The London School of Economics and Political Science

Assessing the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid.

The cases of Myanmar, Lebanon, Mozambique

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Abstract

The socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 have been felt worldwide, but especially in low-income countries. In these contexts, the effects of the global crisis have exacerbated the need for humanitarian assistance. While humanitarian programmes have become more critical, ensuring their effectiveness remains a challenge. The thesis investigates the factors that may affect humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness by looking at the European Union (EU), one of the top donors worldwide. Therefore, the two research questions are, firstly: *why does the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes vary?*; and secondly: *What are the factors causing this variation?*

The research is meaningful because it addresses a critical, current challenge and because it also attempts to fill a gap in EU foreign policy literature by empirically assessing the external effectiveness of the EU 'on the ground' in contexts of wars and natural crises. It also assesses the relationship that it has with United Nations (UN) agencies and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in the field, in a sector, humanitarian aid, that has been overlooked as part of development aid. Following a precise definition of effectiveness and based on empirical data gathered through official reports, documents and interviews with UN, NGO, and EU officials, the thesis seeks to answer to the research questions by formulating three hypotheses on the factors that could influence the effectiveness and by empirically assessing them in the context of Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, between 2015 and 2017. The hypotheses include: the EU Member States internal cohesiveness and coordination with Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) on the ground; delegation and coordination in the field between DG ECHO and UN agencies/NGOs; the national authorities' attitude vis-à-vis EU humanitarian aid programmes.

The research finds that the last two factors can be particularly decisive in the effectiveness of the programmes and proposes a formula for effectiveness. It suggests that EU humanitarian aid programmes should focus on resilience and preparedness, that the agents involved should closely coordinate, and the use of new technologies to speed up processes should be increased. Finally, the thesis suggests pathways to generalise these findings to non-EU humanitarian and to development actors, such as the World Bank.

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Virginia Woolf famously argued that "a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction". I think this statement can also be applied when writing a PhD and I am grateful to several people for enabling me to pursue this path.

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List of Acronyms

AASM	Associated African States and Madagascar
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ACP	Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific
AICS	Agenzia Italiana Cooperazione Sviluppo
ALIMA	Alliance for International Medical Action
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AU	African Union
BCG	Boston Consulting Group
BLF	Banque Libano-Française
CFM	Complaint and Feedback Mechanism
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CHEMO	Consorcio Humanitario de Mocambique
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
CO	Country Office
COHAFA	Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
COSACA	Concern, Oxfam, Save the Children, Care
CRS	Crisis Response System
CVM	Mozambique Red Cross
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DIPECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department's Disaster Preparedness Programme
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAR	Emergency Aid Reserve
EDF	European Development Fund

EEAS	European External Action Service
ENDE	Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERCC	Emergency Response and Coordination Centre
ESAN	Food and Nutrition Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUHAP	European Union Humanitarian Aid Policy
EUCPM	European Union Civil Protection Mechanism
FAFA	Financial Administrative Framework Agreement
FAO	Food Agriculture Organisation
FCA	Forgotten Crisis Assessment
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Committee
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HARP	Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
HQ	Head Quarters
IAF	Integrated Analysis Framework
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IMO	International Organization for Migration
INFORM	Index For Risk Management
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian Development Framework
JST	Joint Strategy Team
LAF	Lebanese Army Forces

LCC	Lebanon Cash Consortium
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LOUISE	Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organizational System for E-cards
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation to Development
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MMF	Multi-Annual Financial Framework
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSBSP	National Strategy for Basic Social Protection
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PAMRDC	National Multi-Sectorial Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition
PQG	Programa Quinquenal do Governo
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RIASCO	Regional Inter-agency Standing Committee
RO	Regional Office
SADC	Southern African Development Committee
SAIO	Southern Africa and Indian Ocean
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
TA	Technical Assistants
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
URD	Groupe Urgence-Réhabilitation-Développement
VASyR	Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WASH	Water Sanitation Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WWD	World Wide Decision
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

Chapter 1. EU humanitarian aid effectiveness: where to begin?

Introduction

Climate change, earthquakes, wars, the current COVID-19 pandemic – these recurring international challenges have a direct and negative socio-economic impact on millions of individuals, especially in low-income countries. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2018), in 2018 alone, 128.8 million people needed humanitarian aid, and 105.1 million people received aid. The numbers have increased over the last thirteen years: in 2005, 40 million people were aid recipients, and the figure has steadily increased, reaching 65 million people in 2011 and 97.6 million in 2016. These statistics underscore how attention to humanitarian aid is becoming crucial. However, while humanitarian aid programmes have become even more critical, ensuring their effectiveness remains a challenge. Indeed, the problem haunting humanitarian assistance – its lack of effectiveness since its failure during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 – persists. Food and medicines directed to a certain number of beneficiaries fail to reach them, leaving people suffering from the impact of natural and/or human-made disasters.

This thesis attempts to single out the factors that influence the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and how can they be improved by focussing on one of the top donors worldwide: the European Union (EU). Through its Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), the EU is engaged in humanitarian aid actions along with its Member States. Indeed, it is not a unitary actor, but comprises 27 Member States that, besides delegating humanitarian aid to DG ECHO, pursue their own independent humanitarian aid policies. However, EU Member States have delegated responsibilities for delivering humanitarian aid to DG ECHO. Thus, humanitarian aid is one of the most significant instruments of EU foreign policy through which the EU can affirm its influence and role in geopolitics.

In 2008, in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, the EU committed to ensuring "policy coherence, complementarity and effectiveness […] to address the root causes of humanitarian crises" (Council, 2008: 4). However, two years later (2010), the Haiti earthquake showed that DG ECHO could not deliver effective humanitarian aid (Brattberg and Rhinard, 2013). Ineffectiveness meant deficiencies in designing the projects and associating with agents who were not sufficiently prepared to face local constraints and technical difficulties. DG ECHO, indeed, relies on third parties such as United Nations (UN) agencies (e.g., World Food Programme, WFP), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (e.g., Oxfam), to implement

its projects. Ineffectiveness also meant delays of up to 12 months for the construction of 1500 temporary shelters, for the renovation of 800 damaged houses, for the construction of sanitation and water supply systems, and the poor sustainable management of resources aimed at improving the food security of households (European Court of Auditors, 2014: 41,50).

Why were the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle not achieved? The following sections will discuss the research questions, the relevance of the thesis and the contribution to the literature. It will end with the structure of the thesis.

1. Research questions

Humanitarian aid is one of the sectors through which the EU expresses its foreign policy (Smith, 2014; Lequesne, 2013; Carta, 2012; Laursen, 2012; Hill and Smith, 2005; Smith, 2003; Dumond and Setton,1999) and affirms itself on the international scene. Through DG ECHO, the EU has responded to all the recent major crises, including those in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Ukraine, as well as to the Ebola crisis. As a result, in 2014 alone, 121 million people affected by disasters, either natural or human-made, received help from the EU, and 80 countries received humanitarian aid (DG ECHO, 2015). Despite this effort, the EU has been repeatedly accused of failure in its response. The most recent and important examples are the Haiti earthquake and the European refugee crisis. As happened in 2010 during the Haiti earthquake, DG ECHO proved incapable of delivering effective humanitarian aid where it was most needed, particularly in Greece. The objectives of the projects, such as the construction of reception centres, were achieved slowly and with delays, making the humanitarian aid, which has to be delivered quickly, ineffective (Pavlćsek, 2017). This thesis aims to understand why this happened and continues to happen. The research questions are, first, why the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes varies, and second, what are the factors causing this variation?

The second question is a specification of the first. Here, 'variation' means a change in the dimensions of effectiveness in relation to the objectives: those expected to be achieved and that are spelt out at the beginning of the formulation of the policy, such as reaching a certain number of beneficiaries in a precise amount of time. The research question aims to understand why such outcomes as Haiti or Greece were possible, what factors influence the variation, and consequently, what factors could improve the effectiveness of these programmes to benefit the recipients and the international image of the EU.

As we have seen, when mentioning the EU, we refer to DG ECHO, which is the principal humanitarian aid actor at the EU level. Separate from DG Development and Cooperation (DG

DEVCO),[1] which deals with long-term development aid policies, it was first set up in 1991, demonstrating the willingness of the EU to strengthen its role in this sector. In 1996, Council Regulation 1257/96 on humanitarian aid set out, for the first time, general principles, objectives and procedures for implementing operations, but it was not until the Lisbon Treaty that this policy was "constitutionalised". Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides the legal basis for EU humanitarian aid policy. It defines EU humanitarian aid policy by affirming that it is intended "to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations" (Dany, 2015: 420). EU humanitarian aid is, indeed, sent quickly to third countries when emergencies occur.

DG ECHO has an extensive network of European technical experts and local agents who work directly in the field and who actively participate in the formulation of the projects and then monitor the implementation. This is different from DG DEVCO, which only has delegations maintaining institutional and official relations with third states. DG ECHO funds humanitarian aid policies that are then implemented through third parties and, primarily, depending on the sector, through UN agencies and NGOs, such as the Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE). The latter is a network of numerous NGOs from different European countries, such as Action Contre la Faim France, Oxfam Belgium, Save the Children Denmark and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) Germany.

Since its foundation, the fields of intervention of DG ECHO have increased. They now encompass food assistance, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, emergency shelter, disaster risk reduction, gender and age-sensitive aid, and capacity building. The research question aims to look particularly at two fields of EU humanitarian aid: (1) food assistance, and (2) health assistance.

This choice stemmed from observing the projects DG ECHO funds. Food and health assistance represent the bulk of work, because they address the most basic needs of those affected by crises. Food assistance encompasses a set of interventions designed to provide access to food for vulnerable and food-insecure populations and guarantee adequate food availability and consumption, relying on instruments such as food aid, cash transfers and vouchers (Omamo, Gentilini, Sandström, 2010). Health assistance aims at preventing mortality and disease associated with humanitarian crises (DG ECHO 2014: 3). In addition, DG ECHO

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[1] Since 2019, DG DEVCO became DG for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). Since the dissertation focusses on 2015-2017, we will refer to it as DG DEVCO.

promotes health education, hygiene and immunisation, and it helps the most vulnerable in accessing health care services through solidarity mechanisms (e.g. fees exemption for vulnerable groups). Finally, DG ECHO supports national health systems in the delivery of preventive and curative health services and aims to strengthen risk analysis and mapping, early warning and surveillance, and emergency preparedness within this sector (DG ECHO, 2014: 17).

1.2 Relevance in the literature: why focus on the EU and EU humanitarian aid effectiveness?

The thesis also aims to fill a gap in EU foreign policy literature. Indeed, among the many academic contributions on EU foreign policy, very few have been dedicated to EU humanitarian aid. Whereas EU's security and defence policy, for instance, has been at the centre of numerous studies (e.g., Economides and Sperling, 2019; Howorth, 2014; Delly, Keohane, Grevi, 2009; Gegout, 2009; EUISS publications), there are few scholarly works on EU humanitarian aid. Indeed, this sector has arguably been overlooked as part of development policy (See Carbone, 2008; Arts and Dickson, 2004; Lister, 1998). Moreover, EU humanitarian aid has been a 'victim' of "developmentalisation" – that is, reducing the difference between the two sectors, and diverting attention away from the narrow focus on saving lives and alleviating suffering (Dany, 2015: 420). Remarkable exceptions to this are Van Elsuwege, Orbie and Bossuyt (2016) and Broberg (2014), who focus on the distinctive features of EU humanitarian aid and the nexus between the latter and development aid. Pusterla and Pusterla (2020, 2015) dedicate their research to delegation in EU humanitarian aid policy. Versluys (2008) analyses the evolution towards greater independence of humanitarian assistance from development and the emerging trend towards a more pronounced Europeanisation of humanitarian aid policy.

Furthermore, general academic contributions on humanitarian aid have focussed on its different aspects, such as economic, social and political factors, and the actors usually studied are international organisations, such as the UN and its agencies or states such as the USA (e.g., Jakupec and Kelly, 2016; Barnett and Walker, 2015; Altay and Labonte, 2014; Barnett, 2013; Kopinak, 2013; Stewart, 2011; Beristain, 2006; Drury, Stuart Olson and Van Bell, 2005; Nafziger and Väyrynen, 2002; Hallam, 1998; Belgrad and Nachmias,1997). The academic literature does not pay enough attention to DG ECHO, despite the fact that it is one of the major international donors for humanitarian aid, as shown in Table 1.1 below. As can be understood from the table, overall DG ECHO funding makes it the third largest humanitarian aid donor worldwide, after the USA and Germany.

Table 1.1 Top international humanitarian aid donors worldwide (2020)

Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 1.2, DG ECHO's contributions have increased over the years along with those of some EU Member States, such as Germany. This is the main reason why it is so important to take into consideration the EU when studying humanitarian aid. Not studying it means having only a partial picture of who is involved in humanitarian aid policies at the international level.

Table 1.2 EU top humanitarian aid donors

EU Top Donors	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
DG ECHO	650	738	904	892	1.065	1.041	1.259	1.264	1.171	1.693	2.404	2.364
Belgium	48	53	68	98	100	136	164	183	84	262	111	218
Denmark	113	124	191	158	186	208	68	276	251	295	316	254
France	83	74	100	80	84	102	61	55	71	133	149	164
Germany	162	177	239	263	295	266	331	430	865	1.068	2.227	2.540
Ireland	99	135	122	85	65	74	61	72	62	84	94	87
Italy	65	45	109	50	59	41	30	37	66	74	94	117
Luxembourg	26	30	29	34	34	32	38	38	43	37	36	16
Netherlands	273	363	275	164	217	124	131	134	239	456	176	N/A
Spain	49	61	21	13	92	172	43	40	40	37	15	38
Sweden	211	185	379	473	470	576	779	528	596	523	391	416
U.K.	159	192	365	207	246	167	328	643	834	1.036	955	722
Sub-Total (12)	1.938	2.177	2.802	2.617	2.913	2.939	3.293	3.700	4.322	5.698	6.968	6.936
Total (28)	2.021	2.266	2.899	2.623	3.026	3.067	3.407	3.827	4.467	5.850	7.142	7.075

As mentioned above, academic contributions and debates on the EU, in general, and on EU foreign policy have primarily been focussed on theoretical and institutional aspects, on the legal framework, and on what kind of power the EU is (See Whitman, 2006; Smith, 2005; Telò, 2004). In 2005, Smith urged that debates on EU foreign policy should change direction and

focus on what the EU does and does not do in international relations (77). This argument was picked up five years later by Schunz, who suggests that studies on EU foreign policy should focus on empirical research, thus understanding whether, how and why the EU influences global politics (2010: 23). Subsequently, a significant part of the latest literature focussed on EU actorness, on the EU's internal effectiveness and how this can influence its external effectiveness, and on the EU "speaking with one voice" in formal international arenas, such as the UN (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014; De Conceiçao-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Delreux, 2014; Panke, 2014; Carbone, 2013; Edwards, 2013; Groen and Niemann, 2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Van Schaik, 2013; Smith, 2010; Smith and Laatikainen, 2006). This type of literature lacks an extensive empirical study on the concrete implementation and effectiveness of policies, in general, but especially of humanitarian aid. Therefore, the thesis proposes to discuss not just the theoretical aspects of EU humanitarian aid, nor does it only focus on its institutional or legal framework.

The thesis attempts to empirically assess the external effectiveness of the EU 'on the ground', in the context of wars and natural crises. It also assesses the relationship that it has with UN agencies and NGOs in the field. Thus, it aims to provide the above-mentioned literature the empirical research and evidence that it currently lacks. The attention will be on "what the EU does" rather than what it is, and will shed light on the influence of the EU vis-à-vis third countries. Studying the effectiveness of humanitarian aid means studying whether and how the EU is achieving what is spelt out in Article 21 Treaty on European Union (TEU), dedicated to the general provisions on the EU's external action, and therefore how the EU is contributing to the promotion of an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and global governance. Article 21 lists a series of objectives such as the safeguarding of values, democracy, peace, the rule of law, and of human rights. It also mentions the objective of "assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or human-made disasters". Furthermore, the analysis of the factors that could influence and improve the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies can be generalisable and extended to a wide range of humanitarian aid policies delivered by other international actors (e. g. UN agencies).

1.3. Structure of the thesis

With the aim of answering the research questions, the thesis will be articulated into nine chapters. Following the first introductory chapter is the theoretical chapter, which will analyse the basic concepts and give definitions of humanitarian aid, aid effectiveness and especially EU humanitarian aid effectiveness. Then, based on EU foreign policy, public policy, humanitarian

and development aid literature, it will discuss the three hypotheses on the factors that could influence effectiveness. It will end with a discussion on the methodology used throughout the thesis.

The third chapter is based on a comprehensive collection of data on DG ECHO's projects worldwide (See Appendix 1). It provides empirical background on DG ECHO's projects, where it mainly devotes its funds, and who are its main agents. The chapter ends with the explanation of the criteria for the selection of the three case studies: Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, between 2015 and 2017.

The fourth chapter discusses the history of DG ECHO and its functioning, focusing on food and health assistance policies. It also discusses the administrative framework, and the procedures DG ECHO follows to select its agents.

The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters are dedicated to Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, respectively. These chapters are the bulk of the thesis since they represent the empirical assessment of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness. Based on the definition of effectiveness discussed in Chapter 2, the three chapters firstly give a background of the issues influencing the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid, and secondly, assess each hypothesis, concluding by pointing out which hypothesised factor has caused the effectiveness to vary vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle.

The eighth chapter is a comparative empirical assessment of the three case studies. It discusses the main findings for each hypothesis in the three countries and suggests a "formula for effectiveness" that could be applied for future EU programmes, but could also be generalisable to other IOs (e. g. World Bank).

The ninth chapter concludes the thesis by discussing its salience, the key empirical findings and by opening a window for future research.

Chapter 2. Explaining EU humanitarian aid effectiveness

Introduction

What is humanitarian aid? What does it mean for EU humanitarian aid to be 'effective'? What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of aid policies? These questions are central to the present chapter, which first defines the key concepts used in this thesis, then presents the analytical framework, including the hypotheses, and finally describes the methodology of this thesis. The chapter defines humanitarian aid, distinguishing it from humanitarian intervention and development aid, and defines the concept of effectiveness in the context of EU humanitarian aid. The main section of the chapter then focusses on the hypotheses, which aim to address the research questions: *why does the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes vary, and what are the factors causing this variation?* By variation we mean a change within each subdimension of effectiveness vis-à-vis the objectives as stated at the beginning of the policy cycle. The hypotheses derive from the relevant literature on EU foreign policy, public policy and humanitarian and development aid, and focus on the factors that might influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid. The theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical assessment of the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in Myanmar, Lebanon, and Mozambique.

2.1. Defining EU humanitarian aid and its effectiveness

Before defining effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid, it is important to define 'humanitarian aid' and 'effectiveness' separately. This section is dedicated to theoretically understanding what characterises these concepts. Effectiveness in particular is a tricky concept to define. This section will describe what it is and what it is not, and why the thesis focusses on this concept rather than others, such as performance or impact. Based on this overview, the last part of this chapter is dedicated to the definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness that will be used throughout the thesis.

2.1.1 Defining humanitarian aid

The term *assistance* or *aid* means help through resources, either material or financial, provided to address the physical and legal needs of people affected by a crisis. These include food items, medical supplies, clothing, shelter, and the provision of infrastructure, such as schools and roads. Humanitarian assistance or aid refers to the assistance provided by humanitarian organisations for humanitarian purposes (i.e., non-political, non-commercial, and non-military

purposes).[2] Humanitarian assistance coincides with the concept of humanitarianism as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as "the independent, neutral, and impartial provision of relief to victims of armed conflicts and natural disaster" (Barnett and Weiss, 2011: 9). Humanitarianism and humanitarian assistance rely on four principles, which are enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 42/182, adopted in 1991, and in Resolution 58/114 adopted in 2004, which are:

1) Humanity: human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found.

2) Neutrality: humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

3) Impartiality: humanitarian assistance must be carried out on the basis of need alone, making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.

4) Independence: the assistance must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented. (OCHA, 2012; HPG, 2000; ICRC, 1996)

The essential purpose of humanitarian assistance is to protect life and health, ensure respect for human beings, limit suffering and strengthen the resilience of the victims. Indeed, the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid are not states, but the women, men and children affected by a crisis.

It is important to underscore that the humanitarian aid literature uses the terms humanitarian *aid* or *assistance* or *action* synonymously. Indeed, these terms refer to providing the necessities of life to people who suddenly find themselves without access to food and shelter, victims of human-made and/or natural crises. Natural disasters are caused by extreme natural events, such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes or droughts. Human-made crises are those whose causes can be found in the government's and society's structure and dynamics, which might lead to social breakdowns, (international) conflicts, technological failures or a mixture of these (Albala-Bertrand, 2000: 189). Despite that it might happen that the government can be the cause for humanitarian crisis, the capacity to respond belongs primarily to the country's national government where the crisis occurs (Coppola, 2015: 322). When disasters overwhelm the national government's capacity to respond, the global community intervenes, provided that the country requests and permits the action of external organisations (Harrell-Bond, 1989: 65). Unlike other types of aid, humanitarian action tends to be delivered in short-term periods,

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[2] Glossary of humanitarian terms by the WHO.

usually for around a year, and focuses on the crisis event and on the immediate needs of the affected populations.

The key principles of humanitarian aid mentioned above constitute its difference from humanitarian intervention. In fact, contrary to humanitarian aid, which requires the consent of local authorities and does not involve military action, humanitarian intervention is an act undertaken without the consent of the host country, and military means are a central component (Barkin, 2013: 91). The literature gives many definitions of humanitarian intervention; Hehir's (2010: 20) seems to be simultaneously the simplest and most exhaustive: "humanitarian intervention is a military action taken by a state, group of states or non-state actors, in the territory of another state, without the state's consent, which is justified, to some significant extent, by a humanitarian concern for the citizens of the state". This definition makes the difference with humanitarian aid clear. First, there is the question of consent. Humanitarian intervention can be conducted without the host state having made a request for help, as is the case of humanitarian aid. In general, humanitarian interventions are implemented in states whose structures are very weak and where conflicts are taking place (Welsh, 2004: 2). Furthermore, contrary to humanitarian aid, humanitarian interventions have the possibility of relying on threat or the use of armed force, justified by the aim of protecting human rights, ensuring political order and opposing tyranny. Examples of humanitarian interventions are those undertaken by NATO in Kosovo during the 1990s or the UN and African Union (AU) intervention in Darfur from 2003 to 2008.

Another important distinction is the difference between humanitarian and development aid, which serve different roles and have different historical backgrounds. Humanitarian aid dates to the 19th century, with the battle of Solferino in 1859 marking the beginning of humanitarian aid thanks to the birth of the ICRC. During World War I, the ICRC continued to deliver aid and other NGOs occasionally emerged during periods of crisis. It was during and after World War II that NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies started to emerge as permanent organisations and to establish new programmes and assistance plans (Barnett and Weiss, 2011 and Polman, 2010). Development aid, on the other hand, began after World War II and during the period of decolonisation. Colonial powers, mainly pursuing their own interests, started to deploy development activities in their (soon to be ex-) colonial territories, introducing new technologies, establishing private-sector enterprises and social services such as education and health. Concurrently, the UN was put in place, as were other international institutions with operational roles such as the FAO (1945), the World Bank (1945), the IMF (1945) and the WHO (1948). This period also witnessed the Marshall Plan, which constituted the first model

of development assistance towards European countries (Stokke, 2009: 3-27). Another vital difference is that humanitarian aid is delivered rapidly, during a short period of time, and in response to emergencies, while the task of implementing long term projects belongs to development aid programmes with the aim of tackling the root of the problem (e. g. poverty). Finally, while humanitarian aid seeks to build resilience at the community level, development aid aims at building resilience at societal and political levels (Hinds, 2015: 4). This is reflected, for instance, in how EU actors are organised. DG ECHO operates directly in the field through its Country Offices (See Chapter 4). DG DEVCO, on the contrary, establishes relationships at the institutional level through its delegations in the host country.

2.1.2 Policy Effectiveness

Following Sartori's guidelines on concept analysis, this section proposes a general definition of effectiveness by differentiating it from a set of related, neighbouring notions which belong to its same semantic field (Sartori, 2009: 124). These concepts include performance, impact, and efficiency. The definition of aid effectiveness will then follow and will be further distinguished from development and humanitarian aid effectiveness.

When researching policy effectiveness, the first concept that emerges is 'bureaucratic effectiveness', which is generally defined as "excellence in performing an agency's perceived mission" (Wolf, 1993). Bureaucratic effectiveness can be influenced by the agency life cycle and by leadership skills, and it varies across different dimensions. For instance, bureaucratic effectiveness can be associated with prowess in politics and ability to gain power, good governance, autonomy, and means to procure sufficient resources for the mission (Peters, 2020: 964; Rockman, 2011: 714).

Policy effectiveness is not the same as bureaucratic effectiveness. If we consider the public policy and EU policy literatures, the most common definition relates to the determinacy and clarity of policy formulation, followed by consistent implementation of the policy, namely the translation of plans into practice (Howlett and Ramesh, 2009). Thus, a policy is effective if it reaches pre-determined outcomes. In this vein, Brattberg and Rhinard (2013: 360) define effectiveness as 'goal attainment' – that is, the achievement of explicitly stated purposes or objectives. Their definition is mostly procedural and looks at how, internally, a policy is implemented. According to them, a policy is considered effective if there is complete consistency between the intentions and the outcome, guaranteed by a speedy mobilisation of the actors, coordination with low transaction costs, and low inter-organisational competition.

In addition, a policy is effective when the actors involved can mobilise sufficient resources and when there is collaboration between agencies (Ibidem: 362).

In line with the study on EU's effectiveness by Oberthür and Groen (2015), effectiveness defined as goal attainment can also be conceived in terms of input, process and outcome. Input is associated with the quality of the policy's objectives, process is the engagement of the EU in IOs and finally, the outcome is the goal achievement. Thus, process is also fundamental in the definition of policy effectiveness. Indeed, effectiveness correlates results and objectives as well as results and needs, meaning that a project is effective when it reaches its pre-established goals and when the goal attainment implies that certain needs are met (Lippi, 2007: 74). Vedung (2004) considers effectiveness evaluation as goal-attainment evaluation, which is a substance-only model because it focusses on substantive content – that is, outputs, outcomes and the processes connecting them. Indeed, the two key questions at the basis of the evaluation of effectiveness are: (a) are the results in accordance with intervention goals?, and (b) are the results at least to some extent produced by the intervention? Thus, two basic concepts of evaluation effectiveness are goal achievement measurement and intervention impact assessment.

As mentioned above, in order to deepen and clarify the concept of effectiveness, it is fundamental to distinguish it from other concepts related to its semantic field but which do not correspond to effectiveness. The concept of effectiveness differs from those of performance, efficiency and impact. Performance refers to the ability of an organisation to achieve agreed objectives (Gutner and Thompson, 2013: 58) and can be defined as "the systematic, ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress towards pre-established goals or standards" (Hatry, 2013: 23). The concept of performance is broader than that of effectiveness, encompassing the overall policy, including evaluation and outcomes (Roller, 2020:916) and four elements: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and financial visibility (Jørgensen, 2013: 90). Thus, effectiveness is one of the aspects of this broader concept. It differs from efficiency, an economic concept deriving from Ricardo which refers to the achievement/cost ratio. Efficiency focusses on the quantity of resources used in relation to the result. "It is measured by comparing observed and optimum cost, revenue, profit, or whatever goal the producer is assumed to pursue, subject, of course, to any appropriate constraints on quantities and prices" (Fried et al., 2008). The concept of efficiency is too narrow for the purpose of this research, as it takes into account only one aspect (the cost/benefit ratio), without considering neither the process nor the outcome of a policy. Also, as we have seen, when dealing with effectiveness and with its measurement, questions on intervention costs are

left out. Finally, while effectiveness articulates itself in goal attainment, input, process and outcome, impact indicates something different. The latter looks at "the effects and consequences of public policy on individuals, groups, the broader society" (Lowi, 2015; Schneider, 2011: 1151). Thus, impact relates to the longer-term effects of a policy and does not consider the processes behind it.

This thesis focusses on effectiveness rather than on the other above-mentioned concepts because what is ultimately at the core of the present study is goal attainment and the process related to it. Did the policy reach its pre-established goals, and if not, why? These essential questions are at the basis of this dissertation, and suggests the choice of this concept, rather than of others, as the most appropriate one for our research purposes. Contrary to the other concepts, the concept of effectiveness includes different dimensions, focussing on substantive content, especially on the process, which is an aspect that is left out both in the concept of performance and efficiency, and which is paramount to better assess a policy.

2.1.3 From policy effectiveness to aid effectiveness

There is no commonly accepted definition of aid effectiveness. Referring to the specific literature on development aid and peacebuilding, two main definitions should be considered. Aid is effective if it contributes to or is associated with, if only modestly, positive development outcomes, such as economic growth or social development (Glennie and Sumner, 2016: 5). In addition, Autesserre (2014: 8) considers a project, program, or intervention to be effective when a large majority of the people involved in it – including both implementers (international interveners and local peacebuilders) and intended beneficiaries (including local elite and ordinary citizens) – view it as having promoted peace in the area of intervention.

When looking specifically at aid effectiveness, the literature generally refers to development aid effectiveness and examining the broad trends, while leaving out humanitarian aid effectiveness or associating it with total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Winthrop, 2010: 242). This is the reason why the distinction between the two is drawn in the next two subsections.

2.1.3.1 Development aid effectiveness

The literature on development aid effectiveness has developed along two parallel lines. One stream has been dedicated to the processes and principles that emerged from the High-Level Forums in Rome (2002), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). The other has been

primarily academic and focuses on assessing whether aid works and, more recently, when aid is effective in achieving its outcomes (Glennie and Sumner, 2016: 34).

The First High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness was held in Rome in 2002 and was the first official occasion that allowed country representatives to discuss principles for aid effectiveness. In particular, the Forum recommended that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of the countries receiving it, and that donor efforts should concentrate on delegating cooperation and increasing the flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects (OECD, 2003).

Further progress was made three years later during the Second High-Level Forum, where more than one hundred countries gathered in Paris to change their approach to the management of aid to improve its effectiveness. The Forum's result was the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which laid out a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the effectiveness of development aid. It was based on principles such as *ownership* (developing countries should set their own development strategies); *alignment* (meaning that donors should give support in line with these strategies and use local systems); *harmonisation* (meaning that donors should coordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication); and *managing to produce and measure* results by donors and developing countries, while being *mutually accountable* for these results (OECD, 2005, 2005/2008).

The Accra High-Level Forum in 2008 strengthened and deepened these commitments. In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its report "Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration". The report pointed out that, despite some progress, the majority of the targets were far from being reached by both donors and developing countries and was judged as being too ambitious. The Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan (2011) offered a more realistic attitude towards development aid effectiveness and renewed the core commitment of accountability. The Forum focussed on new aspects, such as transparency (while harmonisation disappeared), and recognised that there was a need for collaboration among a wide range of actors, including civil society and the private sector. Since this Forum, there have been a series of follow-up meetings, but none of them has brought significant contributions to the overall topic of aid effectiveness (Glennie and Sumner, 2016: 23).

The academic literature on development aid effectiveness has generally revolved around the question "does aid work?". With reference to Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010), four generations of studies can be highlighted. The first generation (from the 1970s) focussed on the extent to which aid increases total savings in recipient countries. The general opinion was that the impact

of aid is positive if it helps to remove either a savings or a foreign exchange gap. The second generation of studies (from the 1980s to the early 1990s) focussed on the impact of aid on growth via investment. These studies underscored the positive link between aid and investment, except for one study by Mosley (1987), who found a negative impact of aid on growth through statistical analysis. This period was followed by a third generation dominated by econometrics and known as "the conditionality literature". Burnside and Dollar (2000) made a significant contribution, advocating that aid works if the recipient government has good policies. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Daalgard et al. (2004), another condition for aid to work is that it is delivered in the correct dosage, neither too high nor too low. Finally, aid is effective if well-functioning institutions are in place (Glennie and Sumner, 2016: 50). A fourth generation of studies emerged in 2004. Their distinctive argument is that aid's aggregate impact on economic growth is essentially non-existent. In 2008, Rajan and Subramanian published a leading article demonstrating that aid does not have a systematic effect on growth regardless of the estimation approach, the time period, and the type of aid. These later studies emphasise that aid contributes to economic growth, but generally in the long run and often modestly.

Academic studies on development aid effectiveness have gradually shifted from the question of "does aid work?" to "when does aid work?", thus referring to the possible conditions that influence aid effectiveness. Recent studies have mainly considered two aspects: the country context and aid management. The country context includes the characteristics of the host economy (political stability, quality of democracy, financial development levels) and the national government's policies (level of social spending or macroeconomic policies) (see, among others, Angeles and Neanidis, 2009; Islam, 2005). Finally, aid management refers to different features of aid, including the type of aid and its governance, such as donor and recipient policies and approaches (see among others Annen and Kosempel, 2009; Alvi et al., 2008).

2.1.3.2 Humanitarian aid effectiveness

Whereas much attention by the international community and academics has been paid to the effectiveness of development aid since the 1970s, the same cannot be said of humanitarian aid. In fact, the latter has been overlooked until about twenty years ago as a sector of development aid effectiveness.

The first time the international community paid attention to humanitarian aid operations and their effectiveness was to criticise their failure during the Rwandan genocide (1994). In fact,

on that occasion, humanitarian aid not only proved to be ineffective, but it made the situation even worse. An example that Winthrop provides (2010: 241) is the building of orphanages, which soon became overcrowded and unhealthy, causing children to die more rapidly.

Ineffectiveness of humanitarian aid policies means, first of all, a failure to deliver material resources that were requested at the beginning of the formulation of the policy, but it could also mean worsening an already compromised situation, such as the case during the Rwandan genocide (i. e. poor management of the orphanages). The ineffectiveness of these policies led the international community (e. g. IOs, NGOs) to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian aid operations and policies by tackling what was considered one of its main causes: a lack of accountability. The two most important initiatives tackling these issues were those taken by the Sphere Project and People in Aid (which is now part of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) Alliance), which established guiding principles and minimum standards in aid delivery.

The Sphere Project, launched in 1997, brought together many humanitarian agencies, such as Care International, Oxfam International and Save the Children, and established, for the first time, a Humanitarian Charter that provides an ethical and legal context to the so-called "protection principles", which are the basis of humanitarian actions. It also established minimum standards that specify the minimum levels to be attained in humanitarian response, regarding the provision of food, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion and shelter.[3]

The non-profit organisation People in Aid, founded in 1995, also established codes of conduct for managing humanitarian aid personnel (Winthrop, 2010: 244). Today the CHS Alliance has set out "nine commitments", which humanitarian actors can use to improve the effectiveness of their assistance.[4] Among the nine commitments one is on giving appropriate assistance relevant to the needs of the communities and people affected by crises; another is on strengthening local capacities and avoiding negative effects; and another is on managing and using resources effectively, efficiently and ethically. These standards and initiatives seemed to have brought an improvement in the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies, as confirmed by the Sphere Project evaluation report (Van Dyke and Waldman, 2004), which argued that the quality of humanitarian assistance witnessed an overall improvement, especially concerning the process of the delivery of services. The survey that was conducted (Ibidem: 45) highlighted how coordination between agencies, service provision, emergency response and involvement of the affected population all improved thanks to the implementation of the common guidelines and minimum standards.

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[3] *The Sphere Project* (http://www.spherehandbook.org).
[4] CHS Alliance (https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/CHS-Guidance-Notes-and-Indicators.pdf).

The humanitarian system, meaning an organic construct composed of a core (the affected communities) interacting with related actors, such as NGOs, UN agencies, donors, private sector entities and host governments,[5] went through a period of reform starting from 2004/2005. At that time, the reform meant tackling not only the lack of accountability, but also the lack of coordination which was negatively affecting both the implementation and the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies. This marked the beginning of the use of the so-called 'cluster approach', which was introduced with the objective of addressing precisely this challenge.[6] The cluster approach is a "system under which UN agencies are designated as lead agencies for all major areas of humanitarian response" (Steets et al., 2010: 24). Its aim is to strengthen the affected population's preparedness and capacity to respond to an emergency and to also to provide leadership and accountability. The lead agencies have the responsibility of coordination. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance involving the UN and UN agencies. Lead agencies have the task to "convene coordination meetings at global and country level and are supposed to act as providers of last resort where gaps arise in the response" (Steets et al. 2010: 24). Clusters concern nine areas of response:

1. Agriculture/Food Security. Lead agencies: Food Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP);
2. Camp Coordination and Camp Management. Lead agencies: UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IMO);
3. Early Recovery. Lead agency: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
4. Education. Lead agencies: UNICEF and Save the Children;
5. Emergency Shelter Cluster. Lead agencies: UNHCR and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC);
6. Health Cluster. Lead agency: WHO;
7. Nutrition Cluster. Lead agency: UNICEF;
8. Protection Cluster. Lead agency: UNHCR;
9. Water Sanitation Hygiene – WASH. Lead agencies: UNICEF

The approach was implemented for the first time in 2005 following the Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan and proved to be useful for establishing clear leadership and acting as a platform for coordination among the different humanitarian actors involved in the delivery of aid. In fact,

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[5] Definition in ALNAP (http://sohs.alnap.org/#introduction).
[6] "What is the Cluster Approach?" (https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach).

its main innovation concerned the clear designation of global lead organisations that acted as providers of last resort and the creation of a global coordination forum.

Although an important effort in the enhancement of the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, the cluster approach did not bring about the desired and expected results. The above-mentioned 2010 Haiti crisis, for instance, showed how this system was weak. Although official reports affirm that OCHA, in charge of the cluster coordination, "provided constant support to the eleven clusters in place in Haiti, encouraging greater inter-cluster interaction, participating in meetings and providing relevant guidance when necessary" (OCHA, 2009), its actions, together with the overall cluster approach, were very much criticised. In fact, OCHA has been accused of poor leadership, poor capacity of coordination, and contributing to a scenario where humanitarian aid was not delivered effectively (Vanrooyen, 2018). As with the case of DG ECHO in Haiti, examples of ineffectiveness were delays in the construction of temporary shelters, the renovation of damaged houses, and the construction of sanitation and water supply systems.

Furthermore, the cluster approach is still characterised by minimal accountability to the Humanitarian Coordinator, who, in each country, is responsible for assessing whether an international response is warranted and, if it is, for ensuring that it is well-organised.[7] There is still poor information management, insufficient coordination of needs assessment with significant duplication of documents that undermines the sharing of results, and a need for greater coherence. Furthermore, researchers such as Steets et al. (2010) have shown that the overall impact on the affected populations is limited: victims did not perceive marked changes in the quality of humanitarian response. Clusters never promoted participatory or community-based approaches, thus leaving out affected populations. They have been accused of undermining national ownership and of weakening the existing coordination at the national level.

A 2006 study by Oloruntoba and Gray drew a parallel between the humanitarian aid supply chain and the business supply chain and underscored that the still-existing lack of coordination and the lack of planning in humanitarian supply chains resulted in the ineffectiveness of humanitarian aid policies. The lack of coordination was found to be essentially due to geographical dispersion or inaccurate communication between the field and headquarters, and among the different organisations involved in humanitarian aid policy implementation (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006: 116).

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[7] Definition by UNHCR (https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/70026/cluster-approach-ias).

More recent studies, such as De Torrenté (2013: 607-634), prove that lack of effectiveness of humanitarian aid is still present since "the aid response is often not timely or sufficient, nor is it equitable or predictable". One of the main reasons is the fact that accountability is upward rather than downward: organisations are accountable towards their funders and their internal decision-making structures, but not towards their beneficiaries (De Torrenté, 2013: 613). Furthermore, the report "The State of the Humanitarian System", commissioned in 2015 by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP),[8] gives an overall negative assessment of the performance of the humanitarian system, since the improvements made throughout the years have been focussed on "the process of aid delivery, rather than on substance and outcomes" (Stoddard et al., 2015: 14). The report is interesting and useful for this thesis since it indirectly gives a definition of humanitarian aid effectiveness. Their definition of effectiveness (Ibidem: 24) is based on the following questions: "How well were humanitarian objectives met?" and "Was the response timely?", with the objectives being those referred to in the strategic response plans and program proposals. Thus, this definition corresponds to the general definition of effectiveness given by the policy literature.

In addition, studies on humanitarian aid effectiveness (Dany, 2020; Miliband, and Gurumurthy, 2015; Strömberg, 2007) have highlighted how the latter is greater when projects are delivered in democratic countries with infrastructural capacities. In this case, the impact of the crises on the people is weaker. Thus, it is expected that the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is not directly linked to the type of crisis (See Chapter 3), but to the coping capacity of the governments to manage the crisis. Democratic countries have, first of all, less need for foreign humanitarian resources, and secondly, even if they do need them, they are better equipped to cope with the crisis, better managing humanitarian aid, thus ensuring its effectiveness.

In conclusion, when focusing on humanitarian aid effectiveness separately from development aid effectiveness, we have seen that the beginning of consciousness about the lack of effectiveness in humanitarian aid, and of the need to revise and reform the status quo, began not so long ago. We have also come to realise that despite international efforts to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies, the latter is still an open issue. In 2016, the UN dedicated an entire issue of its UN Chronicle to humanitarian action. The issue reiterates the need for a better organised humanitarian aid system, where greater effectiveness is guaranteed. One of the articles (Puri and Karunakara, 2016: 38-40) advocates for better data to understand

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[8] ALNAP is a "global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve response to humanitarian crises". See official website: https://www.alnap.org

whether humanitarian aid is effective, thus enabling humanitarian aid organisations to better implement their policies. Examples of sources of data applicable to humanitarian aid are social and thematic surveys at the household or personal level about livelihood, behavioural patterns, and perceptions. Administrative and program data collected by humanitarian agencies and government would help to increase information about the delivery process. Finally, case studies are a source of data aimed at providing a qualitative understanding of local dynamics and processes. Good objectives and aspirations are for now on paper, but these may encourage changes in current humanitarian aid practices.

2.1.4 EU humanitarian aid effectiveness. An empirical definition

The definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness adopted throughout the thesis is built on the definitions presented and discussed above. For the sake of precision, it is relevant to briefly mention the debate on the concept of general EU effectiveness within the EU foreign policy literature. This concept has been elaborated in a number of EU foreign policy studies, which distinguish between EU internal effectiveness and EU external effectiveness (Panke, 2014, Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014; Carbone, 2013; Edwards, 2013; Groen and Niemann, 2013). The former can be associated with internal cohesiveness, meaning the alignment of Member States' preferences; the latter is associated with goal achievement and the EU's ability to reach its objectives by influencing other actors (Smith and Laatikainen, 2006). External effectiveness has also been defined as "the extent to which the EU reaches the main goals of its position in the results of international negotiations" (Van Schaik, 2013: 35) and was also associated with the ability to "speak with one voice" (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013: 267).

  This thesis particularly emphasises external effectiveness, where EU humanitarian aid effectiveness means *goal attainment*. EU humanitarian aid projects ought to be considered effective when they reach the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. The pre-established objectives in EU humanitarian aid are operational ones and should not be mistaken with "the general objectives listed in the Lisbon Treaty" (Jørgensen, 2013:91). Although the overall objectives of EU humanitarian aid are to give relief to affected populations, the operational objectives are to build shelter for a certain number of targeted beneficiaries or establish a cash-based assistance system within a short time. For instance, if a project has the objective of delivering food or medicines to a group of beneficiaries, and it does so, then it is effective. Or if a project has established, since the beginning, that it needs to be delivered within

a certain period of time, and it does so, then it is effective.[9] However, in line with the Oberthür and Groen study (2015), and considering that effectiveness encompasses input, process and outcome, the definition of goal attainment should be further specified through three sub-dimensions of effectiveness, tailored explicitly for EU humanitarian aid.

The first sub-dimension concerns a precise *needs assessment*, meaning that the targeting involves the "right" beneficiaries – that is, those significantly affected by the crisis and who lack the means to satisfy their basic needs (e.g. food, health). This sub-dimension relates to the input. As mentioned above, input is associated with the quality of the policy's objectives. In order to establish those objectives, it is fundamental to have an adequately carried out a needs assessment. In fact, the objectives of a policy are formed based on the targeting of the beneficiaries. Thus, an EU humanitarian aid project is effective when, at its basis, it has a clear targeting that allows for a better allocation of resources. EU humanitarian aid can be considered effective when considering the recipients' point of view through a thorough needs assessment. But these first two dimensions are not sufficient, since a procedural perspective provides an indirect and partial knowledge of effectiveness. As suggested above by Stoddard et al. (2015), a more thorough definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness needs to include "substance and outcome", and this can be done by providing a comprehensive overview of the recipients' needs. As De Torrenté noted (2013), one of the main reasons for low effectiveness is generally that the "main accountability relationship for aid organisations is upward" (613). This means that aid organisations respond only to those who give them funding or to the actors involved in the process, leaving out the affected persons, or "beneficiaries". Indeed, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP),[10] a partnership of humanitarian and development agencies committed to promoting greater accountability to people affected by crises included the point of view of the affected persons so as to have more comprehensive needs assessments. Thus, "recipients of humanitarian aid" are the affected individuals, those people who actually receive the food and medicines.

A second sub-dimension concerns the *seamlessness of the policy cycle*. This sub-dimension is about process. As discussed above, effectiveness correlates results and objectives as well as results and needs. In practice, this is done with the establishment of a process that allows the EU to achieve the pre-established goals. Thus, a procedural perspective is useful to establish the effectiveness of a project and to check the interactions among the actors involved. This

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[9] It would be unreasonable to expect that the aid reaches every single person in need of help quickly, but it would reasonable to expect that the aid should be delivered on time, reaching the largest number of people in need possible.
[10] See HAP (https://www.preventionweb.net/organizations/2545).

means that the procedures are clear, and data and actions are not duplicated. It also means that DG ECHO and its agents regularly share information by, for example, attending the same meetings on the ground and by communicating regularly through emails and telephone calls. For instance, when DG ECHO and its agents share information about the territory, what actions to undertake, and who they are targeting, the project has greater chances of being effective. These are basic aspects of a process, however, they can be fundamental towards the effectiveness of a policy, especially during a crisis, when the projects need to be delivered in the context of emergencies. In fact, the sharing of information and clear contracts, which establish the roles of the actors involved in the process, allow for swifter responses on the ground and for the avoidance of duplication. As described by Oloruntoba and Gray (2006: 116), in a typical humanitarian supply chain, the funding goes to the main international agency, which gives it to international NGOs, which fund local NGOs. At this point, the funds have been transformed into food, vouchers, and medicines. It is then the turn of community-based organisations (local agents), which, in the end, reach "consumers", or aid recipients, whether they be individuals or families.

Ultimately, the definition of humanitarian aid recipients depends on the definition humanitarian aid itself. Since humanitarian assistance means providing "food items, medical supplies, clothing, shelter, seeds and tools, as well as the provision of infrastructure, such as schools and roads", this implies that the main recipients of assistance are individuals and families harmed by the crisis. Aid is delivered through UN agencies, NGOs and local actors that represent the liaison between donors and recipients. Through DG ECHO, the EU is at the beginning of the above-mentioned humanitarian aid chain. It is a donor that funds projects shaped by UN agencies and NGOs that then implement the overall policy, relying on local NGOs (See Chapter 4). The 2011 evaluation report on the humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti, drafted by the Groupe Urgence-Réhabilitation-Développement (URD) and financed by the European Commission, was created to help understand who EU humanitarian aid recipients are and how the EU influences them, although indirectly. An example from the report showed that DG ECHO funded the programme "Koupons Manjé Fré", which was implemented by Action Contre la Faim (ACF). It provided households with a choice of products to buy, helping boost the local market and stimulate the local economy. The main beneficiaries of aid were families and market stall holders (Groupe URD, 2011: 28).

The third sub-dimension of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness is the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) and the nexus, meaning the *shift from humanitarian to development aid*, which has long-term priorities that, generally, concern the fabric of society

and its political and economic system. This sub-dimension can be related both to the process and to the output. The shift can be carried out when there is an established practice that allows for it. It can also mean that humanitarian aid is no longer needed, which is the ultimate goal-achievement for such policies. An EU humanitarian aid project is effective when the logistical and administrative structures have been put into place for a transition to a long-lasting development program. For instance, when DG ECHO and DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) share information and DG DEVCO picks up on DG ECHO's projects, EU humanitarian aid has been effective.

The concept of LRRD dates to the 1980s, when, following food crises in Africa, practitioners and academics pointed out a financial and operational gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance during the operations (Thomas, 2019: 13; Van Elsuwege et al., 2016: 51). The basic idea is that short-term programs should be linked to long-term ones to ensure a sustainable response to the crisis. As it will be also discussed in chapter 4, the concept itself and the implementation of LRRD has changed over time. At first, it was conceived as a linear *continuum* sequence: the relief phase should be followed by a rehabilitation one, and in the end, by a development cooperation program. This way, the phases were seen as separate and subsequent processes. In practice, this vision proved wrong, pushing principals and agents to adopt another view on the LRRD: the *contiguum* approach. This approach recognised the complexity of the crisis and the need to use different aid instruments simultaneously and not as separate processes (European Parliament, 2012: 4). Today, it is more common to refer to nexus or triple nexus. The latter not only refers to the passage from humanitarian to development aid, but also emphasises a third component: building peace. The increased attention on peace was the outcome of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) when the Grand Bargain was adopted following the signatures of 59 international humanitarian donors, NGOs, and UN agencies. The Grand Bargain is an agreement based on fifty-nine commitments to be adopted by donors and agents to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of humanitarian aid. Following this, since 2018, the EU chose six pilot countries – Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq, Myanmar, and Uganda – where the triple nexus approach would be implemented (Interview #10). The efforts to link humanitarian to development aid are now being operationalised together with security and development projects in those countries (Oxfam, 2019: 18) (See Chapter 4 and 6).

2.1.5 Evaluating EU humanitarian aid effectiveness

When dealing with EU humanitarian aid, an evaluation of its effectiveness cannot be Manichean. Indeed, there are contexts, especially those of war, where even the fact of being present on the ground and being able to distribute food is an achievement in itself. When designing single projects or a whole policy, the policymakers' idea is to reach pre-established goals. Thus, they design the project or the policy on the basis of what they want to achieve. In line with Vedung's study (2004) (See 2.1), variation of the effectiveness means a change vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. Why do projects sometimes achieve what was pre-established and at other times, they do not entirely do so? Thus, variation means a change in the sub-dimensions of effectiveness with regard to the ultimate objective, that is full achievement. There can be various degrees of effectiveness. As shown in table 2.1 below, to quantify the variation, we apply a scale from 0 to 3 to both goal attainment and the subdimensions, 0 being not effective, 3 being effective. 'Pre-established objectives' are the ones spelt-out at the beginning of the policy cycle.

Not effective (0)

We could consider that a project is *not effective* if it does not reach pre-established objectives (goal attainment) and if the other three sub-dimensions are not satisfied at all. Therefore, ineffectiveness means that all dimensions equal to 0. In practice, this means that the goal was not achieved (i.e. a project that was supposed to deliver food and medicines did not do so), the needs assessment was not conducted (i.e. this means that beneficiaries were not included, influencing the shaping of the project), the policy cycle was not seamless (meaning, for instance, that the actors involved did not exchange any type of information and did not have the capacities to even push forward the policy cycle), and the LRRD/nexus was neither thought of nor implemented. In other words, none of the pre-established objectives were achieved.

Low effectiveness (1)

A project has *low effectiveness* when goal attainment equals 1, and the other sub-dimensions and the overall project's evaluation comes to the sum of 4. A low effective needs assessment means that it did not include the beneficiaries, but did include persons that were not in need, thus negatively influencing the goal attainment. A low effective seamlessness of the policy cycle means that it was characterised by *severe* delays (i.e. almost a year or more), by the non-sharing of information between principal and agents, by agents not being accountable to the principal, or by overlaps in the projects implemented by the agents. A low effective nexus mean

that a conversation on a passage from humanitarian to development aid was started both at HQ and in the field, but the discussions were only theoretical, without empirical solutions or a budget for the LRRD/nexus process. All these aspects influence the goal attainment itself, making the overall effectiveness low, since only some of the pre-established objectives were achieved.

Medium effectiveness (2)

A project has *medium effectiveness* if goal attainment and each sub-dimension is equal to 2 and the evaluation of the overall project equals to the sum of 8. A needs assessment that is medium effectiveness means that it was conducted but some beneficiaries were not included. It can also mean that the assessment did not cover some areas or that the same beneficiaries were counted more than once. A medium effective seamlessness of the policy cycle means that projects were characterised by some delays (i.e. some weeks or a couple of months), however, contrary to the low effectiveness category, agents were accountable to the principal and shared information throughout the policy cycle and both principal and agents made sure to neither finance nor implement overlapping projects. Finally, a medium effective LRRD/nexus means that initiatives have started being financed (e.g. the Madad fund in Lebanon, see Chapter 6), but they have not yet been fully implemented. All these sub-dimensions have repercussions on goal attainment, since the majority of the pre-established objectives are achieved.

Effective (3)

A project is *effective* if goal attainment and the sub-dimensions equal to 3 and the overall project's evaluation equals 12, the highest value. When a needs assessment is effective, the right beneficiaries are considered when shaping the projects, without leaving any areas out. A policy cycle is seamlessness when the exchange of information between principal and agents is constant, and when the various phases of the cycle are implemented within the established timelines, avoiding delays. A LRRD/nexus is effective when humanitarian aid is no longer needed and funds are devoted to longer-term projects. All of these aspects influence the overall effectiveness and the goal attainment, as all the pre-established objectives get achieved.

Table 2.1 Degrees of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness

Degrees / Main dimension	Not effective		Low effectiveness		Medium effectiveness		Effective	
Goal Attainment	0	None of the pre-established objectives achieved	1	Some of the pre-established objectives achieved	2	Majority of pre-established objectives achieved	3	All pre-established objectives achieved
Sub-dimensions								
Needs Assessment	0	Not conducted	1	No inclusion of the people actually in need	2	Some beneficiaries fell through or were repeated. No coverage of some areas.	3	All beneficiaries included, entire coverage of all the areas
Seamlessness of policy cycle	0	Total lack of exchange and accountability among the actors	1	Severe delays up to 12 months or more, lack of accountability Principal-Agent, no info-sharing, overlaps	2	Some delays (i.e. some weeks or a couple of months), accountability P-A present, info-sharing, no overlaps	3	No delays, full accountability, constant info-sharing, no overlaps
LRRD/Nexus	0	Total lack of initiative and financial instruments	1	A conversation started at both HQ and in the field, but only theoretically, without budget or projects	2	Projects started be financed, but they have not been fully implemented yet.	3	Hum.Aid is no longer needed and funds are devoted to the LRRD/nexus and to longer-term projects
Tot.	**0**		**4**		**8**		**12**	

Source: Own elaboration

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EU humanitarian aid cannot be evaluated as consistently effective in every aspect: besides goal attainment, the other sub-dimensions might be more or less present. It may happen that although goal attainment equals to 3, the needs assessment was poorly conducted, not reaching beneficiaries who have been, for instance, mistakenly excluded from the assessment. In this case, the project has reached its goal (e.g. delivering a certain quantity of food in one week), but, because of poor assessment, the food did not reach a part of the beneficiaries who are in need. The reverse is also valid (e.g. needs assessment = 3, but goal attainment = 0/1/2) and, in general, this is valid for the other dimensions as well. For instance, the seamlessness of the policy cycle did not work out as planned, so it might equal to 1 or 2. However, other dimensions did work out, such as the nexus and/or the goal attainment – let's say they equal to 3. As shown in table 2.1 above, the sum of these values results in an overall evaluation of the effectiveness. When the sum is or it is close to 4 (e.g. 0, 1,2,3), then the project is overall low effective or it is in-between no effective and low. When the sum of the values is or it is close to 8 (e.g. 5,6,7) then the effectiveness of the projects is medium or it is in-between low and medium. Finally, when the sum of these values is or it is close to 12 (e.g., 9, 10, 11), the effectiveness of the project is full or it is in-between medium and effective. When effectiveness varies "positively", this means that improves, reaching higher scores. When effectiveness varies "negatively", it means that worsens, reaching lower scores.

The ultimate failure of effectiveness is when the project does not attain the pre-established goal. This dimension, overall, is the most relevant. However, the other three sub-dimensions contribute towards the stability of goal attainment and overall effectiveness. In fact, when the dimension of needs assessment is persistently not satisfied, it may ultimately jeopardise the goal-attainment itself, and thus potentially the entire effectiveness. The same can be true for the seamlessness of the policy cycle and the nexus. Delays in the process, for instance, undermine the attainment of the goals. Also, the passage from humanitarian to development aid would imply that humanitarian aid projects are no longer needed. Finally, each sub-dimension counts towards goal attainment since it contributes to characterise the effectiveness of an EU humanitarian aid project.

2.2. Hypotheses on the factors that influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid

Having discussed the various degrees of effectiveness and its negative and positive variations, what becomes relevant is why this happens and what are the factors that cause the variation. It is important, however, to be clear in defining whose effectiveness varies. So far, we have discussed 'policy'. It is important to keep in mind the difference between policy, programmes

and projects. Policy means the set of programmes or measures with the same general objective. A programme is a coordinated package of actions with pre-established goals, which are determined based on a budget and are temporally limited. Finally, projects are a sub-category of programmes. They are indivisible actions that have a specific pre-established budget and administrative procedures and whose objectives are operational (Lippi, 2007 :92). Thus, in the thesis we are going to refer to programmes when discussing the more general EU humanitarian aid programme in a country and about projects when discussing specific actions financed by DG ECHO.

This section attempts to make three hypotheses on the factors that might be at the origin of such variations, deriving them from the EU cohesion and actorness literature, from EU public policy literature, primarily referring to Principal-Agent (P-A) theory, and, finally, from humanitarian and development aid literatures.

Hypothesis 1. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO

> *The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO in the field explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

As will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4, DG ECHO's competences are shared and in parallel with those of EU Member States, meaning that EU Member States can partially or fully delegate humanitarian aid policy to DG ECHO. DG ECHO and the EU Member States generally coordinate – meaning, they share information, their projects do not overlap, and they share the same intentions and priorities. However, before delegating to the EU level, EU Member States have to resolve their internal policy conflicts. In fact, the greater the preference heterogeneity, the less likely states are to delegate to an agent and the less likely states are to revise an existing delegation relationship (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017:9; Hawkins et al. 2006: 21). This argument discusses concepts such as EU actorness and internal cohesiveness and how this might be linked to EU external effectiveness.

One of the first scholars to study the concept of (international) actor and of "actor capability" in relation to the EU was Gunnar Sjöstedt, who in 1977 considered actor capability, or actorness, as a "measure of the autonomous unit's capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system" (1977: 16). Two conditions are

fundamental to ensure autonomy: a certain degree of separateness and a minimal degree of internal cohesion. Thus, actorness is associated with criteria such as autonomy and internal cohesion, which can be also understood as coherence, referring to the EU's ability to formulate common and determinate policies (Carbone, 2013: 342). In 1998, a seminal work by Jupille and Caporaso (1998: 214-220) elaborated on the concept of actorness, associating it with criteria such as certain degrees of (external) *recognition* (e.g. diplomatic recognition), *authority* (the extent of delegation of competences from the Member States to the EU in a given subject), *autonomy* (implying distinctiveness and independence from other – state – actors) and *internal cohesion* (EU's ability to formulate internally and represent externally a consistent position with a single voice). Thus, EU actorness depends, among other criteria, on internal cohesiveness.

Referring to Jupille and Caporaso's work (1998), De Conceiçao-Heldt and Meunier (2014) elaborate on the concept of internal cohesiveness. The latter is understood not only as the homogeneity of preferences of the EU Member States, but also considers the decision-making rules, making it possible to aggregate member states' preferences into a collective position. More specifically, they argue that "cohesiveness is not synonymous with homogeneity of preferences; rather it means that member states neither undermine nor overrule the collective position to be defended with one single voice, even if they disagree with it". Thus, there is no internal cohesiveness when there is no common position (2014: 966-967). The degree of cohesiveness can vary. Internal cohesiveness is highest in the case of exclusive competence; it is medium in the case of shared competences; its degree is lowest when the EU has no competences but only a role of coordination, such as general EU foreign policy. Somewhat different, though, is humanitarian aid. Although belonging to EU foreign policy, its peculiarity relies on the fact that it belongs to parallel and shared competences. On the one hand, Member States have control over it; on the other, depending on the situation, DG ECHO can be granted full or, at least, partial delegation.

In addition, there is no internal cohesiveness if bureaucracies (i.e. the DGs, namely ECHO and DEVCO) do not coordinate with each other in either HQ or in the field. The DGs have their own single voices when dealing with their respective sectors. We can affirm that there is bureaucratic unity when the DGs coordinate. There cannot be bureaucratic unity when there is no coordination between the two DGs. Thus, internal cohesiveness has two components. The first one is the alignment of EU Member States' preferences. The second one is the bureaucratic unity among DGs. In fact, the role of bureaucracies in implementation is essential for an effective governance (Peters, 2020: 965).

According to EU foreign policy studies mentioned above (See 2.1.4), EU internal cohesiveness is a way to ensure EU external effectiveness, already discussed above. The two are generally considered to be correlated. The more the EU is able to speak with a single voice, meaning that Member States align their preferences, the more there will be external effectiveness. However, this correlation does not always prove to be correct. It can happen that internal cohesiveness does not automatically translate into external effectiveness or that it can even have a negative impact on it. As per the former, the study by Smith (2010) showed how the EU, although internally cohesive and speaking with one voice, had little influence over the agenda or outcomes of the Human Rights Council. As per the latter, Delreux (2014) showed how the relationship between EU internal cohesiveness and EU external effectiveness is not straightforward and can even be counterproductive. This is the case in regional negotiations where the high EU's relative bargaining power can lead to ineffectiveness. Although internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness, it can facilitate it.

In conclusion, internal cohesiveness is relevant since it is one of the criteria of EU actorness that then translates into external effectiveness. The alignment of Member States' preferences into a collective position can be assessed by looking at the budget approval phase for humanitarian aid. In general, Member States cannot have a say on how DG ECHO funds and implement its projects (See Chapter 4). The only place where they can have a say is during the budget approval process at the beginning of the year. Thus, when empirically assessing the hypothesis, we are going to focus on the preferences expressed by the Member States during this stage. Also, the unity across DG ECHO and DG DEVCO can be empirically assessed by looking at the programmes established so as to guarantee consistency between the two different policies. The internal cohesiveness and bureaucratic unity could both cause variation in the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes, because they could influence the basis on which the programme relies, that is, the funds and the transition from humanitarian to development aid.

Hypothesis 2. Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents

> *DG ECHO's delegation and coordination with the agent (e. g. UN agency, NGO), which has established capacities on the ground and is accountable to the principal, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

The second hypothesis focusses on coordination, meaning that the roles and responsibilities are clear and there is a constant exchange between the actors involved. The hypothesis derives from public policy and Principal-Agent (P-A) theory. Research on public policy considers how decision-makers produce actions that should have an impact outside the political system. The study on public policy also considers how each element of policymaking can cause a particular input and outcome (John, 2012: Chapter 1). The sector of public policy presents a wide range of studies, starting from the seminal works of Lowi (1964, 1972), but here we are going to focus on a particular model which was first used in economics and subsequently in political science, and was then applied to the study of the EU: Principal-Agent theory (P-A). The reason behind this choice lies with the features of the model: P-A implies a hierarchical relationship between the actors involved, with a principal, such as DG ECHO, and an agent, such as a UN agency or NGO. The model is thus particularly well-suited to help explain the relationship between the DG ECHO and its agents. The P-A model also implies a contract between principal and agents. Here, by contract, we mean not only the so-called Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA),[11] but also the Single Form signed by both principal and agent, which is a form that agents need to fill out and return to the principal, where they spell out their objectives, specifying how they are going to reach them, with what means and in how long. This is possible thanks to "established capacities", meaning that the agent knows the context, thus it is able to design feasible projects and has set up all the administrative structures necessary to implement the projects (e.g. offices, delegation to local sub-agents, means to be in touch with beneficiaries).

The P-A theory was first used in economics in the 1970s to analyse the organisation of firms and the relationship between shareholders and managers. From the 1980s, political scientists applied it to the study of the creation and design of political institutions (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017: 7). Since P-A theory has been proven to be useful in understanding the patterns of delegation in the domestic arena, it has been considered as equally applicable to the study of IOs (Lake and McCubbins, 2006: 341).

It was Pollack (1997, 2003) who introduced this theory to the study of EU politics. He went beyond the neo-functionalist vs intergovernmentalism debate on the question of supranational autonomy and influence of EU institutions, by adopting New Institutionalism, particularly Rational Choice Institutionalism, and examined the functions that principals (Member States) delegated to supranational agents (e. g. the Commission), the extent of autonomy of the agents

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[11] The FPA will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Together with the Financial Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) it is the document at the basis of the partnership between DG ECHO and NGOs, and DG ECHO and UN agencies.

when executing their functions and the agent's ability to set the agenda for the member governments. This first phase of P-A theory applied to the study of EU politics was followed by a second one which focussed on micro-delegation (delegation on a particular policy-area), rather than on macro-delegation (delegation of authority to EU institutions in general) and considered external variables to be influential, such as the context of delegation, rather than just focusing on internal variables for delegation (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017: 9).

In general, delegation implies a hierarchical relationship, and is defined as a "conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the principal" (Hawkins et al., 2006: 7). The relationship between the principal and the agent is always based on a contract, and the preferences of principals and agents are important determinants of outcomes in P-A models. In fact, despite the principal granting authority, agents do not always do what principals want. This discrepancy in preferences entails "agency slack", which is an action by the agent not desired by the principal. This happens due to divergence in the actors' preferences and information asymmetry. Granting authority to an agent entails granting discretion, meaning giving the agent the room for manoeuvre in carrying out delegated tasks, specifying the goals, but not how to accomplish them (Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017: 6).

The question then becomes how to control the agent so as to limit agency costs. Various control mechanisms can be grouped in two categories: "police-patrols" and "fire-alarms". The former means that principals directly control the actions of the agents. In the context of EU humanitarian aid, comitology can be seen with the Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC), which is composed of Member States that control DG ECHO's actions, or DG ECHO's country offices checking on the agents' work in the field. The latter, fire-alarms, are indirect forms of control. They can be, for instance, through NGOs reporting to the principal the agent's action (Lake and McCubbins, 2006) or through the appeals to the European Court of Justice (Hawkins et al., 2006: 28). Finally, principals can apply sanctions which generally consist of budgetary contractions.

Policy-making is a chain of principals and agents, where they can play both roles (Vedung, 1997: 107). Indeed, in the case of EU humanitarian aid, DG ECHO acts both as an agent and a principal. Once being the EU Member States' agent, DG ECHO takes on the role of principal when dealing with humanitarian aid. Its agents are then UN agencies and NGOs which implement the projects. However, once DG ECHO delegates a project to the UN agency or the

NGOs, the latter become the principals, delegating part of the projects' implementation to local NGOs. The EU humanitarian aid policy-making chain is illustrated in Table 2.2:

Table 2.2 EU humanitarian aid Principal-Agent policy-making chain

Source: Own elaboration

Principals must weigh the costs and benefits before delegating, but why, eventually, delegate? P-A literature has mainly pointed out six reasons (Pollack, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2006; Lake and McCubbins, 2006; Dehousse 2013; Delreux and Adriaensen, 2017):

1. *Specialisation.* This allows providing information or services that principals are unable or unwilling to provide unilaterally.

2. *Enhancing credibility*. Delegation brings greater credibility to policy commitments and policy implementation.

3. *Managing policy externalities* which may affect principals. Agents could monitor principals' behaviour when cooperating, for instance, and provide information on alternative policies to prevent the failure of cooperation.

4. *Facilitating collective decision-making*. When principals struggle to reach a stable agreement, they can delegate power to an agenda-setting agent to ensure an equilibrium.

5. *Resolving disputes*. Principals delegate authority to an agent to avoid or solve problems among themselves.

6. *Creating policy bias*. This means locking in policies by creating an autonomous agency: "policy winners who want to continue to win in the future can bias policy in their favour through delegation".

In the context of EU humanitarian aid, all six might apply and they can all be reasons why DG ECHO delegates to its agents. Firstly, although DG ECHO is present in the field through its Country Offices and is more informed than EU Member States,[12] it relies heavily on UN agencies and NGOs thanks to their higher degree of *specialisation*. They have, indeed, a better

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[12] As it will be shown in Chapter 4 on the functioning of DG ECHO, this is a peculiarity of the DG.

understanding and knowledge of the context and of the field, thus being able to provide the DG with useful information and capacities, reducing potential transaction costs. UN agencies and NGOs generally have a long-standing presence on the ground, thus being in touch with national governments and with local populations, being able to target beneficiaries and design feasible projects correctly. Secondly, NGOs, both international and local, have a natural advantage because of their perceived neutrality and experience (Simmons, 1998: 87), thus enhancing DG ECHO's projects' *credibility*. A third reason why DG ECHO might delegate to UN agencies and NGOs is the *management of policy externalities*. In fact, agents can help manage policy externalities thanks to their expertise by providing information on alternative policies to prevent a project's failure. Fourthly, DG ECHO might delegate to its agents to enhance and *facilitate collective decision-making*. Besides DG ECHO, many other donors are present on the ground, creating potential for conflict over organisation and resources. UN agencies and NGOs might have the power to help set the agenda for humanitarian aid projects, ensuring an equilibrium among the principals and avoiding such conflicts. This reason is connected to the fifth reason, *resolving disputes.* UN agencies and NGOs might act as peacemakers on behalf of the principals. Finally, *creating policy bias* might be a reason for DG ECHO to delegate to its agents. A general example of policy bias is the creation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) "in order to secure democracy and bias future policy against autocratic elites who might seize power" (Hawkins et al., 2006: 19). In the case of EU humanitarian aid, DG ECHO could delegate the implementation to its agents so as to ensure a long-term trust towards its policies, creating a positive bias in its beneficiaries, but also in the governments that would help guarantee the implementation of the projects. In fact, UN agencies and NGOs have a direct relationship both with the beneficiaries and the government.

According to Principal-Agent theory, once a contract is established between the principal and the agent, the latter needs to be held accountable by the principal. The accountability of an agent towards its principal is fundamental. In general, accountability involves two parties (the principal, and its agent) and three functions: "1) the principal's downward delegation of duties; 2) the agent's upward account-giving; 3) and the principal's downward assessment" (Vedung, 2011: 1082). The agent is expected to give an account of its work to the principal. Based on this, the principal assesses, through monitoring and evaluation, whether the agent has followed the agreement.

As it will be discussed in Chapter 4, DG ECHO does this by imposing the delivery of a periodical report by the agents. Once they start implementing DG ECHO-funded projects, UN agencies and NGOs have to send DG ECHO periodical reports about how the funds are being

spent, how many people are targeted, and the planned next steps. Thus, the agents' accountability becomes fundamental for DG ECHO to monitor whether the agent is following what was signed in the contract that allowed them to have access to a certain amount of funding.

In conclusion, the second hypothesis derives from aspects of public policy literature and P-A theory. Empirically, this hypothesis will be assessed by looking at the coordination expressed in the amount of information shared between principal and agents, at the frequency of the communication, and at the agents' concrete capacities to implement projects (e.g., offices on the ground, number of staff). In this sense, the delegation and coordination relationship between DG ECHO and its agents could create variation in the effectiveness of the programmes.

Hypothesis 3. National authorities' attitude

> *The national governments and local authorities' attitude, whether interfering or facilitating the implementation of humanitarian aid projects, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

The third and final hypothesis derives from the general literature on the effectiveness of development and humanitarian aid. Attention here shifts from the organisations giving aid and their internal processes, to the national institutions of the receiving countries. The literature on the effectiveness of development aid (e. g. Angeles and Neanidis, 2009; Glennie and Sumner, 2016; Svensson 2009) acknowledges the importance of the recipient country's institutional context, particularly the characteristics of the host economy and the policies of national governments, as well as the attitudes of local elites, defined as a relatively small part of the population with a disproportionate share of the country's political economy and power (Angeles and Neanidis, 2009: 2). Indeed, the local elites' attitude, the choice of economic and political policies by the national governments, and intermediaries of foreign aid all determine how much aid is diverted and how much is used to reach the project's objectives. Local elites, for instance, may seize donor funds, redirecting them towards their own interests, since they are not motivated to improve the general social welfare. Furthermore, Svensson (2009) affirms that aid has a positive impact on those countries that are characterised by democratic regimes, where checks on government power are institutionalised and where there is little risk that governments may use these funds to attain their own goals. In the context of the literature on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, Coppola (2015: Chapter 8) underscores the fact that the first contact a

donor has with an affected country is through its embassy in that country, which often provides assessment of the situation on the ground and assists in the logistics and coordination of donated goods and services. Before implementing a humanitarian aid programme, it is necessary for DG ECHO and its agents to take the relevant measures for authorising the operation in a country. This means, for instance, obtaining permits, ensuring compatibility with national legislation and local standards.[13]

It is not uncommon that countries have refused or delayed humanitarian assistance, regarding it as external interference and a threat to their national sovereignty, especially concerning their customs and visa regulations. Following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, strict Japanese customs regulations on importing animals delayed Swiss and American rescue teams from bringing their highly trained search dogs, upon which the teams relied to find survivors (Goldman, 2011). Humanitarian assistance might require changes in regulations to speed up delivery, and national governments might be hesitant to do so. Recipient countries characterised by "political rancour" may also refuse offers of humanitarian assistance because they might consider it as a way for a donor to discredit the local government, using the aid as a tool for propaganda. Following the disasters caused by two violent hurricanes in 2008, Cuba refused aid from the US because "Cuba cannot accept help from a country with an economic embargo against it" (The Guardian, 2008). Finally, corrupt local elites and national governments may benefit from the flows of aid by seizing the funds for their own interests, preventing the funds from financing humanitarian aid policies, thereby hurting the population – the real and ultimate recipients of humanitarian aid. It is, indeed, important to recall that the ultimate beneficiaries of humanitarian aid are the women, men, children affected by the crisis and not the states (See 2.1.1).

Given this background, the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policy might be influenced by national governments and local elites' attitude, defined as a small part of the population in possession of a great share of economic and political power. If national governments and local elites do not interfere in the implementation of the policy and, on the contrary, facilitate and participate in the implementation of the policy, we might see a variation in the effectiveness. This will be empirically assessed mainly by looking at the visa and travel restrictions by the government and the existence of restrictions of access to certain areas. The empirical study of

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[13] See National and local authorities (relations established, authorisations, coordination) available at http://fpa2008.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/preparing_an_action/proposal_submission/single_form/section_6

this hypothesis would contribute to the literature on EU humanitarian aid where little has been written or empirically researched on this topic.

2.3 Alternative analytical perspective

The hypotheses derive mainly from EU policy and public policy literatures, especially from the P-A theory through the lenses of policymaking and development and humanitarian aid literature. However, among other theories or theoretical frameworks[14] on EU foreign policy and International Organisations, one of them could have been used to explain the rationale of the hypotheses, especially the orchestration model.

Both P-A theory and orchestration describe indirect modes of governance. If the former presupposes a principal and an agent, the latter presupposes an orchestrator, an intermediary and a target. Orchestration can be defined as "the mobilisation of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal" (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal and Zangl, 2016: 722). Although this theory provides important insights that could be applied to the study of the EU, this is not the case when studying EU humanitarian aid, and this can be shown by illustrating the four assumptions at the basis of the orchestration model.

First, orchestration considers indirect and soft relationships, meaning that only intermediaries address the targets, and the orchestrator does not exercise hard control over its intermediaries. By contrast, as discussed previously, in the P-A theory the principal delegates power to its agent based on a contract and exercises control over it through a series of mechanisms. This is indeed the case for the entire EU humanitarian aid policymaking chain, where EU Member States delegate to DG ECHO, exercising control over it through comitology. In turn, DG ECHO is the principal delegating implementation tasks to agents upon signing a contract. The agents are held accountable and are controlled by the DG.

Second, the orchestration model assumes that the orchestrator and the intermediary cooperate to achieve their goals, usually ideational, which are not considered by P-A theory. If we look at EU humanitarian aid, DG ECHO has very practical operational goals that are much better emphasised and analysed by P-A theory. Third, the orchestrator may have insufficient capacities to ensure governance, and therefore it relies on intermediaries. The latter, indeed, would compensate for the missing capacities of its orchestrator. This is similar to P-A theory, but orchestration emphasises mutual dependence between the orchestrator and the intermediary. A mutual dependence would imply a sort of equal position between the two actors

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[14] For further discussion on alternatives perspective and public policy, see John (2012), Chapter 1.

involved, and this is not the case in EU humanitarian aid, where the relationship between DG ECHO and its agents is hierarchical, as assumed by P-A theory, being that DG ECHO is the funder of the projects and the agents are dependent on the funds given by the DG.

Fourth, the orchestration model implies that the goals of the intermediary are aligned with those of the orchestrator, although this does not necessarily imply harmony. On the contrary, the P-A model foresees agency slack, thus a misalignment between the goals of principals and agents, and therefore principals enact control mechanisms over the agents' behaviour (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal and Zangl, 2015*:* 16-19). This is indeed what happens in the field between DG ECHO and its agents. For instance, DG ECHO checks on its agents' behaviour through informative periodical reports, especially to check on how funds are being spent. Finally, while orchestration theory may result useful for the study of dynamics of EU regulatory networks (Blauberger and Rittberger, 2015), this perspective does not allow for the hierarchical structure and dynamics characterising the relationship between DG ECHO and its agents.

2.4 Methodology

This thesis seeks to understand why the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policies varies vis-à-vis pre-established objectives at the beginning of the policy cycle, and the hypotheses focus on the factors that may influence this variation. Thus, the thesis aims to examine the causes of different outcomes. As Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 41-50) explain, this procedure may be identified as the "cause-of-effect", which generally corresponds to a qualitative methodological approach. This approach starts with events that have occurred in the real world and moves backwards to examine their causes (2012: 42).

To carry out the research and assess the hypotheses on the factors of variation in effectiveness, the thesis will rely on three case studies corresponding to three different countries. Choosing three case studies allows for in-depth research to check whether the hypotheses do indeed influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policy and which, if any, have the most influence (Gerring, 2004). Moreover, a focus on case studies helps to better grasp the causal mechanisms underneath the examined factors. The thesis is thus case-study oriented, and its objective is to assess what hypothesised factors are most influential on effectiveness (Ragin and Schneider, 2012: 5), resulting in a hypothesis-testing exercise.

The choice of the three countries as case studies – namely Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique – follow precise criteria that will be extensively discussed in the last section of Chapter 3, since, before explaining the reasons behind this choice, it is fundamental to have a general and empirical background of DG ECHO's actions. The idea was to select cases that

were representative of different situations and types of crises: one case of a complex emergency (i.e. Myanmar), another of war (i.e. Lebanon), and a final one of natural disaster (i.e. Mozambique).

Besides enriching the overall study, exploring different types of scenarios allows us to assess the hypotheses better because it would make us understand more precisely whether or not the hypotheses can be relevant in other different contexts. Presumably, the different types of crisis might have an impact on the effectiveness. For example, natural disasters might influence effectiveness differently from human-made ones. In the case of natural disasters, it is expected that governments would actively participate, such as by formulating national mitigation programmes and by encouraging local administrations to take adequate measures to face the consequences of the disasters (Coppola, 2015: 7). Thus, we would expect that the dimensions of effectiveness, such as goal achievement, needs assessment, the seamlessness of policy cycle and the nexus, would have a higher score. We might also expect that, in the context of natural disasters, the hypotheses formulated and, in particular, the third hypothesis on national authorities' attitude will not negatively influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes. On the contrary, in a human-made or complex emergency, the government itself might be the source of the crisis (e.g. Myanmar). We might expect that national authorities would be hostile towards the delivery of humanitarian aid and might contribute towards a general environment where it is difficult for agents to deliver humanitarian aid. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect human-made and complex emergencies to impact the effectiveness' dimensions significantly.

Other criteria were also applied, such as the time frame (i.e. 2015-2017) and the durability of humanitarian aid missions. In addition, although not explicitly a criterion, looking at the governments' capacity of coping with a crisis also helped in the selection of the three case studies.

Thus, the bulk of the thesis is represented by the empirical Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and each one is dedicated to empirically assessing what went well (or not) in those countries – that is, what DG ECHO did, what were the main issues affecting the effectiveness of its projects and why, and what factors influenced DG ECHO's effectiveness on the field.

For each case study, the assessment of the hypotheses was conducted considering the pre-established objectives of EU humanitarian aid projects and the definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness. Indeed, each hypothesis on the factors, considered the independent variable, was assessed in relation to effectiveness, the dependent variable, and more precisely in relation to goal attainment, the seamlessness of the policy cycle, needs assessment, and the shift from

humanitarian to development aid. To this end, empirical data was collected to provide evidence of the influence of the factors over the various dimensions composing effectiveness.

Empirical data was gathered through sources such as interviews and primary literature, including official reports and documents. Interviews proved to be essential for the empirical assessment of the hypotheses. Indeed, they were useful insofar as they gave access to information and points of view that are left out of official documentation. In total, there were 55 interviews, conducted in several rounds. The first one involved officials of the EU Commission, UN agencies and NGOs, diplomats at HQs or European Country Offices. These interviews were particularly useful to frame the case studies and to get a general idea of DG ECHO's actions and its relationship with the agents and with the EU Member States. The second round of interviews focussed only on Myanmar, the third on Lebanon, and the fourth on Mozambique. All of the interviewees were in the field during the time period covered in the case studies and participated in the projects, dealing with DG ECHO and the management of its funds. Following the snowball principle, initial contacts were used to identify further interviewees. The interviewees were chosen based on the role they had during the period considered in the thesis. This has proven to be particularly useful since most of them now have changed jobs or tasks, thus ensuring a detached and objective point of view towards what happened at the time. Attention was paid to guaranteeing that each party involved was represented: thus, not only DG ECHO officials were interviewed, but also the foremost UN agencies and NGOs officials, aiming at getting the broadest range of possible observations and insights.

In the first round, the interviews were semi-structured, thus leaving the possibility for spontaneous questions and follow-ups. In the other three rounds, interviews were both semi-structured and structured. The need for structure stemmed from the impossibility of having a face-to-face meeting. Thus, having pre-established questions helped the flow of the calls and helped the interviewees, who sometimes replied in written form. The questions concerned the dimensions of the definition of effectiveness, thus focussing on the quality of needs assessment, seamlessness of policy cycle, and the nexus. They also focussed on the relationship between DG ECHO and the Member States and between DG ECHO and its agents.

In order to ensure comparability of data, interviewees were provided with a similar set of questions, slightly adapted to their role, depending on the organisation they were part of and whether they were principals or agents. For the sake of anonymity, the interviews were not recorded, and when referencing them in the thesis, it is done by an identifying number. The numbers are included in a reference list (See Annexe 1), that provides information about the

interview, its date, its location, and only some general information on the interviewees' role, without mentioning their names.

As previously mentioned, interviews were gathered both to acquire new information, but also to check information and data gathered through primary literature in the form of official reports and official documents. Indeed, a significant part of the data collected were generated by official EU, UN and NGO documentation. All these documents can be retrieved on official websites of the organisations. Official documents were mainly annual reports discussing the results of humanitarian aid projects (e.g. Myanmar) and provided useful data on the beneficiaries and on the amount of funding invested by DG ECHO. Data were also obtained by consulting publicly available databases on the official UNOCHA website, particularly those informing about the main donors and agents involved in the field. Also, independent organisations and think tank reports proved to be particularly helpful in understanding the dynamics on the ground between DG ECHO and UN agencies, such as for Lebanon and Mozambique. All of this is referenced in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to theoretically explain EU humanitarian aid effectiveness, beginning with defining humanitarian aid and effectiveness, specifically tailored for EU humanitarian aid. The definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness as goal attainment and integrated with its three sub-dimensions is at the basis of the overall thesis, especially of the empirical Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The hypotheses that are empirically assessed later in the thesis were derived from EU foreign policy literature (e. g. concepts of actorness and the linkage between internal and external effectiveness), and EU policy and public policy literature, particularly adopting the P-A theory over other analytical perspectives, such as orchestration. Finally, the chapter discussed the methodology used in the thesis. Chapter 3 will consider the reasons for selecting the case studies in more depth.

Chapter 3. Delivering EU humanitarian aid: data, analysis and case studies selection

Introduction

The year 2007 was an important one for EU humanitarian aid: the soon-to-be-implemented Treaty of Lisbon gave the policy a new and specific legal basis (art. 214 TFEU), and the Commission, the Council and the Parliament signed the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, a joint declaration which "provides a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, in humanitarian aid in third countries". The EU and the Member States agreed to work in a coordinated and complementary manner, supporting the role of the UN. The common framework for the delivery of EU humanitarian aid is based on coordination, coherence and complementarity (e.g. sharing information on situation assessments), accountability, effectiveness, diversity and quality in the delegation, the use of civil and military assets and capabilities.[15] Among the most important objectives, there was the promotion of a systematic sharing of strategies, needs assessment and context analysis, and the streamlining and simplifying of administrative requirements to strengthen coordination with agents, thus improving effectiveness in the field.

This chapter's empirical analysis starts when EU humanitarian aid entered a new legal and political phase. We have discussed the theoretical framework (See Chapter 2) and will continue to discuss legal and procedural aspects of the policy (See Chapter 4). However, to answer the research questions, it is essential to understand what the EU did and does, and, more precisely, what types of project the EU funds, where DG ECHO has invested the most in the last decade (e.g., the top 12 countries), how much it invested compared to the EU Member States, who are its agents and what the funding trends have been in the last few years.

The empirical analysis of this chapter is based on data taken from the Commission's Final Reports on EU humanitarian aid and the collection of data from 2007 to 2018. The collection was possible thanks to EDRIS,[16] an online Commission platform containing real-time information on DG ECHO and EU Member States' contributions to humanitarian aid. The information found on the platform is encoded by the EU Member States. EDRIS provides information on the donors, the recipients, the amount donated/received, the implementing agents, and the types of projects. The aggregate amounts are in Euro. However, from 2007 to

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[15] As par. 61-62 of the Joint Declaration reports, "Under very specific conditions, humanitarian aid may draw upon military assets, notably for logistical and infrastructure support mainly in the context of natural disasters". Military assets belong to the EU Member States and ESDP. These assets are considered last resort, and military assets should retain their civilian nature and character.

[16] See https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/

2014, all DG ECHO funding is grouped under the label "Country Not Specified"; thus, it is more complex to figure out where and how much DG ECHO invested in each country. In order to understand it, an analysis of every single project listed under Country Not Specified was conducted, being careful to select only those funded by DG ECHO and not the EU Member States. By generating a STATA code that helped identify the project and/or the recipient country from the project's description, it was possible to add all the DG ECHO amounts belonging to projects in a specific country, making it possible to deduce helpful information (recipient, amount, purpose of the project) for a complete account of what DG ECHO funded, how much, and where, as well as to which UN agency the implementation was delegated.[17] This process was applied for each year and each country. Essentially, the total amount labelled under "Country Not Specified" was redistributed among countries, as mentioned above, paying attention not to include the projects funded only by the EU Member States, which were originally included under the same label. The redistribution of the total amount under "Country Not Specified" led to the precise amount given by DG ECHO and the EU Member States for each country and the distinct total amounts for each year (total sum for DG ECHO and the total sum for the EU Member States). The number of the overall total EU humanitarian aid amount was visible in EDRIS and coincided with the calculations. All original data collected can be found in Appendix 1. The years 2015 to 2018 were easier since all these calculations were already present in the system, so it was clear from the beginning how much DG ECHO and the EU Member States spent and where. The tables in this chapter are based on the collection of original data.

Thus, this chapter is empirical and aims to understand and analyse the above-mentioned aspects of EU humanitarian aid policy (e.g. amount invested each year, top recipient countries, implementing agents, and a comparison between DG ECHO and the EU Member States). The analysis will give a thorough picture of the overall policy, and it will be useful for understanding generally what the EU is actually "doing" and will lead to the choice of three case studies, on which the following chapters will focus.

The chapter is structured as follows: it will first give a broad overview of DG ECHO's projects, referring both to data acquired through official documentation and those collected through the above-mentioned process, referring in particular to the complete tables for each year. It will analyse the nature of the crises, their typologies, the purpose of the projects, where

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[17] The data collection in the Appendix 1 only refers to the funding give to UN agencies. However, the empirical chapters also considered the funding of NGOs. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the data collected in the Appendix and those collected for Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique.

DG ECHO and the EU Member States mostly funded the projects, and who were the agents on whom DG ECHO relied. The second part of the chapter will focus only on food assistance and health policies. Finally, the chapter discusses the selection and justification of the case studies.

3.1. EU humanitarian aid: an empirical background

This section of the chapter aims to give a general background on DG ECHO's projects. Based on the Commission's final reports and data collection (See Appendix 1), it will look at the nature of the crises, where the projects took place, the purpose of the projects, and at the agents implementing the projects.

Climate change, population growth, conflict, and poverty are at the source of most humanitarian crises, which have increased in number, complexity and severity in the last twenty-five years (ICF et al., 2017). A humanitarian crisis is "an event or series of events that represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or well-being of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area" (OCHA, 2015: 24). The EU's primary objective in these contexts is to save lives and to provide assistance, as spelt out in the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR),[18] the main legal instrument of EU humanitarian aid. As mentioned in previous chapters, there are two different types of humanitarian crises: natural and human-made. According to research by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, natural crises are geophysical (e.g. earthquakes, tsunami), hydrological (e.g. floods), climatological (e.g. drought), meteorological (e.g. cyclones) and biological (e.g. epidemics, plagues).[19] Human-made crises are social crises such as conflicts (Albala-Bertrand, 2000: 189). Complex crises are a combination of the two, and they are generally characterised by violence combined with natural hazards. Analysing the data collected between 2007 and 2018, DG ECHO has intervened especially in the types of emergencies listed in Table. 3.1:

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[18] The Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR), the main legal instrument governing EUHA, lists the general objectives and framework for the EU's funding, prevention and preparedness actions. Further discussion will be in the chapter dedicated to DG ECHO.

[19] See *Characteristics of humanitarian crises*. Available at https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/health-crises/0/steps/22887

Table 3.1 Types of crises (2007-2018)

	Types of Crisis
Natural	Earthquakes
	Floods
	Drought
	Hurricanes/cyclones/typhoons
	Biological/Health emergencies (e.g. Ebola, dengue, meningitis, yellow fever, cholera, HIV)
Human-made	Conflict
	Mines
	Greenhouse gas emissions
Complex	Combination of natural and human-made crises

Source: Own data collection based on EDRIS online database https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/

DG ECHO has funded projects in cases of earthquakes (e.g. Haiti, 2010-2012; Nepal 2015), floods (e.g. Mozambique, 2016, 2007; Bolivia, 2014), drought (e.g. Swaziland, 2007; Guatemala, 2009; Vietnam 2016), hurricanes (e.g. Cuba, 2008; El Salvador, 2009), typhoons (e.g. Laos, 2009; the Philippines, 2013), cyclones (e.g. Vanuatu, 2011; Fiji, 2016), and health emergencies(e.g. Ebola in Libera, 2014; dengue outbreak in Peru, 2012; meningitis in Chad, 2009; yellow fever in Paraguay, 2008; cholera in Benin in 2015; HIV in Lesotho, 2009). In relation to human-made crises, the EU funded projects in cases of conflict (e.g. Chad, 2015; Kenya, 2016), IDPs (e.g. Colombia, 2007; Uganda, 2009), refugee crises (e.g. Lebanon, since 2011; Angola 2017), malnutrition (e.g. Tajikistan, 2011; Eritrea, 2017), food crisis/insecurity (e.g. Zimbabwe, 2012; Senegal, 2014), and mines (e.g. Laos, 2007; Colombia 2015). Finally, complex emergencies such as the ones in Myanmar (since 2015), Palestine (since 2007), Bangladesh (2008), Guinea-Bissau (2011).

EU-funded projects usually last up to a maximum of 18 months. Despite this, many are protracted crises, especially those that are human-made and complex. As the data show, since 2007, the EU has been continuously funding projects in contexts of conflict and complex crises such as in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Iraq, Palestine, South Sudan, Sudan and since 2011, in Syria and Yemen. In other countries, the EU does not always fund the same project for the same crises. Indeed, the nature of the crises, whether natural or human-made or both, changes over time, bringing DG ECHO to fund different kinds of projects every year. This is the case of Chad, for instance, and of the Sahel in general. In 2007, DG ECHO funded food and health assistance projects due to human-made crises (food crisis). In 2009, new projects aimed at tackling a health crisis due to a meningitis outbreak. In 2010, the nature

of the crisis again shifted towards human-made, with projects aimed at assisting refugees. Until 2018, the nature of the crises and the projects changed from drought to conflict to refugee support. Another example in the Sahel is Ethiopia, whose crisis has changed from conflict (2007, 2009, 2014) to food crisis (2008), to a refugee crisis (2010), to El Niño induced droughts (2011-2012, 2015-2018). Changing regions, we can find a similar example in the Philippines. Here, the nature of the crises fluctuated between natural and human-made. Hit by typhoon Durian in 2007, the country experienced conflict in the Mindanao region in 2008, 2010 and since 2015. Between 2011 and 2014, typhoons have repeatedly hit the country. Although the standard humanitarian aid projects should be short-term, DG ECHO keeps funding assistance projects for the so-called "forgotten crises", generally protracted crises where there is not sufficient international aid, little general commitment to solving the crises and lack of media interest. The Sahrawi refugee crisis in Algeria is an example. As it can be seen from the tables in Appendix 1, DG ECHO constantly intervened from 2007 to 2018, and its funds exceeded those given by the EU Member States (except for 2012, 2013 and 2016). Another example is the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar, where DG ECHO was one of the prominent donors long before the crisis started to attract media attention in 2017. A final example is the refugee crises in Ecuador and Venezuela, where according DG ECHO once again outpaced Member States' funding.

According to data collected (See Appendix 1), DG ECHO funds projects all over the world. The Middle East is the region with the highest share of EU humanitarian aid funding, notably Turkey and Syria. The other recipient country receiving most of the humanitarian aid funding was South Sudan. Middle Eastern countries have continued to be the top recipients in recent years due to ongoing conflicts. As we will see more in depth in the following section of the chapter, the largest EU humanitarian food and health interventions have been in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan. The Sahel region is also among the top recipients, as well as Somalia and Mali.

In addition, data collected show how the African continent presents all types of crises: human-made, complex and natural disasters. The human-made ones attracted the majority of funding vis-à-vis the natural ones. In addition, epidemics attracted funds, primarily due to the Ebola crisis. A small percentage was allocated to the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department's Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) (e.g. Mozambique). As shown in Appendix 1, in the Middle East, funds were mainly provided to cope with human-made crises. In general, most of the funding (75%) was devoted to projects in the context of human-made crises, especially conflict, except the region of Central and South America and the Caribbean,

which were hit especially by natural disasters (53% of the funding) (See Appendix 1 and ICF, 2018). The data show that over the last decade (2007-2018), Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have been hit by tropical depressions, drought, tropical storms, floods, and dengue outbreaks. Countries in South America, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay, have been hit by floods, rainfalls, El Niño effects, earthquakes, dengue outbreaks, and yellow fever. Over the years, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Saint Lucia have been victims of numerous hurricanes and tropical storms (i.e., Irma, Sandy, Erika, Matthew, Thomas), earthquakes and tsunamis.

In summary, DG ECHO intervenes following natural, human-made, and complex crises, with the majority of funding going to the Middle East and Africa. DG ECHO's projects can be found in the sectors of food assistance, shelter, health care, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), protection, education in emergencies and strengthening preparedness and resilience, the latter meaning the "the ability of a community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner" (OCHA, 2015). For instance, in the health sector, DG ECHO's funding is used to build clinics, buy ambulances, medicines, and technical instruments, and provide doctors and nurses with salaries. In the food sector, to meet people's needs, many projects aim to distribute cash and vouchers that beneficiaries decide how to spend. Furthermore, DG ECHO funds projects whose aim is to help children access and learn in "safe, quality and accredited primary and secondary education".[20] Strengthening preparedness and resilience of affected communities is also among the areas where the DG invests the most: "In 2017 alone, 65% of all the DG ECHO-funded humanitarian projects included a disaster preparedness component",[21] meaning projects whose aim was to strengthen the reaction capacities of regional and local responders integrating mechanisms that help national and local preparedness systems to act earlier and better. One of the latest examples has been the DG ECHO disaster preparedness projects funded following the hurricanes that hit the Caribbean in 2017.[22] DG ECHO funds are devoted not only to financing projects but also to the means of coordination during the assistance projects themselves, such as funds devoted to emergency telecommunications augmentation and coordination, or humanitarian action coordination in DR Congo in 2017, or cluster coordination, camp coordination and camp management, and coordination of food security, to

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[20] See education in emergencies available at DG ECHO's website https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/education-emergencies_en

[21] See Disaster preparedness available at DG ECHO's website https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/disaster_preparedness_en

[22] See *EU funding for disaster preparedness in the Caribbean* available at DG ECHO's website https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-funding-disaster-preparedness-caribbean_en

name a few. In Appendix 1, these "administrative funding" projects were labelled and considered part of "Country Not Specified".

As discussed previously, DG ECHO funds projects that are then implemented by other agents. The DG works with 220 agents, including:

- 197 NGOs;
- UN Agencies;
- International Organisations such as the ICRC;
- Specialised agencies of Member States.

NGOs range from highly professional organisations to "simpler" and less developed types of organisations. Their activities are divided into three areas: campaigning, fundraising, lobbying; logistics and evaluation of operations; actual operations and projects (Irrera, 2018; Cathie, 1997: 92). They play an important role in EU humanitarian aid: they provide effective lobbying in Brussels, but more importantly, they provide organisational and project capacities for relief and humanitarian activities, where national governments, international agencies and the EU are not able to do so (Cathie,1997: 93, 95).

Despite NGOs having a prominent role in implementing EU humanitarian aid, DG ECHO's top receiving agents are UN agencies. The ICF's report (2018: 35) on EU humanitarian aid reported that the majority of DG ECHO's total funding was given to UN agencies: specifically, they received 47% of total DG ECHO funding, while NGOs received 44%. International organisations such as the Red Cross family (FICR, ICRC, Red Cross) received 9% of the total funding. As shown in the Appendix 1, World Food Programme (WFP), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are DG ECHO's main UN agents. ICRC, Save the Children, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) are among DG ECHO's main NGO agents.

Indeed, data collected from 2007-2018 show that almost every recipient country saw the implementation of DG ECHO-funded projects by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF. WFP is present both when natural, human-made, and complex crises occur. WFP's projects aim to prevent starvation in humanitarian crises and break the hunger-poverty cycle through food assistance (Omamo, Gentilini, Sandström, 2010: 2). WFP not only provides food assistance (cash, vouchers and in-kind), but also contributes to humanitarian aid projects by providing coordination, procurement, telecommunication services, and extending its capacities to support emergency preparedness and medium- to long-term efforts.[23] Indeed, WFP is the top agent in

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[23] Humanitarian support and services. Available at WFP's website https://www1.wfp.org/humanitarian-support-and-services

food security and livelihoods, multi-purpose cash-transfer, and support to operations (IFC, 2018: 39).

UNHCR deals especially with refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers, and returnees. For instance, the UN agency helps States and agents manage migration challenges, provides cash-based interventions, and ensures access to healthcare, food security, and nutrition. DG ECHO relies on UNHCR, especially in the sector of protection and shelter and settlements (Ibid.). According to the data I collected, UNHCR has been assisting Sahrawi refugees in Algeria since 2007; it has always been present in Syria (2007-2018); it has been present in Central African Republic (e.g. 2012), in Tanzania (e.g. 2015), in Chad (2007-2018), in Georgia (2008-2009), in Iraq (2007-2018), and in Colombia (2007-2018, except 2016), to name a few examples. Together with WFP and UNHCR, UNICEF has also been among the UN agencies most active in the field (See Appendix 1). DG ECHO primarily funds UNICEF's projects in nutrition, WASH, education in emergencies and child protection (IFC, 2018: 39). It has been present in Benin (e.g. 2007), CAR (e.g. 2012), Afghanistan (2007-2014), to mention a few examples. Generally, where UNICEF is present, so is WFP.

The "appropriateness of DG ECHO agents" has become a key issue in EU humanitarian aid. DG ECHO sets up a rigorous and precise selection process that all prospective agents must undertake, from UN agencies to NGOs (See Chapter 4). DG ECHO selects the appropriate agents given the humanitarian needs, the agent's expertise and capacity. As indicated in the hypotheses, the agent's capacities are fundamental for the effectiveness of the projects. Lack of or limited technical expertise and capacity among agents are generally among the reasons for the poor effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes. For example, one of the causes for the failure of EU humanitarian aid in Haiti was DG ECHO's reliance on inefficient agents.

As discussed in Chapter 2, according to the policy-making chain, DG ECHO indirectly relies on local agents. Nonetheless, DG ECHO does not work directly with local agents. Instead, they are chosen by the already selected agents, such as WFP. Indeed, one of the EU official recommendations was to think of an active interaction model to increase "localisation", involving local agents (ICF, 2018:60).

Having this general background in mind about EU humanitarian aid (where the DG ECHO mainly invests; for what purpose; who are the agents), the following section focuses on only two areas of humanitarian aid: food and health assistance. The main reason is that every time an emergency occurs, whether natural, human-made or complex, food and healthcare are the two most essential needs in difficult contexts. Indeed, the majority of humanitarian aid projects revolve around these two basic needs.

3.2. EU humanitarian aid policy: food and health assistance programmes

This section of the chapter will focus solely on food and health assistance programmes, which are cornerstones of humanitarian aid policies in general and of EU humanitarian aid. As can be seen in the Appendix 1, most projects focus on the delivery of food and health assistance during all types of humanitarian emergencies. If we also look at the implementing agencies, WFP, the largest UN humanitarian agency dealing with food assistance, is very present. Data on the annual DG ECHO's humanitarian aid funding per sector helps us see this more clearly: the majority of projects concern food and health assistance, thus the majority of funds is devoted to these sectors, confirming the prominent role of these two humanitarian aid policies (See Appendix 1).

Before empirically discussing DG ECHO's food and health assistance policies, we will briefly discuss the background, the objectives and tools used in these two policies. As per health assistance, we will look at the main areas of intervention and the main implementing agency.

3.2.1 Food and health assistance policies: principles, objectives and tools

Originally known as food aid, today scholars and practitioners use the concept and the term of food assistance, which encompasses food aid as an instrument, defined as international transfers of food for which recipients pay nothing or at least considerably less than world market prices (Belfrage, 2007: 163). The two other instruments used within this policy are cash transfers and vouchers. The former are sums of money provided to beneficiaries, with amounts that depend on the objective of the transfer. The latter, vouchers, provide access to a range of commodities, for a predefined value or quantity, at recognised retail outlets or service centres. While extensive literature can be found when referring to UN food assistance (i.e. Shaw, Stokke), not much has been written on specific EU food assistance. The scholarly literature on EU food assistance typically coincided with the birth and evolution of DG ECHO. However, exceptions include Cathie (1997) and Belfrage (2007), who have written about food aid and its consequences, and Walker, Hodges, Wandschneider (2007), who focus on food aid procurement in Ethiopia.

The development of the EU food assistance policy is intertwined with the history of US food aid and the establishment of the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945 and the WFP in 1963 (Shaw, 2011; Cathie, 1997). Thus, the EU-WFP relationship has existed since the beginning of the 1960s, and, over the years, both WFP and EU food assistance broadened their scope. Since there are many factors causing food insecurity and malnutrition, food assistance

has gained importance. Globalisation and climate change, together with other factors such as weak governance, social inequality, food price crises, and global economic crisis, all contribute to lack of food and, thus, severe hunger, which affects the poorest. It is precisely hunger and malnutrition[24] that both WFP and the EU want to tackle through their food assistance policies. As mentioned earlier, WFP aims to avert starvation in humanitarian crises and break the hunger-poverty cycle through food assistance (Omamo, Gentilini, Sandström, 2010: 2). Similarly, the objectives of EU food assistance are:

1. To safeguard the availability of, access to and consumption of adequate, safe and nutritious food for populations affected by ongoing or recent humanitarian crises.

2. To protect livelihoods threatened by recent, ongoing crises; to minimise damage to food production and marketing systems and establish conditions to promote rehabilitation.

3. To strengthen the capacities of the international humanitarian aid system, to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of food assistance (DG ECHO, 2013:5).

Thus, through food assistance, DG ECHO intervenes to ensure food availability when there is inadequate food consumption and when there is an emergency mortality rate. It also intervenes when there is acute food malnutrition to deliver proper nutrition awareness and proper feeding practice; and when compromised livelihoods pose a severe threat to life, leading to inadequate food consumption. The tools adopted vary based on the symptoms and causes. When the problem to be addressed is *lack of food availability*, response tools are generally the distribution of free food commodities on "a blanket basis" (i.e. to everyone) or on a "targeted basis"; distribution of food in exchange for beneficiary's time or labour; provision of livelihoods support to ensure that self-production capabilities are protected or boosted. Also when there is a *lack of access to food*, DG ECHO finances the provision of free cash or vouchers on a targeted or blanket basis. It finances the provision of livelihood support to ensure that incomes are protected or boosted. It finances projects that improve access and the functioning of markets in crisis. When the problem concerns food utilisation,[25] the response tools can be the provision of food preparation and food storage materials, such as safe water, cooking sets, and fuel, as well as the training and awareness on nutrition and feeding practices. Finally, in the case of malnutrition or micro-nutrient deficiency, DG ECHO-financed projects include response tools such as community-based therapeutic feeding centres, supplementary or

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[24] "Malnutrition results from deficiencies, excesses or imbalances of energy, protein and other nutrients". (Commission, DG ECHO, 2013: 38)

[25] Food utilisation is defined as "the physical use of food by an individual prior to consumption (including storage, and processing), and the body's biological use of food, its energy and its micronutrients, after consumption" (Commission, DG ECHO, 2013: 37).

complementary feeding, provision of micro-nutrients such as distribution of Vitamin A and promotion of nutritional awareness and dietary diversity (DG ECHO, 2013: 20-23).

Together with food, health assistance is both a core sector and the main reference when measuring humanitarian response. As DG ECHO's policy paper on health assistance reports, "the overriding objective of DG ECHO's health assistance is to limit excess preventable mortality, permanent disability and disease associated with humanitarian crises" (European Commission, 2014: 3). DG ECHO finances health assistance projects after a strict selection process[26] and following an early needs assessment that determines the scope of the overall health intervention and is followed by a further needs assessment. DG ECHO follows four criteria that help it decide whether to intervene or not:

1. The magnitude and severity of the crisis: if analyses conducted show that levels of mortality and/or disability has exceeded or will soon exceed accepted emergency thresholds,[27] then DG ECHO finances health projects.

2. The capacity of the community and local/regional/national government to respond: the intervention of DG ECHO is meant to remedy "the gap between the needs of the population and the capacity of the affected population and/or its government to meet those needs" (Ibidem, 2014: 6).

3. The degree to which DG ECHO and its agents can have independent access to the affected population and conduct independent monitoring.

4. DG ECHO will consider the comparative advantages or disadvantages of the humanitarian instrument after consultation with its agents (Ibidem, 2014: 7).

DG ECHO's health assistance projects aim, in practice, at restoring or reinforcing disrupted health service, and at supporting access to health services for affected individuals that should be made available without discrimination. An example of DG ECHO's health assistance projects includes mass vaccination campaigns used to immunise a large population and prevent epidemics. The door-to-door approach is used to guarantee awareness and higher coverage, and it can concern measles immunisation, vitamin A supplementation, health and hygiene education and promotion, and health kit delivery (Commission, 2014: 13). The projects that have received

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[26] In order for a project to be selected, it has to go through six stages of decision-making: 1. Does the proposal respond to needs? 2. Does the proposal adhere to Standards? 3. Does the proposal do no harm? 4. Does the proposal have beneficiary participation? 5. Is the proposal integrated? 6. Is there a monitoring and evaluation component? (Commission, 2014: Annexes).
[27] "Greater than 1/10,000 population/day for the general population or >2/10,000 for under-five children or more than twice the baseline rate for the area" (Commission, 2014: 3).

the most funding over the years dealt with primary health[28] and the provision of   medical supplies (see Appendix 1; ICF and Blanchet, Brown, Deboutte, 2017).

The primary beneficiaries of health assistance were refugees and IDPs in South Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, DRC, Mali, Turkey, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia (ICF et al., 2017: 11). Examples include women and children affected by malnutrition in Afghanistan, the population affected by drought and food insecurity in Ethiopia, Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, Rohingya refugees in Myanmar, CAR and DRC refugees (European Commission 2011 and Appendix 1).

A final consideration on the sector of health assistance concerns the agents. As we have seen for food assistance, once again, UN agencies attract the majority of the funds. According to the data collected (see Appendix) and ICF et al. (2017:4), UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNFPA and UNHCR, and the main health UN agency, WHO, attracted 30% of the total funds, contrary to NGOs belonging to the Red Cross family, who attracted 23% of the funds.

This section shifted the attention from a general overview of all EU humanitarian aid policies to just two key policies. Having this further background in mind, the next section will concern DG ECHO's projects in food and health assistance, whose implementing agents are WFP, UNICEF and WHO. Based on data that can be found in the Appendix, we will discuss where these projects have been delivered throughout the years, and how much DG ECHO spent compared to the EU Member States.

3.2.2 Food and health assistance policies: an empirical analysis

As discussed above, most of the DG's funds are devoted to the Middle East, generally because of human-made crises, followed by African countries, due to a greater variety of crises (e.g., natural, human-made and complex), then by South East Asia and the Pacific, where crises are caused either by conflicts or natural disasters and, finally, by Central and South America and the Caribbean, mainly hit by typhoons, cyclones, floods, earthquakes.

This general trend is similar to the trend for food and health assistance policies. From 2007 to 2018, the majority of the yearly amount of EU humanitarian aid has been devoted to human-made disasters, especially to conflict contexts. Table 3.2 below shows the total amounts (in Euro) given to the top 12 recipient countries in food and health assistance from 2007 to 2018. Among the top implementing agencies, the WFP, UNICEF and WHO always figured. The total

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[28] Primary health care refers to the concept elaborated in the 1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata, "which is based on the principles of equity, participation, intersectoral action, appropriate technology and a central role played by the health system", as reported in the European Commission's health assistance evaluation. Terminology by World Health Organization (WHO). Available at http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/Health-systems/primary-health-care/main-terminology.

EU funding includes the top 12 countries and other recipients, whose number varies according to the year. From 2007 to 2018, EU humanitarian aid was delivered to an average of 61 countries all over the world.

Until 2015, Sudan and South Sudan appeared as the top one or top two countries, receiving the most EU humanitarian aid funds. Here, humanitarian aid was delivered following conflicts, food crises, floods, drought (2010) and cholera (2014). As it will be discussed below and further in the thesis (See Chapter 4, 6 and 8), since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Syria has become the primary humanitarian aid recipient, together with its neighbouring countries, like Lebanon and Jordan. Projects were and still are meant to assist the surviving population and Syrian refugees. A series of UN agencies and NGOs are involved, such as OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO, Care, Oxfam, Save the Children, Danish Refugee Council and the Red Cross, the latter especially delivering health assistance.

The tables show that top recipient countries are those experiencing conflict. Besides the already mentioned South Sudan, Sudan, and Syria, other examples include Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, DR Congo, Ethiopia (2009), Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia and Yemen. Health and food assistance to refugees has gone especially to Kenya (2010 and 2012), Liberia (2011), Mali (2014), Somalia (2015), Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon (2016), Greece (2017), and Chad (2018). Countries experiencing natural crises were Uganda and Liberia (2007, floods and health crisis, respectively), Namibia (2008, floods), Chad (2009, meningitis), Zimbabwe (2010, health emergency), Haiti (2010, earthquake), Ethiopia (2011-2012 drought and in 2015, El Nino), Philippines and Niger (2013, typhoon Hayan and cholera, and drought, respectively), and Sierra Leone (2014, Ebola).

Tables 3.2 Top 12 countries where food assistance and health has been delivered (2007-2018)

2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
Country	**EUHA Funding**	**Country**	**EUHA Funding**	**Country**	**EUHA Funding**	**Country**	**EUHA Funding**	**Country**	**EUHA Funding**	**Country**	**EUHA Funding**
Sudan	195,40	Sudan	194,87	DR Congo	110,49	Sudan	143,49	Somalia	147,11	Syrian Arab Republic	210,48
DR Congo	105,17	DR Congo	136,78	Sudan	107,86	Pakistan	140,91	DR Congo	65,70	South Sudan Republic	84,59
Palestinian Territory, Occupied	52,41	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	84,59	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	68,50	Haiti	110,33	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	62,28	Somalia	81,35
Chad	34,26	Ethiopia	65,65	Pakistan	56,96	DR Congo	59,16	Libya	59,74	Sudan	80,98
Uganda	34,16	Namibia	62,33	Somalia	49,78	Chad	55,45	Afghanistan	50,49	DR Congo	77,80
Somalia	31,53	Zimbabwe	50,95	Zimbabwe	41,10	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	51,36	Chad	41,12	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	56,00
Zimbabwe	27,84	Uganda	46,15	Ethiopia	37,79	Niger	42,93	Pakistan	39,13	Afghanistan	51,04
Afghanistan	25,45	Somalia	42,03	Kenya	33,46	Somalia	33,77	Yemen	34,64	Yemen	42,22
Liberia	18,68	Chad	37,92	Afghanistan	33,08	Afghanistan	29,53	Ethiopia	33,41	Niger	38,62
Burundi	18,30	Afghanistan	37,13	Chad	29,59	Ethiopia	21,75	Kenya	31,94	Ethiopia	32,08
CeAfR	15,54	South Sudan	34,47	Uganda	27,49	Kenya	21,47	Liberia	24,17	Kenya	30,76
Lebanon	11,59	Burundi	22,66	Iraq	26,47	Zimbabwe	17,37	South Sudan Republic	23,50	Chad	28,62
Other 52 Countries	588,89	Other 46 countries	719,40	Other 36 countries	645,34	Other 39 countries	802,92	Other 37 countries	943,39	Other 29 countries	1.036,19
Total	**1159,23**	**Total**	**1.534,93**	**Total**	**1.267,91**	**Total**	**1530,44**	**Total**	**1.556,63**	**Total**	**1.850,74**

Source: Own elaboration based on own data collection that can be found in the Appendix 1. It is based on EDRIS online database https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/

2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018	
Country	**EUHA funding**	**Country**	**EUHA funding**	**Country**	**EUHA funding**	**Country**	**EUHA funding**	**Country**	**EUHA funding**	**Country**	**EUHA funding**
Syrian Arab Republic	592,07	Syrian Arab Republic	349,88	Syrian Arab Republic	1.042,20	Syrian Arab Republic	741,15	Turkey	774,67	Syrian Arab Republic	1.078,8
South Sudan Republic	122,78	South Sudan Republic	186,02	South Sudan Republic	253,14	Turkey	518,64	Yemen	529,20	Iraq	388,1
DR Congo	72,09	Iraq	86,66	Iraq	237,19	Iraq	338,67	Iraq	241,74	Somalia	267,0
Mali	61,41	Sierra Leone	67,54	Ethiopia	136,67	South Sudan Republic	239,54	South Sudan Republic	239,27	Yemen	212,7
Somalia	56,28	CeAfRep	66,96	Yemen	117,77	Yemen	209,43	Somalia	212,32	South Sudan Republic	194,2
Philippines	52,78	Somalia	66,30	Lebanon	93,56	Lebanon	143,51	Syrian Arab Republic	200,92	Nigeria	155,1
Palestinian Territory, Occupied	51,42	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	54,65	Jordan	89,42	Greece	123,50	Greece	161,37	DR Congo	128,7
Chad	42,69	Yemen	49,63	Sudan	76,14	Somalia	113,71	Lebanon	134,30	Lebanon	108,0
Kenya	40,77	Chad	35,79	DR Congo	65,24	Afghanistan	92,14	DR Congo	110,22	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	64,2
Yemen	39,80	Afghanistan	35,62	Somalia	61,85	Jordan	87,77	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	102,22	Sudan	60,8
Sudan	29,63	DR Congo	34,95	CenAfrARep	55,90	Nigeria	68,81	Nigeria	101,30	Ethiopia	60,4
Niger	29,10	Mali	30,42	Palestinian Territory, Occupied	54,25	DR Congo	64,08	Ethiopia	86,38	Chad	55,8
Other 24 countries	857,56	Other 32 countries	958,07	Other 49 countries	1.134,54	Other 53 countries	972,19	Other 42 countries	1.155,25	Other 34 countries	1.020,3
Total	**2.048,38**	**Total**	**2.022,49**	**Total**	**3.417,87**	**Total**	**3.713,14**	**Total**	**4.049,16**	**Total**	**3.794,1**

Source: Own elaboration based on own data collection that can be found in the Appendix. It is based on EDRIS online database https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/h

In 2018, both DG ECHO and the EU Member States were engaged mainly in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen. The following section will show the funding trends of DG ECHO and the EU Member States for food and health assistance policies. The reason behind this is because the budget of EU humanitarian aid policy finds its resources essentially in the Commission, in the European Development Fund (EDF), in the Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR, used to respond to unforeseen crises), and in the contributions by the EU Member States. Showing the different trends between the Commission and the EU Member States (see Figure 3.1 below) allows us to see DG ECHO's and EU Member States' weight in EU humanitarian aid policy. This brings to further understanding of EU Member States interests in certain areas and of whether EU humanitarianism is as apolitical and neutral as it tries to be (See Chapter 4).

Figure 3.1 % of total EU (DG ECHO) and EU Member States' food and health assistance funding from 2007 to 2018

Source: Own elaboration based on own collection of data regarding only food and health assistance projects (Appendix 1). It is based on EDRIS online database https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac

First of all, the amount given by the EU Member States has been much higher than the amount given by DG ECHO. This is important because it shows the general trend in EU humanitarian aid and the desire of the EU Member States to retain influence over this policy, especially given that conflict provokes the majority of the crises. As we will discuss (See Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), the influence of the EU Member States over humanitarian aid leads us to question the neutrality and independence of EU humanitarian aid itself. The budget is allocated based on the priorities of the EU Member States. We can observe that among the top 12 countries where EU

humanitarian aid is delivered are all areas of war, where there is an ongoing refugee crisis not far from the European borders (e.g., Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Turkey, Greece). This is consistent with the political objectives and priorities spelt out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, among which there is "a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa". Thus, the decision to allocate the budget to certain type of crisis instead of other is in itself a political decision, making EU humanitarian aid not as neutral and independent as it should be.

The Member States' trend has been similar throughout the years, remaining stable around 70% of the total EU humanitarian aid funding. There was a slight increase in 2011 (73%), a slight decrease in 2012 (69%), a pick-up in 2015 (77%) and a drop between 2016 and 2017 (62% and 62% respectively). This was followed by a steep increase in 2018 (80%). As Appendix 1 shows, in 2018 a significant amount of funding was devoted to Lebanon, suggesting that the steep increase was, again, due to the Syrian refugee crisis. As for DG ECHO, the trend did not vary much, either, remaining stable around 28%, except in 2012 when there was a small increase (31%), and a fall in 2015 (23%). After an increase in 2016 and 2017 (34% and 38%, respectively), there was a steep decline in 2018 (20%).

The two funding trends seemed to compensate each other. This is particularly clear when looking at the years 2015-2018. When Member States' funds increased, DG ECHO's declined, and when Member States' percentage dropped in 2017, DG ECHO's funds, on the contrary, reached their highest peak. The reason for this can be traced back to the causes of the crises. In 2016, when DG ECHO's funds reached 34% of the total, there were 27 recipient countries where DG ECHO's funds exceeded those of EU Member States. The funds were mainly devoted to projects in the context of natural crises, such as El Nino, droughts, climate shocks, Ebola, meningitis, tropical cyclone, and hurricanes. Other projects were devoted to helping refugees. Again, in 2017, when DG ECHO's funds exceeded those of Member States, it was to fund responses to hurricanes, inundations, drought, health emergencies and then assistance to refugees.

Thus, from preliminary analysis, it seems that DG ECHO mainly intervenes (i.e. grants higher funds than the EU Member States) when natural or complex emergencies occur. However, even though the DG is always present, it seems that the EU Member States' funds are higher in the context of human-made crises, especially conflicts. This could be because of various reasons, one of which is political. As mentioned earlier and it will be further discussed in the thesis, behind the apparent neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid, there lie the

interests of the EU Member States, which are probably due to colonial ties or national economic and political interests in a particular region.

3.3. EU humanitarian aid: case studies selection

This thesis is case-study oriented and has a theory-building approach: its objective is to assess hypotheses (Ragin and Schneider, 2012: 5), thus resulting in a hypothesis-testing exercise. This section will discuss the choice of the three case studies: Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, looking at the years 2015 to 2017.

Gerring (2004:344) defines a case study as "an intense study of a single unit whenever the aim is to shed light on a question pertaining to a broader class of units". This is indeed the aim of the dissertation, which focuses on food and health assistance programmes to shed light on why (general) EU humanitarian aid outcomes vary vis-à-vis the objectives. Indeed, the selection of three case studies corresponding to three "units", that is, three countries, is useful and will allow us to conduct in-depth research and check whether the hypotheses proposed (See Chapter 2) do indeed influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes. There are various reasons for why these case studies and these years were chosen.

As shown in Appendix 1, data collected spanned from 2007 until 2018. However, the analysis of the three case studies is limited to the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. These years represent a period where EU humanitarian aid policy was consolidated in its legal and institutional framework. It was also a period where new practices started to be adopted (e.g., World Humanitarian Summit, 2016), which aimed at improving the monitoring, accountability, coordination and effectiveness itself. In addition, cash-based assistance became the priority for both the EU Member States and DG ECHO, characterising humanitarian aid in this period. Finally, 2017 marked the tenth anniversary of the European Consensus, which improved the relationship between the EU and the UN through promoting coordination and complementarity, thus resulting in consolidated practices that contributed to making the assessment more precise . Additionally, the years 2015-2017 were particularly significant in terms of the events happening in each country. In Myanmar, although 2015 seemed to represent a new beginning for the country's democratic system (see Chapter 5), it was also the year marking the beginning of a series of natural disasters, which was followed by the resurgence of violence against the ethnic minority of the Rohingya. In August 2017, a new cycle of violence erupted, causing half a million Rohingya to flee to the neighbouring country of Bangladesh.

In Lebanon, 2015-2017 represented the first years during which cash-based assistance was implemented as a new modality of distributing cash. The first time the EU considered cash-

based assistance as a more advanced aid modality was in 2013 (See Chapter 6). Lebanon was one of the first countries where this type of assistance was implemented, precisely in those years. Thus, 2015-2017 represent the period when cash-based assistance was first implemented and subsequently evolved. Indeed, 2015-2016 represented the early attempts by DG ECHO's agents to implement this type of aid and 2017 represented a more consolidated scenario of cash-based assistance.

Similarly to Lebanon, in Mozambique, cash-based assistance was a prioritised aid modality by the EU in those years (See Chapter 7). Those years were also particularly significant because of the El Niño phenomenon, which caused abnormal droughts in the country, resulting in food insecurity. In fact, Mozambique was among the countries most affected by the drought (FAO, 2015). In addition to El Niño, the country was also affected by Cyclone Dineo in 2016, leaving million in need of food and health assistance.

Furthermore, the period 2015-2017 was chosen because it is relatively recent, allowing me to have better access to the UN, EU, and NGOs officials involved. Although recent, the majority of the projects were started in earlier years and were reaching the end, allowing for a better assessment of their effectiveness.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the type of crises also helped select the three case studies. The idea was to look at all three major types of crises (i.e. complex, human-made and natural) so as to be able to assess the hypotheses in different scenarios, thus verifying the validity of these hypotheses in general, rather than only relevant to a specific context. Indeed, Myanmar is a complex crisis, Lebanon a human-made one, and Mozambique a natural one.

It is expected that the type of crisis could impact the effectiveness and relevance of the hypotheses. Different scenarios might produce a variation in each dimension of effectiveness vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. For instance, in a context of human-made or complex crises, effectiveness could be lower than in a context of natural crises because the aid delivery would be hampered by the actors involved in the conflicts, especially if the national government itself is the source of violence. In addition, concerning the hypotheses, there could not be an internal cohesiveness of EU Member States because of political tensions that might influence the alignment of preferences towards approving a specific budget. This could lead to a lower general budget, meaning fewer instruments and fewer funds to implement humanitarian aid projects. Thus, it would jeopardise the dimension of goal attainment and the entire effectiveness. In the case of a natural crisis, this might, instead, not happen, because a context of natural hazards is expected to be less politicised, contrary to a context of human-made and complex crisis. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is expected that

natural crises would not lead to any political considerations neither by the national government nor the donors.

Among the possible countries that have been subjected to humanitarian crises, the choice of Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique seemed to be the most significant for the purpose of this research. As we have already mentioned, Myanmar was a country where natural disasters and conflicts combined, provoking one of the world's massive refugee exoduses in modern times (i.e. Rohingya into Bangladesh) (ICG, 2017:7), making it a particularly significant case for assessing the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid. Indeed, DG ECHO has also been one of the few donors worldwide that remained in the country and devoted humanitarian aid when the Rohingya crisis was still considered as a "forgotten crisis" – that is, far from international spotlight and consideration, especially before 2017, when violence resurged.

Lebanon is an example of a human-made crisis that was chosen over Sudan, DRC, Yemen, and Venezuela because of the current importance of the Syrian war and because it is geographically closer to the EU than the others. Indeed, the Syrian war has been of the EU's priorities, as discussed in the 2016 EU's Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016), where the EU has been devoting a great share of humanitarian funding. Unlike Myanmar and Mozambique, Lebanon is among the top 12 countries in terms of the highest share of EU humanitarian funding received between 2007 and 2018 (See Table 3.2). Lebanon was chosen over Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq because it was the neighbouring Syrian country that hosted the highest number of refugees relative to its population[29] and because it is one of the first neighbouring countries where DG ECHO opened its Country Office to respond to this crisis (see Chapter 6). Practical considerations – namely, safety measures - were also applied for choosing this country as an example of a human-made crisis. Before COVID-19, interviews were supposed to be conducted *in loco*, thus, automatically excluding Sudan, DRC, the Sahel region, Yemen and Venezuela.

Mozambique is an example of a natural crisis and was chosen over other countries hit by natural hazards, especially in Latin America, which experienced the highest concentration of natural hazards (see section 3.1). However, despite this, the funding that DG ECHO devoted in Latin America was less than the funding devoted to countries hit by natural hazards in Africa (Interview #33, and ICF, 2018). In addition, as already discussed, Mozambique was one of the countries first hit by the effects of the El Niño drought and, at the same time, was also hit by Cyclone Dineo. Indeed, it is a country very prone to hydrometeorological hazards, and where

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[29] See https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/lebanon_en

the EU mainly engaged and focussed its efforts (Interview #33), making it an interesting case study for this type of crisis (see Chapter 7).

The choice of case studies also implies a geographic spread. This is connected to one of the reasons for choosing different types of crises: assessing the hypotheses and the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in different scenarios, making the overall research more substantially solid. In addition, this reflects EU foreign policy priorities, in line with the above-mentioned EU's Global Strategy, that foresees the EU to be present all over the world and in the most important geopolitical events and contexts. In addition, the EU is one of the top humanitarian aid donors worldwide, with a wide network. DG ECHO has a global network of seven Regional Offices and Country Offices in over 40 countries (See Chapter 4). The presence of staff in the field allows the Commission to always have an updated overview of the humanitarian needs. Thus, choosing case studies that represent different contexts around the world is consistent and shows the engagement of the EU globally.

Besides the criteria of the years and the types of crises, another criterion was useful in choosing case studies, which was the durability of humanitarian aid projects. While the effectiveness of development aid policies has been widely studied, there is much less in the academic literature on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies. Besides those mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the reasons could be that the evaluation of development policies is more accurate due to the long-term nature of such projects, which gives it more time to be implemented and its effects observed. Humanitarian aid generally concerns time-limited projects – in the case of the EU, as we have mentioned, these projects last only up to 18 months (see Chapter 2 and 4). Of course, it is not impossible to decide whether a humanitarian aid project has produced impact in this short amount of time, but the evaluation can be less precise. This is the main reason for choosing case studies where DG ECHO has been investing for at least two consecutive years, such as Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, where the EU (through DG ECHO) was among the top donors and was present (and continues to be present) through its Country Offices. The following Tables 3.3.3, 3.3.4, and 3.3.5 summarise the three criteria discussed thus far: limited time period (2015-2017), type of crisis, the durability of the projects.

Myanmar (South-East Asia) – Complex crisis

As will be extensively discussed in Chapter 5, DG ECHO's presence in Myanmar dates back to 1994 and humanitarian aid funds have been constantly increasing over the years. The DG has been one of the few donors that financed the "forgotten crisis" of the Rohingya. During

2015-2017, a new cycle of violence against this community erupted, while conflicts in Kachin and Shan regions, combined with natural hazards such as cyclones, floods, and earthquakes, caused more than one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This makes Myanmar a case of complex emergency that is also an example of protracted crisis. As Table 3.3.3 below shows, its main agents were both UN agencies and NGOs (e.g., WFP, Oxfam).

Table 3.3.3 Humanitarian emergencies in Myanmar (2015-2017)

Recipient	Year	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	DG ECHO's agents
Myanmar	**2015**	Floods	12,13	69%	31%	IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP *Action contre la faim, DRC, Oxfam, Save the Children, Solidarité Intl*
	2016	Conflict	15,24	33%	67%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP *ActionAid, Action contre la faim, NRC, ICRC, Solidarité Intl*
	2017	Rohingya refugee crisis	21,32[30]	0%	100%	ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP *NRC, Action contre la faim, Handicap Intl*

Source: Own elaboration based on own data collection that can be found in the Appendix 1 and EDRIS. The numbers do not include funding to NGOs. *Note:* In italics there are the NGOs.

Lebanon (Middle East) - Human-made crisis

As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, Lebanon is a case representative of a human-made crisis that started as an emergency and became a protracted crisis. DG ECHO was one of the first donors to open a Country Office in Lebanon as soon as the war in Syria started (2011) and has also been among the most generous donors globally. Also, Lebanon is among the top 12 countries where food and health assistance has been delivered (See Tables 3.2). The main UN and NGO agents were WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and Oxfam. As mentioned above, contrary to the data in Chapter 6, the amount of funds was calculated only in relation to UN agencies.

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[30] Chapter 5 considers only funding given by DG ECHO.

Table 3.3.2 Humanitarian emergencies in Lebanon (2015-2017)

Recipient	Year	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	DG ECHO's agents
Lebanon	**2015**	Conflict in the Middle East, refugees	93,56	32%	68%	OCHA, UNHCR, WFP *Acted, Action Contre la faim, DRC, NRC*
	2016	Conflict in the Middle East; refugee crisis	143,51	21%	79%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP *Acted, Concern Worldwide Oxfam, Solidarité Intl*
	2017	Refugees; Conflict in the Middle East	134,30	39%	61%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP *DRC, NRC, Red Cross*

Source: Own elaboration based on own data collection that can be found in the Appendix and EDRIS. The numbers do not include funding to NGOs. *Note:* In italics there are the NGOs.

Mozambique (South Africa and Indian Ocean, SAIO) – natural crisis

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, due to climate change, Mozambique is a country particularly exposed to hydrometeorological hazards, such as the ones that occurred between 2015 and 2017 (i.e., El Niño drought and Cyclone Dineo), leaving millions in need of food and health assistance. DG ECHO has been present and at the forefront of humanitarian aid in the region for the last 20 years. Table 3.3.3 below shows the funding given to UN agencies. However, data in Chapter 7 also includes NGOs.

Table 3.3.3 Humanitarian emergencies in Mozambique (2015-2017)

Recipient	Year	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	DG ECHO's agents
Mozambique	**2015**	Floods	1,31	15%	85%	UNICEF, WFP *Oxfam, Save the Children,Concern Worldwide, Danish Red Cross*
	2016	El Niño	14,51	0%	100%	FAO, WFP *AICS, Care, Oxfam, Terres des Hommes*
	2017	Cyclone Dineo	3,00	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP, WHO *Oxfam, Red Cross*

Source: Own elaboration based on own data collection that can be found in the Appendix and EDRIS. The numbers do not include funding to NGOs. *Note:* In italics there are the NGOs.

Finally, although not a chosen criteria, the governments' capacities of coping with the crises is a very relevant factor to consider when conducting the empirical analysis. As shown in Chapter 2, generally, it is expected that humanitarian aid's effectiveness is greater in countries that are well-governed, because they can rely on infrastructure and formal, organised plans to cope with the crisis. A disaster's impact may be less severe in places with efficient and accountable governments (Strömberg, 2007: 205). In this sense, the type of crisis is linked to the type of government of the country hit by a disaster. If a country has a stable government, the chances of conflict, natural and complex emergencies strongly impacting the population decreases. For instance, we saw this empirically in March 2020, when humanitarian aid in the form of health care units and specific medicines arrived from Cuba to Italy, following the first wave of the pandemic. The aid was effective since it resulted in the quick construction of a field hospital in Lombardia, the region mostly affected by the crisis, in collaboration with the Italian Civil Protection (Mastrogiacomo, 2020).

The majority of governments around the world lacks strong coping capacities. The EU is involved in those countries where this issue is most significant, particularly in low and middle-income countries in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. Thus, taking these countries as case studies is representative of where the EU is most engaged. In addition, looking at governments that are not strong is significant because it may give us insights into what other factors besides state capacity influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid, such as the three hypothesised factors in this thesis.

The capacity of governments to cope with crises can be quantified through the Index For Risk Management (INFORM). This is an open-source index aimed at analysing the risk of humanitarian crises. It is a tool used by DG ECHO to better allocate resources for each part of the world and each country (Interview #1). The Index ranks 191 countries from most to least dangerous and it has different indicators that give an overall picture of the situation for each country, on a scale 1 to 10 (the latter being the worst). The indicators are: hazard and exposure, which measures the potential events and people affected by them (natural and human-made); vulnerability, measuring the susceptibility of people to potential hazards (socio-economic; vulnerable groups); lack of coping capacity, measuring the lack of resources to cope with crises (institutional and infrastructure); and one overall indicator representing a total (INFORM risk). In 2017, another indicator was added: the reliability index. Indicating transparency of data, this indicator measures the reliability of the data itself on a scale of 1-10. The countries with the lowest scores have a risk score based on more reliable data. This indicator takes into account missing data, out of date data and conflict status.

Here, we focus on the lack of coping capacity, which means the lack of institutional and infrastructural resources to minimise the impact of a crisis. This indicator measures the ability of a country to cope with disasters. This data is the aggregate mean of two other categories: institutions and infrastructure. The first category quantifies the institutional capacity of a government to cope with a crisis, considering instruments such as the presence of early-warning systems, overall governance and the corruption index. The second category refers to the physical infrastructure in place to face an emergency, such as access to health care and communication networks (e.g., access to electricity and internet). Looking at this data in Tables 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and 3.3.6 allows us to better understand the type of government in the countries selected.

Table 3.3.4 Government's coping capacity in the three case studies: 2015

Government's capacity / Country	Institutional	Infrastructure	Lack of Coping Capacity (average of institutional and infrastructure)
Myanmar	7.5	6.3	7.0
Lebanon	5.5	3.3	4.5
Mozambique	4.6	8.6	7.2

Source: Own elaboration based on EU Commission, Index For Risk Management (INFORM). Available at https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/

Table 3.3.5 Government's coping capacity in the three case studies: 2016

Government's capacity / Country	Institutional	Infrastructure	Lack of Coping Capacity (average of institutional and infrastructure)
Myanmar	7.6	6.2	7.0
Lebanon	5.7	2.6	4.3
Mozambique	4.4	8.4	6.8

Source: Own elaboration based on EU Commission, Index For Risk Management (INFORM). Available at https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/

Table 3.3.6 Government's coping capacity in the three case studies: 2017

Government's capacity Country	Institutional	Infrastructure	Lack of Coping Capacity (average of institutional and infrastructure)
Myanmar	7.4	5.7	6.6
Lebanon	5.6	2.3	4.1
Mozambique	4.4	8.2	6.7

Source: Own elaboration based on EU Commission, Index For Risk Management (INFORM). Available at https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/

Over the three years considered, the lack of coping capacity of the governments was relatively close in Myanmar and Mozambique, whereas in Lebanon the coping capacity was better (See Tables 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6).

The lack of coping capacity is different from the national authorities' attitude discussed as the third hypothesis in Chapter 3. In fact, the former measures the institutional and infrastructural capacities, whereas the latter focusses on the disposition of governments towards foreign resources. Thus, humanitarian aid effectiveness is expected to vary positively vis-à-vis the pre-established objectives in a country whose government lacks coping capacity but is well-disposed towards humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the effectiveness is worse if the governments are not welcoming towards humanitarian aid projects, thus hampering their smooth implementation. As we will see in Myanmar, for instance (see Chapter 5), the government and the institutions themselves (i.e., Tatmadaw) are the direct causes of the protracted crisis.

Finally, there are numerous reasons behind the choice of Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique as case studies between the years 2015 and 2017. First of all, in a span that goes from 2007 to 2018 (See Appendix 1), the choice was limited to the years 2015 and 2017 because those years were particularly significant in all three countries, when a series of events were concentrated (i.e. resurgence of violence and floods in Myanmar, first attempts of cash-based assistance in Lebanon and Mozambique, together with El Niño and Cyclone Dineo in the latter). In addition, those were the years that marked the tenth anniversary of the European Consensus and of the improvement of the relationship between the EU and the UN.

Secondly, Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique correspond to different types of crises – complex, human-made and natural, respectively – allowing us to assess the hypotheses in relation to different kinds of scenarios. We might also expect that different contexts might produce a variation in each dimension of effectiveness vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in a natural disaster we

might reasonably expect national governments to be better disposed towards foreign humanitarian aid, as opposed to a human-made crisis, where often the government is the source of conflict.

The choice to discard other countries that presented the same type of crisis lie in different reasons. The choice of Myanmar over another case of complex emergency, such as the Philippines (See Appendix 1), was due to the fact that DG ECHO had been one of the few donors worldwide that kept financing the "forgotten crisis" of the Rohingya and to the fact that, at the time, the conflicts and the natural hazards produced one of the most massive refugee exoduses in modern times. The choice of Lebanon out of the 12 countries where human-made crises were occurring and where the EU devoted most of its yearly funding was also due to other ancillary reasons. Lebanon was chosen over DRC, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Venezuela because it is the country that hosted the highest number of refugees compared to its population in the world; because it is part of the region where the EU's Global Strategy fixed its priorities; and because conducting fieldwork would have been logistically safer than, for instance, Syria, or other places experiencing conflict. The choice of Mozambique as a case representative of natural crisis, over Latin American countries which were also subject to hydrometeorological hazards (e.g. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica), was due to the ancillary reason that the EU has been particularly involved in the SAIO region in terms of funding (ICF, 2018; Interview #33; Appendix 1). In addition, Mozambique represents one of the first cases where the El Niño drought and Cyclone Dineo had a devasting impact on the population.

Thirdly, the durability of the projects was considered. The reason to choose Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique was because here DG ECHO had been engaged for more than two consecutive years, making the assessment of the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects more precise. In addition, although not an explicit criteria for the case study selection, the coping capacity of the governments also helped to choose these cases. A geographic spread is observable, which, again, is representative of the EU's wide humanitarian aid network, present in more than 40 countries around the world. This demonstrates how the EU, and DG ECHO, are engaged anywhere humanitarian needs arise, further highlighting it as one of the top humanitarian aid donors worldwide.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide an empirical background on EU humanitarian aid projects to better grasp "what the EU has done and still does" in this aspect of EU foreign

policy. Based on data collected through the EDRIS platform and official documentation, the empirical analysis gave a general background on all EU humanitarian aid policies. The first section of the chapter assessed the nature of the crises (natural, human-made, or complex), where the EU humanitarian aid projects occur, the purpose of the projects, and the implementing agents. Analysing the data found in the graphics, Africa presents all kinds of crises, while human-made crises are the most common in the Middle East. Natural disasters generally hit Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean.

DG ECHO mainly intervenes in the Middle East and Africa, especially with food assistance, shelter, health care, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), protection, education in emergencies, and strengthening preparedness and resilience. The EU relies on agents in order to deliver its projects. The agents who receive the most funding are WFP, UNICEF and, in the health sector, WHO. The fact that almost every EU humanitarian aid project includes food and health projects explains the choice to focus on these two specific sectors of EU humanitarian aid.

The second section discussed the general background of food and health assistance policies (i.e., their principles and tools) and showed the top 12 countries where DG ECHO's projects have been implemented in the last eleven years. One of the main observations was that these projects were generally implemented in the context of human-made crises and that many of them are protracted crises, lasting for several years consecutively. Since EU humanitarian aid funding results from the sum of DG ECHO and the EU Member States' funding, it was possible to show the difference throughout the years between DG ECHO and the EU Member States' investments based on data collection. Starting with the assumption that the EU Member States' funds are higher than the DG ECHO's, the trends seemed to compensate each other. When the funding of Member States increased, that of DG ECHO decreased, and vice versa. By analysing the nature of the crises, it was possible to see that, contrary to DG ECHO, the EU Member States' tend to fund human-made crises, especially conflicts, more than other types of crises. This can be explained by various reasons, one of which is political. Behind the apparent neutrality of humanitarian aid, the EU Member States' interests loom, probably due to past colonial ties or national economic and political interests in a particular region.

Finally, referring to Appendix 1, the chapter ended by justifying the selection of Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique as case studies. The discussion included the chosen timeframe (2015-2017); the type of crisis (complex, human-made, natural) as a way to better assess the hypotheses in relation to different contexts; and the durability of the projects – that is, those countries where DG ECHO has invested for more than two consecutive years, which allowed

for assessment of the projects' effectiveness. Further, the coping capacity of each government was considered as a relevant aspect for the choice of these case studies. Indeed, picking countries where the governments' capacity was not strong is representative of all the countries in which the EU is engaged with humanitarian aid. This factor allows us to focus on other variables that could more important in the assessment of effectiveness. Finally, the choice of case studies provide a geographic spread. This is representative of the EU's engagement in the world as one of the top humanitarian aid donors worldwide.

Chapter 4. EU humanitarian aid and its actors

Introduction

Art. 21 TEU is dedicated to the role the EU should have on the international scene. The EU should define and pursue common policies and actions so as to fulfil a number of objectives, one of which is "to assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance". Thus, EU humanitarian aid can be seen as one of the external relations instruments the EU can rely on.

As mentioned in previous chapters, EU humanitarian aid belongs to the general humanitarian action framework. Indeed, it follows four principles: *humanity* (human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found), *neutrality* (humanitarian aid must not favour any side), *impartiality* (humanitarian aid must be provided only on the basis of need) and *independence* (the objectives must be independent from political or economic aims) (Broberg, 2014: 168). Within this general framework, the EU's engagement with humanitarian assistance has a long-lasting tradition, dating back as far as the 1960s. Nonetheless, the recognition of the EU's role in this sector started to emerge only in the 1990s with the creation of DG ECHO. The latter was not considered a fully-fledged DG until 2004, but it was not until the signing of the Lisbon Treaty that it was finally granted a legal basis in art. 214 TFEU. Historically, the development of EUHA policy can be summed up in three phases. While the first phase corresponds to the years prior to the establishment of DG ECHO (1992), the second phase concerns the first ten years of the DG's activity. The third phase saw the strengthening of the EU's role in this sector thanks to the Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The EU has become one of the top humanitarian aid donors worldwide (See Chapter 2 and 3).

It is peculiar to see how even though the EU has been engaged in this sector for a very long time, a fully-fledged DG and a legal basis in primary law only came about in the last two decades. Among the reasons why this has happened is that EU humanitarian aid was considered an instrument of EU development aid and its functions were for a long time distributed among different DGs within the Commission (Versluys, 2008). After the Maastricht Treaty, the general historical context started to change and the EU became aware that it was inadequately prepared to tackle humanitarian crises, such as those in Iraq after the First Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia. It was only at that point that the then Commission (Delors II) decided to create an administrative structure dedicated only to humanitarian aid: DG ECHO.

In the previous chapters, it was impossible to not mention some aspects of DG ECHO and to start giving a background on its functioning and role. DG ECHO's establishment has previously been touched upon, as well as its legal framework, some of its decision-making procedures and how its partnerships are set up (See Chapter 2). At this point of the thesis, following an extensive empirical chapter on EUHA policy in general, it thus becomes necessary not only to *mention* DG ECHO's role and its legal background, but to extensively explain it by looking at how EU humanitarian aid policy developed and how the DG came into being. This includes what precisely its role is, how it is internally structured and how its partnership framework works. This is indeed the purpose of this chapter.

Following an historical account of EU humanitarian aid policy where the three above-mentioned phases will be illustrated more extensively, the chapter is going to look at the legal background of the policy, then specifically at the institutional structure of DG ECHO, at its procedures and how the Commission relates to Member States and other EU actors as well as agents.

4.1. The three phases: a historical background

The development of EU humanitarian aid followed three phases. The first one was from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, when the EU was engaged in humanitarian aid but did not have an explicit role or independent administrative structure. The second phase not only saw the setup of DG ECHO, it also saw the establishment of the general principles as well as of the procedures for implementation thanks to the 1996 Council Regulation. Finally, during the third phase ECHO became a fully-fledged DG acquiring a legal basis founded in the Lisbon Treaty.

Phase 1: the beginnings

Contrary to EU development aid, which appeared in the founding Treaties (i.e. Treaty of Rome, 1957: art. 92 Section 3; Part Four Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories – especially art. 131), EU humanitarian aid is never mentioned in these agreements. The first time that this domain entered within the competences of the then EEC was following the Second Yaoundé Convention in 1969.[31] Here, article 20 stated:

> In the light of assisting the associated States in facing special and
> extraordinary difficulties creating *exceptional* situation, having a
> serious repercussion on their economic potential and due to either a

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[31] The First Yaoundé Convention (1963) saw associated eighteen countries of the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) with the EEC.

> fall in world prices or to calamities such as famines, floods, a reserve
> fund […] shall be established. In the event that such an exceptional
> situation occurs, the Community may grant aid (EEC, 1969).[32]

Thus, for the first time in EEC history, humanitarian aid was mentioned as the aid the Community could grant to Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) following "exceptional situations" (e.g. economic or natural crises), thus constituting "exceptional aid".

The Lomé Convention that followed (1975-2000) saw the *mis en place* of innovative cooperation agreements with the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), thus extending the scope of the aid. The entire ninth chapter of this Convention (1979) is dedicated not to exceptional, but rather to "emergency aid". Art. 137.1 stressed that:

> "Emergency aid may be granted to ACP States faced with serious
> economic and social difficulties of an exceptional nature resulting
> from natural disasters or extraordinary circumstances having
> comparable effects" (EEC, 1979).

Thus, the Convention focussed not only economic or natural disasters, but also what can be understood as "human-made crises". In general, art. 137 can be considered an embryonal definition of EU humanitarian aid. It also mentions the need for implementing agents:

> "Where appropriate, such aid may, with the agreement of the ACP
> State concerned, be implemented via specialized agencies or directly
> by the Commission"

Additionally, art. 137.8 defines how humanitarian operations should be delivered:

> "operations financed by the emergency aid must be carried out as
> quickly as possible […] the monies must be used within six months of
> the implementing arrangements being established".

This constitutes a modality that is in fact similar to what is done now. Today, humanitarian aid operations must last between six and eighteen months. More or less in the same period, specifically in 1971, the European Parliament had established a separate EU budgetary line only dedicated to humanitarian aid, which applied to all developing countries, including those that were not former colonies of Member States (Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 16).

The first time that EU humanitarian aid became visible and institutionalised was in 1992 following the decision of the Second Delors Commission to create an administrative structure

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[32] Original : « Par ailleurs, en vue d'aider les États associés à faire face aux difficultés particulières et extraordinaires créant une situation exceptionnelle, ayant une répercussion grave sur leur potentiel économique et dues soit à une chute des prix mondiaux, soit à des calamités telles que famines, inondations, il est institué un fonds de réserve […] . Dans le cas où une telle situation exceptionnelle se produit, la Communauté peut attribuer une aide[…] »

entirely dedicated to humanitarian aid. This was to stress the role of the EC within the changing historical context and to equip it for the new humanitarian emergencies the world and the European Community were facing.

Phase 2: the establishment and the first decade

Before the establishment of DG ECHO, the budget for humanitarian aid operations was distributed within the Commission, depending on the nature of the crisis and on the location of the mission. Humanitarian aid was managed by what are now DG RELEX, DG DEVCO and DG AGRI (Agriculture and rural development). Thus, the creation of a new DG avoided in the first instance administrative scattering and fragmentation of resources that usually caused EU humanitarian aid to be inefficient or ineffective. Secondly, the creation of DG ECHO gave the EU a chance to increase and strengthen its role on the international scene with the general establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy following the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, an autonomous administrative apparatus dedicated only to humanitarian aid would have increased and strengthened the legitimacy and international recognition the EU needed to have when intervening in the field. It would also have improved the coordination with Member States, other donors, NGOs and international agencies through joint operations and frameworks (European Court of Auditors, 1997: 1.10). Furthermore, as Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt (2016: 18) note, the creation of an insulated administrative structure would have made it easier to avoid political interference and to stick to the international humanitarian aid principles.

In 1993, DG ECHO was managed by Commissioner Manuel Marín under the cooperation and development sector and the first Framework Partnership Agreement with specialised humanitarian organisations was put into place. The agreement sent a message not only that EU was not a "cash dispenser", but that it had to be considered equal to the other actors involved in relief operations (Versluys, 2008:92; Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 19). DG ECHO started to have greater independence and a stronger role. In 1995, Emma Bonino became the first Commissioner for humanitarian aid, which was considered separate from development policy. In the following year in 1996, the Council Regulation 1257/96 on humanitarian aid (known as Humanitarian Aid Regulation, HAR) established the general principles and objectives as well as procedures for the implementation of operations for the first time.[33] Article 1 of the Council Regulation defines EU humanitarian aid activities:

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[33] See Council Regulation 1257/96 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996R1257&from=FR

"assistance, relief and protection operations on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters".

The main objective of EU humanitarian aid has always been to prevent or relieve human suffering, providing necessary assistance, helping finance the transport of aid, carrying out rehabilitation and reconstruction, coping with the consequences of population movements and ensuring preparedness for risks or natural disasters. The same year that these principles for the implementation of operations were established, two other important initiatives took place: the setup of the Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) and the first Commission Communication on LRRD. The HAC functions as a forum for Member States where they provide input and also control the activities of DG ECHO. It is part of the Comitology system, which refers to a set of procedures (examination and advisory) through which the Commission exercises its implementing powers with the assistance of committees of Member States representatives. Indeed, as established by the Committee's regulations, each Member State is considered to be a member of the HAC and it is up to them to decide on the composition of their delegations, for instance, whether or not they will choose to include experts. The Committee's activities mainly consist of drafting and considering implementing acts to be adopted by the Commission and on which the HAC is asked to give an opinion. As discussed in Chapter 2, that same year the European Commission issued an official communication on LRRD, which specifically addressed the gap between short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development aid programmes.

Despite the fact that DG ECHO was starting to become more visible and acquiring greater independence, this was not reflected in the Amsterdam Treaty. None of its sections was devoted to humanitarian aid. In addition, in 1997, the European Court of Auditors issued a highly critical report on DG ECHO's activities, criticising the DG as well as EU humanitarian aid more generally for taking a piecemeal approach to the policy, for not having adequate staff, for "fragile and unstable" practical cooperation arrangements between the Commission and the UN and for poorly conducted evaluations (European Court of Auditors, 1997: Overall Conclusions).

Phase 3: fully-fledged DG, legal basis and the new momentum

Humanitarian and development aid portfolios were brought together under Commissioner Poul Nielson (1999-2004). The years following this were particularly positive for EU humanitarian aid in general and for DG ECHO in particular. EU humanitarian aid increased its speed and efficiency, and the distinction between relief, crisis management and development started to become apparent (Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 21). Furthermore, in 2003 the EU agreed to the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship, an initiative embraced by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC),[34] which provided a general guide to humanitarian aid based on a needs assessment and a mechanism for greater donor accountability.

The European Convention and the Constitution of Europe devoted an entire section to humanitarian aid for the first time, which, finally, saw its status upgraded to primary law. Despite the Constitution not being ratified (2004), the article on humanitarian aid was picked up by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) and art. 214 TFEU became the legal basis of the entire policy. 2007 was also the year of the European Consensus already mentioned in the chapter III, which prompted the EU and Member States to work in a coordinated and complementary manner to support the role of the UN. The Consensus is a key political document and gave new momentum to the overall EUHAP. In 2008, it was followed by and integrated within a five-year Action Plan. This spelled out a number of directly applicable measures that aimed to implement the provisions of the European Consensus. The latter led to the establishment of the Council's Working Group on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA).

The 2011 Mid-Term review and the 2014 Evaluation on the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid acknowledged progress within the different aspects of humanitarian aid (e.g. coordination, coherence, diversity and quality in partnership), but they both pointed out room further improvement. In particular, the 2014 Evaluation listed nine recommendations. The three most important recommended replacing the Action Plan with a strategic plan that increasingly involved Member States; improving monitoring and accountability; and ensuring flexibility in the implementation approaches between the different Member States. In 2015, building on the previous Action Plan and evaluations, the European Commission published the Implementation Plan of the European Consensus on HA. The document identifies three key priorities: upholding humanitarian and international humanitarian law; reinforcing the needs-based approach; and enhancing coordination and coherence. These

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[34] Within the OECD, it is an international forum grouping the largest provider of aid worldwide. https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/

served as a basis for the overall improvement of effectiveness and accountability of EU humanitarian action and cooperation and were the foundation of the EU position during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Here, as mentioned in chapter 2, the Grand Bargain was adopted following the signatures of 59 international humanitarian donors, NGOs, Red Cross, UN agencies. The Grand Bargain is an agreement based on fifty-nine commitments to be adopted by donors and agents to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of humanitarian aid. From 2016 until 2017, DG ECHO was one of organisers of the annual Grand Bargain meetings and was the key member of the Grand Bargain facilitation group, created to provide momentum to the agreement's implementation. DG ECHO was also one of the primary advocates of the "Joint and Impartial Needs Assessment" approach to making the assessments transparent, coordinated and impartial. DG ECHO was committed to enhancing its engagement with development actors, enhancing cash-based assistance, strengthening cooperation with local agents, and increasing multi-annual funding.

Finally, in celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the signature of the European Consensus it was reported that "the Consensus' added value in enabling better delivery of aid has been acknowledged by a wide range of humanitarian organisations including NGOs, UN agencies and ICRC" (European Commission, 2008).

4.2 The Legal Framework

EU humanitarian aid is unique in the general EU legal and institutional context. According to Art. 4.4 TFEU, humanitarian aid falls within the shared competences of Member States and the EU: "the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct common policy". As with development aid, what makes humanitarian aid special vis-à-vis the other sectors of the shared competences is the absence of the pre-emption principle. According to this principle, found in Art. 2.2 TFEU, Member States can exercise their competences only when the Union has not exercised its competences or decided to cease exercising them. The result is that when discussing humanitarian aid, it is both a *shared* and *parallel* competence between the EU and its Member States.

The fact that humanitarian aid falls within both shared and parallel competences is a strong indicator that Member States are reluctant to give far-reaching competences to a supranational institution. Consistent with the position of the Member States towards the EU's general foreign policy,[35] art. 214 TFEU is explicit in affirming that the "Union's measures and those of the

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[35] See Declarations 13 and 14 TFEU on Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).

Member States shall complement and reinforce each other" (See Table 4.1 below). The Council has an important role in the policy process and, together with the European Parliament and acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, it is responsible for the establishment of the measures that define *the framework* of the implementation of EUHA operations. Furthermore, art. 214.4 stresses that the EU may conclude any agreement with third countries and IOs but "without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements".

Table 4.1 Humanitarian Aid. Article 214 TFEU

1. The Union's operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations. The Union's measures and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.
2. Humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination.
3. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures defining the framework within which the Union's humanitarian aid operations shall be implemented.
4. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 and in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements.
5. In order to establish a framework for joint contributions from young Europeans to the humanitarian aid operations of the Union, a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps shall be set up. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine the rules and procedures for the operation of the Corps.
6. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member States, in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures.
7. The Union shall ensure that its humanitarian aid operations are coordinated and consistent with those of international organisations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United Nations system.

Source: Title III "Cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid", Chapter 3, art. 214, TFEU.

Art. 214.1 not only makes it clear that DG ECHO's activities are shared and in parallel with those of the Member States, it also defines the objective of EU humanitarian aid, affirming that the operations are intended "to provide *ad hoc* assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the

humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations". As mentioned in Chapter 2, the four legal humanitarian aid principles are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. EU humanitarian aid is delivered according to international law and the principles of "impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination". Art. 214.2 seems to have left out the principles of humanity and independence. Broberg (2014: 168-169) analyses this peculiarity, tracing it back from the origins. When this article was first drafted for the Constitutional Treaty, the exclusion of humanity and independence "was in no way intentional", and to reopen the negotiations was considered to be too problematic, thus re-emphasising the concept that "the principle of humanity was so obvious that in any event it would be superfluous to mention". In addition, the principle of independence was viewed by some as contrasting with the objective of a comprehensive approach in external relations. In fact, the objective of the comprehensive approach is to reach "consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these and its other policies" (Council, 2013) and the notion of independence "would potentially contrast with the ambition of having a unitary response to crisis" (Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 28). After the Lisbon Treaty this article in particular was closely remodelled on the Constitutional Treaty and it was decided to leave it as it was and not re-open the so-called "Pandora's box". This was also due to the fact that the new European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid listed all four humanitarian principles (Broberg, 2014: 169). When defining the objective of the operations, art. 214.1 states that these are meant to provide "ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different situations". This statement can be related to the principle of humanity, defined as "human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found". On the contrary, the mentioned principle of non-discrimination cannot be associated with the principle of independence, defined as having objectives that "must be independent from political or economic aims". This is indeed a problematic aspect of the article. In fact, as noted by Broberg, the fact that humanitarian aid must be delivered within a framework of principles and objectives of the external action of the Union (2014: 169) and that this framework is defined by the EP and the Council contrasts with the principle of independence itself. Nonetheless, even if art. 214.1 does not make an explicit reference to it, the whole policy has to respect international law and everything that comes with it, that is, all four of the principles. Furthermore, art. 214.4 refers to art. 21 TEU, which spells out what the EU's role on the international scene should be, and affirms that the "Union shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world democracy, the rule of law, the universality

and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, *and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law*".

Articles 214.6 and 214.7 designate the Commission with the role of promoting coordination, complementarity and consistency between the actions of the EU and its Member States as well as those of IOs, especially the UN. The objective is to ensure that the shared and parallel competences are respected and that an overlapping of activities is avoided. EUHA operations should also be in line with those of the agencies of IOs, especially the UN agencies. The main objective of this is to increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid operations.

Finally, art. 214.5 established the European Voluntary Aid Corps, whose rules and procedures are once again determined by the EP and the Council following the ordinary legislative procedure. Inspired by the American Peace Corps and UN Volunteers, the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EVHC) is supposed to provide technical support to humanitarian aid organisations and projects and contribute to strengthening the local capacity and resilience of the affected communities. This is well outlined in art. 4 of Regulation No 375/2014, which represents the legal basis of this initiative. It states that EVHC aims at "strengthening the Union's capacity to provide needs-based humanitarian aid aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity and to strengthening the capacity and resilience of vulnerable or disaster-affected communities in third countries". Its objectives are not only related to humanitarian aid but are also "expressing the Union's values and solidarity with people in need and visibly promoting a sense of European citizenship" (Commission, 2014).

Previously managed by DG Environment, the scope of DG ECHO's responsibilities have since 2004 been broadened to include civil protection. This has a different legal basis from the general humanitarian policy: art. 196 TFEU (see table 4.2 below).

Table 4.2 Civil Protection. Article 196 TFEU

1. The Union shall encourage cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disasters. Union action shall aim to:
    (a) support and complement Member States' action at national, regional and local level in risk prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel and in responding to natural or man-made disasters within the Union;
    (b) promote swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union between national civil protection services;

> (c) promote consistency in international civil-protection work.
> 2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure shall establish the measures necessary to help achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.

Source: Title XXIII , TFEU.

The rationale behind this article and the establishment of European Union Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM) was to promote a "swift and effective operational cooperation between national civil protection services", as can be read in art. 196.1.b. The role of the Commission is in this case to coordinate, support and complement Member States' actions when responding to natural or man-made disasters *within* the Union and worldwide.[36] Indeed, the EUCPM has two objectives:

- o Strengthening the cooperation between the Union and the EUCPM's Participating non-EU States, that is all EU Member States as well as Norway, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

- o Facilitating coordination in the field of civil protection so as to improve the effectiveness of preventing, preparing and responding to disasters (European Court of Auditors, 2017)

Finally, civil protection assistance consists of governmental aid delivered in preparation for the immediate aftermath of a disaster in Europe and worldwide. At its core there is the Emergency Response and Coordination Centre (ERCC), which will be mentioned in the following section of the chapter.

To make a final note on the legal framework, all the efforts made to distinguish humanitarian aid from development aid have been mentioned. Legally, each policy responds to a different article. That is, if art. 214 is the legal basis for humanitarian aid, then articles 208, 209, 210 and 211 TFEU manage development and cooperation policy. There is also a substantial difference in how the Council, the EP and the Commission relate to the policy. While art. 209 TFEU states that "the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt *the measures necessary for the implementation* of development cooperation", art. 214 TFEU only mentions that *a framework within* which the operations should be implemented. Thus, it seems to indirectly refer to the fact that EU humanitarian aid is often implemented by NGOs and other agencies (Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 25), implying that the Commission can enjoy a relatively greater degree of freedom when delivering humanitarian assistance.

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[36] Although the reference to "worldwide" does not appear in art. 196 TFEU, the official site of the EU Civil Protection adds it. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection_en

The first two sections of the chapter traced the historical and legal framework of EU humanitarian aid policy and that of its "protagonist", DG ECHO. The following two sections will look at the institutional, administrative and budgetary background of the DG in more detail as well as how it interacts with other EU actors.

4.3 DG ECHO: structure, budget, interactions

Since its establishment in 1992, DG ECHO changed name many times. Firstly, it was called the "European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid", then the "European Community Humanitarian Office" and thirdly the "European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office". Today it is known as the European Commission's office for "European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations". Indeed, as previously clarified, it was in 2004 that DG ECHO's responsibilities officially broadened their scope to include the Civil Protection Mechanism.

This section of the chapter will look at different aspects of the DG: its institutional framework and its budget and at its coordination and cooperation with Member States and other EU actors, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG DEVCO. A final and distinct section of the chapter will be left for the delegation framework.

Table 4.3 DG ECHO's Organisational Structure

Directorate A Emergency and RescEU	Directorate B Disaster Preparedness and Prevention	Directorate C Neighbourhood and the Middle East	Directorate D Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and Pacific	Directorate E General Affairs
A.1 Emergency Response Coordination Centre	B.1 Civil Protection and Horizontal Issues	C.1 Humanitarian Aid Thematic Policies	D.1 Strategic Partnerships with Humanitarian Organisations	E.1 International and Interinstitutional Relations, Legal Framework
A.2 Capacities and Operational Support	B.2 Prevention and Disaster Risk Management	C.2 Southeast Europe and Eastern Neighbourhood	D.2 West and Central Africa	E.2 Programming, Control and Reporting
A.3 Security and Situational Awareness	B.3 Knowledge Network and Evidence-Based Policy	C.3 Middle East	D.3 East and Southern Africa	E.3 Contracts and Finance
A.4 Communication		C.4 North Africa, Iraq and Arabian Peninsula	D.4 Asia, Latin America, Caribbean and Pacific	E.4 ECHO Field Network
				E.5 IT Solutions

Source: DG ECHO's Organisational Chart. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/echo_organigramme_en.pdf

4.3.1 Institutional framework and budget

DG ECHO is made up of five Directorates, each one of them further articulated in divisions dealing with different issues, as shown in Table 4.3.

Each Directorate deals with different aspects of policy. While Directorate A is concerned with emergency situation and response, Directorate B deals with disaster preparedness and prevention and civil protection. Directorates C and D deal with different geographical areas of the world: the former with the Neighbourhood and the Middle East, the latter with Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia. Latin America and the Pacific. The final Directorate, Directorate E, deals with the administrative and budgetary aspects of policy.

Directorate A.1 is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which manages coordination with Member States. It is closely linked to Civil Protection, which falls under the responsibility of DG ECHO and in particular of Directorate B.1. The ERCC, set up in 2013, is a 24/7 situation room and is the crisis monitoring and coordination platform for the Commission as well as the EU in general. It is supported by the web-based alert and notification applications called Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), a centralised platform that represents a "hub" between participating States, the affected states and the field experts. It also facilitates cooperation between EU Civil Protection and humanitarian aid operations (European Court of Auditors, 2017). Every country outside the EU can appeal through this platform for EU or Member State intervention (Interviews #2,#8,#9).

Directorate E deals with General Affairs and manages different aspects of the overall policy, in particular international relations, legal framework and the controlling of and reporting on the policies. It also manages the DG ECHO field network. The latter is articulated in:

- o Country Offices (CO), which are made up of national staff and humanitarian experts and represent ECHO in the countries where projects are implemented;
- o Sub-country Offices, which are administratively dependent on COs and are present in very large countries where humanitarian actions are necessary in a specific area;
- o Antennas, which are small temporary offices that conduct project assessment and monitoring and provide logistical and administrative support when necessary; and
- o Regional Offices (RO), which deal with several countries in the same region by providing technical operational expertise and coordination (DG ECHO, 2016).

The overall role of the DG field network includes keeping the headquarters (HQ) in Brussels up-to-date regarding the local humanitarian situation; providing technical advice, needs assessments and monitoring projects; contributing to policy development and ensuring a coherent implementation of the policy guidelines; and representing DG ECHO in forums.

Usually, the work is in the hand of the DG's humanitarian experts called Technical Assistants (TAs). Their role is to identify and evaluate humanitarian needs, supervise funded operations and give administrative and logistical support and communication.

Among the Directorate E's responsibilities is that of contracts and finance, which deals with the policy budget. DG ECHO's *overall* budget is set periodically by the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). In 2014-2020, this fixed the initial *annual* budget at €1 billion per year. If the seven-year ceiling is set by MFF, it is up to the EU Budget Authority (the EP and the Council) to set the annual budget on which DG ECHO can depend. For the first time in 2019, the annual budget reached €1.6 billion, the highest ever.[37] Based on this budget, every year since 2012, the Commission has adopted what is known as the World Wide Decision (WWD). This is a legal document defining the needs to be addressed and indicatively allocating funds for each region and country. While the WWD represents the legal commitment of the Commission to fund humanitarian aid operations, the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) are operational and financing decisions that take the form of legal acts adopted by the Commission in order to authorise DG ECHO to spend funds from the EU budget and fund humanitarian actions (Interview #1). These decisions are made on the basis of needs assessments and set different needs priorities and funding allocations. The needs assessment is conducted following two distinct phases. In the first, the Index for Risk Management discussed in Chapter 3 is used, based on national data. This allows for the comparison between countries and identifies the level of humanitarian risk. There is also the Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA), another tool to identify the above mentioned "forgotten crises". In the second phase an in-depth assessment is conducted by humanitarian experts, making up what is known as the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF).[38]This assessment is a qualitative valuation of humanitarian needs based on single crisis and taking into account the affected population.[39]

The EU humanitarian aid budget is funded in several ways: by the Commission; the European Development Fund (EDF), which devoted to emergency assistance to ACP; the Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR), which used to respond to unforeseen crises; and by contributions from Member States.[40]

Table 4.4. below shows the amount of the contributions by EU Member States to the overall EU humanitarian aid budget. The budget given by EU Member States is combined with the

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[37] *EU adopts record budget for humanitarian aid in 2019*. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-adopts-record-budget-humanitarian-aid-2019_en

[38] ECHO website (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en).

[39] Needs Assessment. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en

[40] EU Funding https://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/funding-humanitarian-aid_en

budget given by the Commission (i.e. DG ECHO), resulting in the total EU humanitarian budget. As shown in the previous empirical chapter, Member States' aggregate funds are generally higher than the total given by DG ECHO. Table 4.4.[41] highlights this aspect and also shows the total amount devoted to EU humanitarian aid, including DG ECHO's funds.

From 2007 to 2018, the Member States that contributed the most were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In particular, Germany, Sweden and the UK stand out as the top three humanitarian donors in the EU. It is important to note however that most of the trends were not regular. While this was not the case with Belgium, Denmark and Germany, whose contributions consistently increased, all other countries' budgets varied. Finland for instance, reached a peak in contributions in 2014 but since then its funding decreased. The case was the same for Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. The latter reached peak contribution in 2015 and since then, its contributions have steadily decreased. Funding from France, Italy, Ireland and Spain both increased and decreased. France and Italy increased their budgets consistently in the last three years, while Ireland and Spain reduced theirs. Having said this, DG ECHO's funds constantly increased and almost tripled by 2018, bringing the overall EU humanitarian aid budget to steadily increase over the last eleven years.

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[41] Data in Table 4.4. could not be displayed in a descending or ascending order, according to the figures. In fact, those change every year. This is why it is displayed according to the alphabetical order of the EU Member States, keeping DG ECHO separate at the end. Highlighted in bold there are the EU Member States that have contributed the most in terms of EU humanitarian aid's budget.

Table 4.4 Overall EU humanitarian aid Budget: DG ECHO and Member States (€ million) – *Source*: Own elaboration on the basis of EDRIS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	1,7	8,6	10,9	14,8	13,9	9,5	10,0	11,2	16,0	52,9	29,2	26,4
Belgium	53,7	68,1	98,4	100,9	136,1	164,1	183,7	84,7	262,6	111,4	218,9	157,5
Bulgaria	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,2	0,0	0,4	2,5	0,2	0,0
Croatia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Cyprus	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Czech Republic	2,4	2,7	3,4	3,3	3,0	2,9	2,8	3,6	8,2	2,8	3,4	0,0
Denmark	124,4	191,5	158,3	186,2	208,6	68,4	276,1	251,4	295,7	316,4	368,4	329,9
Estonia	0,6	0,4	0,5	1,1	1,0	1,1	2,0	2,3	2,7	3,5	3,3	2,4
Finland	72,8	70,8	79,1	86,0	96,7	89,9	102,1	117,7	109,8	92,0	81,2	72,1
France	74,9	100,7	80,8	84,7	102,3	61,3	55,4	71,2	133,7	149,9	164,1	103,6
Germany	177,1	239,3	263,6	295,8	266,6	331,8	430,5	865,5	1.084,3	2.209,3	1.879,4	3.025,2
Greece	3,8	7,0	4,4	0,6	0,8	0,1	0,1	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Hungary	0,3	0,6	0,3	0,7	0,3	0,8	0,7	0,4	1,6	4,3	1,0	0,0
Ireland	135,8	122,0	85,2	65,3	74,2	61,9	72,1	62,9	84,1	94,9	87,2	83,9
Italy	45,2	109,4	50,9	59,5	41,5	30,5	37,1	66,1	74,9	94,3	117,6	130,0
Latvia	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0
Lithuania	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,3
Luxembourg	30,0	29,6	34,1	34,1	33,2	38,8	38,2	43,6	37,1	36,7	16,7	9,5
Malta	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,2	0,7	0,5	0,2
Netherlands	363,9	275,6	164,3	217,9	124,6	131,4	134,5	239,6	456,3	176,2	5,5	165,0
Poland	1,4	1,2	0,7	0,6	4,3	4,2	3,2	2,3	4,9	8,9	14,7	0,7
Portugal	0,0	0,4	0,4	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,0	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0
Romania	0,0	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,0	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,7	0,6	0,0	0,0
Slovakia	0,7	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Slovenia	0,0	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,8	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,0
Spain	61,9	21,4	13,8	92,4	173,3	43,1	40,7	40,6	37,5	15,1	38,3	37,8
Sweden	185,0	379,3	473,9	470,9	577,0	779,7	528,8	596,3	523,6	391,1	419,1	343,3
United Kingdom	192,5	365,7	207,6	246,1	167,8	328,4	643,2	834,2	1.036,3	978,7	785,8	541,5
DG ECHO	738,0	904,4	892,7	1.065,0	1.041,3	1.259,0	1.264,5	1.171,4	1.693,4	2.416,3	2.371,1	1.745,2
Total Sum	2.266	2.900	2.624	3.027	3.068	3.408	3.827	4.467	5.866	7.159	6.606	6.774

Having looked the institutional framework and at the budget, it is important to keep in mind that DG ECHO is not a bubble within the European Framework. Indeed, the understanding of how this DG works is achieved by looking at how it interacts with the EU Member States and other EU organs and DGs, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG DEVCO.

4.3.2 DG ECHO and the EU Member States

Having looked at the institutional framework and understood how DG ECHO is organised and what its budget is, it is now relevant to look at the vertical and horizontal interactions of the DG. Beginning by looking at DG ECHO's interaction with the EU Member States, it is important to bear in mind how this takes place within the above discussed P-A model, where the concept of delegation is fundamental (See Chapter 2). The EU humanitarian aid policy cycle is interesting because its principals and agents vary throughout the policy process. In fact, if at the beginning the Member States are always the principals and DG ECHO the agent, as the cycle progresses, DG ECHO becomes the principal and the agents implementing the policy are other actors. Indeed, this last point will be further discussed in the last section of the chapter dedicated to the partnership framework put in place by DG ECHO.

Considering that the EU Member States can pursue their own policy, the relationship between DG ECHO and Member States at HQ can be understood by looking firstly at the decision-making procedures and secondly by looking at the Comitology system put in place, as mentioned in the historical background.

From 2001 until 2012, when dealing with a humanitarian aid policy, the EU Member States had three choices, depending on the situation (emergency or not). They could either: choose whether or not to give exclusive competence to DG ECHO, thus granting it *full delegation*; keep exclusive competence, thus supporting *unilateralism*; or decide to act jointly with DG ECHO, by keeping a certain extent of autonomy over decision-making and actions, thereby conferring *partial delegation* on DG ECHO (Pusterla, 2015: 19). When dealing specifically with decision-making procedures, the fact that humanitarian aid should be delivered as quickly as possible brought about a streamlining of the whole process. DG ECHO was granted the possibility of undertaking a "*fast-track procedure*", which gave it the freedom to take rapid decisions (within two days) without consulting Member States in advance. It was a procedure that could only be undertaken if the operations lasted less than three months and if the budget was less than €3 million. Besides this, there were two other procedures that could be selected when an emergency operation was required. One was the "*empowerment procedure*", which

allowed the humanitarian aid Commissioner to deliver urgent operations up to the value of €30 million and non-urgent operations requiring up to €10 million for six months. Member States were only consulted if the amounts required for these exceeded the fixed budget. The second process was the "*written procedure*", according to which the Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) approved emergency and non-emergency operations exceeding €30 million and €10 million respectively (Pusterla and Pusterla, 2015: 262; Pusterla 2015: 23). These procedures were for the most part followed when emergencies occur. In other non-emergency situations, the Council played an essential role; indeed, the Commission must always consult the Council, which then decided the course of the action the DG needs to take (Pusterla, 2015: 24).

Since 2012, these procedures have been superseded and are now rarely used. Indeed, those were valid tools before the creation of an overarching financing, that is the WWD. Since the creation of the WWD, the system has become even more flexible. The WWD leaves a margin of flexibility of 20%. Thus, the whole phase of 'asking for permission' from the EU Member States does not take place anymore. For instance, in the case of the Syrian war, after 2012, funding was increased without consulting the Member States. Only if the sudden increase of the funding goes beyond the 20% margin does the WWD need to be amended, but it has never happened before. Thus, the WWD has made the use of emergency procedures obsolete. The last time they were used was for the Nepal's earthquake in 2015 (Interview #1, #19). In addition, the regional Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) are also approved without previous approval by the EU Member States. In addition, as we will see in Chapter 7, DG ECHO was also free to adopt the so-called crises modifiers, that is a legal tool that allows funding to be increased when needed without previous approval.

Besides looking at the decision-making procedure, it is fundamental to look at the HAC and the Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) in order to understand the relationship between DG ECHO and Member States. As mentioned previously, being a Comitology Committee, the HAC is made up of a *representative* of each Member State whose role it is to decide on the composition of their delegations; for instance, whether or not they will choose to include experts. Thus, the HAC directly checks DG ECHO's activities, while COHAFA is only a forum for improving coordination and strategy between Member States and the Commission.[42] The latter is made up of *experts* from each Member State and is chaired by the delegate of the country holding the rotating six-month presidency of the Council (Interviews #4, #5).

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[42] See COHAFA at https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7ej5swx026

The HAC has to meet once a year and provide feedback on financial decisions exceeding €2 million for operations that are not an emergency. In theory, the HAC should discuss DG ECHO's guidelines and coordination with Member States, as well as changes in the way DG ECHO administers humanitarian aid and conducts the assessment of the deployed aid. In practice, HAC is not considered a discussion or coordination platform by the Member States, but rather "as a mandatory administrative step for DG ECHO to get its budget and the operational strategy approved" (ICF, 2018). The HAC is a way for Member States to check on DG ECHO's activities. The administrative step, contrary to a discussion or coordination platform, has the power to indirectly determine the policy itself from the beginning, since it has a say on the budget and on the overall *operational* strategy.

The coordination and interaction between the DG ECHO and Member States takes place in the COHAFA. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, its establishment dates back to 2009, and it is as a way of ensuring greater coordination between the Union and Member States. Specifically, the COHAFA:

1. Monitors humanitarian needs;
2. Ensures coherence and coordination of the EU collective response to crises;
3. Discusses international, horizontal and sectorial humanitarian policies; and
4. Promotes the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (ICF, 2018: 90).

Furthermore, the working group acts as a forum for discussion between national representatives and DG ECHO and takes place once a month or more, depending on the urgency of the operations. Here, Member States use the information and analyses provided by DG ECHO to prepare their own humanitarian aid operations and to better coordinate them (Interview #24). The COHAFA is also useful for the development of common advocacy and diplomatic messages ensuring a common EU approach to crises. Indeed, within the COHAFA, the general EU position vis-à-vis specific issues is discussed before international meetings (Ibidem).

The only phase where EU Member States can influence humanitarian aid is during the initial approval of the overall budget in the HAC. Apart from this, they do not have a say on DG ECHO's programmes themselves (Interviews #3, #20). However, as we will see in the empirical chapters, the role of the EU Member States can be ambiguous and the interests of some States can influence the agenda or the way EU Member states approach DG ECHO's work in the field (Interviews #3, #14). Indeed, the budget approval and where to allocate the funds seems to be a political decision. For instance, the fact that more funding is allocated to certain countries instead of others might lead us to question the neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid

discussed in Chapter 2. We must also consider the historical colonial ties[43] that EU Member States have with third countries where humanitarian aid is delivered. For instance, in 2015, the UK, as we will see in Chapter 5, was one of the EU Member States mostly engaged in Myanmar, where it was present with its own office and coordinated with DG ECHO. Also, the decision by the EU Member States not to allocate certain amount of funding to Myanmar in order to guarantee a bridge between humanitarian and development aid, negatively influenced the overall process, by making it slower. The decision was mostly political as the EU Member States were concerned about the violent escalation going on in Myanmar and had the interest not to consider the Myanmar government as an enemy. Otherwise, this would have jeopardised not only diplomatic relationship, but also the possibility to actually deliver humanitarian aid to the Rohingyas, and the opportunity to support a democratic transition (Interview #4; See Chapter 5).

In general, each EU Member State has a diplomatic and political interest towards third countries (Interview #14, #34). Another example is Italy and Mozambique as we will see in Chapter 7. Mozambique is one of the top Italian foreign policy priorities. Italy has been continuously present in the country since 1975 and contributed to end of the civil war in 1992, by backing mediation efforts with financial cooperation (Sicurelli, 2020: 262). Its interests have been political but also economic, as the EU Member State has major investments in energy and infrastructure companies in Mozambique. Thus, it is not surprising to see that Italy is among the top humanitarian and development aid donors to the country. There seem to be a political interest behind the funding of humanitarian aid programmes, which can be a way to guarantee peace and stabilisation to the territory.

As we have discussed above, we also must consider that EU humanitarian aid is embedded in a legal framework that explicitly states that this aid needs to be delivered consistently with "principles and objectives of the external action of the Union" (art. 214.1 TFEU). As discussed in Chapter 3, this is also reflected in the choice of the top 12 countries where EU humanitarian aid has been mostly delivered since 2007. Table 3.2 shows that the countries that received the highest share of EU humanitarian aid funds are all countries subject to war or complex emergencies. The majority of them is related to Syrian war (e.g., Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey), confirming the supposition that the EU Member States have priorities in that part of the world where there is an ongoing refugee crisis at the borders of Europe, in line with the 2016 EU Global Strategy.

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[43] Here, I am not going to explore this aspect. Although very important, it is behind the scope of the thesis.

4.3.3 DG ECHO, the EEAS and DG DEVCO

DG ECHO's interactions are not only limited to Member States. Indeed, the DG deals with operations and emergencies where other EU actors are involved, in particular the EEAS and DG DEVCO.

The EEAS and DG ECHO's relations respond to general guidelines found in the "Working Arrangements Between Commission Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues", which were set in 2012. The document provides cooperation guidelines both at HQ level and at field level. The visualisations of the interaction are in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 below.

Figure 4.1 Interaction at HQ level among DGs and DG ECHO and the EEAS

Source: Own elaboration (all interviews).

In Brussels, DG ECHO and the EEAS cooperate and exchange information in response to major disasters. The nature of the crisis will determine who is going to initiate the exchange of information: DG ECHO's ERCC or the EEAS Situation Room, under the authority of the Managing Director of Crisis Response Department (European Commission, 2012). Indeed, there are two types of processes depending on whether the nature of the crisis affects EU security or not. If it does, the EEAS initiates the whole process (in figure 4.1, this is represented by the black arrow going from the EEAS to DG ECHO, since it is the EEAS that gives instructions to DG ECHO). The EEAS' crisis department will activate the Crisis Response

System (CRS), which is made up of: the Crisis Response Planning and Operations that assist the High Representative/Vice-President and plan and organise the response activities; the EU Situation Room, which is the EEAS centre providing 24/7 worldwide monitoring; and the Consular Crisis Management, which assists in consular policies across the EU (Interviews #8, #9).

All the relevant actors, the EEAS and other DGs including DG ECHO, are invited to participate in order to formulate the most appropriate strategy to respond to the crisis. Within the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, the Crisis Response Planning and Operations division plans and organises the EU's response, also supporting the HR/V-P in their duty to ensure coherence within overall EU external action (Van Elsuwege, Orbie, and Bossuyt, 2016: 41).

If the crisis does not affect EU security directly according to the EU Member States and is caused by natural or human-made factors, then it is up to the Commission to initiate the whole process. DG ECHO convenes regular meetings including the EEAS to exchange relevant information about the crisis. This is represented by the orange arrow, since there is indeed an exchange between the EEAS and DG ECHO. This happens within the ARGUS framework, the Commission's internal rapid alert system. Created in 2005,[44] it aims to bring together all relevant Commission services so as to evaluate the best options for action and decide the appropriate response measures in an emergency.[45]

The entire process at HQ is summed up more generally in Figure 4.2, where when an emergency occurs the first ones to detect it are DG ECHO's ERCC and EEAS' Crisis Response System. Then, if the emergency affects EU's security interests as discussed previously, the EEAS "takes the reins" of the process and gives instructions to DG ECHO on how to plan the response (black arrow). If the emergency does not affect the EU's security concerns, then there is an exchange between DG ECHO and the EEAS (orange arrow) on how to plan and organise the response. DG DEVCO works together with DG ECHO's activities thus attempting to ensure Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)/Nexus from the very beginning. Finally, DG ECHO chooses its agents.

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[44] See *Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions. Commission Provisions On "Argus" General Rapid Alert System*. COM(2005) 662 Final. 23/12/2005. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0662:FIN:EN:PDF
[45] See *Crisis Coordination*. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/crisis-management_en

Figure 4.2 Entire Process at HQ level when an emergency occurs

The 2012 document also regulates the relations between DG ECHO and the EEAS in the field. The document touches upon different aspects, starting from the merely administrative ones that provide guidelines on the arrangements of DG ECHO and EEAS field offices. It highlights how there is the possibility of co-locating a DG ECHO field office and an EU Delegation, thus sharing for instance the costs of the premises. Then, the document explicitly urges close cooperation between DG ECHO and the EU Delegation in the field. Indeed, DG ECHO's Technical Assistants must keep Heads of Delegation regularly informed, so as to ensure that their activities are compatible with other EU programmes (Interview #34). In turn, the Head of Delegation will have to involve DG ECHO's Technical Assistants in internal Delegation meetings and provide them with any information that could be relevant to the DG's activities. Furthermore, they will also be involved in meetings with Member States where issues relevant to humanitarian aid or civil protection are at stake (European Commission, 2012).

Figure 4.3 Interaction in the field among DGs and EEAS

Source: Own elaboration (Interviews #1-#55).

Besides the EEAS, in figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 DG DEVCO appears as another important actor with whom DG ECHO interacts (Interview #11, #18).

The DGs are different regarding their mandate, their principles, their budget lines, their priorities, their objectives, their programming and funding cycle, their timing, their access in the field and their partners.

As per the mandate, it is already known that DG ECHO's responsibility is to provide assistance relief and protection to victims of natural or man-made crises on a non-discriminatory basis. DG DEVCO's mandate is to formulate development policies in order to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental development and to promote democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law and good governance. DG ECHO's activities are based on humanitarian and international law, and its principles are the humanitarian ones discussed above. DG DEVCO relies on the principles of country and democratic ownership, alignment and mutual accountability. Indeed, the two DGs also differ in terms of priorities and objectives. If DG ECHO's priority is the (most vulnerable) individual, DG DEVCO generally prioritises the society (ICF, 2018). Furthermore, DG ECHO's objectives are to save lives and protect civilians. In this sense they are immediate objectives. DG DEVCO has long-term objectives such as poverty reduction and sustainable development. Therefore, the timing of the policy differs: quickly-delivered operations for DG ECHO and long period policies for DG DEVCO. In terms of budget, DG ECHO's budget lines are fixed by Council Regulation 1257/96 discussed above, while DG DEVCO relies on funding instruments with a geographical focus or

thematic focus. For instance, the European Development Fund provides funding to the geographical area of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Development Cooperation Instrument has both a geographical (i.e. Latina America, North and South-East Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, South Africa, the Gulf) and thematic focus (e.g. food security, climate change) (European Parliament, 2017). As per the programming and funding cycle, DG ECHO is based on the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIPs), while DG DEVCO on programming cycles of five to seven years, which involve national authorities and stakeholders. Finally, DG ECHO and DG DEVCO differ in their access in the field and implementing agents. While DG ECHO provides aid in remote areas and its agents are UN agencies, NGOs and IOs, DG DEVCO does not have access to certain areas and its agents are other than UN agencies and IOs, usually governments, civil society organisations, the private sector and peacekeeping operators (ICF, 2018).

DG ECHO and DG DEVCO's cooperation is visible both at HQ and at the field level. The core of their interaction ought to be found in LRRD/nexus, and in a series of other tools developed through the years, with the aim of enhancing the cooperation and coherence between the activities of the two DGs. We have discussed in Chapter 2 the origin of the concept of LRRD and how it changed over time recognising the complexity of the crises. The documents released over time by the European Commission reflected this change in view as well as the different approaches. In 1996, the European Commission issued an official communication on the LRRD. It specifically addressed the gap between short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development aid programmes. The document states that "Rehabilitation programmes are seen as progressively taking over from relief assistance to stabilise the economic and social situation and facilitate the transition towards a medium and long term development strategy" (European Commission, 1996: 3). Since then, the concept has been reiterated in various communications by the Commission, but while this first communication reflected a linear continuum sequence approach, it later changed to embrace the *contiguum* approach. In fact, in 2001, the Commission released a Communication which points out the complexities of the different crises and how the strategies and instruments used by the two programmes, such as the financial instruments should be implemented simultaneously. This approach was stressed again in the 2008 "European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid" where it is affirmed that "achieving better linkage between LRRD requires humanitarian aid and development aid actors to coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response and to act in parallel with a view to ensure smooth transition. It necessitates mutual awareness of the different modalities, instruments and approaches on the part of all aid actors, and flexible and innovative transition strategies". (Council of the European

Union, 2008: 9). Today, LRRD is mostly known as nexus. The latter is a more joined-up approach that aims to respond holistically at people's need, especially during protracted crisis. This approach recognises that people's need, besides stemming from the contingent emergency, come also from systemic and underlying issues. Thus, this approach tackles life-saving needs while ensuring longer-term investments addressing the roots of the issues causing people to need humanitarian aid (Oxfam, 2019).

Since 2011, two instruments have been implemented in support of the LRRD/nexus and to further improve coordination and cooperation between the two DGs. One has been the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The DCI's prime objective is to reduce poverty and among the many actions it supports, is LRRD. The other instrument is the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) (See Chapter 6). The latter regulates the cooperation between the two DGs. The JHDF is a tool developed in 2011 to strengthen operational cooperation. It is articulated in five steps jointly conducted by the two DGs: discussion of the crisis; identification of the target population; analysis of the causes; identification of the EU response; analysis of risks and shortcoming of EU interventions; and design of an action plan. Thus, it envisages a joint assessment of DG ECHO and DG DEVCO concerning both the nature and causes of the crises and how to respond.[46]

Up until now, the chapter has analysed the historical and legal background of the general EU humanitarian aid policy and then it looked at the DG responsible with this policy. DG ECHO's institutional structure and its budget were analysed as well as its interactions with Member States and other EU actors, such as the EEAS and DG DEVCO. The most important relations DG ECHO has – those with its implementing agents – will now be looked at.

4.4 DG ECHO and its agents

The previous sections have discussed who is generally involved in EU humanitarian aid and what EU actors are particularly involved. Besides DG ECHO, the EU's co-legislators, EU Member States, other DGs (e.g. DEVCO) all play a role in the humanitarian aid policy cycle and can influence DG ECHO's operations. Figure 4.4 below is a visual sum-up of what has been previously shown.

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[46] See JHDF explained here https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/resilience_ethiopia/document/joint-humanitarian-development-framework-jhdf-context-food-security

Figure 4.4 EU humanitarian aid – actors involved

Source: Own elaboration based on chapters 2 and 4 and all interviews.

In orange, among the stakeholders that can influence EU humanitarian aid policy, is the Council and the EP (EU co-legislators) and the EU Member States as well as the Global Forums and UN Clusters (See Chapter 2). Indeed, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter the Council and the EP decide the framework within which DG ECHO's operations occur. The EU Member States, through the Council and Comitology check DG ECHO's activities. In blue, DG ECHO, the donors, other DGs, its agents, and the local agents. Finally, at the core of EU humanitarian aid there are the affected communities and the national governments responsible for the first response and for requesting foreign humanitarian aid.

4.4.1 The Delegation Framework

One of the major challenges for DG ECHO is to choose its implementing agents. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the principal-agent relationship changes. While DG ECHO was formerly the agent of the Member States (the principals), once the DG takes the reins of the policy, it becomes the principal and UN agencies and NGOs then become the agents who are responsible for the policy's implementation. Chapter 3 showed how the UN agencies are the privileged agents, in particular WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR. The Red Cross, Oxfam, NRC are the other privileged NGOs agents.

On the basis of the World Wide Decision and the HIPs previously discussed, the coordination between DG ECHO and UN agencies is defined by the Financial Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA).[47] For coordination with NGOs, the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) constitutes the legal basis (Interview #1). This Agreement was initially signed in 2003, and most recently redefined and updated in 2014. The FAFA sets the principles of cooperation with UN agencies and focuses on the implementation of humanitarian aid actions. It clearly sets the procedures to follow before and during the implementation of projects. For example, it highlights that UN submissions of proposals that the EU contributes to must include objectives and indicators of achievement. Additionally, it states that Commission representatives shall be invited to participate in the main monitoring and evaluation missions relating to the performance of actions funded by the Commission. It also underlines that the Commission's evaluation should be planned and completed in cooperation with UN staff (Interview #6, #16, #23). Furthermore, the FAFA is important as it affirms that there should be agreement between the Commission and the UN, when setting for example the appropriate procurement rules and procedures. Of course, there are also all the financial aspects and costs that need to be agreed upon by both organisations.

The selection process takes place in two phases:

1. Pre-selection phase: the organisation applying for EU funding needs to comply with a set of eligibility criteria, including having three years of operational experience with an annual minimum of €200,000 or having worked with DG ECHO before. The objective is to have agents that are stable and reliable, although this is to the detriment of small NGOs that do not have the same amount of financial possibility as UN agencies (See Chapters 5, 6, 7).

2. Selection stage: once pre-selected the organisations have to complete a detailed questionnaire of 86 questions touching upon the organisation's expertise, legal requirements, administrative and bureaucratic aspects and its technical and logistical capacity (ICF, 2018: 56).

Once selected, how does the project proposal work? And how does then the delegation work? Taking the example of WFP, whose partnership with DG ECHO is going to be assessed in this dissertation, the next section illustrates the whole policy cycle, from the project proposal to the implementation of the project and its evaluation.

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[47] Available at http://eu-unfafa.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/_media/fafa_2014.pdf

4.4.2 The delegation in practice

The procedures to follow are valid for all UN and NGOs. In general, responsible for the beginning of the whole policy cycle is the agent, which formulates a project proposal (Interviews #1, #7, #13, #17, #19). Taking the example of a UN agency such as WFP, it is up to the WFP Country Office (CO) to start formulating food assistance projects following the request and the agreement from the local governments, while DG ECHO does not have any relationship with the national institutions. Before arriving in Brussels, these proposals usually undergo an internal system of clearance and long-term projects usually have to wait for the approval of WFP Executive Board (Interviews #1, #6, #23). Project proposals are first discussed with DG ECHO experts in the field. Indeed, as previously mentioned, one of the peculiarities of DG ECHO is that it has a large network of people (450 in total) who work in the field: 1/3 are European technical experts (the above-mentioned Technical Assistants), and 2/3 are local agents (who can be both local experts or support, e.g. drivers). Once WFP CO experts have started to discuss the project proposal with DG ECHO experts in the field, and after having passed the internal clearance process, the project proposal is sent to Brussels.

At HQ, the project is analysed by DG ECHO desk officers responsible for the country concerned. At this point, a sort of ping-pong between WFP and DG ECHO begins; it is rare that the project proposal is accepted as it is sent. These exchanges mainly consist of comments, requests for further clarifications and requests for changes, for instance a change of criteria and/or targets. In fact, it may be that the goals proposed are unrealistic and need adjustment, or it could also happen that there has been a request for too much funding (Interview #1). It is important that when formulating or modifying projects and operations, experts consider what has been done in other countries so as to make sure there is not too much difference between regions. The exchanges are done electronically through a series of tools (notably the so-called *fiches opérationnelles*) that allow immediate online exchange between DG ECHO and the agents. Ultimately, both actors reach an agreement on the final project proposal that will be financed (Interview #1, #6).

Thus, the implementation phase begins. The two actors are supposed to be in touch during this stage. An Annual Strategic Dialogue is held between WFP and DG ECHO. Here the two organisations meet and discuss policies and strategies to implement and set the operational priorities for the current and following year. During the implementation phase, DG ECHO's Technical Assistants have the important task of monitoring the implementation of projects. DG ECHO organises regular meetings and regular contact is kept with partners and experts in the field (Interview #13). Thus, coordination also happens this way, through regular contact that

could be both formal and informal. WFP officers keep in touch regularly with desk offices of DG ECHO in Brussels. It is also significant to know that WFP and DG ECHO officers know each other, especially at senior managerial level, and that good coordination is also kept with those who work in the field.

No later than three months after the end of the project, the agent has to complete and submit a final report to DG ECHO. During the evaluation phase, to understand if the project has been correctly implemented within the fixed period of time and if the targets were achieved, both WFP and DG ECHO hire external evaluators. In addition, DG ECHO desk offices keep a constant dialogue with partners to ensure that the goals set in the initial proposal are actually met. Desk officers evaluate the projects; their evaluation takes the form of reports, which are drafted both during the implementation phase of the project and at the end (Interview #3). If the report is positive and the project is judged to be of high quality, DG ECHO finances it entirely; if the project does not meet the targets previously established, there are a set of legal instruments used to reduce or cancel the financing, which until now has never been the case. Indeed, projects have always been judged to be of more than sufficient quality.

These procedures also show how DG ECHO is not solely a "passive" donor; it actively participates in and influences the whole policy cycle in various stages and in different ways:

1. At the beginning, through the HIPs: by setting its priorities DG ECHO already influences the operations. WFP for example will propose projects that are consistent with what is established in the HIPs.

2. During the formulation of the projects: TAs in the field already intervene giving their suggestions and inputs to WFP experts who are formulating the project that will be sent to Brussels once internally approved.

3. During the final shaping of the project: as previously shown, there is a continuous exchange between DG ECHO and WFP through electronic tools. DG ECHO provides WFP with comments and proposed changes that will ensure the project proposal receives financing. Thus, comments on the strategies, targets and amount of financing requested influence the shaping of the project.

4. During the implementation stage of projects: while it is true that the actual implementation is done by WFP and NGOs, DG ECHO TAs do indirectly influence this by monitoring and regularly reporting to DG ECHO HQ. Although it has never occurred, DG ECHO could also make use of the legal instrument that cuts funding if it is proven that the implementation of the project is not reaching the pre-determined goals.

5. In the end, with the evaluation reports: DG ECHO desk offices write evaluation reports documenting the operation, what has been done and if targets were met or not. These reports may have an influence in the long term: if there had been some problems, in that particular year with a certain kind of operation for example, these issues would not be repeated in the future. In this way, DG ECHO makes sure that past mistakes will not be repeated during the shaping phase of the food assistance policy and projects (Morlino, 2018).

This section has shown how DG ECHO's delegation framework works and what happens when the delegation is implemented. Before concluding the chapter, a brief final note on the debate questioning the neutrality of EU humanitarian aid and of DG ECHO's influence towards its agents should be added.

In theory, EU humanitarian aid follows the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence (See Chapter 2). Indeed, as we have seen (See Chapter 3), the fact that the EU pays particular attention to the so-called "forgotten crises" indicates it makes a genuine effort to be independent and neutral. Nonetheless, as Versluys (2008: 107, 110) notes, deciding where humanitarian aid needs are highest is in itself a political decision. Furthermore, the fact that DG ECHO funds finance certain UN agencies and not others, may also indirectly affect its political neutrality and independence. Indeed, as Irrera (2018:37) affirms, "humanitarian aid simply cannot be apolitical and neutral, because it cannot be disconnected from the political context in which it is provided". As discussed earlier, we have seen how Member States indirectly and directly control the activities of DG ECHO. Although EU Member States cannot have a saying during the implementation of the projects, they can influence the approval of the budget, which will then influence the whole humanitarian aid policy. The fact to decide where to allocate the funding can be a political decision itself. For instance, as we will see in Chapter 7, the choice to allocate less funding to the Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (SAIO) region, including Mozambique, where the natural crises also left millions food insecure and to allocate more funding in Syria can have a political justification. Among the reasons why the EU Member States donated more funding to the Syrian crisis, in particular to countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, there might the interest to control the consequences of the war, particularly in terms of refugees. As discussed in Chapter 3 and above, this was also consistent with the EU Global Strategy, whose aim was to guarantee a stable situation in those areas.

Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan are much closer geographically than Mozambique to the EU's borders. Thus, the consequences can be significantly felt. In particular, the EU had an interest in keeping refugees in those countries, avoiding an irregular migratory flux into Europe,

as it is witnessed by the 2016 EU-Turkey deal (European Council, 2016). For the same reason, Lebanon also became among those countries where the EU gave most of its humanitarian aid funding. By helping Syrian refugees there, it would have avoided refugees leaving. For these reasons, it would be naïve to think of EU humanitarian aid as a completely neutral and independent policy.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to shed light on EU humanitarian aid and the actors directly and indirectly involved, that is, DG ECHO as the main actor responsible for humanitarian aid and the other actors the DG interacts with, namely the EU Member States, the EEAS and DG DEVCO and the agents (i.e., UN agencies and NGOs).

To officially become part of the EU's competencies and become institutionalised, EU humanitarian aid had to wait until the beginning of the 1990s, when DG ECHO was established amid a changing political context. The 2000s saw the blossoming of the DG and the policy in general; thanks to the Lisbon Treaty, it became a fully-fledged DG and acquired a legal basis (art. 214 TFEU). Furthermore, the European Consensus represented a key political document and gave new momentum to the overall policy. Furthermore, the last ten years saw a continuous growth of the overall budget thanks to increased funding from the EU Member States and the Commission.

DG ECHO and EU humanitarian aid policy are unique in the general legal and European institutional context. Once the agents of EU Member States, the DG becomes the principal. The DG enjoys a high degree of manoeuvre from the Member States, especially since the establishment in 2012 of the World Wide Decision. They do not have a say in the formulation and implementation of the programmes. The only phase where they can indirectly influence the whole humanitarian aid policy is during the budget approval. The EU Member States also check on DG ECHO through the COHAFA and the HAC, where the budget is also discussed, indirectly influencing the policy. Thus, leading us to think that humanitarian aid is not as neutral as it would be generally expected looking at the principles on which this type of policy is based.

The DG's network and vertical and horizontal interactions are articulated and quite complex. DG ECHO strictly selects its agents and actively participates in the delivery of the programmes. It participates during the formulation, shaping and implementation, both at HQ in Brussels and through its Country and Regional Offices. The DG also cooperates with the EEAS and with DG DEVCO (through the LRRD/nexus).

In conclusion, the information of this chapter will help us to better understand the procedures and the relationship among DG ECHO, the EU Member States, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO's agents. For instance, it will help us to understand better the influence that EU Member States might have on EU humanitarian aid. It is also important because it highlights the procedures useful to know when assessing the EU Member States' alignment of preferences, their internal cohesiveness (i.e. during the phase of the WWD approval), and the relationship between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. Also, knowing the administrative procedures will help us to better assess the second hypothesis on delegation. Knowing the contracts on which the delegation and the relationship between DG ECHO and its agents is based, for instance, is paramount to assess the coordination among them.

Chapter 5. Myanmar (2015-2017)

Introduction

The first empirical case study that can help us to understand why the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policies varies is Myanmar between 2015 and 2017. This case is representative of a protracted crisis and of a complex emergency, caused by both natural disasters and human-made crisis. It also an example of constant presence of DG ECHO in the region. Finally, it is an example of variation in the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid relative to pre-established goals. Discrepancy in the needs assessment, delays in the project, and an almost non-existent nexus were the main issues affecting the overall effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid's policies, causing it to land between low and medium levels of effectiveness.

Based on official documents and on interviews with officials working in Myanmar at the time, the present chapter will analyse why this variation occurred, in the following order: the first section concerns the role of DG ECHO in Myanmar, highlighting both its positive achievements and the issues that affected the effectiveness of the humanitarian aid between 2015 and 2017. The second section is an assessment of the factors that could have influenced the variation in effectiveness. Each hypothesis will be discussed in relation to the theories presented in Chapter 2. Finally, the concluding remarks will consider which factors have been the most relevant in determining the variation.

5.1. DG ECHO in Myanmar: its role and its effectiveness

Over the last six decades, Myanmar has experienced armed conflicts and reoccurring natural disasters. In the years under examination (2015-2017), conflicts in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states, combined with floods, landslides, cyclones, and earthquakes, created more than one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The conflicts in Kachin and Shan, whose roots belong to the complex political history involving various ethnic groups (Mohajan, 2018; Haacke, 2016; Ibrahim, 2016; Kipgen, 2016; Lewa, 2009; Donnison, 1970; Aung, 1967), resumed in 2011 and forced more than 200,000 persons to live in camps. In Rakhine, in 1982, the government passed a new citizenship law rendering stateless more than a million Muslim Rohingya, fostering ongoing and widespread violence against them and forced displacement (Haacke, 2016: 806-807; Pugh, 2013). On August 25, 2017, a new cycle of violence erupted involving the Tatmadaw (the Burmese National Army), causing half a million Rohingya to flee to the neighbouring country of Bangladesh. As reported by the International Crisis Group, ICG (2017: 7), this was one of the "fastest refugee exoduses in modern times and created the largest

refugee camp in the world". According to the UN's Humanitarian Country Team (2015, 2016a, 2016b), more than a million people required food and health assistance in Myanmar as a result, with the majority of IDPs located in Rakhine state.

DG ECHO has been involved in the region since 1994. Together with its agents, it has funded numerous projects focussing on food and health provision and disaster preparedness. This section will discuss DG ECHO's role in Myanmar – what seemed to work well, as well as what did not.

5.1.1. DG ECHO in Myanmar: priorities, objectives, agents and projects

When Myanmar held its first elections in twenty years in 2010, it was clear that the country was about to embark on a transition process. At the 2012 by-elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Ky, won forty-three out of forty-five contested seats, indicating that "Myanmar was changing for the better" (Ibrahim, 2016: 58). A period of new political momentum and engagement saw the EU establish a delegation in Yangon. In 2013, the EU lifted sanctions that had first been imposed in 1990 after the military junta refused to recognise the results of elections, though it left an arms embargo in place. The EU, together with its Member States, directly engaged with the Burmese government through the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union's policy in Myanmar (2014-2020). This Framework spelt out the EU's strategic objectives towards Myanmar and focussed on "supporting political, social and economic development, fostering respect for human rights and assisting the government in rebuilding its place in the international community" (2014: 3). More specifically, the main strategic objectives were to support peace and national reconciliation; to assist in building a functioning democracy; to foster sustainable development and trade; and to support the re-integration of Myanmar into the international community (2014: 3-4).

While 2012 represented the beginning of a new political dialogue between the EU and Myanmar, relations between the two can be traced back to 1994, when a particular focus on humanitarian aid began. Beginning in 1994, the EU, through DG ECHO, gradually increased its aid funding, and in 2005, it further expanded financial assistance to €30-35 million (Haacke, 2006: 78). In total, DG ECHO has provided €240 million towards humanitarian assistance, including responses to conflict situations in Myanmar (€164.6 million) and natural disasters such as Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (€39 million), Cyclone Giri in 2010 (€10 million), floods and landslides (€3.5 million) (EEAS, 2019). As discussed in Chapter 3, DG ECHO is also one of the few donors that constantly financed the so-called "forgotten crisis" – that is, the crisis of the Rohingyas, which started to attract media attention only in 2016/2017 following the

eruption of the new cycle of violence, mentioned above (Interview #1) (DG ECHO, 2017a, 2016b, 2015a).

In the period considered, following conflicts, landslides, floods and two very strong earthquakes, DG ECHO's total funding in Myanmar amounted to €19.13 million in 2015; €17.85 million in 2016 and €10.10 million in 2017 (Interview #25). Despite the progressive decrease, it has been one of the main humanitarian aid donors during the time period under consideration in this thesis.

Figure 5.1 Largest donors overall to Myanmar (2015-2017) ($ million)

Source: Own elaboration based on OCHA (2015, 2016, 2017) https://fts.unocha.org/countries/153/summary/201520162017

As Figure 5.1 above clearly shows , DG ECHO was overall among the largest donors overall that gave the highest share of humanitarian aid funding to the country, together with USA,

Japan, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the UK and Germany. In those years, DG ECHO was also an observer (a non-contributing donor) to the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund (MHF)'s Advisory Board, for the purpose of providing strategic advice (Interview #32). The MHF is a multi-donor, country-based, pooled fund, established in 2007 and managed by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), used to support timely allocation and disbursement of donor resources to address urgent humanitarian needs.

Between 2012 and 2014, DG ECHO funding for Myanmar was allocated through a dedicated Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). From 2015 onwards, the funding to Myanmar became part of the HIPs of Southeast Asia and Pacific.[48] DG ECHO's objectives were primarily to provide food and health assistance to IDPs affected by conflicts and natural disasters. Thus, to respond to immediate humanitarian needs, but also to improve coping capacities and livelihoods of the population over the longer term (DG ECHO, 2016a). For this reason, DG ECHO funded many different projects. In Rakhine, the leading projects revolved around food assistance, nutrition activities, livelihood support, temporary basic health care, WASH, and protection. In Kachin and Shan, projects focussed on WASH in camps and settlements, livelihood support, food assistance, and health services. From 2016 onwards, disaster-risk reduction (DRR) projects also became a priority and were characterised by an integrated approach to DRR and resilience (ICF, 2018: 80). We have to acknowledge that the pre-established objectives of the projects were not precisely stated in public official documents, for instance, not indicating the definite number of people to be reached in each specific project. Therefore, the assessment of the effectiveness was carried out considering this flaw.

DG ECHO relied on agents to implement humanitarian aid projects. Its agents were both UN agencies and NGOs, and the contract at the basis of the delegation was the Single Form, where the agents explained their priorities, objectives, and means, together with time and geographical targets.

As shown in Table 5.1 below, the main UN partner of DG ECHO, with the highest share of its funding, was the WFP, followed by UNHCR. Other relevant agencies that received funding were UNICEF (an average of 16% for the three years), IOM (9% in 2015 and 5% in 2016), and OCHA (an average of 2.5% for the three years).

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[48] South East Asia, and the Pacific includes Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Fiji, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Vanuatu and Vietnam.

Table 5.1 Percentage (%) of the overall international and DG ECHO funding received by UN agencies (2015-2017)

	2015	*2016*	*2017*
WFP	49%	46%	54%
UNHCR	10%	24%	25%

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/153/summary/2015/2016/2017; see also Appendix 2. Myanmar

While UNHCR dealt with projects addressing the basic needs of IDPs – especially in Rakhine, but also in Kachin and Shan, focussing on shelter, protection, non-food items, camp coordination and management projects, the WFP mainly focussed on cash and food assistance in the areas of Rakhine and Kachin and implemented a project for "supporting transition by reducing food insecurity and undernutrition among the most vulnerable" (WFP, 2015b). The project, implemented in 2013, concerned nutrition, health (especially HIV and tuberculosis), community resilience, and school feeding. The project was extended in 2015 and ended in 2017. The major underlying objectives were:

> To prepare for and respond to natural disasters and other shocks, in support of the government; to assist post-disaster recovery by rehabilitating productive assets to improve household food security and create socio-economic opportunities for the most vulnerable; to address undernutrition among children and pregnant women and nursing mother (PNM), and support at-risk groups such as people living with HIV (PLHIV) and tuberculosis (TB) clients; to improve access, enrolment and attendance to primary schools; and to improve the sustainability of responses to food insecurity and undernutrition through knowledge-sharing and capacity development. (Ibidem)

WFP also supported cash transfers for asset creation, such as roads, dikes and drinking-water ponds. Food and livelihood assistance was also given through cash-for-work, cash transfers, and procurement of livelihood assets.

According to internal reports, the food and cash assistance projects implemented by WFP were essential to meet basic needs, especially in Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine (WFP, 2015a, 2015b). Since 2013, when the project began, the UN agency assisted one million people through five major activities: food assistance for assets, nutrition, food-by-prescription for people living with HIV and tuberculosis, and school feeding. DG ECHO funds also contributed to carrying out school feeding programmes, which reached 300,000 school children across nine states and regions by the end of 2016 (WFP, 2016a). In 2016, WFP also delivered cash assistance to 20,000 vulnerable people from both Muslim and Rakhine communities. It sourced rice, beans,

peas and iodised salt locally, and, indeed, 86% of all food distributed during these years was grown and produced in Myanmar (WFP, 2017d: 12).

NGOs were the other fundamental agents upon which DG ECHO relied for the implementation of projects. Oxfam, Save the Children, Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) are some of the main examples (ICF, 2018: 81). NGOs focussed on the sectors of education, food security, nutrition, health, protection, shelter and WASH. In 2016, projects worked to guarantee basic health care services, tackling diseases such as cholera, meningitis, and severe respiratory cases in Rakhine. ICRC was the NGO most involved in tackling health issues by supporting physical rehabilitation centres in Rakhine. It provided five health centres and several satellite posts with technical and material support to improve people's access to health care. Children at these facilities and pregnant women were able to obtain vaccinations against polio and tetanus (ICRC, 2016: 3).

This chapter mainly focusses on Oxfam and Save the Children because of their comprehensive projects and because DG ECHO was their primary funder between 2015 and 2017. These NGOs worked primarily on education, food security, nutrition, health, protection, shelter and WASH. Between 2015 and 2017, DG ECHO was also one of the leading financial supporters of the project "Promoting Durable Peace and Development project in Kachin". The latter was a project implemented by a consortium led by Oxfam, with INGOs such as Swiss Aid and Trócaire, and members of the Joint Strategy Team (JST), which is a collaborative effort of nine local NGOs. The collaboration of the consortium was fundamental to avoiding gaps as well as duplication in the projects and to minimising "donor-driven policies", relying instead on locally owned strategies.

The project aimed at assisting IDPs get access to basic education services and by improving their livelihoods (Caritas, 2015). It was articulated in two phases: the first phase started in 2015 and ended in 2018, and the second started in 2018 and is slated to end in 2022. The initiative, led by Oxfam and mainly funded by the EU (DG ECHO), worked to reach remote areas of Kachin and northern Shan, implementing humanitarian aid projects through seven national and international NGOs[49] and twenty-five local civil society organisations. In the first phase, corresponding to the period studied in the thesis, the project reached an estimated 85,000 conflict-affected people in Kachin, with a particular focus on IDPs, especially women and youth.[50] In addition, Oxfam provided "water and hygiene kits, construct[ed] toilets and

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[49] Together with Oxfam and the above-mentioned SwissAid and Trocaire: Kachin Baptist Convention, Karuna Mission Social Solidarity, Metta Development Foundation, Nyein Foundation.
[50] See Oxfam's Factsheet *Durable Peace Programme* https://oi-files-cng-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/myanmar.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/DPP2%20factsheet.pdf

develop[ed] water supply systems which drastically minimize[d] the prevalence of disease" and "distributed food and cash to displaced communities who are not able to access livelihood or employment opportunities".[51] Finally, Save the Children implemented similar projects tackling essential needs, such as nutrition, food security, health and also education and protection. Since 2017, it especially focussed on Rohingyas children's needs, reaching 13,800 children.[52]

5.1.2 DG ECHO's funded projects in Myanmar: analysis of their effectiveness

Thus far, the projects have seemed to go well: a high number of affected persons were reached over the years and the projects seemed to be beneficial, bringing food and health assistance to those in need. However, considering our definition of effectiveness, identified as goal attainment and its sub-dimensions, DG ECHO's funded projects cannot be considered fully effective (i.e. effectiveness = 12). The most important issues impacting the overall effectiveness of the projects in Myanmar during the 2015-17 period were the discrepancy between the people targeted and the people in need; delays in the implementation of the projects; and the non-implementation of the nexus (Interviews #3; #25; #27; #33). These issues affected the main dimension of effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) as well as the other sub-dimensions, resulting in low/medium effectiveness.

The discrepancy between people targeted and people in need is documented in OCHA's monitoring reports on food and health assistance. As Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below show, the number of people targeted, the people in need and the people reached did not always coincide. When looking at food assistance, in all cases in 2015 (Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, and floods), the number of people reached exceeded the number of people targeted. If we observe the 2016 data for Kachin and Shan, it is clear that the number of people in need exceeded the number of people targeted due to further incidents and increased violence. The 2017 data are incomplete since OCHA only published data for the first quarter of the year. Nonetheless, we see that the trend seems to be negative: in all three years, the number of people reached was below the number targeted and the number in need.

In the case of health assistance projects, data show a worse situation than that of food assistance. In 2015, in all cases (Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, Floods), the people reached were far less than those in need and the number of people targeted. The same happened in 2016, when OCHA (2016:6) denounced a severe shortage of funding. Furthermore, security incidents in

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[51] See Oxfam's Factsheet *Humanitarian https://oi-files-cng-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/myanmar.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/Humanitarian.pdf*
[52] Save the Children, see: https://www.savethechildren.org/us/what-we-do/emergency-response/rohingya-crisis

Rakhine and increased conflict in Kachin and Shan led to the suspension of the implementation of health care projects. In 2017, although data are once again not complete, we see the same trend as the previous years. These data also show that the reaching of the beneficiaries seemed to be directly correlated with the budget's size. The more the budget, the more people reached, and vice versa.

Table 5. 2 Monitoring International Food Assistance in Myanmar (2015-2017)

	Total Required Funding	Total Funded	People in Need	People Targeted	People reached
2015	$98m	$58m	Rakhine 209k	Rakhine 209k	Rakhine 211k
			Kachin/Shan 97k	Kachin/Shan 97k	Kachin/Shan 98k
			Floods 455k	Floods 455k	Floods 502k
2016	$80.2m	$46m	Rakhine 152k	Rakhine 178k	Rakhine 244k
			Kachin/Shan 178k	Kachin/Shan 107k	Kachin/Shan 150k
			Floods 92k	Floods 76k	Floods 60k
2017	$50m	$18.6m	Rakhine 210k	Rakhine 182k	Rakhine 147k
			Kachin 89k	Kachin 84k	Kachin 76k
			Shan 19k	Shan 16k	Shan 9k

Source: Own elaboration based on OCHA (2017a, 2017b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2015a, 2015b).

Table 5.3 Monitoring International Health Assistance in Myanmar (2015-2017)

	Total Required Funding	Total Funded	People in Need	People Targeted	People reached
2015	$29m	$8m	Rakhine 116k	Rakhine 106k	Rakhine 67k
			Kachin/Shan 86k	Kachin/Shan 79k	Kachin/Shan 63k
			Floods N/A	Floods 582k	Floods 145k
2016	$22.9m	$2.8m	Rakhine 421k	Rakhine 421k	Rakhine 125k
			Kachin/Shan 117k	Kachin/Shan 117k	Kachin/Shan 60k
			Floods N/A	Floods N/A	Floods N/A
2017	$16.5m	$2.3m	Rakhine 377k	Rakhine 105k	Rakhine 77k
			Kachin 87k	Kachin 52k	Kachin 7k
			Shan 11k	Shan 6k	Shan 3k

Source: Own elaboration based OCHA (2017a, 2017b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2015a, 2015b).

The 2015 WFP evaluation report put forward a series of observations on how humanitarian aid was not fully delivered, meaning that the pre-established objectives were not met. In Rakhine, for instance, the list of the beneficiaries was not kept up to date, thus not allowing for effective distribution of food. Also, 56% of Rohingyas reported that there were times when the household did not have enough food or money to buy food. In Kachin, the distribution of food took up to 6 hours; in Shan, the passage from food to cash-based assistance was becoming urgent since the beneficiaries began to sell one or two food items in their food baskets in exchange for other essential items or services (WFP, 2015b: 27). Delays in the implementation of the projects implied that the beneficiaries received the aid much later than they were supposed to. Aid that was supposed to be delivered within hours took weeks, if not months, which is problematic because swiftness is a key component of effectiveness humanitarian response. In Myanmar, this seemed not to be possible and since part of the goal attainment is to deliver aid on time, this issue affected the overall effectiveness.

In addition, the passage from humanitarian to development aid was not present. One of the ultimate goals of humanitarian aid, in general and in the EU, is to reach a point where humanitarian aid is no longer needed because it is replaced by longer-term projects that tackle issues having to do with the fabric of society. In Myanmar, although some discussions about longer-term projects started to be carried out, the coordination mechanisms to link humanitarian and development aid projects were not present (Interview #33; European Court of Auditors, 2018).

The degrees of effectiveness in the various dimensions are shown in Table 5.4 below. As anticipated in Chapter 2, each dimension was influenced by the issues discussed above. The needs assessment was conducted, although it was not consistent, as some years, the persons reached exceeded those in need, whereas other years, some regions and beneficiaries fell through, influencing goal attainment. These sub-dimensions had, thus, medium effectiveness (2). The policy cycle was characterised by delays that impacted goal attainment, placing it in the category of medium effectiveness (2). Finally, the passage from humanitarian to development aid at the time was still not in place – although discussions had started at HQ, there were no concrete financial instruments nor projects (1). Based on this, the overall effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects in Myanmar (2015-2017) was between low and medium effectiveness (7), contrary to the overall aims of the DG ECHO.

Table 5.4 Degrees of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness in Myanmar (2015-2017)

Goal Attainment	2	Medium effectiveness
Needs Assessment	2	Medium effectiveness
Seamlessness of the policy cycle	2	Medium effectiveness
LRRD/Nexus	1	Not effective
Tot effectiveness	7	In between low and medium effectiveness

Source: Own elaboration (See Chapter 2)

Why was the needs assessment not precise? Why were projects delayed? And why did development aid actors not take over DG ECHO's projects? The next section will assess the hypotheses regarding which factors could have influenced DG ECHO's effectiveness.

5.2 Why did DG ECHO's effectiveness vary? Assessment of the hypotheses on the factors affecting DG ECHO's effectiveness in Myanmar (2015-2017)

Building on the theories discussed in Chapter 2, the following section intends to understand what caused variation in DG ECHO's project effectiveness by assessing three hypothesised factors. Acknowledging that the objectives of the projects were general (i.e. "provide food assistance" instead of "provide n. of food items to a n. of people"), thus making the evaluation more challenging, each hypothesis will be assessed considering our definition of effectiveness, thus it will look at the degree of goal attainment, needs assessment, seamlessness of the policy cycle, and the LRRD/nexus.

Hypothesis 1. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO

> *The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO in the field explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

In the case of Myanmar, the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States came across on two occasions: in the approval of the yearly World Wide Decision (WWD) concerning the budget for all humanitarian actions, and the decision to delegate EU humanitarian aid to DG ECHO.

As we have discussed in Chapter 4, the WWD is approved by the EU Member States and based on this, DG ECHO prepared the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs), which detailed the operational priorities and budget allocation envisaged by DG ECHO. Approval and discussions happened in the HAC and, following the budget approval, EU Member States indirectly monitored the situation through the HAC and the COHAFA (Interview #3). This has happened for all three years in the case of Myanmar: the budget was approved by all EU Member States (Interviews #1, #3, #25). However, as shown in Figure 5.1, the budget devoted to Myanmar decreased in 2017. The shrinkage of the funding envelope was supposedly caused by the will to transition from humanitarian to development aid. This can be deduced from the 2017 DG ECHO HIP: "EU support is currently transitioning from ECHO's humanitarian assistance to DEVCO's longer term food security and nutrition support" (DG ECHO, 2017a:18). However, this was not the main reason why the humanitarian aid funding envelope decreased. As reported by the European Court of Auditors' report (which did not specify who were the named Member States) (2018: 4):

> the Commission would like to highlight that some Member States were not in a position to agree with a proposed budget support programme, amongst others due to concerns regarding the political context, including a serious escalation of the situation in Rakhine State. This has resulted in a delay in financing of only one, a major one, of the foreseen actions in Myanmar/Burma. While no AAP[53] was adopted for 2016, the Commission has adopted the 2017 AAP (EUR 39million) […].

As discussed in Chapter 4, these discussions happened in the above-mentioned forums, and it seems that the choice of the EU Member States and their difficulties in aligning their preferences were also due to political concerns. This again leads us to think that humanitarian aid or, at least, the intentions of donors at the basis of humanitarian aid are not as neutral and independent as they should be. This is an example. The fact that EU Member States did not agree on a proposed budget because of concerns regarding the political context might mean, indeed, that some EU Member States did not want to meddle in Myanmar's domestic affairs, risking to come into conflict with the national government, jeopardising diplomatic relations.

Furthermore, the same report (2018: 14) underscores that DG ECHO was excluded by the EU Member States in the formulation of 2014-2016 Joint Programming Strategy. The latter

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[53] Annual Action Programme: financing decision adopted in the formulation stage for longer-term, development programmes.

was a strategy aimed at improving longer-term solutions. This is significant because excluding DG ECHO from the formulation of a longer-term strategy would have created inconsistency between humanitarian and development aid, whereas including DG ECHO would have ensured that specific programmes could be picked up by DG DEVCO relatively seamlessly. As the report highlighted, not involving DG ECHO in an area of protracted crisis, where both humanitarian and development aid actors are fundamental, was a missed opportunity to improve overall coordination on the field. This was a clear example of the precarious internal cohesiveness of EU Member States. EU Member States did not agree on a budget that would have guaranteed the funding of longer-term projects following the short-term humanitarian aid ones. The lack of funding for this passage affected the sub-dimension of the nexus, explaining why the nexus was not in place in the years of interest, leading to delays and thus, affecting goal attainment. This is why the sub-dimension of the nexus was 1, meaning 'low effectiveness'.

The cut of the funding envelope even as humanitarian needs increased influenced DG ECHO's effectiveness, since it required the DG to better prioritise its funding. In the field, funding that was much less than required meant that agents had to decrease the scope of their activities, explaining the correlation between the funding and the reach to beneficiaries shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above. When the projects started to receive less funding, fewer people were reached. For instance, WASH activities were limited only to lifesaving projects (ICF, 2018: 85). In addition, the cut to funding also meant that the opportunity for projects to become longer-term was not feasible, jeopardising the overall goal attainment (Interview #27). Agents on the ground felt that the short-term funding was limiting any intention to pursue long-term projects.

The reduced funding also influenced the overall coordination on the ground between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. As discussed in Chapter 2, aid effectiveness can be influenced not only by the internal cohesiveness at EU Member States level, but also by bureaucratic unity. Since the EU Member States did not agree on a budget that would have guaranteed longer-term programmes, the overall funding was reduced, meaning that DG ECHO and DG DEVCO did not have the financial instruments to shape and implement a passage between the two programmes. In addition, the DG DEVCO instruments to implement longer-term activities were not flexible enough to allow for a gradual take over from DG ECHO's implemented projects. An example of this were education projects implemented in North Rakhine where "the EU organisational set-up between development, peace, and humanitarian aid funding was not seen fit for the implementation of nexus approach" (ICF, 2018: 98-101). Finally, even though

both the DGs were active in the country, humanitarian aid aspects were not taken into account sufficiently when longer-term programmes were formulated. There was also no joint implementation of LRRD. There were examples of cooperation in the spheres of humanitarian and development aid, but "they constituted the exception rather than the rule" (European Court of Auditors, 2018: 14). The exception was indeed when DG ECHO contributed to DG DEVCO's consultancies and mid-term review with the aim of developing a coherent joint humanitarian-development framework to further operationalise LRRD (ICF, 2018: 91).

Thus, the non-alignment of preferences by EU Member States during the budget approval process, which could have guaranteed a smooth passage from humanitarian to development aid, caused the overall budget to shrink. Because of this, the two DGs lacked the financial instruments for the implementation of projects, jeopardising the sub-dimension of the nexus.

However, the non-alignment of preferences among EU Member States not only affected the bureaucracies, but also the role in the field of DG ECHO itself. It translated into an attempt to limit DG ECHO's advocacy role for political reasons. The UN was accused, especially by NGOs, of polite compliance with the Burmese government, who was using its military to perpetrate violence against the Rohingya. The UN's approach was one of "quiet diplomacy", closing an eye to what was happening in exchange for being granted access to humanitarian zones, thus neither respecting humanitarian principles nor human rights (Mahony, 2018; Interview #31).

In this controversy, DG ECHO was the only donor who denounced the silent diplomacy approach (Interview #31). This is significant because it denotes how DG ECHO conducted a humanitarian aid policy that attempted to diverge from EU Member States' interests, and was, thus, autonomous in its choice to uphold humanitarian principles (Interviews #31, #33). Although EU Member States did not entirely oppose DG ECHO's stance and could not micromanage the aid in Myanmar (Interviews #3, #20), they were extremely cautious about denouncing the UN's silent diplomacy and the Myanmar government's actions, admonishing the DG ECHO Country Office through the EU ambassadors not to compromise the political relationship with the government (Interview #33). As mentioned earlier, EU Member States did not want to explicitly oppose Myanmar's government so not to risk seeing humanitarian access denied or to create diplomatic frictions. In addition, consistently with what has been discussed in Chapter 4 and above, DG ECHO and the EU Member States discussed the Rohingyas crisis at HQ during the formal and informal sessions of the HAC and COHAFA. In these forums, DG ECHO informed the EU Member States about the ongoing situation. However, the political decision rested with the EU Member States, which did not opt for any type of sanction not to

create political and diplomatic frictions with the government of Myanmar (Interview #3). As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, this again leads us to think that EU humanitarian aid is not neutral and independent, despite the efforts of the DG itself.

The alignment of EU Member States' preferences also translated into what type of delegation to grant to DG ECHO. Although EU Member States were not internally cohesive when discussing the budget and the aspects of nexus, they were in agreement about granting DG ECHO a certain financial discretion in the field and also ensuring that each EU Member State could have its own humanitarian assistance projects. If we consider the HIPs for Myanmar for the years 2015-2017, we can observe periodical modification of the budget. For instance, in 2017, there were four budget modifications starting in July and ending in December (DG ECHO, 2017a). Each time, the initial yearly budget devoted to Myanmar was given further funding. This was possible thanks to the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States and the alignment of their preferences towards granting financial discretion to the DG so to top up the budget when necessary and in a short amount of time due to the emergency.

Thus, DG ECHO found itself coordinating in the field not only with its agents, but also with other donors, among them EU Member States. In the case of Myanmar, the presence of EU Member States was limited. The main EU Member State directly present with an office and staff was the UK through its Department for International Development (DFID). Formal and informal coordination meetings, where information was shared regularly, took place (Interview #32), which ensured that there were no overlaps among the different projects. This is partially why the seamlessness of the policy cycle falls into a medium effectiveness score (2). It is also worth noticing that Germany was also one of the largest donor on the field and attended the same coordination meetings with DG ECHO. However, Germany primarily funded the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund and conducted its own humanitarian aid policy, funding NGOs especially (Interview #32). The same was valid also for the other EU Member States, such as Denmark and Sweden.

During the years 2015-2017, DG ECHO purchased commodities to support beneficiaries from January until May, and the EU Member State's contributions supported beneficiaries from June until July (Interview #27). Officials met regularly, attended the same coordination meetings, and had a joint approach to avoid overlap and competition in the field (Interviews #31, #33). In addition, in 2017, the UK started to implement the Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme (HARP) facility in Myanmar. It envisaged to provide £108.5 million from 2017 until 2022 for both protracted conflict-related crises and natural disasters. "It was an attempt to adopt a resilience approach and better address the nexus-type issues" (ICF, 2018:

89). Thus, especially from the nexus point of view, and contrary to the global strategy at HQ level, there was an attempt at closer coordination and synergy between DFID and DG ECHO. Thus, their relationship was characterised by similar priorities and coordination rather than competition. In addition, the application process for the funding was entirely separate: when NGOs applied for DG ECHO and UK's funding, they had to demonstrate in the proposal how to avoid overlaps between the different projects (Interview #30).

In conclusion, the EU Member States internal cohesiveness influenced the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects in two ways. On the one hand, it negatively affected the sub-dimension of the nexus and, thus, goal attainment. In fact, the non-alignment of preferences around the budget process impeded the creation of a longer-term approach to the protracted crisis, thus affecting the overall effectiveness and causing the goal attainment to be equal to 2. It also explains why during 2015, 2016 and partially also 2017, despite discussions going on at HQ, the LRRD/nexus was not implemented, and why the DG was excluded from the formulation of the 2014-2016 Joint Programming Strategy. It caused a reduction of the funding envelope, forcing DG ECHO's agents to reduce the scope of their activities and falling short of their initial expectations in terms of beneficiaries reached. This is why the effectiveness of the nexus was quantified with a 1. On the other hand, the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States towards the type of delegation and the amount of financial discretion to grant the DG was relevant and positively affected the effectiveness. Indeed, DG ECHO was able to increase the funding when needed and in a short amount of time. The internal cohesiveness also translated into the possibility of DG ECHO to coordinate in the field with other EU Member States, namely DFID. Their synergy was positive and represented the basis for a future attempt in 2017, following the final budget approval, to solve issues around the nexus.

Hypothesis 2. Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents

> *DG ECHO's delegation and coordination with the agent (e. g. UN agency, NGO), which has established capacities on the ground and is accountable to the principal, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

As already discussed in Chapter 4, DG ECHO does not directly implement humanitarian aid projects but relies on third parties, delegating the operational aspects of a project to UN agencies and NGOs. Section 5.1. above discussed the primary agents and projects the DG funded in

Myanmar. WFP, Oxfam and Save The Children were implementing food, cash, and health assistance projects during those years. Based on financial contracts and single forms, the relationship between DG ECHO and WFP and the NGOs was, and still is, hierarchical, empirically explaining why the P-A theory was chosen as the theoretical framework for EU humanitarian aid (See Chapter 2). This hypothesis, in particular, emphasises the importance of the delegation and coordination process, as well as the capacities of the agents. The capacity and responsibility of the agents can profoundly influence the entire policy process, beginning with the agenda-setting, thus influencing the dimensions and the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects (Interview #20).

In the case of Myanmar (and as it will be also for Lebanon and Mozambique, see Chapters 6 and 7), DG ECHO had the tendency to select agents who had been working in the field for several years. According to the selection processes conducted both at HQ and at the Country Office level, the agents needed to have precise administrative and technical skills, showing that they knew the context and knew how and where they could implement humanitarian aid projects. In addition, DG ECHO was also interested in agents that would have a good relationship with the government (Interview #19). Only projects that concretely showed these qualities were funded (Interviews #3, #26). Thus, in Myanmar, the main reason why DG ECHO delegated the implementation of the projects was *specialisation*. Because the context was particularly hostile to foreign aid in general, relying on third parties that had easier access and understood the situation was seen as advantageous for the overall implementation. Indeed, DG ECHO was very careful in choosing those agents who had a thorough knowledge of the context and the right capacities, thus being able to better tailor the projects according to humanitarian needs (Interview #25). The local input was fundamental in the agenda setting and in the shaping of the projects, allowing the DG to adapt them to the changing context. For instance, "activities for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) were sometimes suggested by INGOs but also requested by local NGOs" (ICF, 2018: 84). This helped to guarantee local ownership of the projects and consequently, *credibility* in the eyes of the beneficiaries and the government. It was also an example of *management of policy externalities* – another reason for DG ECHO to delegate the implementation of the projects to its agents. Indeed, the agents' expertise and their direct contact with beneficiaries allowed them to provide the DG with information and recommendations on alternative projects, so as to avoid failure or bad management, thus managing potential externalities. Other examples of this will be presented throughout this section.

These are the main reasons why DG ECHO delegated the implementation of the projects to the agents, starting from the needs assessment, thus from the 'input' phase, associated with the

quality of the policy's objectives (See Chapter 2). Indeed, thanks to their specialisation and credibility in the eyes of the beneficiaries, one of the responsibilities of the agents was to conduct a thorough analysis of the situation, including from the beneficiaries' point of view. Part of the needs assessment done by the agents was to investigate which person in the household tended to be the decision-maker and who was the one spending the money. In some projects, cash was given directly to women so that they would spend it as they preferred, enhancing their autonomy (Interview #3). Also, the needs were identified through formal and informal assessments, such as visits to projects, WhatsApp groups, humanitarian breakfasts, and participative and consultive approaches with vulnerable groups (Interviews #31, #33). WFP consulted various stakeholders, including beneficiaries, before and during the implementation of the project. A complaint and feedback mechanism (CFM) with several communication methods (e.g. letterbox, hotline, in-person communication) were present across the country, allowing WFP to be aware of the concerns and receiving direct feedback (Interview #27). Save the Children and Oxfam also talked personally to IDPs and directly visited camps to tailor their project to their needs. If needs changed or something unexpected occurred, they would send modification requests to DG ECHO (Interviews #25, #31). The DG was considered very quick in adapting to the changing needs. For instance, following the 2016 cyclone, DG ECHO responded with additional financing within two weeks of request by its agents, allowing them to continue to implement their projects (ICF, 2018: 87). Despite these efforts, though, the needs assessment conducted by the agents was limited to sample groups. Thus, targets were not always efficiently planned by the agent (Interview #3). This, together with the reduced funding envelope, partly explains why the there was a discrepancy between the people in need and the beneficiaries reached. This is why the needs assessment's score was 2, medium effectiveness.

The delegation by DG ECHO implied a relationship with the agents throughout the policy cycle and its seamlessness is one of the sub-dimensions of effectiveness that concerns the 'process' (See Chapter 2). In the case of Myanmar, the relationship between principal and agent was based on constant communication, sharing information in formal and informal settings and throughout the implementation of the projects through the above-mentioned WhatsApp groups, official and unofficial meetings (Interviews #33). DG ECHO was described, by NGOs especially, as a frank donor that was open to exchange. It initiated the concept of humanitarian breakfasts: once a month, those working for the DG and others working for local and international NGOs, such as Oxfam and Save the Children, met in different venues and informally discussed what was going on in the field (Interview #31).

WFP also communicated regularly with DG ECHO. It sent a monthly to all partners, and as needs arose, it shared specific updates with DG ECHO (Interview #27). To avoid overlaps, close coordination was pursued through meetings and coordination groups such as the Food Security Sector (co-chaired by WFP and FAO in Myanmar), the Maungdaw Inter-Agency Group (in northern Rakhine), the Cash Working Group (chaired by WFP) (Interview #27). The sharing of information and interaction between principal and agents turned out to be crucial in Rakhine in the aftermath of a new cycle of violence, which erupted on 25 August 25, 2017, prompting 624,000 Rohingyas to flee into Bangladesh. After two months, WFP resumed its activities, such as the distribution of food or cash-based transfers to IDPs, thanks to the coordination not only with local authorities but also with other local NGOs operating in Myanmar (WFP, 2017d: 12).

The constant information-sharing contributed to better coordination, thus, to the seamlessness of the policy cycle, which meant that each agent had its own specific project that did not overlap with others. Indeed, DG ECHO tended to finance specific interventions that avoided duplication of efforts (ICF, 2018: 86; Interview #26). However, despite the efforts to maintain a smooth policy cycle, the strong bureaucratic machine built around this policy process, together with the frequent staff turnover, caused delays in a context of emergency. For instance, it was not uncommon to see projects beginning three months later than agreed because of the agents' difficulties in finding an adequate office, although, as we will discuss below, this did not depend strictly on the agent (Interview #25). All these considerations make the sub-dimension of seamlessness of policy cycle fall into 'medium effectiveness' (2).

The coordination and delegation to the agents implied the need for accountability and control systems. Indeed, although leaving a margin of discretion to its agents and taking up a role of collaborator, DG ECHO acted as a police-patrol through its Country Office, being constantly present in the field, monitoring and checking on the activities of its agents (Interviews #3, #25, #31). This also happened in the input phase of the policy cycle – during the needs assessment – and also during the 'process', thus during the policy cycle. DG ECHO focussed on the feedback and complaint mechanisms, thus attempting to involve local communities in the monitoring phase (Interview #33). It assessed the type of monitoring and feedback systems that were in place (such as post-distribution reports) to check that beneficiaries were satisfied with the timeliness, composition and frequency of distributions or services provided by its agents (Interview #26). As discussed in Chapter 2, the accountability of an agent is fundamental and part of the policy process: the agent is expected and contractually obligated to give an account of its work to the principal. In Myanmar, this happened both formally and informally. WFP,

Save the Children, Oxfam were supposed to keep DG ECHO Country Office and HQ up to date by sharing periodical reports on their activities. Furthermore, the visits to projects mentioned above, as well as humanitarian breakfasts organised by the DG, aimed at ensuring a good relationship with the agents, fostering trust and accountability.

UN agencies were less subject to scrutiny compared to the NGOs discussed here (Interviews #3, #15). The main difference between WFP and NGOs was that the former was better funded than the latter and had a greater number of staff. For WFP, DG ECHO was one of the many donors, and the UN agency had, in this regard, much more freedom and could be more autonomous. The downside was that WFP was not as transparent as the DG would have required of NGOs (Interview #25). However, since WFP had enormous logistical capacities for reaching a large number of people, the DG indirectly arrived at a compromise, allowing UN agencies to not write extremely specific reports (Interview #3). On the contrary, NGOs, who were not as well funded and worked with a smaller number of staff, were subject to greater scrutiny. Indeed, DG ECHO exercised greater control over them, through requesting very specific reports on their activities and constantly exchanging information (Interviews #3, #15, #26, #31). The added bureaucracy, coupled with the constant monitoring and the requirement of frequently reporting, caused NGOs to express their concerns over the time spent on proposal and report writing imposed by the DG in a context where human resources were scarce and where there was frequent staff turnover. In addition, agents also felt that the indicators to evaluate the projects were not adequate to the context: they were too broad and general, and that reports were too complex to be written quickly, as an emergency would require (ICF, 2018: 97; Interview #3).

Another difference between WFP and NGOs such as Save the Children and Oxfam was that the latter could easily reach beyond government-controlled areas, something that was not possible for WFP, who entertained a good relationship with the government (an attitude, as we discussed in the previous hypothesis, considered by NGOs to be contrary to humanitarian aid principles). Reaching remote communities was considered a particular form of success implemented by international NGOs (Interview #31).

If DG ECHO was acting as a police-patrol towards its agents, it could not directly do so with the agents hired by WFP, Save the Children, or Oxfam. As discussed in Chapter 2, according to the EU humanitarian policymaking P-A chain, WFP and NGOs are not only agents, but can, in turn, be principals to local NGOs. This was especially the case when INGOs, such as Oxfam and Save the Children, relied on local NGO to access areas otherwise off-limits due to restrictions (See Hp3). Gaining access to these communities happened through every available

channel: Save the Children's agents, for instance, used motorcycles and backpacks with cash and food items in order to deliver the aid in remote areas (Interview #31). However, DG ECHO indirectly had a say on this by checking and monitoring the projects, thus ensuring that its direct agents knew the capacities of their agents and to whom they had delegated part of the implementation of their projects.

Despite the bureaucratic heaviness mentioned above and felt by NGOs, the constant monitoring and the presence in the field by the DG seemed to be an advantage. Agents perceived the DG to have a very proactive role in advocacy and coordination, creating formal and informal bonds with the agents, fostering close relationships at a personal level, and contributing to the seamlessness of the policy cycle. Furthermore, the constant checking of the DG in the input phase, during the needs assessment, and involving local communities, was significant as it brought about better shaped priorities. This became particularly relevant when the funding envelope was reduced, and the DG needed to make sure that money would not go to waste (Interview #3).

This was also relevant because of the role that DG ECHO had in the field in terms of the nexus. While at HQ there was disagreement on the budget for the passage from humanitarian to development aid, making the overall nexus effectiveness 'low' (1), at field level, there seemed to exist more practical efforts to lay the foundation for a future coordination with DG DEVCO (Interview #33). DG ECHO was one of the main funders of the above-mentioned (See 5.1.1) project, "Promoting Durable Peace and Development project in Kachin." This was an example of DG ECHO's effort to involve its agents in longer-term projects, fostering coordination among different NGOs and avoiding overlaps and gaps, thus ensuring a correct delivery of the project.

In conclusion, based on this discussion, the delegation and coordination between principal and agents, their capacities and accountability, were all aspects useful to the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes, and especially to its three sub-dimensions: needs assessment, seamlessness of the policy cycle and nexus. However, the hypothesis only partially explains the issues negatively influencing DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects' effectiveness. We understand, of course, that DG ECHO was a very present principal, influencing the work of its agents during the whole policy cycle from the beginning. Its participation and monitoring, though, was not enough in certain instances, such as during needs assessment, when its agents, in particular WFP, would shape its projects on a sample of beneficiaries, risking not considering all those in need. However, agents were challenged not by insufficient capacities, nor by the lack of coordinating among themselves and the DG. In

fact, although some aspects, such as staff turnover or heavy bureaucracy, might have partially delayed some administrative processes, they cannot be held totally responsible for the cause of ineffectiveness of the projects, meaning discrepancy in the needs assessment, delays, and the almost non-existent nexus. On the contrary, they were of much help accessing remote areas, always responding and sharing information with the DG, having a direct relationship with the beneficiaries and contributing to their side of the nexus. Indeed, the coordination with the agents proved to be constructive on the ground in terms of the nexus, despite the disagreements among EU Member States at HQ. In general, it seems that it was thanks to these agents – their capacities and coordination – that, despite existing issues, projects were implemented and able to reach the beneficiaries. Thus, we need to look somewhere else to find a more complete explanation for the variation in effectiveness.

Hypothesis 3. National authorities' attitude

> *The national governments and local authorities' attitude, whether interfering or facilitating the implementation of humanitarian aid projects, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

As discussed in Chapter 3, the case of Myanmar is one of a complex emergency (i.e. human-made crisis and natural hazards) and of a protracted crisis. Religious, ethnic, and political tensions were still present in the years under examination and the situation deteriorated significantly between 2016 and 2017, culminating in the eruption of a new cycle of violence in August 2017. The national governments and local authorities played a fundamental role in causing the refugee crisis we are dealing with in this chapter. As we know, international humanitarian aid comes when a government requests it (Interview #6). However, despite the request, the government did not seem well-disposed towards humanitarian assistance coming from abroad. Similarly to Mozambique (See Chapter 7), the government did not want to have witnesses to what was happening in Rakhine, and to the military's actions in Kachin and Shan (Interview #3).

The hostility of the government took the form of not granting travel authorisations and imposing access constraints, especially to agents delivering food and health assistance to Rohingyas. Indeed, the main challenge for DG ECHO's agents was the enormous difficulty of navigating access constrains, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to allow staff to access field

sites and implement programs to the point that 'just being there' was already considered an achievement (Interviews #12, #22, #25, #30).

From October 2017 onwards, national and international staff needed to have travel authorisation to visit camps. The process of granting travel authorisations could be very long and authorisations were often denied by national authorities. For instance, in 2017, DG ECHO was supposed to visit an IDPs camp with one of its agents, namely the Danish Refugee Council. The visit could not take place because authorisation was denied to one of the chief officials of the NGO. The situation was worse in the case of health assistance: there were cases where local hospitals would not treat Muslim people, so DG ECHO had to arrange and fund three-hour boat trips from North Rakhine to Sittwe to find a hospital that might treat them. During the trips, no medical staff could be on board, meaning that people in critical conditions were at risk of dying (Interview #3, #25).

Following the attacks on 25 August 2017, the government issued an official statement accusing "aid workers of helping terrorists" (ICF, 2018: 83). This led to general hostility towards international actors, requiring UN agencies and NGOs to remove their staff or make them work under low visibility for security reasons. This attitude towards foreign aid was also perceived by both WFP and DG ECHO. The government applied a sort of 'divide and rule' approach, meaning that access was granted to certain NGOs instead of others, creating a climate of competition and friction among the various agents, further complicating the situation (Interviews #3, #27). However, DG ECHO was careful in delivering humanitarian aid without creating hostilities among local communities by balancing out its aid funding equally (Ibidem).

The European Court of Auditors' report on Myanmar (2018:7) underscored how the violence exacerbated the conflict and hindered humanitarian and development efforts in the region. In 2017, WFP's distribution of food and health assistance was slowed down by a restriction imposed by government authorities. In addition, WFP had to interrupt its activities because of the conflict, and it could not reach many communities because they were in conflict areas (Interview #27). In this case, local NGOs were extremely helpful, since they had a higher chance of being authorised by the government. WFP, for instance, could not reach communities in the Maungdaw District in Rakhine state, delaying the whole implementation of the projects and thus, affecting all dimensions of effectiveness, including goal attainment. "The majority of schools in Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships remained closed through to November. Distributions were only possible in a few re-opened schools, although low attendance of teachers and children was observed following the conflict" (WFP, 2017d: 18). Furthermore, food delivery had been disrupted since June 2016, especially in Kachin (OCHA, 2016a: 5).

In addition, NGOs felt that, through all the imposed constraints, the government seemed to be actively denying the population aid, especially Rohingyas (Interview #31). DG ECHO played an active role in trying to rectify this, meeting and talking directly with the governors of Kachin in order to negotiate access to the territory (Interview #33).

The attitude of the government exacerbated the tensions discussed above between NGOs and UN agencies. NGOs felt that the UN, and especially UNHCR, assisted the government in minimising the political costs of its treatment of the Rohingya by keeping secret all the information gathered during that time. The UN was accused of colluding with the government in hiding the Rohingya reality from the world (Interview #31). Furthermore, UN agencies were accused of subsidising the prison camps in which the Rohingya were detained. Subsiding them meant fostering the government's policy of segregation. Also, for years, UN agencies and NGOs agreed not to use the word "Rohingya" to comply with the Burmese government's denial of their existence, and have thus been accused of failing to empower, involve and communicate with the Rohingya, who were not adequately consulted. Furthermore, the UN was accused of offering unconditional development support to "a discriminatory apartheid system", thereby fostering rather than solving social inequalities (Mahony, 2018). Ms Renata Lok-Dessalien, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator until 2017, declared that there was no complicity with the government, and that if the UN was not on good terms with the government, access for humanitarian aid would have been completely denied. However, a former senior-level UN representative said that the UN Resident "asked him personally to not be so vocal on the issue of Rohingya rights and even not to visit Rohingya displacement camps" (Stoakes, 2016).[54]

Although not a justification, this information helps better understand how the government was not well-disposed towards foreign humanitarian aid, including DG ECHO funded projects implemented by WFP and NGOs, restricting their ability to carry out aid projects. Both WFP and NGOs needed to be in constant contact with the government to better shape the priorities and to seek approval for project implementation. As discussed above, DG ECHO was one of the few donors who opposed this system.

The obstructionist attitude of the government in the form of travel restrictions and access constraints affected all aspects of aid effectiveness. Starting from goal attainment, as showed above, delays of the implementation of the projects were rather common making the overall goal attainment fall into the 'medium effectiveness'. Furthermore, restrictions and the

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[54] Many saw parallels with the systemic failure of the UN, and especially UNHCR, in Sri Lanka during 2008-2009: after 25 years of civil war, 300,000 IDPs were detained in massive, overcrowded camps controlled by the military, which were funded and maintained by the international community (Nash, 2009).

'threatening' attitude of the government hampered WFP and NGOs to conduct a thorough needs assessment (2), especially when considering Rohingyas. The seamlessness of the policy cycle was also touched by the context and the attitude of the government, which caused friction among the actors involved in delivering humanitarian aid projects, resulting into medium effectiveness (2). Finally, the attitude of the government, with the decision of establishing camps, fostered a protracted crisis (Interview #33), not allowing for the nexus (1). Further incidents and unexpected violence in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan led to an increase of the number of people in need, making it very difficult to go on with longer-term projects.

Given these numerous challenges in Myanmar, humanitarian aid remained very relevant. During 2015-2017, the LRRD/nexus was not yet implemented. At the end of 2017, it seemed impossible to have a nexus approach (Interviews #27, #33). Local actors were reluctant to enable the passage from humanitarian to development aid, since there were still many basic needs to be addressed, and the transition was viewed to be politically problematic by all the international and local actors.

This leads to a clear conclusion that the government's hostile attitude towards humanitarian aid projects caused variation in the effectiveness of DG ECHO's projects. Considering the discussion in Chapter 3 about the government's coping capacity, it seems that in the case of Myanmar, the *attitude* rather than the capacities themselves was a key factor influencing the effectiveness by causing delays and discrepancies in the needs assessment, as well as explaining the lack of nexus. Indeed, the Myanmar government's capacities, although not at same level of coping capacity as the Lebanese government, were not widely inefficient (See Tables 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6).

Conclusion

The case of Myanmar between 2015-2017 was a case of a protracted crisis and of a complex emergency, where human-made and natural crises were compounded. Conflicts in Kachin and Shan resulted in thousands of IDPs needing humanitarian aid, and the conflict in Rakhine caused one of the biggest refugee crises in Southeast Asia. Floods and two earthquakes further worsened the situation, increasing the number of IDPs. DG ECHO has been one of the top donors in Myanmar and has funded humanitarian aid projects since 1994. Relying on WFP and NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children, the DG funded projects aimed at delivering health assistance, as well as food and livelihood assistance, through cash-for-work, cash transfers, and procurement of livelihood assets. Although fundamental to saving lives, the projects did not

achieve full effectiveness (i.e.=12). Considering our definition of effectiveness, identified with goal attainment and its sub-dimensions, the DG ECHO's funded projects where characterised by discrepancies between the people targeted and the people in need; delays in the implementation of the projects; and non-implementation of the nexus between humanitarian and development aid. These issues affected the main dimension of effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment = 2) and characterised the other sub-dimensions, resulting in medium effectiveness (i.e. =7). Indeed, the needs assessment was not conducted as effectively as it could have been (=2), the seamlessness of the policy cycle was characterised by delays (=2), the nexus was discussed at HQ but did not have a dedicated budget and was not implemented in those years (=1).

This chapter discussed three hypotheses for the possible factors that induced a variation in the overall effectiveness of the projects. The assessment of the *first hypothesis* on *EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO* highlighted how the EU Member States internal cohesiveness' influenced the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects in positive and negative ways, and it especially influenced the dimensions of the nexus and the needs assessment. Indeed, EU Member States did not align their preferences around an adequate budget for longer-term programmes, causing delays and thus affecting the overall effectiveness. This explains why during 2015, 2016 and partially also 2017, the LRRD/nexus was not implemented. It also explains the exclusion of the DG from the formulation of the 2014-2016 Joint Programming Strategy (i.e. LRRD/nexus=1). It accounts for the decrease in the overall budget dedicated to Myanmar. The reduced funding envelope was considered one of the main causes explaining the issues of both nexus and of the medium effectiveness of the needs assessment. In fact, as a consequence, the DG's agents on the ground had to downsize their projects, resulting in reaching fewer people in need. It also explains the reason of the discrepancy the funds needed and those actually donated and between the people in need vs those reached. However, the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States towards the type of delegation and the amount of financial discretion granted to the DG was relevant and positively influenced the effectiveness. Indeed, DG ECHO was able to increase the funding when needed and in a short amount of time. The internal cohesiveness also translated into the possibility of DG ECHO coordinating in the field with other EU Member States, namely DFID. Their synergy was positive and represented a seed for a future attempt to improve the nexus, as it happened from 2017.

The *second hypothesis* on *delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents* did not help to thoroughly explain the issues affecting the effectiveness of the DG's projects.

DG ECHO (principal), delegated the implementation of its projects to WFP and NGOs (agents). The reason behind this choice were the agent *specialisation, credibility,* and ability to *manage policy externalities.* DG ECHO relied on its agents, who better understood the context, looked credible in the eyes of the beneficiaries and the government, especially when distribution was made by local NGOs, and, finally, were capable of detecting rising needs, prompting the DG to modify the project to avoid total failure. The DG granted discretion to its agents, although it remained a very present donor through its Country Office on the ground, constantly monitoring the situation and checking on the progress of the agents. The coordination with its agents was fundamental and impacted all dimensions of the effectiveness. The constant information-sharing contributed to better coordination and thus, to the seamlessness of the policy cycle, ensuring that each agent had its own specific project without overlapping with others. The input dimension of needs assessment, for instance, was characterised by a strong presence of the DG that made sure to collect local input and directly involve the local community. WFP, Save the Children, and Oxfam all had direct contact with the beneficiaries. However, a solid needs assessment did not always result in correct targeting, since WFP, especially, relied on a sample of beneficiaries, and the frequent staff turnover and heavy bureaucracy caused delays in the implementation. Moreover, it was perceived as suffocating by NGOs who were subject to greater scrutiny by the DG as compared to the UN's WFP. Still, because these were not caused by the capacities of the agents themselves, nor by the relationship with DG ECHO, we cannot consider this factor as negatively affecting humanitarian aid projects' effectiveness. The role of the agents turned out to be fundamental, as they always shared information with the DG, were able to gain access in remote areas, and of entertain direct contact with the beneficiaries. They also contributed to the set-up of the nexus, despite the disagreements among EU Member States at HQ and the shortage of funds. In general, it seems these agents had the capacity to implement the projects in spite of the existing barriers. Therefore, delegation and coordination were not among the factors causing a decrease in overall effectiveness.

The *third hypothesis* on *national authorities' attitude* proved to be most relevant in explaining the variation of DG ECHO's projects effectiveness. Despite the request for humanitarian aid, the Myanmar government and authorities were not well-disposed towards foreign intervention. The hostility translated into travel restrictions and access constraints. These affected all dimensions of effectiveness. Goal attainment requires swift implementation of the projects, which could not be fully achieved as a result of government policies which delayed and disrupted deliveries and services. In addition, agents were often barred from getting in touch with the beneficiaries, especially Rohingyas, and were thus unable to conduct a precise needs

assessment for targeting. The seamlessness of the policy cycle was also impacted the government, which conditioned the atmosphere, causing friction among the actors involved in delivering humanitarian aid projects. Most importantly, the decision of the government to establish camps, and its being at the root of incidents and unexpected violence in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, led to an increase of the number of people in need, making it very difficult to go on with longer-term projects, thus hindering the establishment of the LRRD/nexus.

Table 5.5 below summarises the discussion, highlighting the factors that were most relevant in explaining the variation of EU humanitarian aid's effectiveness in Myanmar between 2015-2016. The overall effectiveness is in between low and medium, contrary to the hoped for results of the policymakers for maximum effectiveness.

Table 5.5 Relevance of the possible factors in explaining the variation of DG ECHO's projects effectiveness in Myanmar (2015-2017)

	Relevant	**Partially Relevant**	**Not relevant**
Hp 1 – EU internal cohesiveness and coordination on the ground	✓		
Hp 2 – Delegation and coordination with agents			✗
Hp 3 – National authorities' attitude	✓		

Source: Own elaboration.

The first and third hypotheses proved to be particularly relevant. Discrepancy in the needs assessment, delays in the project, the almost non-existent nexus were caused by the precarious alignment of preferences among EU Member States and by the national government's attitude towards DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects. The delegation and coordination of the agents was in-between partially and not relevant. Despite certain delays that could not be attributed to them, the agents and the relationship with the DG proved to be fundamental to increasing the overall effectiveness of the projects, and, thus, cannot be considered relevant towards explaining the issues that caused the effectiveness to vary vis-à-vis the objectives pre-established at the beginning of the policy cycle.

Chapter 6. Lebanon (2015-2017)

Introduction

The second empirical case study about the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policies examines Lebanon between 2015 and 2017. This case is representative of a human-made crisis that started as an emergency and became a protracted crisis. It is another example of DG ECHO playing a vital role in response, because it was one of the first donors to open a Country Office in Lebanon as soon as the war in Syria started in 2011. DG ECHO mainly funded cash-based assistance projects, the most important one being the Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organizational System for E-cards (LOUISE), and others on protection and shelter. However, the project was characterised by some challenges that impacted DG ECHO's effectiveness, namely: there were gaps in the needs assessment; some projects did not reach the beneficiaries in need; the implementation of the projects was delayed; and there was a lack of longer-term policies to transition from humanitarian aid.

Based on official documents and on interviews with officials working in Lebanon at the time, the present chapter examines why this happened, and is articulated as follows: the first section and sub-sections concern the role of DG ECHO in Lebanon, highlighting both the positive achievements and the issues that affected the effectiveness of its humanitarian aid between 2015-2017. The second section is an assessment of the factors that could have influenced the variation in effectiveness. Each hypothesis will be discussed on the basis of the theories outlined in Chapter 2. Finally, the concluding remarks will consider which factors have been the most relevant in determining the variation.

6.1 DG ECHO in Lebanon: its role and its effectiveness

As a consequence of the start of the Syrian war in 2011, more than a million refugees have fled into Lebanon, a country of six million inhabitants. The number of refugees registered in Lebanon by UNHCR, the UN agency in charge of registering refugees since the Lebanese government stopped doing so in 2015, decreased slightly between 2015 and 2017. In 2015, UNHCR registered 1,088,231 Syrian refugees, while in 2016 this figure decreased to 1,031,303 and to 1,001,051 in 2017 (Seeberg, 2018: 5). These figures highlight how an event that was supposed to be an emergency became a protracted crisis. Millions of dollars coming from several governments and international organisations flowed into the country during that period,

and many international conferences were held to better channel and organise the aid.[55] Since 2011, the EU has provided more than €666 million in humanitarian aid funding to respond to the consequences of the Syrian war in Lebanon.[56] The aid was directed primarily towards refugees in need of food, health, and WASH services. This section will address DG ECHO's role in this period, and the issues affecting its effectiveness.

6.1.1 DG ECHO in Lebanon: priorities, objectives, agents, and projects

DG ECHO was the first humanitarian donor to open a permanent office in Lebanon in 2011, at the beginning of the Syrian war (ADE and URD, 2016: 40). It was not, however, the first EU office established in the country: the first EU delegation was opened in Beirut in 1979. But it was not until 2002 that an Association Agreement was signed, entering into force in 2006[57] and representing the legal basis and political and economic framework of the partnership between Lebanon and the EU. The EU-Lebanese partnership is enshrined in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In 2006-07, the first ENP Action Plan was adopted (Seeberg, 2018: 3) – a political document laying out the strategic objectives of cooperation between Lebanon and the EU. The first Plan was followed by another one in 2013-2015, reinforcing the cooperation between the EU and Lebanon through a series of priorities, among which were human rights and protection of vulnerable populations, including Palestinian refugees (EEAS, 2013).

The 2011 Syrian refugee crisis represented a new critical juncture for the EU-Lebanon partnership. In 2016, the partnership was renewed for another four years and the so-called EU-Lebanon Compact was adopted. The latter is particularly relevant because it set out a comprehensive approach to humanitarian crises. The Compact aimed at improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities. Its core objectives are to provide "an appropriate and safe environment for refugees and displaced persons from Syria, during their temporary stay in Lebanon and to provide a beneficial environment for Lebanon, host communities and vulnerable groups" (EU-Lebanon Association Council, 2016: 12). It also affirms that "Lebanon and the EU consider that the only sustainable long-term solution for refugees and displaced from Syria into Lebanon is their safe return to their country of origin,

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[55] In particular, in 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit led to the so-called "Grand Bargain" to enhance humanitarian assistance's efficiency and effectiveness.

[56] See *Lebanon* in https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/lebanon_en

[57] See *Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part.* Available at https://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treat yId=2361

as conditions for such a return are met" (Ibidem). In 2017, the eighth session of the Association Council of the EU and Lebanon confirmed and reiterated the priorities spelt out in the EU-Lebanon Compact and positively assessed the cooperation of the previous years (EU-Lebanon Association Council, 2017).

DG ECHO participated in international conferences about delivering humanitarian aid to the countries affected by the war in Syria, such as Lebanon, and it was very active during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, when the Grand Bargain was adopted (See Chapter 4). On this occasion, DG ECHO committed to improving its engagement with development actors, to enhance cash-based assistance, to strengthen cooperation with local partners, and to increase multi-annual funding. What was most relevant for Lebanon was the focus on cash-based assistance. In fact, during 2015 and 2016, there were many international initiatives in favour of this type of assistance. The High-Level Panel on Cash transfers, chaired by DFID and supported by DG ECHO,[58] urged an increase in cash transfers, and the Council of the EU adopted the "ten common principles for multi-purpose cash-based assistance to respond to humanitarian needs" (DG ECHO, 2015d). This was in line with what was happening at the international level, since the then-UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for cash as the preferred and default method of support.[59] All these commitments and priorities shaped DG ECHO's response, particularly in Lebanon.

Thus, DG ECHO has been at the forefront of responding to the humanitarian crisis in the country. DG ECHO's priorities in Lebanon focussed on ensuring basic assistance, such as health, food and protection to the most vulnerable segment of the population, that was "the 50% of the total of the total refugee population" (DG ECHO, 2016d). As figure 6.1 below shows, the DG was among the largest donors overall that gave the highest share of humanitarian aid funding to Lebanon, together with the US, Germany, and the UK in all three years, and Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada in 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively. Because of past colonial ties, we would have expected that among the largest donor overall to Lebanon, there was going to be France. Unexpectedly, France was one of the EU Member States that gave less funding to humanitarian aid in Lebanon, in that period. Cross-checking UNOCHA data with

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[58] High-level panel on humanitarian cash transfers. January 2015 to September 2015. See https://www.odi.org/projects/2791-high-level-panel-humanitarian-cash-transfers - :~:text=DFID is convening a High, response and the humanitarian system.&text=Cash transfers allow people to, they need through local markets.
[59] See Cash Programming: http://www.deliveraidbetter.org/learning-priorities/cash-programming/

the ones by EDRIS,[60] France's funding was allocated to the entire area, meaning not only to Lebanon, but to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Turkey. Consequently, the funding devoted to Lebanon only was less compared to the ones of DG ECHO, Germany and the UK.

Figure 6.1 Largest donors overall to Lebanon (2015-2017) ($ million)

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/124/summary/20150162017

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[60] See EDRIS https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/

In order to meet the priorities of providing food and health assistance to the most vulnerable, and with the situation in Lebanon becoming a protracted crisis and the needs growing, multi-purpose cash-based assistance projects became prevalent in 2015-2017. DG ECHO's objective was to establish a single modality through which multi-purpose cash-assistance could be channelled. Multi-purpose cash assistance is defined by DG ECHO (2015d:6) as "a transfer (either delivered in several tranches regular or as an ad-hoc payment) corresponding to the amount of money that a household needs to cover, fully or partially, their basic needs that the local market and available services can meet appropriately and effectively". Indeed, cash transfers provide easier guaranteed easier access to food, quicker disbursement, support for local markets and freedom of choice.

The main example of a DG ECHO funded cash-based assistance project in Lebanon is the Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organizational System for E-cards (LOUISE),[61] implemented by DG ECHO's main agents – UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and the Lebanon Cash Consortium (LCC), as shown below in Table 6.1.[62]

Table 6.1 Percentage (%) of the overall international and DG ECHO funding received by UN agencies (2015-2017)

	2015	2016	2017
UNHCR	33%	32%	37%
UNICEF	27%	36%	32%
WFP	27%	22%	20%

Source: Appendix 3. Lebanon

This chapter will mainly focus on the LOUISE project, since it was one of the most significant, because the most innovative, initiatives undertaken at the time. However, it is important to recall that besides this cash-based assistance project, DG ECHO also funded other projects aimed at addressing basic needs, such as food, health, shelter and protection. The main agents, in this case, were NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), which in those years especially were implementing shelter and protection projects (Interviews #38, #40).

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[61] See Cash Programming: http://www.deliveraidbetter.org/learning-priorities/cash-programming/
[62] This consortium "brings together six international NGOs, including Save the Children (Consortium Lead), the International Rescue Committee (Monitoring, Evaluation, and Research Lead), Solidarités International, CARE, ACTED, and World Vision International" (Battistin, 2016).

Prior to the implementation of LOUISE in 2015, DG ECHO operated in a highly fragmented context of aid delivery. In fact, the WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and LCC each had their own cash and vouchers programmes. WFP managed an electronic food voucher, UNICEF implemented education grants, other NGOs, such as Action Contre la Faim, managed paper food vouchers (Bailey and Harvey, 2017:7). UNHCR dealt with winter cash assistance programmes, and, together with LCC, dealt with multi-purpose cash transfers, not including food. It also established a "pre-paid card issuance agreement" with CSC Bank SAL (CSC) to issue cards (CSC-cards) used for the multi-purpose cash assistance through which beneficiaries could withdraw cash from ATMs in Lebanon (Creti, 2015: 5; Interview #42).

The result was that donor funds were dispersed among these similar programmes, which duplication and high transaction costs. To combat this, DG ECHO and DFID were among the leading voices promoting a more coordinated system. Indeed, they were the main advocates and funders of a unique channel where cash would flow from the bank directly to the beneficiaries (Interviews #35; #36). This eventually resulted in the so-called One Card project in 2015, that was later replaced by LOUISE in 2016. Both were funded and supported by DG ECHO.[63]

The idea of a coordinated system started in 2013, when DG ECHO organised a meeting with UNHCR, WFP and NGOs in Brussels to discuss a common delivery channel. At the time, there was an ongoing discussion between UNHCR and WFP for a "common card", meaning a shared payment mechanism. In 2015, Germany and DG ECHO funded a "One Card" pilot programme implemented by UNHCR and WFP (Interview #36). The One Card would have substituted the system of cards implemented only by UNHCR. The objective was to make the whole system more cost-efficient: reducing the number of cards issued, and cost-sharing on card issuance and maintenance (Creti, 2015). Following a single contract between the Banque Libano-Française (BLF) and WFP, One Card was a common payment mechanism: refugees received a single card onto which different aid agencies could make payments. They could use it on food vouchers in authorised WFP shops and the same card to withdraw multi-purpose cash provided by UNHCR or other agencies from ATMs. The money went from the donor to the aid agency and reached the beneficiaries through the BLF (Bailey and Harvey, 2017: 8). The result of the pilot programme was that the efficiency and the effectiveness dramatically increased the distribution of aid (Interview #35). The common card reduced costs and promoted

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[63] DG ECHO also supported projects aimed at providing legal assistance and counselling to refugees. It also supported projects focussed on healthcare, encouraging a more cost-efficient approach to hospital care and focusing on secondary healthcare –j that is, specialised healthcare (DG ECHO, 2016d).

harmonisation in terms of "beneficiary communication and training, common implementing partners, data management, coordination with other agencies and better negotiation with service providers" (Creti, 2015: 25). Furthermore, having just one card was judged by the beneficiaries consulted during the evaluation phase as "more user-friendly and more efficient" (Ibidem).

The basic ideas shaping the One Card pilot programme were later adopted in LOUISE, the programme that replaced it. In fact, the first pilot programme's results fuelled a debate among DG ECHO and its agents about a common channel. The One Card evaluation found that the UN agencies' roles (i.e., WFP and UNHCR) and responsibilities were not precisely spelt out yet, and beneficiaries would still refer to the two agents at the same time. Thus, debates revolved around finding a solution to improve and harmonise the whole system of cards. The idea was to try to find a single financial provider and to create a more accountable and cost-effective approach to cash transfers that could form the basis for a longer-term safety net project (Bailey and Harvey, 2017:5).

The subsequent initiative launched by DG ECHO and DFID called for a project proposal to respond to ten precise principles, among them: the delivery of a one single, unrestricted monthly cash transfer to cover basic needs; a common system for targeting the needs; increased participation of the beneficiaries in the programming; strong referral and robust appeals mechanisms that would ensure that no one was excluded; one representative and consistent governance structure that would be linked to coordination bodies and would inform them; independent monitoring and evaluation. The resulting programme, thus formulated by the agents, was LOUISE - a new single financial service provider that replaced the One Card. LOUISE started to be implemented in December 2016 by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and LCC. It is a system that streamlines the vulnerability assessment, targeting, distribution, training, and communication among the actors involved. It also includes the development of a common hotline and referral protocol to improve accountability towards beneficiaries.

LOUISE's overall purpose was to streamline cash delivery and reduce duplication by similar cash and voucher assistance programmes to increase efficiency. It also aimed at increasing accountability and quality by improving the targeting of beneficiaries. The main point presented in the initiative was the establishment of a single contract and of a single agency responsible for transferring one cash grant to beneficiaries and covering all of the Syrian refugees' basic needs (i.e. food and non-food needs). Furthermore, the intent was to "strengthen collaboration" in terms of accountability, establishing a platform and a common information management portal. Another important principle of this initiative was establishing an independent monitoring and evaluation body to ensure that the programme would adapt to new emerging

needs. Indeed, before LOUISE came into being, monitoring and evaluation were fragmented and inconsistent, thus not providing useful data on the programmes' effectiveness and efficiency (Interview #36).

Thus, the creation and development of LOUISE started in 2016 following the establishment of a joint Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR), an annual needs assessment covering all sectors. The creation of VASyR was funded by DG ECHO and implemented by WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF. The VASyR was based on data collection using household assessments and focussed primarily on socio-economic indicators. In addition, the Banque Libano-Française (BLF) was selected as the financial service provider. By December, there was the first distribution of cash under LOUISE. That same month, DG ECHO and DFID launched a call for proposals for agencies to combine food and multi-purpose cash into one transfer, thus expanding LOUISE. In other words, "rather than receiving approximately $135 in vouchers for food and $175 in cash from different organisations (albeit via one card), refugees funded by DFID and ECHO would receive one monthly payment of $310 from one organisation to support both food and other basic needs" (Bailey and Harvey, 2017: 11).

As per the first LOUISE's results, DG ECHO, UN agencies and NGOs felt that the LOUISE improved humanitarian aid's delivery. In addition, the needs assessment, that is, the VASyR, on which LOUISE was based, was cost-efficient and transparent, making the targeting more standardised and neutral (Interview #35; #36; #38). In addition, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)'s report (2017) gave strong evidence of the advantages of switching to a cash-based system. It reported that 75% of the beneficiaries preferred cash rather than food vouchers and that the average food consumption and security was higher when cash assistance was given (BCG, 2017:16-17).

Following the Grand Bargain and the 2016 London Conference on Syria, proper discussions started on the nexus of humanitarian and development aid (Interview #36). The main issue was how to guarantee a passage from humanitarian to development aid policies in a context of protracted crisis. Here, too, the role of DG ECHO has been fundamental (Interviews #35; #39). DG ECHO supported and implemented the so-called Madad Fund,[64] which is an EU regional Trust Fund established in 2014. It pools funds from the EU budget and voluntary contributions from 22 EU Member States and Turkey. In early 2021, it reached €1.5 billion. It is a flexible instrument and a bridge between humanitarian and development aid. In fact, it aimed at addressing early recovery as well as self-resilience needs. These funds were mainly invested in

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[64] Madad in Arabic means "helping together". See *The Madad Fund* http://childrenofsyria.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Madad-Fund-2-pager-for-print.pdf.

health and education, food security and livelihood, economic development, job creation and integration into labour markets (European Parliament, 2015).[65] In 2016, the Madad Fund made a call for proposal to work with agents including EU Member States authorities (e.g. Germany), development agencies, NGOs, UN agencies (e.g. UNICEF, WFP), and private sector entities.[66] This Trust Fund allowed development agencies to continue the work done by DG ECHO (Interview #38). The latter also made clear in meetings and documents that DG DEVCO would take over the project it started (Interview #36). In addition, DG ECHO and DG NEAR established the basis for a collaboration within the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF), which brought some projects (e. g. those concerning secondary healthcare) to transition from DG ECHO to DG NEAR. Besides DG NEAR and DEVCO, DG ECHO has also collaborated with the EEAS through the EU delegation. This has facilitated the transition from ECHO-funded projects to others with longer-term funding in the second healthcare sector, as well as in the protection and education sectors (Interview #39). Despite important achievements, however, there were still many issues affecting the projects' effectiveness.

6.1.2 DG ECHO's funded projects in Lebanon: analysis of their effectiveness

We have mentioned that the background in which DG ECHO started to operate was one of a protracted crisis, characterised by the duplication and the fragmentation of programmes that did not allow for a correct prioritisation of resources. Also, since multiple agencies provided aid to the same beneficiaries, many other refugees fell through and were not included in the target groups (Interviews #35; #36). In this context, DG ECHO's role has been critical for coordinating and harmonising the overall efforts. However, the effectiveness of DG ECHO's efforts in Lebanon varied and could not be considered fully effective (=12). The objectives were not ultimately reached within the established time, the needs assessment presented some gaps, and the nexus, despite the efforts, was not totally achieved in those years (Interview #39). Thus, the most relevant issues of the DG ECHO-funded project concerned the input sub-dimensions of the needs assessment, the delay in the improvement of carrying out LOUISE, and, finally, the hesitant passage from humanitarian to development aid in those years.

The first issue was about targeting and the needs assessment. Many vulnerable people were left without assistance while projects targeted the same beneficiaries. When the VASyR was first applied in 2012, the exclusion error was very high (Interview #38), meaning that it did not

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[65] See also EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis. See *Objective*s https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/our-mission_en
[66] Ibidem.

accurately identify those in need. Although VASyR made the targeting more standardised, transparent, neutral and cost-efficient (Interview #35; #36; #38), it did not fully reflect the beneficiaries in need, since the parameters used to calculate the beneficiaries were updated every two years (Interview #28). Furthermore, it did not include protection indicators (e.g. legal status of the refugee), thus excluding those who were vulnerable, because considered IDPs by the Lebanese government instead of refugees, protected under international law (See Hp3 below). In addition, basic assistance remained limited and incapable of absorbing the people in need. At the same time, remote areas remained uncovered (Interview #39).

These shortcomings were reflected by data provided by VASyR that also highlighted an increase of the number of people in need, who were not included in previous calculations. In 2016, for instance, it showed that, despite humanitarian aid having been delivered in the previous months, 42% of families had houses that did not meet minimum humanitarian standards, and 60% of households could not access healthcare. Almost half of the children under ten years old were out of school and did not have a proper diet, risking illnesses such as infections, measles, and diarrhoea. As for food insecurity, according to VASyR,

> 93% of the Syrian refugee population was estimated to have some degree of food insecurity, an increase of 4% compared to 2015. A closer look reveals that the share of refugee households, who were moderately or severely food insecure, jumped from 23% in 2015 to 36% in 2016" (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, 2017: 2).

Following the roll out of One Card and then LOUISE, the 2017 VASyR revealed an increase of 2% in food-secure households as compared to 2016. Nonetheless, 91% of Syrian refugees remained food insecure and the number of households that were considered moderately and severely food insecure grew from 36% to 38% (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, 2017: 2). In addition, although there was an increase in the number of households achieving acceptable food consumption and an increase in the number of meals consumed by adults and children since 2016, a deterioration in food consumption was registered. The share of households reporting inadequate food consumption jumped from 32% in 2016 to 38% in 2017. A growing number of households also experienced low dietary diversity, the percentage rising from 14% in 2016 to 21% of households in 2017. Furthermore, 77% of Syrian refugee households did not receive food or money to buy food. In terms of health, 46% required healthcare service, and of these, 89% received the care, although this was progress compared to the 84% who received healthcare in 2016. Among the main reasons for why they did not receive healthcare were the cost of drugs (33%) and consultation fees (33%) (Ibidem).

The second issue concerning aid effectiveness in this context was the delay in implementation. The discussions on LOUISE's improvement began in January 2016, however, the project started to be implemented only a year and a half later, in July 2017, when DG ECHO signed a contract with WFP as its main agent. It is important to remember that this was a humanitarian response which, at least on paper, should have required swiftness. Delays affected the overall goal attainment, since timely delivery is part of goal attainment itself, and had consequences on the overall effectiveness.

Finally, another issue concerned the nexus, namely the passage from humanitarian to development aid. The objective of DG ECHO was to transition towards a long-term approach in the response. The Madad Fund and the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) were considered successful achievements in this sense (Interviews #38; #39; #40). DG ECHO aimed to adopt safety net models to attract development funding and guarantee longer-term support to beneficiaries. As affirmed by a donor representative and reported by Karroum et al. (2018: 39):

> […] If we're going to try to reform the cash assistance sector, it can't just be for the next two, three years. It has to be a longer-term goal, with some kind of social safety net system for the most vulnerable. So, bringing the Lebanese Social Safety Net together, maybe, within whatever we're trying to create here in the crisis response, to enable some kind of system that development donors will be interested in. It's the social safety net side that hopefully will get the interest of development donors […]

However, in 2015-2017, despite the Madad and the JHFD, there was no passage from cash assistance to longer-term programmes that would guarantee effective and permanent safety nets (Interview #35; #42). There was also significant concern about the protraction of the crisis, especially among NGOs. Donors were diverting funding from humanitarian to development aid projects, but since humanitarian aid was still needed, many NGOs began providing both humanitarian and development aid (Karroum et al., 2018:54).

Thus, the issues concerning the effectiveness of DG ECHO's projects touched upon all the sub-dimensions of the effectiveness itself: goal attainment, needs assessment, seamlessness of the policy cycle, nexus. In line with the discussion in Chapter 2, table 6.2 below quantifies each sub-dimension, making up the whole effectiveness. The overall goal attainment was not fully achieved because it did not reach all of its objectives. This is why falls in the sub-dimension of 'medium effectiveness' (=2). The main dimension of goal attainment was linked to the other sub-dimensions. In fact, the needs assessment, although it provided an important basis for targeting, did not cover some areas and refugees fell through and were not considered (=2). In addition, as discussed above, part of the goal attainment is timely delivery. The whole policy

cycle was characterised by delays, where LOUISE was implemented a year and a half later, and the number of people in need increased rather than decreased (=1). Finally, the Madad and the JHFD were fundamental in showing a positive intention towards applying the nexus, but between 2015 and 2017, safety nets programmes struggled to start (=2). Based on this, the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in Lebanon in those years was in between low and medium, although closer to the latter.

Table 6.2 Degrees of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness in Lebanon (2015-2017)

Goal Attainment	2	Medium effectiveness
Needs Assessment	2	Medium effectiveness
Seamlessness of the policy cycle	1	Low effectiveness
LRRD/Nexus	2	Medium effectiveness
Tot effectiveness	7	In between low and medium effectiveness, but closer to the latter

Source: Own elaboration (See Chapter 2)

Why were there gaps in the needs assessment? Why did some projects fail to reach the beneficiaries? Why was the implementation of the projects delayed? Finally, why was there not the possibility to provide safety nets that would have guaranteed a passage from shorter to longer-term policies? In the next section, we will assess the hypotheses on what factors could have influenced these aspects of the DG ECHO's effectiveness.

6.2 Why did DG ECHO's effectiveness vary? Assessment of the hypotheses on the factors affecting DG ECHO's effectiveness in Lebanon (2015-2017)

This section aims at empirically answering the thesis' question regarding variation in the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes. We have seen that in the case of Lebanon, despite many efforts and an overall medium effective policy, pre-established objectives could not fully be met. Why has this happened? Based on Chapter 2 and, in particular considering Table 2.1, we will assess each hypothesised factor affecting the effectiveness of DG ECHO's

funded projects, considering our definition of effectiveness, so it will look at goal attainment, needs assessment, seamlessness of the policy cycle, and the LRRD/nexus.

Hypothesis 1. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO

> *The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO in the field explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

In the case of Lebanon, the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States could be observed in different occasions, starting from the support for the EU-Lebanon compact and the Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework (JHDF). However, the establishment of the Madad Fund exemplifies, at its best, the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States. In 2014, EU Member States agreed to set up a budget that would improve the passage from humanitarian to development aid, and, due to an increase in the number of refugees in the subsequent years, both the European Commission and the European Council called for an increase in the funding aimed at supporting Syrian refugees and their host countries.[67] In particular, Germany and Italy committed €8 million, and another €21.4 million came from Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia (European Parliament, 2015: 6-7). Thus, the agreement of the EU governments to increase the funding directed towards the refugee crisis improved the chances for concrete passage from humanitarian to development aid in the field starting in 2017. In this sense, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness on budget support gave strength to the whole humanitarian aid policy and to its passage to development aid. This is also why the sub-dimension of the nexus falls into 'medium effectiveness' (=2).

In addition, the alignment of preferences of EU Member States was also clear when they backed cash-based humanitarian assistance to be implemented in Syria and the neighbouring countries in June 2015. At the same time as the Council of the EU agreed to cash-based assistance projects, it also endorsed the previously-mentioned ten common principles, recognising this would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid.[68] This was

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[67] See also *Informal meeting of EU heads of state or government on migration, 23 September 2015 – statement* https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/23/statement-informal-meeting/ once again there's a mix of Harvard style referencing and footnotes; this can easily be made into an in-text reference, with full details in the bibliography.
[68] See *EU Member States back cash-based humanitarian assistance* Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-member-states-back-cash-based-humanitarian-assistance_en

a big step made by the EU Member States that further legitimised and strengthened the role of DG ECHO in the field. Indeed, the alignment of preferences of EU Member States towards an increased budget that would have favoured the nexus and towards cash-based assistance programmes translated into coordination among DG ECHO and EU Member States in the field. They had the same priorities, and their relationship has been characterised by this aspect. The EU Member States, indeed, were all prone to cash-based assistance programmes, considering them the most effective way of delivering humanitarian aid. Bearing in mind what has been discussed in Chapter 4, the alignment of preferences was possible also because, at the time, the EU Member States had an interest to contain the migration of refugees towards Europe. It was also in line with the EU Global Strategy that had, among others, the objective to keep that area of the world stable, in order to avoid escalation and significant consequences not so far from the European borders.

Thus, EU Member States' internal cohesiveness at HQ translated into coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO in the field. This is exemplified by the coordination between DG ECHO and EU Member States, such as Germany and the UK. Both countries were actively engaged in advocacy and multi-purpose cash assistance programmes and protection in the field (Interview #39). Germany was one of the main funders of the One Card pilot programme and it was present on the ground through two agencies: DG ECHO, indeed, was in touch and coordinated with *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) and the KFW development bank, attending the same meetings and making sure the pilot programme was carried out as planned (Interview #38).

Furthermore, the UK was present on the ground through DFID. The UK and DG ECHO have always had a strong working relationship in Lebanon (Interviews #36; #41; #42). DFID was present through its field office, and the two shared the same priorities. Their coordination was enhanced by the good personal relationship between the DFID and DG ECHO officials on the ground, and occurred through regular meetings. The relationship that started as informal was later formalised through the signature of joint donors' statements and a memorandum of understanding where their roles and responsibilities were defined and spelt out (Interview #38).

The relationship between UK's DFID and DG ECHO was based on the shared priority of resolving the issues affecting humanitarian aid in Lebanon present before 2015, such as high fragmentation in the delivery of aid with duplication of programmes,[69] high transaction costs,

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[69] A 2014 DFID study indicated, for instance, that there were 100 000 duplicate payment cards (Pongracz, 2014: 4).

and lack of consistent monitoring and evaluation. In 2015/2016, despite the progress already made, both actors

> were concerned that duplication and fragmentation in the ways that cash and vouchers were programmed made it difficult to prioritise donor resources to the most vulnerable, to ensure that refugees did not fall through the cracks between programmes, and to promote greater accountability to refugees (Bailey and Harvey, 2017: 10).

Thus, DFID and DG ECHO were fervent advocates for creating a coordinated system with a unique channel of cash delivery and single agency provider (Interviews #35, #36; #42).

Another common priority for both actors was their strong support of multi-purpose cash assistance. As affirmed by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)'s report (2017: 9),

> ECHO and DFID have expressed strong inclination toward an unconditional and unrestricted cash-based modality. This is founded on the rationale of a basic needs approach – empowering beneficiaries to make personal spending decisions to best meet their basic needs, as well as expected efficiency gains and positive effects on local markets.

The two agreed to cash-based assistance, to harmonising the whole system, and to including an independent monitoring and evaluation contract in the call for proposals. Furthermore, they elaborated the ten principles that agents needed to follow for the proposal to be accepted and for the contract to be signed (Bailey and Harvey, 2017).

The fact that DG ECHO and DFID agreed on pooling funds and jointly issued a call for proposals (thus beginning LOUISE) allows us to understand how aligned the two actors were in terms of what means to choose to reach the objectives of humanitarian response. Their solidarity was also clear when they jointly refused three proposals made by UN agencies and NGOs (Interview #36). Finally, DG ECHO and DFID also agreed to create the basis for longer-term programmes. DFID affirmed that:

> The current approach is not fit for a protracted crisis. Lebanon's refugee crisis is going into year seven. Given the continued underfunding of the LCRP,[70] additional funding will need to be attracted from development actors[71] to provide a minimum social safety net-type of programme for refugees and the poorest Lebanese in the coming years. The sooner humanitarian actors in Lebanon can provide a system that can be co-funded by development actors, the better. Streamlining of systems and rationalisation of actors involved is critical for that aim (Bailey and Harvey, 2017: 10).

Here again, DFID and DG ECHO shared the same vision and the same type of engagement.

In addition, the EU Member States in the field watched DG ECHO's role in Lebanon with great interest, and there was neither competition nor conflict among them (Interviews #28; #35;

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[70] Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP). This will be discussed further below.
[71] Development actors meaning UN agencies or NGOs implementing development aid, but also governmental authorities.

#37). DG ECHO thus enjoyed the support of the EU Member States. We have seen this starting from the budget and during the approval of cash-based assistance projects, which the States themselves judged as an improvement in efficiency and effectiveness compared to the past. This support, both in terms of budget and type of programmes by the EU Member States, created an overall positive framework to DG ECHO's projects, not only because it guaranteed useful funds to develop projects that would have longer-term effects, but also because it further legitimised the work done by the DG in the field and created the basis for coordination with EU Member States' offices, such as Germany and especially the UK.

In conclusion, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness translated into coordination in the field and contributed to creating a positive framework where DG ECHO's projects could be implemented, setting the projects up for passage from humanitarian to development aid and thus creating a foreseeable improvement of the effectiveness, although after 2017. However, this is a factor that is only partially relevant, because other factors outweighed it at the time, such as delays and the lack of a thorough needs assessment. Thus, we have to turn to another hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents

> *DG ECHO's delegation and coordination with the agent (e. g. UN agency, NGO), which has established capacities on the ground and is accountable to the principal, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

Considering the procedures discussed in chapter 4, in Lebanon, DG ECHO relied mainly on WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and LCC for the implementation of LOUISE. It also relied on the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and on the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) to implement shelter and protection assistance projects. The relationship among DG ECHO and its agents was (and still is) hierarchical, based on contracts that expect the agents to be accountable to the principal, thus making the P-A theory the most useful theoretical framework for the discussion on EU humanitarian aid (See Chapter 2).

As in Myanmar, here too DG ECHO selected agents who had previously worked in the field, were familiar with the context and had good relationships with the government (Interview #35). The main reasons that prompted DG ECHO to delegate the implementation of projects were *specialisation* and *the management of policy externalities*. All of the UN agencies and NGOs

had, indeed, been present on the ground for many years, thus having a high degree of *specialisation.* Indeed, DG ECHO tended to rely on agents with extensive experience and established capacities on the ground, meaning that they knew the context and the local actors, were in touch with local authorities, and could distribute materials to the beneficiaries (Interview #35). Agents (e.g. WFP and UNHCR) were in direct contact with the beneficiaries, so DG ECHO relied on them to conduct the needs assessment, namely the VASyR. The latter aimed at "enabling humanitarian stakeholders to improve their programming and to target assistance to the most vulnerable" (ADE and URD, 2016: 28). UNHCR and WFP were thus DG ECHO's main points of reference for needs assessment, since UNHCR had been responsible for registering refugees, and both were in touch with local NGOs and households (Interview #21). This not only meant that both agents had a high degree of specialisation, but also that they could point out to DG ECHO who were the beneficiaries and what they needed, thus *managing policy externalities*, meaning that they could suggest alternatives to adapt the projects to avoid potential failure. However, in the Lebanese case, it seemed that DG ECHO, together with DFID, was the main driver of joint efforts aimed at improving the cooperation, thus, *directly managing policy externalities*. DG ECHO pushed its agents towards finding new policies and new modalities of delivering humanitarian aid through cash assistance. Indeed, the strong push towards harmonisation came from the alignment between DG ECHO and DFID. In line with this, the DG exercised both direct (i.e. police patrol) and indirect control (i.e. fire-alarm) over its agents, requiring them to be accountable and to provide clarification when needed in periodical reports on the implementation of the projects. DG ECHO's Technical Assistants (TAs)[72] had the task of independently monitoring and evaluating the situation and keeping DG ECHO at HQ up to date.[73] In addition, DG ECHO exercised an indirect form of control, relying on NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), to cross-check the VASyR needs assessment conducted by UN agencies and to compensate for the absence of the protection indicator, which was not included in the VASyR.

Thus, DG ECHO's participation in the shaping of LOUISE was regular throughout the 'input' and 'process' phases. As discussed above, the fragmented efforts that characterised humanitarian aid in Lebanon at least until 2016/2017 were due to each agent having their own distinct programme. WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and LCC all had cash and food voucher

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[72] These are not EU officials, but external employees hired by the EU (e. g. consultants, experts).
[73] After 2017, DG ECHO funded and developed a monitoring and evaluation system for WFP projects: CaMALeON. The evaluation, done by a group of NGOs, focussed mainly on multi-purpose cash programmes to strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of WFP's unrestricted cash transfer programmes in Lebanon. In the beginning, WFP was reluctant to accept scrutiny by third parties, especially NGOs. This was consistent with a general reluctance by UN agencies towards coordinated monitoring systems (Interview #42).

programmes that created duplication, high transaction costs and incorrect prioritisation of resources, with a fragmented targeting and inconsistent monitoring and evaluation reports. DG ECHO, together with DFID, attempted to improve the situation by proposing, as we have seen, programmes (One Card and then LOUISE) that would harmonise and coordinate the whole system of cash assistance. However, the establishment of a single agency provider was delayed by nearly six months, until mid-2017. The main cause for the delay was the long and arduous negotiation between DG ECHO and DFID, on one hand, and WFP, UNHCR, and LCC on the other. The negotiations and disagreement between the principals and the agents led to assistance being interrupted for several months. It also led to general confusion among the actors on the ground and among refugees (Karroum et al., 2018: 40). This is why the sub-dimension of seamlessness of the policy cycle corresponded to 'low effectiveness' with a score of 1.

In fact, the UN agencies were sceptical about the DG ECHO/DFID initiative of a single agency provider and, consequently, of an improvement to LOUISE. They felt that a thorough evaluation had not been conducted of whether unrestricted cash-based assistance was effective, and felt that it could undermine existing coordination efforts (Parker, 2017). They believed that they had already invested a lot of effort into the One Card pilot programme and on the initial LOUISE set-up, and that more time was needed to implement and evaluate the projects (Interview #36). Furthermore, UN agencies considered that the work done and coordinated by UNHCR already provided what DG ECHO and DFID were asking for. Indeed, the main point of contention was the single transfer from a single organisation. UN agencies were reluctant because they believed that the implementation of projects by the UNHCR-led consortium already corresponded to DG ECHO and DFID's requests (e. g. no additional costs; accountability). However, DG ECHO and DFID felt that this was not the case, because they did not see how having different payment systems for food and basic needs would be more effective and efficient than a single agency providing the resources for both needs (Bailey and Harvey, 2017: 4). UN agencies' reluctance concerned not only this aspect but also the independent monitoring and evaluation, as it would have added a new layer to an already complicated process (Interview #42). On the contrary, independent monitoring and evaluation was strongly supported by DG ECHO and DFID. Indeed, they believed it to be fundamental to improve future projects and hold the agent accountable. This was in line with their ten principles and the Grand Bargain's commitments (Interview #36).

Thus, all "the back and forth between UN agencies and the donor between January and June 2017 delayed the rollout of different components of LOUISE, and it seemed to have contributed to why some of the aspirational aspects of LOUISE were not implemented as anticipated" (Pelly

and Juillard, 2017: 35). The actual timeline of negotiations on an improvement of LOUISE began in January 2016. By December of the same year, DG ECHO and DFID made a call for a single agency. Starting from January 2017, DG ECHO rejected the UN and LCC proposals three times. The negotiations ended with the UN agencies accepting the requests by DG ECHO/DFID and in July 2017, the principals decided to fund WFP.

Although the agents recognised DG ECHO's efforts in pushing for better coordination and harmonisation of the entire system, the DG was also accused of having fuelled a long debate that absorbed much of the energies of the agents, such as UNHCR (ADE and URD, 2016: 241). These tensions between DG ECHO and UNHCR manifested in their difficult coordination. Although in person meetings were frequent and monthly coordination meetings took place (Interviews #21; #28; #29), information sharing was not constant and was often followed by further clarification requests by DG ECHO. For instance, DG ECHO asked for more information concerning the situation of the refugees' protection because it judged that UNHCR did not provide enough data and was not specific in illustrating its projects (Interviews #35; #38). One of the reasons for this might have been that, at the time, UNHCR picked up the role of a general coordinator. Simultaneously, it also dealt with the registration of refugees and with protection programmes. This triple hatting of UNHCR was considered by NGOs and DG ECHO as a failure, with the agent exercising none of the roles well. This further deteriorated the entire coordination mechanism (Interviews #38; #39). The tensions and resulting difficulties in coordination affected the dimensions of goal attainment and policy cycle by introducing delays, explaining why goal attainment is categorised as 'medium effectiveness' and the seamlessness of the policy cycle is 'low effectiveness' (=1).

The tensions also affected the needs assessment. We have discussed above that basic assistance could not absorb the refugees in need and remote areas remained uncovered. Further, not all vulnerabilities were detected, leaving many refugees without assistance. This vacuum of credible information was intertwined with coordination issues. The vacuum was also due to the agents' silo approach, meaning that the agents did not sufficiently share information among themselves, thus leaving gaps in the analyses of possible beneficiaries and not allowing for correct prioritisation of resources and projects, especially by UN agencies. Pathways for assistance were missing, resulting in ad hoc interventions or no interventions at all. Also, the uncoordinated referral system left people in need in remote areas of the country without coverage (Interview #39). The ECHO-funded VASyR itself, implemented by UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, was also criticised: it was defined as a "labour-intensive process with high costs […] lack of coordination in targeting exercises was also highlighted" (ADE and URD, 2016: 28;

Interview #42). In addition, discussions leading to the algorithm at the basis of the needs assessment lasted more than a year in a situation where people lived in dramatic conditions. The weekly meetings would last for hours involving both principals and agents, and an agreement on the type of indicators was finally reached much later than it should have (Interview #40). In addition, as we have seen above, the VASyR left out the indicator of protection and had a high exclusion error, leaving many vulnerable people excluded from any services. As we have seen, exercising a fire-alarm control mechanism, DG ECHO had to refer to other NGOs, namely the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), to get this information and conduct a cross-check with the information provided by UN agencies. NRC detected that there was a case where refugees, due to their difficulties, did not collect their cash for three months and, even though they were still in need, had then been excluded from the assistance programmes by the UN agencies (Interviews #35; #38). These gaps can at least partially explain why so many vulnerable people (i. e. refugees) were left without assistance while projects targeted the same beneficiaries, further clarifying why needs assessment corresponded to 'medium effective' (=2).

Besides affecting the needs assessment, the tensions and difficulties in coordination had an unforeseen side-effect: competition among agents. This competition was fostered by a lack of a consistent coordination mechanism that should have been led by UNHCR. In general, the competition for visibility and the rivalry among agents over funds and resources damaged the overall projects and caused episodes of corruption and mutual blame for the failure (Karroum et al., 2018: 7; Interview #40). The sector where the competition was particularly fierce was shelter. When UNHCR fostered the enlargement of newly created NGOs dealing with protection in the Bekaa Valley, it contributed to creating projects that overlapped with already existing NGOs' programmes, which were funded by DG ECHO. It also created competition among the agents in search of funds. The DG intervened, pushing for a streamlining of projects and deciding not to fund projects implemented by the newly created NGOs, despite the fact that UNHCR was supporting them (Interview #38). In this context, DG ECHO's role was to act as peacemaker and coordinator, stepping into a role that should have been filled by its agent, UNHCR. DG ECHO was perceived by its agents to have played a significant role in coordination compared to other donors (e. g. DFID) because it pressed for geographical coordination and had fewer, but more efficient, actors in the Bekaa Valley (ADE and URD, 2016: 240).

It is worth adding that the coordination between principal and agents was influenced by humanitarian aid politicisation. UN agencies were more interested in securing a significant

amount of funding than looking for strategies that could lead to better coordination and, consequently, effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies. The agents remained anchored to their methods, impacting their ability to detect risks and act promptly (Interviews #38; #39; #40). DG ECHO - we have seen - had a critical coordination role. However, the political agenda at the EU HQ (see Chapter 3 and 4) influenced the way DG ECHO established relationships with its agents on the ground. DG ECHO HQ applied more strategic reasoning to the aid, seeing it advantageous to funding UN agencies more than NGOs. Indeed, UN agencies could easily manage large-scale projects with a high funding share (Interviews #38; #42). They had long-term relationships with Lebanese authorities, prompting DG ECHO to keep wanting to work with them despite the conflicts.

We have seen how tensions between DG ECHO and its agents brought about delays in the implementation of the projects and affected the needs assessment. Another reason for these issues can be found in the sudden expansion of some agents (e. g. Danish Refugee Council, DRC), which grew beyond their original scope and began implementing projects that went beyond their capacities, often failing to complete projects in a timely manner (Interviews #35; #40; #42). In fact, within a short amount of time, especially in 2015, previously small NGO offices started to receive a significant amount of funding and engaged with projects that required significantly more capacity than what they initially had. The number of staff grew rapidly. Turnover, due to a difficult environment where staff could not easily live for a long time, was frequent in both NGOs and UN agencies. The majority of coordination meetings were spent providing updates to the new staff instead of discussing the projects themselves, which affected the whole implementation phase, often delaying it (Mansour, 2018: 16). Also, the amount of funding given did not always correspond to the NGOs' capacities. The result was that they could not manage a proper distribution of materials in a timely way and some of these materials (e. g. blankets) would accumulate without being given to the beneficiaries. NGOs were working with sectors that did not correspond to their expertise, and were often unable to spend their financial resources (Interviews #35; #40). Thus, the agent was not able to implement the contract they signed with the principal. DG ECHO stopped funding those agents when they began delivering the projects in a non-satisfactory manner (i.e. not respecting the contract) (Interview #35). However, some NGOs still felt that these failures were DG ECHO's responsibility, since it did not sufficiently assess agents' capacities and granted significant amounts of money that the agent was not able to manage, being incapable of setting a correct prioritisation of resources (Interview #40). Thus, it seemed that in granting, in some instances, DG ECHO did not sufficiently apply its control mechanisms or applied them too late, thus

leaving too large of a margin of autonomy to the agents. These faults in the principal-agent relationship led to delays in the implementation of the projects, impacting the first two dimensions of our definition of effectiveness: goal attainment and seamlessness of the policy cycle.

In conclusion, we have seen how tensions between the principal and the agents, and the difficulties in their coordination negatively affected the effectiveness' sub-dimensions of goal attainment, needs assessment and seamlessness of the policy cycle. In fact, since part of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects' goal is the swiftness of delivery, and because these factors were the reasons for delays that affected the goal attainment, they are largely to blame for 'medium effectiveness', since not all the objectives had been met. The tensions and poor coordination also influenced the seamlessness of the policy cycle (i. e. the info sharing was not consistent; roles and responsibilities not clear) and the needs assessment, creating gaps in the beneficiaries' targeting. This further clarifies why the seamlessness of the policy cycle was considered as 'low effective' (=1) and the needs assessment was considered as 'medium effective' (=2). The difficulties in coordination led to an unforeseen side effect, that is the one of competition and overlapping of projects within the same sector, which further contributed to tensions between the principal and the agents. Finally, agents not being capable of handling a significant amount of funding and the lack of scrupulous controls by the principal resulted in projects failing to the goals and made it difficult for both the principals and the agents to establish a seamlessness policy cycle, causing overall delays.

Therefore, the factor of delegation and coordination between DG ECHO and its agents seemed to have significantly harmed the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects in DG ECHO's response in Lebanon. The delegation and coordination with an agent that did not thoroughly follow the contract, did not have the established capabilities on the ground and was reluctant to establish other means of accountability to the principal affected three of the four dimensions of the effectiveness (goal attainment, the seamlessness of policy cycle, needs assessment). However, it seemed to leave out the final dimension of our definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness: the nexus. In this case, the setback from humanitarian to development aid did not concern the relationship between principal and agents. The passage cannot, indeed, be entirely carried out without the approval of local authorities. Therefore, to find the reasons why this passage was not fully implemented in the years 2015-2017, we need to turn to the last hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3. National authorities' attitude

> *The national governments and local authorities' attitude, whether interfering or facilitating the implementation of humanitarian aid projects, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

This last hypothesis shifts the analysis and looks at external factors, namely the national government and local authorities. The Lebanese government's attitude towards the Syrian refugee crisis has varied throughout the years and a brief discussion will help us understand whether it affected the effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes.

In 2011, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese government's reaction was slow and scattered. The probable causes of the slowness in the response included domestic political tensions, the complicated relationship with Syria[74] and the impact of a prolonged presence of Palestinian refugees. The Syrian crisis was expected to be short-term (Karroum et al., 2018:11). Since 2012, following an agreement with the Lebanese government, UN agencies and NGOs have implemented humanitarian aid programmes, and their funding has increased over the years (UNHCR, 2012). In 2014, the government established an inter-ministerial "Crisis Cell", headed by the Prime Minister and including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the General Security Office (Dionigi 2016: 13). Since 2014, the Crisis Cell has supervised the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a joint partnership of 95 partners between the Lebanese government and the UN, to ensure humanitarian assistance to refugees and reinforce Lebanon's economic, social and environmental stability. The LCRP is the Lebanese chapter of the more comprehensive Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) led by UNHCR and UNDP, which includes plans in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (UNDP and UNHCR, 2016). Although the government was actively responding to the humanitarian crisis, NGOs felt that it was behaving opportunistically – that the sudden flow of international money entering the country created an opportunity for economic and social reconstruction. Indeed, the funding received from

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[74] It is worth considering that the border between Syria and Lebanon is porous due to the proximity of the countries and their historical relationship. Lebanon was part of the "Greater Syria" (known as such until World War One), and since then, Syria has always presented challenges to Lebanese sovereignty. Examples include Syria's military presence in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, and the Pax Syriana, approved by the 1989 Ta'if Agreement (Dionigi, 2016: 30). Furthermore, the two countries were brought even closer from a social, political and economic point of view, as made clear by the Treaty of Brotherhood and Cooperation signed in 1992. Thanks to this treaty, Syrians could enter Lebanon without the need for a visa or passport. Over the years, the Syrian labour force has been fundamental to the Lebanese economy (Ibidem: 31).

international donors was often used to fund national projects that the government was previously unable to undertake or subsidise. Apart from this, the government did not seem very keen to help refugees, as such a stance could have further undermined public consent, given the widespread public dissatisfaction with having refugees "at home" and high levels of unemployment (Interview #38).

For four years after the Syrian conflict started, Lebanon kept an "open-door policy" with Syria. Nonetheless, the government always stressed that Lebanon was neither a country of asylum nor the final destination for refugees, but rather a temporary shelter. The government's position came across clearly in its declaration: "the Government of Lebanon's position is that repatriation of de facto refugees from Syria is the preferred durable solution for this crisis" (Government of Lebanon and UN, 2014: 9). Indeed, the government always stressed that the refugees' stay in Lebanon was temporary and outlawed refugee camps (Interviews #35; #36; #40).

In 2015, following a period of domestic civil unrest, the Lebanese open-door policy changed. The government applied policies restricting access to the country and urged UNHCR to stop registering new refugees. The new regulation reduced Syrians' eligibility for admission, residency, and regularisation, resulting in a decline in the flow of refugees and an increase in their marginalisation and insecurity. The new government policies, curfews, and restrictions on refugees' ability to obtain legal status resulted in significant ill-treatment. It is worth noting that Lebanon has never signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and has not signed its 1967 Protocol. Rather, the law that governs refugees is the 1962 Law Regulating foreign nationals' status in Lebanon.[75] Contrary to other states, the Lebanese government does not consider Syrians to be refugees, but instead considers them "displaced". This constitutes a relevant difference, since those defined as "refugees" are protected under international law (Immenkamp, 2017: 6). Also, the lack of legal status reduced refugees' ability to move around and work, leading to a rise in child labour and many new-borns being stateless. In its report, Human Rights Watch (2016) denounced refugees' vulnerability to labour and sexual exploitation by employers without having any possibility of going to the authorities for protection. Furthermore, the Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) carried out regular security operations and evictions at the informal refugee settlement in Bekaa Valley (DG ECHO, 2017c: 11). Due to governmental restrictions and the no Syrian camp policy, 41% of Syrians lived in

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[75] Law Regulating the status of foreign nationals in Lebanon (1962). Available at: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/lbn/1962/order_no__319_regulating_the_status_of_foreign_nationals_in_lebanon_en_html/Order_no_319_EN_excerpts.pdf

substandard housing units, and 18% resided in informal settlements in 2017 (Ibidem: 7). These conditions, together with the restrictions in accessing jobs, with refugees having the possibility to only rely on temporary ones, made it impossible for them to cover monthly expenses in terms of food and of rent, leaving 91% of the Syrian refugee population food insecure and more than 80% of refugees needing to pay rent (DG ECHO, 2015c: 12).

The government's positions and measures mainly influenced the dimension on nexus, but it also affected the dimensions of goal attainment. As mentioned above, DG ECHO aimed to establish safety nets to enable the transition from humanitarian to development aid. The above-mentioned Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) was established, and meetings with DG NEAR and DG DEVCO took place to decide on longer-term solutions. This is why the nexus sub-dimension is considered to be of 'medium effectiveness' (=2). However, the nexus could not be implemented unless it enjoyed the government's support and approval. The Lebanese government did not *de facto* support the establishment of safety nets and social assistance networks, thus slowing down the passage from cash assistance to longer-term solutions in the years 2015-2017 (Interviews #28; #35; #40). Local authorities also jeopardised the passage from humanitarian to development aid by not integrating Syrian refugees into the workforce: their restrictive measures reduced the mobility and sense of security of refugees (Dionigi, 2016: 29).

Concerning goal attainment, as highlighted by UNHCR (2018: 9), refugees were often denied treatment for chronic diseases except if they were in a very difficult situation. This meant that the goal of reaching beneficiaries in need could not always be fully achieved. Furthermore, some projects were delayed because authorities did not give permits. For instance, although access to the territory was much easier than other cases (e. g. Myanmar), in the informal refugee settlement in Bekaa Valley, it was particularly difficult for agents, such as ECHO-funded NGOs, to establish lavatories because of the reluctance of ministries to grant the authorisations. Essentially, the government did not allow for any solution that could be of long-term (Interview #35). This is why goal attainment was considered as 'medium effective' (=2): the majority of objectives had been achieved, but there were notable delays.

In conclusion, in Lebanon's case, the national government and the local authorities were not well disposed towards longer-term solutions that would have improved the full delivery of several ECHO-funded projects. The government's reluctance affected the nexus dimension of effectiveness, causing a score of 2, which is 'medium effectiveness'. The government refused to guarantee safety nets, because this would have meant prolonging a situation that national authorities always wanted to be temporary.

Conclusion

The case of Lebanon between 2015 and 2017 is an example of a human-made crisis and of an emergency that turned into a protracted crisis. More than a million refugees fled Syria, escaping from the war which started in 2011. Refugees were mainly in need of healthcare, food, protection, shelter, and WASH. DG ECHO was at the forefront in responding to this crisis, being one of the first donors to establish a Country Office in Beirut in 2011 and one of the top humanitarian donors, together with the US, Germany and the UK. Relying on WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, LCC and NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), DG ECHO funded cash-based assistance projects, the most important of which was LOUISE. The latter was initiated in 2015 by the DG and DFID and meant to replace a system where each agent had its own programme, because this created fragmentation, duplication, confusion and high-transaction costs. LOUISE was based on the ECHO-funded VASyR, the needs assessment conducted by its agents, and it aimed at streamlining cash delivery through a more harmonious and coordinated single system for cash assistance programmes. It also aimed at increasing accountability and quality through streamlined assistance, and at improving targeting of the beneficiaries. The main point presented in the initiative was the establishment of a single contract and of a single agency responsible for transferring one cash grant to beneficiaries and covering all of the Syrian refugees' basic needs (i. e. food and non-food needs). DG ECHO was also one of the main funders of food, health and shelter projects, implemented especially by NRC and DRC.

Despite the highly fragmented context in which EU humanitarian aid started to be implemented, the situation started to improve. However, many issues still undermined the implementation of LOUISE and the other projects, starting from the needs assessment. Many vulnerable refugees were left without assistance while projects targeted the same beneficiaries (=2). Despite making the targeting more standardised, transparent, neutral and cost-efficient, the VASyR did not fully reflect the beneficiaries in need since the parameters used to calculate the beneficiaries were updated every two years. It also lacked important protection indicators (e. g. legal status of the refugee), thus excluding those who were vulnerable according to this parameter. Delays characterised the overall implementation of LOUISE and of the other projects. These delays affected not only the sub-dimension of the seamlessness of the policy cycle (=1), but also the overall goal attainment (=2). Finally, although DG ECHO supported the initiative of the Madad Fund and the JHDF in 2015-2017, there was not a passage from cash assistance to longer-term programmes that would have guaranteed effective and permanent safety nets (=2). All these issues undermined the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects

in Lebanon, making it vary vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle, resulting in a low/medium effectiveness, rather than full achievement.

The chapter discussed the three hypotheses on the possible factors that induced a variation in the overall effectiveness of the projects.

The assessment of the first hypothesis on *EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO* highlighted how the alignment of EU Member States' preferences brought to the promotion of cash-based assistance projects and to the Madad Fund, which set the basis for the passage from humanitarian to development aid, although the actual implementation occurred after 2017. EU Member States' internal cohesiveness, thus, legitimised the work done by DG ECHO and translated into coordination in the field. This was particularly apparent in the relationship DG ECHO had with Germany, the main funder of the One Card pilot programme, the one that preceded LOUISE, and also with the UK's DFID. It was together with DFID that the DG promoted LOUISE, as they shared the same priorities and objectives. Thus, this first factor did set a positive framework to DG ECHO's projects. It also created the basis for the future nexus. We can say that it was partially relevant to a positive variation of the effectiveness, but it does not explain the issues undermining the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects in Lebanon.

The second hypothesis on *delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents* was relevant in explaining many of the problems with the humanitarian response effectiveness. DG ECHO delegated the implementation of LOUISE and other projects to its agents because of their high degree of *specialisation*. As in Myanmar, here too, DG ECHO chose agents who had established capacities on the ground. However, DG ECHO essentially took over the role of *manager of policy externalities*, which should have belonged to its agents, pushing them to find solutions and new modalities of delivering humanitarian aid through cash assistance. Indeed, this hypothesis took into account the P-A theory: the relationship between DG ECHO and its agents was hierarchical, based on accountability, for which DG ECHO granted a certain degree of discretion, but exerted control both directly and indirectly over its agents. LOUISE was delayed because of the tensions between the principal and the agents (i.e. UN agencies and NGOs), due to the fact that UN agencies were sceptical about the contracts to follow and over an independent monitoring and evaluation system. Tensions were manifest in the coordination difficulties, with agents not sharing appropriate information with the principal. All these aspects negatively affected the dimensions of effectiveness. Since a key aspect of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects' goal is the swiftness of delivery, these factors were the reasons for the delays that affected the goal attainment. The tensions and poor coordination also influenced

the seamlessness of the policy cycle (i.e. the information sharing was not consistent; roles and responsibilities not clear) and the needs assessment, through the VASyR, by creating gaps in the beneficiaries' targeting. Thus, they affected both the 'input' and the 'process' phases. The difficulties in coordination also led to an unforeseen side effect, that is the competition and overlapping of projects within the same sector, which further contributed to tensions between the principal and the agents. Finally, the funding of agents, which did not match their capacities, and the lack of scrupulous controls by the principal, led to failure to achieve the goals and made it difficult for both the principal and the agents to establish a seamlessness policy cycle. This factor, therefore, was determinant of the low/medium effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid projects. The delegation and coordination with agents who did not thoroughly follow the contract, did not have the established capacities on the ground, and were reluctant to establish other means of accountability to the principal affected three of the four dimensions of the effectiveness (i. e. goal attainment, needs assessment, the seamlessness of policy cycle). This, however, seemed to leave out the final dimension of our definition of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness: the nexus. In this case, the setback from humanitarian to development aid did not concern the relationship between principal and agents.

The third hypothesis shows how *national authorities' attitude* undermined effectiveness. It was relevant in explaining why the transition from humanitarian to development aid was not fully carried out in 2015-2017. The establishment of safety net programmes needed the approval of national and local authorities, but the national government did not allow for any solution that could be long-term. The government considered refugees as 'displaced' rather than actual 'refugees', and stressed that Lebanon was only a temporary shelter. This was reflected in the policies, such as the outlawing of refugee camps, the stopping of the registration of refugees, curfews, and restrictions on refugees' ability to obtain legal status. All these policies caused the LRRD/nexus not to be fully achieved in those years, and they also impacted goal attainment. Indeed, the heavy national bureaucracy did not allow for prompt aid delivery, jeopardising the objective's achievement. For instance, the project for establishing lavatories in the informal refugee settlement in the Bekaa Valley was severely delayed because the local authorities refused to grant authorisations.

Table 6.3 below summarises these findings. It highlights the factors that were most relevant in explaining the variation of EU humanitarian aid's effectiveness in Lebanon between 2015-2016. As discussed in section 6.1.2 above, the overall effectiveness is in between low and medium, meaning that not all the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle were met. The second and third hypotheses proved to be particularly relevant in this perspective.

Table 6.3 Relevance of the possible factors in explaining the variation of DG ECHO's projects effectiveness in Lebanon (2015-2017)

	Relevant	Partially Relevant	Not relevant
Hp 1 – EU internal cohesiveness and coordination on the ground		✓	
Hp 2 – Delegation and coordination with agents	✓		
Hp 3 – National authorities' attitude	✓		

Source: own elaboration

The needs assessment that left out beneficiaries, the delays, and the struggle to achieve the nexus were caused by the difficult coordination and the tensions between principal and agents, as well as the national government's attitude of refusing to guarantee safety nets in fear of prolonging what was supposed to be a temporary situation. The internal cohesiveness of EU Member States that translated into coordination between DG ECHO and States, such as Germany and the UK, further legitimised DG ECHO's cash-based assistance projects and guaranteed an initial set up of the nexus thanks to the establishment of the Madad Fund. Thus, it was only partially and positively relevant, but did not explain the issues undermining the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects at the time.

Chapter 7. Mozambique (2015-2017)

Introduction

This last empirical chapter focusses on Mozambique. Contrary to the previous two chapters, this case is representative of natural crises. Mozambique is a country that, due to climate change, has witnessed numerous hydrometeorological hazards, such as El Niño drought and Cyclone Dineo between 2015 and 2017. Millions of people were left in need of food and health assistance in a context of political tensions and fiscal scandals that caused Mozambique, which heavily relied on foreign aid and was once considered a 'donor darling', to lose its international credibility. DG ECHO had already been present in the country and the Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (SAIO) region for twenty years and was at the forefront of delivering humanitarian aid there through UN agencies and NGOs. However, similarly to Myanmar and Lebanon, despite its positive role, DG ECHO's effectiveness was affected by issues such as the discrepancy between people reached and those in need, some areas being left uncovered, and delays in the implementation of the projects.

   Why did the needs assessment leave some areas uncovered and why were there delays? Based on official documents and interviews with officials working in Mozambique at the time, the present chapter will attempt to answer these questions as follows: the first section and sub-sections concern the role of DG ECHO in Mozambique, highlighting both the positive achievements at the time and the issues that influenced the effectiveness of the humanitarian aid between 2015-2017. The second section is an assessment of the factors that could have influenced the variation in the effectiveness. Each hypothesis will be discussed on the basis of the theories discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the concluding remarks will stress what factors have been the most relevant in determining the variation.

7.1. DG ECHO in Mozambique: its role and its effectiveness

Mozambique is part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (SAIO)[76] region. It is one of the countries most prone to hydrometeorological hazards, affected by droughts and floods every two to three years. During 2015-2017, the country was hit by an especially devastating round of natural disasters: El Niño-induced droughts, floods, and Cyclone Dineo. The effects of these natural disasters were enormous. They swept away thousands of crops, leaving almost two million people food-

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[76] The SAIO region includes Angola, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe.

insecure and in need of clean water, sanitation, and hygiene (UNICEF, 2017; RIASCO, 2016: 13). On top of this, in precisely those years, the country went through one of its worst political and financial crises since the 1990s, making the whole context even more fragile (BTI, 2018).

Since 2008, DG ECHO has been involved in the SAIO region through its Disaster Preparedness-ECHO programme, known as DIPECHO. Created in 1996 and launched in the SAIO region in 2008, this programme aimed to build the local population's response capacity to enable them to face future disasters more effectively (DG ECHO, 2014: 6). In 2015, DIPECHO programmes merged into Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programmes, which became, along with food assistance projects, the main programmes that DG ECHO funded during 2015-2017. This section will discuss DG ECHO's role in Mozambique, what seemed to work well and what problems characterised its effectiveness.

7.1.1. *DG ECHO in Mozambique: priorities, objectives, agents and projects*

Over the last twenty years, DG ECHO has been very much involved in the SAIO region, and in Mozambique in particular. In the years under examination, DG ECHO's, and in general, the EU's actions in Mozambique were enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement until 2021.[77] In 2000, this agreement replaced the 1975 Lomé Convention, and was the overarching framework for the EU's relations with countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP). It was based on three pillars: development cooperation, economic and trade cooperation, and politics. In addition, the EU and Mozambique signed a National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2014-2020. This programme was aimed at strengthening their relationship and envisaged €734m investment in good governance and development, rural development, civil society and other support measures. Among the main expected results were improvement of food security and nutrition status, and enhancement of rural competitiveness. The programme mainly focussed on development aspects and did not explicitly allocate an emergency budget. As written in the document: "allocation for unforeseen needs is set at EUR 0 until needs rise" (EEAS, 2015: 16-18). However, when emergencies arose in the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, DG ECHO's funding in the SAIO region represented 31%, 21% and 16%, respectively, of the overall investment by international donors (including the USA) (Morinière et al., 2017: 27).

Figure 7.1 below shows how DG ECHO was among the main donors that financed humanitarian aid programmes along with the USA, Sweden, Germany, Denmark in 2015. In

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[77] Since January 2021, a new agreement for EU-ACP relations replaced the current one. It encompasses new priorities such as democracy and human rights, economic growth, dealing with climate change, peace and security, migration and mobility, and poverty eradication (See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cotonou-agreement/)

2016, DG ECHO was among the top donors with the USA, the UK, Denmark, Germany and Italy. As discussed in Chapter 4, Italy was also among the top donors in Mozambique in those years, with projects mainly devoted to ensuring peace (Marchetti, 2017) as part of its foreign policy and economic and political interests. We are not going to focus on this EU Member State throughout the chapter, but this again to highlight how the objectives behind humanitarian aid are not neutral and independent.

Figure 7.1 Largest donors overall to Mozambique (2015-2017) ($ million)

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/201520162017

The overall priority of DG ECHO in Mozambique was to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable people. Its objective was to prevent food insecurity, to improve early warning

systems, to strengthen the capacity of local communities to future shocks, and to improve WASH (DG ECHO, 2016c). To this end, DG ECHO mainly financed interventions aimed at tackling food insecurity through in-kind or cash-based interventions. Further, DG ECHO has been chiefly occupied with financing and implementing Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) programmes and has reportedly been the first humanitarian donor to fund preparedness and early recovery projects (Morinière et al., 2017: x; Interview #43). This meant adopting community-based approaches, supporting local actors, and identifying a set of measures to better respond to and cope with the immediate aftermath of a disaster. DG ECHO also financed food security and livelihood projects such as "the introduction of appropriate agricultural techniques, improved seeds and new varieties of crops, with the aim of boosting food and nutrition security" (Ibidem: 69). As for Myanmar, we have to acknowledge that the projects' objectives spelt out in the official documents are not as precise as they should be. Therefore, once again, the assessment of the effectiveness is more difficult to carry out.

In Mozambique, DG ECHO's main agents during 2015-2017 were UN agencies and NGOs. As shown in Table 7.2, the main UN agencies involved were WFP and UNICEF. Other UN agencies were FAO (6% in all three years), IOM (8% in 2015 and 1% in 2016), WHO (8% in 2015).

Table 7.2 Percentage (%) of the overall international and EU funding received by the main UN agencies

	2015	*2016*	*2017*
WFP	45%	80%	86%
UNICEF	33%	13%	6%

Source: Appendix 4. Mozambique

UNICEF mainly intervened with WASH programmes, and WFP with food assistance programmes. By relying on the government's needs assessments conducted through its Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) (RIASCO, 2016: 15), UNICEF mainly implemented WASH and health assistance projects by increasing health coverage and reaching remote communities, treating more than 30 000 malnourished children, and providing safe drinking water to more than 40 000 people in 2017 only (UNICEF, 2017b; UNICEF, 2016). UNICEF's response complemented both the government's response and was often executed in close collaboration with the other principal UN agency in the field: WFP. The

present chapter focusses on WFP, since it was the EU's main agent and the one that was given the most financing overall.

WFP mainly implemented food assistance projects focussing on food insecurity and malnutrition following the droughts using food or cash transfers. DG ECHO financed WFP's distribution of food assistance vouchers to people affected by the El Niño-induced droughts. Nutritional rehabilitation for children affected by the floods was also carried out, and the beneficiaries were supplied with monthly vouchers to access food. Other WFP programmes provided the population with seeds for agriculture, accompanied by specific agricultural techniques to enhance productivity. WFP was also the leading agent in providing emergency meals in the Gaza and Inhambane provinces, where the food insecurity level was alarmingly high and had resulted in a steep increase in the number of children dropping out of school. It also provided nutritional rehabilitation to more than 5 000 pregnant women, most of whom fully recovered (WFP, 2016b: 6). WFP implemented food assistance projects through vouchers both for general food distribution and for the "food assistance for assets"[78] following the government's priorities and strategies. In addition, WFP used DG ECHO funds to assist people affected by floods in the province of Zambezia: "the beneficiaries were supplied with monthly vouchers to get access to food during food fairs. They also got some seeds for agriculture and were provided with techniques on how to enhance horticulture productivity" (Molinière et al., 2017: 102).

NGOs also received funding from DG ECHO. Many NGOs operated in consortia, such as the Consorcio Humanitario de Mocambique (CHEMO), and COSACA, the largest, composed of Care International, Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and Oxfam. The latter four NGOs have been working together in Mozambique since 2007, coordinating emergency preparedness responses. COSACA's members each have an individual organisational presence in a number of Mozambican provinces such as Zambezia, Gaza, and Cabo Delgado. The consortium aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the response "through coordination and pooling of expertise, knowledge, and resources in terms of equipment, human capital, and information" (CARE, 2017:3). The programme, financed by DG ECHO with €1.6 million (APA, 2016), started in mid-2017 and lasted 18 months. It aimed to enable preparedness and emergency response actions by helping the local community interpret early warning signs of disasters. The project primarily focussed on the provinces of Gaza, Nampula and Inhambane and the result

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[78] Food assistance for assets is the set of cash, vouchers, food transfers. It is a specific WFP initiative. See https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000023752/download/

was "that 6 % (47 956) of the population of the target areas directly and 11% (125 442) indirectly reduced their vulnerability to shocks across the three provinces" (Ibidem: 2).

The ICRC and the Spanish and German Red Cross were also involved in Mozambique and, along with the Mozambique Red Cross (CVM), with the aid of DG ECHO funds, launched an operation to mobilise Red Cross personnel and provide relief supplies and specialised equipment. Results were mostly positive, mainly because the implementation was timely (IFRC, 2017).

As discussed, DG ECHO financed projects that aimed at distributing humanitarian aid through in-kind vouchers and cash. With a particular focus on the latter, DG ECHO, together with the UK's DFID, advocated for the shift to cash-based interventions, both in paper and electronically, even though the government preferred food in exchange for labour (Interviews #43; #44;#45; #50). The DG and DFID started to finance projects implemented by WFP, Red Cross and COSACA that had this modality of distribution (DFID, 2019). Since 2017, a Cash Working Group was established in order to harmonise and standardise the transfer methods. However, in the years under examination (2015-17), cash-based transfers were limited to only voucher interventions, since the government did not approve the use of multi-purpose cash transfers.

The main innovation that DG ECHO introduced and that characterised its humanitarian aid projects in Mozambique was the so-called "crisis-modifiers". This is a provision included in the agreement that DG ECHO establishes with its agents, which allows the agent to quickly move funds and change aspects of the operations to adapt to shifting needs. Crisis modifiers proved to be useful, especially since Mozambique is particularly exposed to sudden hazards (Interviews #43; #44; #50). For instance, in 2017, following Cyclone Dineo, DG ECHO and its agents used crisis modifiers to shift the initial DRR needs to others, including WASH (Morinière et al., 2017: 16).

Finally, concerning the LRRD/nexus, it is important to notice that one of the official priorities of DG ECHO was indeed to "seek durable solutions" and to "collaborate with development partners on the ground", thus aiming to combine development and humanitarian perspectives (DG ECHO, 2016: 8). Since the beginning, humanitarian aid projects contemplated a longer time horizon (Interview #43; #44; #49). DG ECHO's goal was to push its DRR actions to develop, from the start, direct links with medium/long term development plans, both at the local and national level, to ensure continuity between the two policies. Most importantly, there was a close collaboration, as will be discussed below, between DG ECHO and development actors,

especially in terms of funding with DG DEVCO. For these reasons, as summarised in Table 7.3 below, this sub-dimension is considered to be effective.

7.1.2. DG ECHO's funded projects: analysis of their effectiveness

The scenario in Mozambique was less complex than those in Myanmar and Lebanon, where there were protracted, human-made humanitarian crises. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is consistent with the idea to choose three case studies corresponding to three types of crisis. The idea is to be able to assess the validity of the hypotheses considering different types of scenarios, which may produce different variations in the effectiveness. Delivering effective humanitarian aid in a context of natural crises such as the one of Mozambique is, expectedly, less complex and politicised than if it were to be delivered in context of wars, since often, for instance, national governments are the source of the crisis. In addition, contrary to Myanmar and Lebanon characterised by complex and human-made crises, Mozambique was, instead, characterised by temporary emergencies. This means that most of the projects were framed within long-term strategies, and DG ECHO mainly intervened with ad-hoc interventions and reacted through rapid response mechanisms. Overall, the projects seemed to work well. However, considering our definition of effectiveness, DG ECHO's funded projects cannot be considered fully effective (i.e. =12). Similarly to Myanmar and Lebanon, the main issues influencing humanitarian aid projects concerned the needs assessment and the slowness of the implementation of the projects. These issues affected the main dimension of effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) and the other sub-dimensions, resulting in medium effectiveness.

The period 2015-2017 was characterised by a steady increase of people in need and difficulties in the needs assessment. As reported by the SADC, the total number of food insecure people had increased from 30 million in 2015/2016 to 40 million in 2016/2017, which is an increase of 31% (DG ECHO, 2017b: 4; SADC, 2016). However, most importantly, official documents show a profound gap between the people in need and those reached. In 2016, for instance, of the more than 1 million people requiring food assistance, only about 300 000 received it (RIASCO, 2016: 14). Again in 2017, following Cyclone Dineo, more than 1 million people in need of food assistance were targeted, but only 672 000 were actually reached (RIASCO, 2017: 10). We can see here that although some improvement took place, the situation did not change significantly during 2015-2017. In addition, the overall needs assessment was fragmented (Interview #52), and particularly in northern provinces, many areas were not included. However, a re-assessment of the needs in those years improved the situation, and attempted to rectify these shortcomings (Interview #43).

Another issue influencing the effectiveness of DG ECHO's projects was a delay in their implementation (Interviews #43; #44). Projects that were supposed to be carried out within few weeks took longer, sometimes even more than a year – for instance, the construction of warehouses for farmers (Interview #49). Delays in the implementation of the projects influenced the sub-dimensions of effectiveness and, eventually, the overall goal attainment, which includes timely delivery.

The passage from humanitarian to development aid was positive. It is essential to highlight here that livelihood and nutrition projects, in particular, were not promptly picked up by development actors (Interview #43; #44). In addition, a multi-annual strategy applied to the region for medium-longer term projects was not long enough, as emergencies frequently occurred (Interview #52). Despite this, the LRRD/Nexus was present.

These issues have influenced effectiveness, bringing it to its variation vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. The degrees of each dimension of effectiveness are summarised in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3. Degrees of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness in Mozambique (2015-2017)

Goal Attainment	2	Medium effectiveness
Needs Assessment	1/2	In between low and medium effectiveness
Seamlessness of the policy cycle	1/2	In between low and medium effectiveness
LRRD/Nexus	3	Effectiveness
Tot effectiveness	7/9	Medium effectiveness

Source: Own elaboration (See Chapter 2)

As discussed above, a needs assessment was conducted, but there was a discrepancy between those in need and those reached. In addition, northern provinces were left uncovered. However, a re-assessment in those years allowed an improvement. This is why the score in its effectiveness is in-between 1 and 2, resulting in low/medium effectiveness. It also influenced

the main dimension of goal attainment, since not all the beneficiaries were reached. Delays characterised the implementation of the projects, thus, jeopardising full goal attainment since timely delivery is part of the goal attainment itself. This influenced the main dimension of goal-attainment and the seamlessness of the policy cycle. Slowness in implementing the project meant that some were implemented after months, and one project after one year. However, the accountability relationship between the principal and the agent was present (Interview #43; #44; #45; #46; #52). Therefore, this sub-dimension does not fall into the degree of 'low effectiveness' – it falls between low effectiveness (because of major delays) and medium effectiveness, because the principal-agent accountability was always present, and overlaps, although to some extent present, were limited (#49). Therefore, it is in-between 1 and 2. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, the LRRD/nexus dimension can be considered as effective (=3), because the humanitarian aid projects were shaped with the idea of a passage to longer-term development aid, and a budget for development aid was present. All the sub-dimensions influenced the main dimension of goal attainment. The majority of the pre-established objectives were achieved, although not all, as discussed. In conclusion, DG ECHO's effectiveness on the whole was medium.

Why did the needs assessment leave some areas uncovered? Why were there some delays? The next section will assess the factors that could have influenced DG ECHO's effectiveness.

7.2. Why did DG ECHO's effectiveness vary? Assessment of the hypotheses on the factors influencing DG ECHO's effectiveness in Mozambique (2015-2017)

Building on the theories discussed in Chapter 2, the following section intends to explain what caused the variation in DG ECHO's projects effectiveness by assessing three hypothesised factors. Each hypothesis will be assessed considering our definition of effectiveness, thus it will look at goal attainment, needs assessment, the seamlessness of the policy cycle, LRRD/nexus and their degrees.

Hypothesis 1. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO

> *The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO in the field explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

In the case of Mozambique, internal cohesiveness of the EU Member States can be detected in a few circumstances. Those include the approval of the World Wide Decision budget, the discretion given to DG ECHO to adopt ad hoc decisions for emergencies, the agreement signed with the Mozambican Government, and the National Indicative Programme (NIP). Internal cohesiveness – that is, the alignment of preferences among EU Member States – is related to the coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. All this influenced the effectiveness of the programmes.

We have seen in Chapter 4 that the only phase where the EU Member States can have their say in EU humanitarian aid is precisely during the budget approval (i.e., World Wide Decision). In the years under examination, EU Member States approved a certain amount for humanitarian aid that, as shown above, decreased throughout the years and was devoted to an entire region, the SAIO, which included not only Mozambique, but ten other countries, including Madagascar, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.

Officials felt that the lack of sufficient funding has been one of the limitations to DG ECHO's humanitarian aid and another cause for effectiveness to vary (Interviews #43, #44, #47, #48, #50, #52, #53, #54, #55). There was a wide gap between the funding required and the funding received. For instance, in 2016, the funding required determined by OCHA for Mozambique was around $204 million, while the funding received amounted to $78 million, thus leaving a gap of 62% (RIASCO, 2016: 7). The following year, the funding gap rose to 85% (DG ECHO, 2017: 4). For all three years, the lack of sufficient humanitarian aid funding affected the implementation of projects. Indeed, it limited the scope of the projects in terms of the number of people reached, and in terms of duration. With more funding, the projects could have lasted longer, considering that in that period, natural crises were re-occurring (Interview #43, #44, #45). Therefore, the assessment of the goal attainment is 2. As discussed in Chapter 3 (e.g., see Table 3.2) and 4, in those years, the EU Member States had other priorities due to other major crises were going on around the world, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, Rohingya crisis, and the crisis in Sudan. The EU devoted most of its humanitarian aid budget to these crises (Interview #43, #44, #51).

Although the EU Member States were cohesive in deciding to limit the budget devoted to the SAIO region because of other priorities, their preferences were also aligned in leaving room for manoeuvre to the DG. The latter approved a number of ad hoc decisions, the most substantial being in 2015 (€52 million) that allowed DG ECHO to top up, adding more funds than the ones initially assigned to the SAIO area, including Mozambique (European Commission, 2015). Moreover, the EU signed the agreement with the Mozambican government, the National

Indicative Programme (NIP), mentioned above, which contains the guidelines for EU's development and emergency response. This was significant because it meant that DG ECHO could apply ad hoc decisions when an emergency struck. Finally, thanks to the delegation received by the EU Member States, DG ECHO was able to establish and use the crisis modifiers.

EU Member States' internal cohesiveness in the budget approval and in granting wide room for manoeuvre to DG ECHO translated into coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO in the field, in particular with the UK. In fact, both the DG and the UK's DFID had common priorities, supporting projects implemented by COSACA and CHEMO, aimed to create an environment for cash-based assistance through advocacy and capacity building (Interviews #41, #45, #50). There seemed to be neither competition nor conflicts between the UK and DG ECHO in the field, but rather coordination and complementarity. For instance, DG ECHO and DFID attended the same coordination meetings. At the time, the sharing of information gradually turned from being informal into more formal and structured meetings. At the beginning of this process, apparently DFID took the lead, being the first to push for cash-based assistance interventions when DG ECHO was still sceptical about it. The two worked in synergy, pushing for cash-based interventions in line with the Grand Bargain (See Chapter 4), despite the government's hostility towards this type of aid (Interview #43, #44). As we have seen, this happened in Lebanon as well, where cash-based assistance was also implemented following the objectives established following the Grand Bargain. However, if in Lebanon suitable infrastructures and banking system existed, the same cannot be said for Mozambique, where NGOs felt that cash-based assistance was not the right method of delivering aid and that DG ECHO and the other donors supporting this type of aid should have been more aware of this (Interview #50).

In addition, following the El Niño-induced droughts, DG ECHO complemented DFID's funds, especially for emergency assistance projects implemented by COSACA in the north of the country, where government figures underreported malnutrition. Thus, the projects reduced the vulnerability of 17% of the population in the target areas (Morinière et al., 2017: 15). This is also why the goal attainment score is 2. In fact, despite the issues influencing the effectiveness, the majority of the pre-established objectives were achieved, thanks to this joint effort. Although here we are only focussing on the UK, since it had the most significant role among EU Member States vis-à-vis DG ECHO, it is important to highlight that another EU Member State, Germany, was also very much involved in Mozambique. In 2017 only, for instance, it gave €2.6 million to WFP to improve food security and strengthen the population's

resilience. The basic food and nutrition needs of 85 000 people were met, along with 30 000 students, to encourage children to return to and stay in school (WFP, 2017c).

The internal cohesiveness of EU Member States translated into coordination in the field, and was related to the bureaucratic unity shown by the coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. On several occasions, DG DEVCO offered additional funding to DG ECHO to finance emergency projects. More precisely, DG DEVCO gave DG ECHO €13m to fund projects implemented by WFP that dealt with the consequences of the El Niño drought. The bureaucratic unity turned into a synergy between the two DGs, which was evident when DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes turned into development and resilience programmes implemented by NGOs in the coastal city of Chinde (Morinière et al., 2017: 25-34). Finally, the €52m mentioned above were in part coming from the European Development Fund, which constitutes part of DG DEVCO's finances (Interview #43, #44). In this sense, DG DEVCO was also very proactive in coordinating with DG ECHO. This is one of the reasons why the sub-dimension of LRRD/nexus is considered at a score of 'effective', equal to 3.

In conclusion, the internal cohesiveness of the EU Member States was manifest during the approval of the budget, which influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes. The fact that the Member States had other priorities in the years 2015-2017 led to a smaller budget devoted to the SAIO region and, in particular, to Mozambique. This negatively influenced the humanitarian aid projects and partly explains why not all pre-established objectives could be reached (i.e., goal attainment =2). Indeed, they would have needed more time and more funding to reach an increasing number of people due to re-occurring natural hazards. Despite this, EU Member States all agreed to grant DG ECHO adequate room for manoeuvre, and this enabled it to approve ad hoc decisions, resulting in more funding being added to the initial budget. In addition, DG ECHO was autonomous in establishing crisis modifiers, which helped to quickly move money to fund humanitarian aid projects implemented by, mostly, WFP and COSACA. Finally, the EU established an agreement with the Mozambican government defining long-term objectives and foreseeing potential funds for potential emergencies. In addition, DG ECHO coordinated in the field with UK's DFID, the (then) EU Member State mostly involved in the country. They coordinated in the field and worked together to advocate for cash-based assistance projects vis-à-vis a national government reluctant to allow this type of assistance. In terms of bureaucratic unity, the coordination and the support given by DG DEVCO to DG ECHO enhanced the possibility of reaching pre-established objectives (=2) thanks to the funds given by the development DG, enabling DG ECHO to implement projects following the El Niño drought. In addition, it allowed for better

communication and sharing of information about projects that turned from humanitarian aid focussed into development focussed ones with longer-term objectives. This explains why the LRRD/nexus sub-dimension is considered as being 'effective' and equal 3.

Hypothesis 2. Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents

> *DG ECHO's delegation and coordination with the agent (e. g. UN agency, NGO), which has established capacities on the ground and is accountable to the principal, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between DG ECHO and its agents is that of Principal-Agent. As we know, this means a hierarchical relationship based on a contract with room for manoeuvre for the agent who must be accountable to the principal. The way the relationship was structured in Mozambique empirically is consistent with what has been theorised.

  As shown above, DG ECHO's main agents were WFP (especially for food assistance) and NGO consortia, such as COSACA. Based on contracts and single forms, and following the standard selection process conducted in synergy by the HQ in Brussels and the Country Office (see Chapter 4), DG ECHO delegated the implementation of the projects to agents that had established capacities on the ground and were in touch with the government (Interviews #46, #49, #52). The main reasons for delegation were specialisation, credibility and management of policy externalities. *Specialisation* could be possible because WFP and international and local NGOs had been in the country for several years through established offices. They directly interacted with the beneficiaries by visiting them and having access to the difficult areas where humanitarian aid was delivered. They were also aware of the field dynamics and could be in touch with the people in need, as well with the government. This was important for DG ECHO because it lent greater *credibility* to the projects in the eyes of the beneficiaries and of the government, which, as we will see shortly, was quite hostile to certain modalities of humanitarian aid. Agents also helped DG ECHO to *manage policy externalities*. In fact, being in touch directly with the beneficiaries and the government, agents were able to detect rising issues and inform DG ECHO about them. This was the purpose of the crisis modifiers discussed above. Crisis modifiers granted room for manoeuvre to the agents, allowing them to quickly adapt their projects to the shifting needs by asking for extra funds without going through long

bureaucratic processes. This has helped speed up implementation. A WhatsApp message sent by an agent to DG ECHO's Technical Assistant asking for more funding was basically all that was needed (#50). Crisis modifiers were agreements specifically created and supported by DG ECHO, and their use partly explains why the seamlessness of the policy cycle was close to 'medium effectiveness'.

The relationship between principal and agents was hierarchical because it also implied control and monitoring. As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, DG ECHO has always been a present donor and, as all principals, exercised a form of control over its agents through constant monitoring throughout the process. Agents were supposed to send reports both during the project and in their final stages. DG ECHO checked on its agents directly through its Technical Assistants, who would visit the projects and carry out field assessments. Agents found DG ECHO to be particularly demanding in its requests for reporting (Interview #46). However, contrary to the other two case studies analysed in the thesis, in Mozambique, the relationship between principal and agent, although formally hierarchical, was perceived as equal (Interviews #43, #44). The DG considered agents to be the 'leaders', in the sense that it was up to them to decide what projects to implement and how: they were granted ample room for manoeuvre.

DG ECHO relied on its agents to implement the projects, beginning with the needs assessment in the 'input' phase. When conducting the needs assessment, DG ECHO's agents (i.e., WFP, COSACA) mainly relied on the SETSAN reporting – that is, the needs assessment done by the government. However, when WFP presented a proposal based on this data, DG ECHO rejected it, because the data of the number of people affected by El Niño did not seem to correspond to reality (Morinière et al., 2017: 102). The SETSAN had reportedly weak technical capacities (Interview #49). In its report on needs assessment, many areas of the country were not included, providing only macro-level data. In addition, malnutrition data was delayed and underrepresented, as accurate data from the northern provinces was not included in the assessment (Interviews #45; #50). The agents noticed these issues themselves, who also warned DG ECHO about the poor quality of the needs assessment (Interview #43, #44).

Thus, WFP complemented it with its own assessment. In 2016, it introduced a series of innovations involving the local population. First, to better understand the consequences of the drought, they piloted a remote phone-based data collection system for real-time food security and market price monitoring. Second, they established a formal beneficiary feedback mechanism using a mobile phone platform, which helped catch potential issues with the implementation of the projects (e.g., food quality) in a timely manner. Third, they conducted mobile phone surveys to collect weekly price data and information on general food availability

(WFP, 2016b: 11). NGOs such as Oxfam and Concern Worldwide also conducted their own assessment rather than relying on that of the government (Interview #50). This is why the needs assessment sub-dimension is considered in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). What made it closer to medium effectiveness was precisely that the agents realised on their own that the needs assessment by the government presented some issues (see Hp3) and the rejection by DG ECHO pushed them to complement their assessment.

The delegation by DG ECHO implied, of course, a relationship with the agents throughout the policy cycle, the seamlessness of which is one of the sub-dimensions of effectiveness and concerns the 'process' (See Chapter 2). As discussed in Chapter 4, DG ECHO was present in the field through its Country Office, and the sharing of information about the implementation of the projects happened both in person and through emails (Interview #45, #49, #50). This was important as a way for DG ECHO to check on the work of its agents. The use of crisis modifiers and the fact that the agents could have easily gained access to funding to address shifting need shows the positive coordination between DG ECHO and its agents, bringing positive results. The DG strongly supported crisis modifiers, and agents were at first (before 2015) hesitant in using them (Interview #43, #44). Although they sped up the processes of the extra funding request and made the projects more flexible, DG ECHO's bureaucracy was still considered a burden by the agents because it was very demanding, especially in times of emergencies. Indeed, as we have discussed (see Chapter 4), DG ECHO requires its agents to deliver specific and frequent reports, informing it of the implementation of the projects. Similarly to Myanmar, although understanding it and abiding by it, agents felt that this *modus operandi* slowed down the process, since they had to spend time over the drafting of the reports instead of spending it over the implementation itself that needed to be quick due to the emergency (Interview #15, #49).

However, coordination among principal and agents and among agents themselves was not always straightforward. There were many agents in the field. There were general coordination mechanisms that helped to avoid overlaps, such as the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which included UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and Red Cross and donors' representatives.[79] In addition, agents had coordination meetings once a month and had recurrent exchanges (Interview #49). Despite this, information sharing did not always happen in a concerted way, and information would not be shared as regularly as it should have been

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[79] See UNOCHA https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/mozambique/card/6OSgJ47m4d/

(Interview #52). Similarly to Lebanon, agents were also competing with each other to secure funds, creating a more difficult context (Interview #49).

Thus, the central issue was not really in the coordination between DG ECHO and its agents, but among the agents themselves, and this indirectly influenced DG ECHO's effectiveness. As we know from the Principal-Agent chain shown in Chapter 2, DG ECHO's agents can turn into principals by delegating part of the implementation of the projects to local agents. This happened regularly in Mozambique. We have to look at this type of relationship to find the reason for delays that caused this sub-dimension of seamlessness of the policy cycle to be between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). Local agents had access to areas that were difficult to reach, especially when hydrometeorological hazards caused roads to be severely disrupted, thus isolating entire areas. However, they also did not always have adequate capacities. The construction of warehouses by WFP's local agents took over a year longer to complete, because it was difficult to find local companies with material capacities to build them. Trucks used for transporting food were very old and the equipment outdated (Interview #52). In addition, the great inflation happening in that period, as will be discussed further below, boosted the prices, causing local agents to not find the right materials for a good price/quality, and slowed down the entire process (Interview #49).

The cause of slowness was not, however, only imputable to local NGOs. WFP had its own responsibilities that had repercussions on the entire process. For instance, the internal WFP procedures for finances and payments were very slow due to the amount of required paperwork, and this caused local and international NGOs to slow down and occasionally to halt the implementation of projects, for fear they would not receive funding on time. WFP also required NGOs to send periodical reports that could not be scanned but had to be handed in physically, on paper. In a context of emergency and in a big country where communication and transport were not easy, this slowed down the entire process. In addition, it would happen that the documents stayed in the office's reception for days without officials knowing it. This meant that funds were not spent on time. This was also a consequence of a 'silo-approach' to coordination, meaning there was no adequate communication between WFP and its agents (Interview #45, #51). Finally, similarly to Myanmar and Lebanon, the turnover was also very high, thus creating disruption in the management of the projects (Interview #51, #52).

There was also the lack of sufficient scrutiny by the donors, in particular the DG. Indeed, the real difference between NGOs and UN agencies such as WFP is that the former were much more scrutinised and controlled by DG ECHO (and, in general, the other donors) and received overall less funding, while the latter often did not follow up, without any consequences. Food

aid was left in trucks with the local community leaders, and WFP did not check whether that food had been distributed. DG ECHO itself did not conduct further scrutiny. In addition, UN agencies' and NGOs' projects happened to overlap to some extent, despite the regular coordination meetings (Interview #45, #49). This, again, further explains why the sub-dimension of effectiveness, i.e., the seamlessness of the policy cycle, was in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). Despite its presence on the ground, DG ECHO could have been 'stricter' with WFP in terms of controlling its work. DG ECHO's Country Office was based in Maputo, and there were no other offices in the country, especially in the provinces. This might help explain why the scrutiny by DG ECHO did not achieve as high a standard as it should have (Interview #52). Also, similarly to Lebanon, DG ECHO strategically considered UN agencies as its primary agent over NGOs following the political priorities spelt out in the EU Global Strategy (2016: 15), among which a rule-based global order with the UN at its core.

While coordination presented challenges that caused slowness and delays, resulting in a low/medium seamlessness of policy cycle, this cannot be said about the LRRD/nexus. In this case, the role of the agents and the coordination with them proved to be significant, enabling the passage from humanitarian to development aid. As we discussed above, projects already included longer-term objectives (Interview #51). In the years 2015-2017, in coordination with WFP, DG ECHO was able to re-direct funding from humanitarian to development aid. This was also possible thanks to WFP and its capacity to modify its programmes, adapting it to development needs (Interview #43, #44). This is why the sub-dimension of the LRRD/nexus was 'effective' (= 3). Furthermore, between 2013 and 2019, WFP, together with IFAD and FAO, implemented longer-term projects financed by the EU to reduce hunger and chronic malnutrition (WFP, 2020). This built up the basis for other LRRD/nexus projects, and the results can be observed even recently, when in 2020, through DG ECHO and DEVCO, the EU financed a €3m project for climate resilience and food security in Mozambique, implemented by WFP and FAO.[80]

In conclusion, the delegation and coordination between principal and agents, as well as their capacities and their accountability, were all aspects that characterised the input, process and output, and influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes, in all its dimensions: goal attainment, needs assessment, the seamlessness of the policy cycle and nexus. DG ECHO delegated the needs assessment to its agents, which first relied on the government's SETSAN targeting. However, both DG ECHO and the agents themselves

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[80] See https://www.wfp.org/news/european-union-funds-climate-resilience-and-food-security-gaza-and-tete-provinces-eu3-million

realised that it was poorly conducted and complemented it with their own needs assessments, making it more thorough. Therefore, the needs assessment was in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). The agents in this sense played a major role and contributed to improving the needs assessment, helping to elevate it to medium effectiveness.

The coordination between DG ECHO and its agents and among agents themselves had repercussions on the effectiveness, explaining some of the delays in the projects' implementation. Despite coordination meetings and information sharing, the latter did not always happen in a concerted way, and information would not always be shared as regularly as it should have been. In addition, local NGOs did not always have the adequate capacities to carry out the projects, further delaying their delivery. However, local NGOs were not the only ones responsible for this. WFP's internal procedures for finances and payments were very slow, causing local agents implementing WFP's projects to halt their process. This was also due to a lack of coordination and communication between WFP and its agents. This caused both the seamlessness of the policy cycle to be between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2) and goal attainment to be considered medium effective (=2), since delays are part of the goal attainment itself. Although it was a present donor that acted as 'police-patrol' to the point where its procedures were considered burdensome by its agents, DG ECHO did not scrutinise UN agencies enough, leaving uncertainties as to whether beneficiaries were actually reached with food assistance. This, once again, justifies why the goal attainment dimension was considered to be of medium effectiveness (=2).

Finally, the coordination and delegation to the agents has proved to be positively fundamental in terms of LRRD/nexus. Thanks to its agents, DG ECHO was able to re-direct funding to development objectives and, in general, projects were shaped with longer-term objectives in mind, guaranteeing a passage to development aid at the end of humanitarian aid projects. Therefore, the sub-dimension concerning the LRRD/nexus was equal to 3 and was considered as being 'effective'.

Hypothesis 3. National authorities' attitude

> *The national governments and local authorities' attitude, whether interfering or facilitating the implementation of humanitarian aid projects, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

Contrary to Myanmar and Lebanon, the Mozambique case is less complex, since the crises were natural and did not involve war nor refugee crisis. One might assume that this last hypothesis would be irrelevant in the variation of effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes. However, empirical findings suggest the opposite.

To better understand the relevance of this factor, it is useful to give a brief overview of the institutional context of those years. In 2015-2017, Mozambique began to face one of the most severe political and fiscal crises since the end of its civil war (1977-1992). Until then, the country, in which more than 50% of the population is below the absolute poverty level (RIASCO, 2017:112), had enjoyed the confidence of the international donor community, economic growth of 7% and the discovery of copious natural resource reserves (BTI, 2018: 3).

In the period 2015-2017, recurring political conflicts between the ruling party, FRELIMO, and its opponent, RENAMO,[81] led to an increase in human rights violations, as well as the migration of refugees towards neighbouring countries. The acts of violence, including the burning of towns and villages, rape, and murder, were attributed exclusively to government forces (Ibidem: 35). The political crisis of those years was accompanied and exacerbated by a fiscal scandal that erupted in 2016 and led to, among other consequences, the withdrawal of the World Bank and IMF foreign aid, on which Mozambique had very much depended. The scandal began in 2013 when the country's government borrowed $2bn to set up "three state-backed tuna fishing companies with loans arranged by Credit Suisse and a Russian investment bank" (Ballard, 2018). The government's request was kept hidden, without the scrutiny of the parliament, making it illegal. In 2016, the discovery of the undisclosed government loan and the government's declaration of the unsustainability of the debt, as well as all the subsequent investigations on how the money had been illegally used, plunged the country into the most severe economic crisis since the civil war. The government's introduction of an austerity budget caused economic and social development to decrease, leading Mozambique to rank among the worst-performing countries in the 2017 Human Development Index: 180 out of 187.[82] In 2014, Mozambique had ranked 178th (DG ECHO, 2016c).

This context highlights some characteristics of the government, namely the high level of corruption (see, e.g., IMF, 2019; CMI, 2016), which had indirect repercussions on the

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[81] RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) is the main opposition party to FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique). In 2015-2017, RENAMO continued to reject the results of the 2014 general elections that saw FRELIMO victorious. RENAMO maintains a paramilitary force in order to have leverage and bargaining power. The government "initiated attacks on RENAMO convoys to ensure security, which resulted in the assassination of RENAMO party figures. The state's widespread violence in RENAMO-influenced regions has increased tensions and further jeopardised peace talks" (BTI, 2018: 4).

[82] Human Development Index – Mozambique. Available at https://countryeconomy.com/hdi/mozambique.

effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes. Despite this, it must be stated that the government was very participative in the aftermath of the El Niño droughts and Cyclone Dineo. It declared a Red Alert in 2016 to mobilise resources following the release of the report by the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) that represented a needs assessment that was then given to NGOs and UN agencies. The government also led the coordination of the responses to the drought through the MFA's National Disaster Management Institute (INGC)[83] (SADC, 2016: 54). In general, Mozambique's government had established numerous policies, instruments, and planned strategies to respond to humanitarian and development needs.[84] For instance, in order to tackle undernutrition, the government adopted three strategies since 1998: the Food and Nutrition Security Strategy (ESAN I), followed by the ESAN-II (2008-2015) and later by the ESAN-III (2018-2025). These strategies aim to tackle food insecurity and strengthen governance structures and coordination mechanisms for nutrition and food security (Nutrition International, 2018). In addition, the National Multi-Sectorial Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition, 2011-2020 (PAMRDC) and the Food Fortification Strategy (2016-2021) are both policies led by the government in response to chronic undernutrition, especially among children. To address the needs of the most vulnerable, the government also established the National Strategy for Basic Social Protection (NSBSP) for 2016-2024. These strategies guide the interventions of all social protection partners (WFPb, 2016: 4).

   If, on the one hand, the government's proactive intervention was an advantage, on the other, it was the cause for the effectiveness to vary. Indeed, although the government seemed to be well-disposed towards humanitarian aid programmes, this was not always entirely the case (Interviews #49). As we have already discussed on numerous occasions in this chapter, the needs assessment on which the agents first based their needs assessment was conducted by the government, the SETSAN. This targeting presented several problems: it left out entire areas and was not as accurate as it should have been. The SETSAN had very weak technical capacities, especially in the beginning. It also provided statistics at the macro-level, without being specific to the different beneficiaries and the different areas (Interview #49). In addition,

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[83] The institution, created in 1999, manages the day to day disasters, and it is under the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. See http://www.ingc.gov.mz/

[84] General strategic efforts included "*The revised 'Agenda 2025'*, which takes into account the rapidly changing development context of Mozambique (e.g. extractives); *the National Development Strategy 2015-2035* (Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento – ENDE) with a more explicit and relevant objective of economic transformation and diversification of the production base; *the Five-Year Government Plan 2015-2019 (Programa Quinquenal do Governo, PQG),* which identifies nutrition as one of the key elements to improve living conditions of Mozambicans. The PQG includes systematic indicators for the various priority areas identified with targets to 2019, including indicators related to malnutrition". (European Commission, 2016).

the needs assessment was highly fragmented because it was conducted at different governmental levels, and among these levels, there was a lack of coordination and lack of local capacities (Interview #52). One potential reason for why entire areas were left without coverage is the degree of corruption. This context provided at the beginning of the chapter is useful for understanding that the lists of beneficiaries were based on their political affiliation. Those areas that did not support the ruling party were left without coverage, and this was reflected in the SETSAN. The government underreported entire areas, especially those in the north of the country (Interview #55; Morinière et al., 2017: 15). This is why the needs assessment sub-dimension was in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2), and, as we have seen above, it was thanks to the agents and DG ECHO's initiative that the targeting was improved.

Corruption did not only influence the needs assessment, but also influenced the lack of 'operational space', that is, the possibility for UN agencies, but especially NGOs, to have access to certain geographic areas. Whereas UN officials had diplomatic status and did not encounter any particular problem in obtaining travel and visa permissions, the same cannot be said for NGO officials. International NGO officials had to wait for weeks, even months, to start their projects because the government did not grant them visa and travel access. As in Myanmar, the government, despite at first mobilising foreign resources, did not want foreigners to see what was happening in the country, especially following the previously mentioned political scandal (Interview #52). This explains why there were delays in the seamlessness of the policy cycle (=1/2) that also influenced the goal attainment itself (=2).

In terms of coordination, we have already mentioned that the lack of coordination between different levels of government brought a fragmented needs assessment. The lack of sharing of information, especially between the central government and the provinces, also brought a general slowness in the implementation of the projects, since agents lacked useful guidelines (Interview #52, #55). In addition, the government started to practice a re-settlement policy that made the implementation of the projects even slower and more difficult. Re-settlement meant that the government would make the people affected by the natural hazards move to other areas of the country. Most of the population consists of farmers, so if they had to move, they needed land, which the government guaranteed them. However, the areas where the re-settlements took place were often very remote, making the implementation of the projects for NGOs even more difficult as the roads were almost inaccessible (Interview #52). This is connected to the general lack of infrastructures that further complicated delivery of the projects and contributed to the general slowness of the government's administration (Interview #47, #48, #55). This is another

reason explaining the delays in the implementation of the projects, which resulted in 'medium effective' (=2) goal attainment.

Another issue that influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes was the government's hostility towards cash-based assistance. As we have seen above, DG ECHO and DFID were the main advocates for this type of projects. However, cash-based transfers were limited only to voucher interventions during 2015-2017, since the government did not approve multi-purpose cash transfers. The government was opposed to this because it preferred giving food to the beneficiaries in exchange for their labour (Morinière et al., 2017: 102). In addition, cash-based assistance did not allow the government to have power over the cash flow directly, so it did not allow it to keep the cash or re-direct it elsewhere (Interview #55). Only after 2017, after years of negotiation, did the government start to soften its position, and cash working groups started to be created (Interview #43, #44, #46). The government's hostility complicated the seamlessness of the policy cycle as agents needed to abide by the national rules and could not ease the process. Cash-based assistance, in fact, requires less effort than other modalities of humanitarian aid (Interview #50).

Despite influencing almost all aspects of effectiveness, the government's attitude did not significantly influence the LRRD/nexus. The reason is that the government itself, with all its flaws, tried to implement longer-term projects, and there was more attention to that than to humanitarian aid, as evidenced by the series of policies and strategies oriented towards longer-term objectives.

In conclusion, the government's attitude influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes in a number of ways. Regarding the needs assessment, the SETSAN report on which agents based at first their needs assessment presented major flaws, namely not including certain areas of the country. One of the reasons was the lack of technical capabilities and high levels of corruption, which saw the government adapting the list of beneficiaries to exclude people who were not of the same political affiliation. Second, the lack of communication and coordination between the central and local authorities slowed down the agents' implementation. In addition, the hostility of the government, especially towards NGOs, was obvious when visas and access to certain territories were not granted for months at a time. Poor infrastructure further complicated the implementation of the projects. The re-settlement policy of the government moved people affected by the crises to remote areas that agents could not easily access. Third, the government was hostile to cash-based assistance programmes, especially in the years under examination, and negotiations for this further slowed down the implementation of projects, thus influencing the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid

projects. All these influenced the goal attainment, the needs assessment and the seamlessness of the policy cycle. The one aspect of the effectiveness that was not influenced by it was the LRRD/nexus, since the government itself was, in general, interested in longer-term projects.

Conclusion

Primarily due to climate change, Mozambique is one of the countries most prone to hydrometeorological hazards. Against the backdrop of a deep financial and political crisis, significant natural crises hit the country between 2015 and 2017: El Niño-induced droughts and floods, and Cyclone Dineo. With thousands affected by the disasters and facing food insecurity, the Mozambican government urgently asked for international interventions and resources to respond with food assistance, WASH and disaster-risk and resilience (DRR) programmes.

Having been actively present in the country for almost twenty years, DG ECHO was among the leading donors in the SAIO region in general, and in Mozambique in particular. The main objective of DG ECHO was to alleviate suffering and prepare the population for similar hazards in the future through DIPECHO, food assistance, and DRR programmes. Despite these efforts, some issues still influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes. In particular, there was a discrepancy between the people in need and those reached, the overall needs assessment was fragmented, and many areas were not included. Therefore, the needs assessment was considered to be in-between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). In addition, the implementation of the projects was often delayed, affecting the overall goal attainment and seamlessness of the policy cycle, respectively, resulting in 'medium effective' (=2) and in-between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). The passage from humanitarian to development aid could be considered as 'effective' (=3), because longer-term objectives were already part of the formulation of the projects and were implemented.

Why did the needs assessment leave some areas uncovered? Why were there some delays? The assessment of the *first hypothesis on EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO* highlighted how the alignment of preferences over the budget and over the delegation to DG ECHO influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes. For all three years, the lack of sufficient humanitarian aid funding affected the implementation of projects, limiting the scope of the projects in terms of a number of reached people and in terms of duration. This is why the assessment of the goal attainment is 2. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, in those years, EU Member States had other priorities and devoted the majority of the budget to the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as other crisis around the world, such as the Rohingya and the crisis in Sudan.

This is consistent with what has been argued about EU humanitarian aid not being neutral and independent. The decision about the allocation of funding follows political priorities rather than the gravity of the consequences of the crises. In the case of Mozambique, the limited funding on which EU Member States agreed, negatively influenced the effectiveness of the programmes, since it limited the scope of the projects and fewer people were reached, despite many more were in need. However, EU Member States agreed to leave DG ECHO room for manoeuvre. This was exemplified by the possibility for DG ECHO to take ad hoc decisions useful to add more funding to the original budget and by the use of crisis modifiers. The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness in the budget approval and in granting DG ECHO freedom translated into coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO in the field, in particular with the UK. The two coordinated in the field and worked together to advocate for cash-based assistance projects vis-à-vis a national government reluctant to allow this type of assistance. The internal cohesiveness of EU Member States was also related to the bureaucratic unity, shown by the coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. On several occasions, DG DEVCO offered to DG ECHO additional funding to finance emergency projects. This enhanced the possibility of reaching pre-established objectives (=2) thanks to the funds given by the DG DEVCO, enabling DG ECHO to implement projects following the El Niño drought. In addition, it allowed for better communication and sharing of information about projects that turned into development ones, with longer-term objectives. This explains why the LRRD/nexus sub-dimension is considered being 'effective' and equal to 3.

The *second hypothesis on delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents* also influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes. Specialisation, credibility, and management of policy externalities were all relevant reasons for why DG ECHO delegated the various phases of implementation of the programmes to the agents, especially WFP and NGOs such as Oxfam, Care, Save the Children, and Concern Worldwide. They all had established offices and capacities in the field and were directly in touch with the beneficiaries and the government, thus being able to detect the shifting needs. DG ECHO was present in Maputo with its Country Office and closely monitored the work of its agents. The coordination with the agents influenced all aspects of the effectiveness. It influenced it both positively and negatively.

Beginning from the 'input phase', DG ECHO delegated the needs assessment to its agents, that relied at first the SETSAN targeting made by the government that left areas uncovered and underreported the number of beneficiaries. In this case, especially, the role of the agents was significant. Also, thanks to DG ECHO's push, they realised that the assessment needed to be

further complemented and thus contributed to making the needs assessment more thorough. This is why the needs assessment was in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). Delegation and coordination with the agents also positively influenced the LRRD/nexus. Longer-term objectives were already included since the beginning in the formulation of the projects and DG ECHO, in coordination with WFP, was able to re-direct humanitarian aid funding to development projects.

However, coordination with the agents also negatively influenced the effectiveness, causing slowness and delays that negatively impacted the policy cycle's seamlessness and goal attainment. Despite the meetings and exchanges, sharing information did not always happen in a concerted and regular way. However, what really influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes was not the direct coordination with the agents but the indirect one. Indeed, its agents relied on other local agents, and this relationship had repercussion on the overall effectiveness. Local agents had access to difficult areas, however, they did not always have adequate material capacities, with equipment not meeting standards. This slowed down the entire process, an example being the construction of warehouses by WFP's local agents that took more than a year because it was difficult to find local companies with adequate capacities to build them. However, the cause of delays did not only come from local NGOs but also from WFP itself. Its internal procedures for finances and payments were slow, halting the timely disbursement of funding and, consequently, the entire projects' implementation. In addition, WFP did not always ensure that food was distributed to the beneficiaries as it often left the food with the community's chief. Despite acting as a 'police-patrol' and despite being considered 'too demanding' of a donor by its agents, a lack of sufficient scrutiny of WFP in particular was imputable to DG ECHO, which, instead, controlled the NGOs to a higher degree. In addition, the overlaps of some projects further explains why the sub-dimension of effectiveness, the seamlessness of the policy cycle, was in between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2).

The *third hypothesis on national authorities' attitude* also proved relevant in explaining the variation of DG ECHO's projects effectiveness. The national government was very participative in humanitarian and development aid. When crises occurred, the national government urgently called for foreign intervention and resources. Despite the political crises, the national government played a strong role in general, since it planned and implemented strategies to meet the humanitarian needs of the affected population. However, overall, the government was not well-disposed towards humanitarian aid programmes and this influenced goal attainment, needs assessment, and seamlessness of the policy cycle. The lack of coordination between central and local authorities brought confusion, causing delays in

implementing the projects, thus affecting goal attainment. Also, poor infrastructure delayed the implementation of the projects, exacerbating administrative slowness. Agents, and in particular NGO officials, were granted neither visas nor access to certain territories for months. Of course, because of this, entire projects were delayed. Corruption was also widespread, and this was evident in the SETSAN report. Besides being weak in its technical capacities, the SETSAN left out those areas that opposed the ruling party and adapted the list of beneficiaries according to the political affiliation. In addition, the government was hostile towards cash-based interventions, and the negotiations slowed down the implementation of these types of projects. One reason is that it could not directly check the money flow and preferred a voucher system or labour in exchange for food. This is why goal attainment, needs assessment and seamlessness of the policy cycle were considered medium and in between low and medium effectiveness, respectively. On the contrary, this factor did not influence the last sub-dimension, LRRD/Nexus. The government was, in general, aiming for longer-term projects, as seen by the strategies and longer-term policies that it planned itself.

Table 7.4 Relevance of the possible factors in explaining the variation of DG ECHO's projects effectiveness in Mozambique (2015-2017)

	Relevant	Partially Relevant	Not relevant
Hp 1 – EU internal cohesiveness and coordination on the ground	✓		
Hp 2 – Delegation and coordination with agents	✓		
Hp 3 – National authorities' attitude	✓		

Source: Own elaboration

Table 7.4 above summarises the findings. In the case of Mozambique, all hypothesised factors were relevant towards explaining the variation in DG ECHO's effectiveness. The internal cohesiveness of EU Member States, the delegation and coordination with the agents, and the attitude of the national governments all played their role in explaining why the overall effectiveness did not equal 12, but instead, was considered as 'medium effective'.

Chapter 8. A comparative assessment

Introduction

Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique (2015-2017) are three case studies each one representative of a different type of crisis: complex, human-made, and natural, respectively. Each empirical assessment highlighted the issues causing the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid to vary vis-à-vis the pre-established objectives, and it then highlighted the factors that seemed the most relevant to explain the variation. Always bearing in mind the definition of effectiveness used throughout the thesis, the present chapter will conduct a comparative assessment considering each hypothesis and it will then discuss them in an overall comparative assessment. Based on the findings, the chapter suggests a formula for effectiveness that will be then followed by a brief conclusion.

8.1 Comparative empirical findings

Empirically assessing the three case studies meant first singling out the problems that affected effectiveness in each country, causing a variation. It then meant checking each hypothesis vis-à-vis each dimension of effectiveness, finding out the connections among them.

Table 8.1 Main issues influencing DG ECHO's effectiveness in each country (2015-2017)

Issues \ Country	Myanmar	Lebanon	Mozambique
Discrepancy between people in need vs reached	✓	✓	✓
Delays	✓	✓	✓
No LRRD/Nexus	✓	✓	

Source: Own elaboration based on Chapters 5,6,7

The common issues affecting DG ECHO's effectiveness in all three countries concerned the discrepancy between the people reached and those in need, and delays in the implementation of the projects. The lack of a full passage from humanitarian to development aid only concerned Myanmar and Lebanon. They are summarised in Table 8.1.

These issues influenced each dimension of the effectiveness. As it is showed in Table 8.2 below, in Myanmar, the needs assessment was conducted, but it presented inconsistencies, as in 2015, the persons reached exceeded those in need; in 2016-2017, some areas and beneficiaries fell through, negatively impacting goal attainment. For these reasons, the response was considered medium effective (=2). The policy cycle and its seamlessness were characterised by delays, falling into medium effectiveness (=2), and also influencing goal attainment (=2). Finally, the nexus between humanitarian and development aid was still not in place at the time – though discussions had started at HQ, there were no concrete financial instruments nor projects (=1). Based on this, the overall effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects in Myanmar (2015-2017) was in between low and medium effectiveness (=7).

A similar scenario occurred in Lebanon. Because the programme reached most but not all of its objectives, overall goal attainment was considered to be 'medium effective' (=2). This main dimension was linked to the other sub-dimensions. In fact, the needs assessment, although it provided an important basis for targeting, did not cover some areas, and some refugees were not considered (=2). In addition, the whole policy cycle and its seamlessness were characterised by delays – LOUISE was implemented a year and a half later than initially planned. Since part of goal attainment is timely delivery, this sub-dimension equalled 1. Finally, although progress had been made for the LRRD/nexus, thanks to the Madad Fund and the JHFD, safety net programmes struggled to start in the time period under consideration (=2). Based on this, the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in Lebanon in those years was in between low and medium, although closer to the latter (=7).

Finally, in Mozambique, the needs assessment was conducted, but, once again, there was a discrepancy between those in need and those reached. However, a re-assessment in those years allowed for an improvement. This is why its effectiveness was between 1 and 2, resulting in low/medium effectiveness. This also influenced the main dimension of goal attainment, since not all the beneficiaries were reached (=2). Delays characterised the implementation of the projects, thus jeopardising full goal attainment. However, the accountability relationship between the principal and the agents was present, saving this sub-dimension from falling into the score of 'low effectiveness'. It landed between low effectiveness (=1) (because of major delays) and medium effectiveness (=2), because the principal-agent accountability was always present, and overlaps, although present to some extent, were limited.. Finally, the LRRD/nexus dimension could be considered as effective (=3), because humanitarian aid projects were shaped with the idea of a passage to longer-term programmes, and included a budget for development aid. All the sub-dimensions influenced the main dimension of goal attainment

(=2). The majority of the pre-established objectives were achieved. Therefore, DG ECHO's effectiveness in Mozambique was considered medium (=7/9).

Table 8.2 Summary of the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in each case study (2015-2017)

	Myanmar	Lebanon	Mozambique
Goal Attainment	2 Medium effectiveness	2 Medium effectiveness	2 Medium effectiveness
Needs Assessment	2 Medium effectiveness	2 Medium effectiveness	1/2 In between low and medium effectiveness
Seamlessness of the policy cycle	2 Medium effectiveness	1 Low effectiveness	1/2 In between low and medium effectiveness
LRRD/Nexus	1 Low effectiveness	2 Medium effectiveness	3 Effectiveness
Total Effectiveness	**7** **In between low and medium effectiveness**	**7** **In between low and medium effectiveness, but closer to the latter**	**7/9** **Medium effectiveness**

Source: Own elaboration based on Chapters 5,6,7

From these puzzles, the thesis assessed each hypothesis on the factors that could have caused the effectiveness to vary and determined which one was relevant, partially relevant or not relevant at all. Here, we are going to discuss each hypothesis for the three case studies.

Hypothesis 1. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO

> *The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO in the field explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

This factor proved to be relevant in influencing the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes particularly in Myanmar and Mozambique, while in Lebanon it was partially relevant, because other factors were more influential in determining the variation.

In Myanmar, EU Member States internal cohesiveness both positively and negatively influenced the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects. It especially influenced the needs assessment dimension, goal attainment and nexus. As we know (see Chapter 4), the only phase where the EU Member States can have a say in this policy is during the approval of the annual budget. In the case of Myanmar, the disagreement among the EU Member States precisely in this phase caused delays and a non-passage to development aid. The EU Member States, concerned by the escalating situation in Rakhine State, disagreed on a budget that would have guaranteed the funding of longer-term projects following the short-term humanitarian aid ones. The lack of funding for this passage affected the sub-dimension of the nexus, explaining why the nexus was not in place in our years of interest (=1), how it caused delays and, thus, affected goal attainment (=2). In addition, DG ECHO was excluded from the formulation of a 2014-2016 Joint Programming Strategy that would have ensured the implementation of the nexus. This exclusion meant not guaranteeing consistency between humanitarian and development aid projects.

In addition, the lack of internal cohesiveness over the budget was reflected in the lack of bureaucratic unity. Since the EU Member States disagreed on a budget that would have guaranteed the implementation of longer-term programmes, the budget was reduced, which prevented DG ECHO and DG DEVCO from having the financial instruments to shape and implement the passage between the two policies. Also, DG DEVCO's instruments for implementing longer-term activities were not flexible and did not allow it to take over DG ECHO's projects. The reduced overall budget also caused DG ECHO's agents to downsize their projects, thus reaching fewer people in need. This explains why there was a discrepancy between the funds required vs those granted, and the people in need vs those reached. The non-alignment of preferences among the EU Member States was reflected in the lack of bureaucratic unity and DG ECHO's role in the field. There were attempts to limit the advocacy role of the DG. Contrary to the UN, DG ECHO denounced the atrocities perpetrated by the government against the Rohingya. EU Member States were extremely cautious in being vocal about this and admonished the DG Country Office for potentially compromising their political relationship with the government. Despite this, DG ECHO kept up its advocacy role, further underscoring how it prescinded EU Member States' interests and its autonomy in supporting humanitarian principles. However, EU Member States also positively influenced effectiveness. They cohesively delegated the overall policy to the DG, meaning that it also had financial discretion and was able to integrate the budget with extra funding in a short amount of time. Finally, the internal cohesiveness translated into strong coordination in the field with one of the (then) EU

Member States, the UK's DFID. Their synergy was critical, as it ensured that there were no overlaps between the different projects. This is also why the seamlessness of the policy cycle fell into medium effectiveness (2).

This factor also influenced the effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes in Mozambique. In those years, EU Member States had other priorities and were mainly financing other crises around the world, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, the Rohingya crisis, and the Sudan crisis. This meant that the EU Member States were internally cohesive in approving a limited budget devoted to the SAIO region, which includes Mozambique. The lack of sufficient funding has been one of the limitations to DG ECHO's humanitarian aid and another cause for varied effectiveness. There was an increasingly widening gap between the funding required and the funding received. Because of this, the scope of the projects was limited, and not all beneficiaries could be reached. Agents required more funding because of the increasing number of people in need of humanitarian aid due to the re-occurrent natural hazards. Thus, not all pre-established objectives could be met, leading to 'medium effective' (=2) goal attainment. Despite this, the EU Member States all agreed to grant DG ECHO adequate room for manoeuvre. This allowed DG ECHO to adopt ad hoc decisions to add extra funding to the initial budget and to adopt crisis modifiers, an agreement that helped to quickly fund humanitarian aid projects implemented mostly by WFP and NGOs consortia, such as COSACA. The internal cohesiveness of the EU Member States translated into coordination in the field, once again, with the UK's DFID. The two coordinated and shared priorities, complemented their funds and advocated for cash-based assistance despite the Mozambican government's hostility to the idea. Besides translating into coordination between DG ECHO and the EU Member States in the field, internal cohesiveness was also related to bureaucratic unity. This was observable in the coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. The two DGs worked in synergy, and DG DEVCO financially supported DG ECHO on numerous occasions. This improved the possibility of reaching pre-established objectives (=2) since more people could be reached and additional projects could be implemented. Their synergy allowed for better communication and sharing of information about projects that turned from humanitarian aid into development aid with longer-term objectives. This explains why the LRRD/Nexus sub-dimension is considered as being 'effective' and equal 3.

If for Myanmar and Mozambique this factor was relevant in explaining the variation in the effectiveness of DG ECHO's programmes, this was not the case for Lebanon, where it proved to be only partially relevant. In this case, the EU Member States agreed on a budget and on initiatives such as the Madad Fund to ensure a passage from humanitarian to development aid,

especially after 2017. Thus, the LRRD/nexus in Lebanon is considered 'medium effective' (=2). The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness was also evident when they backed cash-based assistance programmes and when it translated into coordination in the field between them and DG ECHO. Similarly to Myanmar and Mozambique, the main (then) EU Member State with whom DG ECHO coordinated in Lebanon was the UK's DFID. Sharing the same priority on cash assistance, the two jointly launched LOUISE, the programme that encompassed DG ECHO's humanitarian aid in Lebanon in those years. Contrary to the other two case studies, in Lebanon, internal cohesiveness was not relevant in terms of bureaucratic unity. Considering that DG ECHO's efforts were channelled into LOUISE, DG DEVCO had separate programmes relying on the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument.[85] In conclusion, in Lebanon, this first factor set a positive framework for LOUISE. It created the basis for the future nexus, carried out after 2017. However, it did not explain the variation in DG ECHO's humanitarian aid effectiveness vis-à-vis the objectives established at the beginning of the policy cycle. Therefore it is considered only partially relevant.

Table 8. 3. EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO as a factor in explaining the variation of the effectiveness in its dimensions. A comparative view.

Dimensions (DV) Countries	Goal attainment	Needs Assessment	Seamlessness of policy cycle	LRRD/Nexus
Myanmar	✓		✓	✓
Lebanon				
Mozambique	✓			✓

Source: Own elaboration

In conclusion, Table 8.3 above shows the influence of this factor on the dimensions of effectiveness for each country. As we can see, the EU internal cohesiveness and coordination between the EU Member States and DG ECHO were influential in most of the effectiveness dimensions in Myanmar (✓). This was not the case in Lebanon, where the factors (positively) influenced only the LRRD/nexus (✓), although without explaining the reasons for the issues influencing the effectiveness. Finally, in Mozambique, it influenced the goal attainment and the LRRD/nexus (✓).

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[85] See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/lebanon_en

Why these differences? In Myanmar, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness had significant repercussions, both negative and positive. DG ECHO was a major donor even before the Rohingya crisis was 'in the spotlight', but in those years, the Rohingya crisis started to attract media attention and became a priority for the EU Member States. This becomes apparent when looking at the amount of funding devoted to Myanmar in those years (See Chapters 3, 5 and Appendix 1). As for the Syrian crisis, a great amount of funding was devoted to respond to the humanitarian crises. The prioritisation of the crises in Myanmar and Syria was also the cause of reduced funding in Mozambique, as it was not seen as a major priority by the EU Member States. Thus, as we have discussed in several occasions throughout the thesis (e.g. Chapters 3 and 4), the funding distribution according to the priorities of the EU Member States determined the budget devoted to each area, and it had consequences. In Mozambique, the reduced budget meant fewer opportunities to reach additional beneficiaries, thus affecting goal attainment. In Myanmar, the problem was not the amount of budget devoted, but rather *when* the budget for longer-term programmes was approved. The EU Member States disagreed with the initially proposed budget support programme, which was then implemented in 2017, a year later than it was supposed to, due to concerns of the EU Member States about the escalating violence in Rakhine. This was, once again, connected to political considerations. As we have seen, the EU Member States attempted to limit DG ECHO's advocacy role. The DG was among the only donors who denounced the UN's 'quiet diplomacy', meaning that the UN closed an eye to what was happening, coming to terms with the government, thus neither respecting humanitarian principles nor human rights. Although the EU Member States did not entirely oppose DG ECHO's stance, they were extremely cautious about denouncing the UN's silent diplomacy and the government's actions, and through the EU ambassadors warned DG ECHO's Country Office not to undermine the political relationship with the government. However, as for the positive side of the variation, the EU Member States were cohesive when granting DG ECHO room for manoeuvre, which was reflected in the positive coordination and synergy with the UK's DFID in the field, improving the seamlessness of the policy cycle.

The reasons for delegating the implementation of humanitarian aid to DG ECHO are probably the same ones at the basis of DG ECHO's delegation to its agents. In particular, DG ECHO is much more specialised than the EU Member States. It is directly in touch with UN agencies, NGOs and beneficiaries, which can result in more credibility in the government's eyes because it is seen as 'neutral'. This is valid for Myanmar and Mozambique, where, as we have seen, the positive coordination with DG DEVCO made the LRRD/nexus more effective.

In Lebanon, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness translated into coordination in the field, creating a positive framework for DG ECHO to implement its projects. Indeed, the EU Member States' political priorities coincided. In line with the EU Global Strategy, they aimed at having security and stabilisation in the Middle East, and, consequentially, in Syria and its neighbouring countries. This also meant containing the refugee flux towards Europe, which has been a top priority since the conflict began (e.g. EU-Turkey deal in 2016). However, this factor did not explain the variation of the effectiveness and it was only partially relevant, because other factors outweighed it.

Hypothesis 2. Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents

> *DG ECHO's delegation and coordination with the agent (e. g. UN agency,*
> *NGO), which has established capacities on the ground and is accountable*
> *to the principal, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's*
> *humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

This factor influenced the effectiveness in Lebanon and Mozambique, but it was between partially and not relevant in Myanmar.

As discussed in chapter 6, in Lebanon, DG ECHO, together with DFID, started to operate in a context where humanitarian aid was highly fragmented, and duplication of projects was frequent. Thus, funds were dispersed with high transaction costs. Between 2015 and 2017, the DG and DFID, following a pilot programme (e.g., One Card), shaped and financially supported a new single financial provider: Lebanon One Unified Inter-Organizational System for E-cards (LOUISE). Concretely, this was a system for managing a common card that refugees could use like an ATM card, with funding given by donors. It would have streamlined the vulnerability assessment, targeting, funding distribution, and communication, and improved overall coordination. It also included the development of a common hotline and referral protocol to improve accountability towards beneficiaries. LOUISE was implemented by UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and the Lebanon Cash Consortium (LCC). DG ECHO delegated the needs assessment (VASyR) and the implementation of LOUISE and other projects (e.g. shelter) to its agents because of their high degree of specialisation. However, the DG took over the role of manager of policy externalities because it pushed agents to find better solutions and new modalities of distributing humanitarian aid through cash assistance. It exercised control over its agents directly, being involved in the entire policy cycle, and indirectly, by letting other NGOs,

such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, check on the VASyR conducted by UN agencies. What influenced the effectiveness was essentially the tensions between DG ECHO and its UN agents. The latter were sceptical over the contracts to follow and over an independent monitoring and evaluation system, as foreseen by LOUISE. In addition, the sharing of information between DG ECHO and UNHCR, in particular, was not consistent and was often followed by further clarification requests by the DG. This happened when UNHCR did not provide enough data on refugees' protection and was not specific in illustrating its projects. The tensions brought a delay in the rollout of the different LOUISE components that were then implemented in July 2017, a year and a half after negotiations first began. The tensions and difficulties affected the dimensions of both goal attainment, considered as 'medium effective' (=2), and the seamlessness of the policy cycle (=1). They also affected the needs assessment (=2). The uncoordinated referral system left people in need without coverage in remote areas of the country. In addition, the discussions about the algorithm at the basis of the needs assessment, which excluded the 'protection' data (for which DG ECHO had to later rely on the NRC), lasted more than a year. Besides affecting the needs assessment, the tensions and difficulties in coordination had an unforeseen side-effect: competition among agents. This resulted in a lack of coordination among the agents that were competing for both visibility and funds and resources, causing episodes of corruption and mutual blame for the failure. Finally, the sudden expansion of some agents, such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), which grew beyond their original scope and started to implement projects that went beyond their capacities, also influenced the effectiveness. In fact, they were not able to manage a proper implementation of the projects in a timely manner. This is one reason why the policy cycle's seamlessness was considered 'low effective' (=1).

The delegation and coordination between DG ECHO and its agents were also relevant in explaining the effectiveness' variation in Mozambique. Similarly to Lebanon, specialisation, credibility, and management of policy externalities were the main reasons why DG ECHO delegated the various phases of the implementation of the programmes to agents, especially WFP and NGOs such as Oxfam, Care, Save the Children, and Concern Worldwide. In this case, the coordination and delegation between principal and agent influenced all dimensions of effectiveness. Starting with the input, DG ECHO delegated the needs assessment to its agents who, at first, relied on the SETSAN targeting, that is the one conducted by the government. However, both the DG and its agents realised that this needs assessment left entire areas uncovered, especially in the northern part of the country. Therefore, the agents complemented the needs assessment with their own assessment, making it more thorough and precise. This is

why the needs assessment was considered in-between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). In this sense, the agents played a significant role and contributed to improving the needs assessment, helping it gravitate towards medium effectiveness.

Despite coordination meetings between DG ECHO and agents taking place, information sharing did not often happen in a concerted way and not as regularly as it should have been. In addition, local NGOs, on which WFP relied, did not always have adequate capacities to carry out the projects. The construction of warehouses by WFP's local agents, for instance, took more than a year than initially planned because it was difficult to find local companies with material to build them. Also, trucks for food transportation were very old and the equipment outdated. All this meant that implementation of the projects, thus the seamlessness of the policy cycle, was delayed (=1/2). However, local NGOs were not the only ones to blame for the slowness. WFP had its own responsibility. Its internal procedures for finances and payments were slow, causing local agents to, in turn, slow down and sometimes halt the implementation of the projects. This was also due to a lack of sufficient communication between local agents and WFP. Besides impacting the seamlessness of the policy cycle, this factor also influenced goal attainment, making it medium effective (=2), since timely delivery is part of the goal attainment itself. This is connected with a lack of scrutiny: NGOs, in particular, felt that DG ECHO, despite acting as a 'police-patrol', did not sufficiently scrutinise UN agencies, leaving uncertainties on whether beneficiaries were actually reached with food assistance. Although the coordination and delegation *negatively* affected the goal attainment, needs assessment and seamlessness of the policy cycle, this cannot be said for LRRD/nexus. Indeed, agents helped DG ECHO to re-direct funds towards longer-term projects and the projects themselves were shaped considering the development objective. Therefore, this sub-dimension in Mozambique was considered 'effective' (=3).

In this respect, Myanmar differs from Lebanon and Mozambique. Here, this factor did not explain the variation in the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes. The coordination and delegation to agents, – based on specialisation, credibility, and management of policy externalities, similarly to the other case studies – turned out to be positive and fundamental for the whole process, but cannot be held accountable for the discrepancy in the needs assessment delays and lack of LRRD/nexus. Despite some issues in the targeting (i.e., WFP shaped its projects based on a sample of beneficiaries, risking not including all those in need), overall, the agents' role proved to be fundamental. Indeed, WFP, Save the Children, and Oxfam frequently shared information with DG ECHO. They also had access to remote areas and were directly in touch with the beneficiaries. In addition, DG ECHO's presence, although

felt by agents as sometimes 'too demanding', was also recognised as an advantage. It ensured the collection of local input, directly involving the beneficiaries when assessing the needs, and enhanced coordination among agents through numerous initiatives (i.e. humanitarian aid breakfasts). All this meant that the needs assessment was considered 'medium effective', as was the seamlessness of the policy cycle (=2). Also, agents contributed to the set-up of the nexus, despite the shortage of funding discussed above. Contrary to Lebanon and Mozambique, it seems that it was thanks to the agents, their capacities and coordination that projects were implemented despite the existent issues. Therefore delegation and coordination were not among the factors causing the effectiveness to vary vis-à-vis the pre-established objectives.

Table 8.4 Delegation and coordination between the principal and the agents as a factor to explain the variation of effectiveness in its dimensions. A comparative view.

Dimensions (DV) / Countries	Goal attainment	Needs Assessment	Seamlessness of policy cycle	LRRD/Nexus
Myanmar				
Lebanon	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mozambique	✓		✓	

Source: Own elaboration

In conclusion, Table 8.4 above summarises what dimensions of effectiveness were influenced by the delegation and coordination between DG ECHO and its agents. This factor did not influence any dimension of effectiveness in Myanmar. It did, however, influence all dimensions in Lebanon (✓). As for Mozambique, it only influenced the goal attainment and the seamlessness of the policy cycle (✓). To start explaining the differences, we can see that this factor has been relevant especially in Lebanon, where tensions among DG ECHO and UN agencies caused overall delays. Despite tensions and UN agencies not always efficiently delivering effective humanitarian aid, DG ECHO considers them their primary agent. This is the case for Mozambique, where WFP was one of the main agents, despite also having internal issues that affected the overall effectiveness. DG ECHO seems to apply a strategic reasoning in its relationship with the UN agencies, seeing as more advantageous to fund UN agencies. Indeed, UN agencies, contrary to NGOs, are 'richer' in that they have greater capacities, resources, and a higher number of people in the field, which make them the most useful agent for the DG. Of course, NGOs play an extremely significant role, but they are subject to greater scrutiny and control by the DG. They are smaller and do not have the same economic and

human resources as UN agencies. This causes NGOs to be very careful in complying with the bureaucratic requirements so as to be accountable to the DG. Also, DG ECHO seems to choose UN agencies over NGOs as its primary agent, following the political priorities spelt out in the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016: 15), among which the UN is considered as a key actor in a rule-based global order (See chapter 6 and 7).

In Lebanon, the strong role of UNHCR and WFP made them the main interlocutors for DG ECHO (and DFID). UNHCR, in particular, took up the role of coordinator and was also in charge of registering refugees and implementing protection programmes. Each agency had its cash-based programme, and the change DG ECHO and DFID were proposing implied a change in the general practices. Change is often, in the beginning, regarded with distrust. Although conversations with UN agencies about cash-assistance programmes had already been ongoing since 2013, implementing the change through LOUISE meant also disrupting what the UN agencies had already established and were implementing. Therefore, tensions among DG ECHO and UN agencies should not have come as a surprise. The years under examination were precisely the years of this change, and this is why the process was not as smooth as it should have been, affecting all dimensions of effectiveness.

Both in Lebanon and Mozambique, there did not seem to be enough scrutiny of the agents by the DG. In Lebanon, agents grew beyond their original scope, and in Mozambique, they did not have material capacities, which influenced the overall programme's effectiveness. This seems paradoxical since DG ECHO is considered by all its agents as one of the most present donors, always holding them accountable. However, it is also important to consider the general context in this case. Funds had flooded Lebanon in this period, bringing about a situation in which agents suddenly received significantly more funding, which did not correspond to their capacities. This was, in particular, the case for the DRC. Its small office increased in the number of staff and resources in a short time. In Mozambique, the situation was slightly different: Mozambique was undergoing a severe financial crisis and inflation was extremely high in this period. This influenced the agents' capacity since local agents were not able to buy materials that were up to the standard of WFP. The materials were indeed costly because of the ongoing inflation. In addition, the DG ECHO funding received, especially by UN agencies, was often part of multi-donor funding. Therefore, UN agencies were not as meticulous as NGOs in filling in the reports, since they had to be accountable to more than one donor at the time and for a matter of rapidity, in a context of emergency, were not as precise. DG ECHO was not as 'controlling' with UN agencies as it was with NGOs who were often funded by the DG only.

In Myanmar, this factor did not explain the variation in DG ECHO's programmes' effectiveness. However, it should be clarified that the delegation and coordination with the UN were fundamental to implementing humanitarian aid. Paradoxically, precisely because of their controversial role, closing an eye to what the government was doing made it possible to deliver humanitarian aid. However questionable it might be, reaching a compromise with the government enabled agents to distribute food and health assistance. Besides the UN, DG ECHO also relied heavily on NGOs that were able, despite the difficulties deriving from the government, to reach those in need in difficult areas.

Hypothesis 3. National authorities' attitude

> *The national governments and local authorities' attitude, whether interfering or facilitating the implementation of humanitarian aid projects, explains the variation in the degree of DG ECHO's humanitarian aid programmes' effectiveness.*

This factor influenced the effectiveness in all three countries. Myanmar was a complex emergency, meaning that natural hazards were combined with conflicts, especially in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine. Even though the Myanmar government requested humanitarian aid, it was not well-disposed towards it. Its negative attitude influenced all dimensions of effectiveness. The government did not want foreigners to witness what was happening in the country and claimed that aid workers were helping terrorists (See Chapter 5). Therefore, it limited the operational space and restricted access to certain areas. This was done by not granting travel authorisations to visit certain areas or granting them long after they had been requested. In 2017, the WFP's food distribution was delayed because of the government's restrictions. On top of this, the WFP had to interrupt its activities because of the ongoing conflict, and it could not reach many communities because they were in conflict areas. The attitude of the government also exacerbated the clash between NGOs and UN agencies. As discussed above, the former felt that UN agencies were applying a sort of 'quiet diplomacy', assisting the government in minimising the political costs of its treatment of the Rohingya by keeping secret all the information gathered during that time. This was relevant insofar as it showed how agents had to come to terms with the government in order to distribute food and health assistance. WFP and NGOs needed to stay in touch with the government because the authorisation of the projects depended on it. In this context, we saw DG ECHO as one of the few vocal donors denouncing

this system. The main implication of the government's hostile attitude was delays, making the whole goal attainment fall into 'medium effectiveness' (=2). In addition, the WFP and NGOs could not conduct a thorough needs assessment because of the restrictions (=2). The seamlessness of the policy cycle was also impacted, since the government conditioned the atmosphere in a way that created friction among agents, resulting in medium effectiveness (=2). Finally, the government itself was the cause of a protracted crisis, which did not allow for the LRRD/nexus (=1).

In Lebanon, the government always specified that the refugees were not 'refugees' but rather 'displaced', signalling that the country was not the last destination nor a country of asylum, but a temporary shelter. Thus, the government did not permit the establishment of safety net programmes, which would have guaranteed longer-term solutions. In addition, in line with this strategy, the government outlawed refugee camps, stopped refugee registrations, imposed curfews, and restricted refugees' ability to obtain legal status. These policies obstructed the passage from humanitarian to development aid. Therefore, they influenced the effectiveness especially in the LRRD/nexus dimension that could not be entirely carried out (=2), despite various initiatives for this purpose (i.e. Madad Fund, JHDF). In addition, the heavy national bureaucracy did not guarantee the possibility of promptly reaching beneficiaries, jeopardising the achievement of the objectives. For instance, establishing lavatories in the informal refugee settlement in the Bekaa Valley was severely delayed because local authorities did not want to grant authorisations. This is why goal attainment was 'medium effective' (=2).

In Mozambique, the government appeared to be open towards humanitarian and development aid by promoting development strategies and policies, and when the crises occurred, it requested foreign intervention and resources. However, in reality, the government did not have a positive attitude especially towards humanitarian aid because, as for Myanmar, it was reluctant to have "foreign witnesses" to what was happening, and this influenced the effectiveness in several ways. Firstly, through the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN) targeting: agents that based their needs assessment on the government's targeting data had to complement it with their own needs assessment, since the SETSAN's needs assessment presented major flaws, and excluded entire areas, especially those in the northern part of the country. For this reason, needs assessment was considered in-between low and medium effectiveness (=1/2). One of the explanations for this was the weak technical capacities of the Secretariat and the high levels of corruption. The list of beneficiaries was made according to their political affiliation. If certain areas opposed the ruling party, they were excluded. Secondly, poor infrastructure delayed the implementation of the projects, affecting

goal attainment (=2). In addition, there was a lack of coordination between central and local authorities, which brought about confusion, causing delays and, once again, affecting goal attainment. Also, the government was hostile to cash-based assistance, which ended up being supported instead by DG ECHO and DFID. One of the reasons for the government's hostility was because it could not directly control the money flow and preferred programmes that would give food in exchange for labour or in-kind or vouchers programmes. Negotiations about this slowed down the implementation projects, and after 2017, cash-based assistance projects started to be implemented. This is why goal attainment, needs assessment and seamlessness of the policy cycle were considered medium and between low and medium effectiveness, respectively. Finally, the government's attitude did not influence the LRRD/nexus, which, as we have seen, was effective in Mozambique (=3). Indeed, the government was, in general, aiming for longer-term projects, as evidenced by the strategies and longer-term policies that it planned itself.

Table 8.5 *National authorities' attitude* as a factor to explain the variation of the effectiveness in its dimensions. A comparative view.

Dimensions (DV) Countries	Goal attainment	Needs Assessment	Seamlessness of policy cycle	LRRD/Nexus
Myanmar	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lebanon	✓			✓
Mozambique	✓	✓	✓	

Source: Own elaboration

In conclusion, as summarised in Table 8.5 above, national authorities' attitude influenced the effectiveness of the programmes. In Myanmar, it influenced all dimensions of effectiveness (✓). In Lebanon only goal attainment and LRRD/nexus (✓) were impacted. In Mozambique, it affected all dimensions (✓) except the LRRD/nexus. The table shows similarities and differences. How can they be explained? The governments' attitude in Myanmar and Mozambique was similar insofar as both governments did not want 'foreigners' to 'witness' what was happening in the countries. This attitude was translated into travel and visa restrictions and limited access to certain areas. In both countries, this was, of course, a source of delay in the implementation process, and it also caused agents to not be able to carry out a thorough needs assessment. In addition, it created competition and a challenging context for agents to

coordinate, affecting the whole seamlessness of the policy cycle. What is different between Myanmar and Mozambique was the attitude of the government towards the nexus. Whereas in Mozambique, this was positive, in the sense that longer-term strategies were already planned by the government, in Myanmar, the government was the source of widespread violence and protracted crisis. This brought about the continuous need for humanitarian aid, delaying the implementation of longer-term programmes in Myanmar.

In Lebanon, the attitude was slightly different compared to the other two countries. Here, the main caveat was that the government did not want the country to become the final destination for refugees. Considering the troubled relations between Lebanon and Syria, already in 2014, President Michel Sleiman defined the Syrian refugee crisis as an existential threat. Christian political leaders and members of the government felt that the refugee crisis was 'conspiracy' against them, and Hezbollah was concerned for the country's security. In addition, the Syrian presence was associated with unemployment issues, increase in crime, insecurity, and increased costs of living (Dionigi, 2016: 21). This is why the national government was not well-disposed towards any solution that would have guaranteed assistance and, perhaps, a sort of stabilisation of the refugees, thus jeopardising longer-term programmes and slowing down projects' implementation. By denying authorisations for NGOs to implement their projects, the government contributed to the delay of the overall implementation. This happened, for instance, in the informal refugee settlement in Bekaa Valley, where DG ECHO-funded NGOs could not establish lavatories because of the reluctance of ministries to grant the authorisations. However, the Lebanese government was also interested in receiving foreign resources. Indeed, the funding initially planned for humanitarian and development aid were used for national purposes.

8.2. Overall comparative assessment

The assessment and the discussion so far highlighted certain patterns and further points of discussions related to the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid. These are summarised in Table 8.6 below.

Table 8.6 DG ECHO's effectiveness and the relevance of the factors (2015-2017)

	Hp1	Hp2	Hp3	Tot effectiveness
Myanmar	Relevant	In between partially and non-relevant	Relevant	7 In between low and medium
Lebanon	Partially Relevant	Relevant	Relevant	7 In between low and medium
Mozambique	Relevant	Relevant	Relevant	7/9 Medium effectiveness

Source: Own elaboration based on Chapters 5,6,7

Despite the differences in the crises (i.e., complex, human-made, natural), the overall effectiveness is similar in all countries, although slightly better in Mozambique. Considering what has been discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, we expected that different crises would have brought to different outcomes. In particular, in a context of natural crisis, the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects would have been higher than in contexts of complex and human-made crisis. Looking at the total effectiveness in tables 8.2 and 8.6, we can see how in Mozambique DG ECHO's effectiveness seemed to be slightly better than in the other two contexts. This is consistent with what we had expected. However, it is also true that DG ECHO's effectiveness in a context of natural crisis, such as the one in Mozambique, is not *much* higher than the other crises.

Overall, there seems to be a pattern in the issues influencing the effectiveness, no matter the context or the crises type. After all, the issues influencing the effectiveness in Haiti in 2010 were also similar (i.e., delays). Discrepancy between people in need and those reached, delays, protraction of humanitarian aid programmes were issues common to all cases. Thus, it is notable that these issues happen no matter if it is a complex, human-made or natural crisis. However, we also have to acknowledge that DG ECHO's effectiveness in a context of natural crisis was relatively better. In Mozambique, although not entirely well disposed towards humanitarian aid and, thus, influencing the effectiveness, the government was not the source of the crisis, such as in Myanmar. Instead, the Mozambican government attempted to address the crisis, especially by shaping and implementing longer-term development policies and strategies, and this helped to enhance the effectiveness of the overall EU humanitarian aid policies. Indeed, if we look at

the LRRD/nexus (see Table 8.2), Mozambique is the only country where it actually worked, contributing to the overall effectiveness.

As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.1.3.2) and 3 (section 3.3.), it is expected that the impact of the crises on people can be mitigated depending on the coping capacities of the governments, no matter the type of crisis, and that, if the coping capacities of a government are good, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is higher. Indeed, a government that has the institutional and infrastructural capacities to cope with a crisis can mitigate the impact of that crisis. In contrast, the impact of crises is more significant in countries whose governments lack coping capacities, and humanitarian aid effectiveness can be less effective. However, as shown in Tables 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6 (See Chapter 3), the effectiveness in Lebanon, whose governments' coping capacities are better than the ones of the Mozambican government, is in between low and medium effectiveness, instead of being at least fully medium (like in Mozambique) or fully effective. Thus, the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid in Lebanon, contrary to expectations, was worse than in Mozambique, whose government had worse capacities than the Lebanese one. Also, compared to Myanmar, whose low/medium effectiveness was in line with expectations and whose government's capacities were worse than those of Lebanon, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in Lebanon contradicts this expectation. This is a meaningful finding that highlights how the effectiveness of humanitarian aid may not depend solely on the governments' institutional and infrastructural capacities.

Thus, the coping capacity is not completely relevant to understanding what makes the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid vary vis-à-vis the objectives established at the beginning of the policy cycle. We have to turn to other factors. Indeed, more than the governments' capacities, what turned out to be influential was the national authorities' *attitude* towards agents implementing humanitarian aid and towards donors themselves. All three cases, in their own way, empirically show this. Myanmar's government was not well-disposed towards humanitarian aid. Through travel and visa restrictions, it delayed the implementation of the projects, jeopardising the effectiveness of the aid. The same is valid for Lebanon. Here, the government had a no-stay policy and whatever humanitarian aid projects were perceived to create a longer establishment of the refugees on the Lebanese territory (e.g., the lavatories in the Bekaa Valley) had to be hampered. This happened, for instance, by not granting specific permissions to the agents. In Mozambique, political interests, the level of corruption, the shaky coordination between the centre and local authorities, and the hostility towards certain types of aid's modality brought delays in the projects.

The assessment of the three case studies shed light also on another factor that turned out to be influential. It highlighted how the delegation and the choice of the agents are significant. Choosing an agent that does not have the right capacities or/and is not accountable to the DG can easily jeopardise the effectiveness of the projects. This was clear in Lebanon and Mozambique, where agents did not have great capacities and entered into an argument with DG ECHO. This makes it more comprehensible why DG ECHO chooses agents with significant experience in the country and can be directly in touch with the beneficiaries and the government. However, it seems that DG ECHO, no matter its efforts, ends up treating NGOs and UN agencies very differently. The former are much more controlled and scrutinised, whereas the latter's treatment is much more loose. For instance, DG ECHO is strict with NGOs about writing extremely precise periodical reports, which cannot be said for UN agencies. The latter are silently 'allowed' to not be as precise when reporting on their activities. We have discussed above that one reason might be that DG ECHO's funds for UN agencies form just a part of multi-donors funding, while the funding given to NGOs was generally coming from one single donor (i.e., DG ECHO). Related to this argument, two contrasting features characterise DG ECHO. On the one hand, it is extremely present and strict, to the point of being characterised as 'too demanding' by its agents with its 'heavy bureaucracy'. On the other hand, DG ECHO does not always exercise precise control over its agents. This happened in Lebanon, where agents grew beyond their scope: DG ECHO should have foreseen this happening, and it should have moderated the funding flux or re-directed the funding to other agents who were better prepared to take up the sudden flow of money and were more up to the tasks. In Mozambique, DG ECHO should have scrutinised WFP's project implementation more to see where the food would go once it had been delivered, and it should have also checked on the internal coordination between WFP and its local agents. Thus, DG ECHO itself is also directly responsible for the (in)effectiveness of its programmes.

8.2.1 Is EU humanitarian aid really neutral and independent?

The assessment of the case studies also shed light on another aspect. EU humanitarian aid is not as neutral and independent as officials would like it to be. As we have discussed (See Chapter 2), the principles on which humanitarian aid in general and EU humanitarian aid rely on are humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Officially, these principles characterise the work of all IOs and NGOs, including DG ECHO's. However, in general, humanitarian aid has been considered a sort of new "colonisation" (Jayawickrama, 2018; Atlani-Duault and Dozon, 2011), since states have the indirect tendency to change social,

economic and cultural structures of the countries where humanitarian aid is delivered. For instance, it is no secret that France has interest in a stable Lebanon. Macron's visit to the country in August 2020, following the Beirut's explosion, made this clear (L'Orient le Jour, 2020).

As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 and throughout the case studies, in the case of the EU, although there is a genuine effort to make humanitarian aid as neutral as possible,[86] the political priorities of the EU Member States can play a role in humanitarian aid. Officially, the EU Member States can express their position only during the budget approval phase in the HAC. During this phase, DG ECHO shows to the EU Member States the crises around the world and, on the basis of INFORM (See Chapter 3 and 4), points out what countries need humanitarian aid the most. Based on this, the EU Member States might decide what amount goes where, consequently, determining the whole policy.

As shown in Chapter 3 and as also argued in Chapter 7, priorities of the EU Member States during 2015 and 2017 concerned mainly Syria, Sudan, DRC, and Myanmar (since 2017, especially). The SAIO region, including Mozambique, did not receive adequate funding and this indirectly determined the whole policy, because, as we have seen, lack of funding caused agents not to reach more beneficiaries. The sole decision of what crisis in the world has the priority is political.

As argued in Chapter 4 and above, consistently with the EU Global Strategy, one of the reasons why among the EU Member States' top priorities was Syria was because of the overall objective of guaranteeing stability and security in countries not far from the EU borders. This is reflected by Table 3.2 that shows that the 12 top countries, among which Syria and its neighbours, where EU humanitarian aid has been delivered, are all areas that correspond to the EU external action priorities, spelt out in the EU Global Strategy (i.e., "a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa"). Indeed, as we have discussed in Chapter 6, in the years of our interests, Syria and the neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, have been flooded by a significant amount of funds. Thus, presumably, one of the reasons can be identified with the EU Member States' intentions to contain the consequences of the Syrian war, that is, the flux of refugees that came not only from Syria, but especially from the neighbouring countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey. In this perspective, indeed, the EU-Turkey deal was signed in 2016.

In addition, in Myanmar (see Chapter 5), EU Member States' priorities were not only expressed during the budget approval phase in Brussels – they were also observable in the field.

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[86] All the interviews with EU officials indirectly made this clear.

In order to ensure a 'trusted' relationship with the government, the EU Member States did not hesitate to admonish DG ECHO when they thought it was too vocal, denouncing the violence perpetrated by the government and the 'quiet diplomacy' exercised by UN agencies. Thus, we can understand that the EU Member States and the EU, in general, have an interest in being influential in the country and preserving a diplomatic relationship with it.

In Mozambique, we have also seen that the presence of some EU Member States, such as Italy, on which, however, we did not focus since its programmes were mainly on development aid, confirms the idea that the EU Member States have their own political priorities based on which they grant funding to the country. As discussed in Chapter 7, Italy has many economic interests in the country which prompts it to be present in the country and to fund aid programmes.

In addition, the political agenda in Brussels also seemed to influence the attitude and the relationship DG ECHO has with its agents. For instance, we have seen in Lebanon that despite all the existing issues in the coordination with UN agencies, the latter have always been the privileged agents. A similar scenario can be found in Mozambique. Of course, DG ECHO funds UN agencies more than NGOs because they have greater capacities. However, it can also be that the choice DG ECHO makes is strategic and in line with the priorities of the EU's external action, thus of the EU Member States. Among them, there is the goal of preserving a good relationship with the UN system (see EU Global Strategy).

Therefore, alongside development aid (Smith, 2014: 49), humanitarian aid is one of the tools of EU's foreign policy and, intrinsically, it cannot be neutral and independent.[87] As discussed in chapter 4, the legal framework of EU humanitarian aid is art. 214 TFEU. The first paragraph of the article, 214.1, states that "the Union's operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be conducted with the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of the Union". Furthermore, art. 21 TEU spells out those principles and objectives of the external action, including "safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity". Recently, these objectives have been spelt out in the EU Global Strategy that guides the entire EU foreign policy. Thus, EU humanitarian aid is conducted in line with these principles and objectives that correspond to the EU Member States' priorities and, as such it is not neutral and independent.

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[87] There is an ongoing debate on whether or not neutrality is actually a good thing. For instance, Martínez & Eng (2016) argue that the neutrality of food assistance in Syria, unintentionally assisted the Assad regime by facilitating its control over food, used to foster compliance. Also, Slim (2020) questions the assumption for which humanitarian aid should be neutral, arguing that it is not the only legitimate form of humanitarian aid.

8.3 A formula for effectiveness?

Given the discussion above, is it possible to identify a *formula for effectiveness*? What can be done to improve the effectiveness of the EU humanitarian aid projects (and beyond)? Of course, these questions have been studied and discussed for years. Despite having analysed only three case studies based on the assessed hypotheses, it is possible to identify some elements to be considered beneficial to ensure the effectiveness of the projects.

Connected to Hp1 and Hp3, to avoid impediments by the government and making sure that EU Member States are neutral, the projects that donors and agents should focus on are those of disaster preparedness and resilience rather than only food and health assistance (and shelter, in the case of Lebanon). In other words, projects that are not only 'for the aftermath' of a crisis, but also for 'before' the crisis. Disaster preparedness and resilience programmes aim at strengthening the capacities of first responders at the regional, national, local levels by providing them with a set of measures (e.g., training for search and rescue, the establishment of early-warning systems, development of contingency plans, stockpiling of equipment and supplies).[88] These projects would guarantee that the national government would 'own' the response, being more independent from foreign donors. This would lead governments to avoid, or at least decrease, the negative attitudes, such as in Myanmar and Mozambique, where national authorities do not want foreigners to witness (in reality, in the national authorities' perception, to check) what is going on in their own countries. Consequently, the EU Member States would not need to be as 'alert' when dealing with these types of national authorities' attitude and it would be easier for the EU Member States to reach an agreement on a budget without tensions. Related to this last aspect, since this type of programmes includes long-term objectives, this would facilitate the coordination between DG DEVCO and ECHO on the field.

This is indeed what DG ECHO started to do in Mozambique, and this could be especially applicable to countries prone to climate change and hydrometeorological hazards (nowadays increasingly frequent). These projects would guarantee greater independence to the beneficiaries, and national governments could be more prone to accepting these projects rather than those after a crisis, when the government itself is already in great difficulty. In addition, disaster preparedness and resilience projects imply longer-term objectives that, in the long run, would have an impact on the society's fabric.

Furthermore, connected to Hp2, effectiveness could be better ensured when DG ECHO and its agents are completely attuned and work together towards the same objective and ensure that

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[88] See https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/disaster_preparedness_en

the agents have the right capacities to implement the projects. This aspect influences all dimensions of effectiveness, beginning with the needs assessment. The latter should be further improved with frequent cross-checks. DG ECHO could also develop its needs assessment methodology, which could complement UN agencies' efforts, thus becoming more independent in this respect and ensuring a more solid picture of who the beneficiaries are. Also, targets should be more realistic without being too ambitious.

Additionally, what eventually emerged from the empirical assessment is the relevance of the personalities of the people involved. Where officials knew each other and got on well, the programmes have run smoothly (i.e., Myanmar). Thus, to ensure effectiveness, it is important to create collegiality among the staff. For instance, the initiative of the humanitarian breakfasts initiated by DG ECHO in Myanmar was very successful in creating a sense of mutual trust among principal and agents. They also allowed principal and agents to exchange information more rapidly. Similar initiatives, for instance, happened neither in Lebanon nor in Mozambique, where, indeed, the relationships were primarily formal. However, in Mozambique, DG ECHO used the crisis modifiers, which also took advantage of the new communication technologies (e.g., WhatsApp) that made communication swifter. Indeed, besides emails, the use of technologies greatly helps the coordination of humanitarian aid, enabling the agents to stay up-to-date.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to comparatively assess the three case studies. It has done so by looking at each hypothesis, combining the empirical findings for each country. The overall comparative assessment highlighted the most relevant factors in explaining the variation of the effectiveness vis-à-vis the pre-established objectives, namely the national government's attitude and the delegation and the choice of the agent. Based on this, the chapter suggested a formula for effectiveness, shifting the attention towards preparedness resilience, ensuring an improved coordination with the agents, adopting mechanisms to foster cooperation and collegiality and using the latest technologies to streamline communication. The next chapter will end the thesis by discussing the salience of the thesis, the key findings and opening avenues for future research.

Chapter 9. Conclusion

Introduction

The thesis has explored and empirically assessed the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes. Referring to the literature on EU foreign policy, public policy and humanitarian and development aid, the dissertation proposed three hypotheses on three factors that can lead to a variation in the effectiveness vis-à-vis the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. The theoretical analysis was followed by an empirical assessment that considered three case studies: Myanmar, Lebanon, and Mozambique (2015-2017). This chapter concludes the thesis by reviewing the thesis' research question, its salience, the methods used. It will then recall the key empirical findings and discuss avenues for future research.

9.1 EU humanitarian aid effectiveness and its salience

The year 2020 is likely to be remembered as a turning point in contemporary human history for many reasons that span from economic to social. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a steep increase in the number of people in need of humanitarian aid around the world, and the need to deliver aid effectively has become more critical than ever. G7 leaders meeting in Cornwall in 2021 highlighted this aspect by pledging $870m to the global distribution of vaccines, shifting attention on how to achieve this goal (WHO, 2021). The current pandemic is the apex of more than 20 years of progressively increasing numbers of people in need of food and medicine following wars, natural hazards due to climate change, population growth and lack of resources. As OCHA reports (2018), the world went from 40 million people in need of aid in 2005 to more than 128 million people in 2018.

Against this backdrop, this research becomes even more significant. Since millions of lives are at stake, it is crucial to consider what can influence the effectiveness of humanitarian aid programmes and how can they be improved. Concretely, programmes that are supposed to provide food or medicine and end up not doing so could lead to further losses and extended suffering from hunger and disease. Besides donor states, such as the USA (See Chapter 1), which is considered among the top humanitarian aid donors worldwide, international organisations also play a relevant role. They are generally the states' agents for implementing humanitarian aid programmes.

For this reason, it is noteworthy that the EU, a sui generis international organisation, is not an implementer, but rather one of the world's top humanitarian aid donors. In line with the

SDGs, through DG ECHO, the EU has invested billions in all major crises around the world over the last ten years. For instance, DG ECHO, together with its Member States, was very present in the Middle East during the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts. It was also one of the major donors in Africa during the Ebola outbreak, during the Sahel hunger crisis, and during conflicts in South Sudan and DRC. In addition, DG ECHO invested millions in other parts of the world, where human-made and natural crises were going on, such as in Venezuela, Myanmar and Ukraine.

Through DG ECHO, the EU is a donor which delegates the implementation of its projects to agents that are mainly UN agencies (e.g., WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR) and NGOs (e.g., Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE). In this context, it is important to note that the EU is not a unitary actor, but is composed of 27 Member States (28 during the period studied here, 2015-17) that conduct their own humanitarian aid policies. Despite this, the EU Member States choose to delegate some policy to the EU's DG ECHO. Therefore, humanitarian aid is one of the most significant strands of the EU's foreign policy and one of the sectors where the EU's role in geopolitics can be better grasped by assessing what 'the EU does' and looking at how it concretely changes people's lives.

The thesis started from a puzzle dating back to 2010, when a devastating earthquake struck Haiti, killing 250 000 people, causing another 300 000 to be injured, and another 5 million to be displaced (World Vision, 2019). That was the first test for EU humanitarian aid's effectiveness, and the result was not to be positively remembered. At the time, ineffectiveness included associating with agents who were not prepared to face the local constraints and technical difficulties on the ground. This resulted in delays of up to 12 months in constructing temporary shelters, sanitation and water supply systems, and renovating damaged houses. Thus, the effectiveness varied vis-à-vis the pre-established objectives (e.g., providing food and health assistance in a timely manner). Why did this occur?

The research question at the basis of this thesis is why does the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes vary – namely, what are the factors causing the variation? The second question complements and specifies the first one. Variation means a change in the sub-dimensions of effectiveness with regard to the ultimate objective, which is full achievement of the objectives (See Chapter 2). By singling out the factors that cause variation vis-à-vis the objectives, one can better understand what has gone wrong in a humanitarian aid programme and, thus, what can be avoided in the future. This is what makes the thesis meaningful: by understanding what DG ECHO could do to make its programmes more effective, policy-makers

can adjust the programmes to better achieve the pre-established goals. Paying attention to these aspects is not helpful only for policy-makers, but also useful for academics.

Indeed, the thesis' aim was also to fill in a gap in EU foreign policy literature. Although a consistent part of the latest literature has focussed on actorness and how internal effectiveness can influence the external effectiveness of the EU in international arenas, it mainly focuses on these aspects in formal contexts – for instance, international organisations (e.g., the UN, the Human Rights Council and so on) and on the EU speaking with one voice at the UN level. Instead, this thesis empirically assesses the external effectiveness of the EU 'on the ground', in the context of wars and natural crises. It also assesses the relationship that the EU has with UN agencies and NGOs in the field.

As discussed in Chapter 2, EU humanitarian aid has been an overlooked sector of EU development policy, meaning that was considered part of the development aid policy literature, despite being quite different in its priorities and timespans. The few existing academic publications focus mainly on the institutional and legal aspects of EU humanitarian aid rather than on its effectiveness. There has not yet been a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid.

EU humanitarian aid includes a different array of sectors and projects. This thesis focuses especially on food and health assistance, while acknowledging other projects such as shelter, WASH and DRR. The focus is on food and health because they constitute the bulk of every humanitarian aid programme. Indeed, when a crisis occurs, what people immediately need for survival is food and medicine. This is why the most discussed agent throughout the thesis is WFP, the UN agency mainly devoted to food assistance. DG ECHO distributed food assistance through in-kind vouchers, but especially through cash-based assistance following the Grand Bargain in 2016.

Furthermore, the relevance of the thesis lies in the empirical definition of effectiveness used. The latter is a concept not easy to define, especially in a qualitative study. The thesis emphasises external effectiveness. EU humanitarian aid effectiveness means not only goal achievement, but is complemented by three other sub-dimensions. EU humanitarian aid projects can be considered effective when they reach the objectives spelt out at the beginning of the policy cycle. However, in line with Oberthür and Groen study (2015), and considering that effectiveness encompasses input, process and outcome, the definition of goal attainment should be further specified through three sub-dimensions of effectiveness, tailored explicitly for EU humanitarian aid. The first sub-dimension concerns a precise needs assessment, meaning that the targeting involves the "right" beneficiaries. The second sub-dimension concerns

the seamlessness of the policy cycle, so it is about the process. A procedural perspective is useful to establish the effectiveness of a project and check the interactions among the actors involved. The third sub-dimension of EU humanitarian aid effectiveness involves Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)/nexus, meaning the shift from humanitarian to development aid. Effectiveness can vary across these dimensions. Variation means a change in the sub-dimensions of effectiveness with regard to fulfilling the overall objectives of the policy. The various degree of effectiveness and of its dimensions can be quantified on a scale from 0 (ineffective) to 3 (effective) (See Chapter 2). Each dimension varies according to specific features of humanitarian aid projects. We could consider that a project is not effective if it does not reach pre-established objectives (goal attainment) and if the other three sub-dimensions are not satisfied at all (all dimensions score 0). A project has low effectiveness when goal attainment and the other sub-dimensions each equal 1, so the overall project evaluation equals the sum of 4. This means that only some of the pre-established objectives were achieved and the needs assessment did not include the people in need. In terms of seamlessness of the policy-cycle, there were severe delays of up to 12 months or more, and there was a lack of accountability between DG ECHO and its agents. In terms of LRRD/nexus, a conversation had started about transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance, but without concrete implications. A project has medium effectiveness when goal attainment and each sub-dimension equals 2, so the evaluation of the overall project equals the sum of 8. This means that most pre-established objectives were achieved, but the needs assessment did not include some areas and some beneficiaries fell through or were repeated. Regarding the seamlessness of the policy-cycle, there were some delays (i.e. some weeks or a couple of months), accountability between the principal and the agents was present, there was info-sharing and no overlaps. As per the LRRD/nexus, projects started to be financed, but were not fully implemented yet. Finally, a project is effective if goal attainment and the sub-dimensions equal to 3 and the overall project's evaluation equals 12, the highest value. This means that all the pre-established objectives were reached; the needs assessment was thoroughly and precisely conducted; the seamlessness of the policy cycle did not present delays or overlaps, with constant information-sharing among the actors involved; and the LRRD/nexus was totally implemented, to the extent that humanitarian aid was no longer needed. Finally, when considering variation in the effectiveness, it means that each of these dimensions varies vis-à-vis the ultimate objective. The latter is the total achievement of the pre-established goals (=12), which are fixed at the beginning of the policy cycle.

By defining precisely the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid policy, the thesis aims to enrich not only this field of study, but also the way we conceive the effectiveness of humanitarian aid policies in general.

9.2   How to look for the answers

The thesis sought to reply to the research questions by formulating three hypotheses and assessing them empirically through case studies corresponding to three countries in a precise time frame, between 2015 and 2017. The thesis relied on empirical data gathered through sources such as official reports and documents, and 55 interviews with UN, NGO, and EU officials.

The three hypotheses on what factors influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid programmes were formulated based on EU foreign policy, public policy, humanitarian aid and development aid policy literatures. Each hypothesis touched upon different aspects of EU humanitarian aid policy. The first focussed on the internal cohesiveness of EU Member States and how this affects coordination in the field. The second focussed on the hierarchical relationship between DG ECHO, the principal, and its agents in the field. It looked at the agents' capacity and accountability. Finally, the third presented an external factor: the national authorities' attitude towards the delivery of EU humanitarian aid.

The first hypothesis considered how the alignment of preferences among the EU Member States at HQ can bring about external effectiveness that, in turn, can translate into coordination between DG ECHO and the EU Member States in the field. The extent to which preferences are aligned can lead to variation in the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid. The alignment of Member States' preferences into a collective position was assessed by looking at the budget approval phase, the only stage where EU Member States have a say on a humanitarian aid policy. In addition, internal cohesiveness is not only shown through the alignment of Member State preferences. Its second component is the bureaucratic unity among DGs, namely DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. DGs have, indeed, their own single voices, and if they do not coordinate, there is no bureaucratic unity. This has effects in the field. The unity across DG ECHO and DG DEVCO was empirically assessed by looking at the programmes established to guarantee consistency between the two different policies and institutions.

The second hypothesis focussed on the coordination between DG ECHO and its agents (i.e., UN agencies and NGOs). Their P-A relationship is hierarchical, based on a contract with room for manoeuvre for the agent, who has to be accountable to the principal. DG ECHO has various reasons to delegate the implementation of the projects to the agents, including specialisation,

credibility, and management of policy externalities. It also checks directly (police patrols), or indirectly (fire-alarms) what the agents do. In addition, since policy-making is a chain of principal-agents, DG ECHO acts both as an agent and a principal. Initially the EU Member States' agent, DG ECHO then takes on the role of principal when implementing humanitarian aid. In turn, UN agencies and NGOs are the DG's agents implementing the projects, but can also turn into principals, delegating part of the implementation of the projects to other agents, generally local NGOs. Empirically, this hypothesis was assessed by focusing on coordination, expressed by the amount of information shared between principal and agents, the frequency of communication, and the agents' concrete capacities to implement projects (e.g., offices on the ground, number of staff). In this sense, the coordination between DG ECHO and its agents could lead to a variation in the effectiveness of the programmes.

The third hypothesis focussed on the national authorities' attitude towards EU humanitarian aid programmes. If national governments and local elites do not interfere with the implementation of the programmes, but instead facilitate and participate in its implementation, humanitarian aid programmes could be more effective. This was empirically assessed by looking at the visa and travel restrictions imposed by the governments and at the extent to which authorisation for access to certain areas was granted.

The hypotheses were empirically assessed by referring to three case studies, namely Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, highlighting a geographic spread, representative of the EU's engagement anywhere humanitarian needs surge and of its wide humanitarian aid network, present in more than 40 countries around the world. There were a few criteria for choosing these cases.

First of all, the choice of case studies was limited to the years 2015 to 2017. Data collected in Appendix 1 spans from 2007 to 2018. However, the choice was limited to the years 2015 and 2017 because those years were particularly eventful in all three countries. In Myanmar, there had been a resurgence of violence against the ethnic minority of the Rohingya and, at the same time, floods negatively impacted the country. In Lebanon, following the 2016 Grand Bargain, the new approach of cash-based assistance was being implemented for the first time, making these years crucial for the streamlining of this modality of assistance in the country. Similarly, in Mozambique, cash-based assistance was put forward by DG ECHO as a new, more evolved modality of delivering assistance. In this same period, Mozambique was hit by El Nino and Cyclone Dineo.

The type of crisis also helped in the selection of the case studies. Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique correspond to different types of crises: complex, human-made and natural,

respectively. This allowed us to assess the hypotheses in relation to different kinds of scenarios. In addition, at the beginning, we expected that different types of crises might have a different impact on the effectiveness. For instance, we might have expected that in human-made or complex crises, in which national governments are often themselves a source of violence, the effectiveness would have been lower because officials would not be predisposed to foreign humanitarian aid. Other cases that were complex, human-made, natural were discarded. For instance, Myanmar was chosen over other complex crises, such as the Philippines, because DG ECHO has been one of the few donors worldwide that continued financing the "forgotten crisis" of the Rohingya. In addition, at the time, the confluence of conflict and natural disasters produced one of the most massive refugee exoduses in modern times. Lebanon is one of the top 12 recipients of DG ECHO funding (see Table 3.2). It was chosen over the other human-made crises – such as DRC, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, or Turkey – because it was the country that hosted the highest number of refugees in relation to its population. It is also a country that figures among the areas prioritised by the EU's Global Strategy. Finally, it was a human-made crisis where it was safe to conduct fieldwork. Mozambique was chosen over other natural crises – such as the ones in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Costa Rica – because it was the first country hit by the El Niño drought and because it is part of the SAIO region, where DG ECHO has invested the most following this types of crisis (ICF, 2018; Interview #33; Appendix 1). Furthermore, the durability of the projects prompted this choice. In fact, DG ECHO had been engaged for more than two consecutive years in Myanmar, Lebanon and Mozambique, allowing for the assessment of effectiveness to be more precise.

Another relevant aspect to consider, although not formally included as criteria, is the coping capacity of the governments. Looking at countries where the government's capacity of coping with crises is not strong is representative of the countries in which the EU is mostly engaged worldwide. It also leads us to focus on other factors that could be more relevant in the assessment of the effectiveness.

For each case study, the assessment of the hypotheses was conducted considering the pre-established objectives of the EU humanitarian aid projects and the definition of effectiveness. We must acknowledge that often the pre-established objectives formulated at the beginning of the policy cycle, at least in the accessed documents, were not precisely specified. For instance, as we have seen in Myanmar and Mozambique, the priorities and objectives were to provide food and health assistance, as well as protection and shelter. However, they did not specify the number of people or the amount of food that needed to be provided. In Lebanon, as we have seen, the main objective was more precise and it was to establish a single modality through

which distribute cash-based assistance, consequently the pre-established objectives in this case were spelt out more clearly.

Thus, each hypothesis was assessed in relation to effectiveness, and more precisely, in relation to goal attainment, the seamlessness of the policy cycle, the needs assessment, and the shift from humanitarian to development aid. To this end, empirical data were collected to provide evidence of the influence of the factors over the various dimensions composing effectiveness.

9.3 Key Findings

Several key findings emerged from the assessment of the three case studies between 2015 and 2017. First of all, it emerged that, despite what we had expected about the different types of crises (i.e., complex, human-made, natural) and the related outcomes, the issues influencing the effectiveness are similar. They include a discrepancy between people in need and those reached, delays, and protraction of humanitarian aid programmes. They seem to shape a "pattern of ineffectiveness". However, we must also acknowledge that, consistently with what was expected, DG ECHO's total effectiveness was relatively better in a context of natural crisis, such as in Mozambique, rather than in a context of complex crisis, such as in Myanmar, and a human-made crisis, such as in Lebanon. Presumably, one of the main reasons is that in Mozambique, the government, although not well-disposed towards humanitarian aid, was not the source of the crisis, such as in Myanmar, and it contributed to shaping strategies that would have guaranteed longer-term results, as opposed to the Lebanese government.

Secondly, contrary to the general expectations that the effectiveness of humanitarian aid is more significant in countries where governments are stable and have coping capacities, the research showed that, in the case of Lebanon in particular, this is not always true. Indeed, Lebanon's government had superior infrastructural and institutional capacities compared to Myanmar and Mozambican governments. Thus, one would expect that the effectiveness in Lebanon was fully medium or high. Instead, as we have seen, it was in between low and medium, thus similar to Myanmar and worse than Mozambique. Thus, the effectiveness does not depend neither on the type of crisis nor solely on the government's capacity to cope with the crisis. The reasons behind variation in EU humanitarian aid effectiveness are rather found in the hypothesised factors.

The most relevant one in all three case studies was the *national authorities' attitude* (Hp3), which refers to the disposition of governments towards foreign resources, rather than to the institutional and infrastructural capacities (See Chapter 3). As discussed in chapter 8, all three

case studies empirically show this. Despite requesting international aid, in Myanmar, the government was not well-disposed towards the implementation of humanitarian aid projects. The hostility came across through travel and visa restrictions that delayed the implementation of the projects, jeopardising the overall effectiveness of the aid: the government did not want to have "foreign witnesses" to what was happening. In the case of Lebanon, the national government was clear about supporting a no-stay policy. Consequently, it was against any type of humanitarian aid programme that would have guaranteed a continued and stable presence of the refugees. Indeed, the government did not grant specific permissions to the agents, consequently delaying the implementation of the projects and jeopardising the overall effectiveness. In the case of Mozambique, the political interests, the level of corruption, the precarious coordination between the centre and local authorities, and the hostility towards a cash-based assistance modality brought delays in the projects, thus influencing the overall effectiveness.

Another relevant factor that influenced the effectiveness was the *delegation and coordination* between DG ECHO and its agents (Hp2). The empirical findings confirmed what was discussed by P-A literature about the reasons why principals delegate to agents. In all three case studies, DG ECHO delegated the implementation of the projects to its agents on the ground of their specialisation, credibility, and capacity to manage policy externalities. Indeed, DG ECHO assumed that agents knew the context much better than the DG and were directly in touch with local institutions and beneficiaries. Also, when shaping the projects, the agents considered the institutions' and beneficiaries' input significant, which made the agents 'credible' in the eyes of the institutions and beneficiaries themselves. In addition, agents could manage policy externalities because their knowledge of the context and expertise allowed them to provide DG ECHO with information and recommendations on alternative projects following shifting needs, thus avoiding failure and bad management. The latter has been especially so in Myanmar and Mozambique, whereas in Lebanon, DG ECHO was the one detecting the shifting needs and proposed to reshape the projects based on different modalities of aid's distribution (i.e. cash-based assistance).

Furthermore, the cases of Lebanon and Mozambique showed that when some agents did not have the right capacities to implement the projects, they were not as accountable as they should have been towards the DG, and they entered into an argument with the DG itself. Consequently, the overall effectiveness of the projects was jeopardised. This key finding brought to an additional result concerning DG ECHO's relationship with NGOs and UN agencies. In fact, it emerged that DG ECHO was a very present donor through its Country Office and personnel in

the field, attentive and supportive throughout the whole process. However, agents, especially NGOs, felt that the DG was excessively demanding and that it treated NGOs and UN agencies differently. Firstly, NGOs received less funding than UN agencies and this, in itself, marks a basic difference in their treatment. Secondly, DG ECHO tended to control and scrutinise more NGOs than UN agencies. For instance, the periodical reports the NGOs had to send to the DG were numerous and had to be scrupulously drafted. On the contrary, if UN agencies did not draft the reports as precise as the contract required them to, DG ECHO did not negatively react. This is due to the fact that UN agencies have greater capacities than NGOs and also to the fact that DG ECHO's funds form just a part of multi-donors funding to the UN agencies, while the funding given to NGOs is generally coming from one single donor (i.e., DG ECHO), making them even more accountable and subject to scrutiny.

However, if, on the one hand, DG ECHO is very controlling towards its agents, on the other hand, on other occasions, it seemed not to have exercised this control enough. As we have discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this is the case in Lebanon and in Mozambique. In Lebanon, agents, particularly NGOs, grew beyond their original scope, beginning to implement projects that went beyond their capacities and not being able to deliver the projects in a timely manner. DG ECHO should have prevented this from happening by moderating the funding flux, re-directing the funding to other agents better equipped to take up the sudden flow of money and more up to the tasks. Also, in Mozambique, DG ECHO should have better checked WFP's project implementation, ensuring that the food delivery ended up with the right beneficiaries and that WFP rightly coordinated with local agents. In addition, NGOs felt that DG ECHO should have recognised that a cash-based assistance modality was not suitable for all countries. If it was useful in a country such as Lebanon, where the banking system worked and the infrastructures were present, the same was not valid for Mozambique.

Although relatively less relevant than the other two factors, the EU internal cohesiveness and coordination with DG ECHO on the field (Hp1) influenced simultaneously positively and negatively the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid, particularly in Myanmar and Mozambique (See Chapters 5,7 and 8). It influenced it positively because the EU Member States' preferences aligned towards granting room for manoeuvre to DG ECHO. The latter had financial discretion, being able to adopt ad hoc decisions to add extra funding when needed and in a short amount of time. Besides this, in the case of Mozambique, the DG could adopt crisis modifiers, namely, an agreement that enabled the DG to quickly fund humanitarian aid projects. In all three cases, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness in granting the DG ample room for manoeuvre translated into coordination in the field between the EU Member States, particularly the UK,

and the DG. Specifically in Mozambique, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness was related to bureaucratic unity, which was showed by the coordination between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO. The latter, indeed, offered to the former additional funds to finance humanitarian aid projects, enhancing the possibility of reaching longer-term objectives.

The EU Member States' internal cohesiveness also had a negative influence on the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid projects. In Myanmar, the lack of internal cohesiveness among the EU Member States on a budget that would have guaranteed the funding of longer-term projects negatively influenced the overall effectiveness of the projects. It caused delays and a lack of nexus in that period. In Mozambique, the EU Member States' internal cohesiveness on a reduced budget was a limitation to DG ECHO's humanitarian aid and influenced its effectiveness. Indeed, despite the re-current hydrometeorological hazards, the scopes of the projects were reduced. Thus, not all beneficiaries could be reached, and many were left without assistance.

In all three case studies, the assessment of this factor highlighted another relevant finding: EU humanitarian aid is not neutral and independent. As we have seen in Chapter 5, in the case of Myanmar, the tensions over the budget that would have guaranteed a bridge between humanitarian and development aid were caused by political interests and priorities. The EU Member States were concerned by the political situation and the escalation of violence and did not want to jeopardise the diplomatic relationship with the government of Myanmar. This is also consistent with the attitude they had towards DG ECHO. The EU Member States attempted to limit the DG's advocacy role by admonishing it not to be vocal about the perpetration of violence towards the Rohingya and about the UN's 'quiet diplomacy'.

Moreover, we have discussed that, officially, the only phase where the EU Member States can express their opinion is during the budget approval phase (See Chapter 4). The EU Member States cannot have a saying in the formulation and implementation of the projects. However, the reduced budget to the SAIO region, including Mozambique, was a political choice in itself, since it corresponded to the political priorities the EU Member States had in that period. Thus, the choice to prioritise a crisis over another is in itself political. At the time, the Syrian crisis was considered strategically and politically more important than the natural disasters that hit that part of Africa. This was in line with the EU Global Strategy, whose objective was to have a secure and stable Middle East. It was also in line with the intentions of the EU to contain the refugee flux deriving from the Syrian war, which also led to the EU-Turkey deal in 2016. This is why the majority of the funding in that period went to Syria and to the neighbouring countries, and a significant amount of funding flooded Lebanon in particular.

In addition, the priorities of the EU Member States were not solely reflected in the budget but also in the relationship DG ECHO had with its agents and, in particular, with UN agencies. As we have seen in Lebanon and Mozambique especially, the DG chooses them as a privileged agent despite lacking transparency and not being fully accountable. One reason is strategic: UN agencies have significant capacities and can manage large-scale projects. Another reason is political: according to the EU Global Strategy, one of the EU external action's priorities is promoting "a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core" (EEAS, 2016: 15). Therefore, it becomes significant to prioritise the UN as an agent over NGOs also in humanitarian aid. Consequently, EU humanitarian aid can be considered a tool of EU foreign policy and, therefore, not neutral and independent. Also, the policy is enshrined in art. 214 TFEU, which refers to the principles and objectives of the EU external action, spelt out by art. 21 TEU. Thus, since EU humanitarian aid should be delivered in line with these principles and priorities, it cannot be neutral and independent, but it is implemented according to the political objectives of the EU Member States.

These key findings brought to the question of what can be done to improve the overall effectiveness? Is there a formula for effectiveness? Despite having analysed only three case studies, the assessment conducted might suggest some elements that could be beneficial to ensure the effectiveness of the projects independently from the type of crisis.

The attention should be shifted, further than it is already starting to be, from immediate response to preparedness and resilience programmes that national authorities are more likely to accept. Consequently, this would bring the EU Member States to be more neutral in their priorities and relationship with the governments. The formula should also include an "improved coordination" with agents with the right capacities to implement the projects and personalities that would easily cooperate. Moreover, new technologies would further enhance the effectiveness of (not only) EU humanitarian aid projects.

In a nutshell, the 'formula' of effectiveness is characterised by the following.

- The type of project should be devoted to preparedness and resilience in addition to food and health, since they have a greater chance of being accepted by the national authorities and, consequently, guarantee neutrality of EU Member States in assigning the budget for humanitarian aid (See Hp 1 and 3);
- "Improved coordination" with agents who have the right capacities to implement the projects;
- Mechanisms that foster cooperation and collegiality among officials, since, as we have discussed, personalities of the people involved matter (See Hp2);

- Use of the latest communication technologies that help streamline communication (See Hp2).

If one of these aspects is partially or totally missing, effectiveness is undermined. Thus, we can state that the higher the number of (partially or totally) missing aspects, the worse the ineffectiveness. Does this mean that every aspect listed above is equally relevant? Based on this research, the attitude of the national authorities is crucial, closely followed by the 'improved coordination' and the personalities of the officials involved as the second and third relevant aspect. The last one, but not the least, to be considered is the use of technologies.

9.4. Conclusion and avenues for future research

Climate change, population growth, wars, and a scarcity of resources are all increasing the number of people living in precarious conditions. As we have seen throughout the thesis, there are many studies dedicated to the advantages and disadvantages of development aid. If, on the one hand, development aid brings about an improvement of living conditions, it can, on the other hand, create dependency in the receiving country, to say nothing of the issues involving local authorities that often represent an obstacle to the aid itself, by diverting the funds that should be used to finance the projects. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Angus Deaton puts it (2013: 274), "one reason why today's aid does not eliminate global poverty is that it rarely tries to do so". Development aid is not directed towards people, but it is given to governments, and it is not designed to improve the conditions of single persons. In addition, it has been studied and proven that aid does not necessarily mean growth. There is no correlation between the two because aid does not work as an investment (Ibidem: 288; See Chapter 2). Development aid is, thus, controversial, and it did not bring the positive results hoped by policy-makers.[89] Humanitarian aid points towards another path and, vis-à-vis development aid, it acquires greater relevance. Indeed, if development aid is ineffective, controversial, and with negative side-effects, why not instead focus resources on humanitarian aid, or on a combination of the two?

As we have seen throughout this thesis, humanitarian aid can also be controversial, especially if it is politicised. However, contrary to development aid, it is directed towards the people. Health and food assistance projects are useful even if they save or improve the conditions of even just one person. Moreover, humanitarian aid projects can be broken into different types, to include not only food and health but, as we have seen, disaster preparedness.

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[89] The thesis' aim was not to systematically compare humanitarian and development aid. Here, I mainly refer to Deaton (2013) who discusses the ineffectiveness of development aid following the research results of an entire field.

This latter would be implemented proactively, rather than 'parachuting' in assistance or the funding in the aftermath of a crisis when the government is, most of the times, in great difficulty. It would give the people and local authorities, especially, the instruments to be prepared when a crisis strikes, even if the crisis derives from domestic conflicts. For instance, in Myanmar, if programmes had involved local communities to look for instruments to enable them to face a complex emergency (i.e., establish longer-term hospitals and constant flow of medicines), the programmes could have more concretely helped people. In Lebanon, disaster preparedness programmes would have brought together both humanitarian and development aid actors, enhancing the coordination among them and favouring the passage to safety-net programmes. Also, they would have been stronger together vis-à-vis the government in advocating for longer-term projects. The same can be valid for Mozambique, where humanitarian aid combined with elements of development aid could have mitigated the level of corruption, and could have improved the list of beneficiaries making it more complete and thorough. Thus, humanitarian aid seems to be strategic to improving the conditions of people victims of wars or natural hazards both in the moment and in the long-term.

Future research could precisely look into this, going into more depth in assessing the formula for effectiveness and a resilient and preparedness programmes. It also might develop new hypotheses on other factors that could influence the effectiveness of EU humanitarian aid. It might do so by also considering other case studies. For instance, we did not look at some major crises such as the ones in Sudan, DRC, Yemen, or Venezuela (See Chapter 3). Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis and the responses to it, as well as future consequences of this pandemic that are already becoming evident (e.g., increase in poverty worldwide), can provide a vast basis for research and for assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivered by the EU (and beyond) and how can this be improved.

In addition, as we have seen, EU's effectiveness seemed to be relatively better in a context of natural crisis. Future research might look more into depth into this particular aspect, that is, it can empirically assess whether the experiences and methods used by principals and agents in a context of natural disasters can be 'exported' to other types of crisis to ensure the effectiveness.

Finally, we can also open another window for future research. This may mostly concern the relationship between the EU and the UK after Brexit. We have seen that DG ECHO and the UK's DFID have always strongly cooperated and coordinated in all three cases. DFID was advocating cash-based assistance in Lebanon and Mozambique, and it was one of the few EU Member States holding an office in Myanmar and coordinating with the DG. Surely, the fact

that the UK no longer belongs to the EU has a consequence on the EU budget devoted to humanitarian aid. As shown in Table 1.2 in the introductory chapter, together with Germany, between 2007 and 2017, the UK was the EU Member State that contributed most to the overall EU humanitarian aid budget. However, today, the EU established flexibility mechanisms to compensate the loss of budget following Brexit. Among them, the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve amounting to €1.2 bn, that enables swift EU financial support when sudden needs arise. Moreover, the so-called British Adjustment Reserve was established, adding €5 bn to the annual overall EU budget "to counter adverse consequences in the Member States and sectors that are worst affected".[90]

In addition, the UK's DFID has now been replaced by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the UK's foreign policy started to focus more on development rather than on humanitarian aid (Sherriff, 2021). As we have seen, budget cuts generally undermine the overall effectiveness of humanitarian aid programmes. Therefore, we could expect that if the UK has reduced the budget for humanitarian aid, one consequence might be that reaching all the pre-established objectives will be more difficult. However, the merging of DFID into the FCDO will guarantee financial resources that the UK can strategically spend, not necessarily on issues affecting the poorest countries, but on projects that are in line with the UK's interests overseas (Honeyman, 2020). The merger means that the influence of the UK's development agenda is going to be reduced vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Accordingly, this policy becomes only another foreign policy tool that could help the UK push its agenda towards other countries.

Future studies could focus on the influence of Brexit and of the creation of the FCDO on humanitarian aid project's effectiveness and on the relationship with DG ECHO. There are two possible scenarios: if the priorities of DG ECHO and the FCDO are similar, this could once again lead to cooperation. Alternatively, the FCDO may have other priorities, thus it can cooperate and coordinate with other partners, thereby excluding DG ECHO. It can build stronger ties with DG INTPA (the former DEVCO) rather than ECHO. This might have an implication on the field and on the effectiveness. For instance, if FCDO is less influential because it has other priorities, the advocacy role of DG ECHO and of the FCDO itself could be downsized, jeopardizing the entire policy. However, other EU Member States could jump in,

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[90]   See: *What are the flexibility mechanisms you are referring to?* https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2088

substituting the role once held by DFID and the UK, such as France, Germany or the Netherlands.

In conclusion, the thesis assessed humanitarian aid's effectiveness, which has become even more critical following the COVID-19 crisis and the increase in calamities due to climate change and wars (e.g. the 2021 crisis in Afghanistan, that is now opening another scenario of refugee crisis). In this context, the EU is one of the main actors and donors worldwide. This thesis not only discussed a topic of increasing importance but also shed light on an overlooked sector of EU foreign policy, that is humanitarian aid, empirically assessing 'what the EU does', thereby filling a gap in the literature and empirically defining a complex concept such as effectiveness in a qualitative study.

Appendix 1. EU Humanitarian Aid Operations: data collection from 2007 to 2018

Source: Own data collection based on EDRIS online database https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/

2007

Recipient	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing UN Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Post conflict, drought, flood, food crisis	25,45	9,55	15,90	38%	62%	UNHCR, UNDP, WFP, UNMAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, MOFA
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees	6,65	3,95	2,70	59%	41%	UNHCR, WFP, HCR
ANGOLA	Humanitarian crisis	1,61	0,00	1,61	0%	100%	UNHCR, FAO
ARMENIA	Food crisis	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
BANGLADESH	Floods, Cyclone	6,54	1,93	4,61	29%	71%	MOFA, WFP, UNICEF
BELIZE	Hurricane Dean	0,02	0,00	0,02	0%	100%	UNDP
BENIN	Food shortage, school feeding programme	0,32	0,00	0,32	0%	100%	WFP, UNICEF
BHUTAN	Food crisis	0,03	0,00	0,03	0%	100%	WFP
BOLIVIA	Flood, rainfall, disaster reduction, El Nino	1,68	0,31	1,37	19%	81%	FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO
BURKINA FASO	Floods	2,60	1,15	1,45	44%	56%	WFP, UNICEF
BURUNDI	Post conflict, food crisis	18,30	4,92	13,39	27%	73%	WFP, UNHCR, UNOCHA, UNICEF, FAO, PAM
CAMBODIA	Health emergency	0,54	0,00	0,54	0%	100%	MOFA, UNDP
CAPE VERDE	Food crisis	0,39	0,00	0,39	0%	100%	FAO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Post conflict, food crisis	15,54	3,41	12,13	22%	78%	HCR, FAO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNOCHA, UNDP, WFP, WHO

CHAD	Food crisis, Darfur Crisis, Humanitarian crisis	34,26	11,51	22,75	34%	66%	HCR, MOFA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, UNDP, WFP, WHO,
COLOMBIA	Conflict, assistance to IDPs	7,92	1,50	6,42	19%	81%	UNHCR, OCHA,PAHO, UNICEF, WFP
CONGO	Humanitarian crisis	0,78	0,00	0,78	0%	100%	UNICEF
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Complex emergency, post conflict, food insecurity	105,17	7,15	98,03	7%	93%	HCR, MOFA, OCHA, OXFAM, PAM, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
COTE D'IVOIRE	Refugees, humanitarian crisis	5,11	0,50	4,61	10%	90%	UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOCHA, FAO
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	All kinds of crises and administrative financing	384,64	108,91	275,73	28%	72%	BCAH, ISDR, FAO, HCR, MOFA, PAM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNMAS UNRWA, WFP, WHO
CYPRUS	Committee on missing persons	0,05	0,00	0,05	0%	100%	Committee on missing persons
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Tropical storm Noel	1,92	0,50	1,42	26%	74%	UNDP, UNICEF, PAHO, WFP, WHO
EAST TIMOR	Violence	4,02	2,19	1,83	54%	46%	FAO, IOM,UNICEF, UNDP, WFP
EL SALVADOR	Nutritional situation	0,07	0,00	0,07	0%	100%	WFP
ERITREA	Humanitarian crisis	5,48	1,84	3,65	33%	67%	UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO
ETHIOPIA	Drought, Somali refugees	9,27	0,28	9,00	3%	97%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
FRANCE	Support	0,40	0,00	0,40	0%	100%	HCR
GHANA	Floods	1,86	0,60	1,26	32%	68%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
GUINEA	Malnutrition	0,60	0,60	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
GUINEA-BISSAU	Food crisis	1,15	0,00	1,15	0%	100%	FAO,WFP
HAITI	Hurricane Dean	5,29	1,07	4,23	20%	80%	FAO, OCHA,UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP
HONDURAS	Tropical storm Noel	0,63	0,50	0,13	80%	20%	UNICEF, WFP
INDONESIA	Floods	1,92	0,57	1,35	30%	70%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, WFP
IRAQ	Conflict	22,74	0,00	22,74	0%	100%	HCR, IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR

JAMAICA	Hurricane Dean	0,60	0,35	0,25	58%	42%	PAHO, UNICEF
JORDAN	Assistance to refugees	0,69	0,00	0,69	0%	100%	HCR, UNHCR
KENYA	Conflict and food crisis	6,70	4,00	2,70	60%	40%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Floods, food crises	4,38	0,50	3,88	11%	89%	MOFA, WFP, WHO
LAOS	Mines	0,48	0,00	0,48	0%	100%	UNDP
LEBANON	Conflict	11,59	1,86	9,74	16%	84%	UNICEF, UNRWA
LESOTHO	Food input	2,72	2,67	0,05	98%	2%	FAO, MOFA, WFP
LIBERIA	HIV, health crisis	18,68	5,84	12,84	31%	69%	ACNUR, FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNMIL, UNDP, WHO, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Floods, Cyclone	3,53	2,40	1,13	68%	32%	MOFA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MALAWI	Food crisis	0,40	0,00	0,40	0%	100%	FAO, WFP
MALI	Food crisis	3,40	1,50	1,90	44%	56%	UNICEF, WFP
MAURITANIA	Drought, assistance to refugees	1,76	1,41	0,35	80%	20%	HCR, MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
MEXICO	Tropical storm Noel	0,13	0,00	0,13	0%	100%	UNICEF
MOLDOVA	Drought	3,20	3,00	0,20	94%	6%	UNDP, MOFA
MOZAMBIQUE	Cyclone, floods	4,90	2,54	2,36	52%	48%	UNICEF, WFP
MYANMAR	Assistance to vulnerable households	6,87	4,64	2,23	68%	32%	MOFA, UNHCR, WFP
NAMIBIA	Humanitarian support	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
NEPAL	Floods, food crises	4,87	0,84	4,03	17%	83%	UNFPA, WFP
NICARAGUA	Hurricane Felix	4,87	2,37	2,50	49%	51%	MOFA, PAHO, UNICEF,WFP
NIGER	Food crisis	6,31	2,00	4,31	32%	68%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA, WFP
PAKISTAN	Floods, assistance to refugees	3,02	0,75	2,27	25%	75%	UNHCR, UNICEF

PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Complex emergency, conflict	52,41	20,40	32,01	39%	61%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNRWA, UNICEF
PERU	Earthquake	7,09	3,96	3,13	56%	44%	FAO, WFP, PAHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UN Habitat
PHILIPPINES	Typhoon Durian	3,49	0,71	2,78	20%	80%	FAO, UNICEF, UNFPA
RUSSIA	Support	5,26	0,00	5,26	0%	100%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP
RWANDA	Food crisis	1,51	0,00	1,51	0%	100%	WFP
SIERRA LEONE	HIV, political crisis	7,46	0,00	7,46	0%	100%	UNAIDS, UNDP
SOLOMON ISLANDS	Earthquake	0,21	0,00	0,21	0%	100%	UNICEF
SOMALIA	Conflict	31,53	1,00	30,53	3%	97%	FAO, HCR, MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SOUTH SUDAN	Conflict	4,20	4,20	0,00	100%	0%	FAO, OCHA, WHO
SRI LANKA	Conflict	6,13	0,50	5,63	8%	92%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNDSS, UNHCR, UNOCHA, UNICEF, WFP
SUDAN	Conflict, floods, food crisis	195,40	52,34	143,06	27%	73%	MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SWAZILAND	Drought	3,40	2,60	0,80	76%	24%	MOFA, WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Assistance to refugees	2,16	0,98	1,19	45%	55%	HCR, UNHCR
TANZANIA	Assistance to refugees, Health emergency	5,43	4,58	0,85	84%	16%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
THAILAND	Assistance to refugees	0,32	0,00	0,32	0%	100%	UNHCR
TOGO	Floods	1,55	1,00	0,55	65%	35%	MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
UGANDA	Floods	34,16	6,53	27,64	19%	81%	FAO, HCR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
WESTERN SAHARA	Refugee crisis	2,40	0,00	2,40	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
YEMEN	Assistance to refugees	2,47	0,80	1,67	32%	68%	MOFA, UNHCR, UNDP, WFP
ZAMBIA	Assistance to refugees	2,56	2,56	0,00	100%	0%	UNHCR

ZIMBABWE	Food insecurity and impact of HIV and AIDS	27,84	18,48	9,36	66%	34%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNFPA, WFP
Sum 2007		**1159,23**	**320,22**	**839,01**	**28%**	**72%**	

2008

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Food crisis, refugee crisis	37,13	7,41	29,73	20%	80%	FAO, UNDP.UNHCR,UNMAS, WFP
ALGERIA	Food crisis, assistance to Western Saharan refugees	7,12	4,35	2,77	61%	39%	MOFA, UNHCR, WFP
ANGOLA	Returning refugees	1,21	0,00	1,21	0%	100%	UNHCR
ARMENIA	Food shortage	0,07	0,00	0,07	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP
BANGLADESH	Food crisis, humanitarian emergency	7,65	7,15	0,50	93%	7%	MOFA, WFP
BOLIVIA	Flood, climate crisis	3,12	1,27	1,85	41%	59%	MOFA, UNISDR, UNICEF
BURKINA FASO	Humanitarian crisis, health emergency	1,88	1,50	0,38	80%	20%	FAO, MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Con (civil war), food crisis	22,66	8,00	14,66	35%	65%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
CAMEROON	Food crisis, refugee crisis	1,53	1,50	0,03	98%	2%	WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Food crisis, humanitarian emergency	18,71	2,73	15,98	15%	85%	FAO, CICR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP
CHAD	Food crisis, humanitarian emergency	37,92	16,50	21,42	44%	56%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CHINA	Earthquake	1,83	0,00	1,83	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF
COLOMBIA	Conflict, humanitarian emergency	5,72	2,34	3,38	41%	59%	MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Post-conflict, complex emergencies	136,78	20,41	116,37	15%	85%	FAO, MOFA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO

Country	Crisis	Total					Organizations
COTE D'IVOIRE	Humanitarian emergency	2,13	0,24	1,89	11%	89%	MOFA, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian crisis, refugees, general humanitarian coordination	473,91	101,54	372,37	21%	79%	CERF, ICRC, IOM, FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, WFP, WHO
CUBA	Hurricanes	1,34	0,40	0,94	30%	70%	UNICEF, WHO
DJIBOUTI	Food crisis	0,16	0,00	0,16	0%	100%	MOFA, WFP
ECUADOR	Floods	1,94	1,45	0,49	75%	25%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR
EGYPT	Demining	0,53	0,00	0,53	0%	100%	UNDP
EL SALVADOR	Food crisis	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
ERITREA	Drought, humanitarian emergency	4,85	1,80	3,05	37%	63%	MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
ETHIOPIA	Food crisis	65,65	8,00	57,65	12%	88%	MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
GEORGIA	Conflict	11,72	3,60	8,12	31%	69%	ICRC, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
GHANA	Floods	0,11	0,00	0,11	0%	100%	UNDP
GUATEMALA	Food crisis, dengue outbreak	0,84	0,15	0,69	18%	82%	MOFA
GUINEA	Food crisis	1,43	0,93	0,50	65%	35%	MOFA
GUINEA-BISSAU	Food crisis	0,30	0,25	0,05	83%	17%	MOFA
HAITI	Food crisis	19,23	5,69	13,54	30%	70%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
HONDURAS	Floods	2,97	1,22	1,75	41%	59%	UNICEF, WFP
INDONESIA	Emergency fund	2,51	1,15	1,36	46%	54%	OCHA
IRAQ	Conflict, refugees	0,75	0,75	0,00	100%	0%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
JORDAN	Conflict	37,85	6,45	31,40	17%	83%	UNHCR
KENYA	Food crisis	3,05	0,00	3,05	0%	100%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Emergency assistance, food crisis	12,31	7,00	5,31	57%	43%	MOFA, WFP
KYRGYSTAN	Food crisis	3,19	0,00	3,19	0%	100%	WFP

LAOS	Floods, cholera epidemic	0,65	0,60	0,05	92%	8%	FAO, MOFA, UNICEF, UNDP
LEBANON	Conflict, demining	1,72	0,20	1,52	12%	88%	UNRWA
LESOTHO	Emergency food, WASH	6,92	3,81	3,11	55%	45%	MOFA, Save the Children, WFP
LIBERIA	Conflict, yellow fever	2,19	0,00	2,19	0%	100%	FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Cyclone Ivan	8,25	2,62	5,63	32%	68%	MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
MALAWI	Food crisis	3,17	0,98	2,19	31%	69%	WFP
MALAYSIA	Disaster conference	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	UNISDR
MALI	Food insecurity	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
MAURITANIA	Food insecurity	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	WFP
MEXICO	Floods	2,35	1,85	0,50	79%	21%	MOFA, UNFPA
MOLDOVA	Food crisis	0,14	0,00	0,14	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF
MOZAMBIQUE	Food crisis	0,45	0,00	0,45	0%	100%	MOFA, WFP
MYANMAR	Cyclone Nargis, food crisis	1,10	0,00	1,10	0%	100%	FAO, ILO, IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
NAMIBIA	Floods	62,33	17,26	45,07	28%	72%	UNICEF
NEPAL	Post-conflict, floods	2,91	2,27	0,64	78%	22%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
NIGER	Food crisis	2,34	0,00	2,34	0%	100%	FAO, MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
PAKISTAN	Floods, displacement	5,13	0,75	4,38	15%	85%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, food crisis, drought	84,59	37,50	47,09	44%	56%	MOFA, OCHA, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP
PARAGUAY	Drought, yellow fever	0,15	0,05	0,10	31%	69%	MOFA, UNDP
PHILIPPINES	Conflict in the Mindanao region	4,64	4,50	0,14	97%	3%	WFP
RUSSIA	Conflict	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	UNHCR
SENEGAL	Food crisis	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	MOFA, UNHCR
SIERRA LEONE	Healthcare, agriculture	6,60	0,00	6,60	0%	100%	FAO, UNHCR, Special Court Sierra Leone, UN joint programme

SOMALIA	Conflict, food crisis	42,03	5,50	36,53	13%	87%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
SRI LANKA	Conflict	8,67	8,67	0,00	100%	0%	CICR, FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council, IGOs
SOUTH SUDAN	Conflict	34,47	3,40	31,07	10%	90%	FAO, OCHA, IOM, UNICEF, WHO, WFP
SUDAN	Conflict, food crisis, floods	194,87	76,19	118,69	39%	61%	FAO, OCHA, UDNP, UNICEF, UNHAS, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SWAZILAND	Emergency food, WASH	2,16	0,00	2,16	0%	100%	UNICEF, Save the Children, WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Drought, food emergency	8,09	5,50	2,59	68%	32%	MOFA, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP
TAJIKISTAN	Food crisis, energy crisis	3,13	0,91	2,22	29%	71%	FAO, MOFA, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO
TANZANIA	Disaster preparedness, assistance women and children	9,99	6,56	3,43	66%	34%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
THAILAND	UNHCR Global Appeal	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	UNHCR
TOGO	Food insecurity, malnutrition	1,15	0,65	0,50	57%	43%	UNICEF, WFP
TURKEY	Iraqi refugees	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	UNHCR
UGANDA	Humanitarian emergency	46,15	15,64	30,52	34%	66%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
WESTERN SAHARA	Sahara refugee crisis	2,25	0,00	2,25	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
YEMEN	Flood	2,75	0,75	2,00	27%	73%	MOFA, UNRWA, UNHCR
ZAMBIA	Food crisis, flood	0,41	0,00	0,41	0%	100%	MOFA, UNICEF, WFP
ZIMBABWE	Food crisis, cholera crisis, political elections	50,95	5,09	45,86	10%	90%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
Sum 2008		**1.534,93**	**414,98**	**1119,96**	**27%**	**73%**	

2009

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Conflict	33,08	8,45	24,63	26%	74%	ICRC, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees, food crisis	6,02	4,70	1,32	78%	22%	MOFA, WFP
ANGOLA	Humanitarian Demining	0,21	0,00	0,21	0%	100%	MOFA
ARMENIA	Humanitarian crisis	0,05	0,00	0,05	0%	100%	WFP
BANGLADESH	Cyclone Alia	1,00	0,00	1,00	0%	100%	IOM
BHUTAN	Earthquake and assistance to Bhutanese refugees	1,55	1,50	0,05	97%	3%	UNICEF, WFP
BOLIVIA	Dengue outbreak	1,24	0,00	1,24	0%	100%	MOFA
BURKINA FASO	Floods, malnutrition	3,38	1,39	1,99	41%	59%	FAO, OCHA, UN HABITAT, UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Food crisis, assistance to refugees from Tanzania	6,04	4,20	1,84	70%	30%	MOFA, UNHCR, WFP
CAPE VERDE	Dengue outbreak	0,27	0,20	0,07	75%	25%	WHO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Armed conflict	7,33	1,72	5,61	23%	77%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
CHAD	Meningitis (improvement of sanitation and hygiene), assistance to refugees	29,59	16,64	12,95	56%	44%	OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
COLOMBIA	Internally Displaced and blockaded and confined persons	8,46	2,15	6,31	25%	75%	UNHCR, PAHO
CONGO	Assistance to refugees from DRC	2,34	2,00	0,34	85%	15%	MOFA, UNICEF
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict	110,49	13,15	97,34	12%	88%	OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
COTE D'IVOIRE	Humanitarian needs	0,91	0,00	0,91	0%	100%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF

COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies around the world, general humanitarian aid coordination	488,89	111,84	377,05	23%	77%	CERF, ICRC, IOM, FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, WFP, WHO
CYPRUS	Humanitarian	0,05	0,00	0,05	0%	100%	CMP
DJIBOUTI	Humanitarian crisis	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
EL SALVADOR	Hurricane Ida, floods	0,97	0,15	0,82	16%	84%	IOM, MOFA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
ERITREA	Humanitarian emergency	4,02	0,00	4,02	0%	100%	MOFA, UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Conflict, food insecurity	37,79	16,00	21,79	42%	58%	HCR,MOFA, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
GEORGIA	Assistance to refugees , conflict	2,27	2,00	0,27	88%	12%	UNHCR, WFP
GUATEMALA	Drought and food insecurity	1,48	0,65	0,83	44%	56%	MOFA, WFP
HAITI	Structural food insecurity	0,44	0,20	0,24	45%	55%	UNICEF, WFP
INDONESIA	Earthquakes in Sumatra	4,14	1,95	2,19	47%	53%	OCHA, UNDP
IRAN	Assistance to Afghan refugees	2,00	1,00	1,00	50%	50%	UNHCR
IRAQ	Conflict	26,47	5,50	20,97	21%	79%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
JORDAN	Assistance to Iraqi refugees	1,61	0,00	1,61	0%	100%	UNHCR
KENYA	Food and nutrition crisis	33,46	6,00	27,46	18%	82%	IFCR, HCR, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Health emergency	8,24	0,00	8,24	0%	100%	FAO, MOFA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
KYRGYSTAN	Food crisis	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
LAOS	Typhoon Ketsana	3,67	2,50	1,17	68%	32%	FAO, MOFA, UNDP, WFP
LEBANON	Post war	1,84	0,00	1,84	0%	100%	MOFA, UNMAS, UNRWA
LESOTHO	HIV	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
LIBERIA	Health emergency	2,63	2,63	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF,WFP, WHO
MADAGASCAR	Food crisis, drought	5,36	1,74	3,62	32%	68%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
MALAWI	Food crisis	0,20	0,00	0,20	0%	100%	WFP
MOZAMBIQUE	Humanitarian demining	0,14	0,00	0,14	0%	100%	MOFA

MYANMAR	Cyclone Nargis, food crisis	8,94	4,25	4,69	48%	52%	FAO, UNDP, UNOPS, WFP
NAMIBIA	Assistance to Refugees and asylum-seekers	0,60	0,00	0,60	0%	100%	WFP, WHO
NICARAGUA	Drought	0,01	0,00	0,01	0%	100%	WFP
NIGER	Meningitis	1,59	1,50	0,09	94%	6%	WHO
PAKISTAN	Conflict	56,96	29,75	27,21	52%	48%	IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict	68,50	14,06	54,44	21%	79%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNMAS, UNRWA, WFP
PANAMA	Domestic crisis, Colombia	0,15	0,00	0,15	0%	100%	UNHCR
PHILIPPINES	Typhoon Ketsana	9,05	6,41	2,64	71%	29%	IFCR, MOFA, OCHA, OXFAM, UNICEF, WFP
SAMOA	Tsunami	0,15	0,00	0,15	0%	100%	MOFA
SENEGAL	Floods, food insecurity	0,23	0,00	0,23	0%	100%	MOFA, WFP
SIERRA LEONE	food support	3,96	0,00	3,96	0%	100%	FAO, SPECIAL COURT
SOMALIA	Conflict, drought	49,78	8,95	40,83	18%	82%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, ,UN Trust Fund, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN	Conflict	10,05	10,05	0,00	100%	0%	FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNHCR
SRI LANKA	Conflict	12,96	2,55	10,41	20%	80%	FAO, IOM, MOFA, HCR, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF
SUDAN	Conflict, humanitarian crisis	107,86	59,18	48,68	55%	45%	MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
SWAZILAND	HIV	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Drought, assistance to Iraqi Refugees	6,28	2,50	3,78	40%	60%	UNHCR, WFP
TANZANIA	Assistance to Burundian Refugees	5,85	5,60	0,25	96%	4%	UNHCR
THAILAND	Annual Support	1,80	0,00	1,80	0%	100%	HCR, UNHCR
TONGA	Tsunami	0,13	0,00	0,13	0%	100%	MOFA
UGANDA	Malnutrition, food crisis, post-conflict, assistance to IDPs	27,49	9,88	17,62	36%	64%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
UKRAINE	Epidemics	0,02	0,00	0,02	0%	100%	WHO

WESTERN SAHARA	Refugee crisis	3,96	0,00	3,96	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
YEMEN	Conflict	6,12	1,50	4,62	25%	75%	MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF
ZAMBIA	Assistance to returning refugees, food crisis	6,11	2,31	3,80	38%	62%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
ZIMBABWE	Conflict, food crisis	41,10	7,00	34,10	17%	83%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
Sum 2009		**1.267,91**	**373,75**	**894,16**	**29%**	**71%**	

2010

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Conflict, assistance to refugees, epidemics	29,53	9,45	20,08	32%	68%	IOM, OCHA, UNHRC, UNMAS, WFP, WHO
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees	5,95	5,15	0,80	87%	13%	MOFA, UNHCR, WFP
ANGOLA	Humanitarian assistance	0,15	0,00	0,15	0%	100%	MOFA
BANGLADESH	Aid to refugees	0,45	0,00	0,45	0%	100%	UNHCR
BURKINA FASO	Food crisis	2,61	0,45	2,16	17%	83%	FAO, WFP
BURUNDI	Assistance to Refugees	8,30	6,20	2,10	75%	25%	FAO, UNHCR, WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Post electoral crisis, health care support, aid to refugees	13,73	1,68	12,05	12%	88%	OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
CHAD	Assistance to refugees, multiple crises	55,45	20,78	34,67	37%	63%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
CHINA	Quinghai earthquake	0,05	0,00	0,05	0%	100%	UNICEF
COLOMBIA	Floods, violence, assistance to refugees	7,18	2,85	4,33	40%	60%	UNHCR, WFP
CONGO	Polio outbreak, assistance to refugees	7,42	3,55	3,87	48%	52%	OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Measles outbreak, Food assistance	59,16	7,68	51,48	13%	87%	UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, NGOs - Save the Children, Oxfam
COTE D'IVOIRE	Post electoral crisis	7,90	7,83	0,07	99%	1%	UNHCR
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies around the world, general humanitarian aid coordination	620,881	112,19	508,69	18%	82%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
EAST TIMOR	Food crisis	0,90	0,00	0,90	0%	100%	FAO, WFP

ECUADOR	Floods , Assistance to Colombian refugees	0,82	0,80	0,02	97%	3%	MOFA, UNHCR
EGYPT	Support national development plan	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	UNDP
ERITREA	Drought, food crisis	2,20	0,00	2,20	0%	100%	MOFA, UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Refugee crisis and drought	21,75	9,90	11,85	46%	54%	IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
GUATEMALA	Food crisis	2,30	0,00	2,30	0%	100%	FAO, WFP, PAHO
HAITI	Earthquake	110,33	28,17	82,16	26%	74%	CERF, ICRC, IFAD, IOM, NGOs, OCHA, PAHO, UNFPA, UNOPS, WFP
HONDURAS	Risks from landslides and earthquakes in Tegucigalpa	0,54	0,54	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
INDONESIA	geological disasters	2,83	0,67	2,16	24%	76%	IOM, OCHA
IRAN	Assistance to Afghan refugees	3,12	2,00	1,12	64%	36%	UNHCR
IRAQ	Food assistance	8,11	0,00	8,11	0%	100%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
JORDAN	Conflict in Iraq	0,07	0,00	0,07	0%	100%	UNHCR
KAZAKHSTAN	Support	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	OCHA
KENYA	Assistance to refugees, resilience support	21,47	12,00	9,47	56%	44%	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Malnutrition	0,57	0,00	0,57	0%	100%	MOFA, WFP
KYRGYSTAN	Conflict	5,43	1,50	3,93	28%	72%	MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
LAOS	Food insecurity	2,05	1,00	1,05	49%	51%	UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
LEBANON	Assistance to refugee	3,65	0,29	3,36	8%	92%	MOFA, UNMAS, UNRWA
LIBERIA	Measles outbreak, WASH	8,87	7,57	1,30	85%	15%	UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Food crisis	1,52	0,00	1,52	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP
MALI	Support	1,03	0,00	1,03	0%	100%	WFP
MAURITANIA	Food crisis	1,30	0,00	1,30	0%	100%	UNDP, WFP
MOLDOVA	Floods and food crisis	0,15	0,00	0,15	0%	100%	FAO, UNDP, WFP

Country	Crisis	Total	Bilateral	Multilateral	% Bilateral	% Multilateral	Agencies
MONGOLIA	Food crisis	0,26	0,00	0,26	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF
MOZAMBIQUE	Food crisis and drought	1,37	0,27	1,10	20%	80%	WFP
MYANMAR	Cyclone, floods, food assistance to vulnerable households	9,08	6,28	2,80	69%	31%	IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NAMIBIA	Assistance to refugees	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
NEPAL	Conflict, assistance to refugees	0,88	0,38	0,50	43%	57%	UNFPA, UNHCR
NICARAGUA	Food crisis	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	FAO
NIGER	Food crisis	42,93	14,92	28,01	35%	65%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Nutrition emergency	4,50	4,50	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
PAKISTAN	Floods	140,91	40,71	100,20	29%	71%	ICRC, IOM, MOFA, OCHA, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, assistance to refugees	51,36	16,25	35,11	32%	68%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNOPS, UNRWA
PHILIPPINES	Conflict	2,66	1,51	1,15	57%	43%	UNICEF, WFP
SAINT LUCIA	Hurricane Thomas	0,02	0,00	0,02	0%	100%	UNICEF
SENEGAL	Humanitarian demining	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	MOFA
SIERRA LEONE	Food insecurity	10,55	6,60	3,95	63%	37%	UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UN JOINT PROGRAMME
SOMALIA	Conflict and food crisis	33,77	3,40	30,37	10%	90%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF
SOUTH SUDAN	Assistance to displaced persons	12,30	12,30	0,00	100%	0%	IOM, UNICEF
SRI LANKA	Conflict, displacement and floods	3,98	3,13	0,85	79%	21%	MOFA, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
SUDAN	Internal conflict, drought, food assistance	143,49	59,20	84,29	41%	59%	FAO, MOFA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict and drought	4,84	2,00	2,84	41%	59%	FAO, UNDP, UNICEF,UNHCR, UNRWA
TANZANIA	Assistance to refugees	4,00	3,50	0,50	87%	12%	UNHCR, WFP
THAILAND	Cholera outbreak	0,34	0,04	0,30	12%	88%	UNHCR, WHO
TOGO	Malnutrition	1,19	1,04	0,15	87%	13%	UNICEF

UGANDA	Internally Displaced Persons	12,57	6,02	6,55	48%	52%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
UZBEKISTAN	Humanitarian crisis	0,97	0,80	0,17	83%	17%	MOFA
WESTERN SAHARA	Refugee crisis	2,95	0,00	2,95	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
YEMEN	Assistance to refugees, food crisis	8,89	0,50	8,39	6%	94%	OCHA, MOFA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
ZIMBABWE	Emergency Vital Medicines Support	17,37	2,17	15,20	12%	88%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
Sum 2010		**1530,44**	**427,77**	**1.102,66**	**28%**	**72%**	

2011

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Assistance to refugees, floods and conflict	50,49	8,63	41,87	17%	83%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees	8,90	5,00	3,90	56%	44%	UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP
BOLIVIA	Extreme climate events	1,43	0,90	0,53	63%	37%	FAO, UNDP
BURKINA FASO	Malnutrition, meningitis	3,00	1,70	1,30	57%	43%	UNICEF, WFP, WHO
BURUNDI	Food crisis, assistance to Refugees	6,08	3,50	2,58	58%	42%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, cholera outbreak	10,43	0,80	9,63	8%	92%	COMMON HUMANITARIAN AID FUND, UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, WHO
CHAD	Conflict, epidemics, humanitarian crisis	41,12	20,86	20,27	51%	49%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
COLOMBIA	Emergency food assistance, conflict	6,16	1,86	4,30	30%	70%	OCHA, PAHO, UNHCR, WFP
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict	65,70	17,63	48,08	27%	73%	UNICEF
COTE D'IVOIRE	Assistance to refugees, political crisis, post-conflict	16,18	3,80	12,38	23%	77%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	647,43	108,12	539,30	17%	83%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
DJIBOUTI	Health and food assistance to refugees	1,60	1,00	0,60	63%	38%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
ECUADOR	Assistance to Colombian Refugees	2,31	1,70	0,61	74%	26%	UNDP, UNHCR, WFP

EGYPT	Support National Development Plan	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	UNDP
EL SALVADOR	Emergency food security, tropical depression	1,04	0,35	0,69	34%	66%	FAO, PAHO, WFP
ERITREA	Water and health programme	5,86	0,00	5,86	0%	100%	UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Assistance to Somali refugees, drought	33,41	14,86	18,55	44%	56%	IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
GUATEMALA	Tropical depression Ophelia and floods	0,37	0,00	0,37	0%	100%	WFP
GUINEA-BISSAU	Humanitarian and Battle Area Clearance	0,19	0,00	0,19	0%	100%	UNDP
HAITI	Post-earthquake, cholera	14,52	3,72	10,80	26%	74%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNESCO
HONDURAS	Tropical depression	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
INDONESIA	Natural disaster	0,20	0,00	0,20	0%	100%	OCHA
IRAN	Assistance to Afghan refugees	2,40	2,00	0,40	83%	17%	UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA
IRAQ	Conflict, assistance to refugees	8,99	0,00	8,99	0%	100%	UNHCR, CKU
JORDAN	Assistance to refugees	1,41	0,00	1,41	0%	100%	UNHCR, UNICEF
KENYA	Food assistance to refugees, drought	31,94	6,96	24,98	22%	78%	OCHA,UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Food insecurity, deteriorating health	14,05	8,50	5,55	61%	39%	WFP, Save the Children, UNICEF
KYRGYSTAN	Food crisis	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	FAO
LAOS	Typhoon Haima, malnutrition	0,72	0,00	0,72	0%	100%	IFCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
LEBANON	Assistance to Palestine refugees	3,25	1,25	2,00	38%	62%	UNRWA
LESOTHO	HIV	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
LIBERIA	Assistance to Ivorian refugees	24,17	7,00	17,17	29%	71%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
LIBYA	Libyan crisis, assistance to refugees	59,74	36,62	23,12	61%	39%	ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO

MADAGASCAR	Food crisis	1,55	0,00	1,55	0%	100%	FAO, GRET, WFP
MALI	Food crisis	0,60	0,00	0,60	0%	100%	WFP
MYANMAR	Cyclone Giri, Displacement, health emergency	6,56	5,87	0,69	89%	11%	IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR
NAMIBIA	Floods	0,18	0,00	0,18	0%	100%	WFP
NEPAL	Disaster reduction, food crisis	0,85	0,70	0,15	82%	18%	FAO, UNDP
NICARAGUA	Tropical Depression Ophelia	0,37	0,00	0,37	0%	100%	WFP
NIGER	Sahel food crisis	7,58	0,70	6,88	9%	91%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Food crisis	2,00	2,00	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
PAKISTAN	Conflict and flood	39,13	15,55	23,58	40%	60%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, Humanitarian assistance in the Gaza Strip	62,28	14,58	47,70	23%	77%	ICRC, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNMAS, UNRWA
PHILIPPINES	Typhoon, floods	3,54	0,78	2,76	22%	78%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
SIERRA LEONE	Political support, food programme support	4,50	0,00	4,50	0%	100%	UNDP, WFP
SOMALIA	Drought and protracted crisis	147,11	24,40	122,71	17%	83%	FAO, HCHR, IKRK, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, NGOs
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	23,50	10,10	13,40	43%	57%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SRI LANKA	Floods	6,70	4,00	2,70	60%	40%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR
SUDAN	Assistance to refugees	125,06	68,30	56,76	55%	45%	IOM, UNHCR
SWAZILAND	HIV	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict and Iraqi refugees	5,30	0,00	5,30	0%	100%	UNICEF,UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP
TAJIKISTAN	Malnutrition	0,10	0,00	0,10	0%	100%	WFP
TANZANIA	Assistance to asylum-seekers	6,10	4,50	1,60	74%	26%	UNHCR, WFP
THAILAND	Assistance to displaced persons from Myanmar	1,35	1,00	0,35	74%	26%	UNHCR
TUNISIA	Libyan crisis	1,54	0,00	1,54	0%	100%	UNHCR

UGANDA	Malnutrition, assistance to displaced persons	3,50	2,50	1,00	71%	29%	UNICEF, UNHCR
VANUATU	Tropical Cyclone Vania and Yasi	0,03	0,00	0,03	0%	100%	UNICEF
WESTERN SAHARA	Assistance to refugees	0,60	0,00	0,60	0%	100%	OCHA, UNHCR
YEMEN	Conflict, protracted crisis	34,64	11,65	22,99	34%	66%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
ZIMBABWE	Disease outbreaks, humanitarian assistance	7,32	3,40	3,92	46%	54%	IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, WHO
Sum 2011:		**1.556,63**	**426,76**	**1.129,86**	**27%**	**73%**	

2012

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Assistance to refugees, floods and conflict	51,04	9,25	41,79	18%	82%	UNHCR, UNICEF, UNHAS, UNMAS WFP, WHO
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees	5,44	1,80	3,64	33%	67%	UNHCR, WFP
BURKINA FASO	Food insecurity, Sahel crisis	9,23	2,50	6,73	27%	73%	UNHCR, WFP
BURUNDI	Assistance to refugees	3,50	2,70	0,80	77%	23%	IOM, UNHCR, WFP
CAMEROON	Regional response: Sahel crisis	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict and Drought	8,16	2,80	5,36	34%	66%	OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
CHAD	Drought, food crisis	28,62	15,80	12,82	55%	45%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
COLOMBIA	Conflict	5,93	1,80	4,13	30%	70%	OCHA, PAHO, UNHCR
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict	77,80	7,00	70,80	9%	91%	OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNCF, UNHCR, WFP
COTE D'IVOIRE	Political crisis	11,67	10,20	1,47	87%	13%	IOM, UNICEF, WFP
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	851,67	186,05	665,62	22%	78%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
CUBA	Hurricane Sandy	1,83	1,10	0,73	60%	40%	UNICEF
EGYPT	Support and mine action	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	UNDP
ERITREA	Refugee crisis	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	UNHCR
ETHIOPIA	Drought, Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia	32,08	22,61	9,47	70%	30%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR, WFP
FIJI	Floods	0,02	0,00	0,02	0%	100%	UNCEF

GAMBIA	Drought	7,63	5,99	1,64	78%	22%	WFP
HAITI	Hurricane Sandy and Earthquake	12,80	10,00	2,80	78%	22%	UNICEF, WFP, WHO
IRAN	Assistance to Islamic refugees	5,00	2,00	3,00	40%	60%	UNHCR
IRAQ	Assistance to refugees	7,82	5,20	2,62	66%	34%	UNHCR, UNICEF
JORDAN	Syrian crisis	6,02	1,00	5,02	17%	83%	UNHCR,UNFPA, UNICEF, UNRWA
KENYA	Food assistance to refugees	30,76	6,80	23,96	22%	78%	UNHCR, UNCEF, UN WOMEN, WFP, WHO
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Malnutrition	0,45	0,00	0,45	0%	100%	WFP
LAOS	Food crisis	0,47	0,00	0,47	0%	100%	UNDP, WFP
LEBANON	Assistance to Refugees	3,46	1,72	1,75	50%	50%	UNHCR,UNRWA
LESOTHO	Drought and crop failure	5,70	5,50	0,20	96%	4%	FAO,WFP
MADAGASCAR	Drought and political crisis	1,42	0,72	0,70	51%	49%	WFP
MALI	Food crisis, Malian refugees	25,55	7,55	18,00	30%	70%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
MAURITANIA	Assistance to Refugees, Sahel food crisis	8,36	2,60	5,76	31%	69%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
MYANMAR	Conflict, assistance to displaced population	15,78	13,20	2,58	84%	16%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NEPAL	Humanitarian support	0,08	0,00	0,08	0%	100%	UNICEF
NIGER	Malnutrition, cholera outbreak, drought	38,62	12,60	26,02	33%	67%	ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
PAKISTAN	Conflict, floods	19,99	12,95	7,04	65%	35%	IOM,FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, assistance to refugees	56,00	15,03	40,97	27%	73%	OCHA, UNDP, UNRWA,WFP
PANAMA	Sexual gender-based violence	0,17	0,00	0,17	0%	100%	UNHCR

PERU	Dengue outbreak, food crisis	0,43	0,23	0,20	53%	47%	FAO, PAHO, WFP
PHILIPPINES	Tropical Storm Washi, Typhoon Bopha	3,43	1,79	1,64	52%	48%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP
RWANDA	Food assistance	0,25	0,00	0,25	0%	100%	WFP
SENEGAL	Drought, nutrition crisis	4,84	0,00	4,84	0%	100%	FAO, UNHCR, WFP
SERBIE	Kosovo crisis	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	UNHCR
SIERRA LEONE	Cholera outbreak	0,40	0,20	0,20	50%	50%	UNICEF, WHO
SOMALIA	Drought, conflict	81,35	11,30	70,05	14%	86%	IOM, FAO , OCHA, UNCHF, UNICEF,WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	84,59	41,22	43,38	49%	51%	OCHA, UNDP, UNCHF, UNHCR,UNICEF
SUDAN	Conflict and natural disaster	80,98	46,48	34,51	57%	43%	UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict	210,48	88,19	122,29	42%	58%	ICRC, FAO, NGOs, OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP
TANZANIA	Food crisis	0,20	0,00	0,20	0%	100%	FAO, WFP
THAILAND	Refugees	1,15	0,95	0,20	83%	17%	UNHCR
TUNISIA	Refugees	0,40	0,00	0,40	0%	100%	UNHCR
UGANDA	Refugees	0,80	0,00	0,80	0%	100%	UNHCR
YEMEN	Conflict and Drought	42,22	14,39	27,83	34%	66%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCRUNICEF, WFP
ZIMBABWE	Food insecurity, assistance to internally displaced persons	4,84	4,40	0,44	91%	9%	IOM, OCHA, WFP
Sum 2012:		**1.850,74**	**575,60**	**1.275,15**	**31%**	**69%**	

2013

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Conflict	22,52	8,60	13,92	38%	62%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNMAS, UNHAS, UNHCR, WFP
ALGERIA	Assistance to Sahrawi refugees in camps in Tindouf, Algeria	4,00	1,75	2,25	44%	56%	UNHCR, WFP
BURKINA FASO	Drought	20,70	0,00	20,70	0%	100%	FAO, UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Assistance to Expelled Migrants in Burundi	1,42	0,50	0,92	35%	65%	UNHCR
CAMEROON	Drought	1,00	0,00	1,00	0%	100%	WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	20,89	2,65	18,24	13%	87%	OCHA,UNDP, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CHAD	Sahel crisis, food security	42,69	12,43	30,26	29%	71%	ACTED, FAO, UNHAS, UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP
COLOMBIA	Conflict	6,06	1,55	4,51	26%	74%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR,
CONGO	Food assistance	0,17	0,00	0,17	0%	100%	WFP
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Nutritional Crisis, Conflict	72,09	6,00	66,09	8%	92%	FAO, UNDP, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
COTE D'IVOIRE	Assistance to refugees, Mano River	2,35	0,00	2,35	0%	100%	UNHCR
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	675,91	176,61	499,30	26%	74%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
ETHIOPIA	Drought, food crisis	14,13	6,38	7,75	45%	55%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
GUATEMALA	Disaster preparedness	0,28	0,00	0,28	0%	100%	FAO

HAITI	Health emergency, consolidating preparedness	3,06	1,29	1,77	42%	58%	OCHA
HONDURAS	Dengue outbreak, Disaster preparedness	0,53	0,25	0,28	48%	52%	FAO, PAHO
IRAN	Assistance to Afghan Refugees	6,83	2,00	4,83	29%	71%	UNHCR, WFP
IRAQ	Conflict - Syrian Crisis	1,51	0,00	1,51	0%	100%	UNHCR
JORDAN	Conflict - Syrian Crisis	3,21	0,00	3,21	0%	100%	UNHCR
KENYA	Food assistance to refugees	40,77	11,00	29,77	27%	73%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Food insecurity	1,49	0,00	1,49	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
LEBANON	Refugee Crisis - Syrian Conflict	5,76	0,00	5,76	0%	100%	UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Food crisis	2,70	0,00	2,70	0%	100%	FAO, WFP
MALI	Food insecurity, Mali crisis	61,41	25,48	35,93	41%	59%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF,UNHAS, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
MAURITANIA	Food crisis and food insecurity	20,62	1,00	19,62	5%	95%	OCHA, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
MOZAMBIQUE	Floods	2,53	1,10	1,43	44%	56%	FAO, UNICEF
MYANMAR	Assistance to displaced persons, humanitarian coordination	10,80	4,38	6,42	41%	59%	OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
NICARAGUA	Dengue outbreak, food assistance	0,24	0,00	0,24	0%	100%	PAHO, WFP
NIGER	Cholera outbreak, drought	29,10	1,30	27,80	4%	96%	ICRC, FAO,OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Malian crisis	0,23	0,00	0,23	0%	100%	UNHCR
PAKISTAN	Floods and conflict	17,48	8,05	9,43	46%	54%	OCHA, UNICEF,WFP, WHO
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict	51,42	16,03	35,39	31%	69%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP
PHILIPPINES	Typhoon Haiyan	52,78	9,91	42,87	19%	81%	ACH, ACTED, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHAS, UNICEF, WFP
SENEGAL	Drought	3,67	0,70	2,97	19%	81%	FAO, OCHA, WFP

SOMALIA	Humanitarian Crisis	56,28	6,90	49,38	12%	88%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	122,78	30,80	91,98	25%	75%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
SUDAN	Conflict	29,63	1,90	27,73	6%	94%	OCHA,UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
SWAZILAND	Food assistance to people affected by AIDS	0,17	0,00	0,17	0%	100%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict, refugee crisis	592,07	172,10	419,97	29%	71%	ICRC, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
TAJIKISTAN	Seed crisis	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	FAO
THAILAND	Coordination, assistance to Burmese refugees	0,75	0,20	0,55	27%	73%	OCHA, UNHCR
TURKEY	Syrian Conflict - Refugees crisis	0,63	0,00	0,63	0%	100%	UNHCR
UGANDA	Disease outbreak, assistance to refugees	3,69	0,60	3,09	16%	84%	UNHCR, UNICEF
YEMEN	Conflict and food crisis	39,80	12,20	27,60	31%	69%	IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR,WFP
ZIMBABWE	Humanitarian support	1,98	1,50	0,48	76%	24%	IOM
Sum 2013		**2.048,38**	**525,16**	**1.523,22**	**26%**	**74%**	

2014

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Polio eradication, Crisis	35,62	12,15	23,47	34%	66%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
ALGERIA	Refugees from Western Sahara (Sahrawi)	1,84	1,60	0,24	87%	13%	UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
BOLIVIA	Floods	0,36	0,30	0,06	84%	16%	IOM
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	Floods	1,28	1,25	0,03	98%	2%	UNICEF
BURKINA FASO	Drought	6,32	0,45	5,87	7%	93%	OXFAM, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CAMEROON	Food crisis	14,54	3,10	11,44	21%	79%	UNHCR, WFP
CAPE VERDE	Drought	0,08	0,00	0,08	0%	100%	UNDP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	66,96	10,09	56,88	15%	85%	ACF, ICRC, FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CHAD	Assistance to refugees	35,79	15,57	20,22	44%	56%	UNHCR, UNICEF
COLOMBIA	Assistance to refugees, multiple humanitarian crisis	4,93	0,48	4,45	10%	90%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR
CONGO	Assistance to refugees, nutrition support to aids affected population	2,67	2,50	0,17	94%	6%	WFP
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict	34,95	2,50	32,45	7%	93%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
COTE D'IVOIRE	Mano River	2,84	0,00	2,84	0%	100%	UNHCR
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	728,08	212,09	515,99	29%	71%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO

Country	Crisis					Agencies
ETHIOPIA	Conflict and humanitarian coordination	22,05	10,59	11,46	48%	52%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
FIJI	Contribution	0,37	0,00	0,37	0%	100%	OCHA
GRENADA	Disasters	0,38	0,00	0,38	0%	100%	GFDRR
GUINEA	Ebola	2,13	1,50	0,63	71%	29%	WHO
HAITI	Cholera outbreaks	3,21	1,40	1,81	44%	56%	OCHA, PAHO
IRAN	Refugees	4,71	0,00	4,71	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
IRAQ	Conflict, Iraq crisis	86,66	17,30	69,36	20%	80%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP
JORDAN	Syrian Refugee Crisis	2,84	0,00	2,84	0%	100%	ICRC, OCHA, UN HABITAT, WFP
KENYA	Assistance to refugees	17,10	9,40	7,70	55%	45%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR,
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Humanitarian support	2,26	0,00	2,26	0%	100%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF
LEBANON	Syrian Refugee Crisis	26,55	1,00	25,55	4%	96%	ICRC, OCHA, UNRWA, UNHCR, WFP
LIBERIA	Ebola crisis	10,69	0,00	10,69	0%	100%	IFRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MADAGASCAR	Food crisis	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	WFP
MALAWI	Humanitarian crisis	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	WFP
MALI	Sahel crisis, humanitarian support, assistance to refugees	30,42	14,13	16,29	46%	54%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
MAURITANIA	Food crisis	4,67	0,00	4,67	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP
MYANMAR	Myanmar crisis	10,37	5,70	4,67	55%	45%	ACTED, FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
NIGER	Cholera outbreaks, assistance to refugees	13,35	2,00	11,35	15%	85%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Insecurities	2,40	2,40	0,00	100%	0%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
PAKISTAN	Humanitarian crisis	15,44	3,10	12,34	20%	80%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP

PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, food crisis	54,65	7,95	46,70	15%	85%	FAO, OCHA,UNDP, UNRWA, WFP
PHILIPPINES	Typhoon Haiyan	1,77	0,00	1,77	0%	100%	FAO, OCHA, WFP
SAINT LUCIA	Disasters	0,38	0,00	0,38	0%	100%	GFDRR
SENEGAL	Food insecurity	0,20	0,00	0,20	0%	100%	WFP
SERBIE	Floods	0,03	0,00	0,03	0%	100%	UNICEF
SIERRA LEONE	Ebola crisis	67,54	0,00	67,54	0%	100%	UNDP, UNICEF, UNMEER, WHO
SOMALIA	Conflict	66,30	10,25	56,05	15%	85%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHAS, UNHCR, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, food crisis, cholera outbreaks	186,02	60,22	125,80	32%	68%	ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
SUDAN	Conflict	29,02	1,85	27,17	6%	94%	OCHA, UNDP,UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR
SWAZILAND	Nutrition support for AIDS affected people	0,17	0,00	0,17	0%	100%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict, assistance to refugees	349,88	49,59	300,29	14%	86%	ICRC, OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
TAJIKISTAN	Food insecurity	0,30	0,00	0,30	0%	100%	FAO
THAILAND	Assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand	0,33	0,13	0,20	38%	62%	UNHCR
TURKEY	Assistance to Syrian refugees	2,18	1,35	0,83	62%	38%	OCHA, WFP
UGANDA	Conflict; Assistance to South Sudanese refugees in Uganda	6,60	4,50	2,10	68%	32%	UNICEF, UNHCR
UKRAINE	Conflict	14,89	6,67	8,22	45%	55%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP
YEMEN		49,63	8,82	40,81	18%	82%	IOM, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
Sum 2014:		**2.022,49**	**481,92**	**1.540,57**	**24%**	**76%**	

2015

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Conflict	46,95	15,00	31,96	32%	68%	OCHA,UNDP, UNHCR,UNMAS,WFP, WHO
ALGERIA	Refugees from Western Sahara (Sahrawi)	10,07	5,35	4,72	53%	47%	UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP
ARGENTINA	Disaster- risk reduction project	0,73	0,73	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
BANGLADESH	Violence against women, nutrition emergency	3,59	3,59	0,00	100%	0%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR
BARBADOS	Disaster- risk reduction project	1,23	1,23	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP, UNISDR
BENIN	Cholera	1,80	1,80	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
BOLIVIA	Disaster- risk reduction project, strengthening indigenous communities	2,68	2,68	0,00	100%	0%	FAO, UNESCO
BURKINA FASO	Regional emergency: assistance to Malian refugees	19,28	18,13	1,15	94%	6%	UNDP, UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Political crisis	11,43	5,25	6,18	46%	54%	UNHCR, WFP
CAMEROON	Food assistance to refugees, food crisis	22,74	11,32	11,42	50%	50%	UNHCR,UNICEF, WFP, WHO
CAPE VERDE	Drought	0,08	0,00	0,08	0%	100%	UNDP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	55,90	7,88	48,03	14%	86%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
CHAD	Conflict, Boko Haram	45,12	32,35	12,77	72%	28%	FAO, OCHA,UNICEF, UNHCR,WFP
COLOMBIA	El Niño, unexploded mines	7,66	4,00	3,66	52%	48%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNMAS

CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	DRC crisis	65,24	15,39	49,85	24%	76%	OCHA,UNDP, UNHCR,WFP, WHO
COTE D'IVOIRE	Fund for *partenariat*	1,92	0,00	1,92	0%	100%	UNHCR
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	596,78	4,00	592,78	1%	99%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDAC, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
CUBA	Population vulnerable to flooding	0,80	0,80	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
DJIBOUTI	Food assistance to refugees	2,31	1,79	0,52	78%	22%	FAO, UNHCR, WFP
DOMINICA	Tropical Storm Erika	0,32	0,30	0,02	95%	5%	UN PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNICEF
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Seism and tsunami risk	1,39	1,39	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP, UN PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
ECUADOR	Assistance to Colombian Asylum seekers	1,84	1,84	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
EGYPT	Assistance to refugees (Syria)	3,00	3,00	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF,UNFPA, UNHRC
ERITREA	Humanitarian action for children	0,50	0,00	0,50	0%	100%	UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	El Nino	136,67	118,15	18,52	86%	14%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
FIJI	Disaster- risk reduction project	0,60	0,60	0,00	100%	0%	UN PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA	Support to asylum-seekers in the Balkans	6,40	5,65	0,75	88%	12%	UNHCR
GAMBIA	Food insecurity	0,40	0,40	0,00	100%	0%	WFP
GHANA	Explosion of petrol station	0,03	0,00	0,03	0%	100%	UNHRD
GREECE	Refugees	1,50	1,00	0,50	67%	33%	UNICEF, UNHCR
GUATEMALA	Dry corridor	4,14	4,14	0,00	100%	0%	PAHO, WFP
GUINEA	Ebola	4,20	1,00	3,20	24%	76%	FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

HAITI	Cholera outbreak, multiple crisis, improving food security	13,25	10,81	2,45	82%	18%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP
IRAN	Refugees	8,80	2,50	6,30	28%	72%	UNHCR, WFP
IRAQ	Iraq crisis, conflict	237,19	39,10	198,09	16%	84%	ICRC, IOM, IFCR, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
JORDAN	Conflict in Syria and refugees	89,42	32,10	57,32	36%	64%	ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNHRD, UNICEF,WFP
KENYA	El Nino	18,50	10,65	7,86	58%	42%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Multiple humanitarian crises	1,56	0,00	1,56	0%	100%	WFP, UNICEF, OCHA
LEBANON	Conflict in the Middle East, refugees	93,56	29,70	63,86	32%	68%	OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
LESOTHO	El Nino	3,67	3,50	0,17	95%	5%	FAO, WFP
LIBERIA	FPA	1,15	0,00	1,15	0%	100%	UNHCR
LIBYA	Assistance to refugees	5,68	3,50	2,18	62%	38%	IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
MADAGASCAR	El Nino	4,07	3,87	0,20	95%	5%	UNICEF, WFP
MALAWI	El Nino	8,22	7,16	1,06	87%	13%	FAO, IOM, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MALI	Mali crisis	24,39	13,00	11,39	53%	47%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
MAURITANIA	Food crisis, assistance to Malian refugees	8,79	4,10	4,69	47%	53%	UNHCR, WFP
MOZAMBIQUE	Floods	1,31	0,20	1,11	15%	85%	UNICEF, WFP
MYANMAR	Floods	12,13	8,35	3,78	69%	31%	IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
NEPAL	Earthquake	21,40	4,15	17,25	19%	81%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
NIGER	Boko Haram, assistance to refugees	29,06	18,80	10,26	65%	35%	ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
NIGERIA	Boko Haram, multiple crises	11,17	4,65	6,53	42%	58%	ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
PAKISTAN	Multiple humanitarian crises	20,41	13,25	7,16	65%	35%	IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP

PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, Palestinian crisis	54,25	8,50	45,75	16%	84%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNMAS, UNRWA, UN WOMEN, WFP
PARAGUAY	Disaster- risk reduction project	0,70	0,70	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
PERU	Strengthening institutional capacities and preparedness	1,10	1,10	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
PHILIPPINES	Multiple Crises, assistance to conflict affected people in the areas of Maguindanao	0,65	0,30	0,35	46%	54%	IOM, OCHA
RWANDA	Election crisis in Burundi	0,67	0,00	0,67	0%	100%	WFP
SENEGAL	Food crisis, assistance to Nigerian and Cameroon refugees	4,42	1,70	2,72	38%	62%	OCHA, WFP
SERBIE	Refugee crisis	4,01	0,00	4,01	0%	100%	IOM, UNHCR
SIERRA LEONE	Ebola	35,86	3,40	32,46	9%	91%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UK NGOs
SOMALIA	Food assistance to refugees, Somali crisis, El Nino	61,85	14,05	47,80	23%	77%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict	253,14	74,50	178,64	29%	71%	OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
SUDAN	Conflict	76,14	46,80	29,34	61%	39%	OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, WFP
SWAZILAND	Drought	1,57	1,40	0,17	89%	11%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict	1.042,20	72,00	970,20	7%	93%	FAO, ICRC, IOM, OCHA,THPF, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNITAR, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
TANZANIA	Assistance to refugees from Burundi	12,22	11,25	0,97	92%	8%	IOM, UNHCR, WFP
THAILAND	Andaman Sea crisis	0,30	0,30	0,00	100%	0%	IOM
TURKEY	Conflict in Syria and refugees	34,60	11,90	22,70	34%	66%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
TUVALU	Tropical Cyclone Pam	0,01	0,00	0,01	0%	100%	UNICEF
UGANDA	Food assistance to refugees	8,10	7,90	0,20	98%	2%	FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP
UKRAINE	Conflict	28,25	11,57	16,68	41%	59%	IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
VANUATU	Tropical Cyclone Pam	1,55	1,00	0,55	65%	35%	IOM, UNICEF, WFP

VENEZUELA	Humanitarian assistance to Colombian refugees	0,67	0,67	0,00	100%	0%	UNHCR
YEMEN	Conflict, Yemen crisis	117,77	29,80	87,97	25%	75%	IOM, OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP
ZIMBABWE	Food crisis	6,82	6,65	0,17	98%	2%	FAO, WFP
Sum 2015		**3.417,87**	**783,63**	**2.634,24**	**23%**	**77%**	

2016

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %2	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Conflict	92,14	6,13	86,01	7%	93%	IOM, OCHA, UNDP,UNHCR, WHO, WFP
ALGERIA	Refugees from Western Sahara (Sahrawi)	11,36	4,85	6,51	43%	57%	UNHCR, WFP
ARMENIA	Strengthening resilience and environmental capacities	1,30	1,30	0,00	100%	0%	UNISDR, UNDP, UNICEF
BANGLADESH	Forgotten crisis: nutritional and emergency food needs	4,57	3,60	0,97	79%	21%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR
BELGIUM	Empowering voices from youth: EU-AU Summit	0,09	0,09	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
BHUTAN	Strengthening emergency preparedness	0,30	0,30	0,00	100%	0%	WHO
BURKINA FASO	Mali crisis, refugee crisis	29,11	18,68	10,43	64%	36%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Burundian crisis	19,72	3,00	16,72	15%	85%	ICRC, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
CAMEROON	Boko Haram insurgency	23,75	12,15	11,60	51%	49%	ICRC, IOM, UNHCR, WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, multiple humanitarian crisis	60,96	8,10	52,86	13%	87%	FAO, ICRC,OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, WFP
CHAD	El Niño, Boko Haram	34,44	20,41	14,03	59%	41%	OCHA, UNHAS, UNHCR, WFP
COLOMBIA	Risk of unexploded mines, multiple crises	5,09	1,42	3,67	28%	72%	FAO, OCHA, UNMAS
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict	64,08	11,00	53,08	17%	83%	IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP, WHO
COSTA RICA	Support to disaster risk reduction	0,62	0,62	0,00	100%	0%	UNISDR
COTE D'IVOIRE	General humanitarian aid to West Africa	2,30	0,00	2,30	0%	100%	UNHCR

COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	361,12	7,70	353,43	2%	98%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDISDR, UNHCR, UNMAS, UNRWA, UN WOMEN, WFP, WHO
CUBA	Hurricane Matthew	0,55	0,35	0,20	64%	36%	WFP
DJIBOUTI	Multiple Crises	0,49	0,00	0,49	0%	100%	FAO
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	Crisis, food insecurity	0,70	0,70	0,00	100%	0%	FAO
ECUADOR	Earthquake	5,31	4,75	0,56	89%	11%	OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
EGYPT	Assistance to refugee and asylum-seeker	2,80	2,80	0,00	100%	0%	UNFPA, UNHCR
EL SALVADOR	Violent areas of Honduras and El Salvador: strengthening access to safe health service; education	1,45	1,45	0,00	100%	0%	UNHCR, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION
ERITREA	Humanitarian action for children	1,00	0,00	1,00	0%	100%	UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Assistance to refugees	36,80	12,65	24,15	34%	66%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNISDR, WFP
FIJI	Tropical cyclone Winston	1,19	0,00	1,19	0%	100%	UNICEF, UN WOMEN
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA	Assistance to refugees	2,00	0,00	2,00	0%	100%	UNICEF
GEORGIA	Strengthening education	0,09	0,00	0,09	0%	100%	UNICEF
GHANA	Meningitis	0,29	0,29	0,00	100%	0%	WHO
GREECE	Migration and refugee crisis	123,50	120,50	3,00	98%	2%	IOM, UNICEF, UNHCR
GUATEMALA	Building resilient communities	0,47	0,47	0,00	100%	0%	UNESCO
GUINEA	Ebola	0,94	0,60	0,34	64%	36%	UNHCR, UNDP
HAITI	Hurricane Matthew	15,45	4,60	10,85	30%	70%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, WFP
IRAN	Refugees	13,00	4,50	8,50	35%	65%	IOM, UNHCR, WFP
IRAQ	Iraq crisis, conflict	338,67	82,28	256,39	24%	76%	ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP, WHO
ISRAEL	Contribution to ICRC Israel	0,75	0,00	0,75	0%	100%	ICRC

JORDAN	Syrian Refugees	87,77	48,80	38,97	56%	44%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP
KENYA	Conflict; El Niño	11,81	6,30	5,51	53%	47%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF,WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Multiple humanitarian crises	1,18	0,00	1,18	0%	100%	UNICEF
LEBANON	Conflict in Middle East; refugee crisis	143,51	30,00	113,51	21%	79%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP
LIBERIA	Aid West Africa	1,53	0,00	1,53	0%	100%	UNHCR
LIBYA	Libya Crisis	14,19	4,88	9,31	34%	66%	UNMAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MADAGASCAR	EL Nino, food crisis	4,35	0,00	4,35	0%	100%	WFP
MALAWI	El Nino	12,57	0,30	12,27	2%	98%	FAO, UNHCR, WFP
MALI	Food crisis	20,25	8,10	12,15	40%	60%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
MAURITANIA	Climate shocks	3,47	2,97	0,50	86%	14%	UNICEF, WFP
MEXICO	Support right of education	0,16	0,16	0,00	100%	0%	UNICEF
MOZAMBIQUE	El Niño	14,51	0,00	14,51	0%	100%	FAO, WFP
MYANMAR	Conflict	15,24	5,05	10,19	33%	67%	OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NEPAL	Earthquake	1,31	0,80	0,51	61%	39%	UNDP, Caritas
NIGER	Boko haram insurgency, food crisis	34,10	13,55	20,55	40%	60%	FAO, ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Conflict	68,81	27,00	41,81	39%	61%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
PAKISTAN	Drought, assistance to refugees	19,72	11,75	7,97	60%	40%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Food emergency, Palestine crisis	31,71	8,80	22,91	28%	72%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNMAS, UNRWA, WFP
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	El Nino	2,00	2,00	0,00	100%	0%	WFP
PARAGUAY	El Nino	1,23	1,23	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP, UNICEF
PERU	El Nino	0,23	0,23	0,00	100%	0%	UN PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION

PHILIPPINES	Multiple Crises	1,35	1,00	0,35	74%	26%	IOM, OCHA
RWANDA	Rwanda Response Plan	1,00	0,00	1,00	0%	100%	UNHCR
SENEGAL	Climate shocks; malnutrition	2,35	0,68	1,67	29%	71%	OCHA, WFP
SIERRA LEONE	Aid West Africa	0,08	0,00	0,08	0%	100%	UNHCR
SOMALIA	Drought	113,71	12,90	100,81	11%	89%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
SOUTH AFRICA	El Nino	0,15	0,00	0,15	0%	100%	WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict and food insecurity	239,54	62,47	177,07	26%	74%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
SRI LANKA	Tropical cyclone Roanu	0,48	0,25	0,23	53%	47%	UNICEF, WFP
SUDAN	Multiple Crises	55,52	18,42	37,10	33%	67%	OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR,UNMAS, UNICEF, WFP
SWAZILAND	El Nino	0,64	0,00	0,64	0%	100%	WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict	741,15	75,75	665,40	10%	90%	FAO, ICRC, IOM, OCHA,THPF, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
TANZANIA	Crisis in Burundi, Refugees	24,47	14,50	9,97	59%	41%	UNHCR, WFP
THAILAND	Humanitarian assistance to refugees from Rakhine State	0,60	0,60	0,00	100%	0%	IOM,UNHCR
TURKEY	Refugees	518,64	502,25	16,39	97%	3%	OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO
UGANDA	Conflict	19,47	12,96	6,51	67%	33%	UNHCR, WFP
UKRAINE	Conflict in Eastern Ukraine	21,35	7,66	13,69	36%	64%	IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
UZBEKISTAN	Aid in the Tashkent region	0,15	0,15	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
VENEZUELA	International protection	0,60	0,60	0,00	100%	0%	UNHCR
VIET NAM	Drought	0,80	0,80	0,00	100%	0%	FAO
YEMEN	Conflict	209,43	35,10	174,33	17%	83%	IOM, YHPF, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
ZIMBABWE	El Nino	15,64	0,00	15,64	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
Sum 2016		**3.713,14**	**1.253,28**	**2.459,86**	**34%**	**66%**	

2017

Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Humanitarian aid crisis, refugee crisis	34,57	4,98	29,59	14%	86%	IOM, OCHA UNHCR, UNDP, WFP
ALGERIA	Assistance to Refugees	11,09	6,5	4,59	59%	41%	WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF
ANGOLA	Refugees	0,50	0	0,50	0%	100%	WFP, UNHCR
BANGLADESH	Rohingya refugee crisis	21,63	2,825	18,81	13%	87%	IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
BURKINA FASO	Conflict in Sahel	1,63	0,5	1,13	31%	69%	UNHCR, WFP
BURUNDI	Crisis and refugee crisis	13,75	0	13,75	0%	100%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF
CAMEROON	Boko Haram crisis, multiple humanitarian crises	19,62	6,237	13,38	32%	68%	FAO, ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP
CAPE VERDE	Drought	0,30	0	0,30	0%	100%	FAO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CAR crisis, food security crisis	59,43	11,925	47,51	20%	80%	FAO,OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
CHAD	Food security crisis, multiple humanitarian crises	32,32	24,7	7,62	76%	24%	FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
COLOMBIA	Conflict and natural crises	4,75	0	4,75	0%	100%	OCHA, UNGRD, UNMAS, UNHCR
CONGO	Humanitarian crisis	0,40	0	0,40	0%	100%	WFP
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Food assistance to refugees, conflict and natural disasters	110,22	0	110,22	0%	100%	ICRC, IOM, FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNHRD, WFP
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	Humanitarian emergencies, general humanitarian aid coordination	513,78	114,13	399,65	22%	78%	CERF, FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNISDR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, UNRWA, WFP, WHO
CUBA	Hurricane Irma	2,30	1,25	1,05	54%	46%	WFP, UNDP

DJIBOUTI	Food assistance to refugees and asylum seekers	0,30	0,3	0,00	100%	0%	WFP
DOMINICA	Health emergency, Hurricane Irma	2,25	2,25	0,00	100%	0%	IOM,UNDP, UNICEF
EGYPT	Conflict affecting Syria and Middle East	37,10	0	37,10	0%	100%	WFP
EL SALVADOR	Chikunguya and Dengue fever	0,02	0	0,02	0%	100%	UNHRD, WFP
ERITREA	Acute malnutrition	1,50	0	1,50	0%	100%	UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Food crisis, drought, conflict	86,38	47,2	39,18	55%	45%	IOM, OCHA, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF
GREECE	Refugees crisis	161,37	160,37	1,00	99%	1%	IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF
GUINEA	Nutrition crisis	0,50	0	0,50	0%	100%	WFP
HAITI	Multiple crisis, hurricane Matthew	7,88	5,55	2,33	70%	30%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF
IRAN	Food assistance to refugees	15,68	5,75	9,93	37%	63%	UNHCR, WFP
IRAQ	Iraq crisis	241,74	32,9	208,84	14%	86%	ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
JORDAN	Conflict affecting Syria and Middle East	82,57	5,45	77,12	7%	93%	ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNRWA, UNICEF, UN WOMEN, WFP
KENYA	El Niño, refugees	29,70	8,7	21,00	29%	71%	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Food crisis	1,92	0	1,92	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP
LEBANON	Conflict affecting Syria and Middle East	134,30	52,815	81,48	39%	61%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP
LIBYA	Humanitarian crisis	35,70	0,75	34,95	2%	98%	ICRC, OCHA, UNMAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Plague, El Niño	14,30	0	14,30	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MALAWI	EL Niño	0,01	0	0,01	0%	100%	UNHRD, WFP
MALI	Conflict, food security	32,63	5,15	27,48	16%	84%	ACTED, FAO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP

MAURITANIA	Humanitarian emergencies	4,26	2,95	1,31	69%	31%	UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
MEXICO	Cash	0,54	0	0,54	0%	100%	UNHCR
MOZAMBIQUE	Cyclone Dineo	3,00	0	3,00	0%	100%	UNICEF, WFP, WHO
MYANMAR	Rohingya refugee crisis	21,32	0	21,32	0%	100%	ICRC, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP
NEPAL	Inundations	1,20	1	0,20	83%	17%	UNICEF, WHO
NICARAGUA	Tropical Storm Nate	0,20	0	0,20	0%	100%	WFP
NIGER	Drought	26,36	15,2	11,16	58%	42%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
NIGERIA	Famine crisis, food crisis, Boko Haram crisis	101,30	25,55	75,75	25%	75%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
PAKISTAN	Multiple humanitarian crises	7,77	3,35	4,42	43%	57%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNHSPR, WFP
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Gaza crisis, conflict	102,22	8,25	93,97	8%	92%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP
PERU	Humanitarian emergency	0,02	0	0,02	0%	100%	UNHRD, WFP
PHILIPPINES	Conflict, natural disaster	0,77	0	0,77	0%	100%	OCHA
RWANDA	Food crisis	1,50	0	1,50	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
SENEGAL	Resilience	0,20	0	0,20	0%	100%	WFP
SOMALIA	Drought, food crisis	212,32	42,35315	169,97	20%	80%	FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, food insecurity	239,27	37,2	202,07	16%	84%	IOM, OCHA, UNDP. UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
SRI LANKA	Floods	0,20	0	0,20	0%	100%	WFP
SUDAN	Food insecurity	49,25	21,85	27,40	44%	56%	CBPF, FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict	200,92	50,02	150,90	25%	75%	ICRC, OHCHR, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF,UNRWA, WFP
TANZANIA	Burundi refugees	2,68	0	2,68	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP

TUNISIA	Strengthening resilience	1,00	1	0,00	100%	0%	UNDP
TURKEY	Refugee crisis	774,67	767,8	6,90	99%	1%	OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP
UGANDA	Drought and refugee crisis	32,71	19	13,71	58%	42%	FAO, IOM, UNHCR, WFP
UKRAINE	Conflict	23,41	3,95	19,46	17%	83%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
VENEZUELA	Balance-of-payments difficulties	0,47	0	0,47	0%	100%	UNHCR
YEMEN	Conflict, food crisis	529,20	51,00	478,20	10%	90%	ICRC, IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, WHO
ZIMBABWE	El Niño	0,26	0	0,26	0%	100%	UNHRD,WFP
Sum 2017		**4.049,16**	**1.550,67**	**2.498,49**	**38%**	**62%**	

2018

| Recipients	Nature of the Crises	Total EU humanitarian aid funding (€ million)	Amount by ECHO (€ million)	Amount by Member States (€ million)	Amount by ECHO %	Amount by Member States %	Implementing Agencies
AFGHANISTAN	Drought, physical rehabilitation	17,4	5,0	12,7	29%	73%	FAO, ICRC, IMO, OCHA, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNOPS, WHO, WFP
ALGERIA	Saharwi crisis, refugee and humanitarian crisis	10,0	6,0	4,0	60%	40%	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP,
ANGOLA	General humanitarian aid	0,9	0,0	0,9	0%	100%	UNHCR
BANGLADESH	Rohingya refugee and humanitarian crisis	54,2	21,1	33,0	39%	61%	IOM, KFW, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP 33.071.928,14
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	Refugee crisis	2,0	2,0	0,0	100%	0%	IOM, UNHCR
BRAZIL	Venezuela crisis	0,6	0,0	0,6	0%	100%	UNHCR, UNICEF
BURKINA FASO	Food crisis	8,3	3,0	5,3	36%	64%	UNICEF, WFP
BURUNDI	Climate change, humanitarian crisis	19,2	5,2	14,0	27%	73%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CAMEROON	Humanitarian crisis, terrorism	13,0	5,0	8,0	38%	62%	FAO, IOM, OCHA, , UNHCR,WHO, WFP
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, Nutrition crisis	37,3	8,0	29,0	21%	78%	FAO,OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP
CHAD	Food crisis, refugee crisis	55,8	33,6	22,0	60%	39%	Acted, FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
COLOMBIA	Venezuela crisis	10,0	0,0	10,0	0%	100%	OCHA, UNAM, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF	Conflict, Ebola crisis, refugee crisis,	128,7	10,3	118,0	8%	92%	FAO, ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNFPA, WFP
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED	General humanitarian	409,1	42,0	367,0	10%	90%	CERF, FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, UNISDR, UNFPA, ,

	crises, administration					UNHCR, UNRWAOCHA, WFP, WHO
DJIBOUTI	Climate change	1,4	0,3	1,1	21%	79%	IOM, FAO, UNICEF
ECUADOR	Venezuela crisis	2,2	0,0	2,2	0%	100%	WFP
EGYPT	Refugee crisis	3,3	2,3	1,0	70%	30%	UNHCR
ERITREA	Humanitarian crisis	1,0	0,0	1,0	0%	100%	UNICEF
ETHIOPIA	Drought, conflict	60,4	18,0	42,0	30%	70%	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
GERMANY	Innovation accelerator	2,0	0,0	2,0	0%	100%	WFP
GREECE	Refugee crisis	167,5	167,0	0,0	100%	0%	UNHCR
GUATEMALA	Drought	1,0	0,0	1,0	0%	100%	WFP
GUINEA	Health emergency	1,0	1,0	0,0	100%	0%	IOM
GUINEA-BASSAU	Crisis	0,6	0,0	0,6	0%	100%	WFP
HAITI	Food crisis	5,4	5,1	0,3	94%	6%	OCHA, WFP
HONDURAS	Drought	1,5	0,0	1,5	0%	100%	UNHCR, WFP
IRAN	Afghan refugees	3,0	1,0	2,0	33%	67%	UNHCR
IRAQ	Conflict, humanitarian crisis	388,1	16,3	371,0	4%	96%	ICRC, IOM, OCHA, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP
JORDAN	Syrian Crisis, conflict	41,4	16,1	25,0	39%	60%	KWC, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP
KENYA	Food crisis, refugee crisis	11,2	4,0	7,0	36%	63%	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF	Food crisis	4,0	0,0	4,0	0%	100%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
LAOS	Dam failure	0,2	0,0	0,2	0%	100%	FAO
LEBANON	Syrian Crisis, refugee crisis	108,0	49,0	59,0	45%	55%	KFW, OCHA. UNHCR, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP
LIBYA	Emergency health	12,0	2,0	10,0	17%	83%	OCHA, UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP
MADAGASCAR	Drought (El Nino)	2,8	1,3	1,5	46%	54%	WFP

MALI	Conflict, climate change, general Mali crisis	24,1	9,0	15,0	37%	62%	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
MAURITANIA	Food and nutrition crisis	9,1	6,0	3,0	66%	33%	FAO, UNICEF, WFP
MYANMAR	Rohingya crisis, humanitarian crisis	9,0	3,0	6,0	33%	67%	ICRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP
NEPAL	Earthquake (2015)	1,0	1,0	0,0	100%	0%	UNDP
NIGER	Multiple humanitarian crises	21,4	8,0	13,0	37%	61%	FAO, UNICEF, UNOCHA, WFP
NIGERIA	Food insecurity, Conflict	155,1	25,0	130,0	16%	84%	IOM, WFP, OCHA, UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF,
PAKISTAN	Humanitarian crisis (Afghan refugees)	6,1	1,2	5,0	20%	82%	UNHCR, UNFPA, OCHA,
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, OCCUPIED	Conflict, food insecurity, refugee crisis	64,2	23,0	41,0	36%	64%	FAO, OCHA, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNMAS, WFP
PHILIPPINES	Conflict in Marawi, multiple humanitarian crises	0,6	0,0	0,6	0%	100%	OCHA, WFP
SENEGAL	Food crisis	0,8	0,0	0,8	0%	100%	WFP
SOMALIA	Drought, displacement	267,0	35,4	231,0	13%	87%	FAO, IMO, KWF, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF,UNHCR, WFP
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC	Conflict, food crisis, ebola crisis	194,2	21,7	172,0	11%	89%	FAO, ICRC, IMO, KFW, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, WHO, WFP
SUDAN	Drought, multiple humanitarian crises	60,8	26,7	34,0	44%	56%	FAO, IMO, KWF, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF,UNHCR, UNMAS, WFP
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	Conflict, Syria crisis, refugee crisis	1.078,8	45,3	1033,0	4%	96%	IMO, OCHA, UNFPA, UNICEF,UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP
TANZANIA	Balance-of-payments difficulties	1,0	0,0	0,9	0%	90%	UNHCR

TURKEY	Syria crisis	6,9	3,3	3,0	48%	43%	UNFPA, WFP
UGANDA	Food assistance, refugee crisis	35,4	29,4	6,0	83%	17%	IMO, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF, WFP
UKRAINE	Conflict	16,7	5,8	10,0	35%	60%	KFW, IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP
VENEZUELA	Crisis	16,6	16,6	0,0	100%	0%	UNICEF, UNHCR, PAHO/WHO
YEMEN	Balance-of-payments difficulties, Conflict	212,7	80,0	132,0	38%	62%	IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNVIM, WFP
ZAMBIA	Congolese refugees	0,3	0,0	0,3	0%	100%	UNHCR
ZIMBABWE	Cholera	25,4	0,4	25,0	2%	98%	KFW, UNICEF
Sum 2018		**3.794,1**	**765,2**	**3028,1**	**20%**	**80%**	

Appendix 2. Myanmar

2015 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Myanmar


Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/153/summary/2015

2016 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Myanmar

*Source*: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/153/summary/2016

2017 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Myanmar

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/153/summary/2017

2015 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Lebanon

2016 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Lebanon


Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/124/summary/2016

2017 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Lebanon

UN

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees — 37%
- United Nations Children's Fund — 32%
- World Food Programme — 20%
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East — 7%
- United Nations Development Programme — 4%

NGOs

- Norwegian Refugee Council — 34%
- International Rescue Committee — 13%
- International Committee of the Red Cross — 10%
- World Vision International — 9%
- Save the Children — 9%
- Mercy Corps — 6%
- Action Contre la Faim — 5%
- International Medical Corps — 5%
- Gruppo Volontariato Civile — 5%
- American Near East Refugee Aid — 4%

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/124/summary/2017

Appendix 4. Mozambique

2015 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Mozambique

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2015

2016 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Mozambique

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2016

2017 Top UN and NGOs among the international and EU humanitarian funding recipients in Mozambique

Source: Own elaboration based on UNOCHA https://fts.unocha.org/countries/152/summary/2017

Annexe 1. List of interviewees

The interviewees on the field are reported with the position they had during 2015-2017.
MM=Myanmar; LB=Lebanon; MOZ= Mozambique

#	Date	Interviewee Description	Comments
1	27/11/2019	DG ECHO official	
2	30/11/2019	EU Civil Protection official	
3	4/12/2019	DG ECHO official (MM)	
4	4/12/2019	EU Member State Foreign Office official	
5	4/12/2019	EU Member State Foreign Office official	
6	6/12/2019	UN official	
7	9/12/2019	DG ECHO official	
8	9/12/2019	EU Civil Protection official	
9	9/12/2019	EU Civil Protection official	
10	9/12/2019	ECHO Cabinet Member	
11	9/12/2019	DG DEVCO official	
12	9/12/2019	NGO official	
13	10/12/2019	DG ECHO official	
14	10/12/2019	DG ECHO official	
15	10/12/2019	NGO official	
16	11/12/2019	UN official	
17	11/12/2019	Red Cross officials	
18	12/12/2019	DG ECHO official	
19	14/01/2020	DG ECHO official	
20	15/01/2020	ECHO Cabinet Member	

21	15/01/2020	DG ECHO official (LB)	
22	15/01/2020	NGO official	
23	15/01/2020	UN official	
24	16/01/2020	EU Member State Diplomat	
25	8/04/2020	DG ECHO official (MM)	Follow up
26	14/04/2020	DG ECHO official (MM)	
27	5/06/2020	UN official (MM)	
28	17/06/2020	UN official (LB)	
29	19/06/2020	UN official (LB)	
30	22/06/2020	NGO official (MM)	
31	25/06/2020	NGO official (MM)	
32	2/07/2020	EU Member State diplomat (MM)	
33	11/07/2020	DG ECHO official (MM)	
34	16/09/2020	DG ECHO official	
35	1/12/2020	DG ECHO official (LB)	
36	8/12/2020	UN official (LB)	
37	11/12/2020	DG ECHO official (MOZ)	
38	30/12/2020	NGO official (LB)	
39	6/01/2021	DG ECHO official (LB)	
40	8/01/2021	NGO official (LB)	
41	12/01/2021	UK Foreign Common Development Office (LB and MOZ)	
42	20/01/2021	NGO official (LB)	
43	16/03/2021	DG ECHO official (MOZ)	
44	16/03/2021	EEAS official (MOZ)	

45	29/03/2021	NGO Official (MOZ)	
46	30/03/2021	UN official (MOZ)	
47	27/04/2021	AICS official (MOZ)	
48	29/04/2021	AICS official (MOZ)	
49	30/04/2021	UN Official (MOZ)	
50	10/05/2021	NGO Official (MOZ)	
51	11/05/2021	UN Official (MOZ)	
52	2/06/2021	NGO Official (MOZ)	
53	4/06/2021	NGO Official (MOZ)	
54	6/06/2021	NGO official (MOZ)	
55	8/06/2021	AICS official (MOZ)	

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