Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue

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Testimony has a specific epistemological vulnerability problem: What we come to know and understand is highly dependent on the cognitive labour and epistemic contributions of others. However, to form our beliefs *merely* on the grounds of a speaker's words would be epistemically irresponsible, particularly since a speaker is capable of lying, deception, or error; hence, we require further justification for testimonial belief. Moreover, the capacity to make epistemic contributions, that is, to convey knowledge or other kinds of epistemic inputs (e.g., evidence, doubts, and critical ideas) conducive to knowledge (and one could add, understanding) is often dependent on communicative reciprocation of, or appropriate uptake by an audience. This raises questions about how we ought to assess testimony or testifiers, or allow ourselves a critical stance, without violating the norm of due epistemic respect owed to speakers. An upshot of these considerations is that the moral attitudes we bring to testimonial practices, e.g., trust and respect, can also be immediately relevant to our epistemic engagements. Specifically, we can *wrong* testifiers by unjustifiably discrediting their testimony or disbelieving them.

The harm we can inflict on others in their capacity as knowers, and as *epistemic contributors* in particular, has been a subject of philosophical inquiry in recent times and it is the entry point for some overlaps between the ethics and epistemology of testimony. Anscombe's (1979, 150) phrase, '[i]t is an insult and it may be an injury not to be believed' is often cited to motivate and underscore inquiries into what we *epistemically* may owe to testifiers and the concerns about speakers' potential failure to successfully convey information the way they intended it. Let us call this 'testimonial wronging'. As with other cases of wronging, testimonial wronging suggests that testifiers occupy a specific, simultaneously ethically and epistemically relevant status, the status of a *knower*. 'Knower' is therefore also an ethical

concept that can be grasped only against the background of what it means to live a flourishing human life, with testimony – as a form of *epistemic contribution* – being regarded as a capacity of essential human value (Congdon 2018; Fricker 2007, 44; Fricker 2015).

A common suggestion for distinguishing testimony from other epistemic sources, such as perception and (certain conceptions of) memory, is that it involves *trust towards others* (e.g., Fricker 1998; Origgi 2004; Moran 2005, 2018; Faulkner 2007; McMyler 2011). This renders both hearers as well as speakers vulnerable in particular ways. While traditionally, epistemologists of testimony have focused on how trust (or which conception of trust) allows hearers to *justifiably accept testimony* or *believe a testifier*, and their vulnerabilities involved, more recent scholarship highlights the vulnerabilities of *speakers*; what they (justifiably) trust the hearer for and what it means for this trust to be betrayed. One way to put these differential vulnerabilities is suggested by Dormandy, who argues that a hearer trusts a speaker for 'representational epistemic goods', such as knowledge or evidence, making themselves vulnerable to 'misinformation, to practical mishaps, or to a strained relationship with the speaker should her testimony turn out to be false or careless' (Dormandy 2020, 247). In turn, the speaker trusts the hearer mainly for 'recognitional epistemic goods', which consist in the right response to a speaker's epistemic agency or to their status as a knower. Accordingly, testimony makes speakers vulnerable to flawed responses that deprive them of such recognitional epistemic goods, thereby undermining them as knowers. For example, Fricker's central case of testimonial injustice concerns the distinct epistemic wrong in which a hearer attributes a deflated level of credibility to a speaker owing to a *negative identity prejudice* against the speaker (Fricker 1998; Fricker 2007, 30-59).

A number of philosophers have supported and further developed the idea that testimonial injustice relates to some unwarranted attributions of *credibility*, such as credibility excess or deficit (e.g., Jones 2002; Maitra 2010; Medina 2011; Origgi 2012; Hazlett 2017; Lackey 2018, 2020a; Kawall 2020). Some accounts question the centrality of credibility in

identifying testimonial injustice and instead focus on the general epistemic importance of *trust relationships* and the value of *being trusted* (e.g., Townley 2003; Marsh 2011; Jones 1999, 2012). Others suggest going beyond identity prejudice and objectification and instead conceptualize the wrong of testimonial injustice as a more general problem of *(mis)-recognition* or *subject/other relation* (e.g., McConkey 2004; Pohlhaus Jr. 2014; Medina 2018). Moreover, while Fricker conceptualizes her central case of testimonial injustice as an *epistemic vice*, Medina (2013, 30-40) introduces further epistemic vices that can also deprive speakers of recognitional epistemic goods, such as *epistemic laziness*, where inquirers simply decline to engage with particular, potential informants.

These accounts primarily focus on how certain types of speakers are wrongfully assessed, unduly discredited or simply ignored and neglected. However, there are others ways in which hearers can harmfully respond to speakers that directly relate to what the speaker says, or the *content* of their testimony. Dotson identifies a particular form of testimonial oppression that coerces speakers to silence themselves, namely *testimonial smothering,* which likely occurs under three circumstances: '1) the content of the testimony must be unsafe and risky; 2) the audience must demonstrate testimonial incompetence with respect to the content of the testimony to the speaker; and 3) testimonial incompetence must follow from, or appear to follow from, pernicious ignorance.' (Dotson 2011, 244; for a case study on genocide denial, see e.g., Altanian 2021) According to Dotson, testimonial incompetence is a state possessed by an audience, signifying the failure 'to demonstrate to the speaker that she/he will find proffered testimony accurately intelligible' (Dotson 2011, 245). Respectively, one could argue that a speaker also trusts a hearer to *exercise testimonial competence*, including 'to do what it takes to hear what she intends to communicate' (Dormandy 2020, 256). Further, and particularly relevant in contexts of social injustice, a speaker trusts the hearer to *respect any emotional or practical risks* that a speaker might expose herself to, namely when testifying to 'experiences of marginalization to someone who is likely to have trouble relating, especially if their shared

conceptual framework cannot easily bridge their disparate backgrounds' (257). Such accounts suggest that having bad or faulty (e.g., racist) beliefs about, implicit or explicit attitudes towards or perceptions of the testifier (depending on how one conceptualizes 'prejudice') can only account for some cases of testimonial wronging. Other cases are rather concerned with the *comprehension* of testimony. For example, a hearer can fail to comprehend due to conditions of *pernicious reliable ignorance* about the subject matter and on that basis, silence a testifier. However, hearers can also actively (hence, culpably) and explicitly display supposed incomprehension of the meaning of a speaker's words, 'in order to dismiss that speech and the agent who made that speech' (Cull 2019; see also Dotson 2012 on 'contributory injustice'). Such cases are sometimes mere *rhetorical contestations* of testimony employed to derail the conversation or simply not to have to engage in it. There are various ways in which such ignorance as incomprehension can be actively employed (or passively triggered) in order to dismiss testimony as well as testifiers; but also to keep oneself from learning about issues that might be too unsettling (see e.g., Pohlhaus Jr. 2012).

In sum, these accounts of testimonial wronging focus on somewhat flawed or dysfunctional mechanisms in how testimony is comprehended, interpreted and received (see also, e.g., Kukla 2014; Peet 2017). This, however, can still be related in ethically and epistemically relevant ways to the identity and social location of both the speaker and hearer as well as the context in which testimony is proffered, particularly under conditions of social injustice, where such failure to exercise testimonial competence will likely be persistent and systematic. Especially the latter mechanisms of testimonial wronging brings scholarship on testimonial injustice in connection with philosophy of language and speech act theory.

As this brief overview demonstrates, Fricker's (2007) notion of 'testimonial injustice' initiated an extensive philosophical debate on the potential harms and wrongs in epistemic practices in general, and testimony in particular. The articles collected in this special issue – the winners and finalists of the 2020 Robert Papazian and PERITIA prizes of the International

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Journal of Philosophical Studies – seek to contribute to this ever-growing engagement with issues related to testimonial injustice and trust in novel and illuminating ways. They criticize, complement or expand on Fricker's central case of testimonial injustice (and the proposed virtue of testimonial justice), thereby contributing to its better understanding as well as offering new ameliorative proposals. Moreover, through the application of theories of epistemic injustice, and testimonial injustice in particular, to new real-world examples and contexts, they seek to render our theories and concepts more robust and valuable. The 10 articles constituting this special issue fall into the following themes:

i.   Re-Conceptualizations of Testimonial (In)Justice
ii.   Critical Engagements with Fricker's Central Case of Testimonial (In)Justice
iii. New Applications of Theories of Epistemic Injustice
iv.   On (Mis)Trust in Expert Testimony

About the Articles

1) Re-Conceptualizations of Testimonial (In)Justice

The first four articles propose re-conceptualizations of testimonial injustice and, respectively, testimonial justice. The opening article of this special issue is 'Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on Gendered Violence' by Charlotte Knowles, the winner of the Robert Papazian Prize. The article raises a number of concerns regarding the tension between (traditional) epistemology and the ethics of testimony, objecting to a narrow understanding of testimony construed as assertions with a propositional content in discussions of testimonial injustice. Knowles argues that such conceptions of testimony are in tension with cases where testifiers cannot make assertions or contribute fully formed propositional knowledge: where testifiers rather seek to articulate an affective, embodied and potentially non-propositional understanding of experiences that cannot yet be propositionally intelligible. Therefore, Knowles suggests a phenomenological conception of testimony, which is

particularly important in cases such as testimony on gendered violence, where the truth of testimony may not be immediately available and reportable in the way the model of assertion implies. Her proposed phenomenological approach instead shifts our focus to the conditions of testimony under which these truths can come to light. These include, according to Knowles, physical, environmental, social, affective, embodied and relational factors. Taking them into account is crucial to understanding whether and how communicative acts can go wrong and how testimony can fail to be genuinely understood or fully articulated. To show this, Knowles draws on and extends Heidegger's ([1927] 1962) concept of 'disclosedness', focusing particularly on the moods of shame and 'himpathy' (Manne 2017) as examples to explain how the testimony of victims of gendered violence may be erroneously disbelieved.

The winner of the special prize provided by the Horizon 2020 research project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action (PERITIA) is Havi Carel and Ian Kidd's 'Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional Testimonial Justice'. Their contribution also offers a new approach to the topic but focuses on institutional rather than individual instances of testimonial justice and injustice. Drawing on Fricker's (2020) recent work, they first introduce an account of institutional testimonial justice by using the idea of an 'institutional ethos'. They argue that a testimonially just institutional ethos requires the right sorts of *values*, of *structures* and *procedures*, as well as of *outcomes* constitutive of testimonial justice in practice. Based on this, Carel and Kidd show how such an institutional ethos can degrade, focusing particularly on one epistemically important institutional failing they call 'institutional opacity'. Such is a situation in which the institution is increasingly resistant to epistemic assessment and understanding by their agents and, especially, their users, hence thwarting their *testimonial agency*. This makes institutional opacity epistemically problematic because it undermines the values of *trustworthiness*, *transparency*, and *truthfulness* constitutive of an ethos of testimonial justice. Further, they argue that institutional opacity is especially problematic, for persons who are already epistemically *vulnerablized* due their

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socially and materially disadvantaged position. They elaborate on the testimonially unjust impact of such individual situational vulnerabilities and institutional opacity with the example of chronically ill persons. Lastly, they offer two ameliorative strategies that could repair a deteriorated institutional ethos of testimonial justice.

In 'Redefining the Wrong of Epistemic Injustice', Alicia Garcia Álvarez draws on Benhabib's (1987) notion of the 'concrete other' to re-conceptualize the primary harm of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Her main objection to Fricker's account of the primary harm or wrong of these types of epistemic injustice is that it is too narrow: by focusing on the wrong done to knowers as 'universal reasoners', it neglects how it also constitutes a wrong that is intimately tied to who they are as *individuals*. She thus highlights the individual phenomenology of how epistemic injustice also affects a particular, i.e., 'concrete knower'. While Fricker recognizes this harm done to individuals in their capacity of self-constitution, she treats it as a secondary harm of epistemic injustice, whereas Garcia Álvarez argues that it is rather part of the intrinsic injustice. This is because there is always already a 'proto-understanding' of the self, based on one's personal intimated sense or understanding of a given experience and needs, which is being violated through epistemic injustice. Accordingly, Garcia Álvarez suggests a definition of the wrong of epistemic injustice as simultaneously *epistemic-affective*: a failure to recognize the other as a concrete knower with distinctive contributions to make and whose particular needs and constitution are implicit in her epistemic contributions.

Ji-Young Lee's 'Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice' presents a critical appraisal of Fricker's (2007) hearer-dependent, virtue-responsibilist account of testimonial justice. Lee suggests that we should rely less on the goodwill of prejudiced agents to rectify testimonial injustice and instead suggest more practicable ways to do so, including integrating *bystanders* into the scope of responsibility for redress. Put differently, instead of focusing testimonial justice efforts on the development of good motivations and

character traits of particular agents, the focus should be on monitoring the agents' *actions and behaviour* and on practicable ways to correct them. While this does not exclude the possibility of acting upon a good character, she argues against reducing efforts for redress to individual virtue cultivation. After all, Lee argues, even a non-virtuous hearer can interrupt an instance of testimonial injustice, by referring to certain conversational norms that a particular collective has agreed upon in a given context – for example, the workplace. Hence, drawing on Henderson (2020), Lee proposes an account of responsibility for testimonial injustice as *collective behaviour-targeting epistemic interventions*. Here, bystanders are called upon to recognize and intervene when collectively and voluntarily accepted *epistemic norms and rules of conduct* have been violated on a given occasion – to signal to the wrongdoer that behaviours such as testimonial injustice are not socially accepted.

2) Critical Engagements with Fricker's Central Case of Testimonial (In)Justice

The second group of articles in the volume take a critical outlook towards Fricker's work. The invited contribution by Sanford C. Goldberg, 'Can the demands of justice always be reconciled with the demands of epistemology? Testimonial injustice and the prospects of a normative clash', addresses the much debated question of the reconcilability of the (traditional) norms of epistemology and the norms of justice. In contrast to arguments alleging *epistemic partiality in friendship*, and arguments that motivate the hypothesis of *moral encroachment on the epistemic*, Goldberg suggests that an *argument from testimonial injustice* can best account for the prospect of a normative clash between epistemology (i.e., evidence-based belief and justification) and ethics (i.e., justice). More specifically, there are cases of testimony in which an audience responding to a speaker's testimony cannot simultaneously satisfy both the norms of epistemology and those of justice. However, he objects that the language in which we discuss testimonial injustice (inherited from Fricker 2007) actually obscures the conditions that give rise to such clashes. Using a standard model

of conversation, the 'common ground model' (associated with Stalnaker and Roberts), Goldberg offers a different reading of testimony, that is, cases of testimony that amount to speech acts, which brings this prospect of a normative clash to light.

Approaching this tension between ethics and epistemology from a different angle, Ray Auerback's 'Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice?' altogether questions the idea that Fricker's (2007) proposed central case of testimonial injustice is a distinctly *epistemic* phenomenon, or a distinctly *testimonial* injustice, or correctable by the adoption of a *epistemic virtue theoretic framework*. Relying on criticisms of Fricker by Piovarchy (2021), Medina (2011) and Sherman (2016), Auerback offers four objections to her core conception of testimonial injustice. First, that testimonial injustice is an *instance* of identity-prejudicial credibility judgment, but not a distinctly testimonial *kind* of injustice. Secondly, that there is nothing *uniquely epistemic* about the operation of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit in the context of a testimonial exchange; it is rather an *a priori* social-moral phenomenon applied to an epistemic context. Thirdly, identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is not a monolithic phenomenon but one form of a more widely experienced *social and cultural phenomenon* of identity-prejudicial judgements. Lastly and relatedly, it has not been shown that a virtue-epistemological framework is necessary or desirable to (self)-correct for testimonial injustice, especially since identity prejudice is a *social phenomenon* and often held unreflectingly.

3) New Applications of Theories of Epistemic Injustice

The next two papers enhance the conversation around epistemic and testimonial injustices by applying them to specific cases of epistemic wrongs. In 'Representation and Epistemic Violence', Leo Townsend and Dina Lupin draw on Dotson (2011) to argue that there is a distinctive kind of 'epistemic violence' in the case of group spokesperson's speech. Drawing on Austinian speech act theory (1962), they introduce three felicity conditions of speaking for

a group, the non-fulfilment of which by an audience can amount to a distinctive form of silencing in relation to spokesperson speech: *representational authority*, *representational intent*, and *representational uptake*. Based on this, they show that an audience may silence the group as well as the speaker by failing to fulfil the representational uptake condition. Such failure is owed to an audience's profound ignorance about the political structure of the group, with the result that it is unable to correctly identify the group's proper representatives. Further, individual speakers are likely coerced to silence themselves when they become aware of being mistaken as speaking for the group, hence when they cannot trust their audience with respect to correctly identifying the group's proper representative. They illustrate this by reference to *legally mandated consultation* processes with groups affected by legal, policy or administrative decision-making. (Ebbesson 2007) In particular, they discuss the examples of the REDD+ Programme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) launched under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Uganda and Nigeria, and the treatment of speech of Aboriginal and Indigenous bureaucrats within the Australian civil service.

Melanie Altanian's 'Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice' looks at how conditions of genocide denialism give rise to epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. Using Sue Campbell's (2003, 2006) account of relational, reconstructive remembering and particularly of 'good remembering', she argues that genocide denialism constitutes in fact a 'double epistemic wrong' (Fricker 2007, 159), insofar as it subjects survivors and descendants to *epistemically disrespectful challenges* to both their collective memory as well as individual remembers. The former subjects them to unwarranted institutional constraints on their hermeneutical agency, i.e., hermeneutical oppression, while the latter subjects them to constraints on their testimonial agency, i.e., testimonial oppression. In addition, Altanian argues that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are crucially

interrelated when it comes to such 'contested' memory of historical injustice and the biographical testimony it gives rise to. Drawing on Jenkins' (2017) analysis of 'rape myths' as hermeneutical injustice, as well as scholarship on 'wilful hermeneutical ignorance' (e.g., Pohlhaus Jr. 2012), Altanian discusses two mechanisms through which this happens. First, through systematic distortions of the very concept of 'genocide' and the conditions of its use, and secondly, through the systematic portrayal of survivors and descendants as *vicious rememberers*. This is illustrated with the example of Turkey's historical and ongoing denialism of the Armenian genocide.

4) On (Mis)Trust in Expert Testimony

In 'Our epistemic duties in scenarios of vaccine mistrust', the PERITIA early career prize winning article, Giulia Terzian and M. Inés Corbalán build on recent work by Johnson (2018) and Lackey (2020b) to critically assess our epistemic obligation to voice disagreement. Focusing particularly on science denial (SD) and vaccine hesitancy (VH) discourses, Terzian and Corbalán argue that these cases generate an especially strong duty to voice disagreement due to their propensity to be both practically and epistemically harmful. This is because the lay public crucially depends on expert scientific testimony in order to access warranted, true beliefs about such vital subject matters. However, they argue that since the unconstrained circulation of SD discourse generates confusion over who the experts are and what they are saying, public access to important epistemic goods is compromised and obstructed. Moreover, it leads to the formation of false beliefs, hence qualifying as epistemic harm, and will in virtue of this also lead to practical harm. They then turn to discuss situational features that may function as defeaters of such an obligation. Specifically in VH discourse, voicing disagreement may actually constitute a testimonial injustice towards those expressing VH. This is the case if VH is grounded in well-placed mistrust of vaccine-promoting institutions

due to historical institutional misconduct towards affected communities, such as Black Americans.

The special issue concludes with Olga Lenczewska's 'Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies: A Reply to Brennan'. Lenczewska offers both a critique of Brennan's (2016) epistemic argument for *epistocracy* and a modified account of *political competence* required for participation in an epistocratic council. She specifically criticises Brennan's understanding of political competence in terms of possessing expert knowledge of political science and economics. Not only is such an account of political competence too narrow and inadequate, but it may further contribute to the marginalization of socially disadvantaged and oppressed people, insofar as they are more likely to lack the resources necessary to acquire such expert knowledge relative to members of dominant groups, i.e., mostly white, upper middle- to upper-class, educated, employed men. Instead, Lenczewska draws on *standpoint theory* and arguments from *situated and embodied knowledge* to offer a new account of political competence that is more apt for an epistocratic deliberative council. In particular, she argues that besides possession of, say, social scientific knowledge, people can be politically competent by possessing first-personal experience and knowledge unique to, and acquired through, one's disadvantaged or oppressed socio-economic situatedness. To bring such potential epistemic privileges and competences to fruition politically, their perspectives and voices should be included in any epistocratic deliberative council.

On The Prizes

The Robert Papazian Prize

The Robert Papazian Annual Essay Prize on Themes from Ethics and Political Philosophy was established in 2012 in memory of a young political activist who was executed in Iran in

1982. Papazian was born to an Armenian family in Tehran, Iran in 1954. He studied Politics and International Relations at École des Relations Internationales in Paris. Like many other political activists abroad, Papazian returned to Iran in the summer of 1978, to join the uprising against the Shah. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he continued his political activism in Tehran and then in the Kurdistan province of Iran as a political and theoretical instructor to a left-wing opposition group. Papazian was identified by a former activist turned collaborator on the streets of Tehran and was arrested in February 1982. Two weeks prior to his arrest he had turned 28. In prison, he, along with thousands of other political prisoners was not granted any legal representation nor was he permitted to have visitors. Years later the family found out that a representative of the Armenian Council had been allowed to pay a visit to ask him to recant and cooperate with the authorities as a condition of his freedom. He had refused the offer categorically.

Robert Papazian, along with a number of other political prisoners, was executed in July 1982. He was buried anonymously in the mass graves of the Khavaran cemetery in the outskirts of Tehran. However, the date of his execution as well as the exact location of his interred body are unknown. His last letter to the family sent two or three days before his execution, indicates that he had still no knowledge of the verdict. Robert Papazian's political activism was motivated by his hatred of injustice and cruelty. He cared deeply for others and was affected by their suffering. His short life was guided, above all else, by a desire to defend the weak and vulnerable. The themes for this annual competition are chosen to reflect his life and ideals. The Papazian annual prize of €1500 is funded by a donation from the Papazian family.

The PERITIA Prize

The multi-disciplinary research project, PERITIA – Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action, funded by the European Commission's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, is

an international research project exploring the conditions under which people trust expertise used for shaping public policy. Its team members, philosophers, social and natural scientists, policy experts, ethicists, psychologists, media specialists and civil society organisations, from Armenia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, investigate the role of science in policy decision-making and the conditions under which people should trust and rely on expert opinion. The key hypothesis of the project is that affective and normative factors play a central role in decisions to trust, even in cases where judgements of trustworthiness may seem to be grounded in epistemic considerations, such as professional reputation, reliability and objectivity. The PERITIA Essay Prizes are funded by the Centre for Ethics in Public Life at University College Dublin and reflects some of the main themes and interests of the project.

The Winners of the 2020 Prizes

The winning essay of the 2020 Robert Papazian Prize was 'Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on Gendered Violence' by Charlotte Knowles (University of Groningen). Dr Knowles receives a prize of €1500 made available by the Papazian family.

The winner of the special PERITIA Prize of €1500, on the theme of testimonial injustice and trust, made available by UCD Centre for Ethics in Public Life to mark its Horizon 2020 Project, Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action, was 'Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional Testimonial Justice' by Havi Carel (University of Bristol) and Ian Kidd (University of Nottingham).

The winner of the early career PERITIA Prize of €500 was the essay 'Our epistemic duties in scenarios of vaccine mistrust' by Giulia Terzian (NOVA University of Lisbon) and M. Inés Corbalán (independent researcher).

The PERITIA Essay Prize is funded by the Centre for Ethics in Public Life at University College Dublin and reflects some of the main themes and interests of the project. The project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action - PERITIA has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883.

Call for the 2021 Prizes

The International Journal of Philosophical Studies (IJPS) is pleased to announce the 2021 call for the Robert Papazian Essay Prize. The topic for the 2021 competition is 'Ethics and the Emotions'.

There are two prize categories: (1) Annual Robert Papazian Prize for Essays in Ethics and Political Philosophy. A monetary prize of €1500 sponsored by the Papazian family and publication as the lead article of a special issue of IJPS on the topic of Ethics and Emotions. (2) PERITIA Prize. A prize of €1500, sponsored by UCD Centre for Ethics in Public Life, on a theme relevant to the Horizon 2020 EU research project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action (PERITIA).

At the discretion of the adjudicators, additional commendation prizes, under either category, may also be awarded.

The 2021 Robert Papazian prize is for papers in the general area of 'Ethics and the Emotions'. Topics may include but are not limited to emotional rationality, emotional recalcitrance, the relationship between emotions and values, and the role of emotions in moral development.

The general topic of the 2021 PERITIA prize is specifically 'The social and political significance of emotional attitudes and emotional responses'. Papers might treat among other questions the role of emotions in trust and its betrayal, the nature of political emotions, and the political significance of sympathy.

Scholarly essays from all philosophical approaches – analytic, continental, and historical are invited. You do not need to specify which prize category applies. Word limit: 8000 –10,000 words, including notes and references.

The closing date for submissions is March 1, 2022. Please submit your paper by email directly to Professor Maria Baghramian at Maria.Baghramian@ucd.ie, using the subject line 'IJPS Ethics and the Emotions'. Make sure that the essay is modified for double blind review and that it has an abstract (200 words).

Terms and Conditions

Submissions should not be under consideration for publication elsewhere and should not be submitted to any other journal until the outcome of the competition is known.

All submitted papers will be evaluated, in the first instance, by the journal's editorial board. The shortlisted papers will be judged by external referee(s). The jury will evaluate the entries on the originality of the paper, its engagement with the announced topics, the contribution it makes to scholarship in the field, the quality of the argumentation and its conceptual clarity.

The decision of the jury will be final. The jury reserves the right to award no prizes at all if submitted material is not of an appropriate standard.

The winning articles will appear in the 2022 volume of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies (IJPS). All shortlisted papers will also be considered for publication in a special issue of IJPS. Visit the official webpage for further information about the Robert Papazian Annual Essay Prize.

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