Focus Structures in Mùwe Ké: Grammatical Category or Much Ado About Nothing?

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the information-structural notion of focus through the morphosyntax of focus structures in Mùwe Ké, a Tibeto-Burman language of Mugu, Nepal with roughly five thousand speakers. The focus structures mainly involve the obligatory focus marking of actors with the otherwise-optional ergative marker -*gane* and a preferred immediately preverbal focus position for focussed terms, both of which are shown to correlate with the notion of focus. This is a common finding for Tibeto-Burman languages since the expression of information structure in the language family has previously been associated with differential case marking, topic and focus marking, word order and the positioning of salient terms. However, in recent years, the very notion of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category has been debated.

The research and analyses presented are based on a corpus of field data collected over three years in Nepal and a grammatical sketch of Mùwe Ké is provided first. Following a discussion on the theoretical approaches and notions that are adopted, a description of focus structures in the language is offered and the manifestations of focus are listed. Subsequently, focus as a category is questioned and an alternative approach is outlined using Cognitive Grammar as the theoretical framework to show the underlying processes that are associated with information update. The reanalysis fails to find evidence for a category of focus in the language due to the lack of any clearly identifiable content or a one-to-one correlation between differential ergative making, the preverbal position and focus. It does, however, show varying interpretative strategies, or focal effects, that may be associated with information structure and which overlap with the notion of focus.

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Abbreviations

A	Transitive subject		INTENS	Intensifier
ABL	Ablative		IPFV	Imperfective
ABS	Absolutive		JUSS	Jussive
ADJ	Adjective		LOC	Locative
ART	Article		M	Masculine
ASSERT	Assertive evidential		N	Noun
ASSOC	Associative		NEG	Negative
CMPR	Comparative connective		NMLS	Nominaliser
CONN	Connective		O	Transitive object
COND	Conditional		P	Transitive patient object
CONJ	Conjunct		PFV	Perfective
CONT	Control		PL	Plural
DAT	Dative		POSS	Possessive
DEDUC	Deductive		POSSBL	Possibility mood particle
DEF	Definite		PRF	Perfect
DEM	Demonstrative		PST	Past
DISJ	Disjunct		PTCL	Particle
EMPH	Emphatic marker		Q	Interrogative
ERG	Ergative		QUANT	Quantifier
ESSE	Essential		QUOT	Quotative
EVID	Evidential		REDUP	Reduplication
EXCL	Exclusive		REVEL	Revelatory
EXIST	Existential		S	Intransitive subject
F	Feminine		SG	Singular
FOC	focus marker		SPEC	Particle of specificity
FUT	Future		TES	Testimonial evidential
GEN	Genitive		TOP	topic marker
H	Honourific		V	Verb
HYPO	Hypothetical mood particle		VOL	Volitional
IMP	Imperative		VSR	Verbaliser
INCL	Inclusive		1	First person
INDEF	Indefinite		2	Second person
INS	Instrumental		3	Third person

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Introduction

This thesis explores the information-structural notion of focus in Mùwe Ké, a Tibeto-Burman (TB) language of Nepal. Based on two years of fieldwork, the study presents a grammar sketch and a description of focus structures in the previously undescribed language before questioning the very existence of a cross-linguistic category 'focus' and reanalysing the presumed focus structures through the framework of Cognitive Grammar to show the underlying processes that may be associated with information update.

This introductory chapter provides the reader with the background that forms the basis of subsequent chapters. Research goals and questions are presented first in §1.1. A background to the Mùwe Ké language, it's location and sociolinguistic context is given in §1.2. §1.3 gives an overview of the methods of data collection and the tasks undertaken and §1.4 offers an outline of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Research Goals and Questions

Since Mùwe Ké was mostly a previously undescribed language the first research goal is to provide a grammar of the language, which will be of use to the linguistic as well as the language community and provide a base for the subsequent research presented here.

The second research goal is to provide a detailed description of information structure (IS) in Mùwe Ké. IS is essentially information packaging, a term first introduced by Chafe (1976), who looked at exactly *how* a message is packaged and sent between interlocutors, according to the content of the message itself. At the moment of speaking, one must take into account perceived knowledge and assumptions of ongoing thought present in an addressee's mind so as to tailor the message accordingly. We all have the capacity to store vast amounts of knowledge in our minds; however, our certain temporary state at any specific time changes in relation to that knowledge and therefore sentences are structured to accommodate the

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immediate (Chafe 1976: 27–8). When speaking, we are aware of the preceding conversation and this allows us to easily use, say, anaphoric devices such as pronouns. We are also aware of the assertions of new information that we impart in regard to the subject at hand, which is arguably the primary goal of communication. How we structure or package these different information blocks into a sentence to optimally convey a message as precisely as possible at a specific moment in time is IS.

As with all things information-structural, there is no one theory or consensus found for the content of IS or its place in grammar. The first to use the now common term 'information structure' was Halliday (1967a; 1967b; 1968), who looked at information units structured by prosody in English and talked of focus as being that which is not able to be recovered from preceding discourse (1967b: 204). Chafe (1976), like the others before him, divided information into given (old) and new: that which the speaker believes is in the mind of her interlocutor at the time and that which the speaker believes she is introducing (1976: 30). Indeed Clark and Haviland (1977) talk of a 'given-new contract' where a speaker must make a syntactic distinction between old/given and new information. The notion of givenness given by Chafe was of particular interest to Prince (1981) and Lambrecht (1994), both of whom proposed rather detailed givenness hierarchies.

Since the early eighties there has been a huge surge of interest in and research into IS, bringing a myriad of premises, proposals and thought. Rooth (1985; 1992) proposed a theory of alternative semantics, where the assigning of focus to a linguistic expression α specifies the existence of alternatives to α that are relevant to the ongoing discourse. Vallduví (1990; 1994) took information packaging to consist of 'instructions' from the speaker to direct the interlocutor to the information encoded within the utterance to retrieve it and store it optimally in their knowledge-store. Lambrecht (1994) proposed to understand IS as a component in which conventions and rules of grammar govern the relationship between formal sentence structure and the assumptions of a speaker regarding their interlocutor's consciousness and knowledge state at the time of speaking. Erteschik-Shir (1997) introduced the notion of 'focus structure' as characterising structural descriptions that are annotated for both topic and focus constituents and investigated its role in grammar, looking at the interface between syntax and focus structure, its semantics and its associated intonation.

Coming into the twenty-first century, Krifka and others (Krifka 2007; 2008; Féry et al. 2007; Féry & Krifka 2008; Krifka & Musan 2012a; 2012b) have sought to give very clear definitions

for the concepts found in the study of IS: topic, focus, common ground, givenness etc., breaking each down into visibly defined types through clear arguments based on the existing literature. Indeed, the wide variety of work on IS can seem *too* varied and it is the Oxford Handbook of Information Structure (OHIS) (Féry & Ishihara 2016a) that attempts to bring the numerous volumes of work together, describing the state of the art and providing clear definitions for the various notions, following, principally, Krifka's (2008) definitions.

However, IS and its related notions are not without challenge; central to this thesis, the notion of focus as a cross-linguistic grammatical category that is sure to manifest through different structural means from language to language has been strongly criticised, starting with the seminal paper of Matić and Wedgewood (2013), who argue that the traditional conception of focus is theoretically and empirically unsustainable due to its failure to comply with the conditions required for a cross-linguistic category, which in turn are the result of poor definitions in the literature, taking focus outwardly as a putatively primitive notion and the positing of a category using identical vocabulary in both the definition of a basic theoretical entity and the description of superficial effects alike.

Research into IS notions is not discouraged, however, but rather Matić and Wedgewood (2013) advocate that focus may instead become a heuristic tool with which to investigate underlying processes that have IS reflexes and relate to the update of information in discourse. It is suggested that research should instead be looking at the deeper cognitive processes involved, at speaker intention, context, and interpretive effects, entrenched patterns and their common cognitive bases, and the interactional management of knowledge and attention.

Furthering this argument and suggestion for future research, Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) look at verum focus, traditionally referring to focus on the truth value of an utterance, putting forward that instead of identifying linguistic structures and lumping them into a 'category', an interpretational account where interlocutors draw attention towards the truth value of a proposition through varying inferential mechanisms is preferable.

Following these two papers, Ozerov (2018) suggests a framework based on a bottom-up approach, analysing the heterogeneous devices employed in the creation of dynamic and interactional structuring of information that is found in natural discourse. IS phenomena are taken as epiphenomenal effects of disparate linguistic devices, related to a range of intersubjective and interactional discourse-structuring aspects of communication and language.

The third research goal, therefore, is to investigate these factors and while no attempt is made at cross-linguistic comparison, Mùwe Ké makes a good case-study language due to the claim that TB languages exhibit a range of devices for IS.

IS has been shown to be expressed through differential argument marking (DAM) in Tibetan (DeLancey 2011; Tournadre 1991; Saxena 1990), TB as a whole (LaPolla 1995; Chelliah & Hyslop 2011) and two languages of Nagaland, northeast India (Coupe 2011); word order and positioning in Qiang (LaPolla & Huang 2003), Yongning Na (Michaud & Brunelle 2016; Lidz 2010) and Belhare (Bickel 2003a); topic and focus marking in Tamang (Mazaudon 2003), Khumi (Peterson 2011) and Sumi (Teo 2012); and prosody, also in Yongning Na.

The subsequent research goal, therefore, is to analyse the focus structures initially discovered using standardly applied methodology through the Questionnaire on Information Structure (QUIS) (Skopeteas et al. 2006), taking into account the recommendations for IS-related analysis and through the coherent conceptual framework of Cognitive Grammar.

The research address three main questions, essentially after three papers representing the contrary position to focus as a category:

- **Is 'focus' a grammatical category that is manifested in Mùwe Ké through specific morphosyntactic strategies?**

The main morphosyntactic strategies for encoding that which can be routinely defined as 'focus' in Mùwe Ké are found to be the differential use of ergative -*gane* marking on focussed actors and a dedicated immediately preverbal position for focussed terms, including those which contrast with a constituent in a previous sentence. These strategies have been discussed in some detail in previous literature; however, this thesis provides a more elaborate description and shows that there is no one-to-one correlation between these strategies and the notion of focus. This leads to the second research question.

- **What are the overall and primitive functions of -*gane* marking and word ordering?**

If, as found, -*gane* and the special preverbal position are not simply manifestations of the category of focus, then their base and overall functions warrant investigation in all attested uses to show why they fit so well in specifically IS contexts. In analysing these issues, I will

primarily rely on the approach advocated by Ozerov (2018), who proposes a framework of a bottom-up approach that analyses heterogeneous devices used to create dynamic and interactional structuring of information found in natural discourse, and that takes IS phenomena as epiphenomenal effects of disparate linguistic devices, related to a wide array of intersubjective and interactional discourse-structuring aspects of language and communication.

- **Is verum a distinct denotation contributed by dedicated grammatical structures?**

So-called verum focus conveys focus on the truth value of an utterance (§3.3.4). Across language, respective structures are found to be prosodic, morphological or syntactic. In Mùwe Ké they involve heavy prosodic stress, repetition of the verb string and a special VERB-CONN VERB (*V-na V*) construction. However, Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) argue against analyses of verum focus that lump identified linguistic structures into a category assuming the association of the category with a discrete denotation that is factored by the appropriate grammatical structure and promote instead an interpretational account that looks at 'salient polarity' and the meanings that interlocutors arrive at through inference while attempting to draw attention towards a proposition's truth value.

In sum, I will argue that there is no current evidence for focus as a category in Mùwe Ké grammar. Instead, it is possible to discuss various interpretive strategies, which I label 'focal effects', that are not dedicated to the realisation of focus but which regularly have the effect of focussing. It is also my aim that this investigation will feed into more general discussions about the status of focus as a universal cross-linguistic category.

1.2   Background to the Mùwe Ké Language

This section presents the context of the language including its genetic affiliation.

Figure 1. Locations where Mùwe Ké is spoken

The TB language of Mùwe Ké (aka Mugom, Mugali) is spoken in the Karnali Zone of Mid-Western Nepal, originally in Mugu village (29°43'40.81"N, 82°30'53.10"E) in the north of Mugu District. The village's long-standing status as a trading post between Tibet to the north and Nepali districts to the south gave rise to the name *Yul Mugum Tshongdui*[1] 'Mugu Village Trading Post', which remains to this day, along with the shorter and more common *Mùm*. There are also communities of Mùwe Ké speakers in Jumla, the district to the south; in the Kathmandu valley; and in Manali, Himachal Pradesh, India.

The geographical location of Mugu village is still very remote, reached only by a three day walk from Gamgadhi, the district headquarters, that can be reached by road or air. This has led to a high level of language retention (van Driem 2001: 857) and even now older members of the community may only have a limited knowledge of Nepali and indeed still refer to leaving the village as 'going to Nepal'.

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[1] *jùl   mùgum   tshóŋdui*
  village   Mugu   business.centre
  'Mugu Village Trading Post'

That is not to say that the Mùwa consider themselves Tibetan but rather of Tibetan origin. The village being established over eight hundred years ago has allowed sufficient time for the language to significantly diverge from Central Tibetan. In fact, Driem (2001) warrants Mùwe Ké as being considered a distinct language due to the negligibly small level of mutual intelligibility between the two.

The number of speakers of Mùwe Ké is difficult to ascertain. The community consistently reports a number of 5,000 while Driem (2001) estimates 3,600 and the SIL 2006 report on ethnologue.com gives 7,000, although this includes speakers of Karmarong, a related dialect. The 2011 Nepali census unfortunately gives no individual statistic for either caste/ethnicity or mother tongue for the community.

The retention of language and culture that isolation afforded is now changing, however. Many younger Mùwa live in Jumla or Kathmandu for work or education and the economic advantage that the yartsagunbu[2] harvest has given the community means that most families have a second home in Jumla, the district to the south, or Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, and almost everyone leaves the highlands of Mugu during the five coldest months of the year. While Nepali is always used for official and governmental functions, there is wide range of use of Mùwe Ké in the village; although, use is logically reduced when living outside. This integration into the wider Nepali society is driving a rapid language shift, especially in the new generation, who speak either a Nepali-Mùwe Ké hybrid in places like Jumla or precious little Mùwe Ké in Kathmandu.

There is currently no written form of the language and the texts that are used for religious practice, like the rituals themselves, are in Tibetan. Therefore, most older Mùwa are able to read and write the Tibetan script and, due to being educated in Nepali or English medium schools, the younger generation read and write Nepali.

Geographically, the language, like the village, is somewhat isolated. Immediately to the south of Mugu village live the Karmarong, who speak a very closely related mutually-intelligible

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[2] Since AD 2000, fortunes have changed with the collecting of yartsagunbu (lit. summer-grass winter-insect), or caterpillar fungus (*ophiocordyceps sinensis*), found in high ground near the village, made up of a fungus that grows on a caterpillar and used as traditional Chinese medicine and a herbal remedy, fetching many thousands of US dollars per kilo.

dialect to Mùwe Ké, which is used in the villages east of Gamgadhi along the Karnali River as far as the border with the neighbouring Dolpa district. In the surrounding villages and districts, local dialects of Nepali are spoken, Khas Bhasa being the example from Mugu district and Jumla. Bordering Mugu to the west is the district of Humla, where the Limirong Tibetans are found, who speak a Central Tibetan dialect and similarly, to the east is the district of Dolpa, where Dolpo is spoken.

Genetically, Mùwe Ké has long been classed as a Central Bodish language after Shafer (1955) and Driem (2001: 831; 2007: 335). The name Bodish is used for the TB branch that contains Tibetan and its most closely affiliated languages (van Driem 2001: 828) and appears to be connected to the West Himalayish and Tamangic groups by "shared geographical provenance, intimate genetic association and shared prehistorical contact situations." (2001: 826). Quite how closely related Mùwe Ké is to other cis-Himalayan Tibetan dialects in Nepal, such as Limirong and Dolpo, is unknown as most of these have yet to be studied or at best have only been the subject of cursory investigation (2001: 856). Noonan (2005) groups Mugu/Mugal under 'Tibetan Complex' while Genetti (2016: 139) groups Mugu(m) under Central Tibetan after Beilmeier et. al. (2008) based on "linguistic and geographic criteria as well as native classification conceptions" (Bielmeier et al. 2008: 8), which in turn is grouped under 'Bodish'.

However, Tournadre (2014) points out that the term 'Bodish' has not been well-defined in the literature and that the historical comparative methodology fails to provide any common innovation that is able to clearly delimit the Bodish subgroup. After Matisoff (1989; 1990) and van Driem (2011), it is argued that a bottom-up approach that starts with firmer lower-level subgroups is preferable, which may then see superordinate subgroups at higher levels so as to discover the structure of a TB family tree (van Driem 2011: 37).

Tournadre therefore puts forward a very clear definition of the term 'Tibetic' to refer to the family of languages that are derived from Old Tibetan, spoken in the seventh to ninth centuries at the time of the Tibetan empire (2014: 107). Tibetic languages are identified on lexical, morphosyntactic and phonological criteria (2014: §3), and are those that have Proto-Tibetic as their direct ancestor, characterised through phonological features (2014: §4). Inner classification is provided for the Tibetic family on a genetic approach that also includes geographical parameters and factors related to migration and language contact (see Chirkova 2013; LaPolla 2013), grouping the language into eight major sections, each constituting a

geolinguistic continuum, that sees a Lhasa-based Central section with others referring to compass points: NW, W, SW, S, SE, E and NE (Tournadre 2014: §6).

Mùwe Ké falls in the South-Western section comprised of Sherpa and Jirel, along with the other languages and dialects that are found along the Tibetan/Nepali border.

The only previous study on the language that I have encountered is a description of the sounds and tones by David Watters (2002), which is discussed in §2.1.

1.3 Methods of Data Collection

Fieldwork for this research was conducted for the calendar year 2015 and the academic year 2017-18. The first year was based in Jumla Bazaar, where I had previously spent 15 months teaching in the school set up for the children of Mugu Village. Due to the fact that families do not live year round in Mugu because of the cold as well as the difficulty in finding teachers to travel to and live in such a remote area, the Mùwa founders of the school decided on Jumla, the neighbouring district to the south, as the best location for the school due to its relative proximity and an already large Mùwa community in and around Jumla Bazaar. During this time strong friendships were made, a role as teacher was established in the community, and aural permissions to work on the language were granted, both in Jumla and during a month-long trip to Mugu Village during the school holidays. The second field trip saw three months spent in Bouddha, Kathmandu with the Mùwa community living there, five months in Mugu and two back in Jumla.

Data was collected in accordance with theory on best practices for language documentation and description (Himmelmann 1998; 2002; 2006; Woodbury 2011), essentially employing two main methodologies according to their goals: the writing of a grammar sketch and the investigation of IS.

The grammar sketch started with word lists such as the Swadesh (1952: 456–7), elicitations of simple grammatical structures, the TMA Questionnaire (Dahl 1985), etc., and the transcription and analysis of simple personal monologues and histories, controlled narratives like the 'frog story' (Mayer 1969), where participants tell the a story from a series of pictures, as well as free full narratives of traditional stories and natural conversation when, with permission, the

recorder was left running after a task. The resulting data, therefore, covered a range of communicative events with respect to 'naturalness', seen here after Himmelmann:

NATURAL COMMUNICATIVE EVENTS

- -

OBSERVED COMMUNICATIVE EVENTS

STAGED COMMUNICATIVE EVENTS
- without props
- with props

linguistic self-awareness

investigators' control

ELICITATION
- contextualising
- translation
- judgement

Figure 2. Types of communicative events with respect to 'naturalness' (Himmelmann 2002: 28)

While natural communicative events are most-likely impossible to record due to the observer's paradox, i.e. the unwitting influence the presence of the investigator has on the situation, observed communicative events are found with natural conversation. Staged communicative events refer to 'free' story telling without props and the more controlled type with picture stimuli like the frog story.

For the investigation into IS, the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006) was performed in full with multiple participants. The QUIS consists of translation tasks for IS notions such as topic and focus and twenty nine experimental tasks, all with visual stimuli in the form of pictures or videos, about which single participants answer questions, provide descriptions, etc. and which pairs of participants are instructed to discuss, argue, solve tasks, or provide instruction, each with the goal of bringing about IS-related utterances.

Further to the QUIS and relevant to later sections, a large amount of direct elicitation, translations and judgement tasks were conducted, following from Matthewson (2004) on how when conducting semantic fieldwork, consultant's comments provide invaluable insights as well as clues as to what to look for with regard to any meaning aspect in any given language. The QUIS includes a large translation task to be completed with a native speaker with 189 sentences dedicated to various types of focus; however, the task was not specifically designed to investigate the existence of a preverbal focus position so I designed a task that consists of both translation of question-answer pairs and felicity judgements (see §4.4.1).

Similarly, for the investigation of contrast (§3.4, §4.7), I designed a naturalistic task after Breen et al. (2010), who conducted experiments with pictures to investigate acoustic correlates of IS in English. Pairs of participants are given questions and pictures respectively with the picture designed to yield a contrastive (corrective) answer, e.g. 'Did Damon bake an omelette this morning?' 'No, he *fried* an omelette this morning.' These Q/A pairs are then compared to non-contrastive pairs with wh- questions eliciting sentence, predicate and term focus. The problem with this, however, was that while the experiments yielded results that showed a clear prosodic difference between the two, they conflated corrections of an explicit alternative with non-contrastive question/answers with an implicit alternative set (*ExplAlt*-[CORR$_{(ii)}$] and *ImplAltSet*-[Q/A$_{(n)}$]) (see §3.4 for explanation). Therefore the results could be due to either contrast based on type of alternative or contrast based on discourse relations. This is also noted in Repp (2016: 286). Therefore, I designed picture tasks that show 'full sentences' rather than a single picture which asked questions to elicit constative structures.

In the task, the participant was given training on the sets of pictures and what they represent and then how a set represents a sentence. This posed no difficulty and utterances came naturally. The sets consisted of 6 people, all members of the local community, and three verbs. The people were all real photos and the verbs where all black-and-white clip art. Figure 3 yields the utterance 'Toma hit Urgen'.

Figure 3. Example picture set for contrast task

For 'similar' utterances (*ImplAltSet*-[SIMILAR$_{(n)}$]) such as '[Dolma] hit [Tashi], [Wangmo] hit [Tsering],' two sets were included, as seen in Figure 4, which yields the utterance 'Toma saw Urgen (and) Wangmo saw Karma.'

Figure 4. Example pictures sets for contrast task

The participant was then asked questions to bring about the required contrast type, e.g. 'Did Wangmo hit Urgen?' 'No, *Toma* hit Urgen,' through either the showing of a single picture or a part or complete set, according to the focus type.

To further investigate the difference in contrastive sentences, the recorded second sentences from this task where played back in isolation to other participants who were asked to judge the 'better' preceding sentence (see the end of §6.3).

In terms of hours of data collected and transcribed, a summary is seen in Table 1. The first three columns refer to the communicative events seen above in Figure 2 with respect to increasing naturalness and the three columns relating to data from the QUIS refer to the elicitation tasks (Eli.), the tasks for a single participant (1) and for pairs of participants (2).

Elicitation	Staged	Observed	QUIS (Eli.)	QUIS (1)	QUIS (2)	**Total**
11 hr	4.5 hr	0.5 hr	4 hr	4.5 hr	3 hr	**27.5 hr**

Table 1. Mùwe Ké Corpus

Finally, with reference to the examples of text data presented in this thesis, all follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules[3] and each is seen with a unique identifier aligned to the right margin as in 'First Sessions-4' seen with the following:

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[3] www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/pdf/Glossing-Rules.pdf

(1)   *ŋè-i*   *mìn*   *dʒòn*   *ìn*

        I-GEN   name   Jon   be.ASSERT

        'My name is Jon'   (First Sessions-4)

All data was analysed using the FieldWorks Language Explorer[4]; therefore, that which appears before the final hyphen in the identifier is the FLEx Interlinear Text Title with the number after referring to the line. 'First Sessions-4', for example, is line 4 of the interlinear text 'First Sessions'.

1.4   Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter 2 presents a grammar sketch of Mùwe Ké that provides the basis for the rest of the thesis. Phonology, nominals and the verb string are presented in turn followed by an examination of grammatical relations and a description of sentence structure, looking at word order, coordination and adverbial clauses before complementation and relativisation.

In Chapter 3, the key notions of IS are offered and defined, looking specifically at the notion of focus, the morphosyntax of which formed the original fieldwork investigation. Focus is also discussed in reference to verum, contrast, and DAM. The IS notions of common ground, givenness and topic are also presented to provide clear definitions on which subsequent chapters rely.

Based on these notions, Chapter 4 provides an overview of basic information structuring and then describes in detail the focus structures found in the language. The basics of IS and DAM are described first followed by predicate, term and sentence focus, highlighting two prominent manifestations of focus: the immediately preverbal position and differential *-gane* (ergative) marking. Verum focus is shown to be expressed through heavy prosody, verb repetition and a special construction while heavy stress is also found to mark contrast. Both verum and contrast were also found to use preverbal positioning and DEM in the same way as the other focus structures. These two manifestations form the basis for the analysis in subsequent chapters.

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[4] software.sil.org/fieldworks/

Chapter 5 turns everything around. First, problems that are associated with the study of IS are discussed and subsequently Cognitive Grammar is introduced as a framework capable of analysing the Mùwe Ké focal effects that were presented in Chapter 4, showing really rather different underlying processes. Following three recent papers, the notion of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category that finds differing manifestations in each language as well as focus as alternatives are shown to be theoretically and empirically untenable. Following the recommendation of using focus as a heuristic tool to investigate underlying processes, Cognitive Grammar, which seeks to unify structure, processing and discourse, is presented and employed as the framework for this analysis. The Cognitive Grammar notions of units, profiling, grounding, grammatical assemblies, the moving window metaphor, baseline and elaboration, and propositional reality are introduced as a means of analysing DEM, word ordering, verum and contrast in Mùwe Ké in the following chapter.

Chapter 6, therefore, utilises Cognitive Grammar to analyse the focus structures presented in Chapter 4, showing DEM, the preverbal position, etc. to be more than simple markers or manifestations of focus. It is shown that *-gane* DEM marking forms a unit that may profile, ground and highlight an actor for their intersubjective focussing of attention for various discursive reasons. The preverbal position is shown to be the result of a given-before-new preference in the language. Verum and contrast are then shown to have very similar underlying processes to each other relying on the notions of propositional reality and interactive grounding, which see interlocutors actively negotiating propositions with regard to their polarity or their involved non-verbal elements, respectively, occurring or not within a model of reality.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, providing a summary of the findings, a discussion on their contribution to the field and prospects for future research.

2

A Grammatical Sketch of Mùwe Ké

This chapter provides a grammatical overview of the Mùwe Ké, a previously undescribed language. The sketch forms the basis for the discussions in subsequent sections of this thesis.

2.1 Phonology

To date, the only previous study that I have encountered on Mùwe Ké is a description of the sounds and tones in five related Tibetan languages by David Watters (2002). The paper looks at Dzongkha, Lhomi, Sherpa, Dolpo Tibetan and Mugom Tibetan (Mùwe Ké). The original examples given here for Mùwe Ké largely corroborate Watters's study although there are minor differences which are pointed out along the way.

The Mùwe Ké phonemic inventory consists of 37 consonant phonemes and the 5 cardinal vowels. I look first at the consonant phoneme inventory in §2.1.1 and vowels and diphthongs in §2.1.2. In §2.1.3 I look at the Mùwe Ké syllable structure and discuss tone in §2.1.4.

2.1.1 Consonants

The 37 Mùwe Ké consonants are seen in Table 2.

	Bilabial		Alveolar		Palato-Alveolar		Retroflex		Palatal	Velar		Glottal
Plosive	p	b	t	d			ʈ	ɖ		k	g	
	ph		th				ʈh			kh		
	pʰ		tʰ				ʈʰ			kʰ		
Fricative			s	z	ʃ							h
Affricate			ts	dz	tʃ	dʒ						
			tsh		tʃh							
			tsʰ		tʃʰ							
Nasal	m		n						ɳ		ŋ	
Lateral Approximant			l									
			hl									
Approximant			r						j		w	

Table 2. Consonant Phonemes

Plosives and affricates in Mùwe Ké exhibit a four-way voicing in initial position as seen here with the velar plosives:

(2) *kó*   to compare; to dig

    khó   he

    kʰò   door

    gò   head

The four-way distinction may be summarised as follows, in line with that illustrated by Watters (2002: 3):

(3) Voiceless, unaspirated   /p t ʈ k ts tʃ/

    Voiceless, aspirated   /ph th ʈh kh tsh tʃh/

    Voiceless (or 'devoiced'), usually with a slight   /pʰ tʰ ʈʰ kʰ tsʰ tʃʰ/

    aspiration followed with breathy voice

    Voiced, unaspirated   /b d ɖ g dz dʒ/

Voiceless unaspirated onsets (*kó*) are typical voiceless plosives transitioning into a vowel and have a shorter voice onset time than the corresponding aspirated voiceless consonants: compare (a) with (b) and (c) in Figure 5, where the articulation of each vowel is aligned at 0.08 seconds.

Figure 5. Oscillograms of the four-way contrast of Mùwe Ké obstruents: kó, khó, kʰò and gò

The voiceless aspirated series (*khó*) carries a much longer aspiration than that found in those that are slightly aspirated (*kʰò*); in (b), the short oscillations of the aspiration can be clearly seen after the initial articulation of [k] and before the transition into [ó] and may be compared in length to that in (c).

In the 'devoiced' series (*kʰò*), named so by Tibetanists due to its derivation from a historically voiced obstruent found in Written Tibetan (Watters 2002: 5), there is usually no voicing in initial position although voicing may be encountered word-medially. This series is characterised by a slight increase in voice-onset time compared to that of the voiceless unaspirated series – compare (c) with (a) – and is followed by a short aspiration leading into breathy voice on the vowel.

Voiced initial plosives (*gò*) start with a period of voicing after which there is the voiceless release of the corresponding voiceless plosive (here [k]) followed by the vowel voicing; therefore, a more accurate transcription of /gò/ would be [gkò]. This 'prevoicing' is common to Tibetan languages of the Himalaya and there is allophonic variation among speakers with the fully-voiced pronunciation: see (d). For convenience, I only include the voiced plosives.

The contrast among the affricates of Mùwe Ké parallels that of the plosives:

(4) *tʃúk*   put.PST

    tʃhúk   put.IMP

    tʃʰùk   to allow

    dʒùk   to put

Voicing is only contrastive in initial position. In word-final position plosives tend not to be realised and I therefore gloss with voiceless phonemes only. In word-medial position, either in compounds or due to the addition of a suffix, voiceless plosives and affricates are usually voiced in rapid natural speech (§2.1.3).

Alveolar **fricatives** may be both voiced and unvoiced although I have only recorded one word that uses [z], found in medial-intervocalic position: *pʰìza* 'son'. [s] occurs in all positions but only word-finally in loan words, e.g. *dʒùːs* 'juice', *gìlas* 'glass cup'.

[h] appears in a handful of words, always word-initially and always with high tone, but is not present in Watters's work. Examples include *há* 'knowledge' and *héi* 'that, there'.

The **Sonorant consonants** found in Mùwe Ké are nasals, approximants and lateral approximants. Nasals and approximants are all voiced sonorant consonants. Between the lateral approximants, however, there is a two-way contrast of the voiced alveolar [l] and the pre-aspirated alveolar [hl]. These are presented in turn.

Bilabial, alveolar, palatal and velar **nasals** are found in Mùwe Ké. Compare:

(5) *má*   wound.N

    ná   nose

    ɲá   scolding.N

    ŋá   five

/ɲ/ only appears in syllable-initial position while the other nasals are unrestricted.

Approximant [j] is found in initial position and intervocalically, e.g. *jén/jéː* 'left/right' and *píjal* 'spouse'. Palatalization may occur, the majority of which is found with velar plosives and glossed here with *j*, e.g. *khjó* 'you.SG'; however, one or two others are also found, e.g. *dʒjàkhaŋ* 'attic', *ʃjár* 'rose.V.PST' and *tʃjá* 'tea'.

/r/ is an alveolar flap [ɾ] and appears in all positions while [w] is only found intervocalically.

The voiced alveolar **lateral approximant** [l] contrasts with the pre-aspirated alveolar [hl]:

(6) *hló*   west   *ló*   cough.N

  hlóŋ raise.IMP   *lóŋ* to borrow

[hl] is only found in initial position.

2.1.2 Vowels

The five vowels found in Mùwe Ké represent the five cardinal vowels:

Vowels at right and left of bullets are rounded and unrounded.

Figure 6. Mùwe Ké vowels

The five vowels contrast for meaning as shown in the following examples. I gloss [ɐ] as *a* throughout for convenience.

(7) *ʃǎ*   meat

  ʃě   told

  ʃǐ   to die, died

  ʃǒ   to tell

  ʃǔ   to seek counsel

Vowel length is contrastive in Mùwe Ké as seen in these examples:

(8) *tá*   horse   *tá:*   on, above

   dzè leprosy; take.H   *dzè:*   ate

   ʈhí   held   *ʈhí:*   chair, bed, table

   rò   corpse   *rò:*   friend

   kú   steal   *kú:*   butter lamp recepticle

The length of long vowels is quite often reduced when suffixes are attached.

Diphthongs are formed in Mùwe Ké with two of the cardinal vowels constituting the nucleus of a single syllable. Not all combinations occur, however.

All vowels combine with the close vowels *i* and *u* to form diphthongs:

(9) *ai* *ái*   older brother   *au* *dàu*   one's side (of torso)

      sài   food   *ʈháu* thin

   ei *èi*   our.EXCL   *eu* *nèu*   hoof

      héi   that, there   *théu* caught

   oi *kói*   roti/chapati   *iu* *dìu*   key

   ui *dzùi* possessed.V   *ʃĭu*   gorilla

      úi   centre   *ou* *óu*   uncle

                                 khjòu funeral stretcher

The back vowels *o* and *u* may also combine with *a* or *e*:

(10) *oa* *khòa* egg   *oe* *tshóe* colour.N

      ròa   friend.M   *khòe* clothes.H

   ua *túa*   stop.V   *ue* *bùe*   invited.V

                                 júe   food preparation

No vowels combine with *o*, that is, the data contains no examples of __*ao*, __*io* etc.

2.1.3   Phonotactics and Syllable Structure

Maximally, the Mùwe Ké syllable template is (C)V(C), where V includes diphthongs, although the majority of monosyllabic words are either CV or CVC – I have recorded only four instances of monosyllabic VC words: *àŋ* 'also', *òk* 'under', and the copulas *ìn* and *òt* (§2.3.9). Minimally,

a single long vowel is required: *í:* 'older sister', *ù:* 'we.INCL'. However, as in Lhasa Tibetan (DeLancey 2003a: 272), in Mùwe-Ké word-initial syllables without a phonological consonantal initial, there are 'automatic laryngeal gestures' meaning that, phonetically, onsets in all syllables are consonantal. A glottal stop is found in high tone syllables while low tone syllables carry breathy voice and a weak breathy [h], produced by an approximation of the glottis. /í:/ and /ù:/ are more accurately [ʔí:] and [hṳ̀:], therefore. I neither include this in glosses, however, nor include the glottal stop in the phoneme inventory.

Onsets may be any of the consonants excluding /z/. Voicing is not contrastive in final position and aspirations are neutralised; therefore, codas include /p t k/ as well as the nasals /m n ŋ/ and the alveolar approximants /l r/:

(11) *phóp* pull down.IMP   *kʰòm* meditation   *khér* took

     phót spill.IMP   *kʰòn* wore   *khél* discussion

     phók hit.PST   *kʰòŋ* Tibetan guitar

There are no consonant clusters in Mùwe Ké, except those formed in polysyllabic words, if palatalised consonants are analysed as unitary segments.

2.1.4   Tone

While there are various pitch contrasts (see Watters 2002 for an excellent analysis), Mùwe Ké has a lexical tone distinction that is essentially high or low, which is marked on the initial syllable of a word, similar to related languages, e.g. Lhasa Tibetan (Tournadre & Dorje 2003), Sherpa (Kelly 2004) and Yolmo (Gawne 2016a).

Watters (2002: 33) gives the illustration seen in Table 3 of the four-way pitch contrast found in Mùwe Ké, which is corroborated by my data. On the monosyllable, the pitch may be high-level (55), high-falling (52), low-level (22) or low-rising-falling (132). In polysyllabic words, the monosyllabic contrast becomes either high-level (55) or low-rising (24) with non-initial syllables always occurring as high-falling (52).

	Monosyllable	Disyllable
high	55	55 52
	52	55 52
low	22	24 52
	132	24 52

Table 3. Mùwe Ké Tones

Since there is only a two-way high/low contrast for tone in Mùwe Ké, tone here is glossed as either high or low on mono- or initial syllables only, indicated with the IPA level tone symbols: high [é] for 55, 52 and their disyllabic equivalents and low [è] for 22 and 132.

Tone is predictable for plosives and affricates, where unaspirated and aspirated voiceless onsets always occur in high initial syllables and devoiced or voiced occur in low (§2.1.1). See example (2), repeated here for convenience:

(2) *kó*   to compare; to dig

khó   he

kʰò   door

gò   head

/h/ and /hla/ onsets always occur in high syllables while all other consonant onsets may be found in either high or low:

(12) *há*   knowledge   –

hlá   God   –

sá   hair   *sà*   nettle

ʃĭŋ   (fire)wood   *ʃìŋ*   field

má   wound.N   *mà*   down

ná   nose   *nà*   to get sick

ŋá   scolding.N   *ŋà*   fish

ŋá   five   *ŋà*   I.1SG

lá: borrowed   *là:*   stood

ré   tore   *rè*   set.PST (i.e. 'the sun set')

jó   (be)side   *jò*   thither

Vowels and diphthongs in initial position may also carry either high or low tone.

2.2 Nominals

Nouns have 'thing-roots' (Haspelmath 2012: 124), used for denoting referents without any extra coding, and the label may be used for the class of words where the names of persons, places and things are mostly found (Schachter & Shopen 2007: 5). A noun's primary function is as head of a predicate argument NP (Dixon 2010: 60), that is, a NP that can function as subject or object (§2.4) within a clause.

In this chapter I look at the structure of the Mùwe Ké noun phrase in §2.2.1 and then present common nouns in §2.2.2, number marking in §2.2.3 and articles §2.2.4. In §2.2.5 I look at personal, interrogative and demonstrative pronouns plus reflexive pronouns in §2.2.6. I present the five Mùwe Ké case markers in §2.2.7, relator nouns, which are used to describe spatial relations, in §2.2.8, and (noun-like) adjectives in §2.2.9. §2.2.10 presents the two manners of nominalisation found in Mùwe Ké, through the addition of nominalising suffixes and reduplication, and provides links to their use in other aspects of the language.

2.2.1   The Noun Phrase

The Mùwe Ké noun phrase contains an obligatory noun or pronoun, which requires case marking and may optionally be followed by any or all of the following: a modifying adjective; article; plural marker, number or quantifier; emphatic marker; or topic marker. The head noun may also be preceded by either a demonstrative, usually with anaphoric expression, or a possessive pronoun. The basic ordering pattern is as follows, with optional elements in brackets, exemplified in (14) to (17):

(13)   NP → (DEM +)/(POSS +) **NOUN** (+ADJ) (+ART) (+PL) +CASE (+EMPH) (+TOP)

(14)   *pʰùŋ   dìː-Ø*
       Tree   this-ABS
       'The tree'   (Relativisation-5)

(15)   *ʈímar   màrbu-la-ni*
       monkey   red-DAT-TOP
       'As for [the gift] for the red monkey'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-305)

(16) *ŋè-i*   *kháŋba-ru*

     I-GEN   house-LOC

     'In my house'   (Egophoric-17)

(17) *dì:*   *pʰè:-do-gi*

     this   cat-PL-GEN

     'These cats' [food]'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-252)

2.2.2 Common Nouns

The word class of 'noun' in Mùwe Ké may be characterised after Dixon (2010: 39) as always occurring in an NP, which in turn is an argument of a predicate. Semantically the class includes words that refer to *things*, or concrete objects, e.g. 'house', 'dog', 'potato', etc. as well as abstract nouns such as 'knowledge' or 'truth'. All nouns may take the modifying elements – adjectives, articles, number and case markers etc. – described immediately above.

Mùwe Ké nouns may be both mono- and polysyllabic although the latter tend to be either compound nouns or derived forms of verbs and verb-like adjectives suffixed with nominalisers. I discuss these in turn.

A random selection of **monomorphemic nouns** is given in (18):

(18) *lú*   song   *kói*   flatbread

     dzà   day   *pʰè:* cat

     jàp (tree) branch

Biological gender pairs are mostly represented with distinct lexical items:

(19) *pʰòŋ*   girl/daughter   *pʰìza*   boy/son

     í: older sister   *ái*   older brother

     pʰàŋma wife   *khjóu* husband

     màu   sheep   *khálba* ram

     pʰàlaŋ cow   *lóu*   bull

However, while there is no marking for grammatical gender in Mùwe Ké, there is marking on a few words for biological gender as in *kʰjàlbu* 'king' and *kʰjàlmo* 'queen'. Tone also plays a

role in marking biological gender in a handful of words: *róu* 'female best friend', *ròu* 'male best friend'; *ráu* 'female goat', *ràu* 'male goat'.

Compound nouns may be formed in Mùwe Ké with the simple juxtaposition of two words. They may be distinguished from a simple sequence of words both semantically in that their meaning may not be logically deduced from the sum of the parts and formally in that the tonal pattern follows that of polysyllabic words (see §2.1.4) regardless of that of the individual element:

(20) *ménʃa*   *mén* 'medicine' + *ʃǎ* 'meat'   medicinal (not poisoned) meat

     kʰòmlu   *kʰòm* 'meditation' + *lú* 'song'   radio

     tʃʰúrma   *tʃʰú:* 'water' + *má* 'wound.N'   blister

More uncommonly, in (21) nouns appear with verbs (V+N) and in (22) with bare adjective stems (N+ADJ or ADJ+N) to form compound nouns:

(21) *kʰjùgtʃhu*   *kʰjù:* 'to run' + *tʃhú:* 'water'   stream, river

     kédza   *ké:* 'to be born' + *dzà* 'day'   birthday

     ʈʰùʃìŋ   *ʈʰù:* 'to pull' + *ʃìŋ* 'wood'   boat (reportedly, because wooden boats were traditionally pulled along the river from the bank)

(22) *àtʃhe*   *àwa* 'father' + *tʃhé* 'big'   uncle (father's elder brother)

     tʰànak   *tʰà:* 'month' + *nàk* 'black'   black month (a month astrologically unsuitable for holding ceremonies)

     ŋárdʒa   *ŋár* 'sweet' + *tʃʰà* 'tea'   sweet tea

While the meaning of *ŋárdʒa* may seem fairly obvious, I include it as a compound noun because it differs from the prototypical word order of N+ADJ in Mùwe Ké. Compare with (23):

(23) *tʃʰà* *ŋárbu* *dùk*

      tea   sweet   exist.TES

      'The tea is sweet.'

Rarely, nouns and verbs may combine with the bare stems of quantifiers (N+QUANT; QUANT+V):

(24) *mìmaŋ*   *mì:* 'person' + *màŋ* 'many'   crowd

(25) *thámdza*   *thám* 'all' + *tsʰà:* 'to put in'   cooking pot

And in one example, I am told that the *dik* seen in (26) is onomatopoeia from the sound of being hit repeatedly on the head with something:

(26) *nàdik*   *nà* 'to get sick' + *"dik"*   headache

2.2.3   Number Marking

The Mùwe Ké plural marker is *-do* for more than one entity. The plural marker is not obligatory and is not needed if the plurality can be gleaned from context, with no immediately apparent regularities. It is always used when a distinction needs to be made or if stressing that the referent is a group.

Mùwe Ké also uses numerals to specify the exact number:

(27) *mì:*   person
       mì:-do   people
       mì: ŋí: two people
       mì: súm   three people

2.2.4   Articles

To mark for indefiniteness, Mùwe Ké employs the number *tʃĭk* 'one' after the noun. This means that *mì: tʃĭk* could either mean 'one person' or 'a person' depending on the context. *tʃĭk* is nearly always used when introducing non-specific referents into narratives as in (28), for example.

For definiteness, Mùwe Ké uses the singular demonstrative *dì:* 'this' after the noun as in the utterance in (29), which follows (28) in the same narrative.

(28) *tʰàŋʃo-la   ái   tʃáŋbu   tʃík-daŋ   nòː   láʈa*
first-LOC   older.brother   clever   INDEF-ASSOC   younger.brother   foolish

tʃík   òt
INDEF   existed.ASSERT

'Once upon a time, there was a clever older brother and a foolish younger brother.'

(29) *ái   dìː   nàŋ-du   tʰèt*
older.brother   DEF   in-LOC   stayed

'The older brother stayed at home.'   (ái tʃáŋbu nòː láʈa-3-5)

When *dìː* appears before the noun, it serves as a proximal demonstrative (§2.2.5).

2.2.5   Pronouns

I present here personal pronouns and possessives, interrogative pronouns, and demonstratives in turn.

The Mùwe Ké **personal and possessive pronouns** are shown in Table 4.

			Personal	Possessive	'Emphatic' Possessive
Singular	1		*ŋá*	*ŋèi*	*ŋère*
	2		*khjó*	*khjúi*	*khjóre*
	3	M	*khó*	*khúi*	*khóre*
		F	*mòː*	*mùi*	*mòre*
Plural	1	INCL	*ùː*	*ùi*	*òre*
		EXCL	*èː*	*èi*	*ère*
	2		*khjéː*	*khí*	*khére*
	3		*khóː*	*khúi*	*khóre*

Table 4. Mùwe Ké Personal and Possessive Pronouns

There are distinct gender forms only for third-person singular. The first-person plural distinguishes inclusivity. The possessive forms are fossilised forms with the genitive case marker *-gi* (§2.2.7.3) in its allomorphic form after vowels, *-i*, and are glossed accordingly throughout: *ŋè-i* 'I-GEN', *khjú-i* 'you.SG-GEN', etc. The 'emphatic' possessive is a stronger form which translates into English as something like 'her own *x*' or 'her very *x*'.

The **interrogative pronouns** for Mùwe Ké are as follows:

(30)
sú	who
tʃǐ:	what
nàm	when
kʰàna	where
kʰònu	to where / whither
kʰàne	from where
kʰàŋ	which
sú-i	whose (who-GEN)
sú-la	whom (who-DAT)
tʃʰìni	how

Interrogative pronouns appear obligatorily in immediately preverbal position and require the information-question marker *-a* to be appended to the verb complex (see §2.3.12 for interrogative constructions):

(31)
dì:	*tʰèp*	*tʃǐmi*	*dì:*	*tʃǐ:*	*ìn-a*
this	book	small	this	what	be.ASSERT-Q

'What is this little book?   (Anticipation. Adjectives.-26)

(32)
tʃǐ:	*kʰì-gi-or-a*
what	do-IPFV-ASSERT-Q

'What are [you] doing?'   (First Sessions-3)

For the equivalent of English 'why', see adverbial clauses of purpose/reason in §2.5.3.4.

The Mùwe Ké **demonstratives** are as follows:

	Proximal	Distal
this/that	*dì:*	*òdi*
here/there	*dù*	*òdu*
	dè	*héi*
	thsú	*phá*

Table 5. Mùwe Ké Demonstratives

The proximal distal *dì:*, when used before the head noun in the NP means 'this (thing)', located close to the speaker at the time of speaking, contrasting with its use as a definite article when appearing after the noun (§2.2.4). In contrast to the proximal, the distal *òdi* refers to something at a distance.

Of the three pairs for 'here' and 'there', *dù* and *òdu* are reported to refer to '(exactly) here at this place' and 'there at that place', respectively; *héi* is less specific and is translated more like 'over there (somewhere)' while *dè*, for which I have numerous examples, I have only encountered while carrying out the QUIS when people refer to things in photos or drawings, e.g. 'In my picture here…'; *tshú* and *phá* are akin to 'hither' and 'thither', nearly always involving movement to here or to there. *phá* is also used for the other side of something: a wall or a river, for example.

2.2.6 The Reflexive Paradigm

Reflexive pronouns are formed with the personal pronouns and the addition of *ràŋ* 'self'; however, the last three forms seen in (33) are notably missing the final /ŋ/, the addition of which is deemed incorrect by my language assistant and indeed forms with word-final /ŋ/ are not found in the data. More investigation is needed for exactly why this may occur.

(33) *ŋàraŋ*   myself
       khjóraŋ   yourself
       mòraŋ   herself
       khóraŋ   himself
       òraŋ   ourselves.INCL
       èra   ourselves.EXCL
       khjéra   yourselves
       khóra   themselves

They are used in simple reflexive sentences where the actor are undergoer are the same entity:

(34) *ŋà   ŋàraŋ   ʈhú-i-ot*
       I   myself   wash-IPFV-ASSERT
       'I am washing myself.'   (elicited)

(35) *mò: mòraŋ ʈhú-i-duk*
     She herself wash-IPFV-TES
     'She is washing herself.'
<div align="right">(elicited)</div>

Reflexive pronouns are also commonly used emphatically as in the following sentences.

(36) *ʃám-la   tʰèni ŋàraŋ tsópema gjàkar phín*
     later-LOC then myself Rewalsar India   went
     'Then later I *myself* went to Tsopema (Rewalsar), India.'
<div align="right">(Life Story Norbu-14)</div>

(37) *jàŋ òdi kóba   dì: khóraŋ khúr   phín*
     again that wicker.basket this himself carried went
     'Again [*he*] took that wicker basket *himself*.' (His brother wouldn't help)
<div align="right">(ái tʃǎŋbu nò: láʈa-116)</div>

2.2.7   Case Markers

Mùwe Ké distinguishes six cases, illustrated in Table 6 and the following subsections.

Absolutive	*-Ø*
Ergative	*-gane / -gadi:*
Genitive	*-gi / -i*
Dative	*-la*
Locative	*-la / -na / -ru / -du / -ra / -r*
Ablative	*-ne*

Table 6. Mùwe Ké Case Markers

All of the case markers are phrasal enclitics.

2.2.7.1   Absolutive

The unmarked Absolutive case in Mùwe Ké is used for either a single participant in an intransitive clause (38) or the undergoer in a transitive clause (39)-(40):

(38) *khó-Ø   ŋál-gi*
     he-ABS   sleep-IPFV
     'He is sleeping.'
<div align="right">(Evidentiality and Volitionality-17)</div>

(39) *ŋè-i-gane kháŋba-ru mómo-Ø dzùe*
I-ERG-ERG house-LOC momo-ABS made
'I made momos (dumplings) at home.'   (QUIS Instructions-149)

(40) *ŋà-la sér-Ø dʒòr-soŋ*
I-DAT gold-ABS received-PST.TES
'I found gold.'   (Grammatical Relations-40)

However, Mùwe Ké transitive verbs do fall into distinct categories according to the case-marking pattern that they trigger, one of which – the ergative-dative – does not require the unmarked Absolutive. See §2.4 for further discussion.

Examples are also found where both arguments in a transitive utterance are left unmarked, as in the following, and this is discussed with reference to DAM in §4.2. In this thesis the absolutive is left unglossed for convenience.

(41) *kérmen bòl láta kʰjà-i*
woman ball kick.N hit.VSR-IPFV
'The woman is kicking the ball.'   (QUIS-1.2-93)

Absolutive pronouns are also unmarked for case as in (38) and the following:

(42) *ŋà kíː-la kʰà-i-duk*
I dog-DAT love-IPFV-TES
'I love dogs.'   (Grammatical Relations-41)

2.2.7.2 Ergative

The Ergative *-gane* (and *-gadiː*) is used to indicate both ergative and instrumental functions. The difference in the use of *-gane* and *-gadiː* appears to be one of language variety with the latter being noted only with speakers from Kathmandu, Nepal and Manali, India. Speakers consistently use either one or the other and all aspects of their case functions appear to be identical:

(43) *kérmen-gane kérgjal-la tʰù-i-duk*
woman-ERG man-DAT beat-IPFV-TES
'The woman is hitting the man.'   (QUIS-3.1-12)

(44) *ʈáʃì-gadì:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *tʰù:-soŋ*

Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES

'Tashi hit Dolma.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-51)

(45) *khjíbuk-gane*   *dzè:-s*

spoon-INS   ate-PST.TES

'[She] ate with a spoon.'   (QUIS-Translation-2-Focus-123)

(46) *ʈʰì:-gadì:*   *tsó-dʒi-ni ...*

knife-INS   stabbed-CONN-TOP

'[He] stabbed [the cow's foot] with the knife …'   (ái tʃǎŋbu nò: láʈa-10)

Instrumental objects may be marked, as in the previous two examples, as well as body parts used as such:

(47) *tʃóksi*   *dì:*   *làkpa-gane*   *phúl-dʒi-ni*   *khér-gi-ga-duk*

table   this   hand-INS   pushed-CONN-TOP   take-IPFV-SPEC-TES

'[He] pushed the table with his hand and is taking it right now.'   (QUIS-2.1-215)

The markers attach to the right edge of the noun phrase (§2.2.1):

(48) *òdi*   *kí:*   *màrbu-gane*

that   dog   red-ERG

'That red dog …'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-5)

(49) *ái*   *dì:-gadì:*   *ɖòbu*   *bùe*

older.brother   this-ERG   guest   invited

'The older brother invited the guests.'   (ái tʃǎŋbu nò: láʈa-70)

The undergoer in an ergative construction may be marked as either dative or absolutive, dependent on the verb type (see §2.4): compare (43) and (44) to (49), respectively.

Synchronically, *-gane* and *-gadi:* function as single suffixes. Historically, however, the suffixes originate from *-ga*, a particle of specificity, and the Ablative *-ne* (§2.2.7.6) and the demonstrative/definite article *dì:* (§2.2.5/§2.2.4), respectively. Evidence for the synchronic functioning as single ergative suffixes is seen in the attachment to the right edge of the noun phrase, as in the last two examples, and also in *-ga-ne* being unable to indicate ablative function

or *-ga-diː* definiteness. Indeed in (49), the Ergative *-gadiː* is seen attached to demonstrative *dìː*, which is functioning as the definite article.

Subject to further research, the particle *-ga* would appear to relate to the particle *ka* found in classical literary Tibetan (Hahn 2005: 31–2), based on the independent nominal stem *kha* 'part', which, important to the discussion here, possesses "indicative and intensifying functions" after pronouns and numerals – 'this one here', 'those two over there', etc.

In Mùwe Ké, aside from occurring in ergative constructions, *-ga* precisely indicates pronouns, nouns, numerals, demonstratives, adverbs of time, etc. as seen in the examples given here. It may also occur in the verb string to intensify aspectual meaning. I gloss *-ga* as SPEC[5] throughout.

(50)   *dùru-ga*
      here-SPEC
      'right here; exactly here'   (Misc-28)

(51)   *dìː-ga* / *héi-ga*
      this-SPEC / that-SPEC
      'exactly this/that; this/that exact [one]'   (Misc-29)

(52)   *tʰìriŋ-ga*
      today-SPEC
      'exactly today; just today'   (Misc-30)

(53)   *ɖàwa-ga*
      Dawa-SPEC
      'exactly/only Dawa'   (Misc-31)
      (this could be used when choosing a person for a job or a team, for example)

(54)   *tʃĭk-ga*
      one-SPEC
      'only' (Lit: exactly one)   (QUIS-4.3-218)

---

[5] Not to be confused with 'specifiers' in the x-bar sense.

(55) ŋà   mùwa-ga   ìn

     I   Mùwa-SPEC   be.ASSERT

     'I'm definitely Mùwa.'   (Misc-32)

     (said in correction to the comment "You're not Mùwa")

(56) ŋà   pʰùŋna   nàŋ   đò-i-ga-ot

     I   forest   in   go-IPFV-SPEC-ASSERT

     '[At the exact time when] I was going in the forest…'   (TMA_Part-B-1)

Functioning as a particle of specificity, *-ga* is also found on absolutive arguments, as seen in the following example, and also on dative and locative, seen after.

(57) *tʰèni   ráruk-daŋ   kí: bàlba khóra   súm-ga-Ø   khóre*

     then   child-ASSOC   dog   frog   themselves   three-SPEC-ABS   their.own

     kháŋba-la   lòk   đò-i-ot

     house-LOC   turn   go-IPFV-ASSERT

     'Then the frog, dog and boy, just the three of them, were returning to their own house.' (Without the frog's just-mentioned wife and children)   (bàlbi súŋ – Gyaltsen-40)

(58) *đòlma-gane   ái   súm-ga-la   tʰù:-soŋ*

     Dolma-ERG   older.brother   three-SPEC-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES

     'Dolma hit all three of [my] brothers.' (Not just one)   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Contrast-47)

(59) *kháŋb-i   sùr-ga-la   mì: tʃík   tʰèd-duk*

     house-GEN   side-SPEC-LOC   person   a   stayed-PRF.TES

     'A man is standing right next to the house.'   (QUIS 4.3-101)

Pronominals (§2.2.5) are marked in a similar way to common nouns and may likewise indicate both ergative (60)-(61) and instrumental functions although the latter is not perfectly felicitous; the emergence of *i* before *gane/gadi:* here is explained below.

(60) *mù-i-gane   ʃáu   dzè:-s*

     she-ERG-ERG   apple   ate-PST.TES

     'She ate the apple.'   (Misc-21)

(61) *khú-i-gadi:*   *kháŋba*   *dzòe-soŋ*
he-ERG-ERG   house   made-pst.tes
'He built the house.'

Non-human anaphors are demonstratives in Mùwe Ké; however, no example is found in the data in instrumental function. When elicited, it was reported that the following sentences sound strange and might only be possible when physically pointing out the entity in one's field of vision.

(62) ?*kárma-gane/-gadi:*   *jòba*   *dì:-gane/-gadi:*   *dzè:-s*
Karma-ERG   food   this-INS   ate-PST.TES
Intended: 'Karma ate food with it (the aforementioned spoon).'   (elicited)

(63) ?*ḍòlma-gane/-gadi:*   *tóksi*   *tʃĭk-la*   *thóŋ-s*   *mù-i-gane/-i-gadi:*
dolma-ERG   pickaxe   a-DAT   saw-PST.TES   she-ERG-ERG

òdi-gane/-gadi: *ṭáʃi-la*   *kʰjàp-s*
that-INS   Tashi-DAT   hit.PST-PST.TES
Intended: 'Dolma saw a pickaxe. She hit Tashi with it.'   (elicited)

As seen in examples (60) and (61), pronouns marked as ergative take a different form to personal pronouns (§2.2.5) that are marked the other cases, except the Genitive. The form is syncretic with genitive/possessive pronouns (*mù-i*, *khú-i*, etc.) due to *-gi/-i* historically marking both ergative and genitive (§2.2.7.3) as in Classical and Lhasa Tibetan (DeLancey 2003b: 258; and 2003a: 273–4, respectively) and other related languages, e.g. Lende (Huber 2005), Sherpa (Kelly 2004) and Yolmo (Gawne 2016a). Filimonova (2005) points out that pronouns belong to those parts of the lexicon that are most archaic and are more stable and therefore resistant to both morphological and phonological change when compared to common nouns, thereby preserving older case markers for longer. This would certainly account for pronouns being the only thing that still see the obligatory use of the older *-gi* to mark ergativity as *-gane/-gadi:* entered as a replacement.

Very rarely, *-gi* is still found on common nouns as an ergative case marker and the following elicited sentence is said to be possible:

(64)   *kérmen-gi   kérgjal-la   tʰù-i-duk*
       woman-ERG   man-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES
       'The woman is hitting the man.'   (elicited)

However, while it is consistently reported that this sentence is acceptable and grammatical, I have but a handful of instances where *-gi* is used alone as an ergative/agentive marker in the data. Furthermore, the sentences that do use the form in (64) were all spoken by Mùwa people who also speak Tibetan, making me wonder if it is borrowed.

I am also told that it is possible and acceptable to combine all three suffixes (if *-gane/-gadi:* are analysed as their two components) to give the same meaning – e.g. *kérmen-gi-ga-ne* (woman-ERG-SPEC-ABL) – as well as employing only the first two – *kérmen-gi-ga* – although, again, there are only a couple of examples of each of these in the data. The exception, however, is on personal pronouns, as discussed above, which if analysed separately could be glossed as:

(65)   *ŋè-i-ga-ne   túp*
       I-ERG-SPEC-ABL   cut.PST
       'I cut down [the tree].'   (QUIS-1.2-131)

Again, I am told that *ŋè-i* (I-ERG) and *ŋè-i-ga* (I-ERG-SPEC) are acceptable but that **ŋà-ga-ne* (I-SPEC-ABL) is not.

The same may be said for the instrumental; *-gi(-ga(-ne))* may be used but nearly never is:

(66)   *ébi-gi-ga-ne*   *ùlu-gi-ga-ne*   *rìu   táŋ*
       grandmother-ERG-SPEC-ABL   weaving.stick-INS-SPEC-ABL   drawing.N   VSR.PST
       'The old lady drew [a circle on the ground] with the weaving stick.'
                                                          (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-152)

Ergative pronouns and the few examples where *-gi-ga-ne* / *-gi-ga dì:* are encountered in this thesis are glossed throughout as in the following:

(67)   *ŋè-i-gane*   *ébi-gi-gane*   *ùlu-gi-gane*
       I-ERG-ERG   grandmother-ERG-ERG   weaving.stick-INS-INS

As in related languages, Mùwe Ké exhibits 'differential' case marking (§3.5) in that the pragmatics of the sentence influence whether or not ergative case marking is obligatory. This is investigated in §4 with regard to IS.

2.2.7.3 Genitive

Possessors take the Genitive *-gi*. This is sometimes, but not always, reduced to *-i* after vowels and in the case of polysyllabic nouns ending with *a*, *-i* may replace the vowel as seen with the *balba* 'frog' in (69). Nouns marked for genitive case may appear one after the other, as much as cognitive processing will allow, as seen in (70).

(68) *món-gi*   *jùl-du*   *ò:*
      hindu.people-GEN   village-LOC   came
      '[We] came to the Hindu village.'   (Life Story Dolma-9)

(69) *tʰèni* *bàlb-i* *pʰìduk* *thón*   *ò:*
      then   frog-GEN   baby   emerged   came
      'Then the frog's children came out.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Dawa-57)

(70) *í:-gi*   *mík-gi*   *tʃhéwa*
      older.sister-GEN   eye-GEN   tear
      'The tear of the older sister.' (Lit: Big sister's eye's tear.)   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-179)

As discussed in §2.2.7.2 and listed in §2.2.5, Mùwe Ké genitive pronouns are syncretic with ergative pronouns due to *-gi/-i* historically marking both the ergative and genitive:

(71) *khjú-i*   *kí:*   *ŋè-i*   *kháŋba-ru*   *dùk*
      you.SG-GEN   dog   I-GEN   house-LOC   exist.TES
      'Your dog is in my house.'   (Verbal Categories-47)

(72) *khú-i*   *kháŋba-ru*   *tʰèt*
      they-GEN   house-LOC   stayed
      '[I] stayed at their house.'   (Life Story Norbu-25)

2.2.7.4 Dative

The case marker *-la* has both locative (§2.2.7.5) and dative functions. I gloss LOC and DAT separately due primarily to the fact that the Locative consistently employs its allomorphic variants, discussed in the next section, while the form of the Dative is only ever *-la*.

The Dative *-la* marks the grammatical goal and is therefore used for recipients, either of physical objects (73) or actions (74) & (75) as well as indicating the owner or possessor in constructions of possession (76), including 'abstract' possession of things like knowledge (77):

(73) *ŋá   dì: pʰòŋ-la   té-s*
     fish   this   daughter-DAT   gave-PST.TES
     '[He] gave the fish to the girl.'   (QUIS-1.2-225)

(74) *pʰòŋ   dì: pʰìza-la   kʰjà-i*
     daughter   this   son-DAT   hit-IPFV
     'The girl is hitting the boy.'   (QUIS-1.2-43)

(75) *kérgjal   tʃík-gane   ráruk-la   só-gi*
     man   one-ERG   child-DAT   kill-IPFV
     'A man is killing the child.'   (QUIS-3.1-196)

(76) *ŋà-la   tʰèp   màŋbu   òt*
     I-DAT   book   many   exist.ASSERT
     'I have many books.'   (Egophoric-8)

(77) *dì: ŋà-la   tʃhé   mèt*
     this   I-DAT   knowledge   exist.ASSERT.NEG
     'I don't know this [answer].'   (QUIS-2.1-18)

Dative pronouns are simply personal pronouns with *-la*, as seen in the last two examples and the following:

(78) *rìga-gane   khó:-la   rípit*
     deer-ERG   they-DAT   threw
     'The deer threw them (in the water).'   (bàlbi súŋ – Dawa-46)

(79) *mò-la*   *ŋúl*   *tá:*   *dùk*
　　　she-DAT   money   EMPH   exist.TES
　　　'She totally has money!'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Natural Chat 1-96)

2.2.7.5 Locative

Locative *-la* indicates place and direction, i.e. location with (84) and without (80) movement. The Locative also exhibits the variants *-na, -ru, -du, -ra* and *-r* (thereby distinguishing the Locative from the invariable Dative *-la* (§2.2.7.4)), without, according to both the data and my research assistant, any discernible phonological or semantic reason: see 'house-LOC' in examples (80) to (82) and 'Jumla-LOC' in examples (83) to (85):

(80) *ŋè-i*   *kháŋba-la*   *pʰè:*   *òt*
　　　I-GEN   house-LOC   cat   exist.ASSERT
　　　'There's a cat in my house'　　　　　　　　　　　　(Evidentiality and Volitionality-42)

(81) *dòrdʒe*   *kháŋba-na*   *òt*
　　　Dorjee   house-LOC   exist.ASSERT
　　　'Dorjee is in the house'　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Evidentiality and Volitionality-8)

(82) *khjú-i*   *kí:*   *ŋè-i*   *kháŋba-ru*   *òt*
　　　you.SG-GEN   dog   I-GEN   house-LOC   exist.ASSERT
　　　'Your dog is in my house.'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Verbal Categories-46)

(83) *dzùblaŋ-ru*   *tʰò-gen-e*
　　　Jumla-LOC   stay-NMLS-Q
　　　'Are you going to stay in Jumla?'　　　　　　　　　　　　(Life Story Dolma-21)

(84) *tʰèni*   *dzùblaŋ-du*   *ò:*
　　　then   Jumla-LOC   came
　　　'Then [we] came to Jumla.'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Life Story Dolma-14)

(85) *dzùblaŋ-ra*   *tʰò-gen*
　　　Jumla-LOC   stay-NMLS
　　　'[I] am going to stay in Jumla.'　　　　　　　　　　　　(Life Story Dolma-23)

The locative also marks complements of time:

(86) ŋà   tʃhúdzo   ʈʰùgpa-la   là:-gi-ot
     I   hour   sixth-LOC   get.up-IPFV-ASSERT
     'I get up at six o'clock.'   (TMA_061-075-61)

(87) théla-la   kʰì:
     eleventh.month-LOC   do.VSR.IMP
     'Do [the ritual] in the eleventh month.'   (Lama Breakfast-14)

The Locative is not found in the data with personal pronouns and appears to be logically impossible.

2.2.7.6   Ablative

The Ablative *-ne* marks provenance, either spatially (88) or temporally (89):

(88) tʰà   mùm-ne   kʰjàkar-la   ò:
     now   Mugu-ABL   India-LOC   came
     'Now [we] came from Mugu to India.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-44)

(89) tʰèni   òdi-ne   tʃhúdzo   ʈʰùgpa-ne   sà-i   ìn
     then   that-ABL   hour   sixth- ABL   eat-FUT   be.ASSERT
     'Then, after that, he will eat from/after six o'clock.'   (Natural Chat 1-17)

When affixed to a verb, *-ne* has a 'for *x*-ing' gerund-type function. The first example refers to a trumpet that may be made from the femur of the deceased and used in religious rituals.

(90) mèrkaŋ   bù-ne
     human.femur.trumpet   blow-ABL
     'Leg trumpet for blowing.'   (ái tʃǎŋbu nò: láʈa-118)

(91) tʃhóme   bùl-ne
     religious.candle   offer.H-ABL
     'Candle for offering.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-250)

Ablative pronouns are not found in the data but elicitation reveals the requirement for pronouns in possessive rather than personal form (§2.2.5):

(92)   *mò*   *ŋè-i-ne*   *phín-s*

        she   I-GEN-ABL   went-PST.TES

        'She went away from me.' (Lit. mine)   (elicited)

(93)   *mù-i-ne*   *kʰjùk*

        she-GEN-ABL   go.IMP

        'Get away from her!' (Lit. hers)   (elicited)

2.2.8   Relator Nouns

Spatial relations in Mùwe Ké are formed with a construction where the lexical noun with genitive case is paired with a relator noun and the locative marker. Relator nouns are akin to those found in Lhasa Tibetan and "represent an intermediate category of erstwhile nouns grammaticalizing into postpositions," (see DeLancey 1997a; 2003a: 275). A random selection of relator nouns are seen in (94) followed by two examples of the 'N-GEN RELATOR-LOC' construction:

(94)   *nàŋ*   in   *phíŋgu*   outside

       tá: on, above   *òk(dza)*   below, under

       tʰòŋ   in front   *kʰjàp*   behind

       jòmba   left   *jéwa*   right

       tʰàsa   near   *tʃhák*   beside

(95)   *tá*   *dì:*   *pʰùŋ-gi*   *kʰjàb-la*   *dùk*

       horse   this   tree-GEN   behind-LOC   exist.TES

       'The horse is behind the tree.'   (QUIS-3.1-5)

(96)   *kʰáŋb-i*   *tʰòŋ-ru*   *kérgjal*   *tʃĭk*   *dùk*

       house-GEN   in.front-LOC   man   a   exist.TES

       'There is a man in front of the house.'   (QUIS-1.2-100)

With some of the more common relator nouns, perhaps where the spatial relationship is obvious, the genitive marker may be omitted:

(97) *pár*   *nàŋ-la* …

    picture   in-LOC

    'In the picture…'   (QUIS-2.1-111)

(98) *pár-gi*   *nàŋ-la* …

    picture-GEN   in-LOC

    'In the picture…'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-28)

2.2.9   Adjectivals

Adjectives in Mùwe Ké have grammatical properties similar to those of nouns but are grammatically distinct from both nouns and verbs. They typically modify a noun in an NP and include words from the prototypical adjective-semantic types of dimension, age, value and colour (after Dixon 2010: 103). They may be recognised (Dixon 2010: 70) in that they make statements as to a certain property of something in a copula complement slot, that their specification assists in identifying the referent of the head noun in an NP – 'the <u>pretty</u> girl' (not the ugly one) – and that they function as parameters of comparison as shown below.

Adjectives are formed with a stem and a nominal suffix, usually *-pu* and its variants although *-pa* is not uncommon. A selection of adjectives are seen in (99), including examples of the handful of adjectives that agree with the biological gender of the noun they modify:

(99) *tʃhóbu*   big.M   *tʃhómu*   big.F

    khòbu   old.M (person)   *khòmu*   old.F (person)

    sárpa   new.M   *sárma*   new.F

    kárbu   white   *nàkpu*   black

    ŋóbu   blue   *màrbu*   red

    ʈhàŋmu   cold   *tshándi*   hot

    tʃhúkpu   rich   *mèbu*   poor

    tʃhóbu   big   *tʃĭmi*   small

The pattern of *-pu* → *-pa(:)* → *-ʃo* is found for comparative and superlative forms although, as illustrated, there is no masculine/feminine distinction in the superlative form:

(100) *tʃhóbu* big.M *tʃhóba* bigger.M

tʃhómu big.F *tʃhóma* bigger.F *tʃhéʃo* biggest

tʃhúkpu rich *tʃhúkpa* richer *tʃhúkʃo* richest

Comparative adjectives, as discussed in the next paragraph, are not used in comparative constructions of the type 'This cup is bigger than that cup,' but rather found in utterances such as (101), where there are two glasses in the speaker's field of vision and he is referring to the larger one and (102), where the speaker is drawing his interlocuter's attention to the smaller of two horses.

(101) *pʰòŋ* *dì:* *tʰòŋge* *tʃhóba:* *khér-gi*

daughter this glass bigger take-IPFV

'The girl is taking the larger glass (cup).' (QUIS-3.1-185)

(102) *tá* *tʃhóba:* *dì:* *màn*

horse bigger this be.ASSERT.NEG

'Not the bigger horse.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-91)

Comparative forms are also used for an emphasised meaning of 'very *x*'. In (103) there is only one window and in (104) there is only one dog in the pictures the participants are looking at.

(103) *dʒàl* *tʃhóba:-gi* *tʰàsa-ru*

window bigger-GEN near-LOC

'Near the very big window…' (QUIS-3.1-194)

(104) *tʃhèŋki:* *tʃhóba* *tʃík* *dùk*

Tibetan.dog bigger a exist.TES

'There is a very big Tibetan dog.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-145)

The word-final vowel of comparative forms may be extended (compare 'bigger' in (103) and (104)) ad infinitum for extra emphasis and it is not uncommon for speakers to enter into 'falsetto', by which I mean there is a marked rise in pitch on the final vowel, for added emphasis, akin to 'so so so big' in English, for example. This emphatic phonetic phenomenon is not restricted to adjectives, however.

Superlative forms are found in the data in two stories that form part of the QUIS. In both there are parents with three sons. In (105) and (106) the father sends his eldest son to cut down a

tree, which he is not able to do, and then his middle son (always referred to as the 'second' son in the data) and finally the youngest, who manages the task at hand.

(105)   *pʰìza   tʃʰéʃo-la   khjó   túp   né:*
    son   biggest-DAT you.SG cut.IMP told
    '(The father) told (his) biggest son, "You cut down (the tree)."'   (QUIS-4.3-129)

(106)   *pʰìza   tʃúnʃo   dì:-gane   pʰùŋ   túp-s*
    son   smallest this-ERG tree cut.PST-PST.TES
    'The smallest son cut down the tree.'   (QUIS-2.1-147)

Comparative constructions use the non-comparative form of the adjective and mark the standard of comparison (Tashi in (107)) with a comparative connective *-ta* and the ablative marker *-ne*. The subject of comparison (Tsering) is left unmarked.

(107)   *tshériŋ   (dì:)   ʈáʃi-ta-ne   tʃhúkpu   dùk*
    Tsering (this) Tashi-CMPR-ABL rich   exist.TES
    'Tsering is richer than Tashi.'   (Random Sentences-6)

(108)   *khjú-i   kháŋba   (dì:)   ŋè-i   kháŋba-ta-ne   sárpa   dùk*
    you.SG-GEN house (this) I-GEN house-CMPR-ABL new   exist.TES
    'Your house is newer than my house.'   (Random Sentences-7)

(109)   *népalgandʒ-ta-ne   dzùblaŋ   ʈʰàŋmu   dùk*
    Nepalgunj-CMPR-ABL Jumla cold   exist.TES
    'Jumla is colder than Nepalgunj.'   (Random Sentences-8)

(109) also demonstrates that the order of elements is interchangeable.

2.2.10 Nominalisation

There are two main forms of nominalisation in Mùwe Ké: the addition of the suffixing particle *-gen* to the present-future verb stem and the reduplication of past verb stems suffixed with *-a*, which is quite often dropped in natural speech (see §2.3.2 for verb stems). I discuss each in turn and then give some examples of *-sa*, a nominaliser for 'place', found commonly in the data and related languages.

2.2.10.1 The Nominaliser *-gen*

The nominaliser *-gen* suffixes to the present-future verb stem as seen in the following examples. In general, it may be compared to the English suffix *-er* as in 'teacher', i.e. 'one who teaches'.

Allomorphs of *-gen* include *-an, -en* and *-n* and while there are tendencies for allomorphs to appear with certain stem-final features, no rule of assimilation holds unwaveringly true. Rather, the choice of *-gen* vs. allomorph seems to correlate with more- or less-formal registers. The exception is *ɖò* 'go' which always appears as *ɖò-an*, lexicalised perhaps due to its high frequency in speech. *-an* appears only with stem-final back vowels; *-en* with front vowels, stem-final velars /k, ŋ/ and stem-final approximants /r, l/; and *-n* only with stem-final /ɑ/.

(110)   *ɖè-gen*
       fight-NMLS
       'fighter / one who fights'   (ái tʃáŋbu nò: láʈa-128)

(111)   *ɖò-an*
       go-NMLS
       'go-er / one who goes'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-42)

(112)   *tʰì:-en*
       ask-NMLS
       'ask-er / one who asks'   (QUIS Instructions-202)

(113)   *sá-n*
       eat-NMLS
       'eater / one who eats'   (Conjunct/Disjunct-18)

(114)   *dì*   *kháŋba*   *dzò-an*   *ŋè-i*   *ái*   *dàk*
       this   house   build-NMLS   I-GEN   older.brother   be.ASSERT
       'My brother is the builder of this house.' (He built it.)   (TMA_122-156-24)

In addition to copula sentences such as 'he is the builder' (114), the nominaliser *-gen* is used for future intention with [+CONTROL] verbs (§2.3.8.2), in relative-clause formation (§2.5.5), adverbial clauses of manner (§2.5.3.3) and conditional sentences (§2.5.3.5).

2.2.10.2 Nominalisation through Reduplication

Past verb stems may be reduplicated to form a nominal, which may be suffixed with the nominaliser -*a* – very occasionally pronounced -*wa* – although this is usually dropped in natural speech leaving only the reduplicated form.

The second (reduplicated) element, since it is a non-initial syllable, becomes atonal (§2.1.4). Syllable-final consonants on the first element and initial consonants on the second become intervocalic, or part of a consonant cluster as such, and are therefore voiced.

Examples are as follows. Since reduplicated forms are used in the perfective only, and a gloss of 'sat-er' would be strange for (115), I gloss with the relativized 'one who sat' form.

(115) *tʰèd-ded-a*
      sat-REDUP-NMLS
      'one who sat'   (QUIS-2.1)

(116) *khúr-gur*
      carried-REDUP
      'one who carried'   (QUIS-1.2-84)

(117) *léb-lep*
      arrived-REDUP
      'one who arrived'   (QUIS-3.1-37)

Reduplication is found in relativisation (§2.5.5), complementation (§2.5.4), adverbial clauses of manner (§2.5.3.3) and in counterfactuals (§2.5.3.5).

2.2.10.3 The Locative Nominaliser -*sa*

Like many related languages, Mùwe Ké uses the nominaliser -*sa* with present-future verb stems to give the meaning of 'place to V'. The nominaliser is derived from Classical Tibetan *sá* 'earth, place' (DeLancey 1999: 238), which has also been retained as a lexical noun in Mùwe Ké:

(118) *ʃèldam* *tʃĭk* *sá-la* *dùk*

bottle   a   ground-LOC   exist.TES

'There is a bottle on the floor.'   (QUIS-3.1-21)

(119) *pár* *nàŋ-la* *sá* *ʃì:* *òt*

picture   in-LOC   place   four   exist.ASSERT

'There are four locations in the picture.'   (QUIS Instructions-192)

Examples of the nominaliser *-sa* are as follows:

(120) *ké-sa*

to.be.born-NMLS

'birthplace'   (Life Story Dolma-4)

(121) *dì:* *ŋè-i* *lè* *kʰì-sa* *ìn*

this   I-GEN   work   VSR-NMLS   be.ASSERT

'This is my work place.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-30)

(122) *ái* *pʰàlaŋ* *tshó-sa-ne* *lòk* *ò:*

older.brother   cow   graze-NMLS-ABL   returned   came

'The older brother came back from the place to graze cows.'   (ái tʃăŋbu nò: láţa-38)

2.3 Verbs

Verbs have 'action-roots' (Haspelmath 2012: 124), that lacks special coding when used predicatively, and the label may be used for the parts-of-speech class where words expressing actions and processes or similar are mostly found (Schachter & Shopen 2007: 9). A verb's primary function is as head of a predicate (Dixon 2010: 60), denoting actions or processes.

In this Section I first present the Mùwe Ké verb phrase in §2.3.1 and the four verb stems in §2.3.2. §2.3.3 takes a brief look at honourific vocabulary found in very polite speech. In §2.3.4, I show how Mùwe Ké verbs fall into two categories of [±CONTROL], which affects their grammatical behaviour, §2.3.5 explains the conjunct/disjunct forms found in this family of languages, §2.3.6 looks at evidentiality in Mùwe Ké and §2.3.7 explains the notion of volition, related to but distinct from control. In §2.3.8, I list and exemplify the tense/aspect forms found in the language, I look at copula verbs in §2.3.9, imperatives and prohibitives in §2.3.10,

negation in §2.3.11 and interrogatives in §2.3.12. Finally, verbalisers and serial verb constructions are shown in §2.3.13.

2.3.1   The Verb Phrase

The Mùwe Ké verb phrase is evidenced as a constituent through standard syntactic tests (see Van Valin 2001: 11, inter alia).

The tree primary tests for constitution are substitution, permutation and coordination. Only a constituent may be substituted by another element and this is found in Mùwe Ké in utterances like the following where the verbalised form of 'like this' replaces the VP 'bought tomatoes'.

(123)   ʈáʃì   ʈámaʈar   ŋòe-s   kárma   àŋ   òdare   tʃʰèː-s
        Tashi   tomato   bought-PST.TES   Karma   also   like.this   VSR.PST-PST.TES
        'Tashi bought tomatoes. Karma did too.'   (elicited)

The criterion of permutation states that a constituent can occur in different places within a sentence while keeping the same internal structure. As Mùwe Ké is a strict verb-final language, however, moving the VP simply yields ungrammatical utterances and is therefore not useful here.

The coordination criterion tests for the linking of constituents. Commonly through coordination, coordinate structures are formed through the linking of constituents and it is only constituents that may be linked. While Mùwe Ké lacks coordinating conjunctions, coordination is achieved with either simple juxtaposition or the addition of the non-final clause marker -dʒi-ni (§2.5.2).

(124)   ʈáʃì   bàzar-ru   phín-s   ʈámaʈar   ŋòe-s
        Tashi   market-LOC   went-PST.TES   tomato   bought-PST.TES

        kháŋba-ru   lòk   òː-s
        house-LOC   turned   came-PST.TES
        'Tashi went to the market and bought tomatoes and came home.'   (elicited)

No person or number agreement is marked on the Mùwe Ké verb; rather, marking is based on the tense and aspectual categories and evidentiality, including a conjunct/disjunct evidential

pattern, all discussed below. The verb string may be negated with a prefix and also suffixed with a modal particle, resulting in the following representation:

(125) [NEG] + **Verb-stem** + [TENSE/ASPECT] + [EVIDENTIAL] + [MODAL]

(126) *ŋà kháŋba-ru ɖò-i-ot*
       I   house-LOC   go-IPFV-ASSERT
       'I'm going home'   (First Sessions-15)

(127) *mìn-ɖo   mìn-ɖo   ɖòʈi mìn-ɖo*
       NEG-go.NEG   NEG-go.NEG   Doti   NEG-go.NEG
       '[We] won't go, [we] won't go, [we] won't go to Doti.'
       (Chanted during a demonstration against the proposed move of Karnali
       government headquarters to Doti district.)   (attested)

(128) *jùl-la   ɖò-i-ot-ʈho*
       village-LOC   go-IPFV-ASSERT-POSSBL
       '[We] might be going to the village.'   (Tomorrow-20)

2.3.2   The Verb Stem

Mùwe Ké maximally exhibits four distinct verb stems: present-future, past, imperative and a negative form that is used for negative future, negative imperfective and prohibitives. It may be that one or more of these forms are identical while for some verbs four alternate forms are found. I gloss present-future and past forms with their English equivalents, imperative forms with IMP and negative forms with NEG. Since all negative forms are found with a negative prefix (*mì-* or *mà-*; §2.3.11), pushing them into second-syllable position in the tone template (§2.1.4), they are all atonal.

(129) *bò*   spill
       pʰòt   spilled
       phót   spill.IMP
       bot   spill.NEG

(130) *ɖò*   go

　　　phín   went

　　　kʰjùk   go.IMP

　　　ɖo   go.NEG

(131) *ò:*   come, came

　　　ʃók   come.IMP

　　　oŋ   come.NEG

(132) *jò:*   check, check.IMP

　　　já: checked

　　　joŋ   check.NEG

(133) *kjúr*   throw, threw, throw.IMP

　　　kjur   throw.NEG

It is important to note that the present-future and past verb stems do not indicate tense (perhaps with the exception of the unmarked past verb stem §2.3.8.3) but are labelled as such in line with other works on TB languages and to refer to the Classical Tibetan verb, which could have up to four distinct stems: present, past, future and imperative. In modern Mùwe Ké, it is the tense/aspect suffixes (§2.3.8) that indicate tense and other categories, not the stems. The stem distinction is important, however, since suffixes require certain stems: imperfective *-gi* requires the present-future and perfective *-soŋ* the past, for example (see DeLancey 2003a: 277 for similar discussion on Lhasa Tibetan).

Tournadre and Dorje (2003: 417–8) also discuss this point in regard to modern Standard Tibetan and put forward that it is perhaps more accurate to consider aspects over tenses. The present "tense" is rather the imperfective aspect since, as in Mùwe Ké, it may also be used in the imperfective past while maintaining the same form that utilises the present-future verb stem (§2.3.8.1). Similarly "past" is in actuality the perfective aspect and may be found in perfective-future utterances such as 'Once/after we go / have gone (lit. went) there, what will we do?' (see (324) in §2.5.3.1, for example).

In sum, while verb stems do not indicate tense or other categories, each type of verb suffix, be it aspectual, connective, nominalising, etc., requires a particular stem and this is shown in the following sections.

2.3.3 Honourifics

Mùwe Ké, like many Tibetan dialects and other languages of Asia such as Korean and Japanese, has a large number of honourific words in its lexicon that are used when speaking to or about a person of high social status such as a village elder, Lama or Rinpoche[6]. When addressing or referring to such persons, a separate ultra-polite lexicon of verbs and nouns is utilised. Honourific verbs and nouns follow the morphology of the regular verbs and nouns discussed here in §2.3 and §2.2; honourific verbs use the same forms for tense/aspect while honourific nouns use the same plural and case markers, for example (I use H to gloss honourific forms throughout):

(134) *ŋà-la   pʰàlaŋ   súm   ʈhét-soŋ*
　　　 I-DAT   cow   three   met-PST.TES
　　　 'I met three cows.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1 258)

　　　 láma   gòndup   dʒàl-soŋ
　　　 lama   Gondup   met.H-PST.TES
　　　 '(I) met Lama Gondup.'   (Life Story Norbu 16)

(135) *khú-i   ró: bàlba   làkpa-la   khúr   lá:-s*
　　　 he-GEN   friend   frog   hand-LOC   carry   went-PST.TES
　　　 '(He) carried away his friend the frog in (his) hand.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Lama Thinley 20)

　　　 láwa-gi   tʃhák-la
　　　 lama-GEN   hand.H-LOC
　　　 'In the lama's hand.'   (attested)

In (134) and (135) the difference is only in the form of 'meet' and 'hand', respectively.

All Mùwe Ké honourific verbs exhibit identical forms for each of the four possible verbs stems: present-future, past, imperative and the negative form (§2.3.2):

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[6] Lamas are monks or spiritual teachers of the Dharma while a Rinpoche is an accomplished Lama or abbot of a monastery.

(136)

PRES-FUT	PST	IMP	NEG
tʃhót-gi-duk	*tʃhót-soŋ*	*tʃhót-daŋ*	*mì-tʃhot-duk*
eat.H-IPFV-TES	eat.H-PST.TES	eat.H.IMP-JUSS	NEG.IPFV-eat.H-TES
'is eating'	'ate'	'please eat'	'is not eating'

<div align="right">(elicited)</div>

A selection of honourific verbs and their counterparts from the regular register (in present-future form) is seen in (137):

(137)

H	REG			H	REG	
dzì:	*thó*	'see'		*phéu*	*ɖò*	'go'
	tá	'look'			*ò:*	'come'
dzìm	*ŋál*	'sleep'			*lép*	'arrive'
dʒà:	*lá:*	'stand up'		*sén*	*tshór*	'hear'
	tshé	'wake up'			*ŋén*	'listen'
	dzò	'make/build'		*ʃúm*	*ŋù*	'cry'
dʒàl	*ʈhét*	'meet' [–CONT]		*súŋ*	*sèr*	'say'
	thúk	'meet' [+CONT]		*tʰò:*	*ʃǐ*	'die'
dʒù:	*tʰò*	'sit'		*tʃhót*	*sà*	'eat'
nóm	*khér*	'take'			*thú*	'drink'
	kʰòn	'wear'				

To avoid ambiguity when using items like *phéu* 'go/come', deictic expression such as 'here/there' or 'inside/outside' become necessary. In (138) the context is a person leaning out of their window inviting a passing lama in for tea. Without the *nàŋ-ru* the utterance could conceivably be 'please go'. Similarly in (139), without the *phíŋgu-ru* a meaning of either 'they came, went,' or 'arrived' may be construed.

(138) *nàŋ-ru*   *phéu-daŋ*
inside-LOC   come.H.IMP-JUSS
'Please come inside.'

<div align="right">(attested)</div>

(139) *phíŋgu-ru*   *phéu-soŋ*
outside-LOC   went.H-PST.TES
'(They) went outside.'

<div align="right">(attested)</div>

The majority of verbs (and nouns) found in the regular register do not have honourific counterparts (were there a complete exclusive lexicon, one may have to start arguing for a separate language). When regular verbs are used in an honourific context, the particle *-naŋ* is attached immediately after the verb stem.

(140)   *pʰùŋ   túp-naŋ-soŋ*
         tree   cut.PST-PTCL.H-PST.TES
         '(She) cut down the tree.'   (elicited)

However, the particle may not be used with honourific verbs. Compare (141) with (139):

(141)   **phíŋgu-ru   phéu-naŋ-soŋ*
         outside-LOC   went.H-PTCL.H-PST.TES
         Intended: '(They) went outside'   (elicited)

My language assistant reports that there are no honourific adjectives or adverbs, as are found in Lhasa Tibetan, but there are honourific pronouns, seen in Table 7 after a selection of honourific nouns in (142):

(142)

H	**REG**		**H**	**REG**	
kúsuk	*dzìu*	'body'	*tʃhák*	*làkpa*	'hand'
ʃàl	*khá*	'mouth'	*tʃʰàk*	*tʃé*	'tongue'
ʃáŋ	*ná*	'nose'	*tʃhákle*	*lè*	'work'
ʃèlak	*jòba*	'food'	*tʃháp*	*tʃhú:*	'water'
sóldʒa	*tʃʰà:*	'tea'	*tshém*	*tooth*	'tooth'
tʃén	*mík*	'eyes'	*úsa*	*sá*	'hair'

There are no honourific pronoun forms for first person, for there is no need to refer to one's self in an honourific register. Second and third person forms are identical with an honourific quantifier *námpa* 'all' used almost obligatorily in second person plural and in third person only when a singular/plural distinction is not clear from context:

Singular	1	–
	2	*khét*
	3	*khóŋ*
Plural	1	–
	2	*khét námpa*
	3	*khóŋ (námpa)*

Table 7. Mùwe Ké Honourific Personal Pronouns

Accompanying the honourific register are a number of respectful non-verbal gestures, facial expressions and rituals that complete the treatment of respected members of the community.

2.3.4   Control

The notion of control is important in Mùwe Ké verbal morphology, as in related languages, as it affects grammatical behaviour (Sun 1993: 961–4; Garrett 2001: 17–19; Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 141; Zeisler 2004: 250–9; Huber 2005: 84–8). [+CONTROL] verbs are those that may be acted out volitionally or controlled by an actor, e.g. *go, hit, eat*; [–CONTROL] verbs typically may not be controlled by an actor and include *die, forget* and *fall ill*. While control is not grammatically encoded in English, there are pairs of verbs such as *look* [+CONTROL] and *see* [–CONTROL], *listen* [+CONTROL] and *hear* [–CONTROL]; one looks and listens intentionally but has no control over what she sees or hears.

In Mùwe Ké [+CONTROL] verbs may be distinguished from [–CONTROL] verbs by their grammatical behaviour. [+CONTROL] verbs have an imperative form, while [–CONTROL] verbs do not as it is logically not possible to instruct someone to become ill, forget, or die, for example. Where the imperative stem is the same form as the present-future and past stems (§2.3.2), a verb may be tested for [CONTROL] by whether or not it may be suffixed with the jussive particle *-daŋ*. [+CONTROL] *ŋén* 'listen' has identical forms for each verb stem and may take *-daŋ* to produce a 'polite imperative', or jussive (143); however, while [–CONTROL] *tshór* 'hear' may be assumed to have an imperative form identical to the other two verb stems, adding the jussive suffix yields an ungrammatical sentence:

(143)   *ŋà-la   ŋén-daŋ*

       I-DAT   listen.[+CONTROL].IMP-JUSS

       'Please listen to me.'   (attested)

*ŋà-la   tshór-daŋ

I-DAT   hear.[–CONTROL].IMP-JUSS

Intended: 'Please hear me.'   (elicited)

Similarly, [+CONTROL] verbs may also take the nominaliser *-gen* (§2.2.10.1) for first-person future intention while [–CONTROL] verbs may not. In (144) we see that one may intend to listen but not to hear:

(144)   *ŋà   ŋén-gen   dàk*

        I   listen.[+CONTROL]-NMLS   be.ASSERT

        'I'm going to listen.'   (attested)

        ŋà   tshór-gen   dàk

        I   hear.[–CONTROL]-NMLS   be.ASSERT

        Intended: 'I'm going to hear.'   (elicited)

[CONTROL] dictates how a verb may interact with the finite suffixes presented in the next section.

2.3.5   Conjunct/Disjunct

Like most closely related languages, Mùwe Ké exhibits different evidential marking through conjunct and disjunct forms, originally labelled as such for Newari by Hale (1980). In declarative sentences, conjunct forms are required for subjects in the first person, both singular and plural, while disjunct forms are required for second and third.

To illustrate, consider the existential copula verbs *òt* and *dùk* (§2.3.9). The conjunct (nearly always) only permits *òt* while the disjunct requires either *òt* or *dùk*, according to the requirements for evidentiality discussed in the next section. For distinction here, I assume that the example disjunct sentences that follow have all been witnessed visually first-hand and therefore require *dùk*. Example (145) shows first-person conjunct while (146) and (147) show second- and third-person disjunct:

(145)   *ŋà   kháŋba-na   òt*

        I   house-LOC   exist.CONJUNCT

        'I am in the house'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-7)

(146)   *khjó   kháŋba-na   dùk*

        you   house-LOC   exist.DISJUNCT

        'You are in the house.'   (elicited)

(147)   *dòrdʒe   kháŋba-na   dùk*

        Dorjee   house-LOC   exist.DISJUNCT

        'Dorjee is in the house.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-8)

In interrogative sentences, however, the second person (148) requires the conjunct while the disjunct is required for the first (149) and third (150) person (question forms of *òt* and *dùk* take their allomorphs *òr* and *dù*):

(148)   *khjó   kháŋba-na   òr-e*

        you   house-LOC   exist.CONJUNCT-Q

        'Are you in the house?'   (attested)

(149)   *ŋà   kháŋba-na   dù-e*

        I   house-LOC   exist.DISJUNCT-Q

        'Am I in the house?'   (elicited)

(150)   *dòrdʒe   kháŋba-na   dù-e*

        Dorjee   house-LOC   exist.DISJUNCT-Q

        'Is Dorjee in the house?'   (elicited)

The question forms illustrate what is referred to as 'the rule of anticipation' in Tibetic languages (Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 94; Tournadre & LaPolla 2014; Gawne 2016b; Gawne & Hill 2017), where the questioner anticipates the answer of the questionee with the appropriate conjunct/disjunct (and evidential) form: the answer to (148) would be in the first-person conjunct ('Yes, I'm in the house,') and therefore also uses conjunct *òr* in the anticipated question. Similarly the answer to (149) would be in second-person disjunct ('Yes, you are,') so the question is also seen with disjunct *dù*.

It is also worth noting that the conjunct form has also been referred to as the 'egophoric'[7] in Lhasa Tibetan (see Tournadre & Dorje 2003: 93–4) as it does not only refer to the one's self,

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[7] Not to be confused with the related term 'egophoricity', which is understood as the encoding of epistemic authority and is treated as a major typological trait of some languages (see San Roque et al. 2018).

'I', in first person subjects but also to, for example, close family members as they are considered inside of one's 'egosphere' or part of one's 'self'. In (151) and (152) both 'the tree' and 'my little brother' are in the third person; however, it is usual to use the conjunct form *òt* for 'my brother', for example, in Mùwe Ké.

(151) *pʰùŋ dì: ŋè-i jé:-la dùk*
   tree this I-GEN right-LOC exist.DISJUNCT
   'The tree is on my right.'   (elicited)

(152) *ŋè-i nò: ŋè-i jón-la òt*
   I-GEN younger.brother I-GEN left-LOC exist.CONJUNCT
   'My little brother is on my left.'   (Relator Nouns-13)

2.3.6 Evidentiality

As in the other languages of this group, Mùwe Ké uses auxiliary verbs to mark verb strings for evidentiality, which expresses the speaker's level of commitment to the proposition: whether the knowledge is generic or new, whether the action was witnessed first-hand or is merely hearsay, for example.

Evidentiality in Mùwe Ké falls into two main groups: either the speaker has direct sensory evidence of the proposition, i.e. she has seen it with her own eyes, felt it with her own hand etc., or the knowledge is generic and general, such as the fact that water boils at 100°C or that I am currently studying at SOAS.

Depending on the tense/aspect of the verb phrase, these two main groups are subject to various independent nuances; therefore, I explain evidentiality individually for each of the tense/aspect categories below in §2.3.8 as well as revelatory/deductive *-ak* in §2.3.8.5.

I gloss assertions of general knowledge with ASSERT and testimonials based on first-hand evidence TES; where necessary, I also use [±EVID].

2.3.7 Volition

Volitionality is the final category that comes into play in the Mùwe Ké VP. Volition has to do with the intention or choice of the actor in performing the action. While this is closely linked

to the notion of control described in §2.3.4, control, when distinguished, is a lexicalised feature of the verb stem – compare *tʃók* [+CONTROL] 'to break' and *tʃhák* [–CONTROL] 'to break' – but volition, like evidentiality, is expressed through the addition of morphemes, usually auxiliaries. By way of an example and as I discuss below, conjunct perfective [–CONTROL] verb strings require the testimonial evidential *-soŋ* while [+CONTROL] verbs do not:

(153) *ŋè-i-gane* *kárjol* *tʃák*
I-ERG-ERG cup broke.[+CONTROL]
'I broke the cup.' (Intentionally because I was angry.) (elicited)

(154) *ŋè-i-gane* *kárjol* *tʃhák-soŋ*
I-ERG-ERG cup broke.[–CONTROL]-PST.TES
'I broke the cup.' (It fell out of my hand accidently.) (elicited)

However, when the lexicon only contains a [+CONTROL] verb for a certain action, e.g. *só* 'to kill', an actor may be encoded as killing volitionally or involitionally: one may step on a bug on purpose or by accident, for example. The latter, therefore, would take the testimonial *-soŋ*.

2.3.8   Tense and Aspect

The tense/aspect categories and forms are summarised in a table in the Appendix. In turn, the subsections here present the imperfective, future, perfective, perfect and the revelatory particle *-ak*. Note the discussion at the end of §2.3.2, which shows that verb stems do not indicate tense, despite their labels, leaving the indication to the suffixes, exemplified here. Each suffix, however, does require a certain stem as shown.

2.3.8.1   Imperfective

Present-future verb stems are marked for the imperfective aspect with the imperfective particle *-gi* and either *-ot* or *-duk*. *-gi* is usually reduced to *-i* after vowels. In unambiguous natural speech *-ot* and *-duk* are quite often dropped.

Conjunct forms of [+CONTROL] verbs nearly always require *-ot* and can convey either an habitual or progressive action in either the present or the past. (155), therefore, could express that the speaker habitually works every day, that she used to habitually work, that she is

working at the time of speaking or was working at a specific time in the past. Ambiguity is resolved with temporal adverbials.

(155) *ŋà   lèka   kʰì-gi-ot*

I   work   do.VSR-IPFV-ASSERT

'I work.' 'I used to work.' 'I am/was working.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-21)

Conjunct forms of [–CONTROL] verbs may take either *-ot* or *-duk*. With *-ot*, one states a generic fact or habitual action while *-duk* expresses the progressive aspect:

(156) *ŋà   thó-i-ot*

I   see-IPFV-ASSERT

'I see.' (I'm not blind).   (Conjunct/Disjunct-13)

ʈháŋa   tʃík   thó-i-duk

rosary   a   see-IPFV-TES

'I'm seeing a rosary.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-290)

(Right now in the picture that I'm looking at).

(157) *ŋà   dìː   dzèː-na   nà-i-ot*

I   this   ate-CONN   fall.ill-IPFV-ASSERT

'I [always] get sick when I eat this.'   (Verbal Categories-28)

ŋà   nà-i-duk

I   fall.ill-IPFV-TES

'I'm feeling unwell.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-24)

Disjunct forms in the imperfective of [±CONTROL] verbs take *-ot* for assertions of habitual actions or for generic knowledge and *-duk* for testimonials of progressive actions witnessed directly by the speaker:

(158) *khó   jòba   sá-i-ot*

he   rice   eat-IPFV-ASSERT

'He eats rice.' (Everyday).   (elicited)

> *khó jòba sá-i-duk*
>
> he rice eat-IPFV-TES
>
> "He is eating rice.' (Right now in front of me). (elicited)

(159) *mò: káilas bòdi ḍò-i-ot*

she Kailash Bodhi go-IPFV-ASSERT

'She goes to Kailash Bodhi [School].' (Egophoric-18)

> *khó: ʃĩŋnag nàŋ-la ḍò-i-duk*
>
> they forest in-LOC go-IPFV-TES
>
> 'They are going in the forest.' (Describing the events in a picture) (QUIS-3.1-88)

As with the conjunct forms, the imperfective here may refer to past actions; therefore, the two examples in (158) could also mean 'He used to eat rice' and 'He was eating rice', respectively.

On rare occasions it is possible to use *-duk* with conjunct forms of [+CONTROL] verbs. While I do not have examples in natural speech, the two sentences below, which I took from Haller's (2000) description of Shigatse and Themchen Tibetan verbal categories, show an actor performing a controllable action involuntarily. The sentences were translated and deemed grammatical by my language assistants after the context was presented.

(160) *ŋà má-la ḍò-i-duk*

I downward-LOC go-IPFV-TES

'I am [mistakenly] going downwards.' (Verbal Categories-6)

"(The speaker, returning from the market, meets a friend on his way home. After a lively chat he mistakenly takes the way down to the market again, instead of returning to his home which is situated in the upper part of the valley)." (Haller 2000: 180)

(161) *dàŋ tshámu mìlam-la ŋè-i-gane mì: tʃĩk só-gi-duk*

yesterday night dream-LOC I-ERG-ERG person a kill-IPFV-TES

'I was killing someone in [my] dream last night.' (Verbal Categories-15)

2.3.8.2 Future

Three suffixes, *-gen*, *-dʒi*, and *-dʒoŋ* are found with future use in Mùwe Ké. Their use is dependent on the notion of [CONTROL] and the conjunct/disjunct distinction, summarised in Table 8 and discussed in turn.

[+CONTROL]	CONJUNCT	*-gen*	*-dʒoŋ*
	DISJUNCT	*-dʒi*	
[−CONTROL]		*-dʒi*	

Table 8. Mùwe Ké Future Suffixes

[+CONTROL] verbs with conjunct forms have the option of nominalising the present-future verb stem with the nominaliser *-gen* (§2.2.10.1) and an essential copula *ìn/dàk* (§2.3.9.1) to show strong intention or volition. The choice of *ìn* or *dàk* does not appear to convey any difference in meaning although further research will no doubt be revealing.

(162) ŋà kháŋba-ru ḍò-an ìn/dàk

     I   house-LOC go-NMLS be.ASSERT

     'I'm going to go home.'   (attested)

(163) ṭámaṭar-gi pá: kól-gen ìn/dàk

     tomato-GEN curry boil-NMLS be.ASSERT

     '[I]'m going to cook tomato curry.'   (QUIS-2.1-53)

As *-gen* is a nominaliser, examples could be translated as 'I am a V-er', which is also why I gloss *ìn/dàk* as separate copula verbs rather than bound suffixes. In regular speech, *ìn* and *dàk* are usually dropped.

[+CONTROL] verbs with disjunct forms (165) have the option of being marked with *-dʒi* (sometimes reduced to *-i* after stem-final vowels) and *ìn* or *dàk*. For [−CONTROL] verbs, this is the only available future marker for both conjunct (165) and disjunct (166) forms.

(164) tʃʰà ḍà khóŋ-dʒi dàk

     tea some bring.[+CONTROL]-FUT be.ASSERT

     '[They] will bring some tea.'   (Natural Chat 1-176)

(165) ŋà ṭʰùl-dʒi dàk

     I   fall.[−CONTROL]-FUT be.ASSERT

     'I will fall.'   (attested)

(166) *ʈʰɩ̀lbu tʃhóba dì: kí: sérbu-la dʒòr-dʒi in*

bell bigger this dog golden-DAT receive.[–CONTROL]-FUT be.ASSERT

'The yellow dog will receive the very large bell.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-287)

There is a logical split here since one can only speak to their own volition with actions that may be controlled, indicated with the nominalised forms of [+CONTROL] verbs in the conjunct with *-gen*. In contrast, one can neither intend to perform a [–CONTROL] action nor speak to the future intentions of others, each of which is marked with *-dʒi*.

 [+CONTROL] verbs in both conjunct and disjunct constructions may also take the suffix *-dʒoŋ* (or its allomorph *-joŋ*) in affirmative sentences only; there is no negative or interrogative form. Again, there is no obvious phonological reason for the choice of allomorph from my data although stem-final consonants appear only with *-dʒoŋ*. These forms are used for future plans but carry 'less weighty' intention/volition than the other future forms above. (167) is an extract from a monologue (full of *-dʒoŋ/-joŋ* forms) from a lady who was asked about her plans for the following day and (168) is one of the instructions for the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006):

(167) *...sáu tʃhák-dʒoŋ mé tóŋ-dʒoŋ tʃhú: gèn-dʒoŋ*

…dirt sweep-FUT fire light.V-FUT water fill-FUT

'[Tomorrow] … I'll sweep up, light the fire and fetch water.' (Tomorrow-9)

(168) *khjó támu túmima lèma ɲí:-len tá-joŋ*

you.SG movie short occasion two-(TIMES) look-FUT

'You will see a short movie twice.' (QUIS Instructions-10)

It would appear that the future *-dʒi in/dàk* is also used for unwavering truths such as the fact that birds fly and cats meow. (170) and (171) illustrate the fact that while the imperfective is used for general truths that nearly always happen, unwavering truths take a future form.

(169) *dʒùdʒuŋ phúr-dʒi dàk rùl phúr-dʒi màn*

little.bird fly.V-FUT be.ASSERT snake fly.V-FUT be.ASSERT.NEG

'Birds fly, snakes don't.' (QUIS Instructions-266)

(170) *khó: mao kʰì-gi*

they 'meow' do.VSR-IPFV

'They meow.' (TMA_061-075-14)

Source: [Q: What do your cats do when they are hungry?] They MEOW.

TMA (74) (Dahl 1985: 201)

(171) *mao sèr-dʒi dàk*

'meow' say-FUT be.ASSERT

'They meow.' (TMA_061-075-13)

Source: [Q: What kind of sound do cats make?] They MEOW.

TMA (73) (Dahl 1985: 201)

An exception to the norm is seen in (172) where the [–CONTROL] verb *ʃì* 'to die' appears in conjunct form nominalised for future meaning. It conveys the speaker's intention to die, i.e. to kill themselves:

(172) *ŋà ʃì-en dàk*

I die-NMLS be.ASSERT

'I want to die.'

2.3.8.3 Perfective

The Mùwe Ké perfective system is rather neat. Conjunct forms take the unmarked past verb stem for [+CONTROL] verbs (173) and add *-soŋ* to [–CONTROL] verbs (174):

(173) *ŋà sàkhaŋ-la phín (*phín-soŋ)*

I restaurant-LOC went (went-PST.TES)

'I went to the restaurant.' (Evidentiality and Volitionality-25)

(174) *ŋà dàŋ ló lù-soŋ (*lù)*

I yesterday cough.N coughed-PST.TES (coughed)

'Yesterday I coughed.' (elicited)

-son is nearly always reduced to *-s* in rapid natural speech:

(175)   *ŋà   dàŋ   ló   lù-s*

            I   yesterday   cough.N   coughed-PST.TES

            'Yesterday I coughed.'   (elicited)

Perfective disjunct forms mark the past verb stem for evidentiality with *-soŋ* for testimonials of acts witnessed first-hand. Non-evidential assertions are left unmarked, the vast majority of which occur in narratives.

To compare, in the narratives and traditional stories in my data the only instances of [+EVID] *-soŋ* to appear are in reported speech where the speaker is speaking of a witnessed act (these are but a handful in comparison to the unmarked forms (176)). However, when participants in the QUIS were asked to recount the stories they had just seen in either videos or cartoon strips, almost all forms appeared with [+EVID] *-soŋ* (177):

(176)   *áwa   gò-la   tʃhú: tshándi dì: wálla   tʃúk*

            mother   head-LOC   water   hot   this   pour.all.at.once   put.PST

            áwa   dì: ʃĭ

            mother   this   died

            '[He] put the hot water all at once on [his] mother's head and the mother died.'

                                                          (ái tʃăŋbu nò: láṭa-28)

(177)   *phón   léb-soŋ   phón   tág-soŋ   làb   né:-s*

            phone   arrived-PST.TES   phone   lifted-PST.TES   speech   told-PST.TES

            'The phone rang, she picked up the phone and talked.'   (QUIS-1.2-158)

Further evidence of the narrative/evidential distinction comes from Östen Dahl's TMA questionnaire, where participants are asked to recount from different standpoints a story of walking in the woods, stepping on a snake and killing the snake with a stone (Dahl 1985: 205). When my language assistant recounted the story with the preamble, "Do you know what happened to my brother yesterday? I saw it myself," all verb forms took [+EVID] *-soŋ*. After "Once upon a time there was a man. This is what happened to him one day," all past verb stems were left unmarked.

Other examples from the data, all with first-hand visual evidence are:

(178) *ŋè-i   kárjol   tʃhák-soŋ*

      I-GEN   cup   broke-PST.TES

      'My cup broke.' (I saw it fall off the table.)   (Verbal Categories-33)

(179) *khú-i-gane   ŋà-la   ìgi   kúr-soŋ*

      he-ERG-ERG   I-DAT   letter   sent-PST.TES

      'He sent me a letter.' (It's in my hand, it's from him.)   (Egophoric-19)

(180) *khú-i-gane   dìː   tʰèp   ʈóː-s*

      he-ERG-ERG   this   book   read.PST-PST.TES

      'He read this book.'   (TMA_030-060-26)

      Source: [A: It seems that your brother never finishes books.] (That is not quite true.) 'He READ

      this book' (= all of it).

      TMA (54) (Dahl 1985: 200)

An exception is found in the conjunct, again after Haller (2000), where a [+CONTROL] verb was performed 'involitionally' or unintentionally:

(181) *ŋè-i-gane   khjú-i   jòba   dzèː-s*

      I-ERG-ERG   you.SG-GEN   food   ate-PST.TES

      'I [accidently] ate your food.'   (Verbal Categories-12)

      (The speaker thought the food was his.)

Linked to perfective forms, hearsay of a past action is conveyed in Mùwe Ké with reported speech, [+EVID] *-soŋ* and the quotative marker *-lo* 'She said that he wrote a letter'. As seen in §2.3.8.1, generic knowledge about and habitual actions in the past are conveyed with the imperfective aspect.

2.3.8.4 Perfect

The perfect in Mùwe Ké (glossed PRF) is formed with the direct suffixation of an existential auxiliary to the past verb stem: *-ot* for conjunct forms and *-duk* for disjunct.

Conjunct forms of the perfect are relatively rare and only occur with transitive [+CONTROL] verbs in the data. All examples refer to an action performed in the past that has relevance to the present moment. In (182) the speaker and her family have put teachers in their school who continue to work there, the boy in (183) reports that he has brought tomatoes to the house and

they are there ready to make into a tomato curry and in (184) the speaker planted apple trees which are still outside of his house and relevant to the situation he is describing.

(182) *pʰòik-gi* *kʰèrgen* *tʃúk-ot* *índʒi-gi* *kʰèrgen*
       written.Tibetan-GEN teacher put-PRF.ASSERT English-GEN teacher

       tʃúk-ot *népali-gi* *kʰèrgen* *tʃúk-ot*
       put-PRF.ASSERT Nepali-GEN teacher put-PRF.ASSERT
       '[We] have put a Tibetan teacher, an English teacher and a Nepali teacher.'

       (Life Story Sangmu-35)

(183) *kháŋba-ru* *ʈámaʈar* *ŋère-gane* *khúr-ot*
       house-LOC tomato my.own-ERG carried-PRF.ASSERT
       'I myself have brought tomatoes to the house.' (QUIS-2.1-62)

(184) *ŋà* *ʃáu* *màŋbu* *tsúː-ot*
       I apple many planted-PRF.ASSERT
       'I have planted many apple [trees].' (QUIS-1.2-126)

Disjunct perfect forms with *-duk* occur when a speaker witnesses the result of an action and infers from the result that the action must have logically occurred. All but a few of my examples in the data, of which there are many, are from the QUIS where participants are asked to describe what they are seeing in pictures. In (185), for example, the bird is sitting on the woman's head. It is, therefore, a logical inference from the result that at some point the bird landed there. Use of the perfect is found for both [±CONTROL] verbs, either intransitive or transitive. There are no examples of the perfect being used in narratives.

(185) *kérmen* *dìː* *gò-i* *táː-ru* *tʃháː-duk*
       woman this head-GEN on-LOC landed-PRF.TES
       '[The bird] has landed on the woman's head.' (QUIS-1.2-198)

(186) *kíː* *ʃór-duk*
       dog broke.free-PRF.TES
       'The dog has broken free.' (QUIS-1.2-209)

(187) *kʰjàlbu* *dì:* *sé-duk*

king this killed-PRF.TES

'[Someone] has killed the king.'   (TMA_061-075-8)

Source: [Q: What did you find out when you came to town yesterday?] (The king BE KILLED)

TMA (68) (Dahl 1985: 201)

Both conjunct and disjunct forms are found with a further form of the perfect where the VP-final auxiliary verbs are negated while still rendering an inferred positive meaning. Opposite polarity meanings are not unheard of in the language family, Vokurková (2017: §2.3; 2018: 303), for example, reports on formally negative verb endings that are semantically positive with reference to epistemic modality in Modern Standard Tibetan.

In Mùwe Ké conjunct *-ot* is negated as *-met* and disjunct *-duk* as *-min-duk*. This contrasts with the negative perfect (§2.3.11), which takes the negative marker *mà-* before the verb stem rendering standard negation. Compare:

(188) *khú-i-gane* *dì* *tʰèp* *dì:* *ʈó:-met*

he-ERG-ERG this book this read.PST-PRF.ASSERT.NEG

'He has (already) read this book.'   (TMA_030-060-24)

(189) *khú-i-gane* *dì* *tʰèp* *dì:* *mà-ʈo-ot*

he-ERG-ERG this book this NEG-read.PST-PRF.ASSERT

'He has not read this book.'   (elicited)

My language assistants say that 'one is more sure' with *-met/-min-duk* and from the data both convey stronger more-emphatic evidentiality.

The prototypical use of *-met* has an 'already' meaning and is found mostly with conjunct forms, which includes those within one's egosphere (§2.3.5); the 'he' in (188), for example, refers to the speaker's brother. The first example here is a response to an offer for food, the second is during a game where one participant is instructing another in how to arrange animal picture cards and is a response to the instructor, who repeated an instruction thinking it hadn't yet been carried out, and the third the speaker is clarifying a situation though to involve her three brothers but in fact only involved one of them because the other two had already left.

(190) *ŋà jòba dzèː-met*

       I   food   eat-PRF.ASSERT.NEG

      '(No, thank you.) I have already eaten.'   (Past, present, future-7)

(191) *tá-gi   òkza-ru   tʰòm pʰòr-met*

      horse-GEN below-LOC bear put.down.PST-PRF.ASSERT.NEG

      'I have already put down the bear below the horse.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-174)

(192) *dʒèn ái-do   dʒèn lèka-la   sóŋ-met*

      other older.brother-PL other work-LOC went-PRF.ASSERT.NEG

      '(My) other brothers had already gone to work.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Contrast-46)

The prototypical use of *-min-duk* is 'testimonial plus' with an emphasis on drawing attention to that which the speaker has seen/sensed and is mostly found with disjunct forms. The first example below is taken from the frog story task, where participants recount a story from a series of pictures. The *-min-duk* construction was found frequently in this task since the speaker is constantly drawing attention to the things they are seeing on the page. The second was attested when a person leaving the kitchen where we were sat saw that a log had fallen out of the fireplace in the next room and the third is quashing a wife's doubts about whether her husband received his salary due to the speaker having had direct visual evidence.

(193) *khú-i   gò-i   ʃéldam dìː tʃhák-min-duk   ère*

      he-GEN head-GEN bottle this broke-NEG-PRF.TES look.IMP

      'The jar on his (the dog's) head smashed. Look!'   (bàlbi súŋ – Tenzi-15)

(194) *mé thón-min-duk*

      fire emerged-NEG-PRF.TES

      'Fire (a burning log) has come out!'   (Misc-14)

(195) *khó-la ládʒa dʒòr-min-duk*

      he-DAT salary received-NEG-PRF.TES

      'He *has* received his salary!'   (Verum-Tenzi-verumFocus-55)

The *-min-duk* construction is discussed with reference to IS in §4.5.3.

Finally, as with the other tenses/aspects seen above, it is possible to 'play' with the perfect evidential system. In the following examples, disjunct testimonial auxiliaries are used for conjunct subjects; my friend Tashi tells me that (196) is grammatically correct but sounds strange as it gives the idea that the speaker is not entirely sure about eating yesterday – perhaps she was too drunk to remember or something similar. This fits the model presented here as the speaker is inferring the original action from present evidence, albeit strange as the actor was the speaker. (197) is similar to the perfective example given in (181) but the speaker is drawing attention to the action which, being accidental, was outside their sphere of conjunct volition, and therefore something that they had only just seen, thereby distancing themself from the original action by using the emphatic disjunct form.

(196) *ŋè-i-gane   dàŋ   dzè:-duk*
        I-ERG-ERG   yesterday   ate-PRF.TES
        'I have eaten yesterday.'   (Conjunct/Disjunct-23)

(197) *ŋè-i-gane   khjú-i   jòba   dzè:-min-duk*
        I-ERG-ERG   you.SG-GEN   food   ate-NEG-PRF.TES
        'I have [accidently] eaten your food.'   (Verbal Categories-10)

2.3.8.5   Revelatory/Deductive *-ak*

As is often found in related languages, Mùwe Ké attaches *-ak* to *ìn* or *òt*, either in their copula or auxiliary function, to either signify a speaker's discovery or immediate awareness of her assertion (revelatory), or that the speaker is deducing or inferring that an action must have taken place due to enduring traces or to her own powers of deduction (deductive).

To illustrate revelatory assertions, in (198) the speaker has been trying to work out what is in the picture for a short time and suddenly realises that it is a stone. In (199) the two speakers have separately watched slightly different films with the task of trying to find the difference. When it became apparent, this was the utterance.

(198) *ó::   tʰòwa   ìn-ak*
        ohh   stone   be.ASSERT-REVEL
        'Ohh! It's a stone!'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-172)

(199) *khépar   òdi   òr-ak*
difference   that   exist.ASSERT-REVEL
'That's the difference!'

Note that *òt-* is always reduced to *òr-* when combined with *-ak*.

-ak appears with all tense/aspect forms, with [±TRANSITIVE]/[±CONTROL] verbs. (200) is uttered upon seeing a baby yawn, (201) is the discovery of rain having fallen and (202) is from the frog story when the big glass jar gets stuck on the puppy's head.

(200) *ráruk   ŋì   ʈhó-i-or-ak*
child   sleep.N   feel-IPFV-ASSERT-REVEL
'Oh! The child is feeling sleepy'

(201) *nám   bàu-bau   ìn-ak*
rain   fell-REDUP   be.assert-REVEL
'It rained' (Lit: There is rainfall)
Source: [Looking out of the window, seeing that the ground is wet] It RAIN (not long ago)
TMA (59) (Dahl 1985: 200)

(202) *bòtol   dì: gà:-or-ak*
bottle   this   caught.on-PRF.ASSERT-REVEL
'The bottle has got stuck on [the puppy's head].'

There is a little crossover between the two functions with regard to future constructions, which could be said to be either revelatory or deductive. In (203) the speaker has just discovered that she has been poisoned and is therefore either asserting her immediate awareness of the situation or is deducing what will happen. Similarly in (204) the speaker is describing what he is seeing in a picture, which could be either revelatory or deductive and the same could be said for the utterance in (205). Future forms are only found with nominalised forms using *-gen* (§2.3.8.2) in both the conjunct and disjunct, although conjunct forms are relatively rare.

(203) *tʰà   ŋà   ʃ-en   ìn-ak*
now   I   die-NMLS   be.ASSERT-REVEL
'Now I will surely die.'

(204)   *kháŋba   lòk   ḍò-an   ìn-ak*

          house   turn   go-NMLS   be.ASSERT-REVEL

          'They are going home.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-58)

(205)   *tʃhú   sìn-gen   ìn-ak*

          water   finish-NMLS   be.ASSERT-REVEL

          '[My] water is going to run out.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-160)

Other deductive sentences with *-ak* are seen in the following examples:

(206)   *ʈáʃì   lèka   kʰì-gi-or-ak*

          Tashi   work   do-IPFV-ASSERT-DEDUC

          'Tashi must be working.'   (Verbal Categories-21)

          (I'm sure. The noise coming from his workshop can only mean one thing.)

(207)   *kúma   dìː   dʒàl-ne   ʃù-ʃu   ìn-ak*

          thief   this   window-ABL   entered-REDUP   be.ASSERT-DEDUC

          'The thief must have entered through the window.'   (TMA_030-060-30)

          Source: [The police are investigating a burglary. Seeing an open window and footprints beneath it,

          the police inspector says:] The thief ENTER the house by this window.

          TMA (60) (Dahl 1985: 200)

2.3.9   Copulas

There are four copulas in Mùwe Ké subdivided into essential and existential copulas. The former are used for a subject's 'essence', for an unchangeable objective quality, or identificational construction while the latter are used to express a subject's changeable state, either its existence, location, possession or the attributes of an adjective.

All of the copula verbs may also refer to past time and therefore all the examples given below could have past meaning without changing sentence form; (209) could equally be, 'I was/You were/She was a teacher,' and so on.

2.3.9.1   Essential

The essential copula *ìn* is used for both conjunct and disjunct forms and is employed for objective assertions:

(208) *ŋà   dʒòn   ìn*

I   Jon   be.ASSERT

'I am Jon.'   (Egophoric-2)

khjó   ʈáʃì   ìn

you   Tashi   be.ASSERT

'You are Tashi.'   (Anticipation. Adjectives.-1)

mò: ʈʰòma   ìn

she   Dolma   be.ASSERT

'She is Dolma.'   (Word order, 'be', demonstratives-12)

(209) *ŋà/khjó/mò: kʰèrgen   ìn*

I/you/she   teacher   be.ASSERT

'I am/You are/She is a teacher.'   (Word order, 'be', demonstratives-30)

The complement, which prototypically appears in immediately preverbal position, may be a noun, as in the previous examples, or an adjective, as in the following, thereby giving equative or attributive meaning, respectfully. In (210) the speaker is conveying that the essence of the pen is blue, it is one of the pens that is blue; compare to (225) in the following section, repeated here for convenience, where the speaker is describing what she sees with the use of an existential copula. Similarly, example (211) expresses that the water is essentially good, i.e. potable, clean; in (226), however, the sentence conveys that the water is subjectively good, perhaps tasty or of good clarity.

(210) *dì: ŋúgu   ŋóbu   ìn*

this   pen   blue   be.ASSERT

'This is a blue pen.'   (Anticipation. Adjectives.-15)

(225) *ŋúgu   dì: ŋóbu   dùk*

pen   this   blue   exist.TES

'The pen is blue.'   (Anticipation. Adjectives.-12)

(211) *tʃhú: làu   ìn*

water   good   be.ASSERT

'The water is good.'   (attested)

(226) *tʃhúː   làu   dùk*

water   good   be.ASSERT

'The water is good.'   (elicited)

The negative of *ìn* is *màn*, which may felicitously negate all of the sentences seen here:

(212) *mòː   kʰèrgen   màn*

she   teacher   be.ASSERT.NEG

'She is not a teacher.'   (Word order, 'be', demonstratives-19)

(213) *tʃhúː   làu   màn*

water   good   be.ASSERT.NEG

'The water is not good.'   (elicited)

dàk is another essential copula in Mùwe Ké that appears to be completely interchangeable with *ìn* in all but conjunct, which is the source of some debate among my language assistants. *dàk* may felicitously replace the disjunct forms seen in (208) to (211) but it is generally considered strange or ungrammatical to say *ŋà dʒòn dàk* 'I am Jon'; however, I do have the following sentence in my data, elicited and considered grammatical at the time:

(214) *ŋà   tshóŋba   dàk*

I   businessman   be.ASSERT

'I am a businessman.'   (Verbal Categories-40)

It could therefore be that *dàk* is only possible with inclusionary statements, i.e. 'I am in the class of business men,' but not identity statements; more research is needed.

There is no negative or interrogative form of *dàk*.

2.3.9.2   Existential

The Mùwe Ké existential verbs are *òt* and *dùk*, which express existence, location, possession and (subjective) attributes. Conjunct forms nearly always take *òt* while disjunct forms are seen with both *òt* and *dùk* with a [±EVIDENTIAL] distinction. The former conveys general generic knowledge while the latter is used when, as my language assistant Dawa put it, "you see it with your own eyes."

Existence is expressed with disjunct forms in the following examples. The now famous pair of sentences after DeLancey (1986) in (215) show the generic knowledge/visual evidence distinction:

(215) *pʰòd-la*   *ják*   *òt*
       Tibet-LOC   yak   exist.ASSERT.[−EVID]
       'There are yaks in Tibet.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-10)

       pʰòd-la   *ják*   *dùk*
       Tibet-LOC   yak   exist.TES.[+EVID]
       'There are yaks in Tibet.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-11)

In the latter utterance, the speaker will have been to Tibet and witnessed first-hand the existence of yaks there.

Locational constructions are seen for all forms. In (217) one man is telling his friend that the calendar he is looking for is in the cupboard next to where they are sitting. It may take the assertive existential due to it being generic knowledge, i.e. that is the place that the calendar normally lives, or it might be because the cupboard is closed and therefore he does not have the visual evidence required for the testimonial. (218) is taken from the QUIS, which, due to its visual nature of describing pictures, yielded many [+EVID] sentences.

(216) *ŋà* *bàdzar-la*   *òt*
       I   market-LOC   exist.ASSERT
       'I am at the market.'   (Verbal Categories-41)

(217) *héi*   *nàŋ-na* *òt*
       there   in-LOC   exist.ASSERT
       '[The calendar] is in there.'   (Lama Breakfast-32)

(218) *tá*   *tʃík* *tʰòwa-gi* *tʰòŋ-la*   *dùk*
       horse   a   stone-GEN   in.front-LOC   exist.TES
       'A horse is in front of the stone.'   (QUIS-2.1-3)

Although (218) is placed here as a locational example, the sentence could have an existential meaning, especially if it is the speaker's first time seeing the horse, and could therefore be translated as 'There is a horse in front of the stone'.

Possession is expressed with the possessor marked with the dative case *-la* (§2.2.7.4) and the relevant existential copula. Sentence (220) is common knowledge and in (221) the speaker has just returned from the hospital and is being asked if the patient's wife has money to pay the hospital bill. The speaker had already made sure that she did.

(219) *ŋà-la   tʰèp   màŋbu   òt*
       I-DAT   book   many   exist.ASSERT
       'I have many books.   (Egophoric-8)

(220) *dòrdʒe-la   pártʃe   òt*
       Dorje-DAT   hat   exist.ASSERT
       'Dorje has a hat.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-5)

(221) *mò:-la   ŋúl   tá   dùk*
       she-DAT   money   EMPH   exist.TES
       'She has money.'   (Natural Chat-96)

Forms with adjectives and existential verbs express subjective attributes, in the sense that the speaker usually has to make some kind of judgement or evaluation. The disjunct forms are once again according to visual evidentiality. (223) and (224) are the first four sentences of the TMA questionnaire (Dahl 1985: 198). The assertive existential is used when the speaker is talking about the house in which she lives but which is out of sight and also in a scenario referring to the house in which she used to live but has since been torn down. The testimonial existential is used by a speaker standing in front of the house she is referring to and also is used to talk about a house which was seen by the speaker for the first time the day before but which is not visible now.

(222) *ŋà   làu   òt*
       I   good   exist.ASSERT
       'I'm good/fine/well.'   (First Sessions-2)

(223) *khǎŋba   dì: tʃhómu   òt*

house   this   big   exist.ASSERT

'The house is/was big.'   (TMA_001-029-2&3)

Source 1: [Talking about the house in which the speaker lives (the house is out of sight)] The

house BE BIG

TMA (2) (Dahl 1985: 198)

Source 2: [Talking about a house in which the speaker used to live but which has now been torn

down] The house BE BIG

TMA (3) (Dahl 1985: 198)

(224) *khǎŋba   dì: tʃhómu   dùk*

house   this   big   exist.TES

'The house is/was big.'   (TMA_001-029-1&4)

Source 1: [Standing in front of a house] The house BE BIG

TMA (1) (Dahl 1985: 198)

Source 2: [Talking about a house which the speaker saw for the first time yesterday and doesn't

see now] The house BE BIG

TMA (4) (Dahl 1985: 198)

(225) *ŋúgu   dì: ŋóbu   dùk*

pen   this   blue   exist.TES

'The pen is blue.'   (Anticipation. Adjectives.-12)

(226) *tʃhú: làu   dùk*

water   good   be.ASSERT

'The water is good.'   (elicited)

See §2.3.9.1 for a comparison of these last two examples with the essential copula.

Testimonial *dùk* is quite often used in narratives, traditional stories etc. presumably because it brings the story to life more. If the storyteller is coding the events as being witnessed first-hand, then it is more involving for the audience.

dùk is also very rarely used in the conjunct for emotions. I have one life story recorded where, after recounting how various obstacles in life were overcome, the speaker says (227), which my language assistants assure me is in the first person.

(227)   *tʰà*   *kíbu*   *dùk*

       now   content   exist.TES

       'Now [I] am content.'   (Life Story Norbu-34)

However, Mùwe Ké usually employs the verbalisers *kʰjà:* or *tʃʰùŋ* 'obtain, become, happen,' for emotions:

(228)   *ŋà*   *kʰènaŋ*   *kʰjàp-soŋ*

       I   happy   VSR.PST-PST.TES

       'I am happy.'   (Egophoric-5)

(229)   *kʰènaŋ*   *tʃʰùŋ-s*

       happy   became-PST.TES

       '[We] are happy.'   (QUIS-1.2-132)

The classic conjunct possessive construction from the grammars of many related dialects seen in the next example may also be found in Mùwe Ké. In (230), the speaker has just discovered money in her pocket that she did not know she had and therefore employs *dùk* over *òt*:

(230)   *ŋà-la*   *ŋúl*   *dùk*

       I-DAT   money   exist.TES

       'I have money!'   (Verbal Categories-54)

There are times in rapid natural speech when copulas are omitted. This occurs when context and the simple juxtaposition of the two elements is sufficient for equating the two in the mind of the hearer.

The negative forms of *òt* and *dùk* are *mèt* and *mìn-duk*, respectively. They may negate all of the sentences seen here while keeping the same meanings (existence, location etc.) and evidential distinctions:

(231)   *ŋà*   *bàdzar-la*   *mèt*

       I   market-LOC   exist.ASSERT.NEG

       'I am not at the market.'   (elicited)

(232) *kháŋba   dì: tʃhómu   mìn-duk*
house   this   big   NEG-exist.TES
'The house is/was not big.'   (elicited)

2.3.10 Imperatives and Prohibitives

Simple imperatives are formed in Mùwe Ké with the bare imperative form of the verb stem (§2.3.2). As discussed in §2.3.4, it is only [+CONTROL] verbs that have an imperative form. More than one imperative may be used in a construction, as in (235), although the 'purpose' for performing one of the actions, i.e. coming here with the purpose of drinking tea, is preferably marked with the locative. I am told it is possible to not include the locative but that it sounds a bit rude and less respectful.

(233) *sá-la   tʰòt*
ground-LOC   sit.IMP
'Sit down.'   (attested)

(234) *òdi   tʰòwa   ʈʰàsa-ru   kʰjùk*
that   stone   near-LOC   go.IMP
'Go by that stone.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-166)

(235) *tʃʰà: thúŋ-ru   ʃók*
tea   drink.IMP-LOC   come.IMP
'Come and drink tea.'   (elicited)

Simple prohibitives are formed with the negative prefix *mà-* and the negative verb stem (§2.3.2):

(236) *àrga-la   màn-ɖo*
between-LOC   NEG-go.NEG.IMP
'Don't go between.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-28)

(237) *ŋè-i   ʈʰàsa-ru   mà-oŋ*
I-GEN   near-LOC   NEG-come.NEG.IMP
'Don't come near me.'   (Life Story Norbu-18)

(238) *mà-kʰet*   *tʰà*   *òda*

NEG-do.NEG.IMP   now   like.this

'Don't do that now.' (Telling his son not to play with the recorder)   (Natural Chat-222)

To form a more polite imperative, the jussive particle *-daŋ* may be added to the imperative verb stem of both standard and honourific (H) verbs:

(239) *ŋà-la*   *nùe-daŋ*

I-DAT   say.IMP-JUSS

'Please tell me.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-194)

(240) *óu*   *dzì-daŋ*

uncle   look.H.IMP-JUSS

'Uncle, please look.'   (Lama Breakfast-11)

Imperatives with the jussive particle may be negated with the negative marker and the negative verb stem. (241) is the prohibitive of (239):

(241) *ŋà-la*   *mà-ser-daŋ*

I-DAT   NEG-say.NEG.IMP-JUSS

'Please don't tell me.'   (attested)

To form a super-polite imperative, a present-future verb stem may be nominalised with *-ro* followed by the imperative form of the verbaliser *kʰì:*. This may take the jussive particle also:

(242) *pʰìduk* *tʃík* *tér-ro*   *kʰì:*

baby   a   give-NMLS do.VSR.IMP

'Please give us a baby.' (Praying to God)   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-8)

(243) *tʃík*   *tér-ro*   *kʰì:*

one   give-NMLS   do.VSR.IMP

'Please give me something.' (Uttered by a beggar at a palace)   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-168)

(244) *òdi*   *ʃó-ro*   *kʰì:-daŋ*

that   tell-NMLS   do.VSR.IMP-JUSS

'Please tell me that.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-302)

These constructions are also negated with a negative marker and the negative verb stem. My language assistant informs me, however, that jussive *-daŋ* is compulsory here. (245) is the prohibitive of (243):

(245) *tʃĭk   tér-ro   mà-kʰjet-daŋ*
one   give-NMLS   NEG-do.VSR.NEG.IMP-JUSS
'Please don't give me anything.'   (elicited)

Finally, there are a couple of examples in the data of an imperative particle which attaches directly to the imperative verb stem and instructs the interlocutor to do something 'carefully, attentively, properly'. (247) was uttered while drinking tea during a recording before I knew it was customary to hold up your cup when tea was being poured for you. The mother of the family I was staying with in Mugu village therefore instructed the father to do it for me properly/correctly.

(246) *tʰà   tóe-dʒo*
now   look.IMP-IMP.PTCL
'Look carefully now.'   (Verbal Categories-8)

(247) *khú-i   héi   dzè-dʒo*
he-GEN   there   take.H.IMP-IMP.PTCL
'Please hold out that [cup] of his properly.'   (Lama Breakfast-4)

In the negative, the particle has an emphatic preventative meaning akin to 'must not V.':

(248) *khéra   ŋó   mà-thon-dʒo*
you.PL   both   NEG-emerge.IMP-IMP.PTCL
'You two must not leave here.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-86)

2.3.11 Negation

There are two negative prefixes in Mùwe Ké, *mì-* and *mà-*. *mì-* negates the imperfective and future while *mà-* negates the perfective and perfect.

The imperfective is negated with the negative prefix *mì-* attached to the negative verb stem and suffixed with *-ot* or *-duk* with the same evidential pattern found in the affirmative. The imperfective particle *-gi* is not found in the negative.

(249) *ŋà   lèka   mì-kʰjet-ot*

I   work   NEG-do.VSR.NEG-ASSERT

'I don't work.' 'I didn't use to work.' 'I am/was not working.'   (elicited)

(250) *khó   jòba   mì-sa-ot*

he   rice   NEG-eat.NEG-ASSERT

'He doesn't eat rice.' (In general).   (elicited)

(251) *khó   jòba   mì-sa-duk*

he   rice   NEG-eat.NEG-TES

'He isn't eating rice [but everyone else is.]' (Right now in front of me).   (elicited)

The nominaliser *-gen* (§2.2.10.1) for conjunct forms is not found in the negative. *mì-* prefixes the negative verb stem to show negative intention and is commonly used in response to imperatives:

(252) A: *tʃʰà: thúŋ*

tea   drink.IMP

'Take [more] tea.'   (Black book p12)

B: *mì-thuŋ*

NEG-drink.NEG

'I am not going to drink.' (I don't want to)   (Black book p12)

Future forms that take *-dʒi ìn/dàk* do not take a prefix but negate *ìn* with *màn*. In (253) the speaker was explaining to me what I could expect when taking part in a fasting ritual at the monastery. In (254) we see an unwavering truth in the negative.

(253) *ná: ŋárok   ʈhá-la   làb   sèr-dʒi   màn*

day.after.tomorrow   morning   up.to-LOC   speech   say-FUT   be.ASSERT.NEG

'[You] won't speak up to the morning of the third day.'   (Natural Chat-213)

(254) *pʰàlaŋ* *bòl* *tsé-i* *màn*

cow ball play-FUT be.ASSERT

'Cows don't play football.' (QUIS-1.2-105)

Perfective negative forms take the prefix *mà-* attached to the past verb stem. The evidential distinctions are the same as those found in affirmative sentences:

(255) *ŋà* *mà-phin*

I NEG-went

'I didn't go.' (Dolma Metadata-11)

(256) *ŋà* *mà-neː-s*

I NEG-fell.ill-PST.TES

'I didn't get sick.' (attested)

(257) *làm* *mà-dʒor*

road NEG-found

'[He] didn't find the way.' (He didn't know which way to go) (QUIS-1.2-51)

(258) *phón* *mà-lep-soŋ*

phone NEG-arrived-PST.TES

'The phone didn't ring.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-46)

Perfect forms are also negated with the prefix *mà-* attached to the past verb stem but with the addition of conjunct/disjunct *-ot/-duk* as in the affirmative:

(259) *ŋà* *mà-phin-ot*

I NEG-went-PRF.ASSERT

'I haven't gone.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-265)

(260) *òdi* *kérgjal-gane* *ʃàu* *mà-kʰon-duk*

that man-ERG hat NEG-wore-PRF.TES

'That man isn't wearing a hat.' (Lit: 'hasn't worn/put on') (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-242)

2.3.12 Interrogatives

There are two question markers in Mùwe Ké which appear at the end of the verb string for both positive and negative forms. *-e* is used for yes/no questions and *-a* for questions with interrogative pronouns (§2.2.5). *-e* may also be attached to the end of a negative verb string to make a negative question.

(261) *kérmen dì: tʰèp   ʈó-gi-du-e*
       woman   this   book   read-IPFV-TES-Q
       'Is the woman reading a book?'   (QUIS Instructions-235)

(262) *tʃĭ: kʰì-gi-or-a*
       what   do-IPFV-ASSERT-Q
       'What are you doing?'   (First Sessions-3)

(263) *phé   mì-dʒug-du-e*
       barley.flour   NEG.IPFV-put-TES-Q
       'Isn't [she] putting barley flour?' (In the butter tea)   (Natural Chat-195)

These examples also show that, when suffixed, the /t/ in *òt* and *mèt* is reduced to a flap /r/ and the /k/ of *dùk* is dropped. This holds for the copulas and their auxiliary counterparts. In non-interrogative forms, testimonial *-soŋ* is interchangeable with *-s* (§2.3.8.3); however, question particle suffixation is only found with *-s*:

(264) *mòraŋ   lép-s-e*
       herself   arrived-PST.TES-Q
       'Did she herself arrive?'   (Natural Chat-102)

2.3.13 Verbalisers and Serial Verb Constructions

Mùwe Ké, like most languages of the region, exhibits **verbalisers** or so-called 'light' verbs. These are verbs with little semantic content of their own which combine with nouns or adjectives to function as a predicate. *kʰì:* and *kʰjà:* are by far the most common with hundreds of examples found in the data:

(265) *kʰìː* (PST. *tʃʰèː*, IMP. *kʰìː*, NEG. *kʰjet*)

    ŋà   *lèka*   *kʰì-gi-ot*

    I   work.N   VSR-IPFV-ASSERT

    'I am working.'   (Evidentiality and Volitionality-21)

    ŋà-la   *mén*   *kʰì-dʒi*   *ìn-e*

    I-DAT   medicine VSR-FUT   be.ASSERT-Q

    'Will you treat me?' (medically)   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-60)

    ŋà-la   *phón*   *kʰìː*

    I-DAT   phone   VSR.IMP

    'Call me!'   (Verum-Tenzi-verumFocus1-8-69)

(266) *kʰjàː* (PST. *kʰjàp*, IMP. *kʰjòp*, NEG. *kʰjak*)

    kérmen   *bòl*   *láta*   *kʰjà-i*

    woman   ball   kick.N   VSR-IPFV

    'The woman is kicking the ball.'   (QUIS-1.2-93)

    pʰòŋ   *tʃík* *pʰàlaŋ* *tʃík-la* *pʰèrka* *kʰjà-i-ga-duk*

    daughter a   cow   a-DAT   stick.N   VSR-IPFV-SPEC-TES

    'A woman is hitting a cow with a stick.' (Lit. 'sticking')   (QUIS-2.1-29)

    ùkpa-gadiː *khó-la* *só*   *kʰjàp*

    owl-ERG   he-DAT tooth VSR.PST

    'The owl bit him.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Tsultim-18)

Examples of other verbalisers from the data follow here with, by comparison, only tens of examples found in the data. It is worth noting that verbalisers may also function as regular lexical verbs (or perhaps more correctly, lexical verbs may also have a verbalising function). *tó*, for example, has a meaning of 'send' and may be used for sending letters (although one could argue that the noun 'mail' becomes the verb 'to mail') but the second example in (267) clearly shows a verbalisation resulting in the verb 'to draw'.

(267)   *tó* (PST. *táŋ*, IMP. *thóŋ*, NEG. *toŋ*)

mì: *tʃík*   *kháŋb-i*   *ʈʰàsa-na*   *mé*   *tó-i*
person   a   house-GEN   near-LOC   fire   VSR-IPFV
'A man was making a fire near the house.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-38)

ébi-gigane   *ùlu-gigane*   *rìu*   *táŋ*
grandmother-ERG   weaving.stick-INS   drawing.N   VSR.PST
'The old lady drew (a circle on the ground) with the weaving stick'

(kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-152)

(268)   *kú* (PST. *kúi*, IMP. *kúi*, NEG. *ku*)

dì   *kháŋba-la*   *tsúe*   *kú-an*   *sú*   *ìn-a*
this   house-DAT   colour   VSR-NMLS   who   be.ASSERT-Q
'Who painted this house?'   (TMA_122-156-8)
Source: [Looking at a house, recently painted] Who PAINT this house?
TMA (130) (Dahl 1985: 204)

(269)   *dzèt* (HONOURIFIC (all forms identical))

láwa   *tʃhákle*   *dzèt-gi-duk*
lama   work.H   VSR.H-IPFV-TES
'The lama is working.'   (attested)

Since (some) lexical verbs may function as verbalisers, those presented here do not make up a closed list and a more detailed study may reveal what may and may not be a verbaliser in Mùwe Ké.

Serial verb constructions are also found in Mùwe Ké with juxtaposed verbs that share an argument without any explicit coordinating conjunctions. These verbs differ to the verbalisers seen here in that they are also used individually with specific meanings. When combined, however, a new meaning is created which is sometimes but not always obvious from the sum of the parts. The first verb is always in present-future (default) form with TAM, finite suffixes, negators etc. falling on the second:

(270)   *dùru*   *damdase*   *sèr-sa-ru*   *sá*   *kháŋba*   *dzùŋ*   *tʰèt*

        here   Damodase   say-NMLS-LOC   land   house   hold   stayed

        'I settled land here in a place called Damodase.'   (Life Story Norbu-7)

(271)   *khó*   *lòk*   *ò-i-duk*

        he   turn   come-IPFV-TES

        'He is returning/coming back.'   (Serial Verbs-9)

I recognise and define serial verb constructions (SVCs) on a combination of both formal and semantic properties given by Aikhenvald (2006: §2): serial verbs function as a single predicate, are monoclausal, share the prosody of monoverbal clauses, share TAM, refer to a single event and share at least one argument. These are exemplified in turn after a random selection of serial verbs found in the data.

(272)   *lòk ò:*   turn + come   return, come back

        dzùŋ tʰò   hold + stay   settle (a piece of land)

        khúr ò: carry + come   bring

        khúr ḍò   carry + go   take

        nó: dʒùk   make a mistake + put   spoil, ruin

        tʰòe ḍò   flee + go   run after

        thón ò: emerge + come   come out

        lòk khér   turn + take   take back

        lòk tér   turn + give   give back

        pʰòr tʃók   put down + break   leave (it here), keep (the change)

Mùwe Ké SVCs function as a single predicate equal to monoverbal clauses and occupy only one functional slot within a clause. The verbs act together in a SVC as a syntactic whole. The verbs, for example, may not take distinct markers of syntactic dependency and this is seen in Mùwe Ké relative clause constructions (§2.5.5), which require a nominalised verb form, but may not take separate nominalisers. The nominaliser (or REDUP with nominalising function) is attached to the final verb in the construction but scopes over the entire SVC:

(273)   *tʰèi*   *lòk*   *ò:-o*   *mì:*   *dì:-gane*   *jòba*   *dzè:-soŋ*

        that   turn   came-REDUP   person   this-ERG   food   ate-PST.TES

        'The man that returned ate rice.'   (Serial Verbs-1)

(274)   *ŋè-i*   *pʰìza-la*   *nó:*   *dʒùk-en*   *mì:*   *dì:-la*

          I-GEN   son-DAT make.a.mistake put-NMLS person this-DAT

          ŋè-i-gane   *láta*   *kʰjàp*

          I-ERG-ERG   kick.N   VSR.PST

          'I kicked the man that ruined my son.'   (Serial Verbs-2)

Native speaker intuition when translating from Mùwe Ké to English, a language with SVCs, gives further evidence for SVCs functioning as a single predicate as they are always translated as a single verb. While this is not a perfect test, all of the above examples of SVCs were translated without any major hesitation into mono-verbal clauses in English seen in (272).

Mùwe Ké SVCs may also be shown to be monopredicative through looking at answers to yes/no questions. Since there is no real equivalent to 'yes' or 'no' in the language, affirmative answers are given by repeating the verb string and in the case of SVCs both verbs must be repeated lest the individual meaning of one verb be given:

(275)   *khó-la*   *nó:*   *tʃúk-s-e*

          he-DAT   make.a.mistake   put.PST-TES-Q

          'Did (he) ruin him?'   (Serial Verbs-5)

          nó: *tʃúk-s*

          make.a.mistake   put.PST-PST.TES

          '(Yes, he) ruined (him).'   (Serial Verbs-6)

          #tʃúk-s

          put.PST-PST.TES

          '(He) put (him).'   (elicited)

Following from the monopredicative nature of Mùwe Ké SVCs, they may also be said to be monoclausal and, as seen above with relative clauses, may not take distinct markers of syntactic dependency so as to be distinguished from multiclausal structures like coordination, subordination etc. The following two examples differ only in the non-final clause marker *-dʒi-ni*, which alters the meaning quite drastically. It is conceivable in a narrative that the utterance in (276) may appear without the testimonial *-soŋ* (see (278)) and convey either of the meanings of (276) or (277), depending on the prosody.

(276) *khú-i-gane*   *gìlas*   *pʰòr*   *tʃák-soŋ*
he-ERG-ERG   glass   put.down   broke-PST.TES
'He kept the glass.'   (Serial Verbs-8)

(277) *khú-i-gane*   *gìlas*   *pʰòr-dʒi-ni*   *tʃák-soŋ*
he-ERG-ERG   glass   put.down-CONN-TOP   broke-PST.TES
'He put down the glass and then (intentionally) broke it.'   (elicited)

Based on an extremely cursory investigation, Mùwe Ké SVCs appear to share the prosody of monoverbal clauses and certainly differ from multiclausal constructions. In a narrative, where testimonial evidentials are not required, (278) may convey either of the meanings just discussed due to the fact that the present and past forms of *pʰòr* are identical and that although the past form of *tʃák* is distinct, it is the second verb in a SVC that carries the TAM. The main prosodic differences are that a short pause is heard between verbs in a multiclausal construction while a SVC appears to share the prosody of a single disyllabic verb. The tone of the second verb in a multiclausal construction, therefore, follows the tonal requirements of monosyllabic word while in a SVC, it will follow those of the second syllable in a polysyllabic word (§2.1.4).

(278) *khú-i-gane*   *gìlas*   *pʰòr*   *tʃák*
he-ERG-ERG   glass   put.down(.PST)   broke
'He kept the glass.'   (elicited)
'He put down the glass and then (intentionally) broke it.'

Tense and aspect as well as suffixes for conjunct/disjunct, evidentiality, volition, negation, imperative mood etc. are shared between the individual verbs of a Mùwe Ké SVC. Aspectual categories, for example, may only be marked once per SVC and likewise there may only be one negator. The example from above, repeated here, contrasts with (279) in that the verbs in the latter are marked individually while in the former the aspect and testimonial evidentiality in shared.

(276) *khú-i-gane*   *gìlas*   *pʰòr*   *tʃák-soŋ*
he-ERG-ERG   glass   put.down   broke-PST.TES
'He kept the glass.'   (Serial Verbs-8)

(279) *khú-i-gane   gìlas   pʰòr-soŋ   tʃák-soŋ*

he-ERG-ERG   glass   put.down   broke-PST.TES

'He put down the glass (and then) broke (it).'   (Serial Verbs-7)

Similarly, more than one negator is not permitted on Mùwe Ké SVCs:

(280) *khó   lòk   m-e-duk*

he   turn   NEG.IPFV-come-TES

'He is not returning.'   (Serial Verbs-11)

khó   *mì-/*mà-lòk   m-e-duk

he   NEG.IPFV-/NEG-turn   NEG.IPFV-come-TES

Intended: 'He is not returning.'   (elicited)

Finally, it is clear from examples like (276) that the SVC refers to a single event and indeed it is reported to be so from the intuition of my language assistants; it certainly contrasts with the multiple events that are described by the two verbs individually. Furthermore the examples clearly show that, as with prototypical SVCs, at least one argument is shared – in these examples the subject is always shared – and the overall argument structure of each SVC has no more complexity than that of either one of its components.

2.4   Grammatical Relations

Van Valin (2001: §2.2), among many others, points out that grammatical relations may not be identified cross-linguistically through any specific morphosyntactic phenomenon (or group of phenomena). Instead, he lists constructions that have strong tendencies in involving certain grammatical relations, which I go through here with elicited examples from Mùwe Ké.

A distinction is made between coding properties and behavioural properties, the former being mostly morphological and the latter syntactic. Coding properties include verb agreement, case marking and the position of arguments in a sentence; however, none of these prove very useful in identifying grammatical relations in Mùwe Ké as there is not any verb agreement in the strict sense (although there is conjunct/disjunct marking (§2.3.5) but this has more to do with evidentiality), case marking does not always correlate with grammatical relations and the order of arguments within a sentence is relatively free. Therefore, the analysis here will look at the behavioural properties of terms, i.e. their possible involvement in various constructions.

It is worth noting the case marking patterns relevant to the classification of transitive verbs here. Mùwe Ké transitive verbs fall into three classes according to the case pattern that they trigger, shown here in Table 9 with corresponding examples in (281) to (283).

ERG ABS	*khér* 'take', *thó* 'see'
ERG DAT	*tá* 'look', *tʰ ù꞉* 'hit/beat'
DAT ABS	*dʒòr* 'find/receive', *kʰà* 'love'

Table 9. Mùwe Ké Transitive Verb Classes

(281) ERG ABS *khú-i-gane*   *tʰèp*   *khér-soŋ*

he-ERG-ERG   book   took-PST.TES

'He took the book.'   (Grammatical Relations-37)

(282) ERG DAT *mù-i-gane*   *mèntok-la*   *té꞉-soŋ*

she-ERG-ERG   flower-DAT   looked-PST.TES

'She looked at the flower.'   (Grammatical Relations-38)

(283) DAT ABS *ŋà-la*   *sér*   *dʒòr-soŋ*

I-DAT   gold   found-PST.TES

'I found gold.'   (Grammatical Relations-40)

kí꞉-la   *ŋà*   *kʰà-i-duk*

dog-DAT   I   love-IPFV-TES

'I love dogs.'   (Grammatical Relations-41)

I look first at the behavioural properties of subject in both simple and complex sentences (§2.4.1) and then similarly for direct (§2.4.2) and indirect (§2.4.3) object. A review table of the constructions investigated for subject and direct object is presented here first:

	Subject	Object
Simple sentences		
Imperative	✓	
Reflexivisation	✓	
Wh- question formation	✓	✓
Cleft formation	*not found*	
Passive subject	*not found*	
Dative shift	*not found*	
Applicative	*not found*	
Complex sentences		
Relative clause formation	✓	✓
Matrix-coding/raising	*not found*	
Control structure	✓	
Conjunction reduction – omitted NP	✓	
Conjunction reduction – controller	✓	✓

Table 10. Subject and direct object properties in Mùwe Ké

2.4.1 Subject Properties

The Mùwe Ké **imperative** targets second-person subjects, which may be omitted and interpreted as one's interlocutor. The imperative has its own verb stem form (see §2.3.2 & §2.3.10).

(284)　*óu　　dzì-daŋ*
　　　　uncle　look.H.IMP-JUSS
　　　　'Uncle, (please) look!'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Lama Breakfast-11)

(285)　*ʃók*
　　　　come.IMP
　　　　'Come!'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Swadesh_51-100-14)

(286)　*ták　　pʰòr*
　　　　tiger　put.down.IMP
　　　　'Put down the tiger!'　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-132)

Reflexive constructions also involve subjects and in Mùwe Ké it is only the subject that may be the antecedent. In the first two examples here the antecedent is the subject and reflexive pronouns are used felicitously. (288) shows that, since Mùwe Ké reflexive pronouns must agree in gender, the antecedent must be 'younger sister' rather than Tashi (male), the possessor. In (289) we see that if the antecedent is to be a direct object, again due to the gender agreement – while many Mùwa names are gender neutral, Wangpo is only used for males and Dolma for females – *mòre* 'her own' is used instead while *mòraŋ* 'herself' yields an ungrammatical sentence. This is consistent with the discussion on object properties below.

(287)   *ʈáʃiᵢ-gane   khóraŋᵢ-la   thóŋ-soŋ*

          Tashi-ERG   himself-DAT   saw-PST.TES

          'Tashiᵢ saw himselfᵢ.'   (Grammatical Relations-5)

(288)   *ʈáʃiᵢ-gi   nùːⱼ-gane   mòraŋⱼ-la/(*khóraŋᵢ-la)*

          Tashi-GEN   younger.sister-ERG   herself-DAT/(*himself-DAT)

          thóŋ-soŋ

          saw-PST.TES

          'Tashiᵢ's sisterⱼ saw herselfⱼ/*himselfᵢ.'   (Grammatical Relations-6)

(289)   *wáŋpoᵢ-gane ɖòlmaⱼ-la   moreⱼ/(*mòraŋ)   kór-la   néː-soŋ*

          Wangpo-ERG dolma-DAT her.own/(*herself) about-LOC told-PST.TES

          'Wangpo told Dolma about herself.'   (Grammatical Relations-8)

In some languages **wh- questions** and **clefts** are highly constrained, as in the Malagasy examples from Van Valin (2001: 43), where, if the question word is a direct argument, it must be the subject. Mùwe Ké, on the other hand, is decidedly unconstrained with wh- questions, arguments instead being mainly identified through case marking:

(290)   *ŋè-i   jòba súi-gane   dzèː-s-a*

          I-GEN   food   who-ERG-ERG ate-PST.TES-Q

          'Who ate my food?'   (Grammatical Relations-15)

(291)   *àŋmo-gane   sú-la   thóŋ-s-a*

          Wangmo-ERG who-DAT saw-PST.TES-Q

          'Who did Wangmo see?'   (Grammatical Relations-16)

(292) *ʈáʃì-gane*   *jòba*   *sú-la*   *tét-s-a*
　　　 Tashi-ERG   food   who-DAT   gave-PST.TES-Q
　　　 'To whom did Tashi give the food?'　　　　　　　　(Grammatical Relations-17)

Complex sentences provide further tests for subject.

Relative clause formation provides a useful test in some languages as to that which may be the head (i.e. the common argument) of the relative clause. In Mùwe Ké, nominalised verb forms are used to modify the head NP, which may be a subject, object, etc. Subjects that are actor arguments of a [+CONTROL] verb may be distinguished in that the verb within the relative clause requires the nominaliser *-gen* while in all other cases reduplication occurs (see §2.5.5). In the following examples, the relative clause is seen in [square brackets] and the head is underlined.

(293) *ŋè-i-gane*   [*ʈáʃì-la*   *tʰùŋ-en*]   <u>*mì:-la*</u>   *làb*   *né:*
　　　 I-ERG-ERG   Tashi-DAT   hit-NMLS   person-DAT   speech   told
　　　 'I talked to the man who hit Tashi.' (Head=subject of 'hit')　　　(elicited)

(294) *ŋè-i-gane*   [*ʈáʃì-gane*   *tʰù:-du:*]   <u>*mì:-la*</u>   *làb*   *né:*
　　　 I-ERG-ERG   Tashi-ERG   hit.PST-REDUP   person-DAT   speech   told
　　　 'I talked to the man who Tashi hit.' (Head=direct object of 'hit')　　　(elicited)

(295) *ŋè-i-gane*   [*ʈáʃì-gane*   *ŋúl*   *tét-det*]   <u>*pʰìza-la*</u>   *làb*   *né:*
　　　 I-ERG-ERG   Tashi-ERG   money   gave-REDUP   son-DAT   speech   told
　　　 'I talked to the boy to whom Tashi gave money.' (Head=indirect object of 'give')
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(elicited)

So-called **matrix-coding constructions** or **raising constructions** (Van Valin 2001: 49) have not been found in Mùwe Ké.

Control structure constructions (aka equi-NP-deletion) (Van Valin 2001: 53) in Mùwe Ké show that missing arguments in embedded clauses are subjects. In these constructions, the actor argument in the embedded clause must obligatorily be omitted as the following examples show:

(296) *ʈáʃì-gane*   *dʒàl*   *bèt-dʒi*   *tár*   *tʃʰèː-soŋ*
Tashi-ERG   window   open-CONN   preparation   did-PST.TES
'Tashi tried to open the window.'

(297) *ʈáʃì-gane*   *dʒòn-la*   *dʒàl*   *bèt-dʒi-la*
Tashi-ERG   Jon-DAT   window   open-CONN-LOC

ʃúk   *kʰjàb-soŋ*
force.N   VSR.PST-PST.TES
'Tashi forced Jon to open the window.'

In both examples ungrammatical sentences are yielded if another argument is added anywhere in the sentence. This includes repeating 'Tashi' or 'Jon' as well as trying to add a second or third actor in a sentence resembling the English 'Tashi forced Jon (for) Wangmo to open the window.' The structures of (296) and (297) are given in the following two tables:

MATRIX CLAUSE				
*ʈáʃì-gane	~~*ʈáʃì*~~ *dʒàl* *bèt-dʒi*		*tár*	*tʃʰèː-so*
*Tashi-ERG	~~Tashi~~ window open-CONN		preparation	did-PST.TES
	EMBEDDED CLAUSE			

MATRIX CLAUSE				
ʈáʃìᵢ-gane	____ᵢ *dʒàl* *bèt-dʒi*		*tár*	*tʃʰèː-soŋ*
Tashi-ERG	window open-CONN		preparation	did-PST.TES
	EMBEDDED CLAUSE			

Figure 7. The structure of the control construction in example (296)

Figure 8. The structure of the control construction in example (297)

In both examples the missing argument must be the subject, as is shown for if the embedded clause were complete. However, for Mùwe Ké verbs like 'try' (lit. 'to make preparations'), it is the subject of the matrix clause that is the controller in the embedded clause while for verbs such as 'force', it is the direct object that is the controller.

Conjunction reduction constructions involve omitted arguments in coordinate constructions (Van Valin 2001: 56). Two or more clauses make up a construction with only the first clause *not* missing an argument. That which may be omitted is of interest here.

(298) *a.* *àŋmo-gane* *ṭáʃi-la* *thóŋ-dʒi-ni* *mù-i-gane*

Wangmo-ERG Tashi-DAT saw-CONN-CONN she-ERG-ERG

khó-la *láta* *kʰjàb-s*

he-DAT kick.N VSR.PST-PST.TES

'Wangmo saw Tashi and she kicked him.' (Grammatical Relations-28)

b. *àŋmo-gane* *ṭáʃi-la* *thóŋ-dʒi-ni* _____ *khó-la*

Wangmo-ERG Tashi-DAT saw-CONN-CONN _____ he-DAT

láta *kʰjàb-s*

kick.N VSR.PST-PST.TES

'Wangmo saw Tashi and _____ kicked him.' (Black book p165)

c. *àŋmo-gane   ʈáʃì-la   thóŋ-dʑi-ni   mù-i-gane

   Wangmo-ERG   Tashi-DAT   saw-CONN-CONN   she-ERG-ERG

   _____   láta   kʰjàb-s

   _____   kick.N   VSR.PST-PST.TES

   Intended: 'Wangmo saw Tashi and she kicked ____.'   (elicited)

d. ?àŋmo-gane   ʈáʃì-la   thóŋ-dʑi-ni   ____   ____

   Wangmo-ERG   Tashi-DAT   saw-CONN-CONN   ____   ____

   láta   kʰjàb-s

   kick.N   VSR.PST-PST.TES

   Intended: 'Wangmo saw Tashi and ____ kicked ____.'   (elicited)

In (298), (a) shows a coordinate construction with two clauses [Wangmo saw Tashi] and [Wangmo kicked Tashi] linked by the non-finite connector -dʑi-ni. All arguments are present. In (b) the subject is omitted in the second clause and the sentence is still grammatical. In (c) the omission of the direct object in the second clause yields an ungrammatical sentence and in (d), when both arguments are removed in the second clause, the result sounded strange but not impossible to my language assistant, who said it could be possible if the fact that Wangmo and Tashi were the only two people present was already in the common ground between interlocutors.

I give two more examples here to show that it may only be the subject argument that is omitted in the second clause. In both examples, I put the omissible subjects in brackets; the direct objects 'rice beer' and 'dishes' may not be omitted. It is interesting to note that in (299) a pronoun is not possible due to the fact that the actions are simultaneous and the insertion of a pronoun would give the meaning that someone other than Jon is drinking rice beer.

(299)   dʑòn   jòba   sà-i-duk   (dʑòn)/(*khó)   tʃháŋ   thú-i-duk

       Jon   rice   eat-IPFV-TES   (Jon)/(*he)   rice.beer   drink-IPFV-TES

       'Jon is eating rice and (Jon/he is) drinking rice beer.'   (Grammatical Realtions-29-30)

(300)   *àŋmo-gane   jòba   dzè:-dʒi-ni*

           Wangmo-ERG   rice   ate-CONN-CONN

           (àŋmo-gane)/(mù-i-gane)   bàwar   ʈúi-soŋ

           (Wangmo-ERG)/(she-ERG-ERG) dirty.dishes washed-PST.TES

           'Wangmo ate rice and (Wangmo)/(she) washed the dishes.   (Grammatical Realtions-31-32)

2.4.2   Direct Object

The behavioural properties of direct objects in simple sentences in Mùwe Ké do not help in identifying a direct object since, as seen above, direct objects are not possible antecedents of reflexive pronouns and since there is no passive voice in the language, passivisation and the so-called 'dative shift', where arguments not normally appearing as direct objects are realised as such (Van Valin 2001: 60), do not occur. Similarly, applicative constructions, which allow arguments to appear as direct objects, found, for example, in Bantu languages (2001: 62), do not occur in Mùwe Ké.

As above, matrix-coding constructions, which would allow the embedded clause subject to appear as the matrix clause direct object is not found. English sentences such as 'David believes (that) the students…' and 'David believes the students to have…' are expressed identically in Mùwe Ké.

Control structures, however, do allow the direct object argument of the matrix verb to act as the controller in the omitted argument of the embedded clause as we saw above in (297), repeated here for convenience:

(297)   *ʈáʃì-gane   dʒòn-la   dʒàl   bèt-dʒi-la*

           Tashi-ERG   Jon-DAT   window   open-CONN-LOC

           ʃúk   kʰjàb-soŋ

           force.N   VSR.PST-PST.TES

           'Tashi forced Jon to open the window.'   (Grammatical Relations-27)

Again, as seen above in examples (293) to (295), relative clause formation with reduplicated verb forms in Mùwe Ké allows the head of the relative clause to function as subject, (in)direct object, etc.

2.4.3   Indirect Object

The main property shared by indirect objects is semantic rather than morphosyntactic in that that which they typically code is the recipient argument in a ditransitive construction (Van Valin 2001: 67). Ditransitive verbs in Mùwe Ké follow the case-marking pattern of ergative, absolutive and dative for subject, direct object and indirect object, respectively.

(301)   *tsériŋ-gane*   *ʈáʃi-la*   *ŋúl*   *tét-soŋ*
      Tsering-ERG   Tashi-DAT   money   gave-PST.TES
      'Tsering gave money to Tashi.'   (Grammatical Relations-42)

(302)   *mù-i-gane*   *khjó-la*   *kédʒa*   *ʈʰì-i*   *dàk*
      she-ERG-ERG   you.SG-DAT   question   ask-FUT   be.ASSERT
      'She will ask you a question.'   (QUIS Instructions-109)

In summary, Table 11 shows the properties discussed above with regard to grammatical relations in Mùwe Ké. Case marking serves only in the identification of subject in the language since only subject may be marked as ergative while absolutive also marks direct object and dative marking is similarly found on direct and indirect objects. Imperative and reflexive constructions target subjects in Mùwe Ké and in complex sentences, subjects may be identified as the head of a relative clause nominalised with *-gen*, the omitted argument in a control structure construction and the omitted NP in a conjunction reduction construction. The direct object is targeted only by force-type control constructions where it is the controller in the embedded clause. No clear morphosyntactic characterisation is found for the indirect object relation.

			Subject	Direct Object
Simple sentences	*Coding properties*	Ergative case marking	✓	
	Behavioural properties	Imperative	✓	
		Reflexivisation	✓	
Complex sentences		Relative clause formation with *-gen*	✓	
		Control-omitted argument	✓	
		Control in force-type control construction		✓
		Conjunction reduction – omitted NP	✓	

Table 11. Properties of Mùwe Ké subject, direct and indirect object

With particular reference to case marking relevant to later discussions, only A may receive ergative case marking and differential marking is only found with the ergative case marker, the conditions of which are discussed in §4.2.

2.5   Clause and Sentence Structure

In this chapter I look first at prototypical word order in Mùwe Ké in §2.5.1 and the coordination of two or more elements in §2.5.2. §2.5.3 illustrates the various adverbial clauses found in the language, §2.5.4 looks at complementation and §2.5.5 at relativisation.

2.5.1   Word Order

I choose to avoid a description of 'prototypical word order' in Mùwe Ké due simply to the fact that there is not one save for the sentence-final verb. A cursory statistical analysis of the data I have collected reveals SOV to be the preferred ordering but that is not to say that OSV is by any means less acceptable and this is agreed by all of my language assistants. Moreover, I see no advantage to the current study in defining SOV as prototypical due to the result of usage statistics or any other form of analysis when native speakers consistently report on the freedom of constituents in all-new presentational sentences (§4.5.1). If there is no highlighting of focal elements or similar IS-related tendencies (§4), elements may appear in any order. In the following examples, which include four terms (an actor *'Tashi'*, an undergoer *'Dolma'*, and

two adverbials, one of time *'yesterday'* and one of place *'in the house'*) there are restrictions on the case markers, which attach after an NP, and the sentence-final verb, but not at all on the order of the four terms:

(303) *dàŋ*   *khàŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
      yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
      'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-7)

(304) *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *dàŋ*   *khàŋba-ru*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
      Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   yesterday   house-LOC   saw-PST.TES
      'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

(305) *dàŋ*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *khàŋba-ru*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
      yesterday   Tashi-ERG   house-LOC   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
      'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-1)

(306) *khàŋba-ru*   *ɖòlma-la*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *dàŋ*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
      house-LOC   Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG   yesterday   saw-PST.TES
      'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-5)

With four elements, there are a possible 24 combinations, which are not listed here in their entirety; suffice to say that my language assistants consistently report on the grammaticality and felicity of each permutation. Hypotheses of subject/object coming before adverbials, or vice versa, and actor preceding undergoer etc. have been posited but these correlate neither with the natural speech data nor felicity judgement tasks. Any order is possible if the verb appears sentence-finally; however, if the verb is placed at any other position, the utterance is consistently deemed ungrammatical as the next two examples show:

(307) ***thóŋ-soŋ**   *dàŋ*   *khàŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*
      saw-PST.TES   yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT
      Intended: 'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

(308) **dàŋ*   *khàŋba-ru*   ***thóŋ-soŋ***   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*
      yesterday   house-LOC   **saw-PST.TES**   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT
      Intended: 'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

One other word-order restriction relevant to subsequent sections is that question pronouns (§2.2.5) must appear in immediately preverbal position; question pronouns in any position other than preverbal are consistently considered ungrammatical:

(309) *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   **sú-la**   *thóŋ-s-a*
      yesterday   house-LOC   tashi-ERG   **who-DAT**   saw-PST.TES-Q
      'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-11)

(310) **dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   **sú-la**   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *thóŋ-s-a*
      yesterday   house-LOC   **who-DAT**   tashi-ERG   saw-PST.TES-Q
      Intended: 'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-13)

(311) ***sú-la**   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *thóŋ-s-a*
      who-DAT   yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   saw-PST.TES-Q
      Intended: 'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-14)

2.5.2 Coordination

The simplest form of coordination in Mùwe Ké is the simple juxtaposition of clauses with an optional 'and then' or similar in between:

(312) *dòrdʒe*   *tshóŋkhaŋ*   *phín-s*   *tʰèni*   *khú-i-gane*   *khóre*   *rò:*
      Dorjee   shop   went-PST.TES   then   he-ERG-ERG   his.own   friend

      thúk-s   *tʰèni*   *kháŋba-ru*   *phín-s*   *tʰèni*   *khú-i-gane*
      met-PST.TES   then   house-LOC   went-PST.TES   then   he-ERG-ERG

      kʰjàsen   *dzùe-s*
      bean   make-PST.TES
      'Dorjee went to the shop, then he met his own friend, then [he] went home, then he cooked beans.'   (Coordination-1)

What is more commonly found, however, is the use of *-dʒi-ni*, which in adverbial clauses of time has the meaning of 'after'. Here it serves as a non-final marker and while my language assistant tells me that it is grammatically possible to put it at the end of each clause in (312), it "sounds too long" and is a little overkill. Instead, *-dʒi-ni* fits comfortable at the end of the penultimate clause as in (313) and may be omitted between the others.

(313)　…*kháŋba-ru　phín-dʒi-ni　　　khú-i-gane　kʰjàsen　dzùe-s*

　　　…house-LOC　went-CONN-CONN　he-ERG-ERG　bean　　make-PST.TES

　　　'…then [he] went home, then he cooked beans.'　　　　　　　　　(Coordination-2)

-dʒi-ni also serves as a non-final clause marker and as such makes the distinction clear between serial verbs (§2.3.13) and actions performed in succession. Compare:

(314)　*mì:　　tʃík　tébul　khúr　ɖò-i*

　　　person　a　　table　carry　go-IPFV

　　　'A person is taking the table (away).'　　　　　　　　　　　　(QUIS-1.2-206)

(315)　*pʰòŋ　　　tʃík　pʰèrka　khúr-dʒi-ni　　　ɖò-i-ga-duk*

　　　daughter　a　　stick.N　carried-CONN-CONN　go-IPFV-SPEC-TES

　　　'A girl picked up a stick and is going.'　　　　　　　　　　(QUIS-2.1-28)

There are no real coordinating conjunctions used in Mùwe Ké. In (316) either an 'and' or 'but' meaning may be rendered in English. In Mùwe Ké it is possible to add *ìnajaŋ* 'but' (almost certainly borrowed from Tibetan) between clauses although it is not required.

(316)　*ʈáʃì　nùe-s　　　ténzi　kʰò:　　ʃór-s*

　　　Tashi　cried-PST.TES　Tenzin　laugh.N　escaped-PST.TES

　　　'Tashi cried and/but Tenzin laughed.'　　　　　　　　　　(Coordination-3)

However, NPs and adjectives may be coordinated with the associative case marker *-daŋ*:

(317)　*mù-i-gane　kʰjàsen-daŋ　jòba-daŋ　ʃá　　dzùe-s*

　　　she-ERG-ERG　bean-ASSOC　rice-ASSOC　meat　made-PST.TES

　　　'She cooked beans and rice and meat.　　　　　　　　　(Coordination-4)

(318)　*ʃápale　dì:　　ʃibu-daŋ　　tshándi　dùk*

　　　pasty　this　tasty-ASSOC　hot　　　exist.TES

　　　'The pasty is tasty and hot.'　　　　　　　　　　　　(Coordination-5)

The associative is similarly used in the negative for 'neither *x* nor *y*':

(319) ŋà kʰjàkar ké-daŋ   índʒi ké   kʰjàk

I   India   language-ASSOC   English language VSR.NEG

mì-ʃe-ot

NEG-know-ASSERT

'I don't speak Hindi or English.'   (Coordination-6)

(Lit: I don't know [how] to speak…)

Negative 'neither…nor' may also be expressed with *àŋ* 'also':

(320) ŋè-i-gane dʒàl   àŋ   mà-tʃak   kʰò   àŋ   mà-tʃak

I-ERG-ERG window also NEG-broke door also NEG-broke

'I broke neither the window nor the door.'

Disjunction (*x* or *y*) obligatorily displays modality. The speaker knows that one thing or the other happened and so cannot make an assertive or testimonial evidential distinction:

(321) gàri nàŋ-la òː-o   ìn-om   kíː námd̪ul-ne

car   in-LOC came-REDUP be.ASSERT-POSSBL or   aeroplane-ABL

òː-o   ìn-om

came-REDUP be.ASSERT-POSSBL

'[He] either came by car or plane.'   (Coordination-8)

(Lit: [He] maybe came in a car or…)

Exclusion (*x* and not *y*) is once again expressed with mere juxtaposition:

(322) ŋè-i-gane ʃá   dìː   dzèː kʰjàsen dìː   mà-dzeː

I-ERG-ERG meat this ate   bean   this NEG-ate

'I ate the meat [but] not the beans.'   (Coordination-9)

2.5.3 Adverbial Clauses

Adverbial clauses of time, location, etc. are formed with subordinating particles to show the relationship between the clauses. I list the most common Mùwe Ké subordinating connectives here.

2.5.3.1 Time

-dʒi-ni, seen above as a coordinating connective (§2.5.2), is also used for 'after' with a past verb stem:

(323)   *pʰòŋ   dì: kʰjù: phín   má-la   ʈʰùl-gi*

daughter   this   ran   went   down-LOC   fall-IPFV

'The girl ran away and is falling down.'   (QUIS-2.1-114)

ʈʰùl-dʒi-ni   pʰòŋ   já-la   lá:-gi

fell-CONN-CONN   daughter   up-LOC   get.up-IPFV

'After [she] fell the girl is getting up.'   (QUIS-2.1-115)

(324)   *mátitʃaura   phín-dʒi-ni   hù   tʃĭ   kʰì-gen-a*

Matichaur   went-CONN-CONN   we.INCL   what   do-NMLS-Q

'After we go to Matichaur, what will we do?'   (Tomorrow-17)

Perfect assertions – V.PST-*ot* (§2.3.8.4) – may take *-aŋ(-ne)* for 'after':

(325)   *bòtol   dì   tʃhák*

bottle   this   broke

'The bottle broke.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Dawa-25)

tʃhák-or-aŋ-ne   tʰèni   òdi   kjú:-gane   ráruk-la   tʰà:

broke-PRF.ASSERT-CONN-ABL   then   that   puppy-ERG   child-DAT   lick.N

tʃʰè-soŋ

VSR-PST.TES

'After the bottle had broken then that puppy licked the boy.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Dawa-26)

(326)   *mò: púŋba-la   só   kʰjàb*

she   forearm-DAT   tooth   VSR.PST

'She bit [his] forearm.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-32)

(327)   *tʰèni   ʈíka   só   kʰjàb-or-aŋ-ne   mòraŋ   ʃít*

then   immediately   tooth   VSR.PST-PRF.ASSERT-CONN-ABL   herself   died

'Then as soon as [she] had bitten [him], *she* died.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-33)

The construction *mà*-V.PST-LOC is used for 'before'. In addition it may similarly mean 'without *x*-ing' as seen in (330) which has the same meaning of the other two examples in that the actor did *y* before she had managed to do *x*.

(328) *pʰòŋ   bàwar   mà-ʈui-la   phón   léb-s*
       daughter   dirty.dishes   NEG-washed-LOC   phone   arrived-PST.TES
       'The phone rang before the girl had washed the dishes.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-24)

(329) *tsériŋ   mà-lep-la   ù: ɖò-joŋ*
       Tsering   NEG-arrived-LOC   we.INCL   go-FUT
       'We'll go before Tsering gets here.'   (Adverbial Clauses-1)

(330) *làm   mà-dʒor   ʈómʈar   mà-khoː-la   lòk   òː*
       road   NEG-found   tomato   NEG-brought-LOC   returned   came
       '[He] didn't find the way [to the market] so he came back without bringing
       tomatoes.' (Before he had brought…)   (QUIS-1.2-53)

The notion of 'when' is expressed with the past verb stem and *-phadzo(-la)*. The speaker is certain of the eventuality.

(331) *tsériŋ   lép-phadʒo-la   ù: ɖò-joŋ*
       Tsering   arrived-CONN-LOC   we.INCL   go-FUT
       'We'll go when Tsering arrives.'   (Adverbial Clauses-2)

(332) *kʰjòkdoŋ   dìː   ŋúl   dʒòr-phadzo-la   kérmen-la   ŋémba   ŋòe*
       boy   this   money   received-CONN-LOC   woman-DAT   gift   bought
       'When the boy received money, he bought the woman a present.'   (TMA_076-121-24)
       Source: [The boy used to receive a sum of money now and then] 'When the boy GET the money,
       he BUY a present for the girl.'
       TMA (102) (Dahl 1985: 202)

Simultaneous actions 'while *x, y*' are conveyed with *-ga(-ne)* (also see §2.2.7.2 for *-ga*).

(333) *kérmen   tʃík   kʰjàʈe   pʰàu-ga-ne   tébul   khúr   ɖò-i*
       woman   a   stairs   go.down-SPEC-ABL   table   carry   go-IPFV
       'A woman is carrying a table while going down the stairs.'   (QUIS-1.2-149)

(334)   *lèma*   *ɲíː-len-la*   *támu*   *tá-ga-ne*   *tʰùga*   *tʰùga*

        occassion   two-(TIMES)-LOC   movie   look-SPEC-ABL   time   time

        kʰùg-dʒi   *dàk*

        stop-FUT   be.ASSERT

        'While we are watching the movie for the second time we will stop from time to

        time.'   (QUIS Instructions)

(335)   *ráruk*   *òr-ga-ne*   *ískul*   *dà*   *phín-e*

        child   exist.ASSERT-SPEC-ABL   school   any   went-Q

        'When you were a child, did you go to school?'   (Dolma Metadata-10)

2.5.3.2   Location

The noun *sá* in Mùwe Ké, meaning 'place, ground, land', has been grammaticalised into the nominaliser *-sa* and is used to create locative adverbials with the meaning of 'the place where one *x*-s (eats, sleeps, etc.)' The nominaliser is attached to the present-future verb stem but carries no tense or aspect, which must, therefore, be attained from the main clause or from context. The nominalised form may take articles, case marking etc., like any NP.

(336)   *dìː*   *bòl*   *tsé-sa*   *ìn-ak*

        this   ball   play-NMLS   be.ASSERT-REVEL

        'Oh! This is the ball-playing place.'   (QUIS-4.3-60)

(337)   *tʰèni*   *kháŋba*   *màrbu*   *òt-sa*   *tʃĭk-la*   *kʰjùk*

        then   house   red   exist.ASSERT-NMLS   a-LOC   go.IMP

        'Then go to where there is a red house.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-108)

(338)   *ŋèwa*   *rè-sa-gi*   *tʰàsa-ru*   ...

        sun   set-NMLS-GEN   near-LOC

        'Near the sun setting place...'   (QUIS-3.1-196)

(339)   *ái*   *pʰàlaŋ*   *tshó-sa-ne*   *lòk*   *òː*

        older.brother   cow   graze-NMLS-ABL   returned   came

        'The older brother came back from the cow-grazing place'   (ái tʃăŋbu nòː láʈa-38)

2.5.3.3   Manner

Adverbial clauses of manner require a nominalised verb form – either with the nominaliser -*gen* or through reduplication – and the conditional particle -*dʒoŋ-la* (§2.5.3.5) with the meaning 'act like', 'act as if' or 'pretend like', that is, whether or not the manner of acting is based on truth is dependent on context. In (340), it could be that the girl has a cold or just a problem with her nose. (343), however, is from the story of a demon stepmother who pretends to treat the children well but later tries to kill them.

(340)   *mò: tʃhéba kʰjàb-gjab-dʒoŋ-la   làp   sèr-gi-duk*

      she   cold.N   VSR.PST-REDUP-COND-LOC   speech   say-IPFV-TES

      'She is speaking as if she has a cold.'   (Adverbial Clauses-3)

(341)   *ŋè-i-gane   né:-ne-dʒoŋ-la   khúr*

      I-ERG-ERG   told-REDUP-COND-LOC   carry.IMP

      'Carry (it) like I told you.'   (Adverbial Clauses-4)

(342)   *dù-ru   láŋbutʃhe kí:-la   tʃhú: dʒùg-gen-dʒoŋ-la   kʰì-i-duk*

      here-LOC   elephant   dog-DAT   water   put-NMLS-COND-LOC   do.VSR-IPFV-TES

      'Here the elephant is acting like he's putting water on the dog.

                                                  (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-249)

(343)   *pʰìza pʰòŋ   ŋó-la   làu   kʰì-gen-dʒoŋ-la   kʰì-gi-duk*

      son   daughter   both-DAT   good   do.VSR-NMLS-COND-LOC   do.VSR-IPFV-TES

      '[She] was pretending to treat both the son and daughter well.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-44)

(344)   *bìskut   sá-n-dʒòŋ-la   tʃhè:*

      biscuit   eat-NMLS-COND-LOC   did.VSR

      '(You) pretended to eat biscuits.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-85)

In addition, there are examples in the data of -*dzen*, which may only be used to convey that someone is intentionally pretending to do something:

(345)   *mò   nà-dzen   tʃhè:*

      she   get.sick-(PRETEND)   did.VSR

      'She pretended to be ill.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-121)

(346)   *ɖè-dzen*   *tʃʰè*

       slip-(PRETEND)   did.VSR

       '[She] pretended to slip.'   (óu tʰòm-39)

2.5.3.4   Purpose and Reason

Purpose and reason clauses are both formed with the present-future verb stem and *-gi-tsa-la* in Mùwe Ké. In (347) a short man was unable to see over the heads of the other people at the local festival.

(347)   *khó   támu   tá-i-tsa-la*   *dʒìːp   táː-ru   ʃòn-s*

       he   scene   look-CONN-CONN-LOC   jeep   on-LOC   got.on-PST.TES

       'In order to see the show, he climbed on a jeep.'   (Adverbial Clauses-5)

(348)   *khó   ʃá   làu   dʒòr-dʒi-tsa-la*   *kháŋba-ne   ŋòuma   phín-soŋ*

       he   meat   good   find-CONN-CONN-LOC   house-ABL   early   went-PST.TES

       'He left the house early in order to find good meat.'   (Adverbial Clauses-6)

(349)   *pʰòŋ   tʃĭk   òdi   bù   só-dʒi-tsa-la*   *òː*

       daughter   a   that   insect   kill-CONN-CONN-LOC   came

       'A girl came to kill that bug.'   (QUIS-2.1-132)

The question 'why'/'for what reason/purpose' is formed with the 'what' question pronoun:

(350)   *tʃ-i-dza-la*

       what-CONN-CONN-LOC

       'Why?'

This construction is quite often reduced to just the verb stem and the locative case marker:

(351)   *sáŋsirgu-la   mì   láwa   dà-la   ʃú-ru   phín*

       everywhere-LOC   person   lama   some-DAT   seek.counsel-LOC   went

       '[They] went everywhere to seek counsel from some lamas.'   (kʰyàlbu làkja tʰòndup-7)

(352)   *áwa-gane   tʰàŋʃo-la   pʰìza   tʃhé-la   ʈámaʈar   ŋò-ru   tsʰàŋ*

       mother-ERG   first-LOC   son   big-DAT   tomato   buy-LOC   sent

       'At first the mother sent the big (oldest) son to buy tomatoes.'   (QUIS-4.3-49)

2.5.3.5   Conditionals

I present simple, hypothetical, counterfactual and concessive conditionals in turn, loosely following Timberlake (2007: 321–6), who describes three cardinal patterns of conditional constructions: general (equating here to simple), counterfactual and potential (hypothetical). Simple/general/iterative conditionals refer to situations that occur off and on. When said situation occurs, a consequent situation is expected to also occur: 'if *x* happens, *y* will also; if *x* doesn't happen, neither will *y*'. Hypothetical/potential conditions have an uncertain fate but refer to things that may possibly come to pass; a simple conditional refers to things that either happen or do not, like raining or not, while hypothetical situations may not be very like to occur in the mind of the speaker, like running into an old friend or winning the lottery: 'if by some chance *x* comes to pass, expect *y*, otherwise expect the opposite.' Counterfactual conditions are known not to be 'real', actual or factual in the minds of speakers and therefore present an alternative reality. Winning the lottery, however unlikely, could actually happen, while my not being rich at the present time is a fact and therefore any scenario where I were rich is an alternative reality: '*x* is real/fact, but if we imagine the opposite of *x* were true, then we may expect *y*.' In the last section, I discuss concessive conditionals where no matter if *x* or its (usually undesirable) opposite occur, expect *y*.

Simple conditionals of the type 'If you heat water, it boils,' or 'If it's sunny, we'll have a picnic,' occur in Mùwe Ké with the addition of *(-a)-dʒoŋ-la* ((-NMLS)-COND-LOC) to a present-future verb stem to create the protasis ('if' clause) and with the apodosis (consequent) restricted to future verb strings, imperatives, or a copula verb. The nominaliser and/or locative are sometimes dropped in natural speech.

(353)   *khjó*   *pʰè-la*   *ʈʰòɖo*   *tsé-dʒoŋ-la*   *pʰè*   *'máo'*
        you.SG   cat-DAT   joke.N   play-COND-LOC   cat   'meow'

kʰì-dʒi   *dàk*
VSR-FUT   be.ASSERT

'If you tease the cat, it meows/will meow.'   (TMA_061-075-16)

Source: If you tease a cat, it MEOW

TMA - (75) (Dahl 1985: 201)

(354)   *khé*   *è-i*   *lóg-du*   *ɖòmbu*   *ò-a-dʒoŋ-la*
              you.PL   we.EXCL-GEN   place-LOC   guest   come-NMLS-COND-LOC

              kh-í   *káŋ*   *tʃó-gen-daŋ*   *mík*   *dòŋ-en*
              you.PL-GEN   leg   break-NMLS-ASSOC   eye   pull.out-NMLS

              'If you come as guests to our home, I'm going to break your legs and pull out your

              eyes.'   (ái tʃáŋbu nò: láʈa-57)

(355)   *khó*   *ɖò-a-dʒoŋ-la*   *khjó*   *àŋ*   *kʰjùk*
              he   go-NMLS-COND-LOC   you.SG   also   go.IMP

              'If he goes, go too.'   (Conditionals-6)

(356)   *khjó*   *rékʃi*   *pá-a-dʒoŋ*   *ŋè-i*   *nò:*   *in*
              you.SG   liquor   quit-NMLS-COND   I-GEN   younger.brother   be.ASSERT

              rékʃi   *mì-tu-a-dʒoŋ-la*   *ŋè-i*   *nò:*   *màn*
              liquor   NEG-stop-NMLS-COND-LOC   I-GEN   younger.brother   be.ASSERT.NEG

              'If you quit drinking you are my brother. If you don't stop drinking, you are not

              my brother.'   (Life Story-18)

The last example also shows that the (imperfective) negative marker *mì-* is used for negative protases.

When the same verb is used in both the protasis and apodosis, with the present form in the former and the imperative in the latter, a sense of 'If you want to V, then V' is given:

(357)   *ŋèwa*   *súm*   *ʃù:-dʒoŋ-la*   *ʃù:*
              day   three   enter-COND-LOC   enter.IMP

              'If you want to participate for three days, then participate.'   (Natural Chat 1-15)

(358)   *khjóraŋ*   *kʰjà:-dʒoŋ-la*   *kʰjòp*   *mà-kʰjak-dʒoŋ-la*
              yourself   VSR-COND-LOC   paint.IMP   NEG-VSR.NEG-COND-LOC

              mà-kʰjak
              NEG-VSR.NEG.IMP

              'If you want to paint [your house with mud], then paint [it]; if you don't want to

              paint [it], don't paint [it].'   (óu tʰòm-46)

Hypotheticals of the type, 'If I were to run into Brian…' are formed with past verb stems suffixed with the connector *-na* with a future verb sting in the apodosis. In (359), a father is talking about a large tree that is stopping the other trees in the orchard growing well:

(359) *òdi   pʰùŋ   túb-na   tʰèni   ʃèma   pʰùŋ   làu   òŋ-dʒi   ìn*
       that   tree   cut.PST-CONN   then   another   tree   good   come-FUT   be.ASSERT

'If we were to cut down that tree, then the other trees will be good.'

<div align="right">(QUIS-4.3-142)</div>

Similarly, in the next two examples, if the conditions were to come to pass, they would result in crying and pimples:

(360) *ráruk   dì   dʒìri   kʰjàb-na   ŋù-i   dàk*
       child   this   fear   VSR.PST-CONN   cry-FUT   be.ASSERT

'If this child were to become afraid, it will cry.' (Verbal Categories-3)

(361) *ŋè-i   ráruk-do   sùntala   dzèː-na   lìu-la   bùru*
       I-GEN   child-PL   orange   ate-CONN   body-LOC   pimples

thón-gi-ot
emerge-IPFV-ASSERT

'If my children were to eat oranges, they get pimples.' (Verbal Categories-29)

Counterfactuals of the type, 'If I were the president…' are formed with a nominalised (NMLS or REDUP) present-future verb stem and the connectors *(-de)-na*.

(362) *ŋà   mùa   ìn-gen-na   ŋà   mùwe   ké*
       I   Mùwa   be.ASSERT-NMLS-CONN   I   Mùwa.GEN   language

tsáŋma   sèr-dʒi   dàk
clean.ADJ   say-FUT   be.ASSERT

'If I were Mùwa, I would speak clear Mùwe Ké.' (Adverbial Clauses-7)

(363) *òdi*   *kʰjòkdoŋ-gane*   *dàŋ*   *ŋúl*   *dʒò-dʒor*

that   boy-ERG   yesterday   money   received-REDUP

iŋ-en-na   *kérmen-la*   *ŋémba*   *ŋò-i*   *dàk*

be.ASSERT-NMLS-CONN   woman-DAT   gift   buy-FUT   be.ASSERT

'If the boy had received the money yesterday, he would have bought a present for

the woman.'   (TMA_076-121-28)

Source: [The speaker knows the boy was expecting money and that he did not get it] If the boy

GET the money (yesterday), he BUY a present for the girl.

TMA – (106) (Dahl 1985: 202)

To highlight the difference between the conditionals presented, consider the following three

examples all revolving around a task in the QUIS involving a stolen watch.

(364) *ŋà:*   *tʃhúdzo*   *kúi*   *khér-ger*   *iŋ-dʒoŋ-la*   *ŋè-i*   *lìu*

I   watch   stole   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT-CONN-LOC   I-GEN   body

jò:

check.IMP

'If I am the one who stole the watch, search me!'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-97)

(365) *kh-í:*   *kérmen-gi*   *tʃhúdzo*   *ŋà:*   *kúma*   *kúi-na*   *tʃǐ:*   *kʰì:-dʒi*

you-GEN   woman-GEN   watch   I   thief   stole-CONN   what   do-FUT

'If I were to steal your woman's watch, what will (I) do (with it)?'

(QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-88)

(366) *kháŋb-i*   *nàŋ-la*   *òt-gen-na*   *kʰùnu*   *òŋ-dʒi-in-a*

house-GEN   in-LOC   exist.ASSERT-NMLS-CONN   where   come-FUT-ASSERT-Q

'If (the watch) were in the house, where will it be?'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-67)

The first (simple) example is saying 'If it was definitely me who stole the watch,' compared to

a hypothetical 'If I were to steal the watch,' in the second example. In the third example the

counterfactual is employed to pragmatically stress that the watch certainly is not in the house

and therefore 'I certainly didn't steal it.' Interestingly, these sentences may not speak to the

actual truth of reality but are employed to stringently profess one's innocence.

Concessive forms are comfortably formed with the hypothetical connector *-na* attached to a past verb stem:

(367) *nám   bàu-na   àŋ   ù: lúdzen   sá-joŋ*
      sky   fell-CONN   even   we.INCL   picnic   eat-FUT
      'Even if it rains, we will have a picnic.' (Adverbial Clauses-10)

(368) *khú-i-gadi: ró:-gi   kháŋba-ru   jòba   dzè:-na   àŋ   jàŋ*
      he-ERG-ERG   friend-GEN   house-LOC   food   ate-CONN   even   again

      dùru   àŋ   jòba   sà-i   ìn
      here   also   food   eat-fut   be.assert
      'Even if he eats at his friend's house, he will eat here again too.' (Conditionals-24)

2.5.3.6   Substitutive and Additive

Both substitutive and additive adverbial clauses are formed with the addition of *dʒi-ta-ne*:

(369) *sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-la   ɖò-i-ta-ne   ŋè-i-gane   kháŋba-ru   mómo*
      restaurant   in-LOC   go-CONN-CONN-ABL   I-ERG-ERG   house-LOC   momo

      dzùe
      made
      'Instead of going to the restaurant, I made momos at home.' (Adverbial Clauses-11)

(370) *khjóre   kʰòilak   ʈhú-i-ta-ne   khjóre   nò:-gi*
      your.own   clothes   wash-CONN-CONN-ABL   your.own   younger.brother-GEN

      kʰòilak   ʈhú-i   kʰò-i-sa   dùk
      clothes   wash-CONN   need-CONN-NMLS   exist.TES
      'In addition to washing your own clothes, you have to wash your own brother's clothes' (Adv. Cl.-12)

The distinction appears to be made through the verb string in the main clause although more research is needed.

2.5.4 Complementation

Complement clauses, which function as arguments of the main verb, are found in Mùwe Ké and I present ATTENTION, THINKING, DECIDING, LIKING and SPEAKING verb types after Dixon (2010: 395–9). The main strategies for complementation are nominalisation with *-a* for ongoing actions with additional reduplication for completed actions and *-dʒi* for 'future'.

ATTENTION-type verbs such as 'see' and 'hear' are seen here in the perceptions of ongoing actions and 'recognize' and 'discover' (which share the same form in Mùwe Ké) as the uncovering of facts, both ongoing (373) and completed (374):

(371) *ŋè-i-gane [ʈʰòma jòba dzò-a]   thóŋ-soŋ*
       I-ERG-ERG Dolma food make-NMLS saw-PST.TES
       'I saw [Dolma cooking rice]'   (Complementation-1)

(372) *[úrgen-gadi: kí:-la   kʰjà-a]   ŋè-i-gadi: tshór-soŋ*
       Urgen-ERG   dog-DAT hit-NMLS I-ERG-ERG heard-PST.TES
       'I heard [Urgen kicking (a) dog].'   (Complementation-3)

(373) *[mò: dzùn sèr-a]   ŋà há   kʰò-soŋ*
       she lie.N say-NMLS I   knowledge understood-PST.TES
       'I recognized [that she was lying].'   (Complementation-5)

(374) *[ʈáʃi-gadi: mètal tsáŋma dzòe-dzoe-a]   ŋè-i-gadi: há*
       Tashi-ERG car   clean.ADJ made-REDUP-NMLS I-ERG-ERG knowledge

       kʰò-soŋ
       understood-PST.TES
       'I discovered [that Tashi (had) cleaned the car].'   (Complementation-4)

Verbs of THINKING in Mùwe Ké, such as 'think' or 'dream', are not generally found and therefore rather than complementation, the strategy is to use locative phrases such as 'in my thoughts/mind/dream' to accompany a statement, which, with the addition of modal particles, also serve for 'assume' or 'suppose':

(375) *ʈʰòma-gi   sám-la   kárma   ŋóba   ìn*

Dolma-GEN   thought.N-LOC   Karma   madman   be.ASSERT

'Dolma thinks Karma is crazy.'   (Complementation-6)

'(Lit. 'In Dolma's thoughts, Karma is a madman.')

(376) *ŋè-i   sám-la   khjó-la   mùm-gi   làm   tʃhé*

I-GEN   thought.N-LOC   you.SG-DAT   Mugu.Village-GEN   road   knowledge

òt-ʈho

exist.ASSERT-POSSBL

'I suppose you know the way to Mugu.'   (Complementation-9)

(Lit. 'In my thoughts, you may have knowledge of Mugu village's road.')

However, 'send a thought', the rough translation for 'imagine', does utilise complementation:

(377) *[khére   rò: dì: lè-gi   sá-ru   khó:-go-a]*

your   friend   this   work-GEN   place-LOC   brought-REDUP-NMLS

sámlo   thóŋ

thought.N   VSR.IMP

'Imagine [(you) have brought your friend to your workplace].'   (QUIS Instructions-67)

While for 'remember' one may only 'have a memory' of an activity, which doesn't strictly exhibit complementation in Mùwe Ké, there is a verb for 'forget' which takes a complement clause as an argument:

(378) *[mò: kʰjàkar-la   phín-bin-a]   ŋè-i-gadi: tʃʰèt-min-duk*

she   India-LOC   went-REDUP-NMLS   I-ERG-ERG   forgot-NEG-PRF.TES

'I had forgotten [that she went to India].'   (Complementation-11)

As with thoughts and memories, knowledge and beliefs are possessed in Mùwe Ké and no verbs of the type to 'know' or 'believe' with a complement clause are found.

DECIDING-type verbs such as 'decide/resolve/plan (to)' are found in Mùwe Ké with the complement clause in future form since the action always comes after the deciding, resolving or planning takes place. Note here the omission of the repeated subject/actor from the complement clause.

(379)   *ráruk*   *dì:*   *sémba*   *kjó-dʒi-ni*   *tʰà*   *[bàlba*   *tshól-dʒi]*

         child   this   spirit   felt.sad-CONN-TOP   now   frog   search-CONN

         tár   *kʰì-gi-duk*

         preparation   do-IPFV-TES

         'The boy felt sad and was now planning [to search for the frog].'   (bàlbi súŋ - E Karma-5)

Verbs of LIKING are found with complement clauses:

(380)   *[kárma-gane*   *pʰòhik*   *láb-lab-a]*   *ŋà*   *kʰà-i-duk*

         Karma-ERG   written.tibetan   taught-REDUP-NMLS   I   love-IPFV-TES

         'I like/love (how) [Karma taught Tibetan].'   (Complementation-15)

However, to 'enjoy' is to simply 'feel good (while) doing something' and therefore doesn't require complementation.

With verbs of SPEAKING in Mùwe Ké such as 'say', 'report' or 'tell', complementation is not required as that which is said is quoted directly with either the verb *sèr/né:* 'say/said' or the quotative marker *-lo*:

(381)   *dzùblaŋ*   *pʰàlbu*   *nàŋ*   *òt*   *ŋè-i-gadi:*   *né:*

         Jumla   Nepal   in   exist.ASSERT   I-ERG-ERG   said

         'I said, "Jumla is in Nepal."'   (Complementation-17)

(382)   *dàŋ*   *ŋè-i*   *ába*   *s-i-duk*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ái*

         yesterday   I-GEN   father   say-IPFV-TES   dolma-ERG   older.brother

         súm-la   *tʰù:-soŋ-lo*

         three-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES-QUOT

         'Yesterday my father was saying, "Dolma hit [the speaker's] three brothers."'

                                             (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Contrast-43)

(383)   *ŋùŋne*   *kór-la*   *rikord*   *kʰì-gen*   *dàk-lo*

         fasting.ritual   about-LOC   record   VSR-NMLS   be.ESSE.ASSERT-QUOT

         '(He) said, "(I) want to record about the fasting ritual."'   (Natural Chat-116)

However, verbs such as 'describe' and 'promise' do take complement clauses:

(384)　*[ţáʃi-gadiː　kháŋba　dzòe-dzoe-a]*　　*mòː-gadiː　sá-la*

　　　Tashi-ERG　house　made-REDUP-NMLS　she-ERG　all.the.way-LOC

　　　ʃé　　kʰjàb-soŋ

　　　told　VSR.PST-PST.TES

　　　'She described (how) [Tashi built a house].'　　　　　(Complementation-18)

(385)　*khú-i-gadiː　[kʰò-la　　kʰòldʒa　kʰjàk-dʒi]　tʰàmdʒa　tʃʰèː-soŋ*

　　　he-ERG-ERG　door-DAT　lock.N　VSR-CONN　promise.N　did-PST.TES

　　　'He promised [to lock the door].'　　　　　(Complementation-19)

This last example could be analysed with the repeated subject/actor 'he' within the complement clause with the 'promiser' omitted.

Finally, as with 'say', verbs like 'order' or 'command' simply quote the speech directly:

(386)　*ʃúl-la　　óu　　tʰòm　ŋà-la　má-la　　ʃók　　khjóraŋ　má-la*

　　　after-LOC　uncle　bear　I-DAT　down-LOC　come.IMP　yourself　down-LOC

　　　ʃók　　sèr-gi-duk-lo

　　　come.IMP　say-IPFV-TES-QUOT

　　　'After, Uncle Bear told me to come down.'　　　　　(óu tʰòm-35)

2.5.5　Relativisation

Following Dixon's (2010: Ch.17) definition of canonical, the Mùwe Ké relative clause construction involves a main clause (MC) and relative clause (RC) that form a single utterance consisting of a single intonation unit. The two clauses share a common argument (CA) that functions as an argument in both the MC and the RC. While syntactically the RC modifies the CA in the MC, semantically it assists in identifying the CA referent. The Mùwe Ké RC involves basic clausal structure comprised of a predicate and its required arguments with nominalised verb forms (§2.2.10), nominalised with either *-gen* or through reduplication. The CA may appear after, before or 'within' the RC (387), in which it is obligatorily omitted. The relative clause finishes with demonstrative *dìː* 'this' to bring about definite meaning, *tʃĭk* 'one' indefinite, or else another numeral or quantifier. In this section the RC is enclosed in [square brackets] and the CA is underlined.

(387) *[khú-i-gane   tʰù:-du:]*   <u>*mì:*</u>   *dì:*
     he-ERG-ERG beat.PST-REDUP person   this
     'The man who he hit'

     <u>*mì:*</u>   *[khú-i-gane   tʰù:-du:]*   *dì:*
     person he-ERG-ERG beat.PST-REDUP this
     'The man who he hit'

     [khú-i-gane] <u>*mì:*</u>   *[tʰù:-du:]*   *dì:*
     he-ERG-ERG   person   beat.PST-REDUP this
     'The man who he hit'   (Relativisation-1)

The uses of the nominaliser *-gen* and REDUP are according to the source of the action denoted by the verb in the RC. A CA that is an actor and the source of a volitional [+CONTROL] action (as transitive or intransitive subject), as in the following example, requires *-gen*. For all other functions of the CA, REDUP is found: compare the following example with the first of those previous.

(388) *[khó-la   tʰùŋ-en]*   <u>*mì:*</u>   *dì:*
     he-DAT   beat-NMLS   person   this
     'The man who hit him'   (Relativisation-2)

That which may function as CA includes common nouns, as seen in the previous examples, proper nouns and pronouns:

(389) *[lóbta-ru   lè   kʰì-gen]*   <u>*dòrdʒi*</u>   *dì:*
     school-LOC   work   VSR-NMLS   Dorjee   this
     'Dorjee who works at the school'   (Relativisation-7)

(390) <u>*khʝó*</u>   *[tʃhú: bàwa   thúŋ-en]*   *dì:*
     you.SG   water   impurity   drink-NMLS   this
     'You who drank the dirty water'   (Relativisation-14)

There is no generic term for making general statements akin to the English 'one/(s)he who…' but rather either a generic 'person' is taken as the CA or else the CA is omitted altogether:

(391) *[kóra   kʰjà-gen]   <u>mì:</u>   dì:*

circumambulation   VSR-NMLS   person   this

'One who performs circumambulation'   (Relativisation-11)

(392) *[màŋbu: sá-n]   dì:*

so.many   eat-NMLS   this

'She/he/those who eat(s) a lot'   (Relativisation-12)

Similarly, omission of the CA occurs for the equivalent of the English demonstrative-type such as 'that which Jon made':

(393) *[ʈáʃì-gane   dzòe-dzoe]   dì:*

Tashi-ERG   made-REDUP   this

'This/that which Tashi made'   (Relativisation-8)

Within the RC, the CA may function as (transitive or intransitive) subject and (indirect) object, in oblique (locative and temporal) and possessor function, and as the standard of comparison in a comparative construction:

(394) Intransitive subject

[gjèl-gjel]   <u>pʰùŋ</u>   dì:

fell.over-REDUP   tree   this

'The tree that fell'   (Relativisation-6)

(395) Transitive subject

[tʰèi   tóksi   khúr-gen]   <u>mì:</u>   dì:

that   pickaxe   carry-NMLS   person   this

'The man carrying that pickaxe'   (QUIS-2.1-240)

(396) Object

[ʈáʃì-gane   jál-jal]   <u>ŋúl</u>   dì:

Tashi-ERG   lost-REDUP   money   this

'The money that Tashi lost'   (Relativisation-17)

(397) Indirect object

[ŋè-i-gane   mèntok   kúr-gur]   pʰòŋ   dì:
I-ERG-ERG   flower   sent-REDUP   daughter   this

'The girl to whom I sent flowers' (Relativisation-21)

(398) Location

[khjó   tʰùl-ɖul]   sá   dì:
you.SG   fell-REDUP   place   this

'The place where you fell over' (Relativisation-22)

(399) Time

[khjó   lép-lep]   tʃhúdzo   dì:
you.SG   arrived-REDUP   hour   this

'The time at which you arrived' (Relativisation-25)

(400) Possessor

[mètel   ò-gen]   ŋè-i   rò: dì:
car   exist.ASSERT-NMLS   I-GEN   friend   this

'My friend who has a car' (Relativisation-31)

(401) Object of comparison

ŋè-i   rò: [khjú-i-ta-ne   dzìu   rìŋa   tʃhè:-dʒe]   dì:
I-GEN   friend   you.SG-GEN-CMPR-ABL   body   longer   VSR.PST-REDUP   this

'My friend who you are taller than' (Relativisation-33)

Similarly, the following functions are found for the CA within the MC:

(402) Intransitive subject

[[ŋà-la   tʰùŋ-en]   mì: dì:]   lép-s
I-DAT   beat-NMLS   person   this   arrived-PST.TES

'[The man who hit me] arrived.' (Relativisation-41)

(403) Transitive subject

[[ŋà-la tʰùŋ-en] mì: dì:]-gane ŋè-i ái-la
I-DAT   beat-NMLS   person this-ERG   I-GEN   older.brother-DAT

té:-s
looked-PST.TES
'[The man who hit me] looked at my brother.'   (Relativisation-38)

(404) Object

mù-i-gane   [[ŋà-la tʰùŋ-en] mì: dì:]-la thóŋ-soŋ
she-ERG-ERG   I-DAT   beat-NMLS   person this-DAT   saw-PST.TES
'She saw [the man who hit me].'   (Relativisation-44)

(405) Indirect object

ŋè-i-gane   [[ŋè-i kháŋba dzò-an] mì: dì:]-la ŋúl
I-ERG-ERG   I-GEN   house   build-NMLS   person this-DAT   money

tét
gave
'I gave money to [the man who built my house].'   (Relativisation-49)

(406) Instrumental

[[ṭáʃi-la dʒòr-dʒor] pʰèrka tʃík]-gane khú-i-gane kí:-la
Tashi-DAT   found-REDUP   stick.N   a-INS   he-ERG-ERG   dog-DAT

kʰjàp-soŋ
hit-PST.TES
'He hit the dog with [a stick that Tashi found].'   (Relativisation-50)

(407) Locative (§2.2.8)

[[ŋè-i ába-gane dzòe-dzoe] tʃóks]-i tá:-ru khú-i-gane
I-GEN   father-ERG   made-REDUP   table-GEN   on-LOC   he-ERG-ERG

tʰèp pʰòr-soŋ
book   put.down.PST-PST.TES
'He put the book on [the table that my father made].'   (Relativisation-51)

[[mómo tshóŋ-sa] sàkhaṇ dì:]-la ŋà mò-la ṭhét

momo sell-NMLS restaurant this-LOC I she-DAT meet

'I met her in [the restaurant where they serve momo dumplings].' (Relativisation-56)

(408) Time

[[ŋà pʰàlen tʃʰè:-dʒe] ŋèwa dì:]-la mù-i-gane jòba

I marriage VSR.PST-REDUP day this-LOC she-ERG-ERG rice

dzòe-s

made-PST.TES

'She cooked rice on [the day that I got married].' (Relativisation-55)

(409) Possessor

[[ŋà-la tʰùŋ-en] mì: dì:]-gi kí:-la ŋè-i-gane thóŋ-s

I-DAT beat-NMLS person this-GEN dog-DAT I-ERG-ERG saw-PST.TES

'I saw [the man who hit me]'s dog.' (Relativisation-58)

(410) Object of comparison

[[ŋà-la tʰùŋ-en] mì: dì:]-ta-ne ŋà dzìu rìŋa

I-DAT beat-NMLS person this-CMPR-ABL I body longer

òt

exist.ASSERT

'I am taller than [the man who hit me].' (Relativisation-59)

Structurally, therefore, NPs that are core arguments within the RC are marked as they would be in an MC. The RC may include NPs that are in peripheral function with constituents that show time, place, etc., as seen in previous examples, and since only nominalised/reduplicated verb forms are found, tense is clarified using adverbs of time:

(411) *[tʰàldi ŋà-la tʰùŋ-en] mì: dì:*

right.now I-DAT beat-NMLS person this

'The person hitting me right now' (Relativisation-62)

Negation (§2.3.11) in the RC is formed with the imperfective negative prefix *mi-* when the CA is a (negative) actor or else with the perfective *ma-*; both forms take the nominaliser *-a*:

(412) *[khú-i-gane   mà-tʰuː-a]*   *mìː*   *dìː*
      he-ERG-ERG   neg-BEAT.PST-NMLS   person   this
      'The man who he didn't hit'   (Relativisation-69)

(413) *[khó-la   mì-tʰu-a]*   *mìː*   *dìː*
      he-DAT   NEG.IPFV-beat-NMLS   person   this
      'The man who didn't hit him'   (Relativisation-70)

Honourifics (§2.3.3) act like their regular counterparts:

(414) *[kʰjàsen   tʃhó-gen]*   *láwa*   *dìː*
      bean   eat.H-NMLS   lama   this
      'The lama that ate beans'   (Relativisation-75)

Syntactically, a Mùwe Ké MC may associate with multiple RCs, either in different functions within the MC or else in iteration, where clauses are embedded in sequence:

(415) *[rákʃi   kól-gen]*   *kérmen*   *dìː-gane*   *[pʰòŋ-gane*   *dzòe-dzoe]*   *gjàsen*
      liquor   boil-NMLS   woman   this-ERG   daughter-ERG   made-REDUP   bean

      dìː   *[lóbta-la   lób-gen]*   *mìː*   *dìː-la*   *té-soŋ*
      this   school-LOC   teach-NMLS   person   this-DAT   gave-PST.TES
      '[The woman who distils liquor] gave [the beans that the girl cooked] to [the man who teaches at the school].'   (Relativisation-80)

(416) *[[[ɖèː   sà-n]   phúdzi-la   só-gen]   mìː   dìː-la*
      uncooked.rice   eat-NMLS   rat-DAT   kill-NMLS   person   this-DAT

      kʰjà-gen]   kérmen   *dìː*   *ŋè-i-gane*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
      hit-NMLS   woman   this   I-ERG-ERG   saw-PST.TES
      'I saw [the woman that hit [the man that killed [the mouse that ate the rice]]].'   (Relativisation-81)

Semantically, the restrictive/identifying sense of the Mùwe Ké RC is certainly the default and possible the only sense associated. With the following example my language assistant tells me that it is automatically assumed that you have more than one brother and you are profiling the one that lives in NZ over, say, the one that lives in the UK. If I only had one brother, forcing

a non-restrictive sense, then something like the second example is possible but doesn't sound very natural.

(417) *ŋè-i*   *ái*   *[njuːziland-du*   *tʰò-gen]*   *dì:*
I-GEN   older.brother   New.Zealand-LOC   stay-NMLS   this
'My brother who lives in New Zealand'   (Relativisation-78)

(418) *ŋè-i*   *ái*   *tʃíkpa* *[njuːziland-du*   *tʰò-gen]*   *dì:*
I-GEN   older.brother   only   New.Zealand-LOC   stay-NMLS   this
'My only brother, who lives in New Zealand'   (Relativisation-76)

A prosodic analysis of the Mùwe Ké relative clause may well reveal a restrictive non-restrictive distinction.

3

Focus and Focus Domains

This section presents the theoretical background for the description of focus structures in Mùwe Ké that is offered in §4. Since it claims to cover the 'state of the art', the OHIS (Féry & Ishihara 2016b) is followed where possible due simply to the desperate need for a uniform clarity in approaches, notions and definitions in the field of IS research. §3.1 presents an overview of IS and the notions of common ground, focus, givenness and topic, all after Krifka (2008). Due to its central role in this thesis, Krifka's definition of focus is discussed in greater detail in §3.2, which leads into the presentation of the types of domain over which focus may appear in §3.3. §3.4 looks at the notion of contrast after Repp's (2016) excellent chapter in the OHIS, that similarly seeks to bring clarity to the all-too-vague understanding and intuitive definitions found in the vast body of previous work and §3.5 presents the phenomenon of DAM, following Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant (2018), due to its prevalent use in marking focus in TB languages.

3.1 Information Structure: Basic Notions

The following three sections discuss the basic IS notions that are relevant for the present thesis, namely, the notions of common ground (§3.1.1), givenness (§3.1.2) and topic (§3.1.3), each after Krifka (2008). The central notion of focus is addressed in more detail in §3.2.

3.1.1 The Common Ground

Information is structured in accordance with the knowledge assumed to be shared between interlocutors and it is this shared knowledge that is referred to as the **common ground** (CG). The term was first proposed by Stalnaker (1974; 2002) (see also Karttunen 1974; Lewis 1979), who regarded communication as occurring against a background of assumptions and beliefs, recognised and shared by interlocuters, as a general truism. For example, when I talk to my

brother we assume the shared knowledge of our entire family history while when talking to a work colleague such knowledge cannot be assumed to be shared although relevant work-related knowledge may be, along with appropriate cultural facts such as the current prime minister or a TV show we know we both watch. The more information that is present in the CG, the easier communication is; indeed, it would probably not be possible to communicate without at least something shared between interlocutors.

Information that a speaker wishes to impart to an addressee, therefore, is packaged and sent according to that which is present in the CG. Assertions and other speech acts are made in regard to the shared background and new information is added to the CG. The act of communication, then, involves participants in constantly and consistently updating the content of the CG through discourse. It would be redundant to assert things already present in the CG and similarly strange to make an assertion about something not shared; the CG must continue to be modified. This leads to the neat input/output distinction put forward by Krifka (2008: 245): presuppositions are required for the input CG and proffered content, or assertions, are the proposed change to the output CG. As the CG is modified and updated with each utterance, information is packaged with reference to the CG at the very moment of speaking. The same information would most likely be packaged differently moments earlier or later in the discourse as it would need to correspond to a slightly different CG.

Krifka (2008: 246) further subdivides CG into **content** and **management**. CG content relates to the truth-conditional information present in the CG, the very content of the up-to-date CG, which is what has been described immediately above. CG management has to do with the communicative goals of the interlocutors and relevant to the way in which the CG content is to be developed. Questions, for example, are employed to specify the requirement of information by the speaker with the expectation of fulfilment from the addressee. The question itself adds no factual information (content) to the CG but rather steers the conversation in the desired direction. Like CG content, CG management is shared between participants, albeit asymmetrically, and puts requirements on how interlocutors should develop CG content relevant to the ongoing discourse. Questions from one lead to answers from another. The distinction between content and management is relevant here as different aspects of IS, here mainly the notion of focus, may be linked to either CG content in regard to truth-conditional impact or CG management in regard to pragmatic use of expressions.

3.1.2 Givenness and the Cognitive Statuses of Discourse Referents

One parameter relevant to the CG is the cognitive status of discourse entities in the minds of interlocutors. There are several related notions, which are presented here, having to do with givenness, activation, identifiability, familiarity, etc. (see Lambrecht 1994 for an extensive discussion).

Givenness indicates the presence of a denotation in the immediate CG content. Chafe (1976) prominently treated the notion and separated givenness from simply being old information. 'Your brother' in an out-of-the-blue sentence such as 'I saw your brother yesterday' does not assume that the addressee had no prior knowledge of having a brother, of course, but rather that the brother was not present in their consciousness at the time of speaking, that is, not present in the immediate CG. Given may be more accurately described as 'already activated', therefore. Clark and Haviland (1977: 3) describe Given as that which the speaker "believes the listener already knows and accepts as true". Given entities may be either text-given or context-given: having been brought up earlier in the discourse or being prominent contextually.

A definition must, then, include the ability to describe the degree of givenness of an expression, i.e. from whether it is maximally prominent in the immediate CG, having been mentioned in the previous utterance, for example, through being present in the general CG, such as the brother example above or our shared cultural knowledge of leaders and celebrities, to not being given at all, and it is this degree of givenness that is accounted for in Krifka's (2008: 262) definition:

> (419)   A feature X of an expression α is a givenness feature iff X indicates whether the
>   denotation of α is present in the CG or not, and/or indicates the degree to which it is
>   present in the immediate CG.

While this definition allows for the interpretation of givenness as a scale (see Prince 1981; Gundel et al. 1993; Chafe 1976; Lambrecht 1994 and the discussion below), it also allows for givenness being a categorical feature: either given or not (see Schwarzschild 1999).

With reference to givenness, there are two major groups of phenomena specified by Krifka (2008: 262–4): anaphoric expressions and grammatical devices like deaccentuation, deletion and (word) ordering.

Anaphoric expressions by their very nature refer back to a previously expressed unit, their antecedent. Different forms point to the givenness status of denotations in the CG; definite articles, for example, may only be employed to refer to denotations given in the CG while pronouns indicate denotations given in the immediate CG. Other anaphoric expressions include clitics, zero forms, person inflection and demonstratives. Indefinite articles, by comparison, indicate referents that are not given and therefore not present in the CG.

Further to the discussion on anaphoric devices, Krifka (2008: 263–4) discusses three further ways of indicating givenness: deaccentuation, deletion and word order. **Deaccentuation** is a reduction in the prosodic realisation of an expression to show that it is given in the immediate context. Consider the following example, where *the dessert* is deaccented as it is required to be taken as referring to the lunch mentioned in the first part of the utterance. Were it not deaccented, a different meaning, possibly that dessert was eaten at another location away from Peter's house, would be rendered.

(420)   I enjoyed lunch at Peter's house and LOVED [the dessert]$_{given}$.

Deletion may be taken as an acute form of reduction. In the following example, ellipsis occurs on the VP forcing the hearer to refer back and assume the given VP from the previous statement. No other meaning could be rendered here in English.

(421)   Peter [loves cooking]$_{VP}$. David _____ too.

Languages with free word order have a strong tendency for given arguments to precede new and this is also seen in the following English examples. The constituents of a ditransitive construction require the given, here definite, argument to precede new, which is here indefinite.

(422)   David brought the man a cheesecake.

　　　*David brought a man the cheesecake.

　　　David brought the cheesecake for a man.

The way in which Krifka's (2008) approach treats the relationship between the notions of givenness and focus is discussed in §3.2.2 below.

Various other hierarchies of givenness status have been put forward that rank anaphoric expressions by the saliency of their denotations. Discussed here in turn are Prince (1981), Gundel et al. (1993), and Lambrecht (1994).

Prince (1981: 235–7) divides entities into those that are new, i.e. not in the CG, those which are evoked and therefore present in the CG and those which may be inferred, as in (423). New discourse entities are brand-new when the hearer is required to create the entity in their mind and unused when the hearer has the corresponding entity in their knowledge store (like 'your brother' above) but not present in the CG: compare *a lady from work* and *Barack Obama*. A brand-new entity may be anchored if it is 'linked' to an NP that is not brand-new itself or otherwise unanchored: *a man* is unanchored while the man in *a man I know from work* is linked to 'I' through a relative clause and therefore anchored. Evoked entities are already present in the CG either due to the hearer having evoked them earlier in the discourse, i.e. they were previously new or inferred, or due to the hearer being able to evoke them themself for situational reasons. These entities are therefore evoked textually or situationally, respectively: compare *'A girl at school said **she** will travel to Bali'* and *'Do **you** have the time?'*. Inferable entities are assumed to be able to be inferred by the hearer through logical reasoning of entities that are already evoked or inferred, e.g. in *'I went to a restaurant yesterday and over-tipped the waiter'* the waiter is inferable from knowledge of restaurants having waiters. Containing inferables are entities contained within the inferable entity itself: *'one of my students'* is a member of the set of *my students*, which in turn is situationally evoked.

(423)   ***Assumed Familiarity*** after Prince (1981: 237)

These varying types of familiarity/givenness form Prince's hierarchical familiarity scale, seen in (424), with examples of each given in (425); however, Prince makes no explicit links between givenness statuses and particular forms.

(424) THE FAMILIARITY SCALE (Prince 1981: 245)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Evoked} \\ \text{Situationally} \\ \text{Evoked} \end{array} \right\} > \text{Unused} > \text{Inferable} > \begin{array}{c} \text{Containing} \\ \text{Inferable} \end{array} > \begin{array}{c} \text{Brand} \\ \text{New} \\ \text{Anchored} \end{array} > \begin{array}{c} \text{Brand} \\ \text{New} \end{array}$$

(425)

Evoked	*A friend from SOAS said **he** ate a pizza.*
Situationally Evoked	***I** ate a pizza.*
Unused	***David** ate a pizza.*
Inferable	*In class yesterday **the teacher** ate a pizza.*
Containing Inferable	***One of the students that studies at SOAS** ate a pizza.*
Brand New Anchored	***A person that studies at SOAS** ate a pizza.*
Brand New	***A person** ate a pizza.*

Gundel et al. (1993: 275–80) propose six cognitive statuses, each of which is linked to the appropriate use of a certain form(s), related to each other in their givenness Hierarchy, shown in (426) with example English forms. Example sentences are given in (427).

(426) THE GIVENNESS HIERARCHY (Gundel et al. 1993: 275)

in focus	>	activated	>	familiar	>	uniquely identifiable	>	referential	>	type identifiable
{*it*}		$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} that \\ this \\ this \text{ N} \end{array} \right\}$		{*that* N}		{*the* N}		{indef. *this* N}		{*a* N}

(427)

Type identifiable	*I'm upset. **A pizza** (I ordered) came without anchovies.*
Referential	*I'm upset. **This pizza** (I ordered) came without anchovies.*
Uniquely identifiable	*I'm upset. **The pizza** (I ordered) came without anchovies.*
Familiar	*I'm upset. **That pizza** (I ordered) came without anchovies.*
Activated	*I'm upset. **That** came without anchovies.*
In focus	*One of these pizzas isn't what we ordered. **It**'s the one without anchovies.*

Type identifiable referents are where the addressee is able to link the expression to a representation of that which is being referred to. *A pizza* is only appropriate if one is assumed to hold the meaning of *pizza* and therefore link description to understanding. The status is used with indefinite articles in English. **Referential** referents show intention of reference to a particular object with the addressee minimally needing access to a representation of the

intended specific denotation. The colloquial use in English of indefinite *this* in *this pizza* in the example is appropriate for the speaker referring to a particular pizza, giving the hearer the 'option' of retrieving an existing representation or constructing a new one. A **uniquely identifiable** referent is able to be identified by the addressee from the nominal alone. The English use of the definite article indicates a representation already present in the interlocutor's memory, or indeed the CG; however, *the pizza (that) I ordered* would have sufficient descriptive content to indicate specific denotation even if the hearer had no previous knowledge of *the pizza*. **Uniquely identifiable** referents are already represented in the memory of the addressee, either in short-term or long-term depending on recent mention or perception. *That pizza* is only appropriate if the hearer is already aware of the speaker having ordered and received pizza. This status employs the use of English definite demonstratives and personal pronouns. An **activated referent** is present in immediate short-term memory (the immediate CG) and therefore necessarily includes the interlocutors themselves. The English use of activated referents is with all pronominal forms, the demonstrative *that* and stressed personal pronouns. **In-focus** referents are just that; however, Gundel's notion of focus is rather different from the one presented here in §3.2 due to the understanding of focus progressing significantly in the twenty seven years since Gundel et al.'s (1993) paper: there is no mention of alternatives, for example. Suffice it to say in this section that the in-focus referent is in short-term memory and at the centre of current attention and that this status is necessary when using zero forms and unstressed pronominals (1993: 279).

Lambrecht (1994) divides the mental representation of referents into being 'identifiable' or not and for those which are identifiable into being 'active', 'inactive' or 'accessible', i.e. not quite activated. This is summarised in the following diagram (428) with terminological conventions linked in (429).

(428)   Identifiability and Activation (Lambrecht 1994: 109)

```
                              ┌──────────────────┐
                              │  unanchored (1)  │
                 ┌──────────────┐ └──────────────────┘
                 │ unidentifiable│
                 └──────────────┘ ┌──────────────────┐
                                  │   anchored (2)   │
┌────────────────┐                └──────────────────┘
│ IDENTIFIABILITY│
└────────────────┘                        ┌──────────────┐       ┌──────────────────┐
                                          │  inactive (3) │       │   textually (4)  │
                 ┌──────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
                 │  identifiable│→│ ACTIVATION │ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
                 └──────────────┘ └────────────┘ │ accessible   │ │ situationally (5)│
                                          └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
                                          ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
                                          │  active (7)   │ │ inferentially (6)│
                                          └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
```

(429)   (1) unidentifiable/brand-new

(2) unidentifiable anchored/brand-new anchored

(3) inactive/unused

(4) textually accessible

(5) situationally accessible

(6) inferentially accessible

(7) active/given

Identifiability has to do with whether an interlocutor is able to retrieve a referent from their knowledge store from the packaged linguistic expression alone. If the referent is unidentifiable then it needs to be created and Lambrecht subdivides unidentifiable referents into **(un)anchored** after Prince, discussed above. If the hearer does already have the referent in their bank of knowledge, then it may be identified in one of three **activation** states. After Chafe (1987: 22), Lambrecht (1994: 93–4) defines **active** concepts as those 'lit up' in the mind and in one's focus of consciousness in a specific moment; **inactive** concepts as those in long-term memory but not currently the focus of attention or present in immediate consciousness; and **accessible** concepts as being present in one's peripheral consciousness, floating around in the background of awareness but not specifically being consciously focussed on at the particular moment in time. In turn, accessible referents may be **textually** accessible if they have been deactivated after being active in earlier discourse, **inferentially** accessible if they may be inferred from another active or accessible element in the discourse, and **situationally** accessible if they may be accessed from a prominent presence in the text-external world (Lambrecht 1994: 100). Unlike Gundel et al., Lambrecht offers no connection or mapping of mental representations and linguistic expressions.

Important for this thesis are the notions of Given, as defined by Krifka (2008) in (419), and New, after Prince (1981) as not in the CG. Deletion is extremely common in Mùwe Ké and is discussed in §4.1 with reference to referential density but finds no large place in the discussion of IS in the language since the QUIS, on which most of the IS finding are based, asks for full sentences from participants. In-focus referents are of extreme importance and the notion is discussed and defined (as alternatives) in §3.2. Lambrecht's (1994) activation states find parallel with Langacker's (2008 inter alia) notion of Grounding, presented in §5.2.2.

3.1.3   Topic

According to Krifka (2008: 264), 'topic' and its complement 'comment' were originally used in studies of medieval Arabic grammar to refer to that which is introduced into linguistic thinking: *mubtada* 'beginning' and *habar* 'news'. Von der Gabelentz (1869) later referred to the two concepts as 'psychological subject' and 'psychological predicate': that which the speaker is thinking about and that which they are thinking about it. If we presuppose that human communication and memory organise information in such a way that it may be 'about' something (which is not the general definition of information), then we may say that a speaker identifies the topic, to which information, the comment, is then given.

As with all things information-structural, the notion of topic is treated in many different ways in the literature and even the term itself has not been consistently agreed upon. The Prague School used the term 'theme' and conflated the notion with old information (Daneš 1970), Chafe used the term 'subject' (Chafe 1976), which confuses the notion with grammatical subjects, and Vallduví used 'link' (Vallduví 1990; Vallduví & Engdahl 1996). In Lambrecht's (1994) characterisation of topic, a referent is said to be the topic of a proposition if the proposition is understood to be *about* that referent *in a given discourse*, that is, that the proposition expresses information relevant to and increases an interlocutor's knowledge of that referent (1994: 127). If topic is to be defined in terms of contextual relevance and aboutness it follows that it has an inherent relationship with pragmatic presupposition, i.e. it must be somehow under discussion or available from context and the matter of current concern (1994: 150). Roberts (2011) discusses the difficulties in defining topic due, in part, to the very different ways that topic may be realised across the word's languages, as does Büring (2016a), who puts forward that as there is not an agreed way of identifying topics across language and because the notion of (aboutness) topic cannot be established independent of context, the notion

should not be used at all and that language-specific characterisations should be made independently (2016a: 85).

Krifka's definition of topic, seen in (431), follows Reinhart's (1981) organisational metaphor of file cards to show how information is added to the CG (for file-card metaphors, see also Vallduví 1990; Erteschik-Shir 1997; 2007 – the latter is presented in §3.2.1). Reinhart put forward that new information is added to the CG in the same way that information may be added to a card in a file-card system. The utterance *David is the IT guy at the Brighton office*, for example, would see the hearer locating the file card for David – or creating one if the entity is brand-new – and writing/storing the information about David underneath, i.e. either that he is the IT guy or that he works at the office in Brighton or both, depending on what constitutes the new/focal information. This means that while the sentences in (430) express an identical proposition, the first would require the hearer to store the comment 'met Sally in 1989' on a card with the heading 'Harry', while the second would require the comment information to be stored on a card entitled, and therefore about, 'Sally'.

(430)   [Harry]$_{topic}$ [met Sally in 1989]$_{comment}$.
        [Sally]$_{topic}$ [met Harry in 1989]$_{comment}$.

This leads to Krifka's definition of topic, which presupposes information being stored in a metaphorical file-card system (Krifka 2008: 265):

(431)   The topic constituent identifies the entity or set of entities under which the information expressed in the comment constituent should be stored in the CG content.

Krifka goes on to discuss and define the idea of contrastive topics (2008: 267–8; see also Büring 2016a), that combine topic and focus in that the topic contains a focus, which indicates alternatives, as illustrated in the next example where the focus on 'mother' indicates 'father' as an alternative. The mere presence of alternatives, therefore, points to there being further topics, along with their comments, that can also be added to the CG:

(432)   A: What do your parents do?
        B: [My [MOTHer]$_{focus}$]$_{topic}$ [practises LAW]$_{focus}$
            and [my FATHer]$_{focus}$]$_{topic}$ [practises MEDicine]$_{focus}$.

However, see §3.4 for discussion on the notion of contrast that is used in this thesis after Repp (2016).

This thesis relies on the definition of topic after Krifka above in (431).

3.2 Focus

The notion of focus is discussed in detail in the present section due to its central role in this thesis. Krifka's (2008) approach to focus, which is subsequently followed, is addressed at length in §3.2.2 while §3.2.1 presents three alternative approaches to focus for comparison (Vallduví 1990; 1994; Lambrecht 1994; Erteschik-Shir 1997; 2007).

3.2.1 Overview of Approaches to Focus

As with all things information-structural, there are many varying approaches to the notion of focus that have been put forward over the years, each with their merits and drawbacks but each driving towards a similar goal in their definition: that focus is associated with new information not presupposed, derivable or present in the CG that serves as an informative update from speaker to hearer. *Focus* used as the term to mean as such has been in use since the late 1960s in the work of Halliday (1967a; 1967b; 1968), for example. Three approaches to focus are presented here after Vallduví (1990; 1994), Lambrecht (1994) and Erteschik-Shir (1997; 2007).

Vallduví (1990: 57) proposes a trinomial hierarchical structure for the informational articulation of a sentence consisting of FOCUS and GROUND, with ground being further subdivided into LINK and TAIL represented as follows:

(433)   S = {FOCUS, GROUND}
        GROUND = {LINK, TAIL}

Vallduví's structure reflects the focus-background split discussed here but goes further in trying to account for the fact that within the (back)ground/presupposition a special topic-like element often appears in sentence-initial position, which Vallduví dubs the link. In Catalan, on which Vallduví's proposal is built, link roughly corresponds to the more traditional notion of topic. Its compliment is the tail, which indicates *how* the information being conveyed is to be stored.

Focus in Vallduví's framework is the only part of the sentence that is informative, that is, the sentence segment where all information is encoded. Furthermore, as it is the only part that contributes to a hearer's knowledge-store, it is the only non-elidable part of the sentence and all sentences inevitably contain a focus.

Given that the focus may not be elided, the ground is optional and the link must be sentence-initial, Vallduví proposes four informational structures: link-focus sentences, all-focus sentences, link-focus-tail sentences, and focus-tail sentences (1990: 62), illustrated here from Vallduví and Engdahl (1996: 470). The focus is marked with square brackets, the link is sentence-initial and the tail follows the focus.

(434)   **Link-focus**

Tell me about the people in the White House. Anything I should know?

The president [F hates CHOCOLATE].

(435)   **Link-focus-tail**

And what about the president? How does he feel about chocolate?

The president [F HATES] chocolate.

(436)   **All-focus**

The president has a weakness.

[F He hates CHOCOLATE].

(437)   **Focus-tail**

You shouldn't have brought chocolates for the president.

[F He HATES] chocolate.

The link-focus utterance is equivalent to predicate-focus structures discussed in §3.3.1. It instructs the hearer to locate a specific file card (§3.1.3 above) and add the information of the sentence. In (434) the interlocutor will find the address card for 'the president' and enter the information 'hates chocolate'. A link-focus-tail structure, as in (435), gives instructions for an update of information as well but also instructs how. Here the hearer will need to locate the file card for 'the president', find the condition 'feel-like-about chocolate' and substitute 'hate' for the predicate yet to be specified. (436) and (437) are 'linkless' and are therefore taken to refer to specific file cards from previous discourse. All-focus sentences parallel the sentence-focus structures discussed in §3.3.3; however, rather than presenting all-new information,

Vallduví's all-focus structures see the ground as null since the speaker will assume that the hearer is able to enter the information carried by the sentence on the correct address card without specific indication. Similarly there is no need for a tail to show how to enter said information. Sentence (437) is the nondefault mode of update to the default of (436) in the same way that (434) and (435) differ.

While Vallduví identifies the role that the information articulation of a sentence plays through information packaging and his tripartite hierarchical informational-structural division, the approaches of Lambrecht and Erteschik-Shir propose a binary distinction of topic and focus.

However, that is not to say that the two notions are complementary. It would be perfectly neat to put forward focus as the new information conveyed about a topic but Lambrecht does not adopt this definition for two reasons (1994: 206). First, while all sentences convey new information and therefore must contain a focus, not all sentences contain a topic: there may be all-focus sentences, for example, as in an answer to the question "What happened?" Focus, therefore, is not simply the compliment of topic. Second, new information is roughly equivalent to pragmatic assertion in Lambrecht's theory: a proposition superimposed on and including the pragmatic presupposition. However, rather than being the element of information superimposed upon the pragmatic presupposition, the focus is seen generally as that which is added to it. The focus is part of the assertion but does not coincide with it.

The focus of a sentence according to Lambrecht (1994: 207), therefore, is the element of information where the assertion and the presupposition differ from each other. One cannot take for granted the focus part of a proposition at the time of utterance as it is the unpredictable element or pragmatically non-recoverable. The focus is the element that makes a proposition into an assertion, that is, into a prospective piece of information.

What this means is that it is not the focus element as such that is the new information but *the fact* that it participates in the respective proposition. For example, in the following, 'Jon' is the focus but it is not necessarily new in the sense of givenness etc. What is new is the fact that Jon is the person whom I saw, i.e. the proposition 'Jon = the person whom I saw'.

(438)   Whom did you see?
        I saw Jon.

Important to Lambrecht's theory of IS is the concept of focus structure: the conventional association of sentence structure and focus construal of the proposition that it expresses (1994: 336). Lambrecht (1994: §5.2.1) divides the focus articulations of sentences into three distinct types to match different communicative situations. This helps to identify focus domains with major semantic and syntactic categories and also makes it possible to "capture semantic correspondences between formally divergent but functionally identical sentences across or within languages," (1994: 221).

The following question/answer pairs illustrate predicate-focus, argument-focus and sentence-focus structures, respectively, while also illustrating the interplay between topic/presupposition and focus in sentences (Lambrecht 1994: 222–3).

(439)   PREDICATE-FOCUS STRUCTURE

    A: What happened to your car?

    B: My car/It broke DOWN.

(440)   ARGUMENT-FOCUS STRUCTURE

    A: I heard your motorcycle broke down?

    B: My CAR broke down.

(441)   SENTENCE-FOCUS STRUCTURE

    A: What happened?

    B: My CAR broke down.

Predicate-focus structure is found in a sentence where the presupposition contains the subject and the focus is the predicate. This serves the communicative function of predicating a property (broken down) of a given topic (my car). Argument-focus structure is identificational in that the missing argument (my car) is identified by the focus in a presupposed open proposition. Sentence-focus structure sees the focus extending over the subject and predicate to present all-new information (my car broke down); it is also used to report all-new events. It is worth noting that it is possible to combine different focus structures in a sentence to express more than one function at once (Lambrecht 1994: 336).

Erteschik-Shir's (1997; 2007) model of f(ocus)-structure attempts to take into account all IS phenomena. In her inventory of foci, Erteschik-Shir (2007) includes a discussion of how focus

may be marked by stress and intonation but points out that foci may also take particular syntactic positions in languages such as Hungarian and may be marked morphologically.

She therefore argues (2007: 26–7) that optimal notions of focus and topic are not easy to find if we link them to the several perspectives of semantic, phonological, syntactic and pragmatic phenomena found across language. Cross-linguistically these phenomena are far from uniform, which could yield the conclusion that there are simply several types of each notion to be found in language and that they may be overtly marked in only some. Preferably, however, the aim should be to have a minimal set of primitives from which the various kinds of topic and foci may be derived. This is what Erteschik-Shir accomplishes with her model of f-structure, which uses topic and focus as its two basic primitives and shows how, from their interaction, it is possible to derive every kind of topic and focus without the necessity of further primitives.

"F-structure is a structural description, annotated for topic and focus, which interfaces with syntax and both semantics and intonation," (Erteschik-Shir 2007: 43). Following Reinhart (1981), discussed in §3.1.3 above, Erteschik-Shir (2007: 44) also takes a metaphorical set of file cards to represent the CG or context set – the set of proposition that interlocutors accept to be uncontroversially true at the current point in time. Discourse referents are represented by individual cards with that which is presupposed about each referent entered below. Most recent cards are to be found at the top of the stack and there may be more than one card on top and the discourse referents provide potential topics throughout discourse. When a hearer's attention is steered to (the referent of) X, the corresponding card for X is located and placed on top of the stack if the card for a referent already exists (i.e. if the referent is definite) or a new card is made out is not (if the referent is indefinite).

Topic and focus interact in that the file system involves locating a card on top of the stack for topics or in the case of foci, positioning them there. Each card manipulated through processing of the utterance is then updated with the information conveyed by the utterance. The very definition of topic and focus, then, is that they trigger instructions on how to manipulate the file card, each one representing an available referent in the discourse:

(442)   *F-structure Rules*
  a. TOPIC instructs the hearer to locate on the top of his file an existing card with the appropriate reference.

b. FOCUS instructs the hearer to either

    i. open a new card and put it on the top of the file. Assign a new label (for an indefinite) or

    ii. locate an existing card and put it on the top of the file (for a definite).

c. UPDATE instructs the hearer to enter the focus on the topic card and then to copy all entries to all cards activated by the focus rule.

<div align="right">(Erteschik-Shir 2007: 44)</div>

This can be illustrated with a simple question-answer pair, where the topic is *italicised* and the focus is in SMALL CAPS:

(443)   Q: What is Pete doing?

        A: *He* IS COOKING THE DINNER.

It is presupposed that 'Pete' is already present in the discourse and that therefore the referent card is already at the top of the stack. 'The dinner' is part of the focus so the file is found and placed on top also. The card for 'Pete' is then updated:

(444)

Pete
he is cooking the dinner

Erteschik-Shir's approach is advantageous in that it takes into account the wide variety of how languages express IS as its starting point. The approaches of Lambrecht and Vallduví, while invaluable, appear to anticipate that all the IS phenomena found in language will fit into the one theory, looking almost exclusively at European languages.

While each approach to focus would be perfectly valid for the investigation of focus structures in Mùwe Ké, Krifka's notion of focus is followed since it is that which is adopted by the OHIS (Féry & Ishihara 2016b) in the interest of providing a uniform clarity for the investigation of IS. This approach is summarised in the next section.

3.2.2   Focus in Alternative Semantics

Krifka's definition of focus (Krifka 2007; Krifka 2008; Féry & Krifka 2008; Krifka & Musan 2012b) is based upon Rooth's (1985; 1992; 2016) theory of Alternative Semantics, a semantic framework with application in the analysis of focus. Phrasal meanings with alternatives are

referred to by operations or constraints that may be semantic, pragmatic or discourse-structural (Rooth 2016: 19). Rooth offers extensive formalization of this idea, but speaking in informal terms, Alternative Semantics puts forward that when a linguistic expression α is assigned focus, there are alternatives to α relevant to the current discourse. For example, focus on *pizza* in *Jon ate PIZza* indicates the alternatives of things that may have been eaten and simple question-answer pairs such as 'Who wrote the paper?' '*x* wrote the paper' show the presence of a number of alternatives to *x*, being anyone that is able to write a paper.

Focus may be realised prosodically, as in the example here with the nuclear pitch accent being placed on the focussed constituent 'pizza'; morphologically with devices like special focus markers or particles, or differential argument marking; or syntactically with the placement of a focussed constituent into a position designated for focus in the sentence, or with constructions such as clefts.

Further to this central claim of Alternative Semantics, Krifka (2008: 247) gives the following definition of focus, which, in his opinion, captures the "most successful understanding of focus."

(445)   Focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of linguistic expressions.

This definition is useful here as although it makes no claims about how focus may be marked, it restricts the use of terms such as 'focus marking' to signify the role of alternatives in interpretation.

It is worth briefly mentioning that Krifka (2008: 248–9) makes a division between expression focus and denotation focus. The former relates to *forms* of expressions which may have the same denotation such as in the following example:

(446)   Grandpa didn't [kick the BUcket]$_F$, he [passed aWAY]$_F$.

The difference in the two foci is in the connotation, the showing of respect etc. but not in the denotation of the property DIE. Denotation focus, however, relates to alternatives to the denotations themselves. Alternative denotations would need to be of the same type: people, food, times, etc. The notion of focus presented here after Krifka concentrates on denotation focus as it is more important to communication.

One point requiring clarification is the relation between focus and cognitive statuses such as givenness. While it is tempting to see given elements as old in contrast to and perhaps complemented by focal elements, which are new, givenness is not a complementary notion to focus and the two are required for an accurate description of the IS of a specific language. To illustrate, in the next example the focus is on the pronoun *her*, which, through its very nature of being a pronoun, must be given.

(447)   David only brought cheesecake for [HER]_F.

Krifka (2008: 264) puts forward, therefore, the necessity to assume both focus and givenness, i.e. the signalling of alternatives, that is expressed in English though accentuation, and the marking of given constituents through anaphoric expressions, deaccentuation, deletion and word ordering. The example in (447) shows, however, that focus marked through accentuation supersedes givenness marking through deaccentuation. This is true of small/single-word constituents but in cases where the constituent is larger, givenness does have an effect on the accentuation. Consider the following example:

(448)   A: I saw David arrive with a cheesecake at lunch yesterday but I didn't get any.
          B: Oh, he [HID [the cheesecake]_given]_focus (and then ate it himself).

In English, prosodic prominence would usually be found on *the CHEESEcake* but since it is given, it is deaccented, allowing the realisation of the accent on a different constituent, here the verb *hid* (see Féry & Samek-Lodovici 2006 for further discussion).

Focus can influence both CG content and CG management (§3.1.1), which Krifka (2008: 249) describes as **semantic** and **pragmatic** uses of focus, respectively. Semantic uses of focus are to do with factual information that has an immediate truth-conditional effect and directly influences CG content. Erroneous use of semantic focus would, therefore, convey unintended factual information. Pragmatic uses of focus do not influence CG content but rather steer the communication in the desired direction, indicating how it should develop and expressing the communicative goals of the interlocutors. Inaccurate use of pragmatic focus would result in incoherent conversation. While there is a fuzzy boundary between the two uses of focus, prototypical cases are presented here to illustrate how the two may be used, starting with pragmatic usage.

Pragmatic uses of focus after Krifka (2008: 250–3; Krifka & Musan 2012b: 9–12) include answers to wh- questions, corrections, confirmations, parallels and delimitation, discussed here in turn.

The prototypical use of pragmatic focus, after Paul (1880), is to draw attention to the part of an **answer** that corresponds to the wh-like part in a constituent question:

(449)　A:　<u>Who</u> ate the pizza?
　　　　B:　[JON]$_F$ ate the pizza.

When a speaker uses a wh- question they are managing the CG in such a way as to indicate their communicative goal: a request for information that they believe their interlocutor has (see Hamblin 1973 for the formal-semantic modelling of question sets). Asking a 'who' question, for example, identifies a gap in knowledge and restricts it to the set of PEOPLE, for which there are alternatives, and the very indication of alternatives is the core definition of focus. The answer will identify a person within the set of people, and places that information into the CG, fulfilling the communicative need of the questioner.

Focus may be used pragmatically to **correct** or **confirm** information (although see §3.4 for the state-of-the-art discussion of contrast, which separates contrastive corrections from focus). Consider the following example:

(450)　A:　Jon ate the pizza.
　　　　B:　(No,) [DAvid]$_F$ ate the pizza.
　　　　B′:　Yes, [JON]$_F$ ate the pizza.

Here, speaker A expresses an utterance which, among all of the alternatives to the person/actor (Jon), action (eat) and food/undergoer (pizza), they believe to be the only one which expresses the truth. The interlocutor manages the CG in response to A through either correcting the proposition (B) or confirming it (B′). The former naturally excludes all other alternatives, as does the latter although originally there would have been further alternatives under consideration, which are then excluded (Krifka 2008: 252).

Parallels in interpretation may be highlighted through pragmatic uses of focus:

(451)　(a)　[Jon] ate [pizza] and [David] ate [a burger].
　　　　(b)　A [postgrad] student helped an [undergrad] student.

Focus once again creates alternatives, here with the alternative being suggested for use in immediately surrounding contexts (Krifka 2008: 252). However, discussion of this usage is reserved for §3.4, where the notion of SIMILAR propositions in discourse is discussed under Repp's (2016) dissection of contrast, hence the lack of labelling of the square brackets in (451).

Krifka's (2008: 252–3, 270–1) last example of the pragmatic use of focus is to draw attention to a **delimitation** of an utterance with regard to the focussed constituent. Uses include contrastive topics like *Jon* in '*As for JON, ...*' and frame setters like '*In MY opinion, ...*'

Semantic uses of focus have an instant truth-conditional effect and influence directly the CG content. Examples of semantic uses (Krifka 2008: 253–5; Krifka & Musan 2012b: 12–15) include particles like *only* and *also* as well as *not*, reason clauses and operators like *fortunately*, and the assistance of focus in establishing the restrictor of quantifiers, presented here in turn.

Semantic operators that depend on focus for specific interpretation are said to be associated with focus. The focus-sensitive **particles** *only*, *also*, and *even* look to the notion of alternatives; consider the following utterance:

(452)   Jon only gave pizza to David.

Assignment of focus here, in English through prosodic means, renders various distinct truth-conditions. Assigned to the object arguments, focus would indicate that Jon only gave *pizza* and not an alternative food or that he only gave it to *David* and not an alternative person. Focus on the verb would suggest that Jon only *gave* and did not send or show pizza, for example, and a situation is even feasible where the preposition *to* is focussed, rendering false any alternative prepositional truth-conditions such as Jon giving pizza *through* David to someone else. Similarly *also* expresses that the focussed item holds true for a suitable alternative and *even* states that the item in focus is somewhat extreme in comparison to its alternatives (see Jacobs 1983; König 1991; Beck 2016 for further discussion).

The English negation particle *not* may also be analysed as focus-sensitive akin to the examples immediately above. In the following example, that which is focussed, here *pizza*, is negated although there exists the presupposition of Jon having eaten something and it is one of the alternatives that is being refuted.

(453)   Jon did not eat PIZza$_F$ at lunch, but SALad.

Reason clauses, which are a modification of Dretske's (1972) counterfactual examples, employ alternatives for semantic purposes as do **operators** like *fortunately*, illustrated in the next two examples after Krifka (2008: 254):

(454)   Clyde had to marry [BERtha]$_F$ in order to be eligible for the inheritance.
(455)   Fortunately, Bill spilled [WHITE]$_F$ wine on the carpet.

Rooth (1985) puts forward that the **restrictor of quantifiers** may be determined through the assistance of focus, which in turn has a truth-conditional impact. In the following example, the focus has an impact on truth-conditions as were the focus on *q*, the opposite meaning would be rendered, i.e. that every *u* in English comes after a *q*, when of course *u* may be preceded by virtually all English vowels and consonants (2008: 254):

(456)   In English orthography, a [*U*]$_F$ always follows a *q*.

It is worth noting that focus-sensitive operators must appear in a position in the utterance where they may have scope over the focussed item. In example (452), repeated here, *only* can associate with the objects, verb (phrase) or even the preposition but not over the subject *Jon*.

(452)   Jon only gave pizza to David.

However, focus does not overlap directly with scope. In the following two examples, the focus is identical but the scope of *only* differs and therefore renders different readings. The first utterance carries the meaning that Jon did not mention that anyone other than David ate pizza, although there may have been other pizza-eaters, and in the second, Jon is stating that there were no other people eating pizza but David.

(457)   Jon only said that [DAVid]$_F$ ate pizza.
(458)   Jon said that only [DAVid]$_F$ ate pizza.

As with all things information-structural, the result of that which has been presented thus far in relation to focus paints, "A somewhat schizophrenic overall picture," (Krifka & Musan 2012b: 15). Focus clearly relates to pragmatics but then begs the question of how to account for the semantic truth-conditional effects that focus may have. Why isn't this dependency observed with all semantic operators? For example, *yesterday* and other temporal operators and *every* and other universal adnominal quantifiers do not lead to a focus-sensitive interpretation. Beaver and Clark (2008) treat this issue in detail and adopt a general focus

Principle (459) with the assumption being that as the CG is developed, a current question may be assumed at each stage. This focus Principle is able to give explanation to pragmatic uses of focus as well as uses of focus that have a truth-conditional impact, thereby conflating pragmatic and semantic uses.

(459)   **Focus Principle:** Some part of a declarative utterance should evoke a set of alternatives containing all the Rooth–Hamblin alternatives [i.e. the propositions] of the Current Question.   (Beaver & Clark 2008: 37)

Furthermore, Beaver and Clark put forward three degrees of focus association with semantic operators: quasi-, free and conventional associations. Quasi-association with focus is a distinct type of pragmatic inference whose associating expressions are propositional non-veridical operators for which evoked alternatives included in their syntactic scope create a set of propositions which may be congruent to the Current Question (2008: 44). This is found with expressions of negation, possibility modals, belief operators etc., which are concluded not to associate at all with focus, leaving the focus Principle as the only thing necessary. Free association with focus is the resolution of free variables and affects operators that perform comparison within or quantification over a complicit domain (2008: 52). Expressions of this type include quantifiers, modals, verbs of desire, etc. The conventional association with focus, which is a grammatical dependency upon the Current Question, is the case that comes closest to having a real association with focus; expressions of this type include exclusives, such as *only*, additives and intensifiers (Beaver & Clark 2008: 68).

Velleman and Beaver (2016) also collapse the discrepancy between pragmatic and semantic uses of focus and analyse all focus-related effects as resulting from one single, essentially pragmatic, function similar to that above: focus assists in indicating which question under discussion is the Current Question, that is, the question that the immediate discourse move is aimed to address. Focus in this view, therefore, always has an identical pragmatic function in that it is found on the constituent that answers a question, thereby assisting in indicating the question that the speaker is addressing. Question-based approaches to the notion of focus include Ginzburg (1996; 2012) and Roberts (1997; 2012) and may be seen as an add-on to Rooth's Alternative Semantics (1985; 1992).

To wrap up neatly in a nutshell, following Krifka's approach, I will take focus to indicate the presence of alternatives. Semantic uses of focus influence content in the CG while pragmatic

uses manage its development and the two uses may be conflated if we take focus as pointing out the current question under discussion. The following section looks at the types of domain over which focus may apply.

3.3 Focus Domains

Fieldwork for this thesis originally sought to investigate the morphosyntax of the three focus structures, that is, conventionally associated focus meanings with sentence forms, laid out by Lambrecht (1994: §5.2.1) and discussed in §3.2.1 above: predicate, argument and sentence focus. Respectively, these structures take as their focus domains the VP, an (argument) NP and the sentence. Following the OHIS (Féry & Ishihara 2016b), however, as this thesis does through the desire for uniform clarity, and therefore Krifka's (2008: 247) definition of focus as the presence of alternatives, it can be said that the three structures indicate alternatives to either the predicate, an argument or the entire sentence.

The following sections define the adopted focus structures for investigation. Predicate (§3.3.1) and term (§3.3.2) focus follow Zimmermann's (2016) chapter in the OHIS; Zimmermann's definition of the predicate-focus domain differs from Lambrecht's in that it includes functional elements of tense, aspect and mood as well as V and VP and the name 'term' over 'argument' is preferred here since term focus includes 'prepositional-phrase' terms (or adjuncts that are locative, adverbial etc. in Mùwe Ké) along with argument or determiner-phrase terms. Sentence-focus (thetic) structures (§3.3.3) are not explicitly discussed in the OHIS; therefore, Lambrecht's (1994: 233) definition of sentence-focus structures being notable through their absence of presupposition remains. Further to the three classic focus types, verum focus (§3.3.4), traditionally referring to the focus on truth value of an utterance, the discussion of which has advanced rapidly in the last few years, is selected for subsequent description and analysis taking into account Lohnstein's (2016) OHIS chapter of the same name as well as Gutzmann et al.'s (2017) Lexical Operator Thesis which makes the assumption that the verum accent is a means of realising a special lexical verum operator.

3.3.1 Predicate Focus

The working definition of predicate focus adopted in this thesis is taken from Zimmermann's (2016) chapter of the same name in the OHIS (Féry & Ishihara 2016b). Predicate focus after

Zimmermann (2016: 314) refers to every instance of focus on lexical verbal predicates (a verb (V) or verb phrase (VP)) and functional elements such as tense, aspect or mood (TAM) in the extended verbal projection, illustrated in the following examples from English. Zimmermann, following Rooth (1992) and Krifka (2008), controls for focus through the addition of preceding context (C) either in the form of wh- questions and/or 'incorrect' assertions that are then corrected[8] by the interlocutor.

(460) C: What did David do with his car? / David kept his car.
       (No,) David [sold]$_F$ his car.   [V-focus]

(461) C: What did David do? / David gave his car away.
       (No,) David [sold his car]$_F$.   [VP-focus]

(462) C: David has sold his car.
       No, David [had]$_F$ sold his car (but then the buyer backed out).   [T-focus]

(463) C: David is selling his car.
       No, David [has sold]$_F$ his car.   [A-focus]

(464) C: David sold his car.
       No, David [would have]$_F$ sold his car (had the buyer shown up).   [M-focus]

Zimmermann goes on to separate the characterisation of predicate focus from term focus and verum focus, discussed here in §3.3.2 and §3.3.4, respectively; although, he suggests that all-new (sentence) focus, discussed in §3.3.3, may be included under predicate focus: the entire vP in (465) may be analysed as predicating over either an overt or a covert situation argument (2016: 315):

(465) C: What's going on over there?
       There are [$_{vP}$ people singing karaoke]$_F$. / [Some people are singing karaoke]$_F$.

Zimmermann's paper (2016: §16.3) gives an empirical overview of how predicate focus may be grammatically realised from a cross-linguistic perspective, looking specifically at grammatical strategies across languages for realising predicate focus; symmetries within

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[8] Corrections of this sort are later shown to exhibit contrast in the sense of Repp (2016), discussed in §3.4 and described in Mùwe Ké in §4.7

individual languages of predicate-focus marking; mismatches, complexities and strategies of assimilation in how predicate focus may be formally marked; and the associating of predicate focus with focus operators. Predicate focus may be realised across language through a variety of grammatical strategies (2016: 320). These strategies include marking that is prosodic, morphological and morphosyntactic as well as marking through syntactic reordering, which at times is triggered by prosodic needs.

Prosodic marking occurs in intonation languages like English with, for example, the nuclear pitch accent being placed on the focussed constituent. In the English example given above in (460), the nuclear accent is placed upon the focussed constituent 'sold':

> (466)   C: What did David do with his car? / David kept his car.
>
> (No,) David [SOLD]$_F$ his car.   [V-focus]

Realising the accent on a different element would result in an utterance with quite different IS, rendering an infelicitous response. *No, [DAVID]$_F$ sold his car* would give the corrective information that it was David and not someone else that sold his car and would only be used in response to an utterance such as 'William sold his car'. Moreover, the focus would not be predicate focus but term focus.

As a side note, Skopeteas et al. (2006: 238–9) state that languages have at least four ways in which they may express IS categories through the use of intonational prosody:

- The presence vs. absence of intonational pitch accent
- Different types of intonational pitch accent
- Variation in the pitch range of pitch accents/lexical tones
- Changes in prosodic phrasing

Mùwe Ké is a tone language rather than an intonation language; it uses pitch variation to distinguish lexical items (§2.1.4) and therefore limits the strategies for which prosody may be used in the expression of IS in the language. However, Skopeteas et al. (2006: 239) go on to say that while the presence/absence of pitch accent is usually only found in intonation languages, variations of the other three have been observed in all languages and it is certainly the case that Mùwe Ké exhibits such prosodic reflexes but these are beyond the scope of the morphosyntactic description given here.

Morphological marking of predicate focus appears in many languages, especially in Africa it would seem, where special focus markers/particles are employed for predicate focus. Schwarz (2010) looks at verb-and-predication focus in Gur languages (Niger-Congo) and in the following example from Kɔnni, a focus particle is required for a felicitous reply to the question 'What are you doing?' (2010: 300):

(467) *ǹ   súgú!r-é   mɨ̀ŋ   (# ǹ súgú!r-é)*
　　　1S   wash-IPFV   PTCL
　　　'I am WASHing.'

Skopeteas et al. (2006: 237) state that there is a high diversity in the morphological marking of focal information in African languages with respect to the position of focus markers, their occurrences and restrictions, and their possible semantic components.

Syntactic marking of predicate focus involves the placement of a focussed constituent into a position designated for focus. SOV languages like Mùwe Ké, for example, have a tendency to reserve the immediately preverbal position for focus, whether predicate, term or otherwise, rendering a given-before-new sentence order. Van Valin (1999: §3) compares languages that may fall into the categories of rigid or flexible with regard to both their word order, e.g. English is rigid and Mùwe Ké is flexible, and their focus structure, referring to the restrictions placed on a potential focus domain. If different constituent orders are possible in a language, the differing orders may be influenced by IS: positions may be reserved to express topic or focus, given may be required to precede new, or a combination of pragmatic features may influence word order (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 232).

Predicate focus in Mùwe Ké is presented in §4.3.

3.3.2   Term Focus

Term focus refers to every instance of focus on determiner-phrase (DP[9]) terms, that is, the arguments of an utterance, but also on prepositional[10] phrase (PP)-terms and other non-verbal XP-categories such as adverbs, illustrated in the following examples from English.

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[9] 'DP' is used by Zimmermann (2016) and only in this thesis in this section in reference to his paper. The traditional NP is preferred and used throughout.

[10] Prepositions are not found in Mùwe Ké but see §2.5.3 for adverbial clauses of time, location, manner, etc.

(468)　C:　Who let the dogs out? / David let the dogs out.

　　　　(No,) [Mary]_F let the dogs out.　　　　　　　　　　[DP-focus]

(469)　C:　What did Mary let out? / Mary let the cats out.

　　　　(No,) Mary let the [dogs]_F out.　　　　　　　　　　[DP-focus]

(470)　C:　Where were the dogs let out? / The dogs were let out in the town.

　　　　(No,) The dogs were let out in the countryside.　　　　　[PP-focus]

(471)　C:　How did Mary let the dogs out? / Mary let the dogs out quickly.

　　　　(No,) Mary let the dogs out slowly.　　　　　　　　[Adv(P)-focus]

Zimmermann's (2016) paper on predicate focus, discussed in the previous section, states that from the point of view of a formal focus-semantic approach, predicate focus and term focus exhibit no principled differences, which has led some researchers to consider every type of focus as an occurrence of predicate focus semantically (see von Stechow 1991 for discussion). However, if focus is treated as the psychological predicate of a clause in a unified structured-meaning approach (Zimmermann 2016: §16.2.2), the singling out of (di)transitive verbs and DP-terms as categories requiring explicit marking when focussed is possible. The portrayal of focus being the psychological predicate of the clause follows Paul (1880) in the attempt to capture the basic intuition that the focussed element in an utterance is the relevant or new information predicated of a discourse referent already established in the CG, that is, the psychological subject. Zimmermann goes on to investigate the asymmetries in the realisations of predicate and term focus.

Cross-linguistically, languages may mark focus symmetrically or asymmetrically (Zimmermann 2016: §16.3.2). Symmetrically-marking languages consistently use the same strategy to realise focus on every kind of grammatical category. In this group we find languages that mark focus prosodically as well as languages that mark it syntactically, due possibly to prosodic needs. Asymmetrically-marking languages (2016: §16.3.3) employ three different strategies for the marking of predicate focus and term focus through obligatory focus marking, differences in grammatical strategy, and varying degrees of structural complexity.

There are two reasons given for this asymmetrical marking (2016: §16.4). First, there is an inherent, almost default, relation between predication and focus. A 'default' utterance in any language consists of new information about a discourse referent already established in the CG.

Predicate focus as default focus therefore needs to be marked appropriately so that it may be identified as such, which leads to optional formal focus marking, or indeed the obligatory absence of any such marking, on focussed predicates. In contrast, discourse referents in the form of DP- and PP-terms are not the default focus and therefore have a tendency to require explicit focus marking. This is certainly seen cross-linguistically with a strong bias for nominal terms to be explicitly marked.

Second, the grammatical strategies available for focus marking are themselves subject to structural constraints. This follows from the bias for terms being explicitly marked plus the actuality that DP- and PP-terms are non-verbal XP-categories. Therefore, the morphosyntactic marking strategies for term focus are restricted structurally and categorically to those which are typical of adnominal markers, e.g. focus movement may only apply to nominals or morphological markers may only attach to nominal expressions. These devices may not then be simply applied to mark focus on verbal predicates.

Term focus may be realised cross-linguistically through prosody, morphology or syntax.

Prosodically, term focus on nominal categories is found in languages like English, either in response to a wh- question or a correction:

(472)   C: Who got married? / I heard David got married.
        (No,) [DANIEL]$_F$ got married.

However, as mentioned above, term focus is found on PP- as well as DP-terms:

(473)   C: Where did David get married? / I heard David got married in the forest.
        (No,) David got married [on the BEACH]$_F$.

Morphological focus markers are exemplified here in Tamang (Gurung Branch of the Bodish Section of the Bodic Division of TB (Shafer 1955)), which marks argument focus with the suffix *-ka* (Mazaudon 2003: 312):

(474) ^{2}*ai-la* ^{4}*mar-ka* ^{4}*niː-nun* ^{2}*cuŋ-o* ^{3}*pi-pa* ^{1}*ŋa-i-mi*
        you-GEN   gold-FOC   two-INT   sell-IMP   say-IPFV   I-ERG-TOP
        'It is your gold [earrings] that I said to sell both of (I did).'

Syntactically, term focus may influence the constituent order, seen here in Hungarian after É. Kiss (2016: 673). Compare the neutral structure in (50) with the focus constructions in (51):

(475) János fel-hívta Évát
      John   up-called Eve-ACC
      'John called up Eve.'

(476) a. János ÉVÁT hívta fel.
         'It was Eve whom John called up.'

      b. Évát JÁNOS hívta fel.
         'It was John who called up Eve.'

In these examples, the comment of the sentence begins with the focus constituent, immediately preceding the verb; see Kiss (2016: §33.3.1) for theories on the reversal of the verbal particle–verb order (fel-hívta–hívta fel), the idea being that for Hungarian (and a number of other languages) focus corresponds to a particular structural position on the tree.

Term focus in Mùwe Ké is presented in §4.4.

3.3.3   Sentence Focus

Sentence focus refers to all-new out-of-the-blue topicless utterances that are true text starters, presentational or of an event-reporting type, prototypically found in answer to "What happened?" type questions, for which existential sentences – in English of the *there is/are* type, defined through the property of lacking an aboutness topic – are the model example, and for which no pragmatic presupposition is formally evoked. Philosophically, they are thetic sentences, which is a good place to start.

The distinction between thetic and categorical judgement types was first distinguished by the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1874) and his pupil, the Austrian philosopher Anton Marty (1884). Sasse (1987: 511–2) paints a picture of the two challenging the accepted Aristotelian notion that the sole type of human judgement is composed of subject and predicate, proposing in its place a fundamental dichotomy of two distinct basic kinds of logical statement. While the pair did not dispose of the subject-predicate theory altogether, they apportioned the structure to a sole type of judgment which they named categorical, a judgement type assumed

to be made up of two consecutive acts: first naming an entity and then making a statement about it. The thetic judgement that they introduced was taken to be logically unstructured, merely expressing an event, state or situation. In philosophical terms it expresses either recognition or rejection with respect to the material of a judgement. The distinction is seen in (477), with the thetic judgement making no statement in regard to an entity. It merely recognises the fact/state/situation of rain occurring. The categorical judgement, however, names *John* and then ascribes him the property *be intelligent*.

(477)   Thetic: It is raining.
        Categorical: John is intelligent.

Thetic sentences, therefore, contain no topic constituent at all although as Krifka (2008: 266) points out, Marty (1884) does indicate that this is not to say that thetic sentences are about nothing; while there is an absence of a topic constituent, there is a presence of a topic denotation, which is typically a situation given in the context, like that in [*The HOUSE is on fire*]comment.

The matter was not taken up again – although Sasse (1987) credits the work of Vilém Mathesius (see Mathesius 1929, for example) as being influenced by Marty – until later by Kuroda (1972), who observed that the Japanese particles *ga* and *wa* correlate directly to thetic and categorical utterances, claiming that the difference between the pairs of sentences in the following examples are subjectless and with a subject-predicate structure, respectively. The distinction, therefore, has syntactic relevance in the language.

(478)   a.   *Inu ga hasitte iru.*   [Thetic]
             'A dog is running.' / 'There is a dog running.'
             Inu wa hasitte iru.   [Categorical]
             'The dog is running.'

        b.   *Inu ga neko o oikakete iru.*   [Thetic]
             'A dog is chasing a cat.' / 'There is a dog chasing a cat.'
             Inu wa neko o oikakete iru.   [Categorical]
             'The dog is chasing the cat.'   (Kuroda 1972: 161)

Lambrecht (1987; 1988a; 1988b; 1994) defines sentence-focus (thetic) structures as those where pragmatic presupposition is not formally evoked. Even in out-of-the-blue all-new

sentences, where it might be suggested that the proposition of *something happening* may be presupposed, the presupposition is only implied situationally and not evoked lexicogrammatically in the utterance; that which is formally evoked is the *absence* of presupposition, plus the subject is not a topic, conforming to the proposed notion that thetic sentences are topicless, and there are no pragmatically presupposed open propositions of the type "X did Y". Moreover because the assertion ranges over the complete proposition, in sentence-focus structures, assertion and focus coincide and it is this entire absence of a proposition that brings about an "eventive" interpretation with regard to the proposition (1994: 233). As a subtype of thetic sentences, Lambrecht (1988a; 1988b) discusses the 'presentational' type which allows entities or situations to be introduced into a discourse world in constructions of the *once upon a time* type. These constructions are usually existential in nature, feature *there be* constructions and promote referents from a non-topic status to topic, or to put it another way, referents in an all-new presentational utterance are not yet established as topics within a narrative or discourse.

As with the two focus types discussed previously, sentence focus may be realised cross-linguistically through prosody, morphology or syntax.

Prosodically, languages such as English or German – and cross-linguistically, according to Gundel (1988: 230) – receive primary stress on the subject in an intransitive utterance consisting solely of subject and verb in 'all-comment' presentational sentences, for example *A STUDENT walked in*. Likewise, primary stress is found on the direct object in all-new transitive sentences. Vallduví and Engdahl (1996: 466), conflating topicless and all-focus sentences, demonstrate the intonational difference between thetic and categorical sentences with the following pair, where in the topic-comment (categorical) structure in (a), nuclear stress falls upon the predicate and in the topicless (thetic) structure in (b), on the subject. The italics in (a) allude to the possibility of a different pitch accent being associated with the topic.

> (479)   a.   *The screen* DIED.
>   b.   The SCREEN died.

Féry (2011: 1911–12), looking at German, reports that for eventive sentences which simply have no topic, a single accent is realised on the subject:

(480) a. {Why are you so happy?}

… *weil* *MARIA* *getanzt* *hat*

… because Maria danced has

'because Maria danced'

b. {Why are you pulling such a face?}

Mein *AUTO* *ist* *stehen* *geblieben*

my car is stand remained

'My car broke down.'

With the presence of a topic, however, both subject and verb are accented:

(481) a. … *weil* *MARIATOPIC* *GETANZT* *hat*

… because Maria danced has

'because Maria danced'

b. {What happened with your vehicles?}

Mein *AUTOTOPIC* *ist* *STEHEN* *geblieben*

My car is stand remained

(aber *mein* *Motorrad* *nicht)*

but my motorbike Not

'My car broke down, but not my motorbike.'

Morphologically, we may find distinct markers for thetic/categorical sentences, as shown for Japanese in (478), and **syntactically**, the distinction may affect word order, as it does in Russian. The following examples from Kallestinova (2007: 6) show Russian thetic and categorical sentences in turn:

(482) A: *Čto* *proizošlo/slučilos?*

What happened/occurred

'What happened?'

B: *Olja* *razbila* *Vazu*

Olya.NOM broke Vase.ACC

'Olya broke a vase.'

(483)   A: *Kto   razbil   vazu?*
            Who   broke   Vase.ACC
            'Who broke the vase?'

        B: *Vazu   razbila   Olja*_{FOCUS}
            Vase.ACC   broke   Olya.NOM
            'Olya broke the vase.'

Sentence focus in Mùwe Ké is presented in §4.5.

3.3.4   Verum Focus

Accounts of verum focus have traditionally been used to refer to the focus on the truth value of a sentence. In English, as seen above for the other types of focus discussed here, sentence elements, usually the auxiliary (or finite) verb, are prosodically stressed to realise verum focus. Consider the following sentence, uttered in a context where it was believed that David had not finished his assignment on time:

(484)   (It turned out that) David DID finish his assignment on time.

The standard focus-based account of verum focus, also called the focus accent thesis (FAT) (Gutzmann et al. 2017), is based on the verum accent that is found in German and English, first addressed by Höhle (1988; 1992), who coined the term *verum focus*, although the phenomenon had been previously noted by both Halliday (1967b) and Watters (1979) (for other classical contributions see Dik et al. 1981; Gussenhoven 1983; Hyman & Watters 1984; Büring 2006a; 2006b; 2016b; Zimmermann & Hole 2008; Stommel 2012 inter alia). The central point is that the accent realised on the finite verb is a (verum) focus accent that focuses on a covert verum operator that in turn marks the proposition that is expressed by the utterance as true, i.e. the functional effect is that of the speaker wishing to affirm the veracity of their thought:

(485)   *Karl   HAT   den   Hund   gefüttert.*
        Carl   has   the   dog   fed
        'Carl DID feed the dog.'

Accenting of the auxiliary verb *hat* or its English counterpart *did* serves the purpose of stressing the fact that the previous belief of Karl not having fed the dog is incorrect and that the real truth

is that he did, in fact, feed it. Karl, the dog, and the act of feeding are all presupposed and in the CG at the time of the utterance so the only focus-as-alternative being addressed is the truth value. Höhle describes the function of this accenting as assigning an element VERUM to the finite verb, which triggers an emphasising effect for the element in case this exact accent is carried by the finite verb:

(486) Höhle's (1992: 114) characterisation:
       In the observed cases, the finite verb is associated with a semantic element VERUM
       such that the accentuation of the verb makes the element stand out.
                        (Translation form German taken from Lohnstein 2016: 291)

However, it is worth noting that verum focus is not always about the truth. Consider, for example, a child telling a parent that they definitely have brushed their teeth when it is clear that they have not. Lohnstein (2016: 292) points out that since the element VERUM may be used in cases like this where it is certainly not emphasizing 'truth', it is more accurate to say that it is an effective way of stopping disputes around a verum-focussed issue. Lohnstein's paper on verum focus looks at the role of sentence mood and how it may be used in reducing the alternatives of (verbal) behaviour that are characterised by its functions, such as stopping disputes, and leads him to put forward the theory that verum focus is in fact sentence mood focus (see Lohnstein 2016 for explicit discussion).

The prevalent epistemic account is after Gutzmann (2012; Gutzmann et al. 2017), which, instead of assuming that the verum accent is a focus accent or relating it to alternatives, makes the assumption that the verum accent is a means of realising a special lexical verum operator that is responsible for certain discourse conditions that the verum accent puts upon the felicitous use of the utterance (Gutzmann et al. 2017: 8). This is the Lexical Operator Thesis (LOT), which builds the contribution of a verum accent into a semantic operator that is only found in the semantic representation of an utterance if it contains a verum accent. The various accounts of verum found in the literature that are based on the LOT (Romero & Han 2004; Romero 2005; 2015; Gutzmann & Castroviejo Miró 2011; Repp 2013 inter alia) all assign the verum accent special semantics, frequently as a conversational operator that relates the utterance's propositional content directly to the question under discussion (§3.2.2). Crucially, the operator is only found if it is marked overtly, meaning the verum accent contains lexicalised intonational meaning in the sense of Potts (2004) in the verum operator's form. This, therefore, leads to the main assumption of the LOT: that verum focus is, in fact, *no focus at all*. The

realisation of the operator in English or German, then, is just a case of chance since the operator finds its realisation through the same pitch accent that is used to mark focus. Moreover, Gutzmann et al. (2017: 44) put forward that part of the original motivation for verum as verum focus was partially motivated because of this identical realisation of verum and focus marking in German and English and conclude, again, that verum focus is not focus but simply a means of marking verum.

Looking at verum across language, Gutzmann et al. (2017: §4.2) use the following specific contexts in which the expression of verum is expected, with the verum operator being marked in every context where the truth value is at stake. These are contexts in which the focus value of the utterance equals the current question under discussion: contexts of positive, negative and uncertain polarity. The first type in (a), however, is that of sentence focus (§3.3.3), where there is no question under discussion, or if there is, it is a very general 'What happened?' type of question.

(487) **Verum Contexts**

    a.   Out-of-the-blue contexts (verum marking is infelicitous):

        i.   What happened?

            #Jon DID eat breakfast.

    b.   The affirmation of a preceding truth value:

        i.   Katie was looking good yesterday.

            Yes, she was. / Yes, she WAS (looking good).

        ii.   Katie wasn't looking good yesterday.

            No, she wasn't. / No, she WASn't (looking good).

    c.   Opposite polarity contexts:

        i.   You certainly didn't read the book.

            I DID read the book.

        ii.   Jon ate pizza.

            Jon DIDn't eat pizza.

    d.   Answers to yes-no questions:

        i.   Do you sing?

            Yes. / Yes, I do. / Yes, I DO (sing).

Note that in (d), the last 'DO' would be appropriate if the speaker expects that their interlocutor might doubt their ability to sing.

Matthewson and Glougie (2018) look at truth and the related notion of justification and whether and how these two epistemological concepts are encoded across language by looking at justification-based evidentials in Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan, Peru), Nivacle (Matacoan-Mataguayan, Argentina), St'át'imcets (Northern Interior Salish, Canada), Nłeʔkepmxcín (Northern Interior Salish, Canada) and English as well as verum emphasis in German, English and Gitksan (part of the Nass-Gitksan dialect continuum, Canada) and find compelling similarities cross-linguistically in the properties of these constructions. Furthermore, they propose that the discourse conditions whereby truth and justification are encoded are comparable: they appear when one needs to defend their assertion against disagreement or scepticism, either explicit or implied.

Upon the assumption that constructions of verum emphasis serve to emphasise a speaker's belief in that which they are asserting is true, Matthewson and Glougie (2018: 14–15) investigate how verum effects manifest in language through expanding upon a set of diagnostics that was first presented by Zimmermann and Hole (2008), comprising 10 properties of verum emphasis in German and English, which are almost identical in Gitksan. Indeed they do go on to make a near-universal claim about these contexts.

(488) **Properties of verum emphasis in English and German**

Contexts where verum emphasis is allowed:

i.   Correcting a previous utterance

ii.   Corrections of negative expectations

iii.   Emphatic agreement

iv.   Confirmation of expected path of events

v.   Answers to questions (with emphatic effect)

vi.   Answers to indirect questions

vii.   In the antecedent of conditionals ('stressing the conditionality')

viii.   Inside yes-no questions (with an 'Is it really?' effect)

Contexts where verum emphasis is disallowed:

ix.   Discourse-initially

x.   Neutral answers to questions

As with the other focus types discussed previously, verum 'focus' may be realised cross-linguistically through prosody, morphology or syntax.

Prosodically, German and English mark verum as seen in the examples given in (485) and (487), respectively. **Morphologically**, in Bura, a Chadic language of Nigeria, verum emphasis is encoded with a dedicated morpheme *kú* (Hartmann 2013: 113):

(489) Context: The neighbour's car has not been repaired in a long time.

Nawa an tí ga ata námta mótá ngá rí?
when FCOP REL 2SG.S FUT repair car 2SG Q
'WHEN will you repair your car?'

*Ama iya **kú** námta náha (diya).*
but 1SG.S VERUM repair yesterday already
'But I DID repair it already yesterday.'

Syntactically, the language of South Margi, another Chadic language of Nigeria, shows verb movement for answers to yes/no questions as well as for corrections of previous truth values, two contexts which trigger verum expression (Hartmann 2013: 114–5):

(490) *ó sín-gə tə́l mə́lmə́ gə hyi ya?*
AUX know-2SG.S chief town LINK 2PL Q
'Do you know the chief of your town?'

li, ó sín-nyí-y-au.
yes AUX know-3SG.O-1SG.S-FD
'Yes, I (do) know him.'

(491) *nágái shíl o kí-ɗa mai*
2SG.S.NEG come to House-1SG.POSS NEG
'You did not come to my house.'

(It's not true) *a shíl-y o kí-ŋ-au*
AUX come-1SG.S to house-2SG.POSS-FD
'I did come to your house.'

Verum focus in Mùwe Ké is presented in §4.6.

3.4 Focus and Contrast

The teasing apart of the notions of focus and contrast has been the work of many a long year since they both share the crucial feature of a set of alternatives (§3.2.2) relevant to their interpretation (Repp 2010: 1335; see also related articles in Repp & Cook (eds.) 2010). Repp (2016) addresses the question of whether contrast, for which there is a vast amount of evidence in the literature, does in fact have a role in grammar and in particular, in the grammar of individual languages. Like all things information-structural, the notion of contrast is understood all too vaguely in the body of previous work, commonly defined only intuitively. The chapter argues for the need to look at contrastive constituents and the way that alternatives are construed, i.e. the type of alternative sets that they evoke, and also discourse relations connecting discourse segments that contain these contrastive constituents, and to provide detailed analyses pertaining to their effects of grammar through morphosyntax, prosody, etc., so as to gain a precise understanding of the grammatical effects associated with contrast and moreover a better understanding of any grammatical effects that contrast may have in individual languages. Three hypotheses are presented, serving as a proposal for both the critical evaluation of previous findings concerned with the grammatical reflexes of contrast and future research into the subject. The hypotheses specify details for identifying contrast-related alternative formation, contrastive discourse relations and the grammatical manifestations of contrast and are presented here in turn.

Taking any two sentences, it can be said that they have a contrastive relationship if there is an element α in S_1 that may be taken to be an alternative to β, an element in S_2 (Repp 2016: 270). A prototypical example of this definition is seen in (492)(a), where two sentences contain two contrast pairs, which contain identical material as well as the contrastive elements and therefore show some level of parallelism, which can be assumed to help in highlighting their dissimilar qualities. Less prototypical is example (b), due to the lack of parallelism, but the two subjects may still be viewed as contrasting because they are overt alternatives. Sentence (c) additionally shows contrastive elements inside the same sentence. Examples (a) to (c) approach the notion of contrast through the alternativeness of elements, i.e. constituents or their denotations, but the notion may also be approached through the discourse relations between either two sentences or two discourse segments: (d) compared to (a), for example, due to the inclusion of a conjunction, intuitively gives a greater feeling of contrast.

(492) (a) [John]contrast.1 ate [salad]contrast.2. [Mary]contrast.1 ate [pizza]contrast.2.

(b) [David]contrast played video games for a while. Then it was [Anna's] contrast turn.

(c) A [Nepali]contrast linguist was chatting to an [English]contrast linguist.

(d) [John]contrast.1 ate [salad]contrast.2 but [Mary]contrast.1 ate [pizza]contrast.2.

These four examples all show **overt pairs** of alternatives which are expressed linguistically, which is widely considered to be a necessary condition in the application of contrast (Repp 2016: 271–2). Contextual/situational salience or an unexpressed alternative being easily predicted is also considered sufficient: *DAVID went to Paris*, for example, conveys the information that *David* contrasts with an implicit alternative, i.e. someone who did not go to Paris, and this would be the case even in an all-new utterance, an idea extending back to Halliday (1967b; see also Rochemont 1986; Chafe 1976; Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990). Alternatives being presented overtly is a consistent sign for the existence of contrast and is one of many conditions found in the literature as a requirement for marking contrast in grammar; five more conditions are discussed with reference to the alternativeness of constituents.

É. Kiss (1998: 245), similarly to the overtness condition, proposes that the function of what she terms identificational focus is a subset of the set comprised of situationally or contextually given elements that may hold for the predicate phrase, that is, a **restricted set** of alternatives must be present in the context, which are able to be clearly identified by the interlocutors (Repp 2016: 272; Bolinger 1961; Chafe 1976). In (493), for example, *pizza* is marked as contrastive through language-specific mechanisms due to the previous sentence providing a restricted alternative set while *pizza*, as the chosen alternative, and its complement set of *{pasta, salad}* are all able to be clearly identified.

(493) The buffet was full of pizza, pasta and salad. I had pizza.

A contrasting view after López (2009: §2.3.3) puts forward that **context may not provide the alternative set**, being made available instead by the sentence that contains the element marked for contrast (Repp 2016: 272). The second elements of the pairs in the sentences in (492) are contrastive under this view since they may be construed as part of an alternative set along with the element that is in the context, i.e. the alternative set only becomes available after the utterance of the second sentence.

Perhaps the most commonly applied definition of contrast found in the literature is the requirement of an alternative to a profiled element that when **substituted** with the original yields a **false statement** (Repp 2016: 273; Halliday 1967b; Chafe 1976; Kenesei 2006; Neeleman & Vermeulen 2012 inter alia). This captures both the intuition that corrections like that seen in (494)(a) constitute a contrastive discourse type and that the *sun* in (b), after Kenesei (2006: 13), may not be contrastive since, in our world anyway, it is the only thing that can shine through the clouds. This view also brings exhaustivity into the fold.

(494)   (a)   John didn't eat pizza, Mary ate pizza.
        (b)   The sun is shining through the clouds.

Another wide definition is that alternatives are always in contrast to one another regardless of sets or operators due to the simple fact that they are **different** from one another, according to which, the four examples in (492) are all contrastive (Repp 2016: 273; 1998: §2.2; Selkirk 2008; Katz & Selkirk 2011). The notion of contrast here is almost equal to Rooth's Alternative Semantics, discussed in §3.2 above (Rooth 1985; 1992; 2016; Krifka 2008), and may therefore be described under his notion of focus: alternatives are introduced, from the set of which the focussed item is drawn.

The final definition of contrast found is that it is related to the belief systems of the interlocutors in that the alternative that the speaker selects is somehow **unexpected** or **remarkable** (Repp 2016: 274; Halliday 1967b; Frey 2006; 2010). This view is seen by others as only having a loose connection with contrast or independent from it altogether (Zimmermann 2008; Brunetti 2009).

The main point here is that research and opinions on what exactly contrast is are really quite varied, resulting in consequences for how observations of grammatical manifestations of contrasts may be evaluated (Repp 2016: 274). Stating that contrast is marked in such a way in a certain language will bring about a meaning according to the definition of contrast that is followed, resulting in inconsistencies; one particular approach may make the correct prediction for the marking of contrast in one language but be lacking for the identification of strategies in another. Specific features of the alternative set must, then, be taken into account along with those of the constituents that denote the alternatives if we are to make a claim regarding contrast marking.

Repp (2016), therefore, puts forward the hypothesis of C-Const in which she defines three semantic relations between the constituents of a sentence pair that, following the literature, may become contrastive; these relations are described for overt constituents, ignoring the issue of alternatives that are contextually salient but non-explicit:

(495) **Hypothesis about contrasting constituents (*C-Const*)**

An F-marked constituent β_F is a candidate for being a contrastive constituent in a sentence if one of the conditions in (a)-(c) holds:

(a) There is a constituent α in a preceding sentence, $[\![\alpha]\!]^o \neq [\![\beta]\!]^o$, such that $[\![\alpha]\!]^o \in [\![\beta]\!]^f$

= explicit alternative (ExplAlt)

(b) There are constituents $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ $(n > 1)$ in a preceding sentence or preceding sentences such that $[\![\beta_F]\!]^f = \{[\![\alpha_1]\!]^o, \dots, [\![\alpha_n]\!]^o\}$

= explicit alternative set (ExplAltSet)

(c) There is a constituent α is a preceding sentence such that $[\![\alpha]\!]^o$ corresponds to $[\![\beta_F]\!]^f$, where 'correspond to' subsumes relations between kinds and their representatives, plural individuals and their atomic parts, generalised quantifiers and elements of their witness sets.

= implicit alternative set (ImplAltSet)

(Repp 2016: 274)

The basic case is defined in (495)(a), which has an explicit alternative present in the context. This comes straight from Rooth (Rooth 1992: 81), who put forward that F-marked constituents β are construed as contrasting with α if α's ordinary semantic value is an element found in β's focus-semantic value; that is to say the denotation of α is required to be part of the set of focus alternatives found for β. In a context regarding 'that which David bought at the market', for example, one might utter *David bought carrots* followed by *Then he bought* [*apples*]$_F$, where α = *carrots* and β = *apples*. The four examples in (492) are all of this type. For the semantic relation in (b), there exists in the context various explicit elements which make up a set that β may belong to, e.g. *David served a lunch of meat, fish, and vegetables. I ate the* [*vegetables*]$_F$. This explicit alternative set type is that found in É. Kiss's (1998) definition of contrast. In (c) the implicit alternative set type is found in cases where β's focus-semantic value may correspond to α's ordinary semantic value but not vice versa: *David was wondering which fish to buy. He decided on* [*salmon*]$_F$, where α = *fish*. This set type includes those cases when α is a wh- constituent, if it is to be taken that constituents of this kind are indefinites.

Turning to **contrastive discourse relations**, there is a view in many studies that defends the idea of contrast being a gradable phenomenon (see Molnár 2006; Paoli 2009; Calhoun 2010; cf. Bolinger 1961; Lambrecht 1994; Asher & Lascarides 2003), which is possibly at its most intuitive for discourse relations rather than contrastiveness viewed as alternatives (Repp 2016: 275). The inclusion of *but* in (492)(d) is most likely more contrastive than its counterpart in (a) and intuitively corrections are more contrastive still. If, then, there are degrees of contrast, it is reasonable to expect that they correlate with the marking of contrast: higher degrees of contrast may lead to stronger prosodic marking or there may be a certain level that the degree of contrast needs to reach before a morphosyntactic marker is employed, for example. Dialogues of the type in (496) are typical stimuli for contrast experiments, where the *tea* in the final sentence is both given and contrastive with the discourse relation, a correction, being highly contrastive.

(496)   A: Are you thirsty?
        B: Yes, I'm about to make tea.
        A: You're about to make [coffee]$_{contrast}$?
        B: No, I'm about to make [TEA]$_{contrast}$.

However, while a contrastive feature, like stronger prosodic force in English, is consistently found in paradigms such as this, Repp (2016: 276) points out that the feature responsible for such effects is not readily identifiable since it could be due to the absence vs. presence of an overt alternative or a highly contrastive vs. non-contrastive discourse relation, for example. Both a highly contrastive relation *and* an alternative may be required and whether the same effects are found for less contrastive relations would also need to be examined.

Across the literature, theories on discourse and discourse relations all contain a relation CONTRAST; however, as with all things information-structural, there are a wide variety of differing definitions of what the relation actually is, which is also related to the varying total number of discourse relations as well as the associated level of specificity for each relation (Repp 2016: 276). In Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (Asher & Lascarides 2003), for example, the notion of CONTRAST subsumes the relations of CONTRAST, CONCESSION and ANTITHESIS that are found in Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson 1988; Mann & Taboada 2014), while Wolf and Gibson (2005) (following Hobbs 1985) make a distinction between CONTRAST and VIOLATION OF EXPECTATION, which is roughly equal to CONCESSION, but not between CONTRAST and ANTITHESIS. The common consensus among all theories is that

two discourse segments necessitate both similarities and dissimilarities for a CONTRAST relation. Notions such as ANTITHESIS, the incompatibility of denoted states of affairs as in (497)(a), or CONCESSION, like the violation of expectation in (497)(b), are either taken as an addition to the CONTRAST relation and therefore as adding to the contrastiveness degree (Asher & Lascarides 2003) or allocated different discourse relations, such as ANTITHESIS or CONCESSION.

(497)   (a)   [Daniel]$_{contrast}$ won the auction, not [John]$_{contrast}$.   (ANTITHESIS)

      (b)   Even though [John]$_{contrast}$ is much richer, [Daniel]$_{contrast}$ won the auction.

                                                             (CONCESSION)

A further discourse relation found in these theories is that of SIMILAR(ITY) (Wolf & Gibson 2005), also labelled as PARALLEL (Hobbs 1985; Asher & Lascarides 2003) or LIST (Mann & Taboada 2014). Repp prefers the use of the term SIMILAR, in a relation of which similarities are established between parallel sets of events or entities like those seen in (498)(a), where two actors are carrying out identical actions, which is highly compatible with *too*, a SIMILAR-typical marker (2016: 266–7). The example in (b) may also be classified as SIMILAR, where two actors are performing similar activities (here making a salad) but examples such as this are often classified as having a CONTRAST relation due to the presence of both similarities and dissimilarities.

(498)   (a)   Mary was doing her homework. Paul was too.   (SIMILAR)

      (b)   Mary was chopping lettuce. Paul was cutting tomatoes. (SIMILAR/CONTRAST)

      (c)   Mary was chopping lettuce because Pete was cutting tomatoes.

Due to the rhetoric surrounding similarity/dissimilarity being all-too vague, Repp (2016: 267) classifies examples like (498)(b) as SIMILAR because there is neither incompatibility of state-of-affairs nor violation of expectation present in the meaning and puts forward as doubtful SIMILAR discourses involving contrast above the level of contrastive constituents. The example in (c) varies only slightly with that in (b) with the inclusion of a discourse relation; however, intuitively it involves no differing level of contrast with (b) and therefore should not be viewed as having contrastive discourse relations in any significant sense, independent of constituent alternatives. She therefore defines a SIMILAR relation in (499)(n)(b) as one in which the segments of discourse make an identical contribution to the present question under discussion,

a definition that captures the intuitive idea that SIMILAR discourses are both smooth and without any incompatibilities, either real or perceived.

Discourse markers like *still, although* and *but* all convey contrastive meaning components such as violation of expectation or incompatibility and throughout the literature, most examples given for the CONTRAST relation are found with *but*, which is assumed traditionally to indicate that the utterance prior to *but* provides a background assumption against which the following utterance argues (see Anscombre & Ducrot 1977, for example) (Repp 2016: 277). The two sentences in (498)(b), for example, could be based on the background idea that Mary was supposed to be making the salad alone and with the insertion of *but*, it is signalled that this expectation has been violated. To be more general, *but* indicates that the two utterances provide contrary contributions to the present question under discussion (Lang 1991; Sæbø 2003; Umbach 2005). Repp uses the term OPPOSE for these kinds of discourse relation so as to avoid the label *contrast* and to keep things less specific than *violation of expectation* with the definition given in (499)(i). Intuitively, SIMILAR is less contrastive that OPPOSE, since the latter deals with a discourse relation that is truly contrastive, which in turn is less contrastive than ANTITHESIS, since it involves no correction. CORR is used for *correction* over ANTITHESIS because it covers monologic ANTITHESIS as well as dialogic rejections, due to the latter being used so regularly in investigations into contrast, and Repp's definition for CORR is seen in (ii).

While the discourse relations thus far are all found with declarative utterances, interrogative discourses also figure in the contrast debate (Repp 2016: 278). Intuitively non-contrastive are discourse segments of questions with congruent answers, labelled as Q-A in (499)(n)(a); however, declarative utterances used for the rejection of a question, e.g. *A: What did John sing? B: DAVID sang!*, in which B rejects a presupposition present in the question – that John sang – results in a CORR relation.

The discussion on discourse relations plus their relation to and potential degrees of contrast are summarised in Repp's hypothesis on contrastive discourse relations in (499), which covers smooth non-contrastive discourse relations of the type Q-A and SIMILAR due to the fact that they have been utilised in empirical investigations that look at contrast.

(499)   **Hypothesis about contrastive discourse relations (*C-DRel*)**

The degree of contrastiveness of the discourse relation between two discourse segments d_1 and d_2 increases from *(n)* to *(ii)*.

(n)   Smooth discourses (= non-contrastive)

    a.   [Q-A(n)]: d_1 is associated with a question meaning, i.e. a set of propositions; the proposition associated with d_2 is an element of that set

    b.   [SIMILAR(n)]: the proposition associated with d_1 and the proposition associated with d_2 can both be true in the evaluation world: d_1 and d_2 make the same kind of contribution to the current question under discussion

(i)   [OPPOSE(i)]: the proposition associated with d_1 and the proposition associated with d_2 can both be true in the evaluation world; d_1 and d_2 make opposing contributions to the current question under discussion

(ii) [CORR(ii)]: d_2 rejects d_1 because certain background assumptions for the felicitous use of d_1 are not met, or because the proposition associated with d_1 and d_2 cannot both be true in the evaluation world.

(Repp 2016: 278)

Putting together the observations about constituents and discourse relations that may potentially be contrastive, Repp proposes the hypothesis in (500) for the role that contrast plays in the grammar of a specific language.

(500)   **Hypothesis about the role of contrast in the grammar (*C-Gram*)**

Contrast is a grammatically relevant notion in the grammar of a language *L* if in discourses consisting of two discourse segments d_1 and d_2, *L* uses grammatical means to mark d_2 in the following way:

● A constituent that is a candidate for being a contrastive constituent in *C-Const* is marked differently from non-contrastive constituents and it is marked differently from candidate contrastive constituents in at least one class of *C-Const* (a)-(c) that is different from its own. The constituent is marked by the same means for all discourse relations in *C-DRel*.

              = contrast based on type of alternatives

If *L* marks all the discourse types in *C-DRel* for all contrastive constituent types in *C-Const* by the same means, contrast marking is F-marking in *L*, and 'contrast' is focus.

- The constituents that are candidates for being contrastive constituents in *C-Const* (a)-(c) are marked differently when they occur in OPPOSE(i) or CORR(ii) in comparison to when they occur in other discourse relations.

  = contrast based on discourse relations

  Contrast is a gradable notion if there are differences in the marking of OPPOSE(i) or CORR(ii).

  (Repp 2016: 279)

The hypothesis does not attempt to cover cases in which a subset of the types in *C-Const* is marked if found in a subset of the *C-DRel*. The possible combinations between *C-Const* and *C-DRel* are shown below in Table 12, although not all seem conceptually plausible, and a language may contain particular marking strategies for certain combinations. According to the empirical situation, particular theoretical notions need to be defined language-specifically to describe such licensing conditions and since these cannot be shown through an unspecific notion of contrast, using more specific terminology helps to bring the licencing conditions of each individual case to light. "In my assumptions I deviate from much of the earlier literature, which has tried to come up with a notion of contrast that holds across languages," (Repp 2016: 280).

	ExplAlt	*ExplAltSet*	*ImplAltSet*
[Q-A$_{(n)}$]	Did [Jon] sing last night? Yes, [Jon] sang last night. N.B. A 'yes' answer to a question is included so as to compare [Q-A$_{(n)}$] and [CORR$_{(ii)}$] since d_1 (Jon) is associated with a question meaning, i.e. a set of propositions, and the proposition associated with d_2 (also Jon) is an element of that set (see (499)(n)(a)). However, *ExplAlt* cannot be compared to *ExplAltSet* or *ImplAltSet* since $[\![\alpha]\!]^o \neq [\![\beta]\!]^o$ (see (495)(a)).	Who of Mary and Ann did Jon call? Jon called [Mary]. Did William or Chuck like the present that Shirley sent to her sister? [William] liked the present that Shirley sent to her sister. Who of you two broke the vase? [I] broke the vase.	What happened? [Jon called Mary] What did Jon do? Jon [called Mary] Who did Jon call? Jon called [Mary] Who broke the vase? [Jon] broke the vase.
[SIMILAR$_{(n)}$]	[Pete]$_{cont.1}$ went to [Rome]$_{cont.2}$. [Marc]$_{cont.1}$ went to [London]$_{cont.2}$.		Do you know [what]$_{alt\ set\ 1}$ they stole from [your classmates]$_{alt\ set\ 2}$ in the gym? [Mary]$_{cont2}$ lost [her watch]$_{cont1}$ [Jon]$_{cont2}$ lost [his wallet]$_{cont1}$.
[OPPOSE$_{(i)}$]	Did Jon and Pete mow the lawn together? John was mowing the lawn but Pete was [pruning roses].		
[CORR$_{(ii)}$]	Did [Jon] sing last night? [Pete]$_{cont}$ sang last night. Jon had [ice-cream]. (No.) He had [cake]$_{cont}$. [It's raining outside.] [The sun is shining!]$_{cont}$ Look out the window! Jon didn't have [ice-cream], but [cake]$_{cont}$.	Did [William] or [Chuck] like the present that Shirley sent to her sister? [David] liked the present that Shirley sent to her sister.	Three pupils of class 10a earned some money in the last week of the school vacation by now and then cleaning machines in the BMW factory. Unfortunately, Friday's attendance list went missing. The secretary told the head of department that [all three pupils]$_{impl.\ alt\ set}$ had worked on that day. But she was wrong. On Friday, only [Sabine]$_{contrast}$ came. The others weren't in the mood for working any longer. Did [all of your daughters] hit Jon? No, only [Mary] hit Jon.

Table 12. Some combinatorial possibilities after Repp (2016)

Reserving a conclusion on the relation between focus and contrast and one clear definition of contrast that will be employed in subsequent analysis, this thesis follows Repp's argument of

contrast being a multi-faceted phenomenon with these facets warranting investigation within an individual language. "Grammars of individual languages are sensitive to aspects of contrast, and … which aspects these are requires careful specification," (2016: 289).

Contrast in Mùwe Ké is presented in §4.7.

3.5 Focus and Differential Argument Marking

DAM is presented here following Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant (2018). While being far from an exclusively information-structural phenomenon – its discussion finds no place in the OHIS, for example – DAM, or more specifically differential ergative marking (DEM), was selected for description and analysis in Mùwe Ké due to its clear importance to focussing from the outset of data collection as well as being a pervasive theme in the IS descriptions of related TB languages. The use of DEM in Mùwe Ké to mark predicate-, term-, sentence-, verum-focus and contrast structures, each discussed above, is presented in §4.3 to §4.7, respectively.

3.5.1 General Introduction to Differential Marking

Differential marking was first referred to as such by Bossong (1982; 1985), who looked at *differential object marking* in New Iranian languages and Sardinian although the phenomenon had been previously given the term *split* (*ergativity*) in research investigating differential agent marking, which has been used since the work of Silverstein (1976), finding popularity through Dixon (1979; 1994) (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 2). In more recent times, as interest in the area increased, many related terms have appeared. De Hoop and de Swart (2009) led the way with their systematic discussion of *differential subject marking* (DSM), where *subject* was taken rather broadly to include various less-canonical subject-like arguments. Covering more precise argument roles were the works of Fauconnier (2011), who looked at *differential agent marking*; Haspelmath (2007) and Kittilä (2008), who explored *differential recipient/goal marking* and *differential theme marking*; McGregor (1992; 1998; 2006; 2010), Meakins (2009) and Gaby (2010), among others, who examined a further notion subsumed under DAM in that of *optional ergative marking,* which extends to how ergative case may be used to mark focal, contrastive or unexpected agent arguments besides its semantic function of agent encoding; and Sinnemäki (2014), who, having observed *DOM* implying assumptions regarding the factors that trigger differential marking, introduced *restricted (object) case*

marking in order to include all instances of differential marking regardless of their respective factors (see also Barðdal & Chelliah 2009; McGregor & Verstraete 2010 inter alia).

From these varying terms, then, differential marking as a notion is rather broad and covers a large number of phenomena, which leads to Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant's (2018: 3; after Woolford 2009; and Iemmolo & Schikowski 2014) initial broad definition of DAM:

(501)   Broad definition of DAM:
        Any kind of situation where an argument of a predicate bearing the same generalized
        semantic argument role may be coded in different ways, depending on factors other
        than the argument role itself, and which is not licensed by diathesis alternations.

This definition is refined below in the narrow definition given in (505) after a presentation of the aspects central to the understanding of DAM, summarised in the following diagram:

Figure 9. DAM systems according to their trigger (after Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 20)

Argument-triggered DAM systems are those where DAM is found with an identical form of the predicate; there are two ways that argument properties may determine DAM: the argument that is differentially marked may have properties that are responsible for the marking alone or else more than one argument may determine the marking (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 4). Following Bossong (1991: 159), these argument properties may further include either semantic or formal (inherent) characteristics or ones that are primarily pragmatic (non-inherent).

One type of DAM is conditioned by properties that are argument-internal or LOCAL (Silverstein 1976: 178; Malchukov 2008: 213) but the properties of other arguments found in the same

clause may also influence argument marking, that is, the complete configuration of who is acting upon whom may shape the DAM system, which Silverstein (1976: 178) labels as GLOBAL, due to case marking being regulated on a wider level that involves all of the arguments (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 12). In Kashmiri, for example, P is marked accusative or dative if it is higher than A on the language's Animacy/Person Hierarchy (Malchukov 2008: 213; on data from Wali & Koul 1997: 155).

Inherent lexical argument properties are like those seen in (502), which are often organised into implicational hierarchies, like that of Dixon's (1979) 'potentiality of agency scale', drawn from Silverstein's (1976) 'hierarchy of inherent lexical content' and made popular by Croft (2003: 130) as 'the extended animacy hierarchy' (for similar hierarchies see Moravcsik 1978; DeLancey 1981; Aissen 1999; Bickel & Nichols 2007)

(502)   first person pronoun > second person pronoun > third person pronoun > proper nouns > human common noun > animate common noun > inanimate common noun (Dixon 1979: 85)

The dimensions such as person or animacy seen in this hierarchy play a major role in shaping DAM systems across language and have been suggested due to the fact that distinct dimensions are not fully orthogonal: pronouns, for example, are usually inherently animate but also definite and highly accessible (as discussed in §3.1.2) (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 5). Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant (2018) provide an overview of these dimensions that contribute to such hierarchies, looking first at inherent lexical argument properties that contain a semantic component, listed in Table 13, which are the contributory factors most often discussed in relation to DAM, with examples of how they affect case marking and agreement that are found frequently across the literature (Silverstein 1976; Aissen 1999; Dixon 1994 inter alia).

Dimension	Example
Person	First & Second person > Third person > (Obviative / Fourth person) (cf. Dixon 1979: 85; Croft 2003: 130)
Animacy	Humans > Animate non-humans (animals) > Inanimate (cf. Bossong 1991: 159; Silverstein 1976; Aissen 2003)
Uniqueness	Proper nouns > Common nouns (e.g. as part of Croft 2003: 130)
Discreteness	Count nouns > Mass nouns (cf. Bossong 1991: 159)
Number	Singular vs. Plural vs. Dual

Table 13. Inherent semantic argument properties

The levels listed in Table 13 are ordered with the aim of an implicational hierarchy; regarding argument marking, they were designed to echo universal constraints on the possible splits that may be found for case alignment and agreement and/or the frequency of actual language types cross-linguistically (cf. Croft 2003: 123) (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 6). Furthermore, the list is not intended to imply that for each dimension a DAM system exists where that particular property is the sole trigger of DAM but rather that these, and other, dimensions intricately interact in the majority of languages where DAM systems are found.

Further to an argument's inherent semantic properties, differences in argument marking can frequently be captured better through looking at their inherent morphological properties (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 7–8). This includes two types of DAM: the part-of-speech distinction, that is, pronoun vs. noun, and gender/inflectional-class distinctions.

The distinction between pronoun and lexical noun is an extremely common line of split in case marking cross-linguistically (cf. Bickel et al. 2014) and this may well be due to pronouns receiving different argument marking because they belong to the very archaic part of the lexicon, as discussed in §2.2.7.2 after Filimonova (2005). Due to their 'age', pronouns are more resistant to morphological or phonological change in comparison to lexical nouns and therefore tend to hold their case markers for longer but they are often subject to greater syntactic constraints, all of which may go part of the way in explaining why they are the most 'notorious' hierarchy offenders (see Bickel et al. 2014 for examples). It is important to note, however, that these inherent properties should be viewed only as triggers of DAM, not as either its function or result, because properties such as pronoun vs. noun are already lexically coded (Klein & de Swart 2011: 4–5).

Gender and inflectional classes may also trigger DAM; certain noun classes in a language may be marked for case while others are not or different inflectional classes may have differing allomorphs of the same marker. These triggers are rarely discussed in the literature with reference to DAM, most likely because in many languages inflectional class assignments are only partly conditioned semantically, being otherwise idiosyncratic, and therefore do not produce an obvious functional explanation. Another reason could likely be because the main focus of studies on DAM have been interested in variation in alignment patterns that result from DAM but not in the identical alignment patterns yielded from DAM.

Non-inherent discourse-based argument properties are addressed separately in §3.5.2 since they are crucial for the present thesis. Before that, the remaining DAM systems are briefly surveyed.

Another way that arguments may trigger DAM is due to properties that are dependent upon **event semantics**, that is, the way that arguments are involved in a particular event (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 14). Relevant aspects include volition (see §2.3.7 above), control (§2.3.4) or agentivity, plus affectedness (see Næss 2004; McGregor 2006; Fauconnier 2012 for discussion). DAM may be employed in these contexts so as to differentiate varying degrees of transitivity with agent (or subject) marking typically manipulating the level of volition, control or agentivity and with DOM helping to express the level of affectedness on P arguments and resultativity on the verbal domain, which ties in with prototypical notion of A and P as affect*er* and affect*ed*.

By way of example, differential S marking is triggered by volitionality in Tsova-Tush (Nakh-Daghestanian), where ergative and nominative case marking on the same S argument imply that the action was either one's own fault, and therefore volitional or controlled, or was an accident, seen in the following pair of utterances, noted as early as Meščaninov (1967: 82; cited in Comrie 1973: 241; and Holisky 1987: 105):

(503)   *as*   *wože*
        1SG-ERG   fell
        'I fell.' (It was my own fault that I fell down.)

        so   *wože*
        1SG-NOM   fell
        'I fell.' (No implication that it was my fault.)   (Holisky 1987: 105)

Looking at similar data from Lithuanian, Seržandt (2013) puts forward the notion of control over the pre-stage (CoP) of an event to better explain certain cases of DAM, where the subject referent does not necessarily have control over the action. In the following example, the context implies that the doctor has the CoP and therefore the more agentive NOM-ACC construction in (b), which is grammatical in isolation, presupposes the nominative participant as having the CoP, resulting in ungrammaticality. The DAT-NOM case frame in (a), however, only encodes the experiencer's perception of their physical state without being responsible for it. In turn, (b) would put the responsibility for the resultative state on the experiencer:

(504) *Gydytojas ant skaudančio piršto uždėjo ledų, ir po dešimties*
      doctor   on aching   finger put   ice   and after ten

minučių
minutes

(a) *man   pirštas   visai   atšalo*
    I:DAT   finger:NOM   fully   get cold:PST.3(SG)

(b) **aš   pirštą   visai   atšalau*
    I:NOM   finger:ACC   fully   get cold:PST.1SG

'The doctor put ice on [my] aching finger and after 10 minutes *my finger got cold*.'

(Seržant 2013: 289)

All of the cases considered thus far have in common DAM cases in which the properties of the argument function as its trigger, while the predicate forms remain constant. Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant (2018: 16) consider this type to be the more central one, following the tradition of it being the focus of study on DAM since its inception, and therefore put forward their narrow definition of DAM:

(505) Narrow definition of DAM:
      Any kind of situation where an argument of a predicate bearing the same generalized
      semantic role may be coded in different ways, depending on factors other than the
      argument role itself and/or the clausal properties of the predicate such as polarity,
      TAM, embeddedness, etc.

Predicate-triggered DAM systems are those in which the DAM is dependent upon the form of the predicate that is involved, in contrast to argument-triggered cases of DAM, which

involve the same predicate form. In these instances, different predicate forms, which are nevertheless related paradigmatically, necessitate DAM without inherent or discourse-related argument properties playing any kind or role (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 17). Predicate-triggered DAM systems include clause-type-based, TAM-based, and polarity-based differential marking as well as the marking of IS with verbal morphology.

Clause-type-based differential marking is argument marking that is dependent upon the type of clause in which it is found, e.g. main/matrix vs. subordinate (cf. Dixon 1994: 101; McGregor 2009: 492) (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 17). For example, Bickel and Yādava (2000: §2) show that the same arguments in Maithili (Indo-European) are found in the nominative case in main clauses and in the dative case in dependent clauses. Importantly, this differential marking is not found with the same predicate; the complementary distribution is dependent upon the status of the predicate as matrix or embedded.

TAM-based differential marking is DAM triggered by the tense, aspect or mood of the clause (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 18), usually discussed in tandem with split ergativity (cf. Comrie 1978; Dixon 1994: 97–101; de Hoop & Malchukov 2007). Harris (1981: 42) shows that in Georgian (Kartvelian), for example, the agent in marked with nominative case in the present and narrative (ergative) case in the aorist.

Polarity-based differential marking see arguments marked differently in affirmative and negative clauses, e.g. in Finnish, Sulkala and Karjalainen (1992: 115) demonstrate that P may be marked as accusative or partitive in affirmative clauses but only as partitive in negative clauses (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 19).

Although DAM driven by **IS** usually falls under the narrow definition in (505), certain information-structural configurations may additionally require different predicate forms (see e.g. Saeed 1987 for Somali), e.g. Hayward (1984: 113) shows that in Arbore (Cushitic) a topical nominative subject takes an auxiliary while the focal subject does not (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 19).

3.5.2   The Role of Information Structure in Differential Argument Marking

The role of **non-inherent discourse-based argument properties** will be of primary importance for the present thesis. They are those characteristics that relate to how referents

employed in discourse are found to interact with DAM: properties that include semantic dimensions like definiteness and specificity on the one hand and the notions of IS on the other (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 9).

Definiteness and specificity find their definition here through the notion of identifiability as discussed in §3.1.2 after Gundel et al. (1993) and Lambrecht (1994), closely related to the notion of givenness. The difference between the two here is that the referent for a definite argument is able to be identified by the hearer, after Lyons (1999: 2–5), or deemed as stored in their mind by the speaker, after Lambrecht (1994: 76), whereas a nominal is seen as specific if the speaker, with no regard to the hearer, has in mind a particular referent, again after Lyons (1999: 35). Since the two interact so closely, they are more often than not integrated into a single hierarchy, as seen in (506) (after Comrie 1986: 94; Croft 2003: 132):

(506)   definite > (indefinite) specific > (indefinite) non-specific

Sinnemäki's (2014) investigation on the effects of specificity and definiteness on DOM found that of the 178 languages that exhibit DOM in the sample, 71 saw either definiteness or specificity playing a role. Moreover, the languages of Africa, Europe and Asia were found to be more prone to being affected by this feature than those of Australia, New Guinea or the Americas (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 10).

The effect of **IS** properties on DAM were noted in early studies on the subject, such as Bossong (1985) and Laca (1987), and has since become rather prominent (for differential agent marking see McGregor 1998; 2006; and for DOM see Iemmolo 2010; von Heusinger & Kaiser 2007; 2011; Escandell-Vidal 2009; Dalrymple & Nikolaeva 2011 inter alia) (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 10). The notions of topic (§3.1.3) and focus (§3.2) have gone a long way in accounting for previously seemingly unpredictable variability in argument marking across language.

Central to this thesis, focality may play a large role in DAM, predominantly in so-called 'optional' ergativity. In Lhasa Tibetan, for example, Tournadre (1991) put forward that occurrences of the ergative case marker have a clear rhetorical function that serve to underline or highlight agentivity, corroborated by not being present when the agent is the topic, undefined or unknown. Compare the following:

(507) *nga*   *dpe.cha*   *lta-gi.yod*

      I+ABS   book+ABS   look(pres)-UNAC+EGOVOL

      'I'm reading [a Tibetan book].' (possible answer to: "What are you doing?")

      dpe.cha   *de*   *nga-s*   *lta-gi.yod*   *'khyer*   *ma*   *'gro*   *a*

      book+ABS   this   I+ERG   look-UNAC+EGOVOL   take   not   go   PART

      'I am the one who is reading this book, don't take it (away)!'

                                                                       (Tournadre 1991: 102)

In the first sentence, 'I' is the topic and is left unmarked but in the second, it is in focus or else contrastive, serving to emphasise the actor.

Research on DAM in TB languages during the following twenty years, summarised by DeLancey (2011), showed the prevalent 'alignment' to be a pattern of 'pragmatic ergative' where case markers are optionally present on A arguments, as well as some S arguments. The presence of an ergative marker is said to be determined (not exclusively) by the semantic factors of agentivity and perfectivity and the pragmatic factor of contrast. In the same volume, Chelliah and Hysop (2011: §2) list pragmatic factors related to DAM in TB as contrastive focus (or topic), speaker's subjective judgements that the action of the agent is somehow unexpected or unsanctioned socially, for the change of actor in narratives, setting-apart or foregrounding effects, agents that are new information, or for disambiguating actor and undergoer, all of which have a connection to the notion of focus.

Witzlack-Makarevich and Seržant (2018: 11) point out the difficulty in defining and operationalising the notion of focus or emphasis for the analysis of DAM and put forward the related notions of unpredictability, surprise or unexpectedness of the referent as preferable for the description of individual DAM systems. Schikowski (2013: 214), for example, in addition to factors such as animacy, specificity and topicality, puts forward *unexpectedness* as being able to explain dative marking in Nepali where animacy and specificity are not able to. Reasons for a referent being unexpected include its unlikeliness in a certain position or due to being in contrast:

(508) *Purus-ko*   *hʌinʌ*   *mʌila-ko*   *ʌbʌstha(-lai)*   *her-nu*   *pʌr-ch-ʌ.*

      man-GEN   NEG   woman-GEN   situation-DAT   look.at-INF$_1$ fall-NPST-3s

      'One should look at the situation of the women, not of the men.'

                                                                      (Schikowski 2013: 164)

The same notion of unexpectedness is seen in the Western Australian language of Warrwa, for which McGregor (2006: 402) puts forward the Expected Actor Principle, which also links into the factor of change of actor and the idea of predictability:

> The episode protagonist is – once it has been established – the expected (and unmarked) Actor of each foregrounded narrative clause of the episode; any other Actor is unexpected. (McGregor 1998: 516)

In Warrwa, Agent NPs are marked by *-nma*, a focal ergative marker, when both the Agent's identity is surprising or unpredictable and the referent of the Agent exhibits an unexpected or exceptional degree of agentivity (2006: 399), otherwise the ordinary ergative postposition *-na* is found:

(509)   *nyinka*   *jurrb*   *ø-ji-na-yina*   *kinya*   *wanyji*   *kwiina*   *iri,*
         this   jump   3minNOM-say-PA-3minOBL   this   later   big   woman

         ka-na-ngka-ndi-ø   *ø-ji-na*   *kinya*   **-na**   *wuba,*
         1minNOM-TR-FUT-get-3minACC   3minNOM-say-PA   this   **-ERG**   small
         'The little one jumped at her then, at the big woman, and tried to get her.'

         kinya   *kwiina*   **-nma**   *iri*   *marlu*   *laj*   *ø-ji-na-ø*
         this   big   **-fERG**   woman   not   throw   3minNOM-say-PA-3minACC

         kinya   *wuba,*   *laj,*   *marlu*   *laj*   *ø-ji-na-ø,*
         this   little   throw   not   throw   3minNOM-say-PA-3minACC
         'But no, the big woman threw the little man away.'   (McGregor 2006: 402)

It is worth noting that the typology of argument effects presented here, and indeed the neat dichotomies in Figure 9, represent a typological idealisation only and that most argument-triggered DAM systems employ a combination of inherent and non-inherent properties (Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018: 12).

DAM in Mùwe Ké is discussed in §4.2.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented an overview of the basic IS notions of CG, givenness, topic and focus before looking in detail at focus in alternative semantics and the focus domains of predicate, term, sentence and verum and subsequently at focus in relation to contrast and DAM. This thesis adopts these notions, following the approaches discussed above, for the description of focus structures in Mùwe Ké, presented in the next chapter, before questioning them in Chapter 5, specifically the notion of focus as a grammatical category, for subsequent analysis of the IS-related patterns encountered in the language.

4

A Description of Mùwe Ké Focus Structures

Following from the information-structural notions introduced in Chapter 3, this chapter presents focus structures in Mùwe Ké. The first two sections provide general background information. §4.1 presents a general overview of the interaction between IS, word order and morphological marking in Mùwe Ké, discussing the notions of givenness, topic and focus to provide a background for the rest of the chapter. The two main focal reflexes found in the language from the data from the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006) are a preferred immediately preverbal position for focussed terms and obligatory ergative marking on focussed actors. The description provided here is primarily based on these two expressions. In §4.2, therefore, DAM in the language is discussed with reference to an initial investigation into whether it is indeed dependent on pragmatic/information-structural functions. The following sections investigate these two reflexes in more depth relative to focus domains. They present the focus domains of predicate (§4.3), term (§4.4), sentence (§4.5) and verum (§4.6) focus, plus the notion of contrast (§4.7), ending with a summary (§4.8) of the IS patterns found in the language, that forms the basis for the analysis in Chapter 5.

4.1 Basics of Information Structuring in Mùwe Ké

This section presents a brief introduction to the morphosyntax of IS in Mùwe Ké based mostly on the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006). Information status (given vs. new), focus and topic are discussed in turn.

In terms of **information status** (see §3.1.2 for givenness), syntactically, Mùwe Ké prefers a given-before-new constituent order save for the hard requirement of a sentence-final verb; morphologically, given and new information may be marked as definite and indefinite, respectively (§2.2.4), and both given and new actors may optionally receive ergative case marking, most likely with a pragmatic distinction (while it is obligatory for focal actors: see §4.2 for the discussion of DAM in Mùwe Ké along with the subsequent sections that discuss

its use in focus structures); and ellipsis is a common occurrence on given items, discussed below along with referential density.

Mùwe Ké **constituent order** exhibits a preference for given before new in most utterances. Whether this preference is due more to given/topical items appearing first or the preference for new/focussed information appearing in immediately-preverbal position is discussed later in subsequent sections; however, the classic Q/A test nearly always returns the preferred word order seen in the following examples with the given 'woman' preceding the new 'beans' in the first and vice versa in the second:

(510) *kérmen-gane   tʃǐː   dzèː-s-a*
   woman-ERG what ate-PST.TES-Q
   'What did the woman eat?'

   kérmen-gane   kʰjàsen   dzèː-s
   woman-ERG bean ate-PST.TES
   'The woman ate beans.'

(511) *kʰjàsen   sú-i-gane   dzèː-s-a*
   bean who-ERG-ERG ate-PST.TES-Q
   'Who ate beans?'

   kʰjàsen   kérmen-gane   dzèː-s
   bean woman-ERG ate-PST.TES
   'The woman ate beans.'   (elicited)

Task 3 'Visibility' in the QUIS explores the impact of givenness on clause structure through the showing of a pair of pictures one after the other and yields a strong preference for given terms preceding new. In the second sentence in the following first example, the given woman, present in the first picture, precedes the new man. In the second example, where the man is given, the opposite order of terms is found.

(512)

dì:	pár	nàŋ-du	kérmen	tʃík	ʈhí:	tá:-ru	tʰèd-duk
this	picture	in-LOC	woman	a	chair	on-LOC	stayed-PRF.TES

là:-dʒi-ni
stood-CONN-TOP

'In this picture, a woman has gotten on a chair and stood (there).'

tʰèni	òdi	kérmen-la	kérgjal	tʃík-gane	phúl-da	kʰjàb-soŋ
then	that	woman-DAT	man	a-ERG	push-EMPH	VSR.PST-PST.TES

'Then a man pushed that woman.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-44)

(513)

tʰà	dì:	kérgjal	dì:	làkpa	dzùŋ	...	kjéba	làkpa	dzùŋ	tʰèd-duk
now	this	man	this	hand	held		hip.N	hand	held	sat-PRF.TES

'Now this man is standing with hand on hip.'

dì:	kérgjal-gane	pʰòŋ-la	phúl-da	kʰjà-i
this	man-ERG	daughter-DAT	push-EMPH	VSR-IPFV

'This man is pushing the girl.' (QUIS-4.3-31)

All-new sentences (discussed in §3.3.3, and presented in Mùwe Ké in §4.5) enjoy freedom from word order restrictions with terms appearing in any sequence with reportedly no effect on the overall meaning. Consider the four terms – 'yesterday, house, Tashi, Dolma' – in the following four utterances:

(514)   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *ḍòlma-la*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
       yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
       'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-7)

       ʈáʃi-gadi: *ḍòlma-la*   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
       Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   yesterday   house-LOC   saw-PST.TES
       'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

       dàŋ   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ḍòlma-la*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
       yesterday   Tashi-ERG   house-LOC   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
       'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-1)

       kháŋba-ru   *ḍòlma-la*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *dàŋ*   *thóŋ-soŋ*
       house-LOC   Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG   yesterday   saw-PST.TES
       'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-5)

Ditransitive constructions are equally influenced by givenness. QUIS Task 2 'Giving' looks at given/new in ditransitives by showing participants short animated videos and returns the strong trend for given before new. In (515), the man and woman had been introduced in the description of the video in preceding utterances while the umbrella is newly introduced (see also p228 in §4.4.1 for QUIS Task 7 'Birthday Party' in reference to the word-ordering of ditransitive terms in term focus). Similarly in (516), both clauses of the conditional utterance show given before new in the sense that speaker and hearer, while not text-given, are context given due to their physical interaction.

(515)   *kérgjal-gane*   *kérmen-la*   *jìpjol*   *dʒòŋ-la*   *tʃík*   *tér-gi*
       man-ERG   woman-DAT   umbrella   like-LOC   a   give-IPFV
       'The man was giving the woman an umbrella-like thing.'   (QUIS-2.1-250)

(516)   *khjó*   *ŋà-la*   *làm*   *tón-dʒoŋ-la*   *ŋà*   *khjó-la*   *ŋúl*   *tér-en*
       you.SG   I-DAT   road   show-CONN-LOC   I   you.SG-DAT   money   give-NMLS
       'If you show me the way, I will give you money.'   (TMA_122-156-22)
       Source: [Traveller to local:] If you SHOW me the way, I GIVE you money
       TAM (145) (Dahl 1985: 204)

Similarly, locative expressions follow the same pattern. In Task 4 'Locations', participants describe four pictures returning a strong trend for given before new as well as freedom of word order for given terms and all-new sentences (see p241 in §4.5.1 for detailed description).

Morphologically, no markers are found on given/new items save for the requirement of ergative marking on focal elements, which is shown in detail in the subsequent sections presented here.

Ellipsis is a very common feature of natural Mùwe Ké speech but is not represented effectively in the QUIS since participants are instructed to give complete/full sentences and while this is extremely useful for looking at word order and IS, ellipsis is left somewhat out in the cold. However, recordings were made of eight different people narrating the 'Frog Story' (Mayer 1969), a wordless picture book that tells the story of a boy and his pet dog who go looking in the forest for their frog that escapes from its jar during the night. From the transcription and as would be expected, only given terms are omitted:

(517)   *tshól-ro*   *tfʰè:*   *tʰèni*   *khó:*   *síni*   *mà-dʒor-or-aŋ*

        search-NMLS   VSR.PST   then   they   INTENS   NEG-found-PRF.ASSERT-CONN

        tʰùŋal   *kʰjàb*

        sad   VSR.PST

        '(The dog) helped (the boy) to search (for the frog). Then when they didn't find (the frog) at all, (they) felt sad.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Tsultim-7)

Interestingly, when ellipsis *is* encountered in the QUIS tasks, the major difference found in its use is between predicate (§4.3) and term (§4.4) focus, where it is not found once in the former but abundantly in the latter. This even extends to the ellipsis of verbs, something which is not possible in predicate-focus sentences, of course, as the verb is included in the focus domain.

From the Frog Story narrations, it is also possible to calculate the referential density (RD) of the language after Bickel (2003b), that is, the ratio of overtly realised argument NPs to the number of possible argument according to verb valency. In Mùwe Ké, for example, a given subject, object, or both, may be dropped leaving one or no overt arguments in a transitive utterance, exemplified in (517). To calculate the RD, therefore, overt arguments are counted and divided by the number of possible arguments:

(518)
$$RD = \frac{N \,(\text{overt argument NPs})}{N \,(\text{available argument NPs})}$$

This leads to more-rigid languages like English, which exhibits even a 'dummy pronoun' in utterances like '*It is raining*', as having a higher RD than so-called pro-drop languages like Spanish.

Bickel (2003b) compares the RD of narratives in three Himalayan languages and accounts for the differences through the degree of relevance of morphosyntactic features of NPs, particularly case features, for syntactic processing. The more pivots or syntactic rule controllers such as verb agreement there are, the higher the degree.

A preliminary RD of Mùwe Ké was calculated using eight narrations of the 'Frog Story' (Mayer 1969), following Bickel's (2003b: §3.3) conventions and Noonan's (2003a; 2003b; found in Song 2014: Appendix A) guidelines. The results, cumulating in an average RD of 0.51, are seen in the following table.

Speaker	Ch	Da	Ja	Ka	Gy	Te	Ts	Ya	
Gender	F	M	F	F	M	F	M	F	
Age	22	27	53	48	37	40	35	45	
Literacy	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	
Clause units	163	113	76	55	108	94	88	130	
RD	**0.52**	**0.51**	**0.36**	**0.66**	**0.60**	**0.62**	**0.35**	**0.46**	$\bar{x} = \mathbf{0.51}$

Table 14. Referential density for eight participants narrating the Frog Story

As a side note, I feel that the average RD shown here is a little high for the language and would be much lower in natural speech. I believe this is due to the task itself in which participants look at a somewhat alien picture book and attempt to tell its story. As with a lot of the tasks in the QUIS, pictures in sequence are not always seen as such and participants may give presentational-type utterances when turning a new page, for example. Bickel's narrative production experiments were based on the similar 'Pear Story', presented in video form and where participants would recount the entire story 'freely' minutes after watching (Bickel 2003b: §3.2). Were a similar practice followed with the frog stories, i.e. look at all the pictures, close the book and recount the story, I have no doubt that a much lower average would be yielded, one more similar to speakers 'Ja' (0.36) and 'Ts' (0.35) in Table 14, whose speech

sounds instinctually more natural and 'village-like', as opposed to 'Ka' (0.66), 'Gy' (0.60) or 'Te' (0.62), who are much more 'academic' and 'city-like', offering the 'best/complete version' of the language. More research is needed.

Focus in Mùwe Ké is discussed in length in the remainder of this thesis. To summarise in a nutshell, however, it may be said that there is a preferred immediately preverbal focus position, utilised for both new-information focus, seen in (510) and (511) above, as well as contrastive focus (519) (see §3.4 for the notion of contrast), and while no morphological focus marker is found in the language, ergative case marking (§2.2.7.2) is required on focussed terms in ergative-dative constructions (§4.2), exemplified in (520) and (521):

(519)   *dzòn   kára   dzè:-s*
      Jon   candy   ate-PST.TES
      'Jon ate candy.'

      màn   *khú-i-gane   kék   dzè:-s*
      be.ASSERT.NEG   he-ERG-ERG cake   ate-PST.TES
      'No! He ate [*cake*]contrast.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Contrast-CORR(ii)-5)

(520)   *námḍul-la   sú-i-gane   tá-i-or-a*
      aeroplane-DAT who-ERG-ERG look-IPFV-ASSERT-Q
      'Who looks at the aeroplane?'

      námḍul-la   ṭáʃi-gane (*ṭáʃi) tá-i-ot
      aeroplane-DAT Tashi-ERG   look-IPFV-ASSERT
      '[Tashi]focus looks at the aeroplane.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-45)

(521)   *ṭáʃi-gane tʃi:-la   tá-i-or-a*
      Tashi-ERG what-DAT look-IPFV-ASSERT-Q
      'What does Tashi look at?'

      ṭáʃi(-gane) námḍul-la   tá-i-ot
      Tashi-ERG aeroplane-DAT look-IPFV-ASSERT
      'Tashi looks at [the aeroplane]focus.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-53)

The discussion so far has highlighted the given-before-new preference found in Mùwe Ké as well as a preferred immediately preverbal position for focussed terms. Logically, therefore,

topics (§3.1.3), that to which the comment adds information in the CG, should have a strong preference for initial position and this is exactly what is found. Looking at the next example, the entity for which a metaphorical file cards exists, under which information from the comment is stored (Krifka's definition, given in (431)), is clearly Tashi. Speaker A identifies Tashi as a potential topic and asks B for information *about* him. B keeps the topic in initial position and provides the requested information about Tashi – that he is looking at Dolma – in the comment.

(522)   A: *ʈáʃì-gane   tʃǐ: kʰì-gi-du-a*
             Tashi-ERG   what   do-IPFV-TES-Q
             'What is Tashi doing?'

        B: *ʈáʃì-gane   ɖòlma-la   tá-i-duk*
             Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   look-IPFV-TES
             'Tashi is looking at Dolma'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-35)

Contrastive topics (see (432)) are also found in initial position. In QUIS Task 19 'Fairy Tale', participants are given a comic strip of 9 pictures, one of which depicts the story of a mother who sends her children to buy tomatoes. The eldest loses his way, as does the middle child, but the youngest is successful. The sons, as contrastive topics, are all found in sentence-initial position:

(523)   *ái   tʃhéʃo-gane   làm   há   mà-kʰot-dʒi-ni*
        older.brother   biggest-ERG   road   knowledge   NEG-knew-CONN-TOP

        khó   tóŋba-la   lòk   ò:
        he   empty-LOC   returned   came
        'The biggest brother didn't know the way so he returned empty (handed).'

        pʰiza   pʰàrba-la   àŋ   làm   há   mà-kʰò-la   lòk
        son   middle.(child)-DAT   also   road   knowledge   NEG-knew-LOC   returned

        ò:
        came
        'The middle son also didn't know the way and came back.'   (QUIS-2.1-54)

Inferrable topics such as the partial topic (see Büring 1997) in the following example are also found in initial position. Task 24 'Groups' presents stimuli that can be grouped into subsets that share a salient inherent property, like the girls vs. men in the following example:

(524)

'What animals are the people holding?'

ráruk	*kérmen*	*súm*	*bàlba*	*dzùŋ-duk*	*kérgjal*	*súm*	*tʃǎ:*
child	woman	three	frog	held-PRF.TES	man	three	INTENS

mà-dzuŋ-a
NEG-held-PRF.TES

'The three girls are holding frogs, the three men aren't holding anything at all.'

(QUIS-3.1-25)

Similarly, topical adjuncts prefer initial position. Task 22 'Events in Places' induces sentences with spatial or temporal topics:

(525)

ŋìmu	*nám*	*ŋóbu-la*	*ʃín*	*dùk*	*tʰèni*	*tshámu*	*tʰèni*
daytime	sky	blue-LOC	cloud	exist.TES	then	night	then

sóruk-dʒi-ni	*nám-la*	*kárma*	*ʃár-duk*
dusk-CONN-TOP	sky-LOC	star	shone-PRF.TES

'In the daytime, there are clouds in the blue sky. Then at night, then after dusk fell, the stars are shining in the sky.'

(QUIS-3.1-13)

Morphologically, actor topics may optionally exhibit ergative *-gane* marking with no reported change in meaning, which is discussed here in depth in the sections with reference to DEM in

Mùwe Ké (§4.2, §4.3.2, §4.4.2), and there is also a topic marker *-ni*, which has a central 'as for…' meaning akin to the English 'As for me, I just love beetroot.'

To provide a short description of *-ni*, Büring's (2016a: 83) questions[11] on the exact properties of such topic marking are followed.

From the data, only nominals are marked with *-ni* in its topic-marking function, that is N(P)s and nominalised verb forms (§2.2.10). The extraposed topic may correspond to various grammatical relations within the clause, compare object in (526) and subject in (527), which may be either overt, as in the non-deletion of the second 'dog' in the former, or covert, as in the non-repeated 'I' in the latter.

(526) *kíː-ni   ràŋdzaŋ-do-gadiː kíː-da   síːn   ŋóː-dʒi-ni …*
       dog-TOP   bee-PL-ERG   dog-EMPH   INTENS   chased-CONN-TOP
       'As for the dog, after the bees chased the dog … (it ran away).'   (bàlbi súŋ – Tenzi-30)

(527) A: *ŋà-la ják sérbu ʃiː dùk*
          I-DAT   yak golden four exist.TES
          'I have four yellow yaks.'

       B: *ŋà-la-ni ják màrbu ŋíː dùk*
          I-DAT-TOP yak red   two exist.TES
          'As for me, I have two red yaks.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-232)

(528) *tʰèni tshól ɖò-a-ga-ni …*
       then   search go-NMLS-SPEC-TOP
       'Then, as for when (they) were going to search (for the frog) …' (bàlbi súŋ – Tsultim-16)

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[11] 1. what items can be so marked (DPs only, definites only….);

2. whether the marking can…

  (a) establish a new discourse referent as the aboutee for the following, or

  (b) establish an existing discourse referent as the new aboutee (as in Tzozil), or

  (c) refer to an established aboutee throughout its tenure as 'what the passage is about'?

  (d) … or do something altogether different;

3. whether elements that meet that description have to be so marked, or merely may be;

4. whether the same marking can serve other pragmatic functions;

5. whether there are other tests (than occurrence with that marking) to establish the status marked by it.

All items in the data that are marked with *-ni* are given and therefore the marking can be said to establish a new aboutee of an existing discourse referent. In narratives, therefore, *-ni* helps to locate the correct metaphorical file card when many entities are immediately present in the CG, as is seen in (526) where potential actors/undergoers from preceding sentences may be the bees, a boy, an owl, a rat etc. In discourse such as (527), the marking emphasises a sense of 'you may have *x* but *as for me*, I have *y*', highlighting the speaker as the new aboutee. Similarly, in (528), the time when the boy and dog were searching for their frog is emphasised for further comment.

New aboutees certainly do not need to be marked as such in Mùwe Ké and the majority are not; however, the marking serves to emphasise a referent or else pick one out of a potential group to avoid confusion.

While no further pragmatic functions have been identified from the naturally-occurring examples in the data, *-ni* is also found on past verb strings with a connective function of 'after *x, y*' (§2.5.2).

Establishing a new aboutee of an existing discourse referent may, of course, occur without the topic marker though word order, as discussed above, as well as emphatic prosody, not explicitly discussed in this thesis.

To summarise, syntactically, Mùwe Ké prefers a given-before-new constituent order save for the verb-final requirement, focussed terms prefer the immediately preverbal position and topics prefer to appear sentence-initially. Morphologically, ergative marking is optional on all but focussed actors, where it is required, and topics may be marked by *-ni* for an 'as for' effect. The ellipsis of given terms is also found to be a very common feature of the language.

4.2   Differential Argument Marking in Mùwe Ké

A major preliminary for the descriptions given here in the subsequent sections is the initial investigation into whether or not differential[12] argument marking is found in Mùwe Ké with pragmatic/information-structural functions or whether there is a split along the lines of the

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[12] The term 'optional' is used throughout for case marking where its presence/absence has no (detectable) effect on meaning and 'differential' for when the presence/absence has some pragmatic (focal) effect.

properties discussed in §3.5, seen in Figure 9, and listed in the following table. DAM systems fall into those which are predicate triggered, seen at the bottom of the table, and those which are argument triggered with either inherent lexical argument properties, non-inherent discourse-based argument properties or properties dependent on event semantics.

		DAM Trigger	Example
Argument-triggered	Inherent properties	Person	conjunct, disjunct
		Animacy	1 2 3 pronouns, human, animal, inanimate
		Uniqueness	proper nouns, common nouns
		Number	singular, plural
	Non-inherent properties	Definiteness	definite, specific, non-specific
		IS	topic, focus, etc.
	Event semantics	Control, volition	control verbs, non-control verbs
Predicate-triggered		Clause type	matrix clause, subordinate clause
		TAM	tense, evidentiality
		Polarity	negative clause, positive clause
		IS	topical S, focal S

Table 15. Dimensions investigated in Mùwe Ké in reference to DAM

To begin, it was confirmed that no case marking is found on the S argument of intransitive sentences. This is true for IPFV, PFV, FUT and PRF utterances, elicited with verbs that are [±CONTROL], [±VOLITIONAL], with CONJUNCT and DISJUNCT subjects (1st vs. 2nd and 3rd person (see §2.3.5)), that are human, animal, inanimate, [±PRONOMINAL] and marked as [±EVIDENTIAL] (§2.3.6). For no combination was case marking reported to be permitted, which is perfectly logical if the Ergative case is closely related to agentivity, which requires 'patientivity', and the Dative is only found on arguments in benefactive/affective-type utterances, both of which require transitivity. A short selection is given here by way of example:

(529)   [IPFV] [+CONT] [+VOL] [CONJ] [+EVID]

   *ŋà / *ŋè-i-gane   ɖò-i-ot*

   I / I-ERG-ERG   go.[+CONTROL]-IPFV-ASSERT.CONJUNCT

   'I am going.'   (Elicitation2-DAMorLS)

(530)   [PFV] [–CONT] [–VOL] [DISJ] [+EVID]

        ʈáʃì / *ʈáʃì-gane   *nὲ:-s*

        Tashi / Tashi-ERG   got.sick-PST.TES

        'Tashi fell ill.'   (Elicitation2-DAMorLS)

(531)   [FUT] [+CONT] [+VOL] [DISJ] [–EVID]

        khjó / *khjú-i-gane   *ɖὸ-i*

        you.SG / you.SG-ERG-ERG   go-FUT

        'You will go.'   (Elicitation2-DAMorLS)

(532)   [PRF] [–CONT] [–VOL] [DISJ] [+EVID]

        ràŋdzaŋ / *ràŋdzaŋ-gane *nàŋ*   *tʃábe*   *tʰὲ-duk*

        bee / bee-ERG   in   calmly   sat-PRF.TES

        'The bees have stayed calmly in (their hive).'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Guru Norbu-16)

Turning to transitivity, the properties and triggers in Table 15 were investigated through elicitation to measure the extent to which they may account for the differential marking that is found in Mùwe Ké. Each of the three Mùwe Ké transitive verb types[13] (§2.4, Table 9) were investigated. Absolutive marking is zero marking (§2.2.7.1) and the dative marker (§2.2.7.4) was established as non-differential so it is only ergative marking on ERG ABS and ERG DAT constructions that are of interest here, that is, DEM on actor terms. The judgement comes from two languages assistants and the claims are substantiated by the corpus data. Ergative marking in Mùwe Ké comes in the way of *-gane* or *-gadì:*, as described in §2.2.7.2.

Looking first at **inherent lexical argument properties**, **conjunct and disjunct** forms show a split only in the imperfective of ERG DAT constructions. Ergative marking is not permitted on conjunct forms, while disjunct forms may be marked differentially:

(533)   *ŋà / *ŋὲ-i-gane* *í:-la*   *tá-i-ot*

        I / I-ERG-ERG   older.sister-DAT   look-IPFV-ASSERT

        'I am looking at my sister.'

---

[13] ERG ABS, ERG DAT, DAT ABS

(534) **_kérmen / kérmen-gane_** _ráruk-la_ _tá-i-ot_

woman / woman-ERG   child-DAT   look-IPFV-ASSERT

'The woman is looking at the child.'   (Elicitation2-DAM_or_lexical_split.pdf-29,33)

All **pronominal forms** (aside from imperfective ERG DAT conjunct constructions) may be marked as ergative and **animate** humans and animals as well as inanimate entities may all receive ergative marking although few inanimates may logically act agentively, of course:

(535) **_kí:-gane_** _bòtel_ _tʃhák-s_

dog-ERG   bottle   broke-PST.TES

'The dog broke the bottle.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Chhorden-5)

(536) _khjú-i_   _pár_   _tʃík_   _dì:_   **_kírkir-gane_**   _kór-ot_

you.SG-GEN   picture   one   this   **circle**-ERG   surrounded-PRF.ASSERT

'One of your pictures is circled.' (Lit. 'The circle has surrounded…)   (QUIS Ins-211)

Therefore, both **proper and common nouns** may both be marked as ergative, either as **singular or plural**:

(537) **_kʰàlden-gane_** _dàŋ_   _ùrgen-la_   _tʰù:-s_

Galden-ERG   yesterday   Urgen-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES

'Galden hit Urgen yesterday.'   (Contrast 1-60)

(538) **_kérmen-gane_** _kʰjàsen_ _dzè:-s_

woman-ERG   bean   ate-PST.TES

'The woman ate beans.'   (QUIS-Translation-2-Focus-136)

(539) _dàŋ_   **_kérmen-do-gane_** _kérkjal-do-la_   _tʰù:-s-e_

yesterday   **woman-PL**-ERG   man-PL-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES-Q

'Did the women hit the men yesterday?'   (Contrast 1-19)

The **non-inherent lexical argument properties** of **definiteness**, which have also to do with givenness (§3.1.2) and accessibility (specificity), and **IS** certainly have an effect on ergative marking and this is discussed in detail in the following sections.

Turning to **event semantics**, **control** and **volition** have an effect on ergative marking. In the analysis of focus structures in Mùwe Ké, the two are grouped under the label of CONTROL since

the notions are so closely interconnected in Mùwe Ké and because they are to do with the verb stem and verbal morphology, respectively. Control verbs (§2.3.4) are those that may be acted out volitionally or controlled by an actor, such as 'go', 'hit', 'eat'; non-control verbs typically may not be controlled by an actor and include 'die', 'forget' and 'fall ill'. Volition (§2.3.7) has more to do with one's intention or choice in performing an action and while control is a lexicalised feature of the verb stem, volition is encoded through the addition of morphemes to the verb stem. Volition is a separate feature in the language due to there not always being neat pairs of [+/–CONTROL] verbs available like 'break' *tʃăk* [+CONTROL] and *tʃhák* [–CONTROL]: *só* 'to kill', for example, is a control verb if we look at its grammatical behaviour but may be performed involitionally, like when one accidently steps on a bug, where it receives [+EVID] marking. This niche alternation does not appear to affect ergative marking:

(540) *ŋè-i-gane*   *bù*   *sé*
       I-ERG-ERG   insect   killed
       'I (intentionally) killed a/the bug.'

       ŋè-i-gane   *bù*   *sé-s*
       I-ERG-ERG   insect   killed-**PST.TES**
       'I (accidently) killed a/the bug.'   (elicited)

There is certainly not a clear split with the marking on the arguments of [±CONTROL] verbs, as can be seen in Table 16, where ergative marking is shown as either obligatory (ERG), not permitted (*ERG) or else differential (+/–ERG). Furthermore, the notion of control may not be separated from tense and, where shown, evidentiality or the conjunct/disjunct distinction.

		+CONTROL	−CONTROL
ERG ABS	FUT	*ERG	ERG
	IPFV	*ERG	
	PRF	ERG	ERG
	PFV	+/−ERG ERG for [−EVID]	ERG
ERG DAT	FUT	*ERG	+/−ERG
	IPFV	*ERG for [CONJ] +/−ERG for [DISJ]	*ERG for [CONJ] +/−ERG for [DISJ]
	PRF	ERG	+/−ERG
	PFV	+/−ERG ERG for [−EVID]	+/−ERG

Table 16. Ergative marking on the actor of [±CONTROL] verbs

With regard to predicate-triggered DAM systems, **clause types** do not affect ergative marking. The actor of a **subordinate** clause is marked as it would be in the **matrix**:

(541) *[khú-i-gane tʰù:-du:]*   *mì:*   *dì:-gane ŋà-la tʰù:-soŋ*
he-ERG-ERG beat.PST-REDUP person this-ERG I-DAT beat.PST-PST.TES
'The man [that **he** hit] hit me.'   (Relativisation - 19)

Tense and aspect surely affect ergative marking and Table 17 shows data (overlapping with that discussed above) sorted primarily for tense/aspect. Subsequent columns show relevant notions that interplay with whether ergative marking is obligatory, prohibited or differential.

FUTURE	ERG ABS	+CONTROL			*ERG
		−CONTROL			ERG
	ERG DAT	+CONTROL			*ERG
		−CONTROL			+/−ERG
IMPERFECTIVE	ERG ABS				*ERG
	ERG DAT	CONJUNCT			*ERG
		DISJUNCT			+/−ERG
PERFECT	ERG ABS				ERG
	ERG DAT	+CONTROL			ERG
		−CONTROL			+/−ERG
PERFECTIVE	ERG ABS	+CONTROL	CONJUNCT		+/−ERG
			DISJUNCT	+EVIDENTIAL	+/−ERG
				−EVIDENTIAL	ERG
		−CONTROL			ERG
	ERG DAT	CONJUNCT			+/−ERG
		DISJUNCT	+CONTROL	+EVIDENTIAL	+/−ERG
				−EVIDENTIAL	ERG
			−CONTROL		+/−ERG

Table 17. Ergative marking with primary reference to tense/aspect

With regard to **polarity**, ergative marking is not affected by negation (§2.3.11). Both **positive** and **negative** clauses receive the same marking:

(542) *ŋárok   ténzi-gane   píndal   túp-s*
      morning Tenzi-ERG   potato   cut.PST-PST.TES
      'Tenzi cut potatoes in the morning.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88-100)

      ŋárok   ténzi-gane   píndal   mà-tup-s
      morning Tenzi-ERG   potato   NEG-cut.PST-PST.TES
      'Tenzi didn't cut potatoes in the morning.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44-63)

And finally, **IS**-driven DAM does not require different predicate forms in Mùwe Ké. Topical and focal 'subjects' (here 'Tashi'), for example, take the same verb string:

(543)　Q: Who did Tashi hit?

ʈáʃì-gane　　[ɖòlma-la]_F　**tʰù:-soŋ**

Tashi-ERG　Dolma-DAT　beat.PST-PST.TES

'Tashi hit [Dolma]_F.'　　　　　　　　　　(Focus, Term - Flashcards-51)

Q: Who hit Dolma?

ɖòlma-la　　[ʈáʃì-gane]_F　**tʰù:-soŋ**

Dolma-DAT　Tashi-ERG　beat.PST-PST.TES

'[Tashi]_F hit Dolma.'　　　　　　　　　　(Focus, Term - Flashcards-49)

From the properties and triggers listed in Table 15, therefore, the differential marking seen in Table 16 and Table 17 (+/–ERG) is not able to be explained by the properties other than the pragmatic use of non-inherent lexical argument properties. The differential marking appears mostly in the perfective and seems to be possible only in certain combinations related to control, conjunct or disjunct, and evidentiality; therefore, it was these notions that were included in the investigation of DEM in relation to the focus structure discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

That which was investigated in relation to DEM is seen in the following table. The decision was made to look only at ERG DAT constructions for uniformity, in each of the four 'tenses', for CONJUNCT and DISJUNCT forms, of [±CONTROL] verbs, all of which were [+EVIDENTIAL] due to the difficulties of eliciting [–EVID] forms in this kind of elicitation (random sentence pairs about one person hitting another, for example, failed to be seen as common knowledge or part of narrative, and hearsay would require a quotative marker) except for future forms where evidentiality plays no role.

		C/D	**CONTROL**
ERG DAT	FUT		−CONT
ERG DAT	IPFV	DISJ	
ERG DAT	PRF		−CONT
ERG DAT	PFV		

Table 18. Utterance forms investigated for DEM

Entries seen in the C/D and Control columns represent restrictions on DEM from the previous elicitation, shown in Table 16 and Table 17, while for blank spaces both forms are investigated: [FUT], for example, includes both conjunct and disjunct forms but only [–CONT] verbs.

In summary, splits may be found with ergative marking for inherent lexical argument properties such as conjunct and disjunct, properties dependent on event semantics such as +/–control verbs (interacting with TAM and person) and predicate triggered DAM systems such as tense/aspect (interacting with control, person and evidentiality); however, as subsequent sections show, it is only the non-inherent discourse-based argument properties, i.e. IS, that appear to explain the differential marking patterns encountered in the elicitation tasks and summarised in Table 23 in §4.8.

DEM is discussed in relation to predicate focus in §4.3.2, term focus in §4.4.2 and sentence focus in §4.5.2 as well as verum focus in §4.6 and contrast in §4.7.

4.3 Predicate Focus in Mùwe Ké

The two sections here present predicate focus in Mùwe Ké with respect to word order and DEM in turn. The overall pattern of a preferred preverbal focus position and the requirement of ergative marking on focussed actors is established.

4.3.1 Predicate Focus and Word Order

This section argues that terms included in VP-predicate focus are strongly preferred to appear in immediately preverbal position alongside the verb, which is always required to appear sentence-finally in Mùwe Ké. 'Terms' refers mostly to argument NPs but, as is seen, may include locative expressions, adverbials etc.

Linking with the section below that looks at term focus and word order in Mùwe Ké (§4.4.1), where a very strong tendency for focussed terms to be found in immediately preverbal position is shown, one would expect terms that are focussed as part of the VP to be found in the same position. This is certainly the case, as argued for in this section. In §3.3.1, Zimmermann's (2016: 314) predicate focus was shown to refer to all instances of focus on lexical verbal predicates; while the pattern for VPs in Mùwe Ké is interesting with regard to sentential word order since terms included in the focus could potentially appear anywhere in the utterance,

looking purely at V-focus is not so due to the hard requirement in Mùwe Ké for the verb to appear sentence-finally whether focussed or not. Question/answer pairs for V-focus, therefore, return a 'non-eventful' word order as the verb may not appear in any other position in the utterance:

(544)   *tshámu   kárma-gane   tshádʒa   tʃǐ: tʃʰè:-s-a*
        night   Karma-ERG butter.tea what did-PST.TES-Q
        'At night what did Karma do with the butter tea?'

        tshámu   kárma-gane   tshádʒa   [tú:-s]ᶠ
        night   Karma-ERG butter.tea drank-PST.TES
        'Karma [drank]ꜰ butter tea at night.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 51-2)

(545)   *ŋárok   ténzi-gane   píndal   tʃǐ: tʃʰè:-s-a*
        morning Tenzi-ERG potato   what did-PST.TES-Q
        'What did Tenzi do with the potatoes in the morning?'

        ŋárok   ténzi-gane   píndal   [túp-s]ᶠ
        morning Tenzi-ERG potato   cut.PST-PST.TES
        'Tenzi [cut]ꜰ the potatoes in the morning.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 37-8)

This is also the case for examples of tense focus:

(546)   *kérmen dì:-gane   ténzin-la   tʰù:-duk*
        woman this-ERG Tenzin-DAT beat.PST-PRF.TES
        'The woman has hit Tenzin.'

        màn   kérmen dì:-gane   ténzin-la   [tʰùŋ-dʒi dàk]ᶠ
        no   woman this-ERG Tenzin-DAT beat-FUT   be.ASSERT
        'No, the woman [will hit]ꜰ Tenzin.'   (QUIS-Trans-P2-Q165-Wangmo)

Syntactically, therefore, V-focus and T-/A-/M-focus are discussed no further in this section. Focus on the VP, however, returns the expected word order of focussed terms in preverbal position next to the focussed verb complex:

(547)   *kérmen-gane*   *tʃǐː*   *tʃʰèː-s-a*

woman-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q

'What did the woman do?'

kérmen-gane   *[kʰjàsen*   *dzèː-soŋ]ꜰ*

woman-ERG   beans   ate-PST.TES

'The woman [ate beans]ꜰ.'   (QUIS-Trans-P2-Q71-Tashi)

(548)   *ŋá*   *dìː*   *tʃǐː*   *kʰì-gi-du-a*

fish   this   what   do-IPFV-TES-Q

'What was the fish doing?'

ŋá   *[pʰèː-la*   *múk-gi]ꜰ*

fish   cat-DAT   bark-IPFV

'The fish [was barking at the cat]ꜰ.'   (QUIS-1.2-152)

Actor and undergoer, in the following pairs of sentences 'the grandmother' and 'the curry', respectively, are therefore found in preverbal position according to the phrasing of the question or preceding utterance:

(549)   *khjú-i*   *ébi-gane*   *tʃǐː*   *tʃʰèː-s-a*

you.SG-GEN   grandmother-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q

'What did your grandmother do?'

ŋè-i   *ébi-gane*   *[lùk*   *ʃá*   *páː*   *dzùe-s]ꜰ*

I-GEN   grandmother-ERG   goat   meat   curry   made-PST.TES

'My grandmother [made goat meat curry]ꜰ.'   (QUIS-Trans-P3-Q1-Wangmo; Tashi)

(550)   *lùk*   *ʃá*   *páː*   *kór-la*   *nùe*

goat   meat   curry   about-LOC   say.IMP

'Tell me about the goat meat curry.'

lùk   *ʃá*   *páː*   *dìː*   *[ŋè-i*   *ébi-gane*   *dzùe-s]ꜰ*

goat   meat   curry   this   I-GEN   grandmother-ERG   made-PST.TES

'[My grandmother made]ꜰ the goat meat curry.'   (QUIS-Trans-P3-Q2-Wangmo)

Evidence for this pattern comes from translation tasks, elicitation tasks, the QUIS and questions on the frog story.

Translation tasks prove difficult for assessing word order since language assistants tend to read the English word order and translate as they go. When asked specifically which word order is better for a particular question, however, it is consistently reported that the focussed argument and verb are 'best' sentence-finally:

(551) *dàŋ*　　　*bàdzar-la*　　*khjú-i-gane*　　　*tʃĭ*　　*tʃʰùŋ-s-a*
　　　　yesterday　market-LOC　you.SG-ERG-ERG　what　happened-PST.TES-Q
　　　　'What did you do in the market yesterday?'

　　　　dàŋ　　　*bàdzar-la*　　*ŋè-i-gane*　　*[ʈáʃì-la*　　*tʰù:]F*
　　　　yesterday　market-LOC　I-ERG-ERG　Tashi-DAT　beat.PST
　　　　'I [hit Tashi]F in the bazaar yesterday.'　　　　　　(180228-002-23:50)

It is also consistently reported that attempts at placing an adverbial between focussed argument and verb results in an infelicitous answer:

(552) *dàŋ*　　　*bàdzar-la*　　*khjú-i-gane*　　　*tʃĭ*　　*tʃʰùŋ-s-a*
　　　　yesterday　market-LOC　you.SG-ERG-ERG　what　happened-PST.TES-Q
　　　　'What did you do in the market yesterday?'

　　　　#dàŋ　　　*ŋè-i-gane*　　*[ʈáʃì-la]F*　　*bàdzar-la*　　*[tʰù:]F*
　　　　　yesterday　I-ERG-ERG　Tashi-DAT　market-LOC　beat.PST
　　　　　'I [hit Tashi]F in the bazaar yesterday.'　　　　　(elicited)

The **elicitation** task that was designed for investigating contrast, in which participants are asked a question and shown pictures to elicit the answer, used VP focus as one of the control groups and returned the expected word order:

(553)   *ŋárok*   *ṭáʃì-gane*   *tʃǐː*   *tʃʰèː-s-a*

morning   Tashi-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q

'What did Tashi do in the morning?'

ŋárok   *ṭáʃì-gane*   *[kárjol*   *tʃhák-s]*_F

morning   Tashi-ERG   cup   broke-PST.TES

'In the morning Tashi [broke (a) cup]F.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 103-4)

(554)   *tshámu*   *tsíriŋ-gane*   *tʃǐː*   *tʃʰèː-s-a*

night   Tsering-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q

'What did Tsering do at night?'

tshámu   *tsériŋ-gane*   *[tóksi*   *khúr-soŋ]*_F

night   Tsering-ERG   pickaxe   carried-PST.TES

'Tsering [carried the pickaxe]F at night.'   (Contrast 2.2 - Tashi 53-104: 99-100)

The task consisted of four questions to elicit VP focus and was performed by two participants, returning eight sentences, all of which exhibited sentence-final VP focus.

The **QUIS** returned precious few VP-focus utterances but of those that it did, focussed terms were found sentence-finally along with the focussed verb complex.

Task 16 'Tell a Story' shows participants either a short film or picture series to elicit monologues and dialogues aimed at provoking contrastive expression. Relevant here, however, are 'natural' question/answer pairs found in dialogues where pairs of participants where asking/answering questions on the visual material:

(555)   *tóksi*   *khúr-gur*   *mì:*   *dì:*   *tʃǐ:*   *kʰ-i-d-a*

            pickaxe   carried-REDUP   person   this   what   do-IPFV-TES-Q

            'What is the man carrying a pickaxe doing?'

            tóksi   *khúr-gur*   *mì:*   *dì:*   *[pʰùŋ*   *tʃǐk*   *...*   *pʰùŋ-la*   *kʰjà-i]ꜰ*

            pickaxe   carried-REDUP   person   this   tree   a   tree-DAT   hit-IPFV

            'The man carrying a pickaxe [is hitting a tree]ꜰ.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-206-7)

(556)   *òdi*   *kóʈha*   *nàŋ*   *mì:*   *tʃǐ:*   *kʰì-gi-du-a*

            that   room   in   person   what   do-IPFV-TES-Q

            'What were the people doing in that room.'

            kóʈha   *nàŋ-du*   *mìrgu*   *ŋí:*   *kérgjal*   *ŋí:*   *òdi*   *...*   *[tshákpar*   *ʈó-gi]ꜰ*

            room   in-LOC   person   two   man   two   that   newspaper   read-IPFV

            'Two people, two men [are reading the newspaper]ꜰ in the room.'

                                                                (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-12-13)

Non-Q/A pairs are found in two further tasks that introduce an entity and then give information about it/them in subsequent utterances. In Task 9 'Guiding', for example, one participant 'guides' another around their home for the first time, introducing family members.

Figure 10. Pictures from QUIS task 9 'Guiding' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 97)

(557)   *dì:*   *ŋè-i*   *nù:*   *dàk*

            this   I-GEN   younger.sister   be.ASSERT

            'This is my little sister.'

            nù: *[mòre*   *ála*   *ódʒila*   *ála*   *tsé-i-duk]ꜰ*

            younger.sister   her.own   toy   together   game   play-IPFV-TES

            'Little sister [is playing with her toys]ꜰ.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-55)

This pattern is seen most prevalently in task 3 'Visibility' where participants are shown two pictures, one after the other, with either a new actor or undergoer plus a new action:

Figure 11. Picture pair from QUIS task 3 'Visibility' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 39)

(558) *pʰìza tʃík kʰjùk-gi-du*

son a run-IPFV-TES

'A boy is running.'

tʰà pʰìza dì:-la [mì: tʃík-ga nám-la ták-duk]ꜰ

now son this-DAT person a-SPEC sky-LOC lifted-PRF.TES

'Now [to the sky a person is lifting]ꜰ the boy.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-234-5)

(559) *kí: dì: múk-gi-duk*

dog this bark-IPFV-TES

'This dog is barking'

kí:-gane [rùl-gi ŋáwa-la só kʰjàb-duk]ꜰ

dog-ERG snake-GEN tail-DAT tooth VSR.PST-PRF.TES

'The dog [is biting the snake's tail]ꜰ.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-225-6)

The task returned 28 sentence pairs of which 21 followed the VP-focus pattern, which is exactly 75%. While many factors may be involved in the 7 sentences that were not as expected, I put it down mostly to confusion over the strange visual material and not always understanding the supposed temporal connection between the two since all-new presentation-style sentences are found with indefinite articles even in the second utterance. However, 75% points to a strong tendency.

The questions asked to participants who told the **frog story** all returned the VP-focus pattern:

(560) *pʰìza dì: ŋál-ga bàlba dì: tʃĭ: kʰ-i-du-a*

son this sleep-SPEC frog this what do-IPFV-TES-Q

'What did the frog do while the boy was sleeping?'

pʰìza   dì: ŋál-ga   bàlba   dì: [bòtel-gi   tʃhú   nàŋ-ne
son   this   sleep-SPEC   frog   this bottle-GEN   water   in-ABL

phí-la   thón   ɖò-i-duk]ꜰ
outside-LOC   emerged   go-IPFV-TES

'While the boy was sleeping, the frog [was going out from the water of the bottle]ꜰ.'

<div align="right">(bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-3-4)</div>

(561) *ɖùŋ-gi   ʃúlʃo-la   pʰìza-gadi: tʃí: tʃʰè:-s-a*
story-GEN   the.end-LOC   son-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q

'At the end of the story, what did the boy do?'

ɖùm-gi   ʃúlʃo-la   pʰìza-ga   [khóre   bàlba   dʒòr-s]ꜰ
story-GEN   the.end-LOC   son-ERG   his.own   frog   found-PST.TES

'At the end of the story the boy [found his own frog]ꜰ.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - E Karma-17)

Of the 8 participants, who answered 5 questions designed to elicit predicate focus, 100% returned the sentence-final pattern.

There is, therefore, a clear preference for terms included in a focussed VP to appear in preverbal position.

4.3.2   Predicate Focus and DAM

This section argues that actor arguments that are part of VP predicate focus require ergative case marking. The section starts with the results of the elicitation sessions after Table 18 (p200).

From elicitation, it was reported that ergative marking is obligatory on terms that are included in VP-focus. This includes future utterances:

(562) *ɖòlma-la   tʃí: òŋ-dʒi   ìn-a*
Dolma-DAT   what   come-FUT   be.ASSERT-Q

'What will happen to Dolma?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-61)

> *ḍòlma-la*   ***[ŋè-i-gane / *ŋà*** *tá-i*   *dàk]*_F
>
> Dolma-DAT   I-ERG-ERG / I   look-FUT   be.ASSERT
>
> '[I will look]_F at Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-62)

And also imperfective:

(563) *ṭáʃì-la*   *tʃĭ:*   *kʰì-gi-du-a*

Tashi-DAT   what   VSR-IPFV-TES-Q

'What is happening to Tashi?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-33)

> *ṭáʃì-la*   ***[ḍòlma-gane / *ḍòlma*** *tʰù-i-duk]*_F
>
> Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG / Dolma   beat-IPFV-TES
>
> '[Dolma is hitting]_F Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-34)

As well as perfective:

(564) *ṭáʃì-la*   *tʃĭ:*   *tʃʰùŋ-s-a*

Tashi-DAT   what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened to Tashi?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-13)

> *ṭáʃì-la*   ***[ḍòlma-gane / *ḍòlma*** *tʰù:]*_F
>
> Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG / Dolma   beat.PST
>
> '[Dolma hit]_F Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-14)

And finally perfect:

(565) *ḍòlma-la*   *tʃĭ:*   *tʃʰùŋ-du-a*

Dolma-DAT   what   happened-PRF.TES-Q

'What has happened to Dolma?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-79)

> *ḍòlma-la*   ***[ṭáʃì-gane / *ṭáʃì*** *thóŋ-duk]*_F
>
> Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG / Tashi   saw-PRF.TES
>
> '[Tashi has seen]_F Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-80)

During this elicitation session it was reported at different times that ergative marking is required and not required on the actor term when it is not in focus, which speaks to the difficulty for language assistants in doing these strange tasks but also that ergative marking is optional when it is not in focus. For the next example, it was reported that *-gane* was needed on the

non-focussed actor, which contrasts with the following examples, where it was reported that it was not needed.

(566) *ʈáʃi-gane* *tʃǐ:* *kʰì-gi-du-a*
Tashi-ERG what do-IPFV-TES-Q
'What is Tashi doing?'

ʈáʃi-gane / *ʈáʃi [*ɖòlma-la* *tá-i-duk*]ꜰ
Tashi-ERG / Tashi Dolma-DAT look-IPFV-TES
'Tashi [is looking at Dolma]ꜰ.'

The first example that follows may be compared to (564) while both examples show that ergative marking was reported to be optional on terms that were not in focus:

(567) *ɖòlma-gane* *tʃǐ:* *tʃʰè:-s-a*
Dolma-ERG what did-PST.TES-Q
'What did Dolma do?'

ɖòlma-gane / ɖòlma [*ʈáʃi-la* *tʰù:-soŋ*]ꜰ
Dolma-ERG / Dolma Tashi-DAT beat.PST-PST.TES
'Dolma [hit Tashi]ꜰ.'

(568) *khjú-i-gane* *tʃǐ:* *tʃʰè-wa*
you.SG-ERG-ERG what did-PRF.Q
'What have you done?'

ŋà / ŋè-i-gane [*ɖòlma-la* *thóŋ-ot*]ꜰ
I / I-ERG-ERG Dolma-DAT see-PRF.ASSERT
'I [have seen Dolma]ꜰ.'

The task from the QUIS that returns this pattern is task 3 'Visibility', where participants are presented with two pictures sequentially (see Figure 11 on p207). For conditions that returned predicate focus that included the actor term, ergative marking was found on each of the eleven sentences:

(569)

rùl	*dì:*	*múk-dʒi*	*tár*	*kʰì-gi*
snake	this	bite-FUT	preparation	do.VSR-IPFV

'The snake is getting ready to bite.' (QUIS-3.1-179)

rùl-gi	*ŋáwa-la*	*[kí:-gane*	*mú:-duk]*F
snake-GEN	tail-DAT	dog-ERG	bit-PRF.TES

'[(A) dog has bitten]F the snake's tail.' (QUIS-3.1-180)

While for the eleven utterances that returned predicate focus that include the undergoer argument, 5 marked the actor as ergative and 6 did not:

(570)

kérmen	*dì:*	*lákpa*	*kjéba-la*	*dzùŋ-dʒi-ni*	*kér-ge-la*	*lá:*
woman	this	hand	hip.N-LOC	held-CONN-TOP	stood-REDUP-LOC	stood

tʰèd-duk
stayed-PRF.TES

'The woman put her hands on her hips and has stood.' (QUIS-3.1-74)

kérmen-gane [kérgjal-la   lákp-i-gane   kʰjàg-dʒi   tár   kʰì-gi]_F

woman-ERG   man-DAT   hand-INS-INS hit.VSR-FUT preparation do.VSR-IPFV

'The woman [is going to hit the man with her hand]_F.'   (QUIS-3.1-75)

(571)

dèna   mì: tʃǐk   dùk

here   person   a   exist.TES

'There is a man here.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-20)

òdi   mì: [kʰùdzur   mì:-la   láta-gane   kʰjà-i]_F

that   person   (an)other person-DAT   kick-ERG   hit-IPFV

'That man [is kicking another man]_F.' (Lit: hitting him with a kick (INS))

                                                        (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-21)

From translation and QUIS tasks, therefore, it is seen that ergative marking is required on actor arguments included in focussed VPs and optional when not included in the focus domain.

4.4   Term Focus in Mùwe Ké

The two sections here present term focus in Mùwe Ké with respect to word order and DEM in turn, continuing the presentation of the pattern of preferred preverbal position for terms included in a focus domain and the requirement of ergative marking on focussed actors.

4.4.1   Term Focus and Word Order

Here data is presented to evidence a dedicated immediately preverbal focus position for focussed NP-terms, adjunct terms and other non-verbal XP-categories such as adverbs (§3.3.2) in Mùwe Ké. The section argues that the immediately preverbal position is strongly preferred for focussed terms but not obligatory.

When terms are focussed, there is a very strong tendency for the focussed term to appear immediately pre-verbally in the utterance, whether it be subject, object or adverbial. When conducting elicitation, language assistants consistently report that the 'best/most-correct/proper/most-natural' position for either a (wh-) question pronoun or the corresponding focussed answer term is in preverbal position. In natural speech and in elicited spontaneous speech from tasks found in activities like the QUIS, there is a strong almost-obligatory tendency to follow this pattern.

The following two examples exhibit the basis of the pattern being investigated. The examples show the preference for the (wh-) question word to appear in immediately preverbal position as well as the corresponding focussed term in the answer, enclosed in square brackets.

> (572)   Source: Who ate the beans?
>
>   [The woman]
>
>   *kʰjàsen   sú-i-gadiː   dzèː-s-a*
>
>   bean   who-ERG-ERG   ate-PST.TES-Q
>
>   'Who ate the beans?'
>
>   *kʰjàsen   [kérmen]ꜰ-gadiː   dzèː-soŋ*
>
>   bean   woman-ERG   ate-PST.TES
>
>   '[The woman]ꜰ ate the beans.'   (QUIS-Translation-2-Focus-Q41)
>
> (573)   Source: What did the woman eat?
>
>   [Beans]
>
>   *kérmen-gadiː   tʃǐː   dzèː-s-a*
>
>   woman-ERG   what   ate-PST.TES-Q
>
>   'What did the woman eat?'

kérmen-gadi: [kʰjàsen]ꜰ *dzè:-soŋ*

woman-ERG bean ate-PST.TES

'The woman ate [beans]ꜰ.'

Elicitation and several tasks from the QUIS confirm the requirement of preverbal focussed terms. Elicitation with flashcards for four sentences ((574) to (577)) representing the three classes of transitive verbs in Mùwe Ké (§2.4), repeated here from Table 9, consistently exhibit preverbal question pronouns and focussed terms. Each sentence contains an actor, undergoer, and two adverbials: one of space and one of time.

ERG ABS	*khér* 'take', *thó* 'see'
ERG DAT	*tá* 'look', *tʰù:* 'hit/beat'
DAT ABS	*dʒòr* 'find/receive', *kʰà* 'love'

Table 9. Mùwe Ké transitive verb classes

(574) *dàŋ* *kháŋba-ru* *ʈáʃi-gadi:* *ɖòlma-la* *thóŋ-soŋ*

yesterday house-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT saw-PST.TES

'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.' (Focus, Term - Flashcards-7)

(575) *khónup* *sàkhaŋ* *nàŋ-ru* *ʈáʃi-gadi:* *ɖòlma-la*

day.before.yesterday restaurant in-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT

tʰù:-soŋ

beat.PST-PST.TES

'Tashi hit Dolma the day before yesterday in the restaurant.' (Focus, Term - Flashcards-45)

(576) *dàŋ* *làm-ru* *ʈáʃi-la* *ŋúl* *dʒòr-soŋ*

yesterday road-LOC Tashi-DAT money found-PST.TES

'Tashi found money yesterday in the street.' (Focus, Term - Flashcards-66)

(577) *khónup* *dzʌ̀ŋgel* *nàŋ-ru* *ʈáʃi* *tʰòm-la* *dʒìri*

day.before.yesterday Jungle in-LOC Tashi bear-DAT fear

kʰjàb-soŋ

VSR.PST-PST.TES

'Tashi felt afraid of the bear the day before yesterday in the jungle.'

(Focus, Term - Flashcards-76)

When each of these sentences was elicited, it was reported that any order was possible, with the exception of the sentence-final verb requirement. When question forms were elicited, the question pronoun was instinctively and consistently placed in immediately preverbal position. The following four examples relate to the previous four, with the elicitation for the actor in the first example, the undergoer in the second, and the adverbials in the third and fourth:

(578) *dàŋ*   *ḍòlma-la*   *kháŋba-ru*   *sú-i-gadi:*   *thóŋ-s-a*
yesterday   Dolma-DAT   house-LOC   who-ERG-ERG   saw-PST.TES-Q
'Who saw Dolma in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-37)

(579) *khónup*   *sàkhaŋ*   *nàŋ-la*   *ḍòlma-gadi:*   *sú-la*
day.before.yesterday   restaurant   in-LOC   Dolma-ERG   who-DAT

tʰù:-s-a
beat.PST-PST.TES-Q
'Who did Dolma hit in the restaurant the day before yesterday?'
                                     (Focus, Term – Flashcards-46)

(580) *ʈáʃi-la*   *làm-ru*   *ŋúl*   *nàm*   *dʐòr-s-a*
Tashi-DAT   road-LOC   money   when   found-PST.TES-Q
'When did Tashi find money on the street?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-68)

(581) *khónup*   *ʈáʃi*   *tʰòm-la*   *kʰònu*   *dʐìri*   *kʰjàb-s-a*
day.before.yesterday   Tashi   bear-DAT   where   fear   VSR.PST-PST.TES-Q
'Where did Tashi feel afraid of the bear the day before yesterday?'
                                     (Focus, Term – Flashcards-81)

When the question form had been elicited the remaining three terms were moved around to test for whether a particular order was preferred for the non-focussed items and it was consistently reported that any order was fine with no effect on meaning. For example:

(582) *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *dàŋ*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*
house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   yesterday   who-DAT   saw-PST.TES-Q
'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-9)

(583)   *kháŋba-ru*   *dàŋ*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        house-LOC   yesterday   Tashi-ERG   who-DAT   saw-PST.TES-Q

        'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-10)

(584)   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   who-DAT   saw-PST.TES-Q

        'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-11)

However, when the question word was moved to any other position but preverbal, the utterance was considered 'not proper…wrong…unnatural', making the following examples infelicitous:

(585)   *#dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *sú-la*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        yesterday   house-LOC   who-DAT   Tashi-ERG   saw-PST.TES-Q

        Intended: 'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-13)

(586)   *#sú-la*   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        who-DAT   yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   saw-PST.TES-Q

        Intended: 'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-14)

(587)   *#ɖòlma-la*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *kʰònu*   *khónup*   *tʰù:-s-a*

        Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG   where   day.before.yesterday   beat.PST-PST.TES-Q

        Intended: 'Where did Tashi hit Dolma the day before yesterday?'

                                                        (Focus, Term - Flashcards-61)

Focussed terms as answers are consistently encountered in immediately preverbal position throughout the task:

(588)   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   who-DAT   saw-PST.TES-Q

        'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-15)

        dàŋ   *kháŋba-ru*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *[ɖòlma]F-la*   *thóŋ-soŋ*

        yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES

        'Tashi saw [Dolma]F in the house yesterday.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-16)

Interestingly there appears to be a requirement also for the non-focussed items in the answer sentence to mimic that of the question and this is consistent throughout the data. My language

assistant volunteered this information during the elicitation session also. Compare (588) with (589):

(589)   *kháŋba-ru*   *dàŋ*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        house-LOC   yesterday Tashi-ERG who-DAT   saw-PST.TES-Q

        'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-17)

        kháŋba-ru   *dàŋ*   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *[ɖòlma]F-la* *thóŋ-soŋ*

        house-LOC   yesterday Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT saw-PST.TES

        'Tashi saw [Dolma]F in the house yesterday.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-18)

However, attempts to put an unfocussed term between that which is focussed and the verb produces infelicitous utterances considered 'not natural':

(590)   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *kháŋba-ru*   *dàŋ*   *sú-la*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        Tashi-ERG house-LOC yesterday who-DAT saw-PST.TES-Q

        'Who did Tashi see in the house yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-20)

        #ʈáʃi-gadi: *[ɖòlma]F-la* *kháŋba-ru*   *dàŋ*   *thóŋ-soŋ*

         Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT house-LOC yesterday saw-PST.TES

         Intended: 'Tashi saw [Dolma]F in the house yesterday.   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-21)

The pattern of question word and focussed answer term only felicitously appearing in preverbal position with the remaining terms appearing in seemingly any order, is found consistently throughout the elicitation data. Further examples are seen here with question-answer pairs and counterparts deemed to have infelicitous word order:

(591)   *ʈáʃi-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *kháŋba-ru*   *nàm*   *thóŋ-s-a*

        Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT house-LOC when saw-PST.TES-Q

        'When did Tashi see Dolma in the house?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-34)

        ʈáʃi-gadi: *ɖòlma-la*   *kháŋba-ru*   *[dàŋ]F*   *thóŋ-soŋ*

        Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT house-LOC yesterday saw-PST.TES

        'Tashi saw Dolma in the house [yesterday]F.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-35)

(592) #[dàŋ]_F   ṭáʃi-gadi: ḍòlma-la   kháŋba-ru   thóŋ-soŋ

yesterday   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   house-LOC   saw-PST.TES

Intended: 'Tashi saw Dolma in the house [yesterday]_F.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-36)

Example (592) was said to be 'not a good answer to this particular question, although it would be grammatical in another context', again demonstrating that while word order in Mùwe Ké is relatively free, focussed terms are preferred to appear in preverbal position.

(593) ṭáʃi-gadi: khónup   sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-ru   sú-la

Tashi-ERG   day.before.yesterday   restaurant   in-LOC   who-DAT

tʰù:-s-a

beat.PST-PST.TES-Q

'Who did Tashi hit in the restaurant the day before yesterday?'

(Focus, Term - Flashcards-53)

ṭáʃi-gadi: khónup   sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-ru   [ḍòlma]_F-la

Tashi-ERG   day.before.yesterday   restaurant   in-LOC   Dolma-DAT

tʰù:-soŋ

beat.PST-PST.TES

'Tashi hit [Dolma]_F in the restaurant the day before yesterday.'

(Focus, Term - Flashcards-54)

(594) #ṭáʃi-gadi: khónup   [ḍòlma]_F-la   sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-ru

Tashi-ERG   day.before.yesterday   Dolma-DAT   restaurant   in-LOC

tʰù:-soŋ

beat.PST-PST.TES

Intended: 'Tashi hit [Dolma]_F in the restaurant the day before yesterday.'

(Focus, Term - Flashcards-55)

The sentence in (594) was reported to be 'ungrammatical'.

(595) dàŋ   làm-ru   ŋúl   sú-la   dʒòr-s-a

yesterday   road-LOC   money   who-DAT   found-PST.TES-Q

'Who found money in the street yesterday?'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-68)

dàŋ   *làm-ru*   *ŋúl*   *[ʈáʃi]ꜰ-la*   *dʒòr-soŋ*

yesterday   road-LOC   money   Tashi-DAT   found-PST.TES

'[Tashi]ꜰ found money in the street yesterday.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-69)

(596)   *#[ʈáʃi]ꜰ-la*   *dàŋ*   *làm-ru*   *ŋúl*   *dʒòr-soŋ*

        Tashi-DAT   yesterday   road-LOC   money   found-PST.TES

        Intended: '[Tashi]ꜰ found money in the street yesterday.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-70)

When asked about (596), it was reported again that 'the correct way is at the end [in preverbal position],' and that the utterance was 'unstylish'.

(597)   *khónup*   *ʈáʃi*   *tʰòm-la*   *kʰònu*   *dʒìri*   *kʰjàb-s-a*

        day.before.yesterday   Tashi   bear-DAT   where   fear   VSR.PST-PST.TES-Q

        'Where did Tashi feel afraid of the bear the day before yesterday?'

                                               (Focus, Term - Flashcards-82)

        khónup   *ʈáʃi*   *tʰòm-la*   *[dzʌ̀ŋgel*   *nàŋ-ru]ꜰ*   *dʒìri*

        day.before.yesterday   Tashi   bear-DAT   jungle   in-LOC   fear

        kʰjàb-soŋ

        VSR.PST-PST.TES

        'Tashi felt afraid of the bear [in the jungle]ꜰ the day before yesterday.'

                                               (Focus, Term - Flashcards-83)

(598)   *#khónup*   *[dzʌ̀ŋgel*   *nàŋ-ru]ꜰ*   *ʈáʃi*   *tʰòm-la*   *dʒìri*

        day.before.yesterday   Jungle   in-LOC   Tashi   bear-DAT   fear

        kʰjàb-soŋ

        VSR.PST-PST.TES

        Intended: 'Tashi felt afraid of the bear [in the jungle]ꜰ the day before yesterday.'

                                               (Focus, Term - Flashcards-84)

Similarly, the example in (598) was simply deemed 'not right'.

The examples thus far, all of which were taken from an elicitation session, give a strong indication to there being a reserved immediately preverbal position in Mùwe Ké for focussed terms, be they actor, undergoer or adverbial.

To complement the elicitation data, I turn to data that uses visual stimuli from two tasks in the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006): task 5 'Sequences' and task 18 'Who Does What?' Both tasks include conditions that elicit term focus and provide further evidence for a preverbal focus position. While the second task elicits question/answer pairs, similar to the data above, the first uses picture pairs to elicit two declarative sentences.

The first task seeks to elicit transitive expressions in different IS conditions. Useful for the task at hand were conditions C and D, which show picture pairs with a new actor and new undergoer, respectively, thereby eliciting term focus:

Figure 12. Picture pairs from QUIS task 5 'Sequences' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 78–9)

To complement the exercises, pairs of utterances for the second picture were prepared for a judgement task. The task returned sentence pairs such as the following for C2:

(599) *dèna kérgjal tʃík pʰàlaŋ-la kʰjà-i-duk*
here   man   a   cow-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES
'Here a man is hitting the cow.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-37)

tʰèni dèna pʰàlaŋ-la [kérmen tʃík]ꜰ kʰjà-i-duk
then   here   cow-DAT   woman   a   hit-IPFV-TES
'Then here [a woman]ꜰ is hitting the cow.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-38)

The new actor, here 'a woman', was reportedly required to appear in preverbal position. The cow, which was seen as the same cow in each picture, therefore needed to appear before that in the sentence. This was later confirmed in the judgement task for item 2 which looked like this:

1)	kergyal chik phalang-la khjai duk
2)	kermen chik phalang-la khjai duk
	phalang-la kermen chik khjai duk

Table 19. Judgement task for Condition C, Item 2

That is:

(600) *kérgjaḷ tʃĭk pʰàlaŋ-la kʰjà-i-duk*
man   a   cow-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES
'A man is hitting the cow.'

kérmen tʃĭk pʰàlaŋ-la kʰjà-i-duk
woman   a   cow-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES
'A woman is hitting the cow.'

pʰàlaŋ-la kérmen tʃĭk kʰjà-i-duk
cow-DAT   woman   a   hit-IPFV-TES
'A woman is hitting the cow.'

It was reported that the second sentence in Table 19 number 2 is better and forms a connection between the pictures because it is the same cow while the first sentence gives the idea that the two cows are not connected and that essentially the two sentences are then presentational.

The same pattern was given for C1:

(601) *dèna kérmen tʃĭk kúrtsi-la ták-dʒi-ni   ɖò-i-duk*
here   woman   a   chair-DAT lifted-CONN-TOP go-IPFV-TES
'Here a woman is carrying a chair.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-44)

tʰèni jàŋ kúrtsi dì:-la   [kérgjaḷ tʃĭk]F ták-dʒi-ni
then   again chair   this-DAT   man   a   lifted-CONN-TOP

ɖò-i-duk
go-IPFV-TES
'Then again [a man]F is carrying the chair.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-45)

The two sentence pairs for condition D followed the same pattern:

(602)   *dèna*   *kérgjal*   *tʃík*   *mèntok*   *ták-dʒi-ni*   *ɖò-i-duk*

          here   man   a   flower   lifted-CONN-TOP   go-IPFV-TES

          'Here a man is going carrying the flower.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-46)

          tʰèni   *kérgjal*   *dì:*   [*kúrtsi*   *tʃík*]_F   *ták-dʒi-ni*   *ɖò-i-duk*

          then   man   this   chair   a   lifted-CONN-TOP   go-IPFV-TES

          'Then the man is carrying [a chair]_F.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-47)

(603)   *dèna*   *kérmen*   *tʃík*   *pʰìza-la*   *tʰù-i-duk*

          here   woman   a   son-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES

          'Here a woman is hitting the boy.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-48)

          tʰèni   *kérmen*   *dì:*   [*pʰàlaŋ-la*]_F   *tʰù-i-duk*

          then   woman   this   cow-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES

          'Then the woman is hitting [the cow]_F.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-49)

The second task, 'Who Does What', returned question-answer pairs all of which followed the pattern seen above of question word and focussed answer term appearing in immediately preverbal position.

The task was designed to elicit double foci with questions such as 'Who is drinking what?' for Item 1 in Figure 13. Useful for term-focus elicitation, however, were conditions F and G, which asked single questions about the actor and undergoer, respectively, such as 'Who is drinking the coke?' or 'What is the man drinking?' Once natural responses had been elicited, whether or not another term could come between the focussed term and the verb was tested as above.

Figure 13. Pictures from QUIS task 18 'Who does What?' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 143)

The eight questions with actor focus in condition F were translated from English to Mùwe Ké and then Mùwe Ké answers were elicited. Each of them returned the preverbal-focus pattern

seen above in the form of the following two examples, which relate to the two pictures seen in Figure 13:

(604) *kók   dì: sú   thú-i-d-a*
coke   this   who   drink-IPFV-TES-Q
'Who is drinking the coke?'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-51)

kók   dì: [kérgjal]F   thú-i-duk
coke   this   man   drink-IPFV-TES
'[The man]F is drinking the coke.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-53)

(605) *kéla   dì: sú   sà-i-d-a*
banana   this   who   eat-IPFV-TES-Q
'Who is eating the banana?'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-54)

kéla   dì: [kérgjal]F   sà-i
banana   this   man   eat-IPFV
'[The man]F is eating the banana.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-55)

The judgement task again returned consistent comments that answers akin to the following example were 'unnatural' and 'incorrect as an answer to this question'.

(606) *kéla   dì: sú   sà-i-d-a*
banana   this   who   eat-IPFV-TES-Q
'Who is eating the banana?'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-56)

#[kérgjal]F   kéla   sà-i-duk
 man   banana   eat-IPFV-TES
 '[The man]F is eating the banana.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-57)

The eight questions with focus on the undergoer in condition G also returned total consistency with the emerging pattern, as the next two examples illustrate:

(607) *kérgjal   dì: tʃǐ: thú-i-du-a*
man   this   what   drink-IPFV-TES-Q
'What is the man drinking?'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-83)

kérgjal   dì: [kók]_F   thú-i-duk

man   this   coke   drink-IPFV-TES

'The man is drinking [coke]_F.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-84)

(608)   *kérgjal   dì: tʃǐ: sà-i-d-a*

man   this   what   eat-IPFV-TES-Q

'What is the man eating?'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-85)

kérgjal   dì: [kéla]_F   sà-i-duk

man   this   banana   eat-IPFV-TES

'The man is eating [banana]_F.'   (Focus,Term-QUIS.Elicitation-86)

In QUIS task 16 'Tell a Story', questions are asked to investigate the effect of contrast. Relevant here, however, are the questions that elicit term focus[14]. Question/answer pairs all show immediately preverbal term focus. Respectively, the following four examples have term focus on the actor, the undergoer and then on two adverbials of location and direction:

(609)   *bìskut   sú-i-gane   dzè:-s-a*

biscuit   who-ERG-ERG   ate-PST.TES-Q

'Who ate the biscuit?'   (MONO-517.wav)

bìskut   [kérmen   tʃík]_F-gane   dzè:-soŋ

biscuit   woman   a-ERG   ate-PST.TES

'[A woman]_F ate the biscuit.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-126)

(610)   *pʰùŋ   tʃík   sú-la   thó-s-a*

tree   a   who-DAT   bumped-PST.TES-Q

'Whom did a tree stop?' (Source: 'Who is stopped by a tree?')   (MONO-543.wav)

pʰùŋ   tʃík   [mì:]_F-la   thó-s

tree   a   person-DAT   bumped-PST.TES

'A tree stopped [the man]_F.' (He bumped into a tree.)   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-218)

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[14] Questions 4, 5, 8, 13, 17, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 35 and 38. (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 130–6)

(611) *támu-gi*   *tʰàŋ-ʃo-la*   *kérgjal-do kʰàŋ*   *tʃhók-la*   *tʰèd-du-a*
movie-GEN   first-SUPER-LOC   man-PL   which   side-LOC   sat-PRF.TES-Q
'At the beginning of the film which side were the men sitting on?'   (MONO-527.wav)

támu-gi   *tʰàŋ-ʃo-la*   *kérgjal-do [jòmba]F*   *tʃhók-la*   *tʰèd-duk*
movie-GEN   first-SUPER-LOC   man-PL   left   side-LOC   sat-PRF.TES
'At the beginning of the film the men were sitting on [the left]F side.'

(QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-73)

(612) *ʈʰùʃiŋ*   *kʰàŋ*   *jó-la*   *ɖò-i-du-a*
boat   which   side-LOC   go-IPFV-TES-Q
'Where is the boat heading?'   (MONO-545.wav)

ʈʰùʃiŋ   *[jón]F*   *jó-la*   *ɖò-i*
boat   left   side-LOC   go-IPFV
'The boat is going [to the left]F side.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-4.1-229)

QUIS task 11 'Anima' presents participants with four photos for a short time and then asks questions in the form of a memory test:

Figure 14. A photo set from QUIS task 11 'Anima' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 99)

The task was designed to investigate different focus types but relevant here is the wh- question that elicits term focus. Of the sentences that do not exhibit ellipsis, the focussed term is found in immediately preverbal position for each one. The following two examples show term focus on the actor and undergoer, respectively:

(613)   *jòekhaŋ*   *nàŋ-du*   *sòegu*   *dì:*   *sú*   *túb-gi-du-a*

        kitchen   in-LOC   pumpkin   this   who   cut-IPFV-TES-Q

        'In the kitchen, who is cutting the pumpkin?'   (MONO-192.wav)

        jòekhaŋ   *nàŋ*   *sòegu*   *[pʰìza*   *tʃĭk]F*   *túb-gi*

        kitchen   in   pumpkin   son   a   cut-IPFV

        'In the kitchen, [a boy]F is cutting the pumpkin.'   (QUIS-2.1-Tsultrim-152)

(614)   *kháŋba*   *nàŋ-du*   *kérgjal*   *dì:*   *tʃĭ:-la*   *kʰjà-i-du-a*

        house   in-LOC   man   this   what-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES-Q

        'In the house, what is the man hitting?'   (MONO-219.wav)

        kháŋba   *nàŋ-du*   *kérgjal*   *dì:*   *[gàri]F-la*   *kʰjà-i*

        house   in-LOC   man   this   jeep-DAT   hit-IPFV

        'In the house, the man is hitting [a jeep]F.'   (QUIS-3.1-195)

To emulate this task and in order to gather further data, I conducted the 'Frog Story' (Mayer 1969) with ten people. The story is presented in pictures in a wordless book of some twenty five pages. Participants are asked to look through at their leisure and then tell the story in Mùwe Ké when they are ready. The story follows a young boy and his dog, who go searching for their friend the frog after waking up and finding him gone one morning. Example pages are seen here:

Figure 15. Example pages from 'Frog, Where Are You?' (Mayer 1969)

To elicit the focus types investigated here, questions were designed to follow the story-telling in the manner of the 'Anima' task immediately above. The six questions that elicit term focus are seen in (615) with i, v and vi, which I have chosen to exemplify here since they also contain an adverbial, translated into Mùwe Ké in (616).

(615) i. At the beginning of the story, who was living in the house?

ii. What did the dog break?

iii. Where did the boy and the dog go to look for the frog?

iv. Who climbed a tree?

v. What animal did the boy find in the tree?

vi. What did the boy find behind the log?

(616) i *ɖùŋ-gi*   *tʰàŋʃo-la*   *kháŋb-i*   *nàŋ-ru* *sú*   *tʰò-gi-or-a*

story-GEN   first-LOC   house-GEN   in-LOC   who   stay-IPFV-ASSERT-Q

'At the beginning of the story, who was living in the house?'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-1)

v *pʰìza-gadi:*   *pʰùŋ*   *tá:-ru*   *kʰàŋ*   *dʒùdʒuŋ*   *dì:*   *thóŋ-s-a*

son-ERG   tree   on-LOC   which   little.bird   this   saw-PST.TES-Q

'What bird did the boy see in the tree?'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-21)

vi *pʰìza-gadi:*   *tʰòŋbu-gi*   *tʃhák-ru*   *tʃĩ:*   *thóŋ-s-a*

son-ERG   log-GEN   side-LOC   what   saw-PST.TES-Q

'What did the boy see beside the log?'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-31)

Each of the sixty answers (six questions with ten participants) exhibit the focussed term in immediately preverbal position; although, three sentences contained ellipsis on non-focussed terms and in one the verb did not match the verb used in the question. However, this still returns 100% of sentences with preverbal term focus, which is a big compliment to the notion that Mùwe Ké reserves the preverbal position for focussed terms. Examples of answers to i, v and vi are seen here:

(617) i *ɖùm-gi*   *tʰàŋʃo-la*   *kháŋb-i*   *nàŋ-du*   *[mì:-daŋ*   *kí:*   *bàlba]*_F

story-GEN   first-LOC   house-GEN   in-LOC   person-ASSOC   dog   frog

tʰò-gi

sit-IPFV

'At the beginning of the story, [a man, dog and frog]_F were staying in the house.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Guru Norbu-1)

v *pʰìza-gadi: pʰùŋ nàŋ-du [ùkpa]ꜰ thóŋ-s*

  son-ᴇʀɢ   tree in-ʟᴏᴄ owl   saw-ᴘsᴛ.ᴛᴇs

  'The boy saw [the owl]ꜰ in the tree.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - E Karma-11)

vi *pʰìza-ga tʰòŋbu-gi ʧhák-ru [khú-i ró: bàlba]ꜰ thóŋ-s*

  son-ᴇʀɢ log-ɢᴇɴ side-ʟᴏᴄ he-ɢᴇɴ friend frog   saw-ᴘsᴛ.ᴛᴇs

  'The boy saw [his friend the frog]ꜰ beside the log.' (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Lama Thinley-19)

To end this section and show further evidence for an immediately preverbal term-focus position in Mùwe Ké, I present examples of term focus in ditransitive (dative) sentences as well as term focus on adverbials not seen above: beneficiary (for whom?), location (where?), and time (when?).

The ditransitive sentences come from QUIS task 7 'Birthday Party'. The task presents pairs of participants with corresponding cards. For example, in Figure 16 Participant B has a card with gifts (themes) (a pumpkin, a potato and some nettles (three common foods in Mugu)), and recipients (the three cats), while participant B will have either only the gifts or the recipients (here the recipients) and will therefore need to ask a question such as 'For whom is the pumpkin?' or here 'What gift will the blue cat receive?'

Figure 16. Example cards for adapted QUIS task 7 'Birthday Party' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 85)

When the recipient was given and the theme new, the theme appeared in preverbal position in each of the twelve sentences recorded while performing this task with four different pairs of participants. When the theme was given and the recipient new, the recipient was found in preverbal position in eight out of nine sentences akin to the next two examples:

(618) *pʰèː màrbu-daŋ sérbu ŋóbu súm-la tʰèni ŋémba tʃĭː tʃĭː*

cat red-ASSOC golden blue three-DAT then gift what what

thób-dʒi ìn-na

receive-FUT be.ASSERT-Q

'For the red, yellow and blue cats three, then what kind of gifts will they receive?'

pʰèː ŋóbu-la [sòegu tʃĭk]F pʰèː sérbu-la [píndal tʃĭk]F pʰèː

cat blue-DAT pumpkin a cat golden-DAT potato a cat

màrbu-la [sà tʃĭk]F thób-dʒi ìn

red-DAT nettle a receive-FUT be.ASSERT

'The blue cat will receive [a pumpkin]F, the yellow cat [a potato]F, the red cat [a nettle]F.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-2-4)

(619) *dèna ŋà-la éi tsíːtóŋne tʃĭk-daŋ tʰèni pártʃe tʃĭk-daŋ tʰèni*

here I-DAT eh? calculator a-ASSOC then camera a-ASSOC then

hlódʒu bùl-ne kúː tʃĭk dùk ĕi

religious.candle offer.H-PTCL butter.lamp.receptacle a exist.TES eh?

'Here I have a calculator then a camera then a butter lamp receptacle for offering butter lamps, right?

tʰèni òdi dìː tʰèni sú sú-la thób-dʒi ìn-na

then that this then who who-DAT receive-FUT be.ASSERT-Q

nùː ŋà-la nùe-daŋ já

younger.sister I-DAT say.IMP-JUSS yeah

'Then who will receive those? Please tell me, sister, OK?'

tsíːtóŋne dìː [kjúː màrbu-la]F thób-gi

calculator this puppy red-DAT receive-IPFV

'[The red puppy]F is receiving the calculator.'

pártʃe dìː [kjúː sérbu-la]F thób-gi

Camera this puppy golden-DAT receive-IPFV

'[The yellow puppy]F is receiving the camera.'

kúː   *dìː*   *[kíː*   *ŋóbu-la]*_F   *thób-gi*

butter.lamp.receptacle   this   dog   blue-DAT   receive-IPFV

'[The blue dog]_F is receiving the butter lamp.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-246-250)

The final three examples come from the translation task and have been deemed the 'correct' order by three language assistants. They show term focus on a beneficiary, location and time:

(620)   **Beneficiary**. Source: Whose child is the ticket for? [for my friend's (child)]

ʈíkit   *sú-i*   *pʰìɖuk-tsa-la*   *ìn-a*

ticket   who-GEN   baby-CONN-DAT   be.ASSERT-Q

'Whose child is the ticket for?'

[ŋè-i   *róː-gi*   *pʰìɖuk]*_F*-tsa-la*   *ìn*

I-GEN   friend-GEN   baby-CONN-DAT   be.ASSERT

'(It) is for [my friend's child]_F.'   (QUIS-Trans-P2-Q59-Wangmo)

(621)   **Location**. Source: Where did the woman eat? [in a cheap restaurant]

kérmen   *dìː-gane*   *kʰùnu*   *dzèː-s-a*

woman   this-ERG   where   ate-PST.TES-Q

'Where did the woman eat?'

kérmen   *dìː-gane*   *[sàkhaŋ*   *kʰèu*   *nàŋ-du]*_F   *dzèː-s*

woman   this-ERG   restaurant   cheap   in-LOC   ate-PST.TES

'The woman ate [in a cheap restaurant]_F.'   (QUIS-Trans-P2-Q68-Wangmo)

(622)   **Time**. Source: When did the woman eat the last time? [yesterday]

kérmen   *dìː-gane*   *khédziŋ*   *nàm*   *dzèː-s-a*

woman   this-ERG   in.the.past   when   ate-PST.TES-Q

'When was the last time the woman ate?'

kérmen   *dìː-gane*   *[dàŋ]*_F   *dzèː-s*

woman   this-ERG   yesterday   ate-PST.TES

'The woman ate [yesterday]_F.'   (QUIS-Trans-P2-Q62-Wangmo)

Focussed NP terms, i.e. the arguments of an utterance, non-verbal XP-categories such as adverbs and other adjunct terms may therefore be seen as strongly preferring to appear in an immediately preverbal position akin to the terms discussed in §4.3.1 that appear in predicate focus.

4.4.2   Term Focus and DAM

This section argues that focussed terms (§3.3.2) that are actors are obligatorily marked as ergative. Examples from the elicitation are presented first and then relevant tasks from the QUIS.

From the elicitation, it was reported that for all of the forms in Table 18, ergative marking is required on the focussed term. For future utterances, ergative *-gane* was said to be obligatory on the focussed actor:

(623)   *ɖòlma-la*   *sú-i-gane*   *tá-i*   *ìn-a*
         Dolma-DAT   who-ERG-ERG   look-FUT   be.ASSERT-Q
         'Who will look at Dolma?'

         ɖòlma-la   *[ʈáʃi-gane / *ʈáʃi]ꜰ*   *tá-i*   *dàk*
         Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG / Tashi   look-FUT   be.ASSERT
         '[Tashi]ꜰ will look at Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-66)

And also for the imperfective:

(624)   *námɖul-la*   *sú-i-gane*   *tá-i-or-a*
         aeroplane-DAT   who-ERG-ERG   look-IPFV-ASSERT-Q
         'Who looks at the aeroplane?'

         námɖul-la   *[ʈáʃi-gane / *ʈáʃi]ꜰ*   *tá-i-ot*
         aeroplane-DAT   Tashi-ERG / Tashi   look-IPFV-ASSERT
         '[Tashi]ꜰ looks at the aeroplane.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-46)

Plus the perfective:

(625) *ʈáʃi-la*   *sú-i-gane*   *tʰùː-s-a*

Tashi-DAT   who-ERG-ERG   beat.PST-PST.TES-Q

'Who hit Tashi?'

      ʈáʃi-la   ***[ɖòlma-gane / *ɖòlma]**F* *tʰùː-s*

Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG / Dolma   beat.PST-PST.TES

'[Dolma]F hit Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-26)

And finally the perfect:

(626) *ɖòlma-la*   *sú-i-gane*   *thóŋ-du-a*

Dolma-DAT   who-ERG-ERG   saw-PRF.TES-Q

'Who has seen Dolma?'

      ɖòlma-la   ***[ŋè-i-gane / *ŋà]**F* *thóŋ-ot*

Dolma-DAT   I-ERG-ERG / I   see-PRF.ASSERT

'[I]F have seen Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-87)

Interestingly, during the same elicitation session, it was reported that ergative marking is required on the actor even when it is the undergoer term that is in focus. The following may be compared to (623):

(627) *khjú-i-gane*   *sú-la*   *tá-i*   *ìn-a*

you.SG-ERG-ERG   who-DAT   look-FUT   be.ASSERT-Q

'Who will you look at?'

      ŋè-i-gane / *ŋà *[ɖòlma-la]F* *tá-i*   *dàk*

I-ERG-ERG / I   Dolma-DAT   look-FUT   be.ASSERT

'I will look at [Dolma]F.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-68)

And the next example may be compared to (624):

(628) *ʈáʃi-gane*   *tʃǐː-la*   *tá-i-or-a*

Tashi-ERG   what-DAT   look-IPFV-ASSERT-Q

'What does Tashi look at?'

ʈáʃi-gane / *ʈáʃi   *[námḍul-la]*F   *tá-i-ot*

Tashi-ERG / Tashi   aeroplane-DAT   look-IPFV-ASSERT

'Tashi looks at [the plane]F.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-54)

However, this last judgement is not consistent with the data gathered from the QUIS, presented next, where it is found that ergative marking on actors that are not in focus is optional.

The first relevant QUIS task is task 11 'Anima' (see Figure 14 on p225), where participants are presented with four photos for a short time and then asked questions about them. Of the five sentences that displayed term focus on the actor, each is found with ergative marking:

(629)   *òdu-ru*   *sàmba-gi*   *tʰòŋ-la*   *kérkjal*   *dì:-la*

         there(distal)-LOC   bridge-GEN   in.front-LOC   man   this-DAT

         sú-i-gane   *kʰjà-i-du-a*

         who-ERG-ERG   hit-IPFV-TES-Q

         'There in front of the bridge, who is hitting the man?'

         *[kérmen-gane]*F   *kʰjà-i*

         woman-ERG   hit-IPFV

         '(A) [woman]F is hitting (him)'   (QUIS-4.3-40)

And for the four utterances where the focus falls on the undergoer, ellipsis was found on one of the actors and for the other three no ergative marking was seen:

(630)   *kháŋb-i*   *nàŋ-ru*   *kérkjal*   *dì:-gane*   *tʃí:-la*   *kʰjà-i-du-a*

         house-GEN   in-LOC   man   this-ERG   what-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES-Q

         'In the house, what is the man hitting?'

         kháŋba   *nàŋ-du*   **kérgjal**   **dì:**   *[gàri-la]*F   *kʰjà-i*

         house   in-LOC   man   this   jeep-DAT   hit-IPFV

         'Inside the house, the man is hitting [(a) jeep]F.'   (QUIS-3.1-195)

A similar task, where participants see a short film or cartoon-style picture sequence and then ask and answer questions about them, is task 16 'Tell a Story'. Ergative marking is found for the four answers that exhibit term focus on the actor:

(631) *ʈʰù: nàŋ lèka kʰì-gen-gi káŋba-la ʧíː-gane sùk*
boat in work do-NMLS-GEN foot-DAT what-ERG pain

tʰòn-gi-du-a
take.out-IPFV-TES-Q
'What is hurting the sailor's foot?'

ʈʰù: nàŋ lèka kʰì-gen-gi káŋba-la [tʰìksiŋ-gane]ꜰ [só
boat in work VSR-NMLS-GEN foot-DAT crab-ERG tooth

kʰjàb-dʒi-ni] sùk tʰòn-gi-duk
VSR.PST-CONN-TOP pain take.out-IPFV-TES
'[(A) crab]ꜰ is hurting the sailor's foot [from biting (it)].' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-276)

And for the answer that exhibits verb focus, no ergative marking is found in the actor:

(632) *tʰèni láŋbuʧhe jòdʒila mì: dì: ʧǐ kʰì-i-d-a*
then elephant together person this what do-IPFV-TES-Q
'Then what is the man doing with the elephant?'

láŋbuʧhe dì: mì:-la [ʧʰú: dʒù-gi-duk]ꜰ
elephant this person-DAT water put-IPFV-TES
'The elephant [is putting water on]ꜰ the man.' (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-245)

In task 19 'Fairy Tale', participants again tell a story from a picture sequence and are asked questions about it. For the five sentences that exhibit term focus on the actor, all appeared with ergative marking.

(633) *kʰàŋ pʰìɖuk-gane pʰùŋ túp-s-a*
which baby-ERG tree cut.PST-PST.TES-Q
'Which child cut down the tree?'

pʰìza [ʧúŋʃo dì:-gane]ꜰ pʰùŋ túp-s
son smallest this-ERG tree cut.PST-PST.TES
'[The smallest]ꜰ son cut down the tree.' (QUIS-2.1-147)

From the data, the pattern that focussed actors in either predicate or term focussed constructions require ergative marking is followed.

4.5   Sentence Focus in Mùwe Ké

The three sections here present sentence focus in Mùwe Ké with respect to word order (§4.5.1) and DEM (§4.5.2) before presenting the *-min-duk* construction that is found in Mùwe Ké and used to (emphatically) point out something new or draw attention to a state of affairs (§4.5.3). The sections show that freedom of word order and optional ergative marking is found in all-new sentences. Sentence-focus utterances, aka broad-focus, all-new, out-of-the-blue or thetic (§3.3.3), are established as such due to either being text/narrative starters, answers to 'what happened'-type questions or the initial description of a single picture or first picture of a sequence, found in a lot of the QUIS tasks.

4.5.1   Sentence Focus and Word Order

This section argues that any constituent order is possible in sentence-focus utterances with no effect on meaning apart from the hard requirement in Mùwe Ké of a sentence-final verb. The freedom of non-verbal elements in all-new utterances is evidenced through elicitation, tasks from the QUIS and opening sentences from the frog story.

Through **elicitation** with sets of five flashcards comprised of a verb, two human arguments plus a temporal and a spatial adverbial it was consistently reported that the elements could go in any order if serving as a text starter or out-of-the-blue utterance, save for the sentence-final verb, which is a hard requirement in Mùwe Ké, seen earlier in the examples in (514) and discussed briefly in §4.1:

(514) *[dàŋ   kháŋba-ru   ʈáʃì-gadi: ɖòlma-la   thóŋ-soŋ]*_F
       yesterday   house-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
       '[Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house]_F.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-7)

       *[ʈáʃì-gadi: ɖòlma-la   dàŋ   kháŋba-ru   thóŋ-soŋ]*_F
       Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   yesterday   house-LOC   saw-PST.TES
       '[Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house]_F.'   (elicited)

       *[dàŋ   ʈáʃì-gadi: kháŋba-ru   ɖòlma-la   thóŋ-soŋ]*_F
       yesterday   Tashi-ERG   house-LOC   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES
       '[Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house]_F.'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards-1)

*[kháŋba-ru ɖòlma-la ʈáʃì-gadi: dàŋ thóŋ-soŋ]*_F

house-LOC Dolma-DAT Tashi-ERG yesterday saw-PST.TES

'[Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house]_F.'   (Focus, Term - Flashcards-5)

With four elements there are a possible 24 combinations, which I do not list here in their entirety; suffice to say that my language assistants consistently report on the grammaticality and felicity of each permutation. Hypotheses of subject/object coming before adverbials, or vice versa, and actor preceding undergoer etc. have been posited but these correlate neither with the natural speech data nor felicity judgement tasks. Any order is possible if the verb appears sentence-finally; however, if the verb is placed at any other position, the utterance is consistently deemed ungrammatical as the next two examples show:

(634)   *thóŋ-soŋ*   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru* *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*

     saw-PST.TES yesterday house-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT

     Intended: 'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

(635)   *dàŋ*   *kháŋba-ru* *thóŋ-soŋ*   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*

     yesterday house-LOC saw-PST.TES Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT

     Intended: 'Tashi saw Dolma yesterday at the house.'   (elicited)

When terms or VPs are focussed, however, as discussed in §4.4.1 and §4.3.1, focussed terms are infelicitous in any position other than immediately preverbal:

(636)   *kháŋba-ru* *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *nàm* *thóŋ-s-a*

     house-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT when saw-PST.TES-Q

     'When did Tashi see Dolma in the house?'

     ʈáʃì-gadi: *ɖòlma-la*   *kháŋba-ru* *[dàŋ]*_F   *thóŋ-soŋ*

     Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT house-LOC yesterday saw-PST.TES

     'Tashi saw Dolma in the house [yesterday]_F.'

     *[dàŋ]*_F   *ʈáʃì-gadi:*   *ɖòlma-la*   *kháŋba-ru* *thóŋ-soŋ*

     yesterday Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT house-LOC saw-PST.TES

     'Tashi saw Dolma in the house [yesterday]_F'   (Focus, Term – Flashcards: 28, 33, 36)

In further elicitation of Q/A pairs with the question "What happened?" it was also consistently reported that answers may be in 'any order' as long as the verb appears sentence-finally:

(637) Source: [I hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday]

What happened?

tʃǐ: *tʃʰùŋ-s-a*

what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened?'

*[ŋè-i-gane dàŋ ʈáʃi-la bàdzar-la tʰù:]*F

I-ERG-ERG   yesterday Tashi-DAT market-LOC beat.PST

'[I hit Tashi in the market yesterday]F.'

*[dàŋ bàdzar-la ŋè-i-gane ʈáʃi-la tʰù:]*F

yesterday market-LOC   I-ERG-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST

'[I hit Tashi in the market yesterday]F.'

*[bàdzar-la dàŋ ʈáʃi-la ŋè-i-gane tʰù:]*F

market-LOC   yesterday Tashi-DAT   I-ERG-ERG   beat.PST

'[I hit Tashi in the market yesterday]F.'   (180228-002: A1-00:24)

And this freedom of word order is neither effected by tense/aspect (§2.3.8):

(638) Source: [B is watching Dolma hitting Tashi right now]

What is happening?

tʃǐ: *kʰì:-gi-du-a*

what   VSR-IPFV-TES-Q

'What is happening?'

*[ɖòlma-gane ʈáʃi-la tʰù-i-duk]*F

Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES

'[Dolma is hitting Tashi]F.'

*ʈáʃi-la ɖòlma-gane tʰù-i-duk]*F

Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG   beat-IPFV-TES

'[Dolma is hitting Tashi]F.'   (180302-001: P3-06:03)

(639) Source: [I will see Dolma in the street tomorrow]

What will happen?

tʃǐː   òŋ-dʒi-in-a

what   come-FUT-ASSERT-Q

'What will happen?'

[ŋà   ɖòlma-la   tá-i   dàk]ꜰ

I   Dolma-DAT   look-FUT   be.ASSERT

'[I will see Dolma tomorrow.]ꜰ'

[ɖòlma-la   ŋà   tá-i   dàk]ꜰ

Dolma-DAT   I   look-FUT   be.ASSERT

'[I will see Dolma tomorrow.]ꜰ'   (180302-002: EE1-00:43)

(640)   Source: [Tashi has seen Dolma]

                 What has happened?

tʃǐː   tʃʰùŋ-du-a

what   happened-PRF.TES-Q

'What has happened?'

[ʈáʃì-gane   ɖòlma-la   thóŋ-duk]ꜰ

Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PRF.TES

'[Tashi has seen Dolma]ꜰ.'

[ɖòlma-la   ʈáʃì-gane   thóŋ-duk]ꜰ

Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG   saw-PRF.TES

'[Tashi has seen Dolma]ꜰ.'   (180304-000: TT3-01:22)

Nor is it effected by conjunct/disjunct (§2.3.5); compare (637) to the following:

(641)   Source: [Dolma hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday]

                 What happened?

tʃǐː   tʃʰùŋ-s-a

what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened?'

[dàŋ   bàdzar-la   ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃì-la   thùː-soŋ]ꜰ

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   hit.PST-PST.TES

'[Dolma hit Tashi in the market yesterday]ꜰ.'

*[ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃi-la   dàŋ   bàdzar-la   tʰù:-soŋ]*_F

Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   yesterday   market-LOC   hit.PST-PST.TES

'[Dolma hit Tashi in the market yesterday]_F.'   (180228-002: A3-02:41)

Nor is there an effect from [±CONTROL] verbs (§2.3.4); compare the previous example [+CONTROL] with the following [−CONTROL]:

(642)   Source: [Tashi saw Dolma in the street yesterday]

                What happened?

ʈʃĭ: ʈʃʰùŋ-s-a

what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened?'

*[dàŋ   ʈáʃi-gane   ɖòlma-la   làm-la   thóŋ-soŋ]*_F

yesterday Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   road-LOC   saw-PST.TES

'[Tashi saw Dolma in the street yesterday]_F.'

*[dàŋ   làm-la   ʈáʃi-gane   ɖòlma-la   thóŋ-soŋ]*_F

yesterday road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PST.TES

'[Tashi saw Dolma in the street yesterday]_F.'   (180228-002: A4-06:57)

Nor is there an effect with pronominalisation; compare (637) and (641) with the following:

(643)   Source: [I hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday]

                A: What happened?

                B: I hit him in the bazaar yesterday.

ʈʃĭ: ʈʃʰùŋ-s-a

what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened?'

*[ŋè-i-gane dàŋ   bàdzar-la   khó-la   tʰù:]*_F

I-ERG-ERG   yesterday market-LOC   he-DAT   beat.PST

'[I hit him in the market yesterday]_F.'

*[dàŋ   bàdzar-la   khó-la   ŋè-i-gane   tʰù:]*_F

yesterday market-LOC   he-DAT   I-ERG-ERG   beat.PST

'[I hit him in the market yesterday]_F.'   (180228-002: B1-08:08)

Nor does evidentiality (§2.3.6) have an effect; compare (641) with the following:

(644) Source: [Dolma hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday]
           What happened?

t͡ʃǐː   t͡ʃʰùŋ-s-a
what happened-PST.TES-Q
'What happened?'

*[dàŋ   bàdzar-la   ɖòlma-gane ʈáʃi-la   tʰùː(-soŋ(-lo))]*F
yesterday market-LOC Dolma-ERG Tashi-DAT hit.PST(-PST.TES(-QUOT))
'[Dolma hit Tashi in the market yesterday]F.'

*[ɖòlma-gane ʈáʃi-la   dàŋ   bàdzar-la   tʰùː(-soŋ(-lo))]*F
Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT yesterday market-LOC hit.PST(-PST.TES(-QUOT))
'[Dolma hit Tashi in the market yesterday]F.'   (180228-002: A3-06:06)

Nor, finally, does the animacy of the undergoer; compare (637) and (643) with the following:

(645) Source: [I hit the tree in the bazaar yesterday]
           What happened?

t͡ʃǐː   t͡ʃʰùŋ-s-a
what happened-PST.TES-Q
'What happened?'

*[dàŋ   bàdzar-la   ŋè-i-gane   pʰùŋ-la   tʰùː]*F
yesterday market-LOC I-ERG-ERG tree-DAT beat.PST
'[In the market yesterday I hit the tree]F.'

*[ŋè-i-gane dàŋ   bàdzar-la   pʰùŋ-la   tʰùː]*F
I-ERG-ERG yesterday market-LOC tree-DAT beat.PST
'[In the market yesterday I hit the tree]F.'   (180228-002: C1-11:40)

Turning to relevant **QUIS tasks**, the first is task 4 'Locations', which looks at given and new information in the description of spatial scenes (after Klein 1991) from a sequence of four pictures in turn each with a modified spatial relation between a locatum, which is the animate referent whose location in space is expressed (the bear or horse in Figure 17); a relatum, the

inanimate fixed referent with respect to which the locatum is located in space (the rock or tree); and a relation, the spatial relation between locatum and relatum (in front behind etc.).

Figure 17. Picture sequence (left to right) from QUIS task 4 'Locations' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 73)

Relevant here is the first picture that elicits an existential utterance (§2.3.9.2), which is the very model of an all-new out-of-the-blue text-starting presentational topicless thetic sentence, that may then be compared to subsequent elicitations in the sequence, all of which show term focus on the new locatum, relatum or relation.

Spatial relations in Mùwe Ké are formed with a fixed-word-order construction where the lexical noun with genitive case is paired with a relator noun and the locative marker (N-GEN RELATOR-LOC, see §2.2.8), seen in (646) with *pʰùŋ-gi kʰjàb-la* 'behind the tree'. Since this construction has an unchangeable order in Mùwe Ké, the task returns sentences with either a <u>locatum relatum-relation</u> or <u>relatum-relation locatum</u> word order, seen in the following two utterances, respectively:

(646) *tá dìː pʰùŋ-gi kʰjàb-la dùk*
      horse this tree-GEN behind-LOC exist.TES
      'The horse is behind the tree.'

      pʰùŋ-gi kʰjàb-la tá dìː dùk
      tree-GEN behind-LOC horse this exist.TES
      'Behind the tree is the horse.'　　　　　　　　　　　(QUIS-3.1-5)

While the task does not exactly work since participants get confused with the strange pictures, fail to form a temporal connection between them, etc. the data does show a tendency for presentational utterances being free in their word order and new locata, relata and relations found in immediately preverbal position:

(647) *[pʰòŋ   tʃĭk tʃhórten tʰàsa-na   dùk]ꜰ*
daughter   a   stupa   near-LOC   exist.TES
'[There is a girl near a stupa]ꜰ.'

ó::   tʰà   pʰòŋ-ni   [kháŋba   tʃĭk   tʰàsa-ru   léb-min-duk]ꜰ
oh   now   daughter-TOP   house   a   near-LOC   arrived-NEG.PRF-PRF.TES
'Oh now the girl [has arrived near a house]ꜰ.'

tʰà   pʰòŋ-ni   [kháŋba-gi   tʰòŋ-na   tʰèd-duk]ꜰ
now   daughter-TOP   house-GEN   in.front-LOC   stayed-PRF.TES
'Now the girl [is standing in front of]ꜰ the house.'

ó::   tʰàldi-ni   kháŋb-i   tʰòŋ-na   [pʰìza   tʃĭk]ꜰ   dùk
oh   right.now-TOP   house-GEN   in.front-LOC   son   a   exist.TES
'Oh now there is [a boy]ꜰ in front of the house.'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-263-6)

While the data is not black and white, a trend is definitely seen when the new items are presented. In Table 20 we see that all-new sentences may take either form L-MN/MN-L with no strong preference for either one; although, when new items are presented, there is around a 2:1 ratio for sentences putting the new information in immediately pre-verbal position.

	L MN	MN L
Condition A: all new	13 (43%)	17 (57%)
Condition B: new locatum (L)	10 (31%)	22 (69%)
Condition C: new relatum (M)	19 (63%)	11 (37%)
Condition D: new relation (N)	16 (62%)	10 (38%)

Table 20. Ratios of L-MN:MN-L in Task 4 'Locations'

Participants were later asked if this pattern was the 'most natural' when a connection is formed between the sequence of pictures and it was consistently reported that in the first all-new sentences, the sentence-final verb is the only word-order restriction and that subsequently new Ls or MNs sound 'most correct' preverbally.

Task 5 'Sequences' elicits simple transitive utterances with given/new actors and undergoers through a sequence of just two picture pairs:

Figure 18. Picture sequence from QUIS task 5 'Sequences' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 80)

While the data is sparse, I think it is fair to say that none of the participants made a temporal connection between the pictures with most giving presentational-style utterances for both pictures. Relevant, however, is the follow-up elicitation discussed in §4.4.1 (see example (599) onward), where it was reported that if the sentences are deemed as 'having a connection' then the focussed term is to appear in preverbal position. The first all-new sentences, however, allowed for arguments to be presented in any order with no difference given to the overall meaning:

(648) *[kérgjal tʃík pʰàlaŋ-la kʰjà-i-duk]_F*
     man   a   cow-DAT hit-IPFV-TES
     '[A man is hitting a cow]_F'   (Focus, Term - QUIS Elicitation: 41)

     [pʰàlaŋ-la kérgjal tʃík kʰjà-i-duk]_F
     cow-DAT   man   a   hit-IPFV-TES
     '[A man is hitting a cow]_F'   (elicited)

     tʰèni tʰà pʰàlaŋ-la [kérmen tʃík]_F kʰjà-i-duk
     then   now   cow-DAT woman   a   hit-IPFV-TES
     'Then now [a woman]_F is hitting the cow.'   (Focus, Term - QUIS Elicitation: 42)

Task 10 'Event Cards' presents participants with a single picture in order to elicit all-new sentences:

Figure 19. A selection of images used for QUIS task 10 'Event Cards' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 98)

Interestingly, 100% of utterances returned displayed an SOV, or rather actor-undergoer-verb, word order:

(649) *[dùru pʰòŋ   ʧĭk kʰòilak ʈhú-i   tár   kʰì:-gi]*F
       here   daughter a   clothes wash-FUT preparation VSR-IPFV
       '[Here a girl is preparing to wash clothes]F.'   (QUIS-2.1: 107)

(650) *[áwa   dì: pʰìduk-la ʈhú-i   kʰjà-i-duk]*F
       mother this baby-DAT   wash-IPFV VSR-IPFV-TES
       '[This mother is bathing (her) child]F.'   (QUIS-3.1: 30)

Subsequent elicitation/judgement, however, confirmed that any order of arguments is possible without changing the overall meaning.

The final QUIS task in this section is task 27 'Surprises' where participants watch a short video and then answer questions.

Figure 20. Snapshot of short film 'Ball' in QUIS task 27 'Sequences' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 194)

The following trio of utterances neatly illustrate predicate, sentence and term focus, respectively in response to a five-second film where a cow is seen playing with a football.

(651) What is the cow doing?

       *pʰàlaŋ [bòl tsé-i-duk]*F
       cow   ball play-IPFV-TES
       'The cow is playing ball.'   (QUIS-2.1-Tsultrim: 109)

(652) What is happening?

       *[támu   nàŋ-la pʰàlaŋ-gane bòl   tsé-i]*F
       movie in-LOC   cow-ERG   ball play-IPFV
       '[In the film the cow is playing ball]F.'   (QUIS-3.1-Dorjee: 107)

(653)　Who is playing ball?

[bòl　dì:　pʰàlaŋ　tsé-i]ғ
ball　this　cow　play-IPFV

'[The cow]ғ is playing with the ball.'　　　(QUIS-4.3-Karma: 104)

And finally, the frog story was carried out with ten participants, all of whom observed the series of wordless pictures about a boy who lost his frog and told the story in their own words. Very useful here, then, is the very first utterance that is in the 'once upon a time' presentational style based upon the first picture of a boy, his dog and their frog, which they keep in a jar in the boy's bedroom.

Figure 21. The first page in 'Frog, Where are You?' (Mayer 1969)

Since it is consistently reported that all-new sentences may appear in any order save for the sentence-final verb, it would be expected that a variety of ordering of elements would be found and that is exactly what is encountered from the ten narrations of the story. 'Once upon a time' type constructions, when found, are always sentence initial, and then the boy, the dog, the frog and the location are found in any order. I have chosen five introductory sentences which form a rather nice conclusion to this section.

(654)　*ŋár　　tʰàŋbu　tʰàŋbu　kí:　tʃík-daŋ　tʰèni　bàlba　tʰèni　òdi*
　　　long.ago　first　　first　　dog　a-ASSOC　then　frog　　then　that

　　　kérkjal　tʃík　kʰáŋb-i　　tʃík　nàŋ　tʰò-gi-or-ak
　　　man　　a　　house-GEN　a　　in　sit-IPFV-ASSERT-REVEL

　　　'A long time ago, a dog a frog and a boy lived in a house.'　　　(bàlbi súŋ – Chhorden: 1)

(655) *ŋár*   *tʰàŋbu jùl*   *tʃĭk nàŋ-la ráruk tʃĭk-daŋ kĭ:*   *tʃĭk-daŋ*
long.ago first   village a   in-LOC child a-ASSOC dog a-ASSOC

tʰèni bàlba bàlba tʃĭk khó: súm khó: súm jùl   *nàŋ-la*
then frog   frog   a   they three they three village in-LOC

khóre   *kháŋba nàŋ-la tʰò-gi-or-ak*
their.own house   in-LOC   sit-IPFV-ASSERT-REVEL

'Once upon a time in a village a boy and a dog and a frog, they three, lived together in their very own house.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Gyaltsen: 1)

(656) *pʰìza tʃĭk-daŋ kĭ:* *tʃĭk-daŋ bàlba tʃĭk dùk*   *dè:*
son   a-ASSOC dog a-ASSOC frog   a   existed.TES look.at.this.IMP

'There was a boy, a dog and a frog.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Tenzi: 1)

(657) *tʰàŋbu tʰàŋbu dèna kháŋba tʃĭk dùk*
first   first   here house a   existed.TES

'A long time ago there was a house here.'   (bàlbi súŋ – Yanzi: 1)

(658) *ráruk tʃĭk-la bàlba tʃĭk ró:*   *dùk*
child a-DAT frog   a   friend existed.TES

'A boy had a frog friend.'   (bàlbi súŋ - E Karma: 1)

From the data and consistent judgements from language assistants, it has been shown that all-new utterances contain no constituent order requirements save for the sentence-final verb.

4.5.2 Sentence Focus and DAM

This section argues that ergative marking is optional for all-new sentence focus utterances. The section starts with the results of the elicitation sessions after Table 18 (p200).

From the elicitation, it was reported that actors in future all-new utterances may be optionally marked as ergative with no apparent change to the meaning:

(659) Q: *tʃĭ:*   *òŋ-dʒi*   *ìn-a*
what come-FUT be.ASSERT-Q

'What will happen?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-55)

A: *ŋà / ŋè-i-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *tá-i*   *dàk*

I / I-ERG-ERG   Dolma-DAT   look-FUT   be.ASSERT

'I will see Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-56)

A′: *ʈáʃi / ʈáʃi-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *tá-i*   *dàk*

Tashi / Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   look-FUT   be.ASSERT

'Tashi will see Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-57)

This is also true in the imperfective:

(660)   Q: *tʃǐː*   *kʰ-i-or-a*

what   do-IPFV-ASSERT-Q

'What happens?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-27)

A: *ŋèwatare*   *ɖòlma-la*   **ʈáʃi-gane**   *tʰùː-i-ot*

everyday   Dolma-DAT   Tashi-ERG   beat-IPFV-ASSERT

'Tashi hits Dolma every day.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-28)

A′: **ʈáʃi**   *ɖòlma-la*   *tʰùː-i-ot*

Tashi   Dolma-DAT   beat-IPFV-ASSERT

'Tashi hits Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-29)

Also in the perfective:

(661)   Q: *tʃǐː*   *tʃʰùŋ-s-a*

what   happened-PST.TES-Q

'What happened?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-1)

A: *dàŋ*   *ɖòlma-la*   **ŋà**   *làm-la*   *thóŋ*

yesterday   Dolma-DAT   I   road-LOC   saw

'I saw Dolma in the street yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-2)

A′: **ŋè-i-gane**   *dàŋ*   *ɖòlma-la*   *làm-la*   *thóŋ*

I-ERG-ERG   yesterday   Dolma-DAT   road-LOC   saw

'I saw Dolma in the street yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-4)

And finally in the perfect:

(662) Q: *tʃǐ:*   *tʃʰùŋ-du-a*
        what   happened-PRF.TES-Q
        'What has happened?'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-73)

      A: **ŋà** *ḍòlma-la*   *thóŋ-ot*
        I   Dolma-DAT   see-PRF.ASSERT
        'I have seen Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-74)

      A': **ŋè-i-gane** *ḍòlma-la*   *thóŋ-ot*
        I-ERG-ERG   Dolma-DAT   see-PRF.ASSERT
        'I have seen Dolma.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-75)

From the QUIS tasks, there are five where visual stimuli are presented, the first of which elicits all-new sentence focus utterances. Upon examining the ERG DAT constructions, it was found that ergative marking is optional on actor terms.

In task 1 'Changes' all-new sentences are found with and without ergative marking on the actor term:

(663)

kérgjal-gane *póli-la*   *láta*   *kʰjà-i*
man-ERG   ball-DAT   kick.N   hit.VSR-IPFV
'(A) man in kicking (a) ball.'   (QUIS-3.1-76)

kérgjal *dì:*   *bòl-la*   *láta*   *kʰjà-i*
man   this   ball-DAT   kick.N   hit.VSR-IPFV
'The man is kicking (a) ball.'   (QUIS-2.1-95)

From the first pictures in task 5 'Sequences' actor terms are also found with and without ergative marking:

(664)

dì: mì: dì: pʰàlaŋ-la kʰjà-i

this   person   this   cow-DAT   hit-IPFV

'This person is hitting (a) cow.'   (QUIS-4.3-183)

(665)

*pár   nàŋ-la   **kérmen-gane**   pʰàlaŋ-la   pʰèrga   kʰjà-i*

picture   in-LOC   woman-ERG   cow-DAT   stick   hit.VSR-IPFV

'In the picture, (a) woman is hitting (a) cow.' (Lit: 'sticking' a cow.)   (QUIS-3.1-1)

In the ERG DAT construction in task 10 'Event Cards' no ergative marking was found:

(666)

áwa   dì: pʰìduk-la   ʈhú-i   kʰjà-i-duk

mother   this   baby-DAT   wash-IPFV   VSR-IPFV-TES

'The mother is bathing (the) child.'   (QUIS-3.1-30)

Similarly in task 12 'contrast' no ergative marking is found on actor terms:

(667)

(668) *pár-gi*   *nàŋ-la*   *kérmen*   *dì:-la*   **kí:**   *só*   *kʰjà-i*   *kérgjal*

picture-GEN   in-LOC   woman   this-DAT   dog   tooth   VSR-IPFV   man

dì:-la   **pʰè:**   *só*   *kʰjà-i*

this-DAT   cat   tooth   VSR-IPFV

'In the picture, the dog is biting the woman, the cat is biting the man.'   (QUIS-1.2-153)

And finally, in task 18 'Who Does What?' no ergative marking is found either:

(669)

mè: *tʃĭk*   *tʃóksi-la*   *phúl-gi-ga-duk*

elder.N   a   table-DAT   push-IPFV-SPEC-TES

'An old man is pushing (a) table.'   (QUIS-2.1-217)

From the QUIS tasks overall, optional ergative marking was found on actor terms in ERG DAT constructions at a ratio of 1:4, indicating a strong tendency for the ergative to be 'dropped' in all-new presentational sentence-focus utterances.

The data clearly shows, therefore, that ergative marking is optional on actors in all-new sentence-focus utterances.

4.5.3   The *-min-duk* Construction

This section presents an interesting construction that is found with out-of-the-blue all-new presentational sentence-focus utterances, *V-min-duk*, which appears as if it should be negative ('V-NEG-PRF.TES') but is not (see §2.3.8.4 for suffixes that are formally negative but semantically positive and §2.3.11 for the negation of perfect verb strings). While utterances of this sort are not always all-new, the construction was encountered so frequently in a thetic out-of-the-blue capacity 'on the fly' during fieldwork that it warrants inclusion here in reference to the discussion of word order and DAM, of which it follows the emergent pattern of free word order and optional ergative marking.

The construction is used to (emphatically) point out something new or draw attention to a state of affairs. For example, when a guest was leaving the kitchen where I was sat one day, they saw that a log had fallen out of the fire under the still in the adjoining room and announced:

(670) *mé   thón-min-duk*
       fire   emerged-NEG-PRF.TES
       'Fire has come out!'   (Miscellaneous-14)

Upon which the mother of the family leapt into action and dealt with the problem.

The following sentence is common for people to say to children as a (sometimes angry) way to tell them to wipe their noses:

(671) *náu   thón-min-duk*
       snot   emerged-NEG-PRF.TES
       '(Your) nose is running! (Lit: snot has emerged.)'   (Miscellaneous-13)

When returning to the house one day, I spotted that the horses had come for their afternoon feed and said:

(672) *tá   lép-soŋ*
       horse   arrived-PST.TES
       'The horses arrived.'   (Miscellaneous-15)

And was told that a more correct/appropriate way of saying this to inform the happening to my companion is:

(673) *tá   lép-min-duk*
       horse   arrived-NEG-PRF.TES
       'The horses have arrived!'   (Miscellaneous-16)

And finally, the following utterance would be used in a situation where one accidently eats the food of another:

(674) *ŋè-i-gane   khjú-i   jòba   dzè:-min-duk*
       I-ERG-ERG   you.SG-GEN   food   ate-NEG-PRF.TES
       '(Oops!) I've (accidently) eaten your food!'   (Verbal Categories-10)

While all of the attested examples were intransitive, from elicitation it was confirmed that order of terms is free and that ergative marking is optional in ERG DAT constructions as seen in the following examples, which differ in word order and ergative marking on the actor 'Dolma':

(675) *dàŋ* *bàzar-ru* *ḍòlma-gane* *ṭáʃi-la* *tʰù:-min-duk*
 yesterday market-LOC Dolma-ERG Tashi-DAT beat-NEG-PRF.TES
 'Yesterday in the market, Dolma hit Tashi.' (Misc-26)

(676) *ḍòlma* *ṭáʃi-la* *dàŋ* *bàzar-ru* *tʰù:-min-duk*
 Dolma Tashi-DAT yesterday market-LOC beat-NEG-PRF.TES
 'Dolma hit Tashi yesterday in the market.' (Misc-27)

Since the *-min-duk* construction is not exclusively an all-new device, it is certainly possible that it is rather a kind of fully or semi-grammaticalised mirative marker, i.e. representing new or unexpected information (e.g. DeLancey 1997b; 2012). Evidence for this interpretation is its compatibility with given subjects, for example, which certainly militates against the its treatment as a pure "all-new" marker. In the next example the participant is describing the pictures in sequence; in the second sentence, 'the girl' is given but her arrival near a house is new and perhaps unexpected:

(677)

pʰòŋ *tʃík* *tʃhórten* *ṭʰàsa-na* *dùk*
daughter a stupa near-LOC exist.TES

tʰà *pʰòŋ-ni* *kháŋba* *tʃík* *ṭʰàsa-ru* *léb-min-duk*
now daughter-TOP house a near-LOC arrived-NEG-PRF.TES
'A girl is near the stupa. Now, as for the girl, (she) has arrived near a house'

(QUIS-TwoInfs-2.2-263-4)

Another sign of grammaticalisation is that the construction operates outside the conjunct-disjunct distinction, having identical form for both: compare conjunct (674) with the other examples.

To summarise, these three subsections have shown that there are no word order preferences or ergative marking requirements in thetic all-new sentence-focus utterances of the 'regular' kind as well as with the *-min-duk* construction.

4.6   Verum Focus in Mùwe Ké

This section argues that verum (§3.3.4) is expressed in Mùwe Ké through prosodic stress, verb repetition, and a special V-na V construction. Word order of terms is free and ergative marking is optional on the actor term in transitive ERG DAT constructions.

The elicitation into verum focus revealed three strategies for verum 'focus': extra prosodic stress in the verb string, repetition of the verb string and a unique construction *V-na V*.

Extra prosodic stress was found for verum utterances in each of the four 'tenses' during the elicitation task, both from positive (affirmative) to negative ('*x* did *y*' → '*x* **didn't** do *y*') and vice versa, and is compared to all-new sentence-focus utterances with reference to pitch (Hz) and intensity (dB) below in Table 21.

The heavy stress, seen in bold in the following examples, is primarily on the lexical verb in verum utterances in the PFV, IPFV and PRF, that are both positive and negative:

PERFECTIVE

(678)   A: *dàŋ*　　*bàzar-ru*　　*ɖòlma-gane*　*ʈáʃì-la*　　*tʰ ù:-s*

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

B: *dàŋ*　　*bàzar-ru*　　*ɖòlma-gane*　*ʈáʃì-la*　　*mà-tʰu:*

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST.NEG

'Dolma **didn't** hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'　　(Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-2)

(679)   A: *dàŋ*　　*bàzar-ru*　　*ɖòlma-gane*　*ʈáʃì-la*　　*mà-tʰu:-s*

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

B: *dàŋ*　　*bàzar-ru*　　*ɖòlma-gane*　*ʈáʃì-la*　　***tʰ ù:-s***

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma **did** hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'　　(Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-20)

IMPERFECTIVE

(680) A: *tʰàldi*   *bàzar-ru*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃi-la*   *tʰù-i-duk*
       right.now   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES
       'Dolma is hitting Tashi in the bazaar right now.'

       B: *tʰàldi*   *bàzar-ru*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃi-la*   *mì-tʰuː-duk*
       right.now   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG.IPFV-beat-TES
       'Dolma is **not** hitting Tashi in the bazaar right now.' (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-69)

(681) A: *tʰàldi*   *bàzar-ru*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃi-la*   *mì-tʰuː-duk*
       right.now   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG.IPFV-beat-TES
       'Dolma is not hitting Tashi in the bazaar right now.'

       B: *tʰàldi*   *bàzar-ru*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃi-la*   *tʰù-i-duk*
       right.now   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat-IPFV-TES
       'Dolma **is** hitting Tashi in the bazaar right now.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-84)

PERFECT

(682) A: *làm-la*   *ʈáʃi-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-duk*
       road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PRF.TES
       'Tashi has seen Dolma in the street.'

       B: *làm-la*   *ʈáʃi-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *mà-thoŋ-duk*
       road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   NEG-saw-PRF.TES
       'Tashi has **not** seen Dolma in the street.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-105)

(683) A: *làm-la*   *ʈáʃi-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *mà-thoŋ-duk*
       road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   NEG-saw-PRF.TES
       'Tashi hasn't seen Dolma in the street.'

       A: *làm-la*   *ʈáʃi-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-duk*
       road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   saw-PRF.TES
       'Tashi **has** seen Dolma in the street.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-108)

However, for utterances in the FUTURE, the heavy stress is found on the auxiliary:

(684) A: *ŋèrok*   *làm-la*   *ʈáʃì-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-dʒi*   *ìn*

        tomorrow road-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT see-FUT be.ASSERT

        'Tashi will see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'

      B: *ŋèrok*   *làm-la*   *ʈáʃì-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-dʒi*   **màn**

        tomorrow road-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT see-FUT be.ASSERT.NEG

        'Tashi will **not** see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-98)

(685) A: *ŋèrok*   *làm-la*   *ɖòlma-la*   *ʈáʃì*   *thóŋ-dʒi*   *màn*

        tomorrow road-LOC Dolma-DAT Tashi see-FUT be.ASSERT.NEG

        'Tashi will not see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'

      B: *ŋèrok*   *làm-la*   *ʈáʃì-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ-dʒi*   **ìn**

        tomorrow road-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT see-FUT be.ASSERT

        'Tashi **will** see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-102)

A separate strategy for future utterances is unsurprising in the context of focussing on a truth value since there is no 'truth' about the future since it has yet to pass and can therefore only be linked to intention, speculation etc. (see §6.3 for further discussion).

Repetition of the verb string is another way strategy of focussing verum and is often combined with the other two strategies. Everything in the sentence is elided save for the verb string, which is repeated with prosodic stress on the lexical verb:

(686) A: *dàŋ*   *bàzar-ru*   *ɖòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃì-la*   *mà-thuː-s*

        yesterday market-LOC Dolma-ERG Tashi-DAT NEG-beat-PST.TES

        'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

      B: ***thùː-s***   ***thùː-s***

        beat.pst-pst.tes beat.pst-pst.tes

        '(She) **did** hit (him). (She) **did** hit (him).'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-22)

(687) A: *dàŋ*   *làm-la*   *ʈáʃì-gane*   *ɖòlma-la*   *thóŋ*

        yesterday road-LOC Tashi-ERG Dolma-DAT saw

        'Tashi saw Dolma in the street yesterday.'

B: *mà-**thoŋ**-s*   *mà-**thoŋ**-s*

NEG-saw-PST.TES   NEG-saw-PST.TES

'(He) **didn't** see (her). (He) **didn't** see (her).'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-8)

The *V-na V* construction uses the connector *-na* and is deemed the most 'forceful' way of focussing verum or ending disputes. In the data, *-na* attaches to verbs for 'if/when' functions: conditional 'If it rains, we won't go' (§2.5.3.5), and utterances like 'When he looked in the bottle, he didn't find the frog'. This construction is on the cusp of being aggressive in its forcefulness.

(688)   A: *dàŋ*   *bàzar-ru*   *ḍòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃì-la*   *mà-tʰuː-s*

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat-PST.TES

'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

      B: *dàŋ*   *bàzar-ru*   *ḍòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃì-la*   ***tʰùː-na***

yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST-CONN

tʰùː-s

beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma **did** hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-21)

(689)   A: *dàŋ*   *bàzar-ru*   *mù-i-gane*   *khó-la*   *mà-thoŋ-s*

yesterday   market-LOC   she-ERG-ERG   he-DAT   NEG-saw-PST.TES

'She didn't see him in the bazaar yesterday.'

      B: ***thóŋ**-s*   ***thóŋ**-s*   ***thóŋ**-na*   *thóŋ-s*

saw-PST.TES   saw-PST.TES   saw-CONN   saw-PST.TES

'(She) **did** see (him). (She) **did** see (him). (She really really) **did** see (him)!'

(Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-27)

The *V-na V* construction is found in positive verum utterances ('*x* didn't do *y*' → '*x* **did** do *y*') only and the construction *NEG-V-na V is deemed ungrammatical. Furthermore, the construction is reported to only appear in constructions of actions that happened before 'now' so PFV and PRF but not IPFV or FUT.

With regard to the word order restrictions and DEM that is discussed previously in reference to term, predicate and sentence focus, the order of terms is free and ergative marking on actor

terms is optional, which fits the general findings of preverbal-position preference for focussed items and ergative marking for focussed actors since the focus is on the verb (string) in verum-focus utterances.

From elicitation sessions, the **word order** of actor, undergoer and adverbials was consistently reported to have no restrictions:

(690) A: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃi-la   mà-tʰuː-s*
yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat-PST.TES
'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the market yesterday.'

   B: *ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃi-la   dàŋ   bàzar-ru   **tʰùː-na***
Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   yesterday   market-LOC   beat.PST-CONN

   tʰùː-s
beat.PST-PST.TES
'Dolma **did** hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-53)

(691) A: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃi-la   tʰùː-s*
yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES
'Dolma hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

   B: *ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃi-la   dàŋ   bàzar-ru   **mà-tʰuː-s***
Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   yesterday   market-LOC   NEG-beat-PST.TES
'Dolma **didn't** hit Tashi in the market yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-38)

And similarly ergative marking, seen in the following examples in bold, was reported to be truly optional in that its presence/absence had no effect on overall meaning:

(692) A: *sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-ru   ŋèwakhali   ʈáʃi-gane   ɖòlma-la*
restaurant   in-LOC   every.day   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT

   mì-tho-ot
NEG.IPFV-see-ASSERT
'Tashi doesn't see Dolma every day in the restaurant.'

B: *sàkhaŋ   nàŋ-ru   ŋèwakhali   ṭáʃì(-gane)   ḍòlma-la*
restaurant   in-LOC   every.day   Tashi(-ERG)   Dolma-DAT

thó-i-ot
see-IPFV-ASSERT
'Tashi *does* see Dolma every day in the restaurant.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-78)

(693) A: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ḍòlma-gane   ṭáʃì-la   mà-thù:-s*
yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat-PST.TES
'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

B: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ṭáʃì-la   ḍòlma(-gane)   thù:-na*
yesterday   market-LOC   Tashi-DAT   Dolma(-ERG)   beat.PST-CONN

thù:-s
beat.PST-PST.TES
'Dolma *did* hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-91)

While no explicit study of prosody was undertaken for this thesis, the extra prosodic stress on the verb that is clear to one's ear when eliciting verum utterances warrants a cursory investigation and therefore some verum-eliciting stimuli were added into the picture task discussed in the next section (§4.7) in regard to the notion of contrast (see §1.3 for the outline of the task). Following Breen et al. (2010: 1057) the F0 and intensity of the verb (in PFV form so as to be mono-syllabic) in both all-new sentence focus and verum utterances was compared using Praat and a clear trend of higher and louder was found for verum utterances in the very small data sample. The four sentences elicited with stimuli are:

(694) *tshámu   kárma-gane   tʃhà: tú:-s*
night   Karma-ERG   tea   drank-PST.TES
'Karma drank tea at night.'

ŋárok   ṭáʃì-gane   kárjol   tʃhák-s
morning   Tashi-ERG   cup   broke-PST.TES
'Tashi broke (a) cup in the morning.'

> *tshámu   tsíriŋ-gane   tóksi   khúr-s*
>
> night   Tsering-ERG   pickaxe   carried-PST.TES
>
> 'Tsering carried the pickaxe at night.'

> *ŋárok   ténzi-gane   píndal   túp-s*
>
> morning   Tenzi-ERG   potato   cut.PST-PST.TES
>
> 'Tenzi cut potatoes in the morning.'

The stimuli was preceded with either the question 'What happened' or a negative statement that was then 'corrected' for verum:

(695)   *tʃĭː   tʃʰùŋ-s-a*

       what   happened-PST.TES-Q

       'What happened?'

(696)   *tshámu   kárma-gane   tʃʰàː   mà-tuː-s*

       night   Karma-ERG   tea   NEG-drank-PST.TES

       'Karma didn't drink tea at night.'

The results in Table 21 show the trend for higher pitch (F0) and louder intensity with verum bar for the three pairs of highlighted anomalies:

		Mean F0 (Hz)		Max F0 (Hz)		Mean Intensity (dB)		Max. Intensity (dB)	
		Sent.	Ver.	Sent.	Ver.	Sent.	Ver.	Sent.	Ver.
túː-s	'hit'	225	280	251	299	66	62	73	66
tʃhák-s	'broke'	226	266	248	277	63	67	71	76
khúr-s	'carried'	275	318	364	331	61	65	69	74
túp-s	'chopped'	256	311	266	355	62	66	69	74

Table 21. Comparison of pitch and intensity in sentence and verum focus utterances

Interestingly, in a task where participants where played a recording of either a sentence- or verum-focussed sentence and asked to choose the preferred preceding utterance – either 'What happened' (695) or the corresponding negative sentence (696) along with a third choice of 'either' – the 'correct' difference was perceived 100% of the time. When participants were asked why, explanations around a 'stronger' verb were given.

More thorough investigation into verum constructions was undertaken with another participant after Matthewson and Glougie (2018), who look at the manifestations of verum after the diagnostic set presented by Zimmermann and Hole (2008), seen in (488) in §3.3.4 and repeated here for convenience:

(488)   **Properties of verum emphasis in English and German**

Contexts where verum emphasis is allowed:

i.   Correcting a previous utterance

ii.   Corrections of negative expectations

iii.   Emphatic agreement

iv.   Confirmation of expected path of events

v.   Answers to questions (with emphatic effect)

vi.   Answers to indirect questions

vii.   In the antecedent of conditionals ('stressing the conditionality')

viii.   Inside yes-no questions (with an 'Is it really?' effect)

In this task, a somewhat lengthy context was given first and then a sentence to which the participant was asked to reply. For example:

(697)   *You are talking to Dolma on your mobile and she is angry because she thinks that her daughter Galden is outside playing and not doing her homework right now like she should be. However, you are with Dolma's husband and daughter in their home and can see that Galden is in fact doing her homework.*

Dolma: Galden is not doing her homework.

You: ?

The sentences were translated beforehand and the first round of elicitation elicited only all-new utterances in response to 'What happened?' which were later compared to verum utterances from the second round of elicitation, which gave the full context and preceding sentence. The overwhelming difference between the two in each of the eight contexts from (488) is extra prosodic stress on the verb in the verum utterances akin to that discussed above and seen in Table 21. Other notable morphosyntactic constructions are discussed here in turn.

When **correcting a previous utterance** (i), negative verum utterances ('*x* did *y*' → '*x* **didn't** do *y*') were all effected through heavy stress but positive utterances were mostly found with the *V-na V* construction:

(698)   *Karma thinks that his brother has no money and is not receiving any income at the moment. You know that his father is sending him money regularly while he looks for work.*

        Karma: My brother is not receiving money.

ó:	ái-la	ŋúl	dʒòr-na	dʒòr-duk
oh	older.brother-DAT	money	received-CONN	received-PRF.TES

        'Oh, (your) brother *has* received money.'   (Verum-Tenzi-5)

And once, relativisation was employed to highlight verum:

(699)   *Dolma thinks that her daughter Galden broke a cup yesterday because her son Urgen told her a lie. You saw Urgen break the cup and know that it was not Galden.*

        Dolma: Urgen did not break the cup.

ó:	tʃí:	s-i-d-i	tʰòŋge-do	úrgen-gadi:	tʃhák-dʒak
oh	what	say-IPFV-TES-Q	glass(cup)-PL	Urgen-ERG	broke-REDUP

        ìŋ-en-la
        be.ASSERT-NLML-LOC

        'Oh, what are you saying? Urgen *is* the one who broke the cups.'   (Verum-Tenzi-6)

For **corrections of negative expectations** (ii) verb stress is preferred and the lexical item *tʰèba* 'truth' is sometimes found alongside the regular stressing of the verb in imperfective utterances:

(700)   *Dolma thinks Chhorden is pretending to sleep but you know for sure that she is actually sleeping because you heard her snoring.*

        Dolma: She is pretending to sleep.

màn	*mò:*	*tʰèba-la*	**ŋál**-*duk*
be.ASSERT.NEG	she	truth-LOC	slept-PRF.TES

'No, in truth she *has* slept.' (i.e. 'gone to sleep')   (Verum-Tenzi-18)

And the *-min-duk* construction (introduced in §4.5.3 and seen here in [–EVID] form *-met*) was also found in half of the positive verum utterances:

(701)   *Everybody is waiting for a famous singer to arrive in Jumla. Tsering doesn't think that he has arrived yet but you saw the singer get off a plane at the airport an hour ago.*
Tsering: I think that he didn't arrive.

ó:	*màn*	*khó*	*lép*	*tshár-met*
oh	be.ASSERT.NEG	he	arrived	finished-PRF.ASSERT.NEG

'Oh, no. He *has* arrived.'   (Verum-Tenzi-23)

For utterances that show **emphatic agreement** (iii), e.g. 'He will win' 'Yes, he *will* win', the main factor was stress on the verb and also emphasisers like 'in truth' and 'very' were found to appear naturally. For one sentence only the *-min-duk* construction is found:

(702)   *You and Karma are sitting by the river watching someone make a big fire near their house on the other side of the river. The fire gets out of control and starts burning their house.*
Karma: The fire has burned the house.

ó:	*tʰèba-la*	*kháŋba*	*mé-gadi:*	*tshík-min-duk*
oh	truth-LOC	house	fire-ERG	burned-NEG-PRF.TES

'Oh in truth the fire *has* burned the house.'   (Verum-Tenzi-33)

Only prosodic stress is used for the **confirmation of expected path of events** (iv):

(703)   *Against all your good advice, your very drunk friend Tsering is going to walk across a very narrow log bridge over the river. A lot of people are watching and everyone thinks that he will surely fall into the river. You turn to your friend Karma and say:*

thámdʒe-gi	*sám-la*		*khó*	*ʈʰùl-dʒi*	*ìn*	*s-i-duk*	*khó*
all-GEN	thought.N-LOC		he	fall-FUT	be.ASSERT	say-IPFV-TES	he

tʰèba-la	*ʈʰùl-dʒi*	***dàk***
truth-LOC	fall-FUT	be.ASSERT

'Everyone is saying they think he will fall and in truth he *will* fall.' (Verum-Tenzi-35)

And this is also the case for **answers to questions with an emphatic effect** (v) of the type seen in the following example:

(704) *You are looking after your friend's daughter in your home. She has had a bad stomach and hasn't been able to eat more than a tiny bit of rice per day for one month. Today, however, she appears to be feeling better and has eaten three whole plates of daal bhaat. Her father calls you on the phone to ask how she is. You tell him she ate three plates of rice but he can't quite believe you. He asks:*

Friend: Has she (really) eaten three plates of rice?

ú:	*mò:-gadi:*	*tʰèba-la*	*tʰèrma*	*súm*	***dzè:-s***
yeah	she-ERG	truth-LOC	plate	three	ate-PST.TES

'Yes, in truth she *has* eaten three plates of rice.' (Verum-Teni-42)

The responses to **answers to indirect questions** (vi) similarly returned heavy prosodic stress on the verb and one sentence is also found with the *-min-duk* construction:

(705) *Urgen's boss is well-known for not paying salaries on time. Urgen and his wife Dolma have money troubles and are waiting desperately for his salary. On the way to the bazaar you see Urgen who tells you he has received his salary and everything is OK. Later you see his wife who tells you of their money troubles and says to you:*

Dolma: I don't know whether Urgen has received his salary (or not).

khó-la	*ládʒa*	*dʒòr-min-duk*
he-DAT	salary	received-NEG-PRF.TES

'He *has* received his salary.' (Verum-Tenzi-55)

In **the antecedent of conditionals** that 'stress the conditionality' (vii), the only verum effect is prosodic:

(706) *Your friend has so much work to do and you are 99% sure that he will not finish it today. You are planning to go to Kathmandu together the day after tomorrow. However, you say to your husband/wife:*

khú-i	*lèka*	*tʰìriŋ*	**sìn-dʒoŋ-la**	*tʰèni*	*ŋérok*	*káʈmanḍu*	*ḍò-joŋ*
he-GEN	work	today	finish-CONN-LOC	then	tomorrow	Kathmandu	go-FUT

'*If* he finishes his work today, we will go to Kathmandu tomorrow.' (Verum-Tenzi-64)

And finally, **inside yes-no questions with an 'Is it really?' effect** (viii), only prosody indicates verum. Here one is asking if their interlocutor is really sure that what was said is true:

(707) 'Tashi found some money in the street.'

tʰèba-la	*ʈáʃì-la*	*làm-la*	*ŋúl*	**dʒòr-du-e**
truth-LOC	Tashi-DAT	road-LOC	money	found-PRF.TES-Q

'*Has* Tashi in truth found money in the street?' (Verum-Tenzi-76)

In summary, the verum task after Matthewson and Glougie (2018: §4.2) returned prosodic stress on the verb as the most prominent indicator of verum in Mùwe Ké. Furthermore, the *V-na V* construction is common but only in the correction of previous utterances (i) and also the *-min-duk / -met* construction is found, mostly in the correction of negative expectations (ii). On one occasion only, a relative clause was used for verum emphasis (699). Alongside these constructions, lexical items like *tʰèba-la* 'in truth' help in indicating verum; however, the primary heavy prosodic stress remains on the verb.

A slightly 'freer' task comes in the way of questions on the frog story (Mayer 1969). After telling the story from the wordless picture book, participants were asked questions to elicit from memory the various focus types discussed in this thesis. The questions designed to elicit verum utterances took the form of a kind of true-or-false question, to which participants either agreed or corrected. Here, again, the overarching factor found for the indication of verum is prosodic force on the verb:

(708)

ìn-e	*kí:*	*màn-e*	*kí:*	*dì:*	*kórguŋ*	*nàŋ-ne*	*phí-la*
be.assert-q	or	be.assert.neg-q		dog	this	window	in-abl	outside-loc

mà-ʈʰul-soŋ
neg-fell-pst.tes

'Yes or no? The dog didn't fall outside from the window.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-7)

màn	*kí:*	*dì:*	*kórguŋ*	*nàŋ-ne*	*phí-la*	*ʈʰùl-soŋ*
be.ASSERT.NEG		dog	this	window	in-ABL	outside-LOC	fell-PST.TES

'No. The dog *did* fall outside from the window.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - E Karma-4)

(709)

ìn-e	*kí:*	*màn-e*	*sá-i*	*óʈe*	*nàŋ-ru*	*phúdzi*
be.ASSERT-Q	or	be.ASSERT.NEG-Q	ground-GEN	hole	in-LOC	rat

dì: *mìn-duk*
this   NEG-existed.TES

'Yes or no? The rat wasn't in (a) hole in the ground.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-13)

sá-i	*óʈe*	*nàŋ-du*	*phúdzi*	*dì:*	*dùk*
ground-GEN	hole	in-LOC	rat	this	existed.TES

'The rat *was* in (a) hole in the ground.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Tsering Dorjee-8)

The morphosyntactic indicators of verum from this task are the repetition of the verb string, seen in this first example, in response to 'The dog didn't fall outside from the window' (708), with self-correction that led to the addition of huge amounts of prosodic stress, and also relativisation, seen underlined in the first example:

(710) *ìn*   *kí:*   *phíŋgu-ru*   *mà-ʈʰul*   *ìn*
        be.ASSERT   dog   outside-LOC   NEG-fell   be.ASSERT
        'Yes. The dog didn't fall outside. Yes.'

        kí: *dì:*   *phíŋgu-ru*   *té:-dʒi-ni ...*   <u>*kí:*</u>   <u>*phíŋgu-ru*</u>   <u>*ʈʰùl-ɖul*</u>
        dog   this   outside-LOC   looked-CONN-TOP   dog   outside-LOC   fell-REDUP

        <u>*ìn*</u>   *ʈʰùl-s*   hehe   **ʈʰùl-s**   **ʈʰùl-s**
        be.ASSERT   fell-PST.TES   [laughing]   fell-PST.TES   fell-PST.TES
        'When the dog looked outside… (Oh! It was) the dog that fell outside. (Lit. The dog was the 'faller') (He) *did* fall. Ha ha. (He) *did* fall. (He) *did* fall.'

        kí: *dì:*   *kórguŋ*   *nàŋ-ne*   **ʈʰùl-s**
        dog   this   window   in-ABL   fell-PST.TES
        'The dog *did* fall from window.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Nomɖul-4-6)

(711)

        ìn-e   *kí:*   *màn-e*   *ràŋdzaŋ*   *kí:*   *ʃúl-la*
        be.ASSERT-Q   or   be.ASSERT.NEG-Q   bee   dog   after-loc

        mà-la:-soŋ
        NEG-went-PST.TES
        'Yes or no? The bees didn't go after (chase) the dog.'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa-25)

ràŋdzaŋ	*lá:-s*	*lá:-s*	*lá:-s*
bee	went-PST.TES	went-PST.TES	went-PST.TES

'The bees *did* go, *did* go, *did* go (after the dog).'   (bàlbi súŋ-gi ʈʰìwa - Lama Thinley-15)

Finally, the only truly 'natural' verum utterances in the data come one from a QUIS task and the other from a natural conversation. Task 21 of the QUIS, 'Drama' (Skopeteas et al. 2006: 159), shows a short film involving a stolen watch and then asks the two participants to take over the roles of the suspects. The one utterance that showed verum employed heavy prosodic stress on the verb:

(712) A: *... dʒòla   nàŋ-la   tʃúg-or-om   tʃĭ: tʃhé*

   bag   in-LOC   put.PST-PRF.ASSERT-POSSBL   what   knowledge

   '…maybe you have put (the watch) in (your) bag. What (do I) know?'

   B: *dʒòla   nàŋ-la   ŋà   mà-**kher**-ot*

   bag   in-LOC   I   NEG-took-PRF.ASSERT

   'I have *not* put (the watch) in (my) bag!'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-3.1-91-2)

And the last example here is from a natural conversation where a gentleman was discussing with his lama when to perform a blessing ceremony. In Mùwa culture it would be considered bad luck to perform the ceremony during a *tʰà:nak*, an astrologically 'black month', and so the two were consulting an astrological calendar. At first there was doubt and they thought that during the time they were considering there was not a black month, but the gentleman soon saw that there actually was and said simply and with prosodic force:

(713) *dì: dèna   dè: dèna   tʃĭ: n-a*

   this   here   look.at.this.IMP   here   what   be.ASSERT-Q

   'Look at this here. What is it here?'

   *tʰà:nak   **dùk***

   black.month   exist.TES

   'There *is* a black month.'   (Lama Breakfast-40)

To summarise, expression of verum in Mùwe Ké comes about primarily through prosodic force on the lexical verb as well as repetition of the verb string and the unique *V-na V* construction.

The terms of a verum utterance enjoy freedom of word order and actors are optionally ergative marked.

4.7   Contrast in Mùwe Ké

This section argues that contrast is a grammatically relevant notion in Mùwe Ké, based on discourse relations after Repp (2016) (§3.4). Contrasted items are marked with extra prosodic stress so as to be distinguished from focussed terms and very occasionally relativisation is employed. Like focussed terms, those contrasted are preferred in the preverbal position and ergative marking is found to be obligatory.

Following Repp (2016), discussed in §3.4, this section presents the investigation into the grammatical relevancy of contrast in Mùwe Ké set out by her three hypotheses on the role of contrast in the grammar of a language. F-marked constituents that are candidates for being contrastive are identified with regard to their contrast-related alternative formation after the hypothesis about contrasting constituents (*C-Const*) in (495), the relation of contrast and discourse relations along with potential degrees of contrast is considered after the hypothesis about contrastive discourse relations (*C-DRel*) in (499), and then the two observations about potentially contrastive constituents and discourse relations are taken together to specify the grammatical manifestations of contrast in Mùwe Ké after the hypothesis about the role of contrast in the grammar (*C-Gram*) in (500), answering the following questions on the marking of d_2 in discourses consisting of two discourse segments, d_1 and d_2.

(714)   **Contrast based on type of alternatives**:

    (i)   Is a constituent that is a candidate for being a contrastive constituent in *C-Const* marked differently from non-contrastive constituents?

    (ii)   Is it also marked differently from candidate contrastive constituents in at least one class of *C-Const* (a)-(c) that is different from its own?

    (iii)   Is the constituent marked by the same means for all discourse relations in *C-DRel*?

    Focus:

    (iv)   Does Mùwe Ké mark all the discourse types in *C-DRel* for all contrastive constituent types in *C-Const* by the same means? If so, contrast marking is F-marking and 'contrast' is focus.

Contrast based on discourse relations:

(v) Are the constituents that are candidates for being contrastive constituents in *C-Const* (a)-(c) marked differently when they occur in [OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] or [CORR$_{(ii)}$] in comparison to when they occur in other discourse relations?

Gradable notion:

(vi) Are there differences in the marking of [OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] and [CORR$_{(ii)}$]? If so, contrast is a gradable notion.

From translation, elicitation, picture tasks, plus tasks from the QUIS, it is shown that contrast is a grammatically relevant notion in the grammar of Mùwe Ké based on discourse relations. Each of the non-QUIS tasks were designed to compare the utterance types seen in Table 12 in §3.4, simplified here in Table 22.

	ExplAlt	*ExplAltSet*	*ImplAltSet*
[Q-A$_{(n)}$]	Did [Dolma] hit Tashi? (Yes,) [Dolma] hit Tashi.	Did [Dolma] or [Wangmo] hit Tashi? [Dolma] hit Tashi.	What happened yesterday? [Dolma hit Tashi]. [Who] hit Tashi? [Dolma] hit Tashi.
[SIMILAR$_{(n)}$]	[Wangmo] hit [Khado]. [Dolma] hit [Tashi].		What happened yesterday? [[Wangmo] hit [Khado]. [Dolma] hit [Tashi]]. [Who] hit [whom]? [Wangmo] hit [Khado]. [Dolma] hit [Tashi].
[OPPOSE$_{(i)}$]	[Wangmo] hit [Khado] but [Dolma] hit [Tashi].		
[CORR$_{(ii)}$]	(Did) [Khado] hit Tashi.(/?) (No,) [Dolma] hit Tashi.	Did [Wangmo] and/or [Khado] hit Tashi? (No,) [Dolma] hit Tashi.	[Which boys] hit Tashi? [Dolma] hit Tashi. (Dolma is a female name)

Table 22. Combinations compared, after Repp (2016)

To begin, the following examples show F-marked constituents that are candidates for being **contrastive constituents** (*C-Const*):

(715)   Explicit alternative (*ExplAlt*)

ʈáʃi-gane   ʃáu   dzèː-s   tʰèni   ʃúl-la   [kéla]_F   dzèː-s
Tashi-ERG   apple   ate-PST.TES   then   after-LOC   banana   ate-PST.TES
'Tashi ate an apple. Then (he) ate [a banana]_F.'   (translated)

(716)   Explicit alternative set (*ExplAltSet*)

ɖòlma-gane   ʃáu   tʃík-daŋ   kéla   tʃík   ŋòe-s
dolma-ERG   apple   a-ASSOC   banana   a   bought-PST.TES

mù-i-gane   [[ʃáu]_F   dzèː-s
she-ERG-ERG   apple   ate-PST.TES
'Dolma bought an apple and a banana. She ate [the apple]_F.'   (translated)

(717)   Implicit alternative set (*ImplAltSet*)

ɖòrdʒi-gane   páː   ŋò-ru   phín-s   khú-i-gane   [lòu]_F
Dorjee-ERG   vegetable   buy-LOC   went-PST.TES   he-ERG-ERG   parsnip

ŋòe-s
bought-PST.TES
'Dorjee went to buy vegetables. He bought [parsnips]_F.'   (translated)

These examples address the first two questions in (714): (i) constituents that are candidates for being contrastive **are marked differently** from non-contrastive constituents in that it is reported that the preverbal position is preferred and that when the constituent is an actor, ergative marking is required. This is the pattern found for focus marking in the above sections and differs from all-new utterances in the same way. In (715), for example, in the all-new '*Tashi ate an apple*', actor and undergoer may appear in any order and case marking is optional while in '*Then he ate a banana*', '*banana*' preferably appears preverbally – and indeed the given entity is free to elide. Similarly in an utterance such as '*Jon ate a banana. Then [Daniel]_F ate a banana.*', '*Daniel*' requires ergative marking. Turning to (ii), if we compare (715), (716) and (717), **there is no difference in marking** for each of the candidate contrastive constituents: each prefers preverbal position and requires ergative marking if the constituent is an actor. This is confirmed by the contrast picture tasks outlined in §1.3 as well as the QUIS tasks discussed below.

That is not to say, however, that there is no morphosyntactic difference in marking for the candidate contrastive constituents. As is seen in the literature, however, prosodic stress is (perhaps) the most common marker of contrast in the languages that have been studied. Moreover, when [CORR(ii)] utterances are compared to non-contrastive [Q-A(n)] utterances, a marked difference in prosodic force is immediately apparent to the ear. Therefore, while the focus of this thesis is on morphosyntax, a simple look at prosody is required here and is discussed when relevant.

Turning back to (ii), then, while there is no difference in morphosyntactic marking for each of the candidate contrastive constituents, there was also no marked prosodic difference found in the Praat analyses. From the contrast picture task (§1.3), the F0 and intensity of contrastive constituents in utterances exhibiting correction were compared: *ExplAlt*[CORR(ii)], *ExplAltSet*[CORR(ii)] and *ImplAltSet*[CORR(ii)], i.e. the last row in Table 22. For the same participant during the same elicitation session at a consistent distance from the microphone no trend in either pitch (F0) or intensity was found for the corrective utterances exhibiting each of the contrasting constituent type, as the graphs below show.

The task shows participants pictures and asks them to respond to an utterance, as is seen in the following examples that elicit a correction on the actor for each constituent type:

(718)   *ExplAlt*[CORR(ii)]

   tshámu   tshádʒa   ʈáʃi-gane   túː-s-e
   night   butter.tea Tashi-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q
   'At night did [Tashi] drink butter tea?'

   tshámu   tshádʒa   [kárma-gane]   túː-s
   night   butter.tea Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES
   '[Karma] drank butter tea at night.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 91-2)

(719)   *ExplAltSet*[CORR(ii)]

   tshámu   tshádʒa   tsíriŋ-gane   túː-s-e   kíː   ʈáʃi-gane
   night   butter.tea Tsering-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q or   Tashi-ERG

túː-s-e

drank-PST.TES-Q

'Did [Tsering] or [Tashi] drink butter tea at night?'

[kárma-gane]   túː-s

Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES

'[Karma] drank (it).'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 109-110)

(720)   *ImplAltSet*[CORR(ii)]

tshámu tshádʒa kʰàŋ kérmen-gane túː-s-a

night   butter.tea which woman-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q

'Which woman drank butter tea at night?'

kérmen màn   [kárma-gane] túː-s

woman   be.ASSERT.NEG   Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES

'(It) wasn't a woman. [Karma] drank it.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 53-4)

The three instances of *kárma-gane* were compared, as were the three other actors, seen in the following graphs, and this was repeated for undergoers, adverbials and verbs, the total of which yielded no discernible trend.

Figure 22. Prosodic force of corrected actors for each contrasting constituent type

Accordingly, therefore, contrast is not a grammatically relevant notion in Mùwe Ké based on type of alternative. Furthermore, in answer to (iii), the constituent **is not marked by the same means** for all discourse relations in *C-DRel*, exemplified in the discussion of (v) below. This also means that **contrast is not focus** (iv) in Mùwe Ké since the language does not mark all the discourse types in *C-DRel* for all contrastive constituent types in *C-Const* by the same means.

Moving on to (v), Mùwe Ké constituents that are candidates for being contrastive constituents in *C-Const* (a)-(c) *are* **marked differently** when they occur in [OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] or [CORR$_{(ii)}$] in comparison to when they occur in other discourse relations and this is shown by comparing vertical columns in Table 22, e.g. *ImplAltSet*[Q-A$_{(n)}$] with *ImplAltSet*[CORR$_{(ii)}$]: compare (721) with (720). The immediately apparent difference between the contrast comparisons based on type of alternatives and based on discourse relations is prosodic stress. The simple non-contrastive question/answer pair in (721) places the focussed term in preverbal position with no remarkable prosody although this is where the nuclear stress of the utterance falls. In (720), however, the contrasted term still falls into preverbal position and requires ergative marking but has an obviously higher pitch, a slightly longer duration and a higher intensity compared to the focussed term in (721) and also appears to have a very short pause beforehand. This is quite clear to the ear and is corroborated by Praat analyses.

(721)   *ImplAltSet*[Q-A$_{(n)}$]

       tshámu   tshádʒa   sú-i-gane   tú:-s-a
       night   butter.tea   who-ERG-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q
       'Who drank butter tea at night?'

       tshámu   tshádʒa   [kárma-gane]$_F$ tú:-s
       night   butter.tea   Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES
       '[Karma]$_F$ drank tea at night.'　　　　　　(Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 39-40)

The following graphs show simply a clear trend for the corrected element to be given with a higher pitch and with more intensity. This is found for actors, undergoers, adverbials and verbs with the undergoers of sentences such as 'Tashi broke a cup in the morning' illustrated here as an example:

Figure 23. Comparison of prosodic force of ExplAltSet [Q-A$_{(n)}$] and [CORR$_{(ii)}$] undergoers

[OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] discourses have not yet received systematic testing in the literature (Repp 2016: 280; although see Umbach et al. 2004) and attempts to elicit [OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] utterances to compare with [CORR$_{(ii)}$] in Mùwe Ké did not yield workable results. Therefore, no answer to (vi) on whether contrast is a gradable notion is given in this thesis since no clear evidence may be put forward from the data. Instinctually, I tentatively posit that greater prosodic force is found with [CORR$_{(ii)}$] utterances than with [OPPOSE$_{(i)}$] but further research is required.

The remainder of this section presents data from the QUIS that corroborates the claims made above. Prosodic force, defined simply as an increase in pitch and intensity, is the primary marker of contrastive elements but also the preverbal position is found to be consistently preferred, more often than not due to the fact that ellipsis is found on given elements, ergative marking appears to be required and in a small handful of cases, relativisation is utilised as a means of marking contrast. Relevant QUIS tasks are presented in numerical order.

Task 11 'Anima' allows for the comparison of *ExplAlt* [Q-A$_{(n)}$] and [CORR$_{(ii)}$] by comparing 'confirmative focus' (condition F) and 'corrective focus' (condition R) after Dik's focus classification (Dik et al. 1981: 60; Dik 1997). Participants are shown four pictures at once for 30 seconds and then asked questions in the form of a memory test. The consistent pattern found here is for confirmative focus utterances to place nuclear stress[15] on the verb, which is the

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[15] Nuclear stress is not explicitly discussed in this thesis but is defined as the syllable that carries maximal prosodic prominence in terms of pitch and intensity in an utterance (see Zubizarreta 2016).

primary strategy for confirmations in Mùwe Ké since no word comparative to 'yes' is found in the language, and for the nuclear stress to fall upon the corrected element in a corrective utterance with greater prosodic force. No difference in ergative marking is found; however, no explicit enquiry into optional marking on non-focussed items was made. All non-contrastive given elements, save for the verb, where elided, leaving the contrastive element in preverbal position. In the following examples nuclear stress is shown in **bold**.

(722) *jòekhaŋ   nàŋ-du   sòegu   dì: pʰìza   tʃĩk   túp-gi-du-e*
       kitchen   in-LOC   pumpkin   this   son   a   cut-IPFV-TES-Q
       'In the kitchen, is a boy is cutting the pumpkin?'

       *jòekhaŋ   nàŋ-du   sòegu   dì: pʰìza   tʃĩk   **túp**-gi*
       kitchen   in-LOC   pumpkin   this   son   a   cut-IPFV
       '(Yes.) In the kitchen, a boy is cutting the pumpkin.'   (QUIS-3.1-133)

(723) *jòekhaŋ   nàŋ-du   sòegu   dì: pʰòŋ   tʃĩk   túp-gi-du-e*
       kitchen   in-LOC   pumpkin   this   daughter   a   cut-IPFV-TES-Q
       'In the kitchen, is a girl is cutting the pumpkin?'

       *[pʰì**za**]   tʃĩk   túp-gi*
       son   a   cut-IPFV
       '(No.) [A boy] is cutting (the pumpkin).'   (QUIS-1.2-136)

In task 14 'Properties' *ExplAlt* [Q-A(n)] and [CORR(ii)] may also be compared in specific parts of NP constituents. With the use of a picture and an entailing question confirmative and corrective utterances are elicited for either a possessum 'the boy's [trousers]' or possessor 'the [boy's] trousers', a referent 'the black [spade]' or property 'the [black] spade'. Since NP word order for these constructions in Mùwe Ké may not be changed the only indicator of a correction taking place is the placement of nuclear stress with greater prosodic force. As in the previous task, confirmation is given with nuclear stress on the verb, which may be the only element in the utterance.

(724)   *dʒùdʒuŋ*   *dì:*   *pʰòŋ-gi*   **_gò_**   *tá:-ru*   *tʃhá:-du-e*

little.bird   this   daughter-GEN   head   on-LOC   landed-PRF.TES-Q

'Has the bird landed on the girl's [head]?'

tʃhá:-duk

landed-PRF.TES

'(Yes.) (It) has landed (on the girl's head).'   (QUIS-4.3-87)

(725)   *dʒùdʒuŋ*   *dì:*   *pʰòŋ-gi*   **_rèto-gi_**   *tá:-ru*   *tʃhá:-du-e*

little.bird   this   daughter-GEN   shoulder-GEN   on-LOC   landed-PRF.TES

'Has the bird landed on the girl's [shoulder]?'

dʒùdʒuŋ   *dì:*   *pʰòŋ-gi*   **_gò-i_**   *tá:-ru*   *tʃhá:-duk*

little.bird   this   daughter-GEN   head-GEN   on-LOC   landed-PRF.TES

'(No.) The bird has landed on the girl's [head].'   (QUIS-3.1-91)

(726)   *ráruk*   *dì:*   *kér**men**-gi*   *làkpa*   *dzùŋ-gi-du-e*

child   this   woman-GEN   hand   hold-IPFV-TES-Q

'Is the child holding the [woman's] hand?'

dzùŋ-duk

held-PRF.TES

'(Yes.) (The child) has held (the woman's hand).'   (QUIS-1.2-137)

(727) *ráruk dì: kér**kjal**-gi làkpa dzùŋ-gi-du-e*
      child this man-GEN hand hold-IPFV-TES-Q
      'Is the child holding the [man's] hand?'

      *kér**men** làkpa dzùŋ-duk*
      woman hand held-PRF.TES
      '(No.) (He) has held the [woman]('s) hand.'   (QUIS-4.3-75)

In the last two examples, the prominent stress is found on the second syllable of *kérmen* 'woman' and *kérkjal* 'man' since the two are not distinguishable from the identical first syllable.

Task 16 'Tell a Story' induces expressions of contrast by showing participants pairs of short films or picture series with small differences between the two. This provides perfect conditions for eliciting *ExplAlt*[OPPOSE(i)] utterances, for which preverbal position is preferred, ergative marking appears to be required since it is found on each and every actor and strong nuclear-stress falls on the contrasted constituent:

(728) A: *kérkjal ìgi ṭó-gen ŋí: tʃá: tʃʰè:-s-e*
         man letter(mail) read-NMLS two INTENS did-PST.TES-Q
         'Did the two men reading do anything?'

      B: *ŋè-i nàŋ ìgi ṭó-gen ŋí: dùk àŋ*
         I-GEN in letter(mail) read-NMLS two existed.TES even

         mìn-duk tʃík-ga: tʃík dùk
         NEG-existed.TES one-SPEC a existed.TES
         'In my (film) there wasn't even two book readers. There was [only one].'

      A: *tʃík-ga: tʃík dù-e ŋè-i nàŋ **ŋí:** dùk*
         one-SPEC a existed-Q I-GEN in two existed.TES
         'There was only one? In my (film) there was [two].'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-15-17)

(729) *tʰàŋ-ma támu-la kérgjal-gane tʃhúdzo kúi-soŋ*
      first-NMLS movie-LOC man-ERG watch stole-PST.TES
      'In the first film, the man stole the watch.'

ʃá-ma	*támu-la*	*kér**men**-gane*	*tshúdzo*	*kúi-s*
next-NMLS	movie-LOC	woman-ERG	watch	stole-PST.TES

'In the next film, the [woman] stole the watch.' (QUIS-1.2-155)

In task 17 'focus Cards' questions are asked about people and their possessions from pictures to elicit a variety of focus structures, again after Dik et al. (1981). *ExplAlt* [Q-A(n)] and [CORR(ii)] may be compared from the question types labelled 'affirmation' and 'rejection', respectively. For utterances that affirm (730), nuclear stress is found on the verb while for utterances that reject and correct (731), nuclear stress is found on the corrected constituent with an obvious increase in prosodic force that is clearly visible in Praat:

(730)

lòbsaŋ-la	*kí:*	*dù-e*
Lobsang-DAT	dog	exist.TES-Q

'Does Lobsang have a dog?'

lòbsaŋ-la	*kí:*	***dùk***
Lobsang-DAT	dog	exist.TES

'(Yes.) Lobsang has a dog.' (QUIS-2.1-19)

(731)

ùrgen-la   pʰè: dù-e

Urgen-DAT   cat   exist.TES-Q

'Does Urgen have a cat?'

ùrgen-la   **kí:**   dùk

Urgen-DAT   dog   exist.TES

'(No.) Urgen has a [dog].'   (QUIS-4.3-217)

Interestingly, the task also allows the above to be compared to *ExplAlt* [SIMILAR(n)] and [OPPOSE(i)] utterances, given in the task as 'contrast' questions. Participants are asked 'Describe what you see,' which elicits an all-new utterance that may be either non-contrastive (SIMILAR) or contrastive (OPPOSE) depending on how the speaker chooses to view the situation. I put forward that the difference between the two is that nuclear stress is put upon the contrastive constituents with extra prosodic force to create an [OPPOSE(i)] utterance (733) while any extra prosodic force is notably absent in a [SIMILAR(n)] utterance (732). The two are clearly distinguishable in Praat.

(732)

lòbsaŋ-gi	*tá:-na*	*mórtsa*	*màrbu*	*dùk*	*hlámu-gi*	*tá:-na*
Lobsang-GEN	on-LOC	chili	red	exist.TES	Lhamo-GEN	on-LOC

mórtsa	*ŋóbu*[16]	*dùk*
chili	blue	exist.TES

'There is a red chili above Lobsang[17]. There is a green chili above Lhamo.'

<div align="right">(QUIS-1.2-19)</div>

(733)

ŋìma-gi	*gò-la*	**sà**	*ìn-om*	*tʃɪk*	*dùk*
Nyima-GEN	head-LOC	nettle	be.ASSERT-POSSBL	a	exist.TES

hlámo-gi	*gò-la*	**ká**ra	*dùk*
Lhamo-GEN	head-LOC	candy	exist.TES

'There is a [nettle] maybe on Nyima's head (but) there is a [sweet] on Lhamo's head.'

<div align="right">(QUIS-1.2-19)</div>

Task 20 'Map Task' yields *ExplAlt* [OPPOSE(i)] utterances from 2 participants, who are each given a map with one directing the other from a start point to finish. The maps exhibit some discrepancies which elicit contrastive utterances that exhibit nuclear stress with extra prosodic force on the contrastive constituent:

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[16] In Mùwe Ké, green vegetables such as green chili or capsicum are described as blue.

[17] While it is described to participants that an object in a person's box is a possession, much of the time spatial descriptions are given instead. See also example (733).

(734)

A: *tʰèni   kháŋba   màrbu-ne   mì: tʃĭk   lá:-la-a   mìn-du-e*
then   house   red-ABL   person   a   stood-REDUP-NMLS   NEG-exist.TES-Q
'Then from the red house, isn't there a person standing?'

B: *kérmen   dù-e*
woman   exist.TES-Q
'Is there a woman?'

A: *kér**gjal**   dùk*
man   exist.TES
'There is a man.'

B: *ŋè-i   dè-na   kér**men**   dùk*
I-GEN   here-LOC   woman   exist.TES
'In my (map) here, there is a [woman].'   (QUIS-TwoInfs-1.2-78)

Finally, task 21 'Drama' elicits *ExplAlt* [CORR(ii)] contrast on actors accused of stealing a watch. Two participants watch a short film in which a watch is stolen and then either play the roles of the suspects or their lawyers in order to elicit 'No, *you* stole it'-type utterances in first and third person. Prosodic force is the primary indicator of contrast, ergative marking appears to be required, the preverbal position is preferred, due mostly to ellipsis on the given elements, and relativisation (§2.5.5) is also employed with the feeling that it gives 'more weight' to the contrastive correction.

(735)   *ŋè-i   mì:-gane   tʃhúdzo   khér-ger   màn   **khjú**-i*
I-GEN   person-ERG   watch   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT.NEG   you.sg-GEN

mìː-gane   *tʃhúdzo* *khér-ger*   *dàk*

person-ERG   watch   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT

'My person is not the one who took the watch. [Your] person is the one that took

the watch'

(736) A: *tʃhúdzo* *ò-gen-na*   *ŋà* *thóŋ-dʒi* *ìn*   *tʃhúdzo*

watch   exist.ASSERT-NMLS-CONN   I   see-FUT   be.ASSERT   watch

mìn-duk   **khjú**-*i-gane*   *khér-ger*   *dàk*

NEG-existed.TES   you.SG-ERG-ERG   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT

'If there was a watch (there), I would have seen it. There wasn't a watch

(there). [You] are the one that took the watch.'

B: *màn*   *tʃhúdzo tʰàŋ-la*   **mù**-*i-gane* *kúi* *khér-ger*   *dàk*

be.ASSERT.NEG watch   before-LOC she-ERG-ERG stole took-REDUP be.ASSERT

(Addressing researcher) 'No! [She] was the one who stole the watch before.'

A: **khú**-*i-gane*   *kúi*   *khér-ger*   *dàk*

he-ERG-ERG   stole   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT

'[He] is the one that stole (it).'

B: **mù**-*i-gane*   *kúi*   *khér-ger*   *dàk*

she-ERG-ERG   stole   took-REDUP   be.ASSERT

'[She] is the one that stole (it).'

This second example was a rather lively and amusing exchange between a tweenage brother and sister that went on *ad infinitum*.

Contrasted items, like those focussed, follow the pattern of preferring the preverbal position and requiring ergative marking on actors but may be distinguished through prosodic force.

4.8 Summary

A summary of the patterns found in regard to word order and DEM in this section is seen in Table 23, which appears to show a rather neat division. The preference of immediately **preverbal** position and **obligatory** requirement of ergative marking apply to items singled out

for term focus, included in predicate focus and in contrast to a previous discourse segment. The **freedom** of word order and **optionality** of ergative marking apply to all-new sentence focus and *-min-duk / -met* constructions as well as so-called verum utterances.

Word order	Preverbal	Term focus Predicate-focus terms Contrasted items
	Free	Sentence focus *-min-duk* constructions Verum
Ergative marking	Obligatory	Term-focussed actors Predicate-focus actors Contrasted actors
	Optional	Sentence focus *-min-duk* constructions Verum

Table 23. Focus structures found in Mùwe Ké

This table demonstrates that there is a preference/requirement for focussed terms which is not found on those outside of a focus domain or in thetic/sentence-focus utterances.

Further to word order and differential actor marking, other IS reflexes presented were prosodic stress, which was examined in relation to verum and contrast, plus the repetition of the verb string and the *V-na V* construction, used to express verum.

What conclusions may be drawn here? Put simply, research was conducted on a previously undescribed language, the majority of which was the undertaking of the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006). The goal of the research was to discover how the IS notion of focus, defined as indicating the presence of alternatives and taken at face value to certainly exist, was expressed in the language. The findings show that focus can be expressed through a dedicated immediately preverbal sentence position and DEM on actor terms. This researcher took the preformulated universal category of focus without question, explored its expression in Mùwe Ké and attempted to feed the findings back into the taken-as-read definition of focus. Should the reader be looking for a conclusion based on this methodology, then a preverbal position and DEM will suffice: preverbal position is preferred for term focus, terms that form part of predicate focus and contrastive terms/constituents; word order is 'free' in sentence-focus and verum-focus utterances since the utterance is 'all-new' in the former and 'focus' falls on the verb in the latter; and, following the same pattern, ergative marking is required on actors in

term and predicate focus as well as on contrastive terms/constituents but is optional in sentence or verum focus utterances.

However, there is no clear demonstrable one-to-one correlation between DAM, sentence position and focus and for some of the focus structures, with reference to the preverbal focus position for example, it is only possible to talk about preferences rather than requirements, which in itself suggests that something else is occurring. This logically leads to the question of whether the data and descriptive results necessarily require the category of focus in the first place.

In fact, the very notion of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category has been seriously questioned since Matić and Wedgwood's (2013) seminal paper addressing the issue, which has serious ramifications for any conclusions that may be put forward from a chapter that claims to provide a description of focus structure in any language. Furthermore, Ozerov (2018) argues that the methodology described above is circular and majorly problematic. This is the starting point for the next chapter, which looks at the really rather entrenched problems found with the study of focus and IS and goes on to suggest that the patterns seen in Table 23 should be analysed through the lens of Langacker's (2008 inter alia) Cognitive Grammar to give a clearer overall picture.

5

An Alternative Approach to Focus

Chapter 4 presented focus structures in Mùwe Ké with focus manifesting in the language through a preferred immediately preverbal position and obligatory ergative *-gane*[18] marking on actors for focussed terms included in the domains of term (§4.4) and predicate (§4.3) focus as well as items that contrast (§4.7) with an element in a previous utterance. Word order was found to be free and ergative marking optional for elements included in sentence (§4.5) (including *-min-duk* §4.5.3) and verum (§4.6) focus utterances. Data was collected largely from the QUIS (Skopeteas et al. 2006) (§1.3) and focus as indicating the presence of alternatives (§3.2), taken without question to represent a stable cross-linguistic category, was investigated with the intention of finding the available morphosyntactic strategies that encode and manifest focus in the language.

The notion of focus as a stable category has, however, been the subject of much debate and the methods of its investigation in language have been called into question, starting with Matić and Wedgewood's (2013) paper that addresses the notion. This is the starting point for this analytical section, which in §5.1 looks at the problems that have been associated with the study of IS, focus, contrast and verum after three papers from Matić, Wedgwood, Nikolaeva, and Ozerov (Matić & Wedgwood 2013; Matić & Nikolaeva 2018; Ozerov 2018). The three papers' conclusions and suggestions for a better understanding of and approach to IS phenomena benefit greatly when married with the tools available from Langacker's framework of Cognitive Grammar, presented in §5.2, and the two are discussed together in §5.3, where highlighted problems are discussed alongside Cognitive Grammar so as to better explore the IS effects in Mùwe Ké presented above in §4. §6, therefore, analyses the use of *-gane*, word ordering, verum and contrast in turn through the lens of Cognitive Grammar and following the

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[18] For the remainder of this thesis, only '*-gane*' marking is discussed for brevity and refers to all variants of the Ergative: *-((g)i)-gadi:* and *–((g)i)-gane* (see §2.2.7.2).

suggestions presented in the three papers. Conclusions are given in §6.5, where the research questions outlined in §1.1 are also addressed.

5.1 Highlighted Issues with the Study of Information Structure

This section presents problems associated with approaches to IS and the notion of focus, in particular, after three papers from Matić, Wedgwood, Nikolaeva, and Ozerov (Matić & Wedgwood 2013; Matić & Nikolaeva 2018; Ozerov 2018). §5.1.1 begins with Matić and Wedgwood's (2013) paper questioning the very idea of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category that is simply manifested in different languages though different structural means. They address the notion of focus as alternatives (discussed in §3.2) and contrast as a kind of special focus (§3.4) and demonstrate that these conceptions are theoretically and empirically unsustainable. Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) further this argument by looking at previous analyses of verum focus (§3.3.4) that lump identified linguistic structures into a category assuming the association of the category with a discrete denotation that is factored by the appropriate grammatical structure. Their alternate interpretational account looks instead at *salient polarity* and the meanings that interlocutors arrive at through inference while attempting to draw attention towards a proposition's truth value. §5.1.2 presents Ozerov's (2018) paper, which puts forward a framework, following the advocation from the previous two papers, of a bottom-up approach that analyses heterogeneous devices used to create dynamic and interactional structuring of information found in natural discourse. The framework takes IS phenomena as epiphenomenal effects of disparate linguistic devices, that are related to an array of intersubjective and interactional discourse-structuring aspects of language and communication.

The three papers and the shortcomings of previous approaches to IS highlighted within are discussed in turn along with their conclusions and suggestions for a better understanding of and approach to IS phenomena, summarised in §5.1.3.

5.1.1 The Status of Focus as a Cross-Linguistic Category

That which constitutes a grammatical category, either language-specific or suitable for cross-linguistic comparison and therefore universal, has been the subject of many an intense debate (see Newmeyer 2007; Evans & Levinson 2009; Nevins et al. 2009; Rijkhoff 2009; Haspelmath

2010; Plank 2016 (ed.) inter alia. Haspelmath (2010: 663) argues the need to carefully distinguish between descriptive categories of particular languages and comparative concepts that may be used for cross-linguistic comparison since descriptive formal categories are not able to be likened across languages due to the criteria for the assignment of a category being different in each language. This well-established insight is known as CATEGORICAL PARTICULARISM and may be compared to CATEGORICAL UNIVERSALISM, which assumes a large set of universal cross-linguistic categories – noun, adjective, future, subject, etc. – from which a language selects and which may be employed for description/analysis as well as comparison. These two positions largely represent the two sides of the debate.

Matić and Wedgewood's (2013) paper questions the idea of focus being a stable cross-linguistic category that is sure to be 'realised' universally through varying structural means, such as the ergative marking or immediately preverbal position presented here in §4. They argue against this traditional conception of focus, demonstrating it to be theoretically and empirically unsustainable while identifying the roots of apparent misconceptions and put forward the idea that focus should instead be used as a heuristic tool to recognise how languages employ certain structural patterns, through rather diverse mechanisms, to produce related pragmatic effects.

Any cross-linguistic category that intends to describe language needs to comply with three conditions (Matić & Wedgwood 2013: 134–5): the facilitation of identifying meaningful points of comparison, the unification of phenomena found in different languages at a level of abstraction without the imposition of unwarranted uniformity at unfitting levels which may contradict factual data, and to have a power of explanation that allows for the interpretation of the possible variations found across languages. It is put forward that the common invocation of the category of focus in the literature falls rather short of the postulated requirements.

Reasons for this shortcoming include poor definitions of focus in much of the work, introduced all too vaguely or assumed to be already familiar or self-explanatory; taking focus outwardly as a putatively primitive notion that may be applied to cross-linguistic analysis when observing more than one structure with a relation to new or old information, which looks only at the effects of interpreting such structures – focus effects are naturally connected to context, speech acts or interpersonal meanings, i.e. language *use*, leaving aside whether or not focus is indeed a *part* of grammar; and, as a general point, the fact that the positing of a focus category necessarily employs the same vocabulary in the definition of a basic theoretical entity and in

the description of superficial effects alike – a point exemplified intentionally simplistically with a primitive category of the colour green in the analysis of natural organisms, such as plant leaves and algae, and their interrelations (Matić & Wedgwood 2013: 136).

When the sheer diversity of linguistic phenomena related to the notion of focus is examined, it is argued that no one unified notion is sufficient to capture it all (Matić & Wedgwood 2013: 137). The exemplification responds to the notion that an underlying focus primitive is simply realised differently in different languages, refuting the idea that if varying structures are found in language through, for example, the new item in answer to a wh- question or the displaying of alternatives, then the structures necessarily belong to a focus class of entities. The examples that Matić and Wedgwood show (in their §3), however, give *prima facie* evidence to the contrary stance that these focus interpretations, although overlapping in superficial effects, show not only variation but are very different in the ways that they may be arrived at.

Examples are taken from Hungarian, English, Somali, Quechua, Aghem and Tura, which have all been shown in the literature to relate to a universal category of focus through the common diagnostic tests of question/answer pairs, where the answers are either to explicit questions or some kind of implicit question-under-discussion (§3.2.2), and it is argued that, given closer inspection, the structures differ significantly from both each other and other supposed focus structures.

English focal pitch accenting, said to simply express new information, is compared to Hungarian focus movement, which exhibits an inherent contrastive force. Following the Q/A criterion, each of these examples are taken to instantiate focus through their differing strategies:

(737)   [Who did John invite?]

   (a) Jon invited [MARY]FOCUS.

   (b) János   [Marit]FOCUS   hívta   meg.
       John   Mary   called   PTCL
       'It was Mary (and no other contextually relevant person) who John invited.'

Answers to the same question in the two languages, though, do not simply show focus through prosody in English and through syntax in Hungarian, as the immediately preverbal position in

the latter additionally encodes contrast and exhaustivity, not conveyed in the English accenting, which is a rather significant distinction.

Further examples include the Somali morpheme *baa*, which appears to accompany a term-focussed item in a Q/A test as well as some kind of contrast. However, when texts are examined in addition to standard focus tests, the focussing potentials of *baa* appear to be on top of a realis mood-marking function related to assertion and the speaker's commitment to the truth of the utterance, properties which would never present themselves through standard testing. Similarly, the Quechuan morpheme *-mi/-n* attaches to term-focussed items but is also part of the evidential system and its use as a direct evidential or focus marker depends on pragmatic factors, leaving focus in the language as a plausible reading of the evidential in a comparable way to Somali focus being an effect of realis mood application. The Bantu language of Aghem has specialised encodings for corrective focus, corrective polarity focus and exhaustive listings, distributing focus in the language along parameters which are completely underspecified in the unitary English system. The examples given for Aghem and subsequently Tura, an Eastern Mande language spoken on the Ivory Coast, which exhibits two basic focus types alongside a neutral structure, that do not correspond to any subdivision of focus meaning found elsewhere, show the extent of how what is readily labelled focus may be subdivided in sometimes highly idiosyncratic ways.

This seemingly limitless catalogue of foci is dealt with in the literature by what Matić and Wedgwood refer to as the 'splitting strategy' (2013: 143, §4). It is commonly assumed that there exists a basic division in languages between an ordinary focus and one that is contrastive in some way (see §3.4 for contrast) and that either the ordinary or both kinds may feature in a single language. This split is taken to account for the behavioural differences outlined in the last paragraph; however, it is demonstrated that considering two types of focus does little when it comes to the data and that the approach contains substantial conceptual problems, further supporting the argument that while there is no lack of detail in these definitions, the crucial problem lies in considering focus an essential category to begin with.

Moving from dividing a universal category of focus in order to account for its varying manifestations, Matić and Wedgwood examine the opposite strategy found in the literature: increasing the generality of the category through reduction of necessary attributes, i.e. the use of a single defining feature to identify and explain attributes in an attempt to capture the very essence of focus phenomena. They discuss Rooth's (1992; 1996) influential Alternative

Semantics (§3.2.2), which attributes the meaning of focus to the invocation of alternatives, and the Structured Meanings framework (Jacobs 1983; von Stechow 1991; Krifka 2001), which isolates focus in an utterance through lambda abstraction. Both applications create set denotations as the background to a focus, the former with a set of propositions and the latter with some form of predicate denotation. While no argument is given counter to alternatives being intrinsically connected to focussing, Matić and Wedgwood (2013: 154) put forward the rather convincing and seemingly simple argument that it is possible to model focus with alternatives because alternatives cannot be separated from the notion of assertion, which is quite possibly the reason communication exists and almost certainly its primary goal.

An assertion addresses a live issue, which may be resolved in varying ways, making the existence of alternatives fundamental to the relevance of an assertion. The Roothian strategy fits so well into trying to account for focussing because it relates to a broader higher-level aspect of communication; however, it fails to single out a narrow natural class of phenomena that is attributable to an underlying grammatical entity. It looks only at the effects of interpretive processes but not at their nature while relying on a sole characterisation of the effects and therefore concentrating only on the subset of interpretive effects given by this characterisation. The analogy given is accounting for the night sky constellations on a two-dimensional canvas because of the limits of human vision. If we characterise linguistic phenomena through effects on representations of denotational meaning, we will inevitably infer the unification of a range of phenomena simply because they all invoke alternatives. The underlying diversity, which should be of primary importance when describing language or languages, is therefore obscured and left unaccounted for. Preferable is the investigation into specific 'focal' morphemes, markers, syntax, prosody, and the understanding of why they have overlapping effects, most likely rooted in cognitive mechanisms.

While focus may certainly not constitute a category, the pragmatic effects associated with focus remain interesting and merit investigation. Matić and Wedgwood argue that if focus is taken simply as a "heuristic tool" (2013: 158), newness, contrast, exhaustivity and so on can assist in language-internal analysis and help to identify meaningful points of comparison across language. Important insights into language may be sourced from such a comparative tool, delimiting "The phenomenological field of contexts and structures that are in one way or another connected with information update and the speech acts based on it," (2013: 159). An open-ended comparative tool allows for the "identification of relevant grammatical categories

within languages," while leaving the "semantic and formal characterisation of these categories open," (2013: 159). Languages are best unified in "deeper and often dynamic terms – in processes of computation at various levels, and via constraints on developmental trajectories," (2013: 159). This argument is returned to in §5.2.

Following from the idea that an IS notion like focus is not a linguistic category but rather an inferentially derived interpretation that has no place in grammar, **Matić and Nikolaeva** (2018) further the argument by looking at polarity focus (up to this point referred to as verum focus in this thesis: see §3.3.4), although adopting instead the label *salient polarity*. They put forward that previous analyses of verum focus or salient polarity, as in the study of 'general' focus discussed above, identify linguistic structures and lump them into a 'category'. The analyses assume the association of the category with a discrete denotation which is factored by the appropriate grammatical structure; this is the denotational approach. Matić and Nikolaeva's much more tangible account can be called interpretational, in the sense of meanings that interlocutors arrive at through inference, and seeks to understand salient polarity as an interpretive effect of a speaker attempting to draw a hearer's attention to a proposition's truth value. The effect may be achieved through varying inferential mechanisms for differing communicative reasons, which may be derived from entirely unrelated denotations. Salient polarity, therefore, may be thought of as not corresponding to a category that pairs linguistic forms and denotation, but rather as a "fuzzy set of family resemblances unified by shared communicative intentions," (2018: 4).

The standard identification procedure for salient polarity found in the literature usually associates the purported category with some kind of prosodic pattern, such as accent on the auxiliary verb in English – *No, he DID crash the car* – but, more widely, simply on the finite verb. Accented verbs are then put into the category of salient polarity because they pass Q/A diagnostics. As with all things information-structural, there is a far-reaching variety of diverse structures found in language that are said to encode salient polarity. Aside from prosody, examples include expression through particles, adverbials, morphology, constructions and word order (see Matić & Nikolaeva 2018: 6–9 for examples). Numerous distinct structures being assigned identical denotations is simply untenable but the question remains as to whether they may be part of the same grammatical category, founded on form-meaning correspondence.

The denotational approach has at its core reductionist strategies to account for this diversity and keep the category of salient focus small and semantically monolithic (Matić & Nikolaeva

2018: 10). Canonical categorial semantics are established based on those which are considered the most central cases; further more-complex denotations can be derived if necessary through compositional procedures that combine the denotations of their constituent expressions. The accounts of Lohnstein (2012; 2016) and Gutzmann (2012; Gutzmann & Castroviejo Miró 2011; Gutzmann et al. 2017), discussed in §3.3.4, rely on just this strategy, the former an example of a focus-based account and the latter an epistemic account (after Gutzmann 2012).

Focus-based accounts are the most prevalent in the literature and theorise about salient polarity through the notion of focus. Accounts such as Lohnstein's (2012; 2016) (see also §3.3.4 for a list of contributions) do just that, indicating alternatives and then asserting a proposition taken from the relevant set. Since polarity is binary, the alternative is p or $\neg p$; however, what is focussed exactly is not clear since polarity is to be recognised as a semantic entity with a stated denotation. Nevertheless, this is not the common representation of polarity; Lohnstein, for example, uses other sentence mood operators to derive polarity effects.

Focus is established through standard Q/A tests, essentially putting forward that only accented (finite) verbs are exponents of salient polarity. If a structure fails the test or has an alternate interpretation, then it is not part of the category or else requires additional explanation (Matić & Nikolaeva 2018: 12). Lohnstein's (2016) verum category, which is realised through accented verbs, auxiliaries, and functional elements such as complementisers and relative and interrogative pronouns, follows this line of thought while omitting other structures and this appears to work perfectly well for German.

Gutzmann's (2012) Lexical Operator Theory separates polarity focus from IS and assigns it with epistemic and/or conversational meaning. As discussed in §3.3.4, focus effects of salient polarity are considered epiphenomenal and derived secondarily from the primary denotation of relevant structures, defined as a type of conversational operator (Matić & Nikolaeva 2018: 14). As with focus-based accounts, salient polarity is linked with one well-defined denotation.

Matić and Nikolaeva (2018: §2.2) argue against this isomorphic form-meaning correspondence and show evidence that reducing salient polarity to prosodic accentuation of finite verbs is invalid both empirically and conceptually. The demonstrations are threefold. First, accentuation rules affect differing verbs in differing ways and therefore combining covert operators with focus-to-accent rules does not explain accented finite verbs. Second, although accented verbs may be the unmarked option, diagnostic Q/A meaning may be expressed

through other strategies, forms and constructions in one and the same language. Third, accented finite verbs are found in other types of contexts and express a variety of other meanings. Therefore, there is no orderly correlation between (left-peripheral) accenting and salient polarity interpretations; accenting comes about through independent rules linked only indirectly to the evocation of alternatives that are opened by the context. It could then be argued that we need ever more elaborate analyses to explain the focus-accent connection or, as is becoming increasingly obvious, we could agree that there is no valid cross-linguistic salient polarity category that may be assumed on the basis of form-meaning correspondence.

Matić and Nikolaeva's proposal (2018: §3) does just that and puts forward an analysis of accented verb strategies that claims that many more of their interpretations come about via non-compositional enrichment affixed atop productively driveable meanings, which are then conventionalised to varying degrees in a language. They exemplify sets of interpretive effects that are relevant for other structures associated with salient polarity and put forward that if the contexts of their use are viewed in their entirety, semantic and pragmatic disparity turns out to be patently clear. They demonstrate and illustrate how source denotations that are employed to make polarity salient vary greatly and conclude that salient polarity may only be proposed to be a semantic entity in terms of the interpretive effects that come about when normally dissimilar linguistic structures are constructed for the purpose of communication.

The notion of focus is disposed of altogether and rules of deaccentuation are employed to describe accent assignment. The proposal follows the uncontroversial observation of salient polarity clauses being all-given (§3.1.2) and must, therefore, be present in the shared cognitive model of all interlocutors but not in the CG, since the proposition at issue lacks a truth value before the assertion added by salient polarity. As this fails to fit neatly into accounts of focussing based on the notion of CG, an extra concept of Common Propositional Space is introduced, which may be thought of as a set of propositions which interlocutors are aware of but to which no commitment as to truth value has been made. Deaccentuation signals that all material is given and the grammar of a specific language (not the focus) places nuclear stress, which is usually interpreted as salient polarity but may also point to TAM features, intensifying an assertion and other meanings. The presence of a salient polarity structure, then, is dependent on communicative requirements as discourse unfolds, on speakers' assumptions about their interlocutor's knowledge state as well as the specific intentions and psychological state of the speaker (Matić & Nikolaeva 2018: 34).

Processes like deaccentuation and focus-to-accent that are behind accented finite verbs result in underspecified structure, which is subject to interpretations that are pragmatically conditioned. Salient polarity, TAM and verb focus, intensification etc. all come about through processes in communication that are interpretive. Interpretive meanings differ greatly cross-linguistically and Matić and Nikolaeva put forward that this is due to differing interpretive conventionalisations (2018: §3.2): pragmatic inferences that are commonly connected to linguistic forms if certain conditions are met, which, although not entirely regular and certainly capable of being annulled, are conventional. The interaction between conventionalisations and the underspecified denotations and pragmatic inferences discussed above, allows for an account of the range of variation found in and across languages.

Matić and Nikolaeva "treat information-structural patterns as outcomes of multiple interacting factors within specific linguistic systems, namely, as recurrent types of interpretations which come about in an interplay of speaker's intentions, contextual cues and linguistic forms," (2018: 56). With such huge variation found in and across languages with reference to salient polarity, the only plausible common denominator "is the direct or indirect connection to the communicative intention of the speaker to draw hearer's attention to the polarity of the conveyed proposition since, for one or another reason, the relationship of the proposition to the reference world or Common Propositional Space is at issue," and salient polarity may be understood as "a (possibly universal) type of communicative intention manifested through a number of interpretative effects. As such it has no place in grammar, and can only be analysed as a category if we assume that cross-linguistic categories can be entirely interpretation-based," (2018: 57). The communicative intent of drawing a hearer's attention to a proposition's polarity may stem from processes like negation, givenness, existential or epistemic denotations, the partitioning of Common Propositional Space as well as persuasive intension, although there may be many other ways that salient polarity may be derived cross-linguistically, and this merits language-specific and typological investigation looking, however, at processes rather than things. "The strategy therefore is not to search for the 'right' denotational properties of the purported category, but rather to show how source denotations interact with recurrent inferential mechanisms, variable contextual conditions and patterns of conventionalisation, and to investigate the common cognitive basis of this interaction," (2018: 58).

5.1.2 A Dynamic Approach to Information Structure

The downfall of the universals-driven approach to IS, which proposes categories based on presumed features of communication, looks for how these are expressed across language, and accounts for variations with modified categories, leaves the question of where to go next. Matić and Wedgwood (2013) and Matić and Nikolaeva (2018), among others, both advocate a bottom-up approach that analyses heterogeneous devices used to create dynamic and interactional structuring of information found in natural discourse and, taking up the torch, **Ozerov** (2018) proposes a research programme that does just that (2018: 78). His framework takes information-structural phenomena as epiphenomenal effects of disparate linguistic devices, which are directly related to a wide array of primarily intersubjective but also interactional and discourse-structuring aspects of language and communication. This proposed alternative to the study of IS shows how diverse linguistic categories, that have no immediate connection to IS, bring about effects that merely echo certain features of IS.

The task is, therefore, to investigate what is directly expressed and then how indirect interpretations arise, thus breaking the traditional circular methodology (Ozerov 2018: 84). The first stage of analysis is to identify the function of a specific linguistic device, like word-order variation or so-called focus markers, based on a form-function correspondence accounting for the device's full distribution in all attested contexts. It is only after this has been achieved that attempts may be made as to the explanation of the effects that a linguistic device produces in contexts and tasks related to IS through the interaction of context with the device's primitive function. Diverse categories are sure to present themselves and these will need to be defined and analysed as to how they may jointly trigger effects during the processes of interactional management of information.

It is certainly possible that cognitive or discourse concepts such as the processes traditionally connected to IS categories are expressed directly in a language through specially designated means (Ozerov 2018: 84). Such concepts would produce effects that may be compared to those of topic and focus; however, in such cases their analysis would zero in on a specific narrow function. A fine-grained study of such linguistic devices would be able to show precise categories related to attention, cognition and interaction that have an immediate role in communicating and are directly represented in language. Further generalisations of such analyses will produce a thorough account of both interactional and cognitive information management principles as well as discourse processing.

Precious few academic studies have explored a device like an information-structural marker in terms of its semantic meaning and overall function, or asked if the information-structure role occurs directly or merely as a pragmatic interpretation of a somewhat different category (Ozerov 2018: 85). The discovery of a function, like new information, of a form, like a dedicated preverbal position, merits a much wider study that is primarily concentrated on a different linguistic domain whose nature is not able to be predicted solely on the basis of its information-structure-related effects. Broader studies dedicated to the form-meaning correspondence found for topic markers, for example, show their primitive functions, which appear not to have any direct relation to any pre-empirical information-structure categories. Instead, so-called information-structure markers are found to directly express precise concepts of discourse structure and interactional aspects of communication as well as attention management.

Linguistic devices that have formally identified previously as information-structure markers, turn out, then, to directly express diverse low-level instructions for interaction and discourse management (Ozerov 2018: 91). These indicate specific interlocutor-oriented moves on the part of the speaker. For example, wh- clefts in English and German are said to separate a decidedly relevant topic (*italics*) from its nominal focal predicate (<u>underlined</u>):

(738) *Where I really want to go* is <u>Albania</u>.

However, Ozerov (2018: 85, 91) argues that a purely information-structural analysis accounts only for the structure's outcome interpretation, leaving aside the reasons of its usage, which may be metalinguistic, stance-taking, to establish an evaluation frame for a proposition like:

(739) *What I should like to put forward* is that <u>the study needs an entire overhaul</u>.

Taking from other examples also, clefts may be better understood as having a very specific discourse managing function, which may certainly have traditional information-structural interpretations, but not at their core. Informally, they may be characterised as the speaker asking the hearer(s) to wait while a new discourse move is opened and the nature of its content announced. It is notions such as this that are expressed directly by language-specific devices and it is these that take on an immediate role when it comes to information exchange and processing. Further examples, including wh- clefts, of low-level instructions for interaction and discourse management that indicate specific interlocutor-oriented moves on the part of the speaker are informally paraphrased by Ozerov (Ozerov 2018: 91) as follows:

- "Wait; I am opening a new discourse move and announce the nature of its content" (wh-clefts in English and German)
- "Wait; you will need this information to understand my upcoming main point" (DOM *ko* in Burmese)
- "I know it better than you" (*mi* in Tena Kichwa)
- "Do trust me, I have solid knowledge in this regard" (*mi* in many other Quechua varieties)
- "This is my personal attitude" (stand-alone nominalisation in Burmese)

Channelling research into the best or most correct theory of topic or focus has "hampered the analysis of the communicative, interactional and cognitive categories involved in the dynamic process of information structuring in linguistic interaction," (Ozerov 2018: 94). It is the study of these categories and processes that will "advance our understanding of the factors that participate in, shape and govern the dynamic interactional process of information flow and the management of interlocutors' shared knowledge and attention in discourse," (2018: 94).

5.1.3   Conclusion

To summarise this subsection, several papers have argued that focus is not a category but that the pragmatic/interpretive/focal effects associated with the notion still merit investigation. If focus is employed as a heuristic tool, as advocated by Matić and Wedgewood (2013), newness, contrast, etc. may help to find meaningful points of cross-linguistic comparison associated with information update with the goal of unifying languages in deeper and dynamic terms.

IS patterns come about through recurrent interpretations arising from the interplay of linguistic forms, contextual cues and interlocutor's intentions, leading Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) to put forward that the only common denominator for the vast variation found cross-linguistically for something like salient polarity is the drawing of attention to the polarity of a proposition that is at issue, that is, while the intention behind this point in communication may be universal, the interpretive effects for its manifestation are limitless. Rather than looking for the correct denotational properties of a supposed category, therefore, it is preferable to show the manner in which source denotations interact with patterns of conventionalisation, variable contextual conditions and recurrent inferential mechanism, and to explore the common cognitive basis associated with such interaction. As Ozerov (2018) succinctly points out, trying desperately to find the top theory of focus has hindered the investigation of cognitive, interactional and communicative categories that are involved in the dynamic processes of linguistic interaction

and information structuring. Studying these processes and categories will advance understanding of factors participating in, shaping and governing the dynamic interactional processes of information flow as well as the managing of attention and shared knowledge in discourse.

In the remainder of this thesis, it is shown that all of these advocations for better modes of research can be facilitated through the conceptual descriptive framework of Cognitive Grammar, which is presented in the next section before being married with the 'problems' presented here in the 'solutions' section (§5.3), that forms the basis for the subsequent analysis (§6) of the Mùwe Ké focus structures described in §4.

5.2 Cognitive Grammar

An overview of Cognitive Grammar is provided here to link the 'problems' associated with the study of IS highlighted in the previous section (§5.1) with 'solutions', discussed in the following (§5.3).

The cognitive linguistic enterprise began in the 1980s with the work of Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy and while it is not regarded as one specific theory, it is a prolific and intricate research paradigm that offers new tools to various fields of linguistic enquiry, gives new coherence to an array of linguistic interests and interacts with the disciplines of psychology, cognitive science and philosophy of the mind (see Evans 2019; Dancygier 2017; Geeraerts 2008; Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007; Evans & Green 2006 for excellent introductions).

A cognitive linguistic orientation proves to be revealing in theorising about and describing language at every level from phonemes to discourse (Newman 2017: 209). It enables the pursuit of a full comprehensive account that details language in all of its semantic and pragmatic splendour in all of its utilised contexts. Its appeal is that it explores language in a larger setting, rather than looking at decontextualised samples; in its actual use, rather than looking at constructed examples; and considers how language behaviour may be influenced by cognitive, functional, and other external factors. It takes into account the communicative entirety of language and explores its full richness: actual usage, mental processing, poetic language, the dynamics of interlocutors' interaction and so on.

Linguistic analysis within the field follows the trends that affect the movement as a whole. Preferences include attention to a wide range of language facts over the focussing on a core set of phenomena or on exclusively clause-level phenomena; seeking descriptions in general cognitive principles over those that are syntax-specific with no cognitive counterpart; acknowledging the vital role of usage facts when describing phenomena; understating grammar as meaningful in a comparable way the lexicon; understanding meaning as a dynamic process over being fixed and invariable; conducting research into mental processes over formal analysis just for the sake of it; including a more quantitative style in analyses incorporating experimental findings and corpora; and including multiple methodological approaches in the endeavour of fully describing language phenomena (Newman 2017: 210). That is not to say that more conceptual approaches such as Langacker's Cognitive Grammar does not find its place here. The form-meaning pairing as an integrated whole is found in nearly all analyses within the cognitive-linguistic framework.

Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987; 1991; 2008; 2013a; 2017a inter alia) should not be taken as a formal theory but rather as a conceptual descriptive framework. The objective from its inception was to provide an account of language which is natural, unified and comprehensive (Langacker 2017a: 262). Natural in the sense of taking general cognitive capacities as its base, using only known or demonstrable phenomena, and finding compatibility with the findings of other disciplines. Unified with the view that identical capacities and descriptive notions pertain to the diverse features of language structure and therefore positing neither rigid boundaries nor separate components. Comprehensive though the grounding of language structure in interaction through discourse and the characterising of linguistic elements with regard to their interactive as well as discursive functions.

The two phases in the development of Cognitive Grammar both aimed at unification (Langacker 2017a: 262). The account given in the first phase (Langacker 1987; 1991) unified lexicon, morphology and syntax, each postulated as intrinsically meaningful, forming a continuum of form-meaning pairings. The second phase (Langacker 2008 onwards; 2012a) envisions an account of the unification of structure, processing, and discourse. Language structure is dynamic and consists of processing activity at discursive, social, psychological and neural levels. The two phases are presented here in turn, looking at grammar as symbolisation (§5.2.1) and structure as interactive activity (§5.2.2), following the outline of Langacker (2017a), before a discussion of the IS notion of focus as compared to focus*sing* in Cognitive

Grammar (§5.2.3) and a presentation of how the examination of baseline/elaboration as a feature of cognition and a cognitive model of 'reality' provide for a cogent description of verum/polarity (§5.2.4).

As a small preliminary regarding the nature and status of the Cognitive Grammar diagrams used in the following sections, starting with Figure 24 below, they should be regarded as heuristic in nature and as providing a sufficient level of explicitness and precision for the task at hand along with a usability that facilitates discovery (see Langacker 2008: §1.2.3 for full discussion). Of course, they are simply visual aids and it is not assumed that these representations are really present in the human brain. Each figure is described in prose as we go.

5.2.1 Grammar as Symbolisation

Cognitive Grammar description starts with meaning, which is identified, in the widest sense of the term, as **conceptualisation,** that encompasses any and all aspects of our experience and is therefore embodied, interactive and dynamic (Langacker 2017a: 263).

The goal is to investigate the meanings of linguistic expressions; therefore, it is reasonable to ask where these meanings might be found. From the perspective of cognitive linguistics they are found in the minds of interlocutors who create and comprehend the expressions (Langacker 2008: 27). Rather than the platonic view, that treats language as something abstract akin to mathematical laws, or the objectivist position, that identifies sentence meaning through truth conditions regardless of conceptualisation, meaning is seen as deriving from **embodied** human experience. We have a world view specific to our species and the unique physical makeup of the human body and this mediates our construal of reality: think about how we experience colour compared to other animals or gravity compared to birds or fish (Evans & Green 2006: §2.2). Together with our distinctive cognitive structure and organisation, the view is that the mind (where language resides) cannot be studied independently from human embodiment and that mental processes play a critical role in both semantics and grammar.

This does not mean, however, that an individual mind is the place to be looking for meaning if conceptualisation is said to be **interactive**. On the contrary, meanings are to be seen dynamically emerging in social interaction and discourse (Langacker 2008: 28). Far from being predetermined or fixed, interlocutors actively negotiate meanings online on the basis of

the cultural, social, linguistic and physical context. Meaning is not restricted to a particular place but distributed, with aspects of meaning existing in the speech community, the pragmatic circumstances of an individual speech event and also in the surrounding world. This view allows for the context-dependent intersubjective dynamic nature of meaning construction found in actual discourse.

While the study of how linguistic structures are neurologically implemented is still in its infancy, we may say that conceptualisation, as neurological activity, has a temporal dimension and is, therefore, **dynamic** (Langacker 2008: 31). The meaning of an utterance is not apprehended instantaneously but rather unfolds through speech/reading/listening time so that at no one point are all facets simultaneously active and accessible. The two sentences in (740), although characterising an identical objective situation, are not semantically equivalent:

(740)   There is a path that goes all the way from the market to the mountain pass.
         There is a path that goes all the way from the mountain pass to the market.

Despite the description being static, the pair of sentences evoke similar dynamic conceptualisations, the only difference being the direction we mentally scan the path: starting from the market place all the way up to the pass or vice versa. The way the conception is built, through actual processing time, brings about slightly different mental experiences as well as different linguistic meanings. This view of dynamicity links to how conceptual structure is imagistic in character, discussed below.

Linguistic meaning in Cognitive Grammar, as in the wider cognitive linguistic enterprise, is taken to be **encyclopaedic**, presupposing a great **conceptual substrate** comprised of our abilities, knowledge and contextual awareness, upon which it draws in a manner that is flexible and open-ended (Haiman 1980; Langacker 1987: §4.2; Wierzbicka 1995). In contrast to 'purely linguistic' meanings like [FEMALE ADULT BOVINE] for the basic sense of *cow*, lexical meaning resides in a way of accessing a limitless body of knowledge to do with the entity (Langacker 2008: 39): cows provide milk, they are raised for beef, farming them is not so great for the environment etc. These components may be more or less central and therefore always or rarely activated when the expression is used.

Lexical meaning is, therefore, neither totally free nor fixed: the expression brings about a particular range of knowledge but the centrality is to a degree and may be overridden by contextual factors (Langacker 2008: 39). Being both psychologically and linguistically

realistic, this conception has the consequence that a discrete boundary is unable to be drawn between knowledge that is linguistic and that which is extralinguistic; however, such a boundary should only be marked on empirical grounds rather than being imposed a priori.

This issue follows when looking at the meanings of more complex expressions like sentences. Well known in the study of IS, a sentence may convey more than its basic meaning when uttered in a certain context; the full understanding may owe much more to previous discourse, interpretive abilities and general and contextual knowledge than that which is derivable simply from the meaning of overt elements. To what extent do we identify this global understanding as the linguistic meaning of the utterance? That is, which facets do we take as semantic and which as pragmatic?

Taking meaning as encyclopaedic and identified as conceptualisation, which is embodied, interactive and dynamic, the distinction made between semantics and pragmatics, and linguistic knowledge and extra-linguistic knowledge, rather than being categorical, is graded, with no precise boundaries in place. That is not to say that linguistic meaning is purely conceptualisation but rather that it represents how it may be exploited and adapted for linguistic purposes (Levinson 1997; Langacker 2008: §2.1.3).

The meaning of an expression is not only dependent on the conceptual **content** that it invokes but on **construal**, which is the capacity to conceive of and portray an identical situation in different ways (Langacker 2017a: 263; see also Langacker 2008: Ch.3; Langacker 2016). Lexical and grammatical meanings alike consist in content that is construed in a particular way, the difference, which is one of degree, being that while lexical elements are rich in conceptual content, grammatical meaning is mainly an issue of the construal being imposed upon lexical content (Talmy 1988). If we take the metaphor of viewing content as a scene, it is easy to see that *how* we view the scene has relevance akin to construal: whether we look closely or from afar, which part of the scene we pay most attention to etc. Langacker treats the varying aspects of construal under four (non-exclusive) headings: selection, perspective, prominence and imagination.

Elements are limited in what they express and are therefore **selective**. If I refer to a person as a boy, I am leaving open descriptions as to the person's personality, their nationality or race, physical appearance, etc. Similarly in (741)(a) I am selecting to report only the change of state while in (b) I report the full complex event of causation. Selection is a matter of degree from

highly **specific** to **schematic**: compare breaking a watch with the more specific verb *smashing* and the more schematic *changing (the state of)*. Also with regard to the grammar of nominalisations: in (c) using *by* is specific in regard to the participant role of trainers while in (d) their role is indeterminate.

(741) a. My watch broke.

  b. I broke my watch with a rock.

  c. Everybody loves encouragement by personal trainers.

  d. Not everybody loves the encouragement of personal trainers.

Schematisation is vital to cognition and occurs constantly in all realms of experience (Langacker 2008: 56). Extracting a schema is merely reinforcing something found inherently in multiple experiences and therefore ought to be seen as immanent in all of its instantiations rather than being separate or distinct. Schemas serve categorising functions by their very nature and by portraying that which certain precious experiences have in common, they may be applied to new experiences exhibiting the same configuration.

Elaborative relationships and schemas are essential in each aspect of language structure (Langacker 2008: 57). The claim of Cognitive Grammar is that all linguistic generalisations come about through the schematisation of more specific structures. Important to this thesis is that schemas that express grammatical regularities are symbolic, consisting of both a semantic and phonological pole. They characterise natural classes like verbs as well as combinatory patterns like a passive or cleft construction. Since they are representative of conventional patterns of language, schemas provide the foundation for the assessment of linguistic well-formedness: expressions are judged as well-formed in that they bear relationships of elaboration (over extension) to the schemas that are invoked to categorise them.

Perspective has to do with the metaphorical viewing arrangement of a scene: the relationship between the conceptualiser, that is, the subject of conception, and the entity being conceived, the object of conception (Langacker 2017a: 264): see Figure 24. This can be likened to an audience member watching a play at a theatre (Langacker 2008: 77). The attention of the person watching is directed towards the actor currently speaking and this arrangement maximises the asymmetry between the subject and object of perception. Subjective construal is therefore characteristic of a viewer's role as a locus of perceptual experience offstage that is not perceived by the object of conception. To the contrary, the onstage focus of attention, that

is not engaged in viewing, is characterised by the objective construal. An entity construed subjectively is then logically less salient than one that is construed objectively simply by virtue of being that which is being attended to.

Figure 24. Viewing Arrangement (Langacker 2017a: 264)

Since the speaker and hearer are the primary subjects of conception, they take an essential role in the linguistic meaning; however, unless they are part of the situation that is being described they remain implicit (Langacker 2017a: 264). If they are left implicit then they are construed with maximal subjectivity but they may also function, to varying degrees, as objects of conception whereby they become more salient through being construed more objectively (Langacker 2008: 78). For example, speaker or hearer may be put onstage as focus of attention through the use of first- or second-person pronouns and therefore objectively construed.

Onstage facets of the situation being described comprise the expression's immediate scope, a part of its maximal scope, also seen in Figure 24. A day of the week, for example, may have as its immediate scope the concept of Wednesday, which includes a conception for a week, the direct foundation of its characterisation, but not the relation to either a month or year (Langacker 2017a: 264). As discussed above, conceptual content is selected for linguistic presentation, affording access to a certain set of cognitive domains, either in general or specific to the occasion, through an expression. Further to this is the extent of the expression's 'coverage' of the domains accessed, the parts of domains that the expression evokes and utilises for the foundation of its meaning. For every domain in its matrix, the expression has a scope that consists of its coverage within that domain (Langacker 2008: 62). Since there is a finite amount that we are able to mentally encompass at any given time, there is an evident cognitive basis for scope.

Basic components of the viewing arrangement seen in Figure 24 are vantage point and orientation (Langacker 2017a: 264). Take *yesterday* and *tomorrow* in Figure 25, for example. Both of them are described from the vantage point of an adjacent day, distinct only in their temporal orientation: either looking back or forwards.

(a) *yesterday*

(b) *tomorrow*

(c) *the next day*

t = time
VP = vantage point
RP = reference point
G = ground

Figure 25. Vantage Point (Langacker 2017a: 264)

An objective situation may then be viewed and described from various vantage points, rendering different construals that can have overt consequences (Langacker 2008: 75). As part of their meaning, expressions such as *behind* and *in front of* invoke a vantage point using the actual location of the interlocutors: compare *it is [in front of]/[behind] [you]/[that tree]*.

The location of speaker and hearer is the default vantage point and the deictic centre is defined by their interaction, which constitutes the ground, invoked commonly as the offstage point of reference (Langacker 2017a: 265). *The next day* in Figure 25 differs from *tomorrow*, therefore, through bringing a specific temporal reference point onstage in prior discourse:

(742)   a. Daniel came to town on the Saturday and his wife joined us the next day.

Defined more specifically, we use ground for speaker and hearer, the speech event that they are participating in and their immediate circumstances, such as place and time of speaking (Langacker 2008: 78). Since the ground is the platform apprehending evoked content, it is part of the meaning of each and every expression, even if construed with maximal subjectivity. More commonly, however, aspects of the ground themselves are evoked as part of the content and therefore function to some degree as object of conception. The role of ground as understood point of reference is ubiquitous. The tense found in every finite clause is usually deemed from the ground: the future is the future viewed from the time of speaking, for example. Definiteness is the nominal sphere related to interlocutors since it is dependent on whether the referent is apparent to both speaker and hearer within the current discourse context.

It is also certainly possible to depart from the default viewing arrangement of speaker together with hearer in a fixed location (Langacker 2017a: 265). The first example in (743) would sound strange if uttered without context but is deemed perfectly acceptable if heard as an answerphone message. Similarly, despite the mountain peaks in the second example being stable, they may have temporal properties if viewed from the perspective of a traveller moving higher into the Himalaya.

(743) a. Sorry, I'm not here right now.

b. Snowy mountain peaks are becoming a lot more frequent.

Varying types of **prominence**, or salience (Langacker uses the terms interchangeably), need to be differentiated for linguistic purposes (Langacker 2017a: 265) but the terms are not self-explanatory. Simply because something may be prominent, the description of it being so does not make for an adequate characterisation but is the starting point for analysis (Langacker 2008: 66). Focussing of attention and indeed the information-structural notion of focus certainly involve prominence since that which is selected is made salient against that which is left unselected. Prototypes within a category are more prominent than their extensions, space and vision have a salient cognitive status compared to other varying realms of experience, concrete is more prominent that abstract, real more salient that imaginary, explicit more than implicit, and so forth. The ability to group all of these asymmetries under a single label is not as important as distinguishing them properly and determining which figure in particular phenomena. Langacker details two instances of prominence: profiling and the trajector/landmark alignment.

Conceptual reference is pivotal to both lexicon and grammar and is labelled in Cognitive Grammar as profiling. The profile of an expression is the main focus of attention within the immediate scope, that is, the primary object of conception in that it is the entity that the expression designates or refers to (Langacker 2017a: 265). Take *knee* in Figure 26(a) by way of example. Its maximal scope (which should not be taken to be exhaustive) in terms of spatial configuration is the human body's overall shape. The conception of a leg is then brought onstage as the immediate scope. Then, within the immediate scope, *knee* singles out a substructure as its profile and referent. This is then the onstage specific focus of attention.

Figure 26. Profiling

If *knee* (a) is compared to *foot* (b), it is clear that while maximal and immediate scope remain the same, the profile is different (see Langacker (2008: §3.3.1) for further discussion).

It is not only things that may be profiled but also relationships (Langacker 2017a: 265). *Above* has a spatial relationship with *below* where each has a different position on a vertical axis. Each expression has the same content in that they indicate a relative vertical spatial location between one thing and another and they profile the same relationship in that *X above Y* is equal to *Y below X*. The semantic contrast lies in the degree of prominence given to the relational participants (Langacker 2008: §3.3.2). The primary figure, labelled the **trajector** (tr), is the entity that is being located, evaluated, characterised or described (Talmy 1975). A secondary figure, the **landmark** (lm), is evoked for these purposes when needed.

Figure 27. Trajector/Landmark alignment after Langacker (2008: 71)

The semantic contrast between *above* and *below*, therefore, is one of prominence. If we wish to give the location of X, *X above Y* is used and vice versa. The semantic distinction between *above* and *below*, then, is a matter of construal, the difference lying in the trajector/landmark alignment.

Since so much to do with conception involves **imagination**, there are many aspects of construal that fall under this rubric (Langacker 2017a: 265–6). Sensory and motor **imagery** (Kosslyn

1980), mental **simulation** (Barsalou 1999; Bergen 2012), **metaphor** (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), conceptual **blending** (Fauconnier & Turner 2002), **fictivity** (Talmy 1996; Langacker 1999; Matlock 2001; Langacker 2005; Pascual 2014) and **metonymy** (Kövecses & Radden 1998; Panther & Radden 1999; Panther 2005; Handl & Schmid 2011).

With the accommodation of construal into a conceptualist semantics, the integral meaningfulness of grammar (Wierzbicka 1988; Talmy 2000a; 2000b) becomes clear and a symbolic account of grammar may then be envisaged (Langacker 2017a: 266). A claim of Cognitive Grammar is that all elements of grammatical description have conceptual import, albeit often rather schematically, and that like the lexicon, grammar exists in form-meaning pairings, that represent a continuum of symbolic structures. The account is therefore **unified** in this respect. It is also **natural** since the conventional is a method of symbolic expression and **restrictive** since Cognitive Grammar postulates the required minimum in order to fulfil that function: phonological structures and semantic structures with symbolic links between them. However, there is no claim that meaning may be predicted through grammar – an essential feature of linguistic meaning is the semantic significance of grammar itself – but there is no autonomy. Grammar is made up of ways to construe conceptual content and symbolise that construal; specific symbolic expressions instantiate schematised patterns of symbolisation.

Grammatical **constructions** allow complex symbolic structure to be formed out of simpler ones (Langacker 2017a: 269). Constructions include highly schematic patterns, specific instantiating expressions and everything in between. They reside in **assemblies** (discussed in the next section) of symbolic structures joined by correspondences, without any inherent restriction on either their form or complexity. Component symbolic structures in a typical construction come together to form composite symbolic structures that are based on correspondences between specific substructures. Since composite structures may in turn function as component structures at higher levels, grammatical organisation can be said to be hierarchical to some extent.

To demonstrate, Figure 28 represents the grammatical organisation of the symbolic assembly *the day before yesterday* (Langacker 2017a: 269). The assembly instantiates a constructional schema that represents two composition levels: the forming of a prepositional phrase and then the modifying of a noun using that phrase. *Yesterday* is combined with *before* and this profiles a non-processual connection of temporal precedence. The integration of the two is effected through a correspondence that equates the preposition's schematic landmark with the nominal

profile, represented with a dotted line. The shading is to indicate the landmark functioning as an elaboration site that *yesterday* specifies in finer detail. A box with a heavy line marks the profile determinant as *before*, thereby imposing its profile, and therefore its grammatical category, onto the composite structure of *before yesterday*. In turn, this now functions as a component structure and combines at the second level with *the day*. Here the nominal elaborates the prepositional phrase's schematic trajector. The full expression also then profiles the referent, a particular day, of the prepositional phrase since it is functioning as profile determinant. *The* points to the contextual distinctiveness of this referent, which is then interpreted as the unique day immediately previous to yesterday.

Figure 28. A Symbolic Assembly (Langacker 2017a: 270)

Since its inception, Cognitive Grammar has always been a framework that is usage-based (Langacker 2017a: 271; 1987; Barlow & Kemmer 2000). Linguistic structures are made up of acquired patterns of processing activity and well-established structures, labelled **units**, are selected from usage events, defined as instances of actual language use in all their specificity and complexity. Units come about through **entrenchment**, a general phenomenon that is observable in every type of learned human activity. Being a matter of cognition, entrenchment is conventionalisation's individual counterpart; it is the social process of the standardisation of structures within a speech community (see Langacker 2017b).

5.2.2 Structure as Interactive Activity

Langacker's second phase of investigation emphasises the view in Cognitive Grammar that language is **dynamic** and **interactive** and aims to join structure, processing and discourse in a unified account.

Dynamicity is fundamental since structure consists in activity patterns at social, psychological and neural levels and as such cognition must necessarily take place through time. Exactly *how* it does so is often critical; in the study of IS the notion of given information is being 'already activated' (§3.1.2) and since this activation must occur through time, it is, like all conceptualisation, inherently dynamic. In instances at any level of complexity, the various facets of a total conception are activated through real time at successive instants and this sequence of activation forms a part of the total mental experience (Langacker 2008: 500–1). How structure unfolds through processing time is essential to characterisation. Comparable to speech time being a dimension of phonological structure, a basic dimension of grammatical and semantic structure is conception time (Langacker 2017a: 272).

The role of interaction is equally fundamental (Langacker 2017a: 272) and Cognitive Grammar reflects this in several ways. Linguistic units are abstracted from usage events, which are instances of actual language use in all their specificity and complexity, and centre on speakers and hearers and their engagement in discourse, social and physical contexts. Speaker and hearer are the subjects of conception also. They apprehend expression and effect their categorisation while also negotiating their contextual interpretation. In addition, interlocutor's interaction defines the **ground**, discussed in the last section, which has a large number of manifestations in both meaning and grammar.

The linguistic ability of a speaker is made up of a vast **assembly** of symbolic, phonological and semantic units entrenched and conventionalised to varying degrees (Langacker 2017a: 272). In a usage event, units are activated for the apprehension of the target expression and therefore make up part of its structure. This unavoidably effects the assembly in numerous ways: activated units are reinforced and adapt to the context, new structures begin to coalesce as units and conversely units that are not used start to decay. This constant adjustment through usage shows a further dimension of dynamicity.

An assembly is comprised of units simply by their being connected (Langacker 2017a: 272–3). From the point of view of processing, where structures dwell in neural activity patterns,

units are connected through overlap or association, in both of which one structure activates another. An assembly is therefore a set of connected elements but it is important to point out that Cognitive Grammar does not view assemblies through the metaphors that are traditionally employed in linguistics: networks or trees. They are instead understood in terms of **connection** and **grouping**.

Taking a network as something similar to the London Underground map, assemblies differ in various ways (Langacker 2017a: 273). The connected elements differ in their degree of entrenchment; they are non-discrete since connection is a matter of overlap; rather than nodes and links being static, assemblies consist of patterns of activity that take place through time and are, therefore, inherently dynamic; plus, while the structure of a network is flat with all nodes on the same level, assemblies have elements at differing levels of organisation. Since they are connected, elements make up higher-order elements that then have the potential to join further connections and it is the exploitation of that potential that concerns grouping in order that connected elements function together for higher-level purposes. Because connections at that level may also define higher-order elements, grouping provides the foundation for hierarchical organisation, illustrated here:

Figure 29. Connection and Grouping (Langacker 2017a: 273)

That is not to say that an assembly is a tree structure for two reasons: same elements are simultaneously grouped in differing ways based on alternative functions and the emergence of a discrete composite whole, the foundation of constituency, is a matter of degree (Langacker 2017a: 273–4). The symbolic assembly seen in Figure 28 for *the day before yesterday*, for example, may be grouped for semantic or prosodic considerations:

Figure 30. Semantic vs. Prosodic Grouping (Langacker 2017a: 274)

In the semantic grouping, *day before yesterday* indicates the entity to which *the* specifies contextual distinctiveness. In the prosodic grouping, the functional motivation is to do with packaging in an information-structural sense.

Connection necessarily results in more than just the sum of the connected elements: the configurations seen in Figure 29 are not equivalent. Of concern is whether the result goes further than the simple act of connection. In Figure 31 the simple connection of two elements cooccurring within a processing window is the minimal. Structures that depart from this simple baseline may then have emergent properties due to several factors: certain types of connecting operations like scanning, comparison or the assessment of relative position; components being modified; additional content being incorporated; or the composite whole being affected by construal.

Figure 31. Seriality and Constituency (Langacker 2017a: 274)

Assemblies provide for the unified treatment of **seriality** and **constituency**, often regarded as opposites. Seriality has to do with the inherent temporal dimension of processing without regard for emergent properties. Elements are apprehended individually connected only by temporal sequencing, symbolised with >. Constituency may arise emergent properties at each hierarchical level result in a structure distinct from its components that then participates in higher-level connections. Since these are a matter of degree, it is hard to find a pure case but if we are going through a series of associations, there is typically an awareness of the wider whole that they belong to.

Furthermore, assemblies provide a unified approach to the matter of **structure** vs. **function** (Langacker 2017a: 275). Structure consists in groupings, the motivation for which being the functions they fulfil. A grouping's function is simply its place in a larger whole (see Harder 2010) as an element that is participating in higher-level connections plus the groupings they establish. Therefore, for an individual grouping, structure vs. function is an issue of analytical perspective upon the same assembly, looking either at the elements that connect to form it or at its role in subsequent connections that give rise to more inclusive groupings. Functional

description is therefore intrinsic to a full structural description rather than being something peripheral to it.

Since assemblies provide a means of symbolic expression, they help to further the global function of language, that is, its part in thought and communication; lexicon and grammar dwell in assemblies comprised of symbolic structures which effect the application of semantic functions.

The phenomena that grammar traditionally includes have principally related to description; however, because they are usually conflated by structures, these facets of functional organisation are not able to be disentangled and certainly not segregated into distinct components (Langacker 2017a: 277). Cognitive Grammar takes the interplay of all of these factors into account and provides a description that is inherently interactive; it shows the cooperative endeavour of speaker and hearer, apprehending the situation being described with respect to the ground. The role of interlocutors as offstage subjects of conception provides the basis for two notions essential to discussion, introduced in the last section: **profiling**, the intersubjective focussing of attention that is effected through symbolisation, and **grounding**, which indicates the epistemic status of the profiled process or thing (finite clause or nominal) in relation to the speaker and hearer.

A grammatical assembly, therefore, is a representation of an amalgam of discursive and descriptive groupings (Langacker 2017a: 277) and this is where IS fits into the conceptual descriptive framework that is Cognitive Grammar. The semantic functions that are implemented by discursive groupings fall under five broad headings:

- Speech management
- The connection of utterances
- Information structure
- Order of presentation
- The packaging of content

These can be illustrated with the following three sentences:

(744) a. So her HUSBAND, does HE study linguistics TOO?

  b. So does HE study linguistics TOO, her HUSBAND?

  c. So does her HUSBAND study linguistics TOO?

The situation being described is whether or not the husband of a third person also studies linguistics, which is grounded through the interactive function of being a question. The expectation is that the hearer is likely to have the information required and will respond as such, implementing the discursive function of taking turns, which is a basic element of speech management, and bringing about a connection to subsequent utterances also. The *so* has a connecting function also, communicating the idea that the utterance is following somehow from the one before. Since English utilises prosody to mark notions of IS, in (744)(a) the discourse-new content is marked with unreduced stress, shown with SMALL CAPS, contrasting with the content seen as already available in the discourse (i.e. present in the CG: §3.1.1). Furthermore, with regard to the topic function of *her husband*, in (a) a framing function is seen while in (b) is serves as an afterthought. Order of presentation is always of semantic import in Cognitive Grammar, even when seemingly free, minimally inducing the order of conception. The packaging of content, also related to IS (§3.1), and by many accounts the definition of what IS is, is seen here with content packaged into prosodic groupings and grammatical structures. (c) compares to the other two examples in that it offers a marginally different conceptual experience through the compression of the content into a single prosodic window and a single clause.

It is this that is of importance here. IS may not be separated out and studied independently from everything else that occurs in utterances, dialogues, or language.

Discursive structures are not inclined to have much content of their own since they are supervenient on the content that descriptive elements provide (Langacker 2017a: 278). The informational status of *study linguistics* in (744) follows adventitiously from its descriptive content/meaning: if it is seen as old/given information, this necessarily presupposes information. Discursive structure is found mostly offstage in that it inheres to descriptive content's organisation over being itself an object of conception; interlocutors do not have an explicit awareness of the role of prosody in marking old information.

Therefore lexical, grammatical, descriptive and discursive linguistic structures are intertwined aspects of assemblies making up all of these dimensions of organisation (Langacker 2017a:

278). Assemblies are dynamic and consist of patterns of processing activity. Processing runs concurrently on differing time scales: compare the time scales involved in articulating a syllable, grouping symbolic structures into clauses and connecting clauses in a discourse. Of interest here is how Cognitive Grammar represents processing occurring on a given time scale through a series of **windows** where connections are made and also groupings emerge. Elements appear in consecutive windows on a single time scale and are grouped and connected in a window on a wider time scale, basic seriality giving rise to hierarchy. Memory and language is fleeting and in order to deal with continuous linguistic input, the brain needs to compress it and recode it as quickly as it can and this is dealt with through 'Chunk-and-Pass' processing in the sense of Christiansen and Chater (2016): the language system fervently recodes and compresses linguistic input; at each representational level, the system builds a multilevel linguistic representation; and the system predictively deploys the available information so that local ambiguities are managed correctly the very first time since upon the original input being lost, the language system is unable to recover.

Speakers have more awareness of groupings on some time scales more than others (Langacker 2017a: 278). Particularly important are processing windows in spoken discourse that have a duration that coincides with a clause (Chafe 1987; 1994; Langacker 2001). Chafe refers to such structures appearing in clause-sized windows as **intonation units** since they are phonologically delimited by varying prosodic clues:

> In summary, the identification of (1) as a coherent intonation unit is supported by a convergence of (a) the pauses preceding and following it, (b) the pattern of acceleration-deceleration, (c) the overall decline in pitch level, (d) the falling pitch contour at the end, and (e) the creaky voice at the end. These and other features are discussed and exemplified in more detail in Chafe (1992). (Chafe 1994: 60)

Conceptually, intonation units represent currently active information or that being attended to (Langacker 2017a: 278). The construction from (744)(a) seen in (745)(a) is usually expressed iconically with intonation units that correspond to a topic and the clause that it frames. Being presented in successive windows serves to mirror and reinforce the mental progression that constitutes a topic relation. Because the apprehension of their connection involves a longer processing window, seriality predominates due to reduced awareness of groupings on the longer time scale.

(745)　a. //So her HUSBAND // does HE study linguistics TOO?//

　　　　b. //So does HE study linguistics TOO // her HUSBAND?//

　　　　c. //So does HE study linguistics TOO/her HUSBAND?//

　　　　d. //So // does her HUSBAND study linguistics TOO?//

(b) represents an afterthought so the order of presentation, rather than being iconic for topic function, mirrors the status of topic specification as such. Word order is a limited resource and therefore semantic functions quite often compete for its exploitation. The alternate to (b) in (c) packages clause and topic into a single intonation unit and while they also appear in consecutive windows, they appear on a reduced time scale, in which groupings are less evident. This has the phonological consequence of a reduction in the pause and the semantic consequence of the functions of topic and afterthought being downplayed. (d) sees *so* appearing alone in its clause-sized window, which brings about full phonological manifestation and a highly salient connecting function.

Conceptual content appearing in consecutive processing windows may also be visualised as just one window passing through a conceptual landscape and for the purposes of unifying grammar and discourse within an analysis, this metaphor is more perspicuous than the traditional compositional kind that builds smaller parts into a whole (Langacker 2017a: 279). The idea is illustrated in Figure 32 where DT refers to the **descriptive target**, the section of the speaker and hearer's mental universe that is under discussion in a particular discourse. The moving window's position at successive moments is indicated by W_1 and W_2. There is nearly always some overlapping in the content that is being delimited, that is, the content that is being attended to, from instant to instant. The sequence of access brought about through linguistic expression is represented by the progression of the window through DT.

Figure 32. Moving Window Metaphor (Langacker 2017a: 280)

In Figure 33 successive windows 1 and 2 function sequentially as immediate scope for both nominal and clause in the topic construction //*the squirrel // it buried the nuts//*.

Figure 33. Moving Window

The construction exhibits mostly serial organisation; with reference to description, the sequence of components make up the whole without the need for the positing of a single overall profile or distinct composite structure. Outside of the onstage descriptive content, discursive connections are also included: topic and clausal subject are coreferenced, the topic has framing function, and the order of presentation induces the sequence of access. Further contributing factors, that provide the substrate for the description, are various unexpressed aspects of DT and the interaction of interlocutors plus their offstage parts as conceptualising subjects. These form a portion of the utterance's **maximal scope**, i.e. the pertinent scope of awareness, which is a window on a much larger time scale.

The metaphor of a moving window is able to show the view of Cognitive Grammar that language structure is interactive, dynamic and contextually grounded (Langacker 2017a: 280). In a compositional metaphor, expressions are constructed before semantic and pragmatic interpretation giving different entailments. A coherent overall conception in terms of composition, where *it* is identified *as the squirrel*, can only be achieved after the processing of the nominal and clause. The moving window, however, allows for the emergence of an expression from a substrate which includes all of the interactive context, the expression(s) that came prior, plus currently active areas of the descriptive target. A coherent conception is

therefore available from the outset. In place of composition, the task is therefore to dissociate DT into overlapping 'chunks' for the purposes of expression. *It* being interpreted as referring to *the squirrel* comes about automatically due to this overlap.

The process of discourse, then, is cooperative and inherently intersubjective where interlocutors align their focus of attention and scope of awareness through selecting, symbolising and packaging content, negotiate a common apprehension of DT and update it continually (Langacker 2017a: 281). An important foundation for updating is the content that is presented in sequential clause-sized windows, which allow for the delimitation of the quantity of information that may be fully active at one particular time (see Chafe 1994: 69). The updating, however, is dependent on connections that are established in a scope of awareness that is more inclusive, that is, a processing window found on a larger timescale; for example, the pronoun-antecedent relationship in Figure 33 spans across two clause-sized windows. Constructions vary in the size of encompassing windows or structures they subsume. The connection of pronoun-antecedent may span across sentences of course, as seen in (746)(a), indicating that grammar and discourse are part of a continuum.

(746) a. //A squirrel/took away my trail mix.//↓ //It buried the nuts/in the ground.//↓

  b. //It buried the nuts.//↓ //In the ground.//↓

(b) also indicates the existence of a continuum. Here the content of the utterance is divided between clause-sized windows, both of which are delimited through intonational contours with terminal falls, represented with ↓. This alternative discursive packaging shows a compromise between the typical hierarchy of clauses and seriality of discourse. Figure 34(a) shows the canonical packaging of all content into a complete single clause. It shows the uppermost level of composition, that involves the clausal core and the prepositional phrase and while this constituency is not the only one possible, it nevertheless reflects the most probable prosodic grouping. What is important, however, is the forming of a distinct composite structure that has emergent properties: if taken as a whole, the event, rather than the locative relationship, is profiled by the expression.

Figure 34. Packaging and Ellipsis

Figure 34(b) shows the serial alternative that presents the content in sequential clause-sized windows with distinct intonational contours; note the interchange of speaker and hearer. The content is therefore described with separate profiles in separate windows. The necessary connection of *the nuts* as trajector of *in the ground* is established in a wider scope of awareness. Although the content is presented individually, it continues to represent a coherent conception since the descriptions have to do with overlapping portions of DT.

In the ground is seen as ellipsis in that it is taken to be a reduced form of *It buried the nuts in the ground*. In Cognitive Grammar, ellipsis, rather than involving deletion, is about selective description taking into account the discourse context (Langacker 2017a: 282; 2012b). The key factor that is represented in (b) is that content that was invoked in the first window stays active while the second window is being processed. It is therefore part of the second window but only a selection is placed onstage and described explicitly. This selection relates directly to IS since it is the new content, not present in the first window, and the prepositional phrase is apprehended just as it is in (a).

Series of clauses like this represent instances of productive **discourse construction**. They conflate other constructions related to turn taking, prosodic packaging, selective description, IS and clause-internal grammar. Turn taking is associated with the terminal fall ↓, which communicates a sense of completion which a hearer may interpret as a chance to take the floor. After the first window in Figure 34(b), the opportunity for interlocutors to exchange speaker/hearer role is provided and therefore co-construct the discourse sequence. This is easily dealt with in Cognitive Grammar since speaker, hearer and their interaction form an essential part of linguistic meaning as well as the dynamic assemblies that represent grammar and discourse.

The two sections presented so far give an overview of the initial and current phases of Cognitive Grammar research that envisaged unified accounts of lexicon, morphology, and syntax at first and later structure, processing and discourse. The latter can be seen as elaborating the former since its essential features have been present from the start: structure emerging through usage, the central role of speaker and hearer and their interaction and discourse being higher-level grammar, that goes beyond the sentence level (Langacker 2017a: 283). Cognitive Grammar is not attempting to serve as a self-contained formal model but rather a coherent conceptual framework that is able to support an integrated and comprehensive account of language structure. The framework provides for an wide range of descriptive notions that support principled and reasonably explicit characterisations of all of the structures that we find in natural language while relating these structures to the countless factors that give rise to them: social interaction, language change, acquisition and processing.

5.2.3   Focus and Focus*sing* in Cognitive Grammar

This section looks at focus and focussing in Cognitive Grammar in comparison to the IS notion of focus as alternatives presented above (§3.2.2).

As seen above, IS in Cognitive Grammar is one of many semantic functions that are implemented by discursive groupings and as with all aspects of language is not plucked out and studied separately. In early works, Langacker defines focus only as part of larger presentations. In discussing Newari split ergativity (differential subject marking) in reference to case marking, for example, Langacker (1991: 397) describes the focussed element as representing the informative or novel part of an utterance, the part of its semantic content that exceeds that which has been established already in prior discourse. At each moment in time,

content that has been established affords a baseline for the evaluation of the following utterance, where focus is all of the information that is beyond this starting point. This is certainly the classic view of focus.

In addition to brief definitions of focus, Langacker discusses focus*sing* as well as centres/foci of attention (see Langacker 1987: 115, 187, 246 for the latter as well as the presentation of elements being placed onstage as focus of attention in the last two sections). Focussing is a further dimension of construal (§5.2.1); linguistic expressions allow access to certain parts of our conceptual universe and focussing has to do with selecting conceptual content for presentation and arranging it into foreground and background (Langacker 2008: 57).

There are many asymmetries that may be described metaphorically as foreground vs. background (Langacker 2008: 58). As manifestations of a common feature of cognition, each involves some kind of departure from an established baseline so as to interpret subsequent experience (baseline/elaboration is discussed further in §5.2.4 below). In perception, for example, a manifestation is the phenomena of figure vs. ground such as the sound of an alarm clock against silence, a raised bubble of braille against the ground of the flat sheet or the figure in the Mona Lisa against a background of mountains and sky. Background, therefore, is a preceding conception that facilitates the emergence of a foregrounded conception in some way and it is in this broad sense that expressions may be said to invoke background knowledge as a foundation for understanding.

It could be said that an expression, even seemingly 'all-new' utterances, always presupposes such knowledge (Langacker 2008: 58). The sentence *I want you to put the canned tomatoes on the top shelf of the pantry* relies on general or cultural knowledge of food storage, that the tomatoes should be left in the can when stored, that they are placed on the upper surface of the shelf rather than being pinned somehow to its face and even basic knowledge of the physical world and gravity is needed to complete the task. Similarly, source domains of metaphors have a certain precedence over the target and foreground and background are found over and over in narration, where static descriptions of situations and characters form a background for the bounded events of the plot. Furthermore, a speaker may foreground the content they consider important as the target of discussion against a background of subsidiary comments that pertain to the status or assessment of the content. In English, such phrases are prosodically reduced in sentences such as *Boris Johnson is, I believe, proving to be a terrible prime minister*.

Most relevant here is the unfolding of discourse, during which each utterance is constructed and interpreted in the foreground against a background of everything that has gone before (Langacker 2008: 59). Langacker refers to all prior discourse, context and background knowledge as determining what he calls the current discourse space (CDS), which may be compared to the IS notion of common ground (§3.1.1). A mental space, the CDS, is made up of all the things presumed shared by interlocutors as the basis of discourse in a specific moment and utterances update the CDS through various means. Information may, then, be given or new, according to whether it has been presented already, and if given, may be left implicit. The portion of a new utterance that departs from that which has been established previously is called the focus.

Subsequently, therefore, a distinction may be made between 'focus' as the IS notion discussed in §3.2.2 above and 'focus*sing*' as presented here.

5.2.4   Levels of Reality

Langacker (2019) examines baseline/elaboration organisation, a common feature of cognition, plus a cognitive model that represents our conception of reality and how the two relate to one another allowing for a cogent description of features central to English clause structure, which includes, pertinent to this thesis, verum/polarity.

There is an asymmetry involved in numerous aspects of cognition and language which may be described in relation to a **baseline** and a range of levels and dimensions of **elaboration** (Langacker 2016). The baseline may be seen as something that is already established or in place and is substantive in comparison to elaborating elements. Elaboration is the operation that maps a baseline onto a higher-level structure, somehow augmenting, adapting or adding processing activity to it. Consider, for example, the basic vowel system of Mùwe Ké in §2.1.2, which may serve as a baseline onto which the elaboration of tone may be added or plural markers in almost any language, which elaborate baseline nouns. Linguistic structure is therefore usually organised into strata, successive levels of organisation, each of which may serve as a baseline for another elaboration.

Reality, after Langacker (2019), finds its foundation not in philosophy or physics but in human experience as it is reflected in language structure. This definition of reality covers the 'real world' and physical and observable entities but is not limited to them, taking as 'real', for

linguistic purposes, fictive worlds, where we may discuss the *tooth fairy* or *Santa*, abstract entities like *love* or *pi*, cultural and social notions like *Brexit* or a *constitutional monarchy*, products of metaphor or blending like *being buried in red tape* or *Brighton being the San Francisco of Europe* and generalisations like *leopards having spots*.

Relevant aspects of clause structure are described with regard to a cognitive model that reflects fundamental characteristics of pre-linguistic experience:

> According to the **reality model**, affairs in our world have unfolded in a particular way, out of all the ways conceivable. There has been a certain course of events, whereby certain events and situations have occurred, while countless others have not. **Reality** (R) is the history of occurrences, up through the present moment. This history cannot be changed; what has happened has happened. Reality is thus the **established** course of events. Future events are excluded from reality (so defined) because they have not yet occurred and thus have not been either established or fully determined. Moreover, our knowledge of reality is only partial and imperfect. Each of us has our own "take" on it, our own **reality conception** (RC). For a given conceptualizer (C), RC comprises what C accepts as **real** – i.e. as having occurred, or having been **realized**. This conception is always incomplete, and C is bound to be mistaken in many respects. But rightly or wrongly, RC is what C **knows**. (Langacker 2013b: 15)

Langacker (2019) takes specific linguistic properties to motivate assigning clauses to three strata that involve different levels of reality: baseline, basic and propositional.

Baseline reality may be identified with entities which exist in space and time, with reality (R) being conceived reality that is reflected in language (Langacker 2019: 2). R is then a structure, a vast assembly of connected entities, evolving and growing through time as new events occur. Following from above, reality may be characterised as the sum total of what has existed.

The meaning of an utterance is never self-contained, instead emerging from a conceptual substrate that includes ongoing discourse, the speech situation, the object of discussion and background knowledge (Langacker 2019: 3). Complexity of expressions and required conceptual resources are recognised at different hierarchical strata, the initial stratum corresponding to baseline clauses like *Daniel wears glasses* or *Peter drank coffee*, which represent language in its most basic and canonical form, being comprised of the 'essentials': a verb profiling an occurrence, at least one nominal describing the participant(s) and tense to show location within R. Full clauses such as these are representative of the structural

implementation of two semantic functions: description and grounding. Description takes a lexical verb like *wear* or *drink* to specify a basic occurrence, schematic in regard to its participants. Elaboration then occurs with nominals specifying participants: *Daniel* and *glasses*. Finally a clause is yielded when grounded by tense: *wears* and *drank*. The profiled occurrence is then conceived of as an instance, which may be distinguished by its temporal location.

In Cognitive Grammar, the verb to **ground** indicates a speech event, interlocutors as its participants, their interaction, plus the immediate circumstances, most importantly place and time of speaking, and grounding elements serve to specify the status with regard to either the ground of that which a nominal profiles or the process that is profiled with a finite clause (Langacker 2008: 259). Nominal grounding with articles, demonstratives, quantifiers, etc. direct a hearer's attention towards intended discourse referents while clausal grounding with tense, modality, etc. situates the profiled occurrence in regard to a speaker's present concept of reality; grounding connects the interlocutors to content evoked through nominals or finite clauses and gives it a position in their mental universe; therefore pertaining essentially to the content's epistemic status. The main concern for grounding nominals is identification and for clauses is existence. Due to the baseline scenario specifying that interlocutors describe actual occurrences from the 'real world', their reality is presupposed (Langacker 2019: 3).

This is represented in Figure 35, where the baseline scenario in (a) locates the profiled occurrence (**p**) in reality (R) alongside the interlocutors as well as their immediate circumstances, which make up the ground (G) (Langacker 2019: 3). In (b), R is illustrated as a cylinder that is growing through time (t) with the end face of the cylinder representing the manifestation of R in a given moment, which is labelled as the immediate reality (IR), while everything that has gone before it labelled non-immediate reality (N-IR). **p** can therefore be immediate to G and present in IR or else found in N-IR, shown in (c). Because reality is not at issue at this level of strata and with time of speech being a facet of G, immediate and non-immediate to G correspond with present and past time, i.e. the prototypical values of tense markers: *wears* vs. *drank*. This links directly with the experiential factor relating to the occurrence being directly observed or only accessible via memory. In (d), therefore, past occurrences are shown to be lying at a certain distance (DIST) with the arrow, separating **p** from G temporally and experientially and since memory is an extra conceptual resource, a **p** in

N-IR represents a higher stratum. While still at the baseline level, grounding is divisible into substrata: in (d), S_1 is an elaboration of S_0.

Figure 35. Grounding in Baseline Reality (Langacker 2019: 4)

Basic level clauses are elaborations of baselines pertaining to description and grounding alike through the use of perspectival adjustments and grammaticised modals, respectively (Langacker 2019: §3). Adjustments of perspective may be effected through passive, progressive or perfect constructions, affecting the choice of subject, restricting the profiled occurrence to only an internal portion and describing a state where the occurrence is apprehended from a later point of reference, respectively. Each construction morphologically elaborates the verb to derive a participle and combine it at the higher level with the schematic verbs *be* or *have*. Modals elaborate upon grounding so as to introduce a higher level of reality. They specifically remove a profiled occurrence from reality and envisage it as part of a higher stratum of projected reality.

Negation, important in the discussion of verum focus / salient polarity, is an obvious case of existence being considered with respect to other options (Langacker 2019: 8). In English, negative marking occurs on the schematic finite verb, which has the function of either imposing or reinforcing the notion of existence. Negative clauses may then be thought of in the stratum of basic clauses but at a higher-level substratum.

One basic Cognitive Grammar notion is that activity is a necessary part of language structure and occurs on different time scales at different levels from neural activation to interlocutors' interactive activity (Langacker 2019: 9). The time course that conception takes always adds to an expression's meaning, as in example (740) in §5.2.1 of a path going from market to mountain or vice versa, and is essential to negation as it requires a sequenced evocation of conceptions; a positive counterpart must be presupposed if only to convey its absence. Negation is therefore an operation that brings about a conception so as to arrive at another through an element being suppressed, which is a case of baseline/elaboration organisation (Langacker 2016).

In Figure 36(a) it is diagrammed that clausal negation involves a domain serving as a particular level of reality (R) while the positive eventuality is the occurrence that the finite verb is profiling (**p**). (L) represents the locus of processing activity that serves to update in some respect. Negation is marked on the finite verb precisely because it relates to **p** and as it indicates the epistemic status of **p**, it is a facet of clausal grounding. A positive statement, therefore, updates one conception of reality R_i so that the updated version R_{i+1} is where **p** is to be found. In (b), the negative counterpart clause, the location of **p** within R, its reality, is simply provisional, evoked purely as a foundation to subsequently communicate the true situation where **p** is absent in R_{i+1}.

(a) Positive clause   (b) Negative clause

Figure 36. Clausal Polarity (Langacker 2019: 10)

Propositional reality is the highest of the three levels discussed here. At this level, a proposition (P) that is expressed with a finite clause may be negotiated by interlocutors, indicating a different manner of grounding referred to as interactive grounding, which pertains to this higher level of reality (Langacker 2019: 11). A profiled occurrence (**p**) is grounded by a finite clause through placing it in a location of basic reality and, as quoted above, reality is a reality conception that is accepted by a conceptualiser. While the default conceptualiser is the current speaker, the clause does not necessarily represent their view; elaboration of a baseline

substrate may be invoked for the purpose of lying, irony or sarcasm and quoting or paraphrasing another's opinion, for example.

A proposition (P) is expressed by a finite clause and is defined as a profiled occurrence along with its basic grounding (P = [Basic G + **p**]) (Langacker 2019: 12). The identity of C, the person making the grounding assessment, is dependent upon the substrate since propositions are independent of any one conceptualiser and may therefore be used by any C, who may have any level of assessment with regard to the epistemic status of **p**. An epistemic assessment at a higher level that involves reality at a higher level is therefore required for propositions to address their validity: whether or not C accepts as accurate the assessment of **p** as it is expressed through basic grounding. For a specific C, the set of propositions that they accept as valid make up propositional reality (PR) and this is different for every conscious individual, meaning that the validity of a proposition is negotiable and it is this interactive assessment that constitutes the higher level and is a principal function of discourse. Interlocutors actively negotiating the status of P, rather than just passively accepting it, may be conceived as interactive grounding, of which polarity is a dimension.

Polarity, that is, positive vs. negative, may be the focus of attention for interlocutors when it becomes something to be negotiated, therefore constituting a case of interactive grounding at a higher stratum (Langacker 2019: 12). In English, elaboration of the baseline level in Figure 37 for regular negative forms results in discursively non-prominent forms at the basic level in S_2, where utterances follow regular stress patterns. At the higher interactive level at S_3, polarity is put into focus so as to be negotiated and a prosodic accent is placed upon the finite verb:

| POS | NEG | FOC(POS) | FOC(NEG) |
| *He won.* | *He didn't win.* | *He DID win.* | *He DIDN'T win.* |

BASELINE S_1 BASIC S_2 INTERACTIVE S_3

Figure 37. Polarity Organised into Strata (Langacker 2019: 12)

Focussing of polarity is representative of a transition between the organisation of connected discourse and clause structure (Langacker 2019: 13). Belonging to the interactive level, it is an overt manifestation of interlocutors' negotiation while attempting to align their conceptions of reality. Its prominence depends on an awareness of the alternative pole, engaging with a real interlocutor and the required degree of force sufficient to overcome the differing views.

The force-dynamic nature of polarity focussing is evident in English with the amount of prosodic stress put upon the finite verb. This goes from the extreme of making a strong contradiction to a previous statement (747)(a) to the context of the answer to a yes-or-no question (b) to just negating that which has just been uttered (c). It may also simply be to bring a proposition to mind to make sure it is known by all or to trounce a suspicion of an inclination to an opposite pole (748):

(747) a. You are mistaken, I WILL finish this marathon.

     b. A: Do I really have to eat my broccoli?   B: Yes, you DO have to eat it.

     c. A: He has apologised for all of that.   B: No, he HASN'T apologised.

(748) a. In the end, we COULD be leaving the EU without a deal.

     b. Don't forget that we WERE lied to repeatedly.

     c. She may appear lazy, but she DID just write another novel.

The different levels of assessment involved here relate to separate levels of reality; basic grounding provides the location of **p** in regard to basic reality (R), which includes polarity, the representation of the choice between positive and negative (Langacker 2019: 13–14). Interactive grounding then provides a location for P in regard to propositional reality (PR), which includes the focussing of polarity, which conveys that the chosen option is the correct option, that is, it is specific to the validity of the resultant proposition. Therefore, through the negotiation of P, interlocutors also negotiate the status of **p**.

Propositions may undergo negotiation due to being apprehended differently by conceptualisers each with their own version of PR (Langacker 2019: 14). The issue being negotiated with polarity focus is whether or not the overtly expressed P is accepted as valid or its opposite polarity. This involves three versions of PR: the speaker's (PR_S), the hearer's (PR_H) and the intersubjective version (PR_I), which is made up of what they presumably share. In Figure 38(a), the proposition is accepted as valid by the speaker and included in PR_S but not necessarily by the hearer and therefore absent from PR_H. The goal of their interaction, then, is to determine whether or not P should be present in the updated account of PR_I. Negotiation at this advanced level of assessment is naturally one-sided: speakers advocate for their own position, represented with the heavily lined box and arrow, with the hollow arrow representing the force of the advocacy.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 38. Propositional Reality and Polarity Focussing (Langacker 2019: 14)

To reiterate, two levels exist, both of epistemic assessment but with different semantic functions: positive or negative polarity is concerned with existence, that is, whether or not **p** is realised while the focussing of polarity has to do with affirming and therefore reinforcing the polarity option that has been chosen, that is, that which is reflected in P (Langacker 2019: 14). Figure 38(a) is neutral in regard to the proposition being either positive or negative; in (b) and (c), however, the difference is rendered overt. P, the proposition, is positive when the profiled occurrence **p** is located in basic reality R. When **p** is excluded from R, P is negative. Either way, P belongs to PR$_S$ because it is the conception of the propositional reality of the speaker and whether positive or negative, to affirm the polarity option that is expressed overtly, the speaker is indicating that P should be included in PR$_I$. The purpose for the expression is therefore due to the speaker's belief that the hearer could well be inclined towards the exclusion of P. Since **p** and its grounding form part of P, the interlocutors who are negotiating P's status are ultimately concerned with the status of **p**.

Langacker (2019) is confined to single-clause expressions in English and therefore does not make any claim as to universality; however, it does reflect schematic characterisations that do have such a status: the abstract concept of clausal grounding, for example, which, "If broadly defined as indicating the epistemic status of occurrences … represents a fundamental semantic function whose structural implementation varies greatly from language to language," (Langacker 2019: 17).

The four sections presented here have given an overview of Cognitive Grammar that will prove relevant to the subsequent analysis of focus structures in Mùwe Ké in §6. In the next section, the shortcomings of the study of IS that were discussed in the previous section (§5.1) are discussed with relevance to Cognitive Grammar as presented here.

5.3 Another Route for the Study of Information Structure

This section marries the problems with the study of IS highlighted by Matić & Wedgwood (2013), Matić & Nikolaeva (2018) and Ozerov (2018), the three papers discussed in §5.1, plus their suggestions on how to better the study, with the range of tools already available in Langacker's Cognitive Grammar (1987; 1991; 2008 inter alia), that were presented in §5.2 and are employed for analysis in Chapter 6.

Matić & Wedgwood (2013) argue against the regular treatment of focus as a cross-linguistic stable category manifested in different languages through differing structural means: focus markers, word ordering etc. Equally problematic, they argue, is any attempt to salvage such a notion through parameterisation, i.e. the definition or choice of parameters, the introduction of extra primitives like contrast or the reduction to a common single factor. They propose that focus is best seen as a heuristic purely-descriptive linguistic tool that may facilitate the identification of structural patterns and language-internal analysis as well as cross-linguistic comparison without necessarily constituting the analysis (2013: 158).

It is only in this way that the notion of focus should be considered important (Matić & Wedgwood 2013: 159). Focus as a comparative concept allows for the delimitation of the phenomenological field of structures and contexts that have a connection to information update and those speech acts that are based upon it. Since these are central to communication, focus as a comparative tool will most likely bring about important insights regarding the characterisation of human language. Language specifically, therefore, the open-ended tool

facilitates the identification of contexts, structures and relevant grammatical categories while leaving their semantic and formal characterisation open.

This thesis looks at only one language and is therefore unable to make any cross-linguistic claims in regard to the status of focus as a grammatical category after Matić and Wedgwood. Their cogent argument, however, is utterly compelling and the use of focus as a heuristic tool to identify the structural patterns used to generate pragmatic focal effects in Mùwe Ké, presented in §4, has proved very useful. It is agreed, however, that the identification of *-gane* marking and the preverbal position, for example, should not constitute an analysis but instead leave their characterisation open. Matić & Wedgwood (2013: 159) put forward that more explanatory analyses may arise when it is considered that the best way to unify languages is not through gross components of form or function but through deeper and often dynamic terms, that is, in computational processes at various levels.

Matić and Wedgewood (2013: 159) put the examination of these possibilities outside of the scope of their paper, however, simply pointing out that the problems related to linguistic categorisation that they discuss are the results of sloppy practice but also relate to core elements in the theoretic approach that one adopts. However, no specific grammatic theory is suggested as an alternative approach and it is this that this thesis addresses with the application of Langacker's Cognitive Grammar to the ideas developed by Matić and Wedgwood. If languages are to be unified through deeper and dynamic terms examining the various levels of computational processes then there needs to be a way to look at these in an individual language like Mùwe Ké.

The conceptual framework of Cognitive Grammar sees the dynamicity of language as fundamental in that structure consists in activity patterns at each of the neural, psychological, as well as social levels. Understanding how language and structure unfold through processing time is essential to its characterisation as equally as the role of interaction (Langacker 2017a: 272). Langacker's general notions of baseline and elaboration (Langacker 2016), the latter being a dynamic operation of augmentation, adaptation or further processing activity onto the former, helps greatly in the mapping of computational processes at varying levels, as was demonstrated for verum/polarity 'focus' in §5.2.4, which leads to the second paper.

Matić & Nikolaeva (2018) argue against the denotational approach to verum/polarity focus, which treats the notion as a distinct denotation that is contributed by dedicated grammatical

structures. They show that the purported category is defined as such due to faulty analyses, the reification of inferential interpretations as well as the suppression of variation, resulting in an inability of the approach to take account of all of the uses of the grammatical structures standardly assumed to embody verum/polarity focus. As an alternative, an interpretational approach is proposed and the term salient polarity is introduced, understood as the interpretive effects that stem from a speaker's intention to bring their interlocutor's attention towards a proposition's truth value.

This intention links directly to Cognitive Grammar, where the focussing of a hearer's attention by a speaker plays a fundamental role. The descriptive notion of profiling (Langacker 2008: §3.3.1) is the intersubjective focussing of attention that is effected through symbolisation while grounding (Langacker 2008: §9) specifies the epistemic status of the profiled process or thing in relation to the interlocutors. When a proposition itself becomes the subject of negotiation on the part of interlocutors at an interactive level, the negotiation is seen as a higher-level instance of grounding, referred to as interactive grounding, of which polarity is a dimension (Langacker 2019: §5). Figure 38 in §5.2.4 and the discussion thereof assist greatly in the mapping of the process of highlighting the goal of such interaction in whether or not to include a proposition into an updated account of shared intersubjective propositional reality. The interpretive effects that follow are then able to be investigated language specifically.

Since the interpretive effects stemming from a speaker's intention may be brought about by differing inferential mechanisms for varying communicative reasons and may be derived from unrelated denotations, salient polarity after Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) is preferably thought of as a fuzzy set of family resemblances that are brought together through shared communicative intentions rather than a traditional linguistic category defined on the basis of a form/denotation correspondence.

Langacker (2019) takes a similar tack and while his account makes no claims as to universality, since it is confined to single-clause expressions, it does reflect schematic characterisations that do have such a status: the abstract concept of clausal grounding, for example, which, "If broadly defined as indicating the epistemic status of occurrences … represents a fundamental semantic function whose structural implementation varies greatly from language to language," (Langacker 2019: 17). Speakers' intentions, the drawing of attention, inferential mechanisms and their unrelated denotations all find a place in a very neat model while leaving the structural implementation open.

Matić & Nikolaeva (2018) advocate the investigation of Common Propositional Space, after Portner (2007), as well as negation, givenness, existential and epistemic denotations and persuasive intention, which is to say that inquiry should be based on processes rather that things. Rather than looking for the correct denotational properties, it is preferable "to show how source denotations interact with recurrent inferential mechanisms, variable contextual conditions and patterns of conventionalisation, and to investigate the common cognitive basis of this interaction," (2018: 58).

The Common Propositional Space fits very neatly with Langacker's intersubjective version of propositional reality, comprising that which speaker and hearer presumably share (2019: 14), which is found in the model of propositional reality and polarity focussing (Figure 38), that shows the process of negotiating the status of a proposition (and thereby the profiled occurrence also) as the common cognitive basis of a polarity-focussing-type interaction, i.e. interactive grounding.

In the third paper discussed, Ozerov (2018) questions the theoretical bases of IS categories like topic and focus as well as their applicability in a positive move away from the standard circular procedure of formulating a theoretical proposal of a universal category, investigating its cross-linguistic expression and then feeding that back into the category's proposed definition. The proposed framework sees IS phenomena, like those discussed in this thesis, as epiphenomenal effects of various linguistic devices, that are directly related to a wide range of aspects of language and communication, that are intersubjective and interactional as well as useful in the structuring of discourse.

Fitting nicely, Cognitive Grammar is a usage-based framework, where linguistic devices, or structures, are learned patterns of processing activity, referred to as units. Structure is interactive activity and language is dynamic as well as interactive. Profiling is the intersubjective focussing of attention through symbolisation and grounding indicates epistemic status. Grammatical assemblies are representations of an amalgam of discursive and descriptive groupings, where the semantic functions of the former fall under the headings of packaging of content and IS as well as speech management, order of presentation and the connection of utterances (§5.2.2).

The emerging alternative for studying IS, presented in §4 of Ozerov (2018), shows how disparate linguistic categories with no direct relation to IS can create effects that only echo

certain features of IS. To break the circular methodology, the task is set to discover exactly what is directly expressed and how indirect interpretations, like IS, may arise. First, the function of a linguistic device must be identified based on form-function correspondence in all attested contexts. This will subsequently help to explain the effects the device produces in relation to IS contexts. Diverse categories will need to be taken into account and study will be required into how they trigger effects in the interactional management of information.

As discussed above, well-established structures/devices in Cognitive Grammar are units from usage events that come about through entrenchment. The notion of assemblies shows a unified approach to the issue of structure vs. function (Langacker 2017a: 275). Structure consists in groupings, the motivation for which being the functions they fulfil. A grouping's function is simply its place in a larger whole (see Harder 2010) as an element that is participating in higher-level connections plus the groupings they establish. Therefore, for an individual grouping, structure vs. function is an issue of analytical perspective upon the same assembly, looking either at the elements that connect to form it or at its role in subsequent connections that give rise to more inclusive groupings. Functional description is therefore intrinsic to a full structural description rather than being something peripheral to it. The moving window metaphor helps to reflect language structure as dynamic, interactive and grounded contextually. Discourse is cooperative and inherently intersubjective; interlocutors align their focus of attention and scope of awareness through selecting, symbolising and packaging content, negotiating a common apprehension of a descriptive target and updating it continually (Langacker 2017a: 281).

Ozerov (2018: 84) goes on to say that it is certainly possible that cognitive or discourse concepts, such as the processes linked to IS categories discussed in this thesis, may be directly expressed in a language through specially designated means and as such may bring about effects that are comparable to topic or focus; however, their analysis would identify specific narrow functions. Studies dedicated to these linguistic devices would help to show specific cognition-, attention-, and interaction-related categories which play a direct role in communication and which are directly represented in language. Further generalisations based on such analysis would then produce a thorough account of both the cognitive and interactional principles associated with information management as well as how discourse is processed.

Again, this fits perfectly with the discussion of Cognitive Grammar in this chapter. The moving window metaphor allows for a coherent conception of the cognitive and interactional principles that are associated with information update and management from the outset. Discourse is an

inherently intersubjective process. Furthermore, Cognitive Grammar research envisages a unified account of discourse, processing and structure.

Ozerov's primary empirical question (2018: §4.2) is to ask which relevant categories find expression in the world's languages. Precious few studies look into a device like an IS marker in terms of its overall function and semantic meaning or examine if the IS role arises either directly or merely as some kind of pragmatic interpretation taken from a rather different category. Studies dedicated to the form-meaning correspondence of things like focus markers show their primitive functions, which are revealed to not have any direct connection to IS categories. What is found is that they instead directly express concepts of discourse structure, as well as interactional aspects of communication and also attention management, all of which are very easy to understand and model through the coherent conceptual framework of Cognitive Grammar.

Finally, Ozerov (Ozerov 2018: §4.3) asks, then, what *is* expressed exactly. He puts forward that linguistic devices that were previously identified as IS markers instead directly express various interactional and discourse-managing instructions, which indicate interlocutor-oriented moves on the part of the speaker. An example is wh- clefts in English which, paraphrased informally, indicate the speaker's move to express, "Wait; I am opening a new discourse move and announce the nature of its content," (2018: 91). It is notions such as these that are expressed directly by devices specific to one language and that find an immediate role in the exchange and processing of information.

Such analysis fits perfectly the semantic functions that are implemented by discursive groupings, which are represented in a grammatical assembly in Cognitive Grammar: speech management, the connection of utterances, IS, order of presentation and the packaging of content.

Cognitive Grammar, therefore, would appear to be the perfect lens though which to analyse the pattern of Mùwe Ké focus structures described in Chapter 4 while taking into account the shortcomings of previous IS study as pointed out by Matić, Wedgwood, Nikolaeva and Ozerov in §5.1 and following their suggestions for preferable lines of investigation.

This is what is presented in the next chapter.

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6

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Mùwe Ké Focal Effects

This chapter analyses the focus structures presented in Chapter 4 – predicate, term, sentence, verum and contrastive focus – plus the preferred preverbal focus position and differential/focal ergative/-*gane* marking, utilising the Cognitive Grammar notions presented in §5.2 and discussed in §5.3 as solutions to the problems with the study of IS after Matić, Wedgewood, Nikolaeva and Ozerov in §5.1. -*gane* (§6.1), word order (§6.2), verum (§6.3) and contrast (§6.4) are presented in turn and conclusions are given in §6.5.

6.1   The Use of *-gane*

This section argues that rather than being some kind of 'focus' marker applied to actors, *-gane* as a unit profiles and grounds an actor and simply serves a highlighting function for the intersubjective focussing of attention towards it. The two subsections present the argument from the side of the obligatory use of *-gane* in §6.1.1 and its optional employment in §6.1.2.

6.1.1   Obligatory Use of *-gane*

This first subsection presents the required use of the ergative *-gane* marker as grounding actors with a highlighting effect as discourse-significant.

In §5.2.1 it was shown that all elements of grammatical description have conceptual import. Grammar is made up of ways to construe conceptual content and symbolise that construal; specific symbolic expressions instantiate schematised patterns of symbolisation. Linguistic structures are made up of acquired patterns of processing activity and well-established structures, labelled units, are selected from usage events, defined as instances of actual language use in all their specificity and complexity. Units come about through entrenchment, a general phenomenon that is observable in every type of learned human activity. Being a

matter of cognition, entrenchment is conventionalisation's individual counterpart; it is the social process of the standardisation of structures within a speech community.

Discussed in §2.2.7.2, the particle *-ga*, relating to classical literary Tibetan *ka*, based on the independent nominal stem *kha* 'part', has indicative and intensifying functions, seen in examples (50) onwards, some of which are repeated here:

(50) *dùru-ga*

here-SPEC

'right here; exactly here' (Misc-28)

(53) *ḍàwa-ga*

Dawa-SPEC

'exactly/only Dawa' (Misc-31)

(this could be used when choosing a person for a job or a team, for example)

(55) *ŋà mùwa-ga ìn*

I Mùwa-SPEC be.ASSERT

'I'm definitely Mùwa' (Misc-32)

(said in correction to the comment "You're not Mùwa")

(56) *ŋà pʰùŋna nàŋ ḍò-i-ga-ot*

I forest in go-IPFV-SPEC-ASSERT

'[At the exact time when] I was going in the forest…' (TMA_Part-B-1)

The ablative marker *-ne* (§2.2.7.6) indicates provenance and coupled with *-ga* has become a well-established structure, or unit, in the language, selected from usage events and standardised in the speech community through entrenchment and conventionalisation. Although this is difficult to map diachronically since Mùwe Ké has never been written, it can be said that at some point the use of *-gane* replaced the ergative marker *-gi*, found in classical (and modern) Tibetan as well as remaining on Mùwe Ké pronouns, which, as pointed out by Filimonova (2005) and discussed in §2.2.7.2, belong to a lexicon's most archaic parts and are therefore more resistant to morphological changes thereby preserving older case markers for longer than common nouns. Strongly indicative *-ga* and the marker of provenance *-ne* form a unit with an actor so as to point them out unequivocally as the source of the action profiled by an utterance.

The structure may also be viewed in relation to its organisation into strata in relation to the notions of baseline and elaboration (§5.2.4), where elaborative elements map the baseline onto higher-level structures, augmenting or adding processing activity. Indeed morphology shows prime examples of baseline/elaboration layering (Langacker 2016: 13) due to affixation, deriving higher-level autonomous structures which in turn may function as a baseline for further affixation:

Figure 39. Baseline/elaboration into strata of ACTOR(-ga(-ne))

Viewed thus, an actor is seen as a baseline, elaborated with *-ga* for specification a higher-level stratum (S_1), which serves in turn as the baseline elaborated by *-ne* for provenance at the next level (S_2). Equally feasible is the nominal stem *ga* (*kha*) being elaborated by *-ne* to form a morphological unit which may elaborate an actor. Either way results in the entrenchment of action provenance from a specific actor.

In this way, elements and units comprise an assembly simply through their connection and grouping (§5.2.2), unifying structure and function, the function fulfilled being the motivation for grouping structures. The assembly provides a means of symbolic expression furthering the global function of language, i.e. the part it plays in thought and communication. Symbolic structures effect the application of semantic functions. The interplay of these factors provides an inherently interactive description, showing interlocutors' cooperative endeavour to apprehend the situation being described with respect to the ground, which is their offstage point of reference, default vantage point and deictic centre defined by their very interaction (§5.2.1). The role of speaker and hearer as offstage subjects of conception provides the basis for profiling and grounding.

Effected through symbolisation, profiling is the intersubjective focussing of attention; a profile is the conceptual referent, here an actor, put 'onstage' as part of the general locus foregrounded for the viewers' attention. The ground refers to a speech event, the interlocutors involved, as well as their interaction, plus the circumstances immediately surrounding the event, most notably the place and time of speaking (Langacker 2008: 259). Grounding elements specify the status of the thing profiled through a nominal (or process profiled though a finite clause) in

regard to the ground. Nominal grounding with *-ga(-ne)* directs the hearer's attention towards the intended discourse referent and establishes a connection between actor and interlocutors. Grounding therefore singles out and selects a referent (2008: 277–8) from a potential pool of candidates much like Rooth's alternatives (§3.2.2). However, similar to Matić and Wedgewood's (2013: 154) point that focus may be modelled with alternatives since they may not be separated from the notion of assertion, grounding as the singling-out of referents from a pool of candidates is an essential part of communication since content left ungrounded finds no place in the mental universe of interlocutors and is unable to be applied to their situation, left to simply "float unattached as an object of idle contemplation," (2008: 259).

The grammatical assembly is, therefore, representative of an amalgam of descriptive and discursive groupings (§5.2.2). Descriptively, *-gane* identifies and grounds an actor. Supervenient upon the descriptive content are the discursive semantic functions of speech management, connections of utterances, IS and packaging of content (along with order of presentation, not strictly relevant here but discussed with reference to the preverbal position in §6.2), all of which pertain more to linguistic expression in how the descriptive elements are related to each other in coherent and cohesive discourse.

In a classic Q/A pair like (625) from §4.4.2 on term focus, for example, speaker A is enquiring after the identity of the actor in the situation of Tashi being hit, which is grounded through the interactive function of being a question with the expectation that B has that information and will respond with it, which implements the discursive function of turn taking, a basic element of **speech management**, as well as making a **connection** to the subsequent replying utterance.

(625) A: *ʈáʃi-la* *sú-i-gane* *tʰ ù:-s-a*

       Tashi-DAT   who-ERG-ERG beat.PST-PST.TES-Q

       'Who hit Tashi?'

    B: *ʈáʃi-la* *[ɖòlma-gane / *ɖòlma]F* *tʰ ù:-s*

       Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG / Dolma   beat.PST-PST.TES

       '[Dolma]F hit Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-25)

Important also to the management of speech and the connection of the two utterances is the Tibetic rule of anticipation (§2.3.5) where the question is put in such a way so as to anticipate the evidentiality and egophoricity of the answer. Speaker A uses the testimonial *-s(oŋ)* in anticipation of B having direct sensory evidence (§2.3.6) to the knowledge of the actor's

identity and also employs the conjunct form since the actor is a third person to both of the interlocutors. Further to anticipating the evidentiality and egophoricity of the answer, and pending further research, I lightly posit that the use of *-gane* anticipates the grounding of the actor in the answer, thereby also managing speech and connecting the utterances. Indeed the literature only discusses the rule of anticipation with respect to the verb stem but it may well turn out that DAM and word ordering are also required to be anticipated; this would appear to certainly be the case for Mùwe Ké and would merit investigation in Tibetic languages on the whole. B's answer, therefore, connects the requested actor to A's question.

With regard to **IS** and the **packaging of content**, *-gane* directs A's attention to the required actor, highlights the discourse-new 'Dolma' as the source of the action of hitting, and marks the actor as discursively significant content as well as being non-recoverable from previous discourse. This is also the case for non-Q/A examples like example (569) from §4.3.2 on predicate focus:

(569)

rùl	*dì:*	*múk-dʒi*	*tár*	*kʰì-gi*
snake	this	bite-FUT	preparation	do.VSR-IPFV

'The snake is preparing to bite.'

rùl-gi	*ŋáwa-la*	*[kí:-gane*	*mú:-duk]*F
snake-GEN	tail-DAT	dog-ERG	bit-PRF.TES

'[(A) dog has bitten]F the snake's tail.' (QUIS-3.1-179)

While the snake and, through general knowledge about snakes and their inalienable parts, its tail, are recoverable from the first utterance, the discourse-new and discursively significant content of the dog (biting) is required to be packaged as a single unit with *-gane* to contrast

with that which is already available and to highlight and draw any listeners' attention to the new actor.

While this discursive structure is found mostly 'offstage' in that it inheres to the organisation of the descriptive content rather than being the object of conception itself, discursive and descriptive structure intertwine along with grammatical and lexical structure as aspects of an assembly, which are dynamic, consisting of patterns of processing activity, and which may be represented through a series of windows where connections are made and groupings emerge, which, in turn, may be visualised as a single window passing through a conceptual landscape so as to unify grammar and discourse within the analysis through building smaller parts into a whole (§5.2.2).

The dog biting the snake and Dolma hitting Tashi are the descriptive targets (DT) of the respective discourses, that is, the section of the speaker and hearer's mental universe that is under discussion (see Figure 32 in §5.2.2), in the first being presented, in the second being questioned. In Figure 40, the two windows (W_1, W_2) function sequentially as immediate scope (IS) for the two utterances in (569); in the first, the snake (s) is preparing to bite (p_b) while in the second, the dog (d) is biting (b) the snake's tail (s_t).

Figure 40. Example (569) 'The snake is preparing to bite > (A) dog has bitten the snake's tail'

Outside of the descriptive content onstage at the time of speaking, discursive connections are also illustrated: the snake and its tail are coreferenced since the latter necessitates the former and since the dog can't bite the tail without biting the snake, and the interaction of speaker (S) and hearer (H), forming the ground (G), plus their offstage parts as conceptualising subjects, all of which form part of the utterances' maximal scope (MS). Taken altogether, language structure is shown as interactive, dynamic and contextually grounded.

Although content here is presented individually in two utterances, a coherent conception continues to be represented since the descriptions are to do with the overlapping portion of DT. Content invoked in the first window stays active while the second is being processed; it is part of the second but only a selection (the snake's tail) is put onstage and explicitly described. This selection relates to IS in that it is the dog's biting that forms the new content and pertinent to this discussion, *-gane*, which is obligatory here, is employed to highlight and draw the hearer's attention to the new actor in W_2, not present in the overlap with W_1.

This is similarly seen in the Q/A example (625) although, as shown in Figure 41, the ground is different in that the very act of questioning is obliging the speaker to act through answering the question. This is represented by the double-lined arrow from speaker (S) to hearer (H), relating to the first interrogative utterance. The hearer is assumed to have knowledge of the actor's (?) identity in the profiled occurrence of Tashi being hit, represented with the connecting dotted line. In the second utterance, speaker and hearer exchange roles, represented with the correspondence lines, and the new speaker presents the requested identity of the actor as Dolma (D) to the hearer thereby aligning their scope of knowledge.

Figure 41. Example (625) 'Who hit Tashi? > Dolma hit Tashi'

The required use of *-gane* here, therefore, is also (or more so) to point out Dolma as the unequivocal source of the action and ground her as the actor as well as to direct the hearer's attention to the requested actor, thereby highlighting the discourse-new as discursively significant and essentially non-recoverable from previous discourse, and to contrast with that which is already available, which here lacked an epistemic stance on the part of the initial speaker as to the identity of the actor. The descriptive target is only achieved in W_2, therefore, since W_1 is incomplete, which is what necessitated the question in the first place.

In both examples, therefore, a unit is formed which profiles and grounds an actor, towards which interlocutors' attention is directed, and which is highlighted as discursively significant content not recoverable from previous discourse, contrasting with that which is already available. Put as simply as possible, there is a new actor in W_2 which speaker points out to hearer with *-gane*.

It is this simple reduction (and all that it entails) that explains the pattern summarised in §4.8 with respect to the 'focus structures' observed in Mùwe Ké and shown again in the following table (optionality is discussed in the next subsection):

-*gane* marking	Obligatory	Term-focussed actors Predicate-focus actors Contrasted actors
	Optional	Sentence focus -*min-duk* constructions verum

*Table 24. The pattern of -*gane *marking*

For term focus (*Dolma* hit Tashi), predicate focus (*A dog* bit the snake) and, as illustrated next in Figure 42 for (718), contrasted actors (No, *Karma* drank tea), the speaker is pointing out a new actor in W$_2$. This is not due to a Roothian/Krifkan (§3.2) idea of 'focus' as alternatives but simply for the intersubjective focus*sing* of attention (§5.2.3).

Contrast as correction [CORR$_{(ii)}$] (§3.4), in terms of the moving window metaphor, sees the 'replacing' of an element in W$_1$, represented in Figure 42 with a dotted arrow. Note that the rest of the MS is not included here for brevity, which is followed for the remainder of this chapter when it is only the DT that is relevant to the ongoing discussion. In example (718) from §4.7, A asks the question of B as to whether Tashi was the one who drank the tea but the DT be represented equally if it were a statement that was then corrected by B. As in the examples of term- and predicate-focussed actors, contrasted actors in W$_2$ form a unit with -*gane* to point out the new actor as the unequivocal source of the action, profiling and grounding it as a new selection from the pool, directing the hearer's attention towards it, highlighting the discourse-new as discursively significant, non-recoverable from previous discourse and contrasting with that which is already available. Once again, it is employed for the intersubjective focussing of attention.

(718) A: *tshádʒa   ʈáʃì-gane   tú:-s-e*

butter.tea   Tashi-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q

'Did Tashi drink butter tea?'

B: *tshádʒa   kárma-gane   tú:-s*

butter.tea   Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES

'(No.) *Karma* drank butter tea.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 91-2)

Figure 42. Karma drinking tea

Contrastive utterances are discussed in §6.4 below.

In this subsection, the obligatory use of *-gane* was shown to be employed for the intersubjective focussing of attention towards an actor. Its optional use discussed in the following subsection, therefore, corresponds to the lack of this necessity.

6.1.2 Optional Use of *-gane*

Inversely to the previous subsection, the intersubjective focussing of attention accounts for actors that are *not* in a 'focus domain' (§3.3), as in the following term-focus example taken from §4.4.2, that does not require *-gane* marking since speakers have no need to specifically point out the actor (the man) due to it being present from the start in W_1. Speakers still have the option to use *-gane* for highlighting purposes if chosen, of course (which in itself shows that *-gane* is not focus), but its use is not obligatory. Note that subsequent examples do not show the original adverbials since they are not relevant to the current discussion.

(630) *kérkjal   dì:-gane   tʃí:-la   kʰjà-i-du-a*
        man   this-ERG   what-DAT   hit-IPFV-TES-Q
        'What is the man hitting?'

        kérgjal   dì: gàri-la   kʰjà-i
        man   this   jeep-DAT   hit-IPFV
        'The man is hitting (a) jeep.'   (QUIS-3.1-195)

Figure 43. Man hitting jeep

In Figure 43 the actor 'man' (m) hitting (h) is present in W_1. In W_2, it is the jeep (j), the undergoer, that is discursively significant and to which the hearer's attention is directed. In W_2, therefore, the man has already been pointed out as the source of the action; he has already been profiled, grounded and therefore selected from the pool; he is not discourse-new but present in the hearer's scope of attention; he is not discursively significant; and he does not contrast with that which is already available. -*gane*, therefore, is not required.

In this vein, the optional marking in Table 24 may also be explained. In sentence-focus (thetic), *min-duk* and verum utterances, there is no new actor in W_2 that needs grounding, pointing out to an interlocutor or highlighting as discursively significant. Thetic utterances, for example, prototypically by their very nature of being all-new exhibit only a first single window and therefore do not require the pointing-out of the actor any more than any other element. That is not to say that the option of employing -*gane* for some highlighting usage is not there, this is up to how the speaker wishes to construe the situation, but that it is not obligatory. In example (664) from §4.5.2 the participant gave an all-new description of a previously unseen picture which was not part of a series. This yields but a single metaphorical window in DT, where 'this person' (p) is described hitting (h) a cow (c):

(664)

dì:	*mì:*	*dì:*	*pʰàlaŋ-la*	*kʰjà-i*
this	person	this	cow-DAT	hit-IPFV

'This person is hitting (a) cow.'   (QUIS-4.3-183)

Figure 44. Person hitting cow

If, therefore, focus were to be taken as a category that casts its domain over terms, predicates and sentences, an alignment would be expected of obligatory -*gane* on term-, predicate- and

sentence-focus actors since they are included within their respective focus domains. However, if, as shown, *-gane* is for the grounding of and intersubjective focussing of attention towards discursively significant actors in a second overlapping metaphorical window, the alignment is easily accounted for: term-focussed, predicate-focus and contrasted actors all require pointing out in W_2 while actors in sentence-focus, *-min-duk* and verum utterances do not. *-min-duk* and verum are illustrated in turn.

Min-duk constructions, with respect to the actor and *-gane* marking, perform in the same way as thetic utterances. The sentence is all-new and therefore the marking is optional, presumably with a subtle difference in construal that is barely noticeable to the interlocutors. There is only one window, in which the complete action is described and there is, therefore, no need for any element to be highlighted any more or less than any other, illustrated here with example (676) from §4.5.3:

(676) *ɖòlma   ʈáʃì-la   tʰù:-min-duk*
       Dolma   Tashi-DAT   beat-NEG-TES
       'Dolma hit Tashi.'   (Misc-27)

Figure 45. Dolma hitting Tashi

As a small side note, it may be said that *-min-duk* serves a similar grounding and intersubjective highlighting function to *-gane* but with the clause as a whole.

With respect to verum utterances, once again there is no need for highlighting of the actor in W_2 since it remains unchanged in the DT from W_1, due to that which is communicated being to do with the polarity, which is represented very simply in Figure 46 as a replacement of negative to positive. As with thetic and *min-duk* constructions, *-gane* marking is optional.

(693) A: *ɖòlma-gane   ʈáʃì-la   mà-tʰu:-s*
           Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat-PST.TES
           'Dolma didn't hit Tashi.'

B: *ţáʃi-la*   *ḍòlma(-gane)*   *tʰù:-na*   *tʰù:-s*

Tashi-DAT   Dolma(-ERG)   beat.PST-CONN   beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma *did* hit Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-91)

Figure 46. Dolma hitting Tashi

Verum/polarity is discussed in 6.3 below.

Rather than differential marking with *-gane* being related to a preconceived notion of focus, therefore, it instead seeks to simply point out the actor as discursively significant to an interlocutor. Since its use is not required discourse-initially (in a first window) or when given (overlapping with a previous window) it seeks to ground a new actor, bringing it to an interlocutors attention by placing the actor 'onstage', highlighting them as discursively significant, non-recoverable form previous discourse and contrasting with that which is already available. Discursive reasons for its use include the highlighting of requested actors in a Q/A scenario (term and predicate focus), of contrastive actors (§6.4), the introduction of a new or unsuspected actor into a narrative, and any other setting where the actor is discursively 'important'. It is not, however, the manifestation of 'focus' as a grammatical category.

6.2 Word Ordering

This section argues against the immediately preverbal position being some kind of special 'focus' position where term-focus, predicate-focus and contrasted items are placed so as to be marked as 'focal' as presented in §4. It is shown instead that Mùwe Ké prefers a given-before-new preference along with the hard requirement of the verb appearing sentence-finally and therefore the preverbal position is the only place for new (not necessarily focussed) elements to fall. The subsections look at the preverbal preference in §6.2.1 and 'free' word ordering in §6.2.2.

6.2.1   The Preverbal Preference

While the presentation of *-gane* in the previous sections looked at both its descriptive (i.e. profiling, grounding, etc.) and discursive functions, word ordering has only discursive functions. Grammatical assemblies are an amalgam of descriptive and discursive functions (§5.2.2) with the latter supervenient on the former and concerning linguistic expression, that is, the way descriptive elements in a coherent and cohesive discourse are related to one another. Semantically, the import of discursive functions lies in how descriptive content may be presented and accessed while phonologically, temporal sequencing (and prosody) assists in the organisation of descriptive elements, which together fall under the five broad aforementioned headings of speech management, the connection of utterances, IS, order of presentation and the packaging of content.

Due to being supervenient on the content that descriptive elements provide, discursive structure does not have a great deal of content of its own and is found mostly offstage, inhering to the organisation of descriptive content rather than being an object of conception in itself (§5.2.2). It is fair to say, and exemplified greatly in the relative difficulty for language assistants to complete judgement tasks, that interlocutors have no explicit awareness of the role that word ordering plays in the marking of old and new information.

Lexical, grammatical, descriptive and discursive linguistic structures, therefore, are intertwined aspects of assemblies making up all of these dimensions of organisation. An assembly is dynamic and consists of patterns of processing activity, represented in Cognitive Grammar through windows, in which connections are made and groupings emerge. Elements appear consecutively in windows on a single time scale and these are grouped and connected into a window on a wider time scale, basic seriality therefore giving rise to hierarchy. 'Chunk-and-pass' processing (Christiansen & Chater 2016) compresses and recodes continuous linguistic input in order to deal with the fleeting nature of memory and language, building multilevel representation and managing local ambiguities.

Processing windows whose duration coincides with a clause are labelled intonation units (Chafe 1987; 1994), which conceptually represent currently active information or that which is being attended to. Taking example (625) from §4.4.2 on term focus, which was discussed in reference to *-gane* in the previous section, two main intonation units may be identified. While this thesis includes no formal description or analysis of prosody in Mùwe Ké, intonation

units in the language are intuitively easily identifiable on the basis of slight preceding and following pauses, the pattern of acceleration-deceleration, an overall decline in pitch level and a falling pitch contour at the end, after Chafe (1994: 60). In (749), therefore, the canonical prosody of a term-focussed answer is illustrated with the given information, *dàŋ bàzar-ru ṭáʃì-la*, preferably appearing first with a pause following it, accelerated for brevity, and an overall reduction in pitch and intensity. The new information that follows, ĐÒLMA, is seen with a pause beforehand, decelerated to a normal speech speed, with unreduced stress, represented with SMALL CAPS, and with the falling pitch contour occurring with the verb, which is also given and with which it forms an intonation unit, and which has the hard requirement of appearing sentence-finally.

(625)   *dàŋ*   *bàzar-ru*   *ṭáʃì-la*   *sú-i-gane*   *tʰù:-s-a*
         yesterday   market-LOC   Tashi-DAT   who-ERG-ERG   beat.PST-PST.TES-Q
         'Who hit Tashi in the market yesterday?'

         dàŋ   *bàzar-ru*   *ṭáʃì-la*   *ḍòlma-gane*   *tʰù:-s*
         yesterday   market-LOC   Tashi-DAT   Dolma-ERG   beat.PST-PST.TES
         'Dolma hit Tashi in the market yesterday.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-25)

(749)   *//dàŋ bàzar-ru ṭáʃì-la // ĐÒLMA-gane tʰù:-s //*

Pending future research on prosody in the language, however, the same intonation units may be identified morphosyntactically according to the new/focussed answer term preferably appearing in preverbal position with the other given elements preceding it, which may reportedly appear in any order but in the data show a preference for following the same order as in the question (§4.4.1), plus the hard requirement of the verb appearing sentence-finally (§4.5.1: (634)).

The consistent ordering, therefore, is given-new-verb and it is this pattern that is responsible for the suspicion of a dedicated immediately preverbal focus position, as discussed in Chapter 4 and summarised in §4.8 and the following table. However, upon inspection both closer and wider and through the lens of Cognitive Grammar, the language simply exhibits a given-before-new preference (§4.1) and a sentence-final requirement. Logically, therefore, the preverbal position is the only place available for new/focal non-verbal elements but, again, there is no evidence to suggest that the preverbal position is some kind of special focus position but rather that it is the only position for new information to go.

Word order	Preverbal	Term-focus terms
		Predicate-focus terms
		Contrasted items
	Free	Sentence focus
		-min-duk constructions
		Verum

Table 25. Word-order patterning

The distinction between the preverbal and free division in Table 25 may therefore be explained through the five broad semantic functions, essentially due to the packaging of content into intonation units and grammatical structures in the respective utterances. Term-focus, predicate-focus and contrast utterances all contain more than one non-verbal unit and since, for the varying reasons discussed below, given precedes new in Mùwe Ké, the intonation unit containing the new term sees it only fall in preverbal position as the verb must appear finally:

(750) Term focus: // [given] // [new term] / [given verb] //

Predicate focus: // [given] // [new term] [new verb] //

Contrasted item: // [given] // [replacement term] / [given verb] //

These are illustrated and discussed in turn with reference to the moving window metaphor (§5.2.2) and the five broad semantic functions of speech management, the connection of utterances, IS, order of presentation and the packaging of content. Free word ordering is similarly discussed in the next subsection with utterances shown to only contain one non-verbal intonation unit and therefore with no given-before-new distinction to be taken into account.

The **term-focus** Q/A pair in (625), which was illustrated in Figure 41 and is repeated here, sees speech being **managed** simply through the interactive function of being a question, which is highlighted through the word order of given, background or topical *ʈáʃì-la* 'Tashi-DAT' uttered first before the question word *sú* 'who' and sentence-final verb, and which makes a **connection** to the subsequent answer utterance:

Figure 41 (repeated). Example (625) 'Who hit Tashi? > Dolma hit Tashi'

As in the discussion with reference to *-gane* in the previous section, I put forward lightly that the word ordering of the question here is due to the Tibetic rule of anticipation (2.3.5) whereby the asker of the question anticipates the word order of the answer (given-new-verb) from the 'askee' (along with evidentiality and egophoricity) and therefore sees the question word appearing in preverbal position since it is the only place to go, akin to the discussion of new/focal terms given here; more research is needed, however. This anticipation also helps to manage speech and connect the utterances.

The connection of utterances is also brought about through the overlapping of content in the descriptive target (DT). Given content from W_1 is presented first in W_2 (save for the sentence-final verb) so as to highlight the link with the previous (question) utterance, which, since there is a given-new division, has also to do with **IS**, where the language, as established, has a preference for given before new. Given content preferably appears first so as to highlight the new or focal.

This IS preference is in turn linked to the **order of presentation**, always of semantic import in Cognitive Grammar, in that it induces the sequence of access and therefore the order of conception (§5.2.1: (740)). That which is given and which overlaps in the DT is presented first

in order to connect with the previous utterance but also to emphasise the subsequent discourse-new, moving first through the familiar and known landscape to reach the new and previously unknown in much the same way as an English cleft: '*The person that hit Tashi* is <u>Dolma</u>' (§5.1: (738)).

Finally, the **packaging of content**, as discussed above, sees (prosodic) groupings of (intonation) units relating to given and new, which may then be ordered accordingly so as to optimise the intersubjective focussing of attention towards the new/focal content.

With sole reference to word order, **predicate-focus** utterances function equally to term-focus due to the fact that the verb will always be found in sentence-final position. New terms included in the predicate-focus domain appear after the given content to manage speech, letting the given elements form a connection with the previous utterance, to highlight the information-structural notions of given/new/focus, the order of presentation inducing the order of conception to emphasise the new/focal, and the packaging of content into units helps optimise the intersubjective focussing of attention. The intonation unit formed by new term and given verb in a term-focus utterance compares to one formed by a new term and verb in a predicate-focus utterance in that the verb has reduced prosody on the former and unreduced on the latter although this is outside the scope of this morphosyntactic analysis.

The DT for example (553) shows the new/focal information in W_2 as 'broke a cup' but it is only the 'cup' that may be subject to given/new word ordering. 'In the morning Tashi…' is given and therefore appears first leaving the preverbal position as the only available place for the 'cup' to go.

(553) *ŋárok* *ʈáʃì-gane* *tʃĭ:* *tʃʰè:-s-a*
       morning Tashi-ERG   what   did-PST.TES-Q
       'What did Tashi do in the morning?'

       ŋárok *ʈáʃì-gane* *[kárjol* *tʃhák-s]*F
       morning Tashi-ERG   cup   broke-PST.TES
       'In the morning Tashi [broke (a) cup]F.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 44-88: 103-4)

Figure 47. Tashi breaking cup

Examples of **contrast** (§6.4) are also identical in terms of the discussion on word order. The new contrasting replacement term appears after the given content and before the sentence-final verb, again for reasons of connection, highlighting, emphasis and focussing. Taking once again example (718), 'Karma' is the replacement term and the only new element and therefore is preferred to appear as late as possible, after all of the given content in W_1, but can't override the syntactic requirement of the sentence-final verb even though it is also given.

(718) *tshámu   tshádʒa   ʈáʃi-gane   túː-s-e*
       night   butter.tea   Tashi-ERG   drank-PST.TES-Q
       'At night did [Tashi] drink butter tea?'

       tshámu   tshádʒa   [kárma-gane]   túː-s
       night   butter.tea   Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES
       '[Karma] drank butter tea at night.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 91-2)

Figure 48. Karma drinking tea

This subsection has shown that the suspected preverbal focus position is instead the product of a given-before-new preference coupled with the sentence-final verb requirement. In the following, free word ordering is shown to be as such due to the lack of any given/new distinction of non-verbal elements.

6.2.2 Free Word Ordering

Following from the given-before-new argument made in the last subsection, this section presents those with apparently 'free' word order as being so since there is no given/new distinction to be made. Sentence-focus and *min-duk* utterances contain only one all-new unit, within which word order is free save for the verb, which is required to appear sentence-finally. Similarly, verum utterances see all elements apart from the verb string as given, which therefore, as a unit as a whole, have nothing new to which to appear before. Elements within the non-verbal groups are therefore free to appear in any order and (751) may be compared to (750):

(751)   Sentence focus: // [new] //

        -min-duk: // [new] //

        verum: // [given] // [replacement polarity verb string] //

The three are discussed in turn with reference to the moving window metaphor and the five broad semantic functions.

Thetic **sentence-focus** and ***-min-duk*** constructions are both all-new and therefore have no need to display a given-new distinction. Speech is not explicitly managed and there is no previous utterance to which to connect; information-structurally each element is new and while topic as the title of a file card (§3.1.3) and focus as alternatives (§3.2.2) may perhaps prefer to be presented in that order so as to identify a referent and say something about it, there is no requirement to do so; and prototypically, content is packaged into a single prosodic unit. The order of presentation, always of semantic import, is perhaps the only important function here as it shows the speaker's choice about how to lay out the conceptual landscape for the hearer, inducing a sequence of access and therefore the order of conception. Since there is an entrenched preference in the language for presenting given before new to highlight, emphasise or focus attention towards the new element, 'less important' elements may be presented first to give emphasis to that which the speaker considers to be a 'more important' part of the utterance.

Min-duk constructions like those seen in §4.5.3 display such preferences. In (676) 'Dolma hit Tashi yesterday in the market!' for example, which would see only one window in the DT within which all of the elements are found, the speaker has the option of first presenting the background scene of 'yesterday in the market' before getting to the actor and undergoer. Furthermore, there is then the choice of the order to present actor and undergoer; if one is your

sibling and you are reporting the incident to a parent, then they may be emphasised by appearing second and therefore preverbally since a family typically has more interest in its members. Similarly, the location or time may be of more import and therefore appear after actor and undergoer. More research is needed, of course, but the point remains that there is no word-order preference in all-new utterances.

Verum utterances (§6.3), however, differ in that there is a new polarity replacement within the verb string while all other elements are given. Taking example (693) once again, it is only the polarity that is new in W_2, with all other elements overlapping from W_1 (note that for simplicity Figure 49 does not represent the adverbials, which would be found in W_1):

(693) A: *dàŋ* *bàzar-ru* *ɖòlma-gane* *ʈáʃì-la* *mà-tʰuː-s*

    yesterday market-LOC Dolma-ERG Tashi-DAT NEG-beat-PST.TES

    'Dolma didn't hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

  B: *dàŋ* *bàzar-ru* *ʈáʃì-la* *ɖòlma-gane* *tʰùː-na*

    yesterday market-LOC Tashi-DAT Dolma-ERG beat.PST-CONN

    tʰùː-s

    beat.PST-PST.TES

    'Dolma *did* hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.' (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-91)

Figure 49. Dolma hitting Tashi

All elements outside the verb string in W_2 form a connection with the previous utterance, therefore and since they are all information-structurally given, may appear in any order although the order of presentation may well turn out to have import according to the order of conception, as discussed above in reference to all-new utterances, and may, pending further research, be adjusted to highlight a certain element within the given group. The packaging of content sees two intonation units, the given elements and the verb string, with no option for reordering since the verb string must appear sentence-finally.

Word order is a limited resource and semantic functions are often seen in competition for its exploitation. To single out a sentence position or specific word order second only to information-structural notions such as focus is to ignore everything else that is occurring, i.e. speech management, the connections of utterances, packaging of content, etc. Taking focus as a stable cross-linguistic category and searching for it in a language will always result in erroneous conclusions like preverbal position as the focal position due to the very fact that is all that is being examined. Examining a language holistically, however, reveals a multitude of interconnected mechanisms of which IS and 'focus' form only a part, that, if studied independently, lead only to false inferences.

6.3 Verum/Polarity

This section presents the underlying processes of that presented as verum focus in §4.6, which sees interlocutors actively negotiating the validity of epistemic assessments of propositions, which are then grounded interactively through polarity focus*sing*.

The discussion after Langacker (2019) in §5.2.4 examined baseline/elaboration organisation and a cognitive model that represents our conception of reality, leading to a clear description of features central to English clause structure. How these two relate to one another also allows for a cogent description of the verum (focus) features in Mùwe Ké that were presented in §4.6 due to the commonality of the underlying processes of interactive grounding, the focussing of polarity and the drawing of attention towards a truth value, all of which are fundamental semantic functions that need to find expression cross-linguistically if the negotiation of one's own truth and reality is to be implemented. Variation, however, is found in structural implementation: polarity is put onstage for negotiation in English through a prosodic accent on the finite verb and in Mùwe Ké through the same on the lexical verb as well as verb repetition and the *V-na V* construction.

The meaning of a Mùwe Ké utterance, as with all language, is not self-contained but emerges from a conceptual substrate including ongoing discourse, the speech situation, the object of discussion and background knowledge. Its complexity is recognised first at the initial stratum that corresponds to baseline clauses like that seen in (678) in §4.6 on verum focus:

(678) A: *ḍòlma-gane   ʈáʃì-la   tʰù:-s*
       Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES
       'Dolma hit Tashi.'

The clause contains the essentials of a verb profiling the occurrence of a hitting/beating, nominals describing the participants and tense to show location within reality. Nominal grounding, here with the respective case markers, directs the hearer's attention towards the discourse referents, and clausal grounding, here with tense and evidentiality, situates the profiled occurrence in the past / before now with respect to the speaker's present concept of reality.

It is here that the Mùwe Ké 'tenses' may be separated in terms of reality and the profiled occurrence that may be situated within it. In §4.6 it was noted that heavy stress indicating verum focus is found on the lexical verb in perfective (678), imperfective and perfect utterances while for utterances referring to the future (684) the stress is found on the auxiliary:

(678) A: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ḍòlma-gane   ʈáʃì-la   tʰù:-s*
       yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   beat.PST-PST.TES
       'Dolma hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

       B: *dàŋ   bàzar-ru   ḍòlma-gane   ʈáʃì-la   mà-tʰu:*
       yesterday   market-LOC   Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST.NEG
       'Dolma **didn't** hit Tashi in the bazaar yesterday.'

(684) A: *ŋèrok   làm-la   ʈáʃì-gane   ḍòlma-la   thóŋ-dʒi   ìn*
       tomorrow   road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   see-FUT   be.ASSERT
       'Tashi will see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'

       B: *ŋèrok   làm-la   ʈáʃì-gane   ḍòlma-la   thóŋ-dʒi   **màn***
       tomorrow   road-LOC   Tashi-ERG   Dolma-DAT   see-FUT   be.ASSERT.NEG
       'Tashi will **not** see Dolma in the street tomorrow.'

Figure 35, repeated below from §5.2.4, shows the baseline scenario in (a) where a profiled occurrence (**p**) is located in reality (R) alongside the ground (G), made up of the interlocutors and their immediate circumstances. In (b), R is divided into immediate reality (IR) and non-immediate reality (N-IR), i.e. now and before now, and in (c) and (d), **p** is shown to be located

in one of these two places. Not located within either IR or N-IR, however, is the future, represented with the dashed line in (b), due to the fact that the future finds no place in reality since it has yet to pass. If, therefore, the focussing of polarity is for the purpose of interactive grounding within a common propositional reality, as discussed below, the future is unable to be debated as such. What may be negotiated between interlocutors is instead their expectations, predictions, intentions, etc., which represent a separate semantic function and schematic characterisation, that finds a separate structural implementation through emphatic prosody on the auxiliary rather than the lexical verb.

Figure 35 (repeated). Grounding in Baseline Reality (Langacker 2019: 4)

Returning to the main discussion, to elaborate upon a baseline clause with negation brings it to a basic level. Negating the clause considers its very existence with respect to other options; negation brings about the conception of Dolma hitting Tashi in order to suppress the notion at a higher-level substratum.

At the third level, propositional reality, the proposition that the finite clause expresses becomes the subject of negotiation between interlocutors and indicates interactive grounding, of which polarity is a dimension. At this higher stratum, whether the clause is positive or negative becomes the focus of attention for interlocutors.

Example (679) from §4.6 may be used to show the organisation into strata of the three levels discussed. In Figure 50, elaboration of the baseline level at the basic level results in discursively non-prominent forms; however, at the higher interactive level, polarity becomes the focus of attention for the purpose of negotiation and heavy prosodic stress is put upon the lexical verb *tʰuː* 'hit/beat'.

(679) A: *ḍòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃì-la*   *mà-tʰuː-s*

Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma didn't hit Tashi.'

B: *ḍòlma-gane*   *ʈáʃì-la*   ***tʰùː-s***

Dolma-ERG   Tashi-DAT   NEG-beat.PST-PST.TES

'Dolma **did** hit Tashi.'   (Elicitation3-Q-A_Pairs-Verum-20)

POS	NEG	FOC(POS)	FOC(NEG)
ḍòlma-gane	*ḍòlma-gane*	*ḍòlma-gane*	*ḍòlma-gane*
ʈáʃì-la tʰùː-s	*ʈáʃì-la mà-tʰuː-s*	*ʈáʃì-la **tʰùː**-s*	*ʈáʃì-la mà-**tʰuː**-s*
BASELINE S₁	BASIC S₂		
		INTERACTIVE S₃	

Figure 50. Polarity Organised into Strata with 'Dolma hit Tashi'

The drawing of attention to polarity at the interactive level sees interlocutors attempting to align their respective conceptions of reality and its prominence depends on awareness of the opposite pole, engagement of speaker and hearer, and the required degree of force so as to overcome the opposing view. The amount of prosodic stress, in terms of pitch and intensity, upon the lexical verb in Mùwe Ké is variable in its force-dynamic nature according to the perceived difficulty in trouncing an interlocutor's stance. The properties of verum listed in (488), from the correction of a previous utterance to an 'Is it really?' effect and similarly the contradiction to a previous statement to the quashing of a suspected inclination seen in (747) and (748), require different 'strengths' of prosodic enhancement to achieve the goal, seeing stronger and more emphatic objections being much louder and high pitched. Furthermore, in Mùwe Ké, when prosody is deemed insufficient, there is the option to employ verb repetition and the *V-na V* construction, reported to be much more 'forceful' (§4.6), with the latter found only in the correction/contradiction of a previous utterance, which may be argued as the situation most in need of emphasis. The perceived level of force necessary in varying discourse

scenarios and how exactly that is manifested (strength of prosody, employing *V-na V*, etc.) requires further research, however.

Looking again at Figure 38 from §5.2.4, interactive grounding focussing on polarity is to express whether or not a proposition (P) or its polar opposite is to be accepted as valid. Three versions of propositional reality (PR) are therefore involved: that of the speaker (PR$_S$), hearer (PR$_H$) and the intersubjective version (PR$_I$), made up of what they presumably share. In (a), P is accepted by speaker but not hearer, bringing about the negotiation of which version should be included in the common PR$_I$ and while speakers naturally advocate their own stance, the force of their advocacy according to the discourse scenario is represented by the hollow arrow. As discussed, this could range from a mild increase in prosody to a full *V-na V* embellished with a heavy layer of prosodic force.

Figure 38 (repeated). Propositional Reality and Polarity Focussing (Langacker 2019: 14)

In (b) and (c) the profiled occurrence (**p**) within P is that which is being debated. In (b), representing B's stance in (679), **p** is included in reality (R) and the speaker is indicating that this version of P should be included in PR$_I$. The opposite is true for (c), i.e. that the negative

version should be included. It is only when interlocutors find common ground on the issue (perhaps after years of 'yes she did' / 'no she didn't' type discussions) that **p** is (interactively) grounded.

This schematic characterisation and the abstract concept of clausal grounding may well prove to have universal status and certainly seem aligned when comparing English and Mùwe Ké, clearly representing the fundamental function of negotiating the epistemic status of an occurrence but leaving its structural implementation open to variation: emphatic prosody on the finite verb in English and the lexical verb in Mùwe Ké as well as entrenched constructions like *V-na V* and verb repetition, accepted by the speech community as a way to, perhaps more forcefully, negotiate a proposition and interactively ground a profiled occurrence.

Interestingly, emphatic prosody on the lexical verb is always perceived as focussing polarity for interactive grounding when compared to the other focus types discussed in §3.3. A task was performed (§1.3) where participants were played an utterance displaying either predicate, term, sentence or verum focus and asked to select the preceding utterance from a pair that elicited, for example, verum and sentence focus. Upon hearing 'Tenzi cut potatoes in the morning', for example, with heavy stress on the lexical verb due to the utterance being negotiated for polarity, participants chose the preceding utterance as 'Tenzi didn't cut potatoes in the morning' over 'What happened?' every time. This was also true when comparing predicate (verb) focus with verum, both of which see nuclear stress on the lexical verb indicating that there is indeed a clearly perceived increase in prosodic stress for the focussing of polarity. For 'Tashi *broke* the cup', participants consistently chose 'Tashi didn't break the cup' (verum) as the preceding utterance over 'What did Tashi do to the cup' (verb focus). With regular prosody on the verb, the opposite was found.

The underlying process found in reference to verum/polarity 'focus' turns out to be very different to those discussed above with reference to *-gane* and word order. Rather than highlighting an actor or manipulating word order to induce a certain order of inception, the very place of an occurrence within reality is that which is brought onstage for interlocutors to negotiate, debate and interactively ground together with shared communicative intent. The investigation of a preconceived idea of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category brings about the erroneous labelling of 'verum focus' as something similar to term or predicate focus through 'focus' being placed on a truth value rather than a term or predicate to indicate alternatives. Investigation of the underlying cognitive process, however, shows very different

activity for the focus*sing* of polarity, which, as discussed in the next section, is much closer to that found with contrast.

6.4 Contrast

This section presents the underlying processes involved with 'contrastive focus' as being almost identical to those found with 'verum focus' in §6.3 after the notion of interactive grounding introduced in §5.2.4.

§4.7 argues that contrast is a grammatically relevant notion in Mùwe Ké, based on discourse relations and indicated with extra prosodic stress so as to be distinguished from focussed terms. Contrasted items are preferably found in the immediately preverbal position and obligatorily marked with -*gane* if the item is an actor. The argument, therefore, is that contrast is a special kind of focus akin to term and predicate focus, all of which seek to indicate alternatives, and that this specialness is signalled through heavier prosody. However, if the underlying processes are examined akin to the previous section, it would appear that focussing for contrastive reasons is very similar to focussing for polarity. While verum is the intersubjective focussing of attention with regard to polarity, contrast is the intersubjective focussing of attention with regard to contrasting terms. Baseline and elaboration, (interactive) grounding and propositional reality underpin contrastive 'disputes' just as they do with polarity. While verum/polarity utterances see interlocutors negotiating the existence of a profiled occurrence (**p**), contrast utterances find them negotiating a participant or other constituent *within* **p**.

Baseline clauses are baseline clauses; the meaning of the utterance in (752) emerges from a conceptual substrate that includes the ongoing discourse, speech situation, object of discussion and background knowledge (§5.2.4). It contains a verb that profiles the occurrence, nominals describing the participants and tense to show location within reality. Nominal grounding directs attention to discourse referents and clausal grounding situates the occurrence before now.

(752) *kárma-gane tʃʰà: tú:-soŋ*
Karma-ERG   tea   drank-PST.TES
'Karma drank tea.'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 16)

The baseline clause may then be elaborated upon to adjust aspect, introduce modality, bring about negation, etc., thereby augmenting the clause to the basic level.

At the third level, propositional reality, the very proposition that is expressed by the finite clause is subject to interlocutor's negotiation, indicating interactive grounding, of which polarity was discussed as a dimension in the previous section and of which the nominal grounding of participants (or indeed any other contrastive constituent after Repp's (2016: 274) first hypothesis seen in (495) in §3.4) may equally be a dimension. The focus of attention for interlocutors at this higher stratum is whether or not one actor or another, for example, is indeed the actual actor within reality. When such an element becomes the focus of attention for the purpose of negotiation at this higher level, it is indicated as such, just like polarity, through heavy prosody as discussed with example (718) from §4.7 on contrast in Mùwe Ké, also discussed above in reference to -*gane* and word ordering:

(718) *tshámu*   *tshádʒa*   **kárma**-*gane*   *tú:-s*

       night   butter.tea   Karma-ERG   drank-PST.TES

       '(No!) *Karma* drank butter tea at night. (Not Tashi.)'   (Contrast 2.0 - Chhorden 1-44: 92)

The drawing of attention towards a contrastive element at the interactive level once again sees the attempts of interlocutors to align each other's conceptions of reality, with its prominence dependent upon awareness of the two contrasting constituents, engagement of speaker and hearer and the degree of force that is required to overcome the opposing view. The amount of prosodic stress required for one's view to be accepted depends on the perceived difficulty in achieving the acceptance. Compare, for example, a simple correction of a slip of the tongue when speaker knows what hearer *meant* to say to the passionate advocacy of one's innocence as seen in (736) with 'No, **HE** stole the watch!'

Figure 51 illustrates the interactive grounding in (718) focussing on the contrastive actor Karma (K) being the one who drank (d) the tea (t) rather than Tashi (T). The moving window metaphor (§5.2.2) is employed to show the overlap of utterances 'Tashi drank tea' in W_1 and '*Karma* drank tea' in the shaded W_2. This illustrates the fact that it is not the whole profiled occurrence that is being negotiated, it is agreed that tea was drunk, but the actor: not Tashi but Karma. These utterances make up the descriptive target (DT) as the proposition (P) that is being debated. Three versions of propositional reality are involved: the speaker's (PR_S), hearer's (PR_H) and the intersubjective version (PR_I). Interlocutors do not accept the same version of P

thereby bringing about the negotiation of which version should be included in PR$_I$; the force of their advocacy (the prosodic strength) is represented by the hollow arrow.

Figure 51. Propositional Reality and Contrast Focussing

It is the profiled actor within P that is being debated and in Figure 51, the current speaker is indicating that K be included in reality (R) but *not* T, seen located outside of R, and that it is this version, W$_2$, that be included in PR$_I$. Once interlocutors agree upon a version, the actor, and therefore the complete profiled occurrence, is interactively grounded.

Relating to the above sections on -*gane* (§6.1) and word ordering (§6.2), -*gane* is required for pointing out the (correct) source of the action, profiling and (interactively) grounding, i.e. (re)selecting from the pool of candidates, directing the hearer's attention to the (correct) actor, highlighting the discourse-new as discursively significant content that is not recoverable from previous discourse, and as contrasting with that which is already available. The contrastive actor is found in preverbal position since it is the only place to go due to the given-before-new

preference, here d and t overlap with W_1, the requirement that the verb appear sentence-finally, and for reasons of connection, highlighting, emphasis and focussing.

Like the discussion on verum, the schematic characterisation and concept of grounding discussed here in likelihood will prove to have universal status and represent clearly the fundamental function of negotiating the epistemic status of a non-verbal element within an occurrence while leaving the structural implementation open to variation cross-linguistically. That which has previously been referred to as verum focus or contrast, upon inspection of the underlying cognitive processes, appear to be remarkably similar in terms of interactive grounding, the focussing of a 'dispute' (of polarity or a contrasting constituent) and the drawing of attention towards truth/reality. These fundamental semantic functions need to find expression if the negotiation of one's own truth and reality, be it on who did it, who it was done to, or whether the whole thing actually took place, is to be implemented.

6.5 Conclusions

This section provides conclusions and addresses the research questions discussed in §1.1, essentially after the three papers by Matić, Wedgewood, Nikolaeva and Ozerov (Matić & Wedgwood 2013; Matić & Nikolaeva 2018; Ozerov 2018), in light of the analysis of Mùwe Ké focal effects in this chapter. After Matić and Wedgewood (2013), 'focus' in Mùwe Ké is shown not to be representative of a stable category that has clearly identifiable content and manifested through differential -*gane* marking and an immediately preverbal position. Its use as a heuristic tool, however, reveals the highlighting function of -*gane* and the given-before-new preference of Mùwe Ké word ordering as well as the process of interactive grounding common to 'verum' and 'contrast' utterances. Similarly, following Matić and Nikolaeva (2018), verum in Mùwe Ké is not a distinct denotation contributed by dedicated grammatical structures such as prosody, verb repetition and the *V-na V* construction but rather the drawing of attention to an occurrence and negotiation of whether it has a place within reality. Finally, the overall and primitive functions of -*gane* marking and word ordering were discussed after Ozerov (2018), showing IS phenomena to be epiphenomenal effects of the two devices, looking at what is directly expressed and the indirect IS interpretations that may subsequently arise.

The data presented in the chapter shows the unit -*gane* grounding an actor through the selecting of a referent from a pool of potentials. This bears similarities to focus as alternatives but it is

argued that just as alternatives may not be separated from the notion of assertion, the singling-out of referents is a requisite aspect of communication. Grounding with *-gane* is no more focus as alternatives as grounding with the (definite) demonstrative *dì:* or an (indefinite) *tʃĭk* 'one'. We may, however, talk about the intersubjective focus*sing* of attention, related to its highlighting focal effects, discussed below.

The employment of *-gane* is found in so-called term, predicate and contrastive focus utterances, which, when examined in terms of their underlying cognitive processes, are really rather different. Term and predicate focus utterances see *-gane* (standardly) grounding an actor while contrastive utterances/dialogues involve the *interactive* grounding of an actor, which involves interlocutor's negotiation of a profiled occurrence at a higher level of propositional reality, involving that of the speaker and hearer plus an intersubjective version. Stronger strategies, e.g. heavier prosody, are according to the force of one's advocacy and the actor is only grounded when an agreement between interlocutors is reached. Uniting these processes under a category of focus based purely on the alternatives that are involved is simply to offer a blinkered view.

Outside of a focus domain in a verum-focus utterance, *-gane* is found to be optional. Since, as it is claimed, focus is on the truth value of a sentence and in Mùwe Ké only realised on the verb string, the actor is not required to be marked. However, this in itself is an argument against *-gane* as some kind of focus marker since focus as alternatives is not something that is optionally marked – there are alternatives or there are not, the actor is in focus or it is not. Furthermore, if sentence focus (and *min-duk* utterances) is said to be focus over the entire utterance, then the optionality found for *-gane* within this focus domain doesn't fit the proposed pattern. Focus as alternatives means there are alternatives for each sentence element and would therefore require marking on an actor but this is not the case.

Having looked at its overall and primitive functions, essentially as a grounding element, it is then possible to talk about the focal effects of *-gane* but it should be kept in mind that the IS notion of focus is an epiphenomenal effect of the device and while its effects overlap with a traditional notion of IS, as a discursive semantic function, they are not restricted to it.

The main focal effect of *-gane* is the highlighting of an actor. It serves the intersubjective function of focussing attention towards an actor through bringing them 'onstage' as the specific source of an action, marking them as discursively significant and new and therefore non-

recoverable from previous discourse, contrasting with that which is already available. This finds compatibility with and is therefore required in term, predicate and contrastive focus utterances but the highlighting effect is not restricted to them. In all-new utterances, for example, its optional use may be employed for the effect of highlighting an actor as discursively significant from the outset due to the context and speech situation in which interlocutors find themselves.

Turning to the immediately preverbal position, which was suggested as some kind of special focus position where focussed terms, or else terms included within a focus domain, are preferably 'placed', it was instead shown that the position is the only one available for new/focussed terms. Rather than a preference for a preverbal position, Mùwe Ké demonstrates a preference for a given-before-new sentence order and coupled with the hard requirement for a sentence-final verb, makes the preverbal position the only place remaining. There is no evidence, therefore, for the position evidencing the notion of focus; furthermore, the position, or rather given-before-new, is a preference and not a requirement. If we are to talk about a designated focus position, it needs to correlate with focus. That is, unless we were to talk about focus as being optionally marked, which is typically not the stance found in the literature and certainly not with focus as alternatives.

The focal effects of given-before-new and therefore the preverbal position are clear, however, and seek once again to highlight. The order of presentation is always of semantic import in that it induces the sequence of access and therefore the order of conception and Mùwe Ké exploits the entrenched given-before-new preference to highlight the new of focal through a mental journey from the known to the unknown – excluding the sentence-final verb requirement. Useful for term, predicate and contrastive utterances, therefore are the highlighting, connecting, emphasising and focussing effects that come about through the preverbal position but its use is also useful for all-new utterance, for example, where terms considered as more important, for whatever contextual/subjective reason, may be highlighted as such by being placed after those considered less important.

While both *-gane* and the preverbal position share similar highlighting focal effects, it is important to remember that IS-related discursive functions are not the only discursive functions that they help to fulfil; they also assist in speech management, the connection of utterances, order of presentation and the packaging of content.

Looking specifically at verum focus, while focus as alternatives was said to be placed on the truth value of the utterance and expressed through the verb string akin to term and predicate focus, examination of the underlying cognitive process involving interactive grounding was found to be rather different. As was argued above with reference to contrastive focus as compared to term and predicate, to also unite verum under a category of focus is to look only at alternatives while ignoring all other processes.

The focal effects of verum, however, expressed through heavy prosody, verb repetition and the dedicated *V-na V* construction show a highlighting function similar to that discussed above but with the drawing of an interlocutor's attention to the truth value of an utterance and the focussing of polarity as something to be negotiated and interactively grounded.

Finally, contrast, when its underlying processes were examined, turns out to be very similar to verum. Contrast is grammatically relevant in Mùwe Ké based on discourse relations but following the reasons discussed here, fails to show evidence for any distinct category of focus. Its focal effects through interactive grounding and the use of *-gane* and a preverbal position similarly show highlighting, connection, emphasis and the intersubjective focussing of attention.

The analysis of the described focus structures in Mùwe Ké using Cognitive Grammar as the descriptive framework, therefore, fails to show evidence for a notion of focus as a stable category in the language, most importantly because there is no one-to-one correlation between *-gane*, the preverbal position and focus (as alternatives) but also due to the lack of any clearly identifiable content. It *is* possible, however, to speak of epiphenomenal focal effects such as highlighting that overlap with IS notions such as focus but that importantly make up only one semantic function amongst intertwined others which, if studied alone, gives only a limited blinkered account.

7
Conclusions and Prospects

This chapter provides closing remarks with regard to the research presented in this thesis. §7.1 gives a summary of the main findings, including an overview of the thesis chapters. §7.2 discusses contributions to the study of Tibeto-Burman (TB) languages, the typology and theory of information structure (IS) and the role that Cognitive Grammar played in the analysis. In each subsection, avenues of future research are suggested.

7.1 Summary of the Main Findings

Presented here are summaries of the preceding chapters and of the main findings in turn.

7.1.1   Summary of Thesis Chapters

Chapter 1 presented an introduction, establishing the basis for the rest of the thesis. Research goals and questions were presented, which were essentially to provide a grammar sketch of a previously undescribed language within which to investigate IS but then also to question whether the IS reflexes found were indeed representative of a stable cross-linguistic notion of focus. Previous studies on IS in TB were mentioned, showing the presence of phenomena such as differential argument marking (DAM), word ordering and topic/focus markers. A background to the Mùwe Ké language was provided, that included the sociolinguistic situation. Data-collection methodology was presented and the thesis structure described.

In Chapter 2 a grammatical sketch of Mùwe Ké was painted to familiarise the reader with the structure of the language, presented here for the first time, and to give an overview of the language-specific constructions which form a large part of the subsequent description and analysis. Phonology, nominals and the verb string were presented in turn before looking at grammatical relations to provide a background to subject and object in the language plus clause

and sentence structure, showing coordination, conditionals and other adverbial clauses, complementation and relativisation.

Chapter 3 presented an introduction to IS and the notions of common ground, focus, givenness and topic to provide workable definitions for subsequent chapters. The notion of focus as alternatives was discussed at length before defining four types of focus domain according to the scope of focus over different parts of an utterance: the predicate, a single term, the entire sentence, or a special type of focus that falls on the truth value (verum) of an utterance. Focus was then discussed with reference to contrast and was said to be a subdivision of focus used in the correction of elements in a previous utterance. Finally, the relation between focus and DAM was presented, showing a tendency for languages to mark arguments that are focussed.

Using the defined IS notions, Chapter 4 presented focus structures in Mùwe Ké. After describing the basics of IS and DAM in the language, predicate, term and sentence focus were presented and it was put forward that a special immediately preverbal focus position and differential ergative marking (DEM) are the direct manifestations of focus in the language. For the expression of verum focus, it was argued that heavy prosody, verb repetition and a special construction are employed and similarly heavy stress was found to mark contrastive as compared to the other focus structures. Both verum and contrast utterances saw word ordering and ergative marking utilised with respect to focus as in previous sections – free and optional for non-focussed terms in the former, preverbal and obligatory for focussed in the latter. This pattern formed the basis for the analysis in the following chapters.

Chapter 5 started with an overview of problems that have relatively recently been discussed in reference to the taken-for-granted notion that focus is representative of a stable cross-linguistic category that simply finds varying manifestations in language to language. Focus as alternatives, including the notion of verum focus and contrast as a special kind of focus were all shown to be untenable both theoretically and empirically. Since recommendations for future investigation into IS, using the notion of focus as a heuristic tool, include the unification of languages in deeper and dynamic terms, the demonstration of source denotations interacting with patterns of conventionalisation, variable contextual conditions and recurrent inferential mechanisms, plus the exploration of the common cognitive basis associated with such interaction, as well as the investigation of cognitive, interactional and communicative categories that are involved in the dynamic processes of linguistic interaction and information

structuring, Cognitive Grammar, which envisions an account of the unification of structure, processing, and discourse, was introduced as the perfect framework for such analysis.

The chapter continued, therefore, with an overview of the conceptual descriptive framework of Cognitive Grammar. Several notions were introduced: units, well-established linguistic structures made up of acquired patterns of processing activity, that come about through entrenchment; profiling, the intersubjective focussing of attention effected through symbolisation; grounding, which indicates the epistemic status of the profiled clause or nominal in relation to interlocutors; grammatical assemblies, representations of an amalgam of discursive and descriptive groupings; the moving window metaphor, a visualisation of a window passing through a landscape of conceptual content, assisting greatly in the unification of grammar and discourse within an analysis; baseline and elaboration, the latter being the operation that maps the former onto a higher-level structure, somehow augmenting, adapting or adding processing activity; and propositional reality, an elaboration of baseline reality where propositions may be interactively negotiated and grounded by interlocutors; all of which were coupled with the aforementioned problems to suggest solutions for the study of IS, which were then used to analyse the Mùwe Ké focal effects of DEM, word ordering, verum and contrast in the following chapter.

Chapter 6, therefore, analysed the focus structures from Chapter 4 utilising the Cognitive Grammar notions from Chapter 5. DEM marked with -*gane*, rather than being a focus marker, was shown as a unit that profiles and grounds actors while providing a highlighting function for the intersubjective focussing of attention towards them for varying discursive reasons. The preverbal position, rather than being a dedicated focus position, was shown to be the result of a given-before-new preference in the language coupled with an obligatory requirement for the verb string to appear sentence-finally, leaving the preverbal position as the only position available. Furthermore, word order, when 'free', was suggested to have import according to the order or presentation, designating the order of inception, therefore with the option to 'highlight' a sentence element according to the context-specific situation of the interlocutors and with semantic functions related to IS but also speech management, the connections of utterances, packaging of content, etc. The underlying processes with reference to DEM and word ordering were both illustrated with the moving window metaphor. The chapter then moved to the analysis of verum and contrast, which were shown to have remarkably similar underlying processes, discussed and illustrated around baseline and elaboration, propositional

reality and interactive grounding, with higher-level forms shown to indicate the initiation of the negotiation between interlocutors of propositions with regard to either their polarity, i.e. their occurrence or non-occurrence and therefore place within reality, or a non-verbal element involved, such as actor or undergoer.

7.1.2   Main Findings

This research set out to find the morphosyntactic manifestations of the IS notion of focus. Based on a sea of previous literature, a universal category was taken at face value to exist and its expression was explored with the goal of feeding the findings back into the definition. The major discoveries were a dedicated preverbal position and obligatory ergative marking on actor terms, including contrasted items, and prosody to distinguish contrasted items with standardly focussed terms and also to express verum, which is also expressed though verb string repetition and a special *V-na V* construction. However, the category of focus itself was later questioned and the underlying cognitive processes that underpin the use word ordering, (differential) ergative marking, etc. were examined.

Rather than simply being the manifestation of focus as a stable category, therefore, the differential -*gane* marker grounds a nominal with a further effect of highlighting the actor as discourse-significant should it be required. Grounding a nominal with -*gane* specifies its status in regard to the ground, which is made up of the speech event, the involved interlocutors, their interaction and the circumstances that immediately surround the event, most notably the place and time of speaking. It directs the hearer's attention towards the discourse referent, marking them as an actor and establishing a connection between them and the interlocutors. Therefore, grounding includes the singling out and selection of referents from a potential pool of candidates, or, traditionally, focus as alternatives, its widely accepted Roothian definition. However, a referent may not be left ungrounded since it will find no place in the mental universe of the interlocutors, unable to be applied to their situation; grounding must occur if an assertion is to be made. Much as Matić and Wedgewood (2013: 154) point out, therefore, focus may be modelled with alternatives since it may not be separated from the notion of assertion, a broader higher-level aspect of communication. The definition looks only at the effects rather than the underlying cognitive mechanisms such as grounding, thereby continuing to fail to single out a narrow natural class of phenomena attributable to an underlying grammatical entity.

Grammatical assemblies are an amalgam of descriptive and discursive groupings. Descriptively, -*gane* identifies and grounds an actor. Discursively, -*gane* highlights an actor as significant, which also sees a strong connection to the traditional definition of focus; however, its information-structural functions form only a part of its overall discursive semantic functions, which pertain more to linguistic expression in how the descriptive elements are related to each other in coherent and cohesive discourse. -*gane* assists in speech management and the connection of utterances as well as structuring information and packaging content. Highlighting is not focus as alternatives but rather the intersubjective focus*sing* of an interlocutor's attention towards an actor by placing them onstage, highlighting them as discursively significant, non-recoverable from previous discourse and contrasting with that which is already available. Therefore, -*gane* is untenable as the simple manifestation of focus as a stable category when both its descriptive and discursive functions are taken into account, especially when the category itself is shown to be unsustainable.

A similar situation is found with regard to word ordering and the dedicated preverbal focus position when language is viewed holistically and the underlying processes are investigated. Word order is a limited resource in any language and semantic functions are frequently seen in competition for its exploitation, including but not limited to information structuring and focussing. Using IS notions, Mùwe Ké prefers to exhibit *given* elements before *new* but also has an obligatory requirement to have the verb appear sentence-finally. Logically, therefore, the preverbal position is the only position available for new/focal terms.

Word order in Mùwe Ké assists in the management of speech in things like questions where the requested information and its manifestation are found in preverbal position, which also forms a connection between the utterances. The overlapping of content in successive utterances with given before new also assists in the highlighting of their connection as well as the underscoring of the new. This ordering of presentation induces a desired sequence of access, directing the hearer's order of conception. Content that has been packaged into units related to given and new, therefore, are ordered accordingly. Each of these functions represent interconnected mechanisms for the management of discourse and the 'smooth running' of communication.

That which was previously dubbed as verum focus showed a startling difference in terms of the underlying processes when compared to other preconceived focus domains. The description of verum features depends on the relationship between baseline/elaboration

organisation and a cognitive model of reality plus the underlying process of interactive grounding. Rather than simply being focus on the truth value, the place of the occurrence within interlocutors' reality is brought onstage as something that speaker and hearer may actively negotiate and interactively ground together with shared communicative intent. This interaction is conventionally signalled and initiated in Mùwe Ké though heavy prosody, verb repetition and the *V-na V* construction. Their use may be employed for a back and forth that continues potentially *ad infinitum* and it is only when a consensus is reached that the occurrence, or its negative polarity, is interactively grounded in a shared propositional reality.

A preconceived notion of focus sees the lumping of a 'verum focus' with other types of focus such as predicate or term. Looking at the underlying cognitive process, however, shows striking differences, not least in the interaction of interlocutors. What is very interesting, however, is that the process underlying a preconceived notion of contrast involves interactive grounding in much the same way as verum.

Grounding may be either nominal or clausal. Nominal grounding directs attention to a discourse referent while clausal grounding situates an occurrence within reality. Interactive clausal grounding is the interactive negotiation of the polarity of the occurrence, whether it has a place within reality or not, and this is seen with verum-type utterances. Similarly, interactive nominal grounding is the interactive negotiation of an element within an occurrence; its taking place is not questioned and the occurrence is grounded in reality. What is subject for negotiation, however, is, for example, a participant or other nominal. The 'correct' participant in an occurrence, within the speaker's version of propositional reality, is brought onstage as something to be negotiated and interactively grounded together with the hearer with shared communicative intent. This interaction is conventionally signalled in Mùwe Ké with heavy prosody, word ordering, and, if the participant is an actor, the obligatory use of *-gane*. Again, once a consensus is reached, the participant is interactively grounded in a shared propositional reality.

Returning to *-gane* and word ordering, to say that they are manifestation of 'focus' is to ignore the very different underlying cognitive processes that occur at varying levels. While the investigation presented in this thesis is not meant to be an exhaustive list of processes that may be associated with the traditional notion of focus, it has been shown that the processes of grounding and highlighting are different to those involved in interactive grounding within a

model of reality. To label *-gane*, for example, as a marker of focus as alternatives is to ignore these differences.

To conclude, the main findings of the thesis in reference to the research questions posed show that there is no category of focus in Mùwe Ké that is simply realised through different structural means since focus as alternatives (or any other definition of focus given in the literature) fails to account for the underlying processes found in relation to the hitherto assumed reflexes of IS in the language, thereby agreeing with Matić and Wedgwood (2013). Agreement is also found with Matić and Nikolaeva (2018) in that verum focus is not a distinct denotation that is contributed by the dedicated grammatical structures presented for Mùwe Ké but rather that the processes involved represent a set of resemblances unified in their communicative intentions: to draw an interlocutors attention towards an occurrence with the goal of negotiating its polarity and grounding it interactively, which is a fuzzy set of family resemblances that may be easily extended to the processes underlying so-called contrastive statements. Finally, in the search for the primitive functions of *-gane* and word ordering after Ozerov (2018), it was shown that the former points out an actor as the specific source of an action and the latter induces an order of inception, both expressing concepts of discourse structure and interactional aspects of communication and attention management rather than having a direct connection to any preconceived IS category such as focus.

7.2   Contribution to the Field and Further Questions

This section discusses the contribution of this thesis to the field of TB studies and the content and typology of IS before looking at the important role that Cognitive Grammar played in the analysis of focal effects. These are presented in turn and include suggestions for future research.

7.2.1   Tibeto-Burman Studies

This thesis provided a sketch grammar of a previously undescribed Tibetic language which had only received cursory examination of vocabulary and phonology (e.g. Watters 2002) and therefore addresses the need for a description of Mùwe Ké for TB linguistics and the language community alike.

The thesis also presents the expression of IS in the language from a full and comprehensive analysis through the completion of the Questionnaire on Information Structure (QUIS) (Skopeteas et al. 2006). Even through the notion of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category is ultimately refuted, the interaction of reflexes like DAM and word ordering with information update are presented and may be utilised for each side of the argument.

DAM is a pervasive theme in TB language studies and its pragmatic use has been of interest since the early nineties. The discussion of focus aside, the differential use of Mùwe Ké ergative marking was shown to have a clear correlation with focussed items, where its use is obligatory, in term and predicate focus domains as well as with contrasted elements. This was later shown to rather be a highlighting effect; the primitive function of ergative *-gane*, which appears to have replaced the old Tibetan ergative marker *-gi*, is one of grounding a specific profiled referent as the source of the action. Over time, its use has become entrenched within the language community with discursive functions centred around the highlighting of actors with large overlap with the semantic functions of IS but to which they are not solely confined.

Word ordering was also presented after the QUIS and a preverbal position was found to be clearly preferable for items associated with the notion of focus. Whether the notion of focus as a category is taken or not, word ordering in the language clearly correlates with the update of information and shows a strong given-before-new preference. The freedom of word order, excluding the sentence-final verb requirement, allows for the manipulation of the order of presentation according to a speaker's wishes regarding the order of inception. This is a factor in all language but the relative liberty of word order in TB languages allows for greater numbers of possible variants relating to the mental journey that the speaker wishes the hearer to take.

Further to these two main IS reflexes, topic markers and emphatic prosody were also found to be associated with information update. The topic marker *-ni* finds use similar to that found in other TB languages, with a prototypical 'as for *x*' usage. Heavy prosody in terms of pitch and intensity was found to delineate contrastive utterances with those with 'regular' focus as well as signalling verum/polarity focus.

In terms of future research, ergative marking and case marking in general warrant further investigation. Case markers, like all grammatical morphemes, have traditionally been said to lack any semantic content and to function purely to express grammatical notions like case, number or tense (e.g. Van Valin 2001: 16) or more specifically, case markers as morphological

markers to represent how sentence elements function syntactically with reference to their grammatical relations, which may be separated from thematic relations due to their lack of meaning (e.g. Carnie 2013: 336). However, Cognitive Grammar has always accommodated construal into a conceptualist semantics, showing the integral meaningfulness of grammar (Wierzbicka 1988; Talmy 2000a; Talmy 2000b; Langacker 2008: 6), and it has been demonstrated here the ergative -*gane* marker provides a great deal of semantic content in its highlighting or drawing of attention, albeit schematically. Kumashiro (2016), for example, observes how case markers have differing coding effects in Japanese. The primitive functions of case markers in and across TB languages, therefore, would provide a variety of underlying cognitive processes in their attested usage contexts.

Word ordering in Mùwe Ké, TB and language in general would provide insight into the semantic functions that compete for its exploitation in and across language. Word order is always of import not least because it prescribes the order of inception for an interlocutor: the path goes from the market to the mountain or from the mountain to the market provide a different mental journey or scanning route and this may be manipulated for, as seen in Mùwe Ké, concepts such as given and new, providing some kind of highlighting, prominence or importance to the new information. Thetic sentences in TB languages seem to allow for freedom of word order save for the sentence-final verb and it would be interesting to investigate whether items in a given context that are personally or culturally considered more important either in general or to a certain situation are placed later in the utterance. Is a scene usually set before getting to the important information, for example? This would reveal not only a given-before-new preference but also some kind of lower to higher importance ordering. This is of course just one underlying cognitive preference, which is sure to be dependent on societal norms and conventionalised attitudes; other semantic functions are sure to present themselves from language to language providing insight into how word order may be used to order inception.

Following from this, intonation units as currently active information or that which is being attended to may form part of interesting research. What are the limits to that which makes up a unit? Are there restrictions or preferences to the ordering within a unit? Furthermore, do the units themselves then follow the same ordering preferences and restrictions, and may they be manipulated in the same way as single items with regards to providing an interlocutor with an order of inception?

The rule of anticipation in TB languages is a common phenomenon where questioner anticipates an answer with the expected conjunct/disjunct and evidential form (§2.3.5). Further research into other sentence elements and how they may be anticipated would also help to shed light on underlying conventionalisations. Do grounding elements like -*gane* anticipate grounding? Does word ordering anticipate an order of inception? To what extent is this to manage speech and connect utterances as compared to any other semantic function that may come to light during such investigation?

Finally, referential density (RD) after Bickel (2003b) was looked at here only briefly in Mùwe Ké (§4.1). As Bickel concludes, however, it is quite likely that RD is not only a discourse property but may also expose more fundamental cognitive strategies. Speakers, in the reporting of an event, need to balance attention between the event's internal structure, i.e. the certain kind of activity that is being performed, and the participants that are involved. Low RD points to more attention being given to the event while high RD indicates a focus on the participants. The interactive grounding of 'verum' and 'contrast' saw that of occurrence and participant and therefore a study on the connection with RD and these two types of interactive grounding may be revealing according to the strategies they employ, in Mùwe Ké, TB and cross-linguistically.

7.2.2 The Content and Typology of IS

This thesis presents the reader with the option to take what they will. If the notion of focus as a stable cross-linguistic category is assumed, then Mùwe Ké focussed actors require ergative marking and all focussed (including contrastive) terms prefer the preverbal position. If, however, focus as a category is questioned and taken rather as a heuristic tool after Matić and Wedgwood (2013), and word order and ergative marking are looked at broadly within the language, taking all of their uses into account, considered through the conceptual framework of Cognitive Grammar (e.g. Langacker 2008; 2017a), that makes decisions about the nature of language and the concepts that help to explain it at a pre-theoretical stage while providing an abundant pool of cognitively inspired notational tools fit for language analysis, then the interactional, intersubjective and discourse-structuring aspects (after Ozerov 2018) of word ordering and DEM in Mùwe Ké (as well as their epiphenomenal IS effects) may also be demonstrated, resulting in a much more enlightening description, which adds to the understanding of cross-linguistic factors that "participate in, shape and govern the dynamic

interactional process of information flow and the management of interlocutors' shared knowledge and attention in discourse," (Ozerov 2018: 94).

For example and as demonstrated, instead of taking *-gane* in Mùwe Ké as an ergative/instrumental marker (§2.2.7.2) and some kind of focus device, it is preferable to class it as an indicator of a specific interlocutor-oriented move (after Ozerov 2018: 91) that may be informally paraphrased as "(Hey!/Wait!/No!) This is the specific source of the action." Similarly, there is no evidence that the immediately preverbal position in Mùwe Ké is a dedicated information-structural/focal position but rather that word order, being a limited resource, sees semantic functions, like those implemented by discursive groupings under Langacker's (2017a: 277) five broad headings, competing for its exploitation.

While Matić and Wedgwood (2013) discuss the status of focus as a cross-linguistic category, this thesis is unable to draw any conclusions in regard to the universality of focus or its status as a cross-linguistic category since it is based only on one language. This does not preclude, however, the usefulness of a notion of focus as a (heuristic) tool for the description of individual grammars, as in Haspelmath's (2010) discussion of the relation between descriptive categories used in the description of a language and comparative concepts or universal categories as properties of human language in general.

This thesis has argued against the notion of focus as a category in Mùwe Ké and with future research, using focus as a heuristic tool as performed here, the findings may prove to have cross-linguistic relevance, suggesting that focus may be an interpretative category.

Finally, in principle, future research into prosody may reveal a category of focus in Mùwe Ké leading to a modification of the argument put forward here but falls outside the scope of this thesis.

7.2.3   The Role of Cognitive Grammar

Cognitive Grammar in the investigation of the underlying cognitive processes associated with focus and information update has proved to be instrumental and invaluable and has allowed for a clear formulation (and formulisation) of (some of) the associated interpretive focal effects.

The *-gane* marker, for example, was shown to be an entrenched unit providing a means of symbolic expression. When the cooperative endeavour of speaker and hearer as offstage

subjects of conception apprehending the situation being described with respect to the ground was taken into account, the use of -*gane* is one that assists in profiling an actor, intersubjectively focussing attention through symbolisation, as well as grounding it to show the epistemic status of the actor in relation to the interlocutors. This was able to be illustrated with the moving window metaphor, which maps the part of interlocutor's mental universe that is under discussion, including the currently active areas of a descriptive target (DT).

The moving window metaphor also shows that there is nearly always some overlapping of content and reflects the view that language structure is dynamic, interactive and contextually grounded, and explicitly how the order of presentation induces the sequence of access. It allows for the emergence of an expression from a substrate that includes the interactive context, expressions that came prior plus the currently active areas of DT. The DT may therefore be separated into overlapping 'chunks' of language for the purpose of expression and Mùwe Ké word order appears to represent this directly with overlapping parts presented first in an utterance, preceding any update to DT, which, coupled with the hard verb-final requirement in the language leaves the preverbal position as the available place for the intersubjective focussing of attention towards the new content being placed onstage to achieve a measure of alignment between interlocutors. Overlapping content is frequently the subject of ellipsis in Mùwe Ké, taken in Cognitive Grammar not to involve deletion but rather as a matter of selective description according to the discourse context (Langacker 2012b). Such series of clauses, with the preference of 'given' terms before 'new', represent a productive discourse construction conflating other constructions related to turn taking, prosodic packaging, selective description, IS and clause-internal grammar.

Turning to so-called verum focus, the Cognitive Grammar notions of baseline and elaboration (Langacker 2016), the latter being the operation that maps the former onto a higher-level structure (§5.2.4), as well as Langacker's (2019) definition of reality, that finds its foundation in human experience as reflected in language structure, show how a proposition expressed through a finite clause may become the subject of negotiation for interlocutors through the act of interactive grounding, in which polarity may become the focus of attention for speaker and hearer and therefore something to be negotiated. The introduction of a shared intersubjective propositional reality (PR_I) allows for the modelling of the goal of such interaction: whether or not a proposition should be present in an updated account of PR_I. Here speakers naturally advocate their own position and while this involves drawing (or focussing) their interlocutor's

attention, it involves no notion of focus in the sense discussed in §3.2. A speaker's advocacy, and indeed the strength of its force, form part of a schematic characterisation that stands a good chance of having universal status. The abstract concept of clausal grounding as signifying the epistemic status of occurrences embodies a fundamental semantic function, the structural implementation of which can vary vastly cross-linguistically, as well as providing a common cognitive basis for verum/polarity-type interactions (as advocated by Matić & Nikolaeva 2018). Furthermore, the process of interactive grounding is also found with so-called contrastive utterances, where interlocutors, rather than negotiating the existence of an occurrence with reality, negotiate one of its participants or other non-verbal element.

In short, the study of IS and perhaps standardised lines of linguistic enquiry in general may need a rethink. It appears that once a small line of enquiry is identified and a category is presented, blinkered efforts into its description and the quest for the best theory take away from the wider goals of linguistics as the scientific study of language that seeks to describe human language. When the lid is lifted and underlying processes are examined the limitations of narrow investigations are clear. It is these underlying processes that can provide fruitful typological research, uniting languages through common cognitive human processes and fundamental semantic functions. While, from this researchers experience, Cognitive Grammar and the wider cognitive-linguistic enterprise is largely criticised and said to be a lot of conceptual machinery for relatively few empirical insights, I conjecture that, as demonstrated here with IS, it is the perfect place to start and that through the adoption of a cognitive-grammatical perspective, convincing empirical generalisations may be made.

Matić and Wedgwood (2013) put forward the idea that the notion of focus should be used as a heuristic tool to recognise how languages employ certain structural patterns, through rather diverse mechanisms, to produce related pragmatic effects but have not suggested a specific grammatical theory, which has been advanced here through the framework of Cognitive Grammar. This is an important contribution of this thesis since it is (to my knowledge) the first application of a very concrete and elaborate grammatical framework to the ideas developed by Matić and Wedgewood (2013; and also Matić & Nikolaeva 2018; Ozerov 2018) and the first time their ideas have been formulated in a grammatical framework. The result, if I may say, is really rather elaborate.

Cognitive Grammar does not claim or aim to be a self-contained formal model (Langacker 2017a: 283) but seeks rather to provide a coherent conceptual framework that is capable of

supporting an integrated and comprehensive account of language structure. The framework should ideally provide an array of descriptive notions that allow for a reasonably explicit and principled characterisation of the complete range of structures found in natural language. Simultaneously, these structures should be related to the countless factors that give rise to them: social interaction, language change, acquisition, processing etc. While a good foundation has been laid, the requisite synthesis is still a work in progress and therefore contributions that come about through empirical research such as that presented in this thesis can only help to assist the progress and bolster the framework.

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Appendix

Copula forms

affirmative	negative	interrogative without pronoun	interrogative with pronoun	negative interrogative
ìn	*màn*	*ìn-e*	*ìn-a*	*màn-e*
dàk	–	–	–	–
òt	*mèt*	*òr-e*	*òr-a*	*mèr-e*
dùk	*mìn-duk*	*dù-e*	*dù-a*	*mìn-du-e*

Tense/aspect auxiliaries

Imperfective (present-future/negative verb stem)

affirmative	negative	interrogative without pronoun	interrogative with pronoun	negative interrogative
V-gi-ot	*mì-V.NEG-ot*	*V-gi-or-e*	*V-gi-or-a*	*mì-V.NEG-or-e*
V-gi-duk	*mì-V.NEG-duk*	*V-gi-du-e*	*V-gi-du-a*	*mì-V.NEG-du-e*

Future (present-future/negative verb stem)

affirmative	negative	interrogative without pronoun	interrogative with pronoun	negative interrogative
V-gen ìn/dàk	*mì-V.NEG*	*V-gen ìn-e*	*V-gen ìn-a*	*mì-V.NEG-e* *mì-V-gen ìn-e*
V-dʒi ìn/dàk	*V-dʒi màn*	*V-dʒi ìn-e*	*V-dʒi ìn-a*	*V-dʒi màn-e*
V-dʒoŋ	–	–	–	–

Perfective (past verb stem)

affirmative	negative	interrogative without pronoun	interrogative with pronoun	negative interrogative
V	*mà-V*	*V-e*	*V-a*	*mà-V-e*
V-s(oŋ)	*mà-V-s(oŋ)*	*V-s-e*	*V-s-a*	*mà-V-s-e*

Perfect (past verb stem)

affirmative	negative	interrogative without pronoun	interrogative with pronoun	negative interrogative
V-ot	*mà-V-ot*	*V-or-e*	*V-or-a*	*mà-V-or-e*
V-duk	*mà-V-duk*	*V-du-e*	*V-du-a*	*mà-V-du-e*
V-met	–	–	–	–
V-min-duk	–	–	–	–

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