Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant's Moral Philosophy

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In §88, entitled 'On the highest moral-physical good', in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (hereafter *Anthropology* for short), Kant argues that 'good living' (physical good) and 'true humanity' (moral good) best harmonise in a '*good meal in good company*'.[1] The conversation and company shared over a meal, Kant argues, best provides for the 'union of social good living with virtue' in a way that promotes 'true humanity'.[2] This occurs when the inclination to 'good living' is not merely kept within the bounds of 'the law of virtue' but where the two achieve a graceful harmony.[3] As such, it is not to be confused with Kant's well-known account of the 'highest good', happiness in proportion to virtue.[4] But how is it that the humble dinner party and the associated practices of hospitality come to hold such an important, if often unrecognised,[5] place as the highest moral-physical good in Kant's thought? This question is in need of further investigation. Of the most recent studies in English that have taken seriously the importance of Kant's *Anthropology* for understanding his wider moral philosophy,[6] very few have considered §88 in any depth.[7] This paper aims to help bridge this significant gap in the literature.

More generally, by focusing on this section of *Anthropology*, as well as relevant passages from *The Metaphysics of Morals*, we can help to further correct the still common caricature of Kant's ethics derived from a very narrow reading (or, rather, misreading) of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Kant is still all too often read as the proponent of a simplistic moral psychology based exclusively around a private battle between the 'inclinations' and 'reason' in which the latter ought to simply subdue or even

completely eliminate the former. This picture is a gross distortion of Kant's considered views. Kant does locate the foundation of moral normativity, which is the focus of the *Groundwork*, in reason. However, in order to understand Kant's wider moral theory we need to examine not just his account of reason but also his complex distinctions between, and discussions of, empirical and rational desires, attitudes, emotions, feelings, affects, passions, dispositions, predispositions, propensities, and character. This paper begins to address some of these broader issues by emphasising the social aspect of Kant's theory.

Kant differentiates between pathological feelings, which are those that precede reason, and moral feelings, which are the products of reason.[8] The former feelings can, in the case of sympathy and compassion, aid reason in helping us to perform our duty. We should cultivate and strengthen such feelings, as well as the moral feelings of love and respect, and develop a disposition of cheerfulness, sociability, politeness, and affection for others.[9] In order to be able to do our duty gladly, as Kant thinks we should, we need to cultivate our emotions, desires and dispositions along these lines so that they are in harmony with reason. When we have cultivated ourselves in this way we will no longer find, in most cases, our duties to be burdensome, since we would have become the sort of person who, as a matter of course, always treats others, whoever they are, with respect and love. Such a virtuous person is a true friend of humanity, and such friendship is the sort of moral relationship exemplified between guests at a good dinner party. It is also the sort of relationship, with all its emotional and affective complexity, which we should aim to extend to all humans as the highpoint of virtue.

The image of the Kantian moral agent that thus emerges from this study is not that of an asocial and unemotional (yet somehow also guilt-ridden) agent with a rigid fixation on formulating universalisable maxims, the image usually associated with Kant's ethics, but rather that of a warm and engaged (though imperfect) social being who continually strives to become a true friend of human beings as such. The former image, unlike the

latter, completely fails to make sense of much of Kant's wider writings on morality, and in particular Kant's focus on the dinner party in his discussion of humanity's highest moral-physical good.

This paper begins in section one with a detailed investigation of Kant's discussion of the highest moral-physical good in *Anthropology*. This discussion is then linked, via the concept of conversation, with Kant's account of enlightenment in section two and, via the concept of hospitality, with Kant's account of cosmopolitanism in section three. In section four an extensive investigation is undertaken of Kant's accounts, primarily as found in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, of the role of the feelings and duties of love and respect, as well as the connection between gratitude and the key social relationship of friendship. Finally, in section five these various threads are brought back together again through Kant's moral ideal of an enlightened and just cosmopolitan human being who feels and acts with respect and love for all persons. Such an ideal is manifested in the humble dinner party where we create, through sociable conversation, a temporary community where virtue and happiness flourish in harmony.

1. Kant's Dinner Party

One obvious reason why §88, despite its important sounding section heading and significant location in the text (it concludes both Book III and the entire Part I of *Anthropology*), has received little scholarly attention is that it seems to contain nothing but a frivolous discussion of dinner party etiquette. But appearances, especially in society, are often misleading. In order to see why, we need to examine this section in detail. Kant, in the preceding §87, argues that for individuals the highest *physical* good, the 'greatest sensuous enjoyment, which is not accompanied by any admixture of loathing at all, is *resting after work*, when one is in a healthy state'.[10] In contrast, the highest physical good for the human species as a whole, which is provided for by the 'strongest impulses of

nature', '*love of life* and *sexual love*',[11] is a state of perpetual peace where 'the totality of human beings [are] united socially on earth'.[12] In such a state we can all enjoy a collective rest after the long labours of history. Why is it after this discussion that Kant begins to investigate the social graces? As will become clear, it is because Kant sees the path toward a moral perpetual peace to be a *social* one, and for this reason Kant concludes important sections in both *Anthropology* and the *Doctrine of Virtue[13]* with positive accounts of social intercourse.

§88 defines the highest *moral-physical* good for a human being, 'who is partly sensible and partly moral and intellectual', to be a state of '*moral happiness*', where the inclination to '*good living*' is not only limited by '*virtue*' but also in *harmony* with it.[14] While there is no earthly guarantee that our virtue will result in a proportionate amount of happiness, under relatively favourable conditions happiness and virtue are partners, not enemies.[15] As such, Kant's position here is closer to that of Aristotle than the Stoics.[16] For both Kant and Aristotle it is not virtue alone that guarantees or wholly constitutes earthly happiness, but virtue plus the blessings of good fortune. But as long as we are not subject to gross misfortunes or injustices,[17] the chances of which are likely to diminish as we make progress as a species, it will be *because of* and not *despite* our virtues that we will achieve happiness.[18] Living a virtuous life, as Kant understands it, of wisdom and courage, devoted to justice, and to the pursuit of one's own well-rounded perfection and the happiness of others, *is* a happy life.[19] And given the nature of our humanity, the state that is most characteristic of this 'union of good living with virtue' is one of 'sociability', which can unfortunately easily slip into vice and 'false sociability'.[20] Social intercourse thus provides the key link for Kant between virtue and happiness.

For Kant this link between virtue and happiness is most perfect in the sort of social gatherings that he discusses in §88 of *Anthropology*. A good dinner party should primarily aim, not at the mere physical enjoyment of eating and drinking, which can be achieved

just as well by dining alone, but at the attainment of enjoyable and enlightening *conversation*.[21] For this reason the number (and type) of guests is crucial. Too few guests and the conversation may slacken or lack sufficient variety, whereas too many guests, as at a banquet,[22] undermines the quality of the conversation and fragments the social whole into a series of atomised subgroups. Kant notes that during long dinners, with many courses, conversation usually goes through three stages: narration, arguing and jesting.[23] The first stage enlightens by sharing the news of the day, the second stage cultivates our powers of judgment and reasoning through argumentation, while the third stage sharpens our wit through jesting. Consequently Kant downplays 'music, dance and games [and other forms of] *speechless* social gathering (for the few words necessary for such games establishes no conversation'),[24] and encourages the moderate use of wine, 'since it enlivens the company's conversation'.[25] Excessive consumption of food and drink is to be avoided, however, because it lowers the level and tone of the conversation, and expresses disrespect for our own dignity.[26] Good-natured laughter which 'is *sociable*' and smiling are to be encouraged,[27] the latter especially in children who should become 'accustomed early to frank and unrestrained smiling, because the cheerfulness of their facial features gradually leaves a mark within and establishes a *disposition* to cheerfulness, friendliness, and sociability' which approximates 'the virtue of benevolence'.[28] The common thread that underwrites Kant's entire discussion of the dinner party is the role that it plays in allowing for good conversation, the sort of conversation that cultivates our virtues in a way that also promotes our happiness. Kant is thus concerned here only with sociable conversation, and not with deliberative public reason, which he considers elsewhere.[29] The latter, unlike the former, is generally adversarial and not pleasant, and aims at justice and not virtue.

To this end Kant provides maxims for regulating sociable conversation, although this must be done in such a way that it goes 'unnoticed and unenvied'.[30] The guests should

select topics of conversation, and not gossip, which are of interest to all present and to which each can contribute. This ensures that no one is left out of the conversation. Long silences are to be avoided, as is the changing of topics too frequently, because this tends to disrupt the thread and flow of the conversation. Importantly, guests should not express disrespect for humanity through arrogance, defamation or ridicule,[31] and dogmatism must not be allowed to arise, and if it does, it should be deflated through the skilful use of jest. The avoiding of disrespect and dogmatism in turn cultivates 'pluralism' as a 'way of thinking', whereby we become used to avoiding egoism by taking the views of others as a necessary 'touchstone', though not a replacement, for our own thinking.[32] Such pluralism in thinking is central to the achievement of wisdom and the development of good judgment, a point whose importance Hannah Arendt first brought out clearly in her idiosyncratic but innovative reading of Kant.[33] Moreover, whenever conflict arises it is essential that the conversation retains the appropriate '*tone*', neither noisy nor arrogant, so that 'no guest returns home from the gathering *estranged* from the other'.[34] What is of the utmost importance is that 'mutual respect and benevolence always shine forth'.[35]

Kant's ruminations on dinner party conversation may seem very quaint, but is it important? It is a charge that Kant felt compelled to respond to:

No matter how insignificant these laws of refined humanity may seem, especially if one compares them to pure moral laws, nevertheless, anything that promotes sociability, even if it consists only in pleasing maxims or manners, is a garment that dresses virtue to advantage … The *cynic's purism* and the *anchorite's mortification of the flesh*, without good social living, are distorted forms of virtue which do not make virtue inviting; rather, being forsaken by the graces they can make no claim to humanity.[36]

Humanity is a mixture of the sensuous and the rational, and to overplay either at the expense of the other, whether in the form of excessive enjoyment (as in drunkenness and gluttony) or fastidious denial of such pleasures (as the cynic or anchorite does), has no claim to humanity.

It is important to note that Kant uses the crucial term 'humanity' in a number of different ways, but in general we can differentiate between two main senses of the term. First, Kant uses it narrowly to refer to our core capacities as rational agents who have moral feelings and are thereby able to act for the sake of the moral law. Were we to lose these capacities altogether, then our 'humanity would dissolve … into mere animality'.[37] Second, Kant uses the term 'humanity' in a richer anthropological sense to refer, not only to beings with these core rational capacities, but also to complex social beings who desire equal recognition from others, care about their own happiness, sympathise with others, and who find morality always a potential struggle since their empirical desires, feelings and emotions (their sensuous natures) do not necessarily coincide with the demands of their reason (their rational natures).[38]

Like Schiller,[39] Kant understands the moral importance of achieving a graceful harmony between the two elements of our humanity (in the second, broader sense). Being virtuous is something we should find pleasurable, and our duty something we should do gladly.[40] But unlike Aristotle, Kant does not envisage the achievement of a state of character whereby our sensuous desires *never* counteract our moral reasons. This lack of perfection is symbolic for Kant of our radical evil.[41] Morality remains, because of our dual sensuous and rational natures, not ideally, but in principle, an ungraceful struggle. But at a good dinner party struggle gives way to grace, and virtue and happiness achieve unity.

2. Enlightened Conversation

To understand Kant's attention to the rules of conversation we need to appreciate the wider enlightenment context. Indeed, as Christopher Clark puts it, 'The Prussian enlightenment was about conversation'.[42] Semi-formal conversation flourished in Prussia during the second half of the eighteenth century through a series of transnational networks of voluntary associations. These networks were comprised of clubs, such as the Freemasons, reading societies, informal discussions in bookshops and coffee houses (such as Johan Jacob Kanter's bookshop in Kant's native Königsberg), lecture and discussion groups such as the Berlin Wednesday Society,[43] learned academic societies, and publications such as the famed *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. Statutes for the regulation of conversation were prevalent among these associations. These were designed not to stifle but rather to encourage free discussion by ensuring the observance of 'transparent and egalitarian rules of engagement' which were 'essential if status differences were not to cripple debate from the outset'.[44] The Freemasons, for example, had specific rules of conversational civility which included injunctions 'to avoid immoderate speech, frivolous or vulgar commentary and the discussion of topics (such as religion) that would stir divisive passions among the brothers'.[45] Similar statutes for regulating conversation, to ensure that 'the imperatives of politeness and reciprocal respect' were met, appeared in the constitutions of numerous reading societies, along with prohibitions against 'parlour games and gambling'.[46] The reasons for these latter prohibitions were, no doubt, similar to the ones that Kant gave for their exclusion from good dinner parties. Namely, because they stifle the conversation when they are not utterly speechless, and cultivate 'complete egoism' rather than an enlightened and pluralistic cosmopolitan perspective which promotes 'true humanity'.[47]

Kant famously defined the enlightenment as '*the human being's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity* [or *minority*]' (*Unmündigkeit*), that is, the emergence from needing the supervision of a guardian (*Vormund*).[48] Johan Georg Hamann rightly sees

Kant's understanding of enlightenment as revolving around the terms 'immaturity and guardianship' (*Unmündigkeit* and *Vormundschaft*).[49] To be 'immature' or a 'minor' is to need a guardian or legally appointed *mouth*piece to speak for you.[50] The unenlightened need not necessarily be psychologically childish or overly superstitious,[51] but are simply those who lack the courage (as Kant claims), as well as the resources, opportunities, self-confidence and education (as Hamann claims),[52] to make public uses of their mouths by speaking and thus thinking for themselves.

Thinking for oneself is thus closely linked with speaking for oneself and being able to converse with others on equal terms. Indeed, Kant goes so far as to ask:

Yet how much and how correctly could we *think* if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we *communicate* our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us! Thus one can very well say that this external power which wrenches away people's freedom publically to *communicate* their thoughts also takes from them the freedom to *think*.[53]

We cannot think for ourselves if we cannot communicate and converse with others.[54] As such, Jürgen Habermas' emphasis on the isolated transcendental ego as the paradigm of Kantian moral rationality is seriously misguided. Like Habermas, Kant also sees moral rationality as emerging out of regulated conversations with others. For Kant, pure reason in a practical context does not emerge from isolating oneself from everything and everyone, but instead from finding, through actual discourse with others, which norms have universal validity since each person, whatever their particular ends or thick identities, could freely will the norm for themselves. Hence, while there are important differences between the views of Kant and Habermas, these differences are not over whether we must discursively test claims to universality with others in actual discourse.[55]

Further, this emphasises the importance for Kant of ensuring that all persons enjoy the opportunity to participate equally in determining what counts as categorically rational, whatever their thick identities or ends are.[56] However, a person cannot participate equally as the holder of a minority identity if their identity is publically disparaged and their voice is marginalised or ignored. In order, therefore, for a person as the holder of a minority identity to have a public voice they need not only courage, as well as opportunities and education, but also the public recognition of their status, whatever their thick identity, as a free and equal co-legislator of rationally binding public norms.

Kant's moral standpoint is thus not to be conflated with the arrogant (Kant would add narrow-minded and egotistical)[57] moral standpoint that Hegel rejects (and falsely seems to attribute to Kant). This is the view of an agent who thinks that their convictions alone determine what is right and good for everyone.[58] Kant's broad-minded and pluralistic perspective is in fact far closer to (though still distinct from) Hegel's own ethical standpoint, in which the ethical agent does not consider themselves to be an absolute and infallible judge of what is right, but an active participant in the public shaping of collective self-understanding of rightness through dialogue.[59] The Kantian ethical standpoint, much like the Hegelian one, seeks to find a middle ground between abdicating one's own rationality to the guardianship of others and arrogantly asserting one's right to solely determine what is right in utter disregard to the considered views of others.[60] This point is formalised in the third 'supreme form' of the Categorical Imperative, the form that provides a '*complete determination*' of morality,[61] namely the Formula of Autonomy and the associated Formula of the Kingdom of Ends.[62] Here the emphasis is not on what *I* all alone can will for *all*, but on what *we* as equal co-sovereigns of an ideal society can will for *each other*.[63] As interdependent but free beings we must treat each other as if we belonged to an ideal society based on norms that each person, as a bearer of dignity and absolute worth, could freely consent to, and not simply in ways that I

alone could will to be valid for all. Morality, as Kant understands it, necessarily takes a social perspective.

3. Cosmopolitan Hospitality

A good dinner host extends the gift of hospitality to her guests. The project of cosmopolitanism, as Kant envisages it, can be partly understood as a reciprocal extension of the host's hospitality to all of humanity. Kant states in his well-known third definitive article for perpetual peace that 'Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal *hospitality*'.[64] This right amounts to the 'right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility'.[65] The foreigner can be turned away, 'if this can be done without destroying him', but he must not be interfered with as long as he is peaceful.[66] Cosmopolitan right might seem to amount to little more than a duty to grant asylum to the refugee and the negative right of everyone else not to be treated with hostility.[67] However, there is also a positive element to this right, the '*right to visit*', not to presume to be a guest but 'to present oneself for society'.[68] Later in the same paragraph Kant seems to reduce this positive right to nothing more than the right to '*seek* commerce'.[69] Here, though, Kant has in mind the specific case of a European sailor who lands in foreign (non-European) lands and who has the right not to be attacked for merely seeking commerce with local (and often 'uncivilised') inhabitants.[70] But such a right to seek commerce is not for Kant an end but merely a means for allowing strangers from '*distant parts of the world* [to] … enter peaceably into relations with one another'.[71] Indeed, Kant is deeply critical of the practice of limiting our relationships with others to a purely economic (rather than a social) level and elsewhere recommends that it is only in dealing with 'evil-minded human beings' that we should 'limit the association only to business'.[72]

We can better understand Kant's account of hospitality in *Toward Perpetual Peace* if we compare it with the less well-known account given in his discussion of the character

of peoples in *Anthropology*.[73] Whereas the former text focuses on the hospitality Europeans can expect as a right in distant 'uncivilised' lands, the latter text focuses on inter-European hospitality. Kant singles out the English and the French as the two '*most civilised* peoples on earth'.[74] For Kant this is represented, not only by economic conditions, but also by the importance of language, with French being (in Kant's day) the universal language '*of conversation*' and English that '*of commerce*'.[75] However, though both nations are civilised peoples they are not ideally moral peoples. The French, according to Kant, are amiable and '*courteous* especially toward foreigners who visit France', but also vivacious and imbued with an 'infectious *spirit of freedom*' which is not, however, always sufficiently 'kept in check by considered principles'.[76] The English, in contrast, have 'an inflexible disposition to stick to a voluntarily adopted principle', but due to their commercial spirit are too 'unsociable',[77] and believe their 'supposed self-sufficiency' excuses them from 'kindness toward other people'.[78]

Whatever we think of Kant's idiosyncratic opinions on the characters of peoples, their usefulness for us lies in the light they shed on Kant's understanding of cosmopolitanism. We can read Kant's account of the French and the English as emblematic of the two moral forces, respect and love, which are both essential elements of Kant's cosmopolitanism. The English are symbolic of respect, of adhering to norm-based interactions, and the limitation of hospitality to commercial engagement. The French are symbolic of love and benevolence, of sociable desires to converse and be hospitable to others, including foreigners, even if this is not always kept within the bounds of reasonable norms. By combining Kant's discussion of hospitality in *Anthropology* with that in *Perpetual Peace* we thereby gain a richer understanding of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan hospitality is ideally both French and English.[79] It involves not just a right to be allowed to make business propositions to foreigners without harm, but also a wide

duty to be hospitable,[80] that is, to treat other persons sociably and with a mixture of love and respect.

This discussion helps to shed light on the recent debate surrounding Seyla Benhabib's appropriation of Kantian hospitality into an international legal setting in *Another Cosmopolitanism*.[81] Jeremy Waldron, in response, complains that Benhabib stretches Kant's conception of hospitality too far and in the wrong direction. Rather than pointing toward international legal institutions, Waldron sees Kantian hospitality as taking a ''culture-centred' approach' which points in the direction of 'travel, contact and commerce'.[82] In response Benhabib argues that Kant's third definitive article for perpetual peace, which contains the account of cosmopolitan right, must be understood against the background of the first two articles. Read in this way, Benhabib argues that the third article 'ascribes to the individual the status of being a rights-bearing person in a world civil society'.[83] This pushes Benhabib in the direction of *legal* cosmopolitanism, away from Waldron's *cultural* cosmopolitanism. As should be clear from the above discussion, both Benhabib and Waldron pick out different and complementary aspects of Kantian hospitality. But what both overlook, at least to some extent, is the specifically *social* (rather than political or cultural) aspect of cosmopolitanism inherent in the very concept of hospitality.[84] To be hospitable is to invite the other into your home or country,[85] to share your food and table, and to enter into peaceful social relations with them based on the respect and love due to all humans, wherever they come from.

It is a sign of respect for humanity that we fight for human rights in all parts of the world. It is a sign of love for humanity that we undertake our conditional 'duty of *humanity* (*humanitas*)', the duty specific to 'an animal endowed with reason'. This is the duty to promote 'active and rational benevolence', to 'cultivate' our 'compassionate natural (aesthetic) feeling[s]' and to 'sympathize actively in' the 'fate' of all human beings, wherever they are in the world.[86] As Kant notes here aesthetic feelings are linked

with sociability.[87] In the *Anthropology* Kant writes: 'Taste … concerns the *communication* of our feeling of pleasure or displeasure to others, and includes a susceptibility, which this very communication affects pleasurably, to feel a satisfaction (*complacentia*) about it in common with others (sociably).'[88] Such sociable conversation, a form of the highest moral-physical good, arises from our ability to communicate valid judgments of taste to all, thus creating a pleasurable solidarity between peoples. The beautiful and the sublime are both essential to this process. As Kant notes in the *Critique of Judgment*, 'the beautiful prepares us to love something … without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest'.[89] Thus the beautiful is loveable and attracts us, drawing us closer, and thereby prepares us to love humanity. The sublime awes us and thus makes us keep a reverential distance, and thereby prepares us to respect humanity even when others use their autonomy in ways that are within the bounds of right but contrary to our interest. Humanity is for Kant at once sublime and beautiful, worthy of both respect and love.

4. Love and Respect

Kant's treatment of society is based on his underlying account of the role that love and respect ought to play in structuring social relations. Kant gives his fullest account of this in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. There he argues that there are four 'antecedent predispositions on the side of *feeling*', namely receptiveness to moral feeling, conscience, love of others, and self respect, which 'lie at the basis of morality' as '*subjective* conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty, not … objective conditions of morality'.[90] These refer to endowments or capacities, 'predispositions on the side of *feeling*' to reason,[91] in virtue of which we can be motivated by specifically *moral* obligations. These moral obligations differ from obligations of justice, for which we need to presuppose no such emotional capacities. For this reason a nation of purely self-interested but amoral devils could agree to abide by principles of justice.[92] Indeed, in the

Doctrine of Right, Kant considers humans to be essentially asocial and misanthropic. From the perspective of right, the primary thing is not to wrong anyone, even if in so doing you must 'shun all society', and only '(if you cannot help associating with others), *enter* into a society with them in which each can keep what is his'.[93] This coincides with the classic contractarian view of the political community as composed of atomised landowners who are forced, out of self-interest, to set up a society which, by limiting the freedom of each, secures the protection of the rights and property of all. But, as we have seen, when we shift from Kant's doctrine of right to his philosophy of history and his account of virtue, we move from a strict focus on asocial freedom to the sociable (and unsociable) tendencies of human nature. Here moral feeling, conscience, love, and respect are of central importance.

Kant's accounts of moral feeling (pleasure or displeasure respectively from being aware that our actions are in conformity with or contrary to the moral law) and conscience (the ability to place one's subjective judgments before the tribunal of practical reason)[94] are relatively straightforward. A being who lacked the very ability to care about being moral, or who lacked the very capacity to test their maxims against practical reason, is the sort of being who lacks the subjective grounds to be moved by obligations of virtue, even if we force them to comply with principles of justice. In contrast, Kant's accounts of love and respect are far less straightforward. These complexities arise because Kant discusses both the *feelings* of love and respect, and the *duties* of love and respect.[95]

In regard to the feelings of respect there are at least three variants: self-respect or self-esteem as the ground for certain duties to oneself;[96] respect for the absolute value of the humanity in each specific person;[97] and respect for the moral law more generally.[98] In regards to love, Kant focuses not only on the way that reason can produce love of others, but also on our ability to feel love in the form of delight or pleasure in the mere representation of the existence of human beings as such.[99] (Again, the link between beauty

and love as a feeling becomes clear, for beauty teaches us to love without interest, to find pleasure in the mere representation of a thing and not just the thing itself.) Love, in this sense, is not to be confused with the love of particular human beings, which Kant calls 'love … as inclination (pathological love)'.[100] Such personal love is derived from an object of our senses (hence 'pathological'), namely our experience of the person toward whom we feel love, such as our partner, friend, child or parent. Love as a moral feeling, in contrast, takes the form of delight in the mere intellectual representation of human beings.[101] This feeling of delight, though, is best understood as following from (or being strengthened by) good conduct, rather than forming the basis of it. As Kant notes: 'the saying 'you ought to *love* your neighbour as yourself' does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, *do good* to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you'.[102] Duty is thus aided by and in return strengthens our moral feelings, even though it does not make the presence of such feelings a *condition* for action.[103]

The figure of the inhospitable misanthrope, including the 'separatist' misanthrope who merely shuns all society with human beings without 'active hostility toward them', poses an important problem for Kant's account.[104] This is because the misanthrope, who (like those in the social contracting position) is not merely unsociable but completely asocial, feels no love or delight on representing humanity to themselves. They find humanity, in whatever form, hateful.[105] Kant's response to this case is twofold. First, that the moral feeling of love is only a *predisposition*, so that it remains possible that the misanthrope is still predisposed (i.e. has the *capacity*) to be moved by reason to love humans in the appropriate sense, even if *in fact* she does not love them as yet. Second, Kant also argues that not only *can* we love humanity but that we *should* love humanity because humanity *is loveable*. This emphasises the importance for Kant of his argument that humanity is lovable, for if humanity should turn out to be unlovable then this would

be a serious hindrance to moral feeling. Kant argues that humanity is loveable because the human species is constantly progressing and this in turn is evidence of a moral predisposition.[106] A species which, though beset by a propensity to evil, struggles to make progress toward the good, is a species worth loving.[107]

In discussing duties to others Kant differentiates between meritorious duties, the fulfilment of which places others under obligation, and duties which are not meritorious, the fulfilment of which simply returns to others what is already theirs. Duties of love are of the first kind, duties of respect are of the second. When I treat someone with respect I simply give her what her humanity already entitles her to. In contrast, while it is my wide duty to help others to achieve their ends, it is not my specific duty to help you to achieve your ends.[108] Thus in an act of beneficence, in specifically helping *you* to achieve *your* particular ends, I have done something meritorious, not strictly obligatory, and this puts *you* under an extra obligation of gratitude to *me*.

Kant considers gratitude to be a '*sacred* duty' because the obligation 'cannot be discharged completely by any act of keeping with it (so that one who is under obligation always remains under obligation). Any other duty is an *ordinary* duty'.[109] Even if repaid in kind, the initial benefactor still gave first, and so there remains a residual, though in most cases minor, debt of gratitude which cannot be completely repaid. Thus love for others, manifested in the form of beneficence, creates asymmetry in a relationship, and this has the potential to undermine the equality that is the foundation of respect. The two moral forces of love, which beckons us to come closer, and respect, which beckons us to keep our distance, therefore seem to pull us in different directions, and this has the potential to undermine the very coherency of our moral obligations.

It is in light of this dialectic between beneficence and gratitude that we must understand Kant's likening of love and respect to the law of '*attraction* and *repulsion*'.

The principle of **mutual love** admonishes them constantly to *come closer* to one another; that of **respect** they owe another, to keep themselves *at a distance* from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, 'then nothing (immorality), with gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water'.[110]

A world of respect without love would be a barren one, full of rights-respecters who would not lift a finger to help others. A world of love without respect would be a suffocating one where autonomy and self-development would not flourish. However, Marcia Baron contends that Kant overstates his case here, for love already involves an element of respect.[111] While this is true (as Kant himself notes elsewhere),[112] it is clear from Kant's discussion of gratitude that there remains an inherent tension between love and a particular type of equality and thus, perhaps, also between love and respect. This is because in receiving help from others we incur extra obligations of gratitude towards our benefactor. 'Gratitude is not, strictly speaking, love toward a benefactor on the part of someone he has put under obligation, but rather *respect* for him … in gratitude the one put under obligation stands a step lower than his benefactor'.[113] The benefactor ought to act from love, which is meritorious, and in return the beneficiary owes, from respect, a debt of gratitude. This places the beneficiary a step lower than his benefactor.

This asymmetry can lead to the mistaken belief that love undermines respect. It can seem to do so because we can feel ourselves, as benefactors acting from love, to be superior (worthy of extra respect) and, as beneficiaries, to be inferior (worthy of less respect). This can lead benefactors to have an inflated sense of self-esteem and the arrogance to demand that 'others think little of themselves in comparison with him'.[114] This can lead beneficiaries to feel either a lack of self-esteem or even 'resentment [toward their benefactor] at not being able to make oneself fully his equal (as far as relations of

duty are concerned)'.[115] The cure for the benefactor's arrogance is humility,[116] which arises from a proper awareness of the moral frailty that is endemic to our humanity,[117] the good fortune from which we have benefited, and the misfortune that could still strike. Further, those fortunate enough to be in the position to help others should remind themselves that they simply fulfil their duty (meritorious though it be) in helping others.[118]

More generally, the mistaken view that love can undermine respect is premised on a misunderstanding of the basis of respect. Respect, used here and elsewhere in the sense of 'recognition respect',[119] is not dependent upon social status, or the possession of highly praised skills, but rather derives from our common humanity (in the narrow sense of the term). Each and every person is due an *equal amount* of respect in the form of the recognition of their status as free and equal co-legislators of the moral law. Such recognition respect is a categorical demand of reason. This obligates us to treat all persons as ends in themselves, and the recognition of this status is the proper basis of respect. In this sense we are all moral equals and nothing we do can take away the inner dignity of our humanity. Hence love cannot undermine respect because nothing can undermine the equal respect we owe to each other and to ourselves (in the form of self-esteem). We each therefore have 'a duty of free respect toward' each other, which requires us to adopt the '*maxim* of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person' and thereby not 'exalting' ourselves 'above others'.[120]

Therefore, when respect and love are properly understood, the moral gift of beneficence should be taken as an occasion for 'moral kindness, that is, as an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man'.[121] It should be taken in this way because beneficence both affirms the absolute value of the dignity of our humanity and the respect this warrants, which cannot be diminished, and the good natured love that others manifest for us, which reminds us that, though humans are radically frail and impure, they also deserve our love.

However, beneficence can sometimes lead, not to moral kindness, but to ingratitude. Kant argues that ingratitude is 'one of the most detestable vices'[122] because it 'can destroy the moral incentive to beneficence in its very principle'.[123] If my good will toward others is returned with hatred, then I will soon lose my good will toward others. Such ingratitude tends to emerge from misunderstanding the basis of respect for both ourselves and others by locating it, not in our status as free and equal co-legislators of categorically binding norms, but in our publicly recognised social status. This 'misunderstanding' manifests itself in the 'fear' that by showing gratitude we act in a way 'contrary to real self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in one's person)'.[124] But this fear is, as we have seen, unfounded, since nothing can undermine our dignity as persons. One of the spurious sources of this mistaken view is a false sense of pride which aims at total independence from others. Such pride is false since it is based on an ideal that is both unachievable and morally inappropriate. It is unachievable, since we are always already under a debt of gratitude to our forebears.[125] It is morally inappropriate, since such pride is incompatible with the mutual interdependence of friendship, and friendship best harmonises the respect and love that we ought to have for others.

The fear that gratitude undermines self-esteem can also result from the social perversion of our originally good predisposition to humanity. From this natural predisposition 'originates the inclination *to gain worth in the opinion of others* … originally … merely *equal worth* … but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others'.[126] A struggle for public recognition as a person of equal worth to any other and due equal respect is a just demand and an expression of our good predisposition to humanity. Further, receiving such public recognition can help to reinforce our self-esteem, whereas the denial of such recognition, though not undermining the normative basis for self-esteem, can make the maintenance of it a difficult task. In contrast, seeking to gain superiority over others by desiring a higher

level of self-esteem or demanding greater respect from others, and thus seeking to be recognised as worth more, as a person, than others, is an unjust desire. Such a perversion of our good predisposition is itself a vice, that of being *contemptuous* of others,[127] and also tends to lead to the 'diabolical vices' of envy, ingratitude, and malice.[128]

Although ingratitude may initially look out of place sandwiched between envy and malice, all three vices have a common basis. This common basis is a misunderstanding, which tends to become institutionalised in concrete forms of life, of the proper foundations of respect and self-esteem and their connection to well-being and social status. This misunderstanding is manifested in the view that the relative well-being of others, compared to our own well-being, should influence the respect that we have for ourselves and others (and they for us and themselves). This view tends to lead to envy, ingratitude and malice. It leads to envy because we feel distress at the well-being of others since this makes our own relative position worse by comparison. It leads to ingratitude because we feel that our self-esteem is diminished by accepting benefits from others since this makes us inferior by comparison. And it leads to malice because we feel joy, rather than sympathy, in the misfortune of others, since this makes our own relative position better by comparison. In each of these cases our relative possession of particular goods, qualities and recognised social status, rather than our equal possession of core rational capacities, are taken to be not only what well-being consists in, but also to form the appropriate basis for assigning differing degrees of recognition respect to ourselves and others. The worth of a person, as a person, is thus assigned on the basis of what they have relative to others. Under such corrupt social conditions, the more others acquire the more we want for ourselves, and the less others have the better off we take ourselves to be. This leads to a mania for honour, domination and possession.[129]

However, as we have seen, this view misunderstands the basis of respect, which should derive from our equal status as free co-legislators of the moral law, and the dignity

and absolute worth that such an office confers upon us. As such, understanding our well-being as relative to that of others is not an appropriate basis for either respect or self-esteem. Further, this understanding of well-being is itself mistaken. Instead of focusing on how much we have compared to others,[130] we should focus on our three predispositions to the good in the form of desires for self-preservation, the satisfaction of sexual and social drives, the just demand for equal social recognition, and the development of our moral personality. This focus should in turn be incorporated into the broader pursuit of justice and virtue, and thus the worthiness to be happy. This shifts our priorities away from increasing our relative social status, and towards working with others to create ethical communities in which we mutually support each other in the pursuit of virtue.[131] Such a virtuous condition will also likely be a happy one (with, as we saw in section one, a little good fortune).

However, while love in the form of beneficence does not undermine the equal respect we owe to others and ourselves, it does introduce inequalities into relationships. In particular, the beneficiary owes, *from* respect, an *extra obligation of gratitude* to their benefactor (but not, as we have seen, any *extra respect*).[132] This creates inequality as 'far as relations of duty are concerned',[133] with the beneficiary having more onerous obligations towards their benefactor, in the form of a debt of gratitude, than they are owed in return. Of course, in most cases the debts of gratitude that we owe to each other are more or less equivalent, and therefore no *structural* inequality enters into the relationship. However, this is not always the case, and when such structural inequalities do occur they undermine the basis for true friendship.

Kant understands friendship to be the social relationship of absolute equality that is the crown of ethics because it symbolises 'the most intimate union of love with respect'.[134] This intimate union, built on mutual trust, is one where the reciprocal love and respect that friends have for each other is kept in harmony so that no structural inequality, in the form

of vastly differing debts of gratitude, emerges. For this reason Kant understands friendship to be, among other things, a state where I must have complete 'confidence' that my friend, if required, will 'look after my affairs', but where 'I must never ask him to do it' because this would 'alter the relationship. The relation of friendship is that of equality'.[135] If my friend becomes 'my benefactor and I am in his debt … [then] friendship no longer exists'.[136] The significant debt of gratitude that the beneficiary owes their benefactor, where this cannot be reciprocated, creates a structural inequality in the relationship that undermines the basis for true friendship.[137]

While friendship is not compatible with structural inequality in regard to obligations of gratitude, this does not imply that there is anything necessarily morally troubling about such inequalities. Kant gives the example of our forebears.[138] Parents, for example, have more onerous sets of obligations towards their young children than they are owed in return, and as children mature into adults they acquire a debt of gratitude to their parents that can never be fully repaid. Similarly, communities owe a debt of gratitude, which cannot be repaid, to their 'ancestors' who in 'preceding' them have conferred 'benefits' upon them.[139] These cases show us that friendship is not a state where we should owe *no* debts of gratitude to our friend, but rather one where there should be no structural inequalities in that relationship, as there are in the cases of parents and their children, communities and their ancestors, and philanthropic benefactors and their needy beneficiaries. Such relationships, though often important and valuable, are not built upon the same sort of equality that is the basis for friendship and thus are not the sorts of relationships that we should (or can) strive to have with all people.

Further, the debts of gratitude that we owe to others implies that in fulfilling our duties of virtue, but not our duties of justice, we should not be completely impartial since we owe more to those who have specifically conferred benefits upon us.[140] Of course, we still have a wide duty to help all persons to achieve happiness, including those who have

not conferred benefits upon us. However, when deliberating about our wide duties of virtue we need to take into account the fact that we are embedded within complex historical contexts and particular sets of social and familial relations which place us under extra debts of gratitude to specific others.[141] Complete impartiality can therefore, in some cases, be morally inappropriate as it involves ignoring these specific debts of gratitude.[142]

As such, while there is not, as we have seen, any structural tension between respect and love when the basis of respect is properly understood, it remains the case that love can lead to structural inequalities in terms of the obligations of gratitude that we owe to each other. This, in turn, undermines the equality upon which true friendship is built. Thus the real tension we find here is between gratitude and friendship. It is partly because of this tension that Kant understands friendship as a social relation based primarily around conversation and authentic self-revelation.[143] The gift of conversation is always a mutual one (even if the other only listens, listening is also a gift) and it therefore cannot engender the inequality that other gifts can. Further, conversation builds layers of mutual gratitude and equal indebtedness, and this can help to foster solidarity as well as mutual love, care, affection and trust, all the while reinforcing mutual respect. The free gift of sociable conversation, in creating symmetrical obligations of gratitude, is thereby an important foundation for true friendship.

5. Conversation is the Key

Friendship is thus, as Kant understands it, a social relation based around the free exchange of conversation between equals. Enlightenment is also, as we have seen, based around such conversations and can consequently be understood as a sort of expansion of friendship outwards, eventually encompassing (in a cosmopolitan spirit) all of humanity. Friendship, enlightenment and cosmopolitanism, as well as virtue and happiness, all achieve their union only in a society that revolves around universal conversation between

equals. We find such a society in miniature in the social relation of sharing good food with good company. With this point in mind we can now understand what Kant means when he says that the 'human being is a being meant for society',[144] and that we each have 'a duty to oneself as well as to others not to *isolate* oneself … but to use one's moral perfections in social intercourse'.[145] This is a duty, we know from Kant's biography,[146] which he undertook with joyful seriousness. It is a duty to be a 'friend of human beings as such' (*Menschenfreund*), not simply a philanthropist (whose love can undermine equality), but also someone who cares for '*equality*' among humans.[147]

Thus it is with a discussion of the social graces, the appendix which concludes the *Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics*, with which Kant completes his account of friendship, for to cultivate friendship is to cultivate a particular social relationship. Kant values social intercourse so very highly, especially as manifested in friendship, because it allows us to simultaneously achieve our two obligatory moral ends, the happiness of others (through providing pleasant company) and our own self-perfection (through cultivating our skills of conversation, reasoning, judgment and wit). Further, society does this in a graceful way that we find pleasurable, and thus our virtue and happiness are harmoniously united. For this reason the separatist misanthrope commits not only a moral wrong against themselves and others, in shunning all society with other human beings, but also a prudential error. Their moral failings are likely to lead to a crown of unhappiness.

Social intercourse also has further moral benefits in that it cultivates a 'disposition of reciprocity – agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect', which does much 'to associate the graces with virtue'. These '*externals* or by products' give a 'beautiful illusion resembling virtue', without being deceptive.[148] Kant explains:

> *Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality,* and *gentleness* (in disagreeing without
> quarrelling) are, indeed, only tokens; yet they promote the feeling for virtue itself

> by a striking to bring this illusion near as possible to the truth. By all these, which are merely the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse, one binds others too.[149]

For Kant, it is through social intercourse that we learn to treat others as ends in themselves, as beings worthy of our love and respect, and to whom we owe a degree of sociable hospitality. The first and not insignificant step toward being moral is thus at least putting on the *show* of morality,[150] a point Kant repeats on numerous occasions, including in the first *Critique*.[151] A *moral* culture progresses beyond this merely *cultivated* and *civilised* state by being one where the social graces are no longer the *mere shows* of politeness, but are rather *authentic expressions* of respect and love for other human beings.[152] Of course, we do not need refined society manners to do that. Moral decency is all the manners we ought to ever need in any company worth keeping. A virtuous state, then, is one where the *duties* of respect and love ideally flow from (but are not the condition of) *feelings* of respect and love for all other persons. Such a virtuous person is a true *friend* of human beings as such. Christine Korsgaard writes that 'to become friends is to create a neighbourhood where the Kingdom of Ends is real'.[153] The ultimate goal of Kant's moral project is to extend that neighbourhood to encompass all people, to include human beings as such, whatever their backgrounds.

Of course, Kant is far from naïve about the duplicity, mendacity, and deception that is endemic to society and social relations. But despite all the corruptions of society, abandonment is no solution. The romantic withdrawal into an authentic solitude, in order to ensure that one's natural goodness is not perverted, is not a viable solution. Not only are we more likely to find angst rather than happiness there, but we also thereby fail in our ethical duties to promote the happiness of others and our own self-perfection. A similar point is made by J. S. Mill who argues that the 'ultimate sanction' of morality is not some

abstract proof (which is just as well, given the notorious status of Mill's proof), but social feelings. Through social cooperation we become the sort of person who 'as though instinctively' is 'conscious of' themselves as someone who '*of course* pays regard to others'.[154] Like Mill, Kant argues that we become virtuous agents, the sort of person who *of course* treats others with love and respect, (at least partly) through socialisation, education,[155] and public deliberation about matters of justice. Further, such virtuous agents (or 'noble characters' to use Mill's term) are also likely (under not unfavourable conditions) to lead satisfying, rich and happy lives, while at the same time doing right and good in the world.

As such, the moral path forward lies for Kant not in the rejection of social intercourse but in the removal of its deceitful veneer. Fake social niceties ought to become the authentic expressions of respect and love for others felt by enlightened, sociable and cosmopolitan friends of humanity. But in society we also make enemies and meet people we dislike. For Kant the mark of virtue is having the moral strength to treat even unlikable people in ways befitting their humanity, even if the manifestation of humanity in their person is less than agreeable to us.[156] At times, this will require courage and wisdom in the form of adherence to rational principles,[157] and not just grace and good habits. Sometimes acting virtuously will not grant us happiness, as when our love is returned with ingratitude or our respect abused by criminality. Unfortunately, as such cases show, virtue and happiness cannot always maintain the graceful harmony that they achieve when we share a good meal with good company. And when they do part company, it is our virtue and not our happiness that must be our guide.[158]

6. Conclusion

It is only in the moral society 'to come', a society based around the conversations of free and equal persons, that Kant's moral, political and historical projects will reach fruition.

But we momentarily emulate such a society whenever we share good conversation with good company. For this reason Kant turns to a discussion of such social interactions when he outlines our highset moral-physical good in §88 of *Anthropology*. On such social occasions it sometimes happens that we enjoy a state of happiness, all the while achieving our virtuous ends of promoting our own self-perfection and the happiness of others. Further, on such occasions we also become true friends of humanity, expressing authentic love and respect for those around us and developing bonds of equal reciprocal gratitude, while cultivating these same tendencies so that, in an enlightened and cosmopolitan sense, they spread further and further outward until they encompass all of humanity.[159] Here morality and happiness are not in discord but in graceful harmony. For this reason it is the highest moral-physical good. But it remains a delicate state, hostage to a proper balance between virtue and happiness, gratitude and friendship, and love and respect. While grace can shine forth in enlightened social intercourse, the need for moral fortitude in conflict and struggle may never be far away as we strive to become true friends of humanity.[160]

Notes

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, ed. & trans. Robert B Louden (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 7: 277-78.

[2] Ibid., p. 7:277.

[3] Ibid.

[4] See, for example, Frederick Beiser, 'Moral faith and the highest good', in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Matthew Caswell, 'Kant's conception of the highest good, the *Gesinnung*, and the theory of radical evil', *Kant-Studien,* 97 (2006), Stephen Engstrom, 'The concept of the highest good in Kant's moral theory', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 52, no. 4 (1992).

[5] The only exception that I am aware of is Alix A Cohen, 'The ultimate Kantian experience: Kant on dinner parties', *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* 25, no. 4 (2008).

[6] For a defence of the claim that we *should* take it seriously, see Robert B Louden, 'The second part of morals', in *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[7] See, for example, Patrick Frierson, *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, eds., *Essays on Kant's Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Robert B Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), G Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), David G Sussman, *The Idea of Humanity: Anthropology and Anthroponomy in Kant's Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

[8] See Immanuel Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 6:399.

[9] Kant defines 'affection' as 'the inclination toward *community* with others' in Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:268.

[10] Ibid., p. 7:276.

[11] Ibid., pp. 7:276-77.

[12] Immanuel Kant, 'The conflict of the faculties', in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4:79.

[13] See the *Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue* in Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:473-74.

[14] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pp. 7:277-78.

[15] See also Kant's argument for the indirect duty to pursue happiness in order to ward off temptations to vice in Immanuel Kant, 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4:399.

[16] See Aristotle, 'Ethica Nicomachea', in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), pp. Bk. I: Ch. 10. For an extensive discussion of the differing views of the ancients in regard to the relationship between virtue and happiness see Terence Irwin, *The Development of Ethics, Vol. 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[17] That is, as long as we are not forced into dilemmas, such as having to choose between committing perjury (which is unjust) and enduring torture (which, to put it mildly, ruins happiness). See Immanuel Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason', in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 6:50.

[18] This seems to undermine the existential tension between virtue and happiness that is at the heart of Kant's claims about the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as postulates of pure practical reason – see Immanuel Kant, 'Critique of practical reason', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 5:122-32. This tension is central to Peter Dew's recent appropriation of Kant's thought in Peter Dews, *The Idea of Evil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

[19] See the appealing account of the Kantian moral saint in Marcia Baron, 'Moral paragons and the metaphysics of morals', in *A Companion to Kant*, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

[20] 'The way of thinking characteristic of the union of good living with virtue in *social intercourse* is *humanity*' - Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:277.

[21] This point is also emphasised in Cohen, 'The Ultimate Kantian Experience'.

[22] Kant's detailed discussion of the dinner party in *Anthropology* is repeated in brief form in the *Casuistical Questions* for Article III of the duties to oneself as an animal being. There Kant again discusses the banquet which, though a temptation to immoral intemperance through overconsumption, nonetheless still 'aims at a moral end, beyond mere physical well-being: it brings a number of people together for a long time to converse with one another. And yet the very number of guests … allows for only a little conversation (with those sitting next to one)' – see Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:428.

[23] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7: 280. Kuehn conjectures that the conversations between Kant and his friend Green followed this pattern - Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 157.

[24] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,* p. 7: 277.

[25] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:428. Kant repeats similar advice in *Anthropology* where he argues that '[a]ll *silent* intoxication has something shameful in it; that is, intoxication that does not enliven sociality and the reciprocal communication of thought' – see Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:170.

[26] See Kant's account of our duties to ourselves as animal beings in Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:427-28. Also relevant is Kant's discussion in the Third Part of Kant, 'The conflict of the faculties', pp. 7:107-09.

[27] Baier makes the amazing claim that Kant thinks that anything but 'obligatory rejoicing' (whatever that means) in doing one's duty is morally inappropriate, as if Kant claims that there is something morally wrong with the sort of laughter and 'genuine joy' (Baier's term) that emerges from sharing a good meal in good company. See Annette C Baier, *Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 284.

[28] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:265.

[29] See, for example, Immanuel Kant, 'An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Immanuel Kant, 'Toward perpetual peace', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 8:381-86. For Kant on public reason, see Onora O'Neill, 'The public use of reason', in *Judgment, Imagination, and Politics*, ed. Ronald Beiner and Jennifer Nedelsky (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2001). The important role of public reason in relation to justice is also much emphasised by contemporary theorists strongly influenced by Kant, such as Habermas and Rawls. See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), John Rawls, 'The domain of the political and overlapping consensus', in *Collected Papers*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 473-96.

[30] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7: 281.

[31] It is significant that the three vices (arrogance, defamation and ridicule) which violate duties of respect for other human beings are all *social* vices – see Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:465-68.

[32] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pp. 7:128-30.

[33] See Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1968), pp. 234-35, Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982). See also G Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 234.

[34] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p 7: 281.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 7:282.

[37] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:400.

[38] See, for example, Part One of Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason'.

[39] See Friedrich Schiller, 'On grace and dignity', in *Schiller's "On Grace and Dignity" in Its Cultural Context: Essays and a New Translation*, ed. Jane Curran and Christopher Fricker (Rochester: Camden House, 2005). Schiller mistakenly takes himself to be disagreeing with Kant on this point due to his misunderstanding of Kant's account of moral motivation. See the discussion of Schiller in Allen Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 28-30.

[40] See Kant, 'Critique of practical reason', p. 5:83.

[41] See Paul Formosa, 'Kant on the limits of human evil', *Journal of Philosophical Research,* 34 (2009).

[42] Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), p . 247.

[43] The Wednesday Society 'dissolved itself on the basis of the royal edict of 20 October 1798 "for the prevention and punishment of secret societies which could be detrimental to public security"' - Gunter Birtsch, 'The Berlin Wednesday Society', in *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 248. In the light of this we might tentatively read Kant's 1793 attempt to square '*secret societies*' with his principle of publicity, by arguing that such societies would not be necessary were the state to govern in accordance with the '*spirit of freedom*', as a defence of the Wednesday Society (among others) – see Immanuel Kant, 'On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice', in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary J Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 8:305.

[44] Clark, *Iron Kingdom*, p. 248.

[45] See Ibid.

[46] The number of such societies increased rapidly at the height of the enlightenment from the approximately 50 that existed in the German states in 1780 to about 200 by 1790, with membership totalling some 15,000-20,000 people. See Ibid., pp. 248-50.

[47] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:278.

[48] Kant, 'An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?', p. 8:35.

[49] See Johann Georg Hamann, 'Letter to Christian Jacob Krause (18 December 1784)', in *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[50] As Garrett Green notes, the English reader tends to miss not only the specifically legal nature of *Unmündigkeit*, but also its common root with *Vormund* (guardian) in *Mund* (mouth). See Garrett Green, 'Modern culture comes of age: Hamann versus Kant on the root metaphor of enlightenment', in *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 292-93.

[51] Although Kant also understands enlightenment in this way - see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 5:294.

[52] Both Hamann and Kant agree that immaturity and guardianship are the central terms here. However, Hamann sees Kant as laying the blame for their 'self-incurred' state of immaturity on the victims (namely women and other groups without a public voice), rather than on their so-called 'enlightened' guardians. Hamann argues that it is the latter, who keep the former under their guardianship, who ought to incur the blame. The guilt is thus not self-incurred by the immature – see Green, 'Modern culture comes of age', pp. 291-98. Hamann's criticism of Kant on this particular point is valid, for it takes more than sheer courage (although courage is often *also* required), but also resources, opportunities, self-confidence and education, among other things, for a voiceless group, under the yoke

of guardianship, to begin to speak publicly for themselves. However, Kant seems to have revised his views on this matter by 1792, and while he then mentions the importance of education (but not courage) for progress and enlightenment, he pessimistically puts more stock in progress occurring via war than education, because 'the state' has 'no money left' for the 'salaries of teachers … since it uses all its money for war' – see Kant, 'The conflict of the faculties', pp. 7:92-93, Kant, 'On the common saying', p. 8:310.

[53] Immanuel Kant, 'What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?', in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 8:144.

[54] I discuss this claim in detail with regard to both Arendt and Kant in Paul Formosa, 'Thinking, Conscience and Acting in Times of Crises,' in *Power, Judgment and Political Evil: In Conversation with Hannah Arendt*, ed. Andrew Schaap, Danielle Celermajer, and Vrasidas Karalis (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 91-93.

[55] Habermas, for example, approvingly quotes Thomas McCarthy's summary: 'Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law [Kant on Habermas' reading], I must submit my maxim to all others for the purpose of discursively testing its claim to universality [Habermas' own view]' – quoted and discussed in Gordon Finalyson, 'Does Hegel's critique of Kant's moral theory apply to discourse ethics?', in *Habermas: A Critical Reader*, ed. Peter Dews (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 30.

[56] For a relevant discussion of the relationship between identity and participatory parity see Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking recognition', *New Left Review,* 3 (2000).

[57] See Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:130, Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, p. 5:295.

[58] See §140, where Hegel argues that the moral standpoint, with its abstract conception of the good, ends up at 'the view that subjective conviction, and it alone, decides the ethical

character of an action' - G W F Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T M Knox (Chicago: William Benton, 1952).

[59] For an understanding of Hegel broadly along these lines, see Robert B Pippin, 'Hegel, ethical reasons, Kantian rejoinders', *Philosophical Topics,* 19, no. 2 (1991), Kenneth R Westphal, 'Hegel's critique of Kant's moral world view', *Philosophical Topics,* 19, no. 2 (1991), Allen Wood, 'Hegel's Ethics', in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[60] A similar point is made by Robert Arp, 'Vindicating Kant's morality', *International Philosophical Quarterly,* 7, no. 1 (2007), pp. 7, 14-15.

[61] Kant, 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals', pp. 4:436, 4:440.

[62] See Allen Wood, 'The supreme principle of morality', in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[63] Kant, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals', p. 4:434.

[64] Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', p. 8:357.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., p. 8:358.

[67] For a critical discussion of these issues, see Marguerite La Caze, 'Not Just Visitors: Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Refugees', *Philosophy Today,* 48, no. 3 (2004).

[68] Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', p. 8:358.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Kant understands civilisation mainly in economic rather than moral terms. Kant understands the 'state of nature' to refer to nomadic-pastoral or hunter-gather societies. The move to civil societies begins with the shift to agricultural production, which creates surplus value and both allows for the rise of towns and cities and also creates the need for a strong state to enforce property rights and contracts. See the insightful discussion in

Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, pp. 244-49. In a civil condition the arts and culture, along with civilised norms of refined politeness, tend to flourish. However, this civilised 'European' condition is not necessarily more moral than the uncivilised state of nature, but simply replaces the types of vice and evil found in the state of nature (i.e. among largely non-European peoples at the time) with a different set of vices and evil, as well as large scale wars between states. See Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason', pp. 6:32-33. Although neither social condition is particularly moralised, Kant sees progress as arising not by reverting to an earlier pre-agricultural state but by moralising the current cultural and economic order. See Immanuel Kant, 'Conjectural beginning of human history', in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 8:118-20, Immanuel Kant, 'Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim', in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 8:26. Thanks to one of the journal's anonymous referees for assisting me to clarify this point.

[71] Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', p. 8:358. The above italics are my own, not Kant's.

[72] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:294. Further, Kant does not forget to chide the '*inhospitable* behaviour of civilised, especially commercial, states in our part of the world' for the 'injustice they show in *visiting* [distant] foreign lands and people (which with them is tantamount to *conquering* them)' - Kant, 'Toward perpetual peace', p. 8:358.

[73] Unfortunately, Kant's discussion here is marred by his view that the character of peoples are 'innate, natural character[s] which, so to speak, lies in the blood mixture of the human being, not characteristics of nations that are acquired and *artificial*' - Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:319. In an excellent discussion of the development of Kant's views on race, Kleingeld argues that somewhere around 1792 Kant

dramatically changes his mind, for the better, on issues of race and in particular drops his earlier conception of a racial hierarchy with whites at the pinnacle - see Pauline Kleingeld, 'Kant's second thoughts on race', *The Philosophical Quarterly,* 57, no. 229 (2007). But while Kant's discussion of the character of peoples in *Anthropology* is not posed in racial terms, since racially similar peoples (i.e. the English and the Germans) have quite different characters, his claim that the moral characteristics of peoples have a blood origin is troubling. Even so, I am only using Kant's discussion of the character of peoples to make explicit a particular aspect of Kant's understanding of cosmopolitanism, and thus Kant's troubling discussion of the blood (rather than acquired) origin of these characters does not render problematic the use I make of this text here.

[74] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:311.

[75] Ibid., p. 7:312.

[76] Ibid., p. 7:313.

[77] Kant complains that 'even in his own country the Englishmen isolates himself when he pays for his own dinner', preferring to eat in a separate room than at 'the *table d'hôte*, for the same money: for at the *table d'hôte*, some politeness is required' - Ibid., p. 7:315.

[78] Though the English have great 'benevolent institutions', 'the foreigner who has been driven to England's soil by fate and has fallen on hard times can die on the dunghill because he is not an Englishman, that is, not a human being' - Ibid., pp. 7:311, 315.

[79] Kant sees many of these English and French characteristics combined in the Germans, who he considers to be 'too cosmopolitan to be deeply attached to his homeland'. Germans 'more than any other people ... learn foreign languages' and in their 'own country … [are more] hospitable to foreigners than any other nation' - Ibid., p. 7:318.

[80] See also Kant's discussion of the 'ancient customs' where, as a result of sharing food at the same table, one becomes 'safe from all snares by the right of hospitality'. Sharing food formalises a 'covenant of safety'. See Ibid., p. 7:279.

[81] Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[82] Jeremy Waldron in Ibid., p. 90.

[83] Ibid., p. 149.

[84] Pauline Kleingeld develops an account of six different forms of cosmopolitanism that are prevalent in German thought around 1780-1800. They are: 1) moral (e.g. Christoph Martin Wieland and Kant), 2) political, 3) legal (e.g. Kant and, prior to 1800, Fichte), 4) cultural (e.g. Georg Forster) 5) economic or free market (e.g. those inspired by Adam Smith, such as Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch), and 6) romantic (ideals of love and faith, e.g. Novalis) cosmopolitanisms – see Pauline Kleingeld, 'Six varieties of cosmopolitanism in late eighteenth-century Germany', *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 60, no. 3 (1999). Kant develops a moral, political, legal and economic version of cosmopolitanism. The *social* cosmopolitanism I refer to above is not so much a different type of cosmopolitanism as it is an elucidation of the specifically social aspect of moral cosmopolitanism as Kant understands it.

[85] An aspect much emphasised recently in Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001).

[86] This does not mean, Kant notes, that we must increase the world's ills by sharing the pain of others from compassion - see Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:456-58.

[87] Kant's views on the relation of aesthetics to morality are far more complex than the account I give here, which is intended only to identify a single aspect of this relation. For a relevant discussion see, for example, Paul Guyer, 'Beauty, freedom, and morality: Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and the development of his aesthetic theory', in *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 152-53.

[88] Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:244.

[89] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, p. 5:267.

[90] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:399.

[91] Ibid.

[92] See Kant, 'Toward perpetual peace', p. 8:366.

[93] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:236-37.

[94] See Jens Timmermann, 'Kant on conscience, "indirect" duty, and moral error', *International Philosophical Quarterly,* 46, no. 3 (2006).

[95] See also Marcia Baron, 'Love and respect in the *Doctrine of Virtue*', in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[96] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:403.

[97] This is the sort of respect we feel for others when we recognise them to be ends in themselves.

[98] This is the sense in which respect grounds all duties and results from the effect of practical reason on feeling. Respect, in this sense, is 'morality itself subjectively considered' and is the 'sole and also the undoubted moral incentive' - Kant, 'critique of practical reason', pp. 5:75-79.

[99] 'Hence only the love that is *delight* (*amor complacentiae*) is direct. But to have a duty to this (which is a pleasure joined immediately to the representation of an object's existence) … is a contradiction' - Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:402.

[100] See Kant, 'Critique of practical reason', p. 5:83.

[101] Kant gives a finer-grained account in *The Lecture on Ethics* where he differentiates 'love that wishes well' from 'love that likes well'. The former involves wishing another well, and also that they be worthy of happiness. The latter can be intellectual or sensuous. If sensuous, then sexual inclination is an example. If intellectual, then this gives rise to a disposition of benevolence. Kant claims that we are obligated to love others with well-

wishing and well-liking (where this is of the intellectual kind and directed toward the humanity in the person, not necessarily the person themselves). See Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. Peter Heath and J B Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 27:417-19. This kind of intellectual well-liking directed toward humanity is approximately equivalent to the delight in the mere representation of humanity that Kant discusses in *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

[102] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:402.

[103] See Kant's arguments against moral sense theorists who do make the presence of feelings, such as sympathy, the *condition* of action in Kant, 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals', pp. 4:442-43. For Kant's own early moral sense theory, see Immanuel Kant, 'Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime', in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 2:217.

[104] See Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, p. 27:431, Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:402.

[105] The misanthrope proper is not someone who merely hates, dislikes or avoids *most* humans, perhaps because he considers them to be 'common'. Such a person does not hate humanity per se, but only certain types of humans. The misanthrope proper dislikes humanity per se, in whatever forms it takes – including, presumably in themselves, and so they must also engage in a sort of self-loathing.

[106] See Kant, 'The conflict of the faculties', pp. 4:79-94. See also Kant, 'On the common saying', pp. 8:307-12.

[107] I discuss these issues in my paper Paul Formosa, 'Kant on the radical evil of human nature', *The Philosophical Forum,* 38, no. 3 (2007).

[108] We shall ignore here the complexities that arise from special relationships, such as those of a parent to their child.

[109] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:455.

[110] Ibid., p. 6:449. See also Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 27:406-07, Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:458.

[111] Baron, 'Love and respect in the *Doctrine of Virtue*', p. 396.

[112] 'Respect is without doubt what is primary, because without it no true love can occur, even though one can harbour great respect for a person without love' - Immanuel Kant, 'The end of all things', in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 8:337. Wood also argues that for Kant 'without respect, no true love can occur' – Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 179.

[113] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:458.

[114] Ibid., p. 6:466.

[115] Ibid., p. 6:458.

[116] Ibid., p. 6:473.

[117] Kant, 'Critique of practical reason', pp. 5:78-79.

[118] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:473.

[119] Kant differentiates between 'respect in the practical sense', as it is used here and throughout this paper, and respect 'understood as the mere *feeling* that comes from comparing our *worth* with another's (such as a child feels merely from habit toward his superior)' - Ibid., p. 6:449. Although this distinction is not developed by Kant in any great depth, the latter sense of respect seems similar to what Darwall calls 'appraisal respect' (the positive appraisal of a person's particular qualities), in contrast to 'recognition respect' (taking the status of the other into account when deliberating about what to do). See Stephen L Darwall, 'Two kinds of respect', *Ethics,* 88, no. 1 (1977), pp. 38-39. While recognition respect is central to Kant's normative project, whether or not he sees any legitimate role for appraisal respect is debatable. On this point see Wood, *Kantian Ethics*, pp. 179-81.

[120] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:449.

[121] Ibid., p. 6:455.

[122] Ibid., p. 6:459.

[123] Ibid., p. 6:455.

[124] The passage reads in full: 'What makes such a vice [i.e. ingratitude] possible is misunderstanding one's duty to oneself, the duty of not needing and asking for others' beneficence, since this puts one under obligation to them, but rather preferring to bear the hardships of life oneself than to burden others with them and so incur indebtedness (obligation); for we fear that by showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a dependent in relation to his protector, which is contrary to self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in one's person)' - Ibid., p. 6:459.

[125] We shall return to this point later.

[126] Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason', p. 6:27.

[127] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:463.

[128] See Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason', p. 6:27. Elsewhere, Kant calls these three vices the '*vices of hatred for human beings, directly (*contrarie*) opposed to love of them*' - Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:458.

[129] See Kant's discussion of these three manias (or passions) in Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pp. 7:272-74.

[130] Kant's point here is that *simply* understanding our well-being in terms of what we have compared to others is a mistaken conception of well-being. This does not mean either that what we have relative to others cannot form a valid basis for claims about social justice or that such considerations are *completely irrelevant* to a proper conception of well-being.

[131] See, in particular, parts two to four in Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason.'

[132] In a curious passage Kant seems to deny this point. He writes: 'For, the relation of a protector, as a benefactor, to the one he protects, who owes him gratitude, is indeed a relation of mutual love, but not of friendship, *since the respect owed by each is not equal*' (italics are mine) - Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 4:473. However, given Kant's considered moral view that we owe *equal respect* to all persons, and given what he says elsewhere about gratitude and friendship, the above italicised passage should read: 'since the *obligations* owed by each are not equal'. We can either take Kant here to have made a simple error, be talking about appraisal rather than recognition respect, or be talking about the mistaken views (formed by corrupt social conditions) of the two parties involved.

[133] Ibid., p. 6:458.

[134] Ibid., p. 6:469.

[135] Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 27:425-26.

[136] Ibid., pp. 27:425-6.

[137] This provides another angle from which to approach the much disputed status of social justice in Kant's political philosophy. Asymmetries of respect are created whenever adult persons are forced to appeal to the benevolence of their friends or fellow citizens, rather than to justice, to secure the basic necessities of life, in cases where they cannot secure it for themselves. Therefore, some form of substantive social justice, not just procedural equality, is necessary to ensure that the conditions for the possibility of friendship between all citizens as social equals are not undermined.

[138] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', p. 6:459.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Kant mentions the need, when undertaking the *application* of the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue, to consider specific ethical duties that arise from particular conditions and relationships. Such an account, though important, can 'only be

appended to the system' since we can provide only a fragmentary and not a systematically complete account of such special cases. See Ibid., pp. 6:468-69.

[141] In discussing self-love and love of one's neighbour, Kant argues that 'in wishing I can be *equally* benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another)' - Ibid., p. 6:452. Kant's claims here about self-love can equally well be applied to all those who are near and dear to us, including family and friends.

[142] My point here is only to mention that differing debts of obligations can provide a *moral* ground for partiality that is not normally considered by either Kant's defenders or detractors. I have not attempted to provide here any details about when, and to what degree, partiality and impartiality are morally appropriate. For a wider discussion of some of these issues, see 'Agency, attachment, and difference', in Barbara Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 184-207.

[143] Kant cautions, due to his views about the moral frailty of humans, against trusting our friends, at least initially, with too much personal information. However, in true moral friendship, which 'actually exists here and there in its perfection', the 'judicious and trusted friend' is one to whom you can reveal who you are without having to hold anything back - see Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:471-74.

[144] Ibid., p. 6:471.

[145] Ibid., p. 6:474.

[146] See Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*.

[147] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:472-3.

[148] Ibid., p. 6:473. Kant repeats this same point in the final paragraph of §88 in Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. 7:282. See also my discussion of the

morality of 'white lies' and untruthful social niceties in Paul Formosa, '"All politics must bend its knee before right": Kant on the relation of morals to politics', *Social Theory and Practice,* 34, no. 2 (2008), pp. 160-67. Frierson discusses politeness in more depth and develops the distinction between deception and illusion in Patrick Frierson, 'The moral importance of politeness in Kant's anthropology', *Kantian Review,* 9, no. 1 (2005).

[149] Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:473-74.

[150] Although it is not the final step, which requires a revolution in our disposition – see Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason', p. 6:47.

[151] 'It is quite certain that through this propensity to conceal themselves as well as to assume an appearance that is advantageous for them humans have not merely **civilized** themselves but gradually **moralized** themselves to a certain degree … [but] later, when the genuine principles have finally been developed and incorporated into his way of thought, that duplicity must gradually be vigorously combated, for otherwise it corrupts the heart, and good dispositions cannot grow among the rampant weeds of fair appearance' - Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. & trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. A748/B776.

[152] See Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pp. 7: 324-25.

[153] Christine M. Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 194.

[154] See John Stuart Mill, 'Utilitarianism,' in *Utilitarianism, on Liberty, and Considerations of Representative Government*, ed. H B Acton (London: J M Dent & Sons, 1972), pp. 24-30. For a discussion of Mill along these lines, see Wendy Donner, 'Mill's utilitarianism,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*, ed. John Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 273.

[155] See also Kant's discussion of the Socratic *dialogue* method for teaching ethics in Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:477-84.

[156] Kant allows that we may dislike or disrespect the person of a vicious character, even if we grant that their humanity (which they misuse) entitles them to be treated with a certain level of love and respect - Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 27:418.

[157] See Kant, 'The metaphysics of morals', pp. 6:405-06.

[158] This point is central to Kant's rejection of those moral theories that attempt to justify moral obligations on the basis of prudence. See Kant, 'Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals', p. 4:442.

[159] This brings to mind the Stoic idea of expanding concentric circles of affection around the self, the family, the state and all of humanity, with the cosmopolitan goal of drawing the outward circles in – see Martha C Nussbaum, 'Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 5, no. 1 (1997), p. 9.

[160] I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Marguerite La Caze and the two anonymous referees for the *Kantian Review* for their very helpful comments.