



Composing Institutions and Institutionalising Composers

Value and Discipline in Contemporary English University
Composition

Matthew John Heath Warren

Department of Music

St Mary's College

Durham University

Thesis submitted towards the attainment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2021



Abstract

ACADEMICS IN THE FIELD of composition are under numerous pressures and influences. This thesis is based on extensive interviews with composer-academics and examines the field of university composition as the intersection of art worlds, an academic discipline, and an organisationally managed form or work. In-so-doing, it theorises the particular ways in which the field is formed, maintained, and reformed by social and organisational pressures. This particularly concerns the theorisation of conflict and looks at how contradictions between different pressures have the potential to change the practices of composer-academics.

Two key themes are placed at the centre of this theorisation: the value of authenticity and the discipline of rationalisation. The former attributes legitimacy to composers whose work is seen as autonomous and the latter extends the managerialism of the university organisation through the key rationalising technic of grammatisation. Throughout, these two ideas are in play, at every juncture setting up a tension between freedom and control.

The first part lays out the field by considering its composition and ways in which it may usefully be categorised. Part Two examines the practices of research (composing) and teaching and looks at how the university organisation interacts with these. With organisational rationalism taken as the constant, the ideal typical institutions laid out suggest an affinity for certain forms of experimental composition and a banking approach to teaching. The final part flips this, taking the ideal type of autonomy as the constant and theorising what a university that is not in conflict with this fundamental artistic (and academic) ideal could look like in the form of the 'Liminal University'.

Word Count (main text, excluding footnotes): 93331

Acknowledgements

THIS WORK OWES EVERYTHING to the generosity and enthusiasm of all those (quoted and unquoted, named and anonymous) who contributed their time, energy, and wisdom through interviews, writing, and conversation. (A partial list of these contributors can be found on page 244.) Without the knowledge and patience of Dr Simon Mills and Mr John Snijders, this research would have never begun, let alone have been completed. For enabling the communities of fellowship in St Mary's College, in the Music Department and in the Sociology Department as well as for the financial support of a Doctoral Scholarship and research funding, I owe another great debt to Durham University. I am extremely grateful to my examiners, Dr Sol Gamsu and Prof. Pamela Burnard, for devoting their attention to this thesis and conducting a thorough and highly constructive examination.

To Florence Body, I owe more than I can say, and so I hope she will forgive me for not making the attempt. The threads of many chance conversations invisibly bind these pages together; in this, I consider myself extremely lucky to have been surrounded by many deeply thoughtful and wise people, of whom I may name but a few: Elien Ida, Dr Susan Notess, Dr Sam Horlor, Kit Warren, Petr Nuska, Budhaditya Bhattacharyya, Tom Graves, and Juliano Abramovay. My para-supervisory team—Prof. Philip Warren, Lesley Warren, and Sarah Mercer—must also take credit for ensuring not only that I started writing, but also that I stopped.

Contents

| | |
|--|------------|
| Abstract | ii |
| Acknowledgements | iii |
| Contents | iv |
| List of Figures | vi |
| Part 1: Introduction to the Research and the Field | 1 |
| Introduction | 1 |
| <i>I. The Subject</i> | <i>2</i> |
| <i>II. Research Background: Music in Higher Education and Research Organisations</i> | <i>5</i> |
| <i>III. Contributions</i> | <i>7</i> |
| <i>IV. Theoretical Background</i> | <i>9</i> |
| <i>V. Research Methods</i> | <i>15</i> |
| <i>VI. Positionality</i> | <i>18</i> |
| <i>VII. The Argument: thesis structure</i> | <i>19</i> |
| Chapter 1: Central Concepts | 21 |
| <i>1.1 Rationalisation and Grammatism</i> | <i>21</i> |
| <i>1.2 Art, Authenticity, and Autonomy</i> | <i>27</i> |
| <i>1.3 Conclusion</i> | <i>35</i> |
| Chapter 2: Outlining the Field | 37 |
| <i>2.1 The Constitution of the Field</i> | <i>37</i> |
| <i>2.2 Negotiating Self-Definition: composers describing themselves</i> | <i>41</i> |
| <i>2.3 Describing Composers</i> | <i>50</i> |
| <i>2.3 Conclusion</i> | <i>79</i> |
| Conclusion to Part 1 | 80 |
| Part 2: Rationalising Composition | 81 |
| Chapter 3: Composing Music | 81 |
| <i>3.1 Commissioning</i> | <i>82</i> |
| <i>3.2 Compositional Process</i> | <i>91</i> |
| <i>3.3 Ideas of Audience and Reception</i> | <i>99</i> |
| <i>3.4 Conclusion</i> | <i>107</i> |

| | |
|---|------------|
| Chapter 4: Compositional Practice and the Structures of the University | 109 |
| 4.1 <i>Structural Influences</i> | 111 |
| 4.2 <i>The Direct Influence of Research</i> | 114 |
| 4.3 <i>Other Direct Influences</i> | 140 |
| 4.4 <i>Conclusion</i> | 148 |
| 4.5 <i>Taking a Position</i> | 149 |
| Chapter 5: Teaching Composition | 152 |
| 5.1 <i>Modes of Teaching</i> | 155 |
| 5.2 <i>Teaching and Critical Pedagogy</i> | 160 |
| 5.3 <i>Conclusion: The Prevalence of Critical Pedagogy</i> | 178 |
| Chapter 6: Compositional Teaching and the Structures of the University..... | 181 |
| 6.1 <i>Critical Pedagogy, Assessment, and the University</i> | 181 |
| 6.2 <i>Educational Capitalism and Student Demand</i> | 191 |
| 6.3 <i>Modularisation as Rationalisation</i> | 199 |
| 6.4 <i>Conclusion</i> | 201 |
| Conclusion to Part 2: Rationalising Composition..... | 202 |
| Part 3: De-Rationalising the University..... | 207 |
| Chapter 7: Social Indeterminacy and Artistic and Academic Freedom..... | 207 |
| 7.1 <i>A Theory of Social Indeterminacy</i> | 208 |
| 7.2 <i>Social Indeterminacy and Art</i> | 218 |
| 7.3 <i>Social Indeterminacy and Academia</i> | 220 |
| 7.4 <i>Taking a Position</i> | 225 |
| Conclusion to Part 3: De-Rationalising the University | 228 |
| <i>Summary of Findings</i> | 228 |
| <i>Recommendations</i> | 229 |
| <i>Further Research</i> | 231 |
| <i>Protecting Indeterminacy</i> | 231 |
| References | 235 |
| <i>Bibliography</i> | 235 |
| <i>Interviews</i> | 244 |

List of Figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 1. Percent of professors by gender..... | 39 |
| Figure 2. Scale of relative power in commissioning..... | 82 |
| Figure 3. Scale of control in compositional process..... | 92 |
| Figure 4. Scale of power in the relationship between the composer and audience during the production of their music..... | 100 |
| Figure 5. comparison of the REF scores from the sub-panel for Music, Drama, Dance, and Performing Arts unit with that of the average over all units | 118 |
| Figure 6. Summary of concepts of research and composition..... | 126 |
| Figure 7. AHRC framework for understanding types of impact. (Adapted from Arts and Humanities Research Council, undated)..... | 129 |
| Figure 8. An ideal typology of composer-academics compared with the requirements of a rationalising university | 203 |

Part 1: Introduction to the Research and the Field

Introduction

COMPOSERS SITUATED IN UNIVERSITIES as teaching and researching academics inhabit a seemingly contradictory position. To outline the problem in a clear, but ideal-typical way: they are at once subject to the rationalisation of organisational behaviour and of the de-rationalising impulse of artistic practice; they are required to be both subjects of the university and sovereign artists. Accordingly, the subject I am concerned with is the interaction of composer-academics (those composers who are employed within universities, in this case in England) and the university as an organisation. The fundamental question regards how the field of university composition comes to be comprised of the particular behaviours it does. After outlining the field, this breaks down into asking:

- 1) How do composer-academics practice their work and what role do other agencies play in this process?
- 2) How do composer-academics go about teaching composition and what are the values which underlie these methods?
- 3) What are the impacts of the institutions of contemporary universities on both of these strands of activity?
- 4) What do the affinities and conflicts found in the comparison between practices valorised by composers and the universities indicate for the future of academic-composition?
- 5) How could the university organisation allow composition to be practiced in sympathy with the values of the artistic field?

1. The Subject

Music has a long history in European academia as one part of the medieval quadrivium in a university ideologically devoted to a model of doctrinal reproduction (Rüegg, 1992). With the enlightenment came an ideological fragmentation of the European university (Rüegg, 2004): in France, the revolution abolished the historically theological universities and reformed them as a tool of the French state. Partly in reaction to this repression of free thought, key figures in the German enlightenment came together around the idea of a university devoted to discovery and the pursuit of truth free of state interference. Out of this, the University of Berlin was formed in 1810 (albeit with a compromised autonomy from state censure). This was the first of the Humboldtian universities (after the instrumental scholar and statesman Wilhelm von Humboldt). In contrast, however, a different ideology was to be found in the British Isles: a commitment to a liberal education which sought learning as a way to nurture the individual through national culture rather than by the progress of reasoned philosophy (Peters & Barnett, 2018, p.xxiv).

At a similar time, what it meant to be a composer was changing: the rise of a bourgeois public meant that patronage was being overtaken by freelance work, print publication was becoming a source of revenue, and there was a rising romanticism of the Artist as an extraordinary individual.¹ Composers began to work more extensively outside the patronage of noble families and the church. In France and Germany, where the prevailing ideologies valued state mandated training and the pursuit of knowledge, respectively, composers found no home in the university. Musical training was the circumscribed territory of the conservatoire. In Britain, too, the nineteenth century saw the rise of the conservatoire, but it also saw the inauguration of the first chair in music outside Oxford and Cambridge—the Reid Chair—at Edinburgh University, a position first taken up in 1839 and whose first two occupants were composers (Golding, 2013). This took hold and, over the following decades, composers began to populate university music departments as well as the growing conservatoires. Given that in Germany (as to this day), composition didn't take hold in universities, one is led to suppose that the liberal educational values of universities in Britain suited the practice of composition in a way that the humboldtian ideals did not. The next substantial change came in 1964 with the

¹ The effect of this move into modernity has been theorised extensively (see Dahlhaus, 1982; Goehr, 1992; Talbot, 2000; Clarke, 2012; Cook, 2012)

establishment of the music department in York shortly after the University was founded. Significantly, the founding academic staff members were all composers (although each also had other strings to their bow). York was the first university music department to have this focus and also was the first to award doctorates of philosophy (PhDs) in composition. Other departments followed suit in awarding research degrees in composition, but there was also resistance to the idea of composition being research.² As will be explored later, this is a resistance that exists to this day.

The modern university in Britain is the descendent of both of the liberal and Humboldtian ethica as well as a number of other ideas of a university. With the introduction of the nineteenth century civic universities, the polytechnics (and the termination of the two-tier system in 1992), as well as more recent institutions, technical education—providing society with the skilled people it needed—became part of the complex fabric of the ideology of higher education. This ethos developed through the systematisation of higher education (Shattock, 1996) into a prevalently ‘entrepreneurial’ university (Barnett, 2011) which is driven by market and capitalist drives to pursue utility as measured (ideally) financially and whose focus is on managing their staff in aid of productivity.

These are crude characterisations of a type of organisation which is populated by a great many ideas about the proper mission of the university. However, this initial typology, via the historical peculiarity of there being composers in universities in Britain, raises the question ‘given that composition was accepted into the university under a liberal educational model rather than either a research or entrepreneurial model, how has the changing university affected composition?’ This is not a historical enquiry, and so I make no pretence about being able to answer the historical question, but I do ask ‘how is the relationship between composition and universities in England developing?’

The premise which gives rise to this thesis is that these composers are situated at the intersection of institutional fields, most significantly: the artistic field—the network of composers, performers, venues, audiences, and all of the other players that create the stage for their music—and the academic field—colleagues, scholars from other disciplines, publishers, learned societies, students *et alia*. Each field has multiple dimensions of value and its own organisational mechanisms, complete with the managerial structures which can not only impose the particular values of the field, but also discipline by means of regulation and

² Peter Manning, personal communication: online meeting, 14/05/2021

rationalised control. My interest here is in the relationships found in this intersection as embodied by those who inhabit it.

The term I use to refer to the composers I have studied here is ‘composer-academics’. I use this to avoid using the more provocative, if less clunky, term ‘academic composers’. Avoiding this term is important because of the likelihood (not least amongst my research participants) of ‘academic’ being read as a pejorative adjective rather than as a noun. In this field, the term ‘academic’ carried with it connotations of needlessly abstract and unintelligible work—something most composers were keen to disavow. At times it was like there was an antibody working against the idea of being ‘academic’: the composer who, straight off the bat, apologised for describing their composition “almost in the language of university research imperatives” (McLaughlin, interview); or the composer who commented of academic music that, if it refers to the idea of unreachably specialist music, “may it die.” (Landy, interview) This reaction by the conceptual immune system (to stretch the analogy) is an early indication of some of the conflict at play.

I should make it clear at the very outset that when I talk of ‘conflict’ I am not referring to two absolutely irreconcilable social forces—for example, artists and academics in the kind of antithetical setup Henk Borgdorff (2012, p. 5) critiques. Rather, I am referring to dissonance. I view the dissonance between actors (social dissonance) as not dissimilar from the competing conceptual frameworks we all negotiate internally (cognitive dissonance, see Festinger, 1957). In both instances, the reaction is one of resolution, often in the form of change. In other words, conflict is the fundamental of social action. At no point, therefore, am I implying that the position of any discipline or approach is incompatible with the university; academia, as I have indicated already, is a flexible construct as much as composition is and there are always multiple ways to resolve dissonance (each breeding other dissonances). What I am interested in are the conflicts and affinities found in current practice and what they might indicate about the future of a changing social space. I am not interested in social pathology, but in the analysis of change. Conflict is a continual unsettling of otherwise consistent conceptual-behavioural systems. I theorise here the results of this process, not its desirability.

II. Research Background: Music in Higher Education and Research Organisations

The modes of production of music affect the nature of the musical activities and educational institutions are a key player in this, changing the nature of cultural practices through conditional patronage and educational reproduction associated with certain values (Booth & Kuhn, 1990). The idea that academic institutionalisation has affected cultural production is the core thesis of both Juniper Hill's (2009) investigation of Finnish folk music's adoption into the teaching of the Sibelius academy and of Simon Keegan-Phipps's (2007, 2009) research into the Folk music degree at Newcastle University. In both, the organisational adoption changes the means of attaining legitimacy in the field, disciplining an emphasis on 'artified' value systems (see Shapiro & Heinich, 2012). The key tendencies of this academic value system, for Hill, were to value "technical virtuosity, harmonic complexity, standardised tempered intonation, written notation, faithfulness to the score, authority of the composer, a canon of great works by prodigy composers, subfield and role specialisation, orchestral hierarchy, elite high-culture status, progress through the innovations of individual composers, and apolitical transcendental artistry." (Hill, 2009, p. 210; cf. Kingsbury, 1988) This gave rise to an increased professionalisation of the practice, with professional, academy-educated performers forming a new, higher profile class of practitioners, disseminating these values in the wider musical field (Hill, 2009, pp. 230-234). Through these changes the music benefitted from a raised profile in the public sphere and greater legitimacy in the academic sphere. In these processes, naturalised evaluations such as 'rigorous' and 'quality' emerge from or descend into the discourse—passive words laced with the unspoken expectation of certain artified values.

In another case of the organisational position of musical production giving rise to a hegemonic value system, Georgina Born's (1995) study of IRCAM presents a different focus. In her ethnography of the musicians working at the Institute as composers and technicians, she focusses on the dominance of the narrow modernist logic of value legitimised there. She finds composers who in a variety of ways practice music that diverges from the aesthetic ideology of the modernist school, dominated by the charismatic authority of Pierre Boulez. In this ideology the dominant values are to write music which conforms to a narrow and teleological idea of progress. Within this, Born focusses on the strategies employed by individuals to navigate conformity and transgression of the aesthetic ideology in which they are employed. This looks at an organisation that was established for the purpose of housing and promoting the modernist

ideology. Therefore, unlike that of the non-dominant culture of Finnish folk music, the practice was not changed by its incorporation into the organisation but rather, was reinforced by its situation in a highly legitimate research institution.

The significant difference between Hill's and Born's studies is the degree of change imposed by the organisation, reflecting the position of the governing authorities of the organisation itself. In the case of the Sibelius Academy, the organisation's dominant institutions were those of Western classical music and so the institutional environment imposed the distinctive set of logics it entails. In IRCAM, the highest governing institutions (emanating from Boulez) were those of modernism. This difference is key because it shows the dependence of this form of institutional disciplining on the source of legitimacy itself. The practice is changed in as far as the governing authority works by different values to the previous state legitimising body (audience, market, localised community, or musician-gatekeepers, for example).

Both of these strands—the adoption of folk music into historically art musical institutions and the creation of organisations to support and house art music—are concerned with the influence of dominant value systems on less institutionalised modes of cultural production; Born is concerned with the exclusion of some musical practice from legitimate discourse at IRCAM and Hill and Keegan-Phipps with the artification of folk music, both as a result of the dominance of certain artistic value systems. In this way they go beyond seeing organisations (as with Bruno Nettl's schools of music) as functioning “as an institution for the suppression of certain musics.” (Nettl, 1995, p. 82).

However, what has been less studied is the effect of the organisation as an organisation—that is, as a semi-formalised set of relations that structures activity. An exception would be Gary Alan Fine's (2018) study of master of fine arts teaching, which emphasised the education of the art student's ability to articulate their work in a legitimate way. However, even this reading sees this as linked primarily to dominant value systems in fine art rather than the requirements of the organisation as such.

The past few decades have seen a swath of writings in Europe and North America that theorise, reimagine, and critique the University. Many of these have centred around issues to do with the last few decades of university expansion and reform such as commercialisation, rationalisation, and changing culture (for example, Collini, 2012, 2017; Docherty, 2011; Fanghanel, 2012; Graham, 2002; Williams, 2013) This rapid expansion of the literature on the 'idea of the university' (after Newman, 1976) is a reaction to the feeling that “There is a war on for the future of the university” (Docherty, 2015, p. 1). The conceptual threat is that of a perceived monolithic paradigm of narrow utility as “social and economic goals mean that education is far

less likely nowadays to be linked to a moral or intellectual vision of truth, enlightenment, knowledge or understanding.” (Williams, 2013, pp. 4-5) This logic of utility is lived out in organisations by increasing levels of managerialism (Fanghanel, 2012). In short, the university has been brought increasingly in line with the core legitimising tool of modern society: rationalisation.

The sociological study of composers has often focussed on their lives as primarily related to the structures of the artistic field such as in precarity (Smith & Thwaites, 2018, 2019), or young composers’ negotiations of values and identity (El-Ghadban, 2009; Malcomson, 2013), or gendered experience of working as composers (Bennett et al., 2018; 2019). Dennison Nash, in his study of composers in the U.S.A. did consider the role of the university in the constitution of the field, employing the idea of ‘ivory towers’ briefly in the explanation of the urbanised, divided labour of the composer (1961a, 1961b; D. J. Nash, 1957).

The exception to this is in writings on the idea of composition (and art more generally) as research. Although Bennett et al. (Bennett, Wright, & Blom, 2010; 2011) have conducted a small scale study of the topic, most publications have come not from sociologists interested in this situation, but from artist-academics themselves. These have been both dissenting (in composition, most notably Croft, 2015) and those looking to formulate and legitimise a particular idea of artistic research (for example, Blumenfeld-Jones, 2016; Doğantan-Dack, 2015; Elena, 2014; Hansen & Barton, 2009). There has been, therefore, a disparity between the level of concern present in the field and the lack of sociological contribution to this central question: how do contemporary universities affect the nature of musical composition happening under its umbrella?

III. Contributions

Aside from the concern with this deficiency in current research, my hope for this thesis’s contribution has several different aspects, depending on the reader.

Firstly, to those within the field, it aims to provide a contextualisation for their own experiences and position. I have found during this research not only diverse experiences and opinions, but also diverging ideas of the field itself: how big it is, what kind of activities go on within it, and what the prevailing values are. This research is unique in the extent of the

interview-based approach, including the participation of around one fifth of the field's population. This gives a new means for composer-academics understanding better the breadth of their social world.

Secondly, for those outside the field of university composition, it will act as an unprecedented introduction to the subject. Understanding composition within the university brings with it challenges to ideas of the university's tenets and epistemology. In particular, ideas of what it means to research and to teach in academia are unsettled by the contested epistemic values found in composition.

Thirdly, to sociologists, this thesis provides a reading of the social theoretical implications of the expressed experiences and values of composers in universities. Primarily this involves forming an idea of the impact of regulation and non-regulation in organisations with implications for the study of power and bureaucracy in modern life.

Finally, there are significant implications for all involved in the study or inhabitation of Universities; I do not see the discipline of composition as the only area of academia to which this study can offer insights. I argue that composition is not, in certain important respects, an exceptional case, but that many of the aspects I discuss are only more clearly present in an artistic discipline than in others (particularly the role of subjectivity and authority in academic practice). Action relates in all fields to legitimacy.³ In some fields, however, this is more evident than in others where the correspondence and coherence notions of truth are the standard epistemology. The sciences and composition have different value systems because of this, with composition being evaluated in relation to its contingent (often extremely localised) culture. Composition is a far more purely institutionally constituted discipline. In scientific disciplines too, however, there are elements of institutional legitimacy and so the heightened role of this in composition may serve to illuminate its more muted role in other disciplines.

³ This is an unsteady dichotomy as legitimacy can easily collapse into utility, given the ultimate resource competition which social power is based on, just as utility can collapse into legitimacy under any existentialist scrutiny of Albert Camus's first question of philosophy: why not kill oneself? Nevertheless, the differentiation of material and social effect helps to analyse the differences in activities within academia.

IV. Theoretical Background

The theoretical basis for this work draws on complementary aspects of interpretivism, institutionalism, and constructivist structuralism. The common intellectual heritage amongst these is the sociology of Max Weber, as is most clearly exemplified in the prevalent use of the ideal type in the construction of my argument. The institutionalist perspective leads me to a focus on conflicts in compositional, academic, and university value systems as a process of change; the ideal type allows me to elucidate these conflicts by isolating particular logics; and constructive structuralism facilitates my understanding of the construction of common values and how they are interpreted by agents.

Institutionalism and Dialectic

First, a point of definition: ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ in this thesis mean different things. An organisation is a social space set in some kind of formal structure. It has an administrative structure—its morphology—as well as being organised around the actual actors by whom it is populated—the substructure (Benson, 1977). An institution, on the other hand, is a socially constructed rule which may be formal (a law, for instance) or not (a shared moral feeling, for instance).

Institutionalism is concerned with the relationship between social phenomena and institutions, looking at the ways in which social fields regulate behaviour. This grew out of a concern with determinist and behaviourist analyses (Immergut, 1998) and sought to find a way of understanding similar behaviours amongst organisations that were not explained by efficiency (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The central concern for institutionalism is legitimacy, the core thesis being that legitimacy is gained by actions being seen to be isomorphic (consistent) with the institutions of their field. The legitimacy which a particular organisation has is best defined by Meyer and Scott as

the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives [...] In such a[n] instance, legitimacy mainly refers to the adequacy of an organization as theory. A completely legitimate organization would be one about which no question could ever be raised. (Meyer and Scott, 1983 quoted in Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 8)

In this frame, the practices of an organisation have to be understood in relation to their coherence with their institutional field, with the ideal situation being one where the organisation is not even questioned. Legitimacy is a societal attribution of favour to an organisation, which promotes its survival by providing stability and avoiding penalisation for deviance (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The institutional field (also referred to as the organisational field or environment) is “a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with other actors outside the field” (Scott, 1995 quoted in Wooten & Hoffman, 2008: 131). This approach conceptualises institutions not simply as arbitrary rules, but as emerging from a network of (enacted) ideas, known as institutional logics (Patricia H. Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Patricia H Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2015). These are maintained and developed through everyday life—as habitus—as well as through more deliberate thought and action.

The questions of how institutions change is an important one in institutionalism. The central problem has been called the “paradox of embedded agency” (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009). That is, the question of how actors can change institutions when their actions are themselves institutionalised. Moving on from early individualist notions of institutional entrepreneurship, the field has turned to the idea of institutional work: “the practices of individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions.” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011, p. 52) This goes on both consciously and unconsciously and can be facilitated by the loosening of institutional regulation in, for example, moments of crisis (Seo & Creed, 2002). However, more recent approaches encompass a more gradual, evolutionary approach (Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017). In this vein, I conceptualise the development of institutions in terms of interaction between contradictory logics: institutional fields overlap and agents inhabit multiple positions in different fields and so exist in a nexus of different institutional logics. In this circumstance, conflict can produce institutional change through resolution. The interaction of conflicting institutional logics can be suspended: in organisational institutionalism, a central thesis is the idea that organisations can symbolically conform to the institutional requirements of the field whilst in fact continuing with non-isomorphic behaviour—a process known as decoupling. Similarly with mental processes, Born draws upon the idea of ‘splitting’ whereby the individual sets apart two aspects of their lives from one another. In this thesis, I am concerned with conflicts and their suspension and resolution both mentally (as in the theory of cognitive dissonance Festinger, 1962) and in terms of social relations.

This focus on conflict as the sight of institutional change is influenced by dialectical institutionalism, as formulated by Kenneth Benson (1977). Benson formulates an idea (growing out of a Marxist and critical theoretical intellectual background) of organisational institutional analysis that sees organisations as riddled with contradiction and conflict between the morphology and substructure, between substructural actors, and within actors' minds. In this perspective, institutional logics “become overlaid in unique clusters or patterns depending upon the ways in which different groups become involved in their production.” (Benson, 1977, p. 15) This perspective was summed up by Seo and Creed:

[Organisations and institutions] can be understood as multi-level social arrangements that are continually produced and reproduced by social interactions (social construction). However, these ongoing, multilevel processes produce a complex array of interrelated but often mutually incompatible institutional arrangements (totality). Such institutional incompatibilities provide a continuous source of tensions and conflicts within and across institutions (contradiction). The ongoing experience of contradictory reality reshapes the consciousness of institutional inhabitants, and they, in some circumstances, act to fundamentally transform the present social arrangements and themselves (praxis).’ (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 225)

Dialectical institutionalism allows one to answer the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ by means of a reconceptualisation: *social formations are not constituted by actors, but rather are constituted by contradictions*. This basis in conflict theory allows for contradictions to be seen at work on every level from the global to the intra-personal. Social space is populated by division and conflict and the means of both domination and revolution.

New institutionalism is concerned with the power of collective regulation of social behaviours. In a dialectic view, this becomes an interpenetrating means of dominance, acquiescence, resistance, and support. The structure of organisations is both morphological and substructural and here I will be concerned often with the interaction between the two—between the formal structures and the behaviours of composers in relation to their organisational situation. In this light, the central concern of this project becomes the ruptures within and between academic, artistic and bureaucratic logics which constitute the dynamics of the compositional field in academia. They concern the nature of the substructural arenas which maintain these conflicting patterns and the means by which they are engaged with, de-coupled, and controlled by one another.

The subtlety of the institutional pressures and conflicts is such that one cannot trace exactly the process of cause and effect. Instead, I theorise the institutional affinities and conflicts between the administrative, academic, and compositional fields based on the experiences of composer-academics. This is why I call my social theoretical reflections a ‘reading’: the endeavour brushes against philosophy at times, looking at and comparing the structures of ideas. In other words, from my fieldwork I aim to draw out certain institutional logics and express them in strong forms to better understand frontiers of conflict and affinity.

Concept Building: the Ideal Type, Affinity, and Conflict

To understand the veins of inconsistent and complex ideas and behaviours which are actually observed, I build up strong forms of the ideas expressed. These are ideal types—tools for understanding and communicating social phenomena. The ideal type has developed as a mode of sociological thinking from the work of Max Weber (1949). Although it has been further explored by others since (Burger, 1976; Buss, 1999; Parsons, 1969; Rogers, 1969; Segady, 2014; Shelting, 1969; Swedberg, 2017; Wagner & Härpfer, 2014), revisions have been minor and the basic premises as I employ them are fundamentally derived from Weber’s formulation.

The problem Weber confronts is that of the complexity of reality: how to create any intelligible understanding of the social world when every instance is unique and infinitely complex. The ideal type is his answer. It is a concept formed by the sociologist which takes from observed reality a certain value, tendency, system, or any other social phenomenon and mentally isolates it. The sociologist removes its contradictions and compromises, leaving only a system that is internally consistent. From here, it can be theorised that the ideal type has a kinship with numerous different real-world happenings, but it is understood that it does not exist anywhere in its described form. It can be brought into contact with other ideal types and so the mechanics of the conflict (which, again, have a kinship with, but are not identical to any real happening) can be elucidated. This ideal-type can then be compared to reality, highlighting kinship and difference as a way to understand what else is contributing to the complex reality.

The ideal type can highlight an elective affinity or conflict between seemingly disparate actions. Most notably, Weber does this in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 2002), where he develops these two strands of value systems, illustrating their elective affinity, and providing a reading that accounts for the proliferation of industrial development in protestant-dominated countries.

This process of concept-development has important limitations. Weber notes that the ideal type is not an attempt to represent reality. The theoretical construct is created around a kernel of a real phenomenon, but draws out of that a rationally consistent framework of thought and behaviour. People are never found to be thusly consistent, however, so the ideal type itself never represents their actual behaviour.

Rather, the intention is to allow them to be intelligibly articulated so as to be brought into contact with one another, highlighting change processes that are more to do with gradual adaptation than with dramatic events. What the construction of strong forms of certain ideologies allows one to do is to make cataclysmic what is in reality a gradual process. I start from the premise that the friction between different value systems and concepts of legitimacy is normally played out in everyday actions and enters the subjective experience (if, indeed, it is noticed) more often than not in the trivial form of irritation. The use of the ideal type, then, is an attempt to elucidate a theory of the effects of institutional environment on the field in question without denying that, in reality, the fact that such effects are too gradual to trace to exact cause and effect.

Interpretivist Constructivist Structuralism

My reliance on the ideal type leads me to identify my work as interpretivist. That is to say, I am interested in not simply objective behaviours, but the meaning ascribed to those behaviours in the form of value systems (Geertz, 1973). My aim is to draw out the expressed and embodied ideological systems which constitute this social world, the idea being that there are patterns of strategic action which interact and form value-laden structures through the embodied history of habitus.

To involve societal structures in this argument, Geertz's interpretivist anthropology must be complemented by a second theoretical perspective: constructivist structuralism (Bourdieu, 1989). I follow Bourdieu's meaning of this, which is that society is structural in the sense "that there exist, within the social world itself [...] objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations", but can be understood as emerging from the "schemes of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call habitus" (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14). In regard to this constructivist aspect, Bourdieu elsewhere described his approach as "genetic structuralism":

the analysis of objective structures—those of different fields—is inseparable from the analysis of the genesis, within biological individuals, of the mental structures which are to some extent the product of the incorporation of social structures; inseparable, too, from the analysis of the genesis of these social structures themselves: the social space, and the groups that occupy it, are the product of historical struggles (in which agents participate in accordance with their position in the social space and with the mental structures through which they apprehend this space) (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 14)

In Bourdieu's terms, the propensity of humans to act is not determined by structural rules, nor rational choice, but by a certain "feel for the game" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 11), lived out in day-to-day life as habitus. These dispositions have their genesis in the socialisation of an individual with the field—that is, they are learned by interactions with the actions of the 'players'. Thus, Bourdieu reintroduces the agent into structuralism without dispensing with the idea of structure.

What this means here is that the agential, interpretivist ethnographic perspective, exemplified by Geertz, does not preclude the theorising of structure beyond that which the agents involved explicitly recognise. In fact, despite Geertz's caution around flying too close to the sun in developing theory, thick description itself requires a degree of theorising. It is orientated around the interpretation of meaning, and so requires connections to be made between culture and individual actions—links which the individual may not recognise themselves.⁴ Interpretivist sociology, then, requires an attention both to the meaning ascribed to the world by actors as well as relation of multiple subjective viewpoints to one another in order to shed light on the social game, its rules, and the strategies of its participants. This is what Bourdieu means by 'objective relations' (as opposed to 'subjective relations'): social formations which exist (as structures) but which are beyond the individual's meaning creation, and rather are a result of aggregated and interacting individual strategic actions.

⁴ As, for instance, with his description of Balinese cock-fighting's relationship to the cultural demonisation of animalism (Geertz, 1973: chapter 15)

V. Research Methods

This thesis grew out of eighteen months⁵ of research in universities in England.⁶ There were two core strands to this research: a survey of the field based on academic profiles and focussed ethnographic one to one interviews with composer academics. The aim, as with Born's study of IRCAM, was that an "ethnographic method may have unique capacities to elucidate the workings of dominant western institutions and their cultural systems." (Born, 1995, p. 7) I follow Born in maintaining that ethnography can uncover the contradictions which these institutions conceal, even as my objective of surveying the field differs from her more conventional in depth ethnography.

The first stage was to address the issue of the size of the field. There is no formalised means of recording who is a composer in academia and so there was, prior to this research, no available data showing how many composer academics there were. I therefore undertook a two month long process of creating a database and recording the publicly available information about composers. The process for identifying these composers was, using the list of universities compiled by Malcolm Tight (2011) as well as adding in those universities which have been set up since then, to record which offered music degrees, broadly interpreted to include subjects such as music technology and production. Online faculty lists showing employed staff and their research and teaching focusses are published by most university departments. From these lists, I identified composers, again applying this term broadly to include songwriters and sound artists for example. The intention with the breadth of the definition was to avoid differentiating *a priori* between academics whose work comprises of creating sound-based experience, which could have methodologically reinforced too specific an idea of what it means to be a composer.

⁵ The ethnographic present for this work is the academic year 2018-19. The survey of academic profiles was conducted during July and August 2018, and the final interviews were conducted in July, 2019. It should be noted, therefore, that the fieldwork was entirely concluded before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

⁶ The restriction of the subject to universities in England was a practical and methodological decision. The decision to only focus on universities and not on conservatoires related firstly to the expansion of the field of study that would have entailed, taken the project well beyond its practicable limits, and secondly to the differences in the history, ethos, and recent developments of the two types of organisation. A comparative study between the two would be another interesting avenue to explore, but is well beyond what I was able to achieve here. The restriction to England was similarly a matter of scale and of organisational differences: the nature of programmes of study, higher education policy and historical backdrop would have resulted in a fruitful but unmanageable number of variables.

Publicly available email addresses from these profiles were also used to make contact with composers to facilitate the second stage of the research: the interviews. The field-wide survey allowed an impartial identification of potential participants; rather than selecting interviewees, I contacted every composer recorded who had published an email address, or for whom I could find contact details for a departmental administrator who might forward my request.⁷ The intention thereby was that participants would only be self-selecting, rather than being selected on the basis of personal connections or associations. Of the 246 composers whom I sought to contact, I ended up interviewing 66 and receiving two written responses. Interviews were conducted in person (except for two online interviews) over one or more sessions, sometimes on multiple dates. The longest total time spent with an interviewee was five hours, and the shortest was 46 minutes. The length of interviews depended largely on participant availability and the widely varying length of their responses. However, most were around the average duration of two hours and five minutes. The interviews as a whole totalled just over 135 and a half hours.

The interviews were unstructured, although I had a number of areas and prompts that were derived from my initial research questions. These focussed on five main topics: 1) the composer's music, 2) the role of academia in the composer's career, 3) their experience of their university and department, 4) their experience of and opinion on the structures of academia, 5) the future of composers and composition. However, from this starting point, I continually modified and adapted the interview structure and content based both on the individual and their responses as well as based on responses to questions over many interviews. By using a loosely grounded theoretical approach alongside these interviews, I tailored, honed, and developed the interviews and my working ideas about the field as I went along. I treated the interviews as a gradual process of learning and development of theory, changing questions and the emphases of my enquiry as they progressed. For example, I initially used a preliminary questionnaire to gain insight into who the interviewee considered to be their chief influences. However, it became evident that the reduction of what was evidently a complex issue did not sit well with composers and so I ceased using the questionnaire, instead relying on the discussion to bring out quantitative evidence of these influences (see Chapter 2: Outlining the Field).

⁷ The only exception was one university containing five composers, where I ran out of time whilst in the area to visit.

Indeed, the adaptation of the interview process became increasingly intuitive as familiarity with the list of prompts allowed me before long to conduct interviews with no written aid, rather responding to the ideas the composer raised themselves, probing and prompting them to explain and develop them more explicitly. As with much ethnographic interviewing, the aim was to embrace other worlds and so begin to understand the meaning creation at work. I was asked many times about my background and knowledge and thus to contribute my position in the field to the constitution of the interview situation. This background I readily proffered (see VI. Positionality). This occasionally gave rise to a sense of a teacher-student relationship in some interviews, but I regard this as no bad thing as it put the composer in an authoritative position, which may well have helped to put the interview on their turf (particularly as the majority took place in the participant's office).

The difference between this and much grounded theoretical work is one of explicitness in the processing: whereas the use of repeated and continual coding to shape working theory, by necessity this was done implicitly in this study given that the transcriptions were not produced in the first place until some months after the last interview was conducted. In addition, whilst I did code the interviews using NVivo, this was more a process of filing than a process of discovery. In other words, the transcripts were so extensive and the themes so wide ranging that the process of coding could not have been completed multiple times with a narrow set of categories. This means that this coding in itself (with the exception of the quantitative study of influences in Chapter 2: Outlining the Field) is not meaningful—it does not create credible data—but creating it was a process of digestion and the finished codes allowed me to manage the vast quantity of material, accessing discussions of particular topics and ideas from throughout the sample.

Contributors gave written permission for the recordings and transcripts of their interviews to be used in the research and were also asked if they would prefer to be named or anonymous in any publications. The list of interviewed contributors at the end of this thesis is, therefore, a partial list; this work is equally indebted to all those who preferred to remain anonymous (who are referred to using a randomised numerical code). Participants were given the opportunity to read this thesis before its publication and at any time to change or edit their contributions and give any other feedback.

The interviews are treated commonly with minimal social context. Whilst unconventional and potentially disadvantageous in conventional ethnography, this is intended to protect the elective anonymity of participants (given the small scale of the field and the distinctive public profiles of many of them) and to prevent a disproportionate focus on non-anonymised

interviewees. The nature of this thesis lends itself well to such an approach, given the intentional abstraction of many of the ideas into institutional forms. Although much meaning is lost without in depth context, the broad intentions of the project as well as the institutional analysis necessitate a more abstracted approach.

VI. Positionality

My relationship to the art world (the field for this research) is defined also by the intersection of academic and artistic work. I began composing through personal curiosity at age 12 and it fast became a preoccupation far outweighing my practical study as a pianist. I received some guidance on my work at school and a few performances before focussing on composition and ethnomusicology as an undergraduate reading music at Durham University. Coming from a background with extensive ties to universities and research, I had a great admiration for academia and was considering the idea of aiming to attain a doctorate since well before attending university. It was no real surprise, then, when I chose to read composition as for a Master of Arts degree in preparation for proceeding to doctoral study.

In many ways, I seemed set on walking the archetypical path to become a composer-academic (see Chapter 4.1 Structural Influences). The change came during the course of my one-year of post-graduate composition study. This was not due to any discontent with composition—I am still composing today—nor any lack in the course itself—I had bountiful opportunities to develop my compositional work down all sorts of avenues. What diverted me from this path was applying for a PhD. This involved writing a research proposal both for admission to the programme and for the funding application. I wrote a proposal that was in line with my conception of research (this was in 2014 when the idea composition as research was just becoming a widespread concern): this involved adapting techniques from comparative musicology to study social uses of music cross culturally and make cross cultural synthesis the focus of my compositional work. This gained no traction and it was recommended to me that I would do better to focus on formal musical characteristics rather than entangling myself in cultural questions. (I now recognise this as part of the authenticity discourse at the heart of the value system—see Chapter 2.) However, I could not reconcile my idea of what makes meaningful research with idiosyncratic exploration and came up with three or four more ideas that synthesised composition and social studies. For the application, I settled on a proposal around church music, conceiving of composition as a design problem and laying out a method

for ethnographically informed design of music. This project gained me a place, but the application failed to garner funding.

This left me without the opportunity to take up the place and a great deal of questions about the values in compositional research that seemed at odds with my ideas. From these questions, I decided to make that the object of my study. With puzzlement but not bitterness, I turned my attention to the field of compositional academia from an ethnomusicological perspective that fitted more comfortably with my own epistemic ideas. Two further years of funding applications later, I began the research: a half-recognised composer with one foot in and one foot out, described jokingly by one composition lecture during a seminar I was observing as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”.

This is all to say that my position regarding the field I study—both academia and the world of contemporary classical composition—is one of embeddedness, familiarity and some vestigial romanticism. However, I also see myself as someone who has a slightly critical, cockeyed view—with one of the major turns in my life being based on the seeming irreconcilability of my approach with the epistemology of composition as research.

VII. The Argument: thesis structure

In light of these theoretical foundations, I conceptualise the problematic of this thesis broadly thus: composer-academics are situated in at once in both the academic and artistic fields. They are also in an organisation which is increasingly permeated by the technics of rationalisation. How do these three institutional forces—the artistic, the academic, and the organisational—interact in the lives of composer-academics? A particular focus of this conflict is with the idea of autonomy, which is key to academic and artistic legitimacy, but is in conflict with the logic of bureaucratic systems.

Each of the three parts of the thesis takes a different conceptual frame:

Part One: Introduction to the Research and the Field lays out the groundwork for the thesis by outlining its key conceptual tenets as well as the makeup and division of the social field itself. After this introduction, *Chapter One: Central Concepts* will lay out the conceptual foundations of the argument, contrasting autonomy (partnered with authenticity and honesty) and rationalisation (similarly partnered with grammatisation and bureaucracy). These two pillars underpin the argument of the

rest of the thesis and in *Chapter Two: Outlining the Field*, the attribution of autonomy plays a central role in the division of types of composition. This chapter provides an introduction to the makeup and division of university composition.

Part Two: Rationalising Composition takes rationalisation as a constant and, through the lens of the experiences of composer-academics themselves, theorises the effect of its institutional pressures on the two key activities of composition (research) and teaching. *Chapter Three: The Practice of Composition* explores the nature of compositional production in general before the influence of organisational rationalisation processes is considered in *Chapter Four: Compositional Practice in the University*. The same approach is then taken to teaching as the various approaches to compositional pedagogy are explored in *Chapter Five: Teaching Composition* and the influence of organisational rationalisation is considered in *Chapter Six: Compositional Teaching and the Structures of the University*.

Part Three: De-Rationalising the University reverses the conceptual framing used in *Part Two*; rather than taking the rationalisation of the university as a given and considering how this might cause composition to change, it takes artistic autonomy as a given and considers how a university might change to have a greater affinity to such institutions. In this final chapter, *Social Indeterminacy and Artistic and Academic Freedom*, the case study of composition is reflected on in a broader theory of organised freedom. This leads to my formulation of the idea of the Liminal University as a re-imagining of the university, repositioning it as intentionally outside yet integral to society. Through the case study of composition, one can see the action of a more purely institutional field, from there drawing out the centrality of autonomy and reimagining the university as an organisation of authenticity.

Each part of this thesis is distinguished by a particular viewpoint: the first part is descriptive, the second part takes the rationalising administrative framework of the university as a given and examines its relationship to and implications for composers' work, and the third part takes the value of autonomy as a given and examines its relationship to and implications for the university as an organisation. In this way, this thesis engages not only with the nature of this field, but with the composition and recomposition of its institutions.

Chapter 1: Central Concepts

1.1 Rationalisation and Grammatization

UNIVERSITIES' "EXPANDING MANAGERIAL CAPACITY to monitor, incent, and discipline" (Slaughter & Cantwell, 2018, p. 62) has been documented and critiqued at length in recent literature, as I have mentioned (see page 6) and the theorisation of such administrative control underpins much of my thesis. The phenomenon of bureaucracy is a symptom of the pervasive institutional pressure for rationalisation and I formulate using the idea of grammatization—that is, the externalisation of the process of judgement. By examining these ideas, I detach them from the business of administration *per se*, allowing them to be used as analytical tools in the study of the various power dynamics at play within the field of compositional-academia.

The central concern of sociology with the conditions of modernity has led to a great interest in the role of bureaucracy and surveillance: the formalised prosthetics of powerful pressures. This is not least the case in institutionalist studies. Marshall Meyer and Craig Brown considered bureaucracy to be brought about by institutional pressure: "the process of bureaucratization begins with environmental pressures [...] and proceeds by developing rules to accommodate these pressures, elaborating organizational structures consistent with the rules and delegating authority as necessitated by structure." (M. W. Meyer & Brown, 1977 365-366) Similarly, for Benson (1977), bureaucratic structures were constructed as a result of certain substructural institutional interests. Bureaucracy, in both perspectives is a result of a pervasive social concern with centralising judgement and formalising process. This is rationalisation, which is extended by means of surveillance, which "is fundamental to all types of organisation associated with the rise of modernity" (Giddens, 1990, p. 59).

In the extension of bureaucracy and surveillance, rationalisation of human activity can be seen to be a defining feature of modern society. The archetypical example is the division of labour. In capitalist society, work was systematically trivialised as ownership of the means of production was consolidated into a new capital-owning class whose interests thus dominated the mechanics of the field of production. Workers became easily replaceable and, therefore, controllable. Competence to complete the required tasks were no longer dependant on extensive artisanal apprenticeship, rather the craftsmanship lay in the construction of the

production-line itself. Design became divided from manual labour, and the labour of the newly formed proletariat became the subject of rationalisation—a rationalisation that was encoded in the construction of the factory floor. No longer did the hands that produced decide their actions, rather they became a module in a Fordist machine as agency was surrendered to the rationalised technics of production.

This modularisation of labour—the interchangeability of one person for another—only increased and, over the last century, can be seen in the professionalisation of management. Managers were less and less being recruited from the field of the organisation’s activities itself, but rather they became specialists in management *per se*. Equipped with MBAs, the new management were familiar with the rationalised procedures of management, acquired in the abstract, and ready to be slotted into any organisation that needed a manager. Facilitating this has emerged an ever-extending raft of explicitly codified procedure, knowledge of which has become the core learning of those very same MBAs. They standardise activity, ensuring that any module can be inserted into any applicable role. Thus rationalised procedure has become an indispensable part of the modularised labour system.

In both the cases of manual labour and managerial labour, the rationalisation has been characterised by one central, defining aspect: externalisation. This is an extension of Bernard Stiegler’s (2010) ideas concerning memory. Memory, he contends, is supported by the technics we have developed to externalise it, and hold them without ourselves, which he calls *mnemotechniques*. These have developed from the technics of writing to a *mnemotechnology*—“from individual exteriorizations of memory functions to large-scale technological systems or networks that reorganise memory.” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 67) Stiegler uses the example of the calendar moving from the simple written calendar, which retains the marks to be regurgitated to the author. He compares that to the personal digital assistant, which processes, organises and prompts the author. In both cases, however, the key element is the externalisation of the memory. This development, in Stiegler’s terms, leads to an abduction of memory through its externalisation. This, he argues, gives rise to a lack of knowledge on the part of the individual, and a gain in knowledge by the producers of the *mnemotechnology*. In this way, “[t]he only thing left for us will be the passivity of blind consumption, devoid of knowledge and its rewards. We

will become impotent if not obsolete—so long as knowledge is what empowers humanity.” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 68)⁸

“In what we call industrialization, broadly conceived, is the generalization of a mnemotechnological reproducibility of the motor behaviour of producers” (Stiegler, 2010, p. 68). Here, Stiegler extends the idea of mnemotechnics to industry, much in the same vein as I have already described: due to the production of workplaces (from production lines to databases to every other tool of modern industry) that build the technics of rationalisation—the mnemotechnics that ‘grammatise’⁹ production (Stiegler, 2010, p. 70)—into the fabric of the workplace so that the worker to a far lesser degree has to rely on their own memory and knowledge in order to produce. Stiegler’s argument is that industrial societies grammatised memory.

Here, I formulate this point differently in order to link this with the broader sociology of rationalisation, but draw essentially the same conclusion: industrial society is based on the rationalisation of behaviour, which may be read as the externalisation of judgement, that is, the grammatisation of cognitive processes. *Habitus* is too often seen as the preserve of the mind and body—a kind of internal institutionalisation. Grammatization, on the other hand, in its most potent form, is the attempt to create an imprinted *habitus* in the environment, to create standardised behaviour by creating a standard environment, the negotiation of which leads to common strategic behaviours. The user of Facebook, as with the production-line worker, negotiates a standardised environment (albeit that, for the Facebook user the content differs, itself rationalising the happenstance of social experience into a grammatised algorithm which generates the environment) and so can be attributed with certain behavioural tendencies. In both cases, the environment is one designed to govern behaviour in order for the inhabitant to produce more (whether it be attention, in the case of the Facebook user, or widgets, in the case of the production-line worker). *Habitus* is written, more or less intentionally, into the structure of our surroundings because our histories are negotiations—remembrances of our strategic existence *in the world*. What grammatisation attends to, then, is the attempt to consciously design our internal worlds by the manipulation of our external environment.

⁸ This takes after Plato’s (2005) argument, in *Phaedrus*, where writing is seen as leading people to forsake their own internal memories, and Derrida’s (1981) reading of this passage where the *pharmakon* (being writing) is both good and evil—medicine and poison.

⁹ That is, “the process whereby the currents and continuities shaping our lives become discrete elements.” {Stiegler, 2010, p.70}

This rationalisation affords industrial interests the dual (related) advantages of modularisation and control. In its strong form, the idea of rationalised (grammatised) labour destroys the very notion of a vocation: as technics supplant the need for learned or natural abilities in the workforce, then workers as unique individuals lose their value and become standard units of quantifiable effort. No longer is anyone called to a particular form of work, no longer is anyone gifted or chosen by god—the vocation is dead. This, I understand as part of *the incremental capitalisation of production*. That is to say that—whether in the design of a production-line, the creation of a spinning jenny, or in the use of a team task-manager platform—the externalisation of the productive know-how objectifies this knowledge and skill. In its materialised form, productive skill may be owned and controlled. If one can no longer own human beings in order to be powerful, then one now simply has to own their productive capacity. When rationalising technics increase their scope and reach, the power of the productive ownership is ascending at the expense of the increasingly proletarianised labour force. So, if productive abilities can be owned, then the surplus value generated increases. This makes the rationalisation and grammatisation of production a system that increases the power of the capitalist who owns it and, through modularisation, disempowers the labourer.

In sum thus far: grammatisation is a means of externalising judgement, rationalisation is the consolidation of control for which it works, and the effect is to capitalise productive capacity and centralise control.

In individual cases, grammatisation can be seen as the limitation of risk. If we think about moments of societal crisis and outrage, abuses of power are treated with the balm of procedural reform. Human failing is countered with the removal of agency from the role whose occupant was deemed to be at fault. The response to such outrage is to announce an immediate enquiry which will end with the reflection that ‘lessons have been learned’, that the individual (being the locus of the fault) will face justice, and their position (being the locus of the freedom that allowed them to fail) will be reformed. The ‘reformation of the role’ can be read as the ‘rationalisation of the role’—the restriction of the occupant’s freedom using a codified system of action.¹⁰ That is, the internal and tacit reasons for action are made external and explicit, and

¹⁰ This process of treating failure with the further rationalisation of the role—that is, the petrifying of the role holder’s agency in a cast of grammatised agency—can be seen in prime example in the case of school education. In her study of creativity and standardisation (2015), Katie Olivant’s interviewees indicate that it tends to be at ‘underperforming’ schools that standardisation (read here as ‘rationalisation’) is brought in as a reform measure. It is seen (unjustly, in the experience of the interviewees, that the teachers are scripted and intensively retrained in prescribed formats. “Beth, who had previously taught at a low-performing, ‘program improvement’ school, stated: ‘I would still be at (the low-performing school) if they

the contingent subjectivity of the decision-making process is given a veneer of constancy. Human frailty is thus treated with a prosthetic in the form of the technics of rationalisation. As long as behaviour falls short and modernist logics persist, the technics of rationalisation, inch by inch, rest control over action from the agency of the individual.

However, it is not a complete take-over; we cannot say that ‘there is no part of life that is yet not rationalised.’ In fact, rationalisation—a *pharmakon*—ever contains the workings of non-rationalised activity. Within the bounds of any process, no matter how comprehensively laid out in codified documents and material environments, there will always be a micro-activity of human activity animating it. The technics of rationalisation cannot themselves be action; like the engineering of a waterway, they can only direct the flow, and not themselves provide the gravity, nor the clouds to turn a ditch into a running body of water. It is these micro-fora of non-rationalised activity that rationalisation seeks to reduce and limit, but thereby harness and control.

The agent who is harnessed themselves has an interest in being thus controlled: in procedure and paper trails can be traced an abdication of responsibility where every party may agree that ‘the proper procedure was followed’ and so no individual can themselves be criticised. Criticism can only be directed at the de-humanised, externalised process itself. Thus, by making each a replaceable part with the unique quality of, at most, a fluency in the system, rationalised process alienates action from the humans who commit it. It is at once their action and not their own, and so, in a defensive manoeuvre, each person gives up their agency in return for the sanctuary of procedural bureaucracy. Whilst we are in harness, the buck does not stop here. It is only by improper process that societal sanction (in the form of salary or performance record) is jeopardised, with the process of losing a job (itself a highly rationalised process) being predicated on the proof of a lack of diligent submission to proper procedure.

Grammatised authority is constructed to rule and limit human agency. As Stiegler observes of mnemotechnics, modern industrial history is a story of developing complexity and

hadn't told me I had to teach scripted programs the same as the teacher in the room next door.' [...] She later recounted how she and other teachers from her previous school had been sent to intensive trainings, where they realized: 'There's nobody else here except underperforming schools. [...] We quickly came to the conclusion that we are here because we are dummies and the fact that our school is underperforming is (because) we are hopeless and if we only follow their plan, we will become good teachers and that will affect the students.'" (Olivant, 2015, p.121) Later, the difference between this situation and the situation in that of schools that were assessed as being successful was reflected upon by Olivant: "The teachers in this study—particularly those who previously worked at 'low performing' schools—recognized and appreciated that they have been afforded greater latitude and freedom in implementing their curricula at their school, in part because it is a magnet program, but also because the school's test scores have been satisfactorily high so far." (Olivant, 2015, p.124)

power of grammatised agency—the move from autonomous to automaton. The free-person's rhizome of marionette strings that influence action are replaced with a single solid strut, directing completely the working body. More accurately, in feudal systems where power was attached to the person, the individual was in direct service. Slave or serf, in either case there is no externalisation of judgement, but knowledge of explicit dominion that is the form of control. The penalty for failure was on the body directly at the discretion of the master, but action itself was not rationalised. But proceeding into the capitalist mode, action becomes rationalised: exacting and standardising codes proliferate and direct control—discipline, rather than punishment—is visited on the body (Foucault, 1979). In this way, direct submission—one will to another—is replaced with systems of control that are mediated by grammatised agency.

This ideal typical description (as with all of these employed here) has the hermeneutic purpose of highlighting the quintessence of rationalisation so that grammatisation—the externalisation of human judgment—and the rationalisation (ownership and control) of judgement can be effectively recognised within the mess of social reality.

The need for control over the increasingly objectified productive forces has given rise to a class of technic-engineers, who create, maintain, and manage the technics of rationalised industry. Now, in the digital age, we can even see the emergence of technics which are meant to rationalise the work of this very class: digital project-managers, software for creating spreadsheets, time management programmes, or a proliferation of formal procedure. The next step seems to be for the white-collars—these meta-technical engineers—to be proletarianised, to have their work trivialised by the rationalisation of their judgement, and to be supplanted by rationalising meta-technics. The consolation may be, however, that this may just give rise to a new class of meta-technical engineers.

It is worth making the distinction explicit at this point between rationalisation and rationality. By rationalisation, I am referring to a distinct development in social-technical relations involving the solidifying of behavioural instruction, with all of the implications for dehumanisation and control already outlined. Rationality, on the other hand, refers to the general logic by which judgement is exercised. That is, the cognitive and embodied determinants of action. These two are clearly linked concepts: rationality is that thing, the exercise of which is externalised in the process of societal rationalisation. Rationalisation effectively means that the rational process of the individual is divorced from the specifics of action, instead dealing with the choice between compliance and resistance. These two are easily mixed up not least because Max Weber is a key theorist on both subjects. His typology of social action is fundamentally based on its variable orientation to the efficient attainment of goals (that is, to its rationality).

For Weber, then, the rationality of an action relates to the degree of freedom of the actor from non-goal orientated influences; the less involved the influences of tradition, affect, and absolute values are, the more rational the action: “Action is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends (*zweckrational*) when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed.” (Weber, 1947, p. 118) Rationalisation is a way of the controllers of the means of administration joining up a group’s rationality into a more consistent whole. It does not, however, necessarily apply a particular type of rationality. It is merely a formalisation of institutional pressure and the effect of the prosthesis of grammatisation can be profoundly irrational.

The fundamental conceptual premise of the idea of grammatisation is that externalised judgement is a medium for domineering power relations: it dictates the terms of thought and action, providing an unyielding framework which, whether directly via diktat or indirectly in the terms of legitimacy it lays out, determines what is and is not valid action, rationale, and thought. The ‘author’ of any form of externalised agency is exercising a disciplining (as opposed to punishing) power over the inhabitants of their grammatised world. Grammatization is central to this thesis as a unidirectional disciplining power in which teachers, students, composers, musicians, managers, and all of the other actors concerned play various parts at different moments.

1.2 Art, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Alongside rationalisation, a key formulation that underpins this thesis is the idea of authenticity and autonomy. Authenticity (or the attribution thereof) is a key institutional value which emerged from my fieldwork. For the art music world, it is a means of valuing art as such and of separating itself from that of commercial music. By the recognition of these as polar opposites, a key dimension of the field is constructed. The distinction is one of agency: from whose judgement does the work of art come? In the case of art (as opposed to commercial art), I argue here, the distinctive institutional attachment is to the attribution of authenticity to the moment of creation and to its creator. Due to the relationship between art and its authentic creation, composition is defined as that stage in the musical production process which constitutes (or at least is used to constitute) the work’s relationship to art.

The intention in developing this theory of authenticity through the words of my interviewees is to show the particular relationship of art with the attribution of authenticity.

However, it is not thereby argued that the artist creates something that is in its nature art—and therefore valuable for its authenticity—but that the label of ‘artist’ is a license for those coming into contact with their product —labelled ‘art’—to approach it as something apart from any illegitimate social forces and to there *seek out* the authentic account of creator and moment.

“[W]hat I think you have to do as an artist, [...] is to present yourself naked on stage in front of your audience and give them a really true artistic experience” (Egan, interview).^f This is not a controversial statement amongst composers, indeed, it exemplifies a wide-spread understanding of compositional value. But what is meant here by a “true artistic experience”? During my fieldwork, certain recurrent themes emerged, which begin to give indications as to the highest values that composers have for what they should be and do. The central two values that have emerged can broadly be described as ‘newness’ and ‘honesty’. (There is arguably a place here as well for ‘interest’ (as in Malcomson, 2013), but this is, in a sense, impenetrable; interests is to do with affinity, which, though generated and reproduced by social situations, is nonetheless necessarily to some degree inarticulable.)¹¹ The unification of these two values is found in their mutual connection to the true disclosure of the artwork’s ‘nativity’, which I understand as being the meeting point of the cultural voice and the personal voice. That is, newness and honesty culminate in the disclosure of truth of the times and of the self respectively, which amounts to a disclosure of the circumstances of the work’s creation—its nativity. In this conception, the composition (and, therefore, the composer) is valued for its true, uncorrupted disclosure of the circumstances of its own nativity.

Newness and Honesty

The importance of the idea of newness is, perhaps, hardly surprising. Indeed, it is so ubiquitous that contemporary classical music is commonly called ‘New Music’. The majority of the participants in my study have identified their ideas of what composers should be striving for as creating something new, something that is part of a shift or development in culture:

We're all responsible for playing our part in the stepping stone between the past and the future and otherwise music will never change and it will never move on and we'll

¹¹ In fact, one could theorise that inarticulability is the essential kernel of affinity; for, once it becomes explicit, it becomes rationalised into a utility rather than an affinity relation. Affinity is, therefore, by definition undissected and whole, otherwise it ceases to be a result of free agency and so ceases to be affinity.

be stuck with whatever time that stagnation set in the style of music around then.
(Stanović, interview)

This notion of a ‘paradigm shift’ is reflected too in references made to the idea of being avant-garde:

I think, in terms of radicalism, [...] the way we see it is more institutional. So, we don’t operate under any kind of, at least New Music-y kind of institutions. [...] We’ve been quite disillusioned with the New Music [...] world institutions, partly because we always think that [...] the kind of music that they promote is not very interesting and is not that out there or avant-garde in the traditional sense.¹² (Reuben, interview)

This particular instance is an interesting example of a distinction being drawn between groups that both claim a newness: on the one hand, the New Music establishment—festivals, broadcasters, publishers—which is described here as not being ‘out there’ enough; and on the other, their avant-garde radicalism. This is in line with both Peter Bürger’s (1984) and Richard Murphey’s (1999) views of the avant-garde as distinguished by its awareness of and subversive attitude towards institutions. However, newness as an ideal is central to the values of both strands and, so, is widely valorised in teaching:

When students first come, they often have very prescribed ideas about what composition is, and they do tend to think about it in terms of copying someone else, which is fine, because we all start by copying someone else—you shouldn’t end up by copying yourself, that’s the main issue. (Grange, interview)

This idea of moving on from your own practices and not “copying yourself” brings the newness back to a personal newness, which is intrinsically linked with the second wide-spread value: honesty. Honesty in art is, again, not a surprising value if one considers the common parlance around ‘self-expression’. In academia, too, honesty is expected of researchers: a researcher who is not honest, who misrepresents results or distorts experiments is a bad researcher. However, in the case of the bad researcher, what it is they are being honest about is usually fairly clear in a common correspondence idea of truth. What is a composer being honest or dishonest about? It seems that, consistently, value is attributed to honesty about the

¹² That is, avant-garde referring to a type of action rather than to a specific historical period of art.

composer's self. Honesty is linked to the composer's interest, instinct, or inclination, all of which feature constitute the composer's identity. Identity—or, as it's more commonly put, one's 'voice'—is seen as something the student and young composer has to develop or discover.

I have read so many composer interviews, with composers who have, for want of a better term, found their voice, who say things like, 'yeah, I went through these years of writing a kind of quasi-serial thing, because that's what I was taught at university and that seemed to be the thing to do, and then, one day, I just realised 'why am I doing this? This is not the thing that I care about in the music. Why am I starting with a tone row? I don't even like tone rows.' (McLaughlin, interview)

My view has been that it is very important that you develop a sense of your own compositional voice. [...] I think a compositional voice really is a coherent way of communicating simply that you have a strategy for acting and for practice and that strategy is yours (Stanović, interview)

This constitutes an idea of value in terms of honesty to the particular character of the composer. The value of honesty can be seen in its negative as much as its positive, and composers are keen to decry dishonesty—that is, where other forces come between the composer and their composition giving a "lack of honesty about it all. [...] If you haven't got [honesty], what have you got? Yeah, integrity or whatever you want to call it. Authenticity. If you haven't got that, then you've just got a load of lies." (Grange, interview)

The Cultural and Personal Voices

If we look, then, at these two values, newness and honesty, and ask 'why are these important?' a few key themes emerge. With regard to newness it is to do with generational revolution:

Every generation does this. They come along to a previous paradigm and they destroy it [...] because they can make something better out of it. [...] I do think it's important for composers at least to see what boundaries can they push—that's where the innovation and the research lie: what questions can I ask that haven't been asked before? (McLaughlin, interview)

This inevitability of destructive creation in these revolutionary art movements places the value not simply on *renewal*, but on the *relevance* of that renewal:

[R]enewal just for the sake of it shouldn't necessarily lead to something [...] that is valuable. [...] I do think that renewal in terms of the artist is important, partly because you want to be able to express the concerns and ideas of a particular time and [...] that renewal of forms of expression [...] is important in order to express, basically, the ideas [...] of the cultural moment in which you're working. (Reuben, interview)

In other words, the newness of a composition is valuable because it provides the possibility of relevance, of the disclosure of the cultural moment. This, I term, the cultural voice. That is, the *zeitgeist*—the spirit of the time, the world of the moment. It is the truth of the work to that cultural voice at the point of nativity that is, in part, the source of value in the academic discipline of composition.

With regard to the importance of honesty, this is seen as the way to access the personal voice. In this conception, the personal voice is associated with a genuine, instinctive identity that is not made but discovered:

My feeling is that most people have an innate voice, or [...] something they can identify with. [...] I teach lots of people from all over the world now and it's interesting that they come to you and they are the sort of composer who really wants to write something that organically expands and grows [...] but nobody ever taught them that—that's just how they are—and then you spend like a year with them while they're desperately trying to be like Stravinsky and no piece ever turns out like it [...]. So, I think, you just tell them 'why don't you just be honest with yourself? You can like Stravinsky but not actually end up [...] doing what Stravinsky did.' Because, in a way, I'm like that, [...] it took me a heck of a long time before I could do anything that was approaching the sort of thing that Stravinsky did, because that isn't what I naturally was as a composer. (Grange, interview)

This 'innate voice' is also expressed as intuition:

The best way to compose is just to get excited about something and follow your own intuitive drive by getting into it on your own terms. [...] And then, with any luck, if you're somebody that listens a lot, reads a lot, takes in a lot of social cultural things, then stuff's going to come out that will be kind of interesting and relevant and distinctive. (Edmondès, interview)

This links the cultural voice and the personal voice: honesty combined with a cultural awareness is the best chance of creating something “interesting and relevant and distinctive.” Cultural awareness is an attempt to connect with the cultural voice of the work’s nativity by entering into the cultural ferment of the time and, through unstructured, intuitive engagement—the methodologically “useless” thought of the artist (Arendt, 1958, p. 168)—the cultural voice and the personal voice. Creative disorder, a tapping of free association, and an attempt to remove rational mediation of the personal voice are all part of the compositional method to some degree:

[The way I work] creates as seamless a channel between how you’re dealing with the challenges of being a human in [...] regular life [...] and how that then manifests itself in work. [...] I think the way I operate is this kind of raw engagement with life on as many levels as possible and allowing that to become manifest through pieces of work that are generated through living. (Edmondes, interview)

This particular composer’s music involves a lot of improvisation, but the same kind of notion of the unconscious expression of music is relevant to those working with notated music:

The problem with composers as researchers is that they [...] can’t be [...] entirely aware of what they’re doing because when you compose, you’re not always using the conscious part of your mind. [...] When I’m composing, I’m not really [...] thinking ‘now an E flat.’ One lets go, [...] the unconscious composing sort of takes over [...] and I wouldn’t be able to justify what I do in retrospect. One forgets the thought processes once a piece is finished, at least in my experience. (Keeley, interview)

In Malcolmson’s study too, “It was as if conscious agency had to be suspended to allow space for the transcendent, intuitive self to emerge.” (Malcomson, 2013) This, then, shows honesty as facilitated by a ‘letting go’, a ‘channelling’ of the unconscious, of the instinctual, the innate. The personal and cultural voices, then, are released rather than created: the key is a freedom from constrictions—that is, *autonomy*.

Autonomy and Alienation

The perceived autonomy of a work’s creation—the qualifying attribute for it to be art—constitutes the artwork as the embodiment of the circumstance of its birth-moment—its

nativity. In this conception of nativity, then, we can show a conception of the composer's action that links to truth. It is not that the composition is truthful to any transcendental absolute, or can be evaluated by any observable correspondence, but that the composer is seeking to express truth about the work's nativity. In other words, by adopting an honesty towards their instinct, allowing for free association and a disordered mind, composers are trying in some way to create something which shows something about what it is to be them in that moment: they are trying to disclose their authentic world. In disclosing this world, we see a unification of the ideas of personal and cultural voice, with the art being created by a specific person and in a specific time, culture and place. These are brought together in an excerpt from a composer's reflection on an early piece of theirs:

I wouldn't actually even want to say that now [...]. So, I'm glad I said it then, and I'm glad I said it like that—if people don't like it, well, they don't like it, but it says what it says[. ... I]t does what it does. It's authentic. It's got integrity, I suppose, [...] it's honest.
(Grange, interview)

This picks out the unified importance of the time and the individual's honesty. The value expressed here is not in *what the particular work says*—that is speaks some universal truth—but in that *it was truthful of its nativity*. This idea is perhaps best and most clearly expressed in Alfred Gell's *Art and Agency* (1998). Gell aligns art with a particular set of agencies that create it, which are abducted by the viewers. The art is an extension, Gell concludes, of the artist themselves. This extension of their world is into “the non-mortal home for mortal beings” (Arendt, 1958, p.168).

One composer articulated the extension of the artist's world as disclosed in their artwork with reference to Heidegger's *The Origin of the Work of Art*:

In the moment of encountering this artwork, you have understood someone else's world. And I totally buy it, I should say. [...] In general, I go, 'yeah, art is sort of world-disclosing, that's what I encounter [with] really great art. And it's world-disclosing to the extent that when I stop encountering it, my world is different because I understand the world to be different from what I thought it was. And that happens if it's art. [...] But if that's the case, then art is doing philosophical work, I would argue. It's doing things that are to do with metaphysics, to do with ontology, and it's capable of revealing truths about the world. (Iddon, interview)

However, one issue with this idea is that composition, in the respect of disclosing the agency of its creation, is not essentially different from any other thing. All objects are created, and so can disclose their nativity. Gell himself explicitly refuses to define art and extends his theory, for example, to land-mines. What is of particular value about the act of creating an artwork in this theory of art? The importance of the composer as an artist, in this conception, it is the legitimacy of the parents to which the artwork is truthful which gives it its value. Whereas non-art is *seen* as being mediated by social, cultural, political interests that are under suspicion of dishonesty, art (in its idealised form) is seen as embodying what is attributed as being a disinterested and honest account of maker and world. The importance of the unmediated and un-compromising disclosure of the nativity can be seen in its negative, in the fear of compromise and mediation (which is further explored in Chapter Three).

The extent to which an artwork is valuable, or indeed is art, is the extent to which it is un-mediated by utility, and so un-compromisingly truthful to its nativity. In other words, the artist must be attributed the quality of autonomy. Otherwise, alienation of the artwork from its legitimate nativity has a real impact on the work's value. Renato Poggioli described alienation as "the professional malady of the artist and writer" (1968), but he was referencing the social alienation of the avant-garde, a social alienation that comes from a dogged insistence on not becoming alienated from the artwork—on not 'selling out'. Karl Marx (2005) describes how objectified labour leads to alienation from the product (in this case the composition). If the worker's (here, 'composer's') product "does not belong to his intrinsic nature" (the innate identity of the personal voice) then he not only "does not develop freely his physical and mental energy" but also becomes alienated from the product and the act of production and "when he is working, he feels outside himself." (Marx, 2005, p. 274) In this case, it is straightforward to see that if a composer is unable to 'feel themselves' or that their compositions do not belong to their 'intrinsic nature', then the objective of disclosing the nativity is unattainable and the authority of its aura lost. Academic composers seek to avoid alienation from the products of their labour, which would involve a distortion or mediation of the moment of nativity by other concerns and interests—a dishonesty about the moment of genesis.

This unease with mediating forces is not confined to commercialism alone, but applies, too, to the pressures of the university:

It's very difficult for me, these days, to separate out research imperatives from composition, as in, if I wasn't in a university, so I apologise for describing this almost in the language of university research imperatives, but that shouldn't also be read as

any kind of careerist [thing. ...] I compose because I'm absolutely fascinated by it and can't stop thinking about it. It is what I think about twenty-four seven, for better or worse. (McLaughlin, interview)

Here, a researcher is apologising for sounding like they are *trying* to describe their work in terms of research, such is the prevalence of the idea of that as mediating and alienating the composer from the nativity. The nativity is all and those who accept mediation in any form forgo the value of their work.

The value placed on the newness and honesty of a composition leads us to this idea of nativity as the truth of the moment of origin—the value being in the interconnected objectives of honesty and relevance. In other words, the composer is composing in a time, at a place and in a culture that form who they genuinely are, and so the objective is to represent as truly and unmediatedly as possible who they are in that moment to capture the truth of the author's world in the moment.

1.3 Conclusion

The systematisation of the university (see Anderson, 1992; Shattock, 1996) involves the institutionalisation of the charismatic authority of academics. However, the institution finds the core values of that charisma—its autonomy—to not be graspable by rationalised administrative measures. How is the institution to measure the compositional truth—its correspondence to nativity—in terms of its significance or impact? Such measures can carry with them the attribution of illegitimacy of concerns with audience approval or the rationalisation of research questions. How can the composition's truth to their intuitive voice be peer-reviewed or valued in a rationalised organisation?

Now, perhaps the reader's response might be that the university is wrong in its priorities, or perhaps that the composers are wrong in theirs. I am not presenting a view one way of the other here—both are institutionally contingent value systems. Rather, I want to problematise this gap between the rationalised institution and the composer's intention as an alienating conflict of artist and institution.

The body of this thesis is therefore concerned with two questions: 'aside from resignation, compromise and dishonesty, how can the Composer fall in line with the rationalised university system?' and 'aside from rejection or domination, how can the University accommodate this

artistic system of value?' The former will be dealt with in *Part 2: Rationalising Composition*, and the latter in *Part 3: De-Rationalising the University*.

Certainly, however, no matter how many times it looks, it is hard to imagine that the beady Bureaucratic Eye will be able to perceive the nativity; perhaps only the disordered mind, the fool, the Dadaist can see it there, presenting itself naked on stage.

Chapter 2: Outlining the Field

2.1 *The Constitution of the Field*

SOCIAL GROUPING OF COMPOSERS in Universities in England has a flat structure and often little to bind actors together between organisations. As a result, the field is larger than often supposed by composers in conversation with me, whose awareness of its extent is based on direct personal relationships and some key forums (the Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival, for instance). The number of profiles recorded in the survey that were classified as composers working in universities in England was 258 (excluding professors emeritus). Within this, the total number of professors was 63, or 24 percent. This is a comparatively high proportion of a field to hold chairs (that is, the title ‘professor’)—the overall percentage of academics holding chairs is just under 10 percent. This disproportionate number of professors may be a matter of scale as departments seek represent all sub-disciplines at a senior level, but have a high ratio of sub-disciplines to staff.

Another striking feature is the gender balance of the field. The gender balance of composition has been a topic of much debate over recent years, appearing alongside efforts to provide a more balanced representation of female composers in performances and syllabuses. Recent research (D. Bennett et al., 2019; D. Bennett et al., 2018; Macarthur, 2010, 2014), symposia, and journalistic publications (for instance Ross, 2013; Tsioulcas, 2013) have all been concerned with the imbalance between the number of men and women in certain roles in classical music; of particular concern are the roles of conductor and composer. The consistent gender imbalance in the wider classical music industry is reflected in the number of male and female composers (ascertained here by the pronouns used in profiles) employed in academia. 34 female composer-academics (in all positions, including emeritus professors) were found in the survey—just 11.7 percent. Academia, too, has well-documented gender imbalance. However, the overall percentage of women on an academic contract during the same year (2017-18) was 45.9, making the case of composer-academics vastly more male-heavy than is typical across academia.¹³

¹³ Figures for UK higher education are from the UK Higher Education Statistical Agency (2019)

The breakdown of contract levels shows a disparity in gender balance that is hidden in the overall figure for all academic contracts.¹⁴ This is clearly seen by looking at the power and security of contracts: in the most secure, powerful positions—permanent, salaried, and full-time—women are under-represented, with only 43.4 percent of women in academia holding such positions, compared to 63.4 percent of men. On the other end of the spectrum, the least secure and least powerful positions are disproportionately occupied by women: 40.6 percent of women are on part-time contracts, compared to 28.1 percent of men, and 2.2 percent of women are on zero hours contracts, compared to 1.7 percent of men. These positions are less powerful in academic decision-making, less prestigious, less secure, and less well-paid.

This general tendency may account for some of the vast gap between the number of female composers recorded in the data collected here and the HESA data; the publication of online profiles may omit temporary, or casual workers, meaning that the role of female composers might be under-represented in the figure of 11.7 percent. However, a clearer comparison can be made by looking at the occupation of senior academic positions. The most striking demonstration of the unusually disproportionate male-population of the more powerful seats of academia in composition is the fact that, whilst just 25.5% of all professors in 2018/19 were women, in composition this it was just four percent.¹⁵ Figure 1 illustrates this difference between composition and academia as a whole.¹⁶

¹⁴ The following uses figures for the academic year 2018-19 (HESA, 2019)

¹⁵ Although the survey conducted did not have access to the contractual conditions of employment that the HESA data gathering does, it could take account of job titles.

¹⁶ In comparing the two measures, it must be born in mind that HESA covers the UK as a whole, whereas this project's survey covers only universities in England, and that they also necessarily use very different data collection techniques. The comparison must, therefore, be taken as indicative rather than conclusive.




Figure 1. Percent of professors by gender

The ethnic make-up of the field is, in any quantifiable way, not something that the method of data collection employed allowed for. In UK higher education as a whole, in 2018/19, 83.2 percent of academics were white, 2.1 percent black, 10.2 percent Asian, and 2.3 percent mixed and 2.3 percent of other ethnicities. In comparison to this (and going purely on my impression of the field based on direct interview encounters), composition is to a far greater degree than academia as a whole populated by white Europeans (especially those from the British Isles) and North Americans. In terms of demographics, then (those of gender and ethnicity at least) the impression is of a field which is populated, to a greater degree than academia at large, by white men.

Perceptions of the Field

Within the broad field, individual organisations represent a variety of nuanced cells. I recorded 56 universities that employed composers. The average number of composers in each of these universities was just over five, with the most recorded being 14. Of these composers, 64 were professors, with composer-employing universities ranging from having no composition professors to having five. In one interview, the interviewee spoke of the surprise of colleagues at a department containing six composers (Edmondson, interview). How much greater the surprise, then, to be confronted with a department containing 14?

However, this highlights a quirk of the field ‘as perceived’ and the field ‘as documented’: the perceived number of composers in a department tends towards underestimation, just as the perception of the field’s total population tends also towards underestimation. In the same interview just referenced, the participant says that their own department contains “two and a half” composers, whereas the survey recorded five. This is not a problem with data collection, nor with the numeracy of the participant, but with questions of definition and perception of membership. Whilst a university will publish staff profiles on a contractual basis—that is, anyone who is employed on an academic contract—perception of membership of the field is far more restrictive. In the case just mentioned, the interviewee was not even counting themselves in the figure, despite having a PhD in composition and unquestionably qualifying as a composer in the terms of this study. Perceived membership of the field is influenced by presence within the organisation, the primacy of composition in one’s practice, and the genre-recognition of compositional work, with ‘notating composers’ being the most universally recognised and legitimate actors.

Interviewees often identified individuals as composers when they were full-time, and academically established. Even a number of very well established composers who undertake or otherwise have undertaken part-time academic work, were often recognised as being outside academia because it wasn’t recognised sufficiently as part of their identity. The membership of the academic field is predicated in general on a degree of engagement with the business of universities.

Whilst this partly contributes to the apparent disparity between the perception of the presence of composition in music-academia and the survey results outlined here, there is also an element (already mentioned) of the specific identification of the category of ‘composer’. For want of a better term, this project has used the term ‘composer’ throughout, including during the fieldwork. The particular politics and history surrounding the word, therefore, are

intertwined with the results. Those overlooked as composers, therefore, could be those whose practice also involves the performance of their work, resulting in the confusion of the classification categories, diverting the focus from the act of composition to the (more visible) act of performance. This is compounded in cases where the individual is working in a musical world that is not descended from the traditional practices and canonical composers of Western art music. In the worlds of jazz, popular, and folk music, composing is much more commonly not taken on by a separate musician to the performance—the division of artistic labour (except, perhaps, in the most industrialised sections of the popular music industry) is not a core mechanic of these art worlds. This means that those academics who are primarily involved with these areas are less likely to be acknowledged as composers by themselves and others even when they fit the categories of this survey. For these reasons, the present study recognises a far higher number of composers in academia in England than would be recognised by those same composers themselves.

2.2 Negotiating Self-Definition: composers describing themselves

The second way of classifying musical worlds is through a key question in the interviews; I opened the questions in most interviews by asking the composer to describe their music.¹⁷ In many cases, then, there is a clear self-classification of participants' own music, its style and association with other music as well as the features they feel define it. This question also sought to probe the degree to which different composers were willing and able to describe their own music in words. The question was sparked by an experience in the pilot fieldwork where a composer, on being asked this question, would not give an answer except to say that I should go and listen to it. My interest in grammatisation in this project led me to wonder to what degree composers were willing and felt able to articulate their musical work verbally, given the pressure to write in such a way that is occasioned by grant applications, programme notes, and academic publication. Although many composers found it difficult and often unwelcome to be asked to

¹⁷ This question was not always worded identically, and was not used at the start of every interview. Variations on this question were used in instances where the variety of a composer's practice made describing their 'music' an unduly narrow question (in such instances I often substituted the terms 'practice' or 'musical practice' for 'music') or where the initial relationship with the interviewee required a less potentially abrupt feeling to start the interview. The total omission of this question only occurred eight times out of the 65 interviews. For the sake of not artificially excluding those composing with less standard methods, in the following discussion all variations on the wording of the question are included.

describe their work, the flat-out refusal to engage with the question altogether was not replicated.¹⁸ Some responses showed a weariness towards the question, reflecting both the difficulties in answering it and its frequency as an offhand conversational question: [with irony] “nice easy starter for ten.” (Anon_33, interview); “that’s a question that composers always hate, and they prefer people to simply listen to the music.” (Inglis, interview); “Well I mean that’s the question that people do ask and it’s incredibly difficult, I find, to come up with a sensible answer” (Fox, interview); “That’s a very difficult one, isn’t it? That’s the party one: what’s your music like?” (Nicholson, interview);

[If I were asked to describe my music] I would groan. I have various ways of answering this and it depends who’s asking. When [...] a member of the public on the bus [...says] what do you do? And I say oh, I work in a university and they say ‘ what do you do in the university?’ and I say ‘music’ and they say ‘oh, what do you play?’ and I say ‘ I don’t really play anything to any kind of great standard, but I’m a composer,’ and then they say ‘ oh, right, what kind of music do you write?’ So [...] when I know the person will have absolutely no idea what I mean if I say ‘avant-garde concert music,’ I say ‘well it’s modern classical music which is performed in concert halls and [...] you probably won’t have heard any of it on the radio’ and leave it at that. So, the description is something like that. (Marsh, interview)

Others reacted by immediately acknowledging the difficulties of answering the question: “I suppose that’s always a complicated question, right?” (Anon_39, interview); “goodness that’s a very broad question to start with.” (Anon_23, interview); or “that’s one of those questions that composers are asked a lot and that they get better at answering but still fail to do well enough.” (Egan, interview).

This common response highlights a critical point for this section: definition of musical self-identity is not easy for composers, and throws up two key problems for them. Firstly, there is the implication of pastiche. A composer’s voice—their authenticity—is vital to the artistic value of their work. Naming influences as a means of describing one’s work, however, can carry with it the implication of pastiche—that the work is in some way derivative. One composer, in

¹⁸ The omission of this question in cases where the initial interaction with the composer seemed to be in some way adversarial possibly in part accounts for the non replication of this result. This was done so as to not close down the rest of the interview by means of this potentially challenging opening, but may well have excluded those participants from this question who were most likely to refuse to answer this question.

answering this question, illustrated this point by clarifying the non-equivalence of their work to the work of an influence:

I don't necessarily think it's the right approach, but the immediate gut instinct is to start to refer to other people, partly because the likelihood is that you'll know who they are [...] but that's maybe not the most useful starting point. [...] No-one knew who Helmut Lachenmann was when I was a student, for example. Not that I'm using him as, again, [...] an alternative to my music or equivalent (Anon_40, interview)

This illustrates not only the explicit distancing from having too close an influence from another composer, but also the fact that influences, when they were invoked, were usually framed as being formative in the past. Very little was said about who influenced the composer in the present, but other composers were frequently brought up as being important in their past formative years. In particular, it seemed to be legitimate to associate other composers as extremely strong influences during the composer's time as a student. For example:

[I got into] Takemitsu—here's my brace of Takemitsu pieces—and then I really got into Mahler and suddenly I was writing Mahler a hundred years too late, and we all do that. I can point you back to my spectral pieces that are so Grisey it hurts. I can point you back to my Ligeti pieces that are so Ligeti it hurts [...] or my Sciarrino pieces that are so Sciarrino [...] it hurts, because that's what you do as a young composer. (McLaughlin, interview)

A distance is thereby created between influences and the work itself. Influences are presented as a means of discovering one's voice, rather than the voice being a product of influences. This, I see as an avoidance of the imputation of pastiche, and something which is problematic for the composer's description of their own work: how does one describe something musical without recourse to aligning (or at least comparing) it with other music?

The second problem for the composer describing their own work is the avoidance of pigeonholing. For many composers, the association of their identity with a single style is not desirable. It is seen as useful in terms of becoming known, but a weight on their artistic freedom; as one composer put it, "you don't want to paint yourself into a corner." (Anon_10, interview) This is reflected in the responses to my opening question, with composers highlighting their difficulty and reluctance to identify absolutely with a particular bounded style given that their work is changing and perhaps does not fit easily into a certain camp: "I think it's a particularly

difficult question for me because I don't think that I fall into a particular stylistic camp, as it were." (Anon_40, interview); "I mean I never know how it's going to turn out until the project in question emerges." (Watts, interview); "to some people that might be a nice ice breaker. For me that's a little challenging because I do lots of different sorts of music including music under aliases that I pretend isn't really my music at all." (Collins, interview); "I mean it changes from piece to piece. [...] I think it is really important to change to evolve. [...] Just to keep yourself awake and keep things interesting lively." (R. Whalley, interview); or

This is obviously something I think about a lot and I feel like it's something that's almost constantly in flux. So every time I come into some way of even thinking about it never-mind articulating it, it's almost inevitably quite quickly open to change.
(Anon_33, interview)

This is also to do with the sheer range of activity undertaken by many composers, as they take on different roles as improvisers, facilitators, visual artists, technologists, and inventors all within the remit of their practice as composers. So it is perhaps to some degree unsurprising that composers often had difficulty summarising the range of their activity. However, this problem does extend beyond that into a concern not to stop developing nor settle in a clearly defined boundary.

Understanding how composers did describe their work starts to open up avenues with which to understand the field as a whole. The responses were based on two main approaches: productive (means) and conceptual (genesis). The first of these refers to the particular productive means for which their work was intended (the performers and performance situation in particular), and the second to the extra-musical ideas that inspired or otherwise contributed to the production of work. Genre identifiers (classical, for example) were occasionally used in the abstract, and so could also be considered part of the description of their work, however they were usually qualified by reference to productive or conceptual aspects. This may have been down to the wording of the question, with 'describe' inviting a specific identification of the features that give the music its identity, which was indeed the intention behind the question.

Description in Terms of Means

A primarily productive-related description was the most common form of response. For instrumental composers this meant going down the route of describing the instruments required to perform their music. For those involved in creating music for and using electronics, this meant describing the hardware and software tools involved in doing that. This has, in some cases, quite an explicit function as a coded genre-identifier, or rather as a coded identification with a lineage. Composers referred to the history of the use of the material means of their music's production, which identifies them with a history of musical production: "[my music] falls within the ambit of what people call classical music and particularly in that it's mostly conceived for the instrumental resources of the last 400-500 years of European art music." (Fox, interview) Here, the explicit identification is with the material forces without describing what is done with those forces. However, by invoking an association with "the last 400-500 years of European art music", the composer allows certain associations to be made without explicitly endorsing them. This composer immediately went on to make this distanced association with this lineage more explicit:

[T]he work is to a certain extent progressive in that it takes as its points of reference [...] European art music, [which] has been in this state of continuous evolution for centuries and centuries, and I'm trying to [...] carry on that evolution. So I'm not interested in a sort of musical nostalgia or [being] neo-anything. (Fox, interview)

This lineage was evident too in other descriptors of the means employed in making their music, for instance in a reference to "notes on a page composition" (Turowski, interview) or in contrasting their current practice with the mainstream from which they felt they had departed: "I mean I started out as a sort of normal composer [laughs] [...], writing for instrumental forces and most of my education was actually in writing for instrumental forces" (Reuben, interview).

Similarly, when the resources are electronic, there is an implicit association of a genealogy of composition, in particular in the area of acousmatic music, which now has a sufficient weight of history at its back for a reference to a lineage to be meaningful:

[My music is] acousmatic primarily, which means it's composed specifically for loudspeakers, to exploit the situation which occurs when you present sound over loudspeakers. So this is a tradition going back really to the [...] late 1940s, 1950s, where composers started realising that if you record sound then you take it away from the

sound producing source—object, person whatever it may be—[and that] by presenting it over the loudspeakers you in a sense then conceal that source. (Stanović, interview)

Here, then, the definition of the music is inextricable from the material circumstances of its production: loudspeakers are the essential classifier of the field. It is specifically the removal of sound from its origin that makes the performance experience one of near unlimited possibility. It was characterised by a disengagement of expectation. However, again, the purely material description is also the locus of an association with a lineage deriving from the development of acousmatic music, electroacoustic music, and *musique concrète*. In this way, the association with a particular sound was made more often in a tacit way by euphemistically stating the indisputable fact of the material requirements of music's composition and realisation.

This theorisation of the tacit invocation of an association with genre and tradition is less evident in the responses of composers engaged in a newer forms of electronic music:

I'm best known for things pertaining to electronic music particularly computer music. I often do algorithmic composition, so I write computer programs to write the music for me (Collins, interview)

Here there is no hint of reference to a lineage. There is, however, an appeal to a 'scene': "I've been associated with a movement called live coding" (Collins, interview) In a newer field such as this one, one might suggest that 'scene'—musical activity pre-canonisation—could take the place in terms of identifier of genealogy in older fields, potentially suggesting the addition of a pre-traditional stage to Shelemay's (2011) tripartite model of musical communities—a community of joint adventure.

This aspect of appealing to means as a way to tacitly signal to musical referents can also be linked to the performance conditions—that is, to the method of production. In computer music, the link (and indeed blurred boundary) between material and procedural means is illustrated in this description: "I think at least half of my pieces involve computers in various ways including [...] music AI, some of it's machine listening and interacting electronics, so some of it is [...] fairly sophisticated computing." (Anon_60, interview) Whilst, again, computer music is difficult to see as linked to a heritage, this can be seen much more clearly in descriptions of performance process in acoustic music. In particular, some composers referred to the degree of predefinition in the performance process, identifying for example with or in contrast to the field of free improvisation. This particular category disguises in the indisputable identification of its

method of production (that is, a free, unconstrained, non-hierarchical approach) a particular kind of sound:

[T]he more you look at it actually the less free you realise it is because you are free to make any sound but you're not free to suddenly start playing a C major to A minor riff because that's not free—that's set. [...] So it's free providing you don't fall into any of these tropes or traps. [...] And usually like all these things [it] starts really quiet and it builds up, becomes more and more chaotic, somebody will start a pulse and then that will disintegrate and it will finish quiet. You can predict it really. (Best, interview)

[A] lot of the times when they say free improvisation you really have to exclude the recognisable melodies and recognisable chord progressions and recognisable rhythm. But I do include that kind of thing so I can't really [say I do] free improvisation (Hara Cawkwell, interview)

In this way, even the most formally unconstrained musical practice—defined by being “non-idiomatic” (cf. Dominic, 2011; Gavin Bryars, quoted in Sansom, 2001)—alludes to a certain sound, thereby euphemistically linking productive method with aesthetic. References to the manner in which musicians perform stands in place of a declaration of stylistic fealty and as more or less tacit referents to a musical heritage. Thus, composers are able to describe their music without recourse to direct comparison to the music of others and thus the imputation of pastiche. The role of this type of description is illustrated in the comments of a composer who very succinctly summarised a variety of musical practices through the means of their production in explicit association with genre (lineage) labels:

I've been involved [...] in making [...] music that's purely electronic [...] coming out of a kind of acousmatic tradition; I've been involved in making music that is purely instrumental to some extent [...] related to a late modernist tradition [...] and] I've been involved in other things like bands and more now kind of singer-songwriter kind of stuff and playing guitar in a sort of folky popular music style. (Harker, interview)

Description in Terms of Concept

The focus of responses on the conceptual aspect of composition was less common, but featured nonetheless in the strategic negotiation of the challenge posed by the question. In some

composers' use of conceptual descriptors, there was less clear idiomatic reference. For example, one composer was interested "in musical temporality." (Anon_57, interview) Time and memory are indisputably part of every musical experience, meaning that explicitly the description is not linked to any particular sound or idiom. The sounding result of the work is, therefore, not pinned down (and direct musical referents are thus entirely avoided).

In other cases, however, composers highlighted the conceptual basis for their compositions, in the process referring quite explicitly to a musical canon:

[Mine is] music that engages very directly with music history, and specifically Western classical music. I'm currently working on a series of paraphrases of [four works of canonic Nineteenth Century piano music] and the idea of engaging in a dialogue with music of the Western Canon is something that's always going on more or less overtly. (Anon_31, interview)

This dialogue is the conceptual background to the work, but relates explicitly to the music from which it draws. This composer was, in fact, a rare exception to the tendency for composers to avoid direct reference to other composers in describing their music. Immediately preceding this quote, their opening description named four composers considered to be most influential to, and thus the best descriptors for, their work. This composer can perhaps be understood as being more at ease with openly accepting canonical music history than many others.

In more subtle, euphemistic ways, too, the allusion to musical referents came into the use of conceptual description. In one instance, the idea of a cycle was given great importance in the description of the composer's work. In this instance, the identification of cycles invoked a meta-conceptual—that is, which spans genres—of their composition to identify and distinguish their work. Again, this is formally non-sounding as, in theory, any music could be arranged into groups called cycles. However, the term cycle is most commonly and prestigiously used in the Western classical canon, hinting towards a larger world of musical referents.

However, in the main, the conceptual approach to describing music is much less clearly entangled in a particular historical practice. This being said, all of the composers falling into this category would also be at home (looking at the instrumentation of their works rather than their statements on concept) in the classical world. It might be theorised, therefore, that being in this prestigious categorisation allows and perhaps encourages the invocation of neutral descriptors that are not related to idiom, it being assumed already that that is the canon they are related to.

Description in Terms of Reception

It is worth noting that musical practice was very rarely described in terms of reception—who their audience would be and what they hoped the effect on them might be. The exception would be the common practice of describing the concert situation, in particular the idea of writing ‘concert hall music’. I would argue that, again, this carries with it a euphemistic referral to a musical tradition, an organisational framework, and an audience without the composers having to explicitly tie themselves to any of these.

The Associations of Art Worlds

As described here, composers primarily used the means of music’s production to classify their work within a particular art world. The collectivity of artistic production (Becker, 2008) offers a means of defining art worlds socially: “[t]o analyse an art world we look for its characteristic kinds of workers and the bundle of tasks each one does.” (Becker, 2008, p. 9). The product of the artistic process may be societally significant, but it is only so to the extent that the producers themselves are placed to invent and institutionalise the signifiers of their own legitimacy:

[W]ho is the true producer of the value of the work—the painter or the dealer, the writer or the publisher, the playwright or the theatre manager? The ideology of creation, which makes the author the first and last source of the value of his work, conceals the fact that the cultural businessman (art dealer, publisher, etc.) is at one and the same time the person who exploits the labour of the ‘creator’ by trading in the ‘sacred’ and the person who, by putting it on the market, by exhibiting, publishing or staging it, consecrates a product which he has ‘discovered’ and which would otherwise remain a mere natural resource; and the more consecrated he personally is, the more strongly he consecrates the work. (Bourdieu & Nice, 1980, p. 263)

If, rather than the agents, ‘exhibitors’, ‘publishers’, and ‘producers’, one substitutes here ‘performers’, ‘musical directors’, and ‘record labels’, then this gives an idea of why the productive environment is so important to the definition of the musical fields studied here. Their field is socially constituted, as is the value of their work. An effective means of categorisation (without recourse to aesthetic judgement) is, therefore, based on the means of its production (including

the means of its value production). Given the use of production forces as a stand-in for a wider art world, genre, and influential lineage also gives a way into the interlocking mechanisms of legitimisation that fuel these art worlds.

However, not all compositions may be judged purely based on the legitimacy of their productive means. Prestige of this sort may only be thought to work at a general level. It is not to imply that every composer is simply judged on the basis of its institutional endorsements and performance forces. The productive forces must, therefore, be further distinguished into more nuanced categories.

2.3 Describing Composers

Understanding and dividing these composers brings up the crucial ideas of genre, musical style, and artistic influence. However, it also raises issues around the method of forming such analytical distinctions. For Ruth Finnegan (1989), for instance, categories are formed by a separation by space and social gathering; the musicians she studies meet at certain times for rehearsals, concerts, and other musical-social events. Here, however, it is not so easy; universities houses numerous composers who, though gathering together under one roof, do not do so in order to make music with their colleagues; each is an individual who may voluntarily enter into collaboration, but is not there in order to do so. Their musical activities may, in fact, be directly unrelated to the society of the university. Equally, Yara El-Ghadban's description of contemporary music in terms of its transmission "through Western or Western-structured music institutions (conservatories, music faculties, and music research and experimentation centres)" (El-Ghadban, 2009, pp. 157, footnote 152) does not provide finer distinction here, given that the field as a whole is constituted along these lines. In defining a field, different categories from different social dimensions may usefully intersect; El-Ghadban brings the organisational categories into her artistic field. Here, I do the reverse, intersecting artistic with the organisational categories that define the field. My interest in this chapter is with gaining purchase on the diversity and homogeneity of the field.

Academia has an interest in fostering diversity in musical practice. When asked about what they would look for in a new colleague, the most common answer was to highlight a current gap in the range of musical styles exhibited in the department and to seek someone to fill any gaps. But to what extent is pluralism truly acted upon? Explicitly, the composers

interviewed worked without a sense of aesthetic taboo (cf. Born, 1995, p. 21). However, in reality the symbols of legitimate culture are laid out in allusion and euphemism.

The intention of this work is not to form any kind of analysis or typology of music *per se*. The kinds of sound made in the realisation of composers' works are not the object of study here except in so far as they are seen through the 'folk' categories of genre (for example). In as far as possible this involves shying away from the analytical categorisation of music; I do not seek to categorise (and defend the categorisation) of this or that music as an object of study. Rather, I seek to portray the subjective relations performed in musical judgements. That is not to say that these subjective relations do not give rise to objective relations between actors, but the focus on subjective judgements is intended to highlight categories of distinction through the eyes of those who are responsible for distinction within the field.

This all means that seemingly disparate forms of music may be at times grouped together if, in the views of the actors, they are associated. Much of the time, however, the kinship will likely not vastly diverge from the aesthetic judgements that the reader would also make. In these instances, though, this should not be mistaken for an objective aesthetic analysis; the endeavour throughout is to categorise music by either folk-ontology (for instance, being part of a particular school), or by objective societal position (for example, as originating in a particular institution or being created using a particular productive milieu).

This research gives two key ways in which we can understand and classify musical worlds without recourse to a judgement of the sound. The first is some limited use of metrics designed to give an impression of the relationships that composers have to other composers. The key metric here was a count of how many unique mentions (that is, only counting the first mention by each participant) of composers' names there are in the interviews. Similarly to the general approach of this project, 'composers' here is interpreted broadly as any individual or group whose notoriety is in large part derived from their creation of new music (as opposed to the interpretation of music the creation of which is attributed to others).

Establishing Parameters

The best way to understand the broad categories of music in this field is three semi-independent binary poles: acoustic instruments or electronics (the latter of which is further divided by being performed live or being pre-prepared audio), composer-controlled (pre-planned) or performer controlled (improvisatory), and art music or commercial music. Each

represents an axis along which varying degrees of hybrid—mixed practices, compromise, and innovation—may take place.

The last of these dichotomies is the most troublesome to define. However, it is one of the primary folk and organisational categories in the field, and so is worth including here to allow an understanding of this distinction when it is made. It refers to the wider community of performers, audiences, and cultural intermediaries but, once again, also stands in as a referent for a musical lineage to which its sounding result is related.¹⁹ ‘Art’ is of course not a simple category to define, and this is a specific use of this classification based on this field. Notionally the art/commercial dichotomy refers to the social relations involved in its production, something which is central to Booth and Kuhn’s (1990) redrawing of definition along the lines of economy and transmission. This differential in means of production (and the relative importance of cultural and economic capital) is a distinction which Bourdieu draws on repeatedly, referring to ‘left bank’ and ‘right bank’ (in relation to culture in Paris, divided by the Seine) or, even less euphemistically, bourgeois and avant-garde: “[t]he opposition between commercial and non-commercial [...] is the generative principle of most of the judgments which, in the theatre, cinema, painting or literature, claim to establish the frontier between what is and what is not art” (Bourdieu & Nice, 1980, p. 268). ‘Art’ (as opposed to ‘commercial’) refers to an attributed autonomy with which the composer’s work is created. This autonomy is linked, as has been explored already, with the idea of authenticity. This is elucidated in better terms by Bourdieu’s idea of the field of restricted cultural production. Cultural production—here the composition of music—emerged as a field with a professionalisation of the artist as a class in themselves, Bourdieu contends, giving rise to “conditions favourable to the construction of ‘pure’ theories” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 114). That is to say, it gave rise to a valorisation of *l’art pour l’art*, “irreducible to simple material possession” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 114). In this respect, Bourdieu’s division between restricted and large-scale cultural production is the degree of perceived intervention by the mass market over the values and standards of distinction of the artist’s ‘pure theory’—that is, the degree of autonomy.

The terms ‘art’ and ‘commercial’ are, similarly, associated here with the social relations of the art work: who is legitimately able to intervene in the artwork’s creation? Commercial music, it is implied, is the composer’s work, but it is mediated more or less directly by the appeal to a

¹⁹ For a reader wishing to get a better idea of the sounds which these composers create than the sociological perspective I use here, I can only (and admittedly hypocritically, given the attempt here to get composers to describe their music) advise listening to it.

popular market. Art music, on the other hand, refers to a perceived autonomy from economic concerns—a field of restricted cultural production made possible by patronage (Booth & Kuhn, 1990) (a trait which is also superimposed on the history of high art). One composer, who very explicitly highlighted this dichotomy in their different areas of work outlined this distinction in terms of autonomy:

[I class my work as commercial music] if I'm being paid to do it and I wouldn't have done it otherwise [...] for example I publish library music, which gets synced to TV and for that I'm given a brief—I have to create pastiche or I have to create mood music. [...] The distinction is] really about interrogating the process because that could be art making because [I] could be totally behind it [...] but more often than not I find that when I've been given a brief and there's a client involved and money is changing hands, my perspective on the process changes and I can disengage my own sort of aesthetic concerns and it becomes more of a craft—like, I'm [just] making some moody piano music for a sad dog on Supervet or whatever it is. (Anon_10, interview)

The art/commercial axis, then, is in large part to do with the attributed external control over the product, and in particular that control which is driven by market interests. However, the distinction also comes with the association with genre and social divides. This is linked to the perceived dominant ideologies of different art worlds; namely, that which has emerged from the lineage of the (largely European) classical canon is seen as being aloof from economic concerns, whereas those deriving from popular music, emerging from the mass marketisation of the mid-twentieth century in North America can be seen as inherently market driven. The intervention of the market, then, need not be direct, but can also be attributed by a general prejudicial genre-association. In expressing a perceived widespread (within the field) dismissal of popular music as trivial, one composer sought to highlight the facets of its practice which are not directed towards the market:

they have no idea that since at least the end of the 60s, rock and roll and pop music has developed a whole set of substructures of underground DIY intellectual music cultures and artists [...] It occurred to me [...] quite early on that [...] pop music is now full of people who [...] are that clever they are that intellectual, they are that serious, they are that heavyweight basically. [...] And] that's something that my colleagues still don't even begin to entertain let alone understand. (Edmondes, interview)

The ‘underground’, the ‘DIY intellectual’ can be understood as standing for a certain distance from commercialised interests, and particularly from large scale corporations and mass markets. The association is present in the field between a pop aesthetic and a set of institutional values in which the composer’s work is mediated by appeal to the mass market or its cultural intermediaries—it is not engaged with a realm of ‘pure theory’. This quote can be seen as an attempt to ‘artify’ (to borrow a term from Keegan-Phipps, 2009) practices by co-opting the terms of legitimacy reserved by others for artistic production emerging from European classical music—heavyweight, serious, intellectual, and clever. This appeals to Paul Lopes’s (2000) addition of a category of popular music to Bourdieu’s schemata which seeks to include this field: that of restricted popular art (as the counterpart to the field of restricted high art). This sublimation of popular music practices reinforces the values it invokes; by accepting the terms of institutional legitimacy of the historical dominant fraction, it turns them to its own purposes, but is therefore engaged in a struggle on alien turf. This serves to establish that this dichotomy hinges in an attribution of a degree of independence of production from mass market interests.²⁰ The assumption of independence (or lack thereof) may be made on the basis of aesthetic associations: thinking such as ‘if it sounds like John Williams, the composer is probably trying to be a film composer’ (a social sphere widely identified with commercial as opposed to art music).

This category of commercial music is the lesser in the university, both in number of composers engaged in it, and in its prestige. Of the 161 composers mentioned by more than one interviewee, just 15 could be said to be outside the art music world in the sense that they would be associated with the productive and distributive worlds of popular music, film music, and jazz. Of those, almost all can be seen as closely associated with artified, left-field music creation that, in its time, subverted the contemporary mass-market aesthetic in some way. Of these, three were from the world of jazz (John Coltrane, Bill Evans, and Miles Davis)—a homogenous group who were all associated with a seminal moment of artification in jazz’s history: Miles Davis’s album *Kind of Blue*. This was part of the emergence in the 1950s of jazz as an art world that hybridised “popular idioms and popular practices with high art performance practices and claims to high art aesthetics.” (Lopes, 2000, p. 165) Of those from the fields of popular music, the most often mentioned were Frank Zappa, Björk, The Beatles, Squarepusher, and Aphex

²⁰ The caveat is, of course, that much art music is commissioned and so accompanied by a transfer of money. It is, therefore, a matter of degree which is reified in subjective judgements—is a composer sufficiently independent as to be a composer of art music.

Twin. The latter two are poster boys for the artification of electronic music; the eminent electroacoustic composer Trevor Wishart, for example, mentions these two as exemplars of a growth in “experimental DJing [... who] help blur the boundaries between art-music and popular entertainment” (Wishart, 2008, p. 137). This quite explicitly aligns them with an artified version of their popular and electronic music scene. Despite their success, they are attributed with the autonomy more usually reserved for high art. Of the others, their alternative, experimental approaches are what marks each of them out from their field: Frank Zappa, for example, is held up as an exemplary artist of popular music by Max Paddison (1982) in his critique of Adorno’s cultural model. Zappa qualified for this by “mirroring contemporary culture—from Sinatra to Varese—as a giant scrap heap of disposable consumer trash [...] with such imagination, intelligence and irony and with such awareness of the extraordinary variety of material and techniques at his disposal.” (Paddison, 1982, p. 215) Here, one of the key players is ‘irony’. The implication is that Zappa is *subverting* the mass market rather than conforming to it—an artistic fifth columnist. Similarly, The Beatles and Björk are also attributed with some form of avant-gardism (handily illustrated by the title of Bill Martin’s (2002) book *Avant Rock: experimental music from the Beatles to Björk*). In this way, it can be seen that even those influences not directly enmeshed in the productive milieu of high art (classical) music still tend to be those composers attributed with artistic value systems.

To make the dominance of art music in the interviews even clearer, one can look to the composers whose work was and is produced by the social networks and means of classical music. This represents the overwhelming majority in this count. All of the 60 composers mentioned in five or more interviews were from this world and these composers represented just over 90 percent of those mentioned in two or more interviews. Those most mentioned were Karlheinz Stockhausen (in 27 interviews), Harrison Birtwistle (24), Stravinsky (21), Pierre Boulez (21), Beethoven (20), Olivier Messiaen (16), and György Ligeti (16). This mixture of modernist (and modernist influenced) and eighteenth/nineteenth century classical composers continues down the list until it is interrupted by the appearance of Frank Zappa with just four mentions.

This dominant field divides into two again along the lines of the other axis: the involvement of technology in production. Here, acoustic music is by far the dominant partner. This is harder to quantify, as many composers that featured prominently in the count—Stockhausen, Boulez, and Xenakis for example—composed both electronic and acoustic music. These productive mechanisms are, therefore, somewhat enmeshed with one another. However, certain distinctive composers can be pulled out as identifiers of the area of production involving

an emphasis on technology. In particular, electroacoustic (or acousmatic) composition can be aligned with the ten composers who mentioned Dennis Smalley, the six who mentioned Trevor Wishart, the six who mentioned Simon Emmerson, and the five who mentioned Pierre Schaeffer. However, to illustrate the dominance of acoustic music in this field, the equivalent four Twentieth and Twenty-first century composers with the highest count who primarily composed acoustic music were far more frequently cited: Birtwistle (24), Stravinsky (21), Schoenberg (16), and Messiaen (16).

In this way, a hierarchy of presence within the university builds up: at the top is acoustic art music, being the most widely represented and longest embedded, then electronically produced art music, then commercial music. There is no clear field-wide hierarchy in commercial music between electronically produced and instrumentally produced music. This is partly due to the scale of its representation being too small to ascertain this, but partly also that digital production is so pervasive in much commercial music that it blurs the boundaries between the two and over-representing electronic music as, in commercial music, digital production is a near-universal skill. Whereas few art music composers avoid learning to use notation; few commercial music composers avoid learning audio production.

This adds an interesting distinction between the two areas: both externalise their ideas (as is inherent in the idea of musicianship) but acoustic art musicians, to a greater degree, do this via written communication to performers who more often than not are recorded by others—a traditional division of labour in the field—whereas electronic art music and commercial music composers are most often responsible from conception to sounding result. As well as a simply traditional authority, then, the dominance of acoustic art music could also be understood as related to a degree of control exerted over other musicians (see *Chapter Three: Composing Music*). The composer bowing on stage is acknowledging their mastery of the symphony orchestra standing at the head of a symbolic rally of a historical weight in the form of perhaps one hundred or more musicians. The statement of power is unequivocal; they literally orchestrated what just happened—the newest step in the great history classical music—and, though the conductor is surely the general declaring the victory, the composer is the strategist whose genius made it happen. The self-contained labour of the commercial music composer, or the electroacoustic composer on the other hand, typically puts no-one at their disposal. Bands more often collaborate rather than being orchestrated, acousmatic composition is worked on from the studio or from the privacy of a personal computer, and composition for television, film, and games is similarly synthetic in the main.

Here I theorise the dynamics of each compositional field and the place of different practices within them, establishing a basis of value systems (based in Bourdieu's relation of belief and artistic value) from which to examine the relationship of different areas of composition to the university organisation.

The Categories of Composers

Acoustic Art Music

This mode of production is by far the most common area for composer academics to be involved with in their own work. It is a society of musical production that includes those most often seen as at the top of this musical world. Most often referred to in these terms were the composers George Benjamin and Harrison Birtwistle. The highly institutionalised practice of these composers is associated with the large-scale mobilisation of people and resources, professional opera companies and orchestras being the archetypical examples. These organisations cost vast amounts of money to establish, maintain, and mobilise and not only in terms of the musicians—there is also an administrative infrastructure behind their activities: concert managers, publicists, and managers of the ensemble's concert hall (in cases where they have a concert hall of their own.) The music, in this context, has to provide an assurance of worth to those commissioning and programming. To justify (and support) this hulking infrastructure it also must have a certain popular appeal and a certain appeal to the high cultural values of its most committed supporters (including those responsible for the administration of public funds).

However, acoustic art music is far larger and more diverse than these highly institutionalised pillars would suggest. This field ranges from the most prestigious, large-scale professional methods of musical production to some fairly small-scale, underground, and occasionally anti-institutional art worlds. Many composers not accessing the resources of the prestigious orchestral or operatic commission rely on their social network to produce their music. They often work with performers they know, producing small-scale, collaborative works that are performed either within the university, or in venues known for patronage of experimental arts, such as Cafe OTO in London. These works composed are much more likely to be tied to the particular performer with and for whom they were devised. The capital

investment here is smaller than in the high art realm and the performance needs primarily social and cultural (rather than economic and cultural) capital. This affords far less in terms of financial return—commissions being rare and fees (where they are present) being low. However, this field is far more directed towards the restricted field of production: composers need not supply the certainty that an established composer being charged with writing a piece for a professional orchestra does. Experimentation is freer and reliance on the symbolic modes of production that stand in for a historical lineage is much less important (though it is still present in the form of the most common instrumentations).

On the one hand, then, one has the high art composer, writing for large scale ensembles and exercising a traditional authoritative control over the performers, and on the other, the composer writes, often collaboratively, for small groups or soloists. The capital dynamics between these two are blatantly different (not least the evident discrepancy in economic capital required for a given realisation). Between these extremes is, of course, a range of options, not least high art composers writing for small ensembles and experimentalists being commissioned to write for larger ones.

Despite this, however, they all still feel a belonging to the same world. The lineage and symbolic practices of the vast majority of composers in academia align with one history of influences: that of acoustic classical music. This notion of unity of the field is not to mask the importance of stylistic traits in the position of different sounding musics in the field.

The play of the association of artistic legitimacy with stylistic traits can be seen in the unique place of minimalism within the field of acoustic art music. Minimalism is featured on most curricula in university teaching, and is well established in the concert hall. In this sense, minimalism can be seen as firmly within this art world. However, there is also a deep-seated feeling of grievance against the school, a betrayal whose taint lingers in the collective memory. The feeling of this split is well explored by Georgina Born (1995) in whose view the rhythmical and tonal changes influenced by external to the high modernist art world estranged these practices from high cultural organisations (in particular in her study, IRCAM). Composers would split their concepts of their compositional practice into the legitimate and illegitimate spheres.

Minimalism, to some extent, has come to occupy an ambiguous place in this categorisation: its acceptance and half-century long heritage in the canon has earned the likes of Steve Reich and Terry Riley a place in art music's Valhalla, but the same cannot always be said for other minimalists: John Adams, Michael Nyman, or Philip Glass for example. The discomfort with minimalism is more, however, than a historical trauma. There is also an

uncertainty about the art-ness of minimalist composers. The commercial success of the likes of Adams, Nyman and Glass can be theorised as playing a part in this reaction. With regard to the place of commercial success in art, Bourdieu sums this up well:

Intellectuals and artists always look suspiciously—though not without a certain fascination—at dazzlingly successful works and authors, sometimes to the extent of seeing worldly failure as a guarantee of salvation in the hereafter: among other reasons for this, the interference of the ‘general public’ is such that it threatens the field’s claims to a monopoly of cultural consecration. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 116)

A suspicion is perhaps the best way to describe the reaction of composers to minimalism. There is both a historical break whose echoes may still be heard and a suspicion of the ongoing popular success of these works. These are not absolute, and the inclusion of minimalism on musical curricula is testament to the fact that it does have a place within composers’ conceptions of art music.

However, its place in teaching is somewhat ambiguous, often being viewed as something students do as an easy way of creating a lot of music—repetitious use of a small amount of musical material being a key feature of minimalism. In fact, there was an oft expressed view of minimalism as, for most student composers, a kind of juvenile stage which many go through but few produce their fully fledged work in. One described their own minimalist phase as “a bit of a dead end” (Anon_52, interview) and another put its place in their biography thus:

in my early 20s I was very interested in minimalism [...] my portfolio was all minimalist composition, which in hindsight I think is a foolish thing for a student to do in that you're not necessarily going to learn very much [...] I've nothing against minimalist composition, it's just not maybe the best idea for a student. (Andean, interview)

At worst, the view is that it is a kind of easy option—a copout and a symptom of lazy writing. The composition of minimalist music by students was also formulated in terms of being purely an attempt to imitate other composers of the style—one that was (wrongly) seen by students as easy to imitate:

[A] lot of them, they just wrote bad imitation minimalism. That's one of the things you have to wean them off. [...] I love Reich, I love John Adams, and even some Riley, but it's very hard to imitate it without it just being lazy. [...] In the second year they'd write a piece of what was just very very bad minimalism and you'd say, you know, probably

not something you'd want to continue with in the third year, and most of the time they'd agree. (Anon_18, interview)

This is indicative of the previously discussed place of minimalism in this art world, as canonical, but also as (in its more recent iterations) aligned a little too closely with the commercial world. In terms of teaching this was, for instance, on one occasion expressed as a backwardness:

I guess there's a sort of [...] allergy that we develop to minimalism and the idea that [...] if we showed students minimalism in the wrong way they might take that as the way forward and sometimes it's really the way backwards. (Kerr, interview)

Minimalism is, in this field a special case. It has strong stylistic traits which have been arguably associated too closely with commercial music in popular media to be truly within the field. It is not summarily dismissed, but there is certainly a suspicion of illegitimate influence.

Overall, however, acoustic art music can be seen as varying primarily in relation to the capital involved in its production; the productive forces of the music vary in scale and so too do the values in play. Where economic investment is higher, the mobilisation of symbolic goods is of greater importance.

Electronic Art Music

The production of music through electronic means has been a rapidly rising movement over the past century, and particularly during the post-war era. Electronic technology has transformed the distribution and consumption of music in unprecedented ways; it has provided a global platform for musicians of all kinds to—now, without significant cost—distribute their music. In amongst the inflationary din of online distribution, albeit under the popular radar, is a body of academics creating music that builds on a seventy year history of art music being produced using electronic means. This is a base dominated by electroacoustic music—“highly designed electronic art music for close listening with an emphasis on space and timbre” (Collins, Schedel, & Wilson, 2013, p. 1). The key part of the definition is the attributed art-ness (manifested in “close listening”) of the work, requiring the same idea of legitimising creative autonomy as its acoustic counterpart.

The modern method electroacoustic music production is generating (that is, synthesising) or recording sounds and then digitally processing them. By this I mean extracting, combining,

defusing, and altering the sounds to create a track, usually to be played from multiple loudspeakers. At the extreme end of the multi-channel system, the Birmingham Electroacoustic Sound Theatre (BEAST) uses up to 100 loudspeakers. There is little or no notation involved, rather the composer works directly with the sound, and if any performers are involved it is likely to be at the beginning of the process when the recordings are made than at the end (though there are many pieces for performer and 'tape'). The resources required by the electroacoustic composer are, then, quite different from those of the acoustic composer. Rather than the reliance on willing (or paid) performers, electroacoustic composers require a technological infrastructure that can be run with a skeleton crew. BEAST, despite being one of the largest rigs in the world, is run by a team of just five people (BEAST, undated). Compare this to the Hallé Orchestra, whose administrative structure alone numbers some 30 full time and 18 part time members of staff, let alone the 78 musicians that comprise the orchestra (The Hallé, undated). Simply put, the creation and performance of electroacoustic music requires a far smaller mobilisation of human resources and surrounding infrastructure. That said, the material infrastructure required, at least during the compositional process if not during the performance itself, is far greater. This has been truer historically. One composer reminisced on the past difficulties of accessing studios in which to compose:

[I]n the '70s and '80s when [...] my generation was setting out, getting access to [studios] was really difficult. It's difficult to imagine now. [...] We were trying to persuade universities to open their studios to any composer that would come. The universities, even in those days, would say 'can they pay?' and we'd say 'no' [...] Some universities would still allow access: 'come in nights.' So [one noted composer] worked nights [...] and people used to think he was [employed] at [the] University. He wasn't. [...] So his great piece [...] was composed from maybe 4 in the morning till 9 o'clock for months and months. [...] I felt privileged as a university lecturer in those days because I could walk into the studio I directed, switch it on, run it, and compose something. Now that was immensely valuable to me. [...] There were public access studios, not in universities. [...] West Square in London was one, Metro in Newcastle, there was another one in Bristol [Arnolfini]; these were public access studios that tried really hard to say 'whoever you are, you can come and work in the studio.' Thank goodness stuff is [easier now ...] you've got your laptop [...] and there's a bunch of freeware. Just get some decent loudspeakers, which still cost, and you're on. So those [studio access] issues no longer exist [in quite the same way]. (Emmerson, interview)

The economic capital involved in the production of electroacoustic music used to be a significant factor in restricting the field of production. One had, in the main, to be a member of a university or other organisation with the resources to build and maintain a state of the art studio. Now, digital audio workstation software, a laptop, and speakers are available for under a thousand pounds (and even less if using open-source software). This is not to say there is now no value in the studio—certainly composers still use them. In particular, multichannel (beyond stereo) diffusion is still a significant advantage of many studios. However, “production is completely decentralised—anyone can make electroacoustic music on a home desktop computer [...]. Very high-quality digital sound recording has become cheap and easy, and there is a welter of sonic material available through the media and the web.” (Wishart, 2008, p. 137) In other words, the means of composing electroacoustic music are opening up and becoming a popularly accessible form of creativity.

This does not mean, however, that this potential is realised in a wide-spread popular way by most of those who have this access. It is not merely (and nowadays, not even) material means (economic capital) that set the electroacoustic world apart from popular forms of music making. In fact, much audio processing software used by electroacoustic composers is also used by many popular musicians. Rather, it is a matter of distinction (the self-classification by cultural capital). The decision to engage in the composition of this sort of electronic art music is not a ‘free’ one, but is governed by exposure to and taste for electroacoustic music. Thus it remains, in the popular world, niche despite the reduced cost of the means of production.

This discussion of electroacoustic music is not to exclude other forms of electronic art music. In particular, those means of production that are not rooted in the deliberate and tactile manipulation of sonic resources prior to performance. This is broadly called ‘live electronics’. Although the history of electronic instruments is long and might strictly speaking be thought of as live electronics, here I would consider this to be something of an ambiguous hybrid between electronics and acoustic music: if a pianist plays a digital piano, or a guitarist an electric guitar, the social mechanisms for production and appreciation are identical to that of acoustic music, even if the mechanics of the instrument are not. Rather, live electronics refers to the practice of, in some way, constituting the electronics themselves in the performance. Thus Peter Manning (2013) refers to Kagel’s *Transición II* (1959) for piano, percussion, and two tape recorders as the first foray into this area (in Europe at least). This is because, rather than the tape parts just playing pre-prepared audio (a kind of electroacoustic-acoustic hybrid), the second tape recorder was used to record and replay bits of the performance. The use of analogue live electronics that this sparked was transformed into something more radical by the

introduction of digital technology during the following decades. This is the area of most interest here, as the rapidly increasing capabilities of computers have made computer music a specialism in its own right. Computer music uses productive means such as coding, AI programs, algorithms, and the use of various interfaces and tools for creating and processing sound. The significant identifier of the productive process of computer music (as the term is used here) and electroacoustic composition is that the composer mediates their music through digital processes that do not involve direct trial and error manipulation of the sounds (involving iterative creation and review), or which are created digitally in the moment of performance.

Improvisatory computer music is moderately wide-spread in the field of university composition: composers live code, particularly in the programming language SuperCollider, build setups in which to improvise using MaxMSP, or even create artificial intelligences able to improvise live in response to human performers. However, despite this, as mentioned above, those engaged in live computer music do not seem to have the same coherent institutionalism that electroacoustic or acoustic composers tend to have. Acoustic composers draw on the twentieth century avant-gardes of Europe and/or America (depending on their specific practices); electroacoustic composers draw on the likes of Schaeffer, Smalley, and Wishart for their institutional backdrop. Despite being only slightly younger than electroacoustic music, live computer music has none of the weighty history of its older sibling. Not one of the composers mentioned in two or more interviews is primarily noted for their exploits in live computer music. The only live computer musicians referred to by composers engaged in this area tended to be their teachers or others with whom they had personal contact, rather than abstracted cultural figures. This area, then, is in a fairly non-institutionalised state. There is a sense of shared practice to a degree, but this is established through connections. This gives a more anarchic feel to the field, allowing connections to be made at will. This is also perhaps related to the non-capitalistic production: in classical socio-economic terms, improvisation is pure labour. It produces no enduring product—objectified capital—and so has little enduring value. It cannot be owned and cannot be bought—it can only be brought about in the moment of labour. This is true of all performance (ignoring for the moment any kind of recording), but not all forms of composition. Even in a culture where “many a work’s *première* is also its *dernière*” (Landy, 2006, p. 42), the symbolic capital of having composed a Work lingers: the portfolio still represents the theoretical growth in value of (even posthumous) canonisation associated with the great composers. Its theoretical reproducibility puts capital composition in the tantalising uncertainty of value. Improvisation, on the other hand (which pervades the field of live electronics to varying degrees), is of a certain value: it is past, and so its value has been

established in the moment of its creation and reception. There is nothing permanent to hold, to increase in value. The field is one of ephemerality. In this respect two things will become important in the institutional context in substituting for the cultural capital of compositional production: research and technological development.

This field is large, but still smaller and less dominant than the field of acoustic art music. Electronic music composers are also more likely to be involved with teaching across the art/commercial divide as the shared electronic media used in composition, recording, and production allow composers to offer relevant expertise to students of commercial music. Not only this, but the institutional looseness of electronic (and particularly computer) music allows the composer to move more freely between influences, drawing on and displaying their influences from commercial music without compromising their association with the body of historical capital.

Acoustic Commercial Music

Acoustic commercial music does not necessarily refer to unamplified, or non-electronic music, rather it relates to a means of production and consumption. This category includes, by virtue of the label 'commercial', a broad range of musical worlds, but some of the main genre descriptions represented in the present research would be popular music, music theatre, and film music. Each relates to a mode of production and of consumption as well as to an aesthetic network of established associations.

Popular music is commonly composed and performed by the same person or group of people, a band for instance (excluding for the moment more industrialised production where composition and performance are more commonly separated). The forces employed have a cultural and aesthetic resonance with a history of musical production longer than that of electroacoustic music. The guitar is the most prominent symbol of this, echoing a century of blues recordings as well as the American folk scene and the pervasive two guitar (plus bass guitar) line-up of the Beatles. Similarly, the drum kit also serves in this symbolic role. These instruments carry with them stylistic traits and inherent aesthetic markers which gather around to form a broad idea of genre.

However, this clearly cannot be used as sufficient definition. The mode of consumption, too, brings one a little closer: despite being based at its grassroots level in a local circuit of small venues often with informally gathered audiences (for example, in pubs), the institutionalised

ideal of consumption is based on the mass market—as wide a distribution as possible online and using CDs and even vinyl records. Whereas the classical music model tends to emphasise as its productive ideal the ambition of having institutional sponsorship for the composer (in the form of the commission), and so being more detached from a need for mass distribution, commercial music tends to valorise the widely popular.

All of this is not to obscure the differences found within popular music—it is a vast field—but rather it is to try to identify some of the key conditions of production without getting too entrenched in the myriad genre classifications at work. Productive conditions could be used to define genres much more specifically. In particular, though instrumentation might even not vary, the networks of people—composers/performers, venues, festivals, fans—might. The art world is the unique circumstances of the music’s creation, and so is a unique identifier of the music. The music itself, in other words, is a shorthand for the art world.

However, distinct from this, but still under the same bracket of commercial acoustic music are the fields of film and game music and music theatre. The former is identified by its consumption as part of films, television, and computer games. The clearly identifiable conditions for the music’s production allow a more loose association of aesthetic symbols. Film music is able to use everything from the markers of high classical music—the orchestra and the choir, for example—to those of popular music and every kind of synthesis in-between. Similarly, musical theatre, though to a lesser extent, is able to use the symbols of popular music (even varying the style throughout the production to mobilise different associations) as well as those of classical music, with a pit band commonly made up of combinations of guitars, drums, and synthesisers, alongside instruments from the classical orchestra. Again, in the case of music theatre, the means of consumption are well defined: the music is heard as part of a theatrical production, with an idealised distribution through the hugely popular theatres in, for instance, the West End. Again, the actual sounding result is quite consciously mobilising the symbolic goods of other forms of music. The primary ideals of consumption of both of these musical worlds are still orientated towards wide distribution (albeit in different forms). In light of these two areas, a theory of this interaction could be formulated: *the more clear and well defined the mode of consumption, the less restrictively defined the symbolic goods used.*

In academia, where do these art worlds fit? As far as composers’ own music making was concerned, where popular music was part of an interviewee’s work it was most often classified outside the purview of academic concern: “alongside that, as sort of hobby music, I’ve been

involved in other things like bands and more now kind of singer-songwriter kind of stuff and playing guitar in a sort of folky popular music style.” (Harker, interview);

[...] but that's the music that I write as a university person and as a published composer. I've always had a background in other kinds of music. So, I started out in music singing and writing pop songs. [...] I still put a guitar around my neck sometimes and sing songs which I have written. For Village social events, for example, I make up songs which are about the village or about some aspect of the thing that they're celebrating. I wrote a song for my mother's funeral this year [...] and those are songs that anybody would recognise as songs. (Marsh, interview);

[O]n a very large scale, across my entire career I have written kind of indie pop music, guitar based [...] pop music you know four chord tricks that I would never ever even consider using in my "serious" music, for want of a better term, and I use that with distinct air quotes around it—serious only as a way to distinguish it. [...] I will often go home in the evening and pick up a guitar and half an hour later I have written a skeleton of a song that I'll never finish that that has like riffs in it and notes and rhythms and I do that a lot—I air drum all the time. (McLaughlin, interview)

The field of popular music in particular is widely practiced, but not a primary part of the academic work of most academic composers. Even the increasing number of popular music courses are largely taught by composers who have trained, researched, and qualified in art music fields and have then taken jobs with universities that recruit students to popular music courses. In the student body, these areas of commercial music are widely represented (and not only on those courses explicitly dedicated to commercial music).

There is an intriguing disjoin, then, between the art worlds of composer academics and those of a great many students aspiring to find work in commercial music. The student desire for a greater expertise in various kinds of commercial music amongst the staff was often expressed when composer academics were asked about what they would be looking for if they were to hire a new colleague: “Someone who was competent at film music, who had a career as a film music composer.” (Moore, interview) Another academic more fully illustrated the tension:

So there is an argument [that] you could take a strategic look about a program like ours and decide ‘Well what's the point in this avant garde composition anymore? Let's just teach them song writing—they love that.’ You could do that. [...] If I retired tomorrow

I could be replaced by a pop music specialist who teaches people production values and we change the program to take out John Cage and Helmut Lachenmann and these people and replace it with other forms of learning. That's a thing you can do. [...] They definitely won't do that [...] at least in the near future [...] because the community of staff who teach on composition [...] would radically upset that. (McLaughlin, interview)

In this case, the composer sees the student desire for a greater engagement with popular music as being in conflict with the staff capabilities and opinion. This is highlighted again by another composer, although their opinion is in favour of institutionalising and promoting experimental commercial music:

Participant: there's a very important strand in very creative and sometimes very experimental popular music also created by female musicians that is not represented so well in the department I would say. [... Even without] getting the big names, there are still people who might have more experience in certain aspects of popular music song writing or certain aspects of video game music or film music. That would be where I would hire if I had money to get another composer. It wouldn't be an art music composer.

Interviewer: And do you think that could be supported by the department?

Participant: No.

Interviewer: Why not?

Participant: [...] their own self-image depends on the bigging-up of art music above the many other vibrant forms of music, whereas my career is more chequered, more mixed, more all over the place [...] I don't really believe in some hard Aristotelian category between art music and popular music. It's nonsense. So I think there is a big territory that we are missing out on. (Anon_44, interview)

These illustrate that the representation of commercial music composition amongst staff is sometimes ill fitted to students' interest in these areas, and that art music is represented far more fully.

An area which is perhaps ambiguous in its classification as commercial music but is nonetheless scantily represented in universities is jazz. It is a genre that is conspicuous by its

absence. Whilst there has been a significant growth in popular music courses (although not yet an equal growth in specialist academics), jazz has remained in the background. In the sample, only one teacher related teaching the history of jazz, and their background and current practice was in popular and classical music. There was no academic in the sample who described themselves as being primarily concerned with jazz composition (though it should be noted that there are a few who did not participate in the research who describe themselves to be jazz musicians and composers on their academic profiles). This is perhaps related to the division of labour in jazz. As Becker (2008) highlights, the division of labour is such—with the composer as performer, and composition largely taking the form of improvisation—that composition in jazz is focussed on performance. Perhaps for this reason, as well as the fact that the diversification of the academic music curriculum took place after the peak of jazz's popularity, jazz found a home in the conservatoires, where performance rather than the scholarly study of music is at the core of the organisation's practices. Whilst popular music, being of a similar bent, has become more a part of certain curriculums based on the market pressure of rising student interest in its study, jazz seems to have been the subject of no such market pressure, finding itself instead largely confined to an occasional cameo in the teaching of music history.

Electronic Commercial Music

This category of music is the least present in academia. In fact, there was not one example of a composer primarily engaged in this form of musical production in the sample. This is not to say it does not exist, but rather that it is neither widespread nor powerful in university music. In contrast, however, it is a fast growing and popular field in composition at large. Electronic commercial music refers to the practices based around electronic music that involve playing tracks that have been created using digital software, samples, and synthesisers on loudspeakers. Sample libraries, sequencing software, and mechanical distribution are the essential means of production and consumption. Since the late 1950s, electronic manipulation (for example, tape loops) and synthesis has featured as a part of the production of commercial records, becoming a significant part of the identity of the tracks.

The boundary between electronic and acoustic popular music is not so hard and fast, as they often overlap with live sampling and electronic instruments. However, the focus here is on the production of tracks that are not recorded in real time, but are produced primarily to be played mechanically. In this sense, the early examples such as tracks from The Beatles, The Beach Boys, and Telstar use electronic synthesis and other effects as supplemental to the live

recorded music. In film music, however, *Forbidden Planet* (1956), created by Louis and Bebe Barron was the first fully electronic, studio produced soundtrack (Collins et al., 2013, p. 84).

The real significance of the contemporary field of electronic commercial music to the ethnographic present is the digital revolution and the popularisation of sequencing software. It is now easy to access software with not only the ability to arrange and manipulate sounds, but also vast sample libraries which provide material ready to be used by the composer, often using MIDI to precisely determine pitch, duration and velocity. These sample libraries often allow the composer to imitate acoustic instruments, something which has now become a staple of commercial music; soundtracks for adverts, films, and television programs are all often created using such techniques, emulating classical or popular sounds, and creating a cheap, precisely timed track to accompany the visual media. Composition for commercial libraries has also grown, providing a means for a vast number of composers to monetise their music, and a quick and cheap alternative to commissioning for the vastly expanding field of video creators. All of this is based on electronic commercial music production. The means of production are cheap, and the means of distribution are potentially vast, as mechanical realisation is naturalised to an ever greater degree into the popular consciousness. The music is designed for mechanical reproduction, and so it is not a second rate experience to hear the music from one's own computer. The inexpensiveness of the production means that the capital entry level for producing this music is extremely low. No professional studio is required, no vast ensemble funded by state grant or punter, no record label providing the infrastructure for creating recordings and following through with barrages of promotional campaigns; just a laptop, headphones, and time.

Given this low threshold, it is perhaps unsurprising that the representation of this music was so low within universities. The University is an organisation based around institutionalised cultural capital, which is attained and thus legitimised by "privation, renunciation, and sacrifice" (Bourdieu, 2007). What is it to make of a world where a young teenager may produce and profit from a remix after learning (auto-didactically) the requisite skills in a matter of months? Where are the decades of privation? This ingénue of a field has none of this asceticism, and finds its opportunities not in a restricted field, but in the freest, most open market of which music has ever been a part. My interview sample included just one composer who engaged in the production of library music. Even here, however, this was, in this composer's mind, separated from the artistic and research interests they were pursuing as an academic.

The Wild Card

[He] cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the play of differences. Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is neither king nor jack, but rather a sort of joker, a floating signifier, a wild card, one who puts play into play. (Derrida, 1981, p. 93)

Here I introduce one final character to the scene: a surprise addition to the script—surprise being their particular characteristic. This character I call the Wild Card: a composer who refuses to be pinned to a fixed spot in my reductive dichotomisation, who moves through worlds, subverting and misdirecting, relishing bafflement and the transgression of categorisation. It is an operation of negation—a denial of definition not through contradiction, but through laughter at the very idea of the categories (including, perhaps the category of ‘Wild Card’ itself). This phenomenon has been identified in the broader field of intellectuals as the ‘sacrificial intellectual’ (the intellectual who sacrifices conventional authority, that is), who “in contrast with the traditional, authoritative intellectual, [...] thrives on internal contradictions, rejects claims of authenticity and authority, and generally courts controversy” (Bar-El & Baert, 2021, p. 13) or ‘the fool’ whose role is “not to play any role.” (Rieff, 1969, p. 50)

This category is less of a summation of a composer’s professional character (except in two cases where it is the best descriptor for the composer as a whole) than a tendency found in many composers. The most notable expression of this tendency, as already discussed, is the avoidance of definition in describing their practices:

I see myself as somebody who can reserve the right to do anything musically. I would never leave anything off the table in terms of how I might develop in the future. I'm not interested in trying to develop a personal style; to me that's a kind of pointless activity.
(Pickard, interview)

This tendency has been explored above as a common feature of the composer’s strategic negotiation of their field. However, here it is seen in a genealogical sense as helping to structure the value system of a field where distinction by individuality is the name of the game. The ‘Wild Card’ is a characteristic that is in the genetic fabric of the field.

This, arguably, has some resemblance to Becker’s category of mavericks, which he describes as being a group that is dissatisfied with or otherwise unable to operate within the bounds of an art world, “who have been part of the conventional art world of their time, place,

and medium but found it unacceptably constraining.” (Becker, 2008, p. 233) However, Becker maintains this dissatisfaction with the art world as the innovations of the artist being uncontainable by the art world’s present material and intellectual infrastructure. He gives the example of Charles Ives being influenced by his father, starting to experiment with polytonality, and so being rejected by the mainstream musicians of his day. This presents the maverick as a stereotypically oblivious genius to be accepted or rejected by the established art world; the maverick creates their music without attention to the expectations of the art world, making them unaware of their social role.

However, the Wild Card, in contrast, is perfectly aware of the social and subversive role their work is playing. In fact, in its strongest form, this becomes not an incidental side-effect of their art, but an essential motivator for their work: to subvert, to send up, and to undermine the august institutions of the world they were raised in. It is not iconoclastic as there is no desire to flood the libraries (as for Filippo Tommaso Marinetti) or to burn the opera houses (as for Boulez); these are modernist tropes—that all should be washed away with the coming of the new—and are as much a target of ridicule themselves as are the conservative tropes of preservation, historical reproduction, and veneration of tradition. The Wild Card is not interested in destroying so much as putting into doubt the dogmatic assumptions of both sides of this dialectic; it is not the territory of either side that they seek to take, but rather to move so freely as to reveal the rigidity of any boundary to be illusory—to be seen for the collective imagining it is. A good example of a key pillar of art worlds both modernist and conservative is the value of art. Music must be attended to with in depth listening, justified by its value as an aesthetic object and in the process imbuing it with the value of the listener’s attention. This is the key to music’s value for new and old alike: attention. What, then, of this idea from a composer who I associate with being an example of the Wild Card: “I have produced pieces that I didn’t even listen to myself” (Collins, interview). Here, the composer used algorithmic composition to generate music, thus radically devaluing the experience of it in a quasi-inflationary way. This puts the value of art (particularly in a world of hyper-mass production of digital goods) directly in question and is an excellent example of the Wild Card in play.

Often the technique is to take acceptable things from one place and put them somewhere where they are unexpected or even shocking. The stage is a key place to allow composers to show something in a different light: the normal made grotesque, the venerable made ridiculous, and the frivolous thrown into ambiguity by the authority of the stage it stands on. Nothing is off-limits because it is those limits that the Wild Card is on both sides of, folding up the maps

with their borders into a great mutual invasion. One such transgression relates to the academic disciplinary boundary:

[W]hen you think about a professor, what do you think about? [...] at the end of the day what distinguishes one professor from the professor next door is that they have some kind of deeper knowledge of some specialism within [...] some academic discipline. [...] I've kind of done the opposite of that really. So, while I do have deep specialist knowledge in certain areas of music and technology, I also frequently dabble in areas in areas in which I have limited knowledge and expertise but I do that because I can see the potential in combining these fields together (Hugill, interview)

Although this is quite a subtle demonstration of the Wild Card tendency, it again taps into the refusal to pin down one's identity as a composer. Unpredictability is the name of the game: where definition looms, the Wild Card makes itself scarce. This includes not only the material used—often appropriating and subverting everything from the most venerated classics to the most populist commercial phenomena—but also the performers' expectations of the performance itself, often using improvisation and unpreparedness to stimulate the novelty of the performance: “[we] had a Skype before and decided what we wanted to do and we all just showed up and did it and it's kind of like fun to also work like that where you don't rehearse, you just go with what's happening.” (Reuben, interview) Surprise can also easily spill over into popular rejection as performance acts exceed what a venue or programmer is prepared to stage:

Those concerts were [...] really fun for us but also kind of legendary. Like, not many people were there but the type of things we did was quite, like, out there to the point that they kicked us out of the venue so we had [...] some more gigs planned and then they cancelled us because we were doing quite funky stuff. (Reuben, interview)

The Wild Card—as Derrida writes, “a joker”—isn't necessarily funny, but humour is certainly a significant tool in this arsenal; there is eternal amusement that blossoms from the surprising collapse of categorical assumptions. One such composer consistently put humour at the centre of the effect of their work and of what they were trying to achieve:

It's just fun. I do like a bit of fun in composition even if it's serious fun. I'm probably a bit more open to humour than some composers. Some of them are quite serious and the more serious they are the less serious I feel and the more I want to subvert whatever serious setup they've got established there. So I don't think I'm the sort of

person who's going to get any invites to the Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival anytime soon because some might see me as a bit flippant or facetious or annoying, and the more they think that, the more I want to play to it. (Anon_44, interview)

A wild card is not just a card that can be any card. It is a card that puts the idea of being a determined object into doubt. This is what Derrida means when he says that it “is one who puts play into play”: the floating trickster has no ontological inertia and is not obedient to one’s categories, nor even to the idea of being categorisable. It is like catching a mirage that, by being unfixable, subverts the categories by which one might fix him down. Bourdieu comments on the place of such cultural producers as uniquely unacceptable to the established field: “in refusing to play the game, to challenge in accordance with the rules, i.e. artistically, their authors call into question not a way of playing the game, but the game itself and the belief which supports it. This is the one unforgivable transgression.” (Bourdieu & Nice, 1980, p. 267) One may quibble with the idea that this is truly unforgivable (particularly since I am identifying this trait in a highly institutionalised and legitimate context), but nonetheless take Bourdieu’s point that some artists do not act for or against a certain mode of practice, but rather subvert the game itself.

I mention little of the Wild Card in the rest of this thesis; if this pervasive gene (but rare species) escapes my attention that is because this escape is, intentionally or not, integral to the definition of this trait.

The Canon

What has been highlighted so far is that each of these types—these productive fields (within which the ‘Wild Card’ should be treated as at once part of all and none)—has a productive mode that is a referent more or less strongly for a canon. The more deeply embedded in a long and prestigious lineage a productive practice is, the more its members are required to infuse their work and selves with a specific set symbolic goods and cultural competencies; in other words, the greater the lineage of influence, the greater role played by cultural capital.

The ability to pass into the restricted field of cultural production is dependant not on the composer’s economic capital directly, but on their cultural capital. This capital is demonstrated through the mobilisation of symbols of a heritage of influence. Art music is a deeply historicised field—it is maintained with a strong shared base of reference points. These reference points, as highlighted earlier, are embodied in and upheld by the musical forces (the productive forces) of

the classical music world. In this way, this cultural memory is scaffolded by the habitus—the embodied history—of composer, performer, and audience; by, in other words, the canon.

As highlighted above, in the interview sample the majority of composers teaching commercial music had a background not primarily in that field, but rather in art music. It is true that most also had experience in some form of commercial music, but this was usually a side project, and certainly not the primary topic of the main required academic qualification—the PhD. This meant that, at its most varied, the catalogue of reference points (as judged by the number of references to other composers) was drawn in the main from European (and particularly German) art music and its descendants (including those from North America). A typical summary of this canonical bedrock can be seen in one composer’s articulation of a not uncommon basis for compositional education: “So you know I think everyone should know *The Rite of Spring*, and Berio’s *Sinfonia*, and Arvo Pärt, and Bruckner, and Bach, and all the rest” (Zev Gordon, interview). The strength of this fundamental shared ground is corroborated by the reference points of composers, as illustrated earlier. Mentioned by most interviewees were the pillars of established classical music: Stockhausen, Birtwistle, Stravinsky, Boulez, Beethoven, Schoenberg, Messiaen, Ligeti, Mozart, Cage, Bach, Xenakis, Feldman, Maxwell-Davies, and so on. Within this field, composers from other art worlds are found scantily referred to, and where they are it is their art music like value systems that are emphasised. They are used to compliment and expand the palette of educational reference points, rather than as a whole corpus in themselves.

However, this seemingly solid canon faces certain challenges. Firstly, the nature of the canon is continually to some degree changing; for example, composers reminisced about times when the likes of Lachenmann and Ligeti were not well known, and doubtless others will continue to rise and fall. However, despite the rise in commercial music studies, those who are highly academically qualified—in particular, the Doctors of Philosophy (or Music)—seem to be stalwartly committed to this canon. However, as I have highlighted, these courses are largely taught by composers whose work springs from the art music canon. Therefore, in the main, composers moving on to research based study seem, from the accounts heard here, to be engaged with art music and its values rather than with the creation of commercial music. In other words, it is not that the ‘composer’ in ‘composer academic’ maintains the canon, but that this is primarily the work of the ‘academic’ element.

However, as commercial music gains more academic traction, and the universities that have taken to teaching commercial music specifically (which tends to be those with a greater

history of teaching than of research) become increasingly interested in developing their reputation for research (incentivised by the institutionalised competitiveness around rankings), it is entirely conceivable that a new generation of composer academics will be produced whose PhDs will have unabashedly sprung from the world of commercial music. Alternatively, it might be that what is now classed as commercial music will become another field of art music, occupying an ambiguous position similar to that of jazz. In that sense, commercial music will not become part of the composer academic's canon, rather the canon will remain art music, but what is now called commercial music will be legitimised by the academically imbued sense of artistic value.

In addition, composers explicitly from the artistic field will continue to come in and out of fashion; new composers will live and die, and perhaps join the beatified ranks for a time—perhaps many years after their death. The canon in this sense is always provisional. I do not mean to suggest in my use of the term that there is anything necessarily solid about the canon, rather that it is (re)created in every moment of shared reference. This is in fact a key generic implication of the institutionalism that underpins this thesis: regulatory values are contingent. There is no transcendental canon, only one that is provisional on the continual constructive efforts of the members of the field whose power depends on their association with (or rebellion against) the shared understanding of authoritative cultural symbols.

The understanding of these symbols and the work of building upon them has conventionally been the essence of the composer academic's endeavour. The process of gaining competence in this is often framed as an education of awareness: "I think they need to know some of the things that are out there and some of the things that have been done to give them some ideas" (Anon_8, interview); "I think being exposed to that sort of music in their musical journey is important so they've not got a skewed image of what music is. I think just getting close to a handful of works from the contemporary repertoire is important" (Blackburn, interview). However, each is laced with the specific canon of art music: the first precedes discussing the use of Messiaen's *Quartet for the End of Time*, and the second comes in relation to electroacoustic music. Canon, therefore, is created even in moments where the motivation is to provoke creativity and newness.

"The field of restricted production can never be dominated by one orthodoxy without continuously being dominated by the general question of orthodoxy itself, that is, by the question of the criteria defining the legitimate exercise of a certain type of cultural practice." (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 117) This is in contrast to commercial music, which, in its ideal typical form at least, is dependant purely on popular appeal, and the revenue that can be thus generated. In

this sense, orthodoxy—lineage, heritage, and canon—is not important *per se*, except in as far as it is important to the mass market. In this circumstance, the producers themselves are not producing the belief required to create a receptive market; rather, the producer and their values are produced by the market itself. The struggle for control over the canon is, therefore, primarily the preserve of fields of restricted cultural production. Naturally, this characterisation should be tempered with the ambiguities of reality, and treated as ideal typical, but nonetheless serves to elucidate how artistic values amplify the importance of canon and of the control over it—that is, the struggle for power over the means of legitimation in a field.

However, embedded in every canon is its own undoing: the dialectical relationship of establishment and anti-establishment. To accede to the weight of the canon is one form of legitimacy, but to throw it off altogether—to throw off the idea of legitimate culture—is another. In this respect, the canon faces a continual existential threat around the idea of a canon *per se*. This echoes the character of the Wild Card, who plays the game in such a way as to show it up as a game, and therefore undermine the naturalised value systems it puts in place.

The music found in the academic context is a consequence of the confluence of academic and artistic flows of legitimacy. As will be discussed further in Chapter 4: Compositional Practice and the Structures of the University, exactly what compositional practice is housed in universities is influenced by the values of the university, which are only partly created by the imported artistic values musicians housed within it. In other respects, these values—the institutions—are suffused with academic institutional values both in the form of the values of academia and the systemic influences of rational administration.

Geographical variation

In the interviews, a recurring idea was expressed regarding a relationship between location in the country and certain musical and social characteristics. In its most simplistic yet widespread form, this analysis characterised London as the site of a disproportionate amount of compositional work. One composer described moving away from London in terms of a loss of connections with other members of the art world, becoming “disengaged with [...] the other composers and other performers that I would see every concert that I went to” (Vaughan, interview; based in the Midlands) For others London was seen as problematically dominant in the art world, “the musical culture in this country is very much dominated by London and institutions in London. And they’re not as aware as they might be that there is a whole country

out there.” (R. Whalley, interview; based in The North of England) The gravitational pull of London—the attraction due to the mass of its art world, that is—for one London-based composer was clear in their explanation of its appeal for them:

[It's to do with] the idea that I guess I still do have that kind of London is where music happens in the UK and that if you want to go and see a kind of all the best concerts and meet lots of people and kind of really get involved in the UK's music scene that's where you have to go. Simple as that really. [...] It was exerting a pull, there's no doubt about it. [...] I haven't left since and I don't intend to. (Anon_31, interview; based in London)

The view of London as hosting a disproportionate quantity of the compositional scene is borne out by figures on commission income. Sound and Music (previously the Society for the Promotion of New Music) conducted a survey of composers to look into the state of commissioning. In the results of this survey, the mean income for the year studied for composers based in London was £7,377 (n=82), for composers based in England, but outside London, this mean was £3,516 (n=113). This equated to 60% of all commissioning money recorded in the survey being paid to London-based composers, despite them making up just 42% of the survey respondents. This has in part, perhaps, led to an occasional association of London with the careerist composer who risks sailing too close to the commercial world. This association has been made explicitly by one composer based in the West of England who, in a discussion of them finding themselves always “on the fringes” of the London scene, remarked that “I don't like the idea of the sort of career composer who is constantly obsessively networking and so on trying to build up contacts and so on.” (Pickard, interview; based in the East of England)

Richard Whalley felt little connection to what was going on in London, instead having greater links with Europe: “in a way I don't really feel that much part of it. I feel just as connected to you know what's going on in Europe as what's going on in London” (R. Whalley, interview; based in the North of England) This sense of internationalism as opposed to the more insular London mainstream was something more fully outlined as a theory of the organisation of the field by two other composers:

[It] was interesting moving here and [...] getting a sense of what mainstream British music was like: [...] it was a kind of Aldeburgh [Festival and ...] London kind of axis. [...] There's that and then there's [...] the Huddersfield thing which was more continentally focused and you would have [...] British composers who would get played in the Huddersfield Festival [...] but they'd never get played in Aldeburgh and

then you'd have these composers who had these big jobs in London and would get played in Aldeburgh [... and would seem] like quite big fish but were largely unknown outside of the country. (Anon_2, interview; based in the Midlands)

[The Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival] felt quite unique in that it felt like it was part of a European approach to composition rather than a UK approach and my take on UK classical music when I was growing up was that it was interesting but it seemed very London-centric. [... T]he compositional voice that was coming out of the UK that I saw represented on radio and by publishing houses tended to be a distinct kind of language which I saw as sort of distinct from what was happening in Europe and I think I was more interested in what was happening in Europe. (Anon_475, interview; based in the South East of England, not London)

This international orientation of non-London England, and in particular Huddersfield and the North of England was also accompanied with associations between well-funded, London based institutions of English music and a specific sound. This parallels, on a larger scale, the reflection referred to above regarding the careerist composer and was seen at times as resulting in a particular English or London-based sound: “the English scene [...] was one that seemed to be defined by a certain kind of language that was based in London and tended to be referenced to a certain pool of composers, [and] pool of publishers as well.” (Anon_65, interview; based in the South East of England, not London) On the other hand, a composer based in London was keen to point out the sheer diversity of London’s composer academics:

It's not a monoculture by any means. [...] I think that's one thing that I find really vibrant about the UK that in this geographically small island there are lots of different departments and lots of different composers and lots of different perspectives. [...] In London,] you could get on the underground and go to ten different music departments that have completely different views of what contemporary music should sound like. (Anon_64, interview; based in London)

The data collected by Sound and Music, at a general level, do not back up the idea that composers in London are focussed on creating Anglo-centric music. 24% of London-based composers responded that they either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement “Most of my commissions take place overseas” compared to just 12% of the composers based in the North East, North West, and Yorkshire and the Humber. It should be emphasised, however, that this is a general snapshot, and doesn’t account for either the visibility and prestige of the composers

who are composing abroad—that is to say, it may be (and indeed it is extremely likely in my view) that this folk social theory emanates from observation of the figureheads at certain poles, rather than from an awareness about what is happening in general. It also has no bearing on the idea of there being an English (London-Aldeburgh based) sound, which could in theory be as easily exported as it could be produced for domestic performance.

However, imagined or not, this distribution of a perceived sound—a mainstream—based in a disproportionately well financed London scene does play into the field as a whole, influencing people's decisions on where to be based and where to seek a reception for their music.

2.3 Conclusion

Defining this diverse field is challenging, particularly given the persistent resistance to self-definition found in the interviews. However, the way in which composers went about addressing the issue illuminates the importance of productive means and autonomy. Although autonomy is less clearly observable, it too arose from composers' self-definition, in terms of the distinction between art and commercial music. By following this through, one can move towards a clearer four part model of classification based on the musical forces (electronic or acoustic) as well as the less concrete idea of autonomy (art or commercial), both of which carry with them an engrained idea of productive milieu.

The field of university composition is dominated by acoustic art music in terms of both legitimacy and quantity of activity and also has a strong contingent of institutionalised electronic art music composers. Despite the proliferation of popular music courses, most composers have a primary background in art music with regard to their academic qualifications. The key division in the field, both administratively and in terms of social structure is the art/commercial divide, which ultimately hinges on the essential attribution of autonomy (and thus the potential for authenticity).

Conclusion to Part 1

FROM PART ONE, THERE are two key elements that will be instrumental to the following discussion:

- Rationalisation and Autonomy—the dialectic of rationalised control and free action will come to underpin the following discussion on the practices and institutions of composition and their relationships the mechanics and institutions of universities.
- Art/Commercial and Acoustic/Electronic Music—these core categories, based around perceived autonomy and productive means respectively, are the key classifiers of composers, as each spreads out into a network of related institutions, most notably canons.

In Part Two, I examine the exact practices taking place and explore their relationship to the institutions of academia and the University's rationalising bureaucracy. The definitional role of art is crucial in this, highlighting the conflict between attributed autonomy as the key to legitimation and rationalising systems.

Part 2: Rationalising Composition

Chapter 3: Composing Music

THE COMPOSER-ACADEMIC IS situated at the intersection of a particular artistic field with a particular societal position (as the bipartite name, 'composer-academic', suggests). Their work, then, consists of academic work which is in many ways comparable to that of other academics, and compositional work which is similarly comparable to the work of other composers. I start in this chapter with a discussion of the nature of the compositional process.

Contrary to the deeply ingrained individualist idea of composers (Talbot, 2000), the composer's role involves negotiating other agencies, which each have more or less influence over the creative process. However, whilst composers have begun to be understood in terms of their relationships to one another (McAndrew & Everett, 2014), there is lacking a framework for understanding the key agencies that contribute to a composition. In studying creative labour, scholarship has often tended to focus on areas with the clearest commercial interests and organisational structures at play (for instance, Keyton & Smith, 2006; Ritchey, 2019; Siciliano, 2021). Here, however, I will look at some of the key agencies involved in this world of musical composition that is so dominated by art music and at the ways in which composers view and negotiate such the interplays of power and control that characterise these relationships. The central contention is that composers' strategic behaviour is not solely concerned with the retention control over 'their' creative process, but that composers may cede control in order to achieve certain social ends.

This will focus on the genesis of a composition, its musical production, and its reception. Each of these aligns with a key power dynamic: the genesis of the music relates to the relationship between the commissioner and the composer; the production relates to the relationship between performers and the composer; and reception relates to the relationship between the composer and the audience.

These three categories each give rise to a scale of control with the composer on one end and (respectively) the commissioner, performers, and audience on the other. In each instance,

the composition may be more or less formed by the composer’s internal judgement, or by the judgement of the external actors. The suggestion is that there are various socially strategic reasons for a composer to place themselves at any point on any of the scales, holding or ceding control over the sounding music which they are producing. At work in all of this is the contested value of authenticity and the degree in each category to which the composer’s view of the value of their art is tied to a notion of personal authenticity.

3.1 Commissioning

To begin at the beginning of a composition, one of the influential power dynamics in the composition is the commissioning process (Figure 2). The scale of control here refers to the degree to which the composer and commissioner engage their time and resources speculatively (that is, to what extent they entrust the success of the endeavour to the judgement of the other).

Composer control <-----> **Commissioner control**

| Unsolicited commission | Solicited commission | Competition |
|--|--|---|
| Little speculative investment from the composer | Some speculative investment from composer | High speculative investment from composer |
| High speculative investment from commissioner | Some speculative investment from commissioner | Little speculative investment from commissioner |
| e.g. Composer invited to write a new piece by an orchestra in return for a fee | e.g. call for proposals around a theme for a particular ensemble | e.g. Competition requiring works to be as yet unperformed |

Figure 2. Scale of relative power in commissioning

Commissions can be split into two categories: unsolicited commissions (where the composer is approached and asked to write a piece) and solicited commissions (where a composer seeks out and applies for a commission). For an unsolicited commission, a composer is approached by the commissioner and asked to write a piece, usually for specific musicians to perform, or for a specific concert setting. Although there often is an offer of money by the commissioner, the system of exchange is more complex than a simple purchase. Unlike buying a musical score, the product is yet uncreated when the decision is made to offer the commission. The commissioner knows only what the composer has done, and not what they will do, and on this basis makes a judgement.

To buy an already composed score, the product itself is definite and externalised and so the purchaser can judge it directly. To commission a piece of music, the commissioner has to speculatively invest in the composer's work, trusting that the composer will produce something worth the investment ('worth' in this case is not strictly economic, as most new commissions are often loss-making for commissioners, but there may well also be a legitimacy value in the act of commissioning new work). However, such speculative investment requires trust in the composer's work that they will produce something of worth. This kind of assurance can only be sought in the past work and reputation of the composer. Those who are established composers have a defined place in the game—their work has proved sufficiently consistent to establish them in a good position for a span.

Unsolicited Commissions and Being Established

The capacity for a composer to have such a defined place is linked to the phenomenon of the 'mainstream' composer (Malcomson, 2013).²¹ The mainstream composer is a composer whose body of work allows them to be sufficiently predictable (and yet sufficiently new) to be commissioned. They may also have certain cultural intermediaries (gained by the same predictive process) that serve to corroborate their capacity to produce legitimate capital, a publisher of their notated music or a label distributing recordings of their work, for example. These cultural intermediaries confirm belief not only in extant works, but in the composer themselves as it is the individual who is 'signed' to a record label or 'with' a publisher. The value is conferred on the person themselves as an established composer; a traditional and individualist idea of personal genius is at work here.

In the process of becoming established, a composer must be consistent enough to accumulate legitimate cultural capital over a period of time. This requires them to negotiate the ambiguous line between recognisable legitimacy and difference. As Hettie Malcomson reflects:

Composers have to create a sameness so that their personality (or distinctiveness) is identifiable, a sameness that must operate at least at the level of a single work. Identifying difference and innovation is a question of scale. However, only once sameness is recognized by others who are considered capable of such recognition will a composer be defined as individual, and eligible to join the group of composers with

²¹ Note that this does not necessarily refer to commercial mainstreams, but to composers whose work is consistently supported by the apparatus of their particular musical field.

personality. In other words, to be a conventional member of the new music collectivity, composers must create sufficient sameness to be identifiably different, that is, individual. (Malcomson, 2013, p. 130/ my emphasis)

The composer must be predictable enough to be entrusted with a commission, but unpredictable enough to be trusted to do something different—that is, something that will confer the desired legitimacy.

Compositional personality—a defined place in the field— was a subject of some interest to many composers I interviewed: do they have a compositional personality? Many felt that they did not: “I think I'm that kind of person that [...] can't just stay in one slot, which has actually maybe been detrimental, [...] to my [...] self-branding. I cannot just say I belong to one scene, and that's always been the case.” (Anon_59, interview); “I've never ever wanted to find a way that works and then just do it again and again and again.” (Landy, interview); “I haven't kind of settled on a singular unique selling point or musical style [...] I enjoy the process of starting each piece as if it was the very first piece I'd written, which has possibly counted against me in terms of people being able to clearly identify what my music is or what I represent or what might be coming next.” (Best, interview); “When I was in my 20s I wrote an orchestral piece [...] It was quite popular. And I think that commissioning groups hoped that I would write [a second instalment of the same piece], so 'more of the same would be very nice,' and that's something that's never interested me. I'm not interested in repeating myself. So, I felt a certain slight pressure which I always resisted.” (Pickard, interview)

As with these examples, there was an idea amongst these composers that their lack of stylistic consistency over their lives had potentially not worked in their favour in terms of gaining recognition and prestige.

[Not having a clearly identifiable style ...] is probably why I'm never going to be very famous as composer because [...] the most famous composers do the same thing over and over again [...] and so it becomes instantly recognisable. [...] I've never done that.
(Hugill, interview)

From another perspective, a composer who identified themselves as having at any given time a strong sense of compositional project or identity described this as being useful in how they think about their work as well as to others' understanding what they do:

[Having a unified identity is] more sort of an aim—something that frames what I'm trying to do [so that it] has a sort of overarching idea. It's useful for the external identity of what I'm doing of course, but for me it helps me think 'well, actually, is this linked to this or not?' [...] So they are quite useful as labels informally for me just as it kind of a touching point but also for how I talk about the work. (Saunders, interview)

In both the cases of those who felt they had a clear identity and those who felt they did not, the benefits were primarily presented in terms of facilitating the composer's own thinking, rather than as presentational tools, as also in this instance:

I don't know whether it's been a sacrifice in commercial terms or in notoriety terms but it certainly doesn't feel like a sacrifice in composition terms because it means every new piece is as exciting to write as the last one, and I couldn't think of anything more dull than writing a new piece that just treads exactly the same ground as the last one did just by tweaking the harmony or the melodic phrase, but otherwise going through the exact same process. (Best, interview)

I don't want to become one of those composers, and I think that exist, who have figured out a technique and they enact it in every piece. And that technique may be brilliant, so they may consistently win big prizes and have loads of performances [...] but for me that's not what it's about; it's about putting yourself in the position of a challenge that you don't have an answer for. For me that's where the motivation to work comes from, and is that therefore creating something radical? No, but it is more likely to create something radical [...]. And personally that creates a sense of a charge in me and my music is way more likely to have some kind of charge itself if I'm charged when I'm doing it. If I'm not then it's way more likely in my view to be something procedural and probably is way more likely to have lost its capacity to interest, shock excite, entertain an audience. (Stanović, interview)

This last quote very clearly links the idea of having a clear composer identity to a detrimental effect on artistic thought, and so on the art value of the work. The composer must be reinventing themselves because without it, they would not be “radical”, which requires a distancing from certain symbols of success. In this way, the economy of prestige Bourdieu describes has a certain affinity to this idea of reinvention. One composer—a self-declared restless creative—summed up this relationship between perceived artistic identity and its relationship to commissioning:

Identity is overrated. [...] I think some of the model that we have [of the process of moving from being a composition student into being a composer] is that you are supposed to discover a corner of the music world [...] then plant your flag in that corner and defend it at all costs from any intruders [...] so then you have an identity [...] so performers know that if they commission a piece from you that's how it's going to sound, more or less, and programmers of festivals know that if they ask you to write a piece [...] it will fit. [...] So everybody knows where everybody else is situated and it makes producing concerts predictable or kind of manageable. And you can cultivate the people who understand or like what you do in music and you have performers and fellow composers who share your point of view and you form a small tribe and they can [reinforce] each other, and it's effective. You can see it happening and the way it [...] helps people's careers. I somehow cannot live in such an environment. I'm much more restless creatively and I'm not a joiner of clubs. (Anon_60, interview)

In the many cases, just as in this one, the view was that where there is not a clear identity to the composer's work as a whole, there is a problem of uncertainty for commissioners. Indeed, the perceived propensity for prestigious commissioners to favour those with a clearly defined place in the field can be reformulated as a criticism of a lack of risk-taking, and a consequent lack of potential for creativity and disengagement of audiences. In responding to Sound and Music's commissioning survey, one impassioned composer expressed this sentiment:

Put quite frankly—the lack of long-term strategic thinking and professionalism shown by the parties involved suggests that vanity is really the name of the game. As a result, many of our most prominent composers in the UK are bland, safe, boring carbon copies of the last that keep the machine running well where it does. Ensembles, funding bodies, judging panels and composers alike can all be seen peddling the safe option, and this aspiration to mediocrity is stifling everyone's imaginations.

It is my heart-felt belief that a great deal of the commissions receiving public funds this year are not really emotionally appreciated by anyone. The whole machine of churning out new and safe music will just roll on ad infinitum and into a bleak irrelevancy for the rest of the world. Repeat performances are almost non-existent, we're robbing ourselves of a rich performance-practice and history, and nobody can remember a damn thing from one new work to the next. (Sound and Music, 2015)

Solicited commissions and Risk Mitigation

Very few composers, however, are represented by cultural intermediaries. In the same Sound and Music commissioning survey, just 8.8% of composers reported that they were represented by someone else (a publisher, agent, or gallery) in the management of their works. Of these just 3.9% were with a publisher who handles the development of their commissions. In this context, the solicited commission provides risk mitigation for a commissioning body by decreasing the freedom of the composer at the point of commitment to the commission.

In these instances, the composer is not approached, but instead solicits the commission (usually in response to a solicitation on the part of the commissioner). Although this is perhaps a less recognisable type of commission, it is by far the most common and involves the commissioner creating a scheme (a call for scores or a residency, for example) to which the composer applies. The application might involve submitting a proposal for the piece, a C.V., or some past works, or even submitting the finished work itself in the case of competitions. It may also involve the composer paying an application fee. Competitions might be disputably called commissions, given that the work is created without any agreement of payment (and, in most cases, there will be no payment involved), but this is simply the extreme end of the risk mitigations of commissioners rather than as a discrete process. The solicited commission (including competitions) requires an upfront investment of time and energy by the composer with no guarantee of any kind of return on the investment. This weakens the composer's control over the work compared to the case of an unsolicited commission, sometimes even having to invest financially in entering a competition in the form of an application fee.

The feeling of lack of power was expressed by one composer, who advocated for a greater move towards the commissioning over the competition model:

It would be great to do away with competitions, prizes, and the like, and replace these with a commissioning model. Even when these opportunities are advertised as free to participate, it still ends up creating a pay-to-play scenario as it self-selects for composers who can afford to take time off of work, travel, self-publish, etc. I have turned down opportunities for lack of my own funds to become involved, similarly spent money I could not well afford to take part in other opportunities. If opportunities could at minimum not put me way out of pocket, that would be ideal. (Sound and Music, 2015)

Similarly, the investment of time in soliciting commissions (in the form of grant applications) was seen explicitly by another composer as speculative: “[I would like to see] less of a need to rely on gambling (the main source of arts council funding) and on chance (the means by which commission money is raised...grant applications are also a gamble).” (Sound and Music, 2015/ ellipsis in original)

The application fee is perhaps one of the most widely and voraciously detested commissioning practices, being seen as a way of ensembles financially propping themselves up at the expense of the youngest and least established composers—the composers, that is, who are least in a position to provide that finance:

It has long been a safe option for many ensembles to [...] operate pricey competitions for 'emerging' composers - and to generally treat the composer community like crap, rather than taking risks with them. It is an absolute crime that many composers end up paying for the upkeep of non-entity organisations, judging panels, ensemble fees etc. and that all of the risk in creating new work is shouldered by composers. (Sound and Music, 2015)

The competition can be seen as a situation in which the composer has relatively little power, having no choice but to invest all their time (and often some money) upfront with no guarantee of reward—in other words, to gamble.

This is the mechanism with which administrative rationalisation has the greatest affinity. The competition needs no belief in the artist; the product is there, ready to hand over, before it is considered. The creation of the product before its purchase is a supremely rational demand for risk mitigation: from the moment the entries come in, the competition organiser may plan out the route to the ends of the project with near certainty. The objectifying—the grammatisation—of the decisions made by the composer take away all uncertainty around the fickle process of creativity and lay the now petrified artistic judgement on the desk of the administrative clerk. For these reasons, the competition is seen as something young composers do—those who don't have any other choice and who haven't yet build the credible weight of capital to receive unsolicited commissions. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that participation in competitions was fairly rare for the composers I interviewed, who were largely fairly well established (having become sufficiently so to gain a university position).

More common were other, milder forms of solicited commission. These are a compromise between the composer and the commissioner's risk burden. The composer would write a proposal, often in response to a call for proposals. This would outline the idea behind the

proposed piece, how it fits with the given brief, and perhaps also how it would relate to the composer's wider body of work. The proposal is a way of illustrating the idea behind the work without the composer having to speculatively invest their time in actually creating it before they are commissioned. It also carries with it the possibility of a collaborative relationship between composer and performers in the form of workshops or residencies, which were widely considered to be extremely valuable experiences.

The speculative investment by composers is lesser than that required by competitions, but there is still a considerable effort required in order to devise and articulate such proposals. A fluency in the articulation of compositional ideas is important to succeeding in this process. This is especially pertinent here because it requires not only the ability to come up with an idea of an executable composition, but also the ability to put it into words. This, as I will illustrate, is an abiding theme of the composer-academic's work; it is present in the musical field, but is accentuated in several ways by academia. Of particular concern here is that this imperative to articulate compositional ideas is important to the process of soliciting commissions not just from artistic bodies, but also from academic bodies, especially universities themselves and research councils. The specific issues relating to research, applications, and risk will be considered more fully in Chapter Three.

Similarly, for the commissioner, the risk is lesser than in the case of unsolicited commissions (and so less belief in the composer themselves is required), but greater than in the case of competitions, where the finished work is there for them to appraise.

Creating Alternatives: Deflating the Stakes

Thus far I have only discussed the commission as being between a commissioning organisation and a composer, a process with high resource stakes in terms of the costs of the commission and performance of works. One workaround for this is simply to reduce the costs involved, thus reducing the stakes of the game, diminishing concern over speculation, and allowing for more risk taking. In particular, this deflationary approach often involves creating opportunities through peer-to-peer relationships with other musicians. A great many works were started in this way through informal personal contact where ideas and opportunities emerged from the interactions and bonds with others. Some examples of these would be the composer whose ex-student got in touch to ask for a piece for an upcoming recital, or the

request for scores made in the pub by a member of a visiting ensemble, or the performer-composer relationship that sprung up after a concert that included the latter's music.

This often was a way of generating composition and performance opportunities in a field where there are relatively few formal commissions. One composer referred to it as a "survival mechanism" as opposed to the "traditional chamber orchestral situation", in which area "opportunities are narrowing." (Anon_65, interview) Even so, it was not seen as second rate, or as a compromise, as good will often allowed a more sustained and collaborative relationship between composers and performers to develop (rather than a situation in which the commissioning body finances a set amount of rehearsal time to be undertaken when the composition is complete).

[I] largely ignore [calls for scores ...] because I'm in the fortunate position these days where I have an upcoming series of pieces that I'm writing. There's always a couple of things on the horizon and I am slowly [...] learning that it's better to devote my time to [...] nurturing those relationships than just randomly sending off pieces into the aether. (McLaughlin, interview)

This emergence of work through relationships can be seen as a bypass of the scale outlined above, which relates to commissioning through formal channels and so sees composition as being a transactional relationship between an organisation and a composer. By co-creating opportunities with low stakes (often working with very few performers for little or no commission fee), composers remove the risk burden on themselves and their commissioners. Such an approach is facilitated by patronage, in this case that of the university.

Electronic music (often not needing performers and being easily disseminated digitally) can also be composed more easily without the need to engage with commissioning. One such composer outlined this advantage in full:

I think acousmatic music is a different situation from instrumental composition. Instrumental composition requires instrumentalists which means that financially it's a very tricky question. [...] The financial requirements of doing instrumental composition are significantly greater than acousmatic composition, so [...] the opportunity is something very different with instrumental composition. You need composers [and] performers, who somehow are willing to give you their time. There are rehearsals needed, maybe there's travel needed, there's all sorts of things needed [...] and so opportunity means something very different in those situations. You need somebody who's willing to do it to start with. Acousmatic music doesn't have any of

that. [...C]ommissioning is the obvious example: if one is a professional or semi-professional instrumental composer you need [to be commissioned] in part because you need to have your time paid for but almost more importantly you need [...] a way of engaging with performers. [... O]therwise as a composer you end up getting performers just to help you out or you end up paying your performers, in which case I don't know where the money is coming from. [In a]coustic music, none of that happens. So to some extent having opportunities isn't a question. (Andean, interview)

The lack of material requirements to make music allows the stakes to be deflated, and so the composer is more able to retain control over their work. To achieve this in acoustic music, the scale of the performance forces is reduced (most often to a single performer). This small scale also facilitates an inexpensive collaborative approach in order to circumvent the narrow opportunities for formal commissioning. However, this collaborative approach itself involves a negotiation of control over the music. This relationship between composer and performer constitutes the second scale of control, which I will elaborate on in the following section.

The commissioning relationship (the relationship where significant resources are at stake) is transactional, varies in speculative investment by one party or the other, and involves an imbalance of power between the composer and the organisation and a consequent reliance on institutionalised capital. One response to these scarce opportunities is to diminish the stakes by focussing instead on nurturing collaborative relationships in order to create opportunities that are both greater in number and often more rewarding as artistic experiences.

3.2 Compositional Process

The scale which is operative in the social process of composing (Figure 3) is based on the degree to which the composer cedes control over the decisions made in creating a composition to other agencies (typically the performer). At one end of this scale is the individualist composer who controls all (or the vast majority) of the parameters of the musical event. At the other end is a flattened hierarchy where the boundary between composer and performer dissolves in a moment of equal collaboration (and in the middle, of course, fall all actual compositional methods).

Composer control <-----> **Performer control**

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| Directive/Individualist Composition | Disrupted Individualist Composition | Collaborative Composition |
| High degree of specificity | Some specificity with room for flexibility | High degree of freedom |
| Highly differentiated hierarchy in the role of judgements in the process of composition | Disrupted hierarchy, but the composer remains in control ultimately | Flat hierarchy in the compositional process |
| Authority centred on the individual composer (clear division of labour) | Authority centred on the composer but with a degree of legitimate freedom for other actors | Distributed authority (no clear division of labour) |
| Planned in advance | Possibility of limited improvisation and of planned surprise | Possibility of any degree of improvisation and of entirely unanticipated events |
| e.g. Electroacoustic fixed media composition | e.g. string quartet which is workshopped with the performers | e.g. collectively devised small ensemble piece |

Figure 3. Scale of control in compositional process

This scale of control draws heavily on Sam Hayden and Luke Windsor’s (2007) study of collaboration. Their effort is also to highlight the socialised nature of the compositional process, uncovering “the conflict between an idealized liberal notion of the individual and subjective compositional act and the institutional, cultural and economic forces needed to realize its production in performance—a tension that can come to the foreground in a collaborative artistic situation.” (Hayden & Windsor, 2007, p. 38) They formulate three categories of compositional process: directive, interactive, and collaborative composition.

Directive composition—this refers to the conventional concept of a composer as the individual authority of a work. The composer in this model is a non-consulting authority. ‘Directive composition’ is a suitably neutral term, but to parallel what will be discussed in Chapter Five, one might call this a dictatorial (with instruction given by diktat).

Interactive composition—in this category, the composer embraces a degree of consultation, abdicating a portion of their power to listen to the feedback from others, or to give freedom in certain areas. As Hayden and Windsor describe it, this category, however, still involves the composer retaining ultimate authorship over the

work. For this reason, I refer to this category as ‘disrupted individualist composition’, as the individual’s control remains.

Collaborative composition—this is the ultimate abdication of authorship. Here, the composer works with others in a peer-to-peer way. Each actor’s remit is open and flexible, and their spheres of activity overlap (in extremis, to the point of being indistinguishable). The main example held up by Hayden and Windsor is of collective improvisation.

This general aspect at issue here comes down to the control which the composer retains or distributes. In this respect, the determinative deliberations of the acousmatic composer’s process exemplify composition at its most authorially controlled. However should not be mistaken for the ideal typical version of a controlled piece. The acousmatic composer has all sorts of interference in their compositional process that could be argued to disrupt their control; the limitations of the technology used, the interaction with sonic accidents (trial and error being an essential part of the process in most cases), and the aforementioned acoustic circumstances all disrupt the composer’s control.

At the other end of the scale, unstructured collective improvisation represents a flattened hierarchy as no particular player is the composer, but rather they each are responding to rather than obeying the others. Again, this should not be mistaken for a claim that there is no kind of control: the lack of explicit plan belies the shared expectations and tastes whose roots relate to power differentials present in the group and in the field at large.

Nevertheless, differential in the level of control between acousmatic music and improvisation is illustrated by the words of a composer who explicitly split their practice into two—the controlled and the improvisatory:

I have a couple of [...] central poles [that are] quite far apart. Part of my practice is as an acousmatic composer, so electro-acoustic [...] music, which is studio composition. [... But] a lot of my practice is also very [different; it is ...] free improvisation using [...] found objects, sometimes with electronics sometimes with piano [...] So those are my two main poles which are sort of quite opposite: one involves maximum control and the other involves minimal control (Andean, interview)

On the one hand, complete control on the part of the composer, on the other hand there is no hierarchy—the individual is equal in creating music to the other performer-improvisers. It is worth noting that I am not describing control of others—except insofar as this kind of

power is required to control the performance (that is, when other performers are involved)—but rather control over the sounding result.

To move from the left (directive) of the continuum towards the right (collaborative) requires the composer to abdicate some level of decision making. For Gottschalk (2016, p. 16), this is related to an aspect of non-subjectivity whereby control over the music is displaced from the composer themselves, and thus their own subjectivity does not determine the sonic result or its interpretation. In other words, the composer must nominate something to disrupt or overrule their will. The disruption that is introduced to achieve this could be an animate agency, such as that of a performer, or an inanimate agency, such as that of a dataset.

Most commonly, the agency interposed is that of a performer. Composers can loosen notational control (which can in any case never be absolute) over the actions of the performers, allowing them the freedom to exercise their judgement. Such a loosening control over the music is based on an assessment of risk that is mitigated by trust that a performer will make a *good* decision. This assurance, just as with commissioning, can be gained by constraining the performer or by writing for specific trusted performers. One composer described their process for determining the level of control appropriate for a particular notation as being determined on the basis of its capacity to exclude poor choices:

[G]enerally if I'm talking to my students [...] quite often they'll say 'improvise around these notes' and I'll say 'well, can you imagine that being done really well?' and they all say 'yeah, absolutely!' I'll say, 'can you imagine somebody following those same instructions that are there and it sounding really bad?' and usually eventually they say 'well, yeah.' and I say 'well, hey why are you leaving the possibility of that not acceptable one happening? Just write the one that you know is going to work.' [...] it's about knowing the sound you want with sufficient clarity [... so that you can find] the simplest way to put the information down. (Anon_5, interview)

For this composer, the performers are an unknown quantity in most of their work, with pieces being written to commission from an ensemble and collaboration playing a fairly meagre role, so they ensure that their intention for the music is not compromised by allowing the performer the freedom to make the wrong choice. Freedom is only given when the decision doesn't matter to the overall effect. Another composer described a piece that involved choices as a “well sculpted garden” where choices could be made, but ultimately one will always be enjoying the scenery (Moore, interview). These and others serve to demonstrate that there is

flexibility in the level of control but that the degree of freedom often keeps the ultimate authority with the composer. This is the disrupted individualist composition.

Moving further right on the scale, greater freedom was allowed to performers in game-pieces, a field in which several interviewed composers worked. In these pieces, the performers were asked to make decisions according to certain rules and sometimes in order to fulfil certain objectives. The composer designed an environment in which performers performed, but in which actions were to some degree left unspecified. The music emerged then from the interaction of performer and game-environment. A difficulty arising from this is that, as one composer working in this area put it, “when you’re playing a game, you are looking for that optimal way to do it and you’re not always thinking about the aesthetics of your behaviour.” (Turowski, interview) The composer is therefore charged as the game-setter with the task of reconciling the game-objectives with aesthetic results. In this sense, the environment is still not collaborative in the truest sense because the composer is designing the game in such a way that, again, the decisions of the performers will produce an acceptable result.

The alternative to this aesthetically-minded game designer solution is to make the process of navigating the game itself the subject of the spectator’s gaze. In other words, a composer might cross into a type of piece where the game is known to (or worked out by) the audience and so the decisions made by the performers become evident. One composer, who designs pieces that are rule-based environments for decision making described this process:

[T]he intended result is not about me getting the people to do the thing I want. [...] The intention in these pieces is to set up a situation where their [...] personalities, idiosyncrasies, decisions, social capital [become] apparent. So they're quite open spaces. [...] A lot of the pieces aren't goal-based so they [...] just create an environment for decision-making and the result of that is whatever [...] decisions] people make. And of course there is a decision making [on the part of the composer] because you're saying you can do these things but not those things and that [...] creates the walls (Saunders, interview)

The actual actions of the performers are not directed here; the material of the composition is no longer primarily specific sounds, but rather the social behaviours of the performers. Although James Saunders also specified that the sounds were important, significantly, they were also “markers for the sort of behaviours, so [...] they are ways of articulating action essentially” (Saunders, interview). The audience becomes spectators of a game. In this sense, this

composer's work is akin to the idea touched on by Jenny Gottschalk of nonfictional music, that is to say "music that is about the time and place in which it occurs." (Gottschalk, 2016, p. 4)

Giving the performers clearly observable agency makes the event about an encounter with them, rather than with the composer via their rendering; they strip off the black concert dress and look the audience directly in the eye. That said, the 'work'—being the performance game—is still the composer's who is thereby exercising an indirect control over the performer; rather than controlling their actions by direct order, the composer designs an environment thereby channelling the performers' actions. Thus, it still falls in the broad bracket of disrupted individualist composition.

As these kind of freedoms increase, the boundary between composer and performer blur as the responsibility for the judgements that make up the performance become increasingly shared. Moving from the 'disrupted individualist' model to the 'collaborative' model means the notion of composer as author—as authority—disappears in the anarchic interactions of collective creation.

Distributing creativity and procedural control

Whatever position on this scale the composer takes, it is by their own consent that they take it. 'Control' is not necessarily used to describe their ability to determine the relations of power in the compositional process, but rather to their influence over the musical event; the control (or lack thereof) over the sounding music is agreed upon and very often orchestrated by the composer. The question is, then, what are the motivations to choose one particular form of compositional power relations over another?

Giving up control can be a powerful creative stimulant for both composer and performer. Ceding of elements of control by both parties "provides some resistance" and "noise into the system." (Turowski, interview) Beyond the creative reasons for employing collaborative methods, there are undoubtedly more practical strategic factors at play as well. Grants and performers may themselves require collaboration and sustained collaborative relationships can give rise to a greater number of opportunities (as discussed above).

In addition, collaboration can lend itself to the articulation of process required by the university. Articulation—grammatisation— allows work to be acknowledged and valued in a rationalised regime; compositional processes which involve novel modes of social interaction—that is, which explore the relations at work in the creative process—are more readily articulated

than those which rely purely on a non-discursive authority, that is, the composer's aesthetic judgement. This proposal will be discussed in more depth in later (see *The Effect of the Institutional Pressure of Research*, page 130).

However, the distribution of agency in creating sounds can also conceal an important element of authorial control on the part of the composer. In other words, highly collaborative works can shift the emphasis of the work's appreciation from the experience of the sounds themselves to the social processes by which they are created—processes that can be created and attributed to the composer. This is an area in which the composer can undermine the concept of capital through the embodied critique of the work concept, whilst creating works comprised of processes which nevertheless ultimately become capital themselves.

The initial implied critique is of the Work Concept—that is, the ideological framework that gained prevalence around the turn of the Nineteenth Century which frames music as objects rather than action. The work concept emphasises the work's durability (Cook, 2012; Goehr, 1992), its autonomy (Clarke, 2012; Dahlhaus, 1982), and the valorised composer genius (Talbot, 2000). The development of this ideology in classical music amounted to a transformation of composition from pure labour (that is, producing ephemeral performance) to producing capital. Though appropriated and transformed in various ways in neoliberal society (Ritchey, 2019), this framework remains an enduring ideology, which “snatches eternity from the jaws of evanescence” (Cook, 2012, p. 188); under such a conceptual, social, and material regime, the Work—the product of musical labour—becomes ownable and valuable capital.

Collaborative approaches deflate the Author, and so throw the social contingency of the music's creation, undermining ideas of cultural transcendence and inviting questions around the durable value of the work. The composer, in other words, can undermine the work concept by ‘snatching evanescence from the jaws of eternity’ and, in so doing, pursue what Peter Woods describes as a defining drive of experimental music, an ideological stance which “continuously challenges the foundations of western classical music.” (Woods, 2019, p. 459) This tendency to critique of systems of capital was highlighted by musicologist Alan Lessem:

Today's composers have attempted to subvert this objectification of what they do by allowing for accidents of performance to impinge on the composition, and by encouraging performers to avoid mechanical or conditioned responses in their recreation of the score. Such attempts to overturn the closed, autonomous work and replace it with something closer to music-making may collide, however, with market forces and those of media production, which tend to freeze human gestures and reduce

them to commodities. (Lessem in Burckhardt Qureshi, Lessem, Beckwith, Fisher, & Truax, 1989, p. 121)

Ceding control over the musical event is an act of resistance against the commodification of the work, but also has the effect of making a spectacle from the actions in themselves:

the thing which I'm really pleased about [...] apart from whether people like it or not, is [...] that it starts conversations about how power structures within groups work, so people become very interested in that. Aside of the sound of it [...] it does what I'm hoping it will do, which is make people think a little bit about how they work with others in groups. (Saunders, interview)

Saunders frames a meta-discourse on the social situation of musical performance (and on social situations more generally) and in so doing creates a directive work at the level of the experience of the social production of the music. The distinction between more directive composition and the disrupted work is analogous to the difference between owning the script of a television show and owning the format of a quiz show. In this way, one can theorise this kind of composition as giving rise to capital in the form of the meta-discursive work.

For another composer, collaborative composition with a non-musician community gave rise to a dissolved division between composer and contributor:

The piece is indelibly linked with them. They're not people I wrote for, you know? They made the piece, I couldn't have done it without them. [...] Yeah, so it's not a completely non-hierarchical approach, but it's definitely a [...] more distributed idea of authorship. (Anon_33, interview)

More than this, however, the Work is under assault here in the idea that its value is in its final form—that it is important as an artistic object. For this composer, the actual performance of the work growing out of these projects was not important. What was important was the experience of the process:

Interviewer: If the product was never heard, would that affect the value of the project for you?

Interviewee: It's a very good question, because that's something that we are continually asking ourselves. [...] I'm coming to the point of thinking 'no, it doesn't

matter.' [...] But I'm not the only person in charge of answering that question. Anybody and everybody involved in any one of those projects is an author of that work and for some people it matters a great deal[.] (Anon_33, interview)

In this way, the experience of social interactions are the valuable part of the work. The musical composition is contingent on the community making it, but the work—that which comprises the composer's capital—is the method of community transformation they have developed. Again, this shows the importance of meta-discourse in the creation of capital.

In these instances, then, the composers create capital no less than if they were conventionally directive. They are still successful in attaining commissions, project funding, and (by definition in this project) academic positions. In discussing the implications of those composers who resist or undermine the work concept (a question Goehr raises), Michael Talbot pithily articulates the problem with reference to the archetypical advocate of giving up control over a musical work: "John Cage never sacrificed an ounce of fame or royalty income by instructing performers to be free" (Talbot, 2000, p. 184).

By emaciating their own authority, the composer creates a new body of Work, one that deals in a social meta-discourse, inviting the observer to see the creation of the music, rather than the music as a shallow spectacle. Whilst the directive composer controls the specifics of decision-making (a tightly ruled grammatised practice), those loosening control over the specifics of sounds can grammatise an environment whose fascination is in the decisions of performers within the confines of the composer's game. This field allows the composer to nurture a new body of capital, one not over-grazed by the classical mainstream. By divesting themselves of their traditional capital, they can find new pastures in an overcrowded field of power.

3.3 Ideas of Audience and Reception

The final scale of control—concerning the involvement of audience—is not objectively manifest in the process of composition itself (there is no direct intervention of other agencies) but rather it concerns the idea of legitimate reception's role in the composer's judgement. Despite a caricatured idea of the 'ivory tower' composer (largely in relation to those working under academic patronage cf. McClary, 1989; Nash, 1957, 1961a, 1961b) as one who does not seek

(or even actively shuns) audience approval, I will aim to show that audience *per se* is always important; the real question is *who is the legitimate audience?* Even for Milton Babbitt, who is generally seen to have given the archetypical statement of the ‘ivory tower’ composer (Babbitt, 2003), there was a legitimate audience whose judgement mattered: an audience of his peers.

In line with this, rather than a scale between the composer whose decisions are made regardless of the audience and the composer whose decisions are made to please the audience, I formulate this as a scale that relates to the definition of the legitimate audience (see Figure 4). On this scale, the legitimacy granted by the audience is always important—there is no transcending such social concerns—but the question becomes *whose* reception matters, which embeds compositional work always in the material-social world. On the left hand side, the legitimate audience is localised in the extreme to the composer themselves. On the right, the legitimate audience is completely unlocalised to the composer. In essence, this is again about hierarchy: for some composers, some actors’ judgements of the composition is more important than others; for others, all judgements are more or less the same. This relates to the differing material and cultural economies of different compositional worlds.

Composer Control <-----> **Audience Control**

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Self-referential composition | Qualified audience reference | Audience-referential composition |
| Legitimate audience is defined as the composer | Legitimate audience is defined as a group near to the composer's position in the cultural field | All audience is equally legitimate |
| The composer only needs their own tastes; reception by others is not their concern | The composer can mainly rely on their own judgement; positive reception results from commonalities between composer and legitimate audience | The composer sets aside their own tastes completely in favour of that which will be well received |
| Responsibility for reception lies with the audience | Responsibility for the reception lies with the composer, but the legitimate audience must have the legitimate cultural competences | Responsibility for reception lies with the composer |

Figure 4. Scale of power in the relationship between the composer and audience during the production of their music

Self-referential (localised) audience

Firstly, on the far left of the scale, the composer seeks to maximise their agency by defining legitimate judgement as purely their own:

Interviewer: [...] is the audience important to you?

Interviewee: Yeah, that's a big question that comes up [...]. I think it's really important to write the music you want to write. [...] I think if you're trying to please people, you're not going to get anywhere because 'who are you trying to please?' and 'how can you possibly know what their tastes are?' and, besides which, it kind of impedes your creative freedom, I mean it's important to feel [as] free as possible. (R. Whalley, interview)

This could be further interrogated as an idea by asking what constitutes the personal judgement of the composer. For Georgina Born, the rhetoric of autonomy amongst composers concealed a communal legitimisation whereby the composer's work appeared to them "fortuitously and prophetically attuned to the desires of the legitimate sphere" (Born, 1997, p. 487). In other words, this freedom is conditioned by the legitimising audience of specialists in which the composer is embedded. The legitimate autonomous artist arises because they share a cultural ground with others around them.

Authenticity is a matter of social proximity. An individual is most clearly intelligible to those immediately around them. The further one looks from their position, the fewer the common cultural terms between them and the actors found there. To communicate with a group who are not immediately around them, the actor would have to put on an accent for the sake of the game. This, in essence, is inauthenticity. Authentic expression would, in this understanding, be expected to communicate only with those who have the same cultural competences—a highly localised audience.

In this view, the legitimate critic is the composer themselves and any conscious second-guessing of the audience's reaction can be seen to compromise to the compositional process:

[The audience is] very important and it's of zero importance insofar as I think the biggest mistake would be to start to second guess what an audience wants and try and pander to that because then you start to write stuff that's not as committed and as honest as it should be. But that's not to say that if I write a piece that's very committed

and honest and I perform it in public, the audience hate it, of course that upsets me, and if they love it it's a great thrill. But it has to be that way round; it has to be first of all the piece pleases me in so far as I'm happy that it achieved what I wanted it to achieve and that I've done the best I can with it and if anybody else is then likewise moved by it, that's an absolute joy. It's a kind of [an] affirmation, but it's not the driving force behind writing. (Best, interview)

Success, here, depends on an understanding localised audience, which by its inherent cultural affinities will allow the composer the legitimacy of being well received without requiring their repositioning. At the extreme end of this localisation scale was Eric Egan:

I think as a composer, you need to ignore the audience. You can't ignore the performers, it's important to work with them but if you're going to do what I think you have to do as an artist, which is to present yourself naked on stage in front of your audience and give them a really true artistic experience of what you have created, then you need to write something that you want to hear and if they like it that's great and if they don't, they don't. I'm not saying you ignore audience, but you ignore the audience—you think of yourself as the audience. (Egan, interview)

In other words, the audience is not unimportant, it is just extremely localised.

Defined legitimate audience

Moving to the right on the scale, many composers do think of an audience's judgement in composing, but may define that legitimate audience as a specific group:

I think, when I'm composing, I do imagine an audience. I imagine an audience, maybe a very educated one, but an audience, thinking 'oh, I thought he was going to do that, but he did that and that's better.' (Anon_18, interview)

Here, the intervention of the imagined audience's judgement in the compositional process is legitimate because they share a cultural frame with the composer. The audience is still localised, but is imagined as being made up of others.

Another, more extraordinary example of an attempt to re-define the audience for which a work is intended is from a composer of electronic and algorithmic works in a discussion of the outlets for some of their work:

In some ways I feel a bit independent because I've always got routes to create computer music where you don't need any audience or performers, you just do it. I did a whole album I released in 2018 with the expectation that no-one would ever listen to it. All I really wanted to do was get it into all the places like iTunes to corrupt their systems. Genre recognition algorithms automatically state whether something is pop or rock or jazz or classical, so you deliberately make pieces that splice fast between these different things; the album was called *Genre Fiction* to make my suspicion of genre assignment clear. In other algorithmic composition projects I have produced pieces that I didn't even listen to myself (Collins, interview)

In my fieldwork this is a unique approach to audience. On the face of it, this could be read as defying the need for music to have an audience. However, it would make more sense to see the genre-assigning algorithm which Nick Collins seeks to disrupt as the audience. Can a computer program be an audience? Leaving that open, the question is not whether or not an algorithm (or indeed, perhaps more reasonably, the people who end up using the algorithms' outputs) *is* an audience, but how it can be a *legitimate* audience. The legitimacy here is more to do with subversion than with acceptance by a mainstream, something that was consistent with this composer's approach—a Wild Card.

Non-localised audience

As we move further right on the scale, the privileged legitimacy of a particular audience localised to the composer becomes less and less important. With this, a democratisation can take place where a composer's legitimacy is often based on a mass appeal, rather than on the judgements of defined specialists. It should be reiterated that, as with all of these scales, the extremes represent ideal types: there are always those with more legitimate judgements than others and it is doubtful if the composer may ever lose entirely their voice in the crowd. However, with these caveats, the following quote illustrates the quite clear divide in approaches to audience from the perspective of a composer who works entirely in commercial art worlds:

What I admire about composers of “art music” is that they seem to not care what people think of their work, whereas all I care about is what people think—it must be amazingly freeing. If an audience, director or producer doesn't like my material, I don't get paid or hired again. [...]n many ways I'm envious of the freedom those writers enjoy where they can be funded to write whatever they want, to apply any kind of crazy composition technique without worrying about if anyone actually wants to listen to it, let alone pay for it. I mean, I've nothing against that approach but I don't have that luxury. Every time I write, there's a voice in my head asking if anyone is going to be interested in this. I have to write material that a producer sees money in before it can even get to an audience to see if I can land another job or earn any income. (Maltby, interview)

Commercial music is a brazen resource economy, whereas art music is more often an economy of legitimacy constructed, as for Booth and Kuhn (1990), by patronage. In approaches like that of Ethan Maltby, the audience is not legitimising because they themselves have a particular position in the field, rather they are primarily interchangeable financial units (often mediated by gatekeepers such as producers). In other less commercial fields, audience members can have a highly differentiated idea of value to the composer, contributing to the ‘economy of belief’—that is, of legitimation—with their relative cultural heft.

However, there are art music composers who explicitly prize mass appeal and actively involve consideration of audience in their work. This is not necessarily an economic concern, but rather a deliberate vocation. Here, electronic art music comes to play a role as a mediator between the ideals of art and commercial music. It takes up this ambiguous position partly because it is less inextricably entwined with the productive mechanisms of acoustic art music, with no orchestra, no performers, few administrators, and no vast mechanism of funding those parts of the process. This affords a certain independence from the economy of legitimacy:

[I]t might be that in reality in private [an acoustic art music composer] is always dancing around to Abba, but [they're] not going to say as much in this sort of academic meeting. [...] The things that are important to get the concert opportunities depend on going with the party line [...] whereas I feel a little bit more independent because it doesn't matter to me whether I get a commission from [... an] ensemble, so I can weigh in on the side of some new mutant form of Dubstep. (Anon_44, interview)

Approaches that err on the side of audience control, as far as art music is concerned, do seem to be found more prevalently in electronic art music. In the most ardent advocacy for the

paramount importance of the composer considering the audience at every stage, one acousmatic composer, Leigh Landy, described the mission to grow audiences and get composers to write in a way that a wider audience could approach as his “*casus belli*”.²² He extending the tailoring of works to the audience further than any other composer interviewed, asking

‘[I]s there a way that you can optimise what you are offering to them so that [the audience] can benefit most from it?’ [...] One way of dealing with that is choosing your pieces very carefully [...] another one, which is much more radical, which I call the flexible work, is altering work so that it better addresses an audience. That involves music that doesn’t stay the way it is forever. [...] You can amend, you can mould, you can bend works [to] take into account the knowledge level, the experience level, the cultural background, if there is a quasi-homogeneous public. [...] Not just take my works for them to consume (Landy, interview)

Here, legitimacy is not localised around the composer, but the ideal is to address any audience on their terms. However, this view in itself still seems a lone view and this composer sets themselves against their characterisation of the music of those, like Babbitt, who defend and sustain the elite tastes by writing “academic music”:

What is [...] academic music? Is it music made by people who happen to be getting a salary at a university, therefore not needing to go to the Arts Council to get all of their daily bread, or is it music that’s made by people, mainly working in higher education organisations that is so complex and so antithetical that the so called acquired taste is probably never going to come for virtually everybody on earth? If that’s what academic is, may it die. (Landy, interview)

In every case outlined here, the question is not *if* the composer cares about their audience (and so allows their decisions to be directed by the tastes of the anticipated audience) but is *who* the audience is about whom they care. If they share sufficient common cultural ground, then the composer can write for themselves and in so doing approximate in their own judgement the reception of the audience; if the audience is to be much broader or more distant, the composer may have to stifle their own preferences in favour of the anticipated tastes of the audience.

²² It has also been an abiding concern in Landy’s publications (1994; 2007; 2019)

This reformulation contributes significantly to the idea of art music: in particular, the cultural localism that enables authenticity could allow unexpected parallels to be drawn to the music of any small community: much traditional and underground music as well as art music may then fall into the same category of highly localised appeal.

Approaches to audience can differ by context. In particular, the commercial and art value systems play a significant role. That is to say, the audience plays a different role in art music, where they are involved in the sharing of a personal exploration, compared to commercial music, where they are spectators being presented with a product for consumption:

I think [the approach to audience] really depends on context. I think each musical style asks that question and answers it in its own way. So for instance when I was in a rock band there was the idiom of spectacle and of intensity and direct engagement, whereas a more electro-acoustic piece or experimental work, I'm actually coming from a place of my own curiosity with the music and I want to share that curiosity, and I'm not that concerned about direct engagement. I'm not telling something very direct [...] so [...] the performance space [...] is actually an intersection of an exploration, so a sharing of an exploration. [...] I think there's a different type of conversation, a different approach to spaces and where the audience is within that. (Anon_59, interview)

This reinforces the idea of an autonomy division between the art and commercial worlds: in the former, the composer feels themselves to be sharing their curiosity (with, by implication, those who are similarly curious) and thus an *authentic* piece of themselves—their *own* curiosity—whereas in the rock band, the intention to create a spectacle, which “only shows us what it wants us to see, and will attempt to reduce all the troubling complexity of an event to a representative image that works in the spectacle’s favour.” (S. Cooper, 2012, p. 23) In this sense, commercial music (as spectacle) tends to avoid concerning its consumers with questions of its own existence—the problems of authorship, creative process, and control. The significance of the composer’s authenticity may recede because only the facade is significant. Thus, a non-localised audience may be embraced. Where authenticity is important and genuinely pursued by the composer, however, the audience must be in some sense localised in order for them to step from the product into the creative process.

3.4 Conclusion

These three dimensions of control form three layers of intervention in the composer's process. At the first level there is the control over the whole process—the form, brief, and procedure of the composer's work. This is to do with the work's genesis. Second, there is the process itself—the creation of the musical event. This is related to the former category, but deals with the relationships of those actually involved in the decision-making that leads to this or that sound. Thirdly, there are the internal cognitive processes of the composer: are they directed by a highly localised notion of reception, or does a wider audience play a role in their decision-making?

This scheme of variable control gives a tripartite model of the compositional process and the complex power relations at work: the socio-economic framing, the intra-personal creative process, and the internal creative process. At each level, there can be influences of different sorts. These influences are not purely those forced on the composer by material necessity; they are also elements of control willingly given up by the composer to other agencies. This is the central point in each of these three discussions: despite a pervasive ideal of composer control (of artistic freedom, that is), there are effective strategic behaviours that involve giving up such control: for the composer who is just starting out and lacks the legitimate authority to gain unsolicited commissions, the competition (with the requisite high speculative investment on their part and low chance of success) may be a worthwhile approach; for composers seeking to circumnavigate the formal channels of commissioning, diminishing their role as *The Composer* and creating a flattened hierarchy might allow them to engage in a collective compositional process based on mutual interest; and the composer who prioritises the tastes of a mass audience over their own, there can be considerable reputational and material reward. There are also equally good reasons for a composer retaining control.

These scales play into two ideal typical forms: where control is centred on the composer themselves without evident external intervention, this is ego-authoritative composition. Where other agencies evidently are at play in the formation of the music, the composer is exo-authoritative. These two types will become significant in drawing the themes from Part 2 together.

Using these bearings, one can start to understand the key dimensions of this field and how different forms and degrees of risk and gain lead to the construction of different formations of compositional practice. In the effort to re-socialise the idea of artists, such schematics as I

have presented here help to trace the social foundations of artistic practice and, in so doing, allow for a more controlled and nuanced account of what it is to be an artist. The crucial question now is: how do these approaches fare in the university?

Chapter 4: Compositional Practice and the Structures of the University

THERE IS A PREVALENT idea (not least amongst composers themselves) that the nature of the composer-academic's work is affected in no small way to their relationship to the university. I have referred to the composers studied here thus far as 'composer-academics'. This is to sidestep the associations that are often brought up by the idea of an 'academic-composer'. Essentially this is down to the ambiguity of the word 'academic' as a noun and an adjective; whereas I wish to use both words as nouns (indicating their dual identity), the term 'academic' is more likely to be interpreted as an adjective describing the kind of composer they are. I wished to keep these two intersecting identities as independent in order to problematise their relationship. However, in this chapter I will no longer evade this issue: what does being an academic (adj.) composer mean? In other words, what influence do the university organisation and the institutions of academia have on compositional work?

I have established already (see Chapter 2: Outlining the Field) that the field I am studying is made up of neither a random nor a representative sample of the compositional activities present in society at large. Rather, the representation is skewed towards art music composers—those heavily influenced by the titans of that world's history. They are not the whole story—many composers draw on and inhabit art worlds that derive from the history of commercial music (and some straddle this divide), but it is certainly true to say that these composers form the majority.

Whether there is such a thing as 'academic music' is debatable and ultimately a moot point here: there is objectively such a thing—the work of composers employed in the university—but the question here is whether there is such a thing as academic music where 'academic' links the social position of the composer to a tendency to compose in certain ways.

As throughout this thesis, I avoid direct musical analysis. Rather, what I am interested in are the classifications of music by the members of the field themselves. In this respect, the idea of 'academic music' was often seen as being used in a derogatory way, pointing to a needlessly obscure, abstract music:

I have an absolute allergy to anybody applying [... the adjective 'academic'] in a normative or judgmental way because I don't see the need for that adjective to have

some of the negative connotations it's acquired. [...] I've heard that adjective [...] to suggest technical rigour in the absence of originality and creativity, to suggest perhaps reference to a narrow body of musical repertoire, possibly associated with other musicians who teach at university, but [...], as I say, I really resist those uses of that term. (Anon_64, interview)

This composer in fact drew a parallel similar to the one used by Babbitt (2003), going on to say that

I love relating it to the hard Sciences. Imagine the absurdity of a mathematician complaining about a colleagues work being too academic. (Anon_64, interview)

This sees 'academic' as an adjective that ascribes a certain value system in order to denigrate the art world of the music which is created in academia.

The antipathy towards the idea of academic music as an insulated field has already been highlighted in the argument put forward by Landy, who went on to expand on this point in relation to the term 'academic music':

[I]f we make no attempt to get our work performed in non-academic settings at [...] real cultural events that are not attached to higher education, maybe we do deserve the term academic music.[...] Where's the heart? Where's the communication? Where's the thing to hold onto? If there's no discourse about that and it's only being played within then academic music is a valid term and it is a horrible thing. We worked ourselves into a bubble, and I'm sad about that because a lot of it has got amazing potential, a lot of it's ingenious and some of it communicates really well, but how do people know about that? (Landy, interview)

The music of academia is definitely a particular field with a peculiar value system giving rise to certain common themes that run across it. There are two angles from which to analyse these threads. The first is to approach it to look at the structural selection mechanisms required for a composer to enter the field—in this case, to become an academic. The question from this point of view would be 'how does one get to become a composer-academic, and what effect does that pathway have on the kind of compositional work these composers do?' The second angle is to address the particular pressures of an environment that encourage or compel particular behaviours. These two angles are, respectively, the structural and the direct influences on the

field.²³ The structural influences are far less likely to be recognised by the individuals in the field, acting as they do through aggregate influences spread over decades of education and socialisation. In contrast, direct influences are more likely to be recognised and felt as the exercise of power over the individuals concerned.

4.1 Structural Influences

I will begin with the angle of structural influence—in organisational institutionalism called ‘normative isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). It is worth, here, considering briefly the paths taken by composers to become composer-academics. All of the composers interviewed attended school until the end of sixth form (age 18) and went on to university or conservatoire. Most had some form of extra-curricular musical education as children, usually learning an instrument and in some cases having lessons in composition. Those who had pre-university extra-curricular tuition in composition tended to be working (at least at the time) in the realm of acoustic art music. The other formative experience during the youths of composers was playing in bands. A very few composers developed as autodidacts, who tended to be orientated towards the practice of popular music.

The vast majority completed their undergraduate degrees with only a few not specialising in music at that stage. All those who did not complete their undergraduate degrees did later complete an undergraduate degree. All but two composers interviewed had studied a postgraduate degree. Almost all composers interviewed had or were in the process of attaining a doctorate. The typical pathway, then, is for a composer to undergo specialised music education as a child, largely outside formal education, study music at university or conservatoire for a total of seven or eight years of full-time study, and so to mature into the field of the composer-academic—to become fully fledged and eligible—during their late twenties.

In this way, the constitution of the field is structured by the ordained cultural apprenticeship. Conventionally, composers are required to undergo around eleven years of formal academic study of music in school and then university (in England: O-Level/GCSE, A-level, undergraduate, masters, and PhD). This focusses, in the main, on the values and canon of Western classical music, with the central aspects revolving around its theory and history. This

²³ I use structural here in the sense of Bourdieu’s category of ‘objective relations’. This separates it from any kind of ‘structuralism’ which omits the constructedness of social structures.

knowledge is then mobilised in the other aspects of performance and composition, moving the engagement with the historical culture from understanding the genealogy of the practice to embodying it. This, perhaps to a greater extent than in other less practice-based disciplines, can be understood as having the effect of more deeply embedding cultural capital closer to the sense of self (that is, further away from conscious decision-making).

By engaging a practical fluency of historically-embedded production, the values and practices of the field are woven into not only the attribution of meaning, but into the physical relationship with instruments. As with the concept-structuring work done by language, the practice of music structures the physical and cerebral habitus of the musician; it roots the knowledge of the historical field in their abilities, and not just their knowledge. These abilities are required in examinations (again, often from a very young age in independent instrumental and theoretical tuition) as well as to get opportunities to perform, compose for others and enter institutions of higher education. At every stage, the competencies required by the field are seized not just by the mind, but also by the muscles of the fingers, the arm, and the diaphragm. It should be little surprise, given both the length of time involved and the importance of nurturing embodied habitual knowledge, that the field is populated by individuals that share, as their most defining homogeneity, a kinship of influence. This is the structural discipline of the field. It need not be that the composer who does not have this engrained competence is turned down, but rather that they are unlikely in the extreme to ever reach the level of accreditation (the institutionalisation of their cultural capital) at which they would be in a position, or even be aware of the possibility of seeking entry to the field. This, more than the active discipline of the restrictive field, is the key structural discipline of the art world of the composer-academic.

What, though, of the minority who do not conform to this model? There were composers, for example, who did not study music as undergraduates, or even in their schooling. There were composers who had large periods outside the university between degrees. Of these exceptions, as one might expect from the theory I am using, that they tended to conform less to the influence of academia's dominant musical culture; they could display traits of the wild-card, cross boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate culture. There were, however, far fewer of these kinds of composers than of those more resembling the archetype outlined above.

They also tended to be those few composers involved whose primary work in the university related to popular and commercial music. This is indicative of the contrasting value system which has run throughout my description of composition in the university: the comparatively quantifiable nature of success means the commercial composer is perhaps less

reliant on the recognition of their peers than is the art music composer. In terms of the structural selection of composers, then, this means that commercial music is far less reliant on the academic channels and so on the assimilation to a specific cultural norm.

The divide between commercial music and academically channelled art music is seen in the interesting cases of those composers—of which there were a handful—who had obtained doctorates from research institutions in the practice and research of art composition, but whose jobs involved primarily teaching popular and commercial music. For these composers, their experiences outside their academic studies in creating and performing commercial music were the most relevant to their teaching, but their doctorates granted them the academic legitimacy that appealed to institutions looking to improve their research production. There is an important conflict that this observation brings to light: younger universities tend to be those offering commercially orientated music courses; they are also those who are currently trying to build up their research activities. If universities are increasingly in an environment that values research—qualifications in which are mostly undertaken by art music composers—but are in a teaching environment that increasingly values the employability and attainment of technical skills of commercial music courses, then who do they recruit as composer-academics? It is these composers, who have the legitimacy of a research portfolio in art music as well as experience and success in areas of commercial music that will allow them to enter this Janus-faced role. The prediction—if I were to be as foolish as to make one—could be that this is only likely to be a short-term solution in the younger institutions that are subject to both of these pressures, and as they increase their research activities, so too may they increase their accreditation of research students in commercial music research, forming a new cohort to fill these roles who may to a far lesser extent feel themselves add odds with one or other part of their work. In other words, one can foresee a degree of academic drift (cf. Gellert, 1993; Harwood, 2010).

The structural discipline of the field (its elements of homogeneity) seems in large part to be down to both the long enculturation of the higher educational process with its constant rewards and sanctions that build up a sense of natural value and, to a lesser degree, to the selection of academics for their posts. As outlined earlier, academics often expressed a desire to diversify their department's curriculum by hiring experts in popular, film, and other kinds of commercial music. However, the evidence of this actually taking place, particularly in universities with a longstanding research-intensive culture, was scant.

4.2 *The Direct Influence of Research*

Turning to the direct influences on ‘academic-music’, perhaps the most controversial dimension of the composer’s relationship to academia is the idea of research. In the discussion that follows, I am concerned with what makes compositional work a valid currency in the university and, conversely, what diminishes its value as such. The primary influences on this valuation are the institutions of research.

Background

Turning to the direct influences on ‘academic-music’, perhaps the most controversial dimension of the composer’s relationship to academia is the idea of research. In the discussion that follows, I am concerned with what makes compositional work a valid currency in the university and, conversely, what diminishes its value as such. The primary influences on this valuation are the institutions of research.

In recent years debates around composition being undertaken as research have flared up in response to the shifting pressures of a changing institutional environment. Research monitoring—the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in its current form—has become an increasingly important tool in administration of the academic field since the inception of the Research Selectivity Exercise in 1986 (the precursor to the REF). The original impetus for this was the pervasive neoliberal logic wielded by the Conservative government. Since then it has been “insidiously successful in colonizing U.K. academic life” (Torrance, 2020, p. 771) over its seven subsequent iterations. The REF, in its last iteration, involved 52,061 academic staff submitting 191,150 research outputs, which were assessed by 1,157 members of the subject panels (Torrance, 2020, p. 772). All told the cost of this exercise was estimated at 246 million pounds (Stern, 2016, p. 11).²⁴ The scale and significance of the REF has been increasing and with it the pressure to perform well in the specific metrics upon which it functions.

Research assessment is an almost archetypical process of rationalisation: the objective is to make the evanescent process of academic thought into administratively comprehensible units. The academic must submit products—well defined objects that have been created by their

²⁴ The 2021 REF, at the time of writing, is coming up to its revised submission deadline and was still two years away at the time of the fieldwork. As such, it does not have a significant role in the reflections offered herein other than to provide a context of expectation for continued research assessments.

research process. This is most commonly published work explaining that process and its implications. This, by virtue of its solidity as a Work (equivalent to the musical Work), is administratively comprehensible, to a degree. However, this is then subjected to a process that seeks to make disparate and hugely complex products comparable in terms of their value: a process of peer-evaluation on those works takes place, analysing their “originality, significance and rigour” (Research Excellence Framework, 2012, p. 6) and giving them a single rating on a four point scale.²⁵ Here, the academic has no *viva voce*, rather all they give must be written (or otherwise recorded) in order to be assessed. The panel is the translator of the non-rationalised into the rationalised. This comparability allows the administrators to take over; by the interpretation of the panel, the mechanistic bureaucracy to whom the unique or ephemeral is but an insubstantial shade, is able to convert these scores into funding allocations and league tables. University management is able to turn these into a means of comparing biologists to philosophers, theologians to sociologists, and everyone to the institutional and national averages. This process of rationalising academic work focusses centrally on the transformational work of the expert panel, creating fungibility in academic work.²⁶

As I will demonstrate later with regard to teaching, this process of pressurised rationalisation does have certain effects on distorting what constitutes successful work. That is, it is possible (more or less consciously) to game the system—something Nicholas Stern’s report into the 2014 REF highlighted as a continuing problem (Stern, 2016, pp. 12-13)—which is a process by which the indicators, because of the pressures associated with them, become the goals. This is something that come at the expense of the goals as they previously were. This is summed up in what has come to be known as Campbell’s Law: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell quoted in Sidorkin, 2016, p. 321).

The phenomenon has been documented in the sciences of the pressure to publish from various forms of research monitoring creating an environment in which publication of studies tends to favour positive results—in the REF’s terms, those that are more likely to be “significant” or “world leading”. On the other hand, a study that is replicating a previous study in order to corroborate its results would likely be rated one star (the lowest qualifying rating) as “an

²⁵ I lay aside, for the moment, the issue of the impact and environment submissions to focus on the assessment of outputs.

²⁶ The link is made, thereby, to the modularity of the academic: no more the individual with an irreducible value, the system is one of comparability through calculable worth.

identifiable contribution to understanding, but largely framed by existing paradigms or traditions of enquiry” (Research Excellence Framework, 2012, p. 67).

Whilst “strong support” for the idea that the REF has negative influences was found amongst academics by the researchers contributing to the Stern report (2016, p. Appendix D), the reaction amongst composers has been even more heated due to some fundamental dissonances between composers and the tenets of research assessment. This is because there is a strong vein of thought amongst composers not only that the idea of assessing research may not be desirable, but that the idea of composition being research is disingenuous. The swelling of these concerns was fuelled by a change in classification of composition in the 2014 REF: where previously composition had been considered research equivalent, and therefore had not needed to be framed as research in order to have value in the assessment, composition became classified as research and, therefore, composers had to present their work as research in order to score well (and so for their organisation to receive funding).²⁷ This change meant that practice as research submissions (such as composition) were in some cases not framed as research well enough to succeed in the scoring system. As the panel noted, “the 300 word statements [which are submitted alongside the work itself] too often displayed a misunderstanding of what was being asked for and provided evidence of impact from the research, or a descriptive account akin to a programme note, rather than making the case for practice as research.” In extreme cases, “[a] small proportion of PaR [practice as research] was considered not to have met either the REF definition of research or the standard of nationally recognised work.” (Research Excellence Framework, 2015, p. 100) In some organisations, external consultants (composers from other institutions) were brought in to conduct a post-hoc review of the 2014 REF submission for composition in order to find out why the results were poor. One composer described the change that they experienced in the institutional repositioning of the REF’s assessment criteria:

²⁷ The question of artistic research, it was recalled by one composer, had been a subject of discussion for decades, given composition’s place in the university. On the flare-up of the debate after the 2014 REF, they commented that “I couldn't believe we were having this discussion again. We are our own fucking worst enemies [... In the late 1990s,] the National Association for Music in Higher Education [NAMHE], had already looked at this and an article was generated at NAMHE's request by Geoff Poole, [...] which basically debunked the notion that composition could be anything other than research and that the word ‘re-’ and ‘search’ specifically defines composition. [... T]his was something that had been put to bed 10 years before that in 1988. So I sat there [...] thinking 'here we go again. [...]' Because, to me it was simply a given by this stage.” (Anon_40, interview)

[W]e had a very sniffy response [...] that this wasn't research [...], these are just programme notes. And it's sort of a sense that [...] I had certainly never been challenged before and when I was given the job [...] never at any point did the word [...] 'research' regarding me rear its head. This [has] come in in say the last [...] ten, 15 years. (Anon_18, interview)

The debates in the aftermath of REF 2014 came to a head with an article by the Brunel University composer John Croft called 'Composition is Not Research' (2015). Croft took the position that composers either "labour under the delusion that they are doing some kind of 'research' [or] recognise the absurdity of the idea but [...] continue to supervise PhD students, make funding applications, and document their activities as if it were true" (Croft, 2015, p. 6). He argued that, despite the pretence to have research questions in order to satisfy the university's academic evaluation mechanisms, a composer cannot set out to answer a 'research question' when writing a piece, given that each question (for example, he imagined Schoenberg asking "can I make music in which all pitch classes are played equally often?" Croft, 2015, p. 6) may be answered before the composition takes place with a resounding "yes!" Whilst responses varied from challenging the very idea of reifying research (Reeves, 2016) to far more pragmatic reflections (Fells, 2015) and challenges to the right of composers to question their status as researchers (Pace, 2016), Croft's arguments seem to have chimed with a widespread conflict for modern composer-academics. It is a conflict between the practices and institutions of the artistic field and the fact that, increasingly, the music they produce must be legitimate in an organisational sphere in which research is the primary currency. I will lay out here the range of approaches to the idea of composition as research expressed during my fieldwork and then discuss the effects of the increasing emphasis on the importance of the REF, and of research culture generally, on the practice of academic composition.

Despite the controversy and the considerable unrest over the results of the 2014 REF, there was no immediately discernible disadvantage to the performing arts present in the REF results (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. Comparison of the REF scores from the sub-panel for Music, Drama, Dance, and Performing Arts unit with that of the average over all units

This indicates that there is no general disadvantage to performance art subjects (though it is not possible, from the data, to isolate composition specifically, nor even all practice based forms of research). The possibility is open for practice based research to be disadvantaged, and it would seem, from the sub-panel report credible to imagine that the increase in the number of unclassified entries (2% as opposed to 1% over all areas) was related to issues with the classification of practice as research (as opposed to professional practice).

Concepts of Research

In the course of this discussion, I will address different approaches to the idea of research and how it fits with the compositional frameworks of various composers. The aim is to explicate the range of concepts put forward in the course of the interviews. One perspective that was present only occasionally, and which I will mention but which has little significance in the course of this discussion is the abdication of research justification. There were a couple of composers whose approach was simply this: “I don't have to decide if composition is research. HEFCE has done for me.” (Anon_19, interview) I do not contend that this is an invalid position—it is, on the contrary, supremely pragmatic, evading much of the conflict and tension that I outline herein—but I would maintain that it has little to offer the discussion upon which I am embarking. That is, it has little bearing on the emic philosophy of this field of practice.

A number of composers did take the view, similar to that of John Croft, that composition is not research and to treat it as such is, to quote one commentary on the problem, “bonkers” (Hellowell, 2014). This was put more strongly by one interviewee, “having to kind of shoehorn [my composition into a research framing] as we had to do for the REF, I mean that was hateful frankly. Hateful, hateful, hateful.” (Anon_18, interview) The primary focus of the concerns was over the aspect of composers writing about their compositions. The purpose of research should be, in this view, to make them better composers, a task from which the need for academic writing abilities can be at best a distraction and at worst a distortion:

Composers sometimes feel like they have to have a research topic that they're [...] discussing in their music and to me that's really not a good situation because composers are not researchers and, particularly if you [...] have] been to a conservatoire for your undergraduate and your masters, the idea of writing a research essay about anything is [...] ludicrous. [...] We need to accept that you can only be good at one thing and composers are learning to be good at composing and having a level of self-reflection on the creative process. (Anon_31, interview)

Similarly, the idea of imitating scientific research (though not particularly prevalent amongst composers who saw composition as research) was a cause for concern for others:

I've heard in conversation, [there are composers whose] approach to music is a scientific one. They compare what they are doing to scientific experimentation. So they're an experimental composer in the sense of being analogous to scientific

experiments. I think that's just bunk, absolute bunk. There's nothing to be discovered in music, nothing at all. [...] That's not how music refreshes itself. (Melen, interview)

In this context, concern was directed particularly towards research students who felt the need to bend over backwards, contorting their work into an overly scientific or philosophical frame.

One composer's concern over the research dimension of composition was over the locus of judgement. In their view, the composer is not best placed to analyse their work.

I think [the idea of composition as research is] not particularly healthy creatively. [...] I very much believe in [composition's] research equivalence, but it's not fundamentally research—it's primary practice [...] to be researched but [...] ideally not by the composer who wrote it, I think. And I think that's the problem, I mean we're trying to mix two things, a composer's doing creative work and analysis is sitting outside of that and looking at it with an external eye, which is very problematic I think. (Anon_56, interview)

The focus here is on the output as an object of research as a 'primary practice'—it fulfils a purpose. Certainly, over the spectrum of opinions, there was a sense that research could be compromised by threats to autonomy, just as artistic value could. Commissions and functions for the work other than research aims were sometimes seen as threatening the focus on the research objective. One composer referred to a performer colleague's research submissions as an "incredible hoop jumping exercise" (Anon_7, interview). The same was highlighted regarding another colleague producing "commercially orientated performances in a popular medium" for whom, according to this composer, also "there's no new knowledge involved." (Anon_7, interview) In both of these instances, practice was not research in as much as it wasn't legitimate art.

The exercise in these cases becomes a process of *post hoc* research justification. This can be presented more or less cynically, but the essence either way is that a composer who is not intentionally researching during the creation of the work can look over what they have done and rationalise from that a more or less genuine idea of what they have been researching. This can happen particularly when a university seeks to improve their performance in research assessment. This approach of *post hoc* justification in practice research was something commented upon by the REF panel where, on occasion, "a rationalisation, evidently after the event, [...] did not allow for the identification of a research dimension." (Research Excellence

Framework, 2015, p. 100) For others, however, the establishment of research objectives and findings after composition had taken place was not a disingenuous *modus operandi*, but one that reflected the attempt to articulate what in the moment could only be tacit decision-making:

that sort of rational productive thought process switches off and this process of enactment and material takes over and [...] when that split happens and you get into loads and loads and loads of possible avenues, you're actually taking those without probably thinking [... about that as] a series of questions that you're making yes or no answers to. [...] I think what happens [after the research is completed] is then you impose a reductive question making on what happened [...]. I don't think that comes first before you make an action, which is why I believe in practice as research, because I believe there is something happening in the practice which is research based and then we try to explain it later by reducing its down to essential questions. But I don't think they cropped up like that at that moment and I don't think they were dealt with intellectually like that at that moment. (Stanović, interview)

Here, the composer's research rationalisation occurs after the piece is composed, but is in their mind no less a true representation of the intention and the process for that; the creation of the piece itself is a research process, and what comes later is the articulation of that.

The idea of the composition as an artefact of the research (the decisions and problem-solving) that has gone into it is reflected in other closely related views. In particular, an idea often cropped up that composition's research value was in the background research that enabled it to be created. This divorces the research process (which creates the inputted knowledge) from the compositional process (which uses that knowledge to create something), maintaining a research concept that privileges finding out rather than making. However, there was an acknowledgement that this might not be acceptable from an administrative point of view:

[A]ll composition involves a huge amount of research [...]. you can't compose without researching because you're researching into the material you're researching into the instruments, you are researching into the context of the performance and performers and I always start my composition by asking a lot of questions that I am going to have to learn to answer by spending time finding out the answers and that's what I understand research is. But I also recognise that that can't possibly be enough when it comes to an institution that wants to be recognised for the value [...] of its research. (Best, interview)

The issue here, then, is whether the composition is the research or the articulation of that research:

[Y]ou could say that an article in itself isn't research, it's the artefact that comes out of someone having done research, which is exactly the same as a composition in a way that research being into notes and sounds of music rather than something extra to the music. (Anon_56, interview)

If it is, in this comparison that was made a few times, equivalent to a research article then is it the best way to communicate that research? Others write books, make films, and give talks on their research findings: should composition (with the level of ambiguity inherent in musical meaning) be the preferred medium to communicate these findings? Similarly, some composers found a way to justify their research by using composition to inform their writing:

[I]f you see research as the textbook sort of academic, standard research methodologies [... then] no, composition isn't [research.] So it's complicated. So what I do, for example, has certain elements where it can be more research-y [...] in this kind of textbook way, where I write an article, where I try to identify a research question and I try to answer [them] with a particular method [...]. But at the same time I think [...] my creative side [...] also informs my research, [...] which makes me aware of the complexities of music and sound, [...] and] that music is not an academic discipline, but it's an experience, it's a human activity that can be studied, but if you don't do it, then how can you study it? (Reuben, interview)

In this sense, composition was the contextual research that for other 'textbook' research conducted in an explicitly methodologically-driven way. Turning to publication, in fact, was a commonly garnered form of capital, not least because there was a perception that written research was less risky in the assessment. This was despite reassurances that practice as research submissions would not be judged less favourably than written research. In some organisations, this was a belief echoed by administrators and managers. The advantage of the written journal article to the administrative system is that written communication is perceived as less subject to the vagaries of individual taste and preference than other forms of communication. In such a view, it is seen as a more predictable translation from research output into numerical score and so as entertaining less risk.

However, others had a far more integrated approach to the idea of composition as research: for many, composition constituted a kind of "thinking through doing" (Stanović,

interview). The idea here is that the act of composition itself is research: “on the most basic level I think anyone who has a fascination with something and digs into that fascination [...] through the act of extended prosthetical thinking” (McLaughlin, interview). In other words, the act of composing is developing and uncovering new knowledge. This composer’s idea of composition as research was as a continual unfolding of questions and answers from which answers emerged:

I don't think research is answering questions. I think research is the process of continued exploration that can along the way answer questions or at least fence questions off. [...] Research is this constant unfolding process of asking questions, seeking ways to answer them and then picking up on the other questions [...] that emerge out of that. You have this constant emerging unfolding series of problems and things to look at. So from that point of view composition is always research unless you are literally writing the exact same piece again you're going to be doing something different. (McLaughlin, interview)

The kinds of questions that interested this composer were “things like ‘is it possible to have frozen rhythm?’ for example—quite abstract conceptual almost philosophical ideas. Or what really is tempo?” (McLaughlin, interview) Their idea was that composition, by allowing the composer to manipulate the material, would come to a greater understanding of the experience of music in relation to these questions.

Other composers too expressed variants on this approach to compositional research. However, the most coherently articulated stream of this thought was a particular avenue that saw composition as a way of disclosing an experience of the world to the engaged audience:

I'm at the stage now where I think that being a composer is—not for everybody but for me—is a type of philosophy in action. [...] I want people to be made to think by my pieces if possible. [...] So if you like it's autoethnographic. [...] That's why I'm not that interested in creating a beautiful vase [...]. I guess at the end of the day the compositions are like [...] biographies of a sort. (Dwyer, interview)

This aligns with the idea of authenticity and nativity previously outlined—the truth (the ‘knowledge’, if you like) value of the composition is in its ability to disclose the circumstances of its creation, that is, the world of its creator. The composition is, then, research in the same way as autoethnography is research, in that it explores and exposes the composer’s life to the audience (in this case, the research assessors).

One composer gave an even fuller description of this line of thought which is so comprehensively explained that I reproduce here an extended passage:

My suggestion is that one of the things that composition, and indeed artistic practice is in general, is a form of speculative metaphysics. [...] There's a perfectly good philosophical history for this. You can find it in Hegel, where he basically [...] says religion, art, philosophy, are all basically trying to strike at the same thing. [...] It's even better with Heidegger [...]. The brilliant bit of Heidegger, where he actually talks about artwork, [...] he's talking about the difference between equipment and an artwork, and basically says that in the world there are only three sorts of things: mere things, equipment, and artwork. It's already a kind of crazy thing, but the argument is pretty good. So [...] he looks at a pair of shoes, and he says 'what do you want in a pair of shoes?' Frankly, what you want in a pair of shoes is that it does the same job tomorrow as it did today and that it keeps your feet warm and the water out. That's basically what you want it to do. That's [...] its equipmental relationship. It's actually not really its function that matters, but its reliability. [...] Anyway, he then looks at the Van Gogh painting of the peasant shoes, because, of course, they're a pair of shoes. And he says 'right, so what happens when you encounter this artwork?' Well, you don't encounter a pair of shoes, really; the sorts of things you can encounter are the difference in tread between these two shoes, the fact that one of them is slightly heavier than the other, which means that you see the way in which the person wearing them has had a slight limp as they have crossed the muddy field, that you can see is muddy, because you see the way in which this has [...] filled the sides of the shoe [...] and you've seen the failure of the shoe. And, as soon as you've got there, you've got to the stage of, for a moment, encountering what it was like to walk in those shoes, which is to say that in the moment of encountering this artwork, you have understood someone else's world. And I totally buy it, I should say. [...] Art is sort of world-disclosing [...]. And it's world-disclosing to the extent that when I stop encountering it, my world is different because I understand the world to be different from what I thought it was. And that happens if it's art. [...] But if that's the case, then art is doing philosophical work, [...] I would argue. It's doing things that are to do with metaphysics, to do with ontology, and it's capable of revealing truths about the world. And, basically, if you're happy to say that speculative metaphysics is research, then I think you have to be happy to say that writing music is research in the same sort of way. [...] All this is to say that I think there is an argument to be made that's about writing music is research, because it kind of can't not be as long as it's art, because that's one of the things that art does. (Iddon, interview)

I found little evidence of composers going beyond this position by positively putting their work in an empirical epistemic framework. The essential issue with moving too far in this direction is that the composition becomes, not the research output, but the research means. Composers who work on experimental studies (using epistemic frameworks from outside composition—most commonly psychology—to research the enactment or reception of their work) take a path that evades rather than addresses the questions posed here. Their work is in the research of the instrumental work of the composition as an object, and their process of composition is allowed to remain safely subjective, qualified by the empiricism of the observations made about their audience/research participants. This has a very definite amenity when seen in conjunction with the institutions of research assessment, where methodological ‘rigour’ (here, safely borrowed from the empirical disciplines who codify in authoritative manuals the way things are to be done) and the clear accountability of the written word allow the bureaucratic gaze easy purchase.

In these ways, composition (in a perspective that sees it as legitimate to consider composition as research) can play several roles in relation to research, which I lay out in Figure 6.

| | Musical output | Non-musical output |
|--|---|--|
| Research separated from composition | <p>Research as background (research precedes composition) Research (literary, historical, social, political etc.) feeds into the creation of the composition. The composition itself is a reading or interpretation of this research.</p> | <p>Reception as subject (research comes after composition) Research seeks empirical truths about the instrumental role of composition as a social technology. It is the closest of these models to those of the empirical disciplines, and so could have a degree of value in a research environment whose institutional focus is the empirical disciplines.</p> |
| Research is the compositional process | <p>World-disclosing music Composition is akin to autoethnography. The research value is encapsulated in the idea that to truly experience of the music is to stand in someone else's world and so to have encountered new knowledge.</p> | <p>Writing about composing This amounts to an articulation of the process of writing a piece of music. The value here is that such an articulation may inform the practices of other composers.</p> |

Figure 6. Summary of concepts of research and composition

In each case, there can be articulable research questions, whether these are articulated before or after the composition process takes place. Research questions emerged throughout the discussions (as they do in Croft's article) as a key bone of contention. They can be seen as a marker of rigorous process and as providing a means of imminent critique for assessors of the work. In other words, they provide a standard by which to judge a work without giving up the conceptual framework of authenticity that rejects authoritative, absolutist, normative judgement. For the means of administration, research questions confer a degree of legitimacy: they allow an autonomous system of judgement to be set up that may be attributed a degree of objectivity. The prevailing institutional climate being one that discourages the explicit privileging of one taste over another (particularly in the arts), the administrative system must create a bureaucratic machine with whose computation appears to be purely procedural. This, of course, does not exclude the idea that there may be systemic power differentials masked by

the apparent smooth-running of the machine. The research question allows the composer to set up their own problem—their own criteria against which to be judged. It is, then, in the capacity for these criteria to be articulated that the balance of the process starts to influence what constitutes the legitimate practice of research.

Good Music and Good Research

Another key bone of contention was the relationship between research and artistic evaluations. In fact, nowhere is the institutional conflict at the heart of this thesis more clearly illustrated than in the mismatch between artistic and academic quality. Essentially, an important question (often one I posed) was “can bad music be good research and vice versa?” There were often grievances felt that the music composed to be valued in the REF was not good music. In a more nuanced way, one composer put it thus:

I think the things that are most interesting about music are unquantifiable [...] I'm now having to prepare things for the REF, and choose things that I can make arguments about in terms of this is a piece that breaks particular boundaries with whatever and that question. And the question of 'which of my pieces do I think are the best?' is really quite separate. [...] There's this kind of metanarrative about contributions to musical knowledge or whatever, which to me just has very little to do with the value contained within any given piece. And the danger is that I think it encourages university composers to compose in a certain way that has very little to do with music. (Anon_31, interview)

This points to a value differential between these composers and the academic system: the research may be quite separate from the artistic objectives and, in fact, the artistic merit (however judged) is of no consequence to its value. This does have a certain incongruence built into its ethos because alongside the research value of the work, there is also the impact evaluation. The impact of a piece of music largely equates to audiences, and this is very definitely related to aesthetic rather than research-evaluative judgements.

On the other side of the debate, however, there are those who happily accept an aesthetic value neutrality. How, it is argued, can something so blatantly subjective as artistic judgement be introduced into an assessment procedure?

I recall having a very frustrating argument with a colleague from another university talking about music research and [...] his point was just that [music should just have] to be good. [...] At that point [I was] throwing my hands up saying 'but what's good music? Your good music and my good music are totally different things, how can we possibly claim as a sector or as a group of people to have an objective sense of what things are good and bad?' [...] So my point here is that I have an extremely difficult time reconciling it when someone says is it good or bad music? I haven't no idea and no care. It's good in some contexts it's good to some people (McLaughlin, interview)

For another, quality was important in general, but they accepted that their work was valuable not for doing what it was aiming to do at the absolute best, but aiming to explore the most they could, with all of the failures that might entail: "I know that people could do it a lot better than me. So I'm sort of mapping out a new territory that people could do a lot better than I do, so to me that's what the research is and that's how I'll frame it when it comes to the REF." (Edmondson, interview) As with exploration, this composer saw themselves as breaking new ground, but not building upon it—that would come with those who followed. This composer in fact did have a strong desire for others to take up the practices they were developing, perhaps partly because of the subcultural popular music scene from which they worked.

Research Impact

A major value in the research agenda is research impact, the demonstration of which is integrated into the requirements of research funding organisations and the REF itself. To take an example of the kind of framework used, the Arts and Humanities Research Council's conceptualisation of impact (Arts and Humanities Research Council, undated) is made up of 'instrumental' (economic and educational benefits) and 'intrinsic' benefits (enjoyment, emotional development, and social development). These are also conceptualised along a continuum from personal to public benefits (see Figure 7). These are all seen as means of creating value.

| Nature of benefits | Personal <-----Personal with public spillover-----> Community/public | | |
|--------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Instrumental | Personal educational attainment | Learning skills |
| Intrinsic | Pleasure/captivation | Empathy and cognitive growth | Community networks and identity |

Figure 7. AHRC framework for understanding types of impact. (Adapted from Arts and Humanities Research Council, undated)

In this categorisation, most musical experience would fit best into the idea of pleasure or captivation: personal enjoyment in the experience (which is not to say that it cannot in certain instances branch out into other intrinsic and instrumental benefits). This is recognised by this framework as a form of impact. However, the idea of intrinsic benefits which are primarily internal and non-instrumental in a rationalised system is problematic and public instrumental benefits are by far the easiest to articulate (in terms of revenue, exposure, and use). However, the AHRC sets out guidelines for monitoring and evaluating more intrinsic personal impact. This includes extensive use of questionnaires and the development of metrics, each of which attempts to devise a way of translating the unarticulated into a measure of the effect of a project; the ideal is still that of fungibility. In such an endeavour, intrinsic personal impact is bound to be more difficult to legitimately capture than the public instrumental impact.

A process of conscious learning and associated changed behaviour is also more articulable than a barely acknowledged feeling. One composer highlighted this in expressing the need of composers to write and speak about their process:

[W]hat is missing from that at the moment is [...] composers actually talking about what they did. [...] When all you see is the artistic outcome or the object it's not always possible to work backwards from that and work out how it was done. And sometimes how it was done doesn't matter. If I'm in a concert and I hear a cool sound maybe I just go away and I'm influenced by that and the cool sound in itself is enough to make me do something new. But maybe I can't progress unless I know how the cool sound was made. Sure, I can go to musicians afterwards and maybe talk to you then but that's impact on an extremely tiny one to one [...] scale. (McLaughlin, interview)

Scott McLaughlin's music was largely process-driven and he was comfortable with the idea of articulating this. This once again emphasises the importance in a rationalised regime of

legitimacy for a composer to be able to articulate their work. As will be discussed further in the following section, not all compositional processes are equally articulable and so impact (the weighting of which is increasing in the 2021 REF) may have a tendency to favour certain compositional practices over others.

The Effect of the Institutional Pressure of Research

A key question with such coercive institutions as the REF is ‘why would those subject to it participate?’ Torrance approaches this, picking out three main elements: financial reward (as the REF is linked to research funding), reputational benefits (which he also links to the financial benefits of gaining research students), and finally its increasing essentiality to the idea of what a university (or department) is. On this last count, he writes that

The long-standing nature of the REF and its predecessors means that it is now completely embedded in the expectations of university management and individual career development; research is regarded as an integral part of university activity so not to “play the game” would be effectively to label your institution and your department not really operating as a “university” at all. (Torrance, 2020, p. 776)

Having been around for over 30 years, the institutions fostered by research monitoring have now become part of universities’ administrative fabrics; if a university is confident of the quality of their research, then they will enter the ring, or else display a lack of research ambition and admit to not being a proper university. To take this to the personal level, this kind of response—that one should be researching because that is what it is to be an academic in a university—is visible in some composers’ rationales for framing their work as research. In this case, a composer who is sceptical of the idea of composition as research highlights the anxiety of raising such concerns:

[I]n the end we are we are stymied by these institutional structures so that we have to go on saying “this is research” because if we stop saying it's research then [...] someone somewhere will say “Well, if it's not research then you don't need to have a day off to be a composer—you can just teach [...] all week long. We can get more [...] students and [...] we can make more money that way.” Or ‘if it's not research, we won't give you research grants, and therefore your university will value you less.’ (Fox, interview)

Similarly, on the other side of the fence, another composer wished away the ‘self-doubt’ of composers:

I don't experience any conflict between being an academic and being [...] a composer and I'm perfectly happy with that and I think it's perfectly viable and I wish my fellow composers in academia would shut up about composition not being research because [...] they're damaging themselves ultimately. [...] It's bizarre isn't it? I mean how many people really attack their own discipline to that extent? (Hugill, interview)

There was a concern (not least regarding the impact of a projects such as the present one) that too strongly expressing the conflicts felt between the academic environment and artistic practice could worsen the legitimacy of a sub-discipline and, *in extremis*, risk its expulsion from an institutional environment whose material and institutional demands are increasingly inextricable from the practice of research. As another composer commented, “if John [Croft] wants to write himself out of a job, go ahead.” (Anon_40, interview)

With this pressure on researchers to be of value to organisations whose evaluation is based around certain institutions of research, there is bound to be an effect on practice. The REF process, as I have said, is a quintessentially rationalising one—it is an exercise in measuring the conventionally unmeasured, of creating quantifiable value out of what more apparently is valued for its uniqueness; its purpose is therefore to making research into a fungible good. It is a grammatising system both in the sense that its structures shape behaviour and in the sense that it requires the written rationalisation of the compositional process.

The first question might be whether there are certain types of legitimate goods. As I have outlined, there is certainly an institutional bias towards art music, which it was suggested by one composer (themselves, a wild-card, ambiguously orientated towards both art and commercial music:

[I]n critical writing it's so much easier to make a big deal of things that have this sort of elaborate backdrop of esoteric music theory or complex political ideas and all the rest rather than stuff that is seen as a bit too hedonistic, physical, just functional music. (Anon_44, interview)

The vast body of literature has relatively recently started to broaden out to allow a research lineage for those in popular music studies. The ‘functional’, ‘hedonistic’, and ‘physical’ music of this composer’s description is not descended from the abstract ideas of a long history

of music theory, but rather is related, for its value, to an audience's reaction—it has a function. Commercial music was often cited as an example of composition that is not research, for instance here:

That having been said I don't think all composition is research, I mean there's plenty of composition that is professional practice, you know. There's plenty of film music for instance that's professional practice. There's also film music that needn't be that. And sometimes I can see that it might be difficult at the edges, as it were, to distinguish the difference. [...] I don't actually think that applies very much though. (Grange, interview)

Research, very often, was seen as being related to the practices of art music, although (as the quote above illustrates) commercial music was not usually seen as necessarily unable to be research. Some sympathy can be established between art music and research, particularly in the idea of autonomy as a guiding principle of both the academic and artistic fields, but more than that there is certainly still a vestigial lack of recognition of the potential for research in non-art music. This discrepancy in academic value is also apparent in others interviewees' lives, where art music was practiced within the university, but popular or commercial music without, something that is reminiscent of Born's (1995) experience of the dual faces of some IRCAM composers.

The REF acts as a converter—transforming the ungraspable into the graspable, the non-fungible to the fungible—that allows administrative tools to own, evaluate, and strategically manoeuvre research (and its funding) as a resource. However, as with all translation, something is lost. In this case, one composer talked about this thing as 'tacit knowledge':

[O]ne of the big problems I think a lot of academic composers have is that they struggle with the idea that something that they regard as instinctual, as natural to them is just you know 'I can't explain it, it just works' [...]. They believe that kind of thinking can't be assimilated into the academic framework because there's no way of valuing or evaluating that kind of knowledge. (Hugill, interview)

This composer was the only one to speak of tacit knowledge as such, but others spoke of intuition or the inexplicability of their process, their work's inscrutable relationship to their own faculties of decision-making (in the terms I have used here, this is the truth of the work's natal moment). The production of music on these terms, as I have illustrated, depends for its value

on the attribution of its authentic relationship to its creator. Dissecting this process is hardest for composers who have a mono-authorial (directive) approach to composition. In collaboration, I would suggest, the creative process is often more explicit, coming as dialogue which can be recorded and reflected upon (for example, Bayley, 2011). However, for directive composers, their decisions can be taken as a near automatic ability through long practice of the exercise of aesthetic judgement. One such composer (already quoted on page 32), who recently retired²⁸ in part because of a discomfort with the research framework, spoke of this in outlining their objections to the institutions of research:

The problem with composers as researchers is that they [...] can't be [...] entirely aware of what they're doing because when you compose, you're not always using the conscious part of your mind. [...] When I'm composing, I'm not really [...] thinking 'now an Eb.' One lets go, [...] the unconscious composing sort of takes over [...] and I wouldn't be able to justify what I do in retrospect. One forgets the thought processes once a piece is finished, at least in my experience. (Keeley, interview)

This points to what I view as a crucially important issue in the composition as research debate, which is the need to justify methodology. In the REF, composers are required to submit a 300 word statement to accompany their practical portfolio, highlighting the research value of their work. Concerns over this were sometimes dismissed on the grounds that it is only a small written component. However, what I believe is at stake here is not to do with the scale of the writing. Rather, the fact of having to write a *research* statement at all, regardless of the scale, was at the root of the dissonance. As with the composer above, if the functioning of a compositional process is inscrutable—being there simply by the justification of the author's voice—then to justify that process is a breach of the process that gives the work value at all. In addition, there is the dishonesty of explaining something which a composer considers to be inexplicable.

This institutional pressure to grammatisise research may well result in a shift in the kind of practices found in university composition; it is hard to see this shift as other than towards practices (such as collaboration) which are more easily grammatisable.

This change is a multi-faceted one. Whilst direct pressures (such as research monitoring) result in a coercive isomorphism that is resented as a direct intrusion, the structural pressures (such as education) result in normative isomorphism, which can provide a resolution to the

²⁸ Retirement due to research monitoring and 'audit culture' is something identified as a key motivator in Graham Crow's recent research into later careers of academics (Crow et al., 2021).

tension by changing the field over generations. In Tilcsik's (2010) study of government agencies and their post-communist reform, the agencies changed by a process of decoupling (where they seek to appear to conform, whilst resisting change, see *Protecting Indeterminacy*, page 231) and recoupling (when the resistant old guard is replaced by a new guard who were brought up in the new institutional environment) and so genuine change takes place. Students are likely to be trained and rewarded for forms of composition that can be given value in a research environment, particularly in the PhD qualification; there are already lecturers I interviewed who found some of their post-graduate students were far more concerned with establishing a clear research framework when composing than they themselves were. As these students take over the academic chairs, the adaptation to the institutional environment will permeate and resistance (in the form of ceremonial conformity) will die away, leaving institutionally legitimate practices that conform to the requirements of research assessment. One senior academic highlighted this generational change:

[A]ll of that's changed in the last 15 years and now composition must absolutely show to different degrees in different places [...] what it researches. And I find that a great tension. [...] What is the composer's research topic? [...] For some people they do [exist] and I think for the generation that's come after me it's less complicated. They've grown up with it they know that this is what they need to do and they use the language and they indeed may mean the language. (Zev Gordon, interview)

To be appointed to an academic position now, one must be 'REF-able' and so have value to the university in terms of the public funds distributed on the basis of the REF. This raises the question of what the likely transformed discipline will look like. The key to this, again, is that the process of composition must be articulable:

[T]here has been [a drive] for some time to articulate in a more precise manner and by using [...] text why your creative practice is research, [... and you can] see people who change completely what they are doing—they're following different paths [to] before because it's easier to discuss these types of approaches as research. It's not something that I've done yet. (Anon_19, interview)

There are two main forms of making a composition thusly articulable that I identify from the previous discussion: distributed creativity, and explicit procedure, both of which externalise their processes.

Distributed creativity—or collaboration—is used in much compositional work, as has been explored. The key feature of this mode is the communicative rationality of the compositional process. As a research practice, collaboration lends itself to the rationalised system because it has the potential to be documented; it can be recorded, analysed, and reflected upon.²⁹ This mode of composition becomes valuable also when the social activity involved in creating the piece is, itself, the object of contemplation (such as with the game pieces). In these instances, the metadiscursive focus may lend itself to the idea of being articulated in words: it is not the judgements that formed the work which constitute the research, but the social study of those judgements.

In all instances, the process of creation is laid out explicitly ready for the post-mortem examination.³⁰ This sympathy between collaborative composition and the rationalising mechanisms of modern society is described by John Croft:

[I]n our age of ‘aims and objectives’, the idea of judgement without criteria is simply unacceptable. The inability of the dominant box-ticking culture to accommodate thought that cannot be reduced in this way is the most pernicious source of the obsession with collaboration. This is not to say that the result of a collaboration is more predictable, but rather that the ‘process’ is conveniently externalized: by shifting the focus to documentable processes (the ‘research narrative’) and by distributing responsibility for the ‘outcome’, we alienate ourselves from the irreducible quality of musical thought, material and experience. (Croft, 2017, p. 200)

Croft’s compositional approach exemplifies how a composer can feel themselves in conflict, having little sympathy with a research and evaluation orientated institutional environment. Ian Pace (a pianist and Reader in Music at City University, London) recently wrote in support of Croft’s (2017) argument, highlighting this very idea (albeit in more polemical terms that I put it here):

[M]uch work flaunting its ‘distributed creativity’ looks better in terms of words about it than to listen to, look at, read, etc. The concept comes about when artists cannot convince others to engage with their work through the latter means. (Pace, 2021)

²⁹ For a good example of this kind of documentation, see Saunders and Limbrick (2017)

³⁰ The post-mortem can be thought of as the favoured method of the bureaucracy, preferring the still to the living. In contrast, perhaps the post-natal examination can be thought of as the preferred method of the artist, looking for the life in a work that depicts its birth.

Collaboration has one other sympathy with the present university system. In line with Croft's criticism of the business-influenced ideas of the modern university, Torrence highlights that under the influence of the REF, "The very definition and composition of research is changing from that of an individual scholarly undertaking to that of a managed corporate activity" (Torrance, 2020, p. 774) Collaboration requires large-scale funding (which the universities press for) and accountable administration, making the academic and artistic activities intelligible to the administrative eye from the perspective of research's production as well as the output.

The second sympathetic compositional approach I would like to pick up on is that of formalised or procedural composition. This is also a way of overcoming the tacit-ness of the knowledge used in composition: the composer, rather than relying on intuition, externalises some element of decision-making. This could be, for example, in the sonification (rendering in sound) of data (a fairly common practice, though it is not without its controversies), or algorithmic composition. These types of work necessarily make explicit the means of decision making in equations or computer programmes that can be used as evidence of the innovativeness of the work. Reflecting on his feeling of incongruity with the idea of research, Michael Zev Gordon commented that, although composition was "precisely the opposite of analysis" and so the idea of composition as research was hard to apply, a strict and explicit method of composing would help:

[I]t probably has something to do with me being a composer who is essentially very intuitive. If I was a very rational composer who really could have labelled everything step by step along the way, if I was that kind of composer [...] the analytical language of research would be easier and more real probably to map on to what I do. (Zev Gordon, interview)

Both the collaborative and the process-orientated pathways lay out an idea of composition as an augmented practice: the composer augments their judgement using the interventions of others (collaboration) or of systematic processes. In either case, the aesthetic judgement (based on tacit knowledge) becomes secondary to the valuable (that is, grammatisable) augmentations; "Composing—*mere* composing—has become quite unfashionable." (Croft, 2017, p. 199, emphasis in original)

Collaboration and procedural composition both reduce the intervention (and admission) of subjectivity. Collaboration, especially, is increasingly being built into the conditions of

research frameworks, something that troubled Hayden and Windsor, as it troubled some of my participants:

The valorisation of 'collaboration' within current arts funding bodies must be questioned when ethical assumptions as to what collaboration should mean become imposed conditions of artistic production and funding (e.g., the idea that collaborative or interdisciplinary work requires at least two people from different disciplines). (Hayden & Windsor, 2007, p. 39)

Collaboration's increasing dominance is, in my view, a function of administrative institutions: the need for documentation, accountability, and verifiable evaluation all suit a distributed model of creativity.

I have put the emphasis on the increased production of explicit knowledge, accepting the lack of value of tacit knowledge in this system. However, I also note that the same composer who raised the idea of tacit knowledge in composition also believed there were ways for it to be appreciated:

[W]hat I say is that [tacit knowledge] actually is a form of knowledge and it is possible to evaluate and assimilate that knowledge into an academic context. And I will admit that the language to do so is problematic but that actually there's no reason why tacit knowledge is not as valid a form of knowledge as propositional knowledge. So this is quite a heretical view within a university, which traditionally doesn't recognise tacit knowledge at all. And just ignores the fact that people have these knowledges. [... T]he difficulty is evaluating it accurately because obviously, if it's something that can't be said, then how do you make any kind of sensible evaluation. And I think the answer is that you have to work back from the [...] proposition and the process [which] provide the evidence of the tacit and you work back from those and then you can give due credit for that. (Hugill, interview)

The process of composition, in Andrew Hugill's terms, could be summed up (if he will forgive the reduction) as the composition (output) is created by a process whose decisions involve both tacit and propositional knowledge. The output and propositional knowledge can be evidenced, and so what is left is the tacit knowledge. This should be taken as legitimate knowledge within academia.

There are several issues with this framework in the academic-administrative system. For instance, the long entrainment involved in developing tacit knowledge arguably compromises

its claim to being new and the judgement of such knowledge by assessors is also potentially too clearly subjective to be legitimate (a situation where the irreducible, tacit decision-making of the composer is evaluated by the irreducible, tacit judgement of the assessor). However, the key problem is impact. Impact is an important part of the framework of the modern university. It is part of the REF and of research funding requirements. Universities have employees dedicated in some instances to facilitating and documenting impact and it is something that is becoming an increasing part of the academic consciousness. Impact relates to the effect of the research output. In composition, this might be the audience for a piece for music or for a written product. In the case of the former, this came up as problematic several times in my interviews as one can document the number of people who have heard a piece, but there is no way of showing the difference it has made to the members of that audience. The second form of impact, again, relies on the explicitness of knowledge. The idea of tacit compositional knowledge in the academic framework again falls foul of the need for explicitness: if knowledge is tacit, then how can it be shared? how can it have impact? This can be countered, however, if the composer finds a way to articulate this knowledge *post hoc*, which indeed is what many composers attempt to do, thereby making tacit knowledge explicit.

One composer, Adam Stanović was trying to overcome the issue of the inscrutability of tacit knowledge in a different way. Working in electroacoustic composition, his method was to save all of the audio files he created, rather than keeping only the ones that were for the final piece:

[O]ne thing recently I started doing is saving every single step of compositional process and I would be genuinely interested in trying to find a way—and it probably would require some sort of research bid—[...] of posting all of those steps so that somebody could work through a compositional process. [...] I think that will be enormously useful. I think the only reason that doesn't really exist is because nobody wants that in the public domain because it reveals too much. It reveals a lot about the messiness of people's mind, it reveals a lot about the messiness of practice, it reveals a lot about which things you do well and which things you don't do very well and it opens the door to all of those things that you're trying to suppress in order to keep your ability to compose and be confident and make the right decisions. But ultimately I think [...] somebody should do it. (Stanović, interview)

The interest here is in a more transparently documented process of making decisions during composition. This could, given the technology involved in this field, provide a way of

documenting individualist intuitive composition in such a way as certain moments of decision-making can be presented for evaluation in the same way as an *a priori* process, or documented collaborative relationship.

However, there is a fear with this kind of transparency, and the research-consciousness that could accompany it that it may curtail the instinct of composers, prioritising instead the planning and rationalisability of their work. Perhaps even larger decisions are curtailed by the need to think in research terms, a tension that was highlighted by one composer:

So there's part of me that is in deep rebellion against [the pressure to plan and rationalise research activities]. [... M]y artistic heart [...] goes through a lot of different emotions: resentful, [...] angry, sulking, and then sometimes deeply uncooperative with the other part of my brain that's trying to get work done. And the artistic brain says 'well actually maybe what I do want to right now is go and study Indian violin, like I always wanted to do.' Well I can't justify that in research terms, but it might make a lot of sense from an artist's perspective. (Battey, interview)

For the administration of the higher education sector, the problems and proposed solutions raise questions that I would suggest ought to be addressed, something I will consider further in Chapter 7: Social Indeterminacy and Artistic and Academic Freedom.

Here, I have theorised the inevitability of changing the field of academic composition under a rationalising regime focussed on research. The important (but, in both academic and artistic institutional environments, compromising and heretical) question that rises off the back of this is 'what kind of composition should be done in universities?' If one is aware that the measures used are changing what the legitimate work of a composer-academic (or, indeed, any kind of academic) is, then one should be aware of the desired outcome of such a transformation and tailor the rationalising system accordingly. Currently, I do not believe this is being done. Rather, there is a faith in the measurement as a neutral force that simply promotes the values of research. This denial of disciplining power is as necessary for the institutions of academia as for those of art; power, in these spheres, and increasingly in society more generally, can be seen as operating via the machinery of rationalisation, concealed behind the whirring procedural mechanisms of bureaucracy.

4.3 Other Direct Influences

It is worth mentioning three other important influences on the kind of compositional work that goes on in the university. The discussions of these topics are shorter than that of research, but that is an indication of the comparative consensus on the issues (as well as their relative straightforwardness): money allows composers to do more of the work that they are drawn to (with the autonomy demanded of both art and academia), time in which to compose is both allowed and restricted by the university; and the academic community is hugely important to composer-academics. Finally, I include a general discussion of the influence of the university on the ability of composers to take risks in their work.

Money

“Faculty are shielded from market vagaries and the need to satisfy gallerists or collectors. They produce objects that are not salable.” (Fine, 2018, p. 185) Writing of higher education in fine art, Fine points directly to the market abstraction of its practitioners. Substituting ‘gallerists’ and ‘collectors’ for ‘record labels’, ‘ensembles’, ‘programmers’ and all of the other intermediaries of the music world, and this is not an inaccurate picture: the university art world insulates the composer from direct reliance on the popular market. In other words, “there is an inevitable element of protection from the cruel world.” (Anon_18, interview)

The freedoms allowed by this status were not taboo for composers, with many explicitly acknowledging the advantages of having a reliable income that facilitated their work. For those whose work was largely led by commissions, this gave them the freedom to pick and choose:

[Working in the university] gives me a certain amount of freedom compositionally. Because I have a job which essentially pays my bills, I'm not reliant on chasing or accepting commissions purely on the basis of getting paid. If I want to write a piece or some friends [...] then that's all fine—if I don't want to do it I don't have to. (Anon_52, interview)

For others, however, the difference made by this position was more pronounced. As explored in Chapter Three, some composers worked in a way that entirely evaded the market rationales of commissioning, instead pursuing speculative collaborations over extended periods of time in order to work out new routes for their compositions to take. In contrast to the

commission model, where the absence of a university income would largely result in a scaling up of paid work (through a process of being perhaps less selective), the unpaid collaborative relationships could become all but untenable. One highly collaborative composer, when asked whether they had considered working outside academia replied

I don't think I have the stomach for the kind of [thing]. I don't understand how you would do that. [...] Certainly the people who are in that position obviously have worked very hard to maintain that position [...] I can't comment because I'm not living their life but equally that seems so opaque to me that I can't see how I would do that. So no I've never considered that. (McLaughlin, interview)

The salary largely was positioned as secondary to the vocation of composition, but nevertheless pay was an entirely legitimate part of their view. Far from compromising their work with economic concern, it was seen as liberating the composer from the continual precarity of the market.

This financial liberation allowed composers to write music without needing a commission fee, something which is a crucial limiting factor in the art world, often requiring lengthy bidding processes or other forms of competition. One composer even articulated it as part of their role in the university not to take a commission fee:

[B]ecause I work in a university, you know, it doesn't have to have a commission fee attached. I can write pieces without getting paid for them, in fact, I do. If I had commissions for every work then I'd be getting paid twice for some of the research I do. I make sure that I write in enough pieces unpaid to fulfil the research part of my job. (Egan, interview)

In fact, although universities do have stringent guidelines on the taking of payments for research work, composers did, in general, appear to be (to all intents and purposes) exempt from these rules. Their commission fees were, by convention, their own to keep in contrast with research contracts in other areas where the university is the beneficiary of such payments.

Despite the evidence of composers taking payments, the pervasive view (whether positive or negative) goes that they need not make concessions (or considerations) to a paying audience or a commissioning ensemble:

So I think this might be a bit of a stereotype, so I don't want to necessarily make this point too strongly, but I think this could be a difference in the way that I approach

composing and the way that you might approach composing if you're working exclusively within sort of the funding structures of academia. [...] I have to get commissioned and in order for that to happen, I have to write music that people want to go and see, or at least doesn't lose ensembles and orchestras money (Anon_56, interview)

This indicates the idea that the position and support of academic music creates an ever more secluded art world. To put the positive spin on this, composers could see this as a liberation that allowed them to create art authentically, without having to take on subservient positions in the productive process to producers or commissioners: "If anything," one of my interviewees remarked on this, "in academia you may be more free." (Anon_19, interview)

The question will be whether the increasing emphasis on impact (with the impact weighting of REF scores increasing in REF 2021) will counter this trend. Impact is linked to marketisation: the market is a form of impact and, in reducing commercial market pressure, the university also demands different forms of impact. The question for the future is, then, whether this idea of impact comes to be seen to compromise autonomy to the same extent as the market has.

Time

Time is a fundamental resource and, in academia, is a bone of much contention. It is widely understood that the amount of time allowed for unconstrained research is reducing and the hours which academics have to work is increasing. The relevance of this to rationalisation is highlighted by Berg and Seeber, who write that academics "are enjoined to spend our time in ways that can be measured and registered in accounting systems." (Berg & Seeber, 2016, p. 72) Not only is time increasingly the subject of accounting, but it is also increasingly scarce: "time pressure, haste, hurry and rush are prevalent predicaments in the lives of academics" (Vostal, 2015, p. 75) Vostal points not only to the stressing, guilt-inducing pressures of this changing system, but also to the potential for positive, exhilarated work. This mixture of views is also reflected in my own fieldwork as were the experiences of demands on time. For some, time can be scarce:

[T]he demands here are sort of ridiculous, I think. The amount of hours that you have to put in are not conducive to getting on with composing. [...] when the term is going it's just [a] ridiculous workload almost impossible to do. (Grange, interview)

These pressures were sometimes seen as not only applying to academics, but to students too. The lack of unallocated time that Berg and Seeber lament was also something had in recent years, come to affect students as their “lives are just a lot more hectic.” (Moore, interview)

However, there was also often a recognition of the freedoms in terms of time allocation:

[N]o one's complaining that I'm sitting for a couple of hours talking to a PhD student who's not for even from my institution. That's a perfectly valid and reasonable use of my time. And I am entirely convinced that if I told the vice-chancellor that he would say 'yes of course that's perfectly sensible thing to do.' (Iddon, interview)

This was particularly true in regard to the comparison with trying to make a career as a freelance composer:

I mean it's funny isn't it, academics spend a huge amount of time, especially on Twitter [...] moaning about how little research time they're entitled that they have. And it's true, in the middle of term when there are dissertations and things coming out of everyone's eyes and there are loads of marking, everyone's run off their feet. But actually, compared to what it's like to work freelance seven days a week and scrape together a living out of that, you do have more time than you think. (Anon_23, interview)

That said, time pressures were inevitably a factor in determining the compositional work that composers could do. Composition under these conditions favours the tendencies to make work seasonal: to have a composition period over the summer and during periodic sabbaticals. Otherwise, it favours those who are able (or even prefer) to have their compositional activity spread more thinly (who do not find themselves in need of a sustained focussed period of composition). Though this thinning of compositional focus amongst other responsibilities was something that everyone interviewed had to negotiate, there was only one composer who found it a positive boon for their work:

I did not enjoy this research leave at all. It felt [...] so unstructured. I found it deeply dissatisfying at the time, which is why you heard me right when I said I haven't had research leave for 10 years. [...] I decided at that point that I prefer to write within the structures of having other things on. [...] I may be a little bit weird like that. (Anon_40, interview)

This is indicative, it seems, more of an approach to work and organisation than of a particular way of producing music, but it certainly indicates a useful ability for composers to be able to work in short bursts in-between allocated (teaching and administration) time. Several composers I interviewed had already or were intending to move to part-time contracts, sometimes forgoing their contractual research time entirely, in order to have more time in which to compose.

The degree of notational specificity and control required for a particular composer's work is also related to the strain felt in terms of time pressures. Creating detailed notation is extremely time consuming, and so forms of composition that focus more on the conceptual, or performance-process driven composition (often expressed in text scores and/or limited staff notation) have the potential to rely to a far greater extent on the background intellectual gestation process rather than on an extensive period of focussed labour. One such composer illustrated this, viewing the time pressures of academia as tolerable because of the nature of their work:

I don't need two months to notate up a full string quartet. If I write a string quartet it will take me an hour. It might not be right. I may have to redo that hour multiple multiple multiple times to get it to what I want it to be. But that's not the same as knowing that I need to start today in order to have the parts ready in a month's time. It's a very different type of composing labour that I do and that partly arisen out of the situation I find myself in. And also just a happy accident that that's what works for me as a composer. (McLaughlin, interview)

A changing interaction with and perception of time is a crucial element of academic life, as Berg and Seeber (2016) testify. Increasingly the academic experience of time has been of a dominance of “scheduled time” (Ylijoki & Mäntylä, 2003, p. 60)—direct and external demands on the academic's time. In addition, Ylijoki and Mäntylä highlight that the fragmentation of the working day as a result of the multiplying calls on academics' time leading to a loss of the “timeless time” (Ylijoki & Mäntylä, 2003, p. 63) which was reported by their interviewees as an essential part of research. The day-to-day of rationalised (scheduled) time was reported to break up the day, shattering the timelessness of time in an “organised time consciousness” (Hassard, 1991, quoted in Ylijoki & Mäntylä, 2003, p. 57). The ability to work in fragments and the lack of need for timeless time exhibited by the composers referenced above is an important working method in this environment, raising the possibility that forms of labour-light experimental and conceptual compositions might become increasingly suitably to the university environment.

Community

For Berg and Seeber (2016, p. chapter four), the instrumentalisation of time (though far more extensive in their cases) is linked to the issue of community. For them, the cogency of the academic community is broken down by time being increasingly comprehensively allocated to lone work with little time for being in shared spaces engaged in undirected social interactions, building trust, communicating, and generating ideas. Collegiality has traditionally played a great role in the nature of academic life, and this was reflected in composers' feelings about academia: "I just love the sense of community. For me, that's just the most important thing; community with students, with other colleagues, with visitors, [...] the sense of being part of something" (Anon_52, interview). Another composer described their move to their current institution as in large part motivated by the desire to be around a stimulating community of composers, reflected that "my colleagues are great [...] in the sense that you can have really stimulating conversations with them. I feel like I'm stuck [...] in the middle of many different [...] places, which I really appreciate." (Reuben, interview) There is, then, a heterotopian aspect to a good departmental community (see page 145).

The prominence of communal discourse in the academic life is demonstrated in the degree to which community played a part in composers' appreciation of their positions in their universities. Connections with other composer-academics were extremely important, allowing discussion and collaboration, not just within their own discipline, but in other disciplines too: "I think one of the massive advantages to being in academia for me is having such easy access to people in other disciplines." (McLaughlin, interview) In addition, composers' communities can change significantly with the entrance into academia. Their social sphere—their art world—can change to be one defined to a greater extent by the university.

[O]nce you start working for an academic institution [...] there is a danger, and it certainly was the case with me, that you kind of lose contact with [...] your group that you would see all the time [. Instead you have contact with] a group that is entirely framed by the institution, and so you kind of end up doing things where you do things with those people or where those people know somebody and everybody writes a piece for [them ...] which is all great and whatever but it becomes kind of institutionally framed in a way that's not necessarily entirely healthy because you're kind of creating something from within the institution that happens within the institution (Vaughan, interview)

This composer also emphasised the role of grant funding in encouraging university-focussed events, thereby contributing to the university-centricity of the art world (Vaughan, personal communication, 10/05/2021).

Composers' art worlds are not exclusively comprised of other academics, but shared space, interests, and concerns as well as extended socialisation through years of study engender ties with others in academia. This community can have a regulative function, helping to subtly form the rules of the social game. It is this community which constitutes the legitimate symbols and means of production that were crucial to the definition of the field in Chapter 2: Outlining the Field.

Risk

Trust is a form of risk. It is an acceptance of an unrationalised (uncontrolled) behaviour. In the scheme of rationalisation outlined earlier, the animation of rational systems is an uncomfortable necessity, animating the dead written marks of grammatised judgement. When this trust is betrayed by human error or wilfulness, the answer is to regulate—to rationalise by grammatisation—in order to pin down the freedoms that went so awry. This risk averse tendency has already been exhibited in terms of commissioning practices. In universities, this affinity relates to the tendency in recent years for a reduction in stability for the academic associated with a rise in assessments. In terms of the genesis of compositional work, this can mean formalised competitions for grants and research time. An example of this continual assessment process would be one composer who had to enter a funding competition each year in order to run a contemporary music module. That is, this was not a personal project or an added extra; this was a first, second, and third year module which each year depended on a funding application that pinned down what it would be doing that year. In other instances, composers applied to the university to support recording projects, performances, and the costs of travelling for their work. Small scale grants—a matter of a few thousand pounds—are not uncommon for these purposes, but still often require the composer to enter into an application process. Larger grant applications involve a large upfront investment of time and a low chance of seeing a return.

[Y]ou're quite lucky if [a grant application] is successful. It's a bit like the lottery. [...] I always thought with these things, supposedly the success rate is about one in six and it takes a lot of time to write one so you've got a lot of wasted time and they may as

well give you a dice: if you roll a six, 'here's some money' [laughs] and if not, 'sorry, we'll come back to you next year and you can roll the dice again.' (Anon_44, interview)

Similarly to the scale used above to illustrate the relationship between commissioners and composers, the balance of power in these applications can be seen to be in favour of the administering organisation; the composer-academic invests a huge amount of time and energy to apply for funding with little chance of return.

The growing culture of the application-based organisation and the risk-based activities of the individual can also be more starkly seen in the precarity of academics on limited term contracts who have to continually enter competitions for temporary contracts in order to maintain their careers. This is compounded by the competitive advantage of having had prominent commissions, grants, and publications and so they may also be continually entering competitions and soliciting commissions from the university and elsewhere.

The parallel of the composition competition offers a sobering comparison: if the grant application is a form of solicited commission, and the preference of a bureaucracy is taken as being to displace risk, then it would be possible to imagine a circumstance in which the composer academic enters their work—work, that is, which is already completed—into a competition to gain funding. That is, to put it not in the negotiated power space of commissioning, but in the administratively-dominated market place of goods where the producer speculatively takes on the risks and investment associated with production in the hope of later being able to 'sell' it to a cultural intermediary, or even directly to its recipients.³¹ In extremis, this equates to free-lance academics selling, by the minute, their compositions.

It must be noted that this discussion has been dominated thus far by acoustic art music, and not taken into account those areas less prevalent in academic composition. The idea of selling ready-made music by the minute (library music) is not an unusual phenomenon in commercial music. Only one composer I spoke to mentioned writing library music as part of their work, and even then it was explicitly distanced from what they considered to be their art music, which included their academic music. In some models, no external impetus is needed for the creation of this music, as it is created speculatively in order to build up as a body of personal capital. This is in contrast to the capital of the commissioned art music composer whose past works are almost entirely a purely and irredeemably symbolic cultural capital; they

³¹ Interestingly, a variation on this system did in fact exist in the Netherlands until 2011: composers would submit works they had written already and stood a chance of being paid for it retrospectively if they were not commissioned in the first place. (Nederlands Overheid, 2010)

are inhabitants of the curriculum vitae, but are not, in the main, performed again but rather are commissioned, premiered and then only serve to recommend the composer for future commissions.

The values of art are sufficiently institutionalised here that the idea of creating this kind of music that is sold as a ready-made object is still distant from the reality of the field. In fact, the institutional logic of academia (as opposed to the fields of composition, or university administration) is such that the ready-made holds little value. One could argue even that risk—that is, trust—is part of the intrinsic ethos of a research organisation. Without uncertainty there is no discovery, there is only the familiar solutions to what are seen as old problems enacted again and again. A research problem must have unknown solutions, otherwise it is simply not worth looking into. For a university to buy as ‘research’ ready-made work is to contradict this principle, containing as it does all of the answers to its own problems. The creation of *The Work* collapses the possibilities of the project into a single, definite object.

There is an institutional conflict, then, in how the university treats commissioning. The resultant environment is a tense balance between the academic and administrative ideals of uncertainty and certainty respectively. This is reflected in the problems composers have with soliciting compositional work through writing. A particular sticking point can be a perception that what is needed to succeed with grant applications is an ability to commit to certain outcomes for the project, thereby constraining the uncertainty that is interwoven with the academic value of the project in the first place. Croft points out that one may be “objectively ‘innovative’ in a way that you can tell in advance, without going to the trouble of a risky aesthetic judgment.” (Croft, 2015) It was quite usual in my fieldwork for the process of composition to be exploratory and to develop radically in the course of a project, whether by artistic deliberation or expedience.

4.4 Conclusion

In the organisational institutionalist perspective, trends such as those described in this chapter are related to institutions. In composition (particularly non-commercial composition) there is a very ill-defined objective and therefore an amorphous concept of efficiency. This absence of a clear objective leaves the analyst with little but the institutions of the field to draw on to explain common behaviours; to reiterate something touched earlier (page 8), I regard the

restricted field of cultural production as being a site of near pure institutional behaviour. In this sphere, institutionalism holds the keys to the system's workings.

Drawing on these terms, my research in this area concurs with Fine in his analysis of the academisation of fine art in the United States. For Fine, the institution of Master of Fine Arts programmes by universities has changed what it means to be an artist. His contention is that this process has created an institutional environment that places an emphasis on the ability of an artist to construct, use, and articulate theory. Artists are charged with navigating the conceptual justification of their work. Unlike Kingsbry's (1988), Keegan-Phipps' (2007), Hill's(2009), and even Born's (1995) accounts of institutions orientated around particular features of the artistic product—for example, complexity, atonality, new sounds, canonised works, or technological developments—what I describe are institutions increasingly based around *conceptual virtuosity*. If universities produce particular tendencies in composers through coercion and normativity, then they are the tendencies to produce compositions that are intended to engage with the meta-discursive environment of academic theory.

The ideal typical Academic Composer produces work that, in being realised discloses its own production—it is non-fictional composition (Gottschalk, 2016)—it is music that exposes the circumstances of its creation to the audience who are thus pulled into the realm of social theory, and it is music which is aimed less towards sounding new than finding new modes of production for sounds through its privileging of the process (thus avoiding aesthetic judgement). An academic composition may explore collaboration and experiment with power dynamics; rather than creating a world to step into, it steps into the world. It is not merely a truth-telling fiction, but a truth-telling fact. In some forms, it discloses not the artist to the audience, but the audience and their world to themselves. It is work that one can theorise where a unique sound does not (all one can do with a sound is say 'this is how it was produced'). A social phenomenon, on the other hand, is theorisable and thereafter constitutes externalised, explicit knowledge. That is valid capital for the research-producing university.

4.5 Taking a Position

I have been asked a number of times by composers what my view on the composition as research debate is, I therefore follow with my personal perspective on this debate, which I deliberately set outside the substance of my sociological research.

My chief thought as I conducted this fieldwork was not to wonder whether composition is research; there are many definitions of knowledge, of truth, and of research—that, it seems to me, is far too many moving parts to warrant anything but an arbitrary or convenient absolute decision. There is certainly enough room to manoeuvre most practices into a framing where they constitute research (hence the new specialism of staff employed in universities to be research administrators, whose talents are in this very framing). In the end, research is an evaluative term—just like ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘high art’ and ‘low art’. It is a cultural standard that legitimates certain behaviours. In this sense I have sympathy with Reeves’s argument that “anything could be classed as research. But there is no reason to suppose that anything and everything will be.” (Reeves, 2016, p. 58)

However, what I think Reeves fails to appreciate is the interdependence of the university system: composition and music do not simply make their own rules. They are entitled to certain elements of self-definition, just like REF Sub-Panel 35, whose general criteria were determined by those set by its parent, Panel D, which were in turn extremely similar to those of the other three panels (Research Excellence Framework, 2015). All of these were influenced by the conventions and received wisdom of civil-servants, politicians, and society at large. It is not up to composers to decide what research is in many ways, and scientifically influenced frameworks will, it seems, continue to dominate the realms of conventional wisdom.

The question is, then, given this institutional environment, is the primary value of composition to academics and wider society, the same as that which makes it valuable as research under present conditions? Is the source of composition’s resource value (i.e. its validity in research evaluation) the source of its social value? If one were to take away the REF, the research grant applications, and all of the rest, would composition’s values be the same as those of the research system? I would argue that they would likely not be. I do not think that the main value of composition is to be found in the value system of the REF.

In particular, I do not think that the sharing of composers’ problem-solving in a specific set of circumstances is as valuable in its communication to others as the research value system would like. As I have highlighted, the artistic value is to some degree dependant on the uniqueness of its nativity. If, in the style of much work in the arts and humanities, the objective is not to provide transferable laws, but a ‘reading’ of something in a moment, then this may be the value of the work itself, but that is a matter of disclosure in the experience of the artwork (the next question then being ‘who’s experience?’). A composition may be heard as an ethnography may be read. A discussion of its production may be read in a way akin to a methodological theory regarding the process of ethnography. What a discipline such as

anthropology does not do is to make the focus of its value entirely methodological, as with the increasing process-orientation of composition in the research framework. If methodologies are all everyone creates and they are each unique to their author, who, apart from their originator, uses them?

Chapter 5: Teaching Composition

FOR MANY INTERVIEWEES, THE principle characteristic of academia—for better or for worse—was presented as teaching. Teaching took up the most time in academics' work and was often a significant factor in the decision to be in academia at all, repeatedly being cited as the primary motivation for seeking out and staying in an academic position. This can perhaps be attributed to the idea that composition itself is a vocation that a composer will pursue with or without the academic frame of pressure and support. The difference in being an academic, therefore, is more to do with the teaching aspect than with their compositional practice.

On only a few occasions, teaching was identified as being a necessary part of the work, but not one that was a motivation to be an academic:

I won't claim that teaching is my favourite thing. I don't mind it—sometimes it's quite rewarding—but if there wasn't the research I wouldn't be motivated. If it was just being like a school teacher I could only ever do that to get by [...] I don't think I could genuinely feel that much satisfaction from [...] helping to educate people where you could easily be substituted by a bunch of other people covering exactly the same material. Whereas, if you're doing something that links to your research, at least you can convince yourself that you can do a few things that others might not have done—so if there's just a bit of originality, a bit of uniqueness to it. And if school teachers were paid more than some academics, because academics usually get paid more than school teachers, if it was the other way around I still would probably be happy to be [an] academic because I want the chance to research. (Anon_44, interview)

In this case, teaching was made worthwhile by its relationship to research. Composers very often were the authors of their teaching, writing and delivering certain modules. In these circumstances, it was common for the topic to be one related to their compositional practice. Knowing more about their compositional specialisms than other subject areas, composer academics are able to provide a much greater depth of expertise for much less work. The effect of this is to create a mutualistic relationship between teaching and practice, explicitly promoted by some institutions as 'research-led teaching.' This individuality—the fact that one academic's contribution is unlike all others—can be considered anti-rational, as one academic's contribution is not identical to another's. The rational containment of this non-rationalisable

individualism is modularisation of teaching, which will be further discussed in Chapter Six (page 199).

In contrast, teaching was generally seen as being the least rewarding when it was not related to the research/practice specialisms of the composer themselves, as in the following quote where a composer reflects on their previous lecturing position:

That little sliver of what I was doing for my PhD [that] mapped onto my teaching was tiny in comparison to the overwhelming amount of other guff they gave me to do, which at times had no relationship to anything I'd ever studied before, which became immensely frustrating because they had [...] so many students. [...] [It was n]ot research-led, but just this placeholder where you go into the room and there was 25 students there and you'd tell them something. And at the lowest ebb I was teaching them things about business plans for some sort of marketing stuff and I know nothing about it at all. [...] It was pretty grim to be honest and ultimately you realise that when 80% of what you're doing is so far removed from what you've devoted your life to trying to do, then it's not really worth doing I don't think. (Stanović)

In this case it is starkly laid out that the university was rationalising the efficient production of student educational experience. These modules, the interviewee elaborated, were designed to allow any member of staff to teach it, so as to provide teaching for the volume of students taken on. This is an example of a modularised teaching system *in extremis*. These courses allowed for the trivialisation of labour; by decoupling teaching from research, the organisation devalues the extensive cultural capital of the academic, making them, to all intents and purposes, easily replaceable. The key to seeing this as a form of rationalised, alienated labour is looking past cultural assumptions about intellectual labour that assume it must, by virtue of its non-manual character, be more authentic than the work of the manual worker. This thesis is centrally concerned with this idea, that grammatised agency plays a part in controlling intellectual activity, just as it does manual labour.

In contrast to this situation, the same composer described their experience of unalienated labour in the position they subsequently were appointed to:

I was expecting that my teaching would more closely mirror what happens in my research activities so that actually I could genuinely explore a compositional idea in my practice and then use that as work in progress to present in my teaching. So I thought that they would marry together much more coherently. (Stanović, interview)

In the new position, the university did indeed give the composer a greater ability to integrate teaching and research.

I felt like I would have more ownership over the direction of the curriculum and my place within it [...] When I started here the first thing that was sent to me after my contract was a blank module form and I was told to fill it in with what I thought would be most appropriate to teach. And that's an almost heavenly experience from what I'd been in before. [...] And very quickly most of my teaching is around things related to my research and PhD so I feel very positive about that. (Stanović, interview)

This transition lays out starkly common themes in the contrast between what makes teaching fulfilling and what doesn't. In the former situation, teaching was detached from personal expertise, often taking the form of pre-prescribed content, sometimes delivered repeatedly in four consecutive classes, where quantity of provision was prioritised over the depth of the teacher's knowledge. The latter situation, on the other hand, is one in which the composer is given the chance to create their teaching according to their own ideas, incorporating their own expertise from their compositional work, which they teach themselves, keeping the whole process as much as possible linked to them as a unique individual. Teaching, like art was preferred where it was authentic—teaching practice with the teacher as themselves.

This concurs with Katie Olivant's (2015) small-scale study of USA school teachers' experiences of standardised teaching and testing in which she counterposes such top-down prescriptive methods with the creativity of teachers.

[L]egislators and school boards may feel they are ensuring "professionalism" and professional practices by implementing rigorous testing mandates designed to replicate "good work," whereas teachers value the freedom more often associated with creative and artistic occupations. Looked at from another perspective, it could be argued that the transformational power of creativity poses a challenge to organizational systems and institutional frameworks that rely, sometimes necessarily, on compliance and constraint, as well as to approaches to learning, teaching, and assessment that promote strategic or surface approaches to learning. (Olivant, 2015, p. 127)

In the terms used here, the regimes of standardised testing and teaching Olivant's participants are reflecting on are rationalising grammatised systems. For Olivant, the appeal (for her interviewees) of making allowance for a greater role of creativity was described mostly

in terms of the benefits to the students. It was seen as a way for teachers to help the children develop their creative faculties by the teacher acting as a role model; “They’re going to be the cookie cutter; you know, they can go work on an assembly line really well, but we’ve lost them.” (Danielle in Olivant, 2015, p. 121); as a way of tailoring what is being taught to what the children (individually and collectively) are able to do; and as a way of avoiding short-term memorised learning.

However, if we see this as a comparable situation to the one indicated by teaching preferences of composers-academics, in my study there is less instrumental reasoning expressed with regard to the uses of creativity in teaching. Composer-academics focused to a far greater degree on the role of teaching in their work lives—in the kind of work they want to be doing and that they find fulfilling. This emphasises the centrality of personal fulfilment and vocation in the motivation to become academics.

The following two chapters explore the values at play around teaching. In this chapter, I describe modes of teaching and their roles in compositional education and consider the values at play using the conceptual framing of critical pedagogy. Chapter 6: Compositional Teaching and the Structures of the University concerns the relationship between these pedagogic ideals and rationalisation, finally returning to this subject of modularisation. Just as in the previous two chapters, there runs through all of this a vein of contestation: what is the legitimate role of the composer’s judgement? With regard to this, administrative systems seek to harness the composer’s judgement, masking its irreducible subjectivity with grammatised agency.

5.1 Modes of Teaching

Lectures are used in composition teaching as in other areas of higher education. The composer-academic verbally (usually with visual and auditory aids) presents information, often to a large group of students. This tends to be used to cover areas of explicit knowledge that are considered widely applicable and of general importance or interest. As such, it tends to be used most to introduce new students to the key territory and terms of the field: “the first year is very definitely 'here's a bunch of new weird stuff, come with us on the journey, see where it gets you.'” (McLaughlin, interview)

One objective of this is to give students a knowledge of the canon of legitimate works. The lecture offers a chance for the composer to present knowledge of the lineage in which the students are being trained. As for McLaughlin, the introduction of material in this form is

intended to expand their ideas of what is possible and to understand how to use techniques that are new to them. This both endows them with cultural capital (and thus the authority to break rules by signalling the self-consciousness of the transgression), and opens up technical possibilities as a means of inspiration. There is also in this the motivation to signal educational substance: by focussing on composers from outside the popular consciousness, students learn new things and so there is an objective sense of progression and induction.

This is complemented by the seminar. These are small-scale teaching sessions focussed on discussion and participation by the students. One form of these is the listening session, where a piece of music is presented to the group—sometimes one composed by one of the student composers, which I will refer to as a peer-listening session—and discussed. This particularly is used as a means of engaging the students with experiencing and critiquing music. At its most basic, the listening session is an antidote to a trend highlighted multiple times in my interviews in which students are less likely to listen to music of their own volition and in a focussed way.

Getting students to listen to specific music was repeatedly considered to be problematic. This was seen in terms of attendance at live music:

[There was] a transition where you could say to students who were doing a music degree 'right, what was the last concert you went to?' to [a situation] where 'has anyone ever been to a concert?' [...] [T]here was a big shift away from [students listening to classical music voluntarily for their entertainment] but not a shift, interestingly, to where you could say to people 'alright name me the last five gigs you went to and they would start citing all sorts of different indie bands or whatever, it was just something they didn't do. (Vaughan, interview)

It was also seen in the depth and concentration of the listening:

[Some of our students] will just listen to a bit of it and they think that's listening to two minutes of this symphony or whatever, that's quite enough. I've now listened to that symphony. So, there's this sense of sort of skating over the surface of everything, and actually getting people to dig down into it is a challenge. And to say to them 'well, actually, even then, just having heard the beginning of the Eroica Symphony is not enough. Having heard the first movement of the Eroica symphony is not enough. Having looked at it in score is not enough. Having heard the entire Symphony and studied it in score for a month is not enough. You then need to hear all nine Beethoven symphonies in the same depth and you have to be able to understand them in the

context of Mozart and Haydn. Then you're starting to begin to have some idea of what this music is. And I think for many of them, when they're faced with that and they are faced with the whole of music history before them, then it's just sort of overwhelming and they do nothing. (Pickard, interview)

As in the above quotes, the problem was particularly presented by academics with reference to a lack of experience of classical music. The perceived lack of experience with legitimate repertoire was highlighted as being detrimental to the students' compositional work.

I don't feel that that people generally have as wide a knowledge of the repertoire. It's a paradox because it's all so readily available and yet because it's all there most of the music they get is through film or television or incidental music of some sort or easier listening minimalism. Which is not generally melodically very developed and I feel this is a little problem. (Nicholson, interview)

It highlights two aspects: first that listening is often a passive side-effect of watching consuming multimedia, which was associated with a lack of depth, analysis and knowledge; and secondly, the judgement of musical worth in what is being listened to and how it will improve their compositional work. The listening session (including listening to works in lectures) played a remedial role in this. When asked how they go about overcoming this issue, John Pickard replied thus:

You can lead a horse to water as they say. I'm constantly letting them hear music and making sure they hear music in the classes as well. So, it's not enough to say 'go away and listen to this,' we've got to hear stuff together in the classes. (Pickard, interview)

In this sense, the listening session seeks to counteract the challenge of getting students to listen to music and, more particularly, getting them to listen to music that will nurture their compositional abilities.

The peer-listening session is more rarely used, and very different in its intention. Here, the students present their own work to one another and receive the reflections of their peer-composers. This is akin to the presentation in other fields where (particularly post-graduate) students present their work to the class and a discussion ensues. In a similar way, this tends to be the preserve more often of more advanced students who have elected to have some specialism in composition. It is also particularly suited to electro-acoustic composition, as the composition is rendered without the need for musicians.

In acoustic composition, where musicians are more necessary, the workshop fulfils this role. The workshop is the pedagogical tool that is most particular to the discipline of composition. Workshops are sessions which involve the live rehearsal and realisation of a student's composition by other performers. Workshops take two forms which I will call professional and student-participatory.

Professional workshops are when professional musicians are hired by the university to come in and work with the students on their compositions. The performers rehearse the piece, asking questions of the student about their intentions, and making suggestions as to how they might better achieve this. Students in turn are allowed (to varying degrees) to direct the musicians' performance during the short section of the workshop dedicated to their piece. This is, therefore, at least in intention, a thoroughly dialogical form of teaching that allows the piece to be realised in a forum that is open to the negotiation of both composer and performer.

It is worth noting that the workshop is not only a feature of university teaching, but is often used in professional settings where composers can work on a piece with the ensemble that is to perform it. In a university setting, therefore, these sessions provide students with the opportunity to simulate this real-world scenario (akin to an experience like mootings in a law school). In addition, they allow students to write music that would be beyond the technical abilities of their peers.

A student-participatory workshop might be part of the curriculum or might be simply something that students are encouraged to do outside their course. The benefits of forming ensembles to play one's work were repeatedly brought up in interviews. The student-led ensemble was seen as providing creative freedom and experience of the professional compositional world, in which many composers have their own groups which perform their music. Many performances of composers-academics' compositions took place through opportunities they created themselves by knowing performers and creating ensembles that play together either as a one-off or permanently. The idea of encouraging students to thus form ensembles is that they can start to practice being composers in more than purely the act of composition itself and so begin to transition towards professional work.

Student-participatory workshops have one additional benefit: they ensure the students are actually making music. The broader issue was one of initiative and intrinsic motivation:

They tend to be reluctant to take [the] initiative. They prefer to be told exactly what to do (to pass or to get good marks) and [are] scared to make mistakes and don't want to bother to experiment. [...] 'What exactly do you want us to do?' that's what they say.

There's nothing we would like them to do; they should come up with [what they want to do:] 'we would like this, how should we do [it?]' [... then] we can tell them how to do it. We may be able to teach them how, but what to do in music? [...] there is something that you can't teach[. ...] you can't teach what you want to do in music and how to generate the notes [except with a numerical or mathematical approach]. [...] So we have to actually play with them. (Hara Cawkwell, interview)

The interviewee here is involved in a style of teaching that is based predominantly around practical student workshops. They work with groups to play, experiment, introduce new concepts, and encourage them to find a direction they want to take in music. This is not a common method of teaching, and is really particular to this and a few other instances in this sample, and also to the type of music being taught. In this instance, the students are largely studying popular music and, because of the dominant trends in aural (or at least non-western-staff-notational) learning in this area, many of the students neither read nor wrote staff notated music. Instead, everything was composed and learnt by ear with a lecturer present for extensive workshops where they would introduce new concepts. This was limited to the arena of popular music. In contrast, courses where notation was commonly understood and used instead tended towards the more clearly delineated workshop where composers would have their work performed by an ensemble of students or professionals.

The participatory workshop was more commonly a feature of extra-curricular compositional work, but nonetheless appreciated by composers for its role in the compositional education of those who attended. On one occasion, a student composer's society provided both a participatory workshop and a listening session for those who chose to be involved:

We have a really good student composition society which one of our third years runs, [... T]hey basically run a sort of a Friday seminar session where they play each other work in progress and give each other peer assessment of it [and], rather than one of us going '[...] do this', they do that themselves and it's quite informal and there are a core of people who do it, but it's very useful and they also run a new music ensemble as well which links to that as well. (Anon_52, interview)

The form of compositional education thus embraces a range of formats and associated styles going from presentational forms (with hierarchical implications) to participatory forms (with more egalitarian implications). These tools, as I will show, are sites that enact certain underlying ideas of good compositional education.

5.2 Teaching and Critical Pedagogy

Critical Pedagogy

The teaching styles used are bound up with a varying liberatory conceptual framework on the part of composer-academics. The use of workshops as well as peer-listening sessions, for instance, are usually intended to be forums where students may exercise their own judgement, where they interact with music making and have to deal with the issues that it throws up directly, and where their cultural judgement is given primacy over that of their teachers. These values I read using the frame of critical pedagogy.

Critical pedagogy, as developed by Paulo Freire in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972) puts forward an alternative to, what he calls, banking education. Banking education is the mode of education where a teacher is seen as the transmitter of knowledge and the student as recipient. The student's knowledge will accumulate as more knowledge is transferred to them; they are "treated as vessels to be filled with knowledge." (Bhattacharya, 2020, p. 403) The titular 'oppression' is found in that the hierarchical educational system limits the freedom of enquiry "in a master/slave dialectic that created the dyad of oppressor and oppressed." (Trifonas, 2018, p. 367) The teacher, in transferring knowledge, controls the judgement of the student, instituting a cultural hegemony of entrenched (il)legitimacy. The teacher projects "an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression," and, in so doing, "negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry." (Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 72 quoted in Bhattacharya, 2020, p. 404) In other words, the attribution of ignorance makes the student impotent, removing their right and ability to judge and act until they have internalised the sanctioned knowledge.

Critical pedagogy (or 'liberatory education'), in contrast, is a mode of education based on the empowerment of the student's ability to engage in the world. The contrast is well put by Kelvin Stewart Beckett when he writes that "Banking education is monological, problem-solving and constituted by teachers' views of the world. Liberatory education, on the other hand, is

dialogical, problem-posing and constituted by students' views of the world." (Beckett, 2013, p. 50) To take these essential features in turn:³²

Monological/dialogical—Whereas in the monological (banking) education, the process of learning is based exclusively around the teacher's articulation of subject-matter, its problems and their solutions, in a dialogical mode, the student is put in dialogue with their teacher and peers. It is in their hearing and being heard that they encounter a multitude of other agencies, and learn through their interaction with the problems they pose to their world-view.

Problem-solving/problem-posing—for banking education, the world is a problem for the student to which they need answers. They are thus assigned to a subordinate position to the teacher, who is there to provide the solutions to those problems and to provide closure to the world's mysteries. Critical pedagogy, on the other hand, presents the world as a continually unfolding and re-folding complex of meaning creation. The student gains the skill to make sense out of this world and to negotiate the inevitable problems thrown up by any such sense-making. The objective is, in short, to equip people for inquiry—for critiquing the world as it is presented.

Constituted by the teacher's/students' view of the world—The monological view provides a single narrative for the matter at hand: it is as the teacher interprets it and the subordinate student is charged to replicate this narration. On the other hand, in liberatory education, students might not only discuss the subject, but discuss what the subject should be, establishing their own terms of study. In this way, the subject is seen as emerging from the collective dialogue, rather from the dictatorial terms of the teacher.

From all three of these angles, liberatory education essentially involves the meeting of student (and teacher) with other disruptive agencies (paralleling disrupted individualist and collaborative composition). Problems for the student's world view are posed, the solution of which is not to be learned, but rather the creation and negotiation of which *is* the learning process. The student does not learn by replication—by rote—but opens out possibility by overcoming the "limit situations" placed before them (Freire, 1972, p. 72).

³² Note that the following description is put in my terms, drawing on others' interpretations, rather than following any specific writer.

This opposition between critical pedagogy and bank learning facilitates my reading of the ways in which composition is taught and to the conceptual structures which composers form around it. This dualistic understanding of these approaches to teaching will be later involved in considering what effect academic institutional pressures can have on what goes on in the field of composition.

Composition Teaching and Critical Pedagogy

The predominant form of compositional teaching fell within (Western classical) notating composition. That is, composers were required to write musical notation that would then be realised by musicians. It was in this context that the workshop was an important tool in composition teaching, providing a forum for the actions of students to move from the theoretical to the audible—they were a way of learning by acting on the world.

Composition that did not involve any such realisation was largely a thing of the past. In the same vein as the traditional division of labour in Western art music, composers recounted memories of having had teachers who would assess their compositions simply by reading the score, and so their music would not necessarily be heard unless they made an opportunity for it to be:

I'd come to university and all of the submissions were 'write music and submit the score' and we never got to hear the music, which was very very strange[. ... A]lthough I did do composition I felt that I wondered whether composition was going to be for me in the future because, you know, I didn't get to hear anything I'd ever written for the course. I did write some music from my friends, which I didn't submit as my final pieces but I got those played because I managed to pull some friends together [...], but yeah, in terms of the composition for the course I didn't [get to hear any of my pieces.] But I think probably it's changed a lot now. (Anon_8, interview)

As in this quote, the dominant perception was that this mute teaching was generally seen as being replaced by the required or encouraged realisation of the work in a curricular setting—moving away from what one composer-academic referred to as “fiction music” (Anon_60, interview). Regarding this development, one interviewee recounted how their teacher, in their recollection, pioneered the idea of composers needing to hear their music to become competent at their art:

The other thing is [my teacher] always made sure everything that we did was played. And he was most probably the first teacher—because we're talking back in the 70s here, so it's ancient times—[...] to always make sure there was a professional group available for the composers to write for as part of the course. [...] That also influenced me and [...] that influence continues right into the present day here. (Grange, interview)

This indicates that performance has increasingly become valued in a way that rivals the complete reliance on abstract notation.

The significance of this observation could be diminished to a simple change in pedagogic preference and left there. However, such a change in institutionalised values does not happen in a field for no reason, nor without institutional work. Institutions are not arbitrary, stand-alone principles, but are part of a nexus of interlinked institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008)—a habitus. I theorise this shift from mute to sounding pedagogy is an expression of the trend in compositional teaching towards critical pedagogy. The change is concerned with the source of the criticism of student work; in the mute teaching method, the student presents their work to the teacher, who reads (internally realises) it and then gives their judgement to the student. The critique is from teacher to student. The student is in the role of subordinate and apprentice, as their faculties of internal realisation of their music defer to their teacher's greater experience, which masks a hierarchy in taste. This dominance is predicated on the fact that the experience of the music is not shared. In liberatory education, the educational process is one of sharing: students and teachers alike experience certain things together, and thus each individual is allowed to have a personal experience. If one person only is admitted to have the legitimate experience of the work, then theirs can only be the only authoritative source of critique. Not only this, but a musicological lineage based in formalistic ideas means that experience even becomes unimportant as naturalised principles of form (Cook, 2013) cement the teacher's authority in their knowledge of this objective standard. In contrast, liberatory educational approaches, through the student acting upon and experiencing the world for themselves, allows the student to use and reflect on anything that is relevant to their experience of the world. Students assemble and associate different areas of experience, forming a highly personal view and so facilitating critiques of monolithic narratives. Student critique is facilitated by the pluralisation of thought, and so may be stifled by a non-sounding educational experience that only admits critique from the 'abstract' canon of objectified music.

As the 'performative turn' has brought questions about a work-based framework of formalistic musicology, so too in composition. This has led to a greater weight being put onto

the role of the experience of music and the individual experience in the process of learning to compose. The role of the composer as listener and thus legitimate critic comes to the fore in place of the absolutism of the teacher's judgement. When idealism (the ideal realm of forms) is abandoned, the Idea must be found in the world itself (Marx in Antonio, 1981, p.333) in a process of imminent critique; no longer a universal criterion, but a host of learner-constituted standards. The locus of legitimate critique is moved from the teacher to the student, putting the student in the role of both creator and critic. The formation of the critique is found in the disparity not between the teacher's expectations and the student's actions, but between the student's intentions and their experience of the sounding result. This is what Joshua Fineberg is objecting to when he writes of the state of affairs in compositional education:

Self expression is a domain where assessments like right or wrong, better or worse, are not considered appropriate. Therefore no elitist-type judgements can be made. [...] It's permissible to discuss whether someone has achieved his or her aims, but not the legitimacy of those aims. Debating the validity (or interest) of someone's intentions has become "elitist." (Fineberg, 2013, p. 52)

In Fineberg's description, the authority to decide the ends of the work are put in the hands of the student. The only legitimate critique is one that compares the product to the stated intention. In this regime, as Fineberg notes, there is no such thing as a 'bad idea' because the idea is legitimate because it is genuine (the very legitimacy explored above in terms of authenticity).

Thus, this logic puts at the centre of the process the student's own judgement as they reflect on their intentions in relation to the realised work. The idea embraces a subjectivist position on the art, openly relocating the legitimacy of regulative ideals from an absolute (naturalised) position to a relative one:

I think the only sensible objective [of composition teaching] is that [the students] are closer to writing the music that they really want to write than they were at the beginning. And if you don't achieve that then that's a real problem. (Fox, interview)

Achieving this requires a teacher to withdraw their own judgement, instead focussing on creating an environment for the student.

Well I like the idea of setting up kind of models that allow students to think for themselves. I mean I think that's important. And I think I've become better as a teacher in terms of just opening up lines of inquiry rather than feeling that everything has to be really instructive. (Anon_57, interview)

Here, the entire discursive process is put in the hands of students and their peers. Through discussions, workshops, and the challenges of realising their work, the course becomes a kind of open world which it is the student's role then to navigate towards a destination of their own choosing. The student (in the strongest form of this idea) becomes the only legitimate critic of their own work, learning by having what they have written played and so becoming familiar with the consequences of their actions, learning what can be done rather than what should be done. They are not told what is right or wrong according to an authoritative ideal, but instead are themselves responsible for the evaluation.

This self-evaluative imminent critique is possible without performance. The most common method is for the composer-academic to attempt to internalise the student's intentions, using their objectives as a critical standard. In such an instance, they might ask a student about their intentions and then seek to provide a critique themselves on how well a certain notational act will realise those intentions:

[M]y approach has consistently been to work from what the students want to do. [...] The most useful thing you can do as a composition teacher is ask questions. So you say you know "this is what you've written and it seems to me these are the implications of what you've written. Is that what you want?" And if it isn't, then to [...] think more about what it is that they're trying to achieve. And generally speaking that's what seems to work. (Fox, interview)

This is a hybrid between critical and banking educational models and was by far the most commonly stated approach to teaching composition—"to try and understand the intentions of the composer and then to look at the results [...] and compare the two." (Hugill, interview) In another case, this mode was articulated thus:

I'll usually say 'well, what do you want someone to experience at that point?' and see if they can articulate it. If they can't, [I'll] try to help them think of what they might be wanting someone to experience at that point. If you can get to that position then I can say 'here's how you might achieve that more effectively.' (Battey, interview)

This use of imminent critique is linked in the framework set out here to a broader institutional shift that has increasingly de-legitimised teacher criticism and legitimised student criticism of their own work. This has involved a significant trust in the critical abilities of the student, as illustrated by this detailed description of the process of tutorial teaching:

Good composition teaching is essentially getting them to do it and to say it for themselves because once you've faced up to the problem and you've said it out loud to yourself then you are kind of obliged to go and fix it. I mean it's all well and good me telling you what's wrong with the piece, that's no use, you already know what's wrong with it, just say it. And the way in which this is achieved, I believe, is basically a sort of cold reading. Which is to say, get the composer to tell you about the piece, play the recording of the piece, [...] I mean it's useful to hear it but it's really because you really just need to work out what they have told you that they didn't tell you[. ... T]he cheap version of this is you can tell them what they told you and they have to face up to it that way. Better, you can work out how the hell you can advance a line of questioning that gets you to the point where you can actually spell out the thing that they revealed to you that they told you about the piece. [...] A lot of composers will tell you what they're concerned about, occasionally that's absolutely true and then you just have a grown up conversation. But most of the time I think it really is about trusting that this composer that does really know what they're doing, it's just that there's a thing that they don't really want to have to do, and they need to be made to. (Iddon, interview)

Here, the student is seen as being capable of providing effective criticism of their own work. The tutorial environment, in this case, becomes a confrontation between the student and their own judgement. It is less an exercise in learning as such, and more an exercise in responsibility. The responsibility of the composer is thus shown more generally as being to be completely answerable to their own genuine judgement—to the standard of an authenticity only they can know.

In the tutorial method described here, the teacher is responsible for encouraging the student to confront themselves and in the workshop, the student confronts the music they have written; both methods are intended to help the student critique their own work. In contrast, one can also see the critical pedagogic aspect of socialised critique, particularly in the use of peer listening sessions in electronic music.

In electroacoustic music, a composer will usually listen to their recorded material and then cut, edit, and recombine sounds, all the while listening in minute detail, discovering what the processes they have applied to the digital signal have resulted in. The composer is thus

engaged throughout the process in continual listening and judgement. In order to constrain their judgement but also provide provoking feedback, a teacher may use a peer listening session to socialise the judgement of the work, thereby diminishing their dictatorial judgement. This was described by one composer-academic:

I run listening sessions which take place every two weeks where we listen to each other's music and the idea is to create a critical but ultimately supportive context for people to be able to present their newly composed pieces. So it is very critical, people to say what they think that those thoughts don't carry beyond the room. We very intentionally listen to each piece twice, once without the composer saying anything and the audience discussing so that the composer has an opportunity to encounter what a room full of people think about a piece without any outside influence [...]. And then the second time, where the room listens to what the composer thinks, so they can ask questions about what they were trying to achieve and so on. (Stanović, interview)

The intent of these sessions is that the student's views may be exposed to those of their peers. This allows for criticism of their work in a way that disrupts and forces them into questioning their practice whilst not contributing to the authoritarian elevation of the teacher. The contributions of their peers are equally pluralistic and individual, giving the chance for different views to be aired and so putting the student-composer not in the role of subordinate student, nor in the role of dictatorial composer, but rather in the role of arbiter and decision-maker, deciding how to navigate the view which their work elicits. Should they change their piece? Which views are worth taking on board and which are not? Thus, just as with disrupted individualist composition, the *process* rather than the result comes to the foreground. They act on their peers through their work, see the results, and learn what their actions do in the world by doing them rather than by being taught what they should be.

The socialised critique of this teaching mode is explicitly central to its use. Another composer-academic outlined the benefit of this style of this format:

There are times when, particularly in listening sessions when someone says, 'I don't think this works,' and then the next person chimes up says 'yeah I happen to agree,' and then you find out that actually in the room there's a consensus of opinion and the composer unless they decided to tie that piece off and that's it they would be unwise to disregard such a general view. I'm not saying there's a right or wrong in composition because there quite clearly isn't but there are clearly some aspects of both aesthetic

methodology and technical methodology that [...] are obvious on a level that isn't just one person's whim. (166_1)

It should be highlighted that this particular method of teaching was not something brought up by many composers and more often the emphasis of the critical component of their teaching was put on the interaction between teacher and student, especially in the tutorial. However, the socialisation of critique in the manner of the peer listening session bears the hallmarks of the abdication of teacher-authority that is indicative of a critical educational approach. This social rationality (Blau, 2019) allows for a less egocentric, more dialogic approach. In other words, like the collaborative compositional process, the critique is not rendered by one legitimate judge, but is socialised and negotiated (excepting that the individualised educational system means that the composer still has the last say on whether to act on the criticism). This provides a neat escape from a theoretical impasse, namely who is the legitimate judge if not the teacher?

The techniques of critical pedagogy can be understood as the relocation of the source of legitimate critique. In the case of the tutorial, the teacher sets aside their idea of what the aim of a composition should be, instead seeking out the intention of the student so as to help them attain it; the aim of this is to relocate the authoritative judgement of what the *ends* of the composition are in the student. This moves a step away from the dictatorial regime of the school, and the teacher who teaches their students as disciples to write like them, thereby dictating themselves the ends. In the case of the 'cold reading' mentioned by Martin Iddon, this is taken further. In this instance, the teacher (at least in intention) places the authoritative judgement of not only *what* the intention behind the composition is, but also of *how* that is achieved in the hands of the student. The workshop allows the student to hear for themselves the results of their actions and so introduces a disruptive event into their compositional process: the actual sound of it. This removes the legitimate perception of the composition from the teacher and levels the playing-field by sharing the actual experience, allowing the student to criticise their own work. Still another step towards the relocation of critical authority is in the case of the listening session. In the case of electroacoustic music, the teacher is faced with the issue that the realisation of the work is not in itself disruptive to the composer's process, as they have heard it throughout its construction. Here, then, the disruptive agency is introduced through an attempt to understand the perception of a work by others. It is an attempt for the composer to hear the work they have been so focussed on through other ears, and so to understand the implications of their decisions. In this way, this mode of teaching steps completely away from

professorial judgement of means and ends and, dispersing the judgement into the social. This raises questions about legitimate forms of judgement in such a social circumstance and the professorial influence on this.

The Limits of the Use of Critical Pedagogy

The degree and nature of critical pedagogy varies, for example, as already mentioned, with electronic music lending itself to the listening session. Another key element is the students' level of study. Discussion of educational methods which I align here with a critical pedagogic approach was most often confined to those composers who are of a sufficiently high level in their compositional training as to allow this approach to be effective. This is again reiterated here:

I don't think I've got one ideal for all students. [...] At undergraduate level our students [...] need more information. So [...] it's to some extent content driven. [...] Although they're third year students, in some ways their understanding and their knowledge of music is quite limited [...]. So it's kind of opening them up to other possibilities. Whereas, at postgraduate level, [...] we've got such a diverse group of international students, some of whom are already highly qualified sort of practitioners within their own field. [...] So obviously it's still about probing and asking questions and that kind of thing. But there's a certain assumption made there I think that they already come with a certain skill set and a certain level of knowledge, so it's a different way of teaching. (Anon_57, interview)

The key turning point here and in other cases is somewhere between the third year of the three year undergraduate degree and the master's degree. Once technical proficiency and canonical awareness are sufficient, in the third year or in the master's year, the emphasis is put much more wholeheartedly on the student developing their own critique:

[T]hese are people in a master's [...] they know how to compose, they have a certain skill[s] they have a certain personal voice, they know what they're doing. The point of the master's is to be able to create opportunities for critical and experimental thought about this. [...] looking at the things that they take for granted, upending some things putting them in some uncomfortable positions but mostly just asking them to constantly reflect on their own practice: 'why did you choose to do that?' Not 'was that

the best way to do it?' but 'what are the other ways that you could do it?' (McLaughlin, interview)

In the final sentence of this quote, the composer-academic highlights an important aspect of their ethos around teaching: that composition teaching is fundamentally about the opening up of possible routes of action. That said, this is also accompanied by a seeming contradiction: the student should open up possibility, but also find a particular path they want to pursue:

Master's programs, though, because it's only a year and we do have a pressure on them across the portfolio module particularly to they can write four totally different pieces if they want but it makes a lot more sense for them to try and hone a particular idea and I think consciously or [...] subconsciously [...] that's an agenda that I drive: not be good at one thing but develop what it is about you that you are most interested in developing at the moment. (McLaughlin, interview)

The idea, then, is to open up the possibilities of the student's practice, thereby allowing them to follow a path that they are inclined to pursue—their voice. This non-coercive environment is, then, a means of avoiding distorting the natural inclinations of the student (in accordance with the values of authenticity outlined in 1.2 Art, Authenticity, and Autonomy). The idea of belonging to a 'school' of composition can, in this sense, be similarly illegitimate to belonging to a 'market'—in either case, the artistic agency is tainted by inauthenticity.

Teaching as Metadiscourse

This return to authenticity indicates another avenue for squaring the central problem of critical pedagogy—that is, the question 'if not the teacher's judgement, then whose?' Friere emphasises process as product, and so it is too in composition: rather than talking about the required objective of a student's work (in terms of the style in which they should be writing for example), the focus is on the student's process as the thing to be developed. In this sense, the teacher's judgement turns to a kind of meta-language, focussing not on whether they make the 'right' decisions, but on whether they make 'easy' decisions; not on the destination, but on the journey. In this sense the judgement of the teacher can be reintroduced as the judgement of process.

This is tied up with a kind of historicity—the cultural voice, as I have termed it. Even with the teaching of historical compositional schools and their works, the objective of the teaching

can be seen as a kind of metadiscursive sense that is more concerned with the process and reasons for getting to a certain place, rather than with the merits of the place itself, as McLaughlin went on to elucidate:

[We teach, for example,] two weeks on spectral music. I don't want them to come out of the end of it writing spectral music, I want them to come out at the end of it understanding the things that got the spectral composers in there in the first place.
(McLaughlin, interview)

This is paralleled in the idea of experimental anti-authorial composition analysed in Chapter Three (see *Distributing creativity and procedural control*, page 96), whose works disclose their process of creation. In this conception, students are expected to learn how to go about making decisions rather than learning what their decisions should be (as in banking education).

Although this would seem to diminish the regulative role of the teacher's judgement, the process of decision-making taught by teachers using this method can still have a regulative effect. The terms upon which a decision is made constitute the outcome, if, for example, they are bound up with values of creating new and challenging music. Even the terms of a composition brief, such as to write a string quartet (perhaps in order to have it workshopped by professional musicians) imply a certain historical context of composer's work. Judgement, as with non-directive composition, therefore does not disappear, but steps up to the level of metadiscourse; not a judgement of what has been created, but of on what grounds it was composed. The teacher steps out of the illegitimate matter of orthodoxy and school and into a universalising position of authority.

This is akin to Patricia Bizzell's (1991) critical pedagogical conundrum: how to achieve the progressive goals of the teacher whilst not imposing any more than a persuasive will on students. For her, critical pedagogy is persuasive—the student must be convinced rather than coerced. Her solution to this conundrum is to persuade the student of the merits of trusting to the teacher's authority.³³ In compositional terms, what of the student, for example, who writes pastiche compositions and is not inclined to aim for originality? Composition teaching generally errs on the side of discouraging this, on the grounds that it is not critical—that is, that the

³³ In fact, to remain closer to the critical pedagogical values, one can solve this puzzle by theorising the inherent liberatory effect of curiosity and enquiry, rather than the teacher's own social critique, as progressive aspects.

composer's decision making process is not good—thereby reintroducing the professorial judgement in a way that intervenes in the student's learning by doing. This dilemma accentuates the two levels of thinking in compositional pedagogy: at the first level is the language of music—the particularities of the compositional product. This is the territory of banking education, of compositional schools, and imitative writing. In the realm of critical pedagogy, on the other hand, the teacher has no legitimacy intervening in this area. On the second level, there is the meta-language of music—the way in which those decisions are made. In this regime, a teacher may not be able to legitimately dictate a student's aesthetic judgement, but they can direct the means of critical judgement.

The dual logic of the two levels of musical language and musical meta-language is highlighted in this example. Here, the composer first distances themselves from the idea of a dictatorial pedagogic approach before highlighting where they consider it appropriate to guide the student:

[W]hat I've tended to do is look to the individual student and rather than applying a template on to them to say 'once you have these skills you are a composer.' What I've tended to do is look at [...] how I can help really, [...] and that might not necessarily be 'well, you should learn how to write for a string quartet' or a saxophone quartet or whatever, but actually if you're a singer songwriter, have you actually thought about using this particular technique in the studio? [...] for singer-songwriters there could be a really innovative approach there that I would consider new music [...] even though the genre might be something very different to the one I was educated in. (Anon_65, interview)

The influence here is to guide students towards creating new music without prescribing the nature of their composition directly.

The intention to avoid the direct exercise of power on the first level—the 'language of music'—can be seen in the repeated desire by composer-academics for students not to imitate their style. Too strong a lineage—the idea of compositional 'schools' with a particular sound—were described as objectionable. Aligning too closely with a framework of discipleship is seen as inauthentic and old fashioned—an unjustifiable excess of charismatic power. An example, though mildly put, of this aversion in a composer-academic's reflection on their own education is expressed here:

Participant: [P]eople from The Hague conservatory, [...] they kind of self describe themselves as The Hague School. And [...] I wasn't really that sold on that because I think [...] there is weird politics [...] involved in [...] self identifying as a school [...]

Interviewer: So what did they feel The Hague School meant?

Participant: I think it was like very kind of Andriessen-kind-of-influenced [...] rhythmic minimal stuff but maybe a bit more disciplined as well. So, maybe very influenced by Louis [Andriessen. ...] I never wanted to imitate Louis Andriessen, let's put it that way, whereas I had some [...] people that were studying with me that were definitely kind of like either imitating or really influenced by him and [...] I think I was a bit more sceptical. (Reuben, interview)

In their transferal to teaching practice, this kind of anti-school inclination fed into the attempts to remove the teacher's judgement and encourage students to find their own language. However, getting students to exercise their freedoms through the belief that they wouldn't be judged based on the aesthetic standards of their teacher was often cited as a key challenge in teaching students: "the hardest thing to teach is to say 'go off and do something that you think is exciting. Don't try and please me. I'll smell it a mile off if you're trying to write something that you think I would like the sound of. So go off and do something that I wouldn't expect.'"(Anon_33, interview)

In another case, a composer referenced the difficulties of getting (popular music) students to not feel like they needed to imitate his experimentalism: "what they perceive as the weirdness and the outsidersness of it." (Edmondés, interview) William Edmondés also described his discomfort with the structural power differential in which this problem was rooted:

[W]hat is really difficult to break down for them and me is that they see me as part of the political infrastructure, which is [that] I'm a massive part of their route to getting a degree at the end of it. So I'm part of a kind of weird authority culture. So, it's really difficult to expose people to new stuff without them automatically thinking 'oh, that's the stuff I need to do. That's what's going to get me a good mark' [...] that's so awful and it's one of the hardest things to battle against. (Edmondés, interview)

Here, the teacher's challenge is to persuade the students that they must be authentic above all else: "to fall in love with the thing you're doing on your own terms so that it becomes something that is genuinely yours because then that actually will be decent and [... have] all of

the qualities that will get you a good mark.” (Edmondson, interview) In this case, and other popular music teaching like it, the student’s composition was not primarily evaluated by the attribution of originality. In another case where this was very explicitly put, the composer saw the “lust for originality and fear of doing anything at all the same as what has been done in previous generations” as being something of the past: “it’s just not there in our composers. They write like whoever they want and they don’t overtly seek originality in the first instance.” (Brissenden, interview) This was a particular feature of commercial music contexts:

[T]he whole point of popular music things is to write something that sounds very close to something else without plagiarising. So, in that sense, their aim is that and the only thing I can do to help them. I mean telling them ‘no, you shouldn’t write this music—you should listen to Boulez and Stockhausen and write something really different from Boulez and Stockhausen [...]’ is kind of pointless at least in the context I’m working in and for the students I’m teaching. [... A]gain, my role as a composition teacher is to figure out how to help them achieve their goals better. (Anon_386, interview)

Here, the laying aside of the value of the particular brand of newness proceeding from a familiarity with German modernists is seen as necessary because the students’ objectives are within an art world which is seen as valuing competent replication over originality.

The ethos of prioritisation of the student’s judgement means different things in different contexts: in art music it means guiding students to write authentically and originally. In commercial music, it means deferring to the judgement of the student to accept the desire to create marketable goods. The difference is in the teacher’s intervention in the metadiscourse: in art music, the teacher intervenes in that they ensure the student is finding new paths; in commercial music, the teacher is more likely to allow the student to defer to the institutional logic of market production, abdicating even intervention in this metadiscourse. This illustrates how a receding professorial judgement can make room for other institutional logics to dominate. The key to critical pedagogy is the guided disruption of any such settled ideas by introducing disruptive agencies so as to challenge the student’s process of decision-making.

Post-modernism, Plurality, and Critical Pedagogy

In composition, critical pedagogy has a certain affinity with the move towards post-modern thought in both artistic and academic spheres. This can be seen in perceptions of the changing position of certainty around there be a single musical canon. The idea of a canon is a

'grand narratives', an incredulity towards which Jean-François Lyotard (1984) reckoned to be the defining feature of postmodernism. A canon is a teleological tool that narrates history—narrates, that is, the progress of the grand narrative; "Where," Lyotard asks, "after the, metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?" (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv) The canon is an institutional standard that gives way, in post-modern thought to 'little narratives', and where "it is now dissension that must be emphasized." (Lyotard, 1984, p. 61) In this sense, the cohesive canon of banking education is distinctly antithetical to the postmodern sentiment (and even to invention itself [Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv]).

Amongst a few academics, the breakdown of the cohesive, authoritative canon was a significant change that they had seen in the course of their careers: "[W]hen I started [...] it was much more accepted what the important music composers were and now it's much harder to justify." (Anon_18, interview) Another composer referred to a difficulty with getting a sense of students' musical "present [... as there was] no longer a sense of universal present for the students" (Vaughan, interview). Coping with this diversity in experience was a challenge in compositional teaching making the pitching of teaching difficult. Mike Vaughan continued that

As a tutor, you were shifting away from a position where (for example) their common experience might include some early 20th century and late nineteenth-century music, usually gleaned through playing for county youth orchestras and [Associated Board] exams, to one where knowledge and experience is extremely fragmented and specialised. Also, this is not just to do with a rejection of art music traditions in favour of the popular [...] even talking about something like 90s rave music has got as little immediate meaning for them as actually talking about, I don't know, a Webern Trio. And that's a bit of an eye opener when you kind of work through what that actually means. So the [...] shift away from any vision of what one might have as a sort of traditional music student hasn't actually created an alternative music student profile, it's created so many multiple profiles, it's almost impossible to manage unless that you think you're starting from point zero. And that is a great pity because it means that you're actually kind of ignoring all the experiences that any individual student might have, or knowledge that they might have. I found that I was surrounded by people [students] who might have had an encyclopaedic knowledge of some specific area of music-making (many did), but because this knowledge was not common to all of them, it could not be used as part of a common foundation from which to build. I was no longer working in a (cosy) world where [...] specific pre-requisite skill sets relating to classical music canons, or even popular music canons, had and real meaning or resonance for many of the students. The frustration was that whereas they might not

have had certain specific skills (e.g. grade 8 theory) they often had other valuable skills and interests. However, because these were often very different for each student, and not necessarily immediately apparent, it was difficult to find a way to engage with their diversity, especially in a medium to large group context. (Vaughan, interview)

The implications of such a shift in educational ethos—one which seeks to lessen the authority of the canon and teacher—creates a significant issue in the conception of education as essentially reproductive. The canon is the cultural inheritance *par excellence*—the legitimate objects of culture, the recognition of which is the precondition for classification in a certain field (cf. Bourdieu, 2010). Nettle (1995) even makes the canon—as he refers to it as The Pantheon of Western classical music—central to the ethos of the music department, likening the graduates to an ordained priesthood who are tasked with bearing and spreading this doctrine, an analogy echoed by Bourdieu (1996) with regard to the role of elite schools in France. Both of these views are predicated on a view of education as reproduction—‘pedagogy’ in its etymologically literal sense of ‘leading the children’. However, in an ideal typical regime of critical pedagogy, this changes to a revolutionary disposition. To continue Bourdieu and Nettle’s analogy, the priesthood becomes dedicated to developing their personal theology with no special reverence for doctrine. For composers, this translates to not being dedicated to certain cultural objects, but to the critical pursuit of their own creative conscience. This means that the influences on students (in theory) are as diverse as the students themselves. Thus the shared cultural principles of the field start to break up as the legitimacy tied to cultural objects and related cultural competencies lessens. This legitimised diversity highlights the contingency of the cultural value that was previously naturalised within the dominant fraction of a field.

Changes to a canon—including intentional changes such as those of revivalists—are revisionary. The difference between this and the ideal type outlined here is that it is not a conscious changing of the canon in order to promote something as legitimate but rather it aims to overturn the idea of canon *per se*. It is not that the canon is changed, but that the idea of having a canon at all that is in question. It is in this respect that individual critique in critical pedagogy demonstrates a conceptual affinity to the diminishing of the legitimate canon. Again, by this means the pedagogy moves from the substantial—the specifics of legitimate culture—to the procedural metadiscourse: on what basis does one qualify something as good artwork?

The Institutional Environment and Critical Pedagogy

This affinity of critical pedagogy and the wider post-modern institutional logic indicates that the move to a more critical-pedagogical approach need not be a conscious one based on explicit theory (indeed the term ‘critical pedagogy’ was never used in my interviews). This aligns with the findings of Serrano et al. (2017), who studied the intentions of module leaders in arts and humanities (including one music module) where some form of critical pedagogic approach was used. Using a similar method as is employed here, they found that all of the course leaders “worked with some level of ‘intuitive’ Critical Pedagogy” (Serrano et al., 2017, p. 13). This intuitive approach was echoed in my study: many composers espoused intentions to teach in a way that was indicative of some form of liberatory education—with elements of student-constituted leaning and relocation of the legitimate critique—but none drew explicitly upon the theoretical school of critical pedagogy. The pervasiveness of these methods with no explicit theoretical influence indicates that the theory itself is not a significant influence to them (I use it here as a purely analytical framing). Rather, I suggest that this indicates a change in the institutional logic of the academic and artistic fields—of the de-legitimisation of universalism, objectivism, and a cohesive idea of the canon. In its stead is found a promotion of the subjective experience, the individual’s culture and judgement, and the divergent paths of the new. Where students previously were to be taught the appropriate uses of notes—the legitimate style expressed in mute notation—based on the teacher’s judgement, this intuitive critical pedagogic approach reframed the student becomes the key judge of their work.

The inexplicitness of this shared pedagogic theory has given rise to a shared institutional sense without consensus: it is a method variously hybridised with the historical practices with which the composer-academics themselves were educated. This hybridity can be problematic for teachers in confronting difficulties like increasingly plural experience amongst students. In this way, the instantiation of intuitive critical pedagogy is unsettled. The change I am describing is part of a loose change in institutional logic, which undoubtedly could be attributed in part to a vast array of institutional changes at every level of society (for instance, at the most general level, individualism) in which these composer-academics work. Critical pedagogy in this context thus illustrates the impact on habitus of constellations of institutional pressures, rather than the reductionist theorisations of causal change in institutional fields.

Critical pedagogy, as continual revolution, could even be said to resist any kind of explicit or formal institutionalisation. The kinds of explicit pressures involved in identifiable mimetic,

normative, and coercive isomorphism are not present here, yet change takes place all the same even in the face of dissonant organisational pressures.

5.3 Conclusion: The Prevalence of Critical Pedagogy

The engagement with some form of student-led learning was evident throughout the field; no composer expressed a desire to create a school of composition, nor to teach their students what to compose. The banking educational model, in other words, was disavowed by every composer to some extent.

That said, there was certainly a more explicit sense of legitimate canon in some institutions and from some interviewees than others. In particular, a few older institutions were represented by composers with a particularly strong sense of there being a legitimate canon of music that students should learn about (the classical canon of Nettl's [1995] pantheon). This emerged through concern about the changes in music studies towards paradigms less firmly rooted in the works of the established masters of the classical canon. This was a concern expressed particularly by the older generation of composers, but also to a lesser extent by their younger counterparts at these few institutions. In particular, these younger counterparts displayed a commitment to set compositional principles of decision-making, highlighted in an emphasis on the idea of musical technique and formalism. This tended to relate to composers whose work was in the most historically legitimate spheres of musical work: notated classical music, with a particular emphasis on orchestral and instrumental music. However, even in these cases, there was a concern for the student's individuality and for developing their criticism of their own work alongside this maintenance of the legitimate cultural capital.

In this way, the intuitive critical pedagogic attitudes are, despite some variation in degrees of commitment to the ideas and some composers having a greater sense of the importance of the traditional canon than others, extremely widespread. Critical pedagogy seeks renewal and revolution: to bring up students who are prepared for the creativity that uproots the practices of the past and sows anew. It should be emphasised again that my argument is that the paradigm of thought in composition is one *akin* to that of liberatory education; the principles which are predominantly expressed by composers as guiding their approach to teaching are those of the empowerment of student judgement, the recession of teacher judgement, and the student-constitution and direction of learning. To put this in terms of the three qualities of critical pedagogy I opened this discussion with, the quintessence of the approach in most cases is

aligned with the idea of a dialogical education whose primary method is to pose problems for the student to solve and whose objectives are ideally constituted by the student themselves:

Dialogical—the widespread objective of composer academics’ teaching was to consult the student in order to allow for them to cater to the educational objectives of the student. This was presented as being enacted primarily through tutorials, where students would be encouraged to engage their evaluative skills either by the teacher understanding and reflecting their critique back, or by the student themselves explicitly evaluating their work. In peer listening sessions, too, discussion and critique were encouraged.

Problem-posing—composition was largely seen as a subject of praxis. That is to say, it was seen as less teachable than it was doable. The most lauded modes of learning were those where the student acted upon the world, for example by writing notation and having this performed by musicians. In this activity the idea was that they would have posed to them firstly the problem of creating a vision to realise, secondly the problem of communicating it through notation, and thirdly the problem of a realisation that inevitably was not quite as they had expected. A key teaching method was also to pose specific problems in the forms of briefs—in the words of one composer, “cages can be relatively useful” (Anon_5, interview). By putting specific restrictions in place, the intention was for the student to have to deal with an unexpected challenge, and so to prompt them to disrupt and develop their own direction. In these ways, the use of external disruptive influences that were in some way removed from the direct judgements of the teacher was a crucial part of composition teaching.

Constituted by the students’ view of the world—the most widely agreed upon element of composition teaching was the idea that each student’s specific musical objectives should be determined by the student themselves. The role of the teacher in most composer-academics’ views was to understand and teach to each student’s self-constituted goals, putting aside their own preferences and affective reactions. This, again, was seen as being implemented through dialogical forms of learning.

The underpinning of all three of these elements is an antithetical position to the domineering teacher; there is a notional recession of the charismatic judgement of the teacher, and an illegitimacy of overtly subjective critique. In line with the critical pedagogic ethos, I theorise this here as an institutional attitude towards power and, particularly, towards the

power imbalance of the traditional teacher-student relationship. It is a scepticism of the idea of the ignorant student, and a view that they are only ignorant because of a systemic enfeeblement by means of didactic domination.

This I link to the ideal type of the exo-authoritative teacher. Like the exo-authoritative composer who allows their own judgement to recede in favour of collaborative or otherwise distributed agencies, the exo-authoritative teacher diminishes their own judgement in favour of that of the student. The question which remains is how this approach fares in the present university environment.

Chapter 6: Compositional Teaching and the Structures of the University

AS HAS ALREADY BEEN explored, the institutional work of post-modern scholarship has done a significant amount to develop and spread the intuitive implementation of critical pedagogy in the substructure of the university. However, at the same time there have been changes in the institutional, administrative logic of the university as an organisation giving rise to conflicts with critical pedagogy—that is, in the university’s morphology. In this chapter, I set out to examine the relationships between composer-academics’ values in teaching and the structural pressures of universities.

6.1 Critical Pedagogy, Assessment, and the University

In the meeting of the morphological (formal, administrative) and substructural (informal, academic) value systems, assessment is key. It is both a central requirement of the accrediting organisation and a central problem of critical pedagogy. Serrano et al. (2017), sought to explore the very problem posed here: whether modes of critical pedagogic assessment can fit within the regime of a university with a formal administrative structure that demands the rationalisation of learning outcomes and teaching methods. Their focus on assessment found that the module leaders did endeavour to orientate assessment towards the ideals of critical pedagogy, putting “their emphasis on the process of learning, rather than adopting a simple reliance on the measurement of outcomes.” (Serrano et al., 2017, p. 20) However, whilst the teaching seemed to be largely conducted with a critical pedagogic intentions, Serrano et al. remained vague on how successfully this was achieved in assessment.

Problematically for critical pedagogy, assessment is that crucial moment when judgements must be made and so it is the moment in education which is the most reliant on a power inequality:

Assessment is the most political of all educational processes; it is where issues of power are most at stake. If there is no staff/student collaboration in assessment, then

staff exert a stranglehold that inhibits the development of collaboration with respect to all other processes. (Heron, 1979: 13 quoted in Reynolds & Trehan, 2000, p. 268)

Reynolds and Trehan go on to comment that “[m]ore than any other aspect of education, assessment embodies power relations between the institution and its students, with tutors as custodians of the institution’s rules and practices.” (Reynolds & Trehan, 2000, p. 268) In this crucial aspect of the educational process, the organisation as well as the students and society at large invest an extraordinary power—the power to influence a lifetime’s career—in the assessor. How can this be reconciled with the objectives of critical pedagogy?

Endeavours to solve this puzzle have taken a few different forms, each attempting to reduce the power differential between teacher and student. Reynolds and Trehan (2000) typify these approaches into three categories: consultative, collaborative, and peer assessment.

Consultative assessment—The assessment is carried out by the teacher, but in discussion with the student. This provides a minimal abdication of the teacher’s power, as the ultimate decision still rests with them.

Collaborative assessment—Students assess their own work by working on evaluation with their teacher. This gives a mid-point of teacher-intervention.

Peer assessment—Students assess each other’s work, thereby exercising their critical faculties and subjecting their work to a non-teacher-derived judgement. This potentially removes the teacher altogether from the assessment process.

This provides a scheme of three levels of teacher abdication of power over the final judgement of a work.

In as far as composers have engaged with critical pedagogy, the effort has been to suspend or relocate judgement during teaching. Whilst the above typology shows methods of relocating judgement, the suspension of judgement is incompatible to the conventional assessment process. The intention to totally remove judgement was not common amongst interviewees. On one occasion, however, a composer spoke of the environment they wished to create, which was “away from this kind of judgy ascribing grades [...] or any kind of judgement” (Anon_10, interview). In this example, the suspension of judgement is not just that of the teacher, but also that of the student. The desired educational environment was seen as “short-circuiting [the students’] instincts to judge what they’re doing and reject what they’ve done[. ...] I try really hard from day dot to instil people into really celebrating their mistakes and failures in music because they’re the most teachable moments” (Anon_10, interview). Another similarly minded

composer spoke of trying to help students to “learn how to not let the inner critic dominate.” (Battey, interview) The problem is that the idea of suspending judgement is not well suited to an organisational framework and student constituency that both demand formal assessment.

In stark contrast to this and to the use of critical pedagogical teaching methods described in the last chapter is the hard, coercive power of marks and assessment—that moment when judgement becomes reified and quantified. Even where the educational methods are intuitively liberatory, the modes of assessment generally remained in a dictatorial mode of judgement, with the power to mark residing with the composer-academic:

[The basis for our judgements is] our own judgement, which I feel completely fine [with] because we talk about it a lot, we talk about everyone's work and [...] never do we just have one person marking. And I always say to the students, [...] ‘you're currently not an expert doctor, [...] and] if your doctor says [...] this is what I think is wrong with you, or this is what I think you need, then you kind of take their advice.’ And I say it's the same, like we do know [...] what level this is at. We've marked [...] thousands and thousands and thousands of pieces collectively. (Anon_56, interview)

However, even here it is interesting to note that the complete charismatic dictatorial authority to judge where one master has complete power of judgement over the student, is not present. Rather, to avoid the perceived illegitimacy of such a method, appeal is made to the tempering force of communicative rationality (Blau, 2019)—the justification of judgement through the socialisation of never having just one person marking. In this way, even here, where the personal judgement is embraced as the primary basis of the assessment, it is still felt necessary to temper and qualify the viewpoint.

Some academics, however, appeared to be less comfortable with the idea of their own authority over marking, despite having to carry it out. This contradiction may itself indicate one notable feature of the interview responses to questions about teaching ethos: assessment was scarcely ever brought up at all by the interviewees. Where it was discussed, there was inclination, often, to evade of the idea of judgement implied by assessment in most circumstance:

Universities now require there to be a digital archive which includes [...] a PDF with ticks in boxes and paragraphs explaining why you've arrived at [...] well,] not a judgment, you know, [but] feedback which explains the things that seem to work better

and things that [have] perhaps not worked as well as the student hoped. (Fox, interview)

This avoidance of explicit talk of ‘judgement’ (and the connotations of power imbalance, modernist teleological aesthetic thought, and an outdated teaching ethos involving the dominance of a master over a disciple it brings with it) not only reinforces the rhetorical importance of intuitive critical pedagogical principles, but also highlights the inconsistency with university rationalisation. The stated teaching ethos may be based around the student’s own critique of their work, around their experience of action and critical reflection, and around diminishing the teacher’s authority, but the organisation requires judgement. Education has to be quantified in order to be worth something. The examination, like the REF, is a systemic rationalisation—a transformation of something ideally free and subjective into an objective metric.

Methods of critical pedagogic assessment have been developed, as highlighted above, but as Serrano et al. (2017) note, the university organisation as well as students themselves can provide resistance to alternative modes of assessment. The dissonance of the organisational-bureaucratic framework and the liberatory intuition of most composers is laid out here:

You could say from one respect that composition is an impossible subject to teach. [...] If] you look at learning objectives or grading criteria, there are many many big problems there and essentially if it was scrutinised it would collapse [...] It's a very very difficult thing. I used to say to my students ‘[...] the fact that you are marked for your compositions is already affecting the way your composing, so that shouldn't be happening. The only reason I'm marking your compositions is because you want a degree and I need to make money.’ (Ghikas, interview)

The question is, then, how did composers square their ethos of diminishing their own authority with the need to provide marks? Certainly, none engaged in, what was referred to by Reynolds and Trehan above as, ‘peer assessment’ wholesale, nor in purely self-assessment. Equally, there were no modes of assessment mentioned that were based purely on attendance of the course in order to pass or fail. Students were neither given authority to judge each other, nor to judge themselves—the teacher always retained power in one way or another over the judgement of the student’s work. So this contradiction, in as far as critical pedagogic ethos was expressed, was ever-present—the perpetuation of classroom power imbalance in the face of an anti-authoritarian streak. In essence, there was a substructural exo-authoritative ethos

inhabiting a morphology that required judgement: a judgement only legitimately provided by an ego-authoritative teacher.

However, similarly to discussions of teaching ethos, when talking about assessment there was a tendency to emphasise the intentions of the student as a key referent when making judgements. The teacher's judgement was often presented as being based on a projection of the student's critique, fusing the legitimacy of the student's own critique with the power centralisation of the teacher. This constituted a voluntary consultation on the part of the teacher.

Alternatively, the teacher's judgement could be displaced by means of the grammatisation of assessment criteria. A number of teachers explicitly appealed to the use of the marking criteria as a means of explaining the process of judgement without recourse to their personal subjectivity:

I think a lot of it is just being very rigorous with the marking criteria, instead of [...] marking [...] without reference to [it]. Yes, there's is a certain amount of interpretation of that. [...] So the first couple of sessions I'm discussing the criteria with them, and the actual session helps them to interpret the criteria. I show them ways I interpret the criteria so I make it very very clear [...] what it is I'm looking for potentially. (Anon_36, interview)

Here there is a glimpse of a sympathy between critical pedagogy and rationalising logics: the answer to subjectivity and power imbalance is to grammatised the authority of the judgement. No longer is the actor the wielder of legitimate authority, but their freedom to act is only legitimate when it is carried out under the domination of a rationalised system. The teacher is not privileged if they share the same grammatised conditions as the students.

The advantages of such an abdication of judgemental power to rationalised systems were laid out in stark terms by one composer-academic:

[W]e have to be very very clear—again understandably to the students—about [...] what they have to do in terms of assessment, and we have to be very clear about why we are giving something a first or a 2:1 or a 2:2 or a 3rd. [...] It [...] becomes a contract between us and the paying student. [...] But] you've got to anticipate what are the exact right criteria by which we should be able to assess that and to be able to justify down to the nth degree why you've given this a 68 and this a 66. It turns something that must rely on our experience and being entrusted to make good judgement down to a sort of scientific art and an act of statistics to an nth degree of precision that is unreal. But I

can see no alternative [...] in a potentially [...] volatile situation where [a] student feels somehow you haven't delivered according to our promise and potential litigation that could take place if a student was to challenge or appeal a mark and we can't show watertight process of having gone through this assessment process rigorously in the same way that we assess another student. It would be very difficult to defend it in a court other than by having it set in such strict terms that in a way they become a straight-jacket to what is really our goal, which is trying to encourage novelty and diversity and experimentation and award it accordingly, which is an act of faith really more than anything else. (Anon_43, Interview)

Here, the composer clearly lays out the use of rationalised judgement as a way of abdicating agency so that they may claim that their own judgement played as small a role in the process as possible (in so doing becoming depersonalised and modular as the means of their labour becomes grammatised). However, their judgement is still always present as the animating agency for the rationalised system. In this case, the composer still has to commit their judgement in the interpretation of the naturalising terms of the criteria, for instance, 'imagination', 'technical proficiency', 'coherence', or 'sophistication'. These terms are a mask for the 'act of faith' of a student submitting themselves to the teacher's unrationalised judgement. Anon_43 went on to give a very full and impassioned explanation of this kind of use of marking criteria when asked about the kind of marking criteria they use:

[The marking criteria] tend to be worthy in a way that make it sound as though it's watertight and legal. So, for example, 'demonstrate an exemplary level of artistic practice within the context and confines of a given brief.' That doesn't mean anything does it, when it comes down to pinpointing why is it a 70 then rather than a 68? I mean I've just made that up but it tends to be speak of that kind. [...] If it's a pass level, you insert the word 'satisfactory'; if it's 2:2 level you insert the word 'good' in there somewhere; if it's 2:1 level, 'very good', and if it's going to be a first you insert the word 'exemplary' or 'excellent', but you haven't really defined what good, excellent, very good, or satisfactory means so you haven't really made any steps forward but you're couching it in the terms that at least ensures that whatever mark you give, if you use similar language in your feedback, you appear to be justifying the mark you're giving. And to be honest, there isn't really anything beyond that you can do. [...] I signed up to university because I trusted that the teachers there had the insight to award me an appropriate degree. It never occurred to me to expect them to give me a 15 page legal document explaining why I got my first class degree or why on a particular module I only got 53 or whatever. I just thought 'there we are, there's proof that that was good

work and that wasn't good work.' But things have shifted enormously in society generally. This is not specific to universities never mind to this university. I just think this whole process of [...] trying to measure things in order to show them empirically statistically and therefore focusing on things that are measurable because the things that aren't measurable, regardless of how important they might be, fall outside the measurable criteria about which quality is being judged. So you can go hang as far as that's concerned. But there we are. (Anon_43, interview)

In this way, the marking criteria is one means of navigating the contradiction between the institutional distaste for judgement and the essential judgement at the heart of the obligatory assessment. Even Anon_56, who exemplified above the unabashed deployment of the idea of judgement went on to further legitimise their assessment practice using marking criteria:

[W]e do have very specific [marking criteria.] Well, I say specific, it's specific in the sense that it has lists of increasingly positive adjectives to say 'this is [...] good' or 'this is excellent' or 'this is outstanding.' [...] We do have matrix-y type thing that's the students can refer to [...] I mean for us, we do know what we're doing and it comes from experience but it makes it a bit easier to see for them to see. (Anon_56, interview)

The need for such justification can be linked to the distaste of critical pedagogy for the singular judgement of the master. The contradiction between the need for assessment and the desire to diminish the teacher's judgement provides a weak point in legitimacy which the rationalising technics can colonise. In this sense, critical pedagogy creates a fertile ground for the extension of bureaucratic power, and so the consolidation of power into an ownable means of administration. A mark scheme can be changed by a managerial intervention, or targeted by complaints from students whilst the ephemeral and obscured judgement of the teacher can only be sovereign. In this way, judgement is increasingly bound up in administration.

Demonstrable Skill Over Artistry

The fact that criteria are made explicit means that there is an associated potential for their scrutinisation. This means that they have to be all the more aligned with the organisation's institutional environment, and with the expectations of students. Accordingly, criteria focus on rewarding competence as opposed to the unrationalisable aesthetic experience. This dilemma

is also present in value systems of contemporary classical music more generally: is the cleverness of a composition prioritised over its affective appeal? One composer explained their view of the danger of a student losing their voice through the academic mechanism:

I think [there is a danger from] the pressure to be clever, rather than to move people, [...] which is an interesting and ongoing debate. And it can be tricky in teaching students [...]. It's come up recently: 'here is a really moving piece of work—I'm moved by it so [...] I will reward [it] highly in terms of grade.' Somebody else says 'yes, but it's simple and was very easy to do and didn't take them a lot of time, I'm going to give them a very low grade.' [...] I say 'I find this very poetic for this reason and that reason' and another academic says 'yes, but they intended none of that; they haven't expressed any of that—their intentions were actually something very different and something quite banal that isn't deserving of a very good grade' and my response would be that [...] I think our best work often comes when our conscious plans get out of the way so the fact that this wasn't intended, it doesn't lessen the thing. [... A]cademia will prioritise things that you can objectively defend. We have to do it all the time: defend this piece of work, why is this valuable? Why is this valid? If you can say 'well, it's got a very clever structuring principle' or [...] 'there's something very intelligent about it and very expert, [...]' that is emphasised and re-emphasised constantly and it's part of [...] the contemporary music echo chamber. It becomes a real problem in that the only people who care about that are other people who make it inside academia. (Andean, interview)

As with composition as research, the need to have an explicit, usually written, rationale forms what is valued. It is less questionable (and so more institutionally acceptable) to judge on the basis of objective features, which can be related to other symbols of esteem as well as to the time spent on it as a (theoretically) measurable unit of effort—the privation of cultural capital rationalised. This is harder to critique than an affective reaction to a work which can only be related to the judge's own experience. In this way, legitimacy is divided along the lines of what can be justified by the external—references to the canon, to work-time, to the student's intentions even—and what can only be justified by reference to the internal—emotion and beauty for example. In this way, again, in a rationalised administrative system the external and grammatisable is legitimate whilst the internal is illegitimate.

These legitimate criteria of judgement which seek to exclude taste and subjectivity are illustrated by Anon_36's description of the important qualities of successful work:

I make it very clear [in showing students the marking criteria] that it's not a matter of conforming to a particular genre as such, but [...] there's a certain emphasis on what is sophisticated, what is arguably more advanced, what's more developed in terms of compositional song writing. (Anon_36, interview)

However, there is ever slippage into charismatic authority, in this instance found in the interpretation of the terms “sophisticated”, “advanced”, or “developed” music, the subjective teleology of which reaffirms an idea of canon. Anon_36 went on to describe the benefits of using Queen’s Bohemian Rhapsody as an illustration of sophistication: use of modulation, the use of a variety of genres (but particularly influences from classical music), and the range in textures and instrumentation. This was as an educational tool to get students to move beyond just writing for acoustic guitar using three chords, where they would “write some lyrics and sing a nice melody over it and it stops there.” (Anon_36, interview) The use of classical music particularly implies a commitment to an idea of complexity embedded in the modernist teleology of harmony as well as an appeal to the cultural legitimacy of classical music. The requirement for such elements was, again, attributed to the grammatised agency of the marking criteria: “I’m not saying there’s not some merit in [writing using simple harmony and melody,] but in terms of marking that against University undergraduate marking criteria, [...] it may not result in the best marks ultimately” (Anon_36, interview). In this way, the effect of the use of external, grammatisable referents is to reinforce the idea of a legitimate canon, ultimately highlighting a fundamental conflict between the rationalised organisation and critical pedagogy.

Composers tended to refer (that is, to defer) to the terms used in the marking criteria when talking about on what basis they mark a particular work: “show technical proficiency but also creativity” (Anon_60, interview); “demonstrate compositional intention and demonstrate coherence and demonstrate an understanding of language” (Anon_19, interview); “imagination, technique and presentation” (Anon_52, interview); “you can sort of do well technically and then you can sort of do well creatively” (Anon_56, interview); or “very clear fluid sophisticated confident expression, highly effective vocabulary and style” (Anon_36, interview). This emphasises the use of grammatised judgement as a means of (mis)directing the observer away from the composer whilst in fact the vacuity of these terms left the composer as the animator of the external framework. In essence, the ego-authoritative composer was required by the university to create value through assessment, but this had to be disguised behind a pseudo-objective grammatised framework.

The styles of assessment did not seem to differ in significant structural ways between universities. The external reference points—the canon, that is—changed between composer-academics teaching courses in commercial music (largely in post-1992 universities) and classical music. However, throughout the sample I did see the reliance on marking criteria (notionally in place of the teacher’s personal judgement) and the lack of movement towards more critical pedagogic assessment methods.

In one interview we did discuss the use of a “negotiated project”. In this, the student engages with setting out their own objectives against which they are then judged:

Participant: [The third year is about] allowing the student to deal with aesthetics to the extent that they become the arbiter of their own quality. [... Y]ou're judging the score end of the recording and, importantly, the critical evaluation. [... T]he critical evaluation by Level 6 is a statement of intent and [...] the aesthetics of what it is that they want to produce. Now the same is true of studio composition except we don't have a score there so the critical evaluation, if you like, takes on even more importance in terms of them defining how they are the arbiter of their own quality. Does that make sense?

Interviewer: Yeah, so then is your judgement taking their critical evaluation as a starting point?

Participant: Oh, yes it does, yes. [... T]hat's why the final portfolio is definitely termed 'negotiated' because it arises as a [negotiation]. In the best cases it's a negotiation between the student and the tutor as to what it is that they produced. (Brissenden, interview)

This is a process of consultative assessment integrated into the fabric of the course—a method of producing an external referent for the judgement that neither relies for its legitimacy on a mark scheme nor an implicit or explicitly deployed canon. Although many third year projects may be conducted like this (very often development at this stage was seen as them moving into a more autonomous, self-motivated, and reflective mode of working) this was the only interview in which the structure of the teaching was highlighted as actively supporting this tacit critical pedagogic ethos. The fact that this is a unique case serves to highlight the extremely limited use of critical pedagogic ideas in assessment in general.

6.2 Educational Capitalism and Student Demand

Conflicts with critical pedagogic methods are to be found also in the increasingly economic orientation of both universities and students. Although interrelated with a wider societal institutional shift towards private financing and individualism, the 1998 introduction and subsequent raising of tuition fees are the clearest marker of a change in student attitude towards an expectation of being taught in a banking learning style:

What's changed also more recently is that students now have slightly different expectations of what they want out of teaching. [...] I don't want to be too black and white about it but I've noticed the shift, partly perhaps due to funding—students paying for their degrees— but also so maybe just a shift generally in society [...]—that's too strong maybe—but whereas a student might have come at one time very open to experimentation and being prepared to do 99% of the work themselves, There has been a shift to 'So what do I need to do to get a first? Can you give me some composing skills, please?' As though they want me to do all the work and they just receive my wisdom and then they are good at it. And I don't believe you can do that. I don't believe you can teach someone a skill. They have to develop a skill, they had to evolve a skill. What you can give them are the tools to help them knock their skills into shape. You can give advice and guidance and you can give facilities and resources but I can't make someone be creative. I can only help nurture their own creativity.
(Anon_43, interview)

The term 'banking learning' becomes particularly poignant here where the financial outlay (albeit a delayed and, in many cases, symbolic one) is counterbalanced by an expectation that the education they receive will be similarly bank-able. In other words, it is seen as the purchase of capital in an economic sense—a confusion, that is, of the workings of cultural and economic capital. Bourdieu (2007) highlights the difference between the two by describing economic capital as object and where ownership can be straightforwardly transferred. Cultural capital, on the other hand, is primarily *embodied*. He outlines three states of cultural capital: embodied, objectified, and institutionalised. Of these three, he calls the embodied form the fundamental state. Objectified cultural capital, in contrast, is any tangible cultural artefact and is the product of embodied cultural capital both on the part of the producer and the owner. Objectified cultural capital brings credit to its holder by dint of the fact that it functions as a "trace" of their embodied cultural capital (that is, their taste, knowledge, skill) and so

symbolically marks them. In this sense, objectified cultural capital is secondary to embodied cultural capital. One thinks, for example, of the stereotypical parvenu whose tastes in objective cultural capital, no matter their economic means, always betray their lack of cultural capital. Institutionalised cultural capital—educational qualifications, prizes, and other forms of formalised recognition—too is secondary in that it is granted on the basis of a displayed cultural capital in its embodied state (proficiency, knowledge, creativity). Embodied cultural capital is directly linked to the labour of the individual. As Bourdieu puts it, “The work of acquisition is work on oneself (self-improvement), an effort that presupposes a personal cost [...] an investment, above all of time, but also of that socially constituted form of libido, *libido sciendi*, with all the privation, renunciation, and sacrifice that it may entail.” (Bourdieu, 2007) Cultural capital is, therefore, primarily gained and maintained by the labour of the one who wishes to gain it. The transactional idea of education as ‘provider’, where money is exchanged for knowledge, is fundamentally a misrecognition of capital whereby cultural capital is misattributed the characteristics of economic capital; it is imbued with a ‘purchasability’, and so is aligned with a ‘banking’ notion of learning whereby knowledge is simply transferred. Education becomes transactional, the student’s engagement becomes financial rather than critical. The students expect, in Paulo Freire’s words, “to be “receptacles” to be “filled” by the teacher.” (Freire, 1972, p. 45) The student receives and banks such knowledge, waiting with expectation to receive the economic dividends of their purchase.

This links to my core thesis of the effect of rationalisation: that in a rationalised system, as Molesworth et al. (2009) frame it, education of ‘being’ is less legitimate than that of ‘having’. These terms—‘being’ and ‘having’—can loosely be aligned with the concepts of critical and banking pedagogy (though Molesworth et al. do not make this link themselves). In the former, the student develops as a learner—they are engaged in learning in order not to have learned, but to be able to learn. In the latter, the student is focussed on the attainment of a qualification—to *have* a degree. ‘Being’ is focussed on unsettling the student’s worldview with a view to allowing them to adopt an attitude of learning—to engage in inquiry and critique. Having, on the other hand, “gives an illusion of security and only a temporary sense of meaningfulness” (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 283). In other words, an education directed towards ‘having’ might produce the greater instantaneous satisfaction, whereas one directed towards ‘being’ might be uncomfortable in the short term but more meaningful in the longer term, equipping them with the adaptable critical abilities of someone who approaches learning as a way of being rather than an object to possess: “Being offered a degree that largely involves

rule following in an environment devoid of uncertainty and intellectual angst might be popular, but [...] such HE is not likely to be nourishing for any of those involved.” (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 284)

‘Having’ as opposed to ‘being’ implies a pervasive capitalism in which all forms of capital are valuable in as far as they can be owned—legitimate value is only found in externalised, objectified, grammatised indicators. This is something which is facilitated by assessment, which creates ownable, durable capital with a standardised worth. It is this that students are orientated towards in a capitalist system that can only see them as ‘human capital’. This capital, by means of this grammatisation, may become the subject of rationalised judgement—laws, HR policies, or targets, for example.

‘Being’, on the other hand, does not develop the symbolic capital even in the embodied sense, but rather is a kind of meta-proficiency (just as compositional education was described as ‘metadiscursive’)—the ability to learn and adapt; its aim is not to inculcate specific capital, but to allow the student to understand and navigate the rules of the field and so be able to learn. It is thus not accumulable, not ownable, and, crucially, not affirmative towards the rules of society. Ownership is necessarily affirmative, not least of the idea of ownership *per se*. In contrast, critical pedagogy as such is methodologically in conflict with the rules of society—those very structures which create shared meaning and thus value. Education that can be owned is thus in line with prevailing ideals of private ownership and so control over its means of its production becomes valuable. Critical minds—except in so far as their skills are found to serve to increase their future value (for example in the limited scope of such transferable skills as ‘problem solving’)—are not necessarily affirmative of the current structures of value, and so do not carry a value of their own. The university organisation therefore supports and reinforces the interests of students in *having* education over *being* educated.

The ‘having’ (banking) type of education is intertwined with rationalisation; the royal charter gives the power to award degrees (to institutionalise education), the assessment criteria give the students and university a legal basis on which to agree the nature of educational product to which the student is entitled, the student bases their choice within the market on review comparison websites which aggregate owner reviews and financial returns, and academics are monitored for the quality of product they deliver to students (by both grades and satisfaction). All of this grammatisation is based on an idea of education as an ownable product. This rationalisation is exacerbated by an institutional environment that emphasises the right of a consumer to own what they have paid for.

As stated previously, in terms of assessment, the academic move towards critical pedagogy does help to justify and facilitate the expansion of rationalised judgement by questioning the teacher's judgement and therefore inviting the colonisation of assessment by grammatised technics that rationalise judgement. However, the tuition fee regime as part of the wider institutional environment has a greater affinity to banking learning and to the further rationalisation (grammatised objectification) of educational processes. In this way, whilst critical and banking learning might be in conflict, the extension of rationalised agency can be seen in certain respects to be facilitated by both modes of thought.

Educational Consumerism

The capitalist understanding of the educational process and the conflict it creates is well illustrated by Louise Bunce et al. (2017) who found that “students who identify as consumers may have little interest in what is actually being taught and show reduced responsibility for producing their own knowledge.” (Bunce et al., 2017, p. 1959) Their study found that a greater degree of expressed consumer orientation was positively related to a poorer academic performance. From my interviews, too, one interviewee drew a link between the introduction of tuition fees as well as the changing managerial culture as “pandering to the needs of students as clients, as customers rather than people who should be challenged and should be expected to be challenging themselves all the time.” (Ghikas, interview) Another articulated it in these terms: “I think the idea of challenging students is really important and the thing is that challenging someone doesn't necessarily lead to them being happy customers.” (Reuben, interview) The change in student expectation was, in another account, linked to the raising of the cap on tuition fees to £9250:

I'm pretty certain from my experience that nobody said 'I'm paying three thousand a year, what am I getting for that?' They paid their three thousand and they went 'right, I'm here, let's get stuck in.' And now students legitimately say 'I'm paying nine thousand two hundred and fifty and I want to see that on a daily basis in action.' And [I] don't blame them. It's really hard [...] because [...] we couldn't play catch up. We are still delivering the same course, the same modules. Still got the same library as when they were paying three thousand. [...] Therefore now we wrap stuff up in terms of delivering additional stuff. We're not delivering six thousand pounds of additional stuff. So I'm not saying it's wrong. I'm saying I hate the fact that I have no control over

it and I hate the fact that it's there. [...] It's changed the way that students have interacted with colleagues at work. [...] The logistics of being an academic have become more intrusive. (**Moore_1)

Here, the raising of the tuition fee cap is linked to a changing operation of the university; the managerial structures within the organisation are seen as increasingly “intrusive” as a result of the changing demands of a student body. The increase in tuition fees is seen as increasing student’s desire for a precise account of what their money is getting them. It is a focus that demands rational accountancy as the student becomes more engaged with a logic that views their education as costing them £9,250 per year. The cause and effect relationship between fees and an accounting, consumerist attitude is called into question by Joanna Williams who points out that other educational fees both in higher education and elsewhere did not result in widespread consumerist attitudes (Williams, 2013, pp. 6-7). Rather, a wider change in attitude and law coincided with tuition fees to create a consumerist institutional logic. For her, the term ‘student as consumer’ describes an attitude which is “defined less by the act of purchase and far more by the expectations and sense of entitlement that students increasingly demonstrate in relation to HE.” (Williams, 2013, p. 7) In other words, it can be said that the consumer attitude is an institutional logic—a cultural narrative. That is, the accounting may be not so much about the money *per se* than about an environment that encourages (and even enshrines in law) an accounting mentality.

Moore also went on to highlight the effect of such transactional accounting on the student attitude towards spending time at the university: “10 years ago there [were] always people just milling around doing stuff and there were always people in the library. And now it's very rare.” (Moore, interview) A similar point was made by others, which aligns, again, with the qualitative findings of Bunce et al. (2017, p. 1965) that a consumer orientation was negatively related to involvement in non-curricular activities (non-credited courses, volunteering, and other extracurricular involvement), something I have highlighted as a crucial element of a (critical pedagogic) compositional education for many composer-academics.

The commercialisation of education was also highlighted as changing the relationship between student, teacher, and organisation:

[P]artly as a result of tuition fees so that the students are now how much more like they are paying for something and so since they came in the whole ethos of the student-teacher relationship has changed. [...] It's to do with the fact that the whole very delicate balance between the teacher and the taught has [...] become far more a sort of

product that we expected to deliver and so the whole corporate branding neoliberal thing has honed in on this and it's like we're giving them a product which we have to deliver. And if they don't get what they want, [...] there have been kind of threats of litigation because students don't get the degree they want. (Anon_18)

As this quote highlights, tuition fees have played a role in rising managerialism and a more acute sense of resource competition: "I've seen pressure of funding and recruitment [...] I've seen lots of downsizing, I've seen lots of people's workloads being maxed out [...] I've seen a slimming down of support resources" (Anon_10, interview) Many feared for the continued existence of their or others' departments, increasing the importance of student satisfaction. One academic related their experience that "students are now in the driving seat and they know it, so they are acting more and more as consumers would in a kind of demanding way." (Anon_33, interview) This composer also recounted an occasion where a vocal complaint from a student about the ensemble who were invited to give a workshop and a concert meant that a more managerially senior member of staff forced a change in who would be invited the following year:

that's an example of how pedagogy and independent research is starting to be informed and affected by these top-down structural mechanisms that rate the ways in which universities function and also is indicative of the kind of consumer demands that students have these days because they are paying nine thousand two hundred and fifty pounds a year, so there's justification for why they might want that, which is also problematic isn't it? [If they are paying this much, then they] say 'what am I getting for my money?' and then they start to say 'this is not what I want from my money' and that's really problematic. (Anon_33, interview)

In other words, the influence of student expectation was reinforced by the top-down pressure of the university. As Molesworth et al. noted, the

drive to commodify the educational offering is both a top-down and bottom-up process. The Treasury, funding councils and vice-chancellors develop strategy that leads to a market focus, while many of the expanded student group arrive as fee-paying customers knowing how to 'play' markets to maximise self-interest. They are well versed in the pseudo-sovereignty status afforded them by broader consumer culture. Their experiences in commercial marketplaces and their confidence as consumers, allow them to carry the same attitudes over to public goods such as education. (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 279)

The rise in the size and dominance of a managerial class in the university in this way imposes an institutional logic at odds with the academic and artistic logics of the field in response to the need to maintain and develop student demand. This prioritises the expectations of students who are increasingly influenced by an economically-dominated institutional mindset, bringing them into conflict with academics whose field is more interested in a critical pedagogical than a banking approach. This conflict with the dominant managerial institutions was explicitly outlined by one composer academic:

[A] kind of quick result oriented degree is not going to give you [the ability to teach yourself ...] I think it doesn't focus on the right things. [... W]e cannot evaluate [...] really good teaching—the teacher who is inspiring, the teacher who tries [to get] students to become better not by answering the correct question in the test but by becoming self-motivated to learn. [... T]his is something we cannot measure so the government measures something else that it can measure that is nothing to do with what [...] education is about. So the whole system is essentially fucked and maybe I'm being both cynical and idealistic, but I still want to teach my students the way they should be taught. (Anon_60, interview)

This returns to the idea of the structural pressure of rationalisation in the form of metrics. In teaching, the most significant of these is the National Student Survey (NSS). The main term used in the assessment criteria of the survey is 'satisfaction' (cf. Richardson, Slater, & Wilson, 2007). It had been an annual measure of the quality of university teaching at universities for over a decade at the ethnographic present, but also had come in for a significant amount of criticism, for example: in its favouring of softer marking and feedback (R. Bennett & Kane, 2014); in the misuse of its results (Sabri, 2013) including in a comparative capacity (Cheng & Marsh, 2010); and in its perpetuation of boundaries between staff and students (Thiel, 2020). This final criticism, whereby the staff become the object of the student's evaluation, the systematic division of teacher and student contradicts any attempt to foster a more collaborative, co-constituted, critical pedagogy.

In my research, the issue of the National Student Survey was raised explicitly on only a couple of occasions. More often, ideas of conflict were directed towards an ethos of student as consumer or a generally pressured, metric-driven environment. However, on one of the two occasions in which the NSS was raised explicitly, it was as a reason for actually leaving academia. The composer outlined the link in their mind between fees, metrics and a wider competitive environment:

[W]hen they brought in the nine thousand pound tuition fees, it changed the relationship between the students and academics. [...] The students started seeing, and indeed were encouraged to see themselves as customers rather than as students. And coupled with that a whole lot of attempts—[the] National Student Survey's one, the Teaching Excellence Framework and Research Excellence Frameworks are other ones—[...] to give a quantitative measurement to something that's qualitative, so they're actually philosophically floored. [...] They're not going to do what they're purpose is to do. While [...] taking student experience into account is all very good—I used to do [student] surveys in modules I'd taught [...] long before the people had set them up—but now everything's taken so seriously. Everybody's concerned about their place in league tables. (Bateman, interview)

The consumer-supplier relationship is linked to the attempt to quantify satisfaction as the intended product of the transaction. This in turn is given weight by the competition engendered by league tables. This systemic competition is understood by Thiel (2019) as a disciplining technology, which builds perpetual subjugation into the mechanics as teachers continually have to subject themselves to the panoptic gaze of the university, their students, and their future students. The survey grammatises the judgement of what it means to be a good teacher under a rationally legitimate veneer of Likert scales. This is reinforced by the intensifying of the stakes of the struggle: “perpetual competition [...] producing important collateral damage to function as ‘warnings’ along the lines of ‘look what happens if you don't produce good student feedback.’” (Thiel, 2019, p. 549) The (potentially) continual observation of the student over the teacher as an intensification of competition disciplines the universities into fostering the consumerist, transactional notion of education that chases student approval in order to guarantee the success of future recruitment. In turn, teachers are pressured into joining the same race.

The rise of a consumerist ethos on the part of students and university management leaves one with the general notion that there is a conflict between the expectations of students (refracted through the systemic competition of the NSS and so through the university management) and academics. The student-client desires predictable outcomes to their degrees and clearly substantiated judgements that exactly accord to a dictated narrative put forward by the teacher. The academic ethos, on the other hand, is dominated by the institutions of critical pedagogy: the recession of the teacher's judgement and an education constituted by the student's own critical faculties. In this respect, the managerial university reverses the relationship of dominance compared to a collegiate university; managerial judgement comes to the fore as a conduit for student satisfaction. This reversal reinforces the banking mode of

education, exerting some force on keeping the teacher unwillingly in the role of dictatorial master. The strongest form of this idea has the academic seated as an unhappy monarch, writing disingenuous edicts; as Molesworth et al. put it,

[T]he market demands efficient teaching methods and consumer-students seek maximum outcomes for minimal effort. This reconceptualisation—complete with appraisal via the National Student Survey—presses academics into teaching rooted in the having mode, where they reluctantly give students what they need to pass, rather than encourage a reflective, critical, being orientation to the world. (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 283)

As is highlighted here, this is aided and abetted by widespread attempts to rationalise educational outcomes using certain measurements, in particular the National Student Survey.

However, there is of course tempering of this absolutist picture to be done. Just as the spread of critical pedagogy is not complete, but rather is compromised in both the depth of its implementation and in the individual commitment to its principles, the prevalence of upending the power relations of master and student (and, in so doing, preserving the banking educational model) is implied in much of my research, but is not so in every instance. The consumerist attitude towards higher education is not universal nor perhaps even an accurate descriptor for most students. In their study, Bunce et al. (2017) found that, on average, students tended to display a negative to neutral attitude towards consumerist statements. It should be remembered that they were dealing with the expressed self-identification of students. Here, I am approaching the problem from a very different perspective: that of academics' perception of students, which is more likely to be based on the actions of students (such as their work, feedback, and complaints) and not on their self-identification and on the feel of the organisational institutional pressures.

6.3 Modularisation as Rationalisation

In sympathy with the extension of rationalising and capitalising processes, modularisation of teaching has become standard across the whole field. This signals a significant development in terms of labour relations of universities and academics, the latter of whom have become

increasingly proletarianised (Allmer, 2018; Allmer & Bulut, 2018; Hall, 2018; Ouellet & Martin, 2018; Shore, 2021)

Modularisation, is itself an important element of the rationalisation of the university degree. The example addressed earlier with regard to rationalisation as modularisation was the division of labour: as work becomes trivialised, the worker becomes an easily exchangeable part. In the case of the degree, the course is split up (along imposed administrative boundaries) into rigidly sized units (each with an allocation of time and reward for the student). This means not that any module is identical to any other, but that they are none the less interchangeable. That is, in administrative terms, a second year module in sound engineering may be discontinued and replaced by a second year module in the history of Baroque music without affecting the structure (or, notionally, the worth) of the programme. In this way, the Administrator works in purely abstracted, formal terms, where teaching is measured out in a rationalised form—credits—so that they are comparable and interchangeable.

This modularisation does have the potential to reduce the power of (that is, to proletarianise) the academic worker. If modules can be measured as discrete units by their uptake or student satisfaction ratings, then one less well reviewed course can be substituted for another without revising the entire degree programme. This means that an academic becomes singularly responsible, effectively diminishing the joint responsibility of the department and thus intensifying the intra-departmental resource struggle. This, combined with the casualisation of academic work through temporary and sessional teaching contracts means that the Academic becomes eminently modular in their labour. The grammatised form of course design—with its quantification of time, money, and credits—makes not only the part of the course modular, but the academics themselves modular also.

Modularisation makes these academics capital assets who are in a very real sense quantifiably comparable, as with the recent use of metrics in compulsory redundancies at Liverpool University (BBC, 2021). As with compositional work, teaching becomes capitalised and the emphasis always is on possession rather than being or becoming:

They are not scholars, but ‘employees’ who have publications, an RAE score, high ‘teaching scores’ and consultancy work. If they have enough, they receive better job titles and performance-related pay. (Molesworth et al., 2009, p. 284)

The University therefore proletarianises academic labour that it may own and sell the product with no need to own the academic labourer.

6.4 Conclusion

From the methods of teaching composition and avowed approaches, a variable (though tacit) alignment can be seen between composers and the ideas of critical pedagogy. However, the university has a more troubled affinity with the idea: the concept of the authoritative teacher as the unrationalisable locus of judgement conflicts with the need to document and rationalise, but the teaching of technical skill—aesthetic judgement as a functional practice—is a legitimate form of capital, whereas self-assessment and development of personal voice (being of necessity unique) is not rationalisable. Whilst critical pedagogy—through its undermining of teacher authority—provides a fertile ground for rationalising systems to step in and colonise the power vacuum created by the delegitimisation of the sovereign authoritative teacher, the same cannot be said the other way around; rationalisation (seen in the context of the capitalisation of education) does not have an affinity with critical pedagogy. Rather, it colonises this space but excludes radical alternatives that may question the hegemony of rationalised systems themselves. This indicates that the affinity of the formal (morphological) pressures favouring ego-authoritative pedagogy (banking education) whilst the composers themselves (the substructure) favour the values of exo-authoritative education (critical pedagogy).

The compromises of the critical pedagogic paradigm are manifold, with the reproduction of musical canon in lectures, the direct critical feedback from teachers that is demanded by students, and the implicit legitimacy of certain schools of composition influenced by the teacher's own practice. Most of all, however, the critical paradigm is compromised in the use of assessment—the key moment of rationalisation. Assessment is the moment of value-creation for students and thus for the universities—it is the moment that creates institutionalised capital, which is valuable because of the sifting judgement. The university organisation and the student, therefore, have a significant interest in and effect on the critical pedagogic ethos with which I characterise the composer-academic's teaching ethos. This imperfect fledgling critical pedagogy is caught up in a conflict with the values of the Student as consumer and a struggle for rational control by the Administration and it is hard currently to see a future not based on acquiescence to these demands, given the increasing disempowerment by modular proletarianisation of academic labour.

Conclusion to Part 2: Rationalising Composition

LOOKING FROM COMPOSITIONAL WORK to teaching and back again, as described here, certain similarities spring out. In the former I highlighted aspects of control at every turn: power relations between commissioning organisations and the composer, between the composer and performers, and between composer and audience. Similarly, in teaching I described the control of the teacher over the educational process—the power relation of educator and educated and their respective uses of legitimate judgement. In both cases, the central theme is the locus of judgement, that is, the authority of the composer-academic to legitimately act on their own unaccountable judgement, which allows their actions to be perceived as having the attribute of *autonomy*.

Given this commonality, the question is raised of whether there is an identifiable link between the two—that is, whether those inclined to distribute agency the compositional process are similarly inclined in the teaching process. Certainly, Woods' (2019) investigation points us in this direction. His participants are four experimental composers working in improvised and semi-improvised forms. Their practice involves not only the distributed agency of unplanned improvisation, but also of machine interference such that they “perform their own loss of control as authoritative human subjects” (David Novak quoted in Woods, 2019, p. 465). In education (the focus of Woods' enquiry), the composers emphasised the importance of student action as an educational method, providing opportunities and confidence to try things—“immediately having the experiential aspect of getting people practicing right off the bat and improvising” (Amanda Schoofs [participant] in Woods, 2019, p. 463)—and thereby discover for themselves what they can do. In the model used here (though not explicitly in Woods' article), they are operating with the general model of liberatory as opposed to banking education. My research gives a similar impression: those likely to use distributed authority in composition are likely to similarly distribute authority in teaching: the two illustrative ideal types would be the ego-authoritative composer (directive composition and banking pedagogy) and the exo-authoritative composer (collaborative composition and critical pedagogy). This is in conflict in both cases with the ideal typical requirements of the university (See Figure 8). For the ego-authoritative composer, directive composition is hard to rationalise—the privileged judgements of composer-academics cannot be grammatised and thereby submitted to the transformation into rationalised data. In short, the ego-authoritative composer finds it hard to

fit into a research framework. For the exo-authoritative composer, however, it is teaching that is problematic: critical pedagogy, whilst inviting colonisation by rationalising systems, does not have the strong centre of judgement in order to fulfil the need for quantified, definitive, comparable valuations.




Figure 8. An ideal typology of composer-academics compared with the requirements of a rationalising university

This conflict indicates a changing field as it seeks to resolve the conflict. Assuming that the values of the University stay solid, one direction towards a resolution would be to separate out teaching and research and have different composers carry out the two. There are moves in some universities towards offering staff teaching only contracts, but research only contracts are fairly rare, as there is comparatively little funding provided for compositional research. This raises the prospect of composition becoming increasingly teaching-focused.

Another option is for the epistemic structure of composition to be revised to allow directive composition a research legitimacy. The problem for directive composition is that there is no clearly demonstrable way in which a piece of music ‘works’—no external referent. In contrast, in engineering (another creative discipline) there is an objective and a creation can be

said to demonstrably ‘work’. A legitimate mode of directive composition, to draw out this contrast, would be for composition to take on a new functionalism where the composition can be said to work in its fulfilment of their intended ends—that is, for the composer to see themselves as a *social* engineer, using music instrumentally. In theory, such a direction would have the same authority source as a discipline such as engineering, but would involve a schism with the artistic field as autonomy is entirely sacrificed to the extrinsic ends (as with the non-localised audience type of composition).

A third and perhaps more likely option would be for the composers to maintain split values in different spheres. Indeed, where this conflict is present currently, it seems to be largely ameliorated by certain unhappy compromises in the form of tokenistic collaborations or the use of some degree of canonical education in order to legitimise the activity. On this second point, even for the most liberatory-minded composers I interviewed, the process of learning composition involved the learning and correct application (albeit with development) of certain techniques from the relevant corpus. One such composer offered a legitimising statement in amongst their advocacy for students to freely explore and research from the start, saying, “we do want to teach our students skills and we come down like a hammer [...] when the skills we teach them are not being applied correctly.” (McLaughlin, interview) The freedom of the educational process is portrayed as not coming at the expense of the hierarchical epistemology of the discipline in the form of the body of hard skills drawn from the corpus. The response to the institutional demands of a capitalistic educational field is to maintain a body of legitimate knowledge, which set apart teacher and student, a differential which means there is something for the student to bank.

The fundamental issue is that the administrative system demands a hierarchical epistemic structure with the potential to obtain knowledge as a product. This hierarchical form can either be created through the ‘engineering’ model of fostering a vertical instrumental knowledge structure or through the defending and building up of an authoritative canon whose legitimacy is provided by its internal integrity and the intellectual authority of the discipline. Either way, a hierarchical epistemology legitimises the worth of the subject and its products.

The University is in a peculiar position in this regard, as it is not only a dominated subject within a field of power that legitimises rationalised activity, but also is invested by this environment with the authority to a certain extent to define the terms of its legitimate activity. The central logic of rational utility—of administrative rationality—is structural, whereas the preservation and definition of academic space is intentional. In this conflict, my view would be that the intention is weaker than the structural pressure, leading to the penetration of the

academic space by rationalising administration. In organisational institutionalist terms, the ceremonial conformity and decoupling engendered by the will to preserve the academic space is a transitory mitigation of this conflict; as in other fields, it will likely give way as purely performative action is increasingly internalised and acted upon.

Beyond the content of institutionalised values, this part has theorised the formation of disciplines in the modern university as to do with rationalisation *per se*. In composition, this leads one to the simple idea that is at the heart of this thesis: legitimacy in the university may come at the cost of legitimacy in the artistic field. The greater the rationalising administrative control exercised, the more alienated the individual is from their own actions (operating under a greater degree of external authority). This means that, though composers may adapt over time their institutions to become isomorphic with the organisational institutions, in an increasingly rationalised university system, the two key arenas of operation (research and teaching) have the potential, given a fast and drastic enough change, to become mutually exclusive. The question remains for the final part of this thesis, then, how can the academic space be conceptualised in a way that does not lead to such a conflict?

Part 3: De-Rationalising the University

BY WAY OF CONCLUDING, I pivot here, changing the tenets of the analysis from looking at the organisation's formative role in the composer-academic's world to exploring the implications of the institutions of art and academia for the university. In other words, whereas in the second part of this thesis I took the university as a constant (as the more powerful force in the field), here I take the institution of autonomy which has pervaded my findings and look at what it could mean for the university to align with this institution.

Chapter 7: Social Indeterminacy and Artistic and Academic Freedom

“[T]he men of action and the lovers of results in the sciences never tire of pointing out how entirely “useless” thought is—as useless, indeed as the works of art it inspires.”
(Arendt, 1958, p.168)

Composer academics, as has been shown, are embedded in networks of control and discipline: they are subject to the legitimising institutions of artistic and academic autonomy and to the organisational requirements of the university; they can be subject to the requirements of commissioners or sidestep this process by using personal connections to facilitate their work inexpensively; they can abdicate control in favour of more dispersed creativity or hold on to directive control over the sounding music; they can educate students in the banking model or with some elements of critical pedagogy. All of these dynamics are in various ways related to the extension of rationalising technics, which seek to provide a determined delegation of limited powers to the actors. These various relations of power and control are the kind of milieu of agencies that comes at the conjunction of institutional fields; in this case, this is the intersection of the compositional and academic fields with the University's institutional framework.

The overriding conflict drawn out throughout this thesis is that the central value of art (that is, autonomy) is compromised by the central objective of rationalisation (that is, control). In response to this, I have hypothesised certain paths in which composition may develop within the university according to the affinities explored: banking learning, commerciality, collaboration, and extra-musical research objectives, for example. However, in this concluding section, I pivot and question the premise of rationalisation itself, rather than taking it as given and analysing the practices of composition. This means now taking autonomy as the guiding star from which to reimagine the University. What would a university orientated towards facilitating (in Arendt's terms in the above quote) 'useless thought' look like?

I develop a conceptual tool which contrasts with the idea of rationalisation, which I call social indeterminacy and with it I look for the conditions of authentic artistic activity within the university, coming up with the conceptual outline of a 'liminal university.' This is not so much a policy proposal as a solution to the above riddle that lies at the heart of the thesis.

7.1 A Theory of Social Indeterminacy

I have said in setting up the argument of this thesis that the capacity for free action is never truly extinguished by the systematised controls of rationalising bureaucracy. Grammatized agency as a means of control is inanimate: it limits, but it does not create. It requires the drive of action to which it is only a harness. What lurks at the core of the rubrics, guidelines, laws, codes of conduct, procedures, and systems has to be a moment of human action, with all of the potential for creativity, deviance, and failure which that entails. All rationalisation is like this, but in the creative arts and in academia it is thrown into stark relief given the institutional importance of originality and newness (the process for which would be well described with terms like creativity, deviance, and failure). At the core of all hardened casings of rationalised agency is an essential beating human heart, which I term the principle of social indeterminacy. This principle rests on a simple idea already touched upon in relation to Campbell's law of which my formulation would be: one may not openly observe human action without affecting it. Agency occupies an uncertain position when unobserved. This allows the individual to think and act without recourse to external judgements.

Fields of Restricted Cultural Production

This draws together a number of specific theories into a single theory of social indeterminacy. Firstly and most clearly relevant to this thesis, there is Bourdieu's (1993) idea of the field of restricted cultural production. I have already made copious reference to this idea, but the salient point is this: a field of cultural production is specialised and restricted according to some institutionalised cultural capital. This specialisation discriminates between legitimate judgements, with the member-artists being able to rise above the external judgements of audiences and critics. This, in Bourdieu's view, is a product of the historical development of the division of labour and results in an art world which is removed from the judgement of audiences by the ceremonial disavowal of economic concerns (related to the judgement of the public). This asceticism is facilitated by the work of cultural intermediaries in the production of an economy of belief.

Liminality

The second strand is Victor Turner's (1974, 2017 [1969]) development of the theory of liminality. The liminal state is one which individuals or groups are set apart from the rest of society without being cast out: they are neither inside the group, nor outside. This classically relates to rituals of passage—from child to adult or from commoner to leader, for example. In this state, one of the most important features is that of *communitas*. This is Turner's preferred term for a group amongst whom normal hierarchical relationships are not present. Importantly, the influence of this upon those involved is one of mental freedom from regular constraints; *communitas*, according to Turner, is

the liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc., from the normative constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, enacting a multiplicity of social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in some corporate group such as a family, lineage, clan, tribe, or nation, or of affiliation with some pervasive social category such as a class, caste, sex- or age-division. (Turner, 1974, p. 75)

For Turner, this type of relationship is characteristic of liminality, which is to say, a state where the social position of a group becomes—permanently or temporarily—unfixed. Liminality is the state of being on the threshold and thus neither inside, nor outside; neither

outcast nor community member. True liminality as Turner describes it is found within pre-industrial societies; the equivalent in industrial and post-industrial societies is a liminoid—that is, liminal-like—state. The key difference between the two is that the liminal is a product of mechanical solidarity and so is non-optional, whereas in post-industrial society, the organic solidarity makes this participation optional, creating a state that is an allusion to liminality.

The other distinction between the liminal and the liminoid is the role of the activity in societal critique: in small-scale, conservative societies, Turner sees the liminal ritual as part of a social dialectic which “involves successive experience of high and low, *communitas* and structure, homogeneity and differentiation, equality and inequality. [...] In such a process, the opposites, as it were, constitute one another and are mutually indispensable.” (Turner, 2017 [1969], p. 97) The liminal ritual punctuates structure and order with moments of *communitas* and disorder which helps to constitute the normal state of order. In industrial society, however, liminality is a threat to order—a form of resistance—constituted to dismantle rather than to uphold the order:

A mirror inverts but also reflects an object. It does not break it down into constituents in order to remold it, far less does it annihilate and replace that object. But art and literature often do. The liminal phases of tribal society invert but do not usually subvert the status quo, the structural form, of society; reversal underlines that chaos is the alternative to cosmos, so they had better stick to cosmos, that is, the traditional order of culture—though they can for a brief while have a heck of a good time being chaotic (Turner, 1974, p. 72)

Turner associates certain types of ludic activity, two of which are particularly significant here: art and science:

[I]n the liminoid genres of industrial art, literature, and even science (more truly homologous with tribal liminal thinking than modern art is), great public stress is laid on the individual innovator, the unique person who dares and opts to create. (Turner, 1974, pp. 74-75)

In Turner’s mind, liminoid positions allow for divergent, creative activity, with the individual being at one with their peers—their *communitas*—but also able to pursue their own thought without the imposed structures of societal authorities and hierarchies bearing down on them. In terms of wider society, to put liminality in the terms used in this thesis, liminal

individuals and actions are neither legitimate, nor illegitimate—judgement, in short, is suspended. Here I use ‘liminal’ as a general term to refer to features of both the liminal and liminoid.

Between the field of restricted cultural production and liminality, significant commonalities emerge: most importantly, the actors concerned are set apart from the rest of society. Liminal agents are set apart and are not quite the same as other people. In the case of the restricted field of cultural production, Bourdieu points to the role of the cultural intermediary and the gatekeepers of legitimate cultural capital as a means of setting the artist apart from society. Relatedly, both theories emphasise a kind of untouchability about the actors concerned. Liminality can involve individuals being unaccountable for their actions or being kept secretly away from others, removing their activities from the public—judgemental—eye. In restricted fields, the entire precept of the theory is that specialisation cordons off particular individuals and their actions as beyond societal judgment. This quasi-immunity in both ideas is facilitated by a structural denial of the observability of the actions of those within the preserve of the liminal/restricted field.

Everyday Utopias

The third theoretical strand to be woven into this is the idea of social indeterminacy of ‘everyday utopias’. This concept, formulated by Davina Cooper (2014), sees certain social spaces as set aside from dominant discourses, performing “regular daily life [...] in a radically different fashion. [...] They work by creating the change they wish to encounter, building and forging new ways of experiencing social and political life.” (D. Cooper, 2014, p. 2) Some social spaces, in other words, are set aside from the rules of modern society, allowing divergent activities to happen without the regulation of dominant social pressures. Cooper’s studies are, for example, Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park, where social norms about acceptable speech and the acceptability of uninvited public oratory are suspended, or Pussy Palace, a women’s and trans’ bathhouse in Canada, which creates a space in which sexual norms can be suspended or changed. What is particularly notable about this is the fact that they operate under social regulation that is entirely localised. The pressures of the mainstream societal values (legitimate types of speaking and sexual repression, for example) are suspended and the utopia is carefully bounded, for instance with the physical space and (imagined) suspension of repressive laws in speaker’s corner, or with the building and gendered membership of the bathhouse. In some way, the space

is protected and bounded, excluding those forces that suppress counter-normative behaviours in the rest of society.

In this way these spaces could be described as 'anti-structural', as Turner terms it (1974, 2017 [1969]). That is to say, social structures such as those involving rank, wealth, occupation, or gender can be suspended in favour of a reimagined way of living. The conceptual link between everyday utopias and liminality is implied by Turner:

"Anti-structure," in fact, can generate and store a plurality of alternative models for living, from utopias to programs, which are capable of influencing the behavior of those in mainstream social and political roles (whether authoritative or dependent, in control or rebelling against it) in the direction of radical change. (Turner, 1974, p. 65)

In other words, anti-structure creates a counter-cultural social space often characterised by the idea of *communitas*, and of the free-thinking which he speaks about being set free in the liminal state. In a Bourdieusian perspective, the fact of counterculture is not related objectively to any greater degree of free thinking—only to the influence of a different field. These two perspectives are compatible, however: if one takes free thinking as a way of referring to that which emerges from a counter-mainstream habitus, then this only serves to highlight the communal nature of critical thought—as something that is engendered by a group whose strategic behaviour in relation to each other as well as to the mainstream requires a degree of resistance to norms.

The essential point from all three strands of theory is that divergent action and thought takes place in spaces which are liminal and utopian. As a further articulation of this concept, one could draw in Foucault's (1986) notion of heterotopias, which bear a striking resemblance to Turner's liminal spaces. All of these theories depict fields that are set aside and buffered in some way from everyday society; they are sites where the normal logic of society is set aside and a kind of madness is allowed to take hold: the unrationalisable, heretical, and uncategorisable takes place in liminal space because the space is shielded either by jurisdiction or invisibility. In these spaces, the actions of their inhabitants are to society a kind of lunacy because they exist outside the reach of the clawing tendrils of the mono-logical societal rationale. This is all facilitated by social indeterminacy: *action is liminal whilst it is unapprehended (or unjudged) by those who are outside the restricted space*. In short, it is liminal whilst the integrity of the field is preserved and the institutional logics of other (surrounding) fields do not puncture it. The simple injunction which props up this view is that observation changes reality.

The Prison: Observation as Discipline

At the core of this idea is the antithetical relationship between creativity and regulation—to instrumentalising accountability. To illustrate this, imagine a prisoner whose life is governed by strictly determined rationalised procedures: uniforms, mealtimes, inspections, exercise times, and all of the rest. It is still their hands that dress them, their jaw that chews, their legs that walk them around the exercise yard—the rhythms of the administrative domination lay out, but cannot live that life. Now let's say that there is a rule that, during their time in their own cell, they will be checked on every half hour, at which point they must present themselves, standing by their bed, with everything tidy and in order. When would they be able to exercise the freedom to act in any way they choose—to create, to deviate, to fail? It would not be at the moment of inspection, but rather would be in the intervening time. The inspection only recognised completion and standardisation; there is no room for the deviance of the will to action. Let's imagine that these inspections are now every five minutes, or every minute, or every 30 seconds: any action must not be complete and in order in a shorter and shorter period. The scope for that freedom which can only be when it falls through the cracks of rationalised life is narrowed.

Now imagine Bentham's Panopticon: a prison built in such a way that its inmates may be observed by the warders without them being aware of exactly when this is taking place.³⁴ The key architectural idea is that the inspection—though in fact intermittent—is by necessity felt as constant by the inmates as they have no idea when they are not being observed. An uncertain social space is created at the ruling heart of building, transferring the power to act—to determine events—to the rulers and in so doing abolishing the gaps between the structures of rationalised life. In time, the idea of inspection becomes internalised in the mental state of the inmates, rationalising their thinking and castrating their power to act in deviant ways. The inmates are alienated from their capacity to act: "The Panopticon is designed for those who have been forced to eschew any initiative and who are capable of being turned totally into instruments." (Miller, 1987, p. 6) It is the means of, as Miller has it, creating an omniscient deity to discipline minds to inculcate self-regulation of bodies and action (Foucault, 1979). The inmate becomes a fully rationalised subject. It is a structure that allows those in power a space of social indeterminacy whilst denying any sense of that same concealment to those who are dominated—there is no time between inspections to live, rather the judgements that constitute

³⁴ Here my debt no only to Foucault (1979), but to Jaques-Alain Miller (1987) once more emerges: rationalised society brought to a mentally domineering zenith in panoptic discipline.

unalienated living are intentionally colonised by the external agency of the “invisible omnivoyeur” (Miller, 1987, p. 4). The presence of opaque social space, by contrast, allows for escape from judgement: it suspends the domination of the watched by the watcher.

I am not about to suggest that universities are akin to this extreme vision of a rationalised society, though there are some who have taken this route (Amit, 2000; Shore & Roberts, 1993), but I use it just to illustrate the effects of rationalisation in principle. The Panopticon shows *in extremis* the antithesis between rationalisation and divergent action. It serves to illustrate the domination of rationalisation—mechanistic, prescribed, grammatised rule—over the action of individuals and their capacity to think for themselves. Their free action relies on “the liberation of human capacities of cognition, affect, volition, creativity, etc.”, to reiterate Turner’s vital point, “from the normative constraints incumbent upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, enacting a multiplicity of social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in some corporate group” (Turner, 1974, p. 75). Observation changes and restricts action not only in the moment of observation, but through increasing observation as a panoptic-like internalisation of the values imposed through regulation can occur. That is to say, observation (with the panoptic work of a metric-orientated management) alters the logic of a previously indeterminate space. Liminality, utopian space, and the restricted field are all destroyed through observation.

This is perhaps made clearest if one considers the impact of observation on potentiality when Turner remarks that liminality is “an instant of pure potentiality when everything trembles in the balance” (Turner, 1974, p. 75). Liminal space must be indeterminate to the outside eye in order to preserve this ‘pure potentiality’. This is where opacity comes in: in some way, the borders of the liminal space must be opaque to the regulatory eye. This can be literal, as with the liminal *communitas* of a jury’s deliberations, but it can also be social—a form of denial of the legitimacy of observing and judging something, as with the field of restricted cultural production where the value of the product depends on the (symbolic) independence of the artistic judgement. In a similar vein, as has already been touched upon, Sidorkin (2016) (also influenced by Bourdieu) points to the denial of the measurability of some things as a strategic response to rationalisation, rather than a statement of the measurement’s actual impossibility. In these ways observation must not be possible either by separation (a real opacity) or taboo (a socially sanctioned denial which amounts to the same opacity).

The Value of Social Indeterminacy

It is in the power of the mainstream field to colonise the liminal space—the counter-culture is by necessity the smaller, weaker group—and this is what I have described in terms of the rationalised society's tendency (via the technics—most notably grammatisation—of administration) to colonise social spaces with a monologic of limited utilitarianism. What the rationalising project does perhaps most pervasively is to systematically dismantle and disrupt any sense of *communitas*.

Modern rationality demands competition and individual proof of worth; collaboration is only valid (and, indeed as has been shown, is sometimes incentivised) when the contribution of each is clear and traceable back to their individual worth. In a liminal space, by contrast, there may not be an articulated reason for a coming together—be that because it is not articulable or because there is a denial of its rationalisation in order to protect the indeterminacy of the space. The worth of these kinds of relationships is in their loose unpredictability which allows them explore new ideas and ways to live: “a kind of institutional capsule or pocket which contains the germ of future social developments, of societal change” (Turner, 1974, p. 76). This sense of an experimental workshop for society has a striking resemblance to Cooper's description of everyday utopias which sees them as communities that “take regular activities beyond their conventional parameters. Against the assumption that anything outside the “normal” is impossible, everyday utopias reveal their possibility.” (Cooper, 2014, p. 4) “More than a flash in the pan, they form richly productive and important sites for social change politics” (D. Cooper, 2014, p. 218).

The central idea in both theoretical strands is that, by forming a space which is in some way set apart from society and collapsing the normal social structures within that place, that thought and behaviour are far freer. The liminal is the birthing-ground of revolution:

[In] such relatively "late" social processes, historically speaking, as "revolution," "insurrection," and even "romanticism" in art [...] the seeds of cultural transformation, discontent with the way things culturally are, and social criticism [...] have become situationally central, no longer a matter of the interface between "fixed structures" but a matter of the holistically developmental. Thus revolutions, whether successful or not, become the limina [...] between major distinctive structural forms or orderings of society. (Turner, 1974, p. 75)

In a more organisationally applied setting, Michael Lindsay writes that

[L]iminal entities—by definition—challenge existing categories. The interstitial creativity that organizational liminality facilitates allows organizations to draw on multiple resources streams (because of their location near boundaries of fields) and to undertake certain activities not always sanctioned by central actors in the field. Liminality also holds the potential for organizations to challenge and redirect social arrangements (Lindsay, 2010, p. 167)

It is the setting apart (by means of the restriction of the field by admission, place, or network) which allows for a more free-flowing thought. In this sense, the *communitas*—the inclusivity and anti-structuralism of the community within the socially indeterminate space—may only apply within that space, much as the participants may desire, having founded this utopian way of being, to extend structurelessness over their borders. Hard delineation of social space may be unsavoury at times, but is an essential element of social indeterminacy. It is the means of setting apart and by its grace “a society is able to evaluate itself, to reflect upon its structure and the possibilities of changing it” (Coman quoted in Wels, van der Waal, Spiegel, & Kamsteeg, 2011).

The liminal space is significant, therefore, not just because it represents a different way of being, but because it allows a different way of seeing: just as a teenager (that liminal being) may have a way of looking at the mundane rituals of adulthood with an unnervingly critical eye, the liminal space allows for the circumspection of a counterculture.

More than this, however, Turner points one to a far more fundamental role of liminality in human society: the liminal—the anti-structural—is in a dialectical relationship with the structural. Liminality is a means of society being and not being; it is inside and outside (and sometimes inside-out); it is the acceptable taboo. Like Derrida’s (1997) use of writing under erasure: it is a way of saying the unsayable or admitting the inadmissible.³⁵ Like the confessional or the therapist’s chair, liminal space allows for the writing under erasure of what could not be exposed in everyday society.

Social indeterminacy gives voice to the proactive human capacity for action and is facilitated by a resistance of administrative rationalisation. It allows for intrinsic motivation, something linked extensively with creative thought (for example in Hon, 2012) in contrast to the detrimental effects of reward (extrinsic motivation) (for example in Amabile, Hennessey, & Grossman, 1986). More than this, though, it provides a moment of anti-structure that (though

³⁵ Writing under erasure involved printing words that were struck through, ~~thus~~, thereby allowing the reader to read the word without fully authoring it. It is stated and retracted, printed and erased.

I do not presume to analyse why) seems to be both universal in some form and perhaps even necessary to human social structure. Either in a conservative (liminal) or modern-progressive (liminoid) way, the antithesis of ordered, dominated, hierarchical society gives space (whether concessionary or revolutionary) to liberated being.

The Risks of Social Indeterminacy

Social indeterminacy is, from the point of view of the mainstream of society and its institutions, inherently risky. This is the heart of the incompatibility of rationalised bureaucracy with unobserved action—administration will not willingly brook risk; failure must be countered with the corrective of enhanced prescriptive control and monitoring. This uncertainty means that people may act in a way that is counter-normative, even unjust by mainstream standards. Individuality can be evil just as it can be excellent. This leaves the argument here with the prospect of accepting that such a space might mean accepting a degree of all of those unsavoury aspects of human culture. However, what is important to bear in mind is that to trust in the benefits of an indeterminate space is not to entrust each person purely to their own conscience: rather, it is a matter of delineation of societal responsibility. It is not that, as in the strongest form of social indeterminacy, any individual is immune from all judgement or consequences of their actions, only that they are subject only (or primarily) to the judgements of their peers—of the *communitas*. Liminal acts must be undertaken *inter pares*.

There is also a separate risk inherent in indeterminate social space, which is that deviance may be thus be siloed and so safely contained as with a fire break. Arguably, the creation of socially indeterminate spaces such as those of Cooper's everyday utopias is a form of containment and even othering of divergent behaviour by dominant society. If one were to see the university in this light, it would leave one with an impression of an asylum for the chronically curious: a foreign land through which emerging adults have to pass that forms a rite of passage before the emergence into mainstream society.

However, the challenge here is only to produce a liminal space whose protection can be justified by its use value—something the university has been based on throughout its history. The panoptic inclinations of rationalised society are to align everything—to put all things to *use*, which is to say, to put them in relation to other things (Miller, 1987)—in which endeavour liminal space (being by definition to some degree non-relational to the wider world) has little to offer the narrow utilitarian. In this view, the university's objectives must be aligned to those

of employment, of productivity, or at the very least of mental wellbeing. In this, the idea of lack of control is alien: “It is a question of halting fluctuations, of enclosing all displacements, of fixing them once and for all in one place, or at least, of never losing sight of them as they move, of freezing them. Before being a liberal,” Miller writes, “we realise, the utilitarian is a despot.” (Miller, 1987, p. 16) Control, in his reading of Bentham, must be absolute over every detail, excluding any idea of social indeterminacy.

7.2 Social Indeterminacy and Art

For Turner, art recurs as a key example of a liminoid field in post-industrial society, providing a socially sanctioned, professionalised liminality. This is because the liminal state requires a degree of attributed autonomy—the characteristic feature of authentic art. Liminality also relates to the idea of play—it is where the instrumental is suspended and so divergent thought by means of deconstructive play can take place. It is perhaps easiest to recognise this relationship to art in Turner’s comment that “it is the analysis of culture into factors and their free or “ludic” recombination in any and every possible pattern, however weird, that is of the essence of liminality, liminality par excellence.” (Turner, 1974, pp. 60-61)

Again, opacity plays an enormous role in art and in the production of belief. Deliberate opacity is part of the artistic process—that which is too real is hidden in order to create the illusion of a performance suspended by invisible wires outside reality. In the creation of the art, too, the genius is preferable to the reality of the composer. Belief in art and artists is facilitated by the willing construction the myth of their liminal state.

At least, this has been the case when Bourdieu and Turner were writing. There is a good argument to be made that this species of liminal artist is dying out as rationalised society extends its logics into every arena. As marketised ideas of what constitutes successful art permeate (Ritchey, 2019), cultural capital becomes less and less legitimate as compared to economic capital. The liminal artist—to revisit Turner—becomes ergic, rather than ludic. The artist is less and less insulated from the systems of a society based on competition and marketability, and so is forced to instrumentalise. This is where the university steps in: a space which guarantees a place for the artist to practice their work, semi-preserved from the influence of the market and able, therefore, to operate in a liminal space. The programme of rationalisation in universities compromises the liminality of the space. The restriction of a field

of cultural production is not simply something that restricts the legitimacy of judgement, thereby (arguably) unfairly privileging some judgements over others; it is the very means of creating a liminal space conducive to the creative act.

More objectively, the artist's work is facilitated by a liminal societal state. Creativity, crucially, involves the use of freedom and control—free play and judgement (see, for instance, Robinson, 2011). The creative mind must be in a place that not only offers stimulation and imperative, but which also allows for unseen activity. The liminal space provides this, but a rationalised environment (the more it moves towards excessive rationalisation and thus the panoptic internalisation of the instrumentalisation of time) does not. Social indeterminacy—the unaccountable free play of ideas—is reliant on a degree of strategic immunity from rationalisation. I, for instance, came up with half of the ideas that have since been committed to this chapter whilst aimlessly staring at a candle, moving hardened wax from its base to its top to be consumed by the flame. Ideas, too, must be melted down and the liminality of indeterminate space is just such an anti-structural crucible.

The situation of the artist in a liberated position with regard to thought and creative materials is made quite clear by Turner:

In the so-called "high culture" of complex societies, the liminoid is [...] "individualized." The solitary artist creates the liminoid phenomena, the collectivity experiences collective liminal symbols. This does not mean that the maker of liminoid symbols, ideas, images, and so on, does so ex nihilo; it only means that he is privileged to make free with his social heritage in a way impossible to members of cultures in which the liminal is to a large extent the sacrosanct. (Turner, 1974, p. 84)

El-Ghadban frames the young composers she studied as liminal in multiple ways, the first of which was on account of "the particular status attributed to artists in many societies, including Western societies" (El-Ghadban, 2009, p. 141) She refers to this liminality as a burden, but here I am considering the liberation. I have written briefly of the 'Wild Card' as the strategic evasion of categorisation. This is a deliberate liminality, sought out because of a distaste for the limitations of definition. In the experiences related in this thesis, the key issue at stake has been judgement: the judgements required to allocate resource, the judgements involved in the act of musical composition, and the passing of judgement on musical experience. Liminality is a non-judgable state. To pass a judgment, there must be a referent. The referent may be within and tacit—a history of personal experience—or explicit and externalised—like a set of written criteria. However, liminality denies the legitimacy of a referent. The composer who floats in a

liminal state (unfastened from stylistic standards, or external truth referents), evades judgement. They escape every attempt to evaluate that would pin them down.

Bureaucratic mechanisms are unable to deal with the uncategorisable; for administration, everything must be pinned down—rationalised and grammatisable—in order to count. Marks must be given and legally defensible judgements made; a price must be set; rankings must be put together and resources allocated. Worth is taken down in the freeze-frames of ledgers. What is such a system to make of the liminal artist who is placed in a social suspension—unjudged and in free-flux?

This is based, as has been illustrated, in an enlightenment idea of free will (as befits the descendants of Wilhelm von Humboldt). Efforts are repeatedly made to relocate judgement from external authorities—hegemonic institutions, overbearing masters, and domineering marketeers—to the composer themselves; the legitimate judgement is an auto-judicial one. This is held in a dialectical relationship with ideas of music as ‘commercialised’, ‘pastiche’, ‘inauthentic’, or ‘functional’. The autonomous artist maintains their sense of themselves as such by their relationship to these compromised practices, thus the dialectical relationship.³⁶

Rationalisation—grammatisation, the externalisation of judgement—cuts in acts of symbolic violence into the world of becoming. This is not wilful violence, but collateral of a categorised world. Academia has an institutional resistance to such violence, as does the artist. If this does not hold (as I have proposed), then the prospect of an increasingly commercially orientated academic institutional environment will undoubtedly change what it means to be a composer.

7.3 Social Indeterminacy and Academia

Experimental and theoretical science itself is "liminoid" —it takes place in "neutral spaces" or privileged areas (laboratories and studies) set aside from the mainstream of productive events. Universities, institutes, colleges, etc., are "liminoid" settings for all kinds of freewheeling, experimental cognitive behavior as well as forms of symbolic action. (Turner, 1974, p. 65)

³⁶ As always, the ideal typical description of the extreme of the dialectic is illustrative rather than descriptive. Composers to varying degrees hold themselves in some balance of independence and dependence.

The university in this sense is an institution dedicated to producing sustained liminality. The development of anthropological concept of liminality was based in transitional liminality, on rituals that marked moments of change. However, Turner also notes attempts to preserve and sustain liminality in his analysis of types of *communitas* (1974, pp. 79-80; 2017 [1969], p. 132). Turner describes three kinds of *communitas*: spontaneous, ideological, and normative. The spontaneous sort is the feeling of togetherness and equality, of an unobstructed shared understanding of the world as well as a shared intention. This is the spontaneous and transitory situation that accompanies revolutions and movements. These crisis moments function “like a sort of collective ritual divorce from ordinary routines and attachments” (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 193) which, as Bourdieu goes on to write, “transforms the view which the agents normally have of the symbolism of social relations, and especially the hierarchies” (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 193). This liminality is temporary (similarly Weber’s charismatic authority, which I would argue is linked to this concept) and the preservation of *communitas* beyond the initial revolutionary moment (in academia one might think of the first heady wave following a radical breakthrough), in Turner’s mind, has two forms. Ideological *communitas* is the theoretical formulation of anti-structuralism produced by means of a reflection on the relations involved in spontaneous *communitas*. This is the attempt to design a society of equals. Normative *communitas*, on the other hand, is its lived counterpart: it is a community of individuals living in a state of structurelessness.

Communitas is particularly significant for the University in its resonance with the tradition of collegiality. The sympathy with the idea of *communitas* can be gleaned from Wilhelm von Humboldt’s foundational thoughts on the modern university: “The intellectual excursions of men [...] only prosper through a process of collaboration. [...] Given this collective character of individual accomplishment, the inner life of these higher intellectual institutions must be such as to call forth and sustain a continuously self-renewing, wholly uncoerced and disinterested collaboration.” (Humboldt, 2018, p. 47) The dissolution of this collegiality—this *communitas*—is a hallmark of the changes I have been describing with regard to the extension of neo-liberal logics to the university in the form of pervasive competition: “universities compete against each other for contracts, for clients and customers, and for public visibility and external confirmation. The collective academic community fades.” (Barnett, 2011, p. 445)

However, it is not the only element of social indeterminacy which one is met with in the idea of the university literature. Opacity, which I have put at the centre of the idea of social indeterminacy, is an abiding and essential feature of the modern university. From the foundational Germanic principles of the enlightenment university, the idea of a privileged

academic freedom, a wilful blindness of censors towards the work of academics. For Kant, the lower faculty (the scientific faculty) was valuable for the very reason that it was “independent of the government’s command with regard to its teachings” and that “having no commands to give, [it] is free to evaluate everything, and concern itself with the sciences, that is, with truth”. This had, in his view, to be a faculty where “reason is by its nature free and admits of no command to hold something as true (no imperative, “Believe!” but only a free “I believe”).” (Kant, 1979, pp. 27-29) The indeterminacy in Kant’s vision is clear. The liminality of the scholars of the sciences is also apparent in his remark that the lower (scientific) faculty was seen as beneath those faculties of law, theology, and medicine was because “a man who gives commands, even though he is someone else’s humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command.” (Kant, 1979, p. 29) From other prominent figures of the German enlightenment come similar entreaties for the unobservedness of academic activity: “The state must understand that intellectual work will go on infinitely better if it does not intrude.” (Humboldt, 2018, p. 48); “If the intention were to impose on science a certain caution and moderation, to limit it to ordinary practical matters, we could hardly ask teachers to be progressive and to cultivate their disciplines in a philosophical spirit.” (Schelling, 2018, p. 37). From this moment in European cultural history—the founding of the modern ‘Humboldtian’ university—to the present day, this concern is pervasive. As Edward Said reflected,

[W]hether we look to the time of Ibn’Abbad or Ibn’Arabi, or that of John Dewey in the twentieth century, we will find serious thinkers suggesting more or less the same thing, that the place of education is a special province within society [elsewhere Said calls it an “almost utopian place”], a place where freedom of inquiry and thought occur and are protected (Said, 2018, p. 639)

What is present in these kinds of visions of the university but missing in many views from my interviews, however, is the strong form of this concept of academic freedom, of social opacity: namely, what is missing is the socially sanctionable idea that some people in society may be subject to different rules than others. There is an egalitarian feeling in the university that wants to reach out to include all people—to declare that all live under the same rules and to undermine institutionalised forms of power. Many of my interviewees expressed ambivalence or acceptance about quality assurance procedures either in principle or in fact because they saw no reason to be treated differently to any other organisation. In fact, to cede the privilege of the

university would be to eradicate the liminal position from which they are most able to reflect critically on society itself and, from this world apart, look for ways to improve the world. Ronald Barnett, in putting forward his advocacy of the “ecological university”, falls foul of this particular difficulty: he accepts interpenetration as compatible with a university that governs its own culture.

The metaphysical [medieval and early modern] university stood apart from society. Now, the modern university interpenetrates society, as society interpenetrates the university. The university is called upon to develop a societal mission, even a global mission. Very well; let it take that calling seriously and become a fully-fledged ecological university, aware of its interconnectedness with society and putting its resources towards the development of societal and personal well-being. (Barnett, 2011: 453)

The theory I have developed here of social indeterminacy indicates that a social space that is not set apart—whose liminality is compromised—cannot simply by intention redirect its path. There is a fallacy here about the intentional power of academics themselves that fails to acknowledge the social forces at play. The comparative weakness of any liminal community means that they cannot, by pure will, maintain a compromised structure unless they succeed in filling the breach in the walls that set their activity apart. Instead, the flow of legitimacy—in this case through marketisation (often mediated as impact) and the work of interstitial organisations (Slaughter & Cantwell, 2018, pp. 61-62)—will transform the institutions of a field, colonising it with its monologic and in time practice at every level will become isomorphic.

In the case of such an extreme (if gradual) eventuality, where academia is brought into true alignment with the rationales of modern society, it would become like industrial organisation: *leading in experimental profiteering, but following far behind society in the realm of moral, critical, and progressive thought, and indeed in the realm of art.* Recently, the British Sociological Association released a statement regarding reforms at the University of East London (2021) that exemplifies this concern. In it, objections were expressed to the prioritisation of “vocational education for community leadership” over “critical thinking and research driven education.” (In other words, the objection was to the university’s prioritisation of instrumental over liminal space.) It goes on to say that “These are not alternatives.” In this instance, the rationalising university management (like Bentham) has sought to separate that which can be observably put to use—that for which there is demand—from that which is nurtured in liminal, unobservable space. In producing according to demand, the university becomes a follower of

the tides of society; change happens in wider society and then is echoed by the University only in as far as there is economic incentive. The instrumental university is, in this extreme, neither visionary and nor critical—it is an affirmative research and development wing of the capitalist society. This is the result of compromising a space that was deliberately made opaque—a space whose value is its social indeterminacy.

The compromise of the social indeterminacy of the university can be seen in the neither uncommon, nor unreasonable objection that there is “a populist devaluation of the intellectual enterprise, that is, the pursuit of knowledge and inquiry as valuable in its own right rather than just as a means to an end.” (Amit, 2000, p. 222) The insistence on society valuing all knowledge for its own sake is an interesting precept: it implies an equality in value (at least at the speculative point of creation) in which society simply accepts and is grateful for all learning of any sort. However, this does not abolish discrimination between different areas of knowledge, it merely relocates the power of judgement to the university’s idiosyncratic means of judgment. It does not abolish the means-ends relationship, rather it relocates the locus of judgement. Through either denial of the ability of rationalised technics to monitor academic work—a denial which, whether true or not, may be brought into play because it is socially necessary, as Sidorkin (2016) argues—or more direct objection to the shift in power, there is a resistance towards the confiscation of judgement over what constitutes worthwhile academic work. This shift in judgement has been executed using external checks such as the REF, the TEF, impact evaluations, competitive funding bids, and the NSS. The free space that is beyond the reach of these external forces is reduced in size—the cracks between rationalised rubrics through which divergent and creative work can occur are diminished and the power over that space shifts towards the wider institutional field.

The result of this move is an organisation whose credo is increasingly instrumental, as so many critics have articulated. The internalisation of the dominant utilitarian logic was well exemplified in the account of one of my interviewees with regard to their own work:

I think that both the TEF, but mainly the REF culture [...] has been highly problematic in terms of how academic composers view [...] their creative aims because obviously there's an [...] agenda there; you think you are [...] composing freely, but essentially there's just another imposed agenda. So you see that you're doing projects [...] which you're excited about and you're working on these things and suddenly the rubric changes—the brief changes—and suddenly you're told 'well, out of these things this one has great potential and this is great but I think we could only fund this one.' And then suddenly you start thinking of your work [...] in a more utilitarian way, which is

against the work in both ways: against the work that gets the funding and against the work that doesn't get the funding. (Ghikas, interview)

Such an outright appraisal of this kind of intrusion was rare. This is perhaps unsurprising, however, as I have made clear throughout how the autonomy of a composer's activities is key to their legitimacy. More often, composers were keen to highlight how they would not let such pressures influence what they did in their artistic work, though others might.

The quote, however, serves to illustrate with uncommon frankness a wider feeling of the compromise of social indeterminacy, which is a severe thing for the academic environment: "There is something hallowed and consecrated about the academy: There is a sense of violated sanctity, experienced by us when the university or school is subjected to crude political pressures." (Said, 2018, p. 639) This has been brought to the fore recently with the UK government's proposal to appoint an official with the remit of ensuring that freedom of speech is upheld in universities and the power to impose fines. It is not so much the circularity of this idea which is important here, but the reaction, which shows again this feeling of violation by governmental intervention. For instance, the general secretary of the University and Colleges Union, Jo Grady, responded that

In reality the biggest threats to academic freedom and free speech come not from staff and students, nor from so-called 'cancel culture', but from ministers' own attempts to police what can and cannot be said on campus. (Grady quoted in Sellgren, 2021)

I am not here posing a view on this debate—with both sides arguing that their intention is to protect the freedoms of academics—but rather I am using it to illustrate the degree to which the idea of academia is bound up with social indeterminacy.

7.4 Taking a Position

As in Chapter Four (see 4.5 Taking a Position, page 149), I include here a brief account of my perspective on this idea of the university by way of contributing to the imaginary reconstitution of society (Levitas, 2013). I hope to develop this further, but for now I will just indicate the potential I think this idea has. Liminality is perpetually used as an analytical tool: it has been applied to a wide range of social situations onto which Turner's model maps more

or less effectively. However, here I propose it as an architectural tool—as means of designing social life. I imagine that in this case my own design may be quite clear to the reader from the commentary I have presented: in counterpoint to other models such as the Entrepreneurial University, the Liquid University, and the Ecological University, I propose the Liminal University. This, I suggest, is a way of liminal, vaguely defined activities—play, unstructured social interaction, free creativity—being found a valued place in society.

In this vein, I would make the case for the university to be reimagined as a far stronger form of liminal space than it ever has been: a *communitas* seeded with inverted hierarchy, where the last student through the door sits at the highest table; where a degree of asceticism is embraced to facilitate the collegial *communitas*; members set apart from society in either a transitory or permanent state of liminality; and where legitimacy is defined internally according to the logic of the liminal field.

This is not entirely new, but provides a framework for a stronger version of the University being set apart. It has echoes of the founding of the modern University with a communities in which “the teacher does not exist for the sake of the student; both teacher and student have their justification in the common pursuit of knowledge.” (Humboldt, 2018, p. 47) It is also reminiscent of Humboldt’s vision of suspended societal norms: coming to the university, the student becomes “entrusted with freedom and with the right to act autonomously. The young person, on entry into university, should be released from the compulsion to enter either into a state of idleness or into practical life” (Humboldt, 2018, p. 51). It is this entrusting of freedom of action and judgement that is undermined by the audit culture of the rationalised university where “No university worker is trusted just to get on with their job and do it competently.” (Connell, 2019, p. 130)

By taking up the concept of liminality, a stronger form of this can be conceived of than merely an echo of past ideals: the university can be a place of equality fuelled by the commons of the *communitas*; the permissibility (and even favourability) of societal taboos would address concerns over free speech as the anonymity of the liminal ritual provides the requisite social indeterminacy for such liberation of speech and mind; and play, divergent thought, and the non-instrumentality of the liminal space (complemented of course by the inclination to solve problems) would abound.

I do not claim this as a blueprint, but (in line with recent thought on utopian thinking) as a critical proposal: an injunction to see whether a society might willingly erect the appropriate boundaries between its mainstream regulatory fields and academia. From the near pure institutionalism of the compositional field comes a sense of the conditions of autonomy and

authenticity that, I would argue, is only a stronger form of that which is found throughout the academic disciplines. From this, rises the critique of rationalisation and with it the utopian imagining of the liminal university.

Conclusion to Part 3: De-Rationalising the University

THIS THESIS HAS DEVELOPED a theory of the formative power of university patronage on the activities of the composer-academics it employs (in terms of both compositional practice and teaching). The affinity of the rationalised university organisation is to the exo-authoritative (collaborative, non-authorial) composer and to the ego-authoritative (banking-educational) teacher. The conflict between the artistic and university institutional fields is thus far more nuanced than it might first appear. However, fundamentally the core artistic institution is autonomy (authenticity, honesty) and so all attributable intervention by the university would be delegitimising of the composer and their work. In developing this strain of thought, the rough outline of the Liminal University emerges.

Summary of Findings

These ideas are a response to the five questions I set out in the introduction (see p.1).

1) How do composer-academics practice their work and what role do other agencies play in this process? In the artistic sphere, composers negotiate three main balances of control: those between themselves and commissioners, performers, and audiences. There are socially strategic reasons for taking up any position on these scales as well as of subverting their value entirely (something which is facilitated by university patronage).

2) How do composer-academics go about teaching composition and what are the values which underlie these methods? Good compositional teaching is predominantly thought of by composers as in terms that resonate with the core tenets of critical pedagogy (exo-authoritative teaching): the withdrawal of tutor judgement and the empowerment of student critique is a realisation of a more aesthetically relativist stance from composers in which their role is one of facilitation, rather than direction.

3) What are the impacts of the institutions of contemporary universities on both of these strands of activity? The compositional balances of agency highlighted above

can increasingly be added the balance of control with the university. Research frameworks, structural influences, and resource scarcities all have their influences on what composition tends to take place. These are all enmeshed within an administrative system that requires grammatisation. In teaching, critical pedagogy is curtailed by this same impetus towards grammatisation. The ultimate need for an absolute judgement tends towards a forcible re-instatement of the composer-academic's personal authority in establishing worth (ego-authoritative teaching); assessments, at present, subvert the exo-authoritative impulses prevalent in composers' pedagogic value systems.

4) *What do the affinities and conflicts found in the comparison between practices valorised by composers and the universities indicate for the future of academic-composition?* The pressures identified in question 3 are found to have an affinity, on the whole, with the practices of composition that distribute agency (the exo-authoritative composer), creating externalised (grammatised) processes with the potential to be observable in a bureaucratic system. However, they also have an affinity with ego-authoritative models of teaching that ultimately place power in the hands of composer-academics (a banking educational model). This, in the bureaucratic system, has the advantage that it gives a more authoritative weight (legitimised with a grammatising veneer of rubrics) to the judgement that fulfils the student's contractual arrangement with the university.

5) *How could the university organisation allow composition to be practiced in sympathy with the values of the artistic field?* The dichotomy between artistic autonomy and bureaucratic rationalisation has led me to synthesise the idea of the 'Liminal University'. If bureaucracy is fundamentally a system of surveillance, then it runs counter to the predominant normative value in artistic labour: autonomy. The preservation of such a value would involve curtailing the powers of bureaucratic creep by affirming the legitimate boundaries of such surveillance.

Recommendations

For those within composition, the overall recommendation is to engage critically with the University as an organisation. By considering thoroughly the make-up of the field, the values that tend to be promoted within it (both explicitly and implicitly), and the mechanisms and

effects of these values, changes to the field may be recognised in the everyday. The core recommendation for composer-academics, therefore, is to try to become more aware of their social context and so to more intentionally contribute to the direction of ongoing change in their field. Acts of composition, despite the normative value of autonomy, is and always will be far from autonomous. The question is, to what social pressures shall it respond?

This also applies to students of composition: they should be aware of the organisational and cultural context of the music they study, of its limitations as well as its reach. This thesis illustrates the social construction of this musical world, including the defined dimensions of value and limitations of acceptable activity. If you are to push boundaries, then look to the boundaries of culture: critique the dimensions of creativity that get taught.

To other researchers in academia, from all different fields, this thesis comes with the recommendation to attend to the case of the creative arts as a canary in a coal mine: it is a field held together by cultural value systems and, whilst I do not subscribe to a view that all forms of knowledge are equally culturally relative, there are aspects of such value systems in all disciplines. The core ideas of conflict between academic and organisational value systems are at work in many other disciplines. The core recommendation is, then, to look similarly critically on the organisational context in other disciplines and recognise the forms of power that are at work both laterally amongst researchers and vertically from the organisation. Forms of resistance and redirection of change may be found only through such critical reflection.

For all three of these groups there is one key question to drive this critical reflection: why, how and for whom is your work creating and sustaining power?

The other key group for whom this thesis carries key recommendations is that of the managers, administrators, policy makers of universities in England (and, indeed, as many parallels exist further afield, around the world): consider how you adopt and extend the power of bureaucratic systems. If there is one thing that this thesis illustrates, it is that these systems are not value-neutral, but have far reaching and sometimes obscured cultural impacts: the Form, the Committee, and the Balance Sheet are neither neutral nor inherently just. Accountability—so central to the justification of so much of the performativity agenda—is a form of power that may evade the ostentatious demonstrations of domination, but should be seen for what it is: a disciplinary system that warps existing cultural values. This is not to say that such systems are never useful, but current blind pursuit of ever greater rationalised control should be curbed by consideration of the central value of academic work: autonomy.

Further Research

There is doubtless more research to be undertaken in this area. A more extensive theoretical development of the idea of the Liminal University as well as a greater emphasis on the possible practical implications of the idea could be fruitful areas of research. More generally, the understanding of the creative arts in academic settings would benefit greatly from further research, particularly regarding their influence on artistic practice in wider society. There are also other of higher education organisations (notably, conservatoires), cultural settings (other nations, educational systems, and musical traditions), and perspectives (students, administrators, members of the public and those involved in the many levels of governance) that could be fruitfully explored. Building on this work in these ways could provide a much clearer idea of the influences of different institutional fields and types of management on intellectual labour, the impact of these institutionalised forms of cultural production in society at large, and a clearer idea of the practice and impact of higher education in the creative arts.

The contribution of this research to cultural sociology and higher education studies has been to develop frameworks for understanding compositional activity, artistic practice research, teaching, and structure and freedom in the arts. In these aspects, I hope to have laid the groundwork for the development of these research strands.

Fundamentally, this has placed autonomy and rationalisation at odds (whilst recognising their need for one another). I will conclude here by briefly returning the Liminal University—an imaginary reconstruction of the university—to the field of study and considering how resistance and ceremonial conformity brought to light in my fieldwork highlights and expresses the conflicts at the heart of this reimagining.

Protecting Indeterminacy

The effects of rationalisation have been extensively explored throughout this thesis, with the most keenly felt area of conflict being between research monitoring and legitimate artistic practice. I have theorised that the managerial quest for determinacy compromises the fundamental legitimacy of the artwork as such: autonomy. If this is the case, one would expect to see resistance to administrative control and indeed I have found some evidence of this.

Elements of *communitas* are found most notably at the departmental level. It is an economy of legitimacy that is insulated from the vertical organisational institutions. That is, legitimacy is attributed by members of the field itself (those individuals accredited as peers.) In this arena, a method of maintaining the internality of the artistic economy of legitimacy—that is, the opacity of the space—is decoupling. This is a concept drawn directly from organisational institutionalism, and it refers to the practice of avoiding wholesale conformity (isomorphism) with the institutional field by practicing ceremonial conformity, whilst keeping the day-to-day practices in their non-isomorphic form. Decoupling here is a buffer, not between the institutional and the productive as in classic organisational institutionalism, but between two institutional fields. This means that the art world displays a conformity to the institutional requirements of the university, whilst practicing the institutional requirements of autonomy from illegitimate control required by the artistic field. An example of one such former head of department's approach to the REF serves to illustrate this:

I've always dealt with the REF, and I've tried to get colleagues to deal with it as just another form that has to be filled in. And when you fill in forms, you tell a few lies, you give the answers that the person requires. So, when I have written my 300 word statements, which explain my research methodology and all of that, I've just told a few lies. (Marsh, interview)

Marsh describes fairly typically the ceremonial conformity of the act of performing for the REF. His conformity is ceremonial because it does not accurately represent the act of composing and is part of a wider strategic behaviour of academics where “evading intrusive and time-wasting management requirements has become a necessary skill for university workers.” (Connell, 2019, p. 133)

Others described a fairly neutral feeling towards the REF (with an accompanying understanding that others had it harder) on account of the enlightenment of their managers in not taking the REF too seriously, or not passing on university pressure to conform to them.

Interviewer Are there any other ways in which this utility focus kind of manifests in the institutional life?

Participant: Well only in the sort of metrics of the REF and now [...] the TEF. The way everything's statistic driven, but I think the university itself is pretty enlightened. You know that the people at the top of the university are pretty enlightened in seeing that

those metrics aren't the be all and end all of everything, [...] whilst they're important in the sense that they determine that the revenue streams that come into the university they realize that that's not the only way that they should measure the value of what subjects are offering. [...] I think that's great. So yeah, the pressures are there but just to identify pressure doesn't mean it's sort of chronic. Yeah. I mean universities at their best are populated by intelligent enlightened people. [...] I think the day when I thought they were ceasing to be that is the day I would look for something else to do. (Reeves, interview)

Deans, Heads of Department, and all of the other academic staff involved in the administration of academic life, then, have the capability to contribute to the preservation of a non-rationalised space. They are the key to this ceremonial conformity and thus in the preservation of artistic and academic autonomy. The decoupling of this space is one aspect of the preservation of the maintenance of autonomy. The desirability of the decoupling can be seen in yet another reflection on the subject of research:

I think I'm probably happy if people don't look too closely at it as research one way or the other because then potentially the whole edifice falls down and it's not what's interesting about the music anyway, I think. (Anon_5, interview)

However, as has already been raised (see page 134), more recent developments in organisational institutionalism suggest that decoupling and ceremonial conformity are generally a temporary state of affairs (Hallett, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010). Raewyn Connell refers to what I have called 'ceremonial conformity' as 'fake accountability' (Connell, 2019, p. 132); in this turn of phrase is indicated the dissonance between the values of honest authenticity and the idea of conforming to regulation in a purely performative way: "a *university* cannot do [as it likes], because a university does have a soul. Our business is truth." (Connell, 2019, p. 134) This raises the prospect of this resistance being untenable in the long term with, perhaps, ceremonially presented behaviours and values bleeding into real practice. This transformation might come about as composers are employed for being 'REF-able', and as PhDs become more consistently and thoroughly research-based, so composition will favour those practices which can more easily be articulated as research and those practitioners who understand what they do as research. By this gradual process, the protected space that allows the attribution of artistic autonomy may degrade. In this way, isomorphism is not a sustainable form of protected social

indeterminacy. If the field is to retain a sense of autonomy in the artistically legitimate sense, then a more durable liminality would have to be created.

However, it is also posited by this theoretical framework that the concept of autonomy is malleable, and that, therefore, the interventions may become accepted at least into the habitus of the composer themselves as they are increasingly raised in these conditions. In this case, the possible conflict to be found in this posited future is between the academic artist and the wider artistic field. As has been explored here, the dynamic conflict between the competing legitimacies of two institutional environments is perhaps the perennial problem of the composer-academic. This institutional front is composed by a vast array of agents: audiences, academics, administrators, policy-makers, students, parents, and of course composers themselves. In this meeting, reduced here to the artistic and academic fields within the framework of the rationalising University, composers are chiefly responsible for composing themselves, splitting their minds between different worlds; a true conflict of the faculties.

References

Bibliography

- ALLMER, T. (2018). Theorising and Analysing Academic Labour. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*, 16(1), 49-77. doi:10.31269/triplec.v16i1.868
- ALLMER, T., & BULUT, E. (2018). Introduction: Academic Labour, Digital Media and Capitalism. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*, 16(1), 44-48. doi:10.31269/triplec.v16i1.955
- AMABILE, T., HENNESSEY, A., & GROSSMAN, B. (1986). Social Influences on Creativity: the effects of contracted-for reward. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50(1), 14-23.
- AMIT, V. (2000). The University as Panopticon. *Audit cultures*, 215.
- ANDERSON, R. D. (1992). *Universities and Elites in Britain Since 1800*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- ANTONIO, R. J. (1981). Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: its origins and developments in Hegel, Marx and contemporary thought. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 32(3), 330-345. doi:10.2307/589281
- ARENDT, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ARTS AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL. (undated). Understanding Your Project: a guide to self evaluation. Retrieved from <https://ahrc.ukri.org/documents/guides/understanding-your-project-a-guide-to-self-evaluation/> (accessed 21/04/21)
- BABBITT, M. (2003). The Composer as Specialist. In S. Peles (Ed.), *The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- BAR-EL, E., & BAERT, P. (2021). 'The Fool' Revisited: The Making of Žižek as Sacrificial Public Intellectual. *Cultural Sociology*, doi:10.1177/17499755211007243
- BARNETT, R. (2011). The coming of the ecological university. *Oxford Review of Education*, 37(4), 439-455. doi:10.1080/03054985.2011.595550
- BATTILANA, J., & D'AUNNO, T. (2009). Institutional Work and the Paradox of Embedded Agency. In T. Lawrence, R. Suddaby, & B. Leca (Eds.), *Institutional work: Actors and agency in institutional studies of organizations* (pp. 31-58): Cambridge University Press.
- BAYLEY, A. (2011). Ethnographic research into contemporary string quartet rehearsal. *Ethnomusicology Forum*, 20(3): 385-411. doi:10.1080/17411912.2011.645626
- BBC. (2021). University of Liverpool: Academics sign letter against 47 'callous' job cuts. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-merseyside-56169850> (accessed 24/03/21)
- BEAST, Birmingham Electroacoustic Sound Theatre. (Undated). The Team. Retrieved from <http://www.beast.bham.ac.uk/about/the-team/> (accessed 20/11/20)
- BECKER, H. S. (2008). *Art worlds*. London: University of California Press.
- BECKETT, K. S. (2013). Paulo Freire and the Concept of Education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 45(1), 49-62. doi:10.1080/00131857.2012.715385
- BENNETT, D., HENNEKAM, S., MACARTHUR, S., HOPE, C., & GOH, T. (2019). Hiding gender: How female composers manage gender identity. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 113, 20-32. doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2018.07.003

- BENNETT, D., MACARTHUR, S., HOPE, C., GOH, T., & HENNEKAM, S. (2018). Creating a career as a woman composer: Implications for music in higher education. *British Journal of Music Education*, 35(3), 237-253. doi:10.1017/S0265051718000104
- BENNETT, D., WRIGHT, D., & BLOM, D. (2010). The artistic practice-research-teaching (ART) nexus: Translating the information flow. *Journal of University Teaching and Learning Practice*, 7(2), article 3
- BENNETT, R., & KANE, S. (2014). Students' interpretations of the meanings of questionnaire items in the National Student Survey. *Quality in Higher Education*, 20(2), 129-164. doi:10.1080/13538322.2014.924786
- BENSON, J. K. (1977). Organizations: A Dialectical View. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 22(1), 1-21. doi:10.2307/2391741
- BERG, M., & SEEBER, B. (2016). *The slow professor: challenging the culture of speed in the academy*. London: University of Toronto Press.
- BHATTACHARYA, S. (2020). Education as Empowerment. *Journal of Political Science Education*, 16(3), 403-406. doi:10.1080/15512169.2019.1632715
- BIZZELL, P. (1991). Power, Authority, and Critical Pedagogy. *Journal of Basic Writing*, 10(2), 54-70.
- BLAU, A. (2019). Habermas on rationality: Means, ends and communication. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 1474885119867679. doi:10.1177/1474885119867679
- BLOM, D., BENNETT, D., & WRIGHT, D. (2011). How artists working in academia view artistic practice as research: Implications for tertiary music education. *International Journal of Music Education*, 29(4), 359-373. doi:10.1177/0255761411421088
- BLUMENFELD-JONES, D. S. (2016). The artistic process and arts-based research: a phenomenological account of the practice. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 22(5), 322-333. doi:10.1177/1077800415620212
- BOOTH, G. D., & KUHN, T. L. (1990). Economic and transmission factors as essential elements in the definition of folk, art, and pop music. *The Musical Quarterly*, 74(3), 411-438.
- BORGENDORFF, H. (2012). *The Conflict of the Faculties: Perspectives on Artistic Research and Academia*: Leiden University Press.
- BORN, G. (1995). *Rationalizing Culture : IRCAM, Boulez, and the institutionalization of the musical avant-garde*. Berkeley : University of California Press.
- (1997). Modernist discourse, psychic forms, and agency: aesthetic subjectivities at IRCAM. *Cultural Anthropology*, 12(4), 480-501.
- BOURDIEU, P. (1988). *Homo Academicus*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, 7(1), 14-25. doi:10.2307/202060
- (1990). *In Other Words: essays towards a reflexive sociology*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press.
- (1993). *The Field of Cultural Production: essays on art and literature*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1996). *The State Nobility: elite schools in the field of power*. Cambridge: Cambridge : Polity.
- (2007) *The Forms of Capital*.
www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu-forms-capital.htm (accessed 29/07/21)
- (2010). *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste* (R. Nice, Trans.) London: Routledge.
- BOURDIEU, P., & NICE, R. (1980). The production of belief: contribution to an economy of symbolic goods. *Media, Culture & Society*, 2(3), 261-293. doi:10.1177/016344378000200305
- BRITISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. (2021). BSA Statement on UEL. Retrieved from <https://es.britsoc.co.uk/bsa-statement-on-uel/>

- BROWN, N., & SZEMAN, I. (2000). *Pierre Bourdieu: fieldwork in culture*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- BUNCE, L., BAIRD, A., & JONES, S. E. (2017). The student-as-consumer approach in higher education and its effects on academic performance. *Studies in Higher Education*, 42(11), 1958-1978. doi:10.1080/03075079.2015.1127908
- BURCKHARDT QURESHI, R., LESSEM, A., BECKWITH, J., FISHER, A., & TRUAX, B. (1989). From Composer to Audience: the Production of "Serious" Music in Canada. *Canadian University Music Review / Revue de musique des universités canadiennes*, 9(2), 117-137. doi: 10.7202/1014908ar
- BURGER, T. (1976). *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: history, laws, and ideal types*. Durham, N.C : Duke University Press.
- BUSS, A. (1999). The Concept of Adequate Causation and Max Weber's Comparative Sociology of Religion. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 50(2), 317-329. doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.1999.00317.x
- CHENG, J. H. S., & MARSH, H. W. (2010). National Student Survey: are differences between universities and courses reliable and meaningful? *Oxford Review of Education*, 36(6), 693-712. doi:10.1080/03054985.2010.491179
- CLARKE, D. (2012). Musical Autonomy Revisited. In M. Clayton, T. Herbert, & R. Middleton (Eds.), *The cultural study of music: a critical introduction* (pp. 172-183). New York: Routledge.
- COLLINI, S. (2012). *What are universities for?* London: Penguin.
- (2017). *Speaking of universities*: London: Verso.
- COLLINS, N., SCHEDEL, M., & WILSON, S. (2013). *Electronic Music*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CONNELL, R. (2019). *The Good University: what universities actually do and why it's time for radical change*. London: Zed Books.
- COOK, N. (2012). Music as Performance. In M. Clayton, T. Herbert, & R. Middleton (Eds.), *The Cultural Study of Music: a critical introduction* (pp. 184-194). New York: Routledge.
- (2013). *Beyond the Score: music as performance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- COOPER, D. (2014). *Everyday Utopias: the conceptual life of promising spaces*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- COOPER, S. (2012). Preface: The Society of the Spectacle then and now. In G. Debord, *Society of the Spectacle* (pp. 16-25). Chicago: Bread and Circuses.
- CROFT, J. (2015). Composition is Not Research. *Tempo*, 69(272), 6-11. doi:10.1017/S0040298214000989
- (2017). Intervention: on working alone. In E. Clarke & M. Doffman (Eds.), *Distributed Creativity*: Oxford University Press.
- CROW, G., HOLMWOOD, J., WOODTHORPE, K., BENTO, K., DOIDGE, M., & LAIDLAW, M. (2021). Academic Careers: past, present, future. Paper presented at the British Sociological Association Annual Conference: Remaking the Future, Online.
- DAHLHAUS, C. (1982). *Aesthetics of music*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DEEHOUSE, D. L., & SUCHMAN, M. (2008). Legitimacy in Organizational Institutionalism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 49-77). London: SAGE.
- DERRIDA, J. (1981). *Dissemination* (B. Johnson, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1997). *Of grammatology* (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- DIMAGGIO, P. J., & POWELL, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147-160.
- DOCHERTY, T. (2011). *For the University: Democracy and the Future of the Institution*: A&C Black.
- (2015). *Universities at War*. California: SAGE

- DOĞANTAN-DACK, M. (2015). *Artistic practice as research in music: theory, criticism, practice*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- DOMINIC, L. (2011). Derek Bailey's Practice/Practise. *Perspectives of New Music*, 49(1), 143-171. doi:10.7757/persnewmusi.49.1.0143
- EL-GHADBAN, Y. (2009). Facing the music: Rituals of belonging and recognition in contemporary Western art music. *American Ethnologist*, 36(1), 140-160. doi: 10.1111/j.1548-1425.2008.01105.x
- ELENA, P. (2014). Academic Research and Artistic Practice in Chain Reaction: methodology on two levels. *InFormation: Nordic Journal of Art and Research*, 3(1). doi:10.7577/if.v3i1.940
- FANGHANEL, J. (2012). *Being an Academic*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- FELLS, N. (2015). *Composition as Research Post-REF*. Paper presented at the Practice as Research Symposium. <https://www.rma.ac.uk/news/2015-practice-as-research-NF.pdf> (accessed 16/11/17)
- FESTINGER, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson.
- (1962). Cognitive Dissonance. *Scientific American*, 207(4), 93-106.
- FINE, G. A. (2018). *Talking art: The culture of practice and the practice of culture in MFA education*: University of Chicago Press.
- FINEBERG, J. (2013). *Classical music, why bother?: hearing the world of contemporary culture through a composer's ears*. New York: Routledge.
- FINNEGAN, R. H. (1989). *The hidden musicians: music-making in an English town*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FOUCAULT, M. (1979). *Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison*. New York: Vintage Books.
- (1986). Of Other Spaces. *Diacritics*, 16(1), 22-27.
- FREIRE, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- GEERTZ, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays*. New York: Basic Books.
- GELL, A. (1998). *Art and Agency: an anthropological theory*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- GELLERT, C. (1993). Academic Drift and Blurring of Boundaries in Systems of Higher Education. *Higher Education in Europe*, 18(2), 78-84. doi:10.1080/0379772930180206
- GIDDENS, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Stanford : Stanford University Press.
- GOEHR, L. (1992). *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: an essay in the philosophy of music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- GOLDING, R. (2013). *Music and Academia in Victorian Britain*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- GOTTSCHALK, J. (2016). *Experimental music since 1970*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing
- GRAHAM, G. (2002). *Universities: the recovery of an idea*. Thorverton: Imprint Academic.
- GREENWOOD, R., OLIVER, C., SAHLIN, K., & SUDDABY, R. (2008). Introduction. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 1-46). London: SAGE.
- HALL, R. (2018). On the Alienation of Academic Labour and the Possibilities for Mass Intellectuality. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*, 16(1), 97-113. doi:10.31269/triplec.v16i1.873
- HALLETT, T. (2010). The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, and Inhabited Institutions in an Urban Elementary School. *American Sociological Review*, 75(1), 52-74. doi:10.1177/0003122409357044
- HANSEN, P., & BARTON, B. (2009). Research-Based Practice: situating vertical city between artistic development and applied cognitive science. *The Drama Review*, 53(4), 120-136. doi:10.1162/dram.2009.53.4.120
- HARWOOD, J. (2010). Understanding Academic Drift: on the institutional dynamics of higher technical and professional education. *Minerva*, 48(4), 413-427.
- HAYDEN, S., & WINDSOR, L. (2007). Collaboration and the Composer: case studies from the end of the 20th century. *Tempo*, 61(240), 28-39.

- HELLAWELL, P. (2014). Treating Composers as Researchers is Bonkers. *Standpoint*. Retrieved from <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5539/full> (accessed 16/11/17)
- HESA. (2019). What are their employment conditions? Retrieved from <https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/staff/employment-conditions> (accessed 29/07/2021)
- HILL, J. (2009). The Influence of Conservatory Folk Music Programmes: the sibelius academy in comparative context. *Ethnomusicology Forum*, 18(2), 207-241. doi:10.1080/17411910903141882
- HON, A. H. Y. (2012). Shaping Environments Conducive to Creativity: the role of intrinsic motivation. *Cornell Hospitality Quarterly*, 53(1), 53-64. doi:10.1177/1938965511424725
- HUMBOLDT, W. v. (2018). On the Spirit and the Organisational Framework of Intellectual Institutions in Berlin. In M. Peters & R. Barnett (Eds.), *The Idea of the University: a reader* (Vol. 1, pp. 45-55). Oxford: Peter Lang.
- IMMERGUT, E. M. (1998). The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism. *Politics & Society*, 26(1), 5-34. doi:10.1177/0032329298026001002
- KANT, I. (1979). *The Conflict of the Faculties*. New York: Abaris Books.
- KEEGAN-PHIPPS, S. (2007). Deja Vu? Folk Music, Education, and Institutionalization in Contemporary England. *Yearbook for Traditional Music*, 39, 84-107.
- (2009). Folk for Art's Sake: English Folk Music in the Mainstream Milieu. *Radical Musicology*, 4.
- KEYTON, J., & SMITH, F. (2006). Conflicts Over Creative Control: power struggle on prime time television. In J. Lampel & J. Shamsie (Eds.), *The Business of Culture: Strategic Perspectives on Entertainment and Media* (pp. 27-40). Mahwah, New Jersey: Psychology Press.
- KINGSBURY, H. (1988). *Music, Talent, and Performance: a conservatory cultural system*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- LANDY, L. (1994). The "something to hold on to factor" in Timbral Composition, *Contemporary Music Review*, 10(2), pp. 49-60.
- (2006). Why Haven't I Written About the Pieces Played at ICMC? *Array: the journal of the International Computer Music Association* (Winter).
- (2007). Understanding the art of sound organization: Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- (2019). Editorial: Bringing New Music to New Audiences. *Organised Sound*, 24(3), 225-227. doi:10.1017/S1355771819000293
- LAWRENCE, T., SUDDABY, R., & LECA, B. (2011). Institutional Work: Refocusing Institutional Studies of Organization. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 20(1), 52-58. doi:10.1177/1056492610387222
- LEVITAS, R. (2013). *Utopia as Method: the imaginary reconstitution of society*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- LINDSAY, D. M. (2010). Organizational Liminality and Interstitial Creativity: the fellowship of power. *Social Forces*, 89(1), 163-184. doi:10.1353/sof.2010.0068
- LOPES, P. (2000). Pierre Bourdieu's Fields of Cultural Production: a case study of modern jazz. In N. Brown & I. Szeman (Eds.), *Pierre Bourdieu: fieldwork in culture* (pp. 165-185). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- LYOTARD, J.F. (1984). *The Postmodern Condition: a report on knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MACARTHUR, S. (2010). Women, new music and the composition of becomings. *Cultural Studies Review*, 16(2), 248-270.
- (2014). The woman composer, new music and neoliberalism. *Musicology Australia*, 36(1), 36-52.

- MALCOMSON, H. (2013). Composing Individuals: Ethnographic Reflections on Success and Prestige in the British New Music Network. *Twentieth-Century Music*, 10(1), 115-136. doi:10.1017/S1478572212000436
- MANNING, P. (2013). *Electronic and computer music* (Fourth edition. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- MARTIN, B. (2002). *Avant rock: experimental music from the Beatles to Björk*: Open Court.
- MARX, K. (2005). Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. In J. Cohen (Ed.), *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-1844* (pp. 229-346). New York: International Publishers [Alexander Street Press].
- MCANDREW, S., & EVERETT, M. (2014). Music as Collective Invention: A Social Network Analysis of Composers. *Cultural Sociology*, 9(1), 56-80. doi:10.1177/1749975514542486
- MCCLARY, S. (1989). Terminal Prestige: The Case of Avant-Garde Music Composition. *Cultural Critique*(12), 57-81. doi:10.2307/1354322
- MEYER, J. W., & ROWAN, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340-363.
- MEYER, M. W., & BROWN, M. C. (1977). The Process of Bureaucratization. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 364-385.
- MICELOTTA, E., LOUNSBURY, M., & GREENWOOD, R. (2017). Pathways of Institutional Change: An Integrative Review and Research Agenda. *Journal of Management*, 43(6), 1885-1910. doi:10.1177/0149206317699522
- MILLER, J. A. (1987). Jeremy Bentham's Panoptic Device. *October*, 41, 3-29. doi:10.2307/778327
- MOLESWORTH, M., NIXON, E., & SCULLION, R. (2009). Having, being and higher education: the marketisation of the university and the transformation of the student into consumer. *Teaching in Higher Education*, 14(3), 277-287. doi:10.1080/13562510902898841
- NASH, D. (1961a). The Role of the Composer (Part I). *Ethnomusicology*, 5(2), 81-94. doi:10.2307/924322
- . (1961b). The Role of the Composer (Part II). *Ethnomusicology*, 5(3), 187-201. doi:10.2307/924519
- (1957). The Socialization of an Artist: The American Composer. *Social Forces*, 35(4), 307-313. doi:10.2307/2573318
- Nederlands Overheid. (2010). Deelregeling individuele subsidies van het Nederlands Fonds voor Podiumkunsten. Retrieved from <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024590/2008-10-10/0/Circulaire.divisie2#Circulaire.divisie18> (accessed 26/07/21)
- NETTL, B. (1995). *Heartland excursions : ethnomusicological reflections on schools of music*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- NEWMAN, J. H. (1976). *The Idea of a University: Defined and Illustrated*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- OLIVANT, K. F. (2015). "I Am Not a Format": Teachers' Experiences With Fostering Creativity in the Era of Accountability. *Journal of Research in Childhood Education*, 29(1), 115-129. doi:10.1080/02568543.2014.978920
- OUELLET, M., & MARTIN, É. (2018). University Transformations and the New Knowledge Production Regime in Informational Capitalism. *tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*, 16(1), 78-96. doi:10.31269/triplec.v16i1.875
- PACE, I. (2016). Composition and Performance Can Be, and Often Have Been, Research. *Tempo*, 70(275), 60-70. doi:10.1017/S0040298215000637
- . (2021). Social Media Post. Retrieved from <https://twitter.com/ianpacemain/status/1355863091301543939> (01/02/21)
- PADDISON, M. (1982). The Critique Criticised: Adorno and Popular Music. *Popular Music*, 2, 201-218.

- PARSONS, T. (1969). The Ideal Type and Generalized Analytical Theory. In R. E. Rogers (Ed.), *Max Weber's ideal type theory* (pp. 56-85). New York: Philosophical Library.
- PETERS, M., & BARNETT, R. (2018). Introduction: the very idea of the university. In M. Peters & R. Barnett (Eds.), *The Idea of the University: a reader* (Vol. 1, pp. xiii-xxxiii). Oxford: Peter Lang.
- PLATO. (2005). Phaedrus (C. Rowe, Trans.). London: Penguin.
- POGGIOLI, R. (1968). *The theory of the avant-garde*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- REEVES, C. (2016). Composition, Research and Pseudo-Science: a response to John Croft. *Tempo*, 70(275), 50-59. doi:10.1017/S0040298215000625
- RESEARCH EXCELLENCE FRAMEWORK. (2012). *Panel Criteria and Working Methods*. Retrieved from https://www.ref.ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/pub/panelcriteriaandworkingmethods/01_12.pdf (accessed 23/01/21)
- (2015). *Overview report by Main Panel D and Sub-panels 27 to 36*. Retrieved from <https://www.ref.ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/expanel/member/Main%20Panel%20D%20overview%20report.pdf> (24/01/2021)
- REYNOLDS, M., & TREHAN, K. (2000). Assessment: A critical perspective. *Studies in Higher Education*, 25(3), 267-278. doi:10.1080/03075070050193406
- RICHARDSON, J. T. E., SLATER, J. B., & WILSON, J. (2007). The National Student Survey: development, findings and implications. *Studies in Higher Education*, 32(5), 557-580. doi:10.1080/03075070701573757
- RIEFF, P. (1969). *On intellectuals: theoretical studies, case studies*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
- RITCHEY, M. (2019). *Composing capital: classical music in the neoliberal era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ROBINSON, K. (2011). *Out of our minds: learning to be creative* (Fully rev. and updated ed.). Chichester: Capstone Publishing Ltd.
- ROGERS, R. E. (1969). *Max Weber's ideal type theory*. New York : Philosophical Library.
- ROSS, A. (2013). Women, Gays and Classical Music. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/women-gays-and-classical-music> (accessed 30/07/20)
- RÜEGG, W. (1992). Themes. In H. d. Ridder-Symoens (Ed.), *Universities in the Middle Ages* (pp. 3-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2004). Themes. In W. Rüegg (Ed.), *Universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries* (pp. 3-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SABRI, D. (2013). Student Evaluations of Teaching as 'Fact-Totems': The Case of the UK National Student Survey. *Sociological Research Online*, 18(4), 148-157. doi:10.5153/sro.3136
- SAID, E. (2018). On the University. In M. Peters & R. Barnett (Eds.), *The Idea of the University: a reader* (Vol. 1, pp. 636-645). Oxford: Peter Lang.
- SANSOM, M. (2001). Imaging Music: Abstract Expressionism and Free Improvisation. *Leonardo Music Journal*, 11, 29-34. doi:10.1162/09611210152780647
- SAUNDERS, J., & LIMBRICK, S. (2017). Intervention: Surfaces. In *Distributed Creativity*: Oxford University Press.
- SCHELLING, F. W. J. (2018). The Scientific and Moral Functions of Universities. In M. Peters & R. Barnett (Eds.), *The Idea of the University: a reader* (Vol. 1, pp. 33-44). Oxford: Peter Lang.
- SEGADY, T. W. (2014). The Utility of Weber's Ideal Type: Verstehen and the Theory of Critical Mass. *Sociological Spectrum*, 34(4), 354-361. doi:10.1080/02732173.2014.917249
- SELLGREN, K. (2021). Plan for campus free speech post prompts autonomy warning. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-55995979> (accessed 28/02/2021)
- SEO, M.-G., & CREED, W. E. D. (2002). Institutional Contradictions, Praxis, and Institutional Change: A Dialectical Perspective. *The Academy of Management Review*, 27(2), 222-247. doi:10.2307/4134353

- SERRANO, M. M., O'BRIEN, M., ROBERTS, K., & WHYTE, D. (2017). Critical Pedagogy and assessment in higher education: The ideal of 'authenticity' in learning. *Active Learning in Higher Education*, 19(1), 9-21. doi:10.1177/1469787417723244
- SHAPIRO, R., & HEINICH, N. (2012). When is Artification? *Contemporary Aesthetics, Special Volume*(4).
- SHATTOCK, M. (1996). *The creation of a university system*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- SHELEMAY, K. K. (2011). Musical Communities: Rethinking the Collective in Music. *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 64(2), 349-390. doi:10.1525/jams.2011.64.2.349
- SHELTING, A. V. (1969). "Idealtypus". In R. E. Rogers (Ed.), *Max Weber's ideal type theory* (pp. 45-55). New York: Philosophical Library.
- SHORE, C. (2021). *Tackling corruption in the university: fraud prevention, market making and the Big Four*. Paper presented at the Centre for Global Higher Education Webinar Series, Online.
- SHORE, C., & ROBERTS, S. (1993). *Higher Education and the Panopticon Paradigm: Quality Assessment as "Disciplinary Technology"*. Paper presented at the Society for Research into Higher Education Conference, Brighton.
<https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED368243.pdf> (accessed 23/02/20)
- SICILIANO, M. L. (2021). Creative Control. In *Creative Control*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- SIDORKIN, A. M. (2016). Campbell's Law and the Ethics of Immensurability. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 35(4), 321-332. doi:10.1007/s11217-015-9482-3
- SLAUGHTER, S., & CANTWELL, B. (2018). The Idea of the University: contemporary perspectives. In M. Peters & R. Barnett (Eds.), *Global Studies in Education* (Vol. 2, pp. 55-77). Oxford: Peter Lang.
- SMITH, N. T., & THWAITES, R. (2018). Narratives of Originality in Competitive Composition Opportunities for 'Emerging Composers'. *Tempo*, 72(283), 45-55.
doi:10.1017/S0040298217000936
- (2019). The composition of precarity: 'emerging' composers' experiences of opportunity culture in contemporary classical music. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 70(2), 589-609. doi:10.1111/1468-4446.12359
- SOUND AND MUSIC. (2015). *Composer Commissioning Data*. Retrieved from:
<https://soundandmusic.org/2015-composers-commissioning-survey> (accessed 29/01/20)
- STERN, N. (2016). *Building on Success and Learning from Experience: An Independent Review of the Research Excellence Framework*. Retrieved from
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/541338/ind-16-9-ref-stern-review.pdf (accessed 23/01/21)
- STIEGLER, B. (2010). Memory. In W. Mitchell & M. Hansen (Eds.), *Critical Terms for Media Studies* (pp. 64-87). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- SWEDBERG, R. (2017). How to Use Max Weber's Ideal Type in Sociological Analysis. *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 18(3), 181-196. doi:10.1177/1468795X17743643
- TALBOT, M. (2000). The Work-Concept and Composer-Centredness. In M. Talbot (Ed.), *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?* (pp. 168-186). Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- THE HALLÉ. (Undated). Board and Staff. Retrieved from <https://www.halle.co.uk/about-us/board-and-staff/> (accessed 20/11/20)
- THIEL, J. (2019). The UK National Student Survey: An amalgam of discipline and neo-liberal governmentality. *British Educational Research Journal*, 45(3), 538-553.
doi:10.1002/berj.3512
- (2020). Student Feedback Apparatuses in Higher Education: an agential realist analysis. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 41(3), 471-483.
doi:10.1080/01596306.2018.1494544

- THORNTON, P. H., & OCASIO, W. (2008). Institutional Logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 99-129). London: SAGE.
- THORNTON, P. H., OCASIO, W., & LOUNSBURY, M. (2015). The institutional logics perspective. In R. A. Scott & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), *Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences* (pp. 1-22).
- TIGHT, M. (2011). How many universities are there in the United Kingdom? How many should there be? *Higher Education*, 62(5), 649. doi:10.1007/s10734-011-9411-5
- TILCSIK, A. (2010). From Ritual to Reality: Demography, Ideology, and Decoupling in a Post-Communist Government Agency. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 53(6), 1474-1498.
- TORRANCE, H. (2020). The Research Excellence Framework in the United Kingdom: Processes, Consequences, and Incentives to Engage. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 26(7), 771-779. doi:10.1177/1077800419878748
- TRIFONAS, P. P. (2018). Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 50 years. *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies*, 40(5), 367-370. doi:10.1080/10714413.2019.1570789
- TSIOULCAS, A. (2013). What Is Classical Music's Women Problem? Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/sections/deceptivecadence/2013/10/09/230751348/what-is-classical-musics-women-problem?t=1596089956903> (accessed 20/07/20)
- TURNER, V. (1974). Liminal to Liminoid, in Play, Flow, and Ritual: an essay in comparative symbology. *Rice Institute Pamphlet-Rice University Studies*, 60(3).
- (2017 [1969]). *The ritual process: structure and anti-structure*. New York: Routledge.
- VOSTAL, F. (2015). Academic life in the fast lane: The experience of time and speed in British academia. *Time & Society*, 24(1), 71-95. doi:10.1177/0961463x13517537
- WAGNER, G., & HÄRPFER, C. (2014). On the Very Idea of an Ideal Type. 5(9). doi:10.13128/SMP-14492
- Weber, M. (1947). *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press.
- (1949). *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. New York: The Free Press.
- (2002). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells. In: New York: Penguin.
- WELS, H., VAN DER WAAL, K., SPIEGEL, A., & KAMSTEEG, F. (2011). Victor Turner and liminality: An introduction. *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 34(1-2), 1-4. doi:10.1080/23323256.2011.11500002
- WILLIAMS, J. (2013). *Consuming Higher Education: why learning can't be bought*. London: Bloomsbury.
- WISHART, T. (2008). Globally Speaking. *Organised Sound*, 13(2), 137-140. doi:10.1017/S1355771808000174
- WOODS, P. J. (2019). Conceptions of teaching in and through noise: a study of experimental musicians' beliefs. *Music Education Research*, 21(4), 459-468. doi:10.1080/14613808.2019.1611753
- WOOTEN, M., & HOFFMAN, A. J. (2008). Organizational Fields: Past, Present and Future. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 130-147). London: SAGE.
- YLIJOKI, O.H., & MÄNTYLÄ, H. (2003). Conflicting Time Perspectives in Academic Work. *Time & Society*, 12(1), 55-78. doi:10.1177/0961463X03012001364

Interviews

This list details all of the composers interviewed who wished to be acknowledged by name. I am equally indebted to all those who contributed anonymously to this research.

The universities listed here are the universities at which these composers were working (or at which they had most recently worked) at the time of the interviews.

ACKERLEY, PAUL. University of Chichester

ANDEAN, JAMES. De Montfort University

AVEYARD, JON. University of Central

Lancashire

BATEMAN, RALPH. York St John University

BATTEY, BRET. De Montfort University

BEST, CHRIS. Falmouth University

BLACKBURN, MANUELLA. Liverpool Hope

University

BRISSENDEN, PHIL. University of Salford

CASSIDY, AARON. University of Huddersfield

COLLINS, NICK. Durham University

DWYER, BENJAMIN. Middlesex University

EDMONDES, WILLIAM. Newcastle University

EGAN, ERIC. Durham University

EMMERSON, SIMON. De Montfort University

FOX, CHRISTOPHER. Brunel University

GHIKAS, PANOS. Canterbury Christ Church

University

GRANGE, PHILIP. University of Manchester

HARA CAWKWELL, YUMI. University of East

London

HARKER, ALEX. University of Huddersfield

HAWORTH, CHRISTOPHER. University of

Birmingham

HOLLOWAY, ROBIN. University of Cambridge

HUGILL, ANDREW. University of Leicester

IDDON, MARTIN. University of Leeds

INGLIS, BRIAN. Middlesex University

KEELEY, ROBERT. King's College, London

LANDY, LEIGH. De Montfort University

LANE, LIZ. University of the West of England

MALTBY, ETHAN. Canterbury Christ Church

University

MARSH, ROGER. University of York

MCLAUGHLIN, SCOTT. University of Leeds

MELEN, CHRISTOPHER. University of

Huddersfield

MOORE, ADRIAN. University of Sheffield

NICHOLSON, GEORGE. University of Sheffield

PICKARD, JOHN. University of Bristol

REDHEAD, LAUREN. Goldsmiths

REEVES, CAMDEN. University of Manchester

REUBEN, FEDERICO. University of York

RIJNVOS, RICHARD. Durham University

SAUNDERS, JAMES. Bath Spa University

STANOVIĆ, ADAM. University of Sheffield

STAVROPOULOS, NIKOS. Leeds Beckett

University

TUROWSKI, PAUL. University of Liverpool

VAUGHAN, MIKE. Keele University

WATTS, TIM. University of Cambridge

WHALLEY, J. HARRY. University for the

Creative Arts

WHALLEY, RICHARD. University of

Manchester

ZEV GORDON, MICHAEL. University of

Birmingham