countries where citizens consume more Chinese and foreign cultural products tend to have stronger bilateral and multilateral economic relations with China and other countries. In addition, when Asian citizens are more pro-China and pro-globalization, their countries seem to establish closer trade ties with China in particular and the world in general. Admittedly, the illustrations here are merely suggestive due to a non-random small sample size without sufficient controls. Nevertheless, in terms of trade interdependence in East Asia, foreign policy, at least, does not appear to conflict with public opinion. The odds are that the elites and the masses share the same pro-outsider, pro-globalization preferences. Alternatively, their preferences may be incongruent, but the policy outcome reflects the pro-outsider, pro-globalization public opinion, perhaps given ineffective elite manipulation. Regardless, public opinion matters and (positively) correlates with foreign economic policy. Future longitudinal or experimental research can more rigorously examine the causal effects of public opinion and intercultural contact on different foreign policies (e.g., security, investment, aid, migration, energy, and environment), which will provide more direct, realistic, and prominent implications for relevant policymakers.




Figure 5.13 Bivariate correlation between bilateral trade with China, exposure to Chinese culture, and opinion of China

Note: The solid lines represent the fitted linear correlations while the shaded areas the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 5.14 Bivariate correlation between trade dependence, generalized cultural exposure, and trust in MNCs

Note: The solid lines represent the fitted linear correlations while the shaded areas the 95% confidence intervals. MNC: multinational corporation.

6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Building upon the parasocial contact theory where indirect unidirectional contact via mass media ameliorates intergroup relations, I propose the positive effects of exposure to foreign-made cultural products on individual attitudes toward foreign countries. Media-based intergroup contact alone does not necessarily dampen ingroup bias or outgroup prejudice. Rather, exposure to political news about foreign nations may intensify intergroup negativity since outgroupers are often negatively, stereotypically portrayed. I contend that media content and media producer are two crucial yet underexplored factors in the existing contact literature. For an effective prejudice-reducing impact, the media products consumed by ingroup members should be culture-focused and produced by outgroups, such as foreign TV programs, movies, animation, and video games. Moreover, I categorize exposure to foreign-made cultural products into two types: group-specific exposure to a foreign culture and generalized exposure to diverse foreign cultures. On the one hand, group-specific exposure to a foreign country's cultural products facilitates information and knowledge about the target, cultivates outgroup liking and affinity, and encourages empathy, perspective taking, and identification with the outgroup media characters. On account of decategorization via repeated group-specific cultural exposure, group-level relationships are gradually mixed, blurred, and even replaced by parasocial relationships at the individual level. As a result, ingroup audiences tend to deemphasize between-group differences, avoid negative stereotyping, and hold a favorable perception of the contacted foreign nation. On the other hand, the effect of group-specific exposure can be extended to other noncontacted outgroups, giving rise to a more generalized exposure effect. Growing exposure to a variety of foreign cultures prompts one to recategorize self-other boundaries and to reconstruct a more inclusive superordinate identity that subsumes and transcends subgroup national identity. Recategorization

via generalized cultural exposure is embodied by a cosmopolitan world outlook in this increasingly globalized and interconnected era. Echoing the psychological microfoundations of constructivism in international relations, it is identity that plays a central role in accounting for state behavior and world politics. Long-time socialization and acculturation, from a constructivist perspective, helps to (re)construct a common “we” identity in the international community that promotes mutual trust and cooperation between states. Accordingly, citizens who consume a diversity of foreign cultural products are expected to have a supranational identity and a pro-outsider view.

Drawing upon data from the ABS and EASS, my research lends empirical support to both group-specific and generalized cultural exposure effects. In East Asia, individuals frequently exposed to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean cultures tended to hold more positive attitudes toward China, Japan, and Korea (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, Asian citizens with greater generalized cultural exposure were more likely to have a favorable opinion of the three foreign countries and to adopt a shared Asian identity beyond their national identity (Hypotheses 2 and 3). I then put forward two conditional hypotheses where the positive impact of generalized exposure is moderated by perceived symbolic threat and interest in global issues. The corresponding regression analyses show that both interaction effects are statistically significant. Respondents who initially perceived foreign cultures to be threatening and were uninterested in global issues can benefit more from the prejudice-reducing effect of generalized exposure (Hypotheses 4 and 5). On top of that, I take group-specific and generalized cultural exposure jointly into consideration and suggest a mediating effect where the positive association between group-specific exposure and outgroup attitudes is partially explained by a superordinate identity based on generalized exposure. Structural equation modeling reflects that generalized exposure and

common identity are two significant intervening variables after controlling for the direct impact of group-specific exposure (Hypothesis 6). Thereafter, using multilevel modeling, I examine the contextual effect of generalized cultural exposure at the aggregate level. In accordance with the constructivist paradigm, in countries with higher levels of cultural exposure, citizens were more likely to evaluate foreign nations favorably, embrace a collective Asian identity, and express trusting attitudes toward major IOs like the UN (Hypotheses 7 and 8). Finally, the positive effect of generalized cultural exposure can be extended from outgroup attitudes to globalization attitudes. Individuals exposed to a variety of foreign-made cultural products are found to have more favorable opinions on immigration, globalization, transnational actors, and international cooperation (Hypothesis 9).

Although observational data in cross-national surveys enhance an empirical study's generalizability, the causal inference is vulnerable to endogeneity. In the presence of measurement error, omitted variable bias, and/or reverse causality, the key explanatory variable—exposure to foreign cultural products—is likely to be endogenous, resulting in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. Utilizing whether having a cable TV in one's house as an instrument, the quasi-experimental IV method in this research serves to alleviate endogeneity concerns. Compared to the conventional single-equation estimation, the IV estimation implies that the causal effect of cultural exposure on outgroup attitudes is much larger. Allowing for some modest violation of the exclusion restriction assumption, a series of sensitivity analyses indicate that the IV-based inference is relatively robust under an imperfect but plausibly exogenous instrument. In addition, the instrument-free KLS approach also demonstrates this plausible exogeneity and produces results similar to those based on 2SLS and ERMs. Therefore, the overall research design and empirical methods try to achieve a balance between external

validity (given cross-national surveys) and internal validity (given a valid IV). Notably, reverse causality that pro-outsider people tend to consume more foreign cultural products does not seem to be a primary source of bias. This is consistent with the finding in prior contact studies where the causal path from intergroup contact to prejudice reduction is stronger than that from outgroup prejudice to contact avoidance (Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Powers and Ellison 1995; Wilson 1996). The qualitative work of Bouissou (2012) likewise echoes this point.

According to the 2006-2007 Manga Network Survey about European fans of Japanese animation, a vast majority of respondents in Europe stated that they “didn’t know anything about Japan” before starting to read Japanese comics (France: 53.5 percent; Germany: 52 percent; Italy: 58.1 percent). Only a very small minority have already shown an interest in Japan before the consumption of Japanese cultural products (France: 5.4 percent; Germany: 9 percent; Italy: 8.3 percent).

This study also provides implications and suggestions for some sociopolitical issues in the real world. First of all, recent years have witnessed a new trend of anti-globalization and anti-immigration public opinion, for instance, the border wall dispute between the United States and Mexico, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, and the rise of many right-wing populist and authoritarian political leaders/parties globally. Propelling parasocial intercultural contact may be one of the effective ways to reduce outgroup prejudice, improve tolerance of ethnic/racial diversity, and protect a collaborative, peaceful, and harmonious world order from extreme ethnonationalism and xenophobia. In East Asia, for example, mediated intercultural contact has laid the mass attitudinal groundwork for deeper and broader regional integration and cooperation. Inter-Asian media culture circulation has made more and more East Asians connected through transnational media culture consumption, advanced cross-border parasocial

dialogue, promoted mutual understanding, and contributed to the development of a common Asian identity (Chua 2004; Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Iwabuchi, 2002, 2004; Kim 2008; Lee 2008; Leung 2004). As Iwabuchi (2010: 201) puts it, “The mutual consumption of media culture has created an opportunity in which the understanding of other society and culture dramatically deepens and improves, and the socio-cultural issues and concerns are sympathetically appreciated and shared by many people in the regions.” Despite a high level of ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity, intercultural contact has steadily oriented East Asian citizens to a more inclusive, cooperative, and cosmopolitan interpretation of interstate relations.

What is more, cultural products are image-boosting agents. Exporting cultural and media products is a kind of cultural diplomacy that has the potential to influence international public opinion, reinforce a country’s soft power, and upgrade its global image. According to Chua (2012: 66), China, Japan, and South Korea are “all trying to increase their regional and global appeal through the massive production and export of pop culture products.” The Korean government, for instance, has been supporting legal, educational, and technological infrastructure essential to the development of culture-related industries so as to brand South Korea as a culturally exciting country. Most Korean pop stars, particularly world-renowned idol groups like EXO and BTS, have been systematically trained by entertainment management firms for a long time to become “qualified” in global cultural markets. Their songs are composed by a team of international and professional composers, targeting not just Korean audiences but, more importantly, foreign fans (Yang 2012). The Presidential Council on Nation Branding and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been taking advantage of the worldwide popularity of Korean pop culture to promote the country’s image and to protect its national interests (Jang and Paik 2012). The relationship between South Korea and Taiwan is a case in point. In 1992, South

Korea's normalization with China and the severance of diplomatic relationship with Taiwan greatly enraged Taiwanese people, leading to widespread anti-Korean sentiments and protests in Taiwan (Hahm and Heo 2019). However, since the 2000s, the bilateral relationship has been thawing given the rising popularity of Korean TV dramas and music in Taiwan (Hahm and Song 2021). In a 2008 survey, over 70% of Taiwanese respondents enjoyed cultural products from South Korea and had Korean entertainers that they admired. "The popularity of Korean cultural products and their associated stars has changed the national image of South Korea from a male-dominated, impoverished country that betrayed Taiwan to an affluent society with handsome men devoted to their women" (Hahm and Song 2021: 234). In part because of South Korea's soft power, socioeconomic exchanges, including trade, investment, and travel between the two societies, have incrementally expanded over time (Kim, Chen, and Su 2009). The power of culture appears to be subtler, but its longer-run influence over global public opinion and international relations should not be neglected.

On the other hand, this research also has some limitations that require continuing reflection and investigation in the future. To begin with, the two surveys for empirical analysis were conducted more than ten years ago. Whether the positive effect of cultural exposure on outgroup attitudes remains significant in present-day Asia is debatable. "Survey data captures public opinion at certain intervals while country image is a dynamic concept" (Sevin, Ayhan, and Ingenhoff 2021: 239). Besides, interstate relations in East Asia experienced many momentous changes in the past decade. For example, China has taken the place of Japan and become the world's second largest economy. With its rising economic and military power, China has been more assertive and aggressive in defending its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Such a shift in China's foreign policy has exacerbated mistrust and conflict with its neighboring

countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Drawing upon the Pew Global Attitudes and Trends Question Database (2005-2018), Xie and Jin (2022) find that the overall percentage of respondents who view China favorably is dwindling in 59 countries. Ordinary citizens in Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—countries that have maritime territorial disputes with Beijing over the East or South China Sea—are less likely to hold a positive perception of China from 2010 to 2016 (Kuo, Huang, and Chu 2022). Will Asian public opinion of today's China still be positively associated with exposure to Chinese culture? In the absence of a latest questionnaire, it is plausible to cast doubt on the validity of a positive association in the case of China. More broadly, future research can examine whether the impact of intercultural contact on outgroup attitudes is conditioned by interstate territorial disputes, namely, a test of cross-level interaction effects. This research direction echoes the paradigmatic debate in international relations between realism (power politics) and constructivism (identity politics) as well, which deserves greater clarification of the interplay between the first image (individual-level variation) and the second image (country-level variation). Meanwhile, with the rapid development of information and communications technology (ICT), the Internet, especially social networks, has exerted a prominent influence over intercultural contact in recent years. By comparison to traditional media like televisions and radios, smart phones, computers, and other new media provide ingroup members with more convenient, efficient, and instant avenues to outgroup information. While cable TV ownership is an instrument positively correlated with cultural exposure based on the extant data sets, it is expected that smart phones and computers are equally or more prevalent in propelling exposure to foreign cultural products in view of the ICT revolution. Hence, provided that a new cross-national survey is available, the level of generalized cultural exposure is likely to be higher, which in turn implies a stronger

cosmopolitan identity and a warmer outgroup attitude. Other than cable TVs, smart phones and computers are two potentially valid IVs that strengthen causal inference. Future work can seek to check whether the above logic is supported by updated empirical data. If so, various new mass media will be critical antecedent variables that predict consumption of foreign-made cultural products and its impact on opinion of foreign countries, adding to the reliability of the core theoretical framework of parasocial intergroup contact.

Relatedly, given data limitations, the statistical findings that correspond to the mediating hypothesis and the multilevel hypothesis should be interpreted with caution. First, although group-specific exposure is theoretically expected to precede generalized exposure, this is tested using cross-sectional analysis not longitudinal analysis.²⁶ In other words, the hypothesized causal mechanism is only indirectly tested in spite of statistical significance based on structural equation modeling. For a stricter test of causal mediation, future research design ought to take temporality into account and focus on time-series cross-sectional data. In light of the difficulty of data collection, it is conceivable that such a research project requires more funding and resources. Second, owing to few countries in the existing data sets, the multilevel hypothesis cannot be tested as rigorously as the individual-level hypothesis. Devoid of degrees of freedom at the country level, the likelihood of omitted variable bias can be high, which is an inherent shortcoming of random/mixed-effects models too. Besides, the countries are not randomly sampled in the surveys, so the prerequisite of null-hypothesis significance testing in general and multilevel modeling in particular is actually not met. To avoid these methodological problems, future work needs to conduct surveys in more countries, especially other non-Western societies

²⁶ Because parasocial contact needs time to take effect, for example, watching all episodes of a foreign TV drama, experiments are not considered the most appropriate research method.

in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. A larger cross-national database can enhance generalizability and external validity as well, though it consumes more time and effort.

Last but not least, this study elaborates on the psychological mechanisms where exposure to foreign cultures affects attitudes toward foreign nations, so the unit of analysis is individuals. In terms of policy implications in international security and political economy, however, it is necessary to further specify the causal pathways linking public opinion to foreign policy where outgroup attitudes are an independent or intervening variable rather than a dependent variable. Additionally, for a more policy-centered analysis, treating public opinion as unitary is inadequate. According to Putnam's (1988) two-level games, domestic interests pressure the government to adopt their favored policy at the national level. In the meantime, at the international level, the government endeavors to satisfy domestic pressures in interstate negotiation. Since an international agreement may create winners and losers domestically, the internal struggle between different interests, in large part, shapes the likelihood and magnitude of interstate (non)cooperation (Milner 1997). In this logic, a cooperative foreign policy hinges on those chief domestic interests that are pro-outsider, pro-globalization and can effectively constrain policymakers. On the other hand, not every foreign policy is equally important and not everyone has enough information or interest in global issues; only attentive individuals in well-organized societal groups are supposed to exert a substantial bottom-up influence over political elites. A potential avenue for future research is thereby to delve into the heterogeneous effects of policy domain and public attention. In respect of public attention to foreign affairs, "high politics" issues like national security are differentiated from "low politics" issues like trade and investment. In foreign policy crises where public interest is higher, policymakers are more likely to incorporate popular preferences into decision making than under the circumstances of public

quiescence (Klarevas 2002; Larson and Savych 2005; Sobel 2001). It is thus expected that the policy-public opinion linkage will vary across distinct foreign policy domains (Knecht and Weatherford 2006). On condition that the interests of the masses and the elites are at odds in a specific foreign policy, less informed citizens will be more vulnerable to elite discourse and issue framing, whereas more attentive, sophisticated citizens will assert themselves and, when mobilized to take collective actions, will compel the elites to be more responsive and accountable in the foreign policy process (Baum and Potter 2008). To sum up, although bivariate correlations in Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show positive relationships between (aggregate) intercultural contact, outgroup/globalization attitudes, and foreign trade policies, the findings are more suggestive than conclusive. More refined theoretical and empirical work is essential to a thorough scrutiny of the parasocial contact theory, particularly the prejudice-reducing effect of exposure to foreign cultures and its connection with foreign policy characterized by multiple interactions between political leaders and public opinion.

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APPENDICES

Table A1. Summary statistics based on ABS.

	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Opinion of China	5,660	3.68	0.94	1	5
Opinion of Japan	5,591	4.06	0.84	1	5
Opinion of South Korea	5,084	3.52	0.87	1	5
Opinion of foreign countries	4,943	3.71	0.66	0.98	4.91
Trust in MNCs	5,533	2.68	0.76	1	4
Trust in the UN	5,495	3.06	0.76	1	4
Trust in the WTO	5,138	2.97	0.76	1	4
Trust in the WB	5,177	3.02	0.76	1	4
Trust in the IMF	5,105	2.90	0.77	1	4
Opinion on international cooperation	4,221	3.77	0.70	1.29	5.03
Superordinate identity	5,857	2.45	0.68	1	3
Exposure to Chinese culture	5,973	3.56	1.85	1	6
Exposure to Japanese culture	5,975	2.73	1.64	1	6
Exposure to Korean culture	5,961	3.15	1.83	1	6
Generalized culture exposure	5,942	3.20	1.52	1.01	6.07
Having TV in house	6,012	0.26	0.44	0	1
Travel abroad	6,012	0.06	0.24	0	1
Job contact with foreigners	6,012	0.02	0.15	0	1
Social trust	5,988	0.16	0.37	0	1
National pride	6,002	3.83	0.47	1	4
Traditionalism	5,730	2.15	0.88	1	3
Right-leaning ideology	5,868	2.14	0.91	1	5
Democratic value	5,998	4.55	0.61	1	5
Level of religiosity	6,001	3.95	1.31	1	5
Male	6,012	0.46	0.50	0	1
Employment status	6,008	0.66	0.47	0	1
Household income	5,745	2.03	0.78	1	3
Education	6,007	2.73	1.03	1	5
Age	6,012	37.95	12.55	20	69

Table A2. Cross-national opinion of China, Japan, and Korea in ABS.

	Respondent	Opinion of China		Opinion of Japan		Opinion of Korea	
Malaysia	1,000	3.79	(0.76)	3.90	(0.78)	3.47	(0.84)
Indonesia	1,000	3.29	(1.06)	3.89	(0.94)	3.45	(0.96)
Philippine	1,000	3.51	(1.04)	4.04	(0.77)	3.53	(0.90)
Thailand	1,000	3.75	(0.76)	3.73	(0.76)	3.29	(0.71)
Cambodia	1,012	3.62	(0.93)	4.46	(0.80)	3.78	(0.91)
Laos	1,000	4.10	(0.89)	4.31	(0.73)	3.57	(0.84)

Note: Regarding opinion of each state, the first number is mean and the second is standard deviation (in parentheses). All dependent variables are a five-point scale: 1=very negative, 2=negative, 3=neither negative nor positive, 4=positive, and 5=very positive.

Table A3. Summary statistics based on EASS.

	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Closeness to Chinese coworkers	5,524	0.68	0.47	0	1
Closeness to Chinese neighbors	5,532	0.70	0.46	0	1
Closeness to Chinese relatives	5,515	0.61	0.49	0	1
Closeness to Japanese coworkers	6,504	0.59	0.49	0	1
Closeness to Japanese neighbors	6,505	0.62	0.49	0	1
Closeness to Japanese relatives	6,504	0.52	0.50	0	1
Closeness to Korean coworkers	7,024	0.59	0.49	0	1
Closeness to Korean neighbors	7,046	0.62	0.49	0	1
Closeness to Korean relatives	7,031	0.54	0.50	0	1
Opinion on immigration	8,605	2.82	1.03	1	5
Opinion on globalization	8,362	5.12	1.29	1	7
Superordinate identity	8,654	1.79	0.83	1	4
Exposure to Chinese culture	8,720	2.14	0.98	1	4
Exposure to Japanese culture	8,720	1.94	0.98	1	4
Exposure to Korean culture	8,725	2.26	1.06	1	4
Generalized culture exposure	8,715	2.00	0.68	0.94	3.76
Travel to China	5,718	0.25	0.43	0	1
Chinese acquaintances	5,697	0.20	0.40	0	1
Travel to Japan	6,581	0.17	0.37	0	1
Japanese acquaintances	6,567	0.09	0.29	0	1
Travel to Korea	7,225	0.10	0.30	0	1
Korean acquaintances	7,217	0.06	0.23	0	1
Travel to Southeast Asia	8,729	0.20	0.40	0	1
Southeast Asian acquaintances	8,704	0.08	0.28	0	1
National identity	8,713	3.36	0.65	1	4
Traditionalism	8,730	4.70	1.45	1	7
Interest in global issues	8,715	3.37	1.93	1	7
Perceived symbolic threat	8,690	3.58	1.50	1	7
Male	8,745	0.48	0.50	0	1
Age	8,743	46.02	16.36	18	98
Urban	8,711	0.72	0.45	0	1
Education	8,705	10.79	4.42	0	25
Employment status	8,740	0.64	0.48	0	1
Household income	8,695	2.60	0.82	1	5

Table A4. Cross-national opinion of China, Japan, and Korea in EASS.

	Respondent	Opinion of China		Opinion of Japan		Opinion of Korea	
China	3,010	—	—	0.34	(0.47)	0.50	(0.50)
		—	—	0.33	(0.47)	0.52	(0.50)
		—	—	0.28	(0.45)	0.44	(0.50)
Japan	2,160	0.66	(0.48)	—	—	0.70	(0.46)
		0.63	(0.48)	—	—	0.69	(0.46)
		0.56	(0.50)	—	—	0.60	(0.49)
Korea	1,508	0.78	(0.42)	0.81	(0.40)	—	—
		0.82	(0.39)	0.86	(0.35)	—	—
		0.61	(0.49)	0.66	(0.47)	—	—
Taiwan	2,067	0.63	(0.48)	0.80	(0.40)	0.61	(0.49)
		0.68	(0.47)	0.86	(0.34)	0.69	(0.46)
		0.66	(0.47)	0.79	(0.41)	0.63	(0.48)

Note: Regarding opinion of each state, the first number is mean and the second is standard deviation (in parentheses). There are three measures for a country's foreign image, based on "Can you accept the people who are from China, Japan, and South Korea (1) working alongside you in your job, (2) on your street as neighbors, and (3) as close kin by marriage?" All dependent variables are coded as follows: 1=positive; 0=negative.

Table A5. Probit analysis of the effect of group-specific cultural exposure (EASS).

	Opinion of China	Opinion of Japan	Opinion of Korea
Chinese culture	0.05** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Japanese culture	0.02 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Korean culture	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Travel abroad	-0.01 (0.05)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.08)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Interest in global issues	0.02** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Symbolic threat	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.10** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Observations	5,338	6,387	6,871

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign neighbors. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A6. Probit analysis of the effect of generalized cultural exposure (EASS).

	Opinion of China	Opinion of Japan	Opinion of Korea
Group-specific exposure	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
Generalized exposure	0.20*** (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Travel abroad	-0.01 (0.05)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.10 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.08)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Interest in global issues	0.02** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Symbolic threat	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Observations	5,338	6,387	6,871

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign neighbors. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A7. Probit analysis of the moderating effect of perceived symbolic threat (EASS).

	Opinion of China	Opinion of Japan	Opinion of Korea
Generalized exposure	-0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)
Symbolic threat	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.03)
Generalized exposure× Symbolic threat	0.06*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Group-specific exposure	-0.03 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
Travel abroad	-0.01 (0.05)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.08)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Interest in global issues	0.02** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Male	0.09** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Observations	5,338	6,387	6,871

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign neighbors. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A8. Probit analysis of the moderating effect of interest in global issues (EASS).

	Opinion of China	Opinion of Japan	Opinion of Korea
Generalized exposure	0.34*** (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)
Interest in global issues	0.10*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Generalized exposure× Interest in global issues	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Group-specific exposure	-0.02 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
Travel abroad	-0.01 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Foreign acquaintances	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.08)
National identity	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Traditionalism	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Symbolic threat	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.08** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Urban	0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Employment status	-0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Observations	5,338	6,387	6,871

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Dependent variables are closeness to foreign neighbors. Country dummies and constants are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A9. Path models of association between culture and opinion through mediators (ABS).

	China	Japan	Korea
Group-specific exposure → Opinion	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Group-specific exposure → Generalized exposure	0.68*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.74*** (0.00)
Generalized exposure → Common identity	0.20*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
Common identity → Opinion	0.07* (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Travel abroad → Opinion	0.04 (0.11)	0.40*** (0.12)	0.25** (0.12)
Job contact → Opinion	-0.07 (0.18)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.18)
Social trust → Opinion	-0.08 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)
National pride → Opinion	0.04 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.18*** (0.07)
Traditionalism → Opinion	0.13*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)
Right-leaning ideology → Opinion	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Democratic value → Opinion	0.07 (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.05)
Level of religiosity → Opinion	0.06** (0.02)	0.05** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Male → Opinion	0.12** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)
Employment status → Opinion	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Household income → Opinion	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Education → Opinion	0.01 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Age → Opinion	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Number of countries	6	6	6
Number of respondents	5,958	5,958	5,955

Note: Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2007 ABS. Country dummies, cut-off points, and constants are omitted for space constraints. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure A1. SEM analysis of the association between cultural exposure and closeness to foreign coworkers.
Note: Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are not reported. AIC=-224914.9, BIC=-224504.6. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure A2. SEM analysis of the association between cultural exposure and closeness to foreign neighbors.
Note: Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are not reported. AIC=-225761.1, BIC=-225350.8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).




Figure A3. SEM analysis of the association between cultural exposure and closeness to foreign relatives.
Note: Data are drawn from the 2008 EASS. Entries are unstandardized path coefficients. Other variables are not reported. AIC=-223903, BIC=-223492.7. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A10. OLS and 2SLS analysis of group-specific cultural exposure's effect (ABS).

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	OLS (1)	2SLS (2)	OLS (3)	2SLS (4)	OLS (5)	2SLS (6)
<i>First stage</i>						
TV in house		0.60*** (0.06)		0.23*** (0.05)		0.27*** (0.06)
<i>F</i>		108.32		17.92		18.84
<i>Second stage</i>						
Group-specific exposure	0.05*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.27** (0.13)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.14)
Travel abroad	0.14*** (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.16** (0.08)	0.14*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)
Job contact	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.07 (0.11)
Social trust	-0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.04)	0.07 (0.07)
National pride	0.05* (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.06** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Traditionalism	0.09*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Democratic value	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)
Level of religiosity	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)
Male	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.06)
Employment status	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.06*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.10** (0.04)
Education	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.08** (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Observations	5,084	5,084	5,029	5,029	4,630	4,630

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2007 ABS. All dependent variables are treated as interval instead of ordinal. Instrumental variable is cable TV ownership. Constants are not reported.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).

Table A11. ERM and KLS analysis of group-specific cultural exposure's effect (ABS).

	<u>Opinion of China</u>		<u>Opinion of Japan</u>		<u>Opinion of Korea</u>	
	ERM (7)	KLS (8)	ERM (9)	KLS (10)	ERM (11)	KLS (12)
<i>Secondary equation</i>						
TV in house	0.60*** (0.06)		0.23*** (0.05)		0.27*** (0.06)	
<i>Primary equation</i>						
Group-specific exposure	0.26*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.27** (0.13)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.14)	0.41*** (0.03)
Travel abroad	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.16** (0.08)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)
Job contact	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)	0.07 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)
Social trust	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.07)	0.08* (0.04)
National pride	0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Traditionalism	0.14*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Democratic value	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
Level of religiosity	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Male	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.03)
Employment status	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Household income	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.10** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.02)
Education	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Correlation estimate	-0.37*** (0.08)		-0.39** (0.20)		-0.57*** (0.16)	
Observations	5,084	5,084	5,029	5,029	4,630	4,630

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data are drawn from the 2007 ABS. All dependent variables are treated as interval instead of ordinal. Instrumental variable is cable TV ownership in ERMs. The KLS endogeneity correlations are assumed to equal the correlation estimates in ERMs. Constants are not reported. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed).